

SUMMA THEOLOGIAE

PRIMA PARS

Volume 2

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PRIMA PARS

with the Commentary of Cardinal Cajetan

Volume 2

On the Holy Trinity and Creation in General

QQ 27-74

**Thomas Aquinas and Thomas de Vio
Cajetan**

Translated by William H. Marshner



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To the martyrs of Magadan:
Orent pro nobis

Translator's Preface

Sixty years ago, when Thomism was still the mandated pedagogy in Roman seminaries, and a theologian's career could depend on whether his published works were *ad mentem divi Thomae*, the relevance of a book like this, to a particular clerical public, would have been obvious (and its author would have been "profiled" by rival factions). Today, happily, we are in a different climate.

The thought of Aquinas is no longer the party platform of any denomination, nor the exclusive property of any "school." Serious thinkers from many churches (and none) have found new reasons to be interested in the 13th century genius who came to be called the Angelic Doctor. His account of knowledge has been retrieved by Alvin Plantinga (*Warrant and Proper Function*). His account of analogy has been studied searchingly by Richard Swinburne (*The Coherence of Theism*). His account of freedom has been defended by Linda Zagzebski (*The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge*). The philosophical aspects of his thought on God and creation have received a volume each from the late Norman Kretzmann (*The Metaphysics of Theism* and *The Metaphysics of Creation*).

Until about 70 years ago, it was universally agreed that, when one tried to read Aquinas, the commentaries written just before the Reformation by a Dominican cardinal, Thomas de Vio, called Cajetan, were the indispensable aids to doing so. They certainly shed decisive light on the famous topics just mentioned. But they also put Aquinas's work into dialogue with the intellectual innovators who came after him: the Scotists, Nominalists, Latin Averroists, and revived Augustinians. It is not surprising, then, that for five hundred years, the rising generation of Dominican friars was trained by reading through the *Summa* article-by-article with these commentaries in hand. Early printed editions of the *Summa* typically included them in a Talmudic arrangement, as marginal text running around each article by Aquinas. Their importance was reaffirmed late in the 19th Century, when Leo XIII ordered Cajetan's commentaries to be included in the critical "Leonine" edition of Aquinas's works.

No English translation of the *Summa* has ever imitated this example. Hence the first and principal reason for the present work: to make Cajetan's help available to the modern reader.

What happened about 70 years ago was that the neo-scholastic revival brought into prominence a handful of scholars who had become critics of Cajetan on particular points. One such was Étienne Gilson, according to whom Cajetan never understood the originality in Aquinas' philosophy of existence. Another was Henri de Lubac, SJ, according to whom Cajetan never understood the lack of originality (nay, the Augustinian conservatism) in Aquinas's theology of nature and grace. The pre-Reformation Cardinal was too much of an Aristotelian, said the latter. No, he was half a humanist, said the former. Whatever the merits of these complaints, the commentaries came under a cloud; reliance on them went out of fashion.

Hence a second reason for the present work: to put the controversial texts under the eyes of readers who can judge for themselves the rights and wrongs of the case.

There is a third reason for it, too, which takes a bit of explaining. In Anglo-American analytical philosophy, the second half of the 1960s saw logical positivism killed off and replaced by views more friendly to the cognitive significance of metaphysical claims. One of the principal reasons was the discovery by Jaakko Hintikka and Saul Kripke of formal models for systems of modal logic. This kind of logic, neglected since the Middle Ages, overlooked by Russell, but revived by C. I. Lewis, was the kind that captured claims about necessity and possibility (among other topics). In a modal predicate logic, one could distinguish between the properties a thing had to have (if it was to exist or belong to a certain kind) and those it might have but did not need. So when Hintikka's and Kripke's models made modal logic respectable again, a broad array of traditional topics came back to life as well: natural kinds, essential traits, accidents, real existence, physical (as opposed to logical) necessity, even the talk of a necessary being. A return to metaphysics was thus in order, and it has been executed with persuasive grace by many analytical philosophers. It is crucial to add that they have made the return without sacrificing the fruits of the "linguistic turn" earlier in the 20th Century. The result has been a new intellectual context within which to read Aquinas' works, and a new set of tools with which to interpret them. Since something called "analytical Thomism" has already appeared, the time is decidedly ripe for an analytically inspired translation of the main Thomistic texts.

Of course, boasts of new tools and contexts are often hollow. Contexts are not always helpful, and

'tools' is a dubious metaphor. German idealism was once a highly touted context in which to read earlier philosophy, and one shudders at the thought of what will be done with "tools" borrowed from post-modern Frenchmen. But it is a provable matter of fact that, in order to read Aquinas well, one needs certain assets which the neo-scholastic revival did not revive, but which analytical philosophy has cultivated. One needs

- a philosophy of language that keeps the sense of a word distinct from its reference and keeps extensional contexts distinct from opaque ones
- a palette of logics that includes second order quantification (so as to say what "there is" in all the categories, to accommodate an analogy of being) and multiple modalities (so as to distinguish alethic, temporal, epistemic, and deontic modal claims), and
- a philosophy of science that keeps scientific accounts of things (*rationes*) distinct from the everyday notions embodied in ordinary-language and keeps them equally distinct from the topics of cognitive psychology (such as concepts).

Well, a reader who has these assets quickly discovers that they are very nearly (and sometimes precisely) the ones that Cajetan had. Hence the third reason for the present work: to let people see how far the *Summa* read with Cajetan's commentaries is "analytical Thomism."

With these goals in mind, the translation policy of the present effort has been simple: to secure the clearest good English that is consistent with fidelity to the technical force of the original. This has resulted in seven sub-policies:

- (1) to keep the English good by making the Bible sound like the Bible, the way the Old Itala of his Psalter and the Vulgate sounded to Aquinas: archaic and beautiful; in English, one achieves this by using the Authorized Version or, where needed, the Douay;
- (2) to avoid latinisms by giving important words their real translations; '*quaestio*', for example, did not mean 'a question' but 'an inquiry'; '*perfectio*', did not mean 'perfection' but the finished state of a thing, or a property contributing to its completeness; '*proprius*' did not mean 'proper' but 'distinctive' or, in semantic contexts, 'literal'; '*simpliciter*' did not mean 'simply' but 'unqualifiedly'; '*absolutē*' meant 'independently [of further considerations]'; '*adaequatus*' meant 'equivalent', not 'adequate', etc.;¹
- (3) to relieve the monotony of impersonal, passive constructions by turning verbs into the active voice, so that '*ut dictum est*' can become 'as I said above', etc.;
- (4) to avoid abstract nouns which have drifted off into collective or concrete meanings, the way 'humanity' has come to be a name for the race, and both 'deity' and 'divinity' have come to be names for God or a god; I apologize for the resulting neologisms like 'humanness' and 'divineness';
- (5) to follow a spelling reform common in recent philosophy; when talking about volitional matters, I continue to spell 'intention' and 'intentional' in the traditional way; but when talking about the forms and objects involved in cognition, I spell them with an 's': 'intension' and 'intensional';
- (6) to make consistent use of single quotes to indicate that a word or phrase is under discussion, *i.e.* being mentioned, not being used for what it (usually) stands for;
- (7) to make a judicious use of certain conventions pioneered by analytical philosophers where clarity recommends them. These include the occasional use of individual variables (like x and y) or predicate variables (like ϕ and ψ).

Of course, no defensible policy will turn a scholastic disputation into easy-going English prose.² Some parts of what follows are going to remain difficult, no matter what the translator does to smooth

¹ These Latinisms are the fatal flaw of the old English Dominican translation, published originally by Benziger Brothers, then republished by Christian Classics, and now gaining ubiquity due to its free availability online.

² The new Blackfriars translation (published by McGraw Hill) reads splendidly as English, but it misses important technical points where exactitude counts. Some of these are points where Aquinas's philosophy of science is at stake, because the Latin features the crucial *ratio*-idiom (*ratio* followed by a substantive in the genitive case); others are points where his philosophy of language is at stake, because the Latin features key terms in medieval semantic theory; others are points where his analysis of relations is at stake, or his epistemology. If one handles these things poorly, one can translate Aquinas only fuzzily, and one cannot translate Cajetan at all. One also misses one's opportunities to connect Thomas' statements with today's debates.

things along. One can only hope that other parts, which the reader finds accessible, will be rewarding enough to motivate patient perusal of the rough bits.

One more word: my policy in footnotes has been to acknowledge what empirical science has made obsolete in the work of St. Thomas but also to make clear how much today's science would have saved him useless labor.

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A number of individuals need to be thanked for the guidance they gave to a not always tractable pupil. The foremost among these are the late Prof. Frederick D. Wilhelmsen, who first gave me a taste for Thomism, the late Prof. William E. May, who directed my dissertations, and the late Prof. Germain Grisez, who deserves to be better known as the real pioneer of analytical Thomism. Thanks also to Fr. Romanus Cesario, OP, who teaches virtue-theory while exhibiting its subject matter, and Prof. Patrick Lee, who was kind enough to raise some sharp objections. The late Prof. Damien Fedoryka, during his tenure as president of Christendom college where I teach, provided financial support, and a subsequent president Dr. Timothy O'Donnell, not only granted a timely sabbatical but also extended needed financial support, including two paid years as a professor emeritus.

Others need to be thanked not for guidance but for indispensable aid. Many student amanuenses turned my dictation into soft copy, most recently Mr. Charles Fuller. They came from a talent pool recruited by Profs. Eric Jenislawski and Matthew Tsakanikis, who shared the sense of urgency made evident to me by the irreversible effects of senectude. My family is to be thanked for affectionate patience and unflagging encouragement, especially my wife of 50 years, the political activist and Celtic scholar, Connaught Coyne Marshner.

William H. Marshner

Features of the Text and its Layout

Margins

The left and right margins are used for short notes, to spare the reader's eye from continually jumping to the bottom of the page. These short notes are of two kinds. The first completes a citation begun in the text (as in the Leonine edition). The second kind, marked with a printer's symbol (*, †, ‡, *etc.*) displays the original Latin term or phrase in a case where the reader needs to see it, because it is an important technical term or because I am giving it a less than obvious translation.

Footnotes

All the footnotes in this work are marked with superscripted numbers, and they have the status of translator's notes. I have inserted them either to make connections with current debates or to obviate difficulties for someone who is philosophically literate but not trained in matters medieval.

Sub-headings

In all the longer commentaries, translator's sub-headings have been inserted. For in a typical commentary, Cajetan first clarifies the issue, then lists the jobs done by Aquinas in that article, then begins a job-by-job analysis. But he breaks off to handle any problem or controversy attaching to how Aquinas did the job in question. As this interruption can be quite lengthy, involving simultaneous polemics against many parties, Cajetan's longer commentaries are quite hard to follow without a device that lets the reader know which party is being debated, when an interruption is finished, and when the job-by-job analysis is being resumed. Sub-headings serve this purpose.

Square brackets

Square brackets enclose material added by the translator, usually to fill-in where the text is elliptical.

By contrast, ordinary parentheses are just punctuation marks for translated text, so that the material inside them is not to be taken as coming from the translator/editor but as part of the original.

Angle brackets

Angle brackets indicate a textual problem. In Aquinas' text, they enclose a word or phrase that translates what was reckoned as a genuine part of the text, either in Cajetan's copy or in the Leonine edition, but which is no longer reckoned genuine in the New Blackfriars edition. They may also enclose a textual amendment recommended by the translator, especially in a commentary.

Sigla

CG = *Summa Contra Gentiles*; the book number is prefixed, and the chapter number follows, as in 2 *CG* c. 16

Denz = Denzinger-Hünemann, *Enchiridion Symbolorum, etc.*, 43rd edition..

In + title = A commentary on the book with that title; thus *In I Sent.* indicates a commentary (by Aquinas unless otherwise indicated) on the first of the *Libri Sententiarum*. *In Boethii de Trinitate* indicates a commentary on Boethius' *De Trinitate. Etc.*

PG = Migne, *Patrologia Graeca* (cited by volume number and column number)

PL = Migne, *Patrologia Latina* (likewise cited by volume and column)


I Sent.,

II Sent., = Book I (II, *etc.*) of the *Quatuor Libri Sententiarum* of Peter Lombard
etc.

ST = Aquinas' *Summa Theologiae*. The part number is prefixed, and the *quaestio* and article numbers follow in that order. Thus 2/2 *ST* 5, 4 indicates the *Secunda Secundae* q. 5, a. 4.

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Inquiry Twenty-Seven: Into the processions of divine Persons

After considering the topics belonging to God's oneness in essence, it remains to take up those that pertain to the threeness of Persons in God. Since divine Persons are distinguished from one another by their relations of origin, an orderly exposition should deal first with their origination or "procession" [q.27], then with the relations of origin [q.28], and thirdly with the Persons [qq.29ff]. Concerning procession, five questions are asked:

- (1) is there procession within God?
- (2) can any procession in God be called a generation?
- (3) besides generation, can there be any other procession in God?
- (4) can the other procession be called a generation, too?
- (5) are there just two processions in God?

article I

Is there procession within God?

In I Sent. d.13, a.1, 4 CG cc.7, 11, Compend. Theol. c.52; De Potentia Dei, q.10, aa.1-2

It seems that there cannot be procession in God.

(1) After all, 'procession' means an outward movement. In God, nothing can move, and nothing is "outside" anything else. Therefore, nothing proceeds in Him either.

(2) Besides, everything that "proceeds" is different from what it proceeds from. But in God there is no diversity, just utter simplicity. Ergo there is no procession in God.

(3) Moreover, proceeding from something else conflicts visibly with what it takes to be a *first source* [*primum principium*]. God is a first source, as shown above. So there is no room for a "God" who proceeds.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what the Lord says in John 8:42, "I proceeded forth and came from God."

ANSWER: when holy Scripture speaks of the divine reality, it uses terms that pertain to proceeding. But this language has been construed differently by different writers. Some have taken it to mean the proceeding whereby an effect comes forth from its cause. This is how Arius took it, saying that the Son proceeds from the Father as the first creature, and that the Holy Spirit proceeds from Father and Son as the creature of both. — On that construal, neither the Son nor the Holy Spirit would be true God. This goes against what is said of the Son in 1 John 5:20 ("that we may be in Him that is the true Son, Jesus Christ; this is the true God") and against what is said of the Holy Spirit in 1 Corinthians 6:19 ("know ye not that your body is the temple of the Holy Ghost?"); only God has a temple.

Other writers have taken it to mean the proceeding whereby a cause is said to go forth into its effect, inducing a change in it or putting its stamp on it. This is how Sabellius took it. He said God the Father was called the "Son" because He entered flesh from the Virgin and was

called the "Spirit" because He sanctified a rational creature and moved it to eternal life. — But this is against the Lord's saying in John 5:19 ("The Son can do nothing of Himself") and many other verses showing that the Father is not *who* the Son is.

If one looks at the matter thoughtfully, both these parties took 'proceeding' to mean heading out* from God, and so neither posited a procession *within* God. But any proceeding goes with some action; and so, just as there is outward proceeding with action headed toward outside matter, so also there is inward[†] proceeding with action that remains within the agent. The clearest case of this is in the intellect (whose action, understanding, remains within the thinker); for when anyone understands, by the very fact that he is understanding, there is something proceeding within him, a conception of the thing understood, arising from his intellectual faculty and an initial awareness[‡] of that thing. This conception is called an inner word[§] and is what a spoken word carries as its meaning.[¶]

Since God is the highest of all beings, words applied to God should not be taken in the sense suggested by lower creatures (bodies), but in that suggested by the highest of them, intellectual substances (and a likeness drawn even from these falls short of representing the divine reality). So "procession" should not be taken as local motion found among bodies, nor as a cause's acting on an effect outside itself, like heat going from the heater to the heated; rather, it should be taken as mental emanation, as a mental word proceeds from a speaker but remains in him. Also, this is the sense in which the Catholic faith posits procession in God.

[†] The "inner word" is not imaginary speech but a concept. The Stoics called this word *enclathetic* (in contrast with spoken, *prophoric*, words), and the Apostolic Fathers saw that it could explain how the Son is called the Word in John 1:1.

* *ad extra*

† *ad intra*

‡ *notitia*

§ *verbum cordis*

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): that objection uses ‘procession’ for local motion or for what arises from action headed towards outside matter or an outside effect; that sort of procession is not in the divine reality, as I said.

ad (2): what proceeds in an *outward* procession has to be diverse from what it proceeds from. What proceeds inwardly in a mental proceeding does not have to be diverse; indeed, the more perfectly it proceeds, the more it is one [in nature] with its source. After all, the more a thing is understood, the more deeply its conception is within the mind understanding, and the more fully the conception is one with it; for thanks to its act of understanding, the intellect becomes one with the thing understood. Therefore, since the divine act of understanding is at the very apex of perfection (as I have said above), the

divine inner word has to be perfectly one [in nature] with its source, without any diversity.²

ad (3): to proceed from a source as a thing extraneous and diverse conflicts with what it takes to be a first source; but to proceed from a source mentally, as within it and not diverse from it, is included in what it takes to be a first source. After all, when we call a builder the source of a house, his conception of his art is included in what it takes for him to be the house’s source — and it would be included in what it took for him to be its *first* source, if he were its first. Well, God, who is the first source of things, stands to created things as a builder stands to his buildings.

² The known becomes one with the knower; so in God’s self-knowing, the self-concept is one with God.

Cajetan’s Commentary

The order in which topics will be taken up in this treatise is made clear enough in the text. So, notice first that the word ‘procession’ in the opening article’s title-question is to be taken broadly; the issue is not yet this or that sort of procession. Second, the word ‘is’ in the title should be taken in its strong sense, contrasting with ‘is understood’; we are asking whether in the *real* there is procession in God, not in *our account* [i.e., not just in our way of thinking and describing Him]. Third, the word ‘within’ is to be taken in its strong sense, meaning a way of being “in” something form-wise [rather than virtually]. Fourth, the word ‘God’ is to be taken most strictly, to mean what is really God. So the sense of the question is this: Is any kind of procession found form-wise in God Himself in the real?

Analysis of the article

ii. In the body of the article, Aquinas does three jobs: (1) he answers the question as regards what was clear, (2) he deals with two mistakes regarding what was not clear, and (3) he answers the question by settling and expounding what was not clear.

iii. In job (1), he makes the uncontroverted statement that, when Scripture speaks of God, it uses terms indicating procession. Given that Scripture says nothing false and is not speaking figuratively in these passages, it follows that some procession must exist and be realized in God. But it remains unclear what sort of procession this should be. So the rest of the article deals with this problem.

iv. In job (2), Aquinas first lays out the mistake of Arius, who said this “procession” was one of effects from their cause. This is reproved with authoritative texts from Scripture. Then he lays out the mistake of Sabellius, who explained this “procession” in terms of the divine cause going forth into its effects. This is reproved the same way. St. Thomas’ handling of the two mistakes is very brief here, because he had treated and refuted them at greater length elsewhere, in 4 CG.

cc 5ff

v. In job (3), he says three things. First, to prepare for a distinction he will draw later between two sorts of procession, he exposes the blind-spot common to both mistakes. Both tried to salvage procession in God, but when looked at closely, neither succeeded in doing so. They put the procession outside God. Both posited only a procession *ad extra*.

Second, he says there are in fact two kinds of procession: *ad extra* and *ad intra*. This is shown as follows. There are two kinds of action, transitive and immanent; one kind of procession occurs with transitive action, another with immanent (any procession would occur with some sort of action). So there is a procession that occurs thanks to the action of understanding.* — Drawing this conclusion is justified as follows: a procession *ad intra*, i.e., occurring with an immanent action, is most obvious in the case of the intellect. Here is why: in one who understands something, by virtue of the very fact that he understands, a conception arises [*procedit*] within him — a conception of the thing understood. It arises from his intellectual faculty together with his initial awareness [*notitia*] of that thing. This conception is called the inner word,[†] which (among human beings) is conveyed by the outer, spoken word.[‡]

Third and last, he reaches the conclusion that answers the question: there is procession in God thanks to mental emanation.[§] He supports it thus. [*Antecedent:*] God is above all things; so [*1st inference:*] the items spoken of in God should be taken on the pattern of intellectual substances, not bodily ones; and so [*2nd inference:*] the procession spoken of in God does not occur thanks to action bearing upon an external effect but thanks to mental emanation. — He confirms the argument by observing that this is how the Catholic faith posits procession in God. — Drawing the first inference is supported on the ground that bodies are the lowest creatures, whereas intellects are the highest (although even these fall short of likeness to God). — The second inference is left as obvious by induction over cases of lo-

* *intelligere*

† *verbum cordis*

‡ *verbum vocalis*

§ *emanatio intelligibilis*

cal motion and qualitative change.

Doubt I

vi. Against what has been said above, many doubts have been raised.¹ Take the proposition that a procession *ad intra* occurs thanks to an immanent action.

Scotus, Aureol, Durandus, Peter of La Palu and the Carmelite Gerard [of Bologna] argue against this.² The gist of their argument follows. [*Antecedent*]: The difference between immanent and transitive action is that something is produced* by transitive action, nothing by the immanent kind; ergo [*inference*]: Aquinas' fundamental thesis on divine procession collapses. The antecedent, they argue, is clear from *Metaphysics IX*, as well as from *Ethics I*. Drawing the inference is then obvious. Durandus adds a confirming argument: nothing is produced from sensing and willing; ergo, nothing from intellection either. Gerard adds the argument that, whenever an operation yields a product, the latter is more noble than the operation itself; but nothing is more noble than an immanent second act; ergo it does not yield a product. These positions are documented in Capreolus on *I Sententiarum*, d.27, q.2 [a.2].[†]

* operatum

c. 8; 1050a 24
c. 1; 1094a 5

† as arguments
against his con-
clusion I

Doubt II

vii. Another doubt concerns the same proposition: is the immanent act itself the very producing of what is said to proceed with it? Scotus (*In I Sent.*, d.27, q.1) holds the negative and advances three arguments.

(1) For the reason already alleged [in § vi], namely, that an immanent operation is ultimate act.

(2) If intellection were an action productive of a terminus, it would be impossible to understand that action to exist and not understand its terminus to exist, as is clear in the case of calefaction and hotness. But it is not impossible to understand that intellection occurs without a terminus. Ergo.

(3) If Aquinas were right, understanding would beget the inner word instead of *memoria* [self-consciousness] doing it, which is against Augustine [*De Trin. IX*, c.10].

¹ To understand the upcoming *dubia*, the reader needs two pointers. (1) For the Thomists, the intellect had just one operation relevant to present purposes; it was called *intelligere*, if an inner *verbum* emerged, its emergence was internal to this operation, finishing the *intelligere* as its terminus and object. But (2) for Scotists and others, the intellect had two operations; one was *intelligere*, the other *dicere* (expressing); the former was immanent; the latter, transitive. Nothing proceeded in the *intelligere*; rather, the *intelligere* itself proceeded (was expressed in) the *dicere*. For Scotus, in short, the intellect first did its act of understanding and then expressed this act to itself; '*verbum*' referred to the *intelligere* as expressed.

² These were important theologians of the 14th century. John Duns Scotus, OFM (1265-1308) is too famous to need introduction. Peter Aureol, OFM (1280-1322) was introduced in fn. 3 on p. 490 above. William Durandus, OP, was born in Saint Pourçain; he advanced under two Avignon popes to occupy ultimately the see of Meaux, where he died in 1334 as a notorious controversialist, nominally a Thomist, but frequently dissenting. Peter of La Palu was another celebrated Dominican (died 1342), having been Master General and a high-level

Doubt III

viii. Another doubt arises about our proposition that in anyone who understands something, by the very fact that he is understanding, something is proceeding within him.

(1) For one thing, the blessed as such understand God but form no "inner word" about Him; so, the above proposition is false. The premise is clear; otherwise God, as object of beatific Vision, could be represented by a created likeness* — which is denied in q.12, a.2.

(2) For another thing, we know apart from faith that God understands, yet we cannot prove there is procession in Him. So, either this proposition is believed, not known, or else it is false.

* species

Doubt IV

ix. Against the same proposition, another doubt arises: is it true that the intellect's concept is *other* than the act of understanding itself (as the article suggests), or is it the same thing identically? Scotus holds the opposite from Aquinas on this, as do many others cited by Capreolus, *loc. cit.* But the opponents are divided four ways:

- (1) Some deny the very distinction between the concept and the act of understanding;
- (2) some deny the true reason for the distinction;
- (3) others deny not the true reason but a supposed one, namely, to represent or know more perfectly;
- (4) others argue by deducing an impossibility.

Scotus and Durandus try to break down the distinction itself by reason and authority. Scotus, writing on *I Sentences*, d.27, and reasoning by way of division, infers that the inner "word" is just the act of intellection itself. Since his quarrel with our view has been mentioned already [§ vii] we pass on to the others.

Durandus, in his commentary on the same text, argues as follows.

In I Sent. d.27,
q.2

(1) Being a word or concept of *x* lies in having what it takes to manifest *x* to oneself or to another; so, lest there be a progression to infinity, the first "word," which is the *verbum cordis*, is essentially manifestation itself — but this is actual intellection itself. Ergo [the conception = the act]. — And in confirmation: what has a property by extrinsic denomination is traced back to what has it intrinsically. So, since having what it takes to manifest belongs only extrinsically to an outer [spoken] word, a trace must be made back to something which is intrinsically manifestive by its essence. But this is actual intellection. Ergo as before.

(2) If an ability[†] requires two forms in order to operate but is given just one, it is still in "essential" potency, because it is in potency not only to its operation but also to a form. So if the inner word is made distinct, the intellect in first act will still be in essential potency.³

† virtus

diplomat for John XXII and Philip VI. Gerard of Bologna was a Prior General of the Carmelites. He died in 1317 famous for his piety.

³ The intellect "in first act" was the intellect equipped with a prerequisite for it to understand, *i.e.*, an impressed *species*. For the distinction between impressed *species* and concept (expressed *species*), see above, p. 298, fn. 2.

(3) In commenting on *I Sentences* d. 6, he argues that [if the inner word were somehow distinct from the very act of understanding.] two forms of the same species would be in the same subject.⁴

For the other arguments against the reason for, or the possibility of, this distinction, you can see every one in Capreolus, if you want to; but an easy solution to the lot will emerge from what I shall say below.

Doubt V

x. As to the proposition that a conception of the object understood arises from the intellective faculty together with the initial awareness it has [*notitia ejus*], a doubt arises as to what awareness is meant, habitual or actual. Durandus claims that the proposition is not verifiable by habitual awareness [provided by the impressed species] in his comments on *I Sent.* d.27, q.2, because the more perfect does not proceed from the less perfect. But the intellect with only one species is less perfect than the *verbum* or concept. Nor will it help to claim that, while the species is less perfect than the concept, the intellect-with-its-species is more perfect than the concept. This dodge comes to nothing. For (1) just as the producer is the intellect-with-species, so the produced is the intellect-with-*verbum*; and (2) the question about the quasi-formal source and terminus of a procession is which of *them* is more perfect; it is not about composites, as is clear case-by-case. But obviously the terminus or concept is more perfect than the [impressed] species. Ergo the [impressed] species is not the initial awareness from which the concept proceeds.

Meanwhile, a case that actual awareness is not the *notitia* in question is argued by Scotus in many ways; I omit the arguments because, as we shall see, they are not against us.

Answering doubt I

Refer back to § vi

xi. As to the first doubt: the difference between immanent and transitive action is not so drastic but is to be construed either (a) as a matter of the necessity of a product or (b) as a matter of the aim [*ordo*] involved.

* According to construal (a), the point is this: a transitive operation necessarily yields a thing-produced, but an immanent operation does not necessarily involve one. And thus all the objections collapse, as is obvious. This was clearly Aristotle's meaning, and it is certainly correct. For example, habits are generated from frequently repeated immanent acts; so it is clear that yielding a product other than itself does not conflict with an action's being immanent.

* According to construal (b), the point is this: the fact that a transitive action yields a product means that the action aims at* that product. In that sense, an immanent action has no "product" because it does not intrinsically aim at one; rather, if such an action has a product at all,

* *ordinatur ad*

⁴ In this argument, the subject would be the intellect; the two forms would be the impressed species of a thing *x* and the expressed species of the same *x*.

⁵ A transitive action is done for the sake of an effect outside the agent doing it. Thus a punch is thrown for the sake of a black

the product is aimed at it.

Both of these construals are relevant to the matter at hand. The act of understanding does not necessarily produce a concept; and when it does yield one, it is not aimed at the concept; on the contrary, the concept is aimed at the completion of the act. Thus our response to all the opposing arguments is clear. And *à propos* of Gerard's addition: the thing-produced is more noble when the operation is intrinsically aimed at it, but not when the reverse is the case, as we see with action and habit.⁶

Answering doubt II

xii. As to the second doubt: our opponents all seem to agree (except Durandus) that mental production of the "inner word" is an act of mental "speaking" [*dicere*]; where they differ is this: does *dicere* include the act of understanding in its own defining makeup, or does it include only the producing? (And never mind whether the producing is really another second act or just a relation signified after the fashion of a second act.) Scotus distinguishes two second acts in the intellect — the one its operating, the other a producing, such that *intelligere* is the operating, *dicere* is the producing; *vis-à-vis* their common source [intellect in first act], he orders these two second acts among themselves in such a way that the intellect is naturally operating before it is producing or "speaking." Thus for Scotus, to speak or produce the inner word is not the act of understanding, though it is an act of the intellect. These ideas appear in his remarks on *I Sent.*, d.2, q. ult.; on *I Sent.* d.27, q.1; and in his *Quodlibets*, q.1, a.3.

Refer back to § vii

That this position is unsatisfactory can be shown by a single argument *ad hominem* [that is, an argument borrowing a premise from the very person being argued against, in this case Scotus]. [*Major:*] A cause having two effects, so related that neither effect is the cause of the other, is such that the linkage of both to their cause is more essential than a linkage of either to the other — such that if *per impossibile* the first effect were suppressed, the connexion of the second to its cause would not have to be denied. But [*minor:*] the intellect in first act is like a cause having these two effects (*intelligere* and *dicere*) so related that neither is the cause of the other. So if *per impossibile* the *intelligere* were subtracted, it would not follow that the *dicere* was suppressed. And so this conditional sentence is possible:

if the intellect were not understanding, it would still be speaking.

But this involves a contradiction. What would it speak, if it were not considering anything? The major is Scotus' own (from *In II Sent.*, d.1, q.1, a.3), and the minor is

eye (or some other discomfort) in another.

⁶ The scholastics got from Aristotle several rules for assessing "nobility." The relevant one here had to do with purpose; it said that if *x* is for the sake of *y*, then *y* is nobler than *x*. So suppose an immanent action like thinking produces a habit, but the habit is for the sake of the action (its better performance), not the reverse; then the habit is not nobler than the action. Ditto for a concept.

also his (from the passages cited above); but the impossibility of the conclusion is clear.

q.34, a.1 ad 2,3;
In 1^a Sent d.27,
q.2, a.2, q.1^a

xiii. St. Thomas, on the other hand, holds in all his works that to “speak” [mentally] is to understand by expressing, or to express by understanding, so that both of these belong to its defining makeup. And if the words of this article are carefully considered, the act of understanding itself is the producing of the concept — leaving aside for now whether every act of understanding produces an inner word or not. For the text explicitly says that, through the immanent act which is *intelligere*, a concept or inner word proceeds. So for him there is no room for another operation, distinct from *intelligere*, that would be the producing of the concept. For if he intended another kind of operation, his whole reasoning process would fall apart.

Now two sets of objections are made against this position. One set holds that *intelligere* is not a productive operation. The other set holds that *dicere* [in God] is not *intelligere* [in God]. The first set is handled here; the second set (since they mix the Trinitarian identifier-terms* into the issue⁷) are solved below, in my comments on q. 34, where the inner Word [in God] is to be treated in detail. Here, however, we are still talking in general terms. And since we are at the beginning [of the treatise], it is acceptable to be lengthy, by Plato’s adage that it is easier to progress once the starting points have been discussed thoroughly.

* *notionalia*

xv. To Scotus’ first argument, then, our rejoinder is clear from what has been said already. An immanent operation is called, and is, an ultimate act; it does not necessarily produce a product; and if it does, that product is aimed at it rather than the other way about.

To his second argument [we rejoin]: an operation’s being productive of a terminus comes about in two ways — in one, necessarily, in the other, permissively. The conditional used by Scotus is not true in the case of an operation productive permissively, such as intellection, as already said in solving the first doubt.⁸

Answering doubt III

Refer back to § viii

xv. As to the third doubt, the ‘anyone’ quantifies over human beings in this life. The text aims to go from things seen in us to the unseen and incomprehensible things of God. *We* in understanding always form some concept, adequate or inadequate to [the intellect specified in] first act, complete or incomplete, etc. So there

⁷ The Trinitarian identifiers (*notionalia*) were terms that helped people understand the distinct Persons, but the correspondence of these terms to acts, traits, or relations really “there” in God was controversial. They are coming up in q.32.

⁸ Scotus’s third argument is not answered here. It was an appeal to the authority of Augustine, who had said that the *verbum* was begotten by *memoria*. Whether this conflicted with the doctrine of Aquinas depended on how Augustine’s vocabulary was to be lined up with that of Aristotle. Suffice it to say that Aquinas had one way of coordinating the two vocabularies, and Scotus had another.

is nothing to do with this batch of objections but to concede their conclusion, namely, that it is not required that every intellect in act produce an inner word — and this is so not only in the case of God and the blessed but also in that of the angels as regards their self-understanding. For the beatified soul can produce a partial *verbum* but not one adequate to the Vision; such a soul sees more in God than it can “say” by any created “word.” And the angel, having himself as an object present through himself to himself, has no need to form an inner word about himself for himself. So speaking universally of “every intellect,” the proposition in question is believed, not known by philosophical proof.

Answering doubt IV

xvi. As to the fourth doubt: although many agree with Scotus in affirming the identity of the concept and a certain actual intellection (a begotten one), St. Thomas explicitly holds in q.34, a.1 (towards the end) that the concept is other than the act of understanding, as a terminus is other than that whose terminus it is.

Refer back to § ix

To see his point, one must realize that, in the intellectual part of us, besides potencies, acts, and habits, he posits a terminus of the act as a necessary condition for the second act’s object to be present to that act object-wise. For an object of the intellect can be present to the intellect in two ways: (1) as co-source of the act of understanding (and this is brought about through the [impressed] intelligible species), (2) as object of that act. For ‘object as object’ does not mean a cause or source of the act but a terminus of it. And this “terminating” has to come about through the concept, which is also sometimes called “inner word” and “expressed species.” Otherwise, the object of the intellect would not be within [the intellect] *actually* with the actuality of second act. That the [impressed] intelligible species does not suffice for this function is clear from the fact that the object-function is that of a terminus, whereas the intelligible species has the role of a source [or start]. That the act of understanding does not suffice for this function either is supported by the fact that the office of an object is not the office of the second act itself, except in reflexive intellection [*i.e.*, unless an act of understanding is trying to understand itself]. Hence in us, the concept or inner word is not something *intelligible*, but something actually understood in intentional being. And it is posited with the same necessity as an object of the intellect is posited *within* the intellect actually. If any one doubts this was Aquinas’ thinking, let him read 1 *CG* c.35, 4 *CG* c.11, and *De Potentia* q.8, a.1, and q.9, a.5, from which it is clear that those who (like Durandus) attribute to us the view that the inner word is posited only for more perfect knowledge or for more explicit representation have spoken rather badly.

xvii. Nevertheless, note very carefully that the concept or inner word can be taken in two ways, when we make the claim that a concept or inner word is the object and terminus of an act of understanding:

- (1) a concept can be taken as the image of something else, *i.e.* according to the thing represented, so as to render the claim that the very thing conceived terminates the act of understanding (in this sense, the mode of being thus spiritually within is a condition of the thing objectified and known); or
- (2) a concept can be taken as the sort of thing it is, *e.g.* a spiritual quality, *etc.*

Now, the first sense is the one in which we claim that the concept is the object of the intellect in act, not the second sense (save in the case of a reflexive act [forming the concept of a concept]). From this it is clear how all the objections fall to the ground, as well as from the fact that things themselves (a lion, an ox) are known directly in act and not the species in the soul, and from the fact that the same what-it-is is the object of all intellects, and from other points of this kind.

To fail to distinguish between the object as a thing and the object as the image of a thing is a cause of error. But those who make this distinction and who pay attention to the two above-mentioned conditions of the concept [as terminus and as object], using Aristotle's point in *De Memoria et Reminiscencia* that movement towards a likeness = movement toward the thing whose likeness it is, easily solve and interpret all these matters as to why the inner word is an object, *etc.* Since the act of knowing and the concept are [in one respect] and are not [in another respect] simultaneous, they also are and are not the source of something [else] — such that, just as an act of knowing may be the cause of another act of knowing or of willing, so also the concept. As far as agency is concerned, they are counted as one.

xviii. We need say no more against Scotus, since he was answered in handling doubt II. Instead we turn to Durandus: his first argument makes four mistakes.

• First and most basically: being manifestive belongs to what it takes to be a word, but it is not its constitutive *differentia*, since it also belongs to what is not a word. This would be clear if we thought of God in His absolutes alone, as the philosophers do; for we should then suppose all things to be manifested in God by simple intellection without concept.

• Secondly, since what it takes for *x* to manifest *y* is *x*'s relation to the *y* manifested, "manifests" bespeaks only a thought-produced relation.* Hence it will be said below that the Father manifests Himself and the Holy Spirit and all things by His Word.

• Thirdly, how a word manifests [some item *x*] is not just any old way, but only this precise way: it manifests [*x*] as expressed by another, as will become clear below. So there is no need to trace the outer word back to what is manifestation-pure-and-simple *per essentiam*, but to what is manifestation expressed by another. But this latter is not intellection (see below q.34), which obviously does not include being "by another."⁹

⁹ Verbal manifesting is a three-place relation: *w* manifests *x* to *y*, where *w* is a word (inner or outer), *x* is what the word is about, and *y* is a mind. Cajetan's point is that a word "mani-

• Fourthly, if we use terms correctly, if a word is "manifestive" of the thing spoken about, it will follow that "manifestation itself" is nothing other than the very producing of the word. But the word should not be traced back to its production in the sense of "traced back" by which what participates in ϕ is traced back to what is ϕ *per essentiam*, as Durandus does. No, the outer word is to be traced back to the inner word, as the dependent is traced back to that on which it depends; and among inner words, those that are created are traced back to the divine Word, which alone exists by its essence — as Scripture says, "And the Word was God."

Against Durandus' second argument: the major is false unless both forms are previous to the act; but the concept is not a form previous but terminating the act.

Against Durandus' third argument: concepts, acts, and impressed species are not forms of the same kind in their manner of being [*in essendo*]. Rather, the species is complete of the subject; the act is *esse*, and the concept is object — though, granted, in representing or attaining the object as an object, they all meet the same definition as partial concurrents towards one complete *esse* actually such [namely, the *esse* which is being-cognizant-of-this].

Answering doubt V

xix. As to the fifth doubt: there are three opinions. The first is that the initial awareness [*notitia*] which concurs towards the production of a concept or inner word, as a form by which the agent acts, is a second act, *i.e.* an *intelligere* — and this seems to be the path of Henry [of Ghent]. The second opinion is that such *notitia* is first act alone. Thus Scotus, *In I Sent.*, d.2, q.7. The third is that the *notitia* is at least first act but may sometimes be actual intellection. Thus St. Thomas.

To see his point, learn from *De Veritate* q.4, a.2, that the *notitia* from which the concept proceeds can be of three kinds, according to the three ways in which actual *notitia* is caused in us. The first kind is quasi-habitual, *i.e.* first act: intellection emerges from first act. The second kind is the propositional *notitia* of first premisses: scientific knowing arises from this. The third kind is the simple [non-propositional] grasp of a prior quiddity: *notitia* of a posterior quiddity comes from this. Since these last two ways bear upon such-and-such sort of concept, not upon the concept in general, it follows that absolutely speaking and *per se* the concept proceeds from *notitia* as first act alone; yet a particular sort of concept can proceed otherwise. So there is no need for great concern about this.¹⁰

xx. As to the reasoning of Durandus: species or habits can be compared to acts in two ways:

- (1) in their mode of being,
- (2) in their specification.

For both are found in either. If they are compared in the

fests" *x* by being "another" from *x*, an "expression" of it. So *x* verbally manifested is *x* "expressed by another." Here *x* is the initial *notitia*.

¹⁰ More about the initial *notitia* in q.34, a.3.

c.1.
450b 20ff

* *relatio rationis*

Refer back to
§ x

first way, an act is more noble than a habit or species, as already said. For an act is simply act, while habits and species have a being that is intermediate between act and potency. This is nothing else but to say (a) that the thing known is present to the soul in a nobler way when it is present in second act than when it is present in habit or in first act, and (b) that the soul is more nobly situated when it attains things in an act than when it attains them habitually. However, in its mode of being (the first way of comparison), the act is not produced by the species but by the intellect.

By contrast, if these things are compared in the second way [*i.e.* in terms of their specification], and we are speaking with respect to the same object, they are of equal nobility. Thus taken, an act adequate to the [impressed] species emanates from it as an effect from a univocal cause; for the act has the wherewithal to be such-and-such from its form-wise source, which is the species, as happens also in other cases. — So much for Durandus' argument, which goes not only against us but also against Aristotle.

Doubt about a key inference

xxi. In Aquinas' case for his main conclusion [§ v], doubt arises about the second inference [*i.e.* that the procession spoken of in God does not occur thanks to

action bearing upon an external effect]. For it is false to say that procession thanks to action *ad extra* is distinctive of the lowest creatures, bodies. The intellectual substances [angels], after all, obviously proceed from God thanks to action *ad extra*. So the reasoning in the text seems to rest on a false foundation.

The SHORT ANSWER to this is that the reason the text seems to put proceeding thanks to action *ad extra* among bodily proceedings is not because it is found only there but because it is so common as to be found even among bodies and is easiest to see in bodily affairs. A kind of procession that fits everything, no matter how low, has to be a really low-grade sort of procession. So in the business at hand, where processions are being graded, that kind is rightly reckoned among the corporeal, lowest ones and is rightly set apart from the kind of procession found distinctively in intellectual substances, which hold highest place in the universe.

On the answer *ad* (3)

xxii. In the answer *ad* (3), beware of being too hasty; don't let the wording of the text give you the idea that the real procession posited absolutely by our faith is included in what it takes to be a first source. The right way to understand this matter will be made clear below, at q.45, a.6.

Can any procession within the divine reality be called a generation?

4 CG cc 10-11; *De Potentia* q 2, a 1; *Opusc. contra Graecos, Armenos, etc.*, c.3;
Compend. Theol. cc.40, 43, *In Ep. ad Coloss.* c 1, *lectio* 4

It seems that no procession within the divine reality can be called a case of "generation."

(1) After all, "generation" is a change from not-being to being, the opposite of corruption; and in both processes, the underlying subject is matter. None of this can characterize the divine reality. Hence there cannot be a generation within the divine reality.

(2) Besides, procession in God follows the intellectual mode, as was just maintained. An intellectual procession in us is not called a generation. So, neither should it be called such in God.

(3) Moreover, anything generated gets being from its progenitor. So the existence of anything generated is *received* existence. But no received existence is self-subsistent existence. So, since divine existence is self-subsistent existence (as was shown above), no generated thing's being is divine existence. Therefore, there is no generation within the divine reality.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Psalm 2:7 says: "This day have I begotten thee."

ANSWER: the procession of the Word within the divine reality is called a generation. To see why, one needs to know that we use the term 'generation' in two senses. One is the *general* sense applying to anything coming-to-be and passing away; and in this sense, 'generation' is nothing but a change from not-being to being. The other sense applies only among living things; and in this sense, 'generation' means the origin of a living thing from a living source united to it. (This is properly called a birth.) However, not everything arising in this way is called begotten, but only what proceeds with what it takes to be a likeness [to the living source]. Thus a hair or beard does not have what it takes to be "begotten" or "a son," but only what proceeds with what it takes to be a likeness — and not just any likeness. The worms generated within animals do not fit the definition of begetting or sonship, even though they are like the animals in genus; rather, the definition for this kind of generation requires that a thing proceed with what it takes to be a *likeness in nature of the same species*, as a human proceeds from a human, and a horse from a horse.

Now, for the living things that proceed from potency into actualness of life, as people and animals do, their "generation" involves both senses of the word. But suppose there is a living being whose life does not emerge from potency into actualness; then, if there is procession in such a being, it entirely excludes the first definition of "generation", but it can still meet the second definition, which is unique to living things.

This, then, is how the procession of the Word in

the divine reality meets the definition of a generation. The Word proceeds by way of intellectual action, which is a living operation, from a source united to it (as said above), and with what it takes to be a likeness, because the intellect's conception is a likeness of the thing understood; and the Word is existent in the same nature [as its Source] because, in God, the act of understanding = His existing, as was shown above. Thus the procession of the Word within God is called a case of generation, and the Word that proceeds is called a Son.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): this objection is using 'generation' with its first definition, going from potential being to actualness. Generation is not found in God in that sense, as I said.

ad (2): in us, our act of understanding is not our intellect's substance [much less our whole human substance], and so an inner word that proceeds by way of our intellectual operation is not of the same nature as the faculty [much less the person] from which it proceeds. This is why no conceiving in us is literally a "generation" or meets its definition fully. But God's act of understanding is the very substance of the One doing the understanding (as shown above); and so the inner word that proceeds [in God] proceeds as a referent of the same nature.* Hence it is literally called "begotten" and "a Son." This is also why Scripture uses words for the generation of living things, such as 'conception' and 'birth', to indicate the procession of divine Wisdom in Proverbs 8:24-25: "when there were no depths, I was conceived ... before the hills existed, I was born." But in speaking of our understanding, we do use the word 'conception', due to the fact that, in the inner word of our intellect, there is found a likeness to the thing understood, even though an identity with our nature is not found.

ad (3): not everything gotten is "received" in a subject; otherwise, since no subject "receives" a created thing's whole substance, one could not say that its whole substance is gotten from God. Rather, what is begotten in God gets existence from what begets it, but not as if that existence were "received" in any matter or subject (because that would conflict with the fact that divine existence is self-subsistent): rather, the Word's existence is called "gotten" due to the fact that the Word has divine existence as proceeding "from another" (and not as if the Word existed as a thing other than the divine existence). For within the sheer completeness of divine existing there is contained both the Word intellectually proceeding and the Source of the Word (just as anything else in God's completeness is contained in His existing, as I said above).

a 1

q 14, a.4

q 14, a.4

* *ut eiusdem naturae subsistens*

q 14, a.2

Cajetan's Commentary

The title means to take 'generation' form-wise, and this will become clearer as we go along.

Analysis of the article

In the body of the text, Aquinas does two jobs: (1) he distinguishes the predicate in question, 'generation', and (2) he answers the question affirmatively.

ii. As to job (1), he distinguishes, describes, and compares two senses of 'generation'. The distinction is between 'generation' used broadly and 'generation' used as proper to living things. Each is described thus:

- the "generation" common to all things is change from not-being to being, as we see in *Physics V*;
- the "generation" proper to living things, which is specifically called "birth," is *origin of one living thing from another living thing united to it, according to a likeness amounting to sameness of nature*. The comparison covers how the two senses of 'generation' can be verified separately and together. Obviously the first can be verified without the second [as when any inanimate thing comes to be]; in the living things that we are familiar with, both senses are verified at once, since these things [in being born] pass from potency to act. It follows, then, that if any living thing is born without passing from potency to act, the second sense of 'generation' is verified in its case without the first.

In the definition of 'birth' only the word 'united' [*conjuncto*] is at all obscure, and you find a lengthy explanation of it in 4 *CG*, c.11.

iii. As to job (2), the conclusion answering the question is this: the Word's procession in God has what it takes to be called a "generation" in the second sense [the one unique to living things]. The support is by showing that each condition involved in "birth" fits the case of that procession. First, there is living operation, since it arises from intellectual action. Next, it is from a source united to it, as was made clear in article 1, especially in the answer *ad* (2). Next, it occurs thanks to likeness, as is proved by the fact that an intellect's conception is a likeness of the thing understood. Lastly, the likeness is based on sameness of nature, as proved by the fact that God's understanding is the same as His being. Thus we get both the answer and the corollary that the Word proceeding in God is a Son.

iv. For the final point he makes in the text, namely, that God's Word proceeds as a thing of the same nature with God, Aquinas gives this reason:

the act of understanding [*intelligere*] is identically the act of existing [*esse*] in God.

You should be aware that this reason is given quite often in this work, but the main exposition of it occurs in 4 *CG* c.11. It is said to hold good for so many uses because, broadly speaking, the being of a concept or word [*esse verbi*] = its being-understood [*intelligi*]; as

a result, wherever the act of understanding [*intelligere*] identified¹ with this being-understood is an accident, the inner word itself is an accident; but where the act of understanding is a substance's act of being, there the inner word is substance. And since this is how things are in God, the divine Word is divine substance; but in all intellectual creatures, their concepts are accidents.

Doubts about this reason

v. As to the validity of this reason, however, doubt arises on two grounds. (1) Being-understood posits nothing in the thing understood; and hence it cannot be the real being of a concept. (2) The act of understanding is really distinct from the concept; and as so distinct, this act is the *intellect's being* in complete act; hence, it cannot be the concept's *being*.

Solution

vi. To clear these up, recall that the inner word, as *inner* word, is the thing understood *in act within the mind*.^{*} So it has three marks. (1) Since it is the thing understood *in act*, it is its *being* such — it is its *being*-understood. You see the same truth in connection with the seen in act [the thing seen *qua* seen is its being seen], and the same goes for all the other faculties. (2) Since the word is the thing understood *within the mind* — that is, since the word is that in which the [outward] thing understood by the act of understanding is expressed — its being is being-understood *taken this way*,[†] that is, being-understood *taken as* being the thing in which [the outward thing understood is expressed] in the mind. But being-understood, when taken *this way*, is a real case of being, since it is being the object's likeness expressed in act. (3) Since the word is the object in act in this way, it has what it takes to be one of the factors contributing to the completion of the act of understanding. Therefore, since this act of understanding is the intellect's being-in-act and so is the being of all the factors contributing to the completion of the intellect-in-act, it is the being of the word as well.

vii. So to dispose of the first doubt, we say that although being-understood posits nothing in the [outward] thing understood, nevertheless being-understood *taken this way*, that is, as affecting only what is in the mind, does posit something real in the thing understood *taken the same way*, that is, with the being that the thing has within-the-mind in the concept.²

² My act of understanding *x* and *x*'s being understood are the same act-state (real in me), looked at from two angles.

³ In other words, 'x is understood' is ambiguous as between the sense arising when 'x' is taken to stand for an extra-mental item and the sense arising when 'x' is taken to stand for the "idea" or "conception" in and through which that item is understood.

* *interius*

† *sic intelligi*

To dispose of the second doubt, we say that the operation of understanding* is the being [*esse*] both of the intellect and of the impressed species and of the word, but differently so in each case. The operation is the to-be of the intellect and of the species insofar as it is to-understand [*intelligere*], while it is the to-be of the word insofar as it is to-be-understood [*intelligi*], in the former two cases it is the to-be of sources, while in the latter case it is the to-be of a terminus; in the former two cases it is the to-be of one complete subject, while in the latter case it is the to-be of an object. So there is nothing wrong here, unless you think really distinct things cannot exist with one and the same to-be. But they can: look at matter, form, and the composite.

Trouble from Aureol

viii. The sense of 'generation' applied to a divine procession has been challenged by Aureol (as reported by Capreolus, *In I Sent.* d.9). Aureol argues that if a divine procession were to be called a generation in this sense, two results would follow, both impossible.

(1) The Son would not be the Word on the same basis as He is the Son, nor *vice-versa*, contrary to the dictum of St. Augustine [*eo Verbum quo Filius*], in *De Trinitate VII*. This would follow, he argues, because in us the generation of a word is not the generation of a living substance, and the begetting of a son among us is not the begetting of a word.

(2) The procession of the Holy Spirit would count as a generation, too. It fits the whole definition as given.

But our response to this is easy. We deny that either result follows. His proof of the first is worthless because, in human beings, a son proceeds through transitive action, and a word proceeds through an operation which is an accident, while in God neither holds. As to why the special property of the Son is expressed also in His title of 'Word', see below, q.34, a.2 ad 3. — Aureol's case for his second result is also worthless, since it assumes a falsehood. As we shall see in a.4, part of the definition does not fit the case of the Spirit, *i.e.*, the part about proceeding "according to likeness."³

³ The last two articles have made a case about the procession of the Word in God as the of Son. How Cajetan understood the case to go has come out in the course of his quarrels with various adversaries, but only in bits and pieces. The reader may therefore appreciate seeing the whole case laid out. This can be done in 24 points, the first eight of which deal with understanding in general.

(1) One's act of understanding this thing = one's act-state of being an understander of it (in Latin, *intelligere = esse intelligens in actu*).

(2) One's act-state of being an understander of this thing = the thing's being understood (*esse intelligens in actu = intelligi rei intellectae*).

(3) So, one's understanding this thing = its being understood (*intelligere = intelligi*). This follows from points (1) and (2) by the transitivity of identity.

On the answer ad (3)

ix. In St. Thomas' answer to the third objection, note the golden words in the last sentence: "For in the sheer completeness of divine existing there is contained both the Word intellectually proceeding and ..." Here it is quite clear that there is no actual "formal distinction" between the divine essence, the personal properties, the attributes, and the other items that are formally "there" in God. If the sheer completeness of God's existence could be defined in its own right, so to speak, it would include all these things within itself. Any such distinction, then,

(4) If a thing's being understood is taken as a real act-state, then its being understood that way (*sic intelligi*) = a being of the thing in the knower as an object understood (*esse interius*).

(5) Typically, a thing's having being in a knower as an object understood = the having emerged of a likeness of it in the knower.

(6) This likeness of it is called an inner word about it, an expressed species of it, or a concept of it.

(7) So, typically, the being which a thing has in a knower as an object understood = the being of its concept in the knower (*esse interius = esse verbi*).

(8) Ergo, typically, the being of a thing's concept = the thing's being understood = the knower's act of understanding it (*esse verbi = sic intelligi = intelligere intelligentis*). This follows from points (3), (4), and (7).

The next seven points concern reflexive understanding (*i.e.* self-understanding).

(9) Suppose there is a kind of knower such that knowers of this kind succeed perfectly in understanding themselves as understanders, *i.e.* succeed perfectly in understanding their own understanding. Call the acts in which they do this RU, and call any knower of this kind a reflexive knower.

(10) Recall that, by points (5) and (6), the inner word or concept is a likeness of the thing understood.

(11) So, in a reflexive knower in whose RU a concept emerges, that concept = a perfect likeness of his understanding.

(12) A perfect likeness of *x* is of the same nature as *x* in any respect in which it is perfect likeness.

(13) In the accepted vocabulary of the scholastics, a concept was said to "proceed" in the mind where it emerged; the knower himself (or his intellect) was called the "source which" yields the concept [*principium quod*], and the knower's act of understanding (*intelligere*) was called the "source whereby" he yields the concept [*principium quo*].

(14) So, if there is a reflexive knower in whose RU a concept emerges, that concept is of the same nature as the source whereby the knower yields it.

(15) Moreover, if there is a reflexive knower in whose RU a concept emerges, the being of that concept = the being understood of an act of understanding = the knower's RU (the *esse illius verbi = the intelligi of an intelligere = the reflexive knower's intelligere*). This follows by point (8).

The last nine points concern the very special reflexive knower who is God.

(16) Suppose there is a reflexive knower whose act of self-understanding (RU) = his very life and existence, and whose existence = his very nature and substance.

(17) God is such a knower, according to 1 ST q.14, aa.1-4, and 1 ST q.3, aa.1-4.

(18) Then, if a concept proceeds in God's RU, that concept is a perfect likeness not only of the act of understanding whereby

a. 1: contra conclusionem. 1

c.2: PL 42, 936

is only a “virtual distinction” inside God, even though

it proceeds but also of the living being who yields it. This follows from points (11), (14), and (17).

(19) A perfect likeness of a living being in the respects in which it is a living being is a living being of the same nature. This follows from point (10).

(20) A living being proceeding from a living source of the same nature is called an “offspring” or “son” of that source.

(21) Thus, if a concept proceeds in God’s RU, that concept or inner Word is a Son, and His procession is a generation.

(22) Moreover, if point (17) is true and a concept proceeds in God’s RU, the *being* of the Word/Son = the being understood of divine understanding = the divine act of RU = the divine being = the divine nature/substance (the *esse Verbi* = the *intelligi* of the *divinum intelligere* = *divinum intelligere* = *divinum esse* = *divina natura/substantia*), by points (15), (17), and (21).

(23) The divine RU, taken as that whence the Word proceeds [*principium quod*] and hence as the Word’s origin, is

it is posited in our understanding on a thought-produced basis.⁴

the Father. This follows by (13), (20), and (21).

(24) Therefore, if (17) is true and a concept proceeds in the divine RU, that concept is a Son proceeding from the Father by way of an intellection which is generation, and that Son is the Father’s Word, and that Son is consubstantial with the Father.

⁴ A “formal distinction” depended on definitions. If being- ϕ did not need to be mentioned in giving the scientific definition of what it took to be- ψ , then being- ψ was “formally distinct” from being- ϕ . Scotus held that this sort of distinction applied within God, independently of our thought. By contrast, a “virtual distinction” was merely something’s power to justify a distinction in human language. The divine being, by containing “in a higher way” and “as one” what would be many traits in creatures, has the power to justify distinctions between those traits — not as they “are” in God but as they are mentioned in our talk of God. See q.13, a.4 (with footnote 2 thereon).

Besides the Word's generation, is there another procession within the divine reality?

In I Sent d.13, a.2; 4 *CG* c. 19; *De Potentia Dei* q.10, aa. 1, 2, *Opusc. contra Graecos, Armenos, etc.*, c. 3

It looks as though there is no other procession in the divine reality besides the generation of the Word.

(1) After all, an argument in favor of another one will also work in favor of yet another, and so on *ad infinitum* — which is hardly suitable. So, one should stop with the first one, so as to have just one procession within God.

(2) Besides, in every nature, we find just one way of communicating it, and the reason for this is that operations are classified as one or many on the basis of their termini. Well, there is no procession within the divine reality except on the basis of communicating the divine nature. So, since there is only one divine nature (as shown above), there is only one procession in God. q 11, a.3

(3) Furthermore, any other procession in God besides the intelligible-object procession of the Word is going to be a love procession, taking place because of the operation of willing. But a love procession cannot be another one from the intellect's intelligible-object procession, because, in God, willing is not something other than understanding, as was shown above. Therefore, there is no other procession in God above and beyond the procession of the Word. q 19, a.1

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is the fact that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, as John 15:26 says, and yet is someone other than the Son according to John 14:16, "I will pray the Father, and He shall give you another Comforter." Within the divine reality, then, there is another procession beyond that of the Word.

ANSWER: there are two processions within the divine reality, that of the Word, and another one. To see this, one needs to recall the fact that a procession within God is only there thanks to an action that does not head for something outside but remains within the divine agent. In an intellectual nature, such an action is that of understanding and that of willing. The Word's procession is found to occur thanks to the action of understanding. But thanks to the operation of willing, another procession is found to occur in us, namely, a procession of love, thanks to which the beloved is in the lover, much as, through conceiving an inner word, the

thing "said" or understood is in the one understanding it. Thus, beyond the procession of the Word, another procession is also posited within the divine reality, which is a procession of Love.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): there is no need to go on *ad infinitum* with divine processions. Within an intellectual nature, procession stops with the will's procession.

ad (2): whatever is in God is God (as was shown above), and that is not the case with things other than God. The result is that, *via* any procession that is not headed outwards, the divine nature is communicated, but no other natures are communicated that way.

ad (3): even though willing and understanding are not different things in God, it still belongs to the definitions of willing and understanding that the processions arising thanks to the actions of each stand in a certain relation [*ordo*]. There is no love procession except in relation to a word procession, because nothing can be loved by the will unless it has been conceived in the understanding. So just as we find a *relation* [and hence distinctness] between the Word and the Source whence it proceeds (even though understanding and its conception are the same substance in God's case), so also Love's procession has distinctness *by a relation* from the Word's procession (even though willing and understanding are the same thing in God's case), because it belongs to love's defining makeup that it should proceed only from a conception of the understanding.¹

q 3, aa.3, 4

¹ A real relation always makes distinct the relata between which it stands, even if those relata are one and the same in their non-relational aspects. Aquinas will argue below that the *from*-relation between *x* and the source of *x* is always a real relation. So even if the Word is the same substance as the cognitive Act whence it arises, the fact that the Word is *from* that Act makes them distinct (not in non-relational terms, *i.e.* not absolutely, but) *as relata*. In just the same way, even if God's loving is the same Act as His understanding, the fact that love of *x* is aroused *from* an inner word about *x* keeps the arousal of Love distinct (not absolutely but) *as a relatum* from the origination of the Word.

Cajetan's Commentary

In the title, 'other' means true otherness; and thanks to the word 'is', it has to mean real otherness. For there is no true otherness between real processions besides real otherness. The phrase 'in God' is to be taken [in full strictness] as it was in article 1, and the same holds for

all the other articles in this inquiry.

Analysis of the article

ii. In the body of the article, one conclusion is reached, answering the question with a yes: In God, be-

sides the procession of the Word, there is another procession, which is a procession of love. The support goes as follows. [*Antecedent:*] In an intellectual nature (as among us humans), besides a procession of the word due to intellectual action, there is another procession, that of love, which occurs thanks to the operation of the will. [*Inference:*] So in God, besides the procession of the Word, there is another procession, etc.

The premise is established by way of a proportion: just as, through the conceiving of the word, the known is in the knower, so also, through the arising of love, the beloved is in the lover. Drawing the inference is justified this way: no procession occurs in God except in accordance with the immanent action of an intellectual nature; but there are two such actions, that of intellect and that of will.

First doubt about this argument

iii. Here a doubt is raised similar to the one raised about the procession of the Word, namely: *whether, via the act of willing, something proceeds in the will as the terminus of its act.* Besides the general arguments from the nature of immanent action, there are further arguments drawn from the properties of the will.

In the first place, the thesis of such a procession seems to contradict what Aquinas himself says in *De Veritate* q.4, a.2 ad 7, where he says that in the will nothing proceeds save by way of operation, and that it is otherwise in the intellect.

Secondly, Scotus (on *I Sent.*, d.10) and others argue against this procession, maintaining that the produced love is the act of loving (viewed as spirated), just as they hold that the inner word is the act of understanding (viewed as begotten). Their argument depends more on authorities than on reasons; but all their authorities and reasons boil down to this: that the Holy Spirit is love, and love is the act of loving.

Second doubt

iv. Against the words, 'according as the beloved is in the lover', a challenge is raised in the work of Aureol (on *I Sent.*, d.10). He uses many arguments to refute this idea both simply and *ad hominem*. But all his reasons boil down to this: love, or the impulse of the will, consists in a tending towards the thing loved, not in a likeness to it; therefore, through the procession of love, it does not come about that the beloved is in the lover but rather that the lover is drawn, is transformed, and comes to be in the beloved, as Mt. 6:21 suggests, "Where your treasure is, there your heart will be also."

Resolving the first doubt

v. In order to understand these points, one must keep the following fact in mind: because the things of the will are less known and less explicitly named than those of the intellect, St. Thomas tries to redress the balance by defining the items in the will. Just as, in the process of understanding, we form a concept, so

also, in the process of loving, we form in ourselves a certain inclination towards the beloved — which inclination, because it lacks a name of its own, is variously called "love," "impulse," "inclination," "affection," etc. But the difference between the intellect and the will does not lie only in the fact that the terminus of the former is a likeness, while the terminus of the latter is an affection. There is also the fact that what is a terminus in the intellect has the mode and name of a terminus, as is clear with 'word' and 'concept'. But the thing which serves as a terminus in the will, though it is in reality a terminus, has neither the mode nor the name of a terminus. For it is a tending towards another and is so signified. Clearly, "tending towards another" is not the mark of a terminus but of a way-to-it.

This last point is the only one Aquinas was concerned to make in the *De Veritate* passage mentioned, as will be clear to anyone who studies the text carefully. Hence the passage has nothing to do with the issue at hand.

These remarks also suffice to show how one ought to answer the other objection brought up in the first doubt: poverty of vocabulary makes the word 'love' serve also for the inner terminus of that act.

Resolving the second doubt

vi. As for the second doubt, Aureol's arguments err in two respects. (1) They overlook the fact that, besides being "in" something by essence and by likeness, there is also a third sense in which one thing can be called "in" another, namely, by inclination or affection. In this way, being-low is said to be in the heavy and being-high is said to be in the light. It is this third sense of being "in" which is in use here, as Aquinas explains in 4 *CG* c.19. This is how the beloved is in the lover, as is self-evident. (2) Having failed to weigh what we mean by the beloved's being "in" the lover, Aureol supposes that, from our saying the beloved comes to be in the lover by virtue of the will, he can draw the conclusion that (in our view) the beloved is drawn towards the lover. Not at all. Because the beloved comes to be in the lover solely according to the affection of the lover towards the beloved, by that very fact it is the lover who is drawn, transformed, impelled towards the beloved, as towards his object, and so has the beloved in him. The same point could easily be made clear by looking at the formal property of "the beloved." For to-be-loved is not to be attracted but to attract the lover; hence becoming beloved as such is not becoming attracted but becoming attractive; so if something comes to be in the will as a thing beloved, it does not come to be so as drawn to the will but rather as drawing the will to it. This is how we take the proportional similarity between intellect and will, as Aquinas asserts it here in a.3: the similarity extends only to the point that, as in the intellect there comes to be a thing known, so in the will there comes to be a thing loved — but differently so, of course, in each case, as will be spelled out more fully below (q.37, a.1).

On the answer *ad* (2)

vii. In the reply to the second objection in the article, notice that the reply consists in pointing out that the objection's major premise does not hold in an infinite nature, which identifies all its properties and operations with itself; rather, that major premise holds true in all other, finite natures, because they are finite; hence it is a principle whose application is very wide.

On the answer *ad* (3)

viii. Concerning the reply to the third objection in this article, note two points.

(1) The third objection was trying to reach the conclusion that between these two processions there is no greater distinction than there is between the intellect and the will themselves; and hence, as there is no true "otherness" between intellect and will in God, neither is there any between these processions. In rebuttal, the reply is trying to show that the distinction between the processions is greater than that between the "faculties"; indeed, it is trying to show that there is otherness between the processions even when there is identity of the faculties, and that this is so because of the relation of origin between the processions. This relation arises from the defining makeup of the two sources (intellect and will) but does not exist between them as sources. So there is a distinction between what is from those sources (a distinction between the sourced) even when there is no distinction between the sources. Because of the defining makeup of the sources, there is a relation of origin not between the sources themselves but between the processions out of them. Thus the otherness wanted between the two processions, only implicitly established in the body of the article, is nailed down explicitly here, on the basis of the relation of origin.

(2) Aquinas says that it is of the nature of love that it should proceed from the intellect's conception; it follows that there should be, in God, a procession from a procession. On this there is a first doubt, whether this connection with the concept is *per se* of the nature of the procession of love in the first sense of '*per se*' or in the second sense. *Vice-versa*, there is a doubt whether it is of the nature of love to proceed from the Word precisely as Word or merely insofar as the Word is the thing known. And there is a third doubt, whether the above-mentioned relation of origin is precisely that by virtue of which the two processions are really distinct, such that, without this relation there would be no real distinction between them. But since these difficulties will be taken up in q.36, a.2, where they will also be better understood, after the divine Persons have been treated, we let them pass at this point.

ix. However, I think that there are five points which absolutely cannot be passed over at this juncture.

First: if we take 'concept' as 'the thing conceived or known as such,' then obviously the procession of love has to be from the concept; for we cannot in any way love unknown things. Hence the text takes it as self-evident that love, by its nature, arises from the

concept.

x. *Second*: the thing known is the cause of love in the line of efficient causality. This is clear from the fact that the text says love has a relation of origin to the concept. In the matter at hand, a relation of origin is clearly an ordering by way of efficiency. Averroes' comment 36 on *Metaphysics XII* concurs perfectly with this: "the bath in the mind is the agent desire," etc.

xi. *Third*: although love arises by way of efficient causality from two things (the will and the lovable thing as known), even as the word arises from the intellect and the intelligible-together-with-the-intellect, nevertheless a major difference must be noticed here. The concept is produced by both as forming one, complete efficient cause, and they form this cause in their mind-independent character as things. Love, on the other hand, is produced by the will and by the known lovable thing, not as forming a single agent, but as remaining diverse and concurring by virtue of diverse traits. For love arises from the will itself in its makeup as a mind-independent thing [*in ratione rei*], while it arises from the lovable thing only in its makeup as a known [*in ratione cogniti*]. For the lovable as known gives birth to love, whereas the will does this simply by virtue of being the sort of thing it is. Let these observations suffice for now for the fundamentals of what must be said about love and the Holy Spirit.

Trouble from Scotus

xii. *Fourth*: Scotus (*In I Sent.*, d.13) picks up the word '*ordo*' used in this reply, takes it to mean that the two processions are distinct as prior vs. posterior, and attacks this idea on three grounds.

(1) Order of priority is not the first distinction between the processions, because the one is prior, the other posterior, only because the one is such-and-such, the other such-and-such.

(2) Divine processions are relations, and relations are not initially distinct by virtue of other relations.

(3) These relations of order are other than the relations of origin. The proof is that they hold between different relata. For the relation of origin holds between the produced and the producer, whereas the relation of order holds between one origination and another. So [Scotus concludes] the article is badly argued.

Response

But the response to these points is easy. The sense of the article will become clear as the treatise proceeds, and it will emerge why Aquinas says so little at this point. For it will be explained further along [q.42, a.3] that in God there is no order-relation save that of origin, and that this does not include relations of prior and posterior. So the relational distinction posited in this article is not correctly explained as one based on priority and posteriority. Rather it is distinction of relation of origin.

If one objects that this distinction is not primary, where real distinction is concerned, the objection is de-

nied. For, as will become clear further along [in q.28, a.3], only the relations of origin produce real distinction in God.

On the other hand, where formal distinction is concerned, the answer is already obvious from the body of the article and from the next article: the processions are formally distinguished by virtue of the fact that one is *via* the intellect, the other *via* the will. Hence this *ordo* does not superimpose new relations over and above the origins themselves, as Scotus' second argument tried to prove.

Nor is it true that the relata of the relations of origin and of "order" are distinct *as things*. For what is produced and its being originated* are one and the same relation in God: by the same ordering by which the produced (the Spirit) is from the produced (the Son), the Spirit's procession is from the Son's procession, *i.e.*, it arises therefrom. Aquinas is silent about these details here, because it is his custom to start with the more general points and then go on to the details.

* *origo passiva*

So at this point he just speaks of "relation," and when the time comes (in q.42, a.3) he will specify: relation of origin.

xiii. Fifth: Scotus' arguments against the people who think these processions are distinct because their sources (God's intellect and will) are *conceptually* distinct are not against us. His arguments only strike against those who hold that a real distinction between the processions depends upon a thought-produced distinction between the sources — which is foreign to the doctrine of St. Thomas. For while we say that the distinction between the former (the processions) arises from the defining makeup of intellect and will, we do not say that it arises from the *distinctness* of the them. It is one thing, after all, to say "from intellect and will," or "from their defining makeup," and quite another thing to say "from their distinctness." For the former means God himself, a real thing, while the latter means an artifact of thought [an *ens rationis*].

Is the love procession within God a case of generation?

1 ST q.30, a.2 ad 2; In I Sent. d.13, a.3 ad 3-4; In III Sent. d.8, a.1 ad 8; 4 CG c 19;
De Potentia Dei q.2, a.4 ad 7; q 10, a.2 ad 22; Comp. Theol. c.46

It seems that the love procession in God is a case of generation.

(1) In any life-form, what proceeds [from the living thing] in likeness of nature is called “begotten” and “born.” Well, what proceeds within God after the fashion of love proceeds [from God] in likeness of nature [to God]; otherwise, it would be foreign to the divine nature, and the procession would be to something outside God. Therefore, what proceeds in God after the fashion of love proceeds as begotten and born.

(2) Besides, the talk of likeness does not enter only into the defining makeup of “inner word” but also into that of “love,” which is why Sirach 13:15 says, “Every beast loveth his like.” So if likeness is why ‘generated’ and ‘born’ apply to the Word proceeding, they also seem to apply to the Love proceeding.

(3) Moreover, an item outside all the species is not in the genus. So if there is within God a procession of love, it has to have a name more specific than the generic one, ‘procession’. But there is no other name to give it but ‘generation’. Therefore, the love procession in God seems to be a case of generation.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is the fact that, on this theory, the Holy Spirit, who proceeds as Love, would proceed as begotten — which is against the Athanasian Creed: “The Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son, not made nor created nor begotten, but proceeding.”

ANSWER: the procession of Love in God should not be called a generation. To see this, one needs to be aware that there is the following difference between understanding and willing: the intellect goes into actuation because the thing known is within it by its likeness,* while the will does not go into actuation because there is within it any likeness of the thing willed, but because the will has a certain inclination towards the thing willed. Thus a procession occurring thanks to what makes for understanding is occurring because of the explanatory factor “likeness” — and thereby it can have what it takes to be a “generation.” By con-

trast, a procession occurring thanks to what makes for willing is not explained in terms of “likeness” but of “impelling” and “motivating towards something.” The upshot is that what proceeds within the divine reality after the fashion of love is not proceeding as begotten or as a Son but rather as an “Aspiring” [*spiritus*] — a word by which we designate a vital motivation and impulse, inasmuch as a person is said to be motivated or impelled to do something “by love.”

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): everything in God is the same [absolute reality] as the divine nature. From this sameness, then, there is no getting a distinctive description of this or that procession, setting it off from another. Rather, such a description has to come from the relation of one procession to another. This sort of relation is found to result from the scientific definitions of willing and understanding. Thanks to these definitions, each procession in God gets a name expressive of the explanatory factors in its reality. And thus it comes about that the One proceeding after the manner of love does indeed receive the divine nature and yet is not called “born” from God.

ad (2): likeness pertains to the inner word in a different way from how it pertains to love. It pertains to the inner word insofar as that word itself is a certain likeness of the thing understood, as an offspring is a likeness of the parent. But how it pertains to love is not that love itself is a likeness, but that likeness calls forth love.* What follows, then, is not that love is begotten, but that the one begotten calls forth love.

ad (3): the terms that we apply to God can only be drawn from creatures, as I said above. The situation among creatures is that communication of their nature takes place only through generation; and so ‘generation’ is the only proper or special name we have for a procession in God. Thus, the procession which is not ‘generation’ is left with no special name of its own. We can adopt, however, the term ‘spiration’, because it means the emergence of an [aspiring or] spirit.†

Ig. 13: 19

Denz. #75f

* *secundum similitudinem*

* *principium amandi*

q.13, a.1

† *processio spiritus*

Cajetan’s Commentary

In the title, take care with the word ‘generation’. For since it was already settled in the preceding article that the procession of love is not the procession of a word, and since it was settled in article 2 that the procession of the Word is a generation, it is clear without further ado that the procession of love is not that particular ge-

neration which is the procession of the Word, and hence it is equally clear that the procession of love is really distinct from that generation in God. So these points are not what is in question here. Rather, what is now asked is whether the love-procession in God has the explanatory factors* of a generation. If you look carefully, you

* *ratio formalis*

* *distinctio
formalis*

will see that, while the preceding article asked about the real distinction of the one procession from the other, this article is asking about their definitional distinction,* and not just in terms of any definition, but in terms of the scientific definition of generation. And really, this is all that remains to be discussed. For given the two processions of the Word and of Love in God, and given that the former is a generation and that what proceeds thereby is a Son, we must inquire and decide whether the latter procession is also a generation, whether what proceeds thereby is also a Son, or not. And this is what we are now asking.

Analysis of the article

ii. In the body of the article two conclusions are reached. The first is directly responsive to the question: the procession of love in God is not a generation. The second gets to the point we are really after: what proceeds in God by way of love proceeds as a Spirit [or an Aspiring].

But before the conclusions are supported, notice that, although the question at hand was a single one, still, for the sake of giving a more complete teaching, St. Thomas' proof not only addresses the question itself but also does justice to the underlying issue, which is the constitutive difference, so to speak, of this latter procession. So the text of the article discloses not only the *fact* that the procession of love is not a generation but also *why* it is not, and what its constitutive difference is, whereby it differs from a generation and is, instead, a spiration.

iii. The first conclusion is supported directly from the difference between intellect and will, as follows. The intellect has, in order, the following three traits:

- (1) it is put into actuation through a likeness of the thing understood;
- (2) procession in the intellect therefore occurs thanks to the explanatory factor of likeness;
- (3) this procession therefore has the defining makeup of a generation, because every begetter begets a thing like itself.

But the will is quite the opposite: (1') it is not put into actuation by a likeness of the thing willed but rather by an inclination towards it; (2') for this reason a procession in the will does not occur thanks to the explanatory factor of likeness but thanks to that of impulsion; (3') therefore this procession is not a generation, and He who proceeds is neither begotten nor a Son.

Then support of the second conclusion is appended (namely that He proceeds as a Spirit), as a further consequence, as follows. 'Spirit' [or 'aspiration'] betokens a living motion with an impulsion — not just any living motion but the one whereby we are said to be moved or impelled by love; therefore that which proceeds in the will by way of an impulse proceeds as a "spirit" [or "aspiration"]; and thus both conclusions are reached together.

The reasoning here takes off from a phrase in the definition of generation, namely, 'thanks to likeness';

because of this phrase, we may say that a procession, by virtue of its own formally defining makeup, is or is not a generation, depending on whether it does or does not arise thanks to similarity or likeness. I mean, of course, that a procession is a generation on this basis *given* all the other points which enter into the definition of generation; but a procession is not a generation given *only* the negation of this one phrase: recall that formal definitions act like numbers, as Aristotle says in *Metaphysics VIII*.¹

A trio of doubts

iv. Concerning the first alleged difference between intellect and will, doubt arises as to what "actuation" is meant, first act or second.² If first act is meant, what is said about the will is false: for it seems false to say that, in order for the will to will anything, there first has to exist in it an inclination formally putting it into first act, more or less as the [impressed] intelligible species is pre-required in the intellect. But if second act is meant, it remains to be explained how the second alleged difference arises from the first: for it might still be the case that both processions are thanks to likeness, as will become clear in the next point of doubt.

v. Concerning the second alleged difference between intellect and will, there arises this doubt: what is said about the will seems to be false and not to follow from the first difference; indeed it seems to contradict the first difference. Here is why. In the case at hand, to proceed thanks to likeness is for the term of the procession. by virtue of the procession, to be similar to what produces it in act — as is clear for the interior word *vis-à-vis* the intellect in first act. But love proceeds as similar to the will in first act: for impulse proceeds from impulse, as expressed likeness proceeds from impressed likeness in the intellect. So it is false that there is no procession thanks to likeness in the will; and given that the will is put into act through inclination, it follows that the will produces inclination and hence yields something similar to itself, no less than the intellect does, *mutatis mutandis*. Nor does it matter in the case at hand whether the will is in first act through itself or through an added inclination; for in and of itself the will is a certain inclination.

vi. Concerning the third alleged difference, or rather the foundation alleged for it in the text (namely, that every begetter begets something similar to itself), a doubt arises: it seems that a non-explanation is being presented as an explanation. For "making something similar to itself" is not the peculiar mark of a begetter

c.3.
1043b 35

¹ Take away any part of a number, and the result is a specifically different number; take away any part of a definition, and the result defines something specifically different. Ditto for additions. Such was the point of Aristotle's remark.

² The intellect in "first act" was the intellect informed and specified by some impressed species. The intellect in "second act" was the intellect operating, *i.e.*, understanding and yielding a concept, as discussed in articles 1 and 2.

but is something common to every agent; for every agent produces something similar to itself according to the form by which it is acting. And therefore, since the will is an agent, the alleged explanation applies to the procession of the will as much as to the procession of the intellect. Thus the argument is flawed not only in presenting a non-explanation of the difference as though it were the explanation but, what is worse, in proving the opposite of what was intended.

Yet a fourth doubt

vii. Concerning the whole reasoning process in this article, a doubt arises as to whether Aquinas is consistent with himself. For the teaching given here seems to contradict what he said in the disputed questions *De potentia Dei*, q. 10, a. 2. In that passage he denied that these processions are distinct of themselves, but here he determines that they are distinguished by their own defining makeups, which amounts to saying that they are definitionally distinct “of themselves.”

Preface to the solutions

viii. To clear these up, two preliminary remarks are needed.

First, the highly universal proposition that every agent yields something similar to itself according to the form whereby it is acting is true when the form is a mind-independent cause of the acting [*i.e.* when the form causes in its makeup as a thing: *in ratione rei*] but is not necessarily true when the form is, so to say, a mind-dependent cause for the acting [*i.e.* when it causes as an object-known: *ut cognita*]. The reason for the difference is that to act “as a thing” is to act because it is such, and so it must do as it is. To act “as a known” is not to act because it is such but because it is known as such; and from *x*'s being known as such-and-such there does not have to follow something similar to *x*; there may follow only an inclination to it, as we experience in ourselves.

Second, the part of ourselves that inclines to things, since it has to be moved by the known, has this oddity: it acts *in a way* “because of the thing it is” and *in a way* “because of a known.” For since love, holding first place in the will, necessarily arises from the will and from the known object-of-inclination [*appetibile*], it follows that if we look at love as it proceeds from the will, then indeed it proceeds as from a thing [*ut a re*]; but if we look at it as proceeding from the object-of-inclination, then it proceeds as from the known [*ut a cognito*]; and if we look at it as proceeding from both at once, as though from an agent and from a reason for its acting (though in different ways, as we said before), then there is no better term to express this mixed way of coming to be and proceeding than ‘living inclination’ [*appetitus*].

With these points in hand, it is easy to answer the first three doubts.

Answers to the trio

ix. We get at the root of the problem by taking them up in reverse order. So against the third doubt, we say that, although yielding something similar to itself is not the distinctive trait of a begetter as distinct from an agent in general, it is nevertheless his distinctive trait as over against one who is inwardly an agent by way of impulse or vital inclining, which is what is at stake in the text. For here the begetter is being distinguished from that which acts in itself “because of the known,” such as the will does; and in this regard yielding something similar to himself is distinctive of the begetter. And thus the explanation advanced in the text is indeed the true explanation or specific difference, and it also proves what it was supposed to prove.

x. Against the second doubt, we say that, when love is compared to its quasi-partial causes, it is seen to arise from the similar and from the non-similar: — from the similar insofar as it arises from the will; from the non-similar, insofar as it arises from the object inclined towards. But when we compare love to the whole of what produces it, namely the will as agent plus the known willable-object as reason for acting, then love proceeds from the non-similar; for love is not a likeness of the thing loved, but an inclination towards it. And this latter comparison is obviously the one made in the text. For the text locates the difference in the fact that a concept is a likeness of the thing known, while love as such is not a likeness of that which is the thing loved. From there, our answer to the objection is clear.

xi. Against the first doubt, we say that the text can be applied to either act. If applied to first act, the text is not to be understood as the objection imagines, however. It simply says that the will in first act in itself goes into act through an inclination, and never mind whether that inclination is one added to the will or one identical to the will itself. Either may be the case toward different objects in our will; for the will is naturally inclined towards happiness and yet is inclined by an added affection towards these or those particular goods to which it is drawn by habit, passion, or reason. About second act, however, there is no dispute.

In order to deduce the further differences from the first one, and also to respect the context of this article, the first difference should be applied to second act. After all, from the very fact that the terminus of the intellect in act is a likeness of the thing known, while the terminus of the will in act is not a likeness of the thing willed but an impulse towards it, it clearly follows that the total package productive of the concept makes a thing similar to itself according to the form which explains its acting [the form which is its *ratio agendi*], while the total package productive of love does not make something similar to itself according to the form which explains its acting, namely, the thing willed. And thus the objections are met.

Answering the last doubt

xii. To clear up the fourth doubt, the first thing you need to know is that

* *distingui seipsis formaliter*

(1) items are definitionally distinct* “of themselves” is quite another matter from

† *formaliter distingui seipsis primo*

(2) items are thus distinct *first off* “of themselves.”†

For (1), it suffices that the distinction arise from something essential to the items, be it part of a definition or the whole of it. For (2), however, this does not suffice. What is required, rather, is that the items be *first off* diverse, so that they are not distinguished through another item making them different.³

The second thing to know is that, just as entities themselves are of diverse orders, so are their form-wise definitions.⁴ Therefore it has to be the case that the definitions of some entities include something outside the essence defined — not so as to define better, but so as to define at all — as is obvious in the case of relations.⁵ The result is that, when we are talking about such entities, and we say that they are or are not distinct “of themselves,” or that they have some other item [distinguishing them], it is necessary to bear in mind that our claim can be understood two ways:

(1) Taken one way, ‘of themselves’ points out the items’ own essences;

(2) taken the other way, it points out their own essences *taken in isolation*⁶ not only from what goes into their definitions through a supplemental clause but also from what belongs to a transcendental relation to them.⁶

‡ *cum praecisione*

³ A horse and a man are distinct in essence (hence “of themselves”) but only through a part of each, namely, the specific difference. By contrast, their two specific differences are diverse *first off*. Cf. q.3, a.8 *ad* 3.

⁴ Here the talk of diverse orders coincides with the current use of “order” in formal logic. The values of predicate variables are “second order” entities, such as properties, relations, movements, etc., which are not defined without mentioning the first-order entities whose properties they are.

⁵ Take the relation whereby *x* is next to *y*. The “essence” of it can be defined by talking about “occupying an adjacent place in some space or series,” but no real case of it can be defined without also mentioning in supplemental clauses the type of entities ‘*x*’ and ‘*y*’ can stand for and the type of space or series in which the places appear. Elsewise, one cannot tell the nextness of seat-mates from that of successive integers.

⁶ A transcendental relation was not a distinct real entity but a nexus cutting across the categories and binding items of diverse orders together. Examples included the inherence whereby an accident “inherited in” a substance, the grounding whereby a quality in *x* was “the basis for” a relation between *x* and *y*, etc. Taking the essence of an action, say, in isolation from its inhering and from the subject in which it inheres would be unrealistic, obviously.

When such a claim is taken in this second way, it is mostly out of ignorance of the proper sense of the phrase, because essences of this kind intrinsically include such a relation within themselves and cannot be abstracted from it. Rather, the interpretation of such a claim is optimal when it is taken the first way, because each and every item has to have its intrinsically constitutive and hence distinctive factor. And since intrinsic factors of this sort [*i.e.* those constituting actions, motions, relations, accidents, etc.] have relation to outside items, both the philosophers and St. Thomas frequently say that these items belong to such entities as extrinsic factors — as their terminus, their object, their subject, etc.; and so what these authors mean is the same as the first sense above, for those who understand them correctly. — It is urgent that these points be recalled in the discussion of potencies/faculties, operations, motions, and other such topics; for from these points, the truth of all the rest is readily apparent.

xiii. With these remarks in place, the response to the doubt is that, in St. Thomas, these processions are not distinct of themselves *first off*. Indeed, if ‘of themselves’ is taken to mean ‘in isolation from the transcendental relation to sources, termini, etc.’, then saying that these processions are distinct “of themselves” is empty talk. These are the two points Aquinas intends to make in the passage cited [*De Pot.* q.10, a.2], as you can see by looking it up. For it is talking about the ultimately distinguishing factors of the two processions and asks if these are their sources and termini; yet it still distinguishes them definitionally through the differing bits in their definitions, namely, ‘by way of likeness’ and ‘by way of impulsion’, as the text says in so many words. Using this sense [of ‘of themselves’], we can admit that the processions are “distinct of themselves.” as we can admit that a cow and a man are, in the same sense. Of course, it is not our custom to use this expression unless we are talking about the items that are *ultimately* distinguishing and distinct. But there is no point in making a fuss about words.⁷

Hence it is easy to see that Scotus is dissenting from St. Thomas on this topic, in his remarks on *I Sentences* d.13. Scotus is holding that these processions are distinct of themselves *first off*, so that they agree in nothing at all. But he does not support this with any argument. And obviously, it was and is an easy move to rebut Scotus with the point that these processions agree in many quidditative predicates: they are both “a procession of a divine Person”; they are both “independent of matter.” etc.

⁷ In the case of a cow and a man, the items which are “ultimately distinguishing and distinct” are their respective specific differences.

Are there more than two processions in God?

4 CG c.26; *De Potentia Dei* q.9, a.9, q.10, a.2 replies to the *sed contra*

It seems that there are more processions within the divine reality than just the two.

(1) After all, power is just as much attributed to God as knowing and willing. So if processions are admitted because of understanding and willing, it seems a third should be admitted because of God's power.

(2) Besides, goodness seems to be above all the source of a procession, since the good is said [by Denis in *De divinis nominibus*, c.4] to be self-diffusive. It therefore looks as though a procession thanks to goodness ought to be admitted in God.

(3) Moreover, the fecundity of an active ability [*virtus*] is greater in God than it is in us. Well, there is not just one procession of an inner word in us, but many, because one such word in us proceeds from another; likewise, one love proceeds from another. In God, therefore, there are more processions than two.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is the fact that there are only two who proceed in God, the Son and the Holy Spirit. Ergo, there are only two processions in Him.

I ANSWER: processions within the divine reality can only be admitted in consequence of actions that are immanent within the doer. In a nature intellectual and divine, such actions are just two: understanding and willing. Sensation, after all, which seems to be an operation in one who perceives, is outside a [purely] intellectual nature and is not entirely separate from the transitive

kind of action, because sensing is brought about by the action of a thing sensed upon the sense faculty. By elimination, then, there can be no other procession in God but that of the Word and that of Love.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): power is the source of acting upon *another*; so what is admitted in consequence of power is transitive action. Hence the procession admitted in consequence of the attribute of power is not that of a divine Person but only that of creatures.

ad (2): as Boethius says in *De Hebdomadibus*, being good pertains to God's essence, not to His acting, unless perhaps as the object of His willing. So, since divine processions have to be admitted in consequence of some actions, no further processions are admitted in consequence of goodness and other such attributes — none beyond those of the Word and of Love, through which God understands and loves His own essence, realness [*veritas*], and goodness.

ad (3): to repeat a point already made above, God grasps everything He understands in one, simple Act and likewise wills everything He wills in one, simple Act. So in Him there cannot be procession of inner word from inner word, nor of love from love; rather, there is in Him just One complete Word, and One complete Love. And His complete fecundity is seen in that very fact.

PL 64, 1314

q.14, a.7
q.19, a.5

Cajetan's Commentary

The title-question is clear from what has preceded.

In the body of the article, a single conclusion answers the question: there can be no procession in God but that of the Word and that of Love.

This is supported as follows. [*Antecedent*:] Divine processions can only be admitted in line with immanent actions; so [*1st inference*:] only in line with understanding and willing; hence [*2nd inference*:] none can be admitted but that of the Word and that of Love.

Drawing the first inference is supported on two grounds: (1) on the ground that there is no other kind of immanent action in an intellectual nature (given that God is of a purely intellectual nature); (2) on the ground that sensation (a third kind of immanent action) is not entirely separate from transitive action, inasmuch as it is brought about by an outside object.

On the antecedent

ii. About the antecedent here, which is the basis for points already made and yet to be made on the topic

of the Trinity, observe that there are two ways it can be attacked.

One way is taken by those who deny that the productive actions within God are the immanent actions themselves. This denial is shared by Scotus and Durandus, as we brought out above [in § *xii* of the commentary on q.27, a.1]. As for Scotus, I have already rehearsed his opinion and argued against it [in the same section of the same commentary]. What remains, then, is to knock down Durandus' remarks.

iii. In comments on *I Sent.* d.10 [q.2], Durandus does not assent to Aquinas' argument [in this article] but goes back to d.6 [q.2], in which he also attacked this article and laid down his own opinion. He argues that divine processions do not arise on the basis of understanding and willing, since these are essential acts common to all the Persons and really identical; but the productive acts are (as all agree) identifier acts, not pertaining to all the Persons, and really distinct.

iv. Durandus thinks divine processions arise from

acts of God's nature, considered apart from His intellect and His will and all their acts. (In this he dissents from Scotus, too, who thought the processions did arise from acts of intellect and will, although he distinguished the acts in question from [the purely immanent ones of] understanding and willing.) — Durandus supports his opinion as follows. [*Antecedent*:] Communication of a nature arises from the fecundity of the nature itself, hence not from intellect and will; so [*inference*:] with these set aside, as the nature stands, so also its fecundity stands, along with the acts communicating the nature; ergo [the processions in God do not come from understanding and willing] *etc.* — The antecedent is clear case-by-case and is, indeed, self-evident; it is also confirmed by the authority of Hilary, "The will of God has given substance to all creatures [but not to a divine Person]," *etc.* — Drawing the inference is supported thus: [*major*:] how things are related when they are really distinct is similar to how they are related when they are only conceptually distinct; but [*minor*:] a thing's nature is obviously *prior* to its intellect and will, and likewise the acts of its nature are *prior* to the acts of its intellect and will. [Ergo: in God, where nature, intellect, and will are only conceptually distinct, the priorities remain the same.]— And here is a confirming argument: if heat were intelligent and volitional, it would still not heat things *qua* intelligent or volitional but by its nature, as it does now. Communicating a nature is thus of itself and firstly the act of a nature, in isolation from anything else. Such is the force of Durandus' position.

De synodis.
c. 58

Answering Durandus

v. To clear up this difficulty, note the following. (1) A nature can have no act unless it be either an immanent action or else a transitive one. For a third type of operation or production is impossible to find, even if one gives free rein to the imagination. This is because every second act completes the being of the agent or else completes the being of an effect. Induction over each nature in the universe would serve to confirm this, even if no argument could be adduced.

(2) Fecundity is not a condition of every nature, for not every nature is able to communicate itself according to a constant definition (or "univocally," which is how we are now speaking). The sun, for example, is not able to generate another sun. Likewise the pure intelligences have no act communicative of their own nature (the reason for which is given below, at q.45, a.5, *ad* 1).

(3) Where a nature does have fecundity, the nature is found to communicate itself in the same way as it *acts* towards self-communication. Since the definition of 'nature' in *Physics II* makes it the remote [first] source of action, not the proximate source, it is not required that, in every nature, the nature itself be the proximate and immediate source of operation, apart from any other power or faculty; it suffices that the nature be the remote source thereof through the mediation of one of its natural powers or faculties, as is clear in the elements and in the animals.

c. 1,
192b 22

vi. It follows as evident by induction and as consonant to reason that, if any fecund nature is communicable through its transitive action, it is not such by virtue of being intelligent, volitional or sentient, but, quite apart from all these things, has through the mediation of its power a self-communicative action which is transitive. But if there is a fecund nature which cannot be communicated through transitive action, such as any purely intellectual nature, then it has through its faculties a self-communicative action that belongs to the immanent type. And since the actions of this type in an intellectual nature are just intellection and volition (for intellect and will are the only faculties proper to a purely intellectual nature), it follows that, if any purely intellectual nature is fecund, its self-communicative act is intellection, or volition, or both. This is the reasoning in this article, which Aquinas began against Arius *et al.* already in the first article of this inquiry.

vii. So to answer the arguments on the other side, starting with the first, I say that the total upshot of it is just that the processions or productions in God are not immanent actions *exclusively qua immanent*; we teach the same; we say that they are "understanding expressing an inner word" and "willing aspiring [*spirando*]," and the same for other cases, as will come out at length below [in q.34, a. 1 *ad* 3, and q.37, a. 1].
viii. As to the root of Durandus' opinion, the thing to do is to concede his antecedent but deny what he infers from it. For alongside the fact that the act communicative of God's nature arises out of His fecundity, there stands the fact that this is in no way *prior* to His act of understanding or volition, because it is against His nature to be communicated by any act but that of understanding or willing. — As for Durandus' support for his inference, where he says, "how things are related," *etc.*, I concede his major but deny what his minor assumes, namely, that a fecund nature has to have a self-communicative act in isolation from its others; for this last is false, as we stated [in § vi].

Suppose you rejoin that, if understanding presupposes a fecund nature, then an act of understanding presupposes the act of a fecund nature. I deny the causal inference and the consequent, even where the antecedent is true. I deny them because such arguments do not hold in cases where the operation is the same [as the nature], such that the former [the fecund nature] can only operate through the latter [the understanding], as in the case at hand. — And if you ask for a reason why the nature cannot operate apart from the faculty, the only reason to give is that it is a nature. What is due to it as a nature is that it be the primordial, not the proximate, source of action: for it conflicts with a nature to be communicated by such a prior act, as I have said.

One's imagination seems to go wrong by picturing the nature and the intellect standing as two natures, so to speak, when in fact we have to picture the

case at hand in such a way that intellectuality is the difference constituting the nature in an order or kind of things such that, either it is infecund, or else its fecundity is thanks to its intellectual acts. And such is the case in [the divine] reality.

Hence it is clear that the truth of Durandus' conditional about heat (and similar ones) contributes nothing relevant. For such conditionals are true of forms communicable through transitive action, and which we imagine as relating to intellectuality as to a property, and not as to a difference determining how it is commu-

nicated, as in the case under discussion here.

Thus the divine processions should be thought of as pre-containing in a higher manner the complete traits of all processions:

- they communicate a nature, because they arise out of the fecundity of that nature;
- they are acts of intellect and will, because they are in a purely intellectual nature;
- and neither has more than one case, because each is unqualifiedly complete, *etc.*



Inquiry Twenty-Eight: Into the divine relations

Consideration must now turn to the divine relations. Four questions are asked:

- (1) are there real relations within God?
- (2) are those relations the divine essence itself, or are they attached to it extrinsically?
- (3) can there be in God several relations that are really distinct from one another?
- (4) how many of these relations are there?

article 1

Are there any real relations within God?

In I Sent. d.26, q.2, a.1; 4 CG c.14; De Potentia Dei q.8, a.1; Compend. Theol. c.53; In Joan c.16, lectio 4

It seems that there are no real relations within God.¹

IV, c 4
PL 64, 1252
* *ad aliquid*

(1) After all, Boethius says in his *De Trinitate* that “when one uses the categories to predicate them of God, everything that can be predicated turns into substance; but relation* cannot be predicated at all.” Well, whatever is really there in God can be predicated of Him. Therefore, no relation is really present in God.

IV, c 6;
PL 64, 1255
† *extrema*

(2) Besides, Boethius says in the same book that “in the Trinity, the relation of the Father to the Son, and of each to the Holy Spirit, is like the identity relation of the same thing to the same thing.” But this sort of relation is a pure product of thought, because any real relation requires the *relata*¹ to be two real things. Therefore, the relations posited within the divine reality are not real but products of thought.

(3) Moreover, the Fatherhood relation is a source relation, and when we say, “God is the source of creatures,” no real relation is implied, but only a thought-produced relation. Therefore, Fatherhood within God is not a real relation either.

q.13, a.7

(4) Furthermore, “generation” in the divine reality arises because of the intellectual procession of the Word. But relations that arise just because of the intellect’s operation are thought-produced relations. Therefore, the fatherhood and sonship talked about in God on account of the “generation” within Him are merely thought-produced relations.

ON THE OTHER HAND, a father is only so called because of fatherhood, and a son because of sonship. If father-

relation was symmetrical. ‘Married to’ was symmetrical (like ‘co-eternal with’ and ‘as glorious as’), while ‘taller than’ was asymmetrical (like ‘father of’, whose converse therefore had to have a different name, like ‘son of’). But even in symmetrical cases, a relation always had its directionality (or “towardsness”), expressed by the difference between subject and terminus. Jack’s marriage-relation was towards Jill, while hers was towards Jack. Thus, Aristotle selected “towardsness” as the distinctive trait of relations.

For philosophers, the main question was whether relations were in the real, or arose from human thinking, as it compared things. Aristotle and his heirs gave a divided answer. *Sometimes* relational predicates expressed bearings which were there in the real, apart from our thought, and *sometimes* they did not. The real cases were assigned to their own category (often called *ad aliquid*) among the kinds of accident; the others were called thought-produced (*relatio rationis*). Typically, a relation and its converse had the same status (real or otherwise); but for the odd cases where a real relation had only a thought-produced converse, review q.13, a.7.

Aquinas thus inherited two key points: (1) that there are real relations, (2) that these are typically “accidents,” *i.e.* items whose way of “being” was being-in their subject without entering into its essential makeup. Point (1) negated the view of those nominalists who had rejected relations wholesale (and whose view would be revived in much modern philosophy). Point (2) was about to give trouble in this article and the next.

Today, the distinction between real and thought-produced relations is drawn in a second order logic with Henkin models, that is, one which is prepared to quantify selectively over the traits of things. In such a logic, a true first-order formula of the form ‘ $\exists xR_x y$ ’ will sometimes be accompanied by a true second-order formula, ‘ $\exists X(X=R_x)$ ’, and sometimes it won’t.

¹ Aquinas expected his readers to be familiar with a philosophical analysis of relations inherited from Aristotle, Porphyry, Boethius, and others. Here is a quick review.

Language gives us predicates which state the bearing of one thing towards another. Think of ‘taller than’ in ‘Jack is taller than Jill’. These were called relational predicates, *relativa*, and were contrasted with all the predicates called *absoluta*, which described a thing in itself independently of others.

For all relational predicates, grammar and logic could distinguish the things related (called the *relata* or the *extrema*) from each other and from the relation itself (the *ipsa relatio*). One *relatum* bore the relation to the other. The one bearing it was called the subject; the other, the terminus. In ‘Jack is taller than Jill’, the persons were the *relata*, Jack the subject, Jill the terminus, and ‘taller than’ stated the relation itself.

Along with the relation came its basis (*fundamentum*) and converse (*relatio opposita*). For ‘taller than’, a physical size (quantity) was the basis, and ‘shorter than’ was the converse, stating the relation which Jill bore back to Jack. In ‘Jack is married to Jill’, certain vows formed the basis, and the converse was expressed the same way (‘married to’). A relation and its converse could thus have the same “name,” in case the

hood and sonship are not real in God, it follows that God is not really a Father or a Son, but is only called so because of how we understand — which is the Sabellian heresy.

ANSWER: certain relations are really there within the divine reality. To see this, one needs to ponder the fact that only among relational traits does one find some which are merely thought-produced and not real. This problem does not arise in the other categories, because the others (such as quality and quantity) indicate as their defining hallmark “an item *inhering in* something.” But relational traits, in their defining hallmark, indicate only “bearing *towards another*.” Sometimes this bearing is in the real,* as when one thing is ordered to another by its very nature or has an inclination towards it. Such relations have to be real. A heavy body, for instance, has in it an inclination and an ordering toward the central place. Ditto for other such cases.² But sometimes the bearing indicated by a relational predicate is only in the apprehension of reason comparing one item to the other; and then the relation is merely thought-produced, as when man is compared to animal as “species” to “genus.”³

Now, when one thing proceeds from a source of the same nature, it has to be the case that both, *i.e.* both what proceeds and what it proceeds from, belong to the same level [*ordo*], and hence the bearings they have towards each other have to be real. Since, therefore, the processions within the divine reality preserve identity of nature, as shown above, it has to be the case that the relations admitted in consequence of the divine processions are real relations.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): Boethius says relation is “not predicated” of God at all, because of the defining hallmark of relational traits, *i.e.* because the proper explanation of relational traits is not gotten by looking at the subject in which the relation inheres but at its bearing towards another. So in making this remark, Boethius did not wish to exclude relation from being in God but from being predicated as inhering (according to the proper explanation of a relation), rather than as bearing towards another.⁴

² The tendency of heavy and light bodies to rest in their “natural places” was a favorite medieval example of real bearings. To update it: all massive bodies are really related by their gravitational pull on each other. Also: the phase space of many physical systems shows that they are really “attracted” to certain stable states.

³ Socrates had in him a form of man but no form of animal. So ‘man is a species of animal’ was not analyzed as relating two forms in the real but as relating a form to an abstraction. ‘Species’ and ‘genus’ were terms of “second intention,” picking out places in a classificational scheme. Such a scheme applied to things only as known to us. So ‘ φ -things are a species of ψ -things’ was a thought-produced relation.

⁴ For Boethius, being-predicated-of- x was so much a mat-

ad (2): the relation conveyed by the word ‘same’ [in ‘ x is the same as y ’] is just a thought-produced relation if ‘same’ is meant in all respects whatsoever; for such a relation can only arise in some “ordering” of a thing to itself, which thought invents because it has come up with two considerations of the thing. Matters are quite different, however, when things are called “the same” not numerically but just in the nature of their genus or species. Boethius is not comparing the relations in God to sameness in all respects, then, but just in one, namely that the relations in God preserve sameness of substance, as the identity relation does.⁵

ad (3): the “procession” of creatures from God does not preserve sameness of nature, and this is why God is outside the “order” of creation as a whole and why no relatedness to creatures arises from His nature. After all, He does not produce creatures by necessity of nature but by understanding and willing, as came out above. So there is no real relation in God towards creatures; rather, the real relation is in creatures, towards God, because they are included in God’s “order” and because it is in their nature to depend upon Him. By contrast, the processions within God preserve sameness of nature. So their case is not the same.

ad (4): the relations that arise solely because of the intellect’s operation are just thought-produced relations, if you are talking about relations that arise in the very topics understood, because such relations are obviously ones which thought invents *between topics understood*. But relations which arise because of the intellect’s operation and which are relations between *the inner word proceeding* and *that from which it proceeds* are not just thought-produced but real. For an intellect-with-its-thought is a certain real thing and relates as a real thing to what proceeds from it intellectually, just as a bodily thing relates as a real thing to what proceeds from it corporeally. Thus fatherhood and sonship are real relations within the divine reality.⁶

ter of inhering-in- x that he thought one could only “predicate” traits which carried the *sense* of inhering.

⁵ Nowadays, sameness in all ways, including numerically, is called identity; it is expressed with ‘=’, as in ‘ $x=y$ ’, and is analyzed as Aquinas said. One and the same real thing, $V(x)$, is looked at two ways (say, once as the referent of ‘ x ’ and once as the referent of ‘ y ’). By contrast, sameness just in substantial nature (as in ‘ x is the same as y in φ -ness’) is a real relation between numerically distinct things, $V(x)$ and $V(y)$, based on the fact that what it takes to be φ is found in both.

⁶ The term ‘*relatio rationis*’ was ambiguous. It could denote an item in Popper’s world 3 (a relation introduced by our thinking into the topic thought about), or it could denote an item in Popper’s world 2 (a relation arising within the psychological process of cognition). In the latter case, a *relatio rationis* was mind-dependent but not thought-up, so it did not contrast with a *relatio realis*. Readers unfamiliar with Sir Karl Popper’s work may read chapter P2 in Karl R. Popper and John C. Eccles, *The Self and its Brain* (London: Routledge, 1993).

* in natura rerum

q 27, a.3 ad 2

Cajetan's Commentary

In the title, what 'real' means is clear. The reason the word is there is stated in the body of the article: namely, because not all relations are real. The phrase 'are within God' bespeaks the form-wise way of being in God [rather than just virtually]. Phrasing the question in the plural insinuates the answer that there are several real relations in God and also shows that the question is about relations *ad intra*. Relations *ad extra*, after all, were dealt with earlier [in q.13, a.7] and would be relations of God to other things rather than relations within God Himself, however we may speak of Him.

Analysis of the article, I

ii. In the body of the article St. Thomas does three jobs: (1) he states an answer to the question; (2) he treats the term 'real'; and (3) he supports his answer.

As to job (1), his answer is affirmative: certain relations are really there within the divine reality.

iii. As to job (2), he gives the reason why realness is a separate issue in connection with relations, and he explains what a real relation is vs. what a thought-produced relation is. The reason realness is a separate issue is the difference between the "towards something" [*ad aliquid*] and the other categories: namely, that while all the other categories are taken as real, some cases of *ad aliquid* are taken merely as products of thought, while others are taken as real. Furthermore, this difference arises from another, namely, that the other categories of accident properly indicate that some trait inheres in a thing, while *ad aliquid* properly indicates merely a bearing of one thing towards another.

Doubts about job (2)

iv. Concerning these statements, many doubts exist. Starting with the first difference, doubt arises on both sides of it. On the side of *ad aliquid*, it arises thus. Insofar as *ad aliquid* is one category over against all the others, it is real being by its own strict, scientific definition;* after all, what gets distributed into the ten categories is a part, member, or mode of *real being*. Ergo, it is false that there is an oddity to the category of relation, to the effect that one finds within it some thought-produced cases. And if you suggest that what is being discussed here is not "relation" as one of the categories but 'relation' as an analogous term covering all relational predicates, your suggestion is knocked down by the text, which contrasts "relation" with the other categories. What contrasts with other categories is one of the categories.

Meanwhile, on the side of the other categories, the doubt goes like this. Instances taken as real and instances taken as thought-produced seem to be found in all of them. A thought-up rose is a thought-produced substance, and so is an abstract triangle, etc. So it is not peculiar to relations to have cases taken as real and cases taken as thought-produced. You find both also

in the category of quantity: there are real quantities, such as a polyhedral body, and quantities that are formally thought-produced, such as time, at least in the opinion of St. Thomas.¹ Ergo [the alleged difference fails].

v. Concerning the second difference, double-sided doubt also arises. Again, on the side of *ad aliquid*, it seems that this category does not just bespeak bearing towards another but towards a real other; otherwise the category would not form a division of real being.

And on the side of the other categories, it seems that *action* also does not properly bespeak something inhering, as St. Thomas himself seems to admit elsewhere (in the Disputed Questions *De Potentia Dei*, q.8, a.2). So not every other category of accident properly bespeaks the inherence of one thing in another.

Resolving these doubts

vi. To address these doubts, we should answer them in reverse order, so as to start with the true root of the matter. The proper and distinctive hallmark* of *ad aliquid* or relation is exactly that by which this category is first-off distinct from the others. This hallmark is not being a being, nor being an accident, nor being inhering, nor being something real, since all of these are common among the categories; rather, the distinctive hallmark is "to have a bearing towards another,"† which we express simply by the word 'towards'. So whenever we are speaking of *ad aliquid* or relation according to its proper scientific account, we are speaking about this *towards*. And since many relations are real and many are just thought-produced, and yet each has its own *towards*, it follows that *towards*, simply as *towards*, need not be real being and need not be thought-produced being, but may be either. Nor is it inappropriate that a phrase thus abstracting from realness should serve (*via* a certain modified part of itself) as a differentiator of real being. And since 'towards' is formally included in this part as the proper hallmark of the category (albeit modified), whenever we are speaking of relations in terms of what is formally unique to them and thus separates them from the other categories — even when we are speaking in that way of real relations, I say — the 'towards' can be understood simply as *towards*. Thus it becomes clear why it is not necessary to speak sometimes of *towards another* and sometimes of *towards a real other*. when we are speaking of relations in terms of that simple trait which is unique to them; both cases boil down to the 'towards', which alone constitutes the simple differentiator.

vii. From these remarks, our answer to the two doubts on the side of *ad aliquid* is obvious. Equally obvious is the reason why we say that relations, according to their proper hallmark, do not posit something in the

* *propria ratio formalis*

* *propria ratio*

† *ad aliud se habere*

¹ Aquinas states this view of time at *In I Sent.*, d.19, q.2, a.1: q.5, a.1; *In IV Phys.*, lectio 23, n.5.

thing related. For this and other such points are true as far as the sheer meaning of 'towards' is concerned, even though they might be false in the case of a given *towards*, e.g. a real one.

And so one must speak cautiously. For how we speak about those kinds of relations which are necessarily real by their very meaning, such as paternity and filiation, is different from how we must speak about relations in general; for the latter mean only *towards another*, while the former mean *towards a real other*.

viii. Now as to the second doubt which arises on the side of the other categories [see § v]: the body of the article does not compare relation to all the other categories but to the *absolute* [i.e. non-relational] categories, such as quantity and quality, which are the only ones mentioned in the text. That this was St. Thomas' intention is made clear by his parallel discussion at *In I Sent.*, d.26, q.2, a.1, where he speaks expressly of all other "absolute" forms. Therefore, if action is an absolute form (whatever may be its mode of signifying, about which St. Thomas speaks in the *De potentia*), it exists in the real* and is referred to as inherent. But if action is a relative form, it poses no objection to what we are saying.

* *ex parte rei*

Still, the distinction can be extended so as to contrast relations with all the other categories, if we take the word 'inhering' not according to its formal meaning, but in a broad sense as covering every mode of being which formally bespeaks being in the real. For in this way all the other categories, including substance, are different from relations. Warrant for taking the text in this second way may be had from the fact that neither the distinctive hallmark of quality nor that of quantity consists in being-in,[†] since being-in is common to all the categories of accident; rather their hallmark is found in a particular way of being-in, a way which by its very nature posits something in the real; but the contrary is true with the hallmark of relation.

† *in esse*

ix. As to the first doubt which arises on the side of the other categories [see § iv]: it arises from a poor understanding of the distinctive difference which St. Thomas assigns. For relation is a certain being-status,[‡] so to speak, some of whose subjective parts conflict with being in the real and get only a thought-produced being, while others of its parts go along with being in the real. Differently stated, relation is the kind of being to which the addition, "existing in the mind," is not a diminution, as it is with the other categories. A rose in the mind is not a rose; Homer in thought is not Homer; but a relation in the mind is a genuine relation. Still differently, it is not the case that a relation is a real being in one respect and thought-produced in another, e.g. completely; rather a relation is sometimes simply and flatly a thought-produced being.

‡ *entitas*

Hence it is clear how to answer the specific objections. Time and the like depend upon the mind only to

complete them. A rose or triangle considered as existing by thought is not a true rose or triangle. The distinction between a rose in real being and one in mental being* is not a distinction between different quiddities, one real, and the other thought-produced, as happens in the case of relations, but is rather a distinction between ways of being for one and the same quiddity, viz., unqualified being vs. being in a qualified sense.

* *esse rationis*

x. We are now ready to go back to the question of what a real relation is, vs. one that is just thought-produced [cf. § iii]. Sometimes having-a-bearing exists in the very natures of things, and sometimes it arises only in the mind's apprehension of them. The former happens when two things have an inclination or ordination to each other, as we see in the case of a heavy body and a low place. The latter happens when the mind compares one thing to another, as we see in the case of "species" and "genus."

xi. Pay attention to two points, however. (1) The present article should be understood to be about relations which are real in both directions[†] [i.e. relations whose converse is also real], because these are the kind that will be under discussion, and it should be understood to be about basis-wise inclination or ordination, a topic on which I commented in connection with q.13, a.7 [at § xvi of the commentary]. (2) Our talk of "the mind comparing" should be taken in utmost generality, as applying to any of the ways in which the intellect understands one thing in comparison to another. How many such ways there are may be seen in *In I Sent.* d.26, q.2, a.1, and in *De Potentia* q.7, a.2.

† *mutuae*

Trouble from Scotus

xii. Further doubt about this part of the article arises from what Scotus had to say on *I Sentences* d. 45. He thought that not every *relatio rationis* arose from the [work of the] intellect but that some arose from the will and some from imagination. He supported this view with the following sort of argument. [*Major:*] Every faculty can have an act dealing with an object *O* that is existing but is not dealt with as existing,¹ and linking that object to another one *O'* to which it is not naturally linked can produce, in the object *qua* object, a relation to that other. [*Minor:*] But the will is of this sort, since it can use God as a means to a creature and can use other objects in similarly perverse ways. [*Conclusion:*] Ergo the will can cause such a relation. It is obvious that such a relation is not real; therefore it is thought-produced, but not thanks to the intellect.

xiii. The right way to answer this comes from *Metaphysics IV* and *V*. The only ways you find "being" broken down is into "being *per se*" divided into the ten categories and "being *per accidens*" (discussed in *Me-*

² Scotus was appealing here to his idea of "objectual being." Cf. §§ xi-xvi in Cajetan's comment on q.14, a.5.

c.7, 1017a 7-34 *tapphysics V*) and “being true” (treated first in *Metaphysics IV* and finished in *Metaphysics V*). So positing any other mode of being is seen to be fiction. For Aristotle himself thought he had dealt sufficiently with “being in the mind” by dealing with “being true.” So such relations have no other actual being to them beyond the fact that a proposition about them is true.

One should bear in mind, however, that a thought-produced relation can be considered in two ways: (1) in terms of its own being (and so considered it has no being but its being-understood), and (2) in terms of its quasi-proximate cause or basis* — and so considered it can be caused by the will or the imagination or even by an external sense (for when sight attains a color, it causes therein a relation of seen to seer). Likewise, the right side of an animal causes a to-the-right-of relation to arise in a column. And yet these relations are only “actual” when they are understood. So, since the will (or any other faculty), taken in itself as separate from thinking, causes a relation in its object only in this way — namely, by yielding a thought-produced relation when one can arise at all — and cannot cause a relation in any other way (for if the faculties were natural causes working on a patient suitably disposed, etc., they would work in such a way as to yield a real relation), and since the being of a thought-produced relation lies in its being-understood, such a relation never “is” actually unless it “is understood” (although it “is” habitually, so to speak, given the aforesaid bases). Thus Scotus’s major premise, if understood as talking about actual causing and about a thought-produced relation in actual being, is false. (Only if construed as talking basis-wise is it true). This is why it says in the text of this article that such a relation “is” in the mind’s apprehension alone.

Analysis of the article, II

xiv. The third job Aquinas does in the article is support his answer, and here is how it goes. Whenever something proceeds from a source of the same nature as itself, both are of the same order and so have real relations to each other. Processions in God preserve identity of nature. So, the relations arising from the processions in God are real. All of that is quite clear.

On the answer ad (1)

xv. In the answer to the first objection, the begin-

ning student needs to observe that predication is based on inherence.* As far as its distinctive hallmark goes, a relation does not inhere, although *in fact* some of them do [namely, as will emerge in the next article, the ones that are real in creatures]. And so, for the same reason, a relation is not said in general to be predicated, even though it sometimes is; but even then, it is predicated in its own way, namely, as towards another.

On the answer ad (2)

xvi. In the answer to the second objection, you see that the relation of sameness in species or genus is a real relation in both directions, beginning where Aquinas says, “Matters are quite different . . .” Even without this remark of his, the mind is easily convinced that the point is sound. Two cases of humanity are no less similar in nature than two cases of whiteness, but the relation of species-similarity between two white things is real; ergo, so is the relation between two human beings. This point will prove to be of the highest importance when the time comes to deal with the basis of a relation or with the distinction between a relation and its basis. For in this passage you see both that there is a relation based immediately on substance and that it is really distinct from its basis. Hence it is clear that, according to St. Thomas, such relations are accidents and belong in the category of Relation [cf. Aquinas on *Metaphysics V*, *lectio 11*].

Nor is this point contradicted by the fact that elsewhere [on *Physics III*, *lectio 1*, n.6] Aquinas seems to say that a relation has to be based on substance indirectly, through the mediation of other categories, because of its weakness. For this remark is not to be understood in terms of [the structure of] the real, but in terms of [the structure of] explanations.† A relation of similarity in quality [between *x* and *y*] is said to be based on quantity because its basis is *oneness*, as Aristotle says in *Metaphysics V*; and yet it is perfectly clear that, in real terms, the qualities or other such forms [in *x* and *y*] are themselves the relation’s basis. Aristotle’s idea is that they are the basis under an explanation‡ that mentions oneness: oneness in quality makes “similarity” (as oneness in quantity makes “equality,” and oneness in substance makes “identity”).

Other points of apparent contradiction will be dealt with later [see the commentary on the next article, §§ 5 and following].

* *praedicari fundatur super inesse*

* *fundamentum*

† *non realiter sed formaliter*

c.15; 1021a 10

‡ *ratio*

Is a relation within God the same "thing" as His essence?

In I Sent. d 33, q.1, a.1; d 26, q.2, a.1, q^u1; d.41, a.1;
De Potentia q.2, a.5, q.8, a.2, *Quodl.* 1, 1; *Comp Theol* cc.54, 66, 67

It looks as though a relation within God would not be the same thing [*idem*] as His essence.¹

c.5;
 PL 42, 914 (1) Augustine says [in *De Trinitate V*]: "Not every description of God applies to Him because of His substance. He is described relationally, after all, as Father to Son. These expressions do not apply because of substance." Therefore, a relation [in God] is not the divine essence.

c.1;
 PL 42, 935 (2) Augustine also says [in *De Trinitate VII*]: "Everything described relationally is also something apart from the relation, as 'the master of the house' is also a man and 'his servant' is a man, too." So it has to be the case that, if there are relations in God, there is also something else in God. But this last can only be His essence. Therefore, His essence is a different thing [*aliud*] from the relations.

c.5;
 Ba 39 (3) Besides, relational being is "bearing towards another," as it says in the *Categories*. So if a relation is the divine essence itself, the existing of that essence is "bearing towards another" — which conflicts with the completeness of God's existing, which is supremely independent and self-subsistent, as was shown above. Hence, no relation is the divine essence itself.

ON THE OTHER HAND, every *thing* which is not the divine essence is a creature. Relation really pertains to God. So, if it is not the divine essence, it will be a creature, and so it will be wrong to give it the adoration of worship — contrary to what we sing in the Preface [for Trinity Sunday]: "... *ut in Personis proprietatis, et in majestate adoretur aequalitas.*"²

ANSWER: Gilbert of la Porrée is said to have gone wrong on this topic and later to have retracted his error at a council in Rheims.³ He said that the relations we speak of in God were "alongside" His essence or "outwardly attached" [*assistentes vel extrinsecus affixae*].

To get the matter clear, one needs to bear in mind the fact that, in each of the nine categories of accident, there are two sides to consider:

- (1) One side is the existing that comes with each of them because it is an accident (and this, in common to all of them, is being-in-the-subject; for an accident's existing is being-in).
- (2) The other side to consider in each is its defining trait or hallmark among the categories.

¹ The issue in this article is how to count "things" in God, a very technical question about which more will be said later.

² "... as distinctiveness is adored in the Persons, and equality, in their majesty."

³ Gilbertus Porretanus (1076-1154) was a chancellor at the School of Chartres and a bishop of Poitiers. For his *De Trinitate*, see PL 164, 1291ff.

In the categories other than relation, such as quantity and quality, even the defining hallmark is gotten by looking at the substance serving as the accident's subject: quantity is called "an amount of *substance*"; quality is "a disposition of *substance*." But the defining hallmark of relation is not found by looking at what it is in but by looking "towards" something outside it.

Even in created cases, then, if we look at relations just insofar as they are relations, they are found to be "alongside," "not inwardly attached," as if indicating a bearing that somehow "happens upon" the thing related, reaching from it to something else. But if each relation is looked at insofar as it is an accident, then it inheres in a subject and has accidental being therein. Gilbert of la Porrée looked at a relation only in the first way.

Now, whatever has accidental being in created cases has substantial being in the divine case; nothing is "in" God as an accident in a subject; rather, whatever is "in God" is His essence. So, on the existential side, where relations in created cases have accidental being in a subject, a relation really existing in God has the divine essence's being and is utterly identical with it. But inasmuch as it is called a "towards something," it does not indicate any standing *vis-à-vis* that essence but rather a bearing towards the relation's opposite [*i.e.* towards what is conversely related].

Thus it becomes clear that a relation really existing in God is the same as His essence thing-wise* and differs from it only in how we understand it † (in that "relation" implies bearing towards an opposite, while nothing of the kind is implied in calling it "essence"). Transparently, then, the situation within the divine reality is such that a relation's existing is not another thing [*aliud*] from His essence's existing but is one and the same [*idem*].

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): the point of Augustine's words is not to say that fatherhood's existence (or that of any other relation in God) is not the same as the divine essence; their point, rather, is to say that the relation is not predicated as substance — as existing "in" the thing said to be so related — but as bearing towards another. This is why Augustine says there are just two categories in [the talk of] God. For in both their being and their category-hallmark, the other categories involve a standing *vis-à-vis* the thing of which they are said. Nothing "in God," *vis-à-vis* what it is in (or said of) can have any standing but identity, thanks to His supreme simplicity.

ad (2): in created cases, what we find in a thing described in relational terms is not only the relation to another but also something absolute [*i.e.* something not a relation]. The same holds in the divine case, but

* *idem secundum rem*
 † *secundum intelligentiae rationem*

De Trinitate V, cc.5, 8
 PL 42, 914 and 916-7

q.3, a.8

it holds in a different way. For when we set aside what is contained in the descriptive force of the relative term, what we find in a creature is another thing [*alia res*], while what we find in God is not another thing but one and the same Thing — a Thing which no term expresses so completely as to capture It comprehensively in the term's descriptive force. When the terminology for God was being discussed above, I said that the fullness of the divine essence contains more than can be captured by any term. The result is that what follows from Augustine's point is not that, besides the relation in God, there is something else in Him *as another real factor*, but only that there is more to Him than is grasped in the relative term's own account (or in that of any other term).

q.13, a.2

ad (3): if there were nothing more in the fullness of the divine essence than what the descriptive force of a relative term captured, then it would follow that His existing is imperfect (He would just *be* a bearing towards another); similarly, if there were nothing more in His fullness than what the descriptive force of 'wisdom' captured, He would not be something subsistent. But since the fullness of the divine essence is greater than what can be captured comprehensively in any term's meaning, the mere fact that a relative term (or any other term) applied to God does not indicate something complete does not imply that the divine essence has incomplete existence; for the divine essence contains within itself the complete trait of *every category*, as I said above.

in q.13, a.11, see fn. 1

q.4, a.3

Cajetan's Commentary

The meaning of the title is made clear in the body of the article.

Analysis of the article

Aquinas does three jobs in this article. (1) He refers to a certain error. (2) He exposes the root of it and the basis for the opposing truth. (3) Beginning at the words 'Now, whatever has accidental being in created cases', he answers the question on the right basis.

As to job (1), he states the error on this question, namely: relations in God are alongside or outwardly attached to His essence; he attributes the error to Gilbert of La Porrée, and he observes that Gilbert subsequently renounced the error.

ii. As to job (2), three points are made.

(a) Relation, along with every other category of accident, comes under two distinct accounts.* One of these is common to all such categories, and this is its account as an accident, namely, being-in a subject [*in-esse subjecto*], since an accident's existing is being-in [*accidentis esse est inesse*]. The other account, however, gives the distinctive hallmark† of each category. And in this regard, the category of relation differs from all the other categories which are absolute. For the hallmarks of all the others bespeak a property looking to its subject. That of relation, however, bespeaks a property looking (not to its subject but) to a terminus. In other words, relation differs from all the other categories in whether it verifies or falsifies the following causal sentence:

φ, by virtue of its hallmark, posits something in a subject.

Where the names of the other categories are substituted for φ, the sentence comes out true, but not when 'Relation' is substituted. This point was already discussed in connexion with article 1.

(b) Even in created things, if relations are taken strictly according to what they possess on the basis of their hallmark alone, they are "alongside"; but if they are taken according to what they possess on the basis

of being accidents, they are inherent.

(c) The reason why Gilbert went wrong is that he considered relations solely according to what they possess on the basis of their hallmark; and so he said that they are outwardly adjacent. But if he had considered their inherence, as Aquinas proceeds to do in this article, he would have spoken differently.

iii. As to job (3), he lays down one conclusion in answer to the question, and he adds one corollary.

• The conclusion is this: a relation really existing in God [*1st part:*] is identical to His essence in reality and [*2nd part:*] differs from it only in our account.*

* secundum rationem

The conclusion's first part is supported thus. [*Antecedent:*] Whatever has accidental being in creatures has substantial being when transferred to God; therefore [*consequence:*] a relation existing in God has the existence of His essence. The antecedent is proved by the fact that, in God, nothing exists as an accident in a subject, but whatever is there is His substance. The consequence follows because a relation in creatures has accidental existence on the part of its "in."

The second part of the conclusion is proved by the following. In saying "relation," we imply a reference to a terminus or converse, whereas in saying "essence" we do not. Therefore relation differs from essence at least in that respect.

iv. • The corollary is this: in God the existence of a relation and the existence of His essence are utterly one and the same existence. Pay scrupulous attention to the fact that, in talk of existence, 'being-in' means an accident's actual existence. But the actual existence even of a relation is not its "towards something," as St. Thomas clearly teaches at *In I Sentences* d.38, q.1, a.1 *ad* 1; and so the actual existence of a divine relation is utterly identical with that of the divine essence itself: for it does not even differ from it in our account [*ratione*], even though the whateness of the relation is understood to differ from the whateness of the essence, as the relative differs from the absolute.

* rationes

† propria ratio

And this is what St. Augustine meant when he said [in *De Trinitate VII*, c. 4, and in his comment on Psalm 68, sermon 1, n. 5], “that whereby the Father is God is the same as that whereby He is; but that whereby He is the Father is not the same as that whereby He is God.” So we have not only a thing-wise identity of the relation with the essence but also an utter [omnimodam] identity between the existences of each. And therefore, the actual existence of all the divine relations is one case of existence, even though the relations themselves are really distinct from one another.

Occasioned by the answer *ad* (2): A disputation about whether relations and their bases are distinct

v. In the answer to the second objection, where you have the words, “when we set aside what is contained in the descriptive force of the relative term, what we find in a creature is another thing [*alia res*], while what we find in God is not another thing,” etc., a great doubt arises about the distinctness of the relation from its basis. It arises both on the merits of the problem and also in the interpretation of St. Thomas’ doctrine. Some authors, even Thomists, hold that a relation is the same thing as its basis. Others hold that it is thing-wise distinct from its basis. And still others hold that some relations are identical with their bases, whereas others are thing-wise distinct from them.

We must now see which of these views is closer to the truth and which is more in accord with the mind of St. Thomas, given his assertions and arguments.

The identity theory

vi. The first opinion [that a relation is the same as its basis] seems to harmonize with St. Thomas because of four propositions which he holds.

- The first is actually common to all authors, namely: the existence proper to each simple form begins and ceases with it [*Quaestio Disputata de Anima*, a.14].

- The second is also common and is taken from *Physics I*: a relation comes to be in something without a change [*mutatio*] having taken place in that thing.

- The third is peculiar to St. Thomas: the being-in* of each accidental form is really distinct from the essence of the accident and from the existence of its subject [*In II Sent.* d.12, q.1, a.1, qu^a1: 4 *CG*, c. 14].

- The fourth is also unique to St. Thomas: a relation’s being-in is not its bearing-towards-another [*De Potentia Dei*, q.7, a.9, ad 7].

From these four points it follows that, if Socrates alone exists as white, there is no similarity to other white things; but as soon as Plato is born white, the similarity exists in Socrates, without his having acquired any new absolute property (otherwise he really would have been changed). Therefore either the being-in of the similarity is the same as the being-in of the whiteness (and

hence the similarity is thing-wise* the same as the whiteness), or else the being-in of the similarity was already there without the similarity itself (which is contrary to the first proposition).

But this opinion really rests upon three foundations: (a) the one already mentioned, i.e., coming-to-be without change; (b) the issue of composition, i.e., that “a similar white thing” is not more composed than “a white thing” (and in *De Potentia* q.7, a.8, Aquinas is explicit that a relation does not form a composition with that whose relation it is); and (c) a relation’s minimal status as a being* compared with all the other categories, as Averroes says on *Metaphysics XII*, comment 19; on this basis, a relation has to have less status as a being than time, which is to some extent a being already apart from the mind, as *Physics IV* says.

Scotus’ theory

vii. The opinion that some relations are distinct from their basis and some are not, belongs to Scotus [*In II Sent.* d.1, q.5; and *In III Sent.* d.8; and in *Quodlibetis* q.3, a.3]. He holds these two universal propositions: (1) a relation whose basis can remain without its terminus is really distinct from its basis, and (2) a relation whose basis cannot exist without its terminus is really the same as that basis. He supports both propositions by the same sort of argument. The support for (1) is that if no contradiction is implied in the basis remaining without the relation, it follows they are two things (for if they were one thing, that same thing would at once be and not be). The support for (2) is the reverse: if a contradiction is implied in the basis being without the relation, it follows that they are one thing.

Aquinas’ theory

viii. The opinion that every real relation is thing-wise distinct from its basis belongs, beyond doubt, to St. Thomas, even though many Thomists have not understood him. For this view is both clearly stated in his authorities and follows from his own propositions. It is clear even in the text of this article: he says that the difference between relations in creatures and relations in God turns on the fact that what is found in creatures above and beyond the content captured in the relative term is *another thing*, whereas in God it is the same thing; but it is evident that the basis is not captured in the meaning of the relative term [e.g. ‘similar’ does not contain whiteness in its meaning; ergo in creatures the basis is another thing from the relation itself]. We also find in Aquinas, undeniably, three propositions.

- The first is that no categorical substance can be thing-wise the same as a relation, as is clear in *De potentia*, q.8, a.2 ad 1.

- The second is: some real relations are based directly upon substance, as one saw with relations of similarity or identity in species, from the previous article.

* *secundum rem*

† *minima sua entitas*

c.14;
223a 26-28

c.2
225b 12f
* *mensae*

q.28, a.1 ad 2

– The third obviously follows from these two, namely: in the cases of real relations of creatures, the relations are-in [*insunt*] the substances and so form a composition of accident with subject; this is also clear at *In I Sent.* d.33, q.1, a.1, towards the end of the corpus.

From these points it follows that every real relation based immediately upon substance is thing-wise distinct from its basis, according to St. Thomas.

ix. From these latter points and from the ground for his first proposition, we may deduce another universal truth: every real relation in creatures is thing-wise distinct from its basis. For it follows from these premises that a real relation founded on substance has its own *being-in* and its own *being-towards*. Since the *being-in* is its actual existence, it follows that the most general description of real relations is “a form having its own existence.” And since it is not by accident that this form is a thing requiring being-in (since ‘accident’ is predicated essentially of relation), it follows that this is true of any particular real relation.

In confirmation of this conclusion, reflect that, if it were not so, it would not be the case that ‘accident’ is predicated in the first mode of *per se* of any relation contained in the category of *ad aliquid*. Whereupon it would further follow that a relation is not formally a thing from which being-in flows, but that such being flows only from the form of its basis.

Now the ground of Aquinas’ first proposition is that substance is defined into one category and hence excluded from any other category, as he says in the passage cited [*De potentia* q.8, a.1 ad 1]. If this reason is good and sufficient, it also imposes a thing-wise distinction between a relation and a quantity or quality. For the major premise has to be formed like this: *a thing defined into one category is really excluded from another category*; whereupon the minor premise would be: *but created substance is defined, etc*. In the same way the following minor premise would be equally sound: *but quantity and quality are each defined into one category*. Ergo [both are excluded from the category of relation]. Therefore the mind of St. Thomas is that every real relation belonging to the category of *ad aliquid* is thing-wise distinct from its basis.

x. That this position is closer to the truth can be seen from Aristotle’s teaching in *Metaphysics XII* [c.4], where he says that the sources of a relation are one thing, and those of quality and the other categories are another. It can also be seen from the reason just given [in § ix], namely, that a relation is essentially an accident and hence has its own *in*, in accord with its own essence. And it will be seen further from the solutions to the objections, which are about to be given.

Answering Scotus’ theory

xi. Scotus’ reasoning is based on a false foundation. For many things are thing-wise distinct and yet are such that the existence of one without the other implies a contradiction. This is conceded in what Scotus himself says [at *In II Sent.* d.1, q.5] about essential parts

taken together, about third entity, and generally about things between which there is an essential dependency. It does no good to say that Scotus acknowledged these exceptions. For all that matters for present purposes is that the impossibility of the one to exist without the other does not imply their thing-wise indistinction; so if you can make an exception for essential dependency, the rest of us also have the right to make an exception for necessary connection, etc.

Also, it is not universally true that what remains is thing-wise distinct from what has corrupted. You see this quite clearly when the heat drops — the remaining heat is not thing-wise distinct from itself as previously higher. So the argument strategy that Scotus used so freely does not *prove* thing-wise [distinction or] indistinction in all cases. It merely suggests this. (How Aristotle used this strategy in the *Topics* is another affair, as is how we may use it). The above suffices for now.

Answering the identity theory

xii. We turn now to the reasons given for the first opinion, starting with the first reason (which has the greatest force). When Socrates alone exists as white, the being-in of similarity is neither wholly there nor wholly not there; it is there in a way and not there in a way; for it is there incompletely, but it is not there completely. And since actual being goes with complete being, this negative sentence is true: *the being-in of the relation is not there*; but this negative is consistent with an affirmative sentence conditioned by ‘in a qualified sense’, namely, *the being-in of the relation is there in a qualified sense*, that is, incompletely. Thanks to the weakness of its being, the relation’s being is completed by the mere apposition of its terminus: for as soon as the relation’s *towards* appears, the completion of its *in* also results. After all, the similarity did not have incomplete being because of a defect of its basis, but because of the absence of a terminus. And so the result is that, given the terminus that was missing, the basis completes the relation as its offspring or fruit, so to speak, or its effect. St. Thomas supplies a similar and quite relevant example in *De potentia*, q.8, a.9 ad 7, where he is talking about the being of action. If there is a strong heat source, but nothing around it capable of being heated, no action of heating actually exists, nor is any such action “in” the source as accident in subject; and yet, as soon as something heatable is supplied, the action immediately exists and exists-in the agent or source, for the same reason, *i.e.*, that both a relation and an action are erased, in act, when you remove the outside terminus or thing affected, and yet both remain present radically or “causally.”

In this way, the argument from change is also dissolved. For what is there already “root-wise” or in its causes does not need a new change in order to emerge in act [*generari*]: for, as far as its causes are concerned, it already has all that it takes to exist in act; but

these sufficient causes are impeded, so to speak, by the absence of an outside terminus. Likewise when a relation ceases to be, no change occurs properly speaking, because that sufficiency of causes remains in act. (A change properly so-called is the end point of an alteration, but here we are dealing only with a certain natural resolution, or with the relation's mere cessation.)

Next, the fact that a relation forms a composition with its basis, and that "a similar white thing" is more composed than "a white thing," is not at all unfitting; in fact, it is necessary. For a real similarity is essentially an accident. Our imagination admittedly fails to grasp this sometimes, because the relational terms do not explicitly present being-in [*in esse*] in their meaning. Moreover, no real difficulty arises from what St. Thomas says in the place cited [*De potentia* q.7, a.8]; the reason for non-composition which he assigns there shows that he is talking about relations taken form-wise, that is, he is talking only about their *towards*; he says, "because it does not convey something in a subject," etc., as becomes even clearer in the following article [q.7, a.9], in his reply *ad* (7).

Finally, a relation is rightly said to be "of minimal status as a being" compared to all the other categories because, simply by virtue of what is proper to it — *i.e.*, just by virtue of its *towards* — it does not even have what it takes to be real; indeed, as far as this hallmark is concerned, it may be purely mental. So it is not surprising that some writers have thought relations were among second intentions. Time, by contrast, has to be real to some extent or other.

xiii. Note that, while Scotus agrees with St. Thomas that certain relations are really distinct from their basis (as I already said), he does not agree with him about the deeper point that the being-in of a relation is really distinct from its essence; nor does Scotus agree with St. Thomas about the broader point that being and essence are really distinct in creatures [see Scotus, *In III Sent.* d.6, q.1]. Nevertheless, you should not suppose that *how* the being-in of a relation is distinct from the relation itself is *how* one relation is distinct from another, nor *how* a wholly absolute thing differs from a relation. For both of these ideas are false. The being of a relation is in the category of relation — but only reductively so, as being the actuality of a relation. In the same way, the being of a substance is in the category of substance, and the being of a quality is in the category of quality, etc.

Meanwhile, Scotus' position does not allow him to avoid an impossible outcome, namely, that the same relative word will be said twice, *i.e.* towards the termini from two angles. Suppose that similarity, for example, really refers to a terminus and that its basis does, too. Obviously, 'similar' will be said because of these. But the actual inherence of similarity in its basis is, according to Scotus, the similarity relation itself, because the similarity relation quasi-grounding the relation's inherence cannot be there without the basis — not without a contradiction arising, says Scotus. Therefore, the similarity will be alleged twice.

On the answer *ad* (3)

xiv. In the answer to the third objection, a doubt arises about the words, "it would follow that His existing is imperfect (He would just *be* a bearing towards another)." For it seems to follow from this remark that relation bespeaks imperfection. But this latter has to be false, because it bespeaks neither perfection nor imperfection — otherwise there would be imperfection in God, or else one Person would have a perfection which another lacks. But [the doubt continues] the false point does follow from the words quoted, as is proved thus. If being a relation did not bespeak incompleteness because its being would = having bearing towards another, it would not follow that being a relation is imperfect, as is evident; but according to the text it follows that that being is imperfect; hence being a relation bespeaks imperfection.

xv. To this I ANSWER that the text does not use in its premise *being a relation*, but *being only a relation*, excluding everything absolute not only from our account of it,* but also from its reality. This is clear from the words "in the divine fullness" [which mean His fullness] not only in the abstraction of the concept, but in the nature of things, as is clear in the text. From this premise it clearly follows that it "would therefore be imperfect," because everything which is nothing but a relation according to the real and in the order of things [*secundum rem, in rerum ordine*] is either thought-dependent or an accident, both of which are imperfect. Hence the words of the text do not conflict with the truth that, in its explanatory account [*i.e. formaliter*], relation bespeaks neither imperfection nor perfection [but only "towards"].¹

* *ratio*

¹ At the end of Cajetan's commentary on q.13, a.7, a final footnote recommended attention to an idea put forward 100 years ago by Bertrand Russell, to the effect that real relations exist entirely *between* the relata and *not in* any. One can now explore its implications further by using it to amend the key contentions in this article. For all categories of accident, there will still be two sides to consider. On the existential side, all will share the trait of "existing dependently on substance," and all the absolute ones will share the trait of "existing-in-a-substance," but relation will have its own style of dependent existing, *i.e.* "existing between" things (the *esse relationis* will be *esse inter*). On the other side, the formal side, the defining trait or hallmark of each category will remain exactly as Aquinas said; the hallmark of relation will still be "towards something," and the directionality of this "towards" will still distinguish subjects from termini. Each real relation in God will have its own "towards," that of Sonship converse to that of Fatherhood, etc., but none will have accidental *esse inter*; rather, all will have the substantial *esse* of the divine essence. The rest of Aquinas' remarks (and Cajetan's) will remain as they stand; but it will be easier to grasp why a relation exists as soon as a terminus appears, without a *mutatio* in the relation's subject, and without making that subject "more composed" form-wise. It will also be easier to understand why a relation is always really distinct from its basis, as Aquinas wanted. It is thus hard to see what damage, if any, the adoption of Russell's idea would do to the Angelic Doctor's trinitarian theology.

Are the relations within God distinct things from one another?

1 ST q.40, aa.2-4; *In I Sent.* d.13, q.1, a.2 *ad* 4; d.26, q.2, a.2; *De Potentia* q.2, aa.5-6

It would seem that the relations in God are not really distinct from one another.¹

(1) After all, things the same as the same thing are the same as each other. But every relation existing in God is thing-wise the same as the divine essence. Ergo, these relations are [the same as each other,] not thing-wise distinct from one another.

(2) Besides, 'fatherhood' and 'sonship' are definitionally distinct from 'divine essence'; [well] 'goodness' and 'power' are distinct from it in just the same way. But definitional distinction does not result in a thing-from-thing distinction between God's goodness and power. Neither, then, does such distinction between 'fatherhood' and 'sonship' result in a thing-from-thing distinction between them.

(3) Moreover, the only way real distinction arises within God is by origination. But it does not seem that one relation arises from another. Therefore, the relations in God are not really distinct from one another.

ON THE OTHER HAND, Boethius says [in his *De Trinitate*] that substance in God preserves His oneness, while "relation raises the count to His threeness." So, if the relations are not thing-wise distinct from one another, there will be no real threeness in God but only in our thought, which is the mistake of Sabellius.

IV, c.6;
Pl. 64, 1255

ANSWER: when one attributes a trait to anything, one cannot help attributing everything involved in explicating the trait's makeup [*ratio*]. For example, when one attributes the trait of being human to someone, one cannot help attributing to the same person an endowment of reason. Well, a bearing towards another — a bearing thanks to which something is relationally opposed to that other — is involved in explicating the makeup of a relation. Therefore, since relation really exists in God, as I said above, relational opposition has to exist also. In turn, relational opposition in-

q.28, a.1

¹ 'Really distinct' meant thing-wise distinct, *i.e.* as one thing from another.

cludes in its makeup *distinctness*. So there has to be real distinctness in God — not thanks to the absolute thing which is His essence, but thanks to a relational thing [*i.e.* a real relation] in God.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): Aristotle says [in *Physics III*] that this argument (things the same as the same thing are the same as each other) holds good when the things are the same in the real and in definition, like clothes and garments. But not when they differ in their defining makeup. Thus in the same passage he says that, although my action upon *x* and *x*'s undergoing change are both the same as my inducing change in *x*, it still does not follow that acting is the same as undergoing. For "acting" involves a bearing as the source whence change comes to *x*, whereas "undergoing change" involves a bearing as what is had from the source. Similarly, although fatherhood is thing-wise identical to the divine essence, and so is sonship, these two involve opposite bearings in the defining makeup proper to each. Hence, they are distinct from one another.²

c.3;
202b 10

ad (2): power and goodness do not involve any opposition to each other in their defining makeup; so the case is not the same.

ad (3): although relations do not arise or proceed from one another, strictly speaking, they are still taken oppositionally because of the procession of one thing from another.³

² My acting on a thing and its undergoing change are "one and the same process," namely, my inducing change in it, but they are relatively opposed aspects of it. So, their sameness with the process does not make them the same aspect. Likewise, in God, fatherhood and sonship are one and the same absolute essence, but they are converse to each other as relations and hence are not the same relation.

³ When *x* gives rise to *y*, it is not only the case that *x* and *y* are opposed (as source to what is from it) but also the case that *x*'s relation to *y* (a "source-of" relation) is relationally opposed to *y*'s relation back to *x* (a "from" relation). The relations are opposed as converses to each other.

Cajetan's Commentary

In the title, the word 'relations' is taken indefinitely rather than universally, because it is not Aquinas' present purpose to discuss whether *all* the divine relations are really distinct from each other (as will be clear later on in the case of paternity and active spiration); rather, the question is whether there are *some* real relations in God which are thus distinct.

ii. In the body of the article there is one conclusion, answering the question affirmatively: in God there is

distinctness between certain relations thing-wise [*secundum rem*], but thanks to "relational thing," not "absolute thing."

The support goes like this. Relation really exists in God; so [*1st inference:*] a bearing relationally opposed to another exists in Him; so [*2nd:*] there is relative opposition; so [*3rd:*] there is real distinctness; but therefore also [*4th:*] the distinctness is not because of an absolute thing (for in absolutes there is utter unity and

simplicity in God) but because of a relational thing.

The first inference, along with all the others, is established by way of this overall major premise: *when any trait is attributed to a thing, all that belongs to the makeup* defining that trait must also be attributed* (as is clear inductively in the case of 'human' and other examples). Under this major goes the minor that opposed bearing belongs to the makeup defining relation; under that goes the premise that opposition belongs to what defines such bearing; and under that goes the premise that distinctness belongs to the makeup defining opposition, etc., as is clear in the body of the text.

Beginners' doubts

iii. Concerning these points two doubts may well occur to a beginner.

First, concerning that major premise: it does not seem true. Many properties are attributed to God in such a way that parts of their definitions are not attributed to Him, as is clear in the case of wisdom, justice, and other such terms [*i.e.* wisdom and justice are defined as certain sorts of qualities; but in God they are not accidents of quality; this part of their *ratio* does not get attributed].

Second, concerning the inference to "therefore there is relative opposition in God": it doesn't seem to be valid. Go back to the white Socrates and Plato. In the white Socrates there is a relatively opposed bearing of real similarity; but it doesn't follow that there is therefore relative opposition in him; it only follows that one side of the relative opposition in him. And so the last inference in the article, to there being relative distinction in God, does not follow; it only follows that one side of the relative distinction in Him. So, Aquinas' reasoning falls apart.

iv. The first doubt is very easily answered from points made earlier [see the commentary on q.13, a.5, §§ vii ff]. That broad major premise is talking about the *formal* makeup[†] of the property [also called its *formale significatum*], embracing what is unique to it (plus the common transcendentals). For a trait ascribed to God, everything included in its makeup of this formal kind is verified in God;[‡] objections to the contrary always make the false assumption that, for example, being a quality or a habit belongs to the *formal* makeup of things like justice or wisdom.

The second doubt forgets that we are speaking here of relations *ad intra*, so that the whole antecedent reads, "Relation *ad intra* really exists in God." Whereupon the inferences are perfectly valid, since it follows that both sides have to be in God. The above attempts at counter-examples had to do with relations *ad extra*.

On the answer *ad* (1)

v. *Re* the answer to the first objection, Aureol raises an argument reported by Capreolus at *In I Sentences* d.2, q.3, a.1. [*Major:*] The kind of

sameness* that the extremes have with each other is the same kind as they have with the third term; but [*minor:*] in the case at hand, the latter kind of sameness is real [*i.e.*, in God each real relation is thing-wise the same as His essence]; therefore the former kind of sameness must also be real [*i.e.* any two real relations in God must be thing-wise the same]. The major premise of this argument is supported by the claim that, if it were not true, the foundation for all the syllogisms would collapse; for in syllogisms we infer the conjunction or separation of the extreme terms from the unity of one or both of them with the middle term.

vi. The SHORT ANSWER is that we flatly reject Aureol's major. This is not the principle on which the syllogisms are founded (see *Prior Analytics I*); they are founded rather on this one:

(Syl) Things the same as the middle term are the same among themselves.

But it is one thing to talk about sameness, and something else to talk about the how of the sameness. In its bearing on the topic at hand, (Syl) can be interpreted two ways. The first is that used in the body of the article, where 'same as the middle term' is taken to mean 'utterly the same', *i.e.* both really and definitionally. So interpreted

[Things both really and definitionally the same as the middle term are both really and definitionally the same among themselves],

(Syl) is absolutely true; otherwise the fallacy of accident would not be committed in syllogizing; for that fallacy is due to this variance in interpretation. The other way of taking (Syl) is according to that in terms of which the extremes are identified with the middle — in other words, in terms of the *reason for their identification* with the middle:

[Things the same as the middle term for reason *X* are the same among themselves for reason *X*.]

This version also comes out true, and this I think is what Aristotle directly had in mind; notice also that this second version includes the first, so that it has universal application. After all, things which are the same as the middle term do not have to be the same among themselves in those points in which they are not identified with the middle, that is, in those points which are not the reason for their identification with it. Not surprisingly, therefore, many fallacies crop up in cases where the terms are the same in one way and not in another. And such precisely is the case at hand, as the article already made clear.¹

¹ Latin had no proper word for identity. '*Identitas*' meant 'sameness', and that was vague. The real foundation for syllogisms is not the transitivity of the identity relation (as Aureol seems to have thought) but that of the inclusion relation among sets. The sets are the extensions of the terms; in valid syllogisms, the minor and major terms get some co-extensionality from the extension of the middle term; so one can describe this foundation (clumsily) as "sameness," provided one adds "of extension."

* *identitas*

c.4; 25b 35

* *ratio*

† *ratio formalis*

‡ *salvatur in Deo*

Are there just four real relations within God (fatherhood, sonship, spiration, and procession)?

1 *ST* q.36, a.2, in *I Sent* d.26, q.2, a.3

It seems that the four relations — fatherhood, sonship, spiration, and procession — are not the only real relations in God.

(1) One should also consider the relation of the understander to the understood in God, and the relation of the willer to the willed. These seem to be real and do not seem to coincide with the relations just mentioned. So there are not just four real relations in God.

(2) Besides, we get real relations in God from the understanding-based procession of the Word. But the count of understandable relations rises to infinity, as *Metaphysics III* c.10 Avicenna says. Therefore, the real relations in God are infinitely many.

(3) Also, the *ideai* are in God from eternity, as was said above. And they are not distinct from one another except by relation to things, as was also said. Therefore, there are many more eternal relations in God.

(4) Moreover, equality and likeness and sameness are relations, and they are in God from eternity. So more relations have been in God from eternity than those mentioned above.

ON THE OTHER HAND, it seems that there are fewer than four. After all, as Aristotle says, the road from Athens to Thebes = the road from Thebes to Athens. For the same reason, it seems that the relation from father to son (called fatherhood) = the relation from son to father (called sonship). With these two reduced to one, there are not four relations in God.

1020b 26ff **ANSWER:** Aristotle maintains [in *Metaphysics V*, c. 15] that every relation is based either on quantity (like being twice-as-much or half-as-much) or on doing and undergoing action (like making-another- ϕ and being-made- ϕ , being-the-master and being-a-servant, etc.). Well, since there is no quantity in God (who is “great without quantity,” in Augustine’s phrase), a real relation in God can only be based on action. But it cannot be based on the actions by which something proceeds outside of God, because God’s relations to creatures

De Trinitate V, c.4, PL 42, 912

q.13, a.7,
q.28, a.1 *ad*3

are not really in Him, as I said above. So real relations can only arise in God by actions with which there is a procession not heading out but remaining within God. Well, such processions are just two, as I said before — the one arising by act of intellect (the procession of the Word) and the one arising by act of volition (the procession of Love). But with each procession there have to be two opposed relations, one belonging to what proceeds from the source, and the other belonging to the source itself. The Word’s procession is called “generation” under the definition proper to living things. In complete living things, the relation had by a generation’s source is called fatherhood, and the relation belonging to what proceeds from it is

called sonship. The procession of Love does not have its own name, as I said above, and so the two relations that go with it do not have their own names either. But let us call the relation had by the source of this procession “spiration,” and the relation had by what proceeds in it “procession,” despite the fact that these two words are already used for the procession or origination itself, not the relations.¹

q.27, a.4

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): in cases where the understanding differs from the understood, and the willer from the willed, there may be a real relation of knowledge to thing-known and of the willer to the thing-willed. But in God the understanding and the understood are utterly the same, because in understanding Himself, He understands all other items: for a parallel reason, the willing and the willed are utterly the same. In God, therefore, such relations are not real, as the relation of a thing to itself is not real. But the relation to the Word is real, because the Word is taken as what proceeds *via* the act of understanding, not as the thing understood in it. When we understand a stone, after all, ‘inner word’ names what the intellect brings forth *from* the topic understood.

ad (2): the count of understandable relations rises to infinity in us, because a human being understands a stone in one act, understands that she understands the stone in another act, understands that she understands the latter in yet another act, and so on: so the count of acts of understanding rises to infinity, and hence the count of understood relations rises, too. But none of this has any place in God, because He understands all things in just one Act.

ad (3): the relations of the *ideai* stand as items understood by God. What follows from their multiplicity is not that there are many relations in God, but that God knows many relations.

ad (4): equality and likeness are not real relations in God: they are only thought-dependent, as will come out below.

ad (5): the road is the same from one terminus to the other, but the directions are different. So the thing to conclude from the sameness of the road is not that Father-to-Son and Son-to-Father are the same relation but that something non-relational would be the same, if it were a “medium” between them.

¹ In the two centuries after Aquinas, naming the relations involved in the procession of the Holy Spirit was made easier by distinguishing spiration into active and passive. It became possible to say that the source of the Holy Spirit [*i.e.* the Father and the Son acting as one] bears to Him the relation of “active spiration” (they “breathe Him forth”), and that the Spirit bears back to His source the relation of “passive spiration.”

Cajetan's Commentary

The title is clear. In the body of the article just one conclusion is reached, answering the question affirmatively: in God there are only four real relations, and these are paternity, filiation, spiration, and procession.

The support goes like this. [*Antecedent:*] The real relations in God do not arise from quantity nor from action *ad extra*; ergo [*1st inference:*] they arise from actions *ad intra*; so [*2nd inference:*] the only real relations in God are those which arise from the two processions *ad intra*; therefore [*3rd inference:*] there are just four real relations, and [*4th inference:*] these are paternity, filiation, spiration, and procession.

The part of the antecedent dealing with quantity is supported by the fact that there is no quantity in God, as was made clear by St. Augustine. The part about action *ad extra* is supported by what was said above in q.13 [a.7]. The first inference rests on the proof in *Metaphysics V* that all relations are based either on quantity or on acting and undergoing. The second inference rests on points already established, to the effect that there are only two processions in God corresponding to his immanent actions, one according to the intellect, and one according to the will — one the procession of the Word, and one the procession of Love. The third inference rests upon the fact that there have to be two opposed [*i.e.* converse] relations involved in any procession: that which proceeds bears one of these relations, and the source from which it proceeds bears the other. Finally, the fourth inference is just a matter of establishing the names. As to the first two, the procession of the Word is called generation under the proper definition of birth in living things; the relation which the source of this birth bears is called paternity, while the one which the person born bears is called filiation; ergo. As to the other two, the procession of love lacks a proper name of its own, and so do the relations which arise from it. But we do have the terms 'procession' and 'spiration', at least; and so it is convenient to name the relation which the source bears in this case spiration, while naming the relation borne by the [Love which is] spirated procession. Thus, the whole matter becomes clear.

The issue of quantity, and two doubts

c 15;
1026b 26ff *ii.* Regarding the part about quantity in that proposition from *Metaphysics V*, and taking into account what is said in *De Potentia* q.7, a.9, one must understand that relations are based on quantity according to *how*

[*modus*], not always according to reality; that is, every real relation is founded upon a reality which is quantity or else upon another reality insofar as it takes on the explanatory force [*ratio*] of quantity. Hence "one" in substance makes things the same, and "one" in quality makes them similar. This "one" belongs how-wise [*modaliter*] to quantity.

But now two doubts arise. First the fact adduced on the authority of Augustine, that in God there is no real quantity, no longer seems sufficient to guarantee the validity of Aquinas' reasoning in this article [for what about relations based on the "how" of quantity?].

Second, the appeal to *Metaphysics V* seems misplaced, because Aristotle posits a third kind of relations there, as St. Thomas himself notices in his commentary, namely, relations which are non-quantitatively based between a measure and what-is-subject-to-it.

1021a 30ff

Answering the doubts

iii. As to the first doubt, Aquinas indeed holds that no real relation arises in God from quantity, whether as a reality or as a how, and he promises in his answer to the fourth objection to treat this further below; he later devotes a whole question to relations such as equality and similarity, which arise how-wise from quantity; and so he passes over that matter quickly here, content to dispose of quantity as a reality.

If you rejoin, "Well, then, the conclusion Aquinas was after is not sufficiently secured in this article," my answer is that it is sufficiently secured *for the time being*, because the relations in doubt are postponed for handling later; granted, the discussion here would not be absolutely sufficient, if every point had to be cleared up here. This is why, lest the limited treatment here mislead anyone, Aquinas says in the answer *ad* (4) that he is going to complete the discussion further along, in its proper place, where the relations which are "conditions" on the divine Persons will be taken up. Thus the order in which Aquinas has chosen to treat matters did not require more to be said here.

As to the second doubt, we are dealing here with real relations between things on the same level [*ordo*], indeed, between things of the same nature; and we are dealing with mutual relations [*i.e.* real relations with equally real converses]. But as Aristotle makes clear, relations of that third kind differ from the others in that they are not mutual. So our appeal to this passage is not misplaced.

1021a 31

Inquiry Twenty-Nine: Into the meaning of the term 'person'

The points which one apparently needs to know about the processions and relations have now been covered; one must move on to the Persons. They will be treated first independently [qq. 29-38] and then in comparison to One Another [qq.39-43]. The independent treatment has to begin with some general points [qq.29-32] and then handle each Person individually [qq.33-38].

The general points are found in four areas: [a] the meaning of the word 'person' [q.29], [b] how many Persons there are [q.30], [c] what their number entails or excludes, such as diversity, likeness, and so on [q.31], and [d] issues of how we come to know of the Persons [q.32].

In the first area [a], four questions are asked:

- (1) how is 'person' defined?
- (2) how does it compare to 'essence', 'subsistence', 'hypostasis'?
- (3) can 'person' be used to talk of God?
- (4) what does it convey in the talk of God?

article I

[How is 'person' to be defined?]

q.29, a.3 ad 2 & ad 4, q.34, a.3 ad 1, 3 ST q.2, a.2, *In I Sent.* d.25, q.1, a.1, *De Potentia Dei* q.9, a.2

PL 64, 1343

The definition that Boethius gives of 'person' [in *De duabus naturis*, 3], "an individual substance of a rational nature," seems to be incompetent.

(1) After all, a singular is not defined. 'Person' indicates a singular. So it is inappropriate to define 'person' at all.

(2) Besides, the word 'substance' in the definition is used to stand for either first substance or second. If it stands for first, 'individual' is redundant, because first substance is individual substance. But if it stands for second substance, 'individual' is wrongly added and conflicts with its noun, because the items called "second substances" are genera or species. So, either way, the definition is badly made.

* *nomen intentionis*

(3) Next, a level of classification* should not be put into the definition of a real thing.¹ It would not be good science, for example, to define man as 'a species of animal'. For 'man' names a real thing, and 'species' names a level of classification. So since 'person' names a real thing (a substance of rational nature), 'individual' is out of place in its definition, because 'individual' names a level of classification.

c.1;
192b 20

(4) Next, we are told in *Physics II* that, in anything having a nature (other than incidentally), that nature is the source of its *change and stability*. But 'person' extends to things admitting no change at all, like God and the angels. So 'nature' should not have been used in defining it; 'essence' would have been better.

(5) Furthermore, a soul separated from the body is an individual substance of a rational nature. But such a soul is not a person. Ergo 'person' has been unsuitably defined in these terms.

ANSWER: although general kinds and particular cases occur in all the categories, there is still a special way in which "an individual" is found in the category of substance. For a substance is individuated of itself, while accidents are individuated through a subject, *i.e.* a substance [in which they inhere]. We speak of *this* whiteness insofar as it is in *this* subject. It is quite suitable, then, for individuals of the substance type to have a special name setting them apart from the others; we call them "hypostases" or "first substances."

But there is a still more special and more complete way in which the particular or individual is found among rational substances. Such substances have control over their own action; they are not just acted upon, like other things, but act of themselves. But actions occur in singular things. This is why the singulars of a rational nature have a special name that sets them apart even from other [first] substances — and that name is 'person'. Hence 'individual substance' is put into the above-cited definition of 'person' because it means a singular thing in the category of substance, and 'of a rational nature' is added because 'person' means a singular among rational substances.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): while this or that singular is not defined, what belongs to the general account of being singular can be defined. Thus Aristotle defines 'first substance', and this is how Boethius is defining 'person'.

ad (2): some exponents say that 'substance' is used in this definition for first substance (hypostasis) and yet 'individual' is not redundant.² Their reason is that

Categories, c.3,
2a 11
Boethius, *On the
Categories*, c.1; PL
64, 181

¹ A real thing should be defined by terms for its real features (in object language), not by terms for how we know it.

² This opinion had been advanced by Richard of St. Victor and by Alexander of Hales.

by using 'hypostasis' or 'first substance' one excludes what it would take to be a universal or to be a part (for we do not say that "man" as a general type [of animal] is an hypostasis, nor that a hand is an hypostasis, since it is a part): and then by adding 'individual' one excludes from a person the wherewithal to be taken on* [by someone else]; thus the human nature in Christ is not a person, because it was taken on by a higher being, namely, the Word of God.

But a better answer is that 'substance' is being used broadly here, to mean what is divided into first and second, so that the addition of 'individual' is narrowing it down to stand for first substance.

ad (3): the differentiators of substances are not known to us, or we have no words for them, and so it is sometimes necessary to use accidents as differentiators instead of substantial traits. For example, one might say 'a fire is a body that is simple, hot, and dry'. Distinctive accidents are effects, after all, of substantial forms and manifest them. In parallel fashion, a classificational term can be used for a thing-name that we do not have. This is how 'individual' is being used in the definition of 'person': to designate the manner of subsisting [*modus subsistendi*] that goes with particulars in the category of substance.

ad (4): Aristotle says the word 'nature' was first used to designate the process generating living things

(for which we now use 'nativity'). Then, since this process comes from an intrinsic source [a source constitutive of what the parent is], the word was broadened to mean the intrinsic source of any initiative or change. This is how 'nature' was defined in *Physics II*. And since this source is [in a thing's] form or matter, both are jointly called its "nature." Then, since the essence of anything is completed by its form, the essence of anything — what is picked out by its definition — is commonly called its nature. This is how 'nature' is being used here. As Boethius says in the same book, "The nature of anything is the specific difference informing it." The specific difference is what completes the definition and is gotten from the thing's distinctive form. 'Nature' was an appropriate word to use, therefore, in defining 'person' (which is a singular thing of a quite specific kind) — more appropriate than 'essence'. For the latter derives from the word for being ['esse'], which is the least specific trait of all.

ad (5): the soul is a part of the human makeup; even when separate, it retains the nature of something unitable [to the other parts]; so it cannot be called an "individual substance" (i.e. hypostasis or first substance) for the same reason as a hand cannot, nor any other part of a human being. Hence the definition of 'person' does not fit the separated soul, and the word itself is not applied to it.

* *ratio assumptibilis*

c 1:
192b 14

De Duobus Naturis,
c 3, PL 64, 1342

q 75, a.4 ad 2

Metaphysics V, c.5,
1014b 16

Cajetan's Commentary

In regard to the title, notice that each discipline uses terms in the way they are customarily understood in that discipline. Rightly so, because the meaning of words is assigned by convention*, and so it is all the more at our discretion to adapt them from one usage to another. So it is quite reasonable, I say, for the chief of all the sciences, sacred theology, to enjoy its own terminology, too. Hence we are not asking here about the word 'person' in just any usage, but as it is used in theology — regardless of the fact that among canonists it is used otherwise, and in other disciplines otherwise again. It was therefore quite ignorant of Lorenzo Valla to argue that Boethius had given a bad definition of the person, because in fact his definition was excellent, as will become clear in this article, so long as 'person' is taken in its theological use, as Boethius intended.

Analysis of the article, I

ii. In the body of the article Aquinas does three jobs: (1) he shows the dignity of an individual substance; (2) he shows the dignity of an individual whose nature is rational; (3) he answers the question.

As to (1): he points out that an individual substance

¹ Lorenzo Valla (d. 1457) was a layman and a famously bad-tempered Classicist, best known for his *Elegantiarum Latinae Linguae*. He made a special target of the Vulgate and of Boethius, writing "In Deo non est persona magis quam in bruto."

is like individuals of the other categories in one respect, namely, that each of them is particular or individual, but differs from the others in two respects, namely, in the cause of its individuation and in the specialness of its name. For a substance is individuated of itself,* while an accident is individuated through its subject, which is a substance; the point is illustrated by the example of "this whiteness." And for this reason an individual belonging to the category of substance gets its own special name and is called "hypostasis" or "first substance"; such terminology is not paralleled in the other categories.

* *per seipsum*

Three doubts thus far

iii. Regarding these points, many doubts arise already.

On the side of substance, how can it be true in Thomistic philosophy that a substance is individuated of itself, when St. Thomas says that numerical distinction belongs first-off to quantity, and then attaches, through quantity, to material substances and other things? And since distinctness from others belongs to the defining makeup of "individual substance," it follows that, as far as what intrinsically distinguishes is concerned, substance is individuated by virtue of quantity, and not of itself, as it says in the text.

4 CG c.65

iv. The second doubt is on the side of accidents. Quantity is individuated of itself, as is clear from the

c.13
1020a 8 definition in *Metaphysics V*: “Quantity means that which is divisible into two or more constituent parts of which each is by nature a ‘one’ and a ‘this’.” And in mathematical abstractions it is clear that you have this line, etc., without any imagined subject.

No little doubt arises also where the text says that the subject individuating an accident is a substance: for it seems clear that this counterfactual is true: “If whiteness were in this quantity without substance, it would still be this whiteness.” Hence Aquinas’ general claim is false.

v. A third doubt also arises on the side of accidents, as to how we are to understand the claim that they are individuated through their subject: is this intrinsically or extrinsically? If the answer is intrinsically, then when we say, “this whiteness,” the subject is intrinsically included in the word ‘this’; but if the answer is extrinsically, then the subject is involved in the same way as a nose enters into the meaning of ‘snub’. For if the subject is only included extrinsically, it follows that the accident is individuated of itself intrinsically. But if the subject is involved intrinsically, it follows that “this whiteness” is [intrinsically a combination, hence] neither a being nor one thing *per se*, and hence not in any category. And if that were so, the text of the article would be wrong in saying that in each category one finds general kinds and particular cases.

Resolving these doubts

vi. The first of these doubts can be answered easily enough for our immediate purposes: in this article, the subject under discussion is not a certain kind of substance but just substance itself, taken independently [of further qualifications]; and so we are talking about all individuals belonging to the category of substance; we are not talking about them insofar as they are individuals of this or that kind of substance, but simply insofar as they are individuals in this category. Otherwise we would not be speaking formally, and we would not be understanding properly the difference which St. Thomas intends to draw between individuals of the substance category and individuals of the accident-categories. As members of *these* two classes, things are distinguished first-off by what is common to all substance-individuals, on the one hand, and by what is common to all accident-individuals, on the other. And thus it is clear how we would answer the remaining doubts also [§ iv]. The objections involve individual accidents not insofar as they are just such individuals but insofar as they are individuals of a particular kind of accident, e.g. of quantity, or of a quality mediately affecting a substance, such as whiteness, which is used in the text as an example for beginners. So the doctrine advanced in the body of the article remains unshaken, namely, that a substance-individual as such is an individual of itself, since, as such, it has no dependence upon an accident; and that an accident-individual as such is individuated through its substance-subject,

since it does not necessarily depend upon any other subject than a substance.

viii. As to the last doubt [§ v], however, we must say that “this accident” does not include the subject intrinsically but rather by way of an addition. Just as, in the definition of “accident,” the subject is included not as something intrinsic to the accident’s essence, but by way of addition, so also in the definition of “this accident” (if such a thing were defined) “this subject” would be included as an addition and not as an intrinsic component. This point does not conflict in any way with the doctrine presented in the article. For just as an accident cannot be understood without dependence on a subject, so also “this accident” cannot be understood without dependence on “this subject.” By contrast, “this substance,” as such, includes no dependence upon anything extrinsic. And so substance is individuated of itself; accident, through substance.

ix. When we are talking about *material* substance and about such-and-such kinds of accidents, and about how they are individuated, it is quite another affair altogether. Any such question is a specialized one.

I should like it to be known at this point, however, that in my opinion a material substance is individuated through matter under certain dimensions, and that matter-under-these-dimensions is not only a distinctive and intrinsic constituent of such a substance, but is also what distinctively and intrinsically renders the substance distinct: for it is chimerical to try to separate these rôles [of constituent and distinguisher] in the real. But by “matter under certain dimensions” I no longer understand what I set forth in my commentary on *De ente et essentia*, namely, matter with a potency to quantity; for that potency itself is in the category of quantity [see *Metaphysics XII*, c. 2]; and so it would follow that Socrates is not one thing of *himself*. Rather, by “matter under certain dimensions” I now mean matter numerically distinct, not as the subject of quantity but as *prior to it in nature, as its foundation, root, and cause*. For matter in itself is numerically distinct before it is so-big, so that the effect might be proportioned in this way to the cause. For the numerical distinction by which Socrates is distinct from Plato, insofar as they are “these men,” is not a quantitative distinction but the foundation for quantitative distinction. In the same way, the principle distinguishing this man from that one, as this man *versus* that one, is the root and foundation of quantity and hence of the distinction which follows from quantity. But this prior principle is matter, which is one part of the composite which first-off terminates substantial generation in nature — terminates it in the first instant of nature, before the adhesion of accidents. Already in that instant the composite must be a singular (as opposed to a universal) and must be of itself a being and one thing, which it could not be understood to be without what constitutes it in being. For through one and the same factor each thing is at once “this” and distinct from other things.

c.2, q.5

x. Yet, for all that, I am not denying the general point taught by Aristotle and St. Thomas, that material numerical distinction belongs first-off to quantity and then, through quantity, to other things. For so we read in the *Posterior Analytics I* [St. Thomas's *lectio* 11, n.8]. But participating in the nature of that to which some property first-off belongs comes about in many ways, and the property itself does not have to be verified form-wise* in everything participating in it, as I showed in my comment on that text. Matter, the root and foundation of quantity, is among the things participating in the nature of quantity even in that logically prior instant; indeed, we might say that it pre-possesses the nature of quantity. And since pre-possession is more than participation, it follows that, if things participating in a nature are somehow empowered to produce its effect, how much more will things prepossessing that nature be empowered to do this? For every effect first-off belonging to *x* must be brought about either by *x* in itself, or by its participants, or by its pre-possessors; this is clear inductively even in formal effects, in vegetative and sensitive properties and the like. Even though the distinctness we are talking about [numerical distinctness of one substance from another] is not a formal effect of quantity, and matter at its first instant does not formally contain quantity, I have made these comparisons to help the reader understand. Further discussion of this is found in my Aristotle commentary.²

c.4; 73b 11

* *formaliter salvatur*

*Commentaria in
Prædicamenta
Aristotelis*

Analysis of the article, II

xi. As to the second job Aquinas does in this article, the dignity possessed by individuals of a rational nature, over against all other individual substances, is pointed out in two regards. The first regard is its way of being a source of operation: the individual existent of a rational nature alone has dominion over its acts. And this dominion redounds to the dignity of the individual, because actions belong to singulars. Here the text is alluding to *Metaphysics I*. The second regard is again the specialness of the name. Other individuals, such as those of an irrational nature, do not deserve their own term, but those of a rational nature have been accorded the special name of 'person', because of the dignity mentioned before. Thus, at one stroke, we get both the two dignities and the essential meaning of the word 'person', in that it is the name of *the individual of a rational nature*.

c.1;
981a 17

² Scholastic discussion of individuation and quantity were hampered by the failure to keep abstract structures (the "measures") distinct from the realities to which they were applied (the real amounts or extents measured by them). Only the latter were categorial accidents of quantity, but Aristotle's definition of quantity (what is divisible into parts, each a "unit" and a "this") fits the measure (think of the number series), not the real extents of substances, some of which are in fact indivisible (as Cajetan pointed out on q. 7, a. 3). So a material substance gets to be "this" and "distinct" not from its real

xii. As to the third job Aquinas does, he answers the title question implicitly in the affirmative, by showing that the [traditional, Boethian] definition of the person is adequate. He shows it thus. [*Antecedent:*] the traditional definition exhibits both properties of the individual of a rational nature; [*inference:*] so it is adequate.

The antecedent gets spelled out as follows. What belongs to a person insofar as he or she is a singular of the category of substance is exhibited by the words 'individual substance'; and what belongs to a person insofar as he or she is a singular of a rational nature is exhibited by the words 'of a rational nature'. Since individuals of the more specific type are also individuals of the more general type, both conditions have to be met. And further, since two things are attributed to the individual, namely existence and operation (neither of which belongs to universals), dignity accrues to the individual through both, firstly through its mode of existence, and secondly through its mode of operation.

On the answers to the objections

xiii. In the answers to the first and third objections, you learn that substance-individuals possess something real which is above and beyond their specific nature, namely, their manner of subsisting. This we have explained more fully in our commentary on Aristotle's *Categories*.

In the reply to the second objection, you learn that individual substance is not being contrasted here with the universal, "substance," but with *the essence of a substance*, whether universal or particular. For the former alone is called "first substance," "referent [*suppositum*]," or "person," etc.

What more is added by talking of a first substance or referent, instead of just talking about [a "case" of a substantial nature, e.g.] "this humanity," will be discussed later, when we deal with the union between the Word and human nature. For now, it is enough to know that what is added to the nature is an all-around incommunicability, so that the nature cannot be common and cannot be taken on [by something]. This case of divine nature [*i.e.* the sole case of divineness] is not a referent for the former reason [it is common to the three Persons], while this case of human nature is not a referent for the latter reason [it can be taken on by a Divine Person].

xiv. In the answer to the fifth objection, you learn that it does not follow from Boethius' definition that the soul is a person, contrary to what Scotus supposed at *In I Sent.* d.23. Scotus never got straight what first substance (here called individual substance) involves.

size, nor even from its potency for a size (which is potency to count as so-many unit-parts in Aristotle's definition), but from something more basic — the matter whereby it is particular, "undivided" in the real (transcendentally "one"), and so pre-possesses what it takes to be sized.

Given a modern edition by M.-H. Laurent (Rome, 1939) under the title *Scripta philosophica*

Is a person the same as an hypostasis, a subsistent, and an essence?

In I Sent. d.23, q.1, a.1, De Potentia q.9, a.1

It seems that a person is the same as a hypostasis, a subsistent, and an essence.

c.3;
PL 64, 1343 (1) After all, Boethius says [in *De duabus naturis*] that the Greeks "called an individual substance of rational nature by the name 'hypostasis'." This is what the word 'person' means among us. Ergo a person is exactly the same thing as a hypostasis.

(2) Besides, in the talk of God, we speak of three "subsistents," just as we talk of three "Persons." This would not be the case unless 'person' and 'subsistent' meant the same. Ergo they mean the same.

c.1;
PL 64, 184 (3) Also, [in his book *On the Categories*] Boethius says that 'ousia' (which is [the Greek word for] 'essence') means the composite of matter and form. But what is composed of matter and form is the individual substance, which is called a hypostasis and a person. Therefore, all the above-mentioned terms seem to mean the same.

c.3;
PL 64, 1344 ON THE OTHER HAND, (4) Boethius says [in *De duabus naturis*] that genera and species only subsist, whereas individuals not only subsist but also stand. But 'substance' comes from 'stand', as 'subsistent' comes from 'subsist'. Therefore, since it does not fit genera or species to be hypostases or persons, these latter are not the same as subsistents.

(5) Moreover, Boethius says that matter is called hypostasis, whereas form is called *ousiōsis*, i.e. subsistence.¹ But neither matter nor form can be called a person. Hence 'person' differs from the other terms.

c.8,
1017b 10 ANSWER: Aristotle says [in *Metaphysics V*] that the word 'substance' is used two ways: (1) In one use, it means the quiddity indicated by a thing's definition; by this use, we say that a thing's definition picks out its "substance." It was substance in this sense that the Greeks called *ousia*, and we can call it "essence." (2) In the other use of 'substance', we apply the word to a subject or referent* which subsists in the category of substance. It is in this sense that, by general acceptance, a substance can also be designated by a meta-linguistic term[†] and called a "referent."

There are also three other terms for a thing called a substance, each describing it in its own way, namely: 'thing of a nature' [*res naturae*], 'subsistent', and 'hypostasis'. Thanks to the fact that it exists in its own right and not in another, we call it "a subsistent"; for we say that things existing in themselves and not in another "subsist." Thanks to the fact that it serves as a referent for[‡] some general nature, we call it an instance or "thing of that nature," as a man is an instance of human nature. Thanks to the fact that it serves as a refer-

ent for accidents, we call it "hypostasis" or "substance." Now, what these three terms indicate across the whole category of substances, 'person' indicates in the class of rational substances.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): for the Greeks, 'hypostasis' had the right sense to indicate any individual substance; but it came to be used for those of a rational nature because they are the outstanding ones.

ad (2): in the talk of God, as we [Latins] speak in the plural of three persons and three subsistents, so the Greeks speak of three hypostases. But 'substance' (which corresponds structurally to 'hypostasis') is ambiguous for us, sometimes meaning essence and sometimes hypostasis; so they preferred to translate 'hypostasis' with 'subsistent' rather than 'substance', to avoid error.

ad (3): properly speaking, an "essence" is what is picked out by a definition. A definition includes the factors yielding a species, but not those yielding individuals. Thus, in [the talk of] things composed of matter and form, 'essence' means not just form, nor just matter, but the composite of matter and a general form, insofar as these are factors yielding the species. But the composite of *this* matter and *this* form has what it takes to be a hypostasis and a person. After all, a soul and flesh-and-bone belong to the defining makeup of *man*, but *this* soul and *this* flesh and *this* bone belong to the makeup of *this man*. Thus 'hypostasis' and 'person' go beyond the makeup of an essence by adding the factors yielding individuals; so in [the talk of] things composed of matter and form, 'hypostasis' and 'person' do not mean the same as 'essence', as I said above in discussing God's simplicity.

ad (4): the reason Boethius says genera and species "subsist" is because certain individuals are able to subsist by falling under genera and species included in the category of substance — not because the species or genera themselves subsist (except in the opinion of Plato, who thought species of things subsisted separately from particulars). By contrast, individuals are able to "stand" *vis-à-vis* their accidents, which fall outside the defining makeup of their genera and species.

ad (5): an individual composed of matter and form has the wherewithal to stand accidents because of what is special to its matter (which is why Boethius says that a simple form cannot be a subject); but it has the wherewithal to subsist because of what is special to its form, which does not attach to a thing already subsisting but gives actual being to matter so that the individual can thereby subsist. This is why Boethius calls matter hypostasis but calls form *ousiōsis* or subsistence: matter is the source of subsisting, and form is the source of subsisting.

¹ Boethius used 'ousia', not 'ousiōsis'. Aquinas is paraphrasing a sentence from *On the Categories*, PL 64, 184.

De Trinitate IV, c.2;
PL 64, 1250

Cajetan's Commentary

The 'is' in the title shows that the question is about true identity. In the body of the article there is one conclusion reached in response: in the class of rational substances, 'person' denotes what three other and mutually equivalent terms denote in the class of all substances — those three terms being 'subsistent', 'thing of a [given] nature', and 'substance' or 'hypostasis'.

This is shown by way of two distinctions. First, the uses of 'substance' are distinguished into those

cases where essence is meant and those cases where first substance is meant. Secondly [the terms for] first substance are divided into three which name the thing directly [*nomina rei*] and one which names how we grasp and speak of it [*nomen intentionis*], as is clear enough in the text. These remarks show, on the one hand, how a person is not the same as an essence and, on the other hand, how a person is the same as a hypostasis and a subsistent.

Should 'person' be used in speaking of God?

3 ST q 2, a.2, *In I Sent.* d.23, q.1, a.2; *De Potentia* q.9, a.3

It seems that the word 'person' should not be used in talking of God.

c.1; PL.3, 587 (1) Denis says [in *De divinis nominibus*]: "About the hidden, super-substantial divineness, one should never dare to say anything but what has been made explicit by God Himself in holy Scripture." The word 'person' was not explicit in the Old or New Testament. Ergo, it should not be used.

c.3; PL.64, 1343 (2) Also, Boethius tells us [in *De duabus naturis*] that the word 'person' seems to have been "borrowed from the *personas* [masks] that represented characters in comedies and tragedies. '*Persona*' came from '*personando*' ['sounding through'], because the sound had to be amplified by hollowness. Indeed," he continues, "the Greeks call these masks *prosopa* because they are put on the face and cover up the actor's features." Well, none of this belongs in the talk of God, unless perhaps by metaphor. So 'person' is used of God metaphorically at best.

PL.64, 1344 (3) Besides, every person is a hypostasis. 'Hypostasis' does not seem to suit God, however, because Boethius says it means what underlies accidents, and God has none. And "in the word 'hypostasis' poison is hiding under honey," says Jerome [in *Epistle 21 to Damasus*]. Ergo the word 'person' should not be used of God either.

in a.1 q.14, a.7 (4) Moreover, if we find that *x* falsifies a definition, we remove from *x* what that definition defines. Well, the definition set forth above does not seem true of God. For one thing, rationality implies discursive knowing, and it was shown above that discursiveness is not in God. So, one cannot say that God is "of a rational nature." For another thing, one cannot call Him an "individual substance," since matter is the source of individuation, and God has no matter; nor does He substand accidents, so as to be called a "substance." Therefore, 'person' should not be applied to Him.

Denz #75 ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what the Athanasian Creed says: "The Person of the Father is other than that of the Son, and still another is the Person of the Holy Spirit."

ANSWER: in the whole panoply of nature, the word 'person' indicates that which is most perfect, namely, one subsisting in a rational nature. Since everything that counts as a perfection should be attributed to God, in that His essence contains within itself every complete trait, it is appropriate that 'person' be applied to Him — not in the same way as it applies to creatures, of course, but in a higher way — like the other terms we derive from creatures and apply to God, as I showed above in discussing the terminology for God.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): the word 'person' itself is not used of God in either Testament, but what it means is often affirmed of Him in both, *i.e.* that He supremely exists in His own right and understands with perfect fullness. If we had to limit what we say of God to the Bible's exact words, we could never use any language but the original ones of the Old or New Testament. But the need to argue with heretics compels us to find new words conveying the ancient Faith. Finding them is not the sort of novelty we have to avoid; St. Paul told us to avoid "profane" verbal novelities, and this is not profane.

ad (2): while 'person' does not suit God in its etymology, what it is *used to mean* suits Him supremely. After all, 'person' came to mean someone having dignity, because the characters on the stage represented famous people. Thence arose the custom of using 'person' for dignitaries in the churches. Some writers therefore define 'a person' as 'an hypostasis distinguished by some mark of dignity'. Because subsisting in a rational nature is very much a mark of dignity, every individual of such a nature is called "a person," as came out above [a. 1]. But the dignity of divine nature surpasses every other; and thanks to that fact, 'person' suits God most of all.

ad (3): the word 'hypostasis' does not suit God by its etymology (as He does not substand accidents), but what the word is *used to mean* suits Him. Jerome says there is poison under the word because, before its sense was well understood among the Latins, heretics were using it to trick unwitting people, getting them to admit more than one essence as they admit more than one hypostasis, playing on the fact that, for Latin speakers, 'substance' corresponded structurally to 'hypostasis' but generally meant essence.

ad (4): one can say that God is "of a rational nature" on the ground that 'rational' does not imply discursiveness but the more general idea of an intellectual nature. Being an "individual" cannot fit God insofar as the source of its individuation is matter, but only insofar as it involves incommunicability [*i.e.* inability to be a "predicate" of something else]. "Substance" applies to God insofar as it means existing in and of oneself.

Still, some writers say that the above-stated definition from Boethius does not define "persons" in the sense in which we speak of them in God. Hence Richard of St. Victor¹ sought to correct the definition by saying that 'person' as used of God means "an incommunicable existence of divine nature."*

¹ Richard was the prior of St. Victor from 1162 to 1173 and lit up the entire second half of the 12th century with his learned works of theology and spiritual exegesis. Aquinas is about to cite his definition of 'person' from book IV c.22 of his *De Trinitate* (PL 196, 945).

1 Timothy 6.20

Albert the Great,
Summa Theologica
I, tr. 10, q.44* *divinae naturae*
incommunicabilis
existentia

Cajetan's Commentary

In the title, "should it be" is asked form-wise.¹

Analysis of the article

In the body of the article, there is one conclusion with two parts: [part 1:] 'person' is applied to God [part 2:] in a more excellent way than it is to creatures.

The first part is supported by the fact that God's essence contains all perfection within itself; therefore every point of perfection should be attributed to God; therefore what is most perfect in all of nature [should be attributed to Him]; therefore 'person' [should be applied to Him]. This last inference is further explained by the fact that 'person' means what subsists in a rational nature.

The second part is supported by the fact that other terms commonly applicable to God and to creatures are applied to God in a more excellent way, as was established earlier [q. 13, a.5].

Two quick doubts

ii. Regarding this reasoning a doubt arises as to how it can be true that 'person' denotes what is most perfect in all of nature. On the one hand, the species seems more perfect than the individual. On the other hand, [part of the meaning of 'person' is incommunicability, which seems to be an imperfection; and so if 'person' is applied to God,] it would follow that a hint of imperfection occurs in God.

Their resolution

iii. To get these things straight, one should realize that 'person' in common parlance denotes what is most complete in all of nature, not because sheer personhood is most complete, but because an intellectual nature, which is the most complete nature of all, is the most complete being of all, when it exists completely. But obviously, unless it subsists on its own in the real (however this may come about), it

¹ Asking whether a term should be applied form-wise [formaliter], as opposed to power-wise [virtualiter] or cause-wise [causaliter], was asking whether the subject had within itself what it took to verify the term, or whether it just had within itself the power to produce what verifies the term.

does not exist completely. And so, since 'person' means the dignity of the subsistent of such a nature, it rightly means what is most complete in the whole of nature.

Thus it does not matter if the individuals are material in nature [hence more perishable than the species]. For one thing, the person is not being compared here to his nature; indeed, the nature is included in the person. For another thing, the topic at hand is the person in general, not persons in material natures.

The second objection, however, is solved as follows. Although the defining makeup of "person" taken in general includes something most complete or perfect in all of nature, it also includes something which abstracts from completeness and incompleteness. For 'person' means a thing (of an intellectual nature) subsisting *incommunicably*; and incommunicability bespeaks neither completeness nor incompleteness. And so it is in this neutral regard that the Divine Persons are distinct from one another, and not in those regards which bespeak completeness/perfection. Thus, the inference [drawn at the end of § ii] is to be denied or, rather, turned aside with a distinction.

A final doubt and its resolution

iv. Yet there still remains the following doubt. If 'person' abstracts from perfection in a certain regard, it would follow by the reasoning used in this article that the entire defining makeup of 'person' is not proved to have application in God. After all, the article reasons from the perfection of the divine essence to the conclusion that the defining makeup of 'person' has application in God because it names a most perfect thing.

To meet this objection, let us say that what follows from the perfection of the divine essence is not just that it embraces every perfection but that it embraces whatever is necessarily included in those terms which bespeak perfection; and one of these necessary inclusions is incommunicability. That way, it will follow from the perfection of the divine essence that [one who is] God is a person as regards everything included in the defining makeup of 'person'. Indeed, as we said above, it belongs to the defining makeup of divine perfection that God himself should be true in these incommunicable things which we call Persons.

q.27, a.2 ad 3,
cf. § ix of the commentary thereon

Does the word 'person' mean a relation?

q 35, a.3 ad 1; q 41, a.5; *In I Sent.* d.23, q 1, a.3; d 26, q.1, a.1; *De Potentia* q 9, a.4

It seems that 'person' does not mean a relation in the talk of God, but means His substance.¹

c.6; PL 42, 943 (1) Augustine says [in *De Trinitate VII*], "when we talk of the Father's person, we are talking of nothing but His substance... for He is called 'a person' *vis-à-vis* Himself, obviously, not *vis-à-vis* the Son."

(2) Besides, the 'what' question is asked about essence. But as Augustine says in the same passage,² when we say, "There are three that bear record in Heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost," and we ask, "Three what?", the answer is, "Three persons." Therefore 'person' indicates essence.

c.7; 1012a 23 q 29, a.1 (3) Also, Aristotle maintains [in *Metaphysics IV*] that what a word conveys is its definition. The definition of 'person' is 'individual substance of a rational nature', as said above. So it means the substance.

(4) So if it means a relation in the talk of God, it will be used equivocally of God and of people or angels.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is the fact that Boethius says, "Every term pertaining to the Persons indicates a relation."³ Well, no term pertains more to the Persons than 'person'. So it means a relation.

ANSWER: the sense of 'person' in the talk of God poses a problem because, unlike terms for His essence, it is used in the plural for three and yet does not describe [what it applies to] as "towards something," as the terms conveying a relation do.

Some writers have therefore thought that 'person' by its sense* alone would mean the essence in God (as the words 'God' and 'wise' do), but that to meet the attacks of heretics, a Conciliar decree gave 'person' a new use, so that it could cover relational matters, especially in the plural (as in "three Persons") or with an accompanying genitive (as in "The Person of the Father is other than the Person of the Son"). But they thought 'person' in the singular could be used for the absolute in God as well as the relational.

Denz: #75f

This hardly seems a satisfactory explanation. For if the sense of 'person' only enabled it to mean the essence in God, saying "three Persons" would not have silenced the heretics' charges but would have provoked them to more and worse.

Hence other writers have said that 'person' used of God means essence and relation at once. Some of them have said it means the essence directly and a relation obliquely, because '*persona*' is like shorthand for 'one through oneself' [*per se una*]. Being one pertains to the essence, but 'through oneself' implies a relation obliquely, because the Father is understood to be distinct from the Son *through Himself* (as if by a relation). — Others have maintained the reverse, that 'person' means a relation directly and the essence obliquely, because the definition of 'person' makes oblique mention of nature [where it says "substance of a rational nature"]. These last got closer to the truth.

To clear the question up, one needs to realize that a more specific term has in its sense something that a more general term lacks. Thus 'human' has *rational* in its sense, while 'animal' does not. Hence it is one thing to ask for the sense of 'animal' and quite another to ask for the sense of 'human animal'. Similarly, it is one thing to ask for the sense of 'person' (the general term) and quite another to ask for the sense of 'divine person'. As a general term, 'person' means an individual substance of a rational nature, as emerged above. But the "individual" is that which, without being divided in itself, is distinct from others. So 'person' applied to a given nature means what is distinct in that nature. *E.g.*, applied to human nature, 'person' means this flesh with these bones and this soul, the factors individuating a human being; although these factors do not belong to the meaning of 'person' alone, they do belong to the meaning of 'human person'.

Well, within God, no distinctness of one item from another arises, except by relations of origin, as I said already. But a relation inside God is not like an accident inhering in a subject but is the divine essence itself — with the result that a relation inside God *subsists* as the divine essence does. Therefore, just as [the nature] divineness *is* God, so divine fatherhood *is* God the Father, a divine Person. In short, 'divine person' means a relation as subsistent. Equivalently: it mentions a relation after the fashion of substance (*i.e.* an hypostasis subsisting in divine nature, although what subsists in the divine nature is not other than that nature itself). Thanks to this fact, it is true that the word 'person' [applied to God] means a relation directly and the essence obliquely; but it does not mean the relation as [mentioned after the fashion of] a relation but as mentioned after the fashion of a hypostasis.⁴

¹ The *reference* of 'person' was not in doubt, even in talk of God; the question here was about its *sense* in that talk or its *ratio* in Trinitarian theology.

² This quotation is not in *De Trinitate VII*, but cf. *De Trin. V*, c.9 (PL 42, 918).

³ This is not in Boethius' famous *De Trinitate*, but there is an equivalent remark in a less known treatise (PL 64, 1302) and in Augustine's *De Trinitate V*, c.5 (PL 42, 914).

⁴ Think of the divine reality as a mysterious *X*. Labeling this *X* with an abstract noun like 'divine essence' or 'divineness' mentions it as one would mention a simple form, while labeling it with a concrete noun like 'God' mentions it as one would mention a thing subsistent. Both labelings are suitable, because the divine *X* is at once form-like (simple) and thing-like (subsistent). So Aquinas told us in q.13, a.1 ad 2. Here

By similar reasoning, 'person' also means the essence directly and a relation obliquely, insofar as a hypostasis [in God] is the same as the essence. But it is *by a relation* that a hypostasis in God is mentioned as distinct. Thus "a relation" mentioned after the fashion of a relation comes obliquely into the defining makeup of a [divine] person.

Thanks to this fact, one can also say that the meaning of the noun 'person' [as applied to God] was not grasped prior to the heretical attacks, when 'person' was only in use as a non-relational term. Afterwards, however, it was adapted to stand for a relational thing thanks to the fitness of its meaning [for such employment] — so that it does not stand for a relational thing *just by usage* (as the first opinion said) but also by its sense.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): the reason the Father is called a person *vis-à-vis* Himself, not *vis-à-vis* another, is that 'person' does not mention a relation after the fashion of a relation but after the fashion of a substance (hypostasis). This is also why Augustine says 'person' means the essence: a hypostasis in God is the same as the essence, since "what is [God]" and "whereby it is [God]" do not differ in God.

ad (2): sometimes 'what?' asks for the nature which a definition picks out, as when one asks, "What is man?" and the answer is "A rational, mortal animal." But other times, 'what?' asks for a referent, as when one asks, "What swims in the sea?" and the

he is applying the same point to a divine Person: both the abstract labeling ('divine fatherhood') and the concrete one ('God the Father') are suitable, because the divine *X qua* Father is at once form-like (so as to be mentioned after the fashion of a relation) and thing-like (so as to be mentioned after the fashion of a substance). Ditto for the other Persons.

answer is "Fish." This is how the question, "Three what?" is being answered with "Three Persons."⁵

ad (3): understanding the phrase 'individual substance' in the talk of God (*i.e.* 'distinct or incommunicable substance'), includes understanding a relation, as I said [in the body of the article].⁶

ad (4): divergent defining makeup for more specific terms does not make the uses of a more general term equivocal. For instance, the defining makeup distinctive to a horse is different from that distinctive to an ass, and yet both are univocally "animals" because the general definition of 'animal' fits them both. Hence the fact that the meaning of 'divine person' contains a relation, while the meaning of 'angelic person' or 'human person' does not, carries no such consequence as that 'person' is being used equivocally. (This is not to say that 'person' is being used univocally in these cases either; for nothing can be said of God and creatures univocally, as I showed above.)⁷

q.13, a.5

⁵ In the first way of asking 'what', we are familiar with real things but seek to know their nature. In the second, we are familiar with a bit of language ('swims in the sea') and seek to know a value of the variable *x* for which '*x* swims in the sea' comes out true. The value will be a referent.

⁶ In the "understanding" which is just verbal decoding, I can understand 'individual substance' in talk of God without understanding a relation, but not in the "understanding" which is theological *scientia*.

⁷ Suppose the ϕ -things divide up into the ϕ -1-things and the ϕ -2-things, such that the former include in their *ratio* the trait of being- ψ , while the latter do not. Aquinas' point is that this situation is a necessary but far from sufficient condition for ' ϕ ' to be used equivocally of the two divisions. Analogous use was a special case of equivocal use. The use of 'person' in 'divine Person' and 'human person' was indeed analogous, but not for the reason stated in this objection.

Cajetan's Commentary

The title is clear and is further explained in the body of the article.

Analysis of the article, I

Aquinas does four jobs in this article: (1) he introduces the reason why there is a difficulty; (2) he rejects certain solutions to it; (3) he answers the question in his own way, and (4) he salvages on his own terms what is salvageable in the other solutions.

ii. As to (1), he locates the source of the difficulty in two facts about how 'person' is used in connexion with God — facts which point in opposite directions. On the one hand, 'person' does not mean that one thing is towards another (*ad aliquid*), and yet, on the other hand, 'person' is used in the plural in connexion with God, and such plurality belongs just to relative

things in God, not to anything absolute; and yet the meaning of 'person' leads us to look for something absolute.

iii. As to job (2), Aquinas considers three solutions or opinions on the matter. The first renders the usage of 'person' equivocal (and this seems to have been Peter Lombard's approach in *I Sentences*, d.25). But this is rejected because it is false to reality and would give rise to attacks against the Faith, *etc.* The second opinion is that 'person' in God means His essence directly [*in recto*] and a relation indirectly [*in obliquo*], while the third opinion is just the reverse — all of which is clear enough in the text.

iv. As to (3), St. Thomas' answer to the question is this: 'Divine Person' signifies a relation after the fash-

ion of a substance. *i.e.*, after the fashion of an hypostasis, in the divine nature. This conclusion involves two terms on the subject side, *viz.*, 'person' and 'divine', and it involves three terms on the predicate side, namely, 'relation', 'after the fashion of an hypostasis', and 'in the divine nature'. Each of these ingredients is explained in the text.

As to the subject, Aquinas first says that asking and talking about the meaning of 'person' is one thing, and asking or talking about the meaning of 'divine person' is another. Second, he says that 'person' is to 'divine person' as 'animal' is to 'man.' Whence there follows a third point, namely, that 'divine person' is a circumlocution for a single term, just as 'rational animal' is a circumlocution for 'man.' In this way the sense of the title of this article becomes clear. The question is not about the meaning of 'person' when applied to God (for this was discussed in the preceding three articles) but about the meaning of 'divine person'. The question is whether this whole expression signifies a relation in God or His essence.

Now as to the predicate, Aquinas supports the conclusion piece by piece. First he shows that 'divine person' signifies a *relation*. He does it thus: [*antecedent:*] 'person in general' signifies the *individual* substance of a rational nature; therefore [*1st inference:*] 'person in such-and-such a nature' signifies what is distinct from others in that nature; therefore [*2nd inference:*] 'divine person' signifies a relation of origin. The first inference is sound because what marks an "individual" is "lacking-division-within-itself" plus "having-distinctness-from-others"; an example is the human person. The second inference is sound, because no distinction arises in God save by relations of origin.

• Then he supports the point that 'divine person' signifies *after the fashion of substance or hypostasis*, as follows. [*Antecedent:*] A relation in God is not an accident but is the divine essence: therefore [*1st inference:*] it is subsistent, just as God's essence is subsistent; therefore [*2nd inference:*] divine fatherhood is God the Father, just as divineness is God: therefore [*3rd inference:*] 'divine person' signifies a relation subsisting, hence after the fashion of a hypostasis.

• Finally, as to the phrase 'in the divine nature', it is supported by excluding a tacit objection based on the identity of nature and hypostasis in God. The point is that, although what subsists in the divine nature is identical with that nature, nevertheless 'person' does not signify what subsists after the fashion of nature but rather signifies it after the fashion of the substance which is the hypostasis in that nature; for these fashions are distinct in concept.

A deepening of doctrine

v. Notice something about the part of St. Thomas' answer expressed by the word 'relation'. In *De Potentia* q.9, a.4, he explains that the sentence,

'Divine person' signifies a relation,

can be understood in two ways: formally or materially. And in that work, he wanted to hold that 'divine

person' only materially signifies a relation of origin, and that formally taken, on the contrary, it means a hypostasis of the divine nature. And many objections are solved with the help of this distinction.¹

But in the article now before us, St. Thomas seems to me to have looked deeper into the proper scientific account* of the subject (*i.e.* of 'divine person') and to have decided that it includes the relation not only materially (*i.e.* as that in which the expression has to be verified) but also formally, though without determinately including any one relation, such as paternity or filiation; for it is indeed true that a relation of origin belongs to the formal *ratio* of a divine hypostasis, though it is not the case that this or that relation belongs to it.² The sign of this change of mind is the fact that here in the *Summa* none of the objections is solved through the material/formal distinction; rather, all the difficulties are handled in terms of the difference be-

* *ratio*

¹ The formal way of taking a term isolated its exact descriptive force when used with a *qua*-clause (*formal* sense) and therefore, given the term's referent, took the term as picking out only that which, in or about the referent, fulfilled the term's descriptive force. Thus, to say that 'divine person' formally signified a relation would have been to say that the descriptive content of 'divine person' was fulfilled by its referent in God simply insofar as that referent was a relation. This was clearly false and so was rejected in *De Potentia*: for a relation, just *qua* a relation, is not subsisting. Rather the formal sense of 'divine person' was "distinct thing subsisting in divine nature" (just as the descriptive force of 'human person' was "distinct thing subsisting in human nature"). Hence what *made* the person distinct, whether it was matter or a relation of origin, fell outside that descriptive force and hence fell outside of what 'divine person' or 'human person' formally signified.

By contrast, the material way of taking a term allowed background knowledge of its referent to seep into what the term meant, so as to allow no firm distinction between what in or about the referent was picked out by the formal sense of the term

and

what in or about the referent was not picked out in that way.

Thus, to say that 'divine person' materially signified a relation was only to say that the referent of 'divine person' was or included a relation in God. This was true and was accepted by Aquinas. In sum, Aquinas' view of this problem in the *De Potentia* led him to treat it wholly as a matter of the *sense* of 'divine Person' in ordinary language. This was a perfectly legitimate view, in the present translator's opinion, and led to a correct solution.

² Notice the change of topic — from the *sense* [signification] of 'divine person' to its *scientific* definition or account [*ratio*]. What Cajetan is telling us is that Aquinas looked more deeply into the latter and changed his view of how to handle the problem. Instead of taking the ordinary-language approach, so as to look at the *sense* that would ordinarily emerge from putting 'divine' and 'person' together, Aquinas decided to take 'divine person' as a technical term of Trinitarian theology. A term used in a scientific theory acquires, as the technical force or *ratio* it conveys, the discoveries of the science explaining what it takes for anything to fit that term — as 'table salt' in chemistry "means" sodium chloride (NaCl).

tween *how* 'divine person' signifies and *what* it signifies: for what it signifies is something relative, but the way it signifies this is absolutely, after the fashion of an hypostasis.³

On a piece of the support

vi. Now concerning the proof for the part of his answer expressed by the words, 'after the fashion of an hypostasis', notice the following. From the fact that 'w' signifies a subsistent relation it is not valid to infer that

ergo 'w' signifies the relation as subsisting, though it might seem that this is the inference being drawn in the text. Nevertheless, the inference becomes valid, if the premise reads this way:

by virtue of its proper scientific account, 'w' signifies whatever it does signify after the fashion of a subsistent.

For then, since 'person' obviously signifies after the fashion of a subsistent, it would only be necessary to prove that it means a relation, and that the relation subsists, in order to prove that it signifies the relation after the fashion of a subsistent. And this latter procedure is very clearly what is going on in the text.

³ On Aquinas' new view of the problem, the key point is that what makes a certain kind of person distinct really is part of the *explanation* of the expression naming that *kind of person*. Well, theology says that relation explains the distinctness of persons in God, just as Aristotelian biology says that particular flesh-and-bone explains the distinctness of persons in humanity. (Of course, it is hard to tell the difference between this kind of biology and ordinary language. A human person's material particularity is part and parcel of his or her person, not just a cause of it, and so forms part of what we ordinarily *mean* by 'a human person'. That is why, when I point and say, "See that person over there?", you expect to see a particular body.) In any case, if the material particularity which is the intrinsic cause of a human person's being-distinct enters into the *ratio* of 'human person', then having a particular relation of origin, which intrinsically causes a divine person's being-distinct, must enter into the *ratio* of 'divine person'.

Once he had reached this conclusion, the sole remaining problem for Aquinas was why it still seemed misleading to call a relation, even a Divine Relation, a person; so he turned to the quite different distinction between the semantic issue of *sense* and the pre-semantic, grammatical issue of *how* a term refers or describes. This latter was its *modus significandi*. The different parts of speech each had a different such mode. An adjective mentioned something as having a certain property. An active participle mentioned something as exercising some act. An abstract noun mentioned something as being a property or nature. A concrete noun mentioned something as subsisting. Well, on this terrain, the rub was that a relation would normally be mentioned by an abstract noun, like 'fatherhood', whereas 'person' mentioned its referent as a thing subsisting. So the problem became: how can a term which does not present its referent after the fashion of a relation refer non-misleadingly to a relation in God? St. Thomas' answer, of course, is that the relations in God, because non-distinct from God's essence, subsist as that essence does.

Trouble from Scotus

vii. Scotus raises a number of objections against the above points [in his commentary on *I Sent.* d.23 and d.25]. He argues that the word 'person' as used in connection with God signifies neither a relation, nor a first or second substance, nor any positive quidditative constituent of the divine Persons.

That it does not signify a relation he proves thus: [if 'person' signifies a relation in God, then 'person' is a relative term in God-talk;] whatever a more specific relative term means, a more general relative term will also mean (though not first-off); [if 'person' is a relative term in God-talk, it is a more general one than 'father', 'son', *etc.*;] therefore if 'person' meant a relation, then, just as the Father is father of the Son first-off, He would also be person of the Son (though not first-off) — which is false.⁴

That 'person' does not signify any positive thing quidditative to the Persons he proves like this: from those traits which *ultimately* constitute persons and render them distinct, one cannot abstract any common property which would be quidditatively predicable of them, because these ultimate traits are first-off diverse; otherwise one could ask about *them* wherein *they* are alike and wherein *they* differ.⁵

That 'person' does not signify first substance he proves on the basis that *the subsistent* is indifferent to being absolute or relative.

Answering Scotus

vii. As far as divine Persons are concerned, for these are the only Persons at issue in Scotus' treatment as well, we may reply to these objections briefly, using the reason given in this article. We say that 'Person' signifies a relation of origin in general, not after the fashion of a relation, however, but after that of hypostasis. And because the relation of origin is constitutive of a divine Person, not only in each specific case, as paternity is, but also according to the defining makeup of "hypostatic relation," it is included quidditatively in the defining makeup of a divine Person. *e.g.* of the Father, in the way in which the generic is included in the defining makeup of the specific. And the very same relation is a first substance or hypostasis of the divine nature. And so we hold the opposite to all three of Scotus' contentions.

⁴ Scotus thinks that if 'person' means a relation, it must mean a generic one like 'kin of', such that, if *x* is father of *y*, then *x* is kin of *y*.

⁵ For Scotus, coming to be was emerging out of generality into full particularity. Hence the "ultimate trait" of anything was its ultimate particularizer — what finished making it unique — a "thisness" [*haecceitas*]. In his view, what explained the distinctness of divine Persons had to be the ultimate particularizer of Each; so, it had to be the thisness of Each. And since a person (in a given nature) had to be what was distinct and incommunicable (in that nature), 'divine person' had to mean a divine thisness. Hence there was no room for 'person' to mean anything common to the Three.

ix. His first contention is clearly answered from the text of the article. His major premise [that whatever a more specific relative term means, a more general relative term will also mean] is not true, when the relative reality is signified after the fashion of the non-relative, as occurs in the case at hand; so his inference is null.⁶

Against Scotus' second contention, we say that it is one thing to talk about *things* and something else to talk about *concepts*. From things as described under ultimately distinguishing concepts, one cannot abstract anything common from those concepts which will be quidditatively predicable of those things (except the transcendentals); but from the things themselves, however simple they may be, taken absolutely [*i.e.* independently of our descriptions], one can certainly abstract some common univocal predicate, like a genus or a species, rather than just some predicate which fits one thing alone. Now, in the case at hand, there is no reason why the following conditional should hold:

if 'divine person' signifies some common and quidditative predicate of the Divine Persons, it has to be common to the [thingsnesses, *i.e.* the] things which, abstractly and precisely taken, constitute those Persons in Their ultimate concepts.

Scotus' contention presupposes this conditional, but it

⁶ The force of Cajetan's answer seems to have been the following. Because 'divine Person' mentions its referent as subsisting, it does not become a relational term (the sort of term that either mentions its referent as related to another or mentions a relation as a relation), and hence it does not become a more general relation-term than 'father of', 'son of', *etc.*, and hence it does not work like 'kin of', *etc.* If this is what Cajetan meant, the point is well taken. Still, one would have thought it important to say more.

Scotus must have thought that Aquinas' contention in this article was that, when you put 'divine' in front of 'person', a relation came to be included in the *formal sense* [*formale significatum*] of 'person' so used. He did not see how a word could have a relation in its formal sense without becoming a relational word (and neither does the present writer). So he thought that Aquinas was giving 'divine Person' a meaning like 'divine kin'. Surely, then, it was important to say that Aquinas was not putting a relation into the *formal sense* of 'divine person' (so as to contradict his claim in *De Potentia*) but into the *explanation* of it, into its *ratio*. This matters because the *ratio* of a term need not alter its grammar. The *ratio* of red as the color with the longest wave-length does not turn the word 'red' into a superlative!

does not have to be true and is not proved by him.

Against his third contention, we deny that the *ratio* of the subsisting (taking 'subsisting' after the fashion of hypostasis, as is done both in Boethius' definition and in that of Richard of St. Victor), when applied to God, abstracts from the absolute and the relative. No, it is relational, even though it can be understood absolutely by us, as it is *de facto* signified by the term 'divine person'. And since a first substance in God is nothing other than such a relational thing subsisting, *etc.*, it so happens that 'divine person', just by signifying a relational thing of this kind, signifies first substance of the divine nature and, just by signifying first substance of the divine nature, signifies a relation of origin subsisting, *etc.*

Analysis of the article, II

x. The fourth thing Aquinas does in this article is go back over the opinions he had previously found unsatisfactory. And first he returns to the third opinion, which had said that 'person' meant a relation directly and God's nature indirectly. He says that this is true about the relation — not as a relation, however, but as subsisting. For the relation can be taken two ways: (1) either as the relation, such as paternity, whereby one thing is referred to another, (2) or as the hypostasis which the relative aspect is understood to characterize, somewhat as the word 'father', taken substance-wise, characterizes a hypostasis.

Next he returns to the second opinion, which had said that 'person' signifies God's essence directly and the relation indirectly. He says that this is true about the essence provided you do not take the essence formally *qua* essence but *qua* identical with the hypostasis — whereupon it will also be true that the relation is signified indirectly, but this time as a relation.

Finally, he returns to the first opinion, which had held that 'person' is used by equivocation and accommodation. He says three things: (1) that its meaning was obscure in the early centuries; (2) that an accommodation was indeed made, but (3) that the cause of the accommodation is not just usage (as this opinion had held) but the [scientifically] true and distinctive meaning of the term.

So emerges the solution to the problem posed at the beginning of the article: the word 'person', by reason of what it means [*i.e.* by reason of its scientific use or *ratio*], can truly be used in the plural in connexion with God and yet, by reason of how it means, does not express relation.

Inquiry Thirty: Into the plural number of Persons in God

We turn next to the fact that the Persons are more than one. Four questions are raised about this:

- (1) are the Persons in God more than one? (3) what do number words mean in talk of God?
(2) how many are there? (4) how does 'Person' mean something common to many?

article 1

Should multiple Persons be posited in God?

In I Sent. d.2, q.1, a.4; d.23, q.1, a.4; d.24, q.1, aa.1-2; *De Potentia Dei* q.9, a.5, *Quodl.* VII, q.3, a.1, *Comp. Theol.* cc.50, 55

It seems wrong to posit more than one Person in God.

(1) After all, a person is an individual *substance* of a rational nature. So, if there is more than one Person in God, there is more than one substance — which sounds heretical.

(2) Besides, in God's case and in ours, even a plural number of absolute properties does not force there to be a [numerical] distinction of persons; much less, then, does a plural number of relations impose such a distinction. But in God there is no plural number of anything except relations, as we saw above. So, one cannot say that there are plural persons in God.

q.28, a.3

PL 64, 1250

(3) Also, Boethius was speaking of God [in *De Trinitate* IV, c. 2] when he said, "This is the true One, in whom there is no number." But the plural implies number. Ergo there are not plural persons in God.¹

(4) Moreover, wherever there is more than one, there is whole-and-part. So, if there is more than one Person in God, we shall have to posit whole-and-part in God — which conflicts with divine simplicity.

DNC: #75f

ON THE OTHER HAND, the Athanasian Creed says, "The Person of the Father is one, that of the Son is another one, that of the Holy Spirit is yet another." Thus, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are more than one Person.

ANSWER: the fact of more than one Person in God follows from points already established. For it was shown above that, in the talk of God, 'person' conveys a relation as a thing subsisting in the divine nature. But it was also shown above that there are several real relations in God. It follows that there are several things subsisting in the divine nature — which amounts to there being more than one Person in the divine reality.

q.29, a.4

q.28, a.4

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): in the definition of person, the word 'substance' is not being used to mean an essence but a referent, as is clear from the addition of the word 'individual'. The Greeks had the

¹ In ancient and medieval thought, 1 was not a number. Number was the break-up of 1 and so started with 2. The utterly simple and uncomposed God could not be broken up; hence God was "One in whom there is no number."

word 'hypostasis' to indicate a "substance" in this sense. Thus they say "three hypostases" as we say "three Persons." It is not our custom to say "three substances" [in God], lest the word's ambiguity should lead people to think of three essences.

ad (2): the absolute properties in God, like goodness and wisdom, are not opposed to one another and so are not really distinct from one another. Thus, even though they subsist, they are not *several* subsisting things, amounting to several persons. (In creatures, by contrast, absolute properties do not subsist but are really distinct from one another, like whiteness and sweetness.) But the relational properties in God both subsist and are really distinct, as I said above. Hence the plural number of such properties suffices to secure in God a plural number of Persons.

q.28, a.3

ad (3): God's supreme oneness or simplicity excludes from Him all multiplicity coming from absolute predicates but not all multiplicity coming from relational ones, because these are predicated of something as *towards another* and thus do not imply composition in the subject of which they are predicated; so Boethius taught in the same book [*De Trinitate* IV, c.6].

PL 64, 1255

ad (4): number is twofold, namely: simple or independent number (like 2, 3, 4), and number in things numbered (like 2 people, 2 horses). If number in the talk of God is taken in the independent or abstract way, there is no problem about there being whole-and-part in it, and it is only present in our mental consideration: for number taken independently of things-numbered is only in the mind. But if number is taken as in things numbered, then *among creatures* one is part of two, and two is part of three (as one person is part of a pair, and two are part of a trio), but *not in God*. For the Father is just as great as the whole Trinity, as will come out below.²

q.42, a.4 *ad* 3

² The less-than relation between numbers (say, $1 < 3$) implied a part-of relation, but this did not have to be a real affair unless the numbers themselves were "numbers in things numbered." These were real quantities, which only material things had. The real quantity of flesh in one opera singer had to be part of the real quantity of flesh in the trio to which the one belonged. Aquinas will eject "number in things numbered" from God below, in a.3.

 Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is obviously asking about real plurality. In the body of the article there is just one conclusion, answering the question in the affirmative: in God there are Persons — plural.

The proof goes as follows. [*Antecedent:*] In God there are real relations (plural); so [*1st inference:*] there are (plural) things subsisting in divine nature; so [*2nd inference:*] there are (plural) Persons. The last inference holds, because 'divine person' conveys a relation as a subsisting thing.

ii. In the answer to the second objection, he says that wisdom and goodness are not opposed in God and infers therefrom that they are not thing-wise distinct. You need to understand that this inference rests uniquely upon the fact that relative opposition alone introduces distinction among divine *things*. In other contexts, outside the talk of God, Aquinas would not hold that if there is no opposition, there is no distinction. But in the context at hand, the inference is sound and suffices to meet the objection.

Are there more than three Persons in God?

In I Sent. d.10, q.1, a.5, d.33, q.1, a.2 *ad* 1; 4 *CG* c.26; *De Potentia* q.9, a.9; *Comp. Theol.* cc 56, 60

There appear to be more than three Persons in God.

q.28, a.4

(1) After all, the count of Persons turns on the count of relational properties, according to the previous article. There are four relations in God, as came out earlier, namely: fatherhood, sonship, common spiration, and procession. Ergo, the Persons in God are four.

(2) Besides, the willing in God is no more different from the nature than the understanding is. But there is a Person who proceeds within God by way of His willing as Love, and another who proceeds by way of the nature as a Son. In parallel fashion, there should be one who proceeds by way of understanding as Word and yet another who proceeds by way of the nature as a Son. So again it follows that there are not just three Persons in God.

(3) Also, the higher the creature, the more inner operations it has; thus man goes beyond the other animals in having understanding and willing. But God is infinitely higher than any creature. So in Him there are not only Persons proceeding by way of willing and understanding but also by infinitely many other ways. Thus there are infinitely many Persons in God.

(4) Moreover, it is out of His infinite goodness that the Father communicates Himself infinitely, producing another divine Person. But there is infinite goodness in the Holy Spirit, too. Ergo the Spirit produces a divine Person, and that one produces another one, and so on *ad infinitum*.

c.1;
1052b 19ff
Denz. #75f

(5) Furthermore, whatever comes under a definite number is measured, because number is a kind of measure [as Aristotle says in *Metaphysics X*]. But divine Persons are immeasurable, as is clear from the Athanasian Creed: "The Father is immense, the Son immense, the Holy Spirit immense." Ergo they do not come under the number three.

De Trinitate V,
c.9, Pl. 42, 918

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is the text [of 1 John 5:7], "There are three that bear record in Heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost." As Augustine comments, "To those who ask, 'Three what?', we respond: 'Three Persons'." So there are just three Persons in God.

ANSWER: because of points already made, one must posit just exactly three Persons in God. For it has been shown that the several Persons are the several relations subsisting as really distinct from one another. But the only reason there is real distinction between divine relations is because of relative opposition [conversehood]. Therefore two converse relations have to pertain to two Persons. And if the relations are not converse, they have to pertain to the same Person. Therefore fatherhood and sonship, since they are converse relations, have to pertain to two Persons. Thus father-

hood subsisting is the Person of the Father, and sonship subsisting is the Person of the Son. The other two relations [common spiration and procession] are not converse to either of these but are converse to each other. They cannot both belong, therefore, to *one* Person. So *either*

one of them belongs to both the Persons mentioned already,

or else

one of them belongs to one of those Persons, and the other to the other.

Well, it cannot be the case that procession belongs to the Father and Son [both], nor to either one of them [singly], because [since procession is from the spirator] it would then follow that the Person begetting and/or the Person begotten proceeded from the spirator, with the consequence that intellectual procession (the one in God from which we get fatherhood and sonship) would arise from the love procession (from which we get spiration and procession) — contrary to what was established above. By elimination, therefore, spiration belongs to the Person of the Father and that of the Son, as not being converse either to fatherhood or to sonship. The relation of procession must therefore belong to another Person, called the Person of the Holy Spirit, who proceeds by way of love, as discussed above. The upshot is that there are just exactly three Persons in God: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.

q.27, a.3 *ad* 3

q.27, a.3

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): there are indeed four relations in God, but one of them, spiration, is not separate from the Person of the Father and of the Son but belongs to both. This is why spiration, although it is a relation, is not called a distinctive trait* (it does not belong to just one Person) and also is not a "personal relation," *i.e.* one that constitutes a Person. But the three relations of fatherhood, sonship, and procession are called "distinctive personal traits," as constituting Persons; for fatherhood is the Person of the Father, sonship is the Person of the Son, and procession is the Person of the Holy Spirit proceeding.

* *proprietus*

ad (2): that which proceeds by way of understanding as the Word proceeds with the defining makeup of likeness, as does that which proceeds by way of nature; this is why we said above that the procession of the divine Word *is* generation by way of nature. Love *qua* love, however, does not proceed as a likeness of that whence it proceeds (even though, in God, the Love *qua* divine is co-essential with that whence it proceeds), and so the procession of Love is not called a generation in God.

q.27, a.2

ad (3): as more complete than the other animals, man has more inner operations than they do, but this is only because our way of being complete is being com-

plex. This is why in the angels, who are both more complete and less composed, there are fewer inner operations than in a human being (they do not have imagination, sensation, and the like). And in God there is in real terms only one operation, which is His essence. (How it is that there are still two processions q 27, a.3 has been explained previously.)

ad (4): that argument would work if the Holy Spirit had a numerically distinct goodness from the Father's; for then it would have to be the case that, as the Father produces a divine Person through His goodness, the Holy Spirit does likewise. But in fact the goodness of Father and Spirit is one and the same. And there is not even any distinction between them except through the

relations of the Persons. The goodness belongs to the Holy Spirit as *had from another* but belongs to the Father as one from whom it comes *to another*. Now relative opposition does not permit a source-of relation to coincide with the Holy Spirit's relation, because He comes *from* the only other Persons there can be in God.

ad (5): a definite number, if taken as a simple number, which is nowhere but in thought, is measured by 1. But if the number is taken as "in the divine Persons numbered," then it does not meet the conditions to be "measured," because the same [amount] is not measured by the same [amount], and the "magnitude" of the three Persons [together] is the same [as that of each], as will come out below.

q.42, a.4

Cajetan's Commentary

As to the title-question, be aware that the intent of the text is not just to discuss whether there are *more* than three Persons, but also whether there are *fewer*, say, just two. Two pieces of evidence make this clear. One is at the beginning of this inquiry, where the text says the second issue to be raised is "How many are there?" The other piece of evidence is the exclusive wording of the conclusion answering the question, reached in the body of the article: "there are *just exactly* three Persons in God;" for this to hold, it must be true that there are neither more *nor fewer*.

Analysis of the article

ii. In the body of the article, a single conclusion answers the question in exclusive form: one has to posit just exactly three Persons in God. The two logical parts of this [namely, that three is the right number, and that no other number is right] are supported thus. [*Antecedent:*] The so-many divine Persons are so-many subsistent relations really distinct from one another by relative opposition alone; ergo [*1st inference:*] all converse relations belong to distinct Persons, and relations not converse to each other belong to the same Person; ergo [*2nd inference:*] fatherhood and sonship pertain to two Persons, such that fatherhood is the Person of the Father; sonship, the Person of the Son. Then, [*3rd inference:*] the other two relations (spiration and procession), being converse to neither of the above but yet converse to each other, do not belong to one Person; ergo [*4th inference:*] one of these relations belongs to both the above Persons or else one belongs to one of Them and one to the Other; however [*5th inference:*], the relation of procession cannot belong to those two Persons, because then the intellectual procession would arise from the love-procession; ergo [*6th inference:*] spiration belongs to them both, as being converse to neither, and so [*7th inference:*] procession belongs to another Person; hence [*8th inference:*] there are just exactly three Persons, namely, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.

A doubt about the reasoning

iii. Concerning this reasoning, no small doubt arises about the mode of proceeding: it seems obviously truncated. For one thing, it proposes a disjunction: spiration and procession are such that one of them belongs to both the Father and the Son, or else one of them belongs to the Father and the other to the Son. Yet the second disjunct is not discussed, even though the possibility that the Persons might be fewer than three depends upon it. For another thing, the reasoning puts forward a negative proposition having two parts: procession does not belong to the Father and Son [both] nor [*2nd part:*] to either one of Them [singly]. But the argument supports only the first part, as the text's reasoning proves and as these further words testify: it would then follow that the Person begetting and the Person begotten proceeded from the spirator ...

Another doubt about it

iv. Concerning the same reasoning process, another doubt arises: it seems to imply [both sides of] a contradiction. On the one hand, it says that (1) only relative opposition really distinguishes items in God, and that (2) the second pair of relations (spiration and procession) are not opposed to the first pair (fatherhood and sonship). On the other hand, (3) it purports to prove the real distinctness of procession from fatherhood and sonship. From these moves, I argue as follows. By (1) only relative opposition really distinguishes, but by (2) procession is not opposed to fatherhood or sonship; ergo they are not really distinct. Yet [by (3)], procession is really distinct from fatherhood and sonship. Ergo either it is opposed to one or both relatively, or else relative opposition is not the only thing that makes real distinction arise in God. Both outcomes are contrary

to the text. Ergo [the text contradicts itself].

Answering the first doubt

v. The thing to say against the first doubt is that it was appropriate for Aquinas to lay out explicitly all the alternatives needing to be discussed, lest any should seem to have been overlooked, and also in order to show from the conclusion of the reasoning that all the alternatives had been discussed implicitly. But the manner in which all the alternatives are understood to have been discussed in this brief article, without omission, is this. After making the general inference that one of them (spiration or procession) is in both (the Father and the Son) or else one of them is in one, the other in the other,

Aquinas, by adding the more specific point that procession is neither in both nor in either, was beginning to pursue the first alternative in both the propositions [mentioned in the *dubium*], *i.e.*

whether one [of the relations] is in both the Father and the Son.

In examining this, he started with procession and inferred the negative side:

procession does not belong to both.

Pursuing the same course he consequently concluded that

the other one, spiration, does belong to both.

Thus with the first alternative resolved, as good order demanded, there was no further need to discuss the other alternatives, because they are obviously found to be excluded by the affirmation of the first alternative and the premisses of the whole reasoning process. For it was already stated that

spiration and procession cannot belong to the same Person,

and now it has been shown that spiration belongs to the Father and the Son. Therefore it obviously follows that procession cannot belong to both, nor to either,

and that

it cannot be the case that procession belongs to one of those Persons and spiration to the other.

For this exposition of the reasoning, it is no problem that the text uses inferential language where it says,

by elimination, therefore, spiration belongs...

For that inference does not allude to everything previously stated but to the common rules used here as premisses and the force of the fact that the relations (spiration and procession) are two. It was meant to indicate that since

if no relative opposition stands in the way, one of these relations is identified with both (the Father and the Son),

and

procession cannot be identified with both,

the remaining alternative is that

spiration be identified with both, *as having no relative opposition to either.*

This is how the text is drawing the inference, and not independently of the just stated [italicized] premise, as is clear to anyone who looks deeply.

Answering the second doubt

vi. The SHORT ANSWER to the second doubt is this. Since the relative opposition distinguishing divine things one from another is according to the order of origin, there are two ways in which things can be said to be relatively opposed in God: by way of the relation [*i.e.* by way of the fact that the one relation is the converse of the other], or by way of origin. Things opposed by way of the relation are merely [conversely] correlative, such as the Father and the Son *vis-à-vis* each other; but those things which are so related that the one has to be from the other, but not *vice-versa*, are opposed by way of origin. Therefore, (1) the second pair of relations (spiration/procession) is not opposed to the first pair (fatherhood/sonship) by way of relation; this is what the text means when it says that neither of these is opposed [converse] to either of those. But (2) the procession of the Spirit is opposed to both fatherhood and sonship by way of origin, since love originates from understanding and not *vice-versa*. And this is what the text means by excluding the Spirit's procession from the Father and the Son; for this opposition is a relative opposition of origin. Active spiration, on the other hand, has no opposition to fatherhood and sonship either by way of relation or by way of origin, and hence it coincides with both. Thus, when we let relative opposition hold for different reasons, there is no implication [of both sides of a contradiction] in the reasoning here, as is clear from what I have said, and it makes an effective proof that the divine Persons are just exactly three.

On the answer *ad* (2)

vii. *Re* the answer to the second objection, be aware that if you want to understand completely why the intellectual procession coincides with "procession of nature" and the volitional procession does not, you need to see the three differences [between intellect and will] laid down in the Disputed Questions *De Potentia Dei*, q.10, a.2 *ad* 11.

Do the number words posit anything in God?

In I Sent d24, q.1, a.2-3; De Potentia q.9, a.7; Quodl. X, q.1, a.1

It looks as though the number words posit something in God.¹

(1) After all, God's oneness is His essence, and every number is oneness repeated. So every number word indicates the essence in God. Ergo it posits something in God.

(2) Besides, any word applied to God and creatures applies to God in a higher manner than it does to creatures. But number words posit something in creatures. Ergo they posit even more in God.

(3) Moreover, if number words do not posit anything in God but are used only to deny something, so that oneness is denied by using the plural, and plurality is denied by 'one', the reasoning is going in circles, confusing the mind and certifying nothing — which is highly inappropriate. Therefore, the number words posit something in God.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Hilary says [in *De Trinitate II*]: "Affirmation of more than one [*i.e.* plurality] in God rules out singleness and solitude." Also, Ambrose says, "When we call God one, the oneness excludes many gods; we are not positing quantity in God." One sees from these authorities that such words are used to deny things of God, not to posit anything in Him.

PL 10, 111
De Fide I, c.2;
PL 16, 533

Libet I Sententiarum d.24, q.1

ANSWER: the Master of the *Sententiae* [Peter Lombard] held that number words do not posit anything in God but only deny. But other writers say the opposite.

To clear this up, one needs to bear in mind the fact that every plurality results from a division, but there are two kinds of division. One the one hand, there is the material kind, which comes about because a continuous thing is divided: the result of this is the "number" which is a kind of quantity. So this sort of

¹ To understand this article, one needs to grasp the medieval use of the word 'numerus'. In learned circles, at any rate, it did not mean what 'number' means to us. It meant more. It meant a numerical measure. So 'numerus trinus' meant three units of measurement (three leagues or ells or cubic cubits or whatever). Since the Mediaevals did not measure fancy things like energy or momentum, their measurements were all of size or amount, which only material things had. The result was that *numeri* had application only to material things. At the same time, the Mediaevals realized that number-words were at home in counting, and that one could count anything, not just unit-chunks in a measurement. The odd result was that number-words were not always naming *numeri*. Trifling as this sounds to us, it posed for the Mediaevals a serious problem: what did number-words mean when they were not naming *numeri*? Some said they just meant negations; some said they meant *numeri* cut off from their category (*i.e.* measurements cut off from any quantity being measured). This is the problem Aquinas intends to address, and he will have his own solution, as we shall see.

number is only in material things having quantity.² On the other hand, there is formal division. This arises thanks to conflicting or diverse forms; from it there results a "manyness" which is not in any category but belongs to the transcendentals (whereby "being" is divided into "one" and "many"). This is the only kind of manyness that turns up among non-material things.³

Certain writers, then, thought of "so-many" only as a species of discrete quantity. They saw that discrete quantity has no place in God. So, some of them held that number words posit nothing in God but only deny; others, looking at the same kind of so-many, [thought its category could be dropped and] said that, JUST AS expertise* is posited in God with its distinctive traits but not with the makeup of its category (because there is no quality in God), SO ALSO a number is posited in God with its distinctive makeup [*e.g.* three] but not with the makeup of its category, which is quantity.

Our view, however, is that number words used in the talk of God are not being used for the numbers that are species of quantity. If they were, God would only be called [one or three] metaphorically, as is the case with other bodily attributes, such as length, breadth, and the like. Rather, they are being used for a manyness which is transcendental. When 'so-many' [say, 'three'] is taken transcendentally, it stands to the many so numbered as 'one' in the sense co-extensive with 'a being' stands to a being. Well, this sort of 'one' (as I said above in dealing with the oneness of God) does not add anything to 'a being' except a negation of division; for 'one' means 'a being not divided'. So, 'one' said of any item *x* indicates that *x* is undivided, as 'one' said of a man indicates a human nature or sub-

* *scientia*

q.11, a.1

² Quantities were taken to be real traits of size or amount, as I said in footnote 1. These traits were then divided into "continuous quantities" (sizes abstracted as the items studied in geometry) and "discrete quantities" (abstracted as the numbers studied in arithmetic). These last are difficult. How did the Mediaevals think of "discrete quantities" as real traits? Did they think a dozen eggs was one substance, having the real accident of "being 12"? No. Numbers defined "species" of real size only by being used in measurements. Take a log, and take a unit (*e.g.* a cubit), then "12 cubits long" was a real size, even though we have to use an arbitrary, thought-up unit to describe it. This was "discrete" quantity because each unit/cubit was being thought of as distinct from all the others. See next footnote.

³ The ordinary counting numbers were the "species" of transcendental manyness. Calling it transcendental was the medieval way of saying that these numbers could be used to count anything (eggs, angels, accidents, anything). But counting material things carried implications about size or amount (as 12 eggs implied more "stuff" than 6), while counting immaterial things carried no such implication. Twelve angels were no more "stuff" than six.

stance not divided. For the same reason, when things are called “many” in this sense of ‘many’, it indicates just those things, with each of them undivided. By contrast, the number which is a species of quantity posits an accidental trait added to a being, and so does the “one” which is the start of [such] number.⁴

Number words used in the talk of God, then, just indicate the items of which they are said and add nothing but a negation, as I said. In this respect, the Master of the *Sententiae* was right: when we say, “The essence is one,” the word ‘one’ indicates the essence undivided; in “The Person is one,” ‘one’ means the Person undivided; when we say, “The Persons are several,” those Persons are meant along with indivision of each, because it belongs to the definition of a multitude that it be made up of *units*.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): since the ‘one’ in question is a transcendental term, it has wider extension than ‘substance’ or ‘relation’ (and ditto for the ‘many’ in question). Hence this ‘one’ can stand for the substance in God or for a relation, depending on how it is being used. And beyond the essence or relation(s) so numbered, such words convey nothing

⁴ He means that ‘one unit long’ is already a size, as ‘one kilo’ is already an amount.

by their distinctive sense but a negation of division in the fashion already stated.

ad (2): the ‘so many’ that posits something in created things is a species of quantity, and this does not carry over into the talk of God; a transcendental ‘so-many’ posits nothing beyond the items numbered, except negation of division in each; and this is the sort of ‘so-many’ that does carry over to God.

ad (3): what ‘one’ denies is not being-many but being-divided, which has explanatory priority over being one or many.⁵ What ‘many’ denies is not oneness [overall] but division in each of the items counted. These points were explained earlier in the discussion of God’s oneness.

One must also realize, however, that the authorities quoted in the ON THE OTHER HAND do not go far enough to support our position. Yes, solitude is excluded by ‘more than one’ [‘plurality’], and plural gods are excluded by ‘one’; but it does not follow that these words convey nothing more. Black, after all, is excluded by the word ‘white’, but ‘white’ conveys more than just not-black.

⁵ He means that ‘divided’ or its negation appears in the explanation of being one and in that of being many.

Cajetan’s Commentary

In the title-question, the “number words” are ‘one’, ‘two’, ‘three’, etc. The phrase “posit something” means ‘convey something positive’. So the sense of the question is this: when we say that the Father and the Son are two, does the word ‘two’ predicate something positive, the way ‘wise’ or ‘Father’ does, or only a negation, the way ‘incorporeal’ does?

Analysis of the article

ii. In the body of the article Aquinas does four jobs. (1) He mentions two extreme opinions, one that of Peter Lombard in *I Sent.*, d.24, who held that only negation is conveyed by these terms; and one holding the opposite. (2) He introduces a distinction between two senses of plurality, so as to have a basis for finding the truth and avoiding mistakes. (3) He shows the basis for the above-mentioned opinions. (4) He answers the question by making his own determinations.

iii. As to the second of these jobs (because the first requires no comment), the distinction is as follows: plurality may be either *material* or *transcendental*. He proves its soundness this way. Plurality results from division; but division is either the division of something continuous [the material kind] or else the division of opposed or diverse forms [the transcendental kind]; thus plurality may be either of these,

since it follows upon division.

The two sides of this distinction are marked by two further differences beyond the basic one already mentioned. A material plurality is a species of quantity, while a transcendental plurality is not in any category. Furthermore, material plurality exists only in things that are so-big, while the transcendental kind exists even in things free of matter.

iv. As to Aquinas’ third job, both the opinions he reviews looked only at material multitude, which is called “number”; the one attacked a positive application of such number, because of the imperfection it would introduce into God; the other defended such positive application by purging the imperfection. Thus both took number words in the same [material] sense, and the one sought to remove what they normally posit, while the other sought to salvage it.

v. As to Aquinas’ fourth job, the conclusion reached in answer to the question is: number words in the talk of God convey the things of which they are predicated and add no information but a negation. This he both proves and illustrates.

The proof goes like this. [*Antecedent: negative part:*] number words as used of God are not taken from the number which is a species of quantity, but rather [*affirmative part:*] from transcendental manyness; [*consequence:*] therefore they convey the sub-

jects of which they are predicated with no added meaning other than a negation.

The negative part of the antecedent (which directly contradicts the basis for both the other opinions) is supported like this. If the number words were coming from the species of quantity, they would be predicated of God only metaphorically. For corporeal properties are only metaphorically applied to God, as is clear in the case of length and breadth, *etc.* The positive part of the antecedent, not explicitly proved, follows from the difference between the two kinds of manyness, especially given the fact that the Divine Being belongs to the order of immaterial things.

The consequent is proved from the difference between the two kinds of manyness and between the two kinds of oneness which are at the source of these two kinds of manyness — the difference, namely, as to whether they convey something positive or negative. The proof goes like this. The transcendental-taken 'one' signifies whatever is being called "one" and adds no information but a negation of division [for instance, if we say, "The Father is one," the word 'one' refers to the Father and describes Him only as not divided]; ergo 'many', transcendental-taken, conveys the things which are called "so-many" and adds no information but a negation of division regarding each of them; for a manyness consists of units [for instance, if we say, "The Father and the Son are two," the word 'two' refers to the Father and the Son and describes them only as being *each* an undivided unit]. By contrast, the "one" which is the source of number and is itself a number signifies a certain positive accident; otherwise it would not be a species of quantity, *etc.* Therefore, if the number words used in talk of God are coming from transcendental manyness, they signify just the things to which they are attached and add no information except a negation. Q. E. D.

Aquinas illustrates this thesis by applying it to God's essence and to the Persons, as is clear in the text.

Three remarks

vi. Concerning the above statements, notice first that what one learns from the text is that Aquinas' opinion differs at root from both the ones mentioned at the outset. As to the conclusion he draws, he differs in every way from the second of those opinions, which Scotus however adopted, for no good reason, in his *Quodlibet XII*,¹ around the beginning of article 1, where he said the term "three" as applied to God abstracts from [the genus] discrete [of the category] quantity. Aquinas' conclusion differs from the first of those opinions [Peter Lombard's] in just one way, *i.e.*, that the number words do not signify *purely* negatively, though Aquinas concedes that they do imply a negation.

Notice secondly that many of the propositions stated here are disputable, *i.e.* that

a number is a certain species of quantity and that

number is only found in quantized things and that

the one which is the source of number is a positive material accident.

But since debating these points does not pertain to present business, there will be a special inquiry about them if time allows.¹

¹ As Cajetan forswears further comment, the present translator had better step in. With the material as well as the transcendental "one" and "many," there are difficulties. Begin with the former.

Any material number was supposed to arise by division (real or mental) of the continuous and was supposed to name a real accident of quantity. This had to belong to some substance. So the material number 3, as applied to a log of wood, was supposed to say that the real size of it (in some dimension), was a size of the species, 3. But one did not say, "This log is three," nor even, "three long." Number words could not be applied to a log intelligibly without the stipulation of some *unit*. "This log is three *cubits* long" made sense, because it mentioned the unit chosen for the measuring. (One could also say, "This log is three times longer than that one," in which the implicit unit was not a conventional one but the actual length, whatever it was, of the other log. In either case something was taken as the unit.)

Well, a log is as long as it is, whether we measure it or not, and whether we measure it in cubits or finger-breadths. So I grant that applying a number-of-units predicate is gesturing at a trait (call it a trait of quantity) which a thing has independently of the mind measuring. The question is whether this trait should ever have been taken into the scientific account of '*numerus*'. This is what the tradition did. It made '*numerus*' narrower in meaning than our word 'number', by making 'measure of a real quantity' part of the *ratio* of '*numerus*', so as to make each *numerus* a species of quantity.

A case could be made for this move, perhaps, if *numeri* were *real* species of quantities. But they are not. It is undeniable that numbers are at best thought-up species, founded on the contrivance of a unit of measure. No doubt, there is a real difference between any one real size and another (which may as well be a specific difference); and, no doubt, we are unable to describe this real difference in any detail except by choosing a unit and saying that the one real size is this-many such units and the other is that-many; but the fact remains that numbers themselves appear only in descriptions arising from the *choice of a thought-up unit*.

I conclude from this, quite simply, that the medieval account of material one and many was wrong, and we are well rid of it. '*Numerus*' should have been understood as 'number' is now, so that all number words are transcendental.

Next we face the difficulties with the medieval account of transcendental one and many. Here, the conviction that "one" is the *principium* of number was ambiguous. It overlooked the difference between the 'one' which just negates division, the 'one' which expresses the being-in-a-set of what was to be counted, and the 'one' which started the count.

Let there be a transcendental 'one' whose meaning is just negation of division. We use it when saying in the metaphysical vein that each being is one, with no intention to count. But when we say in the computational vein that some item is 1 (and another would be 2 if it were there), we do intend to count. The computational 1 contrasts equally with every other number, including zero, whereas the metaphysical "one" contrasts only with division and 'many.' So between these

Notice thirdly that the statement in the text to the effect that

'many' adds nothing to the things [counted] but indivision in each

can be taken two ways. On one construal, 'nothing' refers to the positive; the purpose of the present discussion is to know whether a number word adds anything positive or just one or more negations (for it is certain that manyness includes several negations, *i.e.* the one implied in the oneness which is indivision of

the group itself, and the one added by 'many', which is the distinction of one unit from another). The other construal puts the emphasis on 'the things [counted]'; their being in the plural conveys division of one from another in exercised act, so that, above and beyond the things divided, 'many' adds nothing but a negation of division in each of those things; and on this construal 'nothing' can stand both for the positive and for the negative.

two senses of 'one' there is a difference of intention behind the use of the word.

As I said above, the computational 1 is always a transcendental one, not material. Indeed, it is precisely the transcendental of all *number* as such which allows numbers to be taken from their obvious uses (like keeping track of sheep) and applied to all sorts of other uses in which we count anything we please, including the artificial objects called units of measurement. But in order to count anything we please, we still have to know what we propose to count, and what not. We have to bring the items to be counted under a common description, such as 'domestic animals'. (The description does not have to be realistic. Apples, unicorns, and square roots make three "topics of conversation.") This need for a common description brings to light the connection between numbers and sets.

A set is any collection of items, however diverse, which one puts together (under a common description, if language provides one). This "put-togetherness" of the set sounds like oneness, but it is neither the number 1 nor a pure denial of division. Yet it assumes the latter and is transcendental. Mathematical concepts, including the concept of number itself, are derivable from this notion of set. For example, the persons in this room form one set; the desks in this room form another. If every person occupies a desk, and every desk is occupied by a person, then there are "just as many" persons as desks. This just-as-many is perhaps the most primitive of all mathematical concepts. It arises by putting the members of two or more sets into one-to-one correspondence. If this results in no items left over in either set, the two sets are of the same "cardinality." If the matching activity leaves some items left over in the first set, we say that the first set is "more" than the other, or that the other is "fewer" than the first — and these also are primitive notions.

The notion of number is less primitive; it arises only when we abstract from sets of the same cardinality their common property. One may speculate that this act of abstraction became possible through an exercise which might be called pre-counting, because it could have been practiced before number words were invented. A cave man sees horses on the plain, let us say. He wonders "how many" horses there are. He has a certain natural feel for the size of the set of his fingers. So in order to see how many horses there are, he holds up a finger for each horse he sees. Suppose he runs out of horses when he has held up all the fingers of one hand and another finger from his other hand. He now has a feel for how many horses there are. As soon as he invents a name for what the horses and the held-up fingers have in common, he has a number word in his language. In the case at hand, he will have invented a name for 6. Thus, too, the number which we call 1 is that which all sets having the same cardinality as a set having a single member have in common. 2 is that which all sets having the same cardinality

as a set having a pair of members have in common. *Etc.* Many primitive languages have names for only a few such numbers; but once the idea of number has been grasped through the invention of some names, there is no difficulty about inventing more. In any case, as soon as the names exist, children can be taught simple exercises like holding up fingers one after another as the names are spoken. I hold up a finger and say, "One," then another and say, "Two," *etc.* As a result of this kind of teaching, *the names themselves become an ordered set of labels*; and once that has happened, I can find out how many horses there are in the field by saying the names in order, pronouncing a number-name for each horse I see, skipping the finger step; at that point I am "counting."

Thus all natural numbers arise by abstraction from set cardinalities. And since there is no limit to the diversity of the objects which we can put into the same set, it follows that all natural numbers are "species" of transcendental manyness. Whereupon, because all other kinds of numbers (rational, real, complex) arise from operations we choose to perform upon the natural numbers, it follows that all numbers are "species" of transcendental manyness-with-operations.

We now return to how Aquinas answered the question of what number words posit in God. In terms of real features, the talk of three Persons says exactly what Aquinas says it says, namely, that there are distinct Persons in God, each of which, undivided in Himself, stands as a unit. But it also says something more. It says that the set of these units in God has the same cardinality as the set of asterisks between these parentheses: (**). So why doesn't Aquinas say that this sameness is a positive feature posited in God by the talk of three Persons? Well, if I may take the risk of answering for him, the reason is twofold.

First, sameness of cardinality, taken formally as such, posits nothing in the real because it is a thought-produced relation — thought-produced because it arises from and depends upon the mind's decision to group these or those items together as sets — which decision, remember, purely as founding countability, is totally arbitrary. This much of the answer that I am making up for Aquinas disposes of sameness-of-cardinality formally considered. But there remains the consideration of its basis. I concede that the basis for set-formation is sometimes in the real. There are such things as natural trios (shamrock leaves). Between all such natural trios, there is a real resemblance. So the question is: doesn't the talk of three Persons in God posit a real resemblance between those Persons and every other natural trio? I answer: the talk of three posits a real resemblance but not in God. All other natural trios are creatures; their resemblance to the divine Trinity is a real relation in them; but God's converse resemblance to them is thought-produced, for the same reason that all relations of God towards His creatures are thought-produced. So even in this regard, the talk of three posits nothing real in God. Aquinas' solution in this article turns out to be, in its bottom line, perfectly correct.

Can being "a person" be common to the three Persons?

In 1 Sent. d.25, q.1, a.3, De Potentia Dei q.8, a.3 ad 11

It looks as though the trait of being "a Person" cannot be common to the three Persons.

(1) After all, nothing is common to the three Persons except their essence. But 'Person' does not convey their essence directly. Therefore, it is not common to the three.

(2) Besides, 'common' is the opposite of 'incommunicable'. But what it takes to be a Person includes being incommunicable, as is clear from Richard of St. Victor's definition, stated above. Therefore, the trait of "Person" is not common to the three.

(3) Furthermore, if it is common, the commonality is either real or thought-produced. It cannot be real, because then the Three would be one Person. But neither can it be just thought-produced, because then the "person" status would be a universal, and there is no place for the universal or the particular, nor for genus or species, within the divine reality, as I showed above. Thus, the trait of being "a Person" is not common to the three.

ON THE OTHER HAND, Augustine says [in *De Trinitate I*] that when they ask, "Three what?" the answer is "Three Persons," because they have in common what a person is.

ANSWER: when we say, "three Persons," our very way of speaking shows that "person" is common to the three (just as our saying "three men" shows that "man" is common to three). But this commonality is not a real affair, obviously, the way one essence is common to Them, because then it would follow that the Three had "one person" as they have one essence.

Beyond that, the students of this matter have advanced different theories. Some have said the commonality is one of negation, on the ground that 'incommunicable' goes into defining a person.¹ Others have called it a commonality of second intention, because ['genus', 'species' and 'individual' are terms of second intention, and] 'individual' goes into [Boethius'] definition of 'person', so that 'The status of Person is common to the three' is like saying 'The honour of being a species is common to horse and cow'.²

¹ Thus said the Paris theologian William of Auxerre (d. 1230) in his widely-read *Summa Aurea* (a commentary on the four *Libri Sententiarum*), where he adopted Richard of St. Victor's definition of 'divine person'.

² Thus Alexander of Hales, O.F.M. (d. 1245) in his *Summa theologiae*. Terms of second intention did not mention things as they were in themselves but as they stood to our speaking or cognizing. Thus calling a cow an "individual" was saying where she stood in a classificational scheme. But some terms of second intention, like 'individual' and 'referent', were re-used as metaphysical terms.

But these theories are ruled out by the fact that 'person' is not a mere negative or second-intention word, but a *thing*-word.

The thing to say, then, is that, even in human cases, 'person' is common with a thought-produced commonality, not like 'genus' or 'species', however, but as a term for a vague individual.*

- * *individuum vagum*
- Names of genera or species like 'man' or 'animal' are used to convey the common natures themselves, not their intentional standing, which is conveyed by 'genus' or 'species'.
- A term for a vague individual, like 'a man', conveys the common nature with the definite way of existing that goes with particulars, namely, as a referent in its own right[†] distinct from others.³
- A name for a specified particular, like 'Socrates', conveys something definite and distinguishing, like this flesh and these bones.

† *per se subsistens*

The difference between "a man" and "person" is that the former conveys 'individual case of our nature' with the mode of existing that goes with particulars, whereas 'person' is not used to mean an individual case of our nature but 'a referent' in such-and-such nature. Well, it is common to the divine Persons with thought-produced commonality that each of them is a referent in the divine nature, distinct from the others. So this is how person-status is common, on a thought-produced basis, to the three divine Persons.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): this argument is relevant to commonality in the real.

ad (2): although a person is incommunicable, the way of existing which is "incommunicably" can be common to several.⁴

ad (3): if the commonality is thought-produced and not real, it does not follow that there is universal and particular, or genus or species, within the divine reality. For one thing, even in human cases the commonality of person-status is not one of genus or species. For another thing, the divine Persons [are not different in their being but] have one being, whereas a genus-name, a species-name, or any other universal is predicated of multiple things different in being.⁵

³ The vague individual is a fixture of many jokes: "A man is sitting in a bar, see, and in walks this penguin ..."

⁴ Compare 'uniquely': I am uniquely me, but that does not prevent other people from being uniquely themselves.

⁵ A normal universal, like 'sitting hen' or 'operatic soprano' or 'ballerina' or 'Vassar vixen' applies to these and those females in such a way that the *esse huius* ≠ the *esse illius*. But in God the *esse Patris* = the *esse Filii* = the *esse Spiritus Sancti*.

Cajetan's Commentary

The title is clear. — In the body of the article Aquinas does three jobs: (1) he shows what is clear and what doubtful in this issue; (2) he rejects the opinions of others concerning the doubtful part; (3) he answers the question by making his own determinations.

ii. As to job (1), he says three things. First he talks about the obvious commonality of the name 'person'. He supports this from our very way of speaking: we say, "three Persons." Secondly, he talks about the how of this commonality, namely that it obviously is not how the divine essence is common, because there is not one person common to the three. Thirdly, continuing to talk about the how of commonality, he says that what remains doubtful is how being a person is common to the Three.

iii. As to job (2), he considers two opinions. The one is that person-status is common by a commonality of negation, and this is based on Richard of St. Victor's definition of 'person'. The other opinion is that person-status is common by a commonality of second intention, and this idea is based on Boethius' definition.

But both these opinions are rejected on the basis of determinations which Aquinas reached in the preceding inquiry [q. 29, aa. 1, 4], regarding the meaning of 'person': namely, that it is a term signifying a relation in God after the fashion of a hypostasis and, more generally, signifying a first substance of a rational nature; and hence 'person' is neither a name of second intention nor one of negation. And since the commonality of a term is based upon what it carries in its sense,* it follows that the commonality of 'person' is not a commonality of second intention or of negation but rather the commonality of a thing or item signified.

iv. As to job (3), the conclusion reached in answer to the question is this: being a person is common to the three divine Persons on a thought-produced basis [*secundum rationem*], not like genus-status or species-status, however [that is, not in the way that being a species is common to horse, cow, and dog], but like the vague individual [that is, in the way "a man" is common to Tom, Dick, or Harry]. This conclusion is first stated and then supported.

It is stated by noting the difference between the meanings of generic or specific names and the meanings of names for the vague and singular individual, and also by noting the difference between different names for the vague individual. Thus 'man' or 'animal' convey the nature itself, whereas 'a man' or 'a human person' convey the nature with a definite mode of being; by contrast 'Socrates' signifies *this referent* in the nature. But 'a man' and 'a person', even if they signify the same thing, do not signify it in the same way; for 'person' underscores the *how* of being, i.e. standing as a referent, while 'a man' under-

scores the nature, with particularization added.

The conclusion is supported as follows. [*Antecedent:*] Being a referent distinct from others is common to the three divine Persons; [*inference:*] therefore person-status is common to them in this way. And if you add to the antecedent the fact that this trait [of being a referent distinct from others] does not belong to the divine Persons as their species or genus but rather after the fashion of the vague individual, the whole conclusion follows as it is set forth in the text.

v. Concerning these points notice the following. When we say in theology,

(1) the Father is God

and

(2) the Father is a divine Person,

the predicate of (2) declares the *how* [the subsistence of the nature which is the sense] of the predicate of (1), and therefore the predicate of (2) is said to be common to the divine Persons after the fashion of the vague individual; and yet the predicate of (2), in its relation to the subject of (2), is an essential predicate. This last is true both for the common reason that the essential *how* which is standing-as-a-referent comes from particulars [in the category] of substance, and for the special reason that 'divine Person' signifies a relation and is predicated essentially of paternity or filiation. 'Color' would be similarly predicated of whiteness or blackness, if either were a particular of [the category of] substance. Thus it is clear that Scotus, when he dealt (at places mentioned above) with the meaning and commonality of 'person' and said its commonality was one of negation, or else positive in its own peculiar way, departed from the teaching given here and yet proved nothing against it.¹

In I Sent. dd.23, 25

* *significatum*

¹ Set aside abstract nouns, and set aside proper names. The upshot of this innovative article and its brief commentary is that concrete common nouns come in two very different kinds. One kind the Medievals knew how to handle, namely, the kind that mentions a thing as having a nature (substantial or accidental, absolute or relational) common to many individuals and abstracted from them. These are common nouns like '*homo*', '*bos*', '*albus*', '*pater*' etc. The other kind left the Medievals puzzled, because, while common, they were not mentioning a thing as having a common trait. '*Persona*' was of this kind. Semantically speaking, what was such a noun doing? Aquinas' answer — that it was doing the same sort of work as '*quidam*' or '*aliquis*', namely, mentioning an individual vaguely — was sound in itself, an improvement over earlier medieval theories, and an important step towards the modern doctrine of "variables," "quantifiers" and "incomplete symbols." Moreover, Aquinas' answer forced into the open the deep difference between abstraction and vagueness. These are often confused, but they are not the same. Abstraction yields a *re-usable description*; vagueness yields *indefinite reference*.

Inquiry Thirty-One: Into singular and plural in the talk of God

After these topics, we need to consider issues having to do with the use of singular and the plural in the talk of God. Four questions are raised:

- | | |
|---|---|
| (1) the word 'trinity' [should it be used?] | (3) may an exclusionary word be attached to a term conveying God's essence? |
| (2) may one say the Son is "another" than the Father? | (4) may an exclusionary word be attached to a term conveying a Person? |

article 1

Should 'trinity' [*i.e.* 'threeness'] be used?

In 1 Sent d.24, q.2, a.2

It seems that there is no trinity or threeness in God.

(1) After all, every term used of God conveys either His substance or else a relation. 'Trinity' does not convey the substance, because it is predicated of the distinct Persons: neither does it convey a relation, because it does not function as a relative term. Therefore 'trinity' should not be used in talking of God.

(2) Besides, 'trinity' seems to be a collective noun, since it means a group. Such a term is not suitable for God, because the unity implied by a collective noun is the weakest sort, whereas the unity in God is the strongest. Ergo 'trinity' is not suitable in the talk of God.

(3) Also, every use for 'three' is a use for 'thrice'. In God there is no use for 'thrice', because it names a level of inequality; so there is no use for 'trinity'.

(4) Moreover, whatever is in God is in the unit which is His essence, because God *is* His essence. So, if there is a threeness in God, it will belong to the unit which is the divine essence, and so there will be three units of essence in God, which is heretical.

(5) Furthermore, in every true proposition about God, the concrete is predicated of the abstract. Thus 'Divineness is God' and 'Fatherhood is the Father'. But 'The Trinity is three' cannot be said, because then there would be nine items in God, which is erroneous. Therefore 'threeness'/'trinity' should not be used.

Denz. #79f ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what the Athanasian Creed says: "We must adore unity in the Trinity, and the Trinity in unity."

ANSWER: in the talk of God, 'trinity' conveys a definite number of Persons. Since a plurality of Persons is admitted in God, 'trinity' should be used, too, because 'trinity' conveys with definiteness what 'plurality' already conveys indefinitely.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): to go by morphology, 'trinity' seems [to convey divine substance; it seems] to mean 'one essence of three Persons' because

'trinity' sounds like 'a unity of three'. But if we go by the word's distinctive semantics, it rather means so many Persons of one essence, and this is why we cannot say, 'The Father is the trinity'; He is not three Persons. At the same time, it is not a relative term, because it does not convey the *relations* of the Persons but the *number* of Persons related.

ad (2): a collective noun implies (a) a plural number of referents, and (b) a unity imposed by some ordering relation among them. Thus "a people" is a plural number of human beings taken under some ordering relation. The word 'trinity' works like a collective noun as to (a) but works differently as to (b). For in the divine Trinity there is not just unity by ordering relation but, along with this, unity by essence.¹

ad (3): 'trinity' is used absolutely. It conveys the count of Persons (a count of three). 'Thrice' by contrast [is not absolute, because it] conveys a relation of inequality. For 'thrice' means a type of unequal proportion, as Boethius makes clear in *On Arithmetic*. So 'thrice' does not apply in God, but 'trinity' does. *PL 63, 1100-1101*

ad (4): in 'divine Trinity' we understand both a count and the Persons counted. So when we say, "Trinity in unity," we are not counting a unit-which-is-essence, as if it were 1×3 ; rather, we are placing the Persons counted in the unit-which-is-their-nature, as the referents of any nature are said to be "in that nature." *Vice-versa*, we say "unity in Trinity" as we say a nature is "in its referents."

¹ Ordering relations are asymmetrical relations like ancestor-of, ruler-of, etc. The fact that a population shares in human nature does not make it "a people." It takes the ordering relations introduced by ancestry, history, governance, etc., to make a people. God's unity is stronger because, besides an ordering introduced by the processions, the divine Persons "share in the same nature" in a higher sense. The divine nature does not have multiple cases; each divine Person "shares in" numerically one/same case of divine nature.

ad (5): 'trinity' involves the number 3; if one says, "The trinity is three," a multiplication of that number by itself is meant, because, for any subject *S*, saying 'S is three' indicates distinctness among the referents of *S*.

Hence, "The Trinity is three" cannot be said, because it would follow that there were three referents of 'Trinity'; in like fashion, when I say, "God is three," it follows that there are three referents of divineness.

Cajetan's Commentary

In the title question, 'trinity' is taken according to its distinctive meaning.

In the body of the article, a single conclusion answers the question in the affirmative: 'trinity' should be used in the talk of God. The support goes as follows. [*Antecedent:*] Plurality of Persons is posited in God; ergo [*inference:*] threeness of them should also

be posited. Drawing the inference is supported on the ground that 'threeness'/'trinity' means in a definite way (by invoking a definite number, 3) what 'plurality' means vaguely [by invoking some number above 1]. The argument works by taking for granted [the unstated premise] that the faith is true, *i.e.* that there are in fact three Persons in God.

Is the Son someone "other than" the Father?

In I Sent. d.9, q.1, a.1, d.19, q.1, a.1; d.24, q.2, a.1; *De Potentia Dei* q.9, a.8

It seems the Son is not one "other than" the Father.

(1) After all, "one other than" is a relational phrase conveying diversity of substance. So, if the Son is one other than the Father, it seems He is diverse from the Father. This is against Augustine, who says in *De Trinitate VII* that we do not intend to suggest diversity when we say three Persons.

(2) Besides, any who are "other" than one another differ from one another somehow. So if the Son is someone "other" than the Father, He is different from the Father. But this goes against Ambrose in *De Fide*, where he says, "The Father and the Son are one in divineness, where there is no difference of substance nor any diversity."

(3) Moreover, the word 'alius' ['other'] is the source of the word 'alien'. But the Son is not alien from the Father. For Hilary says [in his *De Trinitate VII*] that, among the divine Persons, "nothing is diverse, nothing alien, nothing separable." Ergo, the Son is not someone "other" than the Father.

(4) Also, 'someone other' and 'something other' have the same meaning and differ only in gender. So if the Son is someone other than the Father, it seems to follow that He is something other than the Father.

ON THE OTHER HAND, Augustine [actually, Fulgentius] says: "The essence of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit is one essence, in which it is not the case that the Father is one thing, the Son another thing, the Holy Spirit yet another, and yet person-wise the Father is someone, the Son is someone else, and the Holy Spirit is someone else again."

ANSWER: since words spoken carelessly breed heresy (as Jerome remarks¹), we must use caution and respect for authority when we turn to the topic of the Trinity, where "error is more dangerous, inquiry more difficult, and discovery more fruitful than anywhere else," according to Augustine. In our talk of the Trinity, we have to steer a middle course between two opposite errors: that of Arius, who posited with a Trinity of persons a trio of substances, and that of Sabellius, who posited with the oneness of essence a singleness of Person.

To avoid the mistake of Arius, our talk of God has to avoid the words 'diverse' and 'different', so as not to compromise the oneness of God's essence; but we can use 'distinct' because of relative opposition. So, wherever we find talk of a "diversity" or "difference" of Persons in an authoritative text, we take these words to mean distinction. Like-

wise to be avoided, if the simplicity of God's essence is not to be lost, are 'separate' and 'divided' (as of a whole into parts). 'Disparity' is to be avoided, lest the equality [of the Persons] be taken away. And lest their similarity be lost, we have to avoid 'alien' and 'discrepant'. For Ambrose says that in the Father and the Son there is "not discrepancy of deity but one deity." And Hilary (as quoted) says there is "nothing alien, nothing separable" in God.

Meanwhile, to stay clear of Sabellius' mistake, we have to avoid 'one and only' [*'singularis'*], so as not to suppress the communicability of the divine essence — which is why Hilary says [in his *De Trinitate VII*], "It is sacrilege to call the Father or the Son the one and only God." We have to avoid 'the only' [*'unicus'*] in order not to suppress the plural number of Persons, which is why Hilary says, "The concept of the one-and-only is excluded from God." (Of course, we say "only Son," because there are not many Sons in God; but we do not call Him "the only God," because being-God is common to more than one [Person].) We also avoid 'fused' lest we deny the order of nature among the Persons; thus Ambrose says, "What is one is not fused, and the undifferentiated cannot be multiple." One also has to avoid 'solitary', so as not to suppress the companionship of the three Persons; thus Hilary says [in *De Trinitate II*], "We must confess neither a solitary God nor a split-up God."

But 'someone other' indicates only a distinction of referent. We may suitably say, "The Son is someone other than the Father," because He is another referent of the divine nature, just as He is another Person and another hypostasis.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): as a quasi-name for a particular, 'someone other' makes mention of a referent; so distinction of "substance" in the sense of hypostasis or person suffices for what it takes to be "someone other." But 'diverse from' requires distinction of "substance" in the sense of essence. And so we cannot say that the Son is diverse from the Father, even though He is someone else.

ad (2): 'different' implies distinction of form. But there is only one form in God, as is clear from Philippians 2: 6, "who, while being in the form of God ..." So the word 'different' has no place in talk of God, as the Scripture just cited shows. Damascene, however, applies 'different' to the divine Persons because the relation distinctive of each is conveyed after the fashion of a form; this is why he says the hypostases do not differ from one another in substance but in their definite distinctives. But 'difference' here is taken to mean distinction, as I said.

ad (3): the "alien" is the foreign and dissimilar:

c.4;
PL 42, 940

De Fide ad Gratianum,
Book I, c.1
PL 16, 533

PL 10, 233

in De Fide ad Petrum
PL 40, 755

De Trinitate I, c.3;
PL 42, 822

De fide ad Gratianum I, c.2,
PL 16, 555

PL 10, 233

PL 10, 233

PL 10, 231

De fide ad Gratianum I, c.1
PL 16, 533A

PL 10, 111

De Fide Ortho-
doxa III, c.5,
PL 94, 999ff

¹ Peter Lombard attributed this remark to Jerome in *I Sent.* d.13, a.2. It comes in fact from the Marginal Gloss on Hoseah 2:16.

but nothing of the kind is implied when we say "someone other." Thus we call the Son "someone other" than the Father, but we do not call Him alien to the Father.

ad (4): the neuter gender is indefinite, while the masculine and feminine are definite and distinct. So, a common essence is well conveyed by the neuter gender, while a definite referent in the common nature is conveyed by the masculine or feminine. Thus in human conversation, the masculine-

gender question "Who is this?" gets an answer like "Socrates," which is the name of a referent. But the neuter-gender question, "What is this?" gets an answer like "An animal which is rational and mortal." So, in the talk of God, since distinction comes from the Persons, not the essence, we say that the Father is *someone* other than the Son but not that He is *something* other; and conversely, we say the Father and the Son are *unum* [one in the neuter] but not *unus* [one in the masculine].

Cajetan's Commentary

In the title of this and the following articles of this Inquiry, the question is about a word or phrase in its proper / literal sense, so that it would yield a true and sound proposition, *e.g.* that the Son is someone other than the Father, *etc.*

In the body of the article, Aquinas does four jobs. (1) He tells how one should speak in talking of the Trinity, *i.e.*, cautiously and with respect for authority, and he develops this in two ways. First in general terms, with authoritative quotes from Jerome and Augustine. Then more specifically, because of the extreme errors of Arius and Sabellius. (2) He says four terms are to be avoided because of Arius: 'diverse', 'divided', 'discrepant' and 'alien'. (3) In

parallel fashion, he gives four terms to avoid on account of Sabellius: 'one and only', 'only', 'fused', and 'solitary'. (4) He answers the question in the affirmative: yes, the Son is "someone other" than the Father. This is supported as follows. [*Antecedent:*] 'Someone other' implies nothing but a distinction of referent; *ergo* [*inference:*] [the Son is someone other, *etc.*] Drawing the inference is supported on the ground that the Son is another referent of the divine nature, which is clear from the equivalent point that He is another Person and another hypostasis [from the Father]. The argument in the body of the article takes for granted that distinction [of referent] is at home in God, and this is supported by the nature of relational opposition.

May the exclusionary word 'alone' be attached to a word for God's essence?

In I. Sent. d.21, q.1, a.1, qu^m1, 2

In the talk of God, it seems that the exclusionary word 'alone' should not be attached to a word that describes God according to His essence [such as 'God' itself].

178a.39 (1) After all, Aristotle [in *De sophisticis elenchis*] says 'alone' describes one who is not with another. But God is with the angels and the souls of the saints. Thus we cannot call God alone.

(2) Besides, whatever is attached to an essence-word in the talk of God can be predicated of each Person and of all the Persons together. Since 'wise God' is properly said, we can say, "The Father is a wise God" and "The Trinity is a wise God." But c.9: PL 42, 930 Augustine says [in *De Trinitate VI*], "Keep in mind that the claim, 'The Father is true God alone', is false." Ergo one cannot use 'God alone'.

(3) Furthermore, if 'alone' is attached to an essence-word *w*, it will affect either *w*'s description of a Person or else *w*'s description of God as one in essence. [Take the essence-word 'God'.] Affecting its description of a Person is wrong, because 'God alone is father' is false; there are human fathers, too. Affecting its description of God as one in essence is also wrong: for suppose 'God alone creates' is true; then 'God the Father alone creates' would also seem to be true, because whatever is said of God can also be said of the Father. But the implied point is false, because the Son also creates. In talk of God, therefore, 'alone' should not be attached to an essence-word.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what 1 Timothy 1:17 says [in the Vulgate], "To the king of ages, immortal, invisible, who is God alone . . ."

ANSWER: the word 'alone' can be taken either as an adjective [*dictio categorematica*] or as a quantifier [*dictio syncategorematica*].

An adjective is a word which independently posits what it conveys about some referent, as 'white' does about a man when 'white man' is said. If the word 'alone' is taken this way, it cannot be attached to any word in the talk of God, because it would posit solitude about what it was attached to, and so it would follow that God is solitary — contrary to points established above.

q.31, a.2 A quantifier is a word that qualifies the relationship of a predicate *P* to a subject *S*, as 'all *S*' does, or 'no *S*'. Such, too, is the function of 'alone': it excludes any other referent from sharing in the predicate *P*. Thus 'Socrates alone is writing' does not convey the idea that Socrates is all by himself, but that no one else shares with him the predicate of writing, even if many other people are around. If 'alone' is taken this way, nothing prevents its being attached to an essence-word in talk of God; it will

just exclude all referents but God from having the predicate. For instance, we may say, "God alone is eternal," because nothing but God is eternal.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): while the angels and holy souls are always with God, God would still be alone or solitary if there were not multiple Persons in God. For solitude is not taken away by the "company" of things with a different nature (one is said to be in a garden "alone" even though there are plants and animals around; God would be called alone or solitary, even with angels and people around, if there were not other divine Persons). The company of angels and souls, therefore, does not rule out God's solitude overall, much less His sole possession of a particular predicate.

ad (2): in proper usage, 'alone ϕ ' does not count as part of the form-wise predicate ϕ but affects its reference by excluding another subject for ϕ . Rather, it is the function of another exclusionary word, the adverb 'only', to affect either the subject or the predicate. We can say either "Only Socrates is running" (meaning no one else is doing so) or "Socrates is only running" (meaning that he is not doing anything else). So it is incorrect usage to say "The Father is alone God" or "The Trinity is alone God," unless perhaps the [grammatical] predicate is meant to convey in implicit form the point that "The Trinity is the God who alone is God." <And in this way it could also be true to say "The Father is the God which alone is God," where the antecedent of 'which' is the predicate-noun 'God', not the referent [who is the Father]> Now, when Augustine says [to keep in mind that] the Father is not God alone but the Trinity is God alone, he is speaking as an expositor [of 1 Timothy 1:17]: it is as if he said, "When the Bible says '<To the king of ages ...> invisible, who alone is God,' it is not talking about the Person of the Father but about the Trinity alone."

ad (3): 'alone' can be attached to an essence-word in either sense. After all, the sentence 'Only God is father' is ambiguous. The predicate 'father' can mean the Person of the Father (in which case, the sentence is true; no human being is that Person) or it can mean just the relation (in which case the sentence is false, because the relation of fatherhood is found in others, though not in a univocal way). Likewise, the sentence 'Only God creates' is true, but the alleged implication, 'So only the Father creates', does not follow. For as the logicians say, an exclusionary word "freezes" the term to which it is attached, so that one cannot predicate downward to its referents. Thus [Socrates is a referent of 'man' but] one cannot go from 'Only man is a rational animal' to 'Only Socrates is a rational animal'.

 Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear enough to those who understand the terms.

In the body of the article, three points are made. (1) The uses of 'alone' are distinguished into two — use as an adjective and use as a quantifier — both explained clearly enough in the text. (2) Then a first conclusion answers the question negatively: 'alone' as an adjective cannot be attached to essence-words in the talk of God. The support is that [from such an attachment] it would follow that God is solitary. (3) Then a second conclusion is drawn, answering the

question affirmatively: 'alone' as a quantifier can be attached to essence-words in the talk of God. The support is the point that other referents can be excluded from sharing in the predicate, as happens quite obviously when we say, "God alone is eternal."¹

¹ This account of 'alone' is substantially the same as Russell's account of his iota-quantifier, 'ιx', which excludes any other value of the variable from verifying the predicate. Thus 'God alone is eternal' is symbolized as 'God=(ιx (eternal x))' and analyzed as $\exists x((\text{eternal } x) \ \& \ \forall y((\text{eternal } y \supset (y = x)) \ \& \ x = \text{God}))$.

May the exclusionary word 'alone' be attached to a word for a divine Person?

In I Sent d.21, q.1, a.2; In Ev. Mat. 11

It seems legitimate to attach an exclusionary word to a term for a Person, even if the predicate is common [to all Three].¹

(1) After all, the Lord is speaking to God the Father in John 17:3, when He says, "that they might know Thee, the only true God." Hence [it must be correct to say that] the Father alone is true God.

(2) Besides, Matthew 11:27 says, "No one knows the Son excepting the Father," which means the same as saying "The Father alone knows the Son." But knowing the Son is common to the three Persons. So the conclusion [that this form of speech is correct] again follows.

(3) Also, 'N alone' leaves intact what we understand by N; 'N alone' does not remove any part of N, nor any universal under which N falls.² For example [let N be Socrates:] from

'Socrates alone is white'

there is no such consequence as 'His hand is not white' or 'A man is not white'. Well, one Person in God is included in what we understand by [the name of] another, as the Father is included in what we understand by 'the Son', and *vice-versa* [the Son is included in what we understand by 'the Father']. Ergo, 'The Father alone is God' does not exclude the Son, nor the Holy Spirit. And so this form of speech seems to be correct.

(4) Moreover, the Church sings [in the *Gloria of the Mass*], "Thou alone art Most High. Jesus Christ."

ON THE OTHER HAND, 'The Father alone is God' is correctly expounded as [a conjunction of] two claims, namely, 'The Father is God' and 'No other than the Father is God'. But this second conjunct is false, because the Son is someone else who is God, other than the Father. Hence 'The Father alone is God' is false. Ditto for other such statements.

ANSWER: 'The Father alone is God' is open to several interpretations. If 'alone' puts solitude around the Father, the sentence is false because 'alone' is being taken as an adjective. If it is taken as a quantifier, there are again several interpretations.

If it excludes [another referent] from the scope of the *subject*, the sentence is true, for then the sense

¹ Certain verses of Scripture implied sentences of the form 'The Father alone is ϕ '. They are cited in the objections. Biblical usage had to be legitimate; but if the predicate ' ϕ ' also fit the Son and the Holy Spirit, Trinitarian orthodoxy prohibited that usage. How should the conflict be resolved?

² N is meant to stand for any proper name or definite description. The objection assumes that when we understand a proper name or definite description in its context, "what we understand" includes the referent (*who* is so named in the context) and the natural kind to which that

of 'The Father alone is God' becomes 'He along with whom no other is the Father is God'. This is how Augustine interprets the matter when he says [in *De Trinitate VI*], "We say 'the Father alone' not because He is separate from the Son or the Holy Spirit but to convey the point that they are not all jointly the Father." But this is not the standard sense of 'The Father alone is God', unless an implication is being understood from the context, so that it amounts to saying, 'He who alone is called the Father is God'.

Rather, the standard sense of the quantifier 'alone' is to exclude [another referent] from sharing in the predicate. So taken, 'The Father alone is God' is false if 'alone' is excluding *anyone* else, but true if 'alone' is excluding *anything* else, because the Son is *someone* other than the Father but not *something* other; and ditto for the Holy Spirit. But since 'alone' bears properly upon the referent, as I said above, it is more likely taken to exclude another *one*, rather than another *thing*.

