

CAHILL  
COMMENTARY  
ON BEING AND ESSENCE

**Cajetan**  
**Commentary on Being and Essence**  
**(In De Ente et Essentia d. Thomas Aquinatis)**

MEDIAEVAL PHILOSOPHICAL TEXTS IN TRANSLATION  
No. 14

EDITORIAL BOARD

James H. Robb, L.S.M., Ph.D., Chairman  
The Rev. Gerard Smith, S.J., Ph.D.  
The Rev. Michael V. Murray, S.J., Ph.D.  
The Rev. Richard E. Arnold, S.J., Ph.D.  
David Host, A.M.  
Paul M. Byrne, L.S.M., Ph.D.

Marquette University Press  
1131 W. Wisconsin Avenue  
Milwaukee, Wisconsin

**Cajetan**  
**Commentary on Being and Essence**

**(In De Ente et Essentia d. Thomas Aquinatis)**

Translated from the Latin  
With an Introduction

By

Lottie H. Kendzierski, Ph.D.

Professor of Philosophy, Marquette University

and

Francis C. Wade, S.J., S.T.L.

Associate Professor of Philosophy, Marquette University

**MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY PRESS      MILWAUKEE, WIS.      1964**

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 64-7794

© Copyright, 1964, The Marquette University Press

Milwaukee, Wisconsin

Manufactured in the United States of America

*TO FATHER GERARD SMITH, S.J.*

*So let your light shine before men, that  
they may see your good works, and glorify  
your Father who is in heaven.*

*(Matt. v. 16. From the Mass for a Doctor  
of the Church)*

## Contents

Translators' Introduction	1
Introduction	39
Question I: [Whether Being Is What the Human Intellect First Knows?]	40
Chapter I	63
Question II: [Whether Being and Essence Signify the Categories or Their Natures Immediately or Mediate?]	65
Chapter II	73
Question III: [Whether Being Is Predicated Primarily of Substance and Secondarily of Accident, or Is Predicated Univocally of Both?]	74
Question IV: [Whether Matter Is a Part of the Quiddity of a Natural Thing?]	90
Question V: [Whether Matter Is the Principle of Individuation?]	94
Chapter III	109
Chapter IV	131
Question VI: [Whether a Nature Taken Absolutely Has Unity or Plurality?]	143
Question VII: [Whether a Nature Taken Absolutely Is What Is Predicated of Individuals?]	155
Question VIII: [Whether Universals in Act Exist Outside the Soul?]	164
Chapter V	181
Question IX: [Whether Matter Can Exist Without Form?]	185
Question X: [Whether Each Species of Separated Substances Has Only One Individual?]	196

Question XI: [Whether Intelligences Are Produced by God as Their Efficient Cause?]	210
Question XII: [Whether the Being (Esse) of Actual Existence and Essence Are Really Distinguished: Whether Intelligences Are Composed of Act and Potency?]	217
Chapter VI	239
Question XIII: [Whether the Perfections Existing in God Are in Some Way Distinct Independently of Every Act of the Intellect?]	245
Question XIV: [By What Is the Intellectual Soul Individuated]	263
Question XV: Whether Intelligences Are Quidditatively Knowable by Us?]	270
Chapter VII	295
Question XVI: [Whether Dependence on a Subject Is of the Essence of an Accident?]	299
Question XVII: [Whether Interminate Dimensions Precede Substantial Form in Matter?]	302
Question XVIII: [Whether Numerically the Same Accident Is in the Thing Generated and Corrupted?]	315
Index	345



## Translators' Introduction

I—

### The Life of Cajetan

Cajetan was a theologian, philosopher, master general of the Dominican order, and a counselor of Popes who lived during the Lutheran revolt. The writings of Cajetan are extensive, consisting of 157 works on theology, philosophy, and exegesis.<sup>1</sup>

Born Thomas de Vio at Gaeta (Cajeta), Italy, on February 20, 1468, Cajetan entered the Dominican order in 1484 and studied at Naples and Bologna. At the age of 23, he began teaching at Pavia. At the age of 25, he was a Bachelor at the University of Padua, where he had to interpret the *Books of Sentences*. At the age of 26, he received the Chair of Thomistic metaphysics at Padua, where he engaged in disputes against Anthony Trombeta, O.F.M., who held the Chair of Scotistic metaphysics, and with the Averroists, Pomponatius and Vernias. These disputes resulted in his commentary on the *De Ente et Essentia* of St. Thomas Aquinas, written at the early age of 27. Because of his brilliance and abilities, the Dominican master general Toriani took off his own Master's insignia and invested Cajetan as Master of Sacred Theology.

In 1497, Cajetan was called by the Duke of Milan to teach theology at the University of Pavia. After two years, he left the University and spent the latter part of 1499 and all of 1500 at the convent in Milan. He became the procurator general of the Dominican Order in 1500. At this time, he went to Rome and engaged in public discourses and sermons before Popes Alexander VI and Julius II. In 1509, he was appointed vicar general of the Dominican order, and in 1510, at the age of 42, he became master general of the order. Pope Julius II appointed him Cardinal in 1517 and Cajetan took part in many im-

---

<sup>1</sup> On the life and works of Cajetan, the following works may be consulted. E. A. Bushinski, C.S.Sp. and H. J. Koren, C.S.Sp., *The Analogy of Names and the Concept of Being* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1953), pp. 1–5; M. J. Congar, O.P., "Bio-bibliographie de Cajétan," in *Revue Thomiste*, XVII (1934–1935), 3–49; E. Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (New York: Random House, 1954), p. 800, n. 76; M. Gorce, "Cajétan précurseur de Catharin et de Bañes," in *Revue Thomiste*, XVII (1934–1935), 371–99; M. Grabmann, "Die Stellung des Kardinal Cajetan in der Geschichte des Thomismus," in *Angelicum*, II (1934), 547–60; J. F. Groner, O.P., *Kardinal Cajetan. Eine Gestalt aus der Reformationszeit* (Louvain: Éditions E. Nauwelaerts, 1951), pp. 9–56; M. H. Laurent, O.P., "Quelques documents de archives vaticanes (1517–1534)," in *Revue Thomiste*, XVII (1934–1935), 50–148; "Les premières biographies de Cajétan," in *Revue Thomiste*, XVII (1934–1935), 446–503; P. Mandonnet, O.P., "Cajétan," in *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, II (1923), coll. 1313–1329; F. Stegmüller \*, "Tolet et Cajétan," in *Revue Thomiste*, XVII (1934–1935), 358–70.

portant councils. In 1518, Leo X named him Legate to Germany in order to interest the Emperor and the Electors in a crusade against the Turks, as well as to receive submission from Luther. Cajetan failed in both attempts and is accused by some of having been imprudent and intolerant in his dealings with Luther. Cajetan returned from Germany in 1519 and was made Bishop of Gaeta. He was subsequently sent by Pope Adrian VI as Legate to Hungary, Bohemia, and Poland to unite these countries in a crusade against the Turks. In 1523, at the death of Adrian VI, Clement VII recalled Cajetan to Rome. Cajetan spent the rest of his life in study until his death on October 10, 1534.

## II— The Works of Cajetan

Cajetan's literary career has been divided into three periods: 1494–1499, when he wrote mostly on philosophy; 1499–1523, when he wrote mostly on theology; 1523–1534, when he wrote his commentaries on the Old and New Testament.<sup>2</sup> Among his philosophical works, mention may be made of the following: *In de Ente et Essentia D. Thomae Aquinatis Commentaria*,<sup>3</sup> 1495; *Commentaria in reliquum libri secundi peri Hermeneias*, 1496; *In Libros Posteriorum Analyticorum Aristotelicos Additamenta*, 1496; *Commentaria in Isagogen Porhphyrii*, 1497; *Commentaria in Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, 1498; *De Nominum Analogia*, 1498; *Commentaria in VIII libros Physicorum Aristotelis*, 1498; *Commentaria in IV libros de Coelo et Mundo Aristotelis*, 1498; *Commentaria super Metaphysicam Aristotelis*, 1498; *De Subjecto naturalis philosophiae*, 1499; *Commentaria in III libros Aristotelis de Anima*, 1509; *Utrum detur in naturalibus potentia neutra*, 1510. Cajetan's famous commentary on the *Summa Theologiae* of St. Thomas was written over a period of years, from 1507–1522.<sup>4</sup>

## III— Cajetan's Commentary *On Being and Essence*

The Laurent edition of Cajetan's commentary is based on a 1498 manuscript listed under Bibliotheca Vaticana, *Stamp. Barberini*, BBB II, 29.<sup>5</sup> The commentary, dedicated to Benedict of Tyre,<sup>6</sup> is thorough

---

<sup>2</sup> See M. J. Congar, O.P., *op. cit.*, pp. 36–49; E. A. Bushinski, C.S.Sp. and H. J. Koren, C.S.Sp., *op. cit.*, pp. 4–5.

<sup>3</sup> In addition to the Laurent and the Paris edition which we have used for the English translation, there is the following edition of this work: *Opusculum De Ente et Essentia Commentariis Caietani Illustratum*; ed. M. de Maria, S.J., (Romae: 1907).

<sup>4</sup> These works appear in *Opera Omnia* (Venetiis: 1588); *Opuscula* (Venetiis: 1612).

<sup>5</sup> For the editions of this text, see the introduction to the Laurent edition, p. xiii, n. 4.

<sup>6</sup> See the introduction to the Laurent edition, p. xii, n. 1. De hoc lege hujus commentarii dedicatorem epistolam "Ad clarissimum artium doctorem d. Benedictum Tyriacam Mantuanum Logicen Mathematicamque publice in Patavino studio profitentem, amicorum optimum.

Petitionibus, beneficiis amicitie et virtutibus tuis, clarissime artium doc-

(footnote continued on the next page)

and complete and has as its primary purpose to combat the errors of Scotus and his follower at the University of Padua, Anthony Trombeta. Cajetan's style is often intricate and complex, and the difficult metaphysical subject matter is treated in such a way that Cajetan, in opposing Scotus and the Scotist position, attempts to substantiate the position of St. Thomas and his own position by using the arguments of Aristotle and Averroes. The commentary is filled with detailed analyses of the Scotist position and arguments for this position, followed by Cajetan's answers to the arguments of his Scotist opponents and an explanation of St. Thomas' position as understood and interpreted by Cajetan.

The English translation, following the Laurent edition, has retained the marginal numbers as well as the italics. Where the text appears corrupt, corrections have been made and indicated in the footnotes. Texts used and cited by Cajetan are given in the Latin exactly as they appear in Cajetan's text, even though at times they are not grammatically correct when incorporated into English sentences. The authors have supplied their own translation of St. Thomas' treatise *On Being and Essence*, and indications have been made in the footnotes showing any deviation from the text of St. Thomas used by Cajetan with the Baur, Perrier, and Roland-Gosselin editions of this text.

For their valuable help and assistance in the preparation of this translation, the authors are grateful to Mr. John Tich, a former graduate assistant at Marquette University, and to Mr. Peter Maxwell and Mr. Thomas Anderson formerly of Marquette University.

#### IV— Cajetan and "Esse"

The most crucial problem of Cajetan in his commentary *On Being and Essence* deals with the meaning of *esse*. Because of the complexity in terminology and thought, a special section in the Introduction is devoted to this problem. Other significant problems and questions will be treated in the doctrinal summary which follows this section.

Had Cajetan chosen to use the same formulae as St. Thomas, there

*(footnote continued from the previous page)*

---

tor Benedicte Tyriaca, secundum vires satisfacere cupiens, commentationes quas te presente, anno elapso, in singulare opusculum De ente et essentia divi Thomae Aquinatis legendo edidi, iam mittere curavi, communicassem enim vero prius illas ni etas et religionis nostre mos animum pulsassent effecissentque ut examini traderentur debito. Unde quam primum opus censore reverendo patre fratre Vincentio de Castro Novo, sacre theologie professore, celeberrime approbatum est, in lucem prodere non dissimulavi . . .

Perlege ergo divinum de Ente et Essentia opus metaphysicae ianuam et exisse me mireris, meminisse enim oportet quod et publica lectionis concurrentia et Patavini studii mos ad id me traxere. Vale."

would have been difficulties enough, owing both to the complicated involvement of being in the data and to the difficulty of expressing this involvement by *esse*. Since both *ens* and *essentia* derive from *esse*, there is always the possibility of substituting, and thus confounding, one for the other. In spite of this ground for confusion, St. Thomas seems to have preferred to use *esse* for the "act of existing"; and when he wished to emphasize the existential aspect of the data he generally resorts to *ipsum esse*.<sup>7</sup> Cajetan employs the same terms, but he also introduces *esse actualis existentiae* or *esse existentiae*, and is likely to oppose these to *esse quidditativum* or *esse essentiae*.<sup>8</sup> Thus Cajetan has at his disposal the following: *esse*, *ipsum esse*, *existentia*, *esse existentiae*, *esse actualis existentiae*, *esse quidditativum*, *esse essentiae*.

The first time Cajetan treats being,<sup>9</sup> he follows the wording of St. Thomas quite closely. The point being explained is that in acquiring knowledge we should go from the easy to the more difficult, that is, from the composite and what is later to the simple and what is prior. *Ens* is composite and later; *essentia* is simple and prior. "Ens significat id quod habet esse . . . essentia vero significat id quod importat diffinitio, ut dicetur, quae non dicit esse vel non esse."<sup>10</sup> Thus being means both essence and existence, while essence does not say either existence or non-existence. Compared with essence, which is simple and prior, being is composite and later. Accordingly, knowledge of essence should be acquired from the knowledge of being.

---

<sup>7</sup> See E. Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*, tr. L. K. Shook, C.S.B., (New York: Random House, 1956), pp. 444–45, n. 2. See also J. Owens, C.Ss.R., "The Accidental and Essential Character of Being in the Doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas," *Mediaeval Studies*, XX (1958), 23–25.

<sup>8</sup> Cajetan uses the expressions *esse actualis existentiae* and *esse quidditativum* in the following passages: Chapter I, n. 14 (Laurent edition p. 28, English translation p. 71); Ch. V, nn. 97 and 99 (Laurent ed. p. 153, English tr. p. 217); Ch. V, n. 101 (Laurent ed. p. 158, English tr. p. 223); Cr. V, n. 104 (Laurent ed. p. 168, English tr. p. 236); Ch. VI, n. 105 (Laurent ed. p. 170, English tr. p. 239); Ch. VI, n. 106 (Laurent ed. p. 171, English tr. p. 240); Ch. VII, n. 135 (Laurent ed. p. 220, English tr. p. 298). Cajetan uses the expression *esse actualis existentiae* alone in the following passages: Chapter IV, n. 56 (Laurent edition p. 88, English translation p. 140); Ch. V, n. 83 (Laurent ed. p. 130, English tr. p. 190); Ch. V, n. 84 (Laurent ed. p. 134, English tr. p. 194); Ch. V, n. 90 (Laurent ed. pp. 141, 143, English tr. pp. 203, 204); Ch. V, n. 100 (Laurent ed. p. 156, English tr. p. 221); Ch. V, n. 104 (Laurent ed. pp. 166, 168, 169, English tr. pp. 232, 235, 236); Ch. VI, n. 105 (Laurent ed. p. 170, English tr. p. 239); Ch. VI, n. 106 (Laurent ed. p. 171, English tr. p. 240); Ch. VI, n. 131 (Laurent ed. pp. 212, 213, English tr. pp. 289, 290); Ch. VII, n. 140 (Laurent ed. p. 227, English tr. p. 307).

<sup>9</sup> In *Prooemium*, n. 8 (Laurent edition p. 20, English translation p. 62).

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*

Two pages later<sup>11</sup> the problem arises relative to *ens* and *essentia* whether they signify natures in the categories mediately or immediately. The point at stake, as Cajetan sees it, is whether being and essence add a grade of reality distinct from the grades in the categories. If *ens* adds a grade, then it will signify the nature mediately and being will be a univocal term. If *ens* does not add a grade of reality, it will signify the natures in the categories immediately and will be an analogous term. Cajetan answers that any grade—generic, specific, differential, individual—can be looked at in two ways. First, a grade of reality can be viewed as having *esse*, and then *ens* is said of the grade which thus belongs to the objective concept of being, for example, in "Man is a being." That is, every grade in the concrete includes *esse*. Secondly, a grade can be viewed absolutely as this distinctive grade and will have its own proper name and objective concept, for example, humanity. Now humanity as such is that to which *esse quidditativum et actualis existentiae* are due or fitting. For this reason the formal perfection in the abstract is represented by the formal concept of being as part of being's objective concept. And the same is true of animal and the other grades considered abstractly, because they have these two in them.<sup>12</sup>

Here is the first time in his commentary that Cajetan introduces *esse quidditativum*. Its role is not emphasized here, nor is it opposed, as it will be later, to *esse actualis existentiae*. Cajetan presents two factors in his solution: humanity as such and *esse*; but his *esse* is two-fold: *esse quidditativum* and *esse actualis existentiae*. He does not say that the fittingness for *esse quidditativum* is sufficient to constitute humanity as *ens*, nor does he deny it. Humanity as such, or animal as such, has a double fittingness for two *esse*'s; it is fit to be a quiddity and be existing actually. Such twofold fittingness insures for it the character of being and that it can be represented formally by the concept, being.

What is said of being holds similarly for essence. Essence, indeed, signifies something common to all genera and species. But this does not mean that essence signifies a nature common to all natures. It means, rather, that it signifies all natures having this in common that they are essences. "For all natures whatever on the score that they are have the character of essence by which they are things; just as all

---

<sup>11</sup> Chapter I, n. 11 (Laurent edition, p. 23, English translation, p. 65).

<sup>12</sup> Chapter I, n. 14 (Laurent edition p. 28, English translation p. 71): "Humanitas ut sic etiam habet quod sibi debeatur, seu conveniat esse quidditativum, et actualis existentiae: et sic representatur conceptu formali entis tanquam pars sui objectalis conceptus, et entis nomine significatur. Similiter animal haec duo in se habet, et sic de aliis."

things have the character of being on the score of having *esse*, or that they are."<sup>13</sup>

The second occasion presented Cajetan for discussing the meaning of *ens* arises in the problem, cognate to the one just discussed, of relating absolute natures to transcendental predicates.<sup>14</sup> An absolute nature has neither the *esse* proper to this or that instance of the nature, nor the *esse* proper to its existence in a mind knowing the nature. How then is such a nature related to transcendental predicates? Are being, one, true, good predicated of "homo secundum se sumptus"? If you say that human nature just in itself receives transcendental predicates, are you not saying that the transcendentals are essential predicates of man? No one says this. If you deny transcendental predicates of an absolute nature, then "homo secundum se sumptus non est aliquid, nec res, nec unum quid: quod omnino negatur." Cajetan could hardly be more emphatic in his denial. It cannot be said that man considered absolutely is not something, nor a thing, nor a one.<sup>15</sup>

First, Cajetan reminds the reader of what he has already shown, that *ens* does not add a grade to any of its subjects of predication. To say, then, man is a being, is one, is true, is a thing, does not add other grades of reality to that of man. All these mean humanity: humanity as having *esse*, as formally undivided, as perfective of the intellect, as having a fullness (*latitudinem*) not made up by the mind.

---

<sup>13</sup> Chapter I, n. 14 (Laurent edition p. 29, English translation p. 72): "... quaelibet enim naturae ut sunt, quibus res sunt, essentiae rationem habent, sicut quaelibet res habent rationem entis, ut sunt habentes esse seu quae sunt."

<sup>14</sup> Chapter IV, n. 56 (Laurent edition pp. 85–88, English translation pp. 136–41).

<sup>15</sup> Chapter IV, n. 56 (Laurent edition p. 85, English translation p. 137). This forthright denial is surprising in one commenting on this section of St. Thomas' *De Ente et Essentia* (Chapter IV, n. 54, Laurent edition p. 82, English translation pp. 133–34). Here St. Thomas allows for two *esse*'s, neither of which an absolute nature has. St. Thomas explicitly says: "Ideo si quaeratur utrum ista natura possit dici una vel plures neutrum concedendum est;" and he concludes: "patet ergo quod natura hominis absolute considerata abstrahit a quodibet esse, ita quod non fiat praecisio alicujus eorum . . ." With no *esse* and no unity, why is it so clear to Cajetan that an absolute nature is *aliquid, res, unum quid*? Cajetan does say (Chapter IV, n. 55, Laurent edition p. 84, English translation p. 135–36): "natura secundum se sumpta nullum esse sibi vendicat," but he also adds, "scilicet nec esse in singulari aut singularibus nec esse in intellectu . . ." Thus the *esse* an absolute nature has is not one of these two. But suppose one introduced an *esse essentiae*, would the absolute nature have this *esse*? Cajetan does not say, but at this point he need not say, since he takes St. Thomas' denial of unity to be a denial only of numerical unity, "natura absolute sumpta nec est una numero nec plures numero." The reasons for reading "a quolibet esse" as "from every *esse* whatever" are given by J. Owens, C.Ss.R., "Common Nature: a Point of Comparison Between Thomistic and Scotistic Metaphysics," *Mediaeval Studies*, XIX (1957), 1–14.

Since *ens*, which adds no grade of reality, is first among the transcendentals and the others are its predicates, no transcendental adds a grade to its subjects. Now Scotus said that it was an essential predicate of all grades of reality except the ultimate difference.<sup>16</sup> But the ultimate differences taken formally do not exclude from themselves the attributes of being. With Scotus' answer to the problem disposed of, Cajetan turns to other answers.

Avicenna, Alfarabi, Algazel, as St. Albert the Great says, solve the problem in the opposite way: being is not a predicate of absolute nature. Thus man is a substance. But you cannot say: "therefore man is being." The reason is that *ens* means something added to a nature, not something that is proper to it. Now St. Thomas expressly rejects the position of Avicenna, yet his own is not easy to distinguish from what he rejects. St. Thomas himself holds that all except God are beings by something added to their essence; he expressly says that *ens* is not an essential predicate;<sup>17</sup> that *ens* is not included in the concept of substance, which is the highest genus.<sup>18</sup>

Some propose to solve this problem by distinguishing two meanings of *ens*: one as a noun, one as a participle. They say that *ens* taken as a noun is an essential predicate of everything. Taken as a participle, i.e., one existing, *ens* is not an essential predicate of anything other than God. The *ens* as a noun is transcendental, is divided into the ten categories; *ens* as a participle is neither of these. Because Avicenna missed this ambiguity in *ens*, he is at fault.

Cajetan did not favor this way of solving the problem. He thought that *ens* taken as a participle, "cum idem sonat quod existens," is the transcendental and is divided into the categories. *Ens* taken as a noun is "esse actualis existentiae." His reason is that St. Thomas could not have meant that *ens* as a noun is transcendental. First, St. Thomas argues that since good and *ens* are convertible, as a thing is *ens* so it is good; but a thing is not *ens* in virtue of its essence; therefore it is not good in virtue of its essence.<sup>19</sup> This argument, Cajetan says, would be guilty of the fallacy of equivocation, unless *ens* is taken as

---

<sup>16</sup> Scotus, *Commentaria Oxoniensia ad IV Libros Magistri Sententiarum*, I, d. 3, q. 3, n. 6; in *Opera Omnia*, ed. Wadding, (Lyons: 1639), V, Part I, 441: "Quantum ad primum dico, quod ens non est univocum dictum in quid de omnibus per se intelligibilibus: quia non de differentiis ultimis, nec propriis passionibus entis."

<sup>17</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *Quodlibetales*, II, q. 2, a. 1.

<sup>18</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *Contra Gentiles*, I, 25.

<sup>19</sup> Cajetan seems to have in mind *De Veritate*, XXI, 5, ad 6: ". . . quod hoc modo essentia denominatur bona sicut et ens; unde, sicut habet esse per participationem, ita et bona est per participationem." This argument requires that *ens* be taken in the concrete, i.e., as a participle in Latin.

participle. Secondly, when relating good and being, St. Thomas says that by which a thing is formally good is not *ens*.<sup>20</sup> But this would be false if *ens* is taken as a noun, "quia esse actualis existentiae, quo res est ens et bona, est ens nominaliter."<sup>21</sup> Consequently, it is *ens* taken participially that is transcendental and is divided into the categories.

Cajetan's point here arises partly from the nature of the Latin language. The participle in Latin always includes the subject of the perfection. *Currens* means *one running* and *ens* (participle) means *one existing*. if you wish to express the action without its subject, you will use the Latin infinitive, *currere*. English proceeds differently. If you want to leave out the subject, you use the participle, for example, *running*; if you want to keep the subject present, you use the noun *runner*.<sup>22</sup> Cajetan's position is that the *ens* which is transcendental and is divided into the categories includes the subject and means "one existing." If the subject is left out, then *ens* means *esse actualis existentiae*. This latter is not transcendental nor divided in the categories.

Cajetan goes on to explain how and why St. Thomas and Avicenna differ on this point. They differ in the way they look at *ens*, which can be viewed in two ways. First, one can consider the reason why we call a thing *ens*. That is, we consider the "esse, quo res est." And this is what Avicenna had in mind when he said without qualification that *ens* is a predicate outside the essence of a thing. Secondly, one can consider that which is called *ens*, that is, "id quod est." And this is what St. Thomas looked at when he disagreed with Avicenna. Now if being is understood as "what is," it does not predicate something outside the essence of the thing. Nor can being be an accident, since even the reason why a thing is being, namely, the *quo res est*,<sup>23</sup> is not a nature foreign to that which is, the *quod est*. The *quo est* is not foreign to the *quod est* because it is constituted by the principles proper to the *quod est*. Such is true of nothing but existence. Everything else is constituted by its own principles. "Ipsium autem existere, non nisi per genus et differentiam et principia ipsius quod est, con-

---

<sup>20</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, 5, 1, Resp.: ". . . bonum dicit rationem appetibilis, quam non dicit ens."

<sup>21</sup> Chapter IV, n. 56 (Laurent edition p. 88, English translation p. 140).

<sup>22</sup> See J. Owens, C.Ss.R., *St. Thomas and the Future of Metaphysics* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1957), p. 76, n. 27. Father Owens argues from these grammatical facts of English that *esse* should be translated by the English *being* as a participle, since both express the act of existing without including the subject.

<sup>23</sup> See Chapter IV, n. 56 (Laurent edition p. 88, English translation p. 141). Cajetan uses *quo res est, scilicet actualis essentia*. He clearly means "actualis existentia." See page 141, note 23 of the English translation.



stituitur."<sup>24</sup> Since actual existence is constituted only by the proper principles of the essence, St. Thomas disagreed with Avicenna about the accidentality of *ipsum existere*. Thus *ens* is not an accidental predicate; it is substantial because it does not draw a nature beyond its proper genus and difference nor from the formal character (*ratio*) of the essence, though it is not substantial in exactly the same way essential predicates are.<sup>25</sup> Here Cajetan gives his answer to one of the central problems in the metaphysics of St. Thomas, that of the accidentality *and* essentiality of being.<sup>26</sup> His answer is that being, though not substantial exactly as are essential predicates, is nevertheless a substantial predicate. The reason is that the proper principles of the essence are constitutive of the existence of the thing. They "cause" the existence of the thing, as Cajetan explains later, by causing the proper receiver of existence. For example, the form of man informing his matter causes the whole composite and thus completes the proper

<sup>24</sup> Chapter IV, n. 56 (Laurent edition p. 89, English translation p. 141). Here Cajetan appeals to St. Thomas, *In Metaphysicorum*, IV, lect. 2; Cathala, n. 558. Avicenna is criticized for saying that *ens* signifies, not the substance of a thing, but something superadded. St. Thomas says: "Sed in primo quidem non videtur dixisse recte. Esse enim rei quamvis sit aliud ab eius essentia, non tamen est intelligendum quod sit aliquod superadditum ad modum accidentis, sed quasi constituitur per principia essentiae. Et ideo nomen Ens quod imponitur ab ipso esse, significat idem cum nomine quod imponitur ab ipsa essentia." The "quasi constituitur" of St. Thomas becomes "non nisi . . . constituitur" for Cajetan, "ce qui n'est plus la même chose." See E. Gilson, "Cajetan et l'existence," *Tijdschrift voor Philosophie*, XV (1953), p. 283, n. 6.

<sup>25</sup> Chapter IV, n. 56 (Laurent edition p. 89, English translation p. 141): "Et haec est ratio, qua S. Thomas arguit Avicennam, unde ens praedicatum de aliquo, puta homine, cum non trahat hominem extra proprium genus et propriam differentiam, nec ratione ipsius quod est, substantiale praedicatum esse relinquitur cum Aristotele et Commentatore, ubi supra, licet non sit omnino eodem modo substantiale, quo praedicata illa, quae in diffinitione cadunt."

<sup>26</sup> For the most comprehensive presentation of this problem, see J. Owens, C.Ss.R., "The Accidental and Essential Character of Being in the Doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas," *Mediaeval Studies*, XX, 1958, 1–40. See especially p. 21 where Father Owens, after a full analysis of the pertinent texts, gives this answer: "It (this new notion of being) is described as something that cannot be ranged under the Aristotelian classifications of matter, form, and accidents. In that sense being is not accidental to a thing's nature. Yet it is not the thing nor any of its essential parts. But it is as if it were constituted by those essential principles. Once those principles are there, it also is there, without having to wait any further addition. The only conceivable way in which this doctrine can make sense is to regard being as somehow prior to essence. If being were subsequent to the essence it would be a predicamental accident. If it were simultaneous, it would be the essence or part of the essence. It is none of these, yet it is other than the essence. It must therefore be prior to the essence."

receiver of existence. In this way the form causes that which is a further act, the ultimate actuality of man.<sup>27</sup> Existence, therefore, is not an accident. It requires a proper subject. That proper subject is constituted by the principles of essence. Consequently, existence is not something totally from the outside, because its proper subject, essence, is constitutive of it.

Cajetan returns to the question of *esse* when he considers the composition of material substances. Here we find "quatuor realiter distincta, scilicet materiam, formam, essentiam compositam ex iis, et existentiam."<sup>28</sup> The last factor, for example in man, is "esse actualis existentiae quo homo formaliter existit in rerum natura." The function of actual existence is that man exist among the things of nature. The first two factors, matter and form, constitute the essence. Thus the first composition is "ex materia et forma; secunda est ex essentia et existentia quae vocatur compositio ex esse et essentia."<sup>29</sup>

Cajetan compares the two compositions, giving two points in which they are similar and ten in which they are dissimilar. They are alike in that both are compositions of act and potency, and both are in the genus of substance. They differ by reason of their relation to substance, by reason of their potential factors, their actual factors, and the resulting compositions. Crucial to understanding *esse* in Cajetan is the role played by his third factor, essence.

Compared to matter, which is only a part of substance, essence "est substantia, essentia scilicet quae est in recta linea praedicamentali."<sup>30</sup> Also, matter is "ens pure potentiale," whereas essence "non est pura potentia, sed ens in aliqua specie quidditative completum, essentia scilicet."<sup>31</sup> Form when informing matter "causando totum compositum, complet proprium receptivum ipsius existentiae."<sup>32</sup> Thus essence is a third factor, the result of the composition of matter and form, and it is this *ens quidditative completum* which is the receiver of existence.<sup>33</sup> It can be called an *ens* because it is such quidditatively and is a substance in a category. Cajetan does not say here, but will say later, that this *ens* has an *esse quidditativum*.

---

<sup>27</sup> Chapter V, n. 90 (Laurent edition p. 142, English translation p. 204): ". . . forma enim hominis, quae ejus materiam informat, causando totum compositum, complet proprium receptivum ipsius existentiae, et sic eam causat quae est ulterior actus."

<sup>28</sup> Chapter V, n. 90 (Laurent edition p. 141, English translation p. 203).

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>30</sup> Chapter V, n. 90 (Laurent edition p. 142, English translation p. 203).

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>32</sup> Chapter V, n. 90 (Laurent edition p. 142, English translation p. 204).

<sup>33</sup> In the composition of a material being there are only three factors according to St. Thomas in his *Quaestio Disputata de Anima*, a. 6, Resp.: "In substantiis enim ex materia et forma compositis tria invenimus, scilicet materiam et formam et ipsum esse."

The resulting composition is different from that of matter and form, which results in a third *unum per se*. Essence cannot be a part of one thing, "nulla enim substantia completa facit unum per se cum quocumque alio."<sup>34</sup> Consequently, the composition of essence and existence is not *compositio ex his*, but *compositio cum his*.<sup>35</sup> Composition *ex* is properly true where a third results. If no third results, it is a composition *cum*. Properly speaking then, nothing is composed *ex* essence and existence. Essence, already a composite, joins with existence and existence with essence; and this union is achieved not in a third, but directly in virtue of the components themselves.

Cajetan does not introduce the distinction between composition *ex* and *cum* in order to indicate that the composition of essence and existence is a composition between principles of beings rather than between beings. On this score the union of matter and form would also be a composition *cum*, since matter and form are not beings but principles of material substance. He introduces the distinction because essence is already a complete quiddity as the condition of its being a receiver of actual existence. Such an essence cannot be a constitutive part of anything. Since it is already complete, "ens in aliqua specie quidditative completum." Strictly speaking, there is nothing which "constet ex essentia et existentia." If there were such, the essence would not be quidditatively complete but would need existence as a component to make it essentially complete, just as matter needs form to make up something complete essentially. Essence is completely made up independently of actual existence. Consequently, existence does not enter into the essence's make up, since it is fully made up by its own proper principles. Essence does join with existence and existence with essence, but they are not the constituents of a composite other than they, "non tamen componendo tertium."

When Cajetan comes to the problem of the real distinction between essence and existence, he follows his customary plan of giving the position of Scotus, then that of St. Thomas, and finally he responds to the Scotistic arguments. Cajetan states the question of the real distinction in this way: "an esse actualis existentiae et essentia distinguantur realiter."<sup>36</sup> He takes his wording of the question from

---

<sup>34</sup> Chapter V, n. 90 (Laurent edition p. 143, English translation p. 205).

<sup>35</sup> Chapter V, n. 90 (Laurent edition pp. 143–44, English translation p. 205): "*Octavo differunt quia prima compositio est compositio ex his et ideo fit ibi unum tertium. Secunda vero est compositio cum his. Nulla enim res datur quae constet ex essentia et existentia, proprie loquendo, sicut datur res constans ex materia et forma; sed essentia componit cum existentia et e converso, et ideo dictum est quod adunantur per se, non tamen componendo tertium.*"

<sup>36</sup> Chapter V, n. 97 (Laurent edition p. 153, English translation p. 217).

Scotus,<sup>37</sup> not from St. Thomas. The differences are significant. St. Thomas speaks of the composition (or distinction) of two factors, *esse* and *essence*. He has only one *esse*, not two. The "real" character of the distinction is not mentioned by St. Thomas in the passages directly concerned with the distinction of *esse* and *essence*, though it does appear when he is explaining other topics.<sup>38</sup> Scotus, of course, with two *esse*'s and his famous "distinctio ex natura rei" that left the factors really identified, needed a more precise statement on both counts, that of the *esse* in question and the kind of distinction. The *esse* is *esse actualis existentiae*, not the *esse essentiae*, and the distinction is one *ex natura rei*, that is, the essence of a thing and its actual existence are really the same. This is the position that Cajetan proposes to disprove.<sup>39</sup>

After taking the wording of the problem from Scotus, Cajetan decides to present the Scotistic position as given in the ten arguments of Trombeta, because these deal directly with matters of reason, and not, as Scotus' arguments, with matters of revelation. When he comes to the position of St. Thomas, he proposes to give three arguments from the *Contra Gentiles*, II, 52,<sup>40</sup> rather than confine his presentation to the argument given in the *De Ente et Essentia*.

The first argument is from the impossibility of anything being added to *esse irreceptum*. If *esse* is not received in a subject, there is no way of adding anything to it. Now if all created essences have

---

<sup>37</sup> Scotus, *In III Sent.*, d. 6, q. 1, n. 2; *ed. cit.*, Vol. VII, Part I, p. 172: "Sed de *esse* tali actualis existentiae, prout distinguitur ab *esse* essentiae, et *esse* subsistentiae, est dubitatio utrum sit aliquod *esse* tale in Christo, aliud ab *esse* increato." (Italics added.)

<sup>38</sup> See J. Owens, C.Ss.R., "The Accidental and Essential Character of Being in the Doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas," pp. 35–36, n. 46. Father Owens gives the following passages where the distinction is called real: *In Sententiarum*, I, d. 19, q. 2, a. 2; *De Verit.*, XXVII, 1, ad 8; *In de Hebdomadibus*, c. II. Father Owens adds: "It is a distinction that holds for international being (*esse anima*) just as well as for real being (*esse in re*), and so cannot be narrowed to the characterization of 'real distinction.'"

<sup>39</sup> See E. Gilson, "Cajétan et l'existence," p. 273. Professor Gilson considers this concession to Scotus of critical importance. La position scotiste du problème est parfaitement justifiée: elle résulte nécessairement du refus opposé par Dons Scot à la notion d'*actus essendi*, ou *esse*, conçue comme celle d'un acte distinct de celui de la forme. Pour que Cajétan ait accepté d'argumenter en termes d'être d'existence actuelle, et même soutenu que c'était là de quoi Thomas avait parlé dans *Contra Gentiles*, II, 52, il faut que lui aussi ait soit laissé échapper, soit éliminé la même notion d'*esse*. Telle est notre hypothèse."

<sup>40</sup> In *Contra Gentiles*, II, 52, St. Thomas gives seven arguments for the position that *esse* and *quod est* differ in intellectual substances. All the arguments lay down that God is *esse subsistens* and therefore no other being is its own *esse*. Of these seven arguments, Cajetan uses the first as his first, the third as his second, the fifth as his third, though modified somewhat, as we shall see.

something other than *esse*, e.g., quantity or thought (in an intellectual substance), this is because they have a subject which receives both *esse* and that other. Thus all created essences have a received *esse*, and their *esse* and essence are not the same. Here Cajetan sticks closely to the first argument of *Contra Gentiles*, II, 52. He does substitute *esse irreceptum* for *esse subsistens*; and where Cajetan talks of *essentia creata*, St. Thomas talks of *ipsam substantiam*. It is only in the confirmatory argument that Cajetan introduces the precise terms of the question.

The purpose of his confirming argument is to show that there is no way to add anything to an *esse substantiale* unless it be in a subject. Certainly, substantial being is not identically something other than itself; for example, being the substance Socrates is not being white. Nor can there be a potency-act relation here, because *esse actualis existentiae* cannot be the subject of another, since it is ultimate actuality. The only possibility left is that *esse substantiale* and the addition be received in a third.<sup>41</sup> This argument stands on the ultimateness of *esse*, a point that St. Thomas did not introduce into his argument. Moreover, the ultimateness in question is one in the line of completion. *Esse actualis existentiae* completes substance; therefore nothing more can be added.

Cajetan's second argument uses the same middle term as St. Thomas' third argument, i.e., the infinite without qualification. St. Thomas argued that there cannot be "duplex omnino infinitum"; and since *esse subsistens* is "omnino infinitum," nothing else is *esse subsistens*. Cajetan argues that *esse irreceptum* is infinite without qualification and no *esse creaturae* is such; therefore *esse creaturae* is distinguished from its essence.

Cajetan's third argument takes off from St. Thomas' fifth. St. Thomas argued that the substance of anything belongs to it *per se* and not *per aliud*; thus being actually luminous does not pertain to the substance of air because being luminous is in air by virtue of something other than air. Now every created thing has its *esse* in virtue of something else, otherwise it would not have been created. Therefore the *esse* of no created substance is its substance.<sup>42</sup>

---

<sup>41</sup> Chapter V, n. 100 (Laurent edition p. 156, English translation p. 221): "Confirmatur hoc: Quia esse substantiale Sortis, aut adunatur cum aliis praeter se identice, et hoc est manifeste falsum, esse enim substantiale Sortis non est esse album; aut sicut potentia et actus, ita quod esse substantiale sit potentia et accidentale actus eius, et hoc non, quia nullum esse actualis existentiae potest poni subjectum alterius, cum sit ultima actualitas. Remanet igitur quod ea ratione adunentur quia ambo recipiuntur in tertio: . . ."

<sup>42</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *Contra Gentiles*, II, 52: "Amplius. Substantia uniuscuiusque est ens per se et non per aliud: unde esse lucidum actu non est de substantia aeris, quia est

(footnote continued on the next page)

This argument of St. Thomas is based on the distinction between what is intrinsic and formal to a thing and what is not intrinsic but from another. Luminosity in air is not in air by virtue of its being air, but in virtue of an outsider. Thus there are two orders of causality in luminous air, the formal causality of the air and the efficient causality of the outsider. Whether air is itself air because it was caused to be or not caused to be does not come into the argument. That is, nothing is said about the origin of the formal causality of air or of created substance. The data include intrinsic formal causality together with efficient causality, but nothing is said about formal causality just by itself and independently of all efficient causality.<sup>43</sup>

Cajetan, however, makes his argument depend on a formal causality that is independent of any efficient causality. He argues that what belongs to "specificae naturae absque omni causa effectiva" is really distinguished from what belongs to it "non nisi per aliquam causam effectivam." But quidditative predicates belong to a thing independently of every efficient cause, whereas existence does not belong to the thing "nisi per aliquod efficiens." Therefore quidditative predicates and "existentia rei" are really distinguished. The only part of this argument that Cajetan considers in need of explanation is the first part of the minor premise, namely, that quidditative predicates belong to a thing independently of every efficient cause.<sup>44</sup> Suppose, he says, we leave aside the relation of a rose to every efficient cause, it is still true: "A rose is a corporeal substance." If one admits the truth of this proposition, then the minor stands. If one denies it, then he will have to hold that "rosa absolute sumpta" is not in a category;

(footnote continued from the previous page)

---

ei per aliud. Sod cuilibet rei creatae suum esse est ei per aliud: alias non esset causatum. Nullius igitur substantiae creatae suum esse est sua substantia."

<sup>43</sup> The mind of St. Thomas on this point seems clear. In *De Potentia Dei*, III, 5, *ad 2*, St. Thomas answers the objection that since the quiddity of a thing is other than its *esse*, then a thing's quiddity is not created by God. He answers: "Ad secundum dicendum, quod ex hoc ipso quod quidditati esse attribuitur, non solum esse, sed ipsa quidditas creari dicitur: quia antequam esse habeat, nihil est, nisi forte in intellectu creantis, ubi non est creatura, sed creatrix essentia." Before they are created, essences are nothing. God is, and He is creator, but they are nothing before *esse* is bestowed. Cajetan refers in another setting (see Chapter IV, number 59, Laurent p. 92, English p. 145) to this text from the *De Potentia*, but he finds in it only that *ens reale*, when opposed to a being not actually existing, strictly means one existing outside its causes, since as possible it is not existing outside its cause.

<sup>44</sup> Chapter V, n. 100 (Laurent edition p. 157, English translation p. 222): "Seclusa omni causalitate effectiva respectu rosae, quaero an sit vera, Rosa est substantia corporea; si sic, habeo intentum, si non, ergo rosa absolute sumpta non est in praedicamento, et praedicta primi modi possunt intelligi non ad esse rei, et diffinitio separatur a diffinito, quae omnia non sunt imaginabilia, etc."

that predicates of the first mode can be understood as not pertaining "ad esse rei"; that definition can be separated from the defined. Such admissions are unimaginable to Cajetan.

Notice that Cajetan is remaking a point he made before.<sup>45</sup> It was to be denied categorically that "homo secundum se sumptus non est aliquid, nec res, nec unum quid." His answer there was that humanity had a fittingness for *esse quidditativum et actualis existentiae*. Here it is unimaginable that "rosa absolute sumpta" is not in a category, or does not have essential predicates belonging to the "esse rei," or is not the defined of its own definition. And his answer here does not call for a fittingness for one or another *esse*, but an *esse rei* by which the rose-essence is in a category, receives essential predicates, and is the defined; and all of this independently of any efficient cause.

There seems to be no reason to consider this as Cajetan's own argument for the real distinction, as we did the confirmatory argument above. Cajetan said that he would give three arguments from *Contra Gentiles*, II, 52. And immediately following this third argument he berates<sup>46</sup> Anthony Trombeta for arguing against a passage in *In I Sententiarum*<sup>47</sup> instead of using *Contra Gentiles*, II, 52, where St. Thomas "ex intentione septem rationibus fundat suam opinionem." Yet Cajetan's argument cannot stand unless essences are independent of all efficient causality, a point that is certainly not essential to the fifth argument in the *Contra Gentiles*. But it should be pointed out that two generations before him another great commentator on St. Thomas, Capreolus, had so read *Contra Gentiles*, II, 52.<sup>48</sup>

After proving the real distinction, Cajetan turns to the arguments of Anthony Trombeta. The first was that mere indifference to *esse* and *non esse* is no ground for a real distinction, because on that score a created essence, since it is not from eternity, would also be indiffer-

---

<sup>45</sup> See p. 6, and n. 15.

<sup>46</sup> Chapter V, n. 101 (Laurent edition p. 157, English translation p. 222).

<sup>47</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *In I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 4, a. 2.

<sup>48</sup> See N. J. Wells, "Capreolus on Essence and Existence," *The Modern Schoolman*, XXXVIII (1960), 1–24. Wells analyzes the pertinent texts from Capreolus' *Defensiones Theologiae D. Thomae Aquinatis*, ed. Paban-Pégues, (17 vols.; Turin: Cattier, 1900). Capreolus posed the question: "Utrum creatura subsistens sit suum esse existentiae?" (*In I Sententiarum*, d. 8, q. 1, a. 1, Vol. I, p. 301b; Wells, p. 2, n. 11). The position he intends to defend is that "nulla creatura subsistens est suum esse quo actu existit in rerum natura" (Vol. I, p. 301; Wells, p. 4, n. 13). His defense of the position has these things in common with Cajetan's: (1) he cites the fifth argument of *Contra Gentiles*, II, 52; (2) *quidditas rosae* necessarily belongs to rose because it belongs to rose "in primo modo dicendi per se" and does not belong "ipsi rosae per aliquam causam agentem extrinsecam" (Vol. I, p. 303a; Wells, p. 12, n. 24); (3) he appeals to the doctrinal complex of St. Albert, Alfarabi, Avicenna, Algazel and Boethius.

ent to essence and not essence, that is, indifferent to itself, which is nonsense. Cajetan's answer is that Anthony Trombeta "non videtur intelligere vocem propriam."<sup>49</sup> Because a rose is not eternal, it is true that it is indifferent to *esse* and *non esse*, but it is not true that it is indifferent to rose and not rose, on the score of its being eternal. As Alfarabi, Avicenna, Algazel, and St. Albert say, whether a rose exists or not it is always a rose and always a corporeal substance, if terms implying measurement are permissible here. Its being eternal or not has nothing to do with its being a rose.<sup>50</sup>

To Anthony Trombeta's fourth argument Cajetan responds by distinguishing: "esse est duplex scilicet existentiae et essentiae."<sup>51</sup> Anthony Trombeta took existence to be the reality of an essence and argued that nothing is compounded with its own reality. Cajetan answers that there are two realities, just as there are two *esse*'s. Thus an essence is not compounded with the reality of essence (paralleling the *esse essentiae*) but is compounded with "realitate existentiae" (paralleling the *esse existentiae*). He concludes that the essence of man considered absolutely is in the real category of substance owing to the reality from the *esse essentiae*; the essence put among the things of nature becomes real with the reality of existence, from the *esse existentiae*. It is this second reality, not the first, that the essence is composed with and this reality of existence is not the first reality of essence, but the second reality, one from the efficient cause which puts the essence "in rerum natura."<sup>52</sup>

The final text where Cajetan introduces the two *esse*'s is in his discussion concerning the separated soul. Scotus had argued against St. Thomas' position that the soul joined to the body is in a better

---

<sup>49</sup> Chapter V, n. 101 (Laurent edition p. 158, English translation p. 222–23).

<sup>50</sup> Chapter V, n. 101 (Laurent edition p. 158, English translation pp. 262–223: ". . . ex negatione enim actus essendi ab aeterno bene sequitur quod rosa sit indifferens ad esse et non esse, sed non quod sit indifferens ad rosam et non rosam, ut enim dicunt Alfarabius, Avicenna, Algazel, et Albertus, sive rosa sit, sive non sit, semper est rosa, et semper est substantia corporea, etc., si aliquo termino mensurae in his uti licet." His last remark indicates a suspicion that could have been profitably investigated. Cajetan has good grounds for suspecting that a non-existing rose would hardly be measurable. But in the last analysis the same grounds hold for the non-existent rose being a rose. That is, if rose is a way of being that is not, is it a way of being at all?

<sup>51</sup> Chapter V, n. 101 (Laurent edition p. 158, English translation p. 223).

<sup>52</sup> Chapter V, n. 101 (Laurent edition p. 158, English translation p. 223): "*Ad quartum* dicitur quod sicut esse duplex scilicet existentiae et essentiae, ita duplex est realitas essentiae et existentiae, et licet nulla res componat cum sua realitate, tamen cum hoc stat, quod componat cum realitate existentiae; unde essentia hominis absolute in reali praedicamento, substantiae scilicet, reponitur: posita autem in rerum natura fit realis realitate existentiae."



state than when separated from the body.<sup>53</sup> Scotus argued that the soul has the same *esse* in and out of the body.<sup>54</sup> The only difference in the *esse* of the soul is that of communicating or not communicating its *esse* to the body.<sup>55</sup> Thus the body gains or loses, but not the soul. Cajetan answers that it is false that the separated soul loses nothing but communication of self to the body. It is true that the soul retains its "integrum esse existentiae," but it is not true that the separated soul retains "idem esse actualis existentiae et nihil nisi sui communicationem ex separatione perdidisse. Amisit enim esse quidditativi specifici integritatem quandoquidem in sua specie integra non manet."<sup>56</sup> The soul loses when separated, it loses its integral *esse quidditativum*. And when Scotus argues that whatever have the same *esse* are equally perfect in being, Cajetan answers with "esse sit duplex, quidditativum et actualis existentiae." The first *esse* remains only partially in the separated soul, whereas man has it integrally. As for the *esse existentiae*, it can be said that man has it more perfectly than the separated soul, because he has it as supposit, though the separated soul has it more perfectly, since this *esse* is properly the soul's, not man's.

From this brief review of Cajetan's teaching in the *Commentary On Being and Essence*, *esse actualis existentiae* has the following marks.<sup>57</sup> It is what is meant by *ens* taken as a noun, that is, taken abstractly so as not to include its subject. It is *quo res est*. It is ultimate

---

<sup>53</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.*, I, 89, 1, *Resp.*: "Sic ergo patet quod propter melius animae est ut corpori uniatur, et intelligat per conversionem ad phantasmata; . . ."

<sup>54</sup> Scotus, *Quodlibeto*, q. 9, n. 15; *ed. cit.*, XII, 232–33: "Dico ergo, quod *esse* animae manet idem, dum anima manet ens illo *esse*, et hoc sive sit conjuncta sive separata; at consimiliter videtur, quod *esse* totius non manet idem, nisi dum totum manet idem in illo *esse* . . ." (Italics added.)

<sup>55</sup> Scotus, *In IV Sent.*, d. 43, q. 1, n. 6; *ed. cit.*, X, 6: "Praeterea, iste in hoc contradicit sibi ipsi: quia alibi dicit quod status animae in corpore est perfectior, quam status eius extra corpus, quia est pars compositi, et omnis pars materialis est respectu totius. Et tunc arguitur sic, quod habet totaliter idem *esse* proprium, non est imperfectius ex hoc solo, quod non communicat alii illud *esse*; sed per te anima totaliter habet idem *esse* separata, quod coniuncta, imo *esse*, quod est totale *esse* hominis, quandoque communicatur corpori: ergo ista nullo est imperfectior, pro eo quod non communicat idem *esse* corpori. Maior apparet, quia perfectio naturaliter praesupponitur ei, quod est communicare perfectionem: ergo non est maior, vel minor per hoc, quod communicat, vel non communicat: et hoc maxime sequitur, si per talem communicationem nullum aliud *esse* est totius, quam istud idem." (Italics added.)

<sup>56</sup> Chapter V, n. 104 (Laurent edition p. 168, English translation p. 235).

<sup>57</sup> In his *Commentary on St. Thomas' Summa Theologiae*, Cajetan uses the complex term, *esse existentiae* or *esse actualis existentiae* very little. His general policy here is to refer the reader to his *Commentary on the De Ente et Essentia* for a complete treatment of the distinction between essence and existence. See, for example, Cajetan's commentary on *Sum. Theol.*, I, 3, 5, vi and I, 28, 2, iv; ed. Leonine, Vol. IV.

actuality, and is in the line of substance, not of accident. It is constituted by the proper principles of the essence, though it itself is from an efficient cause. It unites with the essence, but is not a component in the sense that it constitutes the essence. Its function in the union is not to make an essence, but to make an essence exist in nature. It supposes, therefore, a reality that is not ultimate and to this reality adds ultimate reality, that of existing in nature, though it can remain integrally itself while that other reality lacks integrity, as is seen in the separated soul of man.

Correlative to the *esse actualis existentiae* is essence. It is *quod res est*. Its proper principles constitute the *esse actualis existentiae* as a proper subject constitutes the actuality it receives. It unites with actual existence but not so as to constitute something other than itself. It is in a category owing to its own principles and independently of any efficient cause. It is eternally itself, and real of itself, and to that extent it has *esse*, but only *esse essentialis*. This *esse* accounts for its being itself, but not for its being in nature. It is, therefore, open to the further and ultimate reality of *esse actualis existentiae*, which comes to it from an efficient cause, making it exist actually in nature.

Cajetan's reading of the *esse* that is really distinct from essence as *esse actualis existentiae* was bound to emphasize the aspect of its ultimateness. Such emphasis was an open invitation to admit some reality that was not ultimate, though still reality and worthy of the name "*esse*." In turn, this admission determined the meaning of ultimateness to be only ultimateness in the line of completion and not in the sense of the ground of all that is. The ground of Cajetan's essence is not actual existence, even though it has a fittingness for such existence; essence is grounded in its own principles and in this sense is eternal. Thus the ultimateness of *esse actualis existentiae* is only in the line of completion of essence by actual existence so that it is now in nature. This leaves untouched the kind of reality essence has just in itself, so that it can be so completed. Essence must be accorded something that makes it real enough to be ready for ultimate actuality. Hence the *esse essentialis*. But this *esse* is not from the *esse actualis existentiae*; rather it is the condition requisite for the ultimate actuality.

The importance of the *esse essentialis* in Cajetan is not so much what it is as what it tells us about the *esse existentiae*. It is this later *esse* that Cajetan considers the pearl of great price. He had to show, in order to be faithful to St. Thomas, that it is both essential (that is, constituted in some sense by the principles of the essence) and accidental (that is, *esse* is other than essence). Cajetan defended both positions with vigor. Actual existence can be constituted only by the proper principles of essence. Thus there is no doubt of its essentiality.

At the same time actual existence comes from the efficient cause to an essence fully constituted as essence. Consequently there is no doubt of its being a factor other than essence. Both positions can be defended only if one conceives essence as in some way prior to actual existence. If actual existence is prior to essence, then the principles of essence are not any more constitutive of actual existence than actual existence is of the principles of essence. If essence and actual existence are simultaneous, it could not be added to essence but would always be present with essence as essence, leaving no recognizable ground for a real distinction. But if essence is essence prior to actual existence, then the essence can be what constitutes as subject the actual existence that comes to it from another. This solution leaves no doubt about the real distinction between essence and *esse actualis existentiae*; though it does leave doubts about the importance of an *esse* that is ultimate only in the way that is most proper to accidents.

Since Cajetan was quite willing to shift the question of the distinction between *esse* and *essentia* into a distinction between *existentia* and *essentia*, he was also willing to substitute *existentia* for *esse*, whenever the *esse* in question was ultimate actuality. Consequently, the translators have felt free to do the same. In some cases, *esse* has been translated by "existence" and sometimes by "being," depending on the context. But in every instance where *esse* is used for a factor other than essence, we have added *esse* in parenthesis. If there are exceptions, they are slips. This practical rule has not been followed in translating *ens* and *existentia*. Generally no parenthetical addition is placed after the word translating these two terms. Nor has this rule been followed in translating the passages from St. Thomas' *De Ente et Essentia* given in Cajetan's text. There is no indication that St. Thomas was willing to equate *esse* with *esse existentiae*. Consequently, we have not equated them. Instead we have translated *esse* by "being" or by "the act of existing," as Father Maurer does in his translation of the *De Ente et Essentia*.<sup>58</sup>

V—

### Doctrinal Summary

We now turn to a summary of other problems and difficulties. Cajetan's commentary begins with a lengthy exposition on the knowledge of being, and he attempts to explain the following: "being is that which is first known by the human intellect."<sup>59</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas did not go into this point at great length in his treatise,<sup>60</sup> therefore Cajetan,

---

<sup>58</sup> A. Maurer, C.S.B., *On Being and Essence* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949).

<sup>59</sup> See Question I of Cajetan's commentary.

<sup>60</sup> See St. Thomas Aquinas, *On Being and Essence*, Introduction. St. Thomas, following Avicenna, says that what the intellect first conceives is being and essence. See also *Sum*.

(footnote continued on the next page)

in order to defend the position of St. Thomas against the position of Scotus and his followers, introduces a distinction between two kinds of totalities directly known by the human intellect: a definable whole and a universal whole. The definable whole, based on the actuality of a thing, is ordered to a higher universal if there is one; the universal whole, based on a power or potency, is ordered to lower universals. Cajetan makes a further distinction by showing that the knowledge of a definable whole yields two kinds of knowledges: actual confused knowledge and actual distinct knowledge. The knowledge of a universal whole also yields two kinds of knowledges: virtual confused knowledge and virtual distinct knowledge. Being as the first intelligible will be known in one of these knowledges, and Cajetan proceeds to explain each of the four knowledges.

The actual confused knowledge of the universal views the object as a definable whole without being resolved into its definitive parts, and is defined thus: what is actually found in the object is known confusedly, that is, without penetrating the object. For example, substance is known in itself, without penetrating it.

The actual distinct knowledge of the universal penetrates the thing as a definable whole by resolving it into the singular parts of the definition. This knowledge is defined in the following way: knowledge which penetrates the thing according to what is actually found in the thing; which is, for example, a quidditative knowledge of substance.

The virtual confused knowledge of the universal views the object as a universal whole, without composing it with its subjective parts, and is defined thus: what is virtually included in the object is known confusedly. For example, the knowledge of substance, without composing it with its subjective parts.

The virtual distinct knowledge of the universal penetrates the thing as a universal whole by composing it with its subjective parts. This knowledge is defined in the following way: what is known is virtually included in the thing. For example, a perfect knowledge of

*(footnote continued from the previous page)*

---

*Theol.*, I, 5, 2, *Resp.*: ". . . the first thing conceived by the intellect is being, because everything is knowable only inasmuch as it is actually. Hence, being is the proper object of the intellect, and is thus the first intelligible . . ." *De Verit.*, I, 1, *Resp.*: "Now, as Avicenna says, that which the intellect first conceives as, in a way, the most evident, and to which it reduces all its concepts, is being. Consequently, all the other conceptions of the intellect are had by additions to being. But nothing can be added to being as though it were something not included in being—in a way that a difference is added to a genus or an accident to a subject—for every reality is essentially a being. The Philosopher has shown this by proving that being cannot be a genus. Yet, in this sense, some predicates may be said to add to being inasmuch as they express a mode of being not expressed by the term *being*."

substance with its inferiors, which produces a universal whole composed of subjective parts.

Having posited these four kinds of knowledges, Cajetan's conclusion is that the first thing known by the human intellect in actual confused knowledge is being embodied in an essence able to be sensed.<sup>61</sup> This conclusion is directed against the conclusion of Scotus which states that the first thing known by the human intellect in the order of actual confused knowledge is the ultimate in species.<sup>62</sup>

Cajetan elaborates on his conclusion that being embodied in an essence able to be sensed is the first thing known in actual confused knowledge, and continues to explain the knowledge of being by his famous analysis of total and formal abstraction.<sup>63</sup> Total abstraction is

---

<sup>61</sup> See E. Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949), p. 206: "Cajetan's justly famous formula *ens concretum quidditati sensibili* does not do full justice to the true nature of immediate realism, for it is sensible concreteness itself which is known as a being. See also Cajetan, *In Sum. Theol.*, I, 85, 3, ix: "Quia ergo res denominata universalior est naturaliter nobis notior, consequens est quod simpliciter primum notum nobis sit res denominata universalissima, puta ens."

<sup>62</sup> For Scotus' position, see *In I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 2, n. 22; *ed. cit.*, V, Part I, 409: "His praetellectis primo pono ordinem originis in cognitione eorum actuali, quae concipiuntur confuse, et quoad hoc dico, quod primum actualiter cognitum confuse est species specialissima, cuius singulare efficacius, et fortius primo movet sensum, sive sit audibile, sive visibile, sive tangibile, . . . et hoc supposito quod singulare non possit intelligi sub propria ratione, de quo alias. Loquor enim modo de illis, quae certum est posse intelligi secundum omnem opinionem". See also E. Gilson, *Jean Duns Scot. Introduction a ses positions fondamentales, Études de Philosophie Médiévale*, XLII, (Paris: Vrin, 1952), 73–75, 92, 120.

<sup>63</sup> See A. Maurer, C.S.B., *St. Thomas Aquinas: The Division and Methods of the Sciences* (Toronto: The Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1953), pp. xxiv–xxv, nn. 29, 30: "Cajetan's and St. Thomas' abstractions are not equivalent. Cajetan's *abstraction totalis* and *abstractio formalis* qualify the *act* of abstraction. St. Thomas' *abstractio totius* and *abstractio formae*—of a whole and of a form—qualify the *object* of abstraction." On the abstraction of the whole and of the form in St. Thomas, see *In Librum Boethii de Trinitate*, V, 3, *Resp.*; *Sum. Theol.*, I, 16, 2, *Resp.*; 40, 3, *Resp.*; 85, 1, *ad 1*; *In Metaphysicorum*, VI, lect. 4, n. 1236. On abstraction and separation in St. Thomas, see also M. D. Philippe, "Abstraction, addition, séparation dans la philosophie d'Aristote," *Revue Thomiste*, XLVIII (1948), 461–79; L. - B. Geiger, "Abstraction et séparation d'après s. Thomas," *Revue des sciences philosophique et théologique*, XXXI (1947), 3–40; *La participation dans la philosophie de s. Thomas d'Aquin, Bibliothèque Thomiste*, XXIII, (2nd ed.; Paris: Vrin, 1953), pp. 315–41; C. Fabro, *La nozione Metafisica di Partecipazione secundo S. Tomaso d'Aquino*, (Torino: Societa Editrice Internazionale, 1950), pp. 130–39; F. Blanche, O.P., "La théorie de l'abstraction chez s. Thomas d'Aquin," *Mélanges Thomistes*, (Paris: Vrin, 1934), pp. 237–51; G. Smith, S.J. and L. Kendzierski, *The Philosophy of Being. Metaphysics I*, (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1961), 218–51.

abstraction from species and genera, and takes place when a universal is abstracted from its subjective parts, e.g., animal is abstracted from ox or lion. In total abstraction, being is viewed as a universal whole. Formal abstraction is also abstraction from species and genera, and takes place when what is formal is abstracted from the material, e.g., quantity is abstracted from sensible matter. In formal abstraction, being is viewed as a metaphysical term.<sup>64</sup>

After defining total and formal abstraction, Cajetan shows four ways in which these differ.

- 1) In formal abstraction, each concept is complete and distinct from the other, namely, the formal from the material. In total abstraction, there is no complete distinction of one concept from the other; there is only one concept, namely, of that which is abstracted.
- 2) In formal abstraction, actuality, distinctness, and intelligibility are abstracted. In total abstraction, potentiality, confusion, and lesser intelligibility are abstracted.
- 3) Formal abstraction takes place by a separation from material potentialities. Total abstraction takes place by a separation from specific actualities.
- 4) The speculative sciences are distinguished according to the diverse modes of formal abstraction. Total abstraction is common to all the sciences but properly defines none of them.

In addition to total and formal abstraction, Cajetan introduces a third abstraction, namely, extraction from singulars. Being embodied in an essence able to be sensed is abstracted from singulars and viewed without any separation. This is the being which is first known by the human intellect. Thus being can be known in actual confused knowledge: *actual* because the intellect is actually conceiving being; *confused* because the intellect does not distinguish being from substance and accident. Therefore, to say that *being is that which is first impressed upon the intellect* implies that being is the most imperfect concept owing to its essential priority in origin to all other concepts, and because of the intellect's indistinct knowledge of it.

After Cajetan has established the priority of being to any other concept in knowledge, he continues with an analysis of the meaning of being.<sup>65</sup> Being (*ens*) may be taken in a twofold way. In one way, being is predicated only of things existing in the ten genera, and this being is a composite of essence and existence (*esse*). Essence signifies something common to all the natures of things, and is *that by which* a thing is in a certain genus or species. In a second way, being is predicated of anything that can be the subject of an affirmative proposition.

---

<sup>64</sup> See Cajetan's commentary on *Sum. Theol.*, I, 40, 3 and I, 85, 1.

<sup>65</sup> See Chapter I.

Cajetan then asks whether being and essence signify the categories or their natures immediately or mediately.<sup>66</sup> To signify mediately is to signify by the mediation of some superior. For example, *animal* signifies its species mediately by the mediation of a sensible nature.<sup>67</sup> To signify immediately is to signify through itself. For example, *animal* signifies immediately a sensitive reality.

To further explain the signification of being, Cajetan establishes a division in concepts: formal and objective. St. Thomas' position,<sup>68</sup> as understood by Cajetan, is that being signifies one *formal* concept which represents what is common to substance and accident; God and creatures.<sup>69</sup> Being signifies as an *objective* concept something real found in all genera. A formal concept is a representation formed by the possible intellect, objectively representative of the thing; for example, the representation which the possible intellect forms of a leonine quiddity. An objective concept is represented by the formal concept and terminates the act of knowing; for example, leonine nature itself, represented and known.<sup>70</sup> The objective concept of being is that which is represented by its formal concept and is something real found in all things. The formal concept of being represents the basis of an analogical likeness of being between all real existing beings.

In his treatment of the analogy of being, Cajetan first asks whether being is predicated primarily of substance and secondarily of accident, or whether it is predicated univocally of both.<sup>71</sup> A distinction is made as to whether something is predicated according to the being (*esse*)

---

<sup>66</sup> See Question II.

<sup>67</sup> Cajetan cites this as Scotus' position. For Scotus' analysis of mediate signification, see *In I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 2, nn. 2, 5–15; *ed. cit.*, V. Part I, 387–88, 391–96.

<sup>68</sup> For St. Thomas' position on formal and objective concepts, see *De Pot. Dei*, VII, 9, *Resp.*; VIII, 1, *Resp.*; *Quodlibet.*, V, q. 5, a. 2, *ad 1*; *Sum. Theol.*, I, 34, 1, *ad 2*; *Contra Gentiles*, I, 53; IV, 11. See also John of St. Thomas, *Cursus Philosophicus, De Anima*, Pars IV, q. 11, a. 2; ed. Reiser, t. III, pp. 358b 37–359a 16; *Ars Logica*, Pars II, q. 2, a. 2; ed. Reiser, t. I, p. 291a 5–25; J. Maritain, *An introduction to Logic* (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1937), pp. 17–19; *Réflexions sur l'intelligence et sur sa vie propre* (Paris: Nouvelle Librairie Nationale, 1926), pp. 9–77; J. Peghaire, C.S.Sp., *Intellectus et Ratio selon S. Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris: Vrin, 1936), pp. 14 ff.; B. Lonergan, S.J., "The Concept of Verbum in the Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas," *Theological Studies*, VII (1946), 349–92; VIII (1947), 35–79, 404–44; X (1949), 3–40, 359–93.

<sup>69</sup> See E. A. Bushinski, C.S.Sp. and H. J. Koren, C.S.Sp., *The Analogy of Names and the Concept of Being*, pp 32–33, 68–69, and especially pp. 80–81 where Cajetan says that there is one mental concept that represents being. The concept which is numerically one in the mind in the subjective order is one by analogy in the order of representation.

<sup>70</sup> See Cajetan's commentary on *Sum. Theol.*, I, 34, 1.

<sup>71</sup> See Question III. For a complete treatment of Cajetan on analogy, see E. A. Bushinski, C.S.Sp. and H. J. Koren, C.S.Sp., *The Analogy of Names and the Concept of Being*.

of the predicate, or according to the proper formality of the predicate. That which has being (*esse*) more perfectly in one than in another is said to be predicated analogically according to being (*esse*). Being is in substance in a more perfect way than in accident; and it is predicated primarily and secondarily according to its proper formality when it is predicated of one thing without respect to another, but when predicated of some things is not predicated with respect to something else. For example, health is predicated of animal without respect to diet, medicine and urine, but is not predicated of the latter without respect to an animal.<sup>72</sup> Scotus, on the other hand, holds that being is univocal to substance and accident, and God and creatures, because the concept of being is other than these and is included in these.<sup>73</sup>

<sup>72</sup> See Cajetan, *The Analogy of Names and the Concept of Being*, ch. I, n. 7; *ed. cit.*, p. 13.

<sup>73</sup> Scotus, *In I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 2, nn. 5–15; *ed. cit.*, V, Part I, 387–88, 391–96. See especially n. 6: "Et univocationem sic intellectam probo tripliciter. Primo sic; omnis intellectus certus de uno conceptu, et dubius de diversis, habet conceptum de quo est certus, alium a conceptibus, de quibus est dubius: sed subiectum includit praedicatum, et intellectus viatoris potest esse certus de aliquo, quod sit ens, dubitando de ente finito, vel infinito, creato, vel increato: ergo conceptus entis de aliquo est alius a conceptu isto, vel illo, et ita neuter ax se; sed in utroque illorum includitur: ergo univocus. Probatio maioris, quia nullus idem conceptus est certus, et dubius: igitur vel alius, quod est propositum, vel nullus: et tunc non erit certitudo de aliquo conceptu. Probo minorem. Quilibet Philosophus fuit certus illud, quod posuit esse primum principium, esse ens, puta unus de igne, alius de aqua, certus erat, quod erat ens: non autem fuit certus, quod esset ens creatum, vel increatum: primum, vel non primum. Non enim erat certus, quod erat ens primum; quia tunc fuisset certus de falso, et falsum non est scibile, nec quod erat ens non primum, quia tunc non posuisset oppositum." See also Scotus, *In I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 3, nn. 6–12; *ed. cit.*, V, Part I, 440–41, 444–46. See especially n. 6: "Ad quaestionem igitur, Respondeo, quod nullum potest poni primum obiectum intellectus nostri naturale, propter adaequationem tale, virtualem, propter rationem tactum contra primitatem obiecti virtualis in Deo, vel in substantia. Vel igitur nullum ponetur primum obiectum, vel oportet ponere primum adaequatum propter communitatem in ipso. Quod si ens ponatur aequivocum creato, at increato, substantiae, et accidenti, cum omnia ista sint per se intelligibilia a nobis, nullum videtur posse poni primum obiectum intellectus nostri, nec propter virtualitatem, nec propter communitatem: sed ponendo illam positionem, quam posui in prima quaestione huius distinctionis, de univocatione entis, potest aliquo modo salvari aliquod esse primum obiectum intellectus nostri. Ad quod intelligendum primo declaro, qualis sit univocatio entis, et ad quae est, et secundo ex hoc ad propositum . . ." N. 12: "Unde breviter, ens est univocum omnibus, sed conceptibus non simpliciter simplicibus est univocum *in quid* dictum de eis: sed simpliciter simplicibus est univocus, ut determinabilis, vel ut denominabilis: non autem ut dictum est de eis *in quid* quia hoc includit contradictionem." For an analysis of Scotus on the univocity of being, see E. Gilson, *Jean Duns Scot*, pp. 88–89, 101–103, 114–16, 629.



Cajetan distinguishes between univocal, equivocal, and analogous concepts.<sup>74</sup> In a univocal concept, the name is common and the notion according to that name is simply the same. In a purely equivocal concept, the name is common and the definition corresponding to the name is simply different.<sup>75</sup> In an analogous concept, the name is common and the definition corresponding to the name is partly the same and partly different.<sup>76</sup> The analogous term is thus a medium between the purely equivocal and the univocal.<sup>77</sup>

Things are analogous in a twofold way. First, by reason of a determinate relation of one to the other. The common name and the definition corresponding to the name is partly the same and partly different, for example, health. Secondly, by reason of proportionality.<sup>78</sup> The common name and formality corresponding to the name is in one sense the same and in one sense different. Partly the same because of an identity of proportion found in them; partly different because of the diversity of the natures of the suppositis with such proportions; for example, substantial form is to substance as accidental form is to accident. Being is analogically predicated of substance and accident in both kinds of analogy. Being is predicated of God and creatures only in the second mode of analogy. For example, God is to His being (*esse*) as the creature is to its being (*esse*). Accordingly, the formal concept of being (*entis*) is one and represents the being (*esse*) of substance and accident, and God and creatures. The objective concept of being has no unity except that of a determinate proportion which arises from the identity of the terms or the unity of proportionality and the identity of proportions.

When Cajetan discusses the analogy of being in his treatise *The Analogy of Names*, there is more precision and detail than is found in his commentary *On Being and Essence*. Cajetan notes that according to St. Thomas there are three ways in which something may be said by analogy.<sup>79</sup> In one way, according to intention only and not

---

<sup>74</sup> See St. Thomas Aquinas, *Contra Gentiles*, I, 34; *De Pot. Dei*, VII, 7; *Sum. Theol.*, I, 13, 5, *Resp.*

<sup>75</sup> See St. Thomas Aquinas, *Contra Gentiles*, I, 29; *De Verit.*, II, 11, *Resp.*

<sup>76</sup> See St. Thomas Aquinas, *Contra Gentiles*, I, 33–34; *De Verit.*, II, 11, *Resp.*

<sup>77</sup> See Cajetan, *The Analogy of Names and the Concept of Being*, ch. IV, n. 37; *ed. cit.*, p. 34.

<sup>78</sup> See Cajetan, *The Analogy of Names and the Concept of Being*, ch. VII, n. 77; *ed. cit.*, p. 54. See also A. Marc, S.J., *L'idée de l'être chez saint Thomas et dans la scolastique postérieure* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1933); M. T.-L. Penido, "Cajétan et notre connaissance analogique de Dieu," *Revue Thomiste*, XVII (1934–1935), 149–92; S. Alvarez, "De diversitate et identitate analogica juxta Cajetanum," *La Ciencia Tomista*, XLIX (1934), 5–14.

<sup>79</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *In I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 5, a. 2, *ad 1*. For St. Thomas' position on the analogy of attribution and the analogy of proper proportionality, see *In I Sent.*, d. 22, q. 1,

(footnote continued on the next page)

according to being (*esse*).<sup>80</sup> This happens when one intention refers to several according to priority and posteriority, but has being (*esse*) in one only. For example, the intention *health* refers to animal, urine, and diet, in a different manner according to priority and posteriority, but not according to a diversity of being (*esse*), because health has being (*esse*) only in animals.

In a second way, according to being (*esse*) and not according to intention.<sup>81</sup> This happens when several are considered equal in the intention of something they have in common, but this common factor does not have being (*esse*) of the same kind (*rationalis*) in all. For example, all bodies are considered equally in the intention of *corporeity*. Hence the logician, who considers only intentions says that the name *body* is predicated univocally of all bodies. However, the being (*esse*) of this nature is not of the same notion in corruptible and incorruptible bodies. Hence for the metaphysician and the philosopher of nature, who consider things according to their being (*esse*), neither the name *body* nor any other name is predicated univocally of corruptible and incorruptible bodies.<sup>82</sup>

(footnote continued from the previous page)

---

a. 1; *De Principiis Naturae*, n. 6; ed. Perrier, pp. 7–8; *In Boet. de Trin.*, I, 2; *De Pot. Dei*, III, 4, ad 9; *De Verit.*, II, 1; II, 2; II, 11; XXIII, 7, ad 9; *Sum. Theol.*, I, 13, 5. See also M. T.-L. Penido, *Le rôle de l'analogie en théologie dogmatique* (Paris: Vrin, 1931), pp. 11–78, 85–87, 96, 134 ff.; G. B. Phelan, *St. Thomas and Analogy* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1941); E. L. Mascall, *Existence and Analogy* (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1949), ch. V; H. Lyttkens, *The Analogy Between God and the World* (Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksells, 1952), pp. 18–58, 164–75; J. F. Anderson, *The Bond of Being* (St. Louis, Herder: 1949), chs. I, VIII, XIII, XVII, XXII; J. Maritain, *Distinguer pour unir, ou les degrés du savoir* (Paris: Desclée (de Brouwer, 1932), pp. 821–26; E. Gilson, *Le Thomisme*, 5th ed., *Études de Philosophie Médiévale*, I, (Paris: Vrin, 1945), 150–60; *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*, tr. L. Shook, C.S.B., (New York: Random House, 1956), pp. 105, 360–61; R. Arnou, S.J., *Metaphysica Generalis* (Romae Typis Pontificiae Universitatis Gregorianae, 1941), pp. 95–109; L.-B. Geiger, *La participation dans la philosophie de s. Thomas d'Aquin*, pp. 77–84, 156–217, 238–58, 365–98; G. Smith, S.J. and L. Kendzierski, *The Philosophy of Being. Metaphysics I*, 180–217.

<sup>80</sup> Cajetan calls analogy *secundum intentionem tantum et non secundum esse* the analogy of attribution. See *The Analogy of Names and the Concept of Being*, ch. II, nn. 8–22; ed. cit., pp. 15–23.

<sup>81</sup> Cajetan calls analogy *secundum esse et non secundum intentionem* the analogy of inequality. See *The Analogy of Names and the Concept of Being*, ch. I, nn. 4–7; ed. cit., pp. 11–14.

<sup>82</sup> See Cajetan, *The Analogy of Names and the Concept of Being*, chs. I and III. See also H. Schwartz, "Analogy in St. Thomas and Cajetan," *The New Scholasticism*, XXVIII, n. 2 (April, 1954), 143; "Plato, Aristotle, St. Thomas and Univocity," *The New Scholasticism*, XXVII, n. 4 (Oct., 1953), 373–403; G. Smith, S.J. and L. Kendzierski, *The Philosophy of Being. Metaphysics I*, 216–17: "Cajetan seems to have missed the point here. The point St. Thomas is making is this: an intention which is *designedly made* univocal or equi-

(footnote continued on the next page)

In a third way, according to intention and according to being (*essey*).<sup>83</sup> This happens when a thing is considered neither equal in a common intention nor in being (*essey*). For example, being (*ens*) is predicated of substance and accident in this way. In such cases the common nature must have being (*essey*) in each of those things of which it is predicated, but this being (*essey*) differs by reason of a higher or lesser degree of perfection. Similarly, truth, goodness, and all like terms are predicated of God and creatures by analogy.

After Cajetan has set forth his position on the analogy of being, he returns to the notion of being and essence and shows that, according to the position of St. Thomas, matter is a part of the quiddity of a natural thing.<sup>84</sup> In his analysis of matter, Cajetan divides matter into two kinds: signate matter which is the principle of individuation, and non-signate matter which is a part of a specific essence.<sup>85</sup> Two factors, according to Cajetan, are involved in individuation: that by which a specific nature is first really distinguished from others of the same

(footnote continued from the previous page)

---

vocal is a true analogue. The example St. Thomas uses to illustrate this point is poor: 'body' is not designedly made univocal or analogal; 'body' is univocal because it is drawn from the knowledge of the potency of matter. But the knowledge of substance as that to which it is owed to exist (if it exists) is designedly made univocal and equivocal by the intellect in order that it may understand, when it does understand, that it is substances which exist, no matter what they may be. Hence, in saying that his analogues of inequality are not true analogues, Cajetan is right. In saying it is an abuse of words to call them analogues, he is right again. But if one says that it is an abuse of words to call the parified intention of substance (*id cui debetur esse*), which is drawn from the potency of intellect itself, an analogue, one is denying precisely what St. Thomas had asserted: "those predicates are analogal which are made one in intention but not in being." St. Thomas' example of such analogals ('body' said of celestial and terrestrial bodies) is indeed a poor one, but there are such analogals nonetheless: the analogals of substance (*cui debetur esse*), for example, of necessity, of cause, etc. As to St. Thomas' remark that 'all animals are equal but not equal animals' (*De Malo*, II, 9, ad 16: . . . omnia animalia sunt aequaliter animalia, non tamen sunt aequalia animalia, . . . ), it is a 'true and important' remark, but it is not to the point which Cajetan is trying to make. Cajetan, in making St. Thomas' parified intention, wrongly illustrated by St. Thomas' example of 'body,' an analogue of inequality, seems to have 'unwittingly made univocity analogical,' or if one prefers, he seems to have made the analogical univocal. In this view of all this, it seems best simply to drop the whole business about analogues of inequality from the metaphysics and the vocabulary of analogy."

<sup>83</sup> Cajetan calls analogy *secundum intentionem et secundum esse* the analogy of proportionality. See *The Analogy of Names and the Concept of Being*, ch. III, nn. 23–30; *ed. cit.*, pp. 24–29. For a criticism of Cajetan's notion of *essey*, see E. Gilson, "Cajetan et l'existence," pp. 267–87; H. Schwartz, "Analogy in St. Thomas and Cajetan," pp. 127–44; A. Maurer, C.S.B., "St. Thomas and the Analogy of Genus," *The New Scholasticism*, XXIX, n. 2 (April, 1955), 127–44.

<sup>84</sup> See Question IV.

<sup>85</sup> See Cajetan, *In Sum. Theol.*, I, 29, 1, ix.

species.<sup>86</sup> Cajetan's position is placed in opposition to Scotus. According to Scotus, the principle of individuation is neither matter, nor form, nor quantity, but an individual property, namely, thisness (*haecceitas*), because numerical unity first follows upon thisness.<sup>87</sup> The fundamental difference in individuals, therefore, is not their nature, nor a privation, nor an accident, but *thisness*.

As Cajetan interprets St. Thomas on this point, signate matter is the principle of individuation.<sup>88</sup> All Thomists agree that individuation involves two factors: matter and quantity. They disagree because some hold that the aggregate of matter and quantity is the intrinsic principle

---

<sup>86</sup> See Question V.

<sup>87</sup> Scotus, *In II Sent.*, d. 3, q. 6, nn. 9–14, 15; *ed. cit.*, VI, Part I, 406–409, 413. N. 15: "Et si quaeras quae est ista entitas individualis, a qua sumitur differentia individualis? Estne materia, vel forma, vel compositum? Respondeo, omnis entitas quiditativa, sive partialis, sive totalis alicuius generis, est de se indifferens, ut entitas quiditativa, ad hanc entitatem et illam; ita quod ut entitas quiditativa est naturaliter prior ista entitate, ut est haec: et ut prior est naturaliter, sicut non convenit sibi esse hanc, ita non repugnat sibi ex ratione sua suum oppositum: Et sicut composition non includit suam entitatem, qua est hoc in quantum natura, ita nec materia in quantum natura includit suam entitatem, qua est haec materia, nec forma in quantum natura includit suam; ergo ista entitas non est materia, vel forma, nec compositum, in quantum quodlibet istorum est natura, sed est *ultima realitas entis*, quod est materia, vel quod est forma, vel quod est compositum: ita quod quodlibet commune, et tamen determinabile, adhuc potest distingui, quantumcunque sit una res, in plures realitates formaliter distinctas, quarum haec formaliter non est illa: sed haec est formaliter entitas singularis: et illa est entitas naturae formaliter, nec possunt istae duae realitates esse res et res, sicut possunt esse realitas, unde accipitur, genus et realitas unde accipitur differentia, ex quibus realitas specifica accipitur; sed semper in eodem sive parte, sive toto, sunt realitates eiusdem rei formaliter distinctae." *Reportata Parisiensia*, II, d. 12, q. 5, nn. 8 and 13; *ed. cit.*, XI, Part I, 327, 329: "Sic haec unitas minor de se est haec numero, non essentialiter, sed tantum denominative; sed haecceitas est numero haec essentialiter. . . . Item, si non potest intelligi inclusum esse nisi hoc, igitur neque includens. Si enim non potest intelligi rationale sub opposito rationalis, igitur nec homo includens rationale; sed non potest intelligi haecceitas, ut universale; igitur nec natura speciei includens, cum ipsa haecceitas de se sit haec: igitur impossibile est intelligere naturam specificam ut universale."

<sup>88</sup> See J. Bobik, "The Materia Signata of Cajetan," *The New Scholasticism*, XXX, n. 2 (April, 1956), 127–53: "The *materia signata* of Cajetan is not that of St. Thomas. For St. Thomas, the *materia signata* of the *De Ente* is an existing matter under actual determined dimensions. For Cajetan, *materia signata* taken as *signata* is matter with the vitality to confer incommunicability to others as inferiors, and numerical distinction. In the commentary on the *De Ente et Essentia* of St. Thomas, *materia signata* as *signata*, is *materia capax hujus quantitatis ita quod non illius*. In the commentary on *Sum. Theol.*, I, 29, 1, viii and ix, *materia signata* becomes *materia ut radix quantitatis* or *materia prae habens quantitatem*." See also Umberto Degl'Innocenti, O.P., "Animadversiones in Caietani Doctrinam de Corporum Individuatione," *Divus Thomas*, Piacenza, LI (1948), pp. 3–18.

of individuation: matter is the reason for the incommunicability of indistinction of a thing from itself; quantity is the reason for its distinction from others—which aggregate is signate matter. Others say, and this with better judgment according to Cajetan, that the intrinsic principle of individuation, both as to the incommunicability of a thing and its distinction from others is signate matter, and not quantified matter, nor the aggregate of matter and quantity. Signate matter, therefore, is matter with a capacity for this quantity and not that quantity; it is an intrinsic part of Socrates, and would be included in his definition, if he were to be defined. Thus the proper matter of an individual, signate matter, and matter under determined dimensions, for Cajetan, mean the same thing. Signate matter signifies matter directly and indirectly the act to which it is related. It is, therefore, not an individual property or difference, but the essential principle of individual difference.<sup>89</sup>

With matter established as the principle of individuation, Cajetan then lists composite substances as three in number: generic, specific, and individual.<sup>90</sup> Further, the essence of a composite substance may be spoken of in a threefold way. First, absolutely and with no relation to first or second intentions. Secondly, as expressed by terms of first intention. Thirdly, as expressed by terms of second intention.<sup>91</sup>

The generic and specific essence differ when both are expressed by terms of first intention. The essence signified by a specific term includes a specific designation in *act*, which is a result of its constitutive difference; for example, man includes rational in act since it is included in his definition. The essence signified by a generic term implies this designation confusedly and in an undetermined way, for example, as animal includes rational. The thing signified by the generic term may be viewed as a part and as a whole. St. Thomas begins with *body* and moves on to animal. *Body* in the category of substance is a nature

---

<sup>89</sup> For St. Thomas' position on individuation, see *Contra Gentiles*, IV, 65; *De Verit.*, II, 6; X, 5; *In IV Metaph.*, lect. 8; *Sum. Theol.*, I, 29, 1; III, 77, 2; *De Principio Individuationis*, no. 1–7; ed. Perrier, pp. 573–77. See also M.-D. Roland-Gosselin, O.P., *Le "De Lute et Essentia" de S. Thomas d'Aquin*, *Bibliothèque Thomiste*, VIII, (Paris: Vrin, 1948), 133–34; A. Forest, *La structure métaphysique du concret selon saint Thomas de Aquin*, *Études de Philosophie Médiévale*, XIV, (Paris: Vrin, 1931), 249–55.

<sup>90</sup> See Chapter III.

<sup>91</sup> On first and second intentions, see St. Thomas Aquinas, *In Posteriorum Analyticorum*, I, lect. 20, n. 5; *De Pot. Dei*, VII, 6, *Resp.*; VII, 9, *Resp.*; *In IV Metaph.*, lect. 4, n. 574; *Sum. Theol.*, I, 28, 1, *Resp.* See also Cajetan, *In Sum. Theol.*, I, 28, 1; John of St. Thomas, *Cursus Philosophicus, Ars Logica*, Pars II, q. 1, a. 3; ed. Reiser, t. 1, pp. 259b–69a; Pars II, q. 2, a. 1, pp. 285b–90b; Pars II, q. 2, pp. 290b–93b.

from which three dimensions flow. *Body* in the category of quantity implies the three dimensions.<sup>92</sup>

After showing the number of composite substances, and how these may be spoken of in themselves or as expressed by terms of first and second intention, Cajetan proceeds to show how the essence of composite substances is related to logical intentions, namely, genus, species, and difference.<sup>93</sup> Cajetan views the essence of a composite substance in three ways. First, as signified after the manner of a part; secondly, as existing through itself, separated from individuals; thirdly, as signified after the manner of a whole. In the first way, essence is neither genus nor species nor a difference; in the second way, essence is neither species nor genus; in the third way, essence is a species, genus, or difference. Essence viewed in the third way (signified after the manner of a whole) may be taken in three ways: (1) in itself; (2) according to the being (*esse*) it has in individuals; (3) according to the being (*esse*) it has in the intellect.

1) Essence signified after the manner of a whole, according to itself, is nature considered according to those predicates which are proper to it from its definition. These predicates are essential predicates, neither one nor many in number. This nature appropriates no existence to itself, neither in individuals nor in the intellect. Nature taken absolutely, therefore, abstracts from all existence or non-existence without prescinding, that is, it neither includes nor excludes existence or non-existence.<sup>94</sup>

2) Nature signified after the manner of a whole, according to the being (*esse*) it has in individuals is nature considered according to those predicates which are proper to it because it has being (*esse*) in an individual or individuals. The predicates here are denominative predicates, which posit something real besides the nature.

3) Nature signified after the manner of a whole, according to the being (*esse*) it has in the intellect is nature considered according to those predicates which are proper to it because of its being (*esse*) in the intellect. The predicates here are denominative predicates, which posit nothing real beyond the nature itself; they posit a negative or relative denomination according to some relation of reason.

---

<sup>92</sup> On the predication of body, see St. Thomas Aquinas, *In 1 Sent.*, d. 19, q. 5, a. 2, *ad 1*.

<sup>93</sup> See Chapter IV.

<sup>94</sup> On absolute nature, see St. Thomas Aquinas, *De Pot Dei*, V, 9, *ad 16*; *Sum. Theol.*, 1, 44, 1, *ad 1*. See also J. Owens, C.Ss.R., "Thomistic Common Nature and Platonic Idea," *Mediaeval Studies*, XXI (1959), 211–23; "Common Nature: a Point of Comparison Between Thomistic and Scotistic Metaphysics," *Mediaeval Studies*, XIX (1957), 1–14; G. Smith, S.J. and L. Kendzierski, *The Philosophy of Being. Metaphysics I*, 258–61, 271–72.

Cajetan continues to show the relation between nature and the transcendentals.<sup>95</sup> Following St. Thomas, Cajetan argues that the transcendentals are not proper predicates of absolute nature, nor nature according to its being (*esse*) in individuals, nor according to its being (*esse*) in the intellect. Rather, the transcendentals are common predicates of a nature. In line with the thought of St. Thomas, Cajetan notes that the transcendentals have two factors: first, the relation is not placed in any definition; secondly, they are included in any concept.<sup>96</sup>

Returning to absolute nature, Cajetan asks whether a nature taken absolutely has unity or plurality.<sup>97</sup> Before attempting to answer this question, Cajetan explains the meaning of unity.<sup>98</sup> Unity corresponds to indivision and is of two kinds: numerical and formal. Both kinds of unity have being (*esse*) outside the mind and are really the same and distinct only according to reason. Unity is then related to absolute nature, in that absolute nature has formal unity which is the foundation of specific and generic unity. Finally, absolute nature involves two points: nature and solitude with its conditions; real nature, in turn, involves nature and the particular existence joined to it and its conditions.

After showing the relation of unity to absolute nature, Cajetan asks whether absolute nature is predicated of individuals.<sup>99</sup> In order to resolve the problem of the predication of absolute nature with respect to individuals, Cajetan first speaks of being (*esse*) in the intellect, after which he shows the relation of being (*esse*) in the intellect to being (*esse*) in individuals. Being (*esse*) in the intellect is either subjective or objective. Being (*esse*) in the intellect subjectively involves inher-

---

<sup>95</sup> See Cajetan's commentary on *Sum. Theol.*, I, 5, 1–3.

<sup>96</sup> On the transcendental relation in St. Thomas, see *Sum. Theol.*, I, 3, 1, *ad* 1; 3, 4, *ad* 1; 45, 3; *De Pot. Dei*, V, 1; VII, 2, *ad* 9. See also G. Smith, S.J. and L. Kendzierski, *The Philosophy of Being. Metaphysics* I, 276–328. On the meaning of the transcendentals, see St. Thomas, *Sum. Theol.*, I, 5, 1–3; 6, 3, *ad* 1; 11, 1, *Resp.*; 16, 3, *Resp.* and *ad* 1; 16, 4; 30, 3, *Resp.*; 54, 2, *Resp.*; 59, 2, *ad* 3; 1–II, 29, 5, *Resp.*; 94, 2, *Resp.*; 76, 3, *Resp.*; *In III Metaph.*, lect. 12, n. 501; *In IV Metaph.*, lect. 2, nn. 549–560; *De Pot. Dei*, III, 16, *ad* 3; IX, 7, *Resp.* and *ad* 6; *Quodlibet.*, VI, q. 2, a. 1, *Resp.*; X, q. 1, a. 1, *Resp.*; *Q.D. de Anima*, a. 1, *ad* 2; *In III Sent.*, d. 18, q. 1, a. 1, *ad* 3; *Contra Gentiles*, II, 40–41; *De Verit.*, I, 1, *Resp.* and *ad* 1 and 6; I, 4, *Resp.*; XXI, 1 and 6; *De Malo*, II, 5, *ad* 1 and 2. See also G. Smith, S.J. and L. Kendzierski, *The Philosophy of Being. Metaphysics* I, 329–66.

<sup>97</sup> See Question VI.

<sup>98</sup> See Cajetan's commentary on *Sum. Theol.*, I, 11, 1–4. For St. Thomas' position on unity, see *In III Metaph.*, lect. 12, n. 502; *In IV Metaph.*, lect. 2, n. 549; *De Pot. Dei*, III, 16, *ad* 3; IX, 7, *Resp.*; *Sum. Theol.*, I, 6, 3, *ad* 1; 11, 4; 30, 3, *Resp.*; 76, 3, *Resp.*; *Quodlibet.*, VI, q. 2, a. 1, *Resp.*; X, q. 1, a. 1, *Resp.*; *Q.D. de Anima*, a. 1, *ad* 2; *In III Sent.*, d. 18, q. 1, a. 1, *ad* 3; *Contra Gentiles*, II, 40; *De Verit.*, I, 1, *Resp.*

<sup>99</sup> See Question VII.

ence in the intellect as an accident inheres in a subject. Being (*esse*) in the intellect objectively implies terminating an act of the intellect.

A nature taken according to its objective being (*esse*) in the agent intellect is universal as predicative; a nature taken according to its subjective being (*esse*) in the possible intellect is universal as representative; a nature taken according to its objective being (*esse*) in the possible intellect is universal as predicative. The universal as predicative is a logical intention; the universal as representative is called universal from its own being (*esse*) which depends on the thing it represents.

A nature has being (*esse*) in the agent or possible intellect, both objectively and subjectively, abstracted from all individual conditions. It has a uniform meaning, objectively as predicative, subjectively as representative of all individuals in reality in so far as it is essentially a likeness of all of them objectively as existing; subjectively as representative, leading to the knowledge of all of them in so far as they are, for example, men.

Cajetan then asks whether universals objectively in act exist outside the mind,<sup>100</sup> and gives three meanings to the term *universal*: the universality which is a relation of reason; the thing denominated universal; the aptitude to be in many things, which is the result of the work of the intellect. For Scotus, the universal as an aptitude to be in many exists in reality prior to any operation of the intellect.<sup>101</sup> For Cajetan, the universal is in potency and is reduced to act by the agent intellect in the production of the intelligible species, and by the possible intellect in the formation of the concept. Cajetan further distinguishes between the universal in being (*essendo*) and the universal in representation. The universal in being is Plato's separated nature. The universal in representation has universality in relation to an object, as species represents the same object of all in that species; for example, the species of humanity represented in Socrates and Plato.

Before treating of the essence of simple substances, Cajetan asks whether it is possible for matter to exist without form.<sup>102</sup> For Scotus, matter can exist without form;<sup>103</sup> for St. Thomas, matter cannot exist

---

<sup>100</sup> See Question VIII.

<sup>101</sup> Scotus, *In VII Metaph.*, q. 16, nn. 132–136; *ed. cit.*, IV, 287–90. See E. Gilson, *Jean Duns Scot*, p. 451: "... common nature has real being, secundum illam entitamen (in rerum natura) habet verum esse extra animam reale."

<sup>102</sup> See Question IX.

<sup>103</sup> Scotus, *In II Sent.*, d. 12, q. 2, nn. 3–6 *ed. cit.*, V. Part II, (682–83 N. 3: "Respondeo ad quaestionem, tenendo ut in priori quaestione dictum est, rem materialem esse compositam ex duobus, quae sunt partes rei compositae, et quod semper aliquid generati praeexistit generato, sub forma corruptendi; Dico, quod non est contradictio materiam esse sine forma quacunque substantiali, et accidentaliter, quod probabo: Absolutum distinctum, et prius alio ab-

(footnote continued on the next page)



without form<sup>104</sup> In upholding the position of St. Thomas, Cajetan argues first that from the fact that matter exists, it follows that it is in act; and from the fact that matter exists without any form, it follows that it is not in act. Secondly, every individual determined to a genus existing in itself in nature, is in a particular species in itself or reductively; but matter alone, in itself or reductively, is not in a particular species. Therefore matter alone cannot be some individual in matter. Matter receives form from which the composite results; to the composite comes the being (*esse*) of actual existence by which primarily the composite, secondly form, and thirdly matter exist. Scotus, on the other hand, holds that existence is not really distinct from the thing whose existence it is.<sup>105</sup> Cajetan then distinguishes between nature and supposit. Nature is that which is signified by the definition; supposit is an individual having that quiddity. In material substances, the supposit includes a real intrinsic principle, viz., a principle of individuation; and a real extrinsic principle, viz., the being (*esse*) of actual existence. In separated substances, too, the supposit differs extrinsically from the nature, for there is added extrinsically the reality of existence. In God, however, supposit and nature differ only according to reason.

(footnote continued from the previous page)

---

solutu, potest esse sine contradictione, sine illo: materia est ens absolutum distinctum, et prius forma quacunque, substantiali scilicet et accidentali: igitur potest esse sine alio absoluto, sive sine forma substantiali, vel accidentali absoluta. Maior declaratur: nam id ponitur ibi 'absolutum,' ad excludendum correlativum, quia in his esset instantia, 'prius' ponitur ibi ad excludendum simultatem originis, quae includit etiam simultatem correlativorum. Minor etiam probata est supra 'in, quaest. praecedenti. Quod enim materia sit quid absolutum satis patet; quia facit compositionem realem, et absolutam, quod autem sit prior forma, saltem natura, et origine, patet, quia est receptivum formae, et fundamentum eius: sed receptivum, et fundamentum formae est prius forma."

<sup>104</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.*, I, 66, 1; *De Pot. Dei*, IV, 1; *Quodlibet.*, III, q. 1, a. 1. See Cajetan's commentary on *Sum. Theol.*, I, 66, 1.

<sup>105</sup> Scotus, *In II Sent.*, d. 3, q. 3, nn. 1–3; *ed. cit.*, VI, Part I, 379–80. n. 3: "Per hoc patet ad argumentum, pro opinione dico, quod actus distinguit eo modo, quo est actus: sed actus accidentaliter distinguit accidentaliter, sicut actus essentialiter distinguit essentialiter: ita dico, quod ultima distinctio in coordinatione praedicamentali est distinctio individualis: et illa est per ultimum actum per se pertinentem ad coordinationem praedicamentalem, sed ad hanc coordinationem praedicamentalem non per se pertinet existentia actualis: actualis autem existentia est ultimus actus; sed posterior tota coordinatione praedicamentali: et ideo concedo, quod existentia distinguit ultimate, sed distinctione, quae est extra totam per se coordinationem praedicamentalem, quae distinctio est aliquo modo accidentaliter, licet non sit vere accidentaliter, tamen sequitur totam distinctionem secundum *esse* quidditativum: eo ergo modo quo est actus, distinguit, et in quo est ultimus actus, ultimate distinguit."

