Jan Cossiers (1600–1671), Prometheus Carrying Fire: Museo del Prado, Madrid.

Prometheus:

the Religion of Man

An Essay on the Hermeneutics of the Second Vatican Council

Fr. Álvaro Calderón

Translated by Inés de Erausquin

PO Box 217 | Saint Marys, KS 66536

Previously published as: Prometeo: La Religión Del Hombre, Ediciones del Oeste, Buenos Aires, Argentina, February 2010.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Calderón, Álvaro (Calderón Abdé), 1937- author. | De Erausquin, Ines, translator.

Title: Prometheus : the religion of man : an essay on the hermeneutics of the Second Vatican Council / Alvaro Calderon ; translated by Ines de Erasquin.

Other titles: Prometeo. English

Description: Saint Marys, KS : Angelus Press, [2021] | Originally

published: Prometeo: La Religión del Hombre. Ediciones Rio Reconquista,

2010. | Summary: “This book summarizes the main tenets of Vatican II’s errors, lays down the correct theological and philosophical definitions and principles and exposes the fallacious thinking of the Council”-- Provided by publisher.

Identifiers: LCCN 2021021983 | ISBN 9781949124699

Subjects: LCSH: Vatican Council (2nd : 1962-1965 : Basilica di San Pietro

in Vaticano) | Catholic Church--Doctrines--History--20th century.

Classification: LCC BX830 1962 .C482513 2021 | DDC 262/.52--dc23

LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021021983

©2021 by Angelus Press

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval systems without permission in writing from the publisher, except by a reviewer, who may quote brief passages in a review.

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ILLUSTRATIONS

1. Vatican II vs. Catholicism

2. The Christian vs. The New Man

3. Catholic Doctrine vs. Conciliar Doctrine

regarding the Kingdom of God

4. Concepts of the Kingdom of God / Church

5. New Version of the Social Kingship of Christ

6. Reduction of the Church

7. The Catholic Church vs. The New Church

8. The Catholic Religion vs. The Religion of Man

HEPHAESTUS:

Welcome will Night be when with spangled robe

She hides the light of day; welcome the sun

Returning to disperse the frosts of dawn.

And every hour shall bring its weight of woe

To wear thy heart away; for yet unborn

Is he who shall release thee from thy pain.

This is thy wage for loving humankind.

For, being a God, thou dared’st the Gods’ ill will,

Preferring to exceeding honour Man.

Wherefore thy long watch shall be comfortless,

Stretched on this rock, never to close an eye

Or bend a knee; and vainly shalt thou lift,

With groanings deep and lamentable cries,

Thy voice; for Zeus is hard to be entreated,

As new-born power is ever pitiless.

PROMETHEUS:

Touching my fate, silence and speech alike

Are unsupportable. For boons bestowed

On mortal men I am straitened in these bonds.

I sought the fount of fire in hollow reed

Hid privily, a measureless resource

For man, and mighty teacher of all arts.

This is the crime that I must expiate

Hung here in chains, nailed ’neath the open sky.

O, woe is me!

AESCHYLUS, Prometheus Bound

FOREWORD

The resignation of Benedict XVI and the early election of Pope Francis has seemed to many to be the outcome of the conflict denounced by the former between two interpretations of the last Council: the first one in continuity and the other in rupture with the bimillennial tradition of the Church.

Under Paul VI, the progressive forces would have triumphed, imposing a dynamic of new beginnings, in keeping with the innovative face of the Council, the one that looks to the future. But already under the pontificate of John Paul II, as Prefect of the Doctrine of the Faith, and then especially from the chair of St. Peter’s, Benedict XVI tried to rally the conservative forces to highlight the other face of the Second Vatican Council, the one that looks to the past. But he could not maintain it and had to resign. The canonization of Paul VI sealed the triumph of Franciscan progressivism.

What, then, is the battle to be waged today for the good of the Church of Jesus Christ? To highlight the good interpretation of the Second Vatican Council and to recover continuity with Tradition? That is to say, to join the Benedictines in order to defeat the Franciscans once and for all? To get Pope Francis to resign as well?

A very serious mistake. Both Benedict and Francis are popes of the Council, of the Council itself. Joseph Ratzinger, formed in the new German theology, was moderated by the Council, teaching him not to break abruptly with Tradition. Mario Bergoglio, a little younger, was exalted by the Council. Both are absolutely conciliar Popes, as were Paul VI and John Paul II. The differences in the ways of application, of slowing down or speeding up, the conflict that these differences engender, are essential elements of the revolutionary machine that the Council set up in the Church.

It has long been noted that the anti-Christian revolution progresses by means of the Hegelian engine of the struggle of opposites. As it is well said, the revolution takes two steps forward and one step back. In the face of its destructive advances, it allows partial reactions that excite the good and spur the bad, thus gathering strength to advance another step. Two long strides with Paul VI and John Paul II, a timid retreat with Benedict, and new impetus with Francis. To resist the Franciscan advances relying on the Benedictine positions is to contribute to the self-destruction of the Church.

The problem is in the Council. And not even in the Council. The problem is in the liberalism that has gotten into the veins of Christians. Well, it is and it is not in the Council, let’s be clear!

The problem is in the Council because an ecumenical council is the highest ecclesiastical institution, and when the popes allowed it to be bewitched by modernism, they gave the sect the necessary strength to change the course of the entire Church. But modernism is nothing more than the theological justification of a liberalism that wants to remain Catholic. That is why we say that although the Second Vatican Council is the immediate cause why modernism, condemned by St. Pius X and repressed with some success, has imposed itself with irresistible force throughout the Church, the primary cause is the Christian lukewarmness that allowed liberalism to spread through the veins of Catholicism. Sooner or later the Council was bound to come.

It is absolutely necessary to understand what the Second Vatican Council meant in the process of modernity into which the Church entered seven centuries ago.

Benedict XVI spoke of various “hermeneutics” of the conciliar event. Until not so long ago, the word “hermeneutics” meant the art of interpreting texts that offered some special difficulty, generally because of their antiquity, and it was said especially of the art of interpreting the Sacred Scriptures, which, in addition to their great antiquity, have multiple human authors and a single principal author, the Holy Spirit. But modern subjectivism speaks of “hermeneutics” for the interpretation of every text, putting now the difficulty not in some characteristic but in the general difficulty that man would have to transmit his thought. Moreover, no text would have a single true interpretation, because each one understands it from his own subjectivity, each one has his own “reading.” That is why we do not speak so much of interpreting texts, but rather of events: texts understood in the context of the one who produced them and the one who interprets them. What do we want to do with this “Hermeneutic of the Second Vatican Council”?

An authentic Catholic theologian cannot accept to speak of a “hermeneutic,” for example, of the texts of the Council of Trent or Vatican I, because they are current texts that make just the authoritative interpretation of Tradition, in what is still needed to be explained. If to read Trent, which makes a hermeneutic of Tradition, I, Father Calderón, need the application of a specialized art to be able, in my turn, to interpret it, it means that you, reader, will have to make a hermeneutic of my interpretation. Does it mean that no one can ever speak clearly with anyone the same language? That is exactly what a modern subjectivist thinks, but he is gravely mistaken.

Nevertheless, we are attempting a hermeneutics of the Second Vatican Council because, although it is wrong to speak of “hermeneutics” for the documents of the ecclesiastical magisterium, it is not wrong for the texts of the last Council since they have been written on the basis of a kind of code for initiates. On the one hand, the group of neo-theologians who dominated the Council had the prudence not to be explicit in order to avoid an open confrontation with the traditional message of the majority of the Council Fathers; and on the other hand, the modern thought that animated it is necessarily and deliberately ambiguous, since it does not cultivate the instruments that give rigor to thought, with the intention of remaining in the peaceful sphere of doctrinal pluralism. It is difficult, very difficult for those who are trained in the old way to understand what the Council really meant. Hence these pages.

Benedict XVI asked for a “hermeneutic of continuity,” and that is what we have done. In the Council there was something never seen before that stunned Catholicism, but there was much that was old. Faced with the quaking of the Council, we Catholics have suddenly seen everything fall apart. But if one thinks about it, the cause of this collapse cannot be reduced to what happened fifty years ago: termites had been weakening the structure of the building for a long time. One of the main theses of the explanation given here is that Vatican II is part of a continuous process that began with the Renaissance. But since we have not the intent of becoming historians, this historical aspect is not properly explained, but only pointed out by some milestones. In any case, it is enough to show that those who made the Council were in continuity with centuries of liberal Catholicism. Benedict XVI’s claim, then, has some truth to it.

The key word in our whole interpretation is “humanism,” first uttered in the fourteenth century. Although not always with rancor, from the beginning it was opposed to the word “Christianity.” We affirm, then, that the Second Vatican Council is the greatest—and perhaps the last—effort to support a Catholic humanism, which stands before Christianity, or the Religion of Christ, as the Religion of Man. Hence the title of this book.

The “Prometheus” was so as not to leave it so dry. Renaissance humanists liked to resurrect Greek myths, and the figure of Prometheus interestingly embodies the spirit of humanism. According to Aeschylus, Prometheus was a titan—of divine nature—brother of Atlas and Typhon, but unlike them, his virtue consisted not in brute strength but in cunning: his name means Prudent. Initially a worshiper of Zeus, he became so favorable to mankind—whom, according to other authors, he had shaped—that he saved it from the flood in which the angry Zeus wanted to drown it, ended up stealing the divine fire in some reeds to give it to men, and in the sacrifice of an ox he deceived Zeus by offering man the better part. As divine punishment, he will be chained to a rock where an eagle will perpetually devour his liver, and men will be seduced by Pandora, who unleashes all calamities. Finally, Hercules frees him and reconciles him with Zeus (at the entrance of Rockefeller Center there is a kind of altar raised to Prometheus, where a golden statue represents him bringing to men the divine flame).

The Council is Prometheus in the act of his larceny. It was a maneuver of human prudence carried out by a divinely constituted hierarchy, which burned for men the incense that belongs to God. As in the parable of the unfaithful steward (Lk. 16), the Council canceled man’s debts to God, promising salvation to all; and in the worship of its New Mass, it has given man the better part. But the consequences are not lacking either, for Pandora’s box has poured its evils on the whole Church, while the Catholic hierarchy has been chained, with its own incoherence gnawing at its entrails. And who will be the Hercules capable of liberating her? We believe that it can be only a return of Thomism to Rome.

The pages that follow are difficult, because Modernist theology is false and hollow, but in the anxiety to avoid the anathemas that could exclude it from the Church, it has been weaving its sophisms with subtlety, and if one wants to pinpoint its errors, one needs to sharpen their pencil. But when, in addition to precision, one seeks a general synthesis of the multitude of conciliar deviations without the patience to devote a thousand pages to the whole question, the result is like a mural painted by a miniaturist. We believe that in reading this booklet one may lose many details—which only those who have studied this particular point will be able to appreciate—without losing sight of the general idea.

As can be seen in the table of contents, the work is divided into four chapters. In the first chapter we try to say “quid est,” what the Council is, that is, we try to define it, pointing out its main principles and properties. Then, in the next three chapters, it considers what the Council did. It seems a good way to proceed, since, as the scholastics say, agere sequitur esse, action follows being, it is convenient to first study its intimate nature before explaining the Council’s work.

CHAPTER I

WHAT WAS THE SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL?

The question “Quid est?” must always be answered with a definition. If the definition is a good one, it will include the principal causes of the thing defined, illuminating thereby its other properties and consequences. This present chapter will be divided into three parts. In the first we will seek to define the Council; in the second we will uncover its principal causes and in the third, we will point out its fundamental properties. The consequences will be left for the remaining chapters.

A. Definition of the Council

The inferiority complex of modern thought causes it to distrust definitions, as though it were too hard for man’s intelligence to understand the essentials in the appearances of things. This can happen with things that are hidden from us, but not with those that are clearly manifested. The Second Vatican Council was an enormous occurrence in the life of the Church, affecting even the most intimate aspects of Christian existence. Perhaps, in the first moment of surprise, many did not know of what it consisted; but this is no longer the case after forty years of suffering its consequences. Using simple language, we can define the Second Vatican Council as the officialization of a Catholic humanism.

1. FIRST TERM: OFFICIALIZATION

With the dawning of the ill-named Renaissance, there arose in the Church a spiritual movement which, although it has had various manifestations, has no lack of unity and has a continuous link with the significance of the last Council. But one of the aspects that clearly characterize and distinguish this last event from the rest of its lineage is its having been produced by the highest entity within the Church: an ecumenical council. It is clear and manifest that if the Council could impress upon the Church a movement that until that point had not only belonged to a group of Catholics, but was also declared to be opposed—in a measure as yet undetermined—to what the Church as a whole held, it was because it counted on the power of an entire ecumenical council. This could not have been done even with the power of a pope, if he were working alone.

To sum this up we use the ugly term “officialization.” As we have explained elsewhere,[1] although this Council was an act of the full hierarchy, it cannot be called simpliciter a hierarchical act due to the strange manner in which it was set up. For the same reason, neither was it an act that clearly compromised the authority of the ecclesiastical magisterium. Therefore, we do not find it convenient to speak of “hierarchical” or “authorized” approval. Although officialization means “to give an official character or validity to something that previously lacked it,”[2] and can be taken as a synonym of authorization, legalization or authentication, it also has a pejorative connotation—more explicit in the term “officialism” that is used in our lands—which can indicate a more material and even vicious connection to hierarchical offices. Having been performed by a whole ecumenical council permitted the work of Vatican II to achieve an official character, whose legitimacy we will leave for later discussion.

2. SECOND TERM: HUMANISM

A good definition needs to set out the formal and primary aspects of the thing defined which give information about all its properties. We think we fulfill this condition fully in defining the Council as humanism. This is the word that slipped out in Paul VI’s final discourse, when—as he himself recognizes—it was time to say “what this Council has been”: “You, modern humanists, who renounce the transcendence of the highest realities, at least confer on us this merit and recognize our new humanism: we too—more than anyone—honor mankind.”[3] This is the pope who created the Council and knew what it was doing, with more clarity—we believe—than John Paul II himself, because he knew better the Church as it had always been, and had a clearer knowledge of the conciliar innovations. Hence, to ensure the accuracy of our definition, we will seek no further argument for now than that of this papal allocution.

Paul VI is not attempting to give a synthesis of what the Council has been and done, but he does mean to point out its “religious value,” clearly its principal quality. According to the pope, the “direct and primordial religious intention” was the reflection of the Church on its own “spiritual conscience,” to know and define itself better. But next to this first intention he places a second, which he also considers “capital,” which is attention—“penetrated with an immense sympathy”—to modern man. We could then ask ourselves which is the more formal and primary focus: the examination of conscience of the Church which will lead to its redefinition, or the new humanism. To resolve this matter—and it is necessary to do so to reach the true definition—we must consider which of these two aspects is first in its reason. That is to say, we must consider whether the redefinition of the Church is the cause and foundation of the new humanism, or whether the latter is the cause and reason for the redefinition. The conclusion of Paul VI’s discourse permits us to resolve the question with sufficient security: “The modern mind,” he says, “accustomed to assess everything in terms of usefulness, will readily admit that the Council’s value is great if only because everything has been referred to human usefulness. Hence no one should ever say that a religion like the Catholic religion is without use, seeing that when it has its greatest self-awareness and effectiveness, as it has in council, it declares itself entirely on the side of man and in his service. In this way the Catholic religion and human life reaffirm their alliance with one another, the fact that they converge on one single human reality: The Catholic religion is for mankind.”[4] For the pope, the Catholic religion is ordered for humanity; hence, we may affirm that the innovation of the Council which has led to seeking a redefinition of the Church is the adoption of a new attitude toward humanity in its modern condition. It is convenient, then, that the Council be defined as humanism, understood as an orientation of religion to the service and promotion of modern man. It is the spirit of the divine Prometheus.

3. THIRD TERM: CATHOLIC

The final note of our definition points out that the humanism of the Council is Catholic. Humanism is the first and essential note of the spirit known as modernism. But this orientation toward man conflicts with the orientation toward God which is proper to the Catholic spirit, tending to provoke confrontations with the Church. Nonetheless, we must recognize that humanism, whether we value it positively or negatively, is a modality that only occurs and sustains itself within Catholicism, tending to grow weaker and disappear in the measure in which it departs from it. For this reason, the most authentic humanism—if we may use the word—is that which wishes to remain within Catholicism. This is the humanism of the Council. If there is one thing that characterizes the Council, it is its intention of combining nova et vetera, modern newness with Catholic antiquity. When Pope Benedict XVI maintained that the true hermeneutic of Vatican II is not that of a break with tradition but rather one of continuity, he is pointing to one of its essential aspects. Conciliar humanism has constantly tempered its innovations to keep them within the limits of Catholic dogma, and has tenaciously defended its connection with traditional doctrine.

It is difficult to add the adjective “Catholic” to our definition of conciliar humanism because, as we have said, it takes advantage of certain aspects of Catholicism but clashes with other very fundamental ones; thus, we doubted whether we should use an expression that would indicate a more material connection, such as “of Catholic atmosphere,” for example. But, although there is an intrinsic contradiction between humanism and Catholicism, we would be mistaken if we should think that the intention of conciliar humanism to remain Catholic is not primary and formal. Let it suffice, then, to use the noun humanism and the adjective Catholic, to make it clear that, as they contradict each other, we can only participate in the first insofar as the substance of the second may tolerate it.

4. INTEGRAL HUMANISM

The three sections of our definition reinforce each other. A firm adherence to the Catholic Church allows humanism to remain more complete, and there is no firmer adherence than that of its officialization by the hierarchy. We may therefore summarize our definition by saying that the Council is integral humanism—an expression used before the Council by Jacques Maritain, a thinker who may be considered the true father of Vatican II—and later adopted officially to define the conciliar social doctrine.[5]

B. On the Causes that Explain the Council

When a definition is good, it implies the primary causes of the thing that is defined, causes which explain its other properties and consequences. But, easy though it may be to point out the essential aspects of a manifest matter, it is not so simple to determine its causes with precision. We can foresee that for the cause we have taken in hand it will be even less so; for though all may agree that Vatican II is an officialization of humanism, it has provoked very contrary reactions of acceptance and rejection. Given that what we want is to explain the Council, in pointing out its true causes we shall not refrain from saying how those who created the Council understood them.

First we shall consider, as we should, the Council’s purpose; then it makes sense to point out the subject or matter; in third place the agent; and finally, the formal cause, which tells us what the Council really is.

I. ON THE PURPOSE OF VATICAN COUNCIL II

1. The purpose of conciliar humanism according to its promoters

The declared purpose of humanism is the promotion of human dignity; that is to say that it works ad maiorem hominis gloriam. As Paul VI acknowledges in the closing address already cited, this is the purpose of a “profane and secular humanism,” which renounces “the transcendence of the highest realities” and constitutes itself a true religion: “the religion of man who makes himself God.” But he affirms that it is also the purpose of the new humanism of the Council: “The religion of the God Who has become man, has met with the religion (for such it is) of man who makes himself God. […] You modern humanists, who have renounced the transcendent value of the highest realities, credit us at least this quality and recognize our new humanism: we, too, in fact, we more than any others, honor mankind.” How can it be explained that two movements, which agree on the same purpose, should nevertheless maintain their differences? What is this difference?

The following response is that of conciliar thinking, which we must in courtesy allow to speak first. The difference is in that the modern era has certainly given rise to an atheistic humanism (at least in fact), but much of it was in reaction against the inhuman deism (in fact, at least) of the Middle Ages.[6] The strong theocentric orientation of ancient man led, even in medieval Catholicism, not only to lack of consideration but even disdain for human values. This exaggeration, which culminated in the horror of the black plague and its flagellants, provoked the reaction with which the modern era began in the Renaissance. But, as tends to happen, the contrary exaggeration ended up predominating, which ends by disparaging the divine value of the human, that is to say, the religious dimension of man through which he transcends the limits of his creaturely condition and relates to God. But, after this new disorder culminated in the horror of the two World Wars, it was time to find the balance point with the new humanism of the Council.

As much to those who despise man ad maiorem Dei gloriam, as to those who despise God ad maiorem hominis gloriam, Vatican II points out that both purposes identify themselves in the same reality. To understand this it is enough to take note of the transcendence of man and the liberality of God.

It is clear, then, that if we consider the liberality of God as Creator and the transcendence of man as an image of the Creator, all jealousy between deists and humanists must cease; for the advancement of human dignity may perfectly and adequately identify (secundum rem et rationem) with the advancement of the glory of God. Transcendental anthropocentrism does not cease to be theocentric:

Our humanism becomes Christianity; our Christianity becomes theocentric; so much so that we can also affirm that to know God it is necessary to know man. Would not this Council, then, which has concentrated principally on man, be destined to set forth again to the modern world the ladder leading to freedom and consolation? Would it not be, in short, a simple, new and solemn teaching to love man in order to love God? To love man, we say, not as an instrument [means], but rather as the first step [end] toward the highest, transcendent goal, the beginning and reason of all love; and so this entire Council may be reduced to its definitive religious significance, which is none other than a powerful and friendly invitation to the humanity of today to find God once more, through the path of brotherly love.[7]

2. Three theological notes: On the final purpose of man

It may be thought that in the exposition of the previous point there is no more than a change of language through which traditional concepts are translated with the apologetic intention that men of today may understand them; a purpose that John XXIII pointed out to the Council in his opening address. Traditionally, we used to say that the double purpose of the Church in general is the glorification of God and the sanctification of souls, and that love of neighbor—as St. John teaches in his first epistle—is the surest way to the love of God. The Council would say that to seek the sanctification of souls is no different from fostering human dignity, which is certainly true.

But anyone who has experience of the spiritual life and of human affairs knows how easily and subtly these two final ends, certainly ordered but intimately linked, may be switched. Between the humble friar who works to perfect himself for the love of God, and the proud one who obeys God’s commands for love of his own perfection, there may be a great similarity in words and deeds—so much so that the difference may be hidden from even a sharp-eyed superior—but there is an abyss between the two. The first is at the service of God; the second wants to place God at his service.

3. The inevitable turn to anthropocentrism

The advancement of human dignity, sought only insofar and insomuch as it glorifies God, is certainly an end for the Church received from the Holy Ghost on Pentecost. But sought for its own sake, (as an end simpliciter and not as finis quo), it is an end for human pride deceived by the devil. What did Vatican II set out to do? As we said, it is not easy to see where the intentions of hearts stop; we may only know them well by their fruits. But before we refer to the fruits of the Council, Paul VI’s closing address allows us to anticipate our conclusion. The Council certainly took the advancement of mankind as an end in itself, because in the contrary case it would not have felt immense sympathy, but rather horror at encountering the religion of man who makes himself God:

The religion of the God Who became man has met the religion (for such it is) of man who makes himself God. And what happened? Was there a clash, a battle, a condemnation? There could have been, but there was none. The old story of the Samaritan has been the model of the spirituality of the Council. A feeling of boundless sympathy has permeated the whole of it.[8]

The supposed transcendence that might make the difference between Catholic and atheistic humanism does no more than aggravate the error, because in identifying the glory of man with the glory of God and setting it up as the end simpliciter of creation, the Creator is subordinated to the creature. For he who sets himself to seek a good as an end in itself, is seeing in that good his own perfection[9]; from which it follows that, if God should promote His extrinsic glory as an end in itself, and not His own intrinsic goodness, it would imply that for God, His creation would be an added perfection that would make Him better. Because, always and necessarily, the end simpliciter is the perfection of the agent and, if they are two different entities, the agent is subordinated to the end as such. Hence, applying to God an end distinct from His own goodness is to imply and declare that God is not God.

Evidently, there is a desire to deny this consequence by insisting on the divine perfection and the generosity of the creative act, making it seem like the exercise of the purest liberty, which moves without the slightest necessity or the slightest advantage. It is a subtle matter, because indeed the perfect Agent gains nothing by His work, rather allowing us to partake in what He has; whereas we, imperfect agents, although we be acting out of pure love, will never cease to gain profit.[10] But we may not cast aside the metaphysics of causes: the end moves the agent as his own act and perfection; thence, the end of creation cannot be anything other than divine perfection itself. It is contradictory to affirm divine perfection and at the same time say that the motive of creation is the good of the creature, because this signifies that the glory of our sanctification could in some way complete the Creator. For the humanism of the Council, God may well be very perfect in Himself, but insofar as He is the Creator He is placed totally at the service of the advancement of human dignity. Despite their denial in words, they cannot escape their anthropocentrism.

The trick, then, which distracts the attention so that the conciliar conjurers may switch the purposes of the Church and of man, is in the half-truth of the liberality of the creative act: God is not selfish, He does not seek His own glory but rather that of man![11] The Catholic concept, on the other hand, is characterized the opposite way. If there is one thing of which God shows Himself jealous, it is His glory: “Gloriam meam alteri non dabo! I shall not give my glory to another!” (Is. 42:8; 48:11).

4. The personalism of the new humanism

The most general expression of this error is in the personalist metaphysics which grounds conciliar humanism.[12] According to Christian revelation, the excellence of man through which, differing from other created things, he is called a person, consists of being an image of God. But the personalist exaggeration places this reason of being God’s image in the very thing that it cannot consist of, being what distinguishes the Creator from every creature: the divine Dignity of being lovable for one’s own sake. Contemporary personalism exaggerates the dignity and autonomy of the person so much that it considers the person lovable for his own sake in a similar way to God, thus distinguishing the person from simple things, which may be loved by and for persons. The person, then may never be considered as a means or an instrument, like simple things, but must always be an end in himself.[13]

We may not go to too great a length in the refutation of this error, which turns all metaphysics upside down;[14] but continuing with our method, let us try to point out the truth on which it leans and the point in which it is wrong:

St. Thomas also distinguishes between people and things, not really because persons are lovable in themselves and things lovable by others—the classic distinction between “virtuous good” and “useful good”[15]—but rather because only persons recognize the reason of goodness in things and, therefore, only with persons can there be the love of benevolence and friendship. Here is the truth from which the personalist error feeds.

But, in reality, we can love people as much as things for what they are in themselves, as “virtuous good” (although in speaking of things this term is a little inappropriate), and also, in other aspects, for their usefulness toward other ends. The horse is an excellent animal and, beyond his usefulness, we may love him for what he is and desire good for him; indeed, he shows himself so grateful that we can almost feel a friendship for him. And the pope may be an excellent person, or not; but over and above his virtuousness, we can love him greatly for his usefulness to the Church. However—and this is the point in which personalism is mistaken—neither persons nor things may be loved as final goods and ends simpliciter. Because, even as they do not have their being in themselves, neither do they have goodness in themselves; but rather, they receive all their goodness through their participation in the ultimate End and Good, which is God and God alone. Thus, any created reality, be it a person or no, can only be an intermediate end, and may only be considered in relation to the ultimate end.

5. The personalist humanism of Gaudium et Spes

If we read Gaudium et Spes in light of these warnings, the explicitness of the personalist concept on which its doctrine is founded may well surprise us. All the errors of this way of thinking are exposed there, but for now let us only look at what it does to the idea of our final end. After a long (everything in that document is long) status quæstionis, the explanation begins with these phrases: “Believers and unbelievers alike generally agree on this point: all the good things on earth must order themselves to the service of man, center and summit of them all…The Bible teaches us that man has been created ‘in the image of God,’ with the capacity to know and love his Creator, and who has been constituted by God as lord of all visible creation to govern and use it, glorifying God” (no. 12). Man is center and summit, lord and governor of all creation. Are these not the titles which we usually, ingenuously, attribute to God?

What happens is that, as man is made in the image of God, he deserves what God deserves: “All men have been created in the image and likeness of God, who made from one man all humankind to populate the face of the earth, and all are called to one sole and identical end, that is, God Himself. Wherefore, love of God and neighbor is the first and greatest commandment. Sacred Scripture teaches us that love of God may not be separated from love of neighbor” (no. 24). Yes, here it is said that the goal of all men is God Himself; but, pardon, the precept of charity is not simple, but double: the first and greatest commandment is to love God; love of neighbor is second, and is only like unto the first, because our neighbor is not the final goal but an intermediate one, and is loved only through God. Gaudium et Spes identifies love of God with love of men without distinction, and gives this reason: “Man [is the] only earthly creature whom God has loved for his own sake—propter seipsam” (ibid.). This is definitely something proper to God, not man. Even so, then, as it identifies love, so it identifies the two goals with each other: the goal of creation is God, that is, man, which is what the Creator intended.

As we have said, this switches the relation of the person with the common good. “The principle, subject and end of all social institutions is and must be the human person” (no. 25). The principle should be called authority, but let that pass; the subject is human beings, all right; but the goal of every institution is the common good of those it serves. “Social order, then, and its progressive development must at all times subordinate themselves to the good of people, since the order of things—rerum ordinatio—must submit to the order of persons—ordini personarum—and not the contrary” (no. 26). This is pure and mad personalism, the generator of enormous confusion. “Human activity, just as it proceeds from man, so also is ordered toward man” (no. 35), because for this way of thinking, all good, particular and common, are only things to be ordered for the use of persons. With this conception, evidently the notion of common good would not be applied to God.

6. The anthropocentric inversion in the conciliar magisterium

As we may gather from the previous text, the anthropocentric inversion—in which the good of man is set as the final end of creation, exalting the generosity of the Creator, and the glory of man is identified without distinction with the glory of God—is a very grave, but subtle slope, which does not manifest itself easily in an explicit way in words, but rather in its general spirit and its consequences. In the following conciliar text, for example, there is nothing that is false: “[God the Father] because of His excessive and merciful goodness, creating us freely and calling us, besides, without any self-interest, to participate with Himself in life and in glory, He pours out divine goodness with liberality and does not cease to pour it out, in such a way that He who is the Creator of the universe should become at last ‘all in all’ (I Cor. 15:28), obtaining at once [simul] His glory and our happiness” (Ad Gentes 2). But the insistence on divine liberality and the simultaneity of the ends of the glory of God and our happiness are revelatory indicators.

The Roman Catechism of the Council of Trent is quite brief when it treats of the purpose of creation, but it completely clarifies this point when it speaks of the first petition of the Our Father:

It is impossible that God be loved wholeheartedly and above all things, if His honor and glory are not set before them all…The order of charity teaches us that we should love God more than ourselves, and that we ask first for what we want for God, and afterward what we desire for ourselves. And as our desires and petitions concern those things that we lack, and as nothing can be added to God, that is to say, to the Divine Nature, nor can His Divine Substance, which is ineffably rich in all perfection, be in any way increased, we must remember that the things we ask of God on God’s own account are extrinsic and concern His exterior glory…And when we ask that God’s Name be sanctified, what we desire is that the holiness and glory of the divine Name be increased…True, indeed, the divine name has in itself no need to be sanctified, “since it is terrible and holy,” as God Himself in His very Nature is holy, nor can any holiness be attributed to Him which He has not possessed from all eternity; yet, seeing that here below an honor far inferior to that which He deserves is rendered to Him, and that sometimes even He is dishonored by cursing and blasphemy, we therefore desire and beg that His name may be exalted here on earth with praise, honor, and glory, after the example of that praise, honor and glory which are given Him in heaven.[16]

The commentary which the new Catechism gives to this petition of the Our Father is born of a profoundly different spirit. Having set man up as the goal and good of God, to sanctify the Name of God ends up as sanctifying man:

To ask that His Name be sanctified implicates us in the “benevolent design that He intended from beforehand” (Eph. 1:9) that we might be “holy and immaculate in His presence in charity” (Eph. 1:4). In the decisive moments of His Economy, God reveals His Name, but He reveals it in the realization of His work. This work is not realized for us and in us except in the measure in which His Name is sanctified for us and in us (no. 2807–2808).

The glory for which God created is the glory of man: “The sanctity of God is the inaccessible hearth of His eternal mystery. That part of Him which is manifested in the creation and in history, the Scriptures call Glory, the radiance of His Majesty. In creating man ‘in His image and likeness,’ God ‘crowns him with glory’ (cf. Ps. 8:6)” (no. 2809). “All through our lives, our Father ‘calls us to holiness’ (I Thess. 4:7) and as it comes to us from Him that ‘we are in Christ Jesus, Who of God is made unto us…sanctification’ (I Cor. 1:30),[17] it is a question of His Glory and our life that His Name be sanctified in us and by us. This is the exigency of our first petition” (no. 2813). Thus we arrive at a curious result; no longer is the glory of God the greatest good of mankind, but the glory of man is the greatest good of God!

7. Conclusion

It would be legitimate to point out to the atheist humanist, as an apologetic recourse, that we agree on the advancement of mankind, adding that there is no true advancement of human dignity if we do not consider the relationship of man with God, that is, religion. But only for a moment; for the agreement on that goal is purely material, for some seek it to divinize themselves and others to give glory to the true God, and in consequence, the concrete fulfillment of such advancement would end in opposite ways. But evidently this is not what the Council has done.

It may also happen that this language was adopted so as not to point out the distinctions that it becomes necessary to establish, those which—as we have said—have no lack of subtlety. But this justifies that every so often a bad phrase may be spoken, but not that this manner of speaking be used always and systematically. Besides, if anyone with a Catholic spirit should commit this error, he would be horrified when the consequences become clear. This is probably what happened with the majority of the bishops who signed the Constitution Gaudium et Spes.

But he who sets up man in this manner on the throne of creation and places the Creator at his service, has blinded his intellect with a senseless pride. It is true that this sin, as experience teaches, can grow by degrees without being noticed, because it enfolds itself in the garments of great religiosity. But the adoration of Man as image of God—“Father, glorify Man that Man may glorify Thee”—is, in its complete form, the sin of the first personalist, Lucifer, who preferred the contemplation of his own essence, as a more perfect image of divinity, to subordinating himself with all nature in adoration to the Incarnate Word. The fruits which the Council has produced in forty years do not absolve it of this sin.