Hence this form of speech is not to be imitated or extended; it is rather to be given a pious exception wherever it is encountered in authentic Scripture.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): when we say, "Thee, the only true God," the intended address is not to the Person of the Father but to the whole Trinity, as Augustine explains [in *De Trinitate VI*]. Alternatively, if the address is to the Person of the Father, then [the sense is such that] other *Persons* are not being excluded (thanks to God's oneness of essence), but only other *things*, as I said above.

ad (2): the second objection should be answered similarly: when something pertaining to God's essence [like knowing the Son] is ascribed to the Father, neither the Son nor the Holy Spirit is excluded, thanks to the oneness of their essence. At the same time, however, one needs to realize that the word 'no one' in the verse cited does not have the force it would seem to have, *i.e.* the force of 'no man'. After all, the Person of the Father would not be an exception *in that domain*. Rather, 'no one' is being used to quantify over all rational natures.

ad (3): 'N alone' leaves intact what we understand by N, provided the contents we understand are not different referents but are items like a part of N or a kind under which N falls. But the Son is a different referent from the Father; so the case is not parallel.³

ad (4): we do not say that the Son alone *independently* is most high, but that He alone is most high *with* the Holy Spirit, *in the glory of God the Father*.

referent belongs.

³ Quite right. Take 'Only my sister likes Mimi'. We understand 'my sister' to mean that she, the referent, has a sibling. Does it follow that the sibling likes Mimi, too?

c 6;
PL 42, 929

c 9;
PL 42, 930

 Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is a limited one. It is not asking whether an exclusionary word can be attached to a word for a Person (e.g. 'the Father') in any sentence whatsoever, but in sentences where the predicate is one common to all Three, such as 'lives', 'understands', 'exists', etc.

ii. In the body of the article, Aquinas answers the question with four conclusions and a corollary, but he lays these down in a very artful way.

To begin with, he picks a proposition in which the exclusionary word is attached to a personal subject with a common predicate in such a way that the other Persons are clearly affected, namely,

'The Father alone is God'.

Then he distinguishes four senses of this by taking 'alone' in various ways, and he lays down a conclusion for each of those senses:

(1) First, 'alone' is taken as an adjective, and the proposition thus comes out false, because it posits solitude for God.

(2) Next, 'alone' is taken as a quantifier, and then its force can be taken two ways:

(a) to limit the scope of the subject-term; this way the proposition is true but improperly construed.

That it is true is supported by Augustine's authority;

that it is improperly construed is supported by the point that [it cannot have this sense] unless by an implication supported by the context;

(b) to limit the application of the predicate, and here again there are two possibilities:

(α) to exclude from the predicate's application *someone*, and this way the proposition is false but properly construed, or

(β) to exclude from the predicate's application *something*, and this way the proposition is true but improperly construed.

These last are both supported in both respects. The claim about proper and improper construal is supported by the fact that 'alone' properly concerns the subject [*i.e.* excludes another item of the same kind as the subject] and hence is more correctly taken to exclude someone else than something else. The claim about truth and falsity is supported by the fact that the Son (likewise the Holy Spirit) is someone other than the Father, not *something* other; indeed, what is *something* other [than the Father] has to be a created thing.

The corollary, finally, is that such improper propositions are not to be imitated or repeated but piously interpreted.



Inquiry Thirty-Two: Into how we know of divine Persons

As a result of all the above, an inquiry needs to be made into our becoming aware of divine Persons. Four questions are raised:

- | | |
|---|--|
| (1) can divine Persons be discovered by natural reason? | (3) how many identifiers are there? |
| (2) should certain identifiers be ascribed to Them? | (4) may one hold different views about them? |

article I

Can the divine Persons be discovered by natural reason?

In I Sent. d.3, q.1, a.4, 1 *CG* c.14; *De Veritate* q.10, a.13, *De Potentia* q.9, a.5;
In Boethiu de Trn. q.1, a.4; *In Ep. ad Romanos* I, lectio 6

That there is a Trinity of divine Persons can be discovered, it seems, by natural reason.

(1) After all, it was only by natural reason that the philosophers reached their knowledge of God: but we find that the philosophers made many remarks about the Trinity of Persons. In *De Caelo I*, for example, Aristotle says, "With this number, *i.e.* three, we have applied ourselves to exalting the one God as higher in His properties than created things."¹ And in *Confessions VII*, Augustine has this to say: "I read there, *i.e.* in the books of the Platonists (not in so many words, of course, but suggested by many and various arguments) this very idea: that in the beginning was the Word, the Word was with God, and the Word was God, and so forth." But in these words, a distinction of divine Persons is conveyed. Moreover, it says in the Gloss that Pharaoh's magicians failed in the third sign, *i.e.* in knowledge of the third Person, the Holy Spirit, and so they knew at least two. Also, Trismegistus said, "The monad begat a monad and turned burning love upon himself," which seems to insinuate the generation of the Son and the procession of the Holy Spirit.² Therefore, knowledge of the divine Persons can be reached by natural reason.

(2) Besides, Richard of St. Victor says in his *Trinitate*, "I firmly believe that there are not only probable but even probative arguments to make any truth plain." Thus, to prove the Trinity of Persons, some writers have argued from the infinity of God's goodness, which communicates itself infinitely in the procession of divine Persons. Others have argued

from the premise that no good can be possessed joyfully without company. Then there is Augustine. He worked to make the Trinity of Persons evident from the procession in our own minds of both an inner word and a love — the very route we followed above. Ergo, the Trinity of Persons can be known by natural reason.

(3) Also, it seems pointless to hand down things that human reason cannot come to know. But one must not call the divine tradition handing down Trinitarian knowledge pointless. Ergo the Trinity of Persons can become known by human reason.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Hilary says in *De Trinitate II*, "Let no man think he can attain the mystery of the Son's generation by his own intelligence." Ambrose, too, [in *De Fide ad Gratianum I*] says, "It is impossible to know the mystery of the generation. The mind falls short: speech falls silent." But it is through origin of generation and procession that a trinity of Persons is distinguished in God, as emerged above. So, since people cannot know scientifically or attain by intelligence that for which no probative argument can be had, the Trinity cannot become known by reason.

ANSWER: it is impossible to arrive at a knowledge of the Trinity of divine Persons by natural reason. For it was shown above that the only way a human being can come to a knowledge of God by natural reason is *from creatures*. Creatures point us toward knowing God as effects point to their cause. So, the only truths that natural reason can come to know about God are the conditions He must meet as the causal source of all things. This is the basis for considering God that we used previously. But God's creative power is common to the whole Trinity and so pertains to the unity of essence in God, not the distinction of Persons. Thus the truths about God that can be learned by natural reason are just those that pertain to His unity of essence, not the truths that pertain to the distinction of Persons.

Indeed, anyone who tries to prove the Trinity of Persons by natural reason compromises the Faith in

¹ This was the old translation by Gerard of Cremona. It had been improved by Aquinas's time to read more like this: "we have taken this number from nature ... and used it even for the worship of the gods."

² Hermes Trismegistos was the imaginary author of the hermetic corpus (3rd–4th century A.D.). Bits of it came down to the Medievals in a collection called *The Book of 24 Philosophers*.

q 27, aa. 1-3

c.9; PL 10, 58

c.5
PL 16, 543

q 27

q 2, aa. 2-3

c.1, 26&a 15

PL 32, 740

Glossa ordinaria
on Exodus 8. 18

PL 196, 892

two ways. He compromises first the loftiness of the Faith itself, which is about invisible things transcending human reason; this is why the Apostle says in Hebrews 11: 1 that faith is “of things not seen” <and 1 Corinthians 2:6-7 says, “We speak a wisdom among them that are perfect, yet not the wisdom of this world, nor of the princes of this world ... but we speak the wisdom of God in a mystery, even the hidden wisdom”>. Second, such a person compromises effective evangelization. When someone adduces arguments to prove the Faith, and the arguments are not cogent, he brings the Faith into ridicule. The non-believers think we *rely* on such arguments and that we believe because of them. Attempts should not be made, therefore, to prove matters of faith except by using authoritative texts with audiences that accept their authority. With other audiences, it suffices to defend the point that what the Faith preaches is not impossible. This is why Denis says in *De divinis nominibus*: “If there is someone who totally resists the Scriptures, he will be a long way off from our way of cherishing wisdom. But if he pays heed to the truth of the sacred Scriptures, he and we are using the same canon.”

c.2,
PG 3, 639

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): the Philosophers did not know the mystery of the Trinity of divine Persons in its distinctive terms (fatherhood, sonship, and procession); as the Apostle said in 1 Corinthians 2: 7-8, “We speak the wisdom of God ... which none of the princes of this world (*i.e.* the Philosophers, according to the gloss) knew.” They did know, however, certain of God’s essential attributes; [and once we know of the Trinity] these are appropriated to the Persons, as power is appropriated to the Father, wisdom to the Son, goodness to the Holy Spirit, as will be explained below.

As for Aristotle’s remark about “the number we use,” *etc.*, it should not be taken to mean that he posited a three of anything in God. He just meant to say that the ancients used a three in sacrifices and prayers because of some “perfection” of that number.

In the books of the Platonists, the idea that in the beginning was the Word is not found in such a way that “word” refers to the Person begotten in God; rather it means an ideal “reason” through which God set all things up (a reason appropriated to the Son).

Even though philosophers may have known traits appropriated to the three Persons, they are still said to have failed in the third sign (*i.e.* in knowledge of the third Person), either because they turned aside from the *goodness* appropriated to the third Person, because “when they knew God they glorified Him not as God,” as it says in Romans 1: 21, or because the Platonists posited one First Being (called the Father of the universe) and then a second substance under Him called “mind” or the “paternal mind” (all for reasons discussed by Macrobius in *The Dream of Scipio*) but never posited a third immaterial substance that would seem to correspond to the Holy Spirit. (And we, by the way, do not make the Father and the

Book I, cc. 2, 6

Son different in substance; that was a mistake of Origen and Arius, who followed the Platonists.)³

As for Trismegistus’ remark, “The monad begat a monad and turned burning love upon itself,” that should not be taken as referring to the generation of the Son or the procession of the Holy Spirit. Rather, it should be taken as talking about the production of the world: one God produced one world because of love for Himself.

ad (2): an argument can be advanced for something in two ways:

(1) One way is to prove sufficiently some root-of-the-matter [*i.e.* an explanation].

This in natural science, a sufficient argument is advanced to prove that celestial motion is always of uniform speed.⁴

Aristotle, *Physics*
VIII, 265b 11ff

(2) In the other way, the argument advanced does not sufficiently prove an explanation but just shows that the consequent effects are consistent with an explanation already adopted.

This in astronomy, the argument for eccentrics and epicycles is that, with these in place, the sense appearances* of celestial motion are salvaged; but this argument is not sufficiently probative; the appearances might also be salvaged adopting another explanation.⁵

* *sensibilia* ap-
parentia

In the first way, an argument can be advanced to prove that God is one, and similar points. But arguments advanced to manifest the Trinity stand in the second way, because these arguments are consistent with the Trinity already assumed but are not such that the Trinity of Persons would be sufficiently proved by these arguments. One sees this case by case. God’s infinite goodness is also shown in producing a creation, because producing it from nothing takes infinite power. In other words, if God communicates Himself with infinite goodness, it does not have to be the case that an *infinite thing* proceeds from Him; a [limited] thing may just receive the divine goodness in its own way. Likewise with the point that there cannot be joyful possession of a good without company: the argument only works when a complete good state is not found in just *one* person. For then the [incomplete]

³ The history is inaccurate: Origen followed Plato but did not make the mistake; Arius made it but did not follow Plato.

⁴ Celestial motions, alas, are not as Aristotle “proved.”

⁵ Aquinas could not have foreseen how vast a rôle this distinction would play in the later philosophy of science. The second type of argument is now recognized as pandemic in the empirical sciences; and as the text says, it never proves that an explanation is *the true one*: conformity to observations merely leaves an explanation *among the options* not yet refuted. The first type of argument, genuinely probative of an explanation, is still controversial: either it does not occur at all in empirical sciences (but only in formal-deductive ones like mathematics, where a successful formalization establishes what explains what), or else it takes a weaker form in empirical science, such as showing that a given explanation is superior to all known rivals in meeting *all* the desiderata for a theory (desiderata such as simplicity, logical fertility, high empirical content, good fit with other successful theories, *etc.*).

person needs the good provided by another person, a companion, if he is to have the complete good state of joyfulness. Again, comparison with [what goes on in] our understanding does not prove anything about God, thanks to the fact that "understanding" is not found univocally in God and in us.⁶ This is why Augustine says in his Commentary on John [tract 27] that we reach knowing *via* believing, and not *vice-versa*.

⁶ The need for company if possession is to be joyful is well enough observed in normal human psychology (in the absence of a special grace) but has no application to God. The processions of concepts and inner affections in people cannot be applied to God either, without drawing analogies that *need* revealed warrant — as Aquinas is about to say on the authority of the saint who pioneered such analogies.

It must be obvious, therefore, that Aquinas, in classifying the arguments for the Trinity as cases of the *second way* argument can be advanced, was using the key term "appearances" loosely.

ad (3): an awareness of the divine Persons was needed by us in two ways. The first was to think rightly about the creation of things. By saying that God made all things through His Word, we rule out the error of those alleging that God produced things necessarily, given His nature. By saying that there is a procession of Love in God, we show that God did not produce creatures out of a need on His part, nor thanks to any cause outside Himself, but out of love, from His own goodness. This is why after the words, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," Moses added "And God said, 'Let there be light'," to manifest the divine Word, and further added, "And God saw the light, that it was good," to show the approval of divine love. Ditto for the other works [of creation].

The second and more important way [in which we needed to know something of the Persons] was to think rightly about the human race's salvation, which is brought to completion through the Son's being incarnate and the Holy Spirit's giving His gifts.

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear enough.

In the body of the article, he does three jobs.

(1) He answers the question with a single, negative conclusion: it is impossible to reach a knowledge of the Trinity of divine Persons by natural reason. The support goes as follows. [*Antecedent:*] By natural reason, a human being knows God only from creatures, hence [*1st inference:*] knows Him only as the source of beings, hence [*2nd inference:*] knows Him only in what pertains to the oneness of His essence, and so [*3rd inference:*] does not know the truths pertaining to the distinctness of Persons. — Drawing the first inference rests on the ground that creatures lead

us to know God only as an effect points to its cause. — Drawing the second inference is right because the power to create is common to the whole Trinity. All the points are clear.

In job (2), he shows how adducing natural arguments for the Trinity of Persons does harm in two ways: (a) by demeaning the dignity of the Faith, and (b) by disserving people. Both are clear in the text.

In job (3), in infers how matters of the Faith are to be handled, both in discussions with [Bible] believers and in discussions with unbelievers, drawing in each case on the authority of Denis. These pointers are clear from matters handled above, in Inquiry 1 [a.8].

Should identifiers [of the Persons] be admitted into the talk of God?

1 ST q 40, aa 1-4; In I Sent. d 33, q 1, a 2

It seems wrong to admit the identifiers [*notiones*] into our talk of God.¹

(1) After all, Denis says in c. 1 of *De divinis nominibus* that no one should dare apply to God any words but those made explicit to us in holy Scripture. No use of the identifiers is made in Scripture. Hence these terms should not be admitted into our talk of God.

(2) Besides, anything admitted into the talk of God pertains either to the unity of essence or to the Trinity of Persons. The identifiers pertain to neither. For we cannot make an identifier the subject of a sentence predicating something from God's essence (e.g. we cannot say "Fatherhood is wise" or "Fatherhood creates"), nor of a sentence predicating something about the Persons (we cannot say "Fatherhood begets" nor "Sonship is begotten"). Thus, the identifiers should not be admitted into our talk of God.

(3) Moreover, "to make it known" is not a good reason to posit abstract items in a simple thing, because simple things are known through themselves. But divine Persons are supremely simple. Therefore, identifiers should not be posited in the divine Persons.

De fide orthodoxa III, c.5; PG 94, 999

ON THE OTHER HAND, John Damascene has this to say: "We get to see differentiation among the hypostases," i.e. among the Persons, "in three distinctives, that of fatherhood, that of sonship, and that of procession."

ANSWER: when Praepositinus maintained that distinctives and identifiers should not be affirmed in the talk of God, he was focusing on the divine Persons' simplicity; wherever such terms were found, he explained away the abstract noun with a concrete one.² Just as we often say, "I implore your kind-

¹ *Notiones* was a technical term of Trinitarian theology, coming into Latin from the Greek *idiomata gnostika* and used both for certain words and for the traits they conveyed. The words were ones that served to make a particular divine Person known to us, such as 'unbegottenness' and 'fatherhood' for the Father, 'begottenness' for the Son, etc. As the examples show, these abstract nouns were not biblical words but theological terms of art, designed to convey something biblically revealed about one Person. There was a traditional list of these words. However, use of a word tended to suggest that, in a divine Person, some real property (an identifying *trai*) corresponded exactly to it. Was this a safe suggestion, or was it better (indeed, was it possible) to avoid these words altogether by explaining them away? That issue, debated sharply in the two generations before Aquinas, is the one addressed in this article.

² Praepositinus of Cremona (ca. 1140-1210) was chancellor at the University of Paris. His name sounded like his administrative title, '*praepositus*' (from which we get 'provest'), and his thinking sounds a bit like Gilbert Ryle.

ness," when we mean, "I implore you, a kind person," so also in theology the use of 'fatherhood' should be taken to mean God the Father.

But as I have showed above, the divine simplicity is not compromised by the fact that we use abstract nouns as well as concrete ones. For how we put things into words* comes from how we understand things. Our minds cannot attain the divine simplicity as it should be considered in itself; as a result, our minds apprehend it and put it into words according to the human mind's own fashion, i.e. as it is found [reflected] in the sense-objects from which our mind gets its cognition. To indicate simple forms in these objects, we use abstract nouns; to indicate the things that subsist, we use concrete ones. So (as I said above) we indicate the divine reality with abstract nouns because of its simplicity and yet with concrete nouns, too, because of its subsistence and completeness. Well, this business of indicating with both an abstract noun and a concrete one cannot apply only to the words for what is essential in God, like 'divineness' and 'God' or 'wisdom' and 'wise one', but must also apply to words for the Persons, like 'fatherhood' and 'Father'.

Two main factors force us to this conclusion. The first is clamor from heretics. When we claim that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are one God and three Persons, the heretics ask *thanks to what* — *thanks to what* are they one God? *whereby* are they three Persons? So just as we use 'essence' or 'divineness' to say whereby they are one God, we need some abstract words to say whereby the Persons are distinct. Well, this is what distinctives or identifiers do as abstract nouns, like 'fatherhood' and 'sonship'. As a result, in the talk of God, His essence is indicated as "what" [He is], the Person as a "who," the distinguishing trait as a "whereby."

The second factor is the fact that, in the talk of God, one Person (the Father) is found to be related to two Others (the Son and the Holy Spirit) but not by one and the same relation. For if one and the same relation related the Father to the Son and to the Holy Spirit, it would follow that They were related back to Him by one and the same [converse] relation; and then, since only relation in God raises the count [of Persons], it would follow that the Son and the Holy Spirit were not two Persons.³ — Praepositinus used to answer this by saying that, just as God relates with just one relation to

³ This is just a summary. Here is the argument. Suppose the Father has just one relation (origin-of) to the Son and the Spirit, so that they each have a converse of the same kind (a from-relation) back to Him. This will make the Son distinct from the Father and the Spirit distinct from the Father. But what will make the Son distinct from the Spirit? Only relative opposition; and to secure this, their relations back to the Father cannot be of the same kind. The Spirit's kind must be *from* the Son's kind. Cf. q.27, a.3 ad 3 and q.30, a.2.

* *significans*

q 13, a 1

creatures while they relate with different ones back to Him, so also the Father relates to the Son and the Holy Spirit by just one relation, while they relate back to the Father by two. But this answer will not do. For what puts a relation into its kind* is its status as *towards something*: two relations cannot be called different in kind if a single converse relation corresponds to them. Thus, the relations master-of and father-of have to be different in kind because of the difference between being-a-son and being-a-servant. All creatures relate to God under just one kind of relation, creature-of. But the Son and the Holy Spirit do not relate to the Father by relations of the same kind; so Their case is not the same.

**ratio specifica
relativa*

q.13, a.7

Also, in the case of God, His relation to a creature does not have to be a real one, as emerged above, and there is no problem about raising the count of thought-up relations in God. But in the Father's case, His relation to the Son and the Holy Spirit has to be real. So, thanks to the two relations, the Son's and the Holy Spirit's, to the Father, one cannot help understanding two relations in the Father by which He is related to Them. So, since there is just one [concrete] "Person of the Father," it has been necessary to indicate differently, by abstract terms, the relations which are called His "distinctive" or "identifying traits."

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): the identifiers are not used in Scripture, but there is mention of the Persons in whom they are understood, as an abstract noun is understood in a concrete one.

ad (2): although identifying traits or relations themselves are really there in God, as came out above, it is still the case in our talk of God that how identifying traits come into language is not as *things* but as certain *wherebys*, by which the Persons are known to us. And so predicates of essential or personal *action* in God cannot be attached to [subjects which are] identifier-words, because such predicates conflict with how these words signify.* This is why we cannot say "Fatherhood begets" or "Fatherhood creates" any more than we can say "Wisdom begets" or "Understanding creates". However, essential predicates that do not have bearing on an action but just remove creaturely conditions from God can be attached to identifier subjects. *E.g.* we can say "Fatherhood is eternal" or "Fatherhood is measureless" or anything else of that sort. Also, real identity allows us to attach personal nouns or essence nouns [as predicate nominatives] to identifying [or abstract] subjects; thus we can say "Fatherhood is God" and "Divineness is the Father."

q 28, a.1

* *modus
significandi*

ad (3): the Persons are simple, but their *wherebys* can be indicated properly in the abstract without prejudice to their simplicity, as I said.

Claretian's Commentary

In the title observe two things. First, the question is really of the form *an est*, that is, whether there are identifying traits [*notiones*] in our account of God; so the first thing to get clear is what to make of the term '*notio*' itself.

In general, '*notio*' has to do with notification or manifestation, but it is properly and formally taken when it is taken passively — just as we do in Latin with '*electio*' and '*auditio*' and similar terms.¹

As applied to divine things, '*notio*' is used for a *property of one or two Persons*. It seems that St. Augustine was the first to introduce this usage into trinitarian theology: in Book V of his *De Trinitate*, c.6, he spoke about God the Father and observed this: "the *notio* whereby He is understood as unbegotten is different from the *notio* whereby He is understood as begetter."

Secondly, to fill out the discussion of this point, observe that the word '*notio*' as used by theologians today has the meaning which Aquinas gives it in the text of the next article, where he says that a *notio* is

a "distinctive basis for knowing a divine Person."² Note that 'basis for knowing' [*ratio cognoscendi*] implies that a *notio* is a form-wise source of knowing.³ Whence it follows that, strictly speaking, a *notio* should be signified by an abstract noun. For just as a form-wise source of being- ϕ has to be a form, so also a form-wise source of knowing-a- ϕ , as such, has to be conceived and signified as a form. But to be thus conceived and signified is to be represented as *that whereby* something is ϕ [as a *quo aliquid est*]; and this implies an abstract noun. This is why in the present article we have a dispute with Praepositinus over the abstract and the concrete. For the question here is not about things in themselves but about things *as indicated in words and made known through words*.⁴ [In the definition of '*notio*' as a "distinctive basis ..."] observe that 'distinctive' [*propria*] suggests that we are talking about something unique [to a single Person], otherwise it would not be a distinctive basis for knowing. Hence, as St. Thomas will say below [in a. 3 ad 5], "being from another"⁵ is not a *notio*. Finally, the fact that the definition includes the words 'divine Person' suggests three things: (1) that '*notio*' means something pertaining to origin, because

† *propria ratio
cognoscendi divi-
nam personam*
‡ *formale princi-
pium cognoscendi*

§ *esse ab alio*

¹ In other words, '*notio*' worked like our word 'manifestation': it did not normally mean a thing's act of showing itself but the effect of that act in us, i.e. what is manifested, just as "my choice" (*electio*) is not normally my act of choosing but what was chosen and the "audition" was what was heard.

² A "thing as indicated in words" etc., is best taken as an ordered pair, <thing, description>, such as <Father, 'unbegotten'>. Thus <Father, 'unbegotten'> and <Father, 'begetter'> will be distinct identifiers of the same Person.

divine Persons are distinguished from one another by a relation of origin; (2) that this something pertains to personal dignity (because 'person' is a term of dignity) rather than to God's dignity-by-essence; (3) that a *notio* pertains to one or another divine Person insofar as He or They are one — in other words, if an identifier-word signifies something belonging to more than one, as we have in the case of 'active spiration', the *notio* will belong to Them as one.³ So much for the title.

Analysis of the article, I

ii. In the body of the article Aquinas does two main jobs. First he sets forth the opinion of Praepositinus. Secondly, by refuting it, he answers the question.

iii. As to the first of these main jobs, Praepositinus says three things. (1) He states the opinion that personal distinctives in the abstract, *i.e.* *notiones*, are not to be posited in our talk of God. (2) He advances as the basis for this opinion the simplicity of the Divine Persons. (3) He adduces the exegetical point that, in Scripture, abstract expressions should be expounded in terms of concrete ones.

iv. As to the second main job, it is accomplished by moving in two directions at once. Moving in one direction, Aquinas destroys the basis for the above-mentioned opinion; and, moving in the other, he proves the opposite opinion.

Here is how he undermines Praepositinus' opinion. [*Antecedent:*] We put things into words according to how we understand things; so [*1st inference:*] how we put divine things into words is not how they are, but how empirical things are; so [*2nd inference:*] we put divine things into abstract words because of their simplicity, but also into concrete words because of their subsistence; therefore [*3rd inference:*] using both abstract and concrete terms in talking of God does not prejudice God's simplicity.

The first inference is supported on the ground that our understanding does not manage to know God as He is in Himself, but knows Him after the fashion of empirical things. The second inference is supported on the ground that, with empirical things, the abstract term is taken from the simplicity [of a form], while the concrete term is taken from the further completion which is subsisting.* The remaining inferences are obvious.

Trouble from Aureol

v. Peter Aureol attacks this reasoning in a discussion summarized by Capreolus at *In I Sent.* d.29 [a.2, *contra concl.* 1]. Aureol wants to prove that an identifier in God is distinct from the Person whose trait it is (*e.g.* that fatherhood is distinct from the Father) not only on the basis of our way of under-

standing (arising as it does from empirical things), as this article teaches, but also in the real.* His argument goes like this. [*Major:*] Wherever [what is named by] an abstract [term] differs from [what is named by] a concrete [term] by mode of signification alone, everything said thing-wise of the one will be said of the other, as is clear in the case of divinity and God. [*Minor:*] But [if one takes the predicate, 'distinct from the Son', one will see that] this rule does not work with fatherhood and the Father, because the whole reality of fatherhood is distinct from the Son, and yet the whole reality of the Father is not distinct from the Son [since the Father's essence is not distinct from the Son]. [*Conclusion:*] Ergo [the identifier must also be *really* distinct from the Person who has it].

Reply to Aureol

vi. Our ANSWER to Aureol is short. To say that the distinction between the abstract and the concrete in our talk of God arises from the divine reality can mean two things. Taken one way, it means that there is something in God which has what it takes to verify both the abstract term and the concrete one; and this is true beyond doubt, since in His simplicity He grounds the abstract and in His subsistence grounds the concrete. Taken the other way, it means that there is some *distinction* in God thanks to which there arises the distinction between the abstract and the concrete; and this is chimerical. So we respond to Aureol's reasoning by denying his major premise. His support for it [using the example of God and divinity] is false, because 'begets' is really predicable of God but not of divinity. After all, in order for propositions to turn out true, the predicate has to be appropriate to the thing signified by the subject *under that mode whereby the subject signifies it*, as is made clear in another book of St. Thomas', *De Trinitate et fide Catholica* [c.2].⁴

Analysis of the article, II

vii. Next, here is how Aquinas supports his own opinion, which is the opposite of Praepositinus'. He

⁴ Cajetan means to say, I think, that a proposition cannot be true unless it is well-formed; and in order for a proposition to be well-formed, it is not enough that the predicate convey a property which it makes sense to affirm of the *thing* to which the subject-term refers; no, it is required that the predicate be a term which it makes sense to join syntactically with the logical category into which the subject-term one has chosen *puts* what it refers to by presenting it the way it does. Thus the subject-term 'God' presents what it refers to as a concrete thing, and to concrete-thing-nouns it makes sense to join predicates which are action verbs; hence 'God begets' is logically in order (and also happens to be true). By contrast, the subject-term 'divineness' presents what it refers to as an abstract nature or form, and such items cannot be said to "do" anything; therefore 'Divinity begets' is not logically in order (it commits a category mistake), and hence is not even a candidate to receive a truth value. — However, we shall see below in § xix of this commentary that there is more to Cajetan's doctrine on this point, and it is not clear that the rest is well taken.

³ By contrast, 'being from another' applies to the Son and the Holy Spirit as two, as distinct, and so is not an "identifier."

* *ex complemento standi*

* *ex parte rei*

reaches a conclusion which answers the question affirmatively. In God, it is not only terms referring to essential features which have to be abstract for some purposes and concrete for others but also terms referring to personal features, such as 'fatherhood' and 'the Father', etc. He proves this conclusion by two arguments, the first bearing on both essential and personal features, and the second dealing with personal features alone.

The first argument is that [we need abstract terms] to have answers for objections from heretics. It goes thus. Given our faith that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are one God and three Persons, we need an answer for those who ask *by virtue of what [quo]* are they one God, and *by virtue of what* are they three Persons. We have to say they are one God by virtue of *divineness* and are many Persons by virtue of their *distinctive traits [proprietas]*, such as fatherhood, sonship, etc.; for this is the only way in which we can have appropriate answers for each of the three interrogatives: 'what?', 'who?', and 'whereby?' [*quid, quis, and quo*].

Gregory of Rimini disagrees

- viii. Gregory of Rimini⁵ poses an objection against this reasoning in his commentary on *I Sent.*, d.29. He says that one should not distinguish these distinctive traits because of pressure from heretics. St. Augustine, in his sermon *De Fide et Symbolo*, teaches us to answer this way: "We believe in a Trinity distinct in respect to Persons and united in respect to substance." St. Jerome in his *Expositio fidei Catholicae* gives the answer: "In substance they are one reality, but in Persons and in names they are distinguished." Therefore, we can say by virtue of what they are one and by virtue of what they are many, without appealing to the identifiers.

Answering Gregory

- ix. To this we have a threefold answer. (1) Gregory seems to have confused the issue of this article with matters pertaining to divine things as they are in themselves: but as the title of this whole inquiry makes clear, we are dealing here with *how we know* divine Persons, not with how they exist in themselves. (2) He has not given due weight to the exact wording of the article: it says that we have to give an answer to the question 'by virtue of what?' as it is raised not in connection with 'Trinity' but with 'person';⁶ and with this latter question neither of the above-cited authorities deals. (3) St. Thomas' text, in keeping with his usual custom, speaks formally; its force consists in the fact that, when somebody asks a by-virtue-of-what question, the answer given has to be a term which, thanks to its own mode of

signifying, conveys a whereby [a trait by-virtue-of which]; otherwise the askers' question is not settled. But it is obvious that 'person' does not convey a *whereby*, since it is a concrete noun. So, in order to have a proper answer to the by-virtue-of-what question, not as it is raised in connexion with just this or that term, but as it is raised across the board with the concrete terms in God-talk, we must admit abstract terms for properties into Trinitarian theology. And this is what the article directly intends to say.

Analysis of the article, III

- x. [Now back to Aquinas' proof of his own position.] The second argument for his conclusion is first stated, then an objection by Praepositinus, then a defense against that objection.

The statement of it goes like this. [*Antecedent, 1st part:*] The one Person of the Father is related to two Persons, the Son and the Holy Spirit. [*2nd part:*] not but by one relation: [*consequence:*] therefore one must distinguish identifiers in the Father. The second part of the antecedent is supported by showing that an impossibility results otherwise. Thus: if the Father had a bearing to the Son and to the Holy Spirit by virtue of one relation, then [*1st sub-consequence:*] the Son and Holy Spirit would likewise by virtue of one [converse] relation have a bearing back to the Father; and if this were so, then [*2nd sub-consequence:*] the Son and the Holy Spirit would not be two Persons. This last is supported by the fact that [distinction of] relation alone makes plurality in the Trinity.

- xi. Praepositinus, however, denied the second part of the antecedent and denied also the first [sub]-consequence leading to an impossibility. He offered as a counter-example the fact that God has a bearing, by virtue of one sole relation, towards creatures, and yet creatures are related back to Him by many relations; and so he thought the same might be the case with the Son and the Holy Spirit in Their relation back to the Father.

xii. Against this objection Aquinas lays down two rejoinders in the body of the article. The first goes like this. [*Antecedent:*] The reason why a relational thing is in one species rather than another lies in its having such-and-such a bearing towards another; ergo [*1st consequence:*] to one relation of a given species there cannot correspond two converse relations of different species; so [*2nd consequence:*] to the relations of the Son [to the Father] and of the Holy Spirit [to the Father] there cannot correspond but one relation of the Father [to Them], although to all the relations which creatures bear to God there can correspond just one relation on God's side. The first consequence is illustrated by father and master *vis-à-vis* son and servant. The second consequence is established by the fact that the Holy Spirit's relation [to the Father] has a different defining account from the Son's relation [to the Father], while the relations of creatures to God are all there on the same account.

The second rejoinder observes that the counter-example fails to be cogent because the topic we are talking about is relations which are *real both ways*. But God's

⁵ Gregory of Rimini, O.S.A., was renowned both as a strict Augustinian and as a nominalist. He died in 1348.

⁶ The question is not 'By virtue of what is there a Trinity?' but 'By virtue of what are the Persons in it distinct?'

relation to things created is not real, and hence it does not have to be one. We can have as many thought-up relations as we want in God.

Clarifying how relations differ in kind

xiii. A moment ago the assumption was made that the reason why a relation is in one species rather than another lies in its having such-and-such a bearing towards another. Note that the point of this is not to say that the reason for a relative thing's species derives from the correlative [the terminus] to which it relates (though this might seem superficially to be what is being said in the rest of the argument), as if Aquinas intended to argue that the species of a relation is derived from its terminus, and that it is impossible for termini belonging to different [absolute] species to correspond to [i.e. to stand as termini in] a relation of one species. Not at all; for this is false; St. Thomas himself says [in 3 ST q.35, a.5] that species of relation arise from the cause or basis for the relation. What he rather intends to say is that the reason for a relation's species lies in being toward another cognate to itself. Thus, while relation in general consists in being towards another in general, a specific relation consists in being towards a specific kind of other; and hence a single kind of relation consists in being towards a single correlative kind of other. This is the way in which the *ad aliquid* category breaks down by proper differentiae into its kinds or species.⁷

⁷ The issue here is how relations differ in kind (in species). Aquinas' doctrine was that relations differ in kind insofar as their bases so differ. Thus

a is father of *b*
differed in kind from

a is master of *b*
because their bases or causes were specifically different. Reproducing was a different kind of activity from dominating or acquiring ownership. But

a is father of *b*
was the same in kind as
c is father of *d*,

because their bases were specifically the same. Thus {*x*,*y*: *x* is father of *y*} was one species of relation, while {*x*,*y*: *x* is owner of *y*} was another species, etc.

Next, a given kind of basis was said to "proportion" a relation's terminus to its subject. In other words, thanks to the basis of fatherhood, a terminus of that relation had to have what it took to be an off-spring or child. Thanks to the basis of ownership, a terminus thereof had to have what it took to be a possession. We may put the matter this way. A relation, by the very fact that it relates things, makes them *relata* or correlates. But thanks to its basis, a relation relates things on some specific ground, with the result that things become correlated on *some specific basis*. The various kinds of bases on which things can be related thus establish the *species of relata* (or, as it says in the text, the correlative kinds). Children and parents, possessions and owners, are correlative kinds/species of *relata*, just as men and dogs are species of *substance*. Indeed, one and the same Fido is a dog in his species as substance and a possession in his species as a relatum. Fido and 2106 Maple

Two doubts

xiv. Concerning the points developed above, many doubts arise. The first doubt concerns the proposition, The Father relates to the Son and Holy Spirit not by one relation but by two.

The meaning is either that there are two relations here thing-wise* — which is utterly false, since spiration and fatherhood are numerically one thing in the Father — or that there are two relations here conceptually[†] — and this, though true, is not relevant to the argument at hand. Aquinas' language in this argument is about *things*; he reasons from the *nature of relations*. If his argument is valid, then what follows from his premises is that specifically different relations have to have specifically different converses; but it is obvious that a distinction of reason does not suffice to express specific diversity in the real.

* *secundum rem*

† *secundum rationem*

xv. A second doubt concerns a proposition assumed in the argument against Praepositinus, namely,

A relation of one given species cannot have two converse relations of different species.

It seems clear that we hold the contrary: the one sonship of Socrates has specifically diverse converses, fatherhood and motherhood, belonging to his parents, as we read in so many words in 3 ST q.35, a.5 [ad 3].

Street differ in their (absolute) species as substances but coincide in at least one species as *relata*, since both are possessions.

Now, let $a R_1 b$ and $a R_2 b$ be two relations specifically different between a and b . For example, a man might buy his son at a slave auction and hence be his owner as well as his father (though probably unwittingly). But it follows that b as terminus of R_1 differs in correlative species from b as terminus of R_2 . Whereupon, since b 's species as terminus of R_1 or R_2 provides the basis for b 's converse relation to a , it follows that the converse relation $b R_1 a$ differs specifically from the converse relation $b R_2 a$.

Now back to the Trinity. Let $a R_1 b$ represent the Father's relation of fatherhood to the Son. Let $a R_2 c$ represent the Father's relation of active spiration to the Holy Spirit. R_1 by virtue of its basis (which basis is intellectual begetting according to likeness of nature) requires its term to belong to the correlative species of child or off-spring. The divine Logos, b , thanks to His intellectual mode of procession as a likeness, has what it takes to belong to this species, but the Holy Spirit does not. Thanks to the Spirit's mode of procession through the will as an inclination, the Holy Spirit has what it takes to belong to the correlative species of a love or aspiration (*spiritus*) but not a child. You cannot beget a yearning. You cannot be literally the father of an aspiration. Therefore the termini of R_1 and R_2 , here b and c respectively, belong to different correlative species, and so the converse relations R_1 (sonship) and R_2 (passive spiration, procession) belong to different species, and so *their* obverse relations, R_1 (fatherhood) and R_2 (active spiration) must also belong to different species. As a result, in conceptual terms, there must be a distinction of reason between R_1 and R_2 ; and, in real terms (as Cajetan will tell us in a moment), there perhaps needs to be a virtual distinction. Ergo we must speak of fatherhood and active spiration as distinct manifestive traits, "identifiers," in God the Father — which is what Aquinas had to prove against Praepositinus.

Answering the first doubt

xvi. Against the first doubt, let it be said that there are two issues here: plurality of relations, and the *how* of that plurality. This article says something affirmative about plurality, namely, that fatherhood and active spiration are two real relations, because they are distinguished by relational differences. But as to the *how*, the *mode* in which they are two, Aquinas had earlier denied a thing-wise distinction, because these two relations are not relatively opposed to one another and hence are not two thing-wise;* they are not distinguished by thing-differentiators.†⁸

* *realiter*
† *differentiis rei*

However, to say that they are form-wise two according to reason alone does not satisfy many minds, because to be two according to reason is not to be two but to be understood as two. Indeed, for any number, to be so-many according to reason is not to be so-many but to be understood as so-many. But real distinction and distinction of reason are the only two kinds of actual distinction; so the only remaining possibility is that these two relations should be *virtually* distinct. This means that they behave as if they were two.

Well, I concede that this kind of distinction befits the excellence of the divine reality, is given in the real independently of the mind, and suffices for the case at hand and for solving the other difficulties outstanding. For a specific difference between two relations implies that their converse relations are specifically diverse *form-wise* or *virtually*: that is, those converse relations have either an actual specific distinction in the real or at least behave as if they had that distinction actually. And thus, since the Person of the Father has two relations in such a way that each of them retains what is unique to it as if they were actually two thing-wise, it is necessary to posit two relations in the abstract, as two identifiers of the Father. Otherwise we could not answer the person who asks whereby He is Father and whereby Spirator; for it is clear that He is Father towards the Son but Spirator towards the Spirit.

Nevertheless, for purposes of this article, it seems sufficient to me to say that these relations are *form-wise* distinct [conceptually], because this article is not about things in themselves but about things as grasped and signified, as the text makes clear.⁹

Answering the second doubt

xvii. In answer to the second doubt, St. Thomas is basing himself on Aristotle's statement that no relative item is affirmed twice for the same reason [in *Metaphysics V*] because a relation, just by what it

c.15;
1021a 34 – 1021b 3

⁸ As 2nd-order quantification is over 2nd-order things, the thing-differentiators pare down what-there-is Henkin-style.

⁹ This important section is elaborated in the next article. A "thing as grasped etc." is a thing *x* under a description *d*. Thus the identifiers <*x*, *d*₁>, <*y*, *d*₂> are not identi-

is, bears upon its first-off terminus, which is obviously one [in kind]. For what follows [from a relation] has to be limited according to the limitation of the relation's basis. Now the point that no relative item is affirmed twice can be taken two ways: (1) In the first way, it means that a relative item is not affirmed twice towards two correlates that are [of the same kind and] only numerically distinct. And so taken the statement is false: for the white Socrates by one and the same relation of similarity is similar to all white things. (2) In the second sense, a relative item is not affirmed "twice" in the sense of bearing upon two correlatives of different kinds [diversarum rationum]. But this again can be taken two ways. If it means two correlates of different *partial* kinds, it is not true (as we see in that article from 3 *ST* cited above); but if it means correlates of different *non-partial* kinds, it is true. Hence it is quite significant that, in the same passage, in the last argument, St. Thomas does not conclude, "Ergo it is impossible for one relative term to be said towards two things," but "Ergo it is impossible for one relation to be terminated by utterly diverse correlates," using 'utterly' to suggest 'not partially'. By "partial" relative items, I mean those whose bases concur as parts towards numerically one effect, as is clear with a father and a mother *vis-à-vis* their child.

That this interpretation fits the truth of the matter is shown by the fact that, properly speaking, a relative item is not being said twice because it bears upon many things from the same side (the many being like parts of the relatum) but would be said twice because it bore on one thing from one side and another thing from the other side, like 'species' to 'genus' and to 'individual', and like 'knowing' to 'the knowable' and to 'the knower', etc.¹⁰

So, what St. Thomas meant to say here against Praepositinus was that one relation of a given kind could not have termini of different non-partial kinds. Procession and filiation do not have partial bases but bases of utterly diverse kinds that are complete of themselves; the Son completely terminates the procession of the intellect, and the Holy Spirit similarly is the complete terminus of the procession of the will. By contrast, in that article in 3 *ST* [q.35, a.5 ad 3], termini of diverse partial kinds yielded the filiation, as is evident.

Trouble with the answer ad (2)

xviii. In the reply to the second objection, a doubt arises as to what it means to be signified "as a thing" [*significari ut res*] as opposed to being signified "as a

cal unless both $x = y$ and d_1 is synonymous with d_2 . So Fatherhood and spiration can easily be two identifiers without being two things.

¹⁰ Whatever Aristotle may have meant by his remark, the doctrine presented here makes sense. Nothing prevents a relation from being one-to-many, but the many termini have to be of a common correlative kind. One and the same sonship can have a father and a mother for its termini, but only because these rôles are "partial kinds" within the common correlative kind which is "parent." By contrast, the Son and the Holy

reason whereby” [*significari ut ratio*]. For if this is the same as being signified by a concrete word as opposed to an abstract one, the article contradicts itself, because “wisdom” is an abstract word and yet wisdom is said to do something, namely, to dispose all things gently [Wisdom 8: 1], *etc.*, notwithstanding how the word signifies. On the other hand, if the difference is meant to be the same as that between a real thing and something thought-up, the article is clearly stating a falsehood, since ‘fatherhood’ conveys a real thing [in God], just as ‘wisdom’ does.

Defense of the answer *ad* (2)

xix. To this we reply that the expression ‘as’ or ‘after the fashion of’ implies a condition: the condition of a *thing* is to exist or subsist (since nothing is a thing as a thing unless it exists; and similarly no thing is signified as a thing unless it is signified as a being or existent); but a *reason-whereby* is said to be found for the sake of getting cognizance,* and the source of cognizance is act and form, as we see from c 9, *Metaphysics IX*, and therefore the condition of a “reason” is that it be formally cognizance-giving; thus for a “reason” to be signified as such is for it to be signified as a form-wise source of cognizing; only in this way will a reason’s mode of signifying correspond to its condition as a reason. Well, since these two modes are exercised by abstract and concrete words, we concede that to be signified “as a thing” coincides with a concrete word, and to be signified “as a reason” coincides with an abstract word.

Turning back now to the objection, we concede that it is a common property of all abstract words, by virtue of their mode of signifying, that they do not fit together with [predicates signifying] operations; nevertheless there is a wide range among abstract words as to what sort of formal sense† each conveys. For some abstractions, the formal sense which they convey has no connection, of itself, with a doing (as is clear in the case of relations); but for other abstractions what they mean does have an intrinsic connection or ordination towards doing something: as ‘wisdom’ is connected with ordering things, as ‘justice’ is connected with rendering each his due, *etc.* Those abstract terms which look towards a

Spirit have no common correlative kind (only the common absolute kind which is divineness), and so the Father cannot have to them a single one-to-many relation. He must have two one-to-one relations.

doing by virtue of what they form-wise signify — those abstract terms, I say, can go together [with action verbs] in propositions, as we see in the example of wisdom, given above; in the same vein, one can say that intelligence understands, *etc.* But all other abstract terms, such as ‘fatherhood’ and the other identifier-words, because they do not pick out sources of operating, either [syntactically] by their mode of signifying or [semantically] by what they formally signify, cannot make well-formed* propositions in which operations are predicated. This is the point made in the body of the article. Hence there is no contradiction.¹¹

¹¹ Back in § vi, Cajetan seemed to be saying that a sentence like ‘Divineness begets’ is ill-formed simply by virtue of the mode-of-signifying belonging to the abstract subject-term; now he seems to be softening his objection from one of syntax to include one of semantics, so that what makes ‘Divineness begets’ unacceptable is not simply the problem with the grammatical subject’s mode of signifying but the semantic fact that what ‘divineness’ conveys is *not per se* oriented towards the action of begetting. By contrast, ‘wisdom’ conveys an aspect which does have an orientation towards a certain action, namely, ordering things, and hence the sentence, ‘Wisdom orders all things gently’, is logically in order despite the syntactical problem which he had already discussed above in § vi.

By contemporary lights, Cajetan is not right in this self-amendment, and one should propose the following alternative account. We agree these days to two facts. The first fact is that ‘Wisdom orders things’ and ‘Intelligence understands’ seem natural in a way that ‘Divineness begets’ does not. The second fact is that some abstractions, of course, pick out action-oriented aspects of things, while others do not. From there it seems reasonable to admit that the second fact has something to do with the first; it explains why some syntactically irregular sentences seem more natural than others. But we do not concede that the second fact makes the natural-seeming sentences logically *correct*. Strictly speaking, ‘Wisdom orders’ is just as ill-formed as ‘Divineness begets’ and therefore just as incapable, as it stands, of being true. But the natural languages are always amenable to short-cuts, and so they use some ill-formed sentences as convenient abbreviations for longer well-formed sentences. Thus ‘Wisdom orders things’ is a conventional abbreviation for ‘One’s wisdom is that whereby one orders things’ or ‘Wisdom is that whereby one is a wise man, and what a wise man does, as wise man, is order things’, *etc.* The action-orientedness of what an abstract term picks out is what allows such abbreviations to become conventional and harmless, but it does not make the abbreviation itself a well-formed sentence in its own right. The difference between being a well-formed sentence and being a practically acceptable abbreviation for a well-formed sentence remains; as a result, there is no need to amend § vi or my footnote 4.

* *innocenti gratia*,
cf. *Topics VI*, c. 1

c 9,
1051a 3ff

† *formalis significata*

Are five identifiers to be listed?

In 1 Sent. d.26, q.2, a.3; d.27, q.1. a.1; *Compend. theol.* cc.57-60;
De potentia Dei q.9, a.9 ad 21 & ad 27; q.10, a.3 ad 12

It seems that there are not five identifiers.

(1) After all, the distinctives manifesting the Persons are the relations by which they are distinguished. But the relations in God are just four, as emerged above. So the identifiers are also just four.

q.28, a.4

(2) Besides, God is called "one" thanks to the fact that there is one essence in Him; He is called "trinal" thanks to there being three Persons. So if there are five identifiers, He will be called "quinal," which is unheard of.

(3) Also, if the three Persons existing in God have five identifiers, one of the Persons must have two or more. Thus the Person of the Father is said to have unbegottenness, fatherhood, and common [*i.e.* active] spiration. Then either these three identifiers differ in the real, or else they don't. If they do differ in the real, then the Person of the Father is composed of several real factors. But if they differ only in our thought [*ratione*], then one of them can be predicated of [*i.e.* identified with] another; for just as we may say

God's goodness *is* His wisdom, because of the lack of a real distinction between them, so also we should be able to say

Common spiration *is* fatherhood.

But this last is not admitted. Ergo, there are not five identifiers.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there seem to be more than five.

* *innascibilitas*

(4) Just as the Father is not *from* another, and this is where we get the identifier called unbegottenness,* so also the Holy Spirit is such that no other is *from* Him. So from this we should get a sixth.

(5) Further, as it is common to the Father and the Son that the Holy Spirit proceeds from Them, so it is common to the Son and the Holy Spirit that they proceed from the Father. So just as a common identifier is posited for the Father and the Son, so one should one be posited for the Son and the Holy Spirit, too.

ANSWER: we apply the name 'identifier' to that which is a distinctive basis for knowing a divine Person. What makes those Persons many is their origin. Origin embraces the topics of *from whom another arises* and *who arises from another*; so it is in these two ways that a Person may be identified. Well, the Person of the Father cannot be identified by *from whom* He arises but by the fact that He arises from no one; so from this angle, His identifier is unbegottenness. But from the angle of who arises from Him, the Father is identified in two ways. Insofar as the Son is from Him, He becomes known by the identifier which is fatherhood; and insofar as the Spirit is from Him, He becomes known by the identifier which is common spiration.

The Son, meanwhile, can be made known by the fact that He is *from another* by being-born (from which angle He is identified by sonship) and by the fact that another is *from Him* (from which angle He is identified like the Father by common spiration).

The Holy Spirit, then, can be made known by the fact that He is from another (or from others), from which angle He is identified by procession, but not from the fact of another's coming from Him, because no divine Person proceeds from Him.

Thus there are five identifiers in our account of God: unbegottenness, fatherhood, sonship, common spiration and procession. Of these, only four are relations (because unbegottenness is not a relation except by being "reduced" to that category, as will be discussed below). Only four of them are distinctive properties (as common spiration is not distinctive of one but belongs to two). But three of them are "personal" identifiers, *i.e.* constitutive of Persons (fatherhood, sonship, and procession). For common spiration and unbegottenness are called identifiers "of Persons" but are not called "personal," as will be explained further below.

q.33, a.4 ad 3

q.40, a.1 ad 1

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): besides the four relations, one had to posit another identifier for the reason stated.

ad (2): God's essence comes into language as* a certain Thing, and likewise the Persons come into language as Things, but the identifiers come into language as explanations disclosing the Persons. This is why God, although called "one" after the unity of essence and called "trinal" after the Trinity of Persons, is not called "quinal" after the five identifiers.

* *significatur ut*

ad (3): since only relative opposition produces thing-wise plurality in God, and the several properties of one Person are not relatively opposed to each other, these properties are not thing-wise different. But even so, it is not the case that one can be predicated of another, because they come into language as different explanations of the Persons. Similarly, we do not say God's attribute of power is His attribute of omniscience, even though we say that His knowing = His power.

ad (4): since 'a person' implies a high dignity, as said above, an identifier of the Holy Spirit cannot be gotten from the fact that no Person is from Him; it does not contribute to the Spirit's dignity, whereas being from no one contributes to the authority of the Father.

ad (5): Son and Holy Spirit do not agree in one special way of "being from the Father," whereas Father and Son agree in a special way of producing the Holy Spirit. A source of coming-to-know has to be something special. So the two cases are not similar.

Cajetan's Commentary

The title-question means the number five taken exactly.* so as to ask whether there are *neither more nor less* than five identifiers.

Analysis of the article

ii. In the body of the article Aquinas does two jobs: (1) he answers the question; and (2) he lays down the difference in number between identifiers, relations, distinctive properties, and person-constituting identifiers.

iii. As to the first of these jobs, he answers the question affirmatively: the five identifiers are unbegottenness, fatherhood, common spiration, sonship, and procession. The proof goes like this. [*Antecedent:*] An identifier is a distinctive basis for knowing a divine person: so [*1st consequence:*] an identifier pertains to origin: hence [*2nd consequence:*] an identifier pertains either to *from whom X originates* or to *who originates from X*; ergo [*3rd consequence:*] there are five identifiers.

The antecedent is the definition of 'identifier', which has been expounded above [in the commentary on a. 2]. The first consequence is supported on the ground that divine Persons are rendered multiple by their origins. The second consequence rests on the fact that origin has these two sides to it, and that divine Persons become known thereby. The third consequence follows inductively, by applying each of the two sides of origin to each of the divine persons.

As to the Father, the side expressed by *from whom does He originate* applies not positively but negatively and so yields unbegottenness; but the other side, *who originates from Him*, yields fatherhood and spiration.

As to the Son, the one side yields sonship, while the other yields the same spiration.

As to the Holy Spirit, the *from-whom-does-He-originate* side yields procession, but the *who-originates-from-Him* side yields nothing either positively or negatively, because of the reason given in the answer to the fourth objection.

iv. As to the second job, the numbers are established together with the four things numbered, namely, identifiers, relations, distinctives, and personals; that way the discussion can be interpreted formally and the confusion of one thing with another is avoided. The relevant points are sufficiently clear in the text. Doubts arising on these matters, whether on the personal constitutives or on unbegottenness, will be cleared up at the appropriate places below [q.33, a.4; q.40, a.2].

Scotus suggests a sixth

v. Concerning the discussion that comes up in the text after the answers to the objections [namely, in the discussion of the points ON THE OTHER HAND], Scotus raises a doubt at *In I Sent.* d.28, q.1, arg.3. He wonders why we should not posit a sixth identifier, unspira-

tedness,* common to the Father and the Son. For just as the Father is manifested to us positively in two ways and negatively by negation of either origin [from generation or from spiration] or at least by negation of the first of them [generation], so also the Son should be manifested by the negation of one origin [from spiration], since that is true of Him.

vi. I don't find anything in St. Thomas which deals directly with this point, as far as the Person of the Son is concerned. He says something pertinent as far as the Father is concerned below, in q.33, a.4 [*ad 2*], and at *In I Sent.* d.28, q.1, a.1 [*ad 4*]. He says that unbegottenness implies negation of either origin [*i.e.* that non-generability implies non-spirability], and so there is no need for "unspiratedness" in connection with the Father. But now we are talking about the Person of the Son. The things Aquinas says about the sufficiency of [the five] identifiers at *In I Sent.* d.26 [q.2, a.3] do not readily apply here. For one thing, 'unspiratedness' is a negation within a kind and so says something special. For another thing, St. Thomas does admit 'unbegottenness' as a weaker identifier, with the sense of just negating generation, as we shall see.

Now although Scotus (in the place cited) did want to introduce this sixth identifier, he did not dare to do so against the avalanche of opposing authorities, who approve only five of them. So he satisfied himself with the conditional conclusion that a sixth identifier will have to be admitted unless a contrary reason can be given. Well, it seems to me that we do have a sufficient reason why unspiratedness should not be posited among the identifiers.

Rebutting the suggestion

vii. To see this, recall that (1) an identifier is posited for the sake of coming-to-know, as its name indicates; and (2) lackings and negations are naturally known through havings and affirmations respectively, not the other way around. As a result, negations of modes of origin need not *normally* be counted among the identifiers. Thus, for example, the person of the Holy Spirit has only one identifier, even though He verifies a negation of the nativity belonging to the Son. And since unspiratedness is a negation, it need not have a place among the identifiers either.

viii. The fact that unbegottenness, though negative, is posited as an identifier breaks the normal rule; but there are three special reasons for this exception C reasons which make this negation different from the others.

The first reason is that the Father stands alone in meeting the definition of 'first-source in the Trinity'; for only the Father is source not from a source [*principium non de principio*]. Now, what it takes to be a first and the very definition of 'a first' [*ratio primi*] is best conveyed with a negation. Also, this firstness is the key to the Father's authority (on account of which He

* *inspirabilitas*

is said to be greater than the Son, as St. Hilary explains [in his *De Trinitate LX*, c.54 (*PL* 10, 325)], and so in the Gospel the Son habitually refers all things to the Father, and so the Church directs almost all her prayers to the Father). Therefore, to draw attention to this special authority of firstness, this particular negation [unbegottenness] is justly listed as an identifier. And this reason is touched upon in the text, at the end of the reply *ad* (4), as well as at *In I Sent.* [d.28, q.1, a.1, *ad* 4].

The second reason is that whether 'father' and 'unbegotten' are jointly satisfied or not varies from one use of these words to another. As used of human beings, the two are not jointly satisfied: every father is begotten, *i.e.*, from another; they are even begotten in the strict sense, except for Adam, who was a father and not begotten. Still, as far as their strict meanings are concerned, the two words admit of joint satisfaction, and in the divine person of the Father they get it. Quite different is the case of the two words 'son' and 'unspirated': these are jointly satisfied everywhere. And so it is fair that only that one negation [unbegottenness] should be counted among the identifiers. One can find this reason in St. Augustine's *De Trinitate V*, c. 8.

The third reason is taken from St. Hilary's *De synodis* [on can.26]; it is to stress the unity of the divine nature. For by positing one unbegotten person, one source and head is posited in the divine nature. St. Hilary says that to posit two unbegottens is to posit plural gods and plural divine natures; thus to posit one unbegotten emphasizes the unity of the divine nature. For this reason, the teachers of sacred doctrine do not posit the identifier 'unbegottenness' in just any sense but precisely in the sense unique to the Father, such that it belongs neither to God's essence nor to the Holy Spirit.

A strongly contributing reason is the fact that we lack genuinely distinctive terms for the procession of the Holy Spirit.

Therefore, because we have reasons why unbegottenness should be an identifier by a singular privilege, and because negations are regularly excluded from the identifiers, the doctors of the Church have proceeded rationally in omitting unspiratedness.

On the answer *ad* (2)

ix. In the answer *ad* (2), observe that to come into language as a *thing* is to be signified as a singular thing in the real. By the names of persons in exercised act (such as 'Father', 'Son', and 'Holy Spirit') Persons are signified in God as singular things; and similarly by names for the essence (such as 'God') the divine nature is signified in the same way; but, by the names of identifiers, distinctives, and relations as such — that is, by abstract names — what are signified are not so much things as *reasons* for things [*rationes rerum*]; therefore the number of these latter does not lead us to say that

God is five-fold or four-fold, *etc.*¹

On the answer *ad* (3)

x. In the reply to the third objection, a doubt arises because of Scotus' remarks in *Quodlibetis*, q.5, at the end of a.2. If a thought-produced distinction between fatherhood and spiration were sufficient, he says, to prevent us from saying that the one is the other in their abstract form, such a distinction would also prevent one from saying,

[God's] wisdom is [His] goodness, since the two are form-wise distinct; but the Thomists say otherwise *re* this latter; so they ought to say otherwise *re* the former. Moreover, what Aquinas adds about attributes is not germane to his point; it rather proves the opposite. It is not germane, because 'attribute' is a term of [second] intention, whereas the question is about terms of first intention [*i.e.* names of things]. And it tends to prove the opposite point, because one would gather from this example that, just as the *attribute* of power is not the *attribute* of knowledge, and yet God's power is His knowledge, so also the identifier fatherhood is not the identifier spiration, and yet the Father's fatherhood is His spiration C which is the opposite of the conclusion intended.

xi. To this I REPLY that the objection arises from a poor understanding of the text, indeed from inattentive reading. The text does not say that the two identifiers are not predicated of each other because they are distinct in thought, but because they come into language as diverse reasons for persons, that is, as diverse relational reasons (for the divine persons are subsistent relations, as was said above). And he means to speak of diversity in exercised act, not under the description 'identifier' but under the *defining makeup* of a relation. This answer is based on Aristotle's doctrine in *Metaphysics V*, namely, that things are properly multiple under that description by virtue of whose sub-divisions they are distinct. Thus he means to say that, because fatherhood and spiration fall under different sub-divisions of the description 'divine relation' (since the former is towards the Son, and the latter towards the Spirit), they are therefore two real divine relations. Fatherhood and spiration introduce this distinctness in exercised act, because 'fatherhood' and 'spiration' signify them as diverse reasons for persons (*i.e.* for relative persons); and therefore the one is not predicated of the other.

q 29, a.4

c.6.
1017a 3-6

¹ The present translator is not sure why Cajetan threw in the phrase 'in exercised act' in his discussion of names at the start of § *ix*. Are names of actual persons names in exercised act? Are words which might be personal names and which are actually used as such in some context, on some occasion, in some speech act, personal names in exercised act? Or is his point that such names, on an actual occasion of use in which they are made to refer to persons, do in fact signify-in-exercised-act singular things?

xii. Hence to answer the objection, one must deny its antecedent [i.e. that "a thought-produced distinction between fatherhood and spiration is sufficient to prevent." etc.]. And as to the example St. Thomas gives from the two attributes, it is entirely germane when rightly understood. It is only brought up to illustrate the principle from *Metaphysics V*, to the effect that things retain their plurality under that description under whose sub-divisions they fall. And because God's wisdom and power are distinguished under the description 'attribute' and not under the description 'thing', they are said to be two attributes, and the one is not predicated of the other — even though [in real terms] the one is the other, since as things they are not differentiated by the sub-divisions of 'thing'. Now in the case at hand [fatherhood and spiration], the same is said not only with respect to the second intention involved in the description 'identifier' but also with respect to the underlying formal makeup, that is, the defining makeup of 'divine relation'. For just as attributes are counted when power and knowledge are counted, so also kinds of relation (and not just identifier second intentions) are counted when fatherhood and spiration are counted. And therefore, just as this attribute is not that one, so also (this identifier is not that one — which is left unsaid in the text — and) fatherhood is not spiration; for these [words] are names of relations. To see that this was St. Thomas' intent, look at *In I Sent.* d.28, q. 1, a. 1 in the body and *ad 3.*²

² Scotus thought the distinction between fatherhood and spiration in God posed just the same issue as that between attributes, like wisdom and goodness, in God. Cajetan has replied that the two identifiers pose not only that issue but also another, deeper issue: they differ in their defining makeup as relations, and hence cannot be "the same relation."

The result is that fatherhood and spiration count as two both under the description 'identifier' and under the description, 'divine relation'. But this fact has no bearing on the further question of whether they count as two under the ultimate (2nd order) description, "thing" Ca description which has already proved pivotal in previous articles. The principle that where x and y are not relatively opposed in God, they are "thing-wise" identical in God, tells us precisely and only how to count under this ultimate description. The word 'really', as used in such key predicates as 'really identical' and 'really distinct', 'really one' or 'really two', etc., had a technical force: it meant 'thing-wise' or 'under the description "thing"'. This principle is used so heavily in talk of the Trinity because the metaphysical situation *inside* the Divine Being is so odd (from our point of view), that the ordinary rules in metaphysics and 2nd-order modeling for distinguishing one "thing" from another cannot be trusted. In our experience, after all, it is a certainly the case that where x and y differ in category (e.g. where one is a quality and the other an action), x and y are two "things"; but inside God the categories do not work reliably; they fail to keep "things" apart; even the great divide between absolutes and relatives behaves strangely; fatherhood and God's substance are thing-wise the same, and one self-same infinite and utterly simple Act has all that it takes to be His knowing, His willing, all of His attributes, and all that He ever "does." In our experience, it is a certainly the case that

xiii. Against this response of mine, since it says that fatherhood and spiration are the same thing-wise [*idem realiter*], there are also some more arguments made by Durandus, as reported by Capreolus at *In I Sent.* d.13, a.2, *contra 1^{am} concl.* But they don't seem to me to be worth repeating.

what something is and the fact that it is are two "things"; but inside God they are the same. Beyond that ontological threshold, then, which lies between creatures and items immanent in God, our normal metaphysical rules for distinguishing one "thing" from another simply cease to function reliably.

How, then, do we go on? How do we replace our broken-down rules with ones that work? We cannot go on by philosophy, because the classical philosophy of God simply yields the proof of divine simplicity — God's non-composition out of 2nd-order things — the very simplicity which invalidates the further use of our categorial rules. We can only go on, therefore, by faith. The Faith tells us, astoundingly, that inside this blinding "singularity point" of divine simplicity there are yet three "things" which are distinct: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Reasoning in faith from the fact that these Three have been revealed to us under *relational* descriptions (a Father is such to a Son, etc.), and seeing that these descriptions are relatively opposed, we formulate *in theology* the one and only rule which we can derive from these revealed facts: that where x and y are relatively opposed in God, they are distinct "things," and otherwise not. We cannot "understand" this rule in an intuitive sense; I mean, we cannot "visualize" the Being whom this strange rule describes. And we are not asked to. We only have to know that it is true ... and reason from it.

Part of the greatness of St. Thomas as a theologian of the Trinity lies in the fact that he follows this new rule with resolute consistency. In trinitarian theology, he knows that he is reasoning about what goes on inside the "singularity point"; intuitions and standard metaphysical assumptions must be left behind; he is "flying blind," guided by pure logic and the one rule derivable from the revealed data. If that rule compels him to say, in connexion with fatherhood and active spiration, that we have here two real relations which aren't really two, he says it. For strange as the wording may sound, it is not contradictory. The 'real' in front of 'relations' just means mind-independent, while the 'really' in front of 'two' means thing-wise. Hence the assertion being made is that fatherhood and spiration are mind-independent relations (belonging to different species) and hence relation-wise two, but that they are not thing-wise two. To say that certain items are thing-wise two and also thing-wise one is contradictory; to say that they are relation-wise two but thing-wise one is not contradictory, even though it is impossible anywhere except in God. It is impossible outside of God, because outside of God distinct real relations are distinct things (by virtue of the philosophical 2nd-order modeling rule that real relations are 2nd-order "things"); but inside the divine singularity point, distinct real relations are not necessarily distinct things (by virtue of the theological 2nd-order modeling rule that real relations in God need not be things in their own right at all; they need not be anything but the one blinding Act, unless they have a relative opposite.

Acquiring theological maturity, in the great tradition of the Catholic Church, is learning how to "fly blind." Only thus do faith — and imageless contemplation — take the mind beyond an earth-bound understanding of dogmatic sentences.

Is it permissible for theologians to disagree about the identifiers?

In I Sent. d.33, q.1, a.5

It seems that theologians may not allowably disagree about the identifiers.

c.3;
PL 42, 822

(1) After all, Augustine says [in *De Trinitate I*] that “nowhere is it more dangerous to go wrong” than in Trinitarian matters, to which the identifiers clearly belong. But conflicting opinions cannot exist without someone’s being wrong. Therefore, it is not allowable to disagree about the identifiers.

(2) Besides, it is through the identifiers that Persons come to be known, as was already stated. But conflicting opinions about the Persons are not allowed. Neither should they be allowed, then, about the identifiers.

q.32, a.2

ON THE OTHER HAND, there are no articles of faith about the identifiers. Therefore, people may think one way or another about them.

ANSWER: a point can pertain to the faith in two ways: (1) One way is directly, like the chief points communicated to us by divine tradition, such as: God is three and one, the Son of God has become incarnate, and the like. Just holding a false view on such points introduces heresy into the Church, especially if the view is held stubbornly. (2) The other way is indirectly.

This is how those points pertain from which there follows some consequence contrary to the faith. Suppose, for example, someone held the view that Samuel was not the son of Elcana. From this it would follow that the divine Scripture was false. On points of this kind, then, before it has been pondered or determined that something against the faith follows from them, a person can hold a false view without danger of heresy, especially if he or she does not cling to it stubbornly. But after the matter has become clear, and especially if the Church has determined that something against the faith does follow, there is no going wrong on the topic without heresy. This is why today many points are regarded as heretical which previously were not so regarded: it has now become more clear what follows from them.

I Samuel 1: 19ff

The thing to say, then, is that some theologians have held conflicting views about the identifiers without danger of heresy, since they did not intend to maintain anything against the faith. But if someone held a false opinion about the identifiers while realizing that something against the faith followed from his opinion, he would be falling into heresy.

By these remarks, it is obvious how to answer the objections.

Cajetan’s Commentary

The title is clear. — In the body of the article, he does two jobs: (1) he teaches generally in which matters of faith it is permitted to hold contrary opinions, and in which matters, not; (2) he answers the question.

ii. As to job (1): he posits two classes of points pertaining to the faith, namely, those which pertain directly and those which pertain indirectly. About the first class he says that holding a false opinion is heresy, especially if stubbornness is present. But about the second class he says two things. (a) Before it has been considered or established that something contrary to the faith follows from the false opinion, the opinion is not heresy, especially if held without stubbornness. (b) After such an entailed error has been shown or established by ecclesiastical judgment, the opinion is heresy. From these points he deduces the corollary that many points are considered heretical today which were not recognized as such in earlier times.

iii. Notice here that for something to be heresy in itself,* it suffices that it be an error in things pertaining to the faith: but in order for something to be formally heretical, stubbornness is further required. Hence, the text of the article adds the point about whether stubbornness is present or absent.

* *haereticus in se*

Again, in the second class, in the absence of a determination by the Church, when many teachers hold that something contrary to the Faith follows from a certain position, but other teachers hold the opposite, it is not said to have been “shown” that the error follows. Therefore in such cases, those who hold the false opinion are not only exempt from the charge of heresy but also excused from sin. They think that they are following the better justified opinion to the best of their knowledge, keeping due reverence for the Church.

iv. As to job (2): the answer is yes: contrary opinions on the identifiers may be held, so long as no consequence contrary to the Faith exists or is thought to exist. This is the case because identifiers belong to the second class of things pertaining to the Faith.¹

¹ Cajetan fails to comment on the fact that Aquinas, in this article, gives a falsificationist account of theological progress. The point is important. It makes all the difference in the world whether claims about identifiers and other such theological developments are *theorems*, proved from the first class of “things pertaining to the Faith” as from axioms, or whether they are *theories*, tested against the revealed data and rejected when they are found to have an entailment inconsistent with those data. If genuine theological developments are indeed

new theorems, theology is like geometry; its history is like the history of a mathematical discipline once that discipline has been axiomatized, and the rôle of the Magisterium is like that of an expert reasoner, checking the alleged proofs for fallacies. But if genuine developments in theology are theories, theology is more like an empirical science (with

points of Scripture and tradition standing in the place of observations), its history is more like the history of physics, subject to revolutions and "paradigm shifts," but still cumulative as older theories are falsified and replaced by new theories not yet falsified, and the rôle of the Magisterium is like that of a commissioned guardian of the data.



Inquiry Thirty-Three: Into the Person of the Father

Next we need to study the Persons in individual detail [*in speciali*], beginning with that of the Father. About Him, four questions are raised:

- (1) does it suit the Father to be a "source"?
- (2) does the name 'Father' refer distinctively to the Person of the Father?
- (3) in theology, is the personal use of 'Father' prior to its essential use?
- (4) is being "unbegotten" a distinctive trait of the Father?

article 1

Does it suit the Father to be a "source"?

1 ST q.36, a.4, *In I Sent.* d.12, a.2 *ad* 1, d.29, a.1, *In III Sent.* d.11, a.1 *ad* 5;
Contra errores Graccorum 1, 1, *De Potentia Dei* q.10, a.1 *ad* 8-*ad* 11

* *principium* It seems that the Father cannot be called a source* of the Son, nor of the Holy Spirit.

c. 2,
1003b 23

(1) After all, Aristotle says [in *Metaphysics IV'*] that a source and a cause are the same thing. But we do not call the Father the cause of the Son. So He should not be called the Son's source either.

(2) Besides, a thing is called a source in relation to what is made to flow from it. If the Father is the source of the Son, it follows that the Son is made to flow and hence is caused, which is visibly in error.

(3) Moreover, the word for a source, '*principium*', comes from the word for priority, '*prioritas*'. But there is no prior and posterior in God, as the Athanasian Creed tells us. So, in the theology of the Trinity, we should not use the word for source.

Denz. #75

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is Augustine's statement in *De Trinitate IV* that the Father is the source of the whole Deity [*principium totius deitatis*].

c. 20;
PL 42, 908

ANSWER: the word 'source' means nothing but 'that from which something proceeds'. We call anything from which something else proceeds its source, and *vice-versa*. So, since the Father is one from whom another proceeds. He is a source.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): the Greek Fathers used their words for a cause and a source interchangeably, whereas the Latin Fathers used their word for a source but not their word for a cause.¹ The reason for this is that the [Latin] word for a source has wider application than the word for a cause, just as 'cause' has wider application than

'component'.[†] After all, the starting point or first part of a thing is called its *principium* but is not called its cause. Now, the wider the application a term has, the more suited it is to be used in theology, as I said above, because the more specialized a term's application is, the more it picks out the mode-of-being that goes with a creature. Thus, the word 'cause' seems to imply one substance distinct from another, along with a dependency of the one upon the other, whereas the term 'source' does not imply this. After all, in all cases of coming-to-be from a cause, we always find a "gap" between the cause and what it causes, thanks to some completeness or active power [in the cause but not in the effect]. But we use the word 'source' for cases where there is no such gap but only a difference of placement or order. Thus we say that a point is the "source" of a line, or we even say that a line's initial part is its start or "source."

† *elementum*

q.13, a.11

ad (2): among the Greek Fathers one finds it said that the Son or the Holy Spirit is "caused," but the term is not in use among our [Latin] Fathers. For while we ascribe a certain authority to the Father because of His status as origin, in no way do we ascribe any inferiority to the Son or the Holy Spirit, so as to provide no occasion for error. Thus Hilary says in book IX of his *De Trinitate*, "The Father is 'greater' by the authority of a Giver, but the Son to whom His one being is given is not 'less'."

c. 54,
PL 10, 325

ad (3) although the word '*principium*' seems to be taken etymologically from '*prioritas*', it does not mean priority; it means a source. What a word means is not the same as its etymology, as I noted above.

q.13, a.2 *ad* 2, a.8

¹ Latin writers used '*principium*' to translate 'ἀρχή' because of the Greek word's breadth; it meant not only beginning, origin, source, and first principle, but also cause. Meanwhile, Greek had another word, 'αἰτία', which meant a cause more focally and so came into Latin

with '*causa*'. But since 'αἰτία' could be used for any sort of explanatory factor, it was also a broad word, so that 'ἀρχή' and 'αἰτία' were often interchangeable in Greek. Alas, '*principium*' and '*causa*' were not so readily interchangeable in Latin, for reasons Aquinas is about to explain.

 Cajetan's Commentary

The title-question is clear.— In the body of the article, the one conclusion, that the Father is a source, is supported thus. [*Major:*] A "source" is that from which something proceeds, and *vice-versa* [whatever proceeds is from a "source"]. [*Minor:*] The Father is one from whom another proceeds, namely, the Son and the Holy Spirit. [*Concl.:*] Ergo the Father is a source.

Aureol's attacks on the answer *ad* (1)

ii. Concerning the answer *ad* (1), be aware that two statements in the text are attacked by Aureol, as Capreolus reports at *I Sent.* d.29. The first is the difference between the Greek and Latin Fathers. Against this, Aureol brings forward Hilary (*De Trinitate II*'), giving the Father the title of 'Author', and Augustine (*De Trinitate VII*, c.4), saying this of the Father: "What He has as a cause of being is the cause of His being wise." The second statement is the one to the effect that we [Latins] use our word for 'source' in Trinitarian theology but not our word for 'cause', since the former is of wider application, *etc.* Against this, Aureol objects as follows. A term suitably applied to God because of its generality has the trait that a less general definition of it would not suit. But 'source' does not have this trait, by your own statements. For none of the definitions of 'source' given in *Metaphysics V* suits the situation

c. 1.
1012b 34ff

in which the Father stands *vis-à-vis* the Son, as one can verify easily by running through them.

The replies

iii. Against the first of these attacks, I have two things to say. First, for the text to be true, it suffices that the Latin Fathers did not have 'cause' in standard use, though it is found occasionally. Secondly, I construe the quote from Hilary as St. Thomas does at *I Sent.* d.29, q.1, a. 1, namely, that 'Author' does not imply causality but "source not from another," and so it is applied to the Father. The quote from Augustine, meanwhile, is not germane; it is talking about issues of God's essence, where it is well known that there is no cause, except in thought.

iv. Against the second attack, it is false that no definition of 'source' from *Metaphysics V* is verified by the Father. For it says in the same passage that the most general definition of 'source' is the first: "that from which something is or is known." It is clear that the Father is a first "from which the Son is," according to the line in the Creed, "begotten of the Father before all ages." In the present article, however, this greater generality is shown by things better known to us (a point and a line, *etc.*), not because this particular use has application in theology, but so that by familiar things we might become aware that 'source' is more abstract than 'cause'.

Is 'Father' properly the name of a divine Person?

1 ST q.40, aa.1-3; 1 ST q.60, a.7 ad 3; In IV Sent. d.3, a.2, q¹.1 ad 5

It seems that 'Father' is not properly the name of a divine Person.

(1) After all, the noun 'father' indicates a relation, whereas a person is an individual substance. So 'father' is not a noun distinctively indicating a person.

(2) Besides, 'one begetting' is a broader term than 'father', since every father is one begetting but not vice-versa. A broader term is more properly used in talking of God, as was said above. So 'one begetting' is a more proper name for a divine person than 'father' is, and 'begetter' is more proper, too.

(3) Also, no word used metaphorically can be anyone's proper name. Among us, an inner word is metaphorically called a conception or a brain-child, and hence the person having the inner word is metaphorically called a father. The origin of the Word in God, therefore, cannot literally be called a Father.

(4) Moreover, every term used in talking of God applies to God prior to applying to creatures, whereas the talk of begetting seems to apply to creatures prior to applying to God; for a case where one individual proceeds from a distinct other (distinct not only because of a relation but also because of its essence) is seen to be a truer case of begetting. So, the noun 'father', which comes out of the talk of begetting, does not seem to be distinctive of any divine Person.

Vg Ps 88, 27

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Psalm 89:26 says, "He shall cry unto me, 'Thou art my father.'"

* significant

ANSWER: a name "proper" to any person carries in its sense* that through which this person is distinct from all others. For just as a body and a soul pertain to explaining a human being, so this body and this soul pertain to understanding this human being, as it says in *Metaphysics VII*. It is by these, after all, that *this* human is distinguished from all others. Well, that by which the Person of the Father is distinguished from all others is fatherhood. So, the "proper" name of the Person who is the Father is this noun 'Father', which carries fatherhood in its sense.

c. 11; 1037a9

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): among us creatures, a relation is not a subsisting person. And so among us, the noun 'father' does not carry as its sense

a person but a person's relation. But contrary to what some have falsely supposed, matters stand otherwise in God. There, the relation that 'father' conveys is indeed a subsisting Person. This is why I said above that, in the talk of God, the noun 'person' carries the sense of a *relation as subsisting* in the divine nature.

q.29, a.4

ad (2): Aristotle says in *De Anima II* that the naming of a thing should come especially from its final completeness and purpose. Well, 'begetting' conveys a process as still going on, while 'fatherhood' conveys its completion. Hence 'father' is more the name of a divine Person than 'begetter' or 'one begetting' is.

c. 4; 416b23

ad (3): a [human] word is not something subsisting in human nature, and so it cannot literally be called begotten or a son. But the divine Word is something subsisting in the divine nature: so, He can be called a Son literally, not metaphorically, and His origin can be called a Father.

ad (4): 'begetting', 'fatherhood', and other terms used literally in the talk of God apply first to God, then to creatures, as regards the thing-meant* but not as regards how it is meant.† This is why Paul says in Ephesians 3:14-15, "I bow my knees unto the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, after whom the whole family [I g.: all fatherhood] in heaven and earth is named." This is seen as follows. A process of begetting obviously gets its species from its terminus, which is the form of the thing begotten. The closer this is to the begetter's form, the truer and more perfect a case of begetting it is — as a univocal generation is more perfectly "a begetting" than a non-univocal one. For it belongs to the defining makeup of a "begetter" that it beget a thing like itself in form. Thus the fact that, in God, the begetter's form is numerically the same as that of the begotten, whereas they are not numerically (just specifically) the same in creatures, shows that 'begetting' and 'fatherhood' apply to God prior to applying to creatures.‡ So the very fact that, in God, the begotten differs only by a relation from the begetter enhances the genuineness§ of divine begetting and fatherhood.

* res significata
† modus significationis

‡ veritas

1 The priority was not in our usage, of course, but in the real (*in se*), where the most perfect case of a given kind was always the "first" in the order of exemplar causality.

Cajetan's Commentary

In the title question, 'father' is taken as it is used in [speaking of] the divine Trinity, as the solution section makes clear. The word 'properly' is taken (1) in the sense opposite to 'figuratively' [*i.e.* literally] and (2) in the sense opposite to 'in common' [*i.e.* distinctively], and (3) in the sense opposite to 'extraneously' [*i.e.* in

and of itself]. I call "extraneous" any trait which is in any way by-the-by — as we say of someone that his proper name is 'Byrd', while 'the eldest son of Harry' is not his proper name because it is accidental to him, by-the-by, and not his substance. Sense (3) is how 'properly' is mainly and directly used in this title.

Example updated from 'Socrates' and 'the eldest son of Plato'

but the other two senses are there concomitantly. So, the sense of the question is this: Is 'father' a name conveying the proper substance or substantial distinctiveness of a divine Person, or does it convey something incidental to Him? Hence 'of a divine Person' is referring to a hypostasis itself, as such.

Analysis of the article

ii. In the body of the article, a single conclusion answers the question with yes: 'Father' is a proper name of the Person of the Father. The support goes as follows. [*Major:*] A person's proper name is one conveying that by which the person is distinguished from all others; [*minor:*] but 'Father' conveys fatherhood, by which the Person of the Father is distinct from all others [in God]; [*conclusion:*] ergo 'Father' is a proper name of the Person of the Father. — The major is supported virtually in the text, thus. [*Antecedent:*] A human being's proper name conveys this soul and this body; so [*inference:*] it conveys that by which this human is distinguished from all others; but the same rule would apply in other natures. — The antecedent is made plain (a) by an argument to the effect that as these flesh and bones pertain to understanding this human being, so also, etc., and (b) by the authority of

1037a 9 *Metaphysics VII.*

A doubt

iii. Concerning this argument, a doubt arises about its middle term, *i.e.*, "convey that by which this one is distinguished from others". Either this involves signifying form-wise and in act the very distinguisher of a person, or else it involves signifying materially and in potency, in the manner in which it was said above to signify what is contained under the distinguisher.

— If the middle term is taken as signifying form-wise, the minor premise is false. For 'Father' does not signify the personal distinguisher of the divine Person. Rather, what 'Father' signifies form-wise is that whereby the Father is the same as other fathers (with at least an analogous sameness). A person's distinguisher is that by which he is the same as others; for the one is shared; the other, unique.

— But if the middle term is taken as signifying potentially, the major premise is in vain and so is all the reasoning in the body of the article, because these latter are plainly talking about signifying actually; otherwise 'man' would be a proper name of this man, and these points should not have been brought up.¹

¹ One can now make sense of the distinction between actually and potentially signifying. Start with the phrase *nomen proprium*. This article is not limited to what we call a proper name. Medieval Latin did not distinguish 'name' from 'noun' or 'noun phrase'. So, the doctrine given here covers definite descriptions as well as names. It says that a noun or noun phrase passes the test for mentioning a thing *x* "*proprie*" — "distinctively" — just in case it not only leads the mind to

Response

iv. The short answer to this is that the talk here is about signifying actually, and my answer to the objection is that 'father' can be taken two ways:

(1) First, it can be taken as an analogous noun applicable to anyone who is a father in whatever fashion; with 'father' so taken, the minor premise would be false, beyond doubt; for then 'father' would mean something analogically common to every father.

(2) The other way to take it is as the prime and chief analogate within this analogy, and so taken 'Father' signifies the personal "constitutor and distinguisher" of the first Person of the divine Trinity, as was made clear in q.13 [a.6]. For the formal account explaining to the inquirer what the first divine Person is *qua* "a father" is different from the formal account explaining what Socrates is as a father, just as is the case with other analogous terms applied both to God and to a creature. This difference in explanatory account arises from the elevation of the fatherhood relation to subsistence and personhood, etc. Hence 'father' so taken means, by virtue of its distinctive account, the personhood of That One, and thanks to this the Lord taught that people were to be baptized in the name of "the Father," etc., without further specifiers.

The remaining doubt about the minor, *i.e.* whether fatherhood really is the personal distinguisher of the Father, will be treated in q.40, a.2.

On the answer *ad* (4)

v. In the answer *ad* (4), notice that the explanatory account of begetting includes two factors, *i.e.*, distinction of referents and oneness of the form communicated. And since the begetter as such assimilates the one begotten to himself, and similarity is a kind of oneness, the greater the oneness of form (but keeping the referents distinct), the more perfect is the begetting.

think of *x* and no other but also leads it there on a basis not accidental to *x*. Divine Persons are individuated by relations for which human language happens to have words; so 'the Father' passes this test. But for values of '*x*' individuated by matter, no definite description can succeed in naming *x* *proprie* (all will lead the mind to *x* on a basis accidental to *x*), because human language has no words for what is unique to this body. Well, we have none unless you count what we call proper names, like 'Paul Jones'. This is what the scholastics did; they counted such names as not only referring to an individual but also as carrying (in the case of personal names) the sense of 'this body with this mind'; and since this body *cum* mind were the very substance of the real Paul Jones, they counted 'Paul Jones' as leading the mind to this individual on a non-accidental basis. Cf. Kripke's account of proper names as "rigid designators." The act/potency distinction can now be unraveled. In a speech community using 'Paul Jones', it has no standard use but to mention the one so named. This is actual signifying. 'Man' has wider use, but one can form a context in which 'man' refers to Paul Jones; thus it signifies him potentially.

In discussing God, does using 'Father' for the Person have priority?

3 ST q.23, a.1-3; *In III Sent.* d.10, q.2, a.1, qu.1, 2

It seems that in discussing God, the use of 'Father' for the Person does not have priority.¹

(1) After all, in the order of understanding, what is common comes ahead of what is unique. 'Father' as used for the Person is unique to the Person of the Father; but as used for God's essence, 'Father' is common to the whole Trinity. For we call the whole Trinity "our Father." Ergo the essence-wise use has priority over the personal use.

(2) When different things have a trait ϕ under the same definition of what it takes to be ϕ , using ' ϕ ' to describe one of them is neither prior nor posterior to using it to describe the other. But 'father' and 'son' are used under a single definition to say that a divine Person is Father of the Son, and that the whole Trinity is our Father, the Father of creatures; and the reason for this, according to Basil [*Homilies de Fide*], is that "receiving" is a trait the Son and creatures have in common. So there is no priority or posteriority of the personal use over the essence-wise use.

(3) Also, when different things are being called ϕ but not under a constant definition of what it takes to be ϕ , there is no comparing the one to the other. But the Son is compared to creatures in what it takes to be a son, or to be begotten, in Colossians 1:15, "who is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of every creature." Therefore, the use of 'father' for the Person in theology is not prior to the essence-wise use; they both come under a common definition.²

ON THE OTHER HAND, what is ϕ eternally is prior to what is ϕ in time. But God is eternally the Father of the Son and only temporally the father of creation. Ergo 'father' is used of God *vis-à-vis* the Son prior to being used of God *vis-à-vis* creatures.

ANSWER: among a term's uses, one in which its whole definition is satisfied has priority over one in which the definition is only satisfied to some extent. For in the latter case, the term's use turns upon a likeness with something in which the whole definition is

¹ 'Father' had two theological uses, one to mention the first Person of the Trinity, and one to mention God without distinction of Persons (as in "Our Father, which art in heaven"). The latter use was called "taking 'father' essence-wise." The question at hand was which use had priority.

² Col. 1:15b, *prototokos pasēs kteseōs* (where the genitive could be partitive or comparative: 'firstborn of all creation' or 'born first before all creation'), came into Jerome's Latin as *primogenitus omnis creaturae* (where the genitive had to be partitive). The objector is taking this to mean that the Father begets the Son under the same definition as He begets creatures — not unqualifiedly (that would be Arianism) but in a certain respect — and that Scripture is supporting this by comparing His sonship to theirs (as older).

satisfied (because incomplete cases are construed in light of complete ones). In this way, 'lion' is used first of the animal in which the whole scientific definition of a lion is satisfied, and which is called "a lion" literally,* and only secondarily of a man in whom something of a lion's makeup is found, such as boldness, fortitude, etc.; for when a man is called a lion, the use is based on a likeness.

It became clear in remarks made above that the entire definition of "being a father" and "being a son" is found in God the Father and God the Son, because they share one nature and glory. But in a creature, "being God's son" is not found in its entire definition (as Creator and creature do not share one nature) but only by a certain likeness — one which becomes more complete the closer the creature comes to meeting the genuine definition of "being God's son." The likeness is just vestigial if God is called father to irrational creatures, as in Job 38:28, "who is father to the rain, or who hath begotten the drops of dew?" [There is likeness of image if] He is called father to rational creatures, as in Deuteronomy 32:6, "is not He thy father that hath bought thee? hath He not made thee and established thee?" God is father to some by a likeness based on grace; these are called His adoptive children since they are set to inherit eternal glory through the working of the grace they have received; thus Romans 8: 16f., "The Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit, that we are the children of God; and if children, then heirs." The likeness is based on glory [when God is called father] of some others, since they already possess the inheritance of glory; thus Romans 5:2 [1g], "we rejoice in hope of the glory of the sons of God."

It is obvious, then, that in theology the use of 'father' as it involves the Person-to-Person relation is prior to uses of it involving a God-to-creature relation.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): among absolute terms, the common ones are prior in our understanding to the unique ones, because the common are involved in understanding the unique, but not *vice-versa*. Thus 'God' is thought in understanding 'Person of the Father' but not *vice-versa* [since one understands 'God' without thinking of the Persons]. But common terms involving relation to creatures are posterior to the unique terms involving Personal relations, because a Person proceeding within God proceeds as *source* of the production of creatures. Just as the concept[†] in an artist's mind is understood to proceed from him prior to the art work he produces on the pattern of his concept, also the Son proceeds from the Father prior to a creature, which is called "son" after some likeness it shares with the Son or the Father, as is clear from Romans 8:29, "whom He did foreknow He also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of His Son."

* *proprie*

q.27.a.2

PG 31, 468

† *verbum conceptum*

ad (2): “receiving” is said commonly of creatures and the Son, but not with univocal use of ‘receiving’; the basis is rather a remote likeness, thanks to which the Son is called “firstborn of creation.” Hence a Scripture already cited adds “that He might be the first-born among many brethren” after it had just said that some were to be conformed to the image of

God’s Son. But God’s son naturally has something unique beyond the others, namely: He has by nature what He receives, as Basil also says. And thanks to this unique standing, He is called the “only begotten,” as one sees in John 1:18, “the only begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him.”

From this, the solution to objection (3) is clear.

Cajetan’s Commentary

In the title-question, pay attention to three terms. The first is ‘personal’. For God is called Father in two ways: (1) personally, when He is called the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, and essence-wise, when He is called the Father of mercies [2 Cor. 1:3]. And so ‘personal’ was not put in for nothing.

(2) The second is ‘use of “Father”’. For the question here is not whether, in God’s case, being the Father *ad intra* is prior to being the Father *ad extra*, but whether the formal sense conveyed by ‘Father’ is used of God as He is Father *ad intra* prior to being used of Him as He is Father *ad extra*.

The third term is ‘prior’; for while the priority in question seems to be left unclear by the objections advanced in the text, the direct use of ‘prior’ here is in fact to stand for a priority according to order-of-nature that is customarily found among the meanings* of a single term, as one sees throughout *Metaphysics I*.¹ So the force of the question is this: is the defining account conveyed by ‘father’ as used personally the meaning of the word that is naturally prior to the defining account conveyed by it as used essence-wise?

Analysis of the article

ii. In the body of the article, a single conclusion answers the question affirmatively: in theology, the personal use of ‘father’ has priority over the essence-wise use. This is supported as follows. [*Antecedent:*] All incomplete cases are construed from complete cases; so [*1st consequence:*] every term is used first of that in which its whole definition is fully satisfied, prior to being used of that in which its definition is only satisfied in some respect; so [*2nd consequence:*] ‘father’ is used of God first as conveying the Person-to-Person relation, prior to being used as conveying the God-to-creatures relation; ergo [the personal use is prior]. The first consequence is supported on the ground that, when a term is used for some *x* [that satisfies its definition] in some respect, it is being used as if by a similarity to some *y* that satisfies it fully; then the point is illustrated by the word ‘lion’. The second consequence rests on the premise that the full definition of being-a-father and being-a-son is [*a*] found in the case of God the Father and God the Son but [*b*] not found in the case of God and a creature, where [*c*] the basis is rather some sort of similitude.

Part [*a*] of this premise is supported by the fact that the divine Persons share one nature and glory; the negative part [*b*] is supported by the fact that a creature is not of the same nature as God. The affirmative part [*c*], however, is illustrated by going up a scale of resemblances in which a creature is like a son towards God; the scale has four levels, *i.e.* those of vestige, of image, of grace, and of glory. All are confirmed in the text, clearly enough, by authoritative quotations.

On the answer *ad* (1)

iii. Pay diligent attention to three things in the answer *ad* (1), namely: the distinction, the comparisons, and the reasons for the comparisons. The distinction is this: of terms used as common [to all three Persons], *i.e.* the terms used essence-wise, some are absolute (like ‘good’, ‘wise’, *etc.*) and some are relational *ad extra* (like ‘Lord’, *etc.*). The comparisons are two. [1] The first says that the absolute terms used as common are prior in understanding to the [absolute] terms used for a Person. [2] The second one says that the relational terms used as common are posterior [in understanding] to the [relational] terms used for Persons. The reason for the first comparison is that the common absolute terms are included in [the understanding of] the [absolute] personal terms, but not *vice-versa*. For it is well established that prior terms are ones that do not convert.¹ The reason for the second comparison is that the procession of divine Persons is the source of the procession of creatures, and hence the [relational] terms used for Persons are pre-supposed by the *ad extra* [relational] terms.²

Pay very careful attention to this reason for the second comparison, because it is only talking about *ad extra* relations consequent upon transitive actions; for these are the only ones pertaining to the procession of creatures.

¹ A term converts (with another term) when it shifts from subject-place to predicate-place without loss of truth in a universal affirmative proposition, such as ‘all ϕ -things are ψ ’. But if ‘ ϕ ’ is prior to ‘ ψ ’, ‘all ψ -things are ϕ ’ will be true, but ‘all ϕ -things are ψ ’ will be false.

² The relation R_1 is prior to R_2 in case the fact that xR_1y helps cause the fact that xR_2z . The relevant priority here is explanatory priority in a scientific theory; so, the fact that x bears R_1 to y will be part of explaining why x bears R_2 to z . Let x be the Father, y the Son, and z a creature.

The result is that, from this passage, one is not getting St. Thomas' thinking about [the Father's] relations-to-creatures that follow from [His] immanent actions [such as their being known]. [Those relations are common to the three Persons]. Thus, one is not getting St. Thomas' thinking as to whether these common relations are prior to the Personal ones. For example, is the fact that the Father understands creatures *prior in the order of understanding* to the fact that He originates the Son? Or is it the other way

about? There is doubt about this if the understanding in question is the "simple understanding" naturally present in God (not the sight-knowledge which is in Him freely). Since this difficulty is irrelevant to the present topic (because is not called "father" to the objects He knows), a separate inquiry into this will be undertaken aside from this article. q.14, a.12

Another difficulty — whether the procession of Persons really is a source of the procession of creatures — will be dealt with thematically below, in q.41, a.6

Is being unbegotten unique to the Father?

In I Sent. d.13, a.4; d.28, q.1, a.1; *Contra errores Gmecorum* 1, 8

It seems that being unbegotten is not unique to the Father.

(1) After all, every distinguishing trait posits something in the thing that has it. But ‘unbegotten’ posits nothing in the Father: it only denies something. Hence ‘unbegotten’ does not convey a distinguishing trait.

(2) Besides, ‘unbegotten’ is taken either in the sense of a lack or else in the sense of a negation. If it is taken as a negation, then anything that is not begotten can be called unbegotten. The Holy Spirit is not begotten, and neither is the divine essence. So ‘unbegotten’ applies to them, too, and is not unique to the Father. But if the word is taken as a lack, then since every lack implies an incompleteness in the thing lacking, it follows that the Person of the Father is incomplete — which is impossible.

(3) Also, in the talk of God, ‘unbegotten’ does not indicate a relation (it is not a relational word); so it indicates substance. In that case, the unbegotten and the begotten differ in substance. But the Son, who is begotten, does not differ from the Father in substance. Therefore, the Father should not be called unbegotten.

(4) Moreover, the unique belongs to one thing alone. But in God there is more than one [Person] who proceeds from another; so nothing seems to prevent there also being more than one who is not from another. In that case, being unbegotten is not unique to the Father.

(5) Furthermore, as the Father is the source of the begotten Person, He is also the source of the proceeding Person [the Holy Spirit]. So if being unbegotten is supposed to be distinctive of the Father because of the relative opposition He has to the begotten Person, one will have to posit another thing distinctive of Him by the same reasoning, namely, being “improcessible.”

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Hilary says in book IV of his *De Trinitate* [c. 33]: “The one is from the one, *i.e.* the begotten from the unbegotten, with a distinctive trait in each, of having an origin and of having none*.”

PL 10, 120

* *unnascibilitas*

ANSWER: just as one finds among creatures a first source and a secondary source, so also among the divine Persons (where none is prior or posterior) one finds a source that is not from a source (the Father) and a source that is from a source (the Son).

In created cases, a “first source” is manifested (1) as a source, by having a relation to what is from it, and (2) as a first source, by not being from another. The Father, too, is manifested [as being a source] by fatherhood and common spiration as His relations to the Persons proceeding from Him. But as being a first source not from a source, He is manifested by the fact that He is not from another. This is the relevance of the distinctive innascibility, which is what ‘unbegotten’ means.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): some say that innascibility (as a distinctive trait of the Father) is meant by ‘unbegotten’ taken not merely negatively but as including either two facts together (that the Father is from no one and is the source of others), or as including a universal authorship,* or as including also a fullness of sourcehood.† But this sort of theory does not seem true, because then innascibility would not be a different distinguishing trait from fatherhood and spiration but would include them as the broad includes the narrow. For in the talk of God, ‘sourcehood’ and ‘authorship’ mean nothing but source of an origination.‡ The thing to do, then, is to follow Augustine in *De Trinitate* V, where he says that ‘unbegotten’ negates passive generation [*i.e.* conveys not having been generated]. He says, “Being called unbegotten has the same force as being called not-a-son.” Yet it does not follow that unbegotten should not count as a unique identifier of the Father. After all, first things and simple things are made known through negations, as we say that a point is that which “has no parts.”

ad (2): sometimes ‘unbegotten’ is taken purely negatively, as in Jerome’s remark, “The Holy Spirit is unbegotten, *i.e.* not begotten.” But the word can also be used in a sense that is privative in a way but implies no incompleteness. After all, we talk of “lacking” in many ways. One is to say that *x* does not have what another thing, *y*, naturally has, even if *x* does not naturally have it. Thus we call a stone a “dead thing” because it lacks life, which certain other things naturally have. We talk of lacking in another way when *x* does not have what something else in its genus naturally has; this is how we call a mole “blind.” We talk in yet a third way when *x* does not have what *x* itself should naturally have — and this is the way in which “lacks” implies incompleteness. Well, this is not the way in which ‘unbegotten’ is said privatively of the Father. Rather, we are talking in the second way: a referent of the divine nature is not begotten, but another referent of that nature is begotten. As ‘unbegotten’ has been construed thus far, however, the Holy Spirit can also be called unbegotten. In order for the term to be unique to the Father, something else has to be understood in the meaning of the word, *e.g.*, that it applies to a divine Person who is the source of another Person. So taken, it would be understood to involve negation across the board of any personal source mentioned in the talk of God. Or the further factor could be that the “unbegotten” Person is not from another *in any way* (not just in the way of generation). On this understanding, the Holy Spirit

* *universalis auctoritas*
† *fontalis plenitudo*

‡ *principium originis*
c 7;
PL 42, 916

Quoted in *I Sent* d 13

would not be unbegotten as a subsisting Person, because He is from another by way of procession; nor would the divine essence be unbegotten, because we can say that it is “in” the Son or the Holy Spirit “from another,” *i.e.* from the Father.¹

ad (3): according to John Damascene [in *De fide orthodoxa I*], when ‘unbegotten’ is taken one way it means the same as ‘uncreated’, and this is how it indicates substance; for this is how created substance differs from uncreated substance. But when ‘unbegotten’ is used another way it indicates the not-begotten; and so used it is a relational word in the manner in which not- ϕ is reduced to the category of ϕ ; thus “not-man” goes into the category of substance, and “not-white” goes into the category of quality. So, since ‘begotten’ means a relation in God, ‘unbegotten’ also pertains to relation. Thus it does not follow that the unbegotten Father differs from the begotten Son in substance; they only differ in a relation, in that the relation ‘son of’ is denied of the Father.

ad (4): as one must posit a first in any kind, one must posit in the divine kind also a source which is not from

¹ Aquinas’s case would be helped by the modern notion of a category mistake. If the divine essence is considered apart from any Person, calling it unbegotten is a category mistake. If the same essence is considered as present in a Person, calling it unbegotten as present in the Son or the Holy Spirit is a factual mistake.

another and which is called unbegotten. Hence, to posit two that cannot be begotten is to posit two gods and two divine natures. This is why Hilary says the following in *De synodis*: “Since there is one God, there cannot be two innascibles.” And the main reason for this is that, if there were two innascibles, one of them would not be from the other. And thus they would only be distinguished by a diversity of nature.

ad (5): the Father’s distinctive trait of not-from-another is indicated more by denying the born-status that the Son has than by denying the procession that the Holy Spirit has. For one thing, the Holy Spirit’s procession does not have a special name, as I noted above; for another, His procession presupposes (in the order of nature) the begetting of the Son. So when being begotten is denied of the Father and yet His status as the source of begetting [is assumed], it follows in consequence that the Father is not proceeding with the procession of the Holy Spirit, because the Holy Spirit is not a source of begetting but proceeds from the one begotten.

Pl. 10, 521

q.27, a.4 ad 3

² If St. Hilary had had at his disposal a better word than ‘*innascibilis*’, such as one that meant unoriginate, Latin theology would have been spared the difficulty addressed in this article. Unfortunately, the word needed was not coined until long after St. Thomas’s time.

Cajetan’s Commentary

In the title question, ‘unique’ [*proprium*] is opposed to ‘shared-with-another’ [*commune*]. It excludes not only other divine Persons [from being unbegotten] but also the divine nature itself, as comes out in the answer *ad (2)*.

Analysis of the article

ii. In the body of the article, a single conclusion answers only implicitly the question posed: being unbegotten is unique to the Father — The support goes as follows. [*Antecedent:*] The Father and the Son in God are [respectively] a source not from a source and a source from a source, as one finds among creatures that this one is a first source, and that one secondary. So [*1st consequence:*] the Father is made manifest in two ways: (1) as a source (by fatherhood and common spiration), and (2) as not from a source (by not-being-from-another); so [*2nd consequence:*] He is manifested by being-unbegotten. And if you understand along with this the point that being a source not from a source or being not-from-another is unique to the Father, you will conclude that ‘unbegotten’ is not only descriptive of the Father (as the text explains) but also unique to Him, which was the point at issue and which the text was aiming to resolve — The antecedent is clarified by the fact that among the divine Persons none is prior or posterior, as will emerge below. The first consequence

is supported on the ground that a first source among creatures is manifested in two ways: (1) by its relation to what is from it and the negation of its being from another. (2) The second consequence rests on the fact that not-being-from-another pertains to the innascibility conveyed by the word ‘unbegotten’.

On the answer *ad (2)*

iii. Notice in the answer *ad (2)* that ‘unbegotten’, since it consists of ‘un’ plus ‘begotten’, has multiple meanings on both counts. For the ‘un’ part has two senses, one purely negative and one privative, and the latter breaks down into further senses — lack within being as a whole, lack within a genus, lack within oneself — only the last of which bespeaks incompleteness. Here the ‘un’ part is being taken privatively in the sense of lack within a genus (either person-wise source or divine Reality). ‘Begotten’ is also used two ways, *i.e.* strictly (being from another by generation) or broadly (being from another in any way).

In the text, then, five points are being made: (1) that ‘unbegotten’ in the purely negative sense is not unique to the Father; (2) that ‘unbegotten’ in the privative sense of lacking something in Himself does not describe the Father; (3) that ‘unbegotten’ in the privative sense of lack within the “genus” of divine Referents is not

unique to the Father, because it also describes the Holy Spirit: (4) that 'unbegotten' in the sense of a lack within the "genus" of person-wise sources is unique to the Father. (In all four of these senses the 'begotten' part is taken strictly). The fifth point being made is that 'unbegotten' in the sense of a lack within the "genus" of divine Reality [and with 'begotten' taken broadly] is unique to the Father, since He alone is not from-another in any way.¹ For the divine essence (not unqualifiedly but) as present in the Son and the Holy Spirit is from the Father.

On the answer *ad* (4)

iv. In the answer to the fourth objection, notice that the text assigns two reasons why there cannot be two unbegotten persons in God.

(1) The first is Hilary's statement, "Since there is one God, there cannot be two innascibles," which assigns the oneness of the divine nature as the reason there is just one innascible Person. This is also the reason assigned by the first deduction in the text, namely, that in every nature one must posit one first; and so if there is more than one first, there will be more than one nature.²

¹ In other words, when 'begotten' is taken so broadly as to mean 'stemming from another in any way', the word 'unbegotten' becomes a synonym of 'unoriginate'.

² It is hard to see what this deduction amounts to. In what sense must one posit in every nature one "first"? Not in a temporal sense, of course, because some natures are such that their referents do not begin to be in time. So, the "first" wanted is the first in some causal ordering. But which? The most germane answer would be the ordering in which every origin is somehow a cause of what is from it. Then the claim is that in every nature there is one "original" whence all other instances are somehow derived. But does this mean at least one original, or at most one? If it means at most one, this premise will give Aquinas the conclusion he wanted "in every nature," but it is far too strong to stand up in modern science. Iron has formed in many stars but not from one original piece. If it just means at least one, why does any "original" have to be unique?

(2) The second assigned reason is that, if there were two innascibles, they would be distinguished by diversity of nature, because they would not be distinguished by opposed relations of origin. Neither would be from the other or from another.³

Scotus objects

But in remarks on *I Sent.* d.2, q.5, Scotus criticizes this argument on the ground that its middle term is not more clearly true* of God than its conclusion; one who posited plural unbegotten Persons would not concede that they were distinguished by relations of origin. Hilary (says Scotus) asserts this but does not prove it.

* *notus*

In fact, however, Hilary's reason, along with its deduction in our text, is not only reasonable but necessary. For either there is no distinction of Persons in God, as the [Greek and Islamic] philosophers say, in which case there is still *one* unbegotten Person; or else there are three Persons in God as the Catholic faith teaches, and then since a distinction between them through absolute [non-relational] properties is unintelligible, the only alternative is that the distinction is through the [relational] order of origin. Thus the middle term is more clearly true of God than the conclusion, just as it is more clearly true that the Persons cannot be really distinct in absolute traits without being diverse in their completive traits.⁴ But Scotus seems to have made his remarks out of a passionate conception which he was to make explicit at d.26 of the same *I Sent.* We shall be going into the matter below.

³ This argument is more successful, because it is focused on divine nature alone. If there are not to be multiple Gods, the Referents of this nature must be distinguished by opposed relations alone. Two unoriginate Referents could not be distinguished in that way. Ergo, if there is at most one God, there is at most one unoriginate Referent. Q.E.D.

⁴ N.B. Cajetan's reply to Scotus is relying on both arguments at once. He takes them cumulatively.

Inquiry Thirty-Four: Into the Person of the Son

The next topic to study is the Person of the Son. To Him three titles are given: 'the Son', 'the Word', and 'the Image'. The reason He is the Son has already been considered in looking at the reason there is a Father in God. What is left to study, then, is 'Word' and 'Image'. About 'the Word', three questions are raised:

- (1) is 'word' used for God's essence in theology, or for a Person?
- (2) is 'the Word' a proper name of the Son?
- (3) does 'the Word' imply a relation to creatures?

article I

Is 'word' used for a Person in the talk of God?

2/1 ST q.93, a.1 ad 2; In I Sent., d.27, q.2, a.2, qd 1; De Veritate q.4, aa. 1, 2, 4 ad 4

It seems that 'word' is not used for a Person in talking of God.

(1) In the talk of God, after all, the words for the Persons are used literally, like 'Father' and 'Son'. But 'word' is used metaphorically in that talk, as Origen says in his commentary on John. Thus 'word' is not used personally in the talk of God.

c.3;
PG 14, 59

c.10,
PL 42, 969

c.63;
PL 158, 208

(2) Besides, according to Augustine in *De Trinitate IX*, an inner word is "knowledge with love." And for a supreme spiritual being, "to speak" is nothing but to have insight in thought, according to Anselm in his *Monologion*. But 'knows' and 'thinks' and 'has insight' are used for His essence in speaking of God. Therefore 'word' is not used for a Person in that talk.

(3) Also, it belongs to the definition of a word that it be spoken. But according to Anselm, "As the Father is actively understanding and the Son is actively understanding and the Holy Spirit is actively understanding, so also the Father is speaking, the Son is speaking, and the Holy Spirit is speaking" — and the same goes for anything else you ascribe to Them; so, the term 'word' is used for something essential in God, not a Person.

Monologion, c.62;
PL 158, 207

(4) Moreover, no divine Person is achieved [*facta*]. But God's word is something achieved, as it says in Psalm, 148:8, "Fire and hail, snow and vapour, stormy wind achieving His word [*Vg. quae faciunt verbum eius*]." Ergo 'word' is not used for a Person in God.

c.2;
PL 42, 936

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Augustine says in *De Trinitate VII*: "As the Son is related to the Father, so is the Word to Him whose Word it is." But 'Son' is a personal term, used relationally. So 'Word' is personal also.

ANSWER: if 'word' is used literally in the talk of God, it is personal, not in any way an essence term.

To see this, one needs to know that in the context of human speech, 'word' is used literally in three ways and non-literally or figuratively in a fourth. The most

obvious and commonplace use is to mean what is pronounced by the voice but arises from within in both the aspects found in the outward word, namely, the vocalization itself and its meaning.* For a vocalization's meaning is something the mind understands, as Aristotle says in *De Interpretatione I*. (At the same time, a vocalization arises from meaning or imagination, as he says in *De Anima II*.) But a vocalization which is not meaningful cannot be called a word. Hence the reason an outward vocalization is called a word is because it conveys the mind's inward conception. Thus, [1] what is first and primarily¹ called a word is the mind's inner conception; [2] what is secondarily so called is the vocalization conveying the inner conception; and [3] what is thirdly so called is an imagined vocalization. These are the three uses of 'word' that Damascene also posits in *De fide orthodoxa I*, where he says: "The mind's natural initiative, with which it moves and understands and thinks, as a light and brightness, is called its word" — there is the first use. "Again, a word is not what is expressed aloud but pronounced in the heart" — that is the third use. "And yet again, a word is the mind's angel or messenger" — there is the second use.

* *significato*

16a.3

c.8,
420b.32

† *primo et principaliter*

c.13,
PG 94, 857

In the fourth and figurative way, we use 'word' to mean what is meant or effected by words; thus we often point to some accomplished fact *meant* by the speaker's word (or a commander's) and say, "This is what I was saying to you" or "This is what the king commanded."¹

Now, 'word' is used literally of God insofar as it

¹ The Latin has *hoc est verbum quod dixi tibi, vel quod mandavit rex*. The translation limps because English does not use 'word' in a way that imitates this use of 'verbum'. Still, the point is not wholly lost. What I was saying or 'telling' you was verbal, whereas the exhibited fact is "what I was saying" by metonymy, because it is what my message was about. Ditto for the king, his command, and its execution.

c 16,
PL 42, 1071
means an intellectual conception. This is why Augustine says in *De Trinitate XI*, "Anyone who can conceive of a word not only before it is sounded but even before he imagines the sound can already see a likeness to that Word whereof it was said, 'In the beginning was the Word.'"

q27, aa3-5
But it is a defining trait of this inner concept of the heart that it proceeds from something else, *i.e.*, the conceiver's awareness of something. Hence 'word', as used literally in talking of God, means something proceeding from another, and so it passes the test of being a personal term in trinitarian theology, since the divine Persons are distinguished by their origin, as I said above. It has to be the case, then, that the term 'word' as taken literally in trinitarian theology is not taken to mean God's essence but solely to mean a Person.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): Origen has been found to be a source of Arianism.² The Arians maintained that the Son was other than the Father by a diversity of substance. So where the Son of God was called "the Word," they tried to construe the passage as speaking non-literally. Iest they be forced (by the account of how a word proceeds) to say that God's Son was not *outside* the Father's substance. For an inner word proceeds from a speaker in such a way as to remain *within* him.

But if one says that the phrase 'word of God' is used figuratively, one must also say that it has a literal use. For the only reason some *w* can be called "a word" figuratively is because of manifesting: either *w* manifests as a word does, or else *w* is the thing manifested by a word. If *w* is manifested by a word, one has to posit the word that does the manifesting. But if *w* is called a word because it manifests outwardly [*i.e.*, because it is uttered], the sounds uttered are only called words insofar as they convey the mind's inner concept, which is also what a person "manifests" by outward signs.³ So if 'word' is sometimes used figuratively in trinitarian theology, one must also admit a literal use of it, which applies to a Person.

ad (2): no term pertaining to the intellect is used for a Person in trinitarian theology, with the sole exception of 'word'. For only 'word' conveys something emanating from another. That which an intellect *forms* in *conceiving* is its word. [So an intellect *vis-à-vis* its word is an intellect looked at relationally.] But the intellect itself, as it is in act through an intentional likeness [*species*], is intellect looked at non-relationally. Equally non-relational is the act of understanding, which stands to an intellect-in-act as the act of being [*esse*] stands to a being-in-act [*ens in actu*], because

² Patristic scholarship no longer sustains this harsh judgment. Origen's unfortunate subordinationism had Platonic roots and stopped well short of the Arian claim that the Son is a creature.

³ In other words, there are two very different kinds of items that are "manifested" by one's spoken word beyond the said word itself: (a) one's thought, and (b) the thing/fact/topic one was thinking (and thereupon talking) about.

'act of understanding' does not mean an action *going out* from the one doing the understanding. So, when knowledge or awareness [*notitia*] is called "a word," it is not being identified with the act-state of an intellect knowing, nor with any habitual feature an intellect may have, but with what the intellect *conceives* in knowing. This is why Augustine also says [in *De Trinitate VII* that the Word is "begotten wisdom" — which is precisely a wise person's conception. In the same way, the Word can also be called "begotten knowledge" or "begotten awareness" [*notitia genita*]; and in still the same way one can understand God's "speaking" as His having insight by thinking [*cogitando intueri*], since God's Word is conceived by the insight of His thought. (Even so, 'thought' and 'thinking' do not strictly apply to God's Word; for Augustine says in *De Trinitate XI*, "It is called God's *Word* so that it *not* be called His *thinking*, lest anything in God be thought of as in flux, as not taking form as a word, as if it were a thing He could dismiss or turn over in His mind in an unformed state." After all, *thinking* is distinctively found in the search for truth, which has no place in God. And once a mind has attained the form of truth, it is not "thinking" but "contemplating" the truth perfectly. It was improper of Anselm, therefore, to take thinking for contemplating.)

ad (3): as 'word' applies literally to a Person in God, not His essence, so 'speak' [applies literally to a Person]. And just as 'word' does not apply commonly to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, so also Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are not one speaker. This is why Augustine says in *De Trinitate VII*, "What is understood in God by that coeternal Word is not just one Person; rather, 'being said' [in the Word] applies to any Person." After all, what "is said" is not just the word but the thing understood or meant by the word. Only one Person in God "is said" the way a word is said, but any Person "is said" the way a thing understood in the word is said.⁴ The Father, after all, in understanding Himself, the Son, the Holy Spirit, and everything else contained in His optimal knowledge, conceives the Word, with the result that the whole Trinity is "said" in the Word, and so is every creature — much as a human intellect "says" in its word what it conceives in understanding (say) a rock.

Anselm, however, improperly took the act of saying for the act of understanding. They are different. The act of understanding involves no bearing but that of the understander to the thing understood, in which there is nothing having the makings of an origin, but only an "informing" within our intellect, in that our intellect is put in act through the form of the thing understood (and in God, the act of understanding involves a sweeping identity, because the intellect and the thing understood are utterly the same in God, as shown above). The act of saying, by contrast, involves main-

⁴ The active voice of the verb '*dicere*' ('say') was used more narrowly than its passive, '*dicī*' ('is said'). The focal meaning of the active was *utter*; that of the passive was more like *be-expressed* or *be-manifested*.

q27, a.1

c.2,
PL 42, 946c.16,
PL 42, 1079c.1,
PL 42, 933

q.14, aa. 2-4

ly a bearing toward the word conceived (for “saying” is nothing but bringing forth a word), but then *via* the word it involves a bearing towards the thing understood which is manifested (in the word brought forth) to the one doing the understanding.⁵ Thus only the

⁵ Unlike Anselm, Aquinas has appreciated the complex elements involved when a speaker (*x*) says a word (*w*) to a hearer (*y*). Superficially, the event poses a three-place relation, but in fact it makes a five-place relation, because the word has behind it a concept (*c*) and the object (*o*) which *c* is a concept of. So, *x* says *w*, but *c* and *o* are said as well insofar as they are expressed in *w*.

Person who brings forth the word [*i.e.*, the Father] is “speaking” in trinitarian theology, even though each Person is doing understanding and is being understood and hence “is said” in the Word.

ad (4): ‘word’ is being used figuratively in that passage in the way in which a sense or effect is itself called a “word” [*i.e.* a “thing said”]. This is how we say creatures “achieve” God’s word: they execute some effect to which they are directed by the conceived Word of divine wisdom, much as a man is said to carry out the king’s “word,” when he does the work to which he was exhorted by the king’s word.

Cajetan’s Commentary

The title question is clear enough, from the standard use of terms in trinitarian theology. The ‘is’ here means that the question being handled is whether or not ‘word’ is a personal term by reason of its *sense*. We are not asking whether it can refer to a Person, or whether it can be turned into a term for a Person by accommodation. We are asking whether it *is* such a term without qualification (but in trinitarian theology, of course), when God is called a Word.

Analysis of the article

ii. In the body of the article, Aquinas does three jobs. (1) He puts forth a conclusion answering the question, *i.e.*, that ‘word’ as used literally in trinitarian theology names a Person and not God’s essence in any way. (2) He at once clarifies the terms of this conclusion as they are used literally in theology. (3) He supports the conclusion at the & beginning, “But it is a defining ...”

iii. As to job (2), in clarifying the literal sense of ‘word’, he distinguishes the uses of ‘word’ and puts them into correct order. The distinction is that ‘word’ is used two ways, literally and figuratively. Then, as literally used, ‘word’ is applied in three ways, so that altogether the term is used four ways (the first three literal, and the fourth figurative). The first application is to the word in the voice; the second, to the word in imaginary speech; the third, to the word in the intellect; the fourth, to some fact which is a word’s meaning, imperative force, or effect. Then he puts these into correct order as (1) the word of the heart, (2) the word of the mouth, (3) the imagined word, and he supports this ordering by the fact that the only reason an outward vocalization has the makings of a word is because it conveys a mind’s inner concept.

To clarify the phrase ‘in the talk of God’, he says that ‘word’ in God is applied to the intellect’s word, and he confirms this by the authority of Augustine. You will find a lengthy and clear exposition of these ways of taking ‘word’ in the Disputed Questions *De Veritate*, q.4, aa.1-2 and in [Aquinas’s remarks on] *I Sent.* d.27, q.2, aa.1-2. So look them up.

A doubt about the order

iv. Concerning the order which the text posits among the [different sorts of] words, a doubt arises as to what sort of order this is: the order in which we learn them [*ordo quoad nos*], or their intrinsic order [*ordo secundum se*]. That it is not our order-of-learning is clear from the fact that what should have first place in this order (as the text itself suggests at the outset) is the vocal word, not the word of the heart. That it is not nature’s intrinsic order is seen by the fact that what gets second place in this order is the imaginary word, since it is well established that the vocal word depends upon imagination. So whichever sort of order you pick, putting the mouthed word in second place seems to be badly done: it should have last place in the order-of-nature and first place in the order-of-learning.

v. The REPLY to this is that the assigned order is the order-of-nature among the intended senses [*intentiones*] conveyed by ‘word.’

vi. To see this, please realize that there are two rules in this sort of business. The first rule is that every term is said form-wise before it is said as an extrinsic denominator. This is clear inductively. The other rule is that every term applied form-wise to more than one thing is used first for the one upon which the other depends, before it is used for the dependent one. And this is also clear inductively. So since ‘word’ is satisfied form-wise only in the heart’s word and the vocal word, and is satisfied merely cause-wise in the imaginary word, the imagined one is the last to be called a “word.” It was to suggest this very point that the text said, “an imagined vocalization is called a word,” insinuating that what is cogitative is called a word because it is the imagining of a word (but a causal imagining). Next, since the formal makeup of a word is in the intellect without dependence upon the vocal word, but is in the vocal word with dependency upon the heart’s word, ‘word’ applies to the heart’s word ahead of applying to the vocal one — but it comes ahead form-wise, as I said, and not as an extrinsic denomination, as Durandus thought. This point [that the

order just stated does not hold for 'word' taken as an extrinsic denomination] is obvious from the fact that the vocalization carried the name of 'a word' before the mind's concept did; for in the old days, a vocal utterance was called a word, and how a concept could count as a word was unknown. So the vocal utterance did not get the label 'word' from the inner word-of-the-heart.¹

vii. Moreover, the vocal utterance is an "expressive sign" not by extrinsic denomination but form-wise, as Socrates is white [form-wise]. But the defining account of a vocal word is that it is a *sign of the mind's concept*, expressing or manifesting it to another, as it says in the text. Similarly, the defining account of a conceptual "word" is that it is a *sign of one's prior^{*} awareness*, expressing the same to oneself, as it says in the questions *De Veritate*. Therefore a meaningful vocal utterance is form-wise a "word," just as it is form-wise "expressive."²

* *habitualls*

viii. Against the argument on the other side, I say that the "order of nature" among the intended senses [*intentiones*] of a term used of multiple things is not the order of the *things* in which those senses are satisfied, nor is it the order of those intended senses in their natural being. Take the sun. Although the sun is prior to what it heats up, and the sun's causality is naturally prior to the heat caused by its causality, we still do not call the sun hot prior to calling the thing heated by it hot: quite the reverse.³ The order of nature among in-

¹ In other words, the priority of mental concept over vocal word in being a "*verbum*" is not historical priority in the development of Latin usage. Nor is it just the explanatory priority that arises from the fact that one cannot explain what makes a vocalization a word in any language without mentioning the concepts formed in the minds of the speakers of that language. For this is true whether or not concepts are called *verba*. No, the "natural priority" of one sense over another sense of the same word has a different basis; see fn. 4.

² A thing *x* had the predicate 'φ' in a language *L* (so that 'φx' came out true in *L*) by extrinsic denomination just in case the speakers of *L* called *x* φ for any reason at all. But *x* had the predicate 'φ' in *L* form-wise only in case *x* had in itself what it took to satisfy the account correctly explaining what-it-is-to-be-φ. Cajetan has just told us that the account correctly explaining what it is to be "a word" is "being a *sign*," and that being a sign involves a three-place relation. A sign is of something and to somebody. By the conventions of one's language, one's vocalization is a sign of one's conception to another person. By the nature of one's mind, one's concept is a sign of something within one's awareness to one's conscious self, such that (by this sign) something one was aware of indistinctly comes to stand before one's mind in a definite guise.

³ This example does not work for us, because we know the sun to be literally and form-wise hot and hence to be a "univocal cause" of heat in the planets it heats up, and so to enter form-wise into the explanation of why sources on earth are form-wise hot. But in Cajetan's still medieval world view, the picture was different. The sun was not hot form-wise but had some sort of higher nature whereby it had what it took to cause heat in lower things without being hot itself. So the

tended senses is set by inclusion: it is the relation whereby this intended sense is included in that one, but not *vice-versa*.⁴ But the form-wise intended sense is prior in just the same way to [the sense intended in] an extrinsic denomination. Because of these points, even though the causality of the imagination whereby there is said to be a "word" in it is prior to the vocal word, the imagined word still gets to be called "a word" after the vocal word.

Analysis resumed

ix. As for job (3), the conclusion is supported thus. [*Antecedent:*] In the talk of God, 'word' means a concept in the intellect; so [*1st inference:*] it means something that proceeds from another; so [*2nd inference:*] it means something personal; hence [*3rd inference:*] it is not used for God's essence but only for a Person.

x. The first inference is supported on the ground that it belongs to the definition of a concept of the heart that it proceeds from another, namely, from the conceiver's prior awareness. The second inference rests on the fact that divine Persons are distinguished by origin. The third inference is obvious of itself.

Three doubts

xi. Concerning this argument and this conclusion, doubt arises on three grounds.

(1) The first is because 'proceeds' abstracts from real proceeding and thought-up proceeding. Likewise, 'from another' can be taken either way: from another in the real or from another in thought. And yet the text leaps to procession and otherness and realness.

(2) The second (which is a confirmation of the first) is because of many objections [like this]: 'act of understanding' and 'act of loving' and the like mean something proceeding from another (from the intellect or from the will, etc.), and yet it does not follow that these are personal terms in trinitarian theology.

(3) The third ground (which heightens the other two) is because Aquinas himself, in the above-cited passages in *De Veritate* and on *I Sent.*, is moved by the objections just adduced into holding that the very argument stated in this article does not conclude decisively, and he maintains the opposite of the conclusion defended here; he says that 'word' is sometimes a term for a Person and sometimes a term for God's essence.

sun's causality of heat was not univocal. The sun could not enter into a chain of explanations having the form 'this thing is hot because that prior thing is hot' etc. So the sun did not enter form-wise into the explanation. Rather, calling the sun "hot" was extrinsic denomination, and so it could not have explanatory priority over the form-wise uses of 'hot'. Such was Cajetan's point in putting this example forward.

⁴ In other words, if sense A was included in sense B, but B was not included in A, then sense A was "naturally prior." In short, the *naturally prior sense* was the *more informative*. E.g. 'furry friend' is likely to mean a dog or another kind of mammal (rather than a tarantula); the dog would be the prior sense because, if 'furry friend' meant a dog, it would mean a mammal, but not *vice-versa*. Romantics think their cats are friends.

Resolving the doubts

xii. To clear up this uncertainty, I need to address two issues: the fact of the matter, and [the writings of] Aquinas.

As to the fact of the matter, you need to know two things. The first is that ‘ ϕ -thing in thought’ or ‘thought-up ϕ -thing’ is a diminishment, like ‘pictured ϕ -thing’ or ‘dead ϕ -thing’. Saying that a thing is “moved in thought,” after all, is not saying that it is moved. So “proceeding in thought” is not proceeding but *being understood* as proceeding, *i.e.* being thought of after the fashion of an item proceeding. Ergo, when the talk is of procession, it should be taken as talking of real procession, the same as when we speak of motion and other topics that are diminished by ‘in thought’. Otherwise, all statements would be uncertain.

The second thing you need to know is that

(1) ‘mean something proceeding from another’ is one thing, and

(2) ‘mean something after the fashion of proceeding from another’

is quite another. With the former, one is saying that the thing meant proceeds from another. But with the latter, one is saying that the thing meant is understood and signified “as proceeding” or “after the fashion of what proceeds” from another.

xiii. Well, the gap between these two is bigger than the gap between heaven and earth, because it is as big as the gap between *is* and *is portrayed as*. For with (1), the thing indicated *is from another*, while with (2) it is *portrayed as from another*.

With these points in place, I can respond: the propositions assumed in the text of the article are not to be distinguished [as the objection does]; they expressly state that the proceeding falls upon the *thing meant*. So the argument stands thus:

‘word’ taken literally for an item in the intellect means a concept proceeding from another, so that the proceeding determines the concept in the real (since otherwise there is no procession)

and

‘word’ is used literally in trinitarian theology hence

‘word’ is satisfied there in both aspects [real proceeding from what is really other]

and therefore

‘word’ is a term for a Person because nothing “is from another” in God except a Person, even though many items “are understood as” from another.

Thanks to the above, my answer to the objections is obvious. For ‘act of loving’ does not mean something proceeding from another but signifies something after the fashion of what proceeds from another. And the same goes for other terms of this sort.⁵

⁵ ‘Act of loving’ means an operation of the will, and this operation is an act-state of the will, remaining in the will. It does not “proceed” from the will but is sometimes thought of that way. Ditto for ‘act of understanding’ and the intellect.

Now, as to Aquinas’ writings, anyone who looks carefully into his works will see that this is a debated topic on which he gradually came to the fullness of the truth. In the commentary on *I Sentences*, he followed the opinion of those who said that ‘word’ and ‘love’ were sometimes terms for the essence, sometimes terms for a Person. Later on, in the questions *De Veritate*, he inclined towards the other view (that these are terms for Persons), but not without deference to the other side, as is clear from the fact that in answering the arguments for both sides he said that the one view was “more reasonable” [or “better supported by argument”]. Finally, in the present text, he asserted the view that ‘word’ is used for a Person together with an explicit rejection of the other view, saying “not in any way an essence term.” And this he said because he saw that all the points that had at one time raised doubt about this were put to rest by this single argument: that ‘word’ *means* something proceeding from another, thereby setting it apart from the terms that just convey something after the fashion of what proceeds. No objection militates against this argument, and there is no room in it for the distinction proposed, as is obvious from the points already made. And Aquinas does not just assume this without proof but supports it by the defining account of the *thing meant*. The word of the heart, he says, has in its defining account the point that it proceeds from another. Therefore a “word” in God is not something of His essence, because no item in God’s essence has in its defining account (either intrinsically or as a necessary concomitant) the trait that it proceeds from another.⁶

And none of this detracts from Aquinas’ stature as a teacher, because it is natural for human understanding to improve over time.

xiv. What Aquinas did, then, was make a retraction, not by mentioning that he had once thought otherwise, but just by rejecting the opinion he had once held.

On the answer *ad* (1)

xv. In the answer to the first objection, notice that this conditional,

if ‘word of God’ is admitted figuratively, ‘word of God’ has to be admitted literally as well,

does not hold good thanks to a form [of logic] but

⁶ The reader may appreciate a further remark about the common talk of actions as “proceeding.” Such talk is at home in the discussion of transitive actions, where an initiative seems to proceed outward from the doer (called the agent) to the thing acted upon (called the patient). Aristotle called the effect in the patient a “change from another,” meaning from the doer. For a full discussion of transitive action, see §§ *ut-iv* in Cajetan’s commentary on q.25, a.1, where St. Thomas was beginning his discussion of God’s power (the aspect of His essence viewed as the source of His transitive actions).

Unfortunately, it is all too easy to imagine God’s immanent actions (understanding and willing) on the pattern of transitive actions and then to speak of them as “proceeding” outward from the intellect/will in God’s essence. My footnote 5 pointed out why this picture is wrong, and now the present footnote is pointing out why it is common.

thanks to the subject matter. For as it says in the text, if a "word of God" is admitted, what is figuratively admitted is either a manifested word of God or something manifesting a word of God (for these are both called "word of God" figuratively), but both imply a word literally so called and hence imply 'word' used for a Person, as was deduced in the text; for nothing involved in the defining account of "a word" involves incompleteness, but only being *from another, etc.*

On the answer *ad* (2)

xvi. In the answer to the second objection, notice that when the text says that the act of understanding stands to an intellect-in-act as the act of being stands to a being-in-act, this is not just stating a similarity but expressing the reality, as if it said: as being in general stands to a being-in-act in general, so such-and-such being (the act-state of understanding) stands to such-and-such a being in act (an intellect in act). For it was

clarified above that understanding something is *being it*, and that in things potentially cognizant, the power-to-cognize is first potentially the thing cognized, then is the thing in a middle manner between potency and act, and then is the cognized in act, and only then are potentially cognizant things called actually cognizant. And the fact that "to understand" is called an action is no obstacle, (a) because it is immanent, as the text says, and (b) because it has in fact more the character of being portrayed as an action than it has of being an action.

On the answer *ad* (3)

xvii. In the answer to the third objection, there is doubt as to whether the divine Word proceeds from *all* the contents of the Father's knowledge, including the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and all creatures [or from something less extensive].

xviii. But since this is treated more focally in a.3 of this inquiry, comment will be postponed until then.

Is 'the Word' a proper name of the Son?

In I Sent., d.27, q.2, aa.1-2; De Veritate q.4, a.3; Contra errores Graec. 1, 12; In Ep. ad Hebr. 1, lectio 2

It seems that 'the Word' is not a proper name of the Son.¹

(1) After all, the Son is a Person subsisting within the divine reality. But 'word' does not mean a subsisting thing, as is clear in our experience. Hence 'the Word' cannot be a proper name of the Son's Person.²

(2) Besides, a word proceeds from a speaker by his utterance of it; so if the Son is literally a word. He only proceeds from the Father by way of an utterance. But this is the heresy of Valentinus, as Augustine makes clear in his book *On the Heresies*.

(3) Also, every proper name of a person conveys some identifying trait of his. So if 'the Word' is a proper name of the Son, it will convey an identifying trait of His, and so there will be more identifying traits in God than were counted above.

(4) Moreover, whoever understands conceives an inner word in understanding. The Son understands. Ergo the Son has an inner word of His own, and so *being a word* is not unique to the Son.

(5) Furthermore, Hebrews 1:3 speaks of the Son as "upholding all things by the word of His power." [In *Against Eunomius V*], Basil took this to mean that the Holy Spirit is the word of the Son. Thus, again, being a word is not unique to the Son.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Augustine says in *De Trinitate VI*, "Only the Son is taken as the Word."

ANSWER: as used literally in trinitarian theology, 'the Word' is used for a Person and is a proper name of the Person who is the Son. For 'word' means an emanation from understanding. But the Person who proceeds within the divine reality by an emanation from understanding is called a Son, and His sort of procession is called generation, as was shown above. The only thing to conclude, then, is that the Son alone is literally] called a Word in trinitarian theology.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): in our case, the act-state of being [human] and the act-state of understanding are not the same, and so [the inner word which is] what has intensional being in us does not belong to our [substantial] nature. But God's act of being is identically His act of understanding. Hence God's inner word is not an accident in Him, nor an

effect of His, but belongs to His very nature and so has to be something subsisting. For everything in God's nature subsists, and this is why Damascene says [in *De fide orthodoxa I*] that the Word in God is a substantial being and is a hypostasis, whereas other words (*i.e.* ours) are just invigorations* of the soul.

ad (2): what becomes clear from Augustine's *On the Heresies* is that Valentinus was not condemned for saying that the Son is born by "utterance" (which is what the Arians falsely said was his error, as one learns from Hilary's *De Trinitate VI*) but for attributing to this utterance a multiple, changeable character.³

ad (3): the term 'word' conveys the same identifying trait as 'son'. This is why Augustine says, "He is called the Word on the same basis as He is called the Son." For the Son's nativity, which is His personal identifying trait, is conveyed by many different terms attributed to the Son to express His perfection in different ways. Thus, to show that He is of the same nature as the Father. He is called His Son; to show that He is co-eternal, He is called His Splendor; so show that He is totally like the Father. He is called His Image; to show that He is begotten in an immaterial way, He is called His Word. For no one word could be found that would highlight all these points."

ad (4) that He understands and that He is God fit the Son the same way, since theology speaks of understanding as going on in God's essence, as I said above. But the Son of God is God-begotten, not God-begetting; hence how He understands is not as producing an inner word but as that word itself proceeding; for the Word proceeding in God does not differ thing-wise from the divine intellect but is distinguished from its source by a relation alone.

ad (5): when the Son is said to be upholding all things by the word of His power, 'word' is being used figuratively for the effect of a word. This is why the gloss on the passage [in the *Glossa interlinearis*] says that 'word' here is used for a command, inasmuch as it is an effect of the Word's power that things are conserved in being (just as it was an effect of His power that they were produced in being). When Basil took 'word' for the Holy Spirit here, he was speaking loosely and figuratively, inasmuch as anything that manifests a person can be called a word about him. Thus, the reason the Holy Spirit is called "a word of the Son" is because He manifests the Son.

³ This Valentinus is the famous 2nd century gnostic. He said that the primordial God conceived or uttered a Logos, but he also said that this God conceived or uttered other "aeons" as His *logoi* as well.

What led the Arians to mischaracterize Valentinus was their project to make Arians of the early Fathers who took 'the Word' so literally as to confuse His procession with the "pronunciation" of "let there be" at Creation.

c.11;
PL 42, 28

q.32, a.3

c.11;
PG 29, 732

c.2;
PL 42, 925

q.27, a.2

c.13,
PG 94, 857
* *virtutes*

PL 10, 162

De Trinitate VII, c.2;
PL 42, 936

† *eo Verbum quo
Filius*

q.14, aa.1-2

¹ For what the scholastics meant by 'proper name', see footnote 1 to the commentary on q.33, a.2 (above, on p. 622).

² For the scholastics, the "subsisting things" in God were the three Persons, and the ones in our experience were the things which Aristotle had called first substances (like this rock, that bush, this man). Whether one took a "word" to be an utterance or the concept behind making one, it did not count as anything subsisting, in our experience. Hence this objection (along with some early heresies).

 Cajetan's Commentary

In the title question, 'proper' is used in contrast to 'common' and also in contrast to 'extraneous' or 'incidental', as I said above about the term 'Father'. So the sense of the question (as is obvious from the argumentation in the text) is this: In trinitarian theology, does the term 'the Word' apply to the Son alone, as a term identifying the Person?

ii. In the body of the article, a single conclusion answers the question with yes: 'the Word' used literally in trinitarian theology is a proper name of the Person who is the Son. — The support goes like this. [*Antecedent:*] 'word' means an emanation from understanding, that is, what proceeds by way of an emanation from understanding: so [*1st inference:*] 'word' means the Son [in talk of the Trinity], and so [*2nd inference:*] the

Son alone is properly called the Word — The first inference is supported on the ground that [in God] a Person proceeding by way of such emanation is a Son, and this sort of procession is generation.

iii. Notice here that, if you want this support to be seen clear-headedly, the second inference is rightly set down without supporting argument. For by the very fact that a Person proceeding by emanation from understanding is a Son, it follows that the term 'word' fits the Son. And from the very fact that proceeding in this way is generation (since it clearly terminates at a son), it follows that being a son [in God] is the same as being a word. Hence being a word is just as unique to the Son Himself as being a son is. And so 'Word' distinctively fits Him alone.

In the term 'Word', is there an implied relation to creation?

3 ST q.3, a.8; In 1 Sent. d.27, q.2, a.3; De Veritate q.4, aa.4, 5, 7; Quodlibet IV, q.6

It would seem that no relation to creation is implied in the term 'Word'.¹

q.34, a.1 (1) After all, every term connoting an effect in creation is used for God's essence in theology. But 'Word' is used for a Person, not the essence, as stated above. So 'Word' implies no relation to a creature.

(2) Besides, terms involving a relation to creatures, like 'Lord' and 'Creator', apply to God from time. But 'Word' applies to Him from eternity. Therefore it does not involve relation to a creature.

(3) Also 'Word' involves a relation to that from which the Word proceeds; so if it involves relation to creatures, it will follow that the Word proceeds from creatures.

q.15, a.1 (4) Moreover, there are many *ideae* in God thanks to various relations to creatures. If the Word, then, involves relation to creatures, it follows that there is not just one Word in God but many.

q.14, a.9 (5) Furthermore, if 'the Word' does imply relation to creatures, it can only be because creatures are known by God. Well, God knows not just beings but also non-beings. So relation to non-beings will be implied in 'the Word', which seems false.

q.63; PL 40, 54 ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Augustine says in his *Book of 83 Questions*, to the effect that what is implied in 'the Word' is not just relation to the Father but also to the things that have been made through the Word by operative power.

ANSWER: a relation to creation is implied in 'the Word'. For God knows every creature in knowing Himself. The inner word conceived in the mind is representative of all that which is actually understood. This is why there are many inner words in us, thanks to the various things we understand. But since God understands Himself and all things in one act, His one Word is expressive not only of the Father but also of creatures. And as God's optimal knowledge of God is just accurate,* while His knowledge of creatures is both accurate and factitive, so also God's Word is purely expressive of what is in God the Father but is both expressive and operative of creatures. This is why Ps. 33:9 says, "He spake, and they were made;" for [His speech act and hence His] "word" implies a reason why the things God made were made.

* *cognoscitiva*

v.g. Ps. 32.9

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): in a term for a

¹ The question here is not about the dictionary-sense of 'word', nor about what it can be counted upon to imply in just any context, but about what St. John's use of 'the Word' to name the Son implies in the context of OT Scripture, where God is presented as creating through speech action.

divine Person, the divine nature is also included obliquely, since a person is "an individual substance of a rational nature." In a term for a divine Person, then, [there is a direct meaning and an oblique one:] as regards [the direct meaning, *i.e.*] the relation constituting the Person, no relation to creation is implied, but only the fact that it [the Person so constituted] pertains to the divine nature. But as regards [the meaning obliquely included in the term], the Person's essence, nothing prevents a relation to creatures from being implied. For as it is unique to the Son that He is "the Son," so, too, is it unique to Him that He is "begotten God" or "begotten Creator." And it is in this way that a relation to creation is implied in the term 'the Word'.²

ad (2): since relations result from actions, some terms (like 'create' and 'govern') imply a relation of God to creature resulting from God's transitive action upon an effect outside Him, and such terms are applied to God from time. But there are certain relations which result not from transitive action upon an outside effect but from an action remaining within the agent, such as knowing and willing, and [terms implying] such relations are not applied to God from time. This is the sort of relation-to-creation implied in the term 'Word'. And it is not true that *all* terms implying a relation of God to creature are applied to Him from time, but only those resulting from His transitive action upon an outside effect.

ad (3): God does not know creatures through a knowledge He got *from* creatures; He knows them, rather, through His own essence. So it does not have to be the case that the Word proceeds from creatures, even though the Word is expressive of creatures.

ad (4): the term '*idea*' is principally used to *mean* a relation to a creature. And so '*idea*' is used in the plural in theology and is not a term for a Person. 'Word', on the other hand, is principally used to *mean* the relation to the speaker, and this carries a relation to creatures as a consequence of the fact that God [the Father and speaker] knows every creature. Hence in theology 'Word' is singular and is used for a Person.

ad (5): God's Word is about non-beings in the same way as God's optimal knowledge is about them, because "there is no less in God's Word than is in His knowledge," as Augustine says [in *De Trinitate XI*].^{c 14; PL.42, 1076} But while the Word is both expressive and factitive of beings, He is only expressive and manifestive of non-beings.

² N.B. No mention is made in this article of the "economic Trinity." If there were in Aquinas a hint of Rahner's *Grundaxiom*, one might have expected to find it here.

Cajetan's Commentary

In the title-question, note the phrase 'in the term 'Word''. For the question here is not whether the Thing which is the Word relates to creatures, but whether the fact that this divine Thing as indicated by the term 'Word' carries a relation to creatures as implicit content.

Analysis of the article

ii. In the body of the article, Aquinas does three jobs.

(1) He sets down a conclusion directly answering the question in the affirmative, along with the middle term used to reach it, and by this he answers as far as relation in general goes. (2) By determining what sort of relation is involved, he answers as far as that sort of relation (had commonly to the Father and to creatures) goes. (3) By drawing a distinction, he answers as far as relation to creatures alone goes — As to job (1), the conclusion is about relation in general (as the question was asked about relation in general), and it is this: in the 'the Word of God', a relation to creation is implied. And he at once adds the middle term: because God knows creatures in knowing Himself.

iii. As for job (2), the proposed middle term is further explained by applying it towards a narrower conclusion about such-and-such relation, namely, the Word of God is expressive of the Father and of creatures. This is supported as follows. [*Antecedent:*] An inner word is representative of all that which is understood in act: so [*inference:*] the Word of God is expressive not only of the Father but also of created items — The antecedent is supported by our experience: we have different inner words thanks to the different things we understand in act. — Drawing the inference is supported on the ground that God understands Himself and all things in one, simple act.

iv. As to job (3), the conclusion is this: God's Word is just expressive of what is in God the Father but is both expressive and operative of creatures. This is supported on the ground that God's knowing is just accurate about God but both accurate and factitive about creatures; ergo God's Word [is accurate], etc. And this is confirmed by biblical authority: "He spake, and they were made."

Four issues

v. Concerning these points and indeed this whole area, observe that there are four issues in play:

- (1) the things spoken of by the Word;
- (2) the relation between the Word and the things spoken of;
- (3) exactly how the Word relates to the things spoken of; and
- (4) the reason why He relates that way.

As to the things spoken of, we learned in a.1 of this Inquiry in the answer *ad* (3) that they are three: the divine essence, the divine Persons, and every creature. For the Father speaks of all these things by His Word. As to the Word's relation to the things said *as said*, it

is a thought-produced relation, a relation of the expressive to the expressed, as the text says.

On these two issues, the other schools agree with us — being forced to, perhaps, by the authority of Augustine.

But on the other two issues (the exact how of this relation and the reason for it), opinions divide.

Trouble from Scotus

In his remarks on *II Sent.* d.1, q.1, a.2 and in his *Quodlibetals* q.14, a.2, Scotus holds that God's Word, by virtue of its production, does not proceed from the [divine] knowledge of creatures but from that of the divine essence. And as one finds again at the end of the remarks on *II Sent.*, at d.32, q.1, Scotus maintains that the Word so proceeds from the knowledge of the essence alone that only concomitantly does it even proceed as the Word about a Person. The picture is that the Father produces the Word out of His understanding the divine essence; by virtue of its production, the Word expresses that essence, while it expresses the divine Persons only concomitantly, as things necessarily connected to the essence; but the Word has what it takes to represent creatures once its own production is already completed.

This position has a foundation which Scotus stated at *I Sent.* d.35: that God produces creatures in being-objects-known [*in esse cognito*]. Hence, he imagines that the divine essence first quasi-moves the Father's intellect to produce an infinite terminus (the Word) and then a finite terminus (a creature in objective being). Thus the word cannot be produced from the knowledge of creatures, because knowing them occurs in a "second moment" of the divine nature.¹

Scotus also argues for this in the passage on *II Sent.* cited above, where he advances three arguments.

(1) [*Antecedent:*] If the Word proceeded as the expression both of God's essence and of every intelligible thing, then [*consequent:*] the Holy Spirit for the same reason would be spirated as Love both of God's essence and of every lovable thing understood. But this [consequent] is false. Ergo [the antecedent is false] — Calling the consequent false is supported on the ground that, if it were true, either God would love creatures necessarily, or else the Holy Spirit would not be produced necessarily — both of which are impossible.

(2) If the Word proceeded from everything [the Father understands], He would proceed from Himself as Word-known-to-the Father, which is hardly suitable, yet the consequent follows because one of the things formally understood by the Father is the Word.

¹ For Scotus, this objectual being was neither real nor thought-produced but something in-between. Cajetan attacked the notion at length above, in §§ *x-xiii* of his commentary on q.14, a.5, and in § *viii* of the one on q.15, a.1

(3) [*Major:*] No real relation of a divine Person is a relation to a creature; [*minor:*] but the relation of the begotten (if really distinct) to that from which it was begotten is a real relation; [*conclusion:*] ergo the Word was not begotten from a stone as known to the Father.

General response

St. Thomas, however, as is clear in the present article, holds that the Word of God is born from everything in the Father's knowledge, be it the essence, the Persons, or anything else that is "simply intelligible" — which I say on account of what is known by God with sight-knowledge.² For, when Aquinas said explicitly in a. 1 that the Father conceives the Word in "understanding" Himself and the Son and the Holy Spirit and every creature, meaning to imply "by simple understanding," people imagine that, in the order of explanation, God the Father first understood all that shone within His essence, prior to producing the Son.³ The truth, however, is that the Word principally expresses the divine essence and secondarily expresses creatures, just as God the Father principally understands His essence and secondarily understands creatures, such that the words 'principally' and 'secondarily' mean nothing but 'in itself' and 'in another' respectively. For creatures are understood and expressed "in the divine essence," while that essence itself is understood and expressed "in itself."⁴

v. Now, as to the figments of Scotus's imagination, the response is easy. His primary foundation is worthless, as becomes clear from the fact that the alleged production of creatures [in objectual being] is chimerical and leads to a dangerous doctrine, namely, that our glorious God cannot exist without creatures hanging around in a diminished sort of being, which seems laughable in philosophy and scandalous in the Faith; but I have made these points elsewhere. We, however, maintain from points worked out above that the divine essence comprehends every intelligible thing both form-wise and object-wise, and we say that since the Word proceeds not from just any knowledge of the divine essence but from the comprehension of it, He has to proceed from awareness of all the items known in comprehending the divine essence — and these points were all stated above, as one can see from q. 14. Ergo [the doctrine in this article is well founded]. And this was St. Thomas' foundation, beyond doubt.

in the places
mentioned in
footnote 1

Cf q. 12, a. 7

² God's knowledge by simple understanding is what He knows entirely by virtue of what He is, independently of any free self-determination, hence independently of any choice about what, if anything, is to exist in created being. It covers things as logically possible and artfully makeable. But His sight-knowledge covers things as actual and so, for creatures, presupposes His choice to create them.

³ If I understand Cajetan's point, the mistake lies in imagining a "priority" of the Father's self-understanding over His begetting His Word.

⁴ Cajetan's construction of 'primarily' and 'secondarily' neatly precludes the temptation to which Scotus succumbed, i.e., to take these words as suggesting succession. The suc-

Point-by-point replies

Hence, to Scotus's first argument, my short answer is that, if one speaks uniformly [of creatures as pure knowers], explanation of the Word from creatures understood in God and explanation of the Holy Spirit from creatures loved in God work the same, and nothing unsuitable [i.e. impossible] follows. Yet [if one speaks of creatures non-uniformly], one can deny Scotus's consequent outright as well as the sameness of the explanations. For Love bears upon lovable things [as existing] in themselves, while the Word bears upon things [as] in the intellect.

To his second argument, I say there is nothing unsuitable about the Word's proceeding from *Himself and the Holy Spirit as known to the Father*, from the prior awareness that the Father has of them; indeed, this is necessarily the case, given the argument already advanced. Indeed, since Scotus himself expressly held in comments on 1 *Sent.* d.6 that the Father understands the Son prior to producing Him, it was arbitrary of him to label this unsuitable.

vii. But as for his third argument, it is unworthy of any response, because the Word is not really distinct from the *knowus* whence it proceeds but from the *one speaking it*, as is self-evident.

However, tread cautiously in this area on account of the truth of this counterfactual:

If God understood nothing in His essence but that essence alone, the production of the Word would still occur,

from which it seems to follow that the Word's production is not [naturally] posterior [but prior] to the understanding of creatures in God. But you have another counterfactual as well:

If God were not productive of a Word in understanding Himself. He would still understand everything intelligible.

For it follows from this that God's understanding creatures in Himself is not [naturally] posterior [but prior] to His production [of the Word] within Himself. So do not be fooled by these counterfactuals into thinking that [on what occurs in God] naturally *de facto* one should adhere to Scotus's above remarks. But I said "naturally" because the things that God *freely* knows *de facto* are far removed from this dispute (since the natural precedes the free).⁵ And since within the comprehension of the natural force of divine knowing there is included the art of making creatures (though not the willing of them), the Word of God that is equivalent to the divine natural knowing has a bearing upon creation which is not only expressive but also operative, as the text says on the authority of Augustine.

cession was not to be temporal, of course, but logical, as Scotus said. But temporal imagination led him to posit "moments" in God's inner life, such that God understood His own essence in a primordial "moment" and brought forth the Word in a subsequent one.

⁵ God's free knowledge is "far removed" from this dis-

On the answer *ad* (1)

viii. Note that Aureol has arguments (reported by Capreolus at *I Sent.* d.27, q.2) against St. Thomas' response to the first objection — arguments, designed to prove that the Word has what it takes to relate to creatures by virtue of His personal distinctive. They all collapse because they assume that saying

The Word relates to creatures by virtue of His distinctive account [*ex propria ratione*] is the same as saying

The Word has what it takes to relate to creatures by virtue of His personal distinctive [*ex proprietate personali*].

But these are very different. The first can be conceded but not the second. The reason for this difference is the fact that 'the Word' implicitly carries in its proper account the prior awareness which is among God's essential features; and because of this, the Word relates (as the text says) to the things said in it, things known and things to be done.⁶

pute" because the free knowledge presupposes free decisions (like creating) and the "free mysteries" (such as the Incarnation). See 3 *ST* q.1, a.3.

⁶ The Word's "personal distinctive" is not an account (*ratio*) of Him but just His relation to the Father whereby He is begotten intellectually. Making creatures implicit in that would

On the answer *ad* (4)

ix. In the answer to the fourth objection, note that with the statement, "'Word' is principally used to mean the relation to the speaker," St. Thomas is retracting (in my opinion) what he had said in *De Veritate* q.4, a.5, to the effect that 'Word' principally conveys an absolute. And this retraction follows from the determination he had reached in a. 1, namely, that 'Word' is solely a personal term, with the result that it conveys first-off (in the form of a concrete noun) the personal distinctive of the Son; and since the prior awareness is like a substrate of this, 'the Word' bears also upon the things said, *etc.* And this harmonizes with the answer *ad* (1) and with the words of the previous article, namely, that 'Word' means a certain emanation from understanding. For it is clear that such emanation is the personal distinctive of the Son. If that were not so, the meaning that 'word' has first-off (by virtue of its literal significance) would not be the personal distinctive of the Son in trinitarian theology; it would only have this meaning by connotation (the opposite of what is said here).

be (a) senseless, because nothing is "implicit" in a relation, and (b) heretical, because it would mean that the second Person of the Trinity could not be *who He is* without a co-eternal universe. Aureol never dreamed of such Hegelian stuff; he just mistook the force of a technical term.



Inquiry Thirty-Five: Into "the Image"

The next topic to investigate is "the Image." About this, two questions are raised:

- (1) is 'Image' used for a Person in speaking of God?
(2) is it a proper name of the Son?
-

article 1

Is 'image' used for a Person in speaking of God?

157 q 93, a.5 ad 4; In 1 Sent., d.28, q.2, a.2

It seems that 'image' is not used for a Person in trinitarian theology.

(1) Augustine [actually, Fulgentius] says in his book, *De fide ad Petrum*, that the image after which man was made is one and the same as the divineness of the Holy Trinity. [But divineness is God's essence.] Ergo 'image' is used for the essence and not for a Person.

(2) Besides, Hilary says in *De synodo* that an image is "of the thing imaged, not differing in *species*." But 'species' or 'form' is used for God's essence in theology; ergo 'image' is so used also.¹

(3) Moreover, 'image' comes from 'imitate', and this latter implies a prior and a posterior [i.e. an original and a copy]. But among the divine Persons, there is no prior or posterior. So 'image' cannot be a personal term in trinitarian theology.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Augustine asks [in *De Trinitate VII c.1*]: "What is more absurd than to call something an image of itself?" So a thing is called an image in relation to something else, and so [since the relations in God belong to Persons] it is a term for a Person in trinitarian theology.

ANSWER: by definition, an image is a likeness. But not just any likeness suffices to make an image. It takes a likeness in species, or at least in a sign of the species. Among bodily things, a "sign of the species" is seen best in the shape. We see that animals diverse

in their kinds (for example) are diverse in shape without being diverse in color. So if somebody paints a thing's color on a wall, we do not call it the thing's image, unless the painting also depicts its shape. But even likeness of species or shape is not sufficient to make *x* an "image" of *y*. Rather, the definition of an image also requires an origination of *x* from *y*. For as Augustine says in his *Book of 83 Questions*, "One egg is not the image of another, because it was not laid from the other."² So for something to be truly an image, it has to proceed from another similar to it in species or at least in a sign of the species. But terms that imply procession or origin in the talk of God are terms for the Persons. Hence, 'image' is a personal term.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): what is properly called an image is what proceeds after the likeness of another. That after whose likeness it proceeds is properly called the exemplar, but in looser speech it is also called an image. This looser way is how Augustine was using 'image' when he said that the image after which man was made was the divineness of the Holy Trinity.

ad (2): 'species' as used by Hilary in his definition of 'image' implies a form brought into something from something else. In this way, a thing's image is said to be its "species," just as something assimilated to something else is called the latter's "form" because it has a form similar to it.

ad (3): among the divine Persons, 'imitation' does not imply posteriority but just assimilation.

¹ In the Latin of late Antiquity, when Hilary was writing, 'species' meant appearance, and such is the sense here: an image of *x* does not differ from *x* in appearance. But by the middle of the 13th century, 'species' had become a philosophical term of art, meaning the form essential to a kind. Thus the objector is trying to turn Hilary's commonsensical remark into a statement about the divine essence.

² Thus 'imago' works like 'copy of'. Two eggs are not copies of each other except in the loose sense of looking alike. Rather, a copy is *from* its original, like the *imago* of Caesar on his coinage. Since no *imago* looks like an invisible original, theology emphasizes the origination element.

 Cajetan's Commentary

The title-question is clear from earlier remarks.

Analysis of the article

ii. In the body of the article, Aquinas does two jobs. (1) He sets down the three conditions necessary for an "image." (2) He answers the question.

iii. As to job (1), the conditions are these: [a] likeness [b] in species or in a sign of the species (say, its shape) [c] arising from the thing whose image it is said to be. The first condition, likeness, is left as obvious. The second, as to what it says about shape, is illustrated by animals and pictures. The third is supported by the authority of Augustine, where he brings up the case of eggs. And notice carefully that this third condition is taken as holding intrinsically [*per se*], that is, that the origination-relation terminates at the image *because it is a likeness, i.e.*, at the fact that it *is* a likeness and not just incidentally a likeness. Make a note of this, because it is the basis for the reasoning in the next article; for unless the matter is understood in this way, all the conditions for being an image will fit the Holy Spirit.

An objection from Aureol

iv. However, against this third condition for an

image, Aureol puts forward the argument that it would follow that only the makers of images had images.

v. But this objection comes from a crude understanding; for even though an image always arises from a thing *represented*, one has to bear in mind that this occurs in more than one way. [It occurs] whenever a thing *x* arises from a represented thing *y* serving as *x*'s source according to *y*'s natural being, as a son arises from a father; and [it also occurs whenever *x* arises from a represented *y* serving as *x*'s source] according to *y*'s being understood or thought of, as a statue of Caesar arises from Caesar thought-of in a sculptor's mind. So Aureol's alleged consequence is obviously worthless.

Analysis resumed

vi. As for job (2), the conclusion answering the question affirmatively is this: 'image' is a personal term in trinitarian theology.

vii. The support goes thus. [*Antecedent:*] Terms implying origination in God are personal terms; [*inference:*] 'image' is a personal term. — The antecedent is obvious. The inference holds given the defining conditions assigned to 'an image'.

Is 'Image' a proper name of the Son?

In *I Sent.*, d.28, q.2, a.3; d.31, q.3, a.1; In *Ep. ad Hebraeos*, lectio 1

It seems that the term 'image' is not proper to the Son.

c.18;
PG 94, 937

(1) Damascene says [in *De fide orthodoxa II*] that the Holy Spirit is the image of the Son. Ergo, being an image is not unique to the Son.

qq.73-74
PL 40, 85

(2) Besides, it belongs to the definition of 'an image' that it have likeness with the one it expresses, as Augustine says in the *Book of 83 Questions*. But this applies to the Holy Spirit; He proceeds from another after the fashion of a likeness. So the Holy Spirit is an "image," and hence being it is not unique to the Son.

(3) Also man is called an image of God, according to 1 Corinthians 11:7, "A man ought not to cover his head, forasmuch as he is the image and glory of God." Thus being His image is not unique to the Son.

c.2;
PL 42, 925

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Augustine says in *De Trinitate VII*: "Only the Son is the image of the Father."

I ANSWER: the Greek doctors as a whole say that the Holy Spirit is an image of the Father and the Son. But the Latin doctors give the title 'Image' to the Son alone. For it is found attributed only to the Son in canonical Scripture. Colossians 1:15 says He is "the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of every creature;" Hebrews 1:3 speaks of His being "the brightness of [the Father's] glory and the express image of His Person."

* *noho*

As a reason for this, some writers appeal to the fact that the Son matches the Father not only in nature but also in the identifying trait* of being a source [*principium*], while the Holy Spirit does not match the Son or the Father in any identifying trait. But this reason does not seem sufficient. For just as the relations in God yield neither equality nor inequality (as Augustine says [in *Contra Maximinum II*]), so also they do not yield likeness [of one Person to another], which is required [for one] to be an image [of another].

PL 42, 775

Hence others say that the Holy Spirit cannot be called an image of the Son because there is no such thing as an image of an image; and He cannot be called an image of the Father because an image has a direct relation to what it is an image of, whereas the Holy

Spirit relates to the Father through the Son: and He cannot be called an image of the Father and Son, because then there would be one image of two things, which seems impossible; and so, by process of elimination, the Holy Spirit is not an image at all. But this last argument amounts to nothing, because the Father and the Son are one source of the Holy Spirit, as will be discussed below; and so nothing prevents there being one image of Father and Son as one, just as man is one image of the whole Trinity.

q.36, a.4

One needs to take, then, a different approach. The Holy Spirit receives by His procession the Father's nature (as does the Son) and yet is not called "born"; also He receives a likeness-in-species to the Father [as the Son does] but is not called an "image." Why not? Because the Son proceeds as the Word, which is by *definition* a likeness-in-species to what it proceeds from, whereas [the Holy Spirit proceeds as Love, and] Love is *not by definition* such a likeness, even though the Love who is the Holy Spirit does have likeness [to His source] inasmuch as He is *divine* Love.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): Damascene and other Greek doctors commonly used the term for image to convey a complete likeness.¹

ad (2): even though the Holy Spirit is in fact "like" the Father and "like" the Son, it does not follow that He is an Image, for the reason already stated.

ad (3): there are two ways an image of *x* is found in a thing *y*. One is in a *y* of the same specific nature, as an image of the king is found in his son. The other way is in a *y* of another nature, as an image of the king is found on his coins. The Son is an image of the Father in the first way, but man is called an image of God in the second; to point out an incompleteness of image in man. Scripture does not call him the image but "after" the image, which indicates a certain *tending* towards completion. God's Son cannot be called "after" the image, since He is the Father's complete and perfect Image.

¹ The Greek Fathers used 'eikōn' instead of 'imago', and its semantics were different. An *eikōn* of *x* was just a likeness of *x*; it did not have to be (like *imago*) a copy or reproduction of *x*.

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear.

ii. In the body of the article, Aquinas does three jobs. (1) He speaks to the usefulness of this question; (2) he presents two opinions, and (3) he determines the right answer.

iii. In job (1) he states three things: (a) the usage of the Greek doctors; (b) that of the Latin doctors, and (c) that of Holy Scripture. All are clear in the text.

iv. Since the usage of the Latins conforms to the Bible, different opinions are put forward as to the reason for it, *i.e.* as to why the Son alone is called an image.

v. The first opinion — that it is because the Son shares an identifying trait with the Father — is excluded on the ground that, from the identifying traits, one does not get [one Person's] being equal [to another], and so

does not get [one's] being similar [to another], and so one does not get [one's] being-an-image [of another].

vi. The second opinion — that if one goes through all the Persons, one does not find any of which the Holy Spirit can be an image — is excluded on the ground that He could be an image of the Father-and-Son as one. This is confirmed on the ground that man is an image of the whole Trinity [as one].

vii. In job (3), the reason is given for the Latin and Scriptural usage: and since 'knowing the reason for the conclusion is the same as knowing the conclusion itself.'" as it says in *Posterior Analytics II*, Aquinas both answers the question with an affirmative conclusion ('Image' is a proper name of the Son) and gives as its support nothing more than the reason why the Holy Spirit is not called an image, while the Son is. The reason is this: [*antecedent:*] the Son proceeds as the Word, as something which is by definition similar to that whence it proceeds; but the Holy Spirit proceeds as Love, which is not by definition similar to that whence it proceeds; so [*consequence:*] the Son alone is an image.

Both parts of the antecedent are clear from q.27. The consequence holds good because of the scientific definition of [y's] being an image [of x].

The force of this reason (assigning mode of procession as the cause) is shown and confirmed by a similar cause producing a similar difference [between descriptions of the Son and Holy Spirit] in the case of "being born." For although both get the Father's nature by proceeding from Him, only the Son is called "born" because of the different modes of proceeding for each, as shown above [in q.27], namely, because the Son proceeds as *similar*, etc. And lest anyone remain worried about where the Holy Spirit gets His similarity to the Father and the Son, or lest anyone believe He gets it from His mode of procession, Aquinas added the point that He gets it not *qua* love but *qua* divine Love.

A challenge from Aureol

viii. Doubt about this arises from the work of Aureol, reported by Capreolus at *I Sent.* d.27, q.2, *concl.* 6. It is a doubt arising from the present text and attacking it thus. [*Antecedent:*] The Holy Spirit proceeds as *divine* Love, hence [*1st consequence:*] He proceeds as *similar* [to the Father and the Son], and hence [*2nd consequence:*] the explanation given here is worthless.

The first consequence holds good thanks to the text itself, saying that the Holy Spirit has what it takes to be similar [to the Father and Son] *qua* divine Love. The second consequence and the antecedent are obvious.

Reply

ix. To clear up this difficulty, one must distinguish the terms used in Aureol's antecedent, namely, 'divine Love' and 'proceed as'.

• As to the former, you need to know that a shared form [here: love] can be narrowed down and described by mentioning what narrows it in two ways:

(1) thanks to a factor inwardly differentiating what is narrowed down, and

(2) thanks to a factor outside the formal scope of what is narrowed down.

An example of (1) is 'white color'; an example of (2) is 'natural color'. The specific trait of being-white differentiates color from within the genus [of color], but being natural (or artificial) is outside the genus of color.

"Love," then, can be narrowed down in two ways: (1) thanks to traits inwardly differentiating love, as in friendship-love vs. desire-love, (2) thanks to the natures of the lovers, as in angelic love or human love.

Now, although love is narrowed by each and every one of its inward differentiators, you never find one whereby love has what it takes to be similar to that whence it proceeds. On the one hand, this is because all the inward differentiators lie within the scope of seeking /pursuing [*appetitus*], and nothing in that scope includes 'being-similar' in its defining makeup. On the other hand (as will come out below), love is a certain impulsion, and so all of its inward differentiators have to be differentiators of impulsion, which is form-wise quite remote from what it takes to be similar (though not cause-wise).¹

But if "love" is being narrowed by something outside its genus, nothing prevents it from sometimes having what it takes to be similar [to the source whence it proceeds], but this is incidental to love both nature-wise and identically, as is obvious.

So when the love is called "divine" love, if 'divine' is narrowing 'love' within the scope of love's inward differentiators, and hence within the scope of volition *qua* volition, 'divine' is indicating whose love it is (as the one loving or the one loved), namely, God's. One must deny that love narrowed this way is similar [to its source]. And the sentence added at the end of the text is not to be understood in this sense — for the reason made obvious by the above remarks.²

But if 'divine' is a description taken from the extraneous, as it were, say, from the nature with which the love is identified, then because of the identity between the love and the nature, it must be admitted that "divine love" is similar to that whence it proceeds. And this is the sense to take from the present text.

• As for the other term ['proceeds as'], please note that when one says, "The Holy Spirit proceeds as divine love" (or the like), two construals can be made:

- (1) a strict one, with 'as' marking only the formal and distinctive features of that mode of proceeding;
- (2) a broad one, with 'as' marking also common traits or concomitants of that mode of proceeding or its terminus.

¹ In other words, the impulsion whereby I love you is not form-wise similar to me (or to you), but it can be caused by your similarity to me in some respect (e.g. in species).

² If 'divine' is to modify 'love' as a feature intrinsic to love *qua* love, it can only be by meaning God's love of God. This does not make the love similar to God, any more than my love of people makes my philanthropy similar to a human being.

For example, in the matter at hand, when we say

The Holy Spirit proceeds as divine love,
if the 'as' is taken strictly, the proposition is not true if we take 'divine love' identically; for if we stick to the formal/distinctive features of the procession of love (even of divine Love but as remaining within the scope of volition), the Holy Spirit does not have what it takes to be God but to be God's love (God's as the one doing the loving and God's as the one loved). Rather, the proposition is true if we take 'divine love' form-wise [*i.e.* as mentioning a concomitant form, so that the 'as' is taken broadly]. But then we can grant Aureol's antecedent, while his first consequence is worthless, as is clear from the remarks above.³

x. And nothing to the contrary is said in the text, if it is speaking of divine love identically. But if the 'as' covers common traits, too, then the first consequence is true of divine love both form-wise and identically;

³ Aureol's antecedent was 'the Holy Spirit proceeds as *divine* Love'; his first consequence was: 'so He proceeds as *similar* [to the Father and the Son]'. Cajetan says that the antecedent is true only if the 'divine' in 'as divine love' is taken as naming the form (the divine nature) with which this love happens to be identical (so that the 'as' is a broad one); but Aureol's first consequence needs the 'as' in 'as similar' to be strict, if his second consequence (denying the value of Aquinas's argument) is to follow.

and so taken, divine love has what it takes to be similar [to the Father and the Son]. But since theologians speak of the "modes of proceeding" strictly and form-wise, the antecedent should be understood and admitted as speaking about divine love in the first way, while the first consequence (that the Spirit proceeds "as similar") has to be denied.

xi. And as for Aureol's support [for drawing that first consequence], the thing to say is that it labors under an equivocation, as is clear from the remarks above. For the word 'divine' is being used equivocally when it is used object-wise and efficient-cause-wise (as it is in the antecedent) but is also used identically (as it is in the support for that consequence).⁴

⁴ Aureol's support was to quote Aquinas's own statement that the Holy Spirit has what it takes to be similar [to the Father and Son] *qua divine* Love. In order to be relevant to Aureol's case, this statement had to be using 'divine' as an intrinsic modifier of 'love', which is how Aureol took it in his antecedent and first consequence. Cajetan has already argued that 'divine' as an intrinsic modifier of 'love' does not verify Aureol's first consequence (for it just means that the love is God's love for God, not that it is anything similar to God). Now he says that the appeal to Aquinas's text brings in a different use of 'divine', namely, as an extrinsic modifier mentioning the nature with which this case of love is in fact identical. Hence Aureol is using 'divine' in two different ways.



Inquiry Thirty-Six: Into the Person of the Holy Spirit

After the foregoing study, we must turn to topics pertaining to the Person of the Holy Spirit, who is called not only "Holy Spirit" but also "Love of God" and "Gift of God." About the Holy Spirit, four questions are raised:

- (1) Is 'Holy Spirit' a proper name of any divine Person?
- (2) Does the divine Person who is called the Holy Spirit proceed from the Father and the Son?
- (3) Does He proceed from the Father through the Son?
- (4) Are the Father and Son one, single source of the Holy Spirit?

article 1

Is 'Holy Spirit' a proper name of any divine Person?

2/2 ST q.14, a.1, In I Sent., d.10, a.4; 4 CG c.19; Compendium Theol. I, cc.46-47

It looks as though 'Holy Spirit' is not a proper name of any divine Person.¹

(1) After all, no term common to the three Persons is proper to any one of them. But 'Holy Spirit' is common to the three. Hilary shows in his *De Trinitate VIII* that sometimes 'Spirit of God' means the Father, as in [Luke 4:18, quoting Isaiah 61:1] "The Spirit of the Lord is upon me." Other times it means the Son, as in [Matthew 12:28] "I cast out devils by the Spirit of God," where Christ is showing that He casts them out by the power of His own nature. And sometimes it means the Holy Spirit, as in [Joel 2:28] "I will pour out my Spirit upon all flesh." So the term 'Holy Spirit' is not peculiar to any divine Person.

(2) Also, the names of divine Persons are relational terms, as Boethius says in his own *De Trinitate*. But 'Holy Spirit' is not a relational term. So it is not a divine Person's proper name.

(3) Besides, the fact that 'Son' is the name of a divine Person is the reason why He cannot be called this man's son or that man's son. But the Spirit is called this man's spirit or that man's spirit, as in Numbers 11:17, where the Lord says to Moses, "I will take of thy spirit and put it upon them," or 2 Kings 2:15, "The spirit of Elijah doth rest on Elisha." Thus 'Holy Spirit' does not seem to be the proper name of any divine Person.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is 1 John 5:7, "There are three that bear record in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit," and as Augustine comments in *De Trinitate VII*, "When the question is asked, 'Three what?' we say, 'Three Persons.'" Therefore, 'Holy Spirit' names a divine Person.

ANSWER: there are two processions in God, and the one that is by way of Love does not have a distinctive

¹ For the scholastic sense of 'proper name' see footnote 1 on page 622.

name, as I noted above. Hence the relations arising with this sort of procession are nameless, too, as I also noted. So the Person proceeding in this way does not have a distinctive name for the same reason. Rather, just as terms are accommodated from usage to indicate the relations just mentioned when we call them "procession" and "spiration" (which sound more like terms for identifying acts* than for relations), so also 'Holy Spirit' is accommodated from biblical usage to indicate the divine Person who proceeds by way of Love.

As to why this is suitable, an explanation can be gotten from two sources:

- (1) from the shared character of the One who is called the Holy Spirit. As Augustine says in *De Trinitate XV*, "Since 'holy spirit' is common to both [Father and Son], this is the proper thing to call the One shared by both. For the Father is a spirit, and the Son is a spirit; the Father is holy, and the Son is holy."
- (2) from the distinctive sense of 'holy *spiritus*'. When used of corporeal things, '*spiritus*' seems to indicate impulsion and motion. We call breathing "*spiritus*," and also the wind.² Well, impelling and moving is the distinctive impact of love upon the will: it impels and moves the will of the lover towards the beloved. Meanwhile, 'holy' is applied to things that are directed to God. So since a divine Person proceeds after the fashion of Love — a Love [directed at God] whereby God is loved — this Person is suitably called the Holy *Spiritus*.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): when 'holy spirit' is said with the force of *nvo* terms, it means something common to the whole Trinity. For 'spirit' suggests the immateriality of the divine substance, as a corporeal

² Aquinas's argument works for the Latin word '*spiritus*' as well as for the Greek '*pneuma*' and the Hebrew '*ru'ah*'. But it does not work for the English word 'spirit', which is a loan word not applied to corporeal things. Hence, I have translated the argument as being about '*spiritus*'.

q 27, a.4 ad 3
q 28, a.4

* *actus notionalis*

c.19,
PL 42, 1086

† *ordinantur*

spiritus is invisible and has little matter. Hence, we apply this term to all immaterial and invisible substances. Meanwhile, by the word 'holy' there is conveyed the purity of the divine goodness. However, when 'holy spirit' is used with the force of one term, it is accommodated by the Church's usage to mean (of the three Persons) the one who proceeds after the fashion of Love, for the reason stated.³

ad (2): while calling something "holy spirit" is not using a relational expression, the phrase is still

³ Note that this reply (like the whole article) is about the *sense* of 'holy spirit', not about its referent in Church usage. The question is whether, or why, the *sense* of 'holy spirit' makes it suitable to use to refer to the Trinity's third Person.

used for a relational thing insofar as it is accommodated to mean a Person who is distinct from others by a relation alone. But even so, a relation can be understood in the phrase, if a "holy spirit" is understood as [a breath of holiness, because a breath is breathed out, *i.e.*] spirated.

ad (3): what we understand in the word 'son' is just the relationship of one who is from a source to that source, while what we understand in 'father' is just the relationship of being source-of. This is likewise all we understand in the word 'spirit' insofar as it implies a certain moving force [like the wind or the impulse to love]. Well, no creature has what it takes to be the source of a divine Person; rather, the reverse. And so we can say 'our Father' [as our source of being] and 'our Spirit' [as our source of loving] but not 'our Son'.

Cajetan's Commentary

In the title question, observe that 'holy spirit' can be taken two ways: (1) One goes by the force of the two words, so that 'spirit' is a substantive and 'holy' is an adjective. (2) The other goes by its force as one name, as if someone were given the proper name 'Good Man'. In the question at hand, 'holy spirit' is being used in the second way, so as to ask what it should denote as so taken: is it a proper name for something?

Analysis of the article

ii. In the body of the article, a single conclusion answers the question in the affirmative. 'Holy Spirit' is a proper name [*i.e.* a distinctive term] for the divine Person who proceeds after the fashion of Love, by virtue of an accommodation made in the Bible. And since this conclusion includes two ideas — the need for an accommodation and the suitability of this one — Aquinas does both jobs in the text. First, he explains the need for an accommodation as follows.

[*Antecedent:*] The second procession in God, the one that is after the fashion of Love, lacks a distinctive name of its own; so [*1st inference:*] the relations [arising from this procession] also [lack distinctive names], and so [*2nd inference:*] the Person proceeding [after this fashion also lacks a distinctive name]; hence [*3rd inference:*] the Person is named by accommodation, just as the relations are.

Secondly, he assigns a reason for such accommodation from the meaning each term contributes as a part of the phrase: (a) because 'holy' and 'spirit' each apply to both the Father and the Son, and (b) because the two terms suggest the distinctive hallmark of divine love — all of which is quite clear in the text.¹

¹ It would have been kind of Cajetan to say what an *accommodatio* was, since this is its first mention in *ST*. *Salvo meliore iudicio*. I think an *accommodatio* of 'w' was just a secondary use of a word or phrase, 'w', found in canonical Scripture, provided the secondary use had a basis in ecclesial exegesis.

Does the Holy Spirit proceed from the Son?

In I Sent. d 11, a 1; 4 *CG* cc 24-25, *Contra errores Gracconum II*, 1-31;
De Potentia Dei q.10, aa.4-5, *In Joann* 15, lectio 5

It seems that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son.

c.1:
PG 3, 588 (1) According to Denis [in *De divinis nominibus*], “We must not dare to say anything about the substantial divinity beyond what the sacred Scriptures have divinely stated.” The idea that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son is not stated in Scripture, but only that He proceeds from the Father, as one reads in John 15:26, “the Spirit of truth which proceedeth from the Father.” Therefore, the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son.

Denz. # 150 (2) The Constantinopolitan Creed reads: “We believe in the Holy Spirit, the Lord and giver of life, who proceeds from the Father, who together with the Father and the Son is worshipped and glorified.” The clause that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son is therefore an addition to the creed, which should not have been made; those who did it seem worthy of anathema.

c.8:
PG 94, 832 (3) Besides, Damascene says [in *De fide orthodoxa I*], “We say the Holy Spirit is from the Father, and we call Him the Spirit of the Father; but we do not say the Holy Spirit is from the Son, even though we call Him the Spirit of the Son.” Therefore, the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son.

Acta Sancti Andreae,
PG 2, 1217 (4) Moreover, nothing proceeds from where it rests. But the Holy Spirit rests upon the Son. Thus it says in the reading on St. Andrew, “Peace be unto you, and unto all that believe in one God the Father, and one Lord, the only-begotten Son Jesus Christ, and in one Holy Spirit, who proceedeth from the Father and abideth in the Son.” Therefore the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son.

(5) Also, the Son proceeds as a Word; but in us, our spirit does not seem to proceed from our word. So the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son.

(6) Further, the Holy Spirit proceeds in a fully complete way [*perfectē*] from the Father. Hence it is superfluous to say that He proceeds from the Son.

c.4:
203b 20 (7) Further still, when we talk of things everlastingly the same, there is no difference between saying “it can be” and saying “it is” (as Aristotle notes in *Physics III*), and still less is there any difference when we talk of things divine. Well, the Holy Spirit *can be* distinguished from the Son even if He does not proceed from Him. For Anselm says in his *On the Procession of the Holy Spirit*, “The Son and the Holy Spirit both have being from the Father, but each in a different way, the one by birth, the other by proceeding. And thereby are they different from each other.” Shortly after, he adds: “Even if they weren’t two Sons or two Holy Spirits for any other reason, they would still be different for this reason.” Ergo the Holy Spirit *is* distinct from the Son without being from Him.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what the Athanasian Creed says: “The Holy Spirit [is] from the Father and the Son, not made, nor created, nor begotten, but proceeding.”

Denz. 75 § 23

ANSWER: one has to say that the Holy Spirit is from the Son. For if He were not from Him, there is no way He could be distinguished from Him as a Person. This is already clear from statements made above. For it is not possible to say that divine Persons are distinguished from each other by anything non-relational,* for it would then follow that there is not one essence of all three. In our talk of the divine reality, whatever is ascribed as non-relational pertains to the oneness of essence. By elimination, then, divine Persons are distinguished from each other by relations alone.

q 27, a 3
q 30, a 2
* *absolutum*

But relations can only distinguish the Persons to the extent the relations are opposed [*i.e.* converse] to each other. This becomes clear from the fact that the Father has two relations — one relating Him to the Son, one to the Holy Spirit — but since these are not opposed, they do not constitute two Persons but belong just to the one Person of the Father. So if nothing were found in the Son and the Holy Spirit but the two [converse] relations giving each of them a relation back to the Father, these relations would not be opposed any more than the Father’s two relations to them are opposed. Then, as the Father’s Person is one, there would be one Person of Son-and-Holy-Spirit, having two relations converse to the Father’s two relations. Well, this is heretical, as it suppresses belief in the Trinity. Therefore, it has to be the case that the Son and Holy Spirit bear *opposed* relations to each other.

The only opposed relations there can be in God, however, are relations of origin, as was proved above. Opposed relations of origin arise in being-a-source and being-from-the-source. By process of elimination, then, one has to say either that the Son is from the Holy Spirit (which no one says) or that the Holy Spirit is from the Son (which is what we profess). The defining makeup of each one’s procession accords, moreover, with this result. For it was stated above that the Son proceeds by way of understanding as the Word, while the Holy Spirit proceeds by way of volition as Love. Well, it has to be the case that Love proceeds from the Word. For we only love something because (and as) we apprehend it in our mind’s conception of it. Thus it is also apparent from this angle that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son.

q 28, a 4

q. 27, aa. 2, 4
q. 28, a. 4

We learn the same lesson from the order among things. For apart from things that are just materially distinct, we never find that multiple things proceed

from one thing without there being an order between them. Thus one manufacturer produces many knives that are materially distinct and have no particular order among them.¹ But in products that are not just materially distinct [but also distinct in kind], we always find an order among them. A beauty of divine wisdom is shown by the order that also exists among His produced creatures. So then: if two Persons (Son and Holy Spirit) proceed from the one Person of the Father, there has to be an order between those two. And there is no order to be found except the order-of-nature whereby one of them is *from* the other. It is just not possible, therefore, to say that the Son and the Holy Spirit proceed from the Father in such a way that neither proceeds from the other — not unless you say the distinction between them is just material, which is impossible.

Hence, even the Greeks understand that the Holy Spirit's procession has some sort of order to the Son. They concede that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit *of* the Son and that He is from the Father *through* the Son. Some of them are even said to admit that He is *from* the Son or *goes forth from* the Son, but not that He *proceeds from* the Son. This seems to be either ignorant or disingenuous.² For if anyone will look at the matter rightly, he will find that "proceeds" is the most general of all the words dealing with an origin. We use it to designate any sort of origination: a line "proceeds" from a point, a ray "proceeds" from the sun, a river "proceeds" from a spring, and the same for all other cases whatsoever. So from [their use of] any other word dealing with origination, one may conclude that the Holy Spirit "proceeds" from the Son.³

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): what one should not say about God is what is not found in Scripture either in so many words *or in sense*. That the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son is admittedly not found in Scripture in so many words. But the sense of it is found there, especially where the Son says this about the Holy Spirit: "He shall glorify me, because He shall receive of mine" (John 16: 14). Also, it is a general rule of Biblical interpretation

¹ Here 'order' meant any real, irreflexive, asymmetrical relation, e.g. sharper-than, more-expensive-than, or comes-from.

² It was neither. The Greek of John 15:26 used the verb *ekporeuethai*, which became a technical word in the East. It meant to come forth from an unqualified first origin and so contrasted with the more general verb *proiēnai*, which meant to come forth in any way from anything else. Think of two concentric circles with a radius drawn from the center to the outer circle. The radius *ekporeuetai* from the center but *proiei* from its intersection with the inner circle as a secondary point of departure. Hence the Greeks could say that the Holy Spirit *proiei* from the Son but *ekporeuetai* only from the Father. The Latins, with their one, standard verb, *procedere*, seem to have been unfamiliar with this semantic situation in Greek.

³ No doubt Aquinas was right about the semantic situation in the Latin-speaking world. '*Procedere ab*' covered all the ground of more specialized verbs, like '*oriri ab*', '*fulgere ab*'

that what is said of the Father must be understood as also true of the Son, even when an exclusionary word [like 'only'] is present, with the sole exception of those matters in which the Father and the Son are distinguished by opposed relations. After all, when the Lord says in Matthew 11:27, "No one knoweth the Son but the Father," He is not denying that the Son knows Himself. So, too, when it says the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father (even if it had added 'from the Father alone'), the text would not be excluding the Son, because Father and Son are not opposed in being the Source of the Holy Spirit. They are only opposed insofar as this one is Father, and that one is Son.

ad (2): in any Council, a creed was established because of an error that was being condemned at the Council. Hence a subsequent Council did not fashion another creed but saw to it that what was implicit in the former creed was brought out in further wording against the heresies newly arising. Thus the decree of the Council of Chalcedon says that the bishops gathered at the Council of Constantinople handed down the doctrine on the Holy Spirit — not meaning to imply that any less had been believed by their predecessors at Nicaea, but that the bishops at Constantinople had clarified, against new heretics, what their predecessors had understood. So, since the error of those who deny that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son had not yet arisen in the era of the ancient Councils, it was not necessary for them to say explicitly that He does. Rather, it was made explicit afterwards, when this error had arisen in certain quarters, by a council held in the West with the authority of the Roman Pontiff (by whose authority the ancient Councils, too, had been called and confirmed).⁴ But in implicit form, it was already contained in the statement that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father.

ad (3): the claim that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son was first advanced by the Nestorians, as one sees from a Nestorian creed condemned at the Council of Ephesus. The Nestorian Theodoret (?) followed this error — as did many after him, among them, Damascene. Hence, one should not support his opinion on this matter.⁵ Others maintain, however, that by the force of the words quoted, Damascene was not denying that the Holy Spirit is from the Son, just as he was not affirming it.

'*profluere ab*', '*incipere ab*', etc. But the semantic situation in Greek was different; see previous note.

⁴ Aquinas seems unable to cite any definite council or Western synod which did this, and so is current scholarship, though some point to Toledo VI (*Deiz.* 490). The addition of '*filioque*' to the creed seems to have spread gradually as a custom, from Visigothic Spain (or from the court of Charlemagne) to the rest of the Latin world, without ever having been officially debated or solemnly sanctioned at Rome. This is not to say that the addition was theologically incorrect, but that it was canonically irregular.

⁵ This "history" is based on a misinterpretation of Theodoret's *Conflatio* (PG 76, 432), and there is nothing in any case to link St. John Damascene to Nestorian thinking.

ad (4): the fact that the Holy Spirit is said to rest or remain on the Son does not exclude His proceeding from Him, because the Son, too, is said to abide in the Father and yet proceeds from the Father. Also, the Holy Spirit is said to rest upon the Son either [in reference to Christ's divinity] as a lover's love rests upon the beloved, or in reference to Christ's human nature, on account of what is written in John 1:33, "Upon whom thou shalt see the Spirit descending and remaining on him, the same is he which baptizeth . . ."

ad (5): the talk of the "Word" in God does not come from a similarity to the spoken word, from which our spirit does not proceed, because then the talk would be metaphorical. Rather, it comes from similarity to the mental word, from which love proceeds.

ad (6): given that the Holy Spirit proceeds in a complete way from the Father, it is not superfluous to

say that He proceeds from the Son; rather, it is strictly necessary, because the active power* of Father and Son is one and the same. Whatever is from the Father has to be from the Son, unless the distinctive trait of sonship conflicts with it — e.g. the Son is not "from Himself" even though He is "from the Father."⁶

ad (7): the Holy Spirit is distinguished from the Son personally by the fact that the origin[†] of the one is distinguished from the origin of the other. In turn, this differentiation is due to the fact that the Son is solely "from the Father," whereas the Holy Spirit is "from Father and Son." Otherwise, the processions would not be distinguished, as I showed above [in the body of the article].

⁶ Being "from Himself" conflicts with the trait of sonship because the latter is an irreflexive relation. In other words, it is impossible for *x* to be a son of *x*.

* *virtus*

† *origo*

Cajetan's Commentary

Re the title question, bear in mind that this article really covers two issues:

- (1) whether the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son,
- (2) whether He would still be a distinct Person from the Son if He did not proceed from the Son.

Of these, (1) is debated between Greeks and Latins, while (2) is debated among the Latins themselves.

ii. So a doubt arises right away. The questions asked in articles of this *Summa* are numerically equal to the issues we know about; but the question raised in this article is one, while the issues known about are two, as is obvious from the body of the article.

iii. Also, this makes things especially awkward for me, writing a commentary article-by-article, because my job is to discuss each *issue*, one at a time.

iv. There are two ways to go about answering this:

- c 1:
90a 6f
- v.* (1) *Posterior Analytics II* says that asking whether the moon gets eclipsed is the same as asking if there is a reason for lunar eclipses. So asking whether the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son is the same as asking if there is a reason for His proceeding from the Son. In either case, the question is optimally answered with the combination of 'it is the case' and 'for such-and-such a reason it is the case'. So there is no fault to be found with this article. In answering the title-question, what is implicit in it gets explicated. There was no need to divide the point asked and the explanation of its answer into two articles; otherwise, one would need to divide every article into two.
 - vi.* (2) Every time a question is raised about a point knowable, one implicitly understands the question to contain the words '*per se*' and '*as such*'. So the intent of the present article is not to discuss the Holy Spirit's procession in any way but *per se*. The intended sense of 'Does the Holy Spirit proceed from the Son?' is 'Does it enter into the distinctive explana-

tion of the Holy Spirit's Person that He proceeds from the Son?' For what applies to *x per se* applies to *x* thanks to its own unique account. To answer this question affirmatively, then, one must show not only that the Holy Spirit does proceed from the Son but also that He does so by virtue of His personal distinctive trait or "form"; otherwise, one would not be showing that the Holy Spirit proceeds this way *because He is the Holy Spirit*.

vii. To see the matter more clearly still, you need to realize that the description, 'necessarily produced by more than one divine Person'

can be true about a product in two ways: (1) for a reason having to do with the producer, and (2) for a reason having to do with the product. As an example of (1), you have the production of creatures by God. Creation is "necessarily produced by three divine Persons" because the Trinity's works *ad extra* are not separately attributed; the reason has nothing to do with the product, because a creature could be produced and be as it is, even if it were produced by the Father alone. There would only be an example of (2) in case the creature would be deprived of its own formal constitutive trait if it did not come from more than one Person.

In the case at hand, the Holy Spirit proceeds necessarily from the Father and the Son. Everybody agrees that this is for a reason having to do with the producer, because everything of the Father's that does not conflict with the Son is necessarily shared with the Son. But whether the Holy Spirit proceeds necessarily from the Son for a reason having to do with the product — that is in dispute. For among the descriptions applying to the product, some apply on a basis intrinsic to it [*per se*], and others apply on a basis incidental (or quasi-incidental) to it. Strictly speaking, therefore, the

question being posed is whether the Holy Spirit has the trait of proceeding from the Son because of a constitutive and distinctive feature of the Spirit.

Analysis of the article, I

viii. In the body of the article, Aquinas does two jobs: (1) he answers the question, and (2) he argues against the Greeks.

ix. As to job (1), a single conclusion answers the question in the affirmative: Necessarily, the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son. This is supported by three arguments.

First argument

The first goes thus. [*Antecedent:*] If the Holy Spirit were not from the Son, He could not be distinguished from the Son as a Person — a claim whose consequent is supported on the ground that divine Persons are not distinguished from one another by anything absolute but only by opposed relations of origin, according as x is source of y , or y is from x . Ergo [*inference:*] if the Holy Spirit did not have such a relation of origin-from-the-Son, He would not be distinguished from Him as another Person.

The antecedent is supported in all its parts [about how divine Persons are distinguished], one by one. The first part (that divine Persons are not distinguished by anything absolute) rests on the ground that [if they were,] the oneness of their essence would be taken away, in that every absolute [i.e. non-relational] trait is in their essence. The second part (that divine Persons are distinguished only by relations) follows obviously from the first part. The third (that they are distinguished by opposed relations) is made evident by the fact that, in the one Person of the Father, there are two relations, but they do not make Him two Persons because they are not relatively opposed. The fourth part (that they are distinguished by relations of origin) rests on the fact that, in terms of relations proper, the only opposed relations there can be in God are those of origin. The fifth (that the relations of origin are as x is source of y and as y is from x) follows obviously from the preceding statements.

Drawing the inference is then supported by the fact that, so long as the antecedent stands, either the Son proceeds from the Holy Spirit, or else the reverse. No one alleges the former; so, it must be the case that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son.

Attack by Scotus

x. Concerning the conditional assumed here as the argument's antecedent, and concerning the support given for it, doubt arises from Scotus' remarks on *I Sent.* d.11, q.2, in which he holds the opposite view. Along four lines, he attacks the foundation of Aquinas' position, namely, that only relative opposition yields thing-from-thing distinction within God.

* *First line of attack.* [*Major:*] A difference between real formal factors* which are impossible in the same referent[†] yields thing-wise distinction

* *rationes*
† *suppositum*

wherever it is found.¹ [*Minor:*] Two total ways of receiving the same nature, i.e. by birth and by procession, are different in the way stated, even within the divine reality. [*Conclusion:*] Relative opposition is not the only thing that distinguishes divine Persons.

xi. In this same vein, Scotus breaks down the support which this article draws from the two relations in the Father. He says active cases of producing need a different account from passive cases of being-produced. An active producer can give being to many, but one passively produced cannot receive being many times (unless, perhaps, it failed at first).

Aureol chimes in

As far as being-produced is concerned, this line of attack is confirmed by Aureol's arguments at *I Sent.* d.11, q.1, a.1. The arguments amount to this. [*Antecedent: 1st part:*] To-be-generated and to-be-spirated are impossible in the same referent. [*2nd part:*] even if spirating is conjoined to [the Son's] very act of being-generated. Hence [*inference:*] they are thing-wise distinct of themselves. The inference is obvious, and the first part of the antecedent is self-evident. Its second part, however, is supported on three grounds.

- First, any trait of a thing in God fits it form-wise and of-itself; so the impossibility of those traits applies of itself. Confirmation: the impossibility arises from the ordering whereby the one procession presupposes the other. But ordering arises from all form-wise traits. So the traits are first-off impossible of themselves.
- Second, if the impossibility came from the conjunction of being-generated with spirating, in what line of causality would spirating yield this impossibility? Not in the line of efficient or final causality, obviously; nor in that of formal causality, because then it would follow that being-generated and being-spirated are form-wise the same.
- Third, because if the impossibility arose from this [conjunction], it would either be because being-generated and spirating are thing-wise identical, or because both apply to the Son simultaneously; or because one is previous to the other; but no such [causal] claims can be made, because the [alleged] causes all apply to spirating itself *vis-à-vis* the divine essence, in which they obviously yield no impossibility with being spirated.²

Scotus resumed

xii. • *Second line of attack.* If (impossible as it may be) active spirating were not in the Father but only in the Son, there would still be a Trinity of Persons. Ergo, there does not have to be relative opposition be-

¹ In other words, if $(x) \rightarrow \neg(\phi x \ \& \ \psi x)$, so that one and the same individual in one and the same possible world cannot be both ϕ and ψ , then $(\phi x \ \& \ \psi x) \supset (x \neq y)$ in that world.

² In section xvii below, Cajetan will attack all three of these grounds. But his main move will be to reject the first part of Aureol's antecedent: being-generated and being-spirated are not so impossible as Aureol and Scotus supposed.

tween the Holy Spirit and a Person [in this case, the Father] from whom He is distinguished — and thus Aquinas's whole reasoning process tumbles to the ground.

xiii. * *The third line of attack* comes from what constitutes the Son. [*Antecedent:*] The Son is constituted in personal being [i.e. in being who He is] by sonship; [*1st inference:*] therefore *de facto* He is distinguished from the Holy Spirit by sonship; so [*2nd inference:*] when active spiration is separated from the Son in thought, there still remains that whereby the Son is personally distinct from the Holy Spirit; therefore [relative opposition is not required] etc. — Drawing the first inference is supported by the fully general principle that what constitutes a thing is the same as what distinguishes it from others, as one sees from Porphyry, and as one learns case-by-case.

xv. * *The fourth line of attack* goes in reverse, from what distinguishes the Son personally to what constitutes Him. [*Antecedent:*] The Son is distinguished as a Person from the Holy Spirit; so [*1st inference:*] the Son is distinguished [from the Spirit] by His defining makeup as a Person; so [*2nd inference:*] He is not distinguished by active spiration; ergo [*3rd inference:*] with active spiration set aside, there would still remain a personal distinction between the Son and the Holy Spirit. — Drawing the first inference is supported by induction and by argument. By induction because [Scotus says] the following [inference schemata] are valid:

- A makes B distinct thing-wise [*realiter*]
- ∴ A belongs to what accounts for B as a thing;
- A makes B distinct essence-wise
- ∴ A belongs to what accounts for B's essence;
- A makes B distinct reference-wise [*suppositaliter*]
- ∴ A belongs to what accounts for B as a referent;
- A makes B distinct relatively
- ∴ A belongs to what accounts for B as a relatum;

etc.

By argument, because if distinction between persons could be brought about by something that did not belong to the defining makeup of a person, then [although Christ's humanity does not belong to the account defining His person, it could still make a person distinct from Him, and] one could no longer sustain the [orthodox] claim that Christ's humanity is not another person from the Word; for I might say that the humanity is a distinct person thanks to some factor which nevertheless does not constitute His person.

Aureol concurs again

This line of attack from the personal distinctive is also confirmed by Aureol's remarks at the place cited, a. 2, as follows. [*Antecedent:*] Suppose [active] spirating made the Son another Person from the Holy Spirit; then [*consequence:*] the Father and the Son would be one Person. But this is false. Ergo [active spiration is not what makes them distinct Persons]. —

Drawing the consequence is supported thus. [*Antecedent:*] Spiration distinguishes Father-and-Son (as one Spirator) from the Holy Spirit, and of itself it distinguishes them person-wise; ergo [*inference:*] being one Spirator is being one Person; and if the Spirator is not one Person, then spiration does not distinguish person-from-person. — This reasoning process is based upon the following fully general principle: every factor which is formally one factor but distinguishes many [say, {x,y}] from something else [say, z] posits in those many some one basis for that distinction, proportionate thereto.

First argument defended: The foundations

xv. To CLEAR UP this muddle (which I will follow the custom of discussing here, even though handling the constitutive traits of the Persons properly pertains to q. 40), you need to know this: nothing is form-wise present in the divine reality except substance and relation; but the substance, as common to the Hypostases, neither constitutes nor distinguishes them; hence both jobs have to go to relation. But a job can belong to a relation in two ways:

- (1) thanks to what is distinctive to a relation, or
- (2) thanks to what is common to relations and [non-relations, i.e.] absolute traits;

so [we have to add that] any jobs given to divine relations belong to them just insofar as they are relations. Thus the jobs of constituting and distinguishing [the Hypostases] belong to a divine relation precisely as it is a relational factor.

Now, between a constitutive factor that is relational and one that is absolute, there is this difference: an absolute factor constitutes a *thing in itself*, while a relational factor constitutes a *thing towards another*. And since how each thing is "one" and "distinct" is how it is "a being," how an absolute constitutive trait of *x* distinguishes *x* is how it makes *x* a being, i.e. it distinguishes *x in itself* and so distinguishes *x* from every other thing; but a constitutive trait of *x* in relative being, since it makes *x a being towards another one*, a correlative one, distinguishes *x* only from that one. Otherwise, *x*'s otherness or distinctness would not be a proportionate result in *x*; its constitutive factor would do more in distinguishing *x* than it did in constituting *x* — which seems unintelligible.

So then: IF relation is the only factor within the divine reality that raises the count to Three, and relation does not do this on an incidental basis but precisely as a relational factor, and a relational factor as such constitutes [x only as towards y] and distinguishes [x] only relatively [from y] (for any other distinctness it gives *x* is not one it yields as a relative factor but would come from traits it has in common with absolute factors, as one sees clearly in the case of "diversity," which is not unique to relations and so cannot be caused by a relation thanks to just its makeup as a relation), THEN the consequence is that there is no thing-from-thing distinction within God except *relative distinction*. And

In 1 Sent. d. 11,
q. 1

since it is well established that relative distinction does not exist without relative opposition, which is only opposition to the correlative, it follows transparently that only relative opposition distinguishes divine Persons as thing-from-thing.

Not paying attention to this, or not getting to the bottom of it, is what has caused disagreement in this area. For if our critics had paid attention to the fact that the Church's Tradition, in teaching us "oneness of substance and threeness of relational things," is implying by its formal manner of speaking that this formula is to be understood form-wise, they would have seen right away that:

- (1) no distinction is being given to us by the Tradition but a distinction of relational things,
- (2) that this is and must be the distinction proper to relational things *qua* relational,
- (3) that these points cannot be salvaged so long as they say that the distinct things are indeed relational but are nevertheless distinguished without relative opposition, because they are just "disparate" and "impossible," *etc.* For as we said above, being disparate and being impossible are common [to every category], not unique to relative things.

Against the 1st, 3rd, and 4th lines of attack

launched in §§ x. xiii,
and xv

From these points one gets an answer to objections drawn from what constitutes the Son; when one says the same trait both constitutes *x* and distinguishes *x* from everything else,

one has to draw the distinction between the absolute kind of constitutive trait, for which this is true, and the relational kind. With the relational kind, one has to distinguish "relative distinction" from any other kind of distinction, such as being disparate from, or being contrary to, or being contradictory to, or even being privative of.

xvi. Now, when it comes to relative distinction, the thing to say is that the assumption behind the objections is utterly false. What constitutes *x* in relational being does not, thanks to the very nature of the relation, distinguish *x* by relative distinction from anything but the correlative; from other things, it distinguishes *x* in some other way. Suppose [what constitutes *x* in a relational being to other things is that] *x* is twice as large as they; then since this being (as relational) is only towards the half-as-large-as *x* [since if *x* is twice as large as *y*, then *y* is half as large as *x*], it also does not distinguish *x* relatively from anything but the half-as-large. From the three-times-as-large, the four-times-as-large, and any other beings, *x* is indeed distinguished by its double size insofar as *x* is this being [a sized body], but not by its twice-as-large-as relation, obviously.³ And since a "Person" in

³ The doctrine was this. The words 'distinct from' did not express a relation but a mere negation of identity. A thing's size was an absolute trait of quantity and so distinguished it from everything of any other size with an absolute distinction. But for one thing to be just *relatively distinct*

the talk of God is form-wise a relation, there is no person-from-person or thing-from-thing distinction in God unless it be a relative distinction. Hence the following proposition is in fact false:

By His sonship, the Son is distinct from the Holy Spirit as thing-from-thing or person-from-person,

because this next proposition is false:

By His sonship, the Son is relatively distinct from the Holy Spirit,

even though the following is true:

By His sonship, the Son is distinct from the Holy Spirit,

but this last does not suffice for a thing-from-thing distinction.⁴ Indeed, trying to argue from a distinction to a relative distinction is a fallacy of the consequent.⁵ Note this well, because the solution to all the objections turns upon it.

It is also clear from these remarks that the text of the present article retains its decisive force in what it says about the two relations in the Father: they are a

Cf § xi

from another, it had to be distinct by virtue of a relation alone. Well, a relation *R* only distinguished a thing from what *R* is a relation to. So *x* was relatively distinct by virtue of *R* only from what *R* was a relation to.

Now let *R* be the relation that *x* has to *y* when *x* is twice the size of *y*, so that *R* is a relation to what is half *x*'s size; and let *R'* be another relation, one that *x* has to *z* when *x* is thrice the size of *z*, so that *R'* is a relation to things a third of *x*'s size. It is easy to see that being twice the size of something else cannot make *x* distinct from something a third its size. So the relative distinction between *x* and *z* has to be coming from *R'*, not from *R*. I think all parties to this debate would have agreed thus far. But now look at *y* and *z*. The former is half the size of *x* (so that *y* bears the relation *R*, the converse of *R'* to *x*), while the latter is a third the size of *x* (so that *z* bears *R'*, the converse of *R* to *x*). It is easy to see that *y* and *z* are "impossible" in the sense that nothing can bear both relations to the same thing. Nothing can be at once half-the-size-of *x* and a-third-the-size-of *x*. So doesn't that very fact force *y* and *z* to be distinct? And aren't they forced to be distinct "by virtue of" impossible relations? And so aren't *y* and *z* "relatively distinct" on that basis alone? This is what Scotus and Aureol are affirming. Cajetan's answer is no. In this situation, *y* and *z* are distinct, all right, but not "relatively distinct." For the source of their distinctness is not a relation *between them*. Rather, they are distinct "absolutely," *i.e.* thanks to their absolute traits of size, and the *diversity* of *R* from *R'* is not a relation but a mere negation of sameness, such as can be found in any category. The point matters, because in God there are no differences of quantity or any other absolute feature to make the Persons distinct: there are only relations.

⁴ Distinction can be just conceptual. Thus the fact that active spiration is distinct from fatherhood (conceptually) does not suffice to make them distinct *things* or Persons.

⁵ A fallacy of the consequent tries to switch 'if *p* then *q*' into 'if *q* then *p*'. Here it is trying to switch a sound conditional, 'if *y* and *z* are relatively distinct, they are distinct', into the unsound one, 'if *y* and *z* are distinct, they are relatively distinct'.

sign that only *relative* distinction and opposition is thing-from-thing distinction in God. Scotus' handling of this matter is off-target, because it turns aside from relations to processions; the present article is talking about relations, not the processions; ergo. But others have focused on the relations and still attacked these words of St. Thomas ferociously. They say he goes wrong by mistaking a non-reason for a reason.

Allied attacks

[Here is their case]. The reason two non-opposed relations do not constitute two Persons is not the absence of opposition. [Why not?] Because:

(1) for one thing, it is well known that procession [*i.e.* passive spiration] and fatherhood do in fact make more than one Person, and likewise [passive spiration and] sonship [make more than one Person], and yet procession [passive spiration] is not relatively opposed to either of them;

(2) if non-opposition explained not constituting two Persons, opposition would explain doing so (in other words, opposed relations would make two Persons), but this is clearly false because common spiration and procession [passive spiration] are opposed relations, and yet common spiration constitutes no Person.

The SHORT ANSWER to these arguments is that they come from a bad interpretation of the text. When it talks about the two relations in the Father and says, "since these are not opposed, they do not constitute two Persons," the verb 'constitute' is about there being two; it is not about 'Person' except insofar as a Person-count rises to a thing-count of two. Thus the sense of "since these are not opposed, they do not constitute two Persons" is that they do not make a thing-from-thing distinction of Persons. For to "constitute two" is nothing other than to distinguish, *etc.* Hence the text is assigning the true and specific cause: the Holy Spirit is not constituted in "being distinct" from Father and Son except as they are spirating, with the result that spirating constitutes Father and Son in being *distinct Person from the Holy Spirit*, while they are made distinct from each other by fatherhood and sonship.

Hence our answers to these [allied] objections is obvious: they equivocate by failing to notice that '[o] constitutes [x] in being distinct [from y]' changes from topic to topic in how it is true, and that

it has a unique way of coming true when the topic is relational things.

Against the 4th line of attack

launched in § xiv

Now, as to the objections [in the fourth line of attack] based on a personal trait as distinguishing, they seem to make trouble more as a matter of words than as a matter of reality. To those who look to the reality, the thing to say is that spiration makes the Persons of the Son and the Holy Spirit distinct as thing-from-thing, and hence it is said to make them distinct as Person-from-Person. But it is obvious that

what makes a Person *relatively* distinct does not have to be His personhood nor a factor involved in the defining makeup of personhood. But to those who look to the force of words and ask what "distinguishes" the Son "personally" from the Holy Spirit, the thing to say is that 'it distinguishes personally' (since it means 'it form-wise makes one Person distinct from the other') comes true in two ways: in one, by yielding *both* the Person and the distinction; in the other, by making [what is already a Person] other, *i.e.* by putting distinctness into a Person. In a similar way, we say that 'it makes a white house' comes true in two ways: either by making both, or by joining the one to the other; and for present purposes it does not matter whether it does this as an efficient cause or as a formal one. So, then: what "distinguishes personally" by making the whole [of 'distinct Person' true] and each of its parts true [*i.e.* 'distinct' and 'Person'] has to belong to the defining makeup of a Person, and spiration does not do so; but what "distinguishes personally" by making the whole [of 'distinct Person' true] by putting one of its parts ['distinct'] into another [*i.e.* into 'Person'] does not have to belong to the defining makeup of the Person; it just has to be a relational identifier of a Person. And thus being "one spirator" is not being "one Person," because spirating is not the constitutive trait of a Person, and yet spirating does "distinguish" the Person of Son-and-Father "personally" by yielding *distinction* from the Holy Spirit, without yielding personhood.

More against the 1st line of attack

Now, as for the objections taken from [being generated and being spirated as] ways of receiving* [the divine nature], our response is given in the text of the article, in the answer *ad* (7). It lies in the point that the Son's and the Holy Spirit's ways of receiving can be viewed in two ways:⁶

from § x
* emanations

- (1) One way is *with all factors* in the defining makeup of each, so that the receptions include the order whereby the one reception is from the other; and when they are so viewed, the fact that the Son and the Holy Spirit are distinguished by their ways of receiving and the fact that they are distinguished by relative opposition of origin are the same fact.
- (2) The other way to view them leaves out the order of origin between them, and this is how our adversaries take them.

So the first thing we say in response is that they handle these matters under incomplete definitions, and so it is not surprising if they go wrong, using incomplete accounts as if they were complete. The second thing we say is that being generated and being spirated are not two total receptions of the same nature. The former is a "reception" of it unqualifiedly, while the second is a "reception" of it in some respect. For if

⁶ From the point of view of the Persons, those who proceed "receive" the divine nature, and I have translated accordingly. But from the point of view of the divine nature itself, each procession in God is an "emanation" of it.

the order of origin between them were missing, the Son through generation would “receive the nature” unqualifiedly, and the same Person through procession [passive spiration] would “receive” it in some respect. And thus the arguments that presuppose or assume that these ways-of-receiving are total and impossible *independently of the order of origin between them* fall to the ground. The predicates ‘impossible’, ‘total’, and other such, apply to them as taken *integrally*, not as taken incompletely.

Answers to Aureol

given in § xi

I shall now answer Aureol’s similarly motivated argument from things produced. I shall take his supporting grounds one-by-one.

Against his first, the answer is clear from the preceding remarks. When being-generated and being-spirated are taken in abstraction from the order of origin between them, they are not impossible. Moreover, it is not true that they become impossible thanks to the order whereby one presupposes the other; rather, it is thanks to the order of origin whereby one is from the other.

Against his second, where he asks what sort of causality is at work, I say that active spirating acts as a formal cause to give this impossibility [with being-spirated] to the begotten Son, as being white is said to act as a formal cause to give its subject impossibility with being black. And the consequence Aureol draws (that being generated would then be the same trait as being spirated) is invalid, because being-spirated is the correlative to spirating — much as it is invalid to say that [if being-white acts form-wise, *etc.*] then the subject of whiteness would be blackness, the contrary to whiteness.

Against Aureol’s third ground, I say that the impossibility arises from none of his three options, but from the fact that “spirating” is an identifier of a Person *relative* to the Holy Spirit.

Against the 2nd line of attack

given in § xii

xvii. Against Scotus’s lone argument motivated by considerations about the Father [*i.e.* against Scotus’s second line of attack], I say that if the Holy Spirit proceeded from the Son alone, He would still be distinct from the Father by order of origin (if not immediately, then at least) *mediately*. And in the same way [*i.e.* *mediately*] there would be relative opposition between them, so long as it remained true that the Father *mediately* [*i.e.* through an intermediary] spirates the Holy Spirit; for the Father would be included implicitly in one of the opposed parties. But in this scenario, there would be no substantiality of the three Persons. Exclusion of the Father from spirating immediately would yield non-sameness in substance.

Analysis of the article, II

xviii. The second argument presented in the text to support the main conclusion goes as follows.

The second argument

[*Antecedent:*] We do not love a thing unless we apprehend it with a conception of the mind: so [*1st inference:*] our love proceeds from our inner word [*i.e.* from our concept of the thing]; so [*2nd inference:*] the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, because the Spirit proceeds as Love, while the Son proceeds as the inner Word.

xix. Notice that the text brings this reason forward more as a reasonable view than as a knock-down argument, as the wording shows: “the defining makeup of each one’s procession *accords* ... with this result.” I make this observation because this reason is based on the fact that love arises from the lover plus the lovable thing as conceived (because we cannot love the entirely unknown). Now, this fact about love and concept is essentially true in every intellectual nature, and yet (as they say) it does not show evident necessity in the case of Love as a personal identifier and Concept as a personal identifier. For a debater may say that the Father produces His identifier Love by the self-knowing that He does in His essence [rather than in the Word]. Nevertheless, it is quite reasonable to think that the order between the understanding and willing which God does in His essence is the same as the order between the understanding and willing which are personal identifiers [*notionalia*]; and thus it is quite reasonable to think that the identifier Love which is the Holy Spirit arises from the identifier Concept which is the Word, as God’s essential love arises by definition from the essential understanding by which the Father form-wise “knows” all things.

Attacks from two angles

Still, some writers have tried to shake the outcome of this reasoning. They argue against it from two angles. The first goes thus. [*Assumption:*] An intellect’s apprehending [an object] can be made to happen without a concept: so [*1st inference:*] love can be made to happen that way, too; so [*2nd inference:*] Aquinas’s antecedent is false. — The assumption is supported (a) by the case of the beatific Vision, (b) by the case of the act of faith, and (c) because Aquinas himself holds that the inner word [or concept] is other than the act of understanding.

The second angle is this. [*Premise:*] The inference from:

(1) one cannot understand without sensing
to

(2) understanding comes from a sense power
as from its productive source

is invalid; so [*consequence:*] the inferences Aquinas makes are invalidly made, too.

Answers to them

The reply to the first of these attacks is that (a) the antecedent in Aquinas’s argument is a truth about *natural* understanding, and so the beatific Vision is not a counter-example: (b) in the act of believing, an inner

word/concept is in fact formed: a concept of the point believed [*verbum fidei*]; (c) although the inner word is other than the very act of understanding, it is still inseparable from it and cannot be cut out of it in natural cases.

Meanwhile, the second attack is perfectly childish, for it thinks Aquinas missed a point familiar to babies, namely, that accompanying something does not imply producing it. In fact, the text is assuming points of common knowledge: that the productive source of love is the *known good* (see *De Anima III* and *Metaphysics XII*), and that being *known* is being conceived mentally (as established in q.27 above). And it is from these that Aquinas's argument gets the conclusion it sought. So the attack strikes at a very crude interpretation, not at the true and intended interpretation.

Analysis of the article, III

The third argument

xx. The third argument is taken from the order of things [as they proceed], as follows.

[*Antecedent: 1st part:*] From one source, several things never proceed without an order between them, [2nd part:] except in the case of things differing only materially; ergo [1st inference:] from the one Father, the Son and Holy Spirit do not proceed without an order between them, and so [2nd inference:] there has to be an order of origin between them. — The first part of the antecedent is illustrated by creatures, because the order among them shows the beauty of divine wisdom. The second part is illustrated by artifacts, such as two knives. The last inference rests on the fact that divine Persons do not differ materially and do not allow any order between them except that of origin (since the other sorts of order involve one or another incompleteness). If you know how to confirm this argument, you will find it effective; for where there is real plurality without real order, there is confusion.

Objections to this argument

xxi. Some writers have taken this argument to task. First they argue that its antecedent is false. (a) If God produced several Gabriels, there would be immaterial plurality without ordering. (b) God could produce all things immediately, by Himself. Secondly, they say that the text conflicts with itself when it says even Greeks admit that order is implied by 'through' and then assumes (without proof) that there can be no order in God except the one conveyed by 'from'.

xxii. The RESPONSE is that 'material plurality' is being used here to mean the [merely numerical] sort we distinguish from plurality in kinds.* So it means the sort which is in fact present when there are two acts of understanding, both of the same kind, and which would be present if there were several Gabriels. Also, many or all of the things produced by God, though produced by Him immediately, are not pro-

duced specifically with a distance or order between them. As for the Greeks, the order which they have disingenuously understood by 'through' is none other than the order we understand by 'from'. For as emerges in the next article, 'through' expresses causality; and it is readily seen by analysis that this must be reduced to the efficient type of causality in the case at hand. Clearly, then, the text did not "assume without proof" (but with implied proof) that the only real order there can be in God is the order of from-whom-there-is-another and who-is-from-another; for it is known that the other real orders involve incompleteness.

Analysis of the article, IV

xxiii. As for the second job of this article, Aquinas argues against the Greeks by rehearsing three of their claims. (a) They commonly admit that there is an order between the Son and the Holy Spirit; (b) some admit that the Spirit is or goes forth from the Son; (c) they deny that He proceeds from the Son. From these, Aquinas accuses the Greeks of ignorance or obtuseness, on the ground that (c) contradicts (a) and (b), and he supports this as follows. [*Antecedent:*] 'Proceeds from' is the most general of all verbs dealing with origination. Ergo [*inference:*] from any concession about origin (such as "order between," or "is from," or "comes from") there follows an affirmation of proceeding, and so affirmations (a) and (b) conflict with a denial of procession. — The antecedent is supported on the ground that we use 'proceed from' in all contexts, as one sees case-by-case.

On the answer ad (3)

xxiv. In the answer ad (3), be aware that some writers rail against these words, because they imply that Damascene was a heretic, which is flatly awkward, and especially so in this book of his, which was received by Pope Eugenius. The REPLY is: these words do not imply that he was a heretic. For as was said in the last article of q.32, one may hold a false opinion without the vice of heresy before the matter was considered or determined by the Church. One would be a heretic if one stuck to the opinion stubbornly after the Church had decided. Damascene belonged to a time when this matter had not been decided, and so, etc.

On the answer ad (7)

xxv. In the answer ad (7), notice that the wording seems to leave the impression that, for Aquinas, the receptions of divine nature are distinguished by the fact that one of them is *from one* [referent], while the other is *from two*. This is what Scotus attributes to us at *In I. Sent.* d.13, q.1. But this idea that they differ

(1) because one reception is from one referent, while the other is from two referents is as remote as heaven is from earth from what we really say, *i.e.* that they differ

c 10: 433b 12
c 7: 1072a 27

* *pluralitas specifica*

(2) because one reception is from the Father alone, while the other is from Father and Son. In (1), the reason for a difference is said to be just the difference between one referent and more than one, which is ridiculous, and Scotus toiled against it. But in (2), the reason for a difference is said to be the order of origin between them. This is what the text's wording really implies. For there is no other way to

salvage an order of origin here except to say that the other reception is from Father and Son. Since it was shown above that this order of origin pertains to the *complete* formal accounts of the origins themselves, as they are thing-from-thing distinct, it does no harm to concede in this same sound sense [of complete accounts] that the Holy Spirit is distinguished from the Son by *His origin*.

Does the Holy Spirit proceed from the Father through the Son?

In I Sent. d.12, a.3; Contra errores Graecorum II, 8.

It seems that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Father through the Son.

(1) If z proceeds from x through y , then z does not proceed from x directly [*immediatē*]. So if the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son, He does not proceed from the Father directly — which looks like an unsuitable conclusion.

(2) Besides, if the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son, He only proceeds from the Son on account of the Father. But in each case, that on account of which is more causative. Ergo, the Spirit proceeds more from the Father than from the Son.

(3) Also, the Son has His being through generation: so if the Holy Spirit is from the Father through the Son, it follows that the Son is generated beforehand, and then the Holy Spirit proceeds. And thus the Holy Spirit's procession is not eternal — which is heretical.

(4) Moreover, when a person is said to do something through another, the converse can also be said. Thus we say that the king acts through his officer, but we can also say that the officer acts through the king. But in no sense do we say that the Son spirates the Holy Spirit through the Father. In no sense, then, can we say that the Father spirates the Holy Spirit through the Son.

c.57:
PL 10, 471

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Hilary says in [book XII of his] *De Trinitate*: “Keep this, I pray, as observance of my faith, that I may ever have Thee, my Father, and may adore the Son along with Thee, and may deserve thy Holy Spirit, who is through thine Only Begotten.”

I ANSWER: in every sentence saying that someone does something “through” someone else or something else, the preposition “through” marks some cause or source of the act — marks it as a cause. When the act is the medium between a maker and an item made, [there are two possibilities.]

- It is sometimes the case that the causal factor marked with “through” is a cause of the acting thanks to which it emerges from the agent, and then it is a *cause of the fact that the agent acts*, whether it be a purpose, a formal cause, an efficient or motive cause. It is a cause of the purpose type, for example, when we say, “The craftsman works through desire for profit.” It is a formal cause, when we say, “He works through his skill.” It is a motive cause, when we say, “He works through the command of someone else.”

- But other times the causal expression marked with “through” is a cause thanks to which the action terminates at the item made, as when we say, “The craftsman works through a hammer.” For this does

not mean that the hammer is a cause working on the craftsman to make him act, but that it is a cause of the thing crafted as it proceeds from the craftsman, and the hammer gets this rôle uniquely from the craftsman.

(This is the fact which some writers express by saying that “through” sometimes discloses authorship *in recto* [i.e. in the noun in the nominative case], as when we say, “The king acts through his officer,” and sometimes discloses it *in obliquo* [i.e. in the noun serving as the proposition's object], as when we say, “The officer acts through the king.”)

So, then, since the fact that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son is something the Son gets from the Father, one can say that the Father spirates the Holy Spirit “through” the Son, or one can say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father “through” the Son — the idea is the same.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): in any case of action, there are two things to consider: the referent acting, and the power [*virtus*] by which it acts, as a fire heats things by its hotness. In the case of the Father and the Son spirating, then, if we consider the power by which they spirate the Holy Spirit, there is no room to speak of a middle factor “through which,” because this power is one and the same [in both Persons]. But if we consider the very Persons spirating, then it turns out that since the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son jointly,* He proceeds from the Father both immediately and mediately — immediately inasmuch as the Spirit is from the Father, mediately inasmuch as He is from the Son. And this last is how He is said to proceed from the Father through the Son. In a similar way, the child Abel proceeded from Adam both immediately (inasmuch as Adam was his father) and mediately (inasmuch as Eve was his mother and she proceeded from Adam). Of course, this example of material procession should be seen as an inept way to talk about the non-material procession of divine Persons.

ad (2): if the Son received from the Father a numerically different power to spirate the Holy Spirit, the Son would be like a secondary or instrumental cause, and it would be true that the Spirit proceeded more from the Father than from the Son. But numerically one and the same spirative power is in Father and Son, and so the Spirit proceeds equally from both. Admittedly, though, it is sometimes said that the Spirit proceeds mainly or especially¹ from the Father, because the Son has spirative power from the Father.¹

* *communiter*

† *principaliter vel propriè*

¹ ‘Principaliter’ can also mean source-wise. The Father is the ultimate source in the Trinity, to whom all talk of origin can be appropriated.

ad (3): just as the Son's being begotten is co-eternal with His source's begetting Him (hence He was not the Father before He begat the Son), so also the Holy Spirit's proceeding is co-eternal with its Source. Hence the Son was not begotten "before" the Holy Spirit was proceeding; rather, both are eternal.

ad (4): when an agent is said to act through something else, the converse is not always accepted. Even though we say that an officer acts through the king, we do not say that a hammer works through the craftsman. The reason is that acting is characteristic of an officer, since he has control over his own acts, whereas acting is not characteristic of a hammer; it is just acted upon, and so it is never mentioned as an agent but only as an instrument.² Now, even though "through" indicates an intermediary, the officer is said to act "through" the king because the more a referent

² So 'x acts through y' does not convert acceptably to 'y acts through x' when y is just an instrument; the conversion is only acceptable when x and y are both genuine agents. Having established that much, Aquinas turns next to specifying when even such conversions are acceptable.

is a *first* agent [a self-starter], the more its power is immediate to the effect, because the power of a first cause connects the secondary cause to its effect. (This is also why first principles are called "immediate" in scientific proofs.) So, insofar as the officer is an intermediary in the order of acting referents, we say the king acts through his officer; but [insofar as the king's power is more immediate] in the order of powers, we say that the officer acts through the king, because the king's power is what gives the officer's action its legal effect.

Well, there is no order between the Father and Son so far as power is concerned, but only so far as referents are concerned, and that is why we say the Father spirates through the Son but do not make the converse statement.³

³ Since 'the Father spirates through the Son' correctly states the order of referents, it will only convert to 'the Son spirates through the Father' in case the Son's power to spirate is activated (joined to the effect who is the Holy Spirit) by the Father's power. Since this is not the case (the Son's power being flatly identical to the Father's), 'the Father spirates through the Son' does not convert.

Cajetan's Commentary

In the title-question, there is nothing in doubt, if one takes it as generally as it sounds, *i.e.* without exclusionary words [to make it say 'only through the Son'], *etc.*

ii. In the body of the article, Aquinas does two jobs.

(1) He shows how many ways 'through' is used in propositions of this sort. (2) He answers the question at the very end of the article.

iii. As to job (1), he says four things. [a] The first is that 'through' indicates some causality in the accusative-case noun which it takes as its object. [b] The second is that this causality sometimes bears upon the action as it emerges from the agent, and he illustrates this for three kinds of causality. [c] The third thing he says is that sometimes the causality bears upon the action as it is terminated at its product, as one sees with artisan's tools. [d] The fourth is that this distinction coincides with one that other writers draw, namely, that sometimes 'through' indicates authorship *in recto*, sometimes *in obliquo*.

iv. As to job (2), the conclusion answering the question in the affirmative is this: the Holy Spirit pro-

ceeds from the Father through the Son. The support is this. [*Antecedent:*] That the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son is something the Son has from the Father; [*inference:*] so one may say that the Father spirates the Holy Spirit through the Son, *etc.* — The inference holds good thanks to the sense of 'through' explained above [in [c]], when it indicates the intermediary [agent's action] on the side of the product, *i.e.* [when it indicates] that the intermediary has from the principal agent what it takes to produce the product; for this is how 'through' is being used here, not the first way [listed above in [b]]. For the Son is not an intermediary cause on the side of the Father: the Son is not a reason why spiration emerges from the Father. Rather, He is a reason why it terminates at the Holy Spirit. And this holds good insofar as we consider the Holy Spirit as from the Father mediately; we have to speak otherwise of Him when we consider Him as He is from the Father immediately. And this is why the text says we can say 'the Father spirates the Holy Spirit through the Son' and does not say that we can speak only this way. For the claim is only true under one consideration.

article 4

Are the Father and the Son a single source of the Holy Spirit?

In I Sent. d 11, aa.2 and 4; 4 *CG* c.25

It looks as though Father and Son are not a single source of the Holy Spirit.

(1) [If they are one source, it must be as one in nature or else as one in some distinctive trait.] The Holy Spirit does not seem to proceed from Father-and-Son as one in either way C not as one in nature, because then the Spirit (being also of their nature) would be proceeding from Himself, nor as one in a distinctive trait, because a single *distinctive* trait cannot belong to two referents. So the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as they are more than one. Ergo, Father and Son are not a *single* source of the Holy Spirit.

(2) Besides, when one calls the Father and the Son "one source" of the Holy Spirit [one must be talking about some sort of oneness. But] one cannot be talking about oneness of person, because then the Father and the Son would be a single Person; nor can one be talking about oneness of a distinguishing trait, because it seems that if *one* distinguishing trait makes Father and Son *one* source of the Holy Spirit, then *nvo* distinguishing traits [unbegottenness and fatherhood] make the Father *nvo* sources of the Son and Holy Spirit — which is unacceptable. Therefore, the Father and the Son are not "one source" of the Holy Spirit.

(3) Also, the Son does not resemble the Father any more closely than the Holy Spirit does. But Father and Holy Spirit are not "one source" of any divine Person. So neither are Father and Son.

(4) Again, if Father and Son are a single source of the Spirit, this is either "one source which is the Father" or else "one source which is not the Father." But neither is acceptable. For if it is "one source which is the Father," it follows that the Son is the Father; if it is "one source which is not the Father," it follows that the Father is not the Father. Therefore, one must not say that the Father and the Son are a single source of the Holy Spirit.

(5) Moreover, if I accept 'Father and Son are one source of the Holy Spirit', I seem obliged to accept the reverse as well:

'The one source of the Holy Spirit is Father and Son'.

But this appears to be false. For my stated subject, 'the one source', has to refer either to the Person of the Father or to the Person of the Son, but the proposition is false both ways. So, the obverse,

'Father and Son are one source of the Holy Spirit' is false, too.

(6) Also, being one in substance makes things "the same." So if Father and Son are one source of the Holy

Spirit, it follows that they are the same source. But this is denied by many writers.¹ So one should not call Father and Son one source of the Holy Spirit.

(7) Furthermore, the fact that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are "a single source" of creation results in their being called "one Creator." But Father and Son are not "one Spirator," according to many writers,² but "two Spirators" — and their opinion is the one that conforms to Hilary [in his *De Trinitate II*]: "one must profess the Holy Spirit to be from the Father and the Son as His authors [plural]." Therefore, they are not "a single source" of the Holy Spirit.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is Augustine's statement [in *De Trinitate V*] to the effect that Father and Son are not two sources but one source of the Holy Spirit.

ANSWER: the Father and the Son are "one" in all respects in which a relative opposition fails to distinguish them. Since they are not relatively opposed in being source-of-the-Holy-Spirit, then, it follows that Father and Son are "one source" of the Holy Spirit.

Nevertheless, some writers say that calling the Father and the Son "one source" of the Holy Spirit is misleading.* For as a word used [in the talk of God] in the singular, 'source' does not convey a person but a distinctive trait; so they say ['source' is an adjective here; and since an adjective is not modified by another adjective,] Father and Son cannot be called "one" source of the Holy Spirit in good grammar unless 'one' is being taken as an adverb, so that the sense is: they are "source" *in one and the same way* [i.e. by spirating]. But [this sort of reasoning cannot be sustained. For] by a similar argument, one could call the Father "two sources" of the Son and Holy Spirit, meaning: [He is source of them] *in nvo ways* [by begetting and by spirating].

The right thing to say, then, is that even though 'source' conveys a distinctive trait, it still conveys it in the manner of a noun, as 'father' and 'son' do among creatures.³ So, 'source', like any other noun,

¹ For instance, Alan of Lille, who taught at Paris in the 1160s and wrote the widely consulted *Regulae theologicae*.

² They included Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, and Albert the Great.

³ What a word conveyed (*significat*) was its force (a.k.a. one or another "form") as a description: being- ϕ . How the word conveyed this was set by its grammar; when the word was a concrete noun, it conveyed it as a thing meeting the description: a ϕ -thing. But sometimes being- ϕ was a joint affair, so that 'a ϕ -thing' needed group reference. See next note.

c.29,
PL 10, 69

c.14;
PL 42, 921

* *impropria*

* On this grammatical claim, see below, § vii in the commentary

gets its number from the form it conveys.* So just as the Father and the Son are “one God” thanks to the oneness of the form conveyed by ‘God’, they are also “one source of the Holy Spirit,” thanks to the oneness of the distinguishing trait conveyed by ‘source’.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): if ‘source’ is taken in terms of the active *power* to *spirate*, the Holy Spirit proceeds from Father and Son as *one* in spirative power — where ‘spirative power’ somehow conveys the divine nature with a distinguishing trait, as will be discussed below. And there is no problem about a distinguishing trait’s being in two referents when they have [numerically] the same nature. But if ‘source’ is taken in terms of the referents of ‘spirating’, the Holy Spirit proceeds from Father and Son as more than one. For He proceeds from them as the Love uniting two Persons.⁴

in the answer *ad* 7

ad (2): calling Father and Son “one source” of the Holy Spirit conveys one distinguishing trait, the form conveyed by the noun ‘source’. But it does not follow that more than one distinguishing trait can make us call the Father “two sources,” because that would imply plurality of referents.⁵

ad (3): in the talk of divine Persons, how far they do or do not resemble one another does not come from relational traits distinguishing them but from their essence. So just as the Father does not resemble Himself “more closely” than He resembles the Son, so also the Son does not resemble the Father “more closely” than

⁴ What a word refers to (*supponit pro*) changes from one context to another, depending on which item or group of items the speaker is using the word to mention and describe. In a given context, this item or group is the word’s referent (*suppositum*). Here the word is ‘source’, and when the context is the source of the Holy Spirit, the “form” it conveys is being-origin-of-Him-by-spirating (which is numerically one *virtus* had by the Father and the Son), brought into language as a concrete noun, hence as thing-which-is-origin-of-Him-by-spirating; but the referent of ‘source’ in this context is a pair of Persons, and this pair is “the thing which is origin of Him by spirating.”

⁵ In the talk of creatures, the number of referents of ‘ ϕ -thing’ normally rises and falls with the number of “forms” which are *cases of being- ϕ* . Thus, when a source of Jones is called an ancestor, we have to use the plural, ‘ancestors’, because many referents (people) have a case of the “form” which is being-an-ancestor-of-Jones. And because his mother and father parent Jones in different “forms,” we have to speak of the referents who are “parents” of Jones in the plural, because there are two of them.

But oddities arise in the case of God, where a rise in the number of referents need not entail a rise in the number of cases of a form. Three referents are “one God” by virtue of numerically one case of divine nature; two referents are “one source” of the Holy Spirit by virtue of numerically one act/power of spirating. And a rise in the number of “forms” need not entail a rise in the number of referents. Thus, the Father’s two forms of being-a-source, begetting and spirating, do not entail that ‘source’ has two referents in the context where the source is the origin of the Son and of the Holy Spirit.

the Holy Spirit does.

ad (4): the two propositions under discussion, *i.e.*,

The Father and the Son are one source
which is the Father

and

The Father and the Son are one source
which is not the Father.

are not contradictories, and so it is not necessary that one of them be true. For when we say, ‘The Father and the Son are one source,’ our word ‘source’ does not have definite reference but vague reference⁶ to two Persons at once.⁶ Hence the objection commits a fallacy of form-of-speech, trying to go from vague reference to definite.

* *supposito confusa*

ad (5): the converse proposition, ‘The one source of the Holy Spirit is Father and Son’, is also true, because my word ‘source’ does not refer to just one Person but refers indiscriminately to two, as I just said [in the answer *ad* 4].

ad (6): one may say quite acceptably that Father and Son are the “same source,” thanks to the fact that ‘source’ refers vaguely and indiscriminately to two Persons at once.

ad (7): some authors admit that the Father and the Son are one “source” of the Holy Spirit but still hold that, thanks to the distinction of referents, they are two “spirators” — just as they are “two spirating” because actions attach to referents. [These writers then differentiate the case of ‘spirator’ from that of ‘creator’. They say] their argument does not apply to ‘creator’ because the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as they are two *distinct* Persons (as said above), whereas creation does not proceed from the three Persons as they are *distinct* Persons but as they are one in essence.

But it seems to me that a better response is to say that, since ‘spirating’ is an adjective [a participle] while ‘spirator’ is a noun, we can say that the Father and Son are “two spirating” (because of the plurality of referents) but not “two spirators” (because there is just one act-of-spirating). For adjectives get their number from that of the referents, whereas nouns get their number from themselves, according to the form [or forms] their sense conveys.

⁶ Here we learn that group reference is vague reference as to the group’s members. Take the case of a three-man electorate, consisting of Tom, Dick and Harry; when the vote goes against Dick, Tom and Harry are “one majority.” The noun ‘majority’ refers vaguely to both. But the objector does not see this; he thinks: either ‘This majority is Tom’ is true, or else ‘This majority is not Tom’ is true. He is wrong because these are not contradictories but are both logically deviant. A metaphysical example arises when Tom is speaking: ‘A soul and a body are the speaker’ is true, but ‘This speaker is the body’ and ‘This speaker is not the body’ are both deviant (one physicalist, one Cartesian).

Cajetan's Commentary

In the title question, be aware that the issue here is *both the reality* (whether it is really such that Father and Son are numerically one source of the Holy Spirit) *and the proposition* (whether 'They are one source' is true when taken in its proper and literal sense).

Analysis of the article

ii. In the body of the article, Aquinas does two jobs. (1) He answers the question as to the reality; (2) he answers it as to the proper wording of the proposition.

iii. As for job (1), the conclusion is this: Father and Son are one source of the Holy Spirit. It is supported thus. [*Antecedent*:] Father and Son are one thing in all respects in which they are not kept distinct by relative opposition; so [*consequence*:] they are one source of the Holy Spirit. The consequence follows because, in being source of the Holy Spirit, they are not opposed to each other relatively.

iv. As for job (2), Aquinas does three things. (a) He sets forth an opinion that holds this proposition to be improper for the reason that 'source' conveys a distinctive trait and hence is taken as an adjective and hence cannot be modified by another adjective, and so 'one' is not being taken as a substantive.* Rather, in order for the proposition to be true, 'one' is taken adverbially, and hence the proposition is improperly worded. (b) He refutes this opinion and both its grounds, going in reverse order. First, he says 'one' is not to be taken adverbially, because [if it were] then one could say that the Father was not one source of the Son and Holy Spirit, since He is their source in different ways. Secondly, he says this inference is invalid:

'source' conveys a distinctive trait, and so it is taken as an adjective,

because in fact it conveys a distinctive trait as a noun, as 'father' and 'son' do among creatures. (c) And so thirdly he draws an inference opposed to this opinion and confirms it with an argument and an example. The argument is: 'source' is a noun; so it gets its number from the number of [cases of] the form conveyed by it; but the [case of the] form conveyed, *i.e.* the distinctive trait, is numerically one in Father and Son; ergo, it is perfectly acceptable to call the Father and the Son "one source" of the Holy Spirit. The example is that, for this same reason, one calls Father, Son, and Holy Spirit "one God," namely, because divineness is numerically one [case of the] form in Them.

On the answer *ad* (1)

v. In the answer *ad* (1), a doubt arises about the part where it says,

if 'source' is taken in terms of the referents of 'spirating', then the Holy Spirit proceeds from Father and Son as more than one.

The doubt is whether the spirative source doing the

spirating requires as such a plurality of referents.¹ I say 'as such' so as to exclude a merely incidental involvement of plurality, as occurs with the creative source. For it is incidental to creation that it comes from three Persons. God could still create if He were not three Persons. So the doubt here is whether spiration is intrinsically [*per se*] from two, or whether it is not so but just incidentally from two (as creation is incidentally from three).

In remarks on *I Sent.* d.12, Scotus holds that more-than-one is not required, and he bases his opinion on the fact that the spirative source is utterly complete in just one referent. St. Thomas, however, in his remarks on *I Sent.* d.11, the last article, seems to have thought the opposite, maintaining a relevant difference between creation and spiration, thanks to a determination he had reached in a.2 of d.11, which also seems to be confirmed in the present text.

The reason there is doubt here is that no convincing argument seems to be forthcoming either way. After all, the point that the spirative source who spirates and whereby He spirates are complete in just one referent seems to get its strength from the idea that otherwise the Father alone would be an incomplete source of the Holy Spirit. Given the utter completeness of both sources in one referent, the following conditional emerges as true:

if that referent were alone, He could spirate the Holy Spirit completely

and so plurality in the source which spirates is not intrinsically required. But at the same time, the manner of proceeding which is said to fit the Holy Spirit, namely, proceeding as a bond, a sharing, a mutually unitive love, is unintelligible unless it is coming from at least two, with the result that a plural number is intrinsically necessary in the source which spirates.

Nevertheless, neither of these routes leads necessarily to the conclusion it is after. The first falls short

¹ The phrase 'source of spiration' or 'spirative source' was distinguished into the source *quod* (which was who did the spirating) and the source *quo* (which was the act, ability, or "form" with which they did it). In the answer *ad* (1), when Aquinas said that the Holy Spirit's source is one, if you are talking about the *virtus* by which Father and Son spirate, he was saying in effect that the Spirit's source *quo* is one (numerically one act/ability). When he then said that the Spirit's source is more than one, if you are talking about referents, he was saying in effect that the Spirit's source *quod* is more than one (since the ones spirating are two, the Father and the Son). What Cajetan is now in doubt about is whether the spirating in God just happens to have two sources *quod* or whether spirating is intrinsically an action that takes more than one source *quod*. In less arcane language, the doubt is whether spirating is intrinsically a "joint" action, requiring more than one "doer," and I have translated accordingly.

* *nominaliter*

because incompleteness is not the reason why the Father alone, or the Son alone, cannot spirate a Holy Spirit consubstantial with Him but personally distinct; rather, the reason is the absence of a condition which is not met (and cannot be met) in one referent alone. The second route falls short, too, because binding, uniting, and the like are not true of the Holy Spirit thanks to His personal distinctive trait but thanks to an essential trait of God included in Him, namely, loving (as will come out in the next inquiry [q.37], a. 1 *ad* 2, where it will also be clearer).

Although arguments such as these are not fully cogent, it is still the case that

- in a.2 (1) St. Thomas was explicit earlier in this inquiry that being from the Father and the Son belongs to the defining makeup of the Holy Spirit, and
- (2) in this article he appends an *as*-clause, saying that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son *as more than one*, person-wise, and
- (3) holy doctors have commonly said that the Holy Spirit is the love which the Father and the Son have for each other.

And so I think one should hold by the view that the spirative source which does the spirating has to be, *as such*, more than one, so that being-two is a condition for spirating but adds no further completeness beyond what a single referent has; rather, the second Person adds just a condition required for being the source which spirates. In the absence of this condition (taking 'absence' negatively [not privatively]), one Person alone would not spirate. And since this condition abstracts from completeness and incompleteness, no Person spirates imperfectly; each spirates perfectly.²

Moreover, we have good reason to believe this. For if the Holy Spirit's procession is necessarily from Father *and* Son, as was shown above, it follows necessarily that He is from Them *as such* and hence as more than one; for They cannot be understood *as such* [as Father *and* Son] without being understood as more than one. Also, the reason adopted in the text, namely, that the Spirit proceeds as unitive love, also sheds light on the conclusion we are after, if we bear in mind that we lack a helpful vocabulary in this area, so that we have to understand and suggest distinctive traits from [words for] appropriated ones.³ Aquinas took a step toward this reason in the last article of *In I Sent.* d.29, where he said spirating is a Personal action.

² Cajetan's position is analogous to saying that spirating is intrinsically a joint activity, like a team sport. No one can play tennis alone; it takes two, no matter how perfectly each player plays, and no matter how "complete" an athlete he or she is.

³ The will-act of love is included in the divine essence, and so speaking of the Holy Spirit distinctively as "love" is a case of appropriating the word to Him. Aquinas had mentioned our poverty of vocabulary for volitional matters and hence for the Spirit's procession in q.27, a.4 *ad* 3 and in q.28, a.4. He will say much more about it in the next inquiry, q.37.

And please do not think that this resolution of the matter has made me forget what I said earlier [about how spiration differs from generation in §.xv of the commentary on q.36. a.2]. For my present claim that

The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as two, *i.e.* as having that number or duality

is perfectly consistent with my earlier point that

The Holy Spirit's procession is not differentiated from generation sufficiently by the fact that the Spirit's is from two, while generation is from one,

since referential duality taken as absolute [non-relational] is not enough for this [rather, it takes a relation of order-of-origin to differentiate the one procession from the other]. There is no need to bring up the arguments of Scotus here, because, apart from what we say about the completeness issue, they do not tell against our position. Our position speaks of a duality of referents only on the side of the source doing the spirating. Rather, Scotus's arguments tell against Henry [of Ghent], who claimed to find a harmony, etc.

On the answer *ad* (2)

vi. In the answer *ad* (2), there is doubt about the claim that the Father cannot be called "two sources," because that would imply two referents. For if the rule about how a noun gets to be singular or plural C *i.e.*, according to the number of forms it conveys C is true, it seems arbitrary to deny plural "sources" in the Father. It is agreed that the forms conveyed [in His case by 'source'] are more than one (fatherhood and spiration). Nor can it be right to say (as some think) that the rule only holds when the conveyed forms are a *real* plurality. For it is clear that the craft of shoemaking is really distinct from the craft of bridle making, and yet Socrates having both is not "two craftsmen."

vii. The RESPONSE to this is that talking about a noun is one thing, and talking about a concrete noun is another. For an abstract noun, conveying more than one form is a *sufficient* condition for it to be put into the plural. For a noun of either kind [abstract or concrete], conveying more than one form is a *necessary* condition, *i.e.* it cannot be plural unless it conveys more than one form, whether this is also a sufficient condition or not. Now, a concrete noun, since it is a noun, needs to convey more than one form [in order to be put into the plural], but since it is also concrete, it needs more than one referent [in order to be put into the plural]. So, since 'source' is a concrete noun, the text is speaking perfectly well in saying that calling the Father "two sources" would imply two referents. There is no departure here from

the rule about nouns, if the rule is rightly understood, as I have just expounded it.⁴

On the answers *ad* (4) and *ad* (5)

viii. A doubt of a logico-linguistic nature has been cast upon the answers *ad* (4) and *ad* (5) by Gregory [of Rimini], in his remarks on *I Sent.* d.12; this is also reported by Capreolus *in loco* (at the end). The doubt is about how 'source' can refer vaguely. For one thing [says Gregory] no noun is such as to leave its reference vague [*confusivum*]. For another, if 'source' did stand vaguely, one could get down to the individuals of which it is predicated by a disjunctive proposition, which Aquinas is disallowing here.

ix. To the first of these there are TWO ANSWERS. First, with respect to a concrete *common* noun, there is no need to look for its vague reference, because this is the kind of reference it has by its nature, as St. Thomas says at *III Sent.* d.1, q.2, a.4; rather, you need to look for its definite reference when it refers non-vaguely [*determinate*].⁵ The second answer is that Gregory is confusing the noun itself with how it works when it is a predicate.⁶

x. To Gregory's second point, there are again TWO ANSWERS. First, that rule does not apply when there are not individuals under the predicate, as in the case at hand; for the particular of 'source' is not the Father, nor the Son, but *this source* (although here there are not more of them); rather, Father and Son are numerically one source of the Holy Spirit; there is no room for a further descent to individuals of 'source'; if we go down to the Father or to the Son, we are already going outside the rule, and we are committing a fallacy of form-of-

⁴ The rule seems to have been that, for a concrete common noun to be made plural, two conditions must be met: (a) more than one form conveyed in its sense and (b) more than one referent. 'Source' is a concrete common noun. So for any divine procession to be said to have "sources," both conditions must be met. The Father cannot be called "sources" of the Son and Holy Spirit because condition (b) fails; the Father and the Son cannot be called "sources" of the Holy Spirit, because condition (a) fails.

⁵ This is correct. The semantics of a concrete common noun like 'player' leave it open to refer to any member of the set of players, as one learns just by learning English. Its reference is narrowed down to a definite player only by its use in a particular context, and this is where doubt can arise. Thus, 'A player has injured her foot' invites the question 'Who?'

⁶ Correct again. The noun 'king' in itself has just its standard reference-to-any, as in 'A king would be good for Brazil'. The noun gets more definite reference only in a context, such as the once-treasonous toast 'To the king over the water.' Con-

speech.⁷ The other answer (given by other writers) is to concede Gregory's inference but deny that the point inferred is false, as you can read in Capreolus.

On the answer *ad* (6)

xi. Note that in the answer here *ad* (6), the author is settling a point he left undecided at the end of his remarks on *I Sent.* d.29.

On the answer *ad* (7)

xii. In the answer *ad* (7), note that the author is now rejecting the opinion he himself had followed in the last articles of *In I Sent.* d.11 and d.19. But the argument he advances here will be examined below, in q.39, a.3, where the topic of adjectives and nouns will be treated expressly.⁸

text is often supplied when 'king' is a predicate, as in 'The current Count of Paris is the king of France.'

⁷ Take 'soccer team'. Its standard reference is to any member of a set of teams. If one has a complete list of them, one can put together a long disjunctive proposition, saying that 'soccer team' in such-and-such a sentence refers to the first on the list, or to the second, or ... But one never gets to individual players, because the members of the set are *teams*, not persons. Cajetan says the same applies to 'spirative source' in theology. Its reference is as definite as it can be when it is to *this pair*, <Father, Son>, not to either Person in the pair.

⁸ At the end of this article and commentary, we are left with a serious problem. We have been told that spirating the Holy Spirit is an intrinsically joint activity, so that its "doer" must be a pair of referents. We have been told repeatedly that the referents in God are the Persons, and that Person-from-Person distinction is the only thing-from-thing distinction in God. But we have also been told that such distinction arises only from relative opposition. So how can Father and Son be a *pair* as spirator if They are not relatively opposed in this regard (and They are *not*, says Aquinas)? How are They a *pair* of referents without being distinct *things*?

The answer is implicit here and becomes more explicit below in q.39, a.1. The divine Persons are constituted by their relations of origin, which are relatively opposed. Hence the Persons are relatively opposed in *who they are*, and they remain so even when they are not relatively opposed in another regard. But the Persons are *referents* in who they are. Hence, the count of referents in God remains fixed even in those respects in which the count of things diminishes. In other words, the Persons in God can coalesce thing-wise without ceasing to be distinct relative *referents*. We know that they do this in forming the one absolute Thing which is the one God (the sole absolute quasi-referent of 'God'). Now we learn that Father and Son do this in forming the one Source of the Spirit.

Inquiry Thirty-Seven: Into the term 'Love'

The inquiry turns next to the term 'Love'. About this, two questions are raised:

- (1) is 'Love' a proper name of the Holy Spirit?
- (2) do the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Spirit?

article I

Is 'Love' a proper name of the Holy Spirit?

In I Sent., d.10, a.4; d.27, q.2, a.2, q^a2; *De Veritate* q.4, a.2 ad 7

It looks as though 'Love' is not a proper name of the Holy Spirit.

(1) After all, Augustine says in *De Trinitate XV*:
c.17; "I don't know of any reason why Father, Son, and
PL 42, 1081 Holy Spirit should not be called Love — all of them together — as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are called Wisdom, all together, not three Wisdoms but one Wisdom." But no title applied in the singular to each Person and to all of them together is a proper name of any one Person. Therefore, 'Love' is not a proper name of the Holy Spirit.¹

(2) Besides, the Holy Spirit is a subsisting Person; love does not come into language as a subsisting person does, but rather as an action going from the lover to the beloved. Therefore 'Love' is not a proper name of the Holy Spirit.

(3) Also, love is a bond between lovers, since PG 3, 713 Denis tells us in c.4 of *De divinis nominibus* that love is a "unitive force." But a bond is a medium between things, connecting them; it is not something proceeding from them. So since the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son (as shown q.36, a.2 above), it does not seem that He is a love, nor a bond between Father and Son.

(4) Further, anyone who loves *has* his love, and the Holy Spirit is one who loves; so, He has a love. Ergo, if the Holy Spirit is Love, there will be a love of Love and a spirit of the Spirit which is awkward.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Gregory says in his Pentecost homily: "The Holy Spirit Himself is Love."
PL 76, 1220

I ANSWER: in the talk of God, the word 'love' can be used either for an essential trait or for a Person. As used for a Person, it is a proper name of the Holy Spirit, as 'Word' is a proper name for the Son.¹

To get this clear, one needs to realize the following. In our account of God, there are two processions

as shown above: one by way of understanding (the procession of the Word), and one by way of volition, a procession of Love. Since understanding is more perspicuous to us and allows us to get into language each of the aspects we need to consider in it, more distinctive terms have been found for this procession in God; but this is not the case for the aspects we need to consider in the will's procession. Hence, we use certain circumlocutions to indicate the Person so proceeding, and for the relations which arise by this procession we use 'procession' and 'spiration' (as I mentioned above), even though they have in themselves more the force of names for origins than names for relations.

But despite this difficulty, one must think about the two processions along similar lines. For just as, from the fact that someone understands a thing, there arises in him an intellectual "conception" (called an "inner word") of the thing understood, so also, from the fact that someone loves a thing, there arises in his affection an "influence" (so to speak) of the thing loved, thanks to which the thing loved is said to be "in the lover," as the thing understood is "in the knower" — with the result that, when someone understands and loves himself, he is "in himself" not just as being the same thing as himself but also as being the one known "in the knower" and the one loved "in the lover."

Now, for the intellect, there are words at hand to convey the relation of the knower to the known, as is clear with the verb 'to understand'; and words are also at hand to convey the emergence of the intellectual conception, like 'to say' and 'word'. In our talk of God, therefore,

- 'to understand' is used only for an essential trait, because it does not convey a bearing to the Word proceeding, but
- 'Word' is used for a Person, because it conveys that which proceeds, and
- 'to say' is used as an identifier-verb,* because it involves the bearing of the Word's source to the Word itself.

q.27, aa.2-5

q.27, a.4 ad 3

* *notionaliter*

¹ For what the scholastics meant by 'proper name', see footnote 1 on p. 622.

But for the will, besides 'to esteem' and 'to love', which

convey the lover's bearing to the thing loved, there are no other words in use to convey the bearing which that "influence" or affection for the thing loved (which arises in the lover from the fact that he loves) has to its source, nor to convey its source's bearing to it. And so, because of our poverty of vocabulary, we convey these relations with the words 'love' and 'to love' — much as if we were to call the Word "conceived understanding" or "begotten wisdom."

So then: since nothing is implied in 'love' or 'to love' but the bearing of the lover to the thing loved,

- we use 'love' and 'to love' for an essential trait, as we use 'understanding' and 'to understand', but
- when we use these words to express the relation of what-proceeds-as-love to its source, and its source's relation to it, so that what we understand by 'love' is *love proceeding* and what we understand by 'to love' is the *spirating* of the love proceeding, 'love' is the name of a Person, and 'to esteem' or 'to love' is an identifier-verb, like 'to say' or 'to beget'.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): Augustine was talking about love as an essential trait in God, as discussed above.

ad (2): understanding, willing, and loving come into language as transitive verbs as if they bore upon outside objects, but in fact they are actions remaining entirely within the agent, as noted above, but in such a way that they involve some sort of relation to an object within the agent. Thus even in us, love is something remaining within the lover (and the inner word is a thing remaining in the sayer) but *with a relation* to the thing loved (or expressed by the word). Well, in God, where nothing is an accident, love has more to it, because His Love (like His Word) is sub-

sistent. So when we say that the Holy Spirit is the Father's love towards the Son (or towards anything else), we are not speaking of an action reaching another but just of a *relation* of love to the thing loved (as the talk of an inner word involves a relation of this word to the thing expressed by it).

ad (3): inasmuch as He is Love, the Holy Spirit is called a bond between the Father and the Son because, since the Father loves with a single act both Himself and the Son (and Son loves Him back in the same way), a relation of the Father to the Son (and of the Son back to Him) as Lover to Loved One is involved in the Holy Spirit *qua* Love. But necessarily, by the very fact that the Father and the Son love each other, the mutual Love which is the Holy Spirit proceeds from both. By His origin, then, the Holy Spirit is not a bond between them but a third Person in the Trinity; but by the relation just discussed, He is a bond proceeding from both.

ad (4): as the Son understands and yet producing a word does not pertain to Him, because [the essence-word] 'understands' pertains to Him as to one proceeding as a word, so also the Holy Spirit loves (taking 'loves' as an essential affair) and yet spirating a love does not pertain to Him (taking this last as an identifier-verb), because He loves (essence word) as Love-proceeding, not as that whence Love proceeds.²

² The picture, in sum, is this. We normally use 'love' to name an act-state of the will, but we can use it to name an affection that arises in the will when we are in that state. If 'love' is used of God in the normal sense, be it noun or verb, it names His essence and involves no relation but that of the lover to the thing loved (in this case: God as a whole to Himself as a whole). But if 'love' is used of God in the affection-sense, the noun and the verb serve as follows. The noun names the Holy Spirit and involves relations between Him (the arising affection) and His source; the verb says what the source "does" in giving rise to the affection, *i.e.* "spirates."

Cajetan's Commentary

The title-question is clear from the things to be said in the body of the article and from points made above about the names 'Father' and 'Word'.

Analysis of the article

ii. In the body of the article, one distinction is drawn and one conclusion. The distinction is that 'love' can be used for God's essence and for a Person. The conclusion is that 'love' used for a Person is a proper name of the Holy Spirit. This is made clear by four moves in the following order.

(1) Aquinas states in general terms the differences between the divine processions as to how well we know and can name what pertains to them. (2) At the & beginning "But despite this difficulty," he states the parallels between them in two respects: [a] in how each is a producing (because just as by understanding Himself God produces a Word, which is a concept

within the knower of the thing understood, so also by loving Himself God produces an influence or affection-within-the-lover for the thing loved); and [b] in how each involves a number of relations (for just as in the one case there are three relations: to the thing understood, to the Word, and from the Word to its source, so also there are three in the other case: to the thing loved, to the Affection, and from the Affection to its source). (3) At the ¶ beginning, "Now, for the intellect," he shows in detail how these processions differ as to our ability to name the relations just mentioned, *i.e.* that in the intellect they are all named, but in the will only the first, the names for the others being accommodated from that of the first. (4) At the ¶ beginning, "So, then," he infers from his foregoing remarks first the distinction [mentioned at the start of § *ii*] and then the conclusion [mentioned there], as is clear in the text.

How many loves are there in God?

iii. Notice here that distinguishing love as this article does, into essence-love and Person-love, is not distinguishing the *reality* [as if into parts or cases] but the *word* 'love' into its meanings. The whole reason for the distinction is the accommodation of the *word* to have another meaning, as if the word 'awareness' were accommodated to mean the Word. So there are not two loves in God, one essential, one Personal.

Rather, because of our poverty of vocabulary, the one word 'love' sometimes means the divine love, which is undoubtedly something essential, and sometimes means the Person who proceeds by way of God's willing and loving. Hence Aureol's arguments against this distinction (reported by Capreolus at *I Sent.* d.32) were a waste of time and effort as far as interpreting St. Thomas is concerned.

The rest of the points pertaining to this article were discussed above in my comments on q.27.

article 2

Do Father and Son love each other by the Holy Spirit?

In I Sent. d.14, q.1, a.1; d.32, q.1, a.1; 4 *CG* c.23; *De Potentia Dei* q.2, a.3

It does not seem that the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Spirit.¹

(1) After all, Augustine proves in *De Trinitate VII* that the Father is not wise by begotten wisdom. But as mentioned [in a. 1], the Holy Spirit is proceeding Love in the same way as the Son is begotten wisdom. Ergo the Father and the Son do not love each other by the proceeding Love who is the Holy Spirit.

(2) Besides, when Father and Son are said to love each other by the Holy Spirit, the verb 'love' is being used *either* for God's essence *or else* as an identifier. The claim cannot come out true if 'love' is talking about God's essence, because in that vein one could just as well say that the Father understands "by the Son." Nor can it come out true if 'love' is an identifier-verb, because then one could just as well say that Father and Son spirate "by the Holy Spirit," or that the Father begets "by the Son." So this claim, 'Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Spirit,' does not come out true on any construal.

(3) Moreover, with one and the same love, the Father loves the Son *and* Himself *and* us. Well, He does not love Himself with the Holy Spirit, because no identifier-act is reflexive; thus, one cannot say that the Father generates Himself or spirates Himself. So, one cannot say that He loves Himself either, if 'loves' is taken as an identifier-verb. At the same time, the love with which He loves *us* does not seem to be the Holy Spirit, because His love of *us* involves relation to creatures and so pertains to God's essence. Therefore, the claim that the Father loves the Son with [the love which is] the Holy Spirit is false, too.

ON THE OTHER HAND, Augustine says in *De Trinitate I7* that the Holy Spirit is whereby [*quo*] the Begotten is loved by the Father and loves the Father back.

ANSWER: the problem here is that, when we say the Father loves the Son [and *vice-versa*] "by the Holy Spirit," the 'by ...' tends to be construed causally, so that the Holy Spirit seems to be made the cause of the fact that the Father loves and that the Son loves — which is quite impossible. As a result, some say that 'Father and Son love themselves by the Holy Spirit,' is false, and that Augustine withdrew it [in *Retractiones I*] when he withdrew the similar claim that the Father is wise by begotten wisdom. Others say that

c. 26;
PL 32, 625

¹ 'By the Holy Spirit' translates a simple Latin ablative, 'Spiritu Sancto'. So wherever this article and its commentary talk about ablative construction, I have paraphrased it to talk about 'by ...' or 'with ...'

the sentence is not in proper form and should be expounded this way: the Father loves the Son with the love which is in His essence, and this love is appropriated to the Holy Spirit. Others again have said that the 'by' is meant for a sign, so that the sense is: the Holy Spirit is the sign of the fact that the Father loves the Son, in that the Spirit proceeds from Them as Love. Others have said that the 'by' is meant as a formal cause, such that the Holy Spirit is a Love whereby (as by a form) the Father and Son love each other. Still others have said that the 'by' expresses a formal effect, and these last have come closer to getting it right.

To clear the matter up, then, one needs to know that things are generally described by their forms (as a thing is called "white" after its whiteness and "human" after its human nature), and so any trait by which a thing is described has, by that fact, the standing of a "form." Thus if I say, "This man is clothed with a garment," the 'with ...' is construed as having the standing of a form, even though a garment is not a form. Cases also arise, however, in which a thing is described by what proceeds from it — not only as an agent is described by his action but also as an agent is described by the very terminus of his action, the effect of it, when that effect is included in understanding the action itself. Thus we say that a fire heats "by warming," even though the warming is not the heat which is the fire's form but an action proceeding from the fire; and we say that a tree blooms "with its flowers," even though the flowers are not the tree's form but are effects proceeding from it.

On this pattern, then, the thing to say is as follows. The verb 'love' in the talk of God is used two ways, for an essential feature and for an identifier. When it is used for an essential feature, the Father and the Son do not love each other "by the Holy Spirit" but "by their essence." This is why Augustine asks in *De Trinitate XI*, "Who would dare to say that the Father does not love Himself, nor the Son, nor the Holy Spirit, except 'by the Holy Spirit'?" And this is the line taken by the opinions I stated earlier. But when the verb 'love' is used for an identifier, it means nothing but *to spirate Love*, as 'speak' means to *produce the Word* and 'bloom' means to *produce flowers*. As a tree, then, is said to bloom "with its flowers," so the Father is said to speak "with His Word" or "by His Son" (when what He is mentioning, however, is Himself and creation), and so, too, the Father and the Son are said to love "by the Holy Spirit" or "with proceeding Love" (when what they love, however, is both Themselves and us).

c. 7;
PL 42, 1065

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): in our talk of God, 'is wise' or 'understands' is taken only for an essential trait; hence one cannot say that the Father is wise or understands "by the Son." But the verb 'love' is taken both for an essential trait and for an identifier. In the latter use, we can say that Father and Son love each other by the Holy Spirit, as I said above.

ad (2): when a definite effect is involved in understanding an action at all, one can describe the doer both by the action and by the effect, as we can describe a tree as blooming either "by its flowering@ or Awith its flowers." But when a definite effect is not included in the [concept of the] action, one cannot describe the action's doer by the effect but only by the action itself. Thus we do not say that a tree *produces* its flower "with a flower;" but "by its act of producing" one. When I say "spirates" or "begets," then, what is [understood as] included is just the identifier act. This is why we cannot say that the Father spirates "by the Holy Spirit" or begets "by the Son." But since 'speak' means *produce a word* and [God's] speaking thus involves a definite Person proceeding, we can say both that the Father speaks "by the Word"

as by the Person proceeding and that He speaks "by His speech-act" as by the identifier act. Likewise 'love', taken as an identifier, means *produce Love*. So, one can say both that the Father loves the Son "by the Holy Spirit" as by the Person proceeding and that He loves the Son "by loving" as by the identifier act.

ad (3): the Father loves not only the Son but also Himself and us "by the Holy Spirit." because (as was said) 'loves' taken as an identifier-verb involves [in its concept] not only producing a divine Person but the Person produced by way of *love*, which bears upon the thing loved. So, just as the Father mentions Himself and every creature "by the Word" which He begets, since the begotten Word adequately represents the Father and every creature, so also the Father loves Himself and every creature "by the Holy Spirit," since the Spirit proceeds as Love of the first goodness, for which the Father loves Himself and every creature. Thus it also becomes clear that relation-to-creation is involved in the Word and in the proceeding Love secondarily, as it were, inasmuch as God's goodness and truth are the source of His understanding and loving every creature.

Cajetan's Commentary

In the title, although the question is worded so as to be about things ("Do the Father and Son love ...?"), notice that the problem is about the truth of a proposition, *i.e.*, whether 'Father and Son love each other by the Holy Spirit' is true. For how the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit stand to each other as real things is quite clear, whether 'love' is taken identifier-wise or essence-wise.

Analysis of the article

ii. In the body of the article, Aquinas does three jobs: (1) he shows why there is a difficulty; (2) he mentions five opinions; (3) he answers the question.

iii. As to job (1), the reason for the difficulty is that the phrase, 'by the Holy Spirit', makes the proposition seem to convey the idea that the Holy Spirit stands as the *causal source* of the loving that occurs in the Father and the Son, which is impossible.

iv. As for job (2), the opinions are stated clearly enough in the text.

v. As to job (3), Aquinas lays down two conclusions, one for each side of the distinction drawn in the text, namely, that 'to love' is used two ways: for an essential act in God and for an identifier.

- The first conclusion is: with 'love' used for an essential act, one may not say that the Father and the Son *love* each other by the Holy Spirit.

- The second conclusion is: with 'love' used for an identifier, one may say that the Father and the Son *love* each other by the Holy Spirit.

These he clarifies and supports by making good sense of the fifth opinion on two bases, one having to do with the phrase "form-wise," and one having to do with a manner of description. The first basis is this: every descriptive term has what it takes to be [taken] form-wise. This is made clear first by the point that things are usually described in terms of forms they have; second, by the example of 'clothed'.

The second basis is that a producer can be described by what proceeds from it, not just [*1st part:*] as its action but also [*2nd part:*] as its action's effect: but this last is true only when the effect is included in understanding the action at all. Here the first part is illustrated by the case of fire described as "warming"; the second, by the case of a tree described as "blooming."

From these bases, plus the concept of 'loving' as an identifier-act, an argument in support of the second conclusion is well formed as follows. [*Major:*] Whenever an action's concept includes the action's effect, the doer of the action can be described in terms of the action and in terms of the effect; [*minor:*] "love" taken as an identifier is such an action; [*conclusion:*] ergo the Father and the Son can be described in terms of their love-action and in terms of the Holy Spirit. — That the minor holds true is made clear in two ways: (1) first by expounding 'loves' taken as an identifier, and (2) second by the parallel case of 'speaks'.

Meanwhile, the first conclusion, as is obvious in the text, is left alone as sufficiently supported by the authoritative quote from Augustine.

Trouble from Scotus

vi. About the points just made *re* the second conclusion, there is doubt on many grounds. Scotus argues four ways in his remarks on *I Sent.* d.33, q.1.

[a] He attacks the very foundation of Aquinas' position. [*Assumption:*] The concept of 'builds' involves a building, he says, because 'build' means *make a building*, and yet we do not say, 'A builder builds by a building'. And in the context at hand, 'spirate' means *emit a spirit*, but we do not admit that Father and Son spirate by the Holy Spirit.

So [*inference:*] Aquinas' foundation is worthless.

[b] Let an opinion like the fifth one Aquinas mentioned [*i.e.* that the phrase 'by the Holy Spirit' is mentioning a formal effect] be granted; it still would not follow that the phrase applies reflexively to the agent, and yet that is what is going on here when one says Father and Son "love themselves" [by the Holy Spirit].

[c] When a verb [of the relevant sort] is transitive, its effect is never expressed as an effect with 'by' [but with a direct-object construction]; but 'love' is a transitive verb; ergo [the effect of the Father's and Son's love cannot be expressed with 'by the Holy Spirit'.]

[d] Scotus combats the example of blooming in two ways: (1) First, because 'to bloom' does not mean to *produce flowers* (α) because it is an intransitive verb, meaning the same as if the corresponding adjective ['in flower'] were used, as 'to get hot' means 'to be hot'; (β) because (as Aureol adds) if God just stuck flowers on a tree, it would still be said to bloom. (2) Secondly, because the example is crucially different from the case at hand; with an intransitive verb like 'bloom', the phrase 'by ...' is not construed to mention the terminus of the action; but here the talk is of a transitive verb ('love'), and the 'by ...' is supposed to mention the action's terminus.

Cajetan's general reply

vii. To CLEAR AWAY this cloud of doubt, one must bear in mind two points. The first is that, where the foundation for our position says,

When the action's effect is included in understanding the action at all ...,

the condition can be understood two ways: in understanding the action language-independently,* or in understanding it as mentioned with such-and-such language.[†] In the case at hand, the condition is not being taken the first way, but the second. The identifier-act whereby the Father and Son produce the Holy Spirit has just one correct account language-independently. But its account as mentioned with 'spirate' is different from its account as mentioned with 'love', because the latter includes something not present in the former, as Aquinas says in his answer *ad* (2).

The second point to bear in mind is that an effect's inclusion in understanding an action-as-men-

tioned-with-this-language comes about in two ways: (a) as *specifying* or determining the action's quality, the way whiteness is included in "to whiten" and as heat is included in "to warm," and ditto for other cases, so as to show that we are not talking about just any sort of doing but the kind mentioned by 'to warm', 'to whiten', 'to build', etc. (b) The second way an effect is included is as *joined* to the action, as the product is joined to its production, the way a vocal word is included in [the concept of] "to mention" used in its vocal sense. After all, 'to mention' is *to say a word about*. This is how 'included' is being taken here, so that the meaning of our fundamental claim is this:

whenever understanding an action-mentioned-with such-and-such-a-verb includes that action's effect, and the effect is included there as a product is joined to its production, the doer of the action can be described by that effect in a 'by...' phrase, etc.

And if you are looking for a reason why some verbs present actions in this way and some do not, there is no other reason to give but that some verbs are *used** to present actions in this way, and some are not. But the difference between them becomes visible in the fact that, when transitive verbs including their effect in this way are put together with other direct objects, as in 'Socrates mentions the history of Troy', those objects are not presented as standing in the product-to-production relation to the action.¹

But with [transitive] verbs that do not present actions in this way, the direct objects are still presented as product-to-production, as in 'Socrates builds a heaven'. And this difference arises from the prior one, namely, that verbs of the one class include in themselves a *distinctive effect*, while those of the other class do not.² Thus relation to the effect as terminus of the action remains unchanged in the one class, but changes with the direct object in the other.

Point-by-point against Scotus

With these points in place, the response to Scotus' first line of argument is obvious. We deny its assumption, because 'build', 'spirate' and other such verbs involve an effect only in the *specificative* way.³

Against his second argument, we say that a reflexive sentence can be put together when the object of the act can be the agent himself, as occurs in the case at hand and in similar cases as well. After all, Socrates

¹ This is correct. What the mentioning *produces* is a spoken or written word, not the topic spoken of.

² A *distinctive* effect included in the very meaning of a verb is what we call today an "internal object." Thus a dream is internal to 'I dreamed', a dance to 'I danced', a word to 'I spoke'. Making them explicit as direct objects is redundant.

³ A genuine internal object does not further specify the action, as the above examples show. It follows at once that, contra Scotus, a building is not internal to the verb 'build'. For one can also build a mound, a fence, or a funeral pyre. Hence, 'I am building a building' is not redundant but has an

* *absolutè*

† *ut sic significatae*: See the commentary on q.38, a.2, with its footnote 5

* *sunt impositi*

can mention himself just as well as Troy's history.⁴

Against his third, we deny its assumption also in the case of verbs that both include their effect in themselves and are transitive upon a direct object, like 'love', 'mention', etc. These are construed with a direct object as terminus of the transitivity and with a descriptive effect, as one can see in a case like 'Socrates mentions that history with a word'.

As to the points brought forward in Scotus' fourth line of argument, about blooming, an easy reply is that we do not use examples as if they were *exact* replicas of what they exemplify, etc. Nevertheless, sticking to the example, we say that 'bloom' does indeed mean *produce flowers*, as common usage makes obvious; but this does not conflict with the fact that 'bloom' is intransitive, because the latter is just a matter of grammar [*modus significandi*], not sense. Also, if God stuck flowers on a tree, we would say

informative direct object "specifying" the activity. Cajetan's fanciful example, 'Socrates is building a heaven', was perhaps intended to make the same point; a space filled with air and clouds is not a building.

Thus far the doctrine is clear enough, but it leaves a problem. Cajetan said above that when a verb with an internal object is given another direct object, this other object no longer stands as product-to-production. This was correct for the examples he chose, but other examples look to be counter-examples. What about 'waltz' in 'I danced a waltz'? Does waltz not stand to the dancing as product-to-production? I suggest that the answer is no. What I produce on a dance floor is always a rhythmic movement (a dance), and 'a waltz' specifies the *quale* of it, as would 'a polka', 'a reel', 'a ländler'.

⁴ The discussion in Latin has been about '*dicere*', which had broad usage, covering all the ground covered by the distinct English verbs 'say', 'speak', 'utter', and 'mention'. This is why Cajetan could write, '*Socrates dicit historiam Troiae*' and '*dicit se*'; but these have to come into English with 'mention' because English will not tolerate 'he spoke the history' or 'he spoke himself'.

truly enough that the tree "has flowers on it," but we would not say that it "bloomed." The right thing to say would be, "A tree which did not bloom has flowers on it." This example also shows that Scotus' final assumption is false, and neither Scotus nor Aureol did anything to support it.

Notice, too, that on an issue like this, in my judgment, it is enough to offer points that are reasonable because of the subject matter — in this case, words. For all these phenomena arise out of words with such-and-such sense. Hence — and what I am about to say is also clear from Aquinas' answer *ad* (2) — if one can say correctly, 'Socrates mentions Troy's history with a word', it is still not the case that one can replace 'mention' with its sense, so as to stay correct and say, 'Socrates says a word about Troy's history with a word'. For this difference between the correct and the incorrect arises from the words' different standing towards grammatical construction: 'say a word about' will not work with 'by a word', but 'mention' will. The case is similar with 'spirate' vs 'love' in connection with 'by the Holy Spirit', and with 'beget' vs. 'speak' in connection with 'by the Word' — as is clear in the text.⁵

⁵ It will not be surprising if, at the end of this article and commentary, the reader is left a bit less than convinced. For the article and commentary were both about issues in Latin, which do not easily become issues in English. As Cajetan well noted at the start of his commentary, the real difficulty here was whether a *sentence* was true, and a sentence is in a definite language, with its own grammar. Yes or no, did the Latin ablative have a use whereby '*Spiritu sancto*' could go into '*Pater et Filius diligunt se*' in such a way that the result was grammatically acceptable and yielded a true proposition? Aquinas's answer to that question could be quite good without turning successfully into an *English* discussion of whether 'by the Holy Spirit' can go into 'The Father and Son love each other' in such a way as to be grammatical *English* and yield the same true proposition. The translator's hope is that Aquinas' and Cajetan's discussions about Latin have become, at his hands, a plausible discussion about English.