In his treatment of the essence of separated substances, Cajetan asks whether each species of separated substances has only one individual.<sup>106</sup> Scotus holds that there are many intelligences of the same species.<sup>107</sup> St. Thomas, following Aristotle and Averroes, holds that each intelligence constitutes one species.<sup>108</sup> Cajetan argues that since separated substances are immaterial, they lack any principle of numerical distinction; because they lack accidental order, there are not many individuals of the same species.

The next question concerning separated substances is the manner of their production, namely, whether intelligences are produced by God as their efficient cause.<sup>109</sup> Cajetan notes that the difficulty here is not whether God created the intelligences, but whether this was the opinion of Aristotle and Averroes. Cajetan wants to show that all intelligences are produced by God as their efficient cause in the position of Aristotle and Averroes on the basis that a final cause must also be an efficient cause.<sup>110</sup>

After an analysis of the distinction between essence and existence,<sup>111</sup> Cajetan introduces the problem of the individuation of intellectual souls. For Scotus, the intellectual soul is individuated by its own proper thisness.<sup>112</sup> For Cajetan, the soul is individuated by a

---

<sup>106</sup> See Question X.

<sup>107</sup> Scotus, *In II Sent.*, d. 3, q. 7, nn. 3–5; *ed. cit.*, VI, Part I, 422–24. n. 3: "Tenenda est ergo conclusio simpliciter opposita, quod scilicet simpliciter possibile est plures Angelos esse in eadem specie, quod probatur: primo, quia omnis quiditas quantum est de se communicabilis est, etiam quiditas divina: qua nec ex perfectione repugnat sibi, ut patet de essentia divina: nec ex imperfectione repugnat, quia convenit generabilibus et corruptibilibus: nulla autem est communicabilis in identitate numerali, nisi sit infinita: ergo quaelibet alia est communicabilis: et hoc cum distinctione numerali, et ita propositum." n. 4: Item, animae intellectivae distinguuntur numero in eadem specie, et tamen sunt formae purae, licet perfectivae materiae: igitur non est impossibilitas a parte formarum, quod distinguantur numero in eadem specie, quicquid enim concluderet istam impossibilitatem ratione formae in Angelis, concluderet in animabus."

<sup>108</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *De Spiritualibus Creaturis*, a. 8; *Contra Gentiles*, II, 93; *Sum. Theol.*, I, 50, 4; *In II Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, a. 1; d. 32, q. 2, a. 3; *Q.D. de Anima*, a. 3.

<sup>109</sup> See Question XI.

<sup>110</sup> Aristotle and Averroes say that the cause of motion is also a final cause. See especially Averroes, *In XII Metaph.*, com. 36 and 44; *ed. cit.*, t. VIII, fol. 149v and 153v, fol. 154r.

<sup>111</sup> See Question XII and pp. 3–19 of the translators' introduction.

<sup>112</sup> Scotus, *In II Sent.*, d. 3, q. 7, n. 4; *ed. cit.*, VI, Part I, 424: "Quod si dicas, quod animae habent inclinationem ad diversa corpora: igitur per haec distinguuntur. Contra, inclinatio non est entitas absoluta, quia non potest aliquid inclinari ad se: ergo praesupponit aliquam entitatem absolutam, et distinctam; quia enim est haec anima, ideo habet talem inclinationem, et non e contra: ergo haec inclinatio non est ratio essendi hanc animam, sed praesupponit eam." See *In II Sent.*, d. 3, q. 6, nn. 9–14, 15; *ed. cit.*, VI, Part I, 406–409, 413.

substantial symmetry to this or that body.<sup>113</sup> Regarding the intellectual soul's knowledge of intelligences, Cajetan argues that according to St. Thomas the human soul joined to the body is unable to know immaterial substances quidditatively. The human soul separated from the body is also unable to have quidditative knowledge of separated substances.<sup>114</sup>

The final chapter in Cajetan's commentary is devoted to the being of accidents.<sup>115</sup> The first question<sup>116</sup> concerning accidents is whether dependence on a subject is of the essence of an accident, or whether aptitudinal inherence is of the essence of an accident. Scotus holds that it is impossible for inherence of any kind to be the essence of an accident,<sup>117</sup> because inherence is a relation, and no relation belongs to the formal concept of a thing. Cajetan shows that according to Thomists, aptitudinal inherence is of the essence of accidents, which inherence implies reference to another as to something receptive. Aptitudinal inherence is not in the genus of relation but is identified with every genus, and can signify an absolute being or a relative being. Therefore, just as *to be toward* constitutes a relation, *to be in* constitutes all accident.<sup>118</sup> Consequently, accident includes in its definition an essential dependence upon a subject.<sup>119</sup>

When Cajetan undertakes to show the order of accidents in relation to form, he asks whether indeterminate dimensions precede substantial form in matter.<sup>120</sup> For Averroes, indeterminate dimensions are received into prime matter which is pure potency,<sup>121</sup> so that some accidents do not have actual being as their subject. According to St. Thomas,<sup>122</sup> every accident follows upon actual being as its subject, and

<sup>113</sup> See Question XIV. See also St. Thomas Aquinas, *Contra Gentiles*, II, 56; *Q.D. de Anima*, a. 1; *In II Sent.*, d. 1, q. 2, a. 5; *De Malo*, V, 5.

<sup>114</sup> See Question XV. See also St. Thomas Aquinas, *Sum Theol.*, I, 88, 1; *Contra Gentiles*, III, 45; *In II Metaph.*, lect. 1, nn. 282–286. See Cajetan's commentary on *Sum. Theol.*, I, 88, 1.

<sup>115</sup> See Chapter VII.

<sup>116</sup> See Question XVI.

<sup>117</sup> Scotus, *In IV Sent.*, d. 12, q. 1, nn. 13–15; *ed. cit.*, Vol. VIII, p. 707; *Reportata Parisiensis*, IV, d. 12, q. 1, n. 4; *ed. cit.*, Vol. XI, Part II, p. 677: "Sicut enim unumquodque habet essentiam, ita et esse, quia omnis essentia est actus, sicut probatum est; sed accidens habet essentiam, et per se unam, et est alterius generis a subjecto suo, igitur habet esse distinctum aliud ab esse subjecti".

<sup>118</sup> On the *esse* of accidents, see St. Thomas, *Sum. Theol.*, I, 45, 4; III, 77, 1, *ad 2*; *In VII Metaph.*, lect. 1, n. 1256; *Quodlibet.*, IX, q. 2, a. 2.

<sup>119</sup> See St. Thomas Aquinas, *In IV Sent.*, d. 12, q. 1, a. 1, qu. 1, *ad 2*; *Quodlibet.*, IX, q. 3, a. 1, *ad 2*; *Sum. Theol.*, III, 77, 1, *ad 2*.

<sup>120</sup> See Question XVII.

<sup>121</sup> Averroes, *De Substantia Orbis*, I: *ed. cit.*, t. IX, fol. 3r–v.

<sup>122</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.*, I, 76, 6. For St. Thomas' earlier position on this point, where he follows Averroes, see *In III Sent.*, d. 2, q. 2, a. 3, *sol. 3, ad 1*.

so accidental form differs from substantial form which has being in pure potency as its subject. Thus, the first act is being (*esse*); then substantial form; then accidental form.

Cajetan distinguishes between accidents which follow principally upon form, and those which follow principally upon matter. For example, operations and operative potencies follow the form; whereas accidents which follow upon matter make matter subject to movement. For example, the act of cutting in a knife comes from the form, and the hardness of the knife comes from the matter; so too, in Socrates, sensing and understanding come from the form, and masculinity from the matter. Some accidents flow from a form dependent upon matter and communicate with matter as, for example, sensing and living. Others flow from a form independent of matter as, for example, understanding and willing.

Cajetan then asks whether the same number of accidents are in the generated and in the corrupted thing<sup>123</sup> and argues that accidents are not identical in number in the generated and in the corrupted thing. In resolving this point, Cajetan makes a second division of accidents. Some accidents are accidents of the individual which follow from matter; others are accidents of the genus or species which follow form. For example, masculine and feminine are individual accidents, whereas risibility is an accident of the species, because it follows upon intellectual apprehension and is necessarily present in all men. In a third division of accidents, Cajetan shows that some accidents are caused by essential principles of the subject according to perfect act which follow the actuality of the thing as, for example, heat into fire; others according to imperfect act or aptitude alone which follow the potentiality of the thing as, for example, fire which is moved upward is caused by its principle of inchoation, viz., lightness.<sup>124</sup>

In explaining the relation of accident to subject, Cajetan argues that according to St. Thomas,<sup>125</sup> a subject may be related to a proper accident in the following ways: as substrate to what it supports; as potency to act; as principle to the principled; as a proper subject supporting the potency and the principle together. To illustrate this point, Cajetan uses the example of heat and fire: the heat of the fire has no being unless it be supported in fire; it is an accidental form of fire; it arises from fire. Many accidents, which are not proper accidents, do not have a proper supporting subject, but are found in many things. Every accident has its proper subject with respect to its

---

<sup>123</sup> See Question XVIII.

<sup>124</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.*, I-II, 10, 1, *ad 2*.

<sup>125</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *De Virtutibus in Communi*, a. 3, *Resp.*

proper potency because every act is related to a proper potency. Some accidents do not have a proper subject as a proper principle. Some accidents do not flow from the subject as from an efficient cause. Some accidents do not, according to radical aptitude, have some proper subject serving as support of the potency and principle together.

Cajetan concludes his commentary by showing the relation of accidents to logical intentions, and the difference in accidents among themselves. Accidents in the concrete are signified with their subjects, for example white and black, whereas accidents in the abstract are signified without their subject, for example whiteness and blackness. Accidents differ among themselves according to their proper principles in the sense that the principles of the subject from which they are caused differ among themselves. Accident in the concrete is defined after the manner of composite things where genus is taken from matter and difference is taken from form. The subject which is related to the accident as matter takes the place of the genus, and the nature of accident which is related as form takes the place of the difference; for example, we say "snub is a curved nose." Accident in the abstract is defined in the following way: what the accident determines for itself as its genus is placed in the definition as genus, and that from which accident according to its specific nature takes its difference, viz., its proper subject, takes the place of the difference for example, we say "snubbiness is the curvature of the nose."

**Thomas de Vio, Cajetan**  
**Commentary on St. Thomas Aquinas'**  
***On Being and Essence***

**Introduction<sup>1</sup>**

Because a small mistake in the beginning is a great one in the end, according to the Philosopher in *primo Coeli et Mundi*,<sup>2</sup> and since what the intellect first conceives is being and essence, as Avicenna says in the *Metaphysica*,<sup>3</sup> we ought first, lest we fall into error through ignorance of them, state for the purpose of disclosing the difficulty they involve, what is meant by the names of Essence and Being, how they are found in different things, and how they are related to logical intentions, namely, to genus, species, and difference.

1) This remarkable work is divided into two principal parts: the introduction and the treatise which begins with the words, *We must observe that*, etc. In the introduction, following the art of rhetoric, St. Thomas accomplishes three things. First, he puts the reader in the proper disposition by showing the usefulness and necessity of what is to be said, using this argument: all who err concerning the principles of all intelligibles will err even more in other matters; all who err concerning essence and being are in error concerning the principles of all intelligibles; therefore all who err concerning essence and being will err even more in other matters. It is therefore useful and necessary, in order to avoid the many errors which occur from not knowing them, to set forth the notion of essence and being. The proof for the major of this reasoning is stated in words taken from *I Coeli*.<sup>4</sup> The minor is proved by the text of Avicenna.<sup>5</sup>

For the evidence of the major and its proof, note well that because the beginning is small in quantity, therefore an error in the beginning is called small; and because the beginning is great virtually inasmuch as it virtually contains all the conclusions, therefore a small error in the beginning becomes a great error in the end. For error grows as the

---

<sup>1</sup> The Latin text used for this translation is the following: Thomas de Vio, Cajetani, *In De Ente et Essentia d. Thomae Aquinatis Commentaria*; Cura et Studio P.M.-H. Laurent, (Taurini: Marietti, 1934), pp. i–xvi, 260. The variations from this text have been taken from the following: *Sancti Thomae Aquinatis, Quaestiones Disputatae accedit liber De Ente et Essentia cum commentariis R.D.P. Thomae de Vio Cajetani Cardinalis*, t. IV; (Parisiis: Librariis Consociationis Sancti Pauli, 1883), pp. 371–569.

<sup>2</sup> Aristotle, *On the Heavens*, I, 5, 271b 13; St. Thomas, *In I de Caelo*, lect. 9; ed. Leonine, Vol. III, n. 4.

<sup>3</sup> Avicenna, *Metaphysica*, tr. I, c. 6, fol. 72r; in *Opera*, Venetiis, 1508.

<sup>4</sup> Aristotle, *On the Heavens*, I, 5, 271b 13.

<sup>5</sup> Avicenna, *Metaph.*, tr. I, c. 6, fol. 72r.

beginning is extended in its consequences, as is quite clear in the beginning of a forked road: a slight deviation leads one very far away.

**Question I—  
Whether Being Is What the Human Intellect First Knows?**

2) For evidence of the minor, there is well-aired dispute in this matter, namely, whether being is known first by the human intellect in the order of origin. In this question, I shall make *five points*.

First, it will be stated where the difficulty in the question resides.

Secondly, the opinion of Scotus with its support will be given.

Thirdly, the teaching of St. Thomas will be given and, at the same time, the opinion of Scotus will be attacked.

Fourthly, the arguments against the statements of St. Thomas will be given and answered.

Fifthly, justice will be done to the principal arguments.

3) *Concerning the first point*, it is to be noted that the universal, which we assert is known directly only by the intellect, has a twofold totality: it is a definable whole and a universal whole. Now these totalities differ in three ways. First, because the definable whole is based on the actuality<sup>6</sup> of the thing, whereas the universal whole is based on a power or potency. Secondly, because the definable whole is ordered to higher universals, if it has them, whereas the universal whole is ordered to lower ones. Thirdly, because the definable whole is naturally prior to the universal whole.

Now, just as the universal itself has a twofold totality, so there is a twofold confused and a twofold distinct knowledge of the universal. The first confused knowledge of the universal is that by which it is known as a definable whole without being resolved into its definitive parts. The second confused knowledge of the universal is that by which it is known as a universal whole but without joining it with its subjective parts. The first distinct knowledge of the universal is that by which it is known as a defined whole by resolving it into the singular parts of the definition; and this corresponds to the first confused knowledge of the universal. The second distinct knowledge of the universal is that by which it is known as a universal whole by joining it with its subjective parts; and this corresponds to the second confused knowledge of the universal.

---

<sup>6</sup> The Laurent edition of Cajetan's commentary (p. 2, line 18 from bottom) has *actualitatem*. The Paris edition of Cajetan's commentary (p. 372, line 14 from bottom) has *actualitates*.

These two confused knowledges, however, differ in three ways. First, because the first confused knowledge of the universal views the object as a definable whole, while the second views it as a universal whole. Secondly, because the first confused knowledge allows within itself no distinct knowledge of the same object, whereas the second confused knowledge allows within itself a distinct knowledge of the same object as a definable whole, inasmuch as such knowledge is not opposed to it. Similarly, I do not know animal in its species and know what an animal is. Thirdly, because the first confused knowledge is naturally prior to the second confused knowledge. Because of these differences, I advance here a difference in wording: I shall refer to the first as an actual confused knowledge, and to the second as virtually confused knowledge. And rightly so, for in the first knowledge what is actually found in the object is known confusedly, and in the second, what is virtually included in the object is known confusedly.

The two distinct knowledges also differ in three ways. First, because the first distinct knowledge penetrates the thing as a definable whole, and the second as a universal whole. Secondly, because the first distinct knowledge allows within itself a virtual confused knowledge of the same object inasmuch as such knowledge is not opposed to it, while the second does not, for with the knowledge of animal with its species there cannot remain ignorance of animal in itself. From this difference follows the third, that the second distinct knowledge bears within itself the first, but not conversely. Because of these differences, I use here a difference in wording: I shall refer to the first distinct knowledge as an actual distinct knowledge; to the second as a virtual distinct knowledge. And with good reason, for the first penetrates the thing according to what is actually found in it; while the second knows the thing according to what is virtually included in it.

From what has been said, I shall first formulate definitions of these four knowledges, then the interordering of the same four. Now, because a privation is known and defined through what is positive (*per suum habitum*), we must begin from what is distinct and say that actual distinct knowledge is that which penetrates what is actually found in the object. Actual confused knowledge is that which knows what is actually found in the object without penetrating it. Virtual distinct knowledge is that which penetrates the object according to what is virtually included in it. Virtual confused knowledge is that which does not perfectly know the object according to what is virtually in it.

Now here are the interorderings of these knowledges. The first order is that of actual confused knowledges; the second, of virtual confused knowledges; the third, of actual distinct knowledges; and the fourth, of virtual distinct knowledges. In the first order, there is the knowledge



by which substance is known in itself without, however, penetrating it; and the knowledge by which body is known as body,<sup>7</sup> and the animated body as animated, and the animal as animal, and man as man; always, however, without penetrating, that is, without having the formal notion (*ratio*) clarified and resolved. In the third order are knowledges which are opposed to the one just mentioned, namely, that by which substance, and body, and animal, and man are known quidditatively. In the second order are knowledges in which substance, body, animated body and animal are known without composing them with their subjective parts. In the fourth order are knowledges which are opposed to these latter, namely, that in which substance now with its inferiors is composed in perfect knowledge into a universal whole, namely, with its parts; and similarly, that in which body with its subjective parts is penetrated, and so for the rest.

Now since, as is clear from what has been said, the order of actual confused knowledge is prior in origin to the other knowledges, and the first known in the order of actual confused knowledge will be the thing known first without qualification. Thus, when we ask, what is the first thing known by the human intellect in the order of origin simply? we do not doubt that it is anything else than what is known first in the order of actual confused knowledge. The issue that stands between Scotus and us, therefore, is whether in the order of actual confused knowledge the first known by way of origin is being (*ens*) or is the ultimate in species (*species specialissima*.) This makes clear the error of Anthony Trombeta<sup>8</sup> who, in his consideration of this point, gives the teaching of St. Thomas from I *parte*, q. 85, a. 3.<sup>9</sup> Now in this text, St. Thomas makes no comparison between actual confused knowledges, which is the whole question here; rather he makes a comparison of actual distinct knowledges with each other. He also compares an actual distinct knowledge of something higher with a virtual distinct knowledge of the same; also he compares confused knowledge of something higher with a virtual distinct knowledge of the same; also he compares actual confused knowledge with an actual distinct knowledge of the same object. This is clear to anyone who reads the text. So for the first point.

4) Concerning the second point, Scotus<sup>10</sup> lays down this conclu-

---

<sup>7</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 3, line 12 from bottom) has *ut corpus*. In the Paris edition (p. 373, line 15 from bottom), *ut corpus* is omitted.

<sup>8</sup> Anthony Trombeta, *Quaestiones Metaphysicales, In I Librum Aristotelis*, q. X, fol. 11 ff.; in *Quaestiones Metaphysicales seu Opus in Metaphysicam Aristotelis* (Venetiis: 1500).

<sup>9</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, 1, 85, 3, *Resp.*

<sup>10</sup> Scotus, *Commentaria Oxoniensia ad IV Libros Magistri Sententiarum*, 1, d. 3, a. 2, n. 22; in *Opera Omnia*, ed. Wadding, (Lyons: 1639), V, Part I, 409.

sion: the first thing known in actual confused knowledge is the ultimate in species, the singular of which first and more efficaciously acts on sense. Scotus proves this conclusion in three ways.

*The first is:* unimpeded natural causes first produce the most perfect effect which they can first produce. This is clear because they act up to the limit of their power; but the agents in the first act of the intellect are unimpeded natural causes; therefore these agents first produce the most perfect effect which they can first produce; but such an effect is none other than the actual confused concept of the ultimate in species; therefore, etc. This last position is proved, because if such a concept, namely the most perfect, were a concept of the more common, it follows that these agents will never produce a concept of an ultimate in species. The consequence holds, for no power can produce an effect more perfect than its most perfect effect; but the concept of an ultimate in species is more perfect than a concept of the more common, just as the whole is of its part.

Anthony Trombeta<sup>11</sup> remarks that this fact is established by a consideration of the following point. Whenever two natural agents are equally present to a properly disposed patient, that which is more actual precedes that which is less actual in acting on the patient; but the objective characteristics (*rationes*) of the ultimate in species and of anything higher are of this sort, namely, that the ultimate in species is the more actual; therefore the ultimate in species produces its effect before the genus does.

*The second reason* is the following. The most universal or metaphysical terms are the last actually known in the order of learning. This is clear from Avicenna who says that metaphysics is the last in the order of learning;<sup>12</sup> but such terms are the most universal; therefore the more universal are not actually known first. Anthony Trombeta remarks that this point is further established because the order of the sciences relative to us is considered from the viewpoint of the order of knowables relative to us. If, therefore, metaphysics is the last relative to us, metaphysical terms will also be the last known relative to us.

*The third reason* is the following. If it were necessary to conceive the more universal before the concept of species, then, supposing that the sense were in act and the intellect were unimpeded, there would be a great interval of time before the intellect knew the species. The consequence holds, for there are many predicates between the superior and the inferior.

---

<sup>11</sup> Anthony Trombeta, *Quaestiones Metaphysicales, In I Lib. Aristotelis*, q. X; ed. cit., fol. 11r ff.

<sup>12</sup> Avicenna, *Metaph.*, tr. I, c. 6; ed. cit., fol. 71v.

*The fourth*, Anthony Trombeta argues the same point in the following way. That which is easier to abstract is known first; but the ultimate in species is the easiest to abstract; therefore the ultimate in species is known first. The major is proved thus: since the intellect does not understand except by abstracting, the way it is related to abstracting is also the way it is related to understanding. The minor is clear, since abstraction is easier from similar than from dissimilar things; but the individuals from which the species is abstracted are more similar than are the species among themselves, from which the genus or any superior is abstracted.

*The fifth*: that universal is the first known by the intellect whose singular more forcefully acts on the sense; but the singular of the ultimate in species acts on the sense more forcefully than the singular of any higher order; therefore the ultimate in species is first known by the intellect. The major is clear because our intellectual knowledge arises from sense knowledge. The minor is proved in two ways. First, the sense is acted on by the singular, and is therefore most acted on by that which is most singular (according to the topical rule: from the unqualified to the unqualified); but the singular of the ultimate in species is the most singular because it is determined not only by the determination of singularity, but also by that of a determinate nature not further determinable by another nature, which does not befit the individuals of a higher order; therefore, etc. Secondly, the minor is proved thus: the more actual singular more forcefully acts on the sense; but the singular of the ultimate in species is more actual because it is more perfect, since it adds to other singulars; therefore the singular of the ultimate in species acts more forcefully.

*The sixth* thus: the more composite is known first; but the ultimate in species is more composite than all higher orders; therefore the ultimate in species is known before all the higher orders. The major is from the Commentator.<sup>13</sup> The minor is clear from Porphyry who says that the species flows down from the genus.<sup>14</sup> So for the second point.

5) *Concerning the third point*,<sup>15</sup> we place two conclusions. *The first is*: being embodied in an essence able to be sensed<sup>16</sup> is the first thing known in the actual confused knowledge.

---

<sup>13</sup> Averroes, *In Physicorum*, I, c. 3; in *Opera*, Venetiis, 1550, t. IV, fol. 4v; St. Thomas, *In Physicorum*, I, lect. 1; ed. Leonine, Vol. II, n. 8.

<sup>14</sup> Porphyry, *Isagogen*, c. 2; in *Comentarium in Aristotelem Graeca*, Vol. IV, Part I: *Porphyrii Isagoge et in Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium*, ed. A. Busse, (Berlin: Reimer, 1887), pp. 28–33.

<sup>15</sup> In the Laurent edition (p. 5), there is no title to this section. In the Paris edition (p. 375), the following title appears. *Conclusio. Ens concretum quidditati sensibili est primum cognitum cognitione actuali confusa.*

<sup>16</sup> The expression used by Cajetan is the following: *ens concretum quidditati sensibili.*

Before I prove this conclusion, I shall present *two points*. *First*, I shall explain the meaning of the term in the subject of the conclusion, namely, I shall explain what it means to say, being embodied in an essence able to be sensed. Secondly, I shall explain a point which this conclusion itself presupposes.

*Regarding the first point*, note that being can terminate the act of the intellect under three conditions. First, as having that condition which is total abstraction; I do not mean abstraction from singulars, but from species and genera. The second mode, as having that condition which is formal abstraction, which likewise is abstraction from species and genera. The third mode, as having none of these conditions, but abstracted from singulars. In the first mode of terminating the act of the intellect, being does not pertain to our question, because being under this condition is a universal whole, and we are speaking of actual confused knowledge, not virtual knowledge. In the second mode, being is a metaphysical term, and perhaps until now escaped the notice of very learned men. It is in the third mode that being is first known, and it is called being embodied in an essence able to be sensed, because it is not separated by one of the listed abstractions from the specific or generic quiddity.

For a better understanding of this point, note that just as there is a twofold composition, namely, of form with matter, and of the whole with its parts, so also there is a *twofold abstraction* by the intellect, namely, that by which the formal is abstracted from the material, and that by which the universal is abstracted from its subjective parts. According to the first, quantity is abstracted from sensible matter; in the second, animal is abstracted from an ox or a lion. I call the first one formal abstraction, and the second one total abstraction. For what is abstracted in the first abstraction is as a form of what it is abstracted from, while what is abstracted in the second abstraction is as a universal whole in relation to what it is abstracted from.

*These two abstractions differ in a fourfold way.*

*First*, because in formal abstraction, each of the two concepts separately stand as complete, namely, the concept of what is abstracted, and the concept of what it is abstracted from, that is, the formal and the material, so that one concept does not include the other. For a line in so far as it is a line has completely its own definition which does not include sensible matter; and conversely, the sensible matter of a line has completely its own definition which does not include in its definition anything of a line in so far as it is a line. Otherwise, the definitions of natural things would abstract from sensible matter. But in total abstraction, each of the two concepts taken separately does not remain complete so that the one does not include the other; for there is only

one, namely, what is abstracted. For when I abstract animal from man, the concepts of man and animal do not cut themselves off from each other; it is only that the concept of animal does not include the concept of man, for man is not intelligible without animal.

The basis of this difference is that total abstraction takes place by the consideration of some factor which is of the essence (*ratione*) of an inferior, and by removal, that is, by the non-consideration of some factor which is of the essence of the same inferior. For animal is abstracted from man in so far as the intellect considers in man the animal factor and not the rational factor, both of which are included in the essence of man. Formal abstraction, however, does not take place by the consideration of some factor included in the essence of matter, and by the non-consideration of some factor included in the same essence; rather, it takes place by a separation of whatever has the nature (*ratione*) of formal from whatever has the nature of material, and conversely, as the example given clearly shows.

*Secondly*, they differ because distinctness and intelligibility arise through formal abstraction because actuality is abstracted. But in total abstraction, lesser intelligibility arises because the confusion of potentiality is abstracted.

*Thirdly*, they differ because in formal abstraction the more abstract a thing is, the more knowable it is in its nature. In total abstraction the more abstract a thing is, the more knowable it is to us. The basis of this difference is that formal abstraction takes place by a separation from material potentialities, and things of this sort. Total abstraction, on the other hand, takes place by a separation from specific actualities, and the more it abstracts from these actualities, the more potential it is, since the genus virtually includes the inferiors; and to this extent it is less intelligible, since act in itself is more knowable than potency.<sup>17</sup>

*Fourthly*, they differ because the speculative sciences are distinguished in view of the diverse modes of formal abstraction, as is said in VI *Metaph.*,<sup>18</sup> but total abstraction is common to all the sciences. For this reason the objects of metaphysics are not compared to the objects of natural philosophy as a universal whole to its subjective parts, but rather as the formal to the material, as also the objects of mathematics are. For, although the intelligibles of the metaphysical order are more universal than others and can be compared to them as to subjective parts, inasmuch as each kind of abstraction can fit the same thing; nevertheless in so far as they are considered metaphysical-

---

<sup>17</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, IX ( ), 8, 1050a 4. See St. Thomas, *In Metaphysicorum*, IX, lect. 8; ed. Cathala, n. 1856.

<sup>18</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, VI (E), 1, 1025b–1026a 32; St. Thomas, *In VI Metaph.*, lect. 1, n. 1144 ff.

ly, they are not universal with respect to natural objects, but are forms, and the objects of natural philosophy are their matter. This has been well noted.

It is, therefore, clear how being sometimes has the condition of formal abstraction, namely, when it is taken with precision from other generic and specific factors; and how it sometimes has the condition of total abstraction, namely, when it is considered as a universal whole, virtually including other genera and species. Also, what we intended to show is now clear, namely, how being is embodied in an essence able to be sensed, namely, when it is supported by neither of these abstractions, but is seen in a sensible essence abstracted from singulars but with no separation. Thus, what we mean by the term, being embodied in an essence able to be sensed, is clear.

*What our conclusion presupposes is the following:* being can be known in actual confused knowledge. This is a point which the Scotists deny, holding that being cannot be known in actual confused knowledge, but only in distinct knowledge. Their proof for this is: what is known by an unqualifiedly simple concept cannot be known by actual confused knowledge; being is known by a simple concept; therefore, etc. The major is clear, because actual confused knowledge takes place when the intellect bears on the object according to what is actually included in it, without knowing the resolution into the parts of the essence of the object. But when something is known by an unqualifiedly simple concept, it does not happen that the intellect bears on the object in one respect and not in another, for then the concept of the object would be composed. The minor is clear, since the concept of being cannot be resolved.

To see that our conclusion does not presuppose anything false, and that this argument of the Scotists is insufficient, note well that it is not of the essence of actual distinct knowledge that the object be known by resolving it into the parts of the essence, as is true when being is known distinctly; but its essence consists in this that the intellect penetrate to what is actually found in the object, whether this comes about by a resolution of the object into the parts of its essence, or by a clear intuition, namely, of a simple object. In like manner, it is not of the essence of actual confused knowledge that the intellect know the object in one respect, and not know it in another; it suffices that the intellect actually bear on the object itself and not penetrate to its actuality. Thus, it is of the essence of actual confused knowledge that the intellect bear on the object according to what is actually in it, without penetrating to that. However, whether this<sup>19</sup> comes about because the ob-

---

<sup>19</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 8, line 17) has *hoc*. The Paris edition (p. 376, line 22 from bottom) has *id*.

ject is resolvable into many concepts, or from some other reason, is accidental to actual confused knowledge. Therefore the reasoning of Scotus lays down a false major and a proof erring by the fallacy of the consequent, from an inferior to its superior negatively, from the negation of one mode of confused knowledge to the negation of every mode.

Now that this is the situation, and that being or anything which is unqualifiedly simple can be known in actual confused knowledge, I prove thus. Whenever the intellect bears on being, actually conceiving it, without distinguishing being from substance and accident, it has an actual confused knowledge of being; but the intellects of many men operate in this way; therefore, etc. The major is made clear in this way. When the intellect actually bears on being, and yet does not separate the proper notion of being from the proper notions of substance and accident, it has either a confused or a distinct knowledge. But such knowledge is not distinct, because the inseparable effect of distinct knowledge is to know the difference of this object from others. Therefore this knowledge is confused; and since it was given that the knowledge is actual, it follows that it must be confused actual knowledge.

Experience substantiates the minor, for we observe that men have been engaged in studies for many years and yet do not distinguish the proper notion of being from substance and accident. But to say that these men have no knowledge of an actual concept of being is fatuous and against common sense, for they consider being according to what it actually contains in itself and they attain the whole. But because they do not understand it as a whole, they therefore do not know it as separated from substance and accident. It remains, therefore, that what was presupposed in our conclusion is true, and that it is false to say that being can be known in actual distinct knowledge only.

*It now remains to prove the first part of our conclusion* from St. Thomas and Avicenna who say that being is that which is first imprinted in our intellect. This conclusion is proved in the following way. The most imperfect concept of all is the first by way of origin; but the actual confused concept of being is the most imperfect of all concepts; therefore it is the first by way of origin. The major is clear because the more imperfect is prior by way of generation.<sup>20</sup> The minor is also evident because every other concept, since it adds to the concept of being, is more perfect than it, just as the whole is of its part.

On this point, Anthony Trombeta remarks that because the perfection of a concept is twofold, namely, the objective perfection and the perfection of clearness; that concept is more perfect objectively which has an object that is more perfect positively, and that concept is more

---

<sup>20</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, IX ( ), 8, 1050a 5; St. Thomas, *In IX Metaph.*, lect. 8, n. 1856.

perfect in clarity which has an object that includes less within it, as Aristotle says.<sup>21</sup> Wherefore, if there is question in the argument of the objective perfection of a concept, the major is false and the minor is true; if there is question of the perfection of the clarity, the major is true and the minor is false.

He is wrong, and I will prove that the minor is true when speaking of the perfection of clearness, so that relative to clarity the actual confused concept of being is the most imperfect. That concept is the most unclear of all when an intellect with it is farther from the knowledge of all other things than with any other concept; but the actual confused concept of being is of this sort, namely, that the intellect having it is farther from the knowledge of other things than one having any other concept; therefore the actual confused concept of being is the most unclear of all.

The major is clear, for clarity of a concept, since it is a proper perfection of the intellect, puts the intellect closer to a knowledge of other things in proportion to the clarity, especially since the intellect naturally proceeds from what is evident to what is not. The minor is proved in the following way. Whenever there are two concepts, one of which actually includes the other, but not conversely, the intellect having the one that actually includes the other is more immediately disposed to know the object of that other than the other way around; but this is the way the concept of being is related to other concepts, that it does not include them, but they actually include it; therefore when the intellect has the concept of being, it is further from the knowledge of other things than when it has any other concept.

This point is confirmed by Scotus himself, who says that part of a nature (*rationalis*) actually understood is so close to the intellect that it cannot be closer. But the point brought in from *prohem. Metaph.*,<sup>22</sup> that clarity pertains to an object actually containing fewer factors, is not at issue here, since that perfection (*certitudo*) is an objective perfection and the point at issue here is the clarity that plays a role for the intellect. It is from such evident and clear concepts that the intellect proceeds to what is not evident and not clear to it.

Secondly, the same conclusion is proved thus. The knowledge of first principles is the first complex knowledge; therefore the knowledge of being is the first incomplex knowledge. The antecedent is clear because the knowledge which proceeds from nature ought to precede the knowledge which proceeds from diligent effort, both because they are known to all, even the knowledges which proceed in childhood, and

---

<sup>21</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, I (A), 1, 981a 1–10.

<sup>22</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, I (A), 2, 982a 25–30.



because they are presupposed in learning, as held in *I Poster.*<sup>23</sup> The consequence is proved in the following way. Since being is that term from which a first principle is acquired, and if being were not the first thing known, but something else was, there could then be another complex act by the intellect, while as yet there was no knowledge of a principle present, etc.

Against the position of Scotus, I argue thus. The ultimate in species is not the most confused object simply; therefore the actual confused knowledge of it is not the first simply, and consequently it is not the first thing known. The consequence holds owing to the stand of the adversary, that therefore the ultimate in species is the first thing known because it is the most confused. The antecedent is proved thus: genus is more confused than species; therefore species is not the most confused. Here the consequence is known. The antecedent I prove in this way. What contains more is the more confused; but genus contains more than does the species, for animal contains more than man; therefore, etc.

They answer that there are two kinds of containing: one actual, one potential; and that that is more confused which contains many actually, not potentially. Now a genus contains many in potency, but the species contains many in act. Therefore the species is more confused.

On the contrary. What contains many without order is more confused than what contains many with order; but what contains many actually contains them as ordered, for the species contains the definitive parts as ordered; but what contains them potentially contains them without order; therefore that which contains many potentially is the more confused.

Anthony Trombeta answers that genus contains species as ordered, and not without order, in that it does not relate to them except by mediating differences, which are highly ordered.

On the contrary. Genus contains species and differences not in act but in potency, as Porphyry says;<sup>24</sup> and therefore it contains them indistinctly. The consequence holds, since it is act which distinguishes;<sup>25</sup> then the ultimate contains indistinctly, and therefore not as ordered. The consequence holds because an order without distinction is not imaginable (even with the liberty of making one up). But what Anthony says, namely, that genus does not relate to species except by ordered mediating differences, is no solution, because genus contains not only the species, but also contains without order the differences which are ordered within themselves, as was proved.

---

<sup>23</sup> Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, I, 1, 71a 17.

<sup>24</sup> Porphyry, *Isagogen*, c. 6; *ed. cit.*, p. 41.

<sup>25</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, VII ( ), 13, 1039a 7; St. Thomas, *In VII Metaph.*, lect. 13, nn. 1588–1589.

We notice here that confusion is not a result of containing many, as the Scotists imagine, for in that case a universal would be the most confused; rather, it is a result of containing many without order whence the proverb, where plurality is without order, there is confusion, etc.

*Our second conclusion is this.* Among actual confused concepts of quidditative predicates, there is no essential order of origin. Here is the proof. When there are concepts essentially ordered in the order of origin, it is impossible to produce the concepts of the extremes without producing the concepts of intermediaries. This point is clear, otherwise there would be no essential order of origin among them. But we do, in fact, have actual confused concepts of the extremes without concepts of the intermediaries; therefore among them there is no essential order of origin. Experience makes the minor clear, for we are aware that we conceive man and substance, and yet we are ignorant of the intermediaries not only as distinct, but even as confused, for we lack the proper concepts of them by which the keenness of the intellect might be directed to them, not merely that we do not know the resolution of them into definitive parts. Now I have advanced this argument alone because it is convincing to me. From it the error of the Scotists, who say that there is an essential order among confused concepts, is manifest, for they cannot answer this argument.

But immediately against this argument the following objection arises. Among actual confused concepts of a superior and an inferior, there is no essential order of origin; therefore the concept of the ultimate in species, just as the concept of being, can be the first concept generated. This is against the first conclusion. The consequence holds because a non-essential order is not necessary and can be varied.

In response to this, I answer by denying the consequence. For, although there is no essential order among all confused concepts, there is, nevertheless, such an order between the concept of being and any other concept. Nor is this a matter of preference, for the concept of being is a kind of general form of the intellect, just as the form of corporeity is a general form of matter. Thus, as between the form of corporeity and other forms there is an essential order, but not among these latter forms in themselves, so also there is an essential order between the concept of being and other concepts, but not among other concepts in themselves. After the concept of being, anything else can be conceived, whether it be substance, accident, species, or genus. There is also a concept of being in a sense natural to the intellect, just as the knowledge of a first principle; for as soon as being is presented it is conceived by all. The concept of being must, therefore, be essentially prior to other concepts, just as universally a natural act is prior to those

which are wholly from the outside. But a similar reason does not hold for other concepts among themselves. So for the third point.

6) *Concerning the fourth point*, because Anthony Trombeta<sup>26</sup> attacks certain statements of the Holy Doctor in *I parte*,<sup>27</sup> treating of the order of intellectual knowledge according to the doctrine of the Peripatetics, I shall state his attacks and offer a solution. *There are five statements* he argues against. First, that the intellect knows universals and knows first the most universal. Second, that the human intellect proceeds from potency to act. Third, that the knowledge of things in the universal is incomplete knowledge. Fourth, that the knowledge in the universal is knowledge in a qualified sense, and in potency. Fifth, that the senses in passing from potency to act know the more common before they know the less common.

*Against the first statement*, he argues in the following way. St. Thomas holds that whatever is in a thing and from the nature of that thing is singular; to which we add another proposition, namely, that which precedes the act of knowing is real. Then this argument: whatever is in a thing is singular; but what is known by the first act of knowledge is in the thing; therefore what is known by the first act of knowledge is singular; therefore the more universal cannot be known. The major is from St. Thomas. The minor is clear owing to the second proposition, which is proved in four ways. (1) A being of reason is posterior to the act of comparison made by the intellect. (2) Such an object is the cause of a real being, namely, of the first act of knowing. (3) Such a first act is related to the object by a real relation, which is impossible if not related to a real term. (4) Such a first act depends on time object as a measure; whereas a real being does not depend on a being of reason.

To this I answer that the major can be understood in two ways. First, whatever is in a thing is singular, that is, whatever is in a thing is singularity; and this is false, for there is in Socrates not only singularity, but humanity and animality. In the second way, whatever is in a thing is singular, that is, whatever is in a thing has singularized being (*esse*); and this is true according to the Peripatetic doctrine. Thus, if an argumentation must have three terms, the major understood in the first sense is false. I concede the major taken in the second sense, for the being which is first known has no real being except in singulars. As to the arguments he adds, what truth they contain will be clear in what follows.

---

<sup>26</sup> Anthony Trombeta, *Quaestiones Metaphysicales, In I Lib. Aristotelis*, q. X; *ed. cit.*, fol. 11r ff.

<sup>27</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.*, I, 85, 3, *Resp.*

*Against the second statement*, namely, that the human intellect proceeds from potency to act, Anthony argues: St. Thomas assumes that proposition to prove this conclusion, namely, that the more universal is known first. But this proposition either concludes nothing to the point or it itself is simply false. If St. Thomas means that the intellect knows something potentially before it knows actually, the proposition is true, but not to the point. I concede that the intellect knows the ultimate in species potentially before it knows it actually, but this does not mean<sup>28</sup> that the intellect knows the genus before it knows the species. If, however, St. Thomas means that the intellect proceeds from potency to act, that is, from imperfect to perfect knowledge, that is not universally true, as is clear when we proceed from a knowledge of the premises to a knowledge of the conclusion, and from a knowledge of the cause to a knowledge of the effect. From this it is clear that this too is false, namely, that the intellect comes to an imperfect act before it comes to a perfect one. For the illuminated air is not illuminated by the sun first imperfectly and then perfectly; in like manner, the intellect produces an act before it produces a habit, and yet an act is more perfect than a habit. Thus, to show the truth of the proposition in question, it is necessary to show an essential order of the incomplete<sup>29</sup> act to the complete act.

To this argument I answer that St. Thomas understands that proposition in neither of these ways exactly, but in this way. The intellect going from potency to the ultimately perfect act will have passed through many intermediate acts and arrives at an imperfect act before a perfect one. This proposition, namely, that what is prior in generation is more imperfect is held in VIII *Phys.*,<sup>30</sup> and in IX *Metaph.*,<sup>31</sup> and in *libro II de Partibus animalium*.<sup>32</sup> Under that major, therefore, let us subsume this minor, namely, that the human intellect going from potency to its ultimately perfect act, for example, the distinct knowledge of the ultimate in species, will have passed through many intermediate acts; therefore it comes to an imperfect act before it comes to a perfect one.

The minor is evident because the knowledge of genus is conceded by all to be an intermediate act. The argument concludes, therefore, we know distinctly the more universal before the less universal. This

---

<sup>28</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 12, lines 7 and 8) has *sed ex hoc non habetur quod*.

<sup>29</sup> There is an obvious misprint in the text: *ncompleti* should read *incompleti*.

<sup>30</sup> Aristotle, *Physics*, VIII, 7, 261a 13; St. Thomas, *In VIII Phys.*, lect. 14, n. 9.

<sup>31</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, IX (0398), 8, 1050a 4; St. Thomas, *In IX Metaph.*, lect. 8, n. 1856.

<sup>32</sup> Aristotle, *On the Parts of Animals*, II, 1, 646a 24.

is precisely the conclusion blessed Thomas intended. But Anthony is deceived. He believed that St. Thomas was speaking of actual confused knowledge when, as was said above, he was speaking of the virtual confused knowledge of the species itself and the distinct knowledge of species and genus. For in that place the actual distinct knowledge of the genus is called confused knowledge of the genus itself and the species, because the species and the virtual content of the genus are known confusedly. In reply to what Anthony adds against this proposition, that the intellect proceeds from imperfect to perfect knowledge, I say that this proposition is universally true if it is understood.

To understand this point and to solve all replies, observe first that the progression of nature and of the intellect is twofold. For one is in the order of generation alone, and the other is in the order of generation and of efficient or final causality. The first process is had when there is between the terms and the media only a priority and a posteriority according to generation. The second when there is over and beyond that priority a priority of efficient or final causality.

Observe, secondly, that one thing can be more perfect than another in two ways, namely, simply and in a qualified sense. It happens that a thing is simply, that is in its nature, more perfect than another, and yet is less perfect than it under some condition; for example, a material substance is simply more perfect than an accident, and yet is more imperfect in a qualified sense, inasmuch as it is actuated by an accident. St. Thomas says, therefore, that in the progression of generation alone both nature and intellect always proceed from the imperfect simply to the perfect simply, inasmuch as the order of generation looks to the genus of material cause, as animal is generated before man, as is said in *libro de Animalibus*.<sup>33</sup> But in the second progression, there is progress from the imperfect, not simply, but in a qualified sense to the more perfect in a qualified sense; for example, substance is prior to accident in the order of generation and beyond this is prior in the order of final causality, inasmuch as substance is the end of accident, and sometimes the agent. It is clear that substance is in a qualified sense more imperfect than accident, in so far as it is in potency with respect to it, and participates in material causality.

In reply to the first of his objections, I answer that the premises are not prior to the conclusion in the order of generation alone, but also in the order of efficient causality, as is said in other words in II *Phys*.<sup>34</sup> (as St. Thomas testifies, commenting on this text),<sup>35</sup> and can be derived

---

<sup>33</sup> Aristotle, *On the Generation of Animals*, II, 3, 736b 2; St. Thomas, *Sum. Theol.*, I, 118, 2, *ad 2*.

<sup>34</sup> Aristotle, *Physics*, II, 2, 195a 15.

<sup>35</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *In II Phys.*, lect. 5, n. 8.

from *I Poster.*<sup>36</sup> It suffices, therefore, to say that the knowledge of the premises is more imperfect in a qualified sense, whence also they are placed in the genus of material cause.<sup>37</sup>

I say the same regarding the passage from the knowledge of the cause to the knowledge of the effect. The example of illuminated air is not to the point, for illumination is not successive, whereas the concept of genus and the concept of species succeed each other. Also it is false that the act which precedes the habit is simply more perfect, although this is true of an act elicited by a habit, but such an act is posterior to the habit. Also, the essential order of a generic concept to a specific concept in distinct knowledge is sufficiently clear from what has been said; thus it will not be necessary to elaborate it in another manner.

*Against the third statement*, namely, that knowledge in the universal is incomplete knowledge, Anthony argues in the following way. Universal demonstration is stronger than particular demonstration; therefore knowledge in the universal, which is acquired through universal demonstration, is stronger than particular knowledge.

I answer that the argument errs through the fallacy of equivocation of the term *universal*. Aristotle calls universal demonstration one in which a property is known of its proper subject, and this for both generic and specific properties. And he wants to say that the knowledge which we acquire by demonstrating a property of its first subject is stronger than the knowledge which we acquire by demonstrating a property of the subjective part of the first subject. Now we say that to know man in an animal is to know man more imperfectly than to know man in himself; and this is what we mean by the knowledge in the universal. It is manifest, therefore, to everyone with talent that what we say is not contrary to Aristotle. For it is one thing to say that A is known in the universal, and another to say that A is demonstrated by universal demonstration. In the first way, A is not known in itself, but in its superior; while in the second way, A in itself is known in its own being (*esse*) in the first subject.

*Against the fourth statement*. It is that the knowledge in the universal is knowledge in a qualified sense, and is in potency; because in the universal itself particulars are known in some confused way. From this we infer: therefore knowledge in the universal is confused knowledge. On the contrary, there is no proof where there is a fallacy of equivocation; but this argument is such; therefore, etc. The minor is explained thus: it is one thing to speak of the actual knowledge of an

---

<sup>36</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *In Posteriorum Analyticorum*, I, lect. 2; ed. Marietti, nn. 13–21.

<sup>37</sup> Aristotle, *Physics*, II, 3, 195a 15; *Metaphysics*, V (2206), 2, 1013b 16; St. Thomas, *In V Metaph.*, lect. 3, n. 778.

object, and another to speak of the virtual knowledge of what is included in the object. For, although the virtual knowledge of the particulars in the universal is confused, the actual knowledge of the universal itself is distinct knowledge. And because confused knowledge is consequent upon factors actually confused in the object, when knowledge be specified by the object and by factors intrinsic to the object, it should not be called confused knowledge, but distinct.

To this argument, I answer that he who wants to make the distinct knowledge of animal as a definable whole be the confused knowledge of animal as a universal whole, and hence a confused knowledge of the species, does not understand St. Thomas. And therefore there is no equivocation present. We admit that the knowledge in which the intellect actually bears on animal itself as a universal and not on its species, is a confused knowledge of animal, as a universal whole is, and not only of its species, as St. Thomas expressly says in that place. Whence it happens that animal can be known distinctly and confusedly at the same time in diverse ways, as was said above. Nor does it follow that if these two knowledges occur at the same time, that they are the same when they are also distinguished, for example, when actually and virtually animal is known distinctly. But what he adds, that such knowledge should not be called confused, is shown to be false, because actual confused knowledge is less than potential. His last addition, that knowledge is specified by an object and by what is intrinsic to the object, is not to the point. Confused and distinct knowledge are not species of knowledge; if they were, confused and actual knowledge of the same object would not be of the same species, and thus knowledge would not be specified by an object. Anthony's position, therefore, implies a contradiction.

*Against the fifth statement*, namely, that the senses, in passing from potency to act, know the more common before they know the less common, he argues in the following way. Sense knows nothing but the singular; therefore it does not know the more common first. But suppose you say that sense does not know the more common in itself, but knows first the more common singular. The argument against this is: either sense knows the more common singular so that singularity will be the formality (*ratio*) of knowing, or [it knows the more common singular] so that the common nature will be the formality of knowing. The first alternative cannot be maintained, as is clear in itself; and Thomists cannot hold the second, for this would mean that the common nature would be the formality of moving a sense.

Against this last point he argues thus. That is not the formality of moving which is identical in reality and in reason to what the formality of moving is repugnant to; but the common nature is identified in

reality and in reason with singularity which the formality of moving is repugnant to; therefore, etc. The proof of the minor: the nature and the singular are not really distinguished, not by the nature of the real as you say, nor by reason. We prove this thus. A distinction of reason follows an act of the intellect; but in what is prior there is no act of the intellect. This point is confirmed in the following way. A real act does not depend upon a being of reason; but sensation is a real act; therefore it does not depend upon a being of reason; but a sensible object, which has in itself a distinction of reason, is a being of reason, or an aggregate of real being and a being of reason; therefore, etc.

The main argument is confirmed by this. Whatever factors are in no way distinct in the thing, if one terminates in some real action, the other will terminate in the same action; but the more common and the less common nature are such; therefore, etc., and this holds granted the due proximity to the sense. The point is confirmed by a second argument. The same sense knows first what the sensible species first represents; but the sensible species, with the due proximity supposed, first represents the singular of the ultimate in species; therefore, etc. The minor is proved thus. The sensible species first represents the object under that formality by which it is impressed upon the sense; but it is impressed by an object under the formality of specific nature, both because this is more actual and perfect and because the sensible species is the natural similitude caused by the object, and represents the nature adequately according to that formality which fits the nature more essentially; therefore the sensible species represents the object under that formality which is more perfect and essential to it, than under that formality which is less essential and less principally belongs to it.

I reply to all this that the response reported there is correct and right. To the attack on it, I say that such a nature, color for example, and not a common nature, that is, common color, is the formality of modifying the sense. As for the proof, I deny the minor for both its parts. Now, according to St. Thomas in *I parte*,<sup>38</sup> nature and singularity are really distinct in material things; and a distinction of reason, though it actually be after sensation, still it comes fundamentally before sensation, and this is sufficient. To his confirming argument, I say first that a sensible object, which has a distinction of reason with a foundation is not a being of reason nor an aggregate of real being and a being of reason; for a distinction of reason with a foundation adds nothing beyond the thing. Secondly, I say that sensation is not caused by a distinction of nature, but by the nature itself conditioned in such a way.

---

<sup>38</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.*, I, 3, 3, *Resp.*



Thus, granted that the distinction in question is a being of reason it still proves nothing; for color does not move the sense in so far as it is distinct from its own singularity, but color<sup>39</sup> in so far as it is color, concerning the essence (*ratio*) of which there is neither a distinction nor a union. To the second confirming argument, I say that the major is false regarding actions which have no real term, such as immanent actions; for one can understand the wisdom of God without understanding his goodness.

As for the other confirming arguments, I bring in first that St. Thomas does not say that the sense always knows first the more common before it knows the less common. These are his words: *And because sense goes from potency to act, as does the intellect, the same order of knowledge exists in the senses, for by sense we first judge the more common before the less common, in reference to both place and time.*<sup>40</sup> These words show only that sense knows first the more common singular in reference to place and time, not that this is always so. Hence, the arguments advanced are not against St. Thomas, even though they do not conclude. For it is false that the sensible species first represents the singular of the ultimate in species; and its proof is also false, namely, that the sensible species is first impressed on the sense by a specific nature. The sensible species is first impressed on the sense by a *per se* primary object of sense; and the ultimate in species is the primary object of no sense, as is clear by running down the list. Wherefore, a visible species is first impressed on the sense by a visible object, inasmuch as it is colored, and not because it is white or black. Nor is this a problem, that whiteness is more actual than color, since this is not sufficient. What is required is the primary object of a power. Nor is his position true, namely, that the ultimately specific nature is more essential to a sensible object than the generic nature. In fact, for this visible object as such, color is more essential than whiteness or blackness. This is evident because when whiteness or blackness is taken away, the object remains visible, whereas the converse is not true. So for the fourth point.

7) *Concerning the fifth point*, I shall now answer in order the arguments advanced.<sup>41</sup>

*The reply to the first argument.* I deny the last premise of this argument, namely, that the most perfect effect which agents involved in intellection can first produce is a specific concept. I say that the most

---

<sup>39</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 16, line 6 from bottom) has *color*. The Paris edition (p. 384, line 13) has *hic color*.

<sup>40</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.*, I, 85, 3, *Resp.*

<sup>41</sup> The arguments advanced are those given in the second point. See section 4, pp. 42–44.

perfect effect such agents can produce at that time is the concept of being; in fact, that they can produce no other at that time. And when the contrary of this is argued: if such is the case, a specific concept would never be produced, the consequence does not hold. Against the proof for the consequence, I say that no power can produce a more perfect effect than what is simply its most perfect effect; but any power can produce a more perfect effect than the most perfect effect it could produce at some prior time, for that effect is not the most perfect, except in a qualified sense. For example, the generative power of a lion is not up to a more perfect effect than the lion, for such an effect is simply its most perfect effect. But it can produce a more perfect effect than that which it produced in the beginning of action, because that effect was the most perfect it could produce at that time. As for the confirming argument, I say that the minor is false. For an intellect existing in pure potency is not disposed to a specific concept in the same way that it is to the concept of being. This is not owing to some contrary disposition, but to the order of the most general concept to specific ones; just as prime matter, leaving aside all contrary dispositions, is not disposed to specific forms in the same way that it is disposed to the form of corporeity, but must receive first the form of corporeity because of the order of a general form to specific ones. Wherefore we customarily say that it is undisposed privatively, not contrarily.

*The reply to the second argument.* The answer is clear from what has been said. We do not claim that metaphysical terms as such are known first by us, for metaphysical terms are abstractions by a formal abstraction. But we say that what is signified by such a term, being embodied in an essence able to be sensed, is known first.

*The reply to the third argument.* I say that it is not necessary in every act of forming a specific concept always and in each case to form ahead of time a confused concept of being; but it suffices that being be the first known of all things, since in the concept of being all things are virtually conceived. Further, we say that since we do not hold an essential order between confused concepts themselves, there is no necessity for much of a time interval between them.

*The reply to the fourth argument.* I say that, speaking of the abstraction which is at issue here, the ultimate in species is not easier to abstract than being. For in the confused concept of the ultimate in species there is required, and suffices, a twofold abstraction. One by the act of the agent intellect, namely, the separation from singulars; and one by the act of the possible intellect, namely, actually to see the species, and not actually to see the genus. So also for the actual confused concept of being, a twofold abstraction is necessary. The first is abstraction from particulars, which takes place when any species is abstracted

by the agent intellect; and the other is done by the possible intellect, in that it first conceives being in any quiddity that is first actually presented to it, without conceiving actually what else is in it. Therefore such is this abstraction of being and as easy as the abstraction of the ultimate in species. In fact, this abstraction of being is easier, since it is easier to conceive actually what is prior without conceiving what is posterior, than conversely. It is clear, therefore, that the abstraction to which the argument refers is not necessary for confused knowledge.

*The reply to the fifth argument.* I say that the minor is false. As for its proof, I deny the consequence, because the sense is not moved by the singular in so far as it is singular. That method of arguing according to the topical rule does not hold, unless the predicate belongs to the subject essentially, as St. Thomas holds in III *contra Gentiles*.<sup>42</sup> This is not present in the matter presented, for it is not this color in so far as it is this color that moves the sight, but in so far as it is color.

To the second proof, I answer that the major used in the argument is not universally true, since the colored thing more moves the sight than this black thing, because it acts on the sense from a greater distance. And with a corporeal agent, to the extent that it acts on the more distant, the more efficacious it appears. Secondly, I say that many imperfect singulars more efficaciously move the sense than one more actual and more perfect singular. And, because all singulars are singulars of being, the cogitative power of a child, in whom new knowledge ought to arise, is moved more efficaciously by the singulars of being than by the singulars of this species. And, since the intellect receives the universal from many singulars, as is said in I *Post.*<sup>43</sup> and in *prohemio Metaph.*,<sup>44</sup> it therefore knows being before species. On this basis I reply to the argument that, other things being equal, the major is true, but not when there is such a preponderant discrepancy as occurs in the argument; for the greater number of the singulars of being outweighs by far the lesser number of the singulars of a species, just as a thousand weak men can pull more than ten strong men.

*The reply to the sixth argument.* I say that the major is simply<sup>45</sup> false. Regarding the text of the Philosopher, I say first that the text the commentator uses is corrupt, for it should read *confused*, not *composite*. In order to salvage the words of the Commentator, I say secondly, that the composite is more knowable than its components as such, but not absolutely. Thus, I know man confusedly before I know his definitive parts as such; yet absolutely, I know the more universal

---

<sup>42</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *Contra Gentiles*, III, 139.

<sup>43</sup> Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, I, 31, 88a 2.

<sup>44</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, I (A), 2, 982a 21–22.

<sup>45</sup> *Simpliciter* in the text should read *simpliciter*.

first. The truth of the minor is clear from what has been said, and receives the approbation of Avicenna.

8) Then St. Thomas, showing the difficulty of the matter to be treated, draws the attention of the reader by proposing three points: what is signified by the terms *essence* and *being*; how they are found differently in diverse things; how they are related to logical intentions. The difficulty of these points is, as the diversity of opinion testifies, no small one; for it is the most universal which is the most difficult to understand, as is said in *I Metaph.*<sup>46</sup>

Regarding this text, note well, that just as the what-it-is of a thing is the quiddity of a thing, so also the what-it-is of a term is the quiddity of a term. Now a term, since it is essentially a sign of the impressions which are objectively in the soul, as is said in *I Perihermenias*,<sup>47</sup> has no other quiddity except to be the sign of some thing understood or thought. Now a sign, as such, is relative to what is signified. Whence, to know the what-it-is of a term is nothing else than to know to what such a term has the relation of sign to signified. Such knowledge can be acquired through the accidentals of the thing signified, through the common and the essential characteristics of the thing, through nods, and in any other way. For example, if we ask a Greek the what-it-is of the term *anthropos*, and he points out a man with his finger, we now understand the what-it-is of the term, and similarly in other cases. But if we ask about the what-it-is of a thing, it is necessary to point out what belongs to the thing signified in the first mode of adequate perseity. And this is the essential difference between the what-it-is of a term and of a thing; that the what-it-is of a term is the relation of a term to the thing signified; but the what-it-is of a thing is the essence of the thing related, or signified. From this difference follow all the others which we usually give. For example, that the what-it-is of a term may pertain to complex non-beings, and may be acquired through what is accidental, common, extraneous; but the what-it-is of a thing pertains to incomplex beings, and is acquired through what is proper and essential. The reason is that the relation of a term can terminate in things which are complex and do not exist in nature, and can be made clear through accidental characteristics, and the like; but the essence of a thing cannot be had except through the essential properties when there is question of incomplex beings.

Now we ought to get our knowledge of the simple from the composite and arrive at our knowledge of what is prior from what is posterior, so that, beginning with easier things, learning

---

<sup>46</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, I (A), 2, 982a 23; St. Thomas, *In I Metaph.*, lect. 2, nn. 45–46.

<sup>47</sup> Aristotle, *On Interpretation*, ch. 1, 16a 3; St. Thomas, *In Perihermenias*, I lect. 2; ed. Marietti, n. 12.

may be more suitable. For this reason we ought to proceed from the meaning of being to the meaning of essence.

In this third part of the introduction, St. Thomas prepares the reader to learn, proposing the method of procedure by means of this conclusion: we must proceed from being to essence. This he proves in two ways. First, we must proceed to what is simple from what is composite; but being stands as the composite, and essence as the simple; therefore we must proceed from being to essence. Second, we must proceed from what is posterior to what is prior; but being is posterior to essence; therefore we must proceed from being to essence. The proof of the major in both arguments lies in the fact that we must begin with what is easier known; but what is composite and posterior is easier for us than what is simple.

Regarding the minor of the first argument, note that being, as will be explained later, signifies that which has existence (*esse*), and that which has existence (*esse*) includes essence in it. Essence, on the other hand, signifies what the definition means, as will be explained, and does not say either existence (*esse*) or non-existence (*non esse*). Being, therefore, is so related to essence that it includes in itself both, namely, essence and existence. Essence, however, is only one of the two factors, and being is therefore called composite in respect to essence.

Regarding the major of the second argument, note that when we must proceed from what is posterior, we mean from what is posterior in nature, but prior to us; for, as is said in *I Phys.*,<sup>48</sup> the natural method of procedure for us is from what is more knowable to us to the less known things of nature. The minor of the second argument is proved from the fact that the composite is posterior to its components, and being, as was said, is composite in respect to essence.

---

<sup>48</sup> Aristotle, *Physics*, I, 1, 184a 16; St. Thomas, *In I Phys.*, lect. 1, n. 6.

## Chapter I<sup>1</sup>

It should be known that being in itself is spoken of in two ways, as the Philosopher says in *V Metaph.*<sup>2</sup> In one way it is divided into the ten categories; in the other it signifies the truth of propositions. The difference between these two is that in the second way everything can be called being about which an affirmative proposition can be formed, even though it posit nothing in reality. In this way, even privations and negations are called beings, for we say that affirmation is opposed to negation, and that blindness is in the eye. But in the first way, nothing can be called being unless it posits something in reality. Thus, according to the first way, blindness and the like are not beings. Therefore, the term *essence* is not taken from being in the second sense. For in this sense some things which do not have an essence are called beings, as is evident in privations. But essence is taken from being in the first sense. Thus the Commentator says in the same place<sup>3</sup> that being in the first sense of the word is what signifies the substance of a thing.

9) *Here begins the treatise, which is divided into two parts. In the first part* is explained what is signified by the name *Being* and *Essence*; in the *second*, how essence is found differently in diverse things. *The first part* of the treatise consists of one chapter; and *the second* of six. Thus the whole treatise is made up of seven chapters. The first chapter, which we are now considering, has three parts. In the first is explained what is signified by the term *Being*. In the second, what is signified by the term *Essence*. And in the third, the different terms for essence itself are designated.

According to this division, he first points out that being is spoken of in two ways. First, as it is divided into the ten genera. Secondly, as it signifies the truth of propositions, in the manner in which Aristotle explains.<sup>4</sup> St. Thomas spoke of being in itself (*per se*) to distinguish it from being *per accidens*, which is the union of beings from diverse genera, for example, a white man, as you find in *V Metaph.*<sup>5</sup> He indicates that being in the first sense *differs in a threefold way* from being in the second sense. *First*, because being in the first sense is predicated only of things existing in the ten genera; but in the second sense being is predicated of anything that can be the subject of an affirmative proposition. *Secondly*, they differ because being in the first sense is that

---

<sup>1</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 21) has no title to Chapter I. The Paris edition (p. 387) has the following title to Chapter I. *Entis et Essentiae nomine quidam significetur, ostendit. Nomina item varia ponit, quae essentiam significant.*

<sup>2</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, V ( ) 7, 1017a 22–35; St. Thomas, *In V Metaph.*, lect. 9, n. 889.

<sup>3</sup> Averroes, *In Metaphysicorum*, V. com. 14; *ed. cit.*, t. VIII, fol. 55v.

<sup>4</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, V ( ) 7, 1017a 22–35.

<sup>5</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *In V Metaph.*, lect. 9, n. 889.

composite, we already spoke of, which in some way includes within itself both essence and existence (*esse*); but being in the second sense is not such, since a thing is being in this sense (namely, a negation or a chimera) which does not have any essence. From this follows *the third difference*, that the term *Essence* is taken from being as it is understood in the first sense, as from the composite which is more knowable, and not from being in the second sense.

Regarding *the first of these differences*, note first that the truth of a proposition, which pertains to being signified by the second sense, is nothing else than a composition made in the second operation of the mind conformed to the object. For example, in the proposition, *Socrates is blind*, the *is* does not signify the inherence of blindness in Socrates, because blindness lacks any inherence, since to inhere is a property of real accidents; but it signifies a composition made by the mind conforming itself by it to the object, namely, to Socrates who lacks the power of vision. Whence it is said in *V Metaph.*<sup>6</sup> in different words that being signifying the truth of a proposition signifies because the proposition is true. But what the first signification of being is, will be seen later.

*Note secondly*, that although Socrates may be blind without any intellect considering this, and does not become more or less blind because an intellect does consider it, yet blindness has no existence (*esse*) in Socrates when an intellect does not consider it; for both of these propositions are true at the same time. This is explained thus. For Socrates to be blind as such is not for Socrates to have any substantial existence (*esse*), as is clear, nor accidental, because Socrates is blind by the sole absence of visual power, and this adds nothing to Socrates; whence blindness adds no existence (*esse*) whatever to Socrates. Thus, because the power of vision is lacking in Socrates without the consideration of any intellect, Socrates must be blind without any intellect considering it.

A question arises here because one does not correctly see that to be blind is not to be something, but to lack the power of vision. For example, a ship is without a pilot, and no intellect considers this. The absence of the pilot does not give the ship any substantial or accidental existence (*esse*), whence for the ship to be without a pilot is not to be something outside the soul, but to not be piloted. For privations and negations acquire existence (*esse*) and become beings because the intellect, knowing privations through characters (*habitus*) and negations through affirmations, in some way forms in itself some sort of image of a thing lacking. For example, when the intellect forms in itself a kind of image of a ship without a pilot, which is this mental proposi-

---

<sup>6</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, V ( ), 7, 1017a 22–35.

tion, *the ship is without a pilot*, the non-presence of the pilot, which is nothing outside the soul, becomes a being in the soul because the intellect makes it a term of a proposition; and since this existence (*esse*) is in the soul, it has no other existence (*esse*). The result is that negations and privations of this kind are not beings except in the soul objectively; thus their existence (*esse*) is nothing else than to be known, in the only manner in which all beings of reason have existence (*esse*).

Regarding the third difference, it must be noted that since terms are signs of concepts, the order of naming is according to the order of conceiving. Wherefore, as we get the notion of essence from being as it is understood in the first sense, as from a composite which is more knowable to us, so the term *Essence* takes its origin from being.

And because, as has been said, being used in this way is divided into the ten categories, essence must mean something common to all natures, through which natures different beings are placed in different genera and species; for example, humanity is the essence of man, and so with other things.

10) In the second part of this chapter he explains what the term *Essence* means in this conclusion: Essence signifies something common to all the natures of all beings. He implies the following explanation of this conclusion. As being signifies something common to all existents, so essence, since it is taken from being, signifies something common to all genera and species. And as being signifies that which is in any genus or species, so essence ought to signify that by which anything is in such a genus and such a species; for being and essence are as a that-which and that-by-which. Since, therefore, the natures of things are that-by-which they are placed in a genus and species, it follows that essence signifies something common to all the natures of things. Wherefore, in the manner in which being is predicated of man, of ox, and of like things which are in genera, so essence is predicated of humanity and goodness as that-by-which things<sup>7</sup> are placed in genera. By the term *Essence*, therefore, we understand the nature of the thing, just as by the term *Being* we understand that which has that nature.

## Question II—

### Whether<sup>8</sup> Being and Essence Signify the Categories or Their Natures Immediately or Mediately?

11) Regarding this passage, there arises a very difficult problem: whether being and essence signify the categories themselves, or their natures immediately or mediately.

---

<sup>7</sup> In the Paris edition (p. 389, line 20), *res* is missing.

<sup>8</sup> In the title to this question, the Laurent edition (p. 23) has *Utrum*. The Paris edition (p. 389) has *Num*.



In this question, I shall consider *three points*.

First, I shall explain the title of the question.

Secondly, I shall state and refute the opinion of Scotus.

Thirdly, I shall give the opinion of St. Thomas.

12) *First*, notice that to signify mediately, as used in this discussion, is to signify something by the mediation of some thing superior. For example, animal signifies its species mediately (namely by the mediation of a sensible nature), for animal signifies man only because man is an animated substance able to be sensed. To signify immediately is to signify something, not through some superior reality or nature, but primarily through itself. For example, animal signifies a sensitive grade, or a sensitive reality, immediately, as is clear. This, therefore, gives rise to the question: whether being signifies some grade, or some reality, which can be abstracted from the categorical natures, common to them like a superior in the line of essence to its inferiors, and thus signifies the categories mediately; or whether it signifies them immediately. So for the first point.

13) *Concerning the second point*, Scotus, as can be gathered from *I Sent.*,<sup>9</sup> thought that being signifies the ten categories mediately. He imagined that from any similar things there could be abstracted one objective reality common and prior to both. And thus, since substance and accident have a similarity in being, it is possible to abstract from them one objective formality (*ratio*) common to both, and prior to substance as well as to accident, which is signified by the term *being*.

For a better understanding of this, I shall state fully the steps of these abstractions. Since Socrates is like Plato in humanity, and not like a brute, humanity, common and prior to both, can be abstracted from them; after that, since man is like a brute in sensibility, and not like a plant, animality, common and prior to both, can be abstracted from them; and then, since animal is like a plant in being vegetable, and not like a stone, life, common and prior, to both, can be abstracted from them; after that, since a living thing is like a stone in being a body, and not like an intelligence, corporeity, common and prior to both, can be abstracted from them; and then, since a body is like an intelligence in substantiality, and not like an accident, substantiality, common and prior to both, can be abstracted from them; after that, since substance is like an accident in real being, and not like a being of reason, being, common and prior to both, can be abstracted from them; and since this reality, the last that can be abstracted, is what being signifies immedi-

---

<sup>9</sup> Scotus, *In I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 2, nn. 2, 5–15; *ed. cit.*, V, Part I, pp. 387–88, 391–96; d. 3, q. 3, on. 6–12; *ed. cit.*, V, Part I, 440–41, 444–46; d. 8, q. 2, nn. 2–3; *ed. cit.*, V, Part II, 716.

ately, it is necessary that the categorical realities, or natures, be mediately enclosed in the signification of being.

In support of this position many means can be advanced which we shall omit for the present in order to avoid a digression on the analogy of being and the relation of the transcendentals to the categories, as to whether they are quidditative predicates or not. These questions will be treated in detail later on.

Against this opinion, I advance two arguments. The first is based on the text of Aristotle, who says in VIII *Metaph.*,<sup>10</sup> where he solves the question of why a quiddity is one, that in separated substances we need seek no other cause because there is nothing in them save form, which by itself is simultaneously being and one; in the same way being by itself is simultaneously substance, quantity and the other categories, and needs nothing else to make it into categorical natures. From this text it is argued thus. Being signifies a certain reality prior to the categories; therefore there is need of something which will contract it to the categories. The consequence is<sup>11</sup> obvious, but the consequent is contrary to the teaching of Aristotle. Therefore, arguing from the denial of the consequent to a denial of the antecedent: being does not signify a reality prior to the categories.

The second argument is based on the text of the Commentator,<sup>12</sup> who says that the term being signifies<sup>13</sup> what is signified in the category of substance, quantity and quality in the first signification, without any medium or the mediation of any common factor. What could be clearer? I will not argue this with reasons, for it would demand exceeding the limits of this work. So for the second point.

14) *Concerning the third point, I will now give the teaching of St. Thomas, which will be drawn from two conclusions. The first* is this: Being signifies one formal concept representatively common to substance and accident, God and creatures. *The second* is this: Being signifies as an objective concept something real found in all genera, which is formally distinct from the proper objective concepts of all the genera, and expresses no grade beyond the generic, specific, and individual natures.

For an understanding of the terms, note that the concept is two-fold: formal and objective. A formal concept is some likeness which the possible intellect forms in itself and is objectively representative of

---

<sup>10</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, VIII ( ), 6, 1045b 23; St. Thomas, *In VIII Metaph.*, lect. 5, n. 1767.

<sup>11</sup> In the Paris edition (p. 390, line 23 from bottom), *est* is missing.

<sup>12</sup> Averroes, *In X Metaph.*, com. 8; *ed. cit.*, t. VIII, fol. 121r.

<sup>13</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 25, line 13) has *nomen ens significat*. The Paris edition (p. 390, line 18 from bottom) has *nomen ens, unum, significat*.

the thing. Philosophers call it all intention or a concept and theologians call it a word. An objective concept, however, is that which, represented by the formal concept, terminates the act of knowing. For example, the formal concept of lion is that representation which the possible intellect forms of a leonine quiddity, when we want to know it; the objective concept of the same thing is the leonine nature itself, represented and known. Nor should we think that when a term is said to signify a concept, that it signifies only one of the two, for the term *lion* signifies both concepts, although in diverse ways. It is the sign of the formal concept as a means or that-by-which, and it is the sign of the objective concept as an ultimate or a that-which. Whence, it is the same thing to speak of the concept of being and of its signification.

I will, therefore, prove *the first conclusion* in this way. All like things, by whatsoever likeness, even analogous or imitative, can be represented by the same image according to that in which they are considered similar; but God and creature, and substance and accident, have at least an analogous likeness between themselves; therefore, according to that in which they are considered similar, they can be represented by the same likeness. But they are alike in being (*esse*); therefore they can be represented by the same likeness in so far as they have being (*esse*); this likeness is the formal concept of being; therefore, etc.

The reasoning is clear, and the propositions are conceded by all once the major has been clarified. Going from what is better known, we urge the major in this way. Whenever there is an agent that produces its likeness in another, if this other produces another like itself in that in which it itself is likened to the first, then the third one ought to be likened to both on the principle that whatever is like another in that in which that other is like another, is like to both. For example, the species of Socrates produced in my eye by an image of Socrates in a mirror is a representative likeness of both the figure of Socrates in the mirror, by which it is immediately caused, and Socrates' own figure, by which it is mediately caused. So it is here, except that among things having an analogous likeness--God and creatures, and substance and accident--we find this kind of relation in reference to the formal concept; therefore, etc. Now this becomes manifest in an example. The divine wisdom produces human wisdom which is one likeness of it, though imperfect; and human wisdom produces a likeness of itself in our intellect, which is nothing else than wisdom in intentional being (*esse*); just as wisdom outside our intellect is wisdom in natural being (*esse*). Since this likeness of wisdom in our intellect represents human wisdom in that in which it is likened to divine wisdom, because it represents it according to its proper formality, it necessarily follows that this single likeness represents both, namely, human and divine wisdom,

inasmuch as it is like both, although it is exemplarized immediately by human wisdom, mediately by divine wisdom.

From this example using particular terms, grasp our meaning in transcendental terms, such as being is. Since the being (*esse*) of a creature is likened to the divine being (*esse*) from which it is exemplarized, and accidental being (*esse*) is like to substantial being (*esse*) from which it emanates, the likeness produced in our intellect by substantial or accidental being (*esse*) will be, in so far as they are alike, an image representative of all. And since a concept is required for intellection only because it represents the thing or object, the intellect by one concept bears on God and creature in so far as they are being, and likewise on substance and accident. Nor is it necessary to posit many concepts and multiply beings without necessity.

That what I say here is not only according to the mind of St. Thomas, but also according to his express statements, is clear from the *quaestione disputata de Potentia Dei*,<sup>14</sup> from which I have taken this reason. And in the same question where,<sup>15</sup> near the end of the body of the article, he uses the example of the mirror, and expressly says that our concept is related to God and creatures as the species to the thing seen in a mirror. So God is as a being reproducing His likeness in a mirror, the creature as the species in the mirror, and our concept as a likeness extracted from the species in the mirror and representative of both. Whence no one of sound mind can deny this while following St. Thomas.

*The second conclusion has three parts.* The *first* is explained thus. The objective concept of being is that which is represented by its formal concept; but its formal concept represents that in which all real beings are alike, which ought to be in them; therefore the objective concept of being is something real found in all things.

The second proposition given, although it may be evident from what has been said, will still be clarified further. The formal concept of animal represents the basis of a generic likeness. The formal concept of man represents the basis of a specific likeness. In general any image that is common to many in its representing, represents the basis of likeness among those many. This is clear in the example used above of the species caused in the eye by the species of Socrates in a mirror, since the species in the eye does not represent the likeness between the species in the mirror and Socrates, for that is a relation, but represents the basis of this likeness, namely, the qualities and the features which are in both. In like manner, the formal concept of being represents the basis of an analogical likeness in being (*esse*) existing in all real beings.

---

<sup>14</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *De Potentia Dei*, VII, 5, *Resp.*

<sup>15</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *De Pot. Dei, Dei*, VII, 6, *Resp.*

That this basis is in all things apart from the work of the intellect is clear because they are alike outside the soul. Since this represented basis is the objective concept of being, as has been said, it is clear that the objective concept of being is something real found in all things; which was layed down in the first part of the conclusion.

*The second part* of the conclusion follows from the first. If the objective concept of being is found in all things, and no proper objective concept of substance or accident is found in all things, it follows that they are not the same in all respects, and the concept of being is distinguished, at least formally, from the proper objective concepts of all things; which was the second part of the conclusion.

*The third part* of the conclusion is explained thus. If the objective concept of being were some grade beyond the specific and generic grades, then considered precisely as specific and generic grades with their precise attributes, there would not be found in them as such the attributes of being. This is false. Therefore, from a denial of the consequent, etc.

The consequence is explained thus. Because animal says a grade other than man, the attributes of animal are precisely not in man according to the differential concept. This is shown by the falsity of the reduplicative proposition: man inasmuch as he is rational is two-footed, where *two-footed* is a circumlocution for a proper attribute of animal. In like manner, if being says a grade other than substance, it follows that substance, considered precisely as the formal constitutive of substance, is not one, nor true, nor good, etc., which are attributes of being, etc.

The falsity of the consequent is proved thus. Man, in so far as he is rational, is precisely a one by the unity which is an attribute of being. Man, in so far as he is rational says, according to you against whom I am arguing, a grade other than being. Therefore an attribute of being belongs to a grade precisely other than being, as you take it. And this is the opposite of the consequent. The first proposition given is from Scotus, in *II Sent.*,<sup>16</sup> who held that the middle unity, less than numerical unity and greater than generic unity, is an attribute of being, and follows the specific nature by reason of an ultimate difference. The same proposition will become clear for the present in this way. Man, in so far as he is rational, is formally indivisible, supposing that rational is the ultimate difference; therefore man, in so far as he is rational, is formally one, for unity is nothing but indivision. Regarding this point, however, we will say more when we treat of the unity of nature. For the present, let it suffice to say that the attributes of being are found in

---

<sup>16</sup> Scotus, *In II Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, nn. 7–10; *ed. cit.*, VI, Part I, 357, 360–61.

the specific grades, precisely considered, and likewise in the generic grades. This was the point to be proved, and that consequently being does not signify a grade distinct from specific and generic natures; which was the third part of the conclusion.

But then, how a thing signified by the term *being* is something found in all things, and is not a grade distinguished against specific and generic grades, remains to be explained. The explanation runs thus. Any grade, generic, or specific, differential or individual, has that in itself<sup>17</sup> whence it can be conceived in many ways; and in so far as each grade<sup>18</sup> therefore has being (*esse*), it imports the term *Being*, and pertains to the objective concept of being. In so far as such or such a grade is considered absolutely, it is signified by its proper name and is the objective concept of *that*. For example, humanity, in virtue of its proper formal perfection, by which it is distinguished from other perfections of the universe, is represented and known by the formal concept of humanity and signified by the term *humanity*. Humanity as such includes what should be due itself, that is, quidditative being (*esse*) and that of actual existence should belong to it. And thus it is represented by the formal concept of being as a part of its objective concept, and is signified by the term *being*. In like manner, animal has in itself these two factors, as other natures do. Whence, the objective concept of being are generic and specific natures as having being (*esse*). So they are the basis of the analogical likeness of which we speak; and for that reason being and its attributes are kept in any grade taken precisely. For any grade, as such, has in itself that whereby it is, and is undivided and is conformable to an intellect, an appetite, etc., which cannot be retained by those who say that being can be abstracted from specific and generic grades. That what I say here is in accord with the teaching of St. Thomas, I make him the judge who diligently examines his doctrine. Later, when we treat the analogy of being, we shall make this clear. For the present, let what we have said here suffice, especially that both the first and the second part of the conclusion follows from the preceding conclusion, which clearly is the doctrine of St. Thomas.

*The third part* of the conclusion is unanimously agreed upon by all Thomists. Thus, it is clear how the concept of being is abstracted from all beings inasmuch as they are alike, and not in the Scotistic manner. It is also clear how true is what St. Thomas says here, namely, that essence signifies something common to all generic and specific natures. For he did not intend that essence signifies some nature common to all

---

<sup>17</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 28, line 18) has *habet in se unde multis modis*. The Paris edition (p. 393, line 10) has *habet in se unum quod multis modi*.

<sup>18</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 28, line 19) has *quod quilibet ergo*. The Paris edition (p. 393, line 11) has *quod quilibet gradus*.

natures, but that all natures are alike in that they are essence. For all natures whatever, on the score that they are, have the character of essence by which they are things; just as all things have the character of being on the score of having *esse*, or that they are.

And because that by which a thing is constituted in its proper genus or species is what is signified by the definition, indicating what a thing is, philosophers have changed the name essence into the name quiddity. And that is why the Philosopher, in VII *Metaphysicae*,<sup>19</sup> frequently names this *what-a-thing-was-to-be*, that is, that by which a thing has *what-is*. It is also called *form*, in so far as form signifies the perfection or determination of each thing, as Avicenna says in III *Metaphysicae*.<sup>20</sup> This is also called by another name, nature, taking nature according to the first of the four ways which Boethius assigns in *de duabus naturis*;<sup>21</sup> that is, according as nature is said of anything which the intellect can in any way grasp. For a thing is not intelligible except through its definition and essence. And thus also the Philosopher says, in V *Metaphysicae*,<sup>22</sup> that every substance is a nature. But the term *nature*, taken in this way, seems to signify the essence of the thing as having an order, or ordered to the thing's proper activity, since no nature lacks a proper activity. The name *quidity*,<sup>23</sup> however, is taken from what is signified by the definition; but it is called essence in so far as through it, and in it, a thing has its act of existing.

15) In this third part of this chapter is explained how the names of essence differ in themselves. He enumerates five of its names: essence, quiddity, what-a-thing-was-to-be, form, and nature; of which the definition and differences are stated clearly enough in the text so that it is unnecessary to add to the explanation given.

Note, however, concerning what is taken from Boethius, that Boethius, in *libro de duabus naturis et una persona Christi*,<sup>24</sup> says that nature is taken in a fourfold way. First, it is every intelligible. Secondly, it is every substance. Thirdly, it is the intrinsic principle of motion. Fourthly, it is the specific essence or difference. Regarding this, if you do not have Boethius at hand, read if you will, in II *Sent.* of St. Thomas,<sup>25</sup> where St. Thomas adopts Boethius' first definition, since in this way it is common to essences as substantial, accidental, generic, and specific, etc.

---

<sup>19</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, VII ( ), 3, 1028b 34; St. Thomas, *In VIII Metaph.*, lect. 3, nn. 1307–1310.

<sup>20</sup> Avicenna, *Metaph.*, tr. III, c. 5; *ed. cit.*, fol. 80r.

<sup>21</sup> Boethius, *Liber de Persona et Duabus Naturis*, I; PL 64, 1341.

<sup>22</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, V ( ), 4, 1014b 35; St. Thomas, *In V Metaph.*, lect. 5, n. 826.

<sup>23</sup> *Qualitatis* in the text should read *quidditatis*.

<sup>24</sup> Boethius, *Liber de Persona et Duabus Naturis*, I; PL 64, 1341.

<sup>25</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *In Quatuor Libros Sententiarum*, II, d. 37, q. 1, a. 1.

## Chapter II<sup>1</sup>

But because being is predicated absolutely and primarily of substance, and secondarily and as in a qualified sense of accidents, it follows that essence is truly and properly in substances, but in accidents it is present in some manner and in a qualified sense.

16) Having settled the first issue, he follows up, in the second part of the treatise, how essence is found in different ways in diverse things, which was proposed as the second point to be explained. First, he explains in three chapters how essence is found in composite substances. Secondly, in two chapters how essence is found in composite substances. Thirdly, in one chapter how it is found in accidents.

Regarding composite substances, there are three things explained in those three chapters. In the first chapter, what is meant by the essence of composite substances. In the second chapter, how the essences of composite substances differ among themselves. In the third chapter, how they are related to logical intentions. He begins in this chapter, then, to follow up the question how essence is found in diverse things. First, he explains this in general by comparing all the essences of the universe in a twofold way. Secondly, he explains the meaning of the essence of composite substances, in three negative conclusions and a fourth affirmative one. Thirdly, he raises a question about the affirmative conclusion, and solves it.

First, he makes the first comparison between the essence of substances and accidents in this conclusion: substance truly and properly has essence; accidents, however, have it in a qualified sense. This he proves thus. As each thing is being, so it has essence; but substance is being simply, and accident is being in a qualified sense; therefore substance has essence simply, but accident has it in a qualified sense. The major is clear from what has been said in the preceding chapter. The minor, though present in VII *Metaph.*,<sup>2</sup> is still proved in the text in this way. That of which being is absolutely and primarily predicated is being simply, and that of which being is predicated secondarily and in a qualified sense is called being in a qualified sense; but being is predicated absolutely and primarily of substance, but secondarily and in a

---

<sup>1</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 31) has no title to this chapter. The Paris edition (p. 394) has the following title to this chapter. *Substantiarum essentiam proprie dici, accidentium autem non nisi secundum quid, ostendit: nobiliores item esse simplicium essentias, quam compositarum substantiarum probat: quod demum essentia substantiae compositae non materia, non forma, vel inter ea aliqua excogitata relatio, vel quippiam ipsi composito superadditum, sed ipsum sit compositum, variis rationibus demonstrat.*

<sup>2</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, VII ( ), 1, 1028a 13; St. Thomas, *In VII Metaph.*, lect. 1, n. 1245.



qualified sense of accidents; therefore substance is being simply, and accident is being in a qualified sense.

**Question III—**

**Whether<sup>3</sup> Being Is Predicated Primarily of Substance and Secondarily of Accident, or Is Predicated Univocally of Both?**

17) There arises at this point the question, whether being is predicated primarily of substance and secondarily of accident, or univocally of both.

In this question, I must treat *five points*.

First, I shall state the problem.

Secondly, I shall state the position of Scotus.

Thirdly, I shall advance arguments against the position of Scotus.

Fourthly, I shall state the position of St. Thomas.

Fifthly, I shall answer the opposing arguments.

18) *Concerning the first point*, we must know that something can be predicated primarily and secondarily of things in two ways. In one way, something can be predicated according to the existence (*esse*) of the predicate. In another way, according to the proper formality of the predicate. That which has existence (*esse*) more perfectly in one than in another is said to be predicated analogically according to existence (*esse*); and thus every genus is predicated primarily and secondarily of its species, since it has by necessity more perfect existence (*esse*) in one species than in another. Whence the Commentator<sup>4</sup> says that the priority and the posteriority of the species does not impede the unity of the genus. And this is not the issue here, for it is immediately known to all that being is in substance in a more perfect way than in accidents, and that in this way it is predicated primarily and secondarily.

That is said to be predicated analogically, or primarily and secondarily according to its proper formality, which is predicated of one thing without relation to another, but of a second only in relation to something else. For example, health is predicated of an animal without relation to diet, medicine, and urine; but is not predicated of these without relation to an animal. For an animal is said to be healthy without any addition, while urine is not said to be healthy except in so far as it is a sign of health existing in the animal; and, likewise, diet is not said to be healthy except in so far as it conserves health, and so with the rest. For when you define the health predicated of the animal, you do not

---

<sup>3</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 32) has *Utrum ens . . . dicatur, an de utroque*. The Paris edition (p. 398) has *Num ens . . . dicatur, ar de utroque*.

<sup>4</sup> Averroes, In *XII Metaph.*, com. 2; *ed. cit.*, t. VIII, fol. 137r–v.

place in the definition of it a relation to one of these. But when you define the health predicated of urine, you include in the definition of it a relation to the health of an animal with the health itself of animal; and similarly, in the definition of diet and medicine in so far as they are healthy. For you say, as was just now said, that urine is healthy in so far as it is a sign of health; diet in so far as it conserves it; and medicine in so far as it is a cause of it. It is in this way that the question arises, whether being is predicated analogically so that it is predicated absolutely of substance, but of accidents only as relative to substance. This is the same as to ask whether substance, in so far as it is being, does not include accident, and whether accident, in so far as it is being, includes substance. It is on this that the issue between Scotus and ourselves hangs, since it is conceded by all that accident, in so far as it is accident, includes substance; but not accident in so far as it is being. So for the first point.

19) *Concerning the second point*, Scotus<sup>5</sup> posits this conclusion: being is univocal to substance and accident, God and creatures. He proves it thus. Every intellect, which is certain of one concept and doubtful of others, has a concept of which it is certain, which is different from the concept of which it is doubtful; every intellect can be certain that God or a proper attribute is being, but uncertain whether it is finite or infinite, or whether it is substance or accident; therefore the concept of being is other than these concepts, and is of itself neither of them, but is included in each; therefore it is univocal. The major is clear from the terms. The minor experience teaches.

*Secondly thus*. Being is not univocal; therefore God is not naturally knowable by us with some simple concept; this is false; therefore, from the denial of the consequent, etc. The consequence is proved: no concept can be produced in our intellect which may not be contained essentially or virtually in the object illuminated in the phantasm; but a concept which is not univocal to God and the object illuminated in the phantasm is not contained either essentially or virtually in the object illuminated in the phantasm; therefore no concept can be produced in our intellect unless it is univocal to the object illuminated in the phantasm. But this is a creature; therefore every simple concept which we have of God is univocal to the creature, and consequently the concept of being is univocal. The major is clear. The minor is explained: a created object does not contain essentially an uncreated concept, as is known in itself; nor virtually, since the prior is not included virtually in the posterior, but conversely.

---

<sup>5</sup> Scotus, *In I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 2, nn. 2, 5–15; *ed. cit.*, V, Part I, 387–88, 391–96; d. 3, q. 3, nn. 6–12; *ed. cit.*, V, Part I, 440–41, 444–46; d. 8, q. 2, nn. 2–3; *ed. cit.*, V, Part II, 716.

*Thirdly*, thus. Every metaphysical reflection about God proceeds by considering the formal character (*ratio*) of something, then by subtracting from it the imperfections it has in creatures and preserving the formal character, then by attributing to it the highest perfection, and so locating it in God; therefore every reflection about God supposes that the intellect has the same univocal concept which it gets from creatures.

*Fourthly* thus. Being is not univocal to substance and accident; therefore substance is not naturally knowable by us; this is false; therefore, etc. The consequence holds because, since substance does not immediately modify our intellect to any intellection of it, but only a sensible accident does, it follows that we cannot have a quidditative concept of substance unless such a concept can be abstracted from the concept of accident; but no such quidditative concept can be abstracted from the concept of accident unless it is univocal to substance and accident.

What Scotus lays down in this proof, namely, that substance does not modify our intellect to any intellection of it, is proved thus. When something by its presence modifies the intellect, the absence of that thing can be naturally known by the intellect when it is [not]<sup>6</sup> modified. For example, it is clear from II *de Anima*,<sup>7</sup> that sight knows darkness when light is not present, because then sight is not modified. Therefore, if the intellect is naturally and immediately modified by substance to an act concerning it, it would follow that when substance were not present, it could be naturally known not to be present. And thus it could be naturally known that the substance of bread is not in the consecrated host; which is manifestly false.

*Fifthly* he argues from texts. In II *Metaph.*,<sup>8</sup> where Aristotle proves that the cause of being and truth are highest beings and true, he lays down this proposition. Whatever is something in the highest degree is predicated of others inasmuch as it is univocal to them; therefore Aristotle speaks of being as univocal when he speaks of the cause of entity, namely, of God and others; otherwise his reasoning would not be valid. For he argues thus. The univocal cause of being and truth is being in the highest degree; and truly God is this kind; therefore. Also, Avicenna<sup>9</sup> says that substance and quantity have no common intention except that of being, some of which are as species and some are as proper accidents. In the fourth chapter he advances the argument that

---

<sup>6</sup> In the text, *not* is missing.

<sup>7</sup> Aristotle, *On the Soul*, II, 10, 422a 20; St. Thomas, *In de Anima*, II, lect. 21; ed. Pirotta, n. 509.

<sup>8</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, II (a), 1, 993b; 24; St. Thomas, *In II Metaph.*, lect. 2, n. 292.

<sup>9</sup> Avicenna, *Metaph.*, tr. I, c. 2; *ed. cit.*, fol. 70v.

was introduced concerning certain and doubtful concepts. All, he says, imagine the perfection (*certitudinem*) of being, but they are in doubt whether it be an agent or a patient. Algazel has it, in his *Metaphysica*,<sup>10</sup> that some men have thought that being does not predicate a concept different from its inferiors, asserting that the being (*esse*) of an accident is nothing else than the being (*esse*) of the substance. Many other arguments for this are advanced. But because, as will be clear, they do not prove the univocity, but rather the otherness of the concept of being, I leave them out; also because from what we have to say, the response to all of them will be clear to anyone with ability. So for the second point.

20) *Concerning the third point*, I argue first. No univocate has in the definition of its univocal perfection anything more than the other univocates have. For you, substance and accident are univocates in being. Therefore accident does not have more in the definition of its univocal perfection, namely of its being, than substance.

The reasoning is valid, but the conclusion is false; therefore one of the premises must be false. Not the major since it is had from the ante-predicaments; therefore the minor, which is the conclusion of our adversary. The falsity of this conclusion is seen from VII *Metaph.*,<sup>11</sup> where it is said that in the definition of accident, in so far as it is being, substance is included. Whence the Commentator says in the third comment,<sup>12</sup> that sitting and standing are not said to be beings without substance; now it is clear that in the definition of substance, in so far as it is being, neither accident nor substance is included, since according to them [Aristotle and Averroes] the definition of substance abstracts from them. Secondly, the falsity of this conclusion is clear from the words of Anthony Trombeta who, in considering this point, agrees that in the definition of accident, in so far as it is being, substance is included. Whence, though the question can have the appearance of being solved by Scotus when he adds to the text of Aristotle—an addition which destroys the text—it can in no way be solved by Anthony Trombeta who, forced by the truth itself, admits in his *quodlibet*. the falsity of this conclusion, something Scotus would deny.

*Secondly, I argue* thus. Being is univocal, is predicated quidditatively of many things differing in species, and is included in no quidditative difference; therefore it is a genus. The consequence holds from the definition of genus and the condition stated by Scotus, in I *Sent.*,<sup>13</sup>

---

<sup>10</sup> Algazel, *Metaphysica*, tract. I, cc. 1 and 6; in *Logica et philosophia*, Coloniae, 1506.

<sup>11</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, VII ( ), 1, 1028a 18; St. Thomas, *In VII Metaph.*, lect. 1, n. 1251.

<sup>12</sup> Averroes, *In VII Metaph.*, com. 3; *ed. cit.*, t. VIII, fol. 72v.

<sup>13</sup> Scotus, *In I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 3, nn. 6–12; *ed. cit.*, Vol. V, Part I, pp. 440–441, 444–446.

for he says that the last phrase given is demanded for the genus, and rightly so according to Aristotle.<sup>14</sup> This first and second part of the antecedent is the same as Scotus'. The third part is proved thus. If being were included in some difference which was not ultimate, it would follow that by adding to genus a difference which was not ultimate, being would be nonsense; this is false; therefore.

The consequence holds, because being would be included twice in the same way: once by reason of the genus, and once by reason of the difference. For example, if being were quidditatively included in the definition of animal and rational, it would be nonsense to say *rational animal* for, since the first part of the definition of animal is being, the proper definition of animal will be being A, B, C. In like manner, since the first part of the definition of rational would be being, the definition of rational will be being D, E, F. Thus, by saying *rational animal*, you will say being A, B, C, being D, E, F, and consequently you include being twice, and you expressly perpetrate nonsense. Nor is there need to attack the answer given above by Scotus to this argument, since it is not to the point. For he says that as we say *white animal* without nonsense, since the being included in the definition of whiteness accidentally denominates the being included in the definition of animal; so in the point here we say *rational animal* without nonsense, since the being included in rational denominates essentially the being included in animal.

Now this is not the point. For it is one thing to speak of being in its common notion, in which things are indistinctly univocated, and another to speak of being viewed in particular. For though the difficulty can be glossed over that a being particularized to *white* and *rational* denominates a being particularized to *animal*, still it cannot be understood that the first part of the definition of *white*, taken formally, denominates the first part of the definition of *animal*. For it is being taken in the same way, since it is univocal. It remains, therefore, that it is nonsense for Scotus to say *rational animal*; in fact, *white animal* is nonsense arguing the same as before by using the quidditative definitions in place of their names.

If one who puts trust in the words of Scotus should say that being is not quidditatively included in *rational* and *white*, but in *rationality* and *whiteness*, our principal contention still follows, namely, that being is not quidditatively included in any difference, because rationality, according to the true teaching of Avicenna, is not a difference, but the principle of difference. For difference is predicated of the species, and rationality is not; wherefore, etc.

---

<sup>14</sup> Aristotle, *Topics*, IV, 6, 127a 28 ff.

*Thirdly I argue* thus. Being is univocal of substance and accident; therefore being expressly falls within the definition of substance; therefore being explicitly falls within the definition of man; this is not fitting and is opposed to the doctrine of Aristotle and common teaching; therefore, etc.

The first consequence is proved from the fact that every univocal superior explicitly falls within the definition of its essential inferior, as animal explicitly falls within the definition of man. The second consequence is proved from the text of Aristotle, in II *libro Topicorum*,<sup>15</sup> namely this. When<sup>16</sup> something is placed in a definition of a thing, if its notion (*ratio*) is put there in place of it, the understanding will be clearer. Therefore, if substance is placed in the definition of man and in place of substance we may put its notion, in which being is explicitly included, in order that the definition be clearer, it follows that being ought to be explicitly placed in the definition of man to make it clearer. Neither does the fact that being itself is the most common in extension nor the lack of differences prohibit this; just as from these considerations being, as a univocal and quidditative predicate, is not prohibited from falling under the notion of substance. And this is confirmed by Scotus, who says in I *Sent.*,<sup>17</sup> that being is the first thing known by distinct knowledge, in that being falls within the quidditative concept of everything as time first quidditative predicate. So for the third point.

21) *Concerning the fourth* principal point, I first make note of the difference between the univocal, the purely equivocal, and the analogous. The univocated<sup>18</sup> are those whose name is common, and the meaning according to that name is simply the same. The purely equivocated are those whose name is common, and the meaning corresponding to that name is simply different. The analogated are those whose name is common, and the meaning corresponding to that name is in one sense the same and in one sense different, or is the same in a qualified sense, and different in a qualified sense. For example,

---

<sup>15</sup> Aristotle, *Topics*, II, 2, 110a 7.

<sup>16</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 36, line 17 from bottom) has *quando*. The Paris edition (p. 389), line 19 from bottom) has *quum*.