II. CATHOLIC HUMANISM (MATERIAL CAUSE)

1. The supposed evangelical roots of conciliar humanism

We can consider it a historical fact that humanism, new or old, has its origins in Christianity, as it takes its ideas and force from it. Gilson, in l’Esprit de la Philosophie Médiévale,[18] points out that if indeed Christian theology could not have established itself without the input of Greek wisdom, esteem for man’s dignity even in the individuality of his person is a consequence of the Gospel. Maritain makes no mistake when he says:

Considering western humanism in its contemporary forms, apparently more emancipated from all metaphysics of transcendence, it is plain to see that if it contains any remnant of the regular concept of human dignity, of freedom, of selfless values, it is the heritage of formerly Christian ideas and sentiments, secularized today.[19]

The assessment of this fact and the explanation of its causes differ greatly, however.

In ancient man—although perhaps it would be better to say in pre-Christian man, because what we say still applies to all those nations which have remained apart from Christian influence—the individual has no worth, indeed almost does not exist except insofar as he is integrated into the “big family,” that is to say, into that social order into which he is born. This was the case not only in Greece and Rome, but also in the ancient peoples of Asia, Africa and America, and even so in the tribe of Israel itself. It is natural that this should happen, since man is by nature a political animal, who cannot survive, nor perfect himself, nor work, nor continue over time except as a part of familial society, considered in the broader sense. In a certain very true sense, everything in man is the common good, because if he exists as an individual substance, he owes his existence to his fathers, and this debt of piety leads him to lay down his life for his fatherland in a manner as spontaneous as that by which he exposes his hand to defend his head. Now, what is natural to man, as the etymology of the word indicates, is that which comes to him firstly through birth and not through free choice.

Man’s belonging to his family is so constitutional that God respected it in His elevation of man to the supernatural order, associating the free gift of original justice to human nature itself, so that this gift must be passed on through birth. Thus, at the loss of this treasure through the first sin, what is passed on at birth is no longer grace but rather original sin.

In God’s chosen people appear elements that arise from the ancient concept of man. Their election rests on the vocation of Abraham and the fidelity of his response, and the titles of their earthly possessions come not from birth but from the divine promise. But belonging to the chosen people continued to be linked to birth, although it must be sealed by circumcision and was marked many times by the free calling from God, as when He chose Jacob rather than Esau.

The ancient regime would change profoundly with the coming of Our Lord Jesus Christ and the institution of the Church. For one does not enter into this Society, offered to all nations as the only Ark of salvation, by natural birth, but rather by Baptism, which is a spiritual birth which we attain by a free and personal response to the divine calling. Today it is difficult for us to imagine the novelty that this presented to ancient societies. A young Roman woman had no other name than the noble name of her family, and belonged body and soul to her gens until she was handed over, by way of matrimony, to another family. An attitude like that of St. Agnes, who at the age of thirteen had determined to belong body and soul to Christ and refused the marriage chosen for her, was unthinkable in the ancient way of thinking. The Church appeared as a superior Society, which did not supplant but included civil society, whose fatherland is the whole world, and which could be entered not by birth but by free personal election. This was the fact that makes the person and his liberty appear under a very different light to that which antiquity afforded them.

Although this manner of belonging to Christ and the Church elevates the person and his responsibility before God and men, nonetheless we remain on the opposite pole from personalist individualism. This is because the Church presents Herself, precisely, as the universal (catholic) Family—whose Father is God Himself and whose true Fatherland is the Kingdom of heaven—which continues to consider the individual as a helpless creature who cannot be saved by himself and whom, for the same reason, She will not remove from his political context. This family-like Society presents herself with an effective (sacramental) power to cure her children from the wounds of ignorance, malice and other miseries, and to sustain them before all worldly power and the satanic power behind it: “Fear not, I have overcome the world” (Jn. 16:33). It would take a thousand years for the prodigal son to forget all that his Father’s House has given him and believe that he could leave it to enjoy individually his reestablished personal freedom.[20]

What gives the human being a dignity that the fragility and misery of his concrete existence could not found, is the revelation of the merciful love of the Father toward us, Who gave us His Son to reestablish us through His Sacrifice in our condition of adoptive sons, and Who sent us His Holy Spirit to vivify the Church, in which our liberty could effectively be repaired: “The truth shall set you free” (Jn. 8:32).

The “new Christians” lean on this fact to say that their personalism and humanism has evangelical roots. But Christian ideals turn into humanism when they are unhinged.[21] The dignity of man must be joined to four fundamental Catholic doctrines: the elevation to a supernatural end, the fall to original sin, the redemption through the sacrifice of Christ and the necessity of the Church:

- The elevation of man to a supernatural end leads us to speak not so much of human dignity as divine: “As all things of his divine power which appertain to life and godliness, are given us, through the knowledge of him who hath called us by his own proper glory and virtue. By whom he hath given us most great and precious promises: that by these you may be made partakers of the divine nature” (II Pet. 1:3-4).

- Our fall to original sin impedes that we glory in any merely human dignity, for it left human nature wounded and all mankind was doomed to eternal death: “Wherefore as by one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death; and so death passed upon all men, in whom all have sinned” (Rom. 5:12).

- The dogma of the Redemption by the sacrifice of Christ obliges us to exalt only our Christian dignity, that is, that of those anointed in the Blood of Christ: “As to me, God forbid that I glory, except in the Cross of Our Lord Jesus Christ, through Whom the world is crucified to me, and I to the world” (Gal. 6:14).

- The dogma of the necessity of the Church for salvation, finally, makes us see that this dignity only remains to us insofar as we are part of the Mystical Body: “Acknowledge, O Christian, thy dignity, for thou partakest of divine nature, and return not to ancient vileness with a depraved life. Remember of what a Head and of what a body thou art a member. Remember that thou hast been rescued from the powers of darkness, and translated to the light and kingdom of God.”[22]

As we shall see, conciliar humanism will make itself the supporter of the evangelical values of human dignity and liberty after having supposedly cured them of their “sacralism,” inverting the relationship between nature and grace (the immediate consequence of the anthropocentric turn); of their “pessimism,” denying the consequences of sin; of their “dolorism,” denying the vicarious satisfaction of Christ; and their “separatism,” denying the necessity of the Church for salvation.

2. The necessity for mankind to remain Catholic

We might object to conciliar humanists: Why is it called “new humanism” when all its signal traits are already present in the humanism of the 14th and 15th centuries? The answer is clear. Humanist tendencies conflict with traditional Catholicism and lead humanity to separate itself from the Church; but in the measure in which it is separate, it becomes warped and dies. This is a necessity in a certain metaphysical way, which can be explained by what we just said: man is a social animal, whose nature is wounded in the personal as well as the political order, and only the real and effective power of the ecclesiastical society is capable of healing him in both ways. When the individual man distances himself from the sacraments, he is trapped by avarice, lust and pride, and loses his control over himself. And when the whole political order falls away from the Church, it ceases to be oriented toward the true common good, and to be dominated by the open or hidden interests of those who govern it. Thus humanism is soon transformed into a mask of hypocrisy.

We may, then, define the old humanism as that which allows itself to be dragged on by the temptation of separation, wishing to enjoy its gains in peace, but soon withers and becomes decrepit. The new humanism, on the other hand, is that which fights back against these lapses and renews its efforts to remain Catholic. It is a “middle-ground” humanism that has no peace; for its relationship with Catholicism is contentious but necessary, for it preserves its life.[23]

We do not believe it will be too difficult to tell the tale of the reactions of the new humanism to the excesses of the old. The Catholic Renaissance spirit (Dante) reacted against the anticlerical and pagan Renaissance spirit, but this fighting back could not avoid, two centuries later, that it should fall into the temptation of the Protestant reformation. Before the disaster of the “reformed” humanism of the sixteenth century appeared a new reaction of Catholic humanism (Vitoria). But this movement could not but inhibit the true Catholic resistance, allowing, another two centuries later, the catastrophe of the French Revolution, caused by enlightened humanism. To palliate these abuses came the “new humanism” of liberal Catholicism (Rosmini),[24] whose efficacious remedy would end, two more centuries later, in Marxist humanism, wrapped up in the horror of the last wars. And, as all these experiences were traumatic enough for it to be clear that it is not good for humanism to be separate from the Church, now comes the great “Catholic” reaction of conciliar humanism. What is new, then, about the humanism which triumphed at the Council—a novelty that renews itself before every failure of the previous novelty—is its ever more immovable intention to remain Catholic.

The intention of “Catholicity” is too firm to think that it is the result of diverse factors accidentally combined, but several traits can be noted in it:

- The humanist illusion assumes a certain ingenuity that only seems possible in those who have been formed in an environment of superficial Christianity. “The children of this world are wiser in their generation than the children of light” (Lk. 16:8), and the latter are the more foolish the less light they have within. As soon as it is separated from the Catholic environment, the humanist illusion becomes a Machiavellian (but always stupid) hypocrisy.

- The Christian ideals which humanism throws off kilter only have true vigor in the integrity of Catholicism; hence the necessity of preserving the greatest possible connection with it for them to keep functioning. As we will see in the next point, their strength is the greatest when they have not only Catholic thinking, but the very power of the ecclesiastical hierarchy at their service. The mortal enemy of integral humanism is integral Catholicism, in particular Thomism, because it possesses in reality all the good things that the former only appears to possess, and is well aware of its sophism. Well, as the saying goes, if you can’t beat your enemy, join him. Therefore, having proven its weakness in the face of the restoration of Thomism which the popes supported, humanism has managed to avoid a direct clash with traditional theology and has especially sought to cover itself up with the authority of St. Thomas. In this matter the defection of Maritain was particularly important.

The great good news of the Council, then, was the fine-tuning of a perfectly balanced formula for supposedly-Catholic humanism. It is a balance of opposing forces whose tension grows as they grow in strength. But whoever believes that their intention to remain in the Church is not sincere or not effective is mistaken. It is, so much so that despite the crisis of authority that the Church suffers today, that intention led to the swift election of Benedict XVI, the pope of “continuity with Tradition.”

3. Conclusion

The humanism of Vatican II has its proper subject in the Church because, as in all humanism, its driving forces are unhinged Christian notions; but, unlike older versions of humanism, it is fully alert to the fact that if it wishes to live, it must not let itself be separated from the Church. Hence its convinced intention to accommodate itself to her dogmas and discipline. And like all humanism, it is essentially anthropocentric, but it is distinguished because not only does it not deny God (there had already been non-atheistic humanism), not only does it not deny Christ (there were already Christian humanisms), but it purports to place the Catholic Church itself at the service of man.

In conclusion, the new form of humanism introduced to the Church by the Second Vatican Council is Catholic in that it lives from the power of the Church, but anti-Catholic as regards its aim. It is very similar to a cancer, which lives and grows by the life-force of the organism it inhabits, and tends to kill it.[25] Just as a tumor that grows in the brain is called “cerebral,” even so we call conciliar humanism “Catholic.”

III. A NEW EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY

(EFFICIENT CAUSE)

1. The modern reinvention of authority

In a diagrammatic way—which would require a lot of explanations—we may say that the humanist movement arose as a movement of rejection of authority. It was born in the fourteenth century as a liberation from the doctrinal authority of the Church, liberating faith by recourse to Scriptural sources without the glosses of theologians, and liberating reason by returning to pagan philosophy and literature. In this destructive task the pendular movement between the voluntary formalism of Duns Scotus and the simplistic nominalism of Brother William of Ockham had a particularly strong effect. As was inevitable, this led to freeing oneself from the disciplinary authority of the Church too. The Christian kings were among the first to do this (Philip the Fair), aiding the general spread of this movement in the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century by their example. The process of liberation could not stop there, either. In the seventeenth century Descartes freed himself, by his “method of doubt,” from all previous doctrinal authorities, be they Christian theologians or pagan philosophers, and began to think without that reverential respect for tradition which had characterized man from ancient times up to that point. And as it did not cease to progress, a century later, enlightened humanists beheaded their kings to free themselves from the disciplinary authority of the Christian political order as well.

But, as no society can exist without authority, in the measure that the concept and reality of the authority upheld by the Church was destroyed, there came the attempt to create a new form of authority, which we may call modern. If we place the origins of this process in Marsilius of Padua and its fullness in Machiavelli, we believe we are not too far from the mark. The former inverted the relationship between political and ecclesiastical power in the temporal order, justifying the existence of a political authority liberated, above all, from its subordination to the magisterium of the Church. Machiavelli would bring this process to completion, freeing the exercise of power from any subordination to doctrinal principles. He reverses the relationship between speculative and practical order. Now, the Machiavellian exercise of power—which can ill be named authority—requires some justification for the ingenuous, and thus the sophism of democracy was created. This is a mask which conceals a power with neither doctrinal principles nor moral responsibility.

Vatican Council II signaled the adoption of the modern method of exercise of power on the part of ecclesiastical authority, the only one that still retained the exercise of a true authority. Thus, along with her fell all the political authorities that were laboriously trying to sustain themselves in a more traditional exercise, for they were strengthened by the moral and doctrinal backing of the Church.

2. A new hierarchy for a “new Christianity”

Liberal humanism rejected the authority of a Church that supposedly placed man at God’s service, in such a way that it ended by scorning human values, impeding their influence on the temporal order. But the new humanism—as we have said—not only proved, with its experience of the divisions of Protestantism, the necessity of a certain authority to maintain unity in a religious community, but also most painfully proved with the two World Wars the necessity of the Church to maintain order among the nations. Liberalism had failed; thus it was necessary to put forth a new way of exercising authority that would permit that Christ reign again over persons and peoples, which was not far to seek, as it would suffice to translate to the ecclesiastical hierarchy the democratic model of modern political powers. In the Council, this proposal of the new humanism, placing the Church at the service of man to reach a “new Christianity,” triumphed and was put into action.

Let us observe that we fundamentalist Catholics cannot fully understand the Catholic character of this new humanism, and identify it with classic liberalism and no more, but it is not exactly so. In the face of the universal triumph of the modern revolution, traditional anti-liberalism had all but despaired of the social kingship of Our Lord, especially discouraged by the policy of ralliement adopted by the ecclesiastical hierarchy of the last century.[26] Now, to be sure, wishing to be faithful to the pontifical directives, the new humanism is also anti-liberal and seeks to restore the social kingship of Our Lord Jesus Christ, and does so—as it believes—with a more intelligent and optimistic realism. We must understand that fundamental humanists feel that they are the true “Cristeros” of modern society.

To undergo the transformation required by the new humanism, it would be enough for the ecclesiastical hierarchy to become aware that their function is not dominion but rather service. If God Himself, exemplar of all authority, placed all creation and its government at the service of man—as humanism understands it, as we explained in speaking of the last ends—with still greater reason should the hierarchy of the Church place itself at the service of man. Did not Our Lord say: “You know that the princes of the Gentiles lord it over them; and they that are the greater, exercise power upon them. It shall not be so among you: but whosoever will be the greater among you, let him be your minister: and he that will be first among you, shall be your servant. Even as the Son of man is not come to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a redemption for many” (Mt. 20:25-28)?

3. Authority and the common good

The exercise of authority, certainly, should not be transformed into an absolute dominion by which men are made to serve the common good of the group which has taken over the resources of the government, as though this group were God. But neither can authority be considered as the majordomo at the service of the particular good of each of the children of the house. Authority is made to sacrificially serve the common good which, in the case of human authority, is higher than itself and all the members of the community. Jesus Christ has shown us how the exercise of authority requires the greatest humility and even the sacrifice of one’s own life, but even when He set Himself to the most menial task, He never undermined His authority: “You call me Master and Lord, and you say well, for so I am. If I, then, have washed your feet, being your Lord and Master, you also must wash each other’s feet” (Jn. 13:13). The popes had a clear idea of authority and the common good when, without stepping down from the Chair of St. Peter, they declared themselves “Servants of the servants of God.”

Indeed, one of the requirements of the new humanism’s Catholicism consists of not abandoning—despite all the difficulties that it implies—dialogue with traditional thought and the reinterpretation of its doctrines. Those who took the liberty of thinking of a break with tradition, ended by being separated from the Church. The new humanism, then, believes it is necessary to cling to what Benedict XVI called the “hermeneutic of continuity.” This requirement forces the new thinkers to give some interpretation to the traditional ideas of authority and common good, despite that their manner of thinking leads them, rather, to be free of them. And it is surprising that authors of such different formation as the Thomist Jacques Maritain and the Jesuit Gaston Fessard, formed in dialogue with Hegel and existentialism, should end in very similar positions.[27]

But perhaps, we should not be so surprised, because the essence of the possible solution is unique and simple. We have seen that the exaggeration of the dignity of the human person leads to the inversion of its relationship to the common good, subordinating the latter to the former. So, there is no need to go further, for as all agree that authority is understood with a view to the common good, authority will also be subordinated to the person by some sort of democracy.

4. Conclusion

The success of integral humanism, fruit of its sincere and persevering will to remain Catholic, consisted in not having opposed the hierarchical power but, on the contrary, having offered itself to it as a mediator in its conflicts with the modern world, even unto persuading it that it had transformed according to its counsel, in which it completely succeeded in the Second Vatican Council. Here, with audacity and determination, the humanists began to put into practice the strategy of the “new Christianity,” putting into play not only the power of Christian ideas, but also the immense power of the pope and the ecclesiastical hierarchy.[28]

IV. WHAT CONCILIAR HUMANISM FORMALLY IS

The personalist inversion that places God at man’s service, and thus the Church, also leads to inverting the relationship between grace and nature, valuing the former only because it perfects the latter. That part of man which is promoted is the dignity that comes from his strictly human values, in particular his liberty; hence this humanism ends in a naturalism likely to crush all Christian dogmas in its mill-stones.

Thus—as we said at the beginning—the Council has committed, in a social manner and with official character, the same sin that the religious commits who ceases to live for Christ and begins to gaze only on himself. Indeed, Paul VI and John Paul II defined the Council several times as a “self-awareness” that the Church was reaching,[29] as though She had forgotten herself until that point. Though this manner of speaking responds to the psychologism of modern thought, it does not cease to have a foundation in reality. The true religious must live by forgetting self and turning completely to Our Lord, and his vocation falls into danger when he begins to pay attention to himself. This very sin was that of the Council: to abandon orientation toward God and turn a satisfied gaze on its own humanity, beautified by the gifts of God. Yes, it is true that our humanity is made in the image of God; but woe to us if our heart stops at the image and does not continue on toward the Creator! This and none other was the sin that damned Lucifer!

If we look well, even as the Catholic religion is very properly called “Christianity,” in the same way the conciliar religion merits the name of “humanism.”

Catholicism consists of a religious attitude which orients all things to Jesus Christ, in that He is “the Image of the invisible God, First-born of all creation, for in Him were all things created” (Col. 1:15), rendering worship to God “per Ipsum, et cum Ipso, et in Ipso—through Him and with Him and in Him” (Roman Canon). Although Christ is God and man, and as man He facilitates our access to the knowledge and love of God, “ut dum visibiliter Deum cognoscimus, per hunc in invisibilium amorem rapiamur; that, knowing God visibly, we might by this be swept up in the love of the invisible” (Preface of Christmas), nonetheless our religion is not idolatrous, because the humanity of Our Lord is assumed in the Person of the Word, consubstantial Image of the divinity. Thus our religion is certainly Christianity, because the worship of Christ is the worship of God in Himself.

Formally considered, the conciliar innovation consists of a religious attitude that reorients all things to man, insofar as he is image of God and first-born of all creation, because—according to the inversion of personalism—all things were created for him. The human person would be as it were the product and emanation of the divine Persons in which God is realized as Creator; so that the Council teaches us to render homage to man, because supposedly through him, with him and in him we would find God glorified. This is why it is very exact to call the conciliar religion humanism, as much as the Catholic religion is called Christianity. Jesus Christ Himself—as will be seen—is esteemed by the Council as perfect Man and not so much because He is God. The only thing we have to clarify is that, unlike Christianity, conciliar humanism is idolatrous, because the humanity adored by the Council is not in hypostatic union with the Godhead.

If we consider, then, the mode of religion introduced by the Council according to its proper form, we must say that it is a new religion that adores man as the supreme reality of the creation and the Creator. In a nutshell, what we have here is the Religion of Man.

V. CONCLUSION

Formally considered, the modality impressed upon the Church by the Second Vatican Council is a new religion. It has as its final end to render homage to the dignity of the human person, in which it coincides with atheistic humanism; but, unlike the latter, it finds in man a transcendent value as a living image of the Godhead, which would crown God as Creator. In this venture all the riches of the Church have been squandered as matter—not only its doctrines and institutions, but even the nobility of its most ingenious sons—by way of a subtle anthropocentric redirection, a task prepared with long-suffering patience by the “modernism” which St. Pius X condemned at the beginning of the last century, and by the “new theology,” condemned by Pius XII until the 1950s. And if this transformation could be imposed on the Church, it was because the ecclesiastical hierarchy itself was used as an agent, modified for the purpose according to the Machiavellian principles of modern democracy.

C. The Most Notorious Properties of the Conciliar Spirit

Once something has been defined and its causes pointed out, it is usually easy to explain some of its properties, especially the most obvious ones. Regarding the work of the Second Vatican Council, several interesting properties spring to view, but we believe it will suffice to highlight three that seem to us to occupy a principal place. The most notorious quality of the conciliar religion is, we believe, its optimism. From this follows another quality which we might name the inclusivity of the conciliar mind. And lastly, we must refer to a third trait which is attributed to it often and in many ways: novelty.

I. THE OPTIMISM OF NEW HUMANISM

1. An optimist Council

In the opening address of October 11th, 1962, John XXIII proposed that optimism be the defining mark of his Council:

- Optimism in the face of modernity, which contributed to the liberty of the Church: “those who in modern times see nothing but prevarication and ruin” are “souls that, though ardently zealous, are lacking in prudence and judgment” (no. 9). “We feel that We must disagree with these prophets of doom, who are always proclaiming worse disasters as though the end of the world were at hand.” “In the present state of affairs, in which a new order of human relationships can be appreciated,” we can easily recognize the intervention of Providence “wisely arranging everything, even adverse human fortune, for the Church’s good” (no. 10), especially in that “this new state of affairs has at least one undeniable advantage: it has eliminated the innumerable obstacles erected by worldly men to impede the Church’s freedom of action” (no. 11).

- Optimism before the hierarchy, without failing in doctrine: “Nor are we here primarily to discuss certain fundamentals of Catholic doctrine, or to restate in greater detail the traditional teaching of the Fathers and of early and more recent theologians. We presume that these things are sufficiently well known and familiar to you all. There was no need to call a council merely to hold discussions of that nature” (no. 14).

- Optimism in the face of errors, which disappear easily: “In these days, which mark the beginning of this Second Vatican Council, it is more obvious than ever before that the Lord’s truth is indeed eternal. As time passes, we see that human ideologies change, mutually excluding each other, and errors often vanish as quickly as they came, fading away like mist before the sun” (No. 15).

- Optimism about the faithful, whose dignity is incorruptible: “The Church has always opposed these errors, and has frequently condemned them with the greatest severity. In our time, however, the Bride of Christ prefers the balm of mercy to the arm of severity. She believes that we must remedy those in need by showing them the validity of Her sacred doctrine, rather than condemning them. There is no lack of false doctrines, opinions, and dangerous concepts which must be forestalled and dispelled; but such errors are in such evident contrast with rightness and goodness, and have given such poisonous fruit, that already men show every inclination to condemn them of their own accord, and especially those ways of life which repudiate God and His Law… Day by day they are more convinced of the supreme value of personal dignity” (no. 15).

- Optimism in the face of unbelievers, who are full of good will: “The unity (of the Church) would seem to shine, as it were, with a threefold ray of supernatural, saving light. There is first of all that unity of Catholics among themselves which must always be kept steadfast and exemplary. There is also a unity of prayer and ardent longing prompting Christians separated from this Apostolic See to aspire to union with us. And finally there is a unity, which consists in the esteem and respect shown for the Catholic Church by members of various non-Christian religions” (no. 17).

- Optimism regarding politics, which shall soon establish peace: “[The Council] will blaze a trail toward the unity of the human race which constitutes the necessary foundation for the earthly realm to be organized in the likeness of the heavenly realm” (no. 18).

- Optimism, finally, about the Council itself: “With the beginning of this Council a new day is dawning on the Church, bathing her in radiant splendor. This is only the dawn, and the first herald of the rising day” (no. 19). “It is true to say that the heavens and the earth are united to celebrate the Council” (no. 20).

And in the closing address, Paul VI proclaimed that the wishes of his predecessor had been fulfilled: “We must recognize that this Council has focused more on the pleasant side of man rather than his unpleasant one. Its attitude was very much and deliberately optimistic. A wave of affection and admiration has flowed from the Council toward the modern world. It has condemned its errors, indeed, because charity demanded it no less than did truth; but for the persons themselves there was only welcome, respect and love. The Council has offered encouraging remedies to the contemporary world in place of depressing diagnoses; instead of dire predictions, messages of hope; its values have not been merely respected, but honored, its ceaseless efforts supported, its aspirations purified and blessed” (no. 9).

2. Historical optimism

Ancient man, who had a vague memory of his origins and had lost the promise of the Redemption, lacked hope in the future. The optimal state of humanity had been at the beginning, when he held the favor of the gods, and whose memory had been preserved in myth. “Traditional [ancient] society was possessed by the nostalgia of a mythical return to its origins, to the primordial era. The future was a threat of dispersal and death… In a truly historical sense, archaic man utterly lacked that faith in the future of humanity that inspires us to hope in the ‘singing mornings’…To the question:—how can man stand history?—the religious reply is always negative: history starts with the fall, the first and essential sin and the sad realm of ephemera. History was born in the loss of paradise and the primordial relationship of man with God.” “Ancient man did not come to know faith in the progressive efforts of mankind, and lacked hope in history. To elude the destructive action of time, he took refuge in the perennial repetition of archetypal myths. History was the kingdom of corruption and death.”[30]

Only the Chosen People could look at history with an optimism founded on the promise of the Redeemer. “The historical attitude of the people of Israel was the first to break the closed circle in which ancient man lived. Israel was born to history under the pressure of the promise of Yahweh. This promise, somewhat vague and imprecise in its beginnings, gathered greater consistency in the historical process of this nation. It announced the time of the Messiah, the King born of the line of David who was to crown the hope of His faithful by giving them a kingdom with no end.”[31]

But God, the good Teacher, in order to raise His people little by little to a greater spiritual maturity, had encouraged their expectations of the Kingdom with earthly promises—as one promises a child a sweet if he says his prayers—which were not false, but should not be interpreted in a carnal manner. Now, those spirits lacking in religious elevation began to forge an idea of the Messianic Kingdom as something totally earthly and temporal, in which they placed above all their hopes of retribution and their envy of the Roman domination. When the Messiah came at last, the chiefs of the Jewish people were caught up in the desire of a worldwide Jewish empire of a political character, which would set Israel at the head of all the nations; and they would not conform to the proposition by Jesus Christ of a dominion purely spiritual, with the definitive institution of the Kingdom of God only after the end of time. And so, they crucified Him.

From the words and example of Jesus Christ, on the other hand, rises no historical optimism, indeed quite the opposite: “When the Son of Man shall come, think ye that He shall find faith upon the earth?” (Lk. 18:8). “There shall be such terrible tribulation then, as there has never been since the beginning of the world until now, nor ever shall be. And if those days were not shortened, none would be saved; but they shall be shortened for the sake of the elect” (Mt. 24:21-22). For the Church will not hope for better, in historical time, than what Christ, Who ended His days on a Cross, received. But if She expects to be crucified by the Antichrist, She is not pessimistic in this expectation, for it will be the moment of returning to Her Redeemer the purest sign of love, which is to lay down one’s life for one’s Friend. What is more, She knows that in this apparent failure of the flesh there is a true triumph of the spirit, and that while She preserves the disposition to martyrdom, the gates of Hell (that is, the corrupting powers of the Enemy) shall never triumph: “In the world ye shall have great tribulations, but have confidence: I have overcome the world” (Jn. 16:33). And what we say of the Church in general must also be said of the faithful Christian in particular—that he does not hope for anything optimal in his own personal history, but only to give the testimony of sacrifice: “I have poured out my life, spent all my future for Thy love, O Jesus! I shall die one day, to the profane eyes of men, like a rose withered forever. But I shall die for Thee, O Child of mine, supreme beauty! O fortunate fate! I wish to demonstrate my love to Thee by scattering my petals” (St. Thérèse of the Child Jesus, six months before dying of tuberculosis).

This is the very attitude which the humanist reaction would reject as pessimistic, wishing to give life and the history of man a more positive vision. For this purpose, it pays more attention to the economy and the temporal ends of politics, thus placing its new hopes closer to the carnalized Jewish hope. The only difference—which shall always be thus?—is in that the restoration of the Kingdom would be the work of no other Messiah than humanity itself. The Judaizing historical optimism was especially accented by the enlightened humanism of the eighteenth century, under the idea of the inevitable “progress” of humankind: “The idea that drove such hopes was the dominant concept, stronger each time it arose after the Renaissance, that human history is moving toward a definite worldly goal in a continually progressive process.”[32] The great theorist of this idea was Hegel, with his Phenomenology of Spirit. Evolutionist hypotheses introduced it into biology, with the unobjectionable authority of the new positive sciences. And Karl Marx would transform it into the driving force of political change. Marxist dialectics demanded personal sacrifice, not to enter personally into the joy of the Kingdom of God, but to prepare the advent in history of the Kingdom of Man, which an ever-future and utopian Humanity would enjoy.

The vision of this historical optimism is nothing but the transposition of Sacred History into the purely human and temporal order. “The modern world was formed in the spiritual context of Christian motives laicized and in a certain way deformed by an orientation of conduct that prefers an economical evaluation of life. The world of history is the only homeland of man. To change our earthly situation according to the exigencies of our material place is the only goal capable of awakening our creative effort. Knowledge will be measured in terms of power over things, and faith in man’s works by its favorable influence in the exercise of his transformative task. Hope, always ruled by faith, cannot transcend the field it points out. It is a hope placed upon progress, with a decidedly historical character and more markedly collective each time it appears.”[33]

3. To the rescue of humanist optimism

Humanism at its outset was Catholic, and although it quickly became Protestant under the Reformation and rationalist with the Enlightenment, there was no lack—as we have said—of Catholic “middle ground” renewals. Historical optimism demonstrates this clearly. One of the many ideas that purported to be reborn with the Renaissance was a more positive view of the future of man, because time is one of its most human values. Three recourses are offered to the theologian so as to manage without ceasing to be Catholic: First: reduce the weight of original sin; second: highlight evangelical progress; third: resurrect millennialism.

First: Along with the consequences of original sin for the individual, who was left wounded in nature and deprived of grace, there follow two more, which join the first to be what the Catechism calls the “enemies of the soul”: the World, the Flesh and the Devil.

- The consequences to the individual, which not even baptism can altogether erase in this life,[34] cause contradictions in man’s state, such that if sanctity is possible for one particular person, it may not be so for an entire society; and though some nations may be more or less Christian, not all of humanity can be. The reason is simple, for when nature is whole, more people are good and fewer are evil, but with our wounded nature, the opposite occurs.[35] And if the argument should seem overly severe, we need only look over the two-thousand-year history of Christendom to realize that it is just.

- As our first fathers sinned by believing Satan over God, they deserved to be handed over to his tyrannical dominion, as criminals to the executioner; a dominion made tremendously easier by relying on the complicity of our voluptuous flesh and the selfish powers of the world.

The humanist theologian will beg us not to demonize spiritual combat over-much, and reduce the individual consequences of sin to a simple deprivation of original justice, thus avoiding an excessively negative view of human nature. As many fall into these excesses, these two points are easy to concede. And thus, no reason is left to deny that there may be societies that are good, albeit pagan.

Second: To this attenuation of original sin we may add not only that there are pessimistic prophecies in Revelation, but that Our Lord also announced that the Gospel would be preached in all the world, that nothing would be denied to those who ask with faith and that the gates of Hell would not prevail. Because alongside the law of the progress of evil, founded on the triumph of Satan on the tree of Paradise, which predicts the progressive weakening of faith and the chilling of charity, there stands also the law of the progress of the Church, built upon the triumph of Christ on the Tree of the Cross. The only thing the optimist theologian needs is to forget that the triumph of the Church happens by participation in the sacrifice of Jesus Christ, and look on history as a progressive approach to the glorious transformation of a Church in which all mankind is generously included.

Third: This re-evaluation of history almost necessarily leads to the resurgence of some kind of millennialism, a Judaizing illusion which has always tempted those who dislike conforming to the reality of things.[36]

With these resources, Catholic theologians can accompany and sustain the ever-flimsy ideologies of progress to a greater or lesser degree. It was Teilhard de Chardin who managed to convert and baptize the most cruel enemy of traditional Catholic theology, the prestigious and scientific evolutionary theory, granting enormous relief to all those who were seeing Catholicism draw farther and farther away from historical progress. Nonetheless, his theo-scientology did not pass unreproached under the eye of the Holy Office, which published a Monitum on his teachings in 1962. Others subscribed to progressivism with more caution, among whom Jacques Maritain stood out as much for his science as for his prudence. His primary operating principle, for which it served him well to be a simple layman and not a Jesuit religious like Teilhard, was to keep a distance between the human sciences and ecclesiastical doctrine. Being a Catholic and a Thomist, he always maintained his position as a philosopher, so Rome remained calm; and with his invention of “Christian philosophy” he was able to methodically laicize revealed truths to support the strategy of integral humanism.[37] Although they are located at the extremes of the progressivist spectrum, Teilhard and Maritain were both—we will not dare say which was more so—venerable Fathers of conciliar optimism.

Nonetheless, the only one that has stubbornly resisted progressivism has been real history, which has always responded with the worst of humor to every attempt at optimism. The Renaissance’s optimism was followed by the Hundred Years’ War between France and England; the Reformation’s optimism was followed by the religious wars of central Europe; the optimism of the Enlightenment was answered by the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars over all Europe, and socialist optimism by the two wars that earned the name of World Wars.[38] And though the true optimist knows that current misery is the herald of happiness to come, having seen the millennium of peace postponed so many times, with a greater sacrifice demanded every time, modern man began to become depressed and tempted to give way to the worst pessimism, inaugurating a new era of post-modernity.