Inquiry Thirty-Eight: Into the term 'Gift'

We turn next to the term 'Gift'. About this, two questions are raised:

- (1) can 'gift' be used for a Person?
- (2) is this use unique to the Holy Spirit?

article I

Can 'gift' be used for a Person?

In I Sent., d.8, a.2

It does not look as though 'gift' is used for a Person.

(1) After all, any term for a Person in God implies some distinctiveness. But 'gift' implies nothing distinctive in God. As Augustine says in *De Trinitate XI*,
 c.19: PL 42, 1086 "The Holy Spirit is given in such a way that God is the gift, so that He gives even Himself *as God*." Therefore 'gift' is not a term for a Person.

(2) Besides, no term for a Person applies to the divine essence. But the divine essence is a "gift," given by the Father to the Son, as you see from Hilary's *De Trinitate VIII*. So 'gift' is not a personal term.
 PL 10, 325

(3) Also, as Damascene says [in *De fide orthodoxa II'*], none among the divine Persons is subjected or subservient to Another. But being a gift implies being in some sort of subjection to the one by whom it is given. Therefore 'gift' is not a term for a Person.
 c.19: PG 94, 1085

(4) Moreover, [if no divine Person is a gift to Another, calling one a] 'a gift' implies a relation to creatures. In that case, it seems to be a term describing Him from time. But terms for a Person describe God from eternity, as 'Father' and 'Son' do. Ergo 'gift' is not a term for a Person.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Augustine says in *De Trinitate XI* [c. 19]: "As our body of flesh is nothing but flesh, so the 'Gift of the Holy Spirit' is nothing but the Holy Spirit." But 'the Holy Spirit' is a personal term. So, then, is 'Gift'.

ANSWER: what is implied in the term 'gift' is a suitability [*aptitudo*] for being given. For what is given has a suitability or relatedness both to the one giving it and to the one being given it. No one gives it, after all, unless it is his or hers, and it is given to someone in such a way as to become his or hers. Well, a divine Person is said to be "someone's" either because of His origin (as the Son is "the Father's" Son) or because He is "had" by someone. Well, what we call "had" by us is what we can freely use and enjoy as we please, and in this way a divine Person can only be "had" by a rational creature united to God.

Creatures not united to God can be *moved* by a di-

vine Person but not in such a way as to have it in their power to enjoy that Person or use His effect. But a rational creature sometimes attains to this status, e.g., as participating in the Word and in proceeding Love in such a way as to freely know God truly and freely love Him rightly. Thus, only a rational creature can "have" a divine Person. Yet even a rational creature cannot attain to having Him by the creature's own power. The status has to be given from above. Well, what we have from elsewhere we say is "given" to us. This is how a divine Person can be "given" and can be "a Gift."

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): 'gift' implies a personal distinction in one respect, namely, insofar as a gift is said to belong to someone by origin. Nevertheless, the Holy Spirit gives Himself inasmuch as He belongs to Himself, in the sense of being able to use (or rather enjoy) Himself, as a free man is said to belong to himself. This is what Augustine was saying in a *Treatise on John*: "What is really yours but you yourself?" — An alternative (and better) answer is to say that a gift has to belong in some way to the giver. But 'x belongs to y' is said in many senses. A first is by way of identity, as Augustine did in a *Treatise on John*, and in this sense the gift is not distinct from the giver but from the one given it; this is the sense in which the Holy Spirit "gives" Himself. In another sense, x belongs to y as the possession or servant of y; so taken, the gift has to be distinct in essence from the [divine] giver, and so this is the sense in which the "gift of God" is something created. In yet a third sense, x is said to belong to y just because of origin; this is how the Son is "the Father's Son" and how the Holy Spirit belongs to both. When the Gift is said to belong to the Giver in this third sense, they are distinct as Persons, and 'Gift' is a personal term.

ad (2): the [divine] essence is called a gift of the Father in the first of the senses just mentioned: by identity.

ad (3): when 'Gift' is used as a personal term in theology, the relation it implies to a Giver is not subjection to Him but just origin from Him. (The relation it implies to the one given it is that of free use or enjoyment, as I said.)

ad (4): a gift is not so called by being given actually but by being suitable to be given. Thus a divine Person is called a Gift from eternity, even though He is given in time. Also, the fact that 'Gift' implies a relation to creatures [receiving it] does not entail that the relation

has to be in God's essence, but only that understanding 'Gift' has to include understanding a point about God's essence, very much as understanding 'a Person' includes [understanding a point about] His essence, as was stated above.

Cajetan's Commentary

In the title, pay attention to the fact that, as the introduction to this inquiry makes clear, the intention in this article is to ask whether 'gift' *can be* a term for a Person, not whether it is *has to be* such. In other words, the question is whether, when we use it in theology, 'Gift' *in one of its senses* is a term for a person.

In the body of the article, there is a single conclusion answering in the affirmative: it suits a divine Person to be a Gift and to be given. The support goes as follows.

[Antecedent: 1st part:] A divine Person can "belong" to Someone by origin and *[2nd part:]* can be "had" by a rational creature but *[3rd part:]* not by any other kind and *[4th part:]* not by even a rational creature's own power; *[inference:]* hence a divine Person can be "a Gift" and can be "given."

The first part of the antecedent is obvious, because the Son belongs to the Father by origin. The second part holds because a rational creature can freely enjoy a divine Person and use His effect; the third part, because no other kind of creature can be raised up to the ability to enjoy a divine Person; the fourth part, finally, is obvious of itself. — Drawing the inference is supported by the three conditions for being given, namely: belonging to Someone as a giver, being able to belong to someone as a receiver, and being beyond the receiver's power, so as not to be owed to him. The first two conditions were stated at the beginning of the text and supported by the fact that 'gift' implies a suitability to be given. The third was stated at the end of the article.

If you like, you can turn the argument around and take as its antecedent the conditions for being given.

Is 'Gift' a proper name for the Holy Spirit?

In II Sent. d.18, a.2, De Veritate q 7, aa.3, 5.

It does not seem that 'Gift' is a proper name [*i.e.* a distinctive term] for the Holy Spirit.¹

(1) After all, a gift is so called from being given; but as Isaiah 9 says, "unto us a son is given." So being a gift fits the Son as well as the Holy Spirit.

(2) Further, any name proper to a person conveys something unique about him. But 'Gift' does not convey anything unique about the Holy Spirit. So 'Gift' is not a proper name for Him.

(3) Also, while the Holy Spirit can be called the "spirit of a given man," He cannot be called the gift of that man, but only the "Gift of God." Therefore 'Gift' is not a proper name for the Holy Spirit.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Augustine says in *De Trinitate IV*: "Just as the Son's being 'born' is His being from the Father, so also the Holy Spirit's being 'God's gift' is His proceeding from the Father and the Son." The Holy Spirit gets a proper name precisely as so proceeding. So 'Gift' is also a proper name of His.

ANSWER: as used in theology for a Person, 'Gift' is a proper name for the Holy Spirit.

To see this, one needs to know that a "gift" strictly so called is a case of giving for which there is no return (according to Aristotle in *Topics IV*), in that it is not made with the intention of being recompensed. So 'gift' implies a free* giving. But what explains free giving is love; after all, we give something to a person freely because we *will* him a good [and willing him or her a good is what it means to say we love

¹ On 'proper name', see footnote 1 on p. 622.

him or her]. Thus the very first thing we give a person is the love whereby we will a good for him or her. So, it is clear that love itself has what it takes to be the "first gift," thanks to which all other free gifts are given. Since the Holy Spirit proceeds, then, as love (as I said above), He proceeds as what it takes to be the "first Gift." This is why Augustine says in *De Trinitate XV* that the many particular gifts given to the members of Christ are distributed *through* the Gift which is the Holy Spirit.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): because the Son proceeds after the fashion of an inner word, and such a word carries likeness-to-its-source as part of its own inner makeup, the Son is distinctively called the Image (even though the Holy Spirit is like the Father, too); just so the Holy Spirit, because He proceeds from the Father as Love, is distinctively called the Gift (even though the Son is given, too). For the fact that the Son is given comes from the Father's love, as it says in John 3:16, "God so loved the world, that He gave His only-begotten Son ..."

ad (2): [as used for a Person in theology], the word 'Gift' implies that the Gift belongs to the Giver thanks to origin. And thus it implies the uniqueness of the Holy Spirit's origination, which is procession.

ad (3): before the Gift is given, He belongs entirely to the Giver; after He has been given, He belongs to the receiver. Therefore, since the title 'Gift' does not imply that the giving has actually taken place, the Holy Spirit cannot be called "a man's gift" but only "God's gift." But once He has already been given, then He is "a man's spirit or gift."

q.27, a.3, q.37,
a.1
c.29, PL 42, 1084

Cajetan's Commentary

The title is clear, thanks to remarks made earlier.

Analysis of the article

ii. In the body of the article, a single conclusion answers the question in the affirmative: as used for a Person, 'Gift' is a proper name in theology for the Holy Spirit. The support goes thus. [*Antecedent:*] 'Gift' means a giving with no expected return; so [*1st inference:*] it implies that the giving has what it takes to be freely done; so [*2nd inference:*] it implies love; and so [*3rd inference:*] love is the first gift. Therefore [*4th inference:*] the Holy Spirit proceeds as First Gift, and so 'Gift' is a proper name for Him.

The antecedent is obvious from Aristotle. The first inference is made clear by the fact that a giving with no expected return is a free giving. The second

inference rests on the ground that we give freely to someone because we will him a good. The third is supported on the ground that love is the reason for giving and is also itself given. The fourth inference then rests on the ground that the Holy Spirit alone proceeds as Love. The conclusion is also confirmed on the authority of Augustine.

Multiple doubts

iii. About what has just been stated, there arises first a general uncertainty. What does 'Gift' convey first-off? The Holy Spirit's personal uniqueness? A suitability relation to rational creatures? Or something else? There is also a many-sided doubt raised by Aureol, as reported by Capreolus on *I Sent. d.18.*

● For one thing, this article contradicts the previous inquiry, where he said the Holy Spirit proceeds "as an

Influence.” Here, he says the Spirit proceeds “as Love.”

• Also, this latter claim is false. For [*Conditional*:] if the Holy Spirit proceeded as love, that whereby God is the Spirit would be the same as that whereby He is love: so [*inference*:] that whereby God is the Spirit would be the same as that whereby He is good and wise, etc., because love is what He is in essence.

• Also, when the Holy Spirit is said to proceed “as Love,” the word ‘love’ is being taken either essence-wise or Person-wise. [1] If essence-wise, it is not germane here, and also it would follow that because of how He proceeds the Holy Spirit would involve a causality towards creatures, namely, the one that love involves when love is taken as internal to God’s essence. [2] But if ‘love’ is being taken Person-wise, Aquinas’ consequence is invalidly drawn, because his argument that love has what it takes to be “first gift” only comes out right when ‘love’ is taken essence-wise; after all, the love in God’s essence is the reason for all His free giving.

Replies to Aureol

iv. To CLEAR ALL THIS UP, you need to realize that general talk of a gift obviously implies three items:

- the thing that can be given,
- its relation of givability to [the recipient], and
- its quasi-possession relation, *i.e.* its belonging to the one who can give it.

As an external description [*denominativē*], ‘gift’ means a thing that can be given, because that very status is what the word conveys.¹ This relation of givability, *i.e.* the thing’s aptness to be given [to a recipient] is what ‘gift’ conveys first-off, as you can gather from the text of both these articles. For this is the starting point of the argument in both, as the insightful reader will see. But the relation to the *giver* is what ‘gift’ co-conveys (I think) rather than conveys. Alternatively, you may say it conveys the possession relation secondarily.²

But the claim that ‘Gift’ as used in theology for a Person because that Person is the “first Gift”

- describes Love as a thing that can be given (because it belongs to the Giver by way of origin),
- co-conveys the procession-relation constitutive of the Holy Spirit, but
- conveys a thought-produced relation to rational creatures (because He is givable to them alone), taking the items in the same order (I think) as I asserted for ‘gift’ in general.³

Nevertheless, the order of items in the real is dif-

ferent from the order in which they are conveyed semantically. [In the real], what pertains to the Holy Spirit first-off is His personal distinctive, thanks to which He belongs to the Father and the Son, the Givers; then comes His status as Love, thanks to which He is the First Givable; and thirdly comes His relation of givability-to. The point that this relation of givability-to pertains to the Holy Spirit because of the love in the divine essence, which He includes, is supported by the argument that nothing Personal as such includes a relation to creatures, and we are persuaded of it by the text of a. 1, in the answer *ad* (4), where we are taught in so many words that the account of ‘Gift’ includes a point about God’s essence (just as the definition of ‘Person’ does) and that this point [since it is about the love in God’s essence] is what makes ‘gift’ imply a relatedness to creatures, whereas ‘Gift’ is a personal term because of the identifier [Love]. However, the fact that God’s essential love is implied in the term ‘Gift’ is obvious on the same basis, namely, that a relation to creatures forces any term that conveys it to imply a point about God’s essence.⁴ Both in the real, then, and semantically (apart from the order in which it signifies items) ‘Gift’ stands as ‘Word’ stands. For JUST AS ‘Word’ bespeaks three items — a relation to its origin [the Speaker], an initial awareness [in the Speaker], and a relation to the things said by the word (including the things that are also to be made) — SO ALSO ‘Gift’ bespeaks a relation to its origin [the Giver], love [as what is in the Giver], and a relation to the things loved (including those that can receive the gift). And JUST AS making the same argument from [what] things [contain] to [what] words [convey] and then back again [from what words convey to what things contain] is no good, because it is not valid [e.g. the following is not valid:]

the Word as “the Word” bespeaks a relation to things said; so, the distinguishing trait of the Son [begottenness] bespeaks such a relation nor this conversely:

the distinguishing trait of the Son bespeaks no such relation; so, neither does the Word as “the Word.”

because the term ‘Word’ implies more than that distinctive trait does. SO ALSO one must think in parallel fashion about the Gift: one cannot argue validly from the word ‘Gift’ to the distinctive trait of the Holy Spirit, nor *vice-versa*, because “the Gift” conveys more, as is clear from points already stated. Be careful to see, therefore, whether the discussion is about *sheer things* or about *things under names*. If we are talking about sheer things, no Person who proceeds has (thanks to His procession) any real item or distinctive makeup to Him but the relation of origin which is identically Himself. In sheer-thing talk, then, neither an initial awareness nor a relation to things said pertains to the Person of the Word, and neither being love nor having the gift-rela-

¹ A gift-shop is so called because the things for sale in it (whatever their natures) are called “gifts,” meaning, things having the status of being able/apt to be given.

² The things for sale in a gift-shop are “able to be given” once you buy them; for then they are *yours*.

³ Actually, the order is slightly different because love, though givable, automatically belongs to the person loving.

⁴ A point about God’s essence is in play *not because* God is essentially related to creatures, but because their relations to Him are solely to Him as One in essence.

tions pertains to the Person of the Holy Spirit. But if we are talking about the same Persons *as indicated by these names*, 'Word' and 'Gift', then we say that the Person of the Word has a distinctive relation to things said, and that the Person of the Gift has such relation to things open to receive Him. *etc.*⁵ And now you can see how to dissolve Aureol's many arguments reported by Capreolus (at the place cited) — the arguments trying to show that

a relation of givability is not distinctive of any Person.

This in fact is true, if we are looking at how the divine Persons are by reason of their personal distinctives just as such [*simpliciter*]. But it is false if we are looking at how They are by reason of the absolute factor included in Them [namely, the divine nature] — included not extraneously but as falling into the account of Them obliquely, as 'of a rational nature' goes into the definition of "a person," and as 'of the divine nature' would fall into the account of "a divine Person," if They were defined, and likewise 'divine knowledge' would be used in defining "the divine Word," if He were defined, and 'divine love' would be used in defining "the Gift" if He were defined, *etc.*

Point-by-point replies

Going back now to Aureol's arguments, I reply as follows.

— Thanks to poverty of vocabulary, we say sometimes that the Holy Spirit proceeds "as Influence," sometimes "as Impulsion," sometimes "as Love," *etc.*, to enable us by using so many alternative terms to convey an obscure thing that has no name of its own.

— As to his added claim that 'the Holy Spirit proceeds as Love' is false. I reject it. This oft-made statement of the saints is true.

ad (1) To his first alternative against it, I respond by denying his inference from the love that is essential in God: it is not the case that that whereby God is love is that whereby He is the Holy Spirit — even though by one and the same procession the Holy Spirit is at once God and Love and Blessed, *etc.*, as is clear from Augustine and Jerome in *I Sent.* d.19.

⁵ Cajetan's distinction between sheer things and things under names needs to be taken carefully, as native to theology, not as it would be taken in a physicalist project like Quine's. In Quine's world, *every* reality which enters human experience enters it independently of human language. But theology studies realities which enter our consciousness as revealed under inspired descriptions drawn from Hebrew, Aramaic, or Greek — not independently of these human languages. Theology must select from them words ("names") which will serve as controlling descriptions under which the revealed realities are to be identified, distinguished, explain-

ad (2) To his second alternative, I respond by saying that 'love' is being taken Person-wise and yet the consequence that the Holy Spirit proceeds as Love is validly drawn, *i.e.* He proceeds as the Influence that arises in and by loving. Therefore, He does proceed as First Gift, because (thanks to His manner of proceeding) love taken essence-wise is included in the defining makeup of that Influence obliquely, as we say knowledge [taken essence-wise] is included obliquely in [the makeup of] the Word, and as we say a nature is included obliquely in the defining makeup of a person. And so it is no problem that essence-wise love is proved to be a gift, and yet being the Gift pertains to Person-wise Love — thanks to the fact that the essence-wise love is included in the Person-wise Love.

One may also say, and say truly, that being the first gift is proved for "influence" in general; and then rising up to divine things, one can infer that it is proved for the Holy Spirit who is that Influence. But since He is a relational reality, and the gift-relation is found to belong to the influence in general because of the non-relational element included in it, we come to understand that the gift-relation belongs to the Holy Spirit because of the non-relational element included in the account of Him as a relational Reality.

Again, one may say thirdly that when the Holy Spirit is said to proceed "as Love," the word 'as' indicates the manner of essential love, since this is really "how" He proceeds. And thus it is more from how He proceeds than from His distinctive trait as proceeding that one proves that 'Gift' (as to the thought-produced relation He has to the things able to receive Him) is a proper name of the Holy Spirit (with His relation of origin being co-understood).

For any of these terms that imply more, lest you go wrong in handling them, judge them as you would complex terms embracing both an identifier and an essential element, such as 'begotten Wisdom', 'produced Love' and the like. For any of these terms is a Person's "proper name" because of the whole combined together (or one part is proper name because of the other part). Such is the case with 'Gift' and similar terms, upon analysis of what is included in their senses, as is obvious in itself.⁶

ed, *etc.* Then other terms for these realities found in Scripture or Tradition can be investigated for what connotations they *add* to the controlling descriptions. Such is the work being done in this article and its commentary. The "Holy Spirit" is a revealed *X* taken as a sheer thing, while "Gift" is the same *X* under a name. Ditto for "Son" and "Word."

⁶ At the end of this remarkable commentary, one hardly knows which to admire more: the acute semantics, the delicate theology, or how both were handled at once. The semantics were already discussed in footnotes 1-3 and 5. The theology was discussed briefly in footnote 4.

Inquiry Thirty-Nine: Into the Persons as they relate to their essence

After considering the Persons individually, it remains to consider how they [1] compare to their essence, [2] to their distinctive traits, and [3] to their identifying acts, plus [4] how these latter compare to each other. On the first topic, eight questions are raised:

- | | |
|---|---|
| (1) in God, is essence the same thing as person? | (5) can they be applied to essence terms in the abstract? |
| (2) should one say three Persons "of one essence"? | (6) can the Persons' names be predicated of concrete essence-terms? |
| (3) should traits essential to God be ascribed to the Persons in the plural or in the singular? | (7) are essential attributes to be appropriated to the Persons? |
| (4) can identifier adjectives, verbs, or participles be applied to essence terms in the concrete? | (8) should an attribute be appropriated to each Person? |

article I

Is "essence" the same thing as "person" in God?

I ST q 3, a.3, In I Sent d 34, q.1, a.1, In III Sent d.6, q.2, a.2 ad 2

It looks as though the essence in God is not the same thing as the Person.

(1) After all, in any case where a thing's essence is the same as its person or referent, there can be only one referent of that nature, as we see in all the substances separate from matter [the angels]. For where factors A and B are the same in the real, the count of one of them cannot rise unless the count of the other rises, too. Well, in God there is *one* essence but *three* Persons, as emerged above. Therefore, His essence is not the same thing as a Person.

q.28, a.3; q.30, a.2

(2) Besides, an affirmative proposition and its negation are not true of the same *thing* at the same time. But such is the case with the essence and a Person in God: a Person "is" distinct [from another Person], and the essence "is not." So the Person and the essence are not the same *thing*.

(3) Also, nothing stands as a subject having or underlying itself. But a person stands as a subject underlying his essence, and this is why he is called a *subposit* [referent] or *hypo-stasis* of the essence. [Ergo a person is not the same thing as his essence.]

ON THE OTHER HAND, Augustine says in *De Trinitate VII* that when we say "the Person of the Father," we are saying nothing but "the substance of the Father."

c.6;
PL 42, 943

I ANSWER: for those who bear in mind the divine simplicity, the point being questioned is open and shut. It was shown above, after all, that divine simplicity requires essence and referent to be the same in God (and in intellectual substances the "referent" is nothing but the person). But difficulty is seen to arise when one takes into account the fact that the divine essence remains one even though the divine Persons are found to be more than one.

q.3, a.3

Boethius said [in his *De Trinitate*, c.6] that *relation* is what raises the count of Persons to three; and so some authors have taken the view that essence and Person differ in God in the same way as relations are said to be "adjacent" [to what they relate]. These authors were looking at relations just insofar as they are "towards another," not taking into account the fact that relations are also real things. — The truth of the matter (as was shown above) is that, just as relations are real in creatures by being in them as accidents, so they are real in God by being [in Him as] the divine essence itself.

PL 64, 1254

From there it follows that, in God, the essence is not other than a Person *as one real thing is other than another [secundum rem]*, and yet the Persons are distinguished from one another exactly as thing-from-thing [realiter]. For 'Person' conveys, as I said above, a relation R as subsisting in the divine nature. Well, *vis-à-vis* the essence, R is not different from it as one thing differs from another but as one account of the thing differs from another account of it [*in ratione*]; but *vis-à-vis* an opposed relation *Æ*, R has thing-from-thing distinctness thanks to the opposition. Thus, the upshot is one essence and three Persons.

q.28, a.2

q.29, a.4

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): in created cases, distinctness of one referent from another cannot be thanks to relations alone but has to come from <essential>* factors, because relations among creatures do not subsist. But the relations within God are subsistent; and so, by being opposed to one another, they can make referents distinct. Yet even so, they do not introduce distinction in-

* textual slip?
Read 'absoluta'?

¹ Opposition between two relations occurs when both are irreflexive, both are asymmetrical, and one is converse to the other. Thus father-of opposes son-of, speaker-of opposes word-of, and spirit-of opposes spirit-of.

to God's essence because, as each is the same thing as His essence, they [are not opposed to each other in that regard and so] are not distinct from each other [in that regard].

ad (2): since there is a way in which "essence" and "person" differ in God, namely, in how the mind gives its account of them,* some point can be affirmed of the one and denied of the other. Thus when one is being referred to [as an object understood], the other is not.²

ad (3): we bring divine things into language the way we bring created things into it, as I said above. Since

² Venus is a single planet, but because it yields different appearances (with the sun rising or setting), the mind can form distinct accounts of it: the Morning Star and the Evening Star. If the planet is taken independently of these accounts relating it to the sun, it cannot be said to shine at all. But one can also take it in *one or the other account*, and then it does shine, but at conflicting times. This is Aquinas's point. The mere distinctness of the accounts has the logical effect denied by the objector.

the natures of created things are individuated by the matter which stands as the subject having their specific nature, it comes about that individuals are called "subjects" or "referents" or "hypostases" [of their nature]. This is why divine Persons are also called referents or hypostases; it is not because they really "underlie" God's nature or stand as "subjects" having it.³

³ The metaphysical structure of creatures requires that an individual and its nature come into language with different syntax: the individual as a name or concrete noun; its nature, as a predicate or abstract noun. When the talk turns to God, His metaphysical structure is very different, but the syntactical difference between how a Person is mentioned and how His essence is mentioned remains. (It remains because we learn to speak by talking about created things and have no other way to talk, as Aquinas says.) This difference supports distinct accounts of one and the same mysterious Thing (an account of It as a Person and an account of It as an essence), much as the different appearances of Morning Star and Evening Star allow them to convey distinct accounts of one and the same not-so-mysterious thing.

Cajetan's Commentary

In the title, "the same thing" means thing-wise identity.

In the body of the article, Aquinas does four jobs: (1) he explains the reason for the question; (2) he reports a certain opinion at "Boethius said ..."; (3) he undermines the opinion at "The truth of the matter ..."; (4) he answers the question at "From there it follows..."

ii. As for job (1), note that the author was vulnerable to the objection that this article is superfluous. Above in q. 3 about the divine simplicity, it was already brought up and settled [in a. 4] that the referent in God is utterly the same thing as the essence. Therefore, at the outset he gave a reason why this article is needed, pointing out that so far as God's simplicity is concerned, the issue was perfectly clear and did not need repeating; but given the trinity of referents or Persons, proved later, a difficult question emerges about the oneness of God's essence, and hence a new discussion is needed, for which there was no occasion back in q. 3.

iii. As for job (2), he seems to be referring to the opinion of Gilbert of La Porrée, to the effect that a Person is not the same thing as the essence because a relation is merely adjacent [to the essence] and hence does not pass into it. Neither does the Person, therefore, because the Person Himself is a relation.

iv. As for job (3), he attacks this opinion because it assumes a false antecedent. A relation in creatures is not just adjacent but exists in [a created substance]; in God, therefore, a relation is not just "towards" but has a substantial being, as is stated at greater length in q. 28.

v. As for job (4): a conclusion answers the question: [part 1] a Person is the same thing as the essence in real terms, while [part 2] the Persons are distinct from

one another in real terms. Support is given for both parts. [*Antecedent:*] A [divine] Person is a relation subsisting in the divine nature; *ergo* [*inference:*] the relation is thing-wise the same as the essence and is thing-wise distinct from another Person relationally opposed to Him. Drawing the inference is supported thus: compared to God's essence, a relation in God does not differ from it in the real but only in our account of it.* But compared to a converse relation, it has real distinction from it, and this is thanks to real relational opposition.

Trouble from Scotus

vi. Concerning the proposition that a relation or Person does not differ from God's essence in the real but only in our account, objections arise. Writing on *I Sent.* d.2. q.4, Scotus wants Person and essence to be distinct in God without any act of a mind at work.¹ He advances his case with reasons and authorities.

His first argument goes thus. [*Antecedent:*] God the Father, apart from any act of the mind, has in the real a being-status that can be shared² [i.e. His being God] and one that cannot be shared³ [i.e. His being the Father]. Therefore, [*inference:*] He has in Himself a reality amenable to diverse formal accounts. Drawing the inference is supported on the following ground. [*Assumed conditional:*] if it were amenable to just one such account, the Father's being would be just shareable or else just unshareable, both of which are heretical.

His second argument is this. [*Antecedent:*] God the Father, in the first logical moment of His origin,⁴ either understands His essence and fatherhood as two objects formally distinct, or else He doesn't. [*1st alternative:*] If He does, I carry my point, because intuitive knowing is

* *secundum intelligentiae rationem*

q.13, a.1

* *non differt re sed ratione tantum*

† *sine omni actu intellectus*

‡ *communicabilis*
§ *incommunicabilis*

Cajetan's answer is in § viii

¶ *in primo instante originis*

knowing a thing as present in oneself. [2nd *alter-native*:] If He does not, then His essence and fatherhood are different only in how they are conceived; in that case [inference:] the distinction between them does not make the one shareable and the other unshareable. The inference is correct because a conceptual distinction does not introduce anything into reality.

The answer is coming in § ix

c 1;
PL 42, 935

His authorities, meanwhile, are from Augustine, *De Trinitate VII*, "Every being described by a relation is something else besides the sheer relation." Also, from the same source, "If the Father is not something in Himself [*ad se*], He is not related to another [*ad aliud*]." And about the Son, Augustine says, "that whereby He is the Son is not that whereby He is wisdom." From all of these it is clear that a thing intrinsically absolute is not formally the same as a relational thing.

These authorities are critiqued in § x

Solutions

vii. To clear these matters up, you need to know that ● just as there is in God in fact (or in the real order) just one Thing, which is not merely absolute, nor merely relational, nor a mixture of the two, nor a composite, nor a resultant from them, but having form-wise* and in the highest manner† the perfection of the relational (indeed, of many relational things) and of the absolute,

*formaliter
† eminentissimè

● so also in the explanatory order (or the order of things' formal explanatory accounts), intrinsically speaking and not just from our point of view, there is for God just one formal explanatory account, which is not merely absolute nor merely relational, not merely shareable nor merely unshareable, but containing form-wise and in the highest manner both everything belonging to absolute [non-relational] perfection and everything the relational Trinity requires.

This has to be the case because, for anything which is simple, intrinsically and maximally "one," the mind must render *one* formal account equivalent to it; otherwise, it would not be first-off and of itself † "one intelligible object" for any intellect. This is confirmed by the fact that God's inner Word is unique. After all, if a word is "complete," it corresponds equivalently to what it is the word for.

‡ per se primo

Where we go wrong, in raising our minds to God from absolute and relational things, is in our imagining that the distinction between absolute and relative is prior, as it were, to the divine Thing, and so we think we have to put It into the one pigeonhole or the other. But quite the opposite is the case. The divine Thing is prior to being and all its divisions. It is above "being" and above "one," etc.¹ Analogously, as lower powers are raised up into the one power of the sun, in such a way as to be no longer form-wise distinct and separate from each other, so *a fortiori* are

¹ The common being found analogously in all ten categories plus its equally analogous "transcendental" traits of being one, being good, etc., are all secondary to the divine Thing, which is the prime analogue of the whole lot.

the absolute and the relative raised up to the one divine Thing and its formal explanatory account.

viii. So, against Scotus' first argument. I deny the inference [that God has in Himself a reality amenable to diverse formal accounts]. And against his support for it, I deny the conditional he assumes. For from the fact that God is amenable to just one formal account in Himself, it does not follow that He is just shareable or just unshareable; rather, it follows that He is both shareable and unshareable on account of the infinity of that formal account; and it is no more surprising that a single formal account should embrace both than that a single Thing should have both. Indeed, this follows in sound philosophy from what is posited by the Faith. For novices, you can also distinguish that assumed conditional: it is true of a single limited formal account, but not of an unlimited one (which happens to be the case at hand).

ix. Against his second argument, the thing to say is that the Father understands His essence and Fatherhood not as intrinsically two formal objects but as one object form-wise and many objects power-wise* (as is obvious from the previous remarks) — not in such a way that His fatherhood and essence are just power-wise in that supreme Thing and formal account, but in such a way that that they are both in It form-wise and thing-wise, while *distinction* between them is only in It power-wise. For they are in It *as if* they were distinct, and It exercises the proper act of each *as if* they were distinct.

Scotus went wrong by dismissing this manner of speaking [in which God is said to be this *and* that "form-wise but in a higher manner"] and by introducing another manner of speaking, utterly his own, namely, speaking of a "formal distinction from the nature of the thing." This new way of speaking is very foreign to the higher manner in which "forms" are in God. It splits the divine Thing into form-wise "parts." But the manner of speaking we have followed is in every way consonant with so high a Thing.²

x. Against his authorities, the thing to say is that we echo back the lofty things of God by babbling as best we can. So Augustine and the Fathers who taught about essence and relation spoke of them as formally distinct. This has a partial basis, on the one hand, in the real, namely, the fact that they are formally distinct power-wise but not actually; on the other hand, to our minds, its basis is the fact that they are actually distinct by an objective account; but this fact posits nothing in God but a relational word for a thought-produced being.³

² This § ix is Thomism's ultimate *theological* critique of the Subtle Doctor's "formal distinction." It deserves to be quoted more often.

³ When God is spoken of by us, a thought-produced relation arises between God and our words. In that relation here, He "verifies" two terms which are actually distinct in human thought. But it does not follow that He needs to have an actual distinction in Himself, in the real, in order to do so — any more than an electron needs an actual distinction it itself in order to verify 'wave' and 'particle.' After all, the "trait" of "verifying distinct descriptions" is just a thought-produced relational trait.

in § vi

in § vii

* virtualiter

in § vi

On the answer *ad* (1)

xi. Notice that the gist of the answer lies in the fact that this very broad major premise [*i.e.*, that where the nature and its referent are the same in the real, the referent cannot become many without the nature's becoming many as well] does not hold true in the case where the nature is absolute and the referent is relational, thanks to the effect of relational opposition, as is clear from remarks made above.

On the answer *ad* (2)

xii. Against this answer, Aureol has made the objection stronger in an attack reported by Capreolus on *II Sent.* d.2, q.3). Aureol's attack goes as follows. [*Major:*] An effect in act has a cause in act. But [*1st minor:*] absence of contradiction [in God the Father] between "shareable" and "unshareable," "distinct from" and "not distinct from" is an effect in act [say you Thomists] before any intervention of the mind. Therefore [*1st conclusion:*] it has a cause in act. But [*2nd minor:*] the cause of this absence of contradiction is a distinction. Therefore, [*2nd conclusion:*] there is a distinction [in act] in God before any intervention by the mind. And it does not suffice to say that the distinction is in God basis-wise; for then the cause would not be in act and yet its effect would be in act, contrary to Aristotle in *Metaphysics V* and *Physics II*.

Some writers have tried to reply by denying Aureol's minor, on the ground that the negative side of the contradiction [saying the Father is unshareable, not distinct] is not "in act" before the mind goes to work, since a negation is nothing but a thought-produced being. But this reply is worthless. It ignores the difference between the 'is not' which means negation in exercised act and the same 'is not' insofar as it puts on

what it takes for there to be a thought-produced being. "A man is not a cow" means neither real being nor thought-produced being, but just that he "is not a cow." Granted, if no intellect thought about it, this sentence would not exist and would not have the makeup of a being. But the state of affairs picked out by the sentence does not depend on an intellect.

In fact the argument can be made a bit stronger:

[*major:*] an effect in act has a cause in act; but [*1st minor:*] affirmations including contradictories like common (shared) and proper (not shared) are effects in act. Ergo, *etc.*

xiii. My sole response to this and all similar arguments is to say that I deny across the board [Aureol's second minor, namely] the proposition that a distinction is the only cause of this effect. After all, this effect can arise from a distinction (as from a univocal cause, as it were) but also from something power-wise containing a distinction (as from an equivocal cause) [*i.e.* from something having the power to cause a distinction]. Now obviously, when an effect can arise from a univocal cause acting alone *and* from an equivocal cause acting alone, neither sort of cause follows determinately from the premise that the effect is in act; only a disjunction of them follows. Well, such is the situation in the case at hand. So I concede that an effect in act has a cause in act; but this cause is *either* a distinction in act *or* a thing having the power to cause a distinction in act, and this second option is the right one in the case at hand, and nothing posed by our objectors militates against it power-wise.

Keep this well in mind in all the subject matters where the Scotists and others are bothering you about the cause of a distinction [which they say is there] because of a reason on the side of the real. With this one thrust you will silence the lot of them.

Should one say the three Persons are "of one essence"?

In I Sent d.25, d.34, q.1, a.22

It would seem not.

c.13, PL 10, 503 (1) In his *De Synodis*, Hilary says the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are "three by substance but one by harmony." But God's substance is His essence. Hence the three Persons are not "of one essence."

PG 3, 588 (2) Also, nothing should be said of God which was not made explicit by the authority of Holy Writ, as Denis says in c. 1 of *De divinis nominibus*. Well, nowhere does it say in Scripture that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are "of one essence." Ergo, this is not to be said.

(3) Besides, God's essence is the same as the divine nature. So it would suffice to say that the three Persons are "of one nature."

(4) Moreover, standard usage does not say that a person is "of an essence" but that an essence is that "of a person." So it hardly seems fitting to say the three Persons are "of one essence."

De Trinitate VII, c.6, PL 42, 945 (5) Further, as Augustine says, we do not say the three Persons are "from one essence," lest people get the idea that essence and person are different things in God. But the preposition 'of' [for the possessive case] is just as transitive as the preposition 'from'. So we have the same reason not to say the three Persons are "of one essence."

c.13, PL 10, 526 (6) Furthermore, when we speak of God, what could occasion error should not be said. Well, when the three Persons are called "of one essence" or "of one substance," there is occasion for error. For as Hilary says in *De synodis*, the "of one substance" either means one thing having two participants, or means that one substance is divided to make two partial ones, or else that a third, prior substance is assumed and named from the two. Hence one should not say the three Persons are "of one substance."

PL 42, 772 ON THE OTHER HAND, in Book II [or chapter 14] of his *Contra Maximinum*, Augustine says that the word "homoussion", made official at Nicaea against the Arians, means the same as saying the Persons are "of one essence."

I ANSWER: as I said above, how our mind puts divine things into language does not go according to how they are (because our mind cannot know them that way) but according to how they are found [reflected] in created things. And given that our mind gets its optimal knowledge from empirical things, and that in such things a species is individuated by matter (so that the nature stands as a form, with the individual standing as a referent of the form), the syntax we use in speaking of divine things has God's essence standing as the form of the three Persons. Well, in speaking of created things, we say that a form is "of" the

thing whose form it is, like a man's good health or good looks. Admittedly, we do not say a thing having a form is "of that form" unless an adjective is attached to modify the form, as when we say, "This girl is of outstanding beauty," or "This guy is a man of perfect virtue." Likewise in the talk of God: given that the Persons are multiple but the essence is not, ["one" serves as the modifying adjective, and so] we say "one essence of the three Persons" and "three persons of one essence," so that the 'of' constructions may be understood as applying to the form.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): here 'substance' is being taken to mean hypostasis, not essence.

ad (2): although the point that the three Persons are of one essence is not found in Scripture in these exact words, the sense of it is found in many places, such as "I and the Father are one" [Jn 10:30], and "I am in the Father, and the Father is in me" [Jn 10:38; Jn 14:10], and in many other places.

ad (3): 'nature' indicates the source of action, while 'essence' is taken from the word for being ['*essendo*']. As a result, all things doing the same sort of action, like all heaters, can be called "of one nature." But only things having one being can be called "of one essence." Hence, the divine unity is better expressed by saying "of one essence" than by saying "of one nature."

ad (4): a form taken by itself, in standard usage, is taken as "of" the one whose form it is, as in "the virtue of Peter." Conversely, the one having a form is not standardly taken as "of it," unless we wish to specify the form further. Then we need a two-word 'of' construction, as in "Peter is of great virtue" or one word having the force of two, as when it says [in the Bible] "He is a man of bloods," meaning a man given to the shedding of much blood. Therefore, since the divine essence comes into language as a form *vis-à-vis* the Persons, the essence is fittingly said to be "of the Person," and not *vice-versa*, unless something is added to describe or specify the essence, as in saying that the Father is a Person "of the divine essence" or in saying that the three Persons are "of one essence."

ad (5): the preposition 'from' does not indicate the standing of a formal cause, but rather that of an efficient or material cause. Such causes are distinguished in all cases from the items they cause: nothing is its own matter, and nothing is its own active source. But something *is* its own form, as we see in all things independent of matter. So given that we indicate the essence in the standing of a formal cause and say "three Persons of one essence," nothing indicates that the essence is a different thing from the Person (but this

would be indicated if we said “three Persons from one essence”).

c.13: PL 10, 538

ad (6): as Hilary says in *De synodis*, “Holy things are badly misjudged if they are supposed not to be holy just because some people don’t accept them as

such.” Likewise, “If ‘homoousion’ is badly understood, what is that to me, who understand it well?” — *PL 10, 527*
Also, he says, “Let there be one substance, then, because of the uniqueness of the nature of the begotten; but let it not be one by taking apart, putting together, or sharing.”

Cajetan’s Commentary

In the title, the only thing to note is that the question is about a proposition, whether it is true and suitable.

ii. In the body of the article, there is just one conclusion, answering the question in the affirmative: we say “One essence of three Persons” and “Three Persons of one essence.” The support goes as follows. [*Antecedent:*] How divine things are brought into language by us is not in the way they are but in the way they are found in created things. Therefore [*1st inference:*] the essence in God is presented as the “form” of the three Persons, and so [*2nd inference:*] we call it the one essence of the three, and we

call the three “of one essence.”

The antecedent is supported on the ground that this is how we know God. — The first inference rests on the ground that a nature is individuated by matter in empirical things, and so stands as a form, while the individual stands as a referent. — The second inference is supported on the ground that, in empirical cases, a form is said to be “of” its referent, and the referent is said to be “of” its form provided that there is an adjective put in to specify the form, as is obvious from the examples.

All the points in the text are clear.

Should essence-terms like 'God' stay in the singular when predicated of the Persons?

In I Sent. d.42, a.2 ad 5; In Boethii de Trinitate q.1, a.4

Terms describing God by what is essential to Him (like the word 'God' itself) should not stay singular, it seems, but become plural when predicated of the three Persons.

(1) After all, [the words 'God' and 'man' have the same grammar.] 'God' serves grammatically to indicate one "having divineness" as 'man' serves for one "having humanness." Well, the Persons are three having divineness. So, [just as 'man' becomes plural in "three men"], the three Persons are three "Gods."

(2) Besides, in Genesis 1:1 where it says, "in the beginning God created heaven and earth," the Hebrew original has '*Elohim*', which can be translated as 'Gods' or 'judges', and it is inflected this way on account of the plurality of Persons. Therefore, the three Persons are three Gods, not one.

(3) Moreover, the word 'thing' (when it stands independently) seems to point to a substance. But 'thing' is said of the three Persons in the plural in *De doctrina Christiana*, where Augustine says, "The things we are to enjoy are the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit." Thus, other essence-terms, too, can be plural when said of the three Persons.

c.5,
PL 34,21

q 29, a.1

(4) Also, ['God' and 'person' have the same grammar.] 'God' means one "having divineness" as 'person' means one "subsisting in an intellectual nature." But we say "three Persons." On the same ground, we can say "three Gods."

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Deuteronomy 6: 4 says, "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord."

* substantiv²

ANSWER: some of the terms for something essential to God convey it as a noun* and some as an adjective. The nouns are said of the three Persons in the singular only, not the plural. The adjectives are said of the Persons in the plural [in the classical languages].¹

There is a reason for this: a noun conveys something in the guise of a substance; an adjective, in the guise of an accident inhering in a subject. Well a substance has being[†] on its own [*per se*], and so it has oneness or manyness on its own. A noun gets to be singular or plural, then, thanks to a form it conveys as its own sense.² An accident, however, has its being in a subject, and so it gets oneness or manyness from

† esse

q 36, a.4

whether it has one or more than one subject. [Since the subject provides a referent for the adjective.] adjectives get to be singular or plural [in Greek or Latin] by agreement with [the number of] their referent(s).³

Among creatures there is no such thing as one form present in many referents. (The apparent exception is the form of a collective, which is "one" in the weak sense of "one by order," like an organized multitude;⁴ nouns conveying that sort of form are said of the multitude in the singular; thus we speak of it as "one college," or "one army," or "one people," while adjectives are handled differently [in Latin]; we speak in the plural of those "in the college," etc.).

But when it comes to God, the divine essence is conveyed after the fashion of a form (as I said) but it is simple and *supremely one*, as was shown above. As a result, nouns conveying the divine essence are predicated in the singular of the three Persons, not in the plural. This is the reason we call Socrates, Plato, and Cicero "three men" but do not call the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit three gods but "one God." For in three referents of human nature there are three cases of the form we call humanness, while in the three Persons there is just one case of the form we call divineness.⁵ But terms conveying that divine essence as adjectives are said of the Three in the plural, because of the plural number of referents. We say, "three existing Ones," or "three wise Ones," or "three Eternal, Uncreated, or Immense" ones, if these words are taken as adjectives. But if they are taken as nouns, we say "One Uncreated, One Eternal, one Immense," as Athanasius tells us [in his Creed].

q 39, a.2
q.3, a.7; q.11, a.4

Dvnt. # 75

³ An adjective borrows reference from the noun it is used to modify. Aquinas is taking a familiar point of Latin grammar (adjectives are singular or plural on a syntactical basis, do agree with their nouns) and is giving it a semantic background: an adjective is singular or plural depending on whether the noun it modifies is being used to refer to one thing exhibiting its sense, or more than one. See next note.

⁴ When a noun refers to creatures, there is no difference between the count of its referents and the count of cases of the form giving the noun its sense. Each referent has its own case of the form in question, and this rule holds whether the noun takes physical individuals as its referents (like 'man' or 'takes a collection of them (like 'soccer team', 'college' or 'army)').

⁵ When a noun refers to God, a difference emerges between the count of referents and the count of cases of the divine form. There is just one case of God's form (being-divine), while the Referents of 'God' are three. What this has to mean metaphysically, as we saw in q.28, aa.2-3, is that the Referents are not three participating in a common form but three identical to the one case of that form

¹ I added 'in the classical languages' because Greek and Latin inflected their adjectives. English does not. We say 'two big eyes', not 'two bigs eyes'.

² He means that nouns become singular or plural on a semantic basis. Their number depends on whether they are being used to speak of one or more than one case of a form they convey as their sense. Cajetan will explain further.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): ‘god’ means the same as ‘having divinity’ but has a different way of meaning it. ‘God’ is a noun, but ‘having divinity’ is an adjective. So, although there are three having divinity, it does not follow that they are three gods.⁶

ad (2): other languages, other idioms. As Greeks talk of three substances* on account of the plural referents. ‘*Elohim*’ [plural of ‘*El*’] is said in Hebrew.⁷ But we say neither three gods nor three substances, lest the plural be misapplied to *the* divine substance.

* *hypostases*

⁶ The argument does not work in ordinary language; it needs a learned, theologically informed semantics.

⁷ The referents were not the reason ‘*Elohim*’ was used for the God of Israel. Semitic philology was little known to the Scholastics. Renewed study of the OT in Hebrew came

ad (3): the noun ‘thing’ is one of the transcendentals [and so can used to mention the items in any category]. When it is mentioning a relation in the talk of God, it is said in the plural; but it is said in the singular when it mentions His substance. This is why Augustine says in the same passage that the Trinity is “a certain Supreme Thing” [singular].

PL 34, 21

ad (4): the form conveyed by the noun ‘person’ is not the essence or nature but a personhood. So since there are three personhoods, the personal distinctives in the Father, the Son, and Holy Spirit are spoken of in the plural, not the singular.

after the Reformation, when that crisis and the Council of Trent called for it. ‘*Elohim*’ was then construed as a “plural *majestatis*.”

Cajetan’s Commentary

In the title-question, ‘like God’ is put in for an important reason; it is meant to confirm that the present article is about *concrete* essence-terms, be they adjectives or nouns.

Analysis of the article, I

ii. Aquinas does two jobs in the body of this article. (1) He distinguishes the subject-matter of the question, staking out two conclusions answering it, one for each side of the distinction. (2) He supports the two conclusions together.

iii. As for job (1), the distinction is that some of the terms describing God by [some feature of] His essence are nouns, and some are adjectives. Conclusion [a] is that the nouns are predicated of the three Persons in the singular, so as not to be used in the plural. Conclusion [b] is that the adjectives are predicated of the three Persons in the plural.

iv. As for job (2), the double-sided conclusion is supported in the following steps. First, Aquinas lays down a broad major premise [about language]. Next, before bringing in a minor premise about language for God, he explains why his major premise holds in all cases of creatures, at the ¶ beginning, “Among creatures . . .” Thirdly, he brings in the minor and draws the two-sided conclusion, explaining also the wording of the Athanasian Creed. Thus what we have here is an argument drawn from the difference between nouns and adjectives in how they signify grammatically.

[*Major:*] [*Antecedent: 1st part:*] How nouns convey [their senses] grammatically is in the guise of substances; [*2nd part:*] how adjectives convey [their senses] is in the guise of accidental traits. So [*inference: 1st part:*] singular or plural number comes to a noun on the basis of the form it conveys but [*2nd part:*] comes to an adjective on the basis of the reference it has. — The first part of this inference holds

good because a substance has being on its own and hence has oneness or manyness the same way, but [the second part holds good because] an accidental trait only has being in a subject and hence gets its oneness or manyness from the subject(s).

Doubts about this major

v. Concerning just this much of the argument, doubt already arises — first about the rule itself and then about the effectiveness of the argument given in its favor.

[1] Doubt surrounds the rule itself [because we Thomists seem to break it elsewhere]. For one thing, in [§ vi of my comment on] q.36 [a. 4]. I said that if Socrates has many craft-skills, he is still not called many craftsmen. For another thing, St. Thomas is explicit below in 3 *ST* q.2, a.7 *ad* 2, that if the Word of God assumed two cases of human nature, He would still not be called “two men,” even though the form conveyed by the noun ‘man’ would have plural cases. vi. [2] As to the argument for the rule, Scotus makes remarks on *1 Sent.* d.12, in which he thinks the argument is insufficient, and he attacks it as follows.

[*Major:*] A singular or plural ending tacks its sense* onto the sense* of a word that can be inflected by it. But [*minor:*] the sense of an adjective and a noun is the same, since both convey a form, and so [*1st conclusion: 1st part:*] the form is what settles singular or plural for both, and [*2nd part:*] how either part of speech works grammatically cannot take this away from it. Ergo [*2nd conclusion:*] Aquinas’ argument is worthless.

* *significatum*

Reply to the first doubt

vii. My answer to the first doubt is that the [relevant] difference between adjectives and nouns lies in the fact that the plural of a noun requires both more than one [case of a] form *and* more than one referent, whereas

just more than one referent suffices for an adjective to be plural. And this point does not detract from the author's teaching, because he had no need here to state anything beyond how nouns and adjectives *differ*. To anyone who compares them, it is readily apparent that their plurals *agree* in requiring more than one referent and *differ* over the effect of one or more than one form. The plural of either requires more than one referent; but the plural of an adjective does not require more than one form, whereas that of a noun does. So, it was quite enough for Aquinas in this place to state the difference, speaking of concrete nouns as they differ from adjectives. Moreover, he did not conceal the other requirement, because he mentioned it above in q.36 [a.4 ad 2] in knocking down the claim that the Father is "two sources." Also, he taught the second requirement explicitly at the right place for it, where it was needed, in the place cited from 3 *ST* [q.2, a.7]. There he was also rejecting the opinion which he himself had followed earlier at *In III Sent.* d.1, q.7, a.5, passing over any views expressed by other writers.

Reply to the second doubt

viii. The answer to the second doubt is that Scotus's major premise is utterly false. What a singular or plural ending does firstly and of itself is tack its sense onto the *reference* of the word inflected by it — and this is true for both nouns and adjectives, as is clear from what I already said [in § vii]. But in the case of concrete nouns (because they are nouns) the ending also tacks its sense onto the noun's sense [the form conveyed by it]. Thus Scotus's objection is what is worthless, and the grammar of nouns is not excluded from having the effect that they go into the plural (or get inflected with a plural ending) on the further basis of [the number of cases of] the form.¹

¹ Perhaps Cajetan means only that the numerical ending affects the form by fixing the number of its cases as one or many. But is this really affecting the form at all? *Qua* form, it remains as its definition says, even if it has zero cases.

Analysis of the article, II

ix. After laying down the rule which serves as the major premise in the argument, Aquinas shows how it works in [the talk of] creatures. Here he teaches two points. The *first* is how vast the difference is between

- oneness of form among the divine referents and
- oneness of form among created referents.

It is so vast that, among several created referents, numerically one form is not found at all (unless it is the form of a collection, made "one" by an ordering relation); but among the divine referents, there is just one form numerically, essentially, and indivisibly.

The *second* point is that created things, even with the minimal oneness [of a collective], support the above-stated rule, as one sees with the case of [a college and] fellows "of the college."²

Lastly, as his minor premise, Aquinas brings in the fact (assumed [from qq.3 and 11]) that the divine essence is uncomposed and supremely one in the three Persons, so as to draw his conclusions:

— first the one about nouns, which he uses to explain the difference between [how we talk of] three human individuals and [how we talk of] the three divine referents, and then

— the second one about adjectives *used as adjectives* (this last being said because of the Athanasian Creed, which uses adjectival words as nouns). No further clarification is needed.³

² The example is clearer if '*collegium*' is taken for the College of Cardinals, whose members are described by the adjective 'red-hatted'.

³ For an English adjective which is also a noun, think of 'champion'. Greek and Latin grammar permitted any adjective to be used as a noun without change of morphology. Thus when Aquinas' rule mentioned adjectives, Cajetan had to say that he meant adjectives *used as adjectives*.

Scotus took the same flexibility to demand that adjectives and nouns have the same semantics. Aquinas took the opposite lesson from the endings in the Athanasian Creed. But could not those endings be explained more simply on the basis that the divine referents are not distinct absolutely?

May concrete essence-terms be used to refer to a Person?

In 1 Sent. d.4, q.1, a.2

It looks as though concrete terms mentioning God as He is by His essence [*nomina essentialia concretiva*] cannot refer to* a Person, so as to make a sentence like 'God begat God' come out true.¹

* *non possunt supponere pro*

(1) After all, a singular term has the same reference as it has sense, or so the rhetoric teachers say.² 'God' seems to be a singular term, since it cannot be used in the plural, as stated above. So since the sense of 'God' is the divine essence, 'God' seems to refer to that essence and not to a Person.

a.3

† *temperatio*

(2) Besides, the reason a term in the subject position is restricted by the one in predicate position is not because of the predicate's sense exactly but because of a co-conveyed fine-tuning.[†] Well, when I say, "God creates," the subject 'God' refers to the essence. So, if one says, "God begets," the subject does not suddenly refer to a Person just because the predicate is [by its sense] an identifier verb.

(3) Also, if 'God begets' is true because the Father does, then by the same token 'God does not beget' will be true because the Son doesn't. In that case, there is a begetting God and a non-begetting God. It seems to follow that there are two gods.

(4) Moreover, if God begat God, He either begat Himself [to be] God or else begat another God. Well, He did not beget Himself as God, because nothing begets itself (as Augustine points out in *De Trinitate* 1). Nor did He beget another God, because there is only one God. Ergo 'God begat God' is false.

c.1,
PL 42, 820

(5) Furthermore, if God begat God, the latter is either the "God" who is God the Father, or else it is a "God" who is not God the Father. If God begat God who is God the Father, then God the Father is begotten [which is false]. If God begat God who is not God the Father, then there is a God who is not God the Father, which is false. So, it is just not allowable to say, "God begat God."

ON THE OTHER HAND, it says right in the Creed, "God from God."

‡ *including Gilbert of La Porcree*

ANSWER: some writers[‡] have maintained that 'God' and similar terms refer most properly, by their nature, to the essence but are drawn to refer to a Person by an attached identifier. The ground for this opinion seems to have been reflection on the divine simplicity, which requires the haver-of-the-essence and the essence-had

¹ This article and the next two form a short but dense treatise on sentence-formation in Trinitarian theology.

² Singular terms, like what we now call proper names, had no plural. Apparently, these rhetoric teachers (*sophistae*) thought of 'God' as a proper name, but they did not think such a name meant its bearer directly, as most of us do today, but indirectly, *via* an individuated form.

to be the same thing in God. And so *divineness* is the same thing as *one having divineness* (which is the sense conveyed by the word 'God').

q.3, a.3

However, in looking at the properties of words, one must pay attention not only to the sense conveyed but also to how it is conveyed. Since *how* 'God' conveys the divine essence is *as in a haver of it*, just as 'man' conveys humanness *as in a referent of it*, other writers have voiced the better view that 'God', by virtue of how it conveys, has what it takes to refer properly to a person, just as 'man' does.

The word 'God', then, refers sometimes to the essence (as in "God creates," because the reason this predicate fits the subject is the form which the subject conveys, divineness), and refers sometimes to a Person — whether just to one, as in "God begets", or to two, as in "God spirates," or to all three, as in "Now into the King eternal, immortal, invisible, the only wise God, be honor and glory ..." (1 Timothy 1:17).

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): 'God' is like a singular term in that the form it conveys does not occur in more than one instance, but it is also like a shared term in that the form it conveys is found in multiple Referents. Thus, the word 'God' need not always refer to the essence it conveys as its sense. ³

ad (2): this objection works only against those who say 'God' has no natural reference to a Person.⁴

ad (3): how 'God' stands towards referring to a person is not the same as how 'man' does. The form conveyed by 'man' (humanness) is really shared among the several referents; so 'man' by itself refers to a person; it needs no added word to focus it onto a person who is a distinct referent of it. And what makes human nature "one thing" or "a shared thing" is not any reality it has, but just our thought of it; and so the word 'man' does not refer to our shared nature unless an added word demands this, as in "Man is a species."

By contrast, the form conveyed by 'God', the divine essence, is *one shared Thing* by virtue of its own reality. So 'God' standing alone refers to that common nature. Only when combined with other words is its reference

* *non oportet quod semper supponat pro essentiae quam significat*

³ Aquinas response to the rhetoricians' theory of proper names is just to say that 'God' does not serve entirely as such a name. *Vis-à-vis* the Persons, it serves as a common name. This is already a broad hint that the semantics of 'God' is unique.

⁴ The predicate's effect upon the semantics of the subject was a matter of fine-tuning its reference. The objector said this effect could not enable 'God' to refer to a Person: Aquinas said it did not have to, because 'God' already had the ability to refer to a Person, by its nature. A word's nature was set by its semantics and grammar. By these, "God" was "of a nature" to refer to anything-having-divinence, be it "this God" (as we shall see) or a Person.

focused onto a Person. Thus, if one says, "God begets," the reference of 'God' is focused onto the Person of the Father because of the identifier verb. But when one says, "God does not beget," nothing is being added that would focus the reference of 'God' onto the Son, and so what one is left to understand is just that begetting conflicts with the divine nature. But if another word is added pertaining to the Person of the Son, a true statement results, as in "The begotten God does not beget." Thus, it does not follow that there is a begetting *God* and a non-begetting *God*, unless something is put in pertaining to the Persons, as in "The Father is God begetting, and the Son is God not begetting." And then it does not follow that there are two Gods, since the Father and the Son are one God, as I said before.

a.3

ad (4): 'The Father begat Himself [to be] God' is false because the reflexive pronoun 'Himself' points back to the same referent. (And no evidence to the contrary is had from Augustine's remark in his letter against Maximinus, "God the Father begat another self," because either the last bit means 'another from Himself' or else it is a loose way of stressing the similarity relation [between the Father and the Son] and so alludes to their identity of nature and means 'another very similar to Himself'.) Meanwhile, 'The Father begat another God' is also false, because even though the Son is "another" from the Father (as I said before), He is not to be called "another God," because then "another" would be understood as having its effect on the substance-word 'God', so as to convey a divineness distinct from another divineness. (Some writers tolerate 'The Father begat another God' by taking 'another' as a noun and 'God' as an appositive to it [*i.e.* "The Father begat another, also God"]. But this makes the sentence an improper way of speaking, and that sort of thing should be avoided as a source of error.)

Ep. 66:
PL 42, 749

q.31, a.2

ad (5): 'God begat God who is God the Father' is false if 'the Father' is an appositive, because then it restricts 'God' to standing for the Person of the Father; the sense is 'begat the God who is the Father Himself', and then the Father would be begotten, which is false.

In that case, the negative version is true: "God begat God who is not God the Father." (But if the sentence is construed to have no appositive in it, but to be elliptical, so that something needs to be inserted, then the situation is reversed: the affirmative is true; the negative, false. For then the sense of the affirmative would be "God begat a God who is the God which is the Father." But this is a tortured interpretation.⁵) So the better thing to say is that, unequivocally, the affirmative is to be denied, and the negative admitted.)

Praepositinus, however, had another idea. He said the negative and affirmative are both false, because the relative pronoun 'who' changes in how it refers. In the affirmative ["God begat God who is God the Father"], 'who' picks up the bare referent [of the direct object]; but in the negative ["God begat God who is not God the Father"], 'who' picks up the referent not only in itself but *as so described* [*i.e.* as not being God the Father]. Thus the affirmative makes 'is God the Father' true of the Son, but the negative not only makes 'is God the Father' false of the Son but also makes 'is God' false of Him. Praepositinus' position seems unreasonable, however, because, according to Aristotle, one can form the negative of the very same point that one affirmed.⁶

Periherm., c.6,
17a.30

⁵ Tortured it certainly is; but the result of the torture is true, because the Father and the Son are the *same God*; hence the Son is the God which the Father is.

⁶ If Aristotle thus excludes Praepositinus' theory, how does he not exclude what Aquinas did with "God begets"/"God does not beget" in the answer *ad* (3)? I think the right response is that Praepositinus allowed no way to form a true affirmative to the false negative, and *vice-versa*. But in Aquinas' discussion, the way to form a contradictory is open and clear. "God begets" (he says) amounts to "A Person who is God begets," so that the contradictory to it is "No Person who is God begets" (which is false). Thus "God does not beget" only *looks like* the contradictory to "God begets." It is really an independent proposition to the effect God's essence conflicts with begetting, which only a Muslim would accept. How Aquinas hit upon this idea is something Cajetan will dodge, as we shall see. But if the idea is right, the contradictory to it is obvious: His essence does not conflict, *etc.*

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear, thanks to topics treated earlier.

Analysis of the article

ii. In the body of the article, Aquinas does two jobs. (1) He mentions a certain opinion; (2) he criticizes it and, in the process, answers the question.

iii. As for job (1), the opinion in question is that terms mentioning God as He is by His essence refer properly of themselves (*ex se*) to that essence; but in combination with an identifier-word, they are drawn to stand for a Person. And the basis for this opinion is the divine simplicity, thanks to which the essence to which the abstract term ['divineness'] refers is identical to the

referent to which the concrete term ['God'] refers.¹

iv. As for job (2), in a first order of business, the opinion just stated is criticized on the ground that, in looking at what is distinctive about a word, one needs to pay attention not only to the sense conveyed but also to how it is conveyed. The said opinion looked only at the sense conveyed (to which the sameness of the haver and the essence-had is relevant).

Next, in a second order of business, Aquinas puts forward another opinion, one that answers the question.

¹ This identity will be explained further. The reader may review pp. 72f. above, where it was first alleged.

q.3, a.3

It says: concrete terms mentioning God as He is by His essence can properly refer to the Persons. — This is supported on the same basis: [*antecedent:*] ‘God’ and similar terms, by how they convey their sense, convey the nature as in-a-haver; so [*inference:*] they can refer to the Persons. The antecedent is shown to hold by taking a case, the case of ‘man’, etc.

Then in his third order of business, Aquinas lays out how ‘God’ does in fact refer sometimes to a Person, or to two, or sometimes to all three.

Three doubts about the body of the article

v. Concerning these statements, three doubts arise from attacks launched by Aureol (reported by Capreolus at *1 Sent.* d.3, q.2, a.3).

(1) The first is against our claim that ‘God’ sometimes refers to the essence, sometimes to a Person. [*Antecedent:*] ‘God’ always refers to one having divineness; so [*inference:*] it always refers to a Person. This is confirmed by the fact that this argument is the one used by this very article in support of the conclusion it reaches to answer the main question.

vi. (2) Aureol’s second attack is against our claim that ‘God’ in “God creates” refers to the essence. [*1st argument: antecedent:*] Actions belong to referents; ergo [*inference:*] the action of creating belongs to Referents of ‘God’ [i.e. to Persons]. Besides, [*2nd argument: antecedent:*] ‘creates’ does not leave out the referents, just as ‘God’s essence clearly seen’ does not leave Them out;² so [*inference:*] [there is no reason for ‘God creates’ to be about the essence apart from the Persons].

vii. (3) His third attacks our claim that ‘God’ in “Now unto the king eternal . . .” refers to all three Referents. This clashes, he says, with our earlier claim [that ‘God’ in “God creates” refers to the essence], For glory and honour are due only to the One who creates; but according to you Thomists, ‘one who creates’ does not single out a Referent; so neither does this verse — or if it points to all three, so does “God creates.”

Three doubts about the answer ad (3)

viii. Alongside these three doubts, there are three more dealing with claims made in the answer ad (3); and these should be handled together with the first batch, in order to ease and shorten the work of learning these interconnected issues.

(1’) First, the answer ad (3) says there is a difference between ‘God’ and ‘man’ in referring, etc. Two reasons exist to doubt this. [a] First, either this difference lies in how they refer to a definite person, or else it lies in how they refer to a person vaguely. On the first option, the difference is nil. Without added

² Aureol and Aquinas agreed that God’s essence was seen in the Beatific Vision, and that the Persons were seen in it. So if the essence mentioned in ‘seen essence’ did not leave out or abstract from the Person, why leave them out of the essence allegedly referred to in ‘God creates’?

words to focus it, ‘God’ does not refer to the Father, nor to the Son, any more than ‘man’ refers to Socrates or Plato without added words. On the second option, the difference is also nil; for just as ‘man’ naturally refers to anyone having human nature, so ‘God’ refers indifferently to anyone having divine nature, as Aquinas said at *1 Sent.* d.4. [b] Secondly, this alleged difference seems to contradict what he said in the body of the article. There he said ‘God’ of itself, thanks to how it conveys its sense, stands for a Person, and he rejected the other opinion which said that ‘God’ got reference to a Person from being combined with an identifier. But here he falls into the rejected opinion himself, when he says “God’ and ‘man’ differ just in this, that ‘God’ of itself refers to the nature and only refers to a Person thanks to some addition, while ‘man’ works the other way about. So the body of the article and the answer ad (3) are in visible conflict.

ix. (2’) The second doubt is over the claim that ‘God does not beget’ is false. Many arguments against this are reported by Capreolus at *1 Sent.* d.4, q.1, a.2, and they need to be broken.

Aureol goes first and argues as follows. [*1st argument: antecedent:*] In “God does not beget,” let ‘God’ stand for the nature, as you Thomists insist; in that case [*inference:*] the sentence is true. — Drawing the inference is supported on the ground that a nature does not beget, as is clear from [the decretal] *Extra* on the supreme Trinity.³ Next, [*2nd argument: antecedent:*] to not-beget should be an identifier; then [*inference:*] it makes ‘God’ stand for a Person [and there is a Person who does not beget; ergo the sentence is true again]. — The antecedent is right because a positive [‘begets’] and its negation are in the same class [e.g. are both identifiers]. Next, [*3rd argument: antecedent:*] ‘God does not beget’ and ‘every God begets’ are contradictories; so [*major:*] they refer to the same thing; but [*minor:*] in the latter, ‘God’ refers to Persons; [*conclusion:*] so it refers to a Person in the former.

Then Durandus and Gregory of Rimini [come into the fray and] claim that ‘God does not beget’ is true by the force of its wording, even though it is not accepted by the theologians because of the danger of error it poses.

With that in mind, Durandus argues thus. [*1st argument: major:*] Everything true of the divine Persons is said truly of God; but [*minor:*] ‘does not beget’ is true of two such Persons; ergo [it is said truly of God]. Also, [*2nd argument: antecedent:*] ‘God’ is a word for one thanks to the nature but for many thanks to the Referents; so [*1st inference:*] ‘God’ has singular force when put with essential predicates but has common, indefinite force *vis-à-vis* the Persons (as is clear by the fact that ‘God begets’ and ‘God is begotten’ are each true of distinct Referents, we say); so by consequence or concomitance [*2nd inference:*] ‘God begets’ and ‘God does not beget’ have to be true in the same way [i.e. true of

³ The Decretal forbade the claim that the divine nature begets. The point is that it does *not* beget should be true, then, Aureol thought, and could not see why Aquinas did not concede it.

distinct Persons].

Gregory, meanwhile, argues as follows. ‘God’ does not beget’ is vague and has two particularizations [one for the Son, one for the Holy Spirit] which come out true, just as ‘A divine Person does not beget’ is obviously true along with another indefinite, ‘A divine Person begets’; so ‘God does not beget’ is not false.

x. (3’) The third doubt is about the text’s claim that ‘God does not beget’ leaves one with the idea that begetting conflicts with the divine nature. Not so, says Aureol, because, when a trait is denied of a nature, it need not follow that there is a conflict; the nature may just abstract from that trait [e.g., as human nature abstracts from one’s being Basque or not].

Preface to the replies

xi. To clear these up, one needs to give extremely careful attention to the fact that, between God and all other substances, there is this difference: in the others, the nature and what has that nature must stand in such a way that what has the nature is a referent of it, and the nature is the essence of that referent.⁴ But in the case of God, what has divineness turns up two ways: as a Referent [of ‘God’], like the Father or the Son, and as a particular, this God.⁵ Thus in talking of God, we have to pay attention to three items: the essence, this God, and the Referents of ‘God’ (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit). In all other cases we find just two [items to watch], e.g. humanness and Socrates, because “this man” is not some item other than Socrates. But “this God” is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and begets, and is begotten, etc.⁶ Of Him they sing in Exodus 15: “He is my God . . . and I will exalt Him,” as St. Thomas explains at the end of the last article in this inquiry.

xii. The reason for this difference is the fact that the divine nature subsists of itself [ex seipsa]: it does not borrow subsistence from its Referents but, indeed, confers it upon them. Other natures do not subsist, except in a referent.⁷

⁴ This sentence could be semantics or metaphysics. In semantics, a referent is something a word has: a thing for which the word is being used to stand and to which its descriptive force applies. In metaphysics, a referent is something a nature has: a substance which lends the nature an instance. Divine and created referents differ not only metaphysically, however, but also semantically, as will emerge in footnotes 7 and 8.

⁵ In Cajetan’s commentary on q.3, a.3, “this God” is a quasi-referent, an approximation which leaves in obscurity the true referents of ‘God’, which are subsisting relations within God.

⁶ This sentence is hard to accept unless “this God” is the Trinity in anonymity, i.e. unless all the identifiers are in “this God” but hiddenly. In Cajetan’s account, I think, the whole difference between “this God” and the Trinity is epistemic.

⁷ Try this paraphrase. The divine nature is self-instantiating as an absolute entity. It does not borrow the “property” of having an absolute instance from its referents (as all other natures do) but confers such instantiation upon its Referents. See q.29, a.4.

Well, since it is the most natural thing in the world for a concrete term to refer to a haver of the form it conveys, it follows that ‘God’ refers initially to this God. And since ‘this God’ means a particular of divine nature, ‘God’ is said to refer to the nature taken concretely. And because this particular is common to the three Referents, ‘God’ is sometimes said to stand for the Persons vaguely; and because this God is the same [absolute] thing as any of the Referents and is conveyed concretely, ‘God’ can stand for each Person.⁸

Point-by-point replies

xiii. From the foundational points just stated, it is time to answer the doubts one by one, beginning (for orderly learning’s sake) with the first one bearing on the answer ad (3).

[ad (1’)]: the words ‘God’ and ‘man’ differ in how they refer to a person vaguely. And [far from being nil,] the difference is such that

- in a sentence by itself, ‘God’ renders the sentence particular, because it refers to this God, which is thing-wise common to the three Persons,⁹ while ‘man’ leaves the sentence indefinite, because it refers person-wise but indefinitely;¹⁰

- in a sentence with certain other words, ‘man’ makes the sentence particular, thanks to having simple reference*, as in “Man is a species,”¹¹ whereas ‘God’ makes the sentence indefinite by having person-wise reference†.¹² And this difference arises,

in § viii

*suppositio simplex

†suppositio personalis

⁸ This crucial section confirms that the phrase ‘divine essence’ has two uses in Aquinas, as Cajetan read him. . . . One takes His essence abstractly (call it essence-A) as what the three Persons share. The other takes it concretely (essence-C) as “this God,” in which the three coincide.

⁹ The topic here is sentences like, “God knows us,” “God creates,” “God hears us.” In these, the reference of ‘God’ is to this God, and so these sentences both (a) contrast with universally quantified ones, like “Every God knows us” (which is theologically inappropriate), and (b) imply the particularly quantified ones, “Some god knows us,” “Some god hears us.”

¹⁰ As Latin lacked definite and indefinite articles, the topic here is unclear. Either it is sentences like “Man is fickle,” which is ambiguous as between “Every man is fickle” and “Some of them (most of them) are,” or else the topic is sentences like “A man is fickle,” which is often a disguised universal but can be indefinite, amounting to “Some man is fickle (e.g. Alcibiades).” The topic is not sentences like “The man is a liar,” where the definite article indicates that a definite and singular referent had been supplied earlier.

¹¹ “Man is a species” does not use ‘man’ to stand for persons but either (as Aquinas thought) for a nature mentally abstracted or (as many current analysts would say) as a collective noun referring to the set of people (the set as opposed to its members). The predicate is saying that the abstracted form or the set has the higher-order property of lying on a certain level of classification.

¹² Examples would be sentences like “God begets,” in which ‘God’ refers Person-wise, but the sentence does not say to whom or to how many (so that the sense is that one or more who are God beget). Ditto for ‘God spirates.’”

as the text says, from the fact that “this God” is found in the real as common to three Persons, while “this man,” if found in the real, is not common.

And contrary to what the second argument [in (1’)] alleges, these points do not conflict with what Aquinas said in the body of the article. For the talk in the body of the article was about the *potentiality* of the word ‘God’ to refer to a Person, and the statement made was that it *can* do so, just as the word ‘man’ can, thanks to how it conveys its sense. But the talk in the answer *ad* (3) is about how this potentiality is actualized, and the statement made is that, while ‘God’ *can* refer of itself to the essence (to this God) and to a Person (to Father, Son, Holy Spirit), it needs no addition [from context] to refer *actually* to this God but will only refer *actually* to Persons with the help of an addition. With the word ‘man’, however, since its sense does not contain one common thing (except as subject to understanding), the actualizing of its referring works the opposite way [it needs no contextual help to refer actually to persons but will only refer to something else actually with contextual help]. So there is no conflict between the points made in the two places.¹³

in § v xiv. [ad (1)] As for the first doubt raised against the body of the article, an answer is quickly obvious from what I have said already. One needs to deny the alleged inference:

if ‘God’ refers to one having divineness,
then it refers to a Person.

Not so: for consistently with the antecedent, ‘God’ may refer to “this God.”

I do not approve of what other writers think St. Thomas meant here, namely, that ‘God’ always stands for a Person but may do so distinctly or indistinctly. For one thing, the distinction he draws in the present article is explicitly between *when* ‘God’ stands for a Person (even any of Them) and *when* it stands for the essence. For another thing, there is no other way to salvage the text of the answer *ad* (3). For yet another thing, if the word ‘God’ in “God does not beget” referred to the Persons indistinctly, the sentence would be true as an indefinite statement.¹⁴ And for still another thing, the text of article 6 will say (against Gilbert of La Porrée) that in the sentence, “God is a father and a son and a holy spirit” or in “God is a trinity,” the word ‘God’ does not refer to [a Person as] its Referent but to numerically One Thing common [among the referents].

And never mind the fact that sometimes when the word ‘God’ is referring to the nature, it is also said to refer to the Persons *indistinctiē*. This needs to be understood as a side-effect* after all. ‘God’ refers first to the nature in the concrete, and since ‘God’ is sometimes predicated of the Persons and comes out true, it

* *concomitantur*

¹³ Notice that “actualized” reference to Persons covers both actual reference to a definite Person (say, the Father) and actual reference to one or another Person *indistinctiē*.

¹⁴ Recall from q.30, a.4, how to take the adverb ‘*indistinctiē*’ in the talk of reference to persons. It means *vaguely*. It does not mean *as non-distinct*.

it can be accepted (but *secondarily*) as referring to the Persons vaguely.

xv. [ad (2)] As for the second doubt raised against the body of the article, it is clear already that the objector has been deceived in taking ‘nature’ to mean *essence in the abstract*. When Aquinas says that ‘God’ in “God creates” refers to the nature, he intends ‘God’ to mean *essence in the concrete*. For in fact ‘God’ [in that sentence] refers to this unique, singular God common to the three Referents. Hence the action of creating belongs to *all* the Referents for the reason just stated. Moreover, what is true universally is not that actions belong to referents but that they belong to particular substances, like this God; hence not “abstracting” from the referents of such an action is obviously irrelevant.

xvi. [ad (3)] As for the third doubt raised against the body of the article, my response (obvious from points already made) is that there is no clash. In fact, it is sometimes the case that

‘God’ refers to all the Persons
follows from

‘God’ refers to the nature
[and *vice-versa*], although with a different form of referring [*quamvis difformiter*], as I said.¹⁵ So, while both of these sentences, ‘God creates’, and ‘To God lone be honour and glory’, come out true whether ‘God’ refers to this God or to the Trinity, still, the latter was adduced as an example of reference to the Trinity (I think) because that is how Augustine interpreted the exclusionary word ‘alone’ in this verse, as was discussed in q.31 [a.3 *ad* 2]. In any case, it was necessary to distinguish this verses from a statement like

God creates,
which presents a separate case; for as we have established, ‘God’ sometimes stands for the nature [concretely taken] and not for any Referent.

xvii. [ad (2’)] As for the second doubt raised against the answer *ad* (3), the one disputing what that answer says against the truth of ‘God does not beget’, the response comes from the foundation already laid.

Against Aureol’s first argument, it is already obvious that he is equivocating on ‘nature’. We have been saying that ‘God’ stands for the nature in the concrete — this God — of which ‘does not beget’ is said falsely — whereas ‘does not beget’ is said truly of divineness [God’s essence-A].¹⁶

¹⁵ The *difformitas* is between approximating to referring (which ‘God’ does firstly) and referring vaguely (which ‘God’ does secondarily).

¹⁶ Matters would have been clearer if Cajetan could have called ‘God’s essence-A begets’ ill-formed, *i.e.*, too much of a syntactical botch to make a statement at all, true or false. Then its apparent negation, ‘God’s essence-A does not beget’ could have been read metalinguistically as rejecting the botch (e.g. as saying, “‘Divineness begets’ is not a statement!”). Instead, Cajetan felt obliged to read the apparent negation as an object-language truth of a Pickwickian kind, like “√2 does not dream.”

Aquinas wisely steered clear of this move by intuiting, I think, that “God does not beget” puts no statement on the table;

in § xx Against his second argument, we deny that 'does not beget' is an identifier. To be an identifier, a word or phrase has to express something unique [to a Person as distinct]. 'Does not beget', however, is common [to two Persons as distinct] and even applies to the divine nature [taken abstractly]. And from the maxim that a positive trait and its negation are of the same type, it does not follow that 'does not beget' is an identifier, because we understand that maxim to be about *type of thing*, not type of information [*principii cognoscendi*]. It hardly follows, after all, that if a positive trait is a distinctive basis for knowing something unique, then its negation is a distinctive basis for knowing something else unique. The negation will come out true not only for a being but also for a non-being.¹⁷ (And it is clear from points stated above [in q.32] that 'identifier' means a distinctive basis for knowing.)

in § xx xviii. Against Aureol's third argument: although it is illicit to say "every God" at all, because there is just numerically one God, we shall still answer by denying that 'God' in "every God" stands for the Referents. For the word 'every' can only quantify over individual cases of divineness — of which of course, again, there is just the one. Moreover, if you do accept 'God' as standing for the Referents in "every God," then the

it rather suggests a claim about God's essence-A: *begetting conflicts with the divine nature*. This is syntactically in order (because a kind of doing is signified act and can conflict with a kind of being), and it makes a false statement.

When Aureol read Aquinas's answer *ad* (3), he saw the suggested claim as about the essence-A but saw 'begetting' as exercised act, so as to make the whole claim a Pickwickian truth which Aquinas ought to have accepted.

When Cajetan read the same answer *ad* (3), he saw the concrete noun 'God' as talking about God's essence-C; he could use the fact that 'does not beget' is not an identifier and thus agree with Aquinas that 'God' in "God does not beget" does not refer Person-wise and hence does not refer (as Aureol's other argument wanted) to any Person vaguely. Then he ignored Aquinas's idea of what "God does not beget" suggested and took it to mean that this God, the essence-C, does not beget. The bottom line, then, for Cajetan, is that "This God does not beget" is a factual falsehood, as we have learned from revelation.

¹⁷ While 'begets' is highly informative about the one divine Person to whom it applies truly, 'does not beget' is uninformative about countless things and non-things to which it applies truly, like UV light and the philosophers' stone.

sentences in question will not be contradictories.¹⁸

xix. To the arguments of Durandus and Gregory, the SHORT RESPONSE is that predicates applying to the Persons are of two types. [1] Some apply only to Referents, like 'begets' 'is begotten' and the like. [2] Others apply both to the Referents and to the nature, like 'is distinct from', 'does not beget', and the like. A key difference between these is that [type 1] predicates force [subject] terms to focus on their referents, because they apply solely to the Referents; by contrast, the [type 2] predicates, because they apply to both, do not force [subject] terms to focus in this way. From this difference there follows another. The [type 1] predicates applying only to the Persons are also predicated of [essence terms which are] concrete nouns. For by virtue of the fact that they force these nouns to refer person-wise, the resulting sentences do not mean that any personal trait qualifies the essence (but only qualifies the Referents). By contrast, the predicates applying to both the Referents and the nature (although they come out true of the Persons) are not predicated of [essence-terms which are] concrete nouns; for by virtue of the fact that they do not force the nouns to refer person-wise, the resulting sentences would mean that personal traits attach to the essence. Thus, while we accept

'The Father is distinct thing-wise from the Son', we do not accept

'God is distinct thing-wise from God'.

In this way it becomes clear how we answer the arguments of Durandus and Gregory. They are both based on the assumption that *whatever is predicated of a Person is predicated of God*. (However, there is also another flaw in each of them, namely, they think that 'God does not beget' is indefinite, whereas in fact it is particular, because 'God' here refers to this God.)

xx. [*ad* (3')] Finally, against the last doubt, we say that, although a conflict does not always follow from a negation, it does in the case of a necessary statement. Whatever is attributed to a subject necessarily either must agree with it or conflict with it. Well, it is quite certain that 'begets' and 'does not beget' can only be applied to God necessarily, because they do not apply to Him by an act of His will.

¹⁸ No [one who is] God begets' and 'every [one who is] God begets' will be contraries, not contradictories, and will both be false.

May abstract essence-terms be used to refer to a Person?

In I Sent. d.5, q.1, a.1

It looks as though abstract essence-terms may be used to refer to a Person, so that 'The essence begets the essence' is acceptable as a true thing to say.¹

c. 2:
PL 42, 936 (1) After all, Augustine says as follows in *De Trinitate III*: "The Father and the Son are one Wisdom, because they are one Essence; and individually [they are] Wisdom from Wisdom, as they are Essence from Essence."

(2) Besides, when we are born, the things in us are born; when we die, they die. The Son is born, and the divine essence is in Him. Apparently, then, the divine essence is born.

q.3, a.3 (3) Also, God and the divine essence are the same thing, as became clear above. But it has already been said [in the previous article] that 'God begets God' is true. Ergo, 'The essence begets the essence' is true.

(4) Further, a term can refer to anything of which it is predicated. Well, 'The Father is the divine essence' [predicates 'divine essence' of the Father and is accepted as true]. Therefore, 'the essence' can refer to the Person of the Father. And so [it can be correct to say that] the essence begets.

(5) Furthermore, the essence is [identical to] a Thing begetting [*i. e.* the Father]. So if the essence does not beget, it will be [identical to] a Thing begetting and yet not be begetting, which is impossible.

c. 20:
PL 42, 908 (6) Moreover, Augustine says in *De Trinitate IV* that the Father is "the source of all divineness." The only way the Father is a source is by begetting or spirating. So, the Father begets or spirates divineness.

c. 1:
PL 42, 820 ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Augustine says in *De Trinitate I*: "Nothing begets itself." But if the essence begets the essence, it is only begetting itself, because there is nothing in God that is distinguished from the divine essence. Therefore, the essence does not beget the essence.

ANSWER: this is a topic on which Abbot Joachim went wrong.² Focusing on the fact that God (thanks to His simplicity) is none other than the divine essence, he maintained that we can say "The essence beget the essence" as we say "God beget God". But he was mistaken in this. For in assessing the truth of sentences, we have to pay attention not only to *what* the words convey but also to *how*, as I have said before.

q. 13, a. 1;
q. 39, a. 4

¹ An abstract noun can be turned into a person's name, of course, by an odd act of name-giving (or perhaps not so odd; think of the girls' name 'Charity'). The question here is not about that sort of thing but about whether abstract nouns can refer naturally, *i. e.* apart from such name-giving, to the divine Persons in trinitarian theology.

² This is the Cistercian monk who eventually became famous as abbot Joachim of Fiore (died 1202).

Even though 'God' and 'the divine essence' convey the same sense, *how* they convey it is not the same in the two cases. For how 'God' conveys the divine essence is *as in a haver of it*, with the result that 'God' gets what it takes to refer to a Person from *how* it conveys its sense. Thus words exclusively true of Persons can be put as predicates to the word 'God' with good results (like 'God is begotten' or 'God begets'), as I 'said above [in a. 4].³ But how the word 'essence' conveys the divine essence is *as an abstract form*, and so it does not get what it takes to refer to a Person from how it conveys its sense. Thus words exclusively true of one or another Person as distinct cannot be put as predicates to the word 'essence'.⁴ A sentence so constructed would convey the idea that there is distinction *within* the divine essence as there is *between* the divine Referents.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): to express the oneness of the essence with the Persons, the holy doctors sometimes spoke more expressively than strict linguistic propriety would allow. Such *dicta* of theirs should not be imitated or repeated — I mean such procedures as expounding abstract terms with concrete ones or even with personal names, as when they used 'essence from essence' or 'wisdom from wisdom' to mean that the Son, who is essence and wisdom, is from the Father who is essence and wisdom. Of course, there is a certain gradation among these abstract terms, to which one should pay heed. The ones that pertain to an act stand closer to the Persons, because acts belong to referents. So 'nature from nature' or 'wisdom from wisdom' are a bit less improper than 'essence from essence'.

ad (2): among creatures, the one born does not get numerically the same [case of its] nature as its progenitor had, but a numerically different case, which begins to exist in it *via* generation and ceases to exist *via* corruption, so that it is "born" and "dies" incidentally [*per accidens*]. But the begotten God receives numerically

³ The Latin says, *propria personarum possunt praedicari de hoc nomine, Deus*. Thus, "predicating" is not affirming properties of things; *hoc nomen, Deus* has none of the properties of the Things which are *Personae*. Rather, "predicating" here is sentence construction; it is adding to a word serving as the subject certain other words chosen to serve as the grammatical predicate, in an effort to put together a true sentence. And since grammatical predicates have to be words, too, we have a text here where a *proprium personae* cannot be a trait unique to a Person but has to be distinctive language about the Person. The result is a rule of orthodox sentence-making

⁴ Remarks parallel to those in footnote 3 apply again here, where the Latin says *propria personarum ... non possunt essentiae attribui*. The text is again about sentence-formation. So, here we have another rule of orthodox sentence-making.

the same [case of divine] nature as the begetting God has. And so the divine nature in the Son is not “born” — not in the direct sense [*per se*], and not even incidentally.

ad (3): although ‘God’ and ‘divine essence’ convey the same real sense, we have to judge them differently [as to what is said correctly with them], because of the difference in how they convey that sense.

ad (4): because of the divine simplicity, ‘divine essence’ works as a *predicate* to ‘the Father’, after the fashion of a sameness statement; but because of the difference in how these words convey their sense, it does not follow that ‘divine essence’ can work as [*a subject*] referring to the Father. This objection would work, rather, in cases where the predicate-word stands to the subject as a universal stands to a particular falling under it.⁵

⁵ The objection would work in sentences having the subject-predicate form (*S* is a *P*). Where such a sentence is true, a thing referred to as *S* will be a case falling under a broader kind, *P*. An example would be ‘The Father is a divine Person’, and the objector’s point would be that the truth of this sentence implies that ‘divine Person’ can refer to the one to whom ‘The Father’ refers, and the objector would be right. But the case at hand, ‘The Father is the divine essence’ does not have the subject-predicate form. Aquinas says it predicates ‘the divine essence’ *per modum identitatis*, which means ‘after the fashion of a sameness’. It is saying that the Father is a same thing [*is one of the same things*] as the divine essence. Normally, of course, this shade of difference strengthens the objector’s hand. Normally, *S* cannot be a same thing as *P* without *P*’s being conversely a same thing as *S*, which means that ‘*S*’ and ‘*P*’ will take all their referents from the same stock. But inside the divine Reality, the situation is not normal. *Divine Persons can be a same thing without being the same referent*. The Father and the Son are a same relative thing (the source of the Holy Spirit) without being the same referent, as emerged above in q.36, a.4. All three Persons are a same absolute thing (the one God) without being the same referent, as also emerged above (q.28, a.2). Now we are seeing that each Person is a same thing as the divine essence-C without being the same referent.

ad (5): here is the relevant difference between a noun and an adjective: a noun brings its own reference, while an adjective does not; it attaches its sense to [the referent of] the noun [it modifies]. As the rhetoric teachers say, “Nouns refer, but adjectives join on [*copulare*].” As a result:

- *nouns* for the Persons can be put as predicates to ‘divine essence’ (thanks to the thing-wise sameness [between any Person and that essence]), without insinuating that the Person’s identifier introduces a distinct essence (because the distinctness rather affects the Referent brought in by the noun:) but

- *adjectives* identifying the Persons cannot be put as predicates to ‘[divine] essence’, unless the adjectives are attached to another noun of their own. Hence, we cannot say, “The essence is busy begetting.” But we can say, “The essence is a *thing* begetting” or “The essence is *God* begetting,” under the following proviso: we can say them in case ‘thing’ and ‘God’ refer to a Person, but not if they refer to the essence. Thus, there is no contradiction in saying, “The essence is a thing begetting and a thing not begetting,” because the first occurrence of ‘thing’ is taken for a Person, while the second occurrence is taken for the essence.⁶

ad (6): insofar as divineness is one item in multiple Referents, it has some likeness to the form conveyed by a collective term. Thus in ‘The Father is the source of all divineness’, the phrase ‘all divineness’ can be taken for the whole set of Persons, inasmuch as the Father is the source among that set. (And it does not have to follow that He is the source of Himself; for someone is called “the ruler of the whole people” without meaning that he is the ruler of himself.) Alternatively, one can say that the Father is the source of all divineness not because He begets or spirates divineness, but because by begetting and spirating He communicates divineness [*i.e.* renders it “shared” with those whom He does beget or spirate].

⁶ Cajetan will need to remark a bit on this *ad* (5).

Cajetan’s Commentary

The title question is clear.

In the body of the article, Aquinas does two jobs: (1) he mentions Abbot Joachim’s mistake, and (2) he answers the question.

ii. As for job (1): as you see at the beginning of the *Decretalium*, Abbot Joachim maintained the affirmative; his ground for doing so was the divine simplicity, because he had misunderstood the authoritative quote from St. Augustine [the one cited here in the first objection].

iii. As for job (2): the conclusion answering the question is negative, to wit, that such abstract terms cannot refer to the Persons. The support goes as fol-

lows. [*Major:*] The truth of propositions depends not only upon the sense conveyed [by the relevant terms] but also upon the manner in which it is conveyed [by those terms]. But [*minor:*] the terms ‘God’ and ‘divine essence’ have different manners [of conveying their sense]. Ergo [it can happen that a sentence constructed with ‘God’ comes out true while a parallel sentence constructed with ‘divine essence’ comes out false]. — The text is plain and straightforward. And Aquinas appends to it a confirming point [to the effect that the opposite conclusion would lead] to awkwardness: if Personal matters were asserted of abstract terms for God’s essence, there would be insinuated a

distinction *among* such abstractions [and hence *within* the divine essence].

On the answer *ad* (5)

rv. In the answer *ad* (5), there is a snippet that runs as follows:

we can say, “The essence is a *thing* begetting” or “The essence is *God* begetting,” under the following proviso: we can say them in case ‘thing’ and ‘God’ refer to a Person, but not if they refer to the essence.

Here, ‘the essence’ in the [final] phrase, ‘refer to the essence’, is taken, for purposes of the present article, to mean *the essence in the abstract*; it does not mean ‘the essence in the concrete’, as it did for purposes of the previous article. The reason I am convinced of this interpretation is that, for any topic, whatever one can deny of it in a proposition, *p*, one can also affirm of it in a proposition contradicting *p*.¹ Hence, since the

¹ This is Aristotle’s *dictum* from *De Interpretatione*, c. 6 (17a 26-30).

the negative ‘God does not beget’ is false when ‘God’ means the essence taken in the concrete,² the contradictory affirmative ‘God begets’ has to be true not only when we take ‘God’ to stand for the Father but also when we take it to stand for the essence in the concrete.³ In this passage, therefore, ‘essence’ is being taken for the essence in the abstract.⁴

² Turn back to the previous article 4; review the answer *ad* 3 and footnotes 4-16 on Cajetan’s commentary. There Cajetan read Aquinas as holding that ‘God does not beget’ is false, when ‘God’ stands for the essence-C.

³ So, “the essence is God begetting” is something we can say truly, when ‘God’ is the essence-C, contrary to what Aquinas seems to be saying at the end of the snippet quoted above.

⁴ Cajetan’s bottom line is that the “essence” at the end of the snippet has to be essence-A. The present translator would beg to differ, if doing so would not take him many miles beyond his mandate. Suffice it to say that his proposal would have saved Aquinas a bit of puzzlement and would have saved Cajetan a bit of work.

May Person-words be predicated of essence-words?

In I Sent. d.48, q.2, a.2 ad 5

It looks as though words for the Persons cannot be predicated of concrete nouns for the essence, so as to say 'God is three Persons' or 'God is a Trinity'.

(1) After all, it is false to say 'Man is every man' because it cannot come out true for any referent [of human nature]. Thus 'Socrates is every man' is false; ditto for 'Plato is every man', and ditto for anyone else. Likewise, 'God is a Trinity' cannot come out true for any Referent of the divine nature: the Father is not a Trinity, nor is the Son, nor is the Holy Spirit. Therefore, 'God is a Trinity' is false.

* *inferiora* (2) Besides, more specific terms* cannot be predicated of the more general terms under which they fall¹ (as when I say 'Animal is man'), unless it is a case of accidental predication (where it happens that an animal is a man). But 'God' stands to the [names of the] three Persons as a general term stands to specific ones falling under it, as Damascene says.² It would seem, then, that the names of the Persons can only be predicated of the noun 'God' accidentally.

‡ *De fide orthodoxa*
III, c 4, PG 94, 997

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Augustine [Fulgentius] says in *De fide ad Petrum*, "We believe that the one God is one Trinity of the divine name."

PL 64, 673

I ANSWER: although personal or identifier adjectives cannot be predicated of [concrete words for] the essence (as I said above), nouns can be so predicated because of the thing-wise sameness between the essence and the Person. Well, the divine essence is not just a same-thing as one Person but a same-thing as all three. Hence one Person, two, or three can be predicated of the essence, so as to say, 'The essence is the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit'. Further,

in a.5

since the word 'God' has of itself what it takes to refer to the essence (as I said before), 'God is three Persons' is true, just as 'The essence is three Persons' is true.

q.39, a.4 ad 3

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): The word 'man' has of itself what it takes to refer to a person, but it gets to stand for our common nature from words added to it in context, as I noted above. This is the reason why 'Man is every man' comes out false on the ground that it cannot come out true for any referent. But the word 'God' has of itself what it takes to refer to the essence. So even though 'God is a Trinity' does not come out true for any Referent of the divine nature, it still comes out true for the essence. This is what Gilbert of La Porrée overlooked when he rejected 'God is a Trinity'.¹

Loc. cit.

ad (2): When one says, 'God is the Father' or 'The divine essence is the Father', the predication is by way of sameness.² It is not a case of predicating the more specific of the more general, because there is no "universal and particular" in God. So just as 'The Father is God' is intrinsic [*per se*] predication, so also 'God is the Father' is intrinsic predication and is not in any way accidental [*per accidens*].

¹ This answer *ad* (1) is conclusive evidence that Aquinas admitted talk of God's essence as both an essence-A and an essence-C, as I have been calling them in the last two articles and commentaries. All of Cajetan's remarks about the essence-C fit what Aquinas says here against Gilbert. Let the inclusive disjunction (FvSvHS) be the essence-C, and let the conjunction (F&S&HS) be the Trinity. So long as the 'v' is inclusive, there is no real difference between them.

² The reader may need to review footnote 5 on article 5.

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear.

ii. In the body of the article, there is one conclusion in two parts. It is this: [*1st part*:] if the person-words or identifiers are adjectives, they are not predicated of the essence, but [*2nd part*:] if they are nouns, they are predicated. — That the first part of this holds good is left as already supported well enough from the previous article. That the second part holds good is made clear by the thing-wise sameness of the essence with the individual Persons and with all of Them C and this sameness holds up for the essence in the abstract as well as in the concrete. The result is that both 'The essence is three Persons' and 'God is three Persons' come out true, as one sees quite clearly in the text. Notice also the following: although what the text says about nouns is true for the essence both

in the abstract and in the concrete, you should understand what it says about adjectives in the first part of the conclusion as applying only to the essence in the abstract. The reason is that one should treat adjectives the same as one treats verbs. So if '___ begets' is verified, so is '___ is generative'; and if the one is rejected,* so is the other. Previous remarks have already made it clear how much it matters whether these blanks are filled by a concrete noun or by an abstract one.

* *negatur*

On the answer *ad* (2)

iii. A doubt arises over the answer *ad* (2). In the [Disputed Questions] *de Potentia Dei*, our author says explicitly in q.8, a.2 *ad* 6, that when 'is the Father' is predicated of the essence,¹ it is not a case of *per se* predication; indeed, a fallacy of accident occurs. But here

¹ i.e. the essence in the concrete

he says that 'God is the Father' is a case of *per se* predication and in no way accidental.

The doubt could also be expanded, but I am going to skip doing so, because the whole difficulty can be cleared away by a single remark, drawing a distinction. It is this: "predications *per se*" come in two kinds. same-thing predications and formal predications. How we differentiate them is that the same-thing ones are not called '*per se*' with no further qualification; rather, they are called '*per se* same', whereas the formal ones are called '*per se*' without further addition. But although both kinds are called *per se*, Aquinas could truthfully say in the other place that these same-thing claims are "not *per se*," because they are not formal, as he explains in that passage.¹

¹ Formal claims (AKA *per se* claims) are best explained with the help of *qua*-clauses. So long as Aquinas followed the view of St. John Damascene, 'The Father is God' could pass as a formal predication because the Father, *qua* the Father, is God. But this article is about claims running the other way, and 'God, *qua* God, is the Father' will not do. It will make God be the Father in such a way as to leave the Son and the Holy Spirit defectively divine, at best. But

You may say that they are "*per se* within the spectrum of sameness statements," as he suggests both at the start of this answer and in his intended meaning. After all, what he is intending to say is that, whereas being the same thing as a man is accidental to "an animal," being [the same thing as] the Father is no accident to "God." And so, as far as being the same thing is concerned, no accident is involved anywhere. A fallacy of accident arises only as far as formalness [of predication] is the issue.

On this view, all of Aquinas's remarks harmonize, and all of the arguments about formal predications (both direct and *per se* in the ways posited in the *Posterior Analytics*) are swept away, because none of them touches same-thing predications properly so-called.

leaving out the *qua*-clause will make God be the Father on an accidental basis. What to do? The solution was to make the 'is' in "God is the Father" what Frege would call the 'is' of identity rather than the 'is' of predication. Cajetan has just told us that identity-statements (AKA same-thing-as statements) can be non-accidental on a different basis. In effect, no *qua*-clause is needed. God is "*per se* same" as the Father just in case the sameness rests on an internal basis.

Should essence-terms be appropriated to Persons?

In 1 Sent. d.31, q.1, a.2

It looks as though terms for God's essence should not be appropriated to Persons.

(1) After all, what borders on error in the faith should be avoided in the talk of God, because (as Jerome* says) heresy comes from words carelessly spoken. Well, to take things common to the three Persons and appropriate them to just One, borders on error in the faith, because people can get the idea that the appropriated trait belongs *only* to that One, or suits Him *more* than it suits the rest. So essential terms should not be appropriated to Persons.

(2) Besides, essential terms expressed in the abstract[†] convey their senses as forms [*significant per modum formae*]. But one Person does not stand to another as His form, since a form is not distinguished referentially from that whose form it is. Therefore, essential terms, especially when expressed in the abstract, should not be appropriated to Persons.

(3) Moreover, the "proper" is prior to the "appropriated," since the proper goes into explaining the appropriated. But in the order of explanation, the essential attributes are prior to the Persons as the "shared" is prior to the "proper." Therefore, the essential attributes should not be appropriated.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 1:24, "Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God."

ANSWER: appropriating essential attributes to the Persons has been a fitting way to shed light on the faith. For while the Trinity of Persons cannot be proved by a demonstration (as noted above), it can be brought to our notice suitably through items more evident to us. The essential attributes of God are more evident to us, thanks to reason, than the distinctive traits of the Persons are, because the thought process going [to God] from creatures whence we get our information enables us to arrive in a warranted way[‡] at a knowledge of the essential attributes but not at a knowledge of the personal distinctives (as I said above). So just as we use the likeness of a vestige or image found in creatures to shed light on the divine Persons, so we use the essential attributes. Shedding light on the Persons through essential attributes is called appropriation.

Now, there are two ways this manifestation of divine Persons through essential attributes can work. One method is by way of similarity, as the attributes pertaining to understanding are appropriated to the Son, who proceeds as the Word by way of understanding. The other method is by way of dissimilarity, as power is appropriated to the Father (says Augustine*) lest we suspect anything in God like what we find among ourselves, where fathers are often weak with old age.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): essential attributes are not appropriated to the Persons in such a way as to assert that they are unique to Them, but just to shed light on the Persons by way of similarity or dissimilarity, as I said. What follows, then, is not an error in the faith but a manifestation of the truth.

ad (2): if the essential attributes were so appropriated to the Persons as to make them traits *unique*[†] to those Persons, then it would follow that one Person was standing as a form to Another. This is what Augustine rules out in *De Trinitate VII*, where he shows that the Father is not the Wisdom which He begets, as if the Son alone were Wisdom, so that the only way we could apply 'wisdom' was to the Father and Son together, not to the Father alone. Rather, the Son is called "the Wisdom of the Father" because He is Wisdom from the Father [who is] Wisdom. Each of them, after all, is Wisdom in and of Himself, and the two together are one Wisdom. The upshot is that the Father is not wise by the wisdom which He begets but by the wisdom which is His essence.¹

ad (3): I grant that an essential attribute, in its own explanation, is prior to a Person in our way of understanding things; but insofar as the attribute meets the condition of being appropriated [to this Person], nothing prevents the Person's distinctive trait from being prior to His appropriated one. This is how a body *qua* a body is naturally prior to its color, but the color is naturally prior to a white body *qua* white.

¹ Actually, St. Paul's statement in 1 Corinthians 1:24 was a confession of the divinity of Christ, based on the Apostolic tradition interpreting Proverbs 9. Christ is the wisdom begotten in God before all creatures, and He is the power "through Whom" all of them were made.

* actually, a gloss on Hoseah 2:16

† *essentia attributa in abstracto significata*

q.32, a.1

‡ *per certitudinem*

q.32, a.1

* actually, Hugh of St. Victor; PL 176, 209

† *propria*

c.1; PL 42, 933

Cajetan's Commentary

In the title-question, 'be appropriated to' does not mean 'be made unique to' (since God's essential traits cannot be made unique to any divine Person) but means 'be accommodated to' or 'be adapted to', which is what the doctors of the Church were regularly doing when they appropriated wisdom to the Son (because He is the Word), *etc.*

ii. In the body of the article, Aquinas does two jobs. In job (1), he answers the question in the affirmative with a single conclusion: appropriating essential traits to Persons was a fitting way to shed light on the faith.

This is supported briefly as follows. [*Antecedent:*] While the Trinity cannot be demonstrated, it can be made easier to think about *via* things more evident to us: so [*1st inference:*] light is fittingly shed on it *via* essential traits, and so [*2nd inference:*] it is fit-

ting to appropriate essential traits to the Persons.

Drawing the first inference is supported on two grounds: (1) because the traits essential to God can be known by natural reason, whereas those distinctive of the Persons cannot; (2) by a comparison: as light is shed on a Person by the likeness of a vestige or image, so also is it shed on a Person by the essential traits. — The second inference is clarified by the fact that, in the case at hand, appropriating is nothing but shedding light on the Persons *via* essential attributes.

In job (2), Aquinas posits two general methods of appropriating: either by similarity to the Persons' distinctive traits, or else by dissimilarity to the imperfections found in human persons called by the same names (*e.g.* fathers and sons, *etc.*), as will become obvious in the next article.

Have teachers of sacred learning applied essence-terms to the Persons rightly?

In I Sent. d.3, q.1, a.1; q.3, a.1; d.34, q.2, a.1

Teachers of the sacred learning seem to have applied essence-terms to the Persons in unsuitable ways.

c.1, PL 10, 51

(1) In book II of his *De Trinitate*, Hilary says: "Eternity is in the Father, loveliness in the Image, and use in the Favor [*munus*]." Here he is using three terms unique to Persons — 'Father', 'Image' (which is unique to the Son, as was said above), and 'Favor' or 'Gift' (which is unique to the Holy Spirit, as was also said above) — along with three appropriated traits. He appropriates being eternal to the Father, being lovely to the Son, being used to the Holy Spirit, and for no apparent reason. Eternity implies duration of being, loveliness is a source of being, and use seems to apply to an activity. But neither being nor activity is appropriated to any Person. So these examples do not seem to have been appropriated rightly to the Persons.

c.5;
PL 34, 21

(2) Also Augustine, in Book I of *De Doctrina Christiana*, says the following: "In the Father is unity, in the Son equality, in the Holy Spirit the harmony of unity and equality." This seems poorly done. A Person is not described formally by a trait appropriated to Another (thus the Father is not "wise" through begotten Wisdom, as noted above), but as he adds in the same passage, "These three are *all one* on account of the Father, *all equal* on account of the Son, and *all in concert* on account of the Holy Spirit." So these do not seem to have been rightly appropriated to the Persons.

q.39, a.7

* In fact, Hugh of St. Victor, PL 176, 208

(3) Elsewhere, Augustine* attributes might [*potentia*] to the Father, wisdom to the Son, and goodness to the Holy Spirit. This, too, seems poorly done. Power [*virtus*] pertains to might, and power is found appropriated to the Son, according to 1 Corinthians 1:24, "Christ the power of God." It is also appropriated to the Holy Spirit by Luke 6:19, "there went power out of Him, and He healed them all." Might, then, should not be appropriated to the Father.

c.1; PL 42, 932

(4) Still elsewhere, in *De Trinitate VII*, Augustine says, "Don't make a muddle of the Apostle's 'from Him and through Him and in Him.' He says, 'from Him' because of the Father, 'through Him' because of the Son, and 'in Him' because of the Holy Spirit." But this seems wrong-headed, because the 'in Him' seems to involve the status of a purpose,¹ which is the first of causes; so this causal status should be appropriated to the Father, who is the Origin from no origin.

† *causa finalis*

(5) On another front, John 14:6 appropriates truth to the Son, "I am the way, the truth, and the life."

Vg. Ps 39: 8

Psalm 40:7 appropriates life to Him also as the book of life, "At the head of the book it is written of me."

taken with the gloss saying, "at the Father, who is my head."¹ Also Isaiah 65:1 appropriates the 'He who is' to the Son by saying, "I said, 'Behold me, behold me,' unto a nation . . ." because a gloss on it says that this is the Son speaking, who said to Moses, "I am who am." Well, these traits seem to be *unique* to the Son, not appropriated. For according to Augustine in his *De vera religione*, truth is "supreme likeness to its source without any unlikeness." Thus being the Truth seems to belong uniquely to the Son, who *has* a Source. Also, the Book of *Life* seems unique to Him, because life means a being that comes from another, and every book, after all, is written by somebody. Also, being He who is seems unique to the Son. For if it had been the Trinity speaking when Moses was told, "I am who am," Moses could have said, "He who is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit has sent me to you." Whereupon he could have said this while indicating a definite Person. But this is false, because no Person is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Therefore, being He who is cannot be common to the Trinity; rather, it is unique to the Son.

Glossa ordinaria

Glossa inter-lincaris

c.36;
PL 34, 152

I ANSWER: since our intellect is led to its knowledge of God from creatures, it has to think of God according to the mode-of-thinking it has picked up from creatures. Well, in thinking of any creature, four lines of thought occur to us in the following order. First, the thing itself is thought of independently, as a certain being. Second, we think of the thing as one. Third, we think of it as having within it a power to act and cause. Fourth, we think of it in terms of the relation it has to what has been caused. These four lines of thinking, then, arises for us also when the topic is God.

The first line of thought, in which God is looked at independently in His own being, is the way to take Hilary's appropriation, in which 'eternal' is appropriated to the Father, 'lovely' to the Son, 'use' to the Holy Spirit.

- For since 'eternal' conveys being without a beginning, being eternal resembles the Father's distinctive trait of being the Origin from no origin.

- Being lovely resembles the distinctives of the Son, because three things are required for beauty: (1) integrity or wholeness (as things with missing parts are unsightly by that fact alone), (2) a due proportion or harmony, and (3) a brilliancy (which is why brightly co-

¹ All the English versions have, "In the volume of the book it is written of me," in accordance with the Masoretic text, 'bi-m'gillat-sepher'. But the Vulgate's 'in capite libri' agrees with the LXX (which sometimes reflects an older state of the Hebrew). In any case, the Vulgate provided the occasion for this allegorizing gloss.

De Trinitate 17, c. 10.
PL 42, 931

lored things are called beautiful). In terms of the first requirement, being lovely suits the Son's distinctive trait of having the Father's nature in Himself *really and completely*. (Augustine suggests the same in his own exposition when he speaks of the Son as "where there is supreme and *complete* Life. etc.). In terms of the second requirement, being lovely suits the Son's distinctive trait of being the express image of the Father. Thus we see that an image is called "a fair copy" if it represents a thing perfectly, even a base thing. (Augustine touches on this when he speaks of the Son as "where there is so much corresponding and primordial matching," etc.). In terms of the third requirement, being lovely fits what is distinctive of the Son as the inner Word, which is the light and brightness of understanding. (Augustine is mentioning this when he says, "as the perfect Word in which nothing is omitted, and as the artistic skill with which God can do anything and everything," etc.).

loc.cit

loc.cit

● Being used, meanwhile, bears a resemblance to the distinctives of the Holy Spirit when 'use' is taken in a broad sense, so that using something covers enjoying it. In this sense, using something is taking it into the power of one's will, and enjoying something is "using it with joy," as Augustine says in *De Trinitate X*. So, on the one hand, the "use" in which Father and Son enjoy each other suits the Holy Spirit's distinctive trait of being Love. Which is what Augustine is saying [in *De Trinitate VII*] "The love, delight, happiness, or blessedness he calls 'use'." On the other hand, the "use" in which we enjoy God resembles the Holy Spirit's distinctive trait of being Gift. Which is what Augustine is showing when he says, "In the Trinity, the Holy Spirit is the sweetness of the Begetter and the Begotten, perfuming even us creatures with immense generosity and freedom."

c. 11;
PL 42, 982

c. 10;
PL 42, 931

loc.cit.

● Thus it is clear why being eternal, being lovely, and being used are attributed or appropriated to the Persons, while "essence" or "activity" are not. These latter, because of their generality, have nothing in their defining makeup that bears any special resemblance to the Persons' distinctive traits.

The second line of thought about God is looking at Him as one. This is the vein in which Augustine [in *De doctrina Christiana*] appropriates 'is one' to the Father, 'is equal' to the Son, and 'harmonizes' or 'connects' to the Holy Spirit. Each of these implies oneness, but differently so. 'Is one' is said [of a thing] independently, not presupposing anything else. And so being one is appropriated to the Father, who presupposes no other Person, since He is the Origin not from an origin. 'Is equal', however, implies oneness in relation to another. An "equal" [to x] is what has one quantity with another thing [x]. And so being equal is appropriated to the Son, who is Origin from an Origin. 'Connects', meanwhile, implies a oneness of two things. So this is appropriated to the Holy Spirit inasmuch as He is from two. Given this interpreta-

c. 5;
PL 34, 21

tion, one can also understand Augustine's statement [in the same passage] that the Three are "one because of the Father, equal because of the Son, and bound together because of the Holy Spirit." Plainly, each trait is being attributed to the one in whose case it turns up *first* (as 'lives' is said of all the genera and species falling under "the living" on account of the vegetative soul, by which what it takes to be alive turns up *first* in these genera and species). Being "one" turns up immediately in the case of the Father, even with the other Persons (*per impossibile*) out of the picture. So the other Persons are one from [*i.e.* after] the Father. But if they are out of the picture, being-equal is not found in the Father. Rather, being-equal turns up at once *given the Son*. And so all are called equal from [after] the Son — not because the Son is the source of equality with the Father,² but because, if the Son were not equal to Him, the Father could not be called "equal." After all, His being-equal is thought of *vis-à-vis* the Son *first*. Thereupon, being equal to the Father is a title which the Holy Spirit has from [after] the Son. Likewise, if the Holy Spirit (who is the nexus of the two) were out of the picture, there would be no understanding a oneness of connection between the Father and the Son.³ And so all are called "connected" from [after] the Holy Spirit. For what it takes to be connected turns up among the divine Persons *given the Holy Spirit*. Thanks to Him, the Father and Son can be called connected.

In the third line of thought, in which God is viewed as having in Himself enough ability to cause things, we are said to get a third appropriation, namely, that of power, wisdom, and goodness. This appropriation works both on the basis of similarity (if one is looking at what is in the divine Persons) and on the basis of dissimilarity (if one is looking at what is in creatures). "Might" has what it takes to be a source, and so it has a likeness with the heavenly Father, who is the Source of the whole divinity, whereas an earthly father is often lacking in might because of old age. "Wisdom" has a likeness to the heavenly Son insofar as He is the inner Word, which is none other than wisdom's concept; but an earthly son is often lacking in wisdom because of his green youth. "Goodness," in turn, since it is the reason for love and the object of love, has a likeness to the Holy Spirit, who is Love, but is seen to clash with the earthly spirit insofar as it involves a violence and an impulsivity, as we read in Isaiah 25:4, "the blast* of the terrible ones is as a storm against the wall." * Vg 'spiritus'

² The source [*principium*] of equality with the Father is the divine essence. In other words, the reason why the Son is equal to the Father is not "because He is the Son" but "because He has the exact same essence as the Father."

³ 'Equal' implies no *connection* between the equal things. Having the same essence is not being *connected* as Persons. Rather, Father and Son are connected as Persons by *jointly* spirating the Holy Spirit.

● The sense in which ‘power’ is appropriated to the Son and the Holy Spirit is not the one in which the very might of a thing is called its power but rather the sense in which what proceeds from a thing’s might is sometimes called its power, as when we say that a strong deed is done “by an agent’s power.”

The fourth line of thought, in which God is viewed in relation to His effects, is the one in which we get the appropriation of ‘from whom’, ‘through whom’ and ‘in whom. The preposition ‘from [ex]’ sometimes implies the relation of a material cause, which has no place in the talk of God, but sometimes implies that of an efficient cause. Being an efficient cause suits God by reason of His active mightiness. Hence the ‘from’ is appropriated to the Father, along with ‘might’. Next, the preposition ‘through [per]’ sometimes indicates an intermediate cause, as when we say an artisan is working “through his hammer.” So taken, ‘through’ is sometimes not an appropriated word at all but one unique to the Son, as in John 1:3, “All things were made by Him [per ipsum]” — not because the Son is an instrument, but because He is the Source from a Source. At other times, however, ‘through’ indicates the rôle of a form by which the agent operates, as when we say an artisan is working “through his skill.” In this sense, as ‘wisdom’ and ‘skill’ are appropriated to the Son, so is the ‘through’.

— Meanwhile, the preposition ‘in’, when used literally, indicates the rôle of a container. God contains things in two ways. In one, it is by their likenesses, *i.e.*, things are said to be “in God” insofar as they are in His knowledge. In this sense, the words ‘in Him’ would be appropriated to the Son. The other way He contains things is that, in His goodness, He preserves them and governs them by guiding them to a fitting purpose. In this sense, the ‘in whom’ is appropriated to the Holy Spirit, along with ‘goodness’.

● And there is no need for the rôle of a purpose (albeit the first of causes) to be appropriated to the Father, the Origin not from an origin, because the divine Persons (of whom the Father is the Origin) do not proceed as “for a purpose” (each of Them *is* the ultimate Purpose) but as by natural process, which seems to pertain more to the makeup of natural potency.⁵ As for the other appropriations that have been questioned, the thing to say is that, since trueness pertains to

understanding (as I said above), it is appropriated to the Son. But it is not unique to Him. For as I also said above, trueness can be considered either as it is in an understanding or as it is in a thing [as its realness]. So since ‘understanding’ and ‘thing’ when taken essentially, are words for God’s essence, not for the Persons, the same holds for ‘trueness’. The definition quoted from Augustine is one he gives for ‘truth’ as appropriated to the Son. Next, ‘Book of Life’ implies knowledge directly [*in recto*] and implies life indirectly [*in obliquo*]. For as I said above, the Book of Life is God’s knowledge about those who will have eternal life. Hence it is appropriated to the Son, even though ‘life’ is appropriated to the Holy Spirit, inasmuch as life implies an inner movement and thus suits the distinctive trait of the Holy Spirit as Love. Now, being written by another does not go into defining a book *qua* a book but *qua* an artifact; hence ‘book of life’ does not imply an origin and is not a personal term, but rather one appropriated to a Person. Meanwhile, the title ‘He who is’ is not appropriated to the Person of the Son thanks to its own definition but thanks to a circumstance, *i.e.*, that in God’s speech to Moses there was prefigured the liberation of the human race accomplished through the Son. To be sure, since ‘who’ is a relative pronoun, it could sometimes be taken to refer to the Person of the Son, and then ‘He who is’ would be used person-wise, as it would be if one said ‘The Son is the begotten one who is’ or if one said ‘[who is the] begotten God’ personally. But as used without any such restriction [*in finitè*], ‘He who is’ speaks of God’s essence. And while the pronoun ‘he’, grammatically speaking, seems to point to a definite Person, it is nevertheless the case that anything that can be “pointed out” can be called a grammatical person, even if it is not naturally a person. Thus we call a rock “this one” and an ass “he.” Grammatically speaking, then, the divine essence, thanks to being conveyed and referred to by the [concrete] noun God’, can be pointed out by the pronoun ‘he’, as in Exodus 15:2, “He is my God ... and I will exalt Him.”

hence by an active power corresponding to its skill or art, and the artifact produced is in non-natural potency to the state or “form” it thus receives. By contrast, what comes from a source “by nature” emerges necessarily, not by choice, it emerges out of natural active power to do or to be, whose objects have a corresponding natural passive potency (to be so done-onto or brought to be). The emergence of a divine Person is analogous to this latter.

⁴ This is an allusion to Aristotle’s contrast in *Physics I* between what is “by nature” and what is “by art.” What a source produces “for a purpose” it produces by choice and

Cajetan’s Commentary

The title is very broad, covering as many appropriations as have been questioned, all of which seem to have been handed down as present in Scripture.

ii. In the body of the article, there is nothing for me

to add, I think, because the text is clear, well organized, well arranged, and easily intelligible by itself. Instead of being expounded or explained, all it needs is to be read.

Inquiry Forty: Into how Persons compare to relations or distinguishing traits

Next, the inquiry turns to how the divine Persons compare to the relations or traits which distinguish them. Here four questions are raised.

- | | |
|--|---|
| (1) Is a relation the same as a Person? | (3) If the relations are mentally subtracted from the Persons, do the hypostases remain distinct? |
| (2) Do the relations distinguish and constitute the Persons? | (4) Are the Persons' acts understood before the relations, or after? |

article I

Is a relation the same as a Person?

In I Sent., d.26, q.2, a.1, d.33, a.2, Compend. Theol. c.67

In our talk of God, it seems that a relation is not the same as a Person.

(1) When any items are “the same,” they count up the same. But it turns out that more than one relation is in one Person (like fatherhood and common spiration in the Person of the Father) and that one relation is in two Persons (like common spiration in the Father and the Son). Ergo, a relation is not the same thing as a Person.

c.3; 210b.23 (2) Moreover, as Aristotle says in *Physics IV*, nothing is “in” itself. But a relation is “in” a Person; and you can’t say this is by virtue of their sameness, because then the relation would also be in the essence. Therefore, in the talk of God, the relation (or distinguishing trait) is not the same as the Person.

(3) Also, any items that are “the same” so stand that anything affirmed of one of them is affirmed of the rest. But it is not the case that everything affirmed of a Person is affirmed of His distinctive trait. We say that the Father “begets” but not that fatherhood “begets” or “is generative.” Hence a distinctive trait is not the same as a Person in the talk of God.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is no difference in the talk of God between what is [*quod est*] and whereby it is [*quo est*], as Boethius tells us in his *De Hebdomadibus*. But whereby the Father is a father is fatherhood. Hence the Father is the same as fatherhood; and, for the same reason, the other Persons are the same as their distinctive traits.

I ANSWER: people have held different opinions about this. Some said that the distinctive traits are neither Persons nor in the Persons. They were influenced by how relation-words convey their trait: *i.e.* not as a trait “in” something but as a bearing “towards” something. So this party said that relations are “adjacent,” as I explained above. But insofar as we speak of a relation as a real thing [*res*] in God, it is His very essence, which (as emerged above) is a same thing as

the Person, and so the relation has to be the same as the Person.

Other writers were looking at exactly this sameness when they said the distinctive traits *are* Persons but are not *in* Persons. On their view, such traits are not in God but are just a manner of speech. I discussed this view earlier; and as I showed at the time, it is in fact necessary to posit distinctive [identifying] traits in God. They come into language as abstract nouns, as “forms” of the Persons. So, since a “form,” by definition, is “in” the thing whose form it is, one has to say that the distinctive traits are “in” the Persons; but one also has to say that they “are” the Persons — just as we say that the essence is *in* God and yet *is* God.

q.32, a.2

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): the Persons and their distinctive traits are thing-wise the same* but differ in how we define them.¹ Hence a rise in the count of the one does not necessarily raise our count of the other. One needs to realize, though, that the divine simplicity supplies *two bases* on which items distinct in creatures are the same in God.

* *idem re*
† *differunt secundum rationem*

[a] The fact that God’s simplicity excludes composition of form and matter from Him entails that the abstract and the concrete are the same thing, as is the case with “divineness” and “God.”

[b] The fact that His simplicity excludes composition of subject and accident entails that any attribute ascribed to God is the same as His essence; thus “wisdom” is the same as “power” in God because both are in His essence.

Now, thanks to these two bases for sameness, a distinguishing trait in God is the same as a Person. [a] The ones that constitute the Persons are the same as the Persons because the abstract is the same thing as the concrete. They are the very Persons subsisting, as fatherhood *is* the Father, and sonship *is* the Son, and procession *is* the Holy Spirit. [b] The distinguishing traits that do not constitute Persons are the same as the Persons on the other basis for sameness, *i.e.* on the

basis that traits attributed to God are His essence. Thus, common spiration is the same as the Person of the Father and the same as the Person of the Son, not because it is one Person subsisting in itself, but because the one distinguishing trait is in both Persons as the one essence is in both, as I said above.

q 30, a.2

ad (2): distinguishing traits are said to be “in the essence” by way of [thing-wise] sameness alone; but they are said to be in the Persons not just by sameness

but also by how they signify, *i.e.* as a form in a referent. This is why such traits limit and distinguish the Persons but not the essence.

ad (3): identifier* participles and verbs convey identifier acts. But acts belong to referents. The distinctive traits do not signify as referents but as forms of referents. And so how these traits signify conflicts with attaching identifier participles and verbs to them as predicates.

* *notiones*

q.32, a.2 ad 2;

Cajetan’s Commentary

The title question is clear.

In the body of the article, Aquinas does three jobs: (1) he treats Gilbert of La Porrée’s opinion; (2) he treats Praepositini’s opinion; (3) he answers the question.

Analysis of the article, I

Before going any further, notice that opinions on the topic at hand could go four ways. (a) One could hold that the distinctive traits are not the Persons and are not in Them. (b) One could hold that they are the Persons but are not in the Persons. (c) One could hold the opposite, that they are in the Persons but are not the Persons. (d) One could hold both that they are the Persons and that they are in Them. No fifth way to go can be imagined. Also, ‘are’ and ‘are in’ convey diverse standings. The ‘are’ conveys sameness; the ‘are in’ conveys form-wise description.* Hence, all these ways of opining have been advanced except the third (c), as is clear in the body of the article

* *formalis denominatio*

[As for job (1)] Gilbert of La Porrée’s followers advanced the first of them, that these traits are neither Persons nor in Persons, because they thought of relations as adjacent, as orderings-to-another. Their view is criticized in the text for a reason often stated, namely, that a relation [in God] is a same thing as the divine essence.

A doubt about this part

ii. Doubt arises about this part of the article, because it looks like a mistake was made in bringing up Gilbert’s opinion here. The last time Aquinas rehearsed this opinion (in the previous inquiry), Gilbert was alleged to have held that a relation was a Person, but that a Person was not a same thing as the essence. So it is a bad job accusing him now of having held that a relation is not a Person.

The SHORT ANSWER to this is that, here, Aquinas is taking it as settled that a Person is a same thing as the essence, whereas back in a.1 of the previous inquiry this was not taken as settled but was the very point in question. So Aquinas has told the story correctly in both places. For when he was talking about divine Persons without assuming that such a Person was the same as the essence, he said Gilbert thought the adjacent relation was a Person. But given the premise

that a Person is the same as the essence, it follows from Gilbert’s analysis that a relation is not a Person, because a relation is alongside the essence [on Gilbert’s analysis] and not identified with it. Well, the discussion of divine Persons in this article has that premise in place, obviously; and so no mistake has been made.

Analysis of the article, II

iii. As for job (2), Praepositini used to say that the distinguishing traits were the Persons and not in the Persons, because (as discussed in q. 32) he denied [any reality to] the identifiers by expounding all the abstract words in terms of concrete ones. For this, he, too, is criticized in the text. For it is necessary to posit distinctive traits in the abstract as “form-wise sources” of the Persons,* as was proved there.

* *formalia principia personarum*

iv. As for job (3), the conclusion answering the question embraces the fourth way of opining and says: the distinguishing traits [*1st part:*] are the Persons and [*2nd part:*] are in the Persons. This is shown to be correct in two ways: (1) The first is by an argument [supporting the second part], thus. [*Antecedent:*] It belongs to the definition of a form that it be in the thing whose form it is; so it has to be the case that [*inference:*] a trait distinguishing a Person is in the Person. Drawing the inference is supported on the ground that the trait is a form of the Person. (2) The second way supports both parts of the conclusion together, on the evidence of a parallel case: [the abstract trait] divineness is in God and also is God; ergo [other abstract traits, like fatherhood, can have the same double standing].

On being-in

v. Note here that the talk of traits’ “being in” the Persons can be understood two ways: as causing an effect there [*transitivē*] and as not-causing one [*intransitivē*]. If the talk is understood non-causatively, the opinion of Praepositini returns, because then our claim conveys nothing but that the distinguishing traits are Persons. But if it is understood causatively, it can be understood in two further ways. Taken one way, the ‘in’ denotes a causal transaction in the real* [*i.e.* a real event of formal causation, an informing], and then the claim is false. The other way, the ‘in’ denotes a transaction in our thought[†], not just in any way but in

* *secundum rem*† *secundum rationem*

the way of a form in a referent, and that is how our claim is being used in the matter at hand.

Now, the reason the argument is necessitating two affirmations, namely, that the trait is [the same as] a Person and is in a Person, is this: if only the sameness were being posited, then, since a distinctive trait is also a same thing as the essence, the trait would not be in a Person in more ways than it is in the essence. And then one would make the same judgment about 'Fatherhood is in the Father' as one makes about 'Fatherhood is in the essence' — whereas in fact the latter is just a sameness statement, while the former is both a sameness statement and a form-wise statement.¹ And please be aware that the basis for sameness is just no distinction of thing-from-thing, but the basis for form-wise description requires something in our thought, namely, a distinction between *what* and *whereby*.

¹ The reason it matters that fatherhood be in the Father in more ways than it is in the divine essence is that fatherhood has to distinguish the Father from the Son without distinguishing the divine essence into a Father-part and a Son-part.

From these points, one can easily answer the arguments of Gregory of Rimini (at *In I Sent.* dd.26 and 27), wherein he denies that there are distinguishing traits in the Persons. They are all solved by paying attention to the fact that a formal-causal transaction is only being denoted in our thought. Thus the argument made in the text holds good on this same basis, namely, that, just as it belongs to the definition of a form really inhering in a referent that it be in that referent really,* so also it belongs to the definition of a form-wise source in knowing[†] that it be in [the thing it makes known] in thought,[‡] in such a way that only the *distinction* implied by 'is in' is thought-produced; for the joining of trait-with-referent is in the real, after the fashion of [the joining of] form-with-referent.²

* *realiter*
 † *in cognoscendo*
 ‡ *secundum rationem*

² In the real, a form ϕ -ness in a thing x makes x be ϕ in an extra-mental "transaction" of in-forming. In the course of knowing, an identifier ' ψ -ness' makes x be known as ψ in a mental "transaction" of informing. Within the thing x , what takes to be ψ does not have to be distinct from anything else in or about x , in order for ' ψ -ness' to work in our minds as a *whereby* in contrast to x itself as the *what*.

Are the Persons made distinct from one another by their relations?

In I Sent. d.26, q.1, a.1; De Potentia Dei q.8, a.3; q.9, a.4 ad 15; Quodl. IV q.4, a.2

It does not look as though the Persons would be made distinct from one another by their relations.¹

(1) After all, simple things are distinct of themselves, and the Persons are supremely simple. They are distinct from one another in and of themselves, therefore, and not because of their relations.

(2) Besides, a form is made distinct only by its own category. Thus [the quality] white differs from black only *by quality*. But 'hypostasis' means an individual in the category of substance. So, hypostases cannot be made distinct from one another by relations.

(3) Moreover, the absolute is prior to the relative, but the distinction between divine Persons is the first of all distinctions. Therefore, the divine Persons are distinct by something absolute, not by relations.

(4) Furthermore, what presupposes a distinction cannot be the first source of it. Well, a relation presupposes a distinction, since the definition of 'relation' includes the point that being related is standing [thus or so] *towards another*. Hence, the *first* source of things being distinct in God cannot be a relation.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Boethius says in his *De Trinitate*: relation alone raises the count of divine Persons to three.

c.6;
PL 64, 1255

I ANSWER: whenever a common factor is found in "more than one" thing, we have to ask what makes the things distinct. Since the three Persons have a common factor (oneness of essence), we have to look for something whereby one Person is distinct from another, so as to make them "more than one." Well, in divine Persons, we find two items by which they are distinct: origination and relation. These last do not differ as one real thing from another, but they still differ in how they come into language. Originating comes in as an act, like to beget, while a relation comes in as a form, like fatherhood.

Some writers have focused on the fact that a relation arises in consequence of an action; so they have maintained that the hypostases in God are made distinct by origination, so that we may say the Father is distinct from the Son by virtue of the fact that He begets and the Son is begotten. Then, what the relations or distinctive traits do is just make their distinctness *apparent*, just as happens among the creatures we are familiar with: their discriminable features make apparent the distinctness which is already there thanks to sources in the matter of one individual vs. another.

¹ The two basic questions to ask about any existing thing are (a) what constitutes it, and (b) what makes it distinct. Since q.29 and a.1 here in q.40 settled it that relations constitute the Persons, a.2 turns to the issue of what makes Them distinct.

But this theory fails to stand up for two reasons. The first goes thus. In order to understand any two things as distinct, one has to understand them as distinct because of a factor intrinsic to each, like the matter in created things, or the form. But originating does not come into language as something intrinsic to a thing but as a sort of "going" *from* or *to* a thing. Generation, for example, comes into language as a going to the thing begotten and from the thing begetting. Thus it cannot be the case that the thing begotten and the one begetting it are made distinct solely by generation; rather, one has to understand *within* the begetter and *within* the begotten factors by which they are distinct from one another. Well, in a divine Person, there is nothing to understand except His essence and a relation or distinguishing trait. So since They agree in the essence, there is nothing left to say but that the Persons are made distinct by the relations.

The second reason goes thus. Making divine Persons distinct is not to be conceived along the lines of dividing up a common stuff, because their common essence remains undivided. Rather, the distinguishing factors *themselves* must make them distinct. Thus the relations or traits make the hypostases or Persons distinct insofar as they themselves are the subsisting Persons, as fatherhood *is* the Father, and sonship *is* the Son (abstract and concrete do not differ in the talk of God). At the same time, it goes against the defining makeup of origination for *it* to constitute a hypostasis or Person, because originating, actively taken, comes into language as a going *from* a subsistent Person and hence as presupposing one, while passively taken (like being born) originating comes into language as the going *to* a subsisting Person and not as already constituting one.

The better thing to say, then, is that the Persons or hypostases are made distinct by the relations rather than by origination. Granted, they are distinguished by both, but first and mainly by the relations according to our way of understanding. Thus the noun 'Father' conveys not only a distinctive trait but also an hypostasis, while 'begetter' (or 'one begetting') conveys only a distinctive trait, because 'Father' conveys the relation which [both] distinguishes *and* constitutes the hypostasis, while 'begetter' (or 'begotten') conveys originating, which does not do both.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): the Persons are precisely *relations* subsisting. So being distinguished by relations does not conflict with their simplicity.

ad (2): the divine Persons are not made distinct in the being in which they subsist [*i.e.* in being God] nor in being anything absolute, but only in being things described relationally. Therefore, a relation is enough to make them distinct.

ad (3): the more primordial a distinction is, the closer it is to [the indistinction of] oneness, and so the primordial distinction has to be the weakest. Thus, distinction between the Persons arises only from what distinguishes things most weakly, *i.e.* from relation.

ad (4): when a relation is an accident, it presupposes distinction of referents. But if the relation subsists, it does not presuppose but introduces this. As to standing *towards another*, the “another” is a correlative, and by nature a correlative is simultaneous, not prior.

cf q 13, a 7, and §§ vi-xii in its commentary

Carjetan’s Commentary

In the title-question, what is being asked about is not just any factor that makes them distinct but the *first* factor to do so. Do relations, in other words, first-off distinguish the Persons?

Analysis of the article, I

In the body of the article, Aquinas does four jobs. (1) He prefaces his remarks with points that need stating. (2) He reviews a certain opinion. (3) He invalidates the opinion. (4) He answers the question.

ii. As for job (1), he makes three prefatory remarks. First is the need for this question: we have here more than one thing sharing a common factor. Next is the limits on the inquiry: we are not to go searching for distinguishing factors but are to stick with these two, relation and origination, because it is by these that divine Persons differ. Third is the likeness and difference between these: they are one in reality but differ linguistically. Relation comes into language as a form, while originating comes in as an act.

Scotus breaches the limits

iii. *Re* the limits on the inquiry, note first the behavior of Scotus at *In I Sent.* d.26. He shows that if he were not afraid to contradict the Church, he would gladly hold that in a divine Person (beyond the essence common to all three and a relation of origin peculiar to each) there is some absolute entity which is incommunicable and which constitutes the Person. He launches this position from a remark of Bonaventure’s on *I Sent.* d.25, and he gives himself a basis in Scripture with Proverbs 30:4 — “What is his name, and what is his son’s name, if thou canst tell?” — from which he argues as follows. A question seeks to resolve a doubt and assumes something certain; here it assumes the term ‘son’ and asks for His proper name. ‘Son’ is not his proper name, therefore, and sonship is not his distinctive constituent.¹ He also adduces many arguments and authorities.

Setting these aside (because Scotus himself answered them), it remains for us to clear up the two I just mentioned.

iv. St. Bonaventure did not hold any such opinion as that divine Persons are absolute, as is explicitly clear in his remarks on *I Sent.* d.26, where he says

that the distinguishing traits *as origins* make the Persons distinct, with the result that, if the origins were removed, the hypostases would not remain. Bonaventure also says that *all* the distinctive traits are relations or origins, except ‘innascibility’, which is negative. The words that Scotus quotes are indeed Bonaventure’s words, but he was making a different point. In his remarks on *I Sent.* d.25, a.1, Bonaventure was asking about the meaning of the word ‘person’. He said that the general and first sense of ‘person’ involves substance, but that its special and ultimate sense [as used in the talk of God] involves relation, because a distinctive trait constituting a Person in God is a relation. He also argued against an objection of his own making: “things said substance-wise and things said relation-wise differ as opposites in the talk of God; so one cannot say in the same breath that ‘person’ is said substance-wise first and generally but relation-wise specially and ultimately.” He answered this by observing that things are said substance-wise in two contexts: one where ‘substance’ means the [divine] essence, and one where ‘substance’ means a hypostasis. Being said substance-wise in the first context is the opposite of being said relation-wise — not in the second context, because substance in the sense of hypostasis gets its tokens in God through relations. With this much said, it must be clear even to the blind that Bonaventure did not posit two absolute items, one essential and one hypostatic, as Scotus wanted to imagine. Bonaventure’s whole point has been that ‘substance’ is used two ways, for an essence and for a hypostasis (which you can also find in *Metaphysics V*, and that ‘substance’ used formally of a divine Person is ‘substance’ in the second sense (hypostasis), and that — once and for all — a divine Person is a hypostasis and yet is a relation, *etc.* And these points are common doctrine, after all, for every theologian. So it is utterly amazing that Scotus tried to impute his idea to Bonaventure — when, at the end of his article [a.1 in d.25], Bonaventure explicitly said that the Person of the Father cannot be abstracted from fatherhood and still keep His personhood. What could possibly be clearer? *Etc.*

v. As to the words of Solomon [in Proverbs 30:4], of which Scotus made so much, the answer is very easy. There is an equivocation on the term ‘Son of God’. He can be named in two ways, just as He can be conceived in two ways. One way is in terms of His own what-He-is (so to speak). The other way is in terms of words and concepts abstractable from creatures. In the first way, we have no name for the Son, nor even for God — as it

c 8,
1017b 23ff

¹ On what ‘proper name’ meant in scholastic discussions, see footnote 1 on p. 622.

is written in Isaiah 53:8, “and who shall declare His generation?” And so it is among the terms that give rise to knowledge in us that ‘son’ is a proper name of the second divine Person — it gives us knowledge that He is. But as to a proper name giving us knowledge of what-He-is — that is ineffable. So, too, ‘God’ is a proper name of God Himself, and yet a name conveying what-God-is is ineffable.

More on the limits

vi. Concerning the same limits on the inquiry, notice secondly that what the author means by the term ‘relation’ is just a relation itself *vaguely*, that is, not bothering to distinguish between

— a relation as it has in itself the “act” of relating and

— a relation as it has in itself the “act” of making distinct.

This is why he often says in this text ‘relation or distinctive trait’. What I am saying at this point (as will become clear below) is that, in a divine Person, there is *one relational thing* brought into language [three ways:] (a) as an originating, and (b) as a relation (since it is a relation), and (c) as an individual or personal distinctive. But the text lumps ways (b) and (c) together and does so (I think) for three reasons. First, because we have no object-language terms* for the distinctives except relation-terms and origin-terms, as you can see by running through our vocabulary. Secondly, because way (b), as a relation, could be subdivided (without damage to its defining makeup), as is in fact done in the text of a.4 of this inquiry. Thirdly, because ([divine] personhood being in fact a relation) putting (b) and (c) together puts the Person into the category of Relation (taking the category-name in a wide [analogous] sense), so that in consequence this “act” [of making distinct] is given to “relation.”

Doubts on origination vs. relation

vii. As to the difference Aquinas assigns between an origination and a relation, doubt arises because it seems untrue that they differ in how they come into language. Both are expressed in abstract words and in concrete ones, in adjectives and in nouns, and in other parts of speech. So they do not differ in this respect. Then, there is a second and larger doubt about the further difference that Aquinas brought in, namely, that relations come into language as forms, while originations come in as acts. When he says ‘come into language as a form’, either he means ‘come in as a formal source in describing’, *i.e.* as that whereby a thing is [called] thus-and-such, and then the difference is nil, because just as fatherhood is that whereby someone is and is called “a father,” generation is that whereby someone is and is called “begetting,” or else he means ‘come into language as a thing inhering’, and so taken it is false that relations come in as forms, because, as St. Thomas himself taught

(in *De Potentia Dei* q.8, a.2), although a relation is in a thing, it is not expressed in language as inhering. Indeed, here again the difference would be nil because (as he said in the same place) actions and relations are the same in this respect.

Removing the doubts

viii. My answer to both of these doubts is that the talk here is not about coming into language grammatically and does not arise from the linguistic side where words convey a sense; rather, the talk is [about coming into language] metaphysically, or arises from the reality side, where a thing gets conveyed, where several scientific accounts of *one thing* call for several ways of coming into language. Therefore, the intention of the text is to say that one thing comes into language in one way (*i.e.* on one such account) in an origin-word, and [comes into language in another way, on another such account] in a relation-word, be it abstract, be it concrete, or be it any way you please grammatically. From this follows my answer to the second doubt: because a form is what yields a thing’s being [thus-or-such] form-wise, to come into language as a form is, in this context, to come into language as yielding being [thus or such] form-wise. And since this happens in two ways — from the side of a word [conveying a sense] and from the side of a scientific account conveyed — and I have already said that the talk here is not about expression in language from the word’s side, the other alternative is what is being admitted. So my answer to the objection on the other side (and I have already touched upon it [above, in remarks on q.28, a.1] is this: it is one thing to talk about a relation as a relation, and it is another thing to talk about an unqualifiedly real relation. A relation just as a relation is not something inhering; but it belongs to the defining makeup of a *real* relation that it does inhere. So, between a real action and a real relation there is the following difference. An action, both as an action and as a real action, has by its scientific account what it takes to be an item *going out*, though it may perhaps inhere. But a real relation, even if it has by its scientific account as a relation only what it takes to be an item adjacent, nevertheless has by its scientific account as a *real* relation what it takes to be an item both adjacent *and inherent* — and this is why, from the reality side where a thing’s scientific account gets conveyed, a real relation comes into language as a form. This is where it differs from originating, and this is why (in upcoming remarks) relation, not origin, will get the job of distinguishing and constituting a Person. This will become clearer in a. 4.

Analysis of the article, II

ix. As to job (2), Aquinas reviews an opinion which Bonaventure² follows, and which says three things. (a) Relation does not make the hypostases distinct, because relation is a consequence of action; (b) originating is

² The dates of St Bonaventure, OFM, were 1221-1274.

* *nomina primarum intentionum*

what makes Them distinct, for the same reason (*i.e.* that it is prior to relation): (c) the relations make the distinctness manifest, as distinctive traits do among creatures.

x. As for job (3), Aquinas brings forward two arguments against the opinion just stated.

The first is this. [*Antecedent:*] What makes [one item] distinct [from another] has to be intrinsic and unique [to one or the other]; so [*1st inference: 1st part:*] neither originating [*2nd part:*] nor essence makes [one divine Person] distinct [from another]; so [*2nd inference:*] relation does it. — The antecedent is supported among creatures, where distinctness comes either by matter or by form. Drawing the first inference is supported as to its first part by the fact that originating has what it takes to be a going from a thing or a going to a thing and so is not intrinsic [to a thing] and is supported as to its second part by the fact that the essence is common and thus not unique [to any Person]. Drawing the second inference is supported by commonplace elimination: besides the essence and the originating, there is nothing left in a divine Person but a relation.

The second argument goes thus. [*Antecedent or major:*] In the talk of God, what makes a Person distinct is what constitutes a Person; but [*minor: 1st part:*] being what constitutes a Person conflicts with originating but [*2nd part:*] does not conflict with a relation. [*Conclusion:*] Ergo what makes a Person distinct is not origination but relation. — The antecedent is made clear by looking at the two ways of making distinct, *i.e.* by constituting the distinct item or by just distinguishing it, in keeping with the two ways of standing towards the distinct item. For sometimes a thing already existing is made distinct, as happens in division of water, and then the only act needed is the making distinct. But other times a thing not already existing is made distinct, and then acts of constituting and making distinct are both needed at once. The divine essence, then, although it is understood by us as pre-existing the distinctive relations, is not divided or distinguished by the relations, but always remains undivided. And so what makes distinct has to both constitute and distinguish the Persons as items not pre-existent, as was already assumed in the antecedent. The minor, meanwhile, as to its first part, is supported by the fact that originating actively taken presupposes a Person, while originating passively taken is a going towards one. As to the minor's second part, it is supported by the fact that the relations are the subsisting Persons themselves, in that the abstract and the concrete do not differ in God.

Doubts about the second argument

xi. There are doubts about this last argument in two respects. First, what are we to make of the words, "the relations constitute the Persons insofar as they themselves are the Persons"? Second, what force do these words get from the point tacked on after them:

the abstract and the concrete do not differ in God?

There is good reason to wonder because, if this premise is true, every item that is itself the Person has the honor of constituting the Person, as you can see from a reduplicative argument: the originating, insofar as it is itself the Person, constitutes Him; the essence, insofar as it is itself the Person, constitutes Him, *etc.* A claim to the effect that

y constitutes x insofar as y is x

does not seem to say anything except that x constitutes itself, which is hardly relevant. The tacked-on words about the abstract and the concrete not only seem irrelevant but, given that they are true, do not appear to be effective; after all, it is just as true for the origins that they "are" the Persons and that the abstract does not differ from the concrete.

Answers to them

xii. The answer to this is that our author is understanding the words 'are the Persons' to mean not just a [thing-wise] sameness but a sameness by reason of the distinctive trait or relation itself. For a trait or relation differs from an originating precisely in this (as I said above): by its defining makeup, a real trait or relation *inheres*, and inhering is replaced in the talk of God with *being the same as* the thing whose trait/relation it is. Originating, however, by its defining makeup, does not inhere and hence does not become [in God] the same as the thing to which it is attributed. Meanwhile, the 'insofar as' is not taken reduplicatively but as a specifier; it determines the condition on which a relation gets to constitute (and an origination does not), as when one says, "This is curly insofar as it has hair."³ The relation gets to constitute by virtue of the fact that, in the case of a divine Person, 'is someone' means 'constitutes the Person'. And since the relation does not constitute the Person as a part of Him would, and does not distinguish Him as a supervenient addition would, Aquinas said it constitutes the Person insofar as it *is* He. So the sense is that, since the relation, thanks to its own defining makeup, is neither a part nor a supervenient factor, but is itself the Person, therefore it both constitutes and makes distinct (recall that we are always talking about the distinctives of the Persons). And to make it manifest that the relation is itself the Person and not a part or an add-on, he has adduced the fact that the abstract is the same thing as the concrete here, which is not true in things that stand as whole-and-part. Thus the answer is clear to all the objections; what gave occasion to them was the hidden claim. You should understand these things because they serve to support this argument; but apart from this argument, how true it is for our author that a relation constitutes insofar as it is the very Person will be spelled out in the next article.

a.3, § vii in the commentary

³ As a specifier, the 'insofar as' is saying that the relation R constitutes the Person to the extent that R is "in the Person." If the 'insofar as' were reduplicative, it would be saying much more, namely, that R constitutes Him just *by* being in Him.

More on the two arguments

xiii. Of the points made in these arguments, take note of two. The first is in the first argument — the point that being made distinct always has to happen through an intrinsic factor (form or matter). One has to have this as a foundation for inquiring into the source of individuation, so as not to posit quantity as the intrinsic distinguisher of Socrates from Plato.

The second is in the second argument — the point that making a Person distinct can come about by constituting Him or without constituting Him. One has to have this before one's eyes when handling the question of the Son's distinction from the Holy Spirit, as we said at length in q.36.

Analysis of the article, III

xiv. As to job (4), the conclusion in answer to the question is this: the divine hypostases are better said to be made distinct by relations than by originations. And since 'better' assumes that both answers are good, the first thing he says in laying out his conclusion is that both are true. Second, he says that this answer is better, because in our way of understanding the hypostases, they are first and mainly distinguished by their relations. And finally he deduces a corollary consisting of the difference between the noun 'Father' and the noun 'begetter', namely, that 'Father' is not just a term for a distinctive trait but also for a Person, while 'begetter' is just a term for a distinctive trait. This obviously follows because the relation constitutes, and the origin does not. As to the basis for the other opinion, that an origin is prior to a relation inasmuch as the latter is a consequence, it will be answered in a.4, where "relation" is distinguished.

On the answer *ad* (1)

xv. In reading the answer *ad* (1), bear in mind that we can speak of divine Persons two ways. One way is according to how they are in Themselves,* and in this way of speaking it is true that they are distinct "in and of themselves," as Praepositini and Gregory of Rimini said. And St. Thomas concedes as much at *In I Sent.* d.26, q.2, a.1 *ad* 5. But if divine Persons are considered as they are disclosed and conveyed in language to us, then (since they are only distinguished by relations in how they are conveyed) they are constituted and made distinct by relations, just as God is constituted and made distinct from other things by divineness.

On the answer *ad* (3)

xvi. Notice in the answer *ad* (3) that relative distinction is put first among real [*i.e.* thing-from-thing] distinctions. This is because, on the one hand, relative

distinction alone is utterly and unqualifiedly necessary; other kinds of distinction could, without contradiction, fail to exist, since they are outside God. On the other hand, relative distinction is first because it neither involves nor presupposes any trace of imperfection. So relative distinction comes first in the order of perfection; and keep this in mind when you are ranking the kinds of distinction in the order of full-fledged beings; otherwise, you would be working in the order of distinctions as such, as we have discussed at length in remarks on the post-predicamentals.³

On the answer *ad* (4)

xvii. In this answer, you have three points. The first is that subsisting relation makes referent-from-referent distinction, and there will more about this later. — The second is that the word 'another' used in defining a relation or a relatum stands for a correlative. And from this you learn how thoroughly in conformity with St. Thomas we were in our remarks on q.13, concerning the terminus of a relation. — The third point is that 'another' is not *presupposed* by the relational term but applies simultaneously with it. And from this you learn how well we were speaking when we said that one relatum defines the other, not as something prior to it, but as something simultaneous with it in nature and in understanding.⁴

³ The phrase 'is distinct from' was not taken to express a real relation; it was just a negation of sameness. And thus distinctions were not full-fledged beings (*entia simpliciter*) but came up as a side issue in the discussion of beings (which discussion was category theory or metaphysics). However, distinctions also came up as a formal issue, in discussing the various kinds of negations and oppositions, and this discussion was called post-categorical (*post-praedicamentalis*). Cajetan's point is that arranging the kinds of distinction into some sort of order was a tricky business, as it depended in good part on whether one was working on them as a side-issue in metaphysics or as a formal issue in post-categorical theory.

⁴ Father and Son are correlatives and hence are logically simultaneous. No one is a father until he has a child. More formally, the fact that a relation obtains ($x R y$), the fact that a description ('father') is satisfied by x , plus the fact that a correlative description ('son') is satisfied by y ; so that the converse relation ($y R x$) also obtains, are completely simultaneous facts; none presupposes another as a *prior* fact. Aquinas admits that in created cases where R and R are both real and asymmetrical, all these facts presuppose a prior basis on which $x \neq y$. But there is no logical obstacle, he thinks, to the divine case, where there is no such prior basis, and where $x \neq y$ simply and solely because $x R y$ and $y R x$ (the relations again being real and asymmetrical). The relations *introduce* the distinctness because (by the rule about abstractly named items and concretely named ones in God) R becomes the same thing as x , and R becomes the same thing as y ; then $x \neq y$ because R and R , being converse relations, have to be distinct.

* *secundum* res

If we mentally abstract the relations from the Persons, do the hypostases remain?

In I Sent. d.26, q.1, a.2; De Potentia Dei q.8, a.4; Compend. Theol. c.61

It seems that if we mentally abstract away from the Persons their distinguishing traits or relations, the hypostases still remain.¹

(1) After all, if being- ϕ stands to a topic as an addition to it, the topic can be understood without that addition. Thus being-man stands to “animal” as an addition, and “animal” can be understood apart from “rational.” Well, being-a-Person stands as an addition to “hypostasis.” A “person” is an hypostasis distinguished by a trait conferring dignity. So if the personalizing trait is removed, “hypostasis” is still understood.²

(2) Besides, what makes the Father a father is not the same as what makes Him someone. He is made a father, after all, by fatherhood; if He were made someone by fatherhood, then the Son, in whom there is no fatherhood, would not be someone. So, with fatherhood mentally removed from the Father, it still remains that He is someone, *i.e.* an hypostasis. Therefore, if the distinguishing trait is thought away from the Person, there remains the hypostasis.³

PL 42, 914 (3) Also, Augustine notes in *De Trinitate V* [c.5] that saying ‘unoriginate’ is not the same as saying ‘Father’, and here is why. If He had not begotten the Son, nothing would have prevented His being called unoriginate; but if He had not begotten the Son, there would have been no fatherhood in Him. Ergo, with fatherhood taken away, the hypostasis of the Father is still there as the unoriginate one.

PL 10, 103 ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Hilary says in book IV [c. 10] of his *De Trinitate*: “the Son has nothing of His own but His birth.” But it is by His birth that He is the Son. So, take away His [birth and you take away His] sonship, and nothing re-

¹ English idiom would prefer ‘if we think these traits away’, but I use the verb ‘abstract’ here and below, because Aquinas will use this article to present parts of his theory of abstraction, which is highly important.

² The use of ‘person’ as an honorific was mentioned above in I *ST* q.29, a.3 *ad 2*. It was standard in canon law, and Albert the Great used it in discussing the Trinity.

³ The modern reader will be tempted to see an affinity between this objector and John Locke. For Locke, a substance was something that “stood under” every property. So the substance was what was left behind after all the properties were mentally stripped away: a “bare particular.” Things may sound similar here, as though the objector thought of “someone” as a bare residue. But in fact his thinking was coming from Platonism, where things got to verify descriptions by participating in “forms.” Here the description was ‘someone’: the question was what form made anything verify it. If fatherhood did it, anything not participating in fatherhood could not be someone, *etc.*

mains — no hypostasis of the Son remains. Parallel arguments hold for the other Persons.

ANSWER: mental abstracting is done in two ways. One is the way a universal is abstracted from a particular, as “animal” is abstracted from a man. The other is the way a form is abstracted from matter — as the [geometrical] form of a circle is mentally abstracted from any empirical matter.⁴

The difference between these two is that, in the case of universal-and-particular, that from which the abstracting was done does not remain: we take away from “a man” the differentiator which is being-rational, and what is left in our understanding is not “a man” but just “an animal.”⁵ By contrast, in the case of abstracting a form from matter, both remain in our understanding: we abstract circular form from bronze, and what is left in our understanding is both notions, that of “a circle” and that of “bronze.”⁶ In the talk of God, of course, there is no universal-and-particular, nor any form-and-matter, in the real; but there is likeness to these in how divine topics come into language. (This is the sense in which Damascene says, “the substance is a common kind, while the hypostasis is a particular.” [*De fide orthodoxa III, c.6*]) So then:

PG94, 1001

— if we are talking about abstracting as it is done according to universal-and-particular, then once the distinguishing traits are thought away, what remains in our understanding is the “common” essence, not a hypostasis, which is a quasi-particular.

— But if we are talking about abstracting in the way that lifts a form from matter, then when we think away distinctive traits that do not constitute Persons, we still have our grasp of the hypostases and Persons. Thus, if we think away from the Father the fact that He is unoriginate, or the fact that He spirates, there is left [in our thought] the hypostasis or Person of the Father. But if we think away a distinctive trait that constitutes a Person, our grasp of the hypostasis is taken away. For the Person-constituting traits are not thought of as supervening upon the divine hypostases, like a form coming into a sub-

⁴ The difference turns on whether the abstracting is going from whole to whole (from a whole of a narrow type to a whole of a broad type) or is going from whole to part. Aquinas is about to focus on a further difference, a consequence.

⁵ Thinking away what puts a particular into a narrow type loses the narrow type. One is left with a token of a broader type.

⁶ Take a circular piece of bronze. In this type of abstraction, the mind isolates a part or aspect of it and is left not only with that part (a geometrical form in this case) but also with the rest of the whole (“piece of bronze”).

ject already there; rather, they bring their referents with them [*ferunt secum sua supposita*] inasmuch as they themselves are the subsisting Persons. Thus fatherhood is the Father Himself. After all, since a hypostasis is an individual substance, 'hypostasis' in the talk of God means *something distinct* [in the divine nature]. So since what makes the hypostases distinct and constitutes them is relation (as I said above), there is no alternative but to say that, when the Person-constituting relations are thought away, the hypostases do not remain.

q.40, a.2

Yes, some writers say that the hypostases are not made distinct by relations in God, but just by their origination, as came out above. On their view, the Father is understood to be a hypostasis on the basis that He is not from another; the Son, on the basis that He is from another by generation. The relations [they say], supervening like "distinctions" pertaining to dignity, give the hypostases what it takes to be Persons [*i.e.* "Persons" in the sense of dignitaries] — and this is why those relations are called person-constituting. The upshot is that [on their view], when such relations are mentally removed, the hypostases remain but not as Persons.

But this theory cannot be right, for two reasons. The first is because the relations *do in fact* constitute the hypostases and make them distinct, as I showed above. The other reason is that every hypostasis of a rational nature is a person, as Boethius' definition [*De duabus naturis*, c.3] makes clear by saying that a person is "an individual substance of a rational nature." So in order for there to be [in God] a hypostasis but not a person, the abstraction could not be removing a distinguishing trait from a Person [because that would leave behind nothing distinct to be a hypostasis]; rather, the abstraction would have to be removing rationality from the nature.

PL 64, 1343

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): [a person is "this whole" and so is a hypostasis; and so] the addition that 'person' makes to 'hypostasis' is not one that sets kinds apart absolutely [as a further addition sets a species apart from the rest of its genus] but

one that sets things apart [comparatively] in terms of dignity. For "this whole" is to be taken as the differentiator of one thing. Well, for a property to distinguish a thing by making it understood as "being this whole" in a rational nature" pertains very much to dignity. So if this property is thought away from "a Person," "a hypostasis" does not remain [because "being this whole" is thought away]; rather, "a hypostasis" alone would remain if the rationality of the nature were thought away. For 'a person' and 'a hypostasis' both mean an individual substance. So in the talk of God, a relation making each distinct belongs to the defining makeup of each.

*subsistens

ad (2): thanks to fatherhood, the Father is not just a father but also a Person and a "someone" or hypostasis. And yet it does not follow that the Son is not a "someone" or hypostasis, just as it does not follow that He is not a Person [since He is all these thanks to His own distinguishing trait, sonship].⁷

ad (3): Augustine's intent was not to say that the *hypostasis* of the Father would remain as "the unoriginate one" if fatherhood were thought away, as if unoriginate-ness constituted the Father's hypostasis and made it distinct. This could not have been his intent because 'unoriginate' posits nothing: it is just said negatively, as Augustine points out. Rather, Augustine was making the general point that not every unoriginated thing is a father. In the talk of God, therefore, when fatherhood is thought away, what remains is not the hypostasis of the Father as *distinct from other Persons*, but [the thought of God] as *distinct from creatures*, as the Jews understood.

⁷ In footnote 3 above, I pointed out the Platonic background of this objection. Aquinas's solution turns upon the fact that being something or someone is being an individual, and (embarrassingly for Platonism) being an individual is not participating in some special form like "tokenhood" or "thisness," nor (*pace* Locke, is it being bare) For Aquinas, being an individual is just being distinct from others; and so any factor that makes one of a given kind distinct from another of that kind makes an individual. In God, this factor is a relation.

Cajetan's Commentary

In the title question, the term 'abstract' needed to be broken down, and the breakdown is made at the beginning of the corpus. By the 'distinguishing traits' he means identifiers, whether they constitute Persons or not.

Analysis of the article, I

In the body of the article, Aquinas does three jobs. (1) He breaks down the abstracting mentioned in the title. (2) He answers the question. (3) He

handles a conflicting opinion.

ii As to job (1), he divides abstracting and applies it to the talk of God. He divides it into whole-wise and form-wise, *i.e.*, into how a universal whole is abstracted from its subjective parts [types falling under it] vs. how a form is abstracted from matter; and he sets down one difference between them: in the whole-wise method the only concept remaining is the result of abstracting [the *abstractum*], while in the form-wise method a concept of each remains, *i.e.* one of the

result [the *abstractum*] and one of what the result was abstracted from,¹ as is clear from the examples in the text. And if you want to look into these abstractions at greater length, see my commentary on *De ente et essentia* at inquiry 1. Aquinas applies these to God not to speak of things abstracted but of how they come into language, using the authority of Damascene.

iii. As for job (2), he answers the question with three conclusions. (a) The first goes according to whole-wise abstraction: abstract away the distinguishing traits, and the Persons do not remain, only the essence. This is supported on the ground that the Persons stand as particulars; the essence, as a universal. In other words, God remains, but Father, Son, and Holy Spirit do not; for “God” stands to the Persons as a universal does to particulars, as Damascene said.

iv. The second conclusion goes according to form-wise abstraction: abstract away the distinguishing traits which are not Person-constituting, and the Persons remain. This is explained in both such cases, *i.e.*, in that of innascibility [unoriginateness] and in that of [common] spiration.

An objection

v. About this second conclusion, a doubt arises. It seems to contradict the teaching given in q.36, a.2, where Aquinas says that if you abstract away from the Son the common spirating, He is not personally distinguished from the Holy Spirit. After all, if the Son remains a Person with spirating abstracted (as he says here), He remains a distinct hypostasis among the Persons in the divine nature, and hence He is not personally distinct from the Holy Spirit thanks to spirating Him. On the other hand, if the Son is personally distinct from the Holy Spirit thanks to spirating Him, the Son does not remain a distinct hypostasis with the spirating abstracted away (contrary to what he says here).

The SHORT ANSWER to this, on a basis established above [in §§ *x ff.* of the commentary on q.36, a.2] is that both teachings are true if they are well understood. With the spirating abstracted away, the hypostasis of the Son remains, as it says here; and yet, with the same abstraction, the distinctness of His hypostasis from the Holy Spirit does not remain, as it says there. These points are not contradictory, and the reason is that His hypostasis is relational, and a relational *x* does not remain distinct from a *y* to which it does not remain related. It is not the case, after all, that a divine Person or any relational item is *both* constituted *and* made distinct from others (even others in the

same nature) by one and the same act, as was shown above [in the same place].

Analysis of the article, II

vi. The third conclusion goes by form-wise abstraction again: when the Person-constituting traits are abstracted away, the hypostases do not remain. This is supported on the basis of the two “acts” of a Person-constituting trait, *i.e.*, to constitute and to distinguish.

- Thanks to the act of constituting: [*antecedent*:] the personal traits do not come to already existing hypostases but bring referents with them, inasmuch as they *are* referents; [*inference*:] therefore, when these traits are abstracted away, the referents do not remain.

- Thanks to the act of distinguishing: [*antecedent*:] an hypostasis is an *individual* substance; so [*1st inference*:] it is something distinct in God; and so [*2nd inference*:] when the personal relation is thought away, the hypostasis does not remain. This last point follows because, in God, relation alone makes items distinct.

Further explanation

vii. On this part, be aware that the oft-repeated proposition that distinguishing traits

constitute the Persons, or bring referents insofar as they are the Persons, is not unique to God but common in all pure [spiritual] and simple beings. Divineness “constitutes” God inasmuch as it is God, and (if they are quite the same) Gabrieliteity constitutes Gabriel inasmuch as it is Gabriel. These propositions indicate a special way of constituting. After all, constituting comes about in two ways. The first is the way a form constitutes a composite, and the second is the way a simple constitutes a simple. When we are talking about the first way, since it is real, we say without further nuance that the rational soul “constitutes” a man, *etc.*, and in this way the factor constituting is not the thing constituted. But when we are talking about the second way, we speak with the additional nuance that *x* constitutes *insofar as x is the thing constituted* — meaning only to say that the constituting element is said to constitute insofar as it posits itself. It constitutes *by* positing itself, because the “itself” points out the thing constituted. Thus fatherhood, by positing itself, constitutes the Father because it is the Father. The ‘insofar as’ is taken reduplicatively; it reduplicates the mode of constituting in uncomposed things.² And there you have an easy way of answering objections to this sort of proposition.

Analysis of the article, III

viii. As for job (3), he mentions and refutes an opinion claiming that, with relations abstracted, (a) the hy-

¹ In Latin, the result of the abstracting was the *abstractum*. If species *S* is in the genus *G*, and I think away from *x* what makes it an *S*-thing, the result is *x* as a *G*-thing — and this is the *abstractum*. If a whole thing *x* has being-*f* as an aspect, and I mentally isolate the *f*-part, the result is *f*-ness, and this is the *abstractum*.

² Taken reduplicatively, ‘insofar as’ = *qua*, and the phrase means that *R* constitutes the Person just exactly *by* being Him.

postases remain but (b) the Persons do not. The argument for part (a) is that distinguishing originations remain; the argument for part (b) is that relations pertain to dignity (a feature of Persons but not of hypostases).

This is refuted in two steps. The argument for part (a) fails because (as was proved) relations are the first distinguishers. The argument for part (b) fails because the dignity that makes a difference between 'person' and 'hypostasis' comes from the nature in question. It is thanks to the nature, after all, that [the sense of] 'person' adds intellectuality to [the sense of] 'hypostasis'. But as far as individuality is concerned, the [sense of] 'person' adds nothing at all, as is obvious from Boethius' definition. So, since the relations work to individuate, it is false that relations belong to the Persons but not to the hypostases. After all, 'person' and 'hypostasis' are at the same level of abstraction [he means: classification] as far as being

individual is concerned; but when it comes to being of a nobler or less noble nature, 'person' is like a further determination.

On the answer *ad* (2)

α. In the answer *ad* (2), recall that there is nothing wrong with calling some things relational under their specific names but not their generic ones, as we are told in *Metaphysics IV*. This situation turns up here: by the term 'Father', the Father is verbally and really related to the Son, but by the term 'person', He is not related verbally (but only really) to the Son. The situation arises here because, as it says in the text, the Father is both a father and a person because of His fatherhood, but 'person' has a non-relational way of indicating it.

c.15
1021b-4ff

I mention these points because of arguments made by Scotus and Aureol, which I see no reason to repeat; they are easily answered from what I just said.

Are the Persons' identifying acts understood ahead of their distinctive traits?

In I Sent d.27, q.1, a.2; *De potentia* q.8, a.3, ad 7; q.10, a.3, *Compend. Theol.* c. 63

* *actus notionalis*
† *proprietas*

It seems that the identifying acts* are understood ahead of the distinctive traits¹.

(1) After all, Peter Lombard says in *I Sent.* d. 27, "He is always the Father because He has always begotten the Son." So, it seems that in our understanding, begetting comes ahead of fatherhood.¹

(2) Besides, every relation, in being understood, presupposes what it is based upon, as equality presupposes quantity. Well, fatherhood is a relation based upon the action which is begetting. Therefore, fatherhood presupposes begetting.

(3) Moreover, as active begetting stands to fatherhood, so [passive] being born stands to sonship. Well, sonship presupposes being born: one is a Son, after all, because one has been born. Therefore, fatherhood presupposes begetting.

ON THE OTHER HAND, begetting is the operation of the Person who is the Father. But fatherhood constitutes the Person of the Father. Therefore, in our understanding, fatherhood is prior to begetting [as the agent is prior to his action].

ANSWER: if one follows those who say the distinctive traits do not *make* the hypostases distinct and do not constitute them, but just manifest them as already distinct and constituted, one must say absolutely that relations (in our way of understanding things) follow upon the identifying actions. Thus, one may say unqualifiedly that "He is the Father *because* He begets."

But if we assume that the relations do make distinct and do constitute the hypostases in God, we must make use of a distinction. Origination is expressed actively and passively in the talk of God — actively, as begetting is attributed to the Father and as spirating (taken as an identifying act) is attributed to the Father

¹ Peter Lombard's sentence took the form '*p* because *q*', in which the content of *q* was taken for the cause of the content of *p*. But causes need to be understood *as* prior to their effects, etc.

and the Son — but also passively, as being born is attributed to the Son, and as procession [being spirated] is attributed to the Holy Spirit. One may say without qualification that originations expressed passively are understood ahead of the distinctive traits of the Persons proceeding, even the personal ones, because an origin passively indicated is being presented as a *going towards* the person constituted by the distinctive trait. — Likewise also, an origination indicated actively is understood prior to the originating Person's relation, when it is not a person-constituting relation; thus, the identifying action of spirating precedes in our understanding the unnamed relational trait common to the Father and to the Son [*i.e.* the relation of being an active spirator of].

But the person-constituting distinctive trait of the Father can be looked at in two ways:² (1) In one way, it is looked at as a relation, and then again in being understood it presupposes the identifying action, because the relation as such is based upon the action. (2) But the other way to look at it is as constituting a person; and that way, the relation has to be understood ahead of the identifying action, as the acting person is understood ahead of His action.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): when the Lombard said "He is the Father because He begets," he was taking the name 'Father' as referring just to the relation, not as referring to the subsisting Person. For that way he would have had to say the converse, namely, that "because He is the Father, He begets."

ad (2): that objection is based on fatherhood insofar as it is a relation, and not insofar as it constitutes a Person.

ad (3): being born is a case of going towards the person of the Son, and so it precedes sonship in being understood, even as Sonship constitutes the person of the Son. But active begetting is presented as coming forth from the Person of the Father and so presupposes the Person-constituting distinctive trait of the Father.

² This sentence has been called the *crux Trinitatis*.

Cajetan's Commentary

The title is clear enough from preceding discussions. — In the body of the article, Aquinas does two jobs: (1) he answers along the lines of an opinion he disapproved of earlier [in a. 2]; (2) he answers it according to the opinion which he himself favors.

ii. As for job (1), according to those who follow the other opinion, the conclusion is just this: the relations follow upon the identifying actions. — And this is made clear by the fact that, in their view, the relations neither distinguish nor constitute the hypostases, etc.

iii. As for job (2), Aquinas first divides origination into active and passive and shows them by examples. — Secondly, he puts down a single conclusion about passive origination: a passive origination comes ahead of a distinctive property of the Person proceeding, even a person-constituting one. The support is that a passive origination is presented as a path toward the person constituted by the distinctive trait. — Thirdly, he puts down a second conclusion about active origination: an active origination precedes a relation of the person ori-

ginating but not the person-constituting relation. This is shown in the case of common spiration, as it is an action, and as it is a relation. — Fourthly, he distinguishes the person-constituting distinctive trait of the Father (which was the only one left); he says it can be looked at in two ways, namely, as a relation, and as constituting the Person. Then he sets down this conclusion: [*first part*:] fatherhood as a relation follows upon begetting; [*second part*:] but as constituting a Person, it precedes begetting. He clarifies the first part on the basis that the relation is based upon the action. But the second part he clarifies by the fact that an action presupposes the person acting.

Doubts arise

iv. Over these last statements, doubts arise. Firstly, these statements seem to conflict with what was said in article 2. Either we are talking about the origination and the relation in the real,* and then they do not differ; or else we are talking about them in thought,[†] and then since both of them are multi-faceted (since the origination can be taken as origination and as constituting a person, and the same is true of the relation), and since neither a relation as a relation nor an origination as an origination constitutes a person, we either have to distinguish origination the way relation was distinguished, or else we could not claim that a relation constitutes or distinguishes any more than an origination does.

v. About the same bit of the text, a greater [2nd] doubt arises. Fatherhood, for example, is a form which either constitutes a person under the account explicit in ‘fatherhood’, or else does so under some other account. If it is under the account of fatherhood, then it is constituting a Person insofar as it is a relation, and the distinction [between relating and constituting] disappears. If it constitutes under another account, Aquinas’ previous remarks fall apart, in which he tried to show that both constituting and distinguishing a Person are “acts” of a relation as distinct from the essence and as distinct from an origination, as is clear in articles 2 and 3.

vi. The doubt is strengthened and enhanced. We have from St. Thomas four real credentials thanks to which the office of constituting a Person is awarded to a relation:

(1) The first of these is ‘[being the] *divine essence*’. In *De potentia* q.8, a.3, in the answer *ad* 7, he says that the relations constitute the hypostases inasmuch as they are the divine essence.

(2) The second credential is ‘[being] *divine*’. In remarks on *I Sent.* d.26, a.2 *ad* 2, he says that a relation marks off[‡] a hypostasis inasmuch as it is divine.

(3) The third is ‘*subsistent*’. He says in article 2 of this Inquiry, in the answer *ad* 4, that a relation brings with it a distinct referent if it is a subsistent relation.

(4) The fourth credential is ‘[being] *the very Person*’. In the article just mentioned [a.2], he said that relations constitute and distinguish the hypostases

insofar as they are the very Persons subsisting.

From all these texts together, there arises a [3rd] doubt as to whether, in the thinking of St. Thomas, a relation constitutes a Person by what lies within the scope and under the conditions of a relation, or whether it constitutes a person by including God’s essence or something of the essence. Both options are problematic. For if the relation constitutes by what lies within the scope of the relative, the statements made in the places just cited fall to the ground. But if it does so by being identical to something absolute [non-relational], it follows that personhood in God is form-wise non-relational — the opposite of what we have professed.

vii. We also have to face arguments by Aureol (reported by Capreolus in his remarks on *I Sent.* d.26), especially his arguments against the statement we just took from the *De potentia*. — Again, we have to face Aureol’s arguments against the statement we cited from article 2 of this inquiry, namely, “a relation as subsistent constitutes a Person.” Aureol asks what ‘as subsistent’ means, and (in short) infers that this amounts to nothing more than that the same thing constitutes itself or that the constituted item constitutes itself as constituted.

Preface to resolving the doubts

viii. TO CLEAR THESE DOUBTS UP, please realize that, although there is no lack of Thomists holding the opposite [of what I am about to say] (on account of the text quoted from the *De potentia* and on account of other remarks on *I Sent.*), it nevertheless seems to me that it was St. Thomas’s thinking that the relations which we call person-constituting *i.e.* the first and unshareable relations, do constitute the Persons *under the scope of the relative, but their own such scope*. I am moved by the teaching in this inquiry. In the first place, in article 2, the act of constituting a Person is attributed to the relation as contrasted with the essence and also with the origination. Therefore, it does not constitute the Person insofar as it is the essence. — In the second place, in article 3, it says explicitly that the personal relations bring with them their referents. If they bring them with them, they do not have reference by *being* the essence, because it is certain that they do not bring the essence with them. — Finally, in the same article, in the answer *ad* 2, it explicitly says that by his fatherhood the Father is not just the Father but a someone and a hypostasis. Well, it is quite certain that what belongs to the Person form-wise by virtue of fatherhood does not belong to Him as being the same as the essence, but rather as being distinct from it.

ix. Now, to construe everything harmoniously and see better where I am going, you must realize that it is one thing for a relation to have a credential *because it is the same as the essence*,* and another thing for the relation to have the credential *as it is the essence*.[†] The first idiom means that the relation has the credential from the essence source-wise [*radicaliter*]; the second means that the relation has the credential form-wise [*formaliter*].

* *secundum rem*

† *secundum rationem*

The reply comes in § xii

The reply comes in § x

Reply in § xi

The reply is given in § xii

‡ *distinguit*

* *quia est eadem essentiae*
† *ut est essentia*

An example of the first is. “The relation is real.” An example of the second is. “The relation can create.”¹

So, in the case at hand, I am supposing that the relation in question is real not from the fact that it is a relation, but from the being which belongs to essential features [in God], as we said above against the followers of Gilbert of La Porrée. But realness belongs to the relation in itself form-wise* but belongs to it thanks to the essence source-wise.[†] Also, being of a subsistent nature (hypostatic subsistence) belongs to the relation (e.g. fatherhood) in and of itself form-wise but thanks to the essence source-wise. And so the relation — not just by being a relation (because then the credential would belong to every relation) — but by being *that one*, i.e. by being a hypostatic and first relational thing, constitutes a Person. Thus, to constitute a hypostasis or to be hypostatic belongs to the relation form-wise — not by the account of anything non-relational but by the account of *that* relation itself.

x. The passages cited above [in § vi] do not mean to say anything else. In the *De potentia*, Aquinas means that the relation has the trait of constituting a Person from the divine essence *source-wise*, as is also clear from q.9, a.5, *ad* 13, where he makes the same judgment about this and about the reason why fatherhood *is* the Father, namely, because of identity with the essence, which has to be understood *source-wise*. — A relation can also be called ‘divine’ in two ways: in one, by identity (because it is the same as the divineness), in the other way form-wise (because it is in the class of divine things). In the case at hand, it is in this second way that a relation is ‘divine’; for this case of fatherhood is itself form-wise of the uncreated and supreme and hence divine order — even though it has this standing from the essence (to which it is identical) *source-wise*. — And since by virtue of the fact that a thing is form-wise divine, it subsists or is substantifying (since the divine can have nothing in the nature of an accident), saying “the relation as divine” and “the relation as subsistent” amount to the same thing. Thus, the relation (say, fatherhood) as relationally substantifying, constitutes the person of the Father (with the other conditions co-understood, i.e. unshareability and firstness) and so differs from spiration, which, even if it belonged to the Father alone, would not constitute a person because it is not a first. Whence it is clear

¹ The examples seem as baffling as the subtle distinction they were meant to illustrate. ‘Source-wise’ and ‘form-wise’ are semantic adverbs for alternative ways a claim can be true. Cajetan’s opponents read Aquinas (rightly enough) as affirming that certain relations had the credentials just listed *source-wise* and then (wrongly) assumed that the ways excluded each other, so that the relations did not have the credentials *form-wise*. This last is what Cajetan is about to dispute. To understand the first example, recall that a relation is called real not from its hallmark of “towards” but from its existing. In a creature, a relation is called real from the accidental *esse* which is its being-in its subject, while a relation within God is called real from the substantial *esse* which is God’s essence (q.28, a.2). So each is called real in *source-wise* predication, yet each existent relation is “real” in itself, form-wise. To un-

what it means to say “a relation as subsistent,” namely, as it is of a substantifying nature form-wise of itself. For from this it has the credential that it constitutes a hypostasis and that it does not include the essence as an intrinsic ingredient but connotes it as a source. — And in fact there is no distinction here between the constitutor and the constituted (save in how they are mentioned); so it was to insinuate that the text said a relation constitutes [a Person] “inasmuch as it is the very Person” — i.e. the relation constitutes the Person in this way alone, namely, by positing itself, because it itself *is* the Person. And hence the constitutor and the constituted are utterly identical thing-wise and form-wise, being distinct only in how they are mentioned.

To gather the whole thing together, when one says the relation constitutes a Person because it is the divine essence, because it is divine, because it is subsistent, because it is the very Person, one is using ‘essence’ to express the source, ‘divine’ to describe the relation’s formal condition in general, ‘subsistent’ to describe the same in more specificity, and ‘the very Person’ to say *how* it constitutes a Person. In so elevated a case of constituting, after all, many things need to be said to express the many conditions in words.

xi. Hereby, all of Aureol’s arguments cease. When people pay attention to *when* the talk is about the source, *when* it is about the formal condition, and *when* it is about the how of constituting, and not mixing up one thing with another, people see likewise that Aureol’s arguments either labor under an equivocation or take what was not really awkward and make it look awkward — e.g. ‘the constitutor constitutes insofar as it is itself constituted’ is not really awkward if ‘insofar as’ specifies the how, etc.

Clearing up the 2nd doubt

xii. Having dealt with the final difficulty, we need to go in reverse order to deal with the others. As to the second of them, I say that just as a relation is indicated in two ways among logicians, namely, as understood [*ut concepta*] and as exercised [*ut exercita*] and is yet one and the same relation, so also in the case at hand fatherhood *as exercised* follows upon the act of begetting and also *as understood* precedes it and constitutes the hypostasis under the account explicit in ‘fatherhood’. Hence, the two do not overlap. It does not follow that “therefore fatherhood does come first” insofar as it is a relation (to keep using the words in the text), because in the text “fatherhood as a relation” means fatherhood as exercising the act of a relation as a relation; but fatherhood “as constituting the person” indicates the same fatherhood as exercising the act of a hypostatic form. And while both of these are included under its scope as

understand the second example, recall that “can create” is said of a divine agent to express what He is in and of Himself (form-wise), an omnipotent Person. So, when a relation constitutes a divine Person, “can create” will be said of that relation form-wise. Yet it will also be said *source-wise*, as being true from the relation’s identity with the essence.

q.28, a.2
* *per seipsum*
formaliter
† *per essentialiam*
radicaliter

in § vi

in § x

a relation, they are not simultaneous in conceptual order; rather, fatherhood as it precedes begetting constitutes and marks off the relative Person of the Father in relative hypostatic being thing-wise and form-wise, but not in relationally exercised being (and so is called fatherhood not “as a relation” but “as constitutive”); and in consequence of the *act* of begetting, it constitutes and marks off the same person not in his hypostatic being but in relationally exercised being (and hence is called fatherhood “as a relation”). Thus there are not two cases of relational being in the Father, but only one, given form-wise before the begetting as hypostatic and after it as exercised. And likewise singular is the relational distinction of the Father from the Son, but it is given first as hypostatic and afterwards as exercised. And ditto for the similar cases.

xiii. If you see to the bottom of these points, they all harmonize. And you will see how Scotus’ argument against this distinction in the text has no value — I mean the argument in the last question under d.28 in *I Sent.* It labors under an equivocation, not perceiving that ‘as a relation’ here does not mean the nature of a relation but the act or office of a relation, as already explained. — You will also see how pointless was all the work he did in *Quodlibetalis* q.4, a.2, sullied as it was by the same sin. For [our distinction of] *fatherhood as constitutive* and *fatherhood as a relation* does not imply two natures but one (and that one indivisible), namely, fatherhood, but it does so by indicating distinct accounts of one and the same relation, the first

of which comes ahead of the begetting, and the second of which follows it. But the word ‘relation’ deceived him; the motive for using it will be discussed ahead in q.42, a.3, where the rest of the problems will be solved.

Back to the 1st doubt

xiv. Now as to the very first difficulty, I say that relation is what needs to be distinguished and affirmed, not origination. Firstly, those who think the opposite do not distinguish talk of an origin but make it constitute the Person as *an originating*, paying no attention to how it is mentioned. — Secondly, a real relation (as I said) thanks to its own defining make-up, is not only present but is [the Person] (as we said against the followers of Gilbert of La Porrée); but an origination as such, has only the makeup of a going-toward. Third and most importantly, only two categories turn up in the talk of God, substance and relation (according to Boethius). Well, a divine Person is form-wise a relation, as we assume, and hence it has to constitute the Person as being related. Therefore, the relation has to be affirmed and then distinguished into its two acts, as a relation, and as such-and-such, as explained. — If the common doctrine of the Saints had posited two sorts of origination in God (active and passive) and not two sorts of relation, they would no doubt have affirmed origination as constituting and they would have distinguished it. But as the facts are to the contrary, relation is what has been well affirmed and distinguished in the past.

in § iv

in § ix

De Trinitate c. 4
PL 64, 1252

Inquiry Forty-One: Into Persons in comparison with their identifying acts

Then the questions turns to the Persons in comparison to their identifying acts. And on this topic six questions are raised.

- | | |
|--|--|
| <p>(1) Should identifying acts be attributed to the Persons?</p> <p>(2) Are such actions necessary or voluntary?</p> <p>(3) Thanks to such acts, does a Person proceed from nothing or from someone?</p> | <p>(4) Should one posit in God a potency for the identifying acts?</p> <p>(5) What would such a potency mean?</p> <p>(6) Can an identifying act terminate at more than one Person?</p> |
|--|--|

article 1

Should identifying acts be attributed to the Persons?

It looks as through the identifying actions should not be attributed to the Persons.

c.4; PL 64, 1252 (1) After all, Boethius says in his *De Trinitate* that "all the categories, when employed in predication about God, are turned into the divine substance, except relations." But *action* is one of the ten categories; so, then, if an action is attributed to God, it will pertain to His essence, and not be an identifier.

c.4; PL 42, 913f (2) Besides, Augustine says in *De Trinitate V* that everything said of God is said either substance-wise or relation-wise. But the things that pertain to God substance-wise are indicated by the essential attributes, and what pertains to relation, through the names of the Persons and their distinctive traits. Beyond these, then, no identifying actions are to be attributed to the Persons.

(3) Moreover, it is characteristic of an action that one can infer from it an undergoing. But we do not posit cases of undergoing in God. So neither should identifier actions be posited there.

c.2 PL 65, 675 ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Augustine [actually, Fulgentius] says in the book *De fide ad Petrum*: "The distinctive thing about the Father is that He begat the Son." But begetting is an action. Therefore, identifier actions are to be admitted into the talk of God.

ANSWER: In our talk of God, distinctness comes to the Persons by their origination. But an origin cannot be indicated conveniently except through some actions. So to indicate the order of origin among the divine Persons, it has been necessary to attribute identifying actions to them.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): every case of origination is indicated by some act. But an order of origin can be attributed to God in two cases. One case

arises as creation comes forth from Him, and this is common to the three Persons. Hence the actions attributed to God to indicate the emergence of creatures from Him are actions pertaining to His essence. The other case of origination in God arises from the procession of one Person from another. Hence, the acts indicating this order of origin are called "identifying" actions, because the identifiers of the Persons are their bearings towards each other, as became clear above.

ad (2): the identifying actions of the Persons differ from their relations only in how they are indicated*; in reality they are utterly the same. This is why the Lombard says in *I Sent.* d. 26 that the begetting and the being born "alternatively are called fatherhood and Sonship."

To get this clear, one needs to pay attention to the fact that change or motion is what first enabled us to guess at origination of one thing from another: for by the fact that a thing changes or moves from its previous disposition, it was obvious that this happened thanks to some cause. And thus the word 'action' in its first usage involves the origin of a change or motion; for just as moving as it is in the thing moved by another is called an undergoing, so also is the origin of a motion as it begins from the other and terminates in what is being moved is called an action. So, when motion is taken away, action means nothing but an order of origin thanks to which a cause or source goes forth into that which is from the source. So, since there is no motion in the talk of God, the personal action of the one producing a Person is nothing but the bearing of a source towards the Person who is from the source. These bearings are the relations themselves or the identifiers. However, we can only talk about divine and purely intelligible things on the

q.32, a.3

* *secundum modum significandi tantum*

pattern of the empirical things from which we get our knowledge, and in which actions and undergoings (since they imply change/motion) are other than the relations which follow upon the actions and undergoings: hence it was necessary to indicate the bearings of the Persons in one way as actions and in another way as relations. And thus it is clear that the actions and relations are one and the same in the real and differ

only in how they are indicated.

ad (3): a case of acting entails a case of undergoing insofar as it implies a source of change/motion, but that is not how cases of acting are attributed to the divine Persons. Hence, no undergoings are attributed to them except merely grammatically, in how they are indicated. This is how we attribute begetting to the Father and being begotten to the Son.

Cajetan's Commentary

The title is clear from previous remarks; after all, the identifying actions are begetting, spirating, speaking [used when the Father is said to speak His eternal Word], *etc.*

In the body of the article, there is just one conclusion answering the question affirmatively: identifier actions are to be attributed to the Persons. — The support goes like this. [*Antecedent:*] Among the divine Persons there is distinction by order of origin; [*consequence:*] therefore, it has been necessary to attribute identifying actions to the Persons. — Drawing the inference is supported on the ground that an order of origin can be indicated suitably only through these acts.

ii. In the answer *ad* (2), notice that he says two things: [1] that these actions are thing-wise identical to the relations, and [2] that they differ from them in how we understand.* The first point is supported on the

ground that an action without motion is nothing but a relation, *etc.* The second rests upon the fact that we understand divine things and speak of them on the pattern of empirical ones.

This is the passage used by the people who say that an action is subject-wise in the thing that is undergoing it. — But this is easily answered, because the talk here is about action as it is action, and not as it is an accident or a substance; and so this text is of no help to them.¹

¹ Acting was too often thought of as moving, and if one thinks of local motion as an accident, the subject of this accident will appear to be the thing which *is* moving, having been *made to move* by the mover/agent. Hence the mistake of thinking that an action is something real only in the thing undergoing it [*in passio*]. Cajetan provided a lengthy rejoinder in §§ *iii-v* of his commentary on q.25, a.1; Q.V.

* *ratione*

Are the identifying actions voluntary?

In 1 Sent. d.6, 4 CG c.11, De potentia q.2, a.3, q.10, a.2 ad 4, 5

It looks as though the identifying actions are voluntary.

*Pl. 10, 520
Dicit = 140*

(1) After all, Hilary says in his *De Synodis*: "Not led on by natural necessity, the Father begot the Son."

(2) Besides, St. Paul says in Col. 1:13. "He hath translated us into the kingdom of His beloved Son." But love is an affair of the will. Therefore, the Son was begotten from the Father by His will.

(3) Moreover, nothing is more voluntary than love. But the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as Love. Therefore, He proceeds voluntarily.

(4) Furthermore, the Son proceeds in intellectual fashion as the Word. But every word comes from the speaker by his will. Therefore, the Son proceeds from the Father by His will, and not by nature.

(5) What is not voluntary is necessary. So, if the Father did not beget the Son by will, it seems to follow that He begot of necessity — which is against Augustine in his book *Ad Orosium*.

*q. 7 in the Dialogus:
Pl. 40, 736*

loc.cit.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Augustine says in the same book to the effect that "neither by will nor by necessity did the Father beget the Son."

I ANSWER: when something is said to be or be done "by will," it can be understood two ways: (1) In one way, as indicating mere concomitance, as I may say "I am a man by will," because of course I am willing to be a man. In this way, one can say that the Father begot the Son by will just as He is God by will, because He is willing to be God and to beget the Son. (2) In the other way to understand it, it indicates the bearing of a source, as one says "an artisan operates by will," because his will is the source of his work. And on this construal, one must say that God the Father did not beget the Son "by will," but produces creatures by will. This is why it says in the *De Synodis*: "If anyone says the Son was made by God's will, like one of the creatures, let him be anathema."

*Pl. 10, 520,
Dicit = 140*

The reason for this is that, as causes, a will and a nature differ in the following way: a nature is determined to one outcome, but a will is not determined to one. The reason for this is that an effect is assimilated to the form through which its cause is acting. Obviously, there is but one natural form of a natural thing — one natural form through which it has being and through which it does such as it is. But the form through which a will acts is not just one but many, inasmuch as many reasons [to act] have been understood. Hence, what a will does is not "as the agent is" but "as he wills and understands." Therefore, a will is a source of things which can be this way or otherwise; whereas a nature is the source of things which can only be one way.

Well, what can be both this way and another way

is far from the divine nature; it pertains rather to the account of a creature, because God is necessarily existent of Himself, while a creature is made from nothing. And so the Arians, trying to deduce that the Son was a creature, said that the Father begot the Son by His will, in the sense in which 'will' indicates the source. What we need to say, therefore, is that the Father begot the Son not by will but by his nature. This is why Hilary says in *De Synodis*, "God's will reaches to the substance in every creature; but the Son's perfect birth gave Him an invulnerable and unborn substance. For all such things were created as God willed them to be, but the Son, born of God, subsists in the same being as God."

Pl. 10, 520P

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): that quotation from Hilary was aimed against those who were removing from the Son's generation even the concomitance of the Father's will, saying that He begot the Son by nature in such a way that no will to beget was present, as we suffer by nature many things against our will, such as death, old age, and similar defects. This meaning is clear from the preceding and following context. Thus, he says there, "it was not with the Father unwilling, or the Father compelled, or led by natural necessity as if He did not want to beget the Son."

ad (2): the Apostle calls Christ "God's dear son" insofar as He has been loved by God superabundantly, not because the source of the Son's generation was this love.

ad (3): insofar as a will is also a nature, it wills something naturally, as a man's will naturally tends towards happiness. In this way, God naturally wills and loves Himself. But towards things other than Himself, God's will can go either way somehow, as I said before. The Holy Spirit proceeds, however, as the Love with which God loves Himself. Hence, He proceeds naturally, even though He proceeds by way of the will.

ad (4): an intellect's conceptions are traced back to the first principles which are naturally understood. God naturally understands Himself. Hence His conceiving of the divine Word is natural.

ad (5): a thing is necessary "of itself" or "thanks to another." The latter is understood two ways: (1) as thanks to an agent and compulsive cause (and that way what is violent is called necessary) or (2) as thanks to a cause of the purpose-type (as a means is called necessary inasmuch as the purpose will not be attained, or not well, without it). In neither of these ways is the divine begetting necessary, because God is not for the sake of a purpose and no coercion acts against Him. — But what is necessary "of itself" [*per se*] is something which cannot fail to be the case; in this way God's existence is necessary, and in this way, too, the Father's begetting the Son is necessary.

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question should be understood as broadly as it sounds, since distinctions are coming in the body of the text. In the body of the text, a single two-sided distinction is drawn, with separate conclusions for each side.

ii. The distinction is this. Something's being the case or coming about "voluntarily" [or "willingly"] happens two ways: concomitantly or cause-wise. An example of the first is "Socrates is willingly a man." An example of the second is "Socrates is building a house voluntarily."¹

The first conclusion picks up the first side of the distinction: the Father begat the Son with a concomitant will. — The clarification is that the Father is also God by concomitant will; *ergo, a fortiori etc.*

The second conclusion picks up the second side: the Father begat the Son with His nature, not His will, as the source; rather, he produced creation with His will as the source. — This conclusion and all of its parts is first supported by the authority of Hilary, then by reason, and thirdly by the opposite Arian heresy. — The authoritative statement from Hilary is plain in the text.

The supporting reason is taken from the four-fold difference between a nature and a will in causing. It goes like this. [*Antecedent:*] A single thing has only one natural form whereby it is; but a will has not one but many forms whereby it acts, inasmuch as there are many understood reasons. [*1st inference:*] Therefore, a nature [in causing] is determined to one outcome [or effect], but the will is not. [*2nd inference:*] Therefore, a natural agent acts according as it is; but a voluntary one acts according as it wills and understands, and not as it is. [*3rd inference:*] Hence, a nature is a source of outcomes which can only go one way; a will is a source of those which can go one way or another. [*4th inference:*] Therefore, God's nature, not His will, is the source of a divine Person, whereas His will is the source of creation — Drawing the first inference is clarified in the text, on the basis that effects are assimilated to the form through which their agent-cause acts. — Drawing the final inference, rests however on the ground that a divine Person, being of the divine nature, is far from being vulnerable to being or not being, because God is necessarily existent of Himself, but as far as creation goes, it can be or not be, because it is from nothing. — The inferences in-between are left as obvious.

Thirdly, evidence from the error of Arius is brought forward, as is obvious in the text, along with the refutation of him published on Hilary's authority.

¹ A concomitant will is one that is "going along" without offering resistance. Thus Socrates, unlike a certain Mr. Jenner, feels no conflict over being a man. But a concomitant will does not support a because-clause; it is not true that Socrates is a man "because he wants to be." Rather, such clauses are supported by the will as a source; Socrates is building a house "because he wants to."

iii. On the points just stated, bear in mind that they are common to the processions of the Son and the Holy Spirit, as is clear both from the title question (about identifying acts across the board) and from the third argument in the text. But in the conclusions the author mentions explicitly the generation of the Son as being prior in explanation, in order that it might become clear how the identifier actions (under that name) stand to the will in exercised act.

iv. *Re* the distinction and the first conclusion together, notice that "a concomitant will" is something we call a will in relation to its object as such, but "a will as source" is something we call a will when it stands in the relation of cause to effect. A will can be found to be concomitant in two ways: antecedently (as when I desire rainfall as future) and consequently (insofar as a rain that is falling or fell pleases me). Whether the first conclusion here is true of the Father's concomitant will both antecedently and consequently in our understanding (or is not) is not expressed in the text. Scotus, however, in remarks on d.6 of *I Sent.*, holds for the affirmative, which I think is consonant with St. Thomas. On the one hand, Aquinas taught above in q.33, a.3, *ad 1* that the absolute traits common to the whole Trinity are prior to the identifiers. But it is clear that willing the generation of the Son, like willing the divine essence, is absolute and common to the whole Trinity. Therefore, the Father wills the generation of the Son before He begets. The same argument seems to fit the procession of the Holy Spirit, who is loved (in our thought) prior to His originating, since the Father, by loving Himself and the Son and the Holy Spirit and loving His spiration for the same reason, spirates the Holy Spirit. — And no problem arises from statements in the *De potentia* q.2, a.3 [*ad 2*], since in that passage what he means by a prior will and a will prior in time (prior by nature or in concept) is a will "as a source," as is clear to one who studies the passage closely.

v. As to the argument adduced for the second conclusion, observe that three differences are mentioned here between a will as a cause and a nature as a cause, and a fourth difference is mentioned between them in their being. We are going to list these in a different order, however, than the text did, so as to make the force of the deduction flow *a priori*.² Therefore, the difference in being is taken up in the antecedent, and the other three differences are put successively into the three consequences.

Now then, the sense of the first difference is that a single natural thing in act has a single form. For our purposes it does not matter whether a single natural thing has many subordinate forms (as those who hold for a plurality of forms in one and the same thing think) or whether there is just one substantial form. On the one hand, for present purposes, all of them are taken as

² A deduction was said to flow *a priori* when it started with an explanatory principle and moved on to its consequences.

having a single causal force. On the other hand, this does not matter because any natural thing you please is just one, whereas one and the same will gets many forms having causal force (that is, many as many, and not just as one), as is obvious when one wills utterly disparate things: and no form of the will gives it just one act of willing, but opposed acts, since, as it says in *Metaphysics IX* a rational faculty handles opposites.

c.5:
1048a 7-11

So a will differs from a nature in that a nature is put into its [act of] being [as it is] by a single form, whereas a will is put into its being, which is its act of willing, through many forms, *i.e.* many objects willed (whether it is the case of willing many things through many acts of willing or the case of willing opposed things through one act of willing).

The last difference, having to do with effects produced, is not to be understood of natural things “no matter what” but as *they stand under such-and-such causes*. And this last can be understood two ways: unqualifiedly (and that way it is false that the effects of a nature cannot be otherwise, as is obvious) or qualifiedly as they stand under this or that cause (and this is true and is what is meant). For once impediments have been removed, a natural effect has to be such as the agent is and cannot be (or could not have been) done without that agent; but a voluntary effect can or could have come out this way or otherwise and hence is voluntary.

A first doubt

vi. On the support for drawing the first inference [in § *ii*], in which the second and third differences are deduced from the first on the strength of the proposition that

[P] *effects are assimilated to the form through which their agent-cause acts,*

a doubt arises. This proposition is true either about assimilation to that form and its manner of being, or else about assimilation just to that form.³ [*Antecedent:*] If it is just to the form, then [*consequent:*] it was used in vain in the text to support the point that a nature is determined to one outcome, and a natural agent *acts as it is,*

via the point that

a single natural thing has one form through which it is established in its natural being, because effects are assimilated to the form had by the agent.

— That the consequent follows becomes clear from the difference between the second and third differences. For the second difference, *i.e.*, that a nature is determined to cause one thing, is about assimilation to the form (for if the agent has but one form and produces something similar, it has to produce something similar to that one form and hence has to produce one effect). But the third difference, *i.e.*, that “it acts such

as it is in itself,” pertains to assimilation to the form *and to its manner of being*, obviously. And this is the point mainly intended, since this is the point from which the fourth difference follows, which is the proximate means to the conclusion. So if that proposition does not hold for assimilation to the form’s manner of being, it does not support the point intended. — But if you say that it is true about assimilation either way (*i.e.* to the form or to the form and its manner) what follows goes against the voluntary side of the distinction. For it would follow that “so the will’s effect is assimilated to the form in the mind in its manner of being” — which is obviously false, since a house in one’s mind is a house without matter.

vii. On this doubt, those who don’t notice much could make a distinction here between a natural and a voluntary agent. But those who notice things must see that the text uses this proposition for natural and voluntary cases *alike* and infers from it that the natural agent acts as it is, while the voluntary one acts as he wills, not as he is; so the attentive reader must say otherwise.

Moving toward its solution

So let (P) be true as to the form and its *per se* manner insofar as it is a reason for acting. For every agent, natural or voluntary, makes something similar to itself, as far as possible, according to its form and the *per se* conditions or manner of its form. A “manner *per se*” is what we call a manner which modifies something within its proper scope — thus, a *per se* manner of teaching is within the scope of teaching, and ditto for other cases. But between a natural and a voluntary agent there is this difference: that the natural one acts because it is, and the voluntary one acts because it wants to; and so the natural form is the reason for acting because the agent *is* that way, whereas the voluntary form is the reason for acting because it is willed. And since the *per se* manner of a natural form *F* is “to be thus and so” (because thus the being-*F* pertains to the scope of being) but the *per se* manner of a voluntary form is “to be thus or so willed,” being “thus willed” looks to the scope of the willed, as *how* a thing [is] is distinguished from *how it is willed*.

From these remarks two further points follow. The first is that a voluntary form has two manners of being: one insofar as it is among the things of the world (and this is its immaterial being in the mind) and the other insofar as it is a reason for acting, and this is being thus or so willed. A natural form has one and the same manner of being, insofar as it is a being and insofar as it is a reason for acting. And the reason for this is the one we said, namely, that a natural form acts because it is, while a voluntary one acts because it is willed; after all, willing is different from being. The second further point is that a natural agent assimilates [its effect] to itself in form and the manner thereof, as much as possible, without any distinction; and this is why a son is assimilated to his father even in individuating conditions, if the latter’s generative power is strong. From this also comes the fact that composite substances can produce

³ Let *F* be a form, let *x* be an individual. The fact that *F* is the sole form in *x* putting it into its natural kind is not a fact about what *F* is, but about its manner of being in *x*. So does an effect of *x* have to resemble *x* in this way, too?

material substances with so little mediation, according to the Aristotelians. But a voluntary agent assimilates his effect to the form by which he acts and to the manner of that form *insofar as it is the reason for acting*, but not its manner insofar as it is a being.

Solution to first doubt

viii. From the above you have the solution to the points made in the above objection [§ vi]. In the major premise cited by the objector, the manner of being of a voluntary form was wrongly included in the manner of the form now under discussion; for that major was really talking about the *per se* manner of a form insofar as it is a reason for acting. And in that light the major is universally true: after all, a voluntary agent tries as best he can to bring about what he wants as, when, and where he wants it, obviously. — And thus you see how insightfully Aquinas drew the third difference from that major, namely, that a natural agent acts as it is, a voluntary one as it wills, and not as it is. Take careful note of this and apply it when you need to.

Another Doubt

ix. Concerning these differences, another doubt comes up, this time on the part of the will. Do the differences hold true of the will as producing effects outside itself only, or also as productive within itself. For if they hold good only for outside effects, the work has been for nothing here, where the issue is about productions within the will. — But if they are also true for internal effects, it follows that nothing is produced by the will inside itself except in a reflexive act. This consequence holds good because (given what was said above) everything produced by a voluntary agent is produced as willed; but there is nothing willed inside the will except reflexively, *etc.*

A short answer

The short answer to this is that a point willed is in the will in two ways: In one way, it is as a thing*, and so taken it is willed reflexively. In the other way, it is as a tendency† towards the object loved, and in this sense it is willed directly with the same volition as the thing willed. — One can also distinguish the thing willed in a different way, namely, as a reason for willing‡ and as an object willed§. — With either distinction in place, what is said here is verified about the will interiorly and exteriorly. It is true for an interior product, because it is willed in a direct act either as a reason for willing, or as a tendency toward something else. And this suffices; for thus willing itself [*ipsum velle*] is voluntary, and love itself is free.

Unpacking the answer *ad* (3)

x. In the answer *ad* (3), pay attention to the distinction and the answer given. The distinction applies to the will in general and says that it can be considered two ways, namely, as a nature and as standing to-

wards alternatives: considered the first way it wills naturally, but in the second way freely. The first way is exemplified by God's will about Himself and by our will to be happy; the second way is exemplified by God's will towards things other than Himself. — The answer lies in applying the first side of the distinction just drawn, namely, that the Holy Spirit proceeds [in God's will] naturally, and yet in the manner of the will.

A major dispute with Scotus:

Is there such a thing as natural volition?

xi. Concerning this distinction a doubt arises. In his remarks on *I Sent.* d.2. in the question about the number of divine productions, and on d.10 of *I Sent.*, and again in the *Quodlibetis* q.16, Scotus holds that the Holy Spirit proceeds freely; he tries to break down the above distinction and to show that a will has no act that is merely natural.

Scotus' case

Scotus argues firstly, then, as follows. [*Antecedent:*] A will and a nature have opposed ways of being a causal source, such that the two are not traced back to a third way, nor is either traced back to the other, and neither indicates imperfection; [*consequence:*] therefore, a will cannot act naturally, and a nature cannot act freely. — The first part of the antecedent is made clear by the fact that a nature is determined of itself towards acting, but a will is not naturally inclined of itself but determines itself to the exercise of its act. — As for the antecedent's other part, to the effect that the one way of causing is not traced back to the other, the support given is that otherwise one or the other would be imperfect in its entire class. — In the interest of brevity, I shall let the rest pass.

Scotus also has a confirming argument. [*Major:*] Opposed ways of acting that first-off distinguish an active power do not belong to the same active power; [*minor:*] but acting freely and naturally are opposed in this way; [*conclusion:*] therefore [they do not belong to the same active power]. — The minor is supported from Aristotle both in the *Physics* and in the *Metaphysics*, where he posits the natural and the free as first-off differences of "active source" but under different names. For in *Physics II* [acting freely] is called acting on purpose [*a proposito*], and in *Metaphysics IX* the will is called "a rational power," *etc.*

This in turn is confirmed on the ground that a will, as a free power or faculty, tends towards those things which are to the purpose; so the will also wills the purpose itself as a free faculty. — The inference holds because the same faculty deals with both.

xii. Secondly [Scotus argues thus]. [*Major:*] The inner condition of a faculty acting absolutely or towards its perfect act does not conflict with perfection in acting; [*minor:*] but freedom is of this sort; [*conclusion and new major:*] therefore, freedom is consistent with the most perfect condition possible in acting. [*New minor:*] Such a condition is necessity; [*second conclu-*

The response is coming in §.xvi

c 5; 196 b 16-22
c.5; 1048 a 7-24
Response in §.xvii

* *ut rem quandam*

† *ut tendentiam*

‡ *ut rationem volendi*
§ *ut obiectum voluntum*

Response in §.xviii *sion.*] therefore, freedom is consistent with necessity.

This argument is confirmed. The firmness of an operation perfects it; but necessity entails firmness; therefore, it perfects a free operation. — This last is in turn confirmed on the ground that there is no one division into an active necessary source vs. a contingent one and into a natural source vs. a free one; so just as a natural thing can act contingently, because it can be impeded, so also a free thing can act necessarily. — Scotus also adduces for this the authority of St. Augustine: “Either that with which we will to be happy in such a way that we not only do not will to be wretched but never can will this, is not will at all, or else it must be called free.”

Enchiridion, c.105

What Scotus wants to get out of all this is two points: namely, that every act of a will is free, and that unqualified necessariness is consistent with its being free. Then he says that the Holy Spirit proceeds freely and necessarily.⁴

A related doubt

xiii. On the same distinction as applied to the Holy Spirit [§ x], a doubt arises about St. Thomas’s own consistency [*ad hominem*]. [*Antecedent:*] The Holy Spirit is from the will as from His source; [*inference:*] therefore, the Holy Spirit can be thus or otherwise — The antecedent is supported on the ground that the Father’s will is the source of the Holy Spirit, as His intellect is the source of the Word. — The inference holds good from statements made in the body of this article, where it was said that what is from a will as its source can be otherwise.

And if one says that being from the will as from a source distinct over against nature yields what can go two ways, but being from the will as a nature does not yield this, the objection is that the Holy Spirit is from the will as the will is distinguished over and against nature; therefore. — The antecedent is supported on three grounds. The first is that otherwise the number of divine processions would have been badly proved above in q. 28, a. 5, and on the ground that in a purely intellectual nature there is nothing but understanding and willing. The second ground is that in the production of the Holy Spirit, the will concurs as a principle conceptually distinct from God’s essence or nature and from His intellect. The third ground is that in this very answer *ad* (3), the Holy Spirit is said to proceed “by way of the will.”

Preface to the solutions

xiv. To clear up this difficulty, distinction, and manner of speech, notice first that JUST AS the intellect is looked at three ways: (1) independently, as it is the

⁴ Who could have predicted that the centuries-long dispute between determinism, free will, and compatibilism would break out in the theology of the Holy Spirit’s procession? And who would have thought Scotus, a radical advocate of volition as inherently free, would also be a pioneer of compatibilism?

intellective faculty and so is called ‘intellect’, (2) as it is cognitive without discursus and so again it is called ‘intellect’⁵ (3) as it is discursive, and so taken it is called reason, SO ALSO analogously, but not in the same order, the will can be taken three ways: (a) as the volitional faculty, and thus it is called ‘the will’, (b) as the same faculty insofar as it is naturally determined to some object or work, and so taken it is called ‘the will as nature’, and (c) as the same faculty as it is undetermined either way, and so taken it is sometimes called ‘free choice’ and sometimes ‘the will’.

Now JUST AS it happens that a will becomes “set” of itself in two ways: (1) as to the specification of its act (*i.e.* if it is in operation towards such-and-such an object, it has to go into an act-state such that it is not willing the opposite object, as our will is “set” on happiness); (2) as to the specification and exercise of its act, as a will seeing God is set on loving Him such that it not only cannot have an act of hatred towards Him but also it cannot suspend the act of loving Him; SO ALSO the will has the makeup of a nature in two ways. In the first way, it is determined of itself, *vis-à-vis* a given object, to will it in such a way that it cannot counter-will it; or conversely, to counter-will something in such a way that it cannot will it. And thus (in agreement with Scotus so far) we say that the will has the makeup of a nature *vis-à-vis* happiness and misery. (But consistent with this naturalness is freedom as to the exercise of the act, *i.e.* to will or not, and to counter-will or not.⁶) — In the second way, it is determined of its own nature, *vis-à-vis* an object, not only to will it as opposed to counter-willing it but also to will it as opposed to not willing it; *i.e.* that it must will of itself such-and-such a presented object without freedom to suspend the act. And this is where Scotus intends to dissent from us — so that the makeup of a nature in the will as regards the exercise of its act is what we disagree about and where we attack.

xv. Notice secondly that, since powers or faculties are differentiated through their acts, and the acts are differentiated through their objects, it follows that if the powers’ many acts have distinctions and differences, one has to keep distinguishing and realize that acts differing by intrinsically first* differences between their formal objects are the acts which differentiate the powers. Other differences between the acts [do not have this effect, they] do not distinguish powers enough to make them diverse among themselves. Therefore, if “natural” vs. “free” is not a difference between acts coming from intrinsically first* objects differentiating the powers, “natural” and “free” do not (for their part) introduce a distinction between powers/faculties. Rather, “natural” and “free” seem to be different ways of doing an act,[†] as “reasoning” and “simple insight” are different ways of understanding. But while discursus and simple under-

* *per se primo*

† *modi agendi*

⁵ The second meaning of ‘intellectus’ was direct, intuitive understanding, involving no movement of thought (*discursus*).

⁶ As we experience in our own lives, when we are facing the issue we cannot will to be unhappy; but we are not always facing the issue, and so we are not always desiring to be happy in exercised volition.

standing are opposed ways of getting to know and do not intrinsically firstly differentiate the faculty but only the way its act is done, they can still be said to differentiate the faculty presupposition-wise, I mean, insofar as they presuppose diverse powers, one such as to be intellectual but not discursive/rational, and one such as to be both discursive and intellectual. For a faculty cannot be rational without being intellectual, because what is derived* cannot be cut off from participating in what it derives from [the *prior*.] Thus intrinsically and first-off, “natural” and “free” differentiate not the faculty but how it acts, and yet they presuppose a difference between natural and free faculties — but not in such a way that there would be a purely natural one alongside a purely free one (because there has to be a participation of the *posterior*/ derived in the makeup of the *prior*, and likewise of the lowest in the highest). It is well established, after all, that “a nature” is prior to “a will,” but there is a truly free faculty which, at its top level, has the makeup of a nature but at its other levels is purely free.

* posterior

Point-by-point against Scotus

xvi. With these points in place, then, we confront in § xi Scotus’ argument by denying that neither of these ways of acting is traced back to the other. *The free is traced back to the natural.* For the free stands to the natural as “many” stands to “one,” as the changing to the unchanging, as the varying to the uniform. It has to be the case, therefore, that the free originates from the natural and is rooted in it and is an effect of it, was will become quite clear below in q.60, a.2 [where what an angel loves “by choice” is derived from what he loves by his nature] and in q.82, a.1.

Scotus supports his opposing view on the ground that [if the free were traced back to the natural] it would follow that [inference:] the free would be incomplete in its whole range, taking ‘incomplete/imperfect’ privatively and distinctively. I deny the inference so long as we are talking about “natural” and “free” on the side of the one doing the willing.⁷ But when we are also talking about the volition produced,⁸ I say that free producing indicates an incompleteness/imperfection in what is really and freely produced,⁷ because it indicates that the product in itself can be as it is and can also be otherwise, as was deduced in the text. I said “really” produced because of the free volition whereby God wills good to His creatures; for this is not produced in the real and thus cannot be thus or otherwise, or could not have been, in itself, although its thought-produced relation to creatures could have been otherwise because of the imperfect nature of the relation’s terminus.⁸

† ex parte
productis
‡ ex parte eorum
producti

⁷ What free exercise of the will produces may be either internal to it (like a choice which could have been otherwise), or external to it (like an option executed which could have been left unachieved).

⁸ In other words, in ‘God wills good to His creatures’, the ‘wills good’ part cannot be otherwise (given His prior decision to create), but the ‘to His creatures’ part is variable,

Thus Scotus’ basis for his argument collapses in the face of this article plus the proposition that free as opposed to natural producing indicates an incompleteness in the volition really produced and hence can have no place in God *ad intra*. This is another defect in Scotus’ basis.

xvii. Against his first confirming argument, then, I say that posterior differences do not vary what is prior to them; “naturally” vs. “freely” vary the way a will does its action and so do not vary the differences of the actions by which powers/faculties are differentiated. I concede, therefore, that “naturally” and “freely” are distinct ways of doing an action but are not opposed ways differentiating powers/faculties but, properly speaking, opposed ways differentiating how actions are posed. And this is what Aristotle meant in the passages cited [by Scotus in my § xi]. From the “done on purpose,” Aristotle did not mean to exclude “by rational nature” both identically and causally, but only as such form-wise, as Aquinas also distinguished will from nature in this article. And what follows is not therefore a will is a different power from a nature but

therefore it is either another power or another account of the same power.

One could clear up these matters in one word by saying that “will” is distinguished from “nature” as the whole out of which the will is cut abstractively* and not from “nature” as internal to the will, which is at once a nature and a will.

* praecisio

Against Scotus’ other confirming argument [given in § xi], we say that, yes, the same faculty attains our [ultimate] end and tends towards it, but not in the same way. Similarly, the same intellect understands the first starting-points of arguments and the conclusions from them, but not in the same way. After all, the free and the natural relate to each other in the will as reasoning and natural awareness relate to each other in the intellect.⁹

xviii. Against Scotus’ second line of argument [given above in § xii], we need to distinguish between what is “necessary” unqualifiedly and what is just immutable. We have to say that an act’s being unqualifiedly necessary (which is the topic here) conflicts as such with its being free. Unqualified necessity is the topic here be-

depending on logically subsequent decisions about which creatures to make. Pending the decisions, nothing is produced really, because without existing creatures to receive them, even the best intended goods cannot be made real. In this context, ‘made real’ means *made to exist outside God*. Only in so existing can a creature be otherwise “*in se*.”

As to a thought-produced relation with an imperfect terminus, suppose I have a daughter approaching marriageable age: I think about a possible son-in-law and decide to give him (when he is actual) an affectionate hug. The decision posits a thought-produced relation of me to him. He may be too imperfect, however, to receive my hug. He may even be a Scotist.

⁹ This comparison is not *ad hoc*. As a good which the will naturally seeks guides the will’s free choice of means to it, so a truth which intellect naturally grasps guides its reasoning.

cause the Holy Spirit proceeds “necessarily” in the sense that His not doing so implies a contradiction in and of itself. Meanwhile, the necessariness which is just immutability is the “firmness” which is consistent with freedom and perfects a free act.¹⁰

Thereby our answer to Scotus’ confirmations [of his second line of argument] becomes clear. They assume that an act’s being free is compossible with its being *unqualifiedly* necessary. That this last is false is clear from *Metaphysics IX*, since being “free” bears upon opposed possibilities.¹¹

c 5:
104&a 7-10

Clearing up the related doubt

xix. Against the doubt which deals with St. Thomas *ad hominem*, I say that it labours under an equivocation. Yes, the Holy Spirit proceeds from the will as a source and from the will as the will (using the word ‘will’ for the faculty of willing), and this is how all the objections conclude.

● Taking the word ‘will’ that way, it is true [a] that the Holy Spirit’s production is from the “will” as a source and from the “will” as opposed to the substance of the One willing, but not [from the will] as opposed to a nature, *i.e.* the makeup of a nature as if participated in the will itself. *i.e.* [not from the will] as opposed to a nature’s way of operating, and it is true [b] that the count of divine processions comes from intellect and “will,” and [c] that the Holy Spirit proceeds after the fashion of the “will.” For given the fact that He proceeds *via* an operation of the volitional power, His procession occurs in the three ways (stated in *De Potentia Dei* q.10, a.2 *ad* 11) in which the will’s procession differs from a nature’s procession.¹² But with all of the above, it remains the case that a will and a nature still agree in one way of oper-

¹⁰ A decision may be taken quite freely and yet be so firm as to be irrevocable, once taken. Obviously.

¹¹ Even though freedom does not reduce to contingency, there is no freedom without contingency.

¹² The will’s procession (a) presupposes a prior procession, (b) yields no likeness to the thing willed, and (c) comes from a dual source.

ating, *i.e.*, “naturally,” as you have it in the text.

● But if you take the word ‘will’ to mean the will’s makeup *qua* free, then no, the Holy Spirit’s procession is not from the “will.” One will say that His procession is not from the faculty *qua* a “will” but *qua* a nature, and the like. One must pay attention here to how one is using one’s words.

A final doubt

xx. There is another doubt remaining, as to whether the word ‘will’ is being used with different meanings [*aequivocē*] in St. Thomas’ first and second conclusions, although those conclusions are held in common by all theologians and were nailed down in *I Sent.*, d. 6.

● If ‘will’ is being used in the same meaning [*univocē*], it follows that the Father wills to beget the Son with a concomitant willing *that could go either way* [in other words, it follows that the Father faced having a Son and not having one with indifferent complacency]. For this is what the talk is about in the second conclusion [where the Father is said to “will” creating with a causal willing *that could have gone either way*].¹³

● If ‘will’ is being used with different meanings [in the two conclusions], disputing the difference will be trivial.

The SHORT ANSWER to this is that ‘will’ is used the same way in both conclusions, namely, to mean the volitional faculty or its act of willing, independently of any further distinction. What is shown in the first conclusion is that an act of willing (never mind what sort) bears upon the Son’s generation or the Holy Spirit’s procession as an object willed. But what is settled in the second conclusion is that willing (never mind again what sort) does not have the makeup of a source fit to go either way *vis-à-vis* the identifier actions. Having the makeup of such a source is indicated with a verb for producing *plus* a prepositional phrase such as ‘by willing it’ or ‘by choice’. Worded that way, there is no equivocation.

¹³ This is a final swipe at Scotus. Positing complacency *either way* is identifying concomitant willing with indifference.

Are the identifying acts from anything?

In I Sent. d.5, q.2, In III Sent. d.11, a.1

It seems that the identifying acts are not from anything.

(1) After all, if the Father begat the Son from something, it was either from Himself or from something else. If it was from something else, then since that from which one is begotten is in the one begotten, it follows that something foreign to the Father is in the Son. But this is against Hilary in Book VII of his *De Trinitate*, where he says “nothing in them is diverse or foreign.” But suppose the Father begat the Son from Himself. Well, that from which a thing is generated (if still existing) gets a description based on what is generated from it. Thus, we say that a man “is pale” because he still exists after being made pale from not being so. It follows, therefore, that the Father either does not still exist, once the Son is born, or else that the Father is thenceforth the Son, which is false. Therefore, the Father did not beget the Son out of anything, but from nothing.

c 39,
PL 10, 332

(2) Besides, that from which something is generated is its source. So if the Father generated the Son from His essence or His own nature, it will follow that the Father’s essence or nature is the source of the Son — but not a material source, because matter has no place in the talk of God. Therefore, it is a quasi-active source as the generator is the source of the generated. But then it follows that the essence begets, which was disproved above.

q 39, a.5

*De Trinitate VII, c.6,
PL 42, 945*

(3) Moreover, Augustine says that the three Persons are not “from” the same essence [*ex eadem essentia*], because the essence is “not another thing” from the Person. But the Person of the Son is “not another thing” from the Father’s essence. Therefore, the Son is not “from” the Father’s essence.

(4) Furthermore, every creature is from nothing [*ex nihilo*]. But in the Scriptures, the Son is called a creature; for it says in Sirach 24:3, from the mouth of begotten Wisdom, “I came out of the mouth of the Most High [*v.g. adds:* firstborn before all creatures]” and later [*v. 9*] from the mouth of the same Wisdom it says “from the beginning, and before the ages, I was created.” Therefore, the Son was not born from anyone but from nothing. — And one can make a similar objection about the Holy Spirit, because of what it says in Zechariah 12:1, “Thus saith the Lord who stretcheth out the heavens and layeth the foundations of the earth and formeth the spirit* of man within him”; and Amos 4:13 says “I am he that formeth the mountains and createth the spirit†.”

* i.e., the breath

† i.e., the wind

PL 65,

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Augustine [Fulgentius] says in the Book *De fide ad Petrum*: “God the Father from His nature without a beginning begat a Son equal to Him.”

I ANSWER: The Son is not begotten from nothing but from the Father’s substance. For it was shown above that Fatherhood and Sonship and being born are truly and properly in God. But there is this difference between a true generation whereby someone proceeds as Son, and a making, namely, that a maker makes a thing from outside matter as an artisan makes a bench from wood, whereas a man begets a son from himself. But as a created artisan makes something from matter, so God makes from nothing, as will be shown below, not because “the nothing” turns into a thing’s substance but because the whole substance of a thing is produced by God with nothing else presupposed. So, if the Son proceeded from the Father as being from nothing, He would stand to the Father as artifact to artisan, which obviously cannot properly be called a Sonship except perhaps according to some likeness. So what remains is that if the Son of God proceeded from the Father as if existing from nothing, He would not truly and properly be a Son. The opposite of that is said in 1 John 5:20, “That we may be in His true Son, Jesus Christ.” A true Son of God, therefore, is not from nothing, and is not made, but only begotten.

q 28, a.2, q 33, a.2
ad 3-4, a.3

q.45, a.2

But if individuals made by God from nothing are called “sons of God,” this will be a metaphor based on some assimilation to the one who is truly His Son. And since He alone is the true and natural son of God, He is called “only begotten” in John 1:18, “the only begotten who is in the bosom of the Father hath revealed it.” And since others are called adoptive sons by assimilation to Him, He is metaphorically called “first-born” in Romans 8:29, “whom he foreknew and predestinated to be conformed to the image of His Son, that He might be the first-born among many brethren.”

What remains, therefore, is that the Son of God is begotten from the Father’s substance — but differently than a human son. For a part of the parent’s substance passes over into the begotten. But the divine nature is indivisible. So it has to be the case that the Father, in begetting the Son, did not pour part of His nature into Him but communicated to Him His entire nature, remaining distinct from Him solely by origin, as is clear from things already said.

q.40, a.2

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): when the Son is said to be born “from the Father*,” the preposition “from” indicates a consubstantial generative source, not a material source. What is produced from matter comes about through a change of that whence it is produced into another form: but the divine essence is not changeable nor open to receive any other form.

* *de Patre*

ad (2): when the Son is said to be begotten “from the essence of the Father†,” as Peter Lombard expounds it in *I Sent. d.5*, the “from” indicates the bear-

† *de essentia Patris*

ing of a quasi-active source. His exposition goes like this: "the Son is begotten from the Father's essence, *i.e.*, from the Father as essence," thanks to what Augustine said in *De Trinitate XI*, "when I say 'from the Father as essence' it is as if I were saying 'from the essence of the Father' more clearly." — But this does not seem to suffice to get at the meaning of this statement. For we can say that a creature is "from God as essence" but not that it is "from the essence of God." — Hence, one can give a different answer and say that the preposition 'from' [*de*] always indicates consubstantiality. This is why we do not say that a house is "from the builder," since he is not its consubstantial cause. But we can say that "something is from someone" in whatever way that means a consubstantial source, whether it be actively (as when a son is said to be from his father) or a material source (as when a knife is said to be made "from iron") or a form-wise source whose forms are themselves subsistent and not communicated to something else (for we can say that an angel is "from an intellectual nature"). This is the way we say that the Son is born "from the essence of the Father" since the Father's essence (communicated to the Son by generation) subsists in Him.

ad (3): when one says, "the Son was begotten from the Father's essence," one adds something by virtue of which a distinction can be salvaged. But when one says, "the three Persons are from [or of] the divine essence" nothing is put down thanks to which a distinction could be drawn and meant by the prepo-

sition. And so the case is not similar.

ad (4): when Scripture says "wisdom is created," it can be understood to mean not the Wisdom who is the Son of God, but the created wisdom which God puts into creatures: after all, Sirach 1: 9, 10 says "He created it," *i.e.* wisdom "by the Holy Spirit and poured it out upon all His works." It is not unfitting for Scripture to speak of begotten Wisdom and created wisdom in the same context, because created wisdom is a participation in the uncreated Wisdom. — Alternatively, the text can be taken as referring to the created nature assumed by the Son, so that the sense will be "from the beginning and before the ages I was created," *i.e.* "I was foreseen to be united to a creature." — Or, one can take the fact that Wisdom is called created and begotten as insinuating to us the manner of the divine generation. For in a [human] generation, the one begotten gets the nature of his begetter, which is complete [*i.e.* mature]; in creation, however, the creator is not changed, but the creature does not receive the Creator's nature. The Son, then, is called both created and begotten so that one might draw from 'created' the immutability of the Father and draw from 'begotten' the unity of nature in the Father and the Son. This exposition is how Hilary understood this text in *De Synodis*. — The [other] Scriptures cited are not talking about the Holy Spirit, but about created spirit, sometimes called the wind, sometimes air, sometimes a person's breath, sometimes even a soul, or any other invisible substance.

On canon 5 from
Ancyra, *De Synodis*,
c.13, *Pl.* 10, 494

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is asking about the identifier acts in exercised act — *i.e.*, whether the Father begot the Son from his own substance or from nothing.

ii. In the body of the article, there is a single conclusion answering the question: the Son is begotten not from nothing, but from the Father's substance. — The first and negative part of this is supported by an argument leading to an impossibility. [*Antecedent:*] If the Son were produced from nothing, [*1st inference:*] He would have been made; and so [*2nd inference:*] He would not be truly and properly a Son. — The first inference is supported by the analogy that matter is to an artisan as nothing is to God. The second inference is supported by the difference between being made and being born. Denying the consequent is shown on the authority of St. John the Apostle.

Next, Aquinas answers a tacit objection, to the effect that "son of God" in the Bible is the title of someone who is from nothing; the answer is that this title is not being applied to the true Son but to a son by assimilation, with Scriptures quoted to this effect.

Then, the second part of the conclusion ["but from the Father's substance"] is inferred by showing a difference, and Aquinas adds that this part is understood differently than being born from the substance of a human father. Aquinas adds how one understands "from the substance of a human father" and "from the substance of the divine Father." In the one case, we are thinking of a part of the substance, but here we are speaking about the whole substance.

Doubt about two answers

iii. In the answer *ad* (1), where Aquinas is denying that the divine essence plays the rôle of matter, and in the answer *ad* (2) also, where he is saying that it plays the rôle of a subsistent form, arguments are launched by Henry [of Ghent] and Durandus, reported by Capreolus in remarks of his on *1 Sent.* d.5. Their arguments are intended to prove that the Son is begotten from the Father's substance *as if* from matter (as if the Father's substance met the conditions of matter) but without involving imperfection.

Henry and Durandus set down four such conditions. [*Antecedent:*] (1) Being intrinsic to an offspring not starting to be, (2) pre-existing and in-existing, (3) remaining the same throughout the whole generation, and (4) being that from which the offspring is generated (as 'that from which' contrasts with 'from nothing') — these four conditions suit the divine essence with respect to the generation of the Son and they are (strictly speaking) conditions of matter; [*consequence:*] therefore, the Son is begotten from the divine essence as if from matter or quasi-matter. As for condition (4), it is supported by the difference between creation and generation, namely that creation is from no subject, whereas generation is from a pre-existent subject.

Henry and Durandus also offer confirming arguments. If the Father begat the Son from a part of His substance or from an outside substance, there is no doubt that the substance would be playing the rôle of matter; therefore, if He begat the Son from His own substance and as a whole, His substance is playing the same rôle. For whole and part, own and other's, do not vary the matter.

Here again is another confirmation. God's essence receives the unique property constituting the Son and is like a passive potency in the generation — otherwise, not every active natural potency would correspond to a passive one. Therefore, God's essence plays the rôle of matter.

Short answer

iv. Here is my short answer to this. Although one can tolerate to some extent a claim that the divine essence meets some condition of matter in the begetting of the Son (as Aquinas himself maintained in *I Sent.* d.5, q.2, a.1), one must follow the text of this article and straightforwardly deny that the Son is born from

the Father's substance as if from matter; one must affirm instead that the Son is from the Father's substance as from a form. — And no condition belonging strictly speaking to matter is salvaged in the divine essence. After all, "being from something" as opposed to "from nothing" is not unique to matter but to what pre-exists intrinsically, which is common to matter and form. This is clear if we imagine Socrates's soul as already existing and now God makes Socrates with new matter. In that case, Socrates is not being created, because he is being made from something pre-existent, and yet he is not being made from some subject. But error crops up in this and the other alleged conditions because, for the most part, we are used to explaining these in terms of a subject or matter; it even happens in this article, where "from nothing" is compared analogously to the "from a subject" of artificial things; but here it is being contrasted with "from something" either as subject or as a pre-existent form. Likewise, the other three conditions are common to what pre-exists as an ingredient.

Against the confirming argument about a part and another substance, I deny what it assumes. And as to another substance, it is clear in angelic nature; and as to a part, it becomes clear in my made-up example about Socrates.

As to what Henry and Durandus add in their final confirmation, one must deny that God's essence *receives* the unique property [of sonship], for the essence is compared to it as "same thing" and not as recipient to thing received. — Also, a passive potency is out of the question in the production of simple things (and a divine Person, of course, is among them). And there is nothing wrong with passive potencies not corresponding to such active ones; it suffices that there be corresponding terms, as "potency to be created" shows (though it is a lower sort of affair).

In the talk of God, is there a potency for the identifying acts?

In I Sent. d.7, q.1, a.1; De potentia q.2, a.1

It seems that in the talk of God, there is no potency with respect to the identifying acts.

q 25. a.1
a.3 (1) After all, every potency is either active or passive. But neither of these can fit the case. There is no passive potency in God, as shown above, and active potency does not suit one person *vis-à-vis* another, since the divine Persons (as shown, too) are not made. Therefore, in God, there is no potency towards the identifying acts.

(2) Besides, potency is about the possible. But the divine Persons are not in the set of possible things, but in the set of necessary ones. With respect to the identifying acts, therefore, by which the divine Persons proceed, no potency should be posited in God.

q 25. a.1 aJ 3-4 (3) Moreover, the Son proceeds as the Word, which is a mental conception, while the Holy Spirit proceeds as Love, which pertains to the will. But potency [*i.e.* power] in God is talked about *vis-à-vis* His effects, not *vis-à-vis* understanding and willing, as was discussed above. Therefore, potency/power should not be talked about in connection with the identifying acts.

c.7
PL 42, 762 ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Augustine says in *Contra Maximum Haereticum II*: "If God the Father could not beget a Son equal to Himself, where is His omnipotence?" Therefore, there is power in God for identifying acts.

ANSWER: as identifying acts are posited in the talk of God, it is likewise necessary to posit in Him power for such acts, since 'a power' means nothing but a source of such an act. Therefore, since we understand the Father as the source of generation and understand the Father and the Son as the source of spiration, it is necessary that we attribute to the Father the [active] power to beget, and to both the [active] power to spirate. Since a power to beget signifies that whereby the begetter does so, but every begetter begets by way of something, it is necessary to posit in every begetter a power to beget and in every spirator a power to spirate.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): as no Person proceeds by an identifying act as a "made" Person, so also no power for an identifying act is mentioned in God *vis-à-vis* a made person, but only *vis-à-vis* a preceding Person.

ad (2): the "possible" in the sense *opposed* to the necessary follows upon passive potency, which is not admitted in the talk of God. Hence, neither is anything possible *in this sense* admitted in the talk of God, but only in the sense in which the possible is contained under the necessary. This is the way in which one may say that for God to exist is possible, and for the Son to be begotten is possible.¹

ad (3): power means a source, but 'source' implies a distinction from that whose source it is. We make a two-way distinction in the things said about God: some are said in the real, and others in thought only. In the real, God is by His essence distinct from the things whose source He is by creation, and one Person is distinct from another, whose source He is through an identifying act. But the action is not distinguished from the agent in God except in thought — otherwise, action would an accident in God. So, with respect to those actions by which things proceed as distinct from God (essentially or person-wise), one can attribute power to God under the proper definition of a source. And so, just as we posit a power to create in God, so also we can posit a power to beget or spirate. But understanding and willing are not such acts as designate the procession of anything distinct from God (essentially or person-wise). So with respect to these acts, one cannot salvage the makeup of power in God except in our way of understanding and speaking alone. The intellect in God and [its act of] understanding are spoken of differently; since God's act of understanding is His very essence, it has no source.

¹ By a sense of 'possible' which excludes being necessary, Aristotle and the Medievales expressed being contingent. By the modern sense of 'possible', which was also in Aristotle, being necessary implies being possible; and such is the sense here.

Cajetan's Commentary

c.12, 1019a 20,
c.1, 1046a 10 In the title question, the word 'potency' occurs. It is taken two ways, as you see in *Metaphysics V* and *LX*. The first way is for logical possibility, which consists in the absence of conflict in the terms, and this is not in discussion here. The second way 'potency' is taken is for a source of operation. And that is the issue here. So, for the potency in question to be in the talk of God means for there to be the formal make-up* of power-to-do the identifying acts; likewise, when one

* *ratio formalis*

asks whether there is knowledge in God, the only thing one is asking is whether optimal knowing in its formal make-up is something we affirm in God.

ii. In the body of the article there is just one conclusion answering the question affirmatively: it is necessary to posit in God a power for the identifying acts. — In the text, this conclusion is first supported as follows. [*Antecedent:*] Identifying acts are posited in the talk of God; [*consequence:*] therefore, it is necessary to posit power

to do them. Drawing the consequence is supported by the fact that 'a power' means just an act's source.

Secondly in the text, the force of this argument is explained in more detail, thus. [*Antecedent:*] every begetter begets by virtue of something; [*1st inference:*] so in every begetter one must posit a source of begetting; [*2nd inference:*] so it is necessary to attribute to the Father a power to beget. — Drawing the first inference is supported on the ground that 'power to beget' means that whereby the begetter begets. Drawing the second inference is supported on the ground that the Father is the source of begetting. — You may form a parallel argument about a spirator and the power to spirate, since judgment about the two cases is the same.

Doubts from Aureol

iii. On these points bear in mind that Aureol (as reported by Capreolus in remarks on *I Sent. d.7*) makes a great many arguments against this conclusion and the support for it. But I think just two of them should be brought forward: one against the supporting argument and the conclusion together; the other against just the conclusion.

In the first of his arguments, Aureol says as follows. Either a power towards the identifying actions is being posited in God in the real [*secundum rem*] — and this is not the case because in the real there is no source eliciting an identifying act, as is obvious, since the act is the same thing as the power — or else it is being posited in thought alone; and this is not the case because then even the intellect would have the makeup of a power, since (in our understanding) the intellect is the source of the act of understanding. So, the argument in the text, based as it is on the point that a power is the source of an act, is invalid either way.

In his second argument, Aureol reasons from an opposite. Negation of a power to generate is not a negation of power; therefore, affirmation of a power to generate is not an affirmation of power. — The antecedent is from Augustine. Drawing the conse-

quence is clear from *De interpretatione I*: affirmation and negation are about the same thing.

Solutions

iv. Against the first of these objections, I say that potency for identifying actions is being posited in the talk of God in the real. But you must bear in mind that an act can imply a source/power for itself on either of two conditions. The first is its being elicited; the second is there being a terminus of it really produced by it. On either condition, the act implies a power for it in the real. Yes, when an act is elicited, it implies a power-source of that thanks to itself [*secundum se*]; but when an act is not elicited but only has an effect or terminus really produced, it implies a power-source of that not thanks to itself but thanks to its effect or terminus. And since begetting is not an act elicited from the Father, but is the Father Himself, and yet has as its quasi-effect the Son really distinct, there is a power to beget in the Father which is a source in the real of begetting, not thanks to itself but thanks to positing the begotten. Therefore, the argument in the text drawn from an act is valid, but with the distinction just mentioned still being understood — I mean from the act either thanks to itself or thanks to its terminus really emanating. To suggest as much, the text explicitly says that powers are posited here the same way the acts are, with 'the same way' meaning that the manner of the power goes according to the manner of the act, since an act can need a power for itself in more than one way, as we have said, and as the text also says in the answer *ad* (3).

As for Aureol's second argument, I concede the whole thing. After all, 'power to beget' does not affirm power but *power-this-way*, i.e. power *vis-à-vis* such-and-such an act (here, an identifying one). But nothing else is being concluded to in this article. So, Augustine spoke optimally when he said that the Son did not beget *not because He could not* — for this would be a negation of the absolute power common to the whole Trinity. But it is consistent with this to say that the power to beget is in the Father alone, as will be stated below.

Does 'power to beget' mean the relation rather than the essence?

In *I Sent.* d.7, q.1, a.2; *De potentia* q.2, a.2

It looks as though 'power to beget' or 'power to spirate' indicates a relation, and not the essence.

(1) After all, 'a power' means a source, as it clear from its definition. We define 'active power' as a source of acting, as is clear in *Metaphysics V*. But in the talk of God, 'source' is used of a Person as an identifier. Therefore, 'power' in the talk of God does not mean His essence but a relation.

c 12;
1019a 15

(2) Besides, in the talk of God there is no difference between 'does' and 'can do'. But 'begets' in the talk of God indicates a relation. Therefore, so does 'power to beget'.

(3) Moreover, terms that mean the essence in the talk of God are common to the three Persons. But the power to beget is not common to the three Persons; rather, it is unique to the Father. Therefore, it does not indicate God's essence.

ON THE OTHER HAND, the way God *can* beget the Son is also the way He *wills* to. But 'wills to beget' points to the essence. So too, then, does 'power to beget'.

ANSWER: Some writers have said that 'power to beget' points to the relation in the talk of God. But this cannot be the case. For what is properly called "power" in any agent is that whereby the agent acts. But every agent producing something through its own action produces something similar to itself as regards the form through which it acts; this is how a begotten man is similar to his begetter in human nature, in virtue of which a father can beget a son. So in anyone who begets, the 'power to beget' lies in a factor in which the begotten is assimilated to the begetter. Well, the Son of God is assimilated to the Father begetting Him in the divine nature. Therefore, the divine nature in the Father is the generative power in Him. Hence also Hilary says in his *De Trinitate V*: "The birth of God cannot fail to contain the nature from which it has come forth; and nothing else subsists as God but what subsists from God and nowhere else."

c 37
PL 10, 155

Thus, the thing to say is that 'power to beget' principally means the divine essence, as Peter Lombard says in *I Sent.*, d.7, and not just the relation — but it does not mean the essence just insofar as it is the same as the relation, so as to mean both equally. Granted, Fatherhood is indicated as the Father's form, and yet is a Personal distinctive bearing upon the Person of the Father as an individual form bears upon a created individual. But in created things, the indivi-

dual form constitutes the begetting person without being that whereby the begetter begets; otherwise Socrates would beget Socrates. Neither, therefore, can Fatherhood be understood as that whereby the Father beget but only as constituting the begetter's Person, otherwise the Father would beget the Father. Rather, that whereby the Father begets is the divine nature in which the Son comes to resemble Him. This is why John Damascene says that begetting "is a work of nature," taking 'nature' not to mean the begetter but that trait of His whereby he begets. And so 'power to beget' indicates the divine nature directly [*in recto*], but a relation indirectly [*in obliquo*].¹

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): 'power' does not mean the begetter's relation, otherwise the power would be in the category of relation; rather, it means that which is the source [of begetting] and thus that by which an agent acts is called his power. The agent is distinct from the thing made and the begetter from the begotten; but that whereby the begetter begets is common to the begotten and the begetter; and the more perfect it is, the more perfect the begetting is. So, since the divine begetting is utterly perfect, that whereby the begetter begets is common to the begotten and the begetter but also the same thing, not just in kind, (as it is among creatures) but in number. As a result, then, when we say that the divine essence is the "source whereby the begetter begets" it does not follow that the divine essence is distinguished [from Him], as would follow if it were said that the divine essence begets.

ad (2): in the talk of God, the power to beget is the same as the begetting in the same way as the divine essence is the same as the begetting and the same as the Fatherhood — but they are not the same in our account of them.

ad (3): when I say the words, 'power to beget', the power is meant directly [*in recto*] and the begetting is meant indirectly [*in obliquo*], as if I should say 'essence of the Father'. So, in terms of the essence which is meant directly, the power to beget is common to the three Persons; but in terms of the identifier connoted, it is a trait distinguishing the Person of the Father.

¹ What is meant by *in recto* and *in obliquo* is illustrated above where Aquinas said in passing that the power to beget is the divine nature *in* the Father. The prepositional phrase 'in the Father' is the oblique part. More generally, in any English phrase, clause, or sentence, what is in it as the object of a preposition is being mentioned obliquely. In Latin, what is mentioned obliquely is often in an "oblique" case (genitive, dative, or ablative).

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear from previous remarks. Let the beginner just pay attention to the fact that 'power' is not being taken here for the source-of-relation but for the thing to which that relation belongs. Both [the source-of-relation and the thing having it] are included in the account of 'power', but what is in doubt here is whether what has the relation is the essence or Fatherhood.

ii. In the body of the article, he does four jobs. (1) He reports an opinion. (2) He criticizes it. (3) He criticizes another opinion at the point where the text says, "and it does not just mean..." (4) He answers the question.

iii. As for job (1), the reported opinion is that 'power to beget' just means the relation.

As for job (2), this opinion is criticized by showing that the term's main meaning is the divine essence, as follows. [*Antecedent:*] the power in each agent is that whereby the agent acts; [*1st inference:*] so it is a form to which resemblance is made; [*2nd inference:*] so a power to beget is in the factor wherein the begotten resembles the begetter; [*3rd inference:*] therefore, the power to beget is the divine nature in the Father; [*4th inference:*] therefore, 'power to beget' mainly means the divine essence and not just the relation. — Drawing the first inference is supported on the ground that every productive cause produces something similar to itself as to the form through which it acts; this is illustrated by the case of human begetting. Drawing the third inference is supported on the ground that the Son of God resembles the Father in having the divine nature. And this is confirmed on the authority of Hilary. Drawing the fourth consequence, in its first part, is confirmed by Peter Lombard in *I Sent.* d.7.

iv. As to job (3), the opinion to be rejected would say that the 'power to beget' means God's essence insofar as it is the same as the relation [of Fatherhood] so as to mean both equally. — This is criticized as follows. [*Antecedent:*] in created things, the form of the individual constitutes the person begetting and is not the one whereby the begetter begets; [*inference:*] in the talk of God, therefore, fatherhood is constituting the Person of the Father begetting, and is not that whereby the Father begets.

The antecedent is supported as to its second part on the ground that otherwise, Socrates would beget Socrates — the inference is supported on the ground that Fatherhood, albeit a form, is only the form of the individual. Support for the second part of the antecedent is applied to the second part of the point inferred by deducing an impossibility: *i.e.* that the Father would beget the Father, as Socrates would beget Socrates.

v. As for job (4), the conclusion answering the question is this: 'power to beget' means the divine nature directly and Fatherhood indirectly. — This is inferred from points made above. Whereby the Father begets

is the divine nature, because whereby-He-begets is in that in which the Son is assimilated to Him; and according to Damascene, generation is "a work of nature" not as what does it but as whereby. Therefore.

Note that our author, along with other theologians, always held that the power to generate included the relation; and so he was not anxious to show it was included, but rather to show it was not the only thing included and was not included in such a way that they are equally meant. — And please be aware that the second opinion criticized in the text is the one that the author himself followed in his remarks on *I Sent.* d.7, q.1, a.2. Through this text, that one is retracted.

A first Doubt

vi. On the first point assumed, namely, "the power in any agent is that through which it acts" a doubt arises as to whether this is true of every factor whereby he acts, or only the first such factor, or perhaps just the proximate factor. One can hardly say that everything whereby an agent acts is a power. For it would follow that there are many powers to beget in Socrates, since he begets by his human nature and by his generative power which is a force of his vegetative part. — One also cannot say that power is only the first factor whereby, for then it would follow that the heat in a fire is not a power to heat; but rather the substance of a fire is the power, because the substance is the first source of heating. — Nor can one say that it is true only of proximate factors, because then the text would have said falsely that human nature is the human power to beget. And the main conclusion would also have been badly drawn, since the divine nature is the source of begetting and spirating only *via* the intellect and will, as became clear above.

q 34, q. 37, a.1

An Answer

vii. The answer to this is that the point assumed is true about everything whereby an agent acts provided that two conditions are met: *i.e.* that it be a form of the agent (as opposed to an instrument) and that it be in and of itself * the source of that action, be it the elicitive source or main source (as opposed to concomitant factors). — This way it does not follow that there are many powers of the same kind in the same agent, for in themselves powers in the same agent are powers of diverse orders, since one of them is first, another last, as is clear with human nature and its power to beget. But as ordered to act, they have a unity. They belong to one and the same power to beget, but in relation to the act, they have a unity.

* *Pr. 12*

They are the source of one and the same begetting; and so, as such, they count as one source and one power ever concurring from first to last.

Another Pack of Doubts

viii. Concerning the position we have taken insofar

Capreolus on *I Sent.*
d.7. q.1. a.2 *contra*
conclusionem u

* *principium quo*

The responses are all
in § 21

c. 5.
Pl. 42, 914

as it affirms that the power to beget is the divine nature, doubt arises on two heads. On the first head, doubt arises about the divine nature as it is distinguished from the attribute-completions such as intellect and will; and Scotus has arguments attacking us on this head. — On the second head, doubt arises from the divine nature as distinguished from the relation, and here is where the arguments of Bonaventure, William of Ware,¹ Henry [of Ghent] and Durandus attack us.

But our author is not taking “divine nature” here as it is distinguished from His intellect and will (unless perhaps in some respect). For Aquinas, after all, while the divine nature is the first source-whereby* of begetting, it is not the only source. It stands rather as the first source-whereby, since God’s intellect is the proximate one, as is clear from his treatments of the processions of the Son and the Holy Spirit. So “divine nature” is not being taken here as itself alone but as including any non-relational factor concurring as a source-whereby for such identifying acts. And so for present purposes in talking about divine nature, further distinction does not matter. — Therefore, Scotus’ arguments are rightly omitted.

ix. But the arguments of the other writers, who attack us for saying the essence as opposed to the relations, [need to be answered]. Their arguments are drawn from the definition of ‘essence’, from the Person-constituting form, from the identifying action, and from authority.

Their first arguments, from the account of essence, go like this. [1] [*Major:*] An action is owed to the form which is its formal makeup, even if that form is separated from the subject (as is clear with separated whiteness *vis-à-vis* the scattering of sight); [*minor:*] but an action like begetting is not owed to divinity as it is understood separately from the Father; [*conclusion:*] therefore, divinity is not the formal reason for the begetting. — [2] Furthermore, [*antecedent:*] divineness has a single, supremely simple makeup; [*inference:*] therefore, it is not the reason for just two actions (generation and spiration) but either of one or of infinitely many. — [3] Further still, [*antecedent:*] divineness is common to the three Persons; so [*inference:*] it does not distinctively explain an act unique to one Person.

[4] From the form constitutive of the Father, *i.e.* fatherhood, they argue that it is the source of His being and operating; after all, it would be a case of imperfection for a form to yield first act and not second act.

[5] Their argument from the act itself says: just as an essential act in God is from His essential form, so also a Personal act is from a Personal form.

[6] The authority is that of St. Augustine in *De Trinitate I*: “He is a Father on the same basis as He has a Son.” Therefore, it is not by His divinity but by

His Fatherhood that He has a Son. The inference holds because one is a father by fatherhood.

Preface to the solutions

x. TO CLEAR UP THESE DOUBTS, please realize that our opponents seem to be deceived because they do not discern how big a difference there is between “the divine nature” and “the divine nature in this one,” *e.g.* the Father. And our author did not mean that the divine nature is the power to beget, but that “the divine nature in a source from no source” is a power to beget. In the text, to insinuate this, immediately before the authoritative quotation from Hilary, he said, “Therefore, the divine nature in the Father is the generative power in Him.” Here he names the Person twice, once on the part of the nature, and once on the part of the power to beget, so as to show that neither of these is taken purely independently. The divine nature is common to the three with all their distinguishing traits; but the divine nature, not just as the Father but as in the Father, is the Father’s alone. For the nature *as this, i.e. as in the Father*, or as belonging to the Father, is the power to beget. And hence it says in the text that the power to beget includes Fatherhood not directly but obliquely; for divineness, *not as Fatherhood, but as of the Father*, is the power to beget and is unique to the Father. — And with this point in place, the objections are easily answered.

Point-by-point

xi. [*ad (1)*] In their first argument, one could deny the major since whiteness separated from quantity does not scatter. But instead let the major be distinguished: an act is attributed to a form in two ways.

(1) One way is absolutely and *per se* positively. So taken, assuming the major to be true, the minor is false; after all, begetting is not attributed to the divine nature absolutely nor *per se* positively, because then it would belong to the nature in whomever it is found, but permissively, as it were, in the way particulars belong to universals. After all, this is one way of comparing a Person to the divine essence, as was said in q. 40.

(2) The other way an act is attributed to a form is “as it is in this” [*ut in hoc*]. So taken, the major premise is false, and the minor is true.

[*ad (3)*] By the above, our answer to their third argument is obvious. After all, the common *as common*, is not the proper explanation of a unique thing; but the common as belonging to one [*ut proprii*] (*i.e.* to one Person) is a proper explanation of an action of that one Person.

[*ad (2)*] One can answer their second argument the same way; for while divineness in itself would no more look to one act than to a thousand, nevertheless, divineness as in this Person (*i.e.* in a source not from a source) and as in one who both is a source and is from a source, at most two acts arise. — But this argument can be knocked down in many other ways:

¹ William of Ware, OFM, was reportedly a teacher of the Ven. Duns Scotus. He flourished ca. 1267.

on the ground, for example, that divineness plus the intellect is the source of the one, and divineness with the will is the source of the other² — and not otherwise, since beyond the acts of intellect and will there is no third act-state in a purely intellect nature. — Also, thanks to a certain order among their productions, one can say that it is not unfitting for the identifying actions to arise from the one [divine nature] in order.

[*ad (4)*] Against their argument drawn from form, their assumption is false according to the common doctrine of philosophy which holds that not every form is active, and in particular that a relation is not active. But one could say that somehow fatherhood, by constituting the Father, yields the act of begetting inasmuch as it gives the Father active concurrence towards begetting as the one who acts [*ut quod*]. Nor is anymore due to it.

[*ad (5)*] Against their argument from the act, one must deny that there is analogous likeness. For an essential act is found within the scope of purely essential things which and whereby [*quod et quo*]. But a Personal act conflicts with being found in the scope of purely Personal things as a whereby [*quo*]; personhood cannot be the explanation for making one

like oneself, unless it could beget itself, which is unintelligible.

[*ad (6)*] Against the authority drawn from Augustine, the thing to say is that it labors under an equivocation. Augustine is talking about a form-wise whereby; but the divineness of the Father is the causal whereby with which the Father begets and has a Son.³

On the answer *ad (1)*

xii. In the answer *ad (1)*, note that between the begetter and the begotten two traits are found, namely, agreement and distinction. The distinction is a condition but the agreement (assimilation) is an explanation; after all, the begetter does not beget in order to make distinct but in order that the distinct one be assimilated to him. And hence the greater the agreement, the more perfect the generation, saving only the hypostatic distinction. And the less this referential distinction is, the more perfect is the generation. Hence, in God's case, the distinction is minimal because it is relative, and the agreement is maximal, because they are numerically one and the same, utterly simple, and undivided thing.

² Since intellect and will are already in God's essence, the claims here have to mean that the essence is the source with special thanks to the intellect within it, etc.

³ A formal whereby is an internal form whereby a thing is ϕ , as heat is that whereby a thing is hot. A causal whereby, however, is a subsistent factor, usually external, such as a stove.

Can an identifying act terminate at more than one Person?

In I Sent. d.7, q.2; De potentia q.2, a.4; q.9, a.9 ad 1ff

It would seem that an identifying act could terminate at multiple Persons in such a way that there would be many Persons begotten or spirated in God.

(1) Whoever has in him the power to beget can beget. But the Son has in Him the power to beget. Therefore, He can beget. — But not Himself. Therefore, He can beget another Son, and so there could be more than one Son in God.

(2) Besides, Augustine says in *Contra Maximinum* c 11: *PL 42, 768* II, “the Son did not beget the Creator, not because He could not, but because He didn’t have to.”

(3) Moreover, God the Father is more able to beget than a created father. But one man can beget multiple sons. Ergo, so can God — especially since the Father’s power is not diminished once the Son is born.

ON THE OTHER HAND, in the talk of God, there is no difference between ‘are’ and ‘can be’. So if there could be multiple Sons in God, there would be. And then there would be more than three Persons in God, which is heretical.

I ANSWER: as Athanasius says [in his Creed] there is in God just “one Father, one Son, one Holy Spirit.” Four reasons for this can be assigned. [1] The first reason comes from the relations by which alone the Persons are distinguished. For since the divine Persons are themselves subsistent relations, there cannot be multiple fathers or multiple sons in God unless there were multiple fatherhoods and multiple sonships. But this would only be possible in things materially distinct: a single kind of form is multiplied only by matter, which is not present in God. So in God there can be only one subsistent sonship, just as a subsistent case of whiteness would have to be the only one. — [2] The second reason comes from the

manner of the processions [*ex modo processionum*]. God understands everything and wills everything in one, simple act. Hence, there can be only one Person proceeding in the manner of the Word, and this is the Son; and only one can be proceeding in the manner of Love, and that is the Holy Spirit. — [3] The third reason comes from how they proceed [*ex modo procedendi*]. After all, the Persons themselves proceed nature-wise, as was just said, and a nature is determined to one outcome. — [4] The fourth reason comes from the perfection of the divine Persons. For because the Son is a perfect Son, with the whole of divine sonship contained in Him, there is just one Son. Ditto for the other Persons.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): admittedly, the Son has the power which the Father has, if you say ‘power’ without further qualification; but one does not admit that the Son has the power of *begetting*, if ‘begetting’ is the gerundive of the active verb, so that the meaning would be that the Son has “power to beget.” Likewise, the same being [*esse*] belongs to the Father and the Son, and yet it does not belong to the Son to be the Father, on account of the attached identifier. But if ‘begetting’ is the gerundive of the passive verb, the power is in the Son, *i. e.* power to be begotten. And likewise, if it is the gerundive of an impersonal verb, so that the meaning would be “power to be begotten” by any Person.

ad (2): in these words, Augustine did not intend to say that the Son could have begotten a Son, but that his not doing so was not because He lacked power, as will emerge below.

ad (3): God’s immateriality and perfection require that there cannot be multiple Sons in God, as I said. Hence, the fact that there are not many Sons is not due to a lack of power to beget in the Father.

q 41, a.2

q.42, a.6 ad 3

Cajetan’s Commentary

In the title question, notice that the question being asked here is not whether there could be more than three divine Persons; after all, that had been discussed in q.30. Rather, the only thing being asked here is whether a Person’s indivisible, formal makeup could be replicated in such a way that there would not be just one Son, or one Holy Spirit. So posed, this question differs from the earlier one because, there, the count of Persons was in question without further qualification, whereas here the question concerns a two-or-more count of Persons of the same formal makeup.

There are two ways we can imagine such a pluralization. In the first way, we could imagine several Sons none of whom is the Father or the Spirit. A se-

cond way would be to imagine several Sons among whom the Holy Spirit would be a Son, too, by another sonship. Likewise, one can distinguish a scenario of two Holy Spirits of whom neither is a Son from a scenario where an extra Son is the Holy Spirit by a second case of passive spiration.

Either way, there would be more sons and more Holy Spirits; and in one of the ways there would be more Persons than three; but in another way, not. Hence, if this question is studied with subtlety, it is consistent with a trinity of Persons; and so it has not been closed after the count of Persons has been settled. Also, no discussion of manyness belongs to it except that of numerical or individual manyness.

a.2

ii. In the body of the article, there is one conclusion, taken from the Athanasian Creed: in God there is just “one Father, one Son, one Holy Spirit.” — This conclusion is supported by four reasons well formulated in the text; but since each has been attacked, we shall examine them one-by-one.

Doubts about Aquinas’ 1st reason

iii. The first reason, based on the point that “a single kind of form is multiplied only by matter,” has many enemies, especially Scotus, Aureol, Adam [of Wodeham],¹ *et al.* Their objections consist in the point that multiple accidental forms are found in the same matter. They bring up light, its appearance in a mirror or in the eye, and [one-to-many] relations. For in the same part of a transparent thing we see many lights, according to the number of the things giving light, as the opposing multitudes of shadows and lights bear witness. — In the same medium (mirror) is an appearance of two walls of the same, size, color, figure, *etc.*, so as to exclude any reason for diversity of species. — One and the same white thing has many relations of similarity to the other white things; and likewise one father is related to many sons by many fatherhoods; otherwise, a relation would remain when a terminus of it is destroyed.

They bring up other arguments also against this reason; you can see them, if you want, in Capreolus on *I Sent.* d.7; but all doubt coming from them will be solved by things I am about to say.

iv. Scotus, too, in *Quodlibet* q.2 argues directly and on many grounds that a form’s lack of matter is not the reason it is “this one” of itself or unmultipliable in number. His first argument goes thus. [*Major:*] that by which a thing is first in act outside its cause and outside the mind, is that whereby it is first “this one”; [*minor:*] but any absolute entity is first outside its cause and outside the mind in and of itself;* [*conclusion:*] ergo [it is first in act “in and of itself;” not by lack of matter]. — The major is supported on the ground that being outside its cause and outside the mind belongs only to a “this one.” Then he has a confirming argument. [*Major:*] A thing is not “this one” through what is not its *per se* cause; [*minor:*] but matter is not the cause of form according to Avicenna [*Metaphysics II*]. [*Conclusion:*] therefore, a form is not a “this one” thanks to matter.

Moreover, it would follow that Gabriel [as a form having no matter] would be a “this” of himself; and hence could not be made a universal, predicable of many, without contradiction.³

Furthermore, there are articles condemned at

¹ Adam of Wodeham (d. 1358) was an English Franciscan, educated at Oxford, and famous as a disciple of Occam.

² Scotus thought Aquinas held an equivalence, “ ϕ is a this $\equiv \phi$ is in matter,” which committed him also to “ ϕ is not a this $\equiv \phi$ is not in matter.” Scotus was attacking this last.

³ Scotus knew Aquinas admitted Gabriel was a this, but inconsistently, he thought, with the equivalence in note 2.

Paris against this proposition. “If [one says] forms do not receive division except by matter: [it is an] error.”

Finally, Scotus infers that it is not sound teaching to hold so sure and necessary a conclusion by overly general propositions, and with so many objectors.

Preliminaries to the solutions

v. To clear these things up, note first that the word ‘matter’ is being used here to mean everything *receptive*. For it is clear that charity is one kind of form multiplied up to the number of blessed angels and human beings; and yet there is no matter in the will which would be part of a composite; rather, there is only a receptive potency. So the meaning of the proposition is that a specific form is only multiplied by what receives it. And Aquinas means that, if a form is receivable, it is made many up to the count of the many things receiving it in act or potency (which I say on account of intellective souls); but if it is unreceivable, it is by that fact alone unmultipliable.

Notice secondly that “those items are one in number whose matter is one,” as is clear from *Metaphysics V* (where the foundations of all the sciences are being given, since we have definitions there of the seeds of them all). Numerical identity, therefore, comes from oneness of matter; and numerical plurality of forms of the same species is inconsistent with oneness of matter.

vi. Hence, following Aristotle, we deny all the points assumed in the objections [raised in § iii]. For it is well known that a form is one in being but multiple in depending or representing or terminating or other such respects. And thus the similarity of a white thing to all white things is just one relation in being yet multiple in its termini. Distinguish “defect from lack of terminus” into lack of an equivalent terminus vs. lack of a non-equivalent one (such as the many related to by one). For a single terminus is not equivalent extensively; and so as long as one of them remains, the relation to it does not cease to be; rather only that termination ceases. — And appearance in a mirror, even *vis-à-vis* objects reflected, is one in its being, but many in representing or depending. Hence, as its content is this, it leads to this; and as it is that, it leads to that. — Now about light: there is one light in its being and many in its dependencies. And so many “illuminations” are conceded, and one concedes that light is multiplex in its paths or tendencies and its obstacles. Hence many shadows appear. So our assumed proposition stands in full and will be further established in the treatise on the angels.

Answering Scotus

vii. Against Scotus’ first argument, I say firstly that he just did not understand the proposition against which he was fighting with so much effort. St. Thomas is not talking here about “immateriality” in the sense of lack of the matter which is the other part of a composite thing, but about “immateriality” as lack of a receptive potency, as we have shown and as even the text here insinuates with its example about whiteness if it were

article 191

c.7.
1017a.20

q.50, a.4

stated in § iii

See Capreolus on *I Sent.* d.7, a.2, *contra conclusionem* 2

Responses are given in §§ vi and vii.

Response is in § vii

* *sempsa*

tract. ii, c.4

to subsist. — For the same reason it was a waste of time for him to bring forward the Parisian articles, which are talking about matter [in the ordinary sense] as matter, while in fact ‘matter’ as understood in this context is receptive potency formally speaking. Still, lest the same arguments be repeated against receptive potency, I am going to answer each one.

Point-by-point against Scotus

the one to § III

In Scotus’s first argument, the major premise is false. For anything to be “firstly outside its cause and outside the mind” is for it to be indicated by a second adjacent, and yet not by his word ‘this’. — Meanwhile, the proof is worthless and does not even look valid, given that unless two ideas agree in some singular term (the two ideas being “is outside the mind and its cause” and “is a this”) one cannot infer the formal identity of the whereby of each.

Against his second argument, even in our dreams we never thought that a form existing in matter was “this one” thanks to matter intrinsically or form-wise, but cause-wise. — And while matter according to Avicenna is not the cause of the material form but of the composite, still, since ‘material cause’ names an intrinsic cause, matter is still the cause of a form in the line of material causality; for the form is educed from it as matter, and this is enough.

As to the points touching on the angels, I will answer them in their place; and I have already done so in my commentary on *De ente et essentia* where I also glossed the Parisian articles.

Notice that the doctrine just communicated is not new yet perhaps comes up to St. Thomas’s lofty intent. The reason he called inability to receive “immateriality” was because [a] in separated substances ‘inability to receive’ means just exactly immateriality subsisting in a species; and also because [b] potency to receive stands on the side of matter and hence is easy to understand from matter. — Thus St. Thomas’ first reason in this article, taken from the immaterial forms common to all subsisting pure spirits, is clear.

Nor was it awkward to bring forward this reason in connection with Person-constituting distinctives. Indeed, it was necessary. For they count among such [immaterial] things, and we do not know them by acquaintance, but we climb up to them as best we can from creatures: thus, we hold the conclusion to be sure and necessary, from the most certain propositions common to all philosophers, indeed common to the mental conception of all wise persons.

Aquinas’ 2nd reason and the doubts about it

viii. The second reason is taken from how the processions are specified, namely, by way of Word and Love. The argument is based on the uniqueness of God’s act of understanding and the uniqueness of His act of loving.

Against this reason, some writers take exception. If the uniqueness of the act of understanding implies the uniqueness of the Son, either you mean real uniqueness or just conceptual uniqueness. If you mean real uniqueness, then the real oneness of the act of understanding with that of willing in God implies the uniqueness of the Person produced. If you mean conceptual uniqueness, then a thought-up distinction is what is implying distinction of Persons (as uniqueness stands to being one, so distinctness stands to being distinct).

ix. But in the place cited above from his *Quodlibet*, Scotus fights against this reason on the ground that it is not valid, because it’s based upon the following proposition: *where there can be only one act of understanding, there can only be one speaking [dicere] and one word.* Well, this proposition is true in us, thanks to matter, because in us every [act of] understanding is expressed through an act of speaking; but this is not true in God, *etc.* — In a nutshell, he says, from oneness of absolute form of the same sort, one cannot infer oneness of production and of terminus across the board and in every matter; therefore, from oneness of the act of understanding, oneness of speaking and of word do not follow thanks to a form.⁴

Answering these doubts

x. The short answer to this is that we are talking here about numerical oneness, which assumes formal oneness, as is clear from *Metaphysics V*, the chapter about one, since the only issue here is a rise in the numerical count of Persons. So Aquinas’s second reason amounts to this: *God’s act of understanding is numerically one; therefore, His Word is numerically one.* And if there were many divine acts of understanding, there would be numerically many words.

Against Scotus’ argument, I say that Aquinas means a formal numerical oneness, *i.e.* a oneness which implies formal oneness, but not numerical oneness by identity, such as there is between God’s act of understanding and His act of willing. And hence I deny the inference — how a distinction of Persons is inferred from a formal conceptual distinction between intellect and will was explained in q.27; and what was said there was that this does not follow immediately but by way of order of origin.

xi. Against the objection by Scotus, I say that the reason given in the text is not based on the proposition he claimed, but rather on this one: *where there is only one act of understanding and a speaking equivalent to it, there is only one act of speaking and one word.* This is obviously true; it would be superfluous to say anything else. — Likewise, from oneness of an absolute form, a oneness of equivalent relational or action-form is optically inferred. And to insinuate this equivalence, the

⁴ Scotus held that an intellect first understands (*intelligi*) and then secondly “says” what it understands (*dicere*); Cajetan attacked this two-acts picture in his commentary on q.27, a.1.

c.6,
1016b 35f

in § viii above

a.3, with § viii ff
in its commentary

in § ix above

text says that God understands everything in a simple act and so “speaks it.”

Aquinas’ third reason and its doubts

xii. The third reason is taken from the way of proceeding that is common [to the Son and the Holy Spirit], which is really a mode, namely, that they proceed naturally as opposed to freely. The basis for this reason is that a nature is determined to one outcome.

Against this reason, too, some writers take umbrage. Either you mean that a nature is determined to numerically one outcome — and this is false even in limited natures. Or you mean that a nature is limited to one mode of proceeding — and this is false in an infinite nature. On neither reading, therefore, is this reason worth anything.

xiii. The SHORT ANSWER to this is that he means it in a third way, namely, that a nature is determined to one outcome form-wise. This rightly covers a nature multiply communicable, which is determined to one outcome in each way, form-wise this way and form-wise that way. And thus Aquinas concludes to the numerical oneness of the product in a given way. — This argument was brought forward to show the difference between a natural agent and a voluntary one as to yielding numerically one effect when acting in a single way. From a voluntary agent more than one can be produced, as Averroes says in comment 44 on *Metaphysics XII*. But a natural agent can only produce one from one. — And thus the answer is clear to the objection Scotus made where he was attacking this reason also on the ground that a nature is not determined to one outcome numerically.

Aquinas’ fourth reason and its doubts

xiv. Our fourth reason is taken from the divine perfection. It is based on the point that each divine thing [act, trait, Person or whatever] has everything that can be found within the scope of its formal account. What obviously follows is that a divine thing admits of no partial cases* [i.e. cases having less than everything within that scope] and hence of no rise in its count of cases.

* *partitionem*

Against this reason also, objection is raised that it has no value, since it would follow that there would be only one thing produced in the divine nature. — The inference is supported on the ground that a thing produced in God is a *divine* thing and thus has everything that can be found within the scope of divineness, and thus excludes multiplication. If this is not valid, neither is Aquinas’s argument.

Answering this doubt

xv. The short answer to this is that understanding it must be based upon a divine thing which is *one* by way of lowest [narrowest] species, and not a divine thing which is *one* only by way of a general kind. After all, below a [lowest] species nothing remains but material difference, whereas under a genus many types are covered. And thus this argument serves well the case at hand, because we are asking about numerical plurality, as I already said.⁵ — Now let these objections cease; after all, ‘product’ does not mean a specific makeup but only a general one. ‘Son’, however, is specific. Ditto for ‘sonship’. But ‘production’ is not specific.

xvi. Pay attention to this argument, because it concludes with a universal statement: no specific item, be it absolute or relative, can have a plural number in God. Hence it is clear that Scotus’s objections to this on a ground such as

the Son is perfect God and yet does not have divinity in every way of having it; therefore, the sonship can be perfect and yet a different Person can have it from a different relation.

does not have any value against this argument. Appeal to similarity likewise amounts to nothing, as is obvious, because it is a way of relating things numerically diverse. Rather, because the Son is perfect God, it follows that He therefore has whatever lies within the scope of divineness and consequently is unmultipliable in His divineness.

⁵ Here we see the point of Cajetan’s insistence that the numerical oneness/manyness debated in this article includes or presupposes *formal* oneness/manyness. Trying to count things not formally one is counting apples and oranges, as we say. So, where formal oneness would fail, so would counting.



Inquiry Forty-Two: Into the divine Persons' mutual equality and likeness

The next topic to take up is how the Persons compare to each other — first in regard to their being equal and similar, then in regard to their being sent. About the first topic, six questions are raised.

- | | |
|---|---|
| (1) Does equality have a place among them? | (4) Are the divine Persons equally great? |
| (2) Is a Person proceeding equally as eternal as the one from whom He proceeds? | (5) Does one of Them come to be “in” another? |
| (3) Is there an order among the divine Persons? | (6) Are they equal in power? |

article 1

Does equality have a place in the talk of God?

In I Sent. d.19, q.1, a.1; 4 CG, c.9

It seems that being “equal” does not suit the divine Persons.

(1) After all, being equal is a matter of agreeing in how-much [*quantitas*], as Aristotle makes clear in *Metaphysics V*. But among divine Persons one finds neither an equality of continuous how-much (of the internal sort called size or the external sort called place or time) nor an equality of discrete how-much (since two Persons are more than one). Thus, being equal does not suit the divine Persons.

(2) Besides, the divine Persons are of one essence, as was said above. But an essence comes into language as a form, and agreement in a form makes similarity, not equality. Hence similarity is to be asserted of divine Persons, not equality.

(3) Moreover, wherever equality is found among things, they measure up to each other; for an equal thing is called “equal” to its equal. But the divine Persons cannot be called mutually equal. For as Augustine says in *De Trinitate VI*, “if an image fully captures what it is an image of, it measures up to it, but the original does not measure up* to its image.” Well, the image of the Father is the Son, and so the Father is not “equal” to the Son. Hence, equality is not found among the divine Persons.

(4) Furthermore, being-equal-to is a relation, and no relation is common to all the Persons, because they are distinguished from each other by relations. Ergo, being-equal does not suit the divine Persons.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Athanasius says in the creed, “The three Persons are co-eternal with each other and co-equal.”

ANSWER: it is necessary to posit equality among the divine Persons. According to Aristotle in *Metaphysics X*, one calls things equal “as if” by denying both “less than” and “greater than.” Among the divine

Persons, we can posit nothing greater or less. For as Boethius says in his *De Trinitate I*, those who speak of lesser and greater are differentiating divineness, like the Arians, who pull the Trinity apart by varying the “levels” and reducing it to a multitude. The reason for this is that one cannot make unequal things be numerically “one” quantity. But “quantity” in God is nothing but His essence. The upshot is that, if there were inequality among the divine Persons, there could not be one essence of them, and so the three Persons could not be one God — which is impossible. One must posit equality, therefore, among the divine Persons.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): quantity is of two kinds. One is called the how-much of amount* or the dimensional how-big, and this occurs only in bodily things; so it has no place in divine Persons. The other kind is the how-much of strength,[†] which comes with the completeness of a nature or form. This is the kind indicated when one says a thing is more or less “hot” by being more or less complete in that kind of heat. We look for [a thing’s] how-much of strength first (as from its root) in the completeness of its nature or form itself, and so taken it is called a spirit-like greatness, as heat is called “great” because of its intensity or completeness. This is why Augustine says in *De Trinitate VI* that, in things “not very great,” being very great is being better. For what is more complete is called better. We look for [a thing’s] how-much of strength secondly in the effects of its form. Well, the first effect of a form ϕ -ness is being- ϕ ; for everything has its being thus-or-such thanks to a form it has. The second effect of ϕ -ness is an operation; for everything acts through a form it has. Thus, [a thing’s] how-much of strength is looked for from a being- ϕ it has and from an operation it does: — from a being- ϕ it has, because things of a more complete nature endure longer; from an operation it does, because things of a more com-

Pl. 64, xxx

* *quantitas molis*

† *quantitas virtutis*; an alternative translation is “virtual quantity”

c.15,
1021a 19ff

q 39, a.2

c 10,
PL 42,xx

* *составляет*

Denz # 75, § 26

c.5,
1056a 17

plete nature have more extensive power to act. This is why Augustine [Fulgentius] says in *De fide ad Petrum*, “we understand equality in Father, Son, and Holy Spirit insofar as none comes ahead of the others in being-eternal, or exceeds the others in greatness, or outdoes the others in power.”

ad (2): equality of strength is a being equal which includes being similar, plus something more: it excludes excess. Any things which share a form, after all, can be called similar, even if they share in that form unequally, as when hot air is called “similar” to fire in hotness, but they cannot be called equal so long as one shares in the form more completely than the other. Since the nature of Father and Son is not only one but completely equal in both, we call the Son not only “similar” to the Father (to exclude the error of Eunomius) but also “equal” to Him (to exclude the mistake of Arius).

ad (3): equality and similarity are mentioned two ways in the talk of God: by nouns/adjectives and by verbs. As mentioned by nouns/adjectives, equality between divine Persons is admitted to be symmetrical, and so is similarity. The Son is equal and similar to the Father, and *vice-versa*. This is the case, of course, because the divine essence is not greater in the Father than in the Son. As the Son has the Father’s greatness (which is being equal to the Father), so the Father has the Son’s greatness (which is being equal to the Son). But when creatures are being discussed [as well as God], Denis tells us in *De divinis nominibus* that the symmetry of equality and simi-

larity is not admitted. After all, caused things are said to “resemble” their causes (because they get their form from their causes), but not *vice-versa* (because the form is originally* in the cause and only secondarily in the thing-caused). But as mentioned by verbs, equality is indicated along with change. Now, while change does not occur in God, the sense of the word ‘change’ is accepted in our talk. The Son “receives” from the Father what it takes to be equal to Him, and not *vice-versa*. This is why we say that the Son measures up to the Father, and not the other way about.

ad (4): in divine Persons, there is nothing to take into account but the essence they share and the relations making them distinct; but equality involves both, *i.e.* the distinctness of the Persons (because nothing is called equal to itself) and the oneness of the essence (because the reason the Persons are equal to each other is their being of one greatness and essence). Well, it is obvious that the self-same thing has no bearing towards itself by a *real* relation, and that one relation does not bear upon another by a third relation. (When we say Fatherhood is converse to Sonship, the being thus opposed is not a relation between Fatherhood and Sonship.) Otherwise, relations would pullulate to infinity. Hence equality and similarity between the divine Persons is not a real relation distinct from the relations constituting the Persons; rather, the equality includes in its concept both the distinguishing relations and the oneness of essence. Hence Master Lombard says in d. 31 of the first book of his *Libri Sententiarum* that, in these cases, nothing is relational but the description[†].