<sup>17</sup> Scotus, *In I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 2, n. 24; *ed. cit.*, V, Part I, 411.

<sup>18</sup> English has no word to express precisely the subject of a univocal or analogous perfection. Thus "analogous" is said of both the subject and the perfection. The Latin of the author distinguishes these by using *univocata*, *aequivocata* and *analogata* for the subjects of perfections and by using *univocum*, *aequivocum*, *analogum* for the perfections of the subjects. We have used "univocal, equivocal and analogous (and analogue)" for the perfections and "univocated, equivocated, analogated" for the subjects of such perfections. The harm thus done the purity of the English is permitted in the name of justice to the author, who himself had to mould Latin to his purposes.

animal and medicine are analogates under health, whence they have that name in common; for we call them both healthy. But the definition of them inasmuch as they are healthy is in one sense the same and in one sense different. For an animal, in so far as it is healthy, has health. Medicine, in so far as it is healthy, is a cause of health. These definitions are in one sense the same, since health is included in both, and in one sense different, since they look to health in different ways. Whence, the analogue is a medium between the pure equivocal and the univocal; just as between what is simply the same and simply different, there is a medium which is the same in a qualified sense and different in a qualified sense. And as a medium takes on the nature of both extremes, the analogue has in a way many meanings and in a way one. For this reason we find at times that among illustrious philosophers the analogue sometimes has many meanings, and sometimes one meaning.

Observe, secondly, that there are two sorts of analogates: some by reason of a determinate relation of one to the other; some by reason of proportionality. For example, substance and accident are analogates under being in the first way; God and creatures in the second way, since the distance between God and creatures is infinite. Now these analogates differ in many ways, because analogates in the first mode are such that what is posterior is defined, according to its analogous name, through its prior; think of accident in so far as it is being through substance. But analogates in the second mode are not so defined, for a creature in so far as it is being is not defined through God. Whence, analogates in the first mode have a common name and a meaning corresponding to the name which is the same in a qualified sense and different in a qualified sense. Owing to this, that analogue is predicated simply, that is, without any addition, of the primary analogate, and of other things only in so far as they are related differently to the primary analogate which, as is clear from the example of health, falls within their meanings.

Analogates in the second mode have a common name and a meaning according to that name which is in some sense the same and in some sense different; not because the analogue is predicated simply of the primary analogate and of others relative to the primary, but because they have a meaning which is the same in a qualified sense, owing to the sameness of proportion which is found in them, and different in a qualified sense, owing to the diversity of the given natures with these<sup>19</sup> proportions. An example: substantial form and matter and the form and matter of accidents are analogates under the names of

---

<sup>19</sup> We have changed *illius* in the text to read *illis*.

*form* and *matter*; for they have a common name, that is, *form* and *matter*, and the meaning corresponding to the names of *form* or *matter* is partly the same and partly different in this way. Substantial form is to substance as accidental form is to accident; in like manner, the matter of substance is to substance as the matter of accident is to accident; for in all instances the sameness of proportions is preserved with diversity of natures and oneness of name. It is this kind of analogy that the Commentator explains,<sup>20</sup> and clearer, following Aristotle.<sup>21</sup>

After this sort of preparation, I lay down *two conclusions*. *The first* is: being is analogically predicated of substance and accident in both modes of analogy. *The second* is: being is predicated of God and creatures only in the second mode of analogy.

*The first conclusion* can be proved by the arguments advanced against Scotus, and especially the first; also, by the text of Aristotle<sup>22</sup> and of the Commentator on the same text,<sup>23</sup> where it is expressly said that being is not one, but has reference to one. Also, XII *Metaph.*<sup>24</sup> expressly says that the principles of the categories are in no way the same, except according to a proportion. On this text we can argue thus. Things which have no identity except that of proportion are not univocal; but the proper principles of substance and accident are such; therefore, etc. The minor is expressly stated in the text of Aristotle. The major is clear from the terms, for if they have no other identity but that of proportion, they must lack a univocal unity. This text is to be noted against Scotists because, if they concede that being has an analogous identity, they say along with this that it has also a univocal identity; which is the opposite of what Aristotle says, since he allows only an identity of proportion among the principles of the categories.

*The second conclusion* is not proved now other than by the text of St. Thomas in *quaestionibus de Veritate*<sup>25</sup> where, inquiring in what manner knowledge is an analogue of divine and created knowledge, he expressly admits that it is an analogue in the second mode of analogy, and not in the first. Thus when being is predicated of God and creature, it is in this way predicated according to proportionality. This means that as God is to His being (*esse*), so the creature is to its being (*esse*). We will say more of this elsewhere when we treat the question. For the present, let it suffice to have made these few remarks; from which it

---

<sup>20</sup> Averroes, *In XII Metaph.*, com. 28; *ed. cit.*, t. VIII, fol. 146v–147r.

<sup>21</sup> Averroes, *In Ethicorum*, I, com. 7; *ed. cit.*, fol. 5r–v.

<sup>22</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, IV ( ), 1, 1003a 33; St. Thomas, *In IV Metaph.*, lect. 1, n. 534 ff.

<sup>23</sup> Averroes, *In IV Metaph.*, com. 1; *ed. cit.*, t. VIII, fol. 31r.

<sup>24</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, XII ( ), 4, 1070b 16; St. Thomas, *In XII Metaph.*, lect. 4, n. 2464.

<sup>25</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *De Veritate*, II, 11.



can be seen<sup>26</sup> that the formal concept of being is one and represents as unequal the being (*esse*) of substance and accident, and of God and creature. And the objective concept of being has only the unity of determinate proportion arising from the identity of the term, or from the unity of proportionality and the identity of proportions. From which we conclude that, since for Aristotle<sup>27</sup> such a unity suffices for the object of science, it is not necessary to say that being is univocal in order for it to have attributes found in contradiction, and have the other things of this sort belonging to it. So for the fourth point.

21<sup>a</sup>) *Concerning the fifth point*, I shall now answer the arguments in order.

*The reply to the first argument is expressed thus.* If anything proves the difference of a concept, it proves the concept is not univocal, as Scotus himself says. Therefore we gladly concede this point, as does Avicenna, who holds that being is not a quidditative predicate, and concedes that being says another concept, but not a univocal or quidditative one.

*The reply to the second argument.* I deny the consequence. Concerning its proof, I say that for something to contain another virtually can be understood in two ways: first, as a cause contains in its own power the effect; secondly, as an effect contains the power of the cause by sharing in it. Since this is the case, the minor is false, for any effect virtually contains God in the second way. Nor is it necessary that the one containing in this way be prior; in fact, it is necessarily posterior. If one told me that this is a misuse of words, because to contain virtually is taken by everyone as applicable only to a cause, I say that if the force of the argument is in the words, then the major is false, because there are three ways of containing: namely, essentially, virtually, and participatively as the effect contains in itself the cause.

*The reply to the third argument.* After conceding the entire antecedent, I deny time consequence; for the analogy of that formal notion suffices.

*The reply to the fourth argument.* I deny the consequence. To its proof I say that it lays down what is false, namely, that substance does not modify the intellect by its proper species. Whence to its proof, I say that quantity and accident in the Eucharist act and are acted upon to the full that that substance would act and be acted on, if it were. For just as quantity and accidents received the mode of being of substance, namely, to be without a subject, so also the action and passion of substance. And therefore from many hosts perceived by sensation the intelligible species of the substance of bread, and a quidditative

---

<sup>26</sup> *Inotescere* in the text should read *innotescere*.

<sup>27</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, IV ( ), 1,1003a 30–32; St. Thomas, *In IV Metaph.*, lect. 1, n. 547.

knowledge of it, is generated in the intellect; just as they act in nutrition as if bread were there. For we are nourished no less by those accidents than by other hosts which have not been consecrated; just as from consecrated hosts worms and ashes are generated no less than from non-consecrated hosts. Whence I say, in answer to the argument, that bread which is absent modifies the intellect because it is not altogether absent; for its own accident remains there in place of the bread. Therefore this case is not the same as that of sight in respect to darkness. Nor is the text of Aristotle against us on this point, since all such examples are concerned with the simple absence of the object, which we do not here concede as far as operations are concerned.

*The reply to the fifth argument.* I say that, because a medium compared to one extreme as its opposite, takes on the character of the other extreme, as is said in *V Phys.*,<sup>28</sup> therefore an analogous term compared to an equivocal term, which simply says diverse meanings, is there called by Aristotle a univocal term; and rightly so, since he uses an analogous term in so far as it is characterized by unity. For it is necessary in order to verify the highest cause that the cause and the effect come together not by language only, but also by some formal meaning which is in some way the same in them. Hence the text in question is not against us.

Regarding Avicenna and Algazel, I say that they do not oppose us on this point, since they imply the otherness, and not the univocity, of the concept of being.

Of substances, some are simple and some composite, and essence is in both. But, in simple substances essence is found in a truer and higher manner, according as they have a higher act of existing; for they are the cause of composite things—at least the first and simple substance, which God is.

22) Here he gives the second comparison by which he compares substances among themselves. His conclusion is: simple substances have their essence in a higher and truer way than composite substances; which he proves in two ways. First thus. Those things are higher in essence which are higher in existence (*esse*); the existence (*esse*) of simple substances is higher than that of composite substances; therefore the essence of simple substances is higher. Secondly thus. A non-univocal cause (add: efficient) has an essence higher than its effect; at least the first simple substance is a univocal cause of composite things; therefore a simple substance is of a more perfect essence than a composite substance. For evidence of this point, note that, as you find in St. Thomas,<sup>29</sup> simplicity of itself implies neither perfection nor imperfec-

---

<sup>28</sup> Aristotle, *Physics*, V, 1, 224b 30; St. Thomas, *In V Phys.*, lect. 1, n. 11.

<sup>29</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *In IV Sent.*, d. 11, q. 2, a. 1, *ad 1*.

tion, for a thing is not more perfect by reason of its simplicity, but rather by being simple in a certain way, that is, it has subsisting simplicity. Thus prime matter is completely simple, and accidental forms are simple, and yet they are not more perfect than composite substances. And therefore, when we say that simple substances are more perfect than composite substances, you should understand this not of just any simple substance, but of simple things subsisting in their simplicity; all separated substances are such.

Because of this beware here of this opinion of Scotus in *I Sent.*,<sup>30</sup> holding that simplicity is a perfection without qualification. Rather, in order that you may know how to safeguard the truth and oppose error, take note of what a perfection without qualification is.

According to Anselm,<sup>31</sup> a perfection without qualification is that in each thing which is better than not-that. I interpret this text as follows. In each thing, in so far as it is an individual of being, that is, this being, not in so far as it is an individual of this or that nature, think of this man or this angel, it is better, etc., because a comparative includes its positive. Therefore it is better, that is, it gives a better good or perfection than not-that, i.e., than anything incompatible with it, so that *not-that* is not taken as contradictory, but as the incompatible. Thus perfection without qualification demands two conditions. First, that it name perfection; secondly, that that perfection in an individual of being be better than whatever is incompatible with itself in that being. For if the first condition be lacking, both relation and negation are excluded from perfections simply. If the second condition be lacking, reasoning, laughing, singing, and this type are not perfections simply, because these things, though they be better in an individual of this or that nature, are not better in an individual of being. We have said that *not-that* is taken of the incompatible, and not the contradictory. Otherwise, everything positive would be a perfection simply, because in an individual of being, anything positive is better than any contradictory taken formally. Be careful not to understand the first condition in a superficial way, because if it is not fulfilled, the simplicity of a thing does not name a perfection simply. For simplicity is nothing else than a negation of composition; thus it is not a perfection, but the negation of imperfection. For this reason, the following manner of argument is invalid: in an individual of being, whatever is incompatible with simplicity names imperfection; therefore simplicity itself is better in each thing than non-simplicity, and consequently is a perfection simply. For

---

<sup>30</sup> Scotus, *In I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 1, n. 6; *ed cit.*, V, Part II, 712.

<sup>31</sup> St. Anselm, *Monologium*, c. XV; PL 158, 163.

it is necessary to add in the antecedent: and simplicity names a perfection; but this is false because simplicity is a negative predicate.

One can argue against the position of Scotus thus. No perfection without qualification is kept in a relation as relation; but simplicity is kept in relation as relation, since indeed "to" is most simple, for it includes no composition, and universally for Scotus every ultimate difference of a relation is most simple; therefore. The major is clear from the fact that for Scotus and ourselves, a relation as relation says neither perfection nor imperfection.

Moreover, what is divided into quantified and non-quantified is not a perfection simply—this is clear, since it implies that something would be non-quantified and a perfection simply; but simplicity is divided into quantified and non-quantified; therefore. The minor is clear, since simplicity is divided into relative and absolute simplicity; but relative simplicity is non-quantified.

If it be said against this that a relation, taken formally, is not simple, but that simplicity is denominatively predicated of it, this does not evade the argument, for relative simplicity is on this showing an attribute of relation, or an intrinsic mode. But it is impossible that one of these be more perfect than that whose it is, so that it may be argued thus. No attribute is of more perfect being than its subject; simplicity denominating a relation is an attribute of relation, just as an attribute of a superior is universally an attribute of an inferior, although not primarily so; therefore simplicity denominating a relation is not of more perfect being than the relation; but a relation is not quantified; therefore relative simplicity is not quantified; therefore neither is it perfection simply. Therefore the position taken remains true, namely that simplicity is divided into quantified and non-quantified.

You can argue in the same way if they should say that simplicity is a mode, though this seems less consonant with the truth. Therefore immaterial substances are more perfect in essence than composite substances, not by reason of simplicity, but by reason of subsistent simplicity and of joining in themselves so much perfection, which they enjoy so indivisibly.

But because the essences of these substances are more hidden from us, then we ought to begin with the essences of composite substances, so that from easier things, learning may advance more readily. In composite substances, therefore, form and matter are found, as the soul and body in man. It cannot be said, however, that either one of these alone is called the essence.<sup>32</sup> For it is clear that matter alone is not the essence,

---

<sup>32</sup> Cajetan's text reads: *Non autem potest dici quod alterum eorum tantum essentia dicatur essentia*. See St. Thomas, *De Ente et Essentia*, c. II; in R. P. J. Perrier, O.P., *Opuscula Omnia Necnon Opera Minora*, t. I,

(footnote continued on the next page)

since through its essence a thing is knowable and placed in its species and genus. But matter is not a principle of knowledge, nor as a cause does it determine anything in a genus or species. That alone which is actually something does this.<sup>33</sup>

23) Here, in the second part of this chapter, St. Thomas will explain what is the essence in composite substances; and because we must begin with what is more knowable, he posits this negative conclusion: matter alone is not the essence of composite substances, which he proves in two ways. The first is this. That which is the essence of a composite substance is the principle of knowing it; but matter alone is not the principle of knowing a composite substance; therefore matter alone is not the essence of a composite substance. The major is clear, since each thing is known quidditatively through its essence, whence arise all other knowledges about it. The minor is taken from IX *Metaph.*,<sup>34</sup> where it is said that the principle of knowing is an act, and not a potency.

The second reason is this. The essence of a composite substance is that by which a thing is placed in a genus and species; but matter alone is not that by which a thing is placed in a genus and species; therefore matter alone is not the essence of a composite substance. The major is evident from a consideration of singulars, for Socrates is by his nature placed in the human species; and likewise in the genus of animal, and so for the rest. The minor is proved in this way. That by which anything is placed in a species must be actual, since it is the principle distinguishing it from other species, and by which it is placed in<sup>35</sup> this grade of being in the universe; but matter alone does not include actuality.

Again, neither can the form alone of a composite substance be called its essence, although some would try to assert this.<sup>36</sup> For it is evident from what has been said<sup>37</sup> that essence is what is signified by the definition of a thing. But the definition of natural substances includes not only the form but matter, for other-

(footnote continued from the previous page)

---

*Opuscula Philosophica* (Paris: Lethielleux, 1949), n. 4, p. 27: *Non autem potest dici quod alterum eorum tantum essentia dicatur*. Obviously, the last *essentia* in Cajetan's text should be omitted.

<sup>33</sup> Cajetan's text reads: . . . *materia autem non est cognitionis principium, nec secundum causam aliquid ad speciem vel ad genus determinatur, sed secundum id solum quo in actu aliquid est*. See St. Thomas, *De Ente et Essentia*, c. II; ed. Perrier, n. 4, p. 27: . . . *sed materia neque principium cognitionis est, neque secundum eam aliquid ad speciem vel ad genus determinatur, sed secundum illud quod actu est*.

<sup>34</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, IX ( ), 9, 1051a 30.

<sup>35</sup> There is a printing error in the text; it should read *in*.

<sup>36</sup> St. Thomas attributes this doctrine to Averroes and some of his followers. See St. Thomas, *In VII Metaph.*, lect. 9, n. 1467.

<sup>37</sup> *Ex hiis* in the text should read *Ex his*.

wise natural and mathematical definitions would not differ. Nor can it be said that matter, posited in the definition of natural substances, is as something added to its essence or as a being outside that nature or its essence, because this mode of definition is more proper to accidents, which do not have a perfect essence. Thus it is necessary that the definition of accidents must include a substance or subject, which is outside their genus. Therefore it is evident that essence embraces matter and form.

24) Here is stated the second negative conclusion: the essence of a composite substance is not form alone. This he shows in a single proof. That is the essence of a composite substance, which is signified by its definition; but form alone is not signified by its definition; therefore form alone is not the essence of a composite substance. The major is clear in itself. The minor is proved. Natural definitions differ from mathematical definitions in that mathematical definitions signify form alone, that is, form without sensible matter, while natural definitions signify form and sensible matter.

But one can say to this argument that to be signified through the definition happens in two ways. In one way, to be signified as part of the thing defined; and in another way, as the subject of the thing defined, or as something which supports the thing defined in a natural definition. Then the form alone is signified as the thing defined. Therefore the quiddity is the form alone, and matter is signified as a support of the quiddity.

Against this response he adds verbatim this reason. That which is proper to accidents owing to the imperfection of their essence does not belong to specific substances; but to include in their definition something outside their essence is proper to accidents owing to the imperfection of their essence; therefore this does not belong to specific substances. The major is clear from the terms, for what is proper to something owing to its own imperfection does not belong to another which has a perfection opposed to that imperfection. The minor is clear from VII *Metaph.*<sup>38</sup>

Regarding the major, note that although it belongs to the form of a part, say the soul, to be defined through something outside its essence and consequently this seems not to be proper to accidents, but common to them and to forms of parts; yet as a matter of fact it is proper to accidents. The reason is that definition is only of things existing in a direct predicamental line, having a complete species, since definition is composed of genus and difference. But of all beings and things complete in species, accidents alone are definable by an addition. And therefore

---

<sup>38</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, VII ( ), 4, 1030a 7.

St. Thomas says that it is proper to accidents to be defined in such way. Thus also the soul is defined through something outside its essence to the extent it participates in the nature of an accident to be in another.

However, we cannot say that essence signifies the relation which exists between matter and form, or something superadded to these, because this would be of necessity accidental or extraneous to the thing, nor could the thing be known through it. All of these belong to essence. For by form, which is the actuality of matter, matter is made being in act and this determinate thing. Thus what is added to it later does not make matter to be actual simply, but to be actual, as accidents do. For example, whiteness makes a thing actually white. Thus when such a form is acquired, it is not said to be generated simply, but in a qualified sense.

25) here is given the third negative conclusion. The essence of a composite substance is not some relation between matter and form or something added to the composite of matter and form. This he proves from two arguments. The first thus. Every relation between matter and form, and likewise everything added to a composite of matter and form, is an accident extraneous to the substance; no essence of a composite substance is an extraneous accident; therefore. The minor is clear in itself. The major is proved: everything added to a being simply, making it to be formally such a being, is an accident with a nature extraneous to substance; every relation between matter and form, and everything added to the composite, happen to a being simply, and make it a being of this sort; therefore all such factors are accidents with a nature extraneous to the composite substance.

The minor of this last syllogism is explained. First, because a substantial form coming to matter makes it be simply and be this determinate thing, as is said in II *de Anima*.<sup>39</sup> Secondly, it is explained,<sup>40</sup> because generation terminated in a substantial form is generation simply; and terminated in an accidental form, it is generation in a qualified sense, as is said in V *Phys*.<sup>41</sup> For when the matter of Socrates acquires a substantial form, then Socrates is said without any addition to become; but when Socrates, once the substantial form is had, acquires size, he is not said to become simply and without any addition, but to become large.

The second reason is this. No addition, such as that relation between, or anything consequent upon the composite of matter and form,

---

<sup>39</sup> Aristotle, *On the Soul*, II, 1, 412a 6; St. Thomas, *In II de Anima*, lect. 1, n. 215.

<sup>40</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 44, line 15) has *declaratur*. The Paris edition (p. 404, line 14 from bottom) has *declarabitur*.

<sup>41</sup> Aristotle, *Physics*, V, 1, 225a 12; St. Thomas, *In V Phys.*, lect. 2, nn. 5 and 6.

is a proper *a priori* principle of a perfect knowledge of a composite substance; the essence of a composite substance is a proper *a priori* principle of complete knowledge of it; therefore, etc.

It remains, then, that the word *essence* in composite substances signifies what is composed of matter and form. This agrees with the statement of Boethius in *commento Praedicamentorum*,<sup>42</sup> where he says that *ousia* signifies the composite. For *ousia* in Greek is the same as essence in our language, as Boethius himself says in *libro de Duabus naturis*.<sup>43</sup> Avicenna, too, says that the quiddity of composite substances is the composition itself of form and matter.<sup>44</sup> Also, the Commentator says, *super VII Metaphysicae*:<sup>45</sup> "The nature which species have in things which are subject to generation is a mean, that is, a composite of matter and form." Reason also is in agreement with this, because the act of existing of a composite substance is not that of the form alone nor of the matter alone, but of the composite itself. Now, essence is that according to which a thing is said to be. Thus it is necessary that essence, by which a thing is called a being, should not be the form alone nor matter alone, but both, even though the form alone in its way is the cause of such an act of existing or essence. For thus we see in the case of other things which are constituted from several principles that<sup>46</sup> they do not take their name from one of these principles alone, but from that which includes both. This is evident in the case of tastes, for sweetness is caused by the hot dissolving the moist. And although in this way heat is the cause of sweetness, still a body is not called sweet from its heat, but from its taste which includes the hot and the moist.

26) Here is stated the fourth affirmative conclusion: essence in a composite substance signifies a composite of matter and form. He concludes this from the texts of Boethius, Avicenna, and the Commentator; and proves it in this way. That by which a composite substance is being, as by a complete principle denominating it, is the composite; but the essence of a composite substance itself is that by which, as by a complete principle denominating it, composite substance is being; therefore the essence of a composite substance is composite. The minor is clear in itself, for Socrates is called and is being in virtue of the essence which he has. The major is explained thus. Whenever some thing is constituted by plural principles, it is not such by one of them as a complete principle, but by both. But a composite substance is being constituted by plural principles, namely, matter and form. Therefore it

---

<sup>42</sup> Boethius, *In I Categoriae*; PL 64,184.

<sup>43</sup> Boethius, *Liber de Persona et Duabus Naturis*, III; PL 64, 1344.

<sup>44</sup> Avicenna, *Metaph.*, tr. V, c. 5; *ed. cit.*, fol. 90r.

<sup>45</sup> Averroes, *In VII Metaph.*, com. 27; *ed. cit.*, t. VIII, fol. 83v.

<sup>46</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 45, line 7) has *quia*. The Paris edition (p. 405, line 25 from bottom) has *quod*.



is and is called being, not in virtue of one of its constituents as a complete principle, but in virtue of both. But that which is composed of both is composite. Therefore that by which a composite substance is being as by a complete principle denominating it, must necessarily be composite; which was the point to be proved. The major of this last syllogism is explained in the words of the text by an example from savor, as from what is more knowable, and the explanation is quite clear in itself. But what is said concerning form, that it alone is the cause of being, will become clear later.

#### Question IV—

#### Whether<sup>47</sup> Matter Is a Part of the Quiddity of a Natural Thing?

27) Regarding what has been said, there arises the question, whether matter is a part of the quiddity of a natural thing.

In this question, I shall consider *three points*.

First, I shall give the opinion of the Commentator.

Secondly, I shall state the position of St. Thomas.

Thirdly, I shall answer the opposing arguments.

28) *Concerning the first point*, the Commentator<sup>48</sup> thinks that matter is not a part of the quiddity of a natural thing, but falls into the definition of a natural thing as a subject bearing that quiddity. In comment XXXIV, he advances the following argument for this. The essence of a thing is substance manifesting the thing quidditatively; matter is not substance manifesting the quiddity of a thing; therefore matter does not pertain to the essence of a thing. The minor can be gathered from *I Phys.*,<sup>49</sup> where it is said that matter is in itself unknowable, and consequently is not manifestive of another. From comment XXI, we can deduce an argument of this sort for this position. If the quiddity of man were man composed of matter and form, then the quiddity of man would have a quiddity; and thus there would be a quiddity of quiddity, which is false.

The consequence holds, because when two things are the same, whatever has one has also the other; if, therefore, the quiddity of man and man-composite are the same, since man composite has a quiddity, it follows that the quiddity of man has a quiddity. Aristotle seems to teach this same position in *VII Metaph.*,<sup>50</sup> where he expressly says that

---

<sup>47</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 46) has *Utrum*. The Paris edition (p. 406) has *Num*.

<sup>48</sup> Averroes, *In VII Metaph.*, com. 21 and 34; *ed. cit.*, t. VIII, fol. 80v and 86v.

<sup>49</sup> Aristotle, *Physics*, 1, 7, 191a 7; St. Thomas, *In I Phys.*, lect. 13, n. 9.

<sup>50</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, VII ( ), 10,1035a 1; St. Thomas, *In VII Metaph.*, lect. 9, n. 1467.

matter is not a part of the quiddity, and in II *Phys.*,<sup>51</sup> where he locates the parts of the definition in the genus of formal cause. Thus also X *Metaph.*<sup>52</sup> says that male and female do not vary the species, because they are material differences.

The same thing can be argued from the consequences of matter. Matter is the cause of corruption, of the distinction of the supposit from nature, of sensibility, and the like, the opposites of which belong to quiddities; for the essences of things are ingenerable, incorruptible, insensible, and the like. So for the first point.

29) *Concerning the second point*,<sup>53</sup> St. Thomas holds that matter is a part of the quiddity of a natural substance.<sup>54</sup> He proves this conclusion by three reasons, two of which are given in the words of the text, and the third is this. Whatever is of the essence of all the individuals contained in a species is universally conceived to be of the essence of the species. This is thoroughly true, because otherwise the specific essence would not say the total essence of the individual. But matter is of the essence of all natural individuals. Therefore matter, universally considered, is of the essence of the species, and does not fall under the species as the bearer of the species, but as an essential part.

In objection to the first argument given in the text, our adversaries say that it is proper to accidents to be defined by the addition of another genus; and that this does not belong to substances, but that substances are defined by the addition of their own genus. For matter is in that genus in which the contracted quiddity is.

Against this. Then there is no difference between the definition of the form of the part, and the definition of the form of the whole, unless perhaps in the mode of signification, since both are defined by the addition of their own genus; and thus the definition of soul, and the definition of wine, will be the same. And then, as no genus of the category of substance is placed in the definition of soul, so none will be placed in the definition of wine, and so for the rest. This is clearly false.

The position of St. Thomas can be *confirmed in three ways*.

*First thus*. Every subject, quidditatively considered, to which there belongs some definite attribute, must have intrinsically within itself the cause of that attribute. But a body subject to contrariety, quidditatively

<sup>51</sup> Aristotle, *Physics*, II, 3, 194b 23; St. Thomas, *In II Phys.*, lect. 5, n.4.

<sup>52</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, X (I), 9, 1058a 29; St. Thomas, *In X Metaph.*, lect. 11, n. 2132.

<sup>53</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 47) has no title to this section. The Paris edition (p. 406) has the following title to this section. *Conclusio. Materia est pars quidditates substantiae naturalis.*

<sup>54</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *In VII Metaph.*, lect. 9, n. 1467 ff.; *Sum. Theol.*, I, 75, 4.

considered, is a subject to which corruptibility belongs as a definite attribute. Therefore a body subject to contrariety, quidditatively considered, must have intrinsically within itself the cause of corruptibility, and such a cause is nothing but matter; therefore. The major is clear, because an attribute must flow from the intrinsic principles of the quiddity, otherwise it would not belong to that essence as that essence. The minor is clear, because corruptibility is a primary consequence of being a body subject to contrariety. That matter is the cause of corruptibility is clear in the Commentator especially.

*Secondly thus.* That which is part of human nature, is part of human quiddity, because nature and quiddity are the same; but matter is a part of human nature; therefore, etc. The proof of the minor is that matter is nature,<sup>55</sup> and if it is not a part, it is necessary that in Socrates there be two natures, which are not parts, since they are not the parts of any nature; which is impossible.

*Thirdly,* I show that this was the thought of Aristotle. First, from VIII *Metaph.*,<sup>56</sup> where he assigns the reason why the definition of a composite substance is one: because from act and potency a unity naturally arises. Now simple quiddities of themselves have unity immediately, he says, because they are only forms. From this we can deduce that if the essence of a composite substance were form alone, there is no reason why Aristotle should assign a reason why it is one, since a form is one of itself. But, because it is composite, he therefore says that it has unity because one part is act, and one part is potency. In like manner, in IX *Metaph.*<sup>57</sup> he says that error occurs in the quiddities of composites, but not in the quiddities of simple things, because (if the multitude of parts of which such quiddities are composed. Whence, from their composition, error can occur, which has no place in simple quiddities, since they have no parts. From this it is apparent that Aristotle thought that the essence of a composite was composite, and not simple, and that the quiddity of a material substance differs from a separate quiddity because the one is essentially simple, the other is essentially composite. So for the second point.

30) *Concerning the third point,* I shall now speak to the opposing arguments.

*The reply to the first argument.* I deny the minor. For, although matter in itself, that is, considered as by itself, is unknowable; nevertheless, joined and subjected to this specific or generic form, matter manifests the form.

---

<sup>55</sup> See Aristotle, *Physics*, II, 194a 12; St. Thomas, *In II Phys.*, lect. 4, n. 2.

<sup>56</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, VIII ( ), 6, 1045a 7 ff.; St. Thomas, *In VIII Metaph.*, lect. 5, nn. 1755–1767.

<sup>57</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, IX ( ), 10, 1051b 17; St. Thomas, *In IX Metaph.*, lect. 11, nn. 1901–1903.

*The reply to the second argument.* I deny the consequence. As for its proof, I say that its major can be understood in two ways. In one way thus. Wherever things are the same in reality, if something real is joined to one, something real is also joined to the other. So taken I concede the major, but this is not against our position. In another way thus. Whenever things are the same in reality, if something is predicated of one, it is predicated of the other. Taken in this way the major is false. For something can belong to one as distinct by reason from the other, because it does not belong to that other, as is the question at issue. To have a quiddity belongs to man as distinct by reason from his quiddity, for the one is distinguished from the other as the having from the had. And because it is necessary in the matter at hand to make such a distinction in the major, then the argument is not valid.

Regarding the text from Aristotle which is added,<sup>58</sup> I say that Aristotle does not remove matter from quiddity, but particular matter and those parts which are accidental to the understanding of the species, such as hands and feet, for example, and these bones and flesh are removed from the definition of man. Nor is the fact that the parts of the definition are located in the genus of formal causality against what we say. It is necessary to remember that every superior is formal in respect to its inferior, as Aristotle himself says in the same text. And male and female, though they do not differ specifically in the genus animal, just as white and black do not, yet they differ specifically in the genus of sex, whose differences are accidental to the genus animal and follow matter. And for this reason they do not cause a specific diversity in the genus animal.

*The reply to the last confirming argument.* Regarding the attributes of matter, I say that they follow particular existing matter, and do not follow matter abstracted from singulars, which is a part of the specific quiddity. Therefore these attributes are not necessarily in a quiddity, nor is it necessary to remove matter from quiddity on the ground that the opposites of these attributes are in the quiddity.

But because the principle of individuation is matter, it might seem to follow from this that essence, which includes in itself both matters<sup>59</sup> and form, be only particular and not universal. Then it would follow that universals do not have a definition if the essence is that which is signified by the definition.

31) In the third part of this chapter, he states this objection against the fourth conclusion. That which includes matter intrinsically within itself is particular; the essence of a composite substance includes matter

---

<sup>58</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, VII ( ), 10, 1035a 1; St. Thomas, *In VII Metaph.*, lect. 9, n. 1467.

<sup>59</sup> In the Paris edition (p. 408, line 24), *materiamis* missing.

intrinsically within itself; therefore the essence of substance is particular; therefore there is no universal essence of a composite substance; which is false. And further, it follows from this that the universals of natural things are not definable, because only the essences of natural things are definable, since definition signifies the essence of the thing; but the essences of natural things, as has been concluded, are particular. The major is proved thus. That which has intrinsically within itself a principle of individuation in act, is particular; that which has matter intrinsically within itself has within itself a principle of individuation, because matter is the principle of individuation; therefore, etc.

Therefore we must realize that the principle of individuation is not matter understood in just any way, but only designated matter. And by designated matter I mean that which is considered under determinate dimensions. Now this matter is not put in the definition of man as man, but it would be put in the definition of Socrates, if Socrates had a definition. In the definition of man, however, undesignated matter is placed, for this particular bone and this particular flesh are not put in the definition of man, but bone and flesh absolutely, which are the undesignated matter of man.

32) Here St. Thomas answers the objection, denying the major and its proof on the basis that matter can be understood in two ways, namely, as designated and undesignated. Designated matter is the principle of individuation; undesignated matter is a part of the specific essence. Designated matter would be included in the definition of Socrates, if he were defined; undesignated matter is included in the definition of universals. Thus it is also clear that universals are defined, and yet include matter, but not designated matter, which is the principle of particularity.

#### **Question V—**

#### **Whether<sup>60</sup> Matter Is the Principle of Individuation?**

33) In this section arises the question, whether matter is the principle of individuation.

In this question, I shall consider *six* points.

First, I shall state the question.

Secondly, I shall give the opinion of Scotus.

Thirdly, I shall attack the opinion of Scotus.

Fourthly, I shall state the teaching of St. Thomas.

---

<sup>60</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 50) has *Utrum*. The Paris edition (p. 409) has *Num*.

Fifthly, I shall advance arguments against the teaching of St. Thomas.

Sixthly, I shall answer the opposing arguments.

34) *Concerning the first point*, observe that when we treat of the principle of individuation, since an individual says two things, namely, indistinction from itself, and distinction from others, the question is only about what primarily makes a specific nature incommunicable, so that it cannot communicate itself to many as a superior communicates itself to inferiors; and about what primarily distinguishes in reality this individual from others of the same species. We are, therefore, considering two factors involved in individuation: that by which a specific nature is first rendered incommunicable; and that by which it is first really distinguished from others of the same species. And note well the singular parts of the title we have indicated, for I found some are mistaken about this point. For we are here treating of the incommunicability which is opposed to real communication, and not the incommunicability which is opposed to the communication of form, which no one questions as belonging primarily to matter. In like manner, we are here treating of the real distinction of individuals of the same species, which is found only in real being, and not of the distinction by which the living Socrates is distinguished from the dead Plato, keeping in mind always that we are now speaking only of the individuation of material substances. So for the first point.

35) *Concerning the second point*,<sup>61</sup> Scotus<sup>62</sup> held that the specific nature is individuated by something positive that contracts the specific nature *per se* and makes one thing with it, so that this positive factor is neither matter, nor form, nor the composite, but a mode of all things, or an ultimate reality of matter, form and composite, and really the same as they. And so for Scotus the following conclusion about the principle of individuation is drawn: the principle of individuation is neither matter, nor form, nor quantity, but an individual property, namely, thisness (*heccheitas*).

*Regarding the proofs for the first three parts of this conclusion, I omit them until the subject matter demands their introduction. Regarding the fourth part, here is the argument.* Unity, speaking in terms of proportion, follows being, for a thing is being and one in the same way; therefore the unity which is simply ultimate, namely, numerical or individual unity, follows upon individual entity. But it is clear that that

---

<sup>61</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 50) has no title to this section. The Paris edition (p. 409) has the following title to this section. *Scoti Propositio. Non materia, nec forma, vel compositum, sed individualis proprietas, heccheitas, principium est individuationis.*

<sup>62</sup> Scotus, *In II Sent.*, d. 3, q. 6, nn. 9–14, 15; *ed. cit.*, VI, Part I, 406–409, 413.

individual entity is not any of the factors which are in act in the species, nor is it any accident, since all accidents come afterwards. Therefore it is an individual property, namely, constitutive of individuals. This is argued thus. That upon which numerical unity primarily follows is the principle of individuation; that property of thisness is that upon which numerical unity primarily follows; therefore thisness is the principle of individuation. The major is clear, because unity proportionately follows being. The minor is proved, because numerical unity does not follow upon quiddity, as is clear, nor upon any accident, since it precedes the entire genus of accident.

*Secondly thus.* Every difference in differing things is reduced to some factors primarily diverse, otherwise there would be no state in differing things; but individuals differ properly; therefore their difference is reduced to some factors primarily diverse. These are not their natures, nor privations, nor accidents; therefore they are thisnesses.

The third part of this last premise is proved. If the difference of individuals is reduced to some accident, it is reduced above all to quantity; but this is impossible. This impossibility is shown thus. We must ask how this quantity differs from that quantity. They do not differ by themselves, for then they would be specifically distinguished; therefore they differ by something else, think of place. But this cannot be, because they are distinguished either by the place which is a special category—not this because such place is posterior to quantity; or by the place which is the difference of quantity—not this because then we must ask how these places are distinguished; or by themselves—this cannot be held, because it is not by themselves that they are these; or by something else—thus we would go on to infinity. Furthermore, since the place which is a difference of quantity is the result of tile continuity and time permanence of parts, it is the same to say that this quantity differs from that quantity owing to different places, and that this quantity differs from that quantity by itself.

*Thirdly thus.* What primarily and fully constitutes some singular in its singular entity and in the unity consequent upon such entity, to this it is primarily and fully repugnant to be divided by a division opposed to that unity; and consequently this is the principle of individuation; but only the individual property or thisness is such; therefore, etc. The major is clear from the terms. The minor is proved in the same way as above. So for the second point.

36) *Concerning the third point*, I advance four arguments against the position of Scotus.

*First thus.* Every singular act demands a singular potency, which it actuates; but thisness is a singular act; therefore it demands ahead of time a singular potency which it actuates. But this potency is the na-

ture, or is in the nature of the individual itself; therefore the nature of the individual is singular before the advent of thisness, and thus thisness is not the principle of individuation.

All the premises in this argument are taken from Scotus, even the major, which is also proved from the teaching of Aristotle,<sup>63</sup> where he treats of the relation of the causes. Thus as a particular form demands ahead of time a particular matter, so act does potency. If one says that this is true where act and potency are really distinguished, because then potency really receives act, this offers no difficulty. The reason is that, according to Scotus, when any two factors are really united, they retain, from the very nature of the thing, the same order they would have if they were really distinct. Since, therefore, a singular act, if it were really distinct, would of its nature demand ahead of time a singular potency, it is necessary that it demand the same thing, since the same order is preserved.

*Secondly thus.* The principles of individuation are primarily and of themselves diverse; the thisness of Socrates and Plato are not such; therefore. The major is taken from Scotus. The minor is proved. What has more in common with one thing more than another, is not primarily diverse from what it has more in common with; but the thisness of Plato has more in common with the thisness of Socrates than it does with the thisness of whiteness; therefore the thisnesses of Plato and Socrates are not primarily diverse.

The major of the last syllogism is clear from the terms; for what is primarily diverse from another has nothing in common with it. The minor is proved in two ways. First, because the thisness of Socrates and Plato fall into the same species, and the thisness of Socrates and the thisness of whiteness differ in genus. Secondly, because those things which have more in common are more assimilated; and they are more assimilated which are more comparable. But the thisnesses of Socrates and Plato are more comparable than the thisnesses of Socrates and whiteness; just as universally things of the same category are more comparable than things of diverse categories.

*Thirdly thus.* What is fitting to one individual of the same species, and repugnant to another, necessarily demands a distinction of the two; the individual property, think of Socratesness, is proper to Socrates, and repugnant to Plato, an individual of the same species; therefore the individual property demands ahead of time the distinction of Socrates from Plato, and thus the individual property is not that by which Socrates is first distinguished from Plato. This conclusion is false, according to Scotus. The reasoning is valid. Therefore one of the premises

---

<sup>63</sup> Aristotle, *Physics*, II, 3, 195b 21; St. Thomas, *In II Phys.*, lect. 6, n. 10.



is false. But both premises are his; therefore Scotus is proved completely wrong. The major is taken from Scotus, in *quolibeto*;<sup>64</sup> the minor is his own conclusion, which we are attacking at present.

*Fourthly thus.* I can show that his position contradicts the Peripatetics, Aristotle and the Commentator. From XII *Metaph.*,<sup>65</sup> this consequence is had: the first heaven, that is, the first principle, is one in species and many in number; therefore it has matter. This consequence would not hold if the individual property were given to distinguish the individuals of the same species.

That the text of Scotus, who means by matter an individual property, destroys the text [of Aristotle], is apparent from the words of the Commentator where he says that everything one in species and many in number has matter. But it was already shown that the principle of the heavens does not have matter. From these words, it appears that Aristotle is speaking of that matter which he showed is not in the first principle. Now it is apparent that Aristotle expressly shows in the text<sup>66</sup> that the mover of the heavens does not have matter in respect to place and being (*esse*), and that he makes no mention of an individual property. The fictitious character of Scotus' text is also clear from III *Metaph.*,<sup>67</sup> where it is said that every multitude is of things differing either according to form or according to quantity, which can also be gathered from the Commentator, in I *Phys.*<sup>68</sup>

Nor can we approve of the text of Anthony Trombeta, which is understood in the same way. For the term *according* to ought to be understood in the same way in both the first and second member. The first member indicates causality; therefore the second does also. One can also discover that this new invention of thisness is a pure fiction, from I *Coeli*,<sup>69</sup> where Aristotle and the Commentator<sup>70</sup> indicate that the unity and plurality of individuals in the same species in material things is only from matter. So for the third point.

37) *Concerning the fourth point*,<sup>71</sup> the teaching of St. Thomas in this text, and in many others,<sup>72</sup> is that designated matter is the principle of individuation.

---

<sup>64</sup> Scotus, *Quaestiones Quodlibetales*, q. 2; *ed. cit.*, XII, 32–66.

<sup>65</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, XII ( ), 8, 1074a 31; St. Thomas, *In XII Metaph.*, lect. 10, n. 2596.

<sup>66</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, XII ( ), 6, 1071b 21; St. Thomas, *In XII Metaph.*, lect. 5, nn. 2495–2499.

<sup>67</sup> Sec Averroes, *In III Metaph.*, com. 2; *ed. cit.*, t. VIII, fol. 19r.

<sup>68</sup> Averroes, *in I Phys.*, com. 3; *ed. cit.*, t. IV, fol. 5v.

<sup>69</sup> Aristotle, *On the Heavens*, I, 8, 278a 18 ff.; St. Thomas, *In de Caelo*, I, lect. 19, n. 8.

<sup>70</sup> Averroes, *In de Caelo*, I, com. 8 and 9; *ed. cit.*, t. V, fol. 29r–30r.

<sup>71</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 53) has no title to this section. The Paris edition (p. 412) has the following title to this section. *Conclusio. Materia signata est per se intrinsecum individuationis principium, non autem quippiam aggregatum ex materia et quantitate.*

<sup>72</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *Contra Gentiles*,

(footnote continued on the next page)

Regarding this conclusion, we should observe that there is agreement and disagreement among Thomists themselves. They all agree that individuation involves two factors, matter and quantity. But they disagree, because some hold that the aggregate of matter and quantity is the intrinsic principle of individuation: the matter is the reason for the incommunicability or the indistinction in the thing, and quantity is the reason for its distinction from others. This aggregate, they say, is designated matter. Others, however, say with far better judgment that the intrinsic principle of individuation, both as to the incommunicability and the distinction from others is designated matter, and not quantified matter, nor the aggregate of matter and quantity. This, in my judgment, is the true teaching of St. Thomas, as we will show. It is this position, therefore, that we wish to explain and defend. We show first the meaning of designated matter; secondly, we refute the first explanation Thomists give; and thirdly, we prove the conclusion we have in mind.

Designated matter is nothing but matter with a capacity for this quantity, and not that quantity. Now this matter is an intrinsic part of Socrates, and would be included in his definition, if he were to be defined. For we must imagine that a particular agent, for example, this semen, immediately appropriates matter for the induction of form in such a way that, as human semen appropriates matter for a human soul, so this semen does for this soul. Thus in the first instant of the generation of Socrates, which is the first existence (*esse*) of Socrates, and the first non-existence (*non esse*) of the preceding form and accidents, there first begins in the order of nature a particular composite, then in natural order all accidents follow (in the human way of thinking) in that instant first according to nature, in which the particular composite *per se* and primarily terminates generation. Consequently matter, which is an intrinsic part of him, namely of Socrates, is so appropriated to Socrates himself by a particular agent, that it has no capacity for any other quantity than that which Socrates determines for himself. For all things existing by nature have a determined limit of size and increase, as is said in II *de Anima*,<sup>73</sup> and such matter is called designated matter.

Designated matter, therefore, adds nothing to matter except a capacity for this quantity, and not that quantity. Now the capacity of matter in respect to this quantity is nothing but a potency receptive of this quantity, and not that quantity. And a receptive potency does not directly say anything really distinct [from matter], but adds some-

(footnote continued from the previous page)

---

IV, 65; *De Verit.*, II, 7; X, 5; *In V Metaph.*, lect. 8.

<sup>73</sup> Aristotle, *On the Soul*, II, 4, 416a 16; St. Thomas, *In II de Anima*, lect. 8, n. 331.

thing which is really distinct from matter only according to reason. In like manner, proper matter adds nothing to matter which is really distinct from matter itself, yet says something real in matter, which matter in itself does not explain. For designated matter is not definable except through this quantity, if it be defined, just as a proper potency cannot be defined except through its proper act, as is said in III *Phys.*<sup>74</sup> Matter in itself, however, does not demand this quantity in its definition; thus the proper matter of an individual, and designated matter, and matter under determined dimensions, mean the same thing. For this reason St. Thomas did not say that designated matter is matter with determined dimensions, but that it is under determined dimensions. And he says elsewhere that as matter relative to general forms (say a total or partial form) generically distinguishes the heavenly bodies from inferior ones, so matter relative to this or that quantity distinguishes numerically in material things. Designated matter, therefore, does not say an aggregate of matter and quantity, but signifies matter directly, and quantity indirectly; just as the potency of matter signifies matter directly, and the act to which it is related indirectly, inasmuch as it is not definable except through act. And thus the meaning of designated matter is clear.

That other Thomists do not explain this fittingly is shown in this way. The principle which distinguishes an individual from the species and from another individual of the same species is the same principle. It is not quantified matter, but designated matter in the way in which we have explained, which is the intrinsic principle that distinguishes an individual from the species; therefore it is not quantified matter, but designated matter which is the intrinsic principle that distinguishes one individual from another individual of the same species. The minor they concede, and it is also expressly stated in St. Thomas' treatise called *de Principio individuationis*<sup>75</sup> which is truly and by ancient title called *de Potentiis cognoscitivis*—this is the way it is in the text in the Pontifical Library,<sup>76</sup> the only place I have ever seen the complete work, for the one in common use is garbled. Now it does not seem that the major can be denied, except in words by the querulous. For we see that it is true universally that whenever something common is divided into many subjective parts, the inferiors differ from one another and from the superior for the same reason; just as it is for the same reason that

---

<sup>74</sup> Aristotle, *Physics*, III, 1, 201a 34; St. Thomas, *In III Phys.*, lect. 2, n. 8

<sup>75</sup> See St. Thomas Aquinas, *De Principio Individuationis*; in P e r r i e r, *Opuscula Omnia*, t. I. *Opuscula Philosophica*, nn. 1–7, pp. 573–77.

<sup>76</sup> See A. Pelzer, *Bibliothecae Apostolicae Vaticanae . . . Codices Vaticani Latini*, t. II, pars I, (Romae: 1931), pp. 144–45; M. Grabmann, *Die Werke des hl. Thomas von Aquin* (2 ed.; Münster: 1931), p. 172.

man differs from an animal and a lion, namely, by the proper difference. Thus too Porphyry gives three acts of difference: to divide the superior; to constitute the inferior; and to distinguish what is constituted from the superior and from other equals.

*This conclusion is proved*, therefore, in the manner we have explained, namely, that designated matter is the intrinsic principle of individuation. That is the intrinsic principle of individuation to which it is primarily repugnant to be communicated as a universal is communicated to a particular; but designated matter is that to which it is primarily repugnant to be communicated as a universal is communicated to a particular; therefore, etc.

The major is conceded by all. The minor we prove. But we must note that the minor includes in it two factors, namely, that it is repugnant to designated matter to be communicated to many, and that this is primarily repugnant to it. The first member is clear in itself. It is impossible that matter which has a capacity for this quantity alone be multiplied. But the second member is proved. That is primarily fit designated matter which belongs to it when everything else is eliminated and, when it is itself eliminated, belongs to no other.<sup>77</sup> But it belongs to designated matter, when everything else existing in sensible substance is eliminated, not to be communicated to many as a universal to a particular, and, when it itself is eliminated, belongs to no other; and therefore not to be communicated to many belongs primarily to designated matter along all the factors found in sensible substances.

Both parts of the minor are proved. The first part is proved thus. That which designated matter, precisely considered, demands for itself, so that in terms of its opposite it is not intelligible, belongs to it with the elimination of everything else. But incommunicability belongs to designated matter considered precisely as such, so that in terms of its opposite, designated matter is not intelligible, for the proper matter of an individual cannot be understood to be communicable. Therefore incommunicability belongs to designated matter, with the elimination of everything else.<sup>78</sup> The second part of the minor will be clear from an example. It is certain that if the designated matter—or the proper matter, which is the same thing—of Socrates were eliminated, this one would not remain, nor would his form remain this form, nor would this

---

<sup>77</sup> *Nulla alteri* in the text should read *nulli alter*. The Laurent edition (p. 55, line 13 from bottom) has *convenit; sed . . .*. The Paris edition (p. 413, line 15 from bottom) has *convenit (ex primo posteriorum): sed . . .*

<sup>78</sup> To grasp the meaning of this proof, it is necessary to have recourse to Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, I, cc. 2–5, 72a 21 – 74b 4.

matter remain. For if he does not have proper matter, how will he get outside the order of what is common?

*Secondly, the same conclusion* can be proved thus. It is useless to use many when fewer suffice and equally well; but the individuation of a composite substance can be adequately accounted for by designated matter, without the use of other principles; therefore it is useless to use any others. From what must be said the minor will become clear when, after the arguments of our adversaries have been answered, our position will stand true and firm. And it is confirmed: because in composite substance there are only matter, form, the composite of these two, and the accidents which accrue to the individual, there is no intrinsic cause of individuation except one of these; therefore, to investigate the cause of individuation it is not necessary to wander outside this thing.

*Thirdly, this same conclusion* can be proved by the text of Aristotle and the Commentator given above, which need not be repeated. It is clearly evident that for them every distinction arises from form or quantity. Designated matter is, therefore, the intrinsic principle of individuation by which Socrates intrinsically, that is particularly, is this man. I say particularly, because I do not think that designated matter is itself the individual property or difference, but rather the essential principle of an individual difference. For I conceive the relation of designated matter to an individual property or difference as I do the relation of the human soul to the constitutive difference of man. For, just as the intellectual soul is not the difference itself, think of the rational, but that from which this difference arises, so designated matter is not the individual difference itself, but that from which the individual difference arises, and that which intrinsically causes it. And just as man is man both by the rational as a total formal principle, and by an intellectual soul as the partial, intrinsic formal principle, upon which the rational principle depends and is caused; so Socrates is this man by an individual difference as something totally naming him—which is nothing but an individual grade, as the specific difference is a specific grade—and by designated matter as by a prior intrinsic cause from which the individual difference itself borrows. As a result, there is this difference between us and the Scotists, that they multiply individual differences having no essential dependence on designated matter. We, however, just as we would not know how animal contracts to man and cow were it not for the forms of the parts, by which the differences contracting animal are caused, so we do not know how species, for example, man, contracts to the individual without designated matter, which is the cause of individual differences. And consequently, designated matter is primarily the intrinsic principle of individuation. I am

moved to say this because I hold that Socrates taken substantially, namely, in the direct predicamental line under a species, is one in number, not by means of unity which is from the category quantity, but by substantial unity. This unity necessarily comes first, since it is an attribute of being on the individual level, which the individual difference itself implies. And let no one judge that this is the thought of the Holy Doctor until he has read him both in *Compendio Theologiae*,<sup>79</sup> where he states that Socrates is numerically the same after the resurrection by reason of his quantity that was numbered, and in the treatise mentioned above.

38) *Concerning the fifth point*, I give the arguments against this conclusion and what is said about this by Scotus, in the references above.

*First thus.* It is impossible that something depending on what is naturally posterior be the same as that which is naturally prior, for then it would be prior and not prior. But substance is naturally prior to quantity. Therefore nothing caused by, or in any way presupposing the nature of quantity, can be the same as substance. Therefore this designation caused by quantity is not the same as substance. The major is proved. Where there is a true and real identity, although it be not formal, it is there impossible that this be and that it not be, because what is really the same would then be and not be; but it is possible that the naturally prior be without what is naturally posterior; therefore it is much more possible that it be without that which was left behind or caused by the naturally posterior.

*Further.* What is a necessary condition of a cause for causing cannot have existence (*esse*) from what is caused, because then the cause, insofar as it is up to causing, would have been caused by the caused, and this caused would be the cause of itself. But singularity or the designation of substance is a necessary condition in substance for the production of quantity, because a caused singular requires a singular cause. Therefore it is impossible that this designation or singularity be from quantity.

*Further.* I ask, what does it mean that quantity causes or leaves behind such a mode or designation in substance? If this is only to say that it is prior to quantity, then this designation is in no way from quantity, because then the designation of substance naturally precedes quantity itself. But if this means something else, I ask, how is this designation caused by quantity, and in what genus of cause is it?

*Further.* Why should quantity rather than quality leave such a mode in substance? There appears to be no reason why, because as quality

---

<sup>79</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *Compendium Theologiae*, c. 157.

by itself informs a surface and leaves nothing in it, so quantity itself<sup>80</sup> informs a substance and leaves no other form behind.

*Further.* This quantity which is involved in individuation is either determinate or indeterminate. It is not determinate, because quantity follows form in matter, and consequently the singularity of substance, because just as substance is the cause of it as determinate quantity, so this substance is the cause of it as this determinate quantity. This is confirmed thus: since determinate quantity is varied merely by rarefaction, the same individual will be in many singularities the same, which is impossible. But if this quantity is indeterminate, against this is: it remains the same in the generated and the corrupted.

*Further.* If quantity is involved in individuation as primarily distinguishing, it is necessary that in itself it be primarily distinct in number from another quantity. But then your proposition is not true, namely this one: every formal difference is specific. For this and that quantity differ<sup>81</sup> specifically since they are forms. But if you exclude quantity from the fundamental disposition of a ruined building, upon what basis will it be proved that formal difference is specific? Any reason whatsoever adduced concerning form will apply to quantity, for quantity is a form.

*Further.* The entire extension of the category of substance is prior to the other categories; therefore, since an individual of substance is included in this extension, it must be intrinsically complete apart from dependence upon quantity, which is posterior. This is confirmed, because nothing is located in any genus through something which is outside that genus.

Many other arguments are advanced by Scotus and others; but, because they conclude that matter alone, or quantity alone, or the aggregate of matter and quantity is not the principle of individuation, I omit them, for they are not against our position. I omit also, since I wish to be brief, arguments which are indirectly against our position. So for the fifth point.

39) *Concerning the sixth point*, I now answer the *arguments* just given and then the other arguments advanced for the opinion opposite ours.

*The reply to the first argument.* I say that the major is false. As evidence for this, we must observe that the relation of designated matter to this quantity is the relation of a potency to a proper act. Thus, just as the potency of matter is really the same as matter itself,

---

<sup>80</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 57, line 13 from bottom) has *seipsa*. The Paris edition (p. 415, line 23) has *in seipsa*.

<sup>81</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 58, line 1) has *different*. The Paris edition (p. 415, line 18 from bottom) has *se different*.

and yet depends upon the form, so the potency or capacity of matter relative to this quantity, which is called its designation, depends upon quantity, and is yet the same as matter. And because a potency is prior and posterior: naturally<sup>82</sup> prior to act in the genus of material causality, posterior in the order of formal causality; then the designation of matter is prior to quantity in the order<sup>83</sup> of material causality, but posterior in the order of formal causality. Thus the major is false in two ways, whether it be understood regarding priority and posteriority according to the genus of material cause, or whether it be understood regarding priority and posteriority in the order of formal cause. For something depending on form is really the same as matter, and something depending on matter is really the same as form, as is clear. To the first argument, where he says, *because then what is prior and not prior would be the same*, I answer that this is not impossible in diverse genera of causes. To the other proof, where he says, *where there is a real identity, etc.*, I deny the second premise, for not everything which is prior can be without that which is posterior, as will be shown elsewhere.

*The reply to the second argument.* I deny the major, since the caused is the cause of its cause in another genus of causality, as is the case in what was proposed. Designated matter is the cause of quantity in the genus of material cause; and quantity is the cause of designated matter in the genus of formal cause, as act is of potency. The falsity of the major is clear from the example given above. For the potency of matter is a necessary condition of matter for the production of form, and yet depends on form in the genus of formal cause. To the proof of the major, I say that a material cause depends, in its causality, upon its effect, namely, upon form, not in so far as form is an effect of it, but in that it is the cause of matter, for causes are causes of each other, as is said in II *Phys.*<sup>84</sup> Therefore it is not impossible that a cause in its causing depend upon what is caused, not as caused, but as cause and according to another genus.

*The reply to the third argument.* I say that for quantity to cause such a designation of matter is nothing else than for matter under this agent to be made thus capable of this quantity, and not that quantity. And so quantity is involved in the designation of matter as the act, in virtue of which such a capacity begins to be. The agent indeed effects this, and such a designation or capacity is prior to quantity in the genus of material cause. And from this we cannot infer: therefore this desig-

---

<sup>82</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 58, line 19 from bottom) has *naturaliter*. The Paris edition (p. 415, line 6) has *et naturaliter*.

<sup>83</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 58, line 17 from bottom) has *in ordine*. The Paris edition (p. 416, line 8) has *ordine*.

<sup>84</sup> Aristotle, *Physics*, II, 3, 195a 8; St. Thomas, *In II Phys.*, lect. 5, n. 7.



nation does not begin to be through quantity, since it begins to be by quantity in the genus of formal cause which like the end is numbered among posterior causes.

*The reply to the fourth argument.* I say that it is not only quantity which designates matter in such a way, but also proper qualities. For the matter of Socrates has a capacity for these qualities, and no others. But, because quantity alone is immediately received in a substance, and because material distinction has its radical origin in quantity alone, we say then in the answer to the argument, that designated matter is matter under determined dimensions, and not matter under determined qualities.

*The reply to the fifth argument.* We say that the quantity which is involved in individuation as the originative non-intrinsic principle is determinate quantity. Nor does the fact that it follows form offer any difficulty, for the form also follows the potency of matter, by which it still is caused. And we concede that this substance is the material cause of this quantity, but conversely, in the genus of formal cause, that this quantity is the cause of this designation of matter, in the way we have explained.

To the confirming argument of Anthony Trombeta, we say that the determinate quantity involved in individuation is not a rigid unit,<sup>85</sup> but has some play. For as any natural species determines for itself a maximum and a minimum quantity within a certain latitude, so any individual determines for itself this quantity within certain limits, and not as a rigid unit.<sup>86</sup> Thus rarefaction can take place with change in so far as it is individuating; for here determinate quantity is not taken down to the last point but with a certain latitude.

*The reply to the sixth argument.* I concede the first consequence, but deny that from it follows the falsity of that fundamental proposition of a structure most firm. The one arguing committed a grave error, for he does not distinguish between a formal difference and a difference of forms. Every formal difference is specific, but not every difference of forms, as St. Thomas says.<sup>87</sup> Otherwise, the form of this fire and the form of that fire would differ specifically since they are forms and are different forms. Thus a mathematical line divided into two parts is two individuals; for each part of a line is a line, and the individuals are forms which differ, but not by a formal difference. What arises from quidditative principles is called a formal difference, which always arises from form as form, and such does not exist between this line and

---

<sup>85</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 59, line 13 from bottom) has *in indivisibili*. The Paris edition (p. 417, line 1) has *in divisibili*.

<sup>86</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 59, line 10 from bottom) has *in indivisibili*. The Paris edition (p. 417, line 4) has *in divisibili*.

<sup>87</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *Contra Gentiles*, II, 81.

that line, because they are both of the same quiddity. In truth, the error of the arguer is quite childish. There are forms, and they differ; therefore they differ formally. There is a monk, and he is white; therefore he is a white monk.

*The reply to the last argument.* I deny the consequence. For, although that which is in the category of substance is simply prior to any other category, yet some condition, without which the individual as such is not in the category of substance, can be posterior in the genus of formal cause and of another category, because a formal cause is posterior in existence (*esse*).

To the confirming argument, I say that each category is completed by a thing of its genus, if we speak of things located in the categories and of the reason for locating them in the categories. But this is not true if we speak of the condition of the thing located in the category. For Socrates is not unless he is a substance, and the reason for locating him in a category is substance. But the condition of individuation, without which there is no reason for locating him in the category, is not against demanding at the same time an accident, for example quantity.

Now, to the first argument advanced to support the conclusion opposite to ours, we say that the minor is false; for numerical unity primarily follows designated matter.

Regarding the second argument, we say that the difference of individuals is reduced to quantities. Quantities, however, differ by proper places which are the differences of quantity. Now, place is not the result of permanence and continuity of parts only, but of these two and a third relation, namely, the relation of parts in the whole, as Albert teaches in *Praedicamentis*.<sup>88</sup> And it is owing to this that a place differs from the place which is a special category, which says the order of parts in place. Thus the places in question are distinguished by their orders of parts in the whole, which orders are of their essence. The orders, however, are distinguished by themselves, for a distinction lodges in the definition of order. And so it is clear that there is not an equal problem with what we reduce individuation to as with quantities; also, that this does not make it necessary for quantities to be distinguished formally. For such an order of parts in the whole is a kind of material factor in quantity itself, found in no other form.

Regarding the third argument of Anthony Trombeta, I say that the minor is false. Designated matter, as was proved, is that to which it is primarily repugnant to be divided as a universal into particulars, and it is by reason of this that it is repugnant to thisness to be so divided.

---

<sup>88</sup> St. Albert the Great, *De Praedicamentis*, tract. III, c. 10; in *Opera Omnia*, ed. A. Borgnet, (Parisius: 1890–1899), t. I, pp. 211–12.

## Chapter III<sup>1</sup>

Therefore it is clear that the essence of man and Socrates do not differ, except by what is designated and not designated. Thus the Commentator says, *super VII Metaph.*<sup>2</sup> that Socrates is nothing else than animality and rationality, which are his quiddity. So, too, the essence of genus and the essence of species differ according to designated and undesignated, although there is a different mode of designation for each. The designation of the individual in respect to the species is through matter determined by dimensions. But the designation of the species in respect to the genus is through the constitutive difference, which follows the form of the thing.

40) Now that St. Thomas has explained what the essence of a composite substance is, in this third chapter he intends to treat the difference of composite essences among themselves, since composite essences are three, namely, generic, specific, and individual. He considers *five points*. First, he speaks of their absolute difference. Secondly, by explaining the differences of these as in first intentions and in first intention terms, he shows how generic essence differs from specific. Thirdly, he shows how genus, species, difference, and definition differ. Fourthly, he removes a doubt. Fifthly, he points out the difference between a specific and an individual essence.

To understand what must be said, we must note that we can speak of essences in a threefold way. First, we can speak of them absolutely and without any relation to first or second intentions. Secondly, we can speak of them as they are expressed by terms of the first intention. Thirdly, we can speak of them as they are expressed by terms of second intention. For example, we speak of human nature in itself, that is, inasmuch as it has predicates which are due it by reason of its essence. We speak of it as it is expressed by the term *humanity*, by the term *man*, and the like. And thirdly, we speak of it as it is expressed by the term *species*. In the first part of this chapter, therefore, St. Thomas speaks of essences as viewed in the first way; in all the rest of the chapter, he speaks of them as viewed in the second way; and in the following chapter, he speaks of them as viewed in the third way.

And note most carefully, if you do not wish to miss the point of this chapter, that after considering the difference between generic,

---

<sup>1</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 61) has no title to this chapter. The Paris edition (p. 418) has the following title to this chapter. *Essentiae generis, speciei, et individuorum quomodo tam absolute, quam primae impositionis nominibus conceptae distinguantur: quomodo item genus, species, differentia, diffinitio differant, exposit: deinde quomodo essentia speciei ipsis individuis comparetur, declarat.*

<sup>2</sup> Averroes, *In VII Metaph.*, com. 20; *ed. cit.*, t. VIII, fol. 80r.

specific, and individual essences in themselves, he posits this conclusion: these essences do not differ except as designated and undesignated. This is explained thus. The essences of animal, man, and Socrates do not properly differ except that in the definition of animal is included animated, sensible substance, without its being determined by rational. But in the definition of man is included animated, sensible, rational substance; and thus there is added to it a designation through a difference. In the definition of Socrates is included substance animated, sensible, rational, in this flesh and these bones; and thus there is added to it a designation of matter, which is not included in the definition of man. Whence, to speak absolutely and according to their proper notions, it is apparent that these essences do not differ except as designated and undesignated, that is, by reason of the explicit or non-explicit<sup>3</sup> inclusion of some designation or determination, even though such a determination is not in the specific nature and the nature of the individual in the same way. For the determination which a specific nature adds to a generic nature is formal and essentially diversifies the genus, since it arises from form as form. But the determination which an individual nature adds to a specific nature is material and produces only a material, not formal, diversity in the species, since the diversity arises from the material conditions of the thing. From this it is clear that considered in themselves, that is, the natures signified, man and humanity, and animal and animality in no way differ. The definition of the nature signified by man and humanity is exactly the same, so that they differ by no determination, but differ, as will be said later, in how they stand under terms of first intention. Thus, because a distinction owing to the determinate and indeterminate is not a real distinction, the Commentator<sup>4</sup> says that Socrates, taken substantially, is nothing but animality and rationality, which make up his quiddity. For Socratesness, which names the nature of Socrates, is in reality the same as animality and rationality.

However, this determination or designation which is in the species with respect to the genus is not owing to something existing in the essence of the species which is in no way in the essence of the genus. In fact, whatever is in the species is also in the genus as undetermined. For if animal is not the whole which is man, but a part of him, it would not be predicated of him, since no integral part is predicated of its whole.

41) In the second part of this chapter, St. Thomas shows how a generic essence differs from a specific essence when both are expressed

---

<sup>3</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 62, line 18) has *non explicitam*. The Paris edition (p. 419, line 5) has *implicitam*.

<sup>4</sup> Averroes, *In VII Metaph.*, com. 20; *ed. cit.*, t. VIII, fol. 80r.

by terms of first intention; for example, how the essence of man and the essence of animal differ when they are expressed by the terms *man* and *animal*. He means that the essence signified by the generic term, think of *animal*, and the essence signified by the specific term, think of *man*, do not differ in this that the essence signified by the specific term includes some determination which is altogether outside the thing signified by the generic name. They differ in this that the essence carried by the specific term includes a specific determination in act, which takes place from its constitutive difference, just as man includes rational in act, for it is included in his definition. But the essence signified by the generic term carries this determination confusedly and in an undetermined way; just as animal includes rational potentially, as Porphyry says. Thus animal, and in general every essence carried by a generic term as such, includes the entire whole that the species includes, though not in the same way. Wherefore, to explain the difference in question, St. Thomas lays down this conclusion: genus says the entire being (*esse*) of the species. This conclusion he proves thus. Every predicate says the total being (*esse*) of what it is predicated of; the genus is predicated of the species itself; therefore the generic nature, for example, animal, says the total being (*esse*) of the species.

He proves the major because no part is predicated of its whole. It must be noted here that this statement is true of valid and direct predication, whether essential or denominative, of the part in so far as it is a part, and not of the part as it is signified in the manner of a whole. For a part can be signified in both ways:<sup>5</sup> as matter is signified as a part of the thing by *matter*; and as it is signified as the whole by *material*. Modified by these conditions, the proposition, *no part is predicated of its whole*, is open to no objection. For when I say, *man is white*, *white* includes within itself all that is man. In like manner, when I say, *man is material*, *material* implicitly includes within itself all that is man. And when I say, *man is an animal*, *animal* implicitly includes all that is man in a way which will be explained later. Thus, it is proved that the essence carried by the generic term includes the specific determination, for outside the whole there is nothing.

We can see how this is so if we consider *body* used as a part of animal, and *body* used as a genus. For it cannot be said to be a genus in the same way as it is an integral part. Therefore the term *body* can be used in many ways. Body in the category of substance means that which has a nature such that three dimensions can be designated in it. And these three designated dimensions themselves are a body, which is in the genus quantity. Now it happens in fact that what has one perfection may pos-

---

<sup>5</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 63, line 19 from bottom) has *utroque*. The Paris edition (p. 420, line 1) has *utrobique*.

sess a further perfection, as is clear in man who has a sensitive nature and, further, an intellectual nature. Likewise, over and above this perfection, which is to possess such a form that three dimensions can be designated in it, another perfection can be added, as life, or something of this kind. Therefore, the term *body* can signify something which has a form such that it admits the possibility of designating in it three dimensions, to the exclusion of any further perfection following on that form. If anything else is superadded, it is outside the meaning of *body* so used. And in this sense, body will be a material and integral part of animal, because then the soul will be outside of the meaning of the term *body*, and it will be additional to the body itself, so that the animal is constituted from these two—body and soul—as parts. The term *body* can also be used to signify something which has a form such that three dimensions can be designated in it, whatever that form may be, and whether some further perfection can come from it or not. And in this sense, body will be the genus of animal, because there is nothing to find in animal which may not implicitly be contained in body. For the soul is not a form different from that through which three dimensions could be designated in the thing. Therefore, when we said that body is what has a form such that owing to it three dimensions can be designated, it was understood of whatever form it might be, whether animality,<sup>6</sup> or stoneness, or any other form. And thus the form of animal is implicitly contained in body, or in the form of body, inasmuch as body is its genus.

42) Now that he has explained that genus is compared to species, not as a part of it, but as the whole, St. Thomas wants to show here how the thing signified by the generic term can be viewed in both ways, that is, as a part and as a whole. He begins with body, as that which is more knowable to us, and then moves on to animal. And he says that, because a thing viewed in the same way cannot be part of a thing and the genus of the same thing, we ought to realize that the term *body* is used in two ways. For it is used equivocally of body that is a thing of the category of substance, and of body that is a thing of the category of quantity. Body, when it signifies a thing of the category of substance, means a nature from which three dimensions flow. But when it signifies a thing of the category of quantity, it means the three dimensions themselves.

43) Again, the body which signifies a thing of the category of substance, of which we are now speaking, is viewed in two ways. In one way, it signifies that nature from which three dimensions flow, to the exclusion of any further substantial perfection. In another way, it signifies this same nature without the exclusion of any further substantial perfection. The reason for this and like distinctions he points out in

---

<sup>6</sup> *Anima* in the text should read *animalitas*.

the text: because a thing, which has some substantial perfection, does not exclude from itself a further substantial perfection. For example, man, because he has the perfection of sense, does not exclude from himself the perfection of intellect; likewise body, because it has the perfection of corporeity, does not exclude from itself the perfection of life, and so for the others. Now, since a prior substantial perfection does not exclude a second or a third, and it is clear also that it does not include them in act, its first perfection can be conceived and signified both with the precision or exclusion of other perfections, and with the inclusion of them in a confused way. Because it does not include other perfections formally, it can be conceived and signified with their exclusion. Because it does not exclude a union with other perfections, it can be conceived and signified with a confused and potential inclusion of them. Thus the nature signified by the term *body*, because it does not formally include the perfection of life, or sense, or intellect, can be conceived and signified with the exclusion of all of these perfections. And because it does not exclude an essential union of these perfections with itself, it can be conceived and signified without the exclusion of them, as including all of them in a confused and determinate way.

We gather from the text a threefold difference in these uses of *body*. First they differ in that body in the first sense means corporeity alone, from which three dimensions and no further perfections naturally flow; in the second sense body means some form upon which corporeity depends, and from which three dimensions naturally flow, along with any other perfection. Secondly they differ in that body in the first sense is a part of the species, since the formal element signified by the species<sup>7</sup> is beyond and outside of what it signifies, as rational soul, for example, is outside of corporeity. For there are two factors in man, namely, a corporeal perfection which, viewed exclusively, clearly does not include intellectuality in any way; and an intellectual perfection, which is the other factor. Body in the second sense is a whole relative to the species, because the perfection or form formally implied by the species is included in what body means in this sense; for it signifies any form upon which corporeal perfection depends; and so the intellectual soul is included in the *any form*. Thirdly they differ in that body in the first sense is not in a direct predicamental line, just as no part is; in the second sense body is directly in the category of substance, just as any other genus is.

And such also is the relation of animal to man. For if animal named only a certain thing having a perfection such that it can sense and move through a principle existing in itself, to the ex-

---

<sup>7</sup> In the Paris edition (p. 421, line 13 from bottom), *speciei* is missing.

clusion of another perfection, then whatever further perfection came to it over and above, would be related to animal as a part, and not as implicitly contained in the notion of animal; and animal would not be a genus. But it is a genus according as it signifies a certain thing from whose form can proceed sensation and motion, whatever this form may be, whether it be only a sensitive soul or a soul that is both sensitive and rational.

44) St. Thomas also explains this point in the genus which is animal. Animal can be viewed as signifying a form from which arise exclusively sense and motion, by which animal is discerned from non-animal, as is said in *I de Anima*.<sup>8</sup> It can also be viewed as signifying any form from which sense and motion arise but not exclusively, and thus it is a genus. Viewed in the first way, animal is a part of the species. Thus man is composed of an animal and an intellectual principle as his essential parts, viewing animal in this first way, for then the intellectual nature is outside of what animal signifies. Viewed in the second way, animal is the whole relative to man, including specific perfections implicitly. For when I say, *animal*, using it in this way, I mean something having a sensitive nature indeterminately, by leaving out through what form it has a sensitive nature. And thus all the specific forms are implicitly included, for a sensitive nature is not had except through the form of man, of lion, of ox, etc. From what has been said, the difference is clear between generic and specific essence as they are expressed by generic or specific terms of first intention, because indeed they differ as including those perfections implicitly and including them explicitly.

And so, therefore, genus signifies indeterminately all that is in the species, for it does not signify matter alone. Likewise also, difference signifies the whole which is in the species, and not the form alone. And definition also signifies the whole, as also does the species, but in different ways. For the genus signifies the whole as a name pointing to what is material in the thing, without the proper form's determination. Thus genus is taken from matter, even though it is not matter.<sup>9</sup> Whence it is clear from this<sup>10</sup> that we say *body* because it has a perfection such that three dimensions can be designated in it, and this perfection is such that materially it can be related to further perfection. But difference is the other way about, as a kind of determination taken from a definite form, without determinate being included in its primary notion. This is clear when we say, *animated*, in

---

<sup>8</sup> Aristotle, *On the Soul*, I, 2, 403b 25; St. Thomas, *In I de Anima*, lect. 3, n. 32.

<sup>9</sup> In the Paris edition (p. 422, line 15 from bottom), *quamvis non sit materia* is missing.

<sup>10</sup> The text reads: *unde patet ex hoc. Ex hoc* does not appear in St. Thomas' text. See St. Thomas Aquinas, *De Ente et Essentia*, c. II; ed. Perrier, n. 9, p. 31.



other words, what has a soul, for we do not determine what that thing is, whether body, or anything else. Thus Avicenna<sup>11</sup> says that genus is not in the difference as a part of its essence, but only as a being outside its quiddity or essence; just as the subject is understood in its attributes. And therefore genus is not predicated of the difference, properly speaking, as Aristotle says in III *Metaph.*<sup>12</sup> and IV *Topicorum*,<sup>13</sup> except perhaps as a subject is predicated of its attribute. But the definition or species embraces both, namely, the determinate matter, which is designated by the name of genus, and the determinate form, which is designated by the name of difference.

45) In this third part of the chapter, St. Thomas compares genus, species, difference, and definition to each other on the basis of agreement and difference. They all agree in this that each of them signifies the whole that is in the species. This follows immediately from what has been said. For if genus signifies the whole, because it is truly and properly predicated of the species, and includes within itself confusedly all to which it extends; it is equally true that difference, since it is truly and properly predicated of the species, and includes within itself confusedly all that it extends to as predicable, will signify the whole. But the difference between them he gives as twofold. The first difference regards the formalities signified by each of them. For the formal element signified by genus is a material perfection; while the formal element signified by difference is a formal perfection. But the formal element signified by species is an aggregate of both of these perfections, but without distinguishing them, while the formal element signified by definition is likewise an aggregate of both these perfections, but by dividing the aggregate into singular parts. For example, the formal element signified by *animal* is a sensitive nature standing as a material factor to intellectual perfection, which is formally signified by *rational*, and consequently the intellectual perfection stands as formal. In like manner, the formal element signified by *man* and *rational animal* is an aggregate of a sensitive and an intellectual nature; *rational animal* expresses these two natures separately, whereas *man* does not.

For an understanding of what we are saying, note that the formal element signified by a name, as used here, is a perfection or a form determinately and primarily expressed by that name. The material element is that which does not fall under the signification of the name primarily. Thus, considering all that is formally as well as materially implied by genus, species, difference, and definition, he says that they

---

<sup>11</sup> Avicenna, *Metaph.*, tr. V, c. 6; *ed. cit.*, fol. 90v.

<sup>12</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, III ( ), 3, 998b 24; St. Thomas, *In III Metaph.*, lect. 8, n. 432.

<sup>13</sup> Aristotle, *Topics*, IV, 2, 122b 20.

mean the same thing and that they agree; but considering the formal element signified by them, we say that they differ and do not mean the same thing. But do not waste time looking for a difference between the formal element signified by the species and by the definition, since there is none; they differ only in the manner of expressing the same formal element. The species implies the whole in act in an indistinct way; and definition divides the whole into singular parts, as is said in I *Phys.*<sup>14</sup>

Therefore, the generic term, animal for example, expresses formally and determinately the material perfection of man, namely, the perfection of sense; and consequently genus is taken from matter.<sup>15</sup> But the term which is a difference, however, think of rational, formally and determinately expresses the formal perfection of the thing and is therefore said to be taken from the form. And as the perfection signified by the difference does not fall within the formal element signified by the genus, since it is included in it indeterminately, so the genus does not fall into the formal concept of difference for the same reason, namely, because the generic perfection falls indeterminately within the term which is the difference. For example, because *animal* signifies a thing having a sensitive nature, it signifies two things: first and formally, the sensitive nature; and indeterminately what has that nature, for it does not express determinately whether it is a man or an ox. So also rational, because it signifies something which has rationality, signifies two things: first and formally, rationality; and secondarily and indeterminately what has this nature, since it does not make definite whether a man or an animal has it. And therefore Avicenna says<sup>16</sup> that genus is not in the difference as a part of its essence, that is, as a part of the formal element signified by it, but is outside the formal element signified by it, as a subject is outside the formal element signified by its attributes. For white signifies a pure quality, as is said in *Praedicamentis*.<sup>17</sup> And although genus is not included in the understanding of difference in this way, namely, as formally signified by it, it is however in the understanding of it in another way, that is, as a subject is included in the understanding of its attribute. For, as we have said above, something can fall within the notion of a thing in two ways. In one way, as a part of the quiddity; and in another way, as the subject of it, in the manner in which the subject enters the definition of attribute, as held in VII *Metaph.*<sup>18</sup> Therefore Aristotle says, in III

---

<sup>14</sup> Aristotle, *Physics*, I, 1, 184b 11; St. Thomas, *In I Phys.*, lect. 1, n. 10.

<sup>15</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, VIII ( ), 2, 1043a 20; St. Thomas, *In VIII Metaph.*, lect. 2, n. 1697.

<sup>16</sup> Avicenna, *Metaph.*, tr. V, c. 6; *ed. cit.*, fol. 90v.

<sup>17</sup> Aristotle, *Categories*, ch. 8, 9b 9.

<sup>18</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, VII ( ), 5, 1031a 2; St. Thomas, *In VII Metaph.*, lect. 4, n. 1331 ff.

*Metaph*<sup>19</sup> and in IV *Topic*,<sup>20</sup> that genus is not predicated *per se* of difference, except perhaps in the manner in which a subject is predicated of its attribute. The reason for the first assertion is that genus is predicated of difference in no mode of *per se* predication; not indeed in the fourth mode, because difference does not express the cause of genus; nor in the second mode, because difference is not put in the definition of genus; nor properly in the first mode, because predicates of the first mode and direct, which are predicated properly, are those which fall intrinsically within the notion, and not those in it by some addition. For *man* is not properly predicated of *risible* in the first mode of predication, which is clear because the proposition, *the risible is man*, is accidental predication, as is said in I *Post*.<sup>21</sup> The reason for the second assertion is that if genus is included in the understanding of difference as a subject is included in the understanding of its attribute, it follows that genus is predicated of difference in the same way that a subject is predicated of its attribute. When he says, *perhaps*, it is not as if he were doubting, but as not deciding; for he is wont to express as doubtful what has not been decided.

Notice that, although genus falls determinately within the understanding of difference, yet the term which is a difference does not express the genus determinately. For rational does not express animal with rationality, but a thing having rationality; just as man falls within the definition of risible, and yet the term *risible* does not express man determinately, but means a thing having risibility.

And from this it is clear why genus, species, and difference are related proportionately to matter, form, and composite in nature, although they are not identical with them. For genus is not matter, but is taken from matter as signifying the whole. And difference is not form, but is taken from form as signifying the whole. Thus we say that man is a rational animal, and not that he is made up of animal and rational as we say that he is made up of body and soul. For man is said to be made up of body and soul as of two things constituting a third thing which is neither of the two, for man is neither soul nor body. But if man be said to be in some way made up of animal and rational, it will not be as a third thing from two things, but as a third concept from two concepts. For the concept of animal expresses, without the determination of a special form, the nature of a thing, because it is material with respect to an ultimate perfection. However, the concept of this difference, rational, consists in the determination of a special form, and from these two concepts is constituted the concept of the species or definition. And, therefore, just as a thing, constituted from other things, does not re-

---

<sup>19</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, III ( ), 3, 998b 24; St. Thomas, *In III Metaph.*, lect. 8, n. 432.

<sup>20</sup> Aristotle, *Topics*, IV, 2, 122b 20.

<sup>21</sup> Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, I, 19, 81b 23 ff.

ceive the predication of those things of which it is constituted, so neither does the concept receive the predication of those concepts of which it is constituted. For we do not say that definition is genus or difference.

46) Here St. Thomas gives in a corollary conclusion the second difference between genus, species, and difference, namely, that genus is proportionately related to matter, which is a part of the composite, and does not signify matter; difference is proportionately related to form, and does not signify form; species is proportionately related to the composite of matter and form, and as such does not signify the composite of matter and form, but something which includes genus and difference.

In the designation of this difference, two points are given in each member. In the first member, the first point is that genus is proportionately related to matter; and the second is that genus does not signify matter, and likewise in the second and third member. The first point of each member follows from what has been said. For, if the generic perfection, which is formally carried by the genus, is material in respect to the differential perfection, which is formally carried by the difference, it is necessary that just as matter stands with respect to the form in a natural composite, for example, Socrates, so genus stands with respect to the difference in a rational composite, namely, to the species; so that, as matter is potential and is perfected and specified by form, so the generic perfection is potential and can be perfected and specified by difference. The second point also follows from what has been said, since from the fact that genus, difference, and species signify the whole, it follows immediately that genus does not signify matter because matter is not the whole, and that difference does not signify the form because the form is not the whole, and that the species as such does not signify the composite of matter and form because the parts of the species as such are not matter and form, but genus and difference. Still, St. Thomas proves this by the following argument. Matter and form are parts of their whole, namely, of the species, as two things of a third thing; therefore genus and difference are not matter and form to the species.

The major is clear in itself, for man is something other than his matter and other than his form. Nor are we concerned at present whether man is a thing distinct really or distinct by reason from these two parts when united. It suffices for us to know that he is a third thing really distinct from each part. The minor is proved thus. If genus and difference constituted the species as two things do a third thing, then man would be composed of animal and rational; which is false. Therefore, taking away the consequent, genus and difference do not

constitute the species as two things do a third thing, which was the point to be proved. The consequence is clear in itself. The falsity of the consequent is proved by this, that no part is predicated of its whole, as was said above.<sup>22</sup> But animal is predicated of man, and so is rational; for we say that man is an animal and that he is rational.

47) We should notice that, in explaining the major by an example, St. Thomas says in the text that man is said to be composed from<sup>23</sup> soul and body as a third thing from two things. These words raise the question how this can be true if one holds St. Thomas' doctrine that there is but one substantial form in the composite. Now things that are really the same do not constitute something as two things do a third thing; but the corporeal perfection and the soul are, if we hold one substantial form, really the same. How, then, do they constitute man as two things do a third thing?

This question, because of its great difficulty, has been solved in various ways.

Some say that the body and the soul are not real parts of man, but are only logical parts; for, although the soul is truly a part, the body in reality is the whole; for body means a composite of matter and form, which is the soul. Therefore man is not composed of soul and body as from two parts in reality but in reason, he is, however, truly composed of them as from two things in that manner in which the whole and the parts are two things, so that there is a third thing which is logically distinct from the one, namely, from the body, and really distinct from the other, namely, from the soul.

Others say, what in effect comes to the same thing, that man is composed from a soul and a body as from a formal cause and that of which it is the formal cause. For, according to Avicenna, the formal cause and that of which it is the formal cause are diverse things; just as the shining is composed of light and the thing shining. Thus these also say that man is composed from two things, namely, from the whole and the part,<sup>24</sup> but not from two parts in reality.

Others say that this phrase must be understood figuratively as follows: man is composed from soul and body by reason of his part,

---

<sup>22</sup> Aristotle, *Topics*, IV, 2, 1221b 20.

<sup>23</sup> Here "ex" is translated "from." Later Cajetan makes a big point of a composition "ex" and a composition "cum." A composition "ex" applies to matter and form; a composition "cum" applies to essence and *esse*. See below, Chapter V, n. 90: *Octavo* different quia prima compositio est compositio ex his et ideo fit ibi unum tertium. Secunda vein est compositio cum his. Nulla enim res datur quae constet ex essentia et existentia, proprie loquendo, sicut datur res constans ex materia et forma; sed essentia componit cum existentia et e converso, et ideo dictum est quod adunantur per se, non tamen componendo tertium.

<sup>24</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 70, line 30 from bottom) has *toto et parte*. The Paris edition (p. 426, line 11) has *ex toto et ex parte*.

namely, matter. As of now, it seems to me that it must be said that man is composed from soul and body, and is a third thing not only as composed from two things, but also as from two parts which are a whole in reality. I take body not in so far as it is the genus, but in so far as it signifies a part, and take soul in its exclusive meaning, as defined in *II de Anima*<sup>25</sup> Thus viewed, body means a composite of matter and a corporeal perfection taken exclusively. Soul means the perfection of life exclusively.

I prove my thesis thus. Body differs really from soul, and not as a whole differs from a part; therefore it differs as a part from a part. The added point is proved: the whole includes, at least confusedly, the part, but the body viewed in this way excludes the soul. Thus the body is included in the definition of the soul as a subject supporting the soul, as St. Thomas says there. The first proposition is evident in itself and conceded by all. The consequence draws its force from an adequate division. For if the soul and the body differ really, the body must differ really from the soul as a whole from the part or as a part from a part. Man, therefore, is composed from body and soul as from parts that are really distinct, which was our thesis.

And note that body as a part, though it means corporeal perfection exclusive of anything outside it, is an identity of the corporeal perfection with the perfection of the soul or the perfection of life. For it just happens, when something comes to the body that is extraneous to it considered exclusively, that the body's perfection be the same as the soul, since of itself it prescind from the soul. And therefore, properly speaking, it was said exquisitely that man is composed really from soul and body. On this basis, then, say in answer to the objection advanced, that although the corporeal perfection or the form of corporeity is really the same as the soul, still the body is in reality other than the soul; and that the corporeal perfection itself, properly speaking, is not really the same as the soul, in fact, when precisely considered, excludes the soul. And therefore body and soul understood exclusively are properly speaking admitted in reality to be parts of man.

This interpretation is favored by the words of the text where the reason given for the statement is the exclusion of soul from what is signified by body. What we said of body and soul with respect to animal, you should be able to say of animal and the intellectual soul with respect to man, of body and form of stone with respect to stone, and so of other things, always viewing the terms precisely as parts. We grant that it is not customary to speak of the inanimate body as com-

---

<sup>25</sup> Aristotle, *On the Soul*, II, 1, 412a 27; St. Thomas, *In II de Anima*, lect. 1, n. 233.

posed of body and specific form as we do the animated body composed of soul and body, because of the hidden difference between corporeal perfection and the form of inanimate bodies. Also, because the form of an animated body elevates the composite to a status where it moves itself, it was necessary to distinguish in it a part which moves and a part which is moved, that is, a soul and a body, which is not found in the forms of inanimate bodies.

48) Notice secondly that as explanation of the minor, St. Thomas says that man is not composed from animal and rational as a third thing from two things, but as a third understanding from two understandings. Here we must observe that genus, species, and difference can be viewed in three ways. In the first way, as the thing signified by the generic, specific and differentiating term of first intention. In the second way, as the formal concept of such terms. In the third way, as the thing signified by their terms in second intention. For example, animal, man, and rational can be viewed in the first way as the thing signified by these terms; in the second way, as their formal concepts: and in the third way, as the relations of genus, species, and difference.

Understood in the first way, neither species nor definition is composed from genus and difference, since the thing signified by species and definition is the same in reality as the thing signified by genus and difference; for the same is not composed from itself. Understood in the third way also, neither species nor definition is composed from genus and difference, since the relation of the relative species is added to the relation of genus, as Porphyry says.<sup>26</sup> Now a correlative is never composed from its correlative and, in general, it does not seem that a relation can be composed from other relations. Thus, as the relation which the word *proposition* signifies is not composed of the relation of the predicate to the subject, but is a relation attributed by the intellect to the complex of predicate and subject, so the relation of the definition is a relation attributed to a concept, formed in the first operation of the mind such that it distinctly unfolds genus and difference.

Understood in the second way, species as well as definition is composed from genus and difference. For the formal concept of species is united from the formal concept of genus and the formal concept of difference as from two parts. For example, the formal concept of man is a kind of aggregate of the formal concept of animal and the formal concept of rational. This can, from what was said, be deduced in this way. Since we showed that genus, difference, and species differ in the formal elements they signify, it is clear that the formal concept of animal is the concept of the perfection of sense, and that the formal con-

---

<sup>26</sup> Porphyry, *Isagogen*, c. 3; *ed. cit.*, pp. 28–33.

cept of rational is the concept of the perfection of intellect, and that the formal concept of man is a concept embracing each perfection of these as a third concept formed by their union. And therefore man is from animal and rational as a third understanding from two understandings, that is, as a third concept from two concepts, and not as a thing from two things. And because no part, as a part, is directly predicated of its whole, the understanding or formal concept of animal is not directly predicated of the understanding, that is, of the formal concept of man. Therefore, this proposition, the formal concept of man is the formal concept of animal, is false, because the formal concept of man brings together the whole formed by the union of sensitive and intellectual perfections. The formal concept of animal, on the other hand, says only a part, that is, the perfection of sense, although, as was said above, according to the concept or the material and formal element signified it says the whole at the same time. Man, therefore, according to the formal understanding or concept is neither animal nor rational, but from animal and rational. And, just as we said of man, who is a species, say the same of [rational] animal, which is a definition. Rational animal according to its formal concept is not animal nor rational but is from animal and rational; for the formal concept of rational animal differs from the formal concepts of animal and rational as a whole from the parts.

What we have said here, that the formal concept, namely, of species and definition, is composed from the formal concepts of genus and difference, can be understood in two ways. In one way of the mental concept; in another way of the objective concept taken formally. If taken in the first way, it can again be understood in two ways. In one way of the subjective being (*esse*) of the mental concept, or as what it is; in another way of its representative being (*esse*). The mental concept of species, according to what it is, is not composed from the mental concepts of genus and difference according to what they are, because they are all simple qualities, and cannot be distinguished into many constituent parts. For we must not imagine that when the intellect forms the concept of the definition of man, namely, of rational animal, that it forms many concepts; it forms only one, which is a kind of simple quality, and distinctly represents the singular parts, just as in things outside the mind, the thing defined has genus and difference without a real composition. Thus understood in this way our statement is not true.

Now the mental concept of species taken formally according to its representative being (*esse*) is composed of the mental concepts of genus and difference taken formally according to their representative being (*esse*), like an image which represents the whole by images of



the parts. For man existing in the mind represents an aggregate of sensitive and intellectual perfections; while animal existing in the mind formally represents only the perfection of sense, and rational only the perfection of intellect. Then in this way our statement is verified.

Since the objective concept of species taken formally is nothing but the formal element which species signifies, the mental concept of the same is of its very nature composed from the objective concepts of genus and difference taken formally; just as the formal element which species signifies is of its very nature composed from the formal elements which genus and difference signify, as was shown above. Thus when man is viewed as an object of the mental concept, that is, in terms of his specificity, he is neither animal nor rational, but is composed from animal and rational, viewing also animal and rational as objectified in their mental concepts. This is shown by the falsity of the proposition: *the specific formal object is the generic or differentiating formal object*. For man as such means something which is an aggregate of sensitive and intellectual perfection; animal as such means only one part of the aggregate, namely, the sensitive nature; rational as such means only the other part, namely, the intellectual perfection. But it is clear that the aggregate is not one of the aggregating elements. Thus understood in this way, our statement contains truth and is perfectly to the point.

And therefore animal relative to the thing it means is neither a part nor the whole with respect to man and rational animal; relative to the material and formal elements which it signifies together, it is the whole; but relative to the formal element which it signifies it is, taken objectively as well as representatively, a part. Then when I say, *man is a rational animal*, if only the thing itself is considered, neither the character of the part nor of the whole will be kept; if the thing itself so signified is considered, namely, as implicitly including the inferiors, it has the character of a whole; and if the thing itself so signified is considered according to what it explicitly includes, it has the notion of a part as such. And this is why animal is placed in the definition of man, as a thing, because a thing is predicated of a thing as a whole, since it is predicated directly; and as a part, because there is added a difference which explains the other factor, etc.

What we said above about species applies also to definition, remembering always what is said in I *Phys.*,<sup>27</sup> namely, that definition divides into singulars, but species does not. And do not make the mistake of applying what we say here to what we said above. There, when we spoke of the formal concept, we meant a mental concept as distinct

---

<sup>27</sup> Aristotle, *Physics*, I, 1, 184b 11; St. Thomas, *In I Phys.*, lect. 1, n. 10.

from an objective concept. Here, however, by understanding or formal concept, we wish to indicate both the mental concept, and the objective concept taken formally.

But, although genus signifies the whole essence of the species, yet it is not necessary that there be one essence for different species which are in the same genus. For the unity of the genus proceeds from its indetermination and indifference; but not in such a way that what is signified by the genus is numerically one nature in different species, to which another thing might be added, which is the difference determining it, as form determines matter which is numerically one. Rather, genus signifies some form, not determinately this or that, which the difference expresses determinately, for this is no other than that which is signified indeterminately by genus. And, therefore, the Commentator, in *XII Metaph.*,<sup>28</sup> says that prime matter is said to be one by the remotion of all forms, but genus is said to be one by the commonness of the designated form. Whence it is clear that by the addition of difference and removing the indetermination which was the cause of the unity of the genus, species remain different in essence.

49) In this fourth part of the chapter, St. Thomas sets out to answer this objection: whatever has one genus has one essence; diverse species have one genus; therefore diverse species have one essence—which is false because species differ essentially. The major is proved by this: that genus, according to what was said above, means the total essence of the species. And although this objection could easily be answered by saying that species have the same essence generically, but not specifically, yet because the argument relies on a more profound problem, we ought to answer it from a more profound principle. For this objection is advanced in order to conclude that diverse species have the same essence simply, and not generically, as is clear from the middle term used. The argument is: those things whose whole essence is one have the same essence simply; the whole essence of diverse species of the same genus is one; therefore diverse species of the same genus have the same essence simply. The minor is clear from the fact that genus says the whole essence of the species, and is one in them.

To answer this objection, St. Thomas explains how genus is one, and introduces this distinction. Something means one in two ways. In one way, by the presentation of one definite thing meant; in another, by not distinguishing or determining the many things indicated. Genus does not signify a one in the first way, but in the second way. For something signifies a one in the first way when what is signified, in it

---

<sup>28</sup> Averroes, *In XII Metaph.*, com. 14; *ed. cit.*, t. VIII, fol. 141v.

self, is some one determined nature; for example, man signifies humanity, which is a definite and determined nature, namely, human nature. Something that signifies one in the second way does not have as the thing signified some determined nature, but many natures indeterminately; for example, animal signifying the perfection or nature of sense does not signify a definite and determined nature or form. For there is no form in the universe which is a sensitive soul, but each one is bovine or leonine or human, etc. Thus it is said in VII *Phys.*,<sup>29</sup> that genus contains a plurality latent in it; and in X *Metaph.*,<sup>30</sup> that the nature of genus differs in the species; and in I *de Anima*,<sup>31</sup> that the formality (*ratio*) of animal varies with different kinds of animals. Genus, therefore, is one in the second way. Then in answer to the objection, we say in accord with our previous distinction, that where the whole essence of things is one in the first way, their essence is the same simply; and that this is not true where the whole essence of things is one in the second way, which is the question here, for genus does not unify the whole essence of the species except by a unity of indefiniteness.

50) Now we should observe, for a better understanding of what has been said, that the words of the text gave the approximate difference between the unity of genus and the unity of prime matter. This difference the Commentator also gives<sup>32</sup> Notice here that matter can be spoken of in two ways. In one way, as being a kind of universal whole including this and that matter as subjective parts. Taken in this<sup>33</sup> way there is no problem, since the judgment of the unity of matter and the unity of any universal is the same thing. In another way, matter can be spoken of as taken alone and in itself, not as being either universal or particular, nor as being in this species or that. This is the sense in which the Commentator spoke of it in the cited text, and St. Thomas speaks of it here. Therefore the unity of matter viewed in this way and the unity of genus differ in that the unity of matter is a numerical unity based upon a determinate thing, while generic unity is not a numerical unity, but a unity of indetermination, based upon indeterminately diverse natures.

When you hear that the unity of prime matter is a numerical unity, understand this negatively, not positively. For something is said to be one in number in two ways, that is, positively and negatively. Something is one in number positively which is one by the presence of a property or a numerical difference, for instance, Socrates. And in this

---

<sup>29</sup> See St. Thomas Aquinas, *In VII Phys.*, lect. 8, n. 6.

<sup>30</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, X (I), 8, 1058a 6; St. Thomas, *In X Metaph.*, lect. 10, nn. 2113–2119.

<sup>31</sup> See St. Thomas Aquinas, *In I de anima*, lect. 1, nn. 12–13.

<sup>32</sup> Averroes, *In XII Metaph.*, com. 14; *ed cit.*, t. VIII, fol. 141r–v.

<sup>33</sup> *Ipsa* in the text should read *ipso*.

way, prime matter in itself is not one in number, because it includes no individual property. Something is one in number negatively which, because it is not universal, is not many in number; and this is what includes within itself nothing distinctive, whence it could have plurality and number. Taken in this way prime matter in itself is one in number, and this sort of numerical unity is based upon a determinate entity, namely, upon that entity which is matter, which includes within itself nothing distinctive, since it is stripped of all act, whose function it is to distinguish. And therefore the Commentator says that matter has a negative unity, because it is one by remotion of all forms, since it has none which are distinctive.