It can be said, then, that the most urgent problem of the last half of the twentieth century consisted of finding the anti-depressant that could rescue the optimism of modern man. Catholic joy astonished the ancients as much as the moderns. While the Church remained in her Father’s house, humanism enjoyed it; but when, like the prodigal son, She went off to foreign lands in the Protestant Reformation, she soon spent all her joy, for it is plain that there can be no joy without the motherhood of the Virgin, without the fatherhood of the Priesthood and without the delight of the Holy Eucharist. But the “new humanism,” that is, the one that would reconcile Catholicism with modernism rather than waiting, like the father of the evangelical parable, for the son to return repentant, wants to open the house for him to come and go with his new friends. And, having managed to put in place a pope conquered for its cause, it set out with Vatican II on an adventure of sophisticated alchemy to offer modernity the positive joy of Catholic riches, totally purified of negative sacrificial spirituality. A project doomed to failure, of course; for the fountain of Christian joy springs at the very foot of the tree of the Cross.

4. The Council’s joy and hope for mankind

The optimism pill which Vatican II has prepared for all of humanity is, as its name suggests, the pastoral constitution Gaudium et Spes, “Joy and Hope.” While it recognizes that there are strong contrasts in the present times, its general judgment—contrary to the judgment of the popes of the last two centuries—is decidedly positive; it consists of a crisis of growth, “accretionis crisis.”[39]

The principal drug of the conciliar medicine may be summed up in the stupid phrase of the 1970’s: “Smile, God loves you.” Because, if the purpose of creation is the glory of God as traditional theology understands it, we have reason for great solemnity, because the Creator could reclaim His glory with an exemplary punishment, for—hard as it is to say—even the men that condemn themselves through their own fault glorify God’s justice. But if the goal of creation is the glory of God as the new theology understands it, that is, the glory and dignity of the human person, there are reasons enough for everyone to smile, because God cannot fail in His goals: there will be no person left without dignity. One consequence, which we may consider metaphysical, of this anthropocentric reversal of the purpose of creation, is the universal salvation of man. Only those who lose their human state could be damned.[40]

As for the results of this treatment, we are already seeing that they have been deadly; for it is terrible for a doctor to confuse the symptoms of a terminal cancer with growing pains. For, as John XXIII’s discourse suggests, in moving from the traditional Catholic vision of human history, tinged, to be sure, with a note of pessimism—because “all the world lies in the power of the Evil One” (I Jn. 5:19) and far more so in the present time—to the senseless conciliar optimism, we would be attempting to change diametrically all the attitudes of the Church, in particular the relationship of the hierarchy to the faithful, to political powers, to other religions and to the world in general.

II. INCLUSIVITY IN THE MIND OF THE COUNCIL

Another trait by which we think the Council may be defined, as it distinguishes it from all the other councils of the Church, is what we call the “inclusivity” of its mind and its language, for until now the ecclesiastical Magisterium tended to think and speak in an “exclusive” manner, which would have jeopardized the desired unity of Christians. This is the thesis which has been upheld to justify the change. Let us, then, briefly explain the motives for which the Council has adopted this method, point out afterwards how it was carried out and, finally, let us make a critical judgment.

1. Damages of scholastic “exclusivity”

Let us hear how the new theologians justify the change of method adopted by the Council in the way of referring to revealed truth. We will not quote any author in particular, but it is more or less how all of them think: The excessive confidence of the Greek spirit in the human logos, fully carried out by Aristotle, would have influenced the scholastic theologians most of all and, through them, on the ecclesiastical Magisterium itself, making them lose sight or at least diminish the dimension of mystery of revealed truths, believing that through distinctions and definitions they could adequately express revealed mysteries. This illusion would not have caused major harm, and would even have had some good in it, if the scholastics had limited themselves to developing a common theological explanation of Revelation, unified rather artificially because in Christian schools only the gnoseological tools of the Greco-Latin tradition were taught, as everyone learned logic with the Isagogé of Porphyrius and theology with the Sententiæ of Peter the Lombard. But it became harmful because even the Magisterium allowed itself to become contaminated, and began to exclude from ecclesiastical communion all that which did not formulate the mysteries of faith with the same distinctions and definitions. Scholastic “exclusivity,” then, consists in the claim that whoever does not think of, and express, revealed mysteries with the precise distinctions and definitions of the medieval Schools must be excommunicated as heretical.

During the thousand years of the predominance of Hellenism (until the 13th century), this damage was limited because the whole Christian world thought more or less the same way, although there were still divisions that a greater broadness of spirit might have been able to impede. But the problem became more critical when, in the Renaissance, it began to become clear that Aristotelianism was not the nec plus ultra of the intellect, and the new sciences and new approaches to modern thought began to emerge. The more liberal Catholic theologians quickly began to lose the angelic certainty of their mental outlines. Those, however, who were more involved in the exercise of the hierarchical Magisterium of the Church, that is, the theologians of the Vatican Curia, were more tied down to past customs and more involved in its present decisions, and it is understandable that they should have been much slower in detaching themselves from the restrictive mental armor of scholastic language. This was the very decision taken by the Second Vatican Council during its first sessions, in ridding itself of the schemata laid out by the preparatory commissions, still contaminated by the scholastic goad.

Please understand—they tell us—the traditionalist structure: It was not a matter of setting aside the Aristotelian magisterium to exchange it for the Hegelian. It consisted of recovering the true Catholicity of the hierarchical magisterium, which should consider that the Christian mystery can be expressed in diverse ways according to the cultural diversity of those who receive it in the Faith. Because the mystery of God and of Christ is in itself ineffable, and can never be exhausted by human concepts, there is room to propose a plurality of theological approaches that are not identical, nor exclusive, but complementary. Until Pius XII, the popes had confused the task of the magisterium with that of theologians, setting forth in their encyclicals true treatises of scholastic theology. The function of the ecclesiastical magisterium is to explain Revelation more fully, in a way that can later be explained by some with a Thomist approach and others in a personalist or Kantian conception.

In speaking, then, of the “inclusivity” of the mindset and language of the Council, we refer, firstly, to the breadth of concepts with which it has expressed the Christian message, laying aside the “narrowness” of scholastic technicality; and secondly, the consequent attitude of comprehension before the modern mindset, not excluding it because it handles itself with other concepts but, on the contrary, translating—if we may so call it—the fundamental aspects of Christianity into its tongue.

2. “Inclusivity” in the acts and sayings of the Council

Since the convocation of the Council, John XXIII set “inclusivity” as the forma mentis which would distinguish this Council from all the others. This would be the first council that was “pastoral” rather than dogmatic. It is true that every previous council wished to be pastoral, because they were always convened to solve the problems of the faithful flock; but the shepherds of old believed that their first care was to feed their sheep with the grass of sound doctrine, and set to defining dogmas and anathematizing. This would be the first council of a new type of shepherds, who did not gather to define doctrines[41] nor to condemn anyone’s opinion,[42] but to remove the strait-jacket of scholasticism from the Gospel message,[43] returning to it the inclusive amplitude that was needed to once again embrace in unity all those children whom ancient scholasticism had excluded from the Church of Christ.[44]

The Roman Curia did not understand the pope’s wishes and prepared a set of schemata still overly impregnated with scholastic quasi-rationalism. They had to give place to a group of Rhine theologians who gave this new fashion to the Council documents. Let us point out some of the characteristics of this new methodology:

- The language of Sacred Scripture is preferred to language of philosophical origin, whence there is a multitude of quotes on every page.

- When new concepts, such as sacrament, the paschal mystery, ecumenism, collegiality, etc. are explained, there is no attempt to bind them with a definition.

- When a notion is explained, it is done in various ways. For example, Lumen Gentium defines the Church under the concepts of a sacrament, the Kingdom, the Mystical Body, the People of God, etc.

- Insofar as possible, exclusive scholastic distinctions are avoided, such as those between nature and grace, power of order and jurisdiction, etc.

- Broad expressions that offer a margin for a plurality of interpretations are sought after.

This new way of thinking and speaking became more and more marked in the post-conciliar magisterium, above all in the ecumenical dialogues that were set up with practically all non-Catholic religious groups. If to all this we add the infinite patience of the ecclesiastical authorities to remain in dialogue ad intra et ad extra of the Church, without hastening to finish any discussion, we end up with the vast “inclusivity” which, alas, was the notion of Catholic truth acquired with the Council.

3. Conciliar “inclusivity” is nothing but subjectivism and ambiguity

Scholasticism is not one manner of thinking among many, but rather the necessary clarity of spirit to enlighten all human reality with revealed truth and defend the Faith from all deceit. It is not the contingent “inculturation” of the Gospel into the Greco-Roman tradition, but the purified incorporation of the universal values which were so lavishly found in Greek thought. The only thing that the traditional Magisterium excluded from the Church was the infection of heresy which would have done away with the flock.

Today, forty years after Vatican II, when in all this time the only authority, the one obligatory reference for all reflection within the Church have been the conciliar documents, Benedict XVI tells us that the true interpretation of the mind of the Council has yet to be found. Evidently the problem is not only in the interpreters, but in the texts themselves, which are not “inclusive” but ambiguous. Their architects laid out in them the modernist doctrine which breaks completely with the traditional doctrine of the Church, with sufficient ambiguity for it to also endure an interpretation in apparent continuity with Tradition, an ambiguity which was made easy for them through the intrinsic vagueness of modern subjectivism. As we have amply explained elsewhere,[45] what we have here called the “inclusivity” of the conciliar mindset is nothing but skeptical subjectivism and Machiavellian ambiguity.

The only thing we can say in defense of those who imprinted this mode of action on the Council, is that it was a poison that had been wearing down Christianity for centuries, and perhaps they were infected in the very seminaries where they were formed. Although it is a very relative defense, because—how often the previous popes had warned of it!

III. CONCILIAR INNOVATIONS

1. A new era for humanity

If we consider the work of the Council, we see the seal of novelty impressed on all its works. We have had a new Ordo Missæ and a new liturgy, a new Code and a new Catechism, a new evangelization and new ecclesial movements, a new magisterium and, finally, a new Church. But it seems clear that, to the Council itself, the beginning and source of this novelty was not located in the Church proper, but in humanity, which was entering a new epoch.

The Constitution Gaudium et Spes, which treats of the relationship of the Church with the current world, when it begins to describe the “situation of man in today’s world,” never tires of using the adjective “new.” “Today, the human race is involved in a new stage of history. Profound and rapid changes are spreading by degrees around the whole world. Triggered by the intelligence and creative energies of man, these changes recoil upon him, upon his decisions and desires, both individual and collective, and upon his manner of thinking and acting with respect to things and to people. Hence, we can already speak of a true cultural and social transformation, one which has repercussions on man’s religious life as well (no. 4).” “New and more efficient media of social communication are contributing to the knowledge of events…; ‘socialization’ brings further ties” (no. 6). “Finally, these new conditions have their impact on religious life” (no. 7); “new social relationships between the sexes” (no. 8); “the number constantly swells of the people who raise the most basic questions or recognize them with a new sharpness” (no. 10). Further on it speaks of a nova ætate of humanity: “the circumstances of the life of modern man have been so profoundly changed in their social and cultural aspects, that we can speak of a new age of human history” (no. 54). And although it does not fail to point out the defects and dangers of this New Era, its evaluation of it cannot but be optimistic: “Throughout the whole world there is a mounting increase in the sense of autonomy as well as of responsibility. This is of paramount importance for the spiritual and moral maturity of the human race. This becomes clearer if we consider the unification of the world and the duty which is imposed upon us, that we build a better world based upon truth and justice. Thus, we are witnesses of the birth of a new humanism” (no. 55).

The Church cloaked herself in novelty in the measure in which she adapted to the new epoch, in fulfillment of the mission of aggiornamento which John XXIII gave the Council.

2. A new incarnation of the Church

“Evangelizo vobis gaudium magnum, I announce to you a great joy” (Lk. 2:10). The “good news” of the Council wants to be a renewal of the Gospel, that is, the announcement of the Incarnation: unto you is born again a Savior! Just as the world rejoiced because the Word left the peace of heaven to become man and save us; even so it should rejoice today because the Church, which in the Middle Ages seemed to have left the world behind in its celestial loftiness, came back to being human to fulfill her function as mediatrix between the world and God. The Council says to the world: Ecce venio, behold I come. “Be glad and rejoice, O daughter of Zion, for behold I come and shall dwell in the midst of thee” (Zach. 2:10); “thou didst not demand a holocaust for sin, therefore I said: behold, I come” (Ps. 39:7-8). Hence John XXIII could be compared to the Precursor,[46] who prepared the paths for the entrance into the world of a truly human Church.[47]

Being incarnated in modern humanity, through a new “communication of idioms,”[48] the Church has not lost her divine attributes but has acquired those of modernity. We may summarize the former in “transcendency” and the latter in “democracy.” And in this way, she may finally fulfill her mediatory mission, achieving that this world, which through democracy has become more human, should relate to God, opening itself up to transcendency. Chapter IV of Gaudium et Spes speaks of the mutual joys which are expected from this humanist espousal between the modern world and the Church.[49]

D. Division of Our Study on Conciliar Innovations

When studying something, the right method demands that we follow a double movement in a sort of inverse path: we have to go first from the whole to the parts, and then from the parts to the whole. In this first chapter we have fulfilled the first movement of resolution or analysis, climbing from the general description of what the Council was, given its definition, to its formal parts, which are its causes. Only now may we take on the explanation of what the Council taught and did, following a movement of composition, for which we shall first consider the simple elements and later the composite ones, for which we needed to have the general causes set forth.

We shall consider, then, firstly the new man born of the Council (Chapter II). Then we shall move on to studying the new Church which results from this new man (Chapter III). And lastly, the new relationship of man and the Church with God, asking if we may truly and properly speak of a new religion (Chapter IV).

[1] P. Álvaro Calderón, La lámpara bajo el celemín. Cuestión disputada sobre la autoridad del magisterio eclesiástico desde el Concilio Vaticano II, Ed. Río Reconquista, Buenos Aires, 2009.

[2] Dictionary of the Real Academia Española.

[3] Paul VI, address at the closing session of the Second Vatican Council, December 7, 1965.

[4] Official translation from Address of Pope Paul VI during the last general meeting of the Second Vatican Council: http://www.vatican.va/content/paul-vi/en/speeches/1965/documents/hf_p-vi_spe_19651207_epilogo-concilio.html. Accessed 01/21/2020. Emphasis added.

[5] Jacques Maritain, Humanisme Integral, Aubier, Paris, 1936, Introduction, pp. 14–15: “Considering Western humanism in its contemporary forms, apparently more emancipated from all metaphysics of transcendence, it becomes clear that if a remnant of the common conception of human dignity, of liberty, of disinterested values subsists in it, it is the legacy of ideas formerly Christian, now secularized. […] A fine occasion for Christians to reduce matters to the truth, reintegrating to the fullness of their original source their hopes of justice and longings for communion, fed by the pain of the world and disoriented in spirit; thus resurrecting a cultural and temporal force of Christian inspiration, capable of acting on history and helping mankind. A healthy social philosophy and a healthy philosophy of modern history would be necessary for this. Then Christians would work on substituting for the inhuman regime that is perishing before our eyes, a new regime of civilization that is characterized by an integral humanism and that, for them, would represent a new Christianity, no longer sacred but secular, as we have tried to show in the studies here collected. This new humanism, without a common ground with bourgeois humanism and the more human in that it does not adore mankind, but really and effectively respects human dignity and recognizes the right to the integral demands of the individual, we conceive as oriented toward a social-temporal realization of that evangelical attention to the human, which must not only exist in the spiritual order, but become incarnate, tending to the ideal of a fraternal communion (Humanismo Integral, translation by A. Mendizábal, Ediciones Ercilla, Santiago de Chile 1947; retranslated I. de E., 2020)

The first title of the Compendium of Social Doctrine of the Church, by the Pontifical Council on Justice and Peace, published in 2004, defines it: “An integral and solidary humanism.”

[6] Cf. Jacques Maritain, Humanisme Intégral, ch. I: “La Tragédie de l’Humanisme.”

[7] Paul VI, discourse at the closing session of the Second Vatican Council, December 7, 1965. As we know, Paul VI is quoting Maritain.

[8] Paul VI, discourse at the closing session of the Second Vatican Council, December 7, 1965.

[9] I, q. 5, a. 1: “The essence of good consists in something being desirable. The Philosopher says in I Ethics 4 that good is that which all desire. It is evident that something desirable is so insofar as it is perfect, because all desire their own perfection.”

[10] Cf. I, q. 44, a. 4.

[11] We will continue to see how all the conciliar transpositions are made in hiding under the splendor of high theological truths, traditional but difficult to understand.

[12] Comisión Teológica Internacional (CTI), “Dignidad y Derechos de la Persona Humana” (1983), in Documents 1969-1996, BAC 1998, p. 322: “Especially in the field of philosophy, the International Theological Commission wishes to note the propaedeutic and explanatory aids which may be found in the current trends of personalism.”

[13] The absolute distinction between people and things, first given by existentialists, is characteristic of personalist thought: “Existentialism expresses a reaction against positivism, a reaction which may be categorized as personalist in the broader sense, although the motto of existentialists is ‘existence’ rather than ‘person.’ They describe man as existing in the literal sense, as standing out from the backdrop of nature; and they emphasize the difference between the human person and the things of nature which man uses. The existentialist draws a rigorous line of demarcation between the Umwelt, the world of things and objects, and the Mitwelt, or world of persons” (F. Copleston, Contemporary Philosophy, Herder, 1959, p. 171).

[14] Cf. Charles de Koninck, De la Primauté du Bien Commun Contre les Personnalistes: Le Principe de l’Ordre Nouveau, Éd. Université Laval, Québec, 1943. Éd. Fides, Montreal, 1943, 195 pages.

[15] Cf. I, q. 5, a. 6: “The thing desired that terminates the movement of the appetite relatively, as a means by which something tends towards another, is called the useful; but that sought after as the last thing absolutely terminating the movement of the appetite, as a thing towards which for its own sake the appetite tends, is called the virtuous; for the virtuous is that which is desired for its own sake.”

[16] Roman Catechism, Part 4, Chapter 10.

[17] “God made Jesus sanctification unto us”: referring to us, as to subjects who may participate in the sanctity of Jesus Christ, but He is not subordinated to us as a means is to the end.

[18] Étienne Gilson, L’Esprit de la Philosophie Médiévale, 2nd edition, Vrin, Paris 1948. Cf. c. X: Le Personnalisme Chrétien (p. 194-213).

[19] Jacques Maritain, Humanisme Intégral, Aubier, Paris, 1936, p. 14.

[20] This is the explanation given by Rubén Calderón Bouchet, who marks the difference between belonging to the ecclesiastical or the civil society. Often, he speaks of the Church as of a “society of persons.” Cf. La Arcilla y el Hierro, Nueva Hispanidad 2002, p. 198).

[21] Rubén Calderón Bouchet, “Religión y Sociedad,” in Cuadernos de La Reja n. 3, p. 20: “Is there any idea, revolutionary as it may seem to us, that is not a Christian idea thrown off its religious center? This truth appears when we approach, with however little intelligence, to study the unfolding of our history; and the revolutionaries will not be the ones to deny this assertion, because they are always pointing out that those things that Christianity promises for an illusory ‘someday,’ they will achieve on earth, no matter how much the structures of our coexistence are changed.”

[22] Pope St. Leo, Sermon I De Nativitate Domini, Lesson VI of Christmas Matins.

[23] It is the typical reaction which occurs, for example, in so many liberal families whose sons enter into Freemasonry but prefer that their wives be pious and their daughters be educated in convent schools.

[24] T. Urdanoz O. P., Historia de la Filosofía, Vol. IV, BAC 1991, p. 645: “The ‘Rosminian spirit’ represents the moderately liberal and renovating movement of philosophy and culture in accordance with the demands of the modern spirit, always maintaining the supremacy of the spiritual values of Christianity.”

[25] It is not exactly a parasite, because it is not a distinct organism from its host. It is a subversion of Catholicism itself.

[26] The policy of ralliement, which could be translated as “policy of accordism,” is the name for the prudential strategy that the popes upheld before the governments born of the Revolution, by which they preferred not to confront them but rather recognize their more than arguable legitimacy, believing this attitude of diplomatic friendliness was better for the Church than open war. There were two moments in which we could clearly appreciate that this strategy was catastrophic—with the ralliement of Pope Leo XIII to the Republic in France, and the condemnation of Action Française by Pius XI. But it was a constant attitude of Rome—with the exception of St. Pius X—which led to the Ostpolitik of Paul VI. This last may certainly be considered as one of the most important immediate causes of the Council. Philippe Prévost writes the history of this process in his important work L’Église et le Ralliement: Histoire d’Une Crise 1892-2000 (C. E. C. Paris 2001, 437 pages), in which we might wish that he had better highlighted the important difference between the prudential error which the popes until Pius XII committed, and the doctrinal error into which they fell later. But we must admit to the author that the former error led to the present, in discrediting the anti-revolutionary Catholics and, above all, in leaving the Church sown with the tares of the liberal bishops.

[27] Gaston Fessard, Autorité et Bien Commun, Aubier, Paris 1944, 122 pp. This little book, rediscovered after the Council and reedited in 1969, is the result of some conferences given for the magazine “Esprit,” founded by E. Mounier and J. Lacroix, which disseminated Christian personalism before and during the Second World War.

[28] The manner of achieving this is analyzed in Chapter III.

[29] Cf. P. de la Rocque, “Vatican II, Voix de la Conscience Ecclésiale,” in Autorité et Réception du Concile Vatican II, 4th Paris Symposium, 2005, pp. 169–196.

[30] R. Calderón Bouchet, Esperanza, Historia y Utopía, Dictio, Buenos Aires 1980, p. 32 and 183.

[31] Ibid., p. 34

[32] M. Schmaus, Teología Dogmática. VII. Los Novísimos, 2nd ed. RIALP, Madrid 1965, p. 42. Cf. R. Calderón Bouchet, Esperanza, Historia y Utopía, p. 79: “Reading the book of John Bury titled The Idea of Progress, confirms an old suspicion which, despite its religious origins, reaches its full power only in the era of the ‘Enlightenment.’ The process of secularization which Latin civilization suffered after the ever-swifter triumph of the capitalist spirit displaces the hope of mankind in the supernatural order to the natural, and nourishes, as a consequence of the prodigious triumphs of technology, the conviction that we must sustain a perfective effort in the economic dominion of reality.”

[33] R. Calderón Bouchet, Esperanza, Historia y Utopía, p. 184. Cf. Schmaus, op. cit., p. 50: “These and other images of the future are the secular progeny and, so to speak, illegitimate children and incapable of legitimating the Christ hope in the future. That which, according to the Christian revelation, is a transcendent figure of the future is promised by them as the final state within the world and within history. But the true and legitimate hope in the future has degenerated into utopia and fanaticism. The conviction of a never-ending progress, far from being confirmed by experience, is denied by it. It reveals rather that men tend to destroy themselves.” Schmaus is a conservative liberal which we include among the “middle-road humanists” (or rather center-left). It seems to us that he has had a similar and symmetrical importance to that of Cardinal Journet (center-right). The latter offered a Thomistic theology open to the modern thought, whereas the former offered a modern theology which was not closed to the traditional thought.

[34] Cf. III, q. 69, a. 3.

[35] I, q. 23, a. 7 ad 3. “The good that is proportionate to the common state of nature is to be found in the majority; and is wanting in the minority. The good that exceeds the common state of nature is to be found in the minority and is wanting in the majority. Thus it is clear that the majority of men have a sufficient knowledge for the guidance of life; and those who have not this knowledge are said to be half-witted or foolish; but they who attain to a profound knowledge of things intelligible are a very small minority in respect to the rest. Since their eternal happiness, consisting in the vision of God, exceeds the common state of nature, and especially in so far as this is deprived of grace through the corruption of original sin, those who are saved are in the minority. In this especially, however, appears the mercy of God, that He has chosen some for that salvation, from which very many in accordance with the common course and tendency of nature fall short.”

[36] This psychological justification seems to us to contain a great deal of truth. Millennialism encouraged Jewish nationalism in the face of the humiliating Roman rule. If millennialism continued to live through the first centuries of Christianity, it was in great part to hold up in the face of persecutions, although it had the justification of the true promises of Christ regarding the triumph of the Gospel. If the millennial dream reappeared in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, taking up the ideas of the Enlightened abbot Gioacchino da Fiore, it was out of inconformity with the state of the Church and in particular the ecclesiastical hierarchy. “[For the Talmud (Arac. Sanh. 97)], reasoning that the world had been created in six days followed by a day of rest, the world would last seven divine days, each one lasting a thousand years; that is to say, seven thousand years, divided thus: two thousand before the Law given by God to Moses; two thousand under Mosaic Law, and two thousand more under the Messiah, and as a rest there would be a thousand years in the temporal kingdom of the just with the Messiah” (Encyclopedia of the Catholic Religion, Barcelona 1953, “Millennialism”). According to Gioacchino da Fiore, the four thousand years of the Old Testament were the age of the Father, the time of wedded couples; then came the age of the Son, the time of the clergy, which he thought was ending in his era, but to which we may assign the two thousand years of the Talmud; and finally, as the prophecies of John Paul II might make us think, comes the millennium of the Holy Ghost, which Gioacchino thought would be the time of spiritual monks, but it seems we should consider the “new age,” inaugurated by Vatican II, of the laymen tired of the clericalism of the previous two thousand years. The “new theology” has been very attentive to this ancient monk. Henri de Lubac dedicated a two-volume essay to “the intellectual legacy of Gioacchino da Fiore.”

[37] Although this judgment of Maritain seems important to us and we realize that what we have said cannot be understood fully without a greater explanation, we do not want to expand too much in what professes to be a synthesis. Let us, then, illustrate the sentence with an example. In his pamphlet On the Philosophy of History, Maritain establishes the idea of “double progress” as the first “functional law” of history. With the parable of the wheat and the cockle, which are permitted to grow together until the harvest day, he points out the theological law of the double progress of good and evil which we mentioned in the previous paragraphs. But with his method of “Christian philosophy” he justifies the transposition of this revealed law to a supposedly mundane-philosophical order:

“What I would like to gradually emphasize is that the parable of the wheat and tares has a universal significance for the world as much as for the kingdom of grace. And we must say, from the philosophical point of view, that the progression of societies throughout time depends on this law of double movement—which could be called, in this instance, the law of deterioration, on the one hand, and of revitalization, on the other, of the energy of history, or of the welter of human activity on which depends the movement of history—While the use of time and the passivity of matter naturally dissipate and deteriorate the things of this world, the energy of history, the creative forces which are proper to the spirit and to liberty and which are its proofs, and which normally are applied by the effort of a few, constantly revitalize the quality of this energy. In this way the life of human society advances and progresses at the cost of many losses. It advances and progresses thanks to the revitalization and super-elevation of the energy of history springing from human spirit and liberty. But at the same time, this energy of history deteriorates and dissipates due to the passivity of matter. However, that which is spiritual is, in this same sense, above time, and exempt from aging. And, certainly, in certain periods of history it has been the deteriorating movement that prevails and predominates, and in other periods, the movement of progress. My point of view is that both exist at the same time in one way or another” (Filosofía de la Historia, Troquel, Buenos Aires 1971, pp. 53–54. Emphases are ours).

Theological “double progress” is a well-founded law, for it has as its principles, as we have said, the consequences of original sin on the one hand, and the healing grace of Christ on the other. But Maritain declares this law valid only for the Platonic “kingdom of grace” which only a theologian can appreciate. For the “world” of the philosopher he proposes a symmetrical law whose principles are “the passivity of matter” and “the energy of history springing from human spirit and liberty,” that is, the (dialectical?) opposition between matter (or necessity) and spirit (or liberty). And we ask ourselves: Is “the energy of history that springs from the spirit” the grace of Christ, or are there “a few” spirits that did not contract original sin? But it seems we are at fault in mixing theology and philosophy. With his permanence within the limits of philosophy, Maritain saves himself a Monitum from the Holy Office, and holds up Hegel with his left hand and St. Thomas with his right, in a rather schizophrenic double standard. He is mad but not stupid, because he keeps the ace of the law of the progress of evil up his left sleeve, so as to whip it out when the law of freedom of conscience does not work. He is a progressivist prepared for any challenge.

[38] It may be feared that the global Masonic optimism canonized by Vatican II will be followed by the nuclear holocaust.

[39] Gaudium et Spes no. 4: “Today, the human race is involved in a new stage of history. Profound and rapid changes are spreading by degrees around the whole world. Triggered by the intelligence and creative energies of man, these changes recoil upon him, upon his decisions and desires, both individual and collective, and upon his manner of thinking and acting with respect to things and to people. Hence, we can already speak of a true cultural and social transformation, one which has repercussions on man’s religious life as well. As happens in any crisis of growth, this transformation has brought serious difficulties in its wake. Thus, while man extends his power in every direction, he does not always succeed in subjecting it to his own welfare. Striving to probe more profoundly into the deeper recesses of his own mind, he frequently appears more unsure of himself. Gradually and more precisely he lays bare the laws of society, only to be paralyzed by uncertainty about the direction to give it. Never has the human race enjoyed such an abundance of wealth, resources and economic power, and yet a huge proportion of the world’s citizens are still tormented by hunger and poverty, while countless numbers suffer from total illiteracy. Never before has man had so keen an understanding of freedom, yet at the same time new forms of social and psychological slavery make their appearance. Although the world of today has a very vivid awareness of its unity and of how one man depends on another in needful solidarity, it is most grievously torn into opposing camps by conflicting forces.”

[40] This seems to be the state of the damned according to Benedict XVI, in his encyclical Spe Salvi, Nov. 30, 2007: “There may be persons who have totally destroyed in themselves the desire for truth and the disposition toward love. There can be people who have totally destroyed their desire for truth and readiness to love, people for whom everything has become a lie, people who have lived for hatred and have suppressed all love within themselves. This is a terrifying thought, but alarming profiles of this type can be seen in certain figures of our own history. In such people all would be beyond remedy and the destruction of good would be irrevocable: this is what we mean by the word Hell.” It would seem that only Hitler and a few others are in Hell.

[41] John XXIII, address Gaudet Mater Ecclesia at the inauguration of the Council, October 11, 1962, no. 14: “Nor is the primary purpose of our work to discuss some of the chief articles of the Church’s doctrine or to repeat at length what the Fathers and ancient and more recent theologians have handed on, things which we have every right to think are not unknown to you but reside in your minds. To have only such discussions, there would have been no need to call an Ecumenical Council.”

[42] Ibid., no. 15: “[A]s age succeeds age, we see the uncertain opinions of men take one another’s place and new-born errors often vanish as quickly as a mist dispelled by the sun. The Church in every age has opposed these errors and often has even condemned them and indeed with the greatest severity. But at the present time, the spouse of Christ prefers to use the medicine of mercy rather than the weapons of severity.”

[43] Ibid., no. 14: “The Christian, Catholic, and apostolic spirit of the whole world expects a leap forward toward a doctrinal penetration and a formation of consciences in more perfect conformity with fidelity to authentic doctrine, with this doctrine being studied and presented through the forms of inquiry and literary formulation of modern thought.”

[44] Ibid., no. 17–18: “This concern of the Church in promoting and defending the truth derives from the fact that, unless they are assisted by the whole of revealed doctrine, people cannot come to that absolute and most firm unity of minds with which true peace and eternal salvation are linked. Unfortunately, the whole family of Christians has not yet fully and perfectly attained this visible unity in the truth. […] For, if we rightly consider the matter, this very unity which Christ implored for his Church seems to shine with a triple ray of heavenly and salvific light: the unity of Catholics among themselves which must always be kept most firm and as a splendid example; the unity of pious prayers and most ardent desire by which Christians separated from this Apostolic See desire to be linked with us; the unity, finally of esteem and respect for the Catholic Church shown by those who still profess the different non-Christian forms of religion… [Thus, the Church] prepares and consolidates this path toward the unity of the human race.” Let us understand clearly. The pope knows that unity must come from revealed truth, but if it is not offered in broader, more aggiornati concepts, heretics and pagans will always be left out.

[45] Cf. P. Álvaro Calderón, La lámpara bajo el celemín, art. 3 and 4.

[46] Y. Marsaudon, L’Œcuménisme vu Par un Franc-Maçon de Tradition, p. 42.

[47] Attention: the analogy which we have just established between Christ and the Church is not ours at all, but is proposed and is very present in the conciliar mindset: As Christ, through the Incarnation, is the “sacrament” that makes God present in the world and fulfills a mission of sacerdotal mediation, the Church does the same while she remains “incarnate.” This comparison is the foundation of the doctrine of the famous conciliar “subsistit in”: even as the Word subsists in a certain human nature through the Incarnation, so also the Church of Christ subsists in a certain human society, the Catholic Church, through a sort of “incarnation.” We shall deal with this in the third chapter. For now, let us only point out that while this analogy may sound very mystical, it is profoundly heretical. Christ is the Mediator in that He is Head of the Church. If we consider the Church herself as a mediatrix as well, we set her up as the head of a Masonic super-church that encompasses all of humanity.

[48] The “communication of idioms” is a consequence of the Hypostatic Union of Christ through which the divine attributes (idiomata) of man can be predicated (communication), e.g. this man [Christ] is creator. Likewise, the human attributes can be said of God, e.g. God died. Cf. III, q. 16, a. 4.

[49] Gaudium et Spes n. 40: “Thus, the Church, at once “a visible association and a spiritual community,” goes forward together with humanity and experiences the same earthly lot which the world does. She serves as a leaven and as a kind of soul for human society [the new liberal humanism understands the Church as a hidden leaven for society], as it is to be renewed in Christ and transformed into God’s family. That the earthly and the heavenly city penetrate each other is a fact accessible to faith alone; it remains a mystery of human history, which sin will keep in great disarray until the splendor of God’s sons, is fully revealed. Pursuing the saving purpose which is proper to her, the Church does not only communicate divine life to men but in some way casts the reflected light of that life over the entire earth, most of all by its healing and elevating impact on the dignity of the person, by the way in which it strengthens the seams of human society and imbues the everyday activity of men with a deeper meaning and importance. Thus, through her individual matters and her whole community, the Church believes she can contribute greatly toward making the family of man and its history more human. In addition, the Catholic Church gladly holds in high esteem the things which other Christian Churches and ecclesial communities have done or are doing cooperatively by way of achieving the same goal. At the same time, she is convinced that she can be abundantly and variously helped by the world in the matter of preparing the ground for the Gospel.”