* *principaliter*† *appellatur*

Cajetan’s Commentary

The title-question is clear enough and should be interpreted as vaguely as it sounds, since whether equality is present, and of what sort, is about to be discussed.

ii. In the body of the article, there is a single conclusion answering the question directly: it is necessary to posit equality among the divine Persons. The support goes thus. [*Antecedent:*] Between the divine Persons, we cannot allege a greater or a lesser, and so [*inference:*] we have to allege equality. Drawing the consequence is supported from *Metaphysics X*, because it says that things are called “equal” as if by negating both “more” and “less.” The antecedent is supported on two grounds. One is the authority of Boethius, but the other is an argument running as follows. [*Antecedent:*] If there were inequality between the divine Persons, then [*1st consequent:*] there would not be numerically one “how much” between them, and then [*2nd consequent:*] there would not be one essence, and then [*3rd consequent:*] the three Persons would not be one God, which is impossible. Accepting the first consequent is supported on the ground that unequal things cannot have one and the same “how much.” The second is sound because the “how much” in God is nothing but

His essence.

iii. Concerning this argument, notice that affirming equality does not follow just from denying inequality, as one sees by comparing a point and a line. This is why St. Thomas says in the text that being equal is asserted “as if” by denying, *etc.* But given that there is “how much” on both sides, affirming their equality does follow from denying their inequality. Whether what results is equality as a real relation or not will come out below.

iv. In the answer *ad* (1), dear Thomist, notice that what you have here in St. Thomas is that a form’s intensity and remission is the very essence of the form and not just how it is in the first “moment” of how much strength it has.¹

v. In the answer *ad* (2) you have the solution to all the arguments launched by Aurool and reported by Capreolus at *In 1 Sent.* d.19. An equality based on substance is distinguished from similarity and identity

¹ Since the Scotists were regularly dividing things into logical “moments,” this § *iv* is recognizably a poke at them. To see the underlying issue, raise the heat to 42,000° and ask if this is the same heat at more strength. Not if heat is defined as molecular motion. At 42,000° there are no molecules.

in mode, as the bases are also distinguished, as the text shows for equality and similarity in the case of white things as such [*i.e. qua* white]. For a white thing just as having what it takes to be a white thing not exceeding another white thing is called equal to it and similar to it by the same relation, and the same judgment is made about a substance taken in the manner of how-much. For equality always includes the prior relation and adds the “how” of its basis.

vi. In the answer *ad* (3), be aware that Aureol (reported by Capreolus in the same place) attacks the final words, because he wants it to be the case that the Father equals and measures up to the Son. His arguments amount to the following. [*Antecedent:*] ‘Measures up to’ does not mean *receives equality* but just means *has it* in the mode of variability,* like the other verbs; ergo [*inference:*] it can be said of the Father. — The antecedent is obvious of itself and from examples†: after all, we say that two lines measure up and yet neither gets equality from the other, etc.

The response to this is that ‘measures up to’ properly means a thing’s change or approach to what it is being measured up to. Hence we do not properly say that a line is equated to another line except when the one is *made equal* to the other in the real or by designation. Thus, Aureol’s antecedent should be denied, and examples point to the opposite. Granted, thanks to the subject matter in our talk of God, every case of receiving, approaching, etc., pertains to an origination, and this gives rise to the difference noted in the text between a noun/adjective and a verb where the Father and Son are concerned, although among creatures, too, when a line is equated *per se* to a line, it measures up to it, as an image of Caesar measures up to Caesar.

On the answer *ad* (4)

vii. In the answer *ad* (4), pay attention to our teacher’s opinion and the grounds for it. His opinion is that the equality of divine Persons is not a real relation, and that when we say the Father and Son are equal, the word ‘equal’ includes three items, [a] the oneness of essence, [b] the real distinctness of subsisting relations (Persons), and [c] the relational description by which they are formally called “equal.” He holds that something real is posited in God by virtue of [a] and [b] but that only a thought-up relation is posited by [c]. This last is also confirmed by the authority of Peter Lombard in d. 31 of *I Sent.* The grounds for this position are two, in keeping with the *two conditions* which are required for a symmetrical relation to be real both ways (and which are missing here). *One* is distinct real bases each way, and *the other* is bases not founded upon another relation.²

² The conditions sound right. In created cases, two distinct relata (call them *x* and *y*) each have a real accident of quantity (call them *Qx* and *Qy*), and when these are such that neither is greater nor less than the other, we call them the distinct real bases for the symmetrical, real relation $x = y$ (in which “=” is not identity and is not founded on relations).

These statements are debated, of course, by those who hold the opposite opinion, one of whom is Scotus, who objects in his remarks on *I Sent.* d.31 and in his *Quodlibet*, q.6.

The arguments from Scotus

[α] Firstly he argues against the requirement of really distinct bases. [*Antecedent:*] An equality, he says, is based on the same quantity belonging to distinct relata; [*inference:*] so an equality based on flatly one quantity belonging to distinct relata is a truer equality than one based on a quantity which is one in some respect. Ergo the truest equality is the one based on numerically one quantity.³

[β] Secondly, he argues that [*major:*] relations require only three conditions to be real, and these are [1] really distinct relata, [2] a real basis, and [3] being-in the relata apart from any work of the mind. [But [*minor:*] the equality between the Father and the Son meets these conditions.] Therefore [the equality-relation in God is a real one].⁴

[γ] Thirdly [if your Thomist conditions were right], the relations of origin could not be really distinct; for if God’s essence is their basis, it is not distinct bases [one in each], and if a relation is their basis, your second condition [the one against basing one relation on another] prevents it [from being real].

[δ] A confirming argument is that if one whiteness were in two surfaces, they would be similar.

Then Scotus turns to arguing against our conclusion itself.

[ε] Equality is in the Son thanks to His procession* and is the primordial equality, according to Augustine at the end of *De Trinitate VI*, and it is an unqualified completeness/perfection according to the same Augustine in c. 7 of *De quantitate animae*. Therefore, it is a real relation.

[ζ] A confirming argument is that, apart from any mind, the Son is really equal to the Father; therefore, the Son is equal to Him by a <real>[†] equality, and not by the sort which is a thought-produced relation.

[η] Scotus says further that if there were an inequality between the Father and the Son, it would be a real relation, and so the equality between them is real, too. The confirmation is that complete inequality is found in the real; so complete equality must be found, too; but no complete case can exist except between the

³ Scotus starts by arguing that the sameness of *Qx* and *Qy* in created cases is just a sameness of measurement of some sort, not a flat-out identity of the two accidents. So, their sameness is only a oneness in some respect, whereas in God the sameness is a oneness of unqualified identity because the divine essence is numerically the same essence in each Person; hence (a) the basis for equality in God is more perfect, and (b) the demand for really distinct bases is refuted.

⁴ The relata who are the Father and the Son are really distinct, and the equality relation between them has a real basis, because this is the divine essence identical in each, and so the relation is “in” each apart from anyone’s thinking about it. So the Father = the Son by a real relation of equality.

* *fluctus*

† *inductivē*

* *productio*

† correction, the text has ‘aequalis’

divine Persons, because every other quantity is incomplete. Ergo.

Cajetan's replies

viii. TO CLEAR THESE MATTERS UP, please notice that failure of the first condition set down in the text, *i.e.* failure of real distinction between the bases, means it is impossible for the relations with those bases to be real, because the bases are the first things compared, as whiteness is the first to scatter sight. It is about those bases that one is first thinking when one says that distinct relata are needed. After all, being equal belongs first to quantities, and it only belongs to anything subtracted or added [to the quantities] because of the quantities.⁵ Meanwhile, [failure of] the second condition set down in the text [the one about not basing relations on other relations] does not make relations fail to be real [exactly] but makes them fail to be distinct from their bases.⁶ Thus any two correlatives [say fathers and sons] are opposed to each other by real relations of opposition [*i.e.* converses], but they are themselves the correlatives. Thus fatherhood itself is relatively opposed to sonship. Hence, if the first condition [for real equality] were met [in the father/son case], the son's equality with the father would be sonship itself, and the father's with the son would be fatherhood itself.

[ad (α)] In reply to Scotus' first argument, then, I say that the antecedent needs to be well understood, since it can be taken two ways. The first way is as it sounds, so that oneness of quantity makes equal. The other way is that "oneness" in the sense of indistinctness of the one quantity from the other, with respect to more and less, makes equal. Likewise, "equal" can be taken two ways. One way is to mean a real relation of equality; the other way is to mean equality vaguely (so as to be real or not). If Scotus' antecedent is taken the first way, it is true about being equal in the second way (*i.e.* vaguely) but not about equality as a real relation; hence the argument is worthless. If his antecedent is taken the second way, it is true about real equality and is the root of our position.

[ad (β)] From statements already made, it is obvious that Scotus' second argument badly interprets the conditions for a real relation. The relata have to be really distinct in the bases, if the relations require the bases.⁷

[ad (γ)] To Scotus' third argument I have two re-

⁵ Thanks to expressions introduced in footnote 2 above, Cajetan's point is easy to see; being equal belongs first to Qx and Qy , and only through them does it belong to x and y .

⁶ On whether real relations are distinct from their bases, see the detailed discussion in §§ $v-x$ in the commentary on q. 28, a. 2, where the issue was brought up by St. Thomas's answer ad (2).

⁷ The bases for $x = y$ are Qx and Qy , and these have to be distinct quantities, as the temperature of my coffee has to be distinct from the temperature of your coffee, if the two coffees are to be equally hot (or equally cold) by a real relation.

sponses. The first is that relations of origin are based on the identifying acts. If you object that these acts are relational* things, too, my answer is that, as a result, the relations of origin are *not other relations* than those [acts], and hence it does not follow that the relations of origin are not real. My second and better response is that the condition in question [that relations not be based on other relations] is about relations that are in need of a basis. Relations are of two orders, after all. Some bring not only their bases but also their referents [relata] with them. These are the relations of origin which, we say, constitute the hypostases, *etc.* Others do not bring these with them but presuppose the bases and hypostases — and such are equality and similarity. This is why the former are real, and the latter are not. Hereby emerges the solution to Scotus' arguments in his *Quodlibet*. They proceed from the idea that God's essence is the basis for the relations of origin — which is not true, strictly speaking.

[ad (δ)] Against his confirming argument from whiteness, I deny that there would be similarity as a real relation (unless perhaps because of diverse parts of the extended whiteness itself, which is outside the present topic).

[ad (ε, ζ, η)] As for the objections made first against our conclusion itself, a single response answers the lot: apart from any mind at work, the Son is truly and really equal to the Father *via* the oneness of their essence and the distinctness of their Persons and *via* their thus [verifying] basis-wise⁸ the relational description ['equal to']. For the Son has these traits by virtue of His generation. And this is how His equality is primordial, *not via* the realness of an added relation. In the same way, the Son is *utterly really* the same as Himself (with no mind thinking about it), and He has this from the Father, and yet it does not follow that His self-identity is a real relation. For He is "identical" to Himself basis-wise,⁹ and in the same way He is "equal" [to the Father] basis-wise.⁸ These examples show the flaw of the objections.⁸

Also, it is not true that equality taken form-wise [*i.e.* taken as a relation] is an unqualified perfection, and Augustine never said it was, even though he did say that you rightly prefer equality to inequality. You rightly prefer white to black, and yet neither is an unqualified perfection. And please realize the truth that the "equal" you prefer is not the relation but the basis for it, as you prefer one to many, and yet being one is not an unqualified perfection unless the thing you are calling "one" is an unqualified perfection, and hence being equal is a long way from the class of items which are complete/perfect unqualifiedly.

Plus, if real inequality were in God, it would not imply that there is also real equality in Him. The former has two numerically distinct quantities — one

⁸ Several recent philosophers have followed Leibniz in thinking that self-identity is an important metaphysical truth about everything there is. If they are taking self-identity basis-wise, a Thomist need not disagree.

* *respectivae*

† *fundamentaliter*

more, the other less — whereas the latter has in fact only one.

As regards complete/perfect equality, we happen to speak of it in two ways: independently, and as a real relation. In both ways, I admit, perfect equality is found in the real: in the independent sense, in God; as a real relation, in other things. For it is impossible for it to be found in that second sense in God, since [such] equality is a form co-requiring an imperfec-

tion, *i.e.*, a numerical distinction of absolute items [*i.e.*, quantities].

You should note this well in the present subject matter, and you should concede that there is in God an equality which is true and perfect and primordial, *etc.*, as was established in the body of the article, but not [in the sense of] a real relation, as the answer *ad* (4) says. And don't go wrong by straying from equality in the one sense to equality in the other.

Is the Person who proceeds co-eternal with His source, such as the Son with the Father?

In III Sent., d.11, a.1; De potentia q.3, a.13; Compend. Theol. c.43; In Decretal. I, In Joannem c.1, lectio 1

It seems that the Person who is proceeding is not co-eternal with His source, such as the Son with the Father.

Candidus Arianus,
PL 8, 1015

(1) After all, Arius distinguished twelve ways one thing could proceed from another. The first way is the way a line flows from a point, where there is not even equal simplicity. The second way is the way rays come from the Son, where equality of nature is lacking. The third way is as a mark or impression comes from a seal, where there is lacking both consubstantiality and causal potency. The fourth is the way a good will is sent into us by God, where again consubstantiality is lacking. Fifth is the way an accident comes from a substance, but the accident lacks subsistence. Sixth is the way a species is abstracted from matter, as a sense gets an appearance from an empirical thing, where a quality of spiritual simplicity is lacking. Seventh is the way a wish is stirred up from a thought, which is a temporal affair. The eighth way is that of transfiguration, as an image comes to be from the air, which is material. Ninth is the way a motion comes from a mover, and here one has cause and effect. The tenth is the way species are educed from a more general kind, which is irrelevant in the talk of God, because the Father is not predicated of the Son as genus of species. The eleventh is the way a thing comes from its plan, as a box outside the mind comes from what is in the mind. The twelfth is the way of birth, as a man is from his father, where there is before and after in time. Clearly, therefore, in every way that one thing comes from another, there is lacking either equality of nature, or equality of duration. So if the Son, is "from the Father," one has to say that he is either lesser than the Father or posterior to Him, or else both.

* principium

(2) Besides, everything which is from another has a beginning.* But nothing eternal has a beginning. So the Son is not eternal, and neither is the Holy Spirit.

† corrumpitur

(3) Further, everything that breaks down[†] ceases to be, and everything which is begotten begins to be; after all, the reason it is begotten is so that it might be. But the Son is begotten from the Father. So He begins to be and is not co-eternal with the Father.

(4) Furthermore, if the Son was begotten from the Father, either He is always being begotten or else there is some moment of His begetting. If He is always being begotten, then since whatever is being begotten is incomplete (as is clear in the sequential items which are always in production, like time and motion), it follows that the Son is always incomplete — which is awkward. Therefore, there must have been some "moment" of the Son's begetting. So, before that "moment" the Son was not.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Athanasius says [in

the Creed], "all three Persons are co-eternal with each other."

Decr. # 75, § 26

ANSWER: It is necessary to say that the Son is co-eternal with the Father. To see this, one must ponder the fact that there are two different ways it can happen that something existing from a source is, in its own being, posterior to the being of its source: one way is on the side of the agent; the other, on the side of the action.

On the side of the agent, it occurs one way in voluntary agents and another way in natural agents. In voluntary agents, it happens on account of a choice of time; for it is in the power of a voluntary agent to choose what form to confer upon his effect, as I said above, and likewise to choose the time at which to produce the effect. But in natural agents it happens because an agent does not have at its beginning a completeness of power naturally sufficient to act, but acquires it later, after some time, as a human being cannot be a parent from his infancy.

q 41, a.2

On the side of the action, what is from a source is impeded from being simultaneous with its source by virtue of the fact that the action is sequential. So, even if an agent began such an action as soon as it existed, its effect could not occur at the same instant but only at the instant when the action terminated.

Well, it is obvious from previous questions that the Father does not beget the Son by will, but by nature. It is likewise clear already that the Father's nature has been perfect/complete from eternity. And again, it is clear that the action whereby the Father produces the Son is not a sequential action (because if it were, then the Son of God would have been begotten successively, and his begetting would have been material and accompanied by change, which is impossible). It has to be the case, therefore, that the Son was whenever the Father was. And so the Son is co-eternal with the Father; and the Holy Spirit is likewise co-eternal with both.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — ad (1): As Augustine says in his book *De verbis Domini*, no creature's manner of proceeding perfectly represents the divine begetting: so, one must gather a similarity from many manners, so that what is lacking in one may be somewhat supplied from another. This is why the following was said at the Council of Ephesus: "that the Son has always co-existed co-eternal with the Father [comes across through His titles]; 'bright Splendour' announces it to you: 'Word' shows you that His birth was without undergoing change; 'Son' insinuates His consubstantiality." But among all the representations, the clearest is the procession of the word from the mind: the word is not posterior to the mind from which it proceeds, unless that mind is one that needs to go from potency into act — which cannot be said to be the case in God.

Pl. 38, 666-669

*Acta III, c.10;
Mansi VI, 210;
PG 77, 1376f*

ad (2): Eternity precludes a beginning of duration, but not a beginning of origin.

ad (3): Every case of breaking down is a change, and so everything that breaks down begins not to be and ceases to be. But the divine begetting is not a change, as I said above. Hence the Son is always being begotten and the Father is always begetting.

ad (4): In the case of time, what is indivisible (an instant) is one thing and what lasts (a time) is another. But in eternity an indivisible "now" is always standing, as I said above. The generation of the Son is not

in a "now" of time, nor in time at all, but in eternity. So to indicate the presentness and permanence of eternity, one can say, "He is always being born," as Origen* did. But it is better to speak as Gregory¹ and Augustine² did and say, "He has always been born," so that 'always' might indicate the permanence of eternity and 'born' might indicate the completeness of the one begotten.¹ Thus the Son is not incomplete, and there was no time "when He was not," as Arius claimed.

¹ As a passive of the perfect tense, 'born' indicated a completed action.

* *Hom 9 on Jeremiah*: PG 13, 357
[†] *Moralia XXIX*, c 1; PL 76, 477
[‡] *Book of 83 Qq.* n 37; PL 40, 27

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article, a single conclusion answers it in the affirmative: necessarily, the Son is co-eternal with the Father. — The support goes as follows. [*Major:*] Everything coming from a source as posterior to its source either proceeds from it by will, or by a nature gradually matured, or by a sequential action. [*Minor:*] But the Father does not beget the Son by will, but by a nature eternally complete, and by an action without succession. [*Conclusion:*] Therefore, the Son is co-eternal. — Ditto for the Holy Spirit.

The major is clarified by dividing the causes of being posterior into those lying on the side of the agent and those lying on the side of the action, as is plain in the text.

The last part of the minor is explained by deriving an impossibility — namely, that the Son would be born successively and with matter and change. — This proof that there would be matter is not based on the premise that wherever there is succession there is matter, but rather on the premise that wherever there is successive generation of a substance, there is matter.

Is there an order of nature among the divine Persons?

In I Sent. d.12, a.1, d.20, a.3; *De potentia* q.10, a.3; *Contra errores Graecorum* II, c.31

It seems that there is no order of nature among the divine Persons.

(1) After all, everything mentioned in the talk of God is either the essence, or a Person, or an identifier. But 'order of nature' does not mean God's essence, nor does it mean a Person, or an identifier. So there is no 'order of nature' in the talk of God.

(2) Besides, wherever there is an order of nature among things, one is prior to another, at least in nature and concept. But among the divine Persons "nothing is anterior and posterior" as Athanasius says. Hence there is no order of nature among the divine Persons.

(3) Moreover, whatever is ordered, is distinguished. But the nature in God is not distinguished. Therefore, it is not ordered. So there is no 'order of nature' in God.

(4) Furthermore, the divine nature is God's essence. But we do not speak of a 'order of essence' in God. So neither should we speak of an order of nature.

ON THE OTHER HAND, wherever there is multitude without order, there is confusion. But there is no confusion among the divine Persons, as Athanasius says. Hence there is order there.

ANSWER: an 'order' is always asserted in comparison to some starting point [*principium*].¹ But as 'starting point' is asserted in many ways — in location (like a point), in understanding (like the first premise of a proof), and among particular causes — so, too, is 'order' asserted in many ways. In the talk of God, however, a starting point is asserted in connection with origination, without anteriority, as I said.

¹ What Aquinas calls an "order" is always an asymmetrical relation or a set of things "ordered" by one. In any well-ordered set, there is at least one first member.

Hence there has to be an order with origination but without anteriority. And this is called an "order of nature," according to Augustine, "not wherein one is earlier than another but wherein one is from another."

Contra Maximum
II, c.14; *PL* 42, 775

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): "order of nature" indicates the notion of an origin [hence an identifier] in general, but not specifically.

ad (2): in created things, even when what arises from a source is coeval with it in duration, the source will still be prior in nature and in our understanding, so long as one is thinking of that which is the source. But if one thinks of the very relations of the cause to the caused and the source to what is from it, the relations are obviously simultaneous in nature and in our understanding, inasmuch as one appears in the definition of the other.² But in God, these very relations [of origin to what is from it, or of what is from it back to the origin] are the Persons subsisting in one nature. Therefore, no one Person can be prior to another because of the nature, nor because of the relations, nor even because of the nature and our understanding of it.

ad (3): the "order of nature" is so called, not because the nature itself is ordered, but because the order among the divine Persons comes in line with their natural origin.

ad (4): a thing's "nature" somehow implies what it takes to be a starting point, but "essence" does not. And so an order of origin is better called an order of nature than an order of essence.

² Causes do not carry their effects in their definitions, but the cause-of relation does carry its converse (effect of) in its definition. Thus a thing which is a cause/source (say, a spark) retains a natural and explanatory priority over the thing which is from it (a fire). But the relations which are "x gives rise to y" and "y is from x" have to obtain simultaneously, if they obtain at all.

Cajetan's Commentary

In the title question, 'nature' is not being specified by 'order'; rather, *vice-versa*, 'of nature' is determining the order. So the sense of it is not "is there an order in God's nature?" as in a thing put-in-order, but "is there an order which is natural, as opposed to being voluntary."

ii. In the body of the article, there is one conclusion: among the divine Persons there is an order of nature. — The support goes thus. [*Antecedent:*] Order is always in comparison to some starting point; [*1st inference:*] therefore, the usage of 'order' is as various

as the uses of 'starting point'; [*2nd inference:*] so order arises in God thanks to origination, without [temporal] priority; [*3rd inference:*] therefore, it is an order of nature.

Making the first inference is illustrated with place, understanding, and particular causes. — Making the second is supported on the ground that a starting point in God is thanks to origin, without anteriority, from q.33, a.1. — Making the third inference is justified by the authority of Augustine, who introduced the term for this purpose.

Verbal Differences

iii. Because this text posits an “order” without “priority,” doubt arises with many writers, who think that priority and posteriority belong to the definition of “an order”: and since Aquinas posits here an order of origin, they think it necessary to admit here also a priority and posteriority of origin.

However, since our purpose here is not to assist the quarrels of theologians, I am about to make a SHORT ANSWER, because the disagreement on this issue is just a matter of words. You need to know, then, that an “order of origin” is nothing but a case of “this being from that,” in which there is really found a “one from which the other is” and a “one who is from the other” (and “one from whom another is” is sometimes called the “one producing from himself,” as is clear in the discussion [we have with Scotists] of the First Producer). And you need to know that on these points there is no disagreement. The consequence is that between us and Scotus, who agrees to all these points (in remarks on *I Sent.* d.28, in the last question, and his *Quodlibet* q.4), there is no controversy about the reality, but merely a difference of words. The Scotists call the one from whom another is “prior in origin” (ditto one producing from himself); the one who is from another they call posterior in origin. The result is that, for them, priority by origin is being “the one from whom,” while posteriority of origin is being “from another.” This is obvious in Scotus’s own remarks on *I Sent.* d.12, q.2 and elsewhere. So, in a discussion like this, out of reverence for the holy doctors who did not use these words, and to take away occasions for error, let the Scotists keep their opinion but correct their language.¹

Also, their ways of speaking beget obscurity in things that are in fact clear. You see this when the question arises about the identity or diversity of “origin” with which the Father and the Son spirate. Of course, the fact itself is clear: the Father spirates from Himself and the Son does it from the Father, while they spirate with a single act, as a single source, as we said above.

Unpacking the answer *ad* (2)

iv. In the answer *ad* (2), a doubt arises from Scotus, which cannot be overlooked; it appears in his remarks on *I Sent.* d.28, last question. He argues that what Aquinas says here contradicts what he said in the last

¹ Scotus was a pioneer of the modern idiom in which, in any ordering, what comes ahead of something else is called “prior” to it (in that ordering), even when temporal succession and causation are excluded. Take ‘greater than’ as an ordering of the integers; since 19 > 17, 19 is called prior to 17 in this ordering (and the reverse is the case in the less-than ordering.) St. Thomas’s use of ‘prior’ and ‘posterior’ is older and closer to Patristic use; but nowadays, for better or worse, it is Thomists who are well advised to correct their language.

article of inquiry 40. Here he says that fatherhood (or the Father) is in no way prior to the Son, not by nature nor by understanding. But back in q.40 he said that the Father’s hypostasis is prior in our understanding to the identifying action which is active begetting, and hence is prior to the Son, who follows upon being begotten, as he says in the same place. So the two passages are inconsistent.

v. To CLEAR UP this difficulty, both in itself and in the mind of St. Thomas, you need to know that the Father and the Son are discussed in two ways in the talk of God. One way is purely according to the reality, and that is how the author is speaking here when he denies all priority and posteriority. And he supports his denial by an utterly effective argument: [*major:*] there is nothing in the Persons except the relations and the essence; [*minor:*] there is no priority in the essence since it is one, and the relations are simultaneous in their nature and in being understood; [*conclusion:*] therefore [there is no priority and posteriority anywhere]. — The other way of discussing the Persons is under some partial concept or way of conceiving them, and this is how he spoke above [in q.40]. And rightly so, because the title of that article was about pre-understanding of the distinctive traits *vis-à-vis* the acts, and *vice-versa*. In this way of talking, the Father (and Fatherhood understood as the hypostasis) precedes the begetting and the Son in our understanding. And so there is no inconsistency in the statements.

Indeed, from this passage it becomes obvious that Scotus, both in the place cited and in *Quodlibet* q. 4, has imposed on St. Thomas a motive to make a distinction between fatherhood as constituting and as relating, so as to salvage the Father’s being prior to the Son. But our author never dreamed of this, and here he has taught the opposite, saying that the subsistent relations which are the Father and the Son have to be altogether simultaneous even in our understanding — and this from the merits of the case. The real reason which moved our author to draw that distinction was the fact that a single relation has two acts, namely, to constitute a hypostasis and to relate it, as was clear in q.40.

vi. Please realize that with this one distinction in place — the distinction between things in themselves and things under a special concept or way of understanding them — you solve all of the objections of those who want to prove a priority in God, either from what Augustine says (to the effect of “nothing begets itself,” because it would have been before it was and hence belongs to the defining makeup of a begetter that he exists before the one begotten), or from similar remarks. No such remarks prove that the real thing or Person begetting is prior, even in our understanding, but only that the thing/person *so conceived* is prior in thought. It is obvious that an argument from a thing thus-and-so conceived to the same thing just in itself is not valid; it is a fallacy of going from ‘in some respect’ to ‘unqualifiedly’.

a. 4 with §§ xii-xiii in its commentary

Is the Son equal to the Father in greatness?

In I Sent. d.19, q.1, a.2, 4 CG cc.7, 11; In Boethii De Trinitate q.3, a.4

It seems that the Son is not equal to the Father in greatness [*magnitudo*].

(1) After all, He Himself says in John 14:28, "The Father is greater than I;" and St. Paul says in 1 Cor. 15:28, "the Son Himself will be subject unto Him who subjecteth all things unto Himself."

(2) Besides, fatherhood pertains to the dignity of the Father. But fatherhood does not belong to the Son. So it is not the case that the Son has whatever dignity the Father has. Therefore, He is not equal to the Father in greatness.

(3) Moreover, wherever there is whole and part, many parts are something greater than just one part or fewer parts; as three men are something greater than two or one man. But in the talk of God, there seems to be a universal whole and a part; for under [the universal] *relation* or *identifier*, many relations or identifiers are contained. So since there are three identifiers in the Father, and only two in the Son, it seems that the Son is not equal to the Father.

ON THE OTHER HAND, it says in Philippians 2:6, "He did not consider it robbery to be equal to God."¹

ANSWER: one has to say that the Son is equal to the Father in greatness. After all, the greatness of God is just the completeness of His nature. But it belongs to the definition of being a father and being a son that a begotten son gets the completeness of the nature that is in his father, just as the father has it. But since in human begetting there is a change from potency to act, the son as a man is not immediately equal to the father begetting him; rather, he comes to equal him through due growth (unless he turns out otherwise because of a defect in his source). Well, it is obvious from previous statements that there is truly and literally a fatherhood and a sonship in God, and one cannot say that the active power of God the Father was defective in begetting, nor that the Son of God attained maturity gradually and by changing. Hence, it is necessary to say that from all eternity the Son was equal to the Father in greatness. This is why Hilary, too, says in his book *De Synodis*, "take away the infirmities of bodies, take away a beginning of conception, take away sorrows and human needs, and every son is equal to his father by natural birth, because likeness of nature is also there."

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): those words are understood to have been said about Christ in His

¹ A better translation is, "He did not consider His equality with God a thing to be clung to . . ."

human nature, in which He is less than the Father and subject to Him. But in His divine nature, He is equal to the Father. And this is precisely what Athanasius says [in his Creed], "equal to the Father in divinity, less than the Father in humanity." Or, as Hilary puts it, in Book IX of his *De Trinitate*, "the Father is greater by the authority of a giver, but the One to whom Being is given is not less." And in his book *De Synodis*, he says that "the Son's subjection is a natural piety," *i.e.* a recognition of paternal authority, "but the subjection of other things is the infirmity of creation."

ad (2): equality comes from greatness, but 'greatness' in the talk of God means the perfection of His nature, as I just said, and pertains to His essence. And so, in God equality and similarity come from the essential traits, and one cannot speak of inequality or dissimilarity thanks to the relations being distinct. Hence, Augustine says in *Contra Maximinum*, "a question of origin is one of what is from what: but the question of equality is one of quality and quantity." Paternity, therefore, is the Father's dignity as well as His essence; for dignity pertains to the absolute and to the essence. So, just as the same essence which is fatherhood in the Father is sonship in the Son, so also the same dignity which is fatherhood in the Father, is sonship in the Son. The statement, "Whatever dignity the Father has, the Son has," is true, then. And it does not follow that "the Father has fatherhood, and so the Son has fatherhood," for [that inference] changes a "what" into a "towards what." For the essence and dignity of the Father and of the Son is the same, but in the Father it is thanks to the relation of the giver, and in the Son it is thanks to the relation of the receiver.²

ad (3): 'relation' in the talk of God is not a universal, even though it is predicated of several relations, because all the relations are one thing in essence and in existence, which conflicts with what it takes to be a universal, whose instances are distinguished in existing. Likewise, 'person' is not a universal in God, as I said above.³ And so all the relations together are not something greater than one of them alone, and all the Persons together are not something greater than One alone, because the whole perfection of the divine nature is in each Person.

² The traits that make them great are all absolute ones contained in the divine nature. Fatherhood is not another such trait (hence the objector's mistake) but the bearing in which the Father "gives" this nature, as Sonship is the bearing in which the Son receives it.

³ A term "predicated" of many need not be a universal; it may be a term of vague reference.

Decc. # 75, § 33

c.54; Pl. 10, 325

c.79; Pl. 10, 532

II, c.18; Pl. 42, 786

*q.27, a.2, q.33, a.2
ad 3, 4; a.3*

c.73; Pl. 10, 528

q.30, a.4 ad 3

 Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article there is one conclusion: it is necessary that the Son be equal to the Father in greatness from eternity.

The first part of this supported as follows. [*Antecedent:*] it belongs to the definition of fatherhood and sonship that a son receives completeness of nature like the father; [*1st inference:*] the Son in God has the completeness of the Father's nature; [*2nd inference:*] therefore. He is equal to the Father in greatness.

The antecedent is exemplified in creatures. — Making the first inference is supported on the ground that fatherhood and sonship are present in God truly

and literally speaking. — Making the second is based on the fact that 'greatness' here means nothing but the completeness or perfection of Their nature.

As to the second part, *i.e.* "from eternity," there is support. The active power of God the Father is not defective, and the Son of God is not successively perfected; therefore, [He is perfect] from eternity.

Making the inference is explained on the basis that the opposite turns up in human beings because the son is not immediately made equal to the father. — Then the whole thing is confirmed by the authority of Hilary.

Is the Son in the Father, and *vice-versa*?

In I. Sent. d. 19, q. 3, a. 2; 4 CG c. 9; In Joannem c. 10, lectio 6, c. 16, lectio 7

It seems that the Son is not in the Father, nor *vice-versa*.

c. 3;
210a 14 (1) Aristotle lists in *Physics IV* eight ways for a thing to be "in" something, and in none of these ways is the Son in the Father or *vice-versa*, as you can see by going through the list. Therefore, the Son is not in the Father, nor *vice-versa*.

(2) Besides, nothing that has gone forth from something is in it. But the Son has gone forth from the Father from eternity according to Micah 5:2, "His going forth is from the beginning, from the days of eternity." Therefore, the Son is not in the Father.

(3) Moreover, of two opposites the one is not in the other. But the Son and the Father are opposites relationally. Ergo, the one cannot be in the other.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what it says in John 14:10, "I am in the Father, and the Father is in me."

ANSWER: in the Father and the Son, there are three things to consider, namely, an essence, a relation, and an origin; and thanks to each of these, the Son is in the Father and *vice-versa*. Thanks to the essence, after all, the Father is in the Son because the Father is His own essence and communicates His essence to the Son, without any change in it; hence it follows that, since the Father's essence is in the Son, the Father is in the Son. Likewise, since the Son is His own essence, it follows that He is in the Father, where His essence is. And this is what Hilary is saying in his *De Trinitate V*: "immutable God follows upon His nature, so to speak, begetting the immutable God. And

cc 37f.
PL 10, 155

hence we understand God's nature to be subsisting in Him, since He is God in God." — Thanks to their relations, one opposed relation is obviously in the other in our understanding of them.¹ — Thanks to origin also, it is obvious that the procession of the inner Word is not an outward procession but remains within the speaker. Also, that which is said in a word is contained in the word.

Parallel thinking applies to the Holy Spirit.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): Phenomena in creatures do not sufficiently represent the things of God. And so in none of the ways listed by Aristotle is the Son in the Father or *vice-versa*. But the closest to it is the way in which something is said to be in the source giving rise to it (except that in created cases oneness of essence² is missing between the source and what comes from it).

ad (2): The Son's going forth from the Father is after the fashion of an internal procession as a Word goes forth from the heart and yet remains in it. So in the divine case, the going forth is due solely to the distinction of relations, and not to any distance in essence.

ad (3): The Father and the Son are opposed relationally but not essentially. Even so, relational opposites are such that the one is in the other, as I said.

¹ How a relation is in our understanding is the account defining it. The converse of a relation is part of the account defining it. Ergo.

² He means numerical oneness of essence.

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear. In the body of the article, there is one conclusion having three parts: (1) the Father is in the Son, (2) and *vice-versa*, (3) thanks to essence, relation, and origin.

On Part One

The first part is supported as follows. [*Antecedent*:] the Father's essence is in the Son; [*inference*:] so, the Father is in the Son. — The antecedent is made clear by the fact that the Father communicates His essence to the Son without any change. The inference is supported on the ground that the Father is His essence. — Likewise, conversely, the essence of the Son is in the Father: therefore, the Son is in the Father because the Son is His own essence. — And this is confirmed by the authority of Hilary.

ii. On this part, notice two things. The first is that the Father's being in the Son because of His essence

can be understood two ways: (1) In one way, it would mean that the essence *just of itself** is the reason for His being in the Son, as we say that the Father understands by reason of His essence. And this meaning is foreign to the mind of St. Thomas, for then it would follow perfectly well that "ergo, the Son is in the Son," just as it follows that "ergo, the Son understands." (2) In the other way, it will mean that the essence, as one thing in many, is the reason why each is in the other, as we say that the essence, as present in the Source, is the reason he begets.¹ And this way is true in the case at

* *secundum se*

¹ Used the first way, the Father does "because of His essence" the acts common to all three Persons, known as the "essential acts" in God, such as understanding and willing. Used the other way, the Father does "because of His essence" the identifying actions of begetting and spirating. These acts, too, involve the divine essence, but only as begetting and spirating are ways to communicate the divine essence.

hand. For since being in another requires two conditions — conjunction and distinction of the two — it happens in two ways: either in thought as far as the distinction is concerned (as divinity is in God, and generally a form is in the referent from which it is not really distinct) or in the real. In the case at hand, it is understood to happen in the real, such that two factors concur towards divine Persons being in each other, namely, a real otherness and a real conjunction. For the Father is in the Son as a consubstantial one is in another consubstantial one, by reason of the oneness of essence in the two. The other thing to notice is that being “in a Person” as we are now discussing is one of the mixed identifiers, such as the power to beget, because it includes in itself the distinction of the Persons and the oneness of the essence. So, just as in other items standing between essential traits and identifiers, no valid argument can be made to the essential traits taken purely, so also no such argument can be made here. So, just as the essence does not beget and yet is the explanation for begetting in the Father, so also, even though the essence is not in any Person in the same way as one Person is in another, it is still the explanation of many Persons being in each other.

From these remarks, the first thing to emerge clearly is the efficacy of the argument in the text, which is not an argument from the identity of the Father or the Son with the essence, as some people seem to have thought, but from the oneness of the essence of both. And this is optimally suggested in the very terms of “Father” and “Son” and “essence”. — The second thing that emerges clearly is the answer to the arguments reported by Capreolus in his remarks on *I Sent.* d.19, q.1. For the two conditions joined together make the reasoning process valid.

A Remaining Doubt

iii. One doubt remains, however, as to whether this argument from the oneness of the essence of both holds good in such a way that saying “the essence of the Father is in the Son, ergo,” etc. is just the same as saying “the essence of the Father is the Son, therefore,” etc. In other words, the question is whether the force of the reasoning requires the “in” as it lies in the text, i.e. “the essence of the Father is in the Son” etc. — The reason for this doubt is that the “in” here means only a thought-produced relation, whereas the Father is in the Son in the real. — And again, the essence is in the Son in a different way than the Father is in the Son, because the essence is there like a form in its referent, while the Father is there like a substantial referent in another referent.

iv. MY RESPONSE to this is that the way a thing comes into language bears only upon the truth of a proposition, because the wording sometimes changes whether it is true. And so, while this reasoning process is based in reality upon the oneness of essence in the several Persons (for this is what makes the Per-

sons consubstantial and puts one of them in another substantially in the real), nevertheless, the better to manifest that this proposition “the Father is in the Son,” and *vice-versa*, is strictly true, the argument is also based on the word “in”. For from the fact the one essence of the several Persons fittingly admits the “in” *vis-à-vis* each of the Persons, it follows optimally that *therefore, each Person, by reason of that One’s essence, can also be said to be in another.*

The difference in how this fact is brought into language is no obstacle; indeed, it has to be the case that how a *reason for being* comes into language differs from how a *being* comes in, as is clear case-by-case. — Nor does it matter that the “in” indicates a thought-produced relation, because the relation is also thought-produced when we say the Father is “equal to” the Son; there are no real relations in God beyond the four relations of origin. So just as the equality of the Persons and their similarity are distinct as to their basis and their terms, etc., so also one must say analogously about their being in each other: it includes the unity of essence and the distinction of Persons.

On Part Two

v. The second part of the conclusion is supported also. [*Antecedent:*] of correlative relations, one is in the other in our understanding; [*inference:*] therefore, one divine Person is in another thanks to relation.

vi. Aureol and Durandus argue against this support, reported in Capreolus in the same place as above [at the end of § ii]. First they argue that the one relation is not “in the other,” but “towards the other,” and is distinguished from it and opposed to it. — Secondly, they argue that on this basis, the Holy Spirit would not be in the Father and the Son, because He is not related back to them but to the “spirator.”

vii. But one sees very easily that these and similar arguments create no problem but pose just a verbal difference. After all, our author did not want to say that the relation puts the Father in the Son in reality (since it is obvious that the Father as such is towards the Son, not in the Son) but *in our understanding*, or in [the relation’s] defining account. By a very frequent usage, after all, we say that one correlative is in the defining makeup of the other, as Porphyry says in the *Praedicabilia*. And since the text explicitly included the words “in our understanding of them” it is amazing how these guys could argue against it.

Again, since it is proper to each Person to have His way of coming into language fall under His formal makeup, it is not at all awkward to conceive that the Holy Spirit, in our understanding of His relation, is not in the Father and the Son except as they are spirating Him. There is no requirement, after all, for each mode to have something from all the modes at once, as the objectors dreamed Aquinas intended to say. So, if one takes “the Holy Spirit is not in the Father and the Son except as spirating Him” and uses it to infer that therefore, “the Holy Spirit is not in the Father and in the

Son," you are committing a fallacy of going from 'in some respect' to 'unqualifiedly'. After all, He (the Holy Spirit) is in them this way, and is in them by reason of His essence as consubstantial with them, as was said in the conclusion's first part, and also thanks to origin, as I will say shortly. So, the following argument is not valid: "the Holy Spirit thanks to relation is not in the Father and the Son except this way [as spirators], therefore, the Holy Spirit is in them only this way [as spirators]." For the 'thanks to relation' works as an 'in some respect'.

On Part Three: Two Doubts from Aureol

viii. The third part of the conclusion is also supported. [*Antecedent:*] The inner word does not go forth outside the speaker, and what is said in the word is contained in it; [*inference:*] therefore, one divine Person is in another thanks to origin.

ix. Against this reasoning, Aureol makes two arguments. His first is that being in another as one's source is an inferior way [to be in someone], (as Averroes has it in comment 23 on *Physics IV*) and it is not reciprocal. But the way in which one divine Person is in another is most perfect and is reciprocal. Ergo.

His second argument is that if this were the rea-

son the Father is in the Word, then the whole world is in the Word. Drawing the inference is supported on the ground that the Father would be in the Word as a thing said, and we know that the whole world is "said" in God's Word.

Answering Aureol

x. My response [to Aureol's first argument] is that being in an active source turns up to two ways, outwardly and inwardly, *i.e.* depending on whether the operation is transitive or immanent. Maybe being in the active source in a transitive action is an imperfect way to be, like being caused; but being in the source of an immanent action is not imperfect in any way. This is why the support used in the text is that the Word does not proceed outside the speaker. — Reciprocity is found even in cases of transitive action, since the cause is in the effects by way of imitation or representation.

The response to his second argument is that "things said" is not a uniform class. For some things are said essentially, and other things only representatively. The Father is in the Son as a thing essentially said in the Word; but all creatures are said representatively, inasmuch as they are represented in God, who has His Word essentially as a thing said and as its speaker.

article 6

Is the Son equal to the Father in power?

In I Sent. d 20, a 2, 4 CG cc. 7, 8.

It seems that the Son is not equal to the Father in power.

(1) After all, John 5:19 says, “The Son cannot do anything of Himself [*a se*], but what He sees the Father doing.” But the Father can act of Himself. Therefore, the Father is greater than the Son in power.

(2) Besides, the power of the one who commands and teaches is greater than that of the one who obeys and hears. But the Father commands the Son according to John 14:31. “As my Father hath given me commandment, so I do.” And the Father teaches the Son according to John 5:20. “The Father loveth the Son and showeth Him all that He Himself doeth.” Likewise, the Son hears according to John 5:30, “I judge, as I hear.” Therefore, the Father is of greater power than the Son.

(3) Moreover, it pertains to the Father’s omnipotence that He can beget a Son equal to Him; after all, Augustine asks in his book against *Maximinus*, “Where is God the Father’s omnipotence, if He could not beget one equal to Himself?” But the Son cannot beget the Son, as was shown above. So the Son cannot do everything that pertains to the Father’s omnipotence. And thus He is not equal to Him in power.

ON THE OTHER HAND, John 5:19 says, “Whatsoever the Father doeth, this also the Son likewise doeth.”

ANSWER: it is necessary to say that the Son is equal to the Father in power. For power to act is a consequence of a nature’s completeness; we see in creatures that the more one has a completed nature, the greater is its power to act. Well, it was shown above that the definitive account of divine fatherhood and sonship requires that the Son be equal to the Father in greatness, *i.e.*, in the completeness of His nature. So the only thing left to say is that the Son is equal to the

Father in power.

The same reasoning applies to the Holy Spirit *vis-à-vis* both of them.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): The statement saying that “the Son cannot do anything of Himself” is not subtracting from the Son any power which the Father has (since the text immediately adds “whatsoever the Father doeth, the Son likewise doeth”), but shows that the Son has power from the Father, from whom He has His nature. This is why Hilary says in Book IX of his *De Trinitate*, “the oneness of the divine nature is such that the Son does by Himself [*per se*] what He does not do from Himself [*a se*].”

ad (2): In the talk of the Father’s “showing” and the Son’s “hearing,” we understand only that the Father communicates knowledge to the Son just as He communicates His essence. One can also take the Father’s “command” the same way, thanks to the fact that from eternity, by begetting Him, the Father has given Him the knowledge and the will to do things. — Alternatively, and preferably, the talk of a commandment can be referred to Christ in His human nature.

ad (3): Just as the same essence which in the Father is fatherhood is Sonship in the Son, so also the same power by which the Father begets is the power by which the Son is begotten. Hence it is clear that whatever the Father can do, the Son can do. But it does not follow that the Son can beget; rather, “what” is changed to “towards what,” because begetting indicates a relation in the talk of God. In short, the Son has the same omnipotence as the Father has, but with another relation. For the Father has omnipotence as giving it,* and this is indicated when it says that He “can beget.” But the Son has omnipotence as receiving it,[†] and this is what is indicated when it says that He “can be begotten.”

c 48:
PL 10, 319

* *ut datus*

† *ut accipiens*

II, c 7,
PL 42, 762

q 41, a.6 ad 1 & 2

a.4

Cajetan’s Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article one conclusion answers the question yes: the Son is equal to the Father in power. — This is supported. [*Antecedent:*] The account defining fatherhood and Sonship requires equality in greatness and in perfection of nature; [*inference:*] so, it requires equality in power. — The antecedent is already clear from a.4.

— Making the inference is supported on the ground that power to act is a consequence of a nature’s perfection. This is supported by the fact that in creatures, the more something is of a better nature, the greater is its power to act. This is clear case-by-case and in each species, and in the whole class of bodily things, and the whole class of substances universally.

Inquiry Forty-Three: Into the sending of divine Persons

The next topic to take up is the sending [mission] of divine Persons. On this topic, eight questions are raised.

- | | |
|--|--|
| <p>(1) Does being sent suit any divine Person?
 (2) Is the sending eternal or only temporal?
 (3) With what is a divine Person sent invisibly?
 (4) Does it suit just any Person to be sent?</p> | <p>(5) Are the Son and the Holy Spirit both sent invisibly?
 (6) To whom is an invisible sending made?
 (7) Is the Holy Spirit sent visibly?
 (8) Does any Person send Himself visibly or invisibly?</p> |
|--|--|

article 1

Does being sent suit a divine Person?

In I Sent. d.15, q.1, a.1, 4 CG c.23, Contra errores Graecorum c.14.

It seems that it does not befit a divine Person to be sent.

(1) After all, the one sent is lesser than the one who sends him. But one divine Person is not lesser than another. Therefore, one divine Person is not sent by another.

(2) Besides, everything that is sent is separated from the sender; and so Jerome says in his commentary on Ezekiel [Book V, on 16:53, 54], “what is conjoined or coupled in one body cannot be sent.” PL 25, 164 But among divine Persons, “nothing is separable,” as PL 10, 233 Hilary says [*De Trinitate VIII*, n.39]. Therefore, no Person is sent by another.

(3) Moreover, whoever is sent leaves some place and newly arrives at some place. Nothing of the kind befits a divine Person, since such a Person is everywhere. Therefore, it does not befit a divine Person to be sent.

ON THE OTHER HAND, John 8:16 says, “Not I alone, but I and the Father who hath sent me.”

I ANSWER: in the account defining “being sent,” two things are involved: one is the relation of the person sent to the one who sent him; the other is the relation of the person sent to the terminus to which he is sent. The fact that someone is sent shows a going forth [*processio*] of the one sent from the sender — be it by command (as a master sends a servant), or be it by advice, (as when an advisor is said to “send” the king to wage war) or be it by origination (as one might say that a flower in bud is sent from a tree). The same fact also shows a relation to a terminus to which the emissary is sent, that the emissary might

begin to be there in some way — either because previously he was not there at all — or because he begins to be there in a new way (a way in which he was not there previously).

Therefore, it can befit a divine Person to be sent insofar as this involves, on one side, a procession of origin from the Sender, and insofar as it involves, on the other side, a new way of existing at some destination. Thus, the Son is said to have been sent by the Father into the world inasmuch as He begins to be in the world visibly through the flesh He has taken up — and yet He was “already in the world” as it says in John 1:10. John 10:36

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): being sent implies an inferiority in the person sent in case it involves coming forth from a sender by command or by advice (because the one commanding is greater, and the one advising is wiser). But in the talk of God, being sent involves only an origination, which is in keeping with equality as was said above. q.42, aa.4,6

ad (2): that which is sent in such a way that it begins to be where it previously was not at all undergoes local motion because of its being sent, and so it has to become separated from the sender in space. But this does not happen in the sending of a divine Person, because the divine Person sent does not cease to be where He was before and does not begin to be where He had not been at all. Such a “mission” is without separation and involves only a distinction of origin.

ad (3): This objection comes from a sending that takes place by local motion, for which there is no place in the talk of God.

 Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear from one's familiarity with Scripture. — In the body of the article, there is a single conclusion answering in the affirmative: it can befit a divine Person to be sent.

The support goes like this. [*Antecedent:*] a case of being sent involves two things: a relation of proceeding from a sender (by command, or by advice, or by origin) and a relation of beginning to be at the destination (flatly or in a new way). [*Inference:*] therefore, it can befit a divine Person to be sent in such a way that this involves a procession by origin and involves beginning to be in another in a new way. — Drawing the inference is confirmed on the ground that the Son has been sent from the Father in

such a fashion as to be in the world in a new way, *i.e.* through His assumed flesh.

ii. Notice here that the text is conveying at one and the same time both what a sending is, and how many items it includes, and in how many different ways it is spoken of. And in the absence of any other middle term, the text draws its conclusion. For it is already known that it befits a divine Person to have a procession in origination and to be somewhere in a new manner of being, as exemplified by the Son.

The doubt that exists about this account of "sending" will be treated in the last article of this inquiry, where it happens to come up.

Is a sending eternal, or only temporal?

In I Sent. d.15, q.4, a.3

It would seem that a sending can be eternal.

*Homily 26 on the
Gospel,
PL 76, 1198*

(1) After all, Gregory says, "The Son is sent for the same reason as He is begotten." But the begetting of the Son is eternal; ergo, so is His mission.

(2) Besides, whatever attaches to a thing temporally changes it. But a divine Person is not changed. Hence, the sending of a divine Person is not temporal but eternal.

(3) Moreover, a sending involves a proceeding. But the proceeding of divine Persons is eternal. Ergo so is the sending.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what it says in Galatians 4:4, "When the fullness of time had come, God sent forth His Son."

ANSWER: among the words conveying the origin of divine Persons, one has to pay attention to a certain difference. Some of them involve in their meaning only the relation to a source, such as 'proceeding' and 'going forth'.* Other words (along with the relation to the source) nail down a terminus of the procession. Of these, some nail down an eternal terminus, such as 'begetting' and 'being spirated', for begetting is the procession of a divine Person in the divine nature, and spirating, passively taken, involves the procession of subsistent Love. Others again (along with the relation to a source) involve a temporal terminus, such as 'sending' and 'giving'. For a thing is sent so that it might be "in" something, and it is given so that it might be "had." But a divine Person's being had by some creature, or being in it in a new way, is a tem-

* *exitus*

poral state of affairs.

Hence, 'sending' and 'giving' are only said temporally in the talk of God, while 'generating' and 'being spirated' are only said eternally. But 'procession' and 'going forth' are said both eternally and temporally: for the Son has gone forth from eternity to be God and temporally to be man as well, (thanks to His visible sending) or to be in man as well (thanks to an invisible sending).

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): Gregory was talking about the temporal begetting of the Son, not from the Father but from His mother. — Alternatively, one may say that the Son has the possibility to be sent because He is eternally begotten.

ad (2): a divine Person's being in someone in a new way or being had by someone temporally is not due to a change in the divine Person but due to a change of the creature. Thus, God is called "the Lord" temporally on account of a change in the creature.

ad (3): 'sending' not only involves procession from a source but also nails down a temporal terminus of procession. Hence, "sending" is only temporal. — Alternatively, the sending includes an eternal procession and adds something to this, namely, a temporal effect. For the relation of a divine Person to His source is only eternal. So, 'procession' is used in two ways, eternal and temporal, not from the fact that the relation to a source is doubled, but rather because the doubling is on the part of the terminus or destination (eternal or temporal).

Cajetan's Commentary

The word 'only' is in the title question on account of "procession," which is subdivided into eternal and temporal in *I Sent* d.15. So the question is whether "sending of a divine Person" should be subdivided into the eternal and the temporal, or whether a "temporal" sending is found and there is no eternal "sending".

ii. The body of the text lays down a tripartite distinction with three conclusions, one for each part. The distinction is as follows. Among the words meaning the origin of divine Persons, some mean only the relation to the source (like 'proceeding'); some along with the relation to the source also mean an eternal terminus (like 'begetting'

and 'spirating'); and some, along with relation to the source, also mean a temporal terminus of procession (such as 'sending' and 'giving'). This is supported on the ground that something is sent in order to be in something or someone (flatly or in a new way), and something is given in order that it may be had. Both of these are temporal.

The conclusions are that (1) the terms in the third group are only used temporally; (2) terms of the second group are only used eternally; (3) terms of the first group are used both ways. And thus the answer to the question is sufficiently clear.

Unpacking the answer *ad* (3)

iii. In the answer *ad* (3), pay careful attention to the fact that the two answers given there do not differ in the number of things they mean, since in both answers 'sending' involves procession from a source and a temporal terminus or effect; they differ rather in the quality or type of procession. For the first response means that 'sending' involves procession in general to a temporal terminus; but the second response means that 'sending' includes an eternal procession and a temporal effect.

Our author prefers this second response to the first, because the relation of a divine Person to His source is unique, namely, the relation by which He proceeds eternally from Him. But according to the first response, the Person sent (say, the Son) alongside the relation of generation is also related to the Father as

sending Him to a temporal terminus (say, the assumed flesh). To confirm this interpretation, Aquinas expounds the distinction drawn with a double procession (temporal and eternal); he says it is not doubled *vis-à-vis* the source, but *vis-à-vis* the terminus, since the source is eternal and the other is temporal. Also, this second response is the one Aquinas generally follows.¹

¹ The answer preferred by St. Thomas and Cajetan is no longer uncontroversial, since the other alternative has been made a centerpiece in Karl Rahner's strategy for a new Trinitarian theology. What Rahner calls his *Grundaxiom* extends the divine Processions to include temporal termini, so that the Son is destined from all eternity to be the one who comes in human nature, and likewise the Holy Spirit is destined by His very procession to be the sanctifier of creatures, as though the existing of creatures had been settled by the necessities within the divine nature and not by a free choice.

Does the invisible sending of a divine Person occur only because of the gift of sanctifying grace?

1 Sent. d.14, q.2, a.2

The invisible sending of a divine Person does not seem to occur only because of the gift of sanctifying grace.

(1) For a divine Person, “to be sent,” after all, is “to be given.” If a divine Person is sent only because of the gifts of sanctifying grace, the Person himself will not be given but only His gifts. This is the error of those who say that the Spirit’s gifts are given but not the Spirit.

(2) Besides, the preposition ‘because of’ [*secundum*] expresses a causal relation. But the divine Person is the cause of the fact that a gift of sanctifying grace is had, not *vice-versa*. As it says in Romans 5:5, “The love of God is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Spirit, which is given unto us.” It would be inappropriate, therefore, to say that a divine Person is sent “because of” the gifts of sanctifying grace.

PL 42, 907

(3) Also, Augustine says in *De Trinitate IV* [c. 20] that the Son is said to be “sent” when He is perceived by a mind in time. But it is not the case that the Son is known only through sanctifying grace; He is known also through a charism, as well as through faith and [the gift of] knowledge. So, it is not the case that a divine Person is sent only because of sanctifying grace.

PL 112, 109

(4) Furthermore, Rabanus says the Holy Spirit was given to the Apostles to work miracles.¹ This gift is not sanctifying grace but a charism. So a divine Person is not given only because of sanctifying grace.

PL 42, 1095

ON THE OTHER HAND, Augustine says in *De Trinitate XV* [c. 27]: “the Holy Spirit proceeds temporally to sanctify the creature.” A sending is a temporal procession. Ergo, since the creature’s sanctification is only through sanctifying grace, it follows that a divine Person’s sending is only through sanctifying grace.

ANSWER: being “sent” attaches to a divine Person because He exists in someone in a new way, while being “given” attaches to Him because He is possessed by someone. But neither of these occurs except because of sanctifying grace. After all, there is a common way of being present, whereby God is present in all things. This is presence “by essence, power, and presence”;^{*} and in this way God is present as a cause in all His effects (since they share in His good state). Above and beyond this common way, however, there is a special way which applies to the rational creature; in such a creature, God is said to be present as the known is in the knower and as the beloved is in the lover. And because a rational creature, by its own

* q.8, a.3

operation of knowing and loving, attains God Himself, this special way is the one in which God is not only said to “be in” the rational creature but also said to “dwell” in him or her as in His temple. So no other effect besides sanctifying grace can be the reason a divine Person exists in a new way in a rational creature. Thus it is only because of sanctifying grace that a divine Person proceeds temporally and is “sent.”

Likewise, we are only said to “possess” what we can freely use or enjoy. But having the power to enjoy a divine Person comes only by sanctifying grace. Still, in the very gift of sanctifying grace, the Holy Spirit is possessed and indwells in a human being. Thus the Spirit Himself is “given” and “sent.”

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): by the gift of sanctifying grace, a rational creature is enabled not only to use freely the created gift itself but also to enjoy the divine Person. Hence the invisible sending comes about because of the gift of sanctifying grace, and yet the divine Person Himself is given.

ad (2): sanctifying grace disposes the soul to possess the divine Person, and this is the point conveyed when one says, “The Holy Spirit is given because of the gift of grace.” Nevertheless, the gift of grace is from the Holy Spirit, and this is the point conveyed when one says, “The love of God is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Spirit.”²

Romans 5. 5

ad (3): even if the Son is known to us by various effects, it does not follow that He dwells in us by them, nor that He is possessed by us through them.

ad (4): working miracles manifests sanctifying grace, as does the gift of prophecy and any other charism. Hence in 1 Corinthians 12:7 a charism is called a “manifestation of the Spirit.” So the Holy Spirit is said to have been given to the Apostles to work miracles because sanctifying grace was given to them with a *manifestive sign*. But if the sign-charism were to be given without sanctifying grace, Scripture would not say that the Holy Spirit was given; a more restrictive expression would be used, as when someone is said to be given “a prophetic spirit” or “a spirit of miracles,” in that the human recipient gets from the Spirit a power of prophesying or working miracles.

² This sounds like a Rahnerian paradox of “reversible causality”—the Spirit is given because of grace, grace is given because of the Spirit. But there is no paradox once ‘given’ is disambiguated. “Given” grace is inherent: the “given” Spirit is just newly present. The Spirit is present to me only when yielding an effect in me; if His action yields a new effect (He puts grace into me), then He is newly present to me only when putting it into me. Two why-statements are true: (1) The Spirit is why grace is in me, but (2) the fact of grace-in-me is why He is newly present.

¹ This is Rabanus Maurus (d. 859). He wrote a commentary on St. Paul’s epistles in which this remark is made in connexion with 1 Corinthians 12:11.

Cajetan's Commentary

The title speaks of "invisible" sending. Ever since Augustine treated the topic in *De Trinitate II'* and it then came into *I Sent.* d.15. sending has been subdivided into visible and invisible. A visible sending is one that occurs with some perceptible sign (as when the Holy Spirit was sent in the form of fire and in the form of a dove; as when the Son was sent in human flesh). An invisible sending occurs inwardly in the soul, without external signs (as when grace is infused, generally speaking). So, the present question is about the invisible sending of a divine Person to the soul. Does it occur only because of the sanctifying grace which makes us children of God? Or does it also occur because of other gifts that come to good and bad people alike, such as knowledge, faith, prophecy, *etc.*? Also, the title speaks of sanctifying grace as opposed to charism-graces, which the Apostle discusses in 1 Corinthians.

cc. 12f

Analysis of the article, I

ii. In the body of the article, St. Thomas means to prove three points. The first is that a divine Person is "sent invisibly" because of sanctifying grace alone. (This is the conclusion which directly answers the question.) The second is that a divine Person is also "given" because of sanctifying grace alone. The third is that, in the very gift of grace, the divine Person is at once "given" and "sent" (cf. where he says, "Nevertheless, in the very gift . . ." *etc.*).

He supports these points, combining the first two, as follows. The "sending" of a divine Person requires that He exist in someone in a new manner, while His being "given" requires that He be possessed by someone: hence both require sanctifying grace. The reason is: because neither comes about except by way of complete grace. Each of these points in turn is supported.

iii. First, as regards the new manner of existing: the fashions after which God exists in creatures are two, the common fashion and the special fashion. The former occurs by way of effects getting a share of their cause [thanks to which the cause is "in" its effects], and [in the case of divine causality] this is subdivided into God's being in His creatures by essence, by presence, and by power (all of which was treated at length in q. 8. above). The other fashion, the special one, occurs by way of God's being an object [of cognition and appetite]: hence it comes about only in a rational creature. When God is in a creature in this manner, He Himself is attained as loved and as known; and so He exists in the rational creature in a new manner, as in His temple. Hence He exists there in this new manner only because of sanctifying grace.

Two doubts

iv. Concerning this deduction, doubts arise about what it seeks to prove, and about the soundness of the

argument. — As to what it seeks to prove: does it mean to say that the new manner of existing is diverse from the four that are listed (*i.e.* by essence, by presence, by power, and as known-and-loved), so that there is a fifth fashion, unique to grace, after which a divine Person exists in someone when He is "sent"? Or does it mean that the new manner of existing is a new species of one of the other four [indeed, a new species of the fourth]? If it means the former, it falsifies itself at the point where it says that the way God dwells in a rational creature as in His temple is the way the beloved is in the lover. But if it means the latter [there is no decisive reason to say that the new manner of existing is a new species of the fourth;] one could just as well say that this new manner is a new species of one of the first three, *e.g.*, a new species of God's being in a creature by essence. After all, grace comes to be in the essence of the soul "immediately" from God, with immediacy of power and of referent.

v. As to the soundness of the argument:

- there is doubt first of all because the cause alleged in the article is not a sufficient condition. The text says that the reason why God dwells in the rational creature after this in-His-temple fashion is "*because, by knowing and loving, the rational creature by its own operation attains God Himself.*" But clearly, this is not the cause. For when a cause is in place, its effect is in place. Hence [if knowing and loving were the cause], it would follow that God dwells as-in-His-temple in every rational creature that knows Him and loves Him. But that is not so. Look at the gentile philosophers.

- Secondly, there is doubt because, even if one grants that the alleged cause is sufficient, it remains unclear where the exclusive 'only' is coming from. Even if God is present as known and loved in a new manner through sanctifying grace, He is not so present "only" through grace. Through faith, too, and through prophecy, God is present as known and loved in a new manner. [To see that this is so,] look at the Christians who do many good works by their love for God, but who are in mortal sin. — Furthermore, let the facts be as they may. Suppose the new manner does arise by sanctifying grace "alone." Where is this proved in the text? Aquinas writes as though he is drawing an inference: "So therefore no other effect besides sanctifying grace can be the reason that a divine Person exists ..." No ground for this inference appears in the text except the one mentioned above, and it supports either a simple affirmative conclusion, or none at all. The exclusive conclusion, therefore, has been drawn arbitrarily.

Answering the first doubt

vi. To address the first doubt [about what the argument seeks to prove]: Aquinas does not mean to say that the new manner is entirely diverse from the other four. He means to say that it is a new species of the fourth.

cf. § xi in the Commentary on q. 8, a. 1

The fourth manner [being-present as known and loved] is more open to this enhancement than the others, for two reasons insinuated in the text. The first is that this manner is special, *i.e.* unique to rational creatures, whereas the other manners are common to all creatures. The second reason is that, in this manner, God Himself is reached by the creature, while in the other manners only His effects are reached. Now, the pre-eminent "sending" of a divine Person to rational creatures must occur by way of what is unique and supreme in such creatures. This is obviously not something whereby the creature is in first act; for a creature which is only in first act is in a sleep-like state; nor is it just any second act [operation]. Rather, it is the second act whereby the All-good God Himself is known and loved. Thus God, as He exists in the soul through the *habit* of grace, exists there in a less noble manner than He does when He exists there through an *act* of grace, that is, through a knowing-and-loving act — and the extent of the difference is the extent to which (a) act surpasses habit, and (b) reaching a thing in itself surpasses reaching it through another. So, it is only in the fourth manner that one should look for a new way for God to exist in a rational creature.

Answering the second doubt

vi. To address the latter doubts [about the soundness of the argument]: there are two ways of interpreting the text of the article. Taken one way, it is giving the cause of the relevant genus, so to speak [the genus of which indwelling is a species]: taken the other way, it is giving the cause of the relevant form, so to speak [the form which is exactly the species]. For the text can be understood to be talking about loving and knowing God unspecifiedly [*absolutè*], but it can also be understood to be talking about the loving-and-knowing that reaches God in Himself, as He should be loved, out of charity.

— If we take the text to be talking about the love of God unspecifiedly, then the reason the text is giving is the reason for the distinctive and intrinsic genus of the new manner in question. For from the fact that the fourth manner is special to the rational creature and that, in this manner, God Himself is attained by the creature's operation, it follows that the preeminent manner in question [indwelling] lies within the scope of the fourth manner. And this seems to be the overt meaning of the text.

And on this reading, there is no room, of course, for the second doubt. For the text will be giving the true cause establishing the proper genus, and yet it will not be correct to say, "where this cause is, there this species [indwelling] is"; it will only be correct to say, "where this cause is, there this genus is." Similarly, *animal* is the proper genus of *lion*, but it is also found

outside the species *lion*. Well, every species is constituted by a difference that lies within its genus, and not by one that is incidental to it (as is clear from *Metaphysics VII*); and therefore, from the fact that the fourth manner is the proper genus of the new mode of existence, it must follow that this new mode emerges in a difference in *how*-God-is-loved-and-known. Then since, above and beyond the common way God is loved and known, there is only one other way, properly speaking, namely, by charity or grace sanctifying His temple, it follows that the exclusive 'only' (the topic of the third doubt) is supported by the generic cause as well.

viii. If you say the text makes no mention of the point that God is loved above the common way only by those whom He indwells, I agree. But remember: Aquinas is presupposing here the unique traits of grace and charity; so, leaving these tacit, he hastens to the conclusion. The Church's pastoral practice suggests the same interpretation. For [in church work] we concede that God is not loved (except in the common way) by anyone in mortal sin or outside of grace; so this tacit point [that God is loved above the common way only by those whom He indwells] is supplied from familiar practice, so as to be implicit here.

But if we take the text to be talking about the [species of] love-of-God whereby He is loved out of charity, then the way [to answer the doubts] is shorter. For from the fact that, by such knowing and loving, the rational creature ascends to a height so great that we attain God Himself as He is to be loved in Himself out of charity, it follows at once that (a) in the fourth manner realized at this, its apex, the divine Person not only "is" in us but "dwells" in us as a temple where He is worshipped, by acts of knowing and loving, and that (b) [it is *only* in the fourth manner realized at this apex that He dwells in us,] since outside this apex He is not attained as He is in Himself, beloved out of charity. And since this apex and this temple arise from grace alone, one moves by perfectly correct inference to the conclusion: ergo sanctifying grace alone is the reason why God is in the rational creature in a new way. — And thus both doubts are resolved.

Analysis of the article, II

ix. Going back now to the second point St. Thomas means to establish in this article [that a divine Person is "given" and possessed because of sanctifying grace alone]: it is proved as follows. One possesses only what one can freely use or enjoy; ergo a divine Person is possessed only by grace. This last is supported: because it is only through grace that one can enjoy a divine Person.

Lastly, the third point — to the effect that [in and through the gift of grace] the divine Person is at once given and sent — is supported thus: because the Holy Spirit indwells in a creature by the very gift of grace.

 article 4

Does it befit the Father to be sent?

In I Sent 4.15, q.2; *Contra errores Graecorum* c.16

Being sent seems to befit even the Father.

(1) After all, a divine Person's being sent is His being given. But the Father gives Himself (since He cannot be had unless He gives Himself). Therefore, one can say that the Father sends Himself.

(2) Besides, a divine Person is sent thanks to the indwelling of grace. But through grace, the whole Trinity dwells in us according to John 14:23, "We shall come unto Him, and we shall make our abode with Him." Therefore, any and every divine Person is sent.

(3) Moreover, whatever befits one Person befits them all, except for the identifiers and the Persons themselves. But "is sent" does not mean any one Person nor even an identifier, since there are only five identifiers, as was said above. Therefore, "is sent" is fittingly applied to any divine Person.

q.32, a.3

c 5,
PL 42, 849

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Augustine says in *De Trinitate II*, to the effect that "the Father alone is never found in Scripture as 'sent'."

ANSWER: being sent includes in its definition procession from another, and in the talk of God this is a procession thanks to origin, as I already said. Hence, since the Father is not "from another," in no

way does it befit Him to be sent, but only the Son and the Holy Spirit, who have the trait of being "from another."

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): if 'give' just meant that one shares freely, then it would be correct to say that the Father gives Himself, insofar as He freely communicates Himself to a creature to enjoy. But since 'give' involves the giver's authority over what is given, 'is given' befits no divine Person but one who is *from* another; and the same applies to 'is sent'.

ad (2): although the effect which is grace is also from the Father, who indwells by grace as does the Son and the Holy Spirit, nevertheless, since the Father is not from another, He is not said to be sent. And this is what Augustine is saying in *De Trinitate IV* with the words, "When the Father is known by someone in time, He is not said to be sent, for He does not have a source from which He exists or from whom He proceeds."

c 20;
PL 42, 908

ad (3): insofar as 'is sent' involves procession from a sender, it includes an identifier in its meaning, but in a general rather than a particular sense, since 'is from another' is a common element in two identifiers.

 Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article, one conclusion answers the question: it does not befit the Father to be sent, but rather the Son and the Holy Spirit.

The support goes thus. [*Antecedent:*] being sent implies procession from another, and in the

talk of God it implies procession thanks to origin; [*inference:*] therefore, being sent does not befit the Father but rather the Son and the Holy Spirit. — Making the inference is supported on the ground that the Father is not "from another" in any way, whereas the Son and the Holy Spirit are from another.

article 5

Does it befit the Son to be sent invisibly?

In I Sent d.15, q.4, a.1, 4 CG c.23

It seems not to befit the Son to be sent invisibly.

(1) After all, the invisible mission of a divine Person arises because of the gifts of grace. But all gifts of grace pertain to the Holy Spirit, according to I Cor. 12:11, "All these worketh that one and the selfsame Spirit." Therefore, no Person is sent invisibly except the Holy Spirit.

(2) Besides, the sending of a divine Person occurs because of sanctifying grace. But gifts pertaining to the perfection of the mind are not gifts of sanctifying grace since they can be had without charity according to I Cor. 13:2, "And though I have the gift of prophecy, and understand all mysteries, and all knowledge; and though I have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing." Therefore, since the Son proceeds as the mind's inner Word, it seems not to befit Him to be sent invisibly.

aa.1, 4 (3) Moreover, a divine Person's being sent is a procession, as was already said. But the processions of the Son and of the Holy Spirit are distinct processions. Therefore, their sendings are also distinct, if both are sent. And in that case, one or the other mission would be superfluous, since one would be sufficient to sanctify creation.

ON THE OTHER HAND, Wisdom 9:10 says of the divine Wisdom, "Send her from thy holy heavens, and from the throne of thy greatness."¹

ANSWER: through sanctifying grace, the whole Trinity indwells one's mind, according to John 14: 23, "We will come unto him and make our abode with him." But for a divine Person to be sent to someone through invisible grace means both a new manner of indwelling for that Person and also His origin from another. So, since both indwelling through grace and being from another befit the Son and the Holy Spirit, being sent invisibly befits them both, and while indwelling through grace suits the Father, it does not suit Him to be from another, so neither does it suit Him to be sent.

q.38, a.2 TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): granted, all gifts just *qua* gifts are attributed to the Holy Spirit because, by being Love, He has what it takes to be the First Gift, as was said above; still, some gifts meeting special definitions are attributed to the Son

¹ Although the LXX unambiguously supports this translation, the Vulgate was ambiguous and could also be read to mean, "Send her from the heavens to thy saints ..." This last better suits St. Thomas's point.

by an appropriation: the gifts which pertain to understanding. A sending of the Son is connected with those gifts. Hence Augustine says in *De Trinitate II* that the Son is "sent to someone" invisibly "when He is known by someone and perceived."

c 20:
PL 42, 907

ad (2): what grace does to the soul is conform it to God. For a divine Person to be sent to someone because of grace, then, requires an assimilation to take place to the Person sent, thanks to some gift of grace. Since the Holy Spirit is Love, the soul is assimilated to the Holy Spirit through the gift of charity, and so the sending of the Holy Spirit occurs because of charity. The Son, meanwhile, is the Word, but not just any sort of word; rather, He is a word breathing Love. This is why Augustine says in *De Trinitate IX*, "the Word we mean to suggest is knowledge with love." So, the Son is not sent thanks to just any intellectual enhancement but thanks to one whereby the soul breaks forth into the affection of love, as it says in John 6:45, "Every man therefore that hath heard, and hath learned of the Father, cometh unto me"; and Psalm 39:3 says, "in my meditation, a fire will burn."² And so St. Augustine significantly added 'and perceived' to 'when He is known by someone', because 'perception' sometimes means an experiential knowledge.³ And such knowledge is properly called wisdom in the sense of "a delicious knowledge," according to Sirach 6:23, "For the wisdom of doctrine is according to her name."

c 10:
PL 42, 969

¶g Ps 38 4

¶g

ad (3): 'being sent' implies the origin of the Person sent and His indwelling through grace (as said above). If we are talking about the being sent as meaning an origin, then the Son's being sent is distinct from that of the Holy Spirit, as His being begotten is distinct from the Spirit's procession. But if we are talking about the being sent insofar as it implies the effect of grace, then the two missions agree as to the root of grace but are distinct as to its effects, which are the illumination of the mind [on the one hand], and the inflammation of the affections [on the other]. And thus it is clear that the one mission cannot take place without the other, since neither occurs without sanctifying grace, and the one Person is not separated from the other.

aa.1, 3

² In the KJV which I usually quote, this is Psalm 39:3, and the translation ("while I was musing the fire burned") is flatly wrong. The Hebrew has "in my prayerful groaning, a fire will burn (בְּהִיגֵי הַתְּעַרְעָרִי אֵשׁ)." In the Vulgate, this is Psalm 38:4, quoted above. The LXX agrees with the Vulgate. In other words, Aquinas was reading the correct text and was taking it plausibly to mean: as my mind turns over divine things, a fire of love for God will burn.

³ This knowledge is a spiritual acquaintance with Christ.

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear from preceding articles. — In the body, one conclusion is reached: being sent invisibly befits the Son as well as the Holy Spirit. — The support goes thus. [*Major:*] A divine Person's being "sent invisibly" includes his origination from another and His indwelling

through grace; [*minor:*] but both of these befit both Persons; [*conclusion:*] therefore, being sent befits each of them. — The major is made clear by its opposite both from the whole Trinity and from the Father, since the indwelling through grace befits only one of them [*i.e.* the whole Trinity].

Is there an invisible sending to all who share in grace?

In 1 Sent. d.15, q.5, a.1

It seems that an invisible sending is not made to all who share in grace.

(1) After all, the Old Testament Fathers shared in grace, but there does not seem to have been an invisible sending to them; for it says in John 7:39, "The Holy Spirit had not yet been given, because Jesus had not yet been glorified." Therefore, an invisible sending is not made to all who share in grace.

(2) Besides, progress in virtue is made only with grace. But an invisible sending does not seem to occur because of a growth in virtue, because such growth seems to be continuous, since charity is always either increasing or diminishing; and so the invisible sending would be continuous. Ergo, an invisible sending is not made to all who share in grace.

(3) Moreover, Christ and the blessed have grace most fully. But there does not seem to be an invisible sending to them, because a sending is made to something far off, whereas Christ as man and all the blessed are perfectly united to God. Hence, an invisible sending is not made to all who share in grace.

(4) Furthermore, the sacraments of the New Law contain grace. But no one says there is an invisible sending to them. Therefore, an invisible sending is not made to all the things that have grace.

*De Trinitate XV,
c.27, PL.42, 1095*

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is Augustine's point that an invisible sending is made "to sanctify the creature." But every creature having grace is sanctified. Therefore, there is an invisible sending to every such creature.

I ANSWER: in the definition of 'being sent', as I said above [a.1], there is an implication that the one who is sent either begins to be where he previously was not at all (as happens among created things) or begins to be where he was already but in a new way, thanks to which a sending is attributed to divine Persons. So, in the one to whom a sending is made, one needs to consider two things: the indwelling of grace and an innovation of some sort through grace. So there is an invisible sending made to all those in whom these two items are found.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): an invisible sending was made to the Fathers of the Old Testament. This is why Augustine says in *De Trinitate II* that according as the Son is sent invisibly, "He comes to be in people or with people; and this was done beforehand, among the Patriarchs and the Prophets." So when it says the Spirit had not yet been given, it is understood to mean the giving that comes with a visible sign, as was made on Pentecost day.

*c.20,
PL.42, 907*

ad (2): there is an invisible sending also because of a progress in virtue or an augment of grace. This is why Augustine says in *De Trinitate IV* that "the Son is sent to someone at the point when He is known by someone and perceived, as best He can be known and perceived given the understanding of the one advancing towards God or of the rational soul perfected in God." Still, an invisible sending occurs mainly because of the increase of grace when someone advances to a new action or a new state of grace — as when someone advances, for example, to the grace of doing miracles or making prophecy, or when a person from the fervor of grace exposes himself or herself to martyrdom or renounces his possessions or initiates any arduous task.

*c.20,
PL.42, 907*

ad (3): there is an invisible mission to the blessed at the very beginning of blessedness. But afterwards, the invisible mission is made to them not by intensification of grace, but by the fact that some mysteries are revealed to them anew (*i.e.*, up to the Day of Judgment). This sort of augment comes from the extension whereby grace extends to more things. — To Christ Himself, however, there was an invisible mission at the beginning of His conception, but not afterwards, since He was full of all wisdom and grace from the very beginning onward.

ad (4): grace is in the sacraments of the New Law as instruments, the way an art work's form is in the tools of the art; the form goes from the artist to his work *through* the tools. But a sending is said to be made only to a terminus. So the sending of a divine Person is not made to the sacraments but to the people who receive grace through them.

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article there is one conclusion implicitly answering the question in the affirmative: an invisible sending is made to all who share in grace.

The support is this. [*Antecedent:*] being sent implies a beginning to be [somewhere] either flatly or in a new way; [*1st inference:*] so in the one to whom

an invisible sending is made, one must posit grace and its new arrival; [*2nd inference:*] so an invisible mission is made to all those in whom these two factors are found; [*3rd inference:*] therefore, to all who share in grace.

ii. Notice here that newness of grace is not different from grace, since grace can fail to be new; rather,

it [is mentioned] to show the time when the invisible sending occurs. For this to happen, after all, mere indwelling of grace is not enough — as is clear in the case of the people who are already in grace over the stretch of time when their grace is not growing; for them, the grace is just “indwelling,” and since there is no innovation in it, there is no sending to them during that stretch of time. Hence I think the author was silently skipping over his last inference,

as if he were inferring that an invisible sending is made to all who share in grace with some innovation — not to exclude some sharers, but to exclude some time in their lives, as I said, and as becomes clear at length in the answers to the objections.

In those answers, the things said about the sacraments and about Christ will need to be discussed in their proper places [3 *ST* q.7, a.9; q.12, a.2; and q.62, aa.1, 4].

article 7

Does it befit the Spirit to be sent visibly?

In I. Sent. d 16, a. 1.

It seems that it does not befit the Holy Spirit to be sent visibly.

(1) After all, because the Son was sent visibly into the world, He is said to be less than the Father. But we never read that the Holy Spirit is less than the Father. Thus, it does not fit the Holy Spirit to be sent visibly.

(2) Besides, a visible sending comes from some visible creature's being assumed, as is the case with the Son's sending in the flesh. But the Holy Spirit did not assume any visible creature. So one cannot say that He is in some visible creatures in a different way than He is in others, unless perhaps as in a sign, as He is also in the sacraments and in all the figures of the Old Law. Therefore, the Holy Spirit is not sent visibly — or else one has to say that His invisible mission is because of all such signs.

(3) Moreover, every visible creature is an effect showing the whole Trinity. So because of visible creatures, the Holy Spirit is no more sent than any other Person.

(4) Furthermore, the Son was visibly sent in connexion with the worthiest of visible creatures, *i.e.* human nature. So if the Spirit is visibly sent, He should be sent in connexion with rational creatures.

(5) Also, things done by God visibly are dispensed through the ministry of the angels, as Augustine says in *De Trinitate III*. So, if some visible appearances have turned up, this has been brought about through the angels. And so the angels were sent, and not the Holy Spirit.

(6) And yet again, if the Holy Spirit were sent visibly, it would only be to manifest His invisible sending (because invisible things are manifested through visible ones). So where an invisible mission was not made to someone, neither should a visible mission have been made; and to all to whom an invisible mission was made (in the New Testament or the Old) a visible mission should have been made — which is obviously false. So the Holy Spirit is not sent visibly.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what it says in Matthew 3:16, to the effect that the Holy Spirit descended upon the Lord when He was being baptized, in the appearance of a dove.

ANSWER: God provides for all things in the way appropriate to each. There is a way connatural to hu-

mans, in which one is led to invisible things through visible ones, as is obvious from previous remarks. So it was appropriate for the invisible things of God to be manifested to people through visible things. So, just as God showed Himself and the eternal processions of the Persons to people in one way or another, through visible creatures thanks to certain hints, so also it was fitting that the invisible sendings of divine Persons should be manifested through some visible creatures. — But differently so for the Son and the Holy Spirit. For inasmuch as the Holy Spirit proceeds as Love, it befits Him to be the gift of sanctification; but since the Son is the source of the Holy Spirit, it befits Him to be the Author of this sanctification. And so the Son was visibly sent as the Author of sanctification, whereas the Holy Spirit is visibly sent as a clue to it.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): The Son took up the visible creature in whom He appeared into the oneness of His Person, with the result that what is said about that creature can be said about the Son of God. And because of the assumed nature, the Son is called less than the Father. But the Holy Spirit did not take up the visible creature in whom He appeared into the unity of His Person in such a way that what was true of it could be asserted of Him. Therefore, one cannot say that the Spirit is less than the Father on account of a visible creature.

ad (2): A visible sending of the Holy Spirit does not come in connection with imaginative visions such as a prophetic vision. As Augustine says in *De Trinitate II*, "A prophetic vision is not shown to the bodily eyes through bodily forms, but in the spirit through spiritual images of bodies; but everybody who was looking saw that dove and that fire with their eyes." And again the Holy Spirit did not relate Himself to those appearances as the Son did to the rock (where it says "the rock was Christ"). "For that rock was already in the world; and thanks to an action it is now called by the name 'Christ' (whom it was signifying); but that dove and fire existed only briefly to signify things. They seem rather to be like the flames that appeared to Moses in the bush and like that column which the people followed in the desert and like the thunderings and flashes of lightning which occurred when the Law was given on the mountaintop: the appearance of these bodily things occurred to signify something and then pass away." — It is obvious, then, that the visible sending did not occur with the visions of the prophets, which were imaginary and not cor-

q.12, a.12

cc 10, 11;
PL 42, 879 & 882c 6,
Pl. 42, 852

1 Cor. 10:4

poral, nor with the sacramental signs of the Old and New Testament, in which certain things already existing were put to use to mean something. Rather, the Holy Spirit is said to be sent visibly insofar as He was shown in certain creatures especially made to be signs of Him.

ad (3): although the whole Trinity produced those visible creatures, they were still made to exhibit this or that Person in particular. In the same way, after all, as the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are indicated by different names, so also they can be indicated by different *things*, even though there is no separation between them or diversity.

ad (4): the Person of the Son had to be manifested also as the Author of sanctification, as I just said, and so His visible sending had to occur through a rational nature both able to act and suited to sanctify. But a hint or clue of sanctification could be any other creature. And no visible creature needed to be formed in order to be taken up by the Holy Spirit in unity of His Person, since He was not assuming a created nature to do anything, but only to indicate something. — For this reason, too, the visible creature did not have to last longer than its office required.

ad (5): those visible creatures were formed by the ministry of the angels but not to signify the person of an angel: rather, it was to indicate the Person of the Holy Spirit. So the Holy Spirit was in those visible creatures as the signified is in a sign, and that is why the Holy Spirit is said to be sent visibly through those creatures, and not an angel.

ad (6): it is not necessary for an invisible mission always to be manifested outwardly by a visible sign; rather, as it says in 1 Cor. 12:7, “But the manifestation of the Spirit is given to each man to profit withal,” *i.e.* for the good of the Church. The utility is that through such visible signs the faith is confirmed and spread. This was done initially by Christ and the Apostles according to Hebrews 2:3, “which

at the first began to be spoken by the Lord, and was confirmed unto us by them that heard him.” And so it was especially right for a visible sending of the Spirit to be made to Christ and the Apostles and to some early saints among whom the Church was somehow founded; yet in such a way that the visible mission made to Christ would show an invisible mission made to Him not then, but at the outset of His conception. The visible mission of the Holy Spirit to Christ was made at His baptism under the appearance of a dove (a fecund animal) to show that there was an authority in Christ to give grace through spiritual regeneration; and so the voice of the Father sounded forth, “This is my beloved Son,” so that others might be born again unto the likeness of the Only-Begotten. At the transfiguration, under the likeness of a bright cloud, the Spirit was sent to Christ to show the abundant richness of His doctrine, and so the voice said “Hear ye Him.” To the Apostles it was under the appearance of a wind to show their ministerial power in dispensing the sacraments, and so it was said to them [John 20: 23], “whosoever sins he remits are remitted unto them.” But thereafter, under tongues of fire, it was to show that they “were beginning to speak in various tongues.”

Matthew 3.17

Matthew 17.5

Acts 2.4

To the Fathers of the Old Testament, no visible sending of the Holy Spirit was due, because the Son’s visible mission had to be finished before that of the Holy Spirit, since the Holy Spirit would “manifest” the Son, as the Son had manifested the Father. There were, however, various apparitions of the divine Persons to the Fathers of the Old Testament; these cannot be called visible sendings because they were not produced (according to Augustine) to show the indwelling of divine Persons through grace, but to show something else corporeal, nor with the sacramental signs of the Old and New Testament, in which certain things already existing were put to use to mean something. Rather, the Holy Spirit is said to be sent visibly insofar as He was shown in certain creatures, as in signs specially made for this.

De Trinitate II,
c.17; PL 42, 866

Cajetan’s Commentary

John 1:14

The title question is well understood from earlier remarks. It only asks about the Holy Spirit since everybody knows that a visible sending of the Son occurred, since “the Word became flesh.”

In the body of the article he does two jobs: (1) he gives a broader answer than was asked for (*i.e.* an answer not just about the Holy Spirit but also about the Son); (2) he sets down the difference in manner between the two cases of being sent.

ii. As for job (1), the conclusion is: it was fitting for the Son and the Holy Spirit to be sent visibly. — The

support goes like this. [*Antecedent:*] it is man’s conatural way that he be led to invisible things through visible ones; [*1st inference:*] so, the invisible things of God were rightly shown to man through visible things; [*2nd inference:*] therefore, just as he showed Himself and the eternal processions to man somehow through visible things, so also it was fitting for Him to manifest the invisible sendings of the Persons through some visible creatures. [*Conclusion:*] Well, this is what it means for them to be sent visibly.

Drawing the first inference is supported by the fact

that God provides for all things in a way favorable to each. The rest of the inferences are reasonable enough.

iii. As for job (2), the difference is that the Son was sent visibly as the author of sanctification (as is clear throughout Holy Scripture), but the Holy Spirit was

sent visibly as an indication of sanctification, as one sees at the baptism of Christ.

— The reason for this difference is provided suitably enough from the identifiers, namely, that the Son is a source of the Holy Spirit, and that the Holy Spirit Himself is “the Gift” since He proceeds as Love, as was made clear above.

q 38, a.2

Is no divine Person sent by anyone except the Person from whom He proceeds eternally?

In I Sent. d.15, q.3; De potentia q.10, a.4 ad 14; Contra errores Graecorum c.14

It seems that no divine Person is sent by anyone except the one from whom He proceeds eternally.

c.20 (1) After all, as Augustine says in *De Trinitate II*, "the Father is sent by no one because He is from no one." So if any divine Person is sent by another, He has to be from that other.

(2) Besides, the sender has authority over the one sent. But a divine Person has no authority over another except according to origin. Therefore, the divine Person who is sent has to proceed from the Person sending Him.

c.26; PL 42, 1093 (3) Moreover, if a divine Person can be sent by one from whom He does not proceed, nothing prevents one from saying that the Holy Spirit is given by a human being, although the Spirit is not from that human being. But this is contrary to St. Augustine in *De Trinitate XI*. Therefore, a divine Person is only sent by the one from whom He proceeds.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is the fact that the Son is sent by the Holy Spirit according to Isaiah 48:16, "And now the Lord God and His Spirit hath sent me." But the Son is not from the Holy Spirit. Therefore, a divine Person can be sent by one from whom He does not proceed.

ANSWER: different writers have given various opinions about this. According to some, a divine Person

is only sent by the one from whom He proceeds eternally. And on this view, when it says the Son of God was sent by the Holy Spirit, the prophet is referring to the human nature inasmuch as it was sent to preach by the Holy Spirit. — But Augustine says in *De Trinitate II* that the Son is sent by Himself and by the Holy Spirit; and that the Holy Spirit is sent also by Himself and by the Son [*De Trinitate XI*] and on this view, the talk of *being sent* in God does not belong to just any Person but only to a Person who exists from another Person; but *sending* befits any Person.

Both these views have some truth to them. When it says that a Person is sent there is indicated both the Person Himself existing from another and a visible or invisible effect thanks to which the divine Person's being sent occurs. So if the sender is designated as the source of the Person who is sent, then not just any Person sends but only the one who is the source of that Person. And thus the Son is only sent by the Father, the Holy Spirit only by the Father and the Son. But if the Person sending is understood to be the *source of the effect* in connexion with which the sending occurs, then the whole Trinity sends the Person sent. — But this does not carry the consequence that a human being gives the Holy Spirit, because the human being cannot cause the effect of grace either.

From these remarks the solution to all the objections is obvious.

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article, he does three jobs: (1) he reports two opinions; (2) he salvages both; (3) he blocks an objection at the point where it says "But this does not carry the consequence . . ." And since all matters are set forth in the text clearly and in order, there is no need to dally.

ii. But to get this question really clear, you need to know that the best way of solving all difficulties is to say that "being sent" is a multi-faceted term having many meanings, rather like the terms treated in *Metaphysics I*. And since its meanings are the ones told in the text, namely, "a procession of the sent one from the sender because of Himself, and because of a new way of being"; and again "procession of the sent one because of Himself from someone, and because of a new mode of being from the sender." The second meaning reduces to the first, as to the

more powerful one. And so in article 1 of this Inquiry, the author said that the defining account of a mission is "procession of the sent one from the sender"; for he was talking about the first meaning of 'being sent'. But without forgetting this, Aquinas distinguishes so that a second meaning of the same term may be at hand, especially on account of reverence for Augustine, the saints, and Peter Lombard in *I Sent. d.15* where (in q.3, a.1) you will find a lengthy explanation of the second meaning.¹

¹ Nowadays, the question is whether the economic Trinity is an exact match of the immanent Trinity, as Rahner's so-called *Grundaxiom* demands. Since the Greeks insist that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son and yet is sent by Him, they obviously accept no such match. But the second meaning just mentioned by Cajetan and allowed out of reverence by Aquinas shows that the West also had a way to reject the match-up demanded by Rahner.

c.5;
PL 42, 849

c.19,
PL 42,
1086



Treatise 4. On Creation in General

Inquiry 44: Into the first cause of all beings	773–787
Inquiry 45: Into the coming forth of creatures from God	788–812
Inquiry 46: Into the creation’s beginning in time	813–819
Inquiry 47: Into the differentiation of creatures in general	820–825
Inquiry 48: Into the specific differentiation of good from evil	826–837
Inquiry 49: Into the cause of evil	838–845

Inquiry Forty-Four: Into the coming forth of creatures from God and into the first cause of all beings

After looking into the divine Persons, it remains to study the emergence [*processio*] of creatures from God. This study will fall into three main parts. The first will handle the production of creatures [qq.44-46]; the second will lay out their differences from one another [qq.47-102], and the third will handle their preservation or governance [qq.103ff].

In the first of these main parts, three topics need to be covered: (A) what the first cause of things is; (B) how creatures emerge from their first cause; (C) the beginning of things in time. On the first of the topics, four issues are raised:

- | | |
|--|--|
| (1) Is God the efficient cause of all beings? | (2) Was prime matter created by God or is it a co-principle of things? |
| (3) Is God <i>the</i> exemplary cause of things, or are there other exemplars? | (4) Is He the final cause of things? |

article 1

Must it be the case that every being has been created by God?

1 ST q.65, a.1; In II Sent d.1, q.1, a.2, d.37, q.1, a.2, 2 CG c.15; De Pot. q.3, a.5; Comp. Theol. c.68;
Opusc. 15 De Angelis c.9; De div. nom. c.5, lectio 1

It would seem not.

(1) After all, it is easy to find a thing without a trait, when the trait is not in its definition, like a man without white skin color. Well, to all appearances, the relation of a caused-thing to its cause is not in the definition of “a being,” because some beings can be understood without this relation. So they can exist without it. Ergo nothing prevents there being “beings” not created by God.

(2) Besides, the reason something needs an efficient cause is in order to exist. Therefore, what cannot fail to exist needs no efficient cause. But no necessary thing can fail to exist, because what necessarily is cannot not-be. So, since there are many necessary items among things, it seems that not all beings are from God.

(3) Moreover, wherever things have a cause, there can be a proof of them by appealing to that cause. But in mathematics, no proof is made by appeal to an agent cause — as is clear from Aristotle in *Metaphysics III*. Therefore, not all beings are from God as from an agent cause.

c.2;
996 a.29

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is Romans 11:36, “From Him and through Him and in Him are all things.”

ANSWER: it must be the case that whatever exists in any manner is from God. For if a trait is found in anything by participation, as heat is found in iron, it has to have been caused in it by something to which the trait belongs essentially, such as fire. Well, earlier on, when the topic was God’s simplicity, it was shown that God is sheer existence subsisting on its own; and again it was shown that there can be only one case of subsistent existence, just as, if whiteness subsisted, there could only be one case of it, since cases of being-white grow in number as the trait is received. What is left, then, is that all things other than God are not their own existing but participate existence. Necessarily, then, all things that are diversified by different participations of being, so as to be more or less complete, are caused from one first Being, which exists most completely.

Hence, Plato, too, said that one must posit a unity ahead of every multitude; and Aristotle says in *Metaphysics II* that what is maximally a being and maximally true/real is the cause of every being and of every thing true/real, just as what is maximally hot [*i.e.*, heat itself] is the cause of everything’s being hot.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): Although its relation to its cause does not enter into the definition of a

1 ST q.3, a.4

1 ST q.9, a.1
ad 3;

1 ST q.9, a.2

Parmenides,
164 b ff.

c.1;
993 b 19-31

caused being, the relation is still a consequence of items in its definition. After all, from the fact that something is a being by participation, it follows that it is caused by another. Therefore, such a being cannot exist without having been caused, just as a man cannot exist without being able to laugh. But since being caused does not enter into the definition of what is called "a being" unqualifiedly, there is found a Being which is not caused.

ad (2): Some writers have been persuaded by this argument to posit that what is necessary does not have a cause, as Aristotle reported in *Physics VIII*. The falsehood of this is obvious in the formal-deductive sciences, in which necessary points are concluded to hold *because* of other necessary points [from which they are deduced]. This is why Aristotle says in *Metaphysics V* that there are some necessary items which have a cause of their necessariness. So the fact that an effect can fail to exist is not the only reason why an agent cause is required: rather, it is because the effect would not be the case if the cause were not the case. This conditional,

c. 1.
252 a 35

c. 5:
1015 b 6-11

after all, is true whether the antecedent or consequent are possible [contingent] or impossible.¹

ad (3): Mathematical things [i.e., numbers or geometrical shapes] are taken as abstracted according to their definition [as mathematical] but not as abstracted according to their being. Each thing properly has an agent cause to the extent it has being. So although mathematically described things have an agent cause, they do not fall under mathematical consideration by their relation to such a cause: so in the mathematical sciences, nothing gets demonstrated through an agent cause.²

¹ If p picked out a sufficient cause of the effect picked out by q , the conditional was $\alpha(p \supset q)$. Therein, p and q were both allowed to be contingent (because if p was contingently true, so was q , and if q was contingently false, so was p) and both were allowed to be necessary (because if αp , then αq), and both were allowed to be impossible (because if $\sim \alpha q$, then $\sim \alpha p$).

² On how mathematical terms were abstracted from the causal complications of real things, see Cajetan's commentary on q 5, a.3, §§ ii-viii.

Cajetan's Commentary

In the title, 'all beings' does not stand for every being other than God: otherwise this first article would be superfluous. Rather, it stands for everything which is strictly called "a being," as composed things are among us, and as subsistent things are in the heavens. 'Creature' is not taken strictly, otherwise there would be no difficulty in the course of this article over causality in the manner indicated by 'creation.' Rather, 'creature' in this context means what has been efficiently caused; this is what Aquinas intends to discuss. This is why the broad title is expounded as you will see in the articles of this inquiry: first, whether God is the efficient cause of all beings, where it is obvious what we are talking about (and it is also obvious in the conclusion answering the question here in the first article). The author has not used the terms 'efficient cause' and 'created' by chance, but to show that the two coincide in the present subject matter: every being [having an efficient cause] is created, and every [created] being is made [i.e. efficiently caused] by God, etc.

ii. In the body of the article, one conclusion answers the question affirmatively: necessarily, everything which exists in any manner is from God. The proof goes as follows. [Major:] Every trait found in anything by participation is caused by the thing in which the trait is present essentially. [Minor:] Existing is found in everything other than God by participation, but in God by His essence. [Conclusion:] Therefore, all other beings have been caused by God Himself. — The major is illustrated by the case of heated iron and

fire. — The minor in God's case is proved from q.3, in which it was established that God is existence itself subsisting. For things other than God, the proof goes thus. [Antecedent:] Being a subsistent [case of some trait] is being the one and only case [of that trait subsisting]; [1st consequent:] so all things other than God are not their own existing; [2nd consequent:] so they participate in existence. — The antecedent was established, we are reminded, in q.9, a.1, ad 3, and more clearly in a.2 of the same q.9. It is also illustrated by an example — if white subsisted, etc. — and a reason is added, namely, that a rising count [of a trait's cases] comes from being received, and the whole argument is confirmed by the authorities of Plato and Aristotle.

Unpacking this argument

iii. In this argument, many points need notice, as to both its text and its topic.

As to the text, notice first that when the conclusion says "everything which exists in any manner," it means in any manner constitutive of a being [in one of the categories], generic or not, rather than the transcendental manner in which we distinguish act from potency. So the meaning is this: everything which is a something, or is a quality, or is a so-much, etc. It does not mean everything which is in act or potency. I say this since "prime matter" [which is sheer potency] comes up in the next article, and also because the very "act of existing" is an [odd] item about which one cannot establish that it is "not its own existing" (which is what the minor says

a.5

about everything other than God). Notice secondly that the text treats the statement

all things other than God are not their own existing

and the statement

all things other than God participate in existing

as equivalent statements.

iv. As to the topic, you need to know that this argument in its usual wording is shared by almost all scholars; their disagreements will lie in how they explain the terms used in it and in how they support it. The major, please realize, is so obvious that it is shared by Platonists and Aristotelians. By Platonists, the major is taken as true by essence and is an undervived proposition; but by us Aristotelians, the major is gotten from the fact that incomplete things are naturally derived from complete ones, and what is true/real thanks to another derives from that which is true/real in and of itself.*

*per se

A thing is said to have a trait "by its essence" when it meets three conditions:

(1) when it is itself a nature, such as that of being a cow or that of being white;¹

(2) when it is not contracted [to being in a subject] in any way (I say this on account of the intellectual soul and imaginary postures); thus, if whiteness were abstracted [from, e.g. white noises] the way the number four is, whiteness would be held in one's mind without even a quantity;

(3) when it is naturally subsistent in itself. I say this on account of the way abstract nouns have their meaning;* the thing signified by the abstract noun 'whiteness' is not whiteness by essence, except in how it is being mentioned by that noun).²

*modum significandi nominibus abstract.

A thing is said to have a trait "by participation," however, when the trait arises from the narrowing of whatever formal make-up³ it may have in whatever way that may come about, be it by a subject, level by level [*gradualiter*], or be it in any other way.³

†ratio

¹ The correct reading of the Latin is *bovitas* (cow nature), not *bonitas* (goodness). The Leonine reading is wrong, because, for Cajetan, 'good' is a transcendental term, with the result that "goodness" is not a nature. See I.57 q.5, a.3 ad 1.

² How a nature is mentioned by an abstract noun is "as absolutely considered," i.e. as shorn of everything but what goes into its definition. This is why 'whiteness' can be understood without thinking of a given surface or extent, and why the number 4 can be understood without thinking of what is being counted or measured.

³ Metaphysically speaking, the subject narrowing a trait's formal make-up is the particular in which the trait inheres, as the piece of chalk now in my hand narrows whiteness to the being it can have in chalk. But natural languages do not limit grammatical subjects to particulars, as in "More white chalk needs to be bought." The whiteness here is still participated whiteness, but narrowed to the 'subject' which is a kind of substance. This is why Cajetan speaks of being in a subject "level by level." If a particular substance is level 0, its lowest species is level 1, its proximate genus, level 2, etc.

v. As regards the minor premise, note that not all scholars concede that God is unique by being "a being by essence"; they explain His uniqueness rather differently. Scotus, in his remarks on *I Sent.* d.2, q.3, ad 3, and on d.8, q.1 ad 2, expounds the matter as follows. God is called a being "by His essence" because His existing is most perfect and infinite, whereas a creature is called a being "by participation" because its existing is a part, i.e., less than [the whole of] existing itself, which is naturally apt to be infinite; and so the creature is traced back to the infinite as the incomplete is traced back to the complete. St. Thomas,* however, with Avicenna,† Boethius [in *De hebdomadibus*], Alfarabi [in his *De intellectu*], and Algazali⁴ explain the matter this way: existence is the very quiddity of God, but in creatures their existence is just their own quiddity's actualness, narrowed to it. Hence in the text, the fact that God is a being "by His essence" is expressed by saying that His existence is subsistent.

*q.3, a.4

†*Metaphysics* VIII, c.4

‡*Metaphysics* III, u.2

vi. As to the support for the two parts of the minor, pay very careful attention to the fact that subsisting alone does not make the subsisting thing *exist* by its essence, as is clear in the case of the separated substances [the angels], and also in the case of things composed with matter.⁴ But the subsisting of an act receivable according to its order makes that [subsisting case of] the act to be [a case of that act] by its essence, and negation of its subsistence makes it be [a case of the act] by participation. So since existing is, according to its order, an act receivable in another, and ditto for wisdom, goodness, etc. (and for Plato, perceptible quiddities receivable in matter), if any one of these traits were subsistent, it would be [a case of the trait] by its essence; and if it did not subsist, it would be [such a case] by participation. Hence the text gives the example of whiteness, which is known to be a form receivable in another. Since "naturally subsistent" includes being-un-receivable in another, and "not naturally subsistent" includes being-receivable in another, the text moves from denial of subsistence to being received, when it says that the count of [cases of] whiteness rises only with [the count of cases of] being received.

vii. Still, there remain here two points in doubt. One of them was touched upon above and will be discussed further below [in q.50, a.4], namely, whether a rising count of individuals of the same kind occurs solely as a result of reception. The other point in doubt is whether it is true of all things other than God that they are not their own existing; for a discussion of that, look at chapter five of my commentary on *De Ente et Essentia*. There also you will find many topics pertaining to how the uniqueness of existing by one's essence arises from being-unreceivable. Hence, I am passing over those topics here.

⁴ Take this angel, Gabriel, and this dog at my feet. "Peachy." Both subsist, but neither exists by its essence. This is because no subsistent thing other than God has existing as its essence.

On the force of this argument

viii. As for the force of this argument, notice two points. First, although the conclusion, to the effect that every being is from God, does not explicitly say “by efficient causality,” this point is meant there implicitly. After all, [let ϕ stand for any trait; then] it is most natural for a ϕ -thing to act in a ϕ -making way, and it is impossible for any ϕ -thing to produce its likeness better than one that is ϕ -by-essence. It follows necessarily that what is ϕ -by-essence is the first thing making other things ϕ -by-participation—unless, perhaps, something were found that already had ϕ -ness in a higher manner. But there is no room for this in the present topic, because nothing can even be conceived that would “be” in a higher manner than what its existence itself by its essence.

The second point to note is that the author has used very subtle art here, in treating creation. He has made his case in genuinely strict terms. After all, to “create” is nothing but to bring it about that things exist, and never mind their being of this kind or that. So asking about the “creator” of all beings is the same thing as asking about their efficient cause “as beings,” as will become more obvious below [q.45, a.5]. After all, one cannot assign a stricter cause of beings *qua* beings than the Being-by-essence as such, just as one cannot assign a stricter cause of living things *qua* living than what is alive-by-essence or of true/real things (as such) than what is realness by its essence.

This I say on the authority of *Metaphysics II* and proposition 18 in the *Liber de causis* (presupposing, of course, that the distinctive trait of efficient causing is producing something similar to the cause).

c.1
993 b 19-31

ix. In the answer *ad 1*, there may be a quibble about whether the relation of [a creature back to God, which is one of] being-created-by is “really” distinct from the created thing itself. But we shall be talking about this in commenting on article 3 of inquiry 45.

Understanding the answer *ad (2)*

x. In the answer *ad 2*, notice that the formal answer lies in denying the major premise [advanced by the objector, namely] that what cannot not-be needs no efficient cause, or needs no cause giving it being. And the reason for denying it is given in the text: because that major commits a fallacy of the consequent, from the causes of being true/real etc.⁵ After all, needing an efficient cause comes about two ways: either from the fact that the thing can exist or not exist, or from the fact that it would not exist if its cause as such did not exist — *i.e.*, if it did not get existence from another, for this is the meaning conveyed by the word ‘cause’. And do pay diligent attention to this interpretation, for

⁵ In other words, the objector’s major takes an agreed point (What needs no efficient cause cannot not-be) and reverses it to say, “What cannot not-be needs no efficient cause.” The reason this reversal is fallacious is because the result of it, the objector’s major, is false, as Cajetan is about to explain.

it solves the doubts of those less able to penetrate this text and it clears up an objection [saying]

A would not exist, if B did not exist, and so
B is the cause of A,

which is not valid, as is clear in cases of correlative terms, and also in the case of man and his ability to laugh: if a man did not exist, a thing able to laugh would not exist, and yet being able to laugh is not the cause of a man. All of this would cease, if people saw clearly that the text is talking about a cause *as a cause*, and not about the thing which is the cause taken independently [of the causal relation]. It is valid, after all, to infer that *A* would not exist, if a cause for it did not exist, *i.e.* if it were not caused; ergo *A* needs a cause. The quibblers took this in terms of the thing which is the cause materially taken.

xi. On the same *ad 2*, note that the author explicitly says there are many necessary beings, a point which he supports in 2 *CG*, c.30. Be aware that in real terms there is no disagreement between him and Scotus, but only a difference in vocabulary. Scotus and others who follow him take ‘unqualifiedly necessary’ to mean ‘cannot not-be, given any power [in anything]’, and so they say that God alone is unqualifiedly necessary. St Thomas, persuaded by the meaning of *Metaphysics V*, calls “unqualifiedly necessary” a ϕ -thing which has no internal potency to not-be- ϕ [*i.e.* no potency to be other than a ϕ -thing]. And hence he concedes and proves that many entities are “unqualifiedly necessary.” And indeed, since judgment about things should be given and spoken in terms of what is distinctive of those things themselves, and not in terms of factors extrinsic to them [like “possibilities” with no basis in them], our author’s terminology is more reasonable, since there are many beings which have in themselves no potency not to be [as they are], and thus it is unqualifiedly true that they “cannot not-be” [as they are] and hence that they are “necessary beings” — despite the fact that in terms of logical possibility and in terms of a power in another (*i.e.* in God), everything other than God “can” not-be.⁶ You get my point. Some people have presumed childishly (not to say ignorantly) to say that the words of St. Thomas on this topic are ill-sounding. Let them pay attention to the natures of things, to formal and strict speech, and to the intentions of metaphysicians, and they will learn to mistrust their own blindness.

xii. On the same answer *ad 2*, some people discount the authorities cited in the text (from *Metaphysics V* and *Physics VIII*) as saying nothing relevant to the current topic, because Aristotle was talking there about propositions* [not things]. But this interpretation of theirs is exceedingly crude. For one thing, *Physics VIII* is discussing this mistake in dealing with the source of everlasting motion, against Democritus, saying that causes

CF Scotus on
II Sent d 13,
a.1

c 5
1015 b-6-9

* complexa

⁶ Cajetan’s point and the soundness of Aquinas’s position come across very well in contemporary modal logic, which is able to distinguish physical modalities from merely logical ones and also able to distinguish *de re* possibilities (which can reflect real potencies in a thing) from *de dicto* ones. The reader would do well to review Cajetan’s commentary on q.9, a.2, especially §§ v – vii, with my footnotes 2–5 on them.

should be sought for everlasting things and illustrating this by a triangle's having three angles. For another thing, after *Metaphysics* V had dealt with propositions, it added the point that the "necessary" is of two sorts, "from itself" and "from another." Then it says that what is necessary "from itself" is unqualifiedly simple, and the text speaks of God. For yet another thing, the cause of a proposition's being [true], is the cause in the real of its being true (which falls under affirmation or negation, as is clearly the case with non-propositional

things); for a proposition exists solely in the mind.⁷

⁷ Consider the proposition, 'Former Senator Chuck Hegel is competent'. If this proposition is true as of this writing, the state of affairs which is his being competent obtains at some time. But if it obtains at some time, there is then in the real a "complex" of a substance and some accidents. Chuck Hegel is the substance, and the qualities involved in being competent inhere in him. Whether they do or do not inhere is subject to affirmation and denial, just like the truth of the proposition itself.

Was prime matter created by God?

2 CG e.16, De Pot. Dei q 3, a.5; Comp. Theol. c.5; In VIII Physicorum, lectio 2

It would seem that prime matter was not created by God.

(1) After all, everything that comes into being consists of a subject and something else, as it says in *Physics I*. But prime matter has no subject. So, prime matter cannot have been made by God.

(2) Besides, inducing change [*actio*] and undergoing it [*passio*] are contrasted with each other. But as the first source of inducing change is God, so also the first source of undergoing it is matter. Therefore, God and prime matter are two principles contrasted with each other, neither of which is from the other.

(3) Moreover, every agent makes something similar to itself: and so, since every agent acts insofar as the agent is in act, it follows that everything made is in some manner in act. But prime matter, as such, is only in potency. Ergo, it goes against the known account* of prime matter for it to have been made.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Augustine says in book XII of the *Confessions*: "Thou hast made two items, O Lord, one close to thee" (the angel), "and one close to nothing" (prime matter).

ANSWER: The ancient philosophers advanced slowly and step-by-step, as it were, in coming to know the truth. At first, the grosser ones did not think there were any beings except perceptible bodies. Those who posited change in these considered the change only in some accidents, like sparseness and density, through clumping together and separating. Supposing the very substance of bodies uncreated, they posited some causes of such accidental transformations, like friendship, strife, intellect, etc.¹ The early philosophers who went further drew an intellectual distinction between substantial form and matter (which they thought of as uncreated). They perceived change in bodies according to essential forms, and posited certain rather universal causes of those changes, like inclination [of the sun's rays] as causing the cyclical changes (according to Aristotle in *De Generatione et Corruptione II*) or like the "Ideas" as conceived by Plato [in the *Phaedo*, 100 b ff].²

¹ On this earliest-studied level, the world of bodies is seen as a set of eternal atoms, among which the only explananda are accidental changes, like re-arrangement in space.

² On this second level, the world of bodies is seen as a set of composites of matter and form, among which the explananda now include the changes making the composites heterogeneous. On this level, when a mouse digests a seed, one can say that the matter of the seed becomes the matter of the mouse, the difference being explained as a re-structuring due to the replacement of one "substantial" form with another. This is

But one must pay attention to the fact that matter is nailed down to being of a definite kind by a form, just as a substance (of a given kind) is nailed down to being a definite way by accidents attaching to it, as a man is nailed down to being white-skinned. In both cases, then, the philosophers were considering a particular being under some description, either as it is "this being," or as it is "this kind of being"; and thus they assigned particular agent causes.

Then some of them went further still and rose high enough to consider a being *qua* a being, and they pondered a cause of things' not merely being "these" or "such and such" things but their being "beings" at all.

That which is the cause of things insofar as they are beings at all has to be the cause not only of their being "such and such" through accidental forms, nor only of their being *these* things through substantial forms, but also the cause of their having what it takes to "be" in any manner. And thus it was necessary to posit prime matter, too, as created by a universal cause of beings.³

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): in the passage quoted from *Physics I*, Aristotle was talking about a particular coming-to-be, which is *from* a form *into* a form, be it accidental or substantial; but now we are talking about things in their emanation from the universal source of being, and not even matter is excluded from this emanation, although it is excluded from the first-mentioned way of coming to be.

ad (2): undergoing change is an effect of action. Hence it makes sense that the first principle of undergoing change should be an effect of the first source of change-inducing action (after all, every incomplete thing is caused by a complete one). But the first source has to be the most complete thing of all, as Aristotle says in *Metaphysics XII*.

ad (3): this argument does not show that matter was not created but just that it was not created without form: for while everything created is in act, it is not pure act. It has to be the case, then, that even what stands on the side of potency [in a created thing] is created if the whole thing said to be is created.

Aristotle's usual level of thinking.

³ On this third level, the world of bodies is seen as a set of beings, and the explananda are no longer changes but the facts about what there is, *i.e.*, the existence of the things that emerged on the second level. These included matter. When matter was conceived in abstraction from all the forms that made it *this* kind of matter (or matter of *this* thing), it was called "prime matter," and the question posed in this article could finally be faced. If forms re-structure matter, why is any re-structurability "there" in the first place?

c 7,
190 b i

* ratio

c 7,
PL 32, 828

190 b 1

c 7,
1072 b 29c 10,
336 a 15-32

Cajetan's Commentary

In the title question, the word 'created' is not being taken strictly (so as to be distinguished from co-created) but broadly, so as just to be distinguished from uncreated. So taken, it means 'created by efficient causality'.¹

Analysis of the article, I

In the body of the article he does two jobs. First, he lays out three orders of causes and effects gradually discovered by philosophers. Secondly (where he says, "That which is the cause . . .") he answers the question.

ii. As for job (1), he says four things. (1) The first discovered order of causes was the causes of accidental changes. (2) The second order of causes was the causes of substantial changes. The third thing he says (where the text says "But one must pay attention") is about how these orders were alike, and this lies in the fact that (3) the philosophers assigned particular things as the agent causes in both orders. This he supports on the basis that in both orders they were considering a particular being in a narrow way*, *i.e.* insofar as it was being *this way or that way*, or insofar as it was *this being or that one*. This claim is supported on the basis that, just as a subject is narrowed down by an accidental form to being a definite way, so also prime matter is narrowed down by a substantial form to a definite species. Then he posits a third order of causes, wherein lies the cause of beings insofar as they are just beings, and he says that (4) this Cause was investigated by considering beings no longer insofar as they were thus or such, these or those (as prior thinkers had done) but just insofar as they were beings at all.

* particulariter

iii. Concerning these orders of causes, note first how 'being' [*ens seu esse*] is used here. Three uses of the word are laid down: accidental being, substantial being, and just "being" without further specification;² and these do not differ uniformly. For between substantial and accidental being, there is an obvious disparity. But "being" without further remark is not a third real kind [*realitas*] but stands to those two as animal stands to such-and-such animals.³ This is why, whenever some case of to-be [*i.e.* to exist] is brought about, what is brought about is either a substantial to-be or an accidental to-be — just as whenever a man comes to exist, an animal comes to exist, and whenever a case of

† esse absolutè

being-white comes to exist, a case of being-colored comes to exist. Nevertheless, what comes to exist is not always a *per se* being but sometimes a *per accidens* being. And when a *per accidens* being comes to be, it comes to be from any cause and is outside the present topic; but when a *per se* being comes to be, it comes to be thanks to the only cause of being *qua* being.⁴ This is how the present text is talking about "being" or "to be," and this is implied by the specifying phrase "*qua* beings." This is also why the text says that the philosophers who studied the causes of substantial and accidental changes considered things in a certain narrow way, *i.e.* under some narrow account, and not under the most universal account; *i.e.*, they considered things insofar as they were *these things* (say, a man, a cow, and animal, *etc.*) or insofar as they were such-and-such things (say heavy, diffuse, white, sweet, *etc.*) and not insofar as they "existed" period.

Doubt (1)

iv. As to how the first two orders are alike and how they differ from the third, a doubt arises as to how far the argument given in the text holds up. It says that matter is narrowed down by a form as substances are [by accidents], *etc.* And so both have been considered as narrow reasons and causes; and hence it remains to ask about a being *qua* a being and hence about the first and most universal cause. These remarks are dubious enough both on the basis of the authorities and on the basis of reason.

— On the basis of the authorities. [Aquinas' case seems to fail] because (as you can see from *Metaphysics XII*) the causes of a being *qua* a being are the causes producing a substance from pure potency. And *Physics V*, says that what comes to be in a case of substantial generation is a being unqualifiedly [*simpliciter*] from a not-being unqualifiedly; therefore, what comes to be is a being *qua* a being.⁴ And a thou-

c.5, 1071 a.24f

c.1, 225 a.15

existential. The use of 'is' was "absolute" when 'is' was the whole predicate of a sentence — as in 'Jones is' — and such a sentence meant that Jones existed. In Aquinas, a thing's existing is its ultimate actualness, which is (yes) a third consideration of its being, beyond the actualness of specification found in its being this substance or its having this accident. But what is ultimately actualized is still specified, so that "existing" works grammatically like an adjective common by analogy to 'existing substance' and 'existing accident'.

³ When '*per se*' and '*per accidens*' are used to modify "a being," their meaning is almost the same as 'direct' and 'indirect,' but this fact needs some unpacking. A *per se* being is one that directly does its existing; it has been brought to the ultimate actualness of existing "in or of itself," and hence is a subsisting thing. A *per accidens* being is one that does its existing only indirectly; it cannot be brought to the ultimate actualness of existing in itself but only "in" or "through" another, as an accident can exist only in a subject that exists.

⁴ Cajetan will attack this identification of "a being unqualifiedly" with "a being *qua* a being" in §x below.

¹ Some items were called "created," and some were called just "co-created" or "concreated." Both depended on being caused, unlike the uncreated God. The difference between the created and the concreated will be explained in a.4 (and was mentioned in § ii of the commentary on q.3, a.7).

² It sounds like Cajetan is taking '*esse absolutè*' as if it were a genus, the way 'it is' would serve as a broad expression under which both 'it is sweet' (the 'is' of an accident) and 'it is an apple' (the 'is' of a substance) would fit, like quasi-species. But in fact Cajetan meant something more

sand places say the same in Aristotle's philosophy.

— On the basis of argument, however, [Aquinas fails] because for a being to come to be *qua* a being is the same as for a being to come to be in act, since 'in potency' is a diminishing qualifier, as it says in comment 15 on *Metaphysics IV*, while a being in act comes to be *per se* from a being in pure potency.⁵ And thus the difference assigned in the text [between the third order and the second] is worthless, and Aquinas's argument falls apart. For although matter is narrowed down, it is not narrowed down as if it came to be so in itself [i.e. as if it spontaneously shrank as a potency]; rather, it gets narrowed down from *being in act* unqualifiedly. According to itself, after all, it is neither a something nor a quality nor anything in the other categories, as one reads in *Metaphysics VII*.⁶

c.3,
1029 a 20

Doubt (2)

v. As to the third order itself, doubt arises, because it falsely assumes that a being *qua* a being has an efficient cause. For [antecedent:] if a being *qua* a being had an efficient cause, every being would have an efficient cause insofar as it is a being; and so [consequent:] God Himself, as a being, would be caused, etc. And the consequent holds up even if the 'qua' is taken as a specifier (as it clearly is when one says that being *qua* being is the subject of metaphysics, and so every being *qua* a being is a subject of metaphysics).⁷

Analysis of the article, II

vi. Before I answer this, I need to treat the second part of the body of the article [where Aquinas answers the question], because the issues are all connected together (as is evident at once). So then: Aquinas answers the question in the affirmative this way, "it has to be the case that prime matter was created by the one cause of all beings, which is God." This is supported on the basis that [antecedent:] the cause of beings *qua* beings is the cause of beings in everything that pertains to their being in any way; therefore [consequent:], prime matter must be from the universal cause of beings. The inference is obvious and the antecedent is implied in the text by the already stated difference between causes of changes and causes of beings *qua* beings, namely, that the former are causes of beings *qua* this or that, whereas the latter are causes of their being "be-ings" at all.

Doubt (3)

vii. As for the antecedent of this last argument, a

⁵ Here we meet 'per se' as an adverb modifying "comes to be." This is a special use, which I shall explain below in fn. 8.

⁶ This objection, in the style of Aristotle but the spirit of Averroes, tries to collapse the third level into the second.

⁷ The word 'qua' was used either to specify or to reduplicate. The former produced a narrower focus (as 'birds qua food' narrows the focus on these birds); reduplication yielded a formal statement ('birds qua birds have wings' is true, but 'birds qua warm-blooded have wings' is false).

doubt arises as to how sound it is. [It says] suppose *A* is the cause of beings *qua* beings; then *A* is the cause of everything that pertains to their being. [Now substitute 'man' for 'being' and observe that] the result is not valid: *A* is the cause of man *qua* man; therefore, *A* is the cause of everything that pertains to being a man (and the same goes for "cow" or any other creatures). The fact that the inference is not valid is clear. Imagine that Platonic Ideas exist and are direct* causes of perceptible things. Then [substitute the Idea of man for *A* and] it follows that the Idea of man would be the cause of man *qua* man, and yet not the cause of the matter which is still a part of him. And the same judgment would have to be made, no matter what cause was put in for *A*.

* per se

Clearing up the doubts

viii. TO CLEAR UP THESE DIFFICULTIES, we must first handle the problem of when a being is brought to be *per se*. According to the doctrine in *Physics I*, c.8 [and cf. *Physics V*, c.1], something's coming to be in general [i.e. something's coming to be-φ] comes about in two ways, *per se* and *per accidens*. As it says in that text, a thing is brought to be-φ *per se* in case what it takes to be-φ [its *ratio*] was not there immediately be-forehand. But a thing is brought to be-φ *per accidens* in case what it takes to be-φ was there before the thing came to be-φ.⁸ An example of the first is when a thing is made to be colored from not being colored at all; an example of the second is when a thing is made to be colored from being black, because it comes to be white. For in the black thing there was a colored thing already there, and the optimal reason for this difference is given in the same text, namely, that nothing acting *per se* tries to make [something be] as it already is, but tries to make it as it is *not yet*.⁹ And here the word 'from' does not indicate the relation of a subject [to its accidents] but rather the relation of a duration to its *terminus a quo* [i.e. its starting point] so that it means the

190 a 34 – 191 b
25
224 a 21-33

Physics I, c 8

⁸ I am taking the general case as one of being "brought to be anything you please." Such is the effect of using the predicate-variable φ, which is a place holder for any predicate you care to insert. So I am reading the doctrine as saying that *x*'s being-φ can be brought about in two ways. It is brought about in the *per se* way when the agent's action upon *x* terminates exactly at the state of affairs that *x* is φ; it follows that *x* was not φ already. But *x*'s being-φ is brought about in the *per accidens* way when the agent's action upon *x* terminates at a different state of affairs, to which *x*'s being-φ just attaches somehow, e.g. as a consequence or presupposition. The difference is clear. Cajetan thinks, when φ is a generic description, like being-colored, and *x* already fits a narrower description falling under it, like being black. Examples come next.

⁹ In scholastic theory, having no color at all was being transparent, and being black was just showing no color. Now let the value of 'φ' be 'colored'. A black body *x* had what it took to be colored (given more light), and a cause making it visibly colored was making it only *somewhat* different from how it already was, and so making it colored was doing so *per accidens*. But if *x* was a transparent body, a cause making it colored was making it to be as it *flatly was not already*, and hence was making it colored in the *per se* way.

same as ‘after’, as is clear in the same text.

A being, then, comes to be in one of two ways, *per accidens* or *per se*. It comes to be *per accidens* when the explanation for it finds a being [already there], or when it comes to be from a being (as when a colored thing comes to be from a black one); but it comes to be *per se* when it comes to be from a not being, as when a colored thing comes to be from a not-colored one, for the same reason. And since every change-agent finds some being [already there] in act, from which it makes another being in act, no change-agent makes a being *per se* but only *per accidens*. For from the fact that the change-agent finds a being there already, even if it is not what the agent is trying to generate, it follows that the agent is not acting to make a being *per se*; rather, it just so happens that in trying to make *such-and-such* a being, it also makes a being. So if the agent were only trying to make a being, it would not be acting at all, because a being is already there ahead of its action.¹⁰

So, then, if this doctrine is genuinely Aristotelian and perfectly well founded on our constant experience and reason, it is true; and one has to say the following: just as a colored thing’s coming to be *per se* requires that no colored-thing was there already, so also for a being to come to be *per se* requires that no being was there already. But this is to say that *nothing* was there already and that the whole came to be “not from anything.” And thus one has to say that if a being comes to be *per se*, it comes to be after a “nothing” of the being itself. From these points, the remarks made in the text become clear. For from the fact that every change-agent shapes up an encountered subject, it is obvious that no such agent produces a being *per se* but only shapes one up to be this or that. Now, although prime matter is not a something or a quality, it still counts as “a being” on the basis that each and every thing producible from it removes it from being nothing; for it is something or other in all of those things. As a result, it truly stands in the way of causing a being *qua* a being [i.e. stands in the way of causing a being *per se*]. And from the *per se* agent-cause of “a being,” the whole effect has to be produced syncategorematically, as it says in the text.¹¹

Removing doubt (1)

ix. Against the first doubt, then: when we are talking about internal causes, they are (in their different ways) causes of ϕ -things *qua* being- ϕ and of changeable things as changeable — in matter and form, as one sees in *Physics I*, c.7ff. and in *Metaphysics VII*, c.2.

¹⁰ We have now seen Cajetan’s account of the special case where what is brought about *per se* is *x*’s being-a-being, and the existential force of his account is perfectly obvious. A being *qua* a being is a substance or accident *qua* existent, and bringing it about *per se* is not out of “pure potency” but flatly nothing.

¹¹ A substance is produced syncategorematically when it is produced with all its traits at once, of whatever category.

Changeable beings, after all, *as beings*, consist of matter and form, while beings separate from matter consist of form alone. When we are talking about external causes, too, the sources of changeable things and of beings *qua* beings coincide materially. For God all-glorious is the first change-agent* and the supreme end and the first source of being. And thus sometimes the same remark is said about the causes of beings *qua* beings and the causes of changeable things, with no distinction drawn. So the reader needs to pay careful attention to tell when the remark is true formally and not just true materially.¹² Well, *here* we are speaking formally, and so we are distinguishing beings *qua* beings from changeable things.

What the objection adds from *Physics V* and similar texts is no problem. For it is one thing to become a being *unqualifiedly*, and something else to become a being *qua* a being. The former involves becoming a being out of pure potency *as the subject*, while the latter implies becoming a being *after* flatly not being.¹³

Against the argument, I concede that becoming a *per se* being and becoming a being in act are the same; but one must deny that a being in act comes to be *per se* when it comes to be from pure potency. Nothing comes to be *per se* except when it becomes a being *after not being* in act at all; but this latter can never happen through change-induction, as I made clear above.* Beware of going wrong because you don’t know how to distinguish these propositions:

- (1) A being in act comes to be from being in potency *per se*, and
- (2) A being in act comes to be *per se*.

In (1) the relation being expressed is that of a terminus [of change] to the subject [undergoing change], and (1) is true — because if a case of being in act has a subject, its subject *per se* is a case of being in potency (and this is the sense of *Metaphysics XII*, text 8 [c.2]). In proposition (2), however, what is being expressed is the relation of a terminus [of change] to its [antecedent process of] becoming*; and hence (2) is never true when what it takes to be the terminus was present already.

Removing doubt (2)

x. Against doubt (2), I say that inference to a universal proposition from one in which a term was used only as a specifier [as the objector did in going from ‘a thing *qua* a being has a cause’ to ‘therefore every being has a cause’] is neither valid unqualifiedly nor with the specifier repeated, formally speaking. After all, the fol-

¹² Thus Cajetan has found an ambiguity in Aristotle’s texts, and the objector had overlooked it.

¹³ Here is the crucial attack I mentioned earlier (in fn. 4). The reader needs to recall q.5, a.1 ad 1, where St. Thomas was talking about the generation of a substance, *x*. He said *x* became a being “unqualifiedly” as soon as *x* had its substantial form. This form supervened upon the “pure potency” (i.e. prime matter) left behind by whatever substantial form had been in that subject (that potency) previously.

* *primum movens*

c.1.
225a 15

* This commentary, § VIII.

† *fiat*

lowing is not valid:

(1) *Socrates is curly-headed qua having hair; therefore everyone having hair, qua having it, is curly-headed, etc.*

Likewise, in this proposition,

(2) *a being, inasmuch as it is a being, has causes, since 'inasmuch as' is taken as a specifier, [an inference to the universal]*

(3) *every being has causes* is not valid]. For the meaning is that a being has causes not just thanks to what explains its special way of being (such as what explains its being a human, being a horse, etc.) but also thanks to what explains its being a being at all (although not in just any being, because not in God); for Socrates depends [on causes] not just because he is a man or an animal but also because he is, etc.¹⁴ — The example alleged [if metaphysics studies being *qua* being, it studies every being] does no harm, because it comes out true [not on logical grounds but just] thanks to the subject matter [of metaphysics].

Removing doubt (3)

xi. Against the third doubt, I say that, formally taken, the following inference is valid in every subject matter:

*A is the efficient cause of B qua B; so
A is the cause of everything that pertains to
being B qua B.*

Otherwise, A would not be the sufficient and *per se* distinctive cause of B. Thus the distinctive cause of man *qua* man is the cause of everything that pertains to

being a man as such. Likewise, the cause of a being *qua* a being is the cause of everything that pertains to a being as such. In this respect there is no difference between the two cases. Rather, the disparity is in a further consequent [*i.e.* "so the cause of man *qua* man is the cause of his body"], thanks to [a problem about] 'matter'. After all, between "being" and the other, narrower terms, such as "man" "animal" etc., the gap is such that, in the narrower things, it is one thing to be matter absolutely and something else to be *this thing's matter* (since matter taken absolutely is neither generable nor corruptible).¹⁵ Well, insofar as the matter belongs to a man, it is from the agent cause of the man. But in the case of "a being," matter is a being's matter, since matter taken absolutely cannot belong to anything but a being. Thus, it is in the narrower terms that the inference in question: "A is the *per se* cause of man; so it is the cause of everything that pertains to a man" is not valid — rather, you have to add "as such" [for *qua* man, as Cajetan did above]. Then the following further inference is not valid: "A is the cause of all that which pertains to being a man; and so it is the cause of his matter, which is a part of a man." But with the most universal term, "a being," the first of these is valid: "A is the cause of a being as a being, therefore it is the cause of all that which pertains to the being as a being"; and likewise the further consequent is valid, "so A is the cause of every-thing that pertains to the being" and "therefore it is the cause of the matter, which is part of the being," as St. Thomas's text infers.

¹⁵ Matter taken "absolutely" is taken without any further specification. It is a point of ontology that matter cannot be generated that way, because matter generated is matter put into act, and matter is not in act without a specifying form. It is a point of semantics that 'matter' taken absolutely has to refer not only to the matter in things here below but also to the matter in heavenly bodies, and that *that* matter was thought to be incorruptible, so matter taken absolutely could not be called corruptible either.

¹⁴ The reader is asked to forgive this atrociously botched-up sentence. Cajetan was in the midst of explaining what proposition (2) means and why it is a proposition true in many cases (in fact, in every case where the being is created), when he couldn't resist throwing in the case which falsifies the universal (3) allegedly implied by (2).

Is there an exemplary cause other than God?

Cf. 1 *ST* q. 15: 1 *Sent.* d. 36, q. 2; 1 *CG*, c. 54; *De veritate* q. 3 aa. 1, 2;
In De div. nom., c. 5, *lectio* 3; *In I Metaphys.*, *lectio* 15.

There seem to be others.

(1) After all, what has been made on a pattern bears a likeness to the pattern. But creatures are far from having any likeness to God. Therefore, God is not their exemplary cause.

(2) Besides, everything which is ϕ by participation is traced back to something that is ϕ of itself, as a thing on-fire is traced back to fire, as I already said. But any and all features in empirical things are [there] only by participating in one or another kind;* this is obvious from the fact that, in no empirical thing, does one find only what belongs to the definition of the kind; rather, individuating traits are joined onto the foundations of the kind. One should therefore posit the kinds themselves as existing on their own, like Human Itself and Horse Itself, and the like. And these are called the exemplars. So there are exemplars besides God.

(3) Moreover, sciences and definitions deal with general kinds in themselves, not insofar as they are in particulars, because there is no science or definition of a particular. Therefore, there are some beings which are not beings in singular things, and these are called exemplars; ergo as above.

(4) Also, we see the same point *via* Denis, who says [in *De divinis nominibus*, c. 5]. "what is being in and of itself † is prior to what is life in and of itself and prior to what is wise in and of itself."

ON THE OTHER HAND, an exemplar is the same thing as an *idea*. But according to Augustine in his *Book of Eighty-Three Questions*, q. 46, the *ideai* are the "originative forms contained in God's understanding." Ergo, the exemplars of things are not outside God.

ANSWER: God is the first exemplary cause of all things. To see this, one needs to realize that a pattern exemplar is necessary in the production of anything, if the effect is to have a definite form. After all, an artisan produces a definite form in matter on account of the pattern or exemplar to which he looks, whether it be something outside himself or something conceived in his mind. Meanwhile, things that come to be in nature obviously attain definite forms. Their definiteness of form has to be traced back (as to its first

principle) to the divine wisdom, which has thought out the order of the universe, and this order depends upon the distinctions among things. One must say, then, that the accounts* of all things (the accounts which were called *ideai* above) lie in the divine wisdom, that is, they are exemplar forms existing in the divine mind. Although these count up to being many [relationally] thanks to the relation each has to a thing, they are not many things; thing-wise they are nothing but the divine essence considered insofar as a likeness to It can be shared in different ways by different things. Thus, God Himself is the first exemplar of all things.

But other exemplars can be said to exist among created things to the extent that some are made on the pattern of others, either in likeness of species or in some analogy of imitation.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS: — *ad* (1): although creatures are not similar to God in their specific nature the way a begotten man is similar to his begetter, they nevertheless reach a likeness to God by representing an "account" understood by God — as a house in matter represents a house in the mind of the builder.

ad (2): it belongs to man's definition that he be in matter, and so there cannot be a human being without matter. And so while this man is "man" by participation in his species, he cannot be traced back to some [pattern] existing on its own in the same species but only to something going beyond the species, like the separated substances. And the same holds for other empirical things.

ad (3): although science and definition are only about beings, it is not necessary that things have the same manner of being in their existing as they have in a mind understanding them. We, after all, abstract universal species from particular conditions through the power of the agent intellect, but it is not necessary that universals *subsist* apart from particulars in order to be exemplars of the particulars.

ad (4): as Denis also says in *De divinis nominibus*, c. 11: "The *per se* alive and the *per se* wise" sometimes name God Himself and sometimes name virtues given to things, but not subsistent things, as the ancients posited.

* rationes

PG 3, 820
† per sePL 40,
30

PG 3, 953

Cajetan's Commentary

In the title, 'exemplary cause' does not mean a fifth kind of cause, but is put among the formal causes in *Metaphysics V*. After all, a thing's exemplary cause is a formal cause of the thing, but separated from it.

Also, the art involved in making a thing is not called its exemplar but, rather, that in imitation of which the

art makes the effect, whether that is a thing outside the mind or something within it, whether it is the same as the art itself or not. After all, we are speaking formally. The words 'other than God' are said in direct denial of the position attributed to Plato about the exemplars of empirical things, etc.

c. 2,
1013 a 25
—1013 b 25

Analysis of the article

ii. In the body of the article there is a single conclusion answering the question: God is the first exemplar of all things. — First this conclusion is supported: then, secondly, at the point where the text says “But other exemplars can be said,” the word ‘first’ in the previous sentence is explained.

The support goes as follows. [*Antecedent*:] Determination of an effect’s form comes from an exemplary cause, and natural things follow upon the forms determined; [*1st consequence*:] so, the definiteness of natural forms is traced back, as to its first source, to the divine wisdom, which has thought out the order of the universe; [*2nd consequence*:] so the exemplar-forms of all things are in the divine wisdom; [*3rd consequence*:] so God Himself is the first exemplar of all things. — The antecedent in its first part is illustrated by the exemplar in artificial products, within the mind as well as without. The second part of it is obvious. — The consequent is supported by the fact that the “order” of the universe depends upon the distinctness of things. — The third consequent is supported, and at the same time a certain objection is avoided. The support goes as follows: those exemplary “accounts” [in God’s wisdom] are thing-wise nothing other than the divine substance. The objection would have been this: Such forms are many, but God’s substance is one. What heads off the objection is this: the manyness of the forms does not make the divine reality many, but only its relations to creatures or creatable things, as was clear already in q.15 [a.2].

Thereafter, Aquinas explains why he put the word ‘first’ in his conclusion, saying that there can be many secondary exemplar causes; thus more complete things can be called the exemplars of inferior things, as the philosophers say.

On exemplary causes

iii. As for the need of an exemplary cause, you should realize that induction by experience shows that the nailing down of an effect’s form is the distinctive effect of an exemplary cause. After all, we see artisans determining forms for their products as they propose such forms in seeking to make such products. The very act of proposing — “I want something like this, something so big, etc.” — is to give an exemplar, from which the form of the effect is made definite. It is true nevertheless, that [the effect of] this sort of operation does not have an exemplar in and of itself, but *via* the agent. This is true in different ways, however: through an agent acting upon a proposal, the effect has its exemplar directly; but the effect of a natural agent has one indirectly, I mean, by way of the giver of the effect’s nature. And thus, inasmuch as the working of nature is a product of intelligence, an exemplary cause

is necessary for determining the forms for all effects.¹ Moreover, an exemplar cause does not take away the sufficiency of the agent, be it a natural agent or one acting deliberately, and does not make it superfluous, but does (in its own order) the same thing as the agent does in another line of causation.

iv. Concerning the basis for the article’s conclusion, notice again that Aquinas is going beyond the determining of natural forms which we see, and bases his reasoning on making God the exemplar cause. Aristotle refutes Plato’s thinking that exemplary causes are outside of particular agents for the sake of distributing things into fixed forms. Lest one go wrong about this, the existence of exemplars can be deduced in two ways from the determination of forms. One way of doing it is to conclude to definite exemplars from determination of form, as proximate causes of things. And so-taken, the deduction is false, since the principal action of the agents known among us would disappear: after all, a cow would not beget a cow. The other way of doing the deduction is like this: we conclude from definite forms insofar as the order of the universe emerges from them, to the point that their exemplar causes are in the first cause, who thought up the order of the universe, as parts of His Idea of this order. And this is reasonable, since the exemplar of some whole is not complete unless the proper exemplars of the parts are there. And this is obviously how the reasoning is going here. Hence, the causality of proximate causes is not taken away; rather, since the working of nature is a product of intelligence, the first reasons for workings of nature are being assigned. And thus you have the force of the first consequent.

v. In the answer ad (2), you have a gloss on the proposition that everything that has ϕ -ness by participation is traced back to something which has ϕ -ness of itself. The gloss is “or to something having ϕ -ness in a higher way*.”

* *em-
nenter*

¹ Aquinas like Aristotle seems to overuse the talk of intentions. The reason is that, for both of them, the alternative to the intentional was the random. The effects coming about in nature are not random. Therefore they are intentional — if not from intentions inside material bodies, then from intentions in the mind of the Creator of those bodies. A popular line of objection to this thinking, today, is that there is a third option between the intentional and the random, namely, the law-governed. Nature seems to be saved from randomness (at least above the quantum scale) by the laws of physics, chemistry, etc., rather than by divinely set patterns. But this objection forces one to think seriously about what the “laws of nature” really are. For a fascinating recent discussion, see Tim Maudlin, *The Metaphysics within Physics* (Oxford, 2007). Maudlin does not supply a theistic account of nature’s laws but shows that a better account is needed and that the favorite metaphysics of most physicists today (a form of Humeanism) cannot give one.

Is God the final cause [purpose] of all things?

c 7;
198 a 24-26.

q 65, a.2; q.103, a. 2, *In II Sent.* d.1, q 2, aa.1, 2; 3 *CG*, c 17, 18; *Compend. Theol.* cc.100, 101.

It seems that God is not the final cause [purpose] of all things.

(1) Acting for a purpose seems to characterize one who needs what achieving the purpose will supply. But God does not need anything. Therefore, it does not suit Him to act for a purpose.

(2) Besides, the purpose of a begetting and the form of the begotten and the form of the agent begetting do not coincide numerically, as it says in *Physics II*, because the purpose of the begetting is the form of the begotten. But God is the first productive agent of all things. Therefore, He is not the final cause [purpose] of all things.

(3) Moreover, all things seek a purpose. But not all things seek God, since they do not all know Him. Therefore, God is not the purpose of all things.

(4) Furthermore, the purpose or final cause is the first of the causes. So if God is the purpose-cause as well as the agent-cause, there will be before and after in Him. Which is impossible.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what it says in Proverbs 16: 4: "The Lord hath made all things for Himself."

ANSWER: every agent acts for a purpose, otherwise the agent's action would no more yield this effect than that one, except by accident. But the purpose of the change-inducing agent and of the thing undergoing the change, *qua* undergoing it, is the same, but differently in each. One and the same [form], after all, is what the agent is trying to impress and what the thing undergoing the change is trying to receive. Now, there are some things which both induce

change and undergo it: these are incomplete agents, and it suits them to seek to acquire something in their acting. But the First Agent is solely an agent [and not also undergoing anything], and so it does not suit Him to act in order to acquire anything; rather, He intends only to communicate His complete perfection, which is His good state. Each and every creature tries to achieve its completion, but this is a likeness of God's good and perfect state. Therefore, the divine good state is the end [purpose] sought by all things.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): to act on account of a need belongs only to an incomplete agent, which is naturally apt both to induce and undergo change. But this does not fit God. And so He alone is supremely liberal, since He does not act for His own advantage, but solely to share His good state.

ad (2): the form of the begotten is only the purpose of the begetting insofar as it is *like* the form of the begetter, who is trying to communicate his likeness. Otherwise, the form of the begotten would be nobler than the begetter, since the purpose is nobler than the things ordered to the purpose.

ad (3): all things seek God as their purpose by seeking any good at all, be it by intelligent seeking or sensory seeking or natural seeking (which is without cognition). For nothing has what it takes to be good and seekable except insofar as it shares a likeness to God.

ad (4): since God is the efficient, exemplary, and final cause of all things, and prime matter is from Him, it follows that the first source of all things is just one single thing in the real. But nothing prevents us from thinking of Him in many conceptually distinct aspects, some of which come into our minds as prior to others.

Cajetan's Commentary

In the title, the phrase 'all things' quantifies over all things other than God; after all, this treatise is about God's causality *ad extra*.

Analysis of the article

ii. In the body of the text there is just one conclusion, the divine good state is the end [purpose] of all things. — The support goes as follows. [*Antecedent, 1st part:*] The First Agent intends only to share His good state, and [*2nd part:*] each creature intends [or seeks] to achieve a likeness to His good state; [*consequence:*] therefore, the divine good state is the purpose of all things.

The first part of the antecedent is clarified by the difference between the First Agent and the other, incomplete agents: namely, that the latter, even in acting on others, seek to acquire something, because they at once act and

undergo, but the former does not act to acquire anything but only to share a purpose [His good state]. The second part of it is supported thus. The purpose of the agent is the same as that of the undergoer *qua* undergoing, although differently so. — As for the First Agent, drawing the consequence is supported by two propositions. The first is that every agent acts for the sake of a purpose. (This is said on the ground that otherwise, the agent's action would no more yield this effect than that one, unless by chance.) The second proposition is that the purpose of the agent and the undergoer *as such* is one and the same. As for creatures, drawing the consequence is supported by the just-stated proposition, namely, that the purpose of agent and undergoer are one and the same.

Two ways to consider God

iii. Concerning the points just stated, insofar as they claim

that the divine good state is the purpose of all things, including even the First Agent, notice that God can be considered in two ways. One way is “absolutely,” and then He has no purpose. The other way is as the First Agent, and this subdivides. Taken one way, we are thinking of the reality which is the action whereby He is said to act, and so taken again it has no purpose, because God’s action is His substance. (And thus it is customary to say that God acts for a purpose that is not His own, but that of others, as was touched upon above in 1 S7 q.19, a.1. *ad* 1.) The other way to look at God as First Agent is formally according to the defining makeup of the action; and so taken He has His good state as the purpose of His action, because every agent (as the text says) acts for a purpose. And this is confirmed on the ground that the purpose is the cause of causes, *i.e.* of the causing done by the other causes; therefore it is cause of the agent’s causality, and this means the cause of His action. Therefore, if the purpose for which God acts is [to share] His own good state, the latter will be the reason why God acts.

The text is trying to teach this explicitly in the body of the article and in the answer *ad* (1), by distinguishing an agent’s acting to achieve a purpose or to share it; and in the answer *ad* (4), by teaching that it is not against the concept of God to distinguish His good state as a cause prior to Himself as agent. — And thus the answer is somehow broader than the question. I said “somehow” because the causality of God’s good state as a purpose does not extend to more things than ‘all creatures’; but it does extend to some concept in the Creator Himself, as Creator, as is clear from what has been said.

Two kinds of imperfect agents

iv. On the difference between all other agents and the First Agent, you need to know that the imperfect agents (which act and are acted upon) are of two kinds. (a) Some act and are acted upon by the things on which they act, by reaction; and such are the agents which share in matter with what they are acting upon, as it says in *De Generatione I*. (b) Others things which act and are acted upon, however, act as they are changed by another, and such is the case of all secondary agents. They are called “imperfect” in the way in which all entities other than the First are also called “imperfect,” because they fall short of the nobility of the First. This is what the text is talking about directly, distinguishing them from the First Agent. From the fact that they act as they are put-in-act, it follows that they tend by their acting (like things acted upon in acquiring or keeping — it doesn’t matter which, since there is no acting to keep apart from the order of acquiring —) toward some completeness of their own; and as a Averroes says in comment 36 on *Metaphysics XII*, they are seeking to lead to resemble the First Cause in making things. And this is the supreme perfection/completeness. As Denis says, “the most divine thing of all is becoming God’s cooperater.”

Doubts about the answer *ad* (2)

v. In the answer *ad* (2), notice three things. The first is that a distinction is insinuated, but only one side of it is made explicit, namely: The form of the begotten is looked at in two ways, in one as similar to the form of the begetter, and the other way . . . is not expressed. The dis-

inction is hinted at when the text says “is only the purpose of . . . insofar as it is like”; so there is another way of considering it. — The second point is what is being said right here, namely, that the form of the begotten is the purpose of the begetting only insofar as it is like the form of the begetter. — The third point is that this is supported on the ground that the purpose is nobler than what is for the purpose. There is doubt about each of these three.

As for the answer itself, there is doubt because it seems false. The form of the begotten, even taken without any relation, is the purpose of the generative process, as is obvious of itself. — It seems wrong also because the answer does not satisfy the implied objection from the fact that the form of the begotten is the purpose of the generative process. It does not follow that the agent himself is the purpose of his own action, since the purpose of the process does not coincide numerically with the [form of the] agent. Indeed, since all one gets from this answer is the fact that the form of the begotten is the purpose only because it’s similar, the objection is rather strengthened. Whether it is the purpose “as similar” or not, it is the purpose and, obviously, it does not coincide numerically. — Confirmation: the form of the begotten precisely as similar is distinct from the form of the agent, because distinctness [the fact that *x* is distinct from *y*] is part of the defining makeup of the similarity relation [whereby *x* is similar to *y*], as it says in *Metaphysics V* [c.15].

Finally there is a doubt about the reasoning here. In univocal cases of generation, the begetter and the begotten are of equal nobility; so if the form of the begotten cannot be the purpose, because it’s not nobler than what is ordered to it, then for the same reason neither can the form of the begetter, nor can the form of the begotten be the purpose insofar as its similar to the begetter.

Clearing up the Doubts

vi. To clear up this difficulty, you need to realize that, although in comparing corruptible things to everlasting ones (as it says in *De Anima II*, text 34, and in *De Caelo II*, comment 17) corruptible agents act on account of something else (even if, as is shown here, they all act so as to share in the divine perfection), nevertheless, speaking absolutely, and not about these or those agents, and comparing agents in general to their effects, as is done in this argument, one has to say that it is common to all agents to act on account of themselves, albeit in different ways. This is made clear as follows. Every agent intends to make something similar to itself; so it intends to diffuse, extend, and amplify itself; this is why a begetter begets, so as to perpetuate itself as best it can, as Aristotle says in the same text. When I say “diffuse or share itself” two things are included, namely, “diffuse” and “itself.” And since it’s obvious that no agent intends itself, so as to diffuse or share *itself* as its purpose, the only thing left is that it intends to diffuse *for the sake of itself* as the end [*finis cui?*]; and thus it is the purpose of the sharing and not *vice-versa*.

But lesser agents and the First Agent differ in this, that the lesser ones order the communication *to themselves*, that is, *to their advantage*. (To be sure, this also happens in different ways in everlasting substances and corruptible ones, since the former act to conserve their likeness to the first cause individually, while the latter act to conserve the like-

cc 6, 7
3a 32ff
-ab 5-10

De caelestia hierarchia, c.3

De Anima II, c.4, 415b 5

ness as best they can.) But the First Cause of communication orders it *to Himself*; that is, *to His own good state*. So other things act so as to be or be conserved in being, but God acts because He is, and hence even the philosophers say that He is the source of the most liberal possible action, as was said in the answer *ad* (1).

Answering doubt (1)

vii. With these preliminary remarks in place, I turn to the first doubt and say that the distinction is this: the form of the begotten is looked at two ways, namely, *as it is of the begotten*, and *as it is similar to the begetter*. After all, St. Thomas intends to exclude the idea that it is the purpose of the agent *just* insofar as it is the form of the begotten, so as to sustain his point that God does not act on account of the created nature as His purpose but on account of Himself.

Answering doubt (2)

As to doubt (2), I deny that this is false. For generation can be thought about two ways: in one way, as *from* the agent; in the second way, independently [of the direction], the way we think of a road. If we are thinking the second way, the purpose of a generation is indeed the form as begotten; but if we are thinking the first way, not so, as the text says — and it is not true that this fails to satisfy the objection. A form “as similar to the form of the begetter” means a form of the begotten, indeed, but to the extent

it is one with the begetter’s, because it is another case of it, because it is like a “vicar” of it: by this the text is insinuating that, if the form of the begotten is the purpose insofar as it puts on the form of the begetter, than that of the begetter is really the purpose. And thus, formally speaking, it meets the objection; while the purpose of the generation does not coincide numerically with the form of the agent, it still comes back to the same thing, in that the form of the begotten is not the purpose except insofar as it is *similar* to the form of the begetter. — Against the confirming argument, however, I say that similarity, since it is *sameness* of quality between distinct things, puts more accent on the oneness it means than on the distinctness it requires as a condition of its subjects. And hence Aquinas has used it here to suggest oneness.

Answering doubt (3)

Against the third objection, finally, I say that the argument in the text concludes optimally that the form of the begotten as such cannot be the purpose of a begetting as from the agent, because it is not nobler than the agent. But it cannot be turned back against the form of the begotten as similar to the agent, I mean against the form of the agent, because no comparison is being made here except distinctness. After all, one and the same thing does not have to be nobler than itself when it acts for the sake of itself; but when the purpose is something other than the agent, the purpose has to be nobler than the agent.



Inquiry Forty-Five: Into how things come forth from their First Source

Next, one asks about the how — how things come from their first source in the coming-forth called creation. Eight questions are posed.

- | | |
|---|---|
| <p>(1) What is creating?
 (2) Can God create anything?
 (3) Is being created a trait in the real?
 (4) What is being created?</p> | <p>(5) Does creating belong to God alone?
 (6) Is it joint work of the Trinity or unique to one Person?
 (7) Is there a vestige of the Trinity in created things?
 (8) Is creating mixed into works of nature and will?</p> |
|---|---|

article 1

Is creating making something *from* nothing?

In II Sent. d.1, q.1, a.2

It seems that creating is not making from nothing.

(1) After all, Augustine says in his book *Against the Enemy of the Law and the Prophets*, “*Making is making what was not at all, but creating is establishing something by bringing it forth [educendo] from what was not already.*”
I, c.2;
PL 42, 633

(2) Besides, the nobility of an action and a change is judged by its endpoints; so, a change which is from good into good, and from being into being, is nobler than one going from nothing to something. Well, creating seems to be the noblest action, and the first among all actions. Therefore, it is not going from nothing to something but rather from being to being.

(3) Moreover, the preposition ‘from’ [‘ex’] conveys a relation to some cause, especially a material cause, as when we say a statue is made “from” bronze. But “nothing” cannot be the matter of a being, nor any other sort of cause of it. Therefore, creating is not making something “from nothing.”

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is Genesis 1: “In the beginning God created heaven” etc., and the gloss* says that to create is to make something from nothing.
* PL 91, 191

ANSWER: as I said above, one must consider not only the coming forth of a particular thing from a particular agent but also the coming forth of all being from the universal cause which is God; and this is the coming forth to which we give the name ‘creation’. Well, what comes forth in a particular emanation must not have existed prior to its emanation; so, if a “man” is begotten, there was not previously a “man;” rather, a man came to be from non-man, and a white thing came to be from non-white. So, if one thinks of the emanation of a “being” from the first source of

beings, there must have been no being before this emanation. But “no being” is the same as nothing. So, as the generation of a man is from the non-being which is a non-man, so also creation, the emanation of being as a whole,* is from the non-being which is nothing.
* universale
est

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): Augustine was using ‘creation’ (equivocally) in the sense in which a promotion is called “being created,” as when we say someone is created a bishop. That is not how we are talking about creation here.

ad (2): changes get their kind and dignity not from their *terminus a quo* but from their *terminus ad quem*. Therefore, a change is more perfect and prior to the extent its *terminus ad quem* is nobler and prior, even if the *terminus a quo* on the other end may be more imperfect or incomplete. Thus, unqualified “generation” is nobler than and prior to a mere change of accident,[†] because a substantial form is nobler than an accidental form, even if a lack of substantial form (the *terminus a quo* in generation) is more imperfect than the *terminus a quo* in accidental change. Similarly, creation is more perfect and prior to generation and accidental change, because its *terminus ad quem* is a thing’s whole substance and what is understood as the *terminus a quo* is sheer non-being.

ad (3): when something is said to be made “from” nothing, the preposition is not indicating a material cause but just an ordering, as when one says noonday “comes from” morning, *i.e.* “Noonday comes after the morning.” But one needs to understand that the preposition may or may not include the negation involved in what I am calling “nothing.” If the preposition does not include it, an ordering is still affirmed and is shown to be the ordering of what exists from the preceding non-being.

* universale
est

† alteratio

But if the preposition does include the negation, then ordering is being denied, and the sense of “comes to be from nothing” becomes “does not come to be from anything,” as when one says “this guy is talking about nothing,” because he is not talking about anything.

Both ways of taking the preposition come out true when something is said to arise “from” nothing. But when it is taken the first way, this preposition implies an order, as I said, while when it is taken the second way, it implies relation to a *denied* material cause.

Cajetan’s Commentary

The title will be clarified at the beginning of the article’s body. — In its body, Aquinas does two jobs: (1) he clarifies what the word ‘creation’ means; (2) he answers the question.

ii. As to job (1), he says two things. The first is that ‘creation’ means an emanation of being as a whole from its universal cause. — The second thing is that this meaning is found in the real. He supports this on the ground that one must look not only at a particular emanation in things but at their universal emanation, as was just said.

iii. As for job (2), the conclusion given in answer is this: creation is from nothing.—And he supports the answer as follows. [*Antecedent:*] What proceeds in a particular emanation is not presupposed [as existing] already; [*1st consequent:*] therefore, since being as a whole proceeds in a universal emanation, no being can be presupposed for it; [*2nd consequent:*] therefore, what is created comes from the non-being which is nothing.

The antecedent is supported inductively, when a man comes to be, and when a white thing comes to be *etc.* The first consequent is left as obvious from the common reasoning applied proportionally to cases of being made. — The second consequent, however, is made clear both as to its terms (on the ground that ‘nothing’ is same as ‘no being’ and that creation is the emanation of being as a whole) and also as to the similarity of the relation [a ϕ -thing from a non- ϕ one] in the case of human generation.

iv. Concerning the remarks just made, pay attention to two points. The first is that the antecedent, with its inductions and consequences, is not talking about a man’s coming to be “from” a non-man (or a

White thing from the non-white, or generally a ϕ -thing from the non- ϕ) *as from a subject*. For if the antecedent were understood this way, it would conclude to nothing. The whole of being, one could say, comes from the non-being which is being in potency, just as a man comes from a non-man who is nevertheless a man in potency, and the white from the non-white which is potentially white. Rather, he understands ‘from’ to mean ‘after’; a man has to come to be after a non-man and a white thing after a non-white one, if it comes to be *per se*.¹ Aquinas intends nothing more here than the above-mentioned foundation in *Physics I*, text 76. So, his words clearly suggest this meaning: when he says “just as, if a man is generated, he was not previously a man,” glossing “a non-man” with “not previously a man,” he insinuates that the ‘from’ means ‘after’.

q.44, a.2

The second point to notice is that it does not matter here whether you understand ‘being as a whole’ to mean the whole universe or a particular thing in it as a whole taken syncategorematically.² It still has to be created from a nothing of itself, *i.e.* after nothing of itself. — And here you have the solution to a doubt about how the rational soul is created and yet always comes to be in a subject — it is brought to be *per se* after nothing of itself, because “rational soul” is not truly said of any other form in matter.

¹ On the rather special sense of ‘*per se*’ in the talk of becoming, coming to be, being brought to be, *etc.*, see the commentary on q.44, a.2, especially § *viii*.

² This point confirms the ambiguity of the phrase ‘*universale ens*’. Taken extensionally, it meant the whole set of beings (the universe); taken intensionally, it meant a particular but entire being with the whole set of its accidents.

Can God create anything?

II Sent. d.1, q.1, a.2; 2 CG c.16; De Pot. q.3, a.1; Compend. Theol., c.69; Opusc. 37, de quatuor oppositorum, c.4; In VIII Phys., lectio 2

It would seem that even God cannot create anything.

c.4
187 a.26 (1) After all, according to Aristotle in *Physics I*, the ancient philosophers accepted it as a common truth that “Nothing comes to be from nothing.” But God’s power does not extend to things violating first principles, as if God could make a whole that was not greater than its part, or as if He could make a statement and its negation both true at once. Ergo, God cannot make something from nothing, or “create.”

(2) Besides, if creating is making something from nothing, then being created is becoming something. But every case of becoming is a case of being changed. So, creation is a change. But every change takes place in some subject, as one sees from the definition of change, *i.e.*, that changing is the actualizing of something in potency [*Physics III*]. Therefore, it is impossible for God to make something out of nothing.

c.1
201 a.10 (3) Furthermore, what has been made ϕ has to have become ϕ at some point, but one cannot say that what is created is at the *same point* becoming and already made. (For in a perduring thing, what it is becoming is not [yet], and what it has been made already, is. So something would both be and not be.) So, if something is made ϕ , its becoming ϕ precedes its being already made such. But this can only happen if the subject in which the becoming occurs already exists. Ergo, it is impossible for something to be made from nothing.

(4) Moreover, an infinite distance cannot be traversed. But the distance between being and nothing is infinite. Therefore, a thing’s being brought to be from nothing does not happen.

ON THE OTHER HAND, Genesis 1 says “In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth.”

I ANSWER: not only is it not impossible for God to create something, but it is necessary to posit that He created everything, as one sees from the previous articles. After all, whenever someone makes something from something, that from which he makes it is presupposed for his action, and is not produced by his action itself — as when an artisan works from raw materials like wood and bronze, which are not caused by the artisanal action but by an action of nature. But even nature only causes natural things to have their form, while it presupposes their matter. So, if God could only act upon something presupposed as already there, it would follow that the presupposed item would not be caused by Him. But it was shown above that nothing can turn up among beings which is not from God, who is the universal cause of being as a whole. Therefore, one must say that God produces things in being from nothing.

q 44, aa.1, 2

q 44, a.2

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): as I said above, the ancient philosophers only considered the emanation of particular effects from particular causes, which have to presuppose something for their acting; and this was the basis for their common opinion that nothing comes to be from nothing. But this has no application to a first emanation from a universal source of things.

ad (2): creation is not a change except in how we describe it.* For it belongs to the definition of a change that some one thing stands differently now and before now. Sometimes it is the same being in act standing differently now and beforehand, as in changes in quantity and quality and place. Sometimes it is the same being only in potency, as in a substantial change whose underlying “subject” is matter. But in creation, through which the whole substance of things gets produced, there can only be some “same thing” standing differently before and after in how we talk about it, as if something were thought to be previously partial and later complete. But since changing and undergoing change agree in the substance changed, and differ only in their diverse relations, as it says in *Physics III*, it has to be the case that when change is removed, nothing remains but the diverse relations in the Creator and the created. — But since how we talk about things follows upon how we think of them, as I said above, creation is talked about as a change, and this is why one says that creation is “making” something “from” nothing. Still, ‘making’ and ‘being-made’ are more fitting talk here than ‘inducing change’ and ‘being changed’, because making and being made *involve* the relations of cause to effect and of effect to cause, and only as a consequence do they imply a change.

ad (3): in things that come to be without change, their becoming and their being finished are simultaneous. Either the coming-to-be is itself the terminus of the change, as with illumination (after all, something is at once getting illuminated and has gotten illuminated); or else the coming-to-be is not the terminus of the change, as when [the change is from not-understanding to understanding and] an inner word [concept] is both being formed and finished. In these cases, what “is finished” is just what “is”; and saying that they “become” just means they “are from another” and not that they previously “have been.” Therefore, since creation is without change, a thing is at once “being created” and “has been created.”

ad (4): this objection comes from false imagination, as if there were some infinite medium between nothing and a being — which is obviously false. The false imagination comes from the fact that creation is talked about as a “change” [and hence] as unfolding between two endpoints.

q 44, a.2

* *secundum modum intelligentiantum*

c 3
202 a 20

q 13, a.1

 Cajetan's Commentary

The title is clear. — In the body there is one conclusion: it is not only possible but necessary that all things have been created by God. — The support goes as follows. [*Assumed conditional: antecedent:*] If God only acts thanks to something presupposed, [*consequent:*] the presupposed thing is not caused by Him. But *nothing* among the beings is uncaused by Him. So, necessarily, God produced things in being with nothing presupposed. But this is what it

means to "create."

The assumed conditional is supported by the categorical universal: no agent who makes something out of something makes that out of which it was made but presupposes it. This is made clear case-by-case, first with artificial products, then with natural ones.

— Negating of the consequent is supported by the preceding inquiry, where it was shown that God is the universal cause of being as a whole

q 44. aa. 1-2

article 3

Is creation something in a creature?

In I Sent. d.40, q.1, a.1, *ad* 1, *In II Sent.* d.1, q.1, a.2, *ad* 4, 5; 2 *CG*, c.18, *De potentia* q.3, a.3.

It seems that creation is not something in a creature.

(1) After all, as 'creation' passively taken is attributed to the creature, so 'creation' actively taken is attributed to the Creator. But the active creating is not something in the Creator, because then it would follow that there was something temporal in God. Therefore, the passive being-created is not something in a creature.¹

(2) Besides, there is no intermediate between the Creator and the creature. But creation is talked about as an intermediate between them. Well, it is not the Creator because it is not eternal, and it is not the creature either, because then one would have to use the same reasoning to posit another creation whereby creation itself was created, and so on *ad infinitum*. So, "creation" is not a something.

(3) Moreover, if creation were something above and beyond the created substance, it would have to be an accident of it. But every accident is in a subject. So, the thing created would be the subject of creation. And thus it would be both the subject of creation and its terminus. Which is impossible, because the subject is prior to the accident and conserves it, while the terminus is posterior to the action or undergoing whose terminus it is; and so as soon as it existed, the acting or undergoing would cease. Therefore, creation itself is not any "thing."

ON THE OTHER HAND, for something to be made in its whole substance is greater than its being made in its substantial or accidental form. But a coming-to-be in some respect, whereby something is made to be in its substantial or accidental form, is something in the thing brought to be. *A fortiori*, then, that whereby a thing is brought to be in its whole substance is something in the thing created.

ANSWER: creation posits in the thing created only a relation. For what is created is not brought about

¹As Cajetan will make clear below, "creation actively taken" is God's act of creating, or the relation whose subject is God and whose terminus is the creature; "creation passively taken" is the converse relation of the creature back to God, where the creature is the subject and the terminus is God.

through change. After all, what is brought about *via* change is brought about *via* something pre-existing, and this happens in the bringing about of some particular beings, but cannot happen here in the production of being as a whole by the universal cause of beings, who is God. Thus God, in creating, brings a thing about without change; but when one subtracts change from an event of acting-and-undergoing, nothing remains but the relation, as I already said. The upshot is that creation in the creature is nothing but a relation to the Creator as to the source of its being — much as, in an undergoing that takes place with change, there is implied a relation to the source of the change.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): creation actively taken means the divine action, which is His essence with a relation to the creature. But a relation of God to a creature is not a real relation but only a relation in thought. The creature's relation to God, however, is a real relation, as I said above, when the topic was the terminology for God.

ad (2): since creation comes into language as a change, as I said before [a.2 *ad* 2], and a change is some sort of intermediate between the changer and the thing changed, creation is also talked about as an intermediate between the Creator and the creature. Nevertheless, creation passively taken is in the creature and is the creature. Yet there is no need for another creation whereby it was created, because relations, just by what they are, are said *towards something* and are not related to that something by other relations but just by themselves. I said the same above when the topic was the equality of the Persons.

ad (3): the creature is the "terminus" of creating insofar as the event is described as a change. But insofar as the event is really a relation, the creature is its subject and is prior to it in being, as the subject is prior to an accident. Yet the accident has a certain priority due to the object towards which the relation is stated, which is the source of the creature. But it is not necessary that the creature keep being called "created" for as long as it exists; for creation implies the creature's relation to its Creator with a certain newness or beginning.

a.2 *ad* 2

q.13, a.7

q.42, a.1 *ad* 4

Cajetan's Commentary

In the title, 'creation' is taken for passive creation, whereby something is indicated as being created. And the word 'something' is taken to mean a real being, as is clear from the sequence of the articles listed at the start of the inquiry.

Analysis of the article

ii. In the body, there is just one conclusion: creation posits in the thing created only a relation. — This is supported as follows. [*Antecedent:*] The production of a being as a whole by the universal cause is not from something already existing; [*1st consequence:*] so God in creating produces a thing without motion and change; [*2nd consequence:*] so in a creature, its being-created is nothing but a relation back to the Creator as to the source of its being.

The antecedent is supported on the basis of the difference between particular productions and the production of being as a whole, or universal production. — Drawing the first consequence is supported on the basis that everything brought about through motion or change is brought about thanks to something already existing. — Drawing the second consequent is supported on the ground that, when one takes away motion/change from an acting and an undergoing, nothing remains but a relation. And this is confirmed on the ground that, JUST AS in an undergoing which occurs with change/motion, a relation is implied to the source of the change/motion, SO ALSO in passive creation there is implied a relation to the source of being.

Trouble from Scotus on the answer ad (3)

iii. In the answer ad (3), when you compare it with the objection itself, you obviously have it that the relation of being-created is an accident, and not a transcendental relation; the point is also explained in *De potentia*, q.3, a.3 ad 3. And since every accident is thing-wise distinct from its substance, it has to be the case that being-created is thing-wise distinct from any created substance, according to the doctrine we follow.¹

iv. Concerning this answer, however, a doubt arises. In his remarks on *II Sent.* d.1, q.5, Scotus holds that creation passively taken is a transcendental relation and is thing-wise the same as its basis. This he tries to prove on three grounds. Here is the first. [*Major:*] That which is properly speaking "in" something and without which it cannot exist without contradiction, is thing-wise the same as it; [*minor:*] but a stone's relation to God is of this kind. Ergo, [the stone's relation to God is thing-wise the same as the stone itself]. — The major premise

is supported as follows. A contradiction between being and not-being, said of some things, implies a thing-wise distinction between them; ergo, the impossibility of accepting such contradictories implies the sameness of those things. And this is true, he says, where there is not essential dependence. — He explains further by saying the following. The impossibility for A to be without B is either on account of their being identical or on account of their simultaneity in nature, or on account of the posteriority of A. But neither of these last two options fits the case of the stone in its relation to God, as is obvious; and yet the stone cannot exist without that relation. Therefore, it is identical to it.

Besides, [*major:*] what is uniformly said about everything other than God *vis-à-vis* God is not an accident in anything; [*minor:*] but this relation [being created by] belongs uniformly to every creature *vis-à-vis* God; therefore, it is not an accident. And so it is the same thing as its basis. — The major premise is supported by the fact that the same account applies to everything.

Furthermore, according to *Metaphysics VII*, a substance is naturally prior to its accident both in definition and in time; and the phrase 'in time' is understood to mean that there is no contradiction in the substance's existing prior to the duration of any accident it has. So, there is no contradiction in saying that a stone could exist prior to any dependency it has on God, and thus it could exist without depending on God, if the dependency is an accident. But this last is absurd; ergo [its dependence on God is not an accident, and so is not a real relation].

e.1
1028 a 31

Clearing this up

v. To clear away this difficulty, it not necessary to lay any new foundation. One just needs to follow what has been laid down already, so as to say that this relation of dependence upon God in any creature is an accident, thing-wise distinct from the substance of the creature, and that the creature nevertheless cannot exist without this dependency, much as a man cannot exist without being capable of amusement. So Aquinas taught in the preceding inquiry, a.1 ad 1, and taught by the same reasoning, namely, that every creature is a "being" by participation in God and cannot be denuded of this.

Point-by-point

vi. Against Scotus' [first] argument on the other side, I deny his major [*i.e.*, that what is properly speaking "in" something and without which it cannot exist without contradiction, is thing-wise the same as it]. And against his support for it, I say that the antecedent [*i.e.*, that a contradiction between being and not-being, said of some things, implies a thing-wise distinction

¹ For the term, 'transcendental relation', see footnote 8 to the commentary on q.13, a.7. On the doctrine Cajetan is following, see q.28, a.2, §§ v-xiii in the commentary.

between them] is false universally speaking, as I showed above when dealing with relations and their bases [q.28, a.2. commentary § xi]. And again, his consequent [*i.e.* that the impossibility of accepting such a contradiction implies the sameness of those things] is worthless, formally speaking, as he himself admits by positing a unique exception. So why shouldn't I be allowed to posit another? — As for his further explanation, I deny the disjunction he sets up on the ground that it is insufficient even in his own thought, as is clear in the case of parts taken together with respect to a third entity. Those parts cannot exist without the third entity's existing: and yet they are not posterior nor simultaneous in nature, nor the same identically as that third entity, nor do they depend upon it essentially. So the argument is worthless. What we say, rather, is that inseparability is sometimes due to a necessary connexion between the things. And such is the case here for the reason stated [in § v].

Against his second argument, I deny the minor [*i.e.* that the relation of being-created-by belongs uniformly to every creature *vis-à-vis* God]. After all, as it says here in the answer *ad* (2), dependence upon God belongs to created substances in one way and in another way to their relations of dependency. The substances depend through the relations, but the relations depend through themselves. It is not the case, therefore, that such relations belong uniformly to all items other than God.

Against his third argument, I say that even admitting his exposition, he needs to infer that "therefore a created substance can exist without any accident," but this is not validly inferred. After all, for the truth of the proposition that "a substance is prior..." it suffices that some substance be prior, and such is the case of the First Substance in truth, and supposedly also in the case of any pure intellect such as Averroes posited [in comment 35 on *Metaphysics XII*].

Is being created proper to composed and subsistent things?

De pot., q.3, a.1 *ad* 12; a.3 *ad* 2; a.8 *ad* 3; *De veritate* q.27, a.3, *ad* 9;
Quodl. IX, q.5, a.1; *Opusculum* 37, *De quattuor oppositorum*, c.4

It seems that being created is not limited to composed and subsistent things.

prop. 4 (1) After all, it says in the *Liber de causis*, “The first of created things is being [esse].” But the being [esse] of a created thing does not subsist. Therefore, being created does not belong exclusively to subsistent and composed things.

(2) Besides, what is created is from nothing. Composed things are not from nothing but from their components. Therefore, it does not fit composed things to be created.

(3) Furthermore, what is produced distinctively in a first emanation is what is presupposed in a second. Thus a natural thing produced in a natural generation is presupposed in a work of artistry. Well, what is presupposed in a natural generation is matter. Therefore, matter is what is distinctively created, and not the composite.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is Genesis 1: “In the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth.” But the heavens and the earth are composed, subsistent things. Therefore, being created belongs distinctively to these.

a.2 *ad* 2
* *esse rei*
I ANSWER: for a thing to be created is for it to be “made,” as I said before. But a thing is made for the sake of its existing.* So in strictly correct usage, both ‘is made’ and ‘is created’ are predicates of what has existence [esse]. But in strictly proper usage, the predicate ‘exists’ belongs to subsistent things, whether they are simple (like the matter-free substances), or are composite (like material substances). After all, being belongs properly to what *has* being; and

its “having being” is its subsisting in its being.¹ By contrast, forms and accidents and other such items, are not called “beings” as if they themselves existed but because by them something “is” ϕ : thus, whiteness is called a “being” because by it a subject “is” white. So, according to Aristotle, an accident is more properly called “of a being” than “a being.” So, then, accidents, forms, and the like, which do not subsist, are more co-beings than beings; indeed, they should rather be called co-created than created. But subsistent things are properly called created.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): when the *Liber de causis* says “the first of created things is being,” the word ‘being’ does not convey a created subject but rather conveys the distinctive reason why an item is called “created.” For a thing is called created from the fact that it is a being, and not from the fact that it is *this* being (since creation is the emanation of being as a whole from the universal source of being, as I said above). This way of speaking in the *Liber de causis* is similar to the way one speaks when one says, “The first visible thing is color,” even though what is strictly speaking “visible” is a colored thing.

ad (2): ‘creating’ does not express the making of composed things from their preexisting sources; rather, a composed thing is called created because it is produced in being together with all of its sources.

ad (3): that argument does not prove that matter alone is created but that matter only arises from creation. For creation is the production of a being as a whole and not just its matter.

¹ For more on this important topic, how to talk about what “exists,” see 3 ST q.17, a.2 and its commentary.

Metaphys.
17, c.1;
1028 a 18

a.1

Cajetan’s Commentary

In the title question, ‘proper’ is used in the sense opposed to ‘common’, and ‘being created’ is opposed to being co-created. So the sense of the question is this: is “being created” (thus taken) a trait of subsisting things alone, whether they are composed or not?

ii. In the body of the article there is one conclusion. It says: only subsistent things are properly speaking “created.” — The support goes as fol-

lows. [*Antecedent:*] Being created is a case of being made: [*1st consequence:*] so being created belongs properly to the things to which existing belongs: [*2nd consequence:*] therefore, it belongs properly to subsistent things.

Drawing the first consequence is supported on the ground that a thing is “made” in order that it exist. — Drawing the second is supported on the ground that existing belongs properly speaking to subsistent things. This in turn is supported by

the difference between subsisting things and items not subsisting (forms, accidents, and the like). Subsisting things *have* being [in] such [a way] that they subsist in it; other items are said to have being not as if they themselves “are” but because by them something else “is” thus or such, as is

clear from the example of whiteness. The point is confirmed by Aristotle’s authority. From there, another difference comes out at the end. For just as subsistent things alone are plain “beings,” and the rest are “co-beings,” so also subsistent things alone are created and the rest are co-created.

Is creating the work of God alone?

Cf. 1 *ST* q.65, a.3; q.90, a.3; *In II Sent.* d.1, q.1, a.3; *In IV Sent.* d.5, q.1, a.3, *qua*.3; 2 *CG* ec.20, 21; *De veritate* q.5, a.9; *De potentia* q.3, a.4; *Quodlibet*. III, q.3, a.1; *Compend. Theo.* c.70; *Opusculum XV De angelis*, c.10; *Opusculum 38. De quatuor oppositorum*, c.4

It seems that creating is not something God alone does.

De Meteor. IV, c.3, 380 a.12; *De anima* II, c.4; 415 a.25ff

(1) Aristotle says a complete thing is one that can make a thing similar to itself. Even material things can do this, as fire generates fire, and a man begets a man. But matter-free creatures are more complete than material ones. *A fortiori*, then, a matter-free substance can make a thing similar to itself. But a matter-free substance can only be made by creating it, since it has no matter from which to be made. Ergo, some creature can create.¹

(2) Besides, the more resistance there is in a thing being made, the more power is needed in the cause making it. But a contrary offers more resistance than nothing. So it takes more power to make something from its contrary (which a creature can still do) than to make something from nothing. *A fortiori*, a creature can do the latter.

(3) Moreover, the strength of the maker is judged by the greatness of what he makes. But a created being is finite, as was established above when the topic was God's lack of limits. Ergo, to produce any created being needs only finite strength. But having finite strength is not against what it takes to be a created being. Therefore, it is not impossible for a creature to create.

c.8
PL 42, 876

ON THE OTHER HAND, Augustine says in *De Trinitate* III that neither good nor evil angels can be the creators of anything. Much less, then, can other creatures.

a.1 &
q.44, aa.1, 2

I ANSWER: given remarks already made, it is clear at first glance that creating cannot be the *distinctive* action of any agent but God. After all, more universal effects are traced back* to prior and more universal causes. But among all effects, the most universal is existing[†] itself. Therefore, it has to be the *distinctive* effect of a first and fully universal cause, *i.e.*, God. (Hence it says in the *Liber de causis* that neither an Intelligence nor a noble soul can give being, except insofar as it operates through the working of God.) Well, to produce existing without further nuance[‡] (not as being-this or being-thus-and-such) pertains to the defining account of 'creating'. Thus, it is obvious that creating is a distinctive action of God Himself.

* *reducuntur*

† *esse*

Prosp. 3, 9

‡ *esse absolute*

Still, it may happen that an agent plays a rôle in the action distinctive of another, not by acting on its own but by being an instrument acting in the po-

wer of that other. This is how air gets the power of fire to heat and ignite. And for this reason, some have thought that, even though creating is the universal cause's *distinctive* action, some lower cause can still create insofar as it acts through the power of the first cause. Thus, Avicenna proposed that the first matter-free substance was created by God, but then it created another one after itself, plus the substance of an orb and its soul, and that the substance of the orb created the matter of lower bodies. In this way, even the Master of the *Sententiae* [Peter Lombard] says in *Liber IV Sententiarum*, d.5, that God can communicate to a creature the power to create, so that it would create ministerially and not on its own.

But this cannot be the case. A secondary instrumental cause cannot contribute to the action of a higher cause except insofar as the instrument, through something of its own, acts dispositively towards the effect of the main agent. So if it did nothing through what it has of its own, using it in one's action would have no point: and there would not need to be definite instruments for definite actions. Thus we see how an ax, cutting wood as it can through a form of its own, produces the form of a bench, which is the distinctive effect of the main agent. Well, the distinctive effect of God creating is what is presupposed for all other effects, namely, a thing's sheer being.* Thus, nothing can act dispositively and instrumentally towards His effect, since creating does not start from anything already there that could be disposed through the action of an instrumental agent. — Hence it is impossible for creating to be done by any creature, either by its own power, or by acting instrumentally/ministerially.

And it is especially maladroit to say of any bodily thing that *it* creates: after all, no physical body acts [transitively] except by touching or moving, and thus it requires for its action something already there to be touched and moved—which goes against the definition of creating.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): a completed thing sharing in a given nature does make something similar to itself — not by producing that nature from nothing but by applying it to something. Thus, a human being cannot be the cause of human nature from nothing, because then the agent would be causing himself; rather, he is a cause of his nature's being in this begotten child. And thus the human agent presupposes in his action a determinate matter thanks to which the child is *this* human being. Well, as this human being shares in human nature, any created being shares in the nature of being, if I may use such an ex-

Metaphysics, tract IX, c.4

* *esse absolute*

¹ This objection plays on the ambiguity of 'perfectus'. Aristotle was speaking of biology, not ontology.

q 7, a 1, ad 3.
a. 2

pression. since God alone is His own being, as I said above. So no created ϕ -thing can produce being- ϕ from nothing but only by causing it *in this thing*, and so that by which it is *this one* has to be presupposed for the action whereby a creature would make something similar to itself. In a matter-free substance, meanwhile, nothing can be presupposed whereby it is *this one*, because it is "this" through the form itself whereby it has its being- ϕ . since such creatures are subsisting forms. So a matter-free substance cannot produce another matter-free substance similar to itself as far as its being- ϕ is concerned, but only insofar as some further perfection would be concerned, as we may say that a higher angel enlightens a lower one, as Denis says. This is the sense in which there is said to be fatherhood among the heavenlies, as the words of St. Paul disclose in Eph. 3:15, "From whom all fatherhood in heaven and on earth is named." From this point also, one sees clearly that no created being can cause anything without presupposing something. And that very fact conflicts with the definition of creating.

Dc Celestia
Hier c.8;
PG 3, 240

c.7;
190 b 23-29

ad (2): a thing is brought to be from its contrary on an accidental basis, as it says in *Physics I*; but a thing comes to be on a *per se* basis from a subject which is in potency. Thus, a contrary resists an agent insofar as it holds back the subject's potency from the act to which the agent is trying to reduce it — as fire tries to reduce water to an act similar to it-

self but is impeded by the form and contrary dispositions whereby the potency in water is held back from being reduced to such an act-state.² And the more a potency is held back, the more power is required in the agent to reduce the matter to act. So, far greater power is required in the agent if no potency at all preexists. Obviously, then, it takes far greater power to make something from nothing than from its contrary.

ad (3): The power of a maker is not only judged by what he makes but also by how; after all, greater heat not only heats more but also more quickly. So, although creating a finite effect does not show infinite power, creating it from nothing does. This is clear from remarks already made. For if the agent needs more power in proportion as the potency is more remote from act, the power of an agent presupposing no potency is infinite, and such is the agent in creation. For the non-proportion of no potency to some potency (which any natural agent's power requires) is the same as the non-proportion of a non-being to a being. And since no creature has unqualifiedly infinite power or being, as was shown above, the only thing to say is that no creature can create.

in the answer
ad 2

q. 7, a. 2

²The Medievals thought water was cool by its natural form and so "resisted" efforts by a fire to make it hot. Today we say that water assumes the ambient temperature, but extra heat is needed to raise it above the ambient level.

Cajetan's Commentary

The title is clear from prior remarks. — In the body of the article, he does four jobs: (1) he answers the question with respect to creating by the agent's own power;* (2) he reports an opinion about creating instrumentally, at the words, "Still, it may happen . . ."; (3) he refutes the opinion just mentioned in general, at the point where he says, "But this cannot be the case"; (4) he refutes the same opinion in a special case where the agent is a bodily one, at the words "And it is especially . . ."

* *virtute propria*

Analysis of the article

ii. As for job (1), the conclusion answering the question is: creating is the distinctive action of God alone. — The support goes thus. [*Assumption (a):*] The first and most universal cause (God) has being* as His distinctive effect; [*assumption (b):*] producing being from nothing belongs to the account defining creating; [*inference:*] therefore, only God has creating as his distinctive action.

* *esse*

Assumption (a) is supported in two ways. The first is by argument, on the ground that [*major:*] more universal effects have to be traced back to more universal and prior causes; but [*minor:*] being is the most universal of all effects [and God is the universal, prior cause]. — The second support is by authority, from the *Liber de causis*, to the effect that no pure intelligence, nor any noble soul, gives being except insofar as it operates under God's action.

Doubt (1) about job (1)

iii. Concerning this part of the article, a lot of doubt arises, and it arises first over assumption (a) [*i.e.* that God, as first and most universal cause, has being as His distinctive effect].¹ In his remarks on *IV Sent.* d.1, Scotus argues against this, saying it is false. He supports his case with this argument. [*Antecedent:*] A

¹These doubts resume a quarrel with Scotus that was pursued above in § vi of Cajetan's commentary on q.8, a.1.

composed thing's being arises from what produces the composed thing; [consequent:] so, it is not God's distinctive effect. — The consequent holds because a composed thing (say, a cow) is from a univocal cause [hence from a composed thing, like a parental cow; but God is not composed, etc.]

Doubt (2) about job (1)

iv. The next doubt is about the supports given for assumption (a). Scotus argues against them in the same place. [Part A] Here is his case against our supporting argument. [Semantic alternatives:] The talk of universality here [in our premise that more universal effects have to be traced back to more universal causes] is either about universality "in being predicated" for both cause and effect, or about universality "in being perfective" for both, or about universality "in being predicated" for the effect but "in being perfective" for the cause.² [1st alternative:] If the talk in both cases is about universality "in being predicated," then Aquinas' minor ["being is the most universal of all effects, and God is the universal, prior cause"] is false because God is not the most universal cause in being predicated [since He is not always invoked as the cause]; and the argument does not reach its intended conclusion.

— [2nd alternative:] If the talk in both cases is about universality "in being perfective," Aquinas' minor is again false, because being is not the most perfective effect. This last is supported on the ground that anything included in many cannot be more perfect than any of the things in which it is included.³

— [3rd alternative:] But if the usage is not uniform,

² Universality "in being predicated" was the extensional feature of any general term, namely, that it could be predicated of many different things or individuals. Analogously, the trait named by such a term was also called universal, because it was "found" in many. On this reading, a "most universal" effect would have been a trait found in just about everything, such as the "trait" of being a being (which Scotus thought was a univocal trait and very different from what Aquinas thought), and a "most universal" cause would have been one invoked to explain just about every effect.

Universality "in being perfective" came from a different account and was an intensional affair. In an effect, it meant that the effect fully perfected anything receiving it. In a cause, it meant having what it takes to produce perfective/completive traits, so as to be able to cause them all. Such a cause would act widely because it was pluri-competent.

³ This second counter-argument sees a conflict between "being as the most widespread effect" and "being as the most perfective trait." For Scotus these had to be different. The "being" which is most widespread was the least perfect effect, the least complete trait of all, since all other traits added to it, he thought. As his supporting argument shows, Scotus thought that the most perfective trait could not be one found in many things (where it would only be a

so that the "universality" of the cause is taken as being perfective and "universality" of the effect is taken as being-predicated, then the argument goes wrong for two reasons. [1st counter-argument:] First, because the major is false. For an effect which is utterly universal in being predicated can come from an imperfect cause, because the effect [which is just being] turns up in many imperfect effects.⁴ [2nd counter-argument:] Secondly, the argument goes wrong because it commits a fallacy of the consequent. After all, from the claim that an effect supremely universal in being-predicated is from a cause supremely universal in perfecting, plus the claim that being is an effect of this kind, the conclusion that follows is: therefore, being as such [i.e. as supremely universal], can only be from a cause most universal in perfecting; but it does not follow that "therefore, this creatable thing can only be from such a cause." It is obvious that there is a fallacy of the consequent in the inference.⁵ And if you try saying that, in this effect, one must consider both its "being this" and its "being at all," you solve nothing, because these are not distinguished unless they are from the same cause, as they are the same.⁶

[Part B] Next, Scotus rails against the other support for assumption (a), namely, that it concludes to the opposite of what Aquinas intended. [3rd counter-argument:] After all, the quoted authority does not flat-out deny that a created intelligence gives being, but rather affirms it, while saying that it only gives being "insofar as it acts under the divine operation."

part, less complete than the whole). The supreme perfective trait had to be more complete than the whole, and for Scotus this had to be its *thiness*. Thiness, of course, is not "included in many," since "being this" is the ultimate completion of one thing alone.

Aquinas, of course, felt no such conflict; for him, the *esse* of creatures is at once "most widespread" and "most perfective," because he distinguished specification from actuation. What all other traits add to *esse* is specification, and what *esse* adds to all of them is pure actuation.

⁴ This must be true, of course, if the "being" found most widely in things is their weakest, least complete trait.

⁵ The third alternative gets the right meanings of "universal" but reads the result *formaliter*, so as to say that the effect found most widely as *so found* has to go back to the most perfective cause. He then takes Aquinas to be arguing from "each thing has a case of being" to "each thing goes back to God." But he can't get there because each thing's case of being is only its being-this, which is not the effect most widely found as *so found*. But a fallaciously drawn conclusion counts as a fallacy of the consequent. It's like trying to go from "fame alone causes a widespread name" and "a name is something had by everybody" to "everybody's name is caused by fame."

⁶ Scotus considers the objection that one finds in this creatable thing both being-this and being-at-all. He rejects the distinction. For him, any creatable thing's being-at-all is either weaker than its being this or precisely the same.

Doubt (3) on job (1)

v. Against the force of Aquinas' inference, doubt arises as follows. When he calls being a "distinctive effect" of the first cause, either he means it is an effect from *only* the first cause — and then the objections of Scotus are on target — or else he means that being is an effect *per se primo* from God.⁷ In the latter case, his inference seems worthless, unless it assumes the following categorical statement: "To produce a being *per se primo* is to create." But this is false: producing *per se primo* the being in a cow is not creating — otherwise, when a cow is begotten, its being is either produced from nothing *per se primo*, or else creating is always mixed into every work of nature, which is contrary to what St. Thomas says in the final article of this Inquiry.

Clearing away these doubts

vi. To clear these up, please realize that a huge difference is made by adding the qualifier '*per se primo*'.⁸ Thus there is a huge difference between

[1] Effect *A* comes about from cause *B*

and

[2] Effect *A* comes about *per se primo* from cause *B*.

Of these, [1] means only that *A* comes about; [2] means that it comes about "of itself and firstly." So these two claims: "being comes about" and "being comes about *per se primo*" are further apart than heaven and earth. Claim [1] only means *that* being [esse] terminates the bringing about; but [2] means *both that* being terminates it *and how* it terminates it. Faced with claim [1], one does not infer: "so, immediately before this, there was no being*"; but when confronted with the claim [2], one does infer this, as is clear from what I quoted above from *Physics I*.

Again, in case [1] is true, one does not infer a distinctive agent-cause; but in case [2] is true, one infers a distinctive and *per se primo* agent. If case [1] is true, finally, one does not infer that the effect is from this cause wherever it emerges; but if [2] is true, one does infer that wherever the effect occurs, it is brought about by that same agent-cause, since an effect has to be caused universally from that whence it comes *per se primo*.⁹ — Hence, since in the current argument we are not talking about effects as they come about any which way, but as they come about *per se primo* (as is obvious from the words "to be traced back to prior

⁷ *Effectus proprius* was ambiguous between 'unique effect' and 'one's own effect'. A special case of the latter was a *per se primo* effect, i.e. one caused not only *per se* but also "firstly." It would seem clear that an effect "entirely one's own" would often be a *per se* effect, but not every cause of it will be its first such cause.

⁸ Cajetan gave two prior accounts of "*per se primo*." The more recent was in § v of his commentary on 1 ST q 8, a.1.

⁹ Cajetan had already made this point in § vi of his commentary on q.3, a.2.

and more universal causes," plus the fact that *tracing back* goes to the *per se primo*.¹⁰ It is obvious that this argument was badly understood by Scotus, who interpreted it as talking about an effect's coming to be without the adverb '*per se primo*'.

Against doubt (1) on job (1)

vii. Against doubt (1), I say that the proposition [given above as assumption (a)] is perfectly true but badly understood by the attacker. After all, the conclusion has to be accepted as it follows from the premises stated, from which one gets the conclusion that being* is the distinctive effect of the most universal cause, which is God, i.e., one gets the point that existing is the *per se primo* effect of God. This is what the word 'distinctive' means, and not just 'alone' or 'only', as the objector understood it, attributing to St. Thomas the claim that being is an effect of God alone. We never dreamed of this.¹¹ Indeed, we hold that every cause gives being [to its effect], but through the power of the First Cause, as the proposition quoted from the *Liber de causis* suggests. So, Scotus strove in vain against the present article to this extent.

Against doubt (2) on job (1)

viii. Against the second doubt, the one attacking our supports, I say that, directly speaking, the major premise uses 'universal' non-uniformly in its application to the cause and the effect. The sense of the major is that a more universal effect in predication is traced back to a cause which is more universal in its causality or its perfectiveness. — Against Scotus' 1st counter-argument, I say that this major is perfectly true, as even Scotus is compelled to say later on, in the same passage. And his support for the opposite is worthless. For while this most universal effect is from many, indeed from all causes, it is still the case that it is *per se primo* from the First Cause alone. We are not just saying that more universal effects are only from more universal causes, as Scotus understood us to be saying, but that they are *traced back* to them, i.e. that they are *per se primo* from them. And it is amazing that Scotus was steamed up about this, since he must have known this major from *Physics II* and from *Metaphysics V*.

Against his 2nd counter-argument, I say that the consequence is [not fallacious but] optimal: being is *per se primo* from the most universal cause, and so the being of this thing or that thing or any one thing is *per se primo* from the same cause. Drawing this infer-

¹⁰ Tracing an effect back was not recovering its causal history but finding the true starting point of its explanation. See footnote 1 on § vi of the commentary on q.3, a.2.

¹¹ Read the attacker's way, assumption (a) would exclude any and all secondary causes from the explanation of anything's coming to be. Is there a new calf in the pasture? Parental cows had nothing to do with it. The calf is there by the will of Allah alone!

* ens
c 7,
190a 34f,
cited in § vii
of the com-
mentary on
q.44, a.2

c 1; 192b 24
c.4; 1014 b
20

ence is based upon the categorical proposition that *being, wherever it comes about, has to come from that whence it comes per se primo*—which of course is self-evident*.¹² — And no problem arises from the fact that when a cow comes to be, its being is brought about by the parental cow; for its existence is not brought about by that cow except *per accidens*, in the way in which a colored thing comes to be *per accidens* when a black thing is made white.¹³

Against [Part B] the attack against the authority Aquinas used, the answer [to the 3rd counter-argument] is already obvious. The text was not quoted to prove that being is from God alone but that it is from God *per se primo*.

Against doubt (3) on job (1)

ix. Against the third doubt, one should say that the argument in the text can be understood in two ways.

— Taken the first way, from the fact that producing a being *per se primo* = creating, one infers that creating is the action of God alone, *i.e.* befits God from His distinctive traits or His distinctive power. So taken the argument would be obvious from remarks made in the previous Inquiry. And while the argument would be true on this interpretation, it does not seem very artful, and the tracing back of effects to causes does not seem terribly relevant.

— So, here is the other way to take it. Given that the *per se primo* terminus of the First Cause's action = the terminus of creating, one infers that creating is the distinctive action of God alone. And so taken, the argument is very artful and proceeds effectively from the assumed propositions. For from the fact that a thing's existing is the *per se primo* reason why it comes to be from the First Cause, and also why the thing is created, it follows optimally that creating is the distinctive effect of the First Cause. And this meaning is plainly suggested by the text when it proves (from the rule for tracing more universal effects back to more universal causes) its first proposition, namely, that its existing is the *per se primo* reason why something is gotten from the most universal cause. But it gets to its second proposition (namely, that a thing's existing is the reason it is created) by saying that to produce a being, not insofar as it is this or that, but insofar as it is just a being, pertains to the *defining account* of creation. In these words, after all, it is shown that existing is precisely what it takes to "be created."

¹²The point is "self-evident" from Aristotle's way of defining the matter. Roughly: let a be a predicate variable; let a be an individual constant, and let φa be the state of affairs that a is φ ; let x, y , and z be individual variables; and let φx be the state of affairs that x is φ . Then a causes φa to obtain *per se primo* just in case (φa obtains & (a is first cause of φa) & ((y is first cause of φa) \supset ($y = a$))) & (z)(φz obtains) \supset (a is first cause of φz)).

¹³ See § viii in the commentary on q.44, a.2, explaining what it means to be brought-to-be *per se vs. per accidens*.

And thus, very subtly, the intended point is reached from the identity of the *per se primo termini* [of proceeding from the First Cause and of being created]. Since this point was already at hand from prior remarks, the text says it is "clear enough at first blush" that creation is the distinctive action of God alone. x. So, against the objection on the other side, I say that the categorical proposition underlying the argument is not this one (although this one is true), "To produce being *per se primo* is to create," but rather this other one: "Taking care of existence *per se primo* is an operation unique to the First Cause" or "Creating is *per se primo* taking care of existence."

When Scotus says that the statement, "to give being *per se primo* is to create," is false, because in making a cow...*etc.*, my answer is that this is no problem: indeed it has to be the case in the making of natural things that the new beast is made from nothing *per se primo* at that point. For it is always the case that each thing comes to be from another being, albeit *per accidens*; and as I've said a thousand times, that whose make-up was there immediately before it, is not brought to be *per se primo*, and hence it comes to be from nothing *per se primo*, whether it comes to be *per se* or *per accidens*, as emerges from *Physics I*.

Very significantly, however, I said "at that point," lest you go wrong here and attribute to me the idea that some positive and inherently one effect in the universe is from no agent *per se primo*. After all, any being brought about by nature, in the production of the whole universe in which all things are produced in one of their parts, namely matter, begins to depend initially upon the First Cause; and afterwards, from the co-operation of the First Cause with secondary causes, each one is brought to be a complete being. And thus *per se primo* anything at all, insofar as it is a being, is from the First Cause; but not through a totally new action. And similarly each thing is conserved by the First Cause. And thus every case of existing is traced back to the action of God as its *per se primo* cause, but not to a totally new action.

On Jobs (2) and (3)

xi. As for job (2), Aquinas puts down clearly enough the opinions of Avicenna and Peter Lombard on sharing the act of creating, namely, that it can be shared out to a creature. And although their arguments were only put forward tentatively, it is shown here that their position does not conflict with the conclusion just reached [in job (1)]. After all, the fact that creating is distinctively an action of God is consistent with the claim that it can belong to another not by its own abilities but insofar as it participates in God, to whom the action is distinctive. This, as far as it goes, is consistent with distinctiveness. The text shows this in mentioning the action of fire with respect to air.

Notice here that in bringing up Peter Lombard, the author is referring also to himself in talking about *II Sent.* d.1, q.1, a.3 and about *II Sent.* d.5, q.1, a.3.

* *per se notum*

190a 24/r

q.44, a.1

Physics I
190a 24-
191b 15

qu³ ad 4, where he did not spurn the Lombard's opinion, although he rejects it here along with those who followed it, even if he himself was one of them. *xii.* As for job (3), he repoves the opinion just rehearsed. Here is his argument. [*Major:*] A secondary instrumental cause only shares in the operation of a higher cause insofar as it acts dispositively through something of its own towards the effect intended by the main agent. [*Minor:*] But no secondary agent can do anything dispositively toward the effect of God creating; [*conclusion:*] therefore, there cannot be any such instrumental cause of the act of creation.

The major is supported on two grounds, each pointing out an unacceptable implication [of denying it]. The first is that, unless a thing acted as an instrumental cause through something naive to it, it would be brought into the job uselessly. The second ground is that definite actions would not require definite instruments. Then the point is shown by an example, because we see how it is with an ax, *etc.* — The minor is also supported on two grounds. The first is from the *terminus* of creating: its peculiar effect is just the existing of the object, which is presupposed for all other *termini* of actions upon it. The second support is drawn from the *how* of creating, *viz.*, that it is not a making "out of" anything and hence excludes anything that could be "disposed" towards it.

Scotus' doubts about job (3)

xiii. Doubts arise about this reasoning — first of all from Scotus. In the passage* cited above, he attacks our assumed major on two grounds, wanting it to come out false with the adverb 'dispositively'; but even without it, he says our major can be well or badly understood. Since Aquinas put in that adverb explicitly and made the minor turn upon it, obviously, Scotus' particular gripes about our major need to be brought forward distinctly.

[1] In the first place, Scotus wants to hold that an instrumental cause does not need to have any action of its own, whereas the text says the opposite.

[2] But supposing the instrumental cause does have something of its own through which it acts, Scotus denies that it does something only through the power of the main agent — and this he supports on the ground that, in any action which the instrument does (but is not in the power of the main agent) it is not acting as an instrument but as a principal agent.

[3] Thirdly, Scotus argues against 'dispositively'. An instrument can reach the very effect of the main agent; therefore, it is not always required that it act dispositively. — The antecedent is conceded, he says, even by Aquinas elsewhere, namely in remarks on *II^a Sent.* d.1, q.1, a.4, qu¹. One sees as much in the coining of money and in stamping.¹⁴

¹⁴ The royal minter takes a slug of gold and makes it a coin by stamping it with the king's image. The terminus of the stamp's action = the terminus of the minter's action.

[4] Fourthly, Scotus inveighs against the example of the ax and similar tools, trying to show that the intended conclusion cannot be gotten from these. They are instruments for an action previous to another action: an ax is an instrument for cutting, which is previous to making the bench. But such is not the case with all instrumental causes, since some are instruments only for the action whereby the main effect occurs.

Doubts from Durandus about job (3)

xiv. [5] Then Durandus attacked, holding first that our argument assumes a false point: *i.e.*, that every secondary cause is an instrumental cause *vis-à-vis* God. This is false, he says, because when an angel acts, it is not moved by God in any way. — Besides, it would follow [from Aquinas's argument] that every natural action would be "an effect of God."

[6] Secondly, Durandus says that our argument, especially in its second support for our minor, assumes something false, namely, that every action of a secondary cause is from a subject. This is not necessarily so, he says. After all, God can separate an accident from its subject when the subject is brought about by a natural agent, just as easily as when it is man-made. Thereupon Durandus reasons thus. [*Antecedent:*] Let God separate an accident from its subject when it arises from a natural agent; then [*1st consequent:*] that case of bringing-about was not from the subject; [*2nd consequent:*] therefore, a secondary cause does not have to operate from its subject, since the opposite can be brought about by divine power.

Clearing Up These Doubts

xv. To clear these up, be aware that, broadly speaking, there are two ways to read the claim that an instrumental cause requires an action of its own plus that of the main agent. One way is to speak of two actions, as it were, having different effects for their *termini*, as heat from digestion both warms one's flesh and generates it. In my judgment, this is not necessary, but it is where Scotus takes aim. The other way to read it is to say that *one* operation, insofar as it comes from the instrument's native power, yields an effect naturally prior to what it yields insofar as it comes from the main agent's power. *E.g.*, moving rods together a certain way both gives you three rods and makes the form defined as a triangle, without any further action being done. The case is similar in sculptures.¹⁵ This second reading is certain beyond doubt, and it is what Aquinas intended.

It is certain beyond doubt, because every instrumental cause has some active power of its own; otherwise, as the text says, it would be of no use. But to every active power there corresponds an effect achievable by it; otherwise it would not be active in any way. And since it is a given that what is first in inten-

¹⁵ The moment the chisel dislodges the last chip, the sculpture's form (and hence the sculptor's work) is finished.

in remarks on *II^a Sent.* d.1, q.5

* In *II^a Sent.* d.1

tion is last in execution, and since whenever a main and an instrumental cause act together, their effect in intention is the effect taken in what it has from the main cause, it follows that what the effect has from the instrumental cause is previous [in execution] to what it has from the main cause — whether those are two real things or one thing distinguished into thing-and-mode, or any other way.

That this was also Aquinas's intent, however, is clear because his terms allude to it, and it makes his reasoning effective. By the word 'disposition' one understands everything [logically or temporally] prior [to the outcome intended by the main agent]; and by the term 'its own action' one understands the operation insofar as it is from the instrument's power. — That the reasoning is effective is clear. After all, if every instrumental cause yields by its own power something [logically or temporally] prior to the formal terminus of the main agent,¹⁶ and if nothing prior in any way can be caused in creating, the consequence is that no instrumental cause concurs in creating.

Against the doubts from Scotus

xvi. [ad 1] Perhaps there is no need to reply, then, to arguments attacking the first way to read our major; nevertheless, I say that an instrumental cause has its own action even if it coincides materially with its action as an instrument of the principal agent.

[ad 2] Switch to the other way to read our major. Now take Scotus's claim that whatever an instrument does through its own power, it causes with the power of a principal agent. This claim can be understood in two ways: (1) The first way is this: 'in the power of a principal agent' means through a power mainly existing in the principal agent. And this is utterly false, since the instrument causes that effect of its own through a power in itself and not in the main agent — otherwise, as I deduced above, it would do nothing of its own through its own power. (2) The other way to take Scotus's claim is this: 'in the power of the principal agent' means as it [the instrument] stands under the principal agent. And this seems true. After all, the principal agent stands in two ways towards the instrumental cause: namely, as using the native power in the instrument, and as elevating it to cause something higher, sought by the main agent. And thus an instrument, in order to be an instrument, needs a power and an action of its own and a share in the action of the main cause. In meeting the second need alone, is it strictly called an instrumental cause, but in meeting the first need it is still not called a main agent but one "causing out of its own power." Hence the inference by Scotus that "in such an action it is not causing in the power of the principal agent but is itself a principal agent," is not valid. It is not necessary, after all, that a cause be properly speaking either a princi-

pal one or an instrumental one *vis-à-vis* any and every action: rather, there is a middle status, which is that of an instrumental cause causing through its own powers. In broad terms, one can call it an instrumental cause even of its own action, insofar as it is applied by another (as heat from nutrition can be called an instrument of the soul even in warming the body, because the soul uses that heat to generate flesh); and it can also be called a principal cause, because it is causing by its own active power. This is not a problem; it is even necessary that every instrumental cause be "a principal one" in this way, *i.e.* in having a power of its own. And this befits an instrument not accidentally but *per se*, as the right matter for each form befits that form; for the defining make-up of an instrument can only be salvaged in its own active power, as the defining make-up of a man can only be salvaged in such-and-such flesh and bones.

[ad 3] Against his third argument, I deny his inference: "it reaches the ultimate form sometimes, and so is not acting dispositively." By disposing from its own powers, the instrument reaches the ultimate effect from the power of the principal agent, even if we take the disposition as one really distinct — as Aquinas illustrates in the same place,* from the active qualities and forms of natural things, in contrast with that of the intellectual soul.

[ad 4] Against Scotus's last complaint, I say that teaching needs to be drawn from more familiar things, and this is why Aquinas used the example of the ax. But even in this he makes his intention clear by saying that it "produces the form of a bench"; he insinuates thereby that he had nothing else in mind but that an instrument "disposes," *i.e.* "does something prior," even when it attains the form intended by the principal agent.

Against the doubts from Durandus

xvii. [ad 5] Against Durandus, I reply first that the argument in the text does not need the proposition that every secondary cause is an instrument of God; rather, what it needs is this other proposition: "If any secondary cause were brought into the act of creating, it would be as an instrumental cause." Everyone knows that this latter cannot be attacked; everybody admits that creating is God's distinctive action alone, and that any cause brought in to carry out the distinctive action of a higher cause is being brought in as an instrumental cause. — I reply secondly, that even the unneeded proposition is true, as is clear from the Disputed Questions *De potentia Dei*, where Aquinas shows at length that an angel (and indeed every secondary cause) fails to act unless put into an act-state by God in one of a number of ways. — And this is no problem for us; indeed every action of a creature has to attain an effect of God, because it always attains to being [*esse*], which no cause gives except in virtue of the First Cause, as is shown here and in 3 *CG*, c.66.

* In *II^a Sent.* d. 1, q. 1

q. 3, a. 4

¹⁶ The "formal" terminus of the main agent is the outcome precisely as intended by him.

[ad 6] Against his second line of objection, I say that even though “an accident can arise from a natural agent” and “an accident can be separate from its subject” are true in the divided sense, they are still not possible together — an accident cannot be separated from its subject and yet brought about by a natural agent — unless perhaps something is playing the rôle of the subject, as we say that in the Sacrament of the Altar the quantity [of the now absent bread] plays the rôle of a substance even in corruption. The reason for the disparity between the possibility of an accident’s being separated [and the possibility of its arising from a natural agent] is that the to-be of an accident is not its being-in the subject actually but its being-in it apitiudinally, and hence it can consistently be separated and exist. But for it to be brought about by a natural agent is for it to be educed from a potency, since a natural agent does not act otherwise than by educing it from the potency of its subject. Hence it is inconsistent to say that the accident is brought about by a natural agent and that it is not educed from the potency of its subject; thus it is inconsistent to say that it is at once from a natural agent and separated from its subject. The implication is even obvious. If Durandus had noticed it, perhaps he would have kept quiet.

On Job (4)

xviii. As to job (4), the opinion [of Avicenna and Peter Lombard] is refuted in the special case of a bodily instrument. The ground is that every bodily agent acts by touching, hence by requiring something already there for it to act upon. But no Creator presupposes anything. Ergo, etc.

Defending the answer ad (1)

xix. On the answer ad (1), be aware that Scotus construes it (in the same place as above) as an argument against Avicenna, so as to go as follows. What participates in a given nature makes something similar to itself, not by producing that nature absolutely but by applying it, etc. And against this Scotus argues on many grounds.

[a] He attacks firstly because two points are assumed here which Scotus has elsewhere disqualified: namely, that a man is only this one through matter, and that an angel is this one through its form.

[b] He attacks it secondly because its major premise is either based on this claim: “The product has to share in the nature” (and then it would follow that an angel could not be created even by God)—or else on this one: “The producing angel shares the nature.” In that case the argument is useless [to our case]. An angel producing another has nothing presupposed for its own existing; therefore, in the produced angel also nothing is presupposed to its existing; but the one to be produced has to be similar to the producer.

[c] Thirdly, Scotus attacks our minor premise that “Every created being shares in the nature of being.” For either being is shared in as an act poster-

ior to the being’s essence, or as the same act as its essence; but in neither way does the argument reach the intended conclusion. Therefore [the argument fails].

Clearing up these doubts

xx. My answers to these will be short. Against the first attack, I say that the points he claims elsewhere to have disqualified have also been elsewhere* sustained and verified.

Against his second attack, I say that (as the text plainly shows) the major itself is verified, because the agent shares that nature. And the text supports this major by reduction to the impossible: that is, because, if a participant in some nature caused that nature absolutely and not just in this individual, it would follow that the agent caused it in himself. And the inference holds good because being the cause of a nature absolutely is being its cause universally, and hence in whoever shares in it; and hence in the agent himself, given that he is one of the participants in that nature. — Against Scotus’s objection, I say that two contradictories follow from the premise that “An angel produces another angel.” The contradictories are that the angel to be produced has something presupposed and that he does not. From the fact that the produced angel has to be similar to the producer, it follows that he has not. But from the fact that the producer is a being by participation, it follows that something of the one to be produced already exists, because the producer’s action can only be a making [the nature] be *in this*. This is hardly astonishing, because the antecedent implies it. Therefore, Scotus’s argument inferring that one consequent does not follow from the other one, is worthless. What we are saying is that *both* follow, and that *this* is what shows the antecedent to be altogether impossible. And from this, as it says in the text, it is clear as a bell that no creature can create.

Against the third attack, I say that the identity or non-identity of essence and existence is neither here nor there; it suffices that there are beings by participation that are either altogether simple or composed inseparably in such a way that nothing pertaining to them can be presupposed before something else of theirs. It has already been shown that the major premise, along with the whole reasoning, is solid on either alternative. — The point Scotus adds to the effect that, for us, “a subject is not assumed on account of the participated nature of the agent but because the form that is part of the participated nature is one that needs matter,” is crude, as the actions of things and the reason given in the text to support our major made clear.

Unpacking the answer ad (3)

xxi. In the answer ad (3), you have our reply to those who wonder why a power to create cannot be shared out to a creature, why there is a conflict, etc. The reason is that a creative power is infinite, if not by reason of the thing made, then still by reason of how it gets

*See Cajetan’s commentary on *De Ente et Essentia* c 5, also q 4. See also above, q 29, a. 1, § ix in Cajetan’s commentary

made. — And thereby you solve many objections against this conclusion reported by Capreolus in his remarks on *II Sent.* d.1, q.3; look them up if you care to.

A doubt from Scotus

In II Sent. d.3, q. 3ff
Scotus, however, in the same place quoted before, adduces this argument; and although he seems to understand it badly, by appealing to a distance between potency and act, nevertheless, because he is obviously trying to reject this article wholesale, I think it necessary to report his solution and refute it. He says, then, that while indeed there is no proportion between “no potency” and “some potency,” he denies the inference that “therefore, an active power which can overcome *this* has no proportion to an active power which can overcome *that*.” The reason he denies this inference is because the items compared in the first case, *i.e.*, “no potency” and “some potency” are items between which there is no reason for a proportion, because one of them is not a so-much; but the items compared in the second case, “power” for this and “power” for that, are items between which there should be a proportion because they are both so-much. — Take the example of a point and a line; between them there is no proportion, and yet power to produce the one and power to produce the other are not without proportion.

Removing this doubt

xxii. To refute Scotus’s solution, and confirm the argument made in our text, please realize that the reasoning in the text is not founded precisely upon an inproportion between the first items compared [*i.e.* between no potency and some potency], as Scotus seems to mistake; rather, it is based on the Aristotelian rule that when two related items so stand that as one of them is reduced the other is increased proportionately, and *vice-versa*, if one posits multiple cases of the two *relata* and keeps combining them in such a way that each combination compares a case of the one with a case of the other, then if one decreases to zero, its correlative increases beyond all measure, *i.e.* to infinity. And by this rule, just as there is no proportion between the diminishing correlative finitely valued and the same value set to zero, so also there is no proportion between the increasing correlative finitely valued and the same taken to infinity. For example (and it is the example put forward in *Physics IV*), how soon a movement is over and the width of the distance to be covered are two items which, other things being equal, so stand that as the distance is diminished, the motion is finished sooner, as is obvious to the senses. If more cases of both are posited and we posit two changes of place and two distances, one motion in one space and the other motion in the other, and the width of the one space is diminished to zero so that there is no width, then the quickness of the change over that distance increases to infinity,

and as the proportion of a space with no width stands to a space having width, so is the proportion of the speed in the one case to the speed in the other.¹⁷ — This is the rule used by Aristotle in *Physics IV* to show that movement over no width and movement over some width are impropotional. This is also the rule on which the argument in our text is based; as is obvious from the text itself, which explicitly asserts two items in its first proposition, and their proportional increase and decrease, saying that “if the agent needs more power in proportion as the potency is more remote from act” (this last implying diminution, *i.e.* the further the remoteness the smaller the potency); and then the text talks about the one side going to zero; it says “the power of an agent presupposing no potency is infinite.” [*i.e.* not proportionate to any finite power]

xxiii. Although this cannot be denied, even if one gives free reign to imagination, it can still be proved and relevantly so in the terms we are using. For otherwise it would follow that a power able to make something arise from some potency and a power able to make it arise from no potency would be equal. But this is unintelligible. After all, it conflicts with the self-evident major premise taken up in the text, about which Scotus was silent, as if he didn’t see it. — And the inference is obvious if we argue in Aristotle’s style. Suppose there is some active power producing from no potency and yet (the Scotists think) finite. Call this power A. Suppose there is another active power, call it B, producing from some potency, and call the latter C; and establish a certain proportion between A and B, *e.g.* that A is ten times greater than B. One argues as follows. If we assume a potency ten times further from act than C was, then an active power to produce from it is ten times greater than B, and so it will equal A, which is ten times greater than B. Ergo, a power to act from some potency equals a power able to act from no potency. — And please observe that it makes no difference whether there exists in nature a potency ten times or a hundred times more remote from act, just as it does not matter whether there can be a width of space a hundred times shorter and a change of place faster and faster. All we need is the conditional truth: for anything conflicting with the truth of such a conditional is impossible. If you deny this, you destroy Aristotle’s natural philosophy, as is clear from *Physics II* [c.8], *Physics I* as a whole, *Physics I/II* [c.1], and *Physics I/III* [c.8, 10]

xxiv. My reply to Scotus, therefore, is that the argument is not going from non-proportional terms taken

¹⁷ The correlative variables are speed (*velocitas*) and length of time; in other words, the sooner a change of place is over, the faster the change has been, according to Aristotle. Recall the equation: rate × time = distance. Divide both sides by the speed, and one has time = distance/speed. If the time is to shorten, the speed must increase. If the time decreases to zero, Aristotle said the speed increased to infinity. Change ‘time’ to ‘potentiality’ and ‘speed’ to ‘active power’.

absolutely but from such terms as *termini* of a process of augmentation and proportional diminution, as is obvious. And so it is valid.

His example about a point and a line, where the terms compared are non-proportional absolutely ta-

ken, is no obstacle, because it has no relevance.

Left standing, therefore, is the solid demonstration in the text that power to create is infinite and so incommunicable; for every finite active power is proportional to any other finite active power, as Scotus himself admits, since each is a finite so-much.

Is creating distinctive of a Person?

Cf. In II Sent., Prologue, De potentia q.9, a.5, ad 20

It would seem that creating is distinctive of a Person.

(1) What is prior, after all, is the cause of what is later; and the complete, of the incomplete. But the procession of a divine Person is prior to the procession of creatures and is more perfect, because a divine Person proceeds in perfect likeness to His source, whereas the creature comes forth in imperfect likeness. Therefore, the procession of divine Persons is the cause of the procession of things. And thus creating is distinctive of a Person.

(2) Besides, since divine Persons are only distinguished from one another by their processions and relations, any effect attributed to the divine Persons *in different ways* belongs to them thanks to their processions and relations. But the causing of creatures is attributed to the divine Persons differently. In the Nicene Creed, it is attributed to the Father that He is the "Creator of all things visible and invisible;" but to the Son is attributed that "through Him all things were made;" and to the Holy Spirit, that He is "the Lord and giver of life." Thus, the causing of creatures belongs to the Persons thanks to their processions and relations.

(3) Moreover, if you say that the causing of creatures is due to an essential attribute appropriated to a Person, this does not seem sufficient. For any divine effect is caused by any essential attribute, such as power, goodness, and wisdom; and thus it does not pertain to any one attribute more than to another. Therefore, no definite way of creating should be attributed to one Person more than to another, unless the Persons are differentiated in Their creating according to the relations and processions.

Denz. # 125f
 ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Denis says in c.2 of *De divinis nominibus*, namely, that all causal matters are common to the whole Godhead.

PG 3, 637

I ANSWER: strictly speaking, creating is causing or producing the existence of things. Since every causal agent yields something similar to itself, the source of an action can be judged from its effect, as fire is what generates fire. And so creating belongs to God in virtue of His existing, which is His essence, which is common to the three Persons. Therefore, creating is not distinctive of any one Person but common to the whole Trinity.

Even so, however, the divine Persons have a causality *vis-à-vis* creating things, thanks to the defining makeup of their processions. As was shown above when dealing with God's knowledge and will, God is the cause of things *via*

q 14, a.8,
q 19, a.4

His intellect and will, the way an artisan is the cause of his works. An artisan labors through a word conceived in his mind, and through a love in his will towards the work. So God the Father likewise worked creation through His Word, which is the Son, and through His Love, which is the Holy Spirit. And in this respect the processions of the Persons are explanatory of the production of creatures, inasmuch as the processions include the essential attributes of knowing and willing.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): the processions of divine Persons are [contributory] causes of creation in the manner just stated.

ad (2): although the divine nature is common to the three Persons, it still belongs to them in a certain order, inasmuch as the Son receives the divine nature from the Father, and the Holy Spirit receives it from both. Likewise also the power to create, though common to the three Persons, belongs to each in a certain order; for the Son has it from the Father, and the Holy Spirit from both. This is why being "the Creator" is attributed to the Father as to the One whose power to create is not from another. It says of the Son that "through Him all things were made," inasmuch as He has the same power but from another (after all, the preposition 'through' usually denotes an intermediate cause or a source from a source). But what is attributed to the Holy Spirit, who has the same power from both, is that He governs in lordship and quickens the things created by the Father through the Son. — One can also get this scheme of attribution from the appropriation of essential attributes. For, as I said above, power is appropriated to the Father, and power is most of all manifested in creating, and so being "the Creator" is attributed to the Father. The wisdom with which an agent operates who is working *via* his mind is appropriated to the Son, and so it says the Son is the one "through whom all things were made." Goodness is appropriated to the Holy Spirit, and a governance so kind as to lead all things to their due ends and to vivify them pertains to goodness; also, being alive is found in a certain interior movement, but the first source of it (the first motivator) is the end and the good.

q 39, a.8

ad (3): even though any of God's effects proceeds from any of his attributes, nevertheless each effect is traced back to the attribute it matches in its defining account. Thus putting things in order is traced to wisdom; the justification of a sinner, to mercy and to goodness diffusing itself superabundantly. But creation, which is the production of a thing's very substance, is traced back to power.

Cajetan's Commentary

In the title, 'distinctive' is used as the opposite of 'common'. — In the body of the article there are two conclusions. The first is that creating is not distinctive of any person but common to the whole Trinity.

The support is this. [*Antecedent:*] Creating, properly speaking, is causing the existence of things; [*1st conse-*

quence:] so it belongs to God as coming from His existing; [*2nd consequence:*] so it is common to the whole Trinity.

Drawing the first consequence is supported on the ground that the source of an action is figured out from its effect, because everything acting yields something similar to itself. — Drawing the second consequence is supported on

the ground that God is His essence, which is common to the whole Trinity.

q 45, a.5 There is no need to bother about the antecedent, because it is already obvious from previous remarks that "causing existence *per se primo*" and "creating" are the same thing. And so the text inserts the phrase 'strictly speaking'.

ii. The second conclusion is that the divine Persons have a causality *vis-à-vis* the production of things thanks to the makeup of their processions, since these include the essential attributes of knowing and willing. — The support goes as follows. [*Antecedent:*] An artisan works through his in-

ner word about and his love for his product, *etc.*: [*consequence:*] therefore God the Father has worked creation through the Son and the Holy Spirit. — Drawing the consequence is supported on the ground that God is the cause of things the way an artisan is, and the Son is His Word, and the Holy Spirit is His Love.

Notice here that the arguments Scotus makes in his remarks on *II Sent.* d.1, q.1, neither make our case nor conflict with it; quite the contrary, as Henry [of Ghent] says on the same passage, where he advances the view that the divine Persons have a causality because of points distinctive to them. But we say it is because of points appropriate to them; and so what he says is really nothing against us.

Quodl. VI,
a.2

Must one find a vestige of the Trinity in creatures?

Cf. *1 ST* q.93, a.6; *In 1 Sent.* d.3, q.2, a.2, 4 *CG* c.26; *De pot.* q.9, a.9

It would seem that there is no need to find a vestige of the Trinity in creatures.

(1) After all, each thing can be learned about from its vestiges. But the Trinity of Persons cannot be learned about from creatures, as was established above. Therefore, vestiges of the Trinity are not in creatures.

(2) Besides, whatever is in a creature is a created thing. So if a vestige of the Trinity is found in a creature thanks to some properties of its own, and every creature has a vestige of the Trinity, it would have to be the case that in each of those vestiges there would also be found a vestige of the Trinity, and so on *ad infinitum*.

(3) Moreover, an effect does not "indicate" anything except its cause. But the causing of creatures pertains to God's common nature, *not* to the relations whereby the Persons are distinguished and counted up. What is found in a creature, therefore, is not a vestige of the Trinity but only of God's essential unity.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Augustine says in *De Trinitate VI*, namely that a vestige of the Trinity appears in creation.

ANSWER: every effect indicates its cause somehow, but differently in different cases. Some effects, after all, indicate only the causality of their cause and not its form, as smoke indicates fire; and this sort of indication is called a "vestige." For a vestige is a footprint, showing the passage of something moving but not what kind of thing it was. But then some effects indicate their cause up to a similarity to its form, as a kindled fire indicates the fire kindling it, and as a statue of Mercury indicates Mercury; and this is the indicating done by an "image."

The processions of the divine Persons occur in virtue of the acts of understanding and willing, as was said above. For the Son proceeds as the Word understood, and the Holy Spirit proceeds as the Love in the will. In rational creatures, then, in which there is intellect and will, one finds an indication of the Trinity of the "image" sort, since we find in them a word conceived and a love proceeding.

But in all creatures one finds indication of the Trinity "vestigially," inasmuch as some features that should be traced back to the divine Persons are found in any creature you please. For every creature subsists in its own existing, has a form through which it is nailed down to a species, and has an ordering to something else. By virtue of being a created substance, it indicates a cause and source and thus points to the Person of the Father, who is a source not from a source. By having a form and a species, any creature indicates the Word, as the form of an artifact is from a conception in the artisan. And insofar as any creature has an ordering, it indicates the Holy Spirit as Love, because the ordering of any product to something else is from the will of its maker.

And this is why Augustine says in *De Trinitate VI* that a vestige of the Trinity is found in each creature inasmuch as each is one something, and each is informed by some species, and each has some ordering. — To these terms, three others are reduced — 'number', 'weight', and 'amount', which are used in Wisdom 11: 21. 'Amount' is taken to mean the substance of the thing as limited by its principles; 'number' is taken to mean its species, and 'weight' is taken to mean its ordering. — To these also are reduced three other terms set down by Augustine in [*De natura boni*]: 'amount', 'species', and 'order'. Likewise the three terms he uses in his *Book of 83 Questions*: "what is there," "what is discerned," "what befits;" after all, a thing is there through its substance, is discerned through its form, and befits through its ordering. — And any other terms so applied can be reduced easily to the same.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): indicating vestige-wise comes from appropriated attributes; in this way one can get from creatures to the Trinity of divine Persons, as I said [in the corpus].

ad (2): a creature is a thing subsisting in its own right, in which the above-mentioned trio of features is found. But there is no need for these to be found in each of the features themselves; rather, it is thanks to the three features that being a vestige is attributed to the subsisting thing.

ad (3): even the processions of the Persons are a cause and reason for creation *in some way*, as I said [in a.6].

Cajetan's Commentary

In the title, 'vestige' is used metaphorically for a thing that "indicates" in the way a footprint indicates what made it. This term has been taken from d.3 of *1 Sent.*, where the subject is treated by theologians.

In the body of the article, three items are given: the first is the meaning of 'vestige' and 'image'; the second is a conclusion answering the question as far as an image is concerned; the third is an answer as far as a vestige is concerned.

ii. As for the first item, it is common to a vestige and an image that they represent, because every effect "represents" its cause. The difference between them is that a vestige represents the cause's acting, while an image indicates its

form. — This is further explained by saying that effects are found to indicate their causes in these two ways, and these ways correspond to the definitions of a vestige and an image.

Notice here that, because 'vestige' is only being used metaphorically, and a metaphor can be interpreted under many conditions, it is not a problem that a vestige is said to indicate causality and not form, or to represent a part and not the whole, or to represent imperfectly, *i.e.* according to features common to all creatures, and not those distinctive of rational ones, *etc.* Each writer is allowed to abound in his own opinion along these lines, so long as he does not depart from the truth.

c 10
PL 42, 932

q 27, aa.1-3

c 3, PL
42, 553

q 18, PL
40, 15

cf q.32,
a 1 ad 1

iii. For the second item, the conclusion is this: in rational creatures there is an image of the Trinity. The support is that the divine processions are of the Word and intellectual Love: so, there is an image of them in rational creatures. The support for this is that there is an inner word and love in each such creature. — But since this will be the focal issue in q. 93, we pass over it here.

iv. For the third item, the conclusion is that a vestige of the Trinity is found in all creatures. — The support is to the effect that [*antecedent:*] in any creature at all, there are found some features which should be traced back to the divine Persons: [*consequence:*] so there is a vestige of the

Trinity in every creature. — The antecedent is illustrated with four trios of terms applicable to any creature, and this is clear in the text.

But pay attention to two points in the antecedent. (1) 'In any creature you please' distributes also over rational ones. For in them, the "image" turns up thanks to rationality, as will become clear below; and the footprint turns up thanks to conditions of theirs analogous to other creatures', such as amount, species, and order, *etc.* — (2) When it says 'features have to be traced back to divine Persons as to their cause' this is understood in the way already established, namely, to the divine Persons *by way of* appropriated attributes, thanks to which They are the cause of creatures.

q.93, a.6

Is creation occurring in the products of nature and art?

In II Sent. d.1, q.1, a.3, ad 5; a.4, ad 4; De potentia q.3, a.8, In VII Metaphys. lectio 7

* *admisceatur* It seems that creating is involved* in the products of nature and art.

(1) After all, in any work of nature or art, a form is produced. But it is not produced from anything, since it does not have matter as a part of itself; therefore it is produced from nothing. And so creating is involved in any work of nature or art.

(2) Besides, an effect is not more powerful than its cause. But in natural occurrences, one does not find anything at work as an active cause except an accidental form (be it an action-related form or a passive one). So, no *substantial* form is produced by what is at work in nature. What is left, then, is that a substantial form is produced by creation.

(3) Moreover, a nature makes something similar to itself. But some things are brought about in nature that are not from anything similar to themselves, as is clear in the case of animals generated by putrefaction. The forms of those things, therefore, are not from nature but from creation. And the same argument applies to other cases.

(4) Furthermore, what is not created is not a creature. So if creating is not involved in the things that arise from nature, it follows that those things are not creatures. Which is heretical.

ON THE OTHER HAND, Augustine in Book V of *Super Genesim ad litteram* distinguishes the work of propagation, which is a work of nature, from the work of creating.

PL 34, 330,
335

ANSWER: debate about this issue arises because of forms. Some authors have maintained that forms do not arise through an action of nature but already existed in matter; they posited, in short, a latency of forms. — But this idea came to them out of their ignorance of matter, because they did not know how to distinguish between potency and act. Just because forms pre-exist in matter potentially, they claimed that the forms flatly pre-existed. Other authors have

maintained that forms are given to things, or caused in things, by an agent independent of matter, after the fashion of creation. On this view, creating is involved in any work of nature. — But this idea came to them from an ignorance of form. They failed to pay attention to the fact that a natural body's form is not subsistent but is a *whereby* something is. And so, since being made and created applies, properly speaking, only to a subsisting thing, as I said above, forms have no business being made or created: they are rather co-created. a.4

Properly speaking, what comes to be from a natural agent is a composed thing made from matter. And hence creating is not involved in the workings of nature but is presupposed for them.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): forms begin to be in act as composed things are made: the forms themselves are not made to be *per se*, but only *per accidens*.

ad (2): action-related qualities in nature operate in virtue of substantial forms. And so a natural agent produces something similar to itself not only in quality but in species.

ad (3): for the generation of very imperfect animals, a universal agent suffices, a celestial power to which the animals are assimilated not in species but in some analogy or other. And one does not have to say that their forms are created by a matter-independent agent.¹ For the generation of more perfect animals, however, a universal agent does not suffice; rather, there is required a distinctive agent which is a univocal begetter.

ad (4): a work of nature does not occur without created *sources* being presupposed; and this is why things which arise through nature are called creatures.

¹ On St. Thomas belief in spontaneous generation (which was really solar-power generation), see footnote 1 to the commentary on q.4, a.2

Cajetan's Commentary

Notice that the question posed in this title is not about *each* work of nature or art, but about all or most of them: is creation involved in all or most works of nature or art? I say this on account of the generation of a human being, of which there is no mention made here, because the article is dealing with most cases.

In the body of the article he does four jobs: (1) he gives a reason why the question is being asked; (2) he handles an opinion; (3) he handles an opposite opinion; (4) he answers the question.

Analysis of the article

ii. As for job (1), the reason for raising the question

is the making of forms, about which there has been (and still is) a huge question among all parties. For since it is a common notion with everybody that *nothing comes to be from nothing*, and likewise that *nothing reverts to nothing* (and the meaning is *from nothing of itself*, and likewise *to nothing of itself*; and not as ignoramus think, *from nothing presupposed*); and people all see substantial forms, especially when they appear and when they disappear, people have fallen into opposite opinions.

[As for job (2):] Some posited latency and so answered the questions negatively because they denied all coming to be, lest they admit that something came to be from nothing. These our author taxes with ignorance of matter.

[As to job (3):] Other authors (among them Plato, it seems, and Avicenna *et al.*) posited that forms properly speaking come to be, and so they answered the question affirmatively, because forms come to be from nothing of themselves.* But the matter underlying forms kept them from seeing that they were positing something made from nothing.¹ These writers our author taxes with not knowing the nature of form, namely, that the forms of material things (which are the ones we are talking about) are neither brought to be nor existent.

Only the God-like genius of Aristotle found the middle way whereby things really come to be and yet nothing comes to be from a nothing of itself. After all, by positing that forms neither are nor cease to be apart from generation and corruption — *i.e.* that there is no producing or corrupting of forms, and that only composite things are produced, generated, and corrupted — he salvaged everything.² After all, something of the composite thing is always there already and remains behind, namely, the matter.

[For job (4):] And so Aquinas answers the question in the negative — not because nothing gets made but because only composed things get made, while

forms “are” at* the making of composed things and cease at* the corruption of them. Creation, therefore, is not occurring in the workings of nature but is presupposed by them. — And thus all the points in the text become clear.

On the answer ad 2

iii. In a fuller answer to the second objection, one would have to deal with whether action-related qualities can induce substantial forms thanks to the substances those qualities belong to. But since it will come up below, where the powers of angels and of the soul will be dealt with, and where a general discussion is held of whether a created substance can be the immediate source of any operation, I postpone the topic until then.

On the answer ad 3

iv. In the answer to the third objection, pay attention to two points. Firstly, when it says that a universal agent suffices to account for the generation of highly imperfect animals, the analogous power of a seed, which is a proximate cause of generation, is not being excluded; what is being excluded, rather, is a formally univocal proximate cause from which that power is derived, as from a parental cow there falls a seed generative of a cow, *etc.* Whether those powers have to be posited is another matter. It suffices here that they are not being excluded on grounds of the sufficiency of a universal agent, since they are instruments of the universal agent, if they exist. Concerning them, see Averroes, comment 13 on *Metaphysics XII*.

The second point is that, since it has not yet been decided whether a celestial power is animate enough to make an animal or shares enough in the power of a matter-independent life, it is no business of the present text to say how a heavenly body can make something live. The question is left hanging, therefore, until we reach the place for it.

* *ex nihilo*
su

* *ad*

q.54, a.3,
q.77, a.1

q.70, a.3 *ad*
3

¹ A modern historian would not tell the story this way. To go by the *Timaeus*, Plato thought a Demiurge shaped material things to match the self-subsisting Forms. If there are no such Forms, or at least none that can be put into matter, Plato’s story leaves empirical forms (appearing and disappearing in natural, substantial changes) with no explanation, as if they were coming from nothing and returning to it.

² Cajetan in line with Aquinas celebrates Aristotle’s contribution to the question addressed in this article. Is creation

occurring in natural, substantial changes? The answer is no, because nothing in such changes is brought to be from nothing. Why? Because “forms” are not beings. “They” are not things; “they” are not even in the same ontological department as what comes to be and corrupts. This perception by Aristotle was immensely important to Aquinas. It gave him the distinction between what (*quod*) and whereby (*quo*). For further discussion, see §§ *xxvii ff* in the commentary on q.76, a.1.

Inquiry Forty-Six: Into a beginning of created things' duration

One must turn now to studying the beginning of created things' duration. Three questions are asked.

- (1) Have creatures always existed?
- (2) Is it an article of faith that creatures began to exist?
- (3) In what sense is God said to have created heaven and earth "in the beginning"?

article I

Has the universe of creatures always existed?

*In II Sent. d.1 q.1, a.5, 2 CG cc.31-38, De potentia q.3, a.17, Quodl. III q.14, a.2, Compend. Theol. c.98,
In VIII Physic. lectio 2; In I De caelo et mund. lectio 6, 29; In XII Metaphys. lectio 5*

The universe of creatures, which we call the "world," did not begin to exist, it seems, but has existed from eternity.¹

(1) Everything that begins to be, after all, was possible to be before it was; otherwise it would have been impossible for it to be. So if the world began to be, it was possible for it to be before it started. But the "possible to be" is matter, which is in potency towards the being it has through a form and towards the non-being it has through a privation. So if the world began to be, matter was there before the world. But matter cannot be without form, and matter with form is a world. Therefore, the world existed before it started, which is impossible.

(2) Besides, nothing having the power to exist always, does so sometimes, and sometimes not, because a thing exists as long as it can. But every incorruptible thing has the power to exist always (since it does not have power to exist for a limited stretch of time). So nothing incorruptible is sometimes and isn't sometimes. Well, everything which begins to be sometimes is and sometimes is not. Therefore, nothing incorruptible begins to be. But there are many incorruptible things in the world, such as the heavenly bodies and all the intellectual substances. Therefore, the world did not begin to be.

(3) Moreover, nothing outside the sphere of becoming begins to be. But Aristotle shows that matter is outside the sphere of becoming [*Physics I, c.9*] and that heaven is ungenerated [*De caelo I, c.3*]. Therefore, the universe of things did not begin to be.

(4) Furthermore, a vacuum is where there is no body but there could be. But if the world began to be, then where the body of the world is now, there previously was no body, and yet there could have been one there (otherwise none would be there even now). Prior to the world, then, there was a vacuum — which is impossible.

(5) Also, no change starts unless what induces it undergoes it stands differently now than it did before. But what stands differently from how it did before is itself changing, and so prior to every incipient change there was

already change happening. Ergo, change has always been happening. Therefore, what undergoes it has always existed, because change "is" only in the thing being changed.

(6) Also, every inducer of change is either natural or else voluntary. But neither sort begins to induce change unless some change is already occurring. Nature, after all, is always working in the same way; and so, unless some change came beforehand (either in the nature of the change-agent or in that of the patient), the only change starting from a natural change-agent would be one that had happened previously. A will, however, without a change in itself, may hold off doing what it proposed, but this only happens thanks to some imagined change, at least in time itself. Thus, one who wills to build a house tomorrow and not today expects something to happen tomorrow which is not going on today; and at least he expects that today will pass and tomorrow come, which does not happen without change, because time is a numerical measure of change. Inevitably, therefore, prior to every incipient change there was another change. And so on back.

(7) Also, what is always at its beginning and always at its end can neither begin nor cease, because what begins is not at its end, and what ceases is not at its beginning. But time is always at its beginning and end, because there is nothing to time but "now," which is the end of the past and the beginning of the future. Therefore, time can neither begin nor cease. So neither can change, which has time as its measure.

(8) Additionally, either God is prior to the world in nature alone, or He is prior in duration, too. If it is by nature alone, then, since God is from eternity, the world is also from eternity. But if He is prior in duration, before and after in a duration make up time; and so prior to the world, there was time — which is impossible.

(9) Again, when an efficient cause is posited, its effect is posited; after all, a cause upon which the effect does not follow is an incomplete one, needing another for the effect to follow. But God is a sufficient cause of the world — both final, by reason of His goodness, and exemplary, by reason of His wisdom, and efficient, by reason of His power — as is clear from previous remarks. Therefore, since God is from eternity, the world has been since eternity.

(10) And yet again, that whose action is eternal has an

¹ Now that scientific cosmology accepts a "beginning," it is fun to read the Medieval objections to the idea, because they came from Aristotle, not Newton, much less Fred Hoyle.

q.44. aa.1.3.4 eternal effect. But God's action is his substance, which is eternal. Therefore, the world is eternal, too.

ON THE OTHER HAND. John 17:5 says: "And now, Father, glorify thou me with thine own self with the glory which I had with thee before the world was;" and Proverbs 8:22 says: "The Lord possessed me at the beginning of His ways, before anything He had made from the beginning."

I ANSWER: nothing other than God has existed from eternity. And to posit this is not impossible. I showed above, after all, that God's will is the cause of things. So a thing "has to be" as God's willing it "has to be," since the necessariness of an effect depends on the necessariness of its cause, as it says in *Metaphysics V* [c.5]. I also showed above that, absolutely speaking, God does not have to will anything but Himself. Therefore, it is not necessary that God will the world to have always been. Rather, the world exists for as long as God wills it to, since the world's being depends upon God's will as upon its cause. So the point that the world has always been is not necessary, and so it is not open to conclusive proof.

The arguments Aristotle advanced for it are not probative unqualifiedly but only in a certain respect, namely, as refutations of arguments used by older writers, who had said the world began in certain ways which really were impossible [*Physics VIII*, c.1; *De caelo I*, c.12]. This interpretation of Aristotle's project emerges as clearly right on three grounds. The first is that both in *Physics VIII* and *De caelo I* he starts with certain opinions (such as those of Anaxagoras and Empedocles and Plato), against which he is advancing refutations. — The second ground is that, wherever he talks about this topic, he brings up the testimonies of the ancients, which is not his practice in making a proof, but something he does in arguing plausibly. — The third ground is that Aristotle admits in Book I of the *Topics* [c.9], in so many words, that there are debatable issues on which we do not have conclusive reasons, such as whether the world is eternal.²

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): before the world existed, it was "possible" for the world to be, not thanks to a passive potency (which is matter) but thanks to the active potency which is the power of God. And if one means to call it "possible absolutely," not thanks to any potency, but just due to the compatibility of non-conflicting terms, this is the sense in which 'possible' is opposed flatly to 'impossible', as Aristotle makes clear in *Metaphysics V*.³
ad (2): thanks to a strength always to be, what has that strength does not sometimes exist and sometimes not; but

² Aquinas speaks from his faith, of course, but it does not dictate what Aristotle "must have meant to say." He looks at textual clues and does a better job of it than many readers because, unlike them, he can tell the difference between Aristotle making an argument and Aristotle giving a proof.

³ The objector hoped to trap a person admitting that the world was possible before it existed into also admitting that matter pre-existed. The trap was set by using 'possible' in the *de re* sense verified by a passive potency (*i.e.*, the world was 'possible' because some stuff could become it). So Aquinas first breaks the trap by taking 'possible' in the *de re* sense verified by an active potency (the world was 'possible' because God could make it). Then he breaks it by going to the "absolute" sense of 'possible', independent of any potencies.

before it had strength, it did not exist. And so this argument, which was laid down by Aristotle in *De caelo I*, does not get the unqualified conclusion that incorruptible things did not begin to be but that they did not begin to be in the natural way in which generable and corruptible things begin to be.

ad (3): in *Physics I*, Aristotle shows that matter is beyond the sphere of becoming because it has no subject from which to arise. In *De caelo I*, he shows that heaven is ungenerated because it has no contrary from which to be generated. So it is obvious that in both places the conclusion is only that matter and heaven did not start to be through generation — as some have claimed, especially about heaven. Our claim, however, is that matter and heaven were put into being by creation, as is clear from our previous statements.

ad (4): "where nothing is" does not say enough to define a vacuum; it needs to say there is space adequate for a body in which there is no body, as Aristotle says in *Physics IV* [c. 1, c.7; *cf. De caelo I*, c.9]. But our claim is that there was no place or space prior to the world.⁴

ad (5): the first inducer of change is always in the same state, but the first undergoer of change has not always been in the same state, because it began to be what it earlier had not been. But this did not come about by [natural] change but by creation, which is not a "change" as I already said. So this argument which Aristotle put forward in *Physics VIII* [c.1] is obviously against those who used to claim that there were eternal changeable things but not eternal change, as was the opinion of Anaxagoras and Empedocles. We, however, claim, that there has always been change ever since changeable things came to be.

ad (6): the first agent is a voluntary agent. And although He has an eternal will to produce an effect, he did not produce an eternal effect. And it is not necessary to presuppose any change, not even on account of imagined time. It is one thing, after all, to understand the case of a particular agent, who presupposes something and causes something else; and it is quite another thing to understand the case of a universal agent, who produces the whole. As a particular agent produces a form and presupposes matter, he has to introduce a form proportionate to the needed matter. One reasonably thinks of him as inducing the form in such matter and no other, thanks to the difference between sorts of matter. But it is not reasonable to think this way about God, who simultaneously produces form and matter; rather, it is reasonable to think of Him as producing matter suitable for the form and the purpose. — Well, a particular agent presupposes time just as he does matter. So it is reasonable to think of him as acting at a later time rather than earlier thanks to an imagined succession of one time after another. But in the case of a universal agent who produces the thing and the time, there is no point to thinking of Him as acting now rather than earlier, thanks to one imagined time after another, as if time were presupposed for His action; rather, one should think of Him as giving to His effect as much time as He wants for it, and as much as is fitting to show His power.⁵

⁴ Thomistic creation (like the "big bang" in Fr. Lemaître's solution to the field equations of General Relativity) brings space into being along with whatever is in it. Why does one never hear this from the historians of science?

⁵ Again, Thomistic creation does not presuppose time but produces it, along with the changeable things measured by it. Why do we never hear this from the historians?

c.12
281 b

192 a 28

270 a 13-

22

208 b 26

251 a 8-
28

After all, the world brings knowledge of God's creative power to mind more clearly if it has not always been, than it would have done if it had always been. For, what has not always been around obviously has a cause, but this is not so obvious about a thing that has always been around.

219 a 16-25 *ad* (7): as it says in *Physics IV* [c.11], "before" and "after" are in time because they are in change. And so a beginning and an end have to be accepted in time as well as in change. Supposing the eternity of a change, one will have to take any moment in the change as a beginning and as a terminus; but one need not do this if the change begins. The same argument applies to the "now" of time. And thus it becomes clear that the above argument about the "now" moment (that it is always a beginning and an end of time) presupposes the eternity of time and change. This is why Aristotle brought this argument forward in *Physics VIII* [c.1] against those who were admitting eternity of time but denying eternity of change.

251 b 10-28

ad (8): God is prior to the world in duration. But this 'prior' does not mean a priority of time but of eternity. — Alternatively, one can say that 'prior' indicates an eternity

of imagined (but not really occurrent) time. Thus, when one says "There is nothing above heaven," the word 'above' indicates a merely imagined place, thanks to the fact that it is possible to imagine other dimensions being added to those of a heavenly body.

ad (9): as an effect follows upon an agent cause naturally according to the manner of its form, so it follows upon a voluntary agent in the manner of the form already understood and settled by Him, as is clear from earlier remarks. So although God has been a sufficient cause of the world from all eternity, it does not have to be the case that the world was produced by Him except according to the prior determination of His will — so that the world's having being after not being might proclaim the world's Author more evidently.

q 19, a.4;
q 41, a.2

ad (10): given an action, an effect follows according to the exigencies of the form at the source of that action. In agents acting voluntarily, what has been understood and pre-determined is taken as the form at the source of the action. So from God's eternal action there does not follow an eternal effect, but one such as God wanted, namely, one that would occur after not occurring.

Cajetan's Commentary

The title is clear. — In the body of the article there is one conclusion with two corollaries.

The conclusion is: Nothing but God has existed from eternity, but an alternative is not impossible. — Notice here that the conclusion says two things. First, it asserts that nothing besides God has always existed. Then, since this is held by faith and is not a matter for proof, it says secondly that the alternative is possible.¹

The assertion is supported as follows. [*Antecedent:*] The cause of things is God's will; [*1st inference:*] so a thing has to be as God has to will it; [*2nd inference:*] therefore it is not necessary for God to will that the world should always be; [*3rd inference:*] therefore, the world is as long as God wills it to be; [*conclusion:*] therefore it is not necessary for God to will anything except Himself. The third, on the ground that the world's existing depends upon the will of God as upon its cause.

The first corollary is that it cannot be proved conclusively that the world has always existed. — The second corollary is that the arguments brought forward by Aristotle are not flatly probative but only in a certain respect. This is made clear from three sources: namely, from the opinions refuted, from the testimonies adduced, and from Aristotle's own explicit admission. — All the points are clear in the text.

¹ The alternative was (and still is) that some other things have always existed. The Mediaevals thought of the heavenly bodies. We now know that none of them are older than the cosmic background radiation. What remains forever beyond the grasp of human empirical science is whether our cosmos is the first and only one.

A doubt about the answer *ad* 10

ii. In the answer *ad* (10), there is a doubt whether God's action is formally in act from eternity, *i.e.* eternally in act as *an action*, or only materially, *i.e.* insofar as it is a certain reality. If the issue is understood the first way, it follows that God is in act from eternity as an agent, a creator, a cause of things, *etc.* And in that case, something has been created, enacted, caused, *etc.*, from eternity. This inference is from *Metaphysics V* [c.2]: particular causes in act as causes are simultaneous with their effects. — But if we understand the issue the second way, then God from eternity is an agent cause in potency and then "later" is a cause working in act, which is awkward.

1014 a23

iii. We need to respond to this doubt with caution, lest we say either that God has been eternally a cause only in potency (which is rejected in 2 *CG* c.6) or that God has been eternally creating a world, which is clearly false, since He is called "creating" *vis-à-vis* the created and is called "creative" *vis-à-vis* the creatable, as it says in *Metaphysics I* [c.15]. Pursuing a middle way, therefore, let us distinguish and say that God's action is in act from eternity not only materially but also formally. But this last can be understood in two ways: (1) in respect to what the action posits in the agent; (2) in respect to what is inferred about it from its effect. In way (1), God's action is in act from eternity; but in way (2), not. Thanks to (1), God is not a cause in potency but in act from eternity; but thanks to (2), God has not created the world from eternity nor is he now creating the soul of the Antichrist. — If one asks how what is inferred from the effect is in God from eternity, in act or potentially, the answer is quick to find, because it is in Him [virtually] in an active power, and never is, was, or shall be in Him formally. *Re* things present in God formally, it is awkward to posit anything in potency. Hence the action, according to all that which it posits in the agent formally, has to be in act in God eternally, *etc.*

1021a 15

article 2

Is it an article of faith that the world had a beginning?

In II Sent. d 1 q 1, a.5; 2 CG c.38; De potentia q 3 a.14, Quodl. XII q.6 a.1; Opusculum 27, De aeternitate mundi.

That the world had a beginning does not seem to be an article of faith but a scientifically provable conclusion.

(1) After all, everything “made” has a beginning. But it can be proved conclusively that God is the efficient cause of the world, as even the more plausible philosophers maintain. Therefore, it can be proved that the world began.

(2) Besides, if we have to say the world was made by God, then it was either from nothing or from something. But it is not from something, because then the world’s matter would have pre-existed it. — Against this Aristotle has arguments positing heaven to be ungenerated. Therefore, we have to say that the world was made from nothing. And thus it got existence after not existing. Therefore, one has to say that it began.

(3) Moreover, every cause that works through understanding, works from some starting point, as is clear in all artifacts. But God is a cause who acts through understanding. Therefore, He works from some starting point. The world, therefore, which is His effect, did not always exist.

(4) Furthermore, it is abundantly clear that certain arts and settlements began at definite times. But this would not be the case if the world had always been. So, clearly, the world has not always been.

(5) In addition, it is certain that nothing can be made equal to God. But if the world had always existed, it would have been equal to God in duration. Therefore, it is certain that the world has not always existed.

(6) Also, if the world has always existed, infinitely many days have preceded today. But an infinite number cannot be gotten through. So the world would never have gotten to today — which is obviously false.¹

(7) Again, if the world has been going on forever, generation has been going on forever. So, one man would have been begotten by another infinitely many times. But a father is the efficient cause of his son, as it says in *Physics II*. So one can go back to infinity in efficient causes?
c 3: 194 b 30
c 2: 994 a 1 — This is disproved in *Metaphysics II*.

(8) And yet again, if the world and generation have always been going on, infinitely many people have lived before us. But people’s souls are immortal. Therefore, infinitely many human souls would now exist in act — which is impossible.² Necessarily, therefore, one can know scientifically that the world began, and the point is not held by faith alone.

¹ This argument from John Philoponus, was prized in medieval Islam and still has its defenders. See William Lane Craig, *The Kalaam Cosmological Argument* (NY: Macmillan, 1979).

² The assumption is that an infinite set of real things cannot be simultaneously actual. See q. 7, a.4

ON THE OTHER HAND, an article of the faith cannot be proved conclusively, because faith is “of things not seen,” as it says in Hebrews 11:1. But that God is the world’s creator in such a way that the world began to be, is an article of the faith. After all, we say “I believe in one God who . . .” — And again, Gregory in his *First Homily on Ezekiel* says that Moses prophesied about the past when he said “In the beginning God created heaven and earth,” in which words the newness of the world is conveyed. So the newness of the world is learned by revelation alone. And so it cannot be proved conclusively [by unaided reason].

Denz: 125
PL 76, 786

ANSWER: that the world has not always existed is held by faith alone and cannot be proved conclusively — just as I said above about the mystery of the Trinity. The reason for this is that the newness of the world cannot be proved from the world itself. For the starting point of a proof is a “what something is.” But each thing, by the scientific definition of its kind, abstracts from here and now — which is why we say that universals are “always and everywhere.” And so there cannot be a scientific proof that man, or heaven, or rock has not always existed.³ — Neither can such a proof be made from an Agent Cause working through his will. The will of God cannot be investigated by reason unless it is about things it was absolutely necessary for Him to will; but such things are not among those He wills about creatures, as I said before.

q 32, a 1

Posterior Analytics I, c 31,
87b 33

But the will of God can be manifested to man through revelation, on which faith is based. Therefore, that the world began is believable, but not provable or knowable in science. — This is a helpful point to keep in mind, lest perhaps someone presuming the faith to be provable brings forward non-cogent reasons, which give unbelievers something to laugh about when they think we believe points of the faith for reasons like these.

q 19, a 3

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — ad (1): as Augustine says in Book XI of *The City of God*, the philosophers positing the world’s eternity were of two minds. Some maintained that the world’s substance is not from God, and their error is intolerable and so has to be refuted. But others maintained that the eternal world was made by God. “They did not want the world to have an age but wanted the start of its creation to have always been made in some scarcely intelligible way” . . . “but however they understood this idea, they did hit upon it,” and as it says in Book X of *The City of God*, “they say that just as if a foot had been in the dust from eternity, there would always have been a footprint under it, which no one doubts was made by a shoe; so also the world has always been while He who made it is ever-

c 4, PL 41,
319

c 31; PL 41,
311

³ Strong empirical evidence that the visible cosmos began 15 billion years ago confirms nothing about things beyond it; cf. previous article. But theories about such things cannot be scientific.

existing.” To grasp this, one should bear in mind that an efficient cause working by inducing change necessarily precedes its effect in time (because the effect is only at the terminus of the action, while the agent has to be the start of it). But if the action is instantaneous and not successive, it is not necessary for the doer to be prior in duration to the done (as is clear in the case of illumination).⁴ And so they say that, if God is the world’s active cause, it does not necessarily follow that He is prior to the world in duration, because the creating whereby He produced the world is not a successive change, as I said before.

q 45, aa.2, 3

ad (2): those who posited that the world is eternal, said the world was made by God from nothing, not because it was made after nothing (as we understand creation), but because it was not made from anything; and so some of them did not shy away from the word ‘creation,’ as is clear from Avicenna in his *Metaphysics*.

tract ix, c. 5,

c 4, 203 a 31

ad (3): this is the argument of Anaxagoras, reported in *Physics III*. But it is not a conclusive argument unless it is about a mind deliberating what to do, which is like a mind in motion. But that sort of thing characterizes the human mind, not the divine mind, as emerged above.

q.14, a.7

ad (4): those positing the eternity of the world suggest that regions have gone from inhabited to uninhabited infinitely many times, and *vice-versa*. Similarly they suggest that the arts, thanks to various accidents and corruptions, have been lost and re-invented infinitely many times. This is why Aristotle says in his *Meteorologica* that it is ridiculous to form an opinion about the oldness or newness of the world from particular changes like those.

l. c 14, 352 a
26, cf. 351a 19
& b 8

ad (5): even if the world had always been, it would not have equaled God in eternalness, as Boethius says at the end of *De consolatioe philosophiae*, because God’s existence is all-at-once, without succession, and the world’s is not.

V. prosa 6, PL
63, 859

ad (6): a length of time is always understood from one

⁴ The spread of light through a darkened space seems instantaneous because the immense speed at which light travels makes its progress imperceptible. Thus, ancient and medieval Philosophers were provided with an apparent example of instantaneous change.

endpoint to another. No matter what day in the past is picked, from that day until today there have been only finitely many days, which can be gotten through. The objection proceeds as if, given the endpoints, the middle would be infinite.

ad (7): it is impossible to go to infinity among efficient causes *per se* — as would be the case if the causes required for some definite effect were multiplied to infinity, as if the stone were moved by a shovel and the shovel by a hand, and so on back to infinity. But it is not thought to be impossible to go to infinity among agent causes *per accidens* — as when the causes whose count rises to infinity are not ordered except as one cause whose multiplication is accidental, as when a carpenter uses up many hammers by accident because one after another they break. So it is accidental to this hammer that it acts after the action of another hammer. Similarly, it is accidental to this man (as he begets) that he was begotten by another; after all, he begets as a man and not as another man’s son. Among efficient causes, all parents are on the same level, *i.e.* the level of a particular begetter. Hence it is not impossible that man be begotten by a man infinitely often. But it would be impossible if the begetting by this man depended upon this man plus an elementary body plus the sun, and so on back and back forever.

ad (8): those who posit the eternity of the world elude this argument in many ways. Some do not hold it impossible for there to be so many souls in act, as you see in al-Ghazali’s *Metaphysics*, where he says that this would be an accidental infinity. But I invalidated this approach above. Others say that the soul corrupts with the body. Still others say that out of all the souls there remains only one. Others again, as Augustine says, take this excuse to posit a circulation of souls, so that souls separated from their bodies go back to being in bodies again after a fixed period of time. All of these ideas will be dealt with in subsequent Inquiries. — But one needs to bear in mind that this argument is *particular*. Hence one could say that the world has been eternal, or that some creature has been (say, an angel), but not man. Here, we are after the more general issue of whether any creature has been from eternity.

Bl. I, tract I,
c 11
q 7, a.4Sermon 241,
Pl. 38, 1135:
City of God
Pl. 41, 361
q 75, a. 6, q 76,
a. 2; q 118, a. 6

Cajetan’s Commentary

In the title question, ‘article of faith’ means what one is bound to hold by faith alone.

In the body of the article, a single conclusion answers the question, namely: [*1st part:*] that the world began is held by faith alone [*2nd part:*] in such a way that it cannot be proven conclusively. — Support for the conclusion goes first to its second part: then the first part of it is made clear; and thirdly, the article shows what profit there is in knowing the conclusion.

ii. The support starts with an argument like this. [*Antecedent, 1st part:*] the recentness of the world cannot be

proved from the world itself. [*antecedent, 2nd part:*] nor from the world’s cause; [*conclusion:*] therefore, it is not provable.

The first part of the antecedent is supported on the ground that the starting point of conclusive proof is “what something is,” and each thing, thanks to the definition of its species, abstracts from here and now; hence there is no way to show that mankind, or heaven, or rocks have not always existed. — The remainder of the antecedent is made clear by the commonplace that “universals are everywhere and always.”

The second part of the antecedent is supported on the ground that what God wills cannot be studied by mere reason unless the issue is things He necessarily wills; [*inference*:] so there is no way to know scientifically what He has willed about creatures. — The inference holds because he does not necessarily will anything about creatures.

iii. On the support for the first part of the antecedent, notice that the force of the argument lies in this: the “what it is” of each created thing, taken as a species, abstracts from here and now; therefore, it cannot provide a sufficient means for inferring the recentness of a thing, because “recentness” involves a difference in time; it is obvious that what is indifferent in itself as to now and previously cannot supply a reason for now and not previously. Hence, the author takes not only the world but also anything belonging to the world and infers that its recentness cannot be proved from its quiddity.¹

iv. Concerning the main consequence, notice that since “the world” means the whole universe of things, and outside the universe there is nothing but its Head, there is no room for a proof of the world’s beginning of the kind called a “proof *that*.”² This is why the text, once an explanatory cause from what the world is and what its parts are has been excluded, leaves standing the point that the world’s newness is unprovable.

v. As for the first part of the conclusion, namely that this point is held by faith, it is made clear on the basis that the divine will can be manifested to man through revelation; [*inference*:] therefore it is credible that the world began. The inference holds because faith is based on revelation.

vi. Thirdly, the text says it is helpful to know this point. This is shown from two ways it helps: (a) to repress presumption, and (b) to avoid derision from unbelievers, as is clear in the text.

vii. In the answer *ad* (7), let the beginner notice that it is one thing to say

(1) Tom (a father) is a *per se* cause of Dick (a son), and Dick is a *per se* cause of Harry

and quite another thing to say

(2) Tom and Dick are *per se* causes of Harry.

Here (1) is perfectly true, since, as one man begets another *per se*, so also your father beget you, as it says in *Meta-*

¹ Aquinas was arguing from the structure of proof as Aristotle pioneered it. He did not anticipate proofs of the sort developed by modern cosmology to establish a finitude of elapsed time since the Big Bang (q.32, a.1 *ad* 2), but he understood their irrelevance to the task of this article. To see it today, just read the speculations positing an everlasting series of Big Bangs before the latest one, or a “multiverse.” Such speculations have no better status than science fiction, of course, but that does not make them philosophically disprovable.

Credibility is quite another issue. The Biblical doctrine of creation has never been more credible than it is today, and the atheist alternatives have never been less so.

² Aquinas followed Aristotle in distinguishing a proof of why a fact obtains (called a proof *proprie quid*) from a proof that a fact obtains (called a proof *qua*). Knowing that a fact obtains was the

physics XII. (2) is utterly false. *Per se* ordered causes of a given effect are on different levels, as the text says, simultaneously causing the effect; and this is why their count cannot go to infinity. But a father and a grandfather are causes on the same level, not simultaneously causing a third person, even though (as the text says) the grandfather was a *per se* cause of the father and the father such a cause of the son. And so for the coming-to-be of Harry it does not matter whether there were finitely or infinitely many ancestors.

Unpacking the Answer *ad* (8)

viii. In the answer *ad* (8), pay careful attention to what is said and the point of saying it. After reporting the opinions, the text adds that one must bear in mind that “this argument is particular.” That is the truth, because it is particular not in itself but in relation to the question asked. The question asked, after all, was whether it is an article of faith that the “world,” *i.e.* the whole universe of creatures, began to be — and not whether it is an article of faith that particular species of creatures began to be. For suppose it is provable that mankind began to be; it still remains in doubt whether it is provable that the whole world began to be, since the eternity of the world is consistent with the beginning in time of mankind, or of the angels, as the text says.

Now the point of saying this is that, in the doctrine of St. Thomas, the argument advanced is cogent. But little of use is said about it in 2 CG c.38, because that text assumes many points on which philosophers disagree.

ix. On same answer *ad* (8), notice that upholding the immortality of souls without reincarnation and denying the possibility of an actual infinity even “*per accidens*,” make it impossible to think that human generation has been going on forever. And so let the Thomists be careful when they admit that the world could have existed from eternity. Let them admit this about the world in its substance, the five elemental bodies; let them also admit it about the motions of the heavenly bodies and the generation of everything except *human beings*. Otherwise, you will either go back to an actual infinity, or have recourse to miracles by positing that one man lived infinitely long and at a certain point began to beget. And even on that basis you would not salvage human reproduction as going on forever but only the existence of our species. But it is ridiculous, in my view, to invoke this miracle where the topic under discussion is the possibility of producing the world such as we see it.³

preliminary to searching for its explanation. On this distinction, see Cajetan’s commentary on q.1, a.2 §§ 7, 13.

³ What Aquinas clearly held to be impossible (even in an accidental collection) is infinitely many human bodies co-existing at once. For the count of such bodies would require an infinite “number.” But he also admitted species of manyness that were not “numbers,” and these were counts of non-material things, like distinct points known by God (q.14, a.12). These were cases of “transcendental manyness,” so called because they were not in a category. Cajetan was more definite than Aquinas seems to have been that the set of the souls could not be a transcendental manyness beyond any finite count. See q.7, a.4, footnote 3.

Did the creation of things happen at the beginning of time?

In *II Sent.* d.1 q.1 a.6

It seems that the creation of things was not at the beginning of time.

(1) After all, what is not in time is not *at* any time. But the creation of things was not in time; for by creation the substance of things was brought into being, and time does not measure the substance of things, especially bodiless things. Therefore, creation was not at the beginning of time.

Physics VII [c 6],
237 b 10

(2) Besides, Aristotle proved that everything made was once getting made; and thus every case of being made has a before and after. But the beginning of time, since it is indivisible, has no before and after. Therefore, since being created is a matter of things being made, it seems that things were not created at the beginning of time.

(3) Moreover, even time was created. But it cannot have been created at the beginning of time, since time is divisible but its beginning indivisible. Therefore, the creation of things was not at the beginning of time.

ON THE OTHER HAND, Genesis 1:1 says, "In the beginning, God created heaven and earth."

ANSWER: the text of Genesis 1:1 has been expounded three ways, so as to exclude three errors. Some writers maintained that the world has always been, and time had no beginning. To exclude this mistake, 'in the beginning' is taken to mean 'of time'. — Others maintained that there had been two sources of creation, one the source of the good things; the other the source of the bad. To exclude this mistake, 'in the beginning' was interpreted to mean 'in the Son'. For just as being the efficient source is appropriated to the Father on account of His power, so

also being the exemplar source is appropriated to the Son, on account of [His being God's] wisdom. Thus when Scripture says, "thou hast made all things in wisdom" it is understood to mean that God made everything "in the Son," thanks to what St. Paul said in Colossians 1:16, "in Him" *i.e.* the Son, "all things were created." — Still others claimed that bodily things had been created by God *via* the mediation of spiritual creatures. To exclude this, 'in the beginning God created' was taken to mean [He made heaven and earth] before anything else at all. That way, four things are being said to have been created together: empyrean heaven, a material body (the earth), time, and angelic nature.

Psalm 103: 24

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): things are not said to have been created at the beginning of time as if the beginning of time were the measure of their creation, but because heaven and earth were created together with time.

ad (2): that statement of Aristotle is about things made through change, or coming at the terminus of a change. For in any change one has to accept a before and an after. Ahead of any designation in the change signified, as long as something is changing and becoming, one must accept a "before" it and also an "after" it, because what is at the start of a change, or at the end of it, is not being changed. But creation is neither a change nor a terminus of change, as I said above. Thus, a thing is created in such a way that it was not previously being created.

q.45, a.2 *ad*
3, a.4

ad (3): nothing is "made" except insofar as it "is." But there "is" nothing to time except *now*. Therefore, time could not have been made except in terms of some *now* — not because time is in that first *now* but because time begins from it.

Cajetan's Commentary

The title is clear enough. — In the article's body, the conclusion is that the phrase 'in the beginning' [in Gen. 1:1] has been expounded in three ways, against three errors:

- as meaning a beginning of time, against the philosophers;
- as meaning "in the Son," against Pythagoras and the Manicheans;
- as meaning "before anything else," against Plato, Avicenna, and their followers. — All points are clear in the text. From them you have the conclusion answering the question in the affirmative, and to round out the doctrine, you have it with added points.

ii. In the answer *ad* (1), Aquinas denies that the first in-

stant of time "measured" creation,¹ not because producing creatures took longer (since it was instantaneous as he said in the preceding article, *ad* 1), but because it included incorporeal substances, which are above time and above the instants of time. So while the first instant of time did not measure creation, it still co-existed with it.² (What was measured by the first instant of discrete time, the measure of spiritual operations, will come out below.)

2/1.57 q 113,
a.7 *ad* 5

¹What measured an event was an interval of time, an instant was only an end-point of an interval and so measured nothing.

²The Medievals also distinguished the visible cosmos from an invisible remainder. Is it not fun to compare multiverse theories with angelology?

Inquiry Forty-Seven: Into differentiation between things overall

After dealing with the production of creatures in being, it is time to study their differentiation from each other. This study will fall into three parts. In the first, we shall study things' being distinct and different in general [q.47]; in the second part, the difference of good from evil [q.48]; in the third, the difference of spiritual from corporeal creatures [q.50]. Here in the first part, three questions are raised:

- (1) about the very multitude or distinctness of things;
- (2) about the inequality of things;
- (3) about the oneness of the world.

article 1

Is the multitude and distinctness in things from God?

2 CG cc.39-45; 3 CG c.97; De potentia q.3, a.1 ad 9, a.16, Compend. Theol. cc.71, 72, 102, In XIII Metaphysicorum, lectio 2, In Libro de Causis, lectio 24.

It seems as though the multitude and distinctness among things is not from God.

q.11, a.4 (1) After all, one thing is always apt to make one thing. But God is supremely one, as became clear above. Therefore, He produces but one effect.

q.44, a.3 (2) Besides, what is made on a pattern is made similar to its pattern. But God is the exemplary cause of His effects, as I said above. Therefore, since God is one, His effect is only one and not [divided internally into things that are] distinct.

q.44, a.4 (3) Also, things made for a purpose are tailored to the purpose. But the purpose of creation is just one, namely, God's good state, as was shown above. So, God's effect is no more than one.

ON THE OTHER HAND, it says in Genesis 1:4, 7 that God "divided the light from the darkness" and "divided the waters from the waters." Therefore, distinctness and multitude in things is from God.

ANSWER: writers have assigned various causes for the distinction among things. Some attributed it to matter, either alone or with an agent. Those picking matter alone, like Democritus and all of the ancient naturalists, posited only the material cause and thought the distinctness in things came from chance movement of matter. — Anaxagoras favored matter with an agent; he posited a Mind distinguishing things and sorting out what had been mixed up in matter.

cf. *Phy. vcs II c. 2, 194a 20ff*
Phy. vcs III c. 4, 203a 34
Phy. vcs III cc. 8-9
198b 10 – 200b 9

q.44, a.2 But this thinking cannot stand for two reasons. The first is that (as shown above) matter itself was created by God. And so even the distinctness which is due to matter has to be traced back to a higher cause. — The second reason it cannot stand is because matter is for the sake of form, and not *vice-versa*. But the distinctness of things arises *through their own forms*. So distinctness is

not in things on account of matter but the other way about: there is pluriformity in created matter so that it might be accommodated to diverse forms.

Other writers attributed the distinctness of things to secondary agents. Thus, Avicenna said that God, in understanding Himself, produced the First Intelligence, in whom there had to arise a composition of potency and act (as will become clear below), since he was not his own being. So, then, the First Intelligence, insofar as He understood the First Cause, produced a Second Intelligence; but inasmuch as he understood himself as having been in potency, produced the body of heaven, which moves; but insofar as he understood himself as being in act, he produced the soul of heaven.

This theory, too, cannot stand for two reasons. First, as was shown above, creating belongs to God alone. So things that can only be caused by creating are produced by God alone — and this covers everything not subject to generation and corruption. — Secondly, according to Avicenna's opinion, the universe of things did not come from the intention of the First Agent but from a congeries of many agent causes. But that sort of thing, we say, comes from chance. And thus the fullness of the universe which lies in a diversity of things would have come from chance, which is impossible.

The thing to say, then, is that the distinctness and multitude of things is from the intention of the First Agent, who is God. He brought things into being in order to communicate His good state to creatures and to have it represented by them. And since it could not be represented sufficiently by one creature, He produced many and diverse creatures, so that what one lacked towards representing the divine good state might be supplied by another. For the good state which is in God in a simple and uniform way is in creatures multiply and dividedly. Hence, the whole universe shares God's good

Metaphys. tract 9, c.4

q.50, a.2 ad 3

q.45, a.5

state and represents it more completely than any one creature does. — And since God's wisdom is the cause of the distinction between things, Moses says that things are distinct by a word of God, which is a conception of His wisdom. This is what is being said in Genesis 1: "The Lord said, let there be light... and He divided the light from the darkness."

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad (1)*: an agent acting by its nature acts through a form thanks to which it is what it is, which is unique in each thing; and so such an agent only does one thing. But a voluntary agent such as God, as was shown above, acts through a form He has understood. And so, since the fact that God understands many things does not conflict with His oneness and simplicity, as I showed already, it remains the case that despite being one, He can do many things.

ad (2): that argument would work for a made-to-pattern thing which perfectly reproduced its pattern (*i.e.* a patterned thing which is not made many except materially). Hence the uncreated Image, which is perfect, is unique. But no creature reproduces the First Exemplar, which is the divine essence, perfectly. And hence the latter can be represented by many. — Yet insofar as the divine ideas are called exemplars, the plurality of things corresponds to a plurality of ideas in the divine mind.

ad (3): in theoretical matters, the middle term of a demonstration fully proving its conclusion is unique; but middle terms for probable arguments are many. Similarly, in practical matters: when the means is fully adequate, so to speak, to the end, one needs only one means. But creatures do not stand that way towards the end who is God. Hence the creatures had to be made many.

Cajetan's Commentary

In the title question, one is asking whether the differentiation is from God, not just somehow or other, but as *directly intended*, as becomes clear in the course of the article.

In the body, he does three jobs: (1) he treats the opinion of the ancients; (2) he treats Avicenna's opinion; (3) he answers the question.

ii. As to job (1), the opinion of Democritus and Anaxagoras is rehearsed, to the effect that distinction between things is from matter alone and by accident, or from matter together with an agent. — Both opinions are criticized for what they allege in common, namely, that differentiation is from matter as from its first cause, *i.e.* irreducibly to any prior cause.¹ They are criticized first because matter itself is from God; secondly, because form also is prior to matter in that matter is for the sake of form.

iii. As for job (2), Avicenna's opinion is reported to the effect that differentiation is from secondary agents. This is undermined on two grounds. First, because this is not true about distinctions between incorruptible things, since these can arise from God alone. — Secondly, because the distinctness of things would be left to chance and hence the fullness of the universe would be a chance affair. The first consequent holds because what arises from the collaboration of many agent causes and is not directly intended by any one cause concerting them, is by chance. The second consequent holds because the perfection of the universe lies in the diversity of things.

iv. As to job (3), the conclusion answering the question is this: the distinctness or multitude is from the intention of the First Agent, who is God. — This is supported thus:

[*antecedent:*] God brought things into being to communicate His good state to creatures and to have it represented by them; [*consequent:*] therefore, He produced many and diverse creatures. The consequent holds good because God's good estate cannot be represented sufficiently by one creature. Which in turn is supported on the ground that, while goodness is in God simply and uniformly, it is in creatures multiformly and dividedly. This is also confirmed on the ground that the whole universe shares in God's good state more perfectly than any one creature could.