Properly speaking, however, genus is not one in number either positively or negatively. This is clear from the fact that a numerical unity, positive as well as negative, is based upon a distinct and determinate thing, which is not found in genus; for genus says many natures and things from which being numbered is possible. But that genus is one by the unity of indetermination is clear from the fact that the many natures which genus indicates are not united in its meaning, except because it signifies them indeterminately. For animal thus unites in itself horse, ox, lion, etc. because it does not express distinctly which of these it is that has the perfection of sense. And, therefore, the Commentator says in that place that genus is one by the commonness of the form signified, that is, because it signifies the forms commonly, and not determinately. Thus it is also clear how the text cited backs up the position of St. Thomas. For, if matter and genus differ in that the unity of matter arises from the negation of forms, and is based upon a definite entity, and genus is not one except in so far as it signifies many natures commonly, it follows that genus is not one except from indetermination—this was the point to be proved.

As we said, the nature of the species is indeterminate with respect to the individual, as the nature of the genus with respect to species. As a consequence, just as the genus, predicated of the species, says indistinctly in its signification everything which is determinately in the species, so too the species, predicated of the individual, necessarily signifies everything which is in the individual, although indistinctly. And in this way, the term *man* signifies the essence of the species, and so man is predicated of Socrates. But if the nature of the species is signified with precision from designated matter, which is the principle of individuation, then it will function as a part, and in this sense it will be signified by the term *humanity*, for humanity signifies that in virtue of which man is man. But designated matter is not that in virtue of which man is man, and is therefore in no way contained among those things by which man is man. Since, then, humanity includes in its concept only those things by which man is man,

it is clear that determined or designated matter is excluded or omitted from its signification. And because the part is not predicated of the whole, then humanity is predicated neither of man nor of Socrates. Thus Avicenna says<sup>34</sup> that the quiddity of a composite is not the composite itself, whose quiddity it is, even though the quiddity itself be also composite; as humanity, although it is composite, yet is not man. Rather, it must be received in something, which is designated matter. But because, as was said, the designation of the species relative to the genus is through form, whereas the designation of the individual relative to the species is from matter, then the term signifying that from which the nature of the genus is taken, with the precision of the determined form perfecting the species, must signify the material part of the whole; as the body is the material part of man. But the term signifying that from which the nature of the species is taken, with the precision of designated matter, signifies the formal part, and therefore humanity is signified as a certain form. And humanity is called the form of the whole, not as something superadded to the essential parts of matter and form, as the form of a house is superadded to its integral parts; but rather that it is a form which is the whole, namely, embracing form and matter, but with the precision of those things through which matter naturally is designated. And so it is clear that the essence of man is signified by the word *man* and by the word *humanity*, but in different ways, as was said. For the word *man* signifies it as a whole, namely, inasmuch as it does not exclude the designation of matter, but contains it implicitly and indistinctly, as has been said that the genus contains the difference. And, therefore, the word *man* is predicated of individuals, but the word *humanity* signifies man's essence as a part, which does not contain in its signification anything except what belongs to man as man, and it excludes all designation of matter. Thus it is not predicated of individual men. And this is why the name essence is sometimes predicated of the thing, for it is said that Socrates is an essence; and sometimes denied, as when we say that the essence of Socrates is not Socrates.

51) In this fifth and last part of the chapter, St. Thomas compares the specific essence to the individual in terms of totality, partiality, predicability, and formality.

To understand the question, we must notice that, as we said above that a generic essence can be signified in the manner of a whole and in the manner of a part, so we say now that a specific essence can be considered as signified in the manner of a whole and in the manner of a part by a term of first intention. It is signified in the manner of a whole as human essence is signified by the term *man*; in the manner of a part as human essence<sup>35</sup> is signified by the term *humanity*. Now this

---

<sup>34</sup> Avicenna, *Metaph.*, tr. V. c. 5; *ed. cit.*, fol. 90r.

<sup>35</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 78, line 9) has *illa et*. The Paris edition (p. 432, line 15) has *illamet*.

essence differs from itself signified in the other manner in that what is signified in the manner of a whole implicitly includes the individuals; but when it is signified in the manner of a part, it excludes individuals from what it signifies. This fact is shown by an example. *Man*, since it signifies one having human nature, implicitly includes under the term *one having* all human individuals, for one having human nature is any human individual. But *humanity*, since it signifies that by which man is man, excludes everything other than humanity by the term *by which*, for that by which man is man is nothing else than humanity. And, therefore, since the individuating principles are other than humanity, as was said above, it follows that humanity excludes the individuating principles from what it signifies, and consequently excludes individuals, which are not intelligible without individuation; just as species are not intelligible without difference. And, since a part as a part is not predicated of its whole, and every direct predicate has the character of a whole, essence understood in the first way, that is, signified in the manner of a whole, is directly predicated of individuals; but signified in the manner of a part it is never so predicated. Owing to this the proposition, *Socrates is a man*, is true; but the proposition, *Socrates is humanity*, properly speaking is false, as Avicenna testifies.<sup>36</sup> And so it is now clear, the relation of specific essence to the individual according to the three, namely, totality, partiality, and predicability.

Now regarding formality, St. Thomas makes clear the appropriate difference between the generic essence signified in the manner of a part with respect to the species, and the specific essence signified in the manner of a part with respect to the individual. For they differ in that the generic essence is the material part of the species; and the specific essence is the formal part of the individual. The reason for this is that the generic essence is compared to the other part of the species as matter is to form, and as the perfectible to its perfection, since the designation, or determination, of genus to species is the function of the difference, which is taken from the specific form, which perfects and completes the generic perfection. But the specific essence is compared to the other part of the individual as form is to matter, and as a perfection to the perfectible, since the designation, or determination, of species to individuals is the function of designated matter, which is more imperfect than the specific form from which specific essence is taken, as is clear. And, therefore, animality is the material part of man; humanity is the formal part of Socrates, and is called the form of the whole, not as if it were superadded, etc.

---

<sup>36</sup> Avicenna, *Metaph.*, tr. V, c. 5; *ed. cit.*, fol. 90r.

To understand what we say here, observe that the form of the whole and the form of the part, as we saw in the second chapter, differ really; not as one form differs from another form, think of whiteness differing from sweetness, but as a whole and a part. And, therefore, St. Thomas states here that the form of the whole is not as something superadded to the parts, that is, it is not a form added to matter and form, as the form of a house is a form added to wood, stones, cement, and the other parts. Rather, it is the form which is the whole, that is, it is the very composite which results from the parts. This composite, when it is signified in the manner of a formal part, is called the form of the whole, since it is completely definitive, distinctive, and determinative of the whole, which are the characters of form. The remainder of the words is an epilogue that is clear in itself.

## Chapter IV<sup>1</sup>

Now that we have seen what is meant by the name essence in composite substances, we must see how it is related to the notions of genus, species, and difference. However, since that to which the notion of genus, species, or difference applies is predicated of this individual designated thing, it is impossible that the notion of genus or species or difference should apply to the essence, according as it is signified in the manner of a part, as in the noun *humanity* or *animality*. And, therefore, Avicenna says<sup>2</sup> that rationality is not a difference but a principle of difference. And, for the same reason, humanity is not a species nor animality a genus.

52) In this fourth chapter,<sup>3</sup> intending to determine how the essence of composite substances is related to the logical intentions, namely, genus, species, and difference, *he makes four points*. *First*, he determines his position by means of six conclusions. *Secondly*, he excludes one error of Averroes. *Thirdly*, he excludes one other objection. *Fourthly*, he answers one tacit objection.

For the understanding of the first part, two distinctions must be noted.

The first is this. The nature or essence of a composite substance can be taken in three ways. First, as signified after the manner of a part. Secondly, as existing through itself, separated from singulars. Thirdly, as signified after the manner of a whole.

The second distinction, which is a subdivision of the third member, is this. The nature of a composite substance, signified after the manner of a whole, can be taken in three ways. First, in itself. Secondly, according to the being (*esse*) it has in singulars. Thirdly, according to the being (*esse*) it has in the intellect.

Having touched on these divisions, you should note that he posits singular conclusions for each member of these divisions. According to the first two members of each division, he posits four negative conclusions; under the last member of each division, he posits two affirmative conclusions, so that under each division he first posits two negative conclusions, and then a third affirmative conclusion. Thus there are six conclusions.

*The first negative conclusion, therefore, is this.* The essence of a composite substance, signified after the manner of a part, as humanity,

---

<sup>1</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 80) has no title to this chapter. The Paris edition (p. 433) has the following title to this chapter. *Quanam ratione essentiae conveniat esse genus, speciem, vel differentiam, ostendit.*

<sup>2</sup> Avicenna, *Metaph.*, tr. V, c. 6; *ed cit.*, fol. 90r.

<sup>3</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 80, line 9) has *capitulo*. The Paris edition (p. 433, line 24) has *capite*.



animality, rationality, is neither a genus nor a species nor a difference. He proves this as follows. Genus, species, and difference are predicated directly of this particular supposit, for example, Socrates; the essence of a composite substance, signified after the manner of a part, is not predicated directly of this particular substance; therefore, the essence thus signified is neither genus nor species nor difference. All these propositions are evident from the preceding chapter,<sup>4</sup> and therefore Avicenna says<sup>5</sup> that rationality, which signifies after the manner of a part, is not a difference, but a principle [of difference], and, likewise, animality is not a genus, but a principle of genus, and humanity is not a species, but a principle of species; just as whiteness is a principle of the white, and a part is a principle of that of which it is a part.

Similarly, too, one cannot say that the notion of genus, species or difference applies to essence according as essence is something existing outside of individuals, as the Platonists held, because in this way, genus and species would not be predicated of this individual. For it cannot be said that Socrates is what is separated from him. Nor, furthermore, would that which is separated help in knowing this designated individual being.

53) Here he gives *the second negative conclusion*: the essence of a composite substance, existing in virtue of itself, but not in individuals, is neither a species nor a genus. He proves this with two arguments. The first is this. Genus or species is predicated of this particular; essence subsisting in virtue of itself and not in individuals, is not predicated of this particular; therefore essence subsisting in virtue of itself and not in individuals, is not a genus or a species. The major is evident. The minor is proved thus. A subject is that which receives direct predication; Socrates is not a separated man; therefore Socrates is not a subject with respect to separated man; therefore separated man is not predicated of Socrates, which was assumed in the minor. The second argument is this. Genus or species is that by which individuals are known; the essence subsisting in virtue of itself and not in individuals, is not that by which individuals are known; therefore the essence subsisting in virtue of itself is not a genus or species. The major is evident from this, that each thing is known through its genus, species, and difference. The minor is evident from the fact that each thing is known quidditatively through that which is in it, and not through that which is not in it.

And, therefore, it remains that the essence has the notion of a genus, species, or difference in so far as it applies to essence ac-

---

<sup>4</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 81, line 8) has *capitulo*. The Paris edition (p. 434 line 4) has *capite*.

<sup>5</sup> Avicenna, *Metaph.*, tr. V, c. 6; *ed. cit.*, fol. 90r.

ording as it is signified after the manner of a whole, as by the noun *man* or *animal*, inasmuch as it implicitly and indistinctly contains everything that is in the individual.

54) Here is placed *the third affirmative conclusion*: the essence of a composite substance signified after the manner of a whole is a species, genus, or difference, etc. This is proved thus. Genus, species, or difference substantially and implicitly contain the whole which is in the individual; the essence of a composite substance signified after the manner of a whole implicitly contains the total being (*esse*) of individuals; therefore the essence of a composite substance signified after the manner of a whole is a genus or species or difference. All the propositions are evident from the preceding chapter where we said that genus, species, and difference agree in that they signify the whole which is in inferiors, and that the separated form of these exclude those things which are in inferiors. Animal, therefore, is a genus, man is a species, and rational is a difference.

But nature or essence so taken can be considered in two ways. In one way, according to its nature and its proper meaning, and this is the absolute consideration of it. In this way nothing can be said to be true of it except what applies to it as such. Whence, whatever else may be attributed to it is false attribution. For example, to man, insofar as he is man, belong rational and animal and other things which fall within his definition; however, white or black or anything of this kind, which is not in the notion of humanity, does not belong to man as man. Therefore, if it were asked whether that nature can be said to be one or many, we must grant neither, because each of these is outside the concept of humanity, and each of these could be added to it. For if plurality were in the notion of humanity, it could never be one, although it is one inasmuch as it is in Socrates. Likewise, if unity were in the concept and notion of humanity, then the nature of Socrates and of Plato would be one and the same, nor could it be multiplied in many.

In another way, it is considered according to the act of existing that it has in this or that individual, and in this way something is predicated of it accidentally by reason of the thing in which it exists, as it is said that man is white because Socrates is white, although whiteness does not belong to man as man.

Now this nature has a twofold act of existing; one in singulars, and the other in the soul; according to both of these, accidents follow the nature, and thus in individual beings it has multiple acts of existing, according to the diversity of individuals. And yet to the nature, according to its proper consideration, that is, absolutely, none of these acts of existing is due. For it is false to say that the nature of man, as such, exists in this individual man, because if existence in this individual belonged to man as man, it would never exist outside the individual. Likewise, if not to exist in this individual belonged to man as man, human nature

would never exist in it. But it is true to say that it belongs to man as man to exist in this or that individual. Therefore it is clear that the nature of man, absolutely considered, abstracts from every act of existing, but in such a way as not to exclude any of them. And it is this nature so considered that is predicated of all individual beings.

55) Here, before the *fourth conclusion* is posited, we begin the second division mentioned above, whose terms ought to be made clear as preparation for an understanding of the conclusions.

A nature, signified after the manner of a whole, according to its nature or proper notion, or according to itself, is the same as nature considered according to those conditions, or according to those predicates, which are proper to it from its definition, or in the first manner of predicating *per se*.

However, a nature signified according to the existence (*esse*) it has in individuals, is the same as that nature considered according to those conditions, or according to those predicates, which agree with it because of the fact that it has existence (*esse*) in an individual or individuals.

A nature, according to the existence (*esse*) it has in the intellect, says the same as that nature considered according to those conditions, or according to those predicates, which are proper to it because of its existence (*esse*) in the intellect. However, the conditions which are proper to a nature according to the different ways it is taken, differ in four ways, as can be gathered from the text. The conditions proper to a nature taken according to itself are essential predicates. For human nature, taken according to itself, is nothing else than rational animal. The conditions proper to a nature, however, taken in the other two ways are denominative predicates. For human nature is not that thing which fits owing to existence (*esse*) in individuals, but that thing is a denomination of human nature. Thus, human nature is not the whiteness which fits it because of the fact that it exists in Socrates, but white is a denomination of the nature. Likewise, human nature is not that thing which fits it because<sup>6</sup> of existence (*esse*) in the intellect, for example, a relation of universality or of species, but universal and species are a denomination of the nature. Although *the last two members* agree in this that they are considered through denominative predicates, *they still differ*, because denominative predicates which belong to a nature existing in individuals, posit something real beyond the nature; as white adds, over and above human nature, the nature of whiteness which is a real being. Denominative predicates, on the other

---

<sup>6</sup> In the Paris edition (p. 436, line 6) *ex* is missing.

hand, which belong to a nature as it exists in the intellect, posit nothing real beyond the nature itself, but they posit a negative or a relative denomination according to some relation of reason. For when I say, *man is a species*, *species* adds nothing real over and above *man*, but only a relation of reason in respect to its genus; for the species of a genus is a species.

*Secondly*, the members placed in the former division *differ* in that nature, taken absolutely, is neither one nor many in number. If it were one, it could not be found in many, which is evidently false, because human nature is in Socrates and Plato. The consequence is proved thus. A nature taken according to itself is one in number; therefore it cannot be distinct in number; therefore it cannot be found in many, which was the contention. The first of these consequences is clear from the fact that it is impossible for something to belong to a thing that is opposite to what belongs to it according to itself; just as it is impossible for the irrational to belong to man. Numerical distinction, however, is opposed to numerical unity and, therefore, if a nature according to itself has numerical unity, it can never have numerical distinction. Similarly, it is proved that a nature taken according to itself is not many in number; for it would follow that human nature is not in Socrates because it could not have numerical unity, from which it could claim for itself numerical distinction according to itself. A nature, however, according to the existence (*esse*) it has in individuals is given numerical unity and distinction. On that account man is one in number, because Socrates is one in number; and for this reason man is numerically distinct in many, because Socrates and Plato are distinct in number.

*Thirdly*, they *differ* in that a nature, as it is in itself, does not claim any existence (*esse*) for itself, that is, neither existence (*esse*) in an individual or individuals, nor existence (*esse*) in the intellect, which is evident from the same grounds. For if existence (*esse*) in an individual belonged to its very notion, it would never be found outside of an individual, since nothing is found outside of what belongs to its very notion. Likewise, if existence (*esse*) in individuals belonged to its very notion, it could not be found in one, because a nature existing in one is not in many. Similarly, if existence (*esse*) in the intellect belonged to its very notion, it could never be found outside the intellect; just as if not being (*esse*) in individuals or an individual belonged to its very notion, it could never exist in some individual. Also, if not being (*esse*) in the intellect were of its very notion, it could never have existence in the intellect owing to that reason. Nothing can have the opposite of its very notion. Whence nature, taken absolutely, abstracts from every existence (*esse*) and non-existence (*esse*) without prescinding, that is,

it neither includes nor excludes something of this kind of existence (*esse*) or non-existence (*esse*). A nature, however, taken in the second or third manner includes one of these existences (*esse*) and excludes the other, as is self-evident. For man, according as it exists in individuals, does not exist in the intellect and, contrariwise, according as it exists in the intellect, does not exist in individuals.

*Fourthly, they differ* because a nature signified after the manner of a whole, taken according to itself, is that which is predicated of individuals when it is said, *Socrates is a man*. A nature, however, taken both as it is in individuals and as it is in the intellect, is not predicated of individuals. This is made clear in the following way. That is predicated of individuals which is attributed to them in a proposition; but a nature, taken absolutely and not according to its existence (*esse*) in individuals nor according to its existence (*esse*) in an intellect, is attributed to individuals in a proposition; therefore a nature taken absolutely and not according to its existence (*esse*) in an individual or in an intellect, is predicated of individuals. The major is evident from the terms. The minor is clarified by examples. When I say, *Socrates is a man*, the meaning of the proposition is, Socrates is a rational animal, so that in this proposition nothing is attributed to Socrates except that he is a rational animal, which, as is evident, are the conditions of human nature taken absolutely. It is the case that when I say, *Socrates is a man*, I attribute something proper to human nature to Socrates from its existence (*esse*) in individuals or from its existence (*esse*) in an intellect; nor do I attribute to Socrates that he has a human nature with something added. I only attribute to Socrates that he has a human nature, or that he is a rational animal, which are, as has been said, the conditions of human nature taken according to itself. Therefore a nature taken in the first way is what is predicated of individuals, but this is not true of nature taken in the second or third way.

56) Here before we go further, *certain doubts* must be examined.

Regarding what was said before, there is a doubt. First of all concerning the first difference indicated, because it was said that natures taken according to themselves are not present except in quidditative predicates, a problem shows up both because of transcendental predicates and because of certain negative predicates. For if it is asserted that the transcendentals, which are being, thing, one, something, true and good, belong to a nature taken absolutely, they are quidditative predicates; and if they are, let them be placed in the definition, for no definition is complete unless it includes all quidditative predicates. However, all deny that transcendentals should be placed in the definition.

The consequence is confirmed by the words of St. Thomas in a text in which he says that those things which are in a nature taken absolutely belong to its definition. If, however, it is said that the transcendentals do not belong to a nature taken absolutely, then man, taken according to itself, is not something, nor a thing, nor one; which is by all means to be denied.

Regarding negative predicates, there occurs a similar problem, because negations of disparate natures, if they belong to an absolute nature, will be quidditative predicates, and thus a negation will belong to the definition of substance. If, however, they belong to a nature according to its existence in individuals or in the intellect, then taking man absolutely, the proposition, *man is not a lion*, is false. This is unreasonable.

In order to solve these difficulties, we must first consider how the transcendentals are related to the natures of the things to which they are applied, a point touched upon above in the question on the meaning of being. No transcendental implies a grade of being or a nature different from the grades or natures of the things to which they are applied. For when I say, *the being man, the one man, the thing man, the true man, the good man, the distinct (aliquid) man*, I do not signify some grade of being other than humanity, but humanity itself according to different modes. For *the being* signifies humanity in so far as it has existence; *the one* signifies it in so far as it is not formally divided; *the thing* in so far as it has fullness (*latitudinem*) since it is not fabricated by the intellect; *the good* in so far as it is perfective of appetite; *the true* in so far as it is perfective of the intellect; *the something* in so far as it is a thing different from others. The same must be said when it is taken in any other generic grade, as can be easily shown from examples.

Secondly, we must consider that since being is first among the transcendentals (because its notion precedes those of the others), and all of the others are convertible with being as its attributes, it will be evident how the others belong, when it has been made clear how being belongs to a nature. Scotus,<sup>7</sup> therefore, thought that being is univocal and is predicated essentially<sup>8</sup> of all its inferiors with the exception of the ultimate differences. He lays down the first statement as self-evident, and he offers two reasons for the second.

The first of these is that if the differences include being, said of them univocally, and if they are not entirely the same, it is necessary that they be diverse beings somewhat the same, and consequently, it

---

<sup>7</sup> Scotus, *In I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 3, nn. 6–12; *ed. cit.*, V, Part I, 440–41, 444–46.

<sup>8</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 85, line 1 from bottom) has *in quid*. The Paris edition (p. 438, line 12) has *inquit*.

follows that the ultimate differences are not properly different, and thus they have other differences and are not ultimate.

Secondly, just as a being composite in reality is composed of act and potency, so a composite concept is one through itself, composed of an actual concept and a potential concept, determinable and determining. Therefore, just as when we resolve a real composite thing we arrive at irreducibly simple things, namely, the ultimate act and the ultimate potency, so that the act includes no potency, and the potency includes no act; so the resolution of a concept must terminate at irreducibly simple concepts, the actual and the potential—the solely determinable so that it includes nothing of the determining, and the solely determining so that it includes nothing of the determinable. Such are the concept of being and ultimate differences. Therefore the ultimate differences do not formally include being.

Against the first, there is this argument. It would follow that being is placed in the definition, and this is contrary to Aristotle,<sup>9</sup> because it would be nonsensical in a definition,<sup>10</sup> as we have proved above in the question on the univocity of being.

Against the second, I argue thus. Everything, which taken formally receives the attributes of being as predicates in the second manner, includes in itself being formally; but the attributes of being are predicated in the second manner of the ultimate difference taken formally; therefore the ultimate difference includes in itself being formally. The minor is evident because the ultimate difference is one through itself and intelligible. The major is proved thus. Everything formally including *a priori* a proper middle term, through which the attributes of being are demonstrated, includes in itself being formally. This is evident because the concept of being is that middle term; but everything, which taken formally receives the attributes of being as predicates in the second manner, formally include in themselves the middle term through which such attributes are demonstrable concerning it; therefore every such thing includes being formally. The minor is evident, because it implies the opposite. For if A does not formally include the proper middle for concluding B, how can B be demonstrable *a priori* concerning A taken formally?

Here is my second argument, and it comes to the same. Every attribute fitting many things taken formally fits them by reason of something common, formally included in them, to which that attribute is primarily fitting; but unity or intelligibility is an attribute fitting all the

---

<sup>9</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, VIII ( ), 6, 1045b 3; St. Thomas, *In VIII Metaph.*, lect. 5, n. 1763.

<sup>10</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 86, line 18) has *quod esset negatio in diffinitione*. The Paris edition (p. 438, line 22 from bottom) has *Praeterea sequitur quod esset negatio in diffinitione*.

ultimate differences taken formally; therefore it fits them by reason of something common, formally included in them, to which it is primarily fitting. Such, however, is being. Therefore all the ultimate differences include being. The minor is self-evident. The major is from Aristotle.<sup>11</sup> Nor can it be said concerning the major that it suffices that the subject be included denominatively in those to which, when taken formally, the attribute of that subject is fitting. Because, if an attribute is in something taken formally, the subject is also in the same thing taken formally; and if the thing taken formally has nothing to do with the subject, how can this thing taken formally have an attribute of the subject, since the total reason why an attribute of something is in another, is the participation of that first subject? Some argue thus. That which, when taken formally, excludes the subject from itself, also excludes the attribute from itself; but the ultimate differences, taken formally, do not exclude the attributes of being in the second manner; therefore neither do they exclude being in the first manner. Don't allow yourself to listen to the answer of Francisci de Mayronis<sup>12</sup> when he says that the rules taken from the *posterioristicam* of Aristotle do not hold concerning the transcendentals. For this text is arbitrary and destroys all metaphysics.

Regarding the reasons of Scotus, we say that since both the first and the second reasons suppose that being has an objective concept which is simply one, they conclude to nothing. Secondly, we say to the second argument, that it limps on the simile. For, although there may be some kind of likeness between a natural composite and an intellectual composite, nevertheless the unlikeness is great in the point at issue, because the parts of a natural composite mutually exclude each other, which are certain specialized things; but the parts of an intellectual composite cannot mutually exclude each other because one of them—namely being—is so universal that nothing can escape it.

However, Avicenna, Alfarabi, and Algazel think that being is not fitting to a nature taken absolutely, as Albert points out in *Postpraedicamentis*.<sup>13</sup> Whence they say that this consequence is not valid: man is a substance; therefore man is a being. The reason is that being signifies something added to the essence of a thing, and does not belong to its essential notion, which the Commentator expressly attributes to Avicenna in IV *Metaph.*<sup>14</sup> and X *Metaph.*<sup>15</sup>

---

<sup>11</sup> See St. Thomas Aquinas, *In I Post. Anal.*, lect. 37, nn. 323–31.

<sup>12</sup> Franciscus de Mayronis, *In quatuor libros Sententiarum*, Prologue, q. VIII; (Vnetiis: 1520), fol. 7r A.

<sup>13</sup> St. Albert the Great, *Liber de Praedicamentis*, tract. VII, c. 9; ed. Borgnet, (Parisiis: 1890–1899), t. I, p. 289.

<sup>14</sup> Averroes, *In IV Metaph.*, com. 3; *ed. cit.*, t. VIII, fol. 32r.

<sup>15</sup> Averroes, *In X Metaph.*, com. 8; *ed. cit.*, t. VIII, fol. 121r.



St. Thomas, however, of whose work we have undertaken to give an exposition, regarding IV *Metaph.*,<sup>16</sup> lect. 2 and X *Metaph.*,<sup>17</sup> expressly criticizes Avicenna on this point. Wherefore, his opinion is not to be considered the same as that of Avicenna, although it is difficult to see how he differs from it, since he himself holds that nothing outside of God is being through its essence, but through something added to its essence. And, he expressly says in *quodlibet*. II,<sup>18</sup> that being is not an essential predicate; and in I *Contra Gent.*,<sup>19</sup> he says that being does not fall within the concept of substance, which is the most general genus.

For that reason, some have said that being is taken in two ways, namely, nominally and participially. And further, being taken nominally, is predicated quidditatively and intrinsically of all things; and thus everything is a being essentially. Being, however, taken participially, since it means the same as existing, is not a quidditative predicate, and thus nothing other than God is a being essentially. Whence, according to them, being taken nominally is fitting to a nature taken absolutely, but not being taken participially. Some add that being taken nominally is divided into the ten categories, and is transcendently converted with others properly speaking but not being taken in the second sense. And, therefore, Avicenna is to be criticized because he neglected this distinction.

However, it appears to me we ought to speak otherwise. I say that being taken participially is that which is transcendent and divided into the ten categories. This can be shown to be evident from the fact that St. Thomas<sup>20</sup> shows that the good, which is also divided into the ten categories, as is said in I *Ethicorum*,<sup>21</sup> is converted with being taken participially, not nominally. This is clearly evident for two reasons.

First, because he says that since the good and being are convertible, just as the thing is being, so also are goods; but the thing is not being by its essence; therefore neither are goods. In this reasoning, in order that the fallacy of equivocation be avoided, I am talking here only of being taken participially. Secondly, because he says that that by which a thing is formally good is not being; but if this is said of being taken nominally, it is false, because the being (*esse*) of actual existence, by which a thing is being and good, is being taken nominally. Therefore

---

<sup>16</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *In IV Metaph.*, lect. 2, nn. 556–560.

<sup>17</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *In X Metaph.*, lect. 3, n. 1981.

<sup>18</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *Quodlibet*, II, q. 2, a. 1.

<sup>19</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *Contra Gentiles*, I, 26.

<sup>20</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.*, I, qq. 5 and 6; *De Verit.*, q. XXI.

<sup>21</sup> Aristotle, *Ethics*, I, 6, 1096a 23; St. Thomas, *In Ethicorum*, I, lect. 6; Marietti, n. 81.

being which is convertible with good, which is transcendent and divided into the ten categories, is being taken partially.

But in the name *being*, two aspects can be considered, namely, that from which the name of being is taken, that is, being (*esse*) itself, by which a thing is; and that upon which the name being is imposed, namely, that which is. For in the beginning of this work, it was said that being signifies that which is in any category, and in this it differs from essence which signifies that by which a thing is placed in a category. Whence, in *I Physicorum*,<sup>22</sup> Aristotle, in place of *being*, puts the *what is* (*quod est*). Avicenna, therefore, looking at that by which a thing is, whence the name *being* has been taken, simply says that being is a predicate outside the essence of a thing. St. Thomas, however, looking at the *what is*, upon which the name being is imposed, did not follow Avicenna. For the *what is* does not predicate something outside the essence of a thing. Moreover, he did not wish to enumerate being among the accidental predicates, noting that that by which a thing is, namely, actual essence,<sup>23</sup> is not of a nature extraneous to the *what is*, but that the *what is* is constituted through principles proper to itself. Now this cannot be asserted of any other thing outside the essence of a thing. Nothing outside the essence of a thing is constituted by proper principles of the thing itself, except the existence of the thing. For everything else is constituted through the proper principles of another genus, namely, the proper genus and proper difference, and universally, the proper principles of that category. However, existence (*ipsum existere*) is constituted only through genus and difference, and the principles of the *what is* itself.<sup>24</sup> And this is the reason why St. Thomas criticizes Avicenna.<sup>25</sup> Wherefore being, predicated of something, for example man, since it does not draw man outside the proper genus and proper difference, nor away from the formal notion of the *what is* itself, is left as a substantial predicate with Aristotle and the Commentator, as above, although it may not be entirely in the same substantial mode as those predicates which fall under the definition.

Having touched on these points, first I say, concerning the doubt, that the transcendentals are not proper predicates of a nature according to its absolute consideration, nor according to its existence (*esse*)

---

<sup>22</sup> Aristotle, *Physics*, I, 2, 185a 21; St. Thomas, *In I Phys.*, lect. 3, n. 2.

<sup>23</sup> Cajetan has ". . . ipsum quo res est, scilicet actualis essentia . . ." He must mean "actualis existentia," for he says in the rest of the sentence that ". . . actualis essentia, non est extraneae naturae ab ipso quod est, sed per principia propria ipsius, quod est constituitur . . ."

<sup>24</sup> Cajetan says: "Ipsum autem existere, non nisi per genus et differentiam et principia ipsius quod est, constituitur." That is, *ipsum existere* has the same predicate as "actualis essentia." Hence this must be a mistake in the text.

<sup>25</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *In IV Metaph.*, lect. 2, nn. 556–60.

in individuals, nor according to its existence (*esse*) in the intellect, but are common predicates of a nature, no matter which way it is taken. They are fitting to it not only concomitantly, but also causally. And concerning a nature, taken either in the second or in the third way, it is evident; for, since man is found in individuals, it has the notion of being, one, thing, and the others. Similarly, since it has existence (*esse*) in the intellect, being is in some way undivided, etc.; and thus some existence (*esse*) is due to it, though that of reason. Regarding a nature, however, taken in the first way, it can be shown as evident from what has been said and from the fact that in whatever thing a posterior transcendental is found, the prior is also found. Regarding the posterior transcendentals, which are one, thing, something, etc., it is manifest that they fit a nature taken absolutely. Whence this is true of man, taken absolutely, *man is a being*. Wherefore St. Thomas says, super X *Metaph.*,<sup>26</sup> that being predicates natures of the ten genera, whether they are considered as actual or potential, and not only as actual.

Regarding the response<sup>27</sup> touched upon in the doubt, where it was said: if this is so, then the transcendentals would have to be placed in the definition, we say first that not all essential predicates must be placed in a definition, but only those which manifest another essential grade of the thing defined. The transcendentals are not such, of which it has been said that they predicate the same grade which genus or difference imply. Whence Aristotle says, in VII *Metaph.*,<sup>28</sup> that it is for this reason that neither being nor one is placed in a definition, because being is immediately each one. For a definition is complete when every grade of being is explained from the first potency to the last intrinsic act. This can be done without the transcendentals which add no grade. Secondly, we say of being that because being in some way implies existence (*esse*) itself, which answers the question, *is it?* and not the question, *what is it?* therefore it differs in some way from the essential predicates.

Regarding the statement of St. Thomas, we say that the transcendentals have two factors: that the notion in question is not placed in any definition; and that they are included in any concept, as was said of being.<sup>29</sup> I am of the opinion, concerning the second statement, that the transcendentals accompany every grade and, therefore, they are absent to no concept. And thus I say that those things which fit a nature taken absolutely, under whose notion they fall, are fitting to a

---

<sup>26</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *In X Metaph.*, lect. 3, n. 1981.

<sup>27</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 89, line 9 from bottom) has *ad responsionem*. The Paris edition (p. 441, line 4) has *ad rationem*.

<sup>28</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, VIII ( ), 6, 1045b 3; St. Thomas, *In VIII Metaph.*, lect. 5, n. 1763.

<sup>29</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, III ( ), 3, 998b 26; St. Thomas, *In III Metaph.*, lect. 8, n. 433.

thing because it is such as it is; for man, because he is a man, is a being, a thing, something, etc. From these considerations, diligent reader, you have that by which you ought intelligently understand the various statements of St. Thomas.

Regarding negative predicates, it can be said briefly that negations can be taken in two ways, namely, formally and fundamentally. If formally, it is false that they fit a nature taken absolutely. For they are attributed to a nature by the work of the intellect, since negations are beings of reason. If fundamentally, since a negation is founded on an affirmation, it is conceded that they are quidditative predicates, but taken in this way they are nothing but genus and proper difference. For the basis of the negations of disparate natures concerning man is nothing else than the nature of man. Thus it is because a man is a rational animal that he is not a lion, nor a cow, etc.

**Question VI—**

**Whether a Nature Taken Absolutely Has Unity or Plurality?**

57) Secondly, there is a doubt concerning the words of St. Thomas in his text regarding the assigning of the second difference, in which it is said that a nature, taken absolutely, has neither plurality nor unity.

This seems to be impossible since that which is not one is not definable, as is said in *VII Metaph.*;<sup>30</sup> in fact, it is unintelligible, as is held in *IV Metaph.*<sup>31</sup> And if it is granted that a nature taken absolutely has unity, it is not easy to say definitely what kind of unity it has, for it is not numerical unity, as has been declared, nor is it specific, nor generic, since these kinds of unity come from the intellect. Neither is it an analogous unity, as is self-evident, for man is not analogously one. Nor can anyone easily say whether that unity is real or not.

In order to clarify this doubt, *five points must be considered.*

First, it must be seen what each kind of unity is.

Secondly, whence does unity have reality.

Thirdly, how each kind of unity is outside the soul.

Fourthly, the doubt that was raised must be answered.

Fifthly, some objections must be refuted.

58) *Regarding the first point*, it must be noted that since the one adds nothing to being except a lack of division, in such a way that one is nothing else than an undivided being, as is said in *IV Metaph.*,<sup>32</sup> any

---

<sup>30</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, VII ( ), 4, 1030a 16; St. Thomas, *In VII Metaph.*, lect. 3, n. 1330.

<sup>31</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, IV ( ), 4, 1006b 10; St. Thomas, *In IV Metaph.*, lect. 7, nn. 613–615.

<sup>32</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, IV ( ), 2, 1003b 31; St. Thomas, *In IV Metaph.*, lect. 2, n. 552.

kind of unity is nothing else than the lack of division of a thing. And since any privation is known through that of which it is a privation, the unity which is indivision must be known from the nature of division which it takes away. The multiple meanings of unity<sup>33</sup> must be taken according to the multiple meanings of division.

Therefore, it must be taken into account that there are two kinds of division. One is material and is caused through the principle of individuation; the other is formal and comes from essential principles. The second kind is subdivided, because in some cases division is through proper essential principles, and in other cases it is through common essential principles. This last case is further subdivided, depending on whether the essential principles are more or less common. For example, between Socrates and Plato, there is numerical, but not formal division, because the distinction between them is not caused by essential, but by individual principles. Between Socrates and this lion, granted that lion and man are in the same proximate genus, there is formal division by means of proper essential principles, namely, by means of ultimate differences. Between Socrates and this plant there is a greater formal division by means of principles, namely the principles common to Socrates and many other species, that is, the division between sensible and non-sensible. Between Socrates and this stone there is still greater formal division by means of common principles, namely, the division between animate and inanimate. And thus, always ascending, formal division becomes wider and wider, until finally we come to the point where we have the greatest formal division between Socrates and this whiteness. It is a division by means of proper and most common essential principles, namely, between the substantive and the dispositive, constitutive of the modes of predicamental being.

Similarly, all of the same divisions can be made of unity. For there are two kinds of unity. Some unity is numerical and some is formal. Numerical unity is always attended by a lack of numerical division. Formal unity, however, is always attended by a lack of formal division, and this is further subdivided. There is one kind of unity which is an entire lack of formal division, caused by proper and common principles, and is formal unity simply. There is another kind of unity which is a lack of formal division, not simply but with qualification, caused namely by means of common principles. This is formal unity in a qualified sense, and is subdivided, depending on whether the absence of division is caused by more or less common essential principles. For example, Socrates is one in number because he is not divided in him-

---

<sup>33</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 91, line 15) has *multiplicitatem, multiplicitatem unitatis*. The Paris edition (p. 442, line 9) has *multiplicitatem unitatis, multiplicitatem*.

self by material differences. Man is formally one simply, because there is no formal division whatsoever in him. Animal is formally one in so far as it is not divided by means of the sensible or non-sensible, but it does not have unity simply, because it is divided by means of rational and irrational. Body is less one formally. It is one because it is not in itself divided by means of corporeal and incorporeal; but it is less one because it has a major formal division, namely, by means of animate and inanimate. Being, however, is the least one. It is indeed one in so far as it is not in itself divided proportionately, but it is the least one in so far as it includes such wide formal diversity with its unity. From these considerations, it is evident, first, what each kind of unity is, because unity is indivision, and the unity corresponds to its indivision, that is, to its lack of division. The result is that there is no difference in saying, Socrates is one in number, that is, Socrates is a being lacking numerical distinction, and in saying, man is formally one, that is, man is a being lacking formal<sup>34</sup> division. So for the first point.

59) *Regarding the second point*, it should be seen that real being is taken in a twofold way: in one way, as distinguished from being fabricated by the intellect; and in another way, as distinguished from what is not existing in act. In the first way, every predicamental thing is a real being, whether it exists or not. In the second way, only that which really exists outside its causes is a real being. And this last is properly real being according to St. Thomas who says, in *quaestionibus de Potentia Dei*,<sup>35</sup> that being before it exists is nothing. In this opinion, he agrees with Aristotle who says in the *Praedicamentis*<sup>36</sup> that if the first substance were destroyed, it would be impossible for anything to remain. Therefore unity just as the others has reality properly speaking in so far as it actually exists outside its causes and the soul. So for the second point.<sup>37</sup>

(60) *Regarding the third point, I lay down three propositions. The first* is: each kind of unity mentioned above, namely both numerical and formal, exist outside the soul. *The second* is: no common unity exists in reality outside the soul in many distinct suppositis. *The third* is: every formal unity existing outside the soul is really multiplied according to the multiplication of things.

*The first proposition* is so manifest that no one of sane mind can deny it. For both kinds of unity appear in Socrates, independent of any operation of the intellect. For he lacks in himself the numerical and formal division which can be caused through proper and common

---

<sup>34</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 92, line 21) has *formali*. The Paris edition (p. 443, line 4) has *formaliter*.

<sup>35</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *De Pot. Dei*, III, 5, *ad 2*.

<sup>36</sup> Aristotle, *Categories*, ch. 5, 2b 5.

<sup>37</sup> In the Paris edition (p. 443, line 15), *haec de secundo* is missing.

principles; and thus he is numerically and formally undivided. Wherefore, in Socrates there is not only numerical unity, but multiple formal unity, according to the multitude of quidditative predicates. And just as it is not only the individuality of Socrates that is outside the soul, but also each quidditative thing predicated of him, so not only numerical unity, but every formal unity in Socrates must be said to exist outside the soul.

In order to understand the *second proposition*, it must be noted that a thing can be understood to be common outside the soul in a twofold way: in one way positively; and in another way negatively. That thing is common positively which, while remaining undivided, is found in many distinct suppositis. That thing is common negatively which is proper to no supposit. Taking commonness in the first way, I know of no one who says there is a common thing outside the soul, except the divine essence according to Christian faith. In the second way, it seems that some posit a common thing outside the soul, about which I shall speak later. And since this seems to me to be untrue, I shall give two proofs to help understand what I have said about commonness taken in the second way.

The first proof is this. No thing which demands that its quiddity be all alone outside the soul exists in reality; but common unity outside the soul, negatively in many distinct suppositis, is a thing which demands that its quiddity be all alone outside the soul; therefore no common unity outside the soul in many distinct suppositis exists in reality. The major is proved thus. Nothing demanding the impossible in order to exist can be found; but it is impossible for a quiddity to be all alone outside the soul, for it must be in some supposit; therefore that which demands that its quiddity be all alone never exists in reality. The minor, however, is proved thus. What demands that its quiddity be not proper to some supposit outside the soul, demands that the quiddity exist alone; but common<sup>38</sup> unity outside the soul in many distinct suppositis demands that its quiddity be all alone in reality. The premises of the above are known from the terms. The major is evident, because a quiddity not proper to some supposit is necessarily all alone, for if it is not alone, it is in some supposit; and if it is in some supposit, it is proper to that supposit. The minor is evident because common and proper are opposites, for common includes the negation of proper, and vice versa. As soon as a thing is appropriated to something, the negatively common ceases to be because it lacks the denial of appro-

---

<sup>38</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 93, line 16 from bottom) has *communis*. The Paris edition (p. 443, line 2 from bottom) has *hominis*.

priation. And as soon as the negatively common is appropriated to something, it no longer exists, because it has the denial of appropriation. Therefore the opposite of the predicate infers the opposite of the subject in both premises.

Further, here is a second proof. Every thing existing in reality is a particular thing; but no common unity outside the soul in many distinct suppositis is a particular thing; therefore there is no such unity in reality. The major is the common opinion of the Peripatetics. The minor is proved thus. Every particular thing is proper to some one supposit, otherwise it is not particular; but no common unity outside the soul in many distinct suppositis is proper to some one supposit, which is evident from the terms; therefore no such unity is particular.

*The third proposition* is proved thus. Whenever any two things are convertibly the same in reality, if one of them is really multiplied, the other will also be multiplied; but one thing and one are convertibly the same in reality; therefore the multiplied thing<sup>39</sup> will be really be multiplied and also its unity. But numerical plurality is real; therefore the multiplied thing is numerically multiplied and also its unity. Whence, just as in Socrates and Plato there are two corporeities, animalities and humanities, so also there are two formal unities corresponding to corporeity, and two corresponding to animality, and two corresponding to humanity. For it is necessary that there be a number of formal unities in each individual corresponding to the number of essential predicates. For just as every quidditative predicate gives some being (*esse*), so it must give<sup>40</sup> some unity, for being and one are the same, as is said in IV *Metaph.*<sup>41</sup>

From these considerations, the third proposition is evident, namely, how unities have being (*esse*) outside the soul, because they are not common but particularized and multiplied numerically according to the number of individuals of which they are unities. So for the third point.

61) *Regarding the fourth point*, I say that a nature, taken absolutely, has some unity. I say this so that the reason brought out by St. Thomas, in *tractatu de natura generis*,<sup>42</sup> concludes efficaciously. And if it be asked whether that unity is numerical or specific, I say that it is formal unity, which is other than numerical unity; just as formal division is other than material division. Nor is that formal unity formally

---

<sup>39</sup> In the Paris edition (p. 444, line 24), *re* is missing.

<sup>40</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 94, line 16) has *scilicet*. In the Paris edition (p. 444, line 21 from bottom), *scilicet* is missing.

<sup>41</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, IV ( ), 2, 1003b 31; St. Thomas, In IV *Metaph.*, lect. 2, n. 552.

<sup>42</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *De Natura Generis*, c. IV; ed. Perrier, *Opuscula Omnia*, t. I, *Opuscula Philosophica*, pp. 511–14.



specific or generic, but it is the foundation of specific unity and generic unity. For these unities are formally from the intellect, but formal unity precedes every act of the intellect. However, what is said in the text, that a nature, taken absolutely, is neither one nor many, is to be understood of numerical unity and plurality. Regarding that which is added to the doubt, as to whether that unity is real or not, I say that in itself, it is real in the first of those ways which we gave above, considering real being just as we considered the nature, namely, taken absolutely. And just as nature, according to the being (*esse*) it has in individuals, is a real being in the second manner, so also that unity which always accompanies a nature in particulars is given as truly and properly real. For the judgment concerning the nature and its unity is the same. So for the fourth point.

62) *Regarding the fifth point*, two problems occur. The first deals with the second proposition, in which it was said that there is no common unity outside the soul. The second deals with that which is now said, namely, by what otherness formal unity is other than numerical unity in Socrates.

*To the first problem*, there is the following objection. All distinct supposita formally one outside the soul have some unity common to them outside the soul; Socrates and Plato are formally one outside the soul; therefore Socrates and Plato have some unity common to them outside the soul. The major is evident from this that if some things which are distinct supposita are one, they are not distinguished in so far as they are one, and thus that *one* is common to both of them, independent of the soul, and from this they are thus one.

Further. The humanity, which is in Socrates, considered in itself is not determined to Socrates or to Plato; therefore the formal unity of humanity, which is in Socrates, considered in itself is common negatively to Socrates and Plato. The consequence is evident, because even formal unity as it is in itself is not determined to Socrates and Plato. The antecedent is self-evident. Therefore there is some common unity negatively in many distinct supposita.

*Regarding the second problem*, it seems that there is a real otherness between the formal unity and the numerical unity existing in Socrates because the disposition of any privations whatsoever are really distinct, and the two negations are also distinct; just as blindness and deafness are really different, because sight and hearing are really distinct. But the disposition of formal and numerical unity are really distinct; therefore, etc. This is evident because formal division and numerical division are so distinguished that, in things separated from matter, formal unity is found without numerical unity; and in things

inferior to these, individuals of the same species have numerical division without formal division.

It appears to those holding the opposite opinion that there is an otherness of reason only, because formal unity is related to numerical unity in the same way that a formal nature is related to an individual nature; but a nature taken formally is really the same as a nature taken numerically, and these two are only rationally distinct; therefore formal unity is really the same as numerical unity, and is only rationally distinct from it.

In order to solve the first doubt, note that there is a twofold way in which two distinct supposita are formally one. In one way, because those two supposita, independently of the soul, are united in something common to and undivided in both of them. In another way, because they both have a mutual negation of formal division. An example of the first, I do not find in reality except, as has been said, in the Trinity which is known by the Christian faith. An example of the second is found in all individuals of the same species. For Socrates, independent of any intellectual consideration, has this negation, namely, that he is not formally divided from Plato, and similarly, Plato is not formally divided from Socrates. And because unity belongs to them formally, nothing else is required that they be formally indistinct. Therefore it is simply true that Socrates and Plato are formally one outside the soul. Therefore the fallacy of the consequent is committed in arguing affirmatively from the superior to the inferior. For to be formally one is superior to those things having something common and undivided in them, independently of the soul, and it is superior to those things having two natures with a mutual negation of formal division. For it is not to be imagined that Socrates and Plato are formally one because they come together in something in which they are not distinguished independently of the soul, but they are such because each enjoys the negation of formal division from the other. To be one formally is nothing else than to be formally undivided. And what we have said of the formal unity simply between Socrates and Plato must also be understood of the formal unity in a qualified sense between Socrates and this lion, and this stone, and this intelligence, etc. For just as Socrates and Plato, because they have two natures between which there is no formal division, are formally indistinct simply, independently of the soul; so because between Socrates and the nature of this lion there is no formal division such as is naturally caused by the sensible and the non-sensible; therefore Socrates and this lion are formally indistinct in a qualified sense. So also because there is no formal division by means of corporeal and incorporeal between Socrates and this stone, therefore Socrates and this stone are formally indistinct in a qualified sense. And

because there is between Socrates and Gabriel no formal division such as is naturally caused between the modes of being, namely, in itself and in another, therefore Socrates and Gabriel are formally indistinct in a qualified sense and, consequently, are formally one independent of any operation of the intellect. Now enough has been said to the effect that one means the same as undivided being.

Regarding the second problem, I say that it is one thing to say that human nature, taken in itself, existing outside the soul is negatively common to many, or is negatively indifferent to many; and it is another thing to say that human nature existing outside the soul is common to many, or is negatively indifferent. The first statement is true; the second is false. The truth of the first statement is evident from what has been said before, namely, that a nature which is outside the soul, for example, the nature of Socrates, taken in itself, that is, taken as a solitary thing, is not determined nor appropriated to something, and consequently it is indifferent or negatively common. The falsity of the second statement is evident from this, that every proposition is simply false where the predicate is repugnant to the subject by reason of a condition explicitly implied in it; just as this is simply false: fire not near the combustible burns. To burn is repugnant to fire when the combustible is not near. But that second proposition, namely, a nature existing outside the soul is negatively common to many, is this type of proposition; therefore it is false.

For evidence of the minor, note that when I say, a nature in itself or nature taken absolutely, I say two things: nature and solitude, and its condition. Similarly, when I say, nature existing outside the soul, I say two things: nature and the particular existence joined to it, and its condition. Whence something belongs to or is repugnant to an absolute nature owing to the nature, and something owing to the solitude. Similarly, something is proper to or repugnant to a really existing nature owing to the nature, and something owing to its association with a particular. Now negative community, which is the predicate in our proposition, does not belong to an absolute nature by reason of itself, i.e., the nature, because it is not a quidditative predicate of it. Negative community belongs to it owing to the explicit condition, *according to itself*, or *taken absolutely*, which is to be all alone. This is the reason why the nature is negatively common, because it is taken all alone, without determination to this or that. Consequently, negative community is necessarily repugnant to a nature under an opposite condition considered precisely under this opposite condition. But the really existing nature provides the condition opposed to solitude, because it provides its conjunction to particular existence, which takes away its solitude. And therefore negative community is repugnant to a nature

existing outside, not by reason of the nature, but by reason of the explicit condition from *existing outside the soul*; and, consequently, that proposition, in which the subject was a nature existing outside, and the predicate was negatively common, is simply false. For as soon as a nature loses solitude, it is also thought to lose community. But it loses solitude as soon as it is in another.

From this the answer to the argument is clear that although both a nature and formal unity, taken in themselves, that is solitarily, are negatively common, the nature really existing is nevertheless not common; just as the nature, when it is considered in itself, is not with another. However, the nature really existing is necessarily with another. Thus it is not valid to infer: the nature considered in itself is not with another, therefore the nature really existing is not with another. Also it is not valid to infer: the nature considered in itself is negatively common, therefore the nature really existing is negatively common. The same error is shown up in both, and it is the case of the fallacy of accident. If you should understand this, you will see in what the position of Scotus, in *II Sent.*,<sup>43</sup> differs from our position, and why he falls into such an opinion. For he says that the specific nature, for example, humanity, by reason of itself follows these two; formal unity, and negative community or indifference to numerical plurality. And he says, at the end of this question, that it is not necessary to seek a cause of a nature's commonness, because the nature itself is a sufficient cause of its commonness. But it is truly necessary to seek the cause of its individuality, because of itself it is not individual. And therefore, just as a nature formally one is found outside the soul, so a common nature is found in many. We do not disagree with the first, but we do with the second. For we say that formal unity follows a nature by reason of itself, but negative community does not follow the nature by reason of itself, but by reason of its solitude; just as we say<sup>44</sup> that individuality follows the nature by reason of its association with existence. And, because the condition of solitude is not proper to a nature by reason of itself, nor by reason of its existence (*esse*) which it has outside the soul, but by reason of the intellect whose nature it is to divide what is united, therefore there is found no commonness in nature before any act of the intellect. And just as the cause of a nature's solitary existence (*esse*) and existence (*esse*) outside must be sought because of itself it has neither, so the cause of the nature's commonness or individuality must also be sought because of itself it has neither.

---

<sup>43</sup> Scotus, *In II Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, nn. 8–10; *ed. cit.*, VI, Part I, 360–61.

<sup>44</sup>The Laurent edition (p. 97, line 2 from bottom ) has *dicimus*. The Paris edition (p. 447, line 28) has *diximus*.

The *cause*, however, for the *falsity* of this Scotistic opinion, seems to be twofold.

The *first* is the equivocal use of the term of *itself*, or *from itself*. Either one of them can be taken in a twofold way. In the one way positively, and in this way it expresses something causal. In the other way negatively, and in this way it expresses solitude, that is, not-with-another. And, in the first way, he understands that the nature is of itself common, so that it is itself the sufficient cause of its community, as is evident from his words. However, he should have understood it in the second way; for a nature of itself, that is not-with-another, is indifferent and common, as when it is said, *nature of itself is common*, the *of itself* does not express some kind of causality, but only a negation of union with another.

The *second cause* is the diversity between a negative and an affirmative proposition concerning an infinite predicate, when reduplication is present. For although from an affirmative proposition concerning an infinite predicate, when the propositions are not reduplicative, there follows a negative proposition and vice versa, as is said in II *Perihermenias*:<sup>45</sup> however, with reduplication, even from an affirmative proposition concerning an infinite predicate there follows a negative proposition concerning a finite predicate, although the opposite is not true. From this proposition: *man because he is man is not white*, it does not follow: *man because he is man is non-white*. For if a man because he is man were non-white, whiteness could never be joined to man, because what belongs to something, insofar as it is that thing, is always proper to it necessarily and of itself. It appears, however, that in this the Scotistic reason clearly fails. For, since commonness taken negatively says the same as not-belonging, it is argued thus. A nature, for example, humanity, as such does not belong to anything; therefore humanity as humanity is not-belonging. Here the defect of what was said before is evident. And that he reasons thus is evident from his procedure. For his conclusion is affirmative of an infinite predicate, since he concludes: therefore nature of itself is common, that is, not-belonging. The antecedent is indeed negative, namely, a nature is not of itself this, that is, belonging to something. The same is evident from the other reasoning which he presents, namely, to exist in another is not repugnant to Socrates' humanity by reason of itself; therefore the humanity of Socrates is *of itself* common. Here the aforementioned defect is evident. For in the first way of proceeding, *of itself* or *from itself* is a reduplication; in the second, *by reason of itself* is, etc. And this is especially to be noted in this matter, and in the matter concern-

---

<sup>45</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *In II Periherm.*, lect. 3, nn. 226–41.

ing universals, because everything depends on this. Therefore it is necessary to notice that if the proposition, the nature in itself is common, ought to be true, it is necessary that the *in itself* and the *common* be taken negatively according to our way and the true way. Then it is the same as saying, a nature not taken with another is non-fitting something, which is evidently true. According to Scotus, however, the *of itself* is taken positively, and incorrectly, and the meaning is, the nature by reason of itself or as such is non-fitting something, which is manifestly false.

Be even more attentive to this, that it is one thing to say, a nature, for example, humanity, insofar as it is of this kind does not belong to something, and it is another thing to say, humanity insofar as it is of this kind is not-belonging or common, which is the same as what was proposed. The first is true, because it does not belong to humanity in-so far as it is humanity to be appropriated to something.

The second, however, is patently false for the same reason, because it does not fit humanity insofar as it is humanity that it be not appropriated to something. For it abstracts from both, namely, from being proper and from being non-proper. If humanity insofar as it is humanity were not appropriated, humanity would never be appropriated to something, because it is said in *I Posteriorum*<sup>46</sup> that something according to itself requires that it be true in every instance, necessary and *per se*. Now commonness does not fit a nature by reason of itself.<sup>47</sup> Above this was proved indirectly, where the proposition, unity existing outside the soul is common to many distinct supposit, was shown to be false for two reasons. For from the falsity of this last proposition follows the falsity of the other, because what does not belong to a thing outside the soul does not belong to it by reason of itself. I now prove it directly as follows. Everything which follows on some nature by reason of itself is predicated simply, that is, without any addition from the supposit of that nature; but according to you, commonness follows on human nature by reason of itself; therefore commonness is predicated simply, that is, without any addition from the supposit of human nature. The reasoning process from the first to the third proposition is valid, but the conclusion is false. Therefore one of the two premises is false. The major is not false, as will be made clear; therefore the minor, which is your position, is false. The falsity of the conclusion is evident, because this is simply false, that Socrates is common to many; and if the *of itself* be added, it is still false to say that

---

<sup>46</sup> Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, I, 4, 73a 25–30; St. Thomas, *In I Post. Anal.*, lect. 9, nn. 78–79.

<sup>47</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 99, line 18) concludes the sentence in the following way: *ista communitas, licet*. The Paris edition (p. 448, line 15 from bottom) concludes: *illa communitas, scilicet*. The Latin is not a sentence, as it stands.

Socrates *of himself* is common to many. The truth of the major is shown thus. Whatever follows on the nature by reason of itself is either an attribute or a mode or a predicable, either *per se* or accidentally, and is either separable or inseparable. But all of these, if they accompany the nature by reason of itself, are such that just as the nature is predicated essentially of an individual, for example, man in Socrates, so these are predicated denominatively, in their order, of the same individual, as is evident by reasoning.

This is confirmed, because in our presentation, formal unity and commonness follow human nature, as you say, by reason of itself. Whence no cause for either formal unity or commonness is to be sought except the nature itself; therefore, just as formal unity is predicated simply of Socrates—for this is simply true, that Socrates is formally one—so commonness is predicated of Socrates simply by saying, Socrates is common. This is false; therefore, etc. What is the reason that is greater for unity than for community, and why are some of the things which follow the nature by reason of itself predicated of individuals and others not? It will not be easy to conceive the reasons which Scotus gives, because they do not conclude that there is commonness outside the soul, but rather unity, and therefore I think that it is superfluous to bring them forward. If, however, any of these reasons or his exposition on VII *Metaph.*<sup>48</sup> are brought forth to prove commonness, it will not be difficult to give an answer from what was said to the two arguments brought up here.

In order to clear up the second doubt, it must be noted that *one*, when it means undivided being, implies something positive and something privative. If we speak of formal unity and numerical substantial unity relative to the given they imply, they are really the same, and distinct only according to reason. Thus Socrates and man are really the same, and distinct only according to reason; because it is the same thing which is one, both formally and numerically. However, if we speak of these unities relative to the implied privations of divisions, I say they are really distinct, provided there is no violence to this, that a real distinction is an attribute of real being. For a privation<sup>49</sup> of formal division is one kind of privation, and the privation of numerical division is another; just as formal division is one thing, and numerical division is another. Nor is there any reason why there should not be many substantial unities really distinct in one being insofar as privations are implied. However, it would be impossible that there should be many substantial unities really distinct in one being regarding the positive

---

<sup>48</sup> Scotus, *In VII Metaph.*, q. 2, nn. 5–10; *ed. cit.*, V, 220–22.

<sup>49</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 100, line 20) has *privatio*. The Paris edition (p. 449, line 28) has *privatia*.

things which they imply. Therefore the conclusion of both reasons given is to be granted in a different manner of speaking, nor is there need to answer in any other way.

**Question VII—**

**Whether<sup>50</sup> a Nature Taken Absolutely Is What Is Predicated of Individuals?**

63) Thirdly, there is a problem regarding the fourth difference. For it does not seem to be true that a nature taken absolutely is that which is predicated of individuals, because a nature taken absolutely is neither universal nor common. However, in propositions of this kind, Socrates is a man, and Socrates is an animal, and similar ones, the universal and superior is predicated of the particular and inferior. Similarly, if it is asked whether this predication, Socrates is a man, is the predication of an equal concerning an equal, or of an inferior concerning an inferior, no answer seems to be possible if one holds that the nature taken absolutely is predicated, since it is neither equal nor superior.

It must be said to this that, just as in a nature existing outside, one must consider its reason for acting and its condition, without which it could not operate—for example, in color, one considers its nature by which it is visible and its particularity, without which it is not visible—so in a predicable nature, there are two things to be considered, namely, that which is predicated and attributed to the subject, and its condition, without which this is not attributed to it. Thus in this proposition, Socrates is a man, that which is attributed to the subject is human nature itself and nothing else. The condition without which *man* is not predicated of Socrates is to be universal, superior, common, or something of this kind. For, as will be evident later, as Aristotle says,<sup>51</sup> nothing is predicated except in so far as it has existence (*esse*) in the intellect, because predication depends on the intellect. Whence to this problem I say that a nature according to its notion is what is predicated of the individual itself. It is predication of a thing concerning a thing. Superiority, however, and universality, and others of this kind, are its conditions. And, therefore, to the question whether in those predications there is predication of an equal or of a superior, I say that it is predication of a superior.

---

<sup>50</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 100) has *Utrum*. The Paris edition (p. 449) has *Nam*.

<sup>51</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, VII ( ), 13, 1038b 15; St. Thomas, *In VII Metaph.*, lect. 13, nn. 1575–76.



Nor is it a problem that superiority be not in the nature taken absolutely which is predicated, since St. Thomas does not say that the nature taken absolutely, insofar as it abstracts from every existence (*esse*) has this condition, namely, predication concerning individuals. Rather, he says that a thing to which that condition belongs is an absolute nature and not a combination of the nature and existence (*esse*) in the intellect or in an individual. For when I say, *Socrates is a man*, the meaning is not, Socrates is a man according to the existence (*esse*) in the intellect, or in an individual, or in a superior, or in an equal. The meaning is, Socrates exists having humanity.

Wherefore the distinction between what is predicated and the condition of the predicate is to be especially noted. For some, not paying attention to this, were perhaps deceived, holding that the *absolute* in this text means that this predication, *man is an animal*, is neither of a superior nor of an inferior nor of an equal. The meaning of the words is that the nature taken absolutely is what is predicated, that is, the nature according to the conditions due it by reason of itself is what is attributed to individuals, and not according to the conditions due it from its existence (*esse*) in the intellect or in an individual. Together with this, it remains that universality and superiority are conditions of existence (*esse*) in the intellect, without which the nature itself is not predicated of individuals.

And yet it cannot be said that universality belongs to the nature so considered, because unity and commonness belong to the notion of universality. But neither of these belongs to human nature considered absolutely. For if commonness were included in the notion of man, then in whatever being humanity was found, there would be commonness, and this is false. For in Socrates there is no commonness, but whatever is in him is individuated.

64) Here we have the fourth negative conclusion: the essence of a composite substance, considered absolutely, is not universal, such as species, etc. This is proved as follows. The universal is one, common to many; the essence of a composite substance as it is in itself is not one, common to many; therefore the essence of a composite substance as it is in itself is not universal, etc. The major is from Aristotle, *I Posterior*.<sup>52</sup> The minor is proved from the fact that if the essence of a composite substance as it is in itself were one and common, that essence would be one and common in every single thing in which it is found, which is impossible. The consequence<sup>53</sup> is evident from the fact that every-

---

<sup>52</sup> Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, I, 4, 73b 26; St. Thomas, *In I Post. Anal.*, lect. 10, n. 92.

<sup>53</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 102, line 8) has *Consequentia*. The Paris edition (p. 450, line 3 from bottom) has *Et consequentia*.

thing which belongs to something as it is in itself belongs to it in whatever thing it is placed, as is evident from I *Poster*.<sup>54</sup> However, the impossibility of the consequent is so evident that Avicenna says in V *Metaphysicae*<sup>55</sup> that no one of sane mind could hold the opposite of his opinion. For who is so simple as to say that the essence of Socrates is common to him and Plato?

But here there is a problem about that proposition upon which the entire reasoning rests, namely, everything which belongs to something as it is in itself belongs to it in whatever it may be placed. There seem to be many examples of this. For motion as it is in itself can be infinitely accelerated, as is shown in VI *Phys*.<sup>56</sup> But the motion in the heavens can by no means be accelerated, because it is velocity itself, as is said in II *Coeli*.<sup>57</sup> Similarly, a continuum as it is in itself is infinitely divisible, from VI *Phys*.<sup>58</sup> A continuum, however, existing in nature is not, for the *ratio* of magnitude is determined by the nature of all complex wholes, as is said in II *de Anima*.<sup>59</sup> Similarly, motion as it is in itself has a contrary, from V *Phys*.<sup>60</sup> Motion, however, posited in the heavens, lacks a contrary, from I *Coeli*.<sup>61</sup>

To these and similar matters, it must be said as a preliminary that it is one thing to say, A belongs to something as it is in itself, and another thing to say, A is not repugnant to something as it is in itself. For the first to be true, it is necessary that A appropriate that thing to itself in either the first, or the second, or the fourth way of perseity. That the second be true, it suffices that the thing be not repugnant to A as such. Upon the truth of the first also, it follows that such belongs to itself in whatever it be placed. Upon the truth of the second, this does not follow. For there are many things which are not repugnant to animal in so far as it is animal, but which are not found in every animal. For whatever belongs to animal in the first, or second, or fourth manner of speaking *per se*, is found in every animal. Wherefore concerning the point at issue, I say that none of the instances brought up is contrary to the proposition we layed down, because all the things which are said in them are to be understood through non-repugnance and belonging. For when it is said that motion can be infinitely accelerated,

---

<sup>54</sup> Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, I, 4, 73a 34; St. Thomas, *In I Post. Anal.*, lect. 9, nn. 82–89.

<sup>55</sup> Avicenna, *Metaph.*, tr. V, c. 2; *ed. cit.*, fol. 87v.

<sup>56</sup> Aristotle, *Physics*, VI, 2, 232b 24; St. Thomas, *In VI Phys.*, lect. 3, n. 10.

<sup>57</sup> Aristotle, *On the Heavens*, II, 4, 287a 25; St. Thomas, *In II de Caelo*, lect. 6, n. 4.

<sup>58</sup> Aristotle, *Physics*, VI, 1, 231b 13; St. Thomas, *In VI Phys.*, lect. 1, n. 7.

<sup>59</sup> Aristotle, *On the Soul*, II, 4, 416a 16; St. Thomas, *In II de Anima*, lect. 8, n. 331.

<sup>60</sup> Aristotle, *Physics*, V, 1, 225a 32; St. Thomas, *In V Phys.*, lect. 2, n. 10.

<sup>61</sup> Aristotle, *On the Heavens*, I, 3, 270a 17; St. Thomas, *In I de Caelo*, lect. 6, nn. 2–13.

we understand that infinite velocity is not repugnant to motion as such. Similarly, when one says that a continuum is infinitely divisible, it is understood that infinite divisibility is not repugnant to a continuum as such. Similarly, when it is said that motion has a contrary, we understand that to have a contrary is not repugnant to motion as such.

If this is not satisfactory, then let it be said that it is one thing to say, A insofar as it is A belongs to something, and it is another thing to say, A insofar as it is A does not belong to something, as is evident. Also, that whatever belongs to A insofar as it is A belongs to every A. But whatever does not belong to A insofar as it is A need not be negated of every A. For risible does not belong to an animal insofar as it is an animal, but it is not negated of every animal. For it is proper to animal in man. And let it be added that all the propositions in the examples brought forth are to be understood negatively so that the meaning is as follows. Motion can be infinitely accelerated, that is, motion as such is [not]<sup>62</sup> of a determinate velocity. Similarly, a continuum is infinitely divisible, that is, a continuum as such is not of some determined division. Similarly, motion has a contrary, that is, motion as such does not determine itself to be without a contrary; and thus, no matter how it is answered, the proposition layed down remains universally true. Still, there might be other things to say about these instances, but since I am more interested in the form of the propositions than in the matter, under the present circumstances I pass them by.

Similarly, too, it cannot be said that human nature according to the existence it has in individuals has the character of a genus, because human nature is not found in individuals according to its unity so as to be one belonging to all, which the notion of a universal requires.

65) Here there is the fifth negative conclusion, namely, the essence of a composite substance according to the existence (*esse*) it has in individuals is not universal. This is proved thus. The universal is in many; the essence of a composite substance according to the existence (*esse*) it has in individuals is not one in many, but is diverse in many; therefore the essence of a composite substance according to the existence (*esse*) it has in individuals is not universal, and consequently it is neither a species, nor a genus, nor a difference, since these suppose universality.

It remains, therefore, that the notion of species applies to human nature according to that existence it has in the intellect. For this nature itself has an existence in the intellect abstracted from all individual conditions, and has a uniform relation to all individuals which are outside the soul, inasmuch as it is essentially

---

<sup>62</sup> The *not* is omitted in the text.

the likeness of all and leads to the knowledge of all insofar as they are men. And because it has such a relation to all individuals, the intellect forms the notion of species and attributes it to the nature. Whence the Commentator says in *I de Anima*<sup>63</sup> that the intellect is that which causes universality in things. Avicenna also says this in his *Metaphysicae*, V.<sup>64</sup>

66) Here in accordance with our division, the sixth affirmative conclusion, answering the difficulty raised, is arrived at, namely, essence according to its existence (*esse*) in the intellect is universal, genus species, difference, etc. It is proved as follows. One which is in many and of many is universal; a nature according to its existence (*esse*) in the intellect is one in many and of many; therefore it is universal. The proof of the minor. A thing which is related to many in the same way, as an essential image of them, is one in many and of many; a nature according to its existence (*esse*) in the intellect is of this kind, because it has existence (*esse*) abstracted from all difference of individuals, and essentially gives rise to their knowledge; therefore, etc.

*The following is evidence of this conclusion* and reasoning. Since terms with multiple meaning must be distinguished, according to the doctrine of Aristotle, *note first* the distinctions of the terms posited in the conclusion. Existence (*esse*) in the intellect is either subjective or objective. To be (*esse*) in the intellect subjectively is to inhere in it, as an accident in its subject, for example, white on a surface. To be (*esse*) in the intellect objectively is to terminate an act of the intellect. The intellect in us is twofold, the agent and the possible, as is said in *III de Anima*.<sup>65</sup> The agent intellect is that which abstracts the intelligible species from the phantasms. The possible intellect is that which receives the intellection in itself. The universal is twofold, representative and predicative. The universal as representative in the present discussion is that<sup>66</sup> which represents a thing, while not representing its conditions as an individual. The universal as predicative is that which is predicated of many things differing according to existence (*esse*).

Having seen this, note the conclusion, namely, a nature, according to its existence (*esse*) in the intellect is universal, which is verified in three ways. First thus. A nature according to its objective existence (*esse*) in the agent intellect is universal as predicative. Secondly thus. A nature according to its subjective existence (*esse*) in the possible intellect is universal as representative. Thirdly thus. A nature accord-

---

<sup>63</sup> Averroes, *In I de Anima*, com. 8; *ed. cit.*, t. VI, fol. 109v.

<sup>64</sup> Avicenna, *Metaph.*, tr. V, c. 1; *ed. cit.*, fol. 87r-v.

<sup>65</sup> Aristotle, *On the Soul*, III, 5, 430a 14; St. Thomas, *In III de Anima*, lect. 10, nn. 732-739. See also St. Thomas, *Sum. Theol.*, I, 54, 4; 79, 3.

<sup>66</sup> In the Paris edition (p. 452, line 8 from bottom), *id* is missing.

ing to its objective existence (*esse*) in the possible intellect is universal as predicative.

67) *Secondly, it must be noted* that an external thing is objectively in the agent intellect according to its actual intelligibility; for thus the action of the agent intellect terminates, because Aristotle posits the agent intellect that it may make a thing intelligible in potency intelligible in act, as the Commentator says in *III de Anima*.<sup>67</sup> However, the external thing is made actually intelligible by the agent intellect, not because it receives or loses something in the line of existence (*esse*) through this action, but because an intelligible species of it is produced by the agent intellect. The external thing is represented through this, but not represented are the individual conditions under which the intelligible was in potency, not in act. Wherefore the production of the intelligible species is the making of an external thing intelligible in act. For the notion of the actually intelligible has two terms. One is within the soul, namely, the intelligible species, which is really produced anew in the possible intellect. The other is external, namely, the thing whose intelligible species it is, which thing acquires nothing real from this fact, except an extrinsic denomination, namely, what is abstracted from the here and now, which is the actually intelligible, etc. Now a nature outside, insofar as it is actually known, is objectively in the possible intellect; for this is the termination of the action which is to understand. An external thing, however, becomes and is actually known, not because it receives or loses something through the action of the possible intellect, but because its concept is formed by the possible intellect; for a thing is understood at the time when we form its concept. Whence the very formation of a concept is the making of an external thing actually known; for this action has two terms. One inside the soul, namely, the concept which really becomes, which is nothing but the expressed likeness of a thing, making the thing objectively present to the possible intellect; the other is outside, namely, the thing which is extrinsically denominated, actually understood, owing to the concept produced.

From this it is evident what the difference and what the agreement is between a thing objectively in the agent intellect and in the possible intellect. The difference indeed is that because it begins to be objectively in the agent intellect, it is actually intelligible, but is not actually understood. And because a thing, which is already actually intelligible, is objectively in the possible intellect, it is now actually understood. The agreement, however, exists because both what is objectively in the agent intellect and what is objectively in the possible intellect have

---

<sup>67</sup> Averroes, *In III de Anima*, com. 18; *ed. cit.*, t. VI, fol. 169v.

what is represented without the conditions of individuality, and consequently, what is abstracted from the here and now, etc.

68) *Thirdly, you must know* from Avicenna<sup>68</sup> that the universal as predicative is that in the intellect which it is not impossible to predicate of many. And this can be threefold.

First, when those many things are actually in reality, such as man as an object of the intellect is universal with respect to Socrates and Plato.

Secondly, when those many things do not exist but can exist, such as a seven-cornered house as an object of the intellect is a universal with respect to many seven-cornered houses which do not, but can exist.

Thirdly, when those many things do not and cannot exist, such as the moon as an object of the intellect is a universal with respect to many moons, which cannot possibly be. And Gabriel as an object of the intellect is universal with respect to many Gabriels, which existing as many involves a contradiction. A universal of the first kind is called by St. Thomas<sup>69</sup> a universal according to the thing and according to reason, because the thing is really in many, and not only as an object of the intellect. A universal of the third kind is likewise called a universal, but it is common according to reason only, because that thing is not really found in many, but as an object of the intellect only. A universal of the second kind is not distinguished there from a universal of the first kind. Still, it could be properly called a universal according to reason and according to things but in potency. Not only does St. Thomas use these names there; he also gives a very subtle reason which is founded on four propositions.

The first is. Universality and predicability do not belong to a thing according to itself, nor according to the existence (*esse*) which it has outside the soul. That is evident from what has been said.

The second is. A material thing, which is known by us only through its proper species according as it is in our intellect, is objectively represented without the conditions of individuality. That also is evident from what has been said.

The third is. An immaterial thing, including God Himself, according as it is in our intellect, is objectively represented after the manner of material things, namely, their individual properties are not represented. This is evident, because those things are not known by us according as they are in themselves, but after the manner of material things; nor are they known through proper species, but through the species of material things.

---

<sup>68</sup> Avicenna, *Metaph.*, tr. V. c. 1; *ed. cit.*, fol. 87r–v.

<sup>69</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.*, I 85, 2, *ad 2*.

The fourth is. Every thing, when represented without the conditions of individuality, does not look to one individual rather than to many. This is evident because, since it is abstracted, it is equally related to one and to many. For no abstract notion can be formed so that this notion refers to one rather than to many, or vice versa. For this reason and expressly, Avicenna added to the definition of a universal this phrase, according as it is in the intellect. For there are many universals to which it is repugnant both according as they exist in reality and according to their proper notion, that they be predicated of many, as will be said of intelligences. But it is repugnant to no universal according as it is represented in the intellect without proper and particular existence or personal uniqueness,<sup>70</sup> to be predicated of many. From these propositions comes the following reasoning. Any single thing related equally to one and to many individuals is actually universal in predicating; any single thing as represented to our intellect is also equally related to one and to many inferiors therefore any single thing, as represented to our intellect, is actually universal in predicating. The major is evident from the definition of a universal given by Aristotle in *I Perihermias*.<sup>71</sup> The second part of the minor is evident from the first proposition the first part, however, is evident from the other three.

From these, I conclude as a corollary, that no actual relation of an object-nature to particulars is needed for something to be actually universal in predicating, but it suffices that the thing itself be so disposed that an intellect can at will truly attribute that relation to itself, adding nothing except that actual relation.

Now that these points have been touched on, the intended conclusion according to all three meanings assigned can be made evident.

For the first meaning, the following argument can be given. What it is not impossible for the intellect to predicate of many, or to use the words of Aristotle, what is apt and destined to be predicated of many, is a universal in predicating but a thing according to its objective existence (*esse*) in the agent intellect is of this kind therefore a thing according to its objective existence (*esse*) in the agent intellect is universal in predicating. The major is evident from Avicenna and Aristotle. The minor is proved thus. A thing abstracted from individual conditions as such is apt and destined to be predicated of many a thing according to its objective existence (*esse*) in the agent intellect is abstracted from individual conditions therefore, etc. All the premises are manifest. From these you see where Scotus<sup>72</sup> was wrong when he said

---

<sup>70</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 106, line 2 from bottom) has *seu pro prietate hypostatica*. The Paris edition (p. 454, line 22 from bottom) has *propriete et hypostasi*.

<sup>71</sup> Aristotle, *On Interpretation*, ch. 7, 17a 39; St. Thomas, *In I Periherm.*, lect. 10, nn. 119–24).

<sup>72</sup> Scotus, *In II Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, no. 8–10; *ed. cit.*, VI, Part I, 360–61.

that a nature, before the act of the possible intellect, has nothing except an agreement with itself outside the soul. For it is evident according to the opinion of Aristotle that it is already actually intelligible, abstracted from the here and now; and consequently there is a universal in act before the act of the possible intellect.

There is no need to present any other argument for the third meaning because the same reasoning is used.

Now the second meaning, for those understanding the terms, is clear from the sense of the terms. For a nature according to its subjective existence (*esse*) in the possible intellect is nothing but an immaterial likeness representative of itself existing in the intellect. An immaterial likeness, however, abstracted from individuals, necessarily represents a thing universally by the very fact that it is abstracted. For if it did not represent a thing universally, but as mixed with particular conditions and not abstracted from material conditions, it would not be universal; therefore the immaterial likeness is the thing itself<sup>73</sup> as representative, according as it is subjectively in the possible intellect, that is, the species or likeness of the nature insofar as it represents the nature without the individual conditions being represented.

And note that because the nature itself has two likenesses in the soul, namely, the intelligible species and the concept, or the impressed species and the expressed species, therefore it follows that according to both species the nature as representative is universal. Why it is necessary to posit two species, and how this is done, will be treated elsewhere, if God gives us life. Now, although the second conclusion can be verified in more than one way, still it is the first and third meaning which concern the point made in the text. For we intend to treat here the universal as predicative, which is a logical intention, and not the universal as representative, which is not called a universal by any logical second intention, but rather from its own being (*esse*) which arises relative to the thing.

You may comment on the text in this way. The nature itself has existence (*esse*) in the agent or possible intellect, both objectively and subjectively, abstracted from all individual conditions. And it has a uniform meaning objectively as predicative, subjectively as representative, of all individuals which are outside insofar as it is essentially a likeness of all of them objectively as existing, subjectively as representative. It brings about knowledge of all individuals insofar as they are men, because they are assimilated as such. And because a nature has such a relation to all individuals, namely, a relation of uniformity and of essential or representative likeness, the intellect devises the

---

<sup>73</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 107, line 1 from bottom) has *est res ipsa*. The Paris edition (p. 455, line 21) has *ipsam est universalis res*.



notion of species, that is, the second intention which is species, and it attributes this to the nature itself uniformly related to individuals, because the nature is represented without any differentiation of what individuates.

**Question VIII<sup>74</sup>—**

**Whether<sup>75</sup> Universals in Act Exist Outside the Soul?**

69) Concerning this problem, whether universals in act exist Outside the soul, or whether they are the result of the work of the intellect, there is no small problem, as has been said.

In this question, first the title will be explained.  
 Secondly, the position of Scotus will be stated.  
 Thirdly, the position of St. Thomas will be stated.  
 Fourthly, the opposing arguments will be answered.

70) *Regarding the first*, since this question, which is understood in different ways, is stated in different ways by philosophers, and since in the present consideration we hold the Peripatetic opinion, namely, that universals do not subsist outside individuals, it must be stated how this is understood.

By the name universal we understand three things. First, the universality which is a relation of reason. Secondly, the thing which is denominated universal from that universality. Thirdly, the aptitude for existing in many things which is a kind of medium between the other two and is the proximate basis why a thing may take on that relative denomination. And consequently the understanding of a thing attributes a relation of universality, because that apt thing is destined to be in many. Whether that relation which is called universal exists formally outside the soul is not a matter of doubt, for all agree that it comes from the intellect. Nor is there any question whether that thing which is denominated universal, which is called a universal objectively in potency, exists outside the soul. Indeed, it is common doctrine that at times that thing exists outside the soul, and at times it does not. For if that thing is a real thing, for example, man, cow, or something of this kind, it is put outside the soul. If, however, that thing is a being of reason, it is not put outside the soul, such as subject, predicate, proposition, syllogism, and other like things. But the question is whether the aptitude for existing in many is outside the soul in such a way that, independently of any work of the intellect, a thing is apt and destined to be in many, which is called a universal objectively in act; or whether only the thing exists outside the soul, while the aptitude for

---

<sup>74</sup> In the Paris edition (p. 455), this appears as Question VII.

<sup>75</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 105) has *Utrum*. The Paris edition (p. 455) has *Num*.

existing in many is in a thing through the work of the intellect. And because that aptitude fulfills the notion of a universal in act, taking universal objectively, although not formally, therefore to ask whether this whole thing, namely, a thing apt and destined to be in many, be found outside the soul, is the same as asking whether a universal objectively in act exists outside the soul.

And you ought to see, in order to understand the terms, that just as white is taken in two ways, namely, formally and subjectively, so also universal is taken in two ways, namely, formally and subjectively. For it cannot be taken subjectively, because universality is in nothing subjectively, since it is a being of reason. Universal taken formally is universality itself, which is a relation of reason. Universal taken objectively is subdivided into a universal objectively in act and a universal objectively in potency. The universal objectively in act is this whole thing, namely, one thing apt and destined to be in many. A universal objectively in potency is the thing itself formally one, without the addition of its aptitude to be in many. From this it is evident where the difficulty lies. Also evident<sup>76</sup> is the reason for the wording of the statement of the question. For we are speaking not of the universal taken formally, nor of the universal objectively in potency, because there is agreement on these. We are speaking of the universal objectively in act. For this reason, when we speak of the universal in act without adding *objectively* to it, we wish it to be understood, lest equivocation result. So for the first point.

71) *Regarding the second point*, Scotus, *super VII Metaph.*,<sup>77</sup> following his fundamental positions, namely, that formal unity and community follow the nature existing outside the soul, was of the opinion that one thing apt and destined to be in many was given outside the soul. And because of this, he said that a universal in act exists in reality prior to any work of the intellect. He gives many reasons for this, and to bring in all of these here would be to exceed the limits of our purpose. For this reason, I shall bring forward those from whose solution the weakness of the rest is made known.

First, he argues by means of the ground of proof "from the definition to the thing defined," in this way. Regardless of any act of the intellect, a thing is apt and destined to be in many; therefore there is a universal in act existing outside the soul. He holds the consequence because a universal objectively in act, as distinguished from the individual and the predicable, is defined in *I Perihermenias*<sup>78</sup> thus: a uni-

---

<sup>76</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 109, line 13 from bottom) has *patet quid*. The Paris edition (p. 456, line 13 from bottom) has *patet in quo quid*.

<sup>77</sup> Scotus, *In VII Metaph.*, q. 16, nn. 132–36; *ed. cit.*, IV, 287–90.

<sup>78</sup> Aristotle, *On Interpretation*, ch. 7, 17a 39; St. Thomas, *In I Periherm.*, lect. 10, nn. 119–24.

versal is that apt thing destined to be in many. The antecedent is proved thus. If this were not the case, then the aptitude for existing in many would be repugnant to it, nor could this aptitude be given at all events by the intellect, because then the intellect could, for the same reason, give such aptitude to Socrates.

Further, a universal in act is the proper object of the intellect; therefore it precedes the act of the intellect. The consequence is valid from *II de Anima*,<sup>79</sup> where it is said that the object is prior to the act.

Further, the object of real knowledge is a being outside the soul; the universal in act is the object of real knowledge; therefore the universal in act is a being outside the soul.

Further, the relation of measure is real,<sup>80</sup> but is founded on some universal. This is proved thus. It is necessary that some kind of one be the measure of some species; but this cannot be one in number according to Aristotle; therefore it is universal.

Further, real operation or passion must be first of all and adequately in the universal in order that it may be understood by man, from *I Phys.*;<sup>81</sup> therefore there is a universal outside the soul.

Further, contrariety is real opposition, and its extremes are universals, not singulars; therefore there are universals outside the soul.

Further, if the universal is from the intellect, how is a thing predicated of a thing? And how can a universal be at all times and places eternal and incorruptible? And how do matter and form pertain to the quiddity of a physical universal? And how is it that the definition is of the universal only? And how is it that genera and species and all the categories are beings outside the soul?

Further, if nothing exists in reality except the singular, there would be no real unity proper to the singular except numerical unity; the consequent is false; therefore, etc. So for the second point.

72) *Concerning the third*, we wish to make it known that we, following St. Thomas and therefore the common doctrine of the Peripatetics, proffer the opposite opinion in this matter. For we say that of those three things which go under the name of universal, only one is at times outside the soul, namely, that one thing taken formally, but the other two are the result of the work of the intellect. And this is proved by a mode of arguing similar to what was argued above. Whatever follows from the nature by reason of itself, is simply predicated of an individual of that nature; but the aptitude for existing in many patently follows from the nature, for example, from humanity by reason of it-

---

<sup>79</sup> Aristotle, *On the Soul*, II, 4, 415a 18; St. Thomas, *In II de Anima*, lect. 6, nn. 304–307.

<sup>80</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, V ( ), 15, 1021a 29; St. Thomas, *In V Metaph.*, lect. 17, nn. 1026–28.

<sup>81</sup> Aristotle, *Physics*, I, 5, 189a 7; St. Thomas, *In I Phys.*, lect. 10, n. 7.

self; therefore the aptitude for existing in many is predicated simply of an individual human nature; therefore this proposition will be true, *Socrates is apt and destined to be in many*, which is impossible. The major was evident above, since all things which accompany a nature by reason of itself are not separated from that nature posited in an individual, and consequently they are predicated of the individual, because *to be in* is the basis of *to be predicated of*.

Further, every aptitude, flowing from some nature, is found in every singular nature inferior to it; but that aptitude, namely, to exist in many, flows from some nature, for example, from humanity; therefore the aptitude to exist in many is found in any human nature. The reasoning is valid, but the conclusion is false; therefore one of the premises is false. Not the major, which is evident from the terms; therefore the minor, which is the conclusion of my opponents. The falsity of the conclusion is proved thus. That aptitude which cannot be reduced to act in any humanity is not to be attributed to any humanity. That is evident, for otherwise that aptitude would have been given to no purpose. For an aptitude is for act; but an aptitude to being in many is of this kind, namely, that if it be placed in any humanity, it could not be reduced to act, because it is impossible that the humanity of Socrates be actually in Socrates and Plato, or that it migrate from Socrates to Plato; therefore the aptitude to being in many is not to be attributed to any single case of humanity. Therefore we say that there is one thing outside the soul; but the aptitude to being in many belongs to the thing according to the existence (*esse*) it has in the intellect, because this belongs to it as placed under the condition of solitude. For a nature taken as solitary is apt and destined to be in many, at least according to the notion of being (*esse*). Solitude, however, since it implies the separation of a nature from individual properties, does not belong to a thing except as an object of the agent or possible intellect.

And notice, as stronger evidence for our position, that here arises a defect in Scotus like the one given above. Since the aptitude to being in many is the same as non-repugnance to being in many, he argues thus. To be in many is not repugnant to a nature, for example, humanity insofar as it is humanity; therefore there belongs to humanity insofar as it is humanity an aptitude or a non-repugnance to being in many, and consequently humanity is universal, prior to any work of the intellect. But the fault of this reasoning is quite evident, since from a negative an affirmative is inferred concerning a predicate which is infinite, with reduplication added. The first proposition, which is negative, is true. But the second, which is affirmative, is impossible. This is evident because humanity insofar as it is humanity abstracts from repugnance to being in many and from non-repugnance to being in

many, just as it abstracts from white and non-white. For if humanity insofar as it is humanity appropriates to itself non-repugnance to being in many, repugnance to being in many cannot in any way belong to humanity, and thus neither *per se* nor accidentally can it be repugnant to humanity to be in many, which is manifestly false. For it is repugnant to the humanity of Socrates to be in many by reason of *thisness* (*haeccheitatis*). The consequence is valid because the opposite of what belongs to some nature insofar as it is what it is, can in no way be found in that nature, as you know from *I Poster.*<sup>82</sup> Therefore, although to be in many is not repugnant to a nature by reason of itself, it does not by reason of itself appropriate to itself non-repugnance to being in many. And since it does not appropriate<sup>83</sup> to itself this non-repugnance according to the existence (*esse*) which it has in individuals, it follows that it will appropriate<sup>84</sup> this non-repugnance to itself according to the existence (*esse*) that comes to it in the intellect. And for something to be a universal in act it needs to appropriate<sup>85</sup> to itself non-repugnance to being in many, since this is included in its definition. And what is placed in a definition belongs *per se* to the thing defined. Consequently a thing by reason of itself cannot be a universal in act, but as soon as it is an object of the agent or possible intellect, it becomes a universal in act, which universal is caused<sup>86</sup> [from what was] in potency. But how it is possible that there be this type of reduction from potency to act has already been said; that is, it is brought about by the agent intellect through the production of the intelligible species, and by the possible intellect through the formation of the concept.

If one were to imagine that the universal in act is constituted through the negation of repugnance to being in many, and that the affirmation of non-repugnance is not necessary, let him observe that he errs on three counts.

First, because in the definition of universal that aptitude or non-repugnance to being in many is affirmatively posited.

Secondly, because if the negation of repugnance to being in many suffices for a universal, then the negation of repugnance to being in one single individual should also suffice for a singular. For the singular

---

<sup>82</sup> Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, I, 4, 73a 34; St. Thomas, *In I Post. Anal.*, lect. 10, nn. 83–86.

<sup>83</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 112, line 8) has *vindicet*. The Paris edition (p. 458, line 15 from bottom) has *vindicet*.

<sup>84</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 112, line 9) has *vindicabit*. The Paris edition (p. 458, line 14 from bottom) has *vindicabit*.

<sup>85</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 112, line 11) has *vindicet*. The Paris edition (p. 458, line 12 from bottom) has *vindicet*.

<sup>86</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 112, line 15) has *causatur*. The Paris edition (p. 458, line 8 from bottom) has *erat*.

is related to only one in the same way as the universal is related to many. And if this is so, then humanity insofar as it is humanity will be both universal and singular, for both kinds of repugnance are denied of humanity as such.

Thirdly, since the universal in act is distinguished from the singular, it is just as repugnant for the universal to be in only one as it is for the individual to be in many. However, it is not repugnant for humanity to be in only one, while the repugnance to being in many is negated of humanity; therefore the negation of such repugnance does not suffice to constitute a universal in act. And the following argument can be made against the principal argument thus. It is repugnant to a universal in act to be in one only; it is not repugnant to humanity insofar as it is humanity to be in one only, otherwise it could not possibly be in only a single individual; therefore humanity as such is not a universal in act. You can say the same for any other nature. So for the third point.

73) *Regarding the fourth point*, we must now answer the opposing arguments.

The antecedent of the *first argument* is denied. To its proof we answer by denying the consequence. For this is not valid: a thing independently of any intellectual act is not a genus; therefore it is repugnant to it to be a genus. The fact is that it abstracts from both, and so it is in what was presented. For a nature itself, independent of any intellectual act, abstracts from the aptitude to being in many, and from the repugnance toward being in many, as is evident from what has been said.

The second can be answered in two ways, and both ways are valid. First, if there is<sup>87</sup> question of the agent intellect, the consequence is denied, because an active potency does not presuppose its object, but rather produces it. If, however, there is question of the possible intellect, granted the first consequence, it does not follow: therefore a universal in act exists outside the soul, because it becomes by the act of the agent intellect. Secondly, we say that since the universal in act has two meanings, namely, a thing and an aptitude, etc., the thing itself is the object, but the aptitude is a mode or condition of the object, without which the thing is not an object. Now it suffices that the thing itself, which is the object, precede the act of the intellect, and it is not necessary that its mode should precede. For the object, says Aristotle, is prior to the act, but the mode of the object is not. Wherefore concerning the form of the argument, we deny the consequence. The rea-

---

<sup>87</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 113, line 8) has *sit*. The Paris edition (p. 459, line 25 from bottom) has *fit*.

son is that although the aptitude being a means of the object is no obstacle to the posteriority in the antecedent, yet it is an obstacle to concluding to the consequent from it; for the priority of a mode cannot be inferred from the posteriority of the object.

The third argument can be answered in the same way, namely, that a thing which is an object of real knowledge exists outside the soul, but not the mode of a thing which is an object; but a universal in act names both of these, namely, the thing and the mode; and, therefore, a universal in act does not follow upon existence (*esse*) outside the soul, because the thing of which it is a knowledge is outside the soul. Concerning the form of the argument, we say that although the major is true, there is a fallacy of figure of speech; for the thing as object is changed to a mode of a thing or to a thing with its mode.

But Scotus in that place objects to these responses. Against the first, he argues thus. Whatever exists through the agent intellect is a first intention; therefore no universal is in the genus of substance and,<sup>88</sup> consequently, there is no essential predication of the superior concerning the inferior.

Further, the universal precedes sense, as was proved elsewhere, therefore it precedes the agent intellect.

Further, the agent and the possible intellect are one power, otherwise man would have two intellects; but one power has one object; wherefore, if the universal precedes the act of one, it precedes the act of the other.

Further, according to this, generation would not be univocal without the action of the agent intellect. Perhaps someone will say that the generator and the generated do not have any real unity, but only likeness. The opposite is true, because the proximate foundation of likeness is one,<sup>89</sup> but it is not the generator nor the generated; therefore it must be something common to both.

Against the second response, he argues that if there is no considering by the intellect, there will be no universal in act, and thus habitual knowledge would not be of a universal object in act.

Further, an object insofar as it is prior in act is not understood along with this mode; therefore either with no mode whatsoever, or with the opposite mode; but it is not understood along with no mode whatsoever; therefore, etc.

Further, that mode is either produced by the intellect, or it is not; if not, the position is valid; if it is so produced, it does not exist as

---

<sup>88</sup> In the Paris edition (p. 459, line 2 from bottom), *et* is missing.

<sup>89</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, V ( ), 9, 1018a 15; St. Thomas, *In V. Metaph.*, lect. 12, nn. 918–919.

necessary in the object, because beforehand the object is understood without any mode caused by understanding the object.

To these responding arguments, we answer by laying down first what has so often been said before, namely, that universal has two meanings: the thing; and the aptitude or universality. The universal taken for the thing in a category is predicable, is knowable, is the object of the intellect, definable, and the like. However, the universal taken for the aptitude, is a mode or condition of a predicamental thing, and is predicable, knowable, definable, etc. Neither the agent nor the possible intellect produces the thing, but only the mode.

To the first reply, therefore, we concede that the universal which is produced by the agent intellect is not in the category of substance; but the second consequence has no verisimilitude.

Regarding the second reply, we deny the antecedent, for although sight can see all colors, as you find in St. Thomas,<sup>90</sup> it does not see universal color.

Regarding the third reply, we again deny the antecedent. For, as is said in III *de Anima*,<sup>91</sup> it is necessary that there be two intellects in our soul, namely, the agent and the possible, and these cannot be the same power since, according to Aristotle, an active power and a passive power are not the same.

Regarding the fourth reply, we deny the consequence and say that the answer given there is excellent if properly understood. To his confirming proof, we say that likeness is grounded in the things themselves, for example, in two whitenesses or humanities, as basis, and that unity is not the basis of likeness, but is the condition of the basis. For, properly speaking, likeness is based on two things having that condition, namely, a mutual negation of formal distinction, for example, two whitenesses. And this is the way in which Aristotle is to be understood. Now grant that unity were the basis, it still would not follow that there is one thing common to each. For I say that likeness is not founded upon the one which is the generator, nor upon the one which is generated, but upon one which is generating and generated. It has already been pointed out above that the fallacy of the consequent is committed if one reasons as follows: the generator and the generated are formally one; therefore they have something common to both of them.

In answer to the *first argument* brought against the second response, we say that if we are to speak precisely of the possible intellect, the universal should be divided in the same way as knowledge, so that

---

<sup>90</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.*, I, 12, 2 *Resp.*

<sup>91</sup> Aristotle, *On the Soul*, III, 5, 430a 11; St. Thomas, *In III de Anima*, lect. 10, nn. 732–39.



knowledge in act is a universal in act; knowledge in potency is a universal in potency; and knowledge in habit is a universal in habit, which is the case when we bring it into act when we wish it. Passing now to the agent intellect, we say that independently of any considering intellect, provided the intelligible species has been produced, there is a universal in act, because when a philosopher is sleeping, a rose, whose intelligible species is conserved in his intellect, is said to be intelligible in act, represented without the here and now, etc.

In answer to the *second argument*,<sup>92</sup> we say that the object considered as prior in act does not appropriate any mode to itself, because quiddity abstracts from every existence (*esse*) and mode.

In answer to the *third argument*,<sup>93</sup> we say that that mode is produced by the agent intellect. And when it is inferred: therefore the mode is not necessary, we deny the consequence, because active potency does not presuppose the condition of its object; it rather produces it. Secondly, we say that granted that it were not produced by the agent intellect, then it is produced by the possible intellect, and we likewise deny the consequence. As for its proof, we say that it lays down what is false, namely, that the intellect first understands a thing and then produces its mode. Both of them are brought about simultaneously. For the intellect, in forming a conceived thing, makes the thing be present to it without the here and now. Nor can it be imagined that it should first produce the thing, and then *without the here and now*; just as Socrates simultaneously generates a man now, and not first a man and then the now.

In answer to the *fourth argument*,<sup>94</sup> we deny that the relation of measure is based on some universal. For it is based neither on the universal nor on the singular as such, but on a nature formally one, which is found in a singular. And thus it is not one in number as such, the measure of others, but it is formally one.

In answer to the *fifth argument*, we say that it concludes nothing except that the universal taken for the thing is outside the soul. For taken in this way, passion or real operation is primarily in the universal; for a man, not universal man, is that to which the power to laugh belongs primarily. Otherwise the power to laugh would not be found in non-universal man, for example, Socrates.

In answer to the *sixth argument*, we say in like manner that the extremes of contrariety are things in themselves, not particular things as such, nor universals; otherwise non-universal things, namely, this whiteness and this blackness, would not be contraries.

---

<sup>92</sup> See above, p. 170.

<sup>93</sup> See above, p. 170.

<sup>94</sup> See above, p. 166.

In answer to the *seventh argument*, we say that these two facts are simultaneously true: the universal is predicated of things; and the universal is produced by the intellect, because the universal taken for the thing is that which is predicated, and in this way it is not produced by the intellect. The universal, however, taken for the aptitude is a condition of a thing which is predicated; and such is produced by the intellect. For predication is not due to things except as having some intentional condition. Wherefore Aristotle<sup>95</sup> too says that substance is not said of a subject, because he was speaking of it according to its nature. But in the *Praedicamentis*,<sup>96</sup> where he was speaking of substance endowed with intentional accidents, he said that substance is said of a subject.