CHAPTER II

THE NEW MAN

The first value that conciliar thought highlights in the dignity of the “new man” is freedom. Let this be our first point, which refers especially to the will. Later we shall consider the consequences of this valuation as regards the intellect. In the third place, we shall study actions from a moral point of view. Finally, we shall turn to consider the relationship between nature and grace according to conciliar thought. In a scholastic exposition, we would have to consider nature first, as it is elevated by grace to the supernatural order; then we should consider the spiritual powers, first the intellect and then the will; and finally action, for the way of acting follows the way of being—agere sequitur esse. But it seems better to follow the order of these matters in modern thought. Of course, in all these thoughts, we shall try to pare it down to essentials, so our work will not become endless. We only seek to understand the Council.

A. Liberty: Supreme Value of Human Dignity

1. HUMANISM FALLS INTO LIBERALISM UNDER ITS OWN WEIGHT

In our general exposition, we have stated that Vatican II officializes a sort of humanism. But now, in commencing the particular explanation of the conciliar mindset, we say that the first value highlighted by the Council is liberty. Now, to place liberty as the highest value of the human being is the characteristic note of liberalism. And at first sight, it is not evident that humanism necessarily must be liberal. Besides, humanism arose in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, whereas liberalism arose only in the seventeenth and eighteenth.

The coherence of our explanation, then, is at risk, because if we have set humanism as the first and proper form of conciliar thought, now we must show that the supremacy of liberty, which we now set up as the principle and foundation of the “new man,” follows immediately from there.

But taking a better look, it is not difficult to realize that humanism falls into liberalism under its own weight.

Humanism, with which modern novelty arose—a movement as vivid as a “renaissance” or renewal—consists in a defense of the purely human values which had been immolated on the altar of sacrifice by the high spirituality of the thirteenth century, the golden age of Christendom.

The path to the highest Christian perfection presents a decidedly negative aspect to a human glance, because it may be summarized in the three evangelical denials: no to wealth (counsel of poverty), no to the affections of the heart (counsel of chastity), no to one’s own will (counsel of obedience). After we fell, through sin, into the slavery of the devil, the world and the flesh, the only path open to us that leads to true liberty is the one blazed by Our Lord: the path of the Cross.

But when Christians, enamored with the sweetness of Bethlehem and the brightness of the Gospel predictions, discover that to enter into the glory of the Lord they must pass with Him through His passion and death, many abandon Him and turn back. Modern humanism—as we said elsewhere—consists in this movement of apostasy and backsliding.[50] It is the reaction of human measure against the unmeasured demands of holiness.

The proper movement of humanism, then, is that which opposes itself to the highest of the evangelical counsels, that of obedience, and consists in the recovery of one’s self-government, that is, autonomy. Given that we are analyzing humanism in its first vital movement, we wish to highlight what brought us to say that the most authentic humanism is not atheistic humanism, but the integral humanism of the Council. It is true that the movement toward autonomy inevitably ends in “pure and absurd license,”[51] but its first intention is nothing more than to advocate for the human rights crushed by divine rights, disproportionately demanded by the ecclesiastical hierarchy. The Christian humanist does not say he is confronting God, but the imprudence of His representatives. He claims to assume the responsibility of thinking and believing, annulled by the abusive exercise of the ecclesiastical magisterium. He claims to assume the responsibility of his morals and his enterprises, childishly directed by ecclesiastical discipline.[52]

Now, the root of responsibility, what strictly belongs to man and might seem possible to free from the dominion of God, is nothing but his free will. Humanism gives preponderance to reason over revelation, of philosophy over theology, entering the slope of rationalism; it gives preponderance to human nature over grace and participation in the divine nature, tending to naturalism. But reason must obey reality, and nature the Creator. Thus, humanism considers liberty as the highest value of the human person. And not liberty understood as the faculty of choosing means in order to find the true good, because theology and experience alike teach that this liberty may not be exercised without the grace of God; but rather, liberty understood above all as the ability to choose good or evil. This is the only power of man that seems to be truly autonomous. The humanist glories in doing good, making it very clear that he could choose not to do it—and this, he believes, is meritorious!—and because of this, when he sins, although he may see he has lost a great deal, he does not feel that he has lost his own dignity, which is to have exercised his freedom.

The error is deadly, because man necessarily seeks the good inasmuch as, under a universal reasoning, it is the source of his happiness. This is the last end regarding which there is no sense in talking of free will, because although, evidently, we do not seek it out of obligation, we orient ourselves to it of necessity due to our very spiritual nature. The exercise of our liberty applies to the means and the intermediary ends which can gain us the greatest participation in the universal Good, which is none other than God. And one absolutely necessary condition for any choice is to know the order which these means and intermediary ends have in relation to God. What sense is there, coming to a crossroads, in speaking of the freedom to choose a path, if we do not know where either path leads? For this Our Lord said to us: “The truth shall set you free” (Jn. 8:32). Sin is a bad choice, through which we take a path that does not lead to where we wanted to go, and implies a future diminishing of liberty, for from that point, only one option makes sense: going back. Thus, understanding liberty as the faculty of choosing good or evil is just as senseless as defining health as the ability to get sick. And this way, we understand also the grievous error of understanding authority as something opposed to liberty, because nothing contributes to the growth of our liberty so much as those authorities that teach us the true value of things.

Conclusion. Humanism is an essentially Christian movement, whose first intention is that of autonomy from the divine authority concretely exercised by the ecclesiastical hierarchy, which leads it to consider liberty, understood as the ability to choose good or evil, as the supreme value of human life. Humanism, therefore, necessarily engenders liberalism.

2. CONCILIAR LIBERALISM

The reclaiming of autonomy not only led to anticlericalism (within the Church), but also to Protestantism (outside the Church) and even atheism (outside of reality). Observing—as we have said—the catastrophic results of these processes, the new humanism wished to return to the initial framework of Catholic unity. The Council, then, has been a forceful attempt to place liberty as the supreme value within the framework of Catholic doctrine and of the ecclesiastical organization, which cannot be done without some alterations, and no small ones, to be sure.

Divine revelation teaches us that the human person has a dignity superior to all other creatures because of his elevation, through grace, to partaking in the divine nature: “By whom he hath given us most great and precious promises: that by these you may be made partakers of the divine nature” (II Pet. 1:4). Thus St. Leo the Great exclaims: “Remember, O Christian, thy dignity, for thou hast been made a partaker of the divine nature.” However, this divine sonship, in which we are adopted by God, is expressed from Genesis in the fact of our being created in the image of God, for children are the image of their father: “Let us make man in our image and likeness; and let him rule over the fishes of the sea, and the birds of heaven, and the beasts, and all the earth, and every creeping thing that moves upon the earth. Then God created man in His own image; in the image of God created He him; male and female created He them” (Gen. 1:26–27). Hence the best Catholic theology has taken this doctrine as the beginning and foundation of Christian morality, thus showing the transcendence of human conduct as the glorification of God.

St. Thomas, distinguishing and uniting the natural and supernatural order with precision, points out that in the natural order the image of God is shown in man, because he is spiritual; and that this very condition explains that he can have been uplifted to the supernatural order, in which his condition of an image is perfected by grace.[53] Hence the moral part of the Summa finds its footing on the spiritual condition of human nature, the first root of his condition as an image: “Since, as Damascene states (De Fide Orthod. ii. 12), man is said to be made to God’s image, in so far as the image implies ‘an intelligent being endowed with free-will and self-movement’: now that we have treated of the exemplar, i.e., God, and of those things which came forth from the power of God in accordance with His will; it remains for us to treat of His image, i.e., man, inasmuch as he too is the principle of his actions, as having free-will and control of his actions” (Prologue to the Secunda Pars).

The Council, at this point, took advantage of the originality of Thomistic doctrine but, instead of uniting the two orders (natural and supernatural), it confused the two without distinction. Thus, it can say: the dignity that man has as an image of God, as St. Thomas teaches, consists of his liberty. If we object that the dignity of man consists in his elevation to the supernatural order through participation in the divine nature, the Council replies: of course, but isn’t freedom, autonomy, what is most proper to the divine nature? So, our participation therein consists of being free. It is the essence of liberty that divinizes us, and if we insist on distinguishing a supernatural order, it would have to be considered as the order of a super-liberty.

In the first chapter of Gaudium et Spes, the Council treats of “the dignity of the human person.” In the first point (no. 12) it teaches, truly, that the dignity of man consists of having been created in the image of God. But it makes it very clear that this dignity as an image is summed up in liberty (emphases ours): “Although he was made by God in a state of holiness, from the very onset of his history man abused his liberty, at the urging of the Evil One. Man set himself against God and sought to attain his goal apart from God. […] But the Lord Himself came to free and strengthen man, renewing him inwardly and casting out that ‘prince of this world’ (Jn. 12:31) who held him in the bondage of sin. For sin has diminished man, blocking his path to fulfillment” (no. 13). “Through his bodily composition [man] gathers to himself the elements of the material world; thus, they reach their crown through him, and through him raise their voice in free praise of the Creator. […] man is not wrong when he regards himself as superior to bodily concerns, and as more than a speck of nature or a nameless constituent of the city of man. For by his interior qualities he outstrips the whole sum of mere things.[54] He plunges into the depths of reality whenever he enters into his own heart; God, Who probes the heart awaits him there; there he discerns his own destiny beneath the eyes of God” (no. 14). In no. 15 the Council touches on the “dignity of the intellect,” with a very brief final reference to contemplation: “It is, finally, through the gift of the Holy Spirit that man comes by faith to the contemplation and appreciation of the divine plan.” In no. 16 it places a strong accent on the “dignity of the moral conscience,” but where the dignity of man finds its greatest value is in no. 17, which treats of the “greatness of liberty”: “Only in freedom can man direct himself toward goodness. Our contemporaries make much of this freedom and pursue it eagerly; and rightly to be sure. Often however they foster it perversely as a license for doing whatever pleases them, even if it is evil. For its part, authentic freedom is an exceptional sign of the divine image within man. For God has willed that man remain ‘under the control of his own decisions’ (Ecclus. 15:14), so that he can seek his Creator spontaneously, and come freely to utter and blissful perfection through loyalty to Him. Hence man’s dignity demands that he act according to a knowing and free choice that is personally motivated and prompted from within, not under blind internal impulse nor by mere external pressure” (no. 17).

3. IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCE:

SUPREMACY OF ACTION OVER CONTEMPLATION

Crowning the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, true Catholic doctrine places the fullness of man as image of the Creator, not in liberty, but in contemplation, that is, the loving knowledge of God: “Hence we refer the Divine image in man to the verbal concept born of the knowledge of God, and to the love derived therefrom.”[55] Because God exercises His liberty in creating, but does not reach the fullness of His happiness in creating, but rather has it as His essence in His eternal contemplation.[56] So had Our Lord said: “This is life eternal: that they know Thee, the one true God, and Him whom Thou hast sent, Jesus Christ” (Jn. 17:3).

The anthropocentric turn by which man is placed as the end and glory of the Creator, also implies the inverted supremacy of action over contemplation. Although it does not state it explicitly, conciliar humanism takes for granted that God reaches the fullness of His happiness in the most free act of creation, because as an artist is fulfilled in producing his masterpiece, so it would occur to God to create man. Man, then, becomes the perfect image of God, not in contemplating Him, but in constituting himself the maker and governor of the created things that God placed at his disposal: “man, created to God’s image, received a mandate to subject to himself the earth and all it contains, and to govern the world with justice and holiness; a mandate to relate himself and the totality of things to Him Who was to be acknowledged as the Lord and Creator of all. Thus, by the subjection of all things to man, the name of God would be wonderful in all the earth” (Gaudium et Spes, no. 34).

4. FINAL CONSEQUENCE: “NON SERVIAM”

However unwillingly, whoever raises the banner of liberty is enlarging Satan’s ranks. The conciliar popes would do very well to meditate seriously on what St. Thomas had taught long ago: “It belongs to a governor to lead those whom he governs to their end. But the end of the devil is the aversion of the rational creature from God; hence from the beginning he has endeavored to prevent man from obeying the Divine precept. But aversion from God has the nature of an end, inasmuch as it is sought for under the appearance of liberty, according to Jeremiah 2:20: “Of old time thou hast broken my yoke, thou hast burst my bands, and thou saidst, ‘I will not serve.’ Hence, inasmuch as some are brought to this end by sinning, they fall under the rule and government of the devil.”[57]

B. Subjectivism, Liberator of Thought

1. HUMANISM IS AIDED BY SUBJECTIVISM

Humanism raised the flag of freedom, and the first thing it sought was freedom of thought; it wished to be responsible for its own opinions. The first to fall was the authority of the theologians, mediator of the Church’s magisterial authority before the faithful. This assumed a double-sourced retrograde movement: the return to sources, and the return to pagan wisdom. The theologians were tutors assigned to explain to the faithful (the learning Church), under the strict vigilance of the Magisterium (the teaching Church), as much what the sources of revelation (Scripture and Tradition) said, as what reason said, especially as cultivated by Greek wisdom. The Renaissance humanist grew tired of his teachers and decided to go directly to the sources and the Greeks himself, to form his own opinion. As theologians were exchanged for books, there was an impressive increase of translations and editions. Evidently, this movement was always animated by a deep anticlericalism.

Nonetheless, these regresses were not enough to free thought, because the great scholastic theologians had already drunk from those wells to a greater advantage, and it was not easy to uphold freedom of opinion in opposition to them. So, along with the aforementioned regresses, an attack movement on the very rigor of scholastic thought began to grow, seeking its argument in the subjective aspects of human thought. On this point it was William of Ockham, with his nominalism, who fired the first shots.

The process of this combat was long and complex, but well enough known to make it necessary for us to expand on it.[58] St. Pius X pointed out the importance of subjectivism, carried to the extreme of agnosticism, in modernist thought.[59] The final act of defense on the part of the Church was the encyclical Humani Generis, of Pius XII.[60]

2. CONCILIAR SUBJECTIVISM

The drug addiction of subjectivism—for drug addiction and subjectivism are two very similar vices—led to such extremes as the infernal madness of Hegelian idealism, which ceases to distinguish between thought and reality.[61] The “new humanism” which triumphed at the Council sought to moderate the dose so as not to do away with all rationality, but it was absolutely necessary for it to keep subjectivism so as not to lose the essential freedom of thought.[62]

Conciliar thought encapsulated its subjectivism in the half-truth of the “inadequacy of dogmatic formulas.” Revelation—it claims—consists of the manifestation of Himself that God has made, and the act of faith consists of a certain perception of the divine mystery. It is true—it holds—that this experience of faith tends to express itself in conceptual formulas that, via the approbation of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, finally become dogmas. But, if the dogmatic formulae may be the complete expression of a communal experience of faith, yet they may never adequately express the object itself of faith, which is the ineffable mystery of God. Faith consists of belief in God and not in conceptual formulae about God.

Here the conciliar sleight-of-hand distracts us with another of its tricks. It is true that the object of faith is the mystery of God, but this is only the most brilliant half of the truth. As St. Thomas teaches, “the object of faith may be considered in two ways. First, as regards the thing itself which is believed, and thus the object of faith is something simple, namely the thing itself about which we have faith [the mystery of God]. Secondly, on the part of the believer, and in this respect the object of faith is something complex by way of a proposition [Christian faith].”[63] This distinction corresponds with the more general one of the scholastics between logical truth, as given by the judgments of the intellect, and ontological truth, the thing in itself, insofar as we can know it. Hence revealed truth, the object of faith, is at once a thing, the divine reality in itself (ontological truth), and a doctrine, summarized in the articles of the Credo (logical truth).

As is evident, the doctrine of faith cannot give us a complete knowledge of God in Himself, because divine reality cannot be understood by human conception; but it gives us enough knowledge to love God and save ourselves. Therefore, if indeed revealed doctrine should not be adequate to divine reality, it is adequate to our way of knowing, and to our necessities.

The new conciliar theology only kept the first way of understanding the object of faith and revealed truth, as the thing believed in itself, and denies the second, insisting scornfully that God did not reveal doctrines, but revealed Himself. And it believes that with this subtle discernment it has baptized its subjectivism, because now it can defend the substantial immutability of revealed Truth and Tradition, because the substance of what has been revealed and is transmitted is the mystery of God itself, certainly immutable. Something else must be said about the conceptual and linguistic forms that express that mystery, which do not suffice for it and are always in a certain way subjective, depending on the moment in history and the cultural environment in which they are expressed.

3. BRIEF ANALYSIS OF CONCILIAR SUBJECTIVISM

Conciliar subjectivism upholds a moderate relativism and resists falling into the absolute “tyranny of relativism,” toward which it constantly tends, nonetheless. It fundamentally denies the capability of reason to know the universal essence of things. Like nominalism of old, although with a more sophisticated language, it replaces the scholastic doctrine of abstraction with that of an indefinite experience, casting aside what is proper to intellectual knowledge and assimilating it to sensible knowledge. This has enormous consequences:

- Denying the universality of intellectual knowledge, this ends up depending—as occurs with sensible knowledge—on hic et nunc, that is to say, the cultural environment and the historical moment. Although it does not deny a certain commonality (never say universality) of concepts, nonetheless, it would say that this is founded on the vital communion of the members of a same culture and historical moment.[64]

- If we do not know the essence of the realities offered through our senses, in a partial but true manner, neither can we know by proper analogy the divine realities. We can ill say that we know anything of the divine Persons if we cannot know what the human person essentially is, because we can only know Them by analogy with the latter. To the new theology, then, only the negative way lies open—that is, to say about God not what He is, but what He is not: that He is not corporeal, that He is not temporal, that He is not like anything we know. As is evident, not only is this no theology, but neither is there space left for any true science.

This philosophical error pretends to be justified by a theological half-truth. Because it is certain that faith supposes a certain immediate contact with God as the First Truth, which explains the possibility of supernatural charity, and which St. Thomas does not hesitate to name “experience.”[65] But this follows because of the divine certainty of the act of faith, and not of the particular truth on which such an act rests, expressed in a conceptual proposition. The sleight-of-hand artists of the new theology dazzle their disciples with this profound aspect of the act of faith, for which they make themselves expert Thomists, and yet deny the most clear and evident aspect: that God revealed Himself to us in a way accessible to our manner of knowing, that is, by means of the conceptual propositions that constitute a doctrinal body.

To the denial of the very evident truth of reason, that intelligence abstracts the universal essence of things, the new conciliar theology adds the denial of a truth of faith: that Revelation also consists of doctrine.[66] This is not a theological conclusion, but rather an explicitly revealed truth; because if revelation were not also doctrine, it could not be said that faith comes from preaching, ex auditu (Rom. 8:17).

4. CONSEQUENCES

Theological pluralism

It is not necessary to meditate much to realize that the consequences are enormous. Revelation would be a “presence” of God, mysteriously manifested through different “symbols” or “sacraments”[67]: Christ and the Church, Scripture and Liturgy, the poor, colored people, women. Faith would consist of the perception of the divine mystery, thanks to the interpretation of the symbol. The perception of faith is indefinable in itself, but man is social and tends to express his experiences in words. As we know, most people cannot express themselves well; but in every community there is never a poet lacking that has the gift of expressing the common feeling of faith.[68] These poets are the neo-theologians, and their theologies are poems that express, with greater or lesser beauty, the hic et nunc of Divine Revelation.

This explains the institution, since the Council, of theological pluralism. To purport, as Pius XII did with his doctrinal encyclicals, that only one theology should be preserved and all others excluded, is a loss of wealth and an abuse of authority.[69] Because, as the Holy Poet of Aquino said, the mystery of the divine Presence should never cease to be sung: “Quantum potes, tantum aude; quia maior omni laude nec laudare suffices.”[70] Now indeed the theologians dare to do all they can, and are continually applauded by the conciliar popes.

The problem of truth

As the new conciliar humanism wishes to be Catholic, it cannot renounce speaking of truth, but for subjectivism as for Pilate, truth has become a problem: Quid est veritas? The truth is a certain equality between the intellect and a thing, perfectly definable and verifiable for one who knows that the intellect can attain to the universal essences of things. But for modern thought, the problem of the truth would be the first in benefiting from the blessings of pluralism, because it receives a thousand answers without being able to decide which of them all is most “truthful.” Perhaps we could say that the diversity of explanations come from understanding truth as a simple sincerity, in which the conceptual expression is equated to personal experience, until it is understood as a practical truth, in which what is true is what is efficacious, that is, the adequate conceptual expression (as means to an end) to preserve interior peace or unity in the human community. But who shall decide if our opinion is true? Let us at least consider that it is sincere and could serve.

Let us give one example.[71] The most mature fruit of subjectivism, as St. Pius X warned, is the truth of all religions; by it, since Vatican Council II, the forbidden pathways of ecumenism were opened. But thirty years later everything was rolling downhill at such a rate that the International Theological Commission, happy to step on the gas at first, nervously began to hit the brakes. In 1996 it published Christianity and the world religions,[72] a document that sought to moderate the pluralist position of those who defend the equal value of all religions. It is interesting to see the extreme positions which the objected-to pluralist opinion reaches—in full coherence with the subjectivist principles of ecumenism—set forth clearly in the Status quæstionis[73]; and later, in the resolution, to touch on the impenetrable obscurity of the arguments with which they would be moderated.

The Status quæstionis sets forth six problems. In the third, the “question of the truth” of religions is valiantly touched upon: “The question of truth carries serious problems of a theoretical and practical order, since in the [non-subjective] past it has had negative consequences in the meeting of religions [since without subjectivism there can be no ecumenism]” (no. 13). It explains there an unmoderated version of the principle of inadequacy, associated to the excessively relativist opinion that is being combated: “The epistemological conception underlying the pluralist position uses Kant’s distinction between noumenon and phænomenon. As God, the ultimate Reality, is transcendent and inaccessible to man, He may only be experienced as a phenomenon, expressed by culturally conditioned images and notions; this explains that diverse representations of the same reality need not be mutually exclusive a priori (no. 14). The problem, no small one, is in that “the omission of discourse about the truth brings with it the superficial equalization of all religions, at bottom draining them of their salvific potential. To affirm that all are true means the same as saying that all are false. To sacrifice the question of truth is incompatible with the Christian vision” (no. 13). Well said.

The document considers, in its second part, “fundamental theological presuppositions” and in the third gives solutions to the problems posed. The most extensively discussed problem, and the most obscure, is the problem of the truth. “[The Church] values the good, true and beautiful of other religions from the background of the truth of its own faith, but does not attribute in general the same validity to the pretension to truth of other religions. This would lead to indifference, that is, to not taking our own claim to truth as seriously as that of others” (no. 96). We Catholics cannot say that we have the truth and others do not, but let us at least say that we have a better claim to it; let us not fall into indifferentism! “Every dialogue lives by the claim to truth of those who participate in it. But dialogue between religions is characterized also by applying the profound structure of the culture of origin of each person to the claim of truth of a foreign culture” (no. 101). Thus, when extreme pluralists object that Catholics must not claim that our doctrine is superior: “A claim to superiority is attributed by the pluralist position to the unique salvific mediation of Christ for all men” (no. 104), the ITC responds that those who dialogue must respect the claim to truth of the other, and Catholics claim that Christ is superior, which is in the Christian faith’s “own structure of truth” (no. 103).

Could anyone ever say whether the “structure of truth” of Christianity is truer than that of another religion? According to the ITC, it can only be said that we “have a claim to it,” by virtue of our “cultural background.”

C: Conscience, the Liberator of Action

1. THE THEFT OF PROMETHEUS:

AUTONOMY OF CONSCIENCE

Subjectivism permitted Prometheus, “prudence,” to steal the divine fire for men. According to the natural order—respected by the supernatural—for the action of man to be right, it must be directed by prudence. And prudence must, in its turn, be informed by the wisdom (now natural, now supernatural) through which we know God as last end, and the order that things keep in regard to Him[74]. While prudence must give its dictate considering the particular circumstances of the action, for which it neither claims nor needs to reach a complete speculative certainty, the principles of wisdom—which are like the soul and framework of the dictates of prudence—are universal. Hence wisdom, the shared light of the divine Fire, constitutes the supreme court of man’s conduct, as much in the individual as in the social order, because by its universal character it rises above the unrepeatable circumstances of prudential dictates, and its own dictate is imposed on all honest men.[75]

But subjectivism subverts this tribunal when it denies the universality of knowledge. And this—as we thought—was the fundamental end for which it came into existence. If the humanist became a subjectivist, it was not so much for speculative reasons as with a practical end: that no authority exists upon earth that could judge his conduct. As long as it is merely a matter of cultural curiosities, the humanist is not disinterested in the metaphysics of Aristotle; but when wisdom claims to rule over his life, there ends the friendship. As subjectivism would have it, there can be no universal knowledge of God as last end, and of the essential order which along with Him keeps each thing according to its nature. This means that to be able to objectively judge the prudential decision of a person, one would have to have been inside his mind to remember all the circumstances surrounding his decision. And if an entire tribunal could do this, its members could never completely agree, because the aspects to be considered are infinite. If subjectivism permits doctrinal pluralism, it justifies an infinitely greater pluralism in the moral order.

Once the tribunal of wisdom is demolished—first that of Christian Wisdom in the light of faith, and in consequence that of metaphysical wisdom in light of reason, which indeed cannot stand without it—men soon pass from liberal to libertine. Having tasted the bitterness of its first consequences, sixteenth-century humanism attempted to raise up a new tribunal of conduct: “conscience.” Although free decisions must not be regulated by the ecclesiastical tribunal of theologians, they still are not freed from the control of reason and faith, but must answer to the moral judgment of one’s own conscience. With this, humanism unbalanced, to its own advantage, another Christian idea.[76]

A grave failing in the Catholic defense against these movements was that even the best Thomist theologians accepted the defense of Catholic morality on this new, dangerously subjective ground. Although they upheld the legitimacy of Christian wisdom as a rule of conduct, they allowed conscience to be established as an immediate rule, which, though it is not exactly false, is unnecessary and awkwardly expressed.[77] In the measure that the criticism which modern thought and the new sciences made against scholastic philosophy and theology gained ground, introducing the poison of subjectivism, the interior tribunal of conscience continued to free itself from the tyranny of theological knowledge, opening the doors to moral relativism. Now man was the master of the divine fire, capable of molding norms, until then ironclad, according to their own convenience.

2. “RIGHT CONSCIENCE” ACCORDING TO THE COUNCIL

Conciliar humanism, as we have repeatedly stated, is the supreme attempt of Prometheus to save modernity with a new transfusion of Catholicism into its veins. Although it may be hard for us recalcitrant fundamentalists to understand, the Council never ceases to battle the relativism into which modern morality has fallen, seeking to reconnect the human conscience to the divine law, but—to be sure—without placing its liberty at risk. Here there is an attempt to apply in particular the matter of conscience, the general matter of the transcendence of the person as image of God.

However, it is clear that there would only be taken from St. Thomas what can be accommodated to the indeclinable principles of conciliar thought, that is, the mere shell of his doctrine. Because for St. Thomas, the natural law is the first principle of the practical order, that is, self-evident propositions which are the object of the habit of synderesis.[78] They are conceptual truths of a universality attained by abstraction, which can be spoken, which can be written on two stone tablets, whose application can be claimed before a court. But modern thought has long since rejected the objectivity of abstract knowledge. The conciliar mindset permits itself to speak of the truth, but the truth is never the logical truth of the intellect that abstracts universal essentials in a way congruent with reality, reaching true knowledge. The truth is always, for the Council, a mysterious reality, ontological truth.

Take for example the encyclical Veritatis Splendor of John Paul II. In the moral order, it says, “truth is indicated by the ‘divine law,’ the universal and objective norm of morality.” However, divine or eternal law is the divine essence in itself: “Reason draws its own truth and its authority in the eternal law, which is nothing but divine wisdom itself” (no. 40). As man cannot possess it in itself, he attains it through natural law or through revelation: “man’s free obedience to God’s law effectively implies that human reason and human will participate in God’s wisdom and providence. By forbidding man to ‘eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil,’ God makes it clear that man does not originally possess such ‘knowledge’ as something properly his own, but only participates in it by the light of natural reason and of Divine Revelation, which manifest to him the requirements and the promptings of eternal wisdom” (no. 41). Up to this point everything seems quite Thomistic, but is “participation” understood in the way that St. Thomas understands it? Clearly not, because if the truth were found in conceptual propositions themselves, our fine pluralism would be done for, being able to declare who is heretical and who is not.

If the natural law is a mysterious inclination of the heart and, according to the “principles of inadequacy,” there is no conceptual formula that could reflect it in a definite manner, it would seem that all moral norms would depend completely on historical-cultural context. But the Encyclical Veritatis Splendor tells us: Fear not, men of little faith, for there are still universal and immutable norms:

The great concern of our contemporaries for historicity and for culture has led some to call into question the immutability of the natural law itself, and thus the existence of “objective norms of morality” [Gaudium et Spes, 16] valid for all people of the present and the future, as for those of the past. Is it ever possible, they ask, to consider as universally valid and always binding certain rational determinations established in the past, when no one knew the progress humanity would make in the future? It must certainly be admitted that man always exists in a particular culture, but it must also be admitted that man is not exhaustively defined by that same culture. Moreover, the very progress of cultures demonstrates that there is something in man which transcends those cultures. This “something” is precisely human nature: this nature is itself the measure of culture and the condition ensuring that man does not become the prisoner of any of his cultures, but asserts his personal dignity by living in accordance with the profound truth of his being. (no. 53)

The foundation of the immutable objectivity of morality, then, is in the deep truth of human nature. But Veritatis Splendor acknowledges that, for the Council, the truth and immutability of the natural law belong only to its substance (which no one measures) and not the conceptual formula that expresses it. Thus, its vaunted objectivity winds up by founding itself, optimistically, on human goodwill to find the most adequate—or rather, the least inadequate—formula to deal with any situation:

Certainly there is a need to seek out and to discover the most adequate formulation for universal and permanent moral norms in the light of different cultural contexts, a formulation most capable of ceaselessly expressing their historical relevance, of making them understood and of authentically interpreting their truth. This truth of the moral law—like that of the “deposit of faith”—unfolds down the centuries: the norms expressing that truth remain valid in their substance, but must be specified and determined “eodem sensu eademque sententia” in the light of historical circumstances by the Church’s Magisterium, whose decision is preceded and accompanied by the work of interpretation and formulation characteristic of the reason of individual believers and of theological reflection.” (no. 53; emphases are from the text itself, not our own)

Thus is revealed the true hermeneutic of no. 16 of Gaudium et Spes, where is discussed the “dignity of moral conscience.”[79]

3. CONCLUSION

The oven-bird has the natural law graven in its little heart, and if this bird is left at liberty it tends to make little mud huts in Brazil just as in Argentina, following its universal and immutable natural instincts. The Christian, too, has the evangelical law graven in his heart from his birth through Baptism, in the form of a divine instinct through which he is led to do well not only by the virtues, but also by the gifts whose movements man cannot explain by reason, for they work in a divine manner. Thus, if a saint is left at liberty—only a saint is perfectly docile to the Holy Ghost—he always does what is best: love, and do what you will.

The Council understands the same natural law in a similar way, as divine impulses that lead to good, proper to man’s nature, which he cannot express except in an incomplete manner. As besides, in its optimism, it has forgotten that man’s heart is wounded by original sin, it believes that, like the oven-bird, it is enough to leave him alone to build his little house in peace and do everything right.

The only problem is that it is not true. The human mind tends naturally to the true and the good, but to rational goodness and truth, conceived by abstract thought and perfectly expressible through a sufficiently cultivated language. Besides, he is the only social animal that is born without instincts and must be taught. He must receive his moral formation through the teaching of wisdom, which will conform his prudence and other virtues. And wisdom is not the heritage of one alone, but rather is the most universal and unchangeable good of all created common goods.

It is not suitable to speak of “formation of conscience,” as if one had to act watching oneself all the time, but rather of “formation in science” or knowledge: a knowledge that must be true wisdom, wisdom that must be Christian wisdom, for there is no other that can show man the way of his salvation and perfection. True education can only be achieved by observing the Church, Mother and Teacher.

The Council became a modern mother who renounces her duty, letting her children form themselves in freedom, like the little birds. But the child who is not taught and rebuked becomes lost. And he loses his mother.

D. Grace, Liberator of Nature

1. HUMANIST NATURALISM

Christian life is marked by three great truths: God created us for a supernatural end, human nature was wounded by sin, and we were redeemed by the Cross of Christ. Thus, it is cloaked in negativity: “If any wish to follow me, let him deny himself” (Lk. 9:23). The Middle Ages set out on this path with faith and generosity, but on the threshold of sanctity, many grew frightened and looked back, yearning for the onions of Egypt. So, humanism was born.

Humanism, as we have said, is the secularized monk who, wavering in his faith, judged it as irrational to despise human values in this way. It does not necessarily imply apostasy—although it ends there—but it does imply the revenge of nature against the demands of grace. Humanism, as its name sincerely gives us to understand, is firstly and immediately a form of “naturalism.” Although it is so only in the first place, because, as we showed in speaking of subjectivism, it cannot stay there: Christian wisdom does not permit it. Thus, in the defense of its positions, it finds itself obliged to renounce its natural possessions, beginning by the certainty of its own knowledge and ending in the unnatural acceptance of homosexuality.

2. CONCILIAR NATURALISM

The new conciliar humanism is an attempt to return to its beginnings, trying to reinforce the dose of Catholicism. The Council says to the old humanists: nolite timere, as St. Thomas himself recognizes that grace does not destroy nature but perfects it: “Cum enim gratia non tollat natura, sed perficiat…”[80] This truth, which could be highlighted from an apologetic point of view to justify the apparently negative Christian spirituality, becomes, in the conciliar mindset, the very essence of the order of grace: God gives us His grace to make ourselves perfect men, and in particular to perfect our freedom. The order of grace would be ordered, by its very end, to the perfection of nature. It need no longer be called the supernatural order, but subnatural (although we have not found this honest term in the conciliar documents).