Then the conclusion is supported by the authority of Scripture in Genesis 1: "God said..."

v. Concerning this reasoning, observe that when it speaks of or asks about a "sufficient representation" of God's good state, the talk is not about unqualified sufficiency, because not even a thousand worlds would suffice for that — but about a sufficiency consonant with the completion of the universe. This is what the argument is reaching for, namely, that we should be able to speak of such a representation of God's good state as directly intended by God in the universe of things, because a single creature would not suffice for such representation.

On the answer *ad (2)*

vi. In the answer *ad (2)*, observe that the text means to attribute being an exemplar to God in two ways: (1) In the first way, [He is an exemplar] by reason of His substance unqualifiedly — and in this way God is the one exemplar of all things. (2) In the second way, [God is an exemplar] by reason of His substance thus-or-so imitable — and in this way there are many exemplars of things in God's mind in keeping with the multitude of His *idca*.

¹ Nowadays, the ancient opinion is undermined by the great number of Big-Bang models predicting a little-differentiated and short-lived universe, devoid even of stars and heavy elements.

article 2

Is the inequality of things from God?

1 ST q.65, a.2; 2 CG cc.44, 45, 3 CG c.97, *De potentia* q.3, a.16, *De anima* u.7,
Compend. Theol. cc.73, 102; *In De Div. Nom.* c.4, *lectio* 16.

It looks as though the inequality of things is not from God.

(1) After all, it is the job of the best to bring out the best. But among the best of things, one is not greater than another. Therefore, it is the job of God, who is the best, to make everything equal.

c.15, 1021a 9-14 (2) Besides, equality is an effect of unity, as it says in *Metaphysics IV*. But God is one. Therefore, He makes everything equal.

(3) Moreover, the work of justice is to give unequal rewards to the unequal. But God is just in all His works. Therefore, since no inequality is presupposed for His work of giving being to things, it would seem that He has made all things equal.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what it says in Sirach 33: 7-8. "Why does day surmount day; and light, light; and year surmount year, and sun upon sun? By the wisdom of the Lord have they been separated."

ANSWER: when Origen wanted to exclude the view [of the Gnostics] claiming that distinction between things came from the opposed sources of good and evil, he posited that God from the beginning created all things equal. He said that God first created only rational creatures who were all equal. Inequality arose from free choices, whereby some turned towards God (some more, some less) and some turned more or less against God. Those rational creatures who turned to God by free choice were promoted into the different orders of angels, in proportion to their different merits. Those who turned against God were tied down to various bodies, according to their various sins; and this is the reason for the creation and diversity of bodies.

But on this view, the universe of bodily creatures would not exist for the sake of communicating God's good state to creatures, but for the sake of punishing sin. But this is against what it says in Genesis 1:31. "God saw all the things which He had made, and they were very good." And Augustine asks in *The City of God XI*, "What could be more stupid than to say that God, the artist, put only one sun in the world, not for its beauty or the well-being of bodily things, but rather because one soul had sinned? As if, had a hundred sinned, the world would have had a hundred suns."

And so the thing to say is that God's wisdom is the reason for things' inequality, just as it is the reason for their distinctness. The issue becomes clear as follows. We find in things a double distinction: one formal, by which things differ in kind, the other material, by which they differ only in number. But since matter is for the sake of form, material distinction is for the sake of for-

mal distinction. As a result, we see that among things that are incorruptible there is but one individual in each species, because the species is sufficiently preserved in one. But among things generable and corruptible, there are many individuals in a single species, so as to preserve the species. From this it is clear that formal distinction is more basic* than material. But a formal distinction always requires inequality because the forms of things are like numbers, which vary in kind by adding or subtracting a unit, as it says in *Metaphysics VIII*. Thus, in natural things, the species seem to have been ordered hierarchically — mixed things are more perfect than the elements, and plants more perfect than mineral bodies, and animals more perfect than plants, and men more perfect than the other animals, and on each of these grades, one species is found to be more perfect than the others. Thus, as divine wisdom, for the sake of the universe's completeness, is the cause of things' distinctness, so also it is the cause of their inequality. After all, it would not be a complete universe if only one level of goodness were found in things.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): the job of the best agent is to produce his best whole effect, and to make each part of the whole not unqualifiedly the best but the best in proportion to the whole. After all, the good state of an animal would be destroyed if each and every part of it had the dignity of its eye. So also, God made a *best whole universe* (in the creaturely way of being best) but not individual creatures — them He made one better than another. And so Genesis 1 says of a single creature "God saw the light, that it was good," and likewise for other particular creatures; but about all of them together, it says: "God saw all that He had made, and it was very good."

ad (2): what first proceeds from unity is equality, and then there proceeds multiplicity. And so from the Father, to whom unity is appropriated (according to Augustine), the Son proceeded, to Whom equality is appropriated; and after that came creation, to which inequality belongs. But even creatures share some sort of equality, namely, that of proportion [or relatedness].

ad (3): This reasoning is what moved Origen, but it has no place except in the distribution of rewards, whose inequality is due to unequal merits. But in the constitution of things, there is no inequality of parts thanks to any preceding inequality of merits nor any inequality of material disposition, but thanks to the completing and perfecting of the whole. One sees the same in works of craftsmanship. The reason a roof differs from a foundation is not because it has different matter in it; rather, the builder sought different materials so as to make the house complete from its different parts and so as to build it so, if he could.

* *principalior*

c.3, 1043b 34

Per Archon I,
 c.6f, *II cc* 1,2,9,
PG 11, 166, 178,
 229

c.23,
PL 41, 337

De doctrina
Christiana I,
 c.5, *PL* 34, 21

 Cajetan's Commentary

The title is to be understood as the preceding one was [namely, to mean that the inequality of things was intended by God] — In the body of the article he does two jobs: (1) he deals with an opinion of Origen's; (2) he answers the question.

ii. As for job (1), the opinion of Origen is stated in the text clearly enough in three points: [a] that rational creatures were created equal, [b] that inequality arose from free choice, and [c] that the diversity of things and even the creation of bodies came from punishment. And thus Origen answers the question in the negative. — Aquinas also mentions what occasioned this opinion, namely, the effort to exclude the opinion saying that inequality of things is from the conflict of the principles of good and evil. It seems to have been the opinion of Empedocles and the Manicheans. If you want to see all of this treated at greater length, read *2 CG* cc.39-46; here the matters are touched upon briefly.

Against this opinion the text argues that it would imply that the universe of corporeal creatures did not exist to share God's good state but rather to punish sin. The awkwardness of this is shown by the authority of Genesis and Augustine.

iii. Note here that God's good state is not excluded totally in Origen's view, since the purpose of punitive justice is also God's good state. What is excluded, rather, is God's good state's being the sole sufficient reason. For this is the difference between unconditional goods and goods that are only punitive, namely, that the divine good state is the sole reason for the first but is never the reason for the second except on a supposition of demerit, which is not from God. Hence, divine goodness is not being denied flatly in the text but qualified with a 'but' — "but to punish sin," by which what we have just said is insinuated.

The awkwardness of Origen's position is optimally

shown by the authority quoted: "God saw all that He had made, and it was very good." Things that are good only in view of punishing are not counted among the unqualified goods, because they are not unqualifiedly sought after.

iv. As for job (2), the conclusion answering the question is this: God's wisdom is the cause of inequality among things, just as it is the cause of distinction among them. — Aquinas first shows that God's wisdom is the cause of inequality, and then shows that it is the cause thereof *just as* it is the cause of distinction.

The first point is supported thus. [*Antecedent:*] God's wisdom is the cause of distinction between things; [*1st consequence:*] therefore, it is the cause of formal distinction; [*2nd consequence:*] therefore, it is the cause of inequality. — Drawing the first consequence is supported on the ground that formal distinctness is the main distinctness. This in turn is supported on the ground that, since only two distinctions exist, numerical and formal, and since matter is for the sake of form, material distinction is for the sake of formal distinction. A sign of this is the fact that we see numerical oneness and plurality to arise on account of a species' form. — Drawing the second consequence is supported on the ground that a formal distinction always requires inequality. This in turn is supported on two grounds: first, because the forms of things are like numbers, as it says in *Metaphysics I/III*: second, because among natural things their species appear in ordered grades, as is clear inductively.

Secondly, Aquinas proves that God's wisdom is the cause of inequality as it is the cause of distinction. The universe would not be complete if only one level of goodness were found in it; therefore, the perfection of the universe requires inequality; therefore, inequality is from God for the sake of the world's completeness just as distinction is. — The whole reasoning process is clear.

article 3

Is there just one world?

De potentia q. 3, a. 16 ad 1; *In XII Metaphys.* lectio 10;
In I De Caelo, lectiones 16ff

It would seem that there is not just one world, but many.

(1) After all, as Augustine says in his *Book of Eighty-Three Questions*, it is awkward to say that God created things without reason. But the reason He created one, could have been the reason to create many, since His power is not limited to the creation of just one world, but is infinite as was shown above. Therefore, God produced many worlds.

(2) Nature makes what is better, and all the more so does God. But it would be better for there to be many worlds rather than one, because many goods are better than fewer. So many worlds have been made by God.

(3) Moreover, everything having its form in matter can be multiplied numerically while remaining the same in species, because numerical multiplication is from matter. But the world has its form in matter. For just as, when I say "a man," I indicate a form, but when I say "this man," I indicate a form in matter; so also, when "world" is said, it means a form, and when "this world" is said, it means a form in matter. Therefore, nothing prevents their being many worlds.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what it says in John 1:10, "The world was made by Him," where "world" appears in the singular, as if only one world existed.

ANSWER: the order existing in things, created by God as they are, shows the oneness of the world. For the world is called one by a oneness of order, as some things are ordered to others. All things coming from God have order towards each other and towards God Himself, as was shown above. Therefore, it has to be the case that they all pertain to one world. — The ones who could hypothesize many worlds were the ones who posited no wise cause ordering the world, but only chance — like Democritus, who said this

world and ever so many others were made by atoms falling together.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): this reasoning is why the world is one — because everything had to be arranged in one order, and to one end. This is why Aristotle concluded to the oneness of the god governing the world, from the unity of order in the things existing in it. Also Plato argued for the oneness of the world from the oneness of the exemplar whereon it was patterned.

ad (2): no agent intends a material plurality as his end, because material multitude has no definite stopping point but tends of itself to go on to infinity, and infinity conflicts with the defining makeup of a purpose.¹ When the objector says that more worlds are better than one, he is saying this in terms of material multitude. But such a "better" is not from the intention of God the agent-cause, because for the same reason, if He had made two worlds, one could say that three would have been better, and so on to infinity.

ad (3): the world consists of all its matter. For it is not possible that there be another earth than this one, because any [volume of the element] earth, wherever it may have been previously, is borne naturally towards this middle place. And the same argument holds for the other bodies which are parts of the world.²

¹ Aquinas argued earlier, in q. 7, a. 4, that an infinite number of items could not be the intended purpose of any designer, on the ground that an intended set would have to have a definite cardinality, and he thought of 'infinite' as meaning indefinite. He was probably thinking of the same argument here.

² Contrary to the popular image of medieval cosmology, the central place of the earth was not a place of honor, but just a low place to which heavy things would be drawn. And since "earth" was the heaviest element, the concentration of it had to occupy that place. On the sense of the modal term 'possible' in this answer, see Cajetan, *Opuscula Omnia* (Lyon, 1562), Tractate VIII "To Brother James".

Metaphysics XI,
e 10, 1076 a 3

Timaeus, 31a

De caelo I, 277 a
21f; 279a 1-11

q 11, a. 3,
q. 21, a. 1 ad 3
Physics III, IV, VIII

Cajetan's Commentary

The title is talking about numerical oneness, and not just for the corporeal world but for the universe [so as to cover spiritual beings as well]; and it is talking about this as a matter of fact, not as one of possibility. For we are not now arguing about the power of God, but about the diversity found in things in general.

ii. In the body of the article, he does two jobs: (1) he answers the question; (2) from the reason given, he deduces as a corollary what other writers may have thought.

As for job (1), the conclusion drawn in answer is that the world is just one. — The support goes as follows. [*Antecedent:*] All the things coming from God have an order to each other and to God Himself; [*consequence:*] therefore, they all have to belong to one world. Drawing the consequence is supported on the ground that this world is one with a oneness of order.

From this, for job (2), the difference between philosophers is deduced as a corollary. Namely, those who posited as the cause of the world a wisdom organizing it did not posit multiple worlds; but those

who said things arose by chance, like Democritus, were able to speak of many worlds.¹

cc. 8, 9
 iii. In the answer *ad* (3), notice that the whole answer is taken from Aristotle in Book I of *De caelo et mundo*. However, since the text says it is not "possible" for there to be another earth, [you should be aware that] the word 'possible' is not being taken in terms of what is possible by God's active power, nor in terms of what is logically possible; but only in terms of what is possible from the potencies with which created things have been endowed. This is the same sense of 'possible' in which we say that it is not

¹ The generalization has held up pretty well. Those who appeal to multiple universes today are physicalists thinking of cosmogony as happening by chance, at least in the sense of having been unguided.

possible for the dead to rise. After all, the present treatise, as I just said, is not about what God could do or could not do, but is about what the distinction among things requires.²

As for the reason quoted in the text from Aristotle to show the oneness of the earth, on the ground that any earth would be naturally moved to this central point wherever it had been, there is a doubt. But since the reason to raise the doubt looks to the book *De caelo* from which the argument is taken, let it be set aside as a special question, or dealt with in its proper place.³

² Since the *de re* sense of 'possible' advocated by Cajetan depends upon the quiddity of "earth" and its "natural place," it is obsolete

³ Cajetan never returned to the issue, which is just as well, since the *De caelo* has been a dead letter since Copernicus.



Inquiry Forty-Eight: Into the differentiation of things more specifically

Next one needs to study the differentiation between things on a more specific basis. We shall deal first with the difference between good and evil; then with that between spiritual and corporeal creatures [q.50] On the first topic, one needs to ask about evil and the cause of evil. On evil itself, six questions are raised.

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| <p>(1) Is evil any sort of nature?
(2) Is evil found in things?
(3) Does evil attach to good as its subject?</p> | <p>(4) Does evil corrupt good totally?
(5) On the division of evil into punishment and fault.
(6) Which has more of what it takes to be evil, punishment or guilt?</p> |
|--|--|

article 1

Is evil any sort of nature?

*In II Sent. d.34, a.2, 3 CG cc 7ff; De malo q.1, a.1;
Compend. Theol. c 115; In De Div. Nom. c.4, lectio 14.*

It seems that evil is a nature of some sort.

- c 11; 14a 23 (1) After all, every genus is a nature. But evil is some sort of genus. It says in the *Categories* that "good and evil are not in a genus but are genera of other things." Therefore, evil is a nature.
- (2) Besides, every difference that marks off a species is a nature. But evil is a difference marking off species in moral matters; after all, a bad habit differs from a good one in species, as liberality differs from stinginess. Therefore, 'evil' means a nature.
- c 10, 12a 22; 13a 15 (3) Moreover, in a pair of contraries, either is a nature. But evil and good are not opposed as a lack and a having, but as contraries, as Aristotle shows in the *Categories*, on the basis that between good and evil there is an intermediate, and one can return from the evil to the good. So, 'evil' means a nature.
- * ens (4) Furthermore, what does exist does not do anything. But evil does something: it corrupts the good. Therefore, evil is a being* and a nature.
- cc 10, 11; Pl. 40, 236 (5) Also, nothing pertains to the completeness of the universe unless it is a being and a nature. But evil pertains to the completeness of universe. After all, Augustine says in the *Enchiridion* that the admirable beauty of the universe comes from everything in it; therein even what is called evil, when it is well-ordered and put in its place, commends the good things all the more." Therefore, evil is a nature.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Denis says in c.4 of *De divinis nominibus*, "evil is neither an existent nor a good."

ANSWER: in a pair of opposites, one is known by way of the other, as light through darkness. So, too, what evil "is" has to be learned from the defining makeup of the good. We said above that a good is

anything that can be sought after; and so, since every nature seeks its own existing and its own completion, one has to say that the existing and completion of each nature has what it takes to be good. Therefore, it cannot be the case that 'evil' means a case of existing, or a form, or a nature. What is left, then, is that the word 'evil' means an absence of good. — This is why Denis said that "evil is neither an existent nor a good;" for since a being as such is a good, the removal of either is the same.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad (1)*: Aristotle was speaking there in the vein of the Pythagoreans, who thought evil was a nature of some sort and so made good and evil into genera. It was Aristotle's custom, especially in his logical works, to pick examples widely accepted in the philosophical thinking of his time. — An alternative answer is this. Aristotle said in *Metaphysics X* that "the first opposition is between having and lacking," because this reappears in all contraries, one of which is always incomplete *vis-à-vis* the other (as black *vis-à-vis* white, and as the bitter *vis-à-vis* the sweet). And as a result, good and evil are not called genera unqualifiedly, but genera of *contraries*. For as every form has what it takes to be a good, so every privation, as such, has what it takes to be an evil.

ad (2): good and evil do not mark species except in moral matters, which get their kind from the purpose (*i.e.*, the object of the will upon which moral matters depend). And since a good has what it takes to be a purpose, good and evil are specific differences in morals — good, of itself, but evil as removal of a due purpose. Even removal of a due purpose does not mark a species in morals unless it is joined to an undue purpose. Likewise, in nature, one does not find privation of a substantial form unless joined to another

*cf Metaphysics I
c.5, 986 a 25f*

c.4, 1055 a 33

form. Thus, the evil which marks a specific difference in morals is some good attached to the privation of another good, as the purpose of a drunk is not just to lack the good of reason, but to enjoy a sensory pleasure — outside the order of reason. Hence, evil as such does not mark a specific difference; rather, the attached makeup of a good does this.

From this we also get an obvious answer *ad* (3). In this text, Aristotle was talking about good and evil as found in morals. Between good and evil in that use, one does find a middle inasmuch as what is ordered is called good, but we call 'evil' not merely what is unordered but also injurious to another. This is why Aristotle says in *Ethics IV* that a free-spender is foolish but not evil. — From the evil found in morals, one can also return to the good; but this is not true of evil in just any context. From blindness, for example, there is no return to vision, and yet blindness is an evil.

ad (4): 'do something' is used three ways. (a) One way is form-wise, in the sort of talk in which one says that whiteness "whitens." And in this sense evil, by being a privation, is said to "corrupt" good, because it is the very corruption or privation of good. (b) Another way is in use when something is said to "do something" as an efficient cause, as when a painter is to "whiten" a wall. (c) The third way is as a final cause, as when a purpose is said to "act" by "moving"

the efficient cause. In these last two uses, evil does not do anything of itself, *i.e.* insofar as it is a privation, but thanks to having a good attached to it. After all, every action is from some form, and everything desired as a purpose is some completeness or other. This is why Denis says in c. 4 of *De divinis nominibus* that evil does not act and is not desired except by virtue of an attached good. In and of itself, rather, it is uncharacterized* and outside the focus of one's will and intention.¹

ad (5): as I said above, the parts of the universe have an order to each other (inasmuch as one acts upon another, or is a purpose or exemplar of the other). An evil cannot stand in such relations except thanks to an attached good. Therefore, an evil does not pertain to the completeness of the universe and is not included in the order of the universe except on an accidental basis, *i.e.* by reason of an attached good.

PG: 3, 717

* *infinitum*

q 2, a.3;
q 19, a 5 *ad* 2;
q 21, a 1 *ad* 3;
q 44, a.3

e.1;
1121a.25

¹ When a proposition had a negated subject-term, as in "a non-rock is no obstacle"

the subject was called *infinitum*. The word obviously did not mean infinite but just indefinite or (better yet) uncharacterized. After all, a non-rock is anything (but a rock). And so the truth of such a sentence is unclear. Is the non-rock a feather or an ocean? The curious may consult a scholastic manual of logic under the topic "infinitated terms." The modern reader may look into set theory under the topic of the "complement" of a set.

Cajetan's Commentary

The title is clear. — In the body of the article, he does three jobs: (1) he lays down the procedure for getting an answer; (2) he follows the procedure and answers the question; (3) he justifies a statement by Denis.

ii. As for job (1), the procedure consist in this: one must learn the defining makeup of evil from that of good. — The support is that one opposite is known through the other, as darkness through light.

iii. As for job (2), evil is an absence of good. — The support goes thus. [*Antecedent:*] Everything sought for is a good; [*1st consequence:*] so the existing and completing of each nature is a case of good; [*2nd consequence:*] so 'evil' does not mean existing or a form or a nature; [*3rd consequence:*] so it is an absence of good. — Drawing the first consequence is supported on the ground that every nature seeks its own being and its own completion.

Notice that the conclusion says "an absence," because not every negation of good is an evil, but rather the negation of a due good, as emerges in 3 *CG* c.6. So the absence of a good *that ought to be present* is an evil. A good is "due" *when, as, where,*

in what, etc., it should be. But just to get our conclusion one does not care about this: presently it suffices to find the "genus" of evil, whereby one knows whether it is a nature of any sort. Rightly therefore, once one has found evil to be an absence made clear by a negation, the proof process ceases.

iv. As to job (3), since evil has been established as a negation of good, and since Denis has defined evil as a negation not only of good but also of being (as the text said in its "on the other hand"), Aquinas says that this statement is a derived one. For a being as such is a good; so a negation of the one is a negation of the other, and *vice-versa*; thus, evil is a negation of both, and so Denis says it is a negation of both. But since the negation of good comes first, evil is defined by us through good.¹

¹ Cajetan means "first" in the process of defining. Since "good" and "evil" belong to evaluative language, one grasps evil from its opposed evaluation. After seeing it as a negation of "good", one looks into what it takes for anything to be called good, so as to see what else evil is negating. This is where one runs into being, as Aquinas did in q.5, a.3.

article 2

Is evil found in things?

1ST q.22, a.2 ad 2, *In I Sent.* d.46, a.3; *In II Sent.* d.34, a.1; 3 *CG* e.71;
De potentia q.3, a.6 ad 4, *Compend. Theol.* c.142, *In De Div. Nom.* c.4 *lectio* 16.

It seems that evil is not found in things.

(1) After all, whatever is found in things is either a being or a privation of being (which is a not-being).
 PG 3, 716 But Denis says in c.4 of *De divinis nominibus* that evil is far from the existent and even further from the non-existent. In no way, therefore, is evil found in things.

(2) Besides, 'a being' and 'a thing' are equivalent terms. So if evil is a being in things it follows that evil is a thing of some sort. Which is against what was said before.

(3) Moreover, the whiter option is the one less mixed with black, as it says in Book III of Aristotle's
 c.5; *Topics*. So also what is better is what is less mixed
 119a27 with evil. But God always makes what is better, far more than nature does. So in the things established by God, no evil is found.

ON THE OTHER HAND, this view would remove all prohibitions and punishments, which only deal with evils.

q 47, a.2 I ANSWER: as I already said, the completeness of the universe requires inequality among things and requires all the levels of goodness to be implemented. Well, there is a level of goodness whereon a thing is good in such a way that it can never fall short. And there is another level of goodness whereon a thing is good in such a way that it can fall short of the good.
 * esse These two levels are also found in being* itself; for there are things which cannot lose their existence (such as the incorporeal things) and some that can lose it (like bodily ones). So since the completeness of the universe requires that there be not only incorruptible beings but also corruptible ones, so also the completeness of the universe requires that there be things that fall short of goodness — whereupon it follows that they do sometimes fall short. But the defining makeup of evil lies precisely in this, that something falls short of the good. Obviously, then, evil is found in things the same way as corruption is — for corruption itself is an evil.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): evil lies far from

what unqualifiedly "is" and far from what unqualifiedly "is not," because it neither "is" like a habit nor "is not" like a pure negation; rather it is a privation.

ad (2): as it says in *Metaphysics IV*, 'a being' is used in two ways: (1) In one it indicates the being-status of a thing as divided into the ten categories; and so taken, "a being" is equivalent to "a thing." And in this way no privation is a being, nor is any evil. (2) The other way 'a being' is used is to allege the truth of a proposition, whose sign is the word 'is' as found in a verbal composition; and this is the 'being' with which one answers the question, *Is it the case?* And thus we say that blindness "is" in the eye, or any other privation "is." And this is the way in which evil is called a being. — Thanks to ignorance of this distinction, when some people have heard some things being called evil or have heard it said that evil is in things, they have come to believe that evil is some sort of thing.

ad (3): God, nature, or any agent does what is better overall but not what is better in every part, except in relation to the whole, as I said above. The whole which is the universe of created things is better and more complete if there are some things in it which can fall short of good, and sometimes do so, God permitting. On the other hand this is because the job of Providence is not to destroy a nature but to preserve it, as Denis says in c. 4 of *De divinis nominibus*. Nature itself contains the rule that what can fall short sometimes does.¹ On the other hand, as Augustine says in the *Enchiridion*, this is because God is so powerful that he can even "build straight with crooked timbers" [*bene facere de malis*]. Hence, many goods would be removed if God permitted no evil to occur. A fire, after all, would not be kindled unless some air were corrupted; and the life of a lion would not be preserved if an ass were not killed, and the justice that vindicates, like the patience which suffers, would not be praised if there were no iniquity.

¹ This version of Murphy's law became a temporal sense of 'can' in which 'can' meant 'sometimes does' and 'sometimes doesn't'. It is found also in the Third Way among the proofs for God's existence (q.2, a.3).

 Cajetan's Commentary

a.1 In the title, evil's being "found in things" does not mean that evil is a real thing, because this has already been excluded. Rather, it means that evil "is" in things in the common sense of 'is'.¹ It says "in things" to set aside items found only in the mind, like second intentions. And the question is about being found in the formal sense of 'found', so that we do not mean to ask just whether evil has a basis in things but whether it is form-wise found in things.²

ii. In the body of the article there is a single conclusion answering the question in the affirmative: evil is found in things, just like corruption. — The support goes thus. [*Antecedent:*] The completeness of the universe requires that there be inequality among things and that every level of good be realized; [*1st consequence:*] so just as it requires there to be incorruptible beings and corruptible ones, so also it requires there to be beings that cannot fall short and beings that can; [*2nd consequence:*] so some things in the universe sometimes fall short; [*3rd consequence:*] therefore, evil is found in things the same way as corruption is.

The antecedent is supported by what has already been said. — Drawing the first consequence is supported on the ground that these are the two levels of goodness found in the universe, in line with the two levels of being, as is self-evident. — Drawing the second consequence is left as obvious; and indeed it is, since, apart from miracles, it is impossible that things able to fail should never in fact fail. — Drawing the third consequence is supported on the ground that the defining makeup of an evil is a falling short from good (meaning a *due* good). — The modifying expression 'the same way as' is confirmed on the ground that corruption is an evil, since it is an evil of [or for] the thing corrupted.

iii. Pay close attention to 'the same way as', because it solves the problem of beginners who ask: How it can be the case, if evil is formally a nega-

tion, and negations exist only in the mind — as the answer *ad* (2) also says if you apply it to the existence of evil — how can it be the case, I repeat, that evil is form-wise in things?

Here you have the solution: it is not the case that evil is in things as a being [*ens*]; rather, it is in them as a corruption in exercised act, *i.e.* as the form-wise removal of a thing.³ For the very absence of a good form-wise is an evil; and — as was said in the answer *ad* (4) of the preceding article — evil form-wise corrupts the opposed good, because it is the very privation of that good in a subject apt to have it, *etc.*

Hence they [the philosophers] say that evil is in things not positively but remotely, *i.e.*, not by form-wise putting something in things but by removing something. And thus evils are found form-wise in things as evils; after all, there are evils of things [*rerum mala*]. It is in the mind, however, (by its putting propositions together and its other operations) that evils are found as beings and goods.³

iv. It is no problem, therefore, but even a help, that evil puts nothing into a thing. For we are speaking of evil as "evil in exercised act" when we say that an evil is not found to put anything anywhere but only to remove a good that was due there; for this is its form-wise "act," as is clear from remarks above. Hence, the following inference is worthless: *evil or privation puts nothing in the real but is a being only in the mind: therefore, it is not found in things form-wise*. It is clearly found form-wise as the removal, in exercised act, of a thing. Indeed, an opposite inference follows: *it removes a case of being in a subject; therefore, it is found in a thing as exercising negation, not positing an act*. But for these things to be found thus in things is for them, unqualifiedly, to be found, because they are found form-wise and in accordance with the proper manner of their kind (the kind which is a non-being or a privation).

¹ The common sense of 'is' was captured by the copula used in putting propositions together without either making or forswearing existential commitments.

² A trait was present form-wise (*formaliter*) when reality contained the makeup defining the trait itself. The alternatives were power-wise (*virtualiter*) in case reality contained only a cause of the defining makeup of the trait, and basis-wise (*fundamentaliter*) in case reality provided some, but the mind supplied the rest, of the makeup it took to define the trait.

³ The mind easily conceives negatives as beings just by the habit of making nouns. Thus 'isn't here' becomes 'absent' or 'lacking' which then becomes 'an absence' or 'a lack', which sounds like a being. To turn negatives into goods is a bit more work. The mind must either misuse an evaluative term (as when one mistakes an evil for a good) or use the term in a way I am about to illustrate. Being eaten by spiders is a bad end for flies, but we judge that, for general ecological purposes, it is good that spiders eat flies; arachnid floundering is a good which makes a good out of the flies' demise.

Does an evil reside in a good as in its subject?

q 17, a 4 ad 2, *In II Sent.* d.34, q.1 a.4; 3CG c.11;
De malo q.1, a.2; *Compend. Theol.* c.118.

It seems that an evil does not reside in a good as in its subject.

PG 3, 733 (1) All goods are existing things, after all. But Denis says in c. 4 of *De div. nom.* that evil “is not an existing thing nor in existing things.” Ergo, evil is not in a good as in its subject.

(2) Besides, evil is not a being [*ens*], but good is a being. A non-being does not need a being in which to reside as its subject
 t. And so an evil does not require a good in which to reside as its subject.

(3) Moreover, one contrary is not the residence of the other. But good and evil are contraries. So an evil des not reside in a good as its subject.

(4) Furthermore, that in which whiteness resides as its subject is called white. So, that in which evil is present as in its subject would be called evil. So if evil resides in a good as in its subject, it will follow that a good is evil — contrary to what is said in Isaiah 5:20, “Woe unto you that call evil good and good evil.”

c 14: PL 40, 238 ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Augustine says in the *Enchiridion*, to the effect that an evil is nowhere but in a good.

I ANSWER: an evil involves the removal of a good, as I said [a.1]. But not every removal of a good is called an evil. For “removal of a good” can be taken privatively or negatively. When it is taken negatively, it does not meet the definition of an evil — otherwise it would follow that things not existing at all would be evils; and again anything you please would be an evil from the mere fact that it did not have the good of something else. A man would be an evil because he did not have the speed of an antelope or the strength of a lion. No, what is called an evil is “removal of a good” taken privatively, as privation of sight is called blindness. Well, the subject of a form and its privation is one and the same, namely, a being* in potency, whether it is altogether in potency (like prime matter,

the subject of a substantial form or its opposed privation), or in potency just in some respect but in act overall, like a transparent body (the subject of darkness or light).¹ But obviously the form through which something is in act is a completion and a good of some sort; and so every being in act is a good of some sort. Likewise, every being in potency as such is a good of some sort, inasmuch as it has an order to the good. For just as it is a being in potency, so also it is a good in potency. There is nothing left to say, then, but that the subject of an evil is a good.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): Denis meant that an evil is not among existing things as a part of them, nor as a natural hallmark of anything existing.

ad (2): “non-being” taken negatively does not need a subject. But a privation is a negation in a subject, as it says in *Metaphysics IV*, and evil is this sort of non-being.

ad (3): an evil does not reside in the good opposed to it but in some other good; the subject of blindness, after all, is not the seeing but the animal. — Still, it seems (as Augustine says) that this is where the rule saying “contraries cannot coexist” breaks down. But this rule applies to the common usage of ‘good’ and ‘evil’, not to the specific use found in the talk of this good and this evil. White and black, sweet and bitter, and other such contraries, are only taken specifically, because they are in certain definite categories. But ‘good’ covers all the categories, and so one good can coexist with the privation of another good.

ad (4): the Prophet cries woe to those who call what is in fact good, *qua* good, evil. But this mistake does not follow from our premises, as is clear from previous remarks.

¹ Light and darkness were viewed as accidents in the 13th Century. What we think of as light coming through a transparent body, they thought of as “lightedness” in that body, where the accident could reside because of the body’s transparency.

c 2:
1004a 15

Enchiridion, c 14,
PL 40, 238

Cajetan’s Commentary

The title is clear. — In the body of the article, a single conclusion answers the question affirmatively: an evil resides in a good as in its subject. — Here is the support, [*Antecedent*:] An evil is removal of a good privatively, not negatively; [*1st consequence*:] so the evil and the good removed are in the same subject, *i.e.* a being in potency utterly or in some

respect; [*2nd consequence*:] therefore, an evil is in a good as in its subject.

The part of the antecedent saying “not negatively” is supported by deducing two impossibilities. The first is that things not existing at all would be evils. The second is that all creatures would be evils. — The rest of the antecedent is supported by the sufficiency

of the two alternatives for what 'removal of a good' might mean.

Drawing the first consequence is supported on the ground that the subject of a form is the same as the subject of its privation, namely, a being in potency unqualifiedly or in some respect. — Drawing the second consequence is supported on the ground that a being in potency either way is a good. For a being

in potency in some respect, this is shown by the fact that it is also a being in act (in some respect), and being in act is a good of some sort. For a being in potency unqualifiedly, its being a good is supported on the ground that it is called a good in the same way it is called a being. And hence, as a being in potency is some sort of being, so also a good in potency is some sort of good.

article 4

Does an evil corrupt a good totally?

211 ST q 85, a.2; In II Sent. d.34, a.5; 3 CG c.12; De malo q.2, a.12.

It seems that an evil corrupts a good totally.

(1) After all, one contrary is wholly corrupted by the other. But good and evil are contraries. Therefore, an evil can corrupt a good as a whole.

c 12;
PL 40, 237;
Cf. De virtutibus
ecclesiae II, 3. PL
42, 1347

(2) Besides, Augustine says in the *Enchiridion* that evil does harm insofar as it "snatches away a good." But good is similar to itself and uniform. Therefore, it is wholly taken away by an evil.

(3) Furthermore, as long as an evil exists, it harms and removes a good. But what sometimes removes something, sometimes consumes it, unless it is infinite (which cannot be the case for any created good). Ergo, an evil wholly consumes good.

c 12, *ibid.* ON THE OTHER HAND, Augustine says in the *Enchiridion*, that evil cannot completely consume good.

ANSWER: an evil cannot totally consume a good. To see why, one needs to reflect that three goods are at stake. One of them is completely removed by the evil, and this is the good opposed to that evil, as light is entirely taken away by darkness, and seeing by blindness. Then there is a good which is neither taken away by the evil nor diminished, such as the good which is the subject in which an evil resides; after all, the substance of the air is not diminished by darkness. And then there is a good which is diminished, indeed, by the evil but not completely removed, and this good is the subject's openness or readiness* for its act.

* *habilitas*

Diminishment of this good is not to be understood as a subtraction (like diminishment in quantities), but as a weakening[†] (like the diminishment in qualities and forms). The weakening of a readiness comes from intensification[‡] contrary to it. Such a readiness is reached by dispositions thanks to which matter is prepared for an act; the more these dispositions are increased in the subject, the more ready it is to receive the completeness and form in question. And contrariwise, it is weakened by contrary dispositions; the more these are multiplied in the matter, and the more intense they are, the more its potency for the act is weakened.

So, if the contrary dispositions cannot be multiplied or intensified to infinity, but only up to a certain limit, neither can the readiness just mentioned be diminished or weakened to infinity. One sees this in the ac-

tive and passive qualities of the elements: the coldness and moistness by which a matter's aptitude for the form of fire is diminished or weakened cannot be increased to infinity. — But if the contrary dispositions can be increased to infinity, then the readiness is also diminished or weakened to infinity — but not totally removed, because it always remains in its root, which is the subject's substance. Suppose infinitely many opaque bodies were interposed between the sun and the air; the air's readiness to be lighted would be diminished infinitely; but it would never be taken away completely so long as the air itself remained, because air is transparent by its nature. Likewise, sins can be added to infinitely, and through them the soul's readiness for grace is more and more diminished. These sins are like obstacles interposed between us and God, as it says in Isaiah 59:2, "Your iniquities have separated between you and your God." And yet this readiness is never removed from the soul totally, because it is a consequence of the soul's nature.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): the good which is opposed to the evil is removed totally, but other goods are not removed totally, as I said.

ad (2): the readiness just mentioned is a middle thing between the subject and its act. On the side where it touches the act, it is diminished by evil; but on the side where it touches the subject, it remains. So even if good is similar in itself, it is not removed wholly but in part, as it is compared to diverse items.

ad (3): some writers have imagined the above-mentioned diminishment of good on the pattern of quantitative lessening. They have said that just as a continuum is divided to infinity when each division is made in the same proportion (when one takes a half from a half or a third from a third), so it goes also in this business of evil weakening good. — But this thinking has no place here. In a division in which the same proportion is always kept, what is being subtracted is less and less, since half of a half is less than half of the whole. But the readiness we are talking about is not necessarily diminished less by the next sin than it was by the previous sin, but equally, perhaps, or more. — The thing to say, therefore, is that although this readiness is finite, it can still be diminished infinitely, not in and of itself* but accidentally, inasmuch as contrary dispositions may be increased even to infinity, as I said.

* *per se*

 Cajetan's Commentary

In the title, 'corrupt' is taken form-wise. 'Good totally' is taken to mean the integral or quasi-integral whole in which the evil is placed. Thus, the sense of it is: "Does an evil put into something form-wise remove all the good found in that something."

ii. In the body of the article there is one main conclusion directly answering the question in the negative: an evil cannot completely consume a good. — A three-part distinction then clarifies this conclusion, along with special conclusions for each part.

iii. The distinction is this: the three-part good is the form, the subject, and the subject's readiness for the form. — The first conclusion is: the good as a form is completely removed by the evil. The conclusion is supported on the ground that the evil is opposed to that form. And the topic is illustrated: as light is removed by darkness, as sight is removed by blindness. — The second conclusion is: the good as a subject is neither removed nor lessened by the evil. This is illustrated by the case of darkness and the air. The third conclusion is: the good as a subject's readiness for the act is diminished by the evil but not removed totally. This conclusion is illustrated first as far as weakening is concerned, and secondly, total removal is denied, where it says "But if the contrary dispositions . . ."

iv. Intending to clarify what sort of diminishment this is and how great it is, Aquinas suggests that there are two sorts of diminishment, namely, by subtraction and by weakening; the first quantitative, the second qualitative. Again, qualitative diminishment (weakening) happens two ways: (1) first, by weakening of the quality itself, and (2) secondly through contrary dispositions of the subject towards the act in question. — In the case at hand, the diminishment is to be taken as a weakening, not of just any sort but by addition of contrary dispositions.

This second point is supported as follows. [*Antecedent:*] Readiness comes from dispositions preparing the matter for the act; [*1st consequence:*] so weakening of readiness comes from dispositions impeding the potency to that act. — The antecedent is made clear by

the fact that the more the matter's dispositions are increased, the more ready it is for the act. Drawing the consequence is supported on the ground that weakening is gotten from a contrary strengthening.

v. Then, intending to show how an evil never takes away the readiness for good totally, Aquinas distinguishes and says that weakening through contrary dispositions can occur two ways: in one, finitely, in the other, infinitely. Then he shows that in neither of these ways is the subject's readiness for its act totally removed.

That the weakening of the readiness is sometimes finite is shown from the fact that the increase of contrary dispositions is finite, as one sees in the increase of qualities in the elements whereby the readiness of the matter for a form, e.g. that of fire, is diminished. — That the readiness is not totally removed in this sort of weakening is clear from the fact that, contrary dispositions and weakening being finite, the readiness of the remaining subject is not necessarily eradicated.

That the weakening is sometimes infinite is shown from the endless increase of opaque bodies between the sun and the air and, analogously, from the infinite increase of sins between the Sun of righteousness and the soul. — That the readiness is not totally removed by such an infinite weakening is proved by the argument that it always remains in its root, which is the subject's substance. This is illustrated by the examples given both natural and moral: the air remaining transparent *vis-à-vis* light and the soul *vis-à-vis* grace.

Thus the main conclusion becomes clear, namely, that an evil never takes away the good totally, since it leaves the subject and aptitude.

vi. In the answer *ad* (3), notice how great the difference is between being diminished *per se* and *per accidens* (i.e. by something else). It is so great that, although it is impossible for a finite amount not to be consumed by infinite and equal subtraction *per se*, it is still possible (as the text says) for a finite thing to be subtracted from equally and to infinity without being consumed, when the diminishment is *per accidens*, as in the case at hand: after all, the aptitude is diminished on account of a joined impediment and not in and of itself.

Is evil adequately divided into pain and fault?

In II Sent. d.35, a.1, De malo, q.1, a.4

* *culpa* It seems that evil is not adequately divided into pain and guiltiness or fault.*

(1) After all, every defect seems to be an evil of some sort. But there is a defect in all creatures because they are not able to preserve themselves, and yet this is neither a pain nor a fault. Therefore, evil is not adequately divided into pain and fault.

(2) Besides, in irrational things one finds neither fault nor pain. But corruption and defect are found in them, and these pertain to the makeup defining evil. Therefore, not every evil is a pain or a fault.

(3) Moreover, temptation is an evil. But it is not a fault, because "temptation is not a sin in one who does not consent to it; rather, it is matter for the exercise of virtue," as it says in the gloss on 2 Cor. 12:7. Temptation is also not a pain, since temptation precedes fault, while pain or punishment follows it. Ergo, evil is inadequately divided into pain and fault.

ON THE OTHER HAND, the division seems superfluous. For as Augustine says in the *Enchiridion*, a thing is called evil "because it injures." But what injures is painful. Hence, every evil is contained under pain.

ANSWER: evil is a privation of good, and good lies mainly and *per se* in completeness and act. But act is of two kinds: first and second act. A thing's first act is its form and wholeness; its second act is a doing [*operatio*]. Hence, evil is also of two kinds. One kind is removing a form or a part needed for a thing's wholeness; in this way, blindness is an evil and so is lacking a member. The other kind is removing a due deed, either because it is not done at all or because it is not done the right way and with the right order.

Now since good without qualification is the object of the will, its privation, evil, is found in a special way

in rational creatures having a will. Here the evil which removes a thing's form or wholeness has the makeup of a pain, and (assuming that all things are subject to God's providence and righteousness, as shown above) this is especially the case since it belongs to the defining makeup of pain that it be against the will. Meanwhile, the evil which lies in removing a due deed in voluntary agents has the makeup of fault. For it is imputed to someone as a fault that he falls short of complete action over which he has control through his will. Thus, every evil in voluntary things is either a pain or a fault.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): since evil is a privation of good and not a pure negation (as I said above), not every lack of a good is an evil, but the lack of a good which naturally ought to be had. A lack of eyesight is not an evil in a stone, after all, but in an animal, because to have sight is against the definition of a creature that it be preserved by itself alone; for the same God who gives being also conserves it. So this defect is not an evil for a creature.

ad (2): pain and fault do not divide evil across the board but only evil in voluntary agents.

ad (3): insofar as a temptation involves a provocation to evil, it is always an evil of fault in the tempter. But in the person who is tempted, it is not properly a fault — except insofar as the person is somewhat changed by it; for this is how the action of an agent is in the one undergoing it. But insofar as the tempted person is changed in an evil direction by the tempter, he or she falls into fault.

ad (4) [*i.e.* against the "on the other hand"]: it belongs to the definition of pain that it injures the agent in his person, but it belongs to the definition of fault that it injures the agent in his action. And thus both are included under evil insofar as evil has the makeup of an injury.

Cajetan's Commentary

The title is taken as it stands, understanding by 'fault' the evil that we do, and understanding by 'pain', the evil that we suffer.

In the body of the article, a single conclusion answers the question in a limited way, namely: every evil in voluntary agents is a pain or a fault. — In this conclusion, three items are contained: (1) every evil, (2) in voluntary agents, (3) pain or fault. He unfolds these items in order.

ii. First, then, he divides evil in general into evil of a thing and evil of a deed. This distinction he supports by the division of good into that by way of first act, and that by way of second act.

Secondly, he shows that there are special reasons, distinctions, and terms for evil arising in voluntary agents.

[*Antecedent:*] Good without qualification is the object of the will; [*consequence:*] so evil is found for a special reason in creatures having a will. — Drawing the consequence is supported on the ground that evil is a privation of good and hence, as good is found in a special way in a will, so is evil. Finally, thirdly, the main point he is after is made clear as follows. [*Antecedent:*] An evil of the thing has the makeup of a pain in voluntary agents, especially assuming that all are subject to divine providence and justice; but the evil of a deed has the makeup of a guilt in the same. [*Consequence:*] So every evil in

one endowed with a will is a pain or a fault. — The first part of the antecedent is made clear by the fact that being contrary to the will belongs to the defining makeup of a pain. Its second part is made clear by the

fact that it is imputed to someone as a fault when he falls short of a complete action that is within his power. — Drawing the consequence, however, is supported by the already-stated division of evil.

article 6

Does pain have more of evil about it than fault does?

2/2. ST q. 19, a. 1; In II Sent. d. 37, q. 3, a. 2; De malo q. 1, a. 5

It seems that pain meets the definition of evil more fully than fault does.

(1) After all, fault points to pain as merit points to a reward. But a reward meets the definition of good more than a merit does, since reward is the purpose of merit. Therefore, a pain meets the definition of evil more than a fault does.

(2) Besides, the greater evil is the one opposed to the greater good. But a pain (as I said) is opposed to the good of the agent, while a fault is opposed to that of his action. So since the agent is better than his action, it would seem that pain is a worse evil than fault.

(3) Moreover, failing to achieve one's purpose is a pain, as one says about missing the vision of God. But the evil of fault lies in losing just the ordering to the purpose. Therefore, pain is a greater evil than fault.

ON THE OTHER HAND, a wise designer risks a lesser evil to avoid a greater, as a physician amputates an infected member to avoid the whole body's ruin. Well, the divine wisdom inflicts pain in order to deter fault. Ergo, fault is a greater evil than pain.

ANSWER: fault meets the definition of evil more than pain does, and I do not just mean sensory pain (which lies in the loss of bodily goods and which most people call pains) but also pain taken in a broader sense, inasmuch as the loss of grace or glory are pains. There are two reasons for this. The first is that a person becomes evil from the evil of fault but not from that of pain; so Denis says in c. 4 of *De divinis nominibus*: "what is evil is not being punished, but being worthy of it." And this is true because (since unqualified good is found in act and not in potency, but ultimate act is a deed or a using of the things one has), a man is thought unqualifiedly good thanks to a good deed or a good use of what he has. We use things through our will. So a man is called "good" from the good will wherewith he uses his things well; and a man is called "bad" from a bad will. One who has a bad will can use even a good he possesses

badly — as when a grammar expert deliberately speaks ungrammatically. So, because fault lies in a disordered act of the will, but pain in privation of the goods the will uses, fault meets the definition of evil better than pain does.

A second reason can be gathered from the fact that God is the author of pain-evil but not of fault-evil. The reason for this is that pain-evil removes a good of the creature, whether it be a created good (as blindness deprives one of vision) or an uncreated good (as losing the vision of God takes an uncreated good from the creature). fault-evil is strictly opposed to the uncreated good; after all, it conflicts with the fulfillment of God's will and with the divine love by which the divine good is loved in God Himself, and not only with the uncreated good as it is shared in by a creature. It is clear, then, that fault meets the definition of evil more fully than pain does.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): although fault ends up in punishment, as merit ends in reward, fault is still not *intended* for the sake of punishment (as merit is sought for the sake of reward) but rather *vice-versa*: pain is brought in to deter fault. And thus fault is worse than pain.¹

ad (2): the right ordering of an action (which is removed by fault) is more complete than the good of the agent, since it is a second completeness, while the good removed by pain is a first completeness.²

ad (3): fault and punishment are not compared as purpose to ordering-to-the-purpose, because both can be removed in some way by fault and by pain. It happens by pain inasmuch as the person himself is removed from his purpose and the order to the purpose. But it happens by fault inasmuch as what it takes away pertains to one's action, which is no longer ordered to a due purpose.

¹ Calling fault a "worse" evil cannot help consequentialists, if fault is worse by definition, not by some calculable amount.

² The talk of first and second completeness is based on the talk of first and second act, introduced above in article 5.

Cajetan's Commentary

The title is clear from remarks already made. — In the body of the article a single conclusion answers the question: fault meets the definition of evil more than any pain does (be it a pain of sense or a pain of damnation). — This is supported on two grounds.

The first support goes as follows. [*Antecedent*:] a person is made evil by a fault-evil, not by a pain-evil; therefore [the former is greater]. The antecedent is supported in two ways. First, by the authority of Denis;

secondly, by an argument as follows. [*Antecedent*:] Unqualified good is found in act; [*1st consequence*:] so the unqualified good of a person lies in good using of what he or she has; [*2nd consequence*:] therefore, a man is called "good" from the good will wherewith he uses what he has; and one is called "evil" out of the bad will [wherewith he misuses the good he has]; [*3rd consequence*:] therefore, fault-evil meets the definition of evil better than pain-evil does.

Drawing the first consequence is supported on the ground that ultimate act is a deed or a use of things. — Drawing the second consequence rests on the fact that we use all of our things through our will. Also, the second part of the consequence, *i.e.* the part about a bad will, is clarified by the fact that a bad will can even use a good thing badly, as one sees in the case of the gram-

mar expert. — Drawing the third consequence rests on the fact that guilt lies in a disordered act of the will, whereas a pain lies in one's being deprived of items the will uses.

ii. The second ground goes like this. [*Antecedent:*] God is the author of pain-evil but not of fault-evil; [*consequence:*] therefore, fault-evil is incomparably worse.



Inquiry Forty-Nine: Into the cause of evil

Next, one asks about a cause of evil. On this topic, three questions are raised.

- (1) Can a good be a cause of evil?
- (2) Can the supreme good who is God be the cause of evil?
- (3) Is there some supreme evil that would be the first cause of all evils?

article 1

Can a good be the cause of evil?

*2/1 ST q.75, a.1; In II Sent. d.1, q.1, a.1 ad 2, d.34, a.3, 2 CG c.41; 3 CG cc.10, 13;
De potentia q.3, a.6 ad 1ff; De malo q.1, a.3, In De div. nom. c.4, lectio 22*

It seems that a good¹ cannot be the cause of an evil.

(1) After all, Matthew 7:18 says, "a good tree cannot bear evil fruit."

(2) Besides, one contrary cannot be the cause of the other. But evil is the contrary to good. So a good cannot be the cause of an evil.

(3) Moreover, a deficient effect comes only from a deficient cause. But evil, if it has a cause, is a deficient effect. Therefore, it has a deficient cause. But everything deficient is evil. So the cause of an evil can only be an evil.

(4) Furthermore, Denis says in c.4 of *De divinis nominibus* that evil does not have a cause. Therefore, good is not its cause.

Book I, c.9,
PL 44, 670

ON THE OTHER HAND, Augustine says in *Contra Julianum*: "There is just no source at all whence evil could arise, except from good."

ANSWER: one has to say that every evil has a cause, one way or another. After all, evil is the lack of a good which naturally ought to be had. But the fact that a thing lacks a disposition natural to it (and due for it) can only come from a cause carrying something away from its disposition. A heavy thing is not moved upwards except by something pushing it, and an agent does not fall short in his action unless because of an impediment.

However, the status of being a cause cannot belong to anything but a good, since nothing can be a cause except insofar it is a being, and every being as such [*i.e.*, to the extent it exists] is a good. And if we think of the special definitions of causes, an agent-cause and a formal one and a purpose-cause imply some completeness that pertains to the definition of a good. But even matter, inasmuch as it is potency to good, has the makings of a good.

¹ Throughout this article, 'a good' means something good in some way. See q.5, a.1 ad 1.

Now the fact that a good is the cause of an evil by way of material causation is clear from points made already; for it has been shown that a good is the subject in which evil resides. Evil does not have a formal cause, but is rather the privation of a form. And likewise it has no purpose-cause but is rather a privation of ordering to a due purpose. (It is not only a purpose that has what it takes to be good but also a useful thing ordered to the purpose.) Evil does have, however, a cause of the agent type, but not a direct one [*a per se cause*], only an incidental one [*a cause per accidens*].

To get this clear, you need to know that evil is caused one way in an action and another way in an effect.

- It is caused in an action by a defect in one of the action's sources, be it the main agent or an instrumental one; thus a defect in an animal's motion can arise either because of a weakness in its active power to move (as in children) or because of a disability in the organs instrumental to moving (as in the lame).

- Evil in an effect which is not the agent's distinctive effect is at times caused by the agent's active power, and at times from a lack in this power, or in the matter acted upon. It comes from the active power or completeness of an agent, when the form intended by the agent necessarily entails privation of another form (as the form of fire entails privation of the form of air or water). So: the more complete a fire is in its power, the more perfectly it imprints its form; and likewise the more completely it corrupts its contrary, the more an evil and corruption in air and water is from the perfection of the fire.² But this is incidental [to the fire]. The fire is not trying to remove the form of water but to induce its own form; and by doing this, it causes the other's loss incidentally.

² The heat of a fire causes water to evaporate faster. Perhaps this disappearance led the Medievals to suppose that fire "corrupted the form" of water.

q 48, a.3

* But if the defect is in the proper effect of the fire, say, that it falls short of giving heat, this is either because of a defect of the action (which goes back to a defect of a source of it, as I said) or from an indisposition of the matter [like greenness of the wood], which does not receive the action of the agent-fire. Thus deficiency comes accidentally to a good which is of itself suited to act. Hence it is true that an evil only has a cause *per accidens*. And on this basis, a good is the cause of an evil.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): as Augustine says in *Contra Julianum*, “what the Lord is calling a bad tree is a bad will, and what he calls a good tree is a good will.” From a good will, no act of moral evil proceeds, since an act is judged morally good from the good will behind it. But even an act of bad will is caused by a rational creature, who is a good. And thus a good is the cause of an evil.

ad (2): a good does not cause the evil which is contrary to it but another one — as the good of a fire causes an evil to water, and as a man good in his nature causes a bad act in his conduct.* And this, too, is on an incidental basis, as I said [cf. q.19, a.9]. — But one finds that even one of the contraries causes the other accidentally — as cold outdoors heats up a man walking, inso-

* *secundum morem*

far as his body-warmth is withdrawn into his insides.

ad (3): an evil has a deficient cause one way in voluntary agents and another way in natural ones. A natural agent produces an effect resembling itself unless impeded by some outside factor (and this itself is a sort of defect). But evil never follows in the natural agent's effect unless some other evil was already there in the agent or in the matter, as I said. But in voluntary agents, a defect of action comes from a will which is only deficiently in act, inasmuch as the act is not [one in which the will] submits itself to its own rule. But this defect is not a fault; rather, fault follows from the fact that the will operates with such a defect.³

ad (4): Evil does not have a direct [*per se*] cause but only an accidental one, as I have been saying.

³ A rule is a universal judgment of practical reason (such as “One should never . . .” or “One should always . . .”) to whose truth, let us suppose, one's mind has assented. The will (as opposed to a blind appetite) is a rational faculty and hence contains a natural tendency to act in accord with one's assents; thus one's will is fully and non-defectively in act when it wills its own submission to such a rule in whatever it is intending or choosing. Should the will choose without willing this submission, the reason is typically the haste which cuts short deliberation. Failure to deliberate fully is not the guilty deed itself but the sorry prelude to it.

Cajetan's Commentary

The title as it stands is meant to ask about a cause in general. — In the body of the article, he does two jobs: (1) he answers the general question in the affirmative; (2) he answers it in detail according to the distinct kinds of causes.

ii. As for job (1), the answering conclusion is: the cause of an evil is a good. — This is supported as follows. [*Antecedent:*] an evil is the defect of a due good; [*1st consequence:*] therefore, every evil has a cause; [*2nd consequence:*] therefore, the cause of an evil is a good.

Drawing the first consequence is supported on the ground that deflection from a natural and due disposition has to come from a cause pulling the thing away from its disposition. — This is supported inductively: first, in an evil-of-a-thing, by the example of [forcibly] moving a heavy body; second, in an evil-of-action, since this comes only from an impediment.

Drawing the second consequence is supported on the ground that only a good thing is suited to be a cause. This is supported in two ways: (1) The first is generally, on the ground that only a being is suited to be a cause; thus, only a good is suited. The inference holds good because every being as such is a good. (2) Secondly, in particular types of causes, on the ground that being an agent, a purpose, and a form involve

having a completeness and hence a goodness: a material cause also has the makings of a good since it is a good in potency. Therefore, in every line of causality, only a good is suited to be a cause.

iii. As for job (2), he puts down four conclusions in line with the four kinds of causes. The first deals with material causality: a good is a material cause of an evil. This is supported on the ground that a good is the evil's subject. — The second conclusion is that evil does not have a formal cause. The support is on the ground that an evil is the privation of a form. — The third conclusion is that evil does not have a purpose-cause. This is supported on the ground that an evil is a privation of ordering to a due end. And hence the privation of a good that is useful towards the purpose. — The fourth conclusion is that evil does not have an efficient cause in and of itself [*per se*] but incidentally.* This is made clear by drawing a distinction as follows. The evil of an action and that of a thing are caused in different ways. For the evil of an action is caused by defect of the main or instrumental source [of the action]. But the evil of a thing (whether it is an agent's distinctive effect or not) is caused in three ways: sometimes from the active power of the agent, sometimes from a defect of the agent, and sometimes from the defect of the matter.

With this distinction in place, Aquinas proves that

* *per accidens*

an evil never has an efficient cause except *per accidens*. In a first case, when the evil is caused by the power of the agent, the causation is accidental because in intending to introduce the right form the agent accidentally intends to damage the opposite form.

In a second case, Aquinas reduces the other ways to one way which is that the agent is deficient. He proves his points as follows. Being deficient happens to a good thing incidentally; therefore, in no way does the evil have a cause except incidentally. The inference holds because a good is suited to act of itself. — Reducing the previously mentioned cases to this one is done as follows. The other ways contained either an evil of the distinctive effect or else of the action. But a defect of the distinctive effect is either from a defect of the action or a defect of what undergoes it — the latter thanks to matter, the former thanks to a defect of the active source. In either way a cause is made to fall short. So every way in which an evil can emerge is reduced to a

defect of the agent cause, wherever more precisely the defect arises.

And thus in a brief way the author has illustrated all the branches of the division reduced down to two, namely, the evil of an outside agent's effect, and an evil of the agent's own effect; for this, too, covers the evil of an action as to its cause.

iv. In the answer *ad* (3), notice that when it says a failure of subjection to a rule "is not a guilt, but guilt follows from the fact," the remark can be well or badly understood. If it is understood to speak of such a defect without further detail, it is true. But if it is understood to be about *this* defect, *i.e.* applied to this agent without a rule, it is false — since from its very application to *this case*, to the agent now acting, it gets the makeup of fault.¹

¹ Cajetan is being so terse here that the present translator cannot make out what he is saying. For a guess, see above, footnote 3 on the text of the article.

article 2

Is the supreme good, who is God, a cause of evil?

q.48, a.6; *In II Sent.* d.33, q.2, a.1; d.34, a.3; d.37, q.3, a.1; 2 *CG* c.41, 3 *CG* c.71, *De malo* q.1, a.5; *Compend. Theol.* c.141, *In Evam. Ioan.* c.9, *lectio 1*, *In Ep. ad. Romanos* c.1, *lectio 7*.

It would seem that the supreme good, who is God, is the cause of evil.

(1) After all, it says in Isaiah 45:6-7, "I am the Lord, and there is none else. I form light, and create darkness: I make peace and create evil." It also says in Amos 3:6, "Shall there be evil in a city, and the Lord hath not done it?"

(2) Besides, the effects of a secondary cause are traced back to the first cause. But good is the cause of evil, as was just said. So since God is the cause of every good, as was shown above, evil is from God, too.

(3) Furthermore, as it says in *Physics II*, the cause of a ship's safety is also the cause of its peril. But God is the cause of everything's safety. Therefore, He is the cause of all loss and evil.

ON THE OTHER HAND, Augustine says in his *Book of 83 Questions*, that God "is not the author of evil because He is not the cause of tending towards non-being."

ANSWER: an evil which amounts to a defect of action is always caused by a defect of the agent, as is clear from previous remarks. But in God there is no defect; rather, there is supreme completeness and perfection, as was shown above. Therefore, the evil which is found in the defect of an action or is caused by the defect of the agent is not traced back to God as ultimate cause.

But the evil which lies in some things is traced back to God as its cause. This is clear both in natural events and in voluntary ones. When an agent produces by its own power a form that results in a corruption and a defect, the agent causes the corruption and defect by its own power, as I said before. But it is obvious that the form which God firstly* intends to put into created things is

the good of the universe's order. But the universe's order requires, as I said above, that there be things which can fall short and sometimes do. Thus, God, by causing the good of the universe's order in things, in consequence and (as it were) by accident causes corruptions of things — in line with what it says in 1 Sam. 2:6. "The Lord killeth, and maketh alive." But when it says in Wisdom 1:13 that "God hath not made death," it means *as if death were directly* intended*. — However, an order of justice, in which it is a requirement that pain of punishment to be inflicted upon sinners, also belongs to the order of the universe. And thanks to this fact, God is an author of pain-evil but not of fault-evil, for the reason already stated.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): those authoritative verses are talking about the evil of pain, not the evil of guilt.

ad (2): the effect of a deficient secondary cause is traced back to a non-defective first cause as regards what the effect has of being-status[†] and completeness: but not as regards what the effect has in and from defect. Thus, any motion one finds in limping is caused by the active ability to move, but whatever crookedness is in it is not from the power to move but from the curvature of the limb. Likewise, whatever there is of being and action in an evil action goes back to God as its cause, but what there is of defect in it is not caused by God but comes from the defect of the secondary agent.

ad (3): the sinking of a ship is attributed to the man sailing it, as its cause, in that *he did not do* what the ship's safety required. But God does not fall short in doing what is needed for safety/salvation. Therefore, the case is not parallel.

Cajetan's Commentary

The title is clear enough from what went before. — In the body of the article Aquinas puts down two conclusions answering the question, one for each of the two kinds of evils distinguished above.

The first conclusion is: the evil in an action is not traced back to God as its cause. — The support goes thus. [*Antecedent:*] The evil of an action has its causal source in a defect of the agent; [*inference:*] therefore, it is not traced back to God. The inference holds because there is no defect in God, but supreme perfection.

ii. The second conclusion is: the evil in some things is traced back to God as its cause. — This is supported both

in natural events and in voluntary ones.

For natural events, the support goes thus. [*Antecedent:*] God intends the good of the universe's order as the form he firstly intends to put into created things, and this order requires there to be defectible and sometimes actually failing things; [*consequence:*] therefore, by causing the good of the universe's order, He incidentally causes evils in things. — Drawing the consequence is supported on the ground that an agent directly produces the form from which there follows corruption and defect and only accidentally causes that corruption and defect. The consequence is confirmed by the authority of Scripture: at the

q.22, a.2 *ad* 2;
q.48, a.2

* *per se*

† *entitas*

* *principaliter*

q.48, a.5

a.1
q.6, a.1, 4
c.3;
195 a.11

q.21;
PL.40, 16

a.1
q.4, a.1

the same time an objection is headed off from the apparently opposed authority of Wisdom 1.

Then, he supports drawing the same consequence in a similar way in the case of voluntary events. The order of the universe requires there to be an order of justice punishing sins; therefore, pain-evil is also from God.

A doubt about defective action

iii. On these points, a doubt crops up as to whether the first conclusion is meant universally about every evil of action or only about voluntary cases. If it is understood universally, then Socrates's lame gait is not from God because it is an evil of action. And if this is admitted, it clearly follows that God is not the author of pain-evil, since walking lamely counts among such pains. And these remarks can be applied to other defects of action likewise, such as those of vision, hearing, *etc.* And thus the doctrine of the Holy Scriptures would fall to the ground, since it alleges that all of these are from God either for punishment or for an increase of merit, *etc.* But if that first conclusion is meant to hold in voluntary cases only, the author seems to have forgotten this limitation, because it does not cohere with the body of the article, in which the second conclusion is obviously meant universally and this passage about evil needs universal treatment.

The SHORT ANSWER to this is that the conclusion is meant to cover every evil of action but form-wise, *i.e. qua* an action. — When one says “therefore, Socrates's lame gait is not traced back to God,” the remark needs distinguishing. Insofar as lameness means a defect of action *as such*, it is not traced back to God as its agent cause but to a defect of the secondary cause. But insofar as lameness means something involuntary, it is traced back to God, as the author of a pain; and then insofar as it is ordered to love, it is traced back to God as the author of merit. Ditto for other cases.

Pharaoh's heart

iv. In the answer *ad* (3), notice that the very absence of an agent cause is called a defect in the cause, when the agent should have been present. So, since God never withdraws the influence which is due to things, it never follows, properly speaking, that God is a cause of defects on the sole basis of what He has *not done*. But sometimes Scripture calls Him such a cause, as is clear with the hardening of Pharaoh.¹

¹ Very tersely, Cajetan has avoided the Calvinist tendency to say that God made Pharaoh hard. Rather, in line with Hebrews 3:8, Pharaoh hardened his own heart. What God did is *not give* Pharaoh the grace to have a softer heart, and He did not owe such grace to Pharaoh or to any other ruler.

article 3

Is there a supreme evil which causes all evil?

In II Sent. d. 1, q. 1, a. 1 ad 1; d. 34, a. 1 ut 4; 2 CG c. 41; 3 CG c. 15. De potentia q. 3, a. 6; Compend. Theol. c. 117; Opusculum XV De angelis c. 16; In De Div. Nom. c. 4, lectio 22.

It seems that there is one supreme evil which is the cause of all evil.

(1) Contrary effects, after all, have contrary causes, but contraries are found among things, according to Sirach 33:15, "Against evil standeth good, and against life, death; so too against a righteous man standeth a sinner." Therefore, there are contrary sources, one of the good, and another of the evil.

(2) Besides, if one of the contraries is in the real, so is the other, as it says in *De caelo II*. But there is a supreme good in the real causing all good, as shown above. Therefore, there is also a supreme evil opposed to it, a cause of all evil.

(3) Furthermore, just as we find good and better in the real, we find bad and worse. But good and better are so called in relation to a best. Therefore, bad and worse are said in relation to some supreme evil.

(4) Moreover, everything having a trait by participation is traced back to something having the trait by its essence. But the things that are bad around us are not evil by their essence, but by participation. Therefore, one must find a supreme thing evil by its essence, which is the cause of all evil.

(5) Also, everything which is the case on an accidental basis is traced back to what is the case in and of itself.* But a good is the cause of an evil accidentally. Therefore, it is necessary to posit a supreme evil, which is the cause of evils *per se*. — And one cannot say that evil has no cause *per se* but only accidentally; because then it would follow that evil would not be in most things, but only in a few.

(6) Again, an evil effect is traced back to an evil cause, because a deficient effect is from a deficient cause, as was said above. But this cannot go back to infinity. Therefore, one has to posit a first evil which is the cause of all evil.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is the fact that the supreme good is the cause of all there is, as was shown above. Therefore, there cannot exist a supreme source opposed to it, which would be the cause of evils.

ANSWER: it is clear from points already established that there is no single, first source of evils in the way there is single source of goods. In the first place, this is because the first source of goods is good by its essence, as was shown above. But nothing can be evil by its essence; it has been shown, after all, that every being insofar as it is a being is a good, and that evil does not exist except *in* a good as resident in it.

In the second place, there can be no first source of evils because the first source of goods is a supreme and perfect good, which precontains all goodness within itself, as shown above. But there cannot be a supreme evil because (as already shown) evil always diminishes a good but can never erase it totally; and so, with a good always remaining, nothing can be integrally and perfectly evil. This is why Aristotle says in *Ethics II* that "if evil is entire, it destroys itself," because if every good were destroyed (as would be needed for evil to be entire), so also would the very evil whose residence is a good be destroyed.

In the third place, there can be no first source of evil because what it takes to be an evil conflicts with what it takes to be a first source. For one thing, every evil is caused by a good as shown above. For another thing, evil can only be a cause accidentally and thus cannot be a first cause, because what causes accidentally comes after that which causes *per se*, as is clear in *Physics II*.

Meanwhile, those who posit two first principles (one of the good, one of the evil) have fallen into this error for the same basic reason as the ancient philosophers fell into other wrong-headed opinions — namely, that they did not think of the universal cause of all being, but thought only of particular causes of particular effects. On account of this, if they found a thing to be destructive of something else through the power of its own nature, they supposed its nature to be evil — as if someone called the nature of fire evil because it burned up a poor man's house. — But one's judgment about the goodness of a thing should not be taken from its relation to some other particular, but rather from how it is in itself and how it is in relation to the whole universe, in which each and every item has its own place in a perfectly orderly way, as emerged above.

They went wrong likewise because, when they found two particular causes of two contrary particular effects, they did not know how to trace the contrary particular causes back to a shared general cause. And so they judged that contrariety in causes was found all the way back to the first sources [of everything]. — But since all contraries agree in a common element, one must find a common cause of both, above and beyond their own contrary causes: thus, above and beyond the contrary qualities of the elements [heat and cold, dryness and moisture], one finds the power of a heavenly body [e.g., the same sun in summer heats and dries, in winter cools, etc.]. And likewise, above all the things which are "being this way" or are "being that way," one finds a first source of their being at all, as I showed above.

1. 57 q. 6, a. 2
q. 48, a. 4

c. 5;
112a 12

a. 1

c. 6,
198 a 8

q. 47, a. 2, ad 1

q. 44, aa. 1-2

To MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): contraries agree in one genus and also in one reason for being. And so, while they have contrary particular causes, they still have to go back to a common first cause.¹

ad (2): having and lacking are not induced in the same thing. The subject of a lacking is a being in potency, as I said. So since an evil is a lack of good (as emerged in the same place), an evil is opposed to the good with which it shares the thing in question — but not to the supreme good, which is pure act.

ad (3): how each [good or evil] is intended goes according to its defining makeup. As a form is a completeness, so also a privation is a removal. So every form and completeness and good is intended as *approaching* a terminal completeness; but every privation and evil is intended as *receding* from the terminal point. Hence, bad and worse are not said in relation to a supreme evil the same way as good and better are said by relation to a supreme good.²

¹ The common “genus” is of *sensibilia*: light and dark are both *visibilia*, sweet and bitter are tastes; hot and cold are both temperatures.

² This answer *ad* (3) looks important to understanding the fourth way of establishing God’s existence in q.2, a.3. It is an

ad (4): no being is called evil by participation, but by a lack of participation. Hence, there is no need to trace evil back to something that would be essentially evil.

ad (5): evil can only have a cause on an accidental basis as was shown already [a.1]. Hence, it is impossible to trace the cause of evil back to something which would cause it *per se*. — Meanwhile, the statement that evil is in most things is flatly false. After all, a natural evil can only occur in things generable and corruptible, which are a small part of the whole universe. And again, in each species, a defect of its nature happens in relatively few cases. Only in human beings is evil seen to be in most of us, [and the reason is] because the “good for us” perceivable by the senses is not the good of man *qua* man — *i.e.* *qua* rational, and more people follow their senses than follow their reason.

ad (6): there is no regression to infinity in causes of evil; rather, all evils are traced to some good cause from which evil follows accidentally.

argument from more and less to a “most” or “best.” But, one objects, why can’t the argument go to a minimum, rather than a maximum? Here, forty-seven inquiries later, we get a hint why Aquinas thought the objection would not work. As evil does not admit of a maximum, being and good admit of no minimum.

Cajetan’s Commentary

The title is asking directly about an efficient cause. — In the body of the article he does two jobs: (1) he answers the question with a single negative conclusion; (2) he shows the underlying mistake of those who had thought otherwise.

ii. As for job (1), the conclusion is: there is no supreme evil, first source of all evils, whereas there is a single supreme good. — The conclusion is supported on three grounds: (a) because there is no such things as an evil by essence, *i.e.* nothing that is evil by its essence; (b) because there is no supreme evil *i.e.* no entire evil; (c) because there is a conflict between being a first principle and being an evil. All points are perfectly obvious in the text.

iii. As for job (2), the errors are rehearsed and refuted from a common root. Those positing two first principles (one of good, one of evil), went wrong in two ways: (1) by thinking that some nature is evil in itself; (2) by thinking that the first principles are contraries.

The reason for their first mistake was that they thought of a nature (such as that of fire) as destructive to a particular. — The refutation of this is that fire should be considered unqualifiedly as a part of the whole universe: for that way everything finds its place in an utterly orderly way and is good.

The reason for the other mistake was that they only

only knew how to reduce contrary effects to contrary causes. — The refutation is that contrary causes should be traced back to a shared and general cause. This is supported on the ground that all contraries agree in something, such as a kind or a subject. After all, we make the same judgment about a common form as a about a common agent, since they are similar and about an active and a passive, since they should match up. And the point is illustrated in the text by a heavenly body in relation to lower ones.

The common root of these and similar mistakes is that they reached particular causes but not the universal cause of beings *qua* beings. For all things are traced back to a single source of being because they all agree in sharing in being, as prior remarks made clear.

q 44, a 1

Trouble in the answer *ad* (2)

iv. In the answer *ad* (2), a doubt comes up. In the last article of the previous inquiry it was said (and established) that a fault-evil is strictly opposed to uncreated good not as it is in us, but as it is in itself; but here, he says (and establishes) that no evil opposes an uncreated good. It does not seem that these two remarks can both stand.

The SHORT ANSWER to this is that an evil’s being opposed to uncreated good can be understood two ways: form-wise or object-wise. Form-wise, it is impossible for

an evil to be opposed to the divine good, for the reason touched on in the text, namely, that a good having a form-wise opposed evil requires a potency in terms of which it can become evil; but God is pure act; ergo [He is not in potency to anything, *etc.*]. — Object-wise, however, fault-evil does oppose the divine good in itself. This was optimally shown in the passage just mentioned

from the object of love. After all, any sinner wills (explicitly or implicitly) that God not be the ultimate purpose (insofar as the sinner can make it so). This is being opposed object-wise to what the divine good is in itself; by contrast, one who loves God with charity wills God to have everything He is and everything owed to Him and thus the two passages are not in conflict.





Treatise 5. On the Angels

Inquiry 50: Into the substance of angels in themselves	849–864
Inquiry 51: Into how angels relate to bodies	865–872
Inquiry 52: Into how angels relate to places	873–889
Inquiry 53: Into the angels' movement from place to place	890–903
Inquiry 54: Into the angels' cognition	904–928
Inquiry 55: Into the means by which an angel knows	929–942
Inquiry 56: Into the angels' knowledge of non-material things	943–951
Inquiry 57: Into their knowledge of material things	952–968
Inquiry 58: Into how their cognizing is done	969–985
Inquiry 59: Into the will in angels	986–994
Inquiry 60: Into love in the angels	995–1,007
Inquiry 61: Into the production of the angels in their natural being	1,008–1,012
Inquiry 62: Into the completions of the angels in grace and glory	1,013–1,027
Inquiry 63: Into the evil of guilt in angels	1,028–1,055
Inquiry 64: Into the punishment for fallen angels (demons)	1,056–1,069

Inquiry Fifty: Into the substance of the angels considered just in itself

Next one takes up the distinction between bodily creatures and spiritual ones. One deals first with the purely spiritual creatures which Holy Scripture calls angels [qq.50-65]; then one turns to the purely bodily creatures [qq.65-75], and thirdly one turns to the creature composed of body and spirit who is man.

As for the angels, one needs to study first the topics that pertain to their substance [qq.50-53], then those that pertain to their understanding [qq.54-58], thirdly those that have to do with their willing [qq.59-60], fourthly those concerning their creation [qq.61-74].

As to their substance, one needs to look at it first in itself [*absolutè*] and then in comparison with bodily substance. About the angels' substance in itself, five questions are asked:

- (1) Is there a creature entirely spiritual and altogether non-bodily?
- (2) If an angel is like that, is it composed of matter and form?
- (3) How many are there?
- (4) How do they differ from each other?
- (5) Are they immortal (incorruptible)?

article 1

Is an angel altogether non-bodily?

2 GG cc.46, 49; *Opusculum XV, De Angelis*, c.18

* *omnino incorporeus* It seems that an angel is not altogether non-bodily*.

(1) After all, what is incorporeal from our point of view, but not from God's, is not altogether incorporeal. But Damascene says in Book II that an angel "is called incorporeal and immaterial *vis-à-vis* us but is found to be corporeal and material compared to God." Hence an angel is not altogether¹ incorporeal.

(2) Besides, only a body [literally] moves, as is shown in *Physics VI*. Well, Damascene says in the same passage that an angel is "an intellectual substance that is ever moving [*semper mobilis*]." Ergo, an angel is a bodily substance.

(3) Furthermore, Ambrose says in his book *On the Holy Spirit* that "every creature is contained within the set limits of its nature." But being "contained" is a distinctive trait of bodies. Hence every creature is corporeal. But the angels are creatures of God, as is plain from Psalm 148:2. "Praise ye Him, all His angels." and then it goes on to say, "[For He spake, and they were made.] He commanded, and they were created." Ergo, the angels are corporeal.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what it says in Psalm 104: 4, "He maketh His angels spirits."

ANSWER: it is necessary to posit some non-bodily

creatures. What God firstly intends, after all, in created things, is the good found in their being made to resemble God. An effect is made to resemble its cause completely when it imitates this cause precisely in that through which it produced the effect, the way one hot thing makes another one hot. Well, God produced creation through understanding and willing, as was shown above. So the completeness of the universe requires that there be some creatures who understand.* But an act of understanding [*intelligere*] cannot be the act of a body nor of any bodily ability¹, because each body is nailed down to a here and now.¹ If the universe is to be complete, then, one has to posit that there is a non-bodily creature.

Ancient thinkers, however, did not fully appreciate the power to understand and drew no distinction between the mind and the senses. They thought that nothing existed in the world but what sense and imagination can apprehend. And since nothing but a body gets into [even] our imagination,² they thought that *only* a body was a be-

¹ Not only is each body limited by being located in space and time, but also everything it can do through a bodily organ is thereby limited. One's eye can only see one's present surroundings; one's ear can only hear the current racket, etc. But one's understanding can attain an item any where.

² In medieval usage, 'imagining' was not a synonym of fanciful conceiving, as it is now. Rather, the imagination was a

q 14, a.8;
q.19, a.4

* *creature
intelligentes*
† *virtus incorporea*

of *De fide Orthodoxa*, c.3;
PG 94, 866

† *simpliciter*

c.4, 234b 10

1, c.7;
PL 16, 723

Vg. Ps 103

c 6. 213a 39 ing. as Aristotle tells us in *Physics IV*. From them came the error of the Sadducees, who used to say that there is no [angel or] spirit. [Acts 23:8] — But the very fact that a mind is higher than a sense offers plausible evidence* that there are non-bodily things.³

* *rationaliter
ascendit*

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): non-bodily substances are in the middle between God and created bodies. What is in the middle, looked at from one extreme, seems like the opposite extreme, as the tepid seems cold compared to the hot. This is why he said

power to put sensory images into new combinations, so that “imagined things” were all fashioned out of empirical inputs.

³ The sort of argument one can make for angels from the plan of the universe is just a defensible conjecture. What makes belief in angels necessary is revelation.

the angels, compared to God, are material and corporeal — not because anything of a corporeal nature is really in them.

ad (2): Damascene is using ‘move’ here in the sense in which understanding and willing are called moving. So he calls an angel a “substance ever moving” because it is always in act as understanding, not sometimes in act and sometimes in potency like us. So this objection turns upon an equivocation.

ad (3): being contained within bounds on where it is* is what is distinctive of a body, but to be contained within bounds on *what* it is[†] is a trait common to every creature, bodily or spiritual. This is why Ambrose says in the book *On the Holy Spirit* that while *some* things are not contained in bodily places, they still have a boundedness to their substance.

* *terminis
localibus*
† *terminis
essentialibus*

Cajetan’s Commentary

In the title, notice two words, ‘non-bodily’ and ‘altogether’. The word ‘bodily’ implies being so-big, or “extended,” either intrinsically like a quantity or incidentally like [a quality of] being-white. ‘Non-bodily’ means not extended in either way. ‘Altogether non-bodily’ can be taken two ways. (1) In one, it would mark a difference from our soul, which, while not extended in itself, is still the form of a body. But this is not how the phrase is being used here, as is clear from the first article of the next inquiry, where the issue is whether an angel is the form of a body. So this possibility is not being excluded here. (2) The second way to use the phrase is to mark a difference from the souls of the higher animals. These, too, are non-extended in the doctrine of St. Thomas (q.76, a.8) but are not “altogether” non-bodily because every one of their operations is a bodily one. — So by “altogether non-bodily” Aquinas means a substance so elevated above a body that neither the substance itself nor an operation it has is bodily, *i.e.* it has [at least one] operation not exercised through a bodily organ.

ii. In the body of the article he does three jobs: (1) he answers the question with a single conclusion. (2) he criticizes the ancients and the Sadducees (at “Ancient thinkers, however . . .”), and (3) he confirms his conclusion from his criticism of them (at “But the very fact . . .”).

The conclusion is: it is necessary to posit a non-bodily creature. — The support goes as follows. [*Antecedent:*] The universe has to be complete; so [*1st inference:*] it has to be complete in resembling God; so [*2nd inference:*] it has to resemble God in His intellectual nature; so [*3rd inference:*] one has to posit a non-bodily creature.

The antecedent is obvious. Drawing the first inference is supported on the ground that creation’s

completeness is found in its being made to resemble God, which is in turn supported on the ground that resembling Him is the first thing God intended in all His creatures.

— Drawing the second inference is supported on the ground that God acts through His understanding and willing. — The support for drawing the third inference is the fact that understanding is not the act of a body, which is in turn supported by the fact that each body is limited to a here and now.

Three doubts

iii. But here many doubts arise. The first concerns the meaning of the first inference drawn, since it seems false. Either it means an unqualifiedly complete resemblance, which would be univocal likeness, and then it is obviously false, or else it means a complete resemblance of a certain kind, say, the kind creatures can have to God. In that case, it subdivides into the kind for creatable creatures or the kind for actually created ones. If it means the former, it is false, because God can make a creature that is more complete and more similar to Himself than any one He actually made. If it means the latter, the inferred point is true but does not go far enough for Aquinas’ purposes. From the mere fact that, among all the effects coming from an analogous or equivocal cause, at least one effect is most completely made to resemble it, it does not follow that “ergo this effect is made to resemble it in the nature whereby it acts,” as is obvious with the lesser effects of the heavenly bodies and Intelligences.

iv. The second doubt is about the middle term used to support drawing the second inference, namely: “God acts by understanding and willing; ergo, the universe, which is the effect completely resembling Him, has in it an intellectual nature.” This does not seem valid. For according to St. Thomas and the experts generally, what is necessary and sufficient for an effect to resemble its cause

* *ratio agendi*

fully is that it be similar not to the agent cause's nature or faculty, but to the reason he was acting,* not insofar as that is a thing but insofar as it is the said reason, as one sees clearly in the case of an art and an artifact. But understanding, willing, and an intellectual nature (be it in God or in any other agent acting by artistry) obviously does not stand as the reason one has been acting. So the inference, "ergo there have to be intellectual natures," is badly drawn.¹

v. Then doubt arises about the third inference; it does not seem to reach the conclusion Aquinas wanted. From the premise that there is an intellectual creature, it does not follow that there is an altogether bodiless one. One may say, after all, that this creature is an intellectual soul, which is part of a bodily substance such as a heavenly body, or an aerial one, or a human being.

Answering these

cc.3-4

of q.25, aa.5-6

vi. Against the first doubt, the talk here is about a complete likeness in the whole set of things possible to create. In that domain, you need to know that comparing the universe to the levels of being is one thing, and comparing it to the special ways of being on those levels is another. The levels of finite things go by act and potency (unless maybe one is hiding in there that is by its essence), and the highest among them, and the most like God, according to Augustine in *De Trinitate* XIV, is the intellectual level. But the ways of being on that level (though they are finitely many if you mean being on it in full actualness) are countlessly many if you mean being on it in logical possibility or within the power of God. For there is no such thing as "the greatest creature God could make."² So the completeness of our universe requires it to contain things on every creatable level, but not every creatable creature. So, from the completeness of our universe, one infers perfectly well the [instantiation of the] intellectual level and thereby the most complete likeness of our universe to God, and hence the most perfect level He can make. Thus saying that the universe is (within the range of things He can make) completely like God can

¹ The Scholastic maxim that an effect must resemble its cause (not in just any way but in the precise way its cause was in act to produce it) required especially careful handling when the cause was a voluntary agent rather than a natural one like a hot iron. Cajetan made a study of this in §§ vi-viii of his commentary on q.41, a.2. A voluntary agent is one who is causing something thanks to his desiring to do so, and so the act-state through which he is causing his effect is what he wants to emerge in it — in short, his intended effect. This, Cajetan argued, is the artist's or craftsman's *ratio agendi*, and this is what his artifact must resemble, or it will not be what he wanted, as he wanted it.

This precision about how a created effect should resemble its voluntary cause is now being used to pose an objection to one of Aquinas' inferences. The Angelic Doctor seemed to be saying that an optimally created universe would have to contain at least one (analogous sort of) replica of its Maker's nature. But as one sees from a craftsman's pottery or a composer's music, a voluntary agent need not have had the intention to make a self-replica.

be taken two ways: in terms of levels, and in terms of creatures. Taken the first way, it is true; taking the second way, not. And since a universe "fully" resembling God in that second way is not even possible, as I just said, the completeness of our universe does not require that sort of resemblance. Rather, speaking in straightforward and unqualified terms, our universe is rightly said to resemble God "completely" because it is like Him in having all its levels of being.

vii. Against the second doubt, I start with the fact that comparing one particular effect to its cause is a different business from comparing the whole set of effects (which is itself the effect first intended and for whose sake all its members are effects, i.e. the universe itself) to its cause. For the latter, a likeness to the cause is required on every possible level of participation in it: for the former, it is not. I am saying, then, that what St. Thomas meant by "understanding and willing" is the intelligible form or "art" by which God made the world through the action of His intellect and will.

Against the argument on the other side, I say that "the reason He was acting" includes two things: the reason itself and its mode of being: effects made to resemble their causes only in the reason they acted [so that each just matches its agent's intended effect] resemble their causes less completely than those made to resemble this reason also in its mode of being. A house produced by a carpenter in matter would better resemble the builder's *art* if it were non-material.² And so, since God acts through a form having the being of an object for understanding,* a universe in which a likeness of that form is salvaged in every way it can exist is a universe made to resemble Him both in that form and in its mode of being, and hence it would be both as described in God's mind and as existing there, and so it would contain in itself a case [at least one case] of intellectual being.³

* *esse intelligibile*† *esse intellectuale*

viii. Against the third doubt, I have three things to say. (1) Its counter-example is irrelevant, because we are talking here about creatures, and a soul that is a part of a substance is not a creature, strictly speaking: it is just an essential part of a creature. — (2) If you look at the last sentence of this article, the attempted counter-example really strengthens the conclusion sought: for once an intellectual nature is admitted as a part of a bodily substance, it is surely plausible to posit among creatures an intellectual substance that is higher than, and independent of, a body.³ — (3) I can go back to the exposition I gave of the title and say that 'altogether non-bodily' is not being taken so strictly here.

² For then the house would match not only the builder's intended plan but also the kind of being the plan had in his mind before he acted upon it.

³ This paragraph confirms footnote 3 on p. 850. The article meant to prove only the lemma that a created universe optimally resembling its divine Cause will include a created mind *somehow*. That it will include one existing as a whole substance with no body at all is just a plausible conjecture from that lemma, given Aristotle's ontology.

Is an angel composed of matter and form?

In I Sent. d.8, q.5, a.2; *In II Sent.* d.3, q.1, a.1; 2 *CG* cc.50, 51; *De Spiritualibus creaturis* a.1; *Quodl.* III, q.8, X, q.4, a.1; *Compend. Theol.* c.74; *Opusc. XV de Angelis*, cc 5-7; c.18; *De ente et essentia*, c.5

It seems an angel would be composed of matter and form.

(1) After all, everything contained in a category is composed of a genus and a difference which, upon being added to the genus, constitutes a species. But the genus comes from matter and the difference from form, as is c.2
1043 a 19
PL 64, 1250
c.2
1043 a 19

(2) Besides, matter is found wherever its distinctive traits are found. Its distinctive traits are that it receives [a form] and stands as a subject having it, which is why Boethius says in his *De Trinitate* [I, c.2] that a "simple form cannot be a subject." But this [receiving and standing] is found in an angel; therefore, an angel is composed of matter plus its form.

(3) Moreover, a form is an actualness [*actus*]. So that which is just a form is pure actualness. But an angel is not pure actualness, since that trait belongs to God alone. Therefore an angel is not just a form but *has* a form in matter.

(4) Furthermore, a form is distinctively limited and bounded by matter. So a form which is not in matter is a boundless form. Well, an angel's form is not boundless because every creature is finite. So an angel's form is in matter.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Denis says in c.4 of *De divinis nominibus*: the first creatures "are understood to be bodiless and immaterial."¹

ANSWER: Some writers hold that the angels are composed of matter and form. Avicbron worked to spread this opinion in his book, *The Fountain of Life*.¹ He assumes that any items distinguished by the mind are distinct in things. In an incorporeal substance, the mind apprehends something whereby it differs from a bodily one and something whereby it is the same [a substance]. From there he wants to conclude that the factor whereby the incorporeal substance differs is its form, whereas the factor common to both and subjected to this differentiating form is its matter. Thus he holds that one and the same universal matter belongs to spiritual things and bodily ones, with the result that we are to think of the form of the incorporeal substance as impressed upon spiritual matter, as the form of a quantity is impressed upon bodily matter.

¹ Avicbron' is the Latinized name of Solomon ibn Gabirol (ca. 1020 – 1068), a Moor who wrote in Arabic. His book had been translated into Latin in the century before Aquinas wrote.

But one sees at a glance that it is impossible for one matter to belong to spiritual and bodily things. It is not possible, after all, for a spiritual form and a bodily one to be received in one and the same part of the matter, because then numerically one and the same thing would be corporeal and spiritual. The alternative is that one part of the matter gets a bodily form; and another part, a spiritual one. But matter only divides into parts insofar as it is understood to come with quantity [in an amount]; take that away, and the stuff remains indivisible, as it says in *Physics* [III]. So then the alternative is that the matter of spiritual things comes in an amount — which is impossible. Hence it is impossible for there to be "one matter" of corporeal and spiritual things.

It is further impossible for an *intellectual* substance to have any matter. What a thing does,* after all, follows from how its substance is.¹ Well, an act of understanding is entirely a matter-independent thing to do. This is clear from its object (which is that from which the act gets its kind and its explanation). After all, each and every object is understood insofar as it is abstracted from matter, because forms in matter are *individual* affairs, which the intellect does not apprehend as such. What remains, then, is that [how] every intellectual substance is [is] entirely matter-independent.²

Still, there is no necessity that items distinguished mentally be distinct in things outside the mind; for the mind does not apprehend things in the mode of being they have outside the mind, but in the mode of being they have within it. Thus material things (which are lower than our mind) have a simpler mode of being in the mind than they have in themselves. Angelic substances, however, are above our mind. So our mind cannot reach so high as to attain them as they are in themselves but only in our mind's own way — the way it apprehends composed things. Which is also how it apprehends God, as I said above.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): the difference is what constitutes the species. But each thing is put into its species insofar as it is nailed down to a particular level among the beings; for the species of things are like numbers, differing from one another by the addition or subtraction of a unit, as it says in *Metaphysics* VIII. In material things, however, what nails them down to a

² This argument is meant to be taken *formaliter*, i.e., as true of intellectual substances *as such*. An intellectual substance *as such* does what its name says: it understands. As this distinctive operation requires matter-independence in the doing of it, and this in turn depends on how the agent "is" as a substance, the agent's substantial being *as intellectual* must be matter-independent.

c.5,
204a 9

* *operatio cuiuslibet rei*
† *modum substantiae eius*

q.3, a.3 *ad* 1

c.3;
1043b 34

particular level is one thing (the form), and what gets nailed down is something else (the matter); and so the genus and the difference are taken from different factors. But in things independent of matter, there is no difference between what nails down and what gets nailed down; rather, each such thing occupies its own definite level among the beings. So genus and difference in them are not gotten from different items, but from one and the same. Still, these items differ in our thought of them, since our mind considers the one item as *indefinite* and gives it the mark of a “genus,” and then considers it as *definite*, and gives it the mark of a difference.

ad (2): that argument is put forward in *The Fountain of Life*. It would be necessarily true if how an intellect receives a form were the same as how matter receives a form. But this is obviously false. Matter receives a form in such a way as to be constituted thereby in being of-some-kind, such as air, or fire, or something else. This is not how the mind receives a form (otherwise Empedocles’ opinion would have been right, which held that we know “earth by [being] earth” and “fire by [being] fire”). No, an intelligible form is in an intellect in its very character as a form,* since this is how it is known by a mind. Thus an intellect’s way of receiving is not matter’s way but that of a matter-independent substance.

ad (3): While there is no composition of form and matter in an angel, there is still composition of act and potency. This may become clear from considering material things, in which we find two levels of composition. On the first level, form and matter are combined, from which a nature arises. But a nature thus composed is not its own existence; its existing is rather an actuation of it.

Hence the nature itself is compared to its existing as potency is to act. Taking away matter, therefore, and allowing a form to subsist on its own, not in matter, there still remains a comparison of the form to existence itself, as of potency to act. This sort of composition is to be understood in the angels. And this is why some writers have said that an angel is composed of “whereby it is” and “what it is,” or from “existing” and “what exists,” as Boethius says; for “what is” is the form itself subsisting, but its existing is “whereby” the substance is, as running is whereby a runner runs. In God, however, there is no difference between the existing and what is, as I showed above. This is why God alone is pure act.

ad (4): Every creature is unqualifiedly finite inasmuch as its existence is not subsisting on its own but is limited by the nature receiving it. But nothing prevents a creature from being “infinite” in some respect. Material creatures have an unboundedness from their matter but a boundedness from their form, which is limited by the matter in which it is received. Created substances independent of matter are finite in their being but unbounded insofar as their form is not received in something else. Thus we might say that a case of whiteness existing separately [from any substance] is unbounded in its makeup as white, because it is not narrowed down to a subject receiving it, but its existing would still be finite, because it is nailed down to a definite nature [*i.e.*, that of the accident, whiteness]. This is why it says in the *Liber de Causis* that a created intelligence is bounded from above (where it receives existence from its superior), but is unbounded from below (where it is not received in any matter).

De Hebdomadibus, PG 64, 1311

q.3, a.4

Prop.16

As reported by
Aristotle, *De
Anima*, 404b 13

* *secundum
ipsam rationem
formae*

Cajetan’s Commentary

The title is clear. — However, notice that when one has denied that an angel has a body (that is, a substance subject to quantity), there remains a doubt as to whether such a quantitatively indivisible substance might nevertheless be divisible essentially (*i.e.*, composed of matter and form).

ii. In the body of the article, Aquinas does two main jobs: (1) he rehearses the opinion of Avicbron; (2) he refutes it. As for job (1), since he rehearses the opinion in order, giving its basis, central holding, and manner (such that the matter posited in the angels would make there be one matter for all things), he did not have to work on any point except this last.

iii. As for job (2), he attacks the opinion in reverse order. He attacks the oneness of matter, since it would follow that an angel was quantified. — He attacks the central claim [angels have matter] on the following ground. [*Antecedent:*] Understanding is an utterly immaterial operation; and so [*inference:*] an intellectual substance is utterly immaterial. Drawing the inference is valid, because how an agent acts bears witness to how it is. The antecedent is supported from the nature of the

intellect’s object. Since the object has to be immaterial, so does the act of understanding it, since the operation is specified by its object. — He refutes the basis [for Avicbron’s thinking] first in general: how a thing is understood by us is not how it is in itself (a sign of which is the fact that material things are in our mind in a simpler way than they are in themselves.)¹ Then he refutes it in the matter at hand, on the ground that we understand higher things [like the angels] through the manner of composed things, in which that in which they agree is distinct from that in which they differ. And this was the source of Avicbron’s error [*i.e.* he supposed they would also be distinct in a higher, uncomposed sort of being]. We met the same problem in trying to grasp the divine nature.

¹ An empirical object which, in the real is a matter/form composite, is in our minds as an uncomposed, non-material item, like a concept. The point is that the knowing mind gives the known a new level of being, thanks to which distinctions present in the thing in itself may be lacking in it as an object known. The reader may need to be reminded that the duality here is metaphysical, not epistemological, hence it gives no support to the dualism of Kant.

Is the oneness of matter disproved?

iv. As for Aquinas' proof against the oneness of matter, a little, tiny doubt comes up. For one might rejoin that the inference is not valid on the basis that the matter common to all things is so divided that by receiving quantity it becomes a part of material bodies, while the rest of matter remains without quantity, and so is spiritual matter, distinct from the bodily stuff because it is not affected by quantity.

v. I can give three answers to this. The first is that St. Thomas foresaw the evasion, and so joined the argument to a flat disproof that angels have matter, which was the main point at issue. — Secondly and better, I can say that this answer does not evade our point that spiritual matter would be divisible quantitatively (although it would not be divided in act). After all, since matter was one thing before it received quantity, there is no reason why this part of it should be affected rather than another part. (Positing that spiritual substances are actually or potentially so-big, or actually or potentially divisible quantitatively, amounts to the same thing.) — Thirdly, and better yet, I can say that this answer cannot be given by anyone who holds that there are at least two angels. For on more or less the same ground, one may question how the matter common to two or more angels (common since it is of the same kind) got partitioned and distributed to multiple angels, if matter without quantity lacks parts, etc. So, since Avicbron admitted a multitude of spiritual substances, St. Thomas' argument against him works effectively.

Trouble from Durandus

vi. Concerning the effectiveness of the argument made in the text against Avicbron, a doubt arises from Durandus. For it only seems to work against those who hold that the angels are intellectual substances in their whole selves. But it is known that there is a substance which is intellectual in part, i.e. in its form, and yet is composed of matter and form, as is clear in the case of man, and in the case of a heavenly body, if it is animated. And since such is the case, the argument here against Avicbron is worthless, even if he himself did not see this other path.

vii. The SHORT ANSWER to this is that, whatever was in Avicbron's mind, the argument in the text obviously concludes that an intellectual substance *as such* is matter-independent, i.e. independent of matter in its being. This is the point supported, after all, by the operation of understanding and its object. So if the intellectual substance is complete in its species, it is entirely matter-independent, as is obvious. And by the word 'angel' we all understand substances complete in their species (a sign of which is the fact that the question about angels is a different question from the one about the souls of heavenly bodies and other animated things). So it obviously follows that the argument is not evaded by the kind of answer Durandus gives. For even if we did not assume the angels were intellectual in their whole selves, we would at least be assuming what the word 'angel' means (an intellectual substance complete in its species). And thus the argument proceeds *formaliter*.^{*}

* See note 2 on the article.

Unpacking the answer *ad* (1)

viii. In the answer *ad* (1), notice that the force of the objection consists in the philosophical proposition of Avicbron, and so Aquinas does three things. First he shows what is formally required for something to serve as a difference (namely, that it nail down to a level of being). Secondly, he shows where Avicbron's claim has application, namely, in material things. Thirdly he shows on the same basis that one must construe 'genus' and 'difference' otherwise in the talk of the angels.

ix. In this same answer, take careful note that Saint Thomas is not disagreeing with the Peripatetics in positing angels in general. Obviously, he is even imitating Aristotle's wording in the last bit of *Metaphysics VIII* [c.6]. He says that in the angels the genus is distinct from the difference not in the real but in our thought. Understand this to be said also about their intrinsic features.

A puzzle in the answer *ad* (2)

x. In the answer *ad* (2), there is a doubt about the difference assigned between matter's receiving a form and the intellect's doing so, to the effect that matter is put into the being of a species and of the naturally received form, whereas the intellect receives a form "in its very character as a form."^{*} What does it mean to receive it "in its very character as a form"? Maybe it means to receive the essence of a form [the what-it-is to be a form] — and this is not the case, because matter receives this, too. Or maybe it means to receive the form alone — and this is wrong because matter also receives this. Or maybe it means to receive intension-wise[†] — but this is wrong because air receives "intension-wise."[‡] Or maybe it means to receive it as a universal — and this cannot be said in line with Saint Thomas, because in his doctrine whatever is received in an intellect is an individual or singular thing, e.g. *this* intelligible species. And the problem gets worse, because the distinction here is between receiving the form in its very character as a form *versus* receiving it as things do when constituted in being [what the form would make them]. It is well known that the sort of receiving we contrast with this latter is "intensional" receiving, and yet this can also be material receiving, as is clear from St. Thomas's third argument in 2 *CG* e.51.

Its solution

xi. The answer to this is that receiving a form in its very character as a form is receiving it in its *mode* as a form,[§] and its "mode as a form" is the mode it has just thanks to itself. Well, this mode is indeterminacy as between this or that [subject]. So, from first to last, it is receiving a form independently of its being shared in [by these or those things] and its having extension in any things.[§] In other words, it is receiving the form af-

[‡] Here is a red poppy. The transparent air "takes" its color to the eye without becoming red itself, and the eye receives it without becoming red either. This was called receiving the form "intentionaliter."

1031b 32

* *recipit formam secundum ipsam rationem formae*

† *intentionaliter*

§ *per modum formae*

§ *amplitudo ad quaecumque*

ter the fashion of a universal.³

To the objection against this, I reply that being received universal-wise does not contrast with every sort of singularity, but only with the material sort, which is tied to the here and now. After all, a single non-material individual is equivalent to limitlessly many material ones; and a kind of stone in the mind is "stone" as a universal, even though it is numerically one thing of a higher (non-material) order.

Against the next objection, I reply that "intensional"

³ Here '*universaliter*' means "in such a way as to act like a universal." When a form is received in matter, it is contracted to this matter, particularized; it ceases to act as a universal because its total impact is now upon this material thing alone, to which it gives a specific structure. But when a form is received in a mind, it is received as abstracted from matter, hence ready to function as a universal in signifying or in making a judgment.

reception has a wide range of application. It subdivides into universal intensional reception and particular such reception, which occurs in a sense-power and in a [transparent] medium, etc. So St. Thomas has no intent to suggest that "receiving [a form] in its own character as a form" is equivalent to "receiving [a form] intension-wise." Rather, since receiving a form comes in three types (the purely material type, which puts a thing into its specific being, the purely formal type, which abstracts from all material conditions, and a middle type, which is partly material and partly formal, which is the intension-wise receiving peculiar to sense powers), St. Thomas distinguished the one extreme (simple reception in matter) from the other extreme (universal intensional reception); thereby he insinuated to the wise the difference between the intellect's receiving and the whole range of matter's receiving, be it complete or partial.

Do angels exist in any great number?

1 *ST* 113, a.4 ad 2, *In II Sent.* d.3, q.1, a.3, 2 *CG* c.93,
De Potentia q.6, a.6, *Opusculum XV, De Angelis*, c.2

It seems angels do not exist in any great number.

(1) After all, a "number" is the kind of quantity that arises from division of the continuous.¹ No such thing can occur among the angels because they are non-material, as was shown above. Therefore, angels cannot exist in great number.

(2) Besides, the closer something is to one, the smaller the count of it is, as one sees with numbers. But among the natures God has created, that of the angels is the closest to God, and God is supremely one. So the count of things in angelic nature should be the smallest.

(3) Moreover, the distinctive effect of these "separated substances" would seem to be that of moving the heavenly bodies.² But the motions of those bodies occur in a small, fixed number, which we can grasp fully. So, the angels are not more numerous than those motions of the heavenly bodies.

(4) Furthermore, Denis says in c.4 of *De divinis nominibus* that "all intellectual and intelligible substances subsist because of rays of divine goodness." Well, the only thing that makes a ray multiple is multiple receivers. One cannot say that matter receives an intelligible ray, since intellectual substances are non-material, as shown above. So it seems that the count of intellectual substances can only rise with the needs of the "first bodies," i.e. the heavenly ones, so that the streaming out of the rays just mentioned terminates, somehow, at them. Which brings us back to the issue raised in (3) above.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what it says in Daniel 7:10, "a thousand thousands ministered unto Him, and a myriad myriads stood before Him."

ANSWER: different writers have taken different views on the number of separated substances. Plato maintained that the separated substances are the kinds [*Ideai*] of empirical things, as if we should hold that Human Nature Itself is a separated substance. On this view, one would have to say that the separated substances are as many as the kinds of empirical things. — But Aristotle disproved this view on the ground that matter belongs to the definition of these kinds of empirical things. Hence the separated substances cannot be exemplar forms [archetypes] of the empirical things; rather, they have higher natures

Phaedo c.49;
Parmenides c.6

Metaphysics
VIII, c.1, 1042a
 25

¹ On this notion of number, see q.30, a.3, with its footnotes.

² A "separated substance" was one separate from matter, like an "angel" in the language of the Church, and like an "Intelligence" in the language of the Arab philosophers. Their alleged cosmic rôle as movers of the heavenly bodies made sense in a pre-Newtonian world view, where nothing moved unless it was (a) alive or (b) pushed.

than the empirical things.

Aristotle maintained that those more perfect natures still bear a relation to empirical things, such as being the movers of them and the purposes for them. And so he tried to discover the number of separated substances by looking at the number of primordial motions.

But since this seem to conflict with the texts of Holy Scripture, Rabbi Moses the Jew, wanting to reconcile Aristotle and the Bible, proposed that the "angels" (insofar as this is the name of non-material substances) are as numerous as the heavenly bodies or their motions, in line with Aristotle. But he also proposed that in the Bible 'angels' is the name given to people announcing divine things and also to the powers of natural things which manifest God's omnipotence. — But in fact saying that the powers of irrational things are the so-called "angels" is foreign to Biblical usage.

So the thing to say is that the angels, even insofar as their name is given to non-material substances, exist in a maximum multitude exceeding that of every material thing. This is what Denis says in c.14 of his *Celestial Hierarchy*: "Many are the blessed hosts of supernal minds, exceeding the low and restricted count of our material numbers." The reason for this is as follows. Since the completeness of the universe is what God first intended in the creation of things, the more complete certain things are, the greater the scale on which God created them. Well, just as greater scale among bodies is a matter of greater size,* so among non-bodily things greater scale can be seen as a matter of their greater multitude. Well, we see that the incorruptible bodies (the most perfect ones among bodies) surpass corruptible bodies in size almost incomparably (since the whole sphere of things acting and acted upon [here below] is something small compared to the heavenly spheres).³ Hence it is reasonable that the non-material substances should surpass the material ones in number, almost incomparably.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — ad (1): among the angels, number is not the discreet quantity caused by division of the continuous; rather it is a manyness caused by distinction between their forms, in the sense in which 'many' belongs to the transcendental terms, as I said above.

ad (2): from the fact that angelic nature is close to God, it must follow that it has a minimum of components — not that it is found in fewer cases.

ad (3): this argument is Aristotle's in *Metaphysics XII*. And one would have to conclude the same way he did,

Metaphysics XII
 c.8, 1073a.33,
 1074a.20

Marmonides,
Guide for the
Perplexed II, 6

PG 3, 321

* *magnitudo*

q.30, a.3

c.8,
 1073a.37

³ The Greek astronomers and mathematicians had made impressive estimates of the diameter of the earth and of the vastly more enormous distance from here to the fixed stars

if the separated substances were for the sake of the bodily ones: for then it would be pointless for non-material substances to exist unless some motion among bodily things happened because of them. However, it is not true that non-material substances exist for the sake of bodily ones, for a purpose is nobler than the things that exist for its sake. Hence even Aristotle says in the same

1073a 16 passage that this argument is not compelling but just

plausible.* He was forced to argue this way because we can only arrive at knowledge of intelligible things via empirical ones. • *probabilis*

ad (4); this argument is from those who think matter is the only reason things are distinct from each other; but this has been disproved already. So a high count of angels is not to be gotten from bodies, but from God's wisdom thinking up various ranks of immaterial substances.

q.47, a.1

Cajetan's Commentary

The title is clear. — In the body of the article, two things happen. First, three opinions are rehearsed: Plato's, Aristotle's, and Rabbi Moses's; then they are individually disapproved. The second thing that happens is that the question is answered with a conclusion to this effect: angels exist in some maximal multitude, exceeding every material number. — This is supported on two grounds, namely, the authority of Denis, and an argument that goes like this. [*Major:*] The more perfect certain things are among the beings, the greater the scale on which they were created; [*minor:*] the angels are extremely perfect; [*conclusion:*] ergo [they have been created on a greater scale]. — The major is supported on two grounds. The first is that the completeness of the universe was the first thing intended. The second is that we see heavenly bodies created on a maximum scale of size [compared to earthly bodies].

ii. Concerning this argument, notice that the support for the major is a bit obscure in our text, because it had been put forward more clearly in book 2 of the *Contra gentiles*, c.92. There our major premise is supported perspicuously on the ground that the perfection of the universe, which is found in its order, requires that its main parts (the ones which exist for their own sake) be made as many as possible. For there is this difference between things wanted for something else and things wanted for their own sake, *i.e.*, things wanted for something else are needed just in the number that suffices for their purpose; but things wanted for their own sake [are such that] the more of them there are, the better the universe is. And since the more perfect parts of being are the parts wanted for their own sake, and the less perfect parts are wanted for the sake of the more perfect. He who intends mainly the perfection of the universe should create in a greater number or size the things that are more perfect.

A doubt about the major

iii. Concerning the major premise of this same argument, a doubt arises. It does not seem true that the more perfect certain things are, the more they exceed the others in size or multitude. In neither way, after all, does gold exceed iron; the number of rocks incomparably exceeds the number of gems; and yet the latter are more precious.

iv. The thing to say in reply, it seems, is that the parts of the universe are of two kinds, as is discussed in *Book I*

c.2; 268b 15ff *De Caelo et Mundo*. Some are like the integral parts of

its substance, and these pertain to the first or primary integrity of the universe. Other parts are like final touches towards a secondary perfection of the universe: and these latter are effects of the first kind of parts. The first kind of parts are just the elements, the heavenly bodies, and intellectual creatures; the second kind of parts are the mixed things, whatever they are. St. Thomas's major premise should be understood as talking about the first parts. Of them, it is perfectly true and suffices for his intent. On this interpretation, it concludes not only that the number of the angels (of the intellectual substances) exceeds the number of the heavens and the elements; but also, just as we see an incomparable excess of size between the higher bodies and the lower ones, *a fortiori*, since the changeless and spiritual substances are further above bodies than any bodies are above any other bodies, it follows that they incomparably exceed the number both of the things just mentioned and of other material things.

A doubt about the conclusion

v. Concerning the main conclusion, a doubt arises as to whether [its claim about the count of angels being higher] is meant to be about every count of material things, no matter if counted by kinds or by individuals, or is meant to be about just the number of kinds of material things, or is meant to be just about the first material parts of the universe. If the conclusion is understood this second or third way, the number of angels does not seem so large and excessive as people usually say. And yet the solution I just gave shows that the conclusion needs to be understood the first way — otherwise there would be an equivocation between the premises and the conclusion. But if it is taken the first way, a large absurdity appears, namely, that there are more angels than grains of millet, grains of wheat, *etc.* The number of these and of pebbles and of grains of sand and other things of that sort does not seem to be wisely compared to intellectual things.

vi. The answer to this is that the talk here, strictly speaking, is about the count of kinds. For, on the one hand, the angels have no other count. On the other hand, the force of the middle term on which the argument is based does not go beyond the limits of a count of kinds, since the first parts of the universe (the elements and the heavenly bodies) are contained in single individuals.¹ —

¹ In medieval cosmology, each heavenly body was the sole member of its natural kind. Thus the sun in our sky was the only

From this it does not follow that the number of angels is excessive. After all, a count going incomparably beyond the count of material kinds is very great, while the size of the first orb [that of the fixed stars] surpassing incomparably the amount of the elements, is also extremely great.²

And this was undoubtedly what St. Thomas was thinking. This is why below, in q.112, a.4 *ad 2*, devoted to the same topic, he uses the word 'natures', saying that the angels exceed "all bodily natures." And in q.6, a.6, of the Disputed Questions *De Potentia Dei*, he uses the word 'species', saying that the angels exceed "all the species of material things."

What is said on the other side about the first parts of the universe is no obstacle. After all, the first corporeal parts of the universe contain the other kinds, if not formally, then at least virtually. And so talking about the count of the universe's first parts and talking about the

sun in the universe: the stars were not thought to be other suns. Ditto for the moon and each planet.

² In medieval cosmology, the quantity of the elements (of earth, water, air, and fire) was limited to what was found here below, the heavenly bodies were thought to be otherwise composed, if composed at all.

count of the kinds of all material things amount to the same, except in terms of what is implicit and explicit. And hence exceeding beyond all proportion the count of the universe's first material parts is also to exceed beyond all proportion the count implicitly and virtually contained in them. — And if the objection is raised, "so then it is also talking about material distinction, because that is contained virtually in those first things," my answer is obvious; the issue is not the same. After all, St. Thomas's argument gets its strength from the bearing of the universe's parts and its perfection (as became obvious above) and hence one should take it to be talking only about the count that is relevant to the universe's perfection; such is not the case with the numerical count [of individuals], but for the count of kinds of primary parts formally and of secondary parts virtually.³

³ Freeing the doctrine in this article from its context in obsolete cosmology would not be a constructive use of one's time, because it is hard to see how any plausible modernization would compromise the main point on which St. Thomas agreed with the language of Daniel 10. Of course, by a "plausible modernization," I mean one in line with genuine physics and astrophysics, not some modern (or recently revived) philosophical mistake, like "neutral monism" or the extreme reductionism one sees in some materialist scientists.

Do angels differ in kind?

In II Sent. d.3, q.1, a.4; d.32, q.2, a.3; *In IV Sent.* d.12, q.1 a.1, q^{ms} ad 3;
2 *CG* c.93; *De Spiritualibus Creaturis*, a.8, *De ente et essentia*, c.5

It looks as though the angels do not differ in kind or species.

(1) After all, since a specific difference is nobler than a generic trait, if things with the generic trait agree in what is noblest in them, they agree in their ultimate constitutive difference, and so they are the same in species. But all the angels agree in what is most noble in them, namely, in their intellectuality. Therefore all the angels are of one species.

(2) Besides, more and less do not make different species. But angels do not seem to differ from one another except in terms of more and less—such that one is simpler than another, and is a more insightful intellect. Therefore the angels do not differ in species.

(3) Moreover, a soul is distinguished from and opposed to an angel. But all souls are of the same species. So too, then, are all angels.

(4) Furthermore, take some one kind of thing; ideally, the more perfect it is in its nature, the more numerous it would be. But this ideal would fail, if there were only a single individual in that one kind. Therefore, the many angels are of one species.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is the fact that one does not find a prior and posterior among things of a single species. So says Aristotle. But among even the angels of a single order, there are first ones, middle ones, and last ones, as Denis says in c.10 of *The Celestial Hierarchy*. Therefore the angels are not of the same species.

I ANSWER: some writers have said that all spiritual substances, including souls, are of the same kind. Others have said that all of the angels are of one species, but not the souls. Some, too, have said that all the angels of one hierarchy, or even one order, are of the same species.

But these ideas are impossible. Things which agree in species and differ numerically agree in their form and differ by their matter. So since the angels are not composed of matter and form, as I established above, it follows that it is impossible for two angels to be of one species. Likewise there could not be many separate instances of whiteness (nor many instances of humaneness), since instances of whiteness are only multiplied because they are in multiple substances.

And if the angels did have matter, multiple angels still could not be of one and the same species. For in or-

der for that to happen, the source of one angel's distinction from another would have to be matter, indeed, but not matter as divided up into quantities (since the angels are incorporeal); rather, it would have to be matter as having different powers [like the matter of water vs. that of air]. But this difference of matter causes diversity not only in species, but also in genus.¹

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): the difference is nobler than the genus as the determinate is nobler than the indeterminate, and the distinctive is nobler than the common; but not as one nature *versus* another. Otherwise it would have to be the case that all sub-rational animals are of one species, or that they have in them some other form more perfect than the sensation-capable soul. [Neither being the case] therefore, sub-rational animals differ in species according to different, definite levels of sensation-capable nature. And similarly, all the angels differ in species according to different levels of intellection-capable nature.

ad (2): more and less, insofar as they are caused by intensification and moderation of a single form, do not yield a different species. Rather, different species arise by being caused by forms belonging on different levels—as we might say that fire is more perfect than air. Only in this way are the angels “diversified” by “more” and “less.”²

ad (3): The good of a species is greater than the good of an individual. Hence it is much better that the angels be made many in species than it would be if they were multiplied as individuals in one species.

ad (4): Since mere numbers can go up and up without limit, a merely numerical head count can also rise without limit, and so no such count is intended by the Agent Cause; rather, He intends only a multitude of *kinds*, as I said above. Hence the full perfection of angelic nature requires that there be a multitude of species in it, rather than a multitude of individuals in the same species.

¹ Everyone knew the elements had different powers, as water can float a boat and air cannot, and no thinker since the pre-Socratics thought the elements reduced to a single kind.

² Each element was specifically different, but they were not equal in “perfection.” Difference of perfection came from being lighter and so having a natural place higher above the earth. The natural place of fire was thought to be above that of the air.

Cajetan's Commentary

The title is clear. — In the body of the article, two things happen. The first is that Aquinas reports three opinions clearly (the third being the one that Scotus* followed). — The second thing that happens is that he attacks all three together on the topic at hand, and does so on two grounds, obviously.

The first ground goes as follows. [*Antecedent:*] The angels are not composed of matter and form; [*consequent:*] so there are not many of them in one species. — The consequent is proven on the ground that any and all things agreeing in species but differing in number,¹ agree in their form, and differ materially.

The second ground attacks the opinions positing that the angels would differ materially, by [dis-] proving their conclusion, as follows. A distinction caused by matter is either due to diversity of quantity [as the water designated as a quart is distinct from the water designated as a gallon], or else due to diversity of power. The first is not the case, because the angels are incorporeal;² therefore the second must hold. But diversity of power excludes not only sameness of species but even sameness of genus. Ergo [the distinctions between the angels cannot have been caused by matter].

A Doubt

ii. Concerning the proof of the consequent in the first ground, doubt arises: either it assumes a falsehood, or else it proves nothing. For if 'differ materially' means [1] that they differ in matter strictly so-called when the matter belongs to different things, it assumes a falsehood. Because then two souls would differ materially, and yet not differ in matter, since they lack it; ditto for two lines mathematically taken, and likewise two accidents of the same kind in angels.— But if 'differ materially' means [2] a difference in matter strictly so called but not belonging to different things, then also it assumes a falsehood (as is obvious in the two examples I just gave, and the many arguments given by Scotus go against this; you find these arguments in my commentary on *De Ente et Essentia*) and also does not prove the point

c 2, q.5; c 5, q.9

¹ For any positive integer n , an item counted as n (or the n^{th}) differed numerically from an item counted as $n+1$ (or the $(n+1)^{\text{th}}$). Of course, in any coherent count, the items counted are of at least one common kind or "form," and a medieval count was called numerical only when the items counted were material (otherwise, the count was called transcendental). Hence the inference from 'distinct numerically' to 'distinct materially'.

² Only a body had enough dimensions for one to differ from another "by diversity of quantity," because a quantity was a real accident of amount or size. So, for Aquinas, if a quantum is a real, minimum amount, then even a photon is "corporeal."

Aquinas was after, inasmuch as "differing materially" in some way is more general than differing materially because of composition from matter and form and differing materially because things somehow differ in matter; and so denying the composition does not allow one to infer a negation of material differing; rather, doing so is a fallacy of the consequent, going from the lower to the higher negatively.³ — But if 'differ materially' just means [3] a difference in matter commonly taken, *i.e.* insofar as the matter relates to the species, then this premise, so taken, is accepted by everyone. But then it proves absolutely nothing relevant for the same reason — I mean because the tacitly assumed minor premise ("the angels do not differ materially") is not proved from the major saying angels are not composed of matter and form; rather, it is again a fallacy of the Consequent.⁴

iii. My RESPONSE to this is that since Saint Thomas' proposition is universal, it is to be understood in the third way. A sign of this is the fact that he appends the example of the multiplication of whiteness, which we know to be individualized not by matter but by extent.

Against the objection going the other way, I reply that Saint Thomas, striving for brevity, was satisfied to offer a proof that worked in the subject matter under discussion. To see this, you need to know that, in his doctrine,* every difference that is purely material arises either from quantity (as happens in material things) or from the subject (as happens in spiritual accidents);⁵ but a difference arising from quantity has no place among substances unless because of matter; but matter does not occur in a complete substance on any basis but as a part of it. The consequence is that, when we are speaking about complete substances such as the angels, differing materially is sufficiently excluded from them by excluding composition of matter and form.⁶

On objection (1)

iv. Concerning the first objection, note that Saint Tho-

³ Trying to go from the lower or less general to the higher or more general negatively is like trying to go from "this is not a duck" to "therefore it's not a bird."

⁴ A fallacy of the consequent is an attempt to go from "if p then q " to "if q then p ." In the case at hand the objector is accusing Aquinas of trying to go fallaciously from "if things do not differ materially, they are not composed of matter and form" to its reversal: "if things are not composed of matter and form, then they do not differ materially."

⁵ A familiar "spiritual accident" is having a thought about $\sqrt{2}$. My thought about it differs from yours simply by being in a different mind.

⁶ Going from "if p then q " to "if q then p " is not wrong in cases where p and q are equivalent. Cajetan is arguing that "they are not composed of matter and form" and "they do not differ materially" are equivalent in contexts where "they" refers to complete substances.

* Scotus, *In II Sent.*, d.3, q.7, arg. 1

* q.75, a.7,
4 CG c 65,
De Ente et
Essentia, c 5

mas is not arguing from general terms for want of arguments using more specialized ones (as was his custom); rather, this argument is examining distinctive traits of the angels.

To see this, you need to be aware of two more-or-less self-evident propositions. The first is that in substances with which we are familiar, [a] *the defining traits of a genus are found in the real without the added nobility of a best nature*. After all, the corporal kind is found without the perfection of mixed matter, as is obvious in the elements; the mixed-matter kind is found without life, as is obvious in the inanimate minerals; the living is found without sensation, as is obvious in the plants; and sense capability is found without self-mobility, as is obvious in oysters; and the self-moving is found without understanding, as is obvious in brute beasts. — The second such proposition is that [b] *intellectuality is the ultimate and highest nature in the universe*.

Out of these two propositions, objection (1) is put together; its major comes from the first of them, [a], and the minor is from the second, [b]. For if a genus is found apart from the highest nature, because it [the generic trait] is inferior to it, it will follow that not all angels agree in having the highest nature; and if they do agree in the highest nature, it is not a [merely] generic nature, because none can be found outside of it. But the angels do agree in intellectuality, which is the noblest of all natures. Ergo [the noblest of all natures is not a generic trait but a species; and so all the angels do in fact belong to one species].

On the answer *ad* (1)

v. In the answer *ad* (1), notice two things. The first is that the talk here is not just about any otherness between the nature of a genus and that of a specific difference, but about the otherness of real separation. The issue is not a difference between the account of a genus and the account of a more perfect specific difference; rather the issue is that the account of a genus differs from the whole range of more perfect specific differences. For example, the account of a thing as living differs from the various accounts of what it takes to have sensation; and the account of a sense-endowed thing differs from the various accounts of what it takes to be biped and quadruped, *etc.* Thus our author intended to restrict the first proposition [labeled above as (a)], although it is sometimes true. — And he supports doing so in two ways. The first is ostensibly, because to make a genus and a difference it is enough that they differ as the indeterminate from the determinate. Secondly, he shows it by deducing an awkward consequence, namely, that in sub-rational animals there would be a higher and more complete form than the sensation-capable nature which is their genus. — Or else they would all be of one species — both of which would be awkward, as will be made clear below

The second thing to notice is that the answer consists formally in the point that agreeing in a kind's noblest happens in two ways: (1) in a noblest nature, and (2) in a noblest level of the common nature. Taken the first way, the major [of the objection itself] is false; taken the second way, it is true, but then the minor [of the same objection] is false.

q 75, a.7 *ad* 2

article 5

Are the angels imperishable?

1 ST q 9, a.2; *In II Sent* d 7, q 1, a.1; 2 CG, c.55;
De Potentia q 5, a.3; *Compend. Theol.* c.74

It seems that the angels are not imperishable [*in corrupti-
 biles*].

*Dx. fide ortho-
 doxa. II. c.3;*
FG 94, 868

41 a

(1) After all, Damascene describes an angel as “an intellectual substance receiving its immortality by grace and not by nature.”

(2) Besides, Plato says in the *Timaeus*, “All ye gods of the gods, whose maker and father I am, ye are my works, destructible in nature — but if I so will, indestructible.” These “gods” can be understood as just exactly the angels. Therefore, the angels are by their own nature perishable.

Monita 377,
c.37, PL 75,
1145

PG 3, 693

(3) Moreover, according to Gregory, “All things would collapse into nothing if the hand of the Almighty did not preserve them.” Well, what can be reduced to nothing is perishable. Therefore, since the angels were made by God, it seems that they are perishable by their nature.

ON THE OTHER HAND, Denis says in chapter four of *De divinis nominibus* that the intellectual substances “have a life immune from the universal corruption, being clean of death and matter and generation.”

ANSWER: it is necessary to say that the angels are imperishable by nature. The reason for this is that nothing perishes except by its form getting separated from its matter; so, since an angel is a subsisting form, as became clear above, it is impossible for his substance to be perishable. For what belongs to something “thanks to itself” * can never be separated from it; rather, what belongs to it “thanks to another”† is what can be separated (separated from it insofar as befits it). Thus the roundness of a circle cannot be separated from it, because the roundness belongs to it thanks to itself. But a bronze circle can lose its roundness, because the circular shape

a.2
 * secundum se
 † secundum alium

gets separated from the bronze. Well, being belongs to a form thanks to itself; * each thing is an actual being [*ens actu*], after all, by having its form. Indeed, matter is an actual being *through* its form. Thus a composite of matter and form ceases to be actual by the form’s being separated from the matter. But if the form itself subsists in its own being, † as I already said was the case in the angels [a. 2], it cannot lose being. An angel’s very matter-independence, therefore, is the reason why he is imperishable by nature.

* esse secundum se competit formae

† subsistat in suo esse

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): Damascene is speaking of the “perfect” immortality which includes all-around changelessness since “every change is a kind of death,” as Augustine says. The angels get perfect immortality only by grace, as will come out below.

*Contra Max-
 iminum II, c. 12,*
PL 42, 772
q 62, aa. 2, 8

ad (2): by ‘gods’ Plato meant heavenly bodies, which he thought were composed of the elements and hence by their nature destructible, but always preserved in being by the divine will.

q 44, a.1 ad 2

ad (3): as I already said, there is such a thing as a “necessary thing” which has a cause of its necessariness. So in the case of a necessary or incorruptible thing, depending on something else as the cause of its existing, does not conflict with it. Hence, when one says that all things would collapse into nothing if God did not sustain them, including the angels, the implication is *not* that some source of corruption is present in the angels, but that their existing depends upon God as upon its cause. After all, nothing is called corruptible just because God could annihilate it by withdrawing His sustaining influence, but rather because it has in itself some source of corruption, or some contrary tendency, or at least the potential for change that comes from matter.

Cajetan’s Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article, there is a single conclusion: the angels are imperishable by their nature. This is supported by two arguments. The first goes as follows.

Analysis of the first argument

[*Antecedent:*] Everything that perishes does so thanks to its form’s being separated from its matter; [*inference:*] hence the angels are imperishable.

Drawing the inference is sound because of the following. [*2nd antecedent:*] The angels are subsisting forms and entirely matter-independent, and so [*infer-*

ence:] separation of form from matter has no place in them. The new antecedent is in turn supported on the following ground. [*3rd antecedent:*] Being goes with a form *per se*; ergo [*1st inference:*] being is inseparable from a form; ergo [*2nd inference:*] what happens in every case of perishing is a separation from matter.

The antecedent assumed just now [the third one, to the effect that being/esse belongs with a form *per se*] has its support [elsewhere in Aristotle] on the ground that whenever being/esse belongs to something, it belongs to it by reason of a form. This is obvious from the case of matter, which is the furthest thing from a form.

1, c.5;
74a 40-74b 3

Drawing the first inference from it is clearly right. from the *Posterior Analytics* and is illustrated by the roundness of a circle vs. that of bronze (i.e. that of a bronze ring). — Drawing the second inference rests upon two points. The first is [the definition] that perishing is a change from being to not being. The second is the fact that there has to be remaining “matter” [a residue] from any case of perishing.¹ What obviously follows from these points is that the separation of a form from matter is what occurs. Then, on the one hand, since a case of being [*aliquid esse*] is destroyed in every case of perishing, and being/*esse* cannot be separated from a form, it has to be the case that the being and the form go down together. On the other hand, since a subject [residue] has to remain from any case of perishing, it has to be the case that, when any object, *x*, perishes, the being of *x* is separated from what had it, and thus the form of *x* is also separated from it — otherwise the talk of perishing [or corruption, or break-down] is unintelligible.

A doubt about this argument

ii. In this first supporting argument, hesitation arises over the truth of the assumed proposition that “being belongs to* a form *per se*.” This is either false or else implies nothing relevant. For it can be taken two ways. The first takes ‘*per se*’ as it contrasts with ‘*per aliud*’ and means the same thing as ‘without an intermediate’ or ‘immediately’. Taken this way, the proposition is true, of course, but offers no support for the conclusion. For it does not follow that being is inseparable from a form. After all, “*A* belongs to *B* immediately, and so it belongs inseparably” is an invalid inference — as is obvious from the case of a form *vis-à-vis* matter and the case of whiteness *vis-à-vis* a surface. — Also the example offered by St. Thomas (roundness and a circle) goes against this interpretation.

The other way takes ‘*per se*’ as it contrasts with ‘*per accidens*’. But so taken the proposition is false both in St. Thomas’s doctrine and outside it. In St. Thomas, being/*esse* is predicated accidentally of any and every form apart from God, so that it is neither of the essence of any form nor a proper effect [*passio*] of any, as he said above in q.3, a.4. For nothing is a self-sufficient cause of the fact that it exists. Outside St. Thomas, nothing can be understood in opposition to what belongs to it *per se*; but without contradiction, one can say of any form but God’s that it “is not.” Therefore being does not belong to a form *per se*.

An answer to the doubt

iii. My response is that ‘*per se*’ can be taken either way. Taken the first way, however, one needs to sub-

¹ When a sub-atomic particle collides with its anti-particle, physics says they “annihilate” each other; but it is better to say that they both “perish,” since a bit of energy is the residue.

² The relation where *x* causes *y* is an irreflexive relation; so “*x* causes *x*” is false for every value of *x*, and so not even God is *causa sui* (*pace* Descartes).

divide “intermediate” into *intermediate action* and *intermediate form*. From the immediate conjunction of two things i.e. without an intermediate form, inseparability cannot be inferred, as the objection says. — But sometimes two things so stand that they are conjoined universally without any intermediate action uniting them. In that case, the two things have to be inseparable from each other: the same generative process generates both, and the same corruptive process destroys both. But such immediacy of action is not found between matter and form (or other such things) because it is perfectly clear that, with the subjects already existing, an agent cause joins them by its action. *But between any form you please and a thing’s existence, no action intermediates to join the one to the other.* The form is not brought about beforehand and then joined to existence by another action. Rather, the very bringing about of the form terminates at that conjunction. Hence a form and its existence are inseparable.³

iv. To open up the second way of taking ‘*per se*’, you need to know that one thing’s belonging to another *per se* (rather than *per accidens*) turns up in two ways: *unqualifiedly* is one way, and *physically* is the other. Persety is called unqualified when it is based on the relation of terms absolutely taken [i.e. independently of how or if they exist]. Persety is called physical when it is based on the relation of the terms posited in natural being [in *esse naturali*]. An example of the first is “Five is uneven.” An example of the second is “Socrates will perish someday.” These two perseties agree in that JUST AS what belongs to something *per se* unqualifiedly adheres to it necessarily absolutely taken, SO ALSO what belongs to something *per se* physically accompanies it necessarily and inseparably in its natural being. The two differ, however, in that predicates attaching *per se* unqualifiedly assume nothing but what is necessarily the case, since they attach to the subjects absolutely taken; but predicates attaching *per se* physically assume something not necessary, namely, that their subjects have been produced in the real (and such production of things is not always necessary); and this is why such predicates bear upon their subjects in physical being. From this fact, the two differ secondly in that the first persety is so

³ To understand this important passage, recall that a concrete particular *x* (unless it is God or an angel) is a composite of matter, *m*, and a form, *f*. But the existence of *x* is not a composite of the existence of *m* plus the existence of *f*. Neither is said to have existence at all. What exists, rather, is the composite *x* itself: for *x* is what subsists, and ‘exists’ is a predicate of subsisting things alone (3 ST q.17, a.2). So the issue here is not *per se* being but *per se* accompaniment (going with, belonging with).

Well, *A* accompanies *B* requires a real distinction between *A* and *B*. Nothing accompanies itself. So, contrary to what the *dubium* tries to insinuate, nothing in this article compromises the Thomistic real distinction between a thing’s form (nature, essence) and the thing’s existence.

Why, then, if the two are distinct, do they go together inseparably (*secundum se, per se*)? Because even God cannot “produce” a form without either producing it in matter (and so making a composite exist) or producing it as subsistent (and so having an angel’s existence).

* *competit*

necessary that its opposite implies a contradiction; the second perseity, however, is only necessary in the natural course of things; and so its opposite does not imply a contradiction. — All these statements are obvious about physical perseity by comparing actual perishing (not now, but at some point) to anything perishable. After all, it is not incidental to any mixed substance that it breaks down at some point; rather its breakdown belongs to it from its essential principles; and yet its never breaking down implies no contradiction; rather it is *despite* its nature that it never breaks down.

By these remarks, my answer to these objections is obvious. 'Exists' is an accidental predicate *vis-à-vis* any nature but God's, but it does not hold *per se* unqualifiedly, and so its opposite implies no contradiction. The predicate is called *per se* with respect to the form but is joined to it with physical perseity. *For existing accompanies the form once produced, necessarily and not accidentally.* This last is true and effectively implies the conclusion sought.

v. This distinction needs to be noted and kept before one's eyes, since it is useful and necessary for theological and physical arguments on many topics. — The remarks just made also solve an objection about the separation of existence from Christ's soul once it had been produced in the real (on the ground that, according to St. Thomas, that soul does not have its own existential being). From what I have already said, it is clear that being accompanies an already produced form *per se* and inseparably insofar as it is from the form; but the produced soul of Christ did not have being from itself but was anticipated by the divine Word and was taken up thereby.

Analysis of the second argument

vi. The second supporting argument works by way of an indication and goes like this. [*Antecedent:*] An object understood is perpetual; [*inference:*] so an intellectual substance is imperishable. — The antecedent is supported on the ground that an object understood is above time. — Drawing the inference is sound because [the operation of] understanding gets its kind and explanation from the object understood; and the mode of the operation shows the doer's mode of being, because each thing acts according as it is in act.

vii. Two things need to be noted here about the antecedent. The first is that its subject, *i.e.* 'an object understood', can be taken two ways. One way is materially, to stand for the thing which is made an object to the intellect; the other way is formally, *i.e.* to mean the intelligible object in act as such. The first way is not how the language is being taken here; rather, the second way.

The second point to notice is that the antecedent's

predicate, *i.e.* 'perpetual', can be taken two ways: positively and negatively. And while the predicate taken the second way would certainly be true, and taken the first way would be a bit doubtful, under either interpretation it serves the meaning wanted and especially in the first interpretation. After all, there is no doubt that the intelligible in act as such is immutable and necessary because it abstracts form motion and change and hence is perpetual negatively. But if one looks at the matter more deeply, one will find that, since the intelligible as such [*i.e. qua* abstracted] is above time and change, it follows also that the intelligible (strictly as such) claims a perpetuity for itself, as motion claims for itself an accelerability without limit* (and thus being corrupted happens to an intelligible object because it is intelligible *this way*, say in phantasms); and it also follows that the intelligible in act, if it existed outside the mind as intelligible in act, would be positively perpetual thanks to its being, since the intelligible is posited to have a being above time and change. Therefore, if it exists in act as such, it is positively perpetual; and if not, it is negatively perpetual *per se*.

viii. As for the inference drawn [that an intellectual substance is imperishable], notice that the force of the inference lies in this: [*antecedent:*] the intelligible in act, as such, is above time; therefore [*1st consequence:*] intellection is "of" things above time; therefore [*2nd consequence:*] an intellectual substance is also such. — Drawing the first consequence is supported on the ground that the defining makeup of an operation comes from its proper object formally taken. For if the intelligible as such is raised above change and time, and demands a changelessness and perpetuity, the consequence should be that the condition of the act of understanding comes from changelessness and perpetuity; and hence the act bears upon the same order [as its object]. — Drawing the second consequence is supported on the ground that, if understanding is operating this way, *i.e.* above time, *etc.*, then the intellectual substance's way of being will also be above time and change. Therefore it will be a perpetual entity

Observe carefully at this point that, from the perpetuity of the object, we do not infer the perpetuity of the operation, but only that it is of the order of perpetual things (*i.e.* raised above time and change). And this strictly speaking is about understanding *as such*; for it happens incidentally that understanding in *such and such a way* namely, through phantasms, is coupled with the on-going and time. — But from the fact that understanding is thus elevated above time, we have a great indication that the intellect as such is more elevated and thus subsists imperishably.

* *velocitatem in infinitum*

3ST 17, 2 ad
4; In III Sent,
d.6, q.2, a.2
1

Inquiry Fifty-One: Into angels considered in connexion with bodies

Next the inquiry turns to angels in connection with bodily things: first with bodies themselves [q. 51], then with bodily places [q. 52], and thirdly with their motion to such places [q. 53]. About the first of these topics, three questions are asked:

- (1) Do angels have bodies that are naturally united to them?
- (2) Do they take on bodies?
- (3) Do they exercise the life-functions in the bodies they take on?

article 1

Do angels have bodies naturally united to them?

In II Sent., d.7, a.1; 2 *CG* c.81, *De Pot.*, q.6, a.6; *De Malo*, q.16, a.1;
De Spiritualibus Creaturis, a.5, Opusc. XV, *De Angelis*, c.18.

It seems that the angels have bodies naturally united to them.

I, c.6;
PG 11, 170

PL 183, 803

III, c.10
PL 34, 284

(1) After all, Origen says in his book, *Peri Archôn*: "Of the nature of God alone, i.e. of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, is it understood as proper to exist without material substance and without any contact with a bodily attachment." — Bernard also says in his homily 6 on the Song of Songs, "To God alone do we concede incorporeality as well immortality; His nature alone needs no bodily support either for Himself or for another. But clearly every created spirit needs a bodily support." — Also Augustine says in his commentary *Super Genesim ad litteram* "The ethereal demons are called animals because they live in bodies of an ethereal nature." But the nature of a demon is the same of an angel's; therefore the angels have bodies naturally united to them.

PL 76, 1110

(2) Besides, Gregory's sermon on Epiphany calls the angel a "rational animal." But every animal is composed of a body and a soul. Therefore the angels have bodies naturally united to them.

(3) Furthermore, the life in angels is more complete and perfect than the life in souls. But a soul not only lives but also vivifies a body. Therefore the angels vivify the bodies naturally united to them.

PG 3, 693

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Denis says in c.4 of *De Divinis Nominibus*, to the effect that angels "are understood to be bodiless."

ANSWER: the angels do not have bodies that are naturally united to them. What happens incidentally to a nature is not found universally in that nature; thus having wings does not belong to the account explaining an "animal" and does not occur in every animal. Since understanding is not the act of a body or of any bodi-

ly ability, as will come out below, having a body united to it does not belong to the account explaining an intellectual substance as such; rather, it occurs incidentally to an intellectual substance, on account of something else. Thus it suits the human soul to be united to a body because it is highly imperfect in the class of intellectual substances and exists in potency [to understanding], not having the fullness of knowledge in its own nature but acquiring it by bodily senses from empirical things, as will be discussed further below. Now in any class in which one finds something incomplete and imperfect, there has to be something else already complete and perfect. Therefore, there are some substances that are perfect in intellectual nature, not needing to acquire knowledge from empirical things. Therefore not all intellectual substances are united to bodies: some, rather, are separate from bodies, and these are the ones we call angels. q.75, a.2

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): some people had the opinion that every being had a body, as I remarked above. From this opinion, some people seem to have derived a conviction that there would be no bodiless substances unless they were united to bodies; and so some people even supposed that God was a soul having the world as His body, as Augustine tells us. But since this opinion clashed with the Catholic faith, which posits God as exalted above all things (as it says in Psalm 8:1, "who hast exalted thy glory above the heavens"). Origen refused to speak that way about God but followed these other people's opinion about everything else, just as he was deceived on many other points by adhering to the ancient philosophers. — The saying of St. Bernard can be taken to mean that created spirits need a bodily instrument, not naturally united to them but taken for some purpose, as will be discussed below. — August-

q.84, a.6;
q.89, a.1

q.50, a.1

De Civitate Dei
VII, c.6; PL 41,
199

next article

tine, however, was not asserting his own view but using an opinion of the Platonists, who posited the existence of certain ethereal animals which they called *daemones*.

ad (2): Gregory calls an angel a “rational animal” metaphorically, because of a similarity of definition.

ad (3): to vivify as an efficient cause is the work

of an unqualifiedly complete thing. So it also belongs to God according to 1 Samuel 2:6 “the Lord killeth and maketh alive.” But to vivify as a formal cause is the work of a substance which is part of a nature and does not have in itself the whole nature of the species. Ergo, an intellectual substance which is *not* united to a body is more perfect than one that is.

Cajetan’s Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article, one conclusion answers the question: the angels do not have bodies naturally united to them. — This is supported as follows. [*Antecedent:*] There are intellectual substances which are complete, not needing to get knowledge from the senses; [*inference:*] ergo there are intellectual substances separate from bodies. These we call angels. Therefore [angels do not have bodies naturally united to them].

The antecedent is supported thus. [*Major:*] in any kind where one finds an incomplete case, there has to be an already complete case; but [*minor:*] in the kind which is “intellectual substance,” one finds an incomplete case, needing to get knowledge by the senses because it is in potency towards intelligible objects, as is clear with the human soul; so [*conclusion:*] [there is an already complete case of intellectual substance, etc.].

Drawing the inference is supported as follows. In the antecedent we assumed two kinds, namely, “intellectual substances” and “complete ones, not needing” etc. And so Aquinas first proves that the former *qua* intellectual substances do not have the trait of being suitably united to a body; thereupon he proves they also do not have it insofar as they are such-and-such intellectual substances [*i.e.* complete ones]. The first point he proves as follows. [*Antecedent:*] Understanding is not the act of a body nor of any bodily ability; [*1st inference:*] therefore being united to a body does not belong in the account explaining an intellectual substance as such; [*2nd inference:*] therefore it does not belong to every intellectual substance. This last inference is supported on the ground that what occurs only accidentally in a given nature is not found universally in that nature. He gives an example of wings on animals. The second inference is supported this way. [*Major:*] Being united to a body occurs accidentally to an intellectual substance, stemming from its imperfection and its need for knowledge, as is clear in the case of the human soul; [*minor:*] but this neediness is not found in complete substances; ergo [natural union with a body is not found in them].

Three Doubts

ii. Concerning the antecedent and the support for it, three doubts arise. The first is about some of the terms taken up, namely ‘complete’ and ‘incomplete’. How are they being used in the argument when it says: “in

any kind where one finds an incomplete case, there has to be an already complete case”? This claim is based on what exactly?¹ On the principle that “act is naturally prior to potency”? — This is no good. For what certifies the truth of this principle is only the fact that what is in potency has to be reduced to act by something already in act, and this is not at stake in the topic at hand. For the only conclusion one could reach from this principle would be that some intellectual substance reduces our soul (which is in potency) to act; but such a thing is the agent intellect (whatever that may be).² — Or is it, maybe, based on another principle, to the effect that “among the differences within the same genus, one needs to stand as an enhancement and perfection, while another stands as a lack and imperfection”? But this, too, is not enough for the case at hand. For nothing can be deduced from it except that there is some intellectual substance more perfect than the human soul in its specific nature. But whether or not this more perfect species has complete knowledge built into it, etc., is not sufficiently deduced from this premise; after all there could be a more perfect species that still did not have its knowledge in-born.

This doubt is confirmed by a look at natures which are sense-endowed. Among them, because one finds a case imperfectly endowed with sense powers among imperfect animals, it follows that there are more perfect animals, *i.e.* those having more complete sense powers. But it does not follow from this that there are animals that are *born* with the sensible images from their interior or exterior senses already *in them*. Yet this is how it would be relevant.³

iii. Doubt arises secondly about another phrase assumed, namely ‘in the same kind.’ Either this ‘kind’ means a genus strictly taken—and then it’s no good, because then the argument would only work on the assumption that the angels are

¹ The claim sounds very dubious to modern ears, unless the “incomplete” case is an immature or larval case.

² Since Aquinas argued that the agent intellect is just a part of our own souls, not a bodiless higher being as Averroes imagined, he can hardly have meant his argument in this article to use the principle Cajetan just eliminated.

³ A more complete intellectual substance, not needing a body because not needing the senses, would not have gotten its concepts (intelligible species) by abstraction from particulars. It must have been “born” with them. Analogously, says the confirming argument, a more complete sense-endowed substance would not have *acquired* its sensory memories but would have been born with them?

Cf. *Metaphysics*
VII, c.6

in a genus (which is not conceded by everybody and indeed is disputed by the Peripatetics). — Or else the talk of a “kind” here is meant for a collection or class, as we are in the habit of saying “in the class of beings” and “in the class of intelligibles.” On that reading, the assumption is true but does not reach the point intended. For one may say that the perfect intellectual substance that has to exist already “in the class of intelligibles” is God all glorious — and hence the final remark, “and these we call angels,” is badly deduced.

iv. Yet a third little doubt occurs about the antecedent, for it speaks in the plural number, saying that there are “some intellectual substances,” etc. And yet from the proof given one can infer no more than a singular, “therefore there is some perfect intellectual substance,” etc. So the point concluded seems to be badly drawn from that antecedent.

Clearing these up

v. To clear away these hesitations, one needs to note that the force of the argument taken up to support the antecedent lies in the premise that

whenever there is a nature distinguishable into several modes or essential differences, it must be the case that if the nature is found in a less complete mode or differentiation, then it must be found also in a more complete one.

The reasons for this are many. In the first place, since both modes are possible, the nature is not more inclined towards the less perfect than it is towards the more perfect. In the second place, less perfect cases are for the sake of the more perfect ones. In a third place, the sub-dividers of a divisible nature are either simultaneous in nature (as one sees in the *Postpredicamentis* with the specific differences sub-dividing a genus), or else the one stands as prior and the other as posterior, as happens in dividing an analogous class into prior and secondary analogates; and *that* is where a posterior implies a prior.

Against the first doubt

vi. Such being the case, my reply to the first doubt is that the proposition here is being taken as based on the other principle. And against the objection to taking it this way I offer two answers. My first answer is that these two phrases — ‘an intellectual substance more perfect than the whole human soul’ and ‘an intellectual nature so perfect as not to need to acquire knowledge from the senses’ — are *equivalent phrases*, and so St. Thomas concluded effectively. He also illustrated this equivalence from things to be discussed later, when it will be shown in q.70 that an intellectual soul needs a body in order to understand only in man’s case. And you can also gather as much from Aristotle at the end of the *De Anima III*. One can also establish the equivalence by argument, but I don’t wish to dwell on it now.

c 12:
434b 5ff

Anstolle,
Categorias c 10

My second answer is that, even given the existence of intellectual substances above the human soul but not having knowledge built into them from birth, the argument would still reach its intended conclusion. For having in-born knowledge is a way an intellectual substance can possibly be, and it is a complete or perfect way for one to be; therefore, if there are imperfect ways of having an intellectual nature, there have to be the more perfect ways of having it; hence there are intellectual substances not needing acquired knowledge.

From the above, my reply to the confirming argument is clear. There is no parallel argument to be made in the cases of intellectual nature and sense-endowed nature in this respect. In intellectual nature, a way of having knowledge with fullness of power and intelligible species already within one is a naturally possible way to be; but a way of having sense-endowed nature so perfect that it even has inborn sensible species is an impossible way for an animal to be; and so our argument works in the case of intellectual nature, but not in that of sense endowed nature.

Against the second doubt

vii. Against the second doubt, I reply that the conclusion goes through as intended, no matter which you mean by ‘kind’. On the one hand, God is not included in the collection of intellectual substances, because He is not part of the universe but is its “separate good” as it says in *Metaphysics XII, text 52*. On the other hand one may restrict the minor premise so as to say “in the kind which is created intellectual substances,” and the conclusion will still go through, as you will see by running through the argument.

c 10,
1075a 12-15

Against the third doubt

viii. Against the third doubt I say that St. Thomas used the plural not from the force of this argument, exactly, but from this argument plus points stated above in the preceding inquiry about the number of intellectual substances.

q 50, a3

A new line of doubts

ix. Concerning the support for drawing that other inference, namely, “it occurs accidentally, and so does not occur universally,” doubt can be raised. It does not seem necessary. It is well known that something can be accidental and yet belong to every case; nothing prevents a color (or whatever you want) from belonging to an animal accidentally and yet belonging to every animal.

x. The SHORT ANSWER to this is that accidents (*i.e.* accidental predicates) work in two ways. Some are accidental both to the more general kind and to the lower, more specific kinds; but some are accidental indeed to the more general kind but essential and constitutive traits of the lower kinds (or they are consequences essentially constituting the lower kinds). Look at ‘rational’ or ‘risible’: it is an accidental trait *vis-à-vis* a general kind, animal, but is an essential trait *vis-à-vis* man. So when the argument says that what is accidental to a given nature does not occur in it universally, the proposition is true and necessary about an accident working the second way, and also is true for the

most part of an accident working in the first way. And since St. Thomas was talking about an accident working in the second way, he was preceding from not only true but necessary considerations.

A fourth line of doubts

xi. On the support offered for the consequence in its second part, doubt can arise because the argument excludes only one way an intellectual substance could have natural union with a body — *i.e.*, the way the human soul has such union. But someone could say that a natural separation of intellectual substance from a body is not sufficiently proved here, unless Aquinas proves that no other mode is possible. Since he didn't do so, he drew his conclusion on an insufficient basis.

xii. My REPLY to this is that by speaking formally about "intellectual substance" in its entire scope *per se*, that is, about all intellectual substances *qua* intellectual (about all of them insofar as they are thus-or-so intellectual), Saint Thomas' reasoning process was sufficient. After all, the only way it happens that an intellectual operation needs a body is in order to acquire knowledge with the services of phantasms, as happens in man. And because Saint Thomas was speaking formally about "intellectual substance," he passed over whatever excluded just this mode. And truly he proceeded wisely. After all, given that some intellectual substance or other (maybe the soul of a heavenly body or maybe one with an ethereal body) could have a natural union with a body, nevertheless his argument keeps its rigor. For if one runs through the whole scope of intellectual things, going through all their differences of intellectuality as such, you only find union with a body on account of an imperfection of the intellectual power. The consequence is that one arrives at a perfect intellectual power that does not need a body. And this is how Saint Thomas proceeded.

xiii. But against this answer of mine, subtle as it may be, one can still pose a rejoinder. For by way of this reasoning process one cannot infer intellectual substances separate from bodies unqualifiedly, but only separate "insofar as they are intellectual." Consistently with this, someone could say that these beings are joined to bodies for another reason, *e.g.*, because they are moving or operating on things outside themselves.*

* *ad extra*

xiv. Against this I surjoin that opining in favor of such a reason for union with a body is not a reasonable way to deal with all intellectual substances, although there could be a doubt about some, perhaps, because of their imperfection. These would have to be intellectual substances so limited and incomplete in motive power that they cannot apply themselves to a thing directly but only *via* conjunction with a bodily

organ, and maybe with other helps. So if an intellectual substance were found at this level of imperfection, there would have to be found one already on a more perfect level, in which the operative power *ad extra* would be proportional to its intellective power, such that both would be high enough that neither would need conjunction with a body in its <operation>.* So since Saint Thomas's intention was to reach a particular conclusion, namely, that there are some intellectual substances separate from bodies, he had no intention to discuss a universal claim as to whether all intellectual substances complete in their knowledge would be separate from bodies (indeed doubt about this is taken up below in q.70). And for the same reason already used, he excluded that objection inasmuch as it stood in the way of the particular conclusion he was after; this objection is taken from a condition outside the scope of intellectuality as such; and so one intending to argue on the strength of intellectuality itself could pass it over in silence.

In the second place, I can say that this objection, although it could raise a doubt independently, cannot raise one in the context of what has been said above about the number of the angels, namely that the number of such substances is so great not because of variation in the ability to move things. So their scope has to come not from moving things but from understanding.

In third place, I can say that St. Thomas's intention was indeed to reach the conclusion with a specifier clause: "as far as the merits of their intellectuality go, the angels are separate from bodies," but he contented himself with putting down the more unqualified one that "angels are separate from bodies." He was not out of order to do so. For one thing, he infers the specifier clause from the middle term he has used, having to do with the complete/perfect and the incomplete/imperfect, as I said in my first surjoiner. For another thing, it goes with the conclusion reached. The angels' being able to understand is primary and essential to them, whereas their being able to move or change things is (as it were) accidental and secondary, as something suitable for them on the basis of their primary ability. Hence, if their primary, essential ability does not need a body, and being unitable to a body is <not> among their essential traits, it follows that there are some such beings not needing bodies, as I said in my second surjoiner. For a third thing, Aquinas was not out of order in view of remarks that are coming below, where the discussion will be about angels as movers. But at present, since we are talking about their substance, and since the substantial traits of things are to be assessed from their main operation, and since such other topics are better discussed in their own places, it is enough to show here that their distinctive and essential operation leads one to hypothesize that their substance can be so elevated that they do not need a body. So one can say simply, at this point, that they are separate from bodies. In the talk of substantial traits, after all, the possible and the necessary do not differ.

* Angle brackets enclose a textual correction, here it is to "operation" from "being"

a.3

q.70, a.3

Do angels ever assume bodies?

In II Sent. d.8, a.2; De Potentia q.6, a.7

It seems that angels do not assume bodies.

(1) There is nothing superfluous, after all, in the work of an angel, just as there is nothing superfluous in the work of nature. Well, it would be superfluous for angels to assume bodies; an angel does not need one, since its strength exceeds every bodily strength. So an angel does not assume a body.

(2) Besides, every case of assuming *x* finishes at a union with *x*, because 'assume' is a way of saying 'take to oneself'. But a body is not united to an angel as to a form, as was just said. And as for being united to one as to a mover, that is not called being "taken up;" otherwise, every body moved by the angels would have been "taken up" by them. So, the angels do not assume bodies.

(3) Moreover, angels do not assume earthen bodies or ones made of water, because these would not suddenly disappear.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Augustine says in *The City of God XVI*: the angels appeared to Abraham in assumed bodies.

I ANSWER: some have said that the angels never assume bodies, and that all the cases of angelic appearances mentioned in the Bible took place in prophetic visions, *i.e.* thanks to imagination. But this idea goes against the Scripture's meaning. For what is seen in an imaginary vision is entirely in the imagination of the seer and so is not seen by anyone else. But divine Scripture sometimes has angels appearing in such a way that they are seen by everyone in common. Thus angels appearing to Abraham were seen not only by him but by his whole family, ditto with Lot and the

townsmen of Sodom. The angel who appeared to Tobias was likewise seen by all. Hence it is obvious that these events happened thanks to bodily vision, by which one sees what is placed outside the seer and so can be seen by all. Well, nothing but a body is seen by that sort of vision. Therefore, since the angels are not bodies and do not have bodies naturally joined to them (as became clear above), the only thing left to say is that they sometimes assume bodies.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): angels do not need an assumed body for their own sake, but for ours, so that by conversing with people familiarly, they may show the cognitive fellowship* we may hope to have with them in the future life. — Also, when angels assumed bodies in the Old Testament, it was sometimes a figurative indication that the Word of God was to assume a human body. For all the Old Testament apparitions were aimed toward the "appearing" whereby the Word of God was to appear in the flesh.

ad (2): the assumed body is not united to the angel as its form, nor just as its mover, but to its mover as *represented* by the mobile body assumed. For just as the distinctive traits of intelligible things are described in the Bible by likenesses to empirical things, so also by divine power empirical bodies are so formed by the angels as to represent fittingly the angel's own intelligible traits.

ad (3): in its normal dispersion, air does not retain a shape or color; but when it is condensed it can be shaped and colored, as one sees with the clouds. Thus angels take bodies of air, condensing it as much as needed by God's power, to assume a body's shape.

c.29
PL 41, 508

Cf. Maimonides,
*Guide for the
Perplexed II, 6*
and 35

a.1

* SOCIETAS
intelligibilis

Cajetan's Commentary

As to what its wording means, the title question needs just two comments. The first is that 'assume' means 'take to oneself' for purposes of self-manifestation, not to perform vital functions. — The other is that one should heed the biblical custom of introducing angels appearing in bodies.

In the body of the article, Aquinas does three jobs: (1) he reports an opinion of Maimonides; (2) he rejects it; (3) he answers the question with a single conclusion.

ii. As for job (1), the opinion said two things: angels do not assume bodies, and accounts of their bodily apparition in the Bible are to be taken as purely imaginary.

iii. As for job (2), he argues against the last bit. [*Major:*] What is seen in common by all observers is seen with the bodily eye, whose object seen is outside the seer. [*Minor:*] The angels appearing bodily

were seen in common by all; ergo.

The major is obvious from the difference between bodily and imaginary seeing: the latter terminates at an inward object, whereas eyesight terminates at an outside object. From this there follows another difference: an object seen in imagination, as such, is only in the imaginer and hence appears to him alone, but an object seen by the eyes can be seen by all observers together, because it exists outside the seer. — The minor is supported by the Scriptures about angels appearing to Abraham, Lot, and Tobias.

iv. As for job (3), the conclusion answering the question is: angels sometimes assume bodies. — This is supported. [*Major:*] A substance not a body, with no body united to it naturally but sometimes seen with bodily seeing, sometimes assumes a body; [*minor:*] the angels fit this description; ergo [they sometimes assume bodies]. — The minor is known from this article and the preceding ones; ditto for the major.

In the bodies they assume, do the angels exercise the vital functions?

In II Sent. d.8, a.4; De Potentia q.6, a.8

It seems that the angels are the ones exercising the vital functions in the bodies they assume.

(1) After all, no deceit befits the angels of truth. But it would be a deceit if the bodies assumed by them seemed to be alive but weren't, and seemed to have vital functions but didn't. Ergo the assumed bodies [are in fact alive and] have the angels exercising the vital functions in them.

(2) Besides, nothing in the works of the angels is pointless. But it would be pointless for them to form eyes, noses, and other sense organs in the bodies they assume, unless the angels were going to sense things with them. So an angel senses through the body it assumes, and that is quite distinctively a vital function.

(3) Moreover, directional movement is a vital function, as is clear from *De Anima II*, and obviously the angels appear to move places in the bodies they have assumed. It says in Genesis 18:16 that Abraham "went with them," leading the angels who had appeared to him. When Tobias asked his angel, "Knowest thou the way that leadeth to the country of the Medes?" he replied, "I know it, and I have often walked through all the ways thereof." So angels exercise vital functions in their assumed bodies.

c. 2,
413a 23
Tobias 5 7f
(Douai)

(4) Furthermore, speech is a vital function done by a voice, which is a sound produced by an animal's mouth, as it says in *De Anima II*. Well, it is obvious from many Scripture passages that the angels in their assumed bodies "spoke." So they exercise vital functions in those bodies.

c. 8,
420b 5

(5) Also, eating is a distinctive animal function, which is why the Lord ate with His disciples after the resurrection in proof of His restored life, as it says in the last chapter of Luke. Well, when angels appeared to Abraham in assumed bodies, they ate; and Abraham offered them food after doing them reverence, as it says in Genesis. So angels exercise vital functions in their assumed bodies.

Luke 24: 41

18 2

(6) Further still, begetting a child is a vital function, and it, too, is attributed to angels in assumed bodies. It says in Genesis 6:4, "After that, when the sons of God came in unto the daughters of men, and they bare children to them, the same became mighty men which were of old, men of renown." So the angels exercise vital functions in the bodies assumed.

ON THE OTHER HAND, the bodies assumed by angels are not alive, as I said above; and so vital functions cannot be exercised through them.

a.1 wd 3

I ANSWER: some vital functions share a feature with other sorts of functions; thus speech, just insofar as it is sound, matches the noises made by inanimate things, and self-directed motion, just as motion, matches other

things' moving. So as far as this shared feature goes, vital functions can be matched by angels in the assumed bodies. But they cannot match what belongs distinctively to living things, because, as Aristotle says in *De Somno et Vigilia*, "the action belongs to what is able to do it." So nothing can have a vital function but what has life, which is the source of ability for such action.

c.1,
454a 8

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): as it does not compromise the truth of the Bible that it describes intelligible things in sensory images (because it does not do so to insinuate that intelligibles *are* empirical things, but just to give some understanding of intelligible things' distinctive traits through a likeness), so also the truthfulness of the holy angels is not compromised by their assuming bodies that seem to be living people but aren't. For the bodies are only assumed in order to indicate the spiritual traits and works distinctive of angels through the traits and works distinctive of a human being. This would not happen suitably if they assumed real people, because then the traits of the latter would point toward people and not angels.

ad (2): sensing is wholly a living function, and so one cannot say in any way that the angels sense things with the organs of their assumed bodies. Yet the organs were not formed pointlessly. For they were not formed to make sensation happen through them but to indicate through them the angels' spiritual powers — as their cognitive ability is indicated by an eye, and their other abilities by other organs, as Denis teaches in the last chapter of the *Celestial Hierarchy*.

c.15;
PG 3, 328

ad (3): the moving which is a distinctively vital function is the moving that comes from a conjoint mover.¹ This is not how bodies assumed by angels are moved by them, because the angels are not their forms. Still, the angels move accidentally in the movements of such bodies, because the angels are "in them" as movers in movables and so get to be "here" rather than elsewhere. (The same cannot be said about God. When the things He is "in" move, He does not move, because He is everywhere. Not so the angels; they move accidentally with the bodies assumed.) But they do not move with heavenly bodies, even if angels are in them as their movers, because a heavenly body as a whole never moves out of one place into another, and because its spiritual mover cannot be pinned down to one location in terms of some one part of the body's substance (which is now in the east, now in the west), but only in terms of a general region* (the moving power is always in the east, as it says in *Physics VIII*).²

* *situs*

¹ In a form-and-matter composite, the two were called "conjoint." So an animal's soul was the conjoint mover of its body.

² This is a mistaken citation. Aristotle's text is in *De Caelo II*, 285b 18, where it is equally obsolete.

ad (4): strictly speaking, the angels do not “speak” through their assumed bodies but only do something similar; they form sounds in the air similar to human voices.

ad (5): again, strictly speaking, “eating” is not something angels do. “Eating” involves the absorption of food convertible into the substance of the eater. Now, granted, food was not converted into Christ’s post-resurrectional body, but was just resolved into its underlying matter; still, Christ did have a body of such a nature that digestion could happen in it, and so what He did after the resurrection counted as real eating. But food taken up by an angel was neither converted into the body assumed, nor was that body of such a nature as to take nourishment; so the eating was not real, but a figure of spiritual eating. This is what the angel said to Tobit: “I seemed indeed to eat and to drink with you, but I use an invisible meat and drink.” Abraham offered his visitors food thinking they were men; and as for his veneration of them, he was venerating God “in” them “as God often used to be in the prophets,” as Augustine says in the *City of God XVI*.

Tobit 12: 18f
(Douai)

c. 29
PL 41, 509

ad (6): As Augustine says in the *City of God XI*, “many have experienced for themselves or heard confirmed by others that wood sprites and fauns (popularly called incubuses) have approached women lustfully and had intercourse with them. So it seems imprudent to deny it.” But there is no way the holy angels of God could have fallen in this way before the Flood. So ‘sons of God’ is better understood to mean sons of Seth, who were good, while by ‘daughters of men’ the Bible is naming women born from the race of Cain. It is not surprising that giants could have been born from them — not that they were ever all giants, but many more were before the Flood than after. — But if anyone was ever born from intercourse with demons, it didn’t happen through semen fallen from them, nor from the bodies they assumed, but through semen gotten from a man for this purpose (and the same demon who became a succubus for a man would become an incubus for a woman. Likewise the seeds of other things are taken up to generate other things, as Augustine says in *De Trinitate III*. In any case, the person born that way would not be a child of the demon but of the man from whom the semen was taken.

c. 8:
PL 41, 468

c. 8,
PL 42, 876

Cajetan’s Commentary

The title question is clear in the text of the article. — In it there is one conclusion answering the question, namely: by their assumed bodies, the angels can do some vital operations insofar as they share a feature with those of non-living bodies, but not insofar as the operation is distinctive of living things. — This conclusion is illustrated and supported. It is illustrated as the distinctions drawn; it is supported in its last part.

The distinctions are these. Some functions are “vital,” because they arise from the soul as a soul; and some are not vital, because they arise just from a nature, like upward motion [by fire] and downward motion [by falling rock]. — Going back to vital functions, some have a feature in common with the non-vital and something else distinctive to the living; but other vital functions have nothing in common with non-living processes. Examples of each are in the text.

The support for the last bit is this. [*Major:*] “The action belongs to what is able to do it,” as it says in *De Somno et Vigilia*; [*minor:*] but in the bodies assumed by angels, there is no ability proper to a soul; [*conclusion:*] so there is no vital action.

A doubt

ii. Concerning that second distinction and the conclusion, doubt arises. When Aquinas drew this distinction, either he meant that in some functions we find two really distinct elements, one common to the living and the non-living, and the other unique to the living; or else he meant that these two are just distinct conceptually, like higher and lower [classifications]. If he did

mean it the first way, it seems false, since all functions of the soul are simple and not composed of really distinct elements. — But if he meant it the second way, it also seems false, because operations of the soul do not differ from one another in this way: all operations of a soul share at least one common description with the operations of inanimate things. And thus the distinction comes to nothing.

An answer

iii. The answer is this: what St. Thomas meant is clear from q. 6 of *De Potentia Dei*, a. 8: he meant to speak of two features really distinct, but not components of the function: he meant features *concurrent* with it. So the sense of the distinction is that some vital functions coincide with non-vital ones in their effect or terminus while differing in source; other vital functions share neither in source nor in terminus nor in effect with the non-vital ones. Those of the first type are speech, progressive motion, and generation; their terms or effects are vibration of the air, locomotion, and [substantial] change, which can also be caused by non-living actions. Vital functions of the second type are sensing, taking nourishment, and other things that are not just from the soul but also terminate at an animated body *qua* animated.

How strong an argument?

iv. As regards the support for the conclusion, notice carefully that this argument sufficiently yields the conclusion that the angels, strictly speaking, exercise no vital functions in the bodies they have assumed, given that

there is no potency for life in the assumed body. And thus (strictly speaking) neither speech nor directed motion pertains to the angels. But because some vital functions have a terminus that can be reached without the action of a soul and hence without the potencies of a soul, like vibrating the air and moving in place, such vital functions are attributed to the angels through their assumed bodies, not insofar as they are deeds of the living, nor insofar as they are such and such deeds of the living, but just insofar as they resemble the effects. In other words functions are attributed to the angels similar to vital functions in their effect. But I am saying 'similar' not metaphorically but literally, as one white thing is similar to another. After all, every vital function could be attributed to them by metaphorical similarity.

Second thoughts on procreation?

v. Concerning what St. Thomas said on this topic in the passage cited from *De Potentia*, a doubt arises: *there* he puts begetting in the class of vital functions sharing features with the non-vital; but here he denies begetting by the bodies assumed by angels, because the matter of that body does not obey the angels towards producing

a formal change. This does not seem true. For a vital begetting terminates at an animated body *qua* animated; and hence, given that no formal change occurs, it would be ill-fitting to an angel, and belongs with the other kind of vital function.

vi. My answer is that the distinction drawn there by St. Thomas could have been extended more widely but was limited by him to functions which are from numerically the same soul, *versus* those which are not. And so begetting, since it terminates at a soul numerically distinct (but of the same species), is put on the second side of the distinction and is excluded for another reason. The wider distinction does not contradict the one whereby vital functions are distinguished into those which arise from a soul and terminate at a soul, be it the same numerically or not, versus those which only arise from a soul. And thus procreating and taking nutrition are excluded for two reasons, namely, that they terminate at an animated thing as such, and that they involve formal changes.¹

¹ The change in begetting is from being parental gametes to being a new human's body; the formal change involved in nutrition is from the substance of the food to the substance of the eater.



Inquiry Fifty-Two Into how angels relate to places

We inquire next into the whereabouts of an angel, and three questions are asked about it.

- (1) Is an angel in a place?
- (2) Can an angel be in several places at once?
- (3) Can several angels be in the same place?

article 1

Is an angel in a place?

In I Sent. d.37, q.3, a.1; *In II Sent.* d.6, q.1 a.3; *De Potentia* q.3 a.19 ad 2, *Quodl.* 1, q.3, a.1;
Opusculum XV, De Angelis, c. 18.

It looks as though an angel is not in a place.

PL 64, 1311 (1) After all, Boethius says in his *De Hebdomadibus*, "it is commonly understood among men of learning that bodiless things are not in a place." Aristotle, too, says in *Physics IV* that "not just anything that is, is in a place, but only a movable body." Well, an angel is not a body, as was shown above. Therefore an angel is not in a place.

* *quantitas*
† *situs* (2) Besides, a place is a size or expanse* having a position.[†] Therefore everything that is in a place has a position. But having a position cannot suit an angel, since its substance is free of the size whose distinctive difference is having a position. Therefore an angel is not in a place.

(3) Furthermore, being in a place is being measured by the place and contained in it, as one sees from Aristotle in *Physics IV*. Well, an angel cannot be measured or contained by a place, because [an angel is pure form, and] what does the containing is more form-like than what is contained, as the air containing water is more form-like than the water, as it says in *Physics IV*. Ergo an angel is not in a place.

Domincan Breviary ON THE OTHER HAND, the collect says: "Let thy holy angels, dwelling in it, keep us in peace."

ANSWER: it suits an angel to be "in a place," but when this is said of an angel, the account to be given is differ-

ent from when it is said of a body. After all, a body is in a place through the fact that it is applied to the place by contact of dimension-giving size.¹ This is not the case with the angels; what they have, rather, is a "size" of power. By application of an angel's power to a place in any manner, an angel is said to be "in" that bodily place. Thus it is clear that there is no need to say that the angel is coextensive with the place, or that he has a position in the continuum.² These features belong to a located *body* because it has a so-much of dimension-giving quantity.

— Likewise, there is no need to say that an angel is contained in a place. After all, incorporeal substances touching a bodily thing with their power contain it without being contained by it; thus the soul is in the body as containing it and not as being contained by it. Likewise an angel is said to be in a bodily place not as contained therein but as somehow containing it.

From these remarks, the answer to the objections is obvious.

¹ Roughly speaking, the three dimensions of the body and the three dimensions of the place coincided in such a way that the edges of the body were everywhere touching the bounds of the place. Thus the body and the place were co-extensive.

² The continuum was the space of which the place was a part: the place's position in that space was what Cartesian coordinates would eventually make it easy to say, in what would come to be known as analytical geometry.

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article, Aquinas does two jobs: (1) he answers the question with a single conclusion; (2) he deduces, so to speak, three corollaries from the conclusion.

As to job (1) the conclusion is this: an angel is in a place, but not in the same way as a body is. — The se-

cond part of this is supported directly. [*Antecedent:*] A body is in a place by contact of size; [*consequent:*] so an angel is in a place by contact of power. — Drawing the consequent is sound because there is no dimension-giving size in an angel.

As for job (2), Aquinas excludes three properties of

a located body (*qua* body) from an angel when the latter is located. These are coextensiveness, position, and being contained, as is perfectly clear in the text.

ii. As regards the support for the conclusion laid down, two things need to be noticed. The first is that, although what is formally asked is whether an angel is in a place, the intention of the theologians raising it is to ask about *how* an angel is in a place, because this is what is subject to doubt. This is why St. Thomas treats only implicitly the first part of the conclusion and answers the second part directly.

The second thing to notice is that the force of St. Thomas's conclusion lies in this: everything which is

* *quantitas*
† *multis*
‡ *contactus*

in a place is in it by reason of the thing's how-much.* But "how much" is twofold: of power and of volume.† So what has a how-much of volume is located by reason of that; but what lacks a volume can only be in a place on account of the "how-much" of its power. — Again, since neither sort of "how-much" is the reason a thing is actually in a place without actual conjunction to the place, it follows that, just as a body is not actually located unless it is joined to the place by quantitative touching,‡ so also a spiritual thing is not actually in a place unless the how-much of its power is joined to the place by power-touching. And thus the two are said *equivocally* to be "located."¹

Many doubts

iii. Concerning these statements, many doubts arise. And firstly there is doubt about the conclusion, as to what St. Thomas meant by power-touching or power-application. He either meant first act or second. If he meant first act, he meant it as non-relational[§] or else as relational. If he meant second act, he meant either an immanent or transitive one. But none of these can be said. Ergo [Aquinas's conclusion falls to the ground].

§ *absolutus*

That this touching is not non-relational first act is proved on two grounds. The first is that everything non-relational in an angel is either his substance or an altogether immaterial quality, and hence abstracts from having a place. — The second is that power-touching in first act comes from being and hence from the conjunction between form and matter, be it substantial or accidental. Since in these options the touching is not quantitative (unless perhaps accidentally [since no matter is involved]), strictly speaking the only power-touching is according to substantial or accidental being. But it is obvious that nothing in an angel formally gives or receives being-in-a-place. Therefore [these options are eliminated.]

That the touching also cannot be a matter of relational first act, is proved from the fact that whenever a new relation attaches to something, there follows a

¹ Equivocal usage arises when the same word (say, 'in' or 'located') is not only applied to different things (say, a state and a song) but also applied to them with different and unrelated accounts of what it takes to be so. Even for the devil, being in Georgia differs from being in a song about it; and for Georgia, being in the Union differs from being in the South.

change. It is not clear what that change is when it follows a relational form. It doesn't have to follow as a change in substance, nor in quantity, nor in quality, nor in place, because it is not necessary for an angel to be brought into a place or moved to the place in order for him to be in the place. These points are obvious if one supposes that the angels were created prior to the corporeal creation, as many doctors have held. For on that hypothesis, it is at least conditionally clear that, after bodily things had been created, the angels did not begin to be in a place through the mere fact that the place didn't used to exist but now does: for on this ground there would be no more reason for the angel to be in this place than in that one. Nor did an angel have to be moved locally at that point because place did not yet exist; after all, being moved locally presupposes being in a place.

That the touching is not immanent second act is obvious. For one thing, every immanent act of an angel is utterly immaterial. — For another thing, understanding or willing a place does not suffice to make anything be there.

Finally, that the touching is not a transitive action is provable on many grounds. Firstly, on the ground that every transitive action goes with a change of form or place in the subject to which it goes; but it's not easy to imagine how any of these would apply to an angel in the empyrean heaven [*i.e.* the heaven above Ptolemy's outermost sphere]. — Secondly, from the fact that this appears to be against St. Thomas in *Quodlibetal I*, q.3, a.1, where he is explaining the proposition that "an angel is only in a place through its operation," and says explicitly that if by 'operation' we understand a moving, the proposition is not true; but if by 'operation' we understand some union of power, the proposition is true. So Aquinas obviously means by a "power-contact" something other than a transitive action. — Thirdly, there are also six arguments against this from Scotus in his remarks on *II Sent.* d.2, q.6, which you have reported by Capreolus on d.2, q.1.

a. 2

A disputation towards a solution

iv. To clear up this area of doubt as much as I am enabled to, by the one who enlightens every man who comes into the world, you need to know that all scholars, both philosophers and theologians, agree that the angels are matter-independent substances and hence that an angel's being in a place is not explained by amount of volume nor by quantity touching quantity, but by amount of power and touching by power. Again, all of them seem to agree that the "touching" is the angel's relation of presence to a place cause-wise or form-wise. But the difference of opinion and the difficulty lies in assigning the basis for that relation of presence.² After all, seeing the basis goes beyond the scope of human talent, because we have it in the sacred books that the

² For prior remarks on a relation whereby *x* is present to *y*, see the discussion on God's being everywhere in § 1x of the commentary on q.8, a.1.

angels are somewhere, and yet it does not appear how they touch that place. Hence, FIVE PROBLEMS NEEDING TO BE SOLVED come together at this point. They are (I) § v how many ways, from our experience of empirical things, can we imagine a located thing to be present in a place? (II) § vi On our list of such ways, which are clear-cut, and which are in doubt? (III) § xvii We shall apply this to the angels. (IV) § xvii We shall see what St. Thomas thought and answer the question accordingly. And (V) § xvii we shall meet the objections to our answer.

PROBLEM I

v As to problem I, the presence to a place of a thing existing in the place comes in two kinds: the circumscriptive kind and the definitive kind. The former implies that the quantitative parts of the thing located are coextensive with the parts of the place. The latter kind implies only that the located thing is limited or nailed down to the place, so as to be *there* and not elsewhere. Then the definitive kind is further divided into substance-presence and causal presence. For a substance, even an indivisible one, to be called "present" is for it to be in *this* place in such a way as not to be in that one, even if it can have no causality *vis-à-vis* the place. Causal presence, however, is further subdivided into three, according to the threefold standing of an efficient cause — namely, into presence of order, and presence of proximity, and presence of operation. The causal presence which is called one of "order" is the *relation of proportion obtaining between the agent and the patient when they are in prepared and immediately proximate potency sufficient for the work at hand, setting aside all impediments*. "Presence of proximity" is what we call the relation of immediate proximity of the agent to the patient, which precedes the action (precedes it at least in the order of nature). "Presence of operation" is what we call the relation of the agent to the patient which is immediately inseparable from the action, so that it is either precisely the bearing implied in the action itself or cannot exist without it. — We can illustrate these three sorts of presence with a sailor and a ship. The first presence of the sailor to the ship is the presence of order existing between the sailor's ability and the ship's potentiality to be steered by him. Next comes his presence to the ship by proximity when he is understood to be on board the ship before operating it. Thirdly he becomes present to the ship by actual operation. Either this presence by operation is the same as the relation of the mover to the moved, or it is distinct from it as I have said.

Cf § xv

PROBLEM II

vi As for problem II, you need to know that of these five sorts of presence only three are clear cut, namely the circumscriptive sort, the causal sort that is of order, and the causal sort which is of operation. The other two are very doubtful, and they coincide, and this whole difficulty is on account of them. As far as circumscriptive presence is concerned, there is no need to

work on it; it is well known to the senses. — Causal presence of order is made clear by the fact that, if there were no bodies, and one intellectual substance could receive something from another, before the one was understood to "act upon" the other, there would be between them the ordering of the active to the passive, whereby the one would be in expedited and prepared proximate potency to act, and the other to receive. After all, this presence follows upon the definitions of an active power and a proximate passive potency, minus the impediments, *etc.*; and it is found both among bodily things and among spiritual ones. — Presence of operation, meanwhile, is obvious, since the immediate agent (with immediacy of referent) is non-distant from the patient while it acts thereon, as is obvious from a long argument in *Physics VI*.

c.1
242b 25ff.

1st dubious case: "substantial presence"

vii. The other two sorts of presence have a doubtful quality about them on account of arguments on both sides. ON THE SIDE AFFIRMING SUBSTANTIAL PRESENCE, the argument is very strong because [*antecedent:*] such a presence is not an impossible thing: it does not imply a contradiction to say that a substance is thus present in a place. Therefore, [*consequence:*] this sort should be posited in so difficult a matter. —The antecedent is illustrated not only in the realm of possibility but also in that of fact, as follows. A particular substance (say this water), located in this place (say, in this vase), if its quantity were to be thought away, would still be in this vase in such wise as not to be elsewhere; this is what it is to have the relation of "substantial presence" to this place. We admit, therefore, the substantial presence whereby an indivisible substance is present in a place minus any ability to act or be acted upon.

viii. ON THE NEGATIVE SIDE there is the point that the above position is unintelligible. After all, [*major:*] every relation requires a basis, whether it arises intrinsically or arrives from without; but [*minor:*] the alleged "substantial presence" relation has no basis; so [*conclusion:*] positing it is a work of fiction.

The major is supported, for one thing, inductively. — For another thing, on the ground that otherwise any relation at all could be attributed to anything, given that no basis is required, since the basis is the reason a thing comes to have a relation in act or potency. — For yet another thing, any relation belongs either to every being or else to some beings. If it belongs to every being, the reason for it has to come from the makeup of a being precisely as a being (as is obvious in the case of 'x has what it takes to be understood by someone' [*intelligibilitas*] and 'x has what it takes to be sought by something' [*appetibilitas*]). If the relation belongs to some beings, a reason has to be given as to why it belongs to these rather than those, on a basis found in these, not in those. — For still another thing, the *capacity to have a certain definite relation* is a predicate provable about a thing, even if having it in act is a contingent state of affairs. Therefore it has a necessary cause in the subject from which it is inferred *a priori*, and thanks to

which the relation is in the subject; otherwise the [capacity for the] relation would be in it contingently. But that cause is the basis.

The minor [that the alleged relation of substantial presence has no basis] is also supported. After all, [major:] the basis for such a relation is either something absolute found in the sheer substance, or else it is an absolute with something extrinsic implied. But [minor:] neither of these can be said. Therefore [the relation of "substantial presence" has no basis.] — That the alleged basis is not something absolute becomes clear by distinguishing the things found in a sheer substance: namely, its makeup, and the limitation thereof; and likewise its power, and the limitation thereof. Now a substance, just so far as it is a substance does not provide a basis for a relation. For one thing, not every substance can serve as just any basis. For another thing, those who posit such a relation, according to the Parisian article 219, say that a substance is not the reason for being in a place definitively. — As far as its being limited is concerned, whether it is limited to a genus, a species, or an individual case, its limitation does not have what it takes to serve as a relation's basis. After all, the word 'limitation' is used equivocally in talking about an essential or entitative determination and limitation to a place. After all, the ways of being and its essential and individual differences attach to such and such a being and to this being; and not to a being that is in a place, or is liable to be in a place, unless they attach to the being through its how-much-of-volume; for then, obviously, they attach to what makes something liable to be in a place. *Via* the other ways a being can be, since they don't attach first off to the locatable, one has to tell how they are subsequently attached thereto. And since nothing of the sort can be assigned, what remains is that the basis is a fiction. — A similar judgment is to be made about a substance's power (the power which is posited to be really identical to the substance), and about its limitation. After all, the entitative limitation of a power is its limitation to such and such an effect (and to so much of it), not to a place.

But that the basis and reason for such a relation is not the substance plus the implication of something outside it is proved as follows. Such an outside factor can only be a negation or a relation. Well, it's not a relation, because, once again, we would have to question the basis for that relation, and the same question would return. — A negation does not appear relevant, unless it is that of non-distance. Someone might think that a substance's non-distance from a place serves as the basis of its relation to the place. But this amounts to nothing. After all an absence of distance would also fit an indivisible substance that never existed, as is obvious. And thus a substance that never existed would happen to be-in-this-place; and hence it would "never be" and yet "be here" — which involves contradiction.

ix. If these remarks are true, it is clear that the imagination positing such a relation is based on a false-

hood. One thinks that this water, as it exists in this vase, has two traits, namely, that it is in there definitively and circumscriptively; thus it would have two bases (the volume as the basis for circumscriptive and the substance as the basis for definitive location). But it is obvious from the previous remarks that there is only one basis here, namely the quantity thanks to which this water is definitively and circumscriptively here; hence it follows further that, just as this water's lacking a color would contradict its being visible, so also its lacking a quantity would contradict its being locatable. And the theory saying this in the way we are speaking of substance, minus any active power or passive potency in any way, is a flatly impossible theory.

x. As for the example given of this water existing in the vase with its quantity thought away, *etc.*, I am saying that one's imagination is deceived in this. After all, without its quantity, that water could not "remain" anywhere, since it would have no bearing towards a place; but it would remain with an absence of distance from that place and any other place. And hence there is no need to ask where it would go; rather, the vase would be found full of air with the water rendered invisible and existing nowhere. This is not surprising but follows from the hypothesis made; similarly, if one posits Socrates with his quantity removed, one would have to say in consequence that he would have no integral parts, such as a heart, a liver, a head, *etc.*, because he would not remain a divisible substance; and yet we imagine that he would remain Socrates. Therefore no credence is to be given to these imaginations.

2nd dubious case: proximity

xi. ON THE SIDE AFFIRMING a presence of proximity of the agent to what it is acting on, prior to the action itself, there is a quite strong argument to the effect that, for an agent to act immediately upon the patient, and for the agent to be immediately together with the patient, are two different things, and they have a natural order between them; and since the action is not prior to the togetherness, the togetherness must be prior to the action.

Each of these points is clarified. Firstly, when we say on the basis of *Physics VII*, that the agent and immediate patient have to be together, if being together is nothing but this one's acting and that one's undergoing, saying "the agent and the patient have to be together" would be saying nothing more than "the agent has to be acting and the patient has to be undergoing" — which is ridiculous. Therefore the two differ from each other. — Then clarification is given to the second point, *i.e.* that these two occur in order. For where there is plurality without order there is confusion. — Finally the third point is clarified, namely, that the action does not come ahead of the togetherness. Otherwise, the agent would not be proximate to the patient because he is acting, but would be acting because he is proximate.

xii. ON THE NEGATIVE SIDE, there is the point that this presence preceding the operation either coincides with items mentioned above, or else is a pure fiction. Either

the agent and the patient are both corporeal, or they are both spiritual, or the one is spiritual and the other corporeal. If both are corporeal, the togetherness preceding action is quantitative touching, as is obvious in *Physics VII*, and this pertains to circumscriptive location. — If both are spiritual, even if we give free rein to our imagination, the togetherness preceding the action is a presence of order (not just any order, but this sort, *i.e.*, immediate order). And rightly so, because, as Augustine taught, among spiritual things order yields what position yields among bodily things; hence, just as the proximity of the agent to the patient among bodily things comes from position, so also among spiritual things it comes from order. — But if one is spiritual and the other corporeal, one cannot imagine that the proximity is positional, because a spiritual thing is such that it cannot be positioned.* Therefore the proximity-presence has to coincide with that of order and that of substance, since it's not easy to imagine a third possibility. And if my above remarks are true, so that substantial presence is a fiction, only the presence of order can be understood as preceding operation. — And thus this alleged presence of proximity coincides with the presence of order and, among bodily things, adds presence by contact of volumes. Or else, if one says it is anything more, it is a pure fiction.

xiii. The argument adduced for the affirmative side [in § xi] has been answered satisfactorily from what has now been said, with the concession that togetherness of the agent and the patient is other than the operation [of the one upon the other] and is prior to it in nature. But I am denying that the togetherness is something other than the presence of order, generally speaking. Going down to corporeal things, I am denying that proximity is anything other than presence of order plus position; for these two suffice for the one to be immediately acting and the other immediately undergoing the action. Positional presence is required because the bodily things are so-big; that of order is required because they are active and passive.

xiv. In both the areas of doubt covered so far, the negative side is more in accord with reason and seems to settle the mind firmly, and so I judge that the negative side is to be adopted. And so we shall accept just three presences: presence thanks to position, thanks to operation, and thanks to order.

xv. However there remains a doubt about presence of operation. Between an actual agent and an actual patient, above and beyond the relations of patient-to-agent and agent-to-patient, is there a relation of presence to each other? I am not asking about a relation preceding or accompanying the operation. I am asking about a relation whereby the agent is formally called "present" to the patient and *vice-versa*.

If one posits this presence as a symmetrical relation and so requiring a basis of the same type in both relata, a question arises about that basis and then about its inseparability from the operation. I don't see how the questions can be answered, given what I said above.

But if we do not posit such a relation, we have no worries, since there is no necessity to posit it. From the defining character of an agent and a patient as such, no symmetrical relation has to arise or come along as an accompaniment. — Hence you have an argument on the negative side, because a plurality is not to be posited needlessly. It suffices therefore that between agent and patient there be first a togetherness based on the presence of order and secondly a presence based on operation. Among bodily things, a third item crops up thanks to the contact of one quantity with another. — So much for Problem II.

PROBLEM III

xvi. The third problem must be addressed briefly. For some writers (and Scotus among them in his remarks on *II Sent.*, d.2, q.6), have maintained that an angel is in a place by substantial presence, thanks to which they also say that a proximity of agent to patient crops up. Nevertheless, such a presence is arbitrary and posited for no good reason, and indeed contradicts things known to us from sense experience, as previous remarks made clear. The substances of angels are bodiless and matter-independent and hence alien to a presence by position; so only two kinds of presence can be at play here, namely, presence of order or presence of operation. — So much for Problem III. § viii

PROBLEM IV

xviii. As for the fourth problem, the several interpreters have spoken differently about what Saint Thomas thought. Some think that his opinion consisted of these two propositions:

- (1) Only a transitive operation is the reason an angel is present in a place.
- (2) The angel's substance is so joined to this place that it is at some distance from any other place.

These writers are imagining that, JUST AS size is the reason a bodily substance is in a place, and that, along with this, the bodily substance itself through its size is in this place in such a way as to be farther from a second place and closer to a third place, SO ALSO a transitive operation is the reason why an angel exists in a place, but that the angel is so nailed down to the place that the angel is more distant from a remoter place than it is from a closer place. — Other writers, however, reject proposition (1) as it stands and amend it to say that either a transitive operation or any relation signified as it were one is the reason an angel is in place. They say this on account of some words in Saint Thomas' first *Quodlibetal*. As for proposition (2), they affirm the first part to the effect that the substance of the angel (and not just its operation) is joined to the place.

Both groups base Proposition (2) on explicit words of Saint Thomas in 3 *ST.* q.52, a.2, saying that the soul of Christ was in Hades in two ways, by operation and by substance; but was in other places by operation or effect alone. — And in his *Quodlibetal VII*, a.2, Aquinas is responding to a prior argument that went like this: If an angel could act through the command of his will, he could act at a distance as well as in his neighborhood,

De Trinitate III, c 4

* *insituabile*

in § viii

and so the angel would not have to come here from heaven to earth in order to operate here. He says in reply that “because a mover has to be together with the movable thing which is being moved by him, as it says in *Physics VIII*, the substance of the angel has to be joined somehow to the things which he moves.” — From these words [they say] you have it clear as day that even among spiritual substances being in a place through its substance differs from being in a place through its operation, and both pertain to a spiritual substance. Also from a second authoritative quote one seems to get the distance and closeness posited in proposition (2).

xviii. What occurs to me, however, is that one ought to put three items into question: [a] what explains being in a place, [b] the exact item existing in the place, and [c] how it stands *vis à vis* distance and closeness.

According to Saint Thomas, item [a] is a how-much of power touching the place, and the “touching” is nothing but presence by operation and presence of order (whether they concur simultaneously or not).

But right here, pay very careful attention to two points. The first is that “presence of order” is not distinguished from presence by operation as potency is from second act, but rather as *habilitation* is from second act. After all, an angel is not said to be somewhere just because he *can* operate there. Rather, presence of order adds to the mere possibility on four sides. On the side of the angel’s substance, it adds an absence of positional distance (in whatever way that could be of benefit, as will be explained below); on the side of the angel’s intellect, it adds practical knowledge of such-and-such a work to be done upon this body by the angel; and on the side of the angel’s executive power, it adds an expeditiousness, such that its power is neither detained nor impeded by any higher power, nor preoccupied with any other work, but is ready and “all set” for this work; and on the part of the angel’s will, it adds a choice to have the aforesaid readiness for this work to be done on this body. After all, this is the defining makeup of a habilitation: it makes one such that as soon as one chooses to act, one does act.

The second point to attend to is this: *JUST AS* operations come in two kinds, in that some of them proceed with continuous external action (like moving) and some of them make do with interrupted external action (like presiding, guarding, and the like); *SO ALSO* angels happen to be present in a place by operation in two ways. One way is because they are touching bodies by actual external operation. The other way is because they actually start and stop, so that what was begun may finish well, even though they are not continuously doing something there by external operation. This is how the angels guarding people and presiding over provinces or localities are said to “be there.” For one who guards or presides doesn’t always have to be doing something to what is guarded or presided over; rather, he must always watch out, pay attention, and come and go — so that now impediments may be removed, now some help may be provided, and now

threats that may arise to the desired outcome may be foreseen, etc.

xix. As to the next item [b] in question, *i.e.* what exactly exists in a place, when an angel is said to be there, I say that not only the angel’s operation (or its effect) is there, but also, beyond doubt, his substance — but differently so. For an operation is in a body as an improvement* is in the thing to be improved.† But the angel’s substance is a thing in its own right, having its own subsistence apart from the body acted on. For the angel located is not the same as the place itself in either its substantial or accidental being, since neither [the angel nor the place] is the accident or substance of the other in any way.³

But one needs to observe that *JUST AS* an angel’s operating on a body happens in two ways — immediately (with immediacy of referent) or mediately — *SO ALSO* there are two ways one can say an angel is *in a place* because of an operation: through its power and through its substance. When an angel acts upon a body immediately, the angel is “in” the body (a) through his operation and his power (because he touches the body with his power) and (b) through his substance (because he touches it immediately with immediacy of referent), while absence of positional distance concurs as a necessary condition. But when he acts upon a body mediately, the angel is “in the body” through his operation and power, but not through his substance.

xx. As for the third item [c] in question, whether the substance of an angel existing in a place is “distant” from another place, the issue needs some distinguishing. The talk of distance can be taken two ways: literally, for local or positional distance, or analogously, for the “distance” [or contrast] between the agent as such and the patient as such, *i.e.* for the “proportion” between this and that whereby the one acts and the other is acted upon by it. If we are talking about distance in this second way, it is obvious that an angel is closer to one place [*i.e.* to one patient] than to another, because this “closeness” is nothing but the agent’s being more “proportioned” to one than to the other. But if we are talking about positional distance, then we need to be distinguishing *per se* from *per accidens*, and we need to subdivide *per accidens* according to Aristotle’s doctrine in *Physics VIII*, and we need to say three things. (1) An angel is not intrinsically² far from or close to any place. (2) An angel is not accidentally far from or close to any place *in himself*, the way an accidentally so-big white thing in one place is accidentally far from another place.⁴ (3) An angel is accidentally far from or close to a place *thanks to the body in which he is*, in such a way that the distance does not affect the angel himself but is

* *perfectio*
† *in perfectibili*

c 6, 259b 20
‡ *per se*

³ The angel’s whereabouts are not an accident of place in the angel; being a pure form, he has no categorical accidents. The fact that certain contingent propositions like “Gabriel is here” are true of him does not give *him* accidents.

⁴ Being white is an accident of a body which has it, and so is the size of the same body, so that its size is incidental to its being white, and from its size it gets a position doubly incidental to its being white.

Physics VIII, c 6,
259b 28-31

predicated of him by reason of the body he is "in." This way he is close to a place close to that body and far from a place far away from it. Similarly, for Aristotle, the mover of a lower heavenly orb is said to be "moved" *per accidens* with the movement [ad motum] of a higher such orb.

q 52, a.2
xxi. From these remarks, it is clear how to interpret the several statements of St. Thomas in a unified way. He said what he said in 3 ST about the soul of Christ because His soul could operate *immediately* in one part of Hades but only *mediately* in other parts — not because He sent a messenger to those other parts, but because He descended to them *via* the effect He had in the limbo of the [Old Testament] Fathers. For through His power-wise descent into the limbo of the Fathers, He both confuted the damned and gave hope to those needing purgation, as one sees clearly from St. Thomas's words in the same place, in the answer ad 3. — The fact that the soul of Christ was in just one place in Hades can also be understood another way: His soul was distant from the other parts *per accidens* in the way explained above, and yet He achieved His effect in those place by divine power.⁵

Aquinas said what he said in *Quodlibetal VI* on account of the togetherness involved in presence-of-order, which precedes operation and excludes positional distance incidentally.⁶

q 3, a.1
xxii. It also becomes clear from these remarks why St. Thomas distinguished power-touch from operation in *Quodlibetal I*, for power-touch comes not only from an exterior operation continuously exercised but also from care and attention towards the outcome of an [intermittent] operation already begun, *etc.* This is why in the same passage he immediately adds: "by 'operation' one should understand not only inducing change but also any union whereby the angel touches a body by his power, as by presiding over it or containing it." And by 'containing it' he does not mean the substantial containing whereby lower things are naturally contained in higher things in a higher way* (because then any angel would be everywhere) but the containing that goes naturally with being a form, which is holding the body's parts together. This is how the soul "contains" the body, as it says in *De Anima I*, and a sign of it is the fact when the soul departs, the body-parts disintegrate. So the angel's help with keeping the body's parts together so that it can amount to something or do something is enough "containing" for one to say that the angel is "there."

* eminenter

c 5,
411b 8

⁵ Did Hades contain parts which were literal places, positionally distant from each other, and each holding souls of different dispositions? Or was Hades a collection of sets of souls, so that each "part" of it was a set of souls so disposed as to be (in the analogous sense) "close" to divine influence or "far" from it?

⁶ In other words, the text makes good sense if Aquinas was excluding distance with the pre-operational "presence of order" rather than the alleged "substantial presence."

xxiii. And don't accuse me of saying that, in Aquinas, an angel is located by presence of order alone. So far, I have not said this, and what I have said heads it off just by maintaining that an angel is in a place on two grounds, by operation and by order; of these, the latter comes first in natural order, because it is the very "approach" of the agent to the patient. Whether such presence suffices for saying an angel is in a place needs a distinction, I should think, because "how" an angel is "in a place" subdivides into "completely" and "incompletely." For him to be there completely, no: presence of order does not suffice. To be there incompletely, it suffices. When the presence of order alone obtains, the presence of the angel to the place has begun but is not yet complete; when he actually begins to operate, then he is present completely. In this way, the divergent statements by theologians can be interpreted as speaking sometimes of an angel's complete presence in a place, and sometimes of his incomplete presence.

xxiv. What St. Thomas's own intention was is not quite clear. In the passage from *Quodlibetal I* and again here is this article, he said explicitly that an angel is in a place "by application of the angel's power to that place in any manner," and so, since the manner of application just discussed here [presence of order] is not outside of 'in any manner', it seems to be included. And this is really the way to expound the text, unless it is an obstacle that the manner of application he was talking about is such that two angels cannot have this manner of application toward the same place. It seems that multiple angels can simultaneously have presence of order to the same place. [So a power-application by presence of order seems not to be included.] — It can also be an obstacle that, in answer to an objection in the same *Quodlibetal*, he said that, as far as being in a place is concerned, acting there is naturally prior to being there. So, since presence of order is naturally prior to operating, if such presence were enough to put an angel in a place, the angel would be in the place before acting there; and so Aquinas did not hold that presence of order was enough to make an angel be in a place.

q 3, a.1
q 3, a.1 ad 1
But one can answer this second obstacle in two ways. My first answer is that, in St. Thomas, presence of order is included in application of power "in any manner." For as I have said, the application can occur in three ways: by a continuing exterior operation, by continuing attention during intermittent operation (with the other conditions met), or by the habitual operation which a presence of order involves. Thus by taking 'operate' broadly enough to cover both actual and habitual operation, it is clear that "operating in a place" is not prior to "being in a place" [nor *vice-versa*]. Indeed the two are the same. But in how we distinguish them conceptually, operating is prior because it is the reason for being in the place. — My second possible answer

⁷ In cases of final causality, the order of conceiving/explaining inverts the order of happening. Whenever y is the reason for x, x is for the sake of y, and so y is the final cause of x and hence prior to x in the order of explaining.

is that St. Thomas is to be understood as speaking formally,* just to evacuate the force of the objection, even given that an angel is in a place only by actually exercised operation (whatever the truth of that may be). And this way, St. Thomas's answer to the objection becomes one that all sides must accept, whatever their attitude toward his conclusion. Thus even Scotus in his remarks on *I Sent.* d.37, where he imagines a presence-by-immensity between God and every place, admits that in natural order God's power has its operation's terminus before a terminus of His immensity is also present.⁸

As for the first obstacle, what to say will be discussed in a. 3 of this inquiry. It is enough for now to know that a spiritual substance's relation to a place always pertains to transitive action (or passion) actually or habitually exercised. — As best I can understand the matter so far, so much for problem IV

PROBLEM V

xxv. As for the fifth problem, Scotus argued on multiple grounds against St. Thomas, and his views are treated at length by Capreolus on *II Sent.* d.2, q.1. So I will touch on things rapidly.

Firstly, Scotus argues that there is such a thing as "substantial presence," and he does so two ways. The first way is *ad hominem*. He says that St. Thomas admitted substantial presence in q.8, a.1, and now denies it; ergo [Aquinas is inconsistent].

Secondly, he argues straightforwardly. The operative power of an angel either stands mediately or immediately towards action in a place. If mediately, we ask about this middle position, and so start again. If immediately, then the substance of the operating angel is immediate to the place, and substantial presence is conceded.

xxvi. But the answer to these is obvious from the above. For my answer to his *ad hominem*, see what I said in commenting on q.8. — Against his second argument, my answer comes from the points made just now. After all, immediacy of referent is admitted, as is non-distance of place; for both of these are conditions for both presence of order and presence by operation. It is to these two alone that Scotus's argument leads, and not to some positive "substantial presence," as he imagined (but supported on no ground and simply assumed).

xxvii. Secondly, Scotus argued that an operation is not the reason why an angel is in a place. He did so in three ways.

His first way was by deducing an awkward consequence. Firstly, because the angel would frequently be nowhere, because it would be doing nothing in the empyrean heaven. — Then because an angel moving a heavenly body would be in the whole heavenly body, because the whole thing moves first off, because such movement is proportionate to it, in such a way that if a star were added to the orb, it would move with labor, according to *de Caelo II*. — Thirdly because an angel would be in a place commensurately, because his op-

eration is in the place commensurately accidentally, and he is only where it is.

Secondly, Scotus argues ostensively. The reason the angel is in a place is in the angel form-wise; otherwise the angel would <not> be in a place form-wise. But a transitive operation is not in the angel form-wise. Ergo [a transitive operation does not suffice to put an angel in a place]

Thirdly, Scotus argues from authoritative passages in St. John Damascene, which say that an angel "works and is" in a place. Therefore, working there is one thing, and being there is another for an angel, otherwise the saint would have been saying the same thing twice.

xxviii. But these arguments are also answered easily from previous remarks. Against his first, to say that an angel is nowhere is not awkward; indeed, as Aristotle says in *de Caelo I*, those blessed beings are not apt to be in a place. — What he mixes into his argument about angels in the empyrean heaven can be answered on many grounds. Firstly, "the angels are in the empyrean heaven" is a metaphorical expression, I may say, because they are in glory, for which the empyrean heaven is a sign. A sign of this is the fact that, as Peter Lombard says in *II Sent.* d.2, that heaven is "full of angels," which can only be understood metaphorically. — Secondly, I can say the angels are at work in the empyrean heaven, but how they are working is hidden from us. — Some writers say that the angels are there by furnishing it, or something of the sort, which is a relation indicated after the fashion of an operation; so I think they say this more out of their imagination than out of reason; after all, nothing we have said touches the question about how a thing is indicated. So if the furnishing is really just a relation, without any actual or habitual operation touching a place, then what is really being alleged is the "substantial presence" which I attacked above; an angel is already posited to be in a place and yet not as operating upon a patient, and everything we have said falls down. — And if anyone does not think ignoring this operation is reasonable, he first has to have an answer for fear of denying the authority of St. Gregory Nazianzen. For he says we are wrong to say the angels "are in a place," since we should say they "operate in a place." [The attribution to St. Gregory is a mistake; the real author of the work, *De natura hominis II*, c.11 was Nemesius.]

In the second argument about awkwardness, I deny the inference. For as is clear in *Physics VIII* [c.8] the mover of a heavenly orb is not first off in the whole orb, but in the equinoctial circle, whose motion is extremely fast. And not even in all of that but in the Eastern place as is clear in *de Caelo II*, because that is where the right side of the thing is set by nature, not materially but formally, as Averroes says, and well says, in his comment 15 on *de Caelo II*. — And there is no need to ask where it rests, since it does not need a place, and does not rest, but is altogether changeless.

In the third argument to an awkwardness, the inference is also worthless, as is self-evident. After all, an accidental effect does not affect the cause in this way;

* *formaliter*

De fide ortho-
doxa I, c 13, II
c 3

c 9;
279a 23

Commentary on
a.1, § 1x

indeed as St. Thomas says, an angel is *per se* in a place but only as operating in it.

Against the ostensive argument, I say that although its major premise is true about being in a place locally, it is not true about being in a place equivocally, so as just to be operating in it, as is obvious.

Against Scotus's argument from Damascene, I say that, in our human way of understanding, we appre-

hend and name higher things in line with our experience of lower things: here below, working in a place is one thing and being in it is another, and this is why St. John put an 'and' between them, saying "being and work." They are not being distinguished here in real terms, but only by the mind's way of conceiving the angel's location by way of operation and by way of presence.

Can an angel be in many places at once?

1 *ST* q 8, a.2 ad 2; 1 *ST* 112, 1; *In I Sent.* d.37, q 3, a.2; *In IV Sent.* d.10, q.1, a.3, qu². *Quaestiones disputatae de Anima*, a.10 ad 18.

It would seem that an angel can be in several places at once.

(1.) After all, an angel does not have less power than a soul. But a soul is in many places at once, because it is "wholly in each part of the body," as Augustine says. Therefore an angel can be in many places at once.

De Trinitate 17,
c 6, PL 42, 929

(2.) Besides, an angel is in a body he has assumed; and since it assumes a continuous body, it seems to be in each part of it. But thanks to its parts, many places are occupied. Therefore an angel is in many places at once.

De Fide Ortho-
daxa 1, c 13;
PG 94, 853

(3.) Moreover, Damascene says that "where an angel is working there he is." But sometimes an angel is working in several places at once, as one sees with the angel overthrowing Sodom [Genesis 19:25]. Ergo, an angel can be in many places at once.

De Fide Ortho-
daxa II, c 3,
PG 94, 869

ON THE OTHER HAND, Damascene says that "so long as angels are in heaven, they are not on earth"

ANSWER: an angel has finite power and a finite essence. But the divine power and essence are infinite and are the universal cause of all things, and so He touches all things by His power; so He is not in just many places but everywhere. The power of an angel, however, because it is finite, does not extend to everything, but to one, definite thing. After all, whatever is matched with one power is matched with it as one thing. Therefore, just as universal being is matched as one thing with God's universal power, so also a particular being is matched as one thing with an angel's power. So, since an angel is in a place by application of his power to that place, it follows that he is not everywhere, nor in many places, but in just the one place.

Some people, however, have gotten this wrong. Some were unable to get past their imagination, and so they thought that an angel's indivisibility was like that of a point; hence they believed that an angel could be at only one point in space. — But obviously they were wrong. For a point is an indivisible item with a position; but an angel is indivisible without having size or position; rather, he applies his power voluntarily to

a larger or smaller body, and so he is in a place which is divisible or indivisible, bigger or smaller. And thus the entire body to which he applies his power corresponds to him as one place.

It also does not have to be the case that if an angel moves a heaven [*i.e.* a heavenly body or orb], he is everywhere. First of all, because his power is only applied to what is moved first off [*primo*] by him; but there is one part of heaven in which movement occurs first off, namely, the eastern part; hence also, Aristotle in *Physics VIII*, attributes the power of the mover of the heavens to the eastern part. — Secondly, because the philosophers do not allege that a single immaterial substance moves all the heavenly orbs immediately, it is not necessary for such a mover to be everywhere.

actually, *De*
Caelo II, c.2,
285b 18

It is obvious, therefore, that being "in a place" belongs differently to a body, to an angel, and to God. A body is in a place circumscriptively, because it is coextensive with the place. An angel is not in a place circumscriptively, since he is not coextensive with the place, but definitively, because he is in one place in such a way as not to be in another. God, however, is not in a place circumscriptively, because he is everywhere.

Thereby an answer to the objections is easy to see. All that to which the angel's power is applied immediately is counted as one place for him, even though it be continuous.¹

¹ To put the conclusion another way, let {E} be a set of events that includes the subsets {E_a} {E_b}, etc. {E} is allowed to include everything that ever is or happens in the actual world; but as an object *matched with* God's power, {E} counts as just one object or effect. An object of an angel's power can only be a particular subset of {E}, such as {E_a}, and can only be a proper and finite subset of {E}. But however many events are included in this subset, as an object *matched with* an angel's power, it has to count as one object or effect. So, if the members of {E_a} are events involving space-occupying entities, then all the entities involved in members of {E_a} count as occupying one place. For example, if St. Michael has the power to guard and protect an entire nation, such as the Russian Republic, the entire Russian territory and population count as "one place" *vis-à-vis* the operation of that power.

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear. — But there is a point to note about it, namely, that the word 'can' is speaking of the natural power of the angels, and the ordinate power of God Himself; we are not asking what divine power could do about this absolutely speaking, but what the order of nature is.

In the body of the article he does five jobs: (1) he answers the question; (2) from this he excludes a certain mistake; (3) he removes an objection; (4) he implies how differently a body, an angel, and God are "in a place;" (5) lastly he solves the objections with what he has said.

ii. As for job (1), the conclusion answering the question has three parts, and it is this: [a] an angel is not everywhere, [b] but in one place, *i.e.* [c] a particular place. — He supports each of these parts. Firstly that an angel “is not everywhere,” from the difference between an angel’s power and divine power, since the one is finite, the other infinite, the one is a particular cause, and the other a universal cause of everything.

Then he supports the second and third parts of the conclusion together, namely, the angel is “in one place,” and in “a particular place,” as follows. [*Antecedent:*] an angel can only have one particular effect: [*consequence:*] therefore it can only be in one particular place — The antecedent is supported in its first part on the ground that each thing matched with some one power is taken as one. As to the third part, the support is that just as God’s universal power stands to the whole of being, so the power of an angel stands to a particular being; ergo, [a particular being stands to an angel’s power as one thing] *etc.* — Drawing the consequence is supported on the ground that an angel is only in a place by the application of his power to that place.

Many doubts, I

iii. About this part, manifold doubt arises. It arises in the first place over the support given to the second part of the conclusion [the part saying that an angel is in one place; its support included the premise that whatever is matched with some one power, is matched with it as one thing]. Either this support assumes a false premise, or it does not reach the point intended, either as far as the predicate is concerned, or as far as its subject is concerned. For when it says “whatever is matched with some one power is matched with it as one thing,” either it is talking about every power across the board, or else some powers, such as created ones. If it is talking about some powers, three awkward results follow. The first is that the argument assumes what it needs to prove. — The second is that Aquinas badly inferred from this proposition a proportionality of “being as a whole” to the power of God and of “a particular being” to the power of an angel. — Thirdly there would be an unreasonable or at least dubious restriction [making the premise true of some powers but not all]. After all, one could restrict the proposition, perhaps, two ways: *i.e.* from the difference between a natural power and a voluntary one, or else between a finite power and an infinite one. But the proposition cannot in fact be restricted on either of these grounds. For one thing, an angel is also a voluntary agent and hence, if the proposition only holds good for natural agents, it will not be relevant. The difference between the finite and the infinite does not contribute anything towards the oneness or plurality of the effect; after all, a natural power (be it finite or infinite) is nailed down to one effect; but a voluntary power (be it finite or infinite) relates to opposed things, as is clear from *Metaphysics LX*. Ergo [if the proposition is about just some powers, it makes a bad support].

But if the proposition is understood to be about every power, questions abound. On the one hand, it

would follow from this that even divine power is nailed down to one effect. And for another thing, it would follow that even the power of a voluntary agent is nailed down to one effect.

Many doubts, II

iv. In the second place, doubts arise about what kind of oneness of power is being talked about here: is it real oneness? Formal oneness? Or both at once? If the issue is real oneness, an obvious objection arises from God’s generative power. His spirative power, and His creative power: they are one power in the real and yet are not determined to a single outcome.

If on the other hand the oneness in discussion is formal, then although the proposition is true, it is not relevant. After all, positing many powers distinct only formally in angels is not a problem (*e.g.* the power to move, the power to guard, and so on) according to the several formal accounts of the effects. And hence the argument so taken does not support the point intended; after all, one may say that an angel, while he is only in one place according to one power, is nevertheless in many places exercising his different powers. And there is no problem about one and the same agent using multiple powers at once. You see this from a human soul, which at once hears and sees and does the functions of man’s vegetative parts and of his intellectual part, while remaining one, single soul according to St. Thomas.

And there you have it already that the argument cannot be talking about real and formal oneness at once, since this is foreclosed from what was just said about the other alternatives.

Many doubts, III

v. In the third place, doubts arise about what kind of oneness of effect is being talked about: is it about formal oneness, or about numerical oneness? If it is about formal oneness, the intended conclusion does not follow, since from a formal oneness of effect there does not follow a numerical oneness. If the oneness meant is numerical, the claim is either about the strictly one in number, or the broadly one in number. [If the strictly one is meant.] then it is false, because then it would follow that an angel could not move two non-adjacent pebbles at once. After all, their moving would be numerically distinct thanks to the distinctness of the pebbles moved, nor could they be called one in number unless perhaps “in some respect.”

Or else it means to speak of numerical oneness in any way, including the way a heap of stones is one thing. And this too, seems false. For one thing, it would follow that God could not produce many things *as many*. — For another thing, [it seems false] because the difference between an angel and God is not between handling one thing at once vs. handling many, but just a greater thing vs. a lesser. And likewise the difference between them would not be existing in one place vs. existing in many, but in a bigger place vs. a smaller one. For every power is limited to numerically one thing in this respect, but the divine power is limited to one in the sense of the whole universe, and others are each limited to particu-

below, q. 77,
a.3

lars. But this is obviously awkward, since God can produce many things at once as *many*, and can be in many places at once. — For another thing, the opposite of the intended conclusion would follow: *i.e.*, an angel could be in many places at once. For if such [broad] numerical oneness is possible in the effect of the angel himself (since this oneness does not require adjacency), he can move two stones at once that are a yard apart, and for the same reason can move two that are ten yards apart, since in acting on them, he does not have to be acting simultaneously upon the intervening distance. And thus he could move at once two pebbles, one to Rome and one to France, and as a result, the angel would be in many places.

Clearing things up

vi. To clear up these difficulties, you need to realize that an effect can be compared to its cause in two ways: (1) as an object to a power; (2) as an effect to its cause. For example, a heated thing is compared to a power-to-heat as a possible object, and as an effect produced by that power's exercise. In the first way, the comparison is between the formal account of the effect and the account of the cause's operating; but in the second way, the comparison is between the referent or individual effect itself, and the operation of the cause in exercised act.

vi. Since the proposition under discussion here can be interpreted in these two ways, I say that if it is taken the first way, it amounts to the same as saying "from one thing *qua* one, only one thing proceeds," which is understood to be about formal oneness of the cause and the effect. And it is universally true; for every power looks to one formal account in its equivalent object; otherwise, it would not be formally one. — And it would not follow from this that a rational power was not towards opposites, or that the divine power could not produce things formally multiple unless it were formally multiplied. After all, both a rational power and the divine power look to one thing *per se primo*. This is obvious about a rational power from *Metaphysics IX*, where it says that a rational power works *per se primo* towards one of the opposites and *per se secundo* towards the other. It is obviously true about God's power because it looks *per se primo* to existence, and to other things insofar as they are ways of existing and participations in it. And thus God can produce things that are form-wise many under "being," as eyesight can see many kinds of colors under one more general type.

And this takes care of the objection from formal multiplication of an angel's power. For I say that in an angel there is one operative power, but its formal oneness does not come from these specific formal accounts but from a generic or analogous account, under which many specific formal accounts are included. Thus the power by which an angel guards, presides, moves, and does whatever he does, is one power, not only thing-wise but also form-wise.

And thus the proposition under discussion is true in this sense; but this was *not* the sense primarily inten-

ded, because we intend to reach numerical oneness of place. But I did say "primarily," because it is meant to be taken this way also, secondarily. After all, as it says in *Metaphysics V*, what is numerically one *per se*, is also one in its account.

viii. So since this proposition is primarily intended in the second sense [*i.e.* in the sense in which a cause relates to its effect], to make its truth evident one needs to know two things. The first is that, JUST AS on the cause's side one finds a common distinction between a total cause and partial causes (*i.e.* between a cause that suffices all by itself in its order, and causes which require more concurring ones of the same order, as one sees in the case of many men dragging a ship *versus* just one man dragging it), SO ALSO analogously, on the effect's side, one can distinguish an effect which is the "total effect," and one which is a "partial effect." Thus, JUST AS not just any two causes of the same kind are called "partial causes" of an effect, but only those which are causes in the same kind and concur in the same order to make up one cause of that order (after all, the sun and a man are not "partial causes" of Socrates; but many men dragging a boat are partial causes of its motion, because they come together to make up one complete dragger and thus acquire the force of one total cause, while still concurring with higher causes at work in their own orders), SO LIKEWISE not just any two effects of a given power are called "partial effects" of it, but only those which go together to produce one total effect. Hence, the account defining a partial effect is distinguished from the account defining a total effect by the fact that the former account necessarily is taken as part of another, whereas the latter account is taken as standing on its own. — The second thing you need to know is that the total effect can be compared to some power in three ways: *i.e.*, as not enough for it, as too much for it, and as equated to it.* For example, with respect to a man's strength to move things, the movable object can be (a) something equaling his strength, (b) something that exceeds his strength, and something less, such that the man could move more. — A third distinction is about coming to be all at once or successively.

ix. From these three distinctions, one gets the right interpretation of the proposition we have been discussing: for the right construction of it goes like this: *Whatever is matched as an effect which is total and (more or less) equal and all at once, with a power which is one power thing-wise and form-wise, is matched with it as numerically one effect.* So taken the proposition is universally true about every power, be it finite or infinite, be it natural or free. This is why Saint Thomas in this article, immediately after stating this proposition, infers that what corresponds to God's power is "universal being," as the effect matched to it. — But notice that although these three conditions need to be understood in that proposition as it stands, the second condition is not necessary if the proposition is restricted to angelic power, because an angel cannot produce even two defective effects simultaneously. The third condition is also not necessary if the proposition is restricted to an infinite power, because whatever such a power can produce suc-

c.6.
1016b 8-10

* *adaequatus*

c.2.
1046b 11-20

cessively, it can also produce at once, unless there is some problem about that on the side of the effect.

Quashing doubts, I

x. With these amendments in place, none of those three awkward results adduced in the objections follow from it. The first does not follow because God cannot produce numerically many effects *as many*, because that numerically one effect which corresponds to His power as an equated effect, is equated to it in its whole possible range, both numerical and formal. It is “universal being;” and so, JUST AS with determination of the creative power to one effect form-wise, *i.e.* to existence, it is consistent that there be many effects form-wise according to the several modes of being, SO ALSO with determination of His power in exercised act to numerically one thing, *i.e.* the universe, it is consistent that there be the multitude of things of which the universe is composed.

Also there is no conflict between this determination and the fact that God could at the same time make another universe outside of this one, or another creation. For one thing, this universe and whatever is posited to be produced outside of it, are necessarily parts of “universal being,” even though they wouldn’t be parts of this or that universe. Hence it is significant that here in the text, St. Thomas did not assign as the effect matched with God’s power “the universe” but “universal being”; and he did not say “whatever is done by some one power” *etc.* but “whatever is matched with some one power,” so as to insinuate that he was talking about an equal or quasi-equal effect, and (as we know) no particular being made or makeable could be such an effect *vis-à-vis* Divine Power. Only “universal being” can be the matched effect. — For another thing, as I said in discussing the title-question, the talk here is about God’s ordinate power, from which only one universe can arise as a matching effect including in itself many partial and defective effects.¹

xi. The second awkward result also does not follow. For attaining so-many partial effects comes about in two ways: (1) just thanks to that in which they agree; (2) thanks also to every respect in which they differ. And herein Divine Power and angelic power differ; for angelic power attains many partial effects only thanks to that wherein they agree; but Divine Power attains all parts in every respect, even in those respects that are distinct. And thus an angel can make only numerically one effect at a time, while God can make many. The angel attains the many only “as one,” whereas God attains the many both “as one” and “as many.” This is why in the text Saint Thomas says two things to suggest both points: the agreement of angelic and divine

¹ In contrast to God’s “absolute power,” which extends to everything logically possible, God’s “ordinate power” is limited to what He can do consistently with all of His logical prior decisions. So, unless we are living in a bubble of what some people call a “multiverse,” God made a prior decision to create numerically one universe and thereby limited His own ordinate power.

power in the fact that they are nailed down to numerically one effect, and the difference between them in the fact that the Divine is determined to such-and-such a “one” effect, from which it necessarily follows that His power can attain many things under that one effect. For from the fact that God’s power attains universal being, it follows that multitude as multitude is attained, since it belongs to the account defining the universe that it has not only many parts as one, but also many as many; *i.e.* not just insofar as the many agree in one respect (e.g. in order) but also in the respect in which they are distinguished. But an angel’s power is nailed down to a “one” such that multitude does not follow from it, because it is a “particular being.”

xii. Against the third awkward consequence. I say that although an angel can move two non-adjacent stones as partial movables of one total motion, arising from two items passive to partial motions, he still cannot move them as two total movables, *i.e.* both cannot be moved as equal to the other. Just as one sees in a person dragging a small log: he could also be dragging another one of equal size, for he could also drag both at once, as two partial movables of the same dragging action; but he could not drag one while dragging the other by another independent action.

As regards how big a distance there can be between two partial effects, we do not have a definite answer. But it seems necessary that, JUST AS other natural finite powers have a fixed sphere for their activity, beyond which they cannot work immediately <though they might be able to work farther mediately> (for it happens that something is coagulated together, as it says in Aristotle’s *De Sensu et Sentato*);² SO ALSO an angel’s power has a fixed sphere for its activity, within which everything it moves at once is moved as existing in one place. And the angel could not move them at once if one of them were placed outside the sphere of its activity. And hence I deny that a large *vs.* a small distance between partial effects makes no difference. Hence it does not follow that an angel could be in diverse places at once.

Doubts from Scotus

xiii. Doubts arise also about another proposition in the text, namely, “an angel applies his power voluntarily to a larger or smaller body, and so he is in a place which is divisible or indivisible, bigger or smaller.” Can an angel be in a divisible place, however small, or however big? Scotus answers in the negative in his remarks on *II Sent.* d.2, q.6. He admits that an angel can be at an indivisible point in space, but he deploys two grounds to support his claim that an angel cannot be in a divisible place, however small. His first ground comes from § 35 in the First Book of Euclid, where it says that anything able to be in one of two equal-sized places can be in the other, shape permitting. It follows from this, Scotus

² Translator’s conjecture: I think the words I have put inside angle brackets have been lost from the text. Without them, the parenthetical appeal to Aristotle makes no sense here.

says, that an angel could be in a place however long, because one can always find a narrower rectangle equal [in area] to a given square. — Second, he argues on physical grounds. [If an angel could be in a place however small.] he would have infinite power. Scotus supports the inference thus. Given that an angel's power is pegged to a very large place, he can apply it to a smaller place with a part of his active power; then he can apply it to a still smaller place with a bit more of his power, and so on to infinity. Therefore, if he can move to a place however small, his power is infinite.

St. Thomas holds three claims about this topic. (1) An angel can be in an indivisible place. (2) He cannot be in a no-matter-how-big place. (3) He can be (and here is where Scotus disagrees) in a no-matter-how-small place, since he can undoubtedly act in a no-matter-how-small place. Neither his effect nor his power conflicts with his doing so, as is obvious, because change of place, at least, does not establish a minimum place (as one sees in *Physics VI?*), and so a local motion can be caused by an angel in however small a place.³

cc.4, 10;

xiv. Answering Scotus' arguments is easy. Against his first, the proposition from Euclid is irrelevant; it is obviously about being in a place co-extensively, and it is making the point that anything co-extensive with one of two equal-sized places is co-extensive with the other (shape permitting). It was ridiculous to think this was relevant. — Against his second argument, I could say that being however long unqualifiedly is one thing, and

³ Current physics puts a sharp limit on these claims: the Planck space is the minimum distance physically possible between two bodies, be they ever so small. While an angel could occupy a Planck space, he could not move a body around within it, or half-way through it, etc. By current estimates, the Planck space is about one ten-quadrillionth of an inch. At the quantum scale, then, quite aside from any theorized "extra dimensions," physical space is no longer sure to be isomorphic to the three-dimensional continuum. It may someday be seen to call for a discrete or "finite" geometry.

being however long within a fixed magnitude is another. Likewise, it is one thing to be able to increase to infinity unqualifiedly, and something else to be able to increase infinitely according to parts removable from a given line, as one sees in *Physics III*. For although a place limitlessly long unqualifiedly cannot correspond to an angel, one that would be limitlessly long by squeezing a given square could correspond to an angel as one place; for such a place would be flatly finite in length and would never exceed a certain size, no matter how much it was stretched. Hence, unless its length went on so far as to get beyond the angel's sphere of activity, he could act in this rectangle for the same reason he could act in the square. If it stretched beyond his sphere of activity, you already have a reason why he could not be in that place. Leaving his sphere of activity would be an obstacle, just as Euclid says about shape in a spatial case.

c.6

Against his second argument, I say it is false to suppose that more power would be required to act in a smaller and smaller place. For this does not depend on a how-much of power but on a free choice, as St. Thomas says. For although applying his power to a whole place takes a measure of power (because no effect can be achieved without using some power), applying it to more or less of an expanse within his sphere of activity does not require more or less power, strictly speaking, but just a free use of his power.

xv. Thus it becomes clear how to answer (with St. Thomas) the doubt Scotus brought up at the end. If an angel is in a place, is he necessarily in a place of definite size, such as a handbreadth? Scotus thinks either answer is acceptable. But the negative answer is what follows from the remarks of St. Thomas, such that the affirmative answer would yield an awkward result. For it would follow that the scope for the angel's use of his power is not free but [subject to a] natural [limit], as your soul's application of its power to your body is natural, though in another line of causality.

Can several angels be in the same place at once?

In I Sent. d.37, q.3, a.3, De potentia Dei q.3, a.7 ad 11, a.19 ad 1, Quodlibetal 1, q.3, a.1 ad 2

It seems that many angels can be together in the same place.

(1) After all, the reason many bodies can't be in the same place is because a body fills a place. But angels do not fill places. Only bodies fill a place in such a way that there is no vacuum there, as is clear from Aristotle in *Physics IV*. Several angels, then, can be in one place.

c 6,
213b 33

(2) Besides, an angel and a body are more different than two angels. But an angel and a body can be in the same place at once, because there is no place that isn't filled already with a perceptible body, as is shown in *Physics IV*.¹ For all the more reason, then, two angels can be in the same place.

c 7,
214b 12

(3) Moreover, one's soul is in every part of one's body, according to Augustine. Well, even if demons do not inhabit people's minds, they do sometimes inhabit their bodies, and in that case a soul and a demon are in the same place at once. For the same reason, therefore, two other spiritual substances can be in one place.

ON THE OTHER HAND, no two souls are in the same body. So for the same reason, no two angels are in the same place.

¹ Aristotle assumed that places were accidents of the bodies in them; it followed that there were no empty places.

I ANSWER: no two angels are in the same place at once. The reason for this is that it is impossible for there to be two complete and direct [immediate] causes of one and the same effect. This is obvious in every line of causation: a single thing has just one proximate form, and it has just one proximate thing moving it or changing it (though there can be many remote ones). — No objection arises from the fact that it takes many men to haul a boat, because none of them is a complete mover; the strength of each is insufficient to move it; rather, all of them together are in the rôle of one mover, since the exertions of all of them combine to yield the one movement. — So since an angel is said to be in a place on the basis that his strength touches the place not just directly but as the strength of a complete agent,* as I said [in a. 1], there can be just one angel in one place.

* continues

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): what prevents many angels from being in a place has nothing to do with filling it. The reason I gave is quite different.

ad (2): *how* an angel is in a place is not *how* a body is there, and *vice-versa*; so the inference does not follow.

ad (3): a man's soul and a demon do not stand to his body in the same relation of causality; the soul is its form, and the demon is not. So the inference does not follow.

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear from the remark made on the title of the previous article. — In the body of this article, a single conclusion answers the question: Many angels cannot be in one place at the same time. — The subject goes thus. [*Antecedent*:] It is impossible for there to be at once two complete, direct causes of the same effect; [*consequence*]: so there cannot be two angels in the same place at once.

ii. The antecedent is supported case-by-case among formal and efficient causes. Then, with the adjective 'complete' or 'perfect', he heads off an objection from the case of many men directly involved in hauling a boat. — Drawing the consequence is supported by the fact that if an angel is in a place, nothing else so completely and immediately touches it in the line of efficient causality.

A problem about modality

iii. Notice that this conclusion can be taken two ways: in terms of natural possibility* and in terms of logical possibility.* If it is taken in terms of logical possibility, it gives rise to many objections. For one thing, there is

* potentia

no visible contradiction in saying that, by God's power, several angels are bound to the same place; indeed, it may even be the case in the real that many souls of the damned are bound to the same place, if they are equal in their demerits. — For another thing, a confusion of operations would be an awkward result of angels' being in the same place, but it is not clear that the "confusion" is logically impossible.¹ — For yet a third thing, it is not logically impossible for two bodies to be in the same place, although we would think it was self-contradictory, if we did not hold it by faith [that the Lord's resurrected body passed through walls, etc].

But if we take the conclusion in terms of natural possibility, THREE PROBLEMS ARISE. [A] The first concerns [a modality problem in] a premise used by St. Thomas. The proposition, "it is impossible for there to be two complete and direct [immediate] causes of one

¹ In scholastic Latin, 'confusio' just meant an absence of order. It did not have to mean "disorder" of a sort logical consistency would not permit.

and the same effect," is *logically* true, because otherwise two contradictory results would follow, namely, that the same effect *would depend* and *would not depend* on an intrinsic* cause of it. The implication is obvious. In the presence of two such causes, it would follow on the one hand that "therefore the effect depends on both [*ultra-que*]," because they are supposed to be intrinsic causes of the effect's existing or coming to be; but on the other hand it would follow that "therefore the effect depends on neither," because it does not depend on a cause in whose absence it would still exist or happen; but this is true of both; therefore it depends on neither. So, a contradiction is implied.² [B] The second problem is that there is no difficulty about producing in one and the same place (in the same parts of it) two simultaneous effects which come about for different reasons by agents acting in different ways; after all, one and the same [body in one and the same] place and in the same part of it can be made hot by one agent, made white by another, and made sweet by a third. Therefore there can be, even naturally speaking, several angels in the same place. [C] The third problem is that on this account a presence of order would not be enough to make an angel "be in a place." For several angels can be present to the same place this way, with no resulting confusion of operations.

Solving it

iv. The thing to say in my judgment is that the conclusion is *not* to be understood in terms of logical possibility, but in terms of natural potency. I am moved to this view by the premise St. Thomas used; it has no application except to the natural way an angel has a location, *i.e.* by its operation, whereas demons get their place from undergoing rather than acting. — I am also moved by the fact that the conclusion makes an indicative† statement about being in a place (saying "no two angels *are* in the same place"), and not a modal statement about possibility. — I am moved thirdly by St. Thomas' customary way of doing things. He reaches his answers on grounds distinctive to, and in terms distinctive of, the matter under discussion. What we are seeking here, as I said in connection with a title question, is what the natural order holds, not what God's power can do.

v. So to meet the objections on the other side, I shall answer the first objection [A] with two replies. My first is that two such causes, standing as causes for the same reason and being just numerically distinct, pose no contradiction. First, not everybody seems to admit that the effect is intrinsically from this cause. And if it is so intrinsically, the result is not contradiction but superfluity. For it does not follow that the effect depends on "both and neither." It depends on "both" only in the sense that they are there together, and so the two claims, "it depends on both" and "it depends on neither" can be false together.³ You get an illustration if you imagine

² N.B. This is not an argument which Cajetan accepts, but an objection which he will attack shortly.

³ The objector slurs the difference between "both" (*uterque*) and "either" (*uter* or *utervis*).

two lights of the same kind and the same strength, equidistant from a medium [say, a volume of air] which can be lit up completely by either of them. To see that this made-up example is not to be rejected or dismissed as dissimilar to the case at hand, let divine power put these two lights in the same place. Then ask if the medium is lit up "by one or the other or by both," *etc.* This is precisely the question we are debating. So, since the made-up example does not imply a contradiction, but could be made a reality by God's absolute power, it follows that two such total causes are not a logical impossibility, but just a physical one. In a case like this, the two lights would stand as parts of one illumination two or more times stronger in its action than the passive potency [to be lit up] in the thing on which it is brought to bear. And from there it is clear that the effect does not depend on the lights as separate parts but as united into one light-source. Thus, in the case we are debating, the effect would depend on two angels acting, not as they are two but as they are united (even while being two).

My second reply to [A] is that it is one thing for several angels to be together in one place, and it is something else for them to be together *naturally* in one place. The former implies no contradiction, but the latter would imply one for the reason Aquinas gave. Thanks to this distinction, one could maintain both sides [of the modality issue?]. St. Thomas's conclusion is indeed about the realm of fact [no two *are* in one place], but he has assumed a major premise about what is impossible. The impossibility is logical if the premise is talking about such causes *qua* more-than-one, but not if it is talking about them as just many [*i.e.* as just happening to be many?].⁴

Against the second problem [labeled above as B], since an angel is in a place *per se* as a worker is in his work, I say that JUST AS works may be really and formally diverse and yet be one in the subject [they are done upon], SO ALSO it is not a problem for many angels to be in the same place materially, but not formally.

On the third problem [labeled above as C] I say that

⁴ These replies to the objector's problem [A] are confusing, at least to this translator. Initially, it looked as though the first reply was headed in the direction stated in my footnote 3. By stipulation, each light (or each working angel) is a direct cause doing enough to produce the effect. So its occurring does not depend on both, but on either; and the argument that the effect would occur without one or the other does not prove it would occur if neither were at work. So "depends on both" and "depends on neither" are both false, and the contradiction disappears. But in Cajetan's illustration, his emphasis shifted to a need to take the two causes as *formally one* and only materially two. Only as formally one, after all, do they yield one illumination twice too strong, *etc.* But if they are formally one [*qua* causing], the effect *does* depend on both (*qua* one). So "it depends on both" is not false. The alleged contradiction is still gone, but there must be another one somewhere. For it emerges now that having formally many causes (on the same level, *etc.*) of numerically the same effect is *logically impossible*. What now is the implied contradiction? What is logically impossible is also physically impossible, of course; so the modality in St. Thomas' premise is salvaged on this basis, if "formally many" poses a contradiction. What is it? Stay tuned.

* *per se*

† *categorica*

JUST AS it cannot naturally happen that two natural, complete agents on the same level, are equally immediate to one and the same thing undergoing their action for the same reason, SO ALSO it is naturally impossible for two intelligences to be present to one and the same place thanks to the same passive potency. And the reason for both is that nature abhors (as the mind does) superfluities as idle. So nothing on this ground prevents presence of order from being a sufficient reason to locate an angel.⁵

Is drawing the consequence supported?

vi. Concerning the support for drawing the consequence, a doubt arises on the ground that a proposition assumed there, *i.e.*, “if an angel is in a place, it is as a complete agent,” does not seem necessarily true. Either his completeness in this causation is a necessary condition prerequisite to the angel’s being in a place, or else it is a necessary condition concomitant with the angel’s being there; but neither can be said; ergo [the support fails]. That the point assumed is not a necessary prerequisite is clear from two points. One comes from the many men hauling a ship, any one of whom (thanks to his body) can be said to be there. Another comes from what St. Thomas said earlier to the effect that an angel is in a place through application of its power immediately *in any manner*. — That it is also not a necessary concomitant is clear from the fact that all angels have finite power and [many of them, at least] can produce a direct effect of the same kind in a given place. From these two points it obviously follows that an effect is possible (such as moving a tremendous mass from one place to another) for which many angel’s powers-to-move-things are required, if it has to be done.

⁵ Perhaps nature abhors a superfluity (as opposed to a redundancy, which nature seems to love), and perhaps this yields the physical impossibility of two sufficient causes’ working the same effect. But where is the logical impossibility of their doing so as “formally” many rather than as “formally” one? I do not see an answer. If there is one, my guess is that it has to do with logical conflict in a sentence with a conjunctive subject (like ‘this and that’), an adverb like ‘separately’, a plural verb (like ‘are’), and a predicate meaning *the one*, like ‘the all-sufficient cause of . . .’

The support is clarified

vi. The thing to say in response is that, since the present inquiry is about natural potency, and not logical possibility, the reason to draw this inference is good enough, if it is necessary with “physical necessity,” *i.e.* true for the most part.⁶ And since these matters are utterly remote from our senses, the reason to draw it is good enough if the proposition is known to us from premises making it reasonable [plausible]. As it says in *De Caelo II* and *Metaphysics XII* [c.8] it is agreeable to reason that an angel (any angel) would get so high a standing among causes that he would be free from the imperfection involved in being a partial cause; it is believed that nature has given this high standing to all of the stars;⁷ how much more, then, should it belong to immaterial causes, the least of which exceeds beyond compare every bodily cause.⁷ — Add the fact that good angels, filled with divine power, are the ones applied to these places; and so they suffice for everything they are sent to do, says St. Thomas in remarks on *I Sent.* d.37. c 12

As a result, no other response is necessary to the point made on the other side. We have said that the proposition in question is not necessary with logical necessity but only physical. And, we’ve said that its having such necessity is only known to us on probable grounds. And hence it can still be maintained, if at some point we find saints or illustrious doctors to have said that many angels are in the same place, as Richard [of St. Victor] seems to think.⁸ q 3, a.3

De Trinitate
IV, c 25

⁶ Cajetan can hardly mean to say that natural or physical necessity just is “truth for the most part.” Rather such necessity is a matter of following as predicted from the relevant laws of nature. But unlike the laws of logic, the laws of nature admit of occasional interference from an unexpected failure of their boundary conditions, as when a miracle seems to “violate” one, or when a freakish combination of circumstances renders the law non-predictive. So, truth-for-the-most part is weaker than physical necessity but follows from it and is a good indicator of its presence.

⁷ Such a belief about the stars is long since dead, of course, and one is rather at a loss to see how to update it.

⁸ This remark at the end is made to allow for revealed information to supplement what is known only to be plausible on natural grounds.

Inquiry Fifty-Three: Into an angel's movement from place to place

One now takes up change of place among the angels. Three questions are asked.

- (1) Can an angel move from place to place?
- (2) Does he go from place to place by passing through the places between them?
- (3) Does the motion of an angel take time or happen instantaneously?

article 1

Can an angel move from place to place?

In I Sent. d.37, q 4, a.1; Opusculum XV, de angelis, c. 18

It seems that an angel cannot move from place to place.

c 4
234b 10 (1) After all, as Aristotle shows in *Physics VI*, "nothing indivisible moves." For as long as something is at a starting point, it is not moving; and when it is at an end point, it is not moving but is finished moving; so everything that is moving, while it is moving, is partly at a starting point and partly at an end point. But an angel is indivisible into parts. Therefore an angel cannot be moving from place to place.

c.1,
201b 5 (2) Besides, moving is "the act of an incomplete thing," as it says in *Physics III*. But a blessed angel is not incomplete, therefore a blessed angel does not move from place to place.

(3) Moreover, moving is only done out of need. But the holy angels have no needs. Therefore the holy angels do not move from one place to another.

ON THE OTHER HAND, a blessed angel's moving is of the same kind as a blessed soul's moving. But one must say that a blessed soul moves locally, since it is an article of faith that Christ descended, in his soul, into Hades. Therefore a blessed angel moves locally.

* *acquiescē* ANSWER: a blessed angel is able to move from place to place, but just as "is in a place" applies to a body and to an angel under different definitions,* so does "moves from place to place". A body, after all, is in a place by being contained in the place and being coextensive with it. It has to be the case, therefore, that a body's change of place is coextensive with a place and occurs according to its requirements. Hence the continuous character of a body's motion is set by the continuous character of its volume;† and the before and after in a body's local motion is set by the before and after in its volume, as it says in *Physics IV*. — But an angel is not in a place as coextensive and contained,

† *magnitudo*
c 11
219a 12

but rather as containing it [acting on it]. Hence an angel's change of place does not have to be coextensive with a place, nor does it have to occur in accordance with a place's requirements, so as to get a continuous character from a place. Rather, the angel's motion is not continuous. After all, since an angel is only

in a place thanks to the touch of his power, as I said, it has to be the case that an angel's "change of place" is nothing but his touches on different places successively (not all at once, because an angel cannot be at multiple places at once, as I said above), and those occurrences of touching do not have to be continuous. q 52, a.1
q 52, a.2

Still, one can find some continuity among them. As I said before, nothing prevents giving an angel a divisible place by the touch of its power; as a body is given a divisible place through the touch of its size. And just as a body bit-by-bit (and not all at once) leaves the place it was before and thereby causes continuity in its place-change, so also an angel can leave bit-by-bit the divisible place where he was before, and then his motion will be continuous. But he can also leave the whole place at once and simultaneously apply himself to a wholly different place; and then his movement will not be continuous.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): that argument is irrelevant for two reasons. First, because Aristotle's proof proceeded from an indivisible *quantity*, to which there had to correspond an indivisible place. None of that can be said about an angel.

It is irrelevant secondly because Aristotle's proof was from continuous motion. If the motion were not continuous, one could say a thing is moving while it is just at a starting point, and while it is at an end point, because the very succession of diverse places [ubi] for the same thing could be called its "moving"; so it could be said to be "changing" in whichever of those places it was. But the continuity of motion prevents this, because no continuous thing is in its starting point, as is obvious because a line is not in a point. So it has to be the case that what is moving is not wholly at either terminus while it moves, but partly in one and partly in another. So thanks to the fact that an angel's motion is not continuous, Aristotle's proof is irrelevant here. — Still, on the occasions when an angel's movement is indeed said to be continuous, one can concede that while the angel is moving, he is partly at a starting point and partly at an end point,

provided that the word 'partly' is not describing the angel's substance, but the place. For at the beginning of its continuous motion, the angel is in the whole divisible place from which it begins to move; but while it is moving therein, it is in part of the first place it is leaving and in part of the second place it is occupying. — And the fact that an angel can occupy parts of two places comes from the fact that he can occupy a divisible place by applying his power, as a body does by applying its size. What follows, then, for a body movable in place is that it be divisible in size: but what follows for an angel is that his power can be applied to something divisible.

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article he does two main jobs. First, he puts down a conclusion answering the question and having two parts, viz.: an angel can move from place to place, but equivocally so, compared to a body. The second job he does is to clarify and support both parts in three respects: (1) moving does not occur to a body under the same definition as it does to an angel; (2) what exactly the motion of an angel is; (3) its varieties.

ii. As for job (1), he uses the following argument. [*Antecedent:*] A body is in a place as contained and co-extensive; [*1st inference:*] therefore its change of place has to be in line with the demands of a place; [*2nd inference:*] hence the continuity of the body's motion is from the continuity of the place, and the before and after of its motion is from the before and after of the place. [*2nd antecedent:*] An angel is in a place as containing it and as not coextensive with it; [*inference:*] therefore his motion does not have to meet the demands of a place and does not have to be continuous. — The points assumed were made clear in the preceding inquiry [q.52, a.1] and from *Physics VI*.

c.4;
234b 10

Doubts about job (1)

iii. However, two doubts remain here. The first is that St. Thomas proceeded in this argument from denying an antecedent to denying a consequence; and hence he seems to have proceeded fallaciously. — The second doubt is whether a causal proposition is true, namely, that continuousness attaches to a motion from size or place, thanks to the fact that the movable thing is coextensive with that place. For on this point turns the solution of a many-sided question. *i.e.* whether an indivisible thing can move as the subject of a genuine, continuous local motion; and whether divisibility of a space alone is a sufficient reason for the continuousness of the motion, *etc.* Since this area of doubt belongs properly to *Physics VI*, I will have to discuss it, God willing, in a commentary on that text. There the opinion of Scotus about this (offered in his remarks on *II Sent*, d.2, q.9) will be examined.

ad (2): moving done by a thing existing with potency is the act of an incomplete thing. But the moving that is done by an application of power is the deed of something existing in act; for the agent's power flows from its being in act.

ad (3): moving done by something existing with potency is due to a need it has: but the moving done by a thing existing in act is not because of its need but because of something else's need. This is why angels move locally to meet our need, according to Hebrews 1:14, "Are they not all ministering spirits, sent forth to minister for them who shall be heirs of salvation?"

For the moment, my answer to the first doubt is that the logical process of St. Thomas is based on the rule stated in Book I of the *Posterior Analytics*: "if an affirmation is the cause of an affirmation, a negation is the cause of a negation." This rule holds in the case of distinctive causes, such as the ones Aquinas used here as his assumptions.¹

c.13,
78b 20

Jobs (2) and (3)

iv. As to job (2), Aquinas means to say that an angel's "motion" is the contact of its power with different places successively. — This is clarified in two respects. (1) As to what 'contact' is: the angel's being in a place is nothing other than touching the place power-wise. (2) He says 'different places' because the angel cannot be in multiple places at once and so has to touch different places successively. But since it might happen that he doesn't touch different places right away but with a quiet interval (and then the angel's touching the places would not be called his "moving"), he adds 'successively', *i.e.* that the touches are without interval and one after the other.

v. As for job (3), he means to say that an angel's motion can be continuous or non-continuous. — Both options are explained: the angel can leave a whole place at once and transfer [his power] to another; and he can leave one place gradually and acquire part of another by continuity of occupation.

The central point

vi. Concerning the above remarks, pay careful attention to the fact that St. Thomas is thinking explicitly and unhesitatingly that movement from place to place, properly speaking, does not happen to spiritual substances; they are *talked about* as being in a place and moving from place to place *equivocally* and by an

¹ A "distinctive" cause was both necessary and sufficient; so it was also called a *causa adaequata*. Aristotle's rule is the one we write nowadays as $(p \equiv q) \supset (\sim p \equiv \sim q)$.

abuse of words, using terms as most people do. So for angels to "move" is not to be a subject moving, just as being "in a place" is not their being subject to [an accident of] placement;* rather, their moving is touching different places in the line of efficient causality.

* *ubr*
In II Sent.
d.2, q.9

Hence it is clear, for one thing, that Scotus in the place mentioned above was wasting his time trying to prove that an angel could univocally move from place to place because he was receptive to some kind of place (rather than under-determined or unlimited in place, etc). For Scotus assumed (without ever proving) that an angel is open to receiving his definitive "where" in his sheer substance, as came out in the previous inquiry. — It is clear for another thing, that those writers who seem to think that St. Thomas attributed "changing places" to spiritual substances by genuinely local motion, or who assert this to be true upon their suspicions about his thought, are off the track and (what is worse) embarrass themselves by boasting that they understand him.

Commentary on
q.52, a.1, §§ *nr*
and *viii-x*

Another doubt

vi. Doubt arises about an angel's [sometimes] continuous moving, as to whether it is just one operation or several. For if it is just one, he will be in just one place by that operation. But then he would be moving and not moving at once. He would be in different places thanks to moving and would be in just one place thanks to the oneness of his operation. — It would also follow that 'angelic motion' would be badly defined in terms of a plurality of touches, since "one operation" implies "one touch."

But if there have to be several operations involved, it follows that the motion is not continuous. — It will also follow that an angel cannot sustain or continue the same operation from place to place (which even a human being can do).

viii. MY REPLY to this is that, when an angel is said to be moving with continuous motion, it can happen with just one operation, *and* it can happen with several. To clear this up, two distinctions must be kept in mind. The first goes thus. An angel can be said to apply his power continuously to different places in two ways: (1) such that the place and the thing touched* go together for purposes of being counted as one thing or different things; (2) in such a way that the thing touched remains one thing despite its different places. (A third way, *i.e.*, with different things touched and one place, is not relevant, because change of place is not involved, and change of place is what we are talking about.) — The second distinction is that an operation's being one or many turns up in two ways: (1) as it comes forth from its doer; (2) as it terminates in the thing touched. And this last happens two ways: (a) in something extrinsic, (b) or in the thing touched itself.

* *putters*

Hence, obviously, whether an angel is called "moving" because he shifts a stone from place to place, or because he continuously pours a great body of water part by part, there always occurs a difference [a plurality] of touches and operations on the side of the thing touched (be it just in terms of a factor outside of the

thing touched, such as the distance the stone is shifted, or in terms of something inside the thing touched itself, as when he moves water in the way I said). *But along with this continuity, does there go a plurality of operations on the part of the doer?* I do not see it as necessary nor impossible; for the plurality of touches on the side of the patient is enough to salvage our description of angelic motion. — Also, it does not follow from the oneness of his operation that he does not reach continually different places; likewise it does not follow from the oneness of a located body that it is always in the same place. But JUST AS a body moving is in different places during any interval* of time and over any number of instants (otherwise it would be at rest) but at individual instants is in one place coextensive with itself; SO ALSO an angel working with one operation on his part (but multiple operations on the side of the thing touched, unqualifiedly or in some respect), at each instant is touching one place, but in particular intervals of time and at any two instants, is touching different places.

* *pars*

Trouble with the answer *ad* (1)

ix. In his response *ad* (1), doubt arises over the fact that St. Thomas seems at odds with himself and the truth of the matter, when he says an angel can be said to "move" while it is in a starting point or an end point. For in talking about this at *I Sent.* d.37, q.4, a.1 *ad* 3, he says that an angel is not moving at either terminus but in the succession from one to another. And his reason is that the angel's motion is not composed of movements but of changes of being-at-work; and hence, the parts of his motion are not movements, and hence at neither terminus is he moving. — And this is confirmed. For as St. Thomas is about to say, the motion of an angel is compared to his being-at-a-terminus the way a number is compared to a unit; and so, just as a number cannot be said to exist while just one unit exists, so also an angel cannot be said to be moving while being at just one terminus. And so, as a motion is not continuing when its terminus arrives, so also an angel's motion [is not continuing when its terminus arrives]; but here he says the opposite.

next article, *ad* 3

An answer

x. To clear up this difficulty, attention needs to be paid to two points. The first is that the termini of an angel's motion are like instantaneous changes in this respect: one finds in them both a becoming and a having become (as it says in *Physics VI*). Thus any terminus of angelic motion can be distinguished into his becoming and his having become. Insofar as it contains his having become, it verifies the negative statement that, *at the terminus, the angel is not moving.* (And rightly so, because the starting point of an angel's motion does not meet the definition of a "part" of the motion, nor does it meet the definition of a "starting point" except in relation to a succeeding terminus; and *vice-versa* about the end point.) But it is also the case that the definition of "succession" applies to termini thanks to these relations, and so

c.1
231b 27-30

[the affirmative statement that, at the terminus] *the angel is moving* applies.² — The second point to which to pay attention is that, since change/motion is in the class of successive phenomena (and not the class of standing things), the angel's motion does not stand as a permanent number but as a successive one. Well, a successive number exists sufficiently if it arises in the succession of its units. Hence, it is not necessary that the units composing it exist simultaneously; they may come to be in act successively. — My answer to the objections is clear from these words.

Do not accuse me of saying that a relation to the end-point takes the place of a starting point, when an angel leaves the stone on which he was working and applies himself to the empyrean heaven. But take

² Recall that succession, *via* the word 'successively' was key to Aquinas' definition of angelic motion.

from my words, rather, the point that, in an angel working at a terminus, there is an act mixed with potency; for by working at the starting point, he will be immediately working at the end point. Similarly, an operation at the end point has to have two features: it has to succeed an earlier operation by terminating the said potency, and it has to be something absolute [*i.e.* a power's exercised act]. And sometimes the operation at the end point has to have a third feature as well, *i.e.*, a mixed potency to the angel's next operation.³

³ So, *at the terminus* of his motion, is an angel "moving" or not? Cajetan's answer, if I read him correctly, is that you can answer either way, depending on how you are looking at the topic. If you are focusing on movement, you will say no. If you are focusing on the relations which connect and constitute termini, you will say yes. So Aquinas' remarks were justified at both places.

Does an angel pass through intermediate places?

In *I Sent.* d.37, q.4, a.2; *Quodlibetal* 1, q.3, a.2

It seems an angel does not pass through middle places.

(1) After all, everything passing through the middle passes through a place equal to itself before passing through a bigger one. But a place equal to an indivisible angel is a place consisting of one point. So if an angel's motion goes through a middle, it must go through infinitely many points, which is impossible.

(2) Besides, an angel is simpler in substance than our soul. But by thinking, our soul can go from one end of any journey to the other without going through anything in between; I can think of Gaul and then Syria without thinking of Italy, which is in between. All the more, then, can an angel go from one end to the other without going through the middle.

ON THE OTHER HAND, if an angel moves from one place to another, when he reaches the end-point, he is not still moving but "has" changed places. Well, before every case of "having changed" there comes the "changing." So, what "is now somewhere" used to be moving. But it was not moving when it was still at its starting point. So it was doing its moving when it was in between. Hence it has to go through a middle.

a.1 ANSWER: As I said above, an angel's movement from place to place can be continuous, and it can be non-continuous. If it is continuous, the angel cannot move from one place to another without passing through what is between them. For as it says in *Physics V*, "The 'middle' is what a continuously changing thing comes to before its final change." For the order of before and after in a continuous motion is set by the order of before and after in the space [traversed], as it says in *Physics IV*.

c.3; 226b 23
c.11; 219a 16
c.1; 219a 19
But if the angel's movement is not continuous, it is possible for him to go from one place to another without going through a middle. This becomes clear as follows. Between any two end places, there are infinitely many middle places, whether they be taken as divisible places or as indivisible ones. For the indivisible ones, this is obvious; for between any two points there are infinitely many intermediate points, since no point follows another point without an intermediate one, as is proved in *Physics VI*.¹ — One must say the same, however, about divisible places. This is proved from the continuous motion of a body. After all, a body only moves from place to place in time. But over the whole of the time spanning its motion, one cannot accept an instant in which the moving body would fail to be in one place and then another; for if it were in one and the same place for two instants, it would be resting there, since resting is nothing but being in the same

place now and before now. But between the initial *now* and the end of the time measuring the motion, there are infinitely many now-instants; so it has to be the case that between the first place from which the body begins to move and the last place where its movement ends, there are infinitely many places.² — This is also apparent empirically. Let there be a body a hand-span wide, and let the distance it has to move be two spans wide. Obviously, the first place (where its movement starts) is a place of one span; and the place at which it stops moving is also a span wide. When it begins to move, it gradually leaves the first span and starts to enter the second span. The number of places in the middle is set by the parts into which the span-width is divided; each designated point in the width of the first span begins a place [for the body]; and each point designated in the width of the second span ends that place. So, since the width is divisible to infinity, and the points are also potentially infinite in any span, it follows that between any two places there are infinitely many middle places.

But a moveable thing only goes through an infinity of middle places because of the continuous character of its motion. After all, as the middle places are potentially infinite, one must accept a potential infinity in a continuous motion. But if the motion is *not* continuous, all the parts of it will be enumerated in act [or actually countable]. So if a moveable thing moves with a non-continuous motion, either it does not go through all the middle points, or infinitely many such points are actually countable — which is impossible. Thus, because the angel's motion is not continuous, it does not go through all of the middle places.³

This achievement of going from end to end without going through the middle can belong to an angel, but not a body. Measured and contained under a place, a body has to follow the laws of place in its motion. But the substance of an angel is not subject to a place as if contained therein, but is superior to it as containing it [acting upon it]. Hence it is within an angel's power to apply himself to a place as he chooses, by going through middle places or not.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): the place of an angel is not attributed to him by his size but by the touch of his power; and thus his place can be a divisible one, and not always a point-sized place. Still, even the divisible intermediate places are infinitely many, as I said; but they are exhausted by the continuous character of a continuous motion, as became clear above.

² This argument from time depends on time's being the measure of motion; so if the one is continuous, so is the other.

³ This modest, negative conclusion is mathematically correct. Discontinuous motion over a continuum of places can touch upon only a proper subset of these places.

¹ Aristotle's account is still how mathematicians define a continuum, *i.e.*, an uncountable infinity, like the real numbers.

ad (2): while an angel is moving from place to place, its essence* is applied to different places; but the soul's essence is not applied to the things it thinks of; rather, the things thought about are in the soul. Therefore the case is not similar.⁴

⁴ An angel acts on places in their real being, while thought does not; it "attains" them only intentionally.

ad "on the other hand" — In a continuous motion, "having been changed" is not a part of moving but a terminus of it; so the moving has to occur ahead of the having been changed. Thus such a motion has to pass through a middle. But in a non-continuous motion, "having been changed" is a part of it, as a unit is part of a number; hence a succession of different places, even without a middle, constitutes such a motion.

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article he does four jobs: (1) he divides angelic motion into the continuous and the discontinuous; (2) for continuous motion, he answers the question with a conclusion saying yes; (3) for discontinuous motion, he answers it with a second one saying no; (4) he gives the reason for the now emerging difference, where middle places are concerned, between angelic and bodily motions.

As for job (1), I have nothing to add; the division was made clear in a. 1 and is just being repeated here.

ii. As for job (2), the conclusion is: by his continuous motion, an angel must pass through all middle places. As the text shows, the support is the definition of 'middle' in *Physics V*, and the argument is from *Physics IV*.

iii. As for job (3), the second conclusion is: by his non-continuous motion, an angel cannot pass through all the intermediate places. — It is supported as follows. [*Antecedent:*] The middle places between any two end places are infinitely many; [*consequence: 1st alternative*] ergo either they cannot all be passed through by discontinuous motion, or else [*2nd alternative:*] infinitely many will be actually counted. [*Elimination of 2nd alternative:*] But to get through an infinite number by actually counting is impossible. [*Conclusion:*] therefore, all the intermediate places cannot be passed through by discontinuous motion.¹

The antecedent is supported by argument and by example, both for indivisible places and for divisible ones, as is clear enough in the text. The consequence is deduced from the fact that infinitely many places are used by a movable thing only if it is moving with continuous motion. And rightly so. For a potential infinity can be equated to a potential infinity, and they can correspond one-to-one,² so that JUST AS there are in potency infinitely many places and infinitely many termini *among the places*, so also there are in potency infinitely many parts and termini in the motion *corresponding to them*, as <places> are matched to parts and ter-

* sic. Read: parts

¹ The conclusion is correct, even though mathematically speaking, the angel's motion could be discontinuous and still go through what is called today a countable infinity of points. 'Countable' no longer = 'finite'. But see note 3.

² I threw in the phrase 'one to one' because it matches the obvious meaning of Cajetan's Latin and also because it may

mini to termini. So the force of the argument lies in this [match-up]. Only by a continuous motion can infinitely many places be gone through by a moving thing: so by a discontinuous motion, either they are not all gone through, or else (if we say they are) they actually get counted, because particular places will actually bound the partial changes composing the discontinuous motion.³

iv. As for job (4), it follows from what has been said that, when an angel is moving discontinuously, he can go from end to end without going through any middle points; indeed, he must skip some. A body, by contrast, can only get from end to end by going through all the midpoints. The reason given for this difference is that a body is contained in* a place actually or potentially, in whole or in part; but an angel contains the place.

* sub

A question about divisible places

v. A bit of a question arises about the antecedent used to reach the second conclusion. How can it be true that between any two divisible places there are infinitely many middle places, when it is quite obvious that between two middle places of a continuum there is just one middle thing to be found, namely, an indivisible [point] which is the common bound at which they are joined, and it is also quite obvious that there is *no* divisible space between them?

§ 111

remind the reader of Cantor's famous proofs about the sizes of infinite sets.

³ An unstated premise in this final part of the argument is that a passed-through place is just a possible place; it becomes actual by being stopped at or occupied. *Occupation* by a body makes the place actual. Well, in a discontinuous motion there are stops, and so there are actual intermediate places. Those places no longer compose just a potential infinity. If the stopped-at places are finitely many, they can be counted up, and all is well. But if the actual places are countably infinite, there are two problems: one mathematical, and one physical. The mathematical one is that even a countable infinity is "inaccessible" from below; it *cannot be counted up to*. ('Countable' just means the count can start, as does a count of the natural numbers, 1, 2, 3 ...; it does not mean that an actual count will ever end). The physical problem is now obvious. An angel's discontinuous traversal of infinitely many actual places must be instantaneous (despite infinitely many stops), or it must take forever.

Short answer

The short answer to this is that it is one thing to talk about two *parts* of a continuum, and another thing to talk about two *places*. Formally speaking, there are no two places which, as places, are not distant positionally. And hence "two parts" of a continuous expanse can be taken two ways: in one way insofar as they are continuous or contiguous (and that way, since they are in the same place, they cannot have what it takes to be two places, and no local motion is possible between them); but if they are taken insofar as they are at some distance from each other, there can be local motion from the one to the other, and infinitely many middle places (divisible or indivisible) between them, as is clear from the definition of a continuum. And since St. Thomas was talking formally about places *qua many places*, and not about sheer parts of a continuum, he spoke optimally in saying "between any two places there are infinitely many middle places," and in *not saying* that between any two parts there are infinitely many parts.⁴

⁴ This is not the place to review real-number analysis, but Cajetan's reply makes good sense if one recalls the difference between open and closed intervals in a continuum. Suppose any interval can represent a "part" of the continuum, but only a discrete closed interval can represent a "place." Then two places cannot share a common boundary, because if they did, they would share a common point and cease to be two discrete intervals. Rather, any two discrete closed intervals will have to be separated by an open interval and hence by infinitely many points.

Trouble from Scotus

vi. Against the second conclusion itself, be advised of what Scotus holds, namely, that an angel cannot by instant change [of place] reach a terminus distant from his starting point without going through the middle. In his remarks on the last section of *II Sent.*, he advances an argument for this. [*Major:*] An order pre-set by a higher agent seems to be binding upon any lower agent when it acts upon the things so ordered; [*minor:*] but the order between the universe's parts from which positional distance derives was pre-set by God for any created power; [*conclusion:*] therefore, when an angel moves himself through such bodies, he cannot transfer himself from one to the other apart from such order. And Scotus adds a confirming point: otherwise no distance or distinction, however great, could impede an angel's action.

Another short answer

The short answer is that the minor premise is flatly false. The order in question was not pre-set for an immaterial power, insofar as it is a moving power in discontinuous motion. In himself, the angel is free from the laws of positional distance (since he is of a higher order [than the bodies bound by them]), nor is he bound to that order by his effects, since they are posited to be discontinuous. — Against Scotus' confirmation, I say that neither a distance between the places nor a distinction between them can prevent the angel's next operation from terminating at the other place. For by an operation cut off from one place, he stands indifferently towards every place and at no distance from any.

Is an angel's motion instantaneous?

In *I Sent* d.37, q.4, a.3, *Quodl. IX*, q.4, a.4; *Quodl. XI*, q.4

It seems that an angel's motion is instantaneous.

(1) After all, the stronger the power of the mover and the less resistant the thing being moved, the faster the move goes. But the power of an angel moving himself exceeds the power of a body moving anything — exceeds it beyond all proportion. [So an angel's speed will exceed a body's beyond all proportion.] Well, the proportion between speeds is set by how little time is taken. But every time is proportionate to every other time. So: if a body moves in time, an angel moves in [what is less time beyond all proportion, i.e.] an instant.¹

(2) Besides, an angel's motion is simpler than any bodily change. But some bodily changes are instantaneous, like being lit up; nothing is lit up successively (the way it heats up successively), and a ray of light does not reach a near place sooner than a far one. All the more, therefore, an angel's motion is in an instant.²

(3) Moreover, if an angel changed place in time, at the last instant of that time he would obviously be at the end point but, in every preceding time, would be either in an immediately preceding place [call it a starting point] or else be partly at a starting point and partly at an end. If he were ever partly at the one and partly at the other, he would be separable into parts — which is impossible. Ergo, in the whole preceding time he is at his starting point. So he is resting there, since resting is being in the same place now and before now, as was said. And thus it follows that the angel would not be moving until the last instant of the time.

ON THE OTHER HAND, in every change there is "before" and "after," and the before and after of a change is reckoned by time. Therefore every change, including that of an angel, occurs in time, since there is a before and after in it.

ANSWER: some writers have said an angel's change of place is instantaneous. They said that when an angel moves from one place to another, the angel is at his starting point the whole time up until the last instant of that time; but at the last instant of it, he is at his end-point. There does not have to be a middle, they said, between the starting point and the end point, just as there is none between a time and its end-point. But between any two now-instants of time, they said, there is a middle-time; this is why they said that there is no

¹ A "time" was an interval; an "instant" was not; it compared to a time as a point compared to a continuous line.

² This objection predates the discovery of light's speed; it uses the obsolete theory that being-lit-up is an accident of some substantial medium such as water or air. The whole substance acquired this accident at once, but from an outside cause, such as the sun's motion.

no last instant at which the angel was at the starting point (as there is no last instant at daybreak* when the air is still dark, and there is no last instant in starting a fire,³ when the matter getting hotter is still lacking the form of fire). But, they said, there is a last *time* such that, at the end of that time, there is either light in the air or a fire-form in the matter; thus daybreak and substantial generation are said to be instantaneous changes.³

But this picture has no place in the topic at hand, and the point is shown as follows. It belongs to the definition of "at rest" that a resting thing is not otherwise now than it was before now; so in any "now" of a time measuring rest, the thing at rest is in the same state [or place] at the outset, in the middle, and at the end. But it belongs to the definition of "change" that what is changing is different now from how it was before; and so in any "now" of a time measuring change, the thing changing is disposed in differing ways. So it has to be the case that in the last "now," the changing thing has a form which it did not have before. Clearly, then, being at rest for a whole time in being ϕ (say, in being white) is to be ϕ at any instant of that time; hence it is not possible that something be at rest at one terminus in the whole time preceding and then be at the other terminus in the last instant of that time. But this is possible in a change, because changing over the whole of a time is not staying the same at any instant of that time. So all such instantaneous changes are *termini* of a continuous change, as "an x is brought to be" terminates a change of matter, and "x is lit up" terminates the place-change of a body, y , shedding light. But the place-change of an angel does not terminate *any other* change going on, but occurs on its own, independently of any other change. Ergo, it is impossible to say that *over a whole time* he is one place and at the last instant is another place.

Rather it is necessary to assign a now-instant when the angel was last in the preceding place. But where there are now-instants succeeding each other, there has to be time (since time is nothing but a count of before and after in a change). The only alternative, then, is that an angel's movement is in time: in continuous time if his motion is continuous; in discrete time if his motion is non-continuous (for angelic motion can happen both ways, as I said); and continuity of time is from continuity of motion, as it says in *Physics II* [c.11].⁴

But the angel's time, be it continuous or not, is not the same as the time that measures the motion of a heavenly body and by which all bodily things are measured if they get their changes from the motion of that body.

³ Since "a time" was an interval, it could be a right-open interval, so as to have no last point or instant but approach a limit asymptotically.

⁴ The present article is all about refuting the above opinion; so the title is misleading; cf. the first § of Cajetan's comment

* *illuminato*

† *generatio
substantive
ignis*

a.2

in a.1
219a.13

1.57 q.10, a.6

After all, the motion of an angel does not depend on the motion of a heavenly body.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS—*ad* (1): if the time of an angel's motion is not continuous but a succession of now-instants, it will not have proportion to the time that measures bodily changes (which is continuous), since it is not of the same kind. But if the time of his motion is continuous, it is indeed proportional, but not thanks to a *likeness* between the mover and the moved but thanks to a likeness between the distances over which the change occurs. — Hence the speed of an angel's motion is not set by the amount of his power but according to the determination of his will.

ad (2): daybreak is the terminus of a change; but it is a qualitative one,* not a place-change in which light would be understood to move first to a closer place and

then to a farther one. But the motion of an angel is a place-change, and not the terminus of a change. Hence the case is not similar.

ad (3): that objection is coming from continuous time. But the time of an angel's motion can be non-continuous. And thus an angel can be at one instant in one place and at another instant in another place, with no intermediate time intervening. — But if the time of the angel's motion is continuous, then in the whole time preceding the final now-instant, the angel varied in place through infinitely many places, as expounded above. He is nevertheless partly in one of the continuous places and partly in another, not because his substance is separable into parts, but because his power is applied to part of the first place, and to part of the second, as I also said previously.

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question needs extremely careful attention. One needs to see that the noun *motus* is used for change as well as motion; so the question can be taken three ways. [1] The first is about simple acquisition of a place: does an angel start to have a place instantaneously? — This sense is irrelevant.¹ The answer is obvious, since an angel can apply himself to a place instantly, if he was previously nowhere. The second way to take it is about acquiring one place after the angel has been in another, and this can go two ways. One way [2a] makes it ask: how long does it take an angel to go from one place to another, *i.e.* how long does it take him to leave the prior place and acquire the latter one? — This question, too, has an obvious answer, because it is well established that this how-long is an instant. This, too, is not the meaning of what St. Thomas is now asking. Many of the arguments advanced by Gregory [of Rimini] reported by Capreolus at *II Sent* d.6, deal with this and hence are not adverse to St. Thomas. They only prove that the angel's end point is attained in the same instant as his starting point is left. Gregory thought we held the opposite.² The third way [2b] takes the question as comparing proper measurements: how does the right measure for an angel's acquiring his endpoint compare to the right measure for his leaving his starting point, *i.e.*: do these two measures stand as instant to instant? As time to time? As an instant to a time? This is the question Aquinas means to discuss. So in this context, asking if an angel's motion is instantaneous is asking: *does the angel's transit from place to place happen in such a way that the measure of his acquiring his endpoint stands to that of his leaving his starting point as an instant stands to a time?*³ Keep this firmly in mind.

¹ It is irrelevant because starting to have a place was a *change* for an angel, not a motion.

² So would any reader who got no farther than the *sed contra*.

³ This was exactly the opinion Aquinas rejected; so the article is about giving this question a better answer.

ii. In the body of the article he does five jobs: (1) he reports an opinion; (2) he attacks it; (3) he answers the question according to his own thinking, at the point where it says, "Rather it is necessary to assign . . ." (4) He shows what sort of time it is in which the angel moves, where he says "in continuous time, if . . ." (5) He shows how such time differs from the common time, at the point where he says, "But the angel's time . . ."

iii. As for job (1) he discusses four propositions used in the opinion reported. The first is that (a) when an angel is moving, in the whole preceding time he is at his starting point, but in the last instant he is at his end point; and hence he moves instantaneously. (b) The second proposition is that, between the two end points, there is no middle, just as there is no middle between a time and its terminus. (c) The third proposition is that there is no final now-instant in which he was at his starting point (just as there is none in a case of generation, *etc.*) (d) The fourth is that there is a final *time* when the angel was at his starting point. This is the opinion Scotus followed.

As for job (2), Aquinas attacks proposition (a) with the following argument. [*Major:*] Every instantaneous change is the terminus of some change; [*minor:*] but the motion of an angel is not the terminus of any change; [*conclusion:*] therefore it is not an instantaneous change. — The minor is obvious. — The major is supported by how motion and rest compare in temporal measure, *i.e.*: whatever is changing over the whole of a time keeps getting different during any part of that time; and likewise whatever is resting over the whole of a time, stays the same during any part of it. From this comparison, two modal claims are derived. The first says:

it is impossible for a thing to be at rest over the whole of a time and be different at its last instant.

The other one says:

In II Sent d
2, q 11

a 2 *contra*
conclusionem
14

a2

a1

it is possible for a thing to be changing over the whole of a time and be different at its last instant.

From these two modal claims, the major premise is obviously true.

As for job (3), the conclusion answering the question is this: the movement of an angel is necessarily in time. The support goes as follows. [*Antecedent:*] In the motion of an angel there are two now-instants; [*inference:*] ergo there is time in it. — The antecedent is clear because in the angel's motion (as in any other motion) one has to assign a "before" and "after"; but in an angel's motion the "before" cannot be a time, but is the last now-instant in which he was at his starting point, and the "after" is another now-instant, as is obvious from the disproof of the preceding opinion. — Drawing the inference is supported by the fact that whenever there is more than one now-instant, there has to be time.

As for job (4), Aquinas says that an angel's continuous movement is in continuous time, but his discontinuous movement is in discrete time. — The support is that time gets its continuous character from motion/change.

As for job (5), he says that both sorts of time measuring an angel's motion are different from the time measuring the motion of the heavens, because the angel's motion does not depend on that of the heavens.

Doubts about job (2)

iv. Concerning the disproof of the first opinion, doubt arises about the proposition on which St. Thomas's argument is based, namely, [α] "it is impossible for something to be at rest over an entire time and be different at the last instant of that time." There is also doubt about this one [β]: "everything at rest over a whole time stays the same in any instant of that time." The doubt is whether these propositions are true thanks to their logical form, or thanks to their subject matter. If we say they are true thanks to their logical form, they have to come out true in every subject matter.⁴ And then there are many obstacles. For it is not necessarily true to say that "everything moving over an entire

⁴ Reduced purely to its logical form, the more basic of the propositions, [β], will be taken to quantify over things, times, and instants in a time; a time will be a linearly ordered set of instants, the predicate 'be at rest' will be replaced by a topic-neutral predicate variable. The result will read thus (ignoring the linear order):

$$[\beta] \quad \forall x \forall t \forall i ((i \in t) \supset ((\phi x \text{ at } t) \supset (\phi x \text{ at } i)))$$

If this is true by its logical form alone, its negation,

$$[\sim\beta] \quad \exists x \exists t \exists i ((i \in t), (\phi x \text{ at } t), (\sim\phi x \text{ at } i)),$$

will be impossible, which is what [α] says about the value of i , ($\forall t$), when $\forall(t)$ is identified with the last instant in t .

It seemed to many medieval writers that [β] was a logical truth, or close to one, but it was hard to say exactly how. Aristotle's predicate logic of 'all' and 'some' did not clear this up, because what an instant measures does not become a predicate of the instant; and the logic of wholes and parts did not clear it up either, because instants are not "parts" of the time in which they fall, just as points are not parts of the line, and the members of a set are not parts of it. Also [β] did not seem reliable for all the predicates that could be values of ϕ . This was the basis for the obstacles which are about to follow.

time is moving in any instant of it." For one thing, it is not moving at any instant.⁵ For another thing, at the first instant, it is not different yet from how it was before, or else every change would start with an already completed change.⁶ — Also, it's not the case that whatever is a man (or white) over an entire time, is a man (or white) at "any" instant of that time. For in the last instant of the time measuring his corruption, he is not a man or white, as is clear in the corruption of all lasting things.⁷ For about these it is truly said that, what they were in the whole preceding time, they are not at the last instant.

On the other hand, if these propositions are true thanks to their subject matter, so that they are true only for the terms 'at rest' and 'stay the same', then one has to give a reason why these propositions hold in this one subject matter and not in others. — Thereupon, one has to exclude the objections that Scotus raised against them in *II Sent.* d.2, q.11, which you also see reported in Capreolus' remarks on *II Sent.* d.6.

The objections from Scotus

v. The first objection is from the instantaneous transubstantiation of bread into the Body of Christ, although it had been "at rest" as bread over a whole preceding time.