Regarding what was added in that place, we say that all those are verified of the universal taken for the thing, but the affirmative proposition must be broken down negatively so that the meaning is: universals are in all places, etc., that is, the natures themselves called universal do not terminate place nor time for themselves. Similarly, we say to that which is added, that form and matter pertain to the quantity of the universal, that is, to the physical thing which is named universal. Similarly, the definition is only of universals, that is, of things which are named universals. Similarly, things named genera, species and differences are outside the soul; their conditions, however, are from the work of the intellect.

In answer to the *eighth argument*, by *individual* we can understand two things: sometimes the individuality itself is understood; and sometimes the whole, that is, the individual thing. If you take individual in the first way, I concede the consequence, but the antecedent is not true. Taken in the second way, the antecedent is Peripatetic, but the consequence is not good. For we have already said above that in the individual many unities exist, and not numerical unity only.

And although this nature as it is in the intellect has the character of a universal according as it is compared to things outside the soul, because it is one likeness of all, nevertheless inasmuch as it has existence in this or that intellect, it is a certain particular species in the intellect. And, therefore, the error of the Commentator, in *III de Anima*,<sup>97</sup> is clear, for he wanted to conclude from the universality of the known form to the unity of the intellect. There is no universality of that form according to the existence which it has in the intellect, but according as it is referred to things as a likeness of things. Thus, even if there were one bodily statue representing many things, it is clear that the image or species of the statue would have an individual and

---

<sup>95</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, VII ( ), 13, 1038b 15; St. Thomas, *In VII Metaph.*, lect. 13 nn. 1575–76

<sup>96</sup> Aristotle, *Categories*, ch. 5, 3a 17.

<sup>97</sup> Averroes, *In III de Anima*, com. 5; *ed. cit.*, t. VI, fol. 117v.

proper act of existing according as it existed in this matter, but it would have the notion of commonness according as it was a common representative of many.

74) In the second part of this chapter, he intends to oppose the error of Averroes, in III *de Anima*,<sup>98</sup> who wanted to show the unity of the intellect from the universality of the known form. The argument is: what is universal is not distinguished numerically as long as it retains its universality; the known form, that is, a nature according to its subjective existence (*esse*) in the intellect is a universal retaining its universality; therefore it is not distinguished numerically. Consequently its subject, which is the possible intellect, is not numerically distinguished. Thus he concludes that there is one intellect in all men. The major is evident from the terms, because numerical distinction is opposed to universality. The minor is evident from the fact that the intelligible species represents the universal. Although this reasoning needs another principle for its refutation and its proof, still for the purposes of our present interests it can be refuted in this way from what we have said: a universal is something twofold, namely, in being, and in representation. There would be a universal in being if there were a separated nature of man, such as the idea of Plato. The major is true for such a universal, but the minor is false. The major is true because numerical distinction will be repugnant to such a universal according to existence (*esse*) also, since according to existence (*esse*) it shares universality; whence it is impossible that one should imagine many universal men. But the minor is false because an intelligible species is not a universal in being, since it is in an individual subject, namely, in the possible intellect which is in some sense individual, though immaterial. However, the universal in representing (as was said) is what represents a universal thing, and of this universal the major is false, although the minor is true. The falsity of the major is known from the fact that such a universal does not have universality according to its own existence (*esse*) by which it looks to a subject, whence the unity or plurality in accidents arise; but it has universality according to representation which looks to an object. Wherefore it does not represent numerically distinct objects, but all species of a certain thing represent one and the same object of them all, for example, the species of humanity in you and in me. It is similar when the same face of Socrates is seen from many angles through many species representing exactly the same thing. As for the minor understood in this way, its truth is evident from what we have said above, for intelligible species represent a nature, but not by representing its particular conditions, as was said. This is the literal meaning of this section.

---

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*

And because what is predicated of Socrates belongs to human nature according to its absolute consideration, and the notion of species does not belong to it according to its absolute consideration but is from accidents which follow from it according to the existence which it has in the intellect, therefore the name species is not predicated of Socrates so that Socrates is called a species. This would necessarily follow if the notion of species belonged to man according to the existence which he has in Socrates, or according to its absolute consideration, namely, inasmuch as he is man. For whatever belongs to man as man is predicated of Socrates.

75) In this part of the third chapter, he wants to exclude this sort of objection arising from what was said above: what is predicated of a predicate is predicated of its subject; but species is predicated of man, which is a predicate with respect to Socrates; therefore species is predicated of Socrates; and thus Socrates is a species. The conclusion is false. The major is true from what has been said before.<sup>99</sup> He points out how the error of this objection might arise from the distinction<sup>100</sup> given above about the things belonging to a nature; at the same time he introduces by this how suitable the traditional doctrine was, since by it accidental difficulties are dissolved. For it was said that there are three kinds of things which are predicated of a nature, namely, some predicated absolutely, some predicated according to existence (*esse*) in the intellect, and some<sup>101</sup> predicated according to existence (*esse*) in the individual. Thus things belonging to a nature according to its existence (*esse*) in the intellect are not belonging to that nature taken absolutely, nor according to its existence (*esse*) in an individual, since these are opposed. And, therefore, the reasoning above is erroneous, because specific denomination belongs to man according to existence (*esse*) in the intellect; and this reasoning concludes about man according to existence (*esse*) in an individual when it concludes: therefore Socrates is a species. Concerning the form of the argument, it can be said that it implies the following distinction. There are two ways of being predicated of a predicate. One way is as a predicate, that is, according to the same reason,<sup>102</sup> that that one is predicated of another, as animal is predicated of the predicate of Socrates, that is of man, for the same reason that man is predicated of Socrates. For man receives the predication of animal and is itself predicated of Socrates for the same reason, that is, according to its nature. Taken in this way, the

---

<sup>99</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 118, line 1) has *ex antedictis*. The Paris edition (p. 463, line 23) has *ex antepredicamentis*.

<sup>100</sup> *Distinction* in the text should read *distinctio*.

<sup>101</sup> In the Paris edition (p. 463), *esse in intellectu, et quaedam* is missing.

<sup>102</sup> In the Paris edition (p. 463), *id secundum* is missing

major is true, but the minor is false. There is another way in which something can be predicated of a predicate, not however as predicate, that is, not according to that reason by which that predicate is predicated of its subject. For example, in the argument given, species is not predicated of man in so far as man is predicated of Socrates, that is, species is not predicated of man according to that existence (*esse*) by which man is predicated of Socrates, because man is predicated of Socrates according to his quidditative being (*esse*) absolutely. Now species is predicated of man not according to its quidditative being (*esse*), but according to the existence (*esse*) which it has in the intellect. Taken in this way, the major is false, but the minor is always true; therefore the one premise is false. And that is what is said in the text, namely, that the notion of species does not belong to man according to its absolute consideration, by which it is fitting that man be predicated of Socrates, because it must also belong to Socrates in this way( as was said above); but species belongs to Socrates according to its existence (*esse*) in the intellect, and it is according to this existence (*esse*) that man is predicated of Socrates.

And yet to be predicated belongs to genus in itself, since it is posited in its definition. For predication is something completed through the action of the intellect composing and dividing, having for its foundation in reality the unity of those things, one of which is said of the other. Whence the notion of predicability can be included in the notion of this intention which is genus, which is likewise completed through the action of the intellect. Nevertheless, that to which the intellect attributes the intention of predicability, composing the one with the other, is not the intention itself of genus, but that to which the intellect attributes the intention of genus, as what is signified by the name *animal*. So, therefore, it is clear how essence or nature is related to<sup>103</sup> the notion of species, because the nature of species is none of those things which belong to it according to its absolute consideration, nor is it the accidents which follow upon it according to the existence which it has outside the soul, as whiteness or blackness; but it is of those accidents which follow upon it according to the existence which it has in the intellect, and it is in this way that the notion of genus or difference belongs to it.

76) In the fourth part of this chapter, he intends to answer a certain unspoken objection which is as follows. What is predicated *per se* of species belongs to the species themselves; but genus is predicated *per se* of species—think of man and ox; therefore *genus* belongs to the species themselves, and thus man will be a genus, and likewise ox. The major is clear from the terms, for it implies that something may be

---

<sup>103</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 118, line 3 from bottom) has *habet ad rationem*. The Paris edition (p. 464, line 15) has *habet ratione*.

predicated *per se* of something else in any manner of persey whatsoever, and is not belonging to it. The minor is proved as follows. That whose definition posits that it is predicated of species is predicated of them *per se*; but genus contains in its definition that it is predicated of species; therefore genus is predicated *per se* of species. The major of this syllogism is evident from the fact that any part of a definition directly in the first mode of persey belongs to what is defined. The minor, however, is evident from Porphyry,<sup>104</sup> where he says: genus is predicable of many things which differ in species.

In a way exactly similar, one might argue about species in respect to the individual, since also in the definition of species one may say that it is predicated of individuals, and thus it may seem that it was wrong to say that Socrates is not a species. The motive of this objection is only touched on in the text where it says: and yet to be predicated *per se* belongs to the genus since it may be put in its definition.

The answer is contained in the remainder of the text, in which he indicates *two distinctions* for the full discussion of this matter.

*The first is: to be predicated* may be taken in two ways, namely, formally and fundamentally or materially.

*The second is:* genus can be taken in two ways, namely, formally and fundamentally or materially. And you should take care to understand the terms in the proposition, *man is an animal*. There are three terms, namely, *man*, *is*, and *animal*. Outside of the soul, these are nothing but human nature introduced by *man*, and sensitive nature introduced by *animal*, and the unity or joining of these with each other introduced by *is*. When the intellect apprehends these three in its second operation, it forms this proposition, *man is an animal*. When this has been formed, by reflecting upon these three so that they terminate the act of its composing, it finds and attributes certain relations. To *man* it attributes the relation of subject; to *animal* the relation of predicate; and to *is* the relation of predication. Wherefore predication, taken formally, is that relation found by the intellect; taken fundamentally or materially, it is the conjunction of the thing predicated with the thing subjected. Similarly, when the intellect apprehends sensitive nature and reflects upon it so that the nature is the object of its own act, and when it shall have seen the nature as such related indifferently to the species in which it first observed that nature to be exemplified, it attributes to sensitive nature or animal as object the relation of genus. And thus genus taken formally is that relation; taken fundamentally, however, or materially, genus is the nature itself, namely, sensitive. And thus the terms of the distinction are evident.

---

<sup>104</sup> Porphyry, *Isagogen*, c. 3; *ed. cit.*, p. 28.

*From these, three things are deduced. The first* is that genus taken fundamentally—think of animal—does not include fundamental predication in its definition, because the conjunction of animal with man or ox is not placed in the definition of animal; neither does it include formal predication, because a thing of second intention is not placed in the definition of a thing. Therefore it follows that when genus is defined by Porphyry, it be taken formally.

*The second* is that fundamental predication of a species, for example man, is not included in the definition of genus taken formally, because the generic relation is not really joined to the thing which is called species. Therefore it follows that to be predicated of many, placed in the definition of genus, is to be taken formally, namely, for the relation of predication. For one relation can fall in the definition of another so that the concept of the relation, which is predication of many, etc., falls in the concept of relation, which is genus. And thence you see how those agree with St. Thomas who assert that genus and species are defined on the side of second intentions in the concrete.

*The third* thing to be deduced is that there are two ways in which something is said to be predicated of species. In one way, as the thing denominated predicable of species; and thus animal is predicated of man and ox. In another way, as that by which a thing is denominated predicable of a species, and thus genus, in whose definition is included that it is predicated of species, is predicated of the species themselves; just as something is said to be divisive of sight in two ways. In one way, as a thing denominated divisive of sight, and in this way snow is said to be divisive of sight. In another way, as that by which a thing is denominated divisive of sight, just as whiteness is said to be divisive of sight since dividing sight is put in its definition. And just as these two stand together, namely, that the thing defined as dividing sight is whiteness and not snow, and that the thing denominated divisive of sight is snow and not whiteness; in precisely the same way in the matter proposed, these two things stand together, namely, that the thing defined as being predicated of species is a generic relation, and the thing denominated predicable of species is a nature which is under that relation, for example, animal. So the thing defined as being predicated, etc., is genus formally, not materially; the thing denominated predicable is genus materially, not formally. Wherefore in the text it is said that the notion of predicability is enclosed in this intention which is genus. However, that to which the intellect attributes the intention of predicability is not the very intention of genus, but a thing to which the very intention of genus also is attributed.

From this the answer to the objection is evident, because where there is question of what is predicated *per se* of species, as the thing

denominated is predicated, the major is true; but the minor is false. However, where there is question of what is predicated *per se* as the principle of denomination, the major is false, although the minor is true. Therefore, since one of the premises is always false, the argument concludes nothing. Now that this distinction is made, you may put it in these simple terms: *predicable of species* may be taken in two ways; formally and denominatively. Animal is what is predicated denominatively of man and ox; genus, however, is what is predicated formally of man and ox. Said of the predicable nominatively, the minor is false; of the predicable formally, the major is false. When you shall have applied what is said here to species in respect to individuals, to difference, property and accident, and the others of this sort, you will solve many objections, and the truth of many propositions which seem obscure will become clear. The remainder of the chapter is an epilogue and is clear in itself, etc.



## Chapter V<sup>1</sup>

Now it remains to see in what way essence is in separated substances, namely, in the soul, in the intelligences and in the First Cause. But, although all philosophers admit the simplicity of the First Cause, some nevertheless try to introduce the composition of matter and form in the intelligences and in souls.<sup>2</sup> The originator of this doctrine seems to have been Avicbron, the author of *libri Fontis Vitae*.<sup>3</sup> But this appears contrary to what philosophers generally say, since they call these substances separated from matter, and prove that they are entirely without matter. The best demonstration of this is from the power of understanding which is in those substances. For we see that forms are not actually intelligible unless they are separated from matter and its conditions; nor are they made actually intelligible except through the power of an intelligent substance, inasmuch as they are received in it and are acted upon by it. Whence it is necessary that in every intelligent substance there be complete immunity from matter, so that those substances neither have matter as a part of themselves nor be like a form impressed on matter, as are material forms.

77) This is the beginning of the second tract of this work, the purpose of which is to impart, in two chapters, an understanding of the essences of simple substances; just as the understanding of the essences of composite substances was propounded.

St. Thomas makes *six points* in the present chapter. *First*, he declares that essence in simple substances does not signify a thing composed of matter and form, but only a form; *secondly*, he compares these essences with the essence of composite substances; *thirdly*, he shows that such essences are composed of existence (*esse*) and essence; *fourthly*, he declares that the intelligences have existence (*esse*) from God as efficient cause; *fifthly*, he shows that they are composed of act and potency; *sixthly*, he treats of their plurality.

He premises this treatment by noting the agreement among the opinion of philosophers regarding the absolute simplicity of the First

---

<sup>1</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 122) has no title to this chapter. The Paris edition (p. 466) has the following title to this chapter. *Quod simplicium substantiarum essentia minime sit ex materia et forma quid compositum, sed tantum forma, non item comparetur compositorum essentiae, et quod ex esse et essentia sit composita. Quod denique intelligentiae effectivae sint a Deo ex actu et potentia compositae, multipliciter ostendit.*

<sup>2</sup> See G. Théry, *L'Augustinisme médiéval et le problème de l'unité de la forme substantielle*, in *Acta hebdomadae augustinianae - thomisticae* (Romae: Taurini, 1931), pp. 140–200.

<sup>3</sup> Concerning the argument, see the treatment on the work of this philosopher in *Fons Vitae*; ed. C. Bauemker in *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, Band I, heft 2–4, (Münster: 1895). See also St. Thomas, *In II Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, a. 1.

Cause, and by pointing out that some disagree concerning the immateriality of the intelligences. Against these latter, he holds the following conclusion: every intellectual substance is immaterial, that is, it is not composed of matter and form, and is independent of matter. He proves it this way: every patient or agent, either receptive of or having in itself the intelligible in act is immaterial; every intellectual substance is either patient or agent, either receptive of or having in itself the intelligible in act; therefore every intellectual substance is immaterial. The three parts of the major are proved by the same middle term, namely, that the intelligible in act must be immaterial, from *III de Anima*;<sup>4</sup> but what acts upon an immaterial thing must be immaterial, because an agent cannot be less noble than its effect, as is said in *XII Metaph*.<sup>5</sup> Likewise, only an immaterial thing can be the recipient of the immaterial, as is said in *III de Anima*.<sup>6</sup> whatever is received is received after the manner of the recipient. And from this same middle term, he shows that only an immaterial thing can have the knowable in itself immaterially. The minor is conceded by all. For it would be in vain that there be immaterial substances unless they undersatnd something, since everything exists for the sake of its proper operation, as is said in *II Coeli*.<sup>7</sup>

Nor can anyone say that intelligibility is not impeded by any matter whatsoever, but only corporeal matter. For if this comes about by reason of corporeal matter alone, since matter is not called corporeal except inasmuch as it stands under a corporeal form, then it would be necessary that matter have a corporeal form, namely, to impede intelligibility. But this is impossible because a corporeal form itself, like other forms, inasmuch as it is abstracted from matter, is actually intelligible. Whence there is in no way a composition of matter and form in an intellectual soul or an intelligence so that matter may be thought to exist in them as it does in corporeal substances. But there is in them a composition of form and the act of existing (*esse*). And so it is said in the commentary on the ninth proposition of *libri de Causis*<sup>8</sup> that an intelligence is being having form and the act of existing; and form is understood here as the quiddity itself or the simple essence.

---

<sup>4</sup> Aristotle, *On the Soul*, III, 4, 429b 21; St. Thomas, *In III de Anima*, lect. 8, nn. 714–19. See Aristotle, *On the Soul*, III, 4, 430a 3; St. Thomas, *In III de Anima*, lect. 9, nn. 724–26.

<sup>5</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, XII ( ), 3, 1070a 21; St. Thomas, *In XII Metaph.*, lect. 3, n. 2454.

<sup>6</sup> See Averroes, *In III de Anima*, com. 18; *ed. cit.*, t. VI, fol. 160v.

<sup>7</sup> Aristotle, *On the Heavens*, II, 3, 286a 8.

<sup>8</sup> See O. Bardenhewer, *Die pseudoaristotelische Schrift "Ueber das reine Gute" bekannt unter dem Namen "Liber de Causis"* (Freihurg: 1882), p. 173; M.-D. Roland-Gosselin, O.P., *Le "De Ente et Essentia" de S. Thomas d'Aquin*, *Bibliothèque Thomiste*, VIII, (Kain: Le Saulchoir, 1926), 146 ff.

78) Since it is possible that someone might believe that there is a response to this reasoning, he intends here to exclude any response which can be imagined adequate. To refute his argument one might make a distinction between corporeal matter and unqualified matter, arguing that while the major is true of corporeal matter, it is not true of unqualified matter. Consequently, he grants that every intellectual substance is immune from corporeal matter, but not from matter, because it is not matter but corporeal matter which hinders intelligibility in act.

He opposes this escape by reducing it to the impossible. Corporeal matter through itself impedes intelligibility; therefore the corporeal form is that from which matter receives the power to impede intelligibility, which is impossible; therefore from the falsity of the consequent, etc. The consequence is known from the terms. For corporeal matter implies two things, namely, *matter* and *corporeal*, and it is not *matter* which hinders intelligibility in act. It remains that this impediment is from *corporeal*. But *corporeal* adds only the corporeal form to matter. Therefore it is because of the corporeal or bodily form that matter hinders intelligibility in act. The falsity of the consequent is proved as follows. Every form conceived separately from matter is actually intelligible, as is clear from III *de Anima*;<sup>9</sup> the corporeal form is in itself conceived separately from matter, for it is held to be distinct from matter; therefore the corporeal form in itself is actually intelligible. Then further, nothing which is in itself actually intelligible, of itself hinders intelligibility; a corporeal form is such; therefore it is not by the corporeal form that matter receives an impediment to intelligibility. This was to be proved. Therefore neither the intellectual soul nor any kind of intelligence is composed of matter and form, if we take the composition of matter and form to be univocal, namely, such that matter and form name the essential parts of a thing, as was said in the preceding chapter that some substances are composites. But there is in them another genus of composition, namely, of form and existence (*esse*). We shall treat this later. Thus is established the first part of what is intended, namely, that in intellectual substances essence does not signify a composite of matter and form. It remains now to show how essence signifies only form; therefore he adds this.

How this is so is clear to see. For whatever things are so related to each other that one is the cause of the existing of the other, the one which is a cause can exist without the other, but not conversely. The relation of matter and form, however, is such

---

<sup>9</sup> Aristotle, *On the Soul*, III, 4, 429b 21; St. Thomas, *In III de Anima*, lect. 8, nn. 714–19.

that form gives existence to matter, and therefore it is impossible for matter to exist without some form. On the other hand, it is not impossible for some form to be without matter, for form as form does not depend on matter. If some forms should be found which cannot exist except in matter, this happens to them because they are distant from the First Principle, which is the first and pure act. Whence those forms which are closest to the First Principle are forms subsisting in themselves without matter. For form according to the whole of its genus does not need matter, as has been said, and the intelligences are forms of this kind. Therefore it is not necessary that the essence or quiddities of these substances be other than form itself.

79) He intends by these words to show how essence in simple substances signifies only form. This he proves as follows: whatever things are such that one is the cause of the existence (*esse*) of the other, and not vice versa, that which is a cause can be without the other; but form and matter are so related that form is the cause of matter's existence (*esse*), and not vice versa; therefore form can exist without matter, but not matter without form. Finally, the essence of intelligences is not composed of matter and form, and cannot be matter alone; therefore it is form alone.

And note that the major proposition can be taken in two ways. First, that what is the cause of the other, etc., can be numerically the same without the other. We are not taking the proposition in this meaning, because this is false and external to the proposition. It is false because a subject causes the existence (*esse*) of its proper attribute (*propriae passionis*), and not vice versa; and nevertheless a subject cannot exist without its proper attribute. It is, indeed, external to the proposition because we do not wish to conclude that a form which is in matter can be without matter, but rather that some forms do not demand matter. Secondly, the major can be understood as follows. That what is a cause relative to its own order can be without the other, that is, relative to something of its own order it can be found without the other. Taken thus the proposition is true and to the point. It is true that since a cause is independent of the caused, it follows that something belonging to its order can exist (*esse*) outside of the caused. It is to the point because we wish to conclude that a form, according to its own genus, does not depend on matter so that there can be some separated form. Wherefore, in the minor we expressly do not use material form or form having existence (*esse*) in matter, but simply form without anything added, as an indication that we are speaking of a form as form, not as such and such a form. Now the minor is evident from IX *Metaph.*,<sup>10</sup> where we find that act is prior to potency absolutely, and

---

<sup>10</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, IX ( ), 8, 1049b 5. 1050a 2; St. Thomas, *In IX Metaph.*, lect. 7, nn. 1844–55.

independent of it. For from the fact that form is essentially act, and matter essentially potency, if act in its own entire fullness does not depend on potency, it follows that form in its own entire order does not depend on matter. It is necessary, however, that matter, since it is essentially potency, depend on form, without which there is no actuality. Thus the minor is evident, because matter depends in its existence (*esse*) on form taken absolutely, inasmuch as it is a form, as potency depends on act, and not vice versa. The fact that some act is such that it is not found except as received into some potency, results from the imperfection of the act; it does not have this because it is act. Likewise, that some forms do not exist except in matter, is the result of their imperfection, which follows upon their distance from the First Principle, the glorious God, and their nearness to prime matter. And, therefore, such forms not only cause the existence (*esse*) of matter, but they are themselves in some way caused by matter; for causes are mutual causes as is said in II *Phys.*<sup>11</sup> Therefore the essence of intellectual substances is immaterial and form alone.

**Question IX**<sup>12</sup>—

**Whether**<sup>13</sup> **Matter Can Exist Without Form?**

80) There occurs a question in this part. This is the ninth question: whether matter can exist without form.

In this question, there are *three divisions*.

First, the position of Scotus.

Second, the position of St. Thomas.

Third, the answer to the opposing arguments.

81) *Regarding the first division*, Scotus, in II *Sent.*,<sup>14</sup> expresses the opinion that matter can exist without form, and he gives a number of arguments in proof of this.

The first is this. Accidents depend on substance no less than matter on form; but an accident can exist without a substance, as is evident in the Sacrament of the altar; therefore matter can exist without form.

Further, an absolute which is distinct and prior to another absolute can exist without the other with no contradiction; matter in respect to form is such; therefore it can exist without form. The minor is evident. The major is proved thus. A prior thing, in so far as it is prior, does not depend on what is posterior, and this is taken from V

---

<sup>11</sup> Aristotle, *Physics*, II, 3, 195a 8; St. Thomas, *In II Phys.*, lect. 5, n. 7.

<sup>12</sup> In the Paris edition (p. 469), this appears as Question VIII.

<sup>13</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 126) has *Utrum*. The Paris edition (p. 469) has *Num*.

<sup>14</sup> Scotus, *In II Sent.*, d. 12, q. 2, nn. 3–6; *ed. cit.*, VI, Part II, 682–83.

*Metaph.*,<sup>15</sup> those things are prior which can exist without something else, which in turn cannot exist without them.

Further, any absolute thing God makes in creatures by means of a secondary cause, which is not of the essence of the thing caused, He can make without it; but God makes matter through form, which is not of the essence of matter; therefore He can make matter without form.

Further, whatever God creates immediately, He conserves or is able to conserve immediately; but God creates matter immediately; therefore He can conserve it immediately; therefore without any form.

Further, since God does not will anything outside Himself necessarily, it does not follow from the fact that He wills matter to exist that He also wills form to exist, unless there is a necessary connection between them; but there is no such necessary connection between matter and form; therefore, etc. Now, that there is no such necessary connection between matter and form is proved as follows. If there were, it would follow that matter would necessarily determine for itself some determinate form. The proof of the consequence is that what determines for itself a genus of form, determines for itself some species in that genus, and what determines a species for itself determines for itself existence (*esse*) in some individual of that species; for whatever is of necessity man is necessarily this or that man. The consequent, however, is false for matter does not determine any form for itself; therefore it remains that matter does not determine for itself the genus of the form so that it be. This is confirmed: whatever is related contingently to something of an absolute genus is contingently related to that absolute genus; but matter is contingently related to any form whatever; therefore matter is contingently related to the genus of the form. It is proved again in this way. If matter of necessity determines for itself the genus of the form, which also necessarily determines for itself only one individual of that genus, then it is impossible that an essential and singular unit should depend upon many of essentially the same genus; but matter is an essential and singular unit; therefore it is impossible that matter should depend on many forms of the same genus. Thus, if matter necessarily determines for itself the genus of the form, it also necessarily determines for itself some one form, which is false. So for the first point.

82) *Regarding the second point*, St. Thomas, in *I parte*<sup>16</sup> and in *quaestione de potentia Dei*<sup>17</sup> and in *quolibet* III,<sup>18</sup> confirms what he

---

<sup>15</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, V ( ), 11, 1018b 9 ff.; St. Thomas, *In V Metaph.*, lect. 13 nn. 936–53.

<sup>16</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.*, I, 66, 1.

<sup>17</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *De Pot. Dei*, IV, 1.

<sup>18</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *Quodlibet.*, III, q. 1, a. 1.

says here, namely, that matter cannot exist without form for *two reasons*.

*The first* reduces it to an impossibility. If matter could exist without form, it would exist and not exist at the same time; this implies a contradiction; therefore, etc. He proves the consequence for the second part because the opponents admit it for the first part. It is impossible for a formal effect to be separated from form; but to exist is a formal effect of form, for form is defined as that which gives existence (*esse*) to a thing; therefore it is impossible to posit existence without form. For just as it is impossible that there be white without whiteness, so it is impossible to be in act without act. But to give existence (*esse*) belongs to first act, which is the same as form. Therefore, from the proposition, *matter exists without any form*, it follows that contradictories would be simultaneously true. From the fact that matter exists, it follows that it is in act; on the other hand, from the fact that it exists without any form, it follows that it is not in act. Scotus gives some kind of answer to this, which we omit because it is a figment of his imagination, and unworthy of him. It is foolish to pay attention to one holding contraries, says Aristotle, from whom we learn, in *libro IX Metaph.*,<sup>19</sup> what act is and how many kinds of act there are.

*The second argument* of St. Thomas to prove the same point is as follows. Every individual determined to a genus, complete or incomplete, existing in itself in nature, is in a particular species in itself or at least reductively; matter alone, either in itself or reductively, is not in a particular species; therefore matter alone cannot be some individual in nature. The minor is evident in itself, for it is not easy to imagine in what particular species matter alone would be. The major is proved from the fact that every individual, both complete and incomplete, if it exists in itself in nature and separate (I say this to indicate an individual in a genus, for example, this substance, or this animal, etc.), is not in itself contained in a genus nor can it be immediately reduced to one, but mediately through a species. For species mediates between the individual and the genus; and the principles of the species mediate between the principles of the genus and the principles of the individual in like manner. Besides this there is an *ad hominem* proof for the major, if we take the fifth argument of Scotus. There he expressly holds that whatever determines some genus for itself determines for itself some particular species of that genus. And one can also argue *ad hominem* from those words of Scotus and prove the opposite of his meaning thus: whatever determines some genus determines for itself some certain species of that genus; matter alone determines

---

<sup>19</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, IX ( ), *passim*.

for itself the genus of substance; therefore it determines for itself some certain species of substance, at least reductively; therefore matter alone would be in some certain species, which is false. The minor is generally accepted and the reasoning is valid; therefore etc.

Aristotle accepts this truth, as Scotus himself admits in the place cited. But because he says that Aristotle held this conclusion on false grounds, namely, on the grounds that God cannot act without secondary causes, I shall show that Scotus errs here from the writings of the Commentator. For in II *Phys.*,<sup>20</sup> from precisely the same basis which St. Thomas adduces in his first argument, Averroes holds that conclusion, where it is evident that there is no mention made of the connection of the causality of the first cause, but only of act and potency, so that from the nature of act and the nature of prime matter, which is pure potency, Averroes concludes that two contradictories would be simultaneously true, as was deduced, etc. Avicenna, too, in II *Metaphysicae*,<sup>21</sup> holds that the conclusion of Scotus is impossible, and nevertheless expressly holds that matter is created. Therefore this must be avoided as being destructive of metaphysical principles. So for the second point.

83) *The third point* contains my answer.

*To the first argument*, I deny the antecedent. Pure potency depends more on act than imperfect act does on perfect act. Anthony Trombeta, however, objects to this. He says that the posterior depends more on the prior than the prior on the posterior; but accident is posterior to substance and matter is prior to form; therefore an accident is more dependent on a subject than matter on form. He says that perhaps one might say that matter is not prior, but posterior to form. He answers that although matter is posterior to form in the order of perfection, it is nevertheless prior to form in the order of generation, and consequently is prior without qualification. As a result he argues in this way. Whenever there are two orders, one of which is unqualifiedly prior to the other, whatever is in the prior order is unqualifiedly prior to any existent in the posterior order; but the order of generation and the order of perfection are orders such that the order of origin is unqualifiedly prior to the order of perfection (he is speaking of limited natures); therefore whatever is prior in origin is unqualifiedly prior to any prior order of perfection whatsoever. Now it is a fact that matter is prior to form in origin, although form has a priority of perfection; therefore matter is unqualifiedly prior to form. The reasoning is valid, and the major, namely, that the order of origin is unqualifiedly prior to the order of perfection, is proved as follows. What is prior in gen-

---

<sup>20</sup> Averroes, *In II Phys.*, com. 12; *ed. cit.*, t. IV, fol. 25r.

<sup>21</sup> Avicenna, *Metaph.*, tr. II, c. 3; *ed. cit.*, fol. 76v.



eration is posterior in perfection, for nature always proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect; therefore the less perfect is unqualifiedly prior to the more perfect; but prime matter is less perfect than form; therefore prime matter is unqualifiedly prior to form. Finally, matter is unqualifiedly prior to form, and whatever is prior without qualification (*in suo priori*) can exist without the posterior; therefore, etc.

There is a threefold answer for getting at the many defects of this argument.

First, I say that form, although it is posterior to matter in the order of generation, is nevertheless prior even in the order of generation, when matter exists. For it is important to distinguish between matter and existing matter; just as surface is prior to whiteness, but whiteness is prior to a surface having a white existence (*esse*). Thus the argument, when there is question of existing matter (for if matter alone were given in nature, it must exist), evidently accepts what is false.

Secondly, I say that there is another false proposition used in the argument, namely, that the order of generation is unqualifiedly prior to the order of perfection whenever we stay within the limits of finite nature. Act is unqualifiedly prior to potency, whether it be held that God is finite or infinite, as is evident from IX *Metaph.*,<sup>22</sup> and the priority of act is the priority of perfection. Then it follows that, according to Aristotle and the truth, the order of perfection is unqualifiedly prior to the order of generation. Further, that which is prior naturally in knowledge and in time is unqualifiedly prior; the order of perfection is naturally prior in knowledge and in time to the order of imperfection, such as the order of generation is, which stands as a material cause; therefore the order of perfection is unqualifiedly prior. The minor proposition is also in Aristotle, VIII *Phys.*,<sup>23</sup> where he expressly speaks of finite nature in order to prove that circular motion is first. With regard to the proof, granted that what is prior by generation is less perfect, and that nature proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect, I deny the consequence that therefore the order of generation is unqualifiedly prior. For although a natural agent influences the imperfect before the perfect, nevertheless it is necessary that the agent first be perfect in itself, as is said in XII *Metaph.*<sup>24</sup> Note here that liars need good memories. In *quaestione de Primo cognito*,<sup>25</sup> Anthony Trombeta opposes propositions which he now holds, etc.

---

<sup>22</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, IX ( ), 8, 1049b 6 and 1050a 2; St. Thomas, *In IX Metaph.*, lect. 7, nn. 1844–55.

<sup>23</sup> Aristotle, *Physics*, VIII, 9, 265a 17; St. Thomas, *In VIII Phys.*, lect. 19, n. 6.

<sup>24</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, XII ( ), 7, 1072b 30 ff.; St. Thomas, *In XII Metaph.*, lect. 8, n. 2545.

<sup>25</sup> Anthony Trombeta, *Quaestiones Metaphysicales, In I Lib. Aristotelis*, q. X; *ed. cit.*, fol. 11r ff.

Thirdly, I say that even granting the whole line of reasoning, the final consequence is invalid. For it is false that everything that is prior can in the real world be separated from any posterior thing whatsoever, as we shall say in answer to the second argument.

Against our first answer, which says that matter does not have its own existence, but receives it from form, he argues as follows. If it belongs to something to be a cause at some moment (*pro aliquo signo*), to exist belongs to it at the same time (*pro eodem signo*); but prime matter is a cause at the moment (*in primo signo*) when it receives form; therefore to exist belongs to it at that moment; but at that moment (*pro illo signo*), it does not have the existence of form; therefore it has its own existence. This is confirmed from the fact that matter either causes the composite and receives form when it exists or when it does not exist; but not when it does not exist; therefore when it exists; therefore at that moment existence is proper to itself, because the existence of form follows on the whole composite. Secondly, this is confirmed by the fact that a cause does not receive anything from its effect; matter, however, causes the existence of the composite and of form; therefore it does not receive existence from them, etc.

To this I answer that it suffices for a cause to have existence in the precise instant of time when it actually causes, nor does it seem necessary that existence be present in every moment (*pro quolibet signo*) of nature in which causality is present. For the order of nature is such in some instant of time that matter receives form from which the composite results; to the composite now comes the being (*esse*) of actual existence by which primarily the composite itself, secondly form, and thirdly matter exist. Now, as to the form of his first objection, I deny the major. To his confirmatory argument, I say that matter causes when it exists, because in any instant that it causes, it exists, for then it is a temporal term. To the second confirmatory argument, I say that although a cause as cause does not receive anything from its effect, nevertheless a material cause receives something from its effect, which is its cause in another order of causality because they are mutual causes.<sup>26</sup> However, it is necessary to admit these answers of the Scotists, the reason being that since Scotus<sup>27</sup> holds that existence is the ultimate act, posterior to the whole predicamental order, although it is not really distinct from the thing whose existence it is, it is necessary that the essence of matter from the nature of the real have a relation to its existence as potency to act. Then we can argue as follows. The essence of matter, as distinct from its existence, causes from the nature of the real its own existence in the genus of material cause by receiving

---

<sup>26</sup> Aristotle, *Physics*, II, 3, 195a 8; St. Thomas, *In II Phys.*, lect. 5, n. 7.

<sup>27</sup> Scotus, *In II Sent.*, d. 3, q. 3, nn. 1–3; *ed. cit.*, VI, Part I, 379–80.

it. Therefore existence belongs to it at that time (*pro illo signo*); and therefore it has existence before it receives it. Likewise, keeping to that time, the essence of matter in the nature of the real receives its existence when it exists or when it does not exist, etc.

*Regarding the second* principal argument, I deny the major. To prove this, I point out that the cause of their inseparability is not merely dependence; any necessary connection suffices. In answer to what he adduces from *V Metaph.*,<sup>28</sup> I say that a universal affirmative is not converted simply. For this is true: whatever things can exist (*esse*) independently of others, and the others not without them, are prior. This proposition is not converted as follows: whatever things are prior can exist without others, and the others without them.

Note also that the Scotistic maxim, *every absolute which is prior*, etc., cannot be justified, even following the way of Scotus, which at present is shown by two reasons.

First, because essential parts taken together are prior to the whole, yet, according to Scotus, they cannot exist without the whole.

Secondly, because the category of quantity is an absolute, prior to the category of quality, especially in regard to the fourth species; nevertheless there can be no continuous quantity without figure. For if quantity without figure were said to become, it would become either finite or infinite. Not infinite, because infinity cannot be given, and if someone still imagines that it can be given, then since it must be linear, it will be either straight or curved, and thus it will be a figure. If it is finite, then it is figured; for figure is that which is enclosed by a limit or limits, and likewise it will have either straight or curved or circular lines, etc.

*Regarding the third* principal argument, whatever be said about the major, I deny the minor. For although form is not of the essence of matter, still it is of the essence of existing matter.

*Regarding the fourth* argument, I say that since the medium is two-fold, either effective or formal, whatever God causes immediately as efficient cause, He can cause without the medium of an efficient cause; but He cannot conserve without the medium of a formal cause. Such a medium is form in relation to matter.

*Regarding the fifth* argument, I deny that there is no necessary connection between matter and form. As for the proof given for this, I deny the consequence. And the major of its proof is false. What is added, namely, that if something is of necessity man, it is of necessity this or that man, proves nothing except that because matter necessarily determines the genus of form to itself, therefore matter cannot be with-

---

<sup>28</sup> See Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, V ( ), 11, 1018b 8 – 1019a 14.

out this or that form, which is also what we hold. But the consequence is not valid: A is necessarily a man; therefore A is necessarily determinately this or that; rather it is confusedly so. We concede that matter must determine form to itself; therefore it must determine this or that form to itself, not determinately but confusedly.

When it is said in confirmation: whatever is contingently related to anything of an absolute genus is contingently related to the genus itself, I answer in the same way, by making a distinction—that it is contingently related to something determinately or confusedly. But in the first way, the major is false. In the second way, the minor is false. For matter is not related contingently but necessarily to any form, indeterminately and confusedly.

In answer to the other proof, I say that one which is essentially one and negatively singular, as prime matter is, can depend essentially in existence (*esse*) on many things of the same genus indeterminately and confusedly, according as those many have one common notion; for example, in the present matter, all forms agree in this that they give actual existence (*esse*). Turn this argument against Scotus dealing with quantity and figure, and perhaps you will be persuaded of the weakness of his argument. For continuous quantity determines the genus of figure to itself, but does not claim any figure for itself. So for the fourth point.

In this lies the difference between the essence of a composite substance and that of a simple substance, that the essence of a composite substance is not from form alone, nor matter alone, but includes matter and form. The essence of a simple substance, on the contrary, is form alone. And from this, two other differences follow. The first is that the essence of a composite substance can be signified as a whole or as a part, which happens because of the designation of matter, as has been said. And, therefore, the essence of a composite thing is not predicated in any way whatever of the composite thing itself. For it cannot be said that man is his quiddity. But the essence of a simple thing, which is its form, cannot be signified except as a whole, since nothing is there besides the form as receiving the form. And thus in whatever way the essence of a simple substance be taken, it is predicated of the substance. Whence Avicenna says that the quiddity of a simple substance is the simple substance itself because there is nothing else receiving it.<sup>29</sup>

84) In the second part of the chapter, he compares the essence of simple substances with the essences of composite substances, pointing out a threefold difference between them. The first difference is that the essence of a simple substance signifies a thing composed of matter and

---

<sup>29</sup> Avicenna, *Metaph.*, tr. V, c. 5; *ed. cit.*, fol. 90r.

form. Both members of this difference are evident from what has been said above. The second difference is that the essence of a composite substance can be signified as whole and part; not, however, the essence of a simple substance. Whence it happens that because the predicate need not have the notion of a part, the essence of a composite substance is at times predicated of the substance and sometimes not, namely, when it is signified as a part. But the essence of a simple substance, because no part can be denoted of it, is always predicated of those whose essence it is.

In evidence of this difference, note that at first glance it appears false, because it is evident that when we give names to separated substances, their essence can be signified in the abstract and in the concrete and, consequently, as a whole or as a part. For I can say Gabriel and Gabrielity; God and Deity, etc. But, although it appears this way, the opposite becomes clear if someone examines it carefully.

For it must be considered that we speak of the essences of things and of the conditions which are consequent upon the essence; we do not speak of those things which are the result only of the operation of the intellect. Because the essences of composite substances have two real parts, or are forms in matter, they have that in them whereby the intellect finds a foundation for signifying after the manner of a part or after the manner of a whole. For when it signifies that form in the thing which has or bears it, it signifies it as a whole and concrete thing, for example, man. But when it signifies the form, not as in the thing which has or bears it,<sup>30</sup> but as it is in itself, it signifies in the abstract and like a part, for example, humanity. But the essences of immaterial substances, because they are forms not received into matter, do not of themselves have that whereby they may be signified in the concrete and in the abstract, as whole and part, etc. There is nothing there which bears or is borne. But because our intellect understands simple superior things after the manner of composite things, therefore, as the Commentator and St. Thomas say,<sup>31</sup> it was necessary that it should form abstract and concrete concepts about them, and understand them after the manner of a whole and of a part. Thus the difference given here is to be understood according to what I add, namely, that the essence of composite substances has of itself that whereby it can be signified after the manner of a part or of a whole, whereas the essence of a simple substance does not have of itself, but rather from the intellect, that whereby it is signified after the manner

---

<sup>30</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 133, line 18 from bottom) has *deferente*. The Paris edition (p. 475, line 8) has *differente*.

<sup>31</sup> Averroes, *In XII Metaph.*, com. 39; *ed. cit.*, t. VIII, fol. 152v; St. Thomas, *Sum. Theol.*, I, 13, 1.

of a whole or of a part. Therefore the difference between the abstract and concrete in composite substances is on the part of the thing and is reduced to a distinction which exists between a subject bearing and the form borne. However, the difference between abstract and concrete in separated substances is not from the thing itself, but from the intellect,<sup>32</sup> as the Commentator here says. And for this reason, Avicenna says that the quiddity of a simple substance is the simple thing itself, but the quiddity of a composite thing is not the composite itself.

There is a problem concerning this section, namely, whether it is true that in separated substances the quiddity and that to which it belongs, that is, the nature and the supposit, are the same. There is ground for doubting, because St. Thomas says in *Quolibet* II<sup>33</sup> that according to Aristotle,<sup>34</sup> in those things in which there is mixed some accident, nature and supposit are distinguished; and there is some accident in intelligences other than the first; in all except the first, nature and supposit or quiddity and that to which quiddity belongs are distinguished. On the other hand, III *de Anima*<sup>35</sup> says that in those things which are separated from matter, the essence (*quod quid est*) and that to which it belongs are the same; and in I *Parte*,<sup>36</sup> St. Thomas says this expressly, and it appears here on the authority of Avicenna.

To solve this difficulty, it must be noted that by the word *nature* is understood that which is signified by a definition; but by the word *supposit* is understood an individual having that quiddity. There is a threefold difference between supposit and nature in the universe, according to the threefold degree of substances.

Indeed, in material substances, supposit differs from nature in two ways, in reality and beyond that in reason. First, they differ intrinsically, because a supposit includes within itself a real intrinsic principle which the nature does not include, namely, a principle of individuation. For if Socrates were defined, this matter would be placed in his definition, which is not placed in the definition of human nature. Secondly, they differ extrinsically, because the supposit includes within itself a real extrinsic principle, namely, the being (*esse*) of actual existence, which the nature does not include. Existence is primarily the act of the supposit, for it is the supposit that comes to be. Now this would be included in the definition of Socrates if he were defined. Thirdly, they differ logically, as is evident.

---

<sup>32</sup> The text is corrupt, for it reads *non est id ex parte intellectus*.

<sup>33</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *Quodlibet*, II, q. 2, a. 2.

<sup>34</sup> See St. Thomas Aquinas, *In VII Metaph.*, lect. 5, nn. 1356–80.

<sup>35</sup> See Averroes, *In III de Anima*, com. 9; *ed. cit.*, t. VI, fol. 167v.

<sup>36</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.*, I, 3,3.

Now in separated substances, other than the first, the supposit differs from the nature in only two ways, namely, extrinsically in reality and in reason. For the supposit has no real intrinsic principle in it which the nature does not also have, because the supposit is not individuated through some positive principle limiting the specific nature so that it stands as an individual difference intrinsic to the supposit, as is the case in material substances. But because in them existence, which is primarily the act of the supposit, as was said, is really distinct from the nature, as will become evident, then the supposit in them differs extrinsically from the nature; for there is added extrinsically the reality of existence. Secondly, the supposit differs from the nature by reason, as is evident. In the glorious God, however, the supposit differs in only one way, namely, according to reason, because the divine nature is neither individuated by something added, nor is His existence really distinct from His essence. For this reason, it is evident that both sides of the question are to some extent true, and that in separated substances the essence (*quod quid est*) and that to which it belongs, are really distinct, because they differ in reality by an extrinsic difference; and they are identical because there is no intrinsic real distinction. That this is the mind of St. Thomas can be easily ascertained by one who carefully examines what he says in the places mentioned.<sup>37</sup>

The second difference is that the essences of composite things, because they are received in designated matter or multiplied according to the division of matter, happen in some cases to be specifically the same and numerically different. But, since the essence of a simple substance is not received in matter, there cannot be in it such multiplication. And, therefore, in these substances there cannot be found many individuals of the same species; but there are as many individuals among them as there are species, as Avicenna expressly says.<sup>38</sup>

85) In this text is placed the third difference, which in the ordering is called the second of those which arise from the first. He states that the essence of a composite substance and the essence of a simple substance differ also in this that the essence of a composite substance can be numerically multiplied in the same species; just as the human essence is numerically distinguished in Socrates and Plato. But the essence of a simple substance, that is, of one separated from matter, cannot be multiplied in many individuals of the same species; but rather each individual constitutes one species and is specifically distinct from the others. This is based on two propositions. The first is:

---

<sup>37</sup> See Cajetan, *In Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 3, a. 3.

<sup>38</sup> Avicenna, *Metaph.*, tr. V, c. 2; *ed. cit.*, fol. 87v.

since act is that which divides and separates,<sup>39</sup> every division is either formal or quantitative, as Aristotle says in III *Metaph.*<sup>40</sup> and the Commentator in I *Phys.*<sup>41</sup> The second is: specific forms are formally indivisible. From this is deduced that specific forms which are received into matter are divided by quantity according to the division of matter, and thus there result many individuals of the same species. But a specific form, not received in matter, lacks all division. It lacks formal division because it is the ultimate in species; it lacks quantitative division because it is not received in matter, upon which quantity follows. Thus there cannot be many individuals in the same species, for multitude follows upon division.

**Question X<sup>42</sup>—**

**Whether<sup>43</sup> Each Species of Separated Substances Has Only One Individual?**

86) In this section, the question arises: whether each species of separated substances has only one individual.

There are *three points* to this question.

First, the position of Scotus, with its bases.

Second, the Peripatetic truth.

Third, answers to arguments of the opponents.

87) *The first point.* Scotus<sup>44</sup> holds that there are many intelligences of the same species because of the following arguments.

First, every quiddity, as it is in itself, is communicable; an intelligence is some kind of quiddity; therefore the quiddity of an intelligence is of itself communicable and can, as a result, be found in many. The major is proved thus: if every quiddity were not communicable, or if communicability were repugnant to it, it will be by reason of quidditative perfection or imperfection. Not by reason of perfection, because according to the Catholic Faith, communicability is consonant with the divine quiddity which is absolutely perfect; nor by reason of imperfection because communicability is consonant with the quiddities of composite substances, which are imperfect. Since, therefore, it is not repugnant for either reason, the major stands true.

---

<sup>39</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, VII ( ), 13, 1039a 7; St. Thomas, *In VII Metaph.*, lect. 13, nn. 1588–89.

<sup>40</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, III ( ), 3, 999a 2; St. Thomas, *In III Metaph.*, lect. 8, n. 436.

<sup>41</sup> Averroes, *In I Phys.*, com. 6; *ed. cit.*, t. IV, fol. 5v.

<sup>42</sup> In the Paris edition (p. 477), this appears as Question IX.

<sup>43</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 136) has *Utrum*. The Paris edition (p. 477) has *Nam*.

<sup>44</sup> Scotus, *In II Sent.*, d. 3, q. 7, nn. 3–5; *ed. cit.*, VI, Part I, 422–24.



Further, every quiddity, intelligible as a universal without contradiction, can be numerically many; a separated quiddity is intelligible as a universal without contradiction; therefore it can be numerically many. The major is proved as follows. To be understood as universal implies also to be of itself singular; for universality is opposed to thisness, just as understanding the divine essence as a universal implies that it is of itself singular.

Further, God can annihilate a particular angel in a particular species. Once the angel has been annihilated, God can restore this species in some other individual, but not in the same individual, according to that opinion; because, according to them, man could not rise again numerically the same unless the intellectual soul remain the same in number. Therefore, in the same species, there will be many individuals, at least successively.

Further, intellectual souls are numerically distinct in the same species, and nevertheless they are immaterial; therefore, etc.

Further, Augustine, in *Enchiridion*,<sup>45</sup> says that because the entire human nature of species fell, therefore a merciful God came to save it; but He did not come to save angelic nature, because the whole species did not fall. Now note that Augustine said that the whole angelic nature did not fall through sin. This could not be true if there are as many species as there are individuals, for if this were so, many angelic natures would have fallen totally, but only one human nature, since human nature is only one.

Further, Damascene, in *Elementario*,<sup>46</sup> says that God made the angels in some species.

Further, Scotus argues to the same conclusion in *quolibeto*,<sup>47</sup> namely, that the above opinion was condemned at Paris in a number of articles. The first is:<sup>48</sup> if one should say that God cannot multiply forms without matter, he is in error. The second is:<sup>49</sup> if one should say that form cannot receive division without matter, he is in error. The third is:<sup>50</sup> that [if one should say] because intelligences do not have matter, God cannot make many in the same species, he is in error.

And if one should hold, says Anthony Trombeta, that this proposition is not condemned everywhere, even though it was at Paris, he objects. For an opinion condemned at some famous university is condemned everywhere or is suspect as heretical, not only by diocesan

---

<sup>45</sup> St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, c. XXIX; PL 40, 246.

<sup>46</sup> Damascene, *Elementario*, c. I; PG 95, 100.

<sup>47</sup> Scotus, *Quolibeto*, q. 2, nn. 1–31; ed. Wadding, XII, 34–66.

<sup>48</sup> Denifle-Chatelain, *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, t. I, (Paris: 1889), 549.

<sup>49</sup> Denifle-Chatelain, *op. cit.*, p. 554.

<sup>50</sup> Denifle-Chatelain, *op. cit.*, p. 548.

authority, but also by the authority of the Pope himself, as is evident from the decretals<sup>51</sup> on heretics.<sup>52</sup> So for the first part.

88) *The second point.* The Peripatetic truth accepted by Aristotle, the Commentator and St. Thomas is that each intelligence constitutes one species, so that there cannot be found many individuals in the same species. St. Thomas, in *quaestionibus disputatis de Spiritualibus creaturis*,<sup>53</sup> and in *II cont. Gent.*,<sup>54</sup> and in *I parte*,<sup>55</sup> and elsewhere,<sup>56</sup> proves this with a number of arguments, of which two will now be presented.

The first of these is taken from their immateriality, by reason of which they lack all principles of numerical distinction. The argument is formulated as follows: every species having many individuals has in itself something distinguishing numerically; intelligences do not have such a distinguishing principle; therefore. You have proof of the minor above, immediately before the question. And note that this argument is taken from *XII Metaph.*,<sup>57</sup> where this consequence is given: the heaven, that is, the first principle, is one in species and many in number; therefore it is material. Here we are expressly given to understand that immateriality is a sufficient cause for lack of numerical multiplication. But, since Scotus says expressly in the place referred to above that his opinion is contrary to Aristotle, I omit authorities.

*The second argument* of St. Thomas is taken from the order of the universe. *It is based upon three propositions*, of which *the first* is: a universe having three parts, namely, a sphere of generable and corruptible beings, the heavenly bodies and immaterial substances, has an order for its intrinsic good; this is from *XII Metaph.*<sup>58</sup> *The second proposition* is that order is twofold, namely, essential and accidental. Essential order is among essentially ordered things, as species, which are like numbers.<sup>59</sup> Accidental order is between individuals of the same species, as is said in *III Metaph.*<sup>60</sup> *The third proposition* is that part of the universe where there is a pure essential order is better than one where there is an essential order mixed with an accidental order.

---

<sup>51</sup> Decretal. Gregor. IX, lib. V, tit. VII, c. 9; in A. E. Friedberg, *Corpus Juris Canonici*, t. II, Lipsiae, 1881, coll. 780–81.

<sup>52</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 137, line 18) has *patet ex decretali de Haereticis*. The Paris edition (p. 478, line 7) has *patet extra de haereticis*.

<sup>53</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *De Spiritualibus Creatoris*, a. 8.

<sup>54</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *Contra Gentiles*, II, 93.

<sup>55</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.*, I, 50, 4.

<sup>56</sup> See St. Thomas Aquinas, *In II Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, a. 4; d. 32, q. 2, a. 3; Q. D. *de Anima*, a. 3.

<sup>57</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, XII ( ), 8, 1074a 32; St. Thomas, *In XII Metaph.*, lect. 10, nn. 2593–96.

<sup>58</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, XII ( ), 10, 1075a 15; St. Thomas, *In XII Metaph.*, lect. 12, on. 2629–31.

<sup>59</sup> See Averroes, *In VIII Metaph.*, com. 10; *ed. cit.*, t. VIII, fol. 102rv.

<sup>60</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, III ( ), 3, 999a 1.

This is from XII *Metaph.*,<sup>61</sup> where the first part of the universe is likened to the sons of a family in which there is no accidental order. Upon these propositions, the following argument is based. That which lacks accidental order does not have many individuals of the same species; the highest part of the universe has no accidental order; therefore it does not have many individuals of the same species. The major is evident from the terms. Although the minor is from Aristotle in the place cited, since these, however, deny Aristotle in this place, as in other places too, it is proved by reason as follows. The highest part of the universe excludes accidental order no less than the middle part, since the highest part is more perfect, and the good of the universe consists in order; also accidental order is something imperfect and less than essential order—in fact, something accidentally ordered is unordered because accidental order is a condition diminishing the notion of order; but the middle part excludes accidental order, as is evident, for celestial bodies do not have many individuals of the same species; since there is only one sun, one moon, etc.; therefore the highest part of the universe *a fortiori* excludes any accidental order. So much for the second part.

89) *The third point.* The arguments of Scotus are answered.

*As to the first argument,* we may bring in theological terms, since the argument is theological. We say that communicability is threefold. First, there is communicability together with division of essence, as the universal is communicable with particulars. Secondly, there is communicability by identity without any division of essence and existence (*esse*), as the divine essence is common to three suppositis. Thirdly, there is communicability by being able to be assumed into a hypostatic union, as human nature is communicable to all divine suppositis. If in his premises Scotus takes communicable in the first way, the major is false—this is evident in the divine essence. If in the second way, the major is again false, for no created essence is communicable in that manner. If in the third way, the major is again false, as is evident concerning the divine essence. However, if *communicable* is taken in none of these three ways, but as *communicable in general*, not specifying this or that kind of communicability, and the whole argument is granted, it does not follow that the angelic quiddity is communicable as a universal to particulars. For the argument commits the fallacy of the consequent, going from the higher to the lower affirmatively. Therefore the argument drawn concludes nothing against us. The first manner of communicability is repugnant to intelligences on account of

---

<sup>61</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, XII ( ), 10, 1075a 19; St. Thomas, *In XII Metaph.*, lect. 12, n. 2633.

their perfection. The second manner of communicability is repugnant to them on account of their imperfection. The third manner of communicability belongs to them because of their imperfection, since their existence (*esse*) is really distinct from their essence.

*As to the second argument.* I distinguish the major. For to be intelligible as a universal can belong to a thing in two ways. In one way, from the thing and from the intellect, if I may use the words of St. Thomas. In the other way, from the intellect alone. Taken in the first way, the major is true, the minor is false. Taken in the second way, although the minor is true, the major is false, since the basis in things for universality is the discovery of that quiddity in several individuals, simultaneously or successively. The basis in intellect for universality is a representation<sup>62</sup> of that quiddity which does not represent individual conditions as such. That which shows both bases is a universal in both ways, namely, in the thing and in the intellect; for example, the human essence is intelligible as a universal in the thing because this essence is really divided and found in many; and in the intellect because it is represented without space and time. That, however, which has only the second basis, namely representation, etc., so that its universality comes from the fact alone that it is placed objectively in the intellect, is universal in the intellect alone. The thing is an object of intellection according to quidditative conditions, not according to its individual conditions. And this is the way the quiddity of an intelligence is universal. For although the individual and specific existence (*esse*) here have the same principle, because it is represented as a thing of some kind and not as an individual thing,—because it is not represented as it is in itself but according to the manner of composite things in which the nature and an individual of that nature differ,—therefore it is universal only as being an object. Consequently, in the same way the quiddity of an intelligence is predicable of many, that is, neither actually nor potentially of many, but in so far as it is an object of the intellect, as you will find in Avicenna, V *Metaph.*<sup>63</sup> In fact, the divine quiddity itself, taken in this way, is common and a universal of reason; for this reason it is used in the plural by grammarians. As for the proof of the major so denied, the response is evident. For when it is said that a quiddity being universal and predicable of many implies it is singular of itself, this is true if universal and predicable here mean on the part of the thing. For a universal in reason only is one in many and of many, as it is only an object. A universal only in the thing is in

---

<sup>62</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 139, line 19) has *repraesentatio*. The Paris edition (p. 479, line 18 from bottom) has *praesentatio*.

<sup>63</sup> Avicenna, *Metaph.*, t. V, c. 2; *ed cit.*, fol. 87v.

many in reality, although it has unity in so far as it is an object. If you wish to understand this fully, recall what was said in the question about universals.

*Regarding the third*, I say that in the case he mentioned, the angel who is restored would necessarily be numerically the same angel, since it is from one and the same principle that Gabriel is an individual and is Gabriel. Nor is it true that we hold God could not restore the same individual, even though we say that if numerically the same soul is not taken up again—which ought not be annihilated if the notion of resurrection is to be saved,—it would not be numerically the same man as the one who has the possibility of being restored by God numerically the same.

*Regarding the fourth*, I say that the intelligences and the intellectual souls cannot be compared in this respect, because souls are that part of the species unitable to bodies; but intelligences are not. This will be treated more fully later.

*Regarding the fifth*, St. Thomas answers that human nature and angelic nature may be considered in two ways. First, they may be considered according to the being (*esse*) of the nature; thus human nature is one, and angelic nature many. Secondly they may be considered according to the being (*esse*) of the way, namely, as wayfarers on the road to supernatural beatitude. Thus, just as human nature is one, so the whole spread of the angelic species is one nature. The reason is that, just as all men have one way to the fatherland, namely, through free choice which can deviate and is remediable, so all angels have one way to beatitude, namely, through free choice which can deviate and is not remediable. Once an angel's will is set, it can no longer be changed, since their apprehension is immobile. It is for this reason that St. Augustine, speaking as a theologian, to whom pertains the question of the way of the angels and men to the fatherland, said that all angels are one in nature.

*Regarding the sixth*, when Damascene is quoted, perhaps he is repeating an opinion of people we do not agree with in this matter. Or, perhaps, by species he understood a subalternate species, not the ultimate in species. I find this interpretation more agreeable because it is not established that he is of the contrary opinion. If the truth is to be told, then he is taking the word species in a wide sense.

*Regarding the seventh*, I say first that the argument proceeds from the wrong interpretation of the Parisian articles. For they are directed against the Averroists who hold that the intellectual soul cannot be multiplied numerically because it is an immaterial form. Therefore the meaning of the first article is as follows: *if one should say that God cannot multiply forms without matter*, that is, without dependence

upon matter, *he errs*. Similarly the second: *if one should say that forms are not divided except through matter*, that is, without dependence upon matter, *he errs*. Similarly the third: *[if one should say] that because intelligences do not have matter, God cannot make many in the same species, he errs. They do not have matter*, that is, dependence upon matter; or *God cannot*, that is, this proceeds from the impotence of God. Or, secondly, let me say that the articles of Paris, in so far as they touch upon or seem to touch upon the doctrine of St. Thomas, were revoked through the lord Stephen, Bishop of Paris, at Gentiliacum<sup>64</sup> in the year of our Lord, 1325, on the Thursday before Ash Wednesday. This is evident from the words which begin:<sup>65</sup> *Experience which teaches all things by certain indications quite evidently demonstrates*. . . . Thirdly, I say that the most holy Pope Urban approved of the doctrine of St. Thomas in his *Extravaganti*,<sup>66</sup> which begins: *Praiseworthy is God in His saints, and wonderful in His majesty*. . . . It is quite unintelligible that these people dare to oppose<sup>67</sup> the articles of Paris to the approval of the Church at Rome. These are the words of the Pope himself at the end of *Extravagantis*, to the University of Toulouse: *Moreover, we wish, and in the tenor of the letters present, we enjoin upon you that the teaching of the said Blessed Thomas be adhered to as if it were the true and Catholic doctrine, and that you endeavor to enlarge upon it with all your powers. Given at Monte Flasco*, etc. Let our opponents meditate upon these words and see how rash it is for them to set themselves up against the commands of the Supreme Pontiff when they oppose the Catholic doctrine of St. Thomas.

Therefore although substances of this kind are forms alone without matter, nevertheless they are not in every way simple nor are they pure acts. They do have an admixture of potency, which is evident from the following consideration. Whatever does not belong to the notion of an essential quiddity<sup>68</sup> comes from without and enters into composition with the essence, for no essence can be understood without its parts. But every essence or quiddity can be understood without anything being known of its existing.<sup>69</sup> For I can know what a man or a phoenix is, and yet be ignorant whether it exists in reality. Therefore it is clear that the act of existing is other than essence or quiddity.

---

<sup>64</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 141, line 3) has *Gentiliacum*. The Paris edition (p. 480, line 2) has *Bertiliacum*.

<sup>65</sup> Denifle-Chatelain, *op. cit.*, t. II, 280–81.

<sup>66</sup> See *Bullarium Ordinis Praedicatorum*, t. II, Romae, 1730, pp. 259–60.

<sup>67</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 141, line 8) has *inducere*. The Paris edition (p. 481, line 6) has *reducere*.

<sup>68</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 141, line 22) has *essentialis quidditatis*. The Paris edition (p. 481, line 17) has *essentiae vel quidditatis*.

<sup>69</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 141, line 20) has *esse suo*. The Paris edition (p. 481, line 21) has *suo esse facto*.

90) In this third part of this chapter, it is proved that separated substances are composed of existence (*esse*) and essence. But, before we proceed to the proof, we must first note that in material substances we find four factors that are really distinct, namely, matter, form, the composite of these, and existence. For in man we must consider the matter into which his form is received; the form itself which is the act of this matter; the human essence which is neither matter nor form; and the being (*esse*) of actual existence by which man formally exists in the real world. The result is that in such substances there are two compositions which are referred to the genus of substance. The first is that of matter and form; the second is that of essence and existence (*existentia*), which is called the composition of existence (*esse*) and essence.

*These compositions agree in some points, and differ in others. There are two points of agreement.*

*First*, they agree in this, that both consist of act and potency. For it is clear that matter and form are related as potency and act. It becomes evident that essence and existence (*esse*) are related as potency and act, because each quiddity is placed into the real world from the fact that it acquires existence.

*Secondly*, they agree in this, that the extremes of either are in the same genus, for both the matter and the form of man and his essence and existence (*esse*) are placed in the genus of substance and in the human species.

*They differ, however, in ten areas.*

*First*, because the extremes of the first composition are parts of substance and not substance properly speaking, as is evident. For matter and form are not in the genus of substance except reductively; whence they do not receive the predication of substance, which is the most general genus, except obliquely. On the other hand, neither of the extremes of the second composition is a part of substance; the one, namely essence, is substance, which is in the direct predicamental line. The other, however, namely existence, is outside of substance.

*Secondly*, they differ because that extreme which is potency in the first composition, namely matter, is purely potential being. But the extreme which is potency in the second composition is not pure potency but being in some species quidditatively complete, namely essence.

*Thirdly*, they differ because that extreme which is potency in the first composition is not that which is, nor is it properly that which becomes. Matter does not properly become, as is said in VII *Metaph.*,<sup>70</sup>

---

<sup>70</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, VII ( ), 8, 1033b 18.

but being (*esse*) belongs to that which becoming belongs, since becoming terminates in being (*esse*). On the other hand, the extreme which is potency in the second composition is that which is and becomes, since every making terminates in the composite, as is said in the same place.

*Fourthly*, they differ because the extreme which in the first composition is act is not the ultimate actuality of the thing, but rather it causes another further act; for the form of man which informs his matter completes its own receptacle of existence itself by causing the whole composite. Thus it causes that which is further act. On the other hand, that extreme which is act in the second composition is the ultimate actuality of that genus; for nothing substantial is added to Socrates posterior to his existence.

*Fifthly*, they differ because the extreme which is act in the first composition is act in such a way that it is nevertheless related to something else as potency. On the other hand, that extreme which is act in the second composition is act in such a way that it is related to nothing at all in the thing as potency. This becomes evident when we consider the relation between form and existence. For the relation of form to actual existence (*esse*) is like the relation of transparency to light, since form receives existence and causes it like transparency does light. Now, air in so far as it is air, has no capacity for light, but must be informed with transparency in order that it become a proper receptacle for light; it is not air nor transparency, but transparent air, therefore, which is primarily luminous, even though secondarily both air and transparency lack luminosity. In the same way, in our position, matter alone is not capable of receiving existence, because act must be received into its proper potency; but it is necessary that the form be received into it in order that it be the proper receptacle of existence, not matter nor form, but that which is composed of these. For that which primarily exists is the composite. Becoming, too, belongs primarily to the composite. However, both matter and form are secondarily actuated by that existence itself. Thus transparency is the formal cause of transparent air, and formally completes air so that it may be a proper receptacle of light; and within the composite it is related to light coming upon it as a receiving potency, although secondarily related to act. In the same way, form is the formal cause of the composite, which formally completes it in order that it may be the proper receptacle of existence, and through the composite is related to subsequent existence itself as receiving potency, yet secondarily related to the act received. For this reason, the very being (*esse*) of actual existence is



not related to anything else as potency to act, but it is the ultimate actuality of every thing, even the form itself.

*Sixthly*, they differ because that extreme in the first composition which is act, belongs intrinsically to the intelligibility or definition of the thing, for form is conceived as intrinsically in the definition, as all men hold. On the other hand, that extreme which is act in the second composition is outside the quiddity of the thing, for definition does not signify existence (*esse*) or non-existence (*non esse*), as is said in *I Poster.*<sup>71</sup>

*In the seventh place*, they differ because there comes from the extremes of the first composition one third thing which is one in itself (*per se unum*). But from the extremes of the second composition, there does not come one third thing which is one in itself, nor is it properly speaking accidentally one. The reason for this is gathered from what has been said above. For a thing which is one in itself does not come about except from two extremes, each of which is a part of a substance, for no complete substance can make a thing, one in itself, with any other. Moreover, one of these extremes is pure potency, for from two acts a one in itself does not result; and the other is act in such a way that it can be related to something else as potency, for parts are material of the whole.<sup>72</sup> Since, however, in the first composition, all of these compositions are kept, and none of them are kept in the second, it follows that in the second composition there does not result a third thing, one in itself; nor is there some accidental unit, because an accidental unit is an aggregate of things of a different genus, but with these extremes it remains that essence is united in itself to existence (*esse*).

*In the eighth place*, they differ because the first composition is a composition from these extremes, and therefore there results a third unit. The second, however, is a composition with these extremes. For, strictly speaking, there is no thing which consists of essence and existence in the same way as there are things consisting of matter and form. Rather, essence compounds with existence, and vice versa. Therefore it is said that they are united in themselves, but not as if composing a third thing.

*In the ninth place*, they differ because the first composition extends itself to fewer things than the second. For the extremes of the first composition are found only in sensible things; that these alone consist of matter and form was concluded above. But the extremes of the second composition are found in both sensible and immaterial

---

<sup>71</sup> Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, I, 10, 76b 35.

<sup>72</sup> The Paris edition (p. 483, line 11) adds the following. *In V Metaph.*, text. com. III.

things, for the intelligences have quiddity and existence. Wherefore, the first composition implies the second, but not conversely; for everything composed of matter and form is composed of essence and existence (*esse*), but not conversely.

*In the tenth place*, they differ regarding their attributes, for quantity, sensible accident, and real change—at least local motion—are consequent upon the first composition. But neither generation nor corruption nor any physical change are consequent upon the second composition. There is only receiving and being received, perfecting and being perfected, because these latter are consequent upon act and potency, whereas the former are consequent upon matter and form. In the text it is proved that this second composition is found in every being other than the first, once this conclusion was stated: every being other than the first is composed of existence (*esse*) and essence. The reason is this: whatever has something outside its essence really joined to its quiddity is composed of quiddity and that addition, that is, of essence and existence (*esse*); every being other than God has something real outside its essence really joined to its quiddity, namely, existence (*esse*); therefore every being other than God is composed of existence (*esse*) and essence. The major is not developed by St. Thomas, since he thinks it is evident. It must be modified so that the thing added be outside the thing's essence taken particularly. (I say this owing to the inferior which, though outside the essence of the superior, does not compound with it.)<sup>73</sup> The proposition modified in this way also serves well because existence (*esse*) is outside the essence of Socrates, for it is not placed in his definition, if he were defined. Therefore the major remains manifest because two things are united, of which neither is contracting the other, one is act and the other is potency, and they are not joined really except through composition. The minor is evident from the sixth difference and from Aristotle,<sup>74</sup> when he says that no definition signifies existence (*esse*).

Unless, perhaps, there be something whose quiddity is its very act of existing. And this thing must be one and the first because

---

<sup>73</sup> The text reads: Et est modificanda ita quod illud additum sit extra essentiam rei particulariter sumptam (quod dico propter inferius, cum sit extra essentiam superioris, non tamen componit cum illo) et etiam deservit sic modificata propositio, quia esse est extra essentiam Sortis, non enim poneretur in ejus diffinitione si diffiniretur. Cajetan here excludes the possibility of contraction of the universal (*superius*) by the less universal (*inferius*). The contracting inferior is outside the contracted superior, but their union is not one of composition, but of contraction, which he wishes to exclude from the present discussion. A few lines later he indicates this point again, *quorum neutrum est contrahens alterum*.

<sup>74</sup> Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, I, 10, 76b 35.

there cannot be a multiplication of anything except through the addition of some difference, as the generic nature is multiplied into species; either by the form being received in different matters, as the specific nature is multiplied in different individuals, or by one thing being separate and another thing being received in something—for instance, if there were a separate color, by reason of its very separation, it would be different from color which is not separated. But if we posit something which is the act of existing alone such that the act of existing itself be subsistent, a difference cannot be added to this act of existing, because then it would not be the act of existing alone, but the act of existing plus a certain form. Much less can matter be added to it, because then it would not be a subsistent, but a material, act of existing. Thus the conclusion is there can be only one thing such that it is its own act of existing (*esse*). With this exception, in anything whatsoever its act of existing is other than its quiddity, nature or form. Therefore the intelligences' act of existing must be over and above their form, and for that reason it has been said that an intelligence is form and act of existing.

91) Here he has the second argument for the same point, which is directed against an unspoken response. Someone could say to the argument already given that there is a kind of thing whose quiddity is its own existence (*esse*) and its definition does not abstract from existing. It is against this, I say, that the second argument is directed, proving that in only one being, namely the first, essence is the same as existence and consequently in any other existence (*esse*) and essence are really distinguished. He argues as follows. Everything that can be multiplied, or that is multiplied, is multiplied in one of three ways: through the addition of a formal difference; or through the reception of both [a thing and its formal difference] into matter; or through the reception of one into, and the separation of the other from, matter. But a quiddity which is its own existence (*existere*) cannot be multiplied in any of these three ways; therefore a quiddity which is its own existence (*esse*) is neither able to be multiplied, nor is it multiplied; therefore there is only one, and thus everything other than it is not its own existence. The reasoning is clear. An explanation of the major follows. Plurality follows upon division, and the division of a thing comes about through formal difference, for example, the generic nature of animal is multiplied in man and a lion. Or through individual difference, for example, specific nature is multiplied in Socrates and Plato, because the humanity of Socrates is in signate matter which is other than that in which the humanity of Plato is. Or, thirdly, a division can be imagined between two of the same nature, because one is altogether separated from material conditions, and the other is concretized in them; for example, Plato's separated

man is distinguished from man taken as a particular, because separated man is immaterial, but the nature of Socrates is received into this matter. If one examines all the categories, it will become clear to him that there is no other manner of real multiplication in the universe. Let no one raise the objection to me that quantity and substance are really distinct, but they are not really distinct through formal differences, nor, etc. It does not matter whether division is brought about by modes or by differences, as long as that which contracts draws the contracted down to some limited nature. An explanation of each part of the minor follows.

First, that something is not able to be multiplied through its genus, is evident from the fact that genus receives the addition of the difference. Through this the nature of the genus is drawn to a determinate specific nature, and thus the genus loses its proper purity; for animal, contracted to the human species, is not pure animal, but human animal. But the quiddity which is its own existence (*existentia*) is purely existence itself (*ipsum esse purum*), and not contracted. If it were contracted, immediately it would lose its purity, and there would be present two, namely, existence (*esse*) and the quiddity to which it had been contracted. The second part of the minor is more clearly evident. For what is received into another is not pure existence (*esse*), subsisting through itself, but it is sustained in another; the quiddity which is its own existence (*esse*) is pure, and consequently subsisting through itself, not admixed with another in which it be sustained. The third part of the minor is evident for the same reason. For if one quiddity which is its own existence (*esse*) is a separated thing, the other existence which is received, by the fact that it is received, cannot be the same as its own existence (*existentiae*) for, as has been said, received existence (*esse*) is not existence (*esse*)<sup>75</sup> identical with quiddity. Thus it is concluded that the quiddity which is its own existence (*esse*) is one only. It is the First Cause of all things, and through this, all the others have existence (*esse*) distinct from their essences.

But everything which belongs to any being is either caused by the principles of its nature, as the power of laughter in man, or it comes to it from some extrinsic principle, as light in the air from the influence of the sun. But it is impossible that the act of existing itself be caused by a thing's form or quiddity,—I say caused as by an efficient cause—for then something would be the cause of itself and would bring itself into existence; which is impossible. Therefore everything which is

---

<sup>75</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 146, line has *receptum non est esse*. The Paris edition (p. 485, line 14) has *receptum non potest*.

such that its act of existing is other than its nature must have its act of existing from another.

92) In the fourth part of this chapter, it is shown that intelligences have existence (*esse*) from God as efficient cause, in Whom existence (*esse*) and essence are altogether the same. The first part of the position is here included in his general conclusion, namely, that everything other than the First Cause is produced by it. He proves this as follows. Everything which has existence (*esse*) distinct from its quiddity is produced efficiently by the First Cause; every being other than the First Cause has existence (*esse*) distinct from its quiddity; therefore every being other than the First Cause is produced efficiently by the First Cause. The minor follows from what has been said, and from what is to be said. The major is proved as follows. Everything having something distinct from its quiddity is such that either it itself is the efficient cause of that, or it has that from another as efficient cause; since no third possibility can be imagined. For the ability to laugh, and whiteness, and whatever else a man has, is either caused by the man himself as efficient cause, or it is caused by some other, which is not the quiddity of man. But it is impossible that some being should effect its own existence, as is said in II *De Anima*.<sup>76</sup> Therefore it is necessary that it have existence from another as efficient cause. That it is impossible that some being should effect its own proper existence is evident from this, that it would then follow that it would exist before it would exist. From the fact that it would cause, it would exist, for every efficient cause exists;<sup>77</sup> from the fact that its own proper existence (*esse*) would cause its own existence (*existere*), it would follow upon causality of that. Thus it would exist before it would exist.

And because everything which exists through another is reduced to that which exists in virtue of itself as to its First Cause, there must be some thing which is the cause of the existing of all things because it itself is the act of existing alone. Otherwise, we would proceed to infinity among causes, since everything which is not the act of existing alone has a cause of its existence, as has been said. Therefore it is clear that an intelligence is form and act of existing, and that it has its act of existing from the First Being which is the act of existing alone. This is the First Cause, which is God.

93) Here he shows the second part of his position in this conclusion, namely, everything which is what it is because of another, is preceded by something which is that in virtue of itself; every being

---

<sup>76</sup> Aristotle, *On the Soul*, II, 4, 416b 17; St. Thomas, *In II de Anima*, lect. 9, n. 344.

<sup>77</sup> Aristotle, *Physics*, III, 2, 202a 9.

other than the First Cause is what it is, namely being, because of another; therefore it is preceded by another which is being through itself. Now that which is being of itself is the cause of all others in their being, as is said in II *Metaph.*<sup>78</sup> Therefore the First Cause is being of itself, or being in virtue of itself. Consequently its quiddity is existence (*esse*) itself; otherwise it would not be a being in virtue of itself, but a being through something other than its quiddity, and consequently it would depend on another. This follows from the preceding argument. Although the major of the argument is found in II *Phys.*,<sup>79</sup> and in VIII *Phys.*,<sup>80</sup> it is nevertheless proved in the text from the fact that otherwise there would be an infinite regress of causes. For if it were not possible to arrive at one which is such in virtue of itself, but rather all were what they are because of another, then for the reason that one is other, for the same reason there will be, before that one, another, and thus there would be an infinite regress. The minor is the conclusion from the preceding argument.

**Question XI<sup>81</sup>—**

**Whether<sup>82</sup> Intelligences Are Produced by God As Their Efficient Cause?**

94) Concerning this part, there is the question, whether intelligences are produced by God as their efficient cause. Those who hold that they are not, argue as follows. Every efficient cause of something effects the other by motion; no cause of immaterial substances effects them by motion; therefore there is no cause of immaterial substances which effects them. The major is from Aristotle, I *Generatione*<sup>83</sup> and is confirmed by Aristotle in XII *Metaph.*,<sup>84</sup> where he says that three things are required in every production, *that from which, that out of which and that into which*. These three are not verified of immaterial substances.

Further, in I *Phys.*,<sup>85</sup> the common opinion of the philosophers is that from nothing, nothing comes; but if the intelligences are from God, as from an efficient cause, they are from nothing, etc.

---

<sup>78</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, II (a), 1, 993b 29; St. Thomas, In II *Metaph.*, lect. 2, no. 295–96.

<sup>79</sup> Aristotle, *Physics*, II, 6, 198a 5.

<sup>80</sup> Aristotle, *Physics*, VIII, 5, 257a 26; St. Thomas, In VIII *Phys.*, lect. 9, nn. 12–13.

<sup>81</sup> In the Paris edition (p. 486), this appears as Question X.

<sup>82</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 147) has *Utrum*. The Paris edition (p. 486) has *Nam*.

<sup>83</sup> See St. Thomas Aquinas, In I *de Generatione et Corruptione*, lect. 17, n. 1.

<sup>84</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, XII ( ), 3, 1069b 35; St. Thomas, In XII *Metaph.*, lect. 3, n. 2444.

<sup>85</sup> Aristotle, *Physics*, I, 4, 187a 26.

Further, in IV *Coeli*,<sup>86</sup> nothing which is eternal has a true efficient cause, as Averroes says, except after the manner of a form and an end. Similarly, in XII *Metaph.*,<sup>87</sup> he criticizes a custom which the moderns have, saying that there are no true agent causes of those things which are separated from matter.

Further, according to the Commentator,<sup>88</sup> nothing which is possible in itself is necessary from another, unless it is moved; but if the intelligences are from God as efficient cause, they are possibles in themselves; therefore they are not necessary from another, and are as a result corruptible.

Concerning the question, in our times at this house of studies at Padua, there is no question as to whether God created the intelligences, but whether this was the opinion of Aristotle and the Commentator. Therefore we wish to offer proof only briefly and incidentally that all intelligences are from God as efficient cause, according to the Commentator and consequently according to Aristotle. For in this question, all admit that consequence. Then, since in this question, many ask how, according to the Commentator, this production comes about, we shall also show the manner of production.

First it is stated as follows: that which is being and truth in the truest sense is the cause of being and truth in others;<sup>89</sup> God is being and truth in the truest sense; therefore God is the cause of being and truth in other beings. If it is said that He is the final cause, and not the efficient cause, against this is XII *Metaph.*<sup>90</sup> of every being separated from matter, that which is the final principle is also the efficient principle. Therefore, if God is the final principle of the intelligences, He is also their efficient principle. Perhaps it will be said that the Commentator did not hold that proposition universally, as we have taken it, but rather indefinitely. Against this, we say that the Commentator holds that, from the separation from matter or immateriality of a thing, the efficient cause coincides with the final cause with regard to the same effect, as is evident in the place cited. Therefore, wherever immateriality is found related to some being as to its final cause, it is necessary that it be found related to that same being as to its efficient cause. This is confirmed by the words of the Commentator in *de Substantia orbis*,<sup>91</sup> where he expressly says that the heavens need an intelligence not only as a mover, but also as im-

---

<sup>86</sup> Averroes, *In IV de Caelo*, com. 1; *ed. cit.*, t. V, fol. 108v.

<sup>87</sup> Averroes, *In XII Metaph.*, com. 41; *ed. cit.*, t. VIII, fol. 153v.

<sup>88</sup> Averroes, *In XII Metaph.*, com. 41; *ed. cit.*, t. VIII, fol. 152rv.

<sup>89</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, II (a), 1, 993b 29; St. Thomas, *In II Metaph.*, lect. 2, nn. 295–96.

<sup>90</sup> Averroes, *In XII Metaph.*, com. 36 and com. 44; *ed. cit.*, t. VIII, fol. 149v and fol. 153v.

<sup>91</sup> Averroes, *De Substantia Orbis*, cap. 2; *ed. cit.*, t. IX, fol. 4v.

parting in its substance eternal permanence, which amounts to a definition of intelligences. If someone should say that he is here speaking of a final and formal exemplar cause, he is repeating himself, and I add that the Commentator says in the place cited that the end signifies the agent by necessary signification; and these are especially noteworthy words. There is further confirmation of this because Averroes in XII *Metaph.* not only holds that they are produced, but also describes the manner in which all things are produced by the First Cause. This will now be set down. The manner of production is described by him in XII *Metaph.*,<sup>92</sup> where he criticizes Avicenna, not because he held that the intelligences were produced by God, but because he held that God caused them after the manner of nature, namely, that from one, only one proceeds. For Avicenna held that the glorious God, Who is pure actuality, by contemplating Himself, produced the first intelligence; when this was produced, by contemplating God, it produced in turn the second intelligence. By contemplating itself in so far as it is actual, it produced the soul of the first sphere; and by contemplating itself in so far as it is potential, it produced the first sphere; and, similarly, the second intelligence acted in the same way, and so on down to the last intelligence which presided over the sphere of active and passive beings. Avicenna was therefore criticized for this, that he said that only one being proceeded immediately from God. Wherefore, he said, *for nothing proceeded it, neither execution nor action, so that we say that one action flows from one agent.* From this, we see why he added, *this one action*, etc., in order to make clear that he is criticizing the mode of production. Wherefore, he adds the manner of production in the following words when he says, *for this is only cause and caused in so far as we can say that the thing understood is the cause of one understanding.* Here note that according to Albert,<sup>93</sup> if the study of the intelligences is to seek the truth, it considers them as operative, not as speculative; for essentially they are makers, since they manifest their instruments, namely, bodies and the heavens. Among the arts, however,<sup>94</sup> there is progression such that the common and principal art causes, by exemplary causality and by efficient causality (at least partially), the specialized subordinate arts in so far as it is inimitable in various ways. For example, military art is the cause of the art of the cavalryman and of the bridle-maker, and others of this kind, in so far as it is imitable in such and so many ways. For all subordinate arts, by

---

<sup>92</sup> Averroes, In XII *Metaph.*, com. 44; ed. cit., t. VIII, fol. 153v–54r.

<sup>93</sup> St. Albert the Great, In XII *Metaphysicorum*, tract. II, c. 21; ed. cit., t. VI, 642.

<sup>94</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 149, line 9 from bottom) has *autem*. The Paris edition (p. 487, line 6 from bottom) has *enim*.



looking to the principal and common art and imitating it, form their own operations in proportion to it. Now the glorious God is the highest art, and the most common being, Who is imitable by all special artificers, such as all intelligences are. Thus, the divine art as imitable in this way, think of motion<sup>95</sup> such as that of Saturn, causes the art of the intelligence of Saturn; and as imitable in another way, think of such operations as those of Jupiter, causes the art of the intelligence of Jupiter; and so on for the others. He causes, I say, not only as exemplar cause, but also as efficient cause, and this totally. For among the human arts, the universal art does not so cause the specialized arts, except by exemplary causality, and this partially, because this cannot come about in the intellect of another<sup>96</sup> except by the concurrence of the light of the agent intellect. For if universal art were separated from matter and subsistent through itself, there would be no reason on the part of this art itself why it could not be the efficient cause in producing the specialized arts imitative of itself. Wherefore, since the divine art is subsistent in virtue of itself and is supreme in the order of efficient cause, it does not require any cooperating agent cause, but solely by understanding itself as imitable in various ways, it produced the specialized arts, which move the spheres as being its proper instruments. Because these arts are not received into anything, it is necessary that they be subsistents and that they be not only intelligible forms, but intelligent. For every immaterial thing which is subsistent is intelligent, according to the doctrine of Aristotle.<sup>97</sup> Thus, since God immediately produces many specialized arts, it follows that He immediately produces many intelligences, for they are essentially arts. And thus, in this case, there are only the cause and the thing caused, as the understood, that is to say, the common are understood, is the cause of the intelligent maker subservient to it.

The following words give confirmation to this meaning. He says it is not impossible that that which is an intelligence and the understood in virtue of itself is the cause of many beings in so far as they are understood by that intelligence in many ways. For the divine art which is a pure intelligence and a pure object of the intellect, in so far as it understands itself as in practice imitable in many ways, produces many arts. Each of these is a principle of operation because this is what it conceives of the common art, since it takes its own principles from the common art; therefore he adds that what the

---

<sup>95</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 150, line 1) has *motum*. The Paris edition (p. 488, line 3) has *modum*.

<sup>96</sup> *In alterius intellectus* might read *in alterius intellectum* or *intellectu*.

<sup>97</sup> Aristotle, *On the Soul*, III, 4, 430a 3; St. Thomas, *In III de Anima*, lect. 9, nn. 724–26.

mover of the sphere of Jupiter conceives of the first mover is other than what the mover of the sphere of Saturn conceives; [what it conceives] is the cause in its soul, namely, that it operates. The Commentator confirms this same relation assigned between the intelligences. For he says, in XII *Metaph.*,<sup>98</sup> that the relation of other intelligences to the first is the relationship of the specialized arts to the common art so that just as the specialized arts are perfected and caused by the common art, in human arts, so in a proportionate way are the other intelligences perfected and caused by the first.

To the first argument for the opposite opinion,<sup>99</sup> I say that *agent* has a twofold meaning. At times it is taken in its proper sense for that which by its action introduces passion which, the more it grows, causes it to recede from substance. This is the way Aristotle uses agent in that place; for in this way, agent and patient are opposed. In another sense, it is taken for every thing which causes in the genus of efficient cause; and thus agent is more general than mover, as is evident from VII *Metaph.*<sup>100</sup>

To the first confirmatory argument,<sup>101</sup> I say that both that and other similar cases are to be understood of physical production, namely, production through motion and change. The second confirmatory argument<sup>102</sup> is answered in the same way.

To the arguments raised from the text of the Commentator and others like him, I say that they are taking agent in its proper sense<sup>103</sup> and are speaking of physical production, or they are opposing the position of Avicenna, that only one emanates from one.

Concerning the second argument,<sup>104</sup> I grant him the major, but deny his minor. For it is established by Aristotle, the Commentator and St. Thomas, and it is the truth that a thing be from another as from an efficient cause, and still be necessary in itself.

In evidence of this, *four propositions are to be noted.*

*The first* is: by possible in itself is meant that which has in itself the possibility of non-existence (*non esse*). This is evident from the terms; for a thing is in the order of possibles, and not in the order of necessary beings, because it has in itself a potency to non-existence (*non esse*). Now, if it lacked a potency to not be (*non esse*), it is impossible for it not to be (*non esse*), and thus it would be necessary for it to be (*esse*).

*The second proposition* is: only that has in itself a potency to not be (*non esse*) which has a part in potency to another existence (*esse*).

---

<sup>98</sup> Averroes, *In XII Metaph.*, com. 44; *ed. cit.*, t. VIII, fol. 153v–54r.

<sup>99</sup> See the beginning of Question XI.

<sup>100</sup> Averroes, *In VII Metaph.*, com. 31; *ed. cit.*, t. VIII, fol. 85r.

<sup>101</sup> See the beginning of Question XI.

<sup>102</sup> See p. 244, par. 1.

<sup>103</sup> See p. 244, par. 2.

<sup>104</sup> See p. 244, par. 3.

This is evident from the fact that no potency in itself primarily tends to non-existence (*non esse*); for every appetite of itself tends to some existence (*esse*), but because the existence (*esse*) it has cannot stand together with one it tends to, it consequently tends to non-existence (*non esse*), which is the privation of the form it has. Just so, the matter of water in itself primarily has appetite toward the form of fire, and the form of fire cannot simultaneously stand with the form of water, consequently it tends to the privation of the form of water which it has. Therefore every potency which tends toward non-existence (*non esse*) has a naturally prior tendency to some other existence (*esse*). It is said clearly in this proposition, *which has a part in potency*, etc., because it is not the whole which tends to another existence (*esse*), but the potential part; for it is not water as a whole which has a tendency toward the existence (*esse*) of fire, but only its matter.

*The third proposition* is: a being, necessary in itself, is one which lacks a potency to existence (*esse*) or non-existence (*non esse*). This is evident from the terms in V *Metaph.*<sup>105</sup> For a necessary being is that which cannot be in any other way; now what lacks the potency to existence (*esse*) or non-existence (*non esse*) cannot be in any other way because all succession, which is described as to be in another way, comes about through the ability to lose this existence (*esse*) and to acquire another.

*The fourth proposition* is: neither intelligences nor celestial bodies have any part which is in potency to another existence (*esse*). Concerning the intelligences, this is known in itself, because they are simple forms; concerning celestial bodies, we must say the same, according to Averroes, because according to him they are simple substances. However, according to St. Thomas, it is true because the matter of each of them can receive only the form which it has.

From these four propositions, succinctly explained, one can make clear that as a matter of truth intelligence and celestial bodies are necessary in themselves. Here is the argument. Everything which lacks a potency to existence (*esse*) or non-existence (*non esse*) is necessary in itself; the intelligences and celestial bodies lack a potency to existence (*esse*) or non-existence (*non esse*); therefore, etc. Since it is still true that they are from another as efficient cause, it is possible that one necessary being be effected by another necessary being, as is said in VIII *Phys.*<sup>106</sup> and V *Metaph.*<sup>107</sup> Wherefore, intelligences and

---

<sup>105</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, V ( ), 5, 1015a 34; St. Thomas, *In V Metaph.*, lect. 6, nn. 832–35.

<sup>106</sup> Aristotle, *Physics*, VIII, 1, 252a 32 ff.; St. Thomas, *In VIII Phys.*, lect. 3, nn. 4–6.

<sup>107</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, V ( ), 5, 1015a 9; St. Thomas, *In V Metaph.*, lect. 6, nn. 839–41.

celestial bodies are necessary in a twofold way, in themselves and from another. In themselves they are formally and intrinsically necessary; from another they are effectively and extrinsically necessary. Thus, the Commentator<sup>108</sup> says that there cannot be anything possible in itself, and necessary from another, except motion. He did not say that it is impossible for something to have necessary existence (*esse*) in itself and from another. When you examine this, all grounds for doubt between what he says in his *de Substantia orbis* and what is said here will disappear. For it was his position that it is impossible except in the case of motion for something to be only necessary from another. For the present, let this suffice.

Now, everything which receives something from another is in potency with respect to what it receives, and what is received in it is its act. Therefore it is necessary that the form itself or quiddity, which is the intelligence, be in potency with respect to the existence which it receives from God, and that existence is received as an act. And so act and potency are found in intelligences, but not, however, form and matter, unless equivocally. So, too, to suffer, to receive, to be a subject of, and all things of this sort which are seen to belong to things by reason of matter, belong equivocally to intellectual and corporeal substances, as the Commentator says in III *de Anima*.<sup>109</sup>

95) In this fifth section, the following conclusion is clarified: intelligences are composed of act and potency, that by which (*quo est*) and that which a thing is (*quod est*). Everything which receives something from another as from an efficient cause is composed of the receiving potency and the act received; intelligences receive something from another, namely, existence (*esse*) from God; therefore intelligences are composed of potency and act. The major is evident from the fact that nothing is from itself.<sup>110</sup> The minor, however, follows from the preceding. And although it is true that act and potency are found in intelligences, they do not have form and matter. For act and potency have a wider extension than form and matter. Wherefore, to understand, to receive, to be subject, and the like, which are attributes of matter are spoken of equivocally in inferior and superior things. For the notion of reception is different for superior and inferior beings. In the former, it occurs without any motion and material condition; in the latter, only with motion and individual conditions. Of this, the Commentator gives testimony in III *de Anima*.<sup>111</sup>

---

<sup>108</sup> Averroes, *In XII Metaph.*, com. 41; *ed. cit.*, t. VIII, fol. 152v.

<sup>109</sup> Averroes, *In III de Anima*, com. 14; *ed. cit.*, t. VI, fol. 168v–69r.

<sup>110</sup> *In seipso* in the text might read *a seipso*.

<sup>111</sup> Averroes, *In III de Anima*, com. 14; *ed. cit.*, t. VI, fol. 168v–69r.

And because, as has been said, the quiddity of an intelligence is the intelligence itself, therefore its quiddity or essence is identical with itself, and the act of existing it receives from God is that by which it subsists in the things of nature. For this account, some assert that a substance of this kind is composed of that by which it is (*quo est*) and that which is (*quod est*), or, as Boethius says,<sup>112</sup> of that from which (*ex quo*) it is and essence.

96) Here he gives the reason why intelligences are said to be composed of that by which it is (*quo est*) and that which is (*quod est*). Everything composed of quiddity, which is the supposit itself and existence (*esse*), is composed of that by which it is and that which is; intelligences are composed of quiddity, which is the intelligence itself and existence (*esse*), by which they subsist; therefore they are composed of that by which it is and that which is. Everything used is manifest from what has been said previously.

**Question XII**<sup>113</sup>—

**Whether the Being (Esse) of Actual Existence and Essence are Really Distinguished? Whether Intelligences Are Composed of Act and Potency?**<sup>114</sup>

97) Regarding what has just been said, there are *two problems*.

*The first* is whether the being (*esse*) of actual existence and essence be really distinguished.

*The second* is whether intelligence be composed of act and potency.

98) *Regarding the first problem, three* things will be dealt with. First, the opinion of Scotus will be given; secondly, the opinion of St. Thomas; thirdly, the arguments of Scotus will be answered.

99) *Regarding the first, Scotus, in III Sent.*,<sup>115</sup> expresses the opinionion that the being (*esse*) of actual existence and the essence of a thing are really the same, although they be distinguished owing to the nature of the real as an intrinsic mode and the quiddity to which it belongs; just as whiteness is not distinguished from its intrinsic mode according to degree, for example, as three or four. We could give Scotus' arguments in proof of this, but since they are concerned with the union of human nature with the divine supposit, I thought

---

<sup>112</sup> Boethius, *De Hebdomadibus*, c. 2; PL 64, 1311; St. Thomas, *In de Hebdomadibus*, lect. 2; in *Opuscula Theologica*, Marietti, Vol. 11, nn. 19–39.

<sup>113</sup> In the Paris edition (p. 490), this appears as Question XI.

<sup>114</sup> The title of this question in the Laurent edition (p. 153) is: *Utrum esse actualis existentiae et essentia distinguantur realiter; an intelligentiae sunt compositae ex actu et potentia*. The title of this question in the Paris edition (p. 490) is: *Nam esse actualis existentiae et essentia distinguantur realiter*.

<sup>115</sup> Scotus, *In III Sent.*, d. 6, q. 1, nn. 2–3; *ed. cit.*, VII, Part I, 172–74.

it best to give here in this first section the ten arguments used by Anthony Trombeta in his *quolibeto*.

First he argues, as he himself says, against the basic argument of St. Thomas as follows. When the reason (*ratione*) remains the same, the effect remains the same; but the whole reason why they hold that the essence differs from existence 1 (*esse*) is because of the indifference of essence to existence (*esse*) or non-existence (*non esse*), for, as they say, a stone is in potency to exist or not exist; therefore where such indifference is found, there must be such a distinction. But the fact is that there is an entirely similar indifference of existence (*esse*) to existence (*esse*) and non-existence (*non esse*), for the existence (*esse*) of a rose is not in the winter but is in the summer. In exactly the same way, there is indifference of essence to essence and to non-essence because the essence of a creature is not from eternity; therefore existence (*esse*) would be really distinct from existence (*esse*), and essence from essence, which is ridiculous.

Further, whenever there are two things essentially ordered and really distinct, there is no contradiction that the prior should become without the posterior; but essence cannot become without existence; therefore. The minor is evident, because a particular essence which alone becomes necessarily is existing.

Further, whatever things are really distinguished stand as thing and thing; but essence and existence do not stand as thing and thing; therefore, etc. This is evident because thing, properly speaking, is convertible with being in act by the actuality of existence.

Further, no thing compounds with its own reality; therefore no quiddity differs really from its own existence. The consequence is valid because existence is the very reality of the thing, for there is no difference in saying that a thing really is and that it exists, and vice versa. The antecedent is known from the terms (*de se notum*). For it is ridiculous to say that something compounds with its own reality.

Further, true man is not composed with his own truth nor affirmed man with his own affirmation; therefore quiddity is not composed with its own existence. The consequent is evident from the fact that the existence of a thing is nothing other than the positing of its truth and its affirmation. The denial of the antecedent does not seem to be very intelligible.

Further, existence and essence have the same contradictory; therefore they are not really distinguished. The consequence is known. The antecedent is shown from the fact that nothing takes away existence (*esse*) without also taking away essence, nor is there one *nothing* which causes the privation of existence (*esse*) and another *nothing* which causes the privation of essence.

Further, man in potency is not composed with man in act; therefore essence and existence are not composed, and consequently they are not really distinguished. The consequence stands as known in itself because essence is in potency and existence is its actuality. The antecedent is evident from the fact that act and potency divide being as a diminishing and perfecting condition; as true and painted divide animal, as the Commentator says in IX *Metaph.*<sup>116</sup> Therefore man in potency, not being man simply, since he becomes man in act, loses only the diminishing condition, having been placed under the perfecting condition. Thus [man in potency] is in no way composed with man in act.

Further, if the being (*esse*) of existence is really distinct from quiddity, it is neither substance nor accident; therefore. The antecedent is proved as follows. That it is not an accident is posited as granted. That it is not a substance is proved from the fact that it is either matter, form, or the composite. But it is none of these, according to St. Thomas; therefore, etc.