Let us look at Gaudium et Spes, the Magna Carta of conciliar humanism, and we shall verify this. In No. 16 it is taught that man’s liberty is comprised of his conscience: “For man has in his heart a law written by God; to obey it is the very dignity of man.” But should we not say that human dignity consists of having been elevated to participate in the divine nature? Of course, but this is said in the next point. What is the most proper attribute to the divine nature? Autonomy. Hence, man partakes of the divinity when he follows the law of conscience freely: “Authentic freedom is an exceptional sign of the divine image within man… man’s dignity demands that he act according to a knowing and free choice that is personally motivated and prompted from within” (no. 17). Nonetheless, there is a risk to human dignity, because “conscience which by degrees grows practically sightless as a result of habitual sin” (no. 16). Hence, the necessity of grace: “Since man’s freedom has been damaged by sin, only by the aid of God’s grace can he bring such a relationship with God [that of a good conscience] into full flower” (no. 17). In this first mention of grace made in the Constitution, it is clear that its function is that of repairing and sustaining freedom.

In perfect coherence, the Council informs us that Revelation does not, as we believed, consist of granting us the knowledge of the mystery of divine nature in its Trinitarian life, but rather in giving us knowledge of the mystery of human nature. Because as “every man remains to himself an unsolved puzzle, however obscurely he may perceive it” (no. 21), “Christ, the new Adam, by the revelation of the mystery of the Father and His love, fully reveals man to man himself and makes his sublime calling clear” (no. 22). This seems to have been the grand reason for the Incarnation: “Only in the mystery of the Incarnate Word does the mystery of man take on light. […] This is the great mystery of man, as seen in the light of Christian revelation. Through Christ and in Christ the riddles of sorrow and death grow meaningful. Apart from His Gospel, they overwhelm us” (no. 22).

E. Conclusion

Modern humanism—not the integral sort, if you please!—upholds the dignity of a mankind whose highest value is liberty, whose intelligence is liberated from the tyranny of reality by subjectivist relativism, whose morality is ruled by the supreme law of his own conscience. It is a mankind that acknowledges nothing above its own nature, that has become atheistic at least in fact, by renouncing—as Paul VI recognized—the transcendence of supreme things.

Prometheus, that is to say, the Council, meets man halfway and proposes a “new humanism,” in which not only will he lose none of his costly conquests, but will be enriched with the divine fire: the heritage of the Church. Let him remember that he took his riches from Her and be warned that only She can preserve them:

- Freedom, to be sure, concedes the Council, is the supreme dignity of man, but through it we transcend our condition of mere creatures and rise to the condition of images of the Creator. Freedom is a participation in divine nature. Let us see how freedom seems more beautiful considered in its transcendency.

- It is true, concedes the Council, that our conceptual formulations depend upon our subjectivity and are not subject to the tyranny of a single doctrinal system, but intelligence can transcend the purely phenomenal and experience Truth in the mystery of God. Let man not fear, because in the mystery of God he will find nothing less than the revelation of his own mystery; even as God sees Himself in man, made in His image, man sees himself in God.

- Conscience, concedes the Council, is certainly the highest law of morality; but as the human tendencies of the heart are the natural law, participating in the eternal law of the Creator, every man of good will spontaneously fulfills the will of God. Let us not fear, then, as God’s will is that we be free to do whatever we like.

- It is true, the Council lastly concedes, that more than one theologian has presented divine grace as a fire that consumes man as incense for the glory of God, but really grace, participation in the divine nature, is no other thing than the fullness of freedom of the children of God. But experience shows that the habit of sin (one little sin is no matter), reduces freedom, as one who smokes cannot stop smoking. But well, the grace of God helps us to free ourselves from these enslaving structures of sin.

Paul VI had good reason to remark that there is no conflict between atheistic humanism and the new humanism of the Council. The only difference is that the former is orphaned and the second has God and the Church at its service.[81]

The Christian

TRICKS

Inverted Catholic Principles

The New Man

God becomes man

to bring

man

to become God:

DEIFICATION

nature

is subordinated

to grace

Grace

perfects

nature

=>

grace

humanizes

man

God becomes man

to bring

man

to become man:

NATURALISM

grace

is subordinated

to nature

Intellect

perfected

by the Magisterium

DOCTRINE

adaptation

to reality

and Revelation

The subject knows in its own way

=>

does not reach

universal

essences

Intellect

liberated

from the Christian Magisterium

SUBJECTIVISM

no subjection

to Revelation

or reality

Will

regulated

by Government

OBEDIENCE

“the truth

shall set you free”

Merit supposes

free will

=>

the supreme value

is freedom

(to sin)

Will liberated

from Christian

government

LIBERALISM

“non serviam”

Action

sanctified

by the Priesthood

CHARITY

wisdom

justifies

action

Good conscience justifies action

=>

all men

are good, act

according to your

conscience

Action liberated

from Christian

sanctification

MACHIAVELLIANISM

effective action

justifies

ideology

[50] Fr. Álvaro Calderón, La lámpara bajo el celemín, p. 117: “The modern spirit is a spirit of backsliding and apostasy. It is the spirit of the wife of Lot who turns to look back, that of the murmurers of Israel who, having manna, long for the onions of Egypt. Modern man is the dog who returns to his vomit. Modernity is not properly a process of decadence, if by decadence we understand the natural aging process of every corruptible organism. The modern spirit was manifested with strength and clarity in the fourteenth century, when Christianity had just reached its peak in the thirteenth century, and no one dies of old age in his prime. The modern spirit is the reaction of the flesh against the demands of holiness.”

[51] Leo XIII, Libertas Praestantissimum, June 20th, 1888, no. 17: “There are already many who, imitating Lucifer, whose criminal expression is: Non serviam, take for liberty what is really a pure and absurd license. Such are the partisans of that extensive and powerful system who, taking the name of liberty itself, call themselves liberals.”

[52] The humanist is a monk, wasted by acedia, who leaves the monastery of Christianity, persuaded that he has been treated like a child and determined to recover his human personality.

[53] I, q. 93, a. 4: “[W]e see that the image of God is in man in three ways. First, inasmuch as man possesses a natural aptitude for understanding and loving God; and this aptitude consists in the very nature of the mind, which is common to all men. Secondly, inasmuch as man actually and habitually knows and loves God, though imperfectly; and this image consists in the conformity of grace. Thirdly, inasmuch as man knows and loves God perfectly; and this image consists in the likeness of glory.”

[54] This paragraph assumes the unfounded personalist-Maritainian distinction between the individual and the person, according to which man as an individual is the “particle of nature” that is subordinate to the common good of the “human city,” while as a person he is the end of and “superior to the whole universe.”

[55] I, q. 93, a. 8.

[56] I, p. 26, a. 2. Autonomy, or dominion over oneself, implies liberty, but is not identified with it. Autonomy is the highest degree of life (cf. I, q. 18, a. 3), because living beings are “those that act for themselves and not as moved by others,” and the highest degree of life is the property of the spiritual being, which proposes its own ends to itself and orders its actions to them. However, in this degree, the only truly autonomous being is God, because only He is not determined by another in any aspect, as much in intellect, because He knows Himself, as in the will, because He Himself is good in essence. Man has the mastery in choosing certain intermediate ends for himself, but he is not master of many things imposed on him by nature, “like the first principles, which [we] cannot doubt, and the final end, which he cannot but will” (I, q. 18, a. 3). Liberty exists in regard to intermediate ends, which are goods in which we partake, and not regarding the last end, which is the essential good. There is no sense in speaking of liberty of wanting or not wanting the essential good, which is the very object of the will. Thus, the scope of man’s autonomy coincides with that of his liberty, because it determines itself with regard to the intermediate ends. But his autonomy is not absolute, because the first principles of the intellect and the last end of the will are given him by nature; that is to say, they are determined for him by God.

[57] III, q. 8, a. 7.

[58] Enciclopedia de la Religión Católica, “Subjetivismo,” vol. VI, col. 1523: “To be sure, modern philosophy and even science have been deeply saturated with subjectivism. Because, we understand that idealism, psychologism, criticism, relativism, pragmatism, instrumentalism, inmanentism, agnosticism, etc., are merely diverse and more or less attenuated forms of epistemological subjectivism. In the history of modern thought, this last was incubated in Cartesian metaphysics. It later received a systematic form in the empirico-spiritualist idealism of Berkeley. It grew sharper and more specific in the critico-skeptical position of Hume; it intervened as a principal element in Kantian criticism. It was also entwined in the associationism of Stuart Mill and Spencer. It appears clearly in nearly all the theses of post-Kantian idealism, especially that of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. There is no need to say how it is shown in solipsism, properly so called. On another hand, it takes an especially “agnostic” direction in positivism, in French neo-criticism, in empirical criticism and in the modern anti-intellectualist philosophies. In voluntarism, pragmatism, intuitionism and immanentism, it takes on an exaggerated relativist dimension, when it is not clearly skeptical. The same could be said of the epistemological exaggerations of modern scientifical critique, owing a great deal to the subjectivist environment created by idealism and its consequences. Any judgment is reduced to the individual who judges; the validity of truth is limited to the individual. It is clear that the reach of such subjectivity of knowledge would differ according to what is understood by the individual, and if the knowing conscience is beyond any psycho-physical organization. But, in truth, the subject individual tends to be identified with his object, and the sense of true transcendence is lost. The greater part—not to say all—of the subjectivist positions have been pointed out and condemned when the Catholic Church condemned modernism.”

[59] St. Pius X, Encyclical Pascendi, Sept. 8, 1907: “Modernists place the foundation of religious philosophy in that doctrine which is usually called Agnosticism. According to this teaching human reason is confined entirely within the field of phenomena, that is to say, to things that are perceptible to the senses, and in the manner in which they are perceptible; it has no right and no power to transgress these limits. Hence it is incapable of lifting itself up to God, and of recognizing His existence, even by means of visible things. From this it is inferred that God can never be the direct object of science, and that, as regards history, He must not be considered as an historical subject. Given these premises, all will readily perceive what becomes of Natural Theology, of the motives of credibility, of external revelation. The Modernists simply make away with them altogether; they include them in Intellectualism, which they call a ridiculous and long-ago defunct system. Nor does the fact that the Church has formally condemned these portentous errors exercise the slightest restraint upon them.”

[60] Pius XII, Encyclical Humani Generis, August 12, 1950: “[T]hey hold that the mysteries of faith are never expressed by truly adequate concepts but only by approximate and ever changeable notions, in which the truth is to some extent expressed, but is necessarily distorted. Wherefore they do not consider it absurd, but altogether necessary, that theology should substitute new concepts in place of the old ones in keeping with the various philosophies which in the course of time it uses as its instruments, so that it should give human expression to divine truths in various ways which are even somewhat opposed, but still equivalent, as they say. They add that the history of dogmas consists in the reporting of the various forms in which revealed truth has been clothed, forms that have succeeded one another in accordance with the different teachings and opinions that have arisen over the course of the centuries. It is evident from what We have already said, that such tentatives not only lead to what they call dogmatic relativism, but that they actually contain it.”

[61] Louis Jugnet, Problemas y Grandes Corrientes de la Filosofía, Colección Clásicos Contrarrevolucionarios, Buenos Aires 1978, p. 88: “Hegelianism is an idealism, that is to say, a doctrine for which only thought exists, with nature and history as its manifestations. In fact, it does not exist without the ‘Idea.’ Logic is the science of idea, pure and abstract; Natural philosophy, the science of determining the Idea in the material world; and Spiritual Philosophy, the science of determining the Idea in the human spirit.”

[62] We have considered this matter rather amply in the third article of our “quæstio disputata” about the conciliar magisterium, La lámpara bajo el celemín, pp. 117–137. We will give a synthesis of our conclusions.

[63] II IIæ, q. 1, a. 2

[64] In the measure in which an effective universal communion begins to appear, it is accepted that effectively universal conceptual formulas begin to arise. It is the hope held in “human rights,” the precious fruit of the globalization of culture.

[65] The Theological Virtues have God Himself as their object: faith reaches out to God as the first Truth, hope as the desired Good and charity as Good Itself. As we cannot love what we do not know and the manner of love corresponds to the manner of knowing, we could not have the love of charity toward God Himself if faith were not a knowledge that reaches, in some way, God Himself.

[66] We say “also” because, as we explained, what is revealed may be understood in two ways: God Himself, and what is revealed about God.

[67] They are called sacraments because they are signs endowed with a sort of efficacy, because they efficaciously make the divine mystery present to whoever has the gift of interpreting them. This efficacy has nothing to do with the efficacy ex opere operato of the Seven Sacraments, as Catholic theology understands it.

[68] As we shall explain more at length in the next chapter, the new humanism is not individualist, but communitarian.

[69] Monsignor Ph. Delhaye, in the “Introducción” a Comisión Teológica Internacional: Documentos 1969-1996. Veinticinco Años de Servicio a la Teología de la Iglesia, BAC, Madrid 1998, pp. 5 and 8, saving what we placed in brackets, which does not appear in this Spanish edition but in the French one from Cerf (the Spaniards are more Papist and such an open criticism of pontifical authority shocks them), p. 16: “Thus we are very far from the exigencies [on the part of the Magisterium] {of one single doctrine, considered classic and taken exclusively} of a single theological current. The pope [Paul VI] desires a pluralism of intentions… the Magisterium is not delegated to the theologians, from those who ask its help. But neither does it take the place of technical theology. There is an abyss between the Wednesday catechism classes of Paul VI, which recall the essential points of the faith that must be believed and lived, and the brilliant discourses of Pius XII that seem to be taken from a classical manual. {And not without reason! They were composed by professors only too happy to pass off their opinions and school theses under cover of Pontifical authority}.”

[70] From the Sequence Lauda Sion, of Corpus Christi: “Dare to do all thou canst, for [the Savior] is greater than all praise, and thou canst never praise Him enough.”

[71] What follows are textual extracts from La lámpara bajo el celemín, pp. 132–134. In the third article of this disputed question we deal at length with conciliar subjectivism.

[72] Comisión Teológica Internacional, “El Cristianismo y las religiones,” en Documentos 1969–1996, BAC, p. 557 to 604. The original text was published in Spanish.

[73] Here, we can situate the theological climate of the document, when it refers to the holy fathers: “In the Catholic theology prior to Vatican II there are two lines of thought in relation to the salvific power of the religions. One, represented by Jean Danielou, Henri de Lubac and others… the other line, represented by Karl Rahner” (p. 559).

[74] …

[75] Without wishing to prejudge our occasional Reader, we suppose that this paragraph would need some explanations, because, while this ought to be the focus of every good treatise on morality, it is not what even our best manuals are accustomed to do. And this defect in Catholic formation comes from the contagion of the modern focus of conscience.

[76] For classical Greek and Latin authors, conscience only has the function of witness and judge of one’s own acts, but it lacks the function of antecedent guide for one’s morality. Conscience as a guide appears with Christianity, especially in St. Paul. Cf. Th. Deman, O.P.’s commentary on the treatise on prudence in the Summa Theologica published by Revue de Jeunes.

[77] St. Thomas recognizes that there are names which, although they denote actions, can also denote the principles of those acts, be it the potency or the habit (as “intellect” can be used to mean the act, the potency and the habit of the first principles, and “charity” of the act or the habit). Nonetheless, warns St. Thomas himself, “conscience” signifies acting in a manner that is not appropriate to denote a potency or a habit, because it signifies “application of science.” Thus, it does not work to use the name “conscience” to denote a rule or norm, that has a habitual and not an active character. The internal norm or rule of conduct are the principles of synderesis, along with those of wisdom and the sciences.

[78] Cf. I-II, q. 94, a. 2

[79] Gaudium et Spes, no. 16: “In the depths of his conscience, man detects a law which he does not impose upon himself, but which holds him to obedience. Always summoning him to love good and avoid evil, the voice of conscience when necessary speaks to his heart: do this, shun that. For man has in his heart a law written by God; to obey it is the very dignity of man; according to it he will be judged. Conscience is the most secret core and sanctuary of a man. There he is alone with God, Whose voice echoes in his depths. In a wonderful manner conscience reveals that law which is fulfilled by love of God and neighbor. In fidelity to conscience, Christians are joined with the rest of men in the search for truth, and for the genuine solution to the numerous problems which arise in the life of individuals from social relationships. Hence, the more that right conscience holds sway, the more persons and groups turn aside from blind choice and strive to be guided by the objective norms of morality. Conscience frequently errs out of invincible ignorance without losing its dignity. The same cannot be said for a man who cares but little for truth and goodness, or for a conscience which by degrees grows practically sightless as a result of habitual sin.”

[80] I, q. 1, a. 8 ad 2: “Since, therefore, grace does not destroy nature, but perfects it…”

[81] Note. To study conciliar doctrine in the documents of the Council itself has an advantage and a disadvantage. It has the disadvantage of being rather undeveloped and hidden in simple phrases, so that only one who is looking for it can find it. It was prepared by the pre-conciliar new theology, and one would have to look into those writings to discern it. But it has no small advantage, as well. The writings of the pre-conciliar neo-theologians, published in a still-hostile medium, were deliberately very complex, written in a personal theological language, in a way that can only be comprehended by one who saturates himself in the author’s mindset. But in the conciliar documents, through the simple style they needed to keep, this new doctrine casts off all its verbal accoutrements and appears in all its simplicity. And the simplicity of these enormous errors is, we must say, brutal.

CHAPTER III

THE NEW CHURCH

Paul VI, in his closing address, affirms that the Council had two great “religious intentions”: one final, to draw closer to modern man through a “new humanism,” and the other immediate, the “redefinition of the Church”: “the Council devoted its attention not so much to divine truths, but rather, and principally, to the Church—her nature and composition, her ecumenical vocation, her apostolic and missionary activity. This secular religious society, which is the Church, has endeavored to carry out an act of reflection about herself, to know herself better, to define herself better and, in consequence, to set aright what she feels and what she commands” (no. 5). In the previous chapter we spoke of that last end; now we must discuss that more “primary and focal religious intention” (no. 5).

It made sense to keep this order because, while the institution of the “new humanism” was last in order of execution, it was certainly first in intention. The redefinition of the Church is the “direct” intention, that is, more immediate; and if the pope considers it “primary,” it is exactly because it constitutes the means to reach it. The Church, as a good Samaritan, redefines herself to save modern humanism, which lies wounded along the way: “Secular humanism, revealing itself in its horrible anti-clerical reality has, in a certain sense, defied the Council. The religion of the God who became man has met the religion (for such it is) of man who makes himself God. And what happened? Was there a clash, a battle, a condemnation? There could have been, but there was none. [What happened was a redefinition of the Church itself:] The old story of the Samaritan has been the model of the spirituality of the Council. A feeling of boundless sympathy has permeated the whole of it” (no. 8).

After what the previous chapter has said, we may understand the general lines of the redefinition of the Church according to the Council. This consists of a resizing in the context of humanity, more precisely, in a humble downsizing. The estimation of human values has become so great that the Council has realized that the Catholic Church is not the only thing that exists and has value, as She thought before. Before, the Catholic Church seemed to believe that She was Everything, but now She has come to know that She is Part of a greater Whole, something in Humanity and for Humanity: “the Catholic religion and human life,” Paul VI acknowledges, “reaffirm their alliance with one another, the fact that they converge on one single human reality: the Catholic religion is for mankind; in a certain sense, it is the life of mankind” (no. 15).

The first surprise that this downsizing of the Church brings, consists in the discovery that there is something respectable beyond her borders: the world and world religions. Before, the Church was considered as the only Ark of salvation, and the outward prospect from her walls showed only a kingdom of darkness, condemned to perdition. All her activity was directed ad intra, in an effort to convert and incorporate all men and nations within Herself. Now that the Council sees Her as part of something greater, a double direction of activities and concerns appears: ad intra and ad extra.”[82]This demands that we divide our chapter into four subjects:

A. The Church and the Kingdom of God. Here we will consider how the Church becomes part of Humanity and what duties She must fulfill to Humanity.

B. The Church and the World. Having established the distinction between the Church-part and the Humanity-whole, we go on to consider the distinction and relationship between the religious sphere of Humanity, in which the Church is included, and the profane sphere, which we may call the World. Here, then, we will not consider the relationship of part to whole, but rather one part to another; in a certain sense, half to half.

C. The Church and World Religions. Within the religious sphere, the Catholic Church discovers new relationships with other religions, supposedly fundamental in regard to its relationship with the World and the foundation of the Kingdom of God in all Humanity.

D. The Church-Communion. Finally, having considered all the new relationships ad extra, we go on to consider how the Council understands the Church must redefine itself in its intimate constitution, ad intra, to be able to fulfill more adequately the former functions, unknown until now.

A. The Church and the Kingdom of God

1. CATHOLIC DOCTRINE

It may be said that all the preaching of Our Lord centered on the Kingdom of heaven, or the Kingdom of God. Jesus Christ speaks of the Kingdom as of a reality to come, but that is still present in a certain way; He teaches that the already-present Kingdom is something interior to man, but that it also constitutes a social reality.[83] It is true that in the Gospels there is much talk of the Kingdom and less of the Church, whereas after Pentecost there is more reference to the Church than the Kingdom, as is seen in the further writings of the New Testament.[84] But it is clear that, with different shades of meaning, both terms signify the same thing.

In the solemn declaration of Our Lord to St. Peter, which St. Matthew relates, the identification of the Church with the Kingdom is uncontestably affirmed: “Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church, and the gates of Hell shall not prevail against it. I will give thee the keys of the Kingdom of Heaven, and whatever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, and whatever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven” (Mt. 16:18–19). “This kingdom of God,” comments one author, “an expression that can have a more or less broad meaning according to context, in this place, due to the perfect parallel with the previous phrase and the following: “whatever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven,” can only signify that the Kingdom of God exists on earth, as Peter, the apostle who stands before Jesus, shall be the supreme authority of this kingdom. The Kingdom of God or kingdom of heaven and the Church are not, therefore, different realities, but two aspects of the same reality. And in this the New Testament corresponds harmoniously with the Old: as the chosen people were the kingdom of God in the Old Testament, so, in the New, the Church of Christ is the kingdom of God on earth. Thus, when Christ speaks of the kingdom of God on earth, He is really speaking of His Church.”[85]

The Kingdom of God principally means that reality that will be fully established beyond history, after the second coming of Our Lord. The Church, on the other hand, principally refers to the society of the baptized instituted by Our Lord in history, in His first coming: that is, the Church Militant. But Our Lord also speaks of the Kingdom as something already established upon the earth, referring to the Church Militant; and the Kingdom that transcends history is what we call the Church Triumphant. The only point on which the idea of “Kingdom” seems broader than that of “Church” is when we refer to the interior rule of God in the heart of the Christian. But neither is this foreign to the idea of the Church, because the immanent Kingdom is established in souls through faith and charity, the principles by which one belongs to the Church of Christ.

Hence, healthy theology has always identified these two concepts: “The Kingdom of God,” St. Thomas says, “is understood as though by antonomasia, in two ways: at times as the congregation of those who walk through the Faith; and so the Church Militant is called the Kingdom of God; at other times, however, as the assembly of those who are already established in the end; and so the Church Triumphant is called the Kingdom of God.”[86]

This is not only theological doctrine, but also Catholic doctrine sustained by the Magisterium itself. The popes, certainly, speak of the Church and the Kingdom of God as the same, identical thing. Leo XIII begins his encyclical on Masonry, Humanum Genus, by saying: “The race of man, after its miserable fall from God, the Creator and the Giver of heavenly gifts, ‘through the envy of the devil,’ separated into two diverse and opposite parts, of which the one steadfastly contends for truth and virtue, the other of those things which are contrary to virtue and to truth. The one is the kingdom of God on earth, namely, the true Church of Jesus Christ.” Pius XI says in Quas Primas: “Catholica Ecclesia, quae est Christi regnum in terris, the Catholic Church, which is the Kingdom of Christ on earth… The gospels present this kingdom [of Christ] as one which men prepare to enter by penance, and cannot actually enter except by faith and by baptism” (Denzinger-Hünermann 2195). Pius XII condemns, in Mystici Corporis, those who distinguish an ideal Church from the juridical Church and clarifies: “The Eternal Father indeed willed it to be the ‘kingdom of the Son of his predilection’; but it was to be a real kingdom in which all believers should make Him the entire offering of their intellect and will.” Indeed, we would never reach an end were we to make a list of passages where the popes identify the Church with the Kingdom of God.

2. THE CONCILIAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN

THE CHURCH AND THE KINGDOM OF GOD

Nonetheless, another of the many surprises that the conciliar doctrine furnishes to the ingenuous traditional Catholic is the distinction between the Church and the Kingdom of God. When we read in Lumen Gentium that the Church is the “kingdom of Christ now present in mystery” (no. 3) and that it “constitutes on earth the budding forth of the kingdom” (no. 5), it might seem to us that it is indistinct from what we had already learned: the Church that fights on earth is the Kingdom of God in the mystery of Faith; and it is at the same time the seed of the Kingdom of Heaven, that is to say, the Church triumphant in the brightness of glory. But where we saw no conflict, the International Theological Commission finds the “difficult question of the relationship between the Church and the Kingdom.”[87] Why is the simple made difficult? Because for us, the Kingdom is simply the Church, but, read closely, for the Council it is not: “Whereas many Fathers of the Church, many medieval theologians and the Reformers of the sixteenth century generally identify the Church with the Kingdom, especially in the last two centuries there is a tendency to place a greater or lesser distance between the two.”[88] Today this distance is considered a commonly accepted doctrine: “To state the inseparable relationship between Christ and the kingdom is not to overlook the fact that the kingdom of God—even if considered in its historical phase—is not identified with the Church in her visible and social reality.”[89]

3. REASONS FOR THE DISTINCTION

As it rose in the defense of human values, humanism is confronting, not so much God as His representatives, that is to say, the hierarchical constitution of the Church. Inasmuch as it moved away from the Catholic Church, it ended up denying her as the legitimate heir of Christ. But, as it is impossible to separate the figure of Jesus Christ from the preaching of the kingdom of God, humanism profited by the nuances between the notions of Church and Kingdom to say that they were distinct entities. This accusation became classic in the phrase of the modernist A. Loisy (excommunicated by St. Pius X in 1908): “Jesus was announcing the Kingdom of God and it was the Church that came about,” objection which, till the Council, was forcibly discussed in every theological or apologetical treatise dealing with the institution of the Church by Christ.

Besides the social aspect of the Kingdom, whence it is identified with the Church Militant, as Our Lord also spoke of its immanent character and its transcendent realization, these two latter aspects have served to negate the first: “Two theories,” Zapelena says, “have reached the greatest celebrity in our days: the first is the eschatological interpretation of the Kingdom of God, which has utterly triumphed in the modernist ranks; the other is the interpretation of the purely internal Kingdom of God, which has many signal patrons in the liberal Protestant school.”[90] The eschatological interpretation was supported principally by A. Loisy, and that of a purely internal Kingdom was defended by Sabatier in France and by Harnack in Germany. Zapelena explains and refutes them amply in his treatise, finally establishing the thesis: “The Kingdom of God which Christ announced is the society, properly so-called, which Christ Himself immediately and voluntarily established: His Church.”

But more recently, among the Protestants there have been more ecumenical opinions which, upholding the distinction between Kingdom and Church, nonetheless recognize that the latter was also in the intentions of Christ; of course, they understand the Church as something greater, of which the Catholic Church is only, in the best of cases, a part. In a scholion to his treatise on the Church, Salaverri considers the matter: “Difference between the concepts of the Kingdom of God and of the Church.” Notably, after mentioning the rationalist and eschatological opinions, he refers to a third, more layered position: “The more recent [critics], however, such as K. Barth, G. Gloege, H. D. Wendland, K. L. Schmidt, affirm that not only the Kingdom of God, but also the Church have Christ as founder; nonetheless in their mind the Kingdom is only transcendent and triumphant, whereas the Church, in contrast, is only temporary and militant; and therefore they establish an absolute distinction and contraposition between the Church and the Kingdom, although they concede that the Church orders itself toward the Kingdom, as an instrument of God in which the virtue of the Kingdom works efficaciously.”[91]

In this context, the new humanism of the Catholics that wanted to make peace between the Church and the modern world tried to accommodate this distinction more closely to traditional doctrine. Maritain attempted it with his integral humanism. But why must they, too, uphold it? It is not difficult to explain.

What is in play here is universality or “catholicity.” However little we know of Jesus Christ, it is clear that His person and His work have an intention of universality. And however little we know of humanism, its pretension toward “catholicity” is also clear, as it sets up the human person as rex et centrum of all creation. But, although the institution founded by Christ takes on the name of “Catholic,” it is irremediably plain that she leaves out many human affairs: all the political novus ordo, which ignores her more and more, and a multitude of other religions. What the new Catholic humanism will do, then, is to recognize universality of action only from the Kingdom of God, in a manner that would effectively encompass all of humanity, and recognize for the Church only universality of intention, that is, that by its function or mission it is directed toward all humanity:

- The universality of the transcendental or eschatological Kingdom does not present a major problem. Firstly, because it is a future problem, and future problems are no problem at all. Secondly, because God will manage to make a new earth where every man is priest and king. The only thing that has to be modified from traditional doctrine, is the matter of universal salvation; for discrimination between right and left, assigning joys to the former and sorrows to the latter, does not correspond to humanist principles. But even this matter of universal salvation, as it is future, is not a problem, and it is enough to establish it as a simple possibility.[92]

- The problem presents itself regarding the present, because the inhuman traditionalists insist that the Church is the universal Ark of salvation, while the old humanists say it is not. The beginning of the solution is found in relegating universality of act to the immanent Kingdom because, although it is not in the future, it is invisible and mysterious, and invisible problems are hardly problems either. The new humanism, then, affirms that every man, by the fact of his being human, belongs interiorly to the Kingdom of God, so he has some relationship with the Church. The equation of universality sums up thus: Humanity = (immanent) Kingdom of God ≈ Church. And should anyone be disturbed, wondering in what the Kingdom of God in the hearts of all men consists, let him know that it is another of the favors of Prometheus, with the astuteness of subjectivism. For Revelation always offers some handholds to find, through the hypostatic union, a certain relationship between Jesus Christ and human nature: “Ipse Filius Dei, incarnatione sua cum omni homine quodammodo se univit.”[93] The detailed explanation of how one thing goes with the other, may be left in the imaginative hands of theological pluralism.[94]

- The conflict with traditional doctrine seemed irredeemable as far as the social Reign and its relationship with the Church as a visible society, especially because of the last developments of the doctrine of Christ the King. But here is where the new humanism unfolded a greater originality, inventing the myth of a “new Christianity,” of which Maritain made himself the standard-bearer; until now no one had realized that Christ reigns in states of “healthy laicism,” whose exemplary model is the United States. Of this we will speak in the next point, in discussing the Church/world relationship. Now let us point out the no less original conciliar explanation of the relationship between the Church and the Kingdom, by means of the notion of sacrament-mystery: the Kingdom is an invisible mystery and the Catholic Church is the sacrament or outward sign that makes it, in a certain way, visible, and efficaciously promotes it in its mysterious growth. In this subtle manner it is explained how the Church is and is not the Kingdom: it is, insofar as it signifies and contains it; it is not, when it serves and seeks it. And some title of universality is still left to the Church: it is not the Ark, but the “Universal sacrament of salvation.”[95]

4. THE CHURCH AND KINGDOM OF GOD ACCORDING TO LUMEN GENTIUM

For Lumen Gentium, is the Church identified with the Kingdom or not? The answer is not immediate because the Church is identified with the Kingdom inchoate on earth—inauguratus in terris—via the mysterious idea of “mystery”: “The Church, or Kingdom of God already present in mystery, visibly grows in the world through the power of God” (no. 3).

This difficult expression is dimly explained in paragraph 5, dedicated especially to this matter:

The mystery of the holy Church is manifest in its very foundation. The Lord Jesus set it on its course by preaching the Good News, that is, the coming of the Kingdom of God, which, for centuries, had been promised in the Scriptures: “The time is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God is at hand” (Mk. 1:15, cf. Mt. 4:17). In the word, in the works, and in the presence of Christ, this kingdom was clearly open to the view of men. The Word of the Lord is compared to a seed which is sown in a field (Mk. 4:4): those who hear the Word with faith and become part of the little flock of Christ (Lk. 12:32), have received the Kingdom itself. Then, by its own power the seed sprouts and grows until harvest time (Mk. 4:26-29). The Miracles of Jesus also confirm that the Kingdom has already arrived on earth: “If I cast out devils by the finger of God, then the kingdom of God has come upon you” (Lk. 11:20; Mt. 12:28). Before all things, however, the Kingdom is clearly visible in the very Person of Christ, the Son of God and the Son of Man, who came “to serve and to give His life as a ransom for many” (Mk. 10:45).

Thus far, it might seem that the Kingdom of God is nothing other than the Church. But the last paragraph alerts us to the distinction:

From this source the Church, equipped with the gifts of its Founder and faithfully guarding His precepts of charity, humility and self-sacrifice, receives the mission to proclaim and to spread among all peoples the Kingdom of Christ and of God and to be, on earth, the initial budding forth—germen et initium—of that kingdom. While it slowly grows, the Church strains toward the completed Kingdom and, with all its strength, hopes and desires to be united in glory with its King.” (no. 5)

It is evident that the Kingdom to be established in all nations is not the Kingdom fulfilled in glory, but the Kingdom that, it is said, is already here. But it is no longer said that the Church is this Kingdom on earth, but rather that the Church has the mission of announcing and establishing it, that the Church is only the initial budding forth of the Kingdom in history and on earth.[96]

The germ, germen, is the bud or stem, the first product of something,[97] which begins it and makes it manifest. The Kingdom of God, then, is a divine reality hidden like the seed beneath the earth, that is, substantially invisible, in the middle of the motion of germinating; and from the Kingdom the Church grows as its visible manifestation, with the mission of announcing and establishing it among the nations. The Church would not be simpliciter the Kingdom of God inchoate upon the earth—as traditional doctrine affirms—but a product of that inchoation; it would not be the seed that becomes the tree, but the first offshoot of that seed which reveals its presence. But, as the offshoot is all that we see, the Church could be called quodammodo the Kingdom of God, inasmuch as in and through Her the mysterious Kingdom is made present: “Ecclesia, seu regnum Christi iam præsens in mysteria” (no. 3). Thus the Council believes it satisfies the traditional doctrine that identifies, without further ado, the Church and the Kingdom.