The second objection is from air that is dark and suddenly illuminated, although in a whole preceding time it remained in darkness. — And if you say (says Scotus) that daybreak is the terminus of a local motion, it does you no good. For one thing, it would be the case accidentally. For another thing, God could produce instantly a luminous presence in air that had rested in darkness over that whole preceding time. For yet a third thing, you have not evaded the point that, on the side of the subject, air has rested in darkness for a whole time in the truth of the matter, and yet is different at the last instant.

The third objection is about the angel himself: from Aquinas's proposition, it would follow that an angel resting at some point would never move afterwards. Drawing this consequence is supported as follows. Suppose the angel is at rest for an hour:

— either he begins to move at the last instant of this hour (but this is not the case, you say)

— or else he begins to move at an instant intermediate [between this hour and the start of the next]

— or at an instant immediate [to the start of the next hour].

Not at an intermediate instant, because then he will have been at rest for an intermediate time [which has no last instant and so precludes a last instant when the angel

⁵ Select a value like 'moving' or 'changing' for ϕ , and it becomes impossible to quantify over instants at all, because they do not measure what can only occur over an interval.

⁶ Again, since no change can occur without covering an interval, none occurs in any interval's first instant.

⁷ Last instants are also a problem with predicates of change, especially when the change is one of "corruption," i.e. a change from having a quality to not having it.

was at rest], nor at an immediate instant, because no instant is immediate to another instant. [So he never moves.]

— Oh, but if you say he starts in an instant of discrete time. I ask what corresponds to that instant in our time. Is it the last instant of the hour? Is it a time immediately following that? Is it an intermediate instant? And since only a time immediately following can be assigned, it follows that an angel at rest cannot start to move instantaneously, which is hard to swallow.

Answering the objections

vi. To clear up the difficulty, one needs to see first the *meaning* of our proposition, and then one needs an answer.

To get the meaning right, you need to know that some people think two distinctions are implicit in *'it is impossible for a thing to be at rest over the whole of a time and be different at any instant of that time'*. One distinction splits the phrase "over the whole of a time." Is this the whole exact* time, or not exact? The other alleged distinction splits "at any instant." Is it any *intrinsic* instant? Or any *extrinsic* one? They say the proposition is to be amended thus:

Anything at rest [in being- ϕ] over a whole exact time (i.e. the time co-extensive with its being at rest as ϕ), remains ϕ at any intrinsic instant of it.

In this form, they say, the proposition is self-evident, and this is how it was being used by St. Thomas.

Well, without offense to these gentlemen, I say that they seem not to know their own voice. As they read St. Thomas, you would not get from his proposition [un-amended] that what is ϕ (e.g. a man, or white) over some whole time, has to be such in the last instant of that time. And yet if this proposition is to be understood as they amend it, it would be obvious that whatever is a man over a whole time co-extensively is a man at any instant of it. — Also the distinction between an intrinsic and an extrinsic instant cannot provide an evasion. For that first opinion which St. Thomas disproved was not saying that a thing rested in the whole of a time and in its last intrinsic instant was different, as is clear in the text. — So SINCE

— Aquinas' intention is to be gathered from the context in which he is speaking;

— and (perfectly obviously) the first opinion judged that the angel's motion stood to his previous rest as the instant x becomes ϕ stands to the time of its pre- ϕ development; — and its development is obviously not measured by a previous whole *exact* time,

— and the instant when x is born is not *intrinsic* to the time as measuring its pre- ϕ development; —

THE CONSEQUENCE is that if St. Thomas effectively disproved the above-mentioned opinion, he took the proposition in the same meaning as his adversaries did; otherwise it would have been just a quarrel about words.⁸

vii. You need to know, therefore, that 'over a whole time' can be quantifying two ways. The first way is over *parts* alone, so that saying "in a whole time" would be the same

⁸ In short, by tightening St. Thomas's key premise enough to make it seem logically necessary, these interpreters ruined his refutation of the opinion he was attacking. Since Cajetan is right about that, I see no need to formalize their anticipated amendments.

as saying "in every part of that time." The second way would be over the parts and whatever they consist of, and then saying "in a whole time" would be the same as saying "in any part and in any instant of the time."⁹ And although both ways to take the proposition are in use, in the proper context, it is understood in the first sense by philosophers and theologians. Otherwise there would be an indirect implication saying, "since a fire comes to be from water, it is water in that whole time, and is fire at the last instant."¹⁰ Clearly it was in this sense that the opinion Aquinas rejects was saying that an angel rests in a whole time and acquires a new place in its last instant. And since Aquinas meant to be contradicting it really and not in appearance, one has to say that his own talk of a "whole time" is distributing in the same sense. And so the argument is over whether this proposition: " x is at rest in a whole time, i.e. in every part in the time and is different in its last instant," is possible. The rejected opinion took this to be possible and based its stand on that possibility. St. Thomas, however, thought it was impossible. — And so much for the issue of meaning.

viii. As for answering the question, the proposition [it is impossible for something to be at rest in a whole time and be different in the last instant of that time] is true thanks to the subject matter and not thanks to its form. In other words, it is not true no matter what the terms are, but in the terms actually used. Both parts of this are explained.

First, the negative part, because from "is such over a whole time" one does not infer by logical form alone that it "is also such in the last instant of that time." The following conditional, for example, is not necessary: "if he is a man during a certain hour, then he is a man at the end of that hour." Indeed the factual falsity of this is apparent for the hour measuring his corruption. — The reason why this does not hold by virtue of its form alone is also evident on the ground that a whole time up until its terminus is compared to its terminus as prior to posterior, and it is not necessary that if a thing is ϕ in the prior, it remains such in the posterior.¹¹

The affirmative part is made clear by noticing that St. Thomas's intention is to treat angels' *natures* and

⁹ To repeat: a "time" is an interval, and its only "parts" are shorter intervals within it, as the better philosophers and theologians knew. But since an interval may be said to "consist of" both its parts and its bounds, less accurate writers assumed that any instant within an interval was also a "part" of it.

¹⁰ This and a thousand other examples would follow just because a change of substance was supposed to be an instantaneous one. This is why the better thinkers avoided taking "the whole of a time" this way.

¹¹ This is not proto-Hume but just the semantics of 'change'. To understand Aquinas, divide the vocabulary of predicates into those of change towards being ϕ , ϕ^C , such that if $\phi^C x$, then $\neg \phi x$ yet, and predicates of staying the same in being ϕ , ϕ^S .

In the negative part of his position, Aquinas rejects the necessity of

[β^C] $\forall x \forall t \forall i ((i \in t) \supset (((\phi^C x \text{ at } t) \supset (\phi^C x \text{ at } i)))$.

For when $\forall(i)$ is identified with the last instant in t , he is always ready to accept

[$\sim\beta^C$] $\exists x \exists t \exists i ((i \in t), (\phi^C x \text{ at } t), (\phi x \text{ at } i))$.

their *natural* traits (whether in the state of nature or the state of grace); so the talk here is not about the possible or impossible logically and *vis-à-vis* God's power, but about the physically possible, in which we attend to what befits the thing's order apart from miracles, and we are not asking what God could do. This is always to be born in mind by those who follow St. Thomas's doctrine when they are looking into natural matters. What is being said, therefore, is that it is impossible in the order of natural things for something to be at rest over the whole of a time and yet be different at the end of it. For every case of having-been that serves as a starting point or any terminus, is preceded in the course of nature by a becoming: for as experience testifies, the order of things has this trait: that nothing new comes to be so fast that nothing preceded it as a way of leading up to it. And so, since something's having been at rest is *not* a way to get to another state (whether by gain or by loss) but gets another state *in a change* which is acquiring or losing, it follows that, as resting in some whole time, a thing remains the same at the terminus of that time; otherwise, it would have come to a terminus to which nothing preceding led it; for what stands differently at a terminus from how it was previously has come to that terminus by a preceding change/motion.¹²

Dissolving the objections

ix. To the objections raised against our proposition thus understood, the answer is easily apparent from what I have said. The objection from transubstantiation falls short in two ways. First it is not a natural change but utterly miraculous, and thus looks to the power of God. — Secondly, transubstantiation has no opposed state of rest (unless we want to abuse words), and it itself is not a change/motion.

x. Against the second objection, from illumination, I say that illumination is the terminus of a local motion. To meet the objections to this view of it, I respond to the first one by saying that although illumination taken just in itself terminates a local motion accidentally (since we know that parts close to the solar body are always lit without any concurring approach or recession of the sun from them), nevertheless a *new* illumination (which is all we can be talking about here) is a *per se* terminus of local motion, not *per se primo*, but *per se secundo*, according to the course of na-

ture. — From this my answer to the second one is also clear: it is not relevant because it is talking about the power of God and not the course of nature. — Against the third, I say that although air is at rest in its substance [absolutely] in the whole time preceding the sun's presence, it is not at rest *relationally*, because it is continually relating differently to the sun, as regards being close or distant. But since there is no *per se* motion/change to a relation (as we learn in *Physics* 1^o), and yet a thing *x* can be continually differing in how it is related to another thing *y*, because of a change not in *x* itself but in *y* as it relates back to *x*, air is neither "at rest" in darkness nor "changing," but has the darkness continually differently, thanks to the change of *y* [the sun] in the relational being that leads to the loss of darkness and the acquisition of light. Both these points are quite reasonable. For since there is no motion towards a relation, neither is there rest towards one, since they have a becoming towards the same thing; but in the place of motion there is "standing differently," and in the place of rest there is "standing the same way." And since a privation of light (*i.e.* darkness) is not based on a form contrary to light but on a relation of distance or absence between the transparent and the light-shedding [bodies], it follows that air, without changing in itself, stands ever differently towards being darkened in consequence of the fact that it stands ever differently towards being close to the sun, thanks to the motion of the sun.

xi. The third objection falls short in many ways, since it does not understand the thinking of St. Thomas where he is talking about the "proper measure" of angelic motion, or where he is talking about being the same or different in the last instant *in its definition as an end point*, and not in just any definition; or where he is talking about motion not as mere acquisition of the terminus, but as we talked about it in explaining the title question.*

So, the objection equivocates first about the angel's "motion," understanding by the word 'motion' the acquisition of a terminus. — Secondly, using words as Scotus does, I say that an angel can at the last instant of a time be in a place both as an end-point and as a starting-point of his motion:

— as a starting-point of it, because he can (after having been nowhere) in one instant of his time coexisting with the last instant of an hour apply himself to a place (for then he was nowhere for the whole hour and is here in the last instant of it, which, according to St. Thomas, is *not moving, but having been changed*).

— and as an end point, because the angel can at two immediate instants of his own time apply himself successively to different places, so that those two instants coexist with an hour in such a way that the second coexists with the last instant of the hour and the first coexists with the whole preceding time.

And if one says that this is what the first opinion was saying, the opinion under attack here by St. Thomas, I answer that it is not so, but comes off badly understanding what he was saying. For as I mentioned in talking about the title question, the present issue is one of comparing the proper measure of reaching the end point to

c.2,
225b 11

* initial § of
this commentary

¹² We have now seen the affirmative part of Aquinas' position. He accepts [B] for predicates of staying the same:

[B^R] $\forall x \forall t \forall i ((i \in t) \supset ((\varphi^R x \text{ at } t) \supset (\varphi^R x \text{ at } i)))$.

He even accepts it in the modalized form

[\square B^R] $\square (\forall x \forall t \forall i ((i \in t) \supset ((\varphi^R x \text{ at } t) \supset (\varphi^R x \text{ at } i))))$,

from which one gets from simple logic and modal interchange his proposition [α]:

[α] $\neg \circ (\exists x \exists t \exists i ((i \in t), (\varphi^R x \text{ at } t), (\neg \varphi^R x \text{ at } i)),$
even if $V(t)$ = the last instant in *t*.

Well, do we now have at last a proposition true by its logical form alone? No, says Cajetan, and surely correctly. What we have is a quite rigid rule of natural process (if you will, a physical necessity) whereby changes/motions come with antecedent preparation (at least in realities far enough above the quantum scale to be observable). But, of course, this rule like any rule of physical process is not miracle-proof.

the proper measure of leaving the starting point. That first opinion was saying that they stand as an instant stands to a time immediately preceding it, and so there is no last instant in the starting point, *etc.* St. Thomas, however, wants it to be the case that they stand as instant to immediate instant, and that there is a last instant at the starting point. — If it should happen that those instants coexist with our time in the way that I just mentioned, they do so accidentally and as coexisting, and not as in their proper measure. And again, even in such a contingency (speaking coexistently, and not measure-wise) the angel would not be said to have been at rest in the whole preceding time but to have *begun* his motion and *thus* be at the end point in the last instant; or, the angel would not be said to have *not been moving* in the whole preceding time but to have *started moving* in the last period of time. And because Scotus and others did not notice these things and so did not understand St. Thomas, they attacked what they did not know.

Jobs (4) and (5) plus new doubt

xii. Regarding jobs (4) and (5), where St. Thomas claims that the angel's motion is not measured by the time which measures the first [heavenly] motion, but by a different time, be it continuous or discrete, manifold doubts arise about the nature of this discrete time (and the need to posit it) and likewise about the difference between this angelic continuous time and our common time. These questions pertain partly to what I discussed above in connexion with q. 10, and partly to matters needing a special inquiry; so I have thought it best to handle here just those objections which arise out of angelic motion.

Scotus, then, fashions arguments first against discrete time. His basis is the general one that a plurality is not to be admitted needlessly, and no reason compels us to posit such time. This he spells out in three ways. (1) You say an angel is in a place by his operation; so it is a transitive one or else an immanent one. If it is immanent, it is measured by an age,* if transitive, it is measured by our common time or by an instant. (2) Anything salvaged by discrete time can be salvaged by continuous time. (3) Just as it is not unfitting for angels to agree a bit with bodily things in a bodily condition, when they are in a condition meeting the same definition, like being in a place, so also it is not unfitting for them (when they are in that condition) to be measured by the same measure as the one used to measure similar conditions in bodies.

xiii. Then Scotus argues especially against the idea that an angel's continuous time is different. If one admits this other time, the main reason is supposed to be that angelic motion does not depend on that of a heavenly body. But really, this is neither here nor there. For one thing, measuring a quality by a quality, or a quantity by a quantity, does not require essential dependency. We just need to be able to determine the how-much of *this* quantity from the how-much of *that* one. — For another thing, Peter will be walking around after the [general] resurrection; but one can't imagine that his walks will be measured by another time than the common one, even though their timing will not depend on the motion of the heavenly bodies we have now, since their motion will not exist then. — And for yet

another thing, on Joshua's long day, the deeds he was doing while the sun stood still were still measured by the common time.

Answers

xiv. The short answer to this is that the need to posit discrete time comes from the fact that the nature of angelic actions corresponds to such time; this was shown already in q. 10, a.5. The need for another continuous time, besides the common one, is asserted by St. Thomas here [in q.53, a.3], to meet the case where a thing's changeability [or pace of change] does not depend on the changing of a heavenly body.

To answer the objections, I say that the *first* of them gets two things wrong. The angels' immanent natural operations are not measured by an age but by discrete time, and the transitive actions they perform in the common course of things (I say this on account of the movers of the orbs) are measured by the common time (or an instant of it), as it says in the text. — The *second* of them also assumes a falsehood. Without discrete time, it is not possible to salvage the fact that an angel's operation has a final being [an end to its occurring]. Nor can one salvage the fact that the angels have measures proportionate to them. It is very awkward that angelic operations, coming one right after the other in such a way that they are both entire all at once and yet exist successively, should be adapted to measurement by our time, no part of which is a whole all at once, and no instant of which stands still. — The *third* objection also assumes something wrong, namely, that an angel is subject to having a predicate of place [an *ubi*] and to being a subject changing place. The falsity of this was pointed out above.

xv. Against the first objection aimed at continuous time, it is true that when a changeable thing's moving and mutability [or pace of change] are independent of what heavenly bodies are doing, their sheer independence is the reason they are not measured by the motion of those bodies. Against the argument on the other side, the fact that one quantity is measured by another turns up in two ways: intrinsically* and incidentally. When the one is measured by the other incidentally, then, yes, it is enough that we can ascertain the one from the other. But in order for the one to be measured intrinsically by the other, there has to be an *intrinsic* dependency of the one upon the other — not in the line of efficient causality, however (as Aquinas taught in answering the last objection in the last article of q. 10), but in the line of formal causality, in the way in which, among beings, the simpler things are intrinsically exemplary for the other things — in such a way that the other things cannot equal their simplicity and perfection, much less exceed it. There is no understanding the idea that a thing, *x*, can have from its own nature a measurability by *A* and yet not depend upon *A*. This is why Aristotle, too, says that a measurable thing is traced back to its measure, but not *vice-versa*.

So there is nothing awkward about saying that Peter's walks after his resurrection will not be measured

a.5 and §§ xiii, xv in its commentary

* *aeuum*

q.52, a.1, q.53, a.1 with § w of its commentary

* *per se*

Metaphysics X (P), c.6, 1056b 22(?)

by the common time, any more than the angelic motion we have been talking about, because it can be faster than a heavenly body's motion.

The standing still of the heavens in that period might fit the definition of 'rest'; and if it did, one would be reasonable in saying that it is measured by potential common time. But since their standing still will not meet the definition of 'rest' but that of a miraculous fixity, the stasis of the heavens will rather be measured by an "age," since there will be no potency in those bodies to shake off the fixity.

On Joshua's long day, there is no basis for saying that the First Movable Sphere was standing still, rather than just

the body of the sun: so the objection is irrelevant. — If one were to grant a stoppage of even the First Movable, one could still say that the miracle would not prevent the lower bodies' movements from still depending, by their nature, on the First, although this dependency of theirs is on an outside thing, and so divine power can suspend it or substitute for it.¹³

¹³ The First Movable was the outermost of the nested spheres making up the Ptolemaic heavens; as the outermost, it was also literally the highest and "outside" all the others. But it was also the highest in the causal sense that all natural motions of the inner spheres were caused and "timed" by its *example*.



Inquiry Fifty-Four: Into an angel's cognition

Having looked into the angel's substance, we must move on to his cognition. This study will come in four parts: the first topic to take up is the angel's cognitive power; the second is the medium of his knowing [q.55]; thirdly will come the matters he knows [q.56]; fourthly will come how he knows them [q.58]. On the first topic, five questions are asked.

- (1) Is an angel's substance his act of understanding?
- (2) Is his existing his act of understanding?
- (3) Is his substance his active power to understand?
- (4) Does an angel have agent and possible intellect?
- (5) Do the angels have any other cognitive power besides their intellects?

article 1

Is an angel's substance his act of understanding?

Opusc. XV, de angelis, c.13

It seems that an angel's substance is his act of understanding.

c 5;
430a 15
In comment 19

(1) After all, an angel is higher and simpler than the agent intellect of a soul. But the substance of an agent intellect is its action, as is made clear by Aristotle in *De Anima III* and by his commentator [Averroes]. *A. fortiori*, then, the angel's substance is his action, and this action is to understand.

c 7,
1072b 27

(2) Besides, Aristotle says in *Metaphysics XII* that "mental action is life." But since "for living things, their to-live is their to-be," as it says in the *De Anima II*, it seems that life = essence. Therefore the action of an angel's intellect is the essence of an angel who understands.

c 4;
415b 13

(3) Furthermore, if the two ends are the same, the middle does not differ from them (because one end is further from the other than it is from the middle). But an angel is his intellect; so he and the object understood by him are [two ends, yet] are the same, at least in the case of his understanding his own essence. Ergo, his act of understanding (occupying the middle place between the thing understood and himself) is the same as the substance of the angel who understands.

ON THE OTHER HAND, a thing's action differs more from its substance than its existing does. But in no created thing is its existing its substance, for this is unique to God, as emerged above. So neither an angel's action nor any other creature's action is its substance.

q 3, a.4, q.7,
a.1 ad 3, a.2;
q.44, a.1

ANSWER: it is impossible for the action of an angel or of any other creature to be its substance. Properly speaking, an acting or operating is the actualization* of a power-to-act,¹ as existing is the actualization of a

* actualitas
† virtus

substance or essence.¹ But it is impossible for anything that has something of potency in it (and so is not pure act) to be its own actualization, since being actualized conflicts with being potential. Only God is pure act. In God alone, then, is His substance identically His existing and acting.

Besides, if an angel's act of understanding were his substance, his act of understanding would subsist. But there can be only one case of subsistent understanding, as there can be only one case of any abstracted item subsisting.² And so the substance of an angel would not be distinguished from that of another angel nor from that of God (which is His subsistent understanding).

Also, if the angel himself were his act of understanding, there could not be more and less perfect levels in understanding, since the levels arise from differences of participation in understanding itself.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): when an agent intellect is said to be its action, the predication is not saying what it is but what comes with it, reflecting the fact that when its substance is in act, its action accompanies it right away, as much as possible. (This is not the case with a possible intellect, which does not have actions until after it has been put into its act-state.)³

¹ The key word in this argument, 'actualitas', was ambiguous between 'actuality' and 'actualization'. I have chosen the latter as suiting the force of the argument. But as Cajetan's comments show, many readers of the Latin picked 'actuality'.

² An action is "abstracted" when taken apart from an agent doing it; if it "subsisted" in that condition, it would count as a concrete being in its own right.

³ A possible intellect is put into its act-state by receiving an impressed species. Only after it is thus specified can it operate.

ad (2): 'life' does not stand to 'to live' as essence does to existence, but as 'race' stands to 'running', [the one indicating the action's cognate object, the other the action itself].³ Hence it does not follow that if to live is to be, then life is essence. — Granted, the word 'life' is sometimes used for an essence, as when Augustine says in *De Trinitate X* "consciousness and intelligence and

c 11;
PL 42, 983

³ Aquinas wrote, "the one indicating the action in the abstract, the other in the concrete," which works in Latin for *currere* and *currere*, but not in English, where 'life' is not an abstract noun from 'to live' but names the cognate object of it, as 'race' names that of 'to run'.

will are one essence, one life." But this was not Aristotle's meaning when he said that mental action is life.

ad (3): an action that reaches to a real thing outside the agent [*i.e.* a transitive action] is a "middle" in real terms between the agent and the thing receiving his action. But an act that remains immanent in the agent is not really a middle between the agent and its object; it just sounds that way in how we talk. In reality, the act of understanding happens *after* the object and agent are unified. From the fact that the thing understood is unified with the one understanding, there follows an *act* of understanding, rather than an effect differing from both.

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear. One merely needs to note that 'substance' is referring here to the angel's essence, not his being a substance. This question is being asked for the sake of our debate with philosophers holding the opposite view (like Averroes in his comment 25 on *Metaphysics XII*). They held the opposite on the ground that [if the angel's act of understanding is not his substance, it is an accident, but] there is no such thing as an accident in a substance independent of matter, as the Intelligences are.

ii. In the body of the article, the title question is answered by one conclusion supported on three grounds. It says: neither an angel's understanding nor any other action a creature does is its substance. — This conclusion has two parts: one about the act of understanding for an angel, the other about any action for any created substance at all. St. Thomas's first supporting ground is intended to support both parts: the other two grounds are meant to continue the support for saying this about the angel's act of understanding.

§§ xi, xxvii

1st supporting ground

The first supporting argument, goes like this. [*Major:*] Only a pure act is its own actualization; [*minor:*] God is [the one case of] pure act; [*conclusion:*] therefore only God is His own actualization. But [*new major:*] "to act" is the proper actualization of a power-to-act, as "to be" is the proper actualization of an essence; [*new conclusion:*] so, only God is His own being and His own action. — The major asserts two points, namely: (1) "A [case of] pure act is its own actualization," and (2) "Nothing other than a pure act is its own actualization." The second point is supported in the text as follows: [*antecedent:*] everything other than a pure act has something of potentiality in it; [*inference:*] ergo, it is not its own actualization, because being actualized conflicts with being potential.

Doubts about it, I

iii. About this ground, doubt arises over the truth of propositions assumed in it and over their efficacy for

reaching the conclusion intended. The doubt is that these propositions need to be taken either formally* or else materially! Which is right?¹ If they are taken formally, two difficulties follow.

* *formaliter*
† *materialiter*

[A] In point (1) asserted by the major, there is a predicate saying "is its own actualization." If a pure act has this predicate formally speaking, then any case of pure act has what it takes to actualize and also has what it takes to be actualized. This consequence follows from the fact that the formal definition of 'act' is respectful [*i.e.* defines 'act' as transcendently related to 'potency'];² and if the relation terminates within a thing (as indicated here by the pronoun 'its own'), it has to be the case that its terminus, *i.e.*, the potency or potential, is in the same thing, and then the thing is *not* pure act.

[B] The second difficulty is that action and power-to-act, being and essence, taken formally and in general, derive from their formal definitions the fact that one of them (say action.) would actualize the other (*i.e.* the power-to-act); and likewise being would actualize an es-

¹ 'Formally' is one of two translations I use for '*formaliter*' depending on its meaning. The other, 'form-wise', is not relevant here but will come up shortly. Formally and materially were the two ways a sentence could be taken when its subject was a descriptive term like 'the witness'. Materially taken 'The witness is in the box' is about the referent of 'the witness', whoever he or she may happen to be, and so the predicate remains undetermined in meaning. Perhaps the witness is a bum in his make-shift shelter. Taking the sentence formally, however, extends the subject with a *qua*-clause: the witness *as a witness* is "in the box." The predicate is now nailed down to meaning that the witness is in a courtroom where the witness stand is called the witness box, and the amended subject refers to the person testifying. Another effect of the *qua*-clause is to facilitate universalizing: every witness is in the box *qua* acting as a witness.

² The definition of 'actualize' was something like put-into-actuality. But "to be actual" contrasted with "to be in potency." Such contrasts were examples of transcendental relatedness or respectivity. A transcendental relation was so called because it was not in the category of relation [*ad aliquid*], but only sounded like it. Hence the more helpful name for it was *relatio secundum dicta*.

sence. The inference follows because St. Thomas's reasoning process is based on this proposition as understood formally, as is obvious in the text. — The point is confirmed when St. Thomas says "action is the proper actualization of a power-to-act, as being is of an essence." Either he means to talk about them in general, or in a special case. Not in a special case, because that way he could not argue from them to a conclusion about God and creatures generally, as he does. Therefore he means to take these terms in general. — But admitting this is awkward, because it would follow that wherever these factors are found form-wise,³ one of them would be act and the other would be potency; otherwise they would not be found there according to their formal definitions [and then either God's essence is not in Him form-wise, or it is His potency to be something].

But if the assumed propositions are to be taken materially, two other difficulties follow. [A'] The first is that the major will beg the question by saying, "only a pure act is its own actualization, i.e. operation"; for this is the very point which is in dispute and is denied by followers of the opposite opinion, as you see from Averroes' comment 25 on *Metaphysics XII*. — [B'] The second difficulty is that St. Thomas's reasoning process will amount to nothing. For it is hard to imagine how his argument could have the appearance of truth, much less the reality, if the definition of act-and-potency is let go,⁴ since the whole reasoning is based on this.

* *praeciditur*

Doubts about it, II

iv. Doubt also arises about point (2) asserted in the major, i.e., "nothing other than a pure act is its own actuality."⁴ The support for this [the claim that nothing with any potency in it is its own actuality] seems ineffective. Either Aquinas intends to conclude to a merely formal distinction, or else he intends to conclude to one that is both formal and real. Not the former, because he could not get the point he is after from this, of course.⁵ Ergo, the latter. But a formal and real distinction does not follow. — For one thing, the proposition assumed in support, "being actual conflicts with being potential," is true, if it is talking about formal identity but not if it is talking about real identity. It is a familiar fact, after all, that one and the same thing may be actual and potential, as one sees from the essence of an angel, which is a certain actuality and yet is potential towards existing. — For another thing, having a potency does not exclude all actuality but only pure actuality. After all, the following is *not valid*: "x has some potency in it, therefore it is not actual." The only thing that follows is that "it is not

³ 'Form-wise' is my other translation of '*formaliter*'. It means how a thing *normally* verifies a trait literally, i.e., by having the trait in itself, not just in something it causes (power-wise), and not in some higher way due to some more inclusive form. So even an atomic sentence can be true form-wise.

⁴ Throughout § iv, I am translating '*actualitas*' the way the objector was reading it; that way, his arguments make sense

⁵ If 'has some potency in it' and 'is its own actuality' are just formally distinct, they are distinct descriptions, yes; but

pure act." And yet St. Thomas has assumed the broader claim: "whatever has some potency in it, is not its own actuality." — Confirmation comes from the word 'its own', which means the same as 'proper' here. The proper actuality of a thing having some potency in it, is defective and in some way potential, such that it is not pure act; ergo [a thing's being its own actuality] does not conflict with its being identified with a thing in act in that defective way, i.e. having some potency in it.⁶ The last bit is obvious, because of the relation that act and potency have to each other.

Clearing these up

v. To make St. Thomas's argument perfectly clear, one needs to know first of all that two formal accounts or definitions* can stand four different ways towards real identity. — [1] They imply of themselves a real identity [of the items defined], for the accounts define things that are really the same wherever they are found, such as that of 'a being' and that of 'a good,' and the like. — [2] Or else they imply of themselves a real disidentity or distinction [of the items defined], as with the accounts defining 'white' and 'sweet'; and wherever the items these define are found, they are really distinct. — [3] Or else they carry of themselves no implication either way. This may happen two ways. [3a] Some items are indifferent as between being really identical and really distinct, though some incline more towards being identical. After all, there are some formal accounts of things which neither of themselves nor from their accompanying conditions, have any intrinsic reason to unite as one, if they are left to themselves, as one sees with the definitions of 'justice' and 'wisdom'. — [3b] But there are still other accounts which, while implying neither identity nor disidentity [of the items they define], nevertheless imply an intrinsic pairing as complementary; and given their accompanying conditions, if they are found alone, their pairing demands a real distinction between them. Such is the case with the definitions of 'power-to act' and 'operation'. For they do not yield real identity of themselves (otherwise they would be really identical in everything). Nor do they yield of themselves a real diversity (otherwise they would be distinct in God). And yet of themselves they do not abstract from pairing with one another; indeed, they pair up of themselves, like a distinctive improvement and that whose improvement it is. And if one looks at these definitions alone, as far as they go of themselves, their "pairing" together is none other than that between act and potency; for there is no other way they could stand towards each other, even with free rein given to the imagination. But from the fact that they intrinsically pair up as act and potency, it further follows that they are really distinct; for if they were really the same, they would be joined identically, and then

* *rationes
formales*

one and the same real thing can still fit both, and the objector thinks it will thereby falsify Aquinas' argument.

⁶ The objector seems utterly deaf to the difference between *having* one's own actuality (which everything does) and *being* one's own actuality (which, Aquinas is arguing, only God is).

neither would be the act of the other. And although one could understand an item as an "act of being in act," with the mind making two things out of one, it is still impossible for a thing to *be* an act of being in act. But in the intrinsic going together of different things as act and potency, the one is not only understood as act, but really is; and the other really is its potency.

vi. The second thing you need to know is that a pair can stand as act and potency in two ways: form-wise and power-wise.* They are found together form-wise when one of them is so joined to the other in the real that it is actuating the other. They are found power-wise when the two are thing-wise identical but have defining accounts such that if they were found together (apart from being identical), the one would be actuating the other. And this is how a power-to-act and an operation stand; for in some cases the operation is in fact actuating the power-to-act in the real, and the power-to-act is completed by it, as happens in us; but in some cases the power-to-act and the operation are the same thing, and hence the operation cannot complete the power-to-act in real terms. But the operation does not lose its status as the sort of being which would actuate that power in the real if it were not prevented from doing so by what is making it identical with that power. And hence one may say that they stand to each other in that case as act and potency *power-wise*, or *conditionally*. Take [God's] being eternal and being immutable: we say that they stand as effect and cause — not form-wise, because His being eternal is not caused in the real by His being immutable (since they are the same Thing), but power-wise, because if His being eternal were caused, it would be caused by His immutability.

vii. From these remarks one sees both the force of St. Thomas's argument and the answer to the objections against it. The force of his argument lies in this. [*Major:*] Items related as a definite act to its distinctive potency are only identical in a case of pure act; [*minor:*] a power-to-do and its operation relate to each other as definite act and distinctive potency; [*conclusion:*] therefore [they are the same thing only in a case of pure act]. — The major is based on the fact that wherever these items are found in their makeup as act and potency, they are really distinct from each other. So, by negating of the consequent (if they are not really distinct) one also negates their coming together with their distinctive makeup as definite act and distinctive potency. So in that case, either both have the makeup of potency (which is impossible), or they both have the makeup of act. — Or to put the matter another way: the thing in which these items become identical without remaining act and potency is either Pure Act (and we have our conclusion) or else it is pure potency, because these are the only two options that would preclude mixture of act and potency. But it is impossible for this thing to be pure potency, because pure potency does not contain act either form-wise or power-wise: indeed it is the most imperfect/incomplete of all beings. Therefore the thing in question is Pure Act, which contains in itself both the makeup of act and the makeup of potency in a higher

way.* From its status as act, it has actuality; and from its status as pure, it excludes every incompleteness/imperfection of potentiality.

* *eminenter*

Against doubts I

viii. Against the objections on the other side, I say that the assumed propositions are to be understood formally; but consistent with understanding them formally is the distinction just drawn between actually [form-wise] and virtually [power-wise], as is clear in the example I gave and similar cases. My point is also taught explicitly by Aristotle in *De Caelo II*. Aristotle accepts the claim: "the motion of the heavens starts in the East," not materially but formally and then interprets it in two ways, *i.e.*, actually (and then he says it is false, because in his thinking the movement of the heavens never began) or virtually, *i.e.*, "if it did begin, it would begin in the East," (and so taken, he says, it is true). Similarly, then, in the case at hand, "A pure act is its own actualization" as formally understood can be distinguished into the sense of being actually so or that of being virtually so. If taken the first way, it seems to imply what the objection said; but taken the second way, it is perfectly true. Beyond any doubt, such propositions are formed by our doctors for the sake of this meaning: they did not mean to say that Pure Act is what does actualize itself but that it is what would do so, if it were actualizable. Likewise when we say that God is his own perfection, we do not mean that God is that which perfects God, but that He would perfect Himself if He were perfectible.

The general proposition, "An operation and a power to-act stand as act and potency," is understood to be about a power and an operation in general, but we still have to use the same distinction between form-wise and virtually. Thus it does not follow that operation and power-to-act are found in God with the makeup of act and potency, nor that the argument is ineffective, as we have shown by clarifying the force of the argument. And for this purpose, the above suffices.

Against doubts II

ix. It is also clear from the above what needs to be said against the second doubt. The whole thing is solved by a single distinction, namely, that it is one thing to talk about act and potency across the board, and something else to talk about a definite act and its distinctive potency. For although a single thing which is not pure act can have the makeup of act and that of potency *towards different things*, it is impossible that a single thing be both a definite act and its distinctive potency, unless that one thing is Pure Act, which pre-contains both in a higher way. For if act and potency are found somewhere actually, they are distinct really, or else one and the same potency is its own distinctive act, which is unintelligible. I say, therefore, that St. Thomas meant to infer a real distinction, and that the proposition, "being actualized conflicts with being potential," is true as far as excluding real identity is concerned if the potentiality is distinctive to the actualization. — Similarly, although this inference is untrue: "x has some potentiality in it, therefore it is not an actuality," this other inference is still

c. 2,

neither would be the act of the other. And although one could understand an item as an "act of being in act," with the mind making two things out of one, it is still impossible for a thing to *be* an act of being in act. But in the intrinsic going together of different things as act and potency, the one is not only understood as act, but really is; and the other really is its potency.

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* *eminenter*

c. 2.

* *virtualiter*

quite true: “. . . therefore it is not the distinctive actualization *vis-à-vis* which there is potentiality in it.” — Likewise again, although nothing prevents a thing having some potency in it from being a defective actuality, it is impossible for it to be its own actualization, even if defective; for as I have already said several times, it would not be its own act, although it might be thought of that way.

x. Pay careful heed, however, to the fact that the above-mentioned propositions can be applied to St. Thomas's intent in two ways. (A) One would be to show that an angel is not his own operation, because he is potential to it. And thus in this reasoning it would be assumed that an angel is in potency *vis-a-vis* the operation, and from this a real distinction of the angel from his operation would be supported. — (B) The second way would be to show that there is no reason to identify in an angel his power-to-act with his operation (which stand as definite potency and definite act). This way the argument assumes that the angel is not pure act and proves a real distinction between the angel and his operation, because the only reason to identify an act with its distinctive potency is [that it is in a case of] Pure Act. Well, the propositions assumed are not to be applied to St. Thomas's intent in the first way, because that way something needing support would be just assumed; but if the propositions are taken the second way, the argument is fully effective, as is clear from what I have already said.

2nd supporting ground

xi. The second supporting argument is one leading to an impossibility, as follows. [*Antecedent:*] If the angel's act of understanding were his substance, [*1st inference:*] it would subsist; [*2nd inference:*] so it would be the only one; [*3rd inference:*] and so one angel could not be distinguished from another, nor from God. — Making the second inference is supported on the ground that a subsistent act of understanding has to be the only such act. This in turn is supported on the ground that no abstract thing subsisting can fail to be the only case [of such a thing subsisting].

Five objections to it

xiii. Concerning this argument, many doubts arise. First, there is doubt about the first inference, namely: “If an angel's act of understanding were his substance, it would subsist.” EITHER the word ‘subsist’ is being used unqualifiedly here (and then the inference is optimally drawn, because we are talking about a complete substance, and “a complete substance subsists” is a necessary truth). But then the second inference is worthless, namely, the one saying, “and so it would be the only one.” (This is a subject to which we will return in the next doubt.) — OR ELSE the word ‘subsist’ is being used here to mean just “in itself,” prescinding from anything further (and then the first inference is worthless, because the following indicative statement is not necessary but

Objection I

contingent: “A substance subsists in itself [period].” The unqualified perfection implied by the word ‘substance’ applies indifferently to a thing subsisting in itself (as happens in God) and a thing subsisting in something contracting it to a nature mixed with potency (as happens in the angels and in other complete substances), as the act of understanding may happen to be a substance (as in God) and may happen to be an accident (as in us).

xiii. Doubt arises secondly over whether this inference, “an angel's act of understanding subsists, and so is the only case,” is to be interpreted as true thanks to its subject matter or thanks to its logical form. It can't be true because of its logical form, because it does not hold in all cases. The following, for example, is invalid: “x subsists, and so is unique in kind and in number” (for such is the kind of oneness we're talking about). You see as much with the quidditative predicates of substances themselves [like ‘animal’, ‘plant’, ‘body’].⁷ After all, such a predicate is common to substances of multiple kinds, and yet subsists; for it cannot be doubted that some essential predicate is common to many angels and yet would subsist in them. And thus saying that “such and such a thing subsists, therefore it is unique in kind and number,” is invalid. Similarly, if there were a subsistent whiteness and a subsistent blackness, it would not be valid to say, “Color subsists, and so it is unique in kind and number.”

But the inference cannot be taken as true thanks to its subject matter, either. For one thing, one would have to state a condition thanks to which the inference held good for an angel's act of understanding, and that is not done here. For another thing, the support for it assumed in the text is universal and thereby indicates that the inference is not being drawn thanks to its subject matter.

xiv. Thirdly, doubt arises about the indicative statement assumed to support making the second inference, namely: “A subsistent act of understanding has to be the only such act,” because it is either irrelevant or else false. This is shown by distinguishing first the phrase ‘act of understanding’ and then distinguishing its conjunction with the word ‘subsistent’. After all ‘act of understanding’ can refer to a pure act of understanding or to one which is just so-and-so, *i.e.* just so complete, such as Gabriel's natural act of understanding. If the word refers to a pure understanding, the proposition is true but not relevant, since an angelic act of understanding is not a pure such act but a so-and-so one. — But if the word refers to a restricted act of understanding, nothing is being inferred except that such an act (say Gabriel's) is one in kind and number, like his substance. And so the last inference drawn, to the effect that one angel would not be distinct from another, or God, is invalid.

Objection II

Objection III

⁷ The objector is assuming that an item like “animal” (the genus, the sort of thing Aristotle called secondary substance) subsists in its species, so that if even one species subsisted in abstraction from all the individuals in it (so that, say, caninity subsisted without individual dogs) “animal” would subsist also.

Similarly, however 'act of understanding' refers, it can be said to subsist in two ways: form-wise and identically. It will do so form-wise, if it gets its subsisting from its own perfection; it will subsist rather identically, if subsisting does not belong to it thanks to its own makeup but thanks to that to which it is conjoined. You see an example of both ways in the example I just gave: if whiteness subsisted and blackness subsisted, then color would subsist identically, whiteness and blackness form-wise. So either the proposition is supposed to mean that an act of understanding subsisting form-wise can only be unique (and this is not relevant, because an angel's act of understanding is not admitted to subsist that way), or else it means that the act of understanding subsisting identically can only be unique (and thus it is false in the case at hand, as you can see from the example I gave). And this is how Averroes would say that an angel's act of understanding was subsisting — *i.e.*, because it is identical to the angel's substance.

Objection IV

xv. In the fourth place, doubt occurs about that other and more universal proposition assumed, namely, "any abstracted thing subsisting has to be the only case." The doubt is about what sort of abstractness is meant. Is it abstractness in how [the word for] it indicates, or in how it [the thing itself] is? If it means abstractness in how it [the word] indicates, it is not relevant here. For one thing, the act of understanding is not indicated abstractly by the term 'act of understanding' but rather by the noun 'intellection'. And for another thing, the issue here is about things and how they really are, not about how words indicate or signify things.

If the abstractness is meant to be about how the thing *is*, either it is abstraction from a receiver,⁸ or an abstraction from anything coming after its entire formal makeup.⁹ If it is meant the first way, the proposition is false, as is clear from the proposition I gave about color; for then color would be abstracted from a recipient but remain more than one in the subsisting whiteness and the subsisting blackness. — But if it is meant the second way, it would be true, but would support no inference except that an act of understanding cut off from anything contracting it would be unique if it subsisted, and that such an act of understanding (I mean one of such and such completeness) abstracting from everything following upon its own makeup, would be unique if it subsists, just as it would follow that if color subsisted taken precisely, it would be only one; and if such a color (say whiteness) subsisted, there would be just one whiteness. But then the point sought would not follow, because there could still be many acts of understanding of different kinds, just as there would be many kinds of color subsisting, although the multitude could not be purely numerical.

⁸ This is ordinary abstraction, the kind that gives us a concrete common noun, like 'cat', by abstracting but not prescinding from the receivers of that nature, like Mungo Jerry and Rumpole Teaser.

⁹ This is the abstracting that gives us an abstract noun, like felinity, by prescinding from everything outside the formal definition of a cat.

xvi. Concerning the last inference in the same argument, "and so it could not be distinguished from the substance of God," doubt arises because it does not seem valid. For a subsisting act of understanding could still be distinguished from God's substance by virtue of the fact that God's act of understanding is not just an act of understanding but also an act of willing and whatever else is in God; but a subsisting act of understanding would be nothing but an act of understanding. — Here is a confirming point: from the mere fact that subsisting is attributed to a thing, no intrinsic perfection is added to that thing. One sees as much if we imagine whiteness subsisting by God's power; its intrinsic makeup would be the same in the subsisting whiteness and in a non-subsisting one, although they would differ as regards being sensed, as regards depending on a subject, as regards acting and undergoing, and the like.

Clearing These Up

I need to answer these objections in an order in which I go first to the fourth one, then to the second one, then to the third one, then to the first one, and finally to the fifth one. Good teaching order requires that we go from the more universal and formal issues down to the less universal and more material ones.

Starting with objection IV

xvi. In answer to the fourth area of doubt, the universal proposition "every abstracted thing subsisting has to be the only case," you see two terms in the proposition's subject, 'abstracted' and 'subsisting'. The word 'subsisting' indicates a mode of being, but the word 'abstracted' indicates a mode of being conceived. So the sense of the proposition is this: "Everything abstractly conceived or conceivable, if it subsists as thus abstracted, has to be the only case." The talk here is about abstraction in general from anything contracting or narrowing [the term or trait], whether that be a receiver, or an essential difference, *etc.* And so understood, this proposition has nothing doubtful about it, nor does it have any counter example. Color conceived in a way abstracting from both differences [of shade] and from subjects [having color] would be unique, if it subsisted in such abstractness. It could not be multiplied form-wise, because it would be abstracting from all formal differences [between one shade of color and another]. Nor could it be multiplied materially, because it would be abstracting from numerical distinguishers, and because one could not assign anything to distinguish one case of it from another case, since the other case would be nothing but color and subsistence. — Also, abstraction in how [a thing] is conceived is not going outside the topic, but maximally clarifies it. For one thing, we are talking about the concept's abstractness on its own side, and not on our side.¹⁰ For another thing, hidden things are conveyed to us by things better known to us. JUST AS A FOR-

¹⁰ The adjective 'abstracted' is not describing the psychological process of concept formation but the nature of the content in the concept formed. Cf. 'abstract' in 'abstract algebra'.

mal account, if it is taken alone in the abstract, is just one item. SO ALSO if what it defines is posited to subsist in the real in its own right, also excludes multiplicity [and so is also just one item]. — Now how this proposition was meant to imply the conclusion St. Thomas was after becomes obvious in points that will follow.

Moving to objection II

xviii. Against the second objection, the proposition [if an angel's act of understanding subsists, it is the only case] can be taken two ways:

- just as it stands (and then it is true thanks to its subject matter), or
- with a view to what is implicit in it (and then it holds good thanks to its logical form).

When worded just as it stands, the inference: "If an act of understanding subsists, it is the only one," does not hold good thanks to its logical form, because the following is false: "every subsistent thing is the only one". But it does hold good thanks to its subject matter, which is not special (covering only what is involved in understanding) but general (covering what it takes to have been abstracted). The result on the terrain of abstracted things is that every subsistent one is unique. Now since "understanding" is among the things abstractly conceived (although it is not indicated by an abstract noun but by a gerund), the consequent [that it is the only case] follows. — But if the inference is taken in terms of what it contains implicitly, it will come out saying "If an act of understanding subsisted in its abstractness, it would be unique," and this does hold good thanks to its logical form. The indicative sentence by virtue of which it holds good is not "Everything subsisting is unique," but rather "Every abstracted thing subsisting is unique," and this is all that St. Thomas assumed. Thus the inference is to be understood formally in the sense I have now explained.

On to objection III

xx. Against the third objection, which is very difficult, I shall say what, with God's help, occurs to me. The whole difficulty lies in whether we are talking about "understanding" or "such-and-such understanding." So as far as I can see, we have just two ways to proceed. They are incompatible with each other; we have to choose between them.

— The first way is to *deny* what the objections assume, namely, that when we abstract the act of understanding from outside factors and hold precisely to what is intrinsic to it, there is still "understanding" and "such-and-such understanding". The ground for denying this would be that understanding only gets to be "such-and-such" from [a] the subject doing it (so as to yield "divine" understanding, or "angelic", or "human" understanding) or from [b] the object understood, since an act of understanding terminates at such-or-such an object. If we take this route, the answer to the objection is easy and obvious. We would be talking about understanding just in terms of its intrinsic makeup, and so the following reasoning would stand firm: if an angels act of understanding were taken precisely, abstracting from

every outside factor as to its subject and its object, it would be [the act of] "sheer understanding *qua* understanding"; then, if it subsisted in such abstractness, the thing subsisting would be sheer understanding [with nothing left to modify or diversify it], and hence there could only be that one case of it, as was said above.

But this answer does not square well with reason. For one thing, every intellect, indeed every immanent act, would belong to one narrow, intrinsic kind, since the same reasoning would fit them all; and thus every act of willing would be of one kind, and every act of seeing, every act of hearing, etc. For another thing, something belonging to the same super-narrow kind would be common by nature to all the Intelligences and to us.¹¹ For a third thing, an act of understanding which is thus-and-such in its object is not thus or such from an outside factor, as will become clear in a moment.

So it is more reasonable to go the other way, conceding what the objector's points assume, namely, that [after all the abstracting has been done] there is still "understanding" and "such-and-such understanding" on an intrinsic basis, so that what St. Thomas says is to be understood formally and *per se* and understood to suffice for the topic at hand.

xx. To clear up the prior issue of what is intrinsic to understanding as such, you need to know that "act of understanding" can be narrowed down in three ways. Firstly, through the subject doing it, and so it is divided into angelic and human. Secondly by the objects understood, when it is divided by where it terminates at such and such an object. Thirdly, [through] the proper differences dividing understanding, the way a genus is divided, or the way an analogy is divided into its analogates. — Division thanks to the subject doing it is obviously extrinsic and accidental; otherwise things in diverse genera would fall into the same species; 'human' would be an intrinsic* differentiator of understanding, of volition, of vision, and of other such items.

Division by objects happens two ways: by secondary objects (and this is obviously extrinsic or accidental) and division by *primary objects*. In the latter way, for example, understanding is divided into understanding proportionate to an intelligible object lit up in a phantasm, or understanding proportionate to an intelligible object illuminated in the intellect itself. I should think that such a division would be *per se* essential. (Not that I think even primary objects are themselves the *per se* differentiators of the act of understanding, because objects are extrinsic, while differentiators are to be intrinsic to what they constitute, since a difference in "what it is to be" something is part of it.) But I think the

¹¹ To get the picture, take every case where *x* understands *y*, then every case where *x* wills *y*, *x* sees *y*, etc. Cut away the variables and conceive the result as "sheer understanding" "sheer willing," etc. The sheer kind is what is now being called the super-narrow kind; and since it is super-narrow, let it now have a univocal kind. The same univocal kind of act will also have an instance (or perhaps will have its one and only instance) in every angel and in every human being (who is awake enough to understand something, will something, etc). By these steps, you will have re-invented extreme, formalistic Scotism!

§ xx

§ xxii
§ xxiii

* per se

essential differentiators of the act of understanding are found in relation in such objects, so as to be inseparable from the relation to them. Well, this can be said reasonably enough, since understanding itself cannot be separated from its relation to its formal object.¹² After all, if one asks, "What is an act of understanding?" the only answer one can give would be "A vital operation dealing with the true," or the like. Also, we have learned that the *per se* differentiators of a genus are to be taken from what diversifies the factor formally constituting the genus. Thus the proper differentiators of 'animal' are the ones dividing the animals by how they sense things.¹³ So since understanding is constituted by a trait inseparable from such and such an object, it follows that it's intrinsic differentiators will be things essentially relating variously defined things to such a [formal] object; and thus understanding will be like a genus formally divisible by essential differences or modes.

It does not follow that the same thing would be the differentiator of many [immanent acts]. For while one and the same thing, *x*, can be the object of the act of understanding and the object of the act of willing, it is an object of the two for different formal reasons. To the act of understanding, *x* is a kind of true thing; to an act of willing, *x* is a kind of good thing. Hence there is no one formal object of both. So much for the prior issue.

xxi. As to what goes into "such-and-such understanding" one needs to say that an angel's act of understanding taken precisely, abstracting from anything outside [its definition], includes intrinsically just two items, (*i.e.* [1] that it is an act of understanding, and [2] that it is such-and-such a one, say proportionate to an intelligible object seen in an intellect having some potentiality in it). Nevertheless, the angel's act also includes a way of being complete,* since both the items just mentioned posit a level of perfection in completeness. And since grammatical subjects are to be construed in a way compatible with their predicates, and 'is a substance' is a predicate meaning [a level of] completeness, 'an angel's act of understanding' is not being taken here in a way that subtracts from completeness by being an accident (for then no act of understanding will subsist), and it is not being taken as just "such and such" understanding (because then, as the objection showed, it would not reach the intended conclusion); rather, it is being taken "as an act of understanding having this much completeness unqualifiedly." (I say 'unqualifiedly' so as to distinguish it from itself as having some imperfection mixed in.) Thus, "an angel's act of understanding" is being taken in a middle way between understanding abstracted absolutely, and understanding so abstracted as to remain "thus and such." The result is

¹² For the "formal object" of a faculty, see the commentary on q.1, a.3.

¹³ Taking cues from the environment is common to all living things, but "sensing" takes specialized organs. In scholastic classification, the intrinsic differences between animals were set by whether they could sense by touch alone, by touch and smell, by smell and hearing, etc.

that when the [counterfactual] condition, if an angels act of understanding were his substance,

is admitted, the term 'angels act of understanding' refers to the very act of understanding and to its unqualified mode of perfection.

And so the meaning is this: "if an angel's act of understanding is of such great perfection that it is his substance, then..." And thus one salvages the inference formally and *per se*. It is formal, because it is about angelic understanding in what belongs to it from the perfection of his understanding. It is *per se*, because being complete/perfect is not an accidental predicate, nor one that takes things outside their definition, but belongs to each thing within its formal scope, as I said more fully above.

xxii. As for the issue of sufficiency, I need to say that (as the objector noted) there were two reasons why St. Thomas' reasoning might seem insufficient:

- because it leaves undiscussed whether an angel's act of understanding as just "such and such" would be a substance, or
- because it passes over the distinction between subsisting form-wise and subsisting identity-wise. I now show that neither of these matters.

For the former, this is easy. Given that 'is a substance' is a predicate bespeaking completeness, if an angel's act of understanding (with all the completeness it bespeaks when taken unqualifiedly) is not a substance, *a fortiori* it will not be a substance with incompleteness mixed into it, as there will be, of course, when it is taken as just "such-and-such" understanding. — For another thing, when taken as limited to being "such and such," an angel's understanding is an extraneous subject for a predicate meaning unqualified completeness, as 'is a substance' does; so it is no wonder that Aquinas omitted it in an argument couched in proper terms. — It is no obstacle that the predicate is not just 'substance' but 'his [the angel's] substance'. After all, if his act of understanding is the angel's substance, it *is* a substance, and that bespeaks completeness unqualifiedly. Whether it could be a substance at all is the main point sought in this question; and transparently, if it is a substance, it is *his* substance, the one doing the understanding.

That the other alleged fault is also no matter is made clear as follows. We can imagine 'subsists' or 'is a substance' attaching to the defining account of something in four ways:

- (1) as a broad kind attaches to a case or species of it (as 'is a substance' applies to a man).
- (2) as a case or species attaches to its broader kind (as 'is a substance' applies to 'a thing that is'*).
- (3) as an intrinsic mode (as we would say 'subsists' applies to infinite wisdom)¹⁴
- (4) as identical (as we say the [personal] relations in God are substances).

¹⁴ Infinite wisdom is an attribute of the One God and so has the substantiality (self-subsistence) of the divine nature in the account defining *how* such wisdom is in God.

If we choose to look at these rightly, (1) is utterly off the topic, because an act of understanding is obviously not a case or species of "substance." Likewise, way (2) is off the topic, because substance is not a case or species of "act of understanding." It is well known, after all, that the differentiators of substance do not differentiate the acts of understanding; and *vice-versa* the differentiators of act-of-understanding do not differentiate the substances. So only two of the options remain. Take option (3) or (4). When either of them is thought to be how 'is a substance' gets to be attributed *per se* to an angel's act of understanding, the thought is knocked down for the following reason. Either of them would look to the *maximum perfection* of the act of understanding. For if subsisting belongs *per se* to an angel's act of understanding as a part of "how it is," or as a result of its being identical to substantiality, it has this status out of its own high perfection unqualifiedly, since both these ways of being subsistent posit unqualifiedly perfect completeness. — [The alternative to attaching *per se* is doing so incidentally (*per accidens*).] Excluding these options as ways 'is a substance' might attach to an act of understanding incidentally is a job we do not have to do. For one thing, being a substance and being an accident do not apply to anything "incidentally." They are always essential conditions of things. For another thing, the only way being a substance could belong to an act of understanding "incidentally" is if the act had an identity with a substance but this identity did not arise thanks to anything coming from the act itself, but thanks to something coming only from the substance [in this case, the angel's substance]. But this too is off the topic, because an angel's substance, as already stated, is a thing of finite completeness/perfection and is not pure act; so it does not have within itself the wherewithal to become identical with everything belonging to it; for it is because of being pure act that God's substance gets to be whatever God has.

xxvii. Thanks to these points, our answer to the objections is already clear, as is the force of St. Thomas's argument. Although it is a reduction to absurdity, the middle term on which it rests secure is the reason for its conclusion. For it is based on the amount of completeness/perfection enjoyed by the angel's very act of understanding. It means to say that if the act is so complete and perfect that it attains the status of being a substance, it will not admit of being many acts; it will be just one act. And this consequent Aquinas supports: because it will be subsisting in its own abstractness [from any and all limiting factors], and anything subsisting as altogether abstracted is just one (in kind and in number).

From these points it is perfectly obvious that it makes no difference whether the act subsists form-wise or identity-wise, nor whether it is such-and-such. The indicative sentence we accept is this: *an act of understanding subsisting as a result of its own perfect completeness is unique.*

Back to objection I

xxviii. Against this first objection, I say that the inference in question ["If an angel's act of understanding

were his substance, it would subsist"] is intended to mean "subsist in itself or in its abstractness." The indicative [corresponding to the consequent] is not this one exactly: "a substance subsists in itself" but rather this one: "an angel's substance (say, Gabriel's) subsists in itself," since the predicate of the antecedent is this whole phrase, "the angel's substance," as is obvious in the text.

But this correction does not salvage the inference, because, with it in place, it still would not follow that the angel's act of understanding would subsist in that act itself, but only that it would subsist in the angel's substance itself,

when it is clear from earlier remarks that the former is what the argument needs, and not just the latter.

Yes, the objection was abusing a double-meaning here, as is evident from the example it gave: "with whiteness subsisting, color would be a thing subsisting in itself, because it would be the whiteness that subsisted in itself." But color would not be subsisting in itself but as narrowed down to whiteness. Likewise, Gabriel's substance is "substance" as commonly predicated of God and creatures, and it subsists in itself, but it does not follow that "therefore it is subsistent in itself abstractly." If you say these objections have no place here, because "act of understanding" and "substance" plainly cannot stand as species to genus [the way whiteness stands to color], since no differentiators of the one could be differentiators of the other, your case can be turned back against you easily with the reply, "While what you say is right so far, there is no proof that 'act of understanding' and 'immaterial substance' cannot stand [as co-extensive] the way 'being' and 'good' do, whose *per se* differentiators fail to match each other form-wise, yet coincide perfectly." Then, *JUST AS* the following is invalid, "A case of goodness is the same thing as the angel's substance, which subsists in itself; therefore goodness subsists in itself," *SO ALSO* the same inference is invalid when 'act of understanding' replaces 'goodness'.

xxv. A different response needs to be made, then, starting with an observation of how these two ways of subsisting relate to each other and how they line up with being a substance. *Subsisting in another* (as "animal" subsists in man), and *subsisting in itself* (as man would subsist in [the Platonic form of] Man if it subsisted apart) relate to each other as the less complete relates to the more complete in the same class (since it is far more complete for a thing to subsist in itself than to borrow its subsisting from something else) and as the prior stands to the posterior (because what is *φ per se* is prior to what is *φ per aliud*, as is clear from *Physics II*, text 66). — As to how these line up with being a substance, they go like this.

- 'x is a substance' follows as a consequence from 'x subsists *either in itself or in another*' (unless some incompleteness about x prevents it, such as x's being more a part of a substance than a whole one).

- 'x is a substance open to further completion form-wise' or 'x is a substance open to be contracted by an in-

dividual' follows as a consequence from 'x subsists *in another*'.

■ 'x is a substance so complete as to preclude being narrowed by any further form or matter' follows as a consequence from 'x subsists in itself'.¹⁵

xxvi. With these points settled, I say that just as the antecedent contains two points, one of them explicitly:

if an angel's act of understanding were his substance,

and the other one implicitly:

if an angel's act of understanding were of such great completeness that it gets to be a substance,

so also two points need to be understood in the consequent, one of them again explicit:

it would subsist (using 'subsist' in its common meaning),

and the other one implicit:

it would subsist in itself.

Thus the explicit follows from the explicit, and the implicit from the implicit.

The fact that both points are contained in the antecedent is evident from things I have already said. It is also evident from the obvious truth that, since these two unqualified completenesses [that of being an act of understanding, and that of being a substance] are intrinsically diverse, they have no reason to be conjoined — no reason coming from their proper definitions, and none coming from their being unqualified completenesses. So if and when they are conjoined, their conjunction has to come from the greatness of the completeness belonging to one or the other, or to both.

The fact that the latter implicit point follows from the former is evident on two grounds. The first is that, if an act of understanding is posited to be so complete that it gets to have the most complete sort of nature (that of a substance), it would also get to have the most complete way of being that such a nature can have, which is to subsist in itself. The second ground is that, since an act of understanding is unqualifiedly a completeness and hence is independent of matter both in its definition and in its existing, if the act were posited to exist in the real with so much perfect completeness in it that it gets to be identical with a nature that is at once supremely complete and utterly diverse from it,^{*} then *a fortiori* it would be posited to have so much completeness that it would exclude being further determinable, either form-wise or matter-wise (since either involves an incompleteness); and hence it would belong to the order of things that do not borrow their being from anything else contracting them. Among such things, the consequent is plain as day: if [this act] is a substance, it can only be a substance so complete that it does not look to be instantiated[†] through something contracting it; rather, it has to subsist in itself.

¹⁵ This passage is a very helpful summary of the doctrine of "subsisting in." It explains how the scholastics were able to keep a usage they inherited from Boethius, who spoke of genera and species as "subsisting."

When we take the inference both for what it contains explicitly and for what it contains implicitly, and we see that the predicate of the consequent is not composed but contains both 'subsists' and 'in itself', we see also that the predicate of the antecedent must also contain two elements. Putting it all together, the corresponding indicative will be this: [the fact that] x is a substance because of the great completeness in it is also the reason x subsists in itself.

Lastly, objection V

xxvii. In turning to the last objection, I say that the word 'subsists' is used two ways. In one way, it just means to affirm a thing's existence in the real and to deny the thing's being-sustained in something else* in any way. Used the second way, 'subsists' implies a natural mode of being, to which the said affirmation and denial attach naturally. In the present discussion, we are not using 'subsist' the first way, but the second, because we are talking about the natural subsistence that would [supposedly] belong to an angel's act of understanding: this would be its being-a-substance[†] and would posit an unqualified completeness, and would belong to the act of understanding out of the latter's own supreme completeness.

So against the objection, I say that if that act of understanding subsisted naturally, it would have as much completeness as an act of understanding could possibly have, because it would not be modified by any limitation on its own breadth — much as subsisting human nature, for Plato, would get every completeness/perfection a human being can have. So, since understanding is an unqualified completeness and so is naturally apt to have limitless such completeness, it has to be the case that a subsisting act of understanding would be limitless. Well, without limits, it would identify itself with every other unqualified completeness. And thus it *would* be God. — Hence it is false to say that if an act of understanding subsisted, it would be just sheer understanding in such wise that it would not also be an act of willing. No, indeed: it would be willing and the will and divinity, etc.

Against the confirming argument, I say that it equivocates on 'subsists'. Although 'subsists' used the first way does not augment the intrinsic completeness [of what is being said to subsist], getting to subsist the second way posits a great completeness; and among things that are unqualifiedly complete, it suggests infinite completeness. — This also emerges from the point that, although an act of understanding is not in the category of substance by its own definition, if it gets to be so complete that it has the unqualified completeness of *being* a substance, it can come to identify itself for the same reason with any other unqualified completeness. Why one more than another? And thus the act of understanding would be pure act, etc.

This distinction about [how we use] 'subsists', along with this confirming argument, needs to be kept very much in mind. The former defeats the Scotists, while the latter defeats the Averroists.

* *sustentatio in alio*

† *substantialitas*

Scotus *In II Sent* d.3, q.7; Averroes on *Metaphys. VII*, comment 2

3rd supporting ground

xxviii. The third argument given in support of the conclusion is this one. [*Antecedent:*] If an angel's act of understanding were his substance, [*consequent:*] there could not be levels of understanding more or less perfectly. The consequent is supported on the ground that such levels come from diverse participation in understanding.

The first thing to note about this argument is the meaning of the consequent, for it could have two. The one is that there could not be more and less complete acts of understanding in the same angel. This version of the consequent is clear, because the substance of one and the same angel does not admit of more or less. I do not see why the consequent would be impossible, however: there does not seem to be any compelling argument against more or less in the understanding of the same angel. — The other meaning, then, and the one intended by St. Thomas, is that there would not be different levels of understanding unqualifiedly. This consequent is confirmed thanks to the preceding argument; for if the act of understanding subsisted, it could only be one, and hence it would exclude distinction into several levels.

xxix. Doubt arises about this argument because the inference does not seem to be valid formally. After all,

the following is not valid: "Substantiality is a substance or subsists; therefore it is not distinguished into diverse levels of substantiality." And yet substantiality is an unqualified perfection just like understanding. — That this inference is not valid for 'substantiality' is obvious of itself; for substantiality is in all angels and complete substances, together with a diversity of levels according as they are more or less complete.

xxx. The SHORT ANSWER to this is that the inference is perfectly good formally, and that if substantiality did subsist in its abstractness, it would be unique and would not admit a diversity of levels. The objection is fallacious because it equivocates on "substantiality subsists." This last could happen two ways. In one way, because out of the completeness it bespeaks, prescind from every admixture of imperfection, substantiality would subsist thus abstracted (and taken this way, as I said, it would be unique). In the other way, substantiality would be taken so as to have some imperfection mixed into it from its dividing differences, such as all the differences in the category of substances, and then the objection would work. But then it is not against our claim. — And only this one, unqualified perfection, *substantiality*, has these two ways of subsisting. For every differentiator and *per se* mode of it *constitutes* a substance in some substantial being and hence as subsisting.

Is an angel's act of understanding his existence?

It seems that an angel's act of understanding is his act of existing.

c.4; 415b 13
c.2; 413a 23

(1) After all, being alive is the "existing" in living things, as it says in *De Anima II*. But understanding is a way of being alive, as it says in *De Anima II*. Ergo an angel's understanding is his existing.

(2) Besides, as the cause stands to the cause, so the effect stands to the effect [so that if the causes are identical, so are the effects]. But the form through which an angel exists is the same as the form through which he understands at least himself. Therefore his understanding is the same thing as his existing.

* motus
PG 3,704

ON THE OTHER HAND, an angel's act of understanding is his changing.* That much is made clear by Denis in c.4 of *On the Divine Names*. But existing is not a case of changing. Therefore an angel's act of existing is not his act of understanding.

c.8;
1050a 23

ANSWER: neither an angel's action nor that of any creature is its existing. There are two kinds of action, after all, as it says in *Metaphysics IX*. One kind goes to something outside the agent, so as to imply that an outside thing undergoes something. Examples are burning something and drying it out. The other kind of action does not go outside but remains within the agent himself, such as sensing, understanding, and willing. By such actions, after all, nothing outside is changed; it all takes place in the agent himself. Now the first kind of action, obviously, cannot be the very existing of the agent; for his existing is indicated as *within him*, while such an action is a flowing out into what is being done by him. The second kind of action, meanwhile, has by its definition an open-ended object (unqualifiedly or in some respect). Open-ended unqualifiedly is the object of an act of understanding (the true) or that of an act of willing (the good), both of which are coextensive with

being; hence understanding and willing, for their part, are open to *everything*, and each of their acts gets its kind from its object. (Open-ended in some respect is the object of sensing, which is open to all *perceptible* things, as seeing is to all visible ones.) But the existing of any creature is limited to *one thing* in genus and species.¹ Only God's existing is unlimited unqualifiedly, holding all things within itself, as Denis says in c. 5 of *On the Divine Names*. Hence only God's existing is also His act of understanding and His willing.

PG 3, 817

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): 'alive' is sometimes used for the very existing of a living thing, and sometimes for a vital operation, *i.e.*, for an operation by which it shows it is alive. This is how Aristotle says understanding is a way of being alive: in the context he is sorting different levels of living things according to their different vital operations.

ad (2): an angel's essence is the whole reason for his being [what he is], but not the whole reason for his understanding [what he understands], because he cannot understand everything through his essence. Thus what-he-is relates to the angel's existence under its proper definition as such-and-such an essence. But what-he-is relates to the angel's understanding as its object under a more universal definition, *i.e.* a true thing or one-that-is. Thus it is clear that, although it is the same form, it is not the source of his being and of his understanding under the same definition. And hence it does not follow that the existing and the understanding are the same thing in an angel.

¹ In other words, an act of existence is specifiable by just one species, that of the thing existing; an act of understanding is specifiable by the species of any object it has. Does this suffice to make the two acts really distinct? Aquinas needs the answer to be yes.

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article he does four jobs. (1) He puts forward a conclusion answering the question, namely, that neither an angel's action nor that of any creature is its existence. — (2) He distinguishes two kinds of action, the immanent and the transitive. — (3) He supports the conclusion as far as transitive action is concerned. — (4) He supports it for immanent action.

ii. The means used to support the conclusion about transitive action is that it is an outflow from the agent into what he is doing, whereas existing is indicated (*i.e.* is a thing signified) inside the agent, as even the meaning shows; for the 'is indicated' stands on the side of

the thing and not on the side of the word's mode of signifying.¹

The means of support for the conclusion about immanent action is that [*major:*] an immanent action is limitless either unqualifiedly or in some respect (*i.e.* within some class; whereas [*minor:*] the existence of a

¹ Cajetan seems to be saying that existence comes into language as a wholly internal factor, as the very meaning of 'exists' testifies, but the word 'exists' is not a meta-linguistic affair. Perhaps he is rejecting a long way in advance Bertrand Russell's idea that 'exists' indicates a property of words, one whereby propositions using them are sometimes true.

thing is finite and nailed down to the definite genus and fixed species of the thing who's existence it is: therefore they are not the same. — The major is clarified by distinguishing the two kinds of immanent action, the one pertaining to our intellective part, the other to our sensory part. The first kind is open-ended unqualifiedly, because its object extends to everything; the second is open-ended in some respect, because its object extends only to certain kinds of things. All points are clear in the text.

iii. Concerning this argument, notice that an immanent operation can be taken two ways: in general (e.g. understanding, seeing, etc.), and specifically or as contracted to such and such a subject (such as human understanding, bovine seeing, etc.). In the present context, we are *not* talking about these in general, because so taken there would not be a difference between them and existing in general; rather, the talk here is about immanent actions as contracted to subjects. What is meant is that, because human existence is in a definite species, but human understanding is not but is open-ended [in the species it can get from its objects], the two are not the same.

Notice secondly that being nailed down or being "in" a species happens in two ways: incidentally or extrinsically, *versus* of itself* or intrinsically. In the topic at hand, the talk is not about extrinsic or incidental specification (because then the argument would be worth nothing, as you can see running through it); rather it is about intrinsic and essential specification. The intended point is that, because human existence is essentially nailed down to man's species, but human understanding is not essentially in man's species but can be essentially specified by all the species of being or all those of the true, and hence is boundless and undetermined unqualifiedly, the two are not the same. And likewise in other cases. — This makes it clear how faithful we were being to St. Thomas with our comments on the preceding article when we declined to admit that 'act of understanding' was an indivisible species; for if it were form-wise an individual completeness, it would already be nailed down essentially to some definite species; his argument here is based on the opposite.

A doubt

iv. There is doubt about the foundation for this argument. One can think it amounts to this:

(1) any things having different essential, specific differences, are different things,

or one can think it amounts to this:

(2) whenever things are such that one of them is in a definite species, but the other cannot be essentially nailed down to one species, the two things are diverse.

— If claim (1) is the foundation for this argument, one has to concede that every form-wise specific distinction is a real one — which is not admitted by the Thomists who think that a relation is really the same thing as its basis, and it also does not seem consonant with St. Thomas's doctrine. For just as the good is formally distinct from being, so also the kinds of good

and the *per se* differentiators of good are formally distinct from the kinds and differentiators of being; and yet they are the same things in real terms.

— But if (1) is declared false, and the reasoning here is said to be based on (2), a similar dubiousness comes back and is worse. For one thing, (2) differs from (1) in only one point. In (1) only diversity of specific differences is blamed for causing real distinction; but in (2) otherness and plurality are blamed, because on the one side there is a constituent difference, but on the other there are multiple specific differences; this (allegedly) is how human existence stands to human understanding. But it is very hard to see how a plurality of other differences can make the thing on that side really distinct from the thing with just one such difference on this side, if the one difference on this side does not suffice for this. After all, the only thing plurality does is give what has a generic nature, as a singleness of specific difference gives what has a specific nature. Also, one sees no reason why a thing of one species cannot be identical with a thing having a generic nature of another order,² if it can be one with a thing with a different specific nature. — For another thing, claim (2) also does not seem to be accepted by the Thomists I mentioned above; after all, whiteness is of one definite species; but the relation with which they propose to identify whiteness is open to many species since it divides into relations of similarity [with everything resembling whiteness] and dissimilarity [with everything else], etc. — And here is a confirming point. If something is not averse to a plurality of specific differences, it is also not averse to three or four or ten such differences. Hence, if it can be one thing in the real and yet be in two species, it can still be one thing in the real and simultaneously be in all the species of a genus.

Clearing this up

v. Against this doubt, I say that directly and proximately the reasoning process of St. Thomas is based on claim (2), without, however, denying (1) — with the result that the proximate foundation of his argument is this proposition: "What is essentially nailed down in its species is not a thing still essentially determinable by many species." This proposition seems to be self-evident; otherwise, one and the same thing would be in essence formally complete down to its last formal specification, and yet not be complete down to its last such specification — which implies both sides of a contradiction at once.

Granted, it does not matter whether the thing is determinable by one specific difference or by many (as a generic nature is specified by many). Many impossible points still follow either way. If one posits that a thing

² The phrase 'of another order', as used here and below, just means belonging to a different scheme of classification. Each scheme or "order" is a list with a broad genus or category at the top, narrower genera appearing as one goes down, and an ultimate species at the bottom. Thus items on a list with a different top are "of another order."

* *per se*

q 54, a. 1,
commentary
§§ xxx, xx

specifically of one order is identical to a thing belonging to another order, nothing follows except that what is essentially nailed down by its ultimate formal determination is still essentially determinable by another formal determination – and thus it would be nailed down ultimately, and not nailed down ultimately. If one posits that a thing specifically of one order is identical to a thing generically of another order, above and beyond the problem just mentioned, there follow two others: (1) a thing nailed down form-wise by its ultimate determination would be a thing essentially open to many formal differences; (2) this thing would be of two opposed natures, because it would be identical with two things of different species dividing that generic thing. Thus if surfaces were by nature just generically colored, it would follow that one and the same surface would be white and black; for every surface would be identically “color,” and hence this surface would not be of just one color (say, white) but would be identically every color — which implies a contradiction. It’s as if someone said that ‘color’ meant numerically one thing and yet was a genus.

From what I just said, it can be obvious that, although both the propositions asserted in the major are true, the only points necessary are those that speak of sameness and distinction between a specified thing and a generic thing of another order; these points are the more obvious ones.

v. So against the objections on the other side, I don’t

think there is anything to say except that the present discussion needs to be limited by two or three conditions. The first is that we are talking about *real* differences, *i.e.* those that add some real makeup. By this condition one excludes objections about the good and the like, since they do not add a real makeup but only a relation of reason. — The second condition is that we are talking about *per se* identity, since a *per accidens* identity is excluded by art [*i.e.* the art of correct argumentation.] And by this condition one excludes the figments of those who speculate in thin air, imagining that some item is really one and the same and yet determined by an ultimate difference and yet is still determinable in another order ultimately. For if we are speaking on a *per se* basis, this is unintelligible. On a *per accidens* basis, however, even if no contradiction is implied, still such a *per accidens* case seems to be posited for no reason. After all, nature avoids the *per accidens* as much as possible and always aims at the *per se*. — A third condition needs to be stipulated for those who think a relation is identical with its basis, namely, that the talk here is about non-relational things.* But let those who add this third condition take thought for how they are going to avoid the above mentioned problems, and especially the third. For the above mentioned problems do not arise because of the subject matter but arise from the definitions of the ultimate differences of genus and species, which definitions are common to relational and non-relational things.

* *absoluta*

An angel's power to understand — is that his essence?

1 ST q.77, a.1, q.79, a.1

It seems that, in an angel, his strength or power to understand is none other than his essence.

(1) After all, 'mind' and 'intellect' are names for the power to understand; but Denis, in many places in his books, calls the angels "intellects" and "minds." Therefore, the angel *is* his power to understand.

(2) Besides, if the power to understand in an angel were something beyond his essence, it would have to be an accident: for we call anything beyond an item's essence an accident to it. But "a simple form, cannot be a subject of accidents," as Boethius says in [c. 2] of his *De Trinitate*; so an angel would not be a simple form, which is contrary to what was settled above.

(3) Moreover, Augustine says in his *Confessions XIII* that God made angelic nature "close to Himself," and made prime matter "close to nothing." It seems from this that an angel is simpler than prime matter, as being closer to God. But prime matter is just its potential. All the more, therefore, must an angel be his intellectual potential.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Denis says in c. 11 of the *Celestial Hierarchy*, to the effect that "the angels are divided into substance, power, and operation." In them, the substance is one thing, and the power is another, and the operation is still another.

ANSWER: neither in an angel, nor in any other creature, is its operative strength or power¹ the same as its essence.² This becomes clear as follows. Since a power/potency is posited on the basis of an act, it has to be the case that a diversity of powers/potencies comes from a diver-

sity of acts. This is why we say that a distinctive act corresponds to its own distinctive potency. Well, in every creature, its essence differs from its existence and is compared to its existence as potency is compared to act, as became clear above. But its potency/power to act corresponds to an operation it does. Well, in an angel, his act of understanding is not his act of existing, and no other operation in an angel or in any other creature is the same thing as his existing. Therefore an angel's essence is not his power to understand, nor is the essence of any created thing its power to understand.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): an angel is called an intellect and a mind, because all of his cognition is intellectual, whereas the cognition of our soul is partly intellectual and partly sensory.

ad (2): because a subject stands to an accident it has as a potency stands to an act, what cannot be the subject of an accident is a simple form which is pure act. Only God is like that; His was the "simple form" Boethius was talking about. — But a simple form which is not its own existence (but stands to it as potency does to act) can be the subject of an accident (and such is the simple form which is an angel). It can especially have an accident that flows from its species; for that sort of accident pertains to the thing's form. (By contrast, an accident that belongs just to an individual does not follow from its whole species but from its matter, which is the source of individuation.)

ad (3): the power/potency of matter corresponds to substantial being; an operative power corresponds rather to an accidental being. So it is not a similar case.

who is not also Pure Act. The issue forces one to deal with the appalling ambiguity of the Latin word '*potentia*', which meant both potency and power.

Cajetan's Commentary

In the title question, one needs to note that since a power is a source of active or passive operation, it includes in itself two aspects: a relation of being-the-source-of, and an absolute [*i.e.* non-relational] factor which is the proximate reason for doing or undergoing. In the present article, the question is not about the relation but the absolute factor. So the sense of the title question is this: is a power (not as a relation but as the absolute thing its name means) the same thing as an angel's substance?

ii. In the body of the article, there is one conclusion answering in the negative, and it is universal for both angels and other creatures, namely: no operative power, be it of an angel or of any other creature, is its substance. — The support goes as follows. [*Antecedent*] No creature's existence is its own operation; [*consequence*] so no creature's substance is an operative power it has.

The antecedent is obvious from the preceding article. — The consequence is deduced on the ground that [*major*:] diversity of distinctive powers has to come from diversity of acts, because each distinctive act corresponds to its own potency/power. [*Minor*:] But existing and operating are different acts, whose distinctive potencies are substance and power-to-act. Therefore a substance and a power-to-act are diverse.

Many Doubts

iii. Concerning this argument doubt arises on many fronts. Start with the proposition, "diversity of acts requires a diversity of powers."¹ Either this is talking about

¹ The wording of the article reads the other way, that diversity of powers requires a diversity of acts. See note 7 below.

Celestial Hierarchy cc 2, 6, 12, PG 3, 137, PG 3, 200, PG 3, 292, *On the Divine Names* cc 1, 4, 7, PG 3, 868

PL 64, 1250 q 51, a.2

c.7; PL 32, 828

PG 3, 284

* *virtus vel potentia*

q 54, a.1, q 44, a.1

a flat diversity with no further nuance, or such-and-such a diversity. If it is talking without nuance, it yields no conclusion, because a distinction of acts coming from a source does not imply a distinction in the source (except perhaps a formal distinction of powers, which is not enough in the case at hand).— If it is talking about such-and-such diversity, either it is talking about formal diversity (and so again doesn't get the intended conclusion), or it is talking about a real diversity (and so taken it is false, obviously, since a real diversity of acts is consistent with a oneness of the power for those acts, as is seen in the case of the power to see, *etc.*); indeed oneness of power is consistent with a real contrariety of acts, as is clear from comment 18 on *De Caelo II*.

iv. Again, the argument is either about every act-state or about certain ones. If it is about every act-state, there obviously follows a regress to infinity. The operative power is itself an "act-state" of some sort, you admit, since you make it an accident, and you say it resides in the soul; and thus if every act-state whatsoever requires its own power, there will exist another potency beforehand [a potency to have the power], and since that one is also an act-state of some sort, there will have to be a still prior potency, and so on to infinity.² — But if the talk is only about certain acts, it will not be easy to say which ones. For if you say the argument is about *ultimate* acts, one fears that this is an evasion, because then an ultimate act (as ultimate) would have the distinctive trait of demanding its own power. But this is false, too; for as is clear in *Metaphysics X* and from *De Anima II* [c.2] and from *Physics III*, every act which comes about *per se* comes about in its own power, but it is obvious that not every ultimate act-state is the *per se terminus* of an action, since every accidental, absolute form is ordered to some operation. — But if you say the argument here is about the act "looked to" by that power, one fears that this is false from what St. Thomas said when he included existing as an ultimate act *vis-à-vis* an essence. For it is clear enough that an essence does not "look to" existing, nor does anything mediate to join this act to this potency; rather, they are generated and corrupted by one and the same process of becoming.

v. A third reason for doubt comes from propositions assumed, such as: "Essence is the distinctive potency for existing, and an operative power is the proper potency for operating." After all, if these propositions are true along with what you said before, it obviously follows that just as operating and existing are always distinct both form-wise and really, so also every essence is really distinct from every operative power. But that implies a contradiction. For one thing, no essence would be the potency to produce an accidental form; thus heat would not be a potency to heat things! For another thing, no operative power/potency would exist, since it would not

be an essence!³

vi. The conclusion itself gives rise to many doubts and objections insofar as it posits that "no created substance is the immediate source of any operation." Either one understands this universally about sources of acting and undergoing, or else one understands it to be about sources of acting alone. If it is a claim about both, it follows that a substance cannot be the immediate subject of any change. But this is a problem, as the opposite appears to be the case in prime matter. — For another thing, this claim can only be salvaged by positing in every substance some accidents of potentiality native to the substance, by the help of which it would be changeable *via* various changes. But this is arbitrary and irrational: a plurality is not to be posited without necessity; nature, after all, does the best it can with fewer entities, as is clear in *Physics I*.

But if the conclusion is only about a source of acting, it follows that all the powers of our sensory part and our intellectual part will be sources of acting, since they are operative powers. And yet in *De Anima II*, it obviously says that the sense powers are passive potencies, and it says the same about the possible intellect in *De Anima III*.

Trouble from Scotus

vii. Finally come the objections that Scotus raised against the conclusion in his remarks on *II Sent.*, d.16, and on *IV Sent.*, d.12. First, he argues this way. [*Major:*] What is ordered to an end is the more nobly ordered, the more immediately it is ordered to that end; [*minor:*] a created substance is ordered in the noblest way towards its end by an operation attaining it; [*conclusion:*] therefore it will operate immediately. — And he gives a confirmation. Operating immediately belongs to less noble forms such as accidents and also to more noble ones such as deity; therefore it belongs to any form in the middle, such as a created substance. — And here is a second confirming argument, namely, that otherwise an intellectual substance would be beatified *per accidens* — which is awkward. The inference is supported on the ground that the mediating potency in which blessedness is received would be the subject beatified, if it were separate from the substance.

viii. Secondly, Scotus argues as follows. A substance has to be produced by a substance even as the source whereby: therefore a substance is the source of the action whereby; and this is nothing but an active power. — And he confirms this. According to you Thomists, the form by which the thing generated is assimilated to what generates it is the reason and source of the generating; therefore, the power to generate in any substance is the substance.

If you say that, yes the substance is the active source of operation and generation, but not the proximate source, but only the first source, as it says in Aristotle's definition of nature, and then you say that power to operate names the proximate source, multiple objections are to be raised. For

³ The objector thinks it safe to take a distinction Aquinas defended in the talk of first-order existence (the kind substances have) and apply it to the talk of second-order existence (the kind an operative power has). He thinks the resulting absurdity discredits Aquinas' distinction.

² The objector assumes that a potency-to-do has to be an accident in any subject having it. Since Aquinas admitted that an accident "actuated" the subject having it, it followed that even a potency was an "act" *qua* accident. If this "act" in turn presupposed a potency . . .

c 6:
189a 11ff

cc 4, 5

c 4

Cayetan's
replies are
in § xv

Physics II,
c.1: 192b
10ff.

The ansver
comes in § xii

c.9
c.3

one thing, it cannot be denied that substance is the immediate source of this sort of power to operate, which you claim is an accident.

For another thing, you also cannot deny that the substance is the immediate source whence a substance is produced. After all, the act of producing a substance is either elicited directly from the substantial form, or from an accidental form. If it is from the substantial form, you have my point. If it is from an accidental form, it is from that form either by its own power (and this is not the case, obviously), or else it is by the power of the substance because the accident is its instrument — and that this is also false is shown four ways.

(1) According to you Thomists, an instrument changes nothing unless it is *moved* by the main agent; therefore there is some operation of the substance whereby it moves the accident to act — which is my point.

(2) A main cause and an instrumental one are essentially ordered as the higher and the lower. But the higher cause reaches the effect in natural priority over the lower cause; and if the higher cause is a natural one, it does as much as it can in natural priority over the lower cause. The result is that, in that natural priority, the substance is produced immediately by the substance. Hence, in the second natural place, where the action of the secondary cause terminates, the substance is not produced, unless it gets produced twice.⁴

(3) Where the instrument does not reach, there the principle agent's action has to reach; but the action of an accident does not attain the essence of bare prime matter; therefore, substantial generation (which happens in prime matter) must be elicited immediately from a substance.⁵

(4) When you say an accident causes a substance in virtue of the substance, the phrase 'in virtue of' either adds something absolute or something relative. If it is something absolute, then since it is an accident, the same question returns. If it is something relative, it is obvious that an accident cannot make a substance *via* an added relation, since a relation is not granted any power to act. And also, that relation would still be an accident.

For yet another thing, one cannot deny that a substance is the immediate source on its own level of anything it does, as is clear from the definition of a higher main cause, as said before. — And here is a confirmation. Although according to the philosophers God only causes things by way of secondary causes, He is still the immediate cause of His own operations on His own level. Therefore created substances and accidental forms will stand similarly in case a created substance only causes by way of mediating accidents.

⁴ "Natural priority" was not temporal priority set by natural factors, as Scotus' writing sometimes suggested, as it does here. Cajetan dealt with this problem at length in his commentary on q.8, a. 1.

⁵ Aristotle had put prime matter into his account of substantial change as a limit case, as if to say that change in the form(s) structuring a body could go all the way down to the most basic ones. On this point see Cajetan's commentary on *De Ente et essentia*, c.2.

ix. Thirdly, Scotus argues by a reduction to the impossible. It would follow that an intellectual substance could be made without an intellect (by divine omnipotence) and *vice versa*, since any absolute thing can be brought to be without another absolute thing really distinct from it.

If you say this cannot be done because of the necessary connection between the intellectual substance and its intellect, I get my point across all the better for two reasons. Firstly, that connection does not come from a connection of potency to act (because every potency is open to an act and its contradictory, as it says in *Metaphysics VIII*, but from the connection of a naturally active cause to its effect (hence even for you Thomists, potencies flow from an essence). Therefore the substance is immediately active, which is my point. — Secondly, since God can take the place of any outside cause, no matter how necessary the connection [between intellectual substance and intellect] may seem, God will still be able to make the one without the other.

x. Fourthly, Scotus argues from points we admit and experience. We say in the first place that an angel understands his own substance through himself; therefore the angel's essence is the proximate source of his act of understanding. — We also experience that warm water cools off of itself; therefore the water's own substance is the proximate source of its cooling off.

Clearing the doubts away

xi. To clear up the present controversy, two distinctions must be kept in mind. The first is between act-states. Some are equivalent to their power, as that of understanding is equivalent to the intellect and that of seeing to the eye: other act-states are non-equivalent, such as understanding just this, say a cow, and seeing just this, like seeing white. In the topic we are dealing with, the talk is only about equivalent act-states; they alone verify the point that powers are distinguished by their acts.⁶

The second distinction is about gradations. Some things are intended by nature (in its primary intention) as acts; while other things are primarily intended by nature as powers. (It may happen, of course, that a thing intended as an act has something of potency mixed into it; and likewise things intended as powers may happen to have something of act-hood mixed into them.) The former things are of themselves first off * and essentially acts, and hence are located unqualifiedly on the level of acts. The latter things however are of themselves firstly and essentially powers, and hence unqualifiedly located on the level of powers. As a result one must imagine that JUST AS we find in the category of substance some things intended by nature firstly to be sources of other things, SO ALSO in every category we find things which are first intended by nature to be proximate sources of other things.

Such being the case, we get a third distinction of act and potency. Both are two-fold. Some acts are acts of themselves first off and secondarily are potencies; and

⁶ Act A is equivalent to power P when A and P imply each other.

The replies are in § xxvii

Replies are in §§ xix, xx

* per se primo

others are the opposite. Likewise some powers are of themselves first off potencies and secondarily are acts, while others are the reverse. (There is a certain amount of latitude in these cases.) Passive powers are “acts” only in how they exist,* inasmuch as some of them inhere in subjects, they get from that fact a certain way of being “acts.” Active powers, on the other hand, are “acts” but in such a way as to have been essentially intended and produced for this in nature, so as to be the sources of operations. And hence, they are essentially located in the class of sources.

In the present subject matter, we are talking about an act of itself first off intended in the makeup of an act, and about a potency of itself first off intended in the makeup of a potency. — That such things are found in nature would have to be the subject of a separate inquiry. For the moment, however, it seems reasonable to grant their existence. As Aristotle taught in *Ethics X*, all practical habitations are such things, since they are not for the sake of anything except operating. Likewise, the powers of the soul (in their formal accounts) are not for the sake of anything except operating.

xii. With the above points in place, I answer the objections made against St. Thomas’s argument. The present issue is about real diversity, not just of any sort, but in form; and real diversity of not just any acts but of equivalent acts, and of those intended of themselves first off in their makeup as acts. For it is this kind of total diversity that demands the diversity of powers, not as an afterthought [*a posteriori*] but as implying it *a priori*, on the ground that the equivalent act is the purpose of the power, and it is clear in so many words in *Physics II* that it is from the purpose that one assigns the account and condition of what is for the purpose, and this is supplying the cause *a priori*. Indeed the purpose is the most important cause in natural things, because natural things are for the sake of a purpose. And so the argument saying, “Distinction in what is from the source does not imply a distinction in the source,” is a fallacy of accident; after all, the [equivalent] acts of the powers distinguish the powers not in being their effects but in being their purposes.⁷

xiii. As to the objection against propositions assumed, I say that the words of St. Thomas at the end of his answer *ad* (3) make it clear that the word “existence” is not being taken broadly here as something common to first, substantial act and accidental act, but entirely for substantial act. And the reason is that “existence” is being taken here as it is wholly distinguished from the “being” which a thing gets by operating. Such existence is not accidental being, (operating is having a certain acci-

dental being).⁸ And so it is no wonder that an “accidental” form is a proximate source of being-φ and operating, because both a thing’s being-φ and its operating are cases of “accidental being.”⁹ But this is not how operating and being-a-substance stand to each other, obviously: because the latter is substance, and the former, an accident.

xiv. Going in order through the objections against the conclusion, I answer that the present discussion, properly speaking, is only about operative power, be it said to operate actively or passively, provided the operation is really that. And thereby all purely receptive potencies are excluded, *i.e.* potencies which have nothing of “act” about them by way of any operation; such is the potency of a subject with respect to its distinctive modification* and universally towards those traits which are intrinsically[†] congenial in it. Hence it does not seem awkward to posit such potencies as congenial in the substances of things. And entities are not being multiplied beyond need. For as is clear in *Metaphysics XII*, in texts 26 and 27, in each genus there is a distinctive potency and a distinctive act which are like the sources of that genus. From this it obviously follows that we have to say one or the other of two things: either that substances are reductively in other categories (as potency is reduced to the category of act) or else that there exist these congenial potencies. And since the former is awkward, as even Scotus admits, we have to say the latter.¹⁰ — One cannot answer the text from Aristotle by saying it is talking about objective potencies. For it is explicitly talking about potency and act as sources of what is in a category; but obviously an objective potency is not the source of a thing: rather it is the thing itself, as the possible is a being. — Against the objection drawn from the potency of matter, the answer is obvious from St. Thomas, who means to say that the potency of matter is towards substantial being, without there being any mediating “operation” that would really be an operation and would be an accident between matter and a substantial form. After all, in the instant of generation there is no real factor in the matter but the substantial form with its consequences.

Cleaning up after Scotus

xv. Against Scotus’s first argument [given in *vii*], I say that being the “source” of an operation turns up in three

⁸ Notice how explicitly Cajetan articulates the distinction between first-order and second-order act-states.

⁹ This is a wonderful word-play on the ambiguity of ‘accident’. On one hand, it means a categorical accident (a second-order entity), and in this sense existence is emphatically not an accident, on the other hand, the word simply denies flowing from the essence. This is the sense in which existence is “accidental” to a created essence.

¹⁰ What Cajetan is now doing is protesting against an assumption about the philosophical analysis of an ordinary-language sentence in which an individual subject is said to do something directly, like produce another of its kind. The assumption is that one should either take the sentence at face value, so that a substance is “of itself” the what-acts and the whereby it acts (as Scotus prefers), or else attach to the substance enough second-order entities to insure that it “acts” only through them (as Scotus thinks Thomists are forced to do). Cajetan will offer a third option.

* modaliter

c.7,
1177b 6-10

cf. § iv

c.9,
200a 10f

cf. § v

cf. § vi

* passivo
† per se

c.5

on // Sem.
d 16,
contra
opm. 1

again in his
answer *ad* 3

ways: as a merely proximate source, as a merely principal source, or as a proximate and principal source at once.

— To elicit an operation as its merely proximate source is an example of incompleteness, because it has to occur in a category of accident.

— To elicit an operation as its proximate and principal source is an example of supreme completeness, because it posits in the subject a completeness which is at once that of a substance and that of an accident.

— But to elicit an operation as its merely principal source is in the middle, and hence it reasonably belongs to a created substance, which is a middle thing between God and accidents.

So against his first argument I say that a substance should be ordered to its purpose not in the noblest way, but in the noblest way possible. Being ordered to its purpose in a mode so immediate as to exclude an intermediate power/potency is a mode impossible for a created substance. — Thereby also it is clear what we say against his first confirmation: namely, that thanks to the great completeness it has, a created substance conflicts with being the merely proximate source of an operation, because it is at once the proximate and principal source.

Against his other confirmation, if one does not wish to abuse words, one denies his inference; for acting by way of one's own power as the whereby-one-operates is not acting "through an accident*."¹¹ — Against his support, I deny that blessedness is compared to the [intellective] power of an intellectual substance (and to the intellectual substance itself) as color is compared to a surface and a bodily substance having the surface, such that, as color would inform the surface if it were separate from the body, so also blessedness would inform the power if it were separate from the substance. This conditional is false, since blessedness is essentially a vital operation, which is only intelligible as the act-state of a living thing. Also, since blessedness can only be in a blessed person, it is impossible to imagine how a separated potency/faculty would be blessed the way a separated surface would be colored. So the antecedent and the consequent of the conditional are both impossible, and so is the conditional itself.¹²

xvi. Against Scotus's second argument [in § viii], I admit that a substance has to be brought into being by a substance as its principal cause, but not as its proximate cause. — Against his first objection about the causing of an accident by a substance, I say that no accident is caused by a substance directly through a mediating operation. But consistent with this is saying that many accidents follow upon the substance both in the line of efficient causation and that of material causation, *by way of natural consequence* and this is how a substance is a cause of its own modifications⁵ and powers.

* *passiones*

¹¹ In Cajetan's third option, one need not think of a substance as "bare" (*pace* Locke). It can have powers built into it as included in being the kind of substance it is. So, if I think "through my intellect," I am not acting through an accident.

¹² Short summary: Scotus made the intellect a second-order entity and gave it a property only a first-order entity can have.

Against his objection from the distinctive causality of a principal and higher cause, I can give two answers. In the first I can deny that a substance and its operative power stand, properly speaking, as principal cause and instrument, or as higher and lower, and hence the objections will have no place. And the reason for my denial can be that a substance and its operative power concur, *not as two causes*, but as cause and a condition of that cause. — In a second answer, I can admit that the substance and its operative power stand (not as higher and lower) but in some way as principal cause and instrument, but that an instrument is twofold, conjoint and separate, and further that among conjoint instruments there is a certain latitude, since heat and the power to augment can be called conjoint instruments of the human soul, and yet the power to augment is more of a conjoint instrument. It is not necessary that every conjoint instrument be *moved* by the principal cause; rather a conjoint instrument can work as a source concurring with the principal agent's operating. By taking 'instrument' thus broadly, this is enough for it to have the condition of an instrument. — Hence no other response is necessary to objections presupposing that a substance and its operative power stand as two causes.¹²

xvii. As for the objection that looks for the proximate source eliciting a substance's generation, I answer that in the real the instantaneous generation of a substance is not an operation but is the terminus of the generative process that has been changing the matter thus far. So there is no need to seek any other source of it; rather, the same thing that was generating in the whole previous time is generating at the last instant of that time, terminating its action.

And when one asks how an alteration (or any other accidental change) makes a substance by the power of a substance — what is that power? I say in a nutshell that it can be two things. First, it is said by some writers to be a certain intentional thing, in the sense in which the intention of "color" is said to be in the air, and that while it is an accident in its being, it is nevertheless a substance in its causing, not as a principle cause, but as a somehow instrumental power, which (we know) can be less complete than its effect, as is clear from the forms of seeds and is supported by *Metaphysics XI*, text 40 — The second response is that the accident, by virtue of being conjoined to such a substance, is its conjoint organ *and* is its power, and there doesn't have to be any added power. And this I think is true in things which are not genuine instruments, but amount to "one cause" with the substance itself.¹⁴

xviii. Against his third argument [given in § ix] I say firstly that this un-nuanced claim, "Really distinct things

¹³ Of Cajetan's two answers, the first is the more radical. The words 'principal cause' and 'instrument' are native to first-order discourse, such that only a first-order entity can be called either (like people and their tools). Why extend the terms to any second-order entities, except perhaps metaphorically?

His second answer offers the consolation that only a small class of "accidents" will be re-labeled as "conjoint instruments."

¹⁴ "One cause" is obvious, if it means one cause *quod agi*, because such a cause is a first-order entity. But it will take discernment to decide when (if ever) a substance and its accident make one cause *quo*, because this is a second-order question.

Cf. Scotus on
III Sent. d.2,
q.2, a.1

are separable from each other," is false, even in Scotus' own doctrine. According to him, the essential parts of something, taken together, are really distinct from the whole; and yet the one cannot be produced without the other.

m §.xvi

Next I say that a necessary connection between a substance and its power, even if it were from active causation, would still not imply that the substance is the immediate source of any operation, as is clear from my prior remarks. — It also does not imply that God could separate them on the ground that He can take the place of the efficient cause. For this claim is understood to be talking about properly efficient causality, *i.e.* through a mediating operation; but that is not the case with a substance *vis-à-vis* its own modification [*passio*], as I've already said.

§.xvii

xix. Against his objection from the essence of an angel, I say that the angel's substance is not the elicitive source of his act of understanding; rather his power to understand is that source. Although the angel's substance concurs towards his act of understanding without the mediation of an intelligible species, it still does not concur as eliciting that act, but as the source of his intellect's being in act to understand himself, as will become clear later on.

q 56, a.1

xx. Against his last argument, the one about the cooling of hot water, I have two replies. The first is that the source of cooling down is a form mediating coolness which remains in the water at some level, because the water cannot be entirely deprived of it. — It is no obstacle that the coolness is less than the heat introduced. For while the coolness is less form-wise, it is greater root-wise and power-wise, because the water's substantial form is its root, and it is a power and distinctive trait of that form. But it can happen that it can suffer as a whole from a whole opposite, because of the contrariety of the active qualities existing in the whole in continuous combat.

A second and better answer is that the water cools off "of itself" thanks to its producer (and thanks to its own form in the manner of a mere consequence), in the way in which a heavy thing, by exercising its weight,* breaks whatever prevents it from falling and so moves downward. For one must imagine (and it is so) that just

* *gravitas*

as a downward motion follows thanks to the form of a heavy thing if it has been produced outside its place, and if nothing prevents it; so also being cold follows according to the form of water present in so-and-so much completeness; and if it is impeded from having that much completeness, a change to being cooler follows as soon as the inhibiting factor is removed. And just as a heavy thing by exerting its weight sometimes overcomes [its obstacle], so also the cool by chilling overcomes the heat inhibiting it, when the heat from the agent spreading it is removed. And again, just as downward motion follows a heavy thing by way of its weight, so also the cooling down of water [sometimes prevails] thanks to the coolness of which water cannot be deprived altogether.

That one or the other of these answers (which are very close) holds good, becomes clear from the fact that, unless one of them is accepted, we will have to resort to extrinsic causes, such as the container. But this cannot be said reasonably. For one thing, water gets cooler than its container. For another thing, if the container were insulated*, or were held neutral, the warm water would still cool off; a clear sign of this is the fact that hot water put into a not-so-hot container becomes lukewarm. Hence the container (and any other extrinsic cause) can only be posited as an accidental cause, as removing an obstacle. For one must posit a natural cause for any natural accident — a natural cause which is an intrinsic source, as emerges in *Physics II*.¹⁵

* *circum-
scriptur*

c. 1,
192b 15

¹⁵ The ambition to find an internal cause was correct in this case, but it could not succeed until the "coolness" of water was recognized as a phenomenon relative to human sensation rather than a natural consequence of water's substantial form. With the human body maintained at a healthy internal temperature of about 98.6 degrees F., water at the normal temperature of the surrounding room had to feel cool to one's finger, elbow, *etc.* A genuine answer to the problem Scotus and Cajetan were arguing about could not be found until it was discovered that heat was a matter of molecular motion, and that non-living things contained no internal source of it. As a heavy thing "moves naturally" towards an object of greater mass (*i.e.* downward in our earth-bound experience, toward our very massive planet), so also an inanimate substance "changes naturally" towards the ambient temperature, whatever it is. And if that temperature, abnormally, is well over 110 degrees F., the water feels hot even to us.

Is there agent intellect and possible intellect in an angel?

I ST q 79, a. 3; 2 CG c 96

It seems that there is an agent and a possible intellect in an angel.

c 5,
330a 14 (1) After all, as Aristotle says in *De Anima III*, "just as there is in every nature some factor whereby it becomes whatever it becomes and a factor whereby it does whatever it does, so also in the soul." Well, an angel is a nature. Therefore there is an agent and a possible intellect in him.

c 4, 429a 15;
c 5, 430a 14 (2) Besides, to receive is the distinctive property of a possible intellect, and to illuminate is the distinctive property of an agent intellect, as is clear in *De Anima III*. But an angel receives illumination from a higher one and illuminates a lower one. Therefore there is agent intellect and possible intellect in him.

c 5; 430a 15;
c 7, 431a 14 ON THE OTHER HAND, there is the fact that we have an agent and a possible intellect in us thanks to our relation to phantasms; these stand to a possible intellect as colors stand to vision and stand to an agent intellect as colors stand to light; one sees as much in *De Anima III*.

* virtus
ANSWER: The need to posit a possible intellect in us came from our finding ourselves sometimes understanding a topic potentially and not actually. Hence there has to be a power* which is in potency towards intelligible things before the act of understanding occurs, but which is brought into act towards those things when it becomes conscious of them and (in another way) when it comes to be considering them. This power is called the possible intellect.¹ By contrast, the need to posit an agent intellect came from the natures of the material

¹ A possible intellect (PI) becomes conscious of something, say, *x*, by receiving an intelligible species of *x*, and this reception puts PI into the "first act" of being "equipped" to understand *x* if it is ever moved to do so. When it is moved by the will to consider *x*, PI entertains an expressed species of *x* and possible judgements. If and when one actually makes a judgment, PI is doing its act of understanding and is in "second act."

things we get to understand; they do not subsist outside the soul in a state that is actually independent of matter and intelligible; rather, as they exist outside the soul, they are only potentially intelligible. And so there has to be a power to make those natures intelligible in act; and this power in us is called the agent intellect.

Neither of these needs is present in angels. They are not in potency to understand the things they naturally understand; and the items intelligible to them are not intelligible potentially, but in act. For they understand first and foremost things that are independent of matter, as will emerge below.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): Aristotle understands those two factors to be present in any nature in which being-generated or being brought-to-be occurs, as his words show. In angels, however, knowledge is not brought to be but is naturally present. So there is no need to posit agent and possible intellect in them.

ad (2): what pertains to an agent intellect is not illuminating another mind but shedding light on things only potentially intelligible; it makes them intelligible in act by abstracting. What pertains to the possible intellect is being in potency and sometimes in act towards naturally knowable things. Thus one angel's illuminating another does not belong to the account defining an agent intellect, and being illuminated by supernatural mysteries does not belong to the account defining a possible intellect (though an angel is sometimes in potency to know these).² If anyone chooses to call these factors in an angel "agent intellect" and "possible intellect," he will be using words equivocally, and equivocal uses do not interest us.

² By implication, in the angels and in us, there is no natural potency to know supernatural mysteries. So, what should one call the potency in which (we humans and) the angels "sometimes" remain? Elsewhere, Aquinas will call it "obediential potency."

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question requires one to recall the teachings given in *De Anima III*, where two powers are posited to exist in our soul, working together towards understanding: one active, and called the agent intellect, and one passive, called the possible intellect. This is what is now being put into question about the angels: is their power to understand distinguished into the two powers, active and passive, or not? This is what it means to ask whether there is present in them agent intellect and possible intellect.

ii. In the body of the article, a single conclusion an-

swers the question in the negative: there is no agent or possible intellect in the angels, unless you are using the terms equivocally. — The support is this. [*Antecedent:*] No reason to need the two sorts of intellect has any place in the angels; [*conclusion:*] therefore [angels do not have them].

The antecedent is unpacked firstly for a possible intellect; then, for an agent intellect. A possible intellect is posited on account of a twofold potency to act (to first act, and to second act; these have no place in the angels as regards natural things, which are the ones we are

talking about. — An agent intellect is posited on account of a defect in the intelligible object, namely: [*major:*] the potentially intelligible needs to be moved up to the level of things actually intelligible. This also has no place among the angels, because [*minor:*] the intelligible object distinctive to them is a matter-independent quiddity intelligible of itself, as light is visible of itself. [Therefore: their objects have no need to be moved up.]

Objections from Scotus

iii. Against the argument supporting our claim that there is no possible intellect in angels, objections come from Scotus in his remarks on *II Sent.*, d.3, q. ult. His direct intention is to refute our argument as follows.

*Contra
opinionem 1*

[*Antecedent:*] There is in the angels a power receptive to intelligible species; [*consequence:*] therefore there is a possible intellect in them. Drawing the consequence is supported on the ground that it does not matter whether a receptive potency precedes its act-of-receiving in time or merely in nature (which is how you Thomists claim an angel's mind differs from our possible intellect.) — And here is a confirmation. If God had given man the intelligible species [at his creation], he would still have had a possible intellect, as is clear in the case of Christ.

iv. Against our argument concerning the agent intellect, Scotus argues in the same place by showing that our minor is false and then concluding the opposite. He says the first (*i.e.* the equivalent) object of an angel's intellect (which you say is intelligible in act) is either a singular thing or a universal one. Not singular, because no singular object would contain virtually all that is knowable by an angel. Therefore the equivalent object is some universal account predicable of everything knowable by an angel. And since these last are not just immaterial things but also empirical objects which are intelligible in potency, the first object of an angel's intellect will be abstracted from what is intelligible in potency. Therefore it will not be altogether in act of itself. Therefore one must posit in an angel an agent intellect.

v. In the same place, Scotus also objects to the conclusion, as follows. [*Major:*] An active potency which is a badge of completeness in a lower creature should not be denied to a higher creature; [*minor:*] the agent intellect is that sort of thing; [*conclusion:*] therefore [an angel intellect is not to be denied to the angels]. — Also, [*antecedent:*] a supremely noble nature should have the powers to acquire for itself its full completeness, if it does not yet have it. [*Consequence:*] therefore angelic nature should have an agent and a possible intellect with which to acquire for itself knowledge of universals (if it is not in them from their creation) and of particulars (which they do not have from their creation).

Answers to them

vi. Answering these objections is easy if one considers the nature of the angels. For as became clear in earlier Inquiries, angelic nature, in the line of things able to understand, is intermediate between pure act and pure potency. From the completeness and actuality it has, an angel's nature gets so much perfection that there flows

from it an intellect which is not unformed [like ours] but informed with the natures of all the things naturally knowable by an angel (as emerged above and is asserted by Aristotelian and Platonic philosophers alike), even though, from the potentiality in it, an angel's nature stands to that informed understanding as a recipient does to a thing received. Similarly, in the things we know by our senses, from the actuality of their nature comes the fact that distinctive properties flow from it, and from the potentiality in their nature it comes about that things get received in them. — And just as a nature does not lack what it needs, so also it does not abound in things it does not need. For anything whose nature is such that its distinctive completion does not flow automatically to it like an unimpedible natural consequence, its nature has to be concerned about giving itself powers by which it can acquire its completion for itself. But if a nature has been set up in such a way that its completion necessarily accompanies it, powers by which to acquire completion naturally would be added to it superfluously, since it cannot naturally lack these. — From this root principle it also comes about manifestly that (a) an angelic intellect has no object moving it to first act, and (b) his intellect is never naturally in a state of potency, and hence does not need an activator.

vii. Against Scotus's objections concerning the possible intellect, I say that they are worthless because they do not distinguish the *per se* and the *per accidens*. After all, 'receptive potency' covers two types. Some of them are *accidentally* coeval with their being in act [so that they didn't ever happen to be in potency to receive]; and the objections arise from such cases — objections which picture the angelic intellect as being like ours, to which having its intelligible species might have been accidentally coeval [say, if God had created Adam with a finished education]. Other receptive potencies, however, are *per se* coeval with their completion because they are naturally inseparable from it, as its shape* is inseparable from a heavenly body; and such a receptive potency cannot be called a "possible" anything, because it is never in a state of potency. Thus it would be ridiculous to say that a heavenly body is "possible" with respect to its shape, according to the philosophers, as is clear from *Metaphysics VII*, text 17. And this is the sort of "potency" that [Scotus supposes] is in the intellect of an angel.

* figura

c.7, 1033a 23

viii. Against his objections about the agent intellect, I say that they go wrong first because the object which is alleged to be equivalent through predication is not a universal abstracted from the senses, either wholly or in part: rather, it arises from the fact that the intelligible species of that object are naturally innate in the angel from its birth. And so there is no need to posit an agent intellect to achieve their abstraction. — The objections go wrong secondly because the need to posit an agent intellect does not arise from the object insofar as it is universal by predication, but from the object insofar as it actually perfects and changes the intellect in the real; after all, the agent intellect is posited to cooperate with the object to actualize the possible intellect. — It is clear from what has already been said that such an object, as

an intellect-changer, in the case of an angel is nothing but its own substance, or that of some other and higher angel (each of which, of course, is an intelligible act). — They go wrong thirdly because the object equivalent to an intellect by predication is common to all intellects, namely the what-is or the true; hence there is no need to hunt for such an object unique to angels' intellects. Rather, the distinctive object of each intellect is the what-is and the true modified in the object which changes it (or quasi-changes it) of itself firstly; this is how, for our intellect, there stands the quiddity of an empirical thing, and to any angel there stands his own substance. And it is from these latter objects that intellects are distinguished among themselves [into human, angelic, divine, *etc.*] and get their particular conditions. Hence one can say, and well say, that the first and of itself equivalent object of any angelic intellect (as a natural changer of that intellect) is a thing which is singular in its being, namely, his own essence. — And when the objection is made that this does not contain everything virtually, I say that there is no need for the object to contain everything virtually; it is enough for it to contain everything naturally knowable representatively, according to the conditions under which it is naturally knowable by such an intellect. And this role does belong to an angel's essence, but differently so for different things. It represents things higher than itself as an effect represents its cause, but things lower than itself as a cause represents an effect. And across the board it virtually contains species repre-

senting both things higher and lower than itself, although it does not so contain their natures. And this last is enough; for it is sufficient that the first object contain virtually the cognitions of everything; it is unique to the Divine [Intellect's] object that it contain both the cognitions and the natures of all things.

ix. My response to the objections against the conclusion is already clear from what I have said. It is false to say that an agent intellect pertains to unqualified perfection in human nature; rather it pertains to perfection insofar as our nature is imperfect, indeed the most imperfect in the class of intellectual things. For an agent intellect pertains to a perfection seeking its own perfection, which presupposes its natural absence, and that obviously implies imperfection. So the proposition "the active potency which is a matter of perfection..." is not true about unqualified perfection. Many things, after all, pertain to the perfection of lower things which would be imperfections in higher things.

It is also obviously false that one should posit in every nature powers whereby it can acquire its own perfection, if it lacks them. This claim has no place except in natures which can naturally lack their own perfection; otherwise, you would have to posit agent and passive intellect even in God.

An angel's knowledge of singulars will be the topic below. For the moment, however, I deny that an angel's intellect is in natural potency towards any first act, be it [possessing species for] a universal object or a singular subject.

q.57, a.2

Do the angels have only intellective cognition?

3 CG c.108, *De Malo* q.16, a.1 ad 14

It seems that intellective cognition is not the only kind in the angels.

PL 41, 231
* *sentit*
(1) After all, Augustine says in Book VIII of *The City of God* [c.6] that in the angels "there is a life that understands and feels*." So they have a sensory power.

PL 83, 536
c.1, 980b 21
(2) Besides, Isidore says that the angels know many things by experience. But experience grows out of many memories, as it says in *Metaphysics I*. So they also have the power to remember.

PG 3, 725
(3) Moreover, Denis says in c.4 of *On the Divine Names* that the demons have perverse fantasies. But having fantasies pertains to the power to imagine. So the demons have an imaginative power, and the angels do, too, for the same reason, since they are of the same nature.

Homily 29 on
the Gospel,
PL 76, 1241
ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Gregory says in his homily on the Ascension: "man senses with the cattle and understands with the angels."

† *vires*
ANSWER: there are abilities[†] in our soul whose operations are done through bodily organs, and such abilities are the acts of certain body parts, as seeing is an act in the eye; and hearing, in the ear. But there are other abilities of our soul whose operations are not done through bodily organs, such as the ability to understand things (the intellect) and the ability to desire things (the will), and these are not the doings of any body parts.

q 51, a.1
Well, the angels do not have bodies naturally united to them, as came out above. So, among the powers of the soul, the only ones that can belong to them are the intellect and the will.

Comment 36
Averroes says the same in a comment on *Metaphysics XII*, to the effect that the separate substances are divided

into a mind and a will. — It also befits the order of the universe that the highest intellectual creature should be wholly intellective, and not just partly so (like our soul). — This is also the reason why the angels are called "intellects" and "minds," as I mentioned above.

a.3 ad 1.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS: I can answer in two ways. (1) One way is to say that the authorities quoted in the objections were voicing the opinion of those who held that angels and demons had bodies naturally united to them. Augustine often uses this opinion in his books, though without intending to assert it as a fact. (This is why he says in *The City of God XXI* [c.10] that "inquiring into this is not worth much work.")

De Gen. ad
Int. II, c. 17,
III, c. 10,

PL 41, 724

(2) The other way is to say that those authorities (and others like them) are to be understood as speaking figuratively. As a sense gets a sure grasp of its distinctive sense-object, a custom of rhetoric allows us to speak of a sure intellectual grasp of something as "feeling" it; thus my judgment is also called my "feeling." — Experience can be attributed to the angels thanks to their resemblance to us as knowers, even though we use a different cognitive ability. There is "experience" in us when we know particulars through our senses; the angels also know particulars (as will emerge below) but not by sensing them. — Memory can be posited in the angels the way Augustine posited it in our minds, though it cannot be attributed as a sense-related part of the soul. — Similarly I can say that *perverse fantasies* are attributed to demons in that they have a false practical estimation of the true good. In us, however, deception arises through vivid imagination: thanks to it, we sometimes adhere to images of things as if they were the things themselves. One sees this in the case of sleepers [dreaming] and insane people.

q.57, a.2

De Trinitate
X, c.11;
PL 42, 983

Cajetan's Commentary

The title is clear. — In the body of the article, there is a single conclusion: in the angels, there is only intellective cognition. Four supports are given. The first is by argument, thus. [*Antecedent:*] Among the powers of the soul, the only ones in angels are those that are not acts of the body; [*1st consequence:*] Therefore there is only intellect and will in them; [*2nd consequence:*] therefore they have only intellective cognition — The antecedent is obvious because angels do not naturally have bodies united to them. — The first consequence is clarified by distinguishing two kinds of powers of the soul: those that work through an organ, and those that do not. — The second consequence is left as obvious.

Secondly, the conclusion is supported by the authority of Averroes, comment 36 on *Metaphysics XII*. — Thirdly, it is supported by its congruence with the

order of the universe, whose lowest part is totally matter for the senses, and its middle part is partially sense-endowed and partially intellective; so it remains for the highest part to be totally intellective. — Fourthly, the names the angels are given ("minds" and "intellects") point in the same direction.

ii. A doubt arises about the first consequence, because it seems to overlook the fact that the angels also have a power to move things, and it is not the act of a body.

The SHORT ANSWER is that (as one sees in *De Anima III*) a power to move things locally coincides, on the part of the soul, with the appetitive power (although local motion adds something on the bodies' part). So since the angels do not have bodies, their power to move things coincides with their power to seek or desire things.* This

c.10; 433a
15-21* *potentia
appetitiva*

is why Aristotle and Averroes say that the intelligences move things by loving and desiring things intellectually. Hence the consequence was optimally drawn; insofar as the power to move is not the strength of a bodily organ it

does not differ from the intellect and the will.

One may also say (and say more safely) that a power to move is not excluded by the mere affirmation of intellect and will; they go together inseparably, after all.



Inquiry Fifty-Five: Into the means through which an angel knows

Next the inquiry turns to the means by which an angel knows. On this topic, three issues are raised.

- (1) Does an angel know everything through his own substance, or through some species?
- (2) If it is through species, are they innate to him or gotten from things?
- (3) Do the higher angels know through species that are more universal than the ones the lower angels have?

article I

Does an angel know everything through his own substance?

q.84, a.2, q.87, a.1; 2/1 ST 50, a.6; q.51, a.1 ad 2; In II Sent d.3, p.2, q.2 a.1. In III Sent. d.14, a.1, q.2.
2 CG c.98, De Veritate q.8, a.8

It seems that angels know everything through their own substance.

PG 3, 869 (1) After all, Denis says in c.7 of *On the Divine Names* that the angels “know the things on earth according to their own nature as mind.” But the nature of an angel is his essence. Therefore an angel knows things through his own essence.

1095a 3
430a 3 (2) Besides, according to Aristotle in *Metaphysics XI* and in *De Anima III*, “in things without matter the mind understanding is the same thing as what is understood.” Well, what is understood is the same thing as the mind understanding by reason of that whereby it is understood. Therefore, in things without matter, like the angels, that whereby things are understood is the very substance of the angel doing the understanding.

PG 3, 701 (3) Besides, everything which is in something else is there after the fashion of the thing that it is in. But an angel has an intellectual nature. Therefore anything in him is in him in an intelligible way. But all things are in him, because lower things are contained in higher ones essence-wise, and higher things are in lower ones by participation; this is why Denis says in c.4 of *On the Divine Names* that God “gathers the whole in wholes,” i.e. gathers all things in all things. Therefore an angel knows everything in his own substance.

PG 3, 692
• *ratiobus* ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Denis says in the same chapter, to the effect that the angels “are illuminated by the real definitions* of things.” Hence they know through an account defining things, and not through their own substance.

I ANSWER: that whereby a mind understands is related

to that mind as its form, because that whereby an agent acts is a form it has. But in order for a power to be completely actuated through a form, it has to be the case that everything to which the power extends is contained under that form. This is why the forms one finds in things subject to corruption do not fully actuate the potency of their matter: matter’s potency extends further than the contents in this or that form. — But an angel’s power to understand extends to all intelligible things, because the [formal] object of his intellect is “being” or “the true” in general, but the angel’s essence does not include in itself everything that “is” or “is true,” since it is an essence narrowed down to a genus and a species. (Rather, containing everything completely in itself is unique to God’s essence, which is infinite.) Since an angel cannot know all things through his essence, his mind has to be completed by some [intelligible likenesses or] species in order for him to know things.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — ad (1): when an angel is said to know things by his nature, the preposition “by” is not marking the means through which he knows (which is a likeness of a thing known), but his power to know, which belongs to the angel by his nature.

ad (2): JUST AS a sense in act is a sense-object in act (as it says in *De Anima III*) not because the sense power itself is a likeness of the object in it, but rather because out of the two [the sense-power and its object] one thing comes to be (as out of act and potency one thing comes to be). SO ALSO the intellect in act is said to be the object understood in act, not because the substance of the intellect is itself the likeness through which it understands, but because that likeness is a form it has. This is what Aristotle meant by “in things without matter, the mind understanding is the same thing as what is understood,” as if to say

c.2.
426a 15

that the intellect in act is the object understood in act; after all, a thing is understood in act thanks to being non-material.¹

ad (3): the things below an angel and those above him are in his substance in some way — not com-

¹ A "sense object in act" is an object as actually sensed; thus a visible thing in act = a thing seen, and its being-seen = an eye's seeing it. Likewise, an "intelligible object in act" = an object as actually understood, and its being understood = an intellect's understanding it.

pletely nor under their own definitions (since an angel's substance is finite [and thus definable] and so is distinguished from those other [higher and lower] things by its own definition) — but rather under some common account. But in God's essence all things are present completely and under their own definitions, as in the first and universal operative power from which there proceeds whatever is distinct in anything *and* whatever is common. And so God has by His own essence a discriminate knowledge of everything. An angel does not, but has only a general knowledge.

Cajetan's Commentary

In the title question, pay attention to four terms. The first is 'know'; it is being used for distinct [or discriminate] knowing. The second term is 'everything'; it is quantifying over all things and all the predicates and conditions of things naturally knowable by an angel. The third term, 'through' indicates the bearing of a formal cause in the way in which the reason for understanding is thought to concur with the act of understanding as its form. The fourth term, 'their own substance' should be understood with prescinding, so as to mean "alone," so as to exclude intelligible species and higher substances. — Thus the force of the question is this: is the angel's essence alone the sufficient reason for his understanding all of the things naturally knowable by an angel as, and insofar as, he can know them.

Analysis of the article

ii. In the body of the article, there is one conclusion answering the question in the negative: an angel does not know everything through his own essence but through additional likenesses. — The support goes like this. [*Major:*] No form completely actuates a power unless it contains everything to which the power extends; [*minor:*] an angel's essence stands as a form *vis-à-vis* his power to understand but does not contain everything he can understand; [*lemma:*] so it is not a form equivalent to his range of knowing. [*Conclusion:*] Hence the angel does not understand everything through that form. The major is clarified *a posteriori* from the form and matter of empirical things. — The first part of the minor is supported on the ground that the form whereby a mind understands relates to that mind as its form. This in turn is supported on the ground that the factor whereby an agent acts is its form. — The second part of the minor is supported on the ground that the angel's intellect extends to everything. This is supported on the ground that "being" and "the true" is the object of every intellect. But an angel's essence does not contain in itself everything [in being or in truth]. This last is supported both on the ground that the angel's

essence is narrowed down to a genus and a species and on the ground that containing everything in itself is unique to God's essence, which is unqualifiedly infinite.

Four points to note

iii. Note here first of all that the second part of the conclusion is tacked on by St. Thomas as a sort of further consequence and is not supported but left as self-evident among those who admit that the angels have knowledge of all things through the defining accounts of those things and who concede that there are intelligible species. Hence two related issues are brought into play here. The one is whether the angels know all things by those defining accounts; the other is whether there are intelligible species. The second of these will be treated below [a.3]. But the first related question, because it deals directly with the matter at hand and is made explicit in the minor, would need to be discussed now, if it were not to be taken up bit by bit in Inquiries below [qq.56, 57]. Hence for the moment, it is taken as a supposition.

iv. Note secondly that, in the present argument, it is being assumed that an angel's essence can be a reason he understands, and the issue taken up is whether or not it is the reason for his understanding everything. The point presupposed here will be explained and discussed in the next inquiry, a.1. Here it is taken as something admitted.

v. Note thirdly that the "containing" at issue here in the major and the minor is complete containing, be it form-wise or power-wise. Containing is called "complete" when something is contained with all its conditions, be it form-wise (as a genus is contained in its species) or power-wise (as creatures are contained in the power of their creator). For if we were not talking about this kind of containing, the form would not be equivalent to the power informed, whatever else it might contain. — And thus the minor is clear. For the angel's essence alone (even if it is like an exemplar of lower things and an effect of higher things, and the species of all things flow from it) in itself, by itself alone, is not equivalent to the species flowing from it, since they add many things to be represented, which the angel's essence all by itself can-

not represent. Only in God are the things represented contained with all their conditions; they add something positive which is not contained in the essences of the angels, because the latter are finite.

vi. Notice fourthly in the text that, where he supports the point that the intellect's form is that whereby it understands, on the ground that a thing's form is that whereby it acts, the words 'acting' and 'act' are

taken broadly so as to cover immanent action also, even though an immanent action is more of a quality. But the force of the argument is not weakened by this; indeed its validity is strengthened. For if to understand is to act in a way which amounts to *being* that way, then *a fortiori* that whereby the intellect acts is its form, because the form is whereby the man understanding has such and such a being.

Do angels understand through species taken from things?

In II Sent. d.3, p.2, q.2, a.1 ad 2; 2 CG c 96; De Veritate q.8, a.9

It would seem that angels understand through species taken from things.

(1) After all, everything gets to be understood *via* a likeness* of it in the one who understands it. But when a likeness of *x* exists in something else, either it is there as an exemplar (so that the likeness is a cause of *x*), or else it is there as an image (so as to have been caused by *x*). It has to be the case, therefore, that for one who understands, every case of knowing is either a cause of the thing understood or has been caused by it. But angelic knowing is not a cause of things existing in the real; only God's knowing is their cause. So, it has to be the case that the likenesses *via* which an angel's mind understands are [images] received from things.

(2) Besides, angelic light is stronger than the light of the agent intellect in our soul. But the light of the agent intellect abstracts intelligible species from phantasms; therefore the light of an angel's intellect can abstract species from the empirical things themselves. So there is no obstacle to saying that an angel understands through species gotten from things.

(3) Moreover, the likenesses which are in an intellect are indifferent as to closeness or distance, except insofar as they are taken from empirical things. So if an angel does not understand from species taken from things, his knowledge would be indifferent as to close things and far off things; and so it would be pointless for the angel to move.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Denis says in c.7 of *On the Divine Names*, to the effect that the angels "do not gather the divine knowledge from divisible things, or from sensible things."

ANSWER: the species through which angels understand are not taken from things but are innate* to them. After all, one should think of the distinction and gradation of spiritual substances as one thinks of the distinction and gradation of bodily ones. The highest bodies have the potency in their matter totally actualized by their form; but in lower bodies, the form does not actualize the matter's potency totally but allows the matter to take now one form and now another, as some agent acts upon it. — Likewise lower intellectual substances, such as the human soul, have an intellectual potency that is not wholly actuated by any natural object but becomes actuated gradually by receiving intelligible species from things. But the power to understand in higher spiritual substances, *i.e.* in angels,

is naturally actualized through having innately the intelligible species for all the intelligible matters which they can naturally know.

This also becomes clear from the very way such substances exist. After all, lower spiritual substances (like our souls) have a being related to the body, inasmuch as they are the forms of bodies; and so from their very way of being it suits them to reach actuated understanding from and through bodies — otherwise they would be united to bodies for no reason. But the higher substances (the angels) are wholly independent of bodies, subsisting without matter with intelligible being; and so their intellectual actuation comes from an intellectual outflow by which they receive from God along with their intellectual nature the species of known things. — This is why Augustine says in Book II of *Super Genesim ad litteram* that "Other things which are beneath the angels are created in such a way that they are first brought to be in the rational creature's cognition and then are brought to be in their own nature."

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): likenesses of creatures are in an angel's mind but not gotten from the creatures themselves; rather, they are gotten from God, Who is the cause of creatures and in Whom the likenesses of things first exist. Hence Augustine says in the same book that "just as the definition in which a creature is created is in God's Word before it is in the creature itself, so also knowledge of this definition is first brought to be in an intellectual creature and then in the creature itself."

ad (2): The only way to go from one extreme to the other is through the middle. Forms in the imagination (which are free of matter but not of material conditions) are the middle between a form's being as it is in matter and its being as it is in the intellect abstracted from matter and material conditions. So however powerful an angel's intellect might be, it could not reduce material forms to intelligible being without first reducing them to the being of imagined forms. This is impossible, since an angel has no imagination, as I said. — And even granting that an angel's mind could abstract intelligible species from material things, it would not do so because it does not need them, since it has intelligible species innate to it.

ad (3): an angel's knowledge is indifferent as between the far off and the close by. But his movement in space is not pointless, because he does not change to a new place in order to learn something but in order to achieve something in the place.

c 8;
PL 34, 269

PL 34, 269

PG 3, 868

* *connaturalis*

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article there is one conclusion answering it: the species through which angels understand are not taken from things but come to the angels with their nature. — This is supported on three grounds; two of them are arguments; the third is the authority of St. Augustine.

First supporting argument

The first argument goes thus. [*Major: 1st part:*] The difference of levels among bodily things has the feature that the lower bodies are in potency to their completive traits and acquire them successively, while the higher bodies have theirs congenitally and are naturally complete, etc. [*2nd part:*] So the difference of levels among intellectual substances has this same feature, that the lower intellects are in potency to their completive traits, while the higher ones have them by nature innately. [*Minor:*] But these completive traits are intelligible species. [*Conclusion:*] So the higher intellectual substances have their intelligible species by nature, innately.

Trouble from Scotus and Durandus

ii. Concerning this argument, be aware that Scotus says it does not conclude to the point Aquinas intended but rather to the opposite. His ground for saying so is that the heavenly bodies' perfective traits are creatable by God alone, while the angels' such traits can be caused by creatures; from this it follows (contrary to what our argument concludes) that one should not judge the two sets of levels the same way. After all, perfective traits that can be caused by creatures are, by divine providence, brought about through secondary causes. Well, it is a known fact that an intellect plus its object are able to cause an intelligible species. Ergo [it can be caused by creatures and does not need to have been created by God, even in an angel].

iii. Durandus also says our argument goes wrong and does so, he says, in three ways. It goes wrong firstly in the proportion it sets up between higher vs. lower bodies and the angels vs. our souls. For either this proportion is to be understood universally, and then it is false, since the higher bodies generate the lower ones, but the angels do not generate our souls. Or else it is to be taken particularly, and then it yields no conclusion at all.

Secondly it goes wrong in alleging a natural completeness of the heavenly bodies. Either it is talking about substantial completeness, and then it is not relevant, or else it is talking about accidental completeness as well, and then it makes a false assumption: the moon and stars get [completed by] light from the Sun.

Thirdly, it goes wrong by leading to an impossibility. For given Aquinas's assumptions, it would follow that an angel is so complete naturally that he cannot be in potency to any accidental completive trait,

and hence can have no new cognition, which you deny.

Answering these

iv. These objections are easily answered by paying attention to two distinctions. The first divides 'completive traits' in our talk of angels and heavenly bodies, since we can talk about them in two ways. One way is according to their general definitions. So taken, both can be caused by creatures: shape, motion, light, and intelligible species in general are entities that can be acquired anew by the action of creatures. — The other way to talk about them is in line with their distinctive definitions *qua* being in such and such a nature, *i.e.* a heavenly body or an angel. And so taken, supposing angelic perfective traits are causable from the outside or not causable at all, is begging the question; this is the very point put in doubt by the present inquiry, and St. Thomas quite reasonably goes from the fact that their nature has already endowed the heavenly bodies with perfections which in general are acquirable anew, to infer *a fortiori* that the angles are natures to which their own perfective traits are congenital, even though they in general would be acquirable anew. From this it follows in *a priori* order that such traits in either are not causable from outside but only from the Author of nature. — So much for our answer to Scotus.

v. The second distinction divides potency. For as it says in *Physics VIII*, a thing can be in potency in two ways: in a being essential to it (*i.e.* in potency to first act) or to an accidental being (*i.e.* in potency to second act). And as you see in *De Anima II* and *III*, an intellect is said to be in potency to a being essential to it when it is like an empty slate, and is said to be in potency in an accident, when it is like one who knows but is not currently doing an act of understanding. In the present topic, the talk is about potency to angels' essential being and to being perfected in first act, not just some first act but every one, be it substantial or accidental, so long as it is natural.

vi. So against the first complaint [from Durandus] I say that his complaint is rather childish. For it is one thing to argue from particular propositions, and something else to argue from a particular condition of a given nature. Here we are arguing from a condition of the heavenly bodies, namely, that they are naturally fully actuated; and yet we are making a universal proposition about all first bodies. So the proportionality we assert is particular as to the condition we are looking at, and is universal as to the predication we are making.

Against his second complaint, I say that heavenly bodies (although they stand to their accidental perfections as potency stands to act, because they stand as a thing receptive stands to the thing it receives) are nevertheless not in potency to their essential being or to an accident *vis-à-vis* their perfections. So their sort of potency is not relevant.¹

¹ The moon does not sometimes shine by actuating a potency resident in itself. The shining comes from the act of the sun.

In *II Sent* d. 3,
quest. ult., contra
opinionem 1

Gregory of Rimini
in *II Sent* d. 7, q. 5,
a. 1

c. 4, 254b 6ff

c. 5;
c. 4

Against his third complaint, I can make two answers. The first is that the proportionality between angels and heavenly bodies comes more from potency in what they are than from potency in an accident they have, because the second act of the bodies is a transitive operation, while that of the angels is an imminent act; but the first act of both groups lies in the thing whose act it is in both cases, and in this respect they are of the same order. For one thing, in both cases their first act is natural, whereas their second act is not but is a free operation in the angels and a naturally determined one in the bodies. For this reason the latter would not be in accidental potency without being imperfect, whereas the angels from their freedom (though in a finite nature) have accidental potency [without being imperfect]. — My second possible answer is that, just as something can be acquired anew partially among heavenly bodies (as one sees from the parts of their movement and its termini, and likewise from the parts of the moon as regards to being lit up) so also among the angels there is accidental potency to a new cognition. For they stand proportionally. The heavenly bodies are always moving and yet changing from terminus to terminus, and the moon is always lit up, and yet ever changing [as to what part]. The angels, meanwhile, are always actually understanding, at least themselves; and yet they change from one act of understanding to another with respect to different things known.

The second supporting argument

vii. The second argument is the following. The way a thing is naturally brought to completion is caused by the thing's natural way of being. A sign of this is the fact that in the case of our soul, whose natural way of being is being in a body, its natural way of getting perfected is to take from a body (otherwise it would be united to the body for no good reason, since matter is for the sake of form and not *vice-versa*). But the angels subsist without union to bodies. Thus, they come to completion without taking from a body, thanks to an intelligible influx from the Author of their nature.

Scotus divides the issue

viii. Concerning this argument, Scotus says that although it does conclude from how *our* soul exists to how *it* becomes perfected, from the bodiless state of an angel one cannot conclude that he is not brought to perfection by a bodily object. After all, independence from a body as one's matter does not imply independence from a body as an object known.

ix. MY ANSWER to this is that St. Thomas is arguing according to the rule handed down in the *Posterior Analytics I*. I mean the rule that if an affirmation is the cause of an affirmative, its negation will be the cause of a negative — And this rule holds in the case of distinctive causes.* For if the distinctive reason a soul gets perfected from a body is how the soul exists,

negating this way of being will be the reason to deny this way of getting perfected; indeed an opposite way of being will be the cause of an opposite way of becoming perfected. The fact that how the soul exists is the unique cause of how it is brought to perfection is proved by St. Thomas on the ground that, otherwise, the union of the intellectual soul to the body (which implies that way of being) would be pointless. The inference holds good, because the union in question is either for the benefit of the soul, firstly, or else for the benefit of the body; but this latter cannot be said, because form is not for the sake of matter; the remaining alternative, therefore, is that matter is for the sake of form. It is well known that the distinctive good of the intellectual soul is found in its intellectual completion. And from this it is obvious that natural independence of a body as from matter implies independence from it also as the object known.

Scotus rebuts

x. But Scotus rebuts this argument, too, in his remarks on *IV Sent.* d.45. He says the argument can be broken into two ways. One is by saying that the soul's being united to the body need not be pointless, if the soul can acquire perfection in this way *and another way* — just as it is not pointless for a sick man to drink a medicine, if the man could also be cured by surgery without drinking the stuff. — The second is by saying that the soul is not united to the body for its own good, nor that of the matter, but for the good of the whole composite. — Either way, one may deny that such and such way of being is the decisive reason for such and such a way of getting perfected.

Cajetan replies

xi. AGAINST THE FIRST of these rebuttals, I say that in the development of complete entities, one does not posit multiple ways of becoming complete, as one sees in natural things. So it is not reasonable that the perfecting of an intellectual substance could come about naturally in multiple ways; after all, a single nature has just one natural way of becoming complete. — Also, it is pointless for something to come about through more things when it could just as well come about through fewer. And this is how things would be in the case at hand: indeed, a soul is better perfected by its known object directly than by a stand-in for it (I mean, a phantasm). Thus either the one way will be natural, or else the other.

AGAINST THE SECOND rebuttal, I say that since the intellectual part as such is not an act of the body, it is not as such a part of the bodily composite. Therefore, when we speak of an intellectual substance formally, we cannot say that its intellectual part is first off for the sake of the composite, unless a reason is given why it can be united to a body. — One cannot say that the reason is because it is such and such a form (say, at once intellectual and sensitive), because the same question would arise about this conjunction of traits. After all, the conjunction is for the benefit of the sensitive aspect or that of the intellectual one; not for the former, because the sensitive aspect is like the matter; ergo the latter, namely, so that the intellectual aspect may get help from the senses — and there you have my point.

c.13,
78b 20

* *causis propriis*

Scotus on the answer *ad* (2)

xii. In the answer *ad* (2), where two ways of answering are given, Scotus attacks the first way on three grounds. First he argues against its effectiveness. Being imaginable is put as a middle between being intelligible and being sensible in one or the other of two ways: on the side of the object (the thing known), or else on the side of the intellective power doing the abstracting. If it is middle on the side of the thing known, it would follow that even God could not understand a stone except by way of His finding it imaginable.² — If it is on the side of the intellect, the argument does not reach its conclusion. For it is well known that something can be a middle for a lower power and not be a middle for a higher power. For example, a level of heat like four degrees has the makeup of a “middle” for a weak heater that warms things gradually, but not for a stronger heater that would make them warmer suddenly.

Secondly he argues for the same point this way. There is nothing in a phantasm that would suffice on its level to cause an intelligible species that would not be there in a higher way in the thing whose phantasm it is: therefore an empirical thing in itself can communicate its species; therefore a phantasm is a “middle” on an accidental basis, *i.e.*, for us in our present state. — The antecedent is supported on the ground that a phantasm works only thanks to the fact that it represents the object.

Third, Scotus argues against the truth of St Thomas’s answer, wanting it to be false that being imaginable is a middle between being intelligible and being sensible, because being imaginable is a way of being sensible, since imagining falls under sense cognition.

xiii. AGAINST THESE OBJECTIONS, one can respond in two ways. The first is that St. Thomas added his second answer here because he saw that his argument was vulnerable to this challenge; he did not think it was compelling but plausible. — I think, however, that he thought the same as Averroes did on *De Sensu et Sensato*. He thought that his argument concluded necessarily if philosophical propositions are admitted (as befits philosophers). But he added the second answer to satisfy theological opponents and people who speak according to their imagination.

xiv. The thing to say, therefore, is that this argument is effective, and that the “middle” is essential not just in being but also in causing, not across the board, but in relation to such and such a cause, *i.e.* an empirical thing. That what can be imagined is a “middle” between what can be an object of the outer senses and what can be understood is self-evident; for the “what it is” of an imaginable thing is partly material

and partly spiritual.³ — That it is the middle in causing something to be intelligible but not across the board is obvious from the fact that this effect, *i.e.* being intelligible, can happen without the concurrence of being imaginable, as is clear from the innate species in the angels. — That it is an essential middle in causing the same effect from such-and-such a cause, *i.e.* from an external sense, (*i.e.* that if its being intelligible needs to be caused by an outside sense object, it can only be caused through this sort of middle, *i.e.* being imaginable [and we are always talking about the possible in the natural order]) is made clear by that very broad premise of Denis in c.7 of *On the Divine Names*, namely, that the “order of all things has the characteristic that the highest of the lower touches the lowest of the higher.” From this I have it that the sensible order touches the lowest of the intelligible order only in its own highest. It is well known, however, that the highest level in the order of sensible things is the imaginable, since it is the most spiritual and the closest to intelligibility, and that the lowest in the order of intelligible things is concurring towards educating an intelligible species from potency to act. Therefore the natural order of things requires that a sense object, as being wholly material, cannot cooperate directly with the intellectual power in producing something’s being intelligible; but if it is to cooperate, it must first be brought to the highest level [to which a sense object can be brought]. I also have secondly the point that only the human intellect, which is the lowest in the order of intellectual things, is joined to the highest of sensible things, which is concurring with sensible inputs towards having and gathering the intelligible. But higher intellects obtain their species in a higher way.⁴

xv. From this point, the answer to the objections is obvious. For one must say to the first of them that being imaginable is a “middle” not only on the side of the intellective power but also on the side of the empirical thing known — not insofar as it has the makeup of an object or terminus, but insofar as it has the makeup of a cause and a changer. And thus it is clear that the objections do not block the way.

Against the second, however, I deny what it assumes: the spirituality of a phantasm is not accidental but contributes *per se* to its causality, as is already clear from the above. — Against Scotus’s support for it, I say that the claim that a phantasm acts solely by reason of the nature represented, can be understood two ways. In one way as a reason for acting, and this I admit. But in another way as a condition of the agent, and this is false. Not thanks to just any trait it has is the quiddity of a cow the proximate source of the cow’s coming to be intelligible, but thanks to the most spiritual trait of its own order, *i.e.*,

³ The word ‘spiritual’ here is being used in a peculiar sense in which it does not mean immaterial but partly de-materialized, the way a sensed thing exists in the neural net-work of the one sensing.

⁴ One regrets this appeal to Denis the Pseudo-Areopagite. Was there nothing in the natural science of Aristotle himself that would demand a neurological “middle” between a material thing

² ‘*Imaginabile*’ did not mean to the Scholastics what ‘imaginable’ means to us. For us, it is just a loose synonym of ‘conceivable’. For them, it meant something more closely tied to sensation. It meant ‘able to be captured in a perceptible image’.

being accessible to the senses. So JUST AS “what it is to be” a cow is the first explanation of its acting in natural generation, when a cow begets a cow, but existing both materially and in sensation (as the cow is in the real) is the condition and reason for the acting and the agent. SO ALSO, when the phantasm co-causes the intelligible species, although the phantasm is nothing but bovine nature in such and such spiritual being, the reason for the acting is the nature itself, but the condition of the reason for acting and of the agent is this sort of spirituality. This last is not contained in a higher way in the outside object, since it is from the soul (not in just any way but in the highest or the highest of its kind). For the sensitive part of the soul obtains its strength for knowing from its conjunction with the intellective part of the soul, from which such spirituality comes. — It is no problem that a phantasm is a so-much and a material thing, and thereby agrees in its mode of being with the outside object. After all, as is clear from what I already said, that way of being, although it is of the same general kind, is nevertheless of a higher and nobler character, to such an extent that it differs from it more than by physical kind and is supreme in the whole spectrum of ways an empirical thing can be — as its supreme closeness to the order of intelligible things testifies. Hence, as I said, a quiddity *in that kind of being* can be the natural co-cause of being intelligible, whereas the quiddity in a wholly material way of being cannot.⁵

Against his third objection, I say that being an object of the senses can be taken in two ways: in one way generally (and then, of course, being imaginable

and an “intelligible” in the natural order of events in which human knowing occurs?

⁵ At the end of the first two replies in this remarkable § xiv, the present translator renews his suggestion that the best way to understand the talk here of sensed objects being put into a “spiritual” state intermediate between their external being and their becoming “intelligible” is to take that talk as anticipating neurology.

is a kind of being that way); in the other way, more strictly, and as a matter of more common usage, it is used to mean being an object of external senses (and this way, of course, being imaginable is a middle). Since we are talking about that sort of sense object, as everyone knows, Scotus’s objection is frivolous.

Unpacking the answer *ad* (3)

xvi. Regarding the answer *ad* (3), be aware that Scotus holds that spatial distance impedes knowledge both for an angel and for a separated soul. He arms himself with authoritative quotations from Augustine’s book *De Cura agenda pro mortuis*, and from the homilies of St. Gregory [*Homily VI* on the Gospel], where they say that separated souls do not know what is going on here in this life but learn it either from the angels or from souls newly departed, as the holy forefathers learned of the descent into hell from John the Baptist. — Scotus also adds two authoritative quotations from Aristotle. The one is from *Physics VIII* where he holds that an Intelligence moving a heavenly orb is present to that part whence it starts, or where the motion is the fastest; the other quotation is from *Physics VII*, where he is holding that the agent and the patient are together by togetherness of contact among bodily things or with a greater togetherness, *i.e.* mutual presence among spiritual things. So according to him, presence is required, and Intelligence is not indifferent as between the distant and the close.

To these objections I REPLY that they go wrong first of all because they assume that an angel or a separated soul gets knowledge from things it senses. — They go wrong secondly by taking a non-cause as a cause, since the ignorance they have about what is going on among us does not come from distance, as will be made clear below. — Hence the authoritative quotes from Augustine and Gregory are not relevant. — Neither, likewise, are the quotes from Aristotle, because they are talking about action and passion. From prior remarks in the inquiry into the whereabouts of angels, it already became clear how Aristotle’s authority is to be understood in terms of a presence of order.

In IV Sent
d 45, q 2

c 15

c 10, 276b 5,
10

c.2, 243a 4

q 89, aa. 7, 8

q 52, a. 1;
comm. § xii

Do the higher angels understand through more universal species than the lower angels?

1 *ST* 89, a.1; *In II Sent.* d.3, p. 2, q.2, a.2; 2 *CG* c.98; *De veritate* q.8, a.10; *De anima*, a.7 ad 5; a.18, *In Libro de Causis*, lectio 10

It seems that the higher angels do not understand through more universal species than the lower ones have.

(1) After all, a universal seems to be what is abstracted from particulars. But the angels do not understand through species abstracted from things. Therefore, one cannot say that the species in an angel's intellect are more or less universal.

(2) Besides, what is known in its special features is better known than what is known in a universal, because knowing something in a universal is a sort of "middle" between potency and act. So if the higher angels know *via* more universal forms than the lower angels, it follows that the higher angels have a less complete knowledge than the lower ones. Which is awkward.

(3) Moreover, the same item cannot be the distinctive reason for many things. But if a higher angel knows various things through one universal form, and a lower angel knows them through multiple special forms, it follows that a higher angel uses a more universal form to know the various things. Therefore he will not have a distinctive cognition of any of them, which seems awkward.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Denis says in c.12 of *The Angelic Hierarchy*, to the effect that the higher angels share in knowledge in a more universal way than the lower ones; and in the *Liber de Causis* it says that the higher angels have more universal forms.

ANSWER: what makes some things higher is their being closer and more similar to the one thing who is God. But in God the whole fullness of intellectual knowing is contained in one thing, *i.e.* in the Divine Essence, through which God knows all things. This intelligible plenitude is found in a lower way in created intellects and with less unity.* It has to be the case, therefore, that the things God knows through one thing, lower intellects know through many things, and through all the more things the lower the created intellect is.

* *minus simpliciter*

So, then, the higher an angel is, the fewer the species he needs through which to apprehend the whole range of intelligible things. So it must be the case that his forms are more universal, each of them extending to more items.

We can glimpse an example of this in ourselves. For there are people who cannot grasp an intellectual proof unless it is laid out for them bit by bit through individual cases; and this happens to them, of course, out of the weakness of their intellect. Other people, however, who are of stronger understanding, can grasp many things through a few.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): a universal just happens to be abstracted from particulars insofar as the intellect knowing them gets its knowledge from things. But if an intellect does not get its knowledge from things, the universal by which it knows will not be abstracted from things but will somehow pre-exist those things either in causal order (as the universal reasons for things are in the Word of God) or at least in the order of nature, as universal reasons for things are in an angel's intellect.

ad (2): knowing something in a universal occurs two ways. In one, it occurs on the side of the thing known, so that only the universal nature of the thing is known. And in this way knowing something in a universal is less complete; after all, one would know a man incompletely if the only thing one knew about him is that he is an animal. In the other way, it happens on the side of the means of knowing. And in this way knowing something in a universal is more perfect; after all, the intellect that can know distinctive particulars through one universal means is more perfect than an intellect which cannot.

ad (3): one item cannot be the distinctive equivalent reason for many things. But if it is a highly excellent item, it can be taken as the distinctive reason and similitude of various things. Thus in man there is a universal prudence as to all the acts of the virtues, and it can be taken as the distinctive reason and similitude of the particular prudence which is in a lion regarding acts of magnanimity and of the prudence in a fox towards acts of cautiousness, *etc.* Likewise God's essence, because of its high excellence, is the distinctive reason for particulars, because His essence is the source whence particulars are assimilated to God according to their distinctive definitions. One must speak in the same way about the universal definition which is in the mind of an angel; through it, on account of its high excellence, many things can be known by distinctive cognition.

Cajetan's Commentary

In the title question, one must bear in mind that the universality of an intelligible species is not a universality in being predicated, or in being, or in causing, but in *representing*. Understanding through more universal species is nothing but understanding through species extending to more items in representing them. — And since this happens in two ways — (1) by representing a more universal thing. (2) by representing more things in act — a species representing animality in the latter way (with all its intrinsic differentia-

tors) actually would be called (and would be) a more universal species than one representing just animality, or just humanity. And this is how 'more universal' is being used here, not the first way.¹

¹ This different meaning of 'more universal' is crucial to the plausibility of this article, where the "more universal" species are said to give higher angels a *better* knowledge, which has to mean *richer*, not just more general.

ii. In the body of the article, there is a single conclusion answering the question in the affirmative, namely: the higher the angels, the more universal the species through which they understand. — This is given two supports. The first support is as follows. [*1st claim:*] The more naturally superior their intellects are, the more similar they are to God in intelligible completeness and in how it is reached; [*2nd claim:*] and the more similar to God they are, the fewer the species through which they understand; [*consequence:*] ergo, they understand [more things in act] via [fewer but] more universal species.

The consequence is well known; otherwise one who understands through fewer species would not have a more complete knowledge of things. — The first claim is clear from the fact that natures are ranked according to the closeness of their natural similarity to the First Being. — The second claim is supported by the fact that God understands everything through *one* factor whereby He understands, and this is the mark of unqualified completeness. From this it obviously follows that one who understands everything discriminately through fewer forms gets a power to understand that is more complete and more similar to God than one who understands through many, since fewer is closer to one than many; and an intellectual light that is less divided or divisible is more perfect than one divisible into many reasons for understanding.

A sign of this is the second supporting argument given in the text, one which our own experience does not allow us to doubt. For we experience among ourselves that there are some students to whom everything has to be said piecemeal, as if broken down into particular species; but there are other students who at once apprehend many points from one statement; and this difference cannot come from anywhere but from the latter group's nobility of talent.

Objections from Scotus

iii. Concerning the supporting arguments and the conclusion, objections arise in the remarks of Scotus on *II Sent.* d.3, q.10. There he objects to the first supporting argument, saying that the proposition, "The more similar the angels are to God, the fewer the species through which they understand," is false. It is not necessary, he says, that an intellect more similar to God be assimilated to Him in understanding things through fewer species but in understanding them more clearly.*

* *Impudus*

iv. Against the second supporting argument, the one taken as a sign, he objects by saying it makes a false assumption, namely, that people with more talent understand through fewer species. After all, there are just as many species in them as there are in persons whose minds are more lumbering, but they know more quickly and more clearly.

v. Against the conclusion itself, he argues directly in three ways. Here is the first. [*Major:*] Oneness of reason-for-understanding presupposes oneness of equivalent object, i.e. the object containing [at least] virtually everything that the species contains representatively (as is clear in the case of the divine intellect as the reason for understanding and as the object known). [*Minor:*] But it is impossible for there to be such a single object containing a multitude of

quiddities. [*Conclusion:*] Therefore there cannot be a created species representing the many quiddities distinctly.

Here is the second. [*Major:*] Any reason for knowing can have an act equivalent to itself; [*minor:*] but such a species [i.e. the kind St. Thomas's argument demands] cannot have an act equivalent to it; [*conclusion:*] hence there is no such thing. — The minor is supported on the ground that according to you Thomists, an angel cannot understand distinctly many species in act simultaneously.

Thirdly, he argues to the same effect in terms of habit, deducing the same awkward result, namely, that an angel would be knowing many natures at once as distinct.

He also tacks on a further argument against those who hold that a species in an angel does not represent so much that it could not represent more (but he says that this does not have to be held by us). — And in this respect Scotus speaks well in talking about quiddities. For it is otherwise with particulars. And hence further on, when we will be dealing with the representation of infinitely many particulars through a single angelic species, his argument will be broken.

q 57, a2

Answers to these

vi. To his objection against our first supporting argument, I REPLY by noting that two lines of completive traits are found in God: those which are communicable to creatures, like wisdom and goodness, and those which are incommunicable, like infinity, divinity, understanding everything distinctly through His own substance, and the like. Not only do these perfections differ in themselves but also in how creatures more similar to God come close to them. In the first line of perfections, closeness comes from greater participation in the account formally defining that completive trait; but in the incommunicable traits, closeness comes from greater distance from the opposite. After all, a thing whose nature recedes further from non-being is a thing more similar to God, etc. — Note next that not only is understanding an unqualifiedly completive trait but so also is *understanding everything through one thing* (as one sees from the definition of unqualified completion given by Anselm in the *Monologion XI*). And it does not matter in the present context whether it is an unqualifiedly completive trait all by itself or is a level or mode of such a trait, such as the one I call 'pure act'. — Notice in the third place that the supreme part of the universe, i.e. the angels, claim by their nature a similarity to God not just in certain completive traits but in all of them, but more-so and less-so thanks to their levels. (One sees as much by running through the list of all the unqualifiedly completive traits.) This is the fact on which St. Thomas based his argument to show that, the higher the angels are, the fewer the species through which they understand. It is because they are more similar to God in *all* the unqualifiedly completive traits and hence in this one as well. So the exception Scotus tries to draw is unreasonable and foreign to philosophy. Why should this trait be the exception, rather than another?

Next, I say that St. Thomas's argument is based on the essential gradation of intellects as such; for the higher an intellect is, the more perfect it is, and the more perfect it is, the more unity it has (so to speak), in that a power uni-

ted is greater than the same power dispersed. But clearly, the more united and undivided intellect is the one less partitioned by intelligible species, as opposed to one which needs to be divided by many species in order to know particulars. And hence the more perfect an intellect is, the more similar it is to God, not only in that it knows more clearly but also in that it knows through fewer species.

vii. To the objection against our second support, I say that St. Thomas did not take our experience as a sign that smarter people understand through fewer species (since this is a hidden matter) but as a sign of what is more obvious, namely, that those who excel in talent apprehend from fewer premises and without a distinct proposal of particulars.² For this is an obvious sign that they understand many things in one thing, and the fact that they do not need to have particulars spelled out separately attests to the magnitude of their intellect.

viii. As to his objections against our conclusion, I say [to the first of them] that there are two ways to understand the claim that oneness of species presupposes a oneness of the intellect's primary and equivalent object. One way would be to claim that it presupposes a formal and real oneness of that object existing in the real. And so taken, the claim does not have to be true, as is clear in the case of the intelligible species we have of bovine nature; for such a thing is not in the real in such a way as to be presented one-to-one by a species, and hence no single thing is found in the real corresponding to it one-to-one. — The other way to take it is as presupposing a merely formal oneness of the object, as if a species of leonine nature were impressed by God upon some intellect, and in this sense the claim is true universally: every species supposes a unity of object, since also every power bears first-off upon one formal account. — Thus I say that Scotus' argument mistakenly assumes that its major is verified in the first way, when in fact it is only verified that way in God. In other intellects, it is quite enough that each species bear first-off upon a single formal account. And this is how the species work in the angels.

ix. Against his second objection, taken from act, I admit that any angel can have an act [of understanding] equivalent to any [intelligible] species it has. — And we are not saying the opposite when we say that the angel cannot understand many things at once. For we are talking formally, and we mean to say that an angel cannot at once understand many *as many*; but when many things are understood through one species, it is not a case of understanding many as many; likewise, when many things are understood through several species standing in an order, or several as ordered to one, *etc.* [Ditto for his third objection.]

x. A retort is made to this because it seems to contradict things said above, since it seems to follow that there could be an angel who understood everything *via* his own essence alone. — The inference seems to hold when one adds another proposition we Thomists hold, namely, that God can make an angel substantially more complete than any He has made already. For it follows from these premisses that if, after creating an angel who understood everything through two species (his own essence and one

additional species) He were to make another still higher one, the new one would understand through fewer species and hence through just one, which would no doubt be his essence.

My SHORT ANSWER to this is that I deny the inference; for given that hypothesis (whatever truth it may have), when a higher angel is created, a new intelligible species has to be added to all the lower ones, by which they could understand distinctly the new one. And so in the one who used to be the highest, there will now be three species, and in the new one just created there would be two and hence fewer. And I will keep answering in the same way if we go on forever: the higher one will always have fewer species, not through subtracting from two but through adding to the plurality in the lower angels.

On the answer *ad* (3)

xi. In St. Thomas' answer to the last objection, doubt arises about the proposition, "A species in the intellect of an angel, on account of its excellence, is the reason for or likeness of many things discriminately, somewhat as the divine essence is the reason for everything." This seems to be false and impossible. Its high excellence is either in its *being* or just in its representing. One cannot say "just in representing," because then the proportion to the divine essence would be nil; God's essence has this rôle because of its excellence in *being*; it pre-contains every account and way of being, and this is why it represents everything. — For another thing, limiting the reason why an angelic species, while single, is representative of many things distinctively, to the point that it is "excellent," *i.e.* because it represents excellently, would be explaining by repetition and would be giving no cause except verbally, because representing many things discriminately and representing particulars excellently or non-equivalently, are the same thing.

But one also cannot say that it works because of its excellence in being. For one thing, it would follow that one species in the mind of an angel is more excellent in its being than many sense-endowed substances specifically distinct, indeed more excellent than many angelic substances, indeed perhaps than all the substances actually created below the top angel, since the angels understand lower things through such exalted species. — For another thing, the species would be nobler in its being than the essence of the angel himself, because what is of such great excellence in its being as to have in itself the wherewithal to resemble all lower things under their distinctive definitions, is nobler in its being than what does not have this trait. — For yet another thing, this conflicts with the doctrine of St. Thomas and with the doctrine common to many others. Just as God cannot communicate to an angel's substance such great excellence in being that it would be the *distinctive* likeness of many things, so also He cannot communicate this to one of the angel's intelligible species; both are created items and narrowed down to a genus and a species.

Clearing this up

xii. To clear up this difficulty, one must note in the first place that there are two kinds of beings. Some have been created first-off *in order to exist* (while secondarily they

See q. 6,
a.3 *ad* 4

a.1 *ad* 3

² We would say that the difference is one of logical fertility. Perhaps the species in the higher angels have the same advantage.

a.1
 Dc. Anima
 I, c. 2. Dc.
 Anima III,
 c. 3.

can perhaps represent other things), and these beings we call "things." Others, however, have been set up first-off to represent other things naturally; and these we call "intensions of things" and "species," whether sensible or intelligible.³ The need to posit these two kinds of beings is that being cognitive has to be not just being oneself, but other things as well, while being intellective is being able to be "all things," as is clear from q.14 and the common opinion of philosophers who agree that "a similar thing is known via a similar thing." The natures of things in themselves cannot be in a knower (because a stone is not in a soul); and even a knower, in his finite substance alone, cannot be of such great excellence as to have in himself the wherewithal to assimilate himself distinctly to the natures of knowable things in their distinctive makeup. So, by elimination, since the being of a cognitive nature is not the reason things are knowable, and the natural being of a knowable thing in itself is not in the knower, it was necessary for "intensional being" to be set up by nature — an intensional being whereby a knower would "be" a knowable.

xii. One must note in the second place that the cognitive and the intensional are not distinguished like two orders of things but rather like items concurring to the completion of one order, *i.e.* the order of cognitive natures, since the intensional is an intrinsic complement of the cognitive. I say "complement" because the intensional was invented to supply what cognitive substances need, *i.e.* that there be cognizable things; I say "intrinsic," because the intensional is joined [to the cognitive] to complete and elicit a cognitive thing's own operation. — Hence, the intensional and the cognitive are proportional in act, in potency, and in level of excellence. They are proportional *as to act*, because the intensional-in-act (the intensional being whereby the knower "is" the things he knows) is built into the cognitive-in-act; *as to potency*, such and such intensional being is potentially in the cognitive, as is clear in our intellective soul and in our sensitive part. As to level of excellence, they are proportional because the higher the cognitive power is, the more unitedly it stands towards the knowable, as is clear by going up from the particular senses to the common sense, and so on. But the more the cognitive power is united, the less diversity it needs in the intensional being wherewith it "is" the known object; and thus the higher the cognitive power, the higher and the less distinct but more universal in representing is the intensional being whereby its knowable objects exist — and this intensional being is nothing but what we call "intelligible species."

And this is how the marvelous height of an intellectual nature depends upon the First Intellect, from which it descends in order. For the first intellect is all things *via* its own substance and knows all things through itself alone. But since this trait cannot be communicated to other things

³ One is reminded of Augustine's division between "things" and "signs." Of course, one had to distinguish convention-based signs from natural ones. Since the latter included not only physical effects like smoke but also effects related to cognitive faculties, like visual and intelligible "species," Cajetan skipped directly to these. But he has also provided a basis for calling intensional beings *natural* ones (natural to intellects). This is a difference between Quine's "naturalized epistemology" and Cajetan's.

(because they are all limited), those things get to be such and such substances and of such and such completeness that what they cannot have in their substantial being they do have in intensional being, more and less universally, in keeping with the greater and lesser completeness of the cognitive substance. All the way down to our soul, the last in the gradation of intellectual things, which is divisible in its intensional being with as much diversity as matter has in natural being.

xv. With these points in place, I say against the objections that the talk here is about high excellence in *being*. This can be understood in two ways: either with respect to the things represented, or with respect to other species representing the same objects. If excellence is understood in respect to knowable natures, it can only be understood in mode of being, to the extent that the species of a higher angel have a mode of being which is of a higher order than not only sense-endowed things have but also than the lower angels have. — But if the excellence is understood in regards to intelligible species, then the meaning is clearer and easier to understand and free of ambiguity. And our claim is understood about excellence not only in its mode of being but also in the very perfection of being. So let us imagine that, since there are different species in our souls in line with the differences of things represented (*e.g.* an intelligible species of a cow, species of a lion, species of an eagle, *etc.*) there will be one species of a higher order excellently equivalent or eminently equivalent to those three or four species, and hence representing distinctly in a higher way the very things represented by those four species. This is what it is to know special objects through a universal definition — which is of the highest perfection.

xv. In this way it becomes clear that the objections brought forward are no problem. For it is not necessary to say that a more universal species is more perfect than the natures represented, but just that it is more perfect than the species representing those natures one-by-one. Which has to be the case.

And we are not making the same judgment about the angel's substantial being and the intensional being in him, but a proportional judgment. That they are not identical is obvious from the fact that we commonly say it is impossible for an angel to represent in his own substantial being the distinctive difference of a stone; and we have also conceded that the stone's distinctiveness is represented to him by an added intensional being. Hence it obviously conflicts with a finite substantial being that it be of a fixed, limited nature and also be representative of something else in the latter's distinctive difference. But this does not conflict with intensional being; for the species of a cow in the soul is a being limited to a certain fixed nature among accidents and yet properly represents the bovine distinctive difference. And the reason for this diversity is the one we touched upon above [§§ xii, xiii], namely, that an intensional being is set up by its nature first-off to represent, so as to complement a cognitive substance; but the very things whose intensions they are, are set up first-off just to be. — But the proportional judgment is about an intellec-

tive substance and an intensional being. For the higher a substance is, the higher is the intensional being proper to it. Indeed, from the high status of the substance there comes the high status of the intension; and a high substantial level posits in the angel a greater perfection (equivocally speaking) than does his high level of intension, since this last posits nothing but matching in a higher way the forms

that represent things one-for-one.⁴

⁴ It remains unclear how the species of a higher angel are at once more extensive and richer than those of a lower one. But try this. A high angel has a species through which to understand all the axioms and theorems of general topology. A lower angel has a species *viz* which to understand just those of affine geometry.



Inquiry Fifty-Six: Into the angels' knowledge of non-material things

The inquiry turns now to the things angels know, beginning with their knowledge of things independent of matter, and then going to their knowledge of material things [q.57].

Concerning the first topic, three issues are explored.

- (1) Does an angel know himself?
- (2) Does one angel know another?
- (3) Does an angel by his natural powers know God?

article I

Does an angel know himself?

2 CG c.98, De veritate q.8, a.6; In III De anima, lect 9, In Libro de causis, lectio 13.

It seems that an angel does not know himself.

(1) After all, Denis says in c.6 of *On the Celestial Hierarchy* that the angels "do not know their own strengths." But when a substance is known, its strength is known. Therefore, an angel does not know its own essence.

(2) Besides, an angel is a particular substance; otherwise, he would not act, since actions are done by subsisting particulars. But no particular is intelligible. Therefore, an angel cannot be understood. And so, since an angel only has intellectual cognition, an angel will not be able to know himself.

(3) Moreover, an intellect is impacted by its intelligible object, because understanding is "a sort of undergoing," as it says in *De anima III*. But nothing is impacted by itself, as is obvious among bodily things. Hence, an angel cannot understand himself.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Augustine says in Book II of *Super Genesim ad litteram*, to the effect that an angel "knows himself in his own conformity to the truth *i.e.* in the brilliance of the truth."

ANSWER: As is clear from earlier remarks, an object relates differently to an immanent action and to a transitive one. For in an action that goes to something outside, the object or matter to which the action goes is separate from the agent (as a heater is separate from what it heats, and as a builder is separate from his building). But in an action that remains within the agent, in order for the action to go forward, it has to be the case that the object is united to the agent (as a sense-object has to be united to a sense power if it is to be sensed in act). And thus the object united to the power to do the action in question relates to it as the form which is the source of the action relates in other agents; for just as heat is the formal source of fire's warming things up, so also the species of the thing seen is the formal source of the seeing in the eye.

One must bear in mind, however, that sometimes such a species of the object is in the power to know only virtually, and then that power is only potentially knowing, and for it to know actually, the cognitive power has to be reduced to the act of that species. But if the power in question always has that act already, it can still know through it without undergoing any change or previous reception. From this it is clear that being impacted by an object does not belong by definition to being a knower (as a knower) but only comes up insofar as the knower is a potential one.

For a form to be the source of an action it does not matter whether that form inheres in something else or subsists on its own. After all, if heat subsisted on its own, it would not warm things any less than heat does inhering in something else.

So if something in the class of intelligible things stands as a subsisting intelligible form, it understands itself. Well, since an angel is independent of matter it is a subsisting form and hence is intelligible in act. Thus it follows that the angel does understand himself in his form, which is his own substance.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): that quotation is from an old translation, which a new one corrects to say "they also [*i.e.* the angels] know their own strengths," instead of what the old one said to the effect that they still do not know their own strengths.¹ — But even the old translation could be salvaged to the extent that the angels do not know their own power perfectly, insofar as it comes from the order of divine wisdom, which is beyond the angel's comprehension.

ad (2): we have no understanding of the particular among bodily things, but not because of its particularity. The reason we cannot understand it is its matter,

¹ The old version known to St. Thomas had been made by Scotus Erigena in the 9th century; the new version was by Johannes Saracenus around 1165.

which is the source of individuation among bodily particulars. So, if there are particulars subsisting without matter, such as the angels, nothing prevents their being understood in act.

ad (3): Being impacted and made to undergo change

belongs to an intellect insofar as it is in potency. So it has no place in an angel's intellect, especially insofar as he knows himself. — After all, an action of the intellect is not of the same kind as the action found in bodily things, where it goes out to other matter

Cajetan's Commentary

In the title question, the only thing to note is that the intention of the present article is to discuss mainly *how* an angel knows himself. That he does, is not in doubt among the wise. But there is doubt about how, *i.e.* whether it is through his own substance or through some additional species.

ii. In the body of the article, one conclusion answers the question affirmatively, namely: an angel understands himself through his own substance. The support takes the form of a hypothetical syllogism, as follows. [*Major:*] If something of the intelligible sort stands as a subsisting intelligible form, that being understands himself through himself; [*minor:*] but any angel is of this kind; [*conclusion:*] ergo [an angel understands himself through himself].

St. Thomas supports the conditional major (for present purposes) by running through the conditions of a thing intelligible through itself. Notice that in the predicate of the assumed conditional's consequent, four things are being said: [a] that such a being *understands*, and [b] that it *is understood*, and [c] *by itself*, and [d] *through itself*. Point [a] has already been discussed above as true of an angel. The rest are meant to be taken up here, especially [d]. So the whole purport of this article turns on the word 'intelligible', by clarifying what concurs intrinsically* and what concurs incidentally† towards a thing's being intelligible in act for some intellect. So, he starts by examining four conditions for an object to be intelligible: namely, its being conjoined [to the knower], its causality, its changing‡ [the knower], and its inhering.

iii. He shows first, then, that what is intelligible in act has to be conjoined to the one understanding it, thanks to the difference between the object of an immanent operation and the object of a transitive one. — Secondly, he shows that an intelligible object actually conjoined [to the intellect] stands as a form-wise source of the act of understanding, as heat is to the act of warming things up, and as a visible species is to seeing. — Thirdly, he shows that an impact upon the knower arises from the circumstance that the knower is in potency; and hence it is not required intrinsically that the intelligible object in act should change the knower. — Fourthly, he shows that the intelligible object's inhering in the knower (as a visible species inheres in a seer) arises from the circumstance that it is an accident; for if it were subsistent, it would still concur to the same effect. And hence it is not required for an object to be intelligible in act that it inform an intellect by inherence.

iv. From these four points the assumed conditional is deduced, since we have it from them that in order for an intelligible object to be actually understood by an intellect, nothing more is required than that it be conjoined and be so conjoined to the knower as to be the formal source of the act of understanding in him, whether this changes him or not, whether it adheres in him or not, but rather subsists. For from this much it obviously follows that if something in the class of intelligible things stands as a subsisting intelligible form, it has the complete makeup of the intelligible in act *vis-à-vis* itself, which presupposes that it is intellective and hence is understood by itself through itself.

And if you look at the matter closely, you will see that these four conditions correspond to three conditions set down in the consequent: the first two imply that such a being is understood, the third, that it is understood by itself, the fourth, that it is understood through itself. And from the fourth you have it that there is no need for a species in the mix, whereby it would inhere in the knower. From the third, you have it that the object does not have to be distinct from the knower on the grounds of what it takes to be a changer and a thing changed; and from the first and the second, you have it that the object has to stand as act and form in the class of intelligible things.

The assumed minor proposition is supported by St. Thomas on the ground that an angel is a subsisting intelligible form in act.

Trouble from Scotus

v. Concerning the conditional taken as our major and the conclusion, many doubts arise touched on by Scotus in his remarks on *// Sent.* d.3. q.8. But before I present them, I want to take up a doubt about St. Thomas's reasoning process, which is also touched upon by Scotus a little, but under another form. And the doubt consists in the fact that the reasoning process seems to go against St. Thomas's own statements and against the truth of the matter.

It seems to go against his own remarks elsewhere, since it says in the first two conditions that the intelligible object has to be united to the intellect as a formal source whereby the mind operates — but then he says there does not have to be a conjoining by way of inherence. So how will the intellect be informed by the intelligible object? — And this doubt is confirmed on the ground that this conjunction of the intelligible object with the intellect is either a conjunction in being or else

q 50, a.1

* *per se*
† *per accidens*

‡ *motu*

* *secundum esse*

in operating. It is not in operating, because you say the conjunction precedes the operation, and is indeed the cause of it. Therefore, it is a conjunction in being* — not substantial being, because the substance of the angel is not the substantial form of his intellect (but is really distinct from it, according to you); therefore, it is a matter of inherence. — The doubt is also confirmed, says Scotus, by your own example. For if heat were subsistent, although it would be a source of making things hot, it would not be that whereby a log is formally made warm. Thus, even though an angel's substance is intelligible in act as far as it itself is concerned, and can be a formal source of understanding, as heat is of getting warm, it still cannot be the formal source whereby an intellect formally understands, if it is not *in* that intellect but subsisting on its own.

The reasoning here conflicts with other statements of St. Thomas, since he himself says in 3 *CG* c.51 that since the divine substance is truth itself and pure act even in the class of intelligible things, it is unique to God's substance that it be the formal source whereby his intellect understands and does not "inform" that intellect in being. So that text is inconsistent with what he is saying here.

The reasoning is also against the truth of the matter, says Scotus, because it is impossible for something to be that whereby a thing formally does an immanent act and yet not be in it, as is clear from *De Anima II* where it is proved that the form whereby an agent formally acts is a form giving being-operative.

vi. Concerning the third condition [listed in § iii], Scotus raises an objection arguing as follows. The object understood in act is a cause *vis-à-vis* the act of understanding in its coming to be and in its existing; therefore, as long as the intellect understands, it is being changed and impacted by the intelligible object — and if it is always understanding, it is always being changed. Wrongly, therefore, did St. Thomas say that the object "changes" the intellect only at the times when the intellect is in potency to understand.

vii. Scotus also raises objections about the fourth condition [listed in § iii], but since they assume the angel's intellect (of itself) concurs merely passively towards the act of understanding, and we are going to have a special discussion of this below, I am omitting them for now.

Answering Scotus

viii. Against the objections I put first [in § v], I say that they all assume a false point, namely, that the angel's essence stands to the angel himself *qua* understanding as a separate form, because it is posited not to inhere in his intellect. But what we are saying is that the essence is intrinsic to the angel himself not only in his natural being but also in his intelligible being. The result is that the intelligible object in act is united more closely to him than it would be through "information" or inherence: for the conjunction is by way of identity.

Here, it is important to notice that the cause of this mistake is failure to distinguish between an extrinsic intelligible object and an intrinsic one. Since a person

understanding, in order to understand, has to have an intelligible nature within himself, it is supposed that just as he has the natures of other intelligible things thanks to "information," so also he has to have "information" of himself, although reason obviously points to the opposite. For, just as one who understands relates differently towards being himself and towards being other things, so also he relates differently towards understanding himself and understanding other things. Hence, since he is himself in such natural being that it is also himself in intelligible being, because that natural being is intelligible in act, he is able to understand himself through himself. But he is not other things either in his natural being or in intelligible being unless something is added to him; and so one needs to posit species of the other things.

ix. So it is obvious how to answer the objections. We must reject calling this object separate because we say it is not conjoined by inherence but by identity and by subsistence, not outside of and separately from the one understanding (as Scotus thought we were saying) but in the very one understanding. — The example about the heat whereby a log is warmed up serves this purpose: if the heat subsisted in the log identically, it would still be that whereby the wood formally warmed up. And likewise if the visible species were subsisting on its own by identity in the seer, it would still be the formal source of seeing in him. — Against what is opposed as a further objection, namely, that according to St. Thomas the intellect is really distinct from the angel himself, I say that this point has nothing to do with the intellect's distinction or identity with the angel. For it is obvious from *De Anima III* that, whether the substance of the soul is said to have in itself the natures of empirical objects and intelligible ones, or that the sensory and intellectual faculties themselves have such natures, one makes the same judgment as to whether it can or cannot operate. For one needs to imagine that, because the act of understanding is first-off the operation of the substance doing the understanding, it comes to do that act more perfectly if the substance itself has both rôles, namely, of the object and the doer, even if it elicits that operation by way of some more special trait than it would if it had only the rôle of the doer and by way of that same special trait acquired the role of an object accidentally.

Remarks of St. Thomas elsewhere pose no obstacle. He says that being the intelligible form of *another* is unique to God, not being the intelligible form of *himself*. Which is what we are affirming in the case at hand, when we say that an angel's substance (because it is subsistent and complete in being independent of matter) has both what it takes to be intellective and what it takes to be actually intelligible, and that from this there flows the power whereby he understands himself, not needing another form, with the preventent substance supplying the formation both more intrinsically and more modificationally than anything tacked on would do.

From these facts, it is also obvious that the present text does not conflict with the proof made in *De Anima II*, because we are not positing a *separate* intelligible object but one more conjoined to the doer than it would

c.2: 414a 10-14

q 79, a.2

c 4, 430a 2ff

be through “information.” But what fools many people is that they think of the angel’s intellect and his substance as two separate things and then look for a way of uniting them, when in fact the intellect flows from the essence as actually intelligible, and is more intimately informed by it than by any intensional species. And this is true in the class of the intelligible. Hence, a person who does not wish to be fooled here, should not distinguish between the intellect and the one understanding as such, but should treat them as one and be content.¹

x. Against Scotus’s objection to the third condition [listed in § vi] I say as follows. The knower or understander (as in *II* or *III De Anima*) is said to be in potency on two levels, to its essential being and to an accidental being (or to its first act and a second act). Being impacted by the object pertains to first act in the intel-

¹ Scotus thought that when St. Thomas said *x* was “really” distinct from *y*, he meant to say that *x* and *y* are separate things or actually separable things. In fact, St. Thomas sometimes just meant that the one thing does not include the other. Cajetan made this point forcibly earlier in these commentaries on the *Prima Pars*, when talking about the real distinction between essence and existence, in q.3, a.5. After all, if an essence were a “separate thing” from its existence, there would simply be no essence, and an essence would not be an intrinsic specifier of the act of existing. So, while an act of existing does include the essence actuated, said essence, in itself, does not include the act of existing, and *voilà* the real distinction. In the present case, in *esse reali*, the angel’s essence includes his intellect, but not *vice-versa*.

lect and not to second act (as is obvious in *De Anima III*), and an intellect in act as knowing does not need to be acted upon beforehand.² c.4

So the objector went wrong in two ways. First, it was by looking for an impact of the object known in the knower in connection with second act, whereas there is none; rather, the knower and the conjoined object are one complete cause of the second act in its coming to be and in its existing. And so it is in this way and in no other that knowing is truly said to depend upon the object in act, in the knowledge’s being or coming to be. — Secondly, the objector badly understood St. Thomas, thinking that he was assigning for cause of impact by the object a temporal difference, *i.e.* between when it is in act and when it is in potency. But in fact no such cause if found in St. Thomas. Rather, he assigns as the cause the intellect’s being in potency, talking about potency to first act. Which is obviously and patently true. For from the fact that the knower does not have the known object within him by his nature, but is only in potency to it, it follows that he is impacted by it and actually becomes such as the known object is. Hence, as St. Thomas adds, if the knower had the nature of the known object within himself either from himself or from elsewhere, he would not be impacted by the known object, — as is obvious, because nothing is impacted by what it already has.

² Rather, the intellect elicits the second act (the act of understanding) from itself alone, once it has been completed by an impressed species putting it into first act.

article 2

Does one angel know another?

2 CG c.98, *De veritate* q 8, a.7

It seems that one angel does not know another.

c 4;
429a.20 (1) After all, Aristotle says in *De Anima III* that if the human intellect had within itself a nature like those of the things we sense, that nature would prevent other natures from showing up in our intellect — much as, if the pupil of one's eye were colored in a certain hue, one could not see every color. Well, as the human intellect stands towards knowing bodily things, so the angelic intellect stands towards knowing matter-independent things. So since the angelic intellect has in itself a definite nature of the matter-independent kind, it seems that it cannot know other such natures.

Prop 8 (2) Besides, it says in the *Liber de causis* that “every intelligence knows what is above it, having been caused by it, and what is below it, as the cause thereof.” But one angel is not the cause of another. So one angel does not know another.

q.50, a.4;
q.55, a.1 *ad* 3 (3) Furthermore, an angel *x* cannot know another angel *y* through the essence of *x*, the knower, since all cognition goes according to similarity, and the essence of *x* is not similar to the essence of *y*, the angel known, except generically, as became obvious above. Hence it would follow that one angel would not have distinctive knowledge of another but only general knowledge. — Likewise it cannot be said that *x* knows *y* through the essence of *y*, because that whereby an intellect understands is inside that intellect (and only the Trinity falls into a mind). — Likewise also one cannot say that *x* knows *y* through the intelligible species of *y*, because that species does not differ from *y* himself, since both are matter-independent. — So there seems to be no way for one angel to know another.

(4) Furthermore, if one angel knows another, this is either through an innate species or one acquired from things. If it were through an innate species, it would follow that if God now created a new angel, it could not be known by those created already. But if it is through a species acquired from things, it would follow that the higher angels could not know the lower ones, from whom they receive nothing. So, again, there seems to be no way for one angel to know another.

Prop 11 ON THE OTHER HAND, it says in the *Liber de causis* that “every intelligence knows the things which do not perish.”

c. 8,
PL 34, 269 I ANSWER: as Augustine says in Book II of *Super Genesim ad litteram*, things which have pre-existed in the Word of God from eternity have flowed forth from Him in two ways: in one way, into angels' intellects; in the other way, so as to subsist in their own natures.

They have flowed into the angels' intellects through God's impressing upon the angels' minds a likeness of the things which He has produced in natural being. But in God's Word from eternity, there have existed not only the defining accounts of bodily things, but also those of all the spiritual creatures. So, then, upon each of the spiritual creatures there has been impressed by God's Word all the defining accounts of all things, be they bodily or spiritual. But this is true in such a way that the defining account of each angel has been impressed on that angel in its natural being and its intelligible being at once, so that each might both subsist in the nature of his species *and* understand himself by it; but the defining accounts of other natures, spiritual and bodily, have been impressed upon a given angel only in their intelligible being, so that he might know through such impressed species both kinds of creatures.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): the spiritual natures of the angels are distinguished from each other by a certain ordering, as I said above. And thus the nature of one angel does not prevent his intellect from knowing the other angelic natures, since both those higher than he and those lower than he have an affinity with his nature, differing from his only by their different levels of completeness/perfection.

ad (2): what it takes to be a cause and an effect does not bring it about that one angel knows another, except because of similarity, insofar as the cause and the effect are similar. And so if mutual similarity is admitted among the angels without mutual causality, there will remain in them a knowledge of each another.

ad (3): angel *x* knows another one, *y*, through *y*'s species existing in *x*'s intellect, and this species differs from the *y* whose likeness it is — not in terms of material *versus* immaterial being, but in terms of natural *versus* intensional being. For the angel *y* himself is a form subsisting in natural being, and this is not the case with his species in the mind of *x*, where the species has intelligible being alone. Thus, the form of the color in a wall has natural being, but in the intervening medium it has only intensional being.

ad (4): God made each and every creature proportionate to the universe He decided to make. So, if God had decided to make more angels (or more things of other natures) He would have impressed more intelligible species upon the minds of the angels. Likewise, if a builder had chosen to make a bigger house, he would have made a bigger foundation. So it's the same with God adding a creature to the universe and adding an intelligible species to an angel.

q 50, a 4 *ad* 1, 2,
see also q. 10,
a. 6, q. 47, a. 2

Cajetan's Commentary

The only thing to notice in the title question is that the intent here is to treat both *whether* one angel knows another and *how*.

In the body of the article a single conclusion answers the question in the affirmative: each angel knows the others through the defining accounts of all things impressed in him. — The conclusion is clarified by the authority of Augustine, who said that things were produced by God not only in their natural being but also in their intelligible being in the minds of the angels. From this one obviously has the point that the defining accounts of all things (both bodily and spiritual) are in each angel, through which he can understand those things. And since the word 'all' distributes over the very angel knowing things, St. Thomas was concerned to confirm the preceding article by showing here how the angel doing the understanding was himself produced in intelligible being, lest you think that by this intelligible being he added some sort of intention within himself over and above his natural being.

Unpacking the answer *ad* (1)

ii. In the answer *ad* (1), doubt arises as to how the answer meets the objection. For it seems that the answer consists in making a certain exception, as if to say that a knower could actually have from his own nature something of the natures knowable by him, when his nature has affinity with the others and is distinct from them by a certain order of more and less perfect. And since this is how each angel's nature stands to the others, it is consistent to say that he has himself in actual intelligible and natural being, and is not impeded from knowing the others.

But this is vulnerable to a large difficulty. On the one hand, as Averroes says in his comment 4 on *De Anima III*, "the proposition saying that

a recipient has to be bare of the nature of what it receives,

is to be understood in terms of the nature of the proximate genus of the thing received."¹ And the fact that the angel's nature already has in it an affinity with the outside natures [which it is supposed to know] is more of an obstacle than a help. — The obstacle is confirmed by the fact that, according to St. Thomas, all the angels belong to the same proximate genus, since he denies that there are subordinate kinds among them. For another thing, St. Thomas's interpretation here would destroy Aristotle's reasoning process in *De Anima III*. For someone could say that the soul has actually something of the natures knowable by it (*e.g.* itself, or as the ancient's used to say, an element); and this does not impede knowledge of other things, since it stands in a certain order to those other things in terms of more and less perfect, of

course, and has an affinity with them on account of closeness in being or causing!

For a third thing, having an affinity and being distinguished by degree does not suppress the reason why a nature existing inside [the knower] prohibits things outside [from becoming known]. For that reason is the fact that when a mind has been narrowed down of itself to a certain nature in act, it cannot be narrowed otherwise; likewise, the nature to which it is nailed down cannot be nailed down to other natures. Thus, Averroes also, in his comment 66 on *Physics I* says that if prime matter had a form thanks to its own nature, it would not receive other forms; and likewise, if it had a privation, it would not receive other privations. Well, it is clear that this reason is at work in natural things however closely related they may be and have of themselves distinctness in terms of more and less perfect. After all, it is common to all actual specific natures that the ultimate differentiator of one cannot be set by the ultimate differentiator of another. And as far as completeness/perfection is concerned, we know by experience that a sense already affected by some sense-object is impeded from perceiving others in that wherein they differ.

Clearing this up

iii. To clear up this difficulty, two issues need to be touched upon briefly. The first is the basis for that broad reason why a form existing within excludes an outside form. The other is the sense of the text. As to the first point, you need to know that the correct reason for this is the fact that one nature is not further determinable by another. For suppose there were a form further determinable by all forms, and prime matter had it: it would not be blocked from receiving the forms of everything.² The jaundice in the tongue of a man with a fever, while remaining itself, would be further determinable by sweetness and not prevented from tasting sweetness. — But these points leave the result that the above proposition does not hold true for natures such that one is determinable by the other, but only for those where neither can be further determined by the other. Hence it obviously does not hold in natures that relate to each other as potency and act. After all, what is not receptive to the sensory forms, as such, is not impeded from receiving them if it is currently vegetative, because a vegetative nature is further determinable by a sensory nature as potency is by act.

iv. As for the second issue, the words of the text can be taken two ways, in line with two ways of considering knowable natures arising because of two orders of knowable things. It is well-known, after all, that knowable natures are of two orders. Some are just knowable, as one sees with empirical things; but others

Opusculum 42, De natura generis, cc. 5, 6

¹ The point was that a receiver cannot "receive" what it already has.

² In reality, Cajetan thought prime matter is blocked from receiving a great many forms, such as those of accidents.

are both knowable and cognitive *and not by distinct traits* (i.e. not because a thing knows because of one factor and is known because of another, as happens in animals) *but thanks just to itself*, so that the same thing knows and is known in act, as happens in things separate from matter.³ And from this comes the fact that knowable natures can be considered in these two ways, namely, as just knowables, and as known knowers, where both are found.

v. From these two distinctions, there emerges both the truth about the sense of the text and the clarity of that truth. For at first blush, the sense of the text seems to be the one already touched upon, namely that a nature of the same genus differing only in specific degree from other knowable natures, if it exists inside a mind, does not prohibit other natures from being known, because they are affine. And this reason seems to be based on the fact that knowing comes about by assimilation, and hence, in similar natures, such as those mentioned above, knowledge of the one does not prohibit knowledge of another. And since the spiritual natures of the angels are of this kind, the nature of one angel does not impede knowing another. — And so taken, the sense of the text is considering natures only as knowable, and makes the same judgment about spiritual natures and bodily ones.

But our experience conflicts with this sense of the text, above and beyond the authorities and arguments already mentioned. For we do experience that one color impedes cognition of other colors, and likewise with flavors; and yet it is clear that colors (and likewise flavors) differ from each other only in species and agree in genus.

vi. But those who study the meaning of the text more closely will see that it is not making the same judgment about the empirical natures intelligible to us and spiritual natures. The angelic intellect does not stand to spiritual natures the way our intellect stands to empirical ones. This was the basis for objecting.

That it is not the same judgment (thanks to the affinity of spiritual things with each other and their differing only in specific order) becomes apparent at this point. Closeness of natures need not apply to things just knowable, among which (as already said) a nature existing inside prohibits another from arising. It can also apply to cognitive knowables, among which it does not impede but rather helps cognition. — That it does not impede it is shown on the ground that it removes the cause of the impediment, which was the fact that one nature cannot be further determined by another (as is clear from things already said [in § *iii*]). For from the very fact one posits an intellectual nature, one necessarily posits one that is determinable by others. Thus if whiteness were not just visible but also could see, it would be further determinable by other colors from that fact alone, just as our power to see is further determinable; but as things stand, since whiteness is only visible, it is not determinable by those other colors. Thus as currently existing, whiteness prohibits [seeing] other colors, but if it could also see, it would not impede [seeing] them. — That positing an intellectual nature helps is clear from the fact that knowing comes about by assimilation, and there is less need for assimilation where there is more closeness.

So, since it is obvious from prior remarks, that spiritual substances are in act as intellective and as intelligible, and that in these things closeness of their natures does not prohibit knowing. St. Thomas, in making his answer, takes the affinity of spiritual natures as the reason for the answer he gives; and he satisfies the objector by saying that the affinity which would impede us does not impede [among the angels].

vii. From these remarks the solution to all of the objections is clear. For they were talking about just knowable and receivable natures generally. We here, however, are talking about things which are actually both known and knowing, which are another story, indeed the opposite story, as has been made clear.

³ So, a "primordial unity of knowing and being known" is what makes pure spirits different beings from the empirical ones we are naturally able to understand. If Rahner had

made this primordial unity *das Wesen der Geistigkeit*, he would have been on common ground with Cajetan. But the late Austrian Jesuit made it *das Wesen des Sems*.

Can the angels know God through their natural powers?

In II Sent. d.23, q.2, a.1; 3 CG cc.41, 49; De veritate q.8, a.3.

It seems that the angels cannot know God through their natural powers.

PG 3, 593 (1) After all, Denis says in c.1 of *On the Divine Names* that God is “placed above all heavenly minds by His incomprehensible power,” and afterwards he adds “because He is above all substance, He is removed from all knowledge.”

(2) Besides, God is infinitely distant from an angel’s intellect. But things infinitely far away cannot be reached. Therefore, it seems that an angel through his natural powers, cannot know God.

q 12, a.4 (3) Moreover, 1 Cor. 13:12 says, “We see now in a glass darkly, but then face-to-face.” From this there seems to be a two-fold knowledge of God: one by which He is seen through His essence (which is called seeing Him face-to-face), the other in which He is seen in the mirror of creatures. Well, the first knowledge of God an angel cannot have through his natural powers, as was shown above. But seeing in a mirror does not suit the angels because they do not get knowledge of God from sensible things, as Denis says in c.7 of *On the Divine Names*. Therefore, the angels cannot know God through their natural powers.

PG 3, 868

ON THE OTHER HAND, angels are more powerful in their knowing than people are. But people can know God by their natural powers according to Romans 1:19, “For that which may be known of God is manifest in them.” All the more, then, can the angels do so.

ANSWER: angels can have some knowledge of God by their natural powers. To get this clear, one needs to ponder the fact that something is known in three ways. In one way, through the presence of its essence in the knower, as if light were seen in one’s eye. In this sense an angel is said to know himself. The second way is through the presence of its likeness in a cognitive power, as a stone is seen by the eye through the fact that an image of it comes to be in the eye. The third way is that the likeness of the thing known is not gotten directly from the thing itself but from another thing in which it

comes to be; this is how we see a man in a mirror.

To the first way of knowing a thing, there corresponds the knowledge of God in which He is seen through His essence, and this knowledge of God cannot be present in any creature thanks to its natural powers, as was said above — The third way of knowing something corresponds to the knowledge with which we know God in this life through the likeness of Him that has come to be in creatures, according to Romans 1:20, “For the visible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.” This is how we are said to see God in a mirror. — But the knowledge with which an angel knows God through his natural powers is intermediate between the two; it is like the knowledge in which a thing is seen through a species received from it. For the image of God is impressed in the angel’s very nature through his essence, and so an angel knows God insofar as he is himself a likeness of God. Still he does not see the very essence of God, because no created likeness is sufficient to represent the divine essence. Hence this knowing is a closer fit with seeing in a mirror, because the angel’s very nature is a sort of mirror representing a divine likeness.

q.12, a.1

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): Denis is talking about the knowledge that amounts to comprehension, as his words show explicitly. And God is not known in that way by any created intellect.

ad (2): because an angel’s intellect and essence are infinitely far from God, it follows that the angel cannot comprehend Him nor see His essence through his own nature. But it does not follow on this account that the angel can have no knowledge of Him: after all, just as God is infinitely far from the angel, so also God’s knowledge of Himself is infinitely far from the knowledge an angel has of Him.

ad (3): the knowledge which an angel naturally has of God is intermediate between the two sorts of knowledge and yet is a closer fit with one of them, as I said above.

Cajetan’s Commentary

The title question is clear, given the added remark that we are asking also about how the angel naturally knows God. — In the body of the article, he does four jobs. In the first, he puts forth a conclusion answering in the affirmative, namely: angels can have through their natural powers some knowledge of God.

In the second job, he explains it by settling the how of such knowledge. He does so by distinguishing three

ways in which a thing is visible and applying them to God *vis-à-vis* created intellects, putting in the middle the way in which God is naturally known by an angel. All points are perfectly clear in the text.

Thirdly, he supports the conclusion thus modified, namely, that an angel knows God through a likeness acquired immediately from Him. [*Antecedent*:] A divine likeness is impressed on an angel in his substance: [*in-*

[*ference*:] so the angel knows God through his own substance as through a species immediately gotten from God. — The inference is soundly drawn because the angel's substance is from God alone.

In the fourth job, he answers a tacit objection in which someone might think that such knowledge of God would be *seeing* Him, because in our experience, knowledge impressed upon us through a species impressed directly by the object has what it takes to be called "seeing." He heads this off by assigning firstly the reason why the knowledge of God in an angel is not the vision of God: namely, that no created likeness suffices to represent God completely. — He heads it off secondly by pointing out that such cognition fits more with the other extreme, namely, seeing in a mirror, for the very same cause, *i.e.* its removal from the other extreme, namely, face-to-face vision. And thanks to this an angel is called a mirror of God.

Doubts about the conclusion

- ii. Concerning this conclusion as thus modified, doubt arises from three heads. The first is the incompleteness of the knowledge and goes thus. From what has been said, it would follow that an angel has only a vague knowledge of God. — The consequence holds because the angel's substance does not represent that whereby God is constituted in His own being and distinguished from other things (just as it does not present that by which another angel is distinguished from him). — This is confirmed on the ground that if an angel knew other angels through his own substance alone, he would not know them distinctly, for the reasons stated above. Ergo, in knowing God *via* his own substance alone, an angel does not know God distinctly. Which is awkward.
- iii. On the second head, Scotus (in his remarks on *II Sent.* d.3, q.9) objects because of the discourse that would be involved. [*Major*:] Knowing *x* through a likeness known as representing *x* is discursive knowing; [*minor*:] but an angel's knowledge of God through the angel's substance is through a likeness known as representing Him; [*conclusion*:] therefore, the knowing is discursive. Well, this is awkward for you, Thomists, because you deny discursive knowledge in angels. And it would be unsuitable to just posit that the first and most perfect natural knowledge which an angel has of God is discursive, even given that angels can think discursively. — The major is clear from the difference between a species representing the reason for knowing (like the species in the eye) and one representing as a known (such as the species in a mirror). The minor is left as self-evident, since an angel only knows God by knowing himself, and since he knows himself through his own substance.
- iv. On the third head, Scotus argues in the same place from the possibility and rationality of positing in the angel's mind an intelligible species representing God distinctly but not equivalently or comprehensively (much as one posits in his mind the intelligible species of another angel).

Scotus tries to support this on three grounds. —

The first is that [*antecedent*:] man in the state of innocence used to have knowledge of his last end in detail and not just in general as he has today; [*inference*:] therefore, an angel, thanks to his own nature, has a greater knowledge of his last end in detail and this is knowing distinctly. — Drawing the inference holds good because the natural blessedness of an angel is greater than the natural blessedness of a man [would have been] in the state of nature.

The second attempt in support goes thus. [*Antecedent*:] After Paul was caught up to see God, he could remember what he had seen; [*inference*:] therefore, a species of the object which he had seen could have been impressed upon him. — Drawing the inference holds good because, otherwise, he would not have remembered. — The antecedent is obvious from the Apostle himself, who recorded that he had heard "hidden things whereof a man is not permitted to speak" etc.

The third attempted support is that, in Augustine, the angels' morning knowledge is a knowledge of things in the Word and is prior to their evening knowledge, and belongs to the angels prior to their beatitude. Therefore, there was in them a distinct knowledge of God through some intensional species as a reason for knowing. — The consequence holds because morning knowledge is a distinct knowledge of things in the Word; but it is impossible for effects to be known distinctly and in order in a cause that is but vaguely known.

Clearing this up

v. This difficulty consists, effect, in whether one should posit an intelligible species of God Himself, or whether the very essence of the intellectual substance taking the place of the intelligible species in representing God to such an intellect supplies sufficiently. TO CLEAR IT UP, *first* one needs to see what is required for anything to be represented distinctly; *secondly*, one needs to see whether it is possible for there to be something representing God distinctly in natural or intensional being.

As to the first issue, you need to know briefly that a thing is not said to be "represented distinctly" unless there is represented that condition whereby it is form-wise constituted in its own, essential being, as is clear case-by-case; after all, a man is not represented "distinctly" unless he is represented as rational (assuming that "rational" is man's proper and essential differentiator); likewise, whiteness is not represented distinctly unless its ultimate differentiator is represented. So God will not be represented distinctly unless there is represented that which stands to Him as the essential and distinctive differentiator constituting Him in what it is to be God — so much for the first issue.

vi. As to the second issue, dealing with a means [of knowing] representing [x], you need to know that a means happens to represent [x] to the extent it happens to give knowledge [of x]. Hence, by arguing from denial of the consequent: if it does not happen to give that much knowledge, it will not be possible for anything to be that fully representative. Well, it is impossible for there to be on a natural basis that much know-

2 Cor. 12.4
Super Genesim
ad litteram IV,
c.24

ledge of God in a creature, I mean, enough to amount to distinct knowledge of Him. Therefore, it is impossible for there to be a [created] means representing God distinctly. — The point that such cognition is impossible is based on the fact that knowing “distinctly” is knowing the ultimate differentiator, or what functions as such. Knowing a thing down to and including its ultimate differentiator (not only as it puts an end to the question “does it exist?,” but also as it terminates the question “what is it?”) is knowing sufficiently (*a priori* from the thing’s nature) everything that suits it. (After all, a *defining* account solves all difficulties. The “what it is to be it” is the starting point of demonstration.) In God’s case, this goes beyond what is natural to any creature.

As regards the object, bear in mind that (if we may speak of God, babbling as we go) His unrepresentability emerges from the fact that

[*major:*] the entitatively infinite as such is not representable distinctly.

So although divine wisdom might be represented by a created thing, it would not be represented distinctly insofar as it is infinite, beyond the question, “does it exist” But

[*minor:*] the distinctive factor constituting God (say,

deity) as such is infinite being.

[*Conclusion:*] Therefore, it is unrepresentable distinctly.

The minor is obvious because one must not imagine that infinity stands to being God as it stands to the definitions of His attributes. For it is not true that AS wisdom and goodness are formal accounts or realities in themselves, and they get finitude or infinity like a “how much” of perfection, SO being God gets to be infinite. Rather, the infinity is precisely the “what it is to be it” of deity. Otherwise, God would not be first-off, essentially, and intrinsically an infinite being.

vii. From these remarks it is obvious how to answer the first objection [stated in § ii]. For by calling any knowledge short of quidditative knowledge “vague,” one realizes that any knowledge a creature can have of God is vague because it is not quidditative.

viii. Against the second objection [stated above in § iii], which is that of Scotus, I say that his major is flatly false, as one sees in the case of knowing Socrates through his species in a mirror: for this knowledge arises through a likeness representing as a known, and yet is not discursive.



Inquiry Fifty-Seven: Into the angels' knowledge of material things

Thereafter one asks about the material things which are known to the angels. And five questions are raised about this.

- (1) Do angels know the natures of material things?
- (2) Do they know particulars?
- (3) Do they know future things?
- (4) Do they know the thoughts of our hearts?
- (5) Do they know all the mysteries of god?

article 1

Do the angels know material things?

2 CG c.99, *De veritate* q.8, a.8, q.10, a.4.

It seems that the angels do not know material things.

(1) What one understands is a perfecting of the one understanding. But material things cannot be perfective of angels, since they are lower than the angels. Therefore, the angels do not know material things.

*Glossa
ordinaria*

(2) Besides, intellectual vision is of the things which are in the soul through their essence, as it says in the gloss on 2 Cor. 12:2. But material things cannot be in the soul of a man or in the mind of an angel by their essences. Therefore, they cannot be known by intellectual vision, but only by imagination (by which likenesses of bodies are apprehended) and by sensation (which deals with bodies themselves). But in the angels there is no imaginary seeing, nor sensation, but only intellectual seeing. Therefore, the angels cannot know material things.

(3) Moreover, material things are not intelligible in act, but are knowable by sense and imaginative apprehension. These are not found in angels. Therefore, the angels do not know material things.

ON THE OTHER HAND, whatever a lesser strength can do, a greater one can do. But a human intellect, which is below the angels' in the order of nature, can know material things. *A fortiori*, then, so can the angels.

ANSWER: the order in things is such that those higher in being are more complete than those lower in being, and what is contained in lower ones deficiently and partially and disunitedly is contained in the higher ones in a higher way, with a certain wholeness and simplicity.

In God, therefore, as in the supreme apex of things, they all pre-exist super-substantially, in keeping with His own un-composed being, as Denis says in *On the Divine Names*. The angels, in turn, are closer to God than other creatures and more similar to Him, and so they share in many aspects of the divine goodness, and share in them more completely than other creatures, as Denis writes in

c. 4 of *The Celestial Hierarchy*. Hence, all material natures pre-exist in the angels, in a simpler and less-material way than they exist in material things, but still unitedly and less completely than in God.

But everything which is *in* something is in it after the fashion set by what it is in. The angels by their nature are intellectual. And so, as God knows material things through His essence, so the angels know them thanks to the fact that they are in them through intelligible species of them.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): a thing understood completes the one understanding it through its intelligible species in his intellect. And thus the intelligible species which are in an angel's intellect are the factors perfecting an angel and the act-states of his intellect.

ad (2): the senses do not apprehend the essences of things but only their outward accidents. Neither does imagination apprehend things' essences, but just likenesses of bodies. Only the intellect apprehends the essences of things. Hence, it says in *De Anima III* that the object of an intellect is a what-it-is, about which it does not err, just as the senses do not err about their proper sense-objects. So, essences of material things are in man's intellect or an angel's, as a thing understood is in the one understanding it, and not in its real being. (But there are some things which are in the intellect or in the soul in both kinds of being; and of them, too, there is intellectual seeing).

ad (3): if an angel got knowledge of material things from those things themselves, he would have to make them intelligible in act by abstracting them. But an angel does not get knowledge from the things themselves (as our intellect does, through species of them which it *makes* intelligible by abstracting), but through species of them which are innate in him and are intelligible in act *already*.

PG 3, 180

c. 6,
430b 28

 Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article a single conclusion answers it: the angels know material things through intelligible species existing in them. — This is supported as follows. [*Antecedent: 1st part:*] material things are contained in the angels [*2nd part:*] by way of their intelligible being; [*consequent:*] hence [the angels know those things through their species].

The antecedent has two parts; as to the first part, namely, that material things are contained [in the angels], this is supported by St. Thomas on the ground that the order of the universe has the feature that lower things are contained in higher things in a more excellent way, namely, more unitedly and more simply. This is illustrated by the containment of all things in God. But the angels are supreme among the beings because they are closest to God. Therefore [as God contains lower things, so do the angels]. — As to the second part of it, it is supported on the ground that things contained in something are in it after the fash-

ion set by the container; and hence, since the angels are of an intellectual nature, everything in them is in them in an intelligible fashion. This is illustrated by the similar way in which things relate to their containment in God.

ii. Notice here just one point: On the strength of this argument nothing is inferred but that the angels contain material things in an intelligible way. Whether that intelligible being (whereby material things are in the angels in a simpler and less-material way than the same material things are in our soul) is the substantial being of the angels themselves (as some Aristotelians think) or is an intensional being [had by the angels] through intelligible species, is not settled in this argument. But St. Thomas had concluded that the being would be intensional because he already settled in the previous Inquiry that the substantial being of an angel is not all by itself of sufficient completeness to be able to assimilate itself to other things according to their own distinctive differences.

a. 1, ad 3

article 2

Do the angels know particulars?

1ST q 89, a.4; *In II Sent.* d.3, p. 2, q.2 a.3, 2 *CG* c 100; *De veritate* q.8, a.2, q.10, a.5;
QQ De anima a.2, *Quodlib.* VII, q.1, a.3; *Opusculum XV De angelis* cc.13, 15.

It seems that that an angel does not know particulars.

c 5;
 189a 7
 q.54, a.5
 (1) After all, Aristotle says in *Physics I* that “sensation is of particulars, while reason (or understanding) is of universals.” But in the angels there is no cognitive power but understanding, as emerged above. Therefore, they do not know particulars.

(2) Besides, all cognition is through the knower’s becoming similar to the known. But it does not seem that an angel can become similar to a particular *qua* particular; for matter is the source of particularity, whereas an angel is matter-free, as was said above. Thus an angel cannot know particulars.

q.50, a.2
 (3) Moreover, if an angel knows particular things, it is either through particular species or through universal ones. Not through particular ones, because then he would have to have infinitely many species. But also not through universal ones, because a universal is not a source sufficient for knowing a particular *qua* particular, since particulars are known only potentially in a universal. Therefore, an angel does not know particular things.

ON THE OTHER HAND, nothing can guard what it does not know. But angels are the guardians of individual people, according to Psalm 91:11, “He shall give his angel charge over thee,” etc. Therefore, the angels know particular things.

ANSWER: some writers wholly subtract knowledge of particulars from the angels. But this view conflicts with the Catholic faith, which posits that lower things are administered by the angels, according to Hebrews 1:14, “They are all ministering spirits.” So if they have no knowledge of particulars, they can exercise no providence over things transpiring in this world (since these are acts of particulars). This also goes against what it says in Ecclesiastes 5:5 [Vg], “neither say thou before the angel that there is no providence.”¹ It would also conflict with the philosophers’ teaching that angels move the heavenly spheres by understanding and willing.

Others, therefore, have said that an angel does know particulars, but only in the universal causes to which all particular effects are traced back; thus an astronomer makes a judgment about a future eclipse through the dispositions of the heavenly motions. — But this position does not elude the problems men-

¹ Aquinas quotes the Vulgate, which takes the verse differently from the Hebrew and the LXX, both of which had “do not say ... it was an error.” They were both advising the sinner not to plead the excuse of inadvertence. Jerome seems to have taken the excuse (“I didn’t realize”) as a complaint against the sinner’s guardian (“You didn’t foresee”). So the advice becomes not to make that charge.

tioned above, because knowing a particular in universal causes is not knowing it *qua* particular, i.e., as it is here and now. After all, an astronomer who knows a future eclipse by computation of the heavenly motions knows it in general but not as it is here and now, unless he sees it. Well, administering things and guiding them providentially deal with changing particulars as they are here and now.

And so one must speak otherwise. Just as a man knows things of all kinds through different cognitive strengths (knowing universals and matter-free things by his intellect, but particulars and bodily things by his senses), so also an angel knows both kinds of things, but does so through a single intellectual strength. The order of things has the feature that, the higher something is, the more united a power it has, and the more its one power extends to more things. In man himself, the common sense (which is superior to the proper senses), although it is a single power, knows all the things that are known by the five outward senses and knows some things that no outward sense knows, such as the difference between the white and the sweet.² One should think likewise in other cases. So since an angel, by the order of nature, is higher than a human being, it is not fitting to say that a human being knows through some power of hers something which an angel does not know through his one power, i.e. the intellect. This is why Aristotle says it is unfitting to say that we know something God does not know, as you see in *De Anima I* and also in *Metaphysics III*.

As to how an angel’s intellect knows particulars, one can think of the matter this way: just as things flow out from God so as to subsist in their own natures, so also they flow out so as to be in angelic cognition. Well, obviously, there flows out from God not only what the things have in them from their universal natures but also what they have as the source of their individuality; for He is the cause of the thing’s whole substance as to both its matter and its form. And as He causes, so also He knows, since God’s knowledge is a cause of things, as was shown above. Therefore, JUST AS God, *via* the essence through which He causes all things, is a likeness of all things and thereby knows all things not only in their universal natures but also in their particularity, SO ALSO the angels, *via* species implanted by God, know things not only in their universal natures but also in their particularity, inasmuch as their species are so-many representations

² The classic text on the *sensus communis* is Aristotle’s *De Anima III*, 426b 8 – 427a 15.

c 5, 410b 4
 c 4; 1000b 5

q.14, a.8

of His unique and simple essence.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): Aristotle is talking about our intellect, which only understands things by abstracting; through the abstracting from material conditions, what is abstracted becomes a universal. But this way of understanding does not belong to the angels, as I said above. So their case is not the same.

q.55, a.2
a.3 *ad* 1

ad (2): thanks to their nature, angels do not become “similar” to material things in the way one such thing comes to resemble another, *i.e.* by coming to agree with it in genus or in species or in an accident; rather, angels become “similar” in the way a higher thing has a likeness with a lower thing, as the sun has with fire. And

this is also how there is a likeness in God of all things both as to their form and as to their matter, on the basis that whatever is in the realm of things pre-exists in Him as in its cause. For the same reason, species in an angel’s intellect, which are similarities derived from the divine essence, are likenesses of things not only in their form but also in their matter.

ad (3): the angels know particulars through universal forms. But [in the angels’ case] these are likenesses of things both in what puts them into their kinds and in what gives them individuation. How the angels can know many things through the same [intelligible] species has already been stated. q.55, a.3 *ad* 3

Cajetan’s Commentary

The title question is clear if you notice that the topic here is *material* particulars and how they are known.

Analysis of the article

In the body of the article, he does four jobs. First, he deals with an entirely negative opinion, apparently held by Averroes, to the effect that the angels do not know material particulars. — And he attacks this opinion on two grounds: (1) from the fact that, on the authority of St. Paul, the angels have providence and administration over material particulars; (2) from their moving the heavenly bodies by their intellect and will, according to Aristotle in *Metaphysics XII* with comments 36 and 37 by Averroes.

cf. *De animae
beatitudine*, c.5

e.8,
1073a.30ff

Avicenna,
Metaphysics
tract 8, c.6

ii. In job (2) he treats another opinion, perhaps from Avicenna, claiming that the Intelligences know particulars by knowing their universal causes. — And he attacks this opinion likewise on two grounds, adding to the previous grounds the fact that knowing a particular in universal causes is not knowing it *qua* particular. He illustrates this by the example of the knowledge an astronomer has about this eclipse, which he never knows as this one, unless he sees it.

A Problem about particulars?

iii. Concerning this argument, a doubt arises on the ground that what it assumes does not seem to be true, namely, that he who knows a particular in universal causes does not know it as this one. After all, keeping the example of the astronomer, it is obvious that a scientist correctly computing the motions of the stars will know not only that an eclipse sometimes happens but also that one will happen at this time, in this hour and this minute and in this place; in short, he will know it to be here and now. After all, such particulars, even *qua* particulars, are determined in their causes as to all their conditions and cannot turn out otherwise.¹

iv. Against this objection, I say that an astronomer will never have sure cognition about a particular event, how-

ever necessary it may be, except through his senses. A singular conclusion cannot be known from a universal major and a universal minor: rather, one or the other premise has to be particular; but the cogitative *sense* forms a particular proposition. — The objector is also deceived in failing to notice that knowing the sun to be now in this position and the moon in that one does not pertain to science but to sensation. Yet without this, one cannot calculate that “Therefore there will be an eclipse in such and such a year.” What pertains to science is just this universal proposition: “Whenever the sun and moon are in such and such positions,” *etc.*, and “To get from this position to that other one takes so much time,” and the like. From such premises one never knows a particular fact unless one subsumes one, like “But now things are thus and such,” and this has to come from the senses.²

Analysis Resumed

v. In the third job, Aquinas answers the question with an affirmative conclusion, to wit, “the angels know particulars.” — He supports this on the basis that items dispersed in lower things come together as one in a higher thing, as one sees from particular senses *vis-à-vis* the common sense; therefore, items we know through different cognitive powers, an angel apprehends through one such power. — This is confirmed by Aristotle, who deems it awkward to claim that we know something which higher beings do not.

Another Problem

vi. Concerning the argument used to support this first conclusion, doubt arises on the ground that the maxim, “Items dispersed in lower things are united in a higher thing,” can be taken two ways. It can

² It is good to see Cajetan give such importance to observation in any genuinely predictive science, especially since observation was not internal to *scientia* as such in his own concept of it.

¹ The objector assumes a determinism as complete as that of M. Laplace.

mean that they are united eminently and formally, as the proper objects of the external senses are united in the common sense, and as perfective traits attributed to God are united in God. The other way is to mean that they are united eminently, to be sure, but not formally, as vermin are in the sun*.³ If the proposition is taken the first way, it is not true in all cases, and the argument collapses. — If it is taken the second way, it yields the opposite conclusion. If it is taken vaguely, it will vaguely imply “All of our cognitions are eminently contained in an angel” but one will not be able to infer “therefore, a cognition of particulars will be in an angel formally.” For I may say that an angel’s knowledge is of a higher order but does not formally contain cognition of particulars.

* i.e., *virtualiter*

This objection is also confirmed. We all know that our intellect is a higher power than all of our senses; and yet cognitions of particulars are not united in it in such a way that the intellect itself would know particulars, unless perhaps indirectly and by arguing from a combination with the senses. And so if the argument were valid, it would also apply to our intellect; and since it does not, it is flatly not valid.

Answering this problem

vii. Against this objection, I say that the proposition is taken vaguely here, so as to be understood to hold as far as possible according to the mode of the higher. So the sense of it is that items dispersed in the lower are united in the higher in the most eminent way in which they can be united, given the mode and capacity of the higher. So, in things that can be united eminently and formally, one infers such union; but in things that can be lifted up only eminently, one infers only an eminent union. And since knowing any object is among the things that can be lifted up formally, one infers in their case a union both eminent and formal.

Against the confirmation from our intellect, one can answer in two ways. One way is to deny that the intellect fails to know particulars; for it will know them at least when it is separate from the body. — A second and better way, in my judgment, is to say that the human intellect does not constitute another level in the order of things; rather, it is included in the level on which man is located. And hence there does not have to be room for the aforesaid proposition without further nuance,⁴ because it is really talking about the nature of a *complete* higher thing. Incomplete things do not have to pre-contain lower things; rather, it suits them to be united [with another part] to make up one complete being, as happens in man. — But I said “without further nuance,” because whatever our lower can attain, our higher can also attain more completely or more nobly.

† *simpliciter*

Analysis re-resumed

viii. In job (4) he answers the question as to the how of

³ The sun was supposed to cause maggots in a higher way (“eminently”) without being “form-wise” alive. It was said to be just “virtually” (i.e. power-wise) alive. In other words, the sun had what it took to cause low-life. God, however, not only caused life, wisdom, etc., but was alive and wise form-wise.

the knowing, saying that angels know particulars through species put into them by God. — He supports this, or clarifies it, as follows. [*Antecedent:*] All things are caused by God in their own natural being in both form and matter; [*1st consequence:*] so they are caused by God in the minds of the angels in the same respects; [*2nd consequence:*] so, through such species the angels know particulars.

The antecedent is assumed. — The first consequence is also assumed from Augustine, holding that things were made not only in themselves but also in the minds of the angels. — The second consequence is supported by proportionality. [*Major:*] as God’s essence, through which He causes all things, stands to His cognition, so also the likeness of that essence (as it is a cause of such things) stand to the intellect in which the likenesses are introduced. [*Minor:*] But God knows all things through that [essence] both as to universal and particular features, because that essence is the likeness of all things in all respects, and because His knowledge is the cause of things. [*Conclusion:*] Therefore, through species patterned on that supreme likeness, an angel will know everything made in both its universal and particular features.

Super Genesis ad Interum II, c 8

Troubles from Scotus, I

ix. Concerning the argument used to support this second conclusion, on how angels know, objections arise in Scotus’s remarks on *II Sent.* d.3, q. ult., where he attacks our argument in three ways. [1,1] The first is that the inference from

things flow from God in their matter and form to so they flow into the mind of an angel to the point of his knowing their particularity is not validly drawn (especially for you Thomists, who hold against Averroes that a thing’s matter is part of its quiddity); it is enough that it flow into an angel’s mind with the rest of the thing’s quiddity.⁴

[1,2] The second way is that the introduced species are not a reason for knowing anything but quiddities, as proved elsewhere.

[1,3] The third way is that, when you say, “the divine essence is the reason for knowing both the particular and the quiddity, so likewise is the species in the mind of an angel,” I say that you are committing a fallacy, going from the more perfect to the less perfect affirmatively.⁵

Cf De ente et essentia, c 2, in Cajetan’s commentary, Inquiry 4

See Scotus on II Sent. d 3, q 8

⁴ A thing’s *quidditas* was the formula stating fully what it was. Thus ‘quiddity’ could be used in place of ‘essence’ or, as here, in place of ‘definition’. Scotus’ point was that knowing a thing’s definition was not knowing it as this particular

⁵ An example of this fallacy would be: “She can make me fall in love with her; therefore, a photo of her can do it.” An inference from what is true of the more complete being to what is true of the less complete is valid only when it proceeds negatively: “if she can’t make me fall in love with her, neither can her photo.”

Troubles from Scotus, II

x. Against the second conclusion itself, Scotus has a lot of objections. [II A] In the first place, Scotus argues (in the same passage) to show that an angel knows particulars through species taken from things and not through innate species. [II A.1] He argues firstly on the ground that [*antecedent:*] a particular like Socrates is known as “this,” and not via the likeness of a quiddity; [*1st inference:*] therefore, [he is known] through his own species. [*2nd inference:*] Therefore, either the angel has been impressed with all of the species of particulars, which is not reasonable, or else he acquires the species of a particular when he knows it, which is my point. — The first part of the antecedent is assumed; the second part is obvious from the fact that this particular is not contained determinately under a quiddity as this particular. And it is supported by Scotus on many grounds in *II Sent.* d.9, q.2 [a.2]. This is the source from which Capreolus takes the arguments which he reports. Not all of these were advanced against St. Thomas, and not all of them conflict with him, but some do, and they will be adduced below.

in §.x

[II A.2] Secondly, he argues thus. A particular is known to an angel as to how it actually is; so it is known through an acquired species. — The inference holds because neither from general notions nor from the definitions of terms is an intellect informed surely about a contingent state of affairs [such as ‘I am sitting’]. For those notions either represent me definitely as sitting (or as doing so tomorrow) or vaguely. If they represent me determinately, it is impossible for the angel to know it through those terms [alone] because it is a contingent matter. If they represent me vaguely, then the angel will never know through those terms that I am definitely sitting. Ergo, he has to get this knowledge from elsewhere. [II A.3] Thirdly, he gives this argument. A particular is known by an angel intuitively; therefore he gets his knowledge from the particular itself. — The inference holds because intuitive knowledge requires the thing itself as present. — This is confirmed on the ground that it is impossible for intuitive knowledge to arise through a species presenting a thing the same way whether it is present or not, as is self-evident.⁶

xi. [II B] I adduce fourthly, and directly against our conclusion, Scotus’ arguments from d. 9, in the place just cited, designed to show that one and the same intelligible species cannot be the reason an angel understands all the particulars of a given species. [II B.1] His first argument goes like this. If a single species presents infinitely many particulars distinctly, it is of infinite completeness. The consequent is impossible, but inferring it is supported thus. [*Major:*] Where ‘many’ implies more completeness, ‘infinitely many’ implies infinite completeness: but [*minor:*] being able to present many involves greater completeness, since it includes the completeness of two equally representative accounts. [*Conclusion:*] Therefore, being able to present many implies infinite com-

pleteness.

[II B.2] His second argument is this. This species that you posit either presents in the same way opposed points pertaining to how particulars are [e.g. I am sitting here vs. I am not sitting here], or else it presents definitely one side of the contradiction, or else it presents now one side, and now the other. It cannot present the first way because then it would present nothing. Nor the second way, because then the angel would always know one side of the contradiction and not the other. Nor the third way, because a species presenting anything naturally and uniformly in the intellect does not present it in two different ways.

[II B.3] His third argument is that it would follow from our position that any existing particular would be known immediately and naturally to any angel; and so spatial distance would not impede the knowledge.

Answering Scotus, I

xii. Anent his objections to our argument supporting drawing the second conclusion [listed in § ix], I say that the point directly and first-off intended by St. Thomas is that, because there flows from God into the angel a likeness of Socrates not only in his common features but also in his particular ones, the angel understands Socrates. And because St. Thomas thinks matter is the source of particularity in material things, while form is the source of common features, one finds in *De Veritate* q.8, a.2, the same argument (which he expresses here in terms of ‘universal’ and ‘particular’) expressed there in terms of ‘form’ and ‘matter’. Hence one may answer Scotus in two ways. Firstly, for present purposes, matter and form are incidental to the issue, because the force of the argument lies in the point that there is impressed in the angel a likeness of all universal and individual conditions, whatever they may be, and through whatever natural sources they arise. — Secondly, we can speak of matter in two ways: (a) in itself as it is in reality, (b) as it is abstracted by the intellect in its ordering to form. What falls into the quiddity of a natural thing is matter taken in way (b), whereas matter taken in way (a) is what individuates. In the case at hand, the talk is of matter taken not just one way but in all ways. So the intended point is that in an angel there is a likeness of matter presenting it in the natural being which it has in things in the real, and not only a likeness of it as part of the definitions of natural things. I can put the point more briefly by saying that the likeness in the angel is not just of matter but of signate matter, which is not put into the definition, of course.⁷

Reply to Scotus, I.1

⁶ These three are Scotus’ most powerful and persuasive arguments. One cannot think of a single analytical philosopher who would not second them strongly. One should pay extra close attention, therefore, to Cajetan’s replies.

⁷ In *De ente et essentia*, Aquinas defined the term ‘*materia signata*’ as matter under certain dimensions or in a certain amount. As Cajetan took it, a certain amount of the right stuff “individuated” a thing of the kind *K* in case it was “just enough” and “only enough” to make one sample of that kind.

c.2

Commentary on *De Ente*, Inquiry 5

Reply to Scotus: 1, 2

Against the second objection to the same argument, I deny that an impressed species is a reason for knowing only a quiddity; and the objector never alleged anything cogent to the contrary.

Reply to Scotus: 1, 3

Against the third argument, I say there is no fallacy in arguing from a common exemplar to an exemplified likeness of it; indeed, the inference is necessary and not just reasonable. After all, with two similar things, whatever resembles one resembles the other. Well, such is the reasoning here, based upon the fact that things have flowed forth from God in a two-fold being, natural and intensional in the minds of the angels. From this it obviously follows, after all, (not because of "perfect" or "imperfect," but because of "similar") that the likeness of a thing existing in natural being before God would make an intensional being similar to itself in the mind of an angel. Hence, that intensional likeness would present the very thing which the divine likeness on which it is patterned, presents — notwithstanding any difference according to more and less perfect.

Answering Scotus, II

Reply to Scotus: II A, 1

* *excellens*

xiii. To answer the objections against the conclusion itself in order, I say to the first of them that being known through a distinctive species⁸ happens in two ways: equivalently, or exceedingly.* A particular is not known by an angel through an equivalently distinctive species (because then it would follow that he had infinitely many species) but through an excessive species, *i.e.* one presenting not only this particular but also many others. — Again, to be known through a species of the quiddity happens two ways: equivalently, and exceedingly.⁹ The particular is not known by the angel through an equivalent species of its quiddity, because then it would not be known as this case (unless perhaps argumentatively and very imperfectly) but through an excessive species of the quiddity, *i.e.*, one representing not only it but also the singular conditions it has in the real. — And this is the path of St. Thomas. He did not think, after all, that when an angel knew a quiddity, say horseness, he knew particular horses thanks to that [abstract] known object (indeed he criticized this path in the passage cited from *De Veritate*). Rather, he thought that an angel, by knowing the quiddity, knew the individuals of it, *i.e.*, that through the same species by which he knew the quiddity he also knew the individual cases, because that species distinctly presented both, in a way that exceeded either.

⁸ A species *S* is a distinctive species of *x* in case *S* presents *x* in such a way as to show how *x* is unique. *S* is "equivalently" distinctive if and only if *S* shows this for *x* alone. *S* is excessive when it also presents how *y* is unique, how *z* is unique, *etc.*

⁹ A quiddity is defined for a kind and tells "what it is to be" of that kind. It does not distinguish the individuals but includes them "vaguely" (*confuse*). To keep an example from the text, take the horse kind. Then a concept or intelligible species *S* presents what it is to be a horse equivalently (*adequate*) if, and only if, *S* presents any horse (and no non-horse). A humanly intelligible species does this. *S* presents what it is to be a horse exceedingly (*excellens*) if and only if *S* presents both any horse and (distinctly) one or more actual horses, as no humanly intelligible concept or species can do.

xiv. I reply to the second and third objections at once by saying that the angelic species presents the quiddity of a thing (say, humanity) with all its variations according to all its natural conditions, as St. Thomas said in the place quoted [in § *xii*]. So it presents humanity's existing here and there, in this one and that one, with such and such a quality and with such and such a quantity, and ditto for the other conditions.

Cajetan clarifies

xv. To get this matter clear, since understanding the whole issue depends on it, two items need to be seen: (a) what is presented, and (b) how it is presented.

As to (a), you need to know that there are four items in things: (1) the quiddity, (2) the particularity, (3) the existence or conjunction of one thing with another in the real [*i.e.* a state of affairs], and (4) the duration of this existing or state of affairs.* All of these need to be known by an intellect having a full knowledge of particulars. And they are separable from each other in being known, since one can be known and the other not known (as you see by going through the list). And since knowledge comes about by the intellect's being assimilated to its object, they must be presented to the intellect knowing them.

For the first two, it is not difficult to conceive that a likeness of them is put into the angel, since both look to the question, "what is it?" — by the first, one knows what Socrates is as conceived in a universal, *i.e.* as man, and by the second what it is to be Socrates *qua* Socrates, apprehended as a particular. This latter is not knowable by us.

But about the last two [items (3) and (4)], it is difficult to see (and especially difficult to see about the fourth) how they can be put into an angel, because they look to the questions, "does it exist so?" and "when does it exist so?"

xvi. To fully clarify the matter, one needs to know that a state of affairs and its duration can be presented to an intellect in more than one way: *i.e.*, in its causes or in itself.

— In its causes, the state of affairs linking humans with the ability to laugh is presented to the intellect by species presenting what it is to be the one and the other; for from these the intellect sees the linkage and the equal duration of the two. But this does not happen with contingent states of affairs, obviously.

— In themselves, a state of affairs and its duration can be presented in two ways. In one way, the duration of a state of affairs is presented as a sort of quality of the item represented, as whiteness is presented to the eye with a shape.¹⁰

¹⁰ The duration of a state of affairs, say, *Socrates' being seated*, is presented this way when it comes with an attached date at which (or time during which) it obtains. Cajetan thinks this information requires a tenseless perspective, which is above the angels.

Start of reply to Scotus: II A, 2, 3

* *conjunctio*

— In the other way, only the state of affairs itself is presented, and its duration concurs as a necessary condition for it to be presented, as in fact the duration or presentness of a color stands to the color seen as presented to the eye. The visible species does not present the duration of the color's presence, but a color cannot be seen or presented unless it is measured by the present time. And since this is the case, an angel's species, according to St. Thomas, not only presents humanity and Socrateity but also the very conjunction of them with existing in the real and with any other accidental and natural being. But they do not present the duration of those conjoined items as a thing presented, but only as a condition without which the state of affairs is not presented.¹¹

xvii. The point that the duration of a contingent state of affairs is not represented [in the angel's species] is clear from the fact that, as we firmly believe, the angels do not know future contingencies. For if there were implanted in the angel a likeness of my sitting down *tomorrow*, he would obviously know that sitting down was going to be conjoined to me tomorrow.¹²

But the point that the duration is presented as a condition *sine qua non* and that this suffices, needs to be explained. And firstly the latter, because it is obviously enough for us to have knowledge, even intuitive knowledge of a thing, through such a species, as happens in our seeing. And this is even clearer if you imagine our seeing as happening by a power to know everything; for then, through such a species as a present color is presented, it would be presented as *now*. Because presence concurs as a condition *sine qua non*, one would know not only this color but this color existing at the present time.¹³ — Next, the former is explained, on the ground that a duration offers no resistance to being represented as such a condition *sine qua non*. And this is confirmed. JUST AS the duration of a color is the condition without which the color neither changes the thing-

¹¹ In this situation, a state of affairs is presented with no date. But if it is being presented to me in a visual species, I believe something about its date, namely, that it obtains "right now" as I see it, because a visual image does not arise in me without the spatio-temporal presence of its physical cause. No such belief occurs to me when an intelligible species does the presenting, *i.e.* when I just understand (rather than see) a state of affairs. An intelligible species does not depend upon our current environs in order to present what it presents. This is why we humans can understand things long past, events which will not happen until the far future, if they ever happen at all, or states of affairs which never have and never will obtain, *etc.* In short, our concepts (unlike our percepts) are stimulus-independent. Are angelic concepts the same, or are they more like our percepts in this regard? Cajetan is about to tell us.

¹² In other words, the angel would know that my sitting down is a state of affairs which obtains tomorrow.

¹³ I have put in bold the key sentence in this paragraph. To get an idea of how an angel knows not only laws and quiddities and general states of affairs, but also current reality, I must imagine how my experience would be if my concepts were like my percepts.

seen nor gets seen, SO ALSO it is the condition without which the color is not presented. — And so much for the issue of "what" is presented.

xviii. As for the second issue, *i.e.* how it is presented, I say briefly that, according to St. Thomas, the species impressed upon an angel by God (with respect to the four items mentioned above) so stands [to the angel] as [a visual species would stand to us] if there naturally existed in the eye an innate species of some object, such as this white thing. This white thing would neither be presented nor known except when it existed; after all, between what presents and the things presented, there has to be a likeness, and this white thing is not similar to the species presenting it unless it exists, since that species represents this white item existing. And thus through that species, the eye would see this white thing when it existed, and would not see it when it did not, and thus the duration of this white thing in the real would stand as a necessary condition for it to be presented and seen — not from any defect of the visual species, but from the default of the object itself. And the angel would know that this white thing now exists not thanks to a change of the species but thanks to a change of the object itself: and afterwards [when the white thing ceased to exist] the angel would perceive that it did not exist, from the lack of assimilation. In this way it is clear how it comes about that a species is implanted but not caused by a particular object, and that it naturally presents and is the reason for knowing the thing in itself* first-off and directly when it exists and, as a consequence, when it does not.¹⁴

And since one individual [thing or species] of a higher order can be equivalent to many individuals and species of a lower order, St. Thomas posited the elevation of angelic nature above bodily insight because one species in an angel is so exceeding that it can be distinctively (albeit more excessively) the reason for presenting many quiddities and particulars, and many contingent states of affairs in the real — such that whenever that state of affairs is posited in the real, it is at once assimilated to that species and thus is represented and known, and when it ceases to be in the real, it ceases to be presented because it ceases to be assimilated.

Point-by-point against Scotus II

xix. With these points in place, answering the objections is very easy. After all, the second objection assumes that a contingent state of affairs is presented not in itself but just in the definitions of

in § xv

* *per se*

More against Scotus' II A.2

¹⁴ The angel knows that the white thing has ceased to exist by the fact that his species of it has ceased. Yes, but has ceased to do what? Exist? Present what it was implanted to present now? Present anything?

Against Scotus' II A.3

its terms. The third one assumes that temporal presentness does not necessarily concur with the thing known unless it is the cause of the knowing. Yet it is clear that this white thing can concur with seeing it in two ways, *i.e.* as a cause changing our sight, and as an object terminating our sight, and that temporal presentness is required for it not only insofar as it is changing but also insofar as it is terminating, such that if it terminated and did not change our seeing, temporal presentness would nevertheless be required. And such is the case in the matter at hand, as previous remarks have made clear.¹⁵

in Scotus' II A.3

Against the confirming argument, however, I say that the proposition upon which Scotus very often bases himself, namely, that "a species representing a thing absent as well as present does not suffice for intuitive knowledge," is not universally true. Representing a thing present and absent comes about in two ways. In one way, the presentation abstracts from the thing's presence and absence, as intelligible species do among us; and for such species, Scotus's proposition is true. The other way is not by abstraction but by greater excellence; *i.e.*, because it is so exceeding that it presents the thing both according to its conditions independently and according to its conditions at present. [This way, it] presents a thing as a divine species does [to God], or as a condition *sine qua non*, as an angelic species does. And for such species the proposition is not true. — A species, therefore, presenting (not on account of abstraction, but on account of its excessiveness) a thing in the same way (for its part) whether the thing exists or doesn't, suffices for intuitive knowledge; because when the thing exists, it presents something new not through a change in itself but through a change or newness of the thing presented. Note this very well.¹⁶

Against Scotus' II B.1

xx. Against Scotus's first argument from *In II Sent.* d.9, which I brought up in the fourth place [in § xi], I deny the inference. And where his support for it says "when many implies more completeness, infinitely many implies infinite completeness," I say that the argument is assuming a falsehood. It should conclude with a disjunction: if many implies more completeness, infinity implies either infinite completeness or a higher order of completeness.

It is well established, after all, that one perfection of higher order contains so much perfection that it exceeds an infinity of perfections of lower order and is equivalent to them in a higher way. — Again, on another ground, I say that something's being of infinite completeness hap-

¹⁵ This much is clear. When I glance at something for the first time, how it looks changes my seeing. When I stare at it for a while, it is no longer changing my seeing but still terminates it.

¹⁶ Now the doctrine has become difficult. When the state of affairs presented by an angel's species ceases to obtain, what happens in the intellect of the angel? An angel's species does not change because of anything in itself, we have now been told. Ergo, one of the alternatives mentioned in footnote 14 is now excluded. The species does not cease to exist. But it does cease to present the state of affairs which it did present when the said state of affairs obtained.

pens in two ways: *i.e.*, unqualifiedly, or in such-and-such a line or kind. Hence, it is not necessary for what is infinite in such-and-such a line or kind to be an infinite being unqualifiedly. One sees as much from infinite whiteness, if it were intensively infinite; for this would not make it more complete than a substance; it would just be of infinite completeness of a certain kind, namely, whiteness. So, in the case at hand, even given that an infinity of contents implies an infinity of the container, it does not follow that "therefore the container is of infinite completeness unqualifiedly," but just in this line or of this kind.

And so this argument fails on two counts. The first is because infinity does not follow even if infinity did follow. The second is because even if infinity did follow, what would follow is not infinity of completeness without qualification but of completeness in this line or kind, just as manyness does not imply more completeness unless it be of the same kind. And since Scotus often uses this argument for different purposes and in different contexts, it is important to note diligently what we are saying here and to apply it in other contexts. As far as the present issue is concerned, it is already obvious that we are positing an intelligible species of a higher order and likewise an act of understanding proportionate to that species.

xxi. Against his second argument, the response is already in hand. For it assumes a false point, namely, that a species in the mind of an angel represents the duration of a contingent state of affairs as a matter presented; we have said the opposite. Indeed, having the state of affairs presented that way is unique to the divine essence and is perhaps not communicable to any intelligible species, since this would amount to presenting things that are contingently future but settled in themselves.¹⁷ — And so when Scotus says "or else presents both contradictories," I answer with a three-way distinction.¹⁸ Either they are presented as (1) a thing presented and its necessary condition; or (2) according to differences of time *vs.* independently; or (3) positively and contradictorily. I say that a species in the angel's mind presents it as a thing, one side of it absolutely, and not with a temporal difference.

Against Scotus' II B.2

¹⁷ The present translator's view of what is going on in the Thomistic account of how God knows future contingencies is found in the footnotes to q. 14, a. 13, and to Cajetan's commentary on it. Cajetan's remarks here seem to confirm my view that God's eternity makes His knowledge fully tenseless; angels, however, have present-tense knowledge.

¹⁸ Perhaps the reader needs reminding of why the angel's knowing contradictories comes up at this point as a problem. It comes up because the contingency of a state of affairs is expressed by contradictory possibilities: it might obtain, and it might not. If he knows it simply as obtaining, how does he know it as contingent?

For it presents the state of affairs that Socrates is sitting, and not that he is sitting and not sitting contradictorily. And it does not present Socrates's sitting as to occur today or tomorrow, but presents his sitting independently of when,* and represents his running independently of when.

* *absolutē*

Now suppose you ask: how does the angel know the other contradictory? And how can he have certainty through such a species about Socrates sitting today and running tomorrow? From points already made, it is clear that when the sitting of Socrates is posited in act, there at once comes to be an assimilation between Socrates sitting and that species; and the present difference of time is presented through the same species as a necessary condition; and thus the angel knows Socrates as sitting now. —

After the hour [of his sitting], Socrates will be known through the same species as not sitting, when the assimilation between him as sitting and that species ceases. And tomorrow he will be known as running, given an assimilation between that species and Socrates as running. And thus it is false that if the species represents one of the contradictories definitely, the angel will never know the other.

xxii. Against his third argument, it is already clear that it is not awkward but indeed necessary that as soon as all natural things come to be they are innate in the angel habitually, and that spatial distance does not impede an angel's knowledge.

Against Scotus' II B, 3

Do angels know future things?

I ST 86, a.4; II-II ST 95, a.1, In I Sent. d.38, a.5, In II Sent. d.3, q.2, a.3 ad 4; d.7, q.2, a.2; 3 CG c. 154, De veritate, q.8, a.12, De malo q.16, a.7; De spiritibus creatis a.5 ad 7; QQ De anima a.20, ad 4; Quodlibet VII q.3, a.1 ad 1; Compend. Theol. c.134, In Isaiam, c.3.

It seems that the angels know future events.

(1) After all, the angels are stronger at knowing than people are. But some people know many future things. All the more, then, do the angels.

(2) Besides, the present and the future are differences of time. But the intellect of an angel is above time: "It is likened to eternal understanding," *i.e.* age-long, as it says in the *Liber de causis*. Therefore, as far as an angel's mind is concerned, past and future are no different; he knows both indifferently.

(3) Moreover, an angel does not know through species gotten from things, but through universal innate species. But universal species relate equally to present, past, and future. Therefore, it seems that the angels know past, present, and future indifferently.

(4) Furthermore, something is called "distant" in time as well as in space. But the angels know things distant in space. So they also know far future things, distant in time.

ON THE OTHER HAND, a badge of divinity does not belong to angels. But knowing the future is a badge of divinity, according to Isaiah 41:23, "Shew the things that are to come hereafter, that we may know that ye are gods." Therefore, the angels do not know future things.

ANSWER: a future event can be known in two ways. One way is *in its cause*. In this way, future things that arise from their causes as necessitated consequences are known scientifically, as that the sun will rise tomorrow. Things which arise from their causes for the most part are not known with certainty but by conjecture, as a physician foreknows the recovery of a sick patient. This way of knowing future things is available to the angels, and to them much more than to us, since they know the causes of things more universally and completely, much as physicians who diagnose the causes more acutely predict the future state of the disease more accurately. — But events which arise from their causes rarely — these are entirely unforeseen, like accidents and lucky breaks.

The other way future events are known is *in themselves*. And this way of knowing the future belongs to God alone, which applies not only to events arising necessarily or for the most part, but even to accidents and happenstances, because God sees all things in his eternity, which, since it is an indivisible whole, is present to all of time and contains it. And thus a single divine insight covers everything that happens anywhere in time, as if they were present events, and he sees all things as they are in themselves, as I said above, when dealing with God's knowledge. — But an angel's intellect, like any other created one, falls short of divine eternity. Hence, the future as it is in its own being cannot be known by any created intellect.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad (1)*: people do not know future events except in their causes (or by divine revelation). And this way the angels know future events in far more detail.

ad (2): although an angel's intellect is above the time by which bodily changes are measured, there is nevertheless in the angel's mind a time thanks to succession of intelligible conceptions, according to what Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad litteram VIII*, to the effect that "God moves/changes a spiritual creature through time." And so, since there is succession in an angel's mind, not all the events going on over time are present to him.

ad (3): although the species in an angel's mind are, for their part, indifferent as to present, past, and future [tense], it is still not the case that present, past, and future things relate in the same way to those species as reasons for knowing. For those which are present have a nature through which they are assimilated to the species in the angel's mind and so can be known through those species. But future events do not yet have a nature through which to be assimilated, and hence cannot be known through the species in the angel.

ad (4): things distant in space are already in the real and share some species whose like is in an angel's mind; this is not true about things future in time, as I just said. So the case is not similar.

I ST q.14, a.13

c.22;
PL 34, 389

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear: the word 'future' is taken in general. — In the body of the article, Aquinas draws two distinctions: one about knowing (knowing a thing in its cause *vs.* knowing it in itself); the other is about the future (arising necessarily, or for the most

part, or seldom). And he does two jobs. First, he examines all members of the second distinction as to how they stand to the first member of the first distinction; secondly, he examines how they stand to the other member of the first distinction.

ii. As to job (1), he states three conclusions. The first is that future things arising necessarily are known in their causes by an angel with certainty. — The second is that future things arising for the most part are known in their causes conjecturally by an angel. This is illustrated by the fact that even people have this knowledge, but the angels have more of it to the extent that they penetrate the inner conditions of the causes more universally and more completely. — The third is: future things that arise seldom are utterly unknown in their cause.

iii. As to job (2), there is but one conclusion: future things arising necessarily and those arising for the most part and those arising hardly ever are known in themselves to God alone. — This is supported on the ground that only God's purview is measured by an eternity relating equally to all different times and hence seeing at once equally all things happening anywhere in time.

iv. Here notice two facts. The first is that Aquinas

says many things he does not support here, either because they are self-evident to practiced minds (say that necessary effects are known with certitude in their causes), or because they have been discussed above (*e.g.* that a future contingency in its cause as such is utterly unknown): after all, this was aired in q.14.

Note second that two reasons can be assigned for knowing future contingencies in themselves: *i.e.* eternity of purview, and fullness of what it would take to represent them *along with* their duration, *etc.* St. Thomas, paid no attention to this second, and sought to get his conclusion with just the first excluded from the angels. I think the reason for this is that they imply each other; exclusion of the one is exclusion of the other. The one looks to eternity, and the other to infinity; but eternity and infinity both belong to God alone. He preferred to argue from eternity because it is more obvious that the angels lack eternal purview than it is that they lack fullness of such representation. — Doubts about this argument from eternity of purview were handled in q.14. So now it is time to move on to other things.

a.13

a.13, comm. §§
viii ff

Do angels know the thoughts of the heart?

De veritate q.8, a.13; *De malo* q.16, a.8; *In I Cor.* c.2, *lectio* 2.

It seems that the angels know the thoughts of the heart.

XVIII, c.48,
Pl. 76, 84.

(1) After all, Gregory says in his *Moralia* on Job 28:17, "The gold and the crystal cannot equal it," because then (*i.e.* in the blessedness of the resurrected) "one man will be as perspicuous to another as he is to himself, and when anyone's mind attends to another, his consciousness will at once be penetrated." But the resurrected are similar to the angels, as it says in Matthew 22:30. Therefore, one angel can see what is in the consciousness of another.

(2) Besides, as shapes stand to bodies, so the intelligible species stand to the intellect. But when a body is seen, its shape is seen. Therefore, when an intellectual substance is seen, the intelligible species in it are seen. So, since one angel sees another, and also sees our soul, it would seem that he can see the thoughts of either.

(3) Moreover, the things which are in our intellect are more like an angel than the things in our imagination, since the former are understood in act, whereas the latter are only understood potentially. But the things which are in the imagination can be known by an angel as bodily things are known, since imagination is a bodily power. Therefore, it seems that an angel can know the thoughts of a mind.

ON THE OTHER HAND, what belongs to God alone does not belong to angels. But knowing the thoughts of the heart is unique to God, according to Jeremiah 17:9, 10, "The heart is deceitful above all things and desperately wicked. Who can know it? I, the Lord, search the heart." Therefore, the angels do not know the secrets of our hearts.

ANSWER: a thought of the heart can be known in two ways. One way is in its effect. In this way a thought of the heart can be known not only by an angel but also by a human being, and can be known the more subtly the more the effect has been hidden. After all, a thought is known sometimes not only by an outward action but also by a facial change; and physicians can know some emotions of the soul by the pulse. Much more so the angels, or even demons, the more subtly they consider such hidden bodily changes. Hence, Augustine, in his book *De divinatione Daemonum*, says that sometimes "they learn with utter ease peoples' dispositions, when they are expressed from the soul with certain signs in the body not only the ones expressed vocally, but also those conceived in thought." However, in his book *Retractions* he says that one should not assert how this happens.

Pl. 40, 586

II, c 30,
Pl. 32, 643

The other way of knowing the thoughts of the heart is as they are entertained in the intellect and as affections in the will. In this way, God alone can know the thoughts of hearts and the affections of wills. The rea-

son for this is that the will of a rational creature is subject to God alone; and He alone is able to work within the will — He who is its first* object and its last end — and this will become clearer below. And so things which are in the will or depend upon the will alone, are known only to God. Obviously, what someone actually thinks about depends upon his will alone, because when someone has habitual knowledge or intelligible species existing in him, he uses them as he wills. This is why the Apostle asks in I Cor. 2:11, "For what man knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of man which is in him?"

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): sometimes the thought of one man is not known by another because of an impediment which is either the coarseness of the body or the will hiding its secrets. The first obstacle will be taken away in the resurrection and is not there in the angels at all. But the second obstacle will remain after the resurrection and is even now present in the angels. And yet the brightness of the body will represent the quality of the mind as to how much grace and glory is in it. And this is how one mind will be able to see another.

ad (2): although one angel sees the intelligible species of another thanks to the fact that the greater or lesser universality of the intelligible species is proportioned to the [levels of] nobility among the intellectual substances, it does not follow that one angel knows how another is using those intelligible species in actually considering things.

ad (3): the yearning of a brute animal is not a master of its action but follows upon the impact upon it of another bodily or spiritual cause. So because the angels know bodily things and their dispositions, they can know through these what is in the yearning and imaginative apprehension of brute animals, and also of human beings insofar as the sense appetite sometimes proceeds into act in us, following upon a bodily impression (as is always the case in brute animals). But it does not have to be the case that the angels know the movement of sense appetite and imaginative apprehension in a human being, insofar as these are prompted by the will and by reason, because even the lower parts of the soul share in reason somehow so as to obey reason's command, as it says in *Ethics I*. — But it does not follow that if an angel does know what is in a man's sense appetite or imagination, he will know what is in his thought or will; after all, the intellect or the will is not subject to sense appetite and imagination, but can use them in different ways.

¹ The will's first object is the formal object in light of which it wills anything else. This object is "good" in general. How this vague "object" relates to God Himself and to the "complete good" which motivates rational choices will be much discussed below in the *Prima Secundae*.

* *principale*
q 105, a.4,
q.106, a.2,
2/1 q.9, a.6

q 55, a.3

c 13,
1102b31

 Cajetan's Commentary

In the title, notice that the present question is about [an angel's] knowing someone else's "thoughts of the heart" in detail and completely as to whether the thought exists and what it is about — *i.e.* if I am currently thinking about something, does an angel know what I am thinking, what I am deliberating, *etc.*?

ii. In the body of the article, a distinction is set down, namely, that a thought can be known two ways, *i.e.* from its effect or in itself. Then two conclusions are put down in line with these ways.

The first conclusion is: the thought of another's heart can be known by an angel from its effect. — This is supported by an *a fortiori* argument: even a human being can know another's thought from facial change and bodily disposition, as doctors sometimes discern. And this is confirmed by the authority of Augustine.

The second conclusion is: thoughts of the heart in themselves (or what amounts to the same thing, as they are in the will) are naturally known to God alone. — The support goes as follows. [*Major:*] Purely voluntary things are known only to God and the person willing them. [*Minor:*] The thoughts of one's heart are purely voluntary, since what one is actually thinking about or willing depends upon the will alone, and a habitual one is used when one wishes. [*Conclusion:*] Ergo [the thoughts of one's heart are known only to God]. — The major is supported on the ground that the will is subject to God alone, who alone can operate in it as its first object and last end. — The conclusion is confirmed by the authority of St. Paul in 1 Corinthians 2.

Doubts from Durandus and Scotus

iii. On the argument just advanced in support of the second conclusion, a doubt arises from the remarks of Durandus on *II Sent.* d.8, q.5. The doubt goes as follows. If the voluntary is known to God alone because it is voluntary, the knowledge is exclusively His because of one or another of these five grounds:

— either [1] because the will is subject to God alone in being caused (and this can't be right, because then prime matter, too, and the essence of the soul would be known to God alone);

— or [2] because the will is subject to God alone in being moved (and this is not right, because then the First Movable [the outermost heavenly sphere] would be known to God alone);

— or [3] because the will by its formal makeup is free (and this is no good, because to be free is to be exempt from compulsion, not cognition);

— or [4] because the will is undetermined as between opposite decisions (but no, because the indeterminacy is removed as soon as a thought is actually embraced, since at that point the will is already settled);

— or just because [5] it is from the will (but this can't be exactly right, because then every act commanded by

the will would be known to God alone, and even external actions, if voluntary, would be unknown to the angels.

Confirmation: according to you Thomists, the angels know through intelligible species which are innate, and these represent equally interior actions and exterior, spiritual actions and bodily ones.

iv. Scotus goes after the same argument two ways, in his remarks on *II Sent.* d.9, q.2. The first says that the will is no more able to hide an actual thought than it is to hide its essence or the fact that it is willing. The second says that, if a thought of the heart is hidden by one's volition, that volition will either be plain to another or else hidden. If it is plain to another, I have my point. If it is hidden, then it is being hidden by another volition, and then the same question arises about this second volition, and so on *ad infinitum*.

v. Against our conclusion itself, many arguments are made by Scotus, as reported in Capreolus's work on *II Sent.* d. 8. Some of these arguments I am not finding in Scotus. Some of them are *ad hominem* arguments by Scotus against Henry [of Ghent]. And some of them trot out the same difficulty [stated in § *iv*]. The result is that by solving the above objections, plus one more aimed by Scotus directly at our conclusion, everything will become clear.

The additional argument (found in the same place as cited in § *iv*) goes as follows. [*Antecedent:*] A thought actually had by an angel is an object which is intrinsically intelligible in act and proportionate to any angel's mind and sufficiently present to every such mind: [*consequent:*] hence it can be understood naturally by another angel. — The consequent is well known and can be confirmed by the very broad principle that says, "When conditions on the agent's side [here: the would-be knower's side] and the patient's side [here: that of the thought to be known] are naturally proportionate, proximate, and unimpeded, the action [here: the knowing] follows." — The antecedent is self-evident in all its parts, assuming that spatial distance does not impede a purely matter-free action such as we are talking about.

And here is a confirming argument. Whatever the lower can do, the higher can do; so [given that the Seraphim are higher than the archangels.] if Michael knows his own thought intuitively, the Seraphim can intuit them in a far higher way.

Clearing things up

vi. To clear this difficulty up, one needs to know that there are two ways to proceed on this topic, given that there are two opinions about the angelic intellect. For those who think an angel's intellect is moved by its object, one has to question whether a voluntary thought, once actual, is an object proportioned to every other angel's intellect and sufficiently present to it to move it. Scotus* takes the affirmative side on this, while Gregory of Rimini† takes the negative. But their quarrel has no

a.2, *contra*
conclusionem.
1

* In *II Sent.*
d.9, q.2

† In *II Sent.*
d.9-10 q.1

place among those of us who think that an angel's intellect is not naturally movable by an object, but has to understand whatever it naturally understands through innate species. On this approach, all the talk about the active and the passive, the mover and the moved, and the like, is a waste of time. Rather, one must investigate *the state of affairs that a will is doing its free operation in exercised act* — is this state of affairs represented through a species innate in angels, or not? *This is the issue on which the whole difficulty turns.* I have said already that a species in the mind of an angel is so exceedingly powerful that it has what it takes to assimilate the angel to Socrates' sitting, Socrates' writing, Socrates' running. So why should it not have within itself what it takes to assimilate the angel to Socrates' willing that *p*, or his thinking that *q*?

vii. As is clearly evident from St. Thomas' remarks here and in the *Questions de Veritate*, q.8, a.13, and in the *Question de Daemonibus*, a.8, he held that thoughts of the heart (as to their actual existence and their particular content, etc.) are not represented by the innate species, because they belong to a higher order than all naturally occurring facts. From the fact that a will (as it wills that *p* or wills that *q*) is above the whole order of natural causes and effects, there results the fact that the will so doing is not represented through the angels' impressed species, which represent only naturally occurring causes and effects. This is the point to which the reasoning of St. Thomas tends, everywhere; for he is always supporting the high standing of the acting will from its independence of and non-connexion with any natural thing — so much so, that the force of his reasoning lies in the claim that [*antecedent:*] the will (as it operates in particular cases, etc.) is outside the nexus of natural things and hence [*consequence:*] is hidden to any outside created intellect. — Drawing the consequence holds because the natural species of intellects represent only natural things. — The antecedent is supported by the fact that the will is subject to God alone both for the exercise of its act and for its specification in a particular case, because He alone can move the will effectively (both as a cause and as an object) since He is the supreme good and the ultimate purpose, etc.

viii. From this much, the objections are solved easily. For the thing to say against Durandus is obvious: the will and the voluntary (precisely because it is voluntary) is inherently hidden from any outside, created knower, because the will is subject to God alone as its cause and object. And so none of the grounds enumerated [by Durandus] is admitted exactly by St. Thomas except the

third — which is exactly what St. Thomas said, although the objector did not understand it (or didn't want to). After all, the will's freedom is not just from compulsion but also from dependency on and connexion with natural causes, and by that alone from outside knowledge by a creature. And from the fact that something is subject to God alone, and not apt to have to have connexion with natural agents, it is naturally hidden from those things which have only the makeup of natural things.

ix. Against Scotus' objections to the same argument, our response is obvious from the same principle. The angel's essence, will, and intellect are a different story from the things which, in second act, are purely voluntary; for the former belong to the natural order of things, and the latter do not. — And we do not say anything so fatuous as that a thought is hidden by the will as if covered with a cloak, as the objector imagines by looking for another cloak [to cover the first]. Rather we say that a thought, by being willed or free, is naturally hidden. And as a reason for its hiddenness, it has the freedom of the one willing it to be so, as I said and explained above.¹

x. Finally, to answer Scotus' objection to our conclusion, I say that this one, like all the others, makes a false assumption, namely, that an intellect separate from matter gets its knowledge from things [it encounters]. This is utterly false. Every intellect separated from matter understands through species infused into it, and in no other way. The only exceptions are the knowledge it has of itself and of God, as became clear above. Since we stand by this point, all the objections are cleared away.

¹ The key contentions of this remarkable commentary are an ontological one — (a) that free choices are factual events not found among those predictable by natural science — and an epistemological one — (b) that choices not predictable by natural science are not "naturally" knowable by other created minds. Contention (a) is denied by all positivists (for whom what cannot be ascertained by a natural science is not a matter of fact), naturalists (for whom what cannot be ascertained by a natural science does not exist), and determinists (for whom all factual events are predictable in principle). Thus (a) may be called hard indeterminism. Contention (b) is limited in three ways: by 'created' to exclude the mind of God; by 'other' to exclude the mind of the choice-maker, and by 'naturally' to exclude knowledge by divine revelation, obviously, but also (I think) to exclude knowledge by testimony.

Yes, you can tell me what you have chosen, and there is a good sense of 'natural' in which what other people tell me is a "natural" way for me to know things. But this is not the hard sense of 'natural' Aquinas has been using; his sense excludes the voluntary. Your telling me is a voluntary act, and so is my believing you. In fact, the whole human enterprise of sharing personal information is shot through with the non-natural.

cf. § iv

cf. §§ ii, vi

cf. § v

q. 55, a.2;
q. 56, aa. 1, 3

article 5

Do angels know the mysteries of grace?

In IV Sent. d.10, a.4, q^m 4; In Epist. ad Ephes c.3, lectio 3

It seems that the angels would know the mysteries of grace.

c.19,
PL 34, 334

(1) After all, the most excellent of all the mysteries is that of the Incarnation of Christ. But the angels knew of this from the beginning. Augustine says in Book V of *Super Genesim ad litteram* that “this mystery was hidden in God from all ages but in such a way that He made it known to the Principalities and Powers in the heavens.” And the Apostle says in 1 Timothy 3:15 that this “great mystery of godliness” was “seen of the angels.” So they know the mysteries of grace.

(2) Besides, the reasons for all the mysteries of grace are contained in the divine wisdom. But the angels see the very wisdom of God, which is His essence. So they know the mysteries of grace.

(3) Moreover, the prophets were instructed by the angels, as one sees from Denis in c.4 of the *Celestial Hierarchy*. But the prophets knew the mysteries of grace; Amos 3:7 says, “Surely the Lord God will do nothing but He revealeth His secret unto His servants, the prophets.” Hence the angels know the mysteries of grace.

PG 3, 209

ON THE OTHER HAND, no one “learns” what he already knows. But even the highest angels inquired after the mysteries of grace and learned them. Denis says in c.7 of the *Celestial Hierarchy* that holy Scripture leads certain heavenly beings to Jesus, asking questions and learning the knowledge of His divine action for us, and Jesus teaches them without intermediary.” See also Isaiah 63:1, where the angels are asking, “Who is this that cometh from Edom ...?” And Jesus answers: “I that speak in righteousness ...” So the angels do not know the mysteries of grace.

I ANSWER: knowledge in the angels is two-fold. One is their natural knowledge, in which they know things both by their essence and by innate species. By this sort of knowledge, the angels are not able to know the mysteries of grace. For these mysteries depend upon God’s sheer will, and if one angel cannot know the thoughts of another when they depend upon the latter’s will, much less can he know those which depend upon God’s will alone. And this is how the Apostle was arguing in 1 Corinthians 2:11, “For what man knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of man which is in him. Even so the things of God knoweth no man, but the Spirit of God.”

But there is also another knowledge in the angels, which makes them blessed; by it they see the Word and

See things in the Word. It is by this seeing that they know mysteries of grace — but not all of the mysteries, nor all of them equally, but only in the measure God has willed to reveal to them, as it says in 1 Corinthians 2:10, “But God hath revealed them unto us by His Spirit.” Yet He has done this in such a way that the higher angels, who contemplate God’s wisdom with more insight, know more and deeper mysteries in their vision of God, and they show these to the lower angels by illuminating them. Also, they have known some of these mysteries from the outset of their creation. But others they were taught only later, as it suited their offices.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): as it so happens, we speak about the Incarnation of Christ in two ways. One way is in general terms*, and in this way it has been revealed to all the angels at the outset of their beatification. The reason for this is that the Incarnation is a far-reaching source of order, at which all the offices of the angels are aimed: “for they are all ministering spirits.” as it says in Hebrews 1:14, “sent forth to minister for them who shall be heirs of salvation” — and salvation is brought about through the mystery of the Incarnation. So they all had to be taught about this mystery together, from the beginning. — The other way we can talk about the mystery of the Incarnation is in its special features.† In this regard, not all the angels were taught about everything from the beginning: indeed, even the higher angels learned these points later, as is clear in the authoritative quote from Denis.

* *in generali*

† *quantum ad speciales con ditones*

in the *Secd contra*

ad (2): even though the blessed angels contemplate God’s wisdom, they do not fully comprehend it. So it is not necessarily the case that they see everything hidden in it.

ad (3): everything the prophets knew of the mysteries of grace by divine revelation was revealed far more excellently to the angels. And while God did generally reveal to the prophets what He was going to do about mankind’s salvation, there were still some special points about it which the Apostles knew and the prophets did not, according to Ephesians 3:4-5, “when ye read, ye may understand my knowledge in the mystery of Christ, which in other ages was not made known unto the sons of men, as it is now revealed unto His holy apostles ...” And among the prophets themselves, the later ones knew things the earlier had not, according to Psalm 119:100, “I understand more than the ancients ...” And Gregory says in his Homily 16 on Ezekiel that “increase of divine knowledge has come over time.”

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article, Aquinas divides knowledge into two sorts; then he answers the question with two conclusions, one for each sort.

The division is this. There are two sorts of cognition in angels: a natural sort (which they have *via* their essences and innate species) and a supernatural and beatific sort (which they have in the Word of God).

First conclusion

The first conclusion is negative: angels do not get to know the mysteries of grace by their natural cognition. — This is supported on the basis that these mysteries depend on God's will alone. — This is confirmed by the fact that angels do not know by natural means the inner thoughts of others. — Both the force and the style of the argument are confirmed by the authority of St. Paul in 1 Corinthians 2.

ii. Concerning this argument, notice that the same reason is given for why the mysteries of grace are hidden as was given for why the thoughts of our hearts are hidden, namely, because they are outside the order of natural things, and the reason for this is because the former are connected to the divine will alone, and the latter are connected only to God's will and that of the person doing the thinking. Among those who posit that an angel's intellect is changed by an object, then, the same reason is used to say that angels are impacted by thoughts of the heart (as soon as they are actually thought) and by the mysteries of grace (as soon as they are actualized), unless otherwise impeded by divine power). This is what Scotus held explicitly in his remarks on *IV Sent.*, d.10, q.8. — There is no need for us to dwell on this any further because, when one denies the foundation assumed by these people (that an intellect free of matter is apt to be moved/changed by its object), their whole edifice collapses.

Second conclusion

iii. The second conclusion is affirmative but with several qualifiers. The angels know in the Word mysteries of grace, but [a] not all of them, and [b] not equally well, and [c] not all at once. — The conclusion itself is supported by the authority of the Apostle in 1 Corinthians 2, "But God hath revealed them unto us," etc. — Qualifier [a] is explained by the fact that the higher angels know more and deeper mysteries, because they contemplate divine wisdom more insightfully. — The second, [b], is explained by the fact that the higher angels enlighten the lower ones about these mysteries. — Qualifier [c] comes from the fact that they knew some of the mysteries from the beginning but gradually learned others, in keeping with their offices.

iv. A doubt arises about this [second] conclusion, because it does not seem true that the angels would know the mysteries of grace with their beatifying cognition.

After all, Scotus argues against this at *IV Sent.* d.10, q.8, *conclusio* 3, as follows. [*Major:*] The only thing that distinguishes a beatified angel from a non-beatified one is seeing the beatific object *qua* beatific and what that object includes *qua* beatific; [*minor:*] but the mysteries of grace are not included in the beatific object *qua* beatific; [*conclusion:*] so [those mysteries are not seen in the seeing that makes an angel blessed]. — The minor is clearly right, because knowing whether grace has been granted to this or that individual does not pertain to [the state of fulfillment which we call] being beatified.

Also, I am adding my own argument *ad hominem*. According to St. Thomas in q.12, [1] seeing more things in God's essence is a consequence of seeing the essence itself better. Elsewhere in his doctrine (and in the truth of the matter), [2] the beatifying seeing is never intended in its essential features (at least by angels; never mind what the case may be in separated souls); therefore it is impossible for angels to see in the Word something new, which they had not seen before. But this destroys one or the other of the propositions just stated: if the angel does see something new, he is not just seeing the Word better, contrary to [1]; but if he does see better, [2] is wrong!

v. My BRIEF REPLY to this doubt is that knowing something in the Word happens two ways: (1) form-wise [as an aspect of the object seen] and (2) cause-wise [as a result of seeing it]. And St. Thomas did not mean that any and all angels see something new in the Word form-wise, but only cause-wise — *i.e.* as a result of divine illuminations related to seeing the Word as concomitant accidents of it, not given all at once but successively, in line with the angels' successive dispositions, on account of their suitability for carrying out their offices. But it is consistent with this that the angels (all or some) should see certain mysteries form-wise in the Word from the outset of their blessedness.

And there is no need for these mysteries to belong to the beatifying object *as* beatifying. It was already explained in q.12 that seeing something in the Word form-wise happens two ways: intrinsically firstly* and secondarily, and that God Himself is seen intrinsically firstly, while creatures are seen secondarily. Hence He alone beatifies us, according to Augustine's famous text, "one who knows Thee and those things is no happier for knowing them, but is happy for knowing Thee alone." So Scotus was picking a fight with us over what we freely grant, even teach, namely, that nothing other than God is necessarily a part of the Object whose sight beatifies us. But this does not make it impossible for many things other than God to be seen in that Object secondarily and quasi-concomitantly with one and the same act of seeing.

¹ Seeing God is not a purpose achievable by a creature and hence is not "intended" by one. Rather, God intends for each elect creature a definite level (no more, no less) of seeing Him.

a.8

q.62, a.9;
In *II Sent.*
d.11, a.1

a.8 ad 4

* *per se primo**Confessiones* I,
c.4

Inquiry Fifty-Eight: Into how angelic knowing is done

Thereafter one must turn to how angelic cognizing is done. Seven questions are raised.

- (1) Is an angel's mind sometimes in potency and sometimes in act?
- (2) Can an angel understand many things at once?
- (3) Does he understand by discursive thought?
- (4) Does he understand by affirming and denying?
- (5) Can there be falsehood in an angel's understanding?
- (6) Can his knowing be called "morning" and "evening" knowing?
- (7) Is his morning and evening knowledge the same or different?

article I

Is an angel's mind sometimes in potency and sometimes in act?

2/1 ST q.1, a.6; 2 CG cc.97, 98, 101, *De Malo* q.16, aa.5, 6.

It seems that an angel's mind is sometimes in potency.

* motus
c.1; 201a 10

(1) After all, changing* is "the act of a thing existing with potency," as it says in *Physics III*. Well, the minds of the angels are changed by their understanding, as Denis says in c.4 of *On the Divine Names*. Therefore, their minds are sometimes in potency.

PG 3

(2) Besides, "desire" is for a thing not had but possible to have. So, whoever "desires" to understand a thing is in potency to it. But 1 Peter 1:12 speaks of things which "the angels desire to look into." Therefore, an angel's mind is sometimes in potency.

Prop 8

(3) Moreover, the *Liber de causis* says a pure Intelligence "understands after the fashion of his substance." But his substance has something of potency in it. Hence, he sometimes understands potentially.

c.8;
PL 34, 269

ON THE OTHER HAND, Augustine says in book II of *Super Genesim ad litteram* that the angels, "from the moment they were created have been enjoying the eternity of the Word with a holy and pious contemplation." Well, a mind which is contemplating is not in potency but in act. So, an angel's intellect is not in potency.

c.4, 429b 7ff
c.4, 255a 30f

ANSWER: as Aristotle says in *De Anima III* and in *Physics VIII*, a mind is said to be in potency in two senses:

- (1) as a mind stands before learning or discovering a point, *i.e.*, before it has a habitual knowledge, and
- (2) as a mind stands when it does have habitual knowledge but is not thinking about it.

In sense (1), the mind of an angel is never in potency towards the things open to being known by him on a natural basis. As the higher (*i.e.* the heavenly) bodies have no potency towards a being they do not have actually,¹ so

¹ In medieval belief, the natural potencies of the heavenly bodies are exhausted by the forms they already have.

also the heavenly intellects (angels) have no potency to understand which has not been actualized by the intelligible species innate* to them. But nothing prevents their minds from being in potency towards matters divinely revealed to them; after all, the heavenly bodies are sometimes in potency to be shone upon by the sun.

* connaturalis

In sense (2), an angel's mind can be "in potency" to things he knows by natural cognition, since he cannot always be engaged in actual thought about everything he knows that way. But towards his knowledge of the Word (and the things he sees in the Word), he is never in potency in this sense; for he is always seeing the Word actually, and ditto for what he sees in the Word. After all, this seeing is where the angels' blessedness is found. And blessedness is not found in a habitual state but in an actual one, as Aristotle says in *Ethics I*.

c.8, 1098b 21

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): Denis is not using 'change' there to mean the act of an incomplete thing (*i.e.*, one existing with potency) but act of a complete thing (existing in act). This is how understanding and sensing are called "changes," as in *De Anima III*.

c.7, 431a 7

ad (2): that mention of "desire" by the angels is not meant to exclude their having the thing desired but to exclude any haughty disdain for it.² — Alternatively, the angels are being said to "desire" new revelations in their Vision of God, which the angels receive from Him opportunely for their offices.

ad (3): an angel's substance has no potency which is unactualized.³ Likewise, an angel's intellect is not in potency in such a way as to lack the act of that power.

² On this interpretation, 1 Peter 1:12 is an anti-gnostic text. The angels postulated by gnostics would have regarded the redemption of material beings as beneath notice.

³ An angel's substance has no potency except to exist, and it was obviously actualized at creation.

 Cajetan's Commentary

In the title question, the only thing to note is that 'in act' and 'in potency' are being used here as adverbs for an angel's cognizing, be it in the natural order or the supernatural.

In the body of the article, Aquinas deploys two distinctions: (1) One divides "potency to understand" into essential and accidental potency. (2) The other divides "angel's knowing" into natural and supernatural and then subdivides this last into knowing by revelation and by seeing the Word. He examines all sides of this second distinction, applying to each the two sides of the first. Then he does three jobs.

(1) He explains the sides of the first distinction by using [a text from] the *De Anima*.

(2) He shows how angelic knowing stands towards essential potency.

(3) He shows how it stands to accidental potency.¹

¹ Cajetan expected his readers to know already that a mind "in potency" in Aquinas' sense (1) was lacking an intelligible species and therefore was said to be in "essential potency" to understand, while a mind in potency in Aquinas' sense (2), by having such a species but not adverting to it, was said to be in "accidental potency" to understand. Perhaps the modern reader will appreciate a word of explanation. An intellect lacking an intelligible species of *x* is in-

ii. As for job (2), he says two things. The first is that the angels are not in essential potency with respect to natural knowing. — The second is that the angels are in such potency with respect to knowledge had by revelation. — He supports both by an analogy between angels and heavenly bodies in their potency towards permanent substantial being and accidental being, and in their potency to be illuminated.

Notice here that Scotus (in remarks on *II Sent.* d. 9, q. ult., argues against this argument drawn from the heavenly bodies. But since his objections coincide with ones dealt with above, I omit them here.

iii. As to job (3), he says two things, namely, [1] that the angels are not always engaged in thinking about everything they know naturally, and [2] that they are always engaged in thinking about what they know in the Word, since this knowing is their blessedness, and blessedness is found in acting.

complete in being the faculty it is supposed to be (an intellect) *vis-à-vis* *x*. It lacks an essential component for being able to understand *x*. By contrast, an intellect equipped with such a species but not adverting to it is complete in being an intellect *vis-à-vis* *x* but has no current operation bearing upon *x*. Since doing the operation is an accidental state, the potency to be doing it is an accidental potency.

in resp. ad arg.

in § II of the
commentary on
q.50, a.2

article 2

Can an angel understand many things at once?

In II Sent. d.3, part2, q 2, a.4; 2 CG, c 101; De Veritate q 8, a.14

It seems that an angel cannot understand many things at once.

c 10;
114b 34

(1) After all, Aristotle says in *Topics II* that it “happens that one knows many things but understands just one [for: just one at a time].”

(2) Besides, nothing is understood unless one’s intellect is formed by an intelligible species of it, as a body is formed by a shape. But the same body cannot be formed by different shapes at once. Therefore, the same intellect cannot understand different things at once.

(3) Moreover, understanding is a case of changing. But no change terminates at diverse end-points. Hence understanding many things at once does not happen.

c.32,
PL 34, 316

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Augustine says in *Super Genesis ad litteram IV*: “By the spiritual power of an angel’s mind, he understands easily and at once whatever he wants.”

ANSWER: as the singleness of a change requires the singleness of its end-point, so also the singleness of an operation requires the singleness of its object. But some things can be taken both as many and as one. Think of the parts of a continuous thing. If each part is taken in itself, they are many; and then they are not taken in by a single operation, nor are they taken together by sense and understanding. But if the parts are taken the other way, as one in the whole, then they can be known together and by a single operation, be it through a sense power or through the intellect, so long as the continuous thing is being taken as a whole, as it says in *De Anima III*. In a similar way, our mind understands at once the subject and the predicate as parts of a single proposition, and understands at once also

c 6;
430b 7

two [or more] items related* when they concur in a single comparison.¹ So it is clear that “many things” *quia* distinct cannot be understood together; but *quia* united in one intelligible object, they can be.¹

Well, each and every thing is actually intelligible thanks to the fact that a likeness of it is in the intellect. So things that can be known through a single intelligible species are known as one intelligible object [by an angel] and hence are known together. But things known through diverse intelligible species are grasped as diverse intelligible objects.

Angels, then, by the knowledge with which they know things through [seeing] the Word, know everything in a single intelligible species, which is God’s essence. So for purposes of such knowledge, they know everything at once, just as our thoughts in our heavenly homeland “will not be fleeting, going from one thing to another and back again, but we shall see all our knowledge at once in a single sight,” as Augustine says in *De Trinitate XI*: — But by the knowledge with which the angels know things though innate species, they can understand at once everything they know through a single species, but not what they know through diverse ones.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): to understand many things as one is, in a sense, to understand one thing.

ad (2): an intellect is formed by the intelligible species it has within itself. So through a single intelligible species it can match many intelligible items at once (as a body, by one shape, can resemble many bodies at once).

ad (3): I reply the same as I did *ad* (1).

¹ In English, ‘relate’ is broader than ‘compare’: in Latin, the reverse. (The point that A is diverse from B does not state a *relatio* but is a *comparatio*.) The text requires the broader term.

* *comparata*
† *comparatio*

c 16
Pl.42, 1079

Cajetan’s Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article, he answers it with three conclusions. (1) Angels know everything at once in the Word. (2) By natural knowledge, angels can know at once everything presented by a single species. (3) Angels cannot know at once things presented to them by different innate species.