Further, existence and essence are really distinguished; therefore in every substantial generation there are two total terms and two formal terms. The consequent is impossible; therefore, etc. The consequence is proved with regard to both parts by laying down two positions. The first is that the composite becomes one in itself from act in itself and potency in itself, from VIII *Metaph.*,<sup>117</sup> where Aristotle knows no cause why the substantial composite is one in itself except that matter is potency in itself and form is act in itself. The second position is that essence is potency in itself and existence is act in itself. From this it is concluded that what results from the union of existence (*esse*) and essence is one in itself. Granted this, it follows that there will be two composites having *per se* unity, of which one is composed of matter and form, and the other of existence (*esse*) and essence. Now, since each *per se* unity is meant to be a term of generation, therefore in generation there will be two total terms. Thus the first part is evident. There will also be two formal terms, namely, existence and substantial form. This is proved as follows. The formal term of generation is that by which something is generated; but both existence and form are that by which something is generated; therefore, etc. The minor is proved as follows. In the same way that something is the principle of existing (*essendi*), it is also the principle of generating; but existence is the principle of existing; therefore it is the principle of generating. The argument can also be formulated as follows. A thing exists in the same way that it is generated; but the

---

<sup>116</sup> Averroes, *In IX Metaph.*, com. 7; *ed. cit.*, t. VIII, fol. 109r

<sup>117</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, VIII ( ), 6, 1045a 23.

composite in itself is not generated by existence (*esse*) such that existence (*esse*) be the term of generation; therefore the composite will not have existence (*esse*) that is existence (*esse*) in itself. The consequent is false; therefore one of the two premises is false; not the major; therefore the minor.

Further, a *per se* unit results from existence and essence; therefore there will be an infinite regress of essences. The consequent is impossible; therefore, etc. The antecedent is evident from the preceding argument and is proved as follows. Just as from matter and form there results a third thing which is one in itself, because matter is potency in itself and form is act in itself; so in the case of essence and existence, because existence is also act in itself and essence is potency in itself; for the same principle holds for both. The consequence is proved as follows: if from existence (*esse*) and essence there results a third [which is] one in itself, and since again this latter is distinct from its own existence, it is composed with it, and from these there is a one in itself. We can argue in the same way concerning this one, and so on to infinity. This suffices for the first point.

100) *Regarding the second point*, the opinion of St. Thomas as he expresses it in II *contra Gentiles*,<sup>118</sup> is that in every creature, quiddity and the being (*esse*) of actual existence are really distinguished, and although this conclusion is proved in the present text, we shall nevertheless, for the sake of clearer presentation, give three proofs St. Thomas gives there.

*The first* is as follows: every created essence has something really joined to it besides its existence (*esse*); no unreceived existence (*esse*) has anything joined to it beside itself; therefore no unreceived existence (*esse*) is the essence of a creature, and consequently the existence (*esse*) and the essence are not the same. For the very existence (*esse*) itself would be unreceived, were it the same as essence, as essence itself is unreceived in the case of substances. The major is evident in itself for, besides his existence (*esse*), Socrates has quantity, whiteness and other like things. Similarly, separated substances, as we shall for the present lay down, have some accident, at least the act of understanding. The minor is proved from the fact that if affirming is the cause of affirmation, negating is the cause of negation; but the precise reason why existence (*esse*) should have something joined to it is that existence (*esse*) is received in another, in which something else can be received. This is evident from the fact that the substantial existence (*esse*) of Socrates and the existence (*esse*) of white, which is in him, are united for no other reason than that both are received

---

<sup>118</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *Contra Gentiles*, II, 52.



into Socrates; for they are only one in their subject. Thus, when existence (*esse*) is not received, there will not be any way at all of having something joined to it.

This is confirmed as follows: the substantial existence (*esse*) of Socrates is either joined identically with other existences besides itself,—and this is manifestly false, for the substantial existence (*esse*) of Socrates is not his white existence (*esse*); or joined as potency to act in such a way that his substantial existence (*esse*) is potency and his accidental existence is act—this cannot be, for no being (*esse*) of actual existence can be the subject of another, because it is the ultimate actuality. It remains, therefore, that they are united because both are received into a third. Therefore, if we remove from the being (*esse*) of actual existence itself, that it be a received existence, we take away the possibility of having anything joined to it. This is what Boethius says in *Hebdomadibus*:<sup>119</sup> that the very thing which is has something besides itself joined to it. Existence (*esse*) itself, however, has nothing joined to it.

*The second argument* for the same point is as follows. Every unreceived existence (*esse*) is simply infinite; no existence (*esse*) of a creature is simply infinite; therefore no existence (*esse*) of a creature is unreceived; therefore it is distinct from essence, etc. The minor is known in itself. The major is proved as follows. Every pure existence (*esse*) is simply infinite; every unreceived existence (*esse*) is pure existence (*esse*); therefore every unreceived existence (*esse*) is simply infinite. The major is evident from the terms (since existence [*esse*] is therefore limited because of the fact that it is not pure, but is mixed with categories), for existence (*esse*) is limited through predicamental natures. If it should be purified of these, lacking all finitude, it would be entirely infinite. The minor is evident from the preceding argument, and the reason given above in the text. Again, let us show it by example. If whiteness be given as unreceived into anything, it is pure whiteness and would have nothing but itself alone and would be infinite in the species white, as is clear in itself. One cannot reasonably suppose a separated whiteness limited to some mode of whiteness; for everything that is what it is in itself has every perfection possible to that nature; just as, according to Plato, separated man has every perfection possible to human nature.

Nor is Anthony Trombeta's objection against this, taken from Scotus,<sup>120</sup> valid, that if whiteness were separated and had every perfection possible to such a species, it would follow that whiteness

---

<sup>119</sup> Boethius, *De Hebdomadibus*, c. 2; PL 64, 1311.

<sup>120</sup> Scotus, *In II Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, nn. 7–10; *ed. cit.*, VI, Part I, 357, 360–61.

would be simply infinite, because it would have the perfection of an infinite number of individuals capable of existing under the species white. This, I say, is not valid; for just as an infinite number of individual instances of whiteness, even if they were to exist simultaneously, would not have infinite perfection simply, since they are limited to the species white. In the same way neither will the separated whiteness, having the perfection of these, be simply infinite, but rather infinite in the species of that sort.

*The third argument* is the following: that which belongs to a specific nature, regardless of any efficient cause, is really distinguished from that which does not belong to it, except by reason of an efficient cause; but quidditative predicates belong to a thing regardless of any efficient cause; existence, however, does not belong to anything except through some efficient cause; therefore the existence of a thing is really distinguished from the quidditative predicates. The major is known in itself. The minor also, as regards the second part, is quite clear. Concerning the first part, it is shown thus. Take a rose. Prescind from all efficient causality regarding it. Now, I ask, whether this is true: that a rose is a corporeal substance. If so, my contention holds; if not, then a rose, taken absolutely, is not in any category,<sup>121</sup> and predicates of the first mode can be understood with no reference to the being (*esse*) of the thing, and the definition is separated from the defined. These things are beyond imagining, etc.

It seems, however, that this opinion is derived from the ancients, namely, Plato, Alfarabi, Avicenna, Algazel, Boethius, Hilary, Albert, and their followers, although we find no evidence of this in Aristotle.<sup>122</sup> Let this suffice for the second point.

101) *Regarding the third point*, the opposing arguments are answered.

*As to the first argument*, let me say by way of introduction that Trombeta did not consult the sources in St. Thomas. This is evident from II *contra Gentiles*,<sup>123</sup> where he gives definitive treatment in seven arguments of his opinion or position. The argument used by the opponent is not of those given. Wherefore, he errs in imputing this one argument to us as the complete basis of our position. We grant that this argument can be extracted from the works of St. Thomas,<sup>124</sup> where he is not treating this question.<sup>125</sup> Then the argument must be formulated thus: essence taken particularly is indifferent to existence

---

<sup>121</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 157, line 14 from bottom) has *in praedicamento*. The Paris edition (p. 493, line 2 from bottom) has *in prato*.

<sup>122</sup> See M. D. Roland-Gosselin, O.P., *op. cit.*, pp. 137–84.

<sup>123</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *Contra Gentiles*, II, 52.

<sup>124</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *In I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 4, a. 2.

<sup>125</sup> See M. D. Roland-Gosselin, O.P., *op. cit.*, pp. 187–188.

(*esse*) and non-existence (*non esse*); therefore it is really distinguished from its own existence (*esse*). Trombeta's answer to this is invalid when he says that in the antecedent it is necessary to add that essence has a proper reality other than the reality of existence, since existence is dependent upon an act of the will. For there is a real distinction between matter and form. No philosophers have any doubt that matter and form have the same reality of existence, since they hold that a *per se* unit comes about through them.

Therefore, in answer to the argument given against this position, I say it is false that existence (*esse*) is indifferent to existence (*esse*) and non-existence (*non esse*) and that essence is indifferent to essence and non-essence. Nothing is indifferent to two factors, one of which it includes in its very definition. Now there is no doubt that existence (*esse*) is included in the notion of existence (*esse*), and essence in the notion of essence. But that the existence (*esse*) of a rose is not in the winter and is in the spring, this is because the essence of a rose, which always has its own quidditative predicates, has not yet attained its act of existing (*actum essendi*), and not because existence (*esse*) itself is indifferent. When he adds that essence is indifferent to essence and non-essence, because it does not exist from eternity, he does not seem to understand his own words. For by denying that a rose has an act of existing (*actus essendi*) from eternity, it follows legitimately that a rose is indifferent to existence (*esse*) and non-existence (*non esse*), but not that it is indifferent to rose and non-rose; for, as Alfarabi, Avicenna, Algazel and Albert say, whether there exists a rose or not, rose is always, and it is always a corporeal substance, etc., if it is legitimate to use a term of measure here.

*To the second argument*, I deny both premises. Indeed, the major used has already been shown false. The minor is clear from the case of Christ in Whom humanity is without an actual created existence.

*To the third argument*, I deny the major as it is understood by Trombeta because it is not necessary to a real distinction that both members have their own proper existence.

*To the fourth argument*, just as being (*esse*) is twofold, namely, that of existence and that of essence, so is the reality of essence and that of existence twofold. And even though no being is composed with its own reality, it is not inconsistent that it should be composed with the reality of existence; wherefore, the essence of man taken absolutely is found in a real category, namely, that of substance; when is posited in the real world, it becomes real with the reality of existence.

*To the fifth argument*, I answer in the same way, that the true is also convertible with being and thing; therefore man, taken simply,

is true in a twofold way, namely, with the truth of essence and that of existence. Man, true with the truth of essence, is not composed with such truth, for it is nothing but fundamental conformity with its quidditative predicates; however, it is composed with the truth of existence, that is, with existence (*esse*) which is the foundation of the truth, *a man is*. The same can be said of affirmation.

*Regarding the sixth*, I deny the antecedent, for both assumptions of the proof are false. For when one of opposites is said in a number of ways, the other one is said in a like number of ways, in I *Topicorum*.<sup>126</sup> Just as being (*ens*) can be predicated in a twofold way, namely, quidditative being and being of existence, so non-being or nothing can also be used in two ways, namely, quidditative nothing and existential nothing. For, since man taken absolutely is in the category of substance, he is quidditative being; still, he is not outside the nothing opposed to actual existence. Therefore the nothing opposed to predicamental being or essence is other than the nothing opposed to actual existence, etc. Similarly, the negation of essence is other than the negation of existence.

*Regarding the seventh argument*, I deny the consequence. For it is one thing to say that man in potency is composed with man in act, and it is another thing to say that essence is composed with existence. The first is false, for a thing is not composed with itself. The second, however, is true because the extremes are really distinguished. Therefore there is not the same relation between essence and existence as there is between man in act and man in potency. In the first case the relation is between a receptive potency and its act, and a real distinction when both extremes are outside their causes; in the second case not, but there is the relation of a thing and itself according to different dispositions of itself which are simultaneously incompatible, namely, to be in potency and to be in act.

*Regarding the eighth argument*, I deny the antecedent. For the existence of substance is substance, and the existence of accident is accident; and, as is clear above, the existence of substance is not matter, nor form, nor the composite, but the actuality of all of these, and thus it is reductively in the genus of substance. Against this, Trombeta objects as follows: everything which is reductively in a genus, is a principle of that genus; but existence (*esse*) is not a principle of substance; therefore it is not in the genus of substance reductively. To this, I answer that since existence (*esse*) is the ultimate actuality of a thing, and the ultimate in generation is the first in intention, existence (*esse*) will be in the genus of substance as the ultimate formal principle of substance itself. For it is through this

---

<sup>126</sup> Aristotle, *Topics*, I, 15, 106b 14.

that a thing is placed in the genus of substance, and that it is capable of substantial being (*esse*); for the differences in all genera are taken from their ordination to being (*esse*) itself, as will be shown later.

*Regarding the ninth argument*, I deny the consequence. In proof of this, I say that Trombetta had a very poor understanding of the first position which he takes from Aristotle.<sup>127</sup> Aristotle does not say that from potency in itself and act in itself there results one third thing. Rather, he says that a thing having parts is one because of the fact that one part is act and the other is potency. This is to be understood, as was proved above, as referring to real composition, namely, where one of two parts is pure potency, since a third thing which is one in itself cannot result from the union of two acts. Now, the quiddity of a thing and its existence are not related as pure potency and act, nor are they parts, as is evident. Wherefore, his appeal to authority is not to the point. It follows, therefore, that it is false that a third thing which is one of itself results from existence (*esse*) and essence; consequently the proof of the consequence as far as the first part is concerned is invalid, because there are not two components there. Regarding the proof of the consequence for the second part, I say that there is no reason why generation cannot have two formal terms in different ways, the one primarily and the other secondarily. The first formal term of generation is form, but the second is existence (*esse*); just as conversely, the formal term of creation is primarily existence (*esse*), and secondarily form. Taken in this way, I concede his arguments.

However, if he intends to prove that existence (*esse*) is the primary term of generation, I answer and say that his assumption that a thing is a principle of being in the same way that it is a principle of generation is false; for, although it is true that which is a principle of being is a principle of the thing which is generated, it is nevertheless not true that it is a principle of being in the same way that it is a principle of generation. The reason for this is that a thing does not go from non-existence (*non esse*) to complete existence (*esse*) through generation, but from privation to form, as is said in *I Phys.*<sup>128</sup> It is creation alone which transfers a thing from complete non-existence (*non esse*) to existence (*esse*), by which it happens that existence (*esse*), the primary principle of being, is rightly and primarily the principle of first production, which is creation. And form, which is secondarily the principle of being, is the first principle of second production, namely, generation. Wherefore, in *I Phys.*,<sup>129</sup> the principles of genera

---

<sup>127</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, VIII ( ), 6, 1045a 23.

<sup>128</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *In I Phys.*, lect. 12, nn. 1–12.

<sup>129</sup> *Ibid.*

tion are held to be form and privation. Through the same reasoning, the answer to the other formulation of the same argument is clear. The major is false because the way in which a thing is generated is not the same as the way in which it exists. Thus, it exists through form secondarily; primarily it exists through itself. In generation, however, the case is the opposite.

*Regarding the tenth argument*, the answer is evident from what has been said, for the antecedent is false.

102) *Concerning the second problem*, it must be noted that it is the common opinion of philosophers that intelligences other than the first are not altogether pure acts, but have in them a mixture of act and potency. But the disagreement among philosophers is great concerning the way in which these two, namely, act and potency, are present in them.

Scotus, in *I Sent.*<sup>130</sup>—we omit other philosophers lest we transgress the limits of our intention—is of the opinion that every creature is composed of act and potency in such a way that each creature, since it is nothing, must have some actuality; and since it is determined to a particular genus or species or grade of perfection, it must have in it the negation of another perfection able to be found in the spread of being; and thus it is possible. Whatever is<sup>131</sup> and lacks some perfection in possible being is simply possible, and thus each thing is composed from act and objective potency. From the fact that it is, it has in itself act; from the fact that it is possible being, it has in itself potency—for the name *possible* is taken from potency. Now, since only God is non-possible act, that is, is not capable of terminating the action of some agent, causative of Himself, the intelligences surrounding Him have been composed of act and objective potency only because they placed no receptive form in their substance.

St. Thomas, however, from the principles posited in the preceding problem, is of the opinion that intelligences as well as every other kind of creature are composed of (*ex*) act and potency, as of (*ex*) two things (*rebus*) really distinct, namely, of existence (*esse*) and essence. It is not necessary to repeat the proofs, but it suffices to solve the reasons of Scotus, which he gives against this opinion in the same place. He argues as follows: if there is in any creature a composition of two things, I take one of these components and ask whether it is simple or composed. If it is simple, then it is not true that every created thing is composite; if it is composed, the same question is asked of its parts, and so on to infinity.

---

<sup>130</sup> Scotus, *In I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 2, nn. 2-3; *ed. cit.*, V, Part II, 716.

<sup>131</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 160, line 8 from bottom) has *Quicquid enim est et caret*. The Paris edition (p. 496 from line 24 from bottom) has *Quicquid enim est ens et caret*.

This is very easily answered. The argument proceeds from a poor understanding of our position. For when it is said that everything other than God is composite, the term *everything* applies only to those things which truly are and properly have existence (*esse*). According to Aristotle and the truth, only such are subsistents. Therefore every supposit, whether substantial or accidental, if it is permissible to speak in this manner, is a composite of act and potency, which are really distinct, namely, quiddity and existence (*esse*). For the quiddity of Socrates, as we have shown, is really distinct from his existence (*esse*); and the whiteness of this white thing is really distinct from its proper existence, as can be shown to be evident from what has been said. Thus we are not so uninformed as to say that every entity whatsoever is composite. Who can doubt that in resolution the ultimate components must be simple? We say, therefore, in our position that since intelligences subsist, they have in themselves quiddity and existence united as potency and act, and they are thus composed of (*ex*) two things (*rebus*) really distinct. However, Scotus can hold his opinion without harm to the other, but it is necessary to force language.

And since we posit potency and act in intelligences, it will not be difficult to find a multitude of intelligences, which would be impossible if there were no potency in them. Thus the Commentator declares in *III de Anima*<sup>132</sup> that if the nature of the possible intellect were unknown, we could not find multitude in separated substances. Therefore the distinction of these to each other is according to their degree of potency and act, so that a superior intelligence which is closer to the First Being has more act and less potency, and so for the others. This gradation terminates in the human soul, which holds the lowest place among intellectual substances. Hence its possible intellect has the same relation to intelligible forms as prime matter, which holds the lowest place in sensible being, has to sensible forms, as the Commentator states in *III de Anima*.<sup>133</sup> That is why the Philosopher<sup>134</sup> compares it to a blank tablet on which nothing is written. Having more potency than the other intellectual substances, the human soul is so close to matter that a material thing is drawn to share in its own act of existing, so that from soul and body there results in the one composite one act of existing, although in so far as it is the soul's act of existing it is not dependent on the body. Therefore, posterior to that form which is the soul, are found other forms which have more potency and are closer to matter, to such a point that they do not exist without matter. Among these forms, there is also found an order and gradation

---

<sup>132</sup> Averroes, *In III de Anima*, com. 5; *ed. cit.*, t. VI, fol. 166r.

<sup>133</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>134</sup> Aristotle, *On the Soul*, III, 4, 430a 1; St. Thomas, *In III de Anima*, lect. 9, n. 722.

until we reach the primary forms of the elements, which are closest to matter. Hence they do not have any operation except according to the exigencies of active and passive qualities and of the others by which matter is disposed to form.

103) In the sixth and last part of this chapter, treating of the multitude of intelligences, he first places two conclusions. The first of these is that according to the aforesaid principle, it is not difficult to ascertain a plurality of intelligences. The second is that without such principles, it is impossible to ascertain plurality in them. This is indeed known on the authority of none other than the Commentator.<sup>135</sup> The proof of the first conclusion is as follows. Whenever something is intermediate through participation in either extreme, it is multiplied according to greater participation in one extreme, and less in the other. For example, let a name be given to intermediate colors, and let them be called A. Because A is intermediate between black and white, through participation in them, it is multiplied into many species, for example, into pale yellow, orange yellow, and lemon yellow, owing to closer approach to white and farther recession from black, and vice versa. But an intelligence is an intermediate, according to what has been already established, between two extremes, namely, pure act and pure potency, participating in the nature of both because it has act joined to potency. Therefore the existence of a plurality of intelligences can be easily concluded from this principle, namely, from the fact that they are composed of (*ex*) act and potency.

In evidence of this, it must be noted that within the spread of being there are two extremes, namely, the glorious God, altogether pure act, and prime matter, altogether pure potency. All the rest are intermediate, seeing they have act and potency. Thus, essential or specific multitude depends upon their nearness and separation from the extremes. Since one of them participates more in the nature of act than another, and that one more than another, therefore they are many, and their dignity is according to their closer approach to the excellent extreme, namely, pure act; for the more actual a thing is, and the less potential, the more excellent it is. Therefore all intermediate forms participate in act and potency. But among them, some have such a degree of actuality that they approach so close to pure act that in themselves they subsist without matter, as being far removed from it. They are not, however, without an admixture of potency, the purity of which is the reason of matter being an extreme. Among these, there is so much latitude according to greater and less participation in act and potency, that the lowest among them

---

<sup>135</sup> Averroes, *In III de Anima*, com. 14; *ed. cit.*, t. VI, fol. 168v.



have such a degree of potentiality that they inform matter, namely, intellectual souls. For among all subsistent forms, this is the furthest separated from pure act. Because of this it happens that it approaches so closely to the other extreme that it receives matter itself and is drawn to its existence (*esse*).<sup>136</sup> Other forms, however, have so much potentiality that they depend upon matter both in existence (*esse*) and in becoming. Among these also a great deal of latitude is observed, for some are more actual than others. This can be known from their operations, for operation makes the form known. Wherefore, the forms of the elements which have the greatest degree of potency, since they are nearest to matter, are not principles of any operation, except through material qualities, namely, cold and heat. The forms of mixtures, being elevated to some degree above matter, operate in a higher manner. For example, a magnet attracts iron, not by reason of heat or cold, but from what is proper to its nature. However, the forms of animals are known to be far more actual, since they move themselves, and we see that they are aware of other things.

From the above, it is not only seen how easy is the approach to knowing the plurality of intelligences, but also that it is impossible to arrive at that without this principle. For how can any latitude be found in that which lacks act and potency? Now, it is common to all extremes, if they are extremes, that they cannot be receptive of any latitude, for they would be ultimate and non-ultimate, as is evident in itself. Therefore it must be in the intermediaries which partake of the nature of both extremes, that latitude is sought. And because we know that an intellectual nature has actuality from the fact that it is intellectual, we would not know that it had any potentiality mixed with it, unless we could see that our own souls have it. The reason for this is that potency is predicated equivocally of intellectual and sensible things, and without potency we could not understand a multitude of intellectual substances. Therefore the Commentator<sup>137</sup> says that if the nature of the possible intellect were not known, we could not understand plurality in separated substances.

104) In this text, *three things must be noted*.

*The first* is this, taken from the words of the Commentator, that if the nature of the possible intellect were unknown, we would not be able to know of the plurality of immaterial substances.

*The second* is that St. Thomas does not say that the intellectual soul partakes of potency to such an extent that it is a material form,

---

<sup>136</sup> See below, p. 231, where Cajetan says that matter is drawn to the soul's existence, because matter is elevated to the higher.

<sup>137</sup> Averroes, *In III de Anima*, com. 5; *ed. cit.*, t. VI, fol. 166r.

but that matter is drawn to participate in the existence (*esse*) of the soul itself.

*The third* is that he says that the soul and the body have one existence (*esse*) and the same existence (*esse*), which is independent of the body.

*The first point* seems to oppose Aristotle's reasoning<sup>138</sup> where from the plurality of motions, he concludes to the plurality of intelligences, making no mention of act and potency. But this is no obstacle to those who think correctly. To conclude to the number of movers is not the same as to conclude to the plurality of intellectual substances; for although the movers of the spheres and immaterial substances are the same in subject, they differ logically—so much so that they pertain to different sciences, according to the Commentator.<sup>139</sup> Therefore, from the plurality of motions it is possible indeed to conclude to the plurality of movers as such, not however to the plurality of intellectual substances as such. Therefore Averroes and St. Thomas intend that the multitude of intelligences, in so far as they are intelligences, cannot be known by us unless the nature of the possible intellect be known; although their plurality, in so far as they are movers of the spheres, be inferred from the number of their effects. Or say that the hunt there—granted the knowledge possessed in the *De Anima* where the possible plurality of intellectual substances radically becomes known—seeks how many they are from the number of motions. There is a persuasive argument for his holding there that the movers belonging to the spheres have a mixed potency, because of what he held there, namely, that the movers belonging to the spheres are proportionate to their spheres, so that one of them moves only one sphere, and if a star should be added, either the mover would not move, or would move slower, as is said in II *Coeli*.<sup>140</sup> Since the other extreme of such a relationship or proportion is a material thing, namely a sphere, it ought not be thought that the other extreme should be entirely stripped of potency; in fact, it is unintelligible to a sane mind.

*According to the second*, it must be understood that there is a twofold order of things in the universe, namely, that of the intelligible and that of the sensible. The order of sensibles is material, necessarily appropriating matter to itself, because all sensible substances have matter, although they have it in different ways, as is said in VIII *Metaph*.<sup>141</sup> The order of intelligibles is immaterial and independent of matter, For each thing is intelligible through its sepa-

---

<sup>138</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, XII ( ), 8, 1073a 32.

<sup>139</sup> Averroes, *In XII Metaph.*, com. 6; *ed. cit.*, t. VIII, fol. 138v.

<sup>140</sup> See Averroes, *In II 141 Aristotle, Metaphysics, de Caelo*, com. 71; *ed. cit.*, t. V, fol. 68r.

<sup>141</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, VII ( ), 1, 1042a 25; 4, 1044a 14 ff.

ration from matter, as is said in III *de Anima*.<sup>142</sup> Since, therefore, matter is under some form of the sensible order, and every form of this kind has all its powers affixed to sensible organs, it does not go beyond the proper limits, for this form pertains to that genus. When, however, it is under a form of the intelligible order, it goes beyond its proper limits, and is said to be drawn to that which transcends its capabilities, namely, to the existence (*esse*) of a thing which does not depend upon it. Now, because the highest among lower ones is contiguous with the lowest among higher ones, according to the doctrine of Dionysius<sup>143</sup> in *libro de Divinis Nominibus*,<sup>144</sup> therefore the highest among sensible things, man namely, or his matter, is joined to the lowest form of the intelligible order, namely the intellectual soul, and participates in its existence (*esse*). Because of this, it is said that matter is drawn to the soul's existence (*esse*), because matter is elevated to the higher.<sup>145</sup>

*As evidence for the third point*, I shall put the arguments of Scotus against the position of St. Thomas so that the truth may shine forth clearer. Scotus<sup>146</sup> gives six arguments against this, some of which are repeated by Anthony Trombeta<sup>147</sup> in the question, *whether something corrupted by divine power can return as numerically the same*. Both he in this question and Scotus, where indicated above, attribute an opinion to St. Thomas which is not his, concerning the question asked here. This happened because they spoke without having the whole law before them, and they make facile pronouncements according to Aristotle after considering a few points.

The first argument in his position is as follows. The being (*esse*) of the soul and of man is identical; therefore the soul joined to the body is no more perfect than when it is separated from the body. The consequent is contrary to St. Thomas,<sup>148</sup> when he says that the soul is in a more perfect state when joined to the body than when it is separated. The consequence is proved thus: nothing having the same being (*esse*) is more perfect from this fact alone that it communicates something to another, even though the other may be perfected by this.

---

<sup>142</sup> Aristotle, *On the Soul*, III, 4, 429b 21; St. Thomas, *In III de Anima*, lect. 8, nn. 714–19.

<sup>143</sup> Dionysius, *De Divinis Nominibus*, c. 7; PG 3, 871.

<sup>144</sup> The text cited in the Paris edition (p. 499, line 7 from bottom) is in *libro de Coelesti Hierarchia*.

<sup>145</sup> See above, p. 270, where Cajetan says that the intellectual soul receives matter and is drawn to its existence because it approaches so closely to the extreme of pure potency.

<sup>146</sup> Scotus, *Quodlibet.*, q. 9, nn. 1–14; *ed. cit.*, XII, 226–39; *In IV Sent.*, d. 43, q. 1, nn. 3–7; *ed. cit.*, X, 7–8.

<sup>147</sup> Anthony Trombeta, *Quaestiones Metaphysicales*, *In VIII Lib. Aristotelis*, q. IV; *ed. cit.*, fol. 72v–73v.

<sup>148</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.*, I, 89, 1.

To communicate, granting that it adds a perfection in the communicant, does not give this perfection to it. As long as the soul is in the body, it always retains the same being (*esse*). It has nothing more in the body except that it communicates its being (*esse*) to the body. Owing to this, then, the soul is not more perfect than when it itself is separated. This argument is confirmed by the mere fact that if a cause does not communicate anything, it does not acquire any imperfection; therefore the soul is not more imperfect when separated if it keeps the same being (*esse*), for it loses nothing but the communication of itself to the body.

Further, the soul has the same being (*esse*) as man; therefore man is not more perfect in being than the soul itself. The antecedent is false. The consequence is proved because whatever things have altogether the same being (*esse*) are equally perfect in being, or at least that to which that existence (*esse*) is communicated is not more perfect in being (*essendo*) than the one communicating.

Further, man as man is a third being really distinct from either of his parts, namely, soul and body; therefore man has his own being (*esse*), other than the being of the parts, and consequently the being (*esse*) of the soul and that of man are not identical. The consequence holds because a distinct being ought to have a distinct existence (*esse*).

Further, the being (*esse*) of man is corrupted at death, but not the being (*esse*) of the soul; therefore the being (*esse*) of the soul and that of man are not the same. The consequence is clear. The proof of the antecedent is that, just as generation terminates in the being (*esse*) of the composite, namely man, so also corruption terminates in its non-being (*non esse*).

Further, man does not remain after death; therefore neither does his being (*esse*). Then further, the being (*esse*) of man does not remain after his death; therefore the being (*esse*) of the soul and that of man are not the same, since the being (*esse*) of the soul remains. The whole line of reasoning is clear, with the exception of the first consequence. This is proved from the fact that we never find the actual being (*esse*) of anything when its subject is not around.

Further, in man there is another form besides that of the soul; therefore there is another being (*esse*) in him besides that of the soul. The consequence is known because every form has its own being (*esse*). The antecedent was proved elsewhere.

Before I give answer to these arguments, note first the principle of St. Thomas that universally the being (*esse*) in every composite is never but one substantial being (*esse*) of actual existence—the point that we are making concerns this—because he holds that there is only one substantial form in the composite, since from one form there is

never more than one substantial existence (*esse*). But there is this<sup>149</sup> difference between the existence (*esse*) of a man and that of other things, that although both the existence of man and that of other things is primarily the act of the supposit as that which, yet in man the whole composite begs that existence (*esse*) from the form, whose act it primarily is, as the proper and complete principle. In other composites, however, the form begs existence from the composite. The reason for the disparity is that in man alone, who occupies the highest position among sensible being, an inferior order, namely, the sensible order, is drawn to the higher intelligible and immaterial order. Wherefore, the existence (*esse*) of man, since it flows from the intellectual soul, is immaterial and of a higher order than is<sup>150</sup> man, just as the soul itself is. Therefore man begs existence from the soul, to which it belongs, inasmuch as it pertains to the soul's genus. Thence it comes about that after the death of man, the soul remains. For the proper existence (*esse*) was independent of the corrupted composite, and thus by taking that away, it subsists to itself. Other things, indeed, are of the same order as the composites to which they are attributed, as are also the forms from which they flow. Thus the forms themselves beg existence from the composites, and also becoming, so that they enjoy existence as long as they remain in the composites; when the composites are corrupted (since they cannot remain without existence) they immediately cease to be.

Note secondly, *three propositions needed to solve*<sup>151</sup> *the arguments*.

*The first* is that since the perfection of a thing is twofold, namely, first and second, a created thing capable of being a cause, though not made more perfect according to the first perfection from the fact that it actually causes, nevertheless does become more perfect according to its second perfection. This is shown in three ways. First, from the fact that a thing actually causing is more in act than a being potentially causing, because operation is the second act of a cause; perfection, however, follows upon actuality as imperfection upon potentiality. Secondly, it is shown from the fact that each thing is more perfect when joined to its end than when separated from it; but a thing actually operating is joined to its inner end, which is operation, according to II *de Caelo et Mundo*,<sup>152</sup> where it says that each thing exists for the sake of its proper operation. Thirdly, the same thing is clear because the more a thing is like God, the more perfect it is. But

---

<sup>149</sup> In the Paris edition (p. 500, line 6 from bottom), *haec* is missing.

<sup>150</sup> In the Paris edition (p. 501, line 3), *est* is missing.

<sup>151</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 166, line 10 from bottom) has *pro solutione*. The Paris edition (p. 501, line 12) has *pro resolutione*.

<sup>152</sup> Aristotle, *On the Heavens*, II, 3, 286a 8; St. Thomas, *In II de Caelo*, lect. 4, nn. 4–5.

a thing actually causing is more like to God than a thing not actually causing, because not only is it likened to God from the fact that it is, but also from the fact that it is communicating itself to others.

*The second proposition* is: a thing is perfect simply not because of its first perfection, but because of its last perfection. This is from Boethius in *libro de Hebdomadibus*,<sup>153</sup> when he says, *I see in things one being (esse), namely, that they are, and a second being (esse), namely, that they are good*. St. Thomas explains this.<sup>154</sup>

In order to understand this, note that, as St. Thomas says in *I Part.*,<sup>155</sup> the perfection of a thing is threefold, namely, first according as the thing is constituted in its being (*esse*); just as the first perfection of man is his substantial existence (*esse*). Secondly, according as it is proximately capable of its perfect operations; for example, the powers of the soul and the habits informing it, by which a man can produce a perfected action. Thirdly, a thing has perfection according as it is joined to its own end; for example, the speculation which unites man to separated substances. It is evident that the man who enjoys only the goodness of nature, or who is far from his end, is not perfect simply. Whence the order of what is simply being to what is being in a qualified way, is opposed to the order of what is simply perfect to what is perfect in a qualified way. For according to substantial being (*esse*), a man is said to be being simply and perfect in a qualified way. That is why the man, who has no perfection other than that he is a man, is not said to be simply perfect; rather we say, with an addition, that he is perfect according to his substantial being (*esse*). However, according to accidental being (*esse*), such as that of habits and operations, the man is said to be a being in a qualified way, but perfect simply; for then none of those things which are needed to perfect a man are lacking to him. The intended proposition, namely, that a being is simply perfect by reason of its ultimate perfection, is evident.

*The third proposition* is this: a real part of an essence is more perfect when in the whole being than when it is separated. It is made clear as follows. Each thing is more perfect when it exists in that which completes its specific being (*esse*) than when it lacks that complement. But when an essential part is in a whole, it exists in that which completes its species, toward whose integrity it is essentially ordered; on the other hand, when it is separated from it, it does not then exist with the complete being (*esse*) of its species, seeing that

---

<sup>153</sup> Boethius, *De Hebdomadibus*, c. 4; PL 64, 1312; St. Thomas, *In de Hebdomadibus*, lect. 4, n. 60.

<sup>154</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.*, I, 5, 1, ad 1.

<sup>155</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.*, I, 6, 3.

the specific nature is an aggregate of matter and form. Therefore an essential part is more perfect when in the whole than when separated.

Proceeding now from these propositions to the problem, we say that the intellectual soul is in a more perfect state in the composite than outside it because, when it is joined to the body, it has not only its first perfection, which is existence (*esse*), but also its second perfection, since its powers then influence the body, and it communicates itself. Thus it is more like God than when it is separated, even though God is altogether immaterial and incapable of composition; just as a moved heart is more like God than an unmoved heart, although God is altogether immovable, for their perfection consists in this.

Moreover, it is more perfect when in the body because in the body it has complete specific being (*esse*), which it has only partially when separated. It is true that it retains, when separated, the complete being (*esse*) of existence which it had in the composite. Nevertheless, it does not then have the integral being (*esse*) of essence that is complete in species in the way it was made to have, namely, as a part in a whole toward which it is ordered, not accidentally, but essentially. Whence it is false that the separated soul, while retaining the same being (*esse*) of actual existence, lost nothing by the separation except the communication of itself. For it lost the integrity of its specific quidditative being (*esse*), seeing that it does not remain in the wholeness of its species. Wherefore, blessed Thomas, in *quaestionibus de Anima*,<sup>156</sup> says that essential principles of a particular species are not ordered to being (*esse*) alone, but to the being (*esse*) of that species. Therefore, although the soul<sup>157</sup> can exist in itself, it is nevertheless not in the fullness of its species without the body.

To the first argument, therefore, I deny the consequence. Its proof assumes what is false, as is evident from our first proposition. We grant that to communicate supposes first perfection in the communicator, still it perfects the communicator by second perfection. By this a thing is said to be more perfect simply; in fact, according to Dionysius, the highest way that creatures have of participation from God is that they are able to communicate.

Secondly, I say that also the minor of the proof is false, namely, that the separated soul lacks only communication of itself. This is evident from the third proposition. For it lacks the integrity of its specific being (*esse*), and this is the primary and principal thing which renders the separated soul more imperfect. It is because it lacks its specific integrity that it lacks second perfection, and not conversely. As for the confirmation, the response is evident from our first proposition, be-

---

<sup>156</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *Q. D. de Anima*, a. 1, ad 16.

<sup>157</sup> *Animal* in the text should read *anima*.

cause a created cause has second perfection from the very fact that it causes; the privation of this is a great imperfection. And in what was said there is more, because the separated soul not only fails in the communication of itself and its power, but it is in a state such that it is hindered from communication of itself and of its powers. This is a sign of no small imperfection. It is this that we were talking about, namely, the separation from the complete being (*esse*) of its quidditative species, which is found expressly in St. Thomas in *questione de Spiritualibus creaturis*.<sup>158</sup>

To the second argument, I deny the consequence. To its proof, I say that being (*esse*) is twofold, namely, quidditative and of actual existence. The first of these remains only partially in the soul, whereas man has this integrally, and according to such being (*esse*), man is more perfect in being. Concerning the being (*esse*) of existence, however, it can be said that man is more perfect in this manner of possessing because, namely, he has it as a supposit. But the soul can be said to be more perfect in another way, namely, inasmuch as such being (*esse*) is its own, and not proper to man, in the way explained above. Therefore man and soul are related in this respect as the overtopping and the overtopped.

To the third argument, I deny the consequence if he is speaking of the being (*esse*) of actual existence. For it is not true that a thing really distinct from another has an existence different from the other, for it has already been said that the parts and the whole have the same being (*esse*). However, I grant the consequent if he is speaking of the being (*esse*) of essence; but this favors our position.

To the fourth argument, I say as before, that if in the antecedent he is speaking of the being (*esse*) of essence, his position in the first part is true, but not in the second part, for it is manifest from what was said above that the complete specific being (*esse*) of the soul is corrupted. If, however, he is speaking of the being (*esse*) of existence, it can be understood in two ways. First, that the being (*esse*) of actual existence of a man ceases simply; and this is false because the soul holds this back to itself. Secondly, this can also be understood as follows: the being (*esse*) of man in death ceases as being (*esse*) of man, that is, it ceases to inform man. Taken in this way, we grant the antecedent. For just as we speak in a particular way of men's generation differently than we do of the propagation of other animals, since Aristotle says in *II de Generatione animalium*,<sup>159</sup> that the intellect alone is from outside, and it alone is divine because its operation does not have communication at all with a corporeal

---

<sup>158</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *Q.D. de Spiritualibus Creaturis*, a. 2, ad 5.

<sup>159</sup> Aristotle, *On the Generation of Animals*, II, 3, 736b 27.



operation; in the same way, we ought to speak in a particular way of his corruption, since Aristotle also says in XII *Metaph.*<sup>160</sup> that in some cases there is no reason to prevent the form surviving afterwards, for example, if the soul is of this sort, not every soul perhaps, but intellect.

To the fifth argument, I deny the consequence. To its proof, using the distinction made, I say that the actual being (*esse*) of a man is taken in two ways, namely, in itself or simply, and in so far as it belongs to this man. In the first way, it is not impossible for it to remain when the man is corrupted; taken in the second way, however, it is unintelligible that it should remain. For the actual being (*esse*) of a thing never remains in so far as it is that thing's being, when that whose being it is, is not found. However, it can be found simply, and the reason is in the position already stated many times, that being (*esse*) is not proper to man but rather to the soul. Therefore it must be the case that it is always to be found when that to which it properly belongs exists, even though that to which it belonged as communicated ceases to be.

To the sixth argument, I deny the antecedent. As for the proofs given elsewhere, answers were given elsewhere. It remains, then, that it is true of the being (*esse*) of actual existence that the being (*esse*) of the intellectual soul of man is entirely one; that in itself it is independent of the body inasmuch as it is not caused by it, because it is not educed from the potency of matter, even though as belonging to this, namely to a man, it is not found except in a body.

---

<sup>160</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, XII ( ), 3, 1070a 24; St. Thomas, *In XII Metaph.*, lect. 3, no. 2451–53.

## Chapter VI<sup>1</sup>

From what has been seen it is evident how essence is found in different beings. In fact, we find that substances have essence in three ways. For there is a being, God, whose essence is His very act of existing. That is why there are some philosophers<sup>2</sup> holding that God does not have an essence, since His essence is nothing but His act of existing.

105) This is the beginning of Chapter VI, which is divided into four parts. The first deals with the essence of God. The second, with the essences of intelligences and human souls. The third part shows how these stand in logical intentions. The fourth part explains composite essences.

Now concerning God's essence—he will affirm two conclusions and exclude two errors—he lays down the first conclusion, which is affirmative, thus: essence in God signifies His very being (*esse*). This conclusion he gives purely as following from what was said before, for it was proved above and is admitted by all. Now the understanding of the conclusion is that the divine being (*esse*) of actual existence is His very essence, in such a way that it is predicated of God as a predicate in the first mode of *per se* predication, so that *God is* is a predication in the first mode of per seity. No other being is said to share this way of predication with God, even if one grants that in creatures the being (*esse*) and essence are really identified, since precisely to exist is the essence of God. This is why some, namely Platonists, say that God has no essence, as if He were pure existence.

It follows from this that He is not in a genus, for what is in a genus must have a quiddity other than its act of existing. The reason is that the generic or specific quiddity or nature does not differ as regards the character (*ratio*) of the nature in members of a genus or species, whereas the act of existing (*esse*) is different in different things.

106) Here we find the second conclusion, a negative one: God is not in a genus. Its proof, from what was said above, is spelled out thus: everything in a genus has a quiddity other than its being (*esse*); God does not have a quiddity other than His being (*esse*) therefore God is not in a genus. The minor is the former conclusion. The major is proved in the following way. All the things in a genus are undis-

---

<sup>1</sup> In the Laurent edition (p. 170), there is no title to this chapter. In the Paris edition (p. 503), the title of the chapter is the following. *Qualisnam sit Essentia Dei: quam item ratione in simplicibus substantiis separatis, et a quo genus et differentia summendum sit, et quomodo multiplicari eas contingat, exponit.*

<sup>2</sup> See Avicenna, *Metaph.*, tr. VIII, c. 4; *ed. cit.*, fol. 99v; tr. IX, c. 1, fol. 101v; St. Thomas, *In 1 Sent.*, d. 8, q. 4, a. 2. See also M.-D. Roland-Gosselin, O.P., *op. cit.*, p. 37, n. 1.

tinguished in the generic or specific essence, but are distinguished by having<sup>3</sup> differently the being (*esse*) of this generic or specific nature; therefore the being (*esse*) of a generic or specific nature is other than the generic or specific nature itself; and so, whatever is in a genus has a nature other than its being (*esse*). The antecedent of this consequence is clear in itself. For a man and a lion are undistinguished in animal nature, but distinguished from each other by having animated being (*esse*) differently, since the genus has a different being (*esse*) in different species. Likewise, Socrates and Plato are undistinguished in human nature, but distinguished from each other because they have different being (*esse*) as human. It would be unintelligible were man to have the same being (*esse*) in Socrates and Plato. Thus the consequence is clear from this, that it appears unimaginable that what distinguishes things is not other than what makes them alike.

And notice that for the purposes of this argument it is sufficient that being (*esse*) be other than the essence, i.e., other than the quidditative concept. For it is sufficient that the principles of conformity and difference are different, as is clear of a genus and specific differences, where the species agree in one and differ in the others. And since in God alone being (*esse*) constitutes His quidditative concept, then God alone is put outside a genus.

But since the being (*esse*) is other than the quidditative concept, because it is really distinct from the essence; and it constitutes the quidditative concept, because it is really the same as the essence; consequently that God is not in a genus is said to proceed from this ground in God, that His being (*esse*) and His essence are really the same. Nor should you be influenced by the fact that this reasoning seems to shift from the being (*esse*) of actual existence to quidditative being (*esse*). Sometimes in the minor premise there is question of the being (*esse*) of actual existence and then in proof of the major, where one ought to speak of the same being (*esse*), there is transition to quidditative being (*esse*). For instance, we say the species are conformed in the genus and differ in diverse being (*esse*), since this is verified of quidditative being (*esse*) taken specifically. For man and cow agree in animal and are distinguished by specific differences, in which animal in them acquires a specifically different being (*esse*). I recommend that you do not let this worry you, since in this chapter it will be made clear that specific differences do not make generic natures different except in relation to the diverse being (*esse*) of actual existence. Consequently, St. Thomas, with marvelous delicacy,

---

<sup>3</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 171, line 6) has *habent*. The Paris edition (p. 504, line 18 from bottom) has *habere*.

does not digress, but pays attention to the prime reason why a generic nature is distinguished in its inferiors. Below, this will be better understood when we point out the most general rule for taking the genus and specific difference.

107) *Note three propositions* which give the evidence for what is supposed here, viz., that in God being (*esse*) pertains to His quidditative concept, because it is the same as His essence.

*The first proposition is this:* His quiddity, which is His actual existence, is not determined to some genus. This is briefly shown by a single middle term taken from II *contra Gentiles*.<sup>4</sup> Thus: every quiddity limited to a genus can be essentially designated by its specific difference, from which the genus begs being (*esse*) in act; therefore no quiddity that is the same as its actual existence is determined to some genus. The major is made known by induction. For animal can be determined essentially by its specific differences, namely, rational and irrational, and from these begs being (*esse*) in act, since it is impossible for animal to be in actual existence unless it be either rational or irrational. Likewise, color is essentially determinable by its specific differences, through which actual existence comes to it, seeing that color cannot be found which is not white or black, etc. As for the minor, it is self-evident to those understanding the terms. How indeed will actual existence beg being (*esse*) in act from something formally other? If it begs being (*esse*) in act from some difference formally, since being (*esse*) in act is nothing else but having actual existence, it will follow that actual existence will have actual existence formally for something other than itself, as animal formally acquires actual existence through rational. But this appears unintelligible. Therefore, etc.

*The second proposition:* actual existence, not determined by any genus, is pure being (*esse*). This proposition is clear from comparable instances. Animal not determined to some species will be pure animal; whiteness not confined in some subject will be pure whiteness. In like manner, being (*esse*) not determined to the capacity of a predicamental nature is necessarily a pure being (*esse*). And if the separation of this kind is the work of intellect, the purity itself also pertains to reason. But if it follows the thing, the purity itself also pertains to the thing, as is evident in itself.

*The third proposition:* being (*esse*) pertains to the quidditative concept of pure being (*esse*) only. This proposition is clear in both its statements. In the first indeed, because it is not intelligible that being (*esse*) itself be not predicated quidditatively of pure being (*esse*).

---

<sup>4</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *Contra Gentiles*, II, 25.

For if any thing can be predicated quidditatively of it, that ought to be being (*esse*) itself, since pure being (*esse*) is posited. As for other things, they do not receive the being (*esse*) in their quidditative concepts. This is evident, because they can be defined in their quiddities independently of being (*esse*) or not-being (*non esse*), since they do not have being (*esse*) in its purity but modified to their quiddities. From what has been said the intended position is deduced in this way. Existence pertains to the concept of a thing's quiddity, because that thing is pure being (*esse*); that thing is pure being (*esse*), because it is not limited to some genus; it is not limited to some genus, because it is the same as its own existence; therefore,—using the first subject and the last predicate—existence pertains to the quidditative concept of a thing, because that thing is the same as its own existence.

Now if affirming is precisely the cause of an affirmation, negating is the cause of a negation. Consequently, from the fact that a created thing is not the same as its own existence, being (*esse*) does not pertain to its quidditative concept. Therefore, since the glorious God is His own being (*esse*), He is nothing other than His own being (*esse*), separate in reality from predicamental natures, subsisting from its own purity.

Nor is it required that, if we say God is only an act of existing, we fall into the mistake of those<sup>5</sup> who assert that God is that universal existence whereby each thing formally exists. For the act of existing which God is, is such that no addition can be made to it. Consequently, owing to its very purity it is the act of existing distinct from every act of existing. For this reason it is said, in the commentary on the ninth proposition of *libri de Causis*,<sup>6</sup> that the First Cause, being simply the act of existing, is individuated by its pure perfection. But being-in-general (*esse commune*) neither includes in its notion any addition nor does it imply any precision from addition. Otherwise, it would be unintelligible that a thing exist in which something beyond the act of existing were added.

108) Here the first error of certain men is excluded. It is that God is the being-in-general (*commune esse*) of all things. These men imagined that since all things are alike in having being (*esse*), this very being (*esse*) of all by which things formally have community and universality is the glorious God Himself. They are impressed by this reasoning: being (*esse*) specified by no addition is a common being (*esse commune*); God is being (*esse*) specified by no addition; therefore God is common being (*esse commune*). But this reasoning is fallacious owing to the multiple meaning of the major. Indeed, there are two meanings to "being (*esse*) specified by no addition." One

---

<sup>5</sup> See M.-D. Roland-Gosselin, O.P., *op. cit.*, p. 37, n. 2.

<sup>6</sup> See O. Bardenhewer, *op. cit.*, p. 173.

applies to the thing subsisting outside the mind; the other only to the thinking of the intellect. Taken in the first meaning, the major is false, but the minor is true; taken in the second meaning, the major is true, the minor is false. For being-in-general (*esse commune*) which is grasped by the intellect in its abstraction includes no limitation; but as outside the intellect there is none without limitation, for every being (*esse*) is limited to substance or accident. However, the being (*esse*) which is the divine quiddity is pure, without any addition in reality, and distinct from the being (*esse*) of all other things by its very purity in reality. And this is in no sense common, just as separated whiteness, because pure whiteness, would be distinct from other instances of whiteness mixed with substances and would not be whiteness in general. Secondly, the major is faulty because it also concerns a double meaning of being (*esse*) specified or limited by no addition. In one sense, there is question only of act; in the other, of act and potency. In the first sense, the major is true, but the minor is false. In the second sense, the major is false; the minor true. For being-in-general (*esse commune*), though contracted by no addition, is still limitable, otherwise no thing which adds something beyond being (*esse*) itself could have being (*esse*). Thus a man would not have being (*esse*) since he would have, beyond being (*esse*), humanity, quantity, etc. Consequently being-in-general (*esse commune*) lacks specification only in act; whereas the divine being (*esse*) has no specification in act nor can it have any. Therefore it lacks addition in act and in potency. And this is the solution that St. Thomas gives in the passage, using other words. He says that whatever is common neither includes nor excludes addition; that is, it does not actually include addition, but it can have such. However, the divine being (*esse*) not only does not include, it also excludes addition. That is, it not only does not include addition in act, it also does not in potency, and so excludes addition. For what cannot possibly be united to a thing is entirely excluded from it. This matter is treated fully in *I contra Gentiles*.<sup>7</sup>

Similarly, although God is simply the act of existing, it is not required that other perfections and excellences be lacking to Him. Rather He has all the perfections of all genera of beings, so that He is said to be perfect without qualification, as the Philosopher<sup>8</sup> and the Commentator<sup>9</sup> say in *V Metaph.* But He has these perfections in a more excellent way than other things, since in Him they are one, while in other things they

---

<sup>7</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *Contra Gentiles*, I, 26, 21, n. 1040.

<sup>8</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, V ( ), 16, 1021b 30; St. Thomas, *In V Metaph.*, lect. 21, n. 1040.

<sup>9</sup> Averroes, *In V Metaph.*, com. 21; *ed. cit.*, t. VIII, fol. 62r.

are diversified. And the reason is that all these perfections are His owing to His simple act of existing; much as if someone by means of one quality could perform the operations of all qualities, he would have all qualities in that one. In this way, God has all perfections in His very act of existing.

109) Here the second error is excluded, namely, that God is not unqualifiedly perfect. The argument for this error in the text is the following: what has only being (*esse*) is imperfect in comparison with what has the being (*esse*) of living and of understanding; but God has only being (*esse*); therefore God is less perfect than other things. The major is known in itself. The minor is proved from what has been said. What is pure being (*purum esse*) is not mixed with other perfections—say, living and thinking—else it would be pure and non-pure. God is pure being (*esse*). Therefore He is not mixed with other perfections, namely, living and thinking, and consequently God has nothing except being (*esse*)—which was to be proved. The defect of this reasoning is not unfolded in the text, but it is in *I contra Gentiles*.<sup>10</sup> There it is stated that from this proposition, that God is pure subsisting being (*esse*), it follows that God is universally most perfect. And for that reason he says explicitly in the text that in fact God has all perfections, etc., as if he were saying, it does not follow that God lacks some perfection, but rather the opposite follows. Here is the way to derive from that base what he has in mind: that which is being (*esse*) in the full strength and power of being (*esse*) itself lacks no perfection or excellence of being (*essendi*); but the pure subsisting being (*esse*) is what is being (*esse*) in the full strength and power of being (*esse*) itself; therefore pure subsisting being (*esse*) lacks no perfection or excellence of being (*essendi*). The major is made clear from this, that every perfection of any genus whatever is not except according to some being (*aliquod esse*). For wisdom does not perfect a man unless a man be wise by it; nor is justice able to be called a perfection of a man, unless a man be just by it. If, therefore, every perfection is considered relative to some being (*aliquod esse*), that in which the full plenitude of being (*essendi*) is found clearly has all perfection. Thus it is unthinkable that a thing have being (*esse*) in its full extent and lack some perfection of being (*essendi*).

As for the minor, it is made clear by examples. If whiteness were found separated from all else, nothing pertaining to the excellence of whiteness could be lacking to it. For what was said above is the reason why the full perfection of the species of whiteness is not in this

---

<sup>10</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *Contra Gentiles*, I, 28.

<sup>11</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, V ( ), 16, 1021b 30; St. Thomas, *In V Metaph.*, lect. 21, n. 1040.

case of whiteness, because it is adapted to its receiving subject, which does not receive it according to the full power of whiteness. In the same way, being (*esse*) itself, if received in another, is restricted to the limits of that nature receiving it, namely, substance or accident, and consequently is limited to the excellence of that genus. But if it is pure and not received in nature, being is unlimited and unqualifiedly infinite, and presents without qualification all the perfection that can appear in a being (*ente*). However, when you hear that whiteness, when separated, has all the possible perfection of its species, you should not think, as those jealous of the truth contend, that the negation, viz., of its reception in another, gives it that perfection. But just as the reception of whiteness is a condition requisite for its own imperfection, so negation of reception is the condition attendant on its unlimited perfection. Whence a valid argument from a thing's reception and separation is taken as separation from necessary and inseparable conditions.

To have the perfections of all genera can be understood in two ways: one, as they are in themselves; another, as in something of a higher order. Therefore, in order to make clear how God Himself, Who is essentially being (*esse*) itself, has all perfections, St. Thomas says that God does not have all perfections in themselves, that is, distinct one from another in their proper natures, as a man has wisdom, justice, prudence, etc. Were this so, God would have to have maximum composition. Instead, God has these indistinctly united in His own most simple being (*esse*). Indeed, that divine being (*esse*) is equivalent to all the perfections of all genera and exceeds each taken singly and all taken at once as being something of a higher and inaccessible order. An example of this can be seen in the light of the sun. The sun above can do what all inferior things are able to do through so many different qualities. For this reason the Philosopher<sup>11</sup> and the Commentator<sup>12</sup> say that God alone is a being (*esse*) unqualifiedly perfect, having in Himself the universe of perfections.

**Question XIII<sup>13</sup>—**

**Whether<sup>14</sup> the Perfections Existing in God Are in Some Way Distinct Independently of Every Act of the Intellect?**

110) Here the question is whether the perfections existing in God Himself are in some way distinct independently of every act of the intellect.

---

<sup>12</sup> Averroes, In V Metaph., com. 21; *ed. cit.*, t. VIII, fol. 62r.

<sup>13</sup> In the Paris edition (p. 508), this appears as Question XII.

<sup>14</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 176) has *Utrum*. The Paris edition (p. 508) has *Num*.



In this question, *five points* are to be treated.

First, the meaning of the question will be made clear.

Second, the opinion of Scotus and his basic reasons will be presented.

Third, the opinion of St. Thomas will be made clear.

Fourth, the opinion of Scotus will be refuted.

Fifth, his rebuttals will be answered.

111) *Regarding the first point*, the first observation is that perfection is twofold: some perfection is without qualification; some is in this or that thing. Unqualified perfection is one whose formal and proper concept expresses a perfection with no imperfection, as wisdom, goodness, and the like. But perfection in this or that thing is one whose proper and formal concept expresses a perfection mixed with imperfection, as humanity, equality, and such like. I said in the *proper and formal concept*, because including some imperfection in a concept common to itself and others, or in its material concept does not take anything away from the unqualified perfection itself. Wisdom, for example, in a generic concept—think of a habit or quality—expresses imperfection, namely, potentiality or dependence, etc. Still, because it does not include this formally in its specifically differentiating concept, nothing keeps it from being an unqualified perfection. I said also, it means<sup>15</sup> a perfection owing to a relation, one which does not express in its proper and formal concept a perfection with no imperfection.

The second observation is that in fact perfections are in something in two ways: one formally, the other virtually. To be formally in something is to be in it as a form is in the thing having that form; for example, humanity, whiteness, quantity, and others of this sort are in man. But to be in something virtually is to be in it as an effect is in its effecting (*effectiva*) cause, as heat is in the sun. Now one should be able to see the great difference between these modes of being (*essendi*) in something from this one effect they have—sufficient at present—that those perfections present in the first way intrinsically name the supposit such; whereas those perfections present in the second way do not name the supposit such. This is clear in the example of the sun, which is also called lucid by reason of its light, but is not called hot by reason of its heat.

Furthermore, perfections are formally in something in two ways. First, they are present as distinct in their own proper natures and limited. Thus in man there is being (*esse*), understanding, willing, etc.

---

<sup>15</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 176, line 15 from bottom) has *dicit*. The Paris edition (p. 509, line 5) has *dici*.

Secondly, they are formally in something of a higher order, united and unlimited. Thus in the light of the sun there is the power to warm, to dry out, and others of this sort. Nor is there a small difference between these two modes. To be in the second way is far more excellent, as the example given shows. Grant that the perfections of all genera are in God in a more excellent way than in creatures. Still, these perfections are not without qualification in Him merely virtually (for He is not named such by them) but are in Him formally without qualification, not in their proper natures as limited, but as actually indistinct and unlimited in a being of a higher order. Consequently, a doubt arises whether the unqualified perfections existing formally in God and really identified are in some way distinct independently of every act of the intellect. So for the first point.

112) *To the second point*, Scotus in *I Sent.*<sup>16</sup> thinks these perfections in God are distinct by a formal distinction owing to the nature of the real (*ex natura rei*), independently of every action of the intellect. He calls a distinction *from the nature of the real* one which arises from the nature of the things themselves, so that it is independent of every operation of the intellect. He adds *formal*, not because every distinction from the nature of the real is formal, but only such as arise from the quiddities, or formal characters (*rationibus*). He proves his position by many reasons. Of these the ones to be adduced are, I take it, those proceeding from purely natural evidence, since at present I do not intend to treat of theology, etc.

Here is the first argument. Wisdom and goodness are absolutely distinguished formally from the nature of the real. Therefore infinite wisdom and infinite goodness are distinguished formally from the nature of the real. The antecedent is evident. As for the consequence it is established, because infinity does not change the formal nature (*ratio*) of what it is added to. For in whatever grade of its latitude a perfection is understood, a perfection always keeps the same formal nature, as is clear in everything. If, therefore, the formal nature of wisdom and infinite wisdom are the same, and the formal nature of wisdom is distinguished from that of goodness, from the nature of the real, it necessarily follows that the formal nature of infinite wisdom does not include, from the nature of the real, the formal nature of goodness.

Further, the distinction that precedes the nature (*ratio*) of the first distinguishing thing is not from that distinguishing thing; but a distinction of nature and intellect precedes thinking, which is the first distinguishing thing according to reason; therefore. The minor

---

<sup>16</sup> Scotus, *In I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 3, n. 13; *ed. cit.*, V, Part II, 760.

is established because if no distinct; on of these preceded, they would be no more distinguished by thinking, as it is thinking, than by thinking, as it is nature. For whatever is distinguished by thinking as it is completely indistinct from nature is distinguished also by nature.

Further, what are understood as formally distinct by the intuiting intellect, have a distinction that exists; but divine perfections are understood as formally distinct from God Himself by the intuiting intellect; therefore they have a distinction existing in them. Nor can this distinction be one of reason; otherwise the divine intellect, by its own intuition, would have to cause some relation of reason in its own essence as an existing relation—this is nonsense. Therefore such a distinction is from the nature of the real. The major is clear from the difference between the intuitive and abstractive intellect; the minor is clear in itself.

Further, God understands His own essence as true; He wills it as good. Therefore truth and goodness are distinguished prior to any act of the intellect. The consequence holds because the distinction in objects precedes the distinction of acts, just as the cause does the effect.

Further, the goodness and truth in God are not distinguished from the nature of the real; therefore they are formally synonymous. The conclusion is against you. The consequence is proved, because goodness and truth do not signify anything except pure perfections themselves in the real, in no way distinct from it.

Further, there is a demonstrative order between divine perfections by which professors demonstrate one perfection from another. There is also a distinction between formal and non-formal predications. For we say that wisdom is not predicated formally of goodness, and there is equality between them according to Augustine.<sup>17</sup> Therefore they are distinguished from the nature of the real. Why, indeed, would professors fill so many reams if all perfections were the same formally? Moreover, a contradiction shows up between divine perfections prior to any act of the intellect, so that God understands and wills by His intellect, wills and understands by His will. Therefore between the divine perfections there is a distinction from the nature of the real.

Further, as complement to the position, a distinction grounding a real distinction does not depend on an act of the intellect. The distinction of divine perfections grounds the real distinction of divine emanations. Therefore the distinction is from the nature of the real, not from an operation of the intellect. So for the second point.<sup>18</sup>

---

<sup>17</sup> St. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, Bk. XV, c. 17; PL 42, 1081

<sup>18</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 178, line. 14 from bottom) has no conclusion.

*(footnote continued on the next page)*

113) *The third section*,—there is no question here of the Trinity of Persons—will make clear *three propositions* which give the thought of St. Thomas and the truth. *The first is*: there is no actual distinction in God considered in Himself. *The second is*: there is a virtual or fundamental distinction of reason in God considered in Himself. *The third is*: there is an actual distinction of reason in God considered as a term of an act of our intellect.

*As evidence for the first proposition* notice that a judgment concerning the formal notions of things when in their own natures is quite different from a judgment concerning the formal notions of the same things when existing formally in some thing of a higher order. For things in their own natures are, independently of any act of the intellect, formally distinguished, because they do not mutually include each other in their own formal notions. And therefore the formal notion of one is not that of the other, because each is so itself as not to be the other. For example, the power of warming and the power of drying in their own natures are distinguished formally from the nature of the real, because the power of warming is so a principle of making warm that it is not a principle of making dry, and the other way around. But things are found united in something of a higher order, as in one simple higher thing, so that they are formally united in the single formal notion of that thing. And thus it is necessary that they lack<sup>19</sup> a formal distinction from the nature of the real, since the ground, already indicated, of such a distinction is not there, that is, the kind of limitation by which each of them is so itself that it is not the other. For neither of them, since so united, is more itself than the other; for instance, developing the example just given, just as the warming and drying powers found formally in the light of the sun are joined in the one nature of light, so in the formal notion of light they are indistinct formally, so that if the complete definition of solar light be given, there is no need to seek further their definitions. For once the definition of solar light has been given, it expressed, owing to the equivalence that must exist between a definition and the thing defined, solar light in its full excellence, in that within itself it pre-contains inferiors indistinctly. Consequently, the definition manifests the warming and drying powers of light; sometimes its warming power is not more itself than it is light and drying power, sometimes the other way around. Since, however, according to Dionysius, in

(footnote continued from the previous page)

---

The Paris edition (p. 510, line 11 from bottom) has the following. *Conclusio. Perfectiones existentes in Deo secundum se distinguuntur, virtualiter tamen sive fundamentaliter: in eodem vero ut terminat actum intellectus, distinguuntur ratione, sed actualiter.*

<sup>19</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 179, line 4) has *careant*. The Paris edition (p. 511, line 12) has *careat*.

*de Divinis nominibus*,<sup>20</sup> perfections in God are without qualification, not limited to their proper natures, but elevated to His unlimited being (*esse*), it follows that as all are formally united in a thing most perfectly one, so in His<sup>21</sup> formal notion (*ratione*) most perfectly one they are formally indistinct. And just as divine wisdom is not more wisdom than it is goodness and truth and the divine being (*esse*) itself, and the other way around, so the formal notion of divine being (*esse*) itself is not more inclusive of being (*esse*) itself than of wisdom and goodness. If one gives an adequate definition of that most perfectly one thing which God is, in that single formal notion would be included formally whatever is God; otherwise, the definition would not be equivalent to the full excellence of the defined. Consequently, the glorious God Himself, Who understands Himself in a manner proper to Himself, forms only a single formal notion, namely, the Word.

Therefore, using this matter, one can argue in this way: whatever perfections are formally united in a single adequate formal notion of God Himself are not distinguished formally from the nature of the real; but divine perfections, independent of every act of the intellect, are united in a single and adequate formal notion of God; therefore, etc. The minor is proved because the powers of inferior qualities are not more united in solar light than are the perfections unqualifiedly in God; but the former are formally united,<sup>22</sup> as is clear from the facts and conceded by the adversaries; therefore, etc. The major is proved because otherwise the definition would not be equivalent to the thing defined.

Secondly, one can argue, principally for the first proposition, in this way: every actual distinction from the nature of the real is grounded on an actual opposition from the nature of the real; but between perfections there is no actual opposition from the nature of the real; therefore. The major is from X *Metaph*.<sup>23</sup> The minor is proved by induction, that in God there be formally no contradictory or privative opposition, which is clear because the other member of both these oppositions is formally a negation and it is impious to put such in God formally. Nor is it sufficient that in God there be a negation fundamentally, since actual distinction demands actual opposition; and actual opposition demands actual extremes, as is clear of every relation<sup>24</sup> according to rule. That there is no contrary opposi-

---

<sup>20</sup> See St. Thomas Aquinas, *In De Divinis Nominibus*, c. V, lect. 2; Marietti, n. 661.

<sup>21</sup> *Illis* in the text should read *illius*.

<sup>22</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 179, line 6 from bottom) has *simpliciter in Deo; sed Illae adunantur formaliter*. The Paris edition (p. 511, line 10 from bottom) has *simpliciter formaliter*.

<sup>23</sup> Aristotele, *Metaphysics*, X (I), 8, 1057b 36 ff.

<sup>24</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 180, line 7) has *relatione*. The Paris edition (p. 512, line 4) has *oppositione*.

tion between them is clear from this, that the other of two contraries is always defective.<sup>25</sup> That there is no relative opposition between them is clear in itself. Nor is this an obstacle, that it seems to follow that in God there would not be many perfections, but only one, say, deity. Most truly God Himself is nothing but one unlimited perfection, totally pre-containing in Himself all the perfections multiplied and multipliable in others.

As *evidence* for both the *second* and *third* propositions, notice that (as we said above in one of the questions) just as that thing most perfectly one, which we call God, is that to which all perfections without qualification existing in their proper natures are assimilated; so it is that to which all their formal concepts are assimilated, since these would be nothing other than these same perfections in intentional being (*esse*). But because God terminates these conceptions as the object understood in them, it is necessary that God Himself, correlative of all them, be understood by many relations of reason according to the number of them. And thus God in Himself must have actually a distinction of reason, so that God, object of many concepts or formal notions, should be said to have in Himself a formal actual distinction of reason. However, He has this objectively, both owing to the plurality of formal concepts of which God is the object, and owing to the plurality of relations by reason by which God is referred or is understood to be referred to the aforesaid perfections, as well in natural being (*esse*) as in intentional being (*esse*). But because in God, independently of any action of the intellect, there is that whence He can cause or terminate the aforesaid concepts, He is said to have in Himself a distinction of reason virtually or fundamentally. Yet God Himself has these from His most unlimited perfection, which no created intellect can have in intentional being (*esse*), just as no creature can have it in natural being (*esse*). For any created intellect whatsoever (even one seeing God in His essence) is unable to form one concept adequate to divine perfection. Hence this argument for the second proposition: everything having in itself that by which it is able as object to cause and terminate, or verify distinct formal notions or conceptions, has in itself a virtual distinction of reason, independently of any action of the intellect; the glorious God is such; therefore.

Here is an argument for the *third* proposition: everything that terminates many formal concepts has in itself actually a distinction of reason; God is such; therefore, etc. So for the third section.

---

<sup>25</sup> In the Paris edition (p. 512, line 5), is added: X *Metaph.* text, comm. xv.

114) *The fourth section is against Scotus, in three arguments.*

*The first argument* is this: a formal distinction from the nature of the real is a greater distinction than a real one; therefore the divine perfections are not distinguished formally from the nature of the real. The consequence is good, and the antecedent is proved as follows. A distinction from what is more interior is greater than one from what is outside the factors interior to a thing; a formal distinction from the nature of the real is from what is most interior to a thing; therefore, etc. The minor is clear from Scotus, in *I Sent.*,<sup>26</sup> saying that a formal distinction from the nature of the real takes place from predicates of the first mode which are in a thing in its first stage (*signo*), but a real distinction takes place from predicates which are in a thing subsequently. The major is proved thus: a distinction from what is interior in some fashion is a distinction in some fashion; a distinction from what is more interior is a greater distinction; therefore a distinction from the most interior is a maximal distinction. For if the unqualified follows on the unqualified and the more on the more, then the maximum necessarily follows on the maximum, etc.

*Here is the second argument.* The divine perfections, abstracted by a perfectly prescinding abstraction, are formally infinite; therefore they are formally the same from the nature of the real. The antecedent is taken from Scotus, in *I Sent.*<sup>27</sup> The consequence is proved by holding that the antecedent can be understood in two ways according to a twofold sort of infinity (given in the response to the first argument), namely, infinity within one perfection (*proprium rationem*) and infinity within the spread of being (*entis*). Then we argue in this way. If you take the antecedent to be verified on the first infinity, such is not true because nothing that is prior includes formally its own subsequents. Divine perfection—think of wisdom—is prior to the first infinity, because its mode is intrinsic, etc. If the second infinity is understood, the intended conclusion follows. For if divine wisdom, taken precisely and formally, is infinite in such a way that it is not terminated formally and unqualifiedly at any perfection of being (*entis*), it must contain unqualifiedly every perfection within the ambit of its formal notion, and must exclude formally no perfection from its notion. Consequently also, divine wisdom from its very nature must be distinguished formally from no perfection. For as soon as one says it is distinguished from other perfections, he says it is formally restricted inside the spread of being (*entis*), which is<sup>28</sup> the opposite of the antecedent as understood. It says that such or so much per-

---

<sup>26</sup> Scotus, *In I Sent.*, d. 2, q. 7 nn. 44–46; *ed. cit.*, V, Part I, 355–56.

<sup>27</sup> Scotus, *In I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 3, n. 16; *ed. cit.*, V, Part II, 728.

<sup>28</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 181, line 10 from bottom) has *quod est oppositum*. The Paris edition (p. 573, line 19) has *quod ad oppositum*.

fection of being (*entis*) is formally introduced so that not every perfection is. For example, it says that wisdom formally and from its nature posits that perfection which wisdom adds to being (*enti*), so as not to posit that perfection which justice or goodness adds, etc.

*The third argument* is: divine perfections are formally distinguished from the nature of the real; therefore there is a real distinction between them. The consequence holds, because that distinction, being a relation existing in the nature of things, is necessarily real, just as everything else existing in the nature of things is real. But the consequent is contrary to Avicenna's saying, that there is no real relation of the same thing to itself.

115) *The fifth section* [answers Scotus' arguments].

For an *answer to his first argument* and destruction of Scotus' fundamental point, notice that being infinite shows up in two ways. One is according to a proper notion (*rationem*); the other, according to being (*ens*), or unqualifiedly. That is infinite according to a proper notion which is enclosed by no limits of its own proper extent, even though confined to such a grade of being (*entis*) that it does not have every perfection of being (*essendi*). But that is infinite according to being (*ens*) or unqualifiedly, which is limited by no terms within the extent of entire being (*entis*), but has every perfection of being (*essendi*). For example, the quantity of a mass. If quantity were infinite, it would be infinite according to the notion (*rationem*) of quantity. It would be infinite quantity, not however infinite according to being (*esse*), for it would be finite being (*ens*) and limited to the genus of quantity. The same holds for the quantity of strength; if whiteness were intensively infinite, it would be infinite according to a proper notion (*rationem*), for it would be infinite whiteness; however, it would not be in finite being (*ens*), because delimited to a species. Nor is it a small matter which infinity is used in saying a thing is infinite. The first infinity, since it pertains to what is within the extent of that thing, leaves the formal notion (*rationem*) of the thing in that formal limitation where it found it, as is clear in the examples given. But the second infinity, because it pertains to what extends itself to the breadth of entire being (*entis*), makes the thing and its formal notion (*rationem*) unlimited and elevates it to where it itself is all possible perfection in being (*ente*) and is not more itself than it is unqualifiedly any other perfection. Owing to this, the second infinity can have nothing to do with that distinction and formal limitation by which it would be distinguished from other things formally from the nature of the real taken absolutely.

Coming now to what was proposed, I say that even though the formal notion (*ratio*) of wisdom and infinite wisdom are completely



the same in the first meaning of infinity, yet in the second meaning of infinity the formal notion (*ratio*) of infinite wisdom is far higher. The conclusion is that all perfection without qualification is in God's formal notion (*ratione*). And since in God all perfections are infinite with the second infinity, there must be one simple formal notion (*rationem*) of all perfections.

As for the argument, no matter what form it takes, the response to it should bring in the equivocation on infinity, since the first infinity, as we said, is such as not to vary the formal notion (*rationem*) and pertains to the perfecting grades of the proper extent of a thing, whereas the second infinity does not. Whence if the divine perfections were infinite only by the first infinity, the argument would conclude validly; but<sup>29</sup> because it uses the second infinity before any action of the intellect, it concludes nothing. Nor is there any problem in this, that perhaps the first infinity of any perfection without qualification may imply the second infinity. It is sufficient that they be distinguished by reason, so that something be infinite in the second and not in the first way. Likewise, there is no problem if one would deny both infinities to the most common perfections,—think of being (*esse*), goodness and the like, etc.—not seeing how to imagine the first infinity in them, because they are lacking in proper spread. In fact, this would favor our position, since if they have both infinities,—a position to be shattered elsewhere—the distinction given above has force; if, however, they have only the second infinity without any distinction, one must deny that being (*esse*) and being (*esse*) infinite have entirely the same formal notion (*rationem*). Thus the whole Scotist structure collapses.

*Against the second argument* concerning every actual distinction, the minor is denied. As for the proof of the minor, the response is to deny all that is assumed. For a fundamental distinction of reason between nature and thinking is sufficient in order that things be distinguished by thinking, as being thinking and not nature. Consequently, when it is said that whatever is distinguished by thinking as being completely indistinct from nature is also distinguished by nature, distinguish the word *indistinct* into actually or fundamentally. Taken in the first meaning say it is false; taken in the second, true. Then deny the subsumed minor: but thinking and nature are fundamentally indistinct prior to every act of the intellect. They have, indeed, a fundamental distinction of reason, as we have made clear.

*Against the third argument*, the minor is denied, even if God sees His own perfections eternally distinct, still not from eternity actually

---

<sup>29</sup> In the Paris edition (p. 514, line 14), *autem* is missing.

distinct. Of course, it is not foreign to philosophy to say that an actual distinction of reason is caused by an act of the divine intellect.

*Against the fourth argument*, the consequence is denied. It is sufficient that the objects of the intellect and will be distinguished fundamentally. There is no call for an actual distinction at present, just as the intellect and will of God are not distinguished at present except by a fundamental distinction of reason.

*Against the fifth argument*, the consequence is denied. Being synonymous, since it is an attribute of words, does not pertain to the identity of the formal notion (*rationis*) of a thing in itself, but pertains to the identity of the formal, or mental, concept. Words indeed are signs of what are modifications (*passionum*) in the soul. Consequently, since the truth and goodness of God have different concepts, in our knowledge they are not synonymous. Thus against the proof we say that although the words signify the same thing formally in itself and solely as a thing signified, yet they signify also distinct mental concepts as notions (*rationes*) of what is being signified—and this destroys the synonymy, as was said.

*Against the sixth argument*, we say that from the side of the real, a virtual, or fundamental, distinction is sufficient for all those perfections; from our side, an actual distinction of reason. We speak as we conceive. And we form distinct concepts such that one arises from the other and is not predicated of the other and has some reference which the other does not have. And therefore we make demonstrations and formal and identical predications; using one concept we deny of God what we affirm of Him under another concept. Thus professors fill books by stammering, as they are able, echoing in human fashion the high dignity of God, and are up to considering and teaching that most simple formal notion (*rationem*), which encompasses everything formally in God, only by means of particular concepts and not owing to a distinction which is in God from the nature of the real. As for the equality between divine perfections before every act of the intellect, there is none except fundamental equality. Between them there is no deviation which is preserved between perfections only virtually distinct.

*Against the seventh argument*, we say that prior to every act of the intellect there is no contradiction formally, but only fundamentally, because one contradictory is formally a negation, which is not except through the operation of the intellect. Consequently, it is sufficient at present that a fundamental distinction of reason be found,<sup>30</sup> which we admit. Nothing else is needed, as is clear of itself.

---

<sup>30</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 184, line 8) has *inveniri*. The Paris edition (p. 515, line 20) has *inquiri*.

To the last argument, we say that the divine emanations are distinguished really and formally, and though the distinction of intellect and will is the foundation of the formal distinction of the emanations, still it is not the foundation of their real distinction. For the divine processions are not therefore distinguished, because one is from the intellect and one from the will, but because they have real relative opposition, as Boethius<sup>31</sup> teaches. It therefore assumes what is false, namely, that the distinction of divine perfections grounds the real distinction of divine emanations. Now in order to found a formal distinction between them, it is sufficient to have a formal fundamental distinction between intellect and will, just as the divine processions themselves are not distinguished formally from the nature of the real without there being a real distinction, but are distinguished by a purely virtual distinction of reason prior to any action of the intellect in such a way that, aside from real relative opposition, they are no more distinguished from the nature of the real than are the intellect and will.

One can answer briefly to this and like arguments by saying that in things divine, prior to every action of the intellect, there is a formal distinction not formally, but virtually, i.e., contained eminently in this manner, because any divine thing says what are proper to it, as if it were formally distinct from the other. The intellect so understands and does not will, the will so wills and does not understand, as if there were a formal distinction formally between intellect and will, and so for the others. Such a way of having a formal distinction is founded upon the deity's eminent formal unity formally and it suffices to preserve all that are introduced as being preserved by a formal distinction formally, because it is equivalent eminently to that distinction.

In a second way essence is found in created intellectual substances. In these the act of existing (*esse*) is other than their essence, even though the essence be without matter. Consequently, their act of existing (*esse*) is not separated, but received and thus limited and founded by the capacity of the receiving nature; but their nature or quiddity is separated, not received in any matter. And therefore it is said in *libro de Causis*<sup>32</sup> that the intelligences are limited from above and unlimited below. For they are limited as to their act of existing (*esse*) which they receive from a superior being. However, they are not limited from below, because their forms are not limited to the capacity of some matter that receives them. Thus in those substances there is no plurality of individuals in one

---

<sup>31</sup> Boethius, *De Trinitate*, c. VI; PL 64, 1254. See St. Thomas, *Sum. Theol.*, I, 40, 2.

<sup>32</sup> See O. Bardenhewer, *op. cit.*, p. 167.

species, as was said, except for the human soul owing to the body it is joined to.

116) The second part of this chapter deals with the essences of created intellectual substances, which are located in the second order of beings. Here St. Thomas brings together four points. First, being (*esse*) is other than essence in created intellectual substances. Second, there is no matter in these substances. Third, their being (*esse*) is limited, but their essence is unlimited. Fourth, the plurality of none of them can be numbered except that of the lowest, namely, the human soul. The first and second points he passes over as already made clear; the third he explains by means of reason and authority.

Note, regarding the evidence from reason, that act is limited by the potency in which it is received; potency is limited, although differently, by the act which it receives. For what is in potency is not determinate, but determinable by the act to which it is in potency; when it has received determination from the act, it is limited formally. Likewise, act according to its essence is receivable in this or that and thus is determinable to this or that subject. When it is received in one subject, it no longer possesses the spread and indetermination relative to this or that subject; it is indeed determined to this one. Consequently, there are two kinds of finiteness and two of infinity: one pertaining to act, the other to potency. Now, infinity pertaining to potency indicates an imperfection, since it exists from the lack of an act limiting potency. But infinity of act says the greatest perfection, since it exists through the lack of potency limiting act. An indication of this is that forms in nature not received in something are far more perfect than received forms are, as is evident. Now since the being (*esse*) of intellectual substances is received in their essence, it follows that being is limited in the way act is limited by potency. Consequently, it is contracted and limited to the genus of its receiver, namely, of the nature whose being it is. But the essence of these substances is not received in something, since it is a form not received in matter. It follows also that the essence is infinite with the infinity that pertains to act; for the essence is not determined to the capacity of some matter receiving the essence, as forms of material things are.

After presenting these considerations, we form the reasoning in this way: a thing whose being (*esse*) is received and its form is unreceived has limited being (*esse*) and unlimited essence; but intelligences are of this sort; therefore. And notice that there is always question in this reasoning of both finiteness and infinity as they apply to act. For the being (*esse*) of intelligences is finite by the same sort of finiteness as the infinity of their essence is infinite. If one wants to

talk of finiteness as it applies to potency, their essence turns out to be finite, seeing that potency in them is determined by an act of being (*essendi*).

This position is confirmed by the text of the *libri de Causis*,<sup>33</sup> where it says that intellectual substances are finite from above and infinite below, because their being (*esse*), which is highest in them, is received, whereas their essence, which is lowest, is not received. And their essence, as looking to what is formally above itself, namely, to the act of being (*essendi*) itself, is limited by receiving that act. However, as looking to what is below itself, namely to matter, the essence is unlimited because not received in matter, etc.

Consider closely this position for understanding the many things said above and in order to avoid the error of those who do not understand the fundamentals of these matters. They say that if being (*esse*) is therefore without qualification infinite, as we said above, because it is received in nothing, then the essence both of immaterial and of composite substances as being wholly unreceived in anything will be infinite without qualification. Now this is nonsense. Consequently, it looks extremely foolish to argue to infinity for non-reception.

Understand, then, that our position is founded on the following proposition: every thing able in its own order to be received in another, and in fact not received, is infinite with the kind of infinity opposed to the finiteness which a thing contracts when received in its own order. I said *able in its own order to be received in another*, because of composites and matter, which in no situation whatever can be received. I said *infinite with the kind of infinity opposed*, etc., because not just anything can be received in any other whatever, but each act has its proper receiving subject, as is said in *II de Anima*.<sup>34</sup> Thus not just any limitation follows from any reception whatever, but a definite limitation from a definite reception. And shifting to opposites, from the lack of reception of a certain kind there follows a certain kind of opposed infinity, namely, opposed to that limitation which the thing would have contracted had it been received. Here is an example. If whiteness, as being receivable in a subject, be given as unreceived, it will be infinite; not however with just any infinity, but with one opposed to the limitation it has in a subject.

Now, in what was proposed, the being (*esse*) as well as the form, each according to its own order has the character (*rationem*) of being receivable (for neither excludes being received), but the receivers are different. The proper receiver of being (*esse*) itself is a quiddity or a supposit; of form, indeed, matter. And therefore, just as the recep-

---

<sup>33</sup> See O. Bardenhewer, *op. cit.*, p. 167.

<sup>34</sup> Aristotle, *On the Soul*, II, 2, 414a 21.

tion of form in matter is of a kind (*rationis*) different from the reception of being (*esse*) in essence, as we said above, so the limitation of form by matter is of a kind (*rationis*) different from the limitation of being (*esse*) by essence, although they have in common that each limitation takes place in the way act is limited by potency. Likewise, there ought to be a difference in kind (*rationum*) between the infinity which form acquires because not received in matter, and the infinity being (*esse*) acquires because not received in any quiddity. For form is closed in when received into matter below itself and loses its universality (*amplitudinem*), by which it is not determined to this or that particular thing. And consequently because it is separated from matter, form is in no way infinite except that it lacks its limits, because not restricted to the capacity of some matter. Being (*esse*), however, is restricted to its genus or species by being received in some quiddity. Granted it be not received, being will be limited to no genus, and consequently, lacking the limits of any genus, will be infinite without qualification.

Thus you have the solution to the problem in that we do not say every non-received is infinite, but a thing receivable in some order and not received; also, in that we do not say everything receivable in its own order and not received is infinite in the same way, but in different ways. From the first position it is clear that a composite substance has no infinity from its non-reception. And from the second, it is clear that the essence of an intelligence, which is confined in the order of form, since it is pure form separated from matter, and is not being (*esse*) itself, is infinite owing to its not being received in matter, but is not without qualification, etc. Also, it is clear that the divine being (*esse*), which is enclosed within the order of being (*esse*) itself, is without qualification infinite from its non-reception in a quiddity or essence.

Also, you have here what is needed to detect the error in judgment of the Scotists and Scotus in *I Sent.*<sup>35</sup> In that place they use an argument from St. Thomas, brought in as the final step for concluding to God's infinity. The argument is: a form is limited by matter; therefore a form not ordered by nature to be in matter is unlimited. You know already what infinity this argument concludes to and that, according to St. Thomas, the infinity of God negates the above terms.

Thus you notice here a triple error. The first error is that the above argument for concluding to infinity without qualification is said to be taken from us, because in our view it concludes to nothing more than qualified infinity. The second error is that the argument above

---

<sup>35</sup> Scotus, *In I Sent.*, d. 2, q. 2, n. 33; *ed. cit.*, V, Part I, 284.

is declared a sophism containing the fallacy of the consequent. The reason is that a form by nature is limited in itself before it is limited by matter; just as the passage in III *Physicorum*<sup>36</sup> argues that a body is limited relative to another body, and therefore, if not limited relative to another body, it is infinite. The manifest error is clear enough, because when one says that a form is limited by matter, the *by* indicates the precise cause of the qualified limitation in question. Of itself the form is not limited in that way, since of itself it is not determined to this or that matter. Consequently, this follows validly: therefore a form which is not by nature ordered to being received in matter, is qualifiedly infinite. For as affirming is the precise cause of affirmation, negating will be the cause of negation. But this is not the line of reasoning in III *Physicorum*,<sup>37</sup> because a body is not limited causally and precisely by another body.

The third error is the attempt to disavow something said above, namely, that the essence of an intelligence is limited from above by its being (*esse*). Against this he says that according to us, being (*esse*) is posterior to essence and accidental to it; therefore the essence of an intelligence in the first stage (*signo*) of nature is unlimited intensively and consequently is not able to be limited by being (*esse*) in its second stage.

Now the response to this is that being (*esse*) is posterior to the essence in the order of generation and accidental to it, that is, outside its formal concept. However, the essence in that prior stage is without qualification finite, owing to the fact that it is a receiver of being (*esse*) itself and is not its own very being (*esse*), etc. Just as an essence is without qualification infinite because the essence is its own being (*esse*), as is clear in God from what has been said; so an essence is not without qualification infinite because the essence is not its own being (*esse*)—according to that maxim: if affirming is the cause of affirmation, etc. Because, therefore, in every prior stage the essence of an intelligence is fundamentally able to receive its being (*esse*) and cannot be abstracted from this, even though the essence does not have it in every prior stage; it follows that the essence is without qualification limited by its own being (*esse*), that is, because it is not its own being (*esse*), but is what can be or has been actuated, etc. Such indeed is the meaning of saying that the essence of an intelligence is limited by its own being (*esse*).

The first part of the fourth proposition should not be taken up here, seeing that it was discussed earlier. But serious consideration is due the second part, namely, that the intellectual soul, which is

---

<sup>36</sup> See St. Thomas Aquinas, *In III Phys.*, lects. 8 and 9, nn. 684–719.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*

last among intellectual substances, is numerically multiplied. The text assigns its union to body as the cause of this. For every form so united to a body as to give it being (*esse*) formally is necessarily multiplied according to the multiplication of the body. Otherwise, many bodies would have numerically the same being (*esse*), since from one form there arises only numerically one substantial being (*esse*). By rights the soul is said to be multiplied numerically by its union to the body, because numerical distinction, not being formal, ought to be according to quantity, as was said above; but according to quantity such a distinction cannot be in the soul if it is not a form of a quantified thing, as intelligences show. Thus the union of the soul itself to body numerically multiplied is a valid reason for concluding to the numerical plurality of souls.

Although the individuation of the soul depends on the body for the occasion of its beginning, because an individuated act of existing (*esse*) is not needed for it except in a body whose act it is, still it is not necessary that individuation cease when the body has been destroyed. Since it has an independent act of existing (*esse*) whence it acquired an individuated act of existing (*esse*) precisely as being a form of this body, that act of existing (*esse*) always remains individuated, and therefore Avicenna<sup>38</sup> says that the individuation and multiplication of souls depend on the body in the beginning, but not in the end.

117) Here one objection to the fourth proposition is excluded. It is: a form multiplied according to the multiplication of a body does not remain in its own multitude when the body is destroyed; but the human soul is multiplied according to the multiplication of the body; therefore human souls cannot remain many when the bodies are destroyed, etc. The formal reasoning is good, but the conclusion is false; therefore one of the premises is at fault. Not the major premise, since it is proved; then the minor is wrong, and this was the fourth proposition. The major is proved by this that if the cause is taken away, the effect is taken away. Therefore if the cause of the multitude of souls is the multitude itself of bodies, then when the multitude of bodies is removed, the multitude of souls is also taken away. The words of the text, however, exclude this objection. They make clear that there are two ways forms are made many relative to bodies making them many: One is with dependence on matter; one without dependence on it. Those with dependence on matter are indeed destroyed when the bodies have been destroyed; but those without dependence on matter remain, since their individuation is from bodies only as on an occasion. The human soul is in this latter group.

---

<sup>38</sup> Avicenna, *De Anima*, tr. V, c. 3; *ed. cit.*, fol. 14r–v.



As evidence for the above, note first of all that judgments are the same when there is question of being (*esse*) and unity and plurality of a thing relative to dependence and independence. Thus if the being (*esse*) of a thing does not depend on matter, neither does its unity or plurality depend on matter. But if a thing's being (*esse*) depends on matter, so also both its unity and plurality depend on it, for one and many are properties (*passiones*) of being (*entis*).

Note secondly that forms exist in three different ways. Some begin in matter and are educed from the potency of matter, such as material forms. Some begin in matter but are not educed from the potency of matter, such as the intellectual soul which comes from outside matter. Some neither begin in matter nor are educed from the potency of matter, such as forms separate from matter, namely, intelligences. There cannot be a fourth kind of forms which would be educed from the potency of matter and would not begin in matter, because the first implies the second, as is self-evident.

And those forms which are neither educed from the potency of matter nor begin in it are completely independent and separate from matter and cannot be multiplied numerically, as was proved above. But the first and second kinds of forms, seeing that in common they begin in matter, have also this in common that they ought to be adapted and proportioned to the receiving matter in which they begin—proper acts must begin in their proper matter, as is said in II *de Anima*.<sup>39</sup> For the form of lion ought to be commensurate with a lion-like body, and not with a horse-like body; and the form of this lion ought to be commensurate with this lion-like body, and not with that one, etc. Consequently, owing to this, they have in common that both ought to be multiplied together with their proper bodies. And whatever ought to be adapted and proportioned to each other acquire at the same time plurality and unity, as is clear when dealing with singulars. For the multiplication of bodies in one species always accompanies the multiplication of forms in the same species, and the other way around. Otherwise, either one would be in diverse material subjects or diverse material subjects would be under one form, and both are impossible.

However, since the first kind of forms is educed from the potency of matter and the second is not, they differ from each other in the following way. The first has being (*esse*) dependent on matter as a material cause causing and sustaining their being (*esse*); the second has being (*esse*) that exceeds the total capacity of matter and is independent of matter as not being caused by it. Consequent on this

---

<sup>39</sup> Aristotle, *On the Soul*, II, 2, 414a 21.

is a second difference. Both the unity and plurality of the first kind of forms are dependent on matter just as the being (*esse*) is; and therefore just as they are destroyed when the bodies have been destroyed, so is their unity and plurality. But the unity and plurality of the second kind of forms are not dependent on matter, just as the being (*esse*) is not; and therefore just as their being (*esse*) remains when the bodies have been destroyed, so does their unity and plurality.

And this is what St. Thomas had in mind when he speaks of the individuation of the soul, i.e., its unity. The same holds for understanding the part concerning the soul's plurality depending on matter as on an occasion. The soul depends on the body in this way because it begins to be in a body, but not as being educed from the potency of corporeal matter. This is what he sets down with the phrase, *because it does not acquire being except in a body*. He adds the reason, that since the soul has absolute being (*esse*), i.e., independent from the body, it can remain without the body when the body has been destroyed. And hence Avicenna<sup>40</sup> says: the individuation of the soul in its beginning depends on the body, but not in the end because, namely, it does not begin to be except in a body. However, it can be and in fact is without the body after death. Thus the proposed objection is solved, because the major is false when there is question of the second order of forms such as is the human soul.

As for the proof of the major it is already evident what should be said. The multiplication of bodies is not properly the cause but the occasion and only in the becoming of the plurality of souls. But the effect does not cease to exist when the cause of becoming ceases.

**Question XIV<sup>41</sup>—**

**By What Is the Intellectual Soul Individuated?**

118) There is question here of the individuation of the intellectual soul, namely, by what is it individuated?

*Three steps* are to be taken in this inquiry.

First, present the opinion of Scotus.

Second, give the opinion of St. Thomas.

Third, answer the arguments given against it.

---

<sup>40</sup> Avicenna, *De Anima*, tr. V, c. 3; *ed. cit.*, fol. 14r–v.

<sup>41</sup> In the Paris edition (p. 520), this appears as Question XIII. The Laurent edition, apparently an oversight, does not give a title to this question. We have supplied the title in the text.

119) *Now the first step.* Scotus, in *II Sent.*,<sup>42</sup> and in most any text<sup>43</sup> where he follows his doctrine of thisnesses (*heccheitatibus*), holds that the soul is individuated by its own proper thisness. Here is his argument against St. Thomas. Anything is first a this by that by which it is in act outside a cause and intellect; but the soul, just as any entity that is strictly separate, is first itself when outside a cause and intellect; therefore the soul when first itself is a this. The proof of the major is that universality, or being not a this, is not applicable to a thing unless it be in an intellect. The minor is clear from the fact that a thing itself first moves away from non-being.

Secondly, every formal distinction or the lack of it, is specified<sup>44</sup> by matter; intellectual souls are distinguished formally, or not so distinguished, by matter; therefore they are distinguished specifically. The conclusion is false, so that one of the premises is false. Not the minor, because separated intellectual souls have no matter. Then the major is false, and this is the ground of your position. If you said that souls have inclinations to diverse bodies and are distinguished by these, the following argument is against you. The soul by a priority of nature is a term of creation, which term as such formally consists in this that it is joined to matter; therefore by a priority of nature the soul is a this before it is joined to matter; therefore the soul is individuated and not by union with the body. The antecedent is proved in this way. That is prior by nature which can be without another and another cannot be without it, as is said in *V Metaph.*<sup>45</sup> But the soul, not only according to essence but also existence, can be without union to matter, whereas it is not a term of creation and a this without that union. Therefore the soul by a priority of nature is a term of creation and a this before it is in matter.

Suppose one said that the soul is not a this by actual union or existence in matter but by the aptitude for existing in it. This does not get around the difficulty, because a nature taken absolutely is prior by nature to its own aptitude, for the soul is the this. Therefore it has the aptitude to be this and repugnance to be that, etc. The following argument results. What is fitting to one and not fitting to another of the same species is not *per se* fitting to the one according to what the two have in common, or at least as a pre-condition necessarily demands their distinction, namely, of this from that. But this aptitude is fitting to this soul and is not fitting to that one. Thus

---

<sup>42</sup> Scotus, *In II Sent.*, d. 3, q. 6, nn. 9–14; *ed. cit.*, VI, Part I, 406–409, 413.

<sup>43</sup> Scotus, *In II Sent.*, d. 3, q. 2, nn. 2–4; *ed. cit.*, VI, Part I, 374–75.

<sup>44</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 191, line 8) has *specificata*. The Paris edition (p. 520, line 4) has *specificata per te*.

<sup>45</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, V ( ), 11, 1019a 3; St. Thomas, *In V Metaph.*, lect. 13, nn. 936–53.

aptitude necessarily demands a pre-condition, the distinction of this from that. Therefore souls are not individuated by aptitude.

Here is the confirming argument. The nature of aptitude, considered formally, is not something ordered to itself (*ad se*), nor has it the character of a being in act; therefore it cannot be the individuating principle of the soul. The first part of the antecedent is proved by this that if it were ordered to itself (*ad se*) it could be thought as not ordered to another as to a termination, which is false. The second part of the antecedent is proved by this: what necessarily needs something not existing, itself is not existing in act; but an aptitude is ordered to a termination that does not exist; therefore its nature has not the character of a being in act. The consequence is clear because a relative distinction presupposes an absolute distinction since the soul is a this and has this aptitude, and not the other way about; and because this soul is a singular by actual singularity or in act, and not this soul by aptitude for this body. Such is what they think about the present question.

120) We, however, proceeding from Peripatetic principles, say that the soul is individuated by a substantial symmetry to this body and that this and that soul are distinguished by their symmetry to this and that body. The proofs for this position were given above when we demonstrated that numerical distinction cannot arise except from quantity. Thus at present it will suffice to show of what we say just how it is. *Symmetry* is taken in two ways: one, as the relation of symmetry; the other, as a thing's substantial adaptation itself. Considered in the first way, symmetry is essentially a referential thing and in the genus of relation. Considered in the second way, it is an absolute thing and pertains to the category of the commensurate thing, for it is essentially the same as the thing itself but differs from it only in viewpoint (*ratione*). The same holds for inclination, aptitude, adaptation, imaging (*sigillatio*), and the like which are introduced for explaining the proposed position.