5. THE CHURCH, “SACRAMENT” OF THE KINGDOM

The seed is Christ, and His presence in the hearts of men is the Kingdom. The Church is neither Christ nor the Kingdom, but the “sacrament” of Christ and the Kingdom. With this novel notion, devised in the circles, until then rather closed, of the “new theology,” the Council believes it solves a conflict with traditional doctrine. And it also fulfills one of its principal purposes: the redefinition or shrinking of the Church before Humanity, made in such a way that it should not lose its merit of the title of “Catholic” or universal.

But, before we go on, a clarification is due. The new theology gets claustrophobic when enclosed within one definition, because as a child it suffered greatly for that reason in its discussions with its stepmother, scholastic theology. Thus, it will not abandon its moderate subjectivism, which allows it to deny the possibility of an essential definition and hold onto a much more comfortable plurality of functional definitions. Lumen Gentium, privileged the definition of the Church as “People of God,” because it suits it to redefine its intimate structure with a more democratic focus. It also continually defines it as the “mystical Body of Christ,” so no one may accuse it of not respecting tradition. But as a definition for theological challenges, it prefers the more subtle term “sacrament,” most adept at reconciling contradictions. Thus no one should be surprised that later, in the concrete life of the post-conciliar Church, neither the former nor the latter term should be used, but rather a new one, the definition of the Church as “Communion,” apt for a peaceful coexistence.

Lumen Gentium defines the Church as a “sacrament” from the first paragraph: “The Church is in Christ like a sacrament or as a sign and instrument both of a very closely-knit union with God and of the unity of the whole human race” (no. 1). For traditional theology, the Church “is” the human race inasmuch as it has united itself to God in Christ, but for the Council that is not the Church, but the Kingdom. The Church is only “like a sacrament, or a sign or instrument” of the Kingdom; that is, of Humanity united with God quodammodo through the Incarnation.

It is true that in the conciliar Constitution the expression “the Church is the sacrament of the Kingdom” does not appear explicitly, because it would have shocked many a pious episcopal ear. But it would be clarified later by the ITC:

It may be useful here to ask ourselves if the Church may justly be designated as the sacrament of the Kingdom… We shall point out, firstly, that the Council has not used this expression in any way… nonetheless, we may resort to the expression “Church, sacrament of the Kingdom” if it is clear that it is used in the following perspective: … The Church is not simply a sign (sacramentum tantum), but the reality signified is present in the sign (res et sacramentum) as the reality of the Kingdom.[98]

As can be seen by the Latin phrases in the last text, the notion of “sacrament” applied to the Church comes attired with all the frills of scholasticism. As long as we do not attempt to be too precise about ontological realities (subjectivism forbids it), the explanation works with a certain simplicity:

- The Kingdom is Christ, truth and grace, present in men of good will. As, according to conciliar optimism, all men have good will, thence the Kingdom is all of Humanity. In a deeper fashion, good will is linked to a certain openness of human liberty to divine transcendence, achieved because the Word quodammodo took on Humanity.

- The Church is a sacrament which signifies Christ and makes Him effectively present before men. Thus it is, as a religious society, the earthly beginning of the transcendent Kingdom, whence it may be said that it “is” the Kingdom (as the whole may be predicated from its principal part); and insofar as it makes Christ visibly present before Humanity, it announces and establishes the Kingdom in the world, whence it may be called the “sacrament” of the Kingdom.

Therefore, should we object that, as the sign is not the signified, the Church (sign or sacrament) is divided from the Kingdom (res significate), the ITC answers: Nego, because although the Kingdom is the mysterious and invisible res, the Church is not sacramentum tantum, but sacramentum et res, that is, it makes the Kingdom present by containing, signifying and being the Kingdom.

6. THE CHURCH, “SACRAMENT” OF CHRIST

The definition of the Church as a “sacrament” is only the tip of the iceberg of the new theology against which the Council was shipwrecked.[99] In the development of the new notion of a sacrament, especially carried out by Schillebeeckx and Semmelroth, Jesus Christ is the “sacrament” of God, and the Church a “sacrament” of Christ. Lumen Gentium does not use these terms but contains their substance. An especially fertile idea was that which drives the notion of the Church as “sacrament” of Christ. Would we not concede that the Church prolongs the presence and work of Christ on earth? Well, this means that the Church is the sign and instrument, i.e., “sacrament,” of Christ in the establishment of the Kingdom in the world. Take note of the following text from Lumen Gentium:

Christ, the one Mediator, established and continually sustains here on earth His holy Church, the community of faith, hope and charity, as an entity with visible delineation through which He communicated truth and grace to all. But, the society structured with hierarchical organs and the Mystical Body of Christ, are not to be considered as two realities, nor are the visible assembly and the spiritual community, nor the earthly Church and the Church enriched with heavenly things; rather they form one complex reality which coalesces from a divine and a human element. For this reason, by no weak analogy, it is compared to the mystery of the incarnate Word. As the assumed nature inseparably united to Him, serves the divine Word as a living organ of salvation, so, in a similar way, does the visible social structure of the Church serve the Spirit of Christ, who vivifies it, in the building up of the body. (no. 8)

If we leave for later discussion the distinction between the hierarchical Church and the Mystical Body, which the problem of “subsistit in” implies, the text tells us that that complex reality which is the visible and spiritual Church is composed of a human element, hierarchical society, and a divine element, the Spirit of Christ, Whose presence in Humanity establishes the Kingdom of God. This Church, then, serves Christ to “communicate to all,” that is, to Humanity, “truth and grace,” which are invisible spiritual gifts. The relationship of the hierarchical Church to the Spirit of Christ is analogous, thence, to the relationship of the assumed nature to the Word of God: both fulfill the function of visible manifestation (= sign) and organ (= instrument) of salvation. The terms are absent, but the concept is there: the hierarchical Church is the “sacrament” of Christ, in a way analogous to how the Man Christ (Nestorianically conceived) is the “sacrament” of the Word.[100]

This paragraph reproduces a felicitous idea of Congar, who humbly attributes it to St. Thomas. It is true that, with St. Thomas (cf. III, q. 8, a. 3), we must understand the Church as Mystical Body as something broader than the hierarchical or militant Church, because it includes the Church Triumphant, Suffering and all those who, on the earth, have supernatural faith, although they have not yet entered by baptism into the hierarchical Church. But the trick is in that, after maintaining that all men are quodammodo united with Christ by a sort of automatic baptism of desire, it is attributed to the visible Church as a whole to be the instrument of Christ for the establishment of the Kingdom. This ministry, in truth, belongs exclusively to the priestly hierarchy, to which it belongs to establish and increase the Kingdom of God on earth, that is to say, the Church. But in cheatingly attributing this ministry to all the Church, She appears as mediator in the establishment and expansion of a Kingdom that reaches beyond her (as indeed the Kingdom or Church reaches beyond the priestly hierarchy). It is thus that the whole Church appears with a “sacerdotal” office as mediatrix between Humanity and God, prolonging the priestly office of Our Lord. A mystical, original and attractive idea, pregnant—as we shall see—with perverse consequences.

The visible Church, thus, has a universality not of extension but of function; it is not the Ark, but the “universal sacrament of salvation.” This is the conciliar reinterpretation of the dogma extra ecclesiam nulla salus.

CATHOLIC DOCTRINE

CONCILIAR DOCTRINE

• The Kingdom of God begun upon earth is identified with the Church.

• The Kingdom of God begun upon earth is identified with Humanity.

• The Kingdom of God extends beyond the visible Church to souls of good will, by reason of the Christian dignity of baptism of desire, incorporated by faith and charity to Christ the Redeemer.

• The Kingdom of God extends beyond the visible Church to souls of good will, by reason of the human dignity of every person, incorporated quodammodo into Christ Incarnate.

• The consequences of original sin and experience of human affairs obliges us to pessimism, considering as extraordinary the existence of Christian dignity outside of the Church.

• Against the teachings of Revelation and experience, the Council obliges itself to be optimistic, considering as ordinary the existence of human dignity in Humanity.

• Hence the necessity and obligation of entering the Church, which is the universal Ark of salvation, because without the doctrine, sacraments and customs of Christian society, the sanctification of men becomes impossible.

• Hence it is neither necessary nor obligatory to enter the Church, which is the universal sacrament of salvation, because the testimony of life in the ecclesiastical society is an efficacious aid to the humanization of men.

• The priestly hierarchy continues the presence and action of Christ for the increase of the Kingdom-Church, in the manner of a living image and instrument, by means of the Sacrament of Holy Orders.

• The visible Church continues the presence and action of Christ for the growth of the Kingdom-Humanity, in the manner of a sign and instrument, because She herself is a Sacrament.

Just as not all are called to enter the clerical state…

…so neither would all be called to enter into the Church.

B. The Church and the World

Here it seems that we have touched the neuralgic point of our problem, not so much from an ideological point of view as from the real point of view. Because, if the liberal distinction between Church and World may be considered as a consequence of the new conception of the Kingdom of God (and the latter, in turn, as a consequence of humanist personalism), this whole doctrinal package is nothing but a great lie to justify and promote the real liberation of political powers, which in the Christian West were really engendered and dominated (as children by their father) by ecclesiastical power. The doctrine adopted by the Council is nothing but a Machiavellian ideology at the service of the occult powers which have been dominating modernity.

To understand the Council, then, it becomes necessary to explain this matter not only from a purely doctrinal point of view, but also with reference to its historical framework. We shall divide the status quæstionis into three periods of very unequal length: that of “Christendom” until the bull Unam Sanctam of Boniface VIII, that of “Catholic humanism” until the encyclical Quas Primas of Pius XI, and the “new Christianity” until the declaration Dignitatis Humanæ of Vatican II. Only then shall we consider the conciliar doctrine and its consequences.

I. CHRISTENDOM UNTIL UNAM SANCTAM

1. The Christian division of powers

The ends that any who govern the multitude must pursue, just as the ends of each individual, cannot be other—as we have seen—than the glory of God and the sanctification of souls. We have not been given being and life for any other reason. The pursuit of these two ends translates, in a more concrete fashion, into the two principal offices of every ruler: to direct his people to give the required public worship to the Creator, and promote growth in virtue in his subjects. Divine cult and virtuous life: behold here the two principal concerns of a ruler worthy of the name.

In a more or less bad fashion (for the consequences of original sin did not allow them to do it well), the pagan kings attempted to attend to these offices. Today, after centuries of liberalism, it seems unthinkable that the president of a nation should concern himself with liturgical laws, but to the chiefs of old it seemed just as unthinkable to begin any enterprise without due application to their gods. But before, as now, hearts were corrupt, and the pagan cults did not maintain, even in the best of cases, more than a shell of religion. A Redeemer was needed.

In the fullness of time, the Word became man to establish on the earth, at last, the promised Kingdom of God. After conquering by the Cross “the prince of this world,”[101] and for the time that must pass until the definitive establishment of the Kingdom at His second coming, Jesus Christ delegated His royal powers for the government of the Kingdom, dividing them into two orders of ministry:

- The apostolic ministry of the successors of Peter, instituted directly by Himself, charged with the properly sacerdotal functions and the superior ruling functions, through which they must teach the nations revealed truth, administer the sacraments as principles of true sanctification, and order the worship of God among the peoples.

- The purely political ministries, whose institution He left to the decisions of men, who discharge the first of the inferior ruling functions: “Render unto Caesar that which is Caesar’s” (Mt. 22:21), through which they must direct the masses in the order of growth and exercise of Christian virtue.

But, as St. Thomas clarifies, there are two ways that the supreme authority may delegate power in ministries that, by the nature of their ends, are subordinate:

- The first way consists of delegating complete power to the superior ministry, so that it in turn may subdelegate its powers to the lesser ministry. According to this procedure, the greater ministry keeps its dominion and responsibility over all that the lesser does, and is the one that gives an account of all before the supreme authority. This is the way in which the ministry of the pope over all the Church commands the ministry of the bishops in their dioceses and the latter over the priests in their parishes; and it is also the manner in which the civil authority of the governor is above that of his ministers.[102]

- But a second way is that the supreme authority should itself delegate, in a direct and immediate manner, its powers to each ministry, so that the lesser ministry need not render accounts of its stewardship to the higher, but directly to the supreme head. The lower power should subordinate its actions in all things that pertain to the higher, but the higher power should not stick its nose into the proper affairs of the lesser, because it has not been made responsible for the conduct of the latter. It is in this second way, and not the first, that Jesus Christ has set up the apostolic and political ministries.[103]

In consequence, although the end of political power, the virtuous life of the masses, is essentially subordinate to the apostolic ministry, ordered directly to the last end, the glory of God and the salvation of souls; nonetheless, political jurisdiction does not descend from ecclesiastical jurisdiction, but directly from Our Lord Jesus Christ the King. Hence it may be said that the political order is indirectly subordinate to the ecclesiastical order. But this is an expression that suffers from a certain ambiguity, because:

– if the adverb “indirectly” refers to the subordination of the jurisdictions, it is correct;

– but if it is understood regarding the subordination of ends, it makes one think that the political end is not essentially, but accidentally subordinated to the ecclesiastical end, which is the Last End; and then it is supremely incorrect.

It is thus that the Apostles received from Our Lord the mission of preaching the advent of the Kingdom of God, inviting not only individuals, but the nations themselves to accept the sweet yoke of Jesus Christ, the only method of achieving justice in time, and salvation in eternity. Because without the magisterium of the Church and the Sacraments, it is impossible for the nations to render due honor to the Creator and acquire the virtues indispensable for living in peace.

2. The establishment of Christendom

In the ancient world, so enslaved to the devil that he was able to offer Our Lord all the kingdoms of the earth: “Omnia tibi dabo” (Mt. 4:9), the most enlightened pagans sighed, with Plato, for the coming of the “reign of the theologians”: “Unless the philosophers rule in the cities, or philosophy and political power should coincide, there shall be no relief for the evils of the cities, nor for those of the human race.”[104] Plato, nonetheless, had pointed out almost cruelly the impossibility for men to establish a government where justice should reign, due to their concupiscence. Men would be needed who should cast off their egoism to seek the common Good of the City, renouncing personal riches and even wives of their own. Where could they be found?

Christ resolved this problem with the division of powers. The Christian kings would submit to an apostolic ministry that, having been relieved of the less spiritual functions, could preserve the necessary purity of intention with the help of grace, practicing the strictest poverty and chastity. The political order would thus be confirmed in virtue by Christian doctrine and the Sacraments, thanks to the higher government of the Christian “Theologians,” that is, the ecclesiastical Hierarchy.

The success of this strategy was confirmed by facts. While the Church could not maintain the Roman order, mortally wounded by its own vices, nonetheless it was able to rebuild from its ruins a most solid order of Christian kingdoms, that which was called “Christendom.” The thirteenth century was the golden age, as much from a religious point of view as a political and cultural one. And we find the doctrinal synthesis of the principles that created it in the Bull Unam Sanctam of Boniface VIII, 18th November of 1302, a declaration that signaled at the same time the beginning of its destruction; for it recalled the principles that men no longer wanted to obey.

II. CATHOLIC HUMANISM UNTIL QUAS PRIMAS

1. Humanism and the separation of powers

As baptism does not completely heal the disorders of concupiscence until after death, the marriage between the apostolic Ministry and the Christian City could not cease to be contentious.[105] It was achieved with much sacrifice, as the long list of martyrs between the first popes and the conversion of the first Roman emperor shows; and was preserved in the same way, as shown by the history of the medieval popes, in particular St. Gregory VII.

But a thousand years made the Christian kings forget the revelation of Constantine: In hoc signo vinces, in this sign thou shalt conquer;[106] that is, that the political order only had the power to conquer its enemies in the measure that it carried on its banners the sign of the Cross of Christ, submitting to ecclesiastical power and lending its swords to its service. Believing that their authority was sustained by the intrinsic nature of the res publica, Christian princes were some of the first to embrace the rebellion of humanism against ecclesiastical authority, in a surfeit of jealousy of the power that the latter had over their own subjects. The attack of Anagni that ended the life of Boniface VIII marked the beginning of the end of Christendom (for it was then that the kings liberated themselves from the dominion of the pope) and gave rise to modernity.[107]

It might be said that, though there was no formal divorce, the popes and political authority began to live separately under the same roof, which gradually merited the name of Christendom less and less. The kings, in general, ceased to promote the faith among their subjects for fear of the strength of spiritual powers; and the popes, in general, ceased to demand obedience from political powers, lest what happened to Boniface VIII also happen to them. And even many of these last were contaminated with humanism.

2. The “middle ground” of Catholic humanism

As we have said, against the excesses of a humanism that inevitably turns against the Church, there has always been a conservative “middle ground” reaction that attempted to save it from shipwreck, reconciling it as far as possible to Catholic doctrine. In the fourteenth century we may see the extreme position in Marsilius of Padua’s Defensor pacis, and the attenuated position of the humanist that would remain Catholic in Monarchia by Dante Alighieri.

Both Marsilius and Dante were weary of ecclesiastical intervention in political matters, not always carried out well. The former proclaims the subordination of Church to state in the temporal order. Meanwhile Dante, as a good Catholic, recognizes the superiority of the ecclesiastical order over the political, but as a better humanist, he separates them and grants a certain autonomy to the latter. Would the result, in the end, be the same or worse? Because the Popes had true power over the states as long as faith in Jesus Christ, Priest and King was kept alive; and political princes were obliged to respect them. But if this faith is extinguished, political power will always seek to subdue the Church. Perhaps the middle position did more to extinguish the faith than the extreme, because the latter hurts the Catholic, but the former anesthetizes him. A strong flame is better extinguished by blocking air from it rather than blowing on it.

The error on which Dante bases his position had already served others and would continue to do service for centuries, until the doors of Vatican II opened. It consists in identifying the temporal end of the state with a purely natural end.[108] It is subtle, because the Christian division of political and ecclesiastical powers proceeds from the distinction between the natural and supernatural orders, but that it proceeds therefrom does not mean that it identifies with it. It is a similar error to that which those commit who, identifying the division between body and soul with the distinction between the animal and rational in man, declare that the body of man has a purely animal function. As the sensible functions, which in a brute are ordained to a purely animal end, are elevated to the service of reason in man; even so political powers, which in a pure order of nature would be ordered to a purely natural end, in the supernatural order in which Christ reestablished us, must be elevated to the service of the Church. Neither man nor society can have two final ends, one natural and one supernatural; but, having been able to have only the natural end, actually have only the supernatural one. The end of the political order is not final, but intermediary, and is essentially subordinate to the last end, directly commended to the power of the Church.

This Solomonic division through which nature and philosophy were left to the State, reserving to the Church theology and grace, delighted the “middle ground,” because, applying the principle that gratia non tollit naturam, sed perficit—grace does not destroy nature, but perfects it, it seemed to do away with the conflicts about the dignity of the popes and leaving the kings free:

- Gratia non tollit naturam. The popes need not claim to dominate, much less remove crowns—Boniface VIII being the last to attempt it—because the latter govern themselves independently with philosophical reason.

- Gratia perficit naturam. The Kings should favor the Church, because it perfects the morality of men.

But—something had to be sacrificed—with this political naturalism the death-blow was dealt to the Christendom born of the Church, whose agony would end two centuries later with the destruction of the Reformation.

In the sixteenth century, Protestant humanism fell into greater excesses. Marsilius of Padua claimed to be Aristotelian and left space for the Church. Luther, on the other hand, rejected the Church and philosophical reason itself, taking refuge in subjectivity. In the new combat that was initiated, the champion of the “middle ground” was the great Catholic humanist Francisco de Vitoria.[109] His position is based on the same error as Dante’s, but now—as happens to the middle point with an ever more distant position—the reduction of the political order to natural law no longer appears as a concession that the innovative theologians seize from the Church, but as the great thesis that the conservative theologians must defend against new denials.[110] Consequently, he would be the first to speak of a philosophical “ius gentium” or international law, a function that Christendom had acknowledged as belonging to the pope as Christ’s Vicar on earth. And, as a final consequence, he would deny that Christ is King of kings.[111]

Vitoria formed a school, and via Francisco Suárez, this reduced position became almost a common doctrine among Catholic theologians.[112] This already decidedly modern concept of the relationship of political order to ecclesiastical would give life to an expression which, as we said, can be clearly understood, but is ambiguous: “indirect subordination.” We had said that the expression is legitimate when applied to jurisdiction, because kings receive it directly from Christ and not the pope; but now it is applied to ends, because the natural end, known through philosophical reasoning, cannot be considered essentially subordinate to the supernatural end, which is gratuitous. Nor can philosophy be considered directly subordinate to Christian theology, only indirectly. From now on, Christians who assume positions in government, govern others as men by philosophical reason, seeking the natural end for their rule, without having to request a nihil obstat from the magisterium of the Church. And they govern themselves as Christians through theological reason, seeking the supernatural end of salvation, in docile attention to the ecclesiastical magisterium; which then continues to have a certain indirect influence over their governments via a Christianity limited henceforth by the rationality of its claims.

In this way, the Catholic intelligentsia abandoned a properly theological combat for the social kingship of Our Lord, and retreated to an allegedly apologetical trench; having accepted the principle that politics moves in a purely natural orbit, Catholic theologians focused on political and social matters from a purely apologetical viewpoint, highlighting the obligation of philosophical reason to accept the Christian faith and recognize the goodness of the Church. But these lame apologetics, animated by a false theological principle, are blighted with incoherence at the very root, because while they do not cease to maintain that rulers must publicly declare themselves Christian and render public worship to the Creator according to the laws of the Church, nonetheless they recognized that in political function they must be guided solely by philosophy. Should they take their subjects to Mass and adore the Eucharist only because it is reasonable to be religious in the Catholic way? Coherence demands one of two things: if a ruler should adore the Eucharist in his condition as a ruler, it is because he cannot behave purely philosophically; and if he must govern as a philosopher, he can only adore the Eucharist as a private individual.

Aggressive humanism was happy to make war on Catholics in this new position. Would they defend themselves solely with the force of reason? Very well; now it will attack them with the subjectivist principle that animates Protestantism: reason depends too much on the subject to take away his freedom of opinion, especially in spiritual matters, whence it cannot be said that it is obligatory to believe; thus, there is no reason to grant privilege to the Catholic religion.

3. Quas Primas

After Boniface VIII, Leo XIII would be the first pope to dare present anew the doctrine of the Church about its relationship with the state (six centuries of silence!) For motives we will not attempt to determine, he judged it more prudent to follow the trend of the anti-liberal theologians of that period and give a decidedly apologetical focus to his political and social doctrine. But he did so with much better apologetics, because he never conceded that the temporal common good which the State pursues is purely natural. Besides, following the impulse of Vatican I, he took up the fight against modern subjectivism, strongly advocating the return of theologians to St. Thomas.

We believe that the most precious fruit of the renovation of Thomism among theologians was the encyclical Quas Primas, of Pius XI, given the 11th of December of 1925, along with the institution of the Feast of Christ the King. We have in it the full and valiant recovery of the true doctrine of the Church about the political order: “We cannot but see that the title and the power of King belongs to Christ as man in the strict and proper sense too.”[113] Quas Primas is the Magna Carta of Catholic politics.

III. THE NEW CHRISTENDOM UNTIL DIGNITATIS HUMANÆ

1. The “New Christendom”

Meanwhile, before the subjectivist assault of modern philosophy, many Catholic theologians and intellectuals took another step back and entrenched themselves in criticism, pretending to defend metaphysics from the point of the Cartesian “cogito.”[114] These intellectual positions manifest a benign, “middle-ground” attitude about modernism, which undermines the firmness of traditional doctrines and attitudes.[115]

These tendencies were strongly encouraged by the policy of ralliement upheld by the Vatican, which preached good doctrine but accepted, in practice, the new order born of the Revolution. We believe we can say that the influence which the doctrine of Quas Primas should have had, was practically nullified by the condemnation of Action Française, made at about the same time. Immediately after this, like mushrooms after a storm, there broke out innumerable writings about “Catholic” policy that progressed along the road of humanist naturalism.[116] The farthest-reaching consequence, perhaps, was the change of sides of Maritain, who having defended the best traditional position in Primauté du spirituel in 1926, ten years later published Humanisme Intégral.

Here there appeared a surprising phenomenon worth considering. The Thomistic renewal of politics was not only aborted, but—via Maritain, Journet, Congar, etc.—seemed to feed the new policy of integral humanism. However, to combat this modernization of the political and social doctrine of the Church, there only remained anti-liberal theologians infected by the apologetical reduction, which accepted the principle of political naturalism.[117] But this position had renounced proposing the doctrine of Christ the King to the states, judging it indigestible to the new democratic republics, relegating Quas Primas to the category of a liturgical encyclical to nourish piety. A notable occurrence then took place: the banner of Christ the King, abandoned by the anti-liberals, would be ably taken up by the Catholic humanist reaction of the new theology, with the intention of establishing a “New Christendom.” The proposal was the following:

New Version of the Social Kingship of Christ

Fundamental principle. When Jesus Christ said: “Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s,” He pointed out that the political order is founded on natural law and its mission is to procure the temporal, that is, natural common good—here is the trick; whereas the ecclesiastical order is based on divine law and has the mission of procuring the spiritual, or supernatural common good.[118]

Ancient Christendom

New Christendom

• In the Middle Ages, men were so Catholic that they embarked their political institutions in “Catholic action,” placing them at the service of a supernatural purpose, mixing the political order within the ecclesiastical order in a theocratic and sacralized Christendom, where the pope was like the Roman emperor over the kings.[119]

• In the Modern Age, men value liberty, equality and fraternity above all. However, these values have been infused into modern society by Jesus Christ, present among men by means of His “sacrament”: the Church.

• Abusing this situation, the popes attempted to depose the kings. But after Philip the Fair, Christian princes freed themselves from this yoke. There were certainly abuses, but in this way the due autonomy of the temporal order was restored.

• Because the Christianization of society does not consist of placing political institutions at the service of the apostolate, but in purifying them within their purely human order. A democratic society, in which liberty, equality and fraternity rule, is in reality a Christian society. As Christian as a society can or should be.

• Feeling nostalgic about the Middle Ages, the theocratic theologians continued to demand that political institutions attend Mass as such, and that rulers offer themselves as ministers of the ecclesiastical power. And when Pius XI spoke of the social kingship of Christ, they did not wish to understand it any other way.

• But many democratic governments only recall the theocratic pretensions of ecclesiastical power and persecute the Church, forgetting that their very existence is owed to Its sacramental presence.

• But medieval Christendom was abnormal, its goodness was very disputable, because both powers caused each other great harm, and now, as everyone recognizes, it is impossible.

• A democracy, then, must cease to be only virtually Christian, becoming so formally and officially, when, recognizing the goodness of this presence, it should favor it legally, declaring religious liberty, which is in its power, for religion is also a human value. This is what constitutes the New Christendom.

2. The consistency of temporal realities

From the traditional beginning of the distinction of jurisdictions: “Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s,” by means of the trick of distinguishing final ends, natural and supernatural, the new theology claims to have rediscovered a forgotten principle, that of the consistency of temporal realities. In a perhaps overly-blunt language, it was the rediscovery of the joys of friendship, wine and money, but the new humanism has managed to wrap this discovery in an almost mystical halo. To understand, it will be useful to go over the history of the process.

The Gospel teaches us that this world is in the hands of the Evil One, wherefore it is good to use its things as though we were not using them, and counsels us to poverty, chastity and obedience:

For the unbeliever, this attitude toward temporal realities seems contradictory and hypocritical. Because medieval clerics denounced riches, but ended up being the first economic power in Christendom; praised chastity, but sacralized matrimony, making the bond with woman indissoluble; preached obedience, but tried to manage the very kings for their own ends.

For the Christian it is easy to understand. The evangelical counsels purify the heart and allow us to find the right appreciation of things in relation to the Kingdom of God: only the poor in spirit value money, only the chaste value woman, only the obedient value authority. And Providence gives what is needed to those who know how to use it; seek the Kingdom of God, and the “temporal realities” shall be added unto you.

With its anthropocentric turn, the humanism of the fourteenth century ceased to seek the Kingdom of God and inevitably placed itself at the service of the other master, Mammon or Money: “No man may serve two masters, because he shall hate the one, and love the other; or he shall give himself over to one, and despise the other. You cannot serve God and Mammon” (Lk. 16:13). The Christian kings ceased to obey God in the person of His Vicar, refusing to hear his counsels, especially that of maintaining the Jews in their ghettos, and they began to fall under the tyranny of Satan, who soon recovered the handling of Christian economy by way of his secular arm, the Synagogue.

But a curious phenomenon is that, at the same time, the “middle ground” of fervent humanism, having lost Christian wisdom as well, fell into an imprudent scorn of temporal realities. Its declaration of the autonomy of the political power, whose temporal and human end (considered natural) would not be directly ordered by the spiritual end of ecclesiastical power, presupposed that the Church had no great need of the service of kings to reach its goals, thus disparaging the importance of the political order with regard to the Kingdom of God.[120] The anti-liberal battle, profoundly affected by this thesis of semi-humanism, was reduced to begging the States to leave the Church in peace, because it neither harmed them nor needed them.

This phenomenon brought on another, no less curious. The new humanism of the twentieth century denounced this true disparagement of the temporal order, although—of course—it confused matters and attributed it directly to the negative medieval spirituality. But the accusation had its subtleties:

The Catholic Church visible on earth—it says—is the sacrament of Christ and the sacrament of the Kingdom. As a symbol of the Kingdom to come, the new humanist appreciates and highlights the angelism of the ecclesiastical institutions, manifested in the evangelical counsels; the cleric must be poor, chaste and humble, just as it is also good that there be laity who take the religious vows, to make themselves announcers of the future spiritual kingdom of Christ. But when, in the Middle Ages, political institutions were sacralized, the spirituality proper to the eternal Kingdom attempted to impose itself on the historical kingdoms, preaching the contempt of worldly goods.

The true Gospel, on the other hand, does not scorn creation; on the contrary, it purifies the heart of men and uncovers the true value of things… Thus far we would be in agreement, but the new thing is that it is not the value that they have for salvation, but the value they have in themselves, considered as what they naturally are, according to their own “consistency” (this is the prevailing term). The admiration of St. Francis for the little birds and the sun, all made up of love of God, is transformed, in the “new” Franciscans, into a mystical love of ecology.[121]

3. Conclusion

We must recognize that the proposal of this “New Christendom” is more coherent with the principle of political naturalism than that of apologetic Christianity. For this reason, “integral humanism” considers it unjust that we accuse it of being liberal. Liberal error, it tells us, consists of separating the temporal from the spiritual, because liberal thought closes off the rational order around itself, denying the possibility of a supernatural order, and thus it is not rational but rationalist, not lay but laicistic. Integral humanism, however, distinguishes both orders to unite them in a “New Christendom.” It seems to us that a society founded only on natural reason would have a great deal of newness, but would have nothing of Christianity; but they explain that it would be, for two reasons:

- Because the purified reason capable of ordering this new humanity is Christian: as the human intellect is wounded by sin, there can be no healthy philosophy without the discreet influence of the Church and grace.

- Because the pure love for creatures, capable of animating renewed humanity, is Christian: as the human heart is wounded, it loves creatures without God or against God; only the purification of Christianity allows him to love creatures in God.

The first motive leads Maritain to defend at all costs the title of Christian for his healthy philosophy; because if philosophy does not merit the name of Christian, neither should its humanist society. The second motive is the mystical naturalism that marvels at the consistency of temporal realities and which today leads Rome to involve itself in the defense of ecology.

As may be supposed, this new Christianity ought to be very pure but also very hidden, like yeast in the dough: “It cannot be realized except with the aid of the medium of the Cross, not the Cross as exterior insignia and symbol placed on the crowns of Christian kings, or decorating honorable breasts; I refer to the Cross of the heart, to the redemptive sufferings carried in the bosom of existence itself.”[122] Maritainism triumphed, and the Council embarked on its last crusade for the social kingship of Our Lord, fighting in every state for the imposition of religious liberty as a civil right.

IV. THE CHURCH AND THE WORLD ACCORDING TO THE COUNCIL

The novelty of Maritainian humanism consists, as we have said, in maintaining the distinction between the Church and the World proper to classical liberalism, but finding the method of consecrating the world to Christ the King. In this rested its success, because when the majority of anti-liberal thinkers, contaminated with the mediocrities of the modern thesis of political naturalism, had cast aside the social royalty of Christ, the new liberals were astute enough to capture this flag and raise it over their troops. This novelty, in the Council, concentrates on the innovative pastoral Constitution Gaudium et Spes on the Church in the present World.

1. A laical but worthy world

Gaudium et Spes merits the adjective “innovative,” because it is the first time that a conciliar document is directed not toward faithful Catholics, but to man in general: “This Second Vatican Council, having probed more profoundly into the mystery of the Church, now addresses itself without hesitation, not only to the sons of the Church and to all who invoke the name of Christ, but to the whole of humanity. For the Council yearns to explain to everyone how it conceives of the presence and activity of the Church in the world of today.”[123] This makes sense neither to the traditional Catholic, nor to the classic liberal; but the new humanism has discovered that the worldly sphere, estranged from the ecclesiastical sphere as the liberal would have it, does not thereby cease to be under the influence of Christ; now the world distinct from the Church, which unbelieving and unbaptized, is a lay World but with the dignity of redemption that leads to final glorification:

[T]he Council focuses its attention on the world of men, the whole human family along with the sum of those realities in the midst of which it lives; that world which is the theater of man’s history, and the heir of his energies, his tragedies and his triumphs; that world which the Christian sees as created and sustained by its Maker’s love, fallen indeed into the bondage of sin, yet emancipated now by Christ, Who was crucified and rose again to break the stranglehold of the Evil One, so that the world might be fashioned anew according to God’s design and reach its fulfillment” (Gaudium et Spes, no. 2).