All these conclusions are supported in the same way, as follows. [*Major*:] Many things, not as they are many but as they are one intelligible object, can be understood by a single operation, together. [*Minor*:] Items represented by a single species have what it takes to be one intelligible object, while items represented by many have what it takes to be many such objects; [*con-*

clusio :] Ergo [items represented by a single species can be understood together by a single operation; items not so represented cannot].

Then further: [*Another minor*:] Knowledge gained in the Word is by a single species (God’s essence); [*new conclusion*:] therefore [it is gained all at once]. — Drawing the new conclusion is supported by Augustine.

In the supporting argument, the major’s first part is supported on the basis that a single operation has to have a single object, as a change has a single end-point. Then the major is clarified by explaining the distinction it presupposes: a plurality of items can stand to a power-to-perceive two ways: as many, and as one. So stand

the parts of a continuous thing to a sense-power; so stand the parts of a proposition to our mind, as do, more generally, the relata in any relation we entertain. — And the truth of the whole major is illustrated by [cases from] our senses and our intellects.

The minor is supported thus. [*Antecedent:*] Being intelligible is conferred upon presented items *via* an intelligible species, because what makes each item intelligible in act is the fact that its likeness is in the intellect. [*Inference:*] Therefore, being a single intelligible object is conferred on them by singleness of intelligible species. — The inference holds good because, in every category, a thing gets a oneness and a being from the same factor.

Several doubts

ii. About this reasoning process, two doubts arise. The first is because no distinction is drawn here between 'know at once' and 'know by one operation,' and yet they differ a great deal, as we experience when we perceive a sound and a color at once but not by the same operation. In short, the difference is self-evident. — Yet they are being confused here, as is obvious from the fact that the title question and the conclusion talk about understanding "at once," while the support for the major talks about singleness of operation. And so the reasoning comes to nothing.

A second doubt comes from the support given for the minor. The proposition that "each and every thing is actually intelligible thanks to the fact that a likeness of it is in the intellect" is true only for empirical things, which, of themselves, are intelligible only potentially. It is not true for things existing free from matter, which are actually intelligible of themselves, of course. Thus the whole argument can support only a particular conclusion: *empirical things* represented by one species are one intelligible object, and those represented by different species are different such objects. It is no longer a universal argument dealing with all represented things (and yet a universal conclusion is what was supposed to be reached).

iii. Concerning the final conclusion [drawn in the body of the article], doubt arises on three fronts. On the first, it comes from Aquinas' own claim that an angel can understand through three species (God's essence, the angel's own substance, and an innate species); he must mean all three at once; otherwise, since the angel is always understanding God and himself, he could never be understanding anything else. So the conclusion Aquinas draws here cannot stand.

On the second front, doubt arises from the fact that [*antecedent:*] an angel knows and affirms the difference between things known *via* diverse species, say, an animal and a rock; hence [*inference:*] he knows something *via* diverse species at once. The inference holds good from the doctrine of *De Anima II* [actually *III*], the chapter on The Common Sense. — And the difficulty increases on this front. The reasoning used to reach the conclusion does not seem valid, given that some things are known as one intelligible object by being compared to each other as "diverse," and yet are

known through diverse species.

iv. On a third front, a very pretty doubt arises about the first and third conclusion [drawn in the body of the article]. It goes as follows. [*Antecedent:*] An angel can understand at once everything he knows through a single species; so [*inference:*] he can understand at once everything for which he has a species. — The antecedent is the <second> conclusion [drawn in the body]; but the point interred is the opposite of the third conclusion. — Reaching the point interred is supported as follows. [*Major:*] An angel knows at once himself and all of his perfective traits. [*1st minor:*] But among his perfective traits is his being-intelligible-objects (indeed, it is the chief perfective trait of an angelic essence, that it be itself and other things in this way [*i.e. intentionaliter*]). Therefore, [*1st conclusion:*] the angel sees at once that he is such-and-such a being quidditatively and is these-and-those other beings intentionally. But [*2nd minor:*] this amounts to knowing all the things represented by the species which are those things in intentional being. [*2nd conclusion:*] Therefore, an angel knows at once and by one operation everything for which he has a species.

The reply is coming in § 11

Clearing these up

v. To clear these difficulties away, you need to know that the species through which an angel understands are not all of the same kind. Some are on the same level,* and others relate to each other as being on different levels.† Likewise among natural things, some forms existing in matter are on the same level (*e.g.* the form of a lion and that of a cow, and the like); others differ in level [or rank] like the merely vegetative and the sense-endowed. But I don't mean to suggest by this example anything beyond a difference of levels among *certain* intelligible species found in angels. Those are the species that go one beyond the other (though in different ways) even when they represent the same thing. The examples are

- the divine essence (which does not count as a "species" because it is perfectly representative of everything),
- the angel's own essence (which does not raise the count of the species he has, because his essence is a species, though an imperfect one, of everything intelligible by him, that gets improved and sharpened up somehow by an added intelligible species, so as to represent such-and-such things distinctly, *e.g.* animals).

But the species on the same level are those which differ from each other in what they represent, such as all the species which are innate in individual angels. — And again these latter species can be taken two ways: as representing the relata of a given relation,‡ and as representing things independently.§

vi. With these points in place, I say that although understanding things together and understanding them by one operation are different achievements, in the case at hand they present the same difficulty, and our point about singleness of operation is better known. The dif-

* *eiusdem ordinis*

† *se habent ad invicem ordine quodam*

‡ *extrema relationis alius*
§ *absolutè*

Reply is coming in § 11

q. 58, a. 1, q. 55,
a. 2, q. 56, a. 1

Reply is coming in § 11

c. 2,
426b 20

c. 4, 999b 25ff

c. 10;
114b 34

ficulty is the same because wholly diverse intelligible points, taken independently and as diverse, resist being understood (as they resist being mentioned) either together or by one operation. As it says in *Metaphysics IV* [actually *III*], "he who does not understand one thing does not understand at all," and it says in *De Anima III* [actually *Topics II*] that "one may happen to know many things while understanding just one." — And it is better known that a single operation should have a single object than it is that it may have potentially many at once (though this is also true). Thus St. Thomas clarifies both issues while giving his teaching in terms of the better known.

vii. From this it becomes clear what to say against the first difficulty [alleged in § *ii*] and the second one [in § *iii*], namely, that an angel can understand through multiple intelligible species at once if they are related as being on different levels. For the intelligible content of those species is not wholly different; as the one species exceeds and contains the other somewhat as the whole exceeds and contains a part. — Likewise, to see the difference between different intelligible species is to understand one thing, and it is not to do so through independently different species but through different species as they go together towards one intelligible relation. — The argument whereby oneness of intelligible content and oneness of species was clarified was neither insufficient nor false. After all, what regularly requires singleness of intelligible content was being treated and should have been treated. This exception is well known, and hence does no damage to the general rule which is and should be handed down about a thing independently knowable and likewise about disparate species taken independently (after all, everyone knows that a relation requires both sides). This is why in *De veritate* q.8 a.14 *ad 1*, St. Thomas says "nothing prevents many things from being understood together as one, or from being understood through a single form."

viii. Against the second difficulty [alleged in § *ii*], I say that it is one thing to be intelligible in act and quite another to be intelligible in act *to this intellect*. While matter-free things and material ones differ in that the former of themselves are intelligible in act, while the

latter of themselves are intelligible only in potency, they still agree in not being intelligible in act to this or that intellect unless they are actually *in* that intellect. We have it from points made above that they are in this or that intellect only through their likenesses. And so it follows that being intelligible to this intellect accrues to each thing through its being in that intellect *via* its species. This is how St. Thomas is to be understood here.

q.55, a.1, q.56,
a.2

ix. Against the doubt raised finally [in § *iv*] against the first and third conclusions. I answer that intelligible things' being represented through species can be understood in two ways: (1) independently; (2) as they are a trait of the mind understanding (a perfective trait). In way (1) they are not understood at once; in way (2) they are, and this does not go against what was settled above.

But this answer does suffer a difficulty. Since it is common to every matter-free substance that it understands things other than itself after the fashion of its own substance, no matter-free intelligence understands something other than itself except through its being that thing. And thus Gabriel knowing a stone independently is his knowing a stone as it is in Gabriel, or is Gabriel himself insofar as he is a stone, which is the same thing. For he does not know more about the stone than he himself *is* in intensional being.

Against this, I say that the answer is good, and that these two cognitions differ as the sight of parts in a whole differs from the sight of parts separately. For although the same thing is seen in both cases, something stands in the way of seeing a part separately which does not stand in the way of seeing it in the whole. And again, a part seen separately is seen more sharply than the part in the whole, as is clear when I see a whole house and then choose to apply my vision distinctly to discerning its individual parts. After all, firstly I see all the parts together in one house: but when I look at the parts distinctly, the intension of my soul subtracts from all the parts the seeing devoted to one part. Analogously, this happens in an angel; although he first sees everything at once in himself as a whole, if he wishes to see particular things separately and more clearly, he attends to one and neglects another: after all, a finite faculty cannot be in complete act simultaneously towards two things of the same kind and level etc.

Do angels know by discursive thinking?

q. 79, a. 8; q. 85, 5; *De Veritate* q. 8 a. 15; q. 15, a. 1

It seems that an angel knows by discursive thinking.

(1) After all, discursive understanding is achieved by knowing one thing through another. But angels know one thing through another; they know creatures through the Word. Therefore, an angel's intellect knows by discursive thinking.

(2) Besides, whatever a lower power can do, a higher one can do, too. But the human intellect can syllogize and know causes in their effects, in both of which discursive thinking happens. Therefore an angel's intellect, which is higher in the order of nature, can do this all the better.

(3) Isidore says that the demons know many things through experience. But cognition by experience is discursive; for "One experience comes to be from many memories, and from many experiences there comes to be one universal," as it says at the end of the *Posterior Analytics* and at the beginning of the *Metaphysics*. So the cognition of the angels is discursive.

Sententiae 1,
c. 10; *PL* 83,
556

II, c. 15; 100a.4
c. 1. 980b.28

PG 3, 868

ON THE OTHER HAND, Denis says in c. 7 of *On the Divine Names* that "angels do not gather their divine cognition from scattered remarks, nor do they go from a common element to the particulars."

ANSWER: as I have often said, the angels hold the status among spiritual substances that heavenly bodies hold among bodily substances (after all they are called "heavenly minds" by Denis); but there is this difference between earthly and heavenly bodies, namely, that earthly ones reach their final completeness through changing and moving, whereas heavenly bodies immediately, by their nature, have their final completeness. So lower intellects (human ones) reach completeness similarly in knowing the truth through changing and discursus of intellectual operation, *i.e.* they go from one known point to another. But if immediately upon knowing first points

De celest. hier.
c. 2; PG 3, 137

they saw all the subsequent conclusions, discursive thinking would not occur in them. This is the situation in the angels; in the things they first know naturally, they immediately see everything they can know in those starting points.

This is why they are called "intellectual" substances. Even among us, things naturally apprehended immediately are said to be "understood" [*intellecta*] and so a habitual grasp of the first principles is called "understanding" [*intellectus*]. But human minds, which acquire knowledge of the truth by a discursive process, are called "rational." — This feature arises from the weakness of the intellectual light in us. For if our minds had the fullness of intellectual light, as the angels do, they would immediately understand, in their first glance at the starting points, the whole fertility of those points, by seeing everything that can be reached from them by valid inference.*

* *quidquid ex
illis syllogizant
potest*

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): 'Discursus' is the name of a movement. But every movement is from an earlier point to another and later point. So 'discursive thinking' arises by going from a prior known point to another and later-known point previously unknown. But if a second thing is seen immediately in the one being looked at, as one sees in a mirror both the thing and its image at once, the cognition is not discursive. And this is how angels know things in the Word.

ad (2) The angels can reason validly[†] inasmuch as they know the valid rule,[‡] and they see effects in their causes and the causes in their effects — but not in such a way that they acquire knowledge of a previously unknown truth by *making inferences* from the causes to the effects and from the effects to the causes.

† *syllogizare*
‡ *syllogismum*

ad (3) "Experience" is said to be in angels and demons by an analogy, namely, that they know the empirical things present to them; but they do so without discursus.

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article there is a single conclusion answering it, supported on two grounds. The first support is by argument, going like this. [*Major:*] The angels hold among spiritual substances the place that heavenly bodies hold among bodies; and hence they differ from lower spiritual substances analogously to how heavenly bodies differ from lower bodies. [*Minor:*] But the only difference among these bodies is that the lower ones acquire their ultimate perfective traits by changing, while the higher ones have their ultimate perfective traits immediately; and lower spiritual substances such as human souls acquire their ultimate completeness (which lies in con-

templating the truth) by discursive changing. [*Conclusion:*] Ergo the angels have their contemplation of the truth completely at once and by their nature, without discursus. — The first bit of the major is confirmed by the quote from Denis. — The other points are self-evident for bodies and are clear from our own [mental] experience for spiritual substances.

Then the conclusion is confirmed from the different words used to describe higher and lower spiritual substances; the former are called "intellectual" whereas the latter are called "rational." — All the points are clear. *ii.* Notice that in these explanations St. Thomas mixes together a reason supporting both an analogy and a se-

mantic difference adduced secondarily. The reason is the difference of complete from incomplete intellectual light. Because the higher spirits differ from our souls in terms of perfect versus imperfect light, and it is a feature of imperfection that it needs discursus to come to see the truth (a sign of which is the fact that if our soul had so much light that, upon seeing the starting points, it would see what is virtually contained in them, it would not think discursively); what remains is that those substances which grasp everything virtually contained in any apprehended object possess the truth about the starting point and the conclusion without discursive movement.

Doubts from Scotus and Gregory

iii. Doubt about the points just stated is raised first by Scotus in remarks on *II Sent.* d.7, q.1, where he says it is groundless to deny all discursus in the angels. He refers back to his prologue on *I Sent.*, where he treats the question of whether theology is a science. There I find an argument which is directly against [discursus in] angels' knowledge in the Word but then consequently is against it in all their other forms of knowledge. Scotus argues as follows. [*Antecedent:*] In whatever light it is seen, the quiddity of a subject, such as a line, virtually contains all the truths about modified lines and is known prior to them; [*1st inference:*] So it is causative of them in any intellect affected by it; [*2nd inference:*] So there will be discursus. — The antecedent along with the first inference is obvious. — The second inference is supported on the ground that the definition of discursus does not require an ordering in time but one of nature and causality, *i.e.* that this be known naturally prior to that, and that we acknowledge that through this, albeit without lapse of time.

a.2, concl 3

iv. Then Gregory of Rimini attacks, in his remarks on *II Sent.*, d.7, q.5, where he says that St. Thomas' reasoning is based on nothing but an opinion about the heavenly bodies, and he says further that St. Thomas' conclusion leads to the impossible. After all, [*antecedent:*] if an angel knows without discursive thinking all the possible traits of a subject as soon as he has seen it, then [*inference:*] either the angel has at once an infinity of distinct intellectual species, or else has one species equivalent to infinitely many distinct ones. Both are impossible, because the angel's being would be infinite. — The inference holds up given the number of shapes and possible modifications, which are infinite, just like the numbers of species and shapes.

v. I shall give SHORT ANSWERS to these. First, Sco-

tus' case goes wrong in four ways. (I) He supposes that one makes the same judgment about a thing known in itself and a thing known in another, whereas in fact these differ greatly. — (II) He assumes that an angelic intellect (and that of a blessed) is acted upon by the thing seen in another, whereas in fact this is false, and quite generally an angel's mind is not changed by an outside object. — (III) Discursus is an effect arising from the intellect rather than from its object, since our intellect thinks discursively from the simplest object of all, *e.g.* God. And so, however much the object has in itself what it takes to cause discursive thinking, and if the intellect is changeable by the object, and if that object is known in itself, the effect which is discursive thinking still does not follow except in the case of a mind apt to think discursively and thus imperfect, so that it does not penetrate immediately from seeing the essence to knowing what it virtually contains. And yet in Scotus' argument, virtually the entire cause is taken from the side of the object. — (IV) For discursive thought to occur, it is not enough that the truth of one point be caused by the truth of another, nor is this required, as is clear in the case of discursive thinking *a posteriori*. What is required rather, is that knowledge of the one is caused by knowledge of the other in *that intellect* — and this cannot take place when both are known in one and the same cognition, since the same thing cannot be in real terms a cause of itself. And so things stand in the case at hand.

vi. Against Gregory, I say that Saint Thomas based the analogy of angels to heavenly bodies on the correct account of perfect and imperfect light (and still strengthened it with an authoritative quote from Denis). And, as Aristotle taught in *De Caelo II*, in matters as obscure and difficult as these, saying something reasonable is saying enough. In particular, this analogy seems to be the common thinking among philosophers.

c.12, 292b 5

The points advanced by Gregory on the opposite side are easily resolved by those who remember that it is quite appropriate for one individual of a higher order to be equivalent to infinitely many lower ones, even if they are distinct in species so long as they are limited to some definite genus. Solution will be equally easy for those who notice that if there were infinitely many species of color, light would still contain all of them in a higher way [*eminenter*] nor would this be an infinite being, any more than those species would compose an infinite being: rather it would be of finite perfection *qua* a being and infinitely only in some respect (that of color). And I am saying this without worrying at present over whether an angel could understand at once all the distinct species of shapes and numbers.

article 4

Do angels understand by affirming and denying?

q 85, a.5; *De Malo* q 16, a.6 ad 19

It seems that the angels understand by affirming and denying.

^{* compositio} (1) After all, where there are many things understood, there is a combining* of them, as it says in *De Anima III*. But in the mind of an angel there are many things understood, since he understands through diverse species rather than grasping everything at once [in one species]. So there is the combining that yields affirmation or denial in the mind of an angel.

^{a.2} (2) Besides, denial is farther from affirmation than any two opposed natures are from each other; for the very first distinction is drawn through affirmation and denial. But an angel does not know far-apart natures through one species, but through different ones, as is clear from points made above. So he has to know affirmation and negation through different species. And so it seems that an angel would understand by affirming and denying.

^{* locutio} (3) Moreover, what we say* is a sign of what we understand. But when angels have spoken to people, they have uttered affirmative and negative sentences (the signs of affirmation and denial in the mind), as one sees from many passages of Holy Scripture. So it seems that the angels understand by affirming and denying.

^{PG 3, 868} ON THE OTHER HAND, Denis says in c.7 of *On the Divine Names* that the “intellectual power of the angels blazes with the clear simplicity of the divine understandings.” But simple understanding is without affirmation or denial, as it says in *De Anima III*. Ergo an angel understands without affirming or denying.

^{c 6, 430a 26}

ANSWER: as a conclusion is related to a starting point in a mind that is reasoning, so a predicate is related to a subject in a mind that is making an affirmative or negative judgment. For if a mind saw the truth of its conclusion already in its starting point, it would not bother with discursive reasoning; likewise, if a mind grasping the WHAT-IT-IS of a subject had immediate knowledge of everything that could be attributed to it or denied of it, that mind would not bother with affirming or denying, but would grasp the whole truth about the subject just

by understanding the WHAT-IT-IS of the subject.

It is clear, therefore, that the reason our mind understands by affirming and denying and the reason it understands by discursive thinking are the same: *i.e.*, that it cannot see immediately everything that may be contained in a thing [or a proposition] in its first apprehension of it.¹ This happens thanks to the dimness of our mind’s natural light, as I said. So, since the intellectual light in an angel is fully bright (as he is a “pure and utterly clear mirror,” as Denis says in c.4 of *On the Divine Names*), it follows that just as an angel does not understand by reasoning, so also he does not do so by affirming and denying.

Nevertheless, an angel understands the affirming and denying (just as he understands the reason for sound inferences); for he understands composed things simple and changeable things synchronically* and material things matter-independently.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): not just any multitude of things understood causes combining, but only a multitude of things whereof one is attributed to another, or denied of another. But an angel, by understanding the WHAT-IT-IS of a thing[†], at once understands whatever can be attributed to it or denied of it. Hence by understanding “what it is,” he understands (through his one simple understanding) everything that we can understand by affirming and denying.

ad (2): the quiddities of things differ less than an affirmation and denial do, for purposes of what it takes to be. But for purposes of what it takes to know, affirmation and denial are closer together [than diverse quiddities], because as soon as the truth of an affirmation is known, the falsity of the opposed negation is known immediately.

ad (3): That angels utter affirmative and negative sentences shows that they know affirmation and denial, not that they know *by* affirming and denying; rather, they know simply by recognizing “what it is.”

¹ An analogy between how conclusions are “contained” in premisses and how predicates are “contained” in subjects needs very careful handling; see the commentary, § vi.

Cajetan’s Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article, he does two jobs: (1) he answers the question with a negative conclusion; (2) he answers a certain tacit objection.

The conclusion is: the angels do not know by affirming and denying. — This is supported as follows. [*Major:*] An intellect able to know everything attribu-

table to some object in its first apprehension of that object, understands without affirming and denying: [*minor:*] an angel’s intellect is of this sort; ergo, *etc.*

The major is supported and explained. It is explained by the analogous similarity between how starting point stands to conclusion in discursive thinking, on the one hand, and how a subject stands to a predicate in

a 3

PG 3, 724

* immobiliter

† quidditas

affirming or denying, on the other hand. For in both cases the need for it has the same reason, namely, because in what is first apprehended, what all is latent in it is not seen. — The major is supported by inserting the premise that when the cause is removed, the effect is removed, according to *Posterior Analytics I* “if an affirmation is the cause of an affirmation...” But the distinctive reason for a need to understand by making judgments and by discursive thinking is that other points are not seen in a simple apprehension of the object. Therefore, an intellect seeing the other things at once in the thing first apprehended does not need discursive thinking or proposition-making.

The minor is supported as follows. [*Major:*] What attaches to our intellect because of its defective intellectual light is not to be attributed to an angel’s intellect, in which the intellectual light is complete, as is supported by the quotation from Denis. [*Minor:*] But our failure to see the things connected to the one we first apprehend comes from our lack of intellectual light, as is obvious. [*Conclusion:*] Therefore [our failure to see connected things is not to be attributed to an angel].

ii. Next Aquinas explains how an angel understands propositions. In a nutshell, he says that the angel understands changing things synchronically and composed things simply, etc. And so he understands a proposition without putting one together and understands a chain of inferences [*discursum*] without making the inferences.* This is to say that an affirming and a denying (and likewise an inferring) in exercised act — e.g. “a rational animal is open to amusement, Socrates is a rational animal, etc.” — stand to an angel’s intellect just as a thing seen, and not as a way of coming to see; whereas they stand to our intellect in both ways.

Doubts

iii. Doubt arises about the major of the argument just used: it seems insufficient on the ground that the reason it alleges is not a universal reason for affirming and denying, but a particular reason. After all, it is the reason the angel does not need to affirm and deny in knowing the traits which are in the subject necessarily¹ or are excluded from it necessarily; but it is not the reason he would not need to affirm and deny in cases where the inherence is accidental [*per accidens*], and fortuitous or random.

This statement is supported on two grounds. The first is that lack of intellectual light is not the reason why, when a subject is known, its accidental traits are not known, or at least its fortuitous ones, because however perfectly a subject is known, one can never foresee its involvement in an accidental state of affairs, especially one obtaining by chance. — Secondly, following an analogy drawn by Saint Thomas, the predicates known “in” a seen subject are those which stand to the subject as a conclusion stands to a premise [whence it follows]; well this is obviously not true of all cases but only of those where the predicates are virtually included in the subject, as a conclusion is virtually contained in the premises [from which it is validly inferred]; and

those predicates do not include accidental and fortuitous ones.¹

Here is a confirmation. Otherwise, any effect at all would have a necessary [*per se*] cause, contrary to what Aristotle says in *Metaphysics V* and in *Physics II*.

iv. Concerning the minor premise of the same argument, doubt arises because the following inference is not valid:

affirming and denying (or thinking discursively) belong to our intellect thanks to an imperfection: therefore the opposed perfection belongs to an angelic intellect.

After all someone could say that the imperfection is a common one to them and us, since it is agreed that an angelic intellect does not exclude all imperfection. And so, since the whole argument is based on this inference, the whole argument is ineffective.

Clearing these up

v. To clear up the first source of doubt, you need to know firstly that seeing several things together in one simple insight happens three ways: (1) as *one with another*, as when whiteness and redness are seen together, and ditto for any other pair of different things; (2) as *one with and in another*, as any accident (and more generally, any predicate) is seen in its subject: (3) as *with, in, and from another*, as a proper case of undergoing something (and more generally, any effect) is seen when it is known with, in, and from its cause.

You need to know secondly that, although knowing many things together in a simple insight testifies to the perfection of the knower, there is still a difference between way (1) and the other ways, in that understanding one thing *with* another in one insight comes from the sheer perfection of the intellect without further ado, whereas understanding one thing *in* another comes not only from the perfected character of the intellect in itself, but also from how complete it is as it is *attaining its initial object*, i.e., the one in which or from which it knows the other. For one thing, from the fact that an intellect better penetrates a cause or a subject known, there arises seeing at the same time what is in it or what comes from it, because the better something is known the better its active strength [*virtus*] or power is penetrated. For from the penetration of a power, there come to be known the things to which the power extends, and proportionally so: i.e., from penetration of a power in its quidditative being, there come to be known also quidditatively the things to which the power extends; and from penetration of a power in its individual and existential being (with the attached conditions), there come to be known the things to which the power extends when they exist.² — For another thing, what leads to a more com-

¹ For the Thomist account of virtual containment, and the important ways in which it differs from the Scotist account, see § VII-XII of the Commentary on q. I, a. 7.

² The possible states of affairs into which a thing *x* can enter are mostly not known until they obtain [*i.e. exist*].

c 13
78b 19-23

c 2, 1013b 34f
c.3, 195a 34-36

The reply is coming in § VII

* non discurrendo

† per se

The reply is coming in § VII

plete cognition of any object is knowing not only its power but also all the features pertaining to it in any way; and so what leads to a more complete *natural* cognition of any object is knowing everything pertaining to that object in any way *within the limits of the natural*.

Specific answers

vi. With these points in place, I answer the objections on the other side. Against the first of them, I say that the reason given for a need to affirm and deny and think discursively is a universal reason, not a particular one. When you allege that the situation where an object is clear while its contingent or fortuitous traits remain hidden does not come from a defect of light but from the natures of the things to be known, I deny it, speaking universally about intellectual light and natural accidents or natural happenstances. After all, from our dim intellectual light there comes the fact that, when Socrates has been seen, and [what is actually going on is that] he is being found by a debtor of his in the market place, the state of affairs that he is found by the debtor is not seen at once but requires one to form a proposition bearing upon Socrates as met by a debtor.

Against the second objection I say that the analogy between a subject's bearing on its predicate and a starting point's bearing on a conclusion reachable from it comes from *potentiality* and not from virtual containment. After all '*virtus*' names an active or operative source; but '*power*' [*'potentia*'] is a name common to both [active and passive sources] and even to a passive potency to exist. The result is that the analogical similarity lies in *potential* containment — be it inherently* or accidentally or in any other way (but within the limits of the natural, as I said).— Alternatively, the analogy consists in this: AS discursive thinking stands to the virtual containment of conclusions in premises, SO ALSO affirming and denying stand to the potential containment of predicates in subjects. And this way of speaking fits better with the text, where '*virtually*' is used in connection with a premise, whereas '*potentially*' is connected with a subject, where it says "whatever *can* be attributed to the subject."³ The point that all predicates are contained at least potentially in their subject is clear case by case. Predicates pertaining to the thing's nature (actually or virtually) are included in the subject as essential traits and distinctive modifications*. Predicates dealing with contingent subject matter, although potentially infinite as attaching sometimes, are still finite and fixed when they exist in the subject; and hence, a potency already reduced to act shows that they [those predicates] were contained in the potency of that subject. Predi-

* *per se*

* *passiones*

ates expressing negated subject matter are undoubtedly hidden virtually in their subject, since negations of conflicting traits follow necessarily from affirming a [trait in the] subject.

Thus it is clear that fortuitous traits do not have to have a *per se* cause just because we say they are known with the subject and pertain to improved knowledge of it. This would follow, after all, if we were saying that a fortuitous trait pertained to better knowledge of its cause [subject] *before* it existed there; but we are saying afterwards. FOR JUST AS the trait's existence once settled makes a composition [*i.e.* a state of affairs] with that in which it is found in the real, and the trait has an existence (albeit an accidental one) without having a *per se* cause, SO ALSO the intellect, if it knew that subject completely, would see every case of being which it actually has, without making the states of affairs necessary ones.

vii. Against the doubt raised against our minor, I say that "defects of intellect" are two-fold: some common to every created intellect, and some special or distinctive of ours. A common defect is that the creature's intellectual power has a touch of potentiality in it, and its mode of knowing is through an added intelligible species and through multiple acts of understanding. A defect distinctive to us is understanding by turning to the phantasms, being in pure potency [initially], and the like. No doubt, what attaches to our intellect from a common defect attaches also to that of an angel. But the inference [in our minor] holds good in the cases that attach to our intellect from its distinctive defects, since the opposed perfections are posited in the angels.

The point that affirming and denying (and likewise discursive thinking) come from the distinctive imperfection of our intellect is a point that St. Thomas assumes here; but it also becomes obvious easily from things he has said. Given that there are the two ways of knowing (*i.e.* by simple insight and by judging), and given that they both attach to our intellect; and given that both discursus and affirming/denying imply the way of knowing which is by judging; and since it is clear that the more perfect way of knowing is by simple insight, and because this way of knowing in us is shared by our soul's highest part in the intellect's first operation, and similarly to some extent in the start of our second operation (*i.e.* in the recognition of first principles), and it has already been established by Denis in Chapter 7 of *On the Divine Names* that the highest point of the lower touches the lowest point of the higher, it obviously follows that the way of knowing which is by affirming and denying comes from the distinctive defect of our intellect, to which a share of the higher is communicated to some extent, because our intellect experiences a *souppçon* of understanding by simple insight.

³ Virtual containment required provability; what was "virtually" contained in a premise *p* was only what *p* had the logical faculty to yield (in company with the standard truths of logic). Now let a true premise *p* have a subject-term *S* referring to a thing, *x*, having at one time or another the predicates *P*₁, *P*₂ . . . *P*_{*n*}. If all these predicates were virtually contained in *S*, there would be a description of *x*, *Dx*, under which *x* could be

proved to have all those predicates. The objector thought Aquinas was giving the angels the concept of this *Dx*. This "gift" would make the angels precursors of Leibniz and preclude all real contingency. To head this off, Cajetan denies that predicates sometimes true of a subject *S* are "contained" in it in any way but potentially.

Does falsehood occur in an angel's understanding?

3 CG c.108, *De Malo* q.16, a.5

It seems there can be falsehood in an angel's understanding.

(1) After all, wantonness pertains to falsehood; but in the demons there is "wanton imagination," as Denis says in Chapter 4 of *On the Divine Names*. So it seems that there can be falsehood in angelic understanding.

(2) Ignorance is a cause of false guessing. But there can be ignorance in the angels, as Denis says in c. 6 of *The Heavenly Hierarchy*; therefore it seems that there can be falsehood in them.

(3) Moreover, everything that falls away from the truth of wisdom and has the makings of depravity in it has falsehood or error of understanding in it. But Denis says this about the demons in c. 7 of *On the Divine Names*. It seems, therefore, that there can be falsehood in the angels' understanding.

ON THE OTHER HAND, Aristotle says in *De Anima III* that "understanding is always true." Augustine also says in his *Book of 83 Questions* that "only the true is understood." But angels do know nothing except by understanding. Therefore there cannot be deception and falsehood in an angel's knowing.

ANSWER: the right answer to this question depends to some extent upon points already made. I have said, after all, that an angel does not understand by affirming and denying but by understanding a what-it-is of something. But an understanding of what-it-is is always true, just as a sense power is always right about its proper object as it says in *De Anima III*.¹ But in us, on an accidental basis, deception and falsehood crop up in understanding the what-it-is, *i.e.* thanks to the makeup of some judgement* — either when we mistake the definition of one thing for the definition of another, or when the parts of the defini-

tion do not go together (as when someone accepts as the definition of something "a four-footed animal able to fly," since there is no such animal), and this last happens indeed in composed things whose definition comes from different sources, one of which is matter to the other. But in understanding simple quiddities, there is no falsehood, as it says in *Metaphysics IX*, because either the simple quiddities are not attained at all (and we understand nothing of them), or else they are understood as they are.

So, then, there cannot be falsehood or error or self-deception in the intellect of an angel in and of itself*: but it may happen on an accidental basis — but yet in a different way from how error crops up in us. For we arrive sometimes at understanding a quiddity by affirming and denying, just as we investigate a definition by denying or proving.² This does not take place in the angels; rather, they know [the truth value of] all the propositions pertaining to a thing through gasping the thing's what-it-is. — It is obvious, however, that the quiddity of a thing can be the starting point of knowing it with respect to the traits naturally true of it or naturally false of it; but the quiddity is not the starting point for knowing the traits that depend upon God's supernatural arrangement. The good angels, then, having an upright will, use their knowledge of a thing's quiddity only to decide* its natural properties in keeping with the divine arrangement. So there cannot be falsity or error in them. But the demons, turning their minds away from divine wisdom through a perverse will, sometimes decide things independently [of divine disposition] on the basis of their natural condition. They are not deceived about the traits naturally belonging to the thing. But they can be deceived in regard to supernatural matters, as when a demon regards a dead man and decides that he will not rise again, and as when the demon sees the man Christ and decides He is not God.

How to answer the objections is clear from these remarks. For the wantonness of the demons comes from their not being submissive to the divine wisdom. — Ignorance, however, is not about naturally knowable things in the angels but supernatural ones. — It is also clear that the understanding of a thing's what-it-is is always true unless it goes wrong on an accidental basis by being unduly ordered to some affirmation or denial.

² What people arrive at is a better understanding of what something is, *i.e.* a description under which the thing is grasped more deeply. Human understanding typically begins with a flash impression of what something is, based on immediate sensation, and needs to progress discursively towards something better that would stand as a defensible scientific account of what-it-is. It is vital to understand that Aquinas admitted this obvious point; otherwise one attributes to him the absurd idea that the human intellect is an essence-camera, grasping a scientifically sound definition in its first snapshot.

¹ It is vital to observe at the outset that the Latin Middle Ages used 'intellectus' in two ways: (1) as we do, to mean the faculty called the intellect, and (2) to mean an understanding; but here their usage differs significantly from ours. *Intellectus* in this second sense, for them, was a technical term borrowed from Aristotle and meaning the "first operation" of the intellect, which they identified with grasping what a thing is, anterior to making judgements about it. In our usage, however, "an understanding" is often identified with a judgement or a product of judgements. Aristotle's claim that our understanding of what-it-is is always true is obviously absurd in the modern usage. But if understanding precludes judgement, or is at least prior to judgement, one can defend the view that "an understanding" is always right — as far as it goes. I switch here suddenly from the word "true" to the word "right" because simple understandings are not evaluated as true or false. All that Aristotle meant was that, in grasping what something is, an intellect is always functioning properly.

c 9;
1051b 26

* per se

* judicant

c.6;
430b 27

* compositio

PG 3, 725

PG 3, 200

PG 3, 868

c 10;
433a 26
q 32;
PL 40, 22

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article, he answers it with one conclusion having four parts, namely: [a] in an angel's intellect there cannot be falsehood inherently, [b] but there can be accidentally, [c] not as regards natural traits, [d] but as regards supernatural ones.

The conclusion is supported as to its first part.

[*Major:*] An intellect in its first operation is always right, inherently speaking, as is clear in the case of a sense power and from *De Anima III*. [*Minor:*] But an angel's intellect always understands in the manner of the intellect's first operation; [*conclusion:*] therefore [an angel's understanding is never false]. — The major is further explained by assigning causes for the two ways in which falsehood crops up in our work of understanding a what-it-is (which is the object of an intellect's first operation), namely, that both ways occur from a mixed-in judgement. Again, the second way happens only with respect to certain objects, *i.e.* composite rather than simple ones, as is clear from *Metaphysics IX*, text 22.

As to the conclusion's second part [b], it is clarified by specifying the difference between how falsehood gets accidentally into our simple understanding and how it gets accidentally into an angel's understanding. In our case, falsehood gets in ahead of the what-it-is, because it crops up on the way to it by affirming or applying; but in the angels, falsehood comes after the what-it-is, since it crops up in making a decision from that.

As to the third and fourth parts of the conclusion, they are at once supported and clarified as follows. [*Major:*] In deciding the conditions of a thing on the basis of what-it-is, an intellect can decide in keeping with the arrangements of divine wisdom or not in keeping with them; so it can go wrong regarding supernatural matters but not natural ones; [*Minor:*] but the angelic intellect is this way in some of them; [*Conclusion:*] therefore [some angels can go wrong about supernatural matters]. — The major is obvious for natural matters, because a knowledge of what-it-is is a sufficient reason for knowing natural traits and the arrangement of divine wisdom as it puts order into the course of nature. But as regards supernatural matters [it is not sufficient] because these matters can be known only by revelation. This is illustrated by the examples of the resurrection of the dead and Christ as man and God. — The minor is explained on the ground that some of the angels are good, and some bad, and that the former (reconciled to their standing) judge always in keeping with the higher arrangement and (as far as it goes) the merits of natural causes; but the latter (puffed up with pride) judge unqualifiedly as if there were no higher arrangement affecting the order of nature; and thus they are said to lead their minds astray sometimes from the order of divine wisdom and to fall into falsehood.

A hard problem

ii. Concerning the statements just made, a doubt arises which cannot be glossed over, namely, as to how

falsehood can be found in the mind of an angel, if all of his understanding is simple apprehension, into which there enters no affirmation or denial. After all, [*major:*] no first operation of an intellect can be wrong unless by reason of a judgment connected to it, as it says in the text, and as we experience in ourselves, and as is clear from the definition of the true and the false in *Metaphysics IV*. [*Minor:*] But no angelic intellection with respect to natural and supernatural things has a judgment connected to it, either ahead of it, or following it. [*Conclusion:*] Ergo there can never be falsehood in the angels' understanding.

iii. A FIRST REPLY to this doubt can be made by denying the minor premise. Although an angel understands all natural traits by seeing the what-it-is insofar as those traits pertain naturally, be it inherently or contingently, as I said above, an angel still understands supernatural conditions by affirming and denying.

One can be persuaded that this was the thinking of St. Thomas by three points. [1] The first is that the reason for excluding affirmation and denial in angels has no place except in natural issues. After all, when a subject has been seen, failure to see predicates naturally belonging to it comes from a defect of intellectual light; but traits that can belong to a thing supernaturally (as they depend upon God's power) cannot be known without *comprehending* God's power — a level of insight in which no creature can share. — [b] The second point is that, otherwise, Aquinas would be contradicting himself in this same article, as came out in the objection just made. His reasoning to show how falsehood arises in an angel's decision on an accidental basis, as in us, but in a different way (on the ground that in us the makeup of falsehood comes ahead of the what-it-is, but in them follows it, and that it happens in us by investigation, but in them by comparing the natural to the supernatural) would amount to nothing. — [c] The third point is that, at the end of the article, where he is answering objections, he says that understanding the what-it-is gets to be false accidentally, as it is ordered to a proposition or judgment.

But since Saint Thomas explicitly holds that even the demons do not think discursively about the things naturally hidden to them (like the thoughts of our hearts), it follows that, in his view, an angel never knows by affirming and denying. In his view, after all, the judgement reached in the previous article about discursus is the same as the judgement about affirming and denying. And there is no other reason why this should be the case about *one* naturally hidden matter and not about another, as can be gathered from the fact that it is regularly the case that supernatural revelations are modified and received in each receiver according to the manner natural to the receiver — as we experience in our own case, by whom revealed matters are known in our fashion. So if an angel's natural way of knowing is through simple apprehension, points revealed to him will also be apprehended simply, and so will anything else that is naturally hidden.

c.7, 1011b25

a.4, Commentary
§ viin *De Veritate* q8
a.15 ad 4

The right solution

iv. Therefore a different reply needs to be made. Given that truth and falsehood arise in a judgement, as judgment-making enters into cognition in two ways, so do truth and falsehood. After all, judgement-making can belong to an intellect on the part of its way of knowing (as when we know that a man is a man) and on the part of the thing known (as when we know a composed thing). On the opposite side, simple apprehension is found in two ways, namely, as to how one knows and as to the thing known. To get what it takes for there to be truth and falsehood, one does not need both cases of judgment-making; rather, either of them suffices. After all, it is obvious that we can have a propositional cognition (true or false) about an ever-so-simple thing; e.g. we can form the proposition that this is this, or that this is not this. And likewise, however simple the way of conceiving may be, a proposition may be apprehended from parts that do or do not go together, and thereby be true or false.

From this it is obvious that composition on the part of the thing known is neither necessary nor sufficient for the second operation of the intellect [judging]; rather what is needed and suffices is composition on the part of the mode of knowing. — And it follows further that simplicity in the thing known is not required for the intellect's first operation [simple apprehension], but rather simplicity in the mode of knowing. — It follows further that in the intellect's first operation (although there cannot be falsehood or truth by reason of the mode of knowing) there can be still be truth or falsehood by reason of the thing known, *i.e.*, when the thing known is composite, and this why it says in *Metaphysics VIII* that in *simple* matters there is no falsehood in any way (neither on the part of the thing known nor in the mode of knowing) if they are known by the intellect's first operation, as the simplicity of this mode of knowing requires.

v. And if you ask how what it takes to be true or false can be found in the mind's first operation from the side of the thing known, since nothing is affirmed or denied in the mind's first operation, I easily answer that, when the mind conceives a composed quiddity or a composed thing, affirmation and denial are *virtually* there, even if they are not there form-wise. Suppose one intuitus AB: if these go together, one conceives a true thing virtually, because one conceives it to be as it is; but if they do not go together, one virtually conceives a falsehood because

one conceives it to be how it is not.

We also say, however, that true and false are found on an accidental basis in the mind's first operation. We say this, on the one hand, because a judgment (on which what it takes to be true or false is based) is an *accident* to that first operation — not just because it is accidental to the operation's object (since it does suit some objects but not all), but because the first operation's object is the *incomplex qua* *incomplex*, because that object as such does not express any judgement, obviously, and hence does not express a truth or a falsehood. Ergo. as the *incomplex* is inherently compatible with the putting together of a judgement, so also it is inherently compatible with truth and falsehood. This is why we say (and say well) that truth and falsity, like the judgement, arise in and of themselves only in the mind's second operation, whose object is the *complex qua* *complex*.¹

vi. From these points, the answer to the objections is obvious. For since an angel knows everything through the intellect's first way of operating, when he knows composed things, he can run into falsity virtually because of a judgment united to the object. And this is what St. Thomas was intending in his list of the roots of falsity or truth on the part of the thing known (be it simple or composed) with any natural or supernatural condition or bearing whatsoever. — And thus truth or falsehood is always formally in a proposition contributed by the intellect. But truth or falsity is virtually present (though not modally so) in the object's composed or divided nature.²

¹ 'Complex' described a judgment or proposition, so that 'incomplex' described something as non-propositional, like a horse or the isolated word 'horse'. Since the mind's first operation was to grasp a what-it-is, and an isolated word or phrase suffices to express this, the "object" of the first operation was the *incomplex*. The reason a proposition was called *complex* was not the mere fact that it was a string of words but, more basically, the fact that it was an amalgamation of the two kinds of meaning: reference and sense. The subject-term did referential duty, while the predicate was chosen for its sense (*i.e.* its descriptive force). The force of the whole proposition was to apply the sense of the predicat(e)s to the referent(s) of the subject(s). In short, it was to bring referring and describing into a complex unity matching the structure of the mental act (judgment) which the proposition brought into language. On these points, see above, footnote 1 on q.13, a.1, and all the footnotes on q.13, a.12 with its commentary.

² Truth or falsity is present "modally" when either is actual (in signified act), not just virtual.

Do the Angels have "morning" and "evening" knowledge?

q 62, a 1 ad 3; q 64, a 1 ad 3, *In II Sent* d 12 a.3, *De Veritate* q.8, a.16, *De Potentia* q.4, a.2, *resp. ad obj.*, *In Epistolam ad Ephesianos* c.3, *lectro* 3

The angels do not seem to have "evening" or "morning" knowledge.

(1) After all, evening and morning [twilight] have a touch of darkness in them. But there is no darkness in the cognition of the angels, since there is no error or falsehood in it. So the angel's knowledge should not be called "morning" or "evening."

(2) Besides, between evening and morning falls the night; and between morning and evening there falls mid-day. So if the angels get a morning and evening knowledge, for the same reason there should be a mid-day and a nocturnal knowledge in them, or so it would seem.

(3) Moreover, knowledge is divided up according to the different things known; this is why Aristotle says in *De Anima III* that "sciences are distinguished as things are." Well, things have three ways of being; in the Word, in their own natures, and in the understanding of the angels, as Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad litteram II*. Hence, if morning and evening knowledge should be posited in the angels on account of the being things have in the Word and the one they have in their own natures, one should also posit in them a third sort of knowledge, thanks to the being things have in the angels' understanding.

ON THE OTHER HAND, what Augustine does in *Super Genesim ad litteram IV* and then also in *The City of God XI* is distinguish the angels' knowledge into morning and evening.

ANSWER: the talk of morning and evening knowledge in the angels was introduced by Augustine, who took the six days in which God made all things (as we read in Genesis 1) and took them to mean not the usual days of the sun's transit, since the sun was created on the fourth day, but to mean a day of angelic knowing, one for each of the six kinds of things made. For just as in a usual day, morning is its beginning and evening its end, so also knowing the primordial being of things is called morning knowledge (and this concerns the being things have in the Word), and knowing the existence

Super Genesim ad lit. IV, c.22, c.26

of a created thing in its own nature is called evening knowledge, since the existence of things flows from the Word as from a primordial starting point, and their flowing out terminates at their existence in their own natures.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): the talk of morning and evening in angelic knowledge is not taken from a likeness to dawn and dusk, but from a likeness to a beginning and an end. — Or one may say that nothing prevents a thing from being called "light" in comparison with one thing and to be called "darkness" in comparison with another, as Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad litteram IV*. In this way, the life of the faithful and the righteous is called light in comparison to the wicked, according to Ephesians 5:8, "ye have been at some time darkness, but now ye are light in the Lord"; but the life of the faithful is called darkness in comparison to the life of glory in 2 Peter 1:19, "ye have the prophetic word, unto which ye do well to attend as to a light shining in a dark place." So, then, the knowledge with which an angel knows things in their own natures is "day" compared to ignorance or error, but "shadow" compared to the vision of them in the Word.

c.23
PL 34, 312

ad (2): morning and evening knowledge pertain to the day, *i.e.* to the illuminated angels, who are distinct from the darkness which is the evil angels. The good angels, when knowing creation, do not fixate upon it (which would be to darken themselves and become night) but relate it back to God (in whom they initially knew everything) in praise. And so after evening, one does not put night but morning, so that this morning is the end of the preceding day and the beginning of the following day, in as much as the angels relate their knowledge of the preceding day's work back to God in praise. — 'Mid-day' is included in the talk of a day as the middle between two extremes. Alternatively, 'mid-day' can be taken as referring to God's own knowledge, which has neither beginning nor end.

ad (3): angels are also creatures. So the being things have in the angels' understanding is included in evening knowledge, as is their being in their own natures.

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question will be made clear by the statements coming in the body of the article. — In that body, to give the question an affirmative answer, Aquinas does two jobs. (1) He discloses the author and root of this distinction, the author having been Augustine, and the root of it being the fact that angelic knowledge is called a "day" in Genesis 1; and so, reasonably enough,

the parts of a day are made to be different sorts of angelic knowledge, and the knowledge is called "morning" and "evening" after the day's morning and evening.

(2) Since these different terms are applied metaphorically to angelic knowledge, Aquinas shows what basis there is for accepting the similitude. He says it comes from what it takes to be a beginning and an end, so that

the knowledge that bears upon the primordial being of things (*i.e.* their being in their first cause) is called morning knowledge; but the knowledge that looks to the final being of things (*i.e.* their existing in themselves) is called evening knowledge. — All points in the text are clear.

Are "morning" and "evening" knowledge the same?

De Veritate q 8, a.16; *De Potentia* q 4, a.2, ad 10, 19, 22

It seems that one cognition is both morning and evening.

(1) After all, Genesis 1:5 says, "And there was evening, and there was morning, one day." But by "a day," we understand angelic knowledge, as Augustine says. So the morning and evening knowledge in the angels are one in the same thing.

Super Gen ad Lit.
II, cc 22, 26
PL 34, 312, 314

(2) Besides, it is impossible for one faculty to have two operations at once. But the angels are always doing their morning knowing, because they always see God and the things in God, according to Matthew 18:10, "There angels always see the face of my father," etc. Therefore, if the evening knowledge were a different cognition from the morning one, an angel could never be doing the evening knowing.

(3) Moreover, the apostle Paul says in 1 Corinthians 13:10, "when the perfect shall have come, the partial shall pass away." But if the evening knowledge were a different one from the morning, it would compare to it as imperfect to perfect. Therefore, evening knowing could not be done at the same time as morning knowing.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Augustine says in *Super Gen. ad lit. IV*, to the effect that "there is much difference between knowing a thing in the Word of God, and knowing it in its own nature — so much so that the former is rightly counted as daylight, and the latter as dusk."

c.23;
PL 34, 312

ANSWER: the evening knowledge, as I've said, is the one with which angels know things as they are in their own natures. But this cannot be understood to mean that the angels get knowledge from the things' own natures, as if 'in' expressed the relation of a source. After all, the angels do not get their knowledge from things, as was said above. The alternative, then, is that 'in their proper natures' means to speak of the things' make up as knowings, as they lie under cognition, so that the knowledge wherewith angels know the being which things have in their own natures is what is called "evening knowledge."

q.55, a.2

But the angels know through two media, *i.e.*, through innate species, and through the accounts of things existing in the Word. It is not the case, after

all, that in seeing the Word, they know only the being which things have in the Word; rather, they also know the being which things have in their own natures, just as God (by seeing Himself) knows the being which things have in their own natures. — So if one uses 'evening knowledge' to mean that with which they know the being of things in their own natures by seeing the Word, then morning and evening knowledge are essentially one and the same, differing according to the things known.¹ — But if we use 'evening knowledge' to mean that with which angels know the being of things in their own natures through innate forms, then the evening knowledge is different from the morning. And this seems to be how Augustine understood the matter, since he posits the one to be inferior to the other.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): as the six days in Augustine's understanding represent the six kinds of things known by the angels, so also the oneness of each day is taken as the oneness of the topic known, but that topic can be known with different cognitions.

ad (2): two operations of one potency can occur together, when one is related to the other — as we see when a will wills both an end and a means to it, and when an intellect equipped with an expertise understands at once premises and the conclusions reachable through the premises. Well, evening knowledge in the angels is related to the morning knowledge as Augustine says. Hence nothing prevents the two from occurring together in angels.

ad (3): when the perfect comes, the imperfect thing opposed to it goes away — as faith (which is of things not seen) departs when the Vision arrives. But the imperfection of evening knowledge is not opposed to the perfection of morning knowledge. After all something's being known in itself is not opposed to its being known in its cause. Nor is there any conflict in something's being known through two media, one of them more perfect and the other less so — just as we can have the same conclusion both by a real proof and by a merely persuasive argument. In the same way, the same thing can be known by an angel through the uncreated Word and through an innate species.

¹ The seeing in the Word includes God's essence as a thing known.

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article it is answered under a distinction by examining the definition of "evening knowledge." And Aquinas does two jobs: (1) he examines the reason for evening

knowledge; (2) he answers the question with a double-barreled conclusion.

ii. As for job (1), since evening knowledge is knowledge of a creature in its own nature, and given that the

the preposition 'in' can indicate three relations, "evening knowledge" can be expounded three ways. After all, 'in' can denote the relation of a cause, that of a medium, and that of an endpoint. Undoubtedly, here it denotes the relation of an endpoint. But it is debated whether it also denotes here the relation of a cause or that of a medium. And hence three points are stated. The first is that it does not denote the relation of a cause, because an angel does not get his knowledge from the thing known, as was already discussed. — Secondly, it can denote the relation of a medium, *i.e.* so that a creature is both the terminus of the knowing and also the medium or the reason for the knowing, because it is known of course through an innate species in the angel himself, and never mind whether the species is an equivalent one or not. — Thirdly, 'in' can denote the relation of a terminus purely and exclusively, *i.e.*, so that the creature is the term of the knowing without being a cause or reason for it; rather the reason for the knowing is the divine essence.

iii. As for job (2) the first conclusion is that evening knowledge, having a creature both as its term and its medium, differs essentially from morning knowledge. — The second conclusion is that evening knowledge having the creature solely as its terminus is really the same as the morning knowledge, differing only in the termini or things known (which is saying the same thing).

Notice here, that since opposites are studied in the same discipline, and since it was decided in the preceding article that morning and evening are taken in terms of knowing and differ according to primordial being and final being (*i.e.* the being of a thing in the Word and its being in itself), and given that the being of a thing in the Word is seen in only one way, *i.e.* in seeing the Word (as Augustine made clear), the consequence has been that the whole breadth of the difference between morning and evening knowledge is shown by the diversity of the two ways of knowing a thing's being in its own nature.



Inquiry Fifty-Nine: Into the will in angels

The next thing to consider is what pertains to the will in angels. And first we shall consider the will itself in them; secondly their will's "movement," which is love or delight.

Concerning the first topic, four questions are asked.

- (1) Is there a will in angels?
- (2) Is an angel's will his very nature, or his intellect?
- (3) Is there free choice in angels?
- (4) Do they have anger-like and desire-like emotions?

article 1

Is there a will in angels?

2 CG, c 47, *De Veritate* q 23, a.1

It seems that angels have no will.

c.9, 432b 5 (1) After all, as Aristotle say in *De Anima III*, "will is in the reasoning part." But in angels there is no reasoning part, but something higher than reason. So there is no will in angels, but something higher than a will.

* *appetitus* c.10, 433a.23 (2) Besides, willing a thing is part of seeking* things, as Aristotle makes clear in *De Anima III*. But seeking a thing is a mark of one's being incomplete, since one seeks what one does not yet have. So since the angels (especially the blessed ones) have no incompleteness, it seems there's no will in them.

c.10, 433b 16 † *appetibile* (3) Moreover, Aristotle says in *De Anima III* that one's will is a moved mover, as it is moved by one's understanding a thing as worth pursuing.† But the angels are not movable, since they are not corporeal. Therefore there is no will in angels.

c.12, PL 42, 984 § *capax Dei* ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Augustine says in *De Trinitate X* to the effect that an image of the Trinity is found in our mind, thanks to consciousness, understanding, and willing. But an image of God is found not only in the human mind but also in the angelic mind, since the angelic mind is also open to God.‡ Therefore there is will in angels.

§ *appetitus naturalis* I ANSWER: it is necessary to posit a will in the angels. To see this, one needs to ponder the fact that, since all things come from God's will, all things are inclined in their own way towards the good by seeking it; but they seek in different ways. Some things, after all, are inclined towards a good just by having a natural relation to it, without knowledge (things such as plants and inanimate bodies). This sort of inclination towards a good is called natural seeking§.¹ — But some things are inclined towards a good

with knowledge of some sort — not that they know what it takes to be a "good," but they know some particular good (as a sense-power knows a sweet thing, a white thing, and the like). An inclination following this sort of cognition is called a sense appetite.* — Some things, however, are inclined towards a good with the knowledge it takes to know the makeup of a "good," and this is unique to an intellect. These last are the things most perfectly inclined towards good — not as if they were just aimed at it by something else (like things lacking cognition), nor as if they sought just a particular good (like things having only sensory cognition), but as being inclined to "good" itself as a universal.[†] And such inclination is called a will. — So, since the angels know through their intellect the universal account of the good, there is obviously a will in them.

* *appetitus sensitivus*

† *in ipsum universale bonum*

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): how reason transcends the senses is different from how simple understanding‡ transcends reason. After all, reason transcends the senses *thanks to a difference of the objects known* (since sensation is of particular things, while reason deals with universals); and this is why there has to be one sort of seeking towards the universal good (a seeking due to reason) and a different sort of seeking towards particular good (due to the senses). But simple understanding and reason differ [not in the *what* but only] in the *how of the knowing*, since simple understanding knows by simple intuition, whereas reason knows by thinking discursively from one thing to

‡ *intellectus*

cause such talk suggests a hunger or quasi-animate hankering. Aquinas is crystal clear in this article and elsewhere that an *appetitus naturalis* given be no more than a relation whereby a thing tends towards a given state or place (*e.g.* heavy bodies towards low places). To give the idea a modern application, see Karl Popper, *A World of Propensities*.

¹ I decline to translate this phrase with "natural appetite" be-

* *appetitus*

to another. Yet reason through discursive thinking arrives at knowing *what* simple understanding knows without such thinking, namely, at a universal. So the same object is put before our yearning* by reason as is put before it by simple understanding. The upshot is that in the angels, who are purely intellectual, there is no seeking* higher than the will.

ad (2): although the term 'seeking' is taken from pursuing things not had, nevertheless our seeking extends not only to these things but also to many others, just as

the term '*lapis*' is taken from hurting a foot, even though '*lapis*' doesn't just mean this. Likewise the tendency to be annoyed* is one we have named after anger,* even though there are many other emotions involved in it, such as hope and bravado and the like.

ad (3): The will is called a moved mover inasmuch as willing and understanding are called "movements"; and nothing prevents this sort of "movement" from occurring in angels, because this sort of "moving" is an act of a complete thing, as it says in *De Anima III*.

* *appetitus*
† *ira*

c 7, 431a 6

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article there is just one conclusion answering the question affirmatively: there is will in the angels. — This is supported as follows. [*Major:*] In things having an intellect there is a seeking for "good" apprehended as a universal; [*minor:*] the angels are intellectual; [*conclusion:*] so there is this sort of seeking in them; and so there is a will. — The last bit comes from the verbal definition of 'will'.

The minor is well known. — The major contains two points, namely that there is a yearning for a good

in intellectual beings, and that there is such and such a yearning namely, for the good as a universal. The first of these is supported on the basis that all things have a yearning for the good because they come from God's will, which can only tend towards the good order of things to it. — The second claim is expounded by showing the three levels of yearning according to the three levels of natures in which yearning occurs (*i.e.* those without cognition, those yearning with particular cognition, and those yearning with universal cognition), all of which is obvious in the text.

Does an angel's will differ from his intellect and from his nature?

In I Sent 4.42, q. 1, a.2.ad 3, De Veritate q. 22, a. 10

It seems that a will in the angels does not differ from their intellect or from their nature.

* *naturale*

(1) After all, an angel is simpler than a physical* body. But a physical body is inclined to its purpose (which is its good) by its own form. Much more, then, is an angel inclined by his form. Well, an angel's form is either the very nature in which he subsists or else a species in his intellect. So an angel is inclined to a good through his nature or through an intelligible species. But this inclination to a good characterizes a will. Hence an angel's will is nothing but its nature or intellect.

† *realiter*

(2) Besides, an object of intellect is a true/real thing [verum], and an object of the will is a good one [bonum]. But a good thing and a true/real thing do not differ in real terms¹ but only in definition. So, a will and an intellect do not differ in real terms.¹

‡ *diversificat*

(3) Moreover, neither a general nor a particular difference [between objects] splits² a faculty; after all, the same power to see covers color and whiteness. But the good and the true/real seem to relate to each other as the general and the particular, for the true/real is a particular good, i.e. that of an intellect. Therefore a will (whose object is good [in general]) does not differ from an intellect (whose object is true/real).

ON THE OTHER HAND, the angels will only things taken as good, but they understand good things and evil ones, since they know both. So the will in the angels is another thing from their intellect.

§ *virtus*

ANSWER: the will in angels is a certain active ability or strength³ which is neither their very nature nor their intellect. That it is not their nature is seen from the fact that the nature or essence of anything is limited to what is within the thing itself; so whatever reaches to an item outside the thing is not its essence. We see [this point] in physical bodies. Their inclination to exist [or be what they are] is not from anything added to their essence but comes from their matter and form — from the matter which seeks being [thus-and-such] before it has that being and from a form which holds them in being [thus-and-such] after they have come to be. But an inclination to anything extrinsic to the body is from something added to its essence, like the inclination to be in a place (which a body has from [an ac-

¹ On the ambiguity in 'versus' between 'true' and 'real', see the footnotes to q. 16, a. 1. On how 'real' and 'good' are co-extensive without being synonymous, see q. 16, a. 4. On the same relation (coextensivity without synonymy) between 'a good' and 'a being' ['ens'], see q. 5, aa. 1 and 3 with their footnotes.

cident of] heaviness or lightness) and like its inclination to make something similar to itself (which it gets from its active qualities). Well, willing naturally involves inclination to a good. So a willer's will and his essence are the same only in a case where the whole of good* is contained in the willer's essence, i.e., in God, Who wills nothing outside Himself except on the basis of [sharing] His own good state. This cannot be said of any creature, since limitless good is outside the essence of any created thing. Hence neither an angel's will nor that of any other creature can be the same thing as its essence.

* *totaliter bonum*

Likewise, a will cannot be the same thing as an intellect, in either an angel or a human being. For cognition comes about through the fact that the known is in the knower; hence one's intellect reaches to something essentially outside itself [not qua outside] but qua apt to be inside the intellect in some way. One's will, on the other hand, reaches to what is outside it because a will tends in some way towards an outside thing [qua outside]. But having within itself what starts outside itself and tending towards a thing remaining outside itself belong to different powers. It has to be the case, therefore, that the intellect and the will are different things in any creature. (But the case is different in God, who has both universal being and universal good within Himself; and so both His will and His intellect are [the same as] His essence).

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — ad (1): a natural body is inclined to its being by its substantial form but is inclined to what is outside it through an added item, as I said.

ad (2): faculties are not split by a material difference between their objects but by a formal difference between what it takes for a thing to be an object of each. And so a difference between what it takes to be good and what it takes to be true/real is enough to split the intellect and the will.²

ad (3): 'A good thing' and 'a true/real thing' are co-extensive in the real,⁴ and this is why an intellect understands a good thing as having what it takes to be true/real, and the will seeks a true/real thing as having what it takes to be good. Still, the diversity of what it takes suffices to split these faculties, as I just said.

* *convertuntur secundum re*

² "What it takes to be an object" is the *ratio objecti*, i.e., the reason [anything] is an object [of the faculty in question]. The *ratio objecti* was also called the "formal object" of the faculty. So if intellect and will differ in what it takes for *x* to be an object of the one (as opposed to the other), as Aquinas is arguing, the two faculties are form-wise distinct, as are their operations. Ah, but do they differ in the real? Yes, if their *rationes objecti* so differ, but the objector thinks they do not, because *verum* and *bonum* are *idem in re*. But this ground, Aquinas suggests here, is not sufficient to identify the two faculties in creatures, where each faculty is a limited ability. See § viii of the commentary.

Cajetan's Commentary

Among Thomists, the title question is commonly and unhesitatingly taken as asking about a real difference. — In the body of the article, there is one conclusion, having two negative parts: the angels' will is not their intellect, and it is not their nature. — These are supported one at a time, and first Aquinas supports the claim that their will is not their nature. He does so as follows.

[*Major:*] Whatever reaches to what is outside a thing, is not its essence; [*minor:*] an angel's will extends to what is outside the angel; [*conclusion:*] therefore [it is not his essence].

The major is supported in two ways. Firstly by an argument *a priori*, to the effect that a thing's essence is apprehended within the thing itself. — Secondly, by an argument *a posteriori*, to the effect that we see in empirical things that their inclination to what is within themselves is intrinsic, while their inclination to what is outside themselves is extrinsic.¹

The minor, however, is supported as follows. [*Major:*] A will having limitless good outside the willer reaches naturally outside him; [*minor:*] every created will has limitless good outside the willer; [*conclusion:*] therefore [every created will naturally reaches outside the creature]. — The major of this supporting syllogism is in turn supported as follows. [*Antecedent:*] A will naturally tends towards good; [*inference:*] so the only will that does not tend towards a good outside [the willer] is the will in one whose essence contains the good totally — which is only the case in God, of course.

ii. Concerning the assumed major [claiming that whatever reaches to something outside a thing is not its essence], notice that it can be taken in two senses, thanks to the fact that 'outside the thing' can be interpreted two ways. In one way, as talking about any *item* willing or seeking. And this way, the proposition is false; after all matter seeks a form thanks to a seeking which *is* its essence, and yet the form is outside the item seeking it. Taken the other way, it talks about a thing pertaining to the integrity of a *complete substance*, so that the meaning is this: whatever extends to what is outside the integrity of a complete substance is not the essence thereof, *i.e.* is not the essence or part of it, nor any complement to it. This latter is the sense assumed here by St. Thomas and supported in the text.²

¹ Note what 'intrinsic' and 'extrinsic' mean in Thomistic school vocabulary: 'intrinsic' does not just mean inside a thing (as its existence is inside it) but means inside its definition. 'Extrinsic' meant outside the definition. So, since for example, a form is outside the definition of matter, we shall read in a moment that a form is "extrinsic" to matter. I have already remarked on this usage in connection with essence and existence; for while existing is an act interior to a thing, it falls outside its essence or nature, hence outside the definition thereof.

² Reaching outside *x* is a matter of having an object outside *x*. Well, a will and an intellect both take objects, but an essence does not.

A doubt

iii. Concerning the support for the main major, doubt arises from the fact that it seems to digress. From the fact that a thing's nature is inside it, it follows well enough that "therefore a seeking towards an outside thing is not a seeking towards its nature," but one does not see how it follows that "therefore a tendency to the outside is not itself the nature." After all, the two points that the essence is inside it and yet that its yearning (which is the essence itself) is towards the outside, seem consistent. — And here is a confirmation. If the inference, "a thing's nature is inside it, and so whatever reaches to the outside is not its nature," holds of every nature, then we see it to be false, since the nature of heaviness is intrinsic to a heavy individual, and yet extends to a place outside it.

A quick answer

iv. The short answer to this is that, in its true and proper use, 'a being' applies only to a complete substance (since both the parts and the accidents were set up by nature so that substances should exist); so in the context at hand 'nature' or 'essence' is understood to mean the entire quiddity of a substance alone, since a substance alone is a being in its own right [*per se*] and for its own sake [*propter se*]. Meanwhile, 'to be inside' or 'to be apprehended inside' means nothing more than independence of an outside factor both in being and in being defined; likewise, by contrast, 'reaches to the outside' means nothing but being essentially related to (and being set up towards) something outside a thing's substance. So the talk here is not about just any extension to the outside (since we know that a thing's substance is the source of its generation, motion and rest) but is about extending outside proximately and immediately and essentially. The result is that the force of the argument consists in this: the quiddity of a complete substance is defined by apprehending just the thing's intrinsic features; but what reaches essentially outwards can only be defined through something extrinsic; therefore what extends towards the outside is not the thing's quiddity and is not within it. But a will (and more generally a potency to operate and to have any accidental being) extends outside in this way, as emerged from Inquiries finished above. Therefore [what extends to the outside essentially, *etc.*, is not the quiddity]. — Thanks to this, the answer to the objections is obvious.

q.19, a.1, q.25,
a.1, q.27, a.3,
q.54, a.3

Another doubt

v. Concerning the support for the major of the second syllogism, a doubt crops up, because the following inference does not seem valid: "a will is naturally inclined to the good; therefore a will having an unlimited good outside itself, tends towards something outside." This inference does not seem to hold up in every subject matter; for example the matter in a substance is naturally inclined towards a good, and yet it does not extend outside itself. Therefore the argument is an empty one.

An answer to this one

vi. The SHORT ANSWER to this is that the inference is formally correct, and getting it wrong comes from an equivocation about 'is inclined to good'. For this phrase can be understood two ways. One way takes 'good' in the sense in which it is distinguished from evil; and so taken the seeking within matter and universally all seeking is naturally inclined to good. — The other way to understand the claim is to take 'good' as it is distinguished from 'this or that good'. And in this sense only an intellectual seeking tends to "good," since only the intellect apprehends the very makeup of good *qua* good. And since good *qua* good includes every good, it follows that what is naturally inclined towards the good *qua* good rests nowhere but in every good; and so if a thing has a limitless good outside itself, it tends towards something outside. Such is not the case with what inclines naturally to this or that good; after all, if this good is included in the thing's substance, it does not incline to the outside even if a limitless good remains outside it.

Thereby the answer to the objection is obvious, because here we are taking 'being inclined to good' unqualifiedly, and not as we speak of matter or any other striving other than the intellectual one which is called a will.

The other half of the conclusion

vii. As to the other part of the conclusion, namely that the angel's will is not his intellect, the following sort of argument is brought forward. [*Major:*] To have an outside object within one's self and to tend towards it belong to different active powers; [*minor:*] but an intellect and a will differ in just these ways, *i.e.* towards having it in one's self, and tending towards it; [*conclusion:*] therefore

they are two powers. — And such is the case in creatures, in which neither the will's object nor the intellect's object is contained completely in their substance. The opposite situation is found in God, who is infinite being and limitless good.

viii. As for the two parts of the conclusion, notice that the arguments are yielding one point directly and immediately, namely that there is a quidditative distinction between a will, a nature, and an intellect, and another point mediately, namely, a real distinction between these things. For since each of them is a limited being, if they are distinguished quidditatively and an identity of one with the other does not flow from the quiddity of any of them, the consequence is that they are really distinct. After all, a real distinction cannot occur between things on an accidental basis — As to the point assumed here, namely, that none of their quiddities yields their being identically one and the same, it was not necessary here to prove a real distinction, once the quidditative distinction was established. For a failure of quidditatively distinct things to be really distinct occurs regularly from only two causes: infinity (as is found in God) or an essential order of generation and development (as is found between the vegetative and the sensitive, the latter of which always includes the former and something more). Well, since neither of these has any place in the matter at hand, enough has been done to answer the question.

One can confirm that Aquinas's way of proceeding is enough by the authority of Aristotle. In *Physics IV*, Aristotle concluded to a real distinction between what exists in something and that in which it exists — and he proved it from the quidditative distinction between what it takes to be in something and what it takes to be that in which something is.

Is there free choice in angels?

In II Sent. d.25, q. 1, a. 1; 2 *CG*, c.48; *De Veritate* q. 23, a. 1, q. 24, a. 3, *De Malo* q. 16, a. 5; *Compendium Theologiae* c.76

It seems there is no free choice in the angels.

(1) After all, the act of free choice is choosing. But choice cannot occur in angels since choosing is done by an informed* power-to-see, and becoming informed [*consilium*] is a sort of inquiry, as it says in ** praeconsiliatus*
c.2, *Ethics III*, but angels do not know by inquiry, because it pertains to discursive thinking. It seems, then, that free choice does not occur in the angels.
1112b3

(2) Besides, a free choice can go either way. But on the part of their intellect, there is nothing in the angels that can go either way, because their intellect does not go wrong on naturally knowable topics, as I said above. Therefore there can be no free choice in them on the part of the appetitive faculty either.
q. 58, a.5

(3) Furthermore, the things that are natural in angels belong to them to greater or lesser extent, since their intellectual nature is more complete in the higher angels than in the lower ones. But free choice does not admit of more or less. So there is no free choice in the angels.

ON THE OTHER HAND, free choice pertains to human dignity. The angels have more dignity than people. So since free choice occurs in people, it occurs all the more in angels.

ANSWER: there are things that do not act out of free choice, but only as they are acted upon and moved by other things, as an arrow is moved towards a target by an archer. There are also things that act by a sort of choice but not a free one, such as the sub-rational animals; thus a sheep runs away from a wolf out of a sort of judgement in which the sheep assesses the wolf as harmful to it; but this judgement does not arise freely in the sheep but by instinct.* Rather, only what has an intellect can act with a free judgement, since it knows the universal account of what it takes for any-
* a natura inditum

thing to be good; and in light of this, it can judge one thing or another [one course of action or another] to be good. So wherever there is intellect, there is free choice. And thus it is obvious that free choice occurs in the angels even more excellently than it does in people, since their intellect works more excellently.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): Aristotle is speaking of choice as it occurs in people: but just as, in theoretical matters, the human way of reaching certainty* differs from an angel's way (in that his way is without inquiry, whereas ours uses inquiry), so also in matters of action. So there is choice in the angels — not with the discursive inquiry of becoming informed, but thanks to a sudden acquisition of the truth.
* aestimatio

ad (2): cognition occurs through the known things' being in the knower, as I said. But it counts against the completeness of anything if an item naturally apt to be in it is not in fact in it. Well, an angel would not be complete in his nature if his intellect were not settled in all the truth he can naturally know. But the act of an appetitive power is one through which affection is inclined towards an outside thing. Well, a thing's completeness does not depend on everything to which it is inclined, but only on its inclination to a higher thing. So a choice does not count against an angel's completeness unless he has his will set on things beneath him. (It would also count against his completeness if his will were unsettled towards what is above him.)
q. 12, a.4

ad (3): free choice is in the higher angels in a nobler way than it is in lower ones, as is the grasp in their intellect. Still, it is true that freedom itself, looked at as an absence of coercion, does not admit of more and less, because privations and negations are not ameliorated by themselves (nor intended in and of themselves*) but only by their cause, or in line with some accompanying affirmation.
* per se

Cajetan's Commentary

In the title question, the following point alone needs noticing. The power of willing and choosing freely are one and the same power in reality, and so it can seem that, given the presence of a will [in the angels], there is no need to raise a further doubt about free choice, and the present article will be superfluous. But if one considers the matter more closely the need for this article comes from two factors. (1) 'Power to choose freely' means an intellect and a will together, since it bespeaks what is composed of freedom and choice; and hence it is unclear at this point whether it is the same thing as the will: and some writers do not think so. — (2) The word 'will' names an intellec-

tive power-to-see the good itself, but it does not express the how of the seeking (free or not free); and so after a will has been established in the angels (*i.e.* a seeking for understood good), it rightly remains to ask about the how of their seeking, whether freely or not freely. That is what is intended in the present article under the term 'free choice', which means nothing but a free act.

ii. In the body of the article there is a single conclusion answering in the affirmative; there is free choice in the angels. — This is supported as follows. [*Major:*] An intellectual thing is characterized by free deciding; [*minor:*] an angel is an intellectual thing; [*conclusion:*]

ergo [an angel has free deciding]. The major is supported by two arguments. The first is *a posteriori*. An angel acts by a free decision. This is made clear by considering three kinds of agents: those without choice (like natural agents) and those with choice or judgement but without freedom (as sense-endowed things judge by instinct of nature) and agents with choice and freedom (like those having an intellect). — The second support is an *a priori* argument. An angel apprehends the universal account of what it takes to be good and hence can prefer this over that (and *vice-versa*) which is deciding freely. For from the fact that the one apprehending is not limited to [seeing only] this or that factor [as the one] to be sought as good, and can compare them to each other, there is left to him a free decision about them.¹

Understanding the answer *ad* (2)

iii. In the answer *ad* (2), a double doubt arises.

Firstly, if an intellect is in settled possession of all natural truth, then the will can embrace only one side of a contradiction where natural things are concerned, just as the intellect is bound to understand the side of the contradiction which is true; and a thing willed has to be a thing known.

Secondly, if the will is determined towards higher things and not towards lower ones, since only God is higher than the angel's will, then the angel's choice can go either way *vis-à-vis* anything else. And in that case, an angel can hate another angel and sin in purely natural matters.

Answering these

iv. Against the first of these doubts, I say that an angel has an intellect determined towards the true both in theoretical matters and in practical ones, be they things to do or things to make, such that he

¹ The contrast here is between understanding the general reason why anything is good and apprehending just the reason why this is good or just the reason why that is good. One who understands the general account can compare two particular reasons why something is good and choose freely between them.

cannot naturally go wrong, if he is considered in his purely natural facets; but he is not bound to this or that truth considered individually, where things to do are concerned, nor to this or that truth considered particularly, where things to make are concerned. And I am saying this about imperative or affective cognition (since there is no natural indeterminacy as regards theoretical cognition). Hence a will can will this or its opposite; and an intellect can understand *this* imperatively and its opposite. The reason for the difference is that cognition *qua* imperative depends on the will, whereas *qua* speculative it depends only on the nature of things. And this is not against St. Thomas. By the truth that an angel can naturally know, he means a truth naturally known as opposed to one supernaturally known and as opposed to one freely known. For negations of these pose no incompleteness in the intellect, as is clear; and as emerges clearly, St. Thomas' whole intention in this argument turns upon the naturally complete and incomplete.

Against the second doubt, I say that, since every sin in moral matters is from turning away from the supreme Good, and whoever sins is sinning against God (according to the text "against thee, thee only, have I sinned"), it follows that all things insofar as they are referable to God, *etc.*, are higher than the angel; and hence a will determined towards the higher things is determined towards unqualified rectitude (but in natural matters). But consistent with this is an indetermination as between doing this or that, doing it now or then, making this or that, (which are lower things) provided rectitude is preserved (because rectitude looks to the higher).²

Psalms 50 6

² The force of these two answers can be seen from an example. Suppose a hiker is overtaken by cold rain and darkness, but an angel is available to help her. With natural, practical knowledge, the angel knows that improvising a shelter would help and also knows that casting light would help, as would providing a thermal overcoat. With the same practical knowledge, the angel knows how to do all three. What his knowledge does not tell him is *what to do first*. This last is "imperative cognition." In the absence of a moral norm, the angel has no answer, because any of the options preserves rectitude. Indeed, "what to do first" has no answer from any quarter unless and until the angel makes a choice.

Are there aggressive and desirous drives in angels?

157 q.82, a.5; In II Sent d.7, q.2, a.1 ad 1; De Malo q.16, a.1 ad 3

It seems that there are aggressive and desirous drives in the angels

PG 3, 725

(1) After all, Denis says in Chapter 4 of *On the Divine Names*, that there is in the demons “an irrational fury” and “a mindless desire.” But the demons have the same nature as the angels, because sin did not change their nature. Ergo there are aggressive and desirous drives in angels.

(2) Besides, love and joy belong to the desirous drive, while anger, hope, and fear belong to the aggressive one. But these traits are attributed to good and bad angels in Scripture. Therefore there are aggressive and desirous drives in angels.

(3) Furthermore, certain virtues are said to be in our aggressive and desirous parts; thus charity and temperance seem to be in the desirous part, but hope and fortitude in the aggressive one. But these are virtues in the angels. Therefore aggressive and desirous parts are in the angels.

c.9;
432b 6

ON THE OTHER HAND, Aristotle says in *De Anima III* that the aggressive and desirous drives are in the sensitive part [of our soul], which does not exist in angels. Therefore there is not in them an aggressive or desirous drive.

ANSWER: intellectual seeking is not divided into the aggressive and desirous; only sensory seeking is so divided. The reason for this is as follows. A power/faculty is not split up because of a material distinction between its objects but only because of a formal reason why it has these [vs. those] objects at all. Thus, if some object belongs to a power/faculty under a general description, there will not be a split in the power because of differences between the things properly contained under that general description. For example, if the distinctive object of the power to see is colored things *qua* colored, we do not split the power to see into multiple powers because of the difference between white and black. Rather, if the proper object of our power to see were just white stuff *qua* white, then we would split off our power to see white from our power to sense black.

Well, it has become clear from prior remarks that the object of the intellectual seeking (called “willing”) is “the

good” according to the general definition of ‘good’: and there can only be a seeking for good. Hence the seeking that occurs in our intellectual part is not split up by distinctions between particular goods — the way sensory seeking is divided up, because it does not look to the good under its general definition but looks only to a particular good. — Since there is only intellectual seeking in the angels, then, their power-to-see is not distinguished into the aggressive and the desirous but remains undivided and is called “a will.”

a.1

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): fury and desire are attributed metaphorically to the demons (as wrath is sometimes attributed to God) on account of a similarity of effect.

ad (2): ‘love’ and ‘joy’ are in the desirous part in so far as they name emotions; but insofar as they name a simple act of the will, they are in the intellectual part; for love is willing a good for someone, and joy is the will’s resting in a good possessed. And across the board, none of these terms is used of the angels in the emotional sense, as Augustine says in *The City of God IX* [c.5].

PL 41,
261

ad (3): Charity as a virtue is not in the desirous part but in the will. For the object of desirous seeking is a good enjoyable to the senses, and the divine good, which is the object of charity, is not of that kind. — For the same reason, one must say that hope is not in the aggressive part, because the object of that is a hard thing to do that is “hard” in a way we can see, and the hope which is a virtue is not about that, but rather about what is hard in connection with God. — Temperance, meanwhile, as a human virtue, is about desires for things enjoyable to the senses, and these pertain to an appetite or drive. Ditto for the fortitude (which is about daring things) and the fears which are in the aggressive drive. So as human virtues, temperance is in the desirous appetite and fortitude in the aggressive. But this is not how they are in the angels. They have no emotions of desire, or fear, or daring, which would need to be regulated by temperance and fortitude. Rather, what is called temperance in them is their doing their willing with a moderation governed by God’s will. And what is called fortitude in them is their carrying out the divine will with firmness. And all of that takes place through the will, not through desirous or aggressive emotions.

Cajetan’s Commentary

q. 54, a. 5

In the title question, notice that ‘aggressive’ and ‘desirous’ can be taken two ways. Firstly, they can be taken as they name emotions or sensory powers. And so taken, it would be ridiculous to ask whether they are in the angels, who do not have a sensory nature, according to what we established above. — Taken the other way, these terms mean (without further qualification) a force or drive of

aggression or desire, whether it be by a sensory operation or not. It is on this interpretation that Aquinas puts it into doubt here whether angelic seeking (immaterial as it is) is to be distinguished into desirous seeking and aggressive seeking. The reason to raise the question was the language of Scripture and the saints, attributing deeds of these drives to the angels.

ii. In the body of the article a single conclusion answers the question in the negative: angelic seeking is not divided into desirous and aggressive. — The support goes as follows. [*Antecedent:*] Powers/faculties are not split by material distinction between their objects. [*1st inference:*] so they are not split by differences within their primary object: so [*2nd inference:*] intellective seeking is not split up by the differences within the good; so [*3rd inference:*] it is not split into aggressive and desirous; [*4th inference:*] ergo angelic seeking is not divided into aggressive and desirous seeking.

The antecedent is evident of itself, since powers are distinguished according to the formal reason why their objects are their objects. — The first inference is obvious of itself, because differences dividing a higher kind materially stand as what first regards that higher kind, as is clear in the case of eyesight with respect to color and its differences. — The second inference holds on the ground that the proper object of an intellective seeking is the good *qua* good. This is explained by the fact that no seeking can be for anything but a good; for if every seeking must tend towards a good form-wise, a seeking that is universal object-wise must be inclined towards the universal reason why a thing is good as to its proper object. — The third inference is sound because aggressive and desirous are distinguished according to the difference between parti-

cular goods, such as the hard good versus unmodified or simple good; and hence this distinction has its place in a sensory seeking, whose role is to look at the good only in the special characters it may have. — The final inference holds good because in angels there is no seeking but the intellective one.

iii. Concerning this argument, notice that there could be a doubt here about its effectiveness, on the ground that it comes from the fact that sensory seeking is divided into the aggressive and the desirous. If, from the fact that intellective seeking regards a higher object common to the hard and the simply good, intellective appetite will lack that distinction. But since sensory appetite, too, looks to a sensed good as its proper object, a fact which is common *vis-à-vis* the hard and the simple good, it follows that there will not be a distinction between the desirous and the aggressive even in a sensory appetite.

But since there will be a special discussion of this distinction below, it suffices for now to believe that the reason a thing is good according to sense is not some one reason motivating or terminating sensory seeking, the way the general makeup of a good is the one motivating and terminating an act of intellective seeking; rather, “sensory good” stands towards sensory seeking as what I may call “a sensible quality” stands to the external senses. q 82, a.5



Inquiry Sixty: Into the love or affection found in angels

Investigation turns now to the act of the will which is love or affection, since every act of a power to seek derives from a love or affection. About this, five questions are asked.

- (1) Is there a natural love in angels? (2) Is there chosen love in them?
 (3) Does an angel love himself with natural or chosen love?
 (4) Does one angel love another as himself with natural love?
 (5) With natural love, does an angel love God more than himself?

article I

Is there a natural love or affection in angels?

In III Sent. d.27, q 1, a.2

It seems that in the angels there is no natural love or affection.

(1) After all, natural love is contrasted with intellectual love, as one sees from Denis in c.4 of *On the Divine Names*. But an angel's love is intellectual. So it is not natural. PG 3, 713

(2) Besides, things that love with a natural love are more acted upon than acting, since nothing controls its own nature. But the angels are not acted upon; rather, they are acting, since they exercise free choice, as was shown above. Therefore there is no natural love or affection in angels. q 59, a.3

(3) Moreover, every affection is upright or not. But upright affection comes from charity, while affection that is not upright comes from iniquity. Neither of these belongs to a nature, because charity is above nature, while iniquity is against nature. So there is no natural affection in angels.

ON THE OTHER HAND, loving follows upon knowing; for nothing is desired or loved unless it is known, as Augustine says in *De Trinitate X*. Well, there is natural knowing in the angels. Therefore there is natural affection. cc. 1, 2, PL 42, 973, 975

ANSWER: it is necessary to posit a natural affection in the angels. To see this, one needs to consider the fact that what comes prior [in a definition] is always preserved in what comes later. But nature is prior to the intellect, since the nature of anything is its essence. So what there is in any nature has to be preserved in natures having intellects. Well, it is common to every nature that it has some propensity* in it, which is its natural seeking† or loving.† But this propensity is found

* *inclinatio*
† *appetitus*

in different ways in different natures, in each after its own fashion. In an intellectual nature one finds a natural propensity in the will; in a sense-endowed nature, the propensity is there in a sensory bent or "appetite"; in a nature lacking cognition altogether, the propensity is only the nature's order-relation* to something.² Thus, since an angel is intellectual by nature, there has to be in his will a natural affection. * *ordo*

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — ad (1): intellectual love is contrasted with a love that is merely "natural" in the sense that it belongs to a nature which does not admit of the enhancement† which is sensing or understanding.³ † *perfectio*

the *appetitus* or *amor* in a nature with an *inclinatio* (which I am translating as a propensity) in the nature.

² Any "order" or "ordering" is based on a relation which is irreflexive and asymmetrical, like the one indicated by which: Nothing is above itself (irreflexivity), and if x is above y, y is below, not above, x (asymmetry). So any such relation throws the items among which it holds into an "order." But note that a propensity is nothing more than such a relation in things with non-cognitive natures only. The propensity becomes (or appears as) a direction of sensory appetite in animals, and becomes (or appears as) a direction of willing in us. But this does not mean that a propensity in us becomes an act of the will. More on that below, at the outset of the commentary.

³ The sense of "nature" needed to be disambiguated because the word was used to name both a mode and a source. As naming a mode, it indicated how a piece of nature operated, i.e. in a way that y yielded a predictable outcome (always or for the most part). The opposite mode was called "free" and named how a will operated as a will, i.e. without such predictability. The other use of "nature" was to name a source, and its opposite was not "free" nor "a will" (because nature as a source did not exclude a will) but "choice". An act of love that was source-wise natural was predictable either as a love of this (its specification) or in its occurrence, i.e. its being "elicited." An act of love that was source-wise "by choice" was not predictable either way.

¹ What I am calling a natural "seeking" is usually called a natural "appetite" or "desire." The sense of the term was much debated in connection with the "natural desire to see God" (as mentioned above in q.12, a.1). Aquinas here again identifies

ad (2): everything in the whole world is acted upon by something (except the First Agent, who acts in such a way to be acted upon by no other, and in whom the nature and the will are the same). And so it is no problem if an angel is acted upon thanks to the fact that his natural propensity has been put into him by the Author of his nature. But he is not acted upon in such a way that he himself does not act at all, since he has a free will.

ad (3): as natural knowing is always true, natural affection is always upright, since natural love is nothing but the propensity put into a nature by the nature's Author. To say, therefore, that a natural propensity is not upright is to insult the Author of nature. — Still, the

uprightness of natural affection is one thing, and that of charity and virtue is another, because the latter uprightness perfects the other. In just the same way, the truth of natural knowing is one thing, and the truth of infused or acquired knowing is another.

⁴ As Aquinas says frequently elsewhere, infused love for God (charity) perfects any love or affection for God which we have by nature. Acquired knowing (learning) perfects "natural knowing" when, for example, a course in logic improves one's grasp of those rudimentary rules which Aquinas says are naturally known to people. A crucial difference between the truth of a point naturally known and the truth of a point acquired by learning is found in the fact that the former is presupposed for acquiring the latter.

Cajetan's Commentary

In the title question, be aware that 'natural love' is used two ways. In one way, it means a thing's natural propensity towards some *x*, such that the propensity is not an operation, nor any modification left over by an operation, but is just a natural aptness for *x*. And in this sense, there is no doubt that there is a natural bent or love in everything towards something. — Taken the other way, 'natural love' means an elicited act of a power to seek. In this sense, the makeup of natural love requires two things: namely, that it be love (and hence has to be the kind of elicited act that love is, *i.e.* a first act of the power to seek) and that it be nature-based and thus has to befit the lover from his nature. (I say "from his nature," so as to contrast it with choice). So what is being asked in the present article is whether there is a natural desiring in the angels, meaning this: is there in them an act of loving arising not from their choice or freedom, but from their nature?

ii. To make the issue clearer, you need to know that 'natural' is being used here in contrast to 'free'; and that a second act¹ is called free in two ways, *i.e.*, as to its exercise or as to its specification; meanwhile, the word 'natural' will also be used in two ways. Thus among operations, some are free in both respects, like choosing (because we both choose freely and freely determine ourselves, if we choose, to one or the other side of the contradiction as far as the object is concerned).² — Some, however, are free as to their exercise but natural as to their specification, like willing good

and understanding first principles (since we freely preform or abstain from doing such actions, but if we have to deal with these objects, it is not in our freedom to determine ourselves to the other side of the contradiction on the part of the object).³ — And still others are natural in both ways, such as all our operations that are in no way subject to our free control.

Presently, then, we are talking about an act that is natural *as to its specification*, whatever may be the case with its exercise. The result is that when we ask about "natural love in the angels" in our question, or when we affirm it in our conclusion, we understand that there is a natural love in them object-wise but not elicitive; the result is that naturalness determines the relation of the act to its object but not its relation to our power to do it. — We do not intend to deny here that an act can be natural as to its exercise; we only mean that (whatever be the case with exercise) the talk in the present inquiry is only about naturalness as to the act's specification.⁴

Analysis of the article

iii. In the body of the article, there is one conclusion answering the question with a yes: there is natural love in the angels. — The support is given in a certain order; the first point supported is that there is a natural propensity in intellectual things; the second point is that this propensity is found in them in the guise of their will.* Given these two points, the intended conclusion

* *secundum
volumatem*

¹ 'Second act' refers to what a power does on the level of operation, like understand *x* or choose *y*. Beware of the different use of 'first' and 'second' when the topic is operations; a power's first operation is a second act.

² A choice is between alternatives, which are sometimes explicitly contradictory (like the choice to go or not to go) and sometimes implicitly so (like a choice between vanilla and strawberry). Choosing is always selecting one of the alternatives (or as Cajetan says, "one side of the contradiction") as a self-determination.

³ In these acts, in other words, one of the alternatives is unwillable (like bad *qua* bad) or unintelligible (like the negation of a first principle)

⁴ The distinction is easier to see in intellectual cases. Nothing compels me to think about De Morgan's law identifying a conjunction with the negation of a disjunction; but if I choose to think about it, I cannot help understanding it as true. In the same way, nothing compels me to will something I naturally know to be good (such as my being happy), but if I do will it, I cannot will its opposite (to be unhappy, wretched, miserable, or worse off).

follows.

The first point is supported thus: [*antecedent:*] it is a common trait of every nature that there flow from it some propensity to something; [*inference:*] so having a propensity from their nature also characterizes intellectual beings. — The inference is sound both as going from a universal to a subjective part of it, and as going from what is naturally prior to what is posterior to it. After all, a nature is prior to an intellect, as an essence is prior to an enhancement; therefore “natural” is prior to “intellectual,” as universally a more common level of being is prior to a less common one that essentially assumes the more common and cannot be based elsewhere.⁵

The second point, meanwhile, is supported this way. [*Antecedent:*] In each and every thing whatsoever there is found a natural propensity after its own fashion; [*inference:*] therefore it is found in an angel thanks to his will. — The antecedent is made clear in the three-fold order of things (*i.e.* merely natural things, sense-endowed things, intellectual things.) — The inference holds good on the ground that an angel is of an intellectual nature.

Doubts I

iv. About the statements just made, a doubt arises about how the word ‘propensity’ is being used in the support for the first point, and likewise about the word ‘nature’. ‘Propensity’, after all, is being taken either for a first act or else for a second act. If it is being taken for a first act, no conclusion follows except, perhaps, that in an intellectual nature there is the propensity which is the intellective seeking which we are calling a will. But that was decided in the preceding article and so is not relevant here — But if ‘propensity’ is being taken for a second act, then since the talk here is not universal about every second act but only about some, nothing gets concluded except that some second act can suit a thing thanks to its intellectual nature. And then it is obvious that, in the support for the second point, when the premise that this belongs to intellectual things in the guise of their will* is brought in, what is being said has no value, because it is well known that this belongs to them thanks to their intellect.⁶

Similarly dubious is how ‘nature’ is being used. Is it being used for the substance of a thing, so as to contrast with its powers, or is it being used for the essence or quiddity of each thing, whether it be a substance or a power? If ‘nature’ is being used the second way, there obviously follows a destruction of freedom. For it would follow that a free faculty operated nature-wise [*i.e.* unfreely] — which is contradictory. But if ‘nature’ is being used the first way, either he means that such and such a propensity belongs to the thing

⁵ This is how being a bird is “prior” to being a sparrow: the latter presupposes being a bird and cannot be based elsewhere.

⁶ The objector is taking ‘*secundum voluntatem*’ to mean because of their will. This is not what Aquinas meant here by ‘*secundum*’ as my translation indicates.

thanks to all its powers, or else he means thanks just to some power it has. Well, not thanks to all, because then one would conclude that natural love is no more in the will than in the intellect. But “thanks to some” also will not work, because if St. Thomas’ reason (that what is prior is preserved in the posterior) holds water, the conclusion holds for any power as well as for any other.

v. As to the assumed proposition that “the prior is always preserved in the posterior.” doubt arises as to how this is meant here. Does he mean preserved form-wise, the way a genus is preserved in its species, or does he mean preserved power-wise, the way a prior efficient cause is preserved in a subsequent agent? If the proposition is being taken the first way, it implies nothing but the fact that the makeup of a nature is preserved in intellectual things, because nature-in-general is prior to and more universal than intellectual nature. But from this one only gets that the essential conditions of a nature belong to intellectual things, as the essential conditions of being an animal pertain to a man. — But if, however, the proposition is being taken the second way, it implies nothing but that all powers operate on the strength of the essence from which they flow.

Confirming argument. Do you mean that the force or makeup of the prior is preserved in the posterior as to its operation, or as to its mode of operating. If as to the operation itself, the only thing it implies is that the operation of the posterior is somehow also an operation of the prior — which is not germane. But if you mean it as to the mode of operating, such that the prior’s mode of operating is also the posterior’s, the proposition is utterly false — as is clear in the case of free choice, which operates freely and yet the substance from which it emerges causes nature-wise. Plus, it is true of agents in general that some act freely, some act nature-wise, and yet the first agent only acts in one way.

Clearing the doubts away

vi. The short answer to these objections is that the talk here is about an actual propensity, which is a second act; but not just any kind of second act but only the kind that meets the definition of a tending towards something and comes from the nature (*i.e.* the substance) of the thing. So the meaning is that it is a common trait of every nature (*i.e.* substance) to have some natural actual propensity. And since an actual propensity belongs to a thing only by way of a habitual propensity, it follows that in every nature there is a second act which is an actual propensity in line with a habitual one. And since this is nothing but the distinctive striving flowing from that nature, it has to be the case that this sort of actual propensity is in the thing thanks to its seeking. And hence the actual propensity of an intellectual nature is in it thanks to its own seeking, which is the intellective seeking which we call the will. — And thus it is obvious that the reasoning does not apply equally to every second act or to every power of the thing. Rather, as the preceding article showed that a power to seek is a consequence of every nature, so that an intellectual seeking

Reply is coming in § v

Reply is coming in § vii

Reply comes in § viii

* *secundum voluntatem*

follows upon an intellectual, nature, so also the present article is showing that it is characteristic of every nature that there should flow from it some actual propensity limited to one target (which is the same as saying that the propensity is natural) and hence showing that this belongs to an intellectual nature through to its own seeking, whereby it tends towards something else, so that the propensity may correspond to the tending.

Doubts II

vii. As to the second matter that was put into question, where we were asking about the meaning of the support brought in for the above mentioned major [*i.e.* the support saying that the prior is always preserved in the posterior], my short answer is that the talk here is about being preserved in the sense in which a participated higher thing is preserved in what falls under it. So, since an intellectual nature has two things in it (that it is a nature and that it is such and such a nature, *i.e.* intellectual) and does not have the makeup of a nature on any level but the intellectual level, the upshot is that the seeking distinctive of a referent having an intellectual nature has in itself something of intellectual substance insofar as it is a nature, and something from it insofar as it is intellectual. And since it gets its freedom from the fact that it is intellectual, it has to get from the fact that it is a nature a naturalness that does not conflict with freedom. Well, such is the objective naturalness of its first act [naturalness as to the specification of what it loves].

From this it is clear that, since St. Thomas' talk is about a nature as a nature, so as to contrast with the free as free, if we are comparing the makeup of a nature with the makeup of its intellectual level, he means that the prior (in the way a more general thing is called prior) is preserved form-wise in what comes after it, because the makeup of a nature is prior and more general than the intellectual level. — But do not think that the makeup of a nature is more general in the way "animal" is more general than "man," but rather in the way "being" and "one" are more general than everything; for "nature" does not name another level than the quiddity of which it is verified, but means utterly the same thing. When I say "a human being," I am not alleging two levels, but just the human level (though under two accounts); likewise when I say "human nature," I am not alleging two levels of things but only the humanness. But things are different when I say "animal man" because now there two levels being mentioned (the sense-endowed, and the intellectual one). And thus I was speaking meaningfully when I said that the talk here is about the manner in which

a further determined universal is preserved in what falls under it. For the further determined conditions of such a universal are *in* the distinctive traits of what falls under it and *penetrate* somehow into them, and do not otherwise belong to what falls under it, as the distinctive traits of being an animal belong to a man. And so it follows from this that an intellectual seeking will have in its own operation both naturalness and freedom. It will have the naturalness in what it bears upon,* with respect to some object; it will have the freedom in how it arises.[†] And thus it follows not only that the conditions of a nature are present in an intellectual nature, but that they are also further nailed down there.

But if one is comparing the makeup of a nature to the power-to-see itself, then one can uphold either way of being preserved, *i.e.*, as a more general thing is preserved in one falling under it (because a will is a sort of nature), or as a prior agent or quasi agent is preserved in a subsequent one (because the will flows from the nature, *i.e.* from intellectual substance, as a conjoined property thereof).

viii. Against the confirming argument in which the question is asked whether St. Thomas' claim holds for the very operation of the prior or just how the prior operates, I respond that there is no reason to limit the proposition; rather the point that the force of the prior is preserved in the posterior is to be understood vaguely and abstractly, but in terms of the capacity of the posterior, whether this amounts to the operating, or to the how of the operating, or both. And since in the case at hand the makeup of a nature includes its being nailed down to one outcome, it follows that in everything having the makeup of a nature, one finds a nailing down to one outcome for all of its powers, according to the power's capacity. And thus an intellectual nature, in all of its powers, will be nailed down to one outcome to the best of its capacity. But the makeup of the intellectual level is incompatible with determination to one outcome elicitively, or with a determination to one outcome object-wise in every case; but only in respect to some object. And so the conclusion we drew was not a universal but a particular, namely that some love belongs nature-wise to an intellectual thing. — No negation of liberty follows, nor is the same argument to be advanced, nor can an argument about some act of intellectual seeking be stretched into an argument about every such act, because naturalness in a thing in some respect does not conflict with the capacity of intellectuality, whereas naturalness in every respect would conflict. As I already said, the prior has to be preserved in the posterior according to the capacity of the latter, and not *vice-versa*.

* *objectivè*
† *elicitive*

Do the angels have a love that is by choice?

2/1 ST q.10, a.1; De Veritate q.22, a.5

It seems that the angels do not have a love by choice.

(1) After all, elective love seems to be rational love, since choice follows upon becoming informed, which depends on an inquiry, as it says in *Ethics III*. But rational love is contrasted with intellectual love (which is the kind proper to the angels), as it says in c.4 of *On the Divine Names*. Therefore there is no elective or chosen love in angels.

c.2;
1112a 15
PG 3, 713

(2) Besides, there is no knowledge in the angels (other than infused knowledge) except their natural knowledge, because they do not think discursively from premises to reach conclusions, and thus everything they can naturally know relates to them as the naturally knowable first principles relate to us. Therefore, in the angels, beyond the grace-given love, there is no love but their natural one; hence there is no elective love.

ON THE OTHER HAND, by our natural features we neither merit nor demerit. But the angels do merit or demerit by some love of theirs. Therefore there is an elective love in them.

ANSWER: in the angels, there is a love they have by their nature and a love they have by choice. And the natural love in them is the source of their elective love, because it is always the case that what pertains to the prior has what it takes to be a source; thus, since each thing's nature is the first thing in it, it has to be the case that what pertains to the nature of anything is the source in it [of its operations].

We see this in people, as to both the intellect and the will. For our intellect knows starting points naturally; and by knowing them, a knowledge of conclusions is caused in us; we do not know the conclusions naturally but by discovering or learning them. Similarly in our will: a purpose stands the way a starting point stands in the intellect, as it says in *Physics II*. As the intellect knows its starting points naturally, the will wills a purpose naturally. Thus the will tends naturally towards its ultimate purpose (after all everyone naturally wills all-around happiness*).¹ And from this natural willing,

c.9;
200a 22

* *beatitudo*

¹ A purpose motivates one to act "for its sake," i.e. to do something to reach it (or choose means to reach it, achieve it, possess it, etc.), and an ultimate purpose motivates one to reach any subordinate purpose. Hence an ultimate purpose (*finis ultimus*) is the starting point for one's whole course of willing. This is why *beatitudo* in the sense of all-around happiness was the plausible item to identify as our "ultimate purpose" as the man in the street understands and wills it.

all other cases of willing are caused, since anything a person wants is wanted for a purpose. Therefore love for the good which a human being naturally wills as his purpose is a natural love; but a love derived from this one (a love for a good which is loved for the sake of the purpose) is an elective love.²

Still, this causing happens differently in the intellect from how it happens in the will. As I said above, the intellect's knowing comes about by the fact that the known things are in the knower. And the fact that our intellect does not possess at once by nature everything we can understand, but only some things, by which we are in some way moved towards the others, is due to an incompleteness of intellectual nature in us. — But the act of a power-to-see, by contrast, occurs thanks to a relation of the seeker towards the things sought. Some of these things are good in-and-of themselves and hence are worthy of themselves to be sought; but others have what it takes to be good only from their linkage to something else, and hence they are worth seeking only for the sake of something else. So the fact that a seeker goes after something naturally as his purpose and something else by choice as ordered to the purpose is not due to an incompleteness of [intellectual nature in] the seeker. — Since intellectual nature in the angels is complete, there is found in them only natural knowledge, not knowledge reached by reasoning; but there is found in them both a natural love and a chosen one.

These statements, however, omit mention of things above the angel's nature; for his nature is not a sufficient source of [knowing or seeking] them. They will be discussed below.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): not every chosen love is a "rational" love in the sense in which 'rational' contrasts with 'intellectual'. After all, what is called "rational love" in that sense is a love which follows upon discursive reasoning; but not every choice follows an episode of discursive thinking, as I said above when we were discussing free choice; rather, only a human being's choosing follows such an episode. Hence the objection does not apply.

ad (2): the answer is obvious from things I have already said.

² Unlike English, scholastic Latin used '*amor*' ('love') for the general willing with which one willed a purpose and the means to it (once chosen). Thus "loving a good" was nothing more than willing it or wanting it. Only "loving a person" meant more.

q 59, a.2

q 62

q 59, a.3 ad 1

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear; an elective love is one that is wholly free both as to its object and as to the exercise of the act.

In the body of the article, he does four jobs: (1) he sets forth two conclusions in answer to the question; (2) he supports drawing the second conclusion; (3) he supports drawing the first conclusion; (4) he discloses that all the preceding remarks had to do with natural [*i.e.* non-supernatural] affairs.

On jobs (1) and (2)

As to job (1), the first conclusion is that there exists in the angels a twofold love, natural and elective. — The second conclusion says; the natural love in them is the source of the love they have by choice.

ii. As for job (2), the second conclusion is supported as follows. [*Antecedent:*] What has to do with its nature is a source in anything; [*inference:*] ergo the natural love in angels is a source of their elective love.

The antecedent is supported on two grounds. The first is an argument. [*Antecedent:*] The first factor in anything is its nature; [*inference:*] so what comes with the nature is the foundation of the other factors in such a way that what comes with the nature is the source of the other factors. Drawing the inference is supported *a posteriori* on the ground that we see in every case that what makes the definition of a source in anything pertains to what is prior in that thing. — Secondly, the antecedent is made manifest in the intellectual nature known to us, *i.e.*, in man's intellect and will. All points are clear in the text.

iii. Concerning this conclusion a DOUBT arises as to what kind of causation makes natural love a cause of elective love.

The ANSWER is that, on the side of its object, natural love is the purpose-cause of elective love, because we esteem other things because of what we esteem naturally. — But on the side of the act, the natural love is causative in the way of an efficient cause, as knowing a starting point is an efficient cause of knowing a conclusion. The will, after all, makes itself will other things by willing the purpose. But it makes itself do this by freely using its natural willing to cause its elective love. Therefore freedom is not lessened by this collaboration, just as freedom is not diminished by the collaboration of any habit in making the choice.

On jobs (3) and (4)

iv. As to job (3), drawing the first conclusion is supported as follows. [*Antecedent:*] Having the two loves (natural and elective) posits no incompleteness in an intellectual nature; [*inference:*] therefore there is no need to deny that both are in the angels.

The antecedent is supported by the two differences between loving and knowing. The first lies in the fact that knowing comes about through the known's being in the knower; but love comes about through the lover's

tending towards the thing loved. — And from this difference there follows a second, namely, that needing to know by inquiry stems from the incompleteness of an intellectual nature, while elective love does not stem from any incompleteness of the seeker.

And this second difference is supported as coming from the first on the ground that knowledge gotten by inquiry implies discursive thinking from the known to the unknown, and hence posits in the knower a lack of something among the knowables, and hence posits the lack of a completeness in the knower himself, because knowing comes about by the fact that the known is possessed in the knower. But since elective love implies pursuit of something (not for its own sake but) on account of something else, it posits a lack of goodness in the very object sought for the sake of something else; (by the fact that it is not sought for its own sake but for the sake of another pursuit-worthy good, it is convicted of having the character of an incomplete good); and it does not posit lack of any completeness in the seeker, because actual seeking does not come about through a seekable thing's being in the seeker, but through the fact that the seeker tends towards the pursuit-worthy thing.

Bear in mind here that the talk at present is not about the seeker in every facet concurring with his act of seeking (because then the pursuit-worthy would also have to be in the seeker [because it would have to be known]), but only about the seeker according to his appetitive power, *i.e.*, taken exclusively form-wise *qua* a seeker. For this is how the assigned differences are salvaged.¹

v. As to job (4), Aquinas makes it obvious that he is talking about the angels in what naturally pertains to them.

Unpacking the answer *ad* (2)

vi. In the answer to the second objection, a doubt remains, because it is not clear from previous remarks how to remove it. If an intellect is determined to one outcome, [it is determined to affirm a given thing or deny it, and so] it cannot propose both sides of the contradiction to the will [as good]; and so the will cannot choose either side of the contradiction; therefore freedom of the will presupposes an indetermination in the intellect.

vii. The answer to this is that an intellect's being determined to one outcome happens in three ways: (1) in first act; (2) in second act; (3) on a particular object. Its being "determined in first act" is what I call its being nailed down to having a given intelligible species; its being "determined in second act" is what I call its determination to a given operation [*e.g.* conceiving, judging, inferring]; and its being "determined on a particular object" is what I am calling it's being nailed down to such-and-such an object understood, *e.g.* to this object, so as not to be nailed down

¹ Yes, every seeker is also an understander; the two are materially co-extensive; but what he is *qua* the one ≠ what he is *qua* the other; so they differ *formaliter*. This is Cajetan's point, and it has been made famous by Quine in his example of renates and chordates.

to its opposite, *i.e.* to one side of a contradiction and not the other. I say that while an angel's theoretical understanding is determined by nature in every way, his practical understanding is not determined in every case in the third way. Either kind of understanding in act has all the [relevant] intelligible species, but his theoretical understanding, if it goes into act, is determined to this side of a contradiction (*e.g.* that it is true) in such a way that it cannot be determined to the other side, as we experience for ourselves. But practical understanding can apprehend both sides of a contradiction as a *true good* and so can propose either to the will, when it is dealing with particular goods, since both sides can cohere with the purpose. (In theoretical matters, I repeat, it cannot be the case that both sides are posited as true; rather, only one of them; and which one, is not known in a particular case until it exists, as is clear from points that I made before.) One must deny, therefore, that the

intellect cannot propose both sides of a contradiction to the will.² — And from this there follows no incompleteness of the intellect, because it does not lack in itself any being of the object in first act; after all, this is the lack that implies the incompleteness discussed in the texts of the article. — And there was no fault in St. Thomas for passing this over in silence, because the same argument applies to the freedom of the will and to this indeterminacy of the practical intellect: by saying the one, he suggested the other to those who study closely.

² When points are contradictory, they cannot both be true. When options are contradictory (I go vs. I don't go), nothing prevents their both being good. Cajetan's point is obvious, but his vocabulary obscures it. He could have dropped the talk of contradiction. He could have said that what practical understanding gives the will is understood possibilities evaluated as options; and when it evaluates multiple options as good, the will confronts them all as "eligible."

q 57, a.2;
Commentary
§§ xv ff.

article 3

Does an angel love himself with natural and elective love?

2/1 ST q 26, a.4, q.29, a.4, *On the Divine Names* c.4, lect.9

It seems that an angel does not love himself with natural as well as elective love.

a.2 (1) After all, natural love is for the end itself, as was said above, whereas elective love is for things that serve as means to the end. But one and the same thing cannot be an end and a means *vis-à-vis* the same agent. Therefore, the same thing cannot get both natural love and love directed by choice.

PG 3, 713 (2) Besides, love is “a power that unites and binds,” as Denis says in c.4 of *On the Divine Names*. But uniting and binding together is bringing *diverse* things into one. Therefore an angel cannot love himself.

(3) Furthermore, loving is a sort of moving. But every case of moving is towards another. Therefore it seems that an angel cannot love himself with natural love nor with the elective kind.

c.4; 1166a 1 ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Aristotle says in *Ethics IX* to the effect that “things loving to another are learned from the things one finds loving to oneself.”

c.6, 1096a 19 ANSWER: since love is for a good, but being good is found in a substance and in an accident (as is clear from *Ethics I*) a thing can be loved in two ways. In one, it is loved as a subsisting good; in the other, it is loved as an accident or inhering good. What is loved as a subsisting good is loved in such a way that one wills a good for it. But an accidental or inhering good is loved as *what* one desires for another [or for something else]. Thus, know-

ledge [*scientia*] is loved not so that it might be good but so that it might be had. Some writers have called this kind of love “desire love,”* but the first kind they have called “friendship love!”

Well, obviously, among things lacking cognition, each naturally seeks to have what is good for itself, as fire seeks a high place. Hence both an angel and a human being naturally seek their own good and their own completeness. And this is loving oneself. Hence it is on a natural basis that an angel as well as a man loves himself, insofar as he desires something for himself with natural yearning. But insofar as he desires a good for himself by choice, he loves himself with an elective love.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): neither angel nor man loves himself with natural and elective love in the same respect,[†] but in different respects, as I said.

ad (2): as being one is more “one” than being united, so also love towards oneself is more “one” than love towards different things which are united to one. But Denis has used the word ‘unites’ and ‘concretizes’ to show the derivation of love from oneself to other things, as ‘uniting’ is derived from ‘unit.’

ad (3): as love is an action remaining in the agent, so also it is a moving remaining in the lover, but not tending towards something else *necessarily*; rather it can bend back to the lover so that he loves himself, just as cognition can reflect back on the knower so that he knows himself.

* *amor concupiscentiae*
† *amor amicitiae*

† *secundum idem*

Cajetan’s Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article, the conclusion has two parts: an angel loves himself with natural love, and he also does so with elective love. — The support goes as follows. [*Antecedent:*] An angel desires some good for himself by natural seeking and some good for himself by choice; [*inference:*] therefore [he loves from both sources].

The antecedent as to its second part is self-evident. As to its first part, however, it is supported by the fact that in all cases (even in things lacking cognition) one finds that each one naturally seeks its own completeness. — Drawing the inference is supported on the ground that this is loving oneself. The point is clarified by distinguishing two ways in which a thing is loved, *i.e.* as a substance or as an accident. And the distinction is supported from the definition of love’s object, namely, the good, which is distinguished into these two kinds. All points are clear.

ii Note here that distinguishing “good” into substance and accident can be understood two ways: (1) to distinguish the things; (2) to distinguish how [they are loved].

If the distinction is thing-wise, the meaning is that one of two real goods is an accident, and the other a substance. So taken, this distinction implies another, *i.e.*, that the one has what it takes to be good in the way of an accident, and the other in the way of a substance. Still, the members of these distinctions do not imply one another; for it is consistent to say that a thing is a substance in the real and yet has what it takes to be both an accidental and a substantial good for different purposes. This is seen in the substances which we take up for our own use; they are sought by themselves in the way of a substance, but by us in the way of an accident. — In the case at hand, both distinctions are needed. For one thing, the talk is about loving oneself in things having perfections beyond those spoken of in the nature of accidents. For another, because the second distinction, which is the one mainly meant here (as is clear from the ‘as subsisting’ and ‘as accidental’ in the text), flows from the first. And so in the text, given the first taken from *Ethics I*, the second is deduced, and thereby a reason is assigned for distinguishing love into friendship love and desire love.

1096a 19

article 4

Does one angel love another as himself with natural love?

In Dionysii De Divinis Nominibus c.4, lectio 9

It seems that one angel does not love another as himself with natural love.

(1) After all, love follows upon knowledge. But one angel does not know another as he knows himself, because he knows himself through his own essence, but knows another only through his likeness, as was said above. So it seems that one angel does not love another as himself.

q 56, aa.1, 2

c 4,
1166a 1

(2) Besides, a cause is stronger than a thing caused, and a source is stronger than what derives from it. But the love which is for another derives from that which is towards oneself, as Aristotle says in *Ethics IX*. Therefore one angel does not love another as himself, but loves himself more.

(3) Moreover, a natural love is towards something as one's end, and cannot be removed. But one angel is not the end of another, and this love can be removed, as is clear in the demons, who do not love the good angels. Therefore one angel does not love another as himself with natural love.

ON THE OTHER HAND, a trait found in everything, even those lacking reason, seems to be a natural one. But as it says in Sirach 13:19 [Vg], "every beast loveth its like." Therefore one angel naturally loves another as himself.

ANSWER: an angel or human being naturally loves himself, as I said. But what is one with something is [in a way] the thing itself, and so each loves what is one with it. And if it is one with it by a natural union, it loves it with natural love; but if it is one with it by a non-natural union, it loves with a non-natural love. Thus a man loves his city with a love based on political virtue, but loves a relative of his with natural love, insofar as the relative is one with him in having a common ancestor.*

* *in principio
generationsis
naturalis*

Well, obviously, what is one with something in genus or species is one with it by nature. And so everything loves with a natural love what is one with it in

species insofar as it loves its own species. And this trait turns up even in things lacking cognition: after all, fire has a natural propensity to communicate its form (which is its good) to another, just as it is naturally inclined to what it seeks as its own good, such as being high up.

The thing to say, then, is that one angel loves another with natural love insofar as he matches the other in nature. But insofar as the one matches the other in other respects, or even insofar as he differs from the other in other respects, he does not love the other with natural love.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): 'as himself' can be said one way to determine a knowing or loving on the side of the object known and loved. In this sense one knows another "as himself" because he knows that the other exists, as he knows that he himself exists. — The other way to take the phrase is to determine knowing and loving on the side of the lover and knower. So taken, one angel does not know another as himself, because he knows himself through his own essence but does not know the other through the other's essence. And likewise he does not love the other as himself, because he loves himself through his own will but does not love the other through the other's will.

ad (2): the word 'as' does not indicate equality but similarity. After all, since a natural love is based on a natural oneness, that which is less one with oneself is less loved naturally. So one naturally loves what is numerically one with oneself more than what is just one in species or genus. But the natural thing is to have a similar love towards the other as towards oneself to the extent that, as one loves oneself by willing good for oneself, so also one loves another by willing the good of the other.

ad (3): love for an end is called natural love, not when the end is the one for whom one wills a good, but when the good is what one wills for oneself and hence for another insofar as he is one with oneself. This natural love cannot be removed even from the bad angels so long as they have a natural love towards other angels insofar as they share with them in nature. Rather, they hate the others insofar as they differ from them as to righteousness and unrighteousness.

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article there is one conclusion with two parts: one angel loves another with natural love in some respect, and does not in some respect. — The support goes as follows. [*Antecedent:*] Each thing loves what is one with itself in the way in which it is one with itself. [*1st inference:*] So each thing loves what is one with itself in nature by a natural love; and does not so love what is not. [*2nd inference:*] Therefore it loves naturally what is one with it in species or in genus. [*3rd inference:*] So a human be-

ing as well as an angel naturally loves another in some respect (namely as they agree in nature) and does not love another naturally in some other respect (i.e. insofar as their agreement is otherwise than in nature, e.g. by choice or habit, or insofar as they differ (because on this account perhaps hatred is had).

The first part of the antecedent is supported on the ground that [*major:*] what is one with a thing, as one with it, is the thing itself; [*minor:*] but each thing naturally loves itself. [*Conclusion:*] [therefore each thing loves what is one

with it] — the second part of the antecedent [to the effect that how *x* loves *y* is the same as how *x* is one with *y*] is made clear by examples: love of one's relatives and love of fellow citizens.

The second inference is supported on the ground that whatever is one in genus or species is one in nature. Since the truth of this inference is the basis for the first part of the conclusion directly answering the question, the same inference is supported by St. Thomas *a pos-*

teriori from the natural propensity of a progenitor (which tends *per se* to the good of a species), on the ground that a fire naturally generates another fire, just as it has a natural propensity to its own good, which is being high up. The other points are clear.¹

¹ The commentary says nothing about the obvious objection that no two angels are of the same species. Clearly, this did not matter, because sameness of genus suffices.

Does an angel love God more than himself with natural love?

2/1 *ST* q.109, a.3; 2/2 *ST* q.26, a.3; *In II Sent.* d.3, pars 2, q.3, *In III Sent.* d.29, a.3, *Quaestib.* 1, q.4, a.3, *In Dionysii De Divinis Nominibus* c.4, lectiones 9, 10

It seems that with natural love an angel does not love God more than himself.

a.4 (1) After all, natural love is based on a natural oneness, as was said above. But the divine nature is utterly remote from an angel's nature. By natural love, then, an angel loves God less than he loves himself or even another angel.

(2) Besides, whence each thing derives is greater than it. Well, by natural love each thing loves another on behalf of *itself*; for each loves something inasmuch as the latter is a good *for it*. By natural love, therefore, an angel does not love God more than himself.

(3) Moreover, by natural love an agent bends back upon itself; for we see that every agent naturally acts to preserve itself. But a thing would not bend back upon itself by nature if it tended [by nature] toward something else more than itself. By natural love, then, an angel does not have more natural love for God than he does for himself.

(4) Furthermore, the fact that someone loves God more than himself seems to be the special hallmark of charity. But charity-love is not natural in the angels, but is "poured forth in their hearts by the Holy Spirit, Who has been given to them," as Augustine says in *The City of God XII*. Hence the angels do not love God more than themselves with a *natural* love.

c.9
PL 41, 357 (5) Still further, a natural love lasts as long as the nature lasts. But loving God more than himself does not last in an angel who sins, nor in a human sinner; for, as Augustine says in *On the City of God XIV*, "the two loves have made two cities, love for self even unto contempt for God has made the earthly city, whereas love for God even unto contempt for self has made the heavenly one." Therefore loving God more than oneself is not natural.

Deuteronomy 6.5 ON THE OTHER HAND, all the moral precepts of the [Mosaic] Law are from the law of nature. But the precept of loving God more than oneself is a moral precept of the Law; therefore it is from the law of nature. Therefore, an angel loves God above himself with a natural love.

* *concupiscentia* I ANSWER: some writers have said that an angel loves God more than himself with a desire-love* because he wills the Divine good for himself more than his own good and that to some extent he loves God more with a friendship-love, insofar as the angel naturally wills a greater good for God than for himself (after all, he naturally wills God to be God, but wills himself to have his own nature). But speaking without qualification, he loves himself more than God with natural love, because he naturally loves himself more intensely

and more fundamentally than he loves God.

But the falsity of this opinion appears quite clearly when one considers (in natural things) that towards which a thing is more naturally moved: for the natural propensity in things without reason points to the natural bent in the will of an intellectual nature. Well, among natural things, whatever by its very nature belongs to something else tends more (and more fundamentally) toward that whose thing it is than it does towards itself. This natural tendency is proved from the things that naturally happen (because "how each thing acts naturally is how it is naturally apt to act," as it says in *Physics II*). Well, we see that a body part naturally exposes itself to preserve the whole body, as a hand is exposed to a blow without liberation to preserve one's whole body. And since reason imitates nature, we find this sort of tendency also among the political virtues: for it is the role of a virtuous citizen to expose himself to danger of death for the preservation of the whole republic; and if the man were a natural part of this city-state, his tendency would be natural in him.

Therefore, since God Himself is the good of everything,* and since an angel and a human being and every creature is included under this good, because every creature naturally, according to what it is, belongs to God, it follows that an angel and a human being love God more than themselves and do so more fundamentally. — Otherwise, if the man or angel naturally loved himself more than God, it would follow that his natural love would be perverse, and that charity would not perfect it but destroy it.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): that argument holds for separate things so standing that one of them is not the very reason the other exists and is good; among such things, after all, each naturally loves itself more than another insofar as each is more "one" with itself than with another. But in cases where the one thing is the whole reason the other things exist and are good, the other naturally loves that one more than itself. As I said above, each part naturally loves the whole more than itself. And each particular thing naturally loves the good of its species more than its own particular good. But God is not just the good of one species but the good of all of them unqualifiedly. Hence each thing in its own way naturally loves God more than itself.

ad (2): when you say an angel loves God "insofar as" God is good for him, if the "insofar as" means an end, it is false: for the angel does not naturally love God on account of his own good but on account of God Himself. But if "insofar as" means the reason for the love on the part of the lover, then it is true. After all, it is not in anyone's nature to love God if he does not depend on the Good which love God is.

c.8,
199a.9

* *universum
bonum*

ad (3): a nature bends back on itself not only with respect to what is particular to this case of it, but more so to what is common to this case and others; after all, each nature tends to preserve not only its individual case but also its species. And all the more does each nature have a natural tendency towards what is the good of every nature unqualifiedly.

ad (4): thanks to being the good of everything, upon Whom every natural good depends, God is loved with natural love by each and everything. But insofar as God is the good that naturally makes us all blessed with supernatural blessedness, He is loved with charity-love.

ad (5): since His substance and His common goodness are one and the same in God, all those who see the very essence of God are moved by the same tide of love towards God's essence as distinct from other things and as their common good. And since He is naturally loved by all inasmuch as He is their common good, it is impossible for anyone who sees His essence not to love Him. But those who do not see His essence — they know Him only through some particular effects, which are sometimes unwelcome to their will. And in this way they are said to have hatred for God; and yet insofar as He is the common good of all, each one naturally loves God more than himself.

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear. — in the body of the article he does two jobs: (1) he reports a certain opinion about the matter in question; (2) he reaches a single conclusion while simultaneously attacking the reported opinion.

As to job (1): The opinion said three things. (a) An angel naturally loves God more than himself with desire-love. — (b) He also loves God more in some respect with friendship-love. — (c) Without qualification, an angel loves himself more than God because he loves himself more intensely and more fundamentally.*

* *principulatus*

ii. As for job (2), the conclusion answering the question is this: with natural love an angel loves God more than himself. — The support is on two grounds. The first ground goes as follows. [*Antecedent:*] Everything which by virtue of what it is belongs to another, naturally loves that other to which it belongs more than itself; [*1st inference:*] therefore an intellectual nature with the sort of tendency proper to it, loves the one to whom it belongs more than itself; [*2nd inference:*] therefore an angel loves God more than himself.

The antecedent in turn is supported a *posteriori* on two grounds. The first is that a sign of this in natural things is the fact that without deliberation a part is risked for the sake of the whole, and hence this occurs naturally, because the way each thing acts naturally is how it is naturally apt to act. — The second is that a sign of this in rational substances is that a good man or a strong one exposes himself to danger for the safety of the republic. And beyond doubt if he were by nature a citizen, he would be naturally inclined to do this; but as it is, he does so from reason. But this is a sign of nature because art imitates nature, and because if the republic existed by nature, his duty would be a natural one.

The first inference, however, is made clear from the fact that a natural propensity in things without reason argues for and indicates by analogy a natural propensity in the yearning of an intellectual thing. — The second inference holds good on the ground that God is the good of everything, and that an angel, like every other creature, is included under this, because

Every creature, thanks to being what it is, belongs to God.

Then the same conclusion is supported by showing that the other opinion leads to an impossibility. The first is that natural love would be perverse. The second is that natural love would not be perfected by charity, but destroyed by it. That this is impossible is obvious, and the inference is immune to doubt, being evident.

iii. Concerning the first reason adduced to support the conclusion, one needs to notice that belonging to another happens in many ways, *i.e.* as a part belongs to a whole, as a possession belongs to an owner, and as an effect belongs to a cause (and this last in many ways). So since the proposition used here, "each thing belonging to another loves the other more than itself," cannot be understood in every such way (because that would obviously be false), the proposition has to be understood as about a special way of belonging to another. And as you can tell from surrounding remarks, it has to be about that way of belonging to another in which a part belongs to its whole — so that the force of the argument lies in the claim that a part naturally loves its whole more than itself.

Objections from Scotus

iv. But now one encounters objections raised by Scotus in remarks on *III Sent.* [d.27, q.1]. There, although Scotus holds our conclusion and agrees with the second argument in its support and agrees that the conduct of a brave citizen is a natural sign of the fact that reason inclines to loving God more than oneself, he seeks to destroy the first argument for our conclusion. He says it falls down in two respects.

First, he says the whole basis for it is false, namely the claim that a part naturally loves the whole more than itself. About the example that a hand is exposed to danger for the well-being of one's whole body, he says it is just false that a hand exposes *itself* for the whole body. Rather the whole (loving itself more than a part, or the main parts more than the secondary parts) exposes a part to save the whole and exposes a less important part for the sake of a more important one.

Secondly, Scotus says that, given that a part is natu-

rally exposed to danger for the sake of the whole, the reason for this is the identity of the part with the whole (because the part "intends" to save what it is identical with inasmuch as it has its being in the whole). And thus a false point is brought into the argument when it says that an angel or any creature stands to God as part to whole, because an angel does not have the condition of being a part that is required for the case at hand, *i.e.* that it be something composing that which is counted as the whole; for in this sense no creature is a part of God.

Answers to these

v. Against the first objection I respond that the basis in question is not only true but sufficiently proved by St. Thomas from the signs he adduces. — Against the attack on the first, what I need to say is readily apparent: whether the part is exposed to danger by the whole or by itself for the good of the whole, so long as it is exposed *in a natural way*, it still follows that the part has more natural inclination to the good of the whole than to its own, based on the fact that each thing naturally acts and moves, by itself or by another, as it is naturally apt to do, and *vice-versa*, as is explained in *II*

199a 9 *Physics*, text 78.

Against the second objection I say that the reason why a part is exposed for the good of the whole is not the identity found between the part and the whole. An obvious sign of this comes from the fact that the part is exposed to losing its identity with the whole, *in order that* the whole may be saved. So the reason for such propensity is not identity, or to save itself in the whole, but to save the being of the whole as such even when it is no longer part of the whole. — Rather the reason for such a propensity is the one assigned by St. Thomas: namely, that both the nature and substance of a part is what it is (essentially and first off) for the sake of the whole and the being of the whole. And this feature belongs to any creature *vis-à-vis* God, of course. After all, any creature you please, thanks to its nature, is a natural part of the universe, and hence naturally loves the universe more than itself, on the basis cited already. Therefore, *a fortiori*, it loves the good of everything, both because the universe is more eminently a whole and because it is every good thing; and because the good of everything (which is our glorious God) is the end and good of the universe itself, and hence is Himself the more loved by whoever loves the universe more — as is obvious from the case of the army and its general, according to *Metaphysics XII*, text 52.

c 10
1075a 14



Inquiry Sixty-One: Into the production of angels in their natural being

After the issues already handled about the nature, knowledge, and will of the angels, it remains to take up their creation, or (more generally) their coming forth [*exordio*]. This study falls into three parts. First one needs to study how they were brought forth into natural being; secondly, one needs to look at how they were completed in grace or glory [q.62]; thirdly, one needs to see how some of them became evil [q.63].

Regarding the first topic, four questions are raised.

- (1) Does an angel have a cause of his being? (2) Does an angel exist from eternity?
- (3) Were angels created before the creation of bodies?
- (4) Were the angels created in the empyrean heaven?

article 1

Do the angels have a cause of their being?

q.54, a.1, *Opusculum XV, De Angelis*, cc.9, 17

It seems that angels do not have a cause of their being.

(1) After all, the things created by God are written up in *Genesis 1*. But no mention of the angels is made there. Therefore the angels were not created by God.

^{c 6}
1045a 36 (2) Besides, Aristotle says in *Metaphysics VIII* that if a substance is form without matter, "it is at once a being and a one of itself and does not have a cause making it either." But the angels are forms free of matter as was shown above; therefore they have no cause of their being.

q.50, a.2 (3) Moreover, everything made by some agent cause gets its form from what made it. But, since the angels are forms, they do not get form from any agent. Hence the angels have no agent causing them.

ON THE OTHER HAND, it says in Psalm 148:2, "Praise ye Him all His angels," and later [v.5] it adds. "For He commanded and they were created."

ANSWER: It is necessary to say that the angels (and everything else there is other than God) have been made by God. For only God is His own existing*; in everything else, the essence of the thing and its existence are different, as became clear above. From this it is obvious

* esse

q.3, a.4; q.7, a.1
ad.3, a.2,
q.44, a.1

that only God is a being by His essence; all other things are beings by participation. But everything that has a ratio by participation is caused by that which has it essentially, as everything is caused to be on fire by fire. Hence it has to be the case that the angels were created by God.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): Augustine says in *The City of God XI* that the angels are not omitted in that first creation of things but are indicated by the word 'heaven' and also by 'light'. — They were not mentioned or indicated by the names for bodily things because Moses was talking to uneducated people who could not yet grasp an incorporeal nature; and if he had told them that certain things were above bodily nature, it would have been an occasion of idolatry for them. (They were prone to that anyway, and Moses was mainly intending to call them back from their mistake.)

ad (2): the substances which are subsisting forms do not have a formal cause of their being and being one, nor do they have an agent cause changing matter from potency to act; but they have a cause producing their whole substance.

From this the answer *ad* (3) is obvious.

c.9,
PL 41, 323

Cajetan's Commentary

In the title question, the only thing to bear in mind is that it is asking about an efficient cause.

In the body of the article, a single affirmative conclusion answers the question briefly: yes, the angels were created by God. — This is supported as follows. [*Major:*]

everything which is a being by participation comes from what is such by essence, as being on fire comes from fire; [*minor:*] but only God is a being by essence, because He alone is His own existing; ergo. — Recall here what we said above when dealing with creation in general.

q.44, a.1

 article 2

Were the angels produced by God from eternity?

It seems that the angels were produced by God from eternity.

(1) After all, God is the cause of the angels through His being, since He does not act through anything added to His essence. But His essence is eternal. Therefore He produced the angels from eternity.

Proposition 2

(2) Besides, everything which at some time exists and at some time does not, is subject to time. But an angel is "above time," as it says in the *Liber de Causis*. Therefore an angel is not at some time existent and at some time not, but always existent.

* *capax veritatis*

(3) Moreover, Augustine argues for the incorruptibility of the soul *via* the fact that our soul is open to truth* through our understanding. But as truth is incorruptible, it is eternal. Therefore an intellectual nature (whether our soul or an angel) is not only incorruptible but eternal.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Proverbs 8:22 says, speaking in the person of begotten Wisdom: "the Lord possessed me from the beginning of His ways, before He had made anything, from the beginning."

a.1 But the angels were made by God, as was just shown. Therefore the angels at some time were not.

ANSWER: only God, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, is from eternity. So the Catholic faith undoubtedly holds,

and anything to the contrary is to be refuted as heretical. For God produced creatures in such a way that He made them "from nothing," *i.e.* "after they had not existed."

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): God's being is the same as his willing: hence the fact that God produced angels and other creatures through his being does not exclude his having produced them through his will. But God's will does not stand on a necessary footing *vis-à-vis* the production of creatures, as I said already. And so He produced *both* what he wanted to *and* when he wanted to.

q.19, a.3; q.46, a.1

ad (2): an angel is above the time which is the count of heavenly motions, because an angel is above every motion of a bodily nature. But he is not above the time which is the count of successive states in his being after not-being; nor above the count of his successive operations. Hence Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad litteram VIII* that "God moves a spiritual creature through time."

c.22; PL 34, 389

ad (3): angels and intellectual souls are incorruptible thanks indeed to the fact that they have a nature though which they are open to truth. But they have not had this nature from eternity; rather, it was given to them by God when he wanted. Hence it does not follow that the angels are from eternity.

 Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article, a conclusion answers it very briefly: only God — Father, Son, and Holy Spirit — is from eternity.

He supports this on the ground that Catholic faith holds it in such a way that the contrary is to be refuted

as heretical. — This is in turn supported on the ground that, according to the faith, when God is said to have made things "from nothing," one understands the "from" to indicate the order in a duration [*i.e.* "from" in the sense of "after"], *i.e.* "after nothing had existed."

Were the angels created before the world of bodies?

In II Sent. d.2, q 2, a.3, *De Potentia Dei* q.3, a.18, *Opusculum XV, De Angelis*, c.17, *Opusculum XXIII, In Decretalibus*, 1.

It seems that the angels were created prior to the world of bodies.

Super Titum I;
Pl. 26, 594

(1) Jerome, after all, in his commentary on the letter to Titus, says "Six thousand years of our time have not yet been completed; and how much time, how many centuries have there been, in which the angels, thrones, dominions, and other orders have served God?" — Damascene also says in Book II [of *De Fide Orthodoxa*], "Some say that the angels came to be before all creation, as St. Gregory the Theologian says, 'first He thought out the angelic and celestial powers, and the thinking-out was His work'."

c.3,
PG 94, 873

Oratio 38 de Theopluania; *PG* 36, 320

(2) Besides, angelic nature is intermediate between divine nature and bodily nature. But divine nature is from eternity, while bodily nature is in time. Therefore angelic nature was made before the creation of time and after eternity.

(3) Moreover, angelic nature is farther from bodily nature than one bodily nature is from another. But one bodily nature was made before another, which is why the beginning of Genesis describes six days for the production of things. All the more, therefore, was angelic nature made before any bodily nature.

ON THE OTHER HAND, Genesis 1:1 says, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth." This would not be true if something had been created already beforehand. Therefore the angels were not created prior to bodily natures.

ANSWER: one finds two opinions in the holy doctors about this; but the more probable one seems to be that the angels were created at the same time as bodily creatures.¹ The angels, after all, are a part of the universe; they do not constitute a universe of their own; they along with bodily creatures enter into the consti-

¹ Translating 'probabilior' with 'more probable' is misleading unless one also understands that, in scholastic vocabulary, 'more probable' meant better supported among the great doctors and other authorities. A 'less probable' opinion had less support, then, but did have enough to be tenable

tution of the one universe. This fact is seen from the ordering of one creature to another; for the order of things to each other is the good of the universe [*bonum universi*].² But no part is finished when separated from its whole. Therefore it is not probable that God, whose "works are perfect," as it says in Deuteronomy 32:4, created angelic nature separately prior to creating the other creatures. — Of course, the contrary opinion is not to be labeled erroneous, mainly thanks to the opinion of Gregory Nazianzen, whose authority in Christian doctrine is so great that no one has ever presumed to cast blame upon his statements.³ (Nor upon the writings of Athanasius, as Jerome tells us).

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): Jerome is speaking here according to the opinion of the Greek doctors, who all maintain that the angels were made before the corporeal world.

ad (2): God is not a part of the universe, but is above it all, pre-containing in Himself and in a higher way all the perfection of the universe. But an angel is part of the universe. So the case is not the same.

ad (3): bodily creatures are all one in matter, but the angels do not conform in matter to the bodily creatures. So once the matter of bodily creation was made, they were all made in a certain sense, but it is not the case that once the angels had been created, the universe itself would have been created.

But if one holds the contrary, the statement in Genesis 1 that "In the beginning God created heaven and earth" needs to be expounded in such a way that 'in the beginning' means 'in the Son' or means 'at the beginning of time' but not 'before anything was', unless the verse is to say 'before there was anything in the class of bodily creatures'.

² He means that order among things is the good internal state of the universe, not the good outside it, for whose sake it exists.

³ See Rufinus, "Preface to the Orations of St Gregory Nazianzen" in *PG* 35, 305.

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article, he does three jobs. Firstly, he reports that there have been two contrary opinions of holy doctors, Greek and Latin, the former holding the affirmative side, and the latter the negative.

Secondly, he shows that the position of the Latin fathers is more reasonable on the following ground. [*Major:*] No part is perfect outside its whole; [*mi-*

nor:] the angels are naturally a part of the universe; [*1st conclusion:*] so they would be imperfect outside the universe. [*2nd conclusion:*] Therefore they were not produced by God prior to the universe. — The major is obvious. — The minor is supported on the ground that the angels do not constitute a universe of their own but compose together with bodily creature the one universe. This in turn is supported on the ground that the one part

is ordered to the other; after all, their order is the good and the bond of the parts of the universe. Drawing the last inference is supported on the ground that God's works are perfect.

Thirdly, he shows that the opinion of the Greek Fathers is not to be reputed erroneous, because the authority of Gregory Nazianzen upholds it.

A Doubt

ii. Concerning this last statement, a doubt arises because (as one sees in the decretals *De Summa Trinitate et Fide Catholica*, in the chapter *Firmiter Credimus*) the Church in a general council under Innocent III determined that the Latin position was to be held; therefore the opposite opinion has to be considered erroneous. We have, after all, these words there: "Who by his almighty power from the beginning of time made at once out of nothing both orders of creatures, the spiritual and the corporeal, that is, the angelic and the earthly." And one cannot excuse St. Thomas by the newness of this determination, because in his day the decretals had already been promulgated and compiled.

Lateran Council IV;
Denz. 800

iii. Some interpreters answer this by saying that if St. Thomas had recollected this decretal when he wrote this article, he would not have said these words.

But it seems to me that he wrote them knowingly and prudently. For those words of the decretal have to be interpreted in the sense in which they were written rather than in the sense they make.¹ As St. Thomas says in his exposition of that decretal, those words were used against the error of Origen and those who thought that spiritual creatures alone had been made by God directly, and that thereafter, on account of the demerits of these spirits, bodily creatures were made. So the claim that the angels were produced before the bodies is held in two senses: (1) to say that angels were the things directly produced in such a way that because of their demerits a bodily world was produced somehow by accident; or (2) to say that, unqualifiedly or absolutely from the will of God, the angels preceded the visible world. Hence that decretal, although it verbally destroys both senses, is to be interpreted against the first sense as against a heresy, but against the second sense only as less probable. And the reason for this gloss is that, customarily, these determinations are made only against certain errors.

Ongen, *De Principis* I, cc. 6ff., II, cc. 1, 2, 9

¹ In theology today, this position is called "historical consciousness"; in legal studies, it is called "originalism."

² The reason sense (1) is erroneous is that it contains a key assumption of the gnostic contempt for material things, viz., that they are in the world because of a prior fault.

article 4

Were the angels created in the empyrean heaven?

1 ST q.102, a.2 ad 1, In II Sent. d.6, a.3, Opusculum XV, De Angelis, c.17

It seems that the angels were not created in the empyrean heaven.

(1) After all, the angels are incorporeal substances. But such substances do not depend upon a body for their being and hence not for their coming to be either. Ergo, the angels were not created in a corporeal place.

c.10:
PL 34, 284 (2) Besides, Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram III* that the angels were created in the upper part of the air. Not, then, in the empyrean heaven.

(3) Moreover, the empyrean heaven is said to be the highest heaven. So if the angels had been created in the empyrean heaven, it would not have seemed good to them to ascend into a higher heaven. Which is contrary to what Isaiah 14:13 says when speaking in the person of a sinning angel: "I ascend to heaven."

Glossa ordinaria
I, 23 ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Strabo says on Genesis 1:1, "What he is calling heaven here is not the visible firmament but the empyrean heaven, i.e. the fiery or intellectual heaven, which is so called not from its heat but from its splendor, which was made at once replete with angels."

ANSWER: the one universe is made up of bodily and spiritual creatures, as I said. Hence the spiritual creatures were so created because they were to have a relation* to bodily creatures and to preside over the entirety of bodily creation. So it was fitting that the angels be created in the highest body as presiding over the whole

*ordo

of bodily nature — whether you call this the empyrean heaven or something else. Thus Isidore says that the highest heaven is that of the angels in his gloss on Deuteronomy 10:14, which says "The heaven and the heaven of heavens is the Lord's thy God."

Glossa ordinaria I, 343

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): the angels were not created in a bodily place as if depending on it for their being or coming to be; for God could have created the angels before any bodily creature, and many holy doctors hold that He did. Rather, they were made in a bodily place to show their order-relation towards bodily nature and because they touch bodily things with their active power.

ad (2): perhaps Augustine meant by the upper part of the air the supreme part of heaven, to which the air has a certain resemblance because of its subtlety and diaphaneity. — Or perhaps he was not talking about all the angels but about those who sinned and who, according to some writers, were of the lower [angelic] orders. Nothing prevents one from saying that the higher angels, having a high and universal power over all bodies, were created in the highest bodily creature, whereas others having more limited powers, were created in lower bodily places.

ad (3): that passage is not talking about any bodily heaven, but about the heaven of the Holy Trinity, to which the sinning angel wished to ascend when he wished to make himself in some way God's equal, as will emerge below.

1 ST q.63, a.3

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article, there is one affirmative conclusion: the angels were created in the 'empyrean' or highest heaven. — The support is on the ground that [*antecedent:*] they were created as parts of the one universe with the bodily

things; [*1st inference:*] therefore as having a certain ordering towards the bodily creation; [*2nd inference:*] therefore as presiding over the whole bodily universe; [*3rd inference:*] hence suitably they were created in a supreme bodily place. — All points are clear.

Inquiry Sixty-Two: Into the completion of the angels in grace and glory

The next issue to take up is how the angels were put into the [supernatural] being of grace or glory. Nine questions are raised about this.

- | | |
|--|---|
| (1) Were the angels already fulfilled at their creation? | (2) Did they need grace in order to turn to God? |
| (3) Were they created in grace? | (4) Did they merit their blessedness? |
| (5) Did they reach blessedness after their meriting it? | (6) Have they received grace and glory according to their natural capacities? |
| (7) After they reached glory, did natural love and knowledge remain in them? | |
| (8) Have they been able to sin afterwards? | (9) After reaching glory, could they progress in it? |

article 1

Were the angels fulfilled beings at their creation?

In II Sent. d.4, a.1

It seems that the angels were created in a state of blessed fulfillment.

c 59,
PL 58, 995
(1) After all, the book [by Gennadius.] *De ecclesiasticis dogmatibus*, says that “the angels who persevered in the blessedness in which they were created do not possess the good they have by nature.” Therefore the angels were created in blessedness.

(2) Besides, angelic nature is nobler than corporeal creatures. But corporeal creation, immediately at the beginning of its creation, was created formed and finished; and an inchoate state did not precede its formation temporarily but only “naturally,” as Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad litteram*; neither, therefore, did God create angelic nature unformed and incomplete. Well, their being formed and completed comes with the blessed fulfillment wherewith they enjoy God. Therefore they were created in blessedness.

IV, c 34;
PL 34, 319
of q.58, aa. 6, 7
(3) Moreover, according to Augustine in *Super Genesim ad litteram*, the things said to have been created in the six days were created together; and so the first six days must have occurred at once on the first day of creation. But in those six days, according to Augustine’s interpretation, the morning was the knowledge wherewith the angels knew the Word. So immediately, at the start of creation, they knew the Word and things in the Word. But the angels are “blessed” thanks to the fact they see the Word. So immediately, at the beginning of their creation, the angels were in blessedness.

ON THE OTHER HAND, blessedness is stability or confirmation in the good. But the angels were not confirmed in the good as soon as they were created, as is evident from the fact that some of them fell; so the angels were not “blessed” at their creation.

ANSWER: the word ‘fulfillment’* is understood to mean the ultimate perfection of a rational or intellectual nature, and this is why fulfillment is naturally desired: each thing naturally desires its own ultimate perfection. But the ultimate perfection of a rational or intellectual nature is twofold. One is the perfected state which one can reach by the power of his nature, and this is called fulfillment or happiness “of a sort.” Thus Aristotle also took the best contemplation with which one can contemplate the best intelligible object (which is God) in this life and said it was man’s ultimate happiness. But above this happiness there is another one, which we await in the future, with which “we shall see God as He is.” This happiness is above the nature of any created intellect, as was shown above.

The thing to say, then, is that as far as the first fulfillment is concerned, the one an angel can reach by the might of His own nature, the angel was created “fulfilled;” for the angel did not acquire this sort of perfected state by any discursive development, the way people do, but had it at once on account of the dignity of His nature, as I said above. — But the ultimate fulfillment which exceeds the ability of their nature — this the angels did not have at once at the outset of their creation, because this happiness is not a facet of their nature but is the purpose of their nature; and so they did not have to have it immediately at the beginning.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad (1)*: in that passage, ‘blessedness’ is being used for the natural completeness which the angels had in their state of innocence.

ad (2): a bodily creature at the outset of its creation could not have the perfection to which its operation brings it; thus, according to Augustine, the germination of plants from the earth did not occur immediately in God’s first works, in which He only gave the earth a power to germi-

* *beatitudo*

1 John 3: 2
q 12, a.4

q.58, a.3

*Super Gen.
lit. V, c.5;
Pl. 34, 326*

nate them. Likewise, an angel at the outset of his creation had the completeness of his nature but not yet the perfect state to which his operation was to bring him.

ad (3): an angel has a twofold cognition of the Word: one natural, and one glorious. By the natural one, he knows the Word by the likeness of Him glowing in the angel's own nature; by the cognition in glory, the angel

knows the Word through His essence. In both, the angel knows things in the Word, but knows them imperfectly with the natural cognition, and perfectly with the cognition in glory. So the first knowledge of things in the Word flowed to the angel from the beginning of his creation; but the second cognition did not: it came only when the angels were made blessed by conversion to the good. The former is what is properly called "the morning knowledge."

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear provided one keeps in mind that, though the question here is about fulfillment in general, the principle intent concerns the fulfillment in which we believe and which we call "blessedness" unqualifiedly [rather than a sort-of blessedness].

ii. In the body of the article, he does three jobs. (1) He gives the nominal definition of fulfillment, *i.e.*, that it is the ultimate completion of an intellectual nature. — (2) He distinguishes fulfillment into two kinds, *i.e.* the

natural and the supernatural. — (3) He answers the question with two conclusions, one for each kind of fulfillment. One of them is affirmative: the angel was created blessed with natural fulfillment, because an angel does not acquire his natural endowments through discursive change, but all at once, as we acquire [understanding of the] first principles. — The other conclusion is negative: the angel was not created "blessed" with supernatural fulfillment, because this is not in him from his nature, but is the purpose of his nature.

article 2

Did an angel need grace in order to turn to God?

In II Sent. d.5, q.2, a.1

It seems that an angel did not need grace in order to be converted to God.

(1) We do not need grace, after all, for the things we can naturally do. But an angel is naturally converted to God, because he naturally loves God, as stated above. Therefore an angel did not need grace to be turned to God.

(2) Besides, we only need help, it seems, for the things that are difficult. But turning to God was not difficult for an angel, since nothing in him was conflicting with his conversion. Therefore an angel did not need the help of grace to be converted to God.

(3) Moreover, to turn to God is to prepare oneself for grace; this is why Zachariah 1:3 says “be ye turned unto me, and I will turn to you.” But we do not need grace for what prepares us for grace, because then there would be an infinite regress. Therefore an angel did not need grace to be turned to God.

ON THE OTHER HAND, by turning to God an angel reaches blessed fulfillment. So if he did not need grace to turn to God, it would follow that he did not need grace to have eternal life — which is against Romans 6:23, “the grace of God is everlasting life.”

ANSWER: the angels needed grace in order to turn to God insofar as He is the object of blessedness. For as was said above, the natural movement of the will is the source of everything we will. The natural inclination of the will is towards that which suites one by nature, and so if something is above nature, the will cannot be carried to it unless it is helped by some other, supernatural source. Likewise, fire obviously has a natural propensity to make warm and to generate a fire, but to generate flesh is above the natural power of fire; and so fire has no natural inclination to this except insofar as it is moved as an instrument by the nutritive soul.¹

¹ The example is obsolete, but in two very different ways, one of which is easy to fix. We still distinguish the various effects a single kind of energy can have in different environments, such as inside or outside a biological system. What is harder to fix is the analogy Aquinas was drawing between a natural process and a supernatural one. What helped him was the agreed point that what controlled the processes special to living things was a soul, and that the soul was an entity ontologically higher than any chemical process. As God could elevate a natural agent to have supernatural properties (like habitual grace), so also a soul could elevate the chemical processes going on in cells to have vital properties. This last is no longer widely granted, of course; so try this. Isolated atoms do not re-

Well, it was shown above that where knowing God is concerned, seeing God by his essence (which is where the ultimate fulfillment of a rational creature is found) is above the nature of any created intellect. Hence no rational creature can have a movement of the will ordered towards that fulfillment unless moved by a supernatural agent. And this we call the help of grace. So the thing to say is that an angel cannot turn willingly to that blessed fulfillment unless by the help of grace.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): an angel naturally loves God insofar as He is the source of natural being. But here we are talking about conversion to God as the object making us blessed by seeing His essence.

ad (2): what is “difficult” is what goes beyond one’s power. But this can happen in two ways. A feat goes beyond one’s power in one way because it transcends one’s power according to its entire natural order. And then if someone can achieve the feat by some help, it is called “difficult”; and if there’s no way one can be enabled to do this, the feat is called “impossible,” as it is impossible for a man to fly. — In the other sense, a feat goes beyond a power not according to the natural order of the power but thanks to some impediment attached to the power. Thus going up is not against the natural order of the soul’s power to move, because the soul (for its own part) is apt to move in any direction; but it is impeded from this by the body’s weight; and so it is hard for a man to go up. — Now being turned to the ultimate fulfillment is hard for a human being *both* because it is above our nature *and* because man carries an impediment (corruption of the body and infection by sin). But to an angel, it is difficult only because it is supernatural.

ad (3): any movement of the will towards God can be called a conversion to Him; and so there are three conversions to God. One comes by the perfect love which is exercised by a creature already enjoying God. For this conversion, consummated grace is required. — The second conversion is the one that is a merit for final blessedness; and what is required for this is habitual grace, which is the source of meriting. — The third conversion is the one by which one prepares oneself to have grace. No habitual grace is required for this but only an operation of God turning the soul towards Him, according to Lamentations 5:21, “turn us, O Lord, unto thee, and we shall be turned.” So there is no regress to infinity.

reflect photons. But when lined up as the surface of a crystal, they do. The reflection of light is an emergent phenomenon, not explained “from below” in particle physics.

q.12, a.4

q.60, a.5

q.60, a.2

 Cajetan's Commentary

In the title question, observe that being "turned to God" is nothing but having an act of the will whereby the will tends rightly to God as He is our supernatural blessedness, in whatever way that comes about (as is elucidated in the answer *ad 3*). "Grace" is being taken here generally for a free gift of God, called "grace" because it is not owed to a nature but given freely (*gratis*).

ii. In the body of the article, there is one affirmative conclusion: an angel cannot turn to God unless helped by the aid of grace. — The support is on the ground that [*major:*] no will can be carried to what is above the ability of the willer's nature unless it is helped by that

which can reach it; [*minor:*] but ultimate blessedness is above the ability of any created nature; [*conclusion:*] therefore [no will can be carried to that blessedness unless helped].

The major is supported on two ground. The first is that every movement of the will begins with its natural movement, and hence does not reach above that. — Secondly, the major is illustrated by the case of fire with respect to making warm and generating flesh.

The minor, however, is supported on the ground that seeing God by his essence exceeds every created nature, as was established in Inquiry 12.

article 3

Were the angels created in grace?

In II Sent. d.4, a.3

It seems that the angels were not created in grace.

c 8;
PL 34, 269 (1) After all, Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad litteram II* that angelic nature was first created without form [informer] and was called heaven. Afterwards, it was formed and was called light. But this formation comes by grace. Therefore the angels were not created in grace.

(2) Besides, grace inclines a rational creature towards God. So if the angels had been created in grace, no angel would have become averse to God.

(3) Moreover, grace is in the middle between nature and glory. But the angels were not in glory at their creation; so it seems that neither were they created in grace; rather, initially they were just in their own nature, and later they secured grace and finally became blessed.

c 9
PL 41, 357 ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Augustine says in Book XII of *The City of God*: “who made the good will in the angels if not the one who created them with their will, *i.e.* with the chaste love wherewith they cling to Him, at once setting up the nature in them and pouring out the grace?”

ANSWER: although there are different opinions about this, with some writers saying that the angels were created in their natural traits alone, and others saying that they were created in grace, it seems more probable that the thing to hold and more in harmony with the statements of the saints is that they were created in sanctifying grace.* For this way, we see that everything produced over the course of time by a creature working under God was produced by divine providence working according to certain genetic designs,† as Augustine says in *Super Ge-*

* *gratia gratum faciente*

† *rationes seminales*

nesim ad litteram VIII. Examples are trees and animals and other such things. Well, of course, sanctifying grace compares to blessed fulfillment the way a genetic design in nature relates to the natural effect; this is why 1 John 3:9 calls grace the “seed” of God. Therefore, in Augustine’s opinion, just as bodily creatures in their first creation were endowed with genetic designs for all their natural effects, so also at once and from the beginning were the angels created with grace.

c.3,
PL 34, 374

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): that lack of form can be understood by comparison with the angels’ formation in glory (and then the formlessness preceded the formation in time); or by comparing it to their formation in grace; and then it did not precede in the order of time but only in order of nature, as Augustine also posits of bodily development formation.

Super Gen. ad Lit. I, c 15: V, c 5; PL 34, 257, 326

ad (2): every form inclines its subject in the manner set by the form’s nature. But the manner of an intellectual nature is to turn freely to the things it wants. And hence the inclination given by grace does not impose necessity; rather, an angel having grace can fail to use it and sin.

ad (3): although grace is the middle between nature and glory in natural rank, nevertheless in the order of time in a created nature, glory should not come simultaneously with the nature, because glory is the purpose to be achieved by an operation of the nature assisted by grace. But grace does not stand as the purpose of operating, because it does not come from works; rather, it stands as the source of operating well. And therefore it was fitting to give the angels grace at once along with their nature.

Cajetan’s Commentary

The only thing to notice in this title question is that the talk here is about sanctifying grace.

ii. In the body of the article he does two jobs. First, he reports the two contrary opinions. — Secondly he shows that the affirmative opinion is more probable for the following reason. [*Antecedent:*] Everything brought about by divine providence in the course of time was produced in the first condition of things through genetic designs;

[*inference:*] so also the state of blessedness by grace was produced in intellectual creatures, just as the natural effects were produced virtually in created bodies.

The antecedent is supported on the authority of Augustine. — The inference is based on the authority of St. John saying that grace is the genetic design [“seed”] of blessed fulfillment. The inference is also based on the analogy between the natural and the supernatural.

Did a fulfilled angel merit his blessed state?

In II Sent. d 5, q 2, a.2, Quodlibet IX, q 4, a.3

It seems that a fulfilled angel did not merit his blessed state.

(1) After all, merit comes from the difficulty of the meritorious act. But an angel had no difficulty about acting well. Therefore his good operation was not meritorious for him.

(2) Besides, one does not merit the traits one has by nature. But being turned to God was natural for an angel. Therefore an angel did not merit fulfillment.

(3) If a blessed angel merited his fulfillment, it was either before he had it, or afterwards. It was not before, because (as it has seemed to many writers) he did not have grace beforehand, and without grace there is no merit. But he also did not merit it afterwards, because then he would be meriting even now (which seems false, because that way a lesser angel could reach the rank of a higher one by meriting it, which is awkward). Therefore a blessed angel did not merit his fulfillment.

ON THE OTHER HAND, it says in Apocalypse 21:17 that “the measure of the angel” in that heavenly Jerusalem was “the measure of a man.” But a man cannot reach blessed fulfillment except through merit. So neither can an angel.

ANSWER: only for God is complete fulfillment natural, because for Him being and being fulfilled are the same thing. But for any creature, being fulfilled is not its nature but its ultimate purpose. Well, everything reaches its ultimate purpose through its own operation. But the operation leading to the purpose either tends to bring it about (in case the purpose does not exceed the strength of the one working towards it, as medicine works to restore health) or else merits the purpose (in case it exceeds the strength of the one acting towards it, as when someone gives it as a gift to another).¹

¹ Thanks to this sentence, the present article should surprise many readers. Protestant exegesis assumes a logical opposition between being a gift and being merited; and so, I think, do most speakers of English, since we think of ‘to merit’ as a synonym of ‘to earn,’ and theologians have said always that glory cannot be earned. So English-speaking believers do not see how glory can be merited either, just as grace is not merited. Aquinas had learned a different usage: the grace we enjoy in this life is neither earned *nor merited*; but the unearned gift of glory is to be merited. So whose usage is biblical, ours or his?

Read Matthew 20:1-16. The workers who came at dawn and labored through the heat of the day earned the promised payment; so to them it was wages (and they could boast of their stamina). The workers who came later (especially those at the eleventh hour) did not earn their payment as a wage (as the other workers complained). It was given to them as a gift by the householder. So apparently one can merit a gift, as did the men who at least showed up to work, albeit belatedly, un-

like those who never showed up at all. So meriting a gift is not contradictory. In the case of human salvation, of course, no work that we can do *earns* salvation (as the Jews mistakenly believed about the works of the Law). Hence everything St. Thomas has said here is fully consistent with Ephesians 2:8-9 “it is the gift of God, not of works, lest any man should boast.” Of course, a gift need not be merited; but it can be.

Well, ultimate fulfillment exceeds angelic nature and human nature, as was made clear above. The only alternative, then, is that an angel as well as a human being will have merited his blessedness.

And if indeed the angel was created in grace (without which there is no merit), we can say without difficulty that he will have merited his blessed state.— Likewise, if one were to say that an angel got grace at some other point prior to being in glory.

But if indeed an angel did not have grace before he was made fulfilled, then either we shall have to say that he had fulfillment *without merit*, the way we have grace — but saying this goes against the definition of ‘fulfillment’, which is defined as a *goal* and as a “reward of virtue,” as Aristotle also says in *Ethics I*. — Or else we shall have to say that angels are meriting blessedness through the good works that they (already blessed) are doing in God’s service, as others have said. But this goes against the definition of ‘merit’; for merit is defined as a way to the goal; but it does not suit one who is already at his goal to move towards it; this why no one merits what he already has. — Or else we shall have to say one and the same act of turning to God *merits* the blessed enjoyment insofar as it is from free will and also *is* the blessed enjoyment insofar as it constitutes the goal. But this does not seem a suitable thing to say, because free choice is not a sufficient cause of merit: this is why an act cannot be meritorious because it comes from a free choice except insofar as the choice was informed by grace; and a choice cannot be informed simultaneously by the incomplete grace which is the source of meriting and the complete grace which is the source of enjoying. Hence it does not seem possible to be at once enjoying and meriting the enjoyment.

So the better thing to say is that the angel had the grace through which he merited the blessed state before he was in that state.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS— *ad* (1): the reason the angels have no difficulty in doing well is not because they have some resistance or impediment to natural virtue, but because this good work is above the power of their nature.

ad (2): an angel did not merit the blessed state by his natural turning to God, but by his charity-filled turning to God, which is thanks to grace.

ad (3): The answer to this is clear from things already said.

unlike those who never showed up at all. So meriting a gift is not contradictory. In the case of human salvation, of course, no work that we can do *earns* salvation (as the Jews mistakenly believed about the works of the Law). Hence everything St. Thomas has said here is fully consistent with Ephesians 2:8-9 “it is the gift of God, not of works, lest any man should boast.” Of course, a gift need not be merited; but it can be.

a.1, 1.57 q 12,
a.4

c 9,
1099b 16

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article Aquinas does two jobs: (1) He answers the question in the affirmative by showing that an angel has merited his blessed fulfillment; (2) he shows the same point from the diversity of ways fulfillment could be had by angels.

On job (1)

ii. As for job (1), Aquinas shows the three ways in which one can imagine someone's being fulfilled: either [a] by nature without a mediating operation (as being open to amusement belongs to a human being), or [b] by an action sufficient by its nature to produce being fulfilled; or [c] through an operation that looks toward fulfillment as the ultimate goal*; but such a goal has to be one naturally in hand or one reached by an operation. So since only God is naturally fulfilled, in whom alone being and being fulfilled are the same thing, *i.e.* substance and fulfillment, the alternative is for fulfillment to be reached by an operation. But it is not by an operation sufficient from the nature of the worker (because this purpose/goal exceeds the power of the worker); so the only alternative is that it be reached by a meritorious operation. Which was the point that needed proving.

* *fins*

iii. On the preceding remarks, note firstly that these statements are to be taken unqualifiedly about the blessed fulfillment in relation to pure creatures; that is how they all hang together. Otherwise, there will be room for nitpicking. For if we look at Christ, one side of the distinction is not sufficient, because he was neither fulfilled by nature, nor fulfilled as a reward by the gift of another. Sufficient distinction between these ways is based on the fact that complete fulfillment is an ultimate goal [for Him to acquire in His human nature] but a simple gift by way of [His human nature's] being assumed. Also His blessed state does not have what it takes to be a reward but a happiness communicated without merit; for He who was born in Mary was not born in just any condition but was born "holy."

Luke 1: 35

iv. Concerning this article notice secondly that between the decisions he has made here and the ones he made in his remarks on *II Sent.* d.5, there is this difference: there St. Thomas left it in doubt whether the angels were created in grace, and defended a fourth opinion; here, however, he embraces the opinion that the angels [were created in, and so already had] grace and disproves all the other opinions. As will be shown later in Inquiry 63, a.6, the opinion of St. Thomas is a combination of the two discussions, here and there.

On job (2)

v. As for job (2), he cycles through four ways in which one can imagine an angel to have merited blessed fulfillment. The first way would be by having

grace prior to blessedness not only by natural priority but also by time. And nobody challenges this way. — Or (secondly) by having blessedness without preceding grace. And then one has to say one of three things — either without merit altogether, or through meritorious acts subsequent to becoming blessed, or because one and the same act is both meritorious of blessed enjoyment and constitutes it. But none of these ways can be maintained. Therefore the alternative is the first way. The sufficiency of the distinction is readily apparent. For either the angels got their blessed state without merit (and this is the second member of the distinction) or else with merit, and then with merit preceding blessedness (which is the first member) or simultaneous with it (which is the fourth member) or subsequent to having blessedness (and this is the third member) and nobody can think of a fifth way.

A little trouble from Scotus

vi. Concerning this part, be aware that Scotus, writing on *II Sent.*, d. 5, accepts the conclusion but says that this last argument, against the fourth member of the distinction is not cogent. For it is false, he says, that the grace to merit is necessarily less complete than the grace to enjoy, even though the use of the grace is more complete in heaven than it is in this life; for it is consistent to say that someone has equal grace in this life and in heaven.

Reply

But my reply to this is that (regardless of how one answers the question whether it is possible for the grace of a pilgrim to equal in essence the grace of one in heaven, because this would need a special inquiry), St. Thomas' argument is not limited to what is complete and incomplete in essence but simply and absolutely assumes that the grace of enjoying has to be the more perfect, and that of meriting less perfect. As far as the state of the grace is concerned, there is no doubt about this, because the one grace is in the consummate state, and the other not; and likewise as far as the act of the grace is concerned. And this suffices in the case at hand, as even Scotus admits in the same place.

vii. Concerning the same argument, be aware that, seemingly, this argument by St. Thomas is not effective, but he solved it in *Quodlibet IX.* a.8, where he is explicit that from someone's meriting and being blessed at once it does not follow that "therefore his grace is complete and incomplete at once"; what follows, rather, is that "therefore complete grace and the end of incomplete grace occur simultaneously." —But this is not relevant, since in that place he is talking about meriting at the end of one's life; but here he is talking about meriting as it is done during one's life; this will be clearer in a.6 of the next inquiry.

Does an angel receive his blessed fulfillment immediately after a single act of merit?

It seems that an angel will not have gotten blessedness immediately after one meritorious act.

(1) After all, it is more difficult for a human being to act well than it is for an angel. But a human being is not rewarded after one act. Therefore, neither is an angel.

(2) Besides, an angel could have done an action immediately at the start of his being created, and in an instant; even natural bodies begin to move in the first instant of their creation; and if bodily motion could be instantaneous (like the workings of intellect and will) they would have moved in the first instant of their generation. So if an angel merited fulfillment by a single movement of his will, he merited it in the first instant of his creation. Therefore, if their blessed fulfillment had not been postponed, they would have been fulfilled in their first instant.

(3) Moreover, between very distant things there has to be a lot intervening. But the angels' state of blessed fulfillment is far distant from their state of nature; and what intervenes between the two is merit. Therefore an angel must reach blessedness through many intervening acts.

ON THE OTHER HAND, a human soul and an angel are likewise ordained to blessed fulfillment; this is why being equal to the angels is promised to the saints. But take a soul separated from the body: if it had the merit for blessedness, it would get blessedness immediately, unless something stood in the way. By the same argument, so would an angel. But in his first act of charity, the angel had the blessedness in him. Therefore, since nothing in him stands in the way, he at once reaches blessed fulfillment through just the one meritorious act.

ANSWER: after his first act of charity, by which he merited blessedness, an angel was immediately blessed; the reason for this is that grace perfects a nature after the fashion of that nature, just as every improvement is received in the thing improvable after the fashion of the

latter. But what is distinctive of angelic nature is that an angel does not reach his natural completion by discursive thinking but has it immediately through his nature, as I showed above. But just as an angel is related by his nature to his natural completion, so also he is related by his merit to glory. And thus immediately after merit in an angel, he reached blessed fulfillment. — Well, merit for blessed fulfillment (not only in an angel but even in a human being) can be present through a single act, because by any act informed by love, a human being merits blessedness. So we are left with the answer that immediately, upon being informed by love, an angel became blessed.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): by his nature, a man is not born to get his ultimate completeness immediately (the way an angel is). And thus a human being is given a longer road towards meriting blessedness than an angel is given.

ad (2): an angel is above the time of bodily things; this is why different "moments" in things pertaining to angels are reckoned only by succession among their acts. But there could not be in them simultaneously an act meriting blessed fulfillment and an act of being blessedly fulfilled (which is enjoyment); for the act of meriting is an act of incomplete grace, and the act of enjoying is one of consummated grace. Thus we are left with the fact that different moments must be posited, in one of which the angel merits blessedness, and other which he has it.¹

ad (3): it belongs to an angel's nature that he reach the completeness to which he is ordained immediately. And therefore only one meritorious act is required. It can be called "intervening," because by it the angel is ordered to blessedness.

¹ If $t_1, t_2, etc.$ are "instants" of angelic time, they are distinguished solely by the fact that an angel's action at t_2 must differ from his action at t_1 . But they do not have to "occur" in distinct intervals of our time. On the notion of instants, see above q 53, a.3

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article, a single conclusion answers it in the affirmative: an angel became blessed immediately after the first act of love for God with which he merited blessedness. — The support goes as follows. [*Antecedent:*] An angel does not acquire his natural completion by discursive thinking, but has it immediately from his nature; [*inference:*] so he gets his supernatural blessedness immediately from his merit. [*New antecedent:*] But he has merit through a single act; [*new inference:*] so he was blessed immediately after his first meritorious act.

The antecedent is obvious from things already said. — Drawing the inferences is supported as follows. Coming from merit stands to an angel's glory as coming from nature stands to his natural fulfillment; and the way he gets to glory is analogous to the way his nature gets to its natural happiness, because grace affects nature after the fashion of that nature, because every improvement is received in the manner of the improvable thing. The proposition brought in at the end is supported on the ground that a human being can merit by a single act; so an angel can, too.

Three blows from Scotus

ii. Concerning this conclusion and the argument for it, be aware that Scotus attacks it on three grounds in his remarks on *II Sent.* d.5, q.1, *ad ult. arg.* Firstly, Scotus attacks the conclusion *ad hominem*. For if the conclusion were true, it would follow that no angel would be damned, because (according to St. Thomas) each one merited his blessedness by a single act.

Scotus's second ground is an argument to the effect that a false assumption has been made about the natural completion of an angel, and gets more false as it is applied to supernatural completion, which does not come to the angel from his nature but from the will of the Giver.

Scotus's third ground is an argument against the conclusion unqualifiedly. [*Major:*] A reward is owed according to the law set down by the reward-giver; [*minor:*] but the law of God is not to save one who has done one or two acts but "one who has persevered unto the end." [*Conclusion:*] Therefore unless one has kept meriting until the end of his life, he will not reach blessedness no matter whether he had previously merited by one act or more.

Mt 10: 22
Mt. 24. 13

Counters to these

iii. To clear these up, you need to pay attention to two things: (1) the force of St. Thomas' reasoning, and (2) the verification of it. As to the former, since things depending solely upon God's will are unknown to us unless He reveals them, and since there is no special revelation in holy Scripture about the time when the angels were made blessed (as we assume), the result is that we believe blessedness to have been given to them according to the general laws. And since the general law is that blessedness be given at the end of one's life, there is no other way to establish when the angels were made blessed but by determining the duration of their lives. And St. Thomas does not mean to imply anything else here, except that an angel is at the end of his life immediately after doing his first meritorious act. And hence asking whether the angel was made blessed im-

mediately after his first meritorious act and asking whether he was at the end of his life after that first meritorious act are the same. And one answers either question in the same way.¹

As to the second thing you need to notice, on the same ground (namely that God's order is not otherwise known to us) since we believe that the development of each intellectual nature is either determined by God's will alone or else is established according to the manner of the developing nature, and we have nothing special about God's will on this point but the general fact that natures are perfected in grace-given things according to their own manner, the only alternative is that each thing's development arises and proceeds according to the manner of its nature. By paying attention to this, St. Thomas determined that the angels' development was at its end immediately after they merited, because this befits their nature, in which it is a distinctive trait that it possess its final state immediately after the beginning.

iv. Against the objecting argument on the other side, I say that Scotus nowhere proved that our assumption about the natural completeness of the angels was false. And if it is true about their natural traits, it should also be true about their supernatural ones; otherwise grace would not be perfecting their nature after its own manner.

Against the argument objecting to our conclusion unqualifiedly, it is already clear that we say that the angels were rewarded because they had persevered to the end of their lives. — Finally, against the objection *ad hominem*, it cannot be answered completely here but will be met fully below in the next Inquiry, a.5 *ad* (4). For the moment, however, I deny the inference: after all there are two ways for blessedness to be given at once after the first meritorious act: *i.e.*, in an impeditable way, and in an unimpeditable way. St. Thomas is thinking of the first way, but Scotus took him as if he meant the second way.

¹ To make sense of this surprising claim, do not think of the angel's life as his span of years (which is incalculable) nor as his career (which is still serving God on our behalf), but as his time of trial. We are on trial for all our adult years and over our whole career, but an angel is not.

Did the angels receive grace and glory according to the greatness of their natural traits?

*In I Sent. d.17, q.1, a.3 ad 4; In II Sent. d.3, pars 1, expo. textus;
In IV Sent. d.4, q.2, a.3, qua 3 ad 1; In Evan. sec. Mattheum, c.25*

It seems the angels did not get grace and glory according to the greatness of their natural traits.

(1) After all, grace is given by God's sheer will. So how much grace is given depends upon God's will, and not on a greatness of natural traits.

(2) Besides, a human action seems closer to grace than human nature, because a human action is preparatory to grace. But grace is not "from works" as it says in Romans 11:6. Much less, therefore is the greatness of grace in the angels based on the greatness of their nature.

(3) Moreover, a human being and an angel are equally ordered to blessed fulfillment or grace. But a human being is not given more grace according to his level of natural traits. So, neither is an angel.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Peter Lombard says at *II Sent.*, d. 3, to the effect that "the angels who were created more subtle in their nature and more insightful in their wisdom have also been endowed with greater favors of grace."

ANSWER: it is reasonable that the angels have been given gifts of grace and completeness of blessedness according to the level of their natural traits. A reason for this can be gotten from two lines of thought. The first line is from the rôle of God himself, who established by ordinance of His own wisdom different levels in angelic nature. But just as angelic nature was made by God to reach grace and blessed fulfillment, so also the levels of angelic nature seem to be ordered to different levels of grace and glory. Imagine that a builder polishes stones to make a house; from the mere fact that he makes some of them prettier and more fitting, he sees them as ordered to the more honorable part of the house. This then, it seems, is how God ordained those He made

of a higher nature to greater gifts of grace and greater fullness of blessedness.

The second line of thought comes from considering the angels themselves and points in the same direction. After all, an angel is not composed of different natures such that the inclination of one would impede or retard the impetus of the other (as happens in a human being, in whom the movement of his intellective part is either retarded or impeded by the inclination of his sensitive part). But when there is nothing to retard or impede it, a nature moves with all its power.* It is reasonable, then, that the angels who had a better nature be turned to God more strongly and more effectively. It happens in people, too, that more grace and glory is given according to the intensity of their conversion to God. Hence it seems that the angels who had better natural gifts would have more grace and glory.

* *virtus*

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): as grace is from God's sheer will, so also an angel's nature is from His sheer will. And just as God's will ordained the nature to grace, so also it ordained the levels of the nature to the levels of grace.

ad (2): the acts of a rational creature are from himself, but his nature is immediately from God. Hence it seems that grace should be bestowed according to the level of his nature rather than on the basis of his works.

ad (3): difference of natural traits appears one way among the angelic persons, who differ in species, and another way among human persons, who differ only in number. After all, the difference in species is for the sake of the purpose, but the difference in number is on account of the matter. — Also in a human person there is something that can impede or retard the movement of intellective nature, but not in angelic persons. — Hence one cannot make the same argument about both.

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear. — in the body of the article, there is one affirmative conclusion: the angels get grace and glory according to the greatness of their natural traits.

This is supported on two grounds. Firstly, [*Antecedent*:] God established intellectual nature for the sake of blessedness; [*inference*:] so he established the different levels of the nature for different levels of blessedness. — The plausibility of the inference comes from the similarity with a builder differently preparing stones for a house.

Secondly, [*Antecedent*:] an angel is carried by his whole effort towards blessedness; [*inference*:] so he reaches blessedness according to the greatness of his natural traits. — The antecedent is supported on the ground that it is reasonable for an unimpeded will to be affected as much as possible by the supremely attractive good*; but obviously an angel's will had no impediment, because the angels are simple in nature and not composed of intellectual and sensory parts, etc. — Drawing the inference is supported on the ground that grace is also given to human beings according to their fervor is more intense.

* *supremo appetibili*

 article 7

Do their natural knowledge and love remain in the blessed angels?

It seems that their natural knowing and loving do not remain in the blessed angels.

(1) After all, as it says in 1 Corinthians 13:10, “when that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done away.” Well, natural knowing and loving is incomplete compared to blessed knowing and loving. Therefore when the state of blessedness arrives, natural knowing and loving cease.

(2) Besides, where one is enough, another is superfluous. But the glorious knowing and loving are enough in the blessed angels. Ergo it would be superfluous for their natural knowing and loving to remain in them.

(3) Moreover, one and the same power does not have two actions simultaneously, just as one segment of a line cannot be terminated at two points. But the blessed angels are always in their act of blessed knowing and loving; after all happiness is not a matter of habit but a matter of action, as it says in *Ethics I*. So natural knowing and loving can never occur in the blessed angels.

c. 8.
1098 b 33

ON THE OTHER HAND, as long as a nature remains in existence, its operation remains. But blessed fulfillment does not take away a nature, since it is a perfecting of it. Therefore the blessed fulfillment does not take away natural knowing and loving.

ANSWER: natural knowing and loving remain in the blessed angels. After all, operations stand to each other as their sources stand to each other. Obviously nature is compared to blessedness as a first source to a second source, because blessedness is added to a nature. But it

is always necessary for the primary to be salvaged in the secondary. So it has to be the case that nature is salvaged in blessedness. And similarly it has to be the case that an act of nature is salvaged in an act of blessedness.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): when the perfect arrives, it takes away the imperfection opposed to it. But the imperfection of a nature is not opposed to the perfection of fulfillment, but underlies it, just as the imperfection of potency underlies the perfection of a form, and what the form takes away is not the potency but the privation opposed to that form. — Likewise also the imperfection of natural knowing is not opposed to the perfection of knowing in glory: for nothing prevents a thing from knowing through different means, just as a fact can be known through probable reasoning and through demonstrative reasoning. Likewise again, an angel can at once know God through His essence (which is the way of knowing that pertains to glory) and through his own angelic essence (which pertains to his own natural knowing).

ad (2): the things that belong to blessedness are sufficient as far as they go. But in order to exist they require beforehand the things pertaining to a nature, because no blessed fulfillment subsists in its own right, unless it be the uncreated fulfillment.

ad (3): two operations cannot be going on at once in a single power/faculty, unless one is related to the other. Natural knowing and loving are related to glorified knowing and loving. Therefore nothing prevents them from going on at once in an angel.

 Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article, he answers the question with a single affirmative conclusion: natural knowing and loving remain in the blessedly fulfilled. — This is supported as follows. [*Antecedent:*] A nature continues to exist in the state of blessedness; [*1st inference:*] hence so do the acts of that

nature; [*2nd inference:*] hence so does its natural love. — The antecedent is supported on the ground that the primary remains in the secondary, and a nature pertains to its blessed fulfillment as primary to secondary. — Drawing the inference is supported on the ground that operations relate to each other as their sources do.

Can a blessed angel sin?

In II Sent. d.7, q.1, a.1, *De Veritate* q.24, a.8

It seems that a blessedly fulfilled angel can sin.

a.7 (1) After all, the blessed state does not take away one's nature, as you said. But it goes into the defining makeup of a created nature that it can sin. Therefore the blessed angel can sin.

(2) Besides, rational powers can embrace opposite options, as Aristotle says. But the will of an angel does not cease to be rational. Therefore it can embrace the good and the bad.

Metaphysics IX,
c.2,
1046b⁵

(3) Moreover, it is part and parcel of our free choice that we can choose good and evil; but free choice is not diminished in the blessed angels. Therefore they can sin.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad litteram XI* to the effect that a nature which cannot sin "is in the blessed angels." So the blessed angels cannot sin.

c.7:
PL. 34, 433

ANSWER: the blessed angels cannot sin. The reason is that their blessed fulfillment consists in the fact that they see God through His essence. But God's essence is the very essence of goodness. Thus a man who sees God stands to God as someone not seeing God stands to the general defining account of the good. Well, it is impossible for someone to want something or do something without paying attention to the good, even if he wants to turn away from the good as such. Therefore a blessed angel can neither will nor act without paying attention to God. And one who wills or acts this way cannot sin. Ergo a blessed angel cannot sin in any way.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): a created good in itself, can fall short. But by being joined perfectly to

Uncreated Good (as in being joined to its blessed fulfillment), it arrives at a point where it cannot sin.

ad (2): natural powers can embrace opposites in matters to which the powers are not ordered by their nature; but for things to which they are so ordered, they do not embrace opposites. After all, the intellect can only *assent* to principles naturally known; and the will can only adhere to a good *qua* good, because it is naturally ordered to the good as to its object. So the will of an angel relates to opposites as far as concerns the many things to do or not do. But as to God himself, whom the angels see to be the very essence of goodness, they do not relate to opposites but direct everything to Him, no matter which option they take. Doing this is without sin.

ad (3): free choice stands to choosing things ordered to a purpose as an intellect stands to conclusions. Well obviously, it belongs to an intellect's power that it can proceed to diverse conclusions according to the premises given; but being liable to jump to a conclusion without seeing its relation to the premises is a defect of intellect. So, too, the ability of free choice to choose different things while keeping ordered to its purpose belongs to the perfection of free choice; but its choosing a thing diverging from order to the purpose (which is sinning) is a defect of free choice itself. Thus, the free choice in angels who cannot sin is greater than the free choice in us, who can.¹

¹ The last two sentences make claims so foreign to modern ears as to sound paradoxical. If you can't do something, how can you be more free than someone who can? To get over the shock, think of freedom as a skill. A batter who can't miss is a better athlete than one who can.

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article, the question is answered in the negative with a single conclusion: a blessedly fulfilled angel cannot sin. — The support goes thus. [*Antecedent:*] The [blessed] angel sees God through His essence; [*1st inference:*] so he sees the very essence of goodness; [*2nd inference:*] so he cannot will or do anything without paying attention to God; [*3rd inference:*] and so he cannot sin.

The antecedent is obvious of itself, along with the first inference. — But the second inference is explained thus. One who sees the very essence of goodness stands towards seeking it as anyone's will stands towards happiness or good in general. But it is not possible to

will anything without attending to the good, because no one acts in the hope of making himself worse off. Therefore it is impossible that one seeing the very essence of goodness should fail to will according to it. The other points are plain.

ii. Notice here that the reason for an analogous similarity between seeing goodness itself and willing the good as such is based on the fact that the very essence of goodness is in a higher way every good and every reason why something is good. Hence, if no power to seek can so recoil from good in general that it would seek something without seeking it as a good, a power to seek that sees the very essence of goodness cannot seek anything except as a good.

Can the blessedly fulfilled angels progress in blessedness?

In II Sent d.11 pars 2, a.1

It seems that the blessedly fulfilled angels can progress in their state of blessedness.

(1) After all, charity is the source of meriting. But there is perfect charity in the angels. Therefore the blessed angels can merit. But with increasing merit, the reward of blessedness also increases. So the blessed angels can progress in their blessedness.

(2) Besides, Augustine says in *De Doctrina Christiana I* that "God uses us for our advantage, and for His goodness." Likewise with the angels whom He uses as spiritual servants, since they are "ministering spirits, sent to minister to them that are heirs of salvation" as it says in Hebrews 1:14. But this would not be to their advantage if they did not merit in doing so and advance in blessedness. The alternative, then, is that the blessed angels can both merit and progress in blessedness.

(3) It is a matter of imperfection that one who is not at the summit cannot progress. But the angels are not at the summit. Therefore if they cannot progress further, that would seem to be an imperfection and a defect in them. Which is awkward.

ON THE OTHER HAND, meriting and progressing belong to the state of pilgrimage. But the angels are not pilgrims; rather they are seeing God. Therefore, the blessed angels cannot merit and cannot increase in blessedness.

ANSWER: in any case of a thing's being changed, the intention of the one making it change is towards some definite state to which he intends to bring the changeable thing; after all intending deals with a purpose/goal, and that conflicts with being indefinite. Yet since a rational creature by its own strength cannot reach the blessedness which is found in seeing God (as became clear above), a rational creature needs to be changed by God towards its blessedness. It has to be the case, then, that this blessedness is something definite, to which a rational creature can aspire as an ultimate goal.

This definite thing cannot be God as the very Object Seen, because supreme truth is seen by all the blessed on different levels. — But when one looks at the how of the seeing, a difference in terminus arises from the intention of the one directing the creature to his goal. After all, it is not possible that a rational creature be brought to seeing the supreme essence in such a way as to see it in the supreme way, which is "comprehending it." For this way of seeing Him can only belong to God, as became clear above. Since infinite ability [*efficatia*] is needed to comprehend God, and a creature's ability to see is only finite, and infinitely many levels separate the infinite from the finite, infinitely many ways turn up for a rational creature to understand God more clearly or less so. Thus blessedness can lie in the seeing itself, so that a level of blessedness is a certain way of seeing.

So, then, each rational creature is produced by God for the end called blessedness in such a way that he is also brought to a definite level of blessedness by God's predestination. So once he has reached that level, he cannot go on to another one.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): meriting is the job of the one who is being changed in the direction of the goal. But for a rational creature, being changed towards the goal is not only a matter of undergoing but also a matter of doing. If the goal were indeed within his power, his doing would be called "acquiring" that goal, the way a man by close study "acquires" knowledge; but if the goal is not within his power, but is expected from another, the doing will be meritorious of the goal. But for one who is at his ultimate terminus, "being changed" is not an accurate description; rather, what describes him is "having been changed." So meriting is the job of the imperfect charity belonging to pilgrimage: the job of perfect charity, however, is not to merit, but rather to enjoy the reward. Similarly with acquisitive habits: an operation preceding the habit is acquisitive of the habit; but what comes from a habit already acquired is an operation which is now a perfect operation done with delight. And similarly, the act of complete charity does not have the character of meriting but rather comes from the completeness of the reward.

ad (2): a thing is called "advantageous" in two ways. In one way it is so called because it is on the way to the goal; and in this way meriting blessedness is advantageous. In the other way, the word is used the way a part is advantageous to the whole, and a wall advantageous to a house. In this way the ministries of the angels are advantageous to the blessed angels in that they are a part of their blessed state; after all spreading the perfection one has to others belongs to the definition of the perfect *quia* perfect.

ad (3): although a blessed angel is not at the top level of blessedness unqualifiedly, he is still at the ultimate level for himself, according to divine predestination.

Still, the joy of the angels can increase — their joy over the salvation of those who are saved through their ministry, according to Luke 15:10, "there is joy among the angels of God over one sinner who repents." But this joy pertains to their reward on an accidental basis, and it can increase up until the day of judgement. This is why some writers say that the blessed angels can also merit towards the accidental reward. — But it is better to say that a blessed person cannot merit in any way unless he is at once a pilgrim and a seer, like Christ, who alone was both at once. For it is more the case that the blessed angels acquire the above-mentioned joy from the power of their blessedness than it is the case that they merit that joy.

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article, he answers it with a single negative conclusion: a blessed angel cannot progress in blessedness. — The support goes as follows. [*Major:*] Everything that can be changed gets changed to a definite and ultimate goal by the intention of the changer; [*minor:*] but an angel heads towards blessedness as one being changed by God Himself; [*conclusion:*] therefore the angel is changed to some definite and ultimate state by the intention of God predestinating him. [*1st attached inference:*] So he is changed to a definite level of blessedness; [*2nd such inference:*] therefore he cannot advance further.

c. 2:
994a 8f

The major is supported by the fact that intention bears upon the purpose/goal, which cannot be indefinite, as is clear from *Metaphysics II*. — The minor is supported by the fact that a rational creature is not able on its own to conduct itself to blessedness.

The [first] attached inference is supported by throwing light on the ways in which one can imagine finding a definite and ultimate point within blessed fulfillment. Thus, either that definite point comes from nailing down the object, or else from nailing down the level of blessedness or (what amounts to the same thing) nailing down the way one enjoys that object. — If it comes from determining the level of blessedness, one can think of this in three ways: (1) that the definite level would be the highest unqualifiedly; (2) that it would be a level fixed by the nature of the mode of seeing; (3) that determination of the level would come from the intention of the one directing, the one establishing direction and conducting toward that level, such that it is to precisely that level, not a lower one, nor a higher one. — So since there are four ways for one to think to find the definiteness and ultimacy of the movement towards blessedness, one goes through them one by one, eliminating the first three, and concluding to the fourth.

And thus drawing the inference is obviously supported as follows. That definite and ultimate point to which an angel is moved by God is not the object [seen], nor the highest grade of seeing it, nor any definite level set by the nature of that way of seeing the object. What is left, therefore, is that a definite level of blessedness is set by divine predestination. — The first part of this is supported first because the object to be seen is common to all the blessed, whereas the definite level is proper to each. Secondly because there are different levels on which that object can be communicated to different seers, but the object itself has no such diversity of levels within it. — The next part is supported on the ground that the highest seeing would be comprehension of the object, which is possible for God alone and cannot be communicated to a creature, because it would require infinite ability, as is clear from *Inquiry 12*. — The third part is supported by the fact that there are infinitely many levels between seeing God and comprehending Him; hence many, indeed infinitely many levels of seeing God lie in between, and hence that many ways of seeing Him; and thus no one has

determined the mode of seeing other than the one unto Whom the rational creature must be moved by God. The distance is called infinite from the fact that between the finite and the infinite there are infinitely many steps. — Inferring that the fourth way is the only one left is self-evident from the sufficiency of the distinction just made.

The second attached inference is self-evident, because once you reach the end point, you cannot go further.

A doubt

ii. Doubt arises about this argument, because its major seems false, as one sees obviously in the changes of the heavens, which God could no doubt make perpetual (although we do not have philosophers saying that it has been in fact perpetual). Therefore there will be something changed which is not being changed to some definite and final goal/purpose. — The support Aquinas brought in was also not sufficient to prop up his claim, because an infinity of movement is consistent with intending some definite purpose, such as God's communicating His goodness, or something's being assimilated to the divine goodness, as Averroes says in his *Comment 36 on Metaphysics XII*.

Some Answers

iii. I can answer this two ways: (1) The first is by saying that change/motion is twofold:

- (a) Some change is aimed at reaching a perfect state of the things being changed or of something nobler. It is impossible for such a change to occur with infinite motion, since the thing would be being moved toward the impossible, *i.e.* to reach what cannot be reached, because an infinite motion is never terminated.
- (b) Other change, however, is not directly ordered to reach a perfection but rather emanates from an achieved perfection (be it one had naturally or one communicated). This sort of change/motion can be infinite. And it does not follow that the mover's intention was towards the indefinite; rather it was towards something definite outside the limitless motion, something not to be reached by the motion but rather something to be preserved or communicated.

Thus it is common to every change/movement that the intention of the mover is towards something fixed and definite, because it conflicts with the definition of a purpose (which is what an intention is about) that it be infinite *i.e.* can never be had, because such is the definition of the infinite. But the difference between the changes lies in the fact that some are ordered to the reaching of that definite purpose, and some are not but are intended to preserve or communicate the purpose. Since the talk here is about a change reaching its intended goal (because the question is about change towards blessedness), the major used by St. Thomas,

along with its support, is both solid across the board and implies his conclusion. After all, he did not assume that every moveable thing is moved *by a finite motion*, but to a definite end/goal — and that is universally true.

And if the discussion is restricted to change that has in itself what it takes to reach a goal, or is aimed at reaching it, there will be no objection even in appearance, and we have our point. — But if the talk is about change/motion taken unqualifiedly* and just in itself,† we nevertheless get our point by applying analogously the “definiteness” of the end/goal in the subsumed proposi-

* *simpliciter*
† *absolute*

tions: for example, if the change requires a definite end-point or goal, understand implicitly that the changing intended to reach it requires a definite end to be reached. — And thus an answer to the objections is obvious.

(2) Secondly however I could say that St. Thomas took up that major premise not in just any way but *as a theologian*. For in fact every movement is a movement to reach some definite end/goal: even the heavens are being moved in order to fill up the number of the elect. But my first answer is more solid.



Inquiry Sixty-Three: Into the evil of which angels are guilty

Next we must turn to the question of how angels became evil. We shall look at this firstly in terms of the evil of which they became guilty; secondly in terms of the evil they undergo as punishment [q.64].

On the first topic, nine questions are asked.

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| <p>(1) Can angels be guilty of an evil?
 (3) What was an angel who sinned seeking to gain or achieve?
 (5) Could any angel have been evil by a willful act in his first instant of creation? If not,
 (7) Was the top angel who fell the top one among all the angels?</p> | <p>(2) What sort of sins can be in them?
 (4) If some became evil through a willful sin, were some others naturally evil? If not,
 (6) Was there a delay between his creation and fall?
 (8) Did the first angel's sin cause the fall of the others?
 (9) Did as many fall as remained good?</p> |
|--|--|

article 1

Can there be in angels an evil of which they are guilty?

In II Sent. d 5, q 1, a 1; d 23, q 1, a 1; 3 *CG* cc 108-110, *De Veritate* q 24, a 7,
De Malo q 16, a 2, *Opusculum XV*, *De Angelis* c 19, *In Iob*, c 4, *lectio* 3

It seems that there cannot be evil of guilt in angels.

(1) After all, evil can only be in things that are in potency, as it says in *Metaphysics IX*; for the subject having a privation is a being in potency.¹ But since the angels are subsisting forms, they do not have their being in potency. Therefore there cannot be evil in them.

(2) Besides, the angels are more worthy than the heavenly bodies. But, as the philosophers tell us, there cannot be evil in heavenly bodies.

(3) Moreover, what is natural to a thing is always in it. But it is natural to angels that they be moved by love towards God. So this cannot be taken away from them. But by loving God, they do not sin. Ergo the angels cannot sin.

(4) Furthermore, seeking is only for a good or apparent good. But in the case of the angels, there cannot be an apparent good which is not a true good, because there can be no error at all in them, or at least none leading to guilt. Therefore the angels can only seek what is truly good. But no one seeking what is truly good sins. Therefore an angel cannot sin by his seeking.

¹ Aristotle was talking about privation as the physical "evil" of lacking an ability one should have had, like the evil of being lame. Losing or failing to develop an ability one should have had required being "in potency" to it (or to its loss).

ON THE OTHER HAND, Job 4:18 says, "His angels He charged with folly."

ANSWER: if an angel or any rational creature is considered in just his own nature alone, he can sin; and if being unable to sin belongs to any creature, he has this as a gift of grace, not from the condition of his nature. The reason is that sinning is just turning aside from the rightness which an act ought to have, whether in natural things, or in artificial ones, or in moral ones. The only act that cannot fall away from being right is one whose standard is set by nothing but the strength of the doer. If the carpenter's hands were themselves the standard for sawing, no carpenter could saw anything but a straight cut; but if the rightness of sawing lies in some other standard, the cutting may happen to be correct or not correct. Well, God's will alone is the standard for His acts, because He is not ordered to any higher purpose. But every will belonging to a creature fails to have rightness in its own act, except insofar as it is regulated by the divine will, to whom the ultimate purpose appertains; thus any will of an inferior should be regulated according to the will of a superior, as the will of a soldier is regulated by that of the army's commander. So, then, it is only in God's will that there cannot be sin. In any will belonging to a creature, there can be sin, thanks to the condition of his nature.²

² He means the condition of being subject to God.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): in the angels there is no potency to their natural being. But there is potency in them thanks to their intellective part — potency to turn to this or to that. And on this front there can be evil in them.

ad (2): the heavenly bodies have only their natural operation. Thus, just as there cannot be the evil of corruption in their nature, there also cannot be an evil of disorder in their natural action. But above the action that is natural in angels, there is the action of freely choosing, thanks to which evil can turn up in them.

ad (3): what is natural in angels is being turned towards God with a movement of love based on His being the source of their natural being. But if they are turned to Him as the object of supernatural fulfillment, it is with a gratuitous love, from which they could turn aside by sinning.

ad (4): freedom can turn up in an act of free choice in two ways: (a) In one way, something evil is chosen, as a human being sins by choosing adultery (which is evil in and of itself*). And such a sin always comes from some ignorance or error;

* *secundum se*

otherwise what is in fact bad would not have been chosen as good. The adulterer errs in a particular matter, choosing the enjoyment of a disordered act as if it were something good and now to be done, because of an inclination of passion or habit, even if in general he did not err but held a true judgement about this matter. In this way, a sin could not arise in angels, because there are no passions in them to mess up their reason or intellect, as was clear from things I said above, nor could their first sin have proceeded from a habit inclining the angel to sin. — (b) The other way sinning can turn up by free choice is by choosing something which is good in itself* but lacking the order of a due measure or standard; this way the defect leading to sin is only on the side of the choosing (which does not have due order) and not on the side of the thing chosen. The case is like someone choosing to pray without paying attention to the order established by the Church. And this kind of sin does not require ignorance beforehand but only an absence of consideration for the things that ought to be considered. It was in this way that the angels sinned, turning themselves to their own good by their free will, but without the due relation to the rule set by God's will.

q 59, a.4

* *secundum se*

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear. — 'Evil of guilt' *versus* 'evil of punishment' was explained above, along with the three ways in which they differ, *etc.*

In the body of the article, one conclusion answers the question affirmatively: every rational creature, as established in his natural traits alone, can sin. — The support goes thus. [*Antecedent:*] Only an operative power which is its own operational rule cannot deviate from the rightness of its act; [*inference:*] so only God's will cannot deviate from rightness in an act of His will.

The antecedent is supported from the general definition of sin, to the effect that it is just a turning aside from the rightness which an act ought to have. This definition is illustrated or manifested in a sin of nature, a sin of art, and a sin of morals. The example is the case of a hand and a rule for sawing, *vis-à-vis* an act of sawing.

Drawing the inference, however, as to its first part,¹ is supported on the ground that the divine will has no superior and thus is a law unto itself. — As to its second part, drawing the inference is supported on the ground that each and every other will needs to be regulated according to the divine will. This is supported [a] on the ground that the distinctive object of

the divine will is the unqualifiedly ultimate purpose, [b] on the ground that in all cases the will of an inferior is to be ruled by the will of the superior, as is clear with a soldier and a general, and universally in all cases of a subordinate who operates by willing.

Understanding the argument

ii. A little bit of hesitation arises about the antecedent, because its second part [cf. footnote 1] seems to be false, namely: "every power which is not its own rule can deviate from the uprightness of its act." It is clear, after all, that a man can have a power which is not its own rule but has the rule in that (stated the first way) from birth and therefore can't deviate from the rightness of its act (as a man is born with a power to be amused).²

iii. The SHORT ANSWER to this is that a power's being its own rule and its being unchangeable from the outset stem from the same reason and are counted as the same thing. For they come down to the same thing, and yet they differ in that (stated the first way) the nature of the operative power would be its own rule form-wise or identically; and (stated the second way) the nature would be its rule power-wise. So it makes no difference in the present case which manner

¹ The inference said 'only', so its "first part" meant the first conjunct in the medieval (and correct) analysis of an *exclusiva*: God's will can't, and [second conjunct] every other will can. The same analysis applied to the antecedent: [first conjunct] such-and-such an operative power can't deviate, and [second conjunct] every other operative power can.

² The objector's example makes no sense except as something congenital. The "risibility" one is born with is not a power-to-do but an openness (*capacitas*) to undergo amusement. If there is a power hercabouts, it is the power to *take* something as funny, which can certainly be abused.

of expression is used. It is well established, after all, that no will but the divine is of such great perfection that it either *is* its own rule or *has* its rule congenitally from its nature; since this includes the fact that there would flow from its nature a changeless love of every good, both natural and supernatural, both naturally had from birth and revealed by revelation (which [in a created will] obviously implies a contradiction, although a [created] will could have such unchangeable love from a free divine gift.

iv. To get the antecedent clear, please realize that it is based on the fact that “rightful act” says two things: act and rightness; and hence its sources are two, *viz.*, the operative power and a rule or standard. Hence thanks to the conjunction of the power with the rule, there will be a conjunction of the act with rightness, such that, if the conjunction is inseparable, the act will necessarily be upright; and if the conjunction of those sources is separable, the act also will be able to be wrong. Similarly, if the conjunction is from nature, the act will naturally be right; and if it is from a gift of grace, the act will be right because of the gift and not from the force of the nature. And hence the following proposition is self-evident: “An operative power which is its own rule cannot naturally fall short of rightness in its action,” taking the phrase ‘is its own rule’ as we said above in [§ iii].

v. As to drawing the inference, keep in mind two points. The first is that we do not mean to say that the divine will alone (taken in isolation [*absolute*], excluding every other power-to-act), is the rule for its own act; rather we mean that *among wills* it alone is the rule of its action. The result is that ‘only’ does not exclude every other operative power but only every other will. After all, natural virtues cannot naturally deviate from the rectitude of their acts, and they are themselves the rules of their acting.

The second point to keep in mind is that we do not mean to say that every other will can fall short in just any voluntary act it does (since an angel cannot fall short in purely natural matters with respect to natural objects); rather, we mean that every other will can fall short in *some* action it has. This is enough for it to be able to sin.

A doubt

vi. Over the support for the point that “Every other will is not its own standard, because it is ordered to an ultimate purpose that pertains to God’s will, and because it has a superior over it,” doubt arises. For if this argument is effective, it concludes that every secondary agent can naturally fall short in its action, because it has a superior, and is ordered to an unqualifiedly final purpose, *etc.* — which St. Thomas nevertheless denies [in the answer *ad* (2), where he says the heavenly bodies cannot fall short].

vii. The ANSWER to this is that the argument is effective not for every agent whatsoever but for a voluntary agent; and not even in every voluntary operation, as I just said, but in *some*, so that one optimally infers, “Therefore every secondary will can fall short in some operation.” The reason for the difference is the double character of “order to an ultimate purpose,” and the disparity of standards for a free operation and a natural one. After all, a natural operation is ordered to one outcome by way of which it looks to God as its ultimate natural purpose; and so for regulating it, there suffices the definition of that one good [namely the good of that one outcome], which although it posits a particular good, does not conflict with being connatural to any creature. But a free operation can turn to *any* good, and hence is ordered to the ultimate purpose in its own right, be it the natural such purpose or the supernatural one. So the defining makeup of every good is needed to regulate a free operation (and having all this in its nature, of course, cannot be natural to a creature, because it would have every good unqualifiedly from the force of its nature) although this could be added to a nature by grace. Therefore, because a will is ordained to the ultimate *supernatural* purpose in its own right (the reason for which is connatural to the divine will alone; this is the point of those words in the text saying “to which the ultimate purpose pertains”), and because in this way it has a superior, one optimally infers: “Therefore it is not its own rule but is ruled by the divine will.”

But these points do not apply to natural agents, nor to all voluntary agents in respect to their natural objects. Therefore [our conclusion is particular], *etc.*

³ This article and its commentary have a bearing on a recent controversy over *secundum se* (“intrinsically”) evil actions, such as adultery. The defenders of consequentialism/proportionalism maintain that no voluntary action deviates “intrinsically” from the standard for our actions to be right; rather, a voluntary action deviates because of the circumstance in which it is chosen, so that even adultery admits of a circumstance in which it is not wrong. However, the defenders of this position do allow an exception for actions that are tautologically or analytically wrong, such as “an act of doing wrong” or “an act of sinning.” These are “always” wrong. By the same token, no voluntary action can be always right unless it is analytically so, like an “act of doing the greater good,” “an act of giving God his due,” *etc.* So, when these writers try to include Aquinas in their ranks, they are embarrassed by his claims that some actions are *secundum se* evil, unless they can make him out to be saying that these actions are analytically so. Well, to come to my point at last, this article and its commentary preclude his saying any such thing. The evaluation of a creature’s action as right or wrong is never analytic but always *contingent* to the action, because the standard for evaluating it is always *extrinsic* to the creature’s will.

Meanwhile, terms like ‘an act of doing right’ are never the names of actions; they are just verbal confusions between actions and the standard for them.

Can a sin of pride and envy be the only sin in angels?

In II Sent. d.5, q.1, a.3; d.22, q.1, a.1; d.43, a.6; 3 *CG* c.109; *De Malo*, q.16, a.2 *ad* 4.

It seems that there cannot be only a sin of pride and envy in angels.

(1) After all, whoever has delight in a sin can bear the sin itself. But the demons take delight in the obscenities of carnal sins, as Augustine says in *The City of God II*. So in the demons there can also be carnal sins.

cc 4, 26,
PL 41, 74, 406

(2) Besides, as pride and envy are spiritual sins, so also are laziness and avarice and anger. But spiritual sins go with a spirit, as carnal sins go with flesh. So, pride and envy cannot be the only sins in angels, but also laziness and avarice.

XXXI, c.45
PL 76, 620

(3) Moreover, according to Gregory in his *Moralia*, many vices are born from pride and also from envy. Well, positing the cause is positing its effects. So if pride and envy can be in angels, the other vices can be in them also and for the same reason.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Augustine says in *The City of God XIV*, to the effect that "the devil is not a fornicator nor a drunk nor anything of the sort; but he is proud and envious."

c 3;
PL 41, 406

I ANSWER: a sin can be in someone in two ways: (1) by the guilt of it; (2) by the willingness* for it. As far as the guilt is concerned, every sin can occur in demons, because when they induce humans to commit all our sins, they incur the guilt for them all. — As for willingness, however, the only sins there can be in bad angels are the ones to which a spiritual nature can be drawn. A spiritual nature is not drawn to goods proper to a body, but to those which can be found in spiritual things. After all, nothing is drawn to anything but what can fit somehow with its own nature. In spiritual goods, however, there cannot be a sin when someone is drawn to them, unless the will of a superior is not being observed in that attraction. And this is the sin of pride: [to will] not to be submitted to a superior where one ought. So the first sin of an angel can be none other than that of pride.

* *affectum*

But consequently there could also be envy in them. After all, a will's being drawn to seek something and its recoiling from the opposite are the same idea. Well, an envious person is saddened over the good of another in so far as he thinks the other fellow's good is an obstacle to his own. But in a bad angel, the good of another could not be thought an obstacle to the good he himself was seeking, unless it was because he was seeking a unique pre-eminence, whose uniqueness will vanish if matched by the excellence of the other. And so after the sin of pride, there ensued in the sinning angel the evil of envy, thanks to which he grieved over man's good and also over the divine pre-eminence, because, by His pre-eminence, God uses the devil (against the devil's own will) for His glory.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): the demons do not delight in the obscenities of carnal sins as if they themselves were drawn to such sins; rather, their attitude comes entirely from envy; they delight in any human sins insofar as they impede us humans from our own good.

ad (2): insofar as envy is a special sin. it is an immoderate yearning for temporal things that come into use in human life and which can be assessed monetarily; and the demons are not drawn to these things, just as they are not drawn to carnal delights. So there cannot be envy in them in the proper and strict sense of the term. But if one takes 'envy' to mean all immoderate desire to have any created good, then envy is contained within the pride which is in the demons.— Anger comes with a certain passion, as does concupiscence. Hence it can only be in the demons metaphorically. — Laziness is a sort of sadness whereby one is rendered sluggish towards spiritual acts on account of the bodily effort they take; and that does not suit the demons. — So, it is clear that only pride and envy are the purely spiritual sins which can be had by demons — yet in such a way that envy not be taken for a passion but for a will set against the good of another.

ad (3): under the envy and pride posited in demons are included all the sins that derive from those two.

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article, there is one two-sided distinction and three conclusions answering the question; the first conclusion going with one side of the distinction, and the others going with the other sides.

The distinction is in the ways a sin can be in a person: for this occurs two ways, *viz.*, by his being guilty for it, and by willingness to do it. A sin that

is in someone by willingness is said to be in him form-wise.* But if it is there by guilt, it is there thanks to the obligation for that sin to be punished, which obligation is an effect of the stain, which is form-wise the sin remaining; and since no one is guilty or obliged to be punished for a sin he did not cause, being in someone by guilt is distinguished from being there by willingness. A sin that is in someone by guilt is said to be in him cause-wise.†

* *formulter*

† *causaliter*

The first conclusion is this: by guilt, every sin can be in an angel. — The second conclusion is: by willingness, the first sin in an angel can only have been pride. — Third conclusion adds: by willingness, the next sin that could arise in angels would have been envy.

ii. The first conclusion is supported on the ground that angels are able to induce people into every sin.

The second conclusion is supported as follows. [*Antecedent:*] The first sin lay in disordered longing for spiritual goods; [*1st inference:*] therefore it lay in non-subjection to the rule of a superior; [*2nd inference:*] therefore it was none other than pride. — Accepting the antecedent is supported on the ground that an angel cannot be drawn to anything except spiritual goods; this in turn is supported on the ground that no one is drawn to something unless it suits his nature in some way. — Drawing the first inference is supported on the ground that no sin arises in longing for spiritual goods except by flouting a rule set by a superior. — Drawing the second inference is supported on the ground that [willful] non-submission to a superior is an act of pride.

The third conclusion is supported in two points successively: the first point is possibility; the second is how it happened. The first point (*i.e.* that the next sin that *could* arise in angels was envy) is supported on the ground that tending towards a good and recoiling from its opposite are two sides of the same defining makeup; and the latter becomes an act of envy because an envious person is saddened by the good of another insofar as it impedes his own good, which he loves. — The second point (*i.e.* how the angel envied) is made clear as follows. [*Antecedent:*] The bad angel longed for a unique pre-eminence; [*inference:*] so he was saddened by the good people would have and by the excellence God did have. The antecedent is supported on the ground that there is no other way envy could have a place in an angel. The inference is made clear by the fact that the angel's unique pre-eminence would lose its uniqueness with the excellence communicable to people and the excellence possessed by God.

Doubts about the second conclusion

iii. Over the argument adduced to support the second conclusion, doubt arises from two sources. Firstly, from a fact being assumed here, namely, that immoderate longing for spiritual things can be no other sin but pride. — Secondly, from the argument fetched in to support this, namely, that longing for spiritual things is only bad if it turns away from a rule set by a superior, and so amounts to pride.

Against the point assumed, one may object both because there seem to be many vices having a spiritual good as their object. And also because immoderate seeking for an enjoyable spiritual good, as such, seems to come down more to excess than to pride. For this reason, in remarks on *II Sent.* d. 6,

last question, Scotus proposes that the longing with which the angel inordinately desired blessedness came down rather to excess, because it was not a seeking for pre-eminence but for the enjoyable. As a sign of this, Scotus brings up the point that the sin whereby one inordinately delights in contemplating a geometrical conclusion comes down to being a sin of excess.

Against the argument brought in for support, he objects on the ground that it would follow that every inordinate longing for any good would be a case of pride; after all, no longing for a good has what it takes to be bad unless because God's rule is not being observed in that longing, and thus excess and avarice would be kinds of pride.

iv. Against the second conclusion itself, a doubt arises which cannot be glossed over. It seems to go against things said in the previous article in the answer *ad 4*, where St. Thomas said that an angel's sin lay on the side of his choosing and not on the side of the things chosen. But now he is saying that the sin is one of pride. If it was a sin of pride, the angel chose *not* to be subject to God, and so he sinned on the side of the thing chosen. The first inference comes from the difference between pride and other sins, which lies in the fact that turning away from God's rule is found in other sins as a consequence, but is found in pride front-and-center [*per se*] and from the very fact that a proud agent does not want to be subject to God and His rules, as Aquinas says in so many words in *2/2 ST* q. 162, aa. 6, 7. — Furthermore, Aquinas says here that the angels sought a unique pre-eminence. Therefore they sinned on the side of the thing chosen.

v. A second doubt arises about the same second conclusion, as to what the spiritual good sought in an angel's first sin was. Was it himself as loved by himself with a pure friendship-love? Or was it fulfillment desired for himself, or (what amounts to the same thing) was it himself as having the desired fulfillment for himself? The occasion for having doubts arises because, for St. Thomas, no other first sin of an angel is found except through inordinate longing for himself as beatifiable. But for Scotus, in the passage mentioned, there were two sins going on: firstly pride, a disordered friendship-love towards himself, and secondly *excess*, disordering the desire-love with which he wanted fulfillment for himself. Scotus' reason for holding this is that inordinate desire-love necessarily presupposes inordinate friendship-love, because I desire inordinately for the one I love so inordinately.

A doubt about the third conclusion

vi. As regards the modality assigned to the last conclusion, a doubt arises because it seems false that there is no other way envy *could have* arisen except by love for a unique excellence. After all, an envious person can be saddened by the good of another not only insofar as it threatens his uniqueness but also because it threatens any other condition of the longed-for good, such as delight in it, free use of it, and the like. And since this is the case, it seems that St. Thomas' reasoning process is vulnerable to a sharp repudiation.

See next article

To clear these up

vii. Against the first doubt, I say that it was not St. Thomas's intention to say without qualification that no inordinate desire for spiritual goods arises except by pride; everybody knows that, alongside pride, the opposite vice can arise, as can the virtue between the two vices, humility; after all, opposite vices concern the same matter. Rather St. Thomas' intent was to say that one *first* sins no other way than by pride in desiring spiritual things. After all, since the first object of pride is the excelling (not just any excelling or any way of excelling, but excelling the measure preset by God *as so preset*), such that the proper object of pride in any matter is exceeding the measure as determined by God. But since spiritual goods cannot be "excessive" of themselves (because the greater they are, the better they are, and hence they cannot be loved "too much" in themselves), the result is that spiritual goods have what it takes to be sought viciously from the factor whereby they first have what it takes to be excessive and disproportionate to someone; but this factor is obviously the divine rule and dispensation. Hence the first disordered desire for spiritual things is reasonably said to be out of pride, tending towards that whence spiritual things first have what it takes to be sought viciously.

Significantly, St. Thomas used the word '*affectio*' ['willingness'], insinuating thereby that the first sin had to be an act of willing [*actum volitionis*] (which goes towards the good as such) and not an act of counter-willing [*actum nolitionis*] (which recoils from the bad as such).¹

viii. So against the first objection on the other side, I say that, although there can be many vices in love of spiritual things, the first of them still has to be pride. The opposite vice, after all, since it tends to disqualify the seeker himself, either has no place in the angels *vis-à-vis* spiritual things, or else could not have had the first place, because it is far more like such an excellent nature to seek something above itself, rather than something below itself, and since it seems to be naturally built into every one to tend toward great things. The other vices dealing with spiritual things either turn on counter-willing, like hatred and envy and the like (and hence could not have been the first) or else they arise from a prideful love, such as vain glory, and hence they could not be first.

ix. There is no problem about seeking the enjoyable as such, as brought up by Scotus. For one thing, seeking the enjoyable cannot be the first thing; rather, seeking the enjoyable naturally falls first on seeking the useful, as enjoyment itself is internal peace in having a conjoined useful good; thus the first deformity in seeking any object is not a disorder of seeking the enjoyable but of seeking the

¹ Counter-willing that something be the case is willing that it not be the case.

good upon the having of which enjoyment follows.*

For another thing, inordinate affection for the enjoyable does not constitute a special vice but looks rather to the same vice that regards those enjoyable goods.² Thus inordinate longing for enjoyment in food, in drink, in sex, in honors, in power, in riches, in knowledge, and in other things, does not look to one vice, and none of them constitutes on its own a kind of vice. Rather they each pertain to the species of vice that looks to the objects (power, knowledge, food, drink, wealth, etc.) inordinately. Likewise, on the other side, ordinally enjoying some good does not constitute one or several virtues but is a condition following upon each virtue: a just man, after all, ordinally enjoys the good towards another; the temperate man moderately enjoys a sensible good, and so on for the rest. Thus, to posit "excess" as a general vice towards the enjoyable as such appears to be arbitrary. — And to what he says about inordinate enjoyment of a geometrical conclusion, I respond that it pertains to that vice which deals with the good apprehended as the basis for the enjoyment, whatever that may be; for enjoying does not occur in any other way.

For yet another thing, even Scotus says [in the same passage] that if excellence is being sought, the seeking of such an enjoyable thing pertains to pride and not to excess. From him, after all, I have two points. The first is the one stated just now, namely, that inordinate longing for some desirable pertains to the same vice to which inordinate longing for its basis belongs; thus inordinate longing to take delight in excellence belongs to the inordinate seeking for excellence, because it belongs to pride. — The second is that the seeking for fulfillment was not excess but pride, because it was a disordered seeking for the seeker's own pre-eminence. For fulfillment (or all around happiness) is "the state made perfect by prescience of all the goods." And so by seeking all around happiness one is seeking first the excellence in which most of us believe all around happiness is found. So, no excellence is greater than happiness itself, which includes in its makeup the excellence of every desirable thing and the highest level thereof; otherwise happiness would not have what it takes to be the ultimate purpose.³

x. Against the objection from the other source, I say that seeking a good without observing the rule of a superior happens in two ways: namely, directly (*i.e.* the superior's rule is despised in and of itself [*per se*]), or indirectly, as a consequence or incidental [*per accidens*]. When seeking a good apart from a rule happens the first way, one infers pride, whose distinctive act is one of contempt for a superior. When it happens the second way,

² In other words, the vice that mishandles a good also mishandles the enjoyment of it. The underlying doctrine is that enjoyment is not a good in its own right but a psychological consequence of having something which is a good in its own right.

³ Boethius's account of *beatitudo* is one of three accounts which Aquinas gives in different places depending on how deeply happiness is understood. Aquinas thought that Boethius's account captured the most widely shared concept of fulfillment; it is broad enough to be a plausible "ultimate purpose" and shallow enough to be evident to everybody (*per se notum omnibus*)

* non est deordinatum appetitibus delectabilibus, sed illius boni ad quod sequitur ratio delectabilis

Boethius, *De Consolatione III*, Prosa 2, Pl. 63, 724

it is common to the other vices of departing from a divine rule.

Defending the Second Conclusion

xi. As to the first argument against the second conclusion itself. I say that, beyond doubt, spurning a superior goes with pride immediately [*per se*] and goes with other vices as a consequence. But since the direct [*per se*] case happens two ways, there are three ways overall in which the rule of a superior is put into contempt. The first way is *object-wise* and *how-wise* [*objectivè et modaliter*]. And here one finds the highest level of pride, wherein not being subject to God is chosen both as the thing chosen and as the how of choosing it; for making the choice itself is not regulated by divine rule in this case. — The second way is *how-wise and in consequence*. Here one finds the turning away from God that belongs to other mortal sins; for while they tend towards their own objects, a turning away from divine rule comes with them.— The third way is *how-wise and directly* [*modaliter et per se*] and here one finds the account of pride in use when one tends to intrinsically good things proudly. From the fact that this seeking is for the good, it follows that the deformity of the act is not coming from its object, and so a turning away from God is not being committed that way; also, equally clearly, the turning away is not now happening object-wise as the thing chosen. And from the fact that the agent is tending towards good things proudly, it follows that in this case non-subjection to God's rule is occurring as the manner of the seeking, and that this manner is involved voluntarily, otherwise it would not be a sin.

When you add to these points the fact that the prideful manner is not coming from passion or ignorance or weakness in this case, the only alternative is that the non-subjection is found here in and for itself [*per se*], and thus the turning away is willed in and for itself, not as the object of the volition but as the "how" of it. And this is how pride was the angel's first sin.— For the defective manner of choosing to be willed in and for itself, it is not required that the chooser be consciously aware of it, because this is the condition of what is voluntary object-wise; rather it suffices that the angel could have known and

avoided it, if he had wanted to, and so he voluntarily did not use the opposite mode, the rule-governed way of choosing.⁴

So when St. Thomas says that pride is an aversion directly, from the fact that it does not want to be subject to God and his rule, he is to be understood as meaning *object-wise* or *how-wise*. It is sufficient, after all, for a sin of pride that one spurns God's rule in how he chooses in no other way but voluntarily, *i.e.* that he purely and voluntarily chooses while not using the divine rule; and this is enough to put non-consideration of the rule into his mind. And since all these traits occur in the angel's sin, as is clear from what I have already said, it has been optimally said that the sin was pride.

Against the other point, I shall be saying more in the next article [in § *xi* of the commentary on q.63, a.3].

xii. Against the second doubt about the same conclusion I say that, since loving is willing good for someone, I do not see how there could be a friendship love (for oneself or for another) that was "pure," *i.e.* did not involve any desire-love. After all, loving a friend is willing him to have at least what he does have, and likewise loving oneself is loving oneself for oneself, at least. This is why above, when the author was asking how an angel loved himself, he as good as said that one loves oneself (naturally or by choice) to the extent one wills something good for oneself (naturally or by choice). And so the response to the point in question is that the doubt makes a false assumption, namely, that an angel loves himself out of pure friendship; for such a love does not seem possible.⁵

q 60, a.3

⁴ This remarkable paragraph in § *xi* shows how a counterfactual condition enters into the assessment of what is "*per se* willed" in a sin.

⁵ On the off-chance that this rebuttal needs further clarification, let me put the point this way. To be loved with friendship love is to be an intended beneficiary. Friendship love for *x*, then, is willing *x* to have (receive or keep) a benefit, and a benefit can be anything sought with desire-love. Well, desire-love is a two-place relation, like the one between me and rye: "I love it." But friendship-love is a three-place relation, which is why in Latin it requires both an accusative (*bonum quod*) and a dative (*bonum cui*), as in "I want a bottle for *x*." Now take the rye out of the sentence but leave *x* in as a beneficiary. Well, a beneficiary of what? Cajetan does not see how there can be a willed beneficiary without a willed benefit, and neither does this translator.

article 3

Did the devil seek to be "as" God?

2/2. ST q.163, a.2; *In II Sent* d.5, q.1, a.2, d.22, q.1, a.2,
2 CG c.109; *De Malo* q.16, a.3

It seems that the devil did not seek to be as God.

(1) After all, what does not enter one's head does not come into one's pursuits, since an apprehended good is what moves one to pursue it, be it a sensory, a rational, or an intellectual good (for only in such pursuit does sin turn up). But that some creature be equal to God does not enter anyone's head; it implies a contradiction because the finite would have to *be* infinite to *equal* the infinite. Therefore an angel could not seek to be as God.

(2) Besides, that which is the purpose of one's nature can be sought without sin. But being more like God is the purpose to which any creature tends naturally. So if the angel sought to be like God, not by equaling Him but by having similarity to Him, he could not have been sinning in seeking this, it seems.

(3) Moreover, the angel was created in greater plenitude of wisdom than man was. But no man, unless completely crazy,* chooses to be equal to an angel, much less God; after all, choice is only among the possible options about which one deliberates. Much less, therefore, did an angel sin by seeking to be as God.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Isaiah 14:13-14 has the devil saying: "I shall ascend into heaven, and I shall be like the most high." — And Augustine [really the Ambrosiaster] says in his book of questions about the Old Testament that the devil, puffed up by elation, "wanted to be called God."

e.113;
PL 35, 2341

I ANSWER: beyond all doubt, the angels sinned by wanting to be as God. This can be understood two ways, however: (1) by equality, (2) by similarity. In the first way, an angel could not have sought to be like God, because he knew that this was impossible by his natural knowledge; and before his first act of sinning he had no habit or passion that would so cramp his cognitive power that he would choose the impossible as a result of cognitive deficiency, as sometimes happens among us. — But even if it were possible, it would still be against his natural desire. After all, there is in each thing a natural desire to preserve its being, and this would not be preserved if it were transmuted into another nature. So nothing which is at a lower level of nature can seek the level of a higher nature (as an ass does not seek to be a horse), because if one were moved up to a higher *nature*, one would no longer be oneself. But one's imagination plays tricks here; a man seeks to be at a higher level in some features accidental to him, which can in-

crease without corrupting their subject, and so he thinks that he can seek a higher level of nature (which in fact he cannot reach without ceasing to be).¹ Well, it is obvious that God exceeds an angel not only in some accidental features but in the level of His nature itself (as one angel also exceeds another). Hence it is impossible for a lower angel to seek to be equal to a higher one, much less to be equal to God.

But seeking to be as God by similarity is done in two ways. One is the way in which a thing is naturally apt to become similar to God. And so if someone seeks to be like God this way, he does not sin, so long as he is seeking to reach a likeness to God in the due relation whereby he would have it from God. But a person would be sinning if he sought to be like God as a matter of right, as if to achieve this by his own power, and not from God's power.

The other way someone would seek to be like God is in a way he is not naturally apt to be like Him — *e.g.* if someone sought to create heaven and earth, which is unique to God; and in such an effort there would be sin. This is how the devil sought to be as God — not to become like Him in having no superior whatsoever (because that way also he would not have been seeking his own being, since no creature can exist except by participating being, under God) but rather to become like God in having his ultimate fulfillment be a bliss he could reach by his own power, and so he bent his desire away from supernatural fulfillment (as it is from God's grace). — Alternatively, if he did seek as his ultimate goal the similarity to God which is given by grace, he wanted to have that similarity by the strength of his own nature, and not from divine help according to God's disposition. This idea chimes in with statements in Anselm, who said that the devil sought what he would have gotten if he had remained standing. — The two solutions reduce to a common point: in both, he sought to have final fulfillment *via* his own strength, and that is unique to God.

De casu Diabolici, c.6, PL 158, 337

Now because what is true in and of itself [*per se*] is the source and cause of what is true through another [*per aliud*], it follows from the desire just discussed that the devil sought to have a pre-eminent leadership [*principatum*] over other things. In this way too, he wanted to be "as God" in a perverse fashion.

From these remarks, the answers to all the objections are obvious.

¹ Being of what nature one is cannot be exceeded so long as one exists, because it is not just *what* one is qualitatively but also *how* one is existentially. Nothing exists as a nature-less Hindu self; rather, one's existence englobes one's nature, even though the nature does not include one's existing (unless one is God).

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article, Aquinas mainly does three jobs: (1) he puts down a conclusion answering the question in general affirmatively; (2) he shows in detail what sort of thing the angel's first sin was; (3) he shows the same fault in the angel's secondary sin.

As for job (1), the conclusion is: the angel sinned by seeking to be as God.

ii. As for job (2), he makes four main points dealing with three results coming from a distinction and a sub distinction in this object of pursuit *i.e.* "to be as God." He distinguishes it into the 'as' of equality and the 'as' of similarity. And this last he sub-distinguishes into the similarity with which something is naturally apt to be assimilated to God *vs.* the similarity with which nothing can be similar to him — *i.e.* [he divides similarity] into one communicable to a creature and one incommunicable to one. And thus there remain three alternatives to be discussed.

And firstly he sets down a negative conclusion *re* the first alternative: the angel did not seek to be "as God" by equality. — He supports this claim with two arguments. The first goes like this [*Major:*] A seeker whose cognitive ability is not impeded by habit or passion cannot choose what he naturally knows to be impossible; [*minor:*] but being as God by equality is of this kind *vis-à-vis* the first angelic choice; [*conclusion:*] therefore [the angel did not first choose to be like God by equality]. The minor is obvious because the first sin was not preceded by any such passion. — The second supporting argument goes as follows. [*Antecedent:*] Each thing has in it a natural desire to preserve its own being; [*1st inference:*] so it is against anything's natural desire to seek the level of a higher nature; [*2nd inference:*] so it is impossible for a lower angel to seek to be equal to God, or even to a higher angel. — Drawing the first inference is supported firstly from the fact that being at the level of a higher nature necessarily involves the non-being of the subject seeking it. Next an objection is headed off: one might doubt this first inference because of the desire we feel in ourselves to have the conditions of other natures. Heading this off consists of saying that the desire we experience is for accidental conditions, which we wish to have while still keeping our own substance, and not for substantial conditions (although imagination sometimes goes wrong by not distinguishing these).

Secondly, he deals with the members of the sub-distinction in general, showing how sin can arise in those cases: in one, from the manner of the seeking; in the other, from its object.

Thirdly he answers the question in more detail for these alternatives by drawing a disjunctive conclusion: the angel sinned by seeking to be as God either by being fully content with having the fulfillment natural to him, or by having a supernatural fulfillment gotten by his own strength. — And he shows that the first

disjunct pertains to the third alternative by distinguishing two traits unique to God: *i.e.* being subject to no superior whatsoever (and he excludes this from the angel's pursuit because it implies the non-existence of the seeker), and to be subject to no supernatural end (and this one he did desire) — the second disjunct is confirmed by the authority of Anselm.

Fourthly, he reduces both disjuncts to the third alternative (because the second disjunct seemed to pertain more to the second alternative).

iii. As to job (3), regarding the angel's secondary sin: the angel sinned secondarily by seeking to be like God in leadership over all things. — He supports this on the ground that what is the case *per se* is prior to and causes that which is the case *per aliquid*.

Three initial doubts

iv. Regarding the first conclusion, two doubts arise: the first is over the first supporting reason, and the second is over the second such reason. In his remarks on *II Sent.*, d. 6, q. 1, Scotus tries to prove by many arguments that a perfect [*i.e.* entirely unimpaired] will can seek the impossible. For one thing, out of hatred for God, the angel wills Him not to exist, as we see from the *Rhetoric II*; — for another thing, a will can use what ought to be enjoyed and enjoy what ought to be used, according to Augustine in his *Book of 83 Questions*; and hence an angel can enjoy himself and thereby will the highest good for himself. This last inference holds good, because willing oneself to be enjoyed and willing the highest good for oneself meet the same definition. — For yet a third thing, with both acts of loving (friendship love and desire love), the will can have the angel's whole being for its object.

Thereupon, to break down an argument by St. Thomas, Scotus splits into two what we can mean by 'a choice'. It can mean an efficacious act of the will, *i.e.* one following upon deliberation (and this cannot be a choice of an impossible thing), or it can be an act of the will following upon full apprehension of the object (and this can be a choice of the impossible).

v. The second doubt is brought by Scotus against the second supporting argument. He says the argument falls short in two ways: first because a will [confronted by a conditional] can will the antecedent without willing the consequent (just as an intellect can understand the one without understanding the other); second, because talking about an ordinate will is different from talking about an inordinate one; the latter can accept an antecedent minus its extrinsic or intrinsic consequent, even though the former cannot.

It seems to me that the argument is vulnerable to another challenge as well. For the argument assumes that what is against a natural desire cannot be sought; but this is obviously not true, unless one is talking about what is pursuit-worthy for its own sake.* But willing something against one's natural desire does happen incidentally [*per accidens*], as is clear in the case of suicides.

Reply in § viii
c. 4, 1382a 15

q 30, PL 40, 20

The reply is in §
ix

Reply in § ix
* *per se*
appetibile

Clearing these up

vi. To clear these doubts away, you need to know firstly that, since the will's object is a known good, and what it takes to be good can neither be sought nor understood apart from the issue of existing, it has to be the case that a willable object meets two conditions. The first is a relation to existence or non-existence, *i.e.* that the willable object be in act or potency. The second condition is its being apprehended, whether the apprehension be true or false (because "it makes no difference whether it *is* good or *seems* so," as it says in *Physics II*. From this it obviously follows that in the intellect's first operation [*i.e.* in simple apprehension], a thing-to-*seek* is never presented. Why not? Because the mind's first operation does not understand its object in relation to existing [but just for what it is]. It also follows that a "willable thing" as such involves a proposition not abstracting from the possible and the impossible. — That what it takes to be good does not abstract from existing is clear from the fact that no one seeks wisdom or justice bracketed off [*absolutē*] but seeks it *to exist* or *be in* oneself or in another. Another reason is that every friendship-love tends toward the beloved because he/she exists; every desire-love seeks the benefit to be in existence (flatly or in some respect). Yet another reason is that one does not find the good in mathematical matters, because they abstract from causes conferring existence.

The second thing you need to know is that things are called "impossible" and "pursuit-worthy" in two ways: *i.e.* in itself [*per se*] and circumstantially [*per accidens*]. What is called impossible "in itself" is not what is just impossible here or now or under a certain hypothesis, but what is impossible no matter what [unqualifiedly]. But we call a thing "impossible" incidentally if it is rendered impossible by some supposition. — A thing is also called "pursuit-worthy"* either for itself or in the circumstances, as is obvious.

vii. With these points in place, I make three claims. (1) What is impossible *in itself*¹ is not pursuit-worthy for itself. (2) A thing impossible in itself can be pursued circumstantially.² (3) What is impossible circumstantially² can be pursued for itself.

Starting from claim (3), an experience we have had quite often is clarified. With or without faith in God's omnipotence, or the resurrection of the dead, or the immortality of the soul, *anyone* whose son died would desire him to be restored to life, and *anyone* who lost a limb would desire it to be restored to the integrity of his body, *etc.* These restorations are assumed to be impossible — but circumstantially impossible, since they have been rendered impossible here and now; and desiring them has never been a sin.¹

My claim (2) is made clear from hatred of God. For those who hate Him don't only will this impossible

state of affairs (that He not exist) as it would be impossible in the circumstances, *i.e.* that He not be out to punish *them*, but also as it would be impossible in itself, *i.e.* that He who punishes not exist. But this latter they seek circumstantially in so far as His non-existing is apprehended as joined with an apparently pursuit-worthy good (and one very convenient for those who hate Him).

My claim (1), meanwhile, is obvious of itself because what is impossible in itself contains neither the makeup of a being nor that of a non-being, because it implies both sides of a contradiction and hence cannot fall under the proper account of what it takes to be sought — and thus, since my being equal to God is impossible in itself, it cannot be seekable for itself. And if you add to these points the fact that this is naturally known and evident to an angel in whom emotion can have no place, he cannot have sought this.

viii. From these remarks, my answers to the points raised in the first doubt are clear. For the first objection (drawn from hatred of God) concludes to nothing but that those who hate God are seeking in the circumstances that He not exist — which is not a problem. — The second objection also amounts to nothing or comes down to the same thing, namely, that the same thing is sought circumstantially. It amounts to nothing on the ground that nothing follows from making one's self the object of one's enjoyment except wishing to be the supreme good *for one's self*, and not the supreme good across the board. It will amount to the same point, however, on the ground that being the supreme good for oneself is sought only in consequence and in the circumstances. — The third objection also assumes a false premise because friendship love is not towards inanimate things, as it says in *Ethics VIII*. It also assumes the false point that a state of affairs just as such is pursuit worthy. And it brings in a false point, *i.e.*, that a creature's being equal to God is some sort of being: in fact, it implies both sides of a contradiction and hence is neither a being nor a non-being.

Scotus's solution needs no further critique, because previous remarks have already made it clear that the distinction he was drawing applies only to impossibilities sought in the circumstances, when we are talking about seeking something for its own sake.

ix. As for Scotus's objections against our second supporting argument, my short answer is that neither an ordinate will nor an inordinate one can will an antecedent without its consequent if the necessary connection is known. And I am speaking about willing either mainly, or in consequence (or its for own sake or incidentally). Otherwise anybody would be excused from sin so long as he willed the antecedent (maybe an enjoyable good) and not the consequent (the attached deformity). My point implies that what really happens is this: when someone wills to be a bishop and knows that a necessary consequence of being one is being a priest, he does *not* will the former because of its [unwanted] consequence.

Against his last objection. I say that St. Thomas's argument does not assume what Scotus claims, but assumes that the talk is about the angel's first sin, which cannot be excused by ignorance or passion, and has to terminate at

c.3
195a.25

1 ST q.5, a.3 ad 4;
Commentary
§§ ii – viii.

* appetibilis

† *i.e.* logically

‡ accidentaliter

c.2;
1155b.27ff

¹ The desiring here is not practical willing but wishing. The impossibility of the thing wished for neither precludes wishing it nor renders the wish so irrational as to be always sinful.

an object towards which the seeker's nature provides an incentive. For it is well known that a nature (setting aside ignorance and passions) does not incentivize anything, even incidentally, towards its direct opposite, *i.e.*, one's not existing.

Two more doubts

x. As to the conclusion answering affirmatively [with a disjunction], two doubts arise. The first is that it says in so many words here that [*major:*] the angel first sinned by seeking [to reach] final blessedness by his own strength. [*Minor:*] But this is an evil in its own right *vis-à-vis* an angel. [*Conclusion:*] Therefore he sinned on the side of the thing chosen and did not only seek "badly" but also sought a "bad thing." Yet the opposite was said in article 1. — The minor is supported on the ground that, if we are talking about supernatural fulfillment, having it by way of a created power is a bad thing to seek. And if we are talking about a natural fulfillment, then (although resting content with that would not be a bad thing for a created nature left in its purely natural traits; indeed would be its best outcome, and the creature could not seek anything further because it would have no knowledge of anything further) contentment with it is still an evil in itself *vis-à-vis* a nature to which a further goal has been shown by revelation and grace, a nature which has been told by its Founder that it is ordained to this further purpose, *etc.*

in the answer ad 4

The reply comes in § 21

Doubt arises secondly, because St. Thomas's conclusion gives us the opposite of his premises. After all, we have it from his conclusion that the angel is seeking the impossible, since having final fulfillment by his own power is impossible, and not just something bad. — As far as supernatural fulfillment is concerned, the impossibility is obvious from statements in Inquiry 12. But regarding natural fulfillment, the impossibility is clear from the immutability of the arrangement* made by divine Wisdom, because It had manifested to the angels and to every intelligent nature that it had ordained them to a supernatural purpose as their ultimate end, and not to a natural one.

* *ordo*

The reply is in § 111

Clearing these up

xi. Against the first of these doubts, I say that the object the angel was seeking when he sinned was something good in itself and not evil; but his way of seeking it was evil, because the angel's choice lacked the order established by God's rule. When Aquinas says that the angel sought final blessedness by his own power, the statement needs to be interpreted to mean that blessedness was the thing sought, and the power of his nature was the mode of seeking it, not a condition of a thing sought. For from that negative, nay privative, way (*i.e.* lacking God's rule) in which the angel's choice was deformed, there follows that way of seeking it, namely, that he wanted to have it on a natural basis. For from this it follows that he sought not supernaturally, ergo naturally. So if he sought supernatural blessedness, then because he sought it not according to God's rule

of mercy, one is convinced that he sought it from his own natural power. And if he sought natural blessedness as unqualifiedly ultimate, he did so in the following way: he sought blessedness as the thing sought; but because he did not order this further to supernatural blessedness, one is persuaded that he sought ultimate and hence final blessedness from the power of his nature, because he willed to have it from the power of his nature. Therefore every condition making such a seeking evil comes form-wise from the way-of-seeking and not from the object sought. Yet as a consequence and implicitly, the evil overflows from the way-of-seeking onto the object (and because of this overflow the doctors use this manner of speaking on the side of the object). For this overflowing does not impede our point, because [a] it is a consequence and not a prior condition, and [b] because those *positive* conditions are found here implicitly and not explicitly, and [c] because they arise from the side of that first way-of-seeking (which first made up what it took to be a sin) and not from the side of the object.

Via this point, my response becomes clear to an objection made in the preceding article. For one needs to expound in the same way the fact that the angel sought a singular excellence *interpretatively, implicitly, and in consequence of the mode of his seeking*. From the fact that he thus sought *aversely*, one is persuaded that he sought a uniqueness which he excluded sharing with others (who would have the supreme excellence by mercy); for he did not wish to be the same as the others in this respect.

Commentary §§
111, 111

xii. Against the second doubt, I give two replies. The first is that St. Thomas says that the impossible cannot be sought *as the very thing sought*; but from what he has said now, it is clear that the thing chosen was not only possible but good; the impossibility came from how it was being sought, as is clear from previous statements.

My second reply is that, as regards supernatural blessedness, it was incidentally willed as a thing impossible in itself; it was not willed for its own sake. — As to the natural fulfillment taken as final, I say that this is impossible in the circumstances, namely, assuming the additional supernatural order; and yet it was still willed circumstantially, as a consequence, *etc.*

Exegetical conclusion

xiii. Concerning the statements of St. Thomas, bear in mind two points. Firstly, when he says that an angel seeking natural fulfillment was seeking to be like God in a way he was not naturally apt to be like God (because only God has His blessedness as something natural to Him), the statement is to be understood in terms of an order already established by the divine wisdom by which all beatifiable creatures (and they are only intellectual ones) are ordained, to the effect that the object of divine fulfillment is to be taken for ultimate fulfillment. His statement is not to be taken absolutely in terms of the natures of things alone. For if that supernatural order had not been added by God, any pure intelligence would have taken his natural ultimate purpose for his blessed ultimate

purpose without sinning; this is how the philosophers posit those entities to be fulfilled.

Bear in mind secondly that the angel's sin is more reasonably located in a striving to be content with natural fulfillment rather than in seeking supernatural fulfillment apart from mercy. For one thing, desiring his natural ultimate purpose is natural to an angel, and nature impels a proud angel more to the former than to the latter. We experience the same in our own lives, when we proudly will to be content in our own attainments, leaving the divine things to God. And this point, in my opinion, satisfies Aquinas. A sign of this is the fact that he set down this option unqualifiedly but mentioned the other only under a conditional — and then Anselm is to be understood in such a way that

the clause 'what he would have attained' is not referring person-wise but simply — *i.e.*, is referring to "ultimate fulfillment" [in general] and not this kind or that kind.² For it is obvious that if the angel had remained standing, he would have arrived at an ultimate fulfillment.

² Medieval logic distinguished referring (*suppositio*) into the usual kind, which is talking about a thing mentioned (and was called *suppositio personalis*) and an odd kind, which is talking about a thing said (and was called *suppositio simplex*). Cajetan is alluding to it here, where the difference is complicated by modal problems native to counterfactuals. Here is the bottom line. Did Anselm mean what an unfallen angel would have attained in any world-plan? Or did he mean what one of the existing angels (say, Satan) would have attained in the actual world-plan? He was right either way, but Cajetan gives him a broader point.

article 4

Are some demons naturally bad?

3 *CG*, c 107; *De Mala*, q 16, a.2, *Opusculum XV, De Angelis*, c. 19,
In Joan c 8, *lectio* 6; *In De Div. Nom.* c. 4, *lectio* 19.

It looks as though some demons are naturally bad.

PL 41, 289 (1) After all, Augustine introduces Book X of *The City of God* by quoting Porphyry to the effect that “there is a certain kind of demons who are naturally deceptive, pretending to be gods and souls of the departed.” But being deceptive is being bad, therefore some demons are naturally bad.

(2) Besides, as the angels were created by God, so also were people. But some people are naturally bad, about whom Wisdom 12:10 says “their malice was bred in them.” Therefore some angels can also be naturally bad.

(3) Moreover, some irrational animals have natural forms of malice, as a fox is naturally cunning, and a wolf is naturally rapacious, and yet they are creatures of God. Therefore demons, too, though they are creatures of God, can be naturally bad.

PG 3, 724 ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Denis says in c.4 of *On the Divine Names*: “demons are not bad by nature.”

ANSWER: all the things there are, insofar as they are and have a nature, tend naturally toward some good, since they all exist from a good source, and an effect always reflects its source. But there may happen to be a bad attached to some particular good, as there is attached to fire the bad feature that it consumes other things. But no bad can be joined to good as a universal.¹ So if there is anything whose nature is aimed at a particular good, it can tend naturally towards something bad, not *qua* bad, but incidentally, as attached to a good. But if there is anything whose nature is ordered to the good under the general definition of ‘good’, it cannot tend by

¹ A “particular” good is a concrete thing evaluated as good, such as a fire on a cold night. To any concrete thing, *qua* concrete, a bad feature can be attached. But good as a universal is abstracted from concrete things, captured in a concept or general definition, and so removed from “attachments.” St. Thomas could hardly have said this, if he had agreed with ultra-realists like D. M. Armstrong, who thought a universal was a

its nature towards anything bad. Well, obviously, any intellectual nature is aimed towards the good as a universal which it can apprehend, and which is the [formal] object of its will. So since the demons are intellectual substances, there is no way that they can have a natural inclination towards anything bad. And so they cannot be naturally evil.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): in the same passage, Augustine scolds Porphyry for saying that the demons are naturally deceptive; Augustine says they are not deceptive by nature, but by their own will. — The reason Porphyry claimed the demons were naturally deceptive was because he posited that they were animals, having a sensory nature. A sensory nature is aimed at some particular good, to which an evil can be attached. In this way, animals can have a natural inclination towards the bad, but only in the circumstance that the bad is joined to a good.

ad (2): some people’s badness can be called natural either because of a habit which is “second nature” to them or because of a natural inclination in their sensory part to some inordinate emotion; thus some people are said to be naturally choleric or lustful. — But this does not come from the intellectual part of their nature.

ad (3): brute animals, thanks to their sensory nature, have a natural propensity towards certain particular goods, to which something bad is attached. Thus a fox is inclined to seek his prey cleverly, to which a certain stealth is attached. But being stealthy is not evil for a fox, since it is natural to him; likewise, being belligerent is not evil for a guard dog, as Denis says in c.4 of *On the Divine Names*.²

PG 3, 728

real thing present in many real things at once. On this view, shouldn’t the universal “type” pick up the attachments of all its “tokens”? If not, it is because a type is a second-order reality, and the attachment is a first-order complication?

² Note again that ‘good’ and ‘bad’ are evaluations, so that whatever their objective basis, they are made from the perspective of the evaluator, be it by judgment or by animal instinct.

Cajetan’s Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article, one conclusion answers it in the negative: demons are not naturally bad. — The support goes as follows. [*Antecedent*:] Things inclined by nature to good as a universal are not inclined to evil; [*1st inference*:] so intellectual substances are not so inclined; [*2nd inference*:] so the demons are not. [*3rd inference*:] Therefore they are not naturally bad.

The antecedent is supported and explained at once by showing the how, the cause, and the condition of a natural inclination to the bad. The “how” of it is incidentally, since no nature is ordered of itself [*per se*] to the bad, but to the good; because every nature is from a good source, and universally the effect reflects its cause. — The “cause” of such an inclination is the attachment of another’s bad to one’s own good (to which one tends

directly). This is obvious by example. — The “condition” is being a particular good to which a nature is directly inclined. This is clear because one particular good can be at odds with another, and so the loss of that one is joined to this one, and *vice-versa*; but it is impossible for any evil to be attached to good as a universal, since it includes every reason why something is good. — From these points the antecedent is obvious. And note carefully that we are not saying that being a particular good is the cause of evil, but a condition of

the good on which an evil is based. After all it is not necessary for every badness of something to be a particular good.

The first inference is obvious on the ground that intellectual seeking is naturally inclined to the good as such, because the good as such is not less than the understanding presenting it but is equivalent to it. — The second inference is obvious because demons are of an intellectual nature. — The third inference is obvious from the force of words.

At the first instant of his creation, was a demon evil by the fault of his own will?

3 *ST* q.35, a.3 ad 1, *In II Sent.* d.3, part 2, q.1; *In III Sent.* d.18, a.3 ad 4; *De Veritate* q.19, a.8 ad 2; *De Malo* q.16, a.4; *In Joan.* c.8, *lectio* 6

It seems that a demon, at the first instant of his creation, was evil through the fault of his own will.

(1) After all, John 8:44 says of the devil "he was a murderer from the beginning."

(2) Besides, according to Augustine in *Super Genesim ad lit. I*, the disorder in creation did not precede its formation in time, but only in origin. By 'heaven', which we read was first created, one understands angelic nature unformed (as Augustine says in book *II* of the same work; and where God said "let there be light, and there was light," one understands the formation of angelic nature by its turning to the Word; so angelic nature was at once created and made to be light. But at the same time light was made, it was distinct from darkness, by which we understand the angels' sinning; therefore, in the first instant of their creation, some angels were blessed and some sinned.

c 15:
PL 34, 257

c 1:
PL 34, 269

(3) Moreover, sin is opposed to merit. But in the first instant of its creation, an intellectual nature can merit (such as the soul of Christ and also the good angels). Therefore in the first instant of their creation, the demons were able to sin.

(4) Furthermore, angelic nature is more powerful than bodily nature. But a bodily creature in the first instant of its creation begins to have an operation (as fire, in its first instant of being kindled, begins to move upward). Therefore the angels were able to operate in the first instant of their creation. Each angel either did an upright operation, or one that was not. If it was upright, since they had grace, they merited blessed fulfillment through that grace. Well, in angels, the reward follows immediately upon the merit, as was said above. So they would have been blessedly fulfilled at once and so never sinned — which is false. So the alternative is that in the first instant, by not operating uprightly, they sinned.

q 62, a.5

ON THE OTHER HAND, Genesis 1:31 says, "God saw all that He had made, and it was very good." But among the things He had made were the demons. Therefore, even the demons were good at some point.

ANSWER: some writers have maintained that immediately, in the first instant of their creation, the demons were evil — not by their nature, but by a sin of their own willing, because "he became a devil by turning away from righteousness. With this opinion, anyone can agree," (as Augustine says in *the City of God XI*) "since it does not savor the Manichean heresy, which says the devil has an evil nature." — But since this idea [of immediate sinfulness] contradicts the authority of Scripture (after all, Scripture speaks of the devil under the image of the prince of Babylon in Isaiah 14:12, "how art thou fallen from heaven, O Lucifer, son of the morning?" and Ezekiel 28:13 speaks of the devil under

c.13,
PL 41, 329

the image of the king of Tyre, saying "thou hast been in Eden, the garden of God.") And so this opinion was reasonably condemned by the teachers as erroneous.

Hence other writers have said that in the first instant of their creation, the angels were able to sin but did not do so. — Yet other writers have rebutted this opinion, too, on the ground that the two operations would have come one after the other, and so it seems impossible that they both terminated at the same "now." Obviously, the angel's sinning was an operation posterior to his being created, which terminated at the very existing of the angel, while his sinful operation terminated at his being evil. So it seems impossible that the angel was evil at the first instant he began to exist. [So he not only did not but could not have sinned at that instant.]

But this rebuttal does not seem sufficient; it applies only to time-consuming changes done successively. Thus if a body changes place *after* changing in quality, the alteration and the local motion cannot terminate at the same instant. But if the changes are instantaneous, the terminus of the first and second change can occur in the same instant (thus in the same instant in which the moon is lit up by the sun, the air is lit up by the moon). Well, obviously, creation is instantaneous, and so likewise are the movements of the free will in the angels, since they do not require comparing options and thinking discursively, as is clear from earlier statements. So nothing prevents the terminus of creation and the terminus of the free choice from coming in the same instant.

q 58, a.3

One must say something else, then. It was impossible for the angel to sin in his first instant through an inordinate act of his free will. For although a thing can operate in the first instant in which it begins to exist, an operation beginning simultaneously with the agent's beginning-to-be is in the agent from the One from whom the agent has existence, as moving upward is in a fire from its kindler. So if anything has existence from a deficient agent (one which could be the cause of a defective action), that thing could have had a defective operation in the first instant in which it began to be (as a leg, born lame from weakness of the father's seed, at once begins to limp). But the agent who brought the angels into being, *i.e.*, God, cannot be the cause of a sin. Hence it cannot be said that the devil was evil in the first instant of his creation.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): as Augustine says in *the City of God XI*, when the Bible says "the devil sins from the beginning," [1 John 3:8] one should not think that he was sinning since the beginning of his creation, but from the beginning of his sinning — *i.e.* that he has never stopped sinning.

c.15;
PL 41, 330

ad (2): the separation of light and darkness, taken such that one understands the sins of the demons by 'darkness', is to be understood according to God's fore-

c. 19: PL 41, 333 knowledge. This is why Augustine says in *the City of God XI* that “He alone could discern light and darkness who also could foreknow those about to fall before they fell.”

ad (3): anything going on in “meriting” is from God; so in the first instant of his creation, an angel was able to merit. But the same reasoning will not hold in the case of sin, as I said.

ad (4): God did not separate the angels before some of them turned away and others converted (as Augustine said in *the City of God XI*). And so all of them, having been created in grace, were meriting in their first instant. But some of them immediately put up an impediment to their blessed fulfillment, cancelling their preceding merit. And so they were deprived of the blessed fulfillment they were meriting.

c. 11: PL 41, 327

Cajetan’s Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article, he does three main jobs in line with the three opinions he treats.

On the first opinion, he says three things. (1) He states the opinion itself (that the angel was evil in his first instant). — (2) He accepts from Augustine the point that this opinion need not be coming from the Manicheans. — (3) He says the opinion conflicts with Scripture.

On the second opinion, he says three things. (1) He states the opinion itself (that the angel could have sinned in his first instant but did not). — (2) He states a rebuttal advanced by some writers based on the order between the creature’s action and the action by which he is created. — (3) He rules out this rebuttal because it applies only to successive *temporal* operations, not to those which are instantaneous, such as the angel’s being created and willing.

The third opinion he makes it his own, and he supports it. The conclusion is that an angel not only did not but could not sin in the first instant of his existing.

The support goes as follows. [*Antecedent*:] God, *i.e.* the agent who brought the angels into being, cannot be the cause of a sin; [*inference*:] so the angel could not have been sinning in his first instant. — The antecedent is taken up both for its own sake and incidentally. — Drawing the inference is supported on the ground that an operation beginning with the thing’s very existence is going on in the thing from its agent cause. This is illustrated by a natural operation (*i.e.* the upward motion of fire) and by a defective operation (*i.e.* the limping of a leg from birth; and this [needed saying] because a sin is a defective operation.)

Seven doubts

ii. Over the argument for the last opinion, doubt arises on many fronts. It arises *first* because the fundamental proposition,

every operation beginning with a thing’s existing is occurring in it thanks to the agent from whom the thing has existence,

either means that the operation is occurring there thanks to the agent cause or begetter *directly*, *i.e.* without an intermediate agent (as is believed about the motion of heavy and light things) — and so taken the proposition

is obviously false: for it would follow that a fire does not heat things, and in general, that natural things are not properly efficient causes¹ — or else it means “either way” (indirectly or directly). But then the first problem is the comment St. Thomas added, “as moving upward is in a fire, from its kindler.”

A *second* problem is that one can talk about an operation in two ways, *i.e.* in its substance or in its conditions; and here the talk is going the second way (otherwise it would not be relevant); and so taken the proposition is neither self-evident nor supported by any argument, and so appears to be arbitrary.

A *third* problem comes from Scotus in remarks on *II Sent.* d.5, q.2. In a secondary cause there are two things to consider [Scotus says]: the perfection it gets from its agent cause, and a defect. Thus an operation beginning with the thing’s existing can be traced back to two causes, *i.e.* to the author of the nature for its substance, and to a defect of a secondary cause for its defective condition in operating. Therefore such defect is not to be attributed wholly to the nature’s Agent Cause.

And here is a confirming argument in the case at hand. God who has the rôle of the begetter in this case is the cause of the thing not only in its coming-to-be but also in its being preserved: so the same argument that an operation co-occurrent with a thing’s coming-to-be should be attributed to the Author of the nature just made is the same as the argument for saying that an operation co-occurrent with a thing’s being conserved should be attributed to the Conserver himself. And thus either every operation of a nature produced by God should be attributed to Him, or else none should. There is no more reason for the one attribution than for the other.

iii. There’s also doubt about the application of the middle term to get the conclusion, since it seems to conflict with the words of Augustine in *The City of God XI* and quoted here by St. Thomas. For Augustine says that it does not smell of Manichean heresy to say that an angel voluntarily sinned in the first moment of his existence. But St. Thomas says that it would follow from this opinion that God is directly the cause of a moral

¹ This would follow because God would be the real actor in what every newly created secondary cause seemed to be doing. The situation would be first-instant occasionalism.

Reply comes in § vi

a. 1

Reply is in § vi

Reply is in § vi

evil, just as the one who kindled a fire is the cause of its upward motion. And from this it would follow further that “ergo God is evil,” and restart the Manichean heresy with its plurality of good and evil gods. Therefore, Aquinas seems to have contradicted both Augustine and himself. — This objection was also touched upon by Scotus in the place cited above.

The reply is given
in § vii

iv. Concerning the conclusion itself, Scotus raises two objections against the part of it saying that an angel could not have sinned in his first instant. The first objection is *ad hominem*. The angel in his first instant of being could have merited, you say, and so he could have sinned. The inference is obvious, because meriting and sinning have the same temporal requirements. — Next he argues thus. [*Antecedent: 1st part:*] the angel had in his first instant a power to act that was ready to act but [*2nd part:*] not necessarily settled on acting rightly; [*inference:*] therefore [he was just as ready to sin]. Accepting the antecedent is supported as to its second part, on the ground that the angel did not necessarily have the rightness issue settled anymore in his first instant than in his second.

q 60, a.2

To clear these up

v. To get clear on these things, you need to know that St. Thomas’ argument is founded on the fact that what comes first in anything is the makeup of its nature (as was already said above); and for this reason the first operation of each and every thing is a natural operation, as coming from that thing because it has the makeup of its nature. And since the operation of a nature is, as such, the work of that nature’s Author, it is true across the board that every first operation of a thing is natural and is attributed to the Author of nature. This does not fail to hold in an intellectual nature just because the latter is free; rather, even in the free power itself, the makeup of a nature holds first place, as is already clear from prior remarks.

q 60, a.2

q 60, a.2

vi. So to meet the objections against our first proposition, I say that the proposition is meant *either way*. It means that each thing’s first operation is in it thanks to its agent cause, *i.e.*, in it by reason of what it has from its agent cause. It does not matter whether what it has from the agent cause concurs with the operation strictly efficiently (as fire heats) or by way of a formal source, as some think weight* concurs in [downward] motion. After all, the comparison used in the text is pointing out similarity as to what is attributed to a thing from its agent cause, and not as to how it is attributed.

* *gravitas*

As to the objection about tracing the operation to two roots, a perfection and a defect, it has no place in the discussion at hand, because an equivocation is being committed there [in that objection]. “Defect of a nature” as well as “defect of an operation” comes in two kinds: namely, negative (say because the defective one is not infinite or not of greater perfection), and privative (say, because it does not have a perfection it should have). Our talk here is about a privative defect of operation, which is opposed to a perfection the operation is naturally apt to have and one that is due to an intellectual nature. Hence, if the first operation as a whole is to

be traced back to positive and privative conditions (but not negative ones) of that which is from the Author (or begetter) of that nature, then it has to be the case that the defect of operation boils down to some privative defect of the nature in question, as is optimally illustrated in the text by the example of lameness in legs from birth.

And this makes clear our answer to the confirming argument. The first act’s being natural is not for the same reason as others would be, just as what is fundamental is not so for the same reason as traits arising subsequently. Hence the objection from God’s causality in bringing into being *vs.* conserving is an irrelevance in the case at hand, because these are incidental.²

vii. Against the doubt occasioned by the authority of Augustine, the short answer sustaining Augustine’s remark and St. Thomas’ ratification of it is that (as you see from previous statements and from the text) those who hold that the angel did or could have sinned by free will do not deduce that God is evil; rather, they are shown to ignore a common assumption, *i.e.*, they ignore the nature of intellectual seeking. After all, they argue out of ignorance of the fact that the first movement of the will is a natural one; they do not argue from a suspected wickedness in God. Thus St. Thomas explicitly assumes (along with his adversaries) the opposite of the Manichean heresy; and with a co-assumed metaphysical proposition, he reaches his intended conclusion not by a reduction to the impossible but ostensibly, as is obvious in [the example of] the formation of a [lame] body.

viii. Against the first objection to our conclusion, no other answer is needed because the answer is there in the text — but against the second objection, I deny the second part of its antecedent. For (as is clear from prior remarks) in its first instant the makeup of the nature was nailing down the angel’s will to rightness, but not so in the second instant, because the first act was natural, but the second free. — And you should know that these arguments by Scotus are ones that St. Thomas had already posed to himself in a. 4 of the disputed questions about evils.

in the *ad* (3)

De Malo, q 16,
a.4

Unpacking the answer *ad* (3)

ix. In the answer *ad* (3), two doubts arise. The first is from Scotus (*loc. cit.*) objecting to our saying that an angel could merit in his first instant. For the angel’s first operation is not his own, but that of the Author of his nature, according to you; therefore he could not have been meriting in it. The inference holds because no one merits in an operation that is not his own.

The second doubt is that the first operation is either totally natural or else partly natural and partly free. It is not totally natural, because (for one thing) in purely natural traits we neither merit or demerit: and (for another thing) for St. Thomas, a pilgrim is free in each act as regards the exercise of the act. Therefore the first

² God’s producing and conserving are incidental to a nature or its operation, because they are not ingredients of the nature or its operation. The counter-factual truth that if God did not act, there would be no nature or operation does not make God’s activity “intrinsic” to either.

2/1 *ST*, q 10, a.2-
De Veritate
q 22, a. 6; *De*
Malto, q 6

operation is free in that respect. And if it is, why shouldn't the will, as free, have been able to pose some circumstance of deformity? No reason for this appears — and here is a confirmation. If the will was free as to its exercise, it could elicit that act and not elicit it. So the angel could have sinned by omission, even if not by commission.

x. The **SHORT ANSWER** to this is that the angel's first operation was indeed natural *as to its specification and rightness*; as a result, the angel's nature determined him to make his first act of willing consonant with his own nature as the willer. After all, this is what it is for a will to start acting under its makeup as a nature, *i.e.* as a thing nailed down to this so as not to be nailed down to its opposite, and thus nailed down to rightness in such a way as not to its opposite. For the angel's nature determines him to love God, as the End and Author of nature, and of himself, and to love these so intensely as not to love the opposite — which should be salvaged in the first act. But the angel was free *as to the exercise of the act*, because the angel's will was not necessitated by

necessity of nature to elicit this act in his first instant, although, if he did go into act, his will was determined to an act consonant with his nature by natural necessity. Hence that first operation was his own, and hence could be meritorious.

And the free will was not able to pose a circumstance of deformity, because it was determined to rightness by nature. — Omission of this, although it could have occurred (otherwise the will's freedom would have been nothing) still could not incur the *sin* of omission. After all, a sin of omission includes the makeup of a *voluntary declining*, and hence the act of the will does not have the right necessarily joined to it; but I already said that the angel's will is naturally nailed down to the rightness of its first act, and hence a *sin* of omission could not have occurred in the first instant for the same reason as a sin of commission could not have.

On the answer *ad* (4)

A doubt arises in the answer *ad* (4) which will have to be treated in the next article.

Commentary §§
iv, vii

Was there a delay between an angel's creation and his fall?

Quodl. IX, a.8

It seems that there was a delay between the creation of an angel and his fall.¹

(1) After all, Ezekiel 28:15 says, "Thou didst walk perfect in thy ways from the day that thou wast created, till iniquity was found in thee." But walking is a continuous motion and so takes time. So there was time between the devil's creation and his fall.

*In Ezech. hom. 1:
PG 13, 670*

(2) Besides, Origen says that the ancient serpent "did not travel immediately upon his back and belly." This is understood to indicate his sin. Therefore the devil did not sin immediately after the first instant of his creation.

(3) Moreover, ability to sin is common to people and angels. But there was some lapse of time between man's formation and his sin. So for the same reason, there was some delay between the angel's formation and his sin.

(4) Furthermore, the instant in which the devil sinned was other than the instant in which he was created. But between any two instants there falls an intermediate [instant of] time. Therefore there was a delay between his creation and his fall.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what John 8:44 says about the devil: "he abode not in the truth." And as Augustine says in *The City of God XI*, "we have to take this to mean that he was in the truth but did not remain so."

*c 15
PL 41, 330*

ANSWER: there are two opinions about this, but the more probable one (and the more harmonious with statements by the saints) is that the devil sinned immediately after the first instant of his creation. And one has to say this, if one posits that in the first instant of his creation he performed an act of free choice and was created in grace, as we said before. For since the angels reach their blessed fulfillment through a single meritorious act (as I said above), if the devil was cre-

*a.5, q.62, a.3
q.62, a.5*

¹ It was settled in a. 5 that an angel's being created and his sinning occur in distinct instants of his existence. So the question here is whether there were intermediate instants between these.

ated in grace and had merited in his first instant, he would have received blessed fulfillment [in his second instant] immediately after the first instant, if he had not set up an impediment by sinning.

If one instead posits that the angel was not created in grace, or that he could not have done an act of free choice in his first instant, nothing prevents one from allowing a delay to have occurred between his creation and fall.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad (1)*: bodily motions consuming time are sometimes used as metaphors in Scripture to stand for instantaneous spiritual motions. And thus by 'walk' we understand a movement of free choice tending to the good.

ad (2): Origen says that the ancient serpent "not from the beginning, nor immediately, traveled on his belly," on account of the first instant in which he was not evil.

ad (3): an angel's free choice is irreversible after choosing; and so, if he had not set up an impediment to his blessed fulfillment immediately after the first instant (in which he had a natural first movement towards the good), he would have been confirmed in the good. But the case is not similar with man. And so the argument does not follow.

ad (4): the claim that between any two instants there is intermediate time has truth to it insofar as time is continuous, as is proved in *Physics VI*. But angels are not subject to the heavenly motion by which continuous time is first measured; among angels, time is reckoned by the sheer succession of operations of understanding or loving. Thus the first instant in angels is understood to correspond to the operation of the angel's mind whereby he reflected upon himself in "evening" cognition (because evening rather than morning is mentioned first for each day). And this operation was good in all the angels. But from this operation, some turned by morning knowledge to the praise of the Word, while others, remaining in themselves, became night, "puffing up with pride," as Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Lit. IV*. And thus the first operation was common to all of them, but they separated in the second. In the first instant, all were good; but in the second, the good separated from the evil.

*c 1:
231b 9*

*c 24,
PL 34, 313*

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article, he does three jobs: (1) he reports and compares two opinions; (2) he traces the roots of the first opinion; (3) he states the roots of the second.

As to job (1), he states two things: the opinions and his preference for the negative one. "There was no delay," on the basis of authority and the probability of the thing in itself.

As to job (2): he posits two roots, namely, that the angel performed an act of free choice in his first in-

stant, and that he was created in grace. For from these points (with the addition of a third, namely, that angels reach fulfillment by a single act), it follows that Satan would have secured blessed fulfillment immediately if he had not immediately put up an impediment.

As to job (3): he says that if either of these roots is denied, the other opinion follows. — Notice here that even without the extra third point but granting the other two, there would be a delay between the creation and the fall (though Scotus denies it); but, since that extra

point follows obviously from philosophical premises, Aquinas did not count it here with the other two, about which different views have been upheld.

A leading doubt

ii. At this point a very big doubt comes up, on the ground that the second instant was one of freedom and merit, such that it was free in all the angels immediately after their creation as an instant for meriting and demeriting; so they were all pilgrims at that point; so no angel was blessed at that point. — This is false, firstly, because the angels created in grace and meriting in the first instant immediately secured blessedness unless, *etc.* — It is false, secondly, that through just the one meritorious act they would come to blessedness, because they all had that same one act. — Thirdly, it is contradictory that the angels' pilgrimage was completed by one meritorious or demeritorious operation, and yet an angel was able to put up an obstacle after it [*i.e.* after that one operation]. — These are the points that render St. Thomas' doctrine difficult.

iii. The SHORT THING to say to this is that (as one sees from the *Quodlibetals* of St. Thomas) the angel's pilgrimage is made up of two instants. At the first, he is on pilgrimage in such a way as not to be at the terminus, while at the other he is both pilgrim and at the terminus. The second instant is one of pilgrimage because it comes from free choice; but it is one of being at the terminus because grace is poured out by God consummately. In the same way, in a sinner's conversion to God, one and the same instant is the instant of conversion and the instant of grace's infusion; and universally, in the same way, becoming and being finished are simultaneous in instantaneous events.

Therefore, the second instant's being one of freedom and merit can be understood in two ways: In the first way *as being pilgrimage as opposed to terminus*, and this way of understanding it is denied. In the other way, the second instant is understood as one of being *at the terminus of the pilgrimage*; and so taken it is admitted. But being at the terminus is consistent with freedom, merit, and blessedness, since that act as it arises from free choice and grace is meritorious and yet, as completed by glory, it is the blessed fulfilment. — And thus all the things we have been saying come out true: right away after their first act they reach blessed fulfillment, and they reach fulfillment by just one meritorious act; one act is standing as the pilgrimage, with which another is needed as the terminus. And thus it is consistent to say that after the one act as pilgrimage, it was possible to put up an impediment through another act as terminus. The sheer pilgrimage, after all, consists in one act; but as aggregated with its terminus, it consists of two meritorious acts and instants. — And this is St. Thomas' ultimate resolution.¹

¹ Difficult as it sounds, what Cajetan has just explained is a standard move in Aquinas: the last instant of A is the first instant of B, when A and B are events believed to succeed one upon the other immediately (*statim*). In short, the Common Doctor gave the events a common instant. Usually when he

Many following doubts

iv. But against this are many objections raised by Scotus: in remarks on *II Sent.* d.5, in answer to a question raised in d.4, Scotus attacks two statements made by St. Thomas. The first is that

in the second instant, there was at once merit and reward.

Scotus attacks this because he thinks meriting precedes the reward by a duration, as was sustained in the preceding inquiry, where [a gap between merit and reward] was shown on the basis of grace being complete [consummated] or incomplete according to the recipient's status. q.62, a.4

— The second statement Scotus attacks is that

in the second instant, some angels posed an obstacle.

The basis for the attack is that [*major:*] those who were meriting up until the "now" of being rewarded, have been rewarded in that "now;" but [*minor:*] all the angels, according to you, were meriting up until the "now" of reward, because they were doing so up until the second "now," which, according to you, is the "now" of getting rewarded; [*conclusion:*] therefore they were all rewarded. And thus none of them sinned. — The major is supported on the ground that the "now" of the reward is no longer in the pilgrimage, while those posing an obstacle are on pilgrimage. For another thing, a man existing in merit over his whole life, cannot demerit at the instant of his death, nor can he pose an obstacle to his being rewarded: he has merited, after all, that sinlessness be given to him. — The minor, however, is taken from you Thomists, who suppose that the pilgrimage of all the angels was equal, consisting of two instants (or brief moments).

Replies to these

v. My reply to the first objection is that merit comes in two kinds: the merit of sheer pilgrimage, and the merit of having reached the terminus of it. The merit of sheer pilgrimage precedes the reward by duration [by a time], but the merit of having reached the terminus can be simultaneous with the reward. And it does not follow that the grace would be at once complete and incomplete, rather it would be at once complete grace and *the terminus of incomplete grace*. Merit, after all, occurs in two ways (in pilgrimage and at its terminus) and so implies incompleteness of grace either in pilgrimage or at the terminus. And hence one reasonably infers from the definition of

did this, he was talking about events in *our time*, which he took to be continuous, so that its successive instants were isomorphic with the real numbers. After a given real number, there is no such thing as "the next" real number. Aquinas could not express the notion of immediate succession by saying a second event occurred at "the next instant" after the first. He could only posit a common instant or place the second event after a delay.

But angelic events are *not in our time*. They occur in their own, discontinuous time, in which each angelic operation corresponds to an instant. Well, discontinuous instants are isomorphic to the natural numbers, after each of which there is a "next." So immediate succession happens in angelic events without a common instant or a delay. So the present article, in the answer *ad 4*, said "no delay." Good. But then why is Cajetan still explaining to us the complications of a common instant?

q.61, a.
Cf. q.11
comme
XIII-XIV

merit that he who merits does so prior by duration to being rewarded, as St. Thomas inferred hereabouts, but he did not infer that no instant of merit was an instant of reward. For from the very fact that merit has to be at the terminus of pilgrimage and during the pilgrimage, it has to precede the reward by duration, and the grace has to be complete in status; but from the very fact that after the merit of pilgrimage there follows the terminus, it has to be the case that one instant is simultaneously an instant of merit *with* its reward and the end-point of incomplete grace.²

vi. So, at the risk of disturbing the peace, [I claim that] St. Thomas has been less well understood by those who say that his doctrine in this *Summa* is not the same as what he had taught in the *Quodlibetals*. It even seems to them that this doctrine cannot be salvaged without that one. But please pay careful attention to the fact that, although St. Thomas did not think his opinion differed between the two places, because he held in both of them that two acts of meriting concur, the one as naturally preceding the terminus, the one difference between the two texts is that there he did not regard as false the opinion saying that there had been just one meritorious act, namely the one that was at the terminus, and that no meritorious act preceded it as in pilgrimage; but here he did call that opinion false: in a preceding article [a.4] he explicitly wanted merit to precede the reward in duration. This is not surprising to one who bears in mind the fact that a studious intellect is continually improving. But that whole doctrine which he cited to support the reasonability of that opinion is flatly to be admitted and applied to merit at the terminus; so he pursued it so diligently that the teaching there seemed to need that opinion. A sign of this is the fact that he solves the arguments on the other side by appeal to that doctrine; and yet one sees that he himself in the same place had selected the other opinion; and one also sees that his custom (and that of all authors, unless they say otherwise) is to answer the objections according to the author's own opinion. So it seems that those arguments are the common property of both that opinion and his own; and so he put together common answers from the element common to both doctrines. And pay strict attention to this.³

vii. Against the second objection, I say that meriting up until the "now" of reward happens in two ways: exclusively, and inclusively. In the second way it is true that those meriting are being rewarded, but not in the first way. — And against the first support on the other side, I say that those in the now of being rewarded are at the terminus of life, and can pose an obstacle

² Cajetan is doing it again! Despite the fact that reward with complete grace succeeds meriting with incomplete grace immediately in an angel, Cajetan is presenting a common instant: the terminal instant of merit = the first instant of reward. Why? The answer, I conjecture, emerges in the next §.

³ Cajetan read Aquinas as positing a common instant in q.8 of *Quodlibetal IX*. Thinking the doctrine unchanged between there and here, he loyally does the same. The result is an exact parallel between the end-point of an angel's pilgrimage and that of a man's life, as we are about to read.

as existing in the terminal instant of life. — Against the second supporting argument, I say that at the terminus of a man's life, the meriting of each man is finished, and it does not seem true at that point that the man is impeccable; rather, each man is free as he exists at the terminus of his life, just as is said about the angels.

Doubts about the answer *ad* (3)

viii. No small doubt arises over the answer *ad* (3), because he seems to say mutually contradictory things here, namely that one act of the angel is his first, is natural, and is meritorious. For if it is meritorious, then it is informed by grace (and it is not enough for it to be the act of one having grace, of course). Again, if it is meritorious, it tends towards God (actually or virtually) as to the source of grace and the object of supernatural beatitude; for this is how grace or charity orders everything to God. — And since the act is his *first*, it actually tends towards God as the object of blessedness because actually tending is prior to virtual tending (as universally that which is *per se* ["thanks to itself"] is prior to that which is *per aliud* ["thanks to another"]); it is clear, after all, that an act virtually tending to something tends virtually because there remains in it the force of a prior act tending there actually. But if it is a *natural* act, either as to its exercise or as to its specification, then it is not meritorious. This is obvious about the act's exercise, because, taken as a naturally occurring act, it would not be in any way a free act and hence not in any way a meritorious act. As to its specification, however, the deduction is easy because (so taken) that act would stop at a natural object; therefore it would not tend to the object that supernaturally beatifies in any way; therefore it would not be informed by grace; therefore it would not be meritorious.

And this doubt grows ever larger, because in the *De Malo*, q.16, a.4, St. Thomas wants the naturalness of an angel's first act to be such that the angel could not have been carried simultaneously towards fulfillment's natural and supernatural object in that first instant.

An answer to these

ix. Against this objection I say that, if the words of St. Thomas are pondered, the solution to the difficulties will emerge. In the first place, he did not say that that act of the angel is natural absolutely but that it is a "natural movement toward the good," so that 'is natural' [as I said above in § x of the commentary on article 5] describes the act not unqualifiedly but in its relation to its object. And now we add that 'is natural' nails down the act to such and such an object, namely the good. So St. Thomas was taking 'natural' as contrasting with 'free' and meant to say that the first act of the angel was not totally free (with the freedom that naturally belongs to a created free choice, *i.e.* towards good and evil) but that the angel's movement was "natural" in that it would tend towards the good because it could not be evil; and not "natural" in that it terminated at a purely natural object. As such, being natural nails the act down in its specification by the good (be it natural or supernatural); and it nails down the natural object such that the act is not towards its op-

posite (the bad); but not in such a way that the object cannot be anything else (because it could at the same time be something not opposed to good but perfecting it, like being supernatural). So an angel's first act is natural in two ways; (1) because it tends naturally, *i.e.* not freely, towards the good; (2) because it tends necessarily towards its object whether it is purely natural (say if the angel did not have grace) or is not in conflict with the natural but perfective of it (say, if he was created in grace).

