descartes and the scotists



as a whole as the frame of reference for motion,59 whereas for Scotists
space was radically relative: there is no absolute frame of reference for
motion.60 Similarly, Thomists thought that without motion there would
be no time,61 whereas Scotists thought that time was independent of
motion.62
Thus we have some clearly defined positions by which we can judge
whether a school philosophy that does not openly declare itself as following any particular author might be considered leaning toward Thomism
or Scotism. Here is a small sample of some sharp dichotomies from
the theological-metaphysical-cosmological side of the curriculum (apart
from the constellation dealing with the formal distinction, objective
being, and objective concept that we have already mentioned).
Thomas

Scotus

. The proper object of the human
intellect is the quiddity of
material being (quidditas rei
materiali)63

*. The proper object of the human
intellect is being in general (ens
in quantum est)64

. Only analogical predication holds
between God and creatures65

*. The concept of being holds
univocally between God and
creatures66

. Man is a unity of single form (the
rational soul)67

*. Man is a composite of a plurality
of forms (rational, sensitive, and
vegetative souls)68

. Prime matter is pure potency69

*. Prime matter can subsist
independently of form by God's
omnipotence70

59

Aquinas , In octo libros De physico auditu sive physicorum Aristotelis commentaria, IV, lectio . See also Goudin , Physica I, thesis III, quaest IV, art. .
60 Scotus , Quaestiones Quodlibetales, quaest. XII.
61 Aquinas , In octo libros De physico auditu sive physicorum Aristotelis commentaria, IV, lectio -. See also Goudin , Physica I, thesis III, quaest III, art. .
62 Scotus, Quaestiones Quodlibetales, quaest. XI.
63 Aquinas - I, quaest. , art. .
64 Scotus , Opus Oxoniense I, dist. , quaest. .
65 Aquinas - I, quaest. , art. .
66 Scotus , Opus Oxoniense, II, dist. , quaest. .
67 Aquinas -, I, quaest. , art. .
68 Scotus , Opus Oxoniense, IV, dist. , quaest. .
69 Aquinas -, I, quaest. , art. .
70 Scotus , Opus Oxoniense, II, dist. , quaest. .



chapter two
Thomas

Scotus

. The principle of individuation is
signate matter (materia signata
quantitate)71

*. The principle of individuation is a
haecceity, or form72

. The immobility of the universe as
a whole is the frame of reference
for motion73

*. Space is radically relative: there is
no absolute frame of reference for
motion74

. Without motion there would be
no time75

*. Time is independent of motion76

If I may be permitted a certain level of generality, the first couple of
theses present Scotus' moderate Augustinianism, his commitment to
the doctrine that humans have knowledge of infinite being,77 leading
him even to accept the ontological argument in some fashion78 (as selfevident to us, and not as Thomas would have it,79 as merely self-evident
in itself). Most of the other theses demonstrate Scotus' attachment to the
doctrine of God's absolute omnipotence, causing him to reject or modify
many propositions he thinks infringe too much upon that omnipotence.
Seventeenth Century Scotism
It thus would seem useful to discuss the destiny of these propositions in
the first half of the seventeenth century, that is, to ask whether or not they
were generally supported by early modern scholastics.
On the key question of whether the proper object of the human
intellect, that which is studied by the science of metaphysics, is the
quiddity of material being (with the intellect proceeding up the hierarchy
of beings ultimately by analogy alone) or whether it is being in general,
Eustachius sides with Scotus (proposition *):
71

Aquinas , chap. .
Scotus , Opus Oxoniense, II, dist. , quaest. .
73 Aquinas , IV, lectio .
74 Duns Scotus , Quaestiones Quodlibetales, quaest. XII.
75 Aquinas , IV, lectio -.
76 Scotus , Quaestiones Quodlibetales, quaest. XI.
77 Though also attempting to avoid the extreme Augustinianism of Henry of Ghent.
See Gilson's discussion of this issue in Gilson , -.
78 Scotus , Opus Oxoniense, I, dist. , quaest.  and elsewhere.
79 Cf. Aquinas -, I, quaest. , art. .
72