2. Earthly realities and the Kingdom of God

In this document we feel everywhere that the distinction between the World and the Church is identified with the distinction between the natural and supernatural orders; but it is never said, because the new humanism wishes to overcome it by pointing out how the earthly sphere, without ceasing to be so, is open to the influence of Christ. Humanism believes it has succeeded in discovering the consistency of earthly realities, that is:

– Earthly realities are good by their very nature;

– Grace does not change them but rather helps them to be what they are, that is, it preserves their “consistency”;

– Earthly realities are thus the “matter” of the Kingdom of God.

Commendatio mundi

Nothing is more Catholic than the contempt of the world: contemptus mundi. What does it profit a man to gain the world and lose his soul? Earthly realities only have meaning in relation to eternal ones, but this does not mean we should not consider them. From Suárez to now—we have said—political naturalism has accepted the equation: temporal = natural, but it defended the Christian order, imprudently despising the importance of temporal realities.

The new humanism would correct this error, but not by showing how temporal goods are the body and instrument of the eternal goods of the supernatural order, but pointing out how they are good in themselves: “This Council, first of all, wishes to assess in this light those values which are most highly prized today and to relate them to their divine source. Insofar as they stem from endowments conferred by God on man, these values are exceedingly good” (no. 11). Evidently, it is neither divine grace nor eternal life that our contemporaries most appreciate, but liberty, the rights and works of man, without pausing to think whether they are useful or not for salvation. The Council admires how good these things are, how loved by God; for God made all things for man, and man for man’s own sake: “the only creature on earth which God has willed for its own sake—propter seipsam” (no. 24); so that the egoism of modern man has no reason to separate him from the plan of a God placed at his service.

The consistency of earthly realities

In three chapters, the Constitution especially considers three contemporary values: the human person, community and work. The outline in all three cases is similar. First the link that these values have to God is pointed out: man was created in the image of God (no. 12), the community is the image of the Trinity (no. 24), through work man is similar to the Creator (no. 30); then it is shown how they were damaged by sin;[124] finally, we are told how they are repaired by grace.[125] The outline might seem traditional: creation, sin, redemption; but the novelty is subtle yet complete:

- The human person, community and work are not considered in the first supernatural order of original justice, but in a purely natural order, in themselves, without reference to the action of grace.

- Sin does not harm God’s interests, but only the interests of man himself.

- Grace does not enfold these “values,” raising them to ends above and beyond their own nature, but helps them to better be what they are by nature, not removing their own “consistency”: “Now many of our contemporaries seem to fear that a closer bond between human activity and religion will work against the independence of men, of societies, or of the sciences. If by the autonomy of earthly affairs, we mean that created things and societies themselves enjoy their own laws and values which must be gradually deciphered, put to use, and regulated by men, then it is entirely right to demand that autonomy. Such is not merely required by modern man but harmonizes also with the will of the Creator. For by the very circumstance of their having been created, all things are endowed with their own stability, truth, goodness, proper laws and order. Man must respect these…”[126] (no. 36).

The material element of the Kingdom

Let us be clear, if you please. We do not say that the Council preaches total naturalism; not so. It preaches a momentary naturalism, only while History lasts. Because the time of the fullness of the Kingdom of God will come, with the transformation of the universe; and then indeed the kingship of Our Lord will be made manifest. The Catholic Church is a historical anticipation of this Kingdom, presented to the world as a visible Sacrament. The World, in turn, prepares for that transformation by bringing earthly realities to natural perfection, thus making them the “matter”—the material element—of the Kingdom: “Now, the gifts of the Spirit are diverse: while He calls some to give clear witness to the desire for a heavenly home and to keep that desire green among the human family, He summons others to dedicate themselves to the earthly service of men and to make ready the material of the celestial realm” (no. 38).

V. AT THE SERVICE OF THE KING OF THE WORLD

After the two World Wars, the Council did not stop talking about peace among the nations. Would the pope, Vicar of the Prince of Peace, offer himself as God’s instrument to establish the peace of Christ in the world? Such was the function of the Roman Pontiff in medieval Christendom, but now it was judged impossible, because ecclesiastical power must not interfere directly in the world order. To explain the relationship between the two spheres, a new concept was found: that of “sacrament.” Spiritual realities should function as exemplary causes of the temporal, that is, as effective signs. The unity and peace of the spiritual sphere—read: the unity of all religions achieved by the pacification of ecumenical dialogue, in which the peace of Christ supposedly exists—must be an example to motivate the nations to unite themselves and achieve peace in the earthly sphere: “Peace on earth, born of love of neighbor, is the image and effect of the peace of Christ which proceeds from God the Father” (Gaudium et Spes, no. 78); “By virtue of her mission to shed on the whole world the radiance of the Gospel message, and to unify under one Spirit all men of whatever nation, race or culture, the Church stands forth as a sign of that brotherhood which allows honest dialogue and gives it vigor” (no. 92). This idea, developed in Lumen Gentium,[127] is not made explicit in Gaudium et Spes, but is present as the backdrop; the term “sacrament” is not used either, but the concept, as the cited texts demonstrate, is present.

The gravest consequence of this error is that, forgetting that the only authority capable of effectively promoting international peace is the pope, the Council advocated for the constitution of a political world authority with power over the nations so as to impede wars; this is the principal demand of Gaudium et Spes: “As long as the danger of war remains and there is no competent and sufficiently powerful authority at the international level, governments cannot be denied the right to legitimate defense once every means of peaceful settlement has been exhausted” (no. 79); “It is our clear duty, therefore, to strain every muscle in working for the time when all war can be completely outlawed by international consent. This goal undoubtedly requires the establishment of some universal public authority acknowledged as such by all and endowed with the power to safeguard on the behalf of all, security, regard for justice, and respect for rights” (no. 81). Now, by theological necessity, the only authority with power to prevent wars that is not that of the Vicar of Christ, must be that of the Antichrist. Dear reader, we are not writing apocalyptic fiction! If it is not the Prince of Peace who establishes the order of justice among the nations by means of the powers He has communicated to His Vicar, it shall be the Prince of darkness who does so by means of the powers he grants to his firstborn, the Antichrist. These are the powers in play, and nothing else is possible. Which kingdom is it, then, whose establishment the Second Vatican Council is aiming to prepare with all its might?

C. The Church and World Religions

The conciliar downsizing of the Church did not reduce itself to merely making it only a part of the Kingdom of God, to make room for a world that is secular, yet consecrated in pectore to Christ (liberal reduction). The Catholic Church would also make itself merely a part of the Church of Christ, to make room now for world religions (ecumenical reduction).

I. THE PROBLEMS OF ECUMENISM

The poison of subjectivism, which necessarily affects humanism, in its pretension to freedom from the mastery of the Church and from the tyranny of metaphysical realism, claimed its first great victim with the rupture of Protestantism. The necessary backing which the “reformers” needed to obtain from political powers and the infinite division of their sects led them to a double humiliation: they had to acknowledge that the Church of Christ, if it existed, was composed of a colorful mosaic of groups, and that none of them could impose their caprices on the political order.

In fact, the doctrine of the Kingdom which we have set forth above was first developed in the environment of the Protestant ecumenical movement, at the beginnings of the twentieth century.[128]

- At the Stockholm conference, August 1925, of the Life and Work ecumenical movement, the problem was posed of how the Kingdom of God influences the sphere of human civilization without identifying with it.

- At the Lausanne conference, August 1937, of another similar movement, Faith and Order, which would later join the former to form the World Council of Churches, there was an effort to determine how the Church of Christ includes the diverse churches: “As only one Christ exists, only one life in Him, only one Spirit, there is not nor can there be more than one holy, catholic (universal), and apostolic Church.”[129]

- At the following Edinburgh Conference, August 1937, the distinction between Church and Kingdom was recognized, though they did not manage to explain what it consists of.

It is inevitable that, if these sects turn more sincere and do not take themselves seriously, they make this double ecumenical and liberal critique. And it is understandable that they dream of bringing in the Catholic Church in these discussions, by respectfully offering her a large slice in the super-Church of Christ.

Among the Eastern schismatics the same phenomenon appeared, augmented by the great influence that Protestant theologians had had among them since the eighteenth century.

The least comprehensible matter is that there should have been Catholics who let themselves be tempted by the charms of this ecumenism. It can be explained, though, because humanist tendencies aim toward this super-universality, permitted by optimist subjectivism.[130] However, the Catholic who would enter into the ecumenical movement without ceasing to be Catholic would face two problems: how to give entity to the other religions, and how to still preserve the identity of the Catholic Church.

1. The entity of religions

Thus far, Catholic doctrine classified sects and religions different from the Catholic Church as false religious forms, yet accepting the possibility that in such communities there might be a few individuals with true faith and grace, through which they belonged interiorly and invisibly to the true Kingdom of God on earth, that is, to the Church, which is an abnormal form of belonging.

The individual entry of all men to the Kingdom of God was relatively easy to manage, because it happens through truth and grace, which are invisible interior realities. It was needful to justify that those who belonged invisibly to the Kingdom were not few, nor was their belonging abnormal:

- For the first point, it was enough to generalize their good will with optimism, basing it on a mysterious and indefinite union of Christ with all men, so justifying that not a few, but all or almost all should thus belong to the Kingdom.

- For the second, the Church had to be distinguished within the Kingdom as the environment of visible religion, justifying this distinction with the liberal doctrine of the “new Christendom,” according to which those who remain in the secular sphere are not obliged to enter the ecclesiastical one, since they become Christians in their souls if they become humanists. Thus, this became a normal mode of belonging.

Religious communities, on the other hand, have visible structures or forms, whence, according to the liberal distinction between the mundane and ecclesiastical spheres, they would have to be calculated into the latter sphere. But how can one justify that their external structures, clearly different from those of the Catholic Church, still belong to the Church of Christ? For the reformed ecumenists it was easy, but not for those who stubbornly refused to stop being Catholic.

2. The identity of the Catholic Church

Besides, if they tugged on the blanket to cover their toes, their heads would be uncovered. Because Catholic doctrine was accustomed to identify the Church of Christ with the Catholic Church, as Pius XII had most recently recalled in Mystici Corporis, so that, if religious communities were simply recognized as part of the super-Church of Christ, the Catholic Church lost its identification with the total Church, which had already been explicitly condemned.[131] How to grant religious communities participation in the Church of Christ in such a way as to classify them as “true,” without the Catholic Church losing her own identity? This last problem was the hardest to solve. But much love gives wings to the imagination, and there was no lack of resources to fly over these problems. The first was solved by the “elementa Ecclesiæ” and the latter by the ingenious “subsistit in.”

II. THE “ELEMENTA ECCLESIÆ”

1. The gateway to ecumenism

Traditional theology offered a handhold to link the sects with the ecclesiastical structure: the “vestigia Ecclesiæ.” These vestiges or remnants of the Church that all recognized as existing in separated religious communities were also principles of truth and grace:

- Principles of truth, such as many truths of faith and, above all, Holy Scripture.

- Principles of grace, such as certain sacraments, especially baptism and, in certain cases, the Holy Eucharist and the priesthood.

If the principles of truth and grace of the individual who is outside the visible perimeter of the Church (the possibility that he have infused faith and sanctifying grace) nonetheless justify his belonging to the same; why would these principles of the communities, the “vestigia Ecclesiæ,” not do something equivalent? Would not the faith by which a Protestant is saved be fed by the Holy Scripture offered him by his community; would not faith come to him through the baptism given him by his community, received as a child, or in good faith?[132]

This was the door on which the new theologians knocked, until the Council opened it.[133]

As the term “vestigia” was a bit disdainful, it was exchanged for “elementa.” And when, after the Council, things had ripened sufficiently, the communities that also had the priesthood and the Eucharist were granted the same category of “particular churches”: “The Churches which, while not existing in perfect communion with the Catholic Church, remain united to her by means of the closest bonds, that is, by apostolic succession and a valid Eucharist, are true particular Churches.”[134]

2. A false gateway

If theology called them “vestigia,” it is precisely because they are only remnants or scraps of the Church, which in the sects become dead and inoperative:

- Heretical or schismatic communities may maintain many dogmas and venerate Sacred Scripture, but they do not have the Faith or the Magisterium of the Church to understand them. The seed of faith that a few souls might keep among themselves tends to be choked by the thorns of heresy that the community upholds.

- The sacraments may be valid, but do not give the fruit of grace, whence it may not be said that they are true. When St. Thomas, for example, asks “if heretics, schismatics and excommunicates may consecrate,” he responds that “they may consecrate the Eucharist, [but] do not receive the fruit of the sacrifice.”[135]

- Apostolic succession in schismatic sects that have preserved the validity of the sacrament of Holy Orders is purely material, and the episcopal sees are usurped, lacking jurisdiction. These communities are dry twigs that have broken off from the true Vine.

The trick of the new theology, then, consisted of considering these dead and useless “vestiges” as living and sanctifying principles, which is well designated by the term “element.”[136]

III. THE DESTINY OF “SUBSISTIT IN”

1. How can the Super Church be and not be the Catholic Church?

Using “vestigia Ecclesiae” (transformed into “elements”), neo-theologians thought they were opening a back door to the ecumenical system. But this wasn’t sufficient for providing an entryway to the World Council of Churches, because the other Christian communities were not happy to be considered a defective part of the Catholic Church. If the papists wanted to enter, they had to recognize that the Catholic Church was no more than another part like they were of the super Church of Christ. Neo-theologians, full of “humility,” were completely willing to accept it, but how could they reconcile it with the well-established Catholic custom of identifying Herself as nothing less than the Church of Christ?

The solution was brilliant. But they themselves must recognize that it was not simple and did not have the traditional aura of the “vestigia Ecclesiae.” That is why this point is still unsettled. The proposal is only understood by those who have a certain theological background. According to ecumenists, the Church of Christ must be recognized as something more than the Catholic Church, for it includes the other Christian communities, and with a little effort, other religions. But conversely, to be a true Catholic, one must identify the Church of Christ with the Catholic Church. This same problem of designations was already posed in regard to the God-man, Jesus Christ. In the mystery of the Incarnation we use the theological tool of the communication of properties, to speak of Christ. What is proper to the divine Word is said of the man Jesus, and what is proper to the man is said of the Word. For instance, Jesus created the Universe or God died on the cross. Although God is greater than man, man is God in Jesus Christ. So, ecumenists wanted to use this same communication of properties to relate the Church of Christ to the Catholic Church. So, while they recognized that the Church of Christ is a greater reality than the Catholic Church, nevertheless, Catholics had to be told that the Catholic Church “is” the Church of Christ, All this without ecumenists being discovered in flagrant contradiction!

However, this brilliant but complex explanation inevitably had a sad outcome because, destined to reconcile ecumenists with Catholics, it was not liked by either one. Catholics do not like to hear that the Church of Christ is larger than the Catholic Church. And ecumenists do not like to hear that the Catholic Church holds a privileged position compared to other faiths. So no neo-theologian wanted to extend the explanation. The solution, then, was to reduce the explanation to the expression “subsistit in” [subsists in], the most obscure formula from scholastic theology—so scorned in other cases by the new theology. St. Thomas had used this expression to explain how the Word can exist in two natures: “The person of Christ subsists in two natures.” Just as God “subsisting in” Jesus’ human nature allows us to affirm that Jesus “is” God, so also to say that the Church of Christ “subsists in” the Catholic Church still allows us to affirm that the Catholic Church “is” the Church of Christ.

This explanation is all the more brilliant because it is so obscure that neither ecumenists nor Catholics can understand it. In ecumenical gatherings ad extra—on the outside—it can be translated “contains,” yet in Catholic groups ad intra—on the inside—it can be translated “is.” So everyone is happy! However, the Council’s texts must be checked more thoroughly before determining the correct interpretation of “subsistit in.”

2. The Vatican II context of “subsistit in”

Popes have repeatedly condemned attempts by Catholics to enter the ecumenical system, clearly denouncing its falsehood. Ecumenism is a very early consequence of the universal brotherhood established by humanism, so the Council would not fail to open this door wide. Like the majority of conciliar metamorphoses, Lumen Gentium offers us the doctrinal keys or tricks of the conjurers of the new humanism. There we find the plastic definition of the Church as “a sacrament” and also both reductions that this notion of “sacrament” tries to justify in two ways. First, the mysterious reduction of the Church compared to the Kingdom announces a lay world separate from the Church, a subject developed in Gaudium et Spes. Secondly, the Catholic Church’s reduction compared to the Church of Christ through “subsistit in,” (the door to Christian ecumenism in Unitatis Redintegratio and to universal ecumenism in Nostra Aetate).

The topic was introduced at the end of the first chapter of Lumen Gentium which deals with the mystery of the Church. The first sentence of No. 8 again takes up the previous subject, explaining that the Church is “a sacrament” of everyone’s union with God. “Christ, the one Mediator, established and continually sustains here on earth His holy Church, the community of faith, hope and charity, as an entity with visible delineation through which He communicates truth and grace to all.” The Church of Christ is a visible whole that, as a sacrament, communicates truth and grace to all men in an invisible way, even to those who do not belong to her.

Following Pius XII in Mystici Corporis and Humani Generis, subsequent sentences deny that a visible hierarchical Church can be distinguished from a purely spiritual one.[137] Then the text continues: “This [complex reality] is the only Church of Christ, which in the Creed is professed as one, holy, catholic and apostolic, which Our Savior, after His Resurrection, commissioned Peter to shepherd, and him and the other Apostles to extend and direct with authority.” No member of the World Council of Churches would deny that, for they all aspire to be part of this one, universal Church that comes from the Apostles. The question is: what role does the current Church of Rome seek to fulfill in it? This is what is made clear—pardon me, what is not at all clearly stated next. “This Church [of Christ], constituted and organized in the world as a society, subsists in the Catholic Church.”[138] This was how the minimum quota for joining the Ecumenical Club was paid. The entrance fee was paid, since Mystici Corporis was not invoked by saying that the Church of Christ “is” the Catholic Church.[139] But it was minimal because the privilege of subsistit in was maintained, so that, when necessary, it could be said ad intra among Catholics, that the Catholic Church certainly “is” the Church of Christ. The door was opened.

The same sentence explains what exists in the Church of Christ besides the Catholic Church. “Many elements of sanctification and of truth are found outside of its visible structure. These elements, as gifts belonging to the Church of Christ, are forces impelling toward catholic unity.”[140]

3. Church, Church, and Churches

Following its collegial, democratic orientation, Vatican II especially emphasized the notion of “particular Church” within the universal Church.[141] The enhancement of the particular Church was provided by the notion of “sacrament,” leaving aside its juridical aspect. “The particular church, since it is formed in the image of the universal Church, can also be considered one of its sacraments” which, as a living image, makes it present and active in every particular place. The sacramental definition of the Church, which is realized in every Eucharistic assembly, also serves the ecumenical agenda excellently. It permits giving the name of true “Churches” to those communities that, although they have separated from the hierarchical structure of the Catholic Church, nonetheless preserve the “ecclesiastic elements” of the Eucharist and the priesthood. The Council’s recognition of this name could only be stated without going into greater detail, for many miters were not yet ripe.[142]

The conditions that would allow a separated Christian community to be called a Church were fixed much later by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith in two documents, the letter Communionis notio in 1992 and the Declaration Dominus Jesus in 2000. The first of these documents tries to palliate the state of generalized schism into which many Catholic groups were falling. It reminded them that the Eucharistic assembly was not enough to be the whole Church, since the pope should not be forgotten. But in fact, this papal “ministry” is not that essential because the truly schismatic communities which have seized Episcopal Sees, are still given the title of Churches: “The orthodox churches have very close bonds and have kept apostolic succession and a valid Eucharist, but are separated from the See of Peter […] We are bonded very closely through the Eucharist…, so they are considered to be particular churches.”

The Declaration Dominus Jesus was published to mitigate many Catholics’ excessive ecumenical enthusiasm.[143] But this did not hinder it from recognizing the title of “true particular Churches” to communities with the Eucharist and episcopate, and from also adding that “the Church of Christ is present and active” in them, which still hadn’t been said very clearly. “Therefore, there exists a single Church of Christ, which subsists in the Catholic Church, governed by the Successor of Peter and by the Bishops in communion with him. The Churches which, while not existing in perfect communion with the Catholic Church, remain united to her by means of the closest bonds, that is, by apostolic succession and a valid Eucharist, are true particular Churches. Therefore, the Church of Christ is present and active also in these Churches, even though they lack full communion with the Catholic Church…” (No. 17).

The Council, then, not only duplicates, but rather triplicates the notion of Church. Now we have the Church of Christ, the Catholic Church, and the particular churches. Some of them belong to the Catholic Church and others do not, but they all belong to the Church of Christ. The Catholic Church and the Church of Christ are present and active (acting as a sacrament) in the particular Catholic Churches, while in the particular non-Catholic Churches only the Church of Christ is present and active. But be careful! The Church of Christ subsists only in the Catholic Church and in none other. Dear me, what a mess!

IV. SAVING “SUBSISTIT IN”

1. Ratzinger comes to the rescue

Since normal people tend to be very gullible, in the spectacle of ecumenism, many Catholics began to discern the Church of Christ like a mosaic of Christian communities, among which the Catholic Church was but the larger portion. And since the whole is very vague, many began to think that the unity of the Church of Christ was only an objective to be reached. But this explicitly contradicts the traditional belief in the indefectible unity of the Church. Therefore already in 1973, the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith was obliged to recall that the Church had not lost her unity. But the process was far from decelerating, so that by the year 2000, Rome had launched her operation to rescue “subsistit in.” As mentioned above, this mysterious expression had to fulfill two jobs: the “ad extra” job of opening the door to ecumenism, implying that the Church of Christ is not totally identified with the Catholic Church, and the “ad intra” job of permitting the translation “est” in a state of emergency. The ecumenical job was successful, so much so that the unity of the Church was by then scarcely believed. Rome then declared the emergency and sought to dust off the traditional interpretation which the Council also had desired to impart.

In 1985, Rome had published a Notification on the volume “The Church: Charisma and Power” by Fr. Leonardo Boff, containing an earlier, lesser known clarification of the meaning of “subsistit in.”[144] The operation, apparently promoted by Cardinal Ratzinger’s team, began with Dominus Jesus, which simply advised that “by the expression of ‘subsistit in’ the Vatican Council II wanted to harmonize two doctrinal statements:” that the Church of Christ continues and exists fully in the Catholic Church, and that the elementa Ecclesiae derive their efficacy from Catholic plenitude.[145] How that term succeeds in harmonizing these two statements is not explained. But merely recalling that subsistit in grants a privilege to the Catholic Church over other Communities caused great unease in the ecumenical arena.

Elected pope in April 2005, Benedict XVI manifested his intention to continue the ecumenical movement, but declared that he was more concerned by the threat of the Church’s impending shipwreck. Without changing, then, the ad extra policy—Cardinal Kasper would continue to be in charge of ecumenism—he tried to blow some traditional oxygen into the handling of the schizophrenic ad intra government. In December of that same year, on the 40th anniversary of the close of the Council, L’Osservatore Romano published an impressive article titled “Subsistit in” (Lumen Gentium, 8) (three whole pages) by Father K. J. Becker, professor at the Gregorian University, adviser to the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, and it is said, J. Ratzinger’s confidant.[146]

Becker presents the problem very clearly right from the beginning. “Nowadays the opinion is widespread that the expression subsistit in was introduced in consideration of the elementa veritatis et sanctificationis present in other Christian communities and, therefore, with the purpose of attenuating the identification between the Church of Christ and the Catholic Church.” After researching the minutes of the discussions that led to the writing of Lumen Gentium 8, he concluded, “The bishops never doubted the statement Ecclesia Christi est Ecclesia catholica, that is, their conviction of faith that the Church of Christ was identified with the Catholic Church. There is no basis in the minutes for the various attempts to translate or explain subsistere in that do not take the previous statement into account. […] No reason is ever given for the change recorded in the minutes from est (is) to adest (is present) and from adest to subsistit (is subsisting). The hypothesis seems possible that with est some foresaw the possibility of denying the presence of ecclesial elements in other Christian communities or of not taking them sufficiently into account. Therefore, the motive would be, in this case, terminological and not doctrinal.”

He also studied Unitatis Redintegratio and Ut Unum Sint, and came to a happy conclusion: “subsistit in means no more than to perdure.” “Subsistit in aims not only to confirm the meaning of est, that is, the identity between the Church of Christ and the Catholic Church, but also to corroborate, above all, the fact that the Church of Christ, with the plenitude of all the means instituted by Christ, persists, remains forever in the Catholic Church.” Although Dominus Jesus said that “subsistit in” reconciled that statement with the one about “ecclesiastical elements” and true “Churches” outside the Catholic Church, Becker said this is not true. He said that the Council left this problem open.[147]

Moreover, he said that the qualification of “ecclesial,” and especially the name of “church” given to non-Catholic communities are terms that have no theological support.[148] But, didn’t Cardinal Ratzinger sign more than one document upholding that the valid Eucharist and apostolic succession were enough to buy a true title of “Church”? Well, yes, but Becker thinks it is not clear enough, and that after the Council, theologians had the freedom of opinion. And if you belong to the Society of St. Pius X and are scandalized by “subsistit in,” my advice is that you go and see Fr. Becker. He’ll calm you down!

The following week, L’Osservatore Romano clinched the “est” nail with an article by Monsignor Fernando Ocariz, under the long title Church of Christ, Catholic Church and Churches that are not in complete union with the Catholic Church. “As is known, this famous expression, ‘subsistit in,’ has been the object of contradictory interpretations. The idea has been and continues to be particularly widespread that the Council did not want to make the traditional statement that the Church of Christ is the Catholic Church, as the preparatory schema had stated, in order to be able to affirm that the Church of Christ also exists in the Christian communities separated from Rome. In fact from analyzing the minutes of the Council, we deduce that…” and he quotes Becker’s happy conclusion.[149]

But Ocariz’s article also seeks to silence Becker’s dissonant opinion of non-Catholic “Churches.” The Council follows “the already traditional use of the term” when designating “non-Catholic Christian communities as Churches.” It doesn’t give them “simply a sociological or even an honorific meaning,” but rather a theological meaning. “Subsequent doctrinal and magisterial development of this topic refers to the letter Communionis notio and to the declaration Dominus Jesus. It led to attributing the certainly theological title of particular Churches to non-Catholic Christian communities that have preserved the episcopate and the Eucharist.” The necessary presence of the pope’s authority in a particular Church “may appear like an insurmountable obstacle for affirming that non-Catholic Churches are true particular Churches.” But the conciliar doctrine of “collegiality” seems sufficient for holding that where there is a bishopric, no matter how schismatic it may be, there is something of the papacy: ubi episcopus, ibi Petrus.[150] Lastly, “another aspect of capital importance must not be omitted: non-Catholic particular Churches are true Churches by what is Catholic in them… Recognizing the characteristics of Churches in these communities that are not in full communion with the Catholic Church necessarily involves affirming that, although it seems like a paradox, these Churches are also portions [sic, in italics] of the One and Only Church, that is, of the Catholic Church—portions in an anomalous theological and canonical situation.”

Ocariz is more politically correct than Becker, but he will not be replacing Kasper in the ecumenical dialogue either. For no ecumenist would ever forgive him for having said that non-Catholic Churches are portions of the Catholic Church. How paradoxical indeed! Yet, Ocariz is wrong. No! It is not true that “subsistit in” means no more than “est” in the mind of the Council. “Est” wasn’t replaced without a reason. When it is said that “the Church of Christ is present and active in the separated Churches,” the Catholic Church cannot replace the Church of Christ as Ocariz naively does. Thus he sins twice. He sins firstly against “subsistit in” because the Church of Christ is not completely the Catholic Church, but rather it is only inasmuch as it subsists in her. He sins also by indiscretion in using the word portion, because it is too clear that these Churches are portions of the Church of Christ and not of the Catholic Church as Ocariz says.

Following the Council’s usual method, after the theologians had stated their opinions, the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith wrote a synthesis. This can be found in Answers to some questions about certain aspects of doctrine on the Church, June 29, 2007. Nothing new is said. The following answer is given to the third question: Why is the expression “subsists in Her” used and not simply the verbal form “is”? “The use of this expression, which indicates complete identity between the Church of Christ and the Catholic Church, does not change the doctrine on the Church. The true reason why it has been used is that it expresses the fact more clearly that many elements of sanctification and truth are found outside the Church. As gifts belonging to the Church of Christ, they lead towards Catholic unity.”

2. A trompeuse (tricky) expression

Although he was simply giving an analysis of the text as to the intention of Lumen Gentium No. 8, Fr. Becker contributes a fact that sheds some light on the true meaning of subsistit in. The ingenious inventor of the expression was none other than Fr. Sebastian Tromp, S.J., professor of the Gregorian University from 1927 to 1967, adviser to the Popes from Pius XI to John XXIII, considered the main consultant for Pius XII’s Encyclical Mystici Corporis, and assistant theologian to Cardinal Ottaviani during the Pre-Council and the Council. Tromp was a member of the Commission in charge of writing the outline on the Church. “Three points are certain, says Becker in the above-quoted article—H. Schauf wanted to substitute adest for est, while S. Tromp answered by proposing subsistit in. Philips, the moderator of the discussion, confirmed the acceptance of subsistit in. Therefore, not the bishops, but members of the commission, changed adest to subsistit, the same as the change from est to adest. Those present in the commission did not elaborate what was actually meant by “subsistit in.”[151]

The mystery thickens, and the question still remains as to how Tromp was able to come up with the famous expression. The expression “subsistit in” must have been excogitated by a scholastic theologian, who was familiar with Thomistic terminology but who was not very imbued with its meaning and use. This certainly seems to be the case of Fr. Tromp, whose leading theologian was not St. Thomas but rather St. Robert Bellarmine. As is traditional and as found in Mystici Corporis, Lumen Gentium No. 8 also established a “profound analogy” between the relationship of the Word incarnate with the human nature of Christ and the relationship of the “Spirit of Christ” with “the social union of the Church,” that is, between the hidden divine principle and the visible human principle. But what was not at all traditional, and the pressure of the Council seems to have imposed it on Tromp’s mind,[152] was that, to construct the Church of Christ, the Spirit of Christ didn’t relate only to the one and only Catholic Church, but to many other non-Catholic additions, the elementa Ecclesiae. In other words, although something new must be said: that the Spirit of Christ is active in other visible societies, nevertheless something old must also be affirmed: that only the Catholic Church is the Church of Christ.

If this is so, one may obviously expand on the analogy: the Word has not only united with Christ the man through the hypostatic union, but also with many other men through grace. So it can be said that Christ is present and active in all of them. To defend, then, the Catholic dogma of the identification of the Church of Christ with the Catholic Church, the scholastic’s bubbly head thought: a union with the Church of Christ analogous to that of grace must be attributed to non-Catholic societies. However, another union must be attributed to the Catholic society analogous to the hypostatic union where it can be said only of Christ the man that He is the divine Word. How could both unions be expressed? Well, let’s say that Christ the man is the Word because the Word subsists in that particular human nature and in no other one. Then, something analogous must be said of the Catholic body: that the Church of Christ subsists in the Catholic Church. Simply brilliant!

Well, Fr. Tromp’s expression certainly is trompeuse (a trap)! He wanted “subsistit in” to be able to be translated “est” so it could say that “the Church of Christ is and continues to be the Catholic Church.” But he wanted to use an “est” that does not mean absolute identity where everything attributed to the Church of Christ would also be attributed to the Catholic Church. Rather it should leave room beyond the visible limits of the Catholic Church. For otherwise ecumenism would sign its death warrant. So, somehow the Church of Christ has to be in the other religious communities that certainly do not belong to the visible structure of the Catholic Church.

3. An expression which neo-theologians cannot understand

At a conference on “The ecclesiology of Lumen Gentium,” published in L’Osservatore Romano on August 25, 2000, the then Cardinal Ratzinger recognized that the origin of “subsistit in” had something to do with scholastics and with the hypostatic union. “When coming to this point, it is necessary to analyze the meaning of the word ‘subsistit’ a little more deeply… By this expression the Council separates itself from the formula of Pius XII who had said in his Encyclical Mystici Corporis Christi: the Catholic Church ‘is’ the only Mystical Body of Christ. The entire ecumenical problem lies in the difference between ‘subsistit’ and ‘est.’

“The word ‘subsistit’ is derived from ancient philosophy and was developed later, by scholastics. It comes from the Greek word ‘hypóstasis,’ which in Christology carries out the basic role of describing the union of the divine and human natures in the person of Christ. ‘Subsistere,’ a special form of ‘esse,’ is a being which is a subject existing of itself. The Council meant that the Church of Jesus Christ, as a concrete subject in this world, can be found in the Catholic Church. That can only happen once, and the idea that ‘subsistit’ could be multiplied is alien to its correct meaning. By the word ‘subsistit’ the Council wanted to express the singularity of the Catholic Church, and not multipliability: the Church exists as a subject in historical reality.”[153]

The problem remained that this scholastic contribution to modernity was not understood by theologians of modern thought, who were the ones who had requested it, because this expression is not used at all among them. For example, Michael Schmaus, the champion of orthodoxy in the seminary of the young J. Ratzinger, is absolutely unacquainted with the use of this term.[154] But that is not very important. “Est” had to be replaced and the more mysterious the replacement was the better, because it was a better resort if hidden. And, so much the better if its author is the same one who had upheld “est” in Mystici Corporis!

What, then, is the philosophical meaning of “subsistit in”? The verb “to subsist” is not only used in its common meaning of “to remain,” but also in the strict meaning of “to be in itself and not in another subject,” as in a mode of being proper to substances. So “to subsist in something” can be understood in one way only—that of the species in the genus, or in the case at hand, of the substance in the nature. So, we say rightly that the person subsists in a certain nature, whether human, angelic or divine. “Est” fits in this case. The person is a man, an angel or God. In this way, says St. Thomas, Christ as a person—that is, the Word—subsists in the human nature and in the divine nature. Therefore it can be said that He is man and He is God.