Also, *absolute* is taken in two ways in the present discussion. In one way, as separate from a termination, and so we say that substance, quantity and quality are absolute beings (*entia*). In a second way, as separate from a receiver or a subject, and then none of the predicamental accidents are absolute, for they are essentially receivable in a substance. Therefore, when we say that souls are individuated by their symmetries, it must be understood as by substantial symmetries, which are the things separate from terminations, though not from receivers, and not symmetries which are relations, etc. For just as it is of the essence of the soul in general that it be essentially proportionate to a physically organic body which appears in its

definition; so it is of the essence of the human soul that it be commensurate to a human body. The human soul is perfective of the human body in a way that it is not of a cow's body. So also its symmetry to this body is of the essence of this soul. And thus symmetry to a human body does not follow on a soul already human but constitutes it precisely human. For this is primarily the difference between the soul of man and that of cow, that one is the proper act of a human body; the other of a bovine body. Now it is obvious that to be the proper act of a human body is the same as to be its substantial perfection substantially commensurate. Thus substantial symmetry of this soul to this body does not follow on being this soul; it constitutes it precisely this soul. For this soul is substantially the proper act of this body. Consequently this soul primarily differs from that soul because this one is the proper act of this body; that one the proper act of the other. This is what St. Thomas teaches in II *contra Gen.*<sup>46</sup> and in *quaestionibus de anima*<sup>47</sup> and wherever he speaks of this subject.<sup>48</sup> Also, this position agrees with the principles of Aristotle. For he teaches in I *libro de partibus animalium*<sup>49</sup> that the proper specific differences of something divided ought to be what distinguishes it *per se* and as such. Here is an example. The proper differences of animal ought not to be white and black, which do not divide animal as animal, for the identity of animal continues under those varieties. Nor should sailing and flying be proper differences, because these do not diversify sensitive nature *per se*. Differences ought to be such or such as sensitive. Animal, because its constitution is sensitive, is not diversified *per se* except by differences of sensing. Consequently, the soul, being such that it is essentially an act of a physical body, is divided by proper differences in so far as it is the act of such or such body. Furthermore, the act of such a body—think of the human body—is divided by proper differences (material still) through its being the act of this or that body. Therefore souls themselves are individuated by substantial symmetries not separate from their receivers; just as souls themselves essentially are not separate from the perfectible bodies receiving them. Failure to consider this point is the cause of the error of all who want to say the same thing about everything (as do the Scotists). It happens to such men, seeing that they pay no attention to the proper natures of things and prefer to equate things to their concepts, that they propose the same answer to the individuation of everything. These men should be classed with

---

<sup>46</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *Contra Gentiles*, II, 56.

<sup>47</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *Q.D. de Anima*, a. 1.

<sup>48</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *In II Sent.*, d. 1, q. 2, a. 5; *De Mallo*, q. V, a. 5.

<sup>49</sup> Aristotle, *On the Parts of Animals*, I, 3, 643a 27.

those described in II *Coeli*,<sup>50</sup> who push their enquiry so long as they find that they do not contradict themselves.

121) With these points covered, we move to *the solution of the arguments*.

To the first argument, we say the major is false. Granted that any thing given outside an intellect and a cause is a this, still it is not by the same thing that it first is and is a this. It first is by being (*esse*) itself, but is first a this by thisness (*heccheitate*). For there are many things which inseparably accompany each other which are not first had by the same principle; for instance, any being other than God is outside an intellect and a cause and is dependent, but not first is and dependent by the same principle. The minor also is false. A thing is not first itself; it is placed outside of nothing through actual existence really distinct from itself, as was explained above, etc.

In the second argument the minor should be denied. Two separated human souls are not distinguished formally, or by matter, even though they are pure forms separated from matter. It is quite different to say: every formal distinction is specific, than to say: every distinction of forms is specific. Indeed, a formal distinction, as being what consists of defining principles, is specific. For whatever things have diverse definitions differ in species, since they have at least ultimate differences not the same, whose diversity suffices for specific diversity. But such is not the difference between the soul of Socrates and of Plato, since they have the same definition. However, distinction of forms, since it is present wherever there happens a division between forms, is found in two separated souls, because they are adapted to diverse bodies. Thus there is not the same intelligibility (*ratio*) for these and for other separated substances which are not joinable to bodies. And so the position taken there is good if sanely understood, that is, in the way explained, that souls are distinguished by their substantial inclinations to diverse bodies.

Regarding the first objection, we say against it that it does not conclude to what was intended. In fact it concludes: therefore the soul by a priority of nature is a this before it has actual union with the body. It ought to conclude: therefore the soul by a priority of nature is a this before it is adapted or ordered to this body. For we do not say that the soul is formally individuated by actual union with the body but by its substantial adaptation to this body, a thing which by a priority of nature would be due<sup>51</sup> the soul before actual union itself. This is clear, because soul as this is the *per se* term of creation,

---

<sup>50</sup> Aristotle, *On the Heavens*, II, 13, 294b 6; St. Thomas, *In II de Caelo*, lect. 22, n. 1.

<sup>51</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 194, line 8) has *deberetur*. The Paris edition (p. 523, line 19) has *deberi*.

not soul as this existing being; also because being in (*inesse*) presupposes being (*esse*), while being (*esse*) particular is more immediate than being in. Thus the position presented there is good, though with a grain of salt. We say that the soul is formally individuated by substantial aptitude, or symmetry, and conditionally individuated by actual union with the body, that is, by an if and only if condition. And because the formal nature of a thing is prior by nature to an if and only if condition, therefore, etc.

As for the argument opposing this, the answer is clear from what has been said. It assumes this false proposition, namely, that this nature is prior to its own substantial aptitude. Thus the major of the argument constructed there for the second part of the disjunctive is false, namely, whatever is fitting to one and not fitting to another thing of the same species demands beforehand the distinction between them. The fact is that it does not demand beforehand but constitutes their distinction, just as what is fitting to one species and not fitting to another of the same genus has no need that it demand a distinction beforehand; rather it is true that it makes their distinction. For example, rational is fitting to man and opposed to lion, and irrational is fitting to lion and opposed to man. Still, rational and irrational do not demand beforehand the distinction between man and lion; they constitute it. Whence you may subsume under that major thus: but the thisness of the soul of Socrates is fitting to itself and opposed to the soul of Plato; therefore thisnesses (*haecceitates*) suppose they are distinguished. Thus you convince the Scotists of the strength of their own argument, etc.

The confirming argument says that the nature of the aptitude is not ordered to itself (*de se*). I say that the nature of a substantial aptitude, which we are considering, is ordered to another; but not to another as a termination but as a receiver. Now the proof says nothing opposed to this. I grant that a substantial aptitude can be understood as not ordered to another as a termination, but it cannot be as not ordered to another as receiver; just as quantity and quality are absolute regarding a termination but not absolute regarding a subject.

The second part of the antecedent is that the nature of aptitude has not the nature of a being in act. First, I say that it is false. For the aptitude to laugh, namely, risibility, has the nature of a being (*entis*) in first act, even though it is potency regarding second act. In fact both propositions of the proof are false. The major—what necessarily demands something not itself existing is not existing in act—since every active potency in first act demands that its operation be not existing while it itself exists in first act. And the minor

is false, because the substantial aptitude of the soul for the body does not exclude the body; it is the composition from contraries which makes the aptitude of the soul be without actual union.

Secondly, I say that we use *aptitude* equivocally. That aptitude, which we understand in the soul, is nothing except the substantial symmetry or imaging (*sigillatio*) of this soul with this body, which is clearly in act both while joined to the body and while separated from it, as was clear in the example of wax given above. But the argument proceeds as if that aptitude were a potential thing waiting for something that should reduce it to act, etc. As for the consequence, it is clear what need be said, because this is not a relative distinction but an absolute one relative to the receiver, etc.

Also, because quiddity and the act of existing (*esse*) are not the same in these substances, then they can be placed in a category. Thus we find in them genus, species and difference, although their proper differences are hidden from us. In sensible things also the essential differences themselves are not known to us; thus we signify them by accidental differences which have their origin in the essential, as a cause is signified by its effect, or "biped" is given as the difference of man. But the proper accidents of immaterial substances are unknown to us; consequently we are not able to designate their differences either through themselves or through their accidental differences.

122) Here, in the third part of this chapter, St. Thomas will show how the quiddities of separated substances stand relative to logical intentions, namely, genus, species and difference, etc.; and, after noting four points, he ends after excluding two objections. Thus he first lays down this conclusion: intelligences are in a category. Here is his proof: everything whose being (*esse*) differs from essence is in a category; intelligences are such; therefore, etc. The minor was proved above. The major can be proved in the following way. Everything having a limited being (*esse*) is in a genus, for if it has limited being (*esse*), it is limited to some genus. If a *per se* subsisting thing was limited to no genus, whence or how would it have limited being (*esse*)? But every being whose being (*esse*) is distinguished from its essence has limited being (*esse*), as was shown above. Therefore all such are in a category. As a corollary from this he concludes that they have genus, species and difference. But he adds, *although their proper differences are hidden from us*. And as a response to your difficulty, which one could raise,<sup>52</sup> as to how one knows there are differences in them if we do not know the differences, the fact is we know con-

---

<sup>52</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 195, line 2 from bottom) has *qua dicere*. The Paris edition (p. 524, line 13 from bottom) has *qua quis dicere*.



cerning them the answer to, are they? and we do not know the answer to, what are they? We know, I say, there are differences in intelligences, but what these are is hidden. Hidden are the differences in themselves of intelligences because it is common to all substances to have hidden differences in themselves, and in this they are like substances of a lower grade. Hidden are the differences according to accidental properties which are their attributes (*passiones*), because they exceed the natural power of the human intellect, which is related to what is most manifest in nature, as the eye of the owl is to the light of the sun. And in this they differ from sensible substances, whose proper differences are designated by the names of their properties, as causes are by the names of their effects. Thus the differences of intelligences are completely hidden from us in so far as what they are, etc.

**Question XV<sup>53</sup>—**

**Whether Intelligences Are Quidditatively Knowable by Us?<sup>54</sup>**

123) There is doubt about the question whether intelligences are quidditatively knowable by us in this life, etc.

In this section *seven steps* need to be taken.

First, explain the title and intention of this question.

Second, give the opinion of Averroes.

Third, attack that opinion.

Fourth, answer his reasons.

Fifth, explain the opinion of St. Thomas.

Sixth, give the reasons of John of Ghent<sup>55</sup> against St. Thomas.

Seventh, answer these reasons, etc.

124) *On the first point*, note that to know a quiddity, or knowledge of a quiddity, is one thing, and quidditative knowledge, or to know quidditatively, is another. One knows the quiddity of lion if he knows some essential predicate of lion. But one knows quidditatively only if he knows all quidditative predicates down to the ultimate difference, etc. Now since we know that intelligences are substances and are intellectual, etc., it is clear that we know their quiddities. Thus this

---

<sup>53</sup> In the Paris edition (p. 525), this appears as Question XIV.

<sup>54</sup> The title of this question in the Paris edition (p. 525) is: *Num intelligentiae sint a nobis quidditative cognoscibiles in hac vita.*

<sup>55</sup> *Johannis de Gandova* is perhaps John of Jandun, the Latin Averroist. John of Ghent was master of theology at Paris about 1303. Since Cajetan is arguing against the Averroist position in this question, John of Jandun seems to be the more likely person. On the confusion of John Ghent and John of Jandun, see E. Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (New York: Random House, 1954), p. 797, n. 62.

is not a matter of doubt. But the question is whether we can know them quidditatively, namely, so that we penetrate to their ultimate differences. There are many opinions on this question, as is clear from *III de Anima*.<sup>56</sup> Still, we are dealing here only with the Scotists and Averroists; and the opinion of the Scotists, as is clear in *I Sent.*,<sup>57</sup> does not arrive at a differing conclusion. Thus we have a dispute only with Averroes. So for the first step.

125) *Now for the second.* Averroes, in *III de Anima*,<sup>58</sup> supposing his earlier fictitious position in *commento V*,<sup>59</sup> thought that the possible intellect, as appropriated to us who are adapted to every speculative intelligible and thereby connected to the agent intellect, as form, understands through the agent intellect the separated substances and so do we, for whom the agent intellect owing to this becomes a form, even though (*sicut modo*) it is only a possible intellect. The result is that just as at one time (*sicut modo*) we understand material things through the possible intellect, so at another we understand separated substances through the agent intellect.

He proves his contention by two arguments. The first is founded on two propositions. The first is: the intellect and the first speculative intelligibles are related like form and matter. Here is its proof. Those things whose operation is strictly one so that the operation of one is communicated to the other, are related like agent and instrument, or like form and matter. But there is strictly one operation of the agent intellect and the first speculative intelligibles, namely, making the intelligibles in act, which is communicated to the first speculative intelligibles. Therefore the agent intellect and the first speculative intelligibles are related like an agent and instrument, or like form and matter. The minor is clear because the intellect in habit cannot only understand, it can also make potential intellectual conclusions intelligible in act. We experience both of these as being within our power, namely, to understand and to make conclusions actually intelligible by means of the first intelligibles which become actually intelligible only in the light of the agent intellect.

Now in the major there is a qualification, (so that the proper operation of one is communicated to the other) because many pulling a ship concur in the same operation, but not like matter and form, nor like agent and instrument, precisely because one does not share in the proper operation of the other. Yet it is clear that what communicates its own operation to another by concurring in the same

---

<sup>56</sup> Averroes, *In III de Anima*, com. 36; *ed. cit.*, t. VI, fol. 175r ff.

<sup>57</sup> Scotus, *In II Sent.*, d. 3, q. 7, nn. 3–5; *ed. cit.*, VI, Part I, 422–24.

<sup>58</sup> Averroes, *In III de Anima*, com. 36; *ed. cit.*, t. VI, fol. 175r ff.

<sup>59</sup> Averroes, *In III de Anima*, com. 5; *ed. cit.*, t. VI, fol. 160v ff.

thing is related to the other like the principal agent is to an instrument, as a carpenter communicates making a chair to a saw; or like form to matter, as heat communicates heating to hot water. And though both parts of the disjunctive conclusion are true, still the first part is more manifest and less to the point. Consequently the Commentator explains the second part, namely, that the first speculative intelligibles and the agent intellect are related as matter and form. He does this by showing that the agent intellect and all speculative intelligibles, not only the first, are related as form and matter. He explains it in this way. Whenever something receives two things having an order between themselves, the more perfect and more formal is like form, and what is less perfect and less formal has the nature of matter. But the possible intellect receives the speculative intelligibles and agent intellect with an order between themselves such that the agent intellect is more perfect and more formal than the speculative intelligibles. Therefore the agent intellect and the speculative intelligibles are related as form and matter. The major says, of things having an order among themselves, because otherwise the proposition would not be true, as is seen in the whiteness and sweetness of milk, where neither is the form of the other. But when they are necessarily ordered, the proposition is verified, as is evident when air receives color and light. The minor is patent in that the intelligible is received in the one understanding. But the possible intellect understands both the agent intellect and the speculative intelligible, etc. And thus the first proposition is clear.

The second proposition is: the possible intellect as appropriated to us sometimes<sup>60</sup> receives the speculative intelligibles and agent intellect only in potency, sometimes partly in act and partly in potency, and sometimes totally in act. This proposition is perfectly clear for the speculative intelligibles. For the intellect of a baby is in pure potency, like a blank tablet on which nothing is written;<sup>61</sup> later it receives knowledge of the first principles; then it acquires successively the knowledge of many conclusions. In this way it is act with reference to something, principles for instance, and in potency relative to something, conclusions for instance. And finally, when it has acquired all conclusions it is totally in act for everything, principles as well as conclusions. Once you join the above to the first proposition, the second proposition in its second part will be clear to you. For if the agent intellect is the form of speculative intelligibles, there will be the same proportion in the union with the agent intellect as there is between the possible intellect and the speculative intelligibles in this

---

<sup>60</sup> Laurent edition (p. 198, line 12) has *quandoque*. The Paris edition (p. 526, line 26) has *quinque*.

<sup>61</sup> Aristotle, *On the Soul*, III, 4, 430a 1.

respect that if totally joined to one, it is totally also to the one left; and if partially to one, it will be partially joined to the one left.

With all this as preparation, the first argument of Averroes is formed in this way. Everything moved to the acquisition of something as a form can, once that is fully acquired, act with the proper operation of that form. But the possible intellect as appropriated to us is moved to the acquisition of the agent intellect as form. Therefore the possible intellect can, once it has acquired the agent intellect, act with the proper operation of the agent intellect. But the proper operation of the agent intellect is to understand separated substances quidditatively. Therefore the possible intellect would be able to understand separated substances through the agent intellect. And since the new operation<sup>62</sup> of the possible intellect is said of us, we know separated substances through the agent intellect, etc. The major is clear as seen in an example. When water is moved to the form of heat, it can, once it has acquired heat, make something hot. The like appears in all things.

The minor is proved in two ways. First, from the two propositions above. Whenever something is moved to two things to be received that are ordered among themselves, it is moved to what is more formal and more perfect as to a form, as the first proposition says. But the possible intellect is moved to speculative intelligibles and agent intellect, because sometimes it is in pure potency, sometimes partly in act and partly in potency. This is according to the second proposition, where things have an order among themselves, because the agent intellect is received by means of the speculative intelligibles and the agent intellect is more formal and more perfect. Therefore the possible intellect is moved to receive the agent intellect as a form. Secondly, the minor is proved in this way. The possible intellect is moved to receive the agent intellect as an end; therefore as a form. The antecedent is clear in that the agent intellect itself is the efficient cause of that motion which moves the possible intellect to itself. Now in things separated from matter the efficient cause and the end of motion are the same, as is said in XII *Metaph.*<sup>63</sup> As for the consequence, it is clear from II *Phys.*,<sup>64</sup> where it is said that the end, the mover (*motus*) and the form are the same. Averroes touches on this proof in XII *Metaphys.*<sup>65</sup>

---

<sup>62</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 198, line 6 from bottom) has *operatio*. The Paris edition (p. 526, line 4 from bottom) has *occupatio*.

<sup>63</sup> Averroes, *In XII Metaph.*, com. 36; *ed. cit.*, t. VIII, fol. 149v.

<sup>64</sup> Aristotle, *Physics*, II, 7, 198a 24; 24; St. Thomas, *In II Phys.*, lect. 11, nn. 472–473.

<sup>65</sup> Averroes, *In XII Metaph.*, com. 38; *ed. cit.*, t. VIII, fol. 151r.

The second reason of Averroes is in II *Metaph.*<sup>66</sup> If intelligences were not knowable by us, nature would have acted in vain, and this consequent is false. The consequence is proved, because it would make non-intelligible to another what of itself and naturally is intelligible, much as if it made the sun not seen by some seeing. Now this consequence and its proof are considered by St. Thomas as open to derision, seeing that it is in vain when a thing cannot attain its own end and to be understood by us is not the end of intelligences. Granted that to be understood is their end, it suffices for their intelligibility that they be understood by themselves. It does not follow that if they are not understood by the human intellect, they are by no intellect; just as it is not valid to argue that the sun is not seen by an owl and therefore by no sight. For this reason, John of Ghent, in III *de Anima*,<sup>67</sup> proves the consequence in two ways. In the first, he reminds us that the Commentator does not lay it down that the end of separated substances is to be understood by us. He holds that intelligences are of themselves intelligibles by our intellect, since they fall under its prime object, namely, being. This then follows validly: intelligences are of themselves naturally knowable by us; therefore our intellect is by nature constituted to understand them. To a thing naturally active, such as is an intelligence, there ought to correspond something passive by nature, such as is the intellect; otherwise an active potency in nature would be in vain.

Secondly, he argues to the consequence from the point above. Granted that the primary end of intelligences is not to be understood by our intellect, still this is their secondary end. For they act by first intention on account of themselves, but secondarily on account of other things, as is said in II *Coeli*.<sup>68</sup> And therefore it follows that intelligences would be in vain at least as regards the secondary end and thus nature would have made something futilely. For this reason, he says, the consequence of the Commentator is close to a *per se* known proposition and is not open to derision.

Again, there is a third way this consequence can be derived from the words of the Commentator,<sup>69</sup> where the reason of Themistius is considered. He says that if our intellect is immaterial, then this consequence holds: our intellect understands things of themselves immaterial. This position is based on the words of Aristotle's III *de Anima*.<sup>70</sup> He says that the intellect, once it apprehends the highly

---

<sup>66</sup> Averroes, *In II Metaph.*, com. 1; *ed. cit.*, t. VIII, fol. 14r.

<sup>67</sup> John of Jandun, *In III de Anima*, q. 37; in *Quaestiones in Libros de Anima*, Venetiis, 1473.

<sup>68</sup> Averroes, *In II de Caelo*, com. 21; *ed. cit.*, t. V, fol. 51r–v.

<sup>69</sup> Averroes, *In III de Anima*, com. 36; *ed. cit.*, t. VI, fol. 176v.

<sup>70</sup> Aristotle, *On the Soul*, III, 4, 429b 3; St. Thomas, *In III de Anima*, lect. 7, nn. 687–88.

intelligible, is strengthened for understanding something higher. From this one has as a ground that immateriality is a sufficient cause of a knowing power to be able to understand separated substances. Consequently, here is the way the consequence is proved. Intelligences are not knowable by our intellects; therefore they are knowable by no other intellect; therefore they are knowable in vain—just as the sun would be visible in vain if it could be seen by no one. The first consequence is good. For if immateriality does not give our intellect understanding of them, it will give it to no one, because it has already been shown that immateriality is the sufficient cause of this knowing. For instance, since sensitivity is the sufficient cause of the sense of touch, if this were present in one species of animal and did not give it touch, sensitivity would give it to no other. The second consequence is clear from the example. Therefore every intellect whatever is, owing to its own immateriality, able to understand separated substances, more or less however, according as they have more or less perfection. So for the second step.

126) *In the third step* we argue against the above position in two ways. First, we argue that the kind of connection given above does not lead the possible intellect as appropriated to us to understanding the separated substances. What is connected with the agent intellect only as the form of speculative intelligibles is not able through it to understand the separated substances quidditatively. But the possible intellect as appropriated in us is connected with the agent intellect only as a form of the speculative intelligibles. Therefore the possible intellect, as appropriated to us, is not able by this connection to understand separated substances quidditatively. The major is proved by laying it down that the agent intellect has relations of different orders towards higher and lower things, namely, to immaterial substances and speculative intelligibles. To the higher the agent intellect is related as contemplator and not as their form; to the lower as maker and form. Once this is established the force of the major is clear. For whenever one thing has a relation to a different order to diverse things, what is connected with it in so far as it has a relation to lower things is not for this reason connected with it in so far as it has a relation to higher things. And to conclude from one of these to the other is to commit obviously the fallacy of accident. Therefore what is connected to the agent intellect as form of speculative intelligibles is not for that reason connected to it as contemplator of immaterial substances. Now the minor is from the words of the Commentator, who lays it down in his position that there is no other way in which the possible intellect is connected to the agent intellect except through speculative intelligibles. Consequently he says that the

possible intellect, when in pure potency to speculative intelligibles, is also in pure potency to the agent intellect; and when it is partly in act and partly in potency regarding them, it is the same regarding the agent intellect; and were it totally in act regarding the speculative intelligibles, it will be totally joined to the agent intellect.

Secondly, we prove that even if such a connection would lead the possible intellect to this, still it is never able to lead us to it. Here is my argument. What is connected with the agent intellect only as the colored is to light and is connected to the possible intellect only as the colored is to vision cannot be denominated as acting with the proper operation of light, as can vision, or the agent or possible intellect. But man who imagines has this connection with these intelligibles. Therefore he cannot be named as making things intelligible and as understanding immaterial substances, which are the operations of the agent intellect, nor named as understanding sensible things, which is the operation of the possible intellect. The major is known from its terms, for it cannot be truly said that the colored illumines or sees. And the minor is clear from III *de Anima*.<sup>71</sup> Nor is there anything in any way against the comparison above, that man by the proper action of his cogitative power spiritualizes phantasms. The colored, indeed, does not spiritualize colors. If one thought up the position that the colored in itself is not able to be presented to the eye and to light but was spiritualized only in the image, because its proper operation would spiritualize the species of the colored itself, our comparison would run on all fours. And yet, such an image, presented to light and vision, could not be truly said to illumine or to see. And this reason, as I see it, is demonstrative. At any rate, if God gives us life, we will show its force more fully. So for the third step.

127) *Now the fourth step. Against the first* reason of Averroes we say that the major is universally false, if it be taken as it should in order to conclude to what is intended. And not merely the subject ought to be taken universally, but also the predicate in this way. Everything moved to acquire some form is able once the form is perfectly possessed, to act with every operation proper to that form—otherwise the argument would not conclude. But it is clear that this proposition is false, seeing that it is sufficient that what acquires some form participate some operation of that form, namely, the operation fitting the form in so far as it pertains to the receiver. The reason for this was given in the first argument made against Averroes. That is, that it is not necessary for a thing connected to a form having dif-

---

<sup>71</sup> Aristotle, *On the Soul*, III, 5, 430a 14.

ferent relations to a lesser and higher thing that it be connected to the form as related to the higher merely because it is perfectly connected to it as related to the lower. Consequently we can grant that because the possible intellect acquires the agent intellect as form, it follows that it can act by the operation of the agent intellect as being the form of the speculative intelligibles. It is precisely as such that it is acquired, that is, to make the intelligibles in act and to extend itself by understanding to all that the agent intellect as maker extends itself. And yet, it does not follow that the possible intellect can understand all that the agent intellect deals with as contemplator.

To his second reason the answer is to deny the consequence. The first proof, we say, commits the fallacy of the consequent, going from the higher to its lower affirmatively. Granted that intelligences are knowable by our intellect because contained under its primary object, it does not follow that therefore they are intelligible to us quidditatively. For not everything contained under being (*ente*) is quidditatively intelligible to us because being (*ens*), though it be the adequate object of our intellect extensively, yet it is not the adequate object intensively with mutual adequation. That is to say, that though every being (*ens*) can be understood by us, yet not every being (*ens*) can be penetrated by our intellect down to the ultimate differences. In this way the quiddity of a material thing is the adequate object of our intellect, namely, with intensive adequation, for only that and every one of them our intellect is by nature constituted to understand quidditatively.

A similar response is given to the second way of deducing the consequence. Even though it be given that the secondary end of intelligences is to be understood by us, still this is not valid: therefore to be understood quidditatively by us is the secondary end. In fact this is impossible.

The same is to be said for the third way. Even though immateriality be the sufficient cause for the knowing power to be able to understand separated substances, yet this is not valid: therefore it has from immateriality the ability to know them quidditatively.

Now the text of Aristotle that was adduced is no obstacle when rightly understood. It must be noted that a sense power relative to the highly sensible has two things happen to it: that it does not know the sensible perfectly; that it suffers by a corrupting passion from the sensible. But the intellect relative to the highly intelligible has only one, namely, that the intellect does not understand it perfectly, since the intellect has no part in passion. The reason is that the second follows matter, whose act is a sensitive power, but not an intellectual



one; whereas the first follows according to the proportion<sup>72</sup> of the potency to the object, which proportion is kept equally in the immaterial power as in the material. Just as the owl, owing to its species, has vision unproportioned to clear light, so a man, owing to his nature, has an intellect unproportioned to the clear separated intelligible, that is, according as the thing is separated from matter. Therefore intellect and sense are like in the first, and differ in the second.

Owing to this difference, Aristotle says in that place, it arises that the sense is weakened after the highly sensible has been sensed, but the intellect is not altered after the highly intelligible has been understood; it is more able to understand other things that are to be understood according to the manner possible to it. However, from this one cannot infer: therefore our intellect can understand immaterial substances quidditatively. He can infer: therefore it does not come from its alteration that it cannot comprehend them. This we freely concede. For man has a reasoning intellect which arises in the shadow of intelligence, as Isaac says, and is therefore naturally proportioned to see, not the pure and clearly intelligible, but the intelligible darkened to matter; such as is the quiddity abstractible from sensibles. So for the fourth step.

128) *The fifth step* is to give the position of St. Thomas. I take it from I *Parte*,<sup>73</sup> and III *contra Gentes*,<sup>74</sup> and II *Metaph.*<sup>75</sup> He himself holds this conclusion: the human soul, joined to the body, is not able to know immaterial substances quidditatively. At present *two proofs* of this are given. *The first* is: an intellect existing in potency only to receiving intelligibles abstracted by the agent intellect is not able to understand immaterial substances quidditatively; but the human intellect is of this sort; therefore. The major is clear from the terms, since the opposite of the predicate infers the opposite of the subject. For what is able to understand separated substances quidditatively is not only in potency to receiving what is abstracted by the agent intellect, seeing that separated substances are not abstracted from matter through the operation of the agent intellect. The minor is taken from Aristotle,<sup>76</sup> where he says that the agent intellect can make all that the possible intellect is able to become.

*The second proof* is: no sensible effect can lead to quidditative knowledge of separated substances; therefore the human intellect, joined to the body, is not able to know them quidditatively. The consequence holds because nothing is in the intellect that was not first

---

<sup>72</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 202, line 4 from bottom) has *in proportione*. The Paris edition (p. 530, line 3) has *improportionem*.

<sup>73</sup> St. Thomas, *Sum. Theol.*, I, 88, 1.

<sup>74</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *Contra Gentiles*, III, 45.

<sup>75</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *In II Metaph.*, lect. 1, nn. 282–86.

in sense. As for the antecedent, it is proved by this, that the effect can lead to quidditative knowledge of its cause in two ways. One is by way of likeness, as from knowing a univocal effect we therefore know its cause quidditatively, because they are of the same nature. And it is clear that in this way no sensible can lead to the natures of immaterial substances, because they differ not only in species but in genus. In the second way the effect leads to the quidditative knowledge of its cause, not by way of likeness, but through this, that it shows the total power of its cause. For example, to understand shows the total power of the intellectual soul and therefore from such operation we proceed to the quidditative knowledge of it. Nor are sensibles strong enough to lead us in this way to quidditative knowledge of intelligences. For no particular effect is equal to the power of a universal cause, and any sensible is a particular effect, as the material conditions of each of them show. Consequently, through no sensible can we arrive at quidditative knowledge of immaterial<sup>77</sup> substances which are the most universal causes. So for the fifth step.

129) *In the sixth step*, John of Ghent, mentioned above, argues in III *de Anima*<sup>78</sup> against this answer.

First, he argues against the phrase, *joined to the body*, that is put in the conclusion. No form is hindered in its most excellent operation owing to the union with proper matter. But to understand the quiddities of separated substances is the most excellent operation of the human soul, as is clear in *X Ethic.*;<sup>79</sup> and the human body is its proper matter. Therefore the human soul owing to union with body is not hindered from contemplating immaterial substances.

Again, to the same point. The human soul is either born to understand the separated substances through its own substance, or through a species introduced from the outside, or through a species caused from the phantasm. If through its own substance, seeing that its substance is not hindered by union to the body, it would then be able to understand. If through a species taken from the phantasm, the union with body will help. If through an introduced species, we ask how the union with body hinders such an influx or does not permit it to happen. Now this does not seem to be reasonable at all, because the generation of one species is not hindered by a body unless the body have a disposition contrary to a disposition requisite for its generation. For example, color requires translucence in the air in order to be received in air; then no body can impede the generation

---

<sup>76</sup> Aristotle, *On the Soul*, III, 5, 430a 14.

<sup>77</sup> *Materialium* in the text should read *immaterialium*.

<sup>78</sup> John of Jandun, *op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*

<sup>79</sup> Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, X, 8, 1179a 22; St. Thomas, *In X Ethic.*, lect. 12, n. 2125.

of the species of color unless it have opaqueness which is contrary to translucence. Now the human body has no disposition contrary to the one required for the reception of introduced intelligible species, as is clear. Therefore.

The reason is confirmed by the following. An unqualified good of some nature is not hindered because of an unqualified good of the same nature. And what hinders an unqualified good of some nature is an unqualified evil to it. But to understand the quiddity of immaterial substances is an unqualified good of the human soul. Therefore it is not hindered through union with body, since this is also an unqualified good for it.

Thirdly, he argues against the conclusion itself taken from the words of St. Thomas. These words says that we know the being (*esse*) of intelligences, not their quiddity. Either their being (*esse*) is the same as their quiddity or diverse. If diverse,<sup>80</sup> then both fall under our knowledge, for if one knows some things are diverse, he knows the extremes of this diversity, as is said in *II de Anima*.<sup>81</sup> If they are the same, then by knowing one the one left is also known.

If one says that we know those quiddities but not perfectly, against this first is that it is against two statements of Thomists. The first is that we do not know the quiddities of separated substances; the second is we know their being (*esse*), not their quiddities. From the first I argue: man does not understand quiddities that are separated; therefore he does not understand them at all. The consequence holds from the source of arguing: from the whole under some aspect negatively to its own part. Using the second statement, the argument goes: the cognition denied of quiddity is the one affirmed of being (*esse*); but being (*esse*) is not known by us except imperfectly; therefore they mean to deny imperfect cognition also of the quiddities. For if we know both imperfectly, why do we rather deny one is known or affirm the other is? Secondly, it is proved in the following way that the response in itself is false. If we know those quiddities imperfectly, the reason is either because we do not know them as perfectly as they are known by themselves—no reason, because this is to bring the ridiculous in question; or because we do not know them with the perfection due us according to our nature, and this is something voluntary. No reason is able to prove this conclusively, for union with the body is not able to hinder this, as was proved. So for the sixth step.

---

<sup>80</sup> In the Paris edition (p. 531, line 19 from bottom, *Si diversum* is missing.

<sup>81</sup> Averroes, *In II de Anima*, com. 146; *ed. cit.*, t. VI, fol. 155v.

130) *The seventh* step is the response to these arguments. It must be noted in advance that according to the doctrine of St. Thomas,<sup>82</sup> there is the following difference between the knowledge of the soul joined to the body and separated. As the joined soul has a mode of being (*essendi*) when mingled with body, so it has a mode of understanding by turning itself to the phantasms. The result is that from the conformity of the mode of acting to the mode of being (*essendi*) it happens that the joined soul is turned towards the phantasms relative to possible intellect, as passive to active, so that it cannot receive species except from the phantasms together with the agent intellect. But as the soul separated from the body has another mode of being (*essendi*) without informing the body, so it has another mode of understanding. The result is that also from the conformity of the mode of acting to the mode of being (*essendi*) it happens that the separated soul is turned relative to the intellect towards the higher things as<sup>83</sup> active. As a result it receives from them an influx of species, inasmuch as it is rendered similar to them in mode of being (*essendi*). And the soul, having left the body, is in some way made freer, no longer bound to phantasms.

Now from this comes another difference, namely, the joined soul cannot know immaterial substances except through species received from sensibles. Its intellect is tied to phantasms. But the separated soul knows them through their proper species, since it is already turned to higher things.

A third difference also arises for those who, with insight, observe that the soul is part of a species and is joined to the body for the better. It is that the knowledge which the soul has through acquired species is distinct and quidditative knowledge, extending as far as the ultimate differences of things; whereas the knowledge which the separated soul gains from introduced species is confused and designates things generally. Since the soul is naturally a part of man, it claims for itself a natural mode of knowing from its proper nature, to understand through species received from the phantasms and not through introduced species. For the latter mode of understanding is natural to intelligences from their own nature. Therefore just as the intelligences have perfect knowledge of things through introduced species, so the soul through species acquired from sensibles can have perfect knowledge, while the introduced species exceed the natural power of its intellect. This mode is connatural and proper to a higher order and does not fit the soul except through some defective participation. Moreover, the order between intellectual substances is

---

<sup>82</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.*, I, qq. 88 and 89.

<sup>83</sup> In the Paris edition (p. 532, line 16), *ut* is missing.

such that the closer they are to the first that penetrates everything through understanding its own substance, the more universal are the species of things through which they acquire perfect knowledge naturally. Lowest among these, the soul, intellectual by its own nature, requires species so fully articulated that it must have single likenesses for single quiddities. For this reason it is also joined to the body, that it may receive them from it. Therefore its intellectual force, when it tries to understand through higher species such as are the introduced, is in a way smothered, and has only confused knowledge; just as a student who is not up to understanding the universal concepts of the teacher remains with no distinct knowledge. A sign of this is that among men of acute talent, once the principles have been given,<sup>84</sup> they immediately move to conclusions and from the same principles deduce many specialized conclusions. You also have men of talent who perceive a distinct truth only when principles are applied to single conclusions and in syllogistic form and with material examples.

From these things you can understand that neither the joined nor the separated soul is able naturally to have quidditative knowledge of immaterial substances. And, what is more, you have from these that a separated soul does not through introduced species know quidditatively either a cow or a lion, but knows generally everything besides its own nature. And wherever you find St. Thomas saying elsewhere that a separated soul knows the quiddities of immaterial substances, etc., call to mind that to be designated quidditative knowledge by him that knowledge is what the separated soul has of them through proper species. This the soul cannot have.

Therefore to the first reason we say that even though understanding immaterial substances is the most excellent operation of the intellectual soul, yet to understand them quidditatively is impossible for it. Nor does Aristotle, in *X Ethic.*,<sup>85</sup> say anything against this. In fact, you will find this question raised by him in *III de Anima*,<sup>86</sup> and never answered. For he layed it down that human happiness consisted in the contemplation of separated substances possible to us, whatever it be. The same is said to the second reason, that union of the soul to body does not hinder quidditative cognition of immaterial substances, since that knowledge is impossible to the soul in every state of the nature. And if these two reasons are arranged with the purpose of concluding that the joined soul can have such knowledge

---

<sup>84</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 206, line 16 from bottom) has *positis*. The Paris edition (p. 532, line 4 from bottom) has *propositis*.

<sup>85</sup> Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, X, 8, 1179a 22.

<sup>86</sup> Aristotle, *On the Soul*, III, 7, 431b 17; St. Thomas, *In III de Anima*, lect. 12, n. 785.

of immaterial substances as the soul when separated has through their species; the response should be to deny right off that understanding immaterial substances in such a way is unqualifiedly the most excellent operation of the soul, even though it be qualifiedly the most excellent. To understand sensible substances distinctly and quidditatively and to understand immaterial substances through sensible effects and common notes puts a greater unqualified perfection in the soul than to understand them in a confused way, though that confused understanding is qualifiedly more excellent, because it is through their species and in a more immaterial way. Thus I say it is not proper<sup>87</sup> for our soul to be hindered in the operation qualifiedly most excellent, because it acquires from union to its proper matter a perfection unqualifiedly most excellent for it. Whence it does not follow that the union is preternatural, but most natural, inasmuch as it is owing to its unqualified perfection; and especially because the knowledge it has when separated is in a sense preternatural to it, as is also the mode of being (*essendi*) it has, etc.

*To the second reason* we say that from union with body the soul is hindered in receiving the influx of species, because its mode of operating only by turning to phantasms follows the mode of being (*essendi*) in a body. This natural turning of the soul to phantasms hinders turning to higher things. And the proof against this gets nowhere, for it happens that the hindrance takes place in another way, as is already clear. To the confirming argument, we say that the minor is false. Understanding immaterial substances in such a way is a qualified good of the soul, not an unqualified one. Union with the body together with what follows this union is its unqualified good.

*To the third reason* we say that being (*esse*) and essence are either distinguished or they are the same; what is proposed is not altered. In God they are the same and in other intelligences they are distinguished; and yet we give the same position concerning both, saying that we know being (*esse*) and not quiddity. Therefore the answer given there is true, because it says we know quiddity imperfectly. Nor is this against what the Thomists say. It is not against their first statement, because that should be understood of quidditative knowledge and not of just any knowledge. Thus it is not valid: therefore we do not in any way know them; but it is valid: therefore we do not in any way know them quidditatively.

But the answer is in no sense against the second statement. For when we say we know being (*esse*) and not quiddity, accustomed to Peripatetic terminology, we mean that concerning those we know the

---

<sup>87</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 207, line 15) has *non convenit*. The Paris edition (p. 533, line 23 from bottom) has *non inconvenit*.

answer to the question, are they? which inquires about being (*esse*); and that concerning those we do not know the answer to the question, what are they? which looks to the quiddity and, if according to some quidditative predicate, we would have known the quiddity as answer. We call that knowledge of fact (*quia*) and not quidditative knowledge, following the footsteps of Aristotle, since in *Posterioribus analyticis*<sup>88</sup> he calls knowledge of a thing through common notes knowledge of the fact (*quia*). And because of this the Thomists in their position deny proportionally that knowledge of the quiddity which is affirmed of being (*esse*), because they say that knowledge is not had concerning the proper question of quiddity, but we do not lack knowledge concerning the proper question of being (*esse*) itself.

*To the last reason*, proving the response is false in itself, I answer that therefore our intellect is said to know immaterial substances imperfectly, because it cannot grasp them quidditatively, and more imperfectly in this life, because through the species of other things. Grant that to know them in the first manner is fitting only to themselves and that it would be ridiculous to doubt that what fits only intelligences should fit others. It is necessary indeed to doubt whether knowing them quidditatively fits only themselves or also our souls. And we say that the second way of knowing them is impossible for us in this life, not because will comes into play, but because reason demands it. For the body joined to the soul turns the soul to sensibles, as was shown, etc.

This, however, should be known that genus and difference in these substances and in sensible substances are not taken in the same way. In sensible substances genus is taken from what is material in the thing, but the difference is taken from what is formal in it. Thus in the beginning of his *libri de Anima*,<sup>89</sup> Avicenna says that the form in things composed of matter and form is the simple difference of what is constituted by it; not that the form itself is the difference, but that it is the principle of difference, as the same author says in his *Metaph.*<sup>90</sup> This kind of difference is called a "simple difference," because it is drawn from what is part of a thing's quiddity, namely, the form. Now, since spiritual substances are simple quiddities, difference in them cannot be taken from what is part of the quiddity, but is taken from the whole quiddity. And therefore Avicenna says, in the beginning of the *de Anima*,<sup>91</sup> that they do not have a simple difference, excepting the species whose essences are composed of matter and form. In like manner also the genus in these substances is taken from

---

<sup>88</sup> Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, I, 13, 78a 21.

<sup>89</sup> Avicenna, *De Anima*, tr. I, C. 1; ed. cit., fol. 1r–v.

<sup>90</sup> Avicenna, *Metaph.*, tr. V, c. 5; ed. cit., fol. 90r.

<sup>91</sup> Avicenna, *De Anima*, tr. I, c. 1; ed. cit., fol. 1r–v.

the whole essence, though in a different manner. For one separated substance is like another in immateriality, but they are different from each other in grade of perfection according to recession from potentiality and approach to pure act. And therefore their genus is taken from what follows on their being immaterial, such as intellectuality and the like. But their difference is taken from what follows on their grade of perfection, yet is unknown to us.

131) Here St. Thomas brings in the second point by which he explains, using a negative comparison with sensible substances, whence a difference and one genus in immaterial substances may be taken.

As evidence for this, know that in things composed of matter and form four things are understood. These are: matter, which is one of two parts of the specific composite; form, the remaining part; the whole quiddity as having the nature (*ratio*) of the perfectible by a further formal perfection; the same whole quiddity as having ultimate formal perfection. An example, in man you can consider the matter which received the form and the form received in it. Notice also the man himself in so far as he is a substance. Man is a substance and as substance has the nature (*ratio*) of being perfectible by corporeal, rational, etc. Notice also the man in so far as he has a rational nature, which is his ultimate formal perfection. Now these four are so related to genus and difference that both the matter, which is a part, and the whole itself, and the perfectible, ground the genus, though in different ways. And the form, which is a part, and the whole itself, as perfected by a further perfection, ground the difference, also differently. Now, since the genus potentially contains the differences and unfolds the nature of the thing incompletely and in potency, and implies a whole as yet able to be perfected, then the root of potentiality in sensible things should by rights be matter of the whole as being able to be perfected formally. And the genus is said to be taken from the matter itself. Likewise the difference, since it is said to divide, to terminate, and to actuate the genus and to unfold the whole relative to a later perfection and actuality, then the root of actuality and perfection should by rights be the form of the whole as what is perfected. And the difference is said to be taken from the form. In a different way, indeed, the parts of the thing itself, namely, the matter and form, the whole quiddity as perfectible and as perfected, ground the genus and difference. For the genus is taken from the whole essence under the aspect (*ratio*) of having the nature of the perfectible, as from a thing formally signified or denominated from itself; while from the matter as from the root of the formal signified itself. Similarly, the difference is taken from the whole es-



sence under the aspect of a further perfection, as from a thing formally signified or denominated from itself; while from the form as from the root of the formal signified itself. Matter, which is a part of man, is not named his genus, nor is the form his difference. The man himself as substance, as animal, acquires the name of genus; as bodily, as rational, he has the name of difference. And it is because matter and form radically ground the genus and difference that Aristotle<sup>92</sup> says that just as the whole intelligibility (*ratio*) is related to the whole thing, so a part of the intelligibility (*ratio*) is to a part of the thing. And in VIII *Metaph.*,<sup>93</sup> you will find that the genus is taken from matter and difference from form. Besides, the Commentator also says in II *Coeli*<sup>94</sup> that the heavenly bodies, if they agree in genus and differ in species, are composed of matter and form.

Also, genus and difference are taken not from a part but from the whole essence, as from a thing signified by a first-intention name and denominated by a second-intention name. For this reason you will find illustrious men saying sometimes that the genus is not taken from matter and the difference is not taken from form. When you have considered their reasons, you will see that they are not against what was said above.

Such being the facts for sensible substances, when we move up to immaterial substances, we do not say that genus is taken from matter or difference from form, because they lack these parts. What is left is that both their genus and difference are taken, formally as well as radically, from the whole essence. And for this reason Avicenna, as the text says, assigns a diversity between the difference of composite and simple substances. He says that in species composed of matter and form, the difference is simple, while the difference of non-composite things is not. And he calls a simple difference one that does not arise from the whole radically, but from part of it, which is simple. In immaterial substances, then, genus and difference are taken from the whole essence, but differently. The genus is taken from the whole essence under the aspect of that by which one is essentially assimilated to the other, for intelligences agree in some quidditative predicate. But the difference is taken from the whole essence under the aspect of that by which one differs substantially from others. And this<sup>95</sup> is a certain grade of formal perfection formally indivisible, which will be more perfect the more some intelligence would happen to be closer (*proximiori*) to purest act, the glorious God. For they

---

<sup>92</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, VII ( ), 9, 1034b 21; St. Thomas, *In VII Metaph.*, lect. 9, nn. 1460–63.

<sup>93</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, VIII ( ), 3, 1043b 31.

<sup>94</sup> Averroes, *In II de Caelo*, com. 49; *ed. cit.*, t. V, fol. 61v.

<sup>95</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 210, line 18) has *hoc*. The Paris edition (p. 536, line 10) has *hic*.

differ among themselves by this that one is closer than the other to pure act and more recedes from the nature of potentiality.

For a better understanding of genus and difference we must begin deeper. Now you should know that it is one thing to speak of genus and difference without qualification and according to what happens to and fits them *per se*; it is another to speak of them as they are applied to natures of such a kind. For if we speak of them according to themselves, then it is required and sufficient for the intelligibility (*rationem*) of both, namely genus and difference, that the difference indeed expound a definite and limited grade of being (*entis*) not naturally foreign to the nature of genus, which it divides formally, while the genus expound a definite nature that is formally determinable. And the first thing we said of difference follows from the difference, when it comes to the genus, constituting the species and placing it in a determinate grade of being (*entis*), namely, in the one it expounds. Thus, in VIII *Metaph.*,<sup>96</sup> species are likened to numbers, because as unity added or subtracted changes a number, so a difference added to or subtracted from beings (*entibus*) changes the beings themselves. And the second thing we said follows from this that difference ought to diversify the genus in such a way that not only the species be other than another species, but the nature of the genus in this species be different from the nature of the genus in another species, as is said in X *Metaph.*<sup>97</sup> Whence Aristotle, in XI *de Animalibus*,<sup>98</sup> says that when figure is to be divided, its differences are not having angles equal to two right angles and having angles equal to many right angles, because these are accidents of figure. But the genus ought to signify a definite nature so that the transcendentals be excluded. These, indeed, as being most special, are formally segregated from the determinable.

If, however, we speak of genus and difference as applicable to material substances, genus not only explains the thing as formally determinable; it also is taken from matter as a possible root (*radicabiliter*). In the same way, the difference not only signifies determination and actuation of the genus; it also is taken radically from the form. But this happens to the genus and difference, because the essence, of which they are genus and difference, is composite and integrated in reality from two principles, namely, from determinable matter and determining form. For it is *per se* fitting to animal that it signify a sensitive nature formally determinable by rational. But

---

<sup>96</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, VIII ( ), 3, 1043b 37.

<sup>97</sup> See Averroes, *In X Metaph.*, com. 24; *ed. cit.*, t. VIII, fol. 128r.

<sup>98</sup> Aristotle, *On the Parts of Animals*, I, 3, 643a 28.

since a sensitive nature has determinability by rational because it has matter, then it happens to this genus, which is animal, that in so far as it is genus it be taken from matter. Consequently, if a sensitive nature were determinable by rational, but not by reason of matter, animal would not be less a genus. Similarly, rational has *per se* that it signify rational perfection essentially determinative of a sensitive nature. But because the grade of intellect is able to determine sensitive nature owing to the intellectual soul's being a form of body, then it happens to this form, namely, rational, that in so far as it is difference it be taken from form. For rational would not be less a difference if a more perfect rational power determined a sensitive nature without a soul informing body. Owing to this, it is commonly said that genus is taken from what is material, rather than from matter; and difference is taken from what is formal, rather than from form. That fits them *per se*; this accidentally. Now when the simple essence of immaterial substances is limited to a definite grade of perfection, since it is not infinite in entity, the result is that in it there is that from which a genus and difference can be taken. Because it is a limited nature, the difference is taken from the determination itself. The genus will be taken from the common nature which is understood as being determined. And because it is simple, the nature itself is limited, such that it does not have two real parts, one limited and one limiting, as sensible substances have matter and form.

And thus in immaterial<sup>99</sup> substances what is *per se* in the meaning of genus and difference is preserved. That is, the genus signifies a definite nature formally determinable; the difference expounds the determinate substantial perfection formally constitutive of it in a definite grade of being (*entis*). It is granted that what is accidental is not preserved, namely, that genus be taken from matter and difference from form.

For a more profound investigation of this subject *three propositions must be noted*. The first is that every individual really distinct from its own being (*esse*) has many quidditative predicates, which in succession more and more approach its own being (*esse*).

Here is the *second proposition*. The order between these quidditative predicates is such that the more actual each is the more it approaches being (*esse*), and the more potential each is the farther it is from being (*esse*). These two propositions will be made clear first by example, then by reason. Socrates, really distinct from his own being (*esse*) of existence, has many quidditative predicates, such as substance, living body, animal, man. It is certain that Socrates in so far

---

<sup>99</sup> The Paris edition (p. 537, line 18) has *materialibus*.

as he is substance is very far removed from his own existence, for it is required for this that Socrates be not only what is substance but also what is body. Now when you have taken Socrates in so far as he is body, he will appear closer to having existence, even though he is still far enough removed from it, since for this he needs to be not only what is corporeal substance, but also what is living. And when you have considered Socrates as living, you will see that he comes closer to being (*esse*), though still removed, since this requires that Socrates be not only what is animated substance, but also what is animal. And when you have examined him in so far as he is animal, you will find him closer to being (*essendum*), though still removed, because this requires that Socrates be not only what is animated sensible substance, but also rational (for nothing can be contained, in the nature of things, under some genus that is not contained under some species). When he has been considered as rational, sensible, animated substance, then he is just now able to receive the being (*esse*) of actual existence, for nothing else that is formal and intrinsic is required for this, that he be, though extrinsic causes and individual properness are required as a condition of one existing. Now it is patent that the predicates adduced are such that the one closer to existence, compared to one more removed, always stands as actual to potential, such as man to animal, animal to living, living to body, body to substance. And, by consequence, the one closer to being (*esse*) itself is more actual, while the one more remote from being (*esse*) is more potential. Thus each of the two propositions is clear by example.

Now for the proof from reason. Being (*esse*) is the most actual of all in a thing and is so actual that it is the proper act of the complete essence only. For the essence to receive it, the essence must be intrinsically complete and determined; just as the air, in order to receive light, must first be perfected by transparency. The substance is made definite, perfected and completed by these quidditative predicates. And therefore the more a quidditative predicate will determine the essence, the more it will make the essence appropriate for being the proper receiver of its own being (*esse*). And oppositely, the less a quidditative predicate determines the essence, the less it makes the essence appropriate for being able to hold its own existence. The closer each thing is to the most actual, the more actual it is; the more removed it is from the most actual, the more potential it is. For this reason such is the order between quidditative predicates, that the one closer to being (*esse*) itself is more actual; the one more removed is more potential.

From these two propositions plus the addition of a *third one*—namely, that the genus is taken from what is as potential and the difference is taken from what is as actual—will be constructed the most general rule, that in all things the genus and difference is taken from the whole essence of a thing according as it is remote or close to the very being (*esse*) of existence. For the ultimate difference, as being constitutive of the species and giving the grade among beings (*entia*) proper to it, is the last complement of the essence itself for it to be. Beyond it, as was already said, the individual waits for no other intrinsic complement as such. The most general genus also, since it expounds the essence as most determinable, is taken from that by which the essence itself is most remote from existence, seeing that it is determinable and perfectible by all differences so that it is able to receive being (*esse*). The intermediate genera and differences are taken from what are intermediate. Because of this we say that the definition expounds the defined from the first potency to the ultimate act. The first genus includes this that it is taken from that by which the essence itself is first able to have being (*esse*) and all differences, by which the essence is determined and actuated as far as the ultimate difference, the act finally determining and perfecting the essence in order to have being (*esse*). And this is why Porphyry<sup>100</sup> says that among the things looking to the interior the difference is what concludes at being (*esse*). Nor do we mean, because we said this, that the genus and difference should be taken from the being (*esse*) of actual existence, for we know that definitions abstract from being (*esse*). We mean that the genus and difference are taken—to put this in the words of St. Thomas—from the order to the being (*esse*) of actual existence. We say, however, from the order, not from the relation of order, but from the foundation of the relation. That is, from that by which the essence approaches as receiver of being (*esse*) itself and from that by which the essence is remote from being itself. According to this you have that from which the genus and difference in intelligences, material substances and accidents should be taken, since it is easy for one who has practiced to work them out in single cases. And by reason of this God alone lacks genus and difference, for His quiddity, since it is His actual existence, cannot be conceived as remote from existence or close to it. Whence St. Thomas in the beginning of this chapter gives the most sufficient cause why God is not in a genus and intelligences are in a category, because He is His own being (*esse*), while their essence is different from their own being (*esse*.)

---

<sup>100</sup> Porphyry, *Isagogen*, c. 4; *ed. cit.*, p. 38.

Nor is it necessary that these differences be accidental because they are according to more or less of a perfection which does not change the species. Certainly, the grade of perfection in receiving the same form does not change the species, such as white things that more or less participate in whiteness of the same species. But the species is changed by different grades of perfection in the forms themselves or in the participated natures. For instance, nature advances by grades from plants to animals through certain things that are intermediate between plants and animals, according to the Philosopher in VIII *de Animalibus*.<sup>101</sup>

132) Here the first objection is excluded. It was said that differences in intelligences are taken from the various grades of perfection by which one is closer than the other to the first act. Against this the objection may be pressed: whatever things differ according to an act that is perfect and less perfect differ only by accidental differences; intelligences differ only according to more or less perfect; therefore they differ only by accidental differences. The formal reasoning is good; the conclusion in fact is false. Then one of the premises is false, and not the major, as it will be proved. Therefore the minor, which is the position given above, is false. The proof of the major is that more and less do not change the species. Certainly, perfect whiteness and less perfect are of the same species. And whatever belong to the same species are distinguished by accidental differences only, since they agree in all essentials. St. Thomas excludes this objection by this beautiful distinction. The more perfect and the less perfect can be considered either as pertaining to the manner of having unqualifiedly some one form or as pertaining to the forms themselves had more or less. In the first way they do not change the species, but do in the second. For whatever things are such that they receive an indivisible (*atomam*) form according to diverse grades of perfection, are distinguished as such only by number, as is clear of white as 4 and white as 6. Those indeed which receive different grades of perfection that are not of the same form, but of many forms, must be distinguished essentially, or specifically, as is clear of man and cow. Whence the answer to the objection is clear, that the minor is false for the first way and the major is false for the second way. Therefore the proof of this is seen without any addition that spells it out, because the comparison indicated by *more and less* has no place except in atomic<sup>102</sup> species, as is said in VII *Phys.*<sup>103</sup>

---

<sup>101</sup> Aristotle, *On the History of Animals*, VIII, 1, 588b 4.

<sup>102</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 214, line 5 from bottom) has *atoma*. The Paris edition (p. 539, line 15 from bottom) has *anatoma*.

<sup>103</sup> Averroes, *In VII Phys.*, com. 27; *ed. cit.*, t. IV, fol. 150r.

Nor is it necessary that with intellectual substances the division always be by true differences, because it is impossible that this happen in all things, as the Philosopher says in XI *de Animalibus*.<sup>104</sup>

133) Here the second objection is excluded. Against the same statement it is argued: wherever there are true species and a true genus, there also ought to be an artificial division of that genus by two real differences; but in intelligences we find a true genus and true species; therefore in these there ought to be a division by two true differences. The conclusion is against the division given above, which was: the genus of intelligences descends to its species by the more perfect and the less perfect, which are not true differences. The major is proved by this, that where there is a true genus with true species, there ought to be differences which divide the genus itself and constitute the species; and a division, which is according to art, ought to have two members, as Boethius holds.<sup>105</sup> This objection St. Thomas excludes by saying that it is impossible, according to the doctrine of Aristotle, in XI *libro de Animalibus*,<sup>106</sup> for the major to be a universal proposition.

As evidence for this it must be noted that differences are called true when they are positive, not foreign, contrary between themselves, convertible with the things of which they are differences, as Aristotle says in that place. Then that genus which contains immediately more than two species cannot be divided by two true differences. But if it still is to be divided by true differences that empty out its power, it must be divided by more than two and thus the division will not be two-membered. And if it still must be partitioned by a two-member division, it is necessary that one is not a true difference, since it will have been taken as the privation of the other. For example, if animal immediately contains man, cow, and lion, it ought to be divided by three true differences or by a true one, say rational, and one not a true, but a privative, difference common to the remaining two, say irrational. Thus because we find some things in the world that are more than two, contained immediately under something common and formally divisible, then we say that it is impossible that universally every division take place by true differences. And this happens in our problem, for intelligences do not have a subaltern genus, as St. Thomas maintains in *tractatu de natura generis*.<sup>107</sup> Because their perfection does not arise from many conjunctions of dif-

---

<sup>104</sup> Aristotle, *On the Parts of Animals*, I, 2, 642b 5.

<sup>105</sup> Boethius, *De Divisione*; PL 64, 888.

<sup>106</sup> Aristotle, *On the Parts of Animals*, I, 2, 645b 5.

<sup>107</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *De Natura Generis*, c. III; ed. Perrier, n. 13, p. 504.

ferences as does the perfection of the species in those lower things, where a common genus and a difference are not sufficient, all intelligences will be contained immediately under one genus. And so their genus, if one needs to descend to them by true differences, demands a many-membered division not known by us. If their genus is to be contracted by a bipartite division, it is necessary without qualification that one be a not-true difference, because privative; the other also must be a not-true difference, owing to the weakness of our intellect which is not able to ascend<sup>108</sup> to any of their proper differences. However, the differences would be such as are given in the text, namely, more perfect and less perfect.

From this the response to the objection is clear, once the impossibility of the major being universal has been shown. Nor does the saying of Boethius cause a problem. For he says that every division is reduced to a two-membered one; he does not say that every two-membered division takes place by true differences of the inferiors to be handled by that division.

The third way that we find essence is in substances composed of matter and form. In these also the act of existing (*esse*) is received and limited, because they have an act of existing (*esse*) also from another. Again, their nature or quiddity is received in designated matter. Consequently, they are limited both from above and below; owing to the division of designated matter, the multiplication of individuals within one species is now possible in them. How the essence of these substances is related to logical intentions, was treated above.<sup>109</sup>

134) In this fourth and final part of this chapter, St. Thomas gives *four points* concerning the essences of composite substances.

*The first* is that their being (*esse*) is limited because they have that from another, since it is really distinct from themselves. This grounds their primary distinction from the first being (*ente*), whose being (*esse*) is infinite and really the same as its quiddity.

*The second point* is that their essence is received in designated matter, for in this or that they are determined to here and now as the formal by its material.

*The third* is what follows as a corollary from these two truths, that is, they are limited from above and below. From above indeed, because they have limited being (*esse*) and their essence is determined by being (*esse*) itself which looks upwards. From below in fact, because their forms are received in matter and they themselves are determined to this and that, which look downwards because under

---

<sup>108</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 215, line 1 from bottom) has *ascendere*. The Paris edition (p. 540, line 22 from bottom) has *descendere*.

<sup>109</sup> See Chapter IV.



these and those material conditions they are received<sup>110</sup> in a material part.

*The fourth* point is that their essence can be multiplied numerically in the same species owing to the separation of designated matter. And they differ by these three from the intelligences, placed in the second order, which free from matter and infinite from below do not bear with an equal to themselves. So ends the second tract of this book.

---

<sup>110</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 216, line 6 from bottom) has *recipiuntur*. The Paris edition (p. 541, line 8) has *recipiuntur tanquam*.

## Chapter VII<sup>1</sup>

But now it remains to see how essence is in accidents; how it is in all substances was stated. And because, as was said, essence is what is signified by the definition, it is necessary that accidents have essence in the same way that they have definition. Their definition, however, is incomplete because they cannot be defined unless a subject be given in their definition. This is because they do not have in themselves absolute being (*esse*) in virtue of themselves, apart from a subject. But just as a substantial act of existing results from the union of matter and form, so an accidental act of existing results from accident and subject when accident is united to a subject. And, therefore, neither substantial form nor matter has a complete essence, because in the definition of substantial form it is necessary to place that of which it is the form. And so its definition is had by the addition of something which is outside its genus, as is also the definition of accidental form. Thus even in the definition of the soul, body is included by the philosopher of nature who considers the soul only inasmuch as it is the form of a physical body. But still there is this much difference between substantial and accidental forms. Just as the substantial form does not have absolute being in virtue of itself without that to which it is united, so neither does that to which it is united, namely, matter. And therefore from the union of both there results that act of existing in which the thing subsists in virtue of itself; from these is produced a substantial unit, and for this reason an essence results from their union. Thus the form, although considered in itself it does not have the notion of a complete essence, yet is part of a complete essence. But that to which an accident is united is in itself a complete being subsisting in its own act of existing. And that act of existing is naturally prior to the accident, which is added. And, therefore, the added accident from its union with its subject does not cause the act of existing in which the thing subsists and by which the thing is a substantial being. It causes a kind of secondary act of existing without which the subsistent thing can be understood to exist, just as what is first can be understood without the second, or the predicate without the subject.<sup>2</sup> Thus from an accident and its subject there is not produced a substantial unit but an accidental unit, and therefore from their union no essence results, as from the union of form with matter. According to this, an accident has neither the notion of a complete essence, nor is it a part of a complete essence. But, just as it is being in a qualified sense, so too it has essence in a qualified sense.

---

<sup>1</sup> In the Laurent edition (p. 217), there is no title to this chapter. In the Paris edition (p. 541), the title of the chapter is the following. *Quod accidentia habeant essentiam incompletam ostendit. Varia item accidentia distinguit, et quomodo in ipsis sumatur genus et differentia exponit.*

<sup>2</sup> The phrase *vel praedicatum sine subjecto* is Cajetan's addition to the text of St. Thomas. See St. Thomas Aquinas, *De Ente et Essentia*, c. VI; ed. Perrier, n. 29, p. 47.

135) In this third tract, complete in one chapter, he treats of accidents, in order that nothing in the entire realm of being may remain untouched. Now it is divided into *three* parts. The *first* explains what essence is in accidents. The *second*, the difference of accidents from substance, and among themselves. The *third*, how accidents are related to logical intentions. He makes the first part clear with this conclusion: accidents have an incomplete essence. This is proved thus. Whatever has an incomplete definition has an incomplete essence; accidents have an incomplete definition; therefore. The major is evident from the fact that essence is what the definition signifies, as was said in the first part of the work.

The minor is proved thus. Whatever must be defined by something outside its essence has an incomplete definition, for the definition of such is not completed by something intrinsic, but needs an extrinsic addition; but accidents are necessarily defined through something which is outside their essence, for it is necessary to place the notion of subject in their definition, as is said in VII *Metaph.*;<sup>3</sup> therefore accidents have an incomplete definition.

In order to make the minor evidently clear, St. Thomas in the text compares accidents to substantial forms according to their likeness and difference, for in this way will appear closely how accidents have an incomplete essence.

He says that *accidents and substantial forms are alike in three ways*.

*First*, they are alike in this, that neither has being (*esse*) separate from a subject, independent of a receiver. Just as from the substantial form joined to matter comes the existence (*esse*) common to both, so from the joining of accident with subject results the existence (*esse*) by which whiteness is and snow is white.

*Secondly*, they are alike in so far as neither has a complete essence, because the essence of both is essentially referred to another as to what receives it. Substantial form is essentially an entity perfective of matter; and accident is essentially an entity qualifying a subject.

The *third* point where they are alike is that neither whole has a definition completed by proper terms, but only by an addition. For just as it is necessary to include in the definition of accident its own subject, which is outside the genus of accident, in like manner it is necessary to include in the definition of substantial form a receiver, namely matter, which is outside the proper genus of form. For the genus of form is act, as is evident from II *de Anima*;<sup>4</sup> but matter is

---

<sup>3</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, VII ( ), 4, 1030a 30; St. Thomas, *In VII Metaph.*, lect. 4, nn. 1335–36.

<sup>4</sup> Aristotle, *On the Soul*, II, 1, 412a 9.

clearly placed under potency, since being is divided into act and potency; consequently matter is clearly outside of act, which is the genus of form. Indication of this is given by Aristotle<sup>5</sup> in his definition of the soul, since he includes in his definition, *physical, organic body*, which is the proper matter of the soul inasmuch as the soul is the perfection of a physical body. Now St. Thomas adds, lest you be surprised, why is it not matter that is placed in the definition of the soul, since the soul is a substantial form, but *physical body* is. This is because the philosopher of nature does not consider the soul as substantial form but as soul which as such requires a physical body as its proper matter. Here you have the reason why it is not the task of the philosopher of nature to consider the intellective soul as such according to its complete quiddity. Aristotle also holds this in *lib. I de partibus Animalium*.<sup>6</sup>

They *differ in five ways*.

*First*, because the receiver of substantial form does not have being (*esse*) in itself without the being (*esse*) of the form; for in this it conforms to its form. Just as substantial form does not have being (*esse*) outside of its receptacle, so neither does its receptacle have being (*esse*) prior to its form. However, the receptacle of an accident has being (*esse*) of itself, independently of the being (*esse*) of its accidents. The reason for this difference is that the receptacle of substantial form is a being in pure potency, but the receptacle of accidental form has being (*esse*) in act.

*Secondly*, they differ because from the union of substantial form to its receptacle, there results that being (*esse*) by which<sup>7</sup> the thing itself subsists or simply is. However, from the union of accidental form with its subject, there results being (*esse*) by which a thing is in a qualified sense. And this difference follows from the first; because the receptacle of substantial form lacks being (*esse*) of itself, it first exists by the being (*esse*) which flows from the form. Contrary to this, because the subject of an accident enjoys its own being (*esse*), when it receives an accident it acquires being (*esse*) such and not being (*esse*) simply, for it already has this. Thus this first being (*esse*) can be understood to exist without the second, for a substance can be separated from an accident, as is said in VII *Metaph.*<sup>8</sup>

*Thirdly*, they differ because from the composition of a substantial form with its subject a substantial unit results. But from the composition of an accident with its subject there results only an accidental

---

<sup>5</sup> Aristotle, *On the Soul*, II, 1, 412a 27.

<sup>6</sup> Aristotle, *On the Parts of Animals*, I, 1, 641a 32 ff.

<sup>7</sup> *Quod* in the text should read *quo*. Cf. Chapter IV, p. 145.

<sup>8</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, VII ( ), 1, 1028a 33; St. Thomas, *In VII Metaph.*, lect. 1, n. 1257.

unit. This difference follows from the second. Because being simply, by which a thing is of itself, results from substantial form, it is necessary that a one without qualification result from that by which a thing is a substantial unit, for unity follows upon being (*ens*). But because a subject and accident have twofold being (*esse*), they cannot be made a substantial unit for the same reason, namely, that unity follows upon being; for it cannot be that a substantial unit follow upon an accidental being.

*Fourthly*, they differ because some third essence, namely entity, results from the union of substantial form with matter. But no third essence results from the union of an accident with its subject. This difference follows from the third. For essence is what is signified by a definition, as the thing defined, and the thing defined must be a substantial unit, according to Aristotle.<sup>9</sup> Because no substantial unit results from an accident and its subject, it follows that neither does an essence result. And conversely, from the fact that a substantial unit comes about from substantial form and prime matter, a third essence does result.

*Fifthly*, they differ because substantial form, though not a complete essence, it is nevertheless a part of a complete essence. But an accident is neither a complete essence, nor a part of a complete essence. This fifth difference follows from the fourth; for if some third essence results from matter and form, then substantial form will be a part of it. If however no essence results from an accident and its subject, an accident cannot be called a part of any complete essence. Thus accident is incomplete and a being in a qualified sense; consequently it has an incomplete essence and definition. Nor should this bother you that substantial form is said to be not absolute without its receiving subject and does not have being (*esse*) without matter, and that earlier we said the intellectual soul is independent of matter and remains a thing when separated from matter, for this is unqualifiedly true. To verify what we have just now said, it suffices that the intellectual soul is essentially informative of matter and in this way it cannot be separated from matter according to quidditative being (*esse*), as its definition shows; also, that substantial form as such does not possess that whereby it may be separated from matter according to the being (*esse*) of actual existence, and exist independently. We grant that this may belong to some substantial form from another source, for example, from the fact that it is intellectual; but we are speaking of the form of a substantial part as such.

---

<sup>9</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, VII ( ), 12, 1037b 10.

*There are many problems concerning the things we have just said.* Concerning the second point of likeness, there is this problem: whether what we said there is true, namely, that accidental essences are essentially not absolutes apart from their receiving subject. This problem is accompanied by another from the third point of likeness, namely, whether accidents are necessarily defined through their subject.

There also occur questions concerning the differences assigned. Concerning the first, there is a problem connected with the bases of both members, namely, whether a substantial form of pure potency is only act; and whether an accidental form is received only in a being in act.

There is this problem concerning the second difference: whether an accident has its own existence really distinct from substantial existence; and again, whether substance subject to accidents can be understood to be without any accident.

If we wished to treat these *six problems* thoroughly, we would go beyond our proposed limits, for they belong to another treatise; but lest in our restraint we pass them over entirely, we shall treat the more important points concerning them in the order in which they have been given, by presenting the bases of our own position and that of our adversaries.

**Question XVI<sup>10</sup>—  
Whether Dependence on a Subject Is of the Essence of an Accident?<sup>11</sup>**

136) Concerning *the first problem*, after explaining the title:

First, we shall give the opinion of Scotus.

Secondly, that of St. Thomas.

Thirdly, answer the arguments against it.

The meaning of the first problem is this: whether it is of the essence of an accident to depend upon a subject. This is the same problem others raise in their technical vocabulary when they ask whether aptitudinal inherence is of the essence of an accident. Scotus, in *IV Sent.*,<sup>12</sup> decided the question about absolute accidents, namely, quantity and quality. He says that those who call this into doubt are ignorant of the meaning of the term *inherence*, and he is satisfied with one argument in order to prove that it is impossible for inherence of any kind to be of the essence of an absolute accident. His argument is: no relation belongs to the formal concept of a thing taken abso-

---

<sup>10</sup> In the Paris edition (p. 544), this appears as Question XV.

<sup>11</sup> The title of this question in the Paris edition (p. 544) is the following. *Num inhaerentia aptitudinalis sit de essentia accidentis.*

<sup>12</sup> Scotus, *In IV Sent.*, d. 12, q. 1, nn. 13–15; *ed. cit.*, VIII, 707.

lutely; but inherence is a relation; therefore no inherence belongs to the formal concept of a thing taken absolutely.

He also gives this argument another formulation as follows. What essentially pertains to itself does not include within itself essentially any reference, according to Augustine;<sup>13</sup> but an absolute accident pertains to itself; therefore an absolute accident does not essentially include a reference; inherence, however, is a reference; therefore.

This argument is confirmed by others as follows: whatever is spoken of as relative is something beyond the relation, for the basis of a relation is formally other than the relation; but an absolute accident, for example quantity, is spoken of as inhering relatively; therefore it is something absolute beyond inherence.

Further, aptitudinal inherence is of the essence of an accident; therefore quantity and quality are not the most general genera. The consequence is valid because then one can abstract from quantity and quality and the rest of the accidents a common quidditative concept with the same meaning in the case of all those things inferior to the concept of being and superior to the nine genera, namely, to be in. Thus, since every such concept is a genus, there will not be nine most general genera of accidents, for there will be one superior genus for all of them.

Now the opinion of Thomists is that aptitudinal inherence is of the essence of accidents and that it is not a relation.

It must be noted that something is absolute or referential in a twofold way, namely, from the side of the subject and from that of a terminus. For a being which is absolute from the side of the subject is one which is not naturally received into another, as substance. Something as subject referred to another is that which is essentially by its nature received into another, as every accident is. Something absolute from the side of the terminus is that which formally does not have reference to another precisely as to a terminus-to-which, as for example substance, quantity and quality. Something as terminus referred to another is that which formally has reference to another precisely as to a terminus-to-which, as the category of relation. In this way, a relation belonging to the category of relation differs from other things which are referential in the other genera. These are called transcendental by some people because reference, pertaining to the genus toward-something, is essentially toward-another, not as to something receptive, or to an efficient, final or formal cause, but precisely toward another as a terminus; for one of the things related is neither the form nor the end nor the efficient cause of the other, but is its

---

<sup>13</sup> St. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, Bk. VII, c. 2; PL 42, 936.

terminus. For this reason, Albert the Great says<sup>14</sup> that one of related things is not to be defined by means of the others, but by reference to the others because the phrase *by means of* denotes causality. The reference, however, of the other genera, which is called *reference* for lack of a proper word, refers to another essentially, but as to a subject, either matter, or form, or something of this sort. For thus matter essentially has reference to form and vice versa, as was said above concerning the commensurate nature of the intellectual soul. Therefore, since aptitudinal inherence implies reference to another as to something receptive, we say that it is not in the genus of relation, but is identified with any genus, and that it signifies now an absolute being, now a relative one. Wherefore there is no reason why aptitudinal inherence cannot be of the essence of an absolute accident because it is referential; moreover, because an accident is not absolute from the side of the subject though it is from the side of the terminus, it follows that essential dependence upon a subject belongs to its essence. This is what aptitudinal inherence explains.

Our position is shown to be reasonable because, just as to-be-toward constitutes a relation, so to-be-in universally constitutes an accident. For being is contracted to the nine genera of accidents by to-be-in. Therefore, just as being-toward is of the essence of relation, so being-in is of the essence of accident. For this reason, Simplicius says, in *commento Praedicamentorum*,<sup>15</sup> that to-be-in does not constitute a genus, but is present in every accident.

This is confirmed by the fact that unless aptitudinal inherence were of the essence of accident, accident could be conceived in a complete definition without aptitudinal inherence given in its definition; which is impossible. For it is necessary that accident include in its definition essential dependence upon a subject, which aptitudinal inherence shows; otherwise there would be no need of a subject in order to define an accident. Therefore St. Thomas says in many places<sup>16</sup> that the definition of accident is the following, or something like it: a thing to which existence-in-another is due. So for the second point.

137) In answer to the first opposing argument, I say that the minor of the first syllogism is false. Scotus seems to be deceived because he does not see the difference between reference-in and reference-toward. For reference in is not a relation, for although such reference

---

<sup>14</sup> St. Albert the Great, *In V Metaph.*, tr. III, c. 8; *ed. cit.*, t. VI, p. 338.

<sup>15</sup> Simplicius, *In Praedicamentorum*, c. 3; in *Commentationes accuratissimae in Praedicamenta Aristotelis* (Venetiis: 1567), p. 20.

<sup>16</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *In IV Sent.*, d. 12, q. 1, a. 1, qu. 1, *ad 2*; *Quodlibet.*, IX, q. 3, a. 1, *ad 2*; *Sum. Theol.*, III, 77, 1, *ad 2*.



terminates in a subject and consequently the subject is the terminus, nevertheless the subject does not terminate as a terminus, but as the receptacle of the accident. It is necessary to note this very closely here, for it is one thing to say that A is the terminus of such a reference, and that A terminates such reference as a terminus, as is evident from what was said.

From this the answer to both the second and the third formulation of this argument is evident, for aptitudinal inherence is always taken to be a relation.

Regarding the last argument, I deny the consequence. For we say that to-be-in has a different meaning in relation to the categories, just as being (*ens*) does; for it is predicated analogously of the nine genera of accidents, just as being (*ens*) is of all genera.

From this, the solution to the *second problem* is evident. In this problem, Scotus agrees with us in *IV Sent.*,<sup>17</sup> so that we agree that an accident cannot be completely defined without the addition of the subject, as it was now proved. This will be more fully clarified later when we show what genus and difference are taken from in accidents. Aristotle treats of this in *VII Metaph.*<sup>18</sup>

138) The *third problem*, since it is extremely broad, may be left for treatment elsewhere; indeed, to give it a complete explanation it is necessary to fill many reams.

#### Question XVII<sup>19</sup>—

#### Whether Interminate Dimensions Precede Substantial Form in Matter?<sup>20</sup>

139) Because the *fourth problem* has to do with the nature of accidents, and that is what this tract is about, I shall not altogether omit it. There are *three* points to be considered.

First, the opinion of Averroes will be stated.

Second, the opinion of St. Thomas will be given.

Third, the opposing arguments will be answered.

Regarding the first point, it must be noted that Averroes, in *libro de Substantia orbis*,<sup>21</sup> gives a foundation for the opinion contrary to

---

<sup>17</sup> Scotus, *In IV Sent.*, d. 12, q. 1, n. 4; *ed. cit.*, VIII, 704.

<sup>18</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, VIII ( ), 5, 1030b 14 – 1031a 14; St. Thomas, *In VII Metaph.*, lect. 4, nn. 1331–55.

<sup>19</sup> In the Paris edition (p. 546), this appears as Question XVI.

<sup>20</sup> The title of this question in the Paris edition (p. 546) is the following. *Num dimensiones interminatae praecedant formam substantialem in materia. Opinio Avicennae de substantias orbis, c. I, col. 2, I Phys., c. lxiii, et IV Phys., c. xxv, prima ratio.*

<sup>21</sup> Averroes, *De Substantia Orbis*, I; *ed. cit.*, t. IX, fol. 3r–v.

ours by holding that interminate dimensions are received into prime matter, which is pure potency. From this it follows that not every accident has a being in act as its subject.

He is led to hold this opinion because of a number of reasons ending in the impossible. The first is this. Interminate dimension is not in matter co-eternal to itself; therefore a body begins to be from a non-body, and dimension from non-dimension. And then finally this follows: therefore corporeal forms, that is, dimensions, are mutually contrary and succeeding one another in the subject, just as substantial forms succeed one another in the same matter. This consequent is impossible; therefore by taking away the consequent, etc. The impossibility of the consequent is evident from the fact that neither motion nor any kind of change is toward interminated quantity. For increase is toward terminated quantity. It is also evident from the fact that quantity has no contrary, as is said in *Praedicamentis*.<sup>22</sup> And the consequence is proved from the fact that everything which comes into being does so from its contrary or its privation, as is said in I and V of the *Phys.*<sup>23</sup>

The second argument is this. If interminated quantity is not in matter, then matter cannot simultaneously receive forms which are distinct in species or in number. The consequent is false in the sense used; therefore. This consequence is proved from the fact that diverse forms cannot be simultaneously received except into different parts of matter; matter, however, does not have diverse parts before it receives quantity, since substance without quantity is indivisible, as is said in I *Phys.*<sup>24</sup>

The third argument is this. If quantity is not in matter as its subject, then form is not divided through the division<sup>25</sup> of matter. The consequence is valid because form is received into indivisible matter, since the position is that matter lacks quantity. Further, it follows that form received into matter has no division. The consequence is valid because every division of a material form demands as prerequisite a diversity of parts of matter. Then it follows further that form received into matter is eternal and has no contrary. This consequence is valid because the temporality of a form follows upon its corruptibility. But no form is corruptible, unless its receptacle has diverse parts, where one form informs one part and another form<sup>26</sup> another part, since it is necessary that those things which are mutually corrupted

---

<sup>22</sup> Aristotle, *Categories*, ch. 6, 5b 11.

<sup>23</sup> Aristotle, *Physics*, I, 7, 190b 11; V, 1, 224b 35 ff. See St. Thomas, *In V Phys.*, lect. 2, n. 4.

<sup>24</sup> Aristotle, *Physics*, I, 2, 185b 4; St. Thomas, *In I Phys.*, lect. 3, n. 2.

<sup>25</sup> *Perdi visionem* in the text should read *per divisionem*.

<sup>26</sup> *Formam* in the text should read *forma*.

must be united in matter, as is said in *I de Gener.*<sup>27</sup> Then it finally follows that matter may receive nothing but the first form, for it is necessary that the corruption of one is the generation of another, as is said in *I de Gener.*,<sup>28</sup> and consequently it would lack a contrary. So for the first point.

Although St. Thomas follows this opinion in certain of his works,<sup>29</sup> his own decision was the opposite, which he set finally in *I Parte*.<sup>30</sup> Here he uses the following argument against the position of Averroes. Whenever something is in potency to all acts of a certain order, it first receives the first act simply, and then the others. But prime matter in itself is in potency to all substantial and accidental acts in a certain order; therefore it first receives the prior act simply, and then the posterior acts. But the first act simply, even in the order of generation, is being (*esse*); therefore the first thing which is understood to be received into matter is being (*esse*); but the being (*esse*) of matter is a substantial being, (*esse*),<sup>31</sup> which is not except from substantial form. Therefore substantial form is received into matter prior to any accidental form, and thus every accident that follows comes to being in act. That the first act simply is being (*esse*), is evident from the text of the *liber de Causis*<sup>32</sup> (at the beginning), both because quantitative being (*esse*) presupposes being (*esse*) and because qualitative being (*esse*) likewise presupposes being (*esse*), and so for the others. Moreover, many unacceptable consequences result from the position that being in a qualified sense is prior to being (*esse*) simply: both that accidental being be prior to being in itself; and that matter be more closely connected with the form of another genus than with the form of its own genus, and owing to this matter can be stripped of all substantial form, but not of all accidental form; and that the principles of substantial generation would not only be three but four; matter, form, privation and interminated quantity. For it cannot be imagined that it is not a principle at least accidentally, since it is joined to a *per se* principle, as is said of privation. Thus Aristotle would have had to enumerate it. Therefore one must hold the opinion of St. Thomas, that every accident has a being in act as its subject, and thereby it differs from substantial form which has as its subject a being in pure potency. So for the second point.

---

<sup>27</sup> Aristotle, *On Generation and Corruption*, I, 7, 324a 34.

<sup>28</sup> Aristotle, *On Generation and Corruption*, I, 3, 318a 25.

<sup>29</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *In III Sent.*, d. 2, q. 2, a. 3, sol. 3, ad 1.

<sup>30</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.*, I, 76, 6.

<sup>31</sup> In the Paris edition (p. 547, line 14 from bottom), *sed esse materiae est esse* is missing.

<sup>32</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *In I de Causis*, lect. 2; ed. Musurgia, XXI, 720.

In answer to the first argument of Averroes, I say that the first of those consequents has many meanings, sometimes true, and sometimes false. Therefore we must distinguish. For if the word *from* [in the expressions *from what is not bodily* and *from the non-dimensioned*] means relation to a material cause, the consequent is true; for a body becomes from matter which is not a body, and is actually indivisible, even though it is potentially a body and divisible. But if the word *from* means relation to a terminus-from-which, the consequent is false; for it is necessary that the matter from which a body comes immediately must have had corporeity before that instant; and, in general, it is necessary that in every instant of time it be subject to dimensions. It is in this way that we must understand what Aristotle says,<sup>33</sup> that it is impossible that a body come from what is not a body, that is, after non-body. Moreover, it is necessary to distinguish the meanings of the phrase *comes to be*. For *a body or dimension comes to be* can be understood in two ways. First it can be understood as terminative, that is, it comes to be as a terminus of some motion or mutation; and in this way it is impossible for dimension to come to be. In another way, it can be understood as concomitant, that is, it comes to be as something consequent upon the terminus of motion or mutation; and in this way it is true that a body comes to be. For neither generation nor alteration nor local motion terminates in quantity in so far as it is quantity, although increase terminates in perfected quantity. But when generation is terminated in itself, primarily in the substantial composite, there is generated consequent to this its inseparable accidents, one of which is quantity, which follows upon substantial corporeity. Therefore there is an error in the first argument of Averroes, because if one grants the first consequence, to the extent that the consequence implies the consequent in one sense, there is no validity in the second consequence which supposes that dimensions do not come about concomitantly and accidentally, but as the terminus<sup>34</sup> of change. For it is verified of things which come to be as termini of changes that they are corrupted contrariwise, and that they succeed one another, mutually expelling one another; but it is not verified in the case of things which come to be consecutively, one of which is interminated quantity.

In answer to the second argument, I deny the consequence; and to its proof I say that diverse parts in matter being a prerequisite for diverse forms can have two meanings. In one way, the word *prerequisite* may indicate a temporal order, and taken in this way

---

<sup>33</sup> Aristotle, *On the Heavens*, III, 2, 302a 3; III, 7, 306a 24.

<sup>34</sup> In the Laurent edition (p. 226, line 18), the word is *terminative*. In the Paris edition (p. 548, line 24 from bottom), the word is *determinative*.

it is true that any two forms whatsoever, received into matter simultaneously, require that the matter be previously distinguished into more than one part immediately before the instant in which the forms are induced. For the same portion of matter cannot by an alteration that is sufficient be disposed to two forms at the same time. But such a prerequisite distinction of parts or matter need not come about by means of interminated dimensions inherent in this matter, but comes about by dimensions of the preceding composites. The word *prerequisite* can be understood in another sense to indicate an order of necessity in such a way that at the instant that the forms are introduced, it is necessary that matter have by a priority of nature a diversity of parts and, posterior to this, distinct forms. This is false. For it is necessary that matter be in nature before it be distinct parts; therefore in that instant and for that instant two forms require distinct parts of matter, but they do not pre-require them.

In answer to the third argument, I say that form be divided by means of the division of its subject can be taken in two ways. First, in such a way that the form have division from the subject, because it is received into already divided matter. I have just now made clear how the position, taken in this way, is true, and how it is false. Secondly, in such a way that the form be divided according to the division of its subject, because the form has this division by reason of its subject. Taken in this way, it is true because quantitative division belongs to the substantial form from the fact that it is in matter, and owing to this the composite is quantified. For just as quality is consequent to the composite by reason of the form, but not in such a way that the quality itself has previous existence in the form as subject; so quantity is present in the composite by reason of matter, but not in such a way that it preexists in matter. It is only by reason of the matter into which form is received that quantitative division belongs to the form. This is evident in the case of forms separated from matter. Therefore I grant that forms are divided according to the division of their subjects; however I do not grant that this division is prior to the form, but that it is concomitant with it. From this the response to the whole line of reasoning is clear, seeing that it collapses, relying on false grounds. It is grounded on this that in our explanation it follows that forms are not divided when the subject is. It is clear that this does not follow.

140) *The fifth problem*, after passing over the arguments according to St. Thomas' doctrine, has a true affirmative part. For since some being (*esse*) comes from every form because it is form that gives being (*esse*) to a thing, it is necessary that accidental being (*esse*) flow from

accidental form. For example, to be white comes from whiteness, and to be sweet from sweetness.

However, it is quite evident from the proper notions of substance and accident that being (*esse*) which flows from accidental form is not the same as substantial being (*esse*). For substantial being (*esse*) is being (*esse*) simply, independent in itself and primary. But accidental being (*esse*) is being (*esse*) in a qualified sense, is in another, dependent upon a subject and posterior. Being (*esse*) of actual existence of the accident is really distinct, not only from being (*esse*) of its actual subject, but also from the very essence of the accidental form by which it is. It has already been proved above that no created quiddity is its own being (*esse*) of existence. Therefore the existence of whiteness is not whiteness itself, nor the existence of the subject, nor the receiving of whiteness in the subject; just as the existence of the substantial form is not the form itself, nor the matter, nor the reception of the form in matter. But as the substantial form received into matter perfects matter so that both of them receive existence, in the same way whiteness received in the subject perfects the subject so that it receives being (*esse*) white. So that whiteness is the intelligibility of the subject, composed of whiteness and the subject which has such being (*esse*) namely, being (*esse*) white, in the same way that form is the intelligibility of matter and the substantial composite which has being (*esse*). And just as there must be as many substantial beings (*esse*) in a thing as there are substantial forms, so there are as many accidental beings (*esse*) in a thing as there are accidental forms; for being (*esse*) white is different than being (*esse*) sweet. Therefore those people are mistaken who impose on St. Thomas the opinion of Scotus in *IV Sent.*<sup>35</sup>

141) Concerning the *sixth problem*, namely whether substance subject to accident could be understood without any accident, the doctrine of the Holy Doctor will be explained and then one error expelled.

To understand the first, we must distinguish the *two ways we can speak* of substance and accident. *First*, we can speak of them as such, that is, of substance according to the notion of substance, and of accident in so far as it is accident. *Secondly*, we can speak of substance and accident in so far as they are a certain kind of substance and accident. *Taken in the first way*, substance is separable from every accident, because substantial being (*esse*) as such has no necessary connection with accidental being (*esse*); otherwise every substance would be subject to accident. *Taken in the second way*, substance cannot be separated from every accident, because it cannot

---

<sup>35</sup> Scotus, *In IV Sent.*, d. 12, q. 1, n. 4; *ed. cit.*, VIII, 704.

be separated from its proper attribute (*passione*) on account of<sup>36</sup> the necessary connection which exists between a subject and its proper attribute, and not because a subject depends on its attribute. Therefore St. Thomas says, in *quaestionibus disputatis de Spiritualibus creaturis*<sup>37</sup> and in *quaestionibus de Anima*,<sup>38</sup> that for a subject to be without its proper attribute is neither possible nor intelligible. In the text, however, where he speaks of substantial and accidental being (*esse*) as such, he says that a subject can exist without an accidental form coming to it. However, he shows by the nature of demonstration that a subject cannot be without its proper attribute; for it is necessary that the conclusion which is arrived at, namely, that an attribute inheres in its subject, is a necessary conclusion and cannot be otherwise.

There is an intolerable error, however, which must be avoided here, one held by Anthony Trombetta in *suo quolibet*. He says that because, according to St. Thomas and his followers, a subject is nothing but a material cause in reference to its attribute, and that an attribute is an accident, it follows necessarily that a subject can exist without its proper attribute. The basis of this consequence is that every passive potency is a potency of the opposite; but a subject is a passive potency only in reference to its attribute; therefore it is in potency to the opposite; therefore it can have the attribute or not have it. The major is drawn from IX *Metaph.*,<sup>39</sup> and is also proved by reason as follows. The attributes of being are distinct in such a way that one includes the negation of the other; therefore potency includes the negation of act, and consequently it is not repugnant to potency, in so far as it is potency, to be without act, on the other hand, it can be in act;<sup>40</sup> therefore every potency is a potency to the opposite.

Further, he proves the same point. The possible is a medium between the necessary and the impossible; therefore since the necessary refers to being (*esse*) alone, and the impossible to non-being (*non esse*) alone, the possible has reference to both being (*esse*) and non-being (*non esse*). Thus every potency, since it is called possible from this, [i.e., its reference to being and non-being] is a potency to the opposite.

---

<sup>36</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 228, line 9) has *propter hoc*. The Paris edition (p. 550, line 4) has *propter hanc*.

<sup>37</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *De Spiritualibus Creaturis*, a. 11, ad 7.

<sup>38</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *Q.D. de Anima*, a. 12, ad 7.

<sup>39</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, IX ( ), 8, 1050b 8; St. Thomas, *In IX Metaph.*, lect. 9, n. 1868.

<sup>40</sup> In the Paris edition (p. 550, line 24), *et ex altere parte potest esse in actu* is missing.

Further, he proves the same. Passive potency is potency to being (*esse*) because it can receive being (*esse*) from another, namely, from an agent; but if it receives being (*esse*) from another and the other is taken away, in so far as it is in itself, potency is subject to no being (*esse*). Therefore if passive potency is in itself subject to no being (*esse*) and can have being (*esse*) from an agent, it necessarily follows that it is a potency to opposites, namely, to being (*esse*) and not being (*non esse*).

Now an error comes in here both in the premises and the conclusion. In its premises, because St. Thomas, in *I Parte*,<sup>41</sup> holds purposely and proves that a subject is a cause of its proper attribute in three genera of causes, namely, material, efficient, and final; thus the error of the minor is evident. The major, though it may be from Aristotle, is badly understood and proved. For material potency is twofold: one is receptive only; the other not only receptive, but also passive, the name *attribute* extended to every genus of change. Potency which is only receptive is necessarily co-temporal with its act, because if it existed before its act, it would be necessary that it receive its act through some change, and thus it would not be receptive only in reference to its act. Passive potency, however, is necessarily co-temporal with no act in reference to which it is passive, because it acquires every act through change, and consequently loses it through change; for whatever is generable is corruptible, as is said in *I Coeli*.<sup>42</sup> Therefore his statement: *every potency is a potency to the opposite* must be understood as passive potency, and not of receptive potency alone. This interpretation is confirmed both by the meaning itself and the text of Aristotle. For, as far as his meaning goes, it is evident that there is in the heavens a potency receptive of its configuration and nevertheless there such a potency is not one to the opposite, for the heavens are not in potency to any other configuration. In fact, Aristotle says<sup>43</sup> that the heavens are not in potency to motion, but only to the terminus of motion, and yet it is evident that the heavens have a potency receptive of their motion. From this he implies that he is speaking of passive potency, for the heavens are in potency to the terminus of motion. Thus, since the subject does not have a passive potency, but a receptive potency only, with reference to its proper attribute—for there is no change which mediates between the subject and its attribute—it is necessary that the subject not be in potency to the opposite with reference to its attribute, and thus the conclusion deduced was false.

---

<sup>41</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.*, I, 77, 1.

<sup>42</sup> Aristotle, *On the Heavens*, I, 12, 282b 4.

<sup>43</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, IX ( ), 8, 1050b 8.



Now an answer to the reasons the arguer uses in his attempt to prove his proposition concerning every receptive potency. And to the first, I say that it is true that the attributes of a being are distinct in such a way that one includes the negation of the other, because one is not formally the other, for potency is not formally act. But it does not follow from this that therefore every attribute can exist without the other. For this is not valid: this is not that, therefore this can exist without that.

To the second argument, I say that the possible, as distinguished from the necessary and the impossible, is taken from passive potency, and not from potency which is only receptive. Therefore from this nothing follows except that passive potency is a potency to the opposite. It remains for him to prove that every receptive potency is a potency to the opposite.

To the third argument, I say that the first proposition given there, namely, that potency has reference to being, because it can receive being from another, namely, from an agent, is true in one sense, and false in another. For if the term *is able* means possible as distinct from impossible, Aristotle says it is false, for the meaning is that potency has reference to being (*esse*) because it is not impossible for it to receive being from an agent. And thus the heavens would be in potency to motion, since they receive it from another. If, however, the term *is able* means potency as distinct from being (*esse*) in act, then the proposition is true. For something is in potency to being (*esse*) because it can receive being (*esse*) which as yet it does not have; just as something in potency to not being (*non esse*) because it can have non-being (*non esse*) which it now lacks. But since every act that can be possessed by some potency is acquired only through change, we are back to our position, namely, that only passive potency has reference to being (*esse*).

It is easy from what has been said, to solve the other arguments by which the Scotists prove that substance is separable from every accident. For they use propositions whose falsity has been explained above.

Now that which is highest and most truly predicated in any genus is the cause of those things which are posterior in that genus. For example, fire which is the ultimate in heat is the cause of heat in hot things, as is said in II *Metaph.*<sup>44</sup> Therefore substance which is primary in the genus of being, having essence most excellently and truly, must be the cause of accidents which secondarily and as in a qualified sense share the nature of being.

---

<sup>44</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, II (a), 1, 993b 24.

142) In this second part of the chapter, before explaining the diversity of accidents among themselves, he determines what the cause of accidents is, in order that he may indicate the causes of their diversity. His conclusion is: substance is the cause of accidents. This he proves as follows. The highest and most truly being is the cause of all other beings; substance is highest and most truly being; therefore substance is the cause of other beings; but these are accidents. The minor is evident from VII *Metaph.*<sup>45</sup> The major is from II *Metaph.*<sup>46</sup> where he says that universally what is highest of a kind in any order is the cause of all other things in that order as such. Thus fire, which is the hottest in the order of hot things, is the cause why all hot things are hot. However, he uses the term *genus* in the text just as Aristotle in that text uses *univocation*, because for the truth of this proposition it is necessary that the cause have a name and an intelligibility common to it and its effect, even though they are only analogously the same. For this does not follow: the heavens are the cause of every hot thing; therefore the heavens are the hottest things. This would follow were it not that the name *hot* belongs to the heavens equivocally. Thus, since substance and accidents have the name and intelligibility of a being analogously, and substance is a being in the highest sense, then substance is the cause why all others are beings.

This, however, happens in different ways. Since the parts of substance are matter and form, then some accidents follow principally upon form and some upon matter.

143) Because accidents are caused by the substance in which they are, and because the diversity of effects proceeds from their causes, he assigns the diversity between accidents *a priori* to the diversity of the parts of substance from which the accidents flow. He gives three distinctions.

The first of these with its divisions is the following. Some accidents follow principally upon form; others follow principally upon matter. Among the accidents following upon form, some of them unite to matter, while others are separate from matter. Among the accidents following upon matter, some follow upon it relative to the general form, and others relative to the special form.

The basis of the first division is that each thing acts in so far as it is in act, and it is always a species which is thought to move and act, as is said in III *Phys.*<sup>47</sup> Then it is necessary that operations and opera-

---

<sup>45</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, VII ( ), 1, 1028a 29.

<sup>46</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, II (a), 1, 993b 24.

<sup>47</sup> Aristotle, *Physics*, III, 2, 202a 9; St. Thomas, *In III Phys.*, lect. 4, n. 6.

tive powers follow the form. Likewise, since each thing undergoes and is changed by reason of matter, it is necessary that many accidents follow matter as, for example, those which are present owing to the diverse complexion of matter and make matter subject to motion, etc. Now he put *principally* in the first division in contradistinction to *totally*, for no accident belongs solely to form or solely to matter. All are of the composite (for even in the case of intellection, it is not only the soul which acts, but the whole composite of matter and form, for it is primarily Socrates who understands). Therefore the meaning of the division is that some accidents follow upon form, not as their total, but as their principal cause; and some likewise follow upon matter as their principal, not total cause. For since the cause of all accidents is that which truly is, that is, a complete substance, the cause of all of them is the thing composed of matter and form. But the principal root of some of them is form, of others matter. In artificial things, something belongs to the composite by reason of the form, and something by reason of matter. Thus in a knife, the act of cutting comes from the form; the hardness of the knife from the matter. It is the same in natural things, something arises in the composite by reason of the form and something by reason of the matter. Thus in Socrates, the act of sensing and of understanding come by reason of the form, but masculinity by reason of the matter. What the rules are by which we discern accidents following upon form and those following upon matter will be clarified later.

There is, however, a form whose act of existing does not depend on matter, for example, the intellectual soul. Matter on the other hand, does not exist except through form. Thus in accidents, which follow upon form, there is something which has nothing in common with matter, such as understanding which does not act through a corporeal organ, as the Philosopher proves in *III de Anima*.<sup>48</sup> Some accidents which follow upon form, however, have something in common with matter, as the act of sensing. But no accident follows upon matter without having something in common with form.

144) Here St. Thomas gives the first subdivision with its cause. Since proper powers and properties and operations of forms must be proportioned to the forms themselves, so that if the essence of the form itself is dependent upon matter, its power and operation (since these are not the form itself from which the more perfect things flow) must depend upon matter. And if the essence of the form is independent of matter it must have some power independent of matter, other-

---

<sup>48</sup> Aristotle, *On the Soul*, III, 4, 429b 3; St. Thomas, *In III de Anima*, lect. 7, n. 687 ff.

wise it would have been in vain that nature made a form independent of matter. Had it made a nature elevated above matter, as such it would not be able to operate, and consequently could not pursue its proper end; for each thing exists for the sake of its operation, as is said in II *Coeli*.<sup>49</sup> Therefore, since we find two genera of substantial forms, namely, those dependent upon matter, as are all material forms, and those independent of matter, as is the human soul; then we find two genera of accidents following upon form.

Some accidents flow from a form dependent upon matter, and these flow from it in such a way that they are still received into the composite as their subject. For this reason they are said to have something in common with matter, as in the act of sensing, living, and the like.