And through this last distinction it finally becomes clear how to understand St. Thomas' doctrine in the questions *De Malo*. Tending towards supernatural things happens in two ways: (1) independently of how* and (2) as conforming to natural things. Tending towards supernatural things independently of how is tending towards them indifferently (doing so well or ill, *etc.*). But tending towards them as conforming to natural things is restricted to tending towards them well, in that evil is outside nature [*praeter naturam*]. And since I have already said that the angel in his second instant was free as between good and evil, but was nailed down to good by his nature in his first instant, he could not have tended in his first instant towards natural things and supernatural ones except insofar as the supernatural is a perfection of the natural. — That this was St. Thomas' thinking is clear from the fact that apprehending the natural and the supernatural at once (as the latter is a perfection of the former) is not a problem, although it would be impossible in the case of independent tending. So from the fact that an angel in his first instant could not apprehend the natural and the supernatural independently, it follows splendidly that he could not sin at that point, since he had to be carried towards natural things. But it is consistent with this that he could have apprehended at the same time something supernatural as a perfection of the natural, in the same way as a further purpose can be apprehended as perfecting an anterior purpose ordered towards it — just as universally we can apprehend and tend at the same time towards the end and the means to it.

Another doubt about the answer *ad* (3)

x. Over the same answer *ad* (3) another doubt arises as to whether the angels in their first instant truly and properly merited eternal life. For if one says yes, then they had an act of love by choice towards the supernatural object of blessedness; and if that was the case, since their choice is irreversible, they were all rendered sinless at that point — which is heretical.

But if one says no, then [*1st inference:*] they did not love God as the object of supernatural fulfillment; ergo [*2nd inference:*] they did not merit, which is the opposite of your doctrine. — The second inference is obvious, because merit only accrues through an act of charity, whose object we know is God as the object of supernatural fulfillment. — But drawing the first inference is supported on the ground that either they loved God as the object of supernatural fulfillment with elective love, or they did so with natural love;

there is no third option. But it was not with natural love, because that does not extend beyond God as a naturally known object, of course. So, if their love was not elective, in no way did they love God as the object of supernatural fulfillment — which was what had to be deduced.

Two answers

xi. To this doubt, there are two answers. The first says that they did not merit strictly speaking — for one thing, because St. Thomas, in his answer *ad* (3), says that their movement was natural. For another thing, because in the answer *ad* (4), he explicitly says the first instant corresponds to the operation in which the angel's mind was reflecting on himself. — For yet another thing, because of the reason adduced on the other side, namely, that a really and truly meritorious act is a chosen act.

xii. But those who give this answer are insufficiently moved to do so, as is shown on three grounds. [A] First, they are making a false assumption. For they believe that an angel in the first instant is converting only towards natural goods; but since he had grace, he merited. Well, this is impossible. For in order that an act be meritorious, it is not enough that it be a not-bad act of one having grace; it has to be informed by grace actually or virtually (just as universally, for an act to pertain to any habit, it has to be informed by that habit), otherwise it would get nothing from that habit, since an act only gets something from it by being informed by it. But if the angel's act was informed by charity, he tended to the object of charity, which is God as He is to be seen supernaturally. And if you add that the angel's first act tended not virtually but actually to the object of charity, then (as I showed) it is impossible that it was a first act meritorious of natural fulfillment alone.

[B] Secondly, [the first answer is seen to be wrong] from the genuine and strict definition of merit. Nothing is required except that one merit eternal life condignly and sufficiently. But this was common to all the angels; for St. Thomas says "some were deprived of the fulfillment they were meriting." Understand this to mean that they merited sufficiently as "in pilgrimage," not as at the terminus (except for those persevering until the end).

in a.6, ad 4

[C] Thirdly, from the answers to the objections. I have already explained how that movement [of the angel's will] was not natural independently, and yet was towards the good. — What St. Thomas says in his answer *ad* (4) is no obstacle. For as one sees there, he is not talking about an angel's turning to himself independently of how but by evening cognition, as contrasted with morning cognition property so called, which is the Beatific Vision. And he meant that two instants are marked by two angelic operations, one of which follows the other, and the first is the evening operation, and the second a morning one: such that the evening cognition is divided into the natural and the revealed, as is every turning to himself and to God short of the turning of enjoyment. — It is obvious that this was really the sense of the text. For one thing, he speaks explicitly about an evening turning as opposed to a morning one. For another thing, the text was concerned about succession: clearly, however many simultaneous operations we posit,

they do not increase the number measuring duration, but all pertain to just one instant; and so there was no need to explain a multiplicity of operations in the first instant. The text indicated it rather by its being an act of nature, *i.e.* turning towards oneself, because that is the basis for all conversions and is more certain.⁴

xiii. When the other side asks if it is by a chosen love, *etc.*, I answer that, 'chosen love' means the same thing as a love that is free not only as to its exercise but also as to its specification; and this last is twofold. So one must draw a distinction as set forth above [in § ix] and say that some love is *wholly free*, and some is *not wholly free* (and we're talking about the freedom naturally belonging to a created will). Totally free is the choice which is also free to be a choice of good or evil; for this freedom naturally belongs to a created free choice. The other is free but not wholly so, because while it is indifferent towards this or that, it is not indifferent as between good and evil. So, the angel loved freely or with a not totally freely chosen love in his first instant, because at that point he was not able to choose evil. — But when Aquinas says that the angel's choice is "irreversible," he is understood to be talking about a choice which is wholly free, and such a choice could not have occurred [until] a second instant.

One could also say that the choice was "natural" for an angel not absolutely but *as having grace* in the first instant of his being and then operating. For from the fact that in that instant an act out of harmony with grace could not have been done, it follows that the free choice (if supernatural factors are included) is determined to be conformable to having grace. This way, although an absolutely natural choice does not tend toward supernatural goods, still the choice natural to one having grace in his first instant tends towards having the supernatural. And that choice is called "natural" because it is nailed down to one outcome (*i.e.* the one conforming to grace in such a way as not to be aiming at its opposite). — And these two answers come down to the same thing.

A further difficulty

xiv. With the above remarks, one's mind is not entirely satisfied; rather a doubt springs up. [*Antecedent:*] If the angels were all really meriting in their

⁴ By 'more certain' [*certior*] he probably does not mean more sure to have happened but more clear-cut, less ambiguous.

act of loving God as he is the object of supernatural fulfillment, [*1st inference:*] then in their second instant they were not bound to actually direct their act towards the object of charity. [*2nd inference:*] Therefore they did not sin by choosing a good without due subjection to God; rather, either they did not sin at all, or they sinned by choosing a bad thing. — Making the first inference is supported, and making the second is also supported.

xv. My REPLY to this is that the argument proceeds from a bad understanding of St Thomas' words. The doubter imagines that the first sin of an angel consisted in just an omission of the actual rule, whereas in fact he sinned by performing an act contrary to the rule. Granted, on the side of his intellect, there was just lack of consideration,* but his free choice not only chose without that rule but *against it* as to how the object was to be achieved. For example, suppose someone makes a cut without the rule and so cuts crookedly; then his act is not only done without the rule but against the rule. Obviously, this is how the angel sinned, because he committed a sin of pride; pride is the contrary of humility and to following God's rules; for as Boethius says, "solely by pride did he set himself in opposition" [*sola superbia se opponit*]. So the angel in sinning withdrew from the virtual charity he had in his first act by willing proudly.

One may also say that the angel in his second instant, because it was the first and last instant of his complete freedom towards good and evil, was obliged to deliberate about the ultimate purpose of his life, as a human being is obliged at the beginning of his exercising free choice.^{5,6}

⁵ The reader will want to compare the brief remark here with Cajetan's more extensive account of a child's first act upon reaching the age of reason; see his commentary on 2/1 ST q.89, a.6, §§ 1–x.

⁶ Not all of this commentary, but the bulk of it has been devoted to resolving difficult conceptual issues posed by "common instants," as the present translator has been calling them. Please review footnotes 1-3. Suppose Aquinas did change his mind between writing *Quodlibetal IX* and writing this *Summa*; would Cajetan's hard work still have been necessary?

If the goal was just to secure immediate succession, surely not. Today even the time of material things is thought to consist of discreet *quanta* of time, each of them a shortest physically possible duration, a Planck time. After each Planck time, there is an immediate "next." What starts and finishes in a Planck time is in a sense "instantaneous," since it is over and done before a second Planck time begins, *i.e.*, in less than a hundred quadrillionth of a second. Do the thoughts and choices of angels really have to be faster than that?

* *inconsideratio*

Was the top angel among those who fell the highest of all the angels?

In II Sent. d.6, a.1; 3 CG c.109, Opusculum XV, De Angelis, c.19

It seems that the angel who was supreme among those sinning was not the highest one of all.

(1) After all, Ezekiel 28:14 says, “thou art the anointed cherub that covereth; and I have set thee so thou wast upon the holy mountain of God.” But the order of cherubim is lower than the order of seraphim, as Denis says in c.7 of *On the Celestial Hierarchy*. Ergo, the angel who was the highest among the sinners was not the highest of all.

(2) Besides, God created intellectual nature to reach fulfillment. So if the angel who was supreme among them all sinned, it follows that God’s arrangement was frustrated in his noblest creature. That is awkward.

(3) Moreover, the more a thing is inclined to something, the less able it is to fall short of it. But the higher an angel is, the more he is inclined to God. So he was less able to fall short of God by sinning. And so it seems that the angel who sinned was not the highest overall but one of the lower angels.

Hom. ii in Evang.
PL 76, 1250

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Gregory says in his homily about the one-hundred sheep to the effect that the first angel who sinned “was the head over all the angel hosts, so as to go beyond their splendor to become more splendid compared to them”

De fide orthodoxa
II, c.4
PG 94, 873

ANSWER: in a sin, there are two things to consider: the proneness to sin, and the motivation. So if we consider in the angels their proneness to sin, then it seems less likely that the higher angels would sin than the lower ones. And this is why Damascene says that the greatest of those who sinned was “the chief of the terrestrial order”. — And this opinion seems to harmonize with the position of the Platonists, which Augustine reported in *The City of God VIII* and *X*. They used to say that all the gods were good, but of the *daimones* some were good and some bad; by ‘gods’ they meant intellectual substances which were higher than the lunar sphere, while by ‘daimons’ they meant intellectual substances below the lunar sphere, though still higher than people in the order of nature. — This opinion is not to be rejected as foreign to the faith, be-

c 13, PL 41, 237
c 11, PL 41, 289

cause the whole of bodily creation is administered by God through the angels, as Augustine says in *De Trinitate III*, and so nothing prevents one from saying that the lower angels were divinely distributed to administer lower bodies, while the higher ones were to administer the higher bodies, and the supreme ones to assist God. It was in line with this doctrine that Damascene that the ones who fell were among the lower ones, among whom also some angels remained good.

But if one considers the motive to sin, more is found in the higher than in the lower angels. After all, the sin of the demons was the sin of pride, as I said above, whose motive is to get preeminence, which is a stronger motive in the higher angels. And so Gregory says the one who sinned was the highest of all.

And this position seems more probable. Because the sin of the angels did not come from any proneness but only from free choice; and so the reason for sin that comes from the motive for it seems to be the one that should be most considered. — Still, the other opinion is not to be dismissed harshly, because even in the highest of the lower angels there could have been a motive like this to sin.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): ‘Cherubim’ is taken to mean fullness of knowledge; ‘seraphim’, to mean ardent or burning ones. Thus cherubim are so called for their knowledge, which is consistent with mortal sin, while seraphim are named after ardent charity, which is not consistent with it. And so the first angel to sin is not called a seraph but a cherub.

ad (2): God’s intention is not frustrated either in those who sin or in those who are saved: God foreknew both outcomes and has glory from both. Since He saves these out of his goodness and punishes those out of his justice. But when an intellectual creature sins, he falls short of his due goal, and this is not awkward in any high creature, set up by God in such a way that he could act for his purpose by his choice.

ad (3): however much inclination to good there was in the top angel, it still did not necessitate him. Therefore he could fail to pursue the good by free choice.

actually *De civitate
Dei IX, c.21,
PL 41, 274*

q.63, a.2

Cajetan’s Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article, he does four jobs: (1) he traces the roots of two opinions; (2) he treats Damascene’s opinion from its root; (3) he treats Gregory’s opinion from its root; (4) he compares the two and their roots.

ii. As for job (1), the roots are a proneness in the sinner, and a motivational power in the object.

As to job (2), he says four things. (a) He states the opinion that the bad angels were of a lower order and that the first of them was just greater among those who preside over earthly things (an opinion coming from the first root). — (b) He states the support for this opinion on the surface, according to the Platonists. — (c) He criticizes that support. — (d) He shows how Da-

mascene's opinion can be well understood. —All the points are clear.

As for job (3), he states the opinion that the higher angels sinned and that the top one among the sinners was the supreme angel over all (and this opinion is from the second root).

As to job (4), he compares the opinions and their

roots as to how probable [tenable] they are; and he says the second opinion is more probable because its root is better. —Then he compares the two opinions in terms of whether either is false, and he says that the first opinion is not to be judged false, because the root of the second opinion applies also to the lower angels.

— Everything is clear.

Was the first angel's sin the cause of the others' sinning?

In II Sent. d.6, a.2

It seems that the sin of the first angel to sin was not the cause of the others' sinning.

De fide orthodoxa II, c.4: PG 94, 876
 (1) After all, a cause is prior to its effect. But all the angels who did sin sinned at once, as Damascene says. Therefore the sin of one was not the cause of sinning for the others.

a.2 (2) Besides, the first sin of an angel can only have been pride, as was said above. But pride seeks pre-eminence. Well, pre-eminence conflicts more with one's being under an inferior than it does with one's being under a superior; and so it does not seem that the demons sinned by willing to be under a higher angel, rather than God. At the same time, the sin of one angel would have been the cause of others' sinning if he had induced them to be subject to himself. Therefore it does not seem that the sin of the first angel was the cause of sinning for the others.¹

(3) Moreover, it is a greater sin to will being under another against God than it is to will being over another against God, because the latter has less motivational power towards sinning. Therefore, if the sin of the first angel was the cause of sinning for others, in that he induced them to be subject to himself, the lower angels would have sinned more gravely than the supreme one—which is against what the gloss on Psalm 104: 26 (“leviathan, whom thou hast formed”) says, namely, “he who was pre-eminent over the others in essence became greater than they in wickedness.” So the sin of the first angel was not the reason for the sins of others.²

Glossa ordinaria III, 241 A

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what it says in Apocalypse 12:4, to the effect that the dragon drew down with him “a third part of the stars.”

I ANSWER: the sin of the first angel was a cause of sinning for the others — not, indeed, a compelling cause but one inducing them as if by an exhortation. A sign of this is seen from the fact that all the demons are subject to that supreme one, as is apparent from what the Lord said in Matthew 25:41, “depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire prepared for the

devil and his angels.” For the order of divine justice has the provision that, in penalty, one is subject to the power of the one at whose suggestion one consented to wrong, according to 2 Peter 2:19, “for of whom a man is overcome, of the same is he brought in bondage.”

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): even though the demons all sinned at once, the sin of one could still cause the sinning for the others. After all, an angel does not need a lapse of time for choosing or exhorting or even consenting, the way a human being does: we need deliberation to choose and consent, and we need a verbal address in which to be exhorted, both of which take time. Yet even a human being, clearly, can begin to speak in the same instant she conceives something in her mind. And at the last instant of her speaking, just when the hearer understands her meaning, the hearer can assent to what she said, as is especially clear in those primordial conceptions “which each person approves upon hearing.” So taking away the time for speech and deliberation that we need, it was possible for other angels to consent in the same instant to what the first angel expressed as his will by an intelligible locution.

cf. Boethius, De Hichdumadibus

ad (2): other things being equal, a proud man prefers to be under a higher boss than a lower one, but if some advantage will accrue to him under the lower boss, which he cannot get under the higher, he chooses to be under the lower boss rather than the higher one. So it was not against the pride of the demons for them to will to be under an inferior boss, consenting to his leadership, desiring him to be their head and duke so that they might attain their ultimate fulfillment by natural power: this is especially so because they were even then subject to a supreme angel in the order of nature.³

ad (3): as I mentioned above, an angel has nothing holding him back but moves with his whole power towards what he is yearning towards, be it good or evil. So, because the highest angel had greater natural power than lower ones, he fell into sin with a more intense motion. And so he became greater than the others in wickedness also.⁴

q.62, a.6

¹ In other words, the objector thinks that Satan could only have caused the fall of other angels by inducing them to be *subject to him*. But being subject to him would not have been a sin in them. So they must have sinned by choosing something other than the one thing Satan could lead them into.

² The objector still assumes that Satan could only cause other angels to sin by inducing them to be *subject to him*; but this time he argues that the choice of subjection would have been a worse sin than his!

³ If I am reading this answer correctly, the objector overlooked the fact that Satan could lead other angels not only to be subject to him but also to seek thereby an alleged benefit that God would not give them.

⁴ Again if I am reading this answer correctly, Aquinas is dismissing the argument that Satan's sin had less motive behind it. Instead he is turning to the point that the devil with his higher nature (rather like a heavier rock) fell in a more headlong fashion than the others; and so their wickedness was not greater than his.

 Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article, a single conclusion answers it: the sin of the first angel was the cause of others' doing likewise — not as forcing them, but as inducing them as if by exhortation. — The support for this is drawn from the outcome, as follows. [*Antecedent:*] The other demons are subject to the first; [*inference:*] therefore they sinned at his suggestion.

The antecedent is supported by the authority of Christ in Matthew 25, "the devil and his angels," *i.e.* his heralds and ministers. — Drawing the inference is supported on the ground that an ordinance of divine justice declares that one is subjected in penalty to the one at whose suggestion one consented to the wrong doing. This is supported by 2 Peter 2.

In II Sent., d 5 ii. In the answer *ad* (1), a doubt arises from Scotus, who argues against the claim that the second instant is a "time" indivisible in itself, or instantaneous. For one thing, the angels sinned with multiple sins of different kinds, not altogether, but in a certain order. For another thing, the sin of the bad angels so tempted the good ones that Apocalypse 12:10 ascribes to the good ones victory over temptation, for their

praise and pre-eminent merit; ergo [the good angels had "time" to be tempted and to overcome]. The inference holds because, if everything had been over and done with in an instant, there would have been no battle between them (or it would have been absurdly easy); and also because the bad angels sinned beforehand and *then* tempted the others, and *then* there followed the ultimate victory of the good angels resisting. Therefore, the "season" of battle and merit was not an instant.

iii. The answer to this in a nutshell is that the whole ordering of sins, battle, and victory, *etc.*, is an ordering of indivisible or instantaneous operations and therefore is not an order of duration but one of nature and [logical] presupposition, just as ever so many illuminations falling on the same thing are instants. — But instant victories deserve supreme praise among those whose natures are not discursive but have everything completely in an instant, even though among us, who understand with continuous steps and time, they are counted as nothing.¹

¹ How can the angels' simple apprehension of Satan's bad example be identically the same act as their rejection of it (or consent to it)? Are simple apprehensions not distinct acts in angelic minds?

article 9

Did as many angels sin as remained upright?

In *I Sent.* d.39, q 2, a.2 *ad* (4); in *II Sent.* d.1, pars 1, a.1 *ad* 3

It looks as though more angels sinned than remained upright.

Topics II, c.6;
112b 11

(1) After all, as Aristotle says, “the bad is for the most part, the good in fewer cases.”

(2) Besides, righteousness and sin are found in angels and people for the same reason. But more people are found to be evil than good, according to Ecclesiastes 1:15, “that which is wanting cannot be numbered.”¹ So the case should be the same among the angels.

(3) Moreover, the angels are distinguished in person and rank. So if more angelic persons remained upright, it would seem that the sinners were not of every rank.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what it says in 2 Kings 6:16 “they that be with us are more than they that be with them,” which is expounded as talking about the good angels, who are with us in battle, and the bad angels, who are opposed to us.

ANSWER: more angels remained upright than sinned. After all, sin is against natural inclination, and things that are done against nature turn up in fewer cases; after all, nature is followed by its effect either always or for the most part.

¹ The English translations follow the Hebrew, as does the LXX. But the objector was relying on the Vulgate, which reads “*stultorum infinitus est numerus*,” i.e. “there is no end of blockheads.”

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): Aristotle is talking about people, among whom the bad arises from the fact that they chase sensory goods, which are known to more people, and leave behind the good of reason, which is known to fewer. But among the angels there is only intellectual nature. So their case is not similar.

The answer *ad* (2) is thereby obvious.

ad (3): according to those writers who say that the devil was a chief among the lower rank of angels, who preside over terrestrial affairs. It is obvious that the ones who fell were not from any rank but the lowest. — But according to those writers who hold that the devil was the chief of a supreme rank, it is probable that others fell from each rank (just as in each rank among human beings there are people making up for the ruin of the angels.)² This view also corresponds better to the liberty of free choice, which can be turned to evil in any grade or rank of creature. — In Holy Scripture, however, the names of some angelic ranks, like Seraphim and Thrones, are not attributed to demons, because these names are taken from ardor of love and divine indwelling, which cannot coexist with mortal sin. But the names attributed to the demons, Cherubim, Powers, and Principalities, are drawn from knowledge and power, which can belong to both the good and the wicked.

² Aquinas is alluding to the Patristic opinion that the human race was created to fill the gap left in heaven by the angels' fall.

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article, a single conclusion answers the question: more angels remained good than fell.

The support is on the ground that what goes against a nature is found in fewer: but sin is against the nature of the angels; ergo [fewer of them sinned].

Inquiry Sixty-Four: Into the punishment of the demons

One turns next to the penalty undergone by the demons. And four questions are raised about this: (1) about the darkening of their minds, (2) about the hardening of their will, (3) about their sorrow, (4) about their place of punishment.

article I

Was the mind of a demon darkened by losing its grasp of every truth?

In II Sent., d.7, q.2, a.1

It seems that a demon's mind has been darkened by losing all knowledge of the truth.

(1) After all, if the demons knew any truth, they especially knew themselves, which is knowing matter-free substances. But this knowledge does not seem to suit their current misery; it seems rather to belong to a great fulfillment. Some writers have put mankind's ultimate fulfillment in knowing such substances.

(2) Besides, what is most manifest in nature seems to be especially manifest to angels, be they good or bad. After all, the reason something is not maximally obvious to us is because our intellect, getting input as it does from sense images,* is weak — just as the reason a bat cannot see sunlight is because the bat's eye is weak. But the demons cannot know God (Who is in Himself the most manifest of all beings, since He is at the apex of truth), because they do not have a clean heart, with which alone God is seen. So they cannot know other things either.

(3) Moreover, knowledge of things had by the angels is of two kinds according to Augustine: *i.e.* morning and evening knowledge. Well, morning knowledge does not belong to demons, because they do not see things in the Word; and neither does the evening knowledge, because evening knowledge gives praise to the Creator (this is why after "evening" it becomes "morning," as it says in Genesis 1).

(4) Furthermore, the angels at their outset knew the mystery of the kingdom of God, as Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Lit. V*, but the demons are deprived of this knowledge because "if they had known, they would never have crucified the Lord of glory" as it says in 1 Corinthians 2: 8. So for the same reason, they were deprived of all other knowledge of the truth.

(5) In addition, whatever truth one knows, one knows either by nature (as we know first principles) or by receiving it from another (like what we know from being taught) or by long experience (such as what we know by finding things out). But the demons do not know truth by

their nature, because the good angels have been divided off from them like light from darkness, as Augustine says, and all manifestation is through light, as it says in Ephesians 5:13. Likewise they do not know through revelation or by teaching from the good angels, because "there is no fellowship of light with darkness," as it says in 2 Corinthians 6:14. Nor do they know any truth by long experience, because experience comes from the senses. Therefore there is no knowledge of truth in them.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Denis says in c. 4 of *On the Divine Names*: "we say the angelic gifts given to the demons have never been changed but are whole and quite splendid." But among these natural gifts is cognition of the truth. Hence there is some knowledge of the truth in them.

ANSWER: knowledge of the truth is twofold: the kind we have by grace, and the kind we have by nature. The knowledge had by grace is in turn twofold: one kind is purely theoretical, as when divine secrets are revealed to someone; the other is affective, producing love for God (and this properly belongs to the gift of wisdom). Of these three cognitions, the first has been neither removed nor diminished in the demons. It follow upon an angel's very nature, after all, who is by nature an intellect or mind; and thanks to the simplicity of an angel's substance, nothing can be taken away from his nature in order for him to be punished by that loss, the way a human being is punished by the loss of a hand or a foot or the like. And so Denis says that their natural gifts remain whole in them. Thus the knowledge that is natural in them has not been diminished. — The second cognition, which is through grace and consists of theoretical truth, is not totally taken away from them but has been diminished, because only as much of the divine secrets is revealed to them as is necessary, whether by the mediation of angels or by "some temporary effect of divine power," as Augustine says in *The City of God IX*; but not like the holy angels, to whom more things were revealed and were more clearly so in the Word Himself. — But they are completely deprived of the third cognition, as they are of charity.

City of God
XI. c 19; PL
41, 333

PG 3, 725

* *phantas-*
matibus

Super Gen. ad
Lit. II, c 22;
PL 34, 317

c.19
PL 34, 334

loc. cit.

c.21,
PL 41, 274

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): happiness lies in attention to what is higher. The matter-free substances are above us in the order of nature, which is why people can have some reason to be happy if they know those substances, even though man's perfect happiness lies in knowing the First Substance, i.e. God. But to a matter-free substance, knowing such a substance is connatural, as it is connatural to us to know empirical natures. So just as man's happiness does not lie in knowing empirical natures, so also the happiness of an angel does not lie in his knowing matter-independent substances.

ad (2): that which is maximally manifest in nature is hidden to us because it exceeds the proportion of our intellect, and not just because our intellect receives input from sense-images. But the divine substance exceeds not only the proportion of human understanding but also that of the angels. So even an angel himself cannot know God's substance thanks to his nature — but he can have a higher knowledge of God through his own nature than man can, because of the completeness of the angel's intellect. And such knowledge of God remains even in demons. For although they do not have the purity which comes through grace, they still have a purity of nature, which suffices for the knowledge of God that suits them from their nature.

ad (3): a creature is darkness compared to the excellence of divine light; and so the creature's knowledge, as had in and of his own nature is called "evening" knowledge. For evening adjoins darkness but still has some light in it (since what lacks light entirely is night). So, then, the knowledge which angels have of things in their own nature, when attributed back to the praise of the Creator (as it is in the good angels) still has something

in it of divine light and so can be called "evening." But if this knowledge is not attributed back to God, as among the demons, it is not called evening, but "nocturnal." Hence also in Genesis 1:5 we read that the darkness which God separated from the light "He called night."

ad (4): all the angels knew in some way from the beginning (especially from being blessed with the Vision of the Word, which the demons never had) the mystery of the kingdom of God, which was fulfilled by Christ. But not all the angels knew it completely or equally. Much less, then, did the demons know the mystery of the Incarnation completely when Christ was in the world. For God "did not reveal it to them," as Augustine says, "as He did to the holy angels who enjoy participated eternity in the Word: but He showed them — as they trembled — what they had to know through certain temporal effects." But if they had known Him to be the Son of God and known the effect of His passion completely and with certitude, they would never have seen to it that the Lord of Glory was crucified.

ad (5): demons know some truth in three ways. In one way, it is by the subtlety of their nature, because although they have been darkened by losing the light of grace, they are still lucid with the light of intellectual nature. — In the second way, they know some by revelation from the holy angels, with whom they do not agree by conformity of will but still agree by likeness of intellectual nature, thanks to which they can receive what is manifested by others. — In the third way, they know by long experience, not as if receiving from the senses, but when a likeness of their innate intelligible species is fleshed out in particulars, they know as present some things which they previously did not know would happen, as I said in discussing the angels' knowledge.

City of God
IX, c.21; PL
41, 274

q 58, a.3 *ad*
3

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article, he does two jobs: (1) he sets down a three-part distinction; (2) he draws conclusions corresponding to the three parts. — The distinction is that knowledge is twofold: natural or grace-given, and this latter is theoretical or affective.

The first conclusion is: their natural cognition is neither taken away nor diminished. This is supported on two grounds: (1) because it's a consequence of a simple nature; and (2) on the authority of Denis.

The second conclusion is: grace-given theoretical knowledge is not wholly removed but diminished. — This is supported on the ground that few things were revealed to them and obscurely so, as needed, through angels or through effects; but more things were revealed to other angels and more clearly.

The third conclusion is: their affective knowledge is entirely taken away. — The support is on the ground that charity has been taken away.

Has the will of the demons become obstinate in evil?

In II Sent. d.7, q.1, a.2; De Veritate q.24, a.10, De Malo q.16, a.5

It seems the demons' will has not become stuck in evil.

(1) After all, freedom of choice belongs by nature to an intellectual nature, which remains in the demons, as was said above [a. 1]. But freedom of choice is intrinsically and first-off* aimed more towards good than towards evil. Therefore the will of a demon is not stuck in evil but can return to the good.

(2) Besides, God's mercy (being infinite) is greater than the malice of demons (which is finite). Well, from an evil one is guilty of, no one comes back to the good of being righteous except through God's mercy. Therefore even the demons can turn back from their state of malice to their state of righteousness.

(3) Moreover, if the demons have a will that is obstinate in evil, they have that obstinacy mainly in the sin by which they fell. But that sin (pride) no longer remains in them, because the motive for it (pre-eminence) no longer remains either. Therefore a demon is not stubborn in evil.

(4) Furthermore, Gregory says that one man can be restored through another because he fell through another. But the lower devils fell through the influence of the first devil, as was said above. Therefore their fall can be repaired through another. So they are not "stuck" in evil.

(5) In addition, anyone who is obstinate in evil never does a good work. But a demon has done some good work: after all, one of them confessed the truth, saying to Christ, "I know who thou art, the Holy One of God" in Mark 1:24; also the demons "believe and tremble" as it says in James 2:19; and in chapter 4 of *On the Divine Names*, Denis also says "they desired the good and the best: to be, to live, and to understand." Therefore they are not obstinate in evil.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what is said in Psalm 74:23, "the tumult of those that rise up against thee increaseth continually," which is taken to be about the demons. So, they have persevered in stubborn malice.

I ANSWER: Origen held the view that every creaturely will, on account of freedom of choice, can bend towards the good and towards the evil, except [the will in] the soul of Christ, on account of its union with the Word. — But this view takes away the reality of blessed fulfillment from the holy angels and from holy people, because everlasting stability is a defining trait of genuine fulfillment; this is why it is called "eternal life." The view also conflicts with the authority of Holy Scripture, which proclaims that demons and bad people are to be sent "into the everlasting fire" while the good are to be borne into "eternal life." — Hence this opinion is to be called an error, and one must hold firmly, according to the Catholic faith, both that the will of a good angel

has been confirmed in the good, and that the will of the demons has been made stubborn in evil.

The cause of their obstinacy, however, should not be taken from the gravity of their fault but from the condition set by the state of their nature. For "the fall is to angels what death is to people," as Damascene says. It is obvious that all of peoples' mortal sins, be they great or small, can be remitted before they die; but after death they cannot be remitted but remain perpetually.

So, to find the cause of such obstinacy, one must consider the fact that in all agents, the power to seek is proportionate to the power to apprehend by which it is moved, as a changeable thing is moved by a changer. Thus, as a sense apprehends a particular, while the intellect apprehends a universal, so also sensory appetite is for a particular good, while willing is for good as a universal, as I said above. — But angelic apprehension differs from ours in that an angel apprehends with his intellect incorrigibly* (as we apprehend just the first principles we get by intuitive understanding[†]) while we apprehend by our reason corrigibly, going from one point to another, and having a way of getting to opposite conclusions. And so man's will also adheres to something corrigibly, as if being able to pull back from it and adhere to its opposite: but an angel's will adheres fixedly and incorrigibly. So if an angel is considered prior to his adhesion, he can freely adhere to this and its opposite (*i.e.* in matters he does not will naturally); but after he has adhered, he adheres incorrigibly. Hence we customarily say that the free choice of a human being is flexible towards opposites *both before choosing and afterwards*, while the free choice of an angel is flexible *before choosing but not afterwards*. — So, then, the good angels, always adhering to righteousness, are confirmed in it; but the bad ones, sinning, are obstinate in sin. — I shall deal later with the obstinacy of humans who have been damned.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): both good and bad angels have free choice, but after the manner and condition of their nature, as I said.

ad (2): God's mercy frees those who repent of sin; but those who are incapable of repentance, adhering to evil incorrigibly, are not freed by divine mercy.

ad (3): the sin with which the devil first sinned remains in him as far as the willingness[‡] for it is concerned, but not so far as to include his believing that he can succeed. The case is rather as if a man believed he could commit murder, and willed to do it, and afterwards lost the power to do it; nevertheless the will for murder can remain in him, such that he still wills to have done it, or wills to do it still, if only he could.

ad (4): the fact that man sinned at the suggestion of another is not the whole reason why man's sin is forgivable. And so the argument does not follow.

De fide orthodoxa II, c.4, PG 94, 877

q.59, a.1

* *immobiliter*
† *intellectus*

‡ *appetitus*

ad (5): an “act of a demon” comes in two kinds. One kind arises from his deliberated willing; and this kind is properly called “his act.” A demon’s act of this kind is always an evil one, because even if he sometimes does a good thing, he still does not do it the right way; for example, when he tells the truth, it is in order to deceive,

and when he “believes” and “confesses,” he does not do it voluntarily but as compelled by the evident character of the fact. —The other kind of “act of a demon” is natural; this kind can be good and attests to the goodness of his nature. And yet the demons abuse even such good acts for wicked ends.

Cajetan’s Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article, he does two jobs: (1) he deals with Origin’s opinion; (2) he determines the truth of the matter.

ii. As for job (1), he does two things. Firstly, he states the opinion in its two points, with the reasons for each: *i.e.* that every created will is changeable, but not that of Christ; the reason for the first is free choice; the reason for the second is union with the Word. — Secondly he judges this opinion as to be avoided as erroneous, giving both an argument and an authority. The argument is: it would ruin the defining makeup of blessedness in the saints. The authority is that of Christ.

iii. As for job (2), he says three things. (1) He states the conclusion that answers the question: *the demons are obstinate in evil*, and the saints are confirmed in the good. (2) He shows where to find the reason for this: *i.e.*, not in the sheer gravity of their fault (because all faults can be forgiven) but in the condition given to their nature by their state, namely, that of being outside the state of pilgrimage, because “the fall is to angels as death is to people.” (3) He assigns a reason for this.

iv. Here notice firstly that St. Thomas has not said the gravity of the fault is not a cause but that it is not *the* cause of so great an effect. In reality, if the gravity of a fault is big enough for the fault to be mortal sin, it is a *demeritorious cause* of obstinacy (causing by its genus because it is mortal; by its species because it is pride; from its source because it comes of bad will; and thanks to the sinner’s condition, because he is so spiritual a being, *etc.*). It is only fair that someone who did wrong not venially but to such an extent that he made himself incapable of acting well deserves the penalty of not being able to will well.¹ But such a cause is

not the sufficient and proximate cause of obstinacy, because the fault’s gravity, however great, does not exclude the possibility of forgiveness.

v. Notice secondly that we are asking about two causes of obstinacy, one subordinate to the other. The proximate reason why the evil ones have become obstinate (and the other angels, confirmed) is their state, *i.e.* the fact that they are outside the state of pilgrimage. After all, the condition of pilgrims is one of changeability from good to evil. But the reason why an angel, by falling, ceases to be in the state of pilgrimage, as a human being ceases by dying, is the prior cause of their obstinacy (and others’ confirmation); for it is the cause of the no-longer-pilgrim state, which is the cause of the obstinacy. And hence the former is the main cause.²

Analysis of the article

vi. So, after having established their state (on the authority of Damascene, in the text), the cause of the obstinacy, *i.e.* the main cause, is presented. Here he does three things. The first is assigning this cause. [*Antecedent:*] **An angel apprehends incorrigibly; and so [inference:] after he has once chosen the good or the bad, his choice is irrevocable.** — The antecedent is supported on the ground that an angel apprehends without discursive thinking (as we apprehend first principles). [*Drawing the inference, however, is supported [a]* on the ground that (in all cases) **a power to seek is proportioned to a power to apprehend** (as the changed is proportioned to its changer); this is exemplified in us, where particular seeking follows upon a particular apprehension, and universal seeking upon universal apprehension; *and [b]* on the companion ground that a **corrigible apprehension is followed by revocable seeking** (as is clear in man, where our apprehension differs from that of an angel because it is corrigible, since it can go by discursive thinking to opposite outcomes, and our choosing is also revocable).

The second thing he does is confirm our customary differentiation between free choice in angels and in people. — The third thing he does is postpone his discussion of human obstinacy to another place, in the Third Part.³

² The main cause explains the obstinacy not as a penalty but as a psycho-metaphysical consequence of the demons’ choice.

³ St. Thomas died before reaching this topic in the third part of the *Summa*. What is printed there these days as q.98, aa. 1, 2, is taken from his earlier comments on *1^o Sent.*, d.50.

¹ One needs to understand that obstinacy in sin is (in part) a penalty for the choice to sin, and the relevant question is on what basis a sin could be said to deserve so great a penalty. This is the job of a “demeritorious cause”: to explain why the wrongdoer deserves his penalty. In the case at hand, the devil’s choice was of a mortal sin, specifically one of pride, which arose out of bad will on his part (malice) and arose in so purely spiritual a being. Similarly in human affairs, the gravity of the crime is a “demeritorious cause” of the death penalty in case (1) the criminal’s choice was not just to commit a crime but the specific crime of murder (2) out of sheer ill will toward the victim (3) when the criminal himself is a prosperous bloke, never injured by the victim, and so unable to plead extenuations.

Above, I called obstinacy a penalty “in part,” because of what is coming in the next paragraph and in footnote 2.

Doubts about accepting the antecedent

vii. Concerning the antecedent assumed in this argument, doubts arise. The first has to do with the discursive thinking we deny in angels. It has been discussed above [q.58, a.3], [but it will need attention* again].

The second ground is that an equivocation has been committed on 'apprehension'. In corrigibility belongs to an angel's natural apprehension, but now we are talking about his practical apprehension in supernatural matters, concerning which he sinned. The fact that this sort of apprehension is not incorrigible is obvious in the case the demon who advocated the death of Christ and afterwards advised against it through Pilot's wife.⁴

Thirdly the antecedent is wrong about the source of incorrigibility. Absence of discursive thinking is not an adequate reason for apprehension to be incorrigible. [It is not a necessary condition because] even corrigible thinking is compatible with incorrigible apprehending, as with geometrical conclusions.⁵ [Nor is it a sufficient condition because] corrigible knowing is consistent with absence of discursive thinking, given a succession of cognitions of simple things. The knower who knew something in act without discursive thinking would be in potency to know the opposite; thus if one knew that every whole is greater than its part, one would be in potency to know the opposite by simple apprehension.⁶ So if by simple apprehension one knew an argument for some conclusion, and afterwards apprehended (by simple apprehension) another and better supported argument for the opposite conclusion, one's mind could be bent towards this latter.

Fourthly, the assumed antecedent omits the true source of incorrigibility, namely, connaturality. From the fact that knowledge of some things is naturally implanted in us, be it speculative or practical, there arises an incorrigible apprehension (as is clear in the case of first principles). This is what excludes potency to the opposite, and not the fact that these are known by simple apprehension; we experience as much in the first operation of our intellect.⁷

Fifthly, if an angel apprehends incorrigibly, then since they all apprehended God as a fulfilling object

⁴ The story comes from a large apocryphal literature about Pilate and his wife. Cajetan will not challenge it, because it poses demonic ambigoly rather than repentance.

⁵ The objector says "conclusions"; so he thinks Euclid's theorems, once proved, are objects of incorrigible (what? assent?) even though the proofs for them are corrigible?

⁶ Did the objector mean simple apprehension or intuitive apprehension? They were not the same. There was no such thing as simple apprehension of a proposition, much less of an argument!

⁷ Simple apprehension was the "first" operation of the intellect because it was prior to judgment; it brought an undescribed object under a concept (description); but it was not immune to criticism or subsequent improvement. Hoping for incorrigible first impressions is what killed critical Positivism.

more loveable than any other, etc., in their first instant of existence, they always kept this practical knowledge and so did not sin in their second instant.

Doubts about drawing the inference

viii. Doubt about drawing the inference arises over its two supporting grounds, and over its own content.

Scotus argues against the first supporting ground [a power to seek is proportioned to a power to apprehend, because the latter moves the former] in remarks on *II Sent.* d.7. In the first place, he says, either you mean a sufficient mover, or an insufficient one. If you mean an insufficient one, then it is obviously false that the item moved has to be proportioned to it, although it is true that the will is moved this way by the intellect. But if you mean a sufficient mover, although it is true that the moved has to be proportioned to a sufficient mover, it is still false (and conflicts with your own claims) that the intellect is a sufficient mover of the will. You will admit that this is false in d.25. — It conflicts with your own claims because two points follow from it: (1) that an angel could not have sinned, (2) and that his will would have been incorrigible not only after his first choice, but in that choice, or before it. — The first of these is deduced as follows. Prior to sinning, an angel's intellect apprehends rightly and incorrigibly, and it moves his will (because a punishment is not present before the fault); and as the intellect is, so it moves the will, because it moves it naturally. Therefore a will, moved irrevocably by a right and incorrigible intellect, tends towards the right irrevocably. Therefore it could never sin. The second point is deduced on the ground that the account given of the first apprehension must also be given to subsequent ones: they are all incorrigible.

ix. At the same time, Scotus argues against the second supporting argument and the inference, on the ground that incorrigibility of understanding is consistent with mutability of willing, as we see in the case of a human being who is certain about some conclusion through discursive thinking. From this, after all, it follows firstly that the inference is not valid, because if it were, the will of a man sure of some things would also be irrevocable. — And it follows secondly that the difference assigned between the will of an angel and that of a man does not hold up. Incorrigible understanding is found in an angel without discursive thinking but also in a human being without discursive thinking. Yet a human will remains changeable. So it should remain so in angels too.

x. The same Scotus, in the same place, objects to the inference itself, because an effect common to people and angels should be assigned a cause common to both. But [major:] obstinacy is the common effect and for one and the same reason in both, as Augustine* suggested in *De Fide ad Petrum*, c.3. [Minor:] But incorrigibility of apprehension is not common to an angel and a human; [conclusion:] ergo [it is not the genuine cause]. — The minor is supported as follows. Since a human being in this life never becomes obstinate in evil, his separated soul becomes obstinate either without a previously incorrigible apprehension, or with one made in the sepa-

* to be given in §
xiii

A reply is in § xv

A reply is inferred
from § xiii below

A reply is inferred
from § xiii below

The reply is
coming in § xv

The answers
come in § xv

The reply is in
§ xvii

* Fulgentius

rated state. Not the second, because a separated soul does not merit. Therefore the first alternative is right, which is the point intended. — And here is a confirmation: the soul of Lazarus was separated from his body and yet it had not become irrevocable in good or in evil.

Reply is coming in
§.xviii

Doubts about the Conclusion

xi. Scotus (*loc. cit*) objects to our conclusion, intending to prove that the will of an angel is not inflexible after his choice, on four grounds.

* Fulgentius

The first ground is the authority of Augustine* in *De Fide ad Petrum* c.3, where he wants it be the case that if a human being could restore himself to righteousness, much more an angel could. Therefore, says Scotus, the nature of an angel does not conflict with reversion to the good any more than human nature does. But if the angel's will were inflexible after his choice, his nature would conflict more than ours, as is obvious. Therefore [his post-choice will is not inflexible].

The reply is in §
.xix

The second ground is an argument of the following sort. Setting aside impediments, a total cause *C* does not cause differently unless *C* itself stands differently *qua* cause. Therefore [*major:*] a will does not cause its acts differently after its first choice, unless it itself, *qua* cause, stands differently. But [*minor:*] from the mere fact that it made a first choice, a will does not stand differently *qua* cause. Therefore [*conclusion:*], a will can cause its subsequent acts with the same free authority as it had in causing its first. —The entire reasoning process is clear, and the key proposition (that after its first choice the will did not stand otherwise *qua* cause) is supported on the ground that a will is a cause prior to its act, and not as it stands under its act; but the prior as prior is not varied by the posterior.

The reply is still in
§.xix

And this is confirmed by the fact that no secondary cause can be a cause in a manner opposed to that of the principal cause of acting, when that manner belongs to the principal cause by virtue of its causality — otherwise it would not be a principal cause. But the will of itself acts freely. Therefore, through no added habit or act does it act necessarily.

The reply is still in
§.xix

The third ground is that a demon has sinned by multiple sins not all at once. Therefore no adhesion made him obstinate and put him at the end of his pilgrimage.

Reply is inferred at
the end of §.xx

The fourth ground is that (according to you Thomists) every angel in his first instant of existence merited and adhered to the good. So every single one did so irrevocably; and so the angels were *all* impeccable — which is false.

Reply is inferred at
the end of §.xx

xii. Arguing against the same conclusion are Durandus[†] and Gregory of Rimini.[‡] Their ground is the claim that it would follow from our conclusion that the good angels are *naturally* conformed in the good and so [by their nature] cannot will badly — which is against St. John Damascene, who says “they are now irrevocably set . . . not by nature, but by grace.”

† *In II Sent* d.7, q.2
‡ *In II Sent*. d.7,
q.1, a.2

De fid. ortho., c.3
The reply is in §.xx

Answers to the first batch of doubts

xiii. Against the doubt about accepting our antecedent, I reply that St. Thomas's position is based on two propositions. The first is that an angel's natural cognition is incorrigible. —The second is that his supernatural cognition follows the manner of his natural cognition and so is also incorrigible.

The first proposition is not based on any other foundation than the one St. Thomas put down in the text, namely, absence of discursive thinking. But this is to be understood as meaning discursive thinking not just in act but also in *potency*, so that the conclusion to incorrigibility is not drawn from the mere fact that some knowledge is acquired without discursive thinking, but from that fact that, since the absence of such thinking is natural to the angels' nature, a point they know neither does nor can terminate discursive thinking. From this, obviously, changeability through change of [cognitive] habit is also excluded. For since what is naturally put into each intellectual nature has to be an unchangeable knowledge (as is clear from the fact that even our soul is so endowed, which is the lowest of all intellectual natures), if knowledge of some things is congenital and knowledge of the rest is left to be acquired, it is necessary that one finish one's knowledge by discursus that takes one from the known starting points to the unknown conclusions, as we see in ourselves. After all, it is not possible to say that higher intellectual creatures have such inborn knowledge of some things but lack any habitually known starting point for getting to other things left unknown, since having this sort of starting point belongs to nobility, with ignorance of other things presumed. But if knowledge of everything is inborn, there can be no place for discursive thinking, nor for change of habit; rather, knowledge of everything stands to that nature as knowledge of the first principles stands to ours; and hence is entirely incorrigible. And thus the root of incorrigible cognition is *not doing discursive thinking at all*, in act or potency. For one who is intellective in this way actually has habitual cognition of everything inborn in him and so has no potency to the opposite, and so his cognition is incorrigible.

The second proposition is based on the point that everything received in something is received after the fashion of the recipient, and that grace perfects a nature in a way conforming to that nature, and we have the experience that we know and judge of supernatural things in the same way we do of natural things, though without the same evidentialness.

xiv. From these remarks emerges our answer to all of the objections on the other side, except for the last one. No equivocation has been committed; rather, incorrigibility has been verified for every angelic cognition, natural or supernatural (although verification is of the natural first and of the supernatural afterwards, through the natural, and not through itself).

stated in §.vii

Our negation of discursive thinking, not just actual such thinking about a particular cognition of one thing, but about discursive thinking in potency as well as in act, and affecting the whole nature of a knower, has been put

down as the cause of cognitive incorrigibility, for from such a negation there arises the negation of any way to the opposite, *i.e.* groping from starting principles to conclusions: and where this negation is found wholly, it brings with it a related negation of change of [cognitive] habit, as is obvious, and hence there is no way open to the opposite.⁸

xv. Against the last objection, one needs to say that when we say every apprehension of an angel is incorrigible, we mean every *complete* and *judiciary* [judgment-like] apprehension; such that, once angels have decided something, they have decided it permanently. Thereby we exclude not only the objection from the demon's vacillation over the death of Christ but also objections from the battle of the good angels in Daniel [10:13, 20, 21] and other cases of this kind. In none of them was there a total apprehension but more like a tentative one, doubtful and suspended. Similarly, the decision of the angels in their first instant of existing was not a complete decision — not because of a hesitancy or puzzlement, but because of a defect of freedom. After all, in a mere pilgrim, a decision about loving the supernatural end requires (of its very nature) that the pilgrim be free towards the good and the evil; otherwise it is not complete. In the first instant of their existence, the angels' apprehension was not free as between good and evil but was necessarily nailed down to the good, as was their [partly] free choice itself, as I said, and so it was not out of full liberty that they decided that the divine good was to be loved above all; and so they did not decide irrevocably. But in their second instant of existence, the decision was fully in the scope of their liberty, no evidentness convincing their mind on either side; since the decision was about supernatural matters, they were still free towards good and evil. And so what they then decided was immutable.

This connaturality of cognition has been touched upon and has been included as a root of incorrigibility, by putting total absence of discursive thinking properly so called into the whole of a nature. For, as I said, this obviously implies having habitual knowledge of all [natural] things, as we have of first principles.

⁸ This doctrine about the cause of cognitive incorrigibility precludes all hope for a human science that would be incorrigible, despite the dreams of Descartes and his many heirs (including the Husserl of *Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft*). For unless a human being can know in the sciences everything he or she seeks to know in them without thinking discursively (*i.e.* without ever needing to do some reasoning), he or she cannot enjoy incorrigible scientific knowledge, according to St. Thomas, if Cajetan is reading him correctly. What little we know "connaturally" by intuitive apprehension (*intellectus*) is of no help, unless one thinks that the "first principles" strictly imply every matter of fact.

⁹ An angel's self-apprehension in his first instant of existing included the whole of what is natural to him but did not include the fact that his fulfillment is to be found in a *special* way of enjoying God's company. If Soto and others thought Aquinas meant that this way of being fulfilled was natural to rational creatures, this article should have stopped them.

Answers to Scotus

xvi. To meet the objections which Scotus raised against our first supporting argument for drawing our inference, I say that we are talking about a mover which is sufficient in its own order; for what we understand [to be good] is a sufficient mover of our will as an object [*objectivē*] and as a purpose-cause [*causa finalis*]. And this is not false, as will become clear below when we inquire into the intellect and the will. — Also, this does not conflict with Aquinas's other statements; neither of the ones alleged disputes that what the angels understood moved their will to their first choice, not badly, but deficiently, as came out above. And so, being defective as to rectitude, their understanding moved their will incorrigibly to a bad act. — The second alleged awkwardness can be understood in two ways. In one way it would make the first choice incorrigible in such a way that in natural priority to the choice's being made, we would understand that it could not be made otherwise. And this properly speaking, is incorrigibility *prior to choice*, and is impossible for an angel. In the other way, it would say that the first choice, having been made, could not be revoked. And it is in this way that every choice made by an angel is irrevocable. And this is obviously our position.

xvii. To meet his objection against our second supporting argument, I say that the assigned difference is optimal; and as far as practical or affective knowledge in a particular case is concerned (speaking of it with its other particular circumstances), no cognition reached by discursive thinking is incorrigible for any human being, naturally speaking. After all, judgment in particular matter (to do it now, here, for this purpose, *etc.*) can always be changed, either because one is moved by the upsurge of a passion, or because an apparently more probable means has occurred to one, or because one forgot one's previously chosen means, or did not think about it — all these things pertain to discursive thinking. But this is not how things go in an angel, in whom the conclusion with the means to it is always available, because there is no discursive thinking going on. Hence it is clear that the difference between thinking discursively and not thinking discursively in what one wills, induces the revocability or irrevocability of one's choice.

xviii. To meet his objection against our inference itself, I say that the obstinacy of a demon and of a separated soul are not due to entirely the same reason, either according to the truth of the matter, or according to Augustine;^{*} and so it is not necessary that they have the same cause under a constant definition. To the extent that they are somewhat due to the same reason, it is due to the fact that they have a somewhat common cause; and it is the incorrigibility of the understanding and willing in a soul posited to be outside the state of pilgrimage. And I say that a soul becomes obstinate through the first act its will elicits in the state of separation from the body; I also say that a soul demerits at that point not as being still in pilgrimage but as being at the end thereof, as came up earlier. As for the soul of Lazarus, although it was outside the present life, it was still not outside the pilgrim state,

in § viii

q 80, a.2

q 63, a.1 ad 4

in § ix

§ x

* Fulgentius

q.63, a.6,
Comm. §§ iii ff

thanks to a divine dispensation (which is bound by no law). — This needs no supporting argument, because it was obvious to the senses.

xix. To meet Scotus's argument [in § xii] against our conclusion, I respond first to his appeal to the authority of Augustine [*Fulgentius*]. The truth of our statement is consistent with the truth of that quoted conditional [if people could, angels could]. After all, committing a mortal sin can only be undone by the efforts of a *divinized* nature, *i.e.* by grace. And if that were natural to a man it would be natural *a fortiori* to an angel, who is “an utterly pure mirror receiving the whole (if I may say so) of God's beauty,” according to Denis. For consistent with the truth of this conditional is the fact that neither man nor angel can rise back up from evil [by his natural power], and that an angel adheres incorrigibly to the evil after he has chosen it.

On the Divine
Names, c.4

Then against Scotus's argument, I say that [his claim], “the will as prior to its act is the cause of its act” can be understood in two ways. In the first way ‘act’ quantifies over every act of the will unqualifiedly, and the meaning is “the will, as prior to its every operation, is the sole cause of everything it wills.” And in this sense, the proposition is flatly false; for this is the way the will is the cause of its first volition only; after all, a will affected by its first act (which is love for a purpose) wills other things, and a will that is bare of influence from its first act does not will anything except the purpose it willed first.¹⁰ — Secondly, if ‘act’ is quantifying more limitedly, and the meaning is “a will as prior to its act of choosing is the cause of that act,” this is perfectly true, since, across the board, an efficient cause is prior to its effect in natural order. — And no other cause of this [act of choosing] needs to be sought, unless it is the will's very nature, to which the trait of causing one way when bare and another way when attracted belongs naturally, in that it passes to the nature of what is attracting it.

Against Scotus's confirming argument, I say that an obstinate will is free and causes its acts freely, even though it is not free with the freedom towards good and evil. So, simply speaking, the following argument is not valid: “the will is nailed down incorrigibly to the evil, therefore it is not free.” Indeed that argument is a fallacy of the consequent, going from denying the less common to denying the more common.¹¹ For just as

¹⁰ The will's first act was its being attracted to a good, and this good (to the extent one kept willing to pursue it) became a “purpose” because one thought of means to secure it. Thus the will's first act was its attraction to a purpose, and the scholastics called this attraction “love” for the good or purpose. To be attracted to a purpose, a will needs no prior act of its own; but to will anything beyond that initial purpose (such as means to it), the will does not act alone as a cause but hand-in-hand with the influence of the “love” just mentioned.

¹¹ A fallacy of the consequent tries to go from ‘if *p* then *q*’ to ‘if *q* then *p*’. Here *p* is “the will is indifferent towards good and evil,” and *q* is “the will is free.” The fallacy in this case will consist of going from ‘not *p*’ (“the will is not indifferent in this way”) to ‘not *q*’ (“the will is not free), which is trying to go from denying the less general to denying the more general.

freedom of the will is consistent with its irrevocable determination to the good form-wise (because no one acts for the sake of being worse off [form-wise]), so also freedom between many things choosable under evil is consistent with a determination to evil. — But if the argument is restricted to freedom *vis-à-vis* good and evil, one needs to say that “causing freely as between good and evil is a way of causing suitable to the will of itself” can be understood two ways. In one way the phrase ‘of itself’ or ‘*per se*’ is taken positively, so that the meaning is that the will does “of itself” claim for itself this way of causing (in some sense of ‘of itself’). The other way of understanding it takes ‘of itself’ negatively, *i.e.* ‘with no further addition’, so that the meaning is that a created will with nothing added to it has this way of causing, *i.e.* freely as between good and evil. And with this distinction in place, I say that, in Scotus' argument, when ‘of itself’ is taken positively, his major is true but his minor is false, because such liberty does not belong to any will “of itself” in the first or second sense of ‘of itself’;¹² otherwise one would have to say that the will of the saints in heaven can sin, because such ability belongs to their will “of itself,” necessarily and inseparably. But when the phrase ‘of itself’ is taken negatively, then Scotus' minor is true but his major is false, since the opposite of what suits something “of itself” negatively, *i.e.* as bare, can belong to it also through something added to it, as is obvious. And so in the case at hand, since the will, if bare, is free as towards good and evil; if it is nailed down by some love to the evil or to the good, it no longer has that sort of freedom. But freedom always remains *vis-à-vis* those means which are towards its good or evil purpose.

My answer to the third and fourth objection is clear from what I have already said.

Answers to Durandus and Gregory

xx. To the objection raised by Durandus and Gregory, I respond by denying their inference both across the board and in connection with the supernatural good under discussion. For just as doing [salvific] good is initially* from grace and secondarily from the angel's will, so also the continuation of doing well is more originally* because of grace than because of his nature, because grace is the cause of such goodness both in coming to be and in being preserved. But it is consistent with saying this to say also that, since grace perfects nature after the fashion of that nature, a condition of the nature rebounds onto the condition of the grace; and thus an immovability of the nature immobilizes the grace, and grace in a changeable will inheres changeably. And it is in this way that we say [with Damascene] that the angels have been confirmed in the good [by grace] — and not because their nature is the main cause of their confirmation.

§ xii

* *principalius*

† *principiator*

¹² In the first sense of ‘of itself’, the subject had the predicate as part of its own defining makeup (*ratio*), as man had animal in his makeup; in the second sense, the predicate had the subject in its makeup, as (in geometry) straight had line. Two other senses of ‘of itself’ were also recognized, but the third and fourth were far less common and far less important. In any case, all four were called the “modes of perscity.”

Doubts about the answer ad (3)

xxi. Doubt arises over the answer ad (3); for it seems to conflict with a determination made in the body of the article. Here Aquinas says, after all, that the sin of the angel did not last in him as regards his opinion about reaching pre-eminence; [*inference:*] therefore the apprehension with which he sinned was not incorrigible. The inference is obvious, because it was in fact changed.

I ANSWER BRIEFLY by denying the inference. For one thing, the apprehension from which he sinned was the assessment [*judicium*] that such a thing was choice-worthy [*eligibilis*] and not the opinion that it was possible [*possibilis*]; the assessment, as it says in the text, remains unchangeably. — For another thing, such an opinion about the possible did not accompany the assessment of choice-worthiness positively [*i.e.* as something present along with it], but negatively [*i.e.* as something absent]; it was not necessary, after all, that when he judged his pre-eminence as to-be-sought, he positively believed it to be possible; it is enough, rather, that he did not think it impossible. Now he does not have this way of thinking, having apprehended positively that it is impossible. — And thus the change is not from one positive apprehension to another, nor from one assessment to the opposite assessment.

This makes clear my ANSWER TO DURANDUS, arguing that an angel could be turned to the good by ceasing his non-consideration, as one sinning from passion can turn back to the good when the passion ceases. For the devil's non-consideration, although it ceased, did so as a theoretical matter, not as an affective matter like a condition of his assessment; rather, the fallen angel persevered in judging that he should choose for himself to be fulfilled without recourse to divine, supernatural mercy.

On the answer ad (5)

xxii. In the answer ad (5), three dubious things were said. (a) The first is that any voluntary act of a demon is evil. — (b) The second is the reason given for this. — (c) The third dubious thing is that the demons abuse any good act of their nature.

Against (a), Scotus objects on two grounds (in the place cited above). His first ground is that this is not necessary, because a will can suspend itself from any second act, as can any other active power, as is clear from Augustine's *Retractiones I* [c.22], saying that "nothing is so much in our power as our will itself." — On a second ground, Scotus objects that it would follow that every voluntary act of the angel would be of the same species—which is awkward.¹³ The conse-

¹³ He meant the same *moral* species. But 'moral species' was ambiguous. It could mean the species into which an act is put by the intention with which it is done, and then it would be awkward to say all a demon's acts were of the same species. But it could also mean the kind into which an act is put by its moral evaluation, *i.e.* the good kind or the evil kind.

quence holds, he says, on the ground that the universal cause of malice can only be the first evil desire,* which of course can only incline the will to an act of the same sort. — On a third ground, Durandus objects that since an angel's willed end is good in general, it is not necessary that his other acts be evil. But such is the case in angels [you say], as is clear from prior remarks.

Scotus objects to (b) on the ground that "he is not doing well, so he is doing evil," is not a valid inference; rather, it is a fallacy of the consequent because "not doing well" is said both of evil (the contrary of good) and of the "not good," which is negatively opposed to the good (*viz.* what does not have the circumstances that would make it morally good). — And here is a confirming argument. In a person who lacks grace, there is a middle ground between a [salvifically] good act and an evil one, such as honoring one's parents; thus in the case at hand, believing from the evidence of things is an act which, though not [salvifically] good, because not aimed at the right purpose, is nevertheless not evil, as Scotus mentions in the place quoted above.

In the same place, Scotus objects to (c) on the basis that a natural inclination like self-reflection [*synderesis*] can have an act conforming to itself [so as to be conscientious but] remaining in itself, such as displeasure over the evil of guilt and likewise grieving over the evil of a penalty as injurious to one's nature and the like. Why it cannot stop at this, without adding on evil circumstances, is left without an explanation; after all, Denis says that the natural traits of fallen angels are "whole and splendid."

Defending the answer ad (5)

xxiii. TO CLEAR THESE UP, you need to know that the relation of a will to its ultimate end, when fully outside the pilgrim state, is like the relation of our will to flourishing in general—such that the said purpose stands to the will completely affected as fulfillment now stands to us. After all, the will by its nature is motivated and then determined by that affection to a single such ultimate purpose, as the will is naturally determined to the makeup of the good. And since that affection is not to a particular end but a universal one, as it is ultimate; and all undertakings are directed to one's ultimate purpose unqualifiedly and are evaluated in their relation to that purpose, the result is that an unqualifiedly obstinate person is not only always remaining in that affection habitually but also virtually, even though not actually, as in the instant when he sinned obstinately. But I say "virtually," *i.e.* "participatively," in as much as our seeking fulfillment is virtually verified in every act of our will. When we will anything, we will it that we may participate in fulfillment. And hence everything that an obstinate person wills is willed virtually for the sake of that purpose. And so because that affection is present in his will, it determines him unchangeably, as nature determines to one outcome. And because that affection is towards the purpose which is ultimate unqualifiedly and not in this or that order, it has the makeup of a first principle for his every subsequent voluntary act (as the purpose in things doable stands [in practical matters]

* *affectio*

Durandus on *II Sent.* d.5, q.1

Reply is in § xxiv

Replies are in § xxiv

On the Divine Names, c.4

In *II Sent.* d.7

A reply is coming in § xxiv

as a first principle does in theoretical matters. —From these remarks our answer to all the objections is easy to see.

xxiv. To Scotus's objections against (a), I say that a will cannot suspend (nor can any other active power) its every act; for willing to suspend itself or another power is an act of the will; and that act would be evil because of the force of the angel's first choice. Nevertheless, in the case at hand, one must deny that the obstinate will is free, since it cannot do anything but grieve and hate its damnation, *etc.* And obviously Scotus has committed a fallacy of a part of speech, trying to argue from "a will" to "an obstinate will." — And it is not the least bit awkward but necessary that every act of an obstinate will be of the same [moral] kind virtually, just as the acts of all the virtues are acts of charity virtually. But consistent with that sameness in species is formal diversity in species between those acts, as is clear in the example I just gave. —And the objection from Durandus is no bother, because it does not matter whether the purpose is bad in general or not, so long as the love towards it is bad and unchangeable and towards the ultimate [purpose] unqualifiedly.

Against the objections to (b), it is already clear that while the statement, "it is not done well, so it is done badly" is not valid unqualifiedly, it is still valid in the case of an obstinate will on account of the unchangeableness of the unqualifiedly ultimate purpose. — And for the same reason there is no voluntary middle ground [between salvific good and moral evil], once one is beyond the state of pilgrimage, although there is middle ground in the pilgrim state. And thanks to these points, our answers to the objections to (c) is obvious. For, since all secondary acts in an angel, conforming to his nature or not, are subject to his will as regards exercising those acts; and since the will of a demon is determined to such and such a purpose, it is necessary that he wills in everything he does what is his end or purpose. And thus all of his operations, even the natural ones insofar as they are voluntary, are infected with the initial love of that purpose. And a demon cannot pause in any act just to the extent it conforms to his nature, unless he could will that act and not will it for his ultimate purpose—which is impossible. For they will to have and do whatsoever they will to have and do *in that wretched state*, as I said; and so they abuse all their good features.

Is there sorrow in the demons?

In II Sent. d.5, q.1, a.2; De Veritate q.24, a.1; q.26, a.3 ad 5

It seems there is no sorrow in demons.

(1) After all, since sorrow and joy are opposites, they cannot both be present in the same person at the same time. But there is joy in the demons, as Augustine says against the Manicheans: "The devil has power in those who despise God's precepts, and over that deplorable power he rejoices." Therefore there is no sorrow in the demons.

(2) Besides, sorrow is a cause of fear; the things we grieve over when they are present are the things we fear when they are future. But in the demons there is no fear, according to Job 41:24 *Vg.*, "he has been made to fear no one."¹ Thus, there is no sorrow in the demons"

(3) Moreover, to grieve over evil is good. But the demons cannot do anything good; therefore, they cannot grieve, at least over an evil of which they are guilty (which pertains to the worm of conscience).

ON THE OTHER HAND, a demon's sin is worse than that of a human being. But a human being is punished by sorrow for delighting in sin, according to Apocalypse 18:7, "How much she hath glorified herself and lived deliciously, so much torment and so much sorrow give her." All the more, then, is the devil, who glorified himself most of all, punished with the distress of sorrow.

* *passiones* **ANSWER:** insofar as they name emotions,* 'fear', 'sorrow', 'joy', and the like [name things which] cannot exist in demons: for as emotions they are hallmarks of sensory appetite, which is an active power in a bodily organ. But insofar as these terms name simple acts of the will, they [name things which] can exist in demons. — And one has to say that there is sorrow in them.

¹ LXX and KJV give the Hebrew: "his heart is like a stone."

After all, sorrow (as a simple act of the will) is nothing but resistance of the will towards what is the case or what is not. Obviously, the demons would wish many things not to be the case which are, and many things to be the case which are not; for since they are envious, they would wish those who are saved to be damned. Hence one must say there is sorrow in them, and especially since it belongs to the definition of a penalty that it irk the will. They are also deprived of the fulfillment they naturally seek; and in many cases their wicked will is frustrated.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): joy and sorrow are opposites if they are over the same thing, but not over different things. So nothing prevents one from simultaneously grieving over one thing and rejoicing over another. This is especially true insofar as sorrow and joy are simple acts of the will: for then we can like one feature and dislike another feature in one and the same thing

ad (2): as there is sorrow in the demons about the present, there is also fear in them about the future. But where the Bible says "he has been made to fear nobody," it is understood to be talking about a fear holding the demon back from sin. But it is written elsewhere, after all, that "the demons believe and tremble."

James 2:19

ad (3): grieving over an evil of which one is guilty, for its own sake, bears witness to a good will (*i.e.* one opposed to the evil will with which one incurred guilt). But to grieve over an evil of punishment, or to grieve over an evil because it will be punished, bears witness to a good nature, to which the evil of punishment is opposed. This is why Augustine says in *The City of God XLX* that "grieving in torment over a missed good is testimony to a good nature." So, since the demons are perverse and obstinate in will, they do not grieve over the evil of which they are guilty.

c.13,
PL41, 641

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article, he does two jobs. (1) He splits in two the sense of 'sorrow', assigning to each half its possibility or impossibility in an angel; (2) he answers the question with an affirmative conclusion necessarily drawn.

As to job (1), sorrow is taken as an emotion, or as a simple act of the will. Taken the first way it is impossible in an angel; taken the second way, it is possible.

ii. Concerning this part, be aware that Scotus, in his remarks on *I Sent. d.1, q.3* and on *IV Sent. d.49, q.7*, imagines some new sort of sorrow and rejoicing in angels and separated souls. He distinguishes the will into: the will as operative, the will as receptive, and the will

as productive. He imagines that the will as operative loves, hates, chooses, *etc.* The will as receptive is delighted and is saddened — such that being delighted or saddened is not doing but undergoing something. For [joy] is an undergoing [*passio*] consequent upon a complete operation. Then insofar as the will is productive, it spirates love. Thus, according to Scotus, delight and sadness are always "passions," but sometimes the passion occurs with bodily change (and then it is [an emotion], a passion of sensory appetite) and sometimes it is a passion of the will (and then it is from an object present in the will itself).

St. Thomas, on the other hand, as you see here, and more fully in 2/1 q.22, especially in a.3, and most espe-

cially in the *ad 3*, knows nothing about such “passions” in the will. Rather, he posits “simple acts of the will” with “an effect similar to emotion.” —It makes no difference if one says that delight is not in the power of the will and that it follows upon a complete operation of the will; for these points are consistent with a simple act of the will, since it is not the case that a will (no matter how it is disposed) can freely just “not operate”: rather, when one act is finished it must then go on to another, *etc.*

The basis for St. Thomas’s thinking touched upon here but spelled out in the other passages, is the fact that ‘undergoing’ or ‘passion’ comes from ‘*pati*’ [*i.e.* to undergo], so that one speaks of a “passion” in as many ways as one speaks of undergoing something. And as Aquinas shows in the other places, one does not speak of a passion/emotion of sorrow or joy on the basis of a mere reception [by the will] but insofar as the person

affected is drawn to the agent. But this happens in every act of the will: “they became according as they loved” [Hosea 9:10]. So in this way all acts of the will are called “passions/emotions”; but this is not strictly correct speech, as is clear from Augustine in *The City of God IX*, quoted in a.3 *ad 3* in 2/1 *ST* q.22.

iii. As for job (2), the conclusion is “necessarily there is sorrow in demons. — The proof goes thus: [*Antecedent:*] the demons want many things which are not the case and don’t want many things which are the case; [*inference:*] therefore they grieve.

Drawing the inference is supported by the definition of ‘sorrow’ used here. —The antecedent is supported on four grounds: (1) because they are envious; (2) because they have been condemned to punishment which (by definition) is undergone involuntarily; (3) because they are deprived of fulfillment; (4) because their wicked will is frustrated by many things.

article 4

Is this air of ours the place where demons are punished?

In II Sent. d.6, q.1, a.3; In IV Sent. d.45, q.1, a.3

It seems that this air is not the place of the demons' punishment.

(1) After all a demon is by nature spiritual; a spiritual nature is not afflicted by a place; therefore, no place is punitive for demons.

(2) Besides, a human being's sin is not worse than a demon's. But the human place of punishment is hell. Much more so is it the place for demons. So they are not being punished in the cloudy air.

(3) Moreover, demons are punished with the pain of fire. But there is no fire in cloudy air. Therefore the cloudy air is not the place where demons are punished.

ON THE OTHER HAND, Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad litteram III* that "cloudy air is, as it were, the prison of the demons until the time of the Judgement."
c.10;
PL 34, 285

ANSWER: thanks to their nature, angels are intermediate between God and man. But divine providence has in its definition the point that it provides the good of lower things through higher things. Well, the good of man is procured by divine providence in two ways. One way is directly, when someone is induced to the good and led away from evil; and this is fittingly done through the good angels. The other way is indirectly, namely, when an embattled person is given exercise through the attack of those who are against to him. And this procurement of human good is suitably brought about by the bad angels, lest they cease to have any utility to the order of nature after their sin. — In this way, then, the demons have two places of punishment coming to them: one by reason of their guilt (and this is hell), but the other by reason of giving humans exercise (and this how the air is due to them).

But the procurement of human *salvation* is postponed to the day of Judgement; so until then, the ministry of the angels and the exercise of the demons goes on. Until then the good angels are sent here to us, and the demons are in the shadowy air for our exercise (although some of them are in hell even now, so as to torment those who have led others to evil; likewise some good angels are with the holy souls in heaven). But after the day of Judgment, all of the wicked, both hu-

man and angelic, will be in hell, whereas the good will be in heaven.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad (1)*: a place is not punitive for an angel or a soul as if the place bothered it by affecting its nature; rather, the place affects the will by saddening it, when the angel or the soul apprehends that it is in a place uncongenial to its will.

ad (2): one soul is not put ahead of another soul by the order of nature, the way demons are put ahead of human beings by the order of nature. Hence the cases are not similar.

ad (3): some writers have said that sensual punishment is postponed until the day of Judgement both for demons and for souls, and likewise that the blessed fulfilment of the Saints is deferred until that Day. But this is erroneous and conflicts with the thought of the Apostle, who says in II Corinthians 5:1, "If our earthly house of this habitation is dissolved, we have a house in heaven." — Other writers do not admit this about souls, but do admit it about demons. — But the better thing to say is that the same Judgement will deal with wicked souls and wicked angels, just as one and the same Judgment will handle good souls and good angels.

Hence the thing to say is that, just as the heavenly place pertains to the glory of the angels, and yet their glory is not diminished when they come to us, because they consider that place to be their own (as we say that the honor of a bishop is not diminished when he is not actually seated in his chair), so also one must say that the demons, while not currently bound to the fire of Gehenna so long as they are in this cloudy air, nevertheless, from the very fact that they know that destination is coming to them, are not relieved from their punishment. Hence it says in a gloss on James 3:6 that they "carry the fire of Gehenna with them wherever they go." — Also, no objection arises from the fact that "they besought the Lord that He not send them into the abyss," as it says in Luke 8:31. For they made this petition thinking it would be a punishment for them if they were excluded from the place where they could bother people. This is why Mark 5:10 says that "they besought Him not to send them away outside that country."

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article, he does two jobs: (1) he answers the question with a conclusion: (2) he answers a tacit objection.

u. As for job (1), the conclusion is this: It suits the evil angels to have two places of punishment, hell unqualifiedly and foggy air until the day of Judgement. — The first part is left as well known. The second part

is supported thus: [*antecedent*:] the definition of divine Providence contains the point that Providence will procure the goods of lower things through higher things; [*1st inference*:] therefore it is fitting that it secure man's good indirectly through the demons; [*2nd inference*:] hence it is fitting that they be located close to us in the air until the day of Judgement.

Drawing the first inference is explained and supported. It is illustrated by distinguishing the two ways of procuring a good for people, *i.e.* directly and indirectly through the exercise occasioned by evil. The support goes this way: since the demons are intermediate between God and man and not totally excluded from being useful in the order of nature, and yet are not equipped to move us to good directly, it remains that they do so indirectly, by fighting us and giving us exercise. — Drawing the second inference is obviously right

in its first part, because the place should be convenient for exercise. But as to its second part, it is supported on the ground that our fighting and exercise goes on until the day of Judgement. And this is illustrated by the contrast that good angels are being sent to us until that time.

iii. As to job (2), he says his position is consistent with the point that some wicked angels are sent even now into hell, just as other good angels are not sent here but remain with the holy souls. But after the Judgement, all of the former will be in hell, and all of the latter in heaven.





Treatise 6. On the Creation of Material Things

Inquiry 65: Into the creation of bodily creatures	1,073–1,081
Inquiry 66: Into the approach to diversification	1,082–1,093
Inquiry 67: Into diversification just in itself	1,094–1,100
Inquiry 68: Into the work of the second day	1,101–1,108
Inquiry 69: Into the work of the third day	1,109–1,113
Inquiry 70: Into the work of adornment on the fourth day	1,114–1,119
Inquiry 71: Into the work of the fifth day	1,120–1,121
Inquiry 72: Into the work of the sixth day	1,122–1,123
Inquiry 73: Into topics pertaining to the seventh day	1,124–1,127
Inquiry 74: Into all seven days together	1,128–1,133

Inquiry Sixty-Five: Into the work of creating bodily creatures

After studying the spiritual creation, one must turn to the bodily creation. In its production. Scripture records three works, *i. e.*, a work of creating (by saying, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth" *etc.*), a work of diversifying things (by saying, "He divided the light from the darkness" and "the waters above the firmament from the waters that are under the firmament"), and a work of adorning the world (by saying, "Let there be lights in the firmament," *etc.*). Hence the first thing to take up is the work of creating [q.65]; then the work of diversifying [q.66], thirdly that of adorning [q.70].

On the first work, four questions are asked.

- | | |
|---|--|
| (1) Is the world of bodies a creation from God? | (2) Was it made for the sake of God's goodness? |
| (3) Was it made by God through the mediation of the angels? | (4) Do the forms of bodies come from the angels or immediately from God? |

article 1

Is the world of bodies a creation from God?

De Potentia q.3, a.6, *In Symbolo Apostolico*, a.1

It seems that the bodily world is not from God.

(1) After all, it says in Ecclesiastes 3:14, "I know that whatsoever God doeth, it shall be forever." But visible bodies do not last forever; and 2 Corinthians 4:18 says that "the things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal." Therefore God did not make visible bodies.

(2) Besides, Genesis 1:31 says, "God saw all the things that He had made, and behold they were very good." But bodily creatures are bad; we experience them as harmful in many ways, as is obvious with many serpents, the heat of the sun, and the like. But a thing is called bad because it harms us. Therefore bodily creatures are not from God.

(3) Furthermore, what comes from God does not turn us away from God, but leads us to Him. But bodily creatures turn us away from God. This is why the Apostle says in 2 Corinthians 4:18, "while we look not at the things that are seen." Therefore bodily creatures are not from God.

ON THE OTHER HAND, it says in Psalm 146:6, "who made heaven and earth, the sea and all that is in them."

ANSWER: certain heretics held the position that the things we see were not created by the good God, but by an evil principle. And to support their error, they used what the Apostle says in 2 Corinthians 4:4, "the god of this world hath blinded the minds of them that believe not." — But this position is utterly impossible. For if diverse things are united in some regard, there has to be a cause of their being united, since things diverse in

themselves do not unite. Hence, whenever some *one* feature is found in diverse things, it has to be the case that those diverse things received that feature from some one cause (as diverse hot bodies have their heat from fire). Well, in all things, however diverse, *what it is to exist* is found commonly. So there has to be one source of existing, from which everything in being in any way has existence, whether those things be invisible and spiritual, or visible and bodily. — Meanwhile, the devil is called "the god of this world" not because he created it but because those who live worldly lives serve him: the idiom is the same as the Apostle used in Philippians 3:19, "whose god is their belly."

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): all God's creatures last forever in some respect, at least in their matter, because creatures are never reduced to nothing, even when they are corrupted. And the closer creatures come to God (Who is unchangeable), the less changeable they are. Corruptible creatures remain in perpetuity as to matter, but are changed as to substantial form. Incorruptible creatures remain also in their substance but are changeable in other respects (*e. g.* in place, like the heavenly bodies, or in their affections, like spiritual creatures). — The Apostle's statement, "the things which are seen are temporal," while true of them taken just in themselves (since every visible creature is subject to time in their existing or moving), was really meant to speak of visible things insofar as they are people's rewards. After all, the profits people have in these visible things pass away with time, but the profits they have in invisible things remain forever. This is why he had also said a little earlier, "an eternal weight of glory is at work in us." II Cor. 4: 17

ad (2): a bodily creature is good in its nature, but its goodness is not the universal good; it is a particular and narrowed-down good. From this particularity and narrowed-down condition, there arises the fact that there is contrariety in them, in which one of them is contrary to another, even though both are good in themselves. — Some people, however, assess things not by their natures but by their own comfort; they call flatly “evil” whatever is harmful to them — paying no attention to the fact that what is harmful to one in some respect is profitable to another (or to itself) in another respect. This would never be the case, if bodily things were evil and harmful in and of themselves.

ad (3): in and of themselves, creatures do not turn us away from God; they lead us to him. “For the invisible things of God from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood from the things that are made,” as it says in Romans 1:20. But the fact that people turn away from God is the fault of those who use the visible things foolishly. This is why it says in Wisdom 14:11, “Creatures are become a snare to the feet of the unwise.” — Indeed, even the fact that they lead fools away from God bears witness to the fact that they are from God. For the only way they lead the unwise astray from God is by displaying something good existing in them, and this they have from God.

Cajetan’s Commentary

The title question is clear. — The phrase ‘from God’ means by efficient causality. — In the body of the article he does three jobs: (1) he reports a certain opinion; (2) he determines the truth against that opinion by answering the question; (3) he gives a satisfactory interpretation to the text that motivated our adversaries.

As to job (1), he says two things. First he states the opinion of Mani: visible bodies are from an evil god. — The second thing he says is the quotation from 2 Corinthians 6.

ii. As to job (2), the conclusion answering the question is this: bodily things, indeed all of them, are from God. — The support goes as follows. [*Major:*] Whenever some feature is found in diverse things, those diverse things have to receive that one feature from some one cause. [*Minor:*] But in all things both corporeal and spiritual there is found existence. [*Conclusion:*] Therefore there is some one cause of existing. This latter is God; therefore [all things receive their existing from God].

The major is clarified by an example or induction

from things having heat, etc. The major is supported by an argument. [*Disjunction:*] Diverse things united or sharing in some feature (they amount to the same thing) are united either of themselves or by another. [*Negation of a disjunct:*] They are not united of themselves, because diverse things as such are not united. [*Conclusion:*] Ergo they are united by some cause of their being so.

Notice here that St. Thomas, striving for brevity, assumed the major premise without qualifications, although he knew that it had to be understood disjunctively, because whenever there is found among diverse things some feature which is specifically, generically, or analogously one, it has to be the case that either what is one in all of them has been caused by some outside cause, or that one of those diverse things is the cause and the others have been caused by the one to whom that feature first belongs. And so interpreted, the proposition is obvious in philosophy.

iii. In job (3), he expounds how to understand the apostolic quotation adduced by the heretics. The matter is obvious in the text.

article 2

Was the world of bodies created because of God's goodness?

q.47, a.2

It does not seem that the world of bodies was created because of * God's goodness.

* *propter*

(1) After all, it says in Wisdom 1:14 that God created all things "so that they might be." Therefore all things created were made for the sake of their own being, and not for God's goodness.

(2) Besides, a good has what it takes to be a purpose. Therefore what counts more as good among things is the purpose of what counts less as good. Well, the spiritual creation is compared to the world of bodies as a greater good to a lesser good. Therefore the world of bodies is for the sake of the spiritual creatures, and not for God's goodness.

(3) Moreover, justice gives unequally only to those who are unequal. But God is just. Therefore, prior to any inequality created by God, there is an inequality not created by God. But an inequality not created by God can only be one that arises out of free choice. Hence all inequality comes from divergent motions of free choice. Well, bodily creatures are unequal to spiritual ones. Ergo bodily creatures were made on account of some motions of free choice, and not on account of God's goodness.

ON THE OTHER HAND, it says in Proverbs 16:4, "The Lord hath made all things for Himself."

Peri Archón III, c.5, PG 11, 329

I ANSWER: Origen claimed that the world of bodies was not in God's first intention but was made to punish spiritual creatures for sinning. He claimed that God initially made spiritual creatures only, and made them all equal. Since they had free choice, some of them turned to God, and received greater or lesser rank in proportion to the intensity of their conversion, and remained in their matter-free state.* But others, because they turned away from God, were bound to various bodies according to the extent of their turning away.

Ibid. I, c.6, III, c.5, PG 11, 329

* *simplicitas*

This position is wrong. Firstly, it conflicts with Scripture, which, having recounted the production of every kind of bodily creature, added, "God saw that it was good," as if to say that each one was made because it was good that it should exist. But according to Origen's opinion, the world of bodies was not made because it was good for it to exist, but to punish the evil doing of another. — Secondly, it is untenable because it would follow that the current disposition of the world of bodies came about by hazard. Suppose the sun's body (as it now is) was made to match some sin of a spiritual creature needing to be punished; then if many spiritual creatures had sinned similarly, there would be many suns in the world. And ditto for [moons and] other things. All of this is utterly unsuitable.

With this position set aside as erroneous, one must ponder the fact that the universe is composed of *all* the creatures, as a whole is made up of parts. Then, if we want to assign a purpose to some whole and its parts, we will find firstly that the individual parts exist for the sake of their own functions, as eyes are for seeing. Secondly, we will find that a less noble part is for the sake of one more noble, as the senses are for the sake of understanding, and as the lungs are for the sake of the heart. Thirdly, one will find that all the parts are there for the completeness of the whole, as matter is for the sake of form (the parts being like the matter of the whole). Finally, however, a whole (e.g. a whole man) is for the sake of an outside purpose, such as to enjoy God. — So, too, with the parts of the universe. Each creature is for the sake of its own distinctive act and completeness. Secondly, the less noble creatures are for the sake of the more noble, as the creatures lower than man are for the sake of man. Further still, particular creatures are for the completeness of the whole universe. But finally, the universe, with all its parts, is ordered to God as its purpose, inasmuch as a certain imitation of God's goodness is represented in them for God's glory (although rational creatures have God as their purpose in a special and higher way, since they can attain Him by their own operation of knowing and loving). And thus it is clear that God's goodness is the purpose of all bodily things.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): by the very fact that a creature has existence, it represents God's existence and goodness. So the fact that God created things to exist does not exclude His having made them all for His own goodness.

ad (2): a purpose does not exclude an ultimate purpose. So the fact that a world of bodies was made in some sense for the sake of spiritual creatures does not negate their having been made for the sake of God's goodness.

ad (3): equality of justice has its place in a scheme of retribution; after all, what is just is that equal retribution be made for equal offenders. But it has no place in the first constitution of things. Thus a builder, for example, puts stones of the same kind in different parts of his building without injustice, and not because of some diversity already there in the stones; rather he is looking towards the completion of the whole edifice, which is attained only if stones are differently placed in it. So also if God from the beginning established diverse and unequal creatures, according to His own wisdom, it was so that there might be completeness in the universe without injustice and without any presupposed difference of merits.

 Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article, he does three jobs: (1) he cites Origen's opinion; (2) he excludes that opinion; (3) he answers the question.

ii. As for job (1): he mentions two things: the opinion and the basis for it. The opinion is that the world of bodies is not from God's first intention, where He looked to his own goodness, but was made to punish a spiritual creature for sinning. — The basis for this is the prior status of the world of spirits, the equality of natural things, free choice, and pluriformity as to merit and demerit, as is clear in the text.

iii. As for job (2), he shows that this opinion is in error in two ways. First, because it conflicts with Scripture's saying that each bodily creature is good in and of itself. — Secondly, by deducing an impossibility, namely, that the present arrangement of the world of bodies would be accidental, as it says in the text.

iv. As for job (3), the conclusion that answers the question is this: divine goodness is the purpose of all bodily things. — This is supported as follows. [*Ante-*

cedent:] The whole universe with each of its parts is ordained to God as its purpose; [*inference:*] therefore divine goodness is the purpose of all bodily things.

The antecedent is clarified by showing in order the purposes of a whole and its parts on four levels and standings: [level (a)] the standing of the parts to their own functions; [level (b)] the standing of the parts to each other; [level (c)] the standing of the parts to the whole; [level (d)] the standing of the whole and its parts to an outside purpose. Support is given on the ground that the universe is for the sake of representing and imitating God's goodness, *i.e.*, that it is ordained to God's glory.

Drawing the inference is supported by the fact that the universe is made up of all creatures, as a whole is made up of its parts; their purpose, then, and that of the whole is the same, generally speaking. But nothing prevents certain parts from being ordained more particularly to the divine goodness for their own reasons through their own operations (on the first level), as is clear in the case of rational creatures.

Was the world of bodies produced by God with the mediation of the angels?

q.45, a.5; *In II Sent.* d.1, aa. 3-4; *In IV Sent.* d.5, q.1, a.3, qua.3 ad 3; *De Potentia* q.3, a.4 ad 9, 12; *Opusc. XV De Angelis* c.10

It seems that the world of bodies was produced by God with the angels mediating.

(1) For as things are governed by divine wisdom, so also they have all been made by divine wisdom according to Psalm 104:24 "In wisdom, thou hast made them all." But the task of the wise man is to put things in order, as it says in *Metaphysics I*; hence in the governance of things, the higher rules over the lower in a certain sense, as Augustine says in *De Trinitate III*. Therefore also, in the production of things, an order was observed such that the world of bodies, as lower, was produced through the spiritual creation, as the higher.

c. 2:
982a 18
c. 4,
PL 42, 873

(2) Besides, a diversity of effects shows a diversity of causes, because the same thing always makes the same thing. So if all creatures, both spiritual and bodily, were produced directly by God, there would be no diversity among creatures, and one would not be further from God than another. This is obviously false, since Aristotle says that some things are corruptible "because they are far distant from God."

*De Gen. et
Corrupt. II,*
c. 10, 336b 30

(3) Moreover, an infinite power is not needed to produce a finite effect. But each and every body is finite. So it could have been produced through the finite power of a spiritual creature; and it was so produced, because in spiritual creatures there's no difference between 'was' and 'could have been'. This is especially true because no dignity pertaining to an angel according to its nature is denied to it, unless perhaps on account of sin.*

* *culpa*

ON THE OTHER HAND, Genesis 1:1 says, "In the beginning, God created heaven and the earth," by which the world of bodies is meant. Therefore the world of bodies was produced directly by God.

ANSWER: some writers have claimed that things came forth from God in stages, such that the first creature came forth from Him directly, and that creature created another one, and so on down to the world of bodies. — But this position is impossible. For the first bodily creature was produced by creation, by which even matter itself was

Avicenna,
Metaphysics IX,
c. 4

created: for in becoming, the incomplete is prior to the complete. But nothing can be created except by God.

To see this, one needs to consider the fact that the higher a cause is, the more broadly its causality extends to things. Well, an underlying factor* is always found more broadly in things than what informs and restricts — as being is found more broadly than living, and living more broadly than understanding, and matter more broadly than a form. Therefore, the more deeply underlying a factor is, the higher the cause from which it proceeds directly. So in all things, the deepest underlying factor† pertains properly to the causality of the Highest Cause. Hence no secondary cause can produce anything without presupposing in it something caused by a higher cause. — But creation is the production of a thing in its whole substance, with nothing presupposed in it that would be either uncreated or created by another. The only conclusion, therefore, is that no agent can "create" anything except God alone, Who is the First Cause. And so Moses, to show that all bodies were created immediately by God, said, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth."

* *id quod sub-*
stratum

† *substratum*

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): there is an order in the production of things, but not such that one creature is created by another (this being impossible); rather, the order is such that different levels are set up among creatures by God's wisdom.

ad (2): with no detriment to His simplicity, the one God Himself knows diverse things, as was shown above. And so God was also the cause of diverse products through His wisdom, thanks to the diverse things known. Likewise an artist, by apprehending diverse forms, produces diverse works of his art.

q.15, a.2

ad (3): how much power an agent has is measured not only by the thing he made, but also by how he made it;‡ after all, one and the same thing is made differently by a greater power than by a lesser one. Well, to produce even something finite in such a way that nothing is presupposed is a feat of infinite power. Hence it cannot belong to any creature.

‡ *modum*
faciendi

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article, he does two jobs: (1) he reports the opinion of Avicenna; (2) he excludes it by reaching the conclusion that answers the question, by reason and authority.

As to job (1), the opinion is affirmative and clear.

ii. As to job (2), the conclusion is: the world of bodies is directly from God, by first production. — This is supported first by an argument. [*Major:*] Creating is an impossible action for a creature; [*minor:*] the first produc-

tion of the world of bodies is creation: [*conclusion:*] ergo [it was not done by a creature].

The minor is obvious by identifying the effect. For in the order of generation, producing the first looks to the first thing produced, and hence to that which is least complete in a thing (because the incomplete is prior, as it were). Creation also looks to producing the first, because it extends even to the production of prime matter. Ergo [first production is creation].

The major is supported as follows. [*Antecedent:*] the higher the cause the further it extends in causing things; [*1st inference:*] therefore it extends to what is more common; [*2nd inference:*] therefore it extends to what is deeper underlying. [*3rd inference:*] Therefore what first [and most deeply] underlies in all things properly pertains to the causality of the highest cause. [*4th inference:*] Ergo no secondary cause can produce anything without presupposing in the thing to be produced something already caused by the first cause. [*5th inference:*] Therefore no secondary cause can create. — The antecedent and the first inference are obvious. But the second inference is supported on the ground that the underlying factor is always found more commonly than what informs it, because to inform is to restrict and terminate, as is obvious with being, living, and understanding, in which there is a formation at each level; and it is also obvious with matter and form, in which there is a union of two things through the one informing the other. — The final inference is supported by the definition of creation, since creation is the production of a thing in its whole substance with nothing created or uncreated presupposed.

Then the authority of Scripture is brought in to support the conclusion.

iii. Notice here firstly that, when it says producing a thing with nothing presupposed belongs to the definition of creation, what is being denied is not flatly every presupposed thing (since an agent is always presupposed, and sometimes matter is, too, as is clear in the creation of an intellectual soul); what is being denied, rather, is anything presupposed that would belong to the thing which is

* *per se primo*

the first-off intrinsic terminus of that act of creating.*

Thus what we call “created” is what is produced in such a way that nothing *of it* is presupposed; for then the whole of the thing’s substance is produced syncategorematically.

I was speaking very deliberately, however, when I spoke of “the thing which is the first-off intrinsic terminus of that act of creating.” Otherwise all forms would be created, since nothing of them is presupposed (since they have no subject). In reality, however, they are not created, because they are not brought to be in their own right [*per se*] but in order to be made into composite things, as Aristotle discloses, because in this way alone could a form escape being “created.” Two conditions, then, are necessary and sufficient for *x* to be a created thing: (a) that *x* be brought about in its own right [*per se*], and (b) that nothing of *x* be presupposed as “already” there in temporal or natural order. This, after all, is what it is for *x* to be brought-to-be out of nothing.

iv. Notice secondly that the argument adduced here to exclude an act of creation by secondary causes is such that, if you have memorized and looked subtly into statements made above in Question 45 [a.5], it concludes not only to the point that a secondary cause cannot create by its own power (which is how it sounds on its face) but also that no secondary cause can do this even instrumentally. For if, in the order in which a thing is composed, the first contribution is a proper effect of the first cause, nothing can be imagined previous to that which would look to an instrumental cause. After all, before the first, there is nothing. But it is well established that every instrument brought in to do something bears on some contribution previous [to that of the main cause], as is clear from remarks 1 made above [in my commentary on q.45, a.5, § xvi].

Metaphysics
VI, c. 8,
1013b 6ff

Are the forms of bodies from the angels?

1 *ST* q 91, a.2, q.110, a.2; *In II Sent.* d.1, q.1, a.4 *ad* 4; d.7, q.3, a.1, 2 *CG* c.43;
3 *CG* cc.24, 69, 103; *De Malo* q.16, a.9; *Opusculum XXXIV, De Occultis Operibus Naturae*

It seems that the forms of bodies come from the angels.

c.2;
PL 64, 1250
(1) After all, Boethius says in his *De Trinitate*, "From the forms which are without matter come the forms which are in matter." Well, the forms without matter are the spiritual substances; the forms in matter are the forms of bodies. Ergo the forms of bodies are from the spiritual substances.

(2) Besides, everything which is-φ by participation is traced back to that which is-φ by its essence. But spiritual substances are forms by their essence, and bodily creatures participate forms. Therefore the forms of bodily things are derived from the spiritual substances.

(3) Moreover, spiritual substances have more causal power than the heavenly bodies. But the heavenly bodies cause forms in the things here below, and so are said to be causes of generation and corruption. Much more, therefore, are the forms in matter derived from the spiritual substances.

ON THE OTHER HAND, Augustine says in *De Trinitate III*, "One must not think that this bodily material serves the angels at their command, but rather God." But bodily matter is said to "serve at command" the one from whom it receives its species. Therefore, the forms of bodies are not from the angels but from God.

I ANSWER: some writers held the opinion that all bodily forms are derived from spiritual substances (such as what we call angels). And they maintained this view in two ways. Plato maintained that the forms which are in bodily matter are derived from and introduced by forms subsisting without matter, by way of some sort of participation. He proposed, after all, a [form of] Man subsisting without matter and likewise a Horse, and ditto for all the other things from which empirical particulars here below are constituted, thanks to the fact that there remains in bodily matter an impression of those matter-free* forms by way of a certain assimilation, which he called "participation." And the [later] Platonists claimed that the hierarchy of forms was a hierarchy of separated substances — e.g., that there is a separated substance which is "Horse," the cause of all horses, above which there is a separated aliveness, which they called "Life Itself," the cause of all life, and above that a separated item which they called "Being Itself," the cause of every case of being.†

* *separata*

† *causa omnis esse*

Avicenna, however, and some others did not claim that the forms in matter in bodily things subsisted in and of themselves [matter-free] but only in the mind. So from forms in the minds of spiritual

creatures (which they called "Intelligences," and we call angels), they said that all the forms in bodily matter proceed into matter as the forms of works of art proceed from the forms in the mind of the artist. — And what certain modern heretics [Albigensians] hold seems to go back to the same idea: they say that God is the creator of all things, but that bodily matter was formed by the devil and diversified into various species.

Well, all these opinions seem to come from one root. The writers just mentioned were looking for the cause of forms *as if forms themselves came to be in their own right*. But as Aristotle proved in *Metaphysics I'II*, what strictly speaking comes to be is a composite; the forms of corruptible things are sometimes there, and sometimes not, without themselves being generated or corrupted. Rather, the composites are generated or corrupted. The reason is that the forms do not have being [esse], but the composites have being through them; after all being "brought to be" fits something the same way as "being" does.¹ And so, since like comes to be from like, there is no need to look for a cause of bodily forms in some non-material form; rather, one should look for a composite item, as one fire is generated by another. So bodily forms are caused, not as introduced by some non-material form, but as matter has been reduced from potency to act by some composite agent.

However, because a composite agent (which is a body) is moved by a created spiritual substance (as Augustine says in *De Trinitate III*), it follows further that even bodily forms are derived from spiritual substances — not as introducing the forms but rather as

¹ To explain this passage, one must back up a bit. Aquinas knew the difference between the "is" of existence and the "is" of predication, but he did not separate them as strongly as Frege did, because he was not looking at them just syntactically. Aquinas attached a metaphysical significance to both. The "is" of existence indicated the actualization of its subject, while the "is" of predication (in mind-independent cases) indicated the specification of its subject. Both uses of "is" are in play in this passage. A subsistent thing here below is a composite one; it alone exercises the "being" which is existence (so as to be an *id quod est*). The forms exemplified in material things do not subsist and hence do not exercise the "being" which is existence; but these forms have everything to do with the "being" which is being-specified, since they are the sources of it (*id quod est*). So, in this passage, Aquinas is making two points. The first is that, although the composites do the existing, they get their being-thus-and-such from the forms by which they "are-φ." His second point, and the one more immediately relevant to this article, is that the talk of being brought to be (produced, generated, *ferri*) must be conducted with the same subjects as the talk of "being" in the existential sense. What does not exist cannot be said to be brought to be. Hence the hunt for what produced (generated, *fecit*) forms was a misguided quest. In a nutshell, what does not exist is not brought to do so.

Avicenna,
Metaphysics IX, 3

c.8;
1033b 17; 1034b
10

c.4;
Pl. 42, 873

moving things towards their forms. Beyond that, even the forms in an angel's mind, which are something like generative reasons for the bodily forms, are traced back to God as to their first cause.

But in the first production of a bodily creature one is not looking at a change from potency to act. And so the bodily forms which bodies had in their first production had been produced directly by God, whose command alone matter obeys as its distinctive cause. To shows this, Moses introduces each of His works with "and God said, Let there be this or that." In these words there is indicated the formation of things made by the Word of God, from Whom (according to Augustine) comes "every form and structure and harmony of parts."

Super Joannem 1, 3,
Pl. 35, 1386

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): by 'forms without matter' Boethius means the plans of things in the mind of God, as did the Apostle in Hebrews

11:3, "through faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the Word of God, so that the things which are seen were not made by things which do appear." — But if by 'forms without matter' he meant angels, one has to say that the forms in matter come from angels not by being introduced by them but by their moving [things toward them].

ad (2): participated forms found in matter are not traced back to any forms of the same kind subsisting in and of themselves (as the Platonists claimed) but to intelligible forms (whether of an angel's intellect whence they come [into matter] by movement, or further back to plans in the divine intellect, whence also seeds of the forms were put into created things, so that they could be put into act through change.

ad (3): the heavenly bodies cause forms in things here below not by introducing them, but by moving things towards them.

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article, he does two main jobs: (1) he reports an affirmative opinion held in different versions by Plato, Avicenna, and certain modern heretics; (2) he answers the question.

ii. As for job (1), he reports four points about Plato: he posited that the forms of material things were separate; he posited that these separate ones follow the order of material forms; he claimed that the material forms in matter were derived from these separate forms; and that this came about through some sort of participation and assimilation. — About Avicenna he reports three things: that there are separated substances such as we call angels different in nature from the forms of lower things; he claimed that in the minds of these separate intelligences the forms of natural things are present as in the mind of an artist; and that natural forms flow out from those. — From the heretics, he reports two points: that God is the creator of all things, and that the devil formed the matter of bodies in various kinds.

iii. As for job (2), he concludes three things. The first is that the forms of bodies are not brought to be in their own right [*per se*]. The second conclusion says that how they are brought to be is by bodily agents as proximate causes, by separate substances as movers towards the forms, and by God as first cause. — The third conclusion is that in the first founding of things, bodily forms were produced by God alone.

The first conclusion is supported as follows. [*Major:*] Being "brought to be" belongs to the same things as "exists" belongs, and in the same way, because being brought to be terminates at existing [*esse*]. [*Minor:*] But forms do not exist in their own right [*per se*] but in such a way that composite things "are" through them. [*Conclusion:*] Hence,

forms are not brought to be in their own right [*per se*] — and this is confirmed by the authority of Aristotle in *Metaphysics VII*. And hence the root error of all the writers reported becomes clear.

The second conclusion is supported by the same means with another proposition added, namely, that "everything is brought to be by something similar to itself," and the support goes as follows. [*Antecedent:*] A composite is brought to be of itself firstly [*per se primo*], and a form is only brought in to make a composite. [*Inference:*] Therefore bodily forms are caused (not as if introduced by some immaterial form but) as matter is reduced from potency to act by some composite agent. — Drawing the inference is supported on the ground that everything brought to be is brought to be by something similar to itself. From this point, the first part of this conclusion is supported as follows. [*Antecedent:*] A form is not brought to be; [*inference:*] therefore it does not need to be derived from an immaterial form. The antecedent is clear from *Metaphysics VII* and from an argument to the effect that [*major:*] existing and being brought-to-be belong to the same thing and in the same way; [*minor:*] but forms do not exist as if they themselves existed; [*conclusion:*] therefore they are not brought to be. The second part of the conclusion is also deduced, thus. [*Antecedent:*] A composite thing is brought to be; [*1st inference:*] therefore it is brought to be by a composed thing, otherwise it would not be brought to be by something similar to itself; [*2nd inference:*] so it is brought to be by something changing matter from potency to act (after all, there is no other way a composite thing can act). And if you add to these points the fact that a form has no other *raison d'être* than to be that by which a composed thing is [what it is], it follows obviously that a form is educed by the same composite cause by its changing the matter. — The other parts of this second conclusion (namely that forms

come from spiritual substances as movers towards forms, and from God as first cause) are also supported on the ground that composed agents are moved by spiritual substances (as Augustine says) and that the very species in an angel's mind are traced back to the first cause, as seeds of being are traced back to a complete and primary agent.

The third conclusion ("bodily forms in the first founding of things were directly from God") is supported on the ground that no change from potency to act occurred at that point, and that matter obeys God alone; the third conclusion is also confirmed by the authority of Scripture, Genesis 1:1, as the text says.

iv. Pay diligent attention here to the fact that a form's *coming about through change* from potency to act and its *being educed* from potency to act do not differ. Hence it is not the same thing for a form to be *received in matter* and for it to be *educed from matter*; rather, for it to be educed, the form has to result from the force of the change. One should imagine, after all, that all the educible forms pre-exist in the matter in potency, as if lurking under its potency, and that a power causative of them is in the matter, but as a material cause. The result is that

when a definite agent approaches a certain kind of thing and transforms its matter, that [matter's potency] is changed by the force of such a change, not from what a thing coming from outside has [in relation] to something, but from the fact that the matter is gradually nailed down from having what it had indefinitely to having *distinctly* what it previously had in itself vaguely. For this is the force of a determinative change.¹

¹ Here is a guess-work explication. Think of composite things, *a* and *b*, as material substances. Think of *a* as the output of a function $f(m_1)$, where f is the substantial form of *a*, and m_1 is the sort of matter required for an argument of f . Think of *b* as the output of a function $g(m_2)$, where g is the substantial form of *b*, and m_2 is the sort of matter required for an argument of g . Suppose there is a physically possible process whereby stuff of the kind m_1 becomes stuff of the kind m_2 , and suppose a causal impact of *b* upon *a* will trigger this process. Then and then only is *b* educing the *g*-form from the stuff that used to be *a*. The action of *b* restructures m_1 enough to make it m_2 . If this guess is correct, then "eduction" is substantial change on the level of the stuff that had been matter for *a*; it forces one to posit a deeper stuff, m_0 , such that $\phi(m_0 \subset m_1)$ and $\phi(m_0 \subset m_2)$, where ' \subset ' is 'included in'. Or so the present translator guesses; but see *iv* in the commentary on q.90, a.2.



Inquiry Sixty-Six: Into creation's approach towards diversification

The next thing to study is the work of separating or diversifying. First one must take up the approach of creation towards diversification; secondly, diversification itself. On the first topic, four questions are raised.

- (1) Did a formless state of created matter precede in time its being diversified?
- (2) Is there one matter of which all bodies are composed?
- (3) Was the empyrean heaven co-created with formless matter?
- (4) Was time co-created therewith?

article I

Did formless matter precede its formation in time?

1 *ST* 69, a.1; 74, a.2; *In II Sent.* d. 12, a.4; *De Potentia* q. 4, a.1

It seems that formless matter preceded in time its becoming formed.

(1) After all, Genesis 1:2 says, "The earth was without form and void" or as another translation [the LXX] says, "invisible [*aoratos*] and discomposed [*akataskeustatos*]." This language indicates a formless state of matter, Augustine says. Therefore matter was at some point formless before it was formed.

(2) Besides, nature in its operation imitates God's operation, as a secondary cause imitates the first cause. But in a natural process, an unformed state precedes a formed state in time. Therefore the same holds in God's operation.

(3) Moreover, matter is stronger than an accident, because matter is part of a substance. But God can make an accident exist without a subject, as is clear in the Sacrament of the Altar. Therefore He could have brought it about that matter was there without a form.

ON THE OTHER HAND, (1') an imperfect effect bears witness to an imperfect agent; but God is the most perfect agent, which is why Deuteronomy 32:4 says, "The works of God are perfect." Therefore a work created by Him was never formless.

PLUS, (2') the formation of the world of bodies was brought about by the work of separating or diversifying; but diversifying is opposed to confusing, as forming-up is opposed to leaving formless. So, if formlessness temporally preceded the forming up of matter, it would follow that from the beginning there would have been the confused state of bodily creation which the ancients called "chaos."

ANSWER: the saints have held different opinions about this. Augustine wants it to be the case that the formlessness of bodily matter did not precede its formation in time but only in origin or order of nature. Other

Fathers, however, like St. Basil [*Homily 2 In Hexaemeron*], St. Ambrose [*In Hexaemeron I*, cc.7, 8], and St. John Chrysostom [*Homily II on Genesis*] want to hold that formlessness of matter temporally preceded its formation. And although these opinions seem to be opposed, they in fact differ little from each other, because Augustine took the talk of formless matter differently from the others.

Augustine understood "formless matter" to mean lacking every form. And on this understanding it is impossible to say that formless matter temporally preceded its being formed or diversified. As far as being formed is concerned, this is obvious. For if formless matter came first for a while, it would be already in act; after all this is what "a while" implies, since the terminus of creating is a being in act. But [in talking of matter] act is the same thing as form. So to say that matter without form came first is to say that there was a being in act without act—which involves a contradiction. — One also cannot say that matter first had a common form and that afterwards different forms supervened upon it, whereby matter was diversified. For this would be the same as the opinion of the ancient Naturalists, who maintained that prime matter was a body in act, such as fire, air, water, or something in between. It followed that coming to be was nothing but being altered.¹ For since that preceding form gave matter being-in-act in the category of substance and already made it "this something," it followed that the supervening form did not make it flatly a being in act, but a being *thus* in act, which is the proper job of an accidental form; and thus the subsequently arriving forms would be accidents, thanks to which there would be no generation going on,

PG 29, 29
PL 14, 148
PG 53, 30

cf. Aristotle, *Physics I*, c. 4, 187a 23; *Metaphysics XI* c. 2, 1069b 22

¹ In scholastic usage, 'alter' was not a general synonym of 'change'. *Alteratio* meant only a change of quality, like going from hot to cold, orange to green.

Confessions XII,
c. 12; *PL* 32, 831
Super Gen. ad lit.
II, c. 11; *PL* 34,
272

Confessions XII,
29; *PL* 32, 843;
Super Gen. ad lit.
I, 15, *PL* 34, 257

but just alteration. Hence it is necessary to say that prime matter was neither created altogether without form nor under a common form, but under distinct forms. — And so, if “formless matter” refers to the condition of prime matter, which in itself does not have a form, matter’s formlessness (as Augustine says) did not precede its formation or distinction in time but only by origin or order of nature, the way potency is prior to act and a part prior to the whole.

The other saints take “formless” not to exclude all form but to exclude that *well-formed* state and beauty which now appear in the world of bodies. And thanks to this they say that formless bodily matter did precede for a time it’s being formed up. And so they agree to some extent with Augustine and also disagree to some extent, as will come out below.¹

q. 69, a. 1;
q. 74, a. 2

A far as one can gather from the text of Genesis, three cases of well-formedness were once missing, thanks to which the world of bodies was called “without form.” From the whole diaphanous body called heaven, there was missing the beauty of light; and this is why it says that “darkness was upon the face of the deep.” Plus two types of beauty were missing from the earth. One came from the fact that the earth was covered over with water; and thanks to this it says “the earth was void,” or “invisible,” because the earth could not appear to bodily sight thanks to the waters covering it everywhere. The other comes from the fact that nowadays the earth is adorned with herbs and plants; and so it was called “void,” or “discomposed,” i.e. not adorned according to the other version. And thus, since Scripture had already mentioned two created natures (the heaven and the earth) it expressed the formless state of heaven by saying that “darkness was upon the face of the deep,” since air is included under heaven; and it indicated the unformed character of the earth by the words “the earth was without form and void.”

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): Augustine takes the word ‘earth’ differently here from the other saints. Augustine wants ‘earth’ and ‘water’ to mean prime matter itself in this verse. Moses was not able to convey prime matter to an uneducated people except under figures of things known to them. So he also expressed it under more than one figure, not calling it just ‘water’ or just ‘earth’, lest it seem that in truth prime matter had been earth or water. But it had a likeness with earth inasmuch as it sinks down under forms, and a likeness to water inasmuch as it is apt to take diverse shapes. On this view, then, the earth is called “without form and void” or “invisible and unadorned,” because matter is known through form (hence is called in itself invisible or formless), and matter’s potential is fulfilled through a form (which is why Plato says that matter is “place”).

Timaeus; cf.
Aristotle, *Physics*
IV, c. 2

¹ Current cosmology draws a picture unanticipated in any ancient opinion. There was a primordial form of “matter” in existence before it had any of its now-known forms as particles

The other saints took ‘earth’ to mean the element, which they said was somehow without form.

ad (2): nature produces an effect in act from a being in potency; and so it has to be the case that in nature’s operation potency precedes act in time, and what is unformed precedes the formed. But God produces a being in act from nothing; and so He produces immediately a complete and perfect thing, according to the greatness of His power.

ad (3): since an accident is a form, it is some sort of “act”; but matter, thanks just to what it is, is a being in potency. So matter’s being in act without form is more of a conflict than an accident’s being without a subject.

TO MEET THE POINTS ON THE OTHER SIDE — *ad* (1’): the other saints held that a formless state of matter preceded its formed state in time, this was not from a lack of power on God’s part, but from His wisdom, so that order might be preserved in the founding of things as they were brought from less complete to complete.

ad (2’): some of the ancient Naturalist philosophers posited an original confusion excluding all diversity; alongside them, Anaxagoras maintained that only intellect was distinct and unmixed. But ahead of the work of diversifying, Holy Scripture posits already more than one distinction. The first is between heaven and earth (in which also a difference of matter is shown, as will emerge below), where it says, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth.” — The second is a distinction of the elements as to their forms, by naming “earth,” and “water.” Moses did not mention air and fire, because it was not as obvious that they were bodies to the unlearned to whom Moses was speaking. Plato, however, would have thought that the air was meant when it says “the spirit of the Lord” (because air is also called spirit or breath); and he would have understood fire to be meant by “heaven” (because of the fiery nature of heavenly bodies), as Augustine reports in *City of God VIII*. Rabbi Moses agrees with Plato on other points but says that fire is what is meant by “darkness,” because (he says) in its own sphere fire does not give light. But the opinion stated earlier seems more suitable, because “the spirit of the Lord” in Scripture is used only for the Holy Spirit as a rule. But he also says that the spirit moved over the waters not in a bodily sense but as the will of an artist moves over the surface of the matter he wishes to form up. — A third distinction is one of place, because the earth was under the waters which made it invisible, but the air (the subject of darkness) is indicated as above the waters, where it says, “Darkness was over the face of the deep.” — What other distinctions remained to be drawn will emerge in coming articles.

Aristotle, *Physics*
I, c. 4

c. 11: *PL* 41, 236
Guide to the
Perplexed II c. 30

in q 69

or elements. It was not a chaos, but an immense radiation expanding and cooling with fine precision suited to the formation of atomic nuclei and the escape of light.

 Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article, he does three main jobs: (1) he reports a diversity of opinion: (2) he shows that Augustine's opinion should be admitted as true; (3) he treats the opinions of the others.

ii. As for job (1), he says two things, namely, the opposing opinions on the matter in question, and the root of the fact that they are not very opposed in truth, because of differing uses of 'formless'.

iii. As for job (2) he tells us two things. The first is what 'formless' meant in Augustine, *i.e.*, it meant absence of every form.

Secondly, he states the conclusion that answers the question in Augustine: a formless state of matter did not precede its formation and diversification in time but only in nature. — For formation, he gives this support: because it would follow that there would be a being in act without act. — For diversification, the support is that the opinion of the ancient Naturalists would follow, claiming that the subject underlying generation is a being in act. Hence there would be no generation but only alteration, because an [accidental] form arising in generation would not produce an unqualified being but would come to such a being. — On the point that the formless state is prior in nature, as potency is prior to act, and parts prior to the whole, the support is on the ground that such a formless condition is that of prime matter in and of itself.

iv. Concerning this part of the text, notice that two questions seem to bear upon it. The one is,

Can matter exist without form?

The other question is,

Has a form of bodiliness served as the form coeval with matter?

The first of these questions does not bear upon this article directly, because we are not talking about divine power but about the order in which things came to be: and it is well established, even to our adversaries, matter cannot exist without form by virtue of the order of things. So this requires a special inquiry in my commentary on *De Ente et Essentia*. — But the second question will be treated below, since it deals with plurality of forms.

v. As for job (3), he makes five points. The first is what the word 'formless' means in Basil, Ambrose, and Chrysostom, namely, a negation of well-formedness. — Secondly he gives the conclusion with which they answer the question: the formless state preceded the formation in time. — Thirdly he discusses the discord and concord of Augustine with the others. — Fourthly, he distinguishes three cases of well formedness in Scripture: light in heaven and the transparent body, visibility on earth and the beauty of vegetation on it. — Fifthly, he takes the opposed formless states from the words of Scripture. Everything is clear in the text.

q.8
q.76, a.4,
commentary

Is the formless matter of all bodily things one and the same?

In II Sent. d.12, a.1, 2 CG c.16, Opusculum XV De Angelis c.8; In Aristotelis De Caelo I, lectio 6.

It seems that the unformed matter of every bodily thing is one and the same.

c.12;
PL 34, 831 (1) After all, Augustine says in *Confessions XII*, "I find two things which thou hast made, one of them formed and the other unformed;" and he calls this latter "the earth invisible and discomposed," by which he means to say the matter of bodily things. Therefore, the matter of all bodily things is one and the same.

c.6;
1016a 24 (2) Besides, Aristotle says in *Metaphysics V* that things which are one in genus are one in matter. But all bodily things agree in the genus of being a body. Therefore all bodily things have one and the same matter.

(3) Moreover, different act-states are brought about in different potentialities, and one act-state in one potentiality. But there is one form of all the things which are bodies, namely, corporeality. Therefore all corporeal things have one and the same matter.

(4) Furthermore, matter considered only in itself is merely in potency. But diversification is *via* forms. Therefore matter considered in itself is just one factor in all bodily things.

c.6;
322b 12 ON THE OTHER HAND, all the things that agree in their matter are changeable into each other and interact with each other, as it says in *De Generatione et Corruptione I*. But the heavenly bodies and the lower bodies are not related in this way. Therefore their matter is not one and the same.¹

Chalcidius, *On the Timaeus*, xvi. I ANSWER: the philosophers had various opinions about this. Plato (and all the philosophers before Aristotle) maintained that all bodies were born from the four elements. So since the four elements share in one matter, so that they show mutual generation and corruption, it followed for them that all bodies were one matter. The fact that some bodies are incorruptible, Plato ascribed not to the condition of their matter but to the will of their maker, *i.e.* God, whom he introduces to the heavenly bodies by saying, "By your nature ye are dissoluble, but by my will ye are indissoluble, because my will is greater than your limits."

¹ It was the ancient conviction, of course, that the heavenly bodies were imperishable, either by divine mandate (according to Plato) or by their nature (according to Aristotle, whose opinion Aquinas will follow, as usual). But setting aside the obsolete cosmology, the text just used in this *sed contra* poses a question which is still alive. The "dark matter" now believed to exist on the periphery of galaxies seems not to interact with ordinary matter except gravitationally; and since its composition is unknown, the question of whether any elements found on earth "can be changed into it," and *vice-versa*, is perforce open, especially if we limit the "can" to such states of matter and energy as can be made to obtain after the Big Bang.

Aristotle refutes this position by appealing to the natural motions of bodies. Since a heavenly body has a natural motion different in kind from the natural motion of the elements, it follows that the heavenly body's nature is other than the nature of the four elements. And just as the circular motion which is distinctive of a heavenly body lacks a contrary, while the motions of the elements are contrary to each other to the extent that motion upward is contrary to motion downward, so also a heavenly body is without contrariety, while the elementary bodies are with contrariety. Since corruption and generation are from contraries, it follows that a heavenly body by its nature is incorruptible, while the elements are corruptible.

But notwithstanding this difference of natural corruptibility vs. incorruptibility, Avicenna* maintained that there was a single matter of all bodies, by fastening upon the oneness of form involved in "being a body." Well, if the form of corporeality were in and of itself one form, upon which there supervened the other forms by which bodies are diversified, what he says would have a certain necessity about it. For that one form would inhere in matter unchangeably, and in respect to that form every body would be incorruptible: rather corruption would arise from the removal of subsequent forms, and this would not be unequal corruption but just corruption in some respect, because a being in act would underlie the privation. The same idea occurred to the ancient Naturalists, who maintained that the subject underlying bodies was some being in act, like maybe fire, or air, or something of the sort.

But on the supposition that no form in a corruptible body remains behind as underlying its generation and corruption, it necessarily follows that the matter of corruptible bodies and incorruptible ones cannot be the same. Matter, after all, thanks to what it is, is in potency to form. It has to be the case, therefore, that matter considered in itself is in potency to the forms of all those things which share the same matter. But through one form, matter is only put into act with *that one form*. So it remains in potency to all the others. — This conclusion is not avoided by supposing that one of those forms is more complete and virtually contains the others within itself. For potency *qua* potency stands indifferently towards the complete and the incomplete. Hence when it is under an incomplete form, it is in potency to a complete one, and *vice-versa*. — So, then, the matter which is under the form of an incorruptible body will still be in potency to the form of a corruptible one. And since it does not have this latter form in act, it will be at once under a form and a privation (because the lack of a form to which a thing is nevertheless in potency is a privation). But this is the situation in a *corruptible* body. So it is impossible for a naturally corruptible body and a naturally incorruptible one to be of one and the same matter.

* Solomon ibn Gabirol, *Fons vitae* I, c.17

*De Substantia
Orbis*, c.2

One also cannot say (as Averroes imagined) that a heavenly body itself is the matter of a heaven, being in potency to place and not to existing; and that its form is a matter-free substance which is joined to it as its mover. For it is impossible to posit a being in act without its being act and form as a whole, or having an act or a form. But if one thinks away that matter-free substance which is supposed to be the mover, and if the heavenly body does not have a form so as to be composed of a form and a subject of the form, it follows that it is form and act as a whole. But everything like that is actually understood — which cannot be said of a heavenly body, since it is a sense object.

The remaining alternative, then, is that the matter of a heavenly body, considered in itself, is not in potency to any form except the one it has. It makes no difference for present purposes what that form may be, be it a soul or something else. That form so perfects that matter that there remains in it no potency to be [something else] but only to be located elsewhere, as Aristotle says. And thus the matter of a heavenly body is not the same matter as that of the elements except by analogy, thanks to the fact that they agree in meeting a definition of potency.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): Augustine followed Plato in this opinion and did not posit a fifth essence.² — Or else one has to say that unformed mat-

²The “fifth essence” was supposed to be an element not found on earth but found in the heavenly bodies, which were composed of it.

ter is “one” by oneness of rank, just as all bodies are “one” in having the rank of bodily creatures.

ad (2): if ‘genus’ is looked at physically, corruptible and incorruptible things are not in the same genus, because of the different mode of potency in them, as it says in the *Metaphysics*; but if ‘genus’ is construed logically, there is one genus of all bodily things thanks to the one definition of ‘bodily’.³

ad (3): the form of bodiliness is not one and the same in all bodies, since it is not other than the forms by which the bodies are diversified, as I said [in the body of the article].⁴

ad (4): since potency is spoken of in relation to act, a being in potency [to this act] is by that very fact diverse from one ordered to a different act, as vision is ordered to color, and hearing to sound. So the matter of a heavenly body is other than the matter of an element, from the sheer fact that it is not in potency to an element’s form.⁵

³ The scholastic definition of ‘body’ was ‘thing having three dimensions’. Its mathematical character is what prevented “the bodies” from forming one physical/natural genus. Ditto for the definitions of ‘cube’, ‘sphere’, etc.

⁴ The Scholastics were well aware that bodies are diversified more by their physics than by their geometry.

⁵ This answer is welcome confirmation that ‘ordinatur ad’ did not express a unique relation; it could mean ‘is ordained to’, ‘tends toward’, ‘aims at’ or just (what it means here) ‘is a potency to’.

Metaphysics XII,
c.2, 1069b 26

XII, c.2, 1069b 26

Cajetan’s Commentary

The title question is clear. — The word ‘one’ is taken strictly for oneness of physical genus, which is what oneness of matter would be strictly speaking, as you see

c.6.
1016a 27

from *Metaphysics V*. In the body of the article he does two main jobs: (1) he treats the opinions on the affirmative side; (2) he treats those on the negative side.

ii. As for job (1), he treats two opinions; the first is that of the ancients, the second that of Avicbron, since they both claimed that there was one matter of all things. On the opinion of the ancients, he makes three remarks: what their opinion was, and Plato’s defense of it, and Aristotle’s attack on it. — On the opinion of Avicbron, he also makes three remarks: what his opinion was, and his basis for it, and an attack against it, on the ground that being generated would be nothing but being altered.

iii. As for job (2), he also deals with two opinions, namely, Averroes’ and his own, in that order. Firstly, he supports the following negative proposition: “the matter of corruptible things and that of incorruptible things is not one and the same.” In this he agrees with Averroes and disagrees with the authors quoted previously; for he derives the opposite opinion from the same foundation.

See below §§
xi, xiv

The supporting argument goes as follows. [*Antecedent:*] Matter, thanks to what it is in itself, is in potency to a form; [*1st inference:*] therefore in itself matter is potency to all the forms to which it is the common matter; [*2nd inference:*] ergo, when it has one of them, it remains in potency to all the other forms; [*3rd inference:*] therefore it is at once under one form [the one it has] and deprived of another; [*4th inference:*] so if one form is corruptible and belongs to an incorruptible composite, one and the same thing will be simultaneously corruptible and incorruptible in its nature; [*5th inference:*] therefore it is impossible for one matter to be that of corruptible things and incorruptible ones.

Drawing the second inference is supported on the following ground. Suppose that, by having one form, it did not remain in potency to the others. Why would this be the case? It would be the case because the one form it has completes it in such a way as to leave behind no potency to the others. But this last cannot be the case on two grounds. The first is that matter is put into act under *one form only* thanks to its potency to that form. The second ground (and this one is given to head off a reply) is that matter in itself stands indifferently towards a complete form [like that of a fish] and an incomplete one [like that of a fin].

Many doubts

iv. Concerning this part of the text, be aware that Scotus objects to the conclusion, while Giles [Aegidius of Rome] objects to both the argument and the conclusion. This is why Giles, in his remarks on *II Sent.* d.12 tries to break down Aquinas's argument by denying the second inference; he imagines that the reason the matter of the moon is not in potency to the form of fire is because the form of the moon has no contrary, and thus is not deprived [of the form of fire] and does not seek it. But it is really amazing how far such a famous disciple can have deviated from his master on such an obvious point. A privation, after all, as we have it in *Metaphysics V*, is absence of a trait in a subject naturally apt to have it; but the matter of the moon, *just in itself*, is naturally apt to receive the form of fire, and has in fact the absence thereof; therefore in the matter of the moon there is privation of the form of fire. And there is no way to answer this except to reject the definition of privation. This is why St. Thomas and Scotus tried to exclude a retort touched upon in the text (because it had an appearance of relevance) — not this one by Giles, which is worth nothing. So the argument in the article stands.

v. Against our conclusion itself, however, argument is made on two fronts: (1) by denying that the [sort of] matter which is pure potency is in the heavens; (2) by attacking the claim that matter in a heaven meets another definition.¹ On the first front, Scotus argues in his remarks on *II Sent.* d.14, q.1, as follows. [*Antecedent:*] In a heaven there is no potency to the other side of a contradiction; [*inference:*] so there is no matter in heaven which is pure potency. The antecedent is from *Metaphysics IX*, text 17. Drawing the inference is supported by the fact that pure potency is in itself potency to be and to not-be.

A confirming argument for this is that pure potency has absence of a form in natural priority to having a form. This in turn is supported on the ground that it has the absence-of-form of itself but has form from another, as the air stands towards darkness and light.

Here's another confirmation. Matter is that through which a thing can be and not be, and according to *Physics I* matter is one source in the underlying subject but two sources in thought, because of privation. Ergo [such matter is not in heaven].

Other writers also argue against the same point, on the ground that if a heavenly orb were composed of matter and form, there would be no need for a soul or Intelligence moving it. The consequent holds because circular motion follows from a form, just as downward motion follows from the form of being heavy.

vi. On the second front [mentioned in § v], Scotus argues in the place I cited before that there are not two first purposes, nor two first agents, and so there are not two prime matters. — Besides, the matter of the sun (while not in potency to another form) is still in potency in itself to the sun's form and its privation. Therefore it is in potency to the other side of a contradiction. And hence

a celestial body will be corruptible just in itself as far as it goes.

Giles, meanwhile, in the place cited above, argues on this same front. He does so firstly on the ground that absence of every form constitutes the oneness of matter in itself; but taking away every form both heavenly and terrestrial, one finds all matter with denial of all from; therefore, all matter in and of itself is one and the same negatively (as we say about the matter of all things here below). — Secondly, Giles argues that act is what distinguishes and separates, according to *Metaphysics VII*, text 49; therefore in pure potency there can be no distinction apart from acts. — Thirdly, if there were different pure potencies, it would follow that there would not be maximal positive distance between pure Act and pure potency; this is unintelligible; therefore. He supports the consequent on the ground that given two pure potencies differing in definition, as is posited here, it would have to be the case that the one is more distant from pure Act than the other: therefore the distance of the one pure potency would not be maximal. — These reports suffice here, because a solution to these will show how to solve the rest.

Clearing these away

vii. To clear up this topic, pay diligent attention to the fact that if one considers the nature of matter as such, one will have an easy time answering these problems. After all, matter in itself, "thanks to what it is" (to quote the text), is not any being but is a substantial potency to form, and has no other nature, and this tells us its WHAT-IT-IS. Granted, this does not show up in just one way but two, because being-towards-a-form shows up in two ways, namely towards the form in its genus and towards the form in its species. For since every potency has to look towards some act *per se primo* as equivalent to it and by which the potency needs to be defined, as is clear in *Metaphysics IX*, it follows that the substantial potency of matter looks towards an equivalent act or form generically or specifically (individual cases, after all, are beyond our skill). Between these two ways, the difference is obvious: a potency to one form generically is towards many species; but a potency to just one species is not to many (unless perhaps accidentally, say, because the species is multiplied numerically). But from this difference there follows another: namely, that a potency showing up in the first way has a privation connected to it, whereas a potency showing up the second way does not. The upshot is obvious: matter which is in potency to many forms but has one of them in act is still in potency to another and is thereby deprived of that other; (after all, potency to some form plus a negation that the form is in it constitutes a privation); but matter whose potency is just to one form, when it has it, lacks nothing it can have, and has no privation.

Do not brush past this, but hold still a moment, philosophically, and ponder the fact that nothing seeks a negation or an evil unless it is seeking a good to which the negation of another good is attached. Thus what admits of being

¹ The two fronts are not rival theories but just two ways to show that Aquinas' case for his own theory is not cogent.

² On the difference between potency to a genus and potency to just one species of it, see c. 2 of Cajetan's *De potentia neutra*, above, p. 44.

q. 3, a.4

c. 22,
1022b 22ff

Reply in § x

cf 1041b 5-7

Reply in § x

c. 8;
1050b 17ff

Reply in § viii

c. 8,
1050a 5-30

Reply in § viii

c. 7;
190b 29ff

Reply in § viii

Reply in § viii

Reply in § ix

heated, by seeking to be hot, seeks the negation of cold; and a fire by seeking its own continuance seeks as a result the corruption of water. And hence if any potency is not to another form, it does not have a coeval privation of the form it does not have. Otherwise it would seek first-off not to be — which is unintelligible.

Hence in the case at hand, matters conform to reason as follows. (1) The prime matter of the things here below is a substantial potency with respect to all the forms of generable and corruptible things and hence looks *per se primo*, as towards its equivalent act, to the form of “generable substance;” and since there are many species under this, it has to be the case that when the matter is under one of them it is in potency to another of them, and hence deprived of that one; and thus they are all generable towards each other, etc. (2) The matter of a heavenly body is not towards one act *just generically*, but towards one act in fully detailed species. The result is that one must not think that the matter of a heavenly body looks towards the form of the “heavenly” as its equivalent act (because then there would follow a potency to many and a privation and intrinsic corruptibility); rather one must think that the matter of the moon is in and of itself in potency only to the form of the moon, and the matter of the sun only to the form of the sun, and so on for all the others. The result is that the species of the heavenly bodies are just as many as their physical genera, and that what I just called “matter of a heavenly body” does not mean some one matter, but applies *analogously* to all the matters of heavenly bodies.

Answering Scotus and Averroes

viii. Against the argument of Scotus and Averroes [*loc. cit.*], let two replies be given: the first dealing with the reality of the matter; the second *ad hominem*, i.e. dealing with Aristotle's way of speaking in *Metaphysics IX*.

As to the reality of the matter, distinguish passive potency into two sorts: one of them purely receptive (*i.e.* one that receives a form without undergoing any intermediate change), and one sort which is receptive and passive at once, such that it is acted upon by the agent cause and receives the form. Now I say (and it is surely the case) that a purely receptive potency is not potency to a contradiction; rather, the potency which is at once receptive *and* passive is potency to a contradiction. From remarks already made, it is clear that the matter of the moon is a receptive potency solely; since the matter has that form without any mediating undergoing or action.³ And it is obvious that this is also the case for a heavenly body's potency to its shape; for that potency is not to a contradiction; for while it is receptive, it is not passive.

— And if one continues to object on the ground that a potency, in and of itself, is indifferent *vis-à-vis* an act and its absence* — or, what is more, has an absence beforehand, because it has the absence in and of itself, as you would gather from Avicenna *Metaphysics IV*, c.2 — my

reply is to deny the inference, if the antecedent [in heaven there is no potency to contradiction] is brought forward negatively, or else I deny the antecedent itself, if it is brought forward positively. For the following negative proposition is true:

a potency does not have its act of itself,

but from this there does not follow the affirmative proposition that “therefore of itself it has non-act.” Indeed the affirmative proposition that

a potency of itself has non-act

is false. And likewise this one is false:

a potency of itself does not have an act rather than a non-act,

since of itself (in its own line of causation *i.e.* material) it claims for itself such and such an act and in no wise an opposite, since it was a potency *to such and such an act* and no other.

As for the *ad hominem* reply, you need to know that Aristotle in *Metaphysics IX*, in the text quoted (# 17), does not call “a potency” anything but a potency *qua a potency*. But a potency *qua a potency* is not there when it is already under an act, and hence he does not call a purely receptive potency a “potency.” And this is why he says that every potency is potency to a contradiction — and if you also want to convince beginners, bring the text and you will see in the same passage that he denies that there is in a heavenly body a potency to local motion, since it is well known that a motion is “the act of a being in potency insofar as it is in potency.” For since Aristotle posited everlasting motion in a heavenly body (as well as everlasting shape), it is clear that a heavenly body is never in a state of potency *vis-à-vis* motion, but is always in act in that respect; and so he said a heavenly body is not in potency to moving but in potency to the endpoints to which and from which its mover continually acts to make the body arrive and depart.

Against the confirming arguments I have two replies. Firstly, I reply by distinguishing not-being and privation without qualification (*simpliciter*) vs. in some respect (*secundum quid*): and matter is that through which a thing can not-be in some respect; and likewise it is one in subject with a privation in some respect. — One can reply secondly, and rather better, that those propositions [that matter is that whereby a thing can be and not-be; and that matter is one subject of an absence and a privation] can be interpreted two ways. In the first, they are so read that the subject claims for itself the predicate, and then they are not true unless one throws in the distinction ‘unqualifiedly’ *versus* ‘in some respect’. The other way of taking them is such that the predicate determines the subject to itself, and so taken these are true across the board; for wherever there is potency to be or not to be, there is matter; similarly where there is privation there is a subject identical to the matter, and not *vice versa*.

Against the argument of the others, I deny the inference. The reason is that the circular motion is a living motion [*motus animalis*] and not merely natural, and hence the form of a heavenly body does not go beyond it. One also should not say that the heavenly body is a purely passive source *vis-à-vis* the circular motion; rather, as the

* *negatio*

³ He means any action other than God's creating. God creates the moon in its form, and so its matter “receives” that form immediately with existing.

form of the heart concurs with the movement of the heart intermediate between the purely passive and active, and yet that motion can only come from the soul; so also, the form of the heavenly body is by nature such that in conjunction with its [moving] soul or Intelligence it is naturally apt to follow a circular motion. Hence the substance of a heavenly body is the natural source of the circular motion (otherwise the whole argument in *De Caelo I* to infer a fifth essence would fall to the ground), and yet a soul has to be joined to it, as one sees with the motion of the heart. For the heavenly motion is the first motion in the universe, just as that of the heart is the first motion in an animal, as is clear in *Physics VIII*.

c.2;
269a 5-10

More against Scotus

ix. Against Scotus's first argument against the second statement, his consequent needs to be denied. For external causes work differently than internal ones, since these latter enter into the composition of things and thereby there has to be variations in the real; but not so with external causes. — Against his second argument, my answer is already clear from what I have said. I deny that the matter of the sun is in potency of itself to privation of its form. The reason is that a potency to a privation of this form is based on potency to another form, as is clear from what I have said.

More against Giles

x. Against the first argument form Giles, I modify the proposition that "negation of all forms constitutes the oneness of matter." For this can be understood two ways. The first way is across the board (*absolutē*) as it sounds; and so taken it is false, and so an across the board negation would also be about nothing. — In the other way it would negate other forms in a subject naturally apt; and this way it is true: but in the case at hand that apt subject is the matter common to many things; this, after all, negatively, not positively. But the matter common to many things does not go with the matter proper to one thing thanks to negation: for from the fact that this matter is common to these things, and that matter is not, they are already diverse.

Against his second argument, I concede that act alone distinguishes. And I say that two pure potencies are distinguished by the act to which they are reduced *per se primo*, and they are defined through those acts, and they cannot be abstracted from them even by the first operation of the intellect. And if you are looking for what intrinsically distinguishes them, I say that it is the substantial commensuration of each with the act equivalent to it. And if you ask about the substantial commensuration to the act, I say that it is not only identically but also formally the very essence of each pure potency. And since the equivalent acts are diverse of themselves, so also the potencies proper to them are diverse of themselves thanks to their acts; for just as matter is for the sake of form, so also the distinctness of matter is for the sake of diversity of forms.

Against his third argument, as regards the matter of fact, I say there is nothing wrong with one pure potency's being more distant than another from Pure Act — not through inclusion of some actualness in one more than in the other (because then they wouldn't be pure potencies), but through the commensuration of the one to a more perfect equivalent act compared to the other; so that the one pure potency is less distant from Pure Act than the other one thanks to being a capacity for a more complete act. — But take care at this point lest you go wrong by a fallacy of the consequent or a figure of speech, slipping from "pure potency" to "pure potency to such and such an act." For the former is close to nothing, and "maximally distant from God," etc. But it has a latitude according to the respective proper acts in the manner stated. Among particular pure potencies, none is maximally distant and close to nothing unless it be commensurate to the least act. — From these statements I think you can easily solve the rest; and so we move on to other things.

Against Averroes

xi. Thereupon in the text, St. Thomas destroys the position of Averroes, which is the following affirmative claim:

the matter of a heavenly body is a simple corporeal substance.

The argument for it goes as follows. [*Major:*] Every being in act either is an act or form, or has an act or form: [*minor:*] but the bodiliness of a heavenly body, apart from its mover, is a being in act and is not itself an act or form. [*Conclusion:*] Therefore such a body is an act or a form. — The reasoning is good, with obvious premises, at least in natural topics, and bears against Averroes. — But the falsehood of the conclusion is proved as follows. If that bodiliness were an act, it would be understood in act — which conflicts with being a heavenly body because the latter is a sense object, of course.

xii. Concerning this argument, notice that it receives insults because it is based on the proposition, "everything which is in and of itself wholly act is understood in act." That this is false, however, is clear from the fact that this whiteness is in and of itself all act, and likewise this form of this cow is all act (since neither has multiple parts some of which might be act or form and the other not; and yet it is obvious that neither of these is understood in act, but is a sense object in act and intelligible in potency. Likewise, Averroes would say the same about the "corporeality" which is in the genus of empirical substance and yet as a whole is act mixed with potency, because it is moveable, and subject to size, shape, and other accidents.

Clearing this up

xiii. To clear this away, be aware that being "a being in act" happens in two ways: (1) narrowly: (2) broadly. Used in the broad way, "a being in act" is what we call everything which is outside its causes one way or another. But narrowly speaking, "a being in act" is what we call only that which properly exists, *i.e.*, what is in its own right and not because it is a trait of something. In things that come to be,

c 8;
1033b 10 this is what comes to be. *i.e.* the composite, as is clear from *Metaphysics VII*; but in things which are not generated or corrupted, the “being in act” is that which would come to be if it did come to be

In the case at hand, we are not talking about “a being in act” in the broad sense but in the narrow and distinctive sense. And thanks to this fact alone, the objections are worthless. After all, no form exists or comes to be here below unless because it is or becomes a composite thing. Hence the argument in the text from the analysis of substance keeps its strength. For since ‘substance’ is divided sufficiently into the matter and the form and the composite of those two, and since matter is defined as “what is not ϕ in and of itself,” whereas form is defined as “that whereby this is ϕ ,” it has to be the case that celestial corporeality (since it’s obviously a this something even apart from its mover) does not fall into the first pigeon hole, *i.e.* matter, but the second or third, *i.e.* a form or a composite. And since Averroes denies that a heavenly body is a composite, the remaining alternative is that it is a form; it exists not because it is a trait of something but because it does so in its own right, such that if it came to be, its coming to be would be *per se primo*; and hence its existence would be *per se primo*. But every form which is *per se primo* is understood in act; for as it says in *De Anima III*, “everything relates to being understood as it relates to being separate from mat-

ter.” Therefore two points follow upon Averroes position. From the fact that it is *per se primo* a being in act, it follows that it belongs to the class of things understood in act. But from the fact that it is subject to quantity and power to be located, *etc.*, it follows that it is in the class of sense objects. But these two results are impossible to combine.

One cannot evade this argument unless one posits a fourth kind of substance, which is obviously alien to Aristotle’s philosophy. What some people propose, namely that the alleged corporeality is included in the first pigeon hole, *i.e.* under matter, distinguishing matter into “matter towards being” and “matter towards a location,” contradicts the definition or distinctive property of the matter which is the first pigeon hole, which is clear from *De Anima II*. It is also in conflict with Aristotle’s doctrine elsewhere, as it would be easy to show if I were now writing against Averroes.

Back to the text of the article: job (3)

xiv. The third job Aquinas does is infer three propositions. The first is that the matter of a heavenly body, in itself, is only in potency to the form it has. — The second is that it does not remain in potency towards being but towards a location. — The third is that the matter of corruptible bodies and of incorruptible bodies is not the same except analogously. And this last is the direct answer to the question.

c 4;
430a 5

Was the empyrean heaven created along with formless matter?

In II Sent., d.2, q.2.

It would seem that the empyrean heaven was not created along with formless matter.

(1) After all, if empyrean heaven is “a something,” it has to be an empirical body. But every empirical body is able to move. The empyrean heaven is not able to move, because its moving would be picked up by the movement of a visible body — which is not seen to happen. Therefore the empyrean heaven is not something created along with unformed matter.

c.4,
PL 42, 873

(2) Besides, Augustine says in *De Trinitate III* that “the lower bodies are ruled through the higher ones by an ordering.” So if the empyrean heaven is a superior body, it has to have some influence on these lower bodies. But this does not seem to be the case, especially if one assumes it to be unmoving* (since no body moves unless it has been moved). Therefore the empyrean heaven was not created along with formless matter.

* immobile

c.20,
PL 42, 907

(3) If one says that the empyrean heaven is a place of contemplation, not aimed at natural effects, Augustine says something relevant in *De Trinitate IV*: “inasmuch as our mind grasps something eternal, we are not in this world.” Clearly, then, contemplating raises the mind above bodily things; so no bodily place has been reserved for doing it.

(4) Moreover, there is found among the heavenly orbs one which is partially transparent and partially luminous, namely, the heaven of the stars. There is also found a heaven which is wholly transparent, which some call the “aqueous” or “crystalline heaven.” So if there is another and still higher heaven, it would have to be totally luminous. But this cannot be the case, because then the air would be continually illuminated, and there would be no night. Therefore the empyrean heaven was not created along with unformed matter.

Glossa ordinaria on Gen 1:1
PL 113

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Strabo said on the text, *In the beginning God created heaven and earth*, namely, “the word ‘heaven’ does not mean the visible firmament but the empyrean, i.e. the fiery one.”

Glossa ordinaria, *ibid.*
Bede, *Hexaemeron I*, on Gen.1:6; PL 91, 18

PG 29, 41

I ANSWER: “empyrean heaven” does not seem to have been posited except by the authorities of Strabo and Bede, and again by the authority of St. Basil. They agree to some extent in positing it, i.e., in saying that it is the place of the Blessed. Thus Strabo and Bede say that “as soon as it was made, it was filled with angels.” St. Basil, in homily II of his own *Hexaemeron*, says, “just as the damned are bound in ultimate darkness, so also the reward for good works is bestowed in the light which is beyond this world, where the Blessed receive their mansion of peace.” But these authors differ in the reason why they posit such a place. Strabo and Bede posit empyrean heaven because the “firmament” (by which they understand the heaven of the stars) is not mentioned at the beginning [of Genesis 1], but

on the second day. Basil, on the other hand, gives the reason as [being deterrence from error]: lest it seem that God began his work utterly in darkness — because the Manicheans made this calumny by calling the God of the Old Testament “a god of darkness.”

PG 29, 37

Well, these reasons are not very cogent. The question about the “firmament” mentioned as having been made on the second day is solved otherwise by Augustine and by other saints. — The question about darkness is answered by Augustine with the point that a formless state of matter (which is what is indicated by ‘darkness’) did not precede the formed state of matter in time, but only in origin.¹ According to other authors, however, darkness, by not being a created thing but a mere privation of light, attests to the divine Wisdom, by the fact that the things He produced from nothing He inaugurated in a state of incompleteness and afterwards brought to completeness.

See below, q.68,
a.1 ad 1*Contra adversarios
Legis et Prophetarum I*, c. 8, 9;
PL 42, 609f.Bede, *loc. cit.*; PL 91, 15

However, a more fitting reason can be derived from the condition of glory. After all, a double glory is awaited in the future reward: a spiritual one, and a corporeal one, the latter consisting not only in the glorification of human bodies but also in that of the whole world. Spiritual glory was begun from the very beginning of the world in the blessedness of the angels, equality with whom has been promised to the Saints. Hence it was fitting that bodily glory also have been begun from the beginning in some body — a body which was free at the outset from the slavery of corruption and change but was wholly luminous, as every bodily creature is expected to be after the future Resurrection. And so that heaven is called “empyrean” (“fiery”) not from its heat but from splendor.²

Luke 22

One should be aware, however, that in *The City of God X*, Augustine says that Porphyry “used to distinguish the angels from the demons by saying that aerial places belonged to the demons, but ethereal or empyrean ones to the angels.” — But Porphyry, as a Platonist, thought the heaven of the stars was the fiery one; he called it “empyrean” or “ethereal” (since the word “ether” was taken from inflammation and not from the speed of motion, as Aristotle tells us). I say this lest anyone think that Augustine posited an “empyrean heaven” the way current writers do.³

c.9,
PL 41, 287*De Civitate I*, c. 3,
270b 20

¹ In other words, formed matter comes “from” the unformed stuff, but instantaneously so.

² In sum, Aquinas’ position seems to have been that “empyrean heaven” is a bodily place, but not one in the empirical state in which its existence would be knowable by a natural science; rather it is a glorified place whose existence can be known by revelation and faith alone.

³ The point of this last paragraph is to warn opposing authors not to use Augustine as an authority for their own views.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): empirical bodies are able to move and change thanks to the present state of the world, because their changing yields [the time in which there is] growth in the number of the elect. But in the final consummation of glory, the changes of bodies will cease. And such must have been the case in the empyrean heaven from the beginning.

ad (2): since the empyrean heaven (according to some) is for the state of glory, it is plausible enough to say that it has no influence on the lower bodies, which are for something else, *i.e.*, for the sake of the natural course of things. — Still, it is yet more plausible to compare the empyrean heaven to the highest of our angel helpers: just as the supreme angels have influence over the middle and lowest angels, who are sent to us, even though the highest themselves are not sent (according to Denis), so also the empyrean heaven has influence over the bodies that move, even though it itself does not. Hence one can say that its influence on the first moving heaven is not one that comes and goes with movement but something fixed and stable, such as the active power to contain and cause, or something of that kind pertaining to high standing.*

*Celest. Hier-
archy*, c.13;
PG 3, 301

* *dignitas*

ad (3): a bodily place is not reserved for contemplation because it is needed but because it is suitable, if the beauty on the outside is to match the beauty inside one. This is why Basil says the ministering Spirit “could not tarry in darkness but had His abode in the light and joy befitting Him.”

Homily II In
Hexameron;
PG 29, 41

ad (4): as Basil says in his second sermon on the work of the six days, “it is certain that heaven was so made as to be enclosed in a spherical shape, having a body dense and strong enough to separate what was outside it from what was inside. Thanks to this shape, it inevitably left beyond it a region without light, cut off from the brilliance that used to radiate towards it.”

Ibid.; *loc. cit.*

However, since the body of the firmament is solid but transparent, and so does not impede the passage of light, as is obvious from the fact that we see the light of the stars despite the intervening heavenly spheres, one may propose instead that the light in the empyrean heaven is not condensed like the body of the sun, so as to emit rays, but is a more subtle affair. Or, the brightness of that heaven is the brightness of glory, which is not at all like natural brightness.

Cajetan’s Commentary

The title question is clear from the standard use [of ‘empyrean heaven’ to mean] an unmoving or unchanging heaven.

In the body of the article, he does five jobs: (1) he tells us where talk of an empyrean heaven comes from, *i.e.*, from just three sources; (2) he tells us where the three agree, *i.e.* on the purpose it serves, and where they disagree, *i.e.* on the reason for believing in it; (3) he weighs those

reasons; (4) he assigns a better one; (5) he confirms his count of “only three” by excluding Augustine from those positing such a heaven.

ii. In the answer *ad* (2), notice that St. Thomas abandoned an opinion he had held (at *In II Sent.* d.2, q.2, a.3) that the empyrean heaven has no influence, which he also rejected in *Quodl. VI*, q.11. The view to embrace, then, is the one he gives here.

Was time created along with formless matter?

In II Sent. d.12, a.5

It seems that time was not created along with unformed matter.

c.12:
PL 32, 831

(1) After all, Augustine, when speaking to God in Book XII of his *Confessions*, says “I find two things which Thou has made apart from time,” namely, the first bodily matter and angelic nature. Therefore time was not created along with unformed matter.

(2) Besides, time is divided into day and night. But at the beginning there was neither night nor day — not until afterwards, when “God separated the light from the darkness.” Therefore at the beginning there was no time.

(3) Moreover, time is the count of the motions of the firmament; which was made on the second day, as we read. Therefore time was not from the beginning.

(4) Also, change/motion is prior to time. Therefore it should be numbered among the first created things, rather than time.

(5) Furthermore, time like place is an extrinsic measure. Therefore time should no more be counted among the first created things than place is.

I, c.1:
PL 34, 247

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad litteram* namely, that the spiritual and bodily creation took place “at the start of time.”

I ANSWER: it is commonly held that four things were created at the very first: angelic nature, the empyrean heaven, unformed bodily matter, and time. One needs to be aware that this common view does not accord with the opinion of Augustine. For Augustine posits just two things as created first, namely, angelic nature and bodily matter, without making any mention of the empyrean heaven. And those two, he says, are prior to matter’s formation not in time but in nature.¹ And just as they are naturally prior to matter’s formation, so also they are naturally prior to change and time. Therefore time cannot be listed among the very first items.

¹ Recall footnote 1 on a.3. On natural priority, see the last bit of my footnote 3 on Cajetan’s commentary on 1 *ST* q.2, a.2.

But the list I gave first follows the opinion of other saints; they posited that a formless state of matter preceded its formation in time; and so there was an interval for which they had to posit some sort of time; otherwise the interval would have had no measure.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): Augustine says this on the ground that angelic nature and unformed matter are prior in origin or nature to time.

ad (2): just as other saints hold that matter was somehow formless and afterwards became formed, so also they hold that time was somehow unformed and afterwards became formed and distinguished into day and night.

ad (3): if the motion of the firmament did not begin immediately from the beginning, then the time which preceded it was not a measure of the firmament’s motion, but of some *first* motion. Being the “measure of the firmament’s motion” is a status time gets insofar as this motion is the first of motions; but if there should be another first motion, that motion would be the one time measure, because all things are measured by the first item of their kind.² And one *does* have to admit that there was some sort of change/motion immediately from the beginning, at least thanks to the succession of thoughts and affections in the angels’ minds. But change/motion is not intelligible without time, since time is nothing but “a count of earlier and later phases in a change/motion.”

Physics IV,
c.2, 219b 2

ad (4): the items counted among the first created are ones that have a general bearing on things. And so time has had to be counted, because it has what it takes to be a common measurement: a motion, however, as involving just one mobile subject, does not have what it takes.

ad (5): place is understood to be in the empyrean heaven containing all things. And since place applies to standing things, it was created as a whole at once with them. But time, which does not stand, was co-created at its beginning, just as even now there is nothing to be had from time in act except a “now.”

² In current cosmology, the “first motion” would have to be the expansion of the universe from its tiny beginning.

Cajetan’s Commentary

The title question is clear. In the body of the article, he does three things. (1) He answers with a conclusion affirmatively: it is commonly said that four things were created together. — (2) He shows that this is not true for

Augustine. And hence the question is answered negatively in Augustine’s works. — (3) He shows that the common account is true in the other saints. — All the points are clear.

Inquiry Sixty-Seven: Into the work of diversification just in itself

The next topic to take up is God' work of diversification, considered just in itself. We shall deal first with the work of the first day. Then with the work of the second day. Thirdly, with the work of the third day.

On the first topic, four questions are raised.

- (1) Can 'light' be applied literally to spiritual things?
- (2) Is the light illuminating bodies itself a body?
- (3) Is it a quality?
- (4) Was it suitable for light to be made on the first day?

article 1

Can 'light' be applied literally to spiritual things?

In II Sent. d 13, q 2; In Iohannem 1, lectio 3

It seems that the word 'light' is said literally of spiritual things.

(1) After all, Augustine says in *Super Genesis ad litteram IV* that in spiritual things "light is better and more certain;" and he says that "Christ is not called the light the way he is called a stone, but literally, and the later only figuratively."

c 28;
PL 34, 315

(2) Besides, in Chapter 4 of *On the Divine Names*, Denis puts 'light' among the understandable names of God. But understandable names are used literally of spiritual things. Therefore 'light' is used literally of spiritual things.

PG 3, 700

(3) Moreover, the Apostle says in Ephesians 5:13 that "everything which is manifested is light." But manifestation occurs more literally in spiritual things than in bodily ones. Ergo, the same for light.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Ambrose says in his book *De Fide* that 'splendor' is among the things said of God metaphorically.

Prologus, c 2;
PL 16, 584

ANSWER: it is customary to speak of any word in two ways: one in line with its derivation, and one in line with its use. As is clear with the word 'seeing', it was derived to mean the act of the sense of sight; but thanks to the high status and certitude of this sense, the word was extended in speakers' use to all knowledge from the other senses (for we say, 'see how it tastes', or 'see how it smells', or 'see how hot it is') and then it has been extended further to intellectual cognition in Matthew 5:8, "blessed are the pure of heart, for they shall see God."

A similar thing is to be said also about the word 'light'. For it was derived first to mean that which yields a manifestation to the sense of vision; afterwards, it was extended to mean everything that yields a manifestation in any kind of cognition. — So if we take the word 'light' by its derivation, it is said metaphorically of spiritual things, as Ambrose says. But if we take it as speakers use it, extending to every manifestation, then it is said literally of spiritual things.

How to answer the objections is thereby plain.

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article there is one distinction drawn between the two ways of taking a word: namely, as to its original derivation, or

as to its use. He answers the question according to both sides of the distinction: negatively on the first side, affirmatively on the second side.

Is light a body?

In II Sent. d.13, a.3; In II De Anima, lectio 14.

It seems that light is a body.¹

(1) After all, Augustine says in his book *On Free Will* that "light holds the first place among bodies." Therefore light is a body.

III, c.3;
PL 32, 1279

Topics V, c.4;
134b, 29

(2) Aristotle says that light is a species of fire. But fire is a body. Therefore light is a body.

(3) Moreover, being carried, intersected, and reflected is proper to bodies; but these are all attributed to light, or a ray of it. Also different rays are united and separated, as Denis says in Chapter 2 of *On the Divine Names*. This again seems to be something said only of bodies. Therefore light is a body.

PG 3, 641

ON THE OTHER HAND, two bodies cannot be at once in the same place. But light is in a place together with air. Therefore light is not a body.

ANSWER: it is impossible for light to be a body. This becomes clear on three grounds. The first comes from a consideration of place.* The place of any one body is different from the place of any other; it is not even possible, naturally speaking, for two bodies to be in the same place at once, no matter what sort of bodies they are. Even contiguity, after all, requires a distinction in position[†].

* locus

† situs

Secondly, the same truth emerges from consideration of motion. For if light were a body, illumination would be the local motion of a body. But no local motion of a body can occur in an instant, because everything which is moved locally has to reach the middle of the distance to be covered before reaching the end of it. But illumination occurs in an instant.³ — Nor can one say that it happens in an imperceptible time. In a small space, the lapse of time could be hidden; but in a large space, such as from the east to the west, the passage of time cannot be hidden. After all, the moment the sun is at a point of the east, the whole hemisphere is lit up all

the way to the opposite point.⁴ — There is also another consideration coming from motion. Each and every body has a definite natural motion; but the motion of illumination is towards every direction and is not more circular than it is rectilinear.⁵ Obviously, then, illumination is not the local motion of any body.

Thirdly, the truth becomes clear from the angle of generation and corruption. When the air is darkened by the absence of a luminary, the body of light would then become corrupted, if light were a body, and its matter would take on a different form. But this is not observed, unless someone claims that darkness is a body. — Nor is it clear from what material there could be generated daily a body big enough to fill a hemisphere. — It is also ridiculous to say that such a body is corrupted by the mere absence of a luminary. — If one says it is not corrupted but comes and goes with the sun, what could one say to the fact that the interposition of a body around a candle [say, a basket] makes the whole house dark? Nor does it seem that the light collects around the candle, because one does not see more brightness there after [removing the basket] than beforehand. Since all these claims conflict not only with reason but also with our senses, one must say it is impossible for light to be a body.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): Augustine took light to be a lucid body in act, *i.e.*, he took it to be fire, which is the noblest among the four elements.

ad (2): Aristotle calls fire "light" in a proper matter, as fire in the air is called "flame" and in earthy matter is called "hot coal." — But one should not care much about the examples Aristotle gives in his books on [language and] logic, because he gives them as plausible examples in other people's opinion.

ad (3): All those traits are attributed to light metaphorically, just as they can also be attributed to heat. For since local motion is naturally the first motion, as is proved in *Physics VIII*, we use words pertaining to local motion in talking of alteration and all changes. Thus the word 'distance' is derived from place and extended to [the contrast between] all contraries, as it says in *Metaphysics X*.

c.7, 260 a 28

c.4; 1055a 9

¹ In this article, one meets a problem deeper than obsolete science, namely, obsolete metaphysics. Aristotle's table of categories had no pigeonhole for radiation (nor for the "forces" now central to physics). Hence the medieval Aristotelians had no concept corresponding to the right answer to the question of what light is. As to the one raised in this article, we also face an ambiguity about 'body'. If a photon is a body, Aquinas is wrong. But if a body is some number of massive particles, light is not a body, because the photon has no mass.

² This is also true on the quantum scale. Even among subatomic particles, two cannot occupy the same quantum-scale place. But more relevantly, gaseous substances are so full of empty space that bosons have no trouble finding "positions" inside them. Even ordinary "solid" bodies contain enough empty space that the massless (or almost massless) neutrino passes through them unhindered.

³ Aquinas was wrong about this, of course. Illumination is just mind-bogglingly fast.

⁴ This argument is correct, except that St. Thomas underestimated how large a space has to be, before the time it takes for light to move across it becomes noticeable without fancy instruments. After all, the speed of light, at 186,000 miles per second, would take it from Vladivostok to Lisbon in less than a 20th of a second, if the path were straight.

⁵ This is the most obsolete piece of the argument, as it relies on the idea of natural motions to natural places. The motion of a photon is indeed rectilinear; but in nature, a photon hardly ever travels alone; its billions of colleagues are going rectilinearly in every direction, except that gravity bends their paths.

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article, a single conclusion answers the question in the negative: light is not a body.

This is supported on three grounds, place, movement, and generation/corruption. The points are clear without further enquiry.

article 3

Is light a quality?

In II Sent. d.13, a.3; In II De Anima, lectio 14

It seems that light is not a quality.

(1) Every quality, after all, remains in its subject even after its agent cause has ceased; thus heat remains in water after it has been removed from the fire. But light does not remain in the air when the luminary leaves. Therefore light is not a quality.

(2) Besides, every sense quality has a contrary, as heat is contrary to cold, and white to black. But there is no contrary to light, because darkness is just a privation of light. Therefore light is not a sense quality.

(3) Moreover, a cause is stronger than its effect. But heavenly light causes the substantial forms in the bodies of things here below.¹ It also gives a spiritual being* to colors, because it makes them visible in act.² Therefore light is not a sense quality but is rather a substantial or spiritual form.

* esse spiritual

De Fide orthodoxa I, c.4, PG 94, 816

ON THE OTHER HAND, Damascene says in Book I that light is a quality.

ANSWER: some writers have said that light does not have a natural being in the air, as color does in a wall; rather, they say, it has an intentional being,[†] like an image of color in the air. — But this cannot be true for two reasons. The first is that the word for light describes air: the air becomes luminous in act. But a word for a color does not describe air: one does not call the air colored. —The second is that light has an effect in nature, because bodies are made warm by the rays of the sun.³ Intentions, however, do not cause natural changes.

† esse intentional

c 6;
430b 28

Other writers have said that light is the substantial form of the sun. — But this seems impossible for two reasons. The first is that no substantial form can be sensed in and of itself, because the WHAT-IT-IS of something is an object of the intellect, as it says in *De Anima III*. But light is visible in and of itself.

¹ Avicenna spread this curious idea: *Metaphysics IX, 2*.

² A visible thing is visible "in act" when a seer has a percept of it (much as a thing is intelligible "in act" when a thinker has a concept of it). To the kind of being that the percept has "in the eye" and the concept has in the mind, the scholastics gave the name "intentional" or sometimes (as here) "spiritual." They did not think, of course, that the air was a "spirit" or had cognitive capacity; but they had no other word to express the kind of being light could have "in the air" without staining it with the color (of the wall, say) which the light was communicating/reflecting.

³ Sunlight includes the infra-red end of the spectrum, which = heat.

The second reason is that it is impossible for what is a substantial form in one thing to be an accidental form in another: for the intrinsic function of a substantial form is to put a thing into its species; hence it is present always and in every case. But light is not the substantial form of air; otherwise, the air would be corrupted when the light fades. Hence it cannot be the substantial form of the sun.

The thing to say, then, is that, as heat is an active quality following upon the substantial form of fire, so also light is an active quality following upon the substantial form of the sun, or of any other body shedding light (if there is another such).⁴ A sign of this is the fact that the rays of different stars have different effects according to the different natures of the stars' bodies.⁵

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): since a quality is a further consequence of a substantial form, a subject stands differently towards receiving a quality than it does towards receiving its form. For when matter receives a form completely, the quality resulting from the form is also firmly fixed—as would be the case if water were converted into fire. But when the substantial form is received incompletely, e.g. inchoately, the resulting quality remains indeed for a while, but not always; such is clearly the case in heated water, which returns to its natural temperature. But illumination does not occur through any change of matter to receive a substantial form, so as to be like the inchoate stage of a form. And so light does not remain except in the presence of its agent cause.

ad (2): it so happens that light does not have a contrary, because it is a natural quality of the first body causing change, which is removed from contrariety.⁶

ad (3): just as heat disposes towards the form of fire instrumentally, so to speak, in the power of fire's substantial form, so also light acts as it were instrumentally in the power of the heavenly bodies to produce substantial forms, and to make colors visible in act, inasmuch as it is a quality of the first observable body.

⁴ An active quality was not itself an action, but it enabled an action. Absent a concept of radiation, this was St. Thomas's only alternative to making light a body.

⁵ Cajetan will ask how this alleged fact is a "sign" of the point intended.

⁶ The first visible body was allegedly the heavenly sphere which started the change-processes by which nearer bodies, once moved, produced contraries.

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article he does three jobs in line with the three opinions given. The first two are the extreme positions: the first belonging to

those who hold that light is an intentional affair: the second to those who hold that it is a substance. Between the extremes is the opinion that light is an active quality follow-

ing upon a body luminous of itself.

As for job (1): he does two things. First he states the opinion: light does not have natural being but intentional being. — Secondly he gives two arguments against it. The first is that [a word for] light describes. The second is that it causes natural effects.

Trouble from Scotus and Giles

ii. Be aware here that Scotus (in remarks on *II Sent.*

a.2 d.13) and also Giles [Aegidius of Rome] (in remarks on

comment 76,
dubium 2

De Anima II and on *II Sent.* d.13 [q.2, a.1]) hold that light has intentional being. Against St. Thomas's first argument, Scotus says that his major premise is not necessary but just incidentally true in many cases, because we do not have a proper descriptive term. — Against St. Thomas's second argument, Scotus denies the major [*i.e.* that intentional entities have no natural effects].

Scotus then adds a difficult argument for his own position, against St. Thomas. [*Antecedent:*] Light is received in an organ of vision; [*consequent:*] therefore it has intentional being. — He supports his antecedent by the authority of Averroes remarks on *De Sensu et Sensato* and of Aristotle at the same place, holding that light is intrinsic to the eye. — Reaching the consequent is supported on the ground that a sensible thing posited as outside a sense [organ] does not cause sensation.

c.2

Clearing this away

iii. The SHORT WAY to answer this, it seems to me, is [to say] that the being of light is neither purely intentional being, nor natural being as distinguished from intentional being; rather it is a higher being, pre-containing in itself power-wise* what pertains to natural being and what pertains to intentional being. The result is that it is *neither, both, and one of the two, i.e.* natural, as St. Thomas says. — It is *neither* in the sense that it does not have the natural being that contrasts with intentional being (*i.e.* a natural being that is material in the way sense objects have being — objects which on account of their materiality cannot be sensed when posited as outside a sense intrinsically, because a sense is only receptive of images* without matter). Nor does it have intentional being as contrasted with natural being, because it is not just the intention of a sensible thing, of course, but a sensible thing in its own right. And light does not lack the compliment of being naturally apt to go with the quiddity of light, whereas the intention of whiteness does not have the being naturally apt to belong to the WHAT-IT-IS of whiteness. — It is *both*, meanwhile, because its efficacy shows this. For it is received in an organ and is not impeded but rather causes sensation; ergo it has what it takes to be intentional. On the other side, it causes real changes in material things, by heating them up, etc. Therefore it has what it takes to be natural. — But it is *one of the two, i.e., natural*, because this higher existing (in which light pre-contains both) *is* its natural being, as

* virtualiter

* species

the subject shows. For the natural being of any quiddity differs from its intentional being in a subject, as is clear in every case inductively; but the subject of light and of "lit" is the same, namely, the transparent as such; therefore [the natural being of light does not differ from its intentional being]. But since this being is very spiritual, it also has what it takes to be intentional. And this comes from the same root, *i.e.*, that the organ of sight is of the same nature as its subject, since it is transparent, as is clear in *De Sensu et Sensato*. — In this way all three opinions were stating the truth in some manner.

On Jobs (2) and (3)

iv. As to job (2), he does two things. First he states the opinion that light is a substantial form. — Secondly he argues against it on two grounds: that it is sensible of itself, and that it is an accident in one subject [the air, and so cannot be substance in another].

v. As for job (3): the conclusion answering the question is this: light is an active quality following upon the substance of a body luminous of itself. — This is supported on two grounds. The first, as it were, is by ruling out the options; it is neither of the above, therefore. — Secondly is it supported by a sign: the rays of the stars have different effects according to the diversity of the stars.

A problem with this "sign"

vi. But a doubt arises about this sign as to why it was adduced. Not to show that light is a quality, surely; nor to show that it is active, because both of those claims have been supported already. So it is adduced to show that light is a consequence of the form of an intrinsically luminous body. But this is not rightly inferred from this sign, unless you hold that all the stars are luminous of themselves — which is either false or doubtful. The point is obvious: diversity of effects does not indicate that light is a consequence of the intrinsically luminous body, unless it is because any light acts in virtue of the body from which it shines; this is how there will be a diversity of actions coming from a diversity of the bodies.

The right REPLY to this is that, whatever may be the causality of light from the stars, it suffices for present purposes to draw the distinction that light comes from a luminous body in two ways: as to its acting, and as to its being. Then, given that light follows in both ways at once only from a body luminous of itself (and that is the sun), still light follows as to its acting from any luminous body since any such body gets light from the sun and acts in its own distinctive manner. This is why the light of the moon has its own effect, even though it is from the sun. So from the fact that light follows the proper trait of each luminous body as far as its acting goes, as is clear with the rays of the different stars, having different effects according to the star's diversity, a sign is in hand that light follows in its being and acting at once from a body luminous of itself as from its first subject.

Was it suitable to put the production of light on the first day?

1 ST q.69, a.1; In II Sent d.13, a.4

It seems not to have been suitable to put the production of light on the first day.

a.3 (1) After all, light is a quality, as was just said. But since a quality is an accident, it does not have what it takes to be a primary thing but rather what it takes to be a subsequent thing. Therefore its production should not have been put on the first day.

(2) Besides, light is what distinguishes night from day. But light comes about through the sun, which is put down as having been made on the fourth day. So the production of light should not have been put on the first day.

(3) Moreover, day and night come about through the circling motion of a luminous body. But circling motion is proper to the firmament, which (as we read) was made on the second day. Therefore the production of light distinguishing night and day should not have been put on the first day.

(4) Furthermore, if one takes the text to be speaking of spiritual light, there is an objection to doing so. The light which (we read) was made on the first day marks a distinction from darkness. But in the beginning there was no spiritual darkness, because even the demons were initially good, as we said above. Hence the production of light should not have been put on the first day.

ON THE OTHER HAND, that without which there cannot be a day has to have been made on the first day. But without light there cannot be a day. Therefore light had to be made on the first day.

ANSWER: there are two opinions about the production of light. It seemed to Augustine that it would not have been suitable for Moses to omit the production of spiritual creatures. Hence he says that, when the Bible said, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," the word 'heaven' meant spiritual nature as yet unformed, while the word 'earth' meant the unformed matter of bodily creatures. And because spiritual nature is of higher standing than bodily nature, it was to be formed first. Then the *formation* of spiritual nature is indicated by the production of "light," so as to mean spiritual light; after all the "formation" of spiritual nature is that through which it was illuminated so as to adhere to the Word of God.

To other authors, it has seemed rather that Moses did omit the production of spiritual creatures. But his reason for doing so has been variously explained. St Basil says Moses put the start of his story at the beginning of the time pertaining to visible things, but omitted spiritual nature, *i.e.* angels, because they were made earlier. — Chrysostom gives a different reason. Moses was talking to a crude people who could not understand anything but bodily objects, but whom he

also wished to recall from idolatry. They would have found an occasion for idolatry if they had been told about substances higher than all bodily creatures; they would have thought of them as gods, since they were even prone to worship the sun, moon, and stars as gods (as Deuteronomy 4:19 commanded them not to do).

But in many respects a lack of formation had also come beforehand in bodily creatures. One comes out where it says, "The earth was without form and void;" another comes out where it says "A darkness was upon the face of the deep." Well, the problem of darkness had to be removed first through the production of light for two reasons. The first is because light (as I said) is a quality of the first body, so that the world was to be formed first in its respect. — The second reason is because of the shared character of light: the lower bodies share in it along with the higher ones. As one proceeds from more common things in acquiring knowledge, so one does also in the work of producing: a living thing was generated before an animal, an animal before man, as it says in *De Generatione Animalium II*. This is how the order of divine wisdom had to be manifested, namely, such that light was produced first among the works of diversification, since it was a form of the first body and because it was commonly shared. — St. Basil offers a third reason: it is through light that all other things are manifested. — One can also add a fourth reason (touched upon in the "On the other hand"): a day cannot exist without light; so light had to be created on the first day.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): if you hold that the unformed state of matter had to come before its formed state in time, you have to say that matter from the beginning was created under substantial forms, but afterwards was formed according to its accidental conditions, among which light holds the first place.

ad (2): some say that the light formed at the outset was a luminous cloud which later, when the sun was made, dissolved into the surrounding matter. But this theory is awkward. At the beginning of Genesis, holy Scripture is commemorating the setup of nature which was to continue afterwards: so one should not say that something was formed back then which afterwards ceased to be.¹ — And so other writers say that the luminous cloud still remains but is so joined to the sun that it cannot be discerned apart from it. But on this theory the cloud remains superfluous, and there is nothing pointless in the works of God. — Still others say that the body of the sun was formed from that cloud. But this also cannot be said if one assumes that the body of the sun is not of the same nature as the four

¹ One is surprised that modern biblical literalists have not used this reason to explain the silence of Genesis about the fossil record from pre-Pleistocene times.

Gen. 1: 2

a.3

c. 3;
736b.Homily II in
Hexaemeron;
PG 29, 44

Super Genesim ad
Literam I, cc.1, 3 et
alibi; PL 34, 247ff

cf. q.61, a.1 ad 1

Homily I in
Hexaemeron;
PG 29, 4Homily V on
Genesis;
PG 53, 52

elements but is by nature incorruptible; for on this assumption, its matter could not have existed under another form.

And so the right thing to say (as Denis did say in PG 3, 700 c.4 of *On the divine Names*) is that the light [of the first day] was the light of the sun, but as yet unformed in the following way. It was already the substance of the sun and had the general power to illuminate; but only later was it given the special and definite power to produce particular effects. On this theory, in and by the production of this light, light was differentiated from darkness in three respects. The first was as to its cause: the substance of the sun was the cause of light, and the cause of darkness lay in the opacity of the earth. The second is a differentiation as to place; in one hemisphere there was light; in the other, darkness. The third is a matter of time; in the same hemisphere for one part of time there was light, and for another, darkness. And this is what the text is saying: "And God called the light Day, and the darkness He called Night."

Gen 1: 5

Homily 11 in
Hexameron;
PG 29, 48

*Super Genesim ad
litteram I*, c. 16;
PL 34, 258

ad (3): Basil says that light and darkness existed at that time through an emission and retraction of light, and not thanks to motion. — But Augustine objects to this theory that there would have been no reason for this trouble of emitting and retracting light, since men and animals would not have existed yet, for whose uses it would be worthwhile. — Moreover, a naturally luminous body does not have the power to retract its light in its own presence, though this could happen miraculously; but one must not look for a miracle in

the first setting up of nature; rather, one should look only for what the nature of things contains, as Augustine says.

And so the right thing to say is that there are two motions in heaven. One is the shared motion of heaven as a whole, which brings about day and night; and this seems to be what was established on the first day. But there is another motion which is diversified thanks to different bodies; thanks to these motions there is a difference of one day from another, and of month from month, and of year from year. This is why, on the first day, mention is made only of a distinction between night and day, which comes about through the shared motion. But on the fourth day there is mention of the differences of days and times and years, where it says, "And let them be for signs and for seasons and for days and years." Their differences come about through particular motions.

ad (4): according to Augustine, matter's unformed state did not come ahead of its formation in time. So he had to say that what is meant by the production of light is the formation of a spiritual creation, not one already perfected through glory (with which it was not created) but one already perfected by grace (with which it was created, as I said). Through this light, then, division was made from darkness, *i.e.* from the unformed state of another creation not yet formed. — Alternatively, if the whole creation became formed at once, the distinction was made from spiritual darkness, which at that time did not exist (because the devil was not created evil) but which God foresaw as future.

Ibid., II, c.1;
PL 34, 263

Gen 1: 14

Confessions XII,
c.29; PL 32, 843
*Super Genesim ad
litteram I*, c. 15, PL
34, 257

q 62, a.3

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article, he does two jobs: (1) the question is answered on Augustine's terms; (2) it is answered in line with the other fathers. It is answered affirmatively on either opinion. But the difference is that on the first view 'light' refers to spiritual light, while on the second it refers to bodily light.

In the first [Augustinian] answer, light is suitably made first, because the lack of formation in spiritual nature needed to be remedied first. And the point should not have been passed over in silence.

As for the second answer [given by the other Fa-

thers], he does two things. (1) First he argues against the second part of the other [the Augustinian] answer on three grounds: (a) because spiritual light had been created beforehand, according to Basil; (b) lest there be an occasion for idolatry, according to Chrysostom; (c) because a crude people was being instructed. — (2) He sets down a second answer supported in four ways: (a) because light is the form of the first body; (b) because bodily light is more widely shared; (c) because it is manifestive of other things; (d) because a day could not exist without light.

Inquiry Sixty-Eight: Into the work of the second day

The next topic to study is the work of the second day. Four questions are raised about it.

- (1) Was the firmament made on the second day?
- (2) Are there waters above the firmament?
- (3) Does the firmament divide waters from waters?
- (4) Is there just one heaven, or several?

article 1

Was the firmament made on the second day?

De Potentia Dei q.4, a.1 ad 15

It looks as though the firmament was not made on the second day.

(1) After all, Genesis 1:8 says, "God called the firmament heaven." But heaven was made before any day, as is clear where it says, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth." Hence the firmament was not made on the second day.

(2) Besides, the works of the six days were arranged according to the divine Wisdom. Well, it would not suit divine Wisdom to take what is naturally prior and make it later. The firmament is naturally prior to water and earth, of which mention was made before the formation of light, which happened on the first day. Therefore the firmament was not made on the second day.

(3) Moreover, everything made during the six days was formed from matter created earlier, before any day. But the firmament could not have been made out of preexisting matter, because then it would be generable and corruptible. Hence the firmament was not made on the second day.

ON THE OTHER HAND, Genesis 1:6 says, "God said, let there be a firmament." And thereafter it says, "And there was evening and morning, a second day."

I ANSWER: as Augustine teaches us, two things need to be watched in questions like these. The first is that the truth of Scripture not be compromised. The second is that, since divine Scripture can be interpreted in many ways, no one should adhere to any one interpretation so exclusively that, if it turned out to be false on a sure ground, he would still presume to say that it was the meaning of Scripture — lest the Scriptures be derided by unbelievers as a result, and lest the route to believing them be closed.

One needs to know, therefore, that what we read about the firmament being created on the second day can be understood in two ways. [A] In one way, it would be about the firmament in which the stars are lo-

cated. On this approach, we would have to expound the text variously, in line with people's different opinions about the <heaven of the stars>.* For some have said that the firmament is composed of the elements. This was the opinion of Empedocles, who nevertheless also said that its body was indissoluble because it did not have strife in it, but only harmony. — Others have said that the firmament is of the nature of the four elements but not composed of them; rather they thought it was one, simple element. And this was Plato's opinion, who maintained that the heavenly body was the element fire. — Still others said heaven was not of the nature of the four elements; it was a fifth body beyond the four. And this was Aristotle's opinion.

If one follows this first interpretation, then, one may concede without reserve that the firmament was made on the second day, even in its substance [on Empedocles' view]. For while producing the substance of the *elements* belongs to the work of creation [at its outset], forming things out of preexisting elements belongs to the work of diversifying and ornamenting. — On Plato's view, however, it is not suitable to believe that the firmament was created in its substance on the second day. For on his view, making the firmament is producing the element fire, and production of the elements belongs to the work of creation [at its outset] according to those who posit an unformed state of matter prior in time to its formed state (because the forms of the elements are those which first attach to matter). — Still less suitable is it to believe that the firmament was made on the second day on Aristotle's theory, if a succession of time is indicated by those days. For if heaven is incorruptible by its nature, it has matter which cannot exist under another form; hence it is impossible for the firmament to be made out of matter previously existing in time. Hence production of heaven's substance would pertain to the initial work of creating. But some sort of formation of it, on these two theories, will pertain to the work of the second day, much as Denis also says in Chapter 4 of *On the Divine Names* that

* *firmamentum*

Reported by Aristotle, *De Gen. et Cor. I*, c.2, 315a 3

Timaeus, commented by Calcidius XV

De Caelo I, c.2; 269b 13

De Caelo I, c.270a 12.

PG 3, 700

the light of the sun was unformed during the first three days, and afterwards was formed on the fourth day. — But if a succession of time is not indicated by those days, but only an order of nature (as Augustine wants to have it), nothing will prevent one from saying on any of these theories that formation of heaven in its substance pertains to the second day.

One can also interpret the text in such a way that [B] the firmament made on the second day is not meant as the firmament in which the stars are fixed, but as that part of the air in which clouds are condensed. And it is called “a firmament” on account of the density of the air in that part; for what is dense and solid is said to be “a firm body as opposed to a mathematical one,” according to Basil. — On this second interpretation, nothing turns up conflicting with anyone’s theory. And Augustine commending this interpretation in *Super Genesim ad Litteram II* says, “I think this consideration is very worthy of praise; for what it says is not against the faith and, obviously, with the [biblical] document in place, it can be believed.”

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad (1)*: according to Chrysostom, Moses first summarized what God made, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth;” and afterwards spelled it out part by part. It was as if someone said, “This builder made the house,” and then added, “First he made the foundations, and afterwards he put up the walls, and then he put on a roof.” This way it is not necessary to understand one heaven when it says “In the beginning God created heaven and earth” and an-

other one when it says the firmament was made on the second day.

One can also say that a different heaven is talked about at the beginning from the one said to have been made on the second day. But this option can be pursued in several ways. On Augustine’s theory, the heavens said to have been made on the first day is unformed spiritual nature; while the heaven said to have been made on the second day is a bodily heaven. — According to Bede and Strabo, the heavens said to have been made on the first day is the empyrean heaven, while the firmament made on the second day is the heaven of the stars. — But according to John Damascene the heaven said to have been made on the first day was a spherical heaven without stars (of which philosophers speak when they say it is the ninth sphere and the first movable, which is moved with the daily movement); but by the firmament made on the second day, the heaven of the stars is meant.

But according to another interpretation touched on by Augustine, the heaven made on the first day is the heaven of the stars while the firmament made on the second day is the area of the air in which clouds condense, and which is called “heaven” equivocally. And so to indicate the equivocation, Genesis significantly says, “God called the firmament heaven,” as it had said above, “God called the light day” (because ‘day’ is also used to mean an extent of twenty-four hours). And the same idea is to be noted in other writers as Rabbi Moses says.

The answers *ad (2)* and *ad (3)* are clear from remarks already made.

Super Genesim ad Litteram I, c 9, PL 34, 252

Bede, *Hexameron*, I: PL 91, 13 Strabo, Gloss on Gen. I

De Fide Orthodoxa II, c 6, PG 94, 880

Guide to the Perplexed II, c.30

Super Genesim ad Litteram IV, c 34, PL 34, 319

Homily III in Hexameron; PG 29, 64

c.4; PL 34, 266

Homily II in Genesim; PG 53, 30

Cajetan’s Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article, he does two main jobs. (1) He prefaces the article with two general directives from Augustine: first, that the truth of Scripture be preserved; second, that no interpretation be attached to it inflexibly.

(2) He answers the question in line with the three opinions about the “firmament” — namely that it is the heaven of the stars composed of elements, or that it is the heaven of the stars as a simple body made of one of the elements, or of a fifth essence; or that it is the upper part of the air, wherein are clouds. — Under this disjunction there is a two-part conclusion. [*1st part:*] If the order of the days indicates an order of time, the

“firmament” taken under the first disjunct can be said to have been made on the second day in its substance; but not under the second disjunct (nor the third), under which it can still be said to have been “made” in terms of some formation. [*2nd part:*] But if the talk of days indicates an order of nature, then under any of the disjuncts, the “firmament” can be said to have been made in its substance on the second day.

The first part of the conclusion is obvious, because the firmament under the first disjunct is a composed body; the next bits are also clear, because the forms of simple bodies belong to the production done on the first day. — The second part of the conclusion is obvious of itself.

article 2

Are there waters above the firmament?

In *II Sent.* d.14, q.1; *De Potentia* q.4, a.1 ad 5; *Quodlibet* IV, q.3.

There do not seem to be “waters” above the firmament.

(1) After all, water is naturally heavy. The proper place for a heavy thing is not up there, however, but down here. Ergo “waters” are not above the firmament.

(2) Besides, water is naturally liquid. But what is liquid cannot lie at rest* on top of a round body, as is clear by experience. So, since the firmament [as a heavenly sphere] is a round body, there cannot be water above it.

(3) Moreover, since water is an element, it exists for the generation of compounds, as an incomplete thing exists for the sake of complete ones. But the place for compound substances is not above the firmament but on earth. So water above the firmament would be without purpose;† and among the works of God, nothing is without purpose. Hence, there is no water above the firmament.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Genesis 1:7 says, “He divided the waters which were under the firmament from the waters which were above the firmament.”

I ANSWER: one should speak as Augustine did in *Super Genesim ad litteram II*: “The authority of this Scripture is higher than any human talent can reach. So however they manage to be there, and whatever they are like, let us never doubt that those waters are there.”

But the question of what sort of waters they are has not been given the same answer by all authors. Origin says the waters above the heavens are spiritual substances, which is why Psalm 148:4 says, “Praise Him . . . ye waters that be above the heavens,” and *Vg.* Daniel 3:60 says, “Ye waters that be above the heavens, praise ye the Lord.” St. Basil responds by saying that this opinion is not voiced because the waters are rational but because “contemplative consideration of them by persons having sense completes the glory they give to the Creator.”

This is why Daniel commands likewise the lightning, the hail, etc., which we know are not rational creatures.

The thing to say, therefore, is that the waters in question are bodily. But what kind of waters they are has to be spelled out in different ways according to the different opinions about the firmament. For if the firmament is understood to be the heaven of the stars, and this is posited to have the nature of the four elements, then for the same reason the waters above the heavens will also, we may believe, have the same nature as the element water.

However, if we understand the “firmament” as the heaven of the stars but say it does not have the nature of the four elements, then the waters above the firmament will also not be the element water. Rather, (as Strabo says) just as the empyrean heaven is called fiery because of its splendor alone, so also another heaven could be

called water-like because of its transparency alone, and this one is above the heaven of the stars. — But even if the firmament is of another nature than the four elements we can still say that it divides the waters, if by ‘water’ we do not mean the element, water, but the unformed matter of bodies, as Augustine says in *De Genesi contra Manichaeos I*, because “on this view, whatever is between bodies divides ‘waters’ from ‘waters’.”

But if the firmament is taken to be the part of the air in which clouds are formed, then the waters which are above the firmament are those which rise above the other part of the air by evaporation, and from which rains are generated. — For to say that evaporated waters get to be above the heaven of the stars (as some people have said, whose opinion Augustine mentions in *Super Genesim ad litteram II*) is all together impossible. For one reason, the heavenly sphere is solid. For another reason, there’s a region of fire in the middle which would consume such vapors. For a third reason, the place to which light and diffuse things are born up is below the vault of the sphere of the moon. For yet a fourth reason, we see with our eyes that vapors do not rise as high as the peaks of some mountains. — As for what they say about the diffusion of a body to infinity (because a body is infinitely divisible) — they say it in vain. For no natural body is divided or diffused to infinity, but only up to a certain limit

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): some writers think this argument is dissolved by the fact that waters, though naturally heavy, can still be contained above the heavens by the power of God. — But Augustine excludes this solution in *Super Genesim ad litteram II*, saying that “the right thing to be asking now is how God set up the natures of things, not what He might want to do in them by a miracle of His own power.”

The thing to say, rather, is that the solution is obvious from prior remarks on the last two opinions about the waters and the firmament. — If one takes the first opinion, one has to posit a different order among the elements than Aristotle posited, so that the dense waters are around the earth whereas the thinly diffused ones are around heaven; and thus we shall have those on heaven and those on earth. — Or one can say that ‘water’ means the matter of bodies, in the interpretation stated above.

ad (2): the solution is again obvious from previous remarks about the two last opinions. — Basil follows the first of them and answers in two ways. In the first, [he says] it is not necessarily the case that what appears round [concave] on the underside is also round [convex] above. In the second [he says] that the waters above the heavens are not liquid but have a glacial solidity around the heavenly firmament. This is why some writers call it the “crystalline heaven.”

c.7;
Pl. 34, 179

c.1;
Pl. 34, 263

c.4;
Pl. 34, 265

De Caelo II, c.4;
287a 32

Homily III in
Hexameron; PG
29, 60

quoted by
Jerome, *Epist.* 51;
PL 22, 523

Homily III in
Hexameron;
PG 29, 76

Daniel 3: 52-81

ad (3): according to the third opinion, waters are above the firmament by evaporation for the sake of the utility of rain. — But according to the second opinion, the waters are above the firmament as a completely transparent heaven with no stars. Some writers call this the “first moveable,” which turns the whole of heaven by a daily motion, so that continuity of generation may be secured by the daily motion, just as the heaven of the stars works through a motion following the zodiac, so

as to achieve the diversity of generations and corruptions, through drawing near and drawing away, and through the different powers of the stars. — But according to the first opinion, the waters are up there (as Basil says) to temper the heat of the heavenly bodies. Some people think there is a sign of this in the fact that the star of Saturn is extremely cold because of its proximity to the waters above the firmament, as Augustine reports the matter.

*Super Gen. ad
Litteram II, c. 5,
Pl. 34, 266*

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article, he does two main jobs. (1) He answers the question, “is there such a thing?” in the affirmative on the authority of Scripture.

(2) He answers the question “what is it?” *i.e.*, what are those waters. On this he does three things. First he discusses whether they are spiritual or corporeal (as debated between Origin and Basil), concluding that they are corporeal. Secondly, he answers the

question three ways according to the opinions about the firmament:

- (a) on Plato's view, that the waters have the nature of the elements;
 - (b) on Aristotle's view, that they are of a transparent fifth essence;
 - (c) on the equivocal use of ‘firmament’, that they are rain waters. Thirdly, he rules out the error of thinking water vapors rise above the stars, using five arguments, as is visible in the text.
-

Does the firmament divide waters from waters?

It seems that the firmament does not divide waters from waters.

(1) After all, a body of one species has one natural place. But "all water and every water is of the same species," as Aristotle says. Therefore, waters should not be distinguished from waters by placement.

Topics I, c. 5;
103a 19

(2) Besides, if one says that the waters above the firmament are of a different species from those below it, there is this objection. Things different in species do not need any other distinguishing factor. Therefore, if waters above and waters below differ in species, the firmament is not what makes them different.

(3) Moreover, what seems to split waters from waters is that which touches waters on both sides, as if somebody put up a wall in the middle of a river. Well, it is obvious that the waters here below do not reach up to touch the firmament. Therefore, the firmament does not divide waters from waters.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Genesis 1:6 says, "Let there be a firmament in the midst of the waters and let it divide the waters from the waters."

ANSWER: one pondering the text of Genesis superficially could imagine [that it was presenting] the position maintained by some ancient philosophers. They posited that water was an infinite body and stood as the source of all other bodies. The casual reader could get the idea of measureless waters from the word 'deep', where it says "darkness was upon the face of the deep." They also maintained that the heaven we see does not contain all bodily things under itself, but that there is an infinite body of water above heaven. And thus one could say that the firmament of heaven divides the outer waters from the inner waters, *i.e.* from all the bodies contained under heaven (whose origin they claimed to be from water).

* *abyssum*

But since this position is shown to be false by sound arguments, one should not call this the meaning of the Scripture. Rather, one should bear in mind that Moses was speaking to a crude people and, condescending to their weakness, proposed to them only

what was obvious to the senses. Every audience, however crude, senses that earth and water are bodies. But air is not perceived universally to be a body; so much so, indeed, that even some philosophers said that air was nothing, and they gave a volume of air the name "vacuum." And so Moses made explicit mention of water and earth but did not mention air by name, lest he propose to the crude something unknown to them. But in order to express the truth for those able to take it in, he provides an opportunity to understand the air by indicating it as attached (as it were) to the water, where he says "darkness was upon the face of the deep"; by this he lets it be understood that upon the face of the water there is some transparent body which is a subject of light and darkness.

Thus, whether we take the firmament to be the heaven of the stars or the cloud-filled space of the air, one may suitably say that the firmament divides waters from waters thanks either to the fact that 'water' means unformed matter, or thanks to the fact that all transparent bodies are understood under the name 'water'. After all, the starry heaven divides lower transparent bodies from the higher ones. The cloud-filled air divides the higher part of the air wherein rains and the like are generated from the lower part of the air, which is connected to the water and is understood under the name 'waters'.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): if 'firmament' means above the waters, the waters above it are not of the same species as those below it. — But if 'firmament' means the cloud-filled air, then both waters are of the same species. In that case, two places are attributed to water but not for the same reason; the higher place is the place of the generation of water, while the lower place is the place of their rest.

ad (2): if the waters are taken to be of different kinds, the firmament is said to divide waters from waters not as a cause making the division but as a boundary of the two waters.

ad (3): because of the invisibility of air and of similar bodies, Moses included all such bodies under the name 'water'. And thus it is clear that on both sides of the firmament (however we take this latter) there are waters.

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article, he does two jobs: (1) he deals with a certain false opinion; (2) he answers the question three ways.

ii. As for job (1), he reports the opinion in two points: the first is that there is an infinite body; the second is that heaven does not contain all of it but only some parts of that infinite body. For its first part, the opinion appeals to the word 'deep'; for its

second part, it appeals to the phrase 'waters from waters'.

Thereupon he disproves the opinion on two grounds. In itself, on the ground that it is false: ergo [it is not the meaning of Genesis 1]. — More deeply, however, on the ground that the surface of the text is not to be taken as it sounds, because it was composed for a crude people, *etc.* A sign of this is the fact that air is not mentioned and yet is insinuated.

iii. As for job (2), he takes the word 'water' two ways: for unformed matter or for a transparent body. Taken the first way the text is salvaged however one takes 'firmament', as Augustine said in the previous article. — But if 'water' is taken the second way, the

text is salvaged two ways according as 'firmament' stands for the heaven between transparent ones, or for the cloud-filled air between the upper and lower parts of the same, and both are transparent, and hence the word includes both the air touching the waters and the air that goes above.

Is there just one heaven?

In II Sent. d.14, a.4; In Ioannem c.6, lectio 4, In II Cor c.4, lectio 1

It seems that there is just one heaven.

(1) After all, heaven is contrasted with the earth, where it says, "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth." But there is just one earth. Therefore there is also just one heaven.

(2) Besides, anything composed of all there is of the matter for it is just one. But heaven is of this kind, as Aristotle proves in *De Caelo I*.

c.9;
279a 7

* ratio

(3) Moreover, any term applied to many things univocally is applied to them under a common definition.* But if there are many heavens, 'heaven' is said univocally of the many, because if it were being used equivocally, they would not properly be called "many" heavens. It has to be the case, therefore, that, if the heavens are called "many," there is some common definition or reason why they are called "heavens." But no common reason [or definition] is assigned. Therefore one should not say that there are many heavens.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Psalm 148:4 says, "Praise him, ye heavens of heavens."

ANSWER: on this issue, there seems to be a difference of opinion between Basil and Chrysostom. The latter says there is only one heaven; and if it is called 'heavens' in the plural, it is because of a peculiarity of the Hebrew language, in whose usage heaven is only named in the plural.¹ (Likewise there are many nouns in Latin which lack a singular.) Basil, however, and Damascene following him, say that there are many heavens. — But this difference is mostly a matter of words. Chrysostom uses the 'one heaven' to mean the whole body which is above the earth and the water; after all, even the birds which fly in the air are called "the birds of heaven."² But since there are many divisions in this one body, Basil posits many heavens.

To know how to distinguish the heavens, one must bear in mind that 'heaven' is used three ways in the Bible. Sometimes it is used literally and naturally; and thus a heaven is said to be a body that is high up and luminous in act or potency and incorruptible by nature. In this use, three heavens are posited. The first is wholly lit up and is called "empyrean." A second is entirely transparent and is called "the aque-

ous or crystalline heaven." The third is partly transparent and partly lit up in act, and is called the heaven of the stars; it is divided into eight spheres — *i.e.* into the sphere of the fixed stars, and seven spheres of the planets. These can be called the eight heavens.

Secondly, an item is called "a heaven" by sharing some distinctive trait of a heavenly body, *i.e.* sublimity and luminosity, in act of potency. In this use, all the space from the waters to the sphere of the moon is called one heaven by Damascene, who calls it aerial.

Thus according to him there are three heavens: that of the air, that of the stars, and another still higher which he thinks St. Paul is talking about when he says he was "caught up into the third heaven." — But because this space contains two elements, fire and air, in each of which one part is called higher and another part lower, Rabanus distinguishes this heaven into four, calling the highest region of fire the "fiery heaven," the lower region of fire "the Olympian heaven" (from the height of a mountain called Olympus); but the highest part of the air he called "ethereal heaven" because of the fire in it, and its lower part he called "the aerial heaven." And so since these four are counted along with the three mentioned earlier, there come to be seven corporeal heavens in the universe according to Rabanus.

Thirdly, the word 'heaven' is used metaphorically. In this way the Holy Trinity itself is sometimes called a heaven, on account of its spiritual sublimity and light. This is the "heaven" the devil was talking about when he said, "I will go up to heaven." *i.e.* rise to equality with God. — Sometimes also the spiritual goods wherein the saints find their reward are called heavens, on account of their eminence; this is how Augustine expounds Matthew 5:12, "great is your reward in the heavens." — Sometimes the three kinds of supernatural visions are called three heavens — *i.e.* corporeal, imaginary, and intellectual. Augustine interprets St. Paul's being caught up to the third heaven as being about these.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): earth stands to heaven as the center does to the circumference. But around a single point many circumferences can be drawn. Hence with one earth existing, many heavens are posited.

ad (2): that argument applies to "heaven" in the sense in which it implies all the created heavenly bodies. In this sense there is just one heaven.

ad (3): in all the heavens there is found the common elements of sublimity and some luminosity, as I said above.

II Corinthians 12:2;
De Fide Orthodoxa II, c. 6, PG 94, 880

Quoted by Bede, in
Pentateuchum Super Genesim I:1,
PL 91, 192

Isaiah 14:13

De Sermone Domini in Monte I,
c 5, PL 34, 1237

Super Gen. ad Lit. XII, c.28, PL 34, 478

¹ Chrysostom is right about Hebrew grammar; the noun for heaven, 'shamayim', is plural in form. Cf. Genesis 1:1.

² This is how Psalm 8:9 reads in the Hebrew: *tispur shamayim*.

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article, he does two jobs: (1) he reports the clash between Chrysostom and Basil as to there being one or more heavens; (2) he numbers the heavens according to the different ways of understanding the term.

As to the reported clash, Chrysostom counted one and Basil many. But the clash is merely verbal, since they were talking past each other, one looking at the whole, the other at the parts.

ii. As to job (2), the talk of heaven is distinguished into three ways it can mean: literally, participatively and metaphorically. Taken literally and in the first way, he counts three heavens: one

wholly luminous, one totally transparent, and one partly both.

Then in a literal and participative way, he counts three heavens in Damascene: the aerial, the starry, and the highest. But here the word 'heaven' is being used participatively in the aerial case, and literally in the others. — In Rabanus, seven heavens are counted participatively and literally: the fiery one, the Olympian one, the ethereal one, the aerial one, the starry one, the aqueous one, and the empyrean one.

Metaphorically, 'heaven' is used for the Holy Trinity, or for the divine goods in heaven, or for the three kinds of supernatural vision (corporeal, imaginative, and intellective).

Inquiry Sixty-Nine: Into the work of the third day

The next topic to take up is the work of the third day. Two questions are asked about it:

- (1) about the gathering of the waters;
- (2) about the production of plants.

article I

Is the gathering of the waters fittingly said to have been done on the third day?

In II Sent., d.14, a.3, De Potentia q.4, a.1 ad 17ff

It seems that gathering the waters together is not fittingly said to have happened on the third day.

** factiois* (1) After all, the things done on the first and second day are expressed with a verb for letting-there-be*: the text says "God said, let there be light," and "let there be a firmament." But the third day is grouped with the first two. Hence the work of the third day should have been expressed with a verb of letting-be and not just with a verb of gathering.

(2) Besides, the earth was previously covered everywhere with water, which is why it was said to be [without form or] invisible. So there was no place left on earth into which the waters could have been gathered.

(3) Moreover, things which are not continuations of each other do not occupy one place. But not all waters are continuous with each other. Therefore it is not the case that all the waters were gathered into "one" place.

(4) Furthermore, gathering things is a matter of moving them. But waters are seen to flow naturally and to run towards the sea. Therefore, there was no need for a divine command for their gathering to happen.

(5) Also, the earth was mentioned at the start of creation where the text says, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth." It is awkward, therefore, for the name "earth" to have been introduced on the third day.

ON THE OTHER HAND, the authority of Scripture suffices.

ANSWER: one has to give different answers here, according as one follows Augustine's interpretation or that of the other saints. For Augustine admits no order of time among all these works, but only an order of origin and nature.¹ He says the first items created were un-

formed spiritual nature and corporeal nature lacking any form, and these he calls the first referents of 'earth' and 'heaven', not because the absence of formation preceded its presence in time but only in origin. And in his view, the formation of the one did not precede the formation of the other in time but only in the order of nature. Given *this* order, it was necessary to put first the formation of the highest nature, the spiritual one, and hence we read that on the first day light was made. — But as spiritual nature is preeminent over bodily nature, so also the higher bodies are preeminent over the lower ones. And so in second place, formation of the higher bodies is mentioned, where it says "Let there be a firmament." By this is meant the impressing of the heavenly form upon unformed matter, which did not exist beforehand in time but only in origin. — In the third place, he posits God' impressing the forms of the elements upon unformed matter, with the matter not predating in time but only in origin. So when the text says, "Let the waters be gathered together and let the dry land appear," it is understood to mean that bodily matter is impressed with the substantial form of water (thanks to which such a motion befits it) and the substantial form of [dry] earth (through which the matter is made ready to be seen).

But according to the other saints, an order of temporal succession is also found among these works: for they said that the unformed condition of matter did precede its formed condition in time, and that one formation preceded another. But in their view, the unformed state of matter was not thought to be one in which every form was missing, because there was already *heaven* and *water* and *earth* (these three being mentioned by name as obviously perceptible to the senses); rather, the unformed state of matter is understood to be one lacking due distinction and consummate beauty. — For the three items just named, Scripture posits three states of unformation. To heaven, which is the highest, there pertained the unformed state of "darkness," because light arises

Ibid., I, c 15;
PL 34, 257
Loc. cit.

Op. cit. IV, c 34;
PL 34, 319

Ibid. II, c 11;
PL 34, 272

cited above in
q.66, a.1

*Super Gen. ad
Lit.* I, c 1; *PL* 34,
247 *et alibi*;

¹ Priority "of nature" or "in nature" was the relation *x* had to *y* when the existence or occurrence of *y* presupposed the existence or occurrence of *x*. It was not a matter of time but of sheer explanatory order.

from heaven. The unformed state of water (which is in the middle) is indicated by the word 'abyss', because it means an unordered immensity of the waters (as Augustine says in *Contra Faustum*). The unformed state of earth is mentioned where it says the earth was "invisible" or "void," thanks to its being covered by water.

On this view, then, the formation of the highest body was done on the first day. And since time follows the motion of heaven, but time is a numerical measurement of the motion of the supreme body, thanks to this formation the distinction of time was brought about *i.e.* between night and day. — On the second day the body in between was formed, namely water. Thanks to the firmament, water acquired a distinction and an order (such that under the term 'water' other things are understood as well; as I said above). — On the third day the last body was given form, namely the earth, thanks to its being uncovered from the waters, and thus a distinction was drawn in the lowest body, called that between earth and sea. Quite suitably, then, as the unformed state of earth had been expressed by calling it "invisible" or "empty," so also its formed state is expressed by saying, "And let the dry land appear."

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): according to Augustine, the reason Scripture does not use a verb of letting-there-be in the work of the third day as it did in the preceding works was to show that the higher forms, *i.e.* the spiritual forms of the angels and those of the heavenly bodies were complete in being and stable, whereas the forms of lower bodies are incomplete and changeable.* And so by waters being gathered and dry land appearing, an impression of such forms is conveyed: "for water is fluidly moved, while earth is stably fixed," as he says in *Super Genesim ad litteram II*. — According to the other fathers, however, one needs to say that the work of the third day was finished by way of place-change alone. And so there was no need for Scripture to use a verb of letting-there-be.

ad (2): the answer is obvious according to Augustine, because there is no need to say that the earth was first covered with waters and afterwards the waters were gathered; rather, one says that the waters were produced in gathered form.

In the works of the other saints, however, three answers are given, as Augustine reports in *Super Genesim ad litteram I*. On one view, the waters were raised to greater height in the place where they were gathered together. For, as Basil says, it was discovered in the Red Sea that the sea is higher than the land.² — A second

answer would be to say that more diffuse water, like a cloud, lay over the lands, and this was made dense by the gathering. — The third answer would be to say that the earth could have been concave in some places, in which the gathering waters were received. — Among these answers, the first seems better supported.

ad (3): all the waters have one terminus, *i.e.* the sea, into which they flow by visible or hidden channels. And this is why the waters are said to be gathered into "one" place. — Alternatively, it means "one" place not absolutely but by comparison to the place of the dry land, so that the sense would be: "the waters were gathered into one place," *i.e.* "apart from the dry land." For to indicate the plurality of water's places, the text adds that "the gatherings of the waters He called seas."

ad (4): the command of God gives bodies their natural motion. This is why it says that by their own natural motions they "accomplish His word." — Alternatively, one may say that the natural thing for water would have been for it to be everywhere around the land, as air is everywhere around the water and the land; but to meet the needs of His purpose, namely that there be animals and plants upon the land, it had to be the case that some parts of the land were no longer covered by water. Some philosophers attribute this to the action of the sun, drying off the land by raising vapors. But Holy Scripture attributes this to divine power not only in Genesis but also in Job 38:10 where the Lord is made to say, "I surrounded the sea with my bounds," and in Jeremiah 5:22, "Will ye not then fear me, saith the Lord, who placed the sand as the bound of the sea?"

ad (5): on Augustine's account, what is meant by 'the earth' as first mentioned is prime matter; but now what is meant is the element, earth. — Or one may follow Basil and say that the earth was first being named according to its nature, but now is named from its main property, which is dryness. This is why He called the dry land earth. Alternatively, one may follow Maimonides and say that every time the text says, "He called," it is indicating an ambiguity of the name. Thus it says first that "He called the light day," because of the fact that the word 'day' also means a twenty-four hour period, thanks to which it says in the same place, "and there came to be evening and morning, one day." Similarly, it says "He called the firmament," *i.e.* the air "heaven," because what was first created is also called by the word 'heaven'. Likewise also the text says here that He called the dry land (*i.e.* the part no longer covered by water) "earth," insofar as it is distinguished from the sea, whereas the land and the sea are also called by the common name "earth." — But wherever it says "He called," it means "He gave it a nature or proper trait whereby it could be so called."

XVII, c 11;
PL 42, 405

q 68, a.3

* *mobilis*

c 11;
PL 34, 273

E.g. Bede,
PL 91, 20

*De Genesi contra
Mamchaeros I*,
c.12, PL 34, 181

c 12;
PL 34, 255

Homily IV in
Hexaemeron;
PG 29, 84

Genesis 1. 10

Psalms 148 8

Aristotle,
Meteorologica II,
c 1, 355b 5

*De Genesi contra
Mamchaeros I*,
c 7, PL 34, 178

Homily IV in
Hexaemeron;
PG 29, 89

*Guide to the
Perplexed II*, c 30

² Basil over-generalizes from a report in Pliny. An ancient attempt to dig a canal from the Red Sea to a branch of the Nile came to grief when it was found that the low lands around the delta were lower than the sea-level in the Red Sea.

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article, he does two jobs: (1) he answers the question according to Augustine; (2) he answers it according to other saints. They differ in whether there is an order of nature or an order of time, both when the formed is compared to the unformed and when one formation is compared to another. They also differ in that Augustine's account extends to spiritual and corporeal things, whereas the others' account extend to bodily creatures only. So in keeping with the three unformed conditions and the three formations, both sides make three points.

As the first things, Augustine posits two: heaven

(*i.e.* angelic nature) and the unformed matter that will go into bodies. Then he understands the matter to have been informed by light, "Let there be light"; and by the form of heaven at "Let there be a firmament" and by the form of the elements where it says "Let the waters be gathered together." All of these stand in order of nature.

The others, however, put heaven, water, and earth as first, in temporal priority. On the first day the heaven was informed by light and by time; on the second day, water was divided and ordered by "Let there be a firmament"; thirdly the land was divided from the sea and made visible, "Let the waters be gathered."

Was the production of plants suitably put on the third day?

1 ST q.102, a.1 ad 5, In II Sent. d.14, a.4 ad 6 ff.

It looks as though the production of plants was not suitably put on the third day.

(1) After all, plants have life as animals do. But the production of animals is not put among the works of diversifying, but pertains to the work of adorning. Hence the production of plants also should not have been mentioned on the third day, which is occupied by the work of diversifying.

(2) Besides, what pertains to the curse upon the earth should not have been mentioned with the formation of the earth. But the production of some plants pertains to the curse upon the earth, according to Genesis 3:17-18, "Cursed is the ground for thy sake . . . thorns also and thistles shall it bring forth to thee." So production of plants in general should not have been mentioned on the third day, which is occupied with formation of the earth.

(3) Moreover, as plants inhere in the earth, so do stones and metals. And yet no mention is made of them in earth's formation. Therefore neither should plants have been mentioned on the third day.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what it says in Genesis 1:12, "The earth brought forth grass and herbs yielding seed;" and afterwards it says, "And the evening and the morning were the third day."

ANSWER: as I said in the preceding article, the unformed character of the earth is removed on the third day. But where earth is concerned, two unformed states were described: (1) that it was formless or void, because the waters covered it; (2) that it was ill-composed or empty, *i.e.* did not have the due beauty which earth acquires from plants somehow crowning it with verdure. And so both unformed states are removed on this third day: the first by the fact that "The waters were gathered together into one place and the dry land appeared;" the second, by the fact that "The earth brought forth grass and herbs."

Still, on the production of plants, Augustine thought differently from the other saints. For the other interpreters say that the plants were produced in act in their species on this third day, as the text seems to say on its surface. But Augustine, in *Super Genesim ad litteram I*, says that "The earth was said to bring forth herbs and trees at that time in a causal sense, *i.e.*, it received the power* to produce them." And this he confirms by the authority of Scripture. For it says in Genesis 2:4-5, "These are the generations of the heavens and

of the earth when they were created, in the day that the Lord God made the earth and the heavens, and every plant of the field, before it was in the earth, and every herb of the field, before it grew." Thus before they grew upon the earth, they were made to be in the earth in their causes.* — Augustine also confirms this by an argument to the effect that, in those first days, God established a created thing origin-wise or cause-wise,* and from this work he subsequently rested; nevertheless, God afterwards "worketh until now" in the administration of created things through the work of propagation. But to produce plants from the earth belongs to the work of propagation. Therefore plants were not produced on the third day in act but only cause-wise.

Nevertheless, according to the other interpreters, one may say that the first establishment of the species belonged to the work of the six days; but because propagation from the species first set-up proceeds to things resembling them in species, this already belongs to the administration of things. And this is what Scripture says with "before it grew upon the earth" or "before it germinated," *i.e.*, before similar things were produced from their like as we now see happening in nature by way of seed-bearing. This is why Scripture significantly says, "Let the earth bring forth grass, the herb yielding seed," because complete species of plants had been produced, from which would come the seeds of others. And it does not matter where the power to bear seed arises, whether it be in the root, or in the stem, or in the fruit.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): the life in plants is hidden, because they lack local motion and sensory power, the features by which animate things are most distinguished from inanimate ones. And so, because they inhere in the earth motionlessly, their production is put down as a formation of the earth.

ad (2): even before that curse, thorns and thistles had been produced either cause-wise or in act. But they were not yet produced as a penalty for man, so that the land man would cultivate for food would germinate some fruitless and noxious things. That is why it says "Thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to thee."

ad (3): Moses only set down the things that appear to all, as I said already. But mineral bodies have a generation that is hidden in the bowels of the earth. And again, they do not have an obvious distinction from earth, but seem to be species of it. And so Moses did not mention them.

* virtualiter

* virtualiter

John 5: 17

q 68, a.3

c.4;
PL 34. 325

* virtus

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article, the affirmative; (2) he discusses what the production of plants was like.

ii. As for job (1), the conclusion is “the production of plants was suitably put on the third day.” — The support is on the ground that this pertains to the formation of the earth. This is explained from the doubly unformed state of the earth.

iii. As for job (2), he says three things. First he reports the difference of opinion between Augustine and the others: Augustine holds the plants were produced virtually, while the others hold that they were produced actually. — Secondly, he tells us what motivated Au-

gustine, namely, the authority of Genesis 2 and an argument from the difference between the work of creating and that of administering by propagation. — Thirdly, he tells us what motivated the other saints holding the other side: they had an argument to the effect that the work of creating goes all the way to the setup of complete/mature things, and yet they salvaged the difference between propagation and creation; they also used the authority of Genesis 2. On this part, our author seems to incline to their view.



Inquiry seventy: Into the work of adornment on the fourth day

The next thing to take up is the work of adornment. It will be discussed first for particular days one at a time; secondly for all six days in general [q.74]. For the day-by-day discussion, then, one needs to study first the work of the fourth day; secondly the work of the fifth day [q.71]; thirdly the work of the sixth day: [q.72] fourthly we take up the topics pertaining to the seventh day.

As to the first day to be studied, three questions are raised:

- (1) about the production of the luminaries.
- (2) about the purpose of their production.
- (3) about whether they are animate beings.

article 1

Should the luminaries have been produced on the fourth day?

In II Sent. d.15, q. 1, a. 1

It seems as though the luminaries ought not to have been produced on the fourth day.

(1) After all, the luminaries are naturally incorruptible bodies. Therefore their matter cannot lack their forms. But their matter was produced in the work of creating before any day. Therefore their forms must have been produced then also. Therefore they were not made on the fourth day.

(2) Besides, luminaries are like vessels of light. But light was made on the first day. Therefore, the luminaries should also have been made on the first day, and not the fourth.

(3) Moreover, as plants are fixed in the earth, so also the luminaries are fixed in the firmament; this is why Scripture says that God "placed them in the firmament." But the production of plants was described together with the formation of the earth wherein they inhere. Therefore production of the luminaries should also have been put on the second day with production of the firmament in which they inhere.

(4) Furthermore, the sun and moon and other luminaries are the cause of plants. But in natural order causes precede their effects. Therefore the luminaries should not have been made on the fourth day, but on the third or earlier.

(5) In addition, according to the astronomers, many stars are greater than the moon. Therefore it should not have been the case that only the sun and the moon get mentioned as the "two great luminaries."

ON THE OTHER HAND, the authority of Scripture suffices.

Fig. I ANSWER: in its recapitulation of God's works, Scripture

says the following: "Thus the heavens and the earth were finished, and all the adornment* of them." In these words one can understand a tripartite work: *i.e.*, the work of *creating*, by which heaven and earth were produced but in an unformed state; plus a work of *diversifying*, through which heaven and earth were completed either by substantial forms given to the wholly unformed matter (as Augustine would have it, or through receiving due beauty and order, as the other saints say; and in addition to these two works, the one of *ornamenting*. Ornamenting differs from completing. The completing of heaven and earth seems to embrace what is intrinsic to them; but ornamenting covers things distinct from the heaven and the earth. Thus a human being is complete by his own body parts and forms, but is ornamented through his clothing or something of that sort. That some items are distinct is revealed best by local motion, whereby the one separates from the other. And thus to the work of ornamentation there belongs the production of those things which have movement in heaven and on earth.

But as I said above, mention is made of three items in God's creating, *i.e.*, heaven and water and earth. And these three are also given form by the work of diversifying on the first three days: on the first day, heaven; on the second day, water; on the third day, differentiation is made on earth between the sea and the dry land. Likewise in the work of ornamenting, its first day (which is the fourth overall) sees the luminaries produced, which move in heaven to ornament it. In its second day (which is the fifth overall) birds and fish come to ornament the middle elements, because they have motion in the air and in the water (air and water being taken as one). On the third day (which is the sixth overall) the animals that have movement on the earth are produced to ornament it.

Genesis 2 1

* the KJV has 'host'

*Super Genesim ad litteram II, c. 11
PL 34, 272*

q 69, a.1

One needs to know, however, that Augustine has no disagreement with the other saints on the production of the luminaries. He says the luminaries were produced in act, not only cause-wise. After all, the firmament did not have the power to produce the luminaries the way earth had the power to produce plants. This is why Scripture does not say, "the firmament produced luminaries," but does say, "the earth brought forth green herbage."

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): for Augustine, this objection raises no difficulty. He does not put temporal succession between these works, and so he does not have to say that the matter in the heavenly luminaries was once under another form. — Also no trouble arises for those who think the heavenly bodies share the nature of the four elements, because they can say that the bodies were formed from matter already lying around, as animals and plants were. — But for those who say that the heavenly bodies have another nature from the elements and are naturally incorruptible, it is necessary to say that the substance of the luminaries was created from the beginning but was previously in an unformed state, and now is formed — not with a substantial form, of course, but by receiving definite power. The reason there was no mention of them from the beginning, but only on the fourth day, according to Chrysostom was to remove people from idolatry, by showing that the luminaries are not gods and did not exist from the beginning.

ad (2): for Augustine, again, the objection raises no difficulty, because the light mentioned as made on the first day was a spiritual light: but now corporeal light is made. — But if the light made on the first day is taken to be corporeal light, one has to say that the first day's light was produced according to the common nature of light, whereas on the fourth day the luminaries got definite power for definite effects (as we see rays of the sun having different effects from those of the moon, and ditto for the others). Thanks to this determination of power, Denis says in c. 4 of his *On the Divine Names* that the light of

the sun was first in an unformed state, and was given form on the fourth day. PG 3, 700

ad (3): according to Ptolemy, the luminaries are not attached onto spheres but have a motion apart from that of the spheres. Chrysostom says [*loc. cit.*] that this is why Scripture does not say God put them in the firmament because they were fixed there but *because he commanded them to be there*, as he put man in paradise so that he would be there. — But according to Aristotle's opinion, the fixed stars are in orbs and do not move apart from the orbs' own motion, as a matter of fact. But motion by the luminaries is perceived by the senses, whereas that of the spheres is not. Moses condescended to a crude people and followed what appears to the senses, as I said before.

But if the firmament made on the second day is assumed to be different (as a having a distinct nature) from the firmament in which the stars were placed, then the objection falls down, even though our senses (which Moses followed) do not discern this. For the firmament was made on the second day as far as its lower part is concerned. But as regards its higher part, the stars were put in it on the fourth day, with result that the whole thing is taken as one thanks to its sensible appearance.

ad (4): according to Basil, the production of plants was put before that of the luminaries so as to exclude idolatry. For those believing that the luminaries are divine say that the first origin of plants was from the luminaries. Still, as Chrysostom says, the luminaries contribute by their motions to the production of the plants, just as a farmer does.

ad (5): according to Chrysostom, they are called "two great luminaries" not so much for their size as for their efficacy and power. For even if other stars are greater than the moon in size, the effects of the moon are still felt more here below. — Also the moon looks bigger to our senses.

¹ Despite the obsolete explanations, temporal separation of light's creation from that of the luminaries is a happy coincidence of Genesis with cosmology. Light was released from the nascent universe billions of years before stars or planets formed.

Syntaxis Mathematica
[a.k.a. *Almagest*] I, c.7

De Caelo II,
c. 8;
289b 32

q.68, a.3

Homily
Hexameron,
PG 29, 96

Homily VI on
Genesis;
PG 53, 58

quoted by Basil
in *Homily VI* in *Hexameron*;
PG 29, 137

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article, he does three jobs. (1) He gathers from the words of Scripture that God engaged in a tripartite work: creation, formation/diversification, and adornment, for each of which he states the object produced: for the first, unformed things; for the second, forms; for the third, extrinsic mobile things.

(2) He answers the question affirmatively: the luminaries were suitably produced on the fourth day. — He supports this on the ground that the fourth is the first day of adornment, on which the first thing created was to be adorned (just as it was formed first by a distinction on the first day, etc.).

He spells this out by enumerating the three things first created: heaven, earth, and waters (these being in the

middle) and by putting their formation in order on the first three days (firstly heaven, secondly the waters, thirdly the earth); and likewise he puts their ornamentation in order: that of heaven on the fourth day, that of waters on the third day, and that of earth of the sixth.

(3) He shows that Augustine agreed with the other saints on the point that the luminaries were created in act, and why he agrees. All points are clear.

ii. Notice here that in the work of creating Scripture puts the earth in second place and the waters in third place; but in the works of diversifying and adorning, the order is reversed. For as to its flatly existing, the earth met a prior need (because earth exists first for the sake of heaven, as is clear in *De Caelo II*, comment 18, etc.); but as far as nobility is concerned, earth comes last.

Is the reason for producing the luminaries suitably described?

It seems that the reason to produce the luminaries is not suitably described [by Genesis 1:14-15].

(1) After all, Jeremiah 10:2 says, “be not dismayed at the signs of heaven, for the heathen are dismayed at them.” Therefore, the heavenly luminaries were not made to be signs.

(2) Besides, a sign is contrasted with a cause. But the luminaries are causes of things that happen here below. Therefore they are not signs.

(3) Moreover, discrimination of times and days began on the first day. Therefore the luminaries were not made “for times and days and years,” *i.e.* to discriminate them.

(4) Furthermore, nothing is for the sake of anything lower than itself, because “a purpose is better than what is done for the purpose.” But the heavenly luminaries are better than the earth. Therefore they were not made to “give light to the earth.”

(5) Also, the moon does not preside over the night when it is new. Yet it is probable that the moon was made in its phase as new, for this is what people reckon from. Therefore the moon was not made to rule the night.

ON THE OTHER HAND, the authority of Scripture suffices.

q.65, a.2 ANSWER: as I said above, a bodily creature can be said to have been made for the sake of its own act, or for the sake of another creature, or for the sake of the whole universe, or for the sake of God’s glory. But Moses, so as to recall people from idolatry, touched solely upon the purpose according to which they were made for people’s use. This is why Deuteronomy 4:19 says, “Lest thou lift up thine eyes unto heaven, and when thou seest the sun and the moon and the stars, even all the host of heaven, shouldst be driven to worship them and serve them, which the Lord thy God hath imparted unto all nations under the whole heaven.”

This service to all the nations Moses explains at the start of Genesis in three points. First, utility comes to people from the luminaries as far as their eyes are concerned, which guide them in their work and are most useful for knowing things. This is why the text says “That they might shine in the firmament and give light upon earth.” — Secondly, to supply what the seasons need, when the cold or heat we loathe is removed and

our health is preserved, and what we need for our nourishment comes up — which would not exist if it were always either summer or winter. And to express this, the texts says “that they might be for seasons and days and years.” — Thirdly, for opportunities in work and business, inasmuch as one learns from the luminaries of heaven the signs of a rainy season or a dry one, which are suited to different enterprises. This is why the text says “That they might be for signs.”

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): the luminaries are for signs of bodily changes, but not of those which depend upon free choice.

ad (2): sometimes we are led by an observable cause to the knowledge of a hidden effect, as is also the case *vice-versa*. Nothing prevents an observable cause from being a sign. The heavenly luminaries are called signs, however, rather than causes, so as to remove an occasion for idolatry.

ad (3): what was made on the first day is the common division of time into day and night, thanks to the daily motion which is common to all of heaven; and this can be understood to have begun on the first day. But special distinctions between days and times — thanks to which one day is warmer than another, one season more temperate than another, and one year better than another — come about thanks to special motions of the stars; and these can be understood to have begun on the fourth day.

ad (4): the talk of giving light to the earth is understood in terms of usefulness to man, whose soul puts him above bodily luminaries. Still, nothing prevents one from saying that a more worthy creature was made for the sake of a lower one, not as considered in itself, but as ordered to the integrity of the universe.

ad (5): when the moon is full, it rises at dusk and sets at dawn, and thus rules the night. And it is likely enough that the moon was created full, just as plants were created in their maturity, “yielding seed,” and ditto for animals and man. For although natural development goes from the incomplete to the complete, what is unqualifiedly complete is nevertheless prior to the incomplete. — Augustine, however, does not assert this, because he says it was not inappropriate for God to make incomplete things, which He would later bring to completion.

Super Gen. ad Lit II, c. 15, PL 34, 276

Cajetan’s Commentary

In the title, the “reason” is “so that they might give light upon the earth so as to be for signs and times.”

In the body of the article, he does two jobs. Firstly, he shows that four purposes can be given for a bodily creature: its own action (*De Caelo II*), another creature

(*Physics II*), the universe as a whole (*Metaphysics XII*), and God (*Metaphysics XII*).

Secondly, he answers the question: Moses (to bar danger of idolatry) touches only one of these purposes, *i.e.* usefulness to man in the three ways plain in the text.

c.3; 195b 17
c.10, 1075a 12

Are the heavenly luminaries animate beings?

In Ill Sent., d.14, q.1, a.3; 2 CG, c.70; *De Veritate* q.5, a.9, ad 14; *De Potentia* q.6, a.6; *De Spirituibus creaturis* a.6; QD *De Anima* a.8, ad 3ff; *Quodlibet* XII, q.6, a.2; *In Ill De Caelo, lectiones* 3,13

It looks as though the heavenly luminaires are animate beings.

(1) After all, a higher body deserves decoration with nobler ornaments. Things pertaining to the decoration of lower bodies are animated beings, *i.e.*, fish, birds, and terrestrial animals. Therefore the luminaries decorating the heavens should also be animate beings.

(2) Besides, the form of a nobler body is a nobler form. But the sun and the moon and the other luminaries are nobler than the bodies of plants and animals. Therefore they have a nobler form. But the noblest form is a soul, which is the source of life, because "any living substance ranks higher than a non-living substance in the order of nature," as Augustine says in his book *De Vera Religione*. Therefore, the luminaries of heaven have souls.

c.29,
PL 34, 145

(3) Moreover, a cause is nobler than its effect. But the sun and the moon and the other luminaries are causes of life, as is especially clear in the case of animals generated from rot, which attain life by the power of the sun and the stars. *A fortiori*, therefore, the heavenly bodies are alive and have souls.

(4) Furthermore, the movement of heaven and of the heavenly bodies is natural, as is clear in *De Caelo I*. But natural motion comes from an inner source. So, since the source of motion of the heavenly bodies is a substance able to apprehend, which is moved as one who desires is moved by the object desired, as it says in *Metaphysics XII*, it seems that a source that apprehends is the intrinsic source of [motion in] heavenly bodies. Therefore they are animated.

c.2;
269a 30

c.7;
1072a 26

(5) Additionally, the first moveable is a heaven. In the class of moveable things, however, the first one is moving of itself, as is proved in *Physics VIII*, because "what is thus-and-such of itself is prior to what is thus-and-such through another." But only animate beings move themselves, as is shown in the same book. Ergo, the heavenly bodies have souls.

c.5;
256a 21

c.4;
255a 6

De fide orthodoxa II, c.6;
PG 94, 885

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Damascene says: "Let no one think the heavens or their luminaries have souls; for they are inanimate and unsensing."

ANSWER: there was diversity of opinion about this question among the philosophers. Anaxagoras (as reported by Augustine in *The City of God XI III*, "was held guilty among the Athenians because he said that the sun was a hot rock, and denied that it was a god," or anything besouled. The Platonists, however, maintained that the heavenly bodies had souls. The same difference of opinion also arose among the teachers of the faith. Origin thought that the heavenly bodies had souls. Jerome seems to have thought the same when

c.41;
PL 41, 601

Timeus and Laws X

Peri Archon I, c.7;
PG 11,173

he was expounding Ecclesiastes 1:6 [*I'g.*], "surveying all, the spirit goes through its circuit."¹ But Basil [Homily III in *Hexaemeron*] and Damascene assert that the heavenly bodies are not animate beings. Augustine leaves the matter in doubt, taking neither side, as is clear in *Super Genesis ad litteram II* and in the *Enchiridion*, where he says that *if* the heavenly bodies are animate, their souls belong to the company of the angels.

PG 29, 76;
loc. cit.

c.18; PL 34, 279
c.58; PL 40, 260

Faced with this diversity of opinions, to learn the truth to some extent, one needs to bear in mind that the union of soul and body is not for the sake of the body but for that of the soul; a form, after all, is not for the sake of the matter but *vice-versa*. But a soul's nature and power is learned from its operation, which is also in a certain way its purpose. But a body is found to be necessary for some operation of the soul which is carried out by way of the body, as is obvious in the operations of sensory and nutritive souls. So such souls have to be united to bodies for the sake of their own operations. There is, however, an operation of the soul which is not exercised by the body, but the soul still gets some help for this operation from the body (as phantasms are exhibited to our soul through the body, and our soul needs these in order to understand). And so such a soul also has to be united to a body for the sake of its own operation, even though it can exist separately.

Well, it is obvious that the soul of a heavenly body cannot have a soul's nutritive operations, which are to digest, grow, and beget; for such operations do not suit bodies that are incorruptible by nature. Likewise also a sentient soul's operations cannot belong to that of a heavenly body, because all the senses are based upon touch, which apprehends the qualities of the elements. Also, all the organs of the sense powers require a definite proportion in the mixture of the elements, and heavenly bodies are remote by nature from these.

By elimination, then, only two operations of a soul would suit the heavenly souls, *i.e.*, to understand and to move. Seeking, after all, follows upon sense and intellect and is ordered with both. The intellect's operation, however, since it is not exercised from a body, does not need a body except insofar as it is helped by phantasms *via* a sense. The sentient operations of a soul do not suit heavenly bodies, as I said. So a soul would not be united to a heavenly body for the sake of an intellectual operation.

By elimination, then, it would be united to a body only for the sake of motion. But in order to move, the heavenly body does not have to be united to its soul as a form; it needs only the contact of power, the way a mover

¹ The vulgate seems to combine two verses of Ecclesiastes, one about the sun, and one about the *rrn* which probably means the wind here (and was so taken by the KJV); but it comes over into the LXX as *πνεῦμα* and into Latin, of course, as *spiritus*.

is united to a thing moved. This is why Aristotle in *Physics VIII* shows that the prime movable itself is composed of two parts, one of which is moving and the other is moved; he then theorizes how these two parts are united. He says it is through contact either of two with each other (if both are bodies) or by touch of one on another but not *vice-versa* (if one is a body and another is not). — The Platonist also held that souls were not united to the heavenly bodies except by contact of power, as in the mover to the moved. And so Plato's holding that the heavenly bodies are animated means nothing more than that spiritual substances are united to the heavenly bodies as their movers.

The fact that the heavenly bodies are moved by a substance that can apprehend, and not just by nature like heavy things and light ones, is evident from the fact that mere nature moves a thing only to one terminus, having reached which, the thing rests. This we do not see in the movement of heavenly bodies. The only alternative then is that they are moved by a substance able to apprehend. — Augustine also says in *De Trinitate III* that "all bodies" are administered by God "through a spirit of life."

It is therefore obvious that heavenly bodies are not animate in the way plants and animals are but only in an equivocal sense.² Hence the difference between those who claim they are animate and those who claim they are not comes down to little or nothing in the real, but is a matter of words.

² Equivocation' meant use of the same word (here 'animate') under different definitions, which may or may not be related. Analogy occurred only when the definitions were in fact related, which Aquinas does not claim here. Probably this is why he showed little interest in the debates over the topic of this article.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): some traits pertain to a furnishing thanks to its own movement and in this respect the heavenly luminaries agree with other furnishings: they are moved by a living substance.

ad (2): nothing prevents there being a thing that is more noble overall* but less noble in some respect. The form of a heavenly body, even if it is not nobler overall than the soul of an animal, is nevertheless nobler in what it takes to be a form; for it totally perfects its matter to the extent that the matter is not in potency to another form (and the soul of an animal does not do this).³ As far as movement is concerned: the heavenly bodies are moved by nobler movers.

ad (3): since a heavenly body is a moved mover, it has what it takes to be an instrument acting in the power of a principal agent, and so it can cause life from the power of its mover, which is a living substance.

ad (4): the movement of a heavenly body is "natural" not on account of its active source but on account of its passive source; *i.e.*, it has in its nature an aptitude to be moved with such motion by an intellect.

ad (5): a heaven is said to move itself inasmuch as it is composed of a mover and a moved part, not as matter and form, but according to a contact of power as I said. — Thus one can even say that its mover is an "intrinsic" source,⁴ as also a heaven's motion can be called "natural" on the part of its active source, as a voluntary movement is said to be "natural" for an animal *qua* an animal, as it says in *Physics VIII*.

* *simpliciter*

c 4;
254b 14

³ He meant: not in *natural* potency to another form.

⁴ What was properly "intrinsic" to *x* went into the account giving *x* its real definition. Otherwise 'intrinsic' was being used equivocally.

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article, he does four jobs: (1) he reports opinions (2) he investigates how a heavenly body and its mover are united, on the assumption that the source of its moving is cognitive; (3) he supports this assumption; (4) he concludes his answer.

ii. As for job (1), he mentions the opinions of Anaxagoras and Plato. Among theologians, he reports those of Origen with Jerome, and of Damascene with Basil, and of Augustine who stayed neutral.

iii. As for job (2), a soul is not joined to any heavenly body as a form, but only as a mover. — This is supported in summary form as follows. [*Antecedent:*] The joining is only for the sake of motion; [*consequent:*] therefore its being joined to a mover suffices.

The antecedent is supported as follows. Matter is for the sake of its form, and the form is for the sake of an operation and is known therefrom; but here the form is not for the sake of a vegetative or sentient or intellectual function; therefore it is for the sake of moving

alone, because there are no phantasms, *etc.*, in this case. — Drawing the consequence is made clear from Aristotle, *Physics VIII*, and from Plato.

iv. As for job (3), he supports the point that heavenly bodies do not move with a natural motion (like the light and the heavy) but by a power that can apprehend, and this on two grounds. The first is by argument, because a natural way of moving is nailed down to one destination—secondly, by the authority of Augustine.

v. As for job (4), the response is firstly this: heavenly bodies are "animate" but equivocally so compared to things here below. — Secondly, there is a corollary to the effect that between the two opinions there is little or no difference in real terms.

A change of mind?

vi. In job (2), a doubt crops up because in 2 *CG*, c.70, St. Thomas wants it to be the case that, for Aristotle, one must say a heavenly body is animate in such wise that a soul is united to the heavenly body as its form. But here

he says, on the basis of Aristotle, that it suffices for such a body to be united to its mover as a thing moved.

vii. To this I see no ANSWER accept one or the other of these two. Either Aquinas is speaking better here, because he wrote it later. — Or else he was intending to say in the other case that, according to Aristotle, a heavenly body's being strictly animated *at least does not conflict* with its nature, in that Aristotle's doctrine tends this way. For although he can be interpreted as is

c.2 done in this article, from his remarks in *De Caelo II* we have it that he posits those bodies to be animated without distinguishing how.* Therefore, it cannot conflict with their nature to be animated substantially. And this is enough to counter Averroes [on *III De Anima*, Comment 5], against whom St. Thomas was

* *indistincte*

speaking. — Those words support this comment because, when the talk is against Averroes, it is permitted to support the other side, as Augustine does against the Pelagians.

One could also give a third answer, perhaps, that Aquinas is speaking here according to his own view, but was speaking in 2 *CG* according to Aristotle's. Although he adduces Aristotle here, too, Aquinas does not assert that this was Aristotle's opinion; rather, he is helping himself from Aristotle's words.

viii. In the answer *ad (5)* there is doubt about how a heavenly body can be said to move "intrinsically," if it is united to its mover only as a mover. And this is a doubt affecting Aristotle as well as Averroes and others [as for this doubt, see below, the commentary on q.86, a.1].



Inquiry Seventy-One: Into the work of the fifth day

One turns next to the work of the fifth day.

Sole article

[Is the work of the fifth day described suitably?]

It seems that the work of the fifth day is badly described.

Exodus 10-12

Genesis 1.20

(1) After all, water produces that for which the power of water suffices. But the power of water does not suffice to produce all of the fish and birds, since we see that most of them are generated from seed. So the text is wrong to say: "Let the waters bring forth abundantly the moving creature that hath life and fowl that may fly above the earth."

(2) Besides, fish and birds are not produced just from water: earth seems to be more predominate than water in their composition, because their bodies are naturally moved towards the earth and rest upon it. Therefore it is not suitable to say that fish and birds are produced from water.

(3) Moreover, as fish have movement in the waters, so also do the birds in the air. So if the fish are produced from water, the birds ought to have been produced from the air, not the water.

(4) Furthermore, not all fish move in the waters, since some of them have feet with which they walk on the earth, like seals. Hence the production of fishes is not suitably expressed by the words, "Let the waters bring forth the moving creature that hath life."

(5) Additionally, terrestrial animals are more perfect than birds and fish. This is clear from the fact that they have more distinct members and a more perfect generation; after all they give birth to animals, but fish and birds lay eggs. But in the order of nature the more perfect things come first. Therefore birds and fish should not have been made prior to land animals on the fifth day.

ON THE OTHER HAND, the authority of Scripture suffices.

q.70, a.1 **ANSWER:** as was said above, the work of ornamenting follows the same order as that of diversifying. Hence, just as the middle one of the three days given over to diversification (the second day) is devoted to diversifying the middle body (water), so also among the three days devoted to the work of ornamentation,

the middle one (the fifth) is devoted to the decoration of the middle body by the production of birds and fish. And so, just as Moses names luminaries and light on the fourth day, to indicate that the fourth day corresponds to the first (on which he said light was made), so also on this fifth day he makes mention of waters and the firmament of heaven to indicate that the fifth day corresponds to the second.

One needs to know, however, that Augustine differs from the other saints on the production of fish and birds, just as he did on the production of plants. The others say that fish and birds were produced in act on the fifth day; but Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad litteram V* that on the fifth day the nature of the waters produced fish and birds in a potential state.

c. 5. PL 34, 326

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad (1)*: Avicenna held that all animals could be generated in a natural way from one or another mixture of the elements, without seed. — But this view does not seem suitable. Nature proceeds to its effects by definite means; hence things naturally generated from seed cannot naturally be generated without seed.

Avicenna, *De Anima* XV, c.1

And so one must say otherwise. In the natural generation of the animals that are begotten from seed, the active principle is a formative power which is in their seed; in things generated from rot, the place of this power is taken by that of a heavenly body. But the main source in the generation of both kinds of animals is an element or something made of the elements. — In the initial set-up of things, the active source was the word of God, which (from elemental matter) produced the animals either in act (as the other saints held) or virtually (according to Augustine). It is not the case that water or earth has in itself the power to produce all the animals, as Avicenna held; rather, the fact that animals can be produced from elemental matter by the power of the their seed or of the stars is true thanks to a power first given to the elements.

ad (2): the bodies of birds and fishes can be thought about in two ways. One way is in themselves. And when they are taken this way, it is necessary that the element of earth should predominate in them, because for there to be a suitable mixture in an animal's body, it has to abound quantitatively in the element which is less active, *i.e.*

earth. — But if those bodies are thought of insofar as they are naturally able to move with such and such motions, they have an affinity with the bodies in which they move. And such is how their generation is described here.

ad (3): because air is impalpable, it is not listed alone but with the others — partly indeed with water, as to the air's lower part, because it is thickened by the water vapors; but partly also with the heaven, as to the air's upper part. But birds have movement in the lower part of the air, and this is why it says they fly "under the firmament of heaven," even if the firmament is taken to be the air where there are clouds. And this is why the production of birds is ascribed to water.

ad (4): nature goes from one extreme to the other through middle points. And so between land and water animals, there are some intermediate ones, which share features with each; and these are listed together with those with whom they share more, and not with those on the other extreme. Nevertheless, to include all such things as share a key trait with the fish, right after the text said "Let the waters bring forth the moving creature that hath life," it says "God created great whales," *etc.*

Genesis 1.21

ad (5): the production of these animals is listed according to the order of the bodies [earth, sea, air] which they adorn, rather than according to their own worthiness. And yet, in the course of generation, more complete things arise from the less complete.

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article, he does two jobs. First he answers the question in the affirmative on the grounds that the fifth day corresponds

to the second. — Secondly he notes the difference between Augustine and the others over whether the production of fish and birds was in act or in active power.



Inquiry Seventy-Two: Into the work of the sixth day

Next one asks about the work of the sixth day.

Sole article

[Is the work of the sixth day fitly described?]

The work of the sixth day does not seem suitably described.

(1) After all, birds and fish have a living soul, as do the land animals; but the land animals are not themselves a living soul. Hence the text reads badly in saying "Let the earth bring forth the living soul." It should have said, "Let the earth bring forth quadrupeds with a living soul."¹

(2) Besides, a genus should not be put in contrast with a species. But "cattle" and "beasts" are included under quadrupeds. Not suitably therefore are four-footed things listed together with cattle and beasts.

(3) Moreover, as other animals are in a definite genus and species, so also is man. But in the making of man there is no mention of his genus or species. Therefore there should have been no such mention in the production of the other animals where it says "after its kind."

(4) Land animals are more similar to man, who is said to be blessed by God, than birds and fish are. So since the birds and fish are said to be blessed, *a fortiori* this should have been said about the other animals.

(5) Also, some animals are generated from rot, which is a corruption of some sort. But corruption does not belong in the initial set-up of things. Therefore animals should not have been produced in the initial set-up.

(6) Additionally, some animals are poisonous and harmful to man. But nothing should be harmful to man before sin entered the world. Therefore either such animals should not have been made by God at all (since he is the author of good things), or they should not have been made before sin happened.

¹ The familiar KJV, "let the earth bring forth the living creature after his kind," is a departure from the original and its ancient versions. The Hebrew and the Greek LXX and the Vulgate all say "let the earth bring forth a living soul, according to its kind." The Vulgate says "*animam viventem in genere suo*." The talk of four-footed things is neither in the KJV nor in the Vulgate; it comes from the LXX translation, "Let the earth bring forth the living creature according to its kind, quadrupeds and reptiles, and wild beasts of the earth according to their kind."

ON THE OTHER HAND, the authority of Scripture suffices.

ANSWER: as the middle body was adorned on the fifth day which corresponds to the second say, so also the last body was adorned on the sixth day, *i.e.* the earth, by production of animals, and so the sixth day corresponds to the third. Hence the earth is mentioned on both days. — And here again, according to Augustine, the land animals were produced in a potential state; but according to the other saints they were produced in act.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): as Basil says, the different levels of life found in various living things can be gathered from the Scripture's way of speaking. For plants have a very incomplete and hidden life. Hence in the production of them, no mention was made of life but only of generation; for this is the only sign of the act of life within them. (Nutritive and growth powers serve the generative power, as I shall be saying below.) — But among animals, the land animals are generally speaking more perfect than birds and fish — not because fish lack memory, as Basil says (and Augustine criticizes him for saying it) but because of the distinctness of their members and the completeness of their generation. (But as to certain forms of cleverness* even some incomplete animals do better, such as bees and ants). This is why the text calls the fish not "a living soul" but "a creeping thing with a living soul;" but land animals it calls "a living soul" on account of the perfection of life in them — as if fish were bodies having something of the soul, while land animals are souls, as it were, dominating their bodies. — But the most complete level of life is in man. And so Scripture does not say the life of man was produced from the earth or the water, like the other animals, but by God.

ad (2): 'cattle' means domestic animals that serve man in any way. 'Beasts' means wild animals, like bears and lions. 'Creeping things' means animals that either do not have feet to raise them above the ground, like snakes, or have short legs that lift them only a little, like lizards and turtles and the like. But

*Super Genesim ad
Litteram V, c.5,
PL 34, 326*

Homily VIII in
Hexameron
PG 29, 163

q.78, a.2

loc. cit.
Super Gen ad Lit. III,
c 8, PL 34, 283

* *sagacitates*

Genesis 1:24, 1'g.

Genesis 1:22

since some animals fit none of these descriptions, like deer and wild goats, the text adds “quadrupeds” to include them — Alternatively, “quadrupeds” come first in the guise of a genus and the others are added like species; after all, there are creeping things with four feet, like lizards and turtles.

ad (3): in the case of other plants and animals, mention is made of their “kind” so as to indicate generations of similar things from similar things. But in the case of man there was no need to say this; because it had already been said about the others, it could also be understood about man. —Alternatively, the reason is that animals and plants are produced in their own kinds and species remotely from any likeness to God; but man is said to have been formed “in the image and likeness of God.”

ad (4): God’s blessing gives the power to multiply by generation. And so what was stated first for birds and fish, which appear first, did not have to be repeated for land animals, but could be understood. — For people, however, the blessing is repeated because there is a special reason for multiplication in their case, to fill up the number of the elect; and “lest anyone say that there is any sin in the office of begetting children.” — Plants, on the other hand, “have no yearning to beget offspring, and they do so without any sensory involvement; hence

words of blessing were thought to be undeserved.”

ad (5): since the generation of one thing is the corruption of another, and since nobler things are generated from the corruption of ignoble ones, corruption does not conflict with the initial setup of things. Hence the animals generated from the rot of inanimate things or plants were able to be generated then — but not those generated from the corruption of animals; at that time they could only have been produced potentially.

ad (6): as Augustine says in *De Genesi contra Manichaeos I*, “if a tyro has entered the office of making sacrifice, he sees many instruments for which he does not see the reason; and if he is a thorough fool, he thinks them superfluous. Indeed if he falls into a furnace carelessly, or wounds himself on some sharp metal, he will think there are many harmful things there; because the craftsman knows their use, he mocks the foolishness of the tyro. Thus in this world, some people make bold to criticize many things for which they do not see the reason: for many things, though not needed by us at home, still contribute to the integrity of the world.” But man before sin had been using properly the things of the world. Therefore poisonous animals had not been harmful to him.

c.16. *Pf.* 34, 185

Augustine, *Super Genesim ad Luce III*, c.13, *PL* 34, 288

Ibid

Cajetan’s Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article, he does two jobs. (1) He answers the question in the affirmative on the ground that the sixth day corresponds

to the third. (2) He marks the difference between Augustine and the other saints over whether the production of land animals was in act or in active power.

Inquiry Seventy-Three: Into topics pertaining to the seventh day

The next topics to take up are those pertaining to the seventh day.
Three questions are asked about this.

- (1) About the completion of God's works.
- (2) About God's rest.
- (3) About the blessing and sanctification of this day.

article I

Should the finishing of God's works be put on the seventh day?

In II. Sent. d. 15, q. 3, a. 1

It seems that the completion of God's works should not be dated to the seventh day.

(1) After all, everything happening in this world pertains to God's works. But the finishing* of the world will be at the end of the world, as it says in Matthew 13:32*ff.* Also, the time of Christ's Incarnation was the time of some completion, which is why Galatians 4:4 speaks of "the fullness of time." And Christ himself when He was dying, said, "It is finished," as we read in John 19:30. Therefore the completion of God's works does not belong on the seventh day.

(2) Besides, whoever finishes his work does something. But we do not read that God did anything on the seventh day; rather, that he rested from all work. Therefore the finishing of his works does not belong on the seventh day.

(3) Moreover, a thing to which many things are still to be added is not called "finished," unless perhaps those things are superfluous; after all, what is called "finished" is that to which nothing it ought to have is lacking. But after the seventh day, many things were done: the production of many individuals, and even the production of some new species; these appear especially frequently among animals generated from rot. Also, God daily creates new souls. The Incarnation was a new work, of which Jeremiah 31:22 says, "the Lord hath created a new thing in the earth." New also are the miraculous works of which Sirach 36:6 speaks, "Show new signs and make other strange wonders." Also, everything will be renewed in the glorification of the saints, according to Apocalypse 21:5, "And He that sat upon the throne said, 'Behold, I make all things new.'" Therefore, the completion of God's works should not have been dated to the seventh day.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Genesis 2:2 says, "And on the seventh day, God ended his work which he had made."

ANSWER: "is finished" is said of a thing on two levels. On the first level, it is "finished" because the thing is complete in its substance. This "being finished" is the form of the whole, which arises from the integrity of the parts.— On the second level, however, the finish of a thing is its purpose [*finis*]. A thing's purpose is either its operation (as the purpose of a lutenist is to play the lute) or something it reaches by operating (as the purpose of a builder is the house which he makes by building). — But the first level of being finished is the cause of the second, because a thing's form is the source of its operation.

The ultimate "being finished," however, which is the purpose of the whole universe, is the completed blessedness of the Saints, which will come at the ultimate consummation of the age. But the first "being finished," which is the integrity of the universe, was the original setting up of things. And this is what is dated to the seventh day.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS— *ad* (1): the first level of being finished is a cause of the second, as I just said. To reach blessedness, however, two causes are required, nature and grace. The perfection of blessedness itself will come at the end of the world, as I said. But this fulfillment is preceded causally, as far as nature goes, by the initial set-up of things, and as far as grace goes, by the Incarnation of Christ, because "grace and truth came by Jesus Christ," as it says in John 1:12. So, then, the consummation of nature was on the seventh day: the consummation of grace was at the Incarnation of Christ; the consummation of glory comes at the end of the world.

ad (2): God did do something on the seventh day, not by creating a new creature, but by administering created things by moving them towards their own operation (which already amounts to a start towards the second level of being finished). And so the con-

summation of God's works is dated to the seventh day according to our translation [the Latin Vulgate]. But according to another translation [the LXX] it is attributed to the sixth day. And both claims can stand. The being finished that comes thanks to the fullness of the parts of the universe belongs to the sixth day; but the consummation coming from the operation of the parts belongs to the seventh day.

Alternatively, one can say that when a thing is in continuous motion and can be moved further, its motion is not called finished until it rests; after all, its rest manifests that the motion is finished. Well God was able to make many creatures beyond those which he had made on the six days. Hence by ceasing to make new ones on the seventh day, His work is said to have finished.

ad (3): nothing God did afterwards is totally new but had precedent of some kind in the works of the six days. Some subsequent things preexisted matter-wise, like the woman formed by God from the side of Adam. — Some preexisted among the works of the six days not only

matter-wise but also cause-wise, as the individuals who are begotten nowadays preexisted in the first individuals of their species. Also new species, if any turn up, preexisted in some active powers, as the animals generated from rot are produced from the powers of the stars and of the elements (powers which they got from the beginning), even if new species of such animals are produced. Animals also arise sometimes in a new species by crossbreeding of diverse species, as when a mule is begotten from an ass and a horse: these also preexisted cause-wise in the works of the six days. — But some have a precedent just thanks to similarity, like the souls which are nowadays being created. The same is true in the work of the Incarnation, as it says in Philippians 2:7, "The Son of God was made in the likeness of men." Even spiritual glory has a precedent by similarity in the angels, while corporeal glory has its precedent in a heaven, especially the empyrean heaven. — This is why Ecclesiastes 1:10 says, "there is no new thing under the sun; for it has precedent in the ages which have passed before us."

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article, a single conclusion answers it: the world's first level of being finished is suitably dated to the seventh day; but its ultimate consummation will come at the end of the world.

These points are clarified first in general terms, by distinguishing two levels of being finished, a first and a

second, and this latter in two ways, by putting them in order. — This is then supported in its second part also, on the ground that the second level of being finished is the complete blessedness of the Saints, and the first part is supported on the ground that it is found in the integrity of the universe.

article 2

Did God rest on the seventh day from all his work?

In II Sent. d.15, q.3, a.2; In Hebraeos c.4, lectio I

It seems that God did not rest from all his works on the seventh day.

(1) After all, John 5:17 says, "my Father worketh hitherto, and I work." So He did not rest from all his work on the seventh day.

(2) Besides, being at rest is opposed to changing or to the work which is sometimes caused by changing. But God produced His works without changing and without work. Therefore one should not say that He rested on the seventh day "from" His work.

(3) If you say God rested on the seventh day because he made man rest, the rejoinder is this. Resting contrasts with working. But when it says "God created or did this or that," the meaning is not that "God made man create it or do it." Hence saying that God rested cannot rightly be taken to mean that He made man rest.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Genesis 2:2 says, "The Lord rested on the seventh day from all his work which he had made."

ANSWER: being at rest is properly contrasted with moving/changing, and hence with the work which arises from moving or changing. But even though 'is moving' is literally applied to bodies, the noun 'change/motion' is derivatively applied to spiritual things in two ways. In one way, every operation is called a changing or moving; even divine goodness is somehow said to move and "proceed" into things as He communicates Himself to them, as Denis says in c. 2 of *On the Divine Names*. In the other way, a thing's having a desire in which it tends towards another is called its moving. — Hence 'rest' is also taken two ways: in one to mean cessation from work; in the other, to mean fulfillment of desire.

In both ways God is said to have rested on the seventh day. In the first way, because on the seventh day He ceased to establish new creatures; for He made nothing afterwards which had no precedent in some way in the first works, as I said above. — In the other way, He is said to have rested because He did not need the things He had made [in order to rest content] but was already fulfilled in enjoying Himself. This is why, after the founding of all the works, it does not say that He "rested in all His works," as if He needed them for His own blessedness; rather it says, "He rested from them," especially in Himself, because He sufficed for Himself and fulfilled His desire. And although He rested content in Himself from eternity, the fact that He rested in Himself *after the works were finished* pertains to the seventh day. And this last is what it means to say He rested from His works, as Augustine tells us in *Super Genesim ad litteram IY*.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): God works up till now in two ways, by conserving and by administering the established creation; but not by making novel creatures.

ad (2): rest is not opposed [here] to work or motion, but to the production of new things and to a desire tending towards something else, as I said.

ad (3): as God rested content in Himself alone and was blessed in enjoying Himself, so also we are made blessed by enjoying God alone. And thus He also makes us rest in Him from His own and our own works. It is therefore a fitting interpretation to say that God rested because He made us rest; but this is not the only meaning to hold; rather the other interpretation is more basic and prior.

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body he does three jobs. (1) He shows how 'rest' is applied to spiritual things in two ways, as is the "motion" to which rest is opposed — namely, to stand for cessation and to stand for fulfillment of desire.

(2) He answers the question with a single two-part conclusion: God rested on the seventh day in both ways. — The support for the first part is that He ceased making new things. The support for the second part is that He rested in Himself.

(3) He excludes an objection to this second part (that He should not be said to rest on the seventh day otherwise than on other days, because He always rests in this way and never has a conflicting movement). — This objection he excludes on the ground that what is attributed to God on the seventh day is being satisfied in Himself, not independently, but "after His works were finished." And this does not always apply, but neither does an opposed motion. The Scripture said this as to show that God did not need the things He made.

article 3

Are blessing and sanctification rightly given to the seventh day?

In II Sent. d 15, q.3, a.3

It seems that a blessing and sanctification were not rightly given to the seventh day.

(1) After all, a time is usually called “blessed” or “holy,” because of some good which turned up in that time, or on account of some evil avoided at that time. But God neither increases nor decreases whether He is working or ceases to work. Therefore a special blessing and sanctification is not due to the seventh day.

(2) Besides, benediction gets its name from goodness. But the good is diffusive and communicative of itself, according to Denis. Therefore the days on which He produced creatures should be called the blessed ones, rather than the day on which He ceased to produce them.

(3) Moreover, a blessing was mentioned above in connection with particular creatures, when the text said of particular works, “God saw that it was good.” It should not have been the case, therefore, that after producing everything, the seventh day was blessed.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Genesis 2:3 says, “God blessed the seventh day and sanctified it, because that in it He had rested from all His work.”

a 2 I ANSWER: as I already said, God’s resting on the seventh day is taken in two ways:

(1) The first is insofar as He had ceased from establishing new works, but in such a way that He

conserves and administers the creation established.

(2) The other way is insofar as He has rested content in Himself after the works. — Taken the first way, a benediction befits the seventh day because (as was said above, benediction pertains to multiplication; this is why God said to the creatures whom he blessed. “Increase and multiply.” But the multiplication of things comes about through the administration of creation, thanks to the fact that similar things are begotten from similar things. — Taken the second way, however, sanctification is what befits the seventh day. After all, the sanctification of anything is found most of all in the fact that it rests in God; this is why things dedicated to God are called “holy.”

q.72 ad 4

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1); the seventh day was not sanctified because God could increase or decrease in some way, but because something was added to creatures by their multiplication and by their resting in God.

ad (2): in the first six days, things were produced in their first causes. But afterwards things are multiplied and conserved by those first causes — and this also pertains to God’s goodness. Indeed, God’s being ontologically complete* is shown most of all in the fact that He Himself rests in it alone and that we can rest by enjoying it.

* perfectio

ad (3): the good remembered on the particular days pertains to the initial setup of nature; but the blessing of the seventh day pertains to the propagation of nature.

Cajetan’s Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article, he does two jobs. (1) He counts two aspects in the seventh day. — (2) He answers the question in the affirmative: blessing is owed to the seventh day. The sup-

port goes as follows. On that day administration begins, as does God’s rest after his works: and to each there is owed blessing and sanctification, blessing to the first, and sanctification to the second, as is clear.

Inquiry Seventy-Four: Into all seven days together

Then one asks about all seven days together. And three questions are in fact asked.

- (1) Are these days enough?
- (2) Are the days really one or several?
- (3) Does the Bible use suitable words to express the work of the six days?

article 1

Are the days enumerated enough?

1 *ST* q 70, a. 1; In *Ep. ad Hebraeos*, c.4, lectio 1

It seems that the days enumerated are not enough.

(1) After all, the work of creating is no more distinct from the works of diversifying and ornamenting than these latter are from each other. But different days are devoted to diversifying and ornamenting. Therefore a different day should also have been assigned to creating.

(2) Besides, air and fire are nobler elements than earth and water. But one day is devoted to dividing the waters and another to diversifying the earth. Therefore, another day should have been counted for dividing fire and air.

(3) Moreover, birds and fish are not more different than are birds and land animals. And man differs from the other animals more than they do from each other. Yet one day is devoted to producing the fish of the sea, and another to producing land animals. Therefore another day should also have been devoted to producing the birds of heaven, and yet another day to the production of man.

ON THE OTHER HAND, it seems that some of the days are superfluous.

(4) After all, light and the luminaries are related as an accident is related to its subject. But a subject is produced at the same time as its distinctive accident. Therefore it should not have been the case that one day was devoted to the production of light, and another to that of the luminaries.

(5) Besides, these days are devoted to the initial set-up of the world. But nothing is initially set up on the seventh day. Therefore the seventh should not have been counted with the others.

ANSWER: the basis for distinguishing these days can be made evident from prior remarks. After all, the first

thing to do had to be diversifying the parts of the world; and then adorning each part through its being filled with its inhabitants. Hence, according to the saints other than Augustine, three parts are indicated in the corporeal creation: (1) the part meant by the word 'heaven'; (2) what is meant by the word 'water'; and (3) what is meant by the word 'earth'. Thus also the Pythagoreans said that completion comes in threes (a beginning, a middle, and an end), as reported in *De Caelo I*. Thus the first part is diversified on the first day and adorned on the fourth; the middle part is made diverse on the second day and adorned on the fifth; the last and lowest part is made diverse on the third day and adorned on the sixth.

Meanwhile, Augustine agrees with these saints on the last three days but differs from them on the first three. According to him, the spiritual creation was formed on the first day, and then bodily creation on the next two, such that the higher bodies were made on the second day, and the lower ones on the third. And thus the completion of God's works corresponds to the perfect character of the number six, which arises from its aliquot parts taken together (these parts being 1, 2, and 3). For one day is devoted to the formation of the spiritual creatures, two to the formation of bodily creatures, and three days to adornment.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): according to Augustine, the work of creating pertained to producing unformed matter and unformed spiritual nature. But these two are outside time, as he himself says in *Confessions XII*, and so the creation of those two is put "before any day." — But according to the other saints, one can say that the work of diversifying and adorning comes with a change of creatures measured by time. Hence the work of creation consists in God's action alone in the instant of producing the substance of

c. 1, 268a 13

cc 12, 13

things. And so a work of diversification and adornment is said to be done “on a day”; but creation is said to have been done “in the beginning,” which sounds like something indivisible.

ad (2): since fire and air are not distinguished by the masses, they are not explicitly named among the parts of the world by Moses; rather they are listed with the middle part (water), especially so for the lower part of the air; as for the upper part, it is listed with heaven, as Augustine says.

*Super Genesim ad
litteram II, c.3 et
alibi,*

ad (3): the production of animals is narrated according to the ornamenting of the world’s parts. And so the days for producing animals are either kept distinct or counted as one according as they agree or differ as to which part of the world they ornament.

ad (4): what was created on the first day was the nature of light in some subject. But the luminaries are said to have been made on the fourth day not because their substance was newly produced but because they were in some way “formed,” as they had not been previously, as I said above.

q-70, a.1 *ad* 2

ad (5): according to Augustine, the seventh day is devoted to something that came after all the things to which the six days were devoted, namely, that God rested from His works in Himself. And so there had to be a seventh day mentioned after the six. — According to the other saints, one may say that on the seventh day the world had a new status, namely, that nothing utterly new would be added to it. And so after six days, a seventh was listed devoted to cessation from working.

Cajetan’s Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article, he does three jobs: (1) he answers the question in general; (2) he answers it in detail according to the other saints; (3) he answers it according to Augustine.

The conclusion is affirmative: the six days enumerated are enough. This conclusion is supported on the ground that what had to be devoted to them was the work of diversifying and adorning the world’s parts.

According to the other saints, there are three corporeal parts of the world. Each has a day devoted to diversifying it and a day devoted to its ornamentation; hence, six days.

According to Augustine, spiritual creatures are included and finished on the first day; higher bodies on the second day; lower bodies, on the third day. In other matters the two sides agree.

Are all these days really just one day?

*In II Sem. d.12, aa 2, 3, De Veritate q.8, a.16;
De Potentia q.4, a.2, In Ep. ad Hebraeos c.4, lectio 1*

It seems that all these days are really just one.

(1) After all, Genesis 2:4, 5 says, "These are the generations of the heaven and the earth, when they were created, in the day whereon God made heaven and earth and all the grass of the field before it sprang up on the earth." Hence there is one day on which He made "heaven and earth and all the grass of the field." But He made heaven and earth on the first day, or rather before any day; but the grass of the field He made on the third day. Therefore the first and the third day are really one. And by similar argument, so are the others.

(2) Besides, Sirach 18:1 [1/g] says, "He that liveth for ever created all things at once."¹ But this would not be the case if the days of these works were multiple, because multiple days are not "at once." Hence there are not really many days, but only one.

(3) Moreover, on the seventh day God ceased from making new works. So if the seventh day is distinct from the others, it follows that He did not make that day. Which is awkward.

(4) Furthermore, He completed instantaneously the whole work ascribed to a day, since for each work the text says "He spake and it was so." Therefore, if He saved the next work for another day, it would follow that he ceased from working the rest of that day — which would be superfluous. Therefore the day of the next work is not another day from that of the preceding work.

ON THE OTHER HAND, there is what Genesis 1 says, "and there was evening and morning, a second day," and "a third day," and so on. Well 'second' and 'third' cannot be said where there is only one item. Therefore there was not just one day.

ANSWER: on this issue Augustine differs from the other saints. Augustine wants it to be the case that all of the so-called seven days are really one day, presented with sevenfold things. —The other exegeses think there were seven different days and not just one.

These two opinions differ greatly, if we are talking about the wording of Genesis. For according to Augustine, 'a day' means a cognition by the angelic mind; and thus a first day would be a cognition of the first divine work, a second day would be a cognition of a second work, and so on for the rest. And each work is said to have been done "on a day" because God produces nothing in the real without having impressed it on the angelic mind. And this mind can know many things at once, especially in the Word in Whom every angelic cognition is completed and ter-

minated. And thus one "day" differs from another by the natural order among the things known — not by successive cognitions or successive productions. Angelic cognition can literally and truly be called "a day," since the cause of "day," which is light, is found literally or distinctively in spiritual things, according to Augustine. — But according to the others, what is shown by those days is both a succession of temporal days and a succession of productions of things.

But if these two opinions are considered when we are talking about the "how" of God's production of things, one finds no great difference between them. This is the case because of two factors in which Augustine differs from the others in doing his exegesis, as is clear from things already said. The first factor is this: what Augustine understands by the "earth" and "water" created earlier is just their bodily matter entirely unformed; but by the formation of the firmament, and the gathering of the waters, and the appearance of dry land, he understands the impression of forms upon corporeal matter. The other saints, however, take the earth and water first created to be the elements of the world existing under their proper forms; and by the subsequent works, they understand a diversification of bodies already existing, as I said above. — The second factor is how they understood the production of plants and animals, which the others thought was a production *in act* in the work of the six days, but Augustine thought was a production in potency only.

So in positing the six days' works to have been done together, Augustine is following the mode of things' production. For according to both, in the first production of things, matter was under the substantial forms of the elements; and according to both, in the initial setup of things there were no animals and plants in act. — But they still differ in four points. According to the other saints, after the first production of creation, there was a time when light did not exist, and a time when the firmament was not formed, and a time in which the earth was not uncovered by water, and in which there were no heavenly luminaries (which amounts to four points). These things should not be maintained according to Augustine's interpretation.

So, lest either opinion be prejudged, one must answer the objections with the arguments provided by both sides.

TO MEET THE OBJECTIONS — *ad* (1): on the day in which God created heaven and earth, He also created all the grass of the field but *not in act*; rather "before it sprang up on the earth," *i.e.* potentially. Augustine ascribes this to the third day; but the others, to the initial set-up of things.

Super Genesim ad litteram IV, c.28; PL. 34, 315

q 69, a. 1

q.69, a.2, qq.71, 72

Super Gen. ad Lit. IV, c.26 [PL. 34, 314]; The City of God, XI, c.9; Ad Orosium q.26

Super Genesim ad litteram V, c.5; VIII, c.3

ad (2): God *created* all things at once as far as their substance is concerned, but without further formation. Then, as for the form-giving done by diversifying and ornamenting, He did not do it all at once. Hence it is significant that Genesis 2:4 uses the word 'created'.

ad (3): on the seventh day God ceased from establishing new works but not from propagating some things from others. The fact that some came to be after the first day pertains to this propagation.

ad (4): the fact that things were not all diversified and decorated at once is not due to a lack of power on God's part, as if He needed time to get things done; rather, it is due to a need for order in the set-up of things. Thus it had to be the case that different days be devoted to different states of the world. In each case a later work brings a new state of perfection to the world.

ad (5): according to Augustine, that order of days is to be explained by the natural order among the works attributed to those days.

Super Genesim ad litteram IV, cc 24, 25; I, c.5

Cajetan's Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article, he treats four topics. The first is the difference of opinion between Augustine and the other fathers, *i.e.*, that Augustine sees one day multiply presented, whilst they see many days.

Secondly, he treats their difference of opinion on the wording of Genesis. From Augustine, he cites five points. (1) A 'day' is a cognition in the angelic mind (because light is most properly in an angel). (2) The 'first day' is that cognition of the first work; the 'second day' is of the second work; the 'third day' of the third work, *etc.* (3) Things are made "on a day," because everything is made first in the angelic mind. (4) The days amount to "one day," because the angels know everything at once in the Word. (5) The distinction of days is not from successive cognitions or productions but comes from the order of nature among the things known and among the divine works. — From the other saints, however, Aquinas reports a succession of temporal days and productions of things.

Thirdly, he treats their difference of opinion on how things were produced. Here he says two things, *i.e.*, that there is a difference and that it is not a great

one. He says it is not great both from the work of diversifying/forming (because they agree in maintaining that the elements were first produced) and from the work of adorning (because they agree that animals and plants were first produced virtually and then actually.) — That some difference still remains is shown in four points: (1) after the first production there was a time without light; (2) without a formed firmament; (3) without an appearance of dry land; (4) without the formation of luminaries — to follow the order of the first four days.

Fourthly, he answers the question saying that neither theory is to be dismissed out of hand.

ii. Notice that St. Thomas puts the difference between Augustine and the others only in the first four days, and not in the fifth or sixth day. For as their agreement shows, both sides say that plants and animals were put into act over time after the initial setup; still, as regards the text of Genesis, the others speak of a third, a fifth, and sixth day; Augustine does not; rather, he says God that made these things at the beginning of time in virtual form and that afterwards they came to be in act.

Does the Bible's wording express the work of the six days suitably?

It seems that Scripture does not convey the works of the six days in suitable terms.

(1) After all, as light and heaven and other works were made though the Word of God [represented as words spoken by God], so also were heaven and earth: "For all things were made by Him," as it says in John 1:3. So allusion should have been made to the Word of God in the [account of] making heaven and earth, as in the [accounts of] other works.

(2) Besides, water was created by God, and yet the fact is not mentioned. Thus the creation of things is described insufficiently.

(3) Moreover, as it says in Genesis 1:30, "God saw all that He had made, and it was very good," so also for each work individually, the account should have said "God saw it that it was good." It was inappropriate, then, for this statement to be omitted in the work of creating and the work of the second day.

(4) Furthermore, the spirit of God is God. But it does not befit God to move* or have a place. Therefore it is not suitably said that "the spirit of God moved† upon the face of the waters."

(5) Also, no one makes what is already made. So after the text says "God said, Let there be a firmament, and it was so," it was inappropriate for the text to add, "and God made the firmament." Ditto for the other works.

(6) Also, evening and morning do not sufficiently divide a day, since there are many parts of a day. So it was not suitable to say, "The evening and the morning were the second day," or "the third day."

(7) For that matter, 'second' and 'third' do not correspond grammatically to 'one' but to 'first'. So the text should have said, "evening and morning were the first day," whereas in fact it says "one day."¹

ANSWER: *ad* (1): according to Augustine, the Person of the Son is mentioned both in the first creation of things and in their diversifying and ornamenting, but differently in each case.² Diversifying and adorning pertain to the shaping up of things, just as the shaping of artistic things comes *via* the art in the mind of the artist, which can be called his "intelligible word." Thus the shaping up of all creation is through the Word of God, and this is why allusion is made to the Word in the [accounts of] those works. — But in the account of creation, the Son is mentioned as the "beginning," where it says "in the beginning God crea-

ted." For by 'creation' Augustine understood the production of unformed matter.

But according to the others, who posit the elements to have been in their distinctive forms as they were first created, one has to speak otherwise. Thus St. Basil says that in the expression "God said" there is conveyed a divine command. But God first had to produce a creature that would obey, *i.e.* the creature mentioned in the command.

ad (2): according to Augustine, the word 'heaven' is used to mean unformed spiritual nature, and 'earth' to mean the unformed matter of all bodies, and thus no creature went unmentioned.

According to Basil, however, heaven and earth are mentioned as two extremes, so that things intermediate between them may be understood, especially since the movement of all the intermediate things is either towards heaven (as with light things) or towards earth (as with heavy things). — Still others say that Scripture customarily means only the four elements by the word 'earth'. This is why after Psalm 148 says "Praise the Lord from the earth," it adds "fire, hail, snow, vapor."

ad (3): in the work of creating there is included something corresponding to what is said in the works of diversifying and ornamenting: "God saw that this or that was good." To see this, one needs to recall that the Holy Spirit is love. "There are two purposes," says Augustine in *Super Genesim ad litteram I*, "for which God loves His creation: namely, that it be and that it endure." That something might be, it says that the Holy Spirit "moved over the face of the water" (inasmuch as 'water' means 'unformed matter'; for thus the love of the artist moves over his material that his work might be formed from it); "so that what He made might endure, it says 'God saw that it was good.'" For in this there is indicated a contentment of God the Maker with the thing made (not that He didn't know it in another way before He made it, or that it didn't please Him, beforehand).* — And thus in the two works of creating and shaping, the Trinity of Persons is suggested. In creation, the person of the Father is indicated by God creating; the person of the Son, by the beginning wherein He created; the Holy Spirit, as the one moving over the waters. In the work of shaping things up, however, the person of the Father is indicated by God speaking; the person of the Son by the word with which He speaks; the person of the Holy Spirit by the contentment with which God sees that what He had made was good.

In the work of the second day, "God saw that it was good" is not stated, because the work of diversifying the waters was just begun at that point, and it was finished on the third day; so what is mentioned in the account of the third day applies also to the second.— Alternatively, the diversifying posited on the second day was not be-

Homilies II and III on the *Hexameron*

Super Gen. ad Lit. I, cc. 1, 3, 4, 9

Homily I on the *Hexameron*

c. 8

* *non quod ullo modo cognosceret, aut placeret ei creatura iam facta, quam antequam faceret*

Super Gen. ad Lit. I, c. 4

¹ The KJV avoided the problem by saying, "the first day," as the English reader can see. But the Hebrew, the Greek, and the Vulgate all said "one day."

² This answer *ad* (1) serves as the *de facto* corpus.

between things that were apparent to the people, and so Scripture does not mention the approval of such things. — Alternatively again, because the cloudy air meant by “firmament” is not among the permanent parts in the universe, or among the world’s major parts. Rabbi Moses [Maimonides] is the source of these three explanations. But some writers assign a mystical reason on the basis of numbers; namely, that what is two recedes from oneness, and so the work of the second is not approved.

*Guide to the
Perplexed II, c 30*

cf. Jerome on the
Prophet Haggai 1:1

ad (4): Rabbi Moses understood ‘the Spirit of the Lord’ to mean the air or wind, as Plato had understood [in the *Timaeus*]. And he says that Scripture says ‘Spirit of the Lord’ because Scripture customarily attributes any gust of wind to God. — But according to the saints, ‘Spirit of the Lord’ means the Holy Spirit. It says He was “moving over the waters” (unformed matter, according to Augustine) “lest God should be thought to have loved His works out of a need; for love for the things one loves is subject to one’s needs. Yet, suitably, something inchoate is suggested before He is said to move over it — not that He is moving in place, but in His all-excellent power,” as Augustine says in I of *Super Genesim ad litteram*.

c. 7

According to St. Basil, however, “He was moving over the element which is water, *i.e.* He was warming and vivifying the nature of the waters, as a sitting hen puts vital strength into the things she is warming.” After all, water has an especially life-giving power, since many animals are generated in water, and the seeds of all the animals are moist. Spiritual life is also given through the water of Baptism, which is why it says in John 3:5: “except ye be born again of water and the Holy Spirit.”

*Super Gen. ad litt. II,
c. 8*

ad (5): according to Augustine, the three expressions indicate the threefold being of things: firstly, their being in the Word by the phrase “let there be”; secondly, their being in the mind of an angel, which is indicated by saying “it was made”; thirdly, the be-

ing of things in their own nature, which is indicated by saying “He made.” And since the formation of the angels is described on the first day, it was not necessary to add “He made” here. — According to others, however, one can say that the phrases “God said” and “it was done,” imply God’s command about being made. But when it says “it was done,” there is conveyed the finishing of a work. After all, it was necessary to say something about how it was done, especially for those who maintain that all visible things were made by angels. And so to remove this idea, it says “God made.” So in each of the works, after it says “and it was so,” some act of God is added — either “He made” or “He divided” or “He called” or the like.

ad (6): according to Augustine, “evening and morning” mean the evening and morning knowledge in angels, which was discussed above. — Or according to St. Basil, all of time is customarily called by its main part, *i.e.* a day, as Jacob said, “the days of my pilgrimage,” (Gen. 47: 9), making no mention of night. But evening and morning are put down as the bounds of a day: its morning is its beginning, and its evening is its end. — Or else because ‘evening’ means the beginning of night, and ‘morning’ means the beginning of the day. It was fitting that where the first diversifying of things is discussed, only the beginnings of times are indicated. Evening is omitted because, since the day begins from light, the end of the light (evening) occurs before the end of the darkness and of night (which is morning). — Alternatively, according to St. John Chrysostom, Scripture says ‘evening and morning’ to indicate that a natural day does not end at evening, but in the morning.

*Super Gen. ad
litt. IV, cc. 22 ff
q. 58, aa. 6, 7*

Homily V on
Genesis

ad (7): on the first day of creation, it says “one day” to indicate that a space of twenty-four hours pertains to one day. So saying “one” prefigures the measure of a natural day. — Or else the idiom indicates that a day is finished by the return of the sun to the same point. — Or else it is because after seven days have been completed, one goes back to a first day, which is one with the eighth day. These three reasons come from St. Basil.

Cajetan’s Commentary

The title question is clear. — In the body of the article, Aquinas answers it two ways. The first is according to Augustine. The person of the Son is mentioned in every work, but in different ways, *i.e.*, as the beginning and as the word spoken in creating and in the other two works, because creating pertains to informing, while the other two pertain to shaping up. — Then he answers according to the other saints: first, the world is created, and then a thing created

is given a commandment by the phrase “God said.”

Pay attention to the fact that the question here is about [the accounts of] all the works. Hence in the body of the article, which is also the answer *ad (1)*, St. Thomas answers the question [by defending] words used to pose an issue common to creating and to the other two works insofar as they all look to God. But in the answers to the arguments [(2) – (7)], he gets down into [defending the use of] other words.