Others, however, flow from a form independent of matter as such, and these flow from the form in such a way that they are received into the form alone as their subject. Therefore they are said to have nothing in common with matter, as is the case of the intellect and the will and the act of understanding, willing, and the like.

Do not suppose that I am carelessly contradicting what I said above with what I am saying now. For it is both true that every accident belongs to the composite, as I said above, and that some accidents belong only to the form, as I am now saying. To say that an accident *belongs to something* can be understood in two ways. In one way, as belonging to the complete eliciting and receiving principle; in another way, as belonging to the supposit. Taken in the second way, every accident belongs to the composite, which is what exists (*esse*) and becomes. Thus the soul does not understand as a supposit which operates, but Socrates does through the soul. Taken in the first way, however, some accidents belong to the soul itself, and some to the composite; for the intellectual power does not have as its subject some part of the body composed of matter and form, but only the essence of the soul. Thus it is said, in III *de Anima*,<sup>50</sup> that the intellect is not the act of any body. Now the sensitive powers do not have the soul alone as their subject, but rather determinate parts of the body, composed of matter and substantial form. Likewise, the complete eliciting principle of sensation is not the potency of the soul alone, but a composite of corporeal organ and power of the soul. But the complete eliciting principle of intellection is the intellectual power alone; and since immanent operation is in its eliciting principle as

---

<sup>49</sup> Aristotle, *On the Heavens*, II, 3, 286a 8; St. Thomas, *In II de Caelo*, lect. 4, n. 5.

<sup>50</sup> Aristotle, *On the Soul*, III, 4, 429b 3; St. Thomas, *In III de Anima*, lect. 7, n. 687 ff.

in a subject, the act of understanding will be in the intellect alone as in its subject.

For this reason, St. Thomas says in another place that the soul understands like the eye sees. The eye sees as a complete eliciting principle; for eye names the composite of corporeal organ and power of the soul. Therefore there is no contradiction between the statements: every accident belongs to the composite as a supposit; and some accidents belong to the form alone as a complete eliciting and receiving principle. And although the entire treatment here concerns the accidents of material substances, still from these the nature of accidents in separated substances is indicated, for it is necessary that they be in the class of those accidents<sup>51</sup> which follow upon a form independent of matter.

And note that before he gives the subdivision of the other member, he assigns in the text the reason why there is no subdivision for accidents following upon matter like the one made for those following upon form, so that one may say that among the accidents following upon matter, some communicate with the form and others do not. The reason is that there are not two kinds of matter, one dependent upon form and the other not, as there are two kinds of form; for no matter can exist without form, as has been proved.

Still among these accidents which follow upon matter, we find a certain diversity. For some are consequent upon matter according to the relation they have to a special form; for example, masculine and feminine in the case of animals, the diversity of which is reduced to matter, as is said in *X Metaph.*<sup>52</sup> Thus, when the animal form is gone, these accidents do not remain, except equivocally. Some accidents, however, flow from matter according to the relation it has to a general form. When, therefore, the special form is gone, they still remain in it. For example, the blackness of an Ethiopian's<sup>53</sup> skin<sup>54</sup> results from the mixture of the elements, and not from his soul; hence it remains in him after death.

145) Here he gives the division of the other member as follows. Among the accidents following upon matter, some follow upon it relative to the general form; others relative to the special form. Those accidents are said to follow upon matter relative to the general form which belong to an individual of a higher genus, more by reason of matter than of form. For example, this mixture has black skin, not

---

<sup>51</sup> In the Paris edition (p. 554, line 7), *substantiarum separatum, oportet enim ea esse de ordine illorum accidentium* is missing.

<sup>52</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, X (I), 9, 1058b 21; St. Thomas, *In X Metaph.*, lect. 11, n. 2132.

<sup>53</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 233, line 4 from bottom) has *Ethiope*. The Paris edition (p. 554, line 25, has *Anthiope*.

by reason of the form of the mixture, but because its matter has undergone such and such, think of the kind of climate where the heat of the sun is excessive. But those accidents are said to follow upon matter relative to the special form which belong to an individual of a lower genus or species, more by reason of matter than of form. For example, this animal is masculine, not principally by reason of the soul, but because a certain passion accompanies matter disposed toward the soul, for instance, because matter was not fully subjected to the influence of the vigorous action of the semen. The sign that these accidents are such, namely, that they follow matter according as it looks to the form of a higher or lower genus, is that some accidents retain the same nature in the corrupted composite, and some persist only equivocally. The black color of a living man and a dead man have the same nature; masculinity does not. The reason for this is nothing else than that masculinity follows upon animality by reason of its proper matter. Therefore when the animal is corrupted and does not persist except equivocally, it is necessary that masculinity, in the notion of which is included animality, persist equivocally. Whiteness, however, because it follows upon the matter of the mixture persisting in the corpse according to the same definition, does not persist equivocally.

**Question XVIII<sup>55</sup>—**

**Whether Numerically the Same Accident Is in the Thing Generated and Corrupted?<sup>56</sup>**

146) There is a problem regarding what is said here, whether the blackness of the skin of a living Ethiopian is numerically one and the same as that of a dead one. Or universally, whether an accident is numerically the same in a generated and in a corrupted thing. Concerning this problem, there are *three points* to be treated.

First, the opinion of certain people will be stated.  
Secondly, the opinion of St. Thomas will be given.  
Thirdly, objections will be answered.

147) *Concerning the first point*, some are of the opinion that accidents common to a generated and a corrupted thing are numerically the same in both. Among these people some, basing such a distinction upon certain words of Averroes, develop their own notion, that accidents common to a generated and a corrupted thing have a two-

---

<sup>54</sup> *Entis* in the text should read *cutis*.

<sup>55</sup> In the Paris edition (p. 555), this appears as Question XVII.

<sup>56</sup> In the Paris edition (p. 555), the following is added to this title: *Averroistarum quorundam opinio. In De Substantia orbis, c. I et I Phys., lxvi.*

fold mode of being, namely, a terminate and an interminate mode. They call interminate accidents the essences of accidents without limitation to such or such a degree. Terminate accidents, however, they call the essences of accidents limited to this or that degree. They hold that interminate accidents are numerically the same in a generated and a corrupted thing, but not terminate accidents. Thus, as interminate<sup>57</sup> quantity is expressly called common and the same in all things by the Commentator, so interminate heat is common and is the same in air and in fire.

This opinion is confirmed by texts and arguments. For when Aristotle says:<sup>58</sup> in these things, if something persist in the generated and corrupted thing, for example, in air and water if both are transparent Or moist, etc., he shows that it is not unfitting that some identical accident be in the generated and the corrupted thing. And in II *de Gener.*<sup>59</sup> he has it expressly that in those things which have a corresponding factor, change is easier, for it is easier to corrupt one thing than two. Again, Averroes in *libro de Substantia orbis*<sup>60</sup> says that not only do interminate dimensions, which he calls simple, remain the same in a generated thing, but universally all qualities common to the generated and the corrupted.

Now the main argument for this position is that if the qualities, disposing the matter of a thing to be corrupted, are corrupted to a new form, it is asked what educes the form to be generated? It cannot be said to be an external agent, because such an agent could not act except through intermediate qualities introduced into matter. But those qualities are said by opponents to be corrupted before the induction of the form; therefore it remains that there would be nothing to educe the form; and this is impossible.

Further, it is asked what are corresponding qualities corrupted by, since no contrary is present? It is pointless to think that a thing is corrupted in the very instant in which the same is said to be generated.

Further, if the configuration of a corpse, the organization<sup>61</sup> and a scar, and whatever else of this kind there might be, do not remain the same, it is asked, what are they generated from? And since it cannot be said what they as followers are generated from, then necessarily there is no generator. Now, that they are not generated as followers

---

<sup>57</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 235, line 2) has *intermitata*. The Paris edition (p. 555, line 18) has *interminata*.

<sup>58</sup> Aristotle, *On Generation and Corruption*, I, 4, 319a 21; St. Thomas, *In I de Gener, et Corrup.*, lect. 10, n. 5.

<sup>59</sup> Aristotle, *On Generation and Corruption*, II, 4, 331a 23.

<sup>60</sup> Averroes, *De Substantia Orbis*, I; *ed. cit.*, t. IX, fól. 3r–v.

<sup>61</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 235, line 14 from bottom) has *organizatio*. The Paris edition (p. 555, line 8 from bottom) has *organi ratio*.

is proved. For some accidents are consecutively generated, because that which gives form gives what is consequent to the form. Only the above-named accidents are rather repugnant to the form than consequent upon it. The indication of this is that under the form of cadaver, they tend to corruption. So for the first point.<sup>62</sup>

148) As for the *second point*, you should know that the opinion of Thomists is: no accident is identical in number in the generated and corrupted thing. For this follows necessarily from our principles. If no accident is in matter as in its subject, and if there is only one substantial form in the composite, it is impossible that the same accident remain numerically identical, since indeed the accident would flit from subject to subject, and it would be the same and not the same. Right now, I shall not offer arguments for this conclusion because in order to prove it effectively it would be necessary to prove the principle, namely, that in the composite there is only one substantial form. But I shall explain how it is possible, and how our position is to be defended against the opponents.

It must be noted, then, that *an accident is corrupted in four ways*. *First*, through an alteration opposite to its contrary, as cold from hot. *Secondly*, owing to the absence of a conserving agent, as light leaves the air when the sun goes down. *Thirdly*, owing to the corruption of a subject, as risibility is corrupted when a man dies. *Fourthly*, owing to the corruption of the terminus, as a likeness ceases when the thing like it is destroyed. And because, when speaking of opposites, there are as many ways to effect one as the other, accidents are generated in four ways. First, by an agent like itself through change, for example, water is made hot by the hot fire. Secondly, in the presence of the agent-cause of becoming and being, for example, light comes to be in the air by the presence of the sun. Thirdly, in the generation of the subject, for example, risibility is generated when man is. Fourthly, in the generation of a terminus, for example, if Socrates were the only white thing existing, immediately upon the generation of another white thing, there would arise a likeness in Socrates.

And although all the kinds of accidents can be corrupted in one or other of these four ways, it is only in the third way that every accident can be corrupted. For it is common to every accident to be corrupted when its subject is corrupted, since the being (*esse*) of an accident is to-be-in. Therefore the sufficient cause of the corruption of accidents is given when the corruption of the subject is given. Thus, when fire comes to be from air, although it be not necessary that the heat of the air be corrupted, but rather that it become more intense;

---

<sup>62</sup> In the Paris edition (p. 556, line 1), the following is added: *Conclusio. Non sunt eadem numero accidentia in genitia et corrupto.*



nevertheless because air, which is the subject of heat, is corrupted, it is necessary that its heat be corrupted without passing to its contrary owing solely to the lack of a subject. Therefore it is evident how those arguments err which infer that corresponding qualities and dispositions preparing for the form to be produced remain, because they lack a contrary on the occasion of corruption. Their error is the fallacy of the consequent.

It must be noted that when an accident is generated on the generation of its subject, or corrupted on the corrupting of the subject, the same action terminates at both; at the subject directly, and the accident consecutively. Thus it is not necessary to seek a generator or corruptor other than the generator and corruptor of the subject. For the agent which simultaneously and by the same operation does both is identical; just as fire generates fire from air by changing the air. At the end of this alteration, fire corrupts the air directly, and consecutively the heat introduced in the air, and universally all the accidents which had the air as their subject owing to the necessity of consecutiveness, because an accident cannot remain without its proper subject. In the same instant, it directly generates fire and consecutively heat, without any other mediating alteration, similar to the heat existing in the prior instant. The conclusion is similar in the case of quantity, figure and other dispositions and similar accidents in the generated and corrupted. For all of them are concomitantly produced, and therefore it is not necessary to look for a generator other than the generator of the subject. When you have examined what is said above, you will see that a likeness is at times corrupted by its likeness concomitantly and by accident; and conversely, from what is not similar the accident itself happens to be generated accidentally and concomitantly. Therefore, whenever Aristotle says that the same thing remains in the generated and in the corrupted, he means the same in species, and this by accident, and not the same in number. For numerical unity is changed, not because of the power of generation, but because of the corruption of the subject. The easier change in things having corresponding factors arises not because of the numerical identity of the corresponding accident, but because of its lack of repugnance in acting or being acted on. And because substantial forms, from which similar qualities flow, are similar, the nature of the cause is known from its effects. Now if Averroes is to be kept, he will be explained in the same way.

149) *In answer to the opinion of the opponents*, I have this to say. *To the first argument*, what educes the form in the final instant is an external generator, not through some action which it may elicit in that instant, but rather touching the nude essence of matter at the ter-

minus of action. Thus, when it is said that an external agent cannot educe the form except through the introduction of intermediary qualities, this is true during the action, but not at the terminus of action. For it suffices and is necessary that change have occurred to the prepared and disposed matter.

*To the second argument*, I say that corresponding qualities and like things are corrupted accidentally upon the corruption of the subject by what corrupts the subject directly. Nor is it pointless that at the same moment we first have non-being (*non esse*) of them and being of similar qualities. Rather it is necessary with the necessity of matter, as has been said.

*To the third argument*, I say that configuration and scars and things of this kind are produced consecutively and accidentally by the generator of their subject, namely, the corpse. It is not true that only those accidents which follow upon form are generated consecutively; but many accidents follow upon the composite by the necessity of matter, which though incompatible are yet in some way opposed to the form, as is self-evident. Therefore I say that configuration and the like follow upon the corpse from the necessity of matter, because a natural agent cannot in so short a time totally corrupt the dispositions rooted by so many transformations. Therefore similar dispositions follow. And because there are no makers in place of the form of the generated, it is hurried to corruption.

And because everything is individuated by matter and placed in a genus or species by its form, then accidents which follow upon matter are accidents of the individual according to which individuals of the same species differ from one another. But accidents which follow upon form are proper attributes of the genus or species. Thus they are found in everything sharing the nature of the genus or species. Risibility in man, for instance, follows upon the form, because laughter happens owing to some act of knowledge of man's soul.

150) Here St. Thomas gives the second division of accidents, which is as follows. Some accidents are accidents of the individual, others are accidents of the genus or species.

There is a twofold difference between them. The first is that accidents of the individual follow upon the composite, principally by reason of matter. On the other hand, accidents of the species or genus follow upon the composite by reason of the form. The second is that accidents of the individual are those in virtue of which differences are found among individuals of the same species. On the other hand, accidents of the genus or species are the common accidents, necessary to all individuals of that genus or species. For example, masculine and feminine are individual accidents, for they

follow upon matter, and it is in virtue of these that Socrates and Bertha are different. Risibility, however, is a specific accident, for it follows upon intellectual knowledge and necessarily belongs to all men. He also points out the basis of the proximate difference when he says that matter is the principle of individuation, and form is that through which a thing is placed in a genus or species. For from the fact that matter is the cause of individual being (*esse*) as such, it follows that it is also the root of the accidents following upon individual being (*esse*) itself. For this reason, accidents of the individual are those which follow upon matter. And because of the fact that form is the principle of generic and specific being (*esse*), it is necessary that it also be the cause of properties and of accidents following upon genus or species. Thus accidents belonging to a genus or species follow upon form. Now the principle of the second distinction is that since in both a generic and a specific form all things contained under them are found, it is necessary that these properties be common to all. But since individuals differ according to matter, material accidents ought also be responsible for differences between particulars, since effects proportionately correspond to their proper causes.

There occur at this point two doubts about the text. The first is: in what sense it is true that it is in virtue of accidents following upon matter that individuals in the same species differ, seeing that quantity follows upon matter and is yet common to all individuals with bodies and inferiors.

The second problem is: in what sense it is verified that accidents following upon matter are not attributes of genus or species, since masculine and feminine follow upon matter, and yet they are attributes of animal; and thus animal is placed in their definition as the subject in the definition of attribute, as is said in X *Metaph.*<sup>63</sup> Likewise, quantity seems to be an attribute of body in the category of substance, and yet it follows matter.

To understand the first problem, see that these words: *it is in virtue of accidents following upon matter that individuals differ*, are not to be understood uniformly, but in diverse ways. For individuals differ in virtue of their material accidents in two ways: either because one of them has one, and the other another; or because both have the same one, but in different ways. For example, Socrates and Bertha differ according to masculine and feminine because he has masculinity, she femininity. They also differ in virtue of their quantity, not because he is quantified and she is not, but because they are not

---

<sup>63</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, X (I), 9, 1058a 29; St. Thomas, *In X Metaph.*, lect. 11, n. 2127 ff.

quantified in the same way. We never find two quantities entirely similar, since it is necessary that they differ in their proper places. Quantity, therefore, though it is common to all individuals, yet because it does not belong to them in the same way, is that according to which individuals differ from one another in a secondary way; and this suffices.

In order to understand the second problem, it must be noted that the attributes of genus are of two kinds. Some belong to it by reason of the generic form, and some by reason of matter. Those which follow upon form were here called attributes of the genus, but not those that follow upon their matter. The reason for this is that the generic nature is such from its form, not from its matter. Animal is animal because of its form, and not because of its matter. In our proposal, the attribute of animal by reason of the form is sensibility; by reason of matter, masculinity or femininity. Thus Aristotle in his *Metaph.*<sup>64</sup> and St. Thomas in this text speak in different ways, moved by different reasons. Because there is an attribute of animal by reason of matter, it is called an attribute there [in the *Metaphysics*]; but because it is not an attribute by reason of form, it is not called an attribute here.

The case is similar with quantity because it follows upon the body by reason of matter, for it follows body according to that by which it is potentially divisible, which is nothing but matter. The indivisibility of immaterial things shows this. And note that this second division of accidents does not differ from the first as regards the members of the division, for the members in this case are the same as those in the former. But they differ logically because the first division is made according to their primary bases, namely, matter and form; the second is made according to the subject to which they are appropriated, namely, genus, species and individual.

We ought also realize that the essential principles sometimes cause accidents according to perfect actuality, as in the case of heat in fire which is always actually hot. Sometimes, however, they cause accidents only by way of an aptitude, receiving their completion from an external agent; for example, transparency in air, which is completed by some shining body outside. In such a case, the aptitude is an inseparable accident. But the completion which comes to it from some principle outside the essence of the thing or which does not enter into its constitution, is separable; for example, being moved and the like.

---

<sup>64</sup> See Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, X (I), 9, 1058a 29; St. Thomas, *In X Metaph.*, lect. 11, n. 2127 ff.

151) here he places the third division of accidents. Some are caused by essential principles of the subject according to perfect act; others according to aptitude only. Those accidents are said to be caused according to perfect act from essential principles which, according to their actualities, arise in the subject from intrinsic principles of the subject; as heat in fire. On the other hand, those accidents are said to be caused according to imperfect act, or according to aptitude only, which arise in the subject from the essential principles of the subject, not according to their actualities but according to inchoate states. For example, that fire is moved upwards is caused by its principles according to its inchoate state, think of lightness. They differ, however, because the first kind, both according to their aptitudes and in themselves, are inseparable from their subjects. The second kind, on the other hand, are in themselves separable; but according to their aptitudes, they cannot be separated. For example, in the case of fire, it cannot happen that either the aptitude to be hot, or heat itself, be separated from fire and that the fire still remain. However, upward motion is not always present in fire; but the aptitude toward upward motion, namely lightness, is inseparable from it. The reason for this is that in the first case, the actuality of the accident flows from essential principles alone; in the second case, only the aptitude flows from essential principles, but the actuality is looked for from something, namely an extrinsic cooperator either acting or not hindering. This is evident in the example given of upward motion which is not present in fire unless it is in some extrinsic cooperator, namely, in what removes a hindrance. Again, transparency is not actually present in the air unless in an external illuminating cooperator; for light is the act of the actually transparent, as is said in *II de Anima*.<sup>65</sup>

The more basic reason for this distinction, I take from I<sup>2</sup>II<sup>ae</sup>.<sup>66</sup> The reason why some accidents as complete act arise from essential principles inseparably, and others arise separably as complete act and inseparably as aptitude, is that the first kind follow the actuality of the thing; the others the potentiality. I understand it in this way, because each thing acts insofar as it is in act, but is passive insofar as it is in potency. From the sufficient actuality of a thing, it comes about that it completely produces accident in itself. On the other hand, from insufficient actuality, and consequently from potentiality, from which all insufficiency comes, it comes about that a thing has accident in itself only according to aptitude, and that it awaits actu-

---

<sup>65</sup> Aristotle, *On the Soul*, II, 7, 418b 9.

<sup>66</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.*, I-II, 10, 1, *ad 2*.

ality from another,<sup>67</sup> or that the accident is separable according to actuality, which is the same.

Further, since being (*esse*) and good follow actuality, and non-being (*non esse*) and evil follow potentiality, it is necessary that accidental being (*esse*) which is perfect and inseparably according to act and aptitude, come from the actuality of the thing; and conversely, it is necessary that the incomplete state of an accident and its separability according to act proceed from the potentiality of a thing. For separability is in itself a kind of non-being (*non esse*), since it is nothing but a negation of the necessary consequence of its complete being (*esse*) in relation to the being (*esse*) of the subject. This is to be understood as above, namely, the aptitude is from the actuality of the subject; and the separability of an accident as actual is from potentiality.

Now it must be noted that St. Thomas does not simply locate the attribute implying aptitude among accidents flowing from essential principles, but rather among the acts of those attributes and aptitudes, which acts as incomplete being (*esse*) he called aptitudes. He did this because aptitude of itself does not have the character of something produced in itself or able to be produced, for nothing in nature intends aptitude, but rather its act.<sup>68</sup> For risibility has no other task than to produce laughter; thus also risibility is a kind of inchoate laughter. Therefore it is not aptitude that is simply posited among the effects of essential principles, but act; because it is not the aptitude, but its act which is intended by the productive principles. And because aptitude is nothing but inchoate state, but an inchoate state is imperfect act, then accidents according to incomplete act are called aptitudes.

152) Before we close the treatise on the diversity of accidents, we ask whether every accident has some proper subject, or whether some accidents are so common that they are proper to nothing.

There is reason for a problem, because if every accident is proper to something, no accident would be separable from that in which it is, since what is proper belongs to each thing alone and always. For it would exist only and always in its proper subject. Moreover, it would follow that the corruption of any accident would always be accompanied by the corruption of the substance; for instance, when the risible is corrupted, man is corrupted. The consequence is evident, because when a property is corrupted, it is necessary that that to which it is proper be also corrupted; otherwise the property would

---

<sup>67</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 240, line 9 from bottom) has *ab alio*. The Paris edition (p. 560, line 9) has *ab illo*.

<sup>68</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 241, line 8) has *actum*. The Paris edition (p. 560, line 26 from bottom) has *aptum*.

not always belong to the subject. But this we know from experience to be false, as is evident in common accidents and second acts.

From the other side, however, since every accident is definable, and the subject of which the accident is predicated directly is part of the definition, as is evident in VII *Metaph.*,<sup>69</sup> it ought to be that every accident have a proper and *per se* subject; for *per se* always and necessarily has universal supposition.

To clear up this problem, it must be realized that according to St. Thomas, in *quaestione de Virtutibus*,<sup>70</sup> a subject has a threefold relation to a proper accident: the relation of substrate to that which it supports;<sup>71</sup> of potency to act; and of principle to the principled. For example, the heat of fire does not have being (*esse*) unless it be supported in the fire; it is an accidental form of the fire, and it arises from the fire. When these conditions are present in something, it can be called a subject of an accident, and to the extent that it lacks these relations, it can be denied that it is the subject of an accident. Thus, because of the lack of the first, which is the more important condition, it is stated in IV *Metaph.*<sup>72</sup> that no accident is in another accident as its subject, because plainly no accident can support another, but only a substance which is a being in itself can offer to others the support of being (*essendi*). However, because some one accident can be related to another as potency to act, and at times as proximate principle to the principled, then it is also granted that one accident is subject of another; as for example, surface is called the subject of color because it is in potency to color, and sweetness is said to be in the hot and the moist because it is caused from the hot and the moist.

Therefore the doubt raised can be understood in four ways. First, it can be understood as asking whether every accident has a proper subject as support. Secondly, whether it has a proper subject as potency. Thirdly, whether it has a proper subject as principle. Fourthly, whether it has a proper subject as support of potency and as principle at the same time.

If the question is taken in the first way, the answer is in the negative to this, that every accident has a proper subject in the sense of support, as the arguments first mentioned prove. For there are many accidents which do not require for themselves any proper support,

---

<sup>69</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, VII ( ), 4, 1030a 30; St. Thomas, *In VII Metaph.*, lect. 4, nn. 1335–36.

<sup>70</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *De Virtutibus in Communi*, a. 3, *Resp.*

<sup>71</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 241, line 6 from bottom) has *sustentantis ad sustentantum*. The Paris edition (p. 561, line 1) has *sustentantis ad sustentantum*. The same is found on pp. 242–43 of the Laurent edition, and on pp. 561–62 of the Paris edition.

<sup>72</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, IV ( ), 4, 1007b 2; St. Thomas, *In Metaph.*, lect. 7, 630–31. The text cited in the Paris edition (p. 561, line 7) is *I Poster.*

but are generally found in many things, as their separation shows; they become separated from their supporting substance, and they remain naturally. This cannot be said of proper accidents. In fact, the same substance can, without undergoing change, support contraries, as is said in *Praedicamentis*.<sup>73</sup>

If the question is taken in the second way, the answer is in the affirmative, that is, that every accident has a proper subject in the sense of a proper potency, because every act is related to a proper potency. For as act is related to potency, this particular act is related to this particular potency, and a specific act to a specific potency. Now every accident is an act of some kind; therefore every accident has a proper potency whose act it is because of what is said in III *Phys.*;<sup>74</sup> that a potency to sickness is other than a potency to health, because health is other than sickness. And XII *Metaph.*<sup>75</sup> has a long argument proving that the principles of the categories are proportionally the same, because to each act there corresponds a proper potency.

If the question is taken in the third way, the answer is in the negative, that not every accident has some proper subject in the sense of a proper principle. The reason is that to have a proper subject, meaning a principle, includes the flowing of this accident from such a subject as from an efficient cause in this way, that the prior subject of two effects having an order among themselves is the efficient cause of the one that necessarily follows the production of the first effect, whether that subject be the receiver of the accident as that-by-which or as that-which. It is evident that not every accident flows from its subject as from an efficient receiver. There are many whose receptacle is purely passive in relation to them, as is evident when the species of a sensible thing is received in a medium or in a sense power.

If the question is understood in the fourth way, it is evident that the answer must be in the negative.

But it must be noted that what we said must be understood of accidents in separation from their received acts and in separation from their aptitudes. For in speaking of accidents, as St. Thomas does in the text, that is, not considering the actuality of accidents separately from their aptitudes, I would say that every accident according to its radical aptitude has some proper subject in the sense of a support of potency and of that of principle, although not according to its actuality. The reason is that the aptitude to a certain kind of accident is not present unless it flows mediately or immediately from a cer-

---

<sup>73</sup> Aristotle, *Categories*, ch. 5, 4a 30.

<sup>74</sup> Aristotle, *Physics*, III, 1, 201a 34; St. Thomas, *In III Phys.*, lect. 2, n. 8.

<sup>75</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, XII ( ), 6, 1071b 23 ff.; St. Thomas, *In XII Metaph.*, lect. 6, n. 2500 ff.



tain substantial grade. Consequently, it is not present unless it is supported, mediately or immediately, in a certain grade of subject. For example, light in its actuality and substance, though it be from an extrinsic source and be a separable accident, nevertheless inchoately or in its radical aptitude—think of transparency—is inseparable and flows from a certain substantial grade common to superior and inferior things. Likewise, although to sit is [a separable] accident, it is accidentally proper according to its aptitude; and it belongs naturally only to a definite being, think of a certain animal, etc., for the aptitude to sit flows from its principles. Similarly, although to see is a separable accident, yet the radical aptitude to see cannot be separated from certain animals.

From this it is clear how the arguments adduced for either position have different conclusions. For in speaking of accidents according to their essences and actualities, the conclusion of the arguments adduced is granted if we accept subject in the sense of support and principle.

Taking subject in the meaning of potency, the conclusion is false, as was said. The proof given against this position is not valid, because when it is said that what is proper belongs to every case, only to them and always, this is understood of what is proper itself, not according to its actuality but according to its aptitude. Likewise, when it is said that the subject ceases on the corruption of what is proper, this is taken to mean if it is corrupted according to aptitude, not however if according to act, generally speaking. Or, it may be said that inseparability and the like do not belong to an accident in reference to its subject in the meaning of proper potency, but as support and principle. However, when speaking of accidents according to their aptitudes, the error of the arguments is evident. For I say that no accident is separable according to radical aptitude at least, but is necessarily co-temporal with its subject, and then when an accident is corrupted according to such an aptitude, the subject must<sup>76</sup> be corrupted. The argument presented for the opposite position concludes that every accident has a subject of which it is predicated directly, either itself or according to its aptitude. For, since act belongs to that to which potency belongs, as is said in *de Somno et vigilia*,<sup>77</sup> it will be the same subject which comes in the definition of accident according to aptitude and according to act. For example, man must be placed not only in the definition of the risible, but also in that of laughter. Therefore these two statements stand simultaneously, that

---

<sup>76</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 244, line 1) has *oportet*. The Paris edition (p. 562, line 16 from bottom) has *potest*.

<sup>77</sup> Aristotle, *On Sleep and Wakefulness*, ch. 1, 454a 8.

an accident according to its actuality does not have a proper subject in which only and always it universally is; and nevertheless it has a proper subject through which it must be defined. The reason is that for the second it suffices that in itself or according<sup>78</sup> to its aptitude it be predicated directly of that subject. For the first, it suffices that an accident, in itself, be only not predicated directly of a subject.

Now it should be known that in accidents genus, species and difference are taken in a different sense than in substances. For in substances, from matter and substantial form a substantial unity is brought about whose union results in one nature which properly is placed in the category of substance. Therefore in substances, concrete names signifying the composite are properly said to be in a category, whether as species or genera, for example, man or animal. But neither the form nor the matter belongs in this way to a category, except by reduction, as principles are said to be in the category of the principled. But an accident and its subject do not produce a substantial unity. Then from their union, no nature results to which the intention of genus or species can be attributed. Consequently, accidental terms expressed in a concrete way, such as white thing or musician, are not placed in a category as species or genera, except by reduction. They belong to a category only when expressed in the abstract, such as whiteness or music.

153) In the third part of this chapter, it is determined how accidents are related to logical intentions. First, how they are related to categorical being (*esse*); then how genus and differences are understood of them. Concerning the first point, he lays down two conclusions:<sup>79</sup> accidents in the concrete are not properly in a category; and accidents in the abstract are properly in a category.

For these conclusions to be clear, it must be noted that accidents have one mode of being (*essendi*), that is, to be in another; for they are not unless they are in another. There are two ways of understanding them, since the intellect naturally divides things which are one in reality. Sometimes they are understood by understanding together with them the subjects which they are in, and they are understood in the manner of accidents, because for an accident to be is to be in another. At other times, they are understood alone, not being understood together with their subjects which in reality they are in, and then they are understood in the manner of substances, because to be in itself, that is alone, belongs only to substance; for accidents always need something else. However, since the manner of signifying is not based upon the manner of being (*essendi*) but rather upon that of

---

<sup>78</sup> In the Paris edition (p. 562, line 6 from bottom), *se vel secundum* is missing.

<sup>79</sup> There is a printing error in the Paris edition (p. 563, line 17). *Conclusisnes* should read *conclusiones*.

understanding, they have thus<sup>80</sup> two ways of signifying. Consequently, sometimes accidents are signified together with their subjects; and here they are signified after the manner of an accident, and they are said to be signified in the concrete, as white, black, etc. At other times, however, the accident alone is signified, that is, without a subject being co-signified; then they are signified after the manner of substance and are said to be signified in the abstract, as whiteness and blackness. Although in the case of accidents the abstract and the concrete differ in the way they are signified, that is, according as the subject is co-signified or not; nevertheless they agree in the signification of the form of the accident. For white signifies pure quality, as is said in *Praedicamentis*,<sup>81</sup> just as whiteness does; but white signifies whiteness in a subject, and whiteness signifies whiteness without it. Because accidents in the concrete bring in the whole joined together, for instance, as white means whiteness in a subject, this unit is not a substantial unit, but is an accidental one and being. Now that which is placed in a category must indicate a one and being in itself, since the categories divide being in itself;<sup>82</sup> therefore accidents in the concrete are not properly placed in the categories. This is the principle upon which the first conclusion is proved in the text. It may be formulated as follows. No term bringing in an accidental being and one is properly in a category; accident in the concrete indicates an accidental one and being; therefore the accidental term in the concrete is not placed in a category properly and directly. In explanation of the minor, he gives the difference between the accidental and the substantial concrete as this, that the substantial concrete brings in a composite of matter and form, and such a being is a substantial unit, and is therefore placed in a category, as genus or species. The accidental concrete, however, brings in a composite of subject and accident, which is an accidental unit, for from accident and subject there results only an accidental unit.<sup>83</sup> Therefore it ought not be placed in a category except reductively, in the same way that a non-pure thing is reduced to the purity of its nature.

And so the second conclusion stands as true, namely, that an accident, taken absolutely, receives predication of genus or species in a category; otherwise, accidents would be entirely excluded from the categories.

However, when you hear that the abstract brings in only the form, do not think of this statement: the abstract completely excludes from

---

<sup>80</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 245, line 4) has *sic*. The Paris edition (p. 563, line 21) has *sicut*.

<sup>81</sup> Aristotle, *Categories*, ch. 8, 9b 9.

<sup>82</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, V ( ), 7, 1017a 24; St. Thomas, *In V Metaph.*, lect. 9, n. 890.

<sup>83</sup> In the Paris edition (p. 564, line 7), *ut dicitur in VII Metaph.* is added.

itself the subject of the form. This is false. Rather, the abstract, owing to its manner of signifying in which alone it differs from the concrete, does not include the subject principally, but secondarily and by consequence. This can be shown from the likeness and difference between them owing to their manner of signifying. For they are alike in that both the abstract and the concrete, from their manner of signifying, bring in these two: that-which and that-by-which, or the subject and the form. For the definition and the thing defined bring in the same thing, but in different ways. Now the definitions of both bring in both the things said, as can be shown from examples. We call snubbiness the curvature of the nose, and snub a curved nose. That this is owing to the manner of signifying is clear from the fact that both the abstract and the concrete signify a pure form, as Aristotle testifies in the *Predicamentis*.<sup>84</sup> However, the abstract and the concrete differ in various ways of signifying, in that the concrete owing to its manner of signifying brings in principally the subject and secondarily the form. The abstract brings in principally the form and by consequence the subject.

Notice that subject and form are related in opposite order to the signification of a concrete term and its manner of signifying. For by reason of signification, the concrete brings in first the form, and then the subject only by a consequent connection. But as far as the mode of signifying is concerned, it first brings in the subject, and by consequence the form. The sign of this is that in the definition of the concrete the subject is first expressed as a genus, which is the first part of the thing defined; and form is put in the second place as a difference. For we say that snub is a nose that is curved. But the abstract both in signification and in manner of signifying first brings in form, and secondarily the subject by consequence from this. The sign of this is that in its definition the form is first expressed as a genus, and the subject in the secondary place of the difference, as is evident when we say that snubbiness is curvature of the nose. This difference arises because the concrete brings in a relationship between subject and form such that it begins with the subject and terminates in the form. But the abstract implies a relationship between form and subject such that it begins with the form and terminates in the subject, as is evident from the examples given. For from the fact that the relationship introduced by the concrete is brought in by the manner of signifying, as beginning from the subject, it follows that it first brings in the subject from which it begins. Similarly, because the relationship introduced by the abstract is brought in by the manner of signifying, as beginning from the form, it follows that it first brings in the form,

---

<sup>84</sup> Aristotle, *Categories*, ch. 8, 9b 9.

from which it begins. The cause of this diversity is that concrete terms are devised to signify composites. But composition arises from the subject. Abstract terms, however, are devised to signify forms which indeed appear to us to be simple, but by these we can name a subject. And therefore concretes mean something composite, abstracts mean forms, as present in a subject however. It is not said, therefore, that the abstract brings in the form alone because it in no way joins the subject, but because from the manner of signifying it does not mean the composite, nor does it bring in the subject principally as the concrete does, but only extrinsically and as the terminus of a relation of the form signified.

Note here that the metaphysician and the logician will judge differently concerning how the abstract and the concrete are in the categories. According to the metaphysician, who considers things in respect to their essence and not according to their manner of understanding or of signifying, the abstract and the concrete do not differ, because the same thing is signified abstractly and concretely. Thus he may say that as the abstract so also the concrete is in a genus. For through its essence a thing enters into or leaves a genus taken metaphysically, that is, through the thing of a genus and not through a manner of signifying. Thus the metaphysician does not call white thing an accidental being, but this white thing, as is evident from V *Metaph.* and VII.<sup>85</sup> The logician, however, who considers things not according to their natures but according to intentions joined to the first things understood and signified, says that the abstract is in a genus, but not the concrete, because things signified by an abstract term can be named a species, as whiteness, or a genus, as color. But the concrete cannot, because of the difference in the manner of signifying, as was said.

The reason why the difference in the manner of signifying provides this truth for the logician is that the mode of signifying precedes<sup>86</sup> second intentions and founds them in a way. For although both the manner of signifying and the second intention agree in that they follow the thing, not as it is in itself, but as it is understood; nevertheless it is primarily the mode of signifying rather than the second intention that follows the thing as understood, because the mode of signifying is nothing other than a sign of the manner of understanding, as a word which signifies is a sign of the thing understood. Thus, just as it is primarily a significant word rather than a second intention which follows the thing understood, so the mode of

---

<sup>85</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, V ( ), 7, 1017a 13; VII ( ), 4, 1030b 10.

<sup>86</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 247, line 17) has *praevenit*. The Paris edition (p. 565, line 26 from bottom) has *praetendit*.

signifying follows the mode of understanding, because the entire order of things pertaining to terms of first intention precedes the order of things which pertain to terms of second intention. And because second intentions denominate things as understood and as signified, and not things absolutely, then it holds that the same thing understood and signified in different manners can be denominated a species or not; and consequently can be directly in a category or not. For example, human nature, signified by the term *man*, is a species; but signified by the term *humanity* is not a species but the principle of a species. Thus in the matter under discussion, according to the logician, the thing understood by the term *whiteness*, signified in different ways, is said to be in or not to be in a category. For if it is signified in the abstract, it is placed in a category, since taken thus it is denominated a species; if, however, the thing is signified in the concrete, it is said not to be directly in a category, since taken thus it does not have the denomination of a species or a genus, because from the manner of signifying, it includes an extraneous thing. And because St. Thomas intends to examine how accidents are related to logical intentions, and not to what genus a thing belongs he therefore separates accidental concrete from the categories.

Along with this, note that a thing can be made to be placed in a category in two ways: either by a cause placing it in a category; or by a necessary condition. The reason for placing a thing in a genus or species, both for the metaphysician and for the logician, is the essence of this thing. For a thing is defined in a genus or species through its essence. The necessary condition is the very manner of signifying. In the category of substance, the condition without which a thing does not receive the denomination of a genus, species, etc., is the manner of signifying in the concrete. In the categories of accidents, however, the condition without which is the manner of signifying in the abstract. Therefore when it was said that the accidental concrete is not directly placed in a category by the logician, understand that this is because of the lack of the necessary condition, and not because of the lack of a reason for placing it there. Similarly, when it is said that humanity and generally the substantial abstract is not in the genus of substance, understand that this is because of the lack of the necessary condition, and not the lack of a reason for placing it there.

And because accidents are not composed of matter and form, we cannot take their genus from matter and their difference from form, as is done with composite substances. But it is necessary that the first genus be taken from their mode of being, according as being is predicated in different ways, according to prior-

ity and posteriority, of the ten genera. Thus it is called quantity because it is the measure of substance, and quality inasmuch as it is a disposition of substance, and so of the other accidents, according to the Philosopher in *IV Metaph.*<sup>87</sup>

154) Here he explains in *three propositions* whence genus and species are taken in accidents. *The first* is: genus and species are not taken from matter and form. *The second* is: the first genus is taken from their own mode of being, by which the category itself is constituted a part of being (*entis*). *The third* is: differences in accidents are taken from the diversity of proper principles.

*The first is evident* thus. What is not composed of matter and form cannot have genus taken from matter and difference from form; but accidents are not composed of matter and form; therefore in them genus cannot be taken from matter and difference from form, as is the case in composite substances. How this is to be understood has been treated above.

*The second is evident* as follows. The first genus ought to unfold the essence according to a proper potency which is present in it, just as the ultimate difference ought to unfold the essence according to the ultimate act; but the essence of an accident, according to that mode by which a part of being (*entis*) is constituted, has a proper potency; therefore the first genus is to be taken from that mode. It must be understood here, first, that being (*ens*) is divided by certain modes into categories, just as in some way genus is divided into species by differences. The result is that just as species are constituted through that by which the parts of a genus are produced in their specific being (*esse*), so the categories are constituted in most general being (*esse*) through that by which the parts of the being come to be. Therefore the proper modes by which being (*ens*) descends to any one of the categories are those in virtue of which the first genera are constituted. Those modes are from the substantial, the mensurative, the dispositive, the relative, the active, etc., as is said in *V Metaph.*<sup>88</sup>

Secondly, it must be noted that since genus is taken from a thing according to that by which it has the character of being determinable, the first genus is taken from a thing according to that by which it first has the character of being determinable. Now a thing first has the character of being determinable when conceived according to its first grade. The first grade of a thing is the one which the thing gets from that mode by which it appropriates to itself its proper place among the parts of being (*entis*). Therefore the first genus taken from that

---

<sup>87</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, IV ( ), 2, 1003a 33 – 1003b 10; St. Thomas, *In IV Metaph.*, lect. 1, n. 534.

<sup>88</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, V ( ), 7, 1017a 24; St. Thomas, *In V Metaph.*, lect. 9, n. 890.

mode of being (*entis*) introduces *thing* as the primary determinable. For this reason these follow each other: to be taken from a thing according to its proper potency, that is, according to that by which it first has the character of being determinable; and to be taken from a thing according to that mode by which it is a part of being (*entis*). Thus the reason given is clear.

Their differences, on the other hand, are taken from the diversity of principles by which they are caused. And because the proper attributes are caused by the proper principles of the subject, therefore the subject is put in their definition in place of the difference when they are defined in the abstract. In this way they belong properly to a category. For example, it is said that snubbiness is the curvature of the nose. But the converse would be true if their definitions were taken in the concrete. In that case, we should in their definition place the subject as their genus, because then they would be defined as composite substances are, in which the notion of genus is taken from matter. For example, we say that a snub nose is a nose curved. The same is true if one accident is the principle of another, as action, passion and quantity are principles of relation. That is why the Philosopher divides relation with reference to them, in *V Metaph.*<sup>89</sup>

155) *Here he gives the third proposition*, that is, that in the case of accidents differences are taken from the diversity of proper principles. It is explained inductively. For the sign that differences are taken from the diversity of proper principles is that in the definition of accidents in the abstract, which properly have genus and differences, the subject takes the place of the difference. This would not be the case unless accidents differed in virtue of their proper principles, for it is because the principles of the subject from which they are caused differ among themselves that proper attributes differ among themselves.

One might be able to reject this sign, saying that the proper subject is at times put in the definition of proper accident in place of the genus, and not in place of the difference. Therefore, in order to exclude this objection, St. Thomas adds: *but the converse would be true, etc.* He wishes to say that although it is so that at times the subject is placed in the definition of proper accidents in place of genus and not of difference, yet this does not happen except when accident is defined in the concrete—accident in the concrete is not in a genus. This then is not opposed to our opinion, because we made clear the source of the difference of the accident according to which

---

<sup>89</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, V ( ), 15, 1020b 26 ff.; St. Thomas, *In V Metaph.*, lect. 17, nn. 1001–1003.



it is in a category. The reason why the subject is put in the place of the genus in the definition of accident in the concrete is not the very nature of the accident, so that its subject appropriates to itself the essence in the place of the genus. Rather, the cause is its manner of signifying because the concrete, from its manner of signifying brings in the whole together, namely, accident and subject. And therefore concrete accident is defined after the manner of composite things in which genus is taken from matter and difference from form. For this reason, the subject which stands as matter is put in place of the genus, and the nature of accident which stands as form is put in place of the difference, and we say: snub is a nose curved. The case is different, however, when accident is defined in the abstract. For then the nature of accident is put as genus because the essence of this accident does the determining as genus; and in place of the difference is put that from which the accident according to its specific nature takes its difference, that is, its proper subject. And we say: snubbinness is the curvature of the nose. This also becomes clear, that is, that the differences of accidents are taken from the diversity of proper principles, not only when the accident is immediately caused by the substance, but also when one accident is the proper principle of another; for then the accidents caused are allotted differences in virtue of the diversity of the accidents causing them. This is evident in the case of relations where the difference comes in virtue of their bases or causes, for example, action, passion, and quantity, as is shown from the divisions of relatives made by Aristotle.<sup>90</sup> In this way, another objection which might be made concerning the second and third attributes of the same subject is excluded. One might raise this objection: how does the difference of a second attribute differ from the difference of a first attribute if difference is taken from the principles from which an attribute flows; for at times the principles from which the first and second attributes flow are the same? This objection is excluded by what was said, that when one accident is the principle of another, the difference of the second accident does not come from the diversity of remote principles, but of proper principles. Therefore, when the first attribute is the principle of the second, the proper and immediate principles of the first and second attributes are not the same.

But because the proper principles of accidents are not always evident, we sometimes take the differences of accidents from their effects, as when we say that contractive and expansive of vision are the differences of color, depending as they do on the

---

<sup>90</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, V ( ), 1020b 26; St. Thomas, *In V Metaph.*, lect. 17, nn. 1001–1003.

abundance and scarcity of light which cause the different species of color. Thus, then, it is evident how essence is in substances and in accidents, and how in composite substances and in simple ones. Also how universal intentions of logic are found in all these, with the exception of the First, which is infinitely simple and to which, because of its simplicity, neither the notion of genus nor of species, nor consequently, definition applies. In this may be the end and consummation of this discussion.

156) Someone might have doubts about this third proposition, that is, that the differences of accidents are taken from their proper principles, because of the fact that at times we take their differences from their effects. We say, for example, that the difference of white is to expand, and of black to contract vision. In order to remove this doubt, he says that this comes about, not because of the nature of accidents, but because of ourselves, when the proper principles of accidents are hidden from us, it is necessary to take the differences from their effects which are better known. These effects indicate in some way the true differences. For instance, in the example he gives, whiteness and blackness differ in their causes, which are the abundance or scarcity of light. Slightly shaded light existing in an opaque body constitutes whiteness, and when almost entirely obscured<sup>91</sup> constitutes blackness. In their effects, however, they differ by the contraction and expansion of vision, for expansion takes place because sufficient light is present, and not the other way around. And because the abundance and scarcity of light are not as manifest to us as the contraction and expansion of vision, then we substitute contraction and expansion in place of the proper differences, and say: white is a color which expands vision; black is one which contracts it. Notice here that he does not say that the subject is the difference of accidents, but is put in place of the difference. For accidents have a proper genus and a proper difference of their own kind, which however cannot be completely explained without the subject. Therefore it is by all means necessary that the subject be included in the definition of accident, as has been said.

Finally, there is an epilogue which summarizes the things that have been said. In the explanation of these, I hope that my opinion was proposed in such a way that wherever it may not be found to agree with the truth, indulgence will be given to my talent and my age; for I am still a young man. Where, however, it will seem to follow the path of truth, let due thanks be given to Blessed Thomas, from whom I have learned what truth it has.

---

<sup>91</sup> The Laurent edition (p. 251, line 18 from bottom) has *obfuscata*. The Paris edition (p. 568, line 14 from bottom) has *offuscata*.

So ends the commentary of Brother Thomas Cajetan, a teacher of sacred theology and a member of the Order of Preachers, on the short work of Blessed Thomas, *On Being and Essence*, in the year of salvation, 1495.<sup>92</sup>

---

<sup>92</sup> The closing paragraph of the treatise in the Paris edition (p. 569) is: *Bene habet. Si quod mendum typographicum in haec irreperit volumina, id eruditi, benevolentisque lectoris acumen deprehendet facile, atque emendabit perofficiose.*

## General Bibliography

### Primary Sources

- Patrologia Graeca* (J. P. Migne, *Patrologiae Cursus Completus*, Series I, Paris: 1857–66, with later reprints), 162 vols.
- Patrologia Latina* (J. P. Migne, *Patrologiae Cursus Completus*, Series II, Paris: 1844–64, with later reprints), 221 vols.
- Albert the Great, St., *Opera Omnia*, ed. A. Borgnet (Parisius: 1890–1899).
- Algazel, *Logica et Philosophia* (Coloniae: 1506).
- Anselm, St., *Monologium*, PL 158.
- Aristotle, *Aristoteles Graece ex recensione Immanuelis Bekkeri*, ed. Academia Regia Borussica (Berlin: Reimer, 1831), 5 vols.
- Aristotle. *The Works of Aristotle*, tr. W. D. Ross and others (Oxford: Clarendon, 1928–31), 11 vols.
- Aristotle. *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. R. McKeon (New York: Random house, 1941).
- Aristotle. *Aristotle's Metaphysics, a Revised Text with Introduction Commentary*, ed. W. D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon, 1924).
- Aristotle. *Aristotle's Physics, a Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary*, ed. W. D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon, 1936).
- Augustine, St., *Opera Omnia*, PL 32–47.
- Augustine, St. *The Works of Aurelius Augustine*, tr. M. Dods (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1871–76), 15 vols.
- Averroes, *Aristotelis Stagiritae Libri Omnes . . . cum Averrois Cordubensis Variis in Eisdem Commentariis* (Venetiis: 1550–1553), 11 vols.
- Avicbron, *Fons Vitae ex arabico in latinum translatus ab Johanne Hispano et Dominico Gundissalino*, ed. C. Bauemker in *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, Band I, heft 2–4 (Münster: 1895).
- Avicenna, *Opera in lucem redacta ac nuper quantum ars niti potuit per canonicos emendata* (Venetiis: 1508).
- Avicenna. *Metaphysices compendium ex arabo latinum reddidit et adnotationibus adornavit Nematallah Carama* (Romae: Pont. Institutum Orientalium Studiorum, 1926).
- Boethius, *Opera Omnia*, PL 63–64.
- Cajetan, *In De Ente et Essentia*, ed. P. M. -H. Laurent, O.P. (Taurini: Marietti, 1934).
- Cajetan. *Sancti Thomae Aquinatis, Quaestiones Disputatae accedit liber De Ente et Essentia cum commentariis R. D. P. Thomae de Vio Cajetani Cardinalis*, t. IV (Parisiis: Librariis Consociationis Sancti Pauli, 1883), pp. 371–569.
- Cajetan. *Commentaria in Summa Theologiae*, in *S. Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia*, iussu Leonis XIII edita (Romae: 1882–1948), vols. IV and V.
- Cajetan. *Commentaria in Isagogen Porphyrii*, ed. I. M. Marega, O.P. (Romae: 1934).
- Cajetan. *Commentaria in De Anima Aristotelis*, ed. P. I. Coquelle, O.P. (Romae: 1938), 2 vols.
- Cajetan. *Commentaria in Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, ed. P. M. -H. Laurent, O.P. (Romae: 1939).

- Cajetan. *De nominum analogia. De conceptu entis*, ed. P. N. Zammit, O.P. (Romae: 1934).
- Cajetan. *De Nominum Analogia, De Conceptu Entis*, ed. P. H. Hering, O.P. (Romae: 1952).
- Cajetan. *The Analogy of Names and the Concept of Being*, tr. E. A. Bushinski, C.S.Sp. and H. J. Koren, C.S.Sp. (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1953).
- Capreolus, *Defensiones Theologiae Divi Thomae Aquinatis*, ed. Paban-Pégues (Turin: 1899–1908), 7 vols.
- Francis of Mayronnes, *In quatuor libros Sententiarum* (Venetiis, 1520).
- Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibeta* (Paris: 1518).
- John of Damascene, St., *Elementario*, PG 95.
- John of Jandun, *Quaestiones in Libros de Anima* (Venetiis: 1473).
- John of St. Thomas, *Cursus Philosophicus*, ed. Reiser (Turin: Marietti, 1930), 3 vols.
- John of St. Thomas. *Cursus Theologicus*, ed. Solesmes (Paris: Desclée, 1931), 4 vols.
- John of St. Thomas. *The Material Logic of John of St. Thomas*, tr. Y. Simon, J. Glanville, G. Hollenhorst (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955).
- John of St. Thomas. *Outlines of Formal Logic. John of St. Thomas' "Textus Summularum," Ars Logica*, tr. F. C. Wade, S.J. (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1955).
- Liber de Causis*, ed. H. Steele, in *Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi*, fasc. XII (Oxford: Clarendon, 1924).
- Plato, *Platonis Opera*, ed. J. Burnet (Oxford: Clarendon, 1905–13), 5 vols. in 6.
- Plato. *The Dialogues of Plato*, tr. B. Jowett (New York: Random House, 1937), 2 vols.
- Plato. *The Dialogues of Plato*, tr. B. Jowett (Oxford: Clarendon, 1871 ), 5 vols.
- Porphry, *Isagogen*, in *Commentarium in Aristotelem Graeca*, Vol. IV, Part I: *Porphyrii Isagoge et in Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium*, ed. A. Busse (Berlin: Reimer, 1887).
- Pseudo-Dionysius, *De Divinis Nominibus*, PG 3.
- Scotus, *Opera Omnia*, ed. Wadding (Lyons: 1639), 12 vols.
- Scotus. B. *Joannis Duns Scoti . . . Commentaria Oxoniensia ad IV Libros Sententiarum*, ed. M. F. Garcia (Quaracchi: Ex Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1912–1914), 2 vols.
- Simplicius, *Commentationes accuratissimae in Praedicamenta Aristotelis* (Venetiis: 1567).
- Thomas Aquinas, St., *S. Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia*, iussu Leonis XIII edita (Romae: 1882–1948), 16 vols.
- Thomas Aquinas, St., *S. Thomae de Aquino Ordinis Praedicatorum Summa Theologiae*, cura et studio Instituti Studiorum Medievalium Ottaviensis ad textum S. Pii V iussu confectum recognita (Ottawa: Impensis Studii Generalis O.Pr.), 4 vols.
- Thomas Aquinas, St., *S. Thomas Aquinatis Opuscula Omnia necnon Opera Minora*, ed. J. Perrier, *Opuscula Philosophica* (Paris: Lethielleux, 1949), vol. I.
- Thomas Aquinas, St., *Opuscula Philosophica* (Turin: Marietti, 1954).
- Thomas Aquinas, St., *Opuscula Theologica* (Turin: Marietti, 1954), 2 vols.

- Thomas Aquinas, St., *Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi*, ed. P. Mandonnet, O.P. and F. Moos (Paris: Lethielleux, 1929–47), 4 vols.
- Thomas Aquinas, St., *In Metaphysicam Aristotelis Commentaria*, ed. M. R. Cathala and R. M. Spiazzi (Turin: Marietti, 1950).
- Thomas Aquinas, St., *In Aristotelis Librum de Anima Commentarium*, ed. A. M. Pirotta (Turin: Marietti, 1925).
- Thomas Aquinas, St., *Quaestiones Quodlibetales* (Turin: Marietti, 1927).
- Thomas Aquinas, St., *Quaestiones Disputatae* (Turin: Marietti, 1949), 2 vols.
- Thomas Aquinas, St., *De Ente et Essentia*, ed. L. Baur (Münster: Aschendorff, 1933).
- Thomas Aquinas, St., *Le "De Ente et Essentia" de S. Thomas d'Aquin*, *Bibliothèque Thomiste*, VIII (Kain: Le Saulchoir, 1926).
- Thomas Aquinas, St., *De Unitate Intellectus contra Averroistas*, ed. L. W. Keeler, S.J. (Romae: Univ. Gregoriana, 1936).
- Thomas Aquinas, St., *Sancti Thomae de Aquino Expositio Super Librum Boethii De Trinitate*, ed. B. Decker (Leiden: Brill, 1955).
- Thomas Aquinas, St., *In librum Boethii de Trinitate, Quaestiones Quinta et Sexta*, ed. P. Wyser (Fribourg: 1948).
- Thomas Aquinas, St., *Basic Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas*, ed. A. C. Pegis (New York: Random House, 1945), 2 vols.
- Thomas Aquinas, St., *On the Truth of the Catholic Faith* (New York: Doubleday, 1955–56), 4 books.
- Thomas Aquinas, St., *Truth* (Chicago: Regnery, 1952–54), 3 vols.
- Thomas Aquinas, St., *On the Principles of Nature*, tr. R. Henle, S.J. and V. Bourke (St. Louis: St. Louis University Press, 1947).
- Thomas Aquinas, St., *The Compendium of Theology*, tr. C. Vollert, S.J. (St. Louis: St. Louis University Press, 1947).
- Thomas Aquinas, St., *On Being and Essence*, tr. C. Riedl (Toronto: St. Michael's College, 1932).
- Thomas Aquinas, St., *On Being and Essence*, tr. A. Maurer, C.S.B. (Toronto: The Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949).
- Thomas Aquinas, St., *The Division and Methods of the Sciences*, tr. A. Maurer, C.S.B. (Toronto: The Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1953).
- Trombeta, Anthony, *Quaestiones Metaphysicales seu Opus in Metaphysicam Aristotelis* (Venetiis: 1500).

#### Secondary Sources

- Albertson, M. S., S.J., "The *Esse* of Accidents According to St. Thomas," *The Modern Schoolman*, XXX (1953), 265–78.
- Alvarez, S., "De diversitate et identitate analogica juxta Cajetanum," *La Ciencia Tomista*, XLIX (1934), 5–14.
- Anderson, J. F., *The Bond of Being* (St. Louis: Herder, 1949).
- Arnou, R., S.J., *Metaphysica Generalis* (Romae: Typis Pontificiae Universitatis Gregoriana, 1941).
- Bardenhewer, O., *Die pseudo-aristotelische Schrift "Ueber das reine Gute" bekannt unter dem Namen "Liber de Causis"* (Freiburg: 1882).
- Blanche, F., O.P., "La théorie de l'abstraction chez s. Thomas d'Aquin," *Mélanges Thomistes* (Paris: Vrin, 1934), pp. 237–51.
- Bobik, J., "The *Materia Signata* of Cajetan," *The New Scholasticism*, XXX (1956), 127–53.

- Bourke, V. J., *Thomistic Bibliography* (St. Louis: St. Louis University Press, 1945).
- Bullarium Ordinis Praedicatorum*, t. II (Romae: 1730).
- Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, t. I–II, ed. Denifle-Chatelain (Paris: 1889–1891).
- Chenu, M. -D., O.P., *Introduction à l'étude de saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris: Vrin, 1950).
- Chevalier, J., *La notion de nécessaire chez Aristote et chez ses prédécesseurs* (Paris: Alcan, 1915).
- Congar, M. J., O.P., "Bio-bibliographie de Cajétan," *Revue Thomiste*, XVII (1934–1935), 3–49.
- Cunningham, F. A., S.J., "A Theory on Abstraction in St. Thomas," *The Modern Schoolman*, XXXV (1958), 249–70.
- Deg'Innocenti, U., O.P., "Animadversiones in Caietani Doctrinam de Corporum Individuatione," *Divus Thomas*, Piacenza, LI (1948), 3–18.
- Fabro, C., *La nozione Metafisica di Partecipazione secundo S. Tomaso d'Aquino* (Torino: Societa Editrice Internazionale, 1950).
- Finance de, J., S.J., *Être et agir dans la philosophie de saint Thomas* (Paris: 1945).
- Forest, A., *La structure métaphysique du concret selon Saint Thomas d'Aquin, Études de Philosophie Médiévale*, XIV (Paris: Vrin, 1931).
- Friedberg, A., *Corpus Juris Canonici*, t. II (Lipsiae: 1881).
- Garrigou-Lagrange, R., O.P., "De personalitate juxta Cajetanum," *Angelicum*, II (1934), 407–24.
- Gazzana, A., S.J., "La materia signata di S. Tommaso secondo la diversa interpretazione de Gaetano e del Ferrarese," *Gregorianum*, XXIV (1940), 78–85.
- Gehring, R. B., S.J., "The Knowledge of Material Essence According to St Thomas Aquinas," *The Modern Schoolman*, XXXIII (1956), 153–81.
- Geiger, L. -B., O.P., "De l'unité de l'être," *Revue des sciences phil. et théol.*, XXXIII (1949), 3–14.
- Geiger, L. -B., O.P., *La participation dans la philosophie de s. Thomas d'Aquin*, 2nd ed., *Bibliothèque Thomiste*, XXIII (Paris: Vrin, 1953).
- Geiger, L. -B., O.P., "Existentialisme, essentialisme et ontologie existentielle," *Étienne Gilson Philosophe de la Chrétienté* (Paris: Les editions du Cerf, 1949), pp. 227–74.
- Geiger, L. -B., O.P., "Abstraction et séparation d'après s. Thomas," *Revue des sciences phil. et théol.*, XXXI (1947), 3–40.
- Gilson, E., *God and Philosophy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941).
- Gilson, E., *L'être et l'essence* (Paris: Vrin, 1948).
- Gilson, E., *Being and Some Philosophers* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949).
- Gilson, E., *Le Thomisme*, 5th ed., *Études de Philosophie Médiévale*, I (Paris: Vrin, 1945).
- Gilson, E., *La philosophie au moyen âge*, 3rd ed. (Paris: Payot, 1947).
- Gilson, E., *Jean Duns Scot. Introduction a ses positions fondamentales, Études de Philosophie Médiévale*, XLII (Paris: Vrin, 1952).

- Gilson, E., "Cajétan et l'existence," *Tijdschrift voor Philosophie*, XV (1953), 267–87.
- Gilson, E., *The History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (New York: Random house, 1954).
- Gilson, E., *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*, tr. L. K. Shook, C.S.B. (New York: Random House, 1956).
- Gilson, E., *Elements of Christian Philosophy* ( New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1960).
- Glutz, M. A., "Being and Metaphysics," *The Modern Schoolman*, XXXV (1958), 271–85.
- Goichon, A. M., *La distinction de l'essence et de l'existence d'après Ibn Sina* (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1937).
- Gorce, M., "Cajétan précurseur de Catharin et de Bañes," *Revue Thomiste*, XVII (1934–1935), 371–99.
- Grabmann, M., "Die Stellung des Kardinal Cajetan in der Geschichte des Thomismus," *Angelicum*, II (1934), 547–60.
- Grabmann, M., *Die Werke des hl. Thomas von Aquin*, 2nd ed. (Münster: (1931).
- Groner, J. F., O.P., *Kardinal Cajetan. Eine Gestalt aus der Reformationszeit* (Louvain: Éditions E. Nauwelaerts, 1951).
- Hegyí, J., S.J., *Die Bedeutung des Seins bei den klassischen Kommentatoren des heiligen Thomas von Aquin: Capreolus, Silvester von Ferrara, Cajetan* (Pullach: Verlag Berchmanskolleg, 1959).
- Hoenen, P., S.J., *La théorie du jugement d'après S. Thomas d'Aquin, Analecta Gregoriana*, XXXIX (Romae: Univ. Gregoriana, 1946).
- Jolivet, R., *Traité de Philosophie*, vol. III, *Métaphysique*, 3rd ed. (Paris: Vittle, 1946).
- Klubertanz, G., S.J., *Introduction to the Philosophy of Being* ( New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955).
- Kossell, C. G., S.J., "Principles of St. Thomas's Distinction between the *Esse* and *Ratio* of Relation," *The Modern Schoolman*, XXIV (1946), 28–36.
- Kossell, C. G., S.J., "St. Thomas's Theory of the Causes of Relation," *The Modern Schoolman*, XXV (1948), 151–72.
- Kremmpel, A., *La doctrine de la relation chez Saint Thomas* (Paris: Vrin, 1952).
- Lauer, J. Q., S.J., "Determination of Substance by Accidents in the Philosophy of St. Thomas," *The Modern Schoolman*, XVIII (1941), 31–35.
- Laurent, P. M. -H., O.P., "Quelques documents de archives vaticanes (1517–1534)," *Revue Thomiste*, XVII (1934–1935), 50–148.
- Laurent, P. M. -H., O.P., "Les premières biographies de Cajétan," *Revue Thomiste*, XVII (1934–1935), 446–503.
- Lonergan, B., S.J., "The Concept of Verbum in the Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas," *Theological Studies*, VII (1946), 349–92; VIII (1947), 35–79, 404–44; X (1949), 3–40, 359–93.
- Lonergan, B., S.J., *Insight. A Study of Human Understanding* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1957).
- Lyttkens, H., *The Analogy between God and the World* (Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksells, 1952).



- Mandonnet, P., O.P., "Cajétan," *Dictionnaire de théologie Catholique*, II, 1923, coll. 1313–1329.
- Mandonnet, P., O.P. and Destrez, J., *Bibliographie thomiste* (Paris: Vrin, 1921).
- Maquart, F. -X., *Elementa Philosophiae*, vol. III, *Metaphysica* (Paris: Blot, 1938).
- Marc, A., S.J., "Being and Action," *The Modern Schoolman*, XXVIII (1951), 175–90.
- Marc, A., S.J., *L'Idée de l'être chez Saint Thomas et dans la scholastique postérieure* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1933).
- Marc, A., S.J., *Dialectique de l'affirmation* (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1952).
- Maréchal, J., S.J., *Le point de départ de la métaphysique*, 3rd ed. (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1944), vol. V.
- Maritain, J., *Distinguer pour unir, ou les degrés du savoir* (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1932).
- Maritain, J., *Sept leçons sur l'être, et les premiers principes de la raison spéculative* (Paris: Téqui, 1934).
- Maritain, J., *Court traité l'existence et de l'existant* (Paris: Hartmann, 1947).
- Maritain, J., *Réflexions sur l'intelligence et sur sa vie propre* (Paris: Nouvelle Librairie Nationale, 1926).
- Maritain, J., *De la philosophie chrétienne* (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1933).
- Maritain, J., *Science et sagesse* (Paris: Labergerie, 1935).
- Maritain, J., *La philosophie de la nature* (Paris: Téqui, 1935).
- Maritain, J., *An Introduction to Logic* (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1937).
- Maritain, J., *A Preface to Metaphysics*, tr. E. I. Watkin (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1940).
- Maritain, J., *Existence and the Existent*, tr. L. Galantiere and G. Phelan (New York: Pantheon, 1949).
- Maritain, J., "On Human Knowledge," *Thought*, XXIV (1949), 225–43.
- Mascall, E. L., *Existence and Analogy* (New York: Longmans, Green, 1949).
- Masiello, R. J., "The Analogy of Proportion According to the Metaphysics of St. Thomas," *The Modern Schoolman*, XXXV (1958), 91–105.
- Maurer, A., C.S.B., "Form and Essence in the Philosophy of St. Thomas," *Mediaeval Studies*, XIII (1951), 165–76.
- Maurer, A., C.S.B., *The Division and Methods of the Sciences*, Question V and VI of St. Thomas' Commentary on the *De Trinitate* of Boethius (Toronto: The Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1953).
- Maurer, A., C.S.B., "St. Thomas and the Analogy of Genus," *The New Scholasticism*, XXIX (1955), 127–44.
- Meyerson, E., *Identité et réalité* (Paris: Alcan, 1908).
- Owens, J., C.S.R., "A Note on the Approach to Thomistic Metaphysics," *The New Scholasticism*, XXVIII (1954), 454–76.
- Owens, J., C.S.R., *St. Thomas and the Future of Metaphysics* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1957).
- Owens, J., C.S.R., "The Number of Terms in the Suarezian Discussion on Essence and Being," *The Modern Schoolman*, XXXIV (1957), 147–91.
- Owens, J., C.S.R., "Common Nature: a Point of Comparison Between Thomistic and Scotistic Metaphysics," *Mediaeval Studies*, XIX (1957), 1–14.
- Owens, J., C.S.R., "The Accidental and Essential Character of Being in the Doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas," *Mediaeval Studies*, XX (1958), 1–40.
- Owens, J., C.S.R., "Thomistic Common Nature and Platonic Idea," *Mediaeval Studies*, XXI (1959), 211–23.

- Paulus, J., *Henri de Gand. Essai sur les tendances de sa métaphysique, Études de Philosophie Médiévale*, XXV (Paris: Vrin, 1938).
- Peghaire, J., C.S.Sp., *Intellectus et Ratio selon S. Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris: Vrin, 1936).
- Pegis, A. C., *St. Thomas and the Greeks* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1939).
- Pegis, A. C., "The Dilemma of Being and Unity," *Essays in Thomism* (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1942), 151–83, 379–82.
- Pelzer, A., *Bibliothecae Apostolicae Vaticanae . . . Codices Vaticani Latini*, t. II, pars I (Romae: 1931).
- Penido, M. T. -L., *Le rôle de l'analogie en théologie dogmatique* (Paris: Vrin, 1931).
- Penido, M. T. -L., "Cajétan et notre connaissance analogique de Dieu," *Revue Thomiste*, XVII (1934–1935), 149–92.
- Peters, J. A. J., C.Ss.R., "Matter and Form," *The New Scholasticism*, XXXI (1957), 447–83.
- Phelan, G. P., *St. Thomas and Analogy* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1941).
- Philippe, M. D., "Abstraction, addition, séparation dans la philosophie d'Aristote," *Revue Thomiste*, XLVIII (1948). 461–79.
- Pruche, B., *Existentialisme et acta d'être* (Grenoble: Arthand, 1947).
- Raeymaeker de, L., *Philosophie de l'être. Essai de synthèse métaphysique* (Louvain: Éditions de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1946).
- Régis, L. M., O.P., *L'Odyssée de la métaphysique* (Montreal: Institut d'Études Médiévales, 1949).
- Renard, H., S.J., *The Philosophy of Being* (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1943).
- Roland-Gosselin, M. D., O.P., *Le De Ente et Essentia de S. Thomas d'Aquin, Bibliothèque Thomiste*, VIII (Kain: Le Saulchoir, 1926).
- Roland-Gosselin, M. D., O.P., *De Distinctione inter essentiam et esse apud Avicennam et D. Thomam, Xenia Thomistica*, III (1925), 281–88.
- Saliba, D., *Étude sur le métaphysique d'Avicennae* (Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1927).
- Salmon, E., "What is Being?" *Review of Metaphysics*, VII (1954), 613–31.
- Salmon, E., *The Good in Existential Metaphysics* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1952).
- Schmitz, K., *The Immortality of the Soul in the Writings of Cajetan (Thomas de Vio)*, unpublished doctoral dissertation (University of Toronto, 1953).
- Schwartz, H., "Plato, Aristotle, St. Thomas and Univocity," *The New Scholasticism*, XXVII (1953), 373–403.
- Schwartz, H., "Analogy in St. Thomas and Cajetan," *The New Scholasticism*, XXVIII (1954), 127–44.
- Simon, Y., *Introduction à l'ontologie du connaître* (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1934).
- Smith, G., S.J., *Natural Theology* (New York: Macmillan, 1951).
- Smith, G., S.J., "Avicenna and the Possibles," *The New Scholasticism*, XVII (1943), 340–57.

Smith, G., S.J. and Kendzierski, L., *The Philosophy of Being. Metaphysics I*, (New York: Macmillan, 1961).

Stegmüller, F., "Tolet et Cajétan," *Revue Thomiste*, XVII (1934–1935), 358–70.

Théry, G., *L'augustinisme médiéval et le problème de l'unité de la forme substantielle*, *Acta hebdomadae augustinianae-thomisticae* (Romae: Taurini, 1931).

Tonquédec de, J., S.J., *La critique de la connaissance* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1929).

Vaux De, R., O.P., *Notes et Textes sur l'Avicennisme Latin aux confins des XII et XIII<sup>e</sup> siècles*, *Bibliothèque Thomiste*, XX (Paris: Vrin, 1934).

Vollert, C., S.J., *On the Various Kinds of Distinctions* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1947).

Walton, W., "Being, Essence, and Existence," *Review of Metaphysics*, III (1950), 339–65.

Wells, N. J., "Capreolus on Essence and Existence," *The Modern Schoolman*, XXXVIII (1960), 1–24.

## Index

### A

#### Absolute,

how understood, 265, 300

#### Absolute Nature,

and transcendental predicates, 6, 30, 31, 136, 137

is neither one nor many, 135

and existence, 30, 135, 136

predicated of individuals, 31, 135, 136, 155, 156

has formal unity, 31, 143-54

#### Abstract,

and concrete in simple and compound substances, 194

and concrete, 328-331

#### Abstraction,

total and formal, 21-22, 45-47

#### Accident, *see* Substance

essence and definition of, 35, 295-301

is being in a qualified way, 74

compared to substantial form, 296-98

compounded with its subject results in an accidental unity, 297-98

*esse* of, 306-307

cause of, 311-12, 322

is generated and corrupted in four ways, 317-19

diversity of, 37, 311-27

following form, 36, 311-15

following matter, 36, 311-15

is not the same in number in the generated and corrupted thing, 36, 315-18

individual, generic and specific, 36, 319-21

has a proper and *per se* subject, 36-37, 323-27

in the abstract is properly in a category, 37, 328-31

in the concrete is not properly in a category, 37, 328-31

genus and difference in, 331-35

#### Act,

is prior to potency, 104-105, 189

must be received in its proper potency, 204

is limited by potency, 257

first, which is *esse*, 304

#### Addition, *see* Common

#### Agent,

how understood, 214

#### Albert the Great, St., 7, 15, 107, 212, 222, 223, 301, 337

#### Albertson, M. S., S.J., 339

#### Alfarabi, 7, 15, 139, 222, 223

#### Algazel, 7, 15, 83, 139, 222, 223, 337

#### Alvarez, S., 25, 339

#### Analogate,

of proportion, 25, 80-82

of proportionality, 25, 80-82

#### Analogous,

meaning of, 25, 79

medium between the univocal and equivocal, 80

#### Anderson, J. F., 26, 339

#### Animality,

in man is the principle of genus, 132

#### Anselm, St., 84, 337

#### Aptitude,

of soul to body, 269

and accident, 323, 325-27

#### Aristotle,

says each intelligence constitutes one species, 34, 198

says intelligences are produced by God, 34

says cause of motion is also a final cause, 34

says act is more knowable than potency, 46

on the distinction of the speculative sciences, 46

says imperfect is prior by way of generation, 48

on the objective concept, 48-49

says act distinguishes, 50, 196

says what is prior in generation is more imperfect, 53

says order of generation looks to genus of material cause, 54

on universal demonstration, 55

says intellect receives universal from many singulars, 60

says most universal is most difficult to understand, 61

on the term, 61

says being is spoken of in two ways, 63

says quiddity is one, 67

says separated substances are form, 67

on essence and quiddity, 72

says every substance is a nature, 72

says the cause of being and truth are the highest beings and true, 76, 211

says substance is included in the definition of accident, 77

says being is not one, but has reference to one, 81

on substantial form and matter, 88

says matter is in itself unknowable, 90

says definition of a composite substance is one, 92

on the relation of the causes, 97, 105, 185, 190

says the first heaven is one in species and many in number, 98, 198

says the unity and plurality of individuals in the same species in material things is only from matter, 98

says a proper potency is defined through its proper act, 100

on genus and difference, 115, 117

on species and definition, 115-16

says genus is taken from matter, 116, 286

on the meaning of soul, 120, 297

says definition divides into singulars, 123

says genus contains a plurality latent in it, 125

says nature of genus differs in the species, 125

substitutes *what is* for being, 141

says *one* is undivided being, 143

says being and one are the same, 147

says predication depends on the intellect, 155

on motion, 157-58, 189, 230, 309

on the continuum, 157

on agent and possible intellect, 159-60, 171, 278

defines a universal as that apt thing destined to be in many, 162, 164-66

on substance and subject, 173

on immaterial substances, 182

on form, 183

on the priority of act to potency, 184, 189

on act, 187

on nature and supposit, 194

on formal and quantitative division, 196

on order in the universe, 198-99

says no definition signifies existence, 205-206

says three things are required in every production, 210

on necessary being, 215

says matter is potency in itself and form is act in itself, 219

says that the principles of generation are form and privation, 225-26

concludes to the plurality of intelligences from the plurality of motions, 230

on matter and intelligibility, 230-31

says each thing exists for the sake of its proper operation, 233, 313

says intellect is divine, 236-37

says God is perfect without qualification, 243, 245

says every act has its proper receiving subject, 258

says intellect is a blank tablet, 271

on contemplation of separated substances and human happiness, 279, 282

on the knowledge of the fact, *quia*, 284

says species are likened to numbers, 287

on subject and accident, 296, 298, 320, 324

on essence and definition, 298

on abstract and concrete, 329

on the division of relatives, 333, 334

Arnou, R., S.J., 26, 339

Augustine, St., 197, 201, 248, 300, 337

Averroes,

says each intelligence constitutes one species, 34, 198

says cause of motion is also a final cause, 34, 211, 273

on prime matter and interminate dimensions, 35

on the signification of being, 67

says the priority and posteriority of species does not impede the unity of genus, 74

on analogy, 81

on the composite of matter and form, 89

says matter is not part of the quiddity of a natural thing, 90

says the unity and plurality of individuals in the same species in material things is only from matter, 98

says prime matter is one by the remotion of all forms, 124

on the unity of genus and the unity of prime matter, 125

says being signifies something added to the essence of a thing, 139

says intellect causes universality in things, 159

on the unity of the intellect, 173-74

says nothing which is eternal has a true efficient cause, 211  
 says nothing which is possible in itself is necessary from another, 211, 216  
 on the manner of production of the intelligences, 34, 211-12  
 says that if the nature of the possible intellect were unknown, we could not find multitude in separated substances, 227, 229  
 says possible intellect has the same relation to intelligible forms as prime matter has to sensible forms, 227  
 on motion, 230  
 on the possible and agent intellect, 271, 272, 273, 275-76  
 says interminate dimensions are received into prime matter, 302-303

Avicenna, 181, 337

Avicenna,

says what intellect first conceives is being and essence, 19-20, 39, 48  
 says metaphysics is the last in the order of learning, 43  
 says form signifies the perfection of each thing, 72  
 says form is the principle of difference, 78, 284  
 says rationality is not a difference but the principle of difference, 78, 131, 132  
 says quiddity of composite substances is the composition of form and matter, 89, 127  
 on genus and difference, 115-16  
 says intellect causes universality in timings, 159, 161, 162  
 says that the quiddity of a simple substance is the simple substance itself, 192, 194  
 says that there are many species of simple substances, 195  
 says only one emanates from one, 212, 214  
 says God's essence is His act of existing, 239  
 says that the individuation and multiplication of souls depends on the body in the beginning, but not in the end, 261, 263

## B

Bardenhewer, O., 182, 242, 256, 258, 339

Beatitude,

human, 282-83

Being (*ens*),

adds no grade of reality, 6-7  
 Cajetan on, 7-8, 17-18, 22  
 in Avicenna and St. Thomas, 7-9, 19-20  
 knowledge of, 19, 40-71  
 embodied in an essence able to be sensed is the first thing known in actual confused knowledge, 44-49, 59  
 terminates the act of the intellect under three conditions, 45  
 concept of, is *quasi* natural, 51, 59  
 abstraction of, 59-60  
 and essence, 22, 62  
 and existence, 62  
 in the ten genera, 22, 63  
 in the truth of propositions, 22, 63-64  
*per se* and *per accidens*, 63  
 how, signifies the categories, 23, 65-71  
 is said analogically of substance and accident, God and creatures, 67, 74-83  
 predication of, 73-75, 224  
 taken nominally and participially, 140-41  
 two aspects in, 141  
 how understood, 140-41  
 is one and many, 145  
 real, 145  
 two extremes in, 228  
 as quiddity and existence, 236

Being (*esse*),

and essence, 5, 10-13, 140-41, 202-203, 206, 207, 223, 226-27, 289  
 and form, 204  
 in Cajetan, 3-19  
 in the intellect is subjective or objective, 31-32, 159  
 is posterior to essence in the order of generation, 225-26, 260  
 in God is a quidditative concept, 239-41  
 common, 243  
 of accidental and substantial form, 306-307  
 of quiddity and existence, 236  
 of actual existence and the composite, 190, 232-33  
 of actual existence and the supposit, 194, 233  
 of actual existence and form, 204  
 of essence and of actual existence distinguished, 220-37, 240

Blanche, F., O.P., 21, 339

Bobik, J., 28, 339

Body, *see* Soul

how understood, 29-30, 111-13, 119-21

Boethius,

on nature, 72

on *ousia*, 89

on the composition of *from which* and essence in intelligences, 217

on essence and *esse*, 221-22

on the divine processions, 256

on the perfection of things, 234

on division, 292-93

Bourke, V. J., 340

*Bullarium Ordinis Praedicatorum*, 202, 340

Bunshinski, E. A., C.S.Sp. and Koren, H. J., C.S.Sp., 1, 2, 23, 338

## C

Capreolus, 15, 338

Cause,

first, *see* God

Causes,

relation of, 97

*Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, 197, 202, 340

Chenu, M.-D., O.P., 340

Chevalier, J., 340

Commensurate, *see* Symmetry

is taken in two ways, 265

substantial, 265-66

Common,

nature, 56-57

neither includes nor excludes addition, 343

and specific nature, 57

*esse*, 243

Communicability,

is threefold, 199-200

Composite,

is known after its components, 60

primarily exists, 204

and the being of actual existence, 232-33

Composite Substance, *see* Substance

essence of, 29, 86-90, 156, 158, 293-94

essence of, is not form alone, 87

essence of, is not a relation of matter to form, 88

essence of, is not something added to the composite of matter and form, 88

essence of, is not universal, 156

differs from the essence of simple substance, 83-85, 92, 192-96

according to existence in singulars is not universal, 156, 158

and logical intentions, 30, 131-75

nature of, signified in the manner of a whole is said of in a threefold way, 131

properties of, 293-94

Composition,

of essence and existence, 11-12, 203-206

of matter and form, 203-206, 285

of act and potency, 225

Concept,

division of, 23

perfection of a, 48-49

clear, 48-49

actual confused, 51

actual confused, of quidditative predicates, 51

specific, 58-59

formal, 23, 67-71, 82, 121-24, 246, 255

mental, 122-24, 255

objective, 23, 67-71, 82, 122-24

formation of a, 160

and the universal, 163

Concrete,

and abstract, 328-31

Congar, M. J., O.P., 1, 2, 340

Contradiction,

does not occur formally before the act of the intellect, 25

Corporeity,

is a general form of matter, 51

and prime matter, 59

and body, 113

Corruption,

of accidents, 3, 17-18

Creation,

terminus of, 225

Cunningham, F. A., S.J., 340

## D

Definition,

differs from species, 110, 124

natural, differs from mathematical, 87

complete, 142

accidental, 87-88, 298-302

of composites is not form alone, 87

is of universals, 173

things having different, differ in species, 267

Degl'Innocenti, U., O.P., 28, 340

Demonstration,

universal, 55

Difference, *see* Genus, Species

formal, 106

specific, differs from genus and species, 115-16, 118

specific, in spiritual substances, 285-90

in accident, 332-35

Dimensions, do not precede form in matter, 35, 302-306

Distinction,

of reason follows the act of the intellect, 57

in God, 249

formal, from the nature of the real, 252-53, 267

Division,

material and formal, 144, 196

plurality follows upon, 207-208

## E

Emanations,

divine, *see* God

Equivocal,

meaning of, 25, 79

Essence, *see* Composite Substance

meaning of, 62, 65, 72

how, signifies the categories, 65-72

and nature, 71, 72

in substances and accidents, 73-74

composite, 109-10

generic, differs from specific, 110-14, 127-28

specific, is twofold, 127-28

according to *esse* in the intellect is universal, 159-60

in simple substances signifies form alone, 181-84, 192, 193

the composition of, and existence, 202-206, 207, 223, 226-27, 289

is really distinct from the being of actual existence, 217-26

in God signifies His existence, 208, 239

of simple and composite substances compared, 192-95

real part of, is more perfect in the whole than in the separated, 234-35

relation of existence to, 224

Existence, *see* Being (*esse*)

## F

Fabro, C., 21, 340

Finance de, J., S.J., 340

Forest, A., 29, 340

Form, *see* Matter

is not the essence of composite substances, 87

corporeal, 183

is cause of matter's existing, 184-85, 187, 192

is prior to matter in the order of perfection, 188-89

is the essence of existing matter, 191

necessary connection of, and matter, 191

composition of, and matter, 203-206

and existence, 204

multiplication of, 261-63

exists in three different ways, 262-63

substantial and accidental distinguished, 295-96, 304, 307

precedes interminate dimensions in matter, 302-306

is divided by means of the division of its subject, 306

gives being to a thing, 306

Francis of Mayronnes, 139, 338

Friedberg, A., 340

## G

Garrigou-Lagrange, R., O.P., 340

Gazzana, A., S.J., 340

Gehring, R. B., S.J., 340

Geiger, L.-B., 21, 26, 340

Generation,

priority in, is imperfect, 53

simple and in a qualified sense, 88

order of, and order of perfection, 189

terminus of, 225-26

distinguished from creation, 225-26

principles of, 304

Genus, *see* Difference, Species

is called the total *esse* of the species, 111

differs from species, difference and definition, 115-19

is in the understanding of difference, 116-18

is not the matter of the species, 118-19

and difference do not comprise the species as two things to a third, 118-19

how understood, 121-22, 175, 286-89

unity of, 124-25

unity of, differs from the unity of prime matter, 125-26

taken formally and materially, 177

quiddity which is the same as its actual existence is not determined to some genus, 241

in immaterial substances, 285-90

in material substances, 287-88

and difference is taken from the whole essence of a thing according as it is remote or close to the being of existence, 290



of accident, 332-35

Gilson, E., 1, 4, 9, 12, 21, 24, 26, 27, 32, 270, 340-41

Glutz, M. A., 341

God,

essence and existence in, 195, 207-10, 239

as exemplar cause, 213

is act, 226

lacks genus and difference, 239-41, 290

*esse* in, is a quidditative concept, 239-42

is not common *esse*, 242-43

has all perfections, 244-45

*esse* in, is a virtual distinction of reason, 251

no actual distinction in, 249-51

as a terminus of the act of the human intellect must have an actual distinction of reason, 251

is unqualifiedly perfect, 244

and the divine emanations, 256

Goichon, A. M., 341

Gorce, M., 1, 341

Grabmann, M., 1, 100, 341

Groner, J. F., O.P., 1, 341

## H

Heccheity,

according to Scotus, 28, 95

and individuation in Scotus, 28, 95, 264

Hegy, J., S.J., 341

Henry of Ghent, 330

Hoenen, P., S.J., 341

## I

Incommunicability,

how understood, 95

Individual, *see* Substance

meaning of, 95, 173

is contained under the genus mediately through a species, 187

is really distinct from its *esse* and has many quidditative predicates, 288

the order of quidditative predicates in, 288-89

Individuation, *see* Matter

two factors in, 28

principle of, 94-107

of intellectual soul, 34-35, 263-69

Infinity,

two kinds of, 252-53, 257

Inherence, *see* Accident

aptitudinal, is of the essence of accidents, 35, 300-301

In itself,

and of itself, 152

Intellect, *see* Knowledge

twofold abstraction by, 45

twofold process in, 54

agent and possible, 59-60, 159, 160, 275-77

*esse* in, is subjective or objective, 159

Intellection,

in immaterial substances is the noblest operation of the intellectual soul, 282

Intellectual Substance, *see* Substance

constitutes one species, 34

is immaterial, 181-83

is form, 181-84, 192-93

is composed of act and potency, 216

is composed of *quo est* and *quod est*, 216-17

*esse* of, is limited, essence is unlimited, 257-58, 260

individuation of, 263-69

and logical intentions, 269-70

is not known quidditatively by the human soul united to the body, 278-80

genus and difference in, 285-91

Intelligences, *see* Intellectual Substance

immateriality of, 181-83

essence of, is form alone, 181-84, 192-93

quiddity of, is universal, 200

constitutes one species, 34, 198

have *esse* from God, 34, 181, 209-16

are composed of existence and essence, 181-83, 195, 203, 209, 216, 226-27, 256

are composed of act and potency, 216, 226-27

multitude in, 181, 228-30

first, is not composite, 227

quidditative knowledge of, 270-71

Intelligible,

species, 160, 163

as a universal, 200

order of, 230-31

## J

John of Damascene, St., 197, 201, 328

John of Jandun, 270, 274, 279, 338

John of St. Thomas, 23, 29, 338

Jolivet, R., 341

**K**

Klubertanz, G., S.J., 341

Knowledge,

four kinds in Cajetan, 20-21, 40-42

confused, 40-42, 47-48

distinct, 40-42, 47-48

and primary object of human intellect, 44-50

order in, 52-56

universal, 55

of being is twofold, 55-56

object of, 166, 169

Kossell, C. G., S.J., 341

Krempel, A., 341

**L**

Lauer, J. Q., S.J., 341

Laurent, P. M.-H., O.P., 1, 341

*Liber de Causis*, 338

Loneragan, B., S. J., 23, 341

Lyttkens, H., 26, 341

**M**

Man, *see* Soul, Body

Mandonnet, P., O.P., 1, 342

Mandonnet, P., O.P. and Destrez, J., 342

Maquart, F.-X., 342

Marc, A., S.J., 25, 342

Maréchal, J., S.J., 342

Maritain, J., 23, 26, 342

Mascall, E. L., 26, 342

Masiello, R. J., 342

Matter, *see* Form

is not the essence of composite substances, 86

is part of the quiddity of a natural thing, 27, 90-94

is the principle of individuation, 27-29, 94-107

designated, 27, 94, 98-103

unity of prime, differs from the unity of genus, 125-26

corporeal, impedes intelligibility, 183

how understood, 125, 183

no necessary connection between, and form, 186, 191

cannot exist without form, 32-33, 184-85, 187-88, 304

is prior to form in the order of generation, 188-89

Maurer, A., C.S.B., 19, 21, 27, 342

Medium,

and the extremes, 83

twofold 191

Metaphysicals,

how known, 59

Meyerson, E., 342

**N**

Name,

formal and material signification of, 115-17

Nature,

twofold process in, 54

progression of, and of intellect is twofold, 54

how understood, 71-72, 194

and its conditions, 134

is predicated in a threefold way, 175

differs from supposit in material substances, 33, 194-95

in spiritual substances, 33, 194-95

human and angelic compared, 201

Necessary,

in itself, 214-16

Negation,

how, acquires *esse*, 64-65

is considered in a twofold way, 143

and affirmation, 220, 260

**O**

One,

and being, 143-44

implies something positive and something privative, 154

Order,

*per se* and accidental, 198-99

of things in the universe, 230

Owens, J., C.Ss.R., 4, 6, 8, 9, 12, 30, 342

**P**

*Patrologia Graeca*, 337

*Patrologia Latina*, 337

Paulus, J., 343

Peghaire, J., C.S.Sp., 23, 343

Pegis, A. C., 343

Pelzer, A., 100, 343

Penido, M. T.-L., 25, 26, 343

Perfect,

something is more, than another in a twofold way, 54

Perfection, *see* God, Generation

simple, 84-85, 246

in things, 233-34

ultimate, in things, 234

of all genera, 244-45

is twofold, 246

formal and virtual, 246

Peters, J. A. J., C.Ss.R., 343

Phelan, G. B., 26, 343

Philippe, M. D., 21, 343

Place,

proper, 107

Plato, 32, 221-22, 338

Porphyry,

- says species flows down from genus, 44
- says genus contains species and differences in potency, 50
- gives three acts of difference, 101
- on genus and difference, 111
- on genus and species, 121
- says genus is predicable of many things which differ in species, 177
- says difference concludes at being, 290

Possible,

- in itself, 214

Potency, *see* Act

- is prior and posterior to act, 104-105, 188
- of matter is twofold, 309-10

Predicates,

- transcendentals as, 136, 141-42
- and definition, 142
- the order of quidditative, in the individual, 288-89
- predication of, 175-76

Predication,

- primary and secondary, 23, 74-75, 177-78
- analogical, 74-75
- conditions of, 155, 175
- of nature to individuals, 155-56, 175
- of a predicate, 175-76
- how understood, 173, 175-79
- of being (*ens*) is twofold, 224

Principles,

- first, of knowledge, 49

Privation, *see* Negation

- is known and defined through what is positive, 41, 144
- how understood, 64-65

Pruche, B., 343

Pseudo-Dionysius, 231, 235, 245, 250, 338

## Q

Quality, *see* Quantity

Quantity,

- and individuation, 103-107
- and body, 112
- is predicated prior to quality, 191

Quiddity,

- is one, 67
- and form, 72
- and nature, 72, 92
- divine, 200
- and existence, 208
- which is its actual existence is not determined to any genus, 241
- knowledge of, differs from quidditative knowledge, 270

## R

Raeymaecker de, L., 343

Rationality,

- in man is the principle of difference, 132

Real Distinction, *see* Being, Essence

- of quiddity and the being of actual existence, 11-12, 220-26

Reference,

- meaning of, 301

Régis, L. M., O.P., 343

Relation,

- and reference, 300-301
- and accident, 301

Renard, H., S.J., 343

Roland-Gosselin, M.-D., O.P., 29, 182, 222, 242, 343

## S

Saliba, D., 343

Salmon, E., 343

Schmitz, K., 343

Schwartz, H., 26, 27, 343

Scotus,

- on *esse*, 11-12, 33, 190
- on *esse* of soul in and out of the body, 16-17
- on mediate signification, 23
- on univocity of being, 24, 75-79, 137
- on heccheity as the principle of individuation, 28, 95, 264
- on the universal, 32
- says matter can exist without form, 32-33, 185
- says there are many intelligences of the same species, 34, 196
- on the individuation of the intellectual soul, 34, 264
- on accidents, 35
- on the ultimate in species, 42-44, 50
- says there is an essential order among confused concepts, 51
- says being signifies the ten categories mediately, 66
- on unity and being, 70
- says being is the first thing known by distinct knowledge, 47, 79
- says simplicity is a perfect without qualification, 84-85
- on unity and commonness, 151, 154
- says universal in act exists in reality, prior to any work of the intellect, 165
- says that the being of actual ex-

- istence and essence of a thing are really the same, but are distinguished as an intrinsic mode and the quiddity to which it belongs, 217
- on the composition of act and potency in creatures, 226
- says that perfections in God are distinct by a formal distinction owing to the nature of the real, 247, 252
- on quantity and quality as absolute accidents, 299
- on subject and accident, 302
- Separated Substance, *see* Intelligences, Intellectual Substance
- essence of, 34, 196-202
- are composed of *esse* and essence, 203-208
- Sign,
- is relative to what is signified, 61
- Signification,
- mediate and immediate, 66
- Simon, Y., 343
- Simple,
- is known in actual confused knowledge, 47
- substance, essence of, 83-84, 181-82, 184
- Simplicity,
- meaning of, 84-85
- Simplicius, 301, 338
- Smith, G., S.J., 343
- Smith, G., S.J. and Kendzierski, L., 21, 26, 30, 31, 343
- Soul,
- defined through something outside its essence, 87-88
- and body in man, 119-121, 229-37
- united to body is more perfect than separated from body, 231-37
- how multiplied numerically, 261-63
- remains many with the destruction of the body, 261-63
- and individuation, 34-35, 263-69
- united with body does not know immaterial substances quidditatively, 35, 278-79
- the manner of knowing in the joined and separated soul, 281-82
- the highest operation of, 282
- Aristotle's definition of, 297
- Species, *see* Definition, Difference, Genus
- ultimate in, 50, 59
- differs from genus and difference, 115-16, 118
- how understood, 121-24
- differ essentially, 124
- impressed and expressed, 163
- intelligible, 174
- predication of, 178-79
- principles of, 187
- of accident, 332-35
- Speculative Sciences,
- are distinguished according to the modes of formal abstraction, 22, 46
- Stegmüller, F., 1, 344
- Subject,
- dependence on, is essence of accidents, 299-302
- is cause of its proper attribute in three genera of causes, 184, 309
- relation of, to accidents, 36, 323-27
- Substance, *see* Composite Substance
- differs from accident, 73-74
- is being simply, 73-74
- composite compared to simple, 83-85
- is said of a subject, 173
- and existence, 224-25
- and accident, 307-308
- is cause of accidents, 311-12
- Supposit,
- meaning of, 33, 194-195
- differs from nature in material substances, 33, 194
- and the being of actual existence, 194
- in separated substances, 33, 194-95
- in God, 33, 195
- in composite of essence and *esse*, 227
- Symmetry, *see* Commensurate
- is understood in two ways, 265
- Synonymity,
- is an attribute of words, 255
- T**
- Term,
- is the sign of something understood, 61, 67
- and thing, 61
- Thery, G., 344
- Thing,
- quiddity of, 61
- how predicated, 123
- can be understood outside the soul in a twofold way, 146
- Thomas Aquinas, St.,
- on *esse* as the act of existing, 4, 19, 304
- on *ens*, 7
- and Avicenna on the meaning of *ens*, 7-9, 140-41

on accidentality and essentiality of being, 9, 18  
 on *esse* and essence, 11-14, 220, 222-24, 226  
 on abstraction of a whole and of a form, 21  
 on formal and objective concepts, 23  
 on analogy, 25-27  
 on individuation, 27-29, 98-100  
 on first and second intentions, 29  
 on the predication of body, 29  
 on absolute nature, 30, 147  
 on the transcendental relation, 31, 142  
 on unity, 31  
 says matter cannot exist without form, 32-33, 186-87  
 says each intelligence constitutes one species, 34, 198  
 on the *esse* of accidents, 35, 306-307  
 on prime matter and indeterminate dimensions, 35-36  
 on subject and accident, 36, 304, 307-309, 324  
 on actual distinct knowledge, 42  
 on the order of intellectual knowledge, 52-56  
 says nature and singularity are distinct in material things, 57  
 on sense knowledge, 58  
 on being *per se* and being *per accidens*, 63  
 on the concept, 69  
 says essence signifies something common to all generic and specific natures, 71  
 on knowledge as an analogue of divine and created knowledge, 81  
 on simplicity, 84  
 says that according to Averroes, essence is form alone, 86  
 says matter is part of the quiddity of a natural substance, 91  
 says every formal difference is specific, 106  
 says genus says the entire *esse* of the species, 111  
 on composition of soul and body in man, 119  
 on the universal, 161-62  
 on nature and supposit, 194  
 says soul is in a more perfect state when joined to body than when it is separated, 231  
 says that the perfection of a thing is threefold, 234  
 on perfections in God, 244, 250  
 on the individuation of souls, 266  
 says human soul joined to body is unable to know immaterial substances quidditatively, 278  
 on the knowledge of the soul joined to the body and separated, 281  
 says intelligences do not have a subaltern genus, 292  
 defines accident as a thing to which existence-in-another is due, 301  
 argues against Averroes' position on interminate dimensions and prime matter, 304  
 says subject is cause of its proper attribute, 309  
 says subject has a threefold relation to a proper accident, 324

Tonquédec de, J., S.J., 344

Transcendentals,

are common predicates of a nature, 31, 136, 141-42  
 relation of, to natures, 137, 141-42  
 are included in every concept, 31, 142  
 do not fall in the definition, 31, 142

Trombeta, A., O.F.M.,

on *esse* and essence, 12, 15, 16, 218-20  
 on the ultimate in species, 42, 43, 44, 48-50  
 on the order in intellectual knowledge, 52-54, 56  
 on universal and particular knowledge, 55  
 on the definition of accident, 77  
 on individuation, 106-107  
 on the prior and posterior, 188-89  
 says soul when joined to body is no more perfect than when separated from body, 231  
 on a subject and its attribute, 308

Truth,

of a proposition, 64

U

Unity,

is indivision, 70, 144-45, 154  
 follows being, 95, 298  
 meaning of, 31, 143-45  
 numerical and formal, 31, 144  
 has being outside the soul, 145-47  
 substantial and accidental, 297-98

Universal,

has a twofold totality, 40  
 how understood, 32, 158, 161, 164-67, 169, 174

does not exist in act outside the soul, 164-77

means the thing and the aptitude, 171

in reason and in the thing, 200-201

Univocal,

meaning of, 25, 79

Univocity,

of being, 75-79, 137

**V**

Vaux de, R., O.P., 344

Virtually,

something to contain another, is understood in a twofold way, 82

Vollert, C., S.J., 344

**W**

Walton, W., 344

Wells, N. J., 15, 344