Saying, then, that the Church of Christ subsists in the Catholic Church, is to affirm that in some way the subsistent subject, the Church of Christ, has the Catholic Papal Society as its own nature, in such a way that no other visible society belongs to it by way of its own nature. If we accept this explanation, as Becker and Ocariz do, the Church of Christ would be nothing more than the Catholic Church, absolutely without exceeding her limits. For, outside of the Catholic modality, it would be denatured. But the Council does not want this. In order to give way to ecumenism, it is necessary to bear in mind the analogy with Christ. For Christ subsists in His concrete, particular human nature, being more than the man who was born in Bethlehem, surpassing His limits since He is also God with a divine nature. And as the God Who He is, He can become present and active in other men. The Council, then, meant that like Christ, the Church of Christ can subsist in a concrete, particular society, the Catholic society, and yet can exceed her limits, becoming present and active in other religious communities, since it also has a divine nature, conferred by the Spirit of Christ.

The use of this scholastic term, however, is incorrect on several points when applied to something other than its Thomistic use. First of all, it is not taken in the strict sense, of course, but in the analogical sense, for a society is not a substance. But, there is still a greater drawback to this analogy.[155] The person of the Word can subsist in a human nature which it exceeds only and strictly because it is divine. Only the pure, infinite Being that includes within Itself all perfection, can, according to its subsistence, take on another limited nature without any contradiction.[156] It is absolutely contradictory for a created reality to subsist in two natures. Either it has one nature, or it has the other, but not both. The Church of Christ, no matter how divine it may be considered, is not an infinite being.

Therefore, when all things are said about “subsistit in,” only two possibilities exist, the first is heretical and the second, Catholic:

- If the Church of Christ is said to be found somehow outside the Catholic society, in non-Catholic communities, it cannot subsist in the Catholic society, since subsistence indicates the intimate nature of a thing. In other words, what is naturally Catholic cannot be also naturally non-Catholic.

- If it means that the Church of Christ subsists in the Catholic society as in its own nature, it follows that it is the Catholic Church and does not exceed it at all. And if it were truly present and active in non-Catholic communities—which it is not!—to the vexation of all of them, it would be the Catholic Church which would be present and active. Then Becker and Ocariz would be right. But that is not what the Council wanted to say.

We have interpreted the verb “subsist” in its scholastic meaning, trying out the hermeneutics of continuity, which ended in failure, and have concluded that this famous expression is no more than a fraud. Yes, we know that the explanation we have given will not be liked by anyone but its author. Yet, it must also be known that it hardly matters to explain it or not because this concentration of enormous, deliberate confusion was propounded precisely as bait to adversaries of ecumenism, Catholics as well as non-Catholics.

By the end of the lengthy Lumen Gentium decree on the nature of the Church, one might hope that it would leave us with definite answers. But the Council redefined the Church in utter confusion: it is a Sacrament and a Mystery, but the Mystery is and is not the Sacrament; the People of God is the Kingdom, but it is not, rather it makes it present; the mystical Body is the Church, yet it is not, but rather subsists in it; etc. The muddle was such that the only sure thing that could be preached about Her was the most extensive, and therefore, the vaguest notion conceivable: that the Church is a “common union…” that is, she only knows that she knows nothing about herself: She is “some type of communion.” But this was the ideal framework for peaceful coexistence with doctrinal pluralism!

V. THE “AD EXTRA” STRATEGY OF VATICAN II

It seems that we are now in a position to understand the “ad extra” strategy of the Second Vatican Council.

1. The conciliar illusion

Humankind, in the mind of the Council, has been chosen by God to establish His Kingdom beyond history, where it shall achieve its fullness as an image of God in full freedom. In history, this final fullness is prepared by the progress of human values: of a freedom in equality for all, which should not lead to division by egoism, but to unity through universal brotherhood. In sum, the Kingdom would come to us, as we pray in the Pater Noster, in the measure that man is made more truly man.

To encourage this process, God established his Kingdom in the Christ-Man, the gathering of all those who, by a special religious and priestly vocation, anticipate the future form of the Kingdom and live religion in a visible and social manner. This Church is the “sacrament” of the Kingdom, that is, it is a visible sign or image of the future Kingdom, with effects ex opere operato to dispose humankind to the final coming of the Kingdom. On seeing these religious communities living in liberty, equality and fraternity in their unearthly sphere, men are moved to establish the same values in their earthly sphere. The Church, in this way, continues the priestly mission of Christ.

But a double obstacle to the preparation of the Kingdom appears:

- The sin of theocratism, committed by the Catholic Church in the Middle Ages, provoked an anti-religious reaction in the States, impeding their communication with the “universal sacrament of salvation,” which consists of the peaceful acceptance of the presence of the Church of Christ among the nations.

- The sin of doctrinalism, committed as well by the Catholic Church in the same era, led her to excommunicate any who did not accept from A to Z the theology of Greco-Roman culture which the Roman hierarchy adopted. In this way the testimony of freedom that the Church of Christ should have given to the nations was overshadowed, dividing itself into a multitude of Christian sects and becoming incapable of incorporating non-Christian religions.

The Second Vatican Council, recognizing for the first time in history that the Church is holy but not that holy, because it too can sin, has decided to make reparation for both these sins, displaying a short-term strategy to make up for these two obstacles to the coming of the Kingdom:

- Promoting religious liberty in the worldly sphere, to make up for its theocratism; because the nation that acknowledges the civil right to religious liberty comes under the social rule of Christ the King, for it communicates with the total Church, the “sacrament” that makes Christ and the Kingdom present, thus going on to integrate the New Christendom.

- Promoting ecumenism, in the religious sphere, to make reparation for its doctrinalism. Because if the World does not see liberty, equality and fraternity shine in the religious sphere, that is, in the total Church, the latter is ill fulfilling its sacramental function as image of Christ and the Kingdom. Through the links of ecumenism, the triple unity of which John XXIII spoke at least begins to shine: First: the tight unity of Catholics in which subsists the total Church; Second: the broader unity of the Christian communities, linked by the “elementa Ecclesiæ”; Third: the fullest unity of the World Religions, linked by the “semina Verbi.”[157]

The long-term strategy to achieve the historical unity of humankind, as an immediate disposition to the transcendent unity of the Kingdom, is also, of necessity, double:

- Achieving the unity of the religious sphere in a Universal Church, under the presidency of the pope, supported by a Council of United Religions, in the exercise of new, non-doctrinal version of the primacy, that respects the dignity of differences.

- Achieving unity of the political sphere in a global World—under the presidency of an Emperor?—supported by a Council of United Nations, which would exercise its authority in a democratic fashion, with the necessary force to stop wars and defend human rights. Both spheres would unite when Christ returns.

2. Catholic reality

If the hearts of men are not elevated to God by the truth, upheld by the Magisterium, and by grace, infused by the sacraments of the Church, they necessarily fall into selfishness and are ruled by Satan. And what is true for the individual, is also true for society.

Although it may not wish to acknowledge it, every political order is of necessity founded on a religious concept, because no man can persuade others to obey him, if not for the purpose of a final good (true or perceived) superior to all men, in relation to which what we call religion is established.[158] Hence, always and necessarily, the highest authority among men has a priestly religious character. In Christendom, kings recognized this authority in the pope, as Vicar of Jesus Christ. For this same necessity, false religions are structures of Satan to dominate men politically, especially the Synagogue and also Islam. If the Protestant sects did not go so far as to give a soul to political orders, it was because they had already been born within the process that would lead to the new liberal order, whose religion is Masonic humanism.

The conciliar illusion, unthinkable as that may seem, places the structure of the Church at the service of liberal humanism. If the task of crowning a world Emperor should be achieved, he should necessarily be discovered as the true spiritual Father of humanity—because the pretended liberal separation of the religious and political spheres is a great lie—and the pope would only be his slave: Prometheus bound. The two spheres, O surprise, would be united, but not for the coming of Christ with His eternal Kingdom, but the apparition of Antichrist with his ephemeral reign of three and a half years.[159] And of this advent has the Second Vatican Council constituted itself the Prophet.

D. The Church-Communion

It remains to consider the ad intra strategies of Vatican II. The Council, as we saw, has used a series of functional redefinitions of the Church, each one useful for diverse needs. For the difficult justification of their ad extra strategies, it was convenient to use a subtle definition as “sacrament.” For the rearrangements ad intra, it would mainly use two terms: the definition of the Church as “People of God,” with a constitutive end, and its definition as “Communion,” with a more operative purpose; the first given in Lumen Gentium, the second used in the post-conciliar years. As agere sequitur esse (action follows being), we shall first consider the Church as Priestly People; then, an important consequence, Collegiality; finally, the notion of Church-Communion.

I. A PRIESTLY PEOPLE

1. The necessary democratic conversion

The intrinsic contradiction of the humanist illusion leads it to cloak itself with the lie of democracy. The contradiction is flagrant and so is the lie, but they support each other by a certain balance of tensions that has something mysterious about it. Humanism wanted freedom and cast off the yoke of authority: it did so completely with ecclesiastical authority in the Protestant Reformation and with political authority in the French Revolution. But without the authority of a shepherd, the wolves devour the sheep, resulting in a quick end to freedom for the latter, and an end to the supply of sheep for the former. Hence, an authority that respected freedom had to be invented; and thus, democracy.

As we have said, the contradiction is clear: there cannot be freedom for all without an authority that will protect the common good. But the freedom which humanism promotes can only be that of the wolves, that is, that of the strongest. And therefore, the falsehood of democracy becomes evident: it is not the rule of all, but the rule of the wolves in sheep’s clothing, who ration their meals so as not to make an end of the flock. As they continue to protect the flock, albeit for their own advantage, the sheep vote for them out of annoyance with the shepherd, for fear of the wolves themselves and out of hope that it will always be the other sheep that gets eaten by the wolf panting at their heels.

Democracy, then, is a lie that is maintained because it wants to be believed: The wolves in sheep’s clothing want it believed to dominate the flock; The sheep with wolves’ teeth want to believe it to justify their disobedience; The sheep that are sheep want to believe it because the truth causes them anxiety.

Forgive the fable; but when the time comes to understand the necessary democratic conversion that Vatican II imposed upon the Church, it becomes relatively easy to uncover the sophistries that justified it, because the falsehood is flagrant, but it is harder to uncover the intentions that led to their adoption, since several intertwine. Let us first sketch out a discernment of their intentions, so as to later dedicate ourselves to denounce more neatly the fallacies with which they cloaked themselves.

2. The purposes of the democratic turn of Vatican II

As we have just suggested, in the establishment of the conciliar democracy three intentions or ends can be discerned: one perverse, one stupid and one Machiavellian:

- The wolves in sheep’s clothing. As in the story of the just Job, God seems to have turned over the faithful Church of the thirteenth century to the besiegement of Satan, who would attempt to establish the kingdom of his firstborn, the Antichrist. The obstacle to his rule is the health that the power of the pope communicates to Christian political powers—that is, to Christendom. Hence Satan has been working for centuries to break that bond, spreading the lie of humanism among men. The final step in this labor of destruction certainly seems to be that the pope himself deliberately renounce the very exercise of his power, and this was achieved by introducing the lie of democracy in the Church[160]. This has been an announced and denounced work of the masonic lodges, which infiltrated the flock of Christ as wolves in sheep’s clothing.

- The stupefied sheep. A lie, flagrant as it may be, can be imposed by force of repetition. The humanist illusion managed to impose itself on ecclesiastical preaching by way of propaganda. Indeed, the progress of the revolution has been intimately tied to the progress of mass media.[161] To simplify the explanation, we may say that the Catholic sheep ended up believing ecclesiastical democracy is necessary because they were stupefied by periodicals, radio and television, we use the term stupefied in the etymological sense: made stupid).

- Carnivorous sheep. The most complex intention is that of the convinced modernists, which we should call Machiavellian. In part they are willfully deceived, because their desire to accommodate themselves to the world has led them to adopt the humanist sophistries, which permit them some justification; although, seeing their intrinsic contradiction of the faith they do not wish to lose, they keep them in a certain confusion so as not to produce all their consequences. And, in part, they deceive everyone else, because if they did not adopt the lying principles of democracy, they could not even dream of imposing such a reform as the Council’s on the Church, because only the democratic form allows the unbinding of the exercise of authority from its commitment to doctrine. However, Machiavellianism is, properly speaking, the form of government that makes doctrine into an ideology at the service of power.

3. The common priesthood

St. Peter calls the Church a “priestly people”: “But you are a chosen generation, a kingly priesthood, a holy nation, a purchased people: that you may declare his virtues, who hath called you out of darkness into his wondrous light: who in time past were not a people: but are now the people of God” (I Pet. 2:9–10). In the Old Testament, only the tribe of Levi was priestly, consecrated to divine worship, whereas in the New Testament the whole Church has that state.

The new humanist theology knew how to take advantage of this doctrine, but, of course, introducing a subtle modification, because it says that the People of God are not only “priestly,” but properly “priests”:

- To traditional theology, even as all the tribe of Levi were priestly, but only the male descendants of Aaron were priests, even so all the Church is priestly, in that all partake through the sacrament of baptism in the Anointing of the High Priest, Jesus Christ, but only the male descendants of the Apostles through the Sacrament of Holy Orders are priests.

- To the new theology, the priesthood of Christ is not communicated firstly and properly to the Apostles and their successors, but to the whole Church as such.

This invention of a “common priesthood” fulfills two excellent services to the humanist vision:

- It consecrates ad extra the reduction of the Church via the notion of “mediation.”

- It consecrates ad intra the conversion to democracy via the notion of “service.”

Priestly mediation

The priestly unction separates the priest from the world and consecrates him as a mediator between God and man. To traditional theology, it is the clerical state with respect to the rest of the Church. But to the new theology, this becomes the state of the whole Church with regard to the World. The sophistry has something of genius to it, because it allows a multitude of errors to be arranged in a sort of synthesis of seeming Catholicity.

The Catholic distinction between the lay and clerical state had been subtly transformed into the liberal distinction between secular or lay and confessional. The Latin term laicus comes from the Greek , belonging to the people (), and from the first centuries of Christianity it was set against the term clericus, from , which comes from , (fate, inheritance); and from the Old Testament is used to refer to the Levites, whose inheritance was the Lord: “And the Lord said to Aaron: “Thou shalt possess nothing in their land, neither shalt thou have a portion among them: I am thy portion and inheritance in the midst of the children of Israel” (Num. 18:20). The cleric, among the Christians, is he who consecrates himself to the service of divine worship, ordained to the priesthood and passing into the ecclesiastical state through the clerical tonsure, whose form is taken from Psalm 15: Dominus pars hæreditatis meæ et calicis mei: the Lord is the portion of my inheritance and of my chalice. The layman, on the other hand, belongs through baptism to the faithful people. “Some Gnostic heretics of the first centuries, seconded principally in the 14th century by Marsilius of Padua and from the 16th century on by every Protestant, fought for the egalitarian concept of all the members of the Church. Catholic doctrine, on the contrary, obliges us to acknowledge the existence, by divine right, of two categories or states of socially distinct people: the clergy and the laity. That this inequality was established by Christ is clear in the Holy Scriptures, is confirmed by patristic tradition and solemnly defined by the Council of Trent.”[162]

As the cleric is the one who has been consecrated to divine worship, “lay” also began to signify “profane,” that is, that which is “not concerned with religion or religious purposes; secular.”[163] But to a society that gradually ceased to be Christian, and among Catholics that began to be accustomed to a political order foreign to the ecclesiastical, “lay” started to mean that which dispenses with the religious, as opposed to “confessional.”[164] The theologians of the new humanism, then, legitimized this meaning of “laicity” as proper to the worldly sphere, distinguishing it from the “laicism” that shuts out all religious transcendence, and—herein lies the innovation—granted to the sphere of ecclesiastical confessionalism all that which the scholastic theologian once attributed to the clerical order. Thus, baptism began to be interpreted as though it were the clerical tonsure, and the entire Church appeared clad in priestly robes.

In this way, a multitude of Catholic truths came to have an extremely different interpretation: the priestly mission and vocation for one, lay dignity for another.

The priestly mission: The priest is sent (missus) by God to expand the Kingdom. To traditional theology, only the Apostles and their successors received the missio from Jesus Christ, in which the clergy collaborate by their own office and the laity in an extraordinary form, as Catholic Action. To the new theology, the whole Church is priestly and, hence, the whole Church receives the “mission”: “[The People of God]’s end is the kingdom of God … which is to be further extended”…“[I]t is also used by [Christ] as an instrument for the redemption of all, and is sent forth into the whole world as the light of the world and the salt of the earth” (Lumen Gentium no. 9); “the Church has received this solemn mandate of Christ to proclaim the saving truth from the apostles and must carry it out to the very ends of the earth.”[165] Catholic action, which we must now interpret as humanist action, becomes the proper office of the lay-priesthood, at whose service the hierarchy is placed.

The Christian vocation. Evidently, the priesthood works for the Kingdom, but does not identify with the Kingdom. As traditionally the clergy, who labor on the earth to establish the Kingdom of God, did not claim that all on earth be made clerics, but only those called by God to this special vocation; so in modern days faithful Christians, who must work so that all the world as such may enter into the Kingdom, must no longer expect that all become “confessional,” but that the manifest belonging to the Kingdom of God be understood as a special vocation.[166] Hence the Church-Priesthood is now distinguished from the Kingdom of God.

Human dignity. Another Catholic truth is that, while the priesthood implies a special consecration, not for that reason does the laity cease to have dignity in the eyes of God. But to the new theologians, scholasticism reduced the priesthood to the clergy, then reduced the Kingdom to the Church and finally demonized the World, considering it the kingdom of Satan. By now acknowledging the priestly consecration of the whole Church, the lay world regains its dignity of belonging as such to the Kingdom of God. To be sure it is no longer the Christian dignity of the baptized, but the no less great “Human Dignity.”

Service

Jesus Christ said to the Apostles: “You know that they who seem to rule over the Gentiles, lord it over them: and their princes have power over them. But it is not so among you: but whosoever will be greater, shall be your minister. And whosoever will be first among you, shall be the servant of all. For the Son of man also is not come to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a redemption for many” (Mk. 10:42-45). With these words—says humanism—began the democratic conversion of authority. Because here it says that it is not people who serve authority in search of the common good, but that authority serves the people, because that same common good is worthless if it is not redistributed among the people.[167] As people are not made for society, but society for people, so neither are people at the service of authority, but authority at the service of its people. However, it is evident that authority would not truly serve mankind, without some species of democracy.

If the democratic conversion hibernated a thousand years without developing—they go on to say—it was because the theocracy of medieval Christendom, begun with the conversion of Constantine, contaminated ecclesiastical authority with the absolute overlordship of pagan authorities. It became necessary that humanism free itself from ecclesiastical authoritarianism to make room for evangelical democracy, resulting in the extraordinary case that it thrived first in the lay states, and it was only later that the ecclesiastical state learned it from them.[168]

For this reason—they conclude—the hierarchical or ministerial priesthood must be interpreted as a function at the service of the common priesthood of the whole Church. And as the Catholic Church had clung to structures and procedures inherited from medieval authoritarianism, the Council was obliged to introduce prudent reforms that should finally realize the evangelical concept of authority.

This perverse error can appear subtle only on paper. Authority serves the common good, which is the greater good of all, and not the particular good of each person. And to achieve it, it must order the intellects, wills and actions of the community, which it would never manage without the respectful docility of each member. If Our Lord highlighted to the Apostles the necessity of humility and a generosity that reaches even to the sacrifice of one’s own life, it is above all because they needed to procure the salvation of men wounded with selfishness by sin. The error, as we say, is subtle only on paper, because democracy is a Machiavellian lie to free political power from moral and doctrinal limitations. It is necessary to be totally foreign to the exercise of power to be able to be deceived. As we have said, the deception is maintained by an immense pressure of propaganda and, above all, procuring that those who have any power should believe they can take advantage of this lie.

4. The priesthood of the faithful

Lumen Gentium would structure all its innovations around the notion of the “common priesthood” of the People of God. But they had to proceed with caution, because the explicit democratic thesis that priestly power belongs firstly to the Church as a whole and only secondarily to the ecclesiastical hierarchy, had already been condemned as heretical.[169] There was a recourse, nonetheless; because, in aid of the liturgical movement, the doctrine of the common priesthood of the faithful had worked its way in among the theologians, becoming, on the eve of the Council, if not a common doctrine, at least a theological opinion commonly accepted as orthodox. The only condition imposed on it was that it recognize an essential distinction from the ordained or ministerial priesthood. The artisans of the Council well knew how to take advantage of the opening.[170]

After the first introductory chapter, where the Catholic Church is reduced before the Kingdom and the Church of Christ (ad extra), Lumen Gentium begins to redefine the Church itself (ad intra), using the notion of a People of God (Chapter 2). In its first paragraph (no. 9) the above-mentioned quote from the first letter of St. Peter appears, along with the mention of the “missio” of the Church. And in the second the notion of a “common priesthood” appears. But, in place of speaking directly of a priesthood of the whole Church, it speaks of the orderly conjunction of the multiple priesthood of its parts: “[T]he common priesthood of the faithful and the ministerial or hierarchical priesthood are nonetheless interrelated: each of them in its own special way is a participation in the one priesthood of Christ” (no. 10). Once this is accepted, we can speak without taboos of the “priestly community”: “It is through the sacraments and the exercise of the virtues that the sacred nature and organic structure of the priestly community is brought into operation” (no. 11).

Lumen Gentium, really, maintains the same theory as the Council of Pistoia condemned by Pius VII, which is, in turn, a Catholicized version of the Lutheran theory. The Church partakes collectively in the priesthood of Christ and each faithful member enters into this participation by baptism, or by faith, or by being quodammodo united to Christ (it is never very clear by what means we hold this common priesthood; an option is chosen according to the needs of the moment). The hierarchy is constituted by those faithful whose common or general priesthood is made special by the sacrament of Holy Orders (here they escape the anathema against Luther). But, as every hierarchical function should be understood as a function of service, ordained priests must consider themselves ministers of Christ through the Church, according to the modern concept of democratic authority (wherewith they do not avoid the anathema against Pistoia).

This error is refuted by showing that no common priesthood of the faithful exists in the proper sense, even when it is called essentially diverse from the ordained priesthood. Catholic doctrine only permits us to speak of a purely metaphorical priesthood of the faithful.[171] In any case, we should not be too disturbed, because the Council considers these theological digressions necessary only to add a link of continuity with traditional doctrine, because the moderns are not too fond of the idea of a priesthood. The term is used as little as possible in the conciliar documents, and practically vanishes afterward. The “ministerial priesthood” becomes “ministry” and the “common priesthood” becomes a “communion.”

5. Priests, prophets and kings

Priestly mediation fulfills a double task, from God to men and from men to God. The priest is God’s representative before men to fulfill the triple office of magisterium, sanctification and government; and represents men before God to offer Him the cult of worship owed Him.

Humanism would reverse this situation. Atheistic humanism denied God, removing the sense of any mediation: Man teaches and worships himself, but the existential vacuum kills him. Reformed humanism found that a God without representatives is easily placed at its own service and only denied mediation: Man is inspired in himself and adores the image of God in himself (coinciding, in fact, with atheistic humanism); but he suffers from the loneliness of individualism. Catholic humanism was more patient and engineered matters to put God and all His representatives, the Hierarchy and the Church itself, at the service of Man. Since Lumen Gentium, it is the whole Church that will fulfill the double task of mediation between Humanity and God: it would exercise the divine functions of prophet (magisterium), priest (sanctification) and king (government) for men, and promote the cult of men toward God. But it would not be done with authoritarian pretensions, but as an act of service.

Prophetic function

Although Humanity is quodammodo united to Christ, it is good that the Church make God present in a visible fashion, not to teach men as a tutor would children, but to give testimony of transcendent realities, the proper task of prophecy. What was the magisterial function of the Hierarchy for traditional theology, to the new theology is the prophetic function of the whole Church: “The holy people of God shares also in Christ’s prophetic office, spreading abroad a living witness to Him” (Lumen Gentium, no. 12).

As we may understand, this office is fulfilled by Catholics in the laical facet of their lives and not in the confessional facet, because by confessional activities they withdraw from the world, living moments of heavenly life as a presage of the heavenly Kingdom, while only in their lay activities do they place themselves before the world, thus presenting Christ in themselves. It is here that the “new evangelization” is actualized, teaching the world by example how to be true men. For the same reason, bishops and priests will preach Catholic spirituality ad intra from their sees and pulpits within the churches, but through the mass media they will preach, ad extra, on ethics and human sociology.

Although this proposal is simple, nonetheless the problem of continuity with traditional doctrine needed to consider the question of the infallibility of the hierarchical magisterium, so highly brought into relief since Vatican I. And here the conciliar wizardry played its trick as well, exploiting the little-defined doctrine of the infallibility of the sensus fidei of the Christian people. It is traditional truth that “the entire body of the faithful… cannot err in matters of belief” (Lumen Gentium, no. 12). For Catholic theology, this property is a consequence of the infallibility of the hierarchy; but the trick of the new theology consisted in attributing it to the direct inspiration of the Holy Ghost: “[D]iscernment in matters of faith is aroused and sustained by the Spirit of truth…Through it, the people of God adheres unwaveringly to the faith given once and for all to the saints” (Lumen Gentium, no. 12).

As no. 25 in the same Constitution also speaks—in a very traditional manner—of the infallibility of the pope and the apostolic College, from Lumen Gentium onward there is a reference to a double infallibility:

– The fundamental infallibility of the Church, founded on the sensus fidei proper to the common priesthood;

– The infallibility of the Magisterium, subordinate to the first, proper to the ministerial priesthood.

In fact, there is one single common infallibility, because neither can exist effectively without the other. The common feeling of the Church requires the hierarchical function to unify and express itself; the hierarchical magisterium must take heed to what the Holy Ghost inspires in the whole Church to translate it into conceptual formulas and proclaim it with authority. In this way the hierarchical magisterium, which before was the immediate representative of Christ in service to revealed truth, is now the direct representative of the People of God in service to ecclesiastical unity.

If to all this we add the principle of moderate subjectivism, with its consequent theological pluralism, it is clear that there are not two infallibilities, nor even one; it makes no sense to speak of doctrinal infallibility, because dogmatic formulas never suffice to explain divine mysteries. Therefore, though the word “magisterium” continues to be used, the reality it signifies has ceased to function.

Priestly function

The Church sanctifies itself with the priestly function through the sacraments, beginning with baptism. But it would sanctify and consecrate the World through the purification of its intelligence, cooperating so that the sciences should base themselves on some metaphysics, and through the purification of the heart, helping it to discover the consistency of temporal realities and to love them without losing sight of transcendent ones.

The office of sanctification of the Church ad intra belongs more to the ministerial priesthood, but the office of sanctification of the world ad extra would, as aforesaid, belong more to the laity: “as those everywhere who adore in holy activity, the laity consecrate the world itself to God” (Lumen Gentium, no. 34). This would be a true “consecration,” because as the World becomes more human, it becomes more divine, as Man is the image of God.

Royal function

The King is one who is not a subject; that is, who has freedom. By its royal function, the entire Church makes herself spiritual director to the World, showing it the paths to freedom. For this reason, the strongest exercise for the social kingship of Christ that the conciliar hierarchy leads, is the battle to implant in all nations the civil right to religious liberty, which is the first and fundamental liberty.

The cult of the new religion

What we have said about the priestly office of the Church also permits us to understand what comprises the cult of the religion of the World, of which She makes herself the mediatrix before God, while historical time lasts, in which the Kingdom is still not fully manifest. This cult is nothing but humanist culture, through which the glory of Man, image of God, is cultivated. The Church has the mission of incarnating the Gospel in Culture, humanizing it and opening it up to transcendency. In this way it fulfills its priestly function of making the World render worship to God, because, discovering the divine value of the human, it is discovered that the glorification of Man is the worship of the Creator (alas, all these things we say are blasphemies!).

This matter of worship was another of the hot topics of the Council. While, with the apologetical retreat of the anti-liberal combatants, the spread of political naturalism had been permitted, one point that was always defended—somewhat incoherently—was the Catholic obligation to worship. The rationalization was the following: the state should be guided by philosophy (false); but philosophy teaches that society must render public worship to God (true), and reason proves that, indeed, the only true worship is Catholic (true, but contradicts the first principle); therefore, presidents should go to Mass on Sundays.

The conciliar wizards needed to put an end to this affirmation, constantly upheld by the magisterium and previous theology. But here the trick was reduced to the simple relationship between cult and culture. Indeed, in every nation, the highest expression of culture was divine cult, or worship, Christendom being its highest form. This is a consequence of the union that necessarily exists between society and religion. But the liberal division into spheres, insofar as it wanted to remain Catholic, needed to resolve this matter. And it must be acknowledged that conciliar humanism resolved it coherently with the principle of political naturalism: no better social cult could be demanded than the cult of the true, the good and the beautiful.

The conciliar solution is set forth in chapter 2 of the second part of Gaudium et Spes, “De Culturæ Progressu Rite Promovenda,” especially in no. 57:

“Christians, on pilgrimage toward the heavenly city, should seek and think of these things which are above. This duty in no way decreases, rather it increases, the importance of their obligation to work with all men in the building of a more human world. Indeed, the mystery of the Christian faith furnishes them with an excellent stimulant and aid to fulfill this duty more courageously and especially to uncover the full meaning of this activity, one which gives to human culture its eminent place in the integral vocation of man. When man develops the earth by the work of his hands or with the aid of technology, in order that it might bear fruit and become a dwelling worthy of the whole human family and when he consciously takes part in the life of social groups, he carries out the design of God manifested at the beginning of time, that he should subdue the earth, perfect creation and develop himself. At the same time, he obeys the commandment of Christ that he should place himself at the service of his brethren. Furthermore, when man gives himself to the various disciplines of philosophy, history and of mathematical and natural science, and when he cultivates the arts, he can do very much to elevate the human family to a more sublime understanding of truth, goodness, and beauty, and to the formation of considered opinions which have universal value. Thus, mankind may be more clearly enlightened by that marvelous Wisdom, which was with God from all eternity, composing all things with him, rejoicing in the earth, delighting in the sons of men. In this way, the human spirit, being less subjected to material things, can be more easily drawn to the worship and contemplation of the Creator. Moreover, by the impulse of grace, he is disposed to acknowledge the Word of God, Who before He became flesh in order to save all and to sum up all in Himself was already ‘in the world’ as ‘the true light which enlightens every man’ (Jn. 1:9-10).”

The text proposes an elevation of culture to cult in four steps: the first two in the temporal sphere, the last two within the religious:

1. The cultivation or culture of the earth becomes culture of the spirit, in the measure in which it is adorned by philosophical, scientific and artistic progress.

2. Philosophico-scientific culture “can do very much” to elevate—we might say, metaphysically—“to a more sublime understanding of truth, goodness and beauty, and to… opinions which have universal value.” Be it noted that here speaks Kant, more than St. Thomas, because Thomistic philosophy does not “do much… to elevate,” but elevates itself to universal judgments over transcendental ones; whereas to Kantian subjectivism, this is beyond philosophy and reason. This metaphysical openness is the most that can be asked of culture in the academic environment and corresponds to religious liberty in the political sphere.

3. Cultures open to transcendence will always be enlightened by the Wisdom that “enlightens every man” (which, of course, is no theological wisdom that can be formulated into concepts, but the operative presence of the Word of God), giving place to the “worship and contemplation of the Creator,” that is, to religious manifestations properly so-called, which, as we know, have always adorned traditional cultures. This enlightenment of Wisdom permits us to suppose that in all religions there are real and legitimate cultural values of a mystic stature (let us not say supernatural, because it is not yet attributed to the “impulse of grace,” but only supra-rational).

4. Finally, when cultures are disposed to religion in general, they are disposed to the particular cult of the Incarnate Word, or Catholic cult. The cult that Christian princes, then, must practice as such, is the humanist culture that opens itself up to religion.

II. COLLEGIALITY

1. An anachronistic monarchy

“The form of rule in the Church,” says Mazzella, “by the very institution of its Author, is monarchical.”[172] The First Vatican Council left no doubt about the matter: “If any should say that the Roman Pontiff has only the duty of inspection and direction, but not full and supreme power of jurisdiction over the universal Church, not only in matters that pertain to faith and morals, but also in the rule and discipline of the Church spread throughout the world; or that he has the principal part, but not all the fullness of that supreme power; or that this power of his is not ordinary and immediate, as much over each and all of the Churches, as over each and all of the pastors and faithful, let him be anathema.”[173]

But at the dawn of the twentieth century, not one political monarchy remained that had not allowed itself to be moderated by democratic elements. It seemed a historical necessity that the Roman Monarchy permit itself to be transformed in this way: St. Pius X says:

We are living in an age when the sense of liberty has reached its fullest development, and when the public conscience has in the civil order introduced popular government. Now there are not two consciences in man, any more than there are two lives. It is for the ecclesiastical authority, therefore, to shape itself to democratic forms, unless it wishes to provoke and foment an intestine conflict in the consciences of mankind. The penalty of refusal is disaster. For it is madness to think that the sentiment of liberty, as it is now spread abroad, can surrender. Were it forcibly confined and held in bonds, terrible would be its outburst, sweeping away at once both Church and religion. Such is the situation for the Modernists, and their one great anxiety is, in consequence, to find a way of conciliation between the authority of the Church and the liberty of believers.[174]

In truth, the scandal of this anachronism was truly pharisaical. The Constitution Pastor Aeternus of Vatican I, with the declaration of the dogma of pontifical infallibility, had closed the ranks of traditional Catholicism around the pope, enormously increasing the efficacy of his authority. If liberal Catholicism cried out for the democratization of the armies of Roman authority, it was because they formed the great dam against which the waves of modernism broke in vain. A strong dam indeed, but, alas! the only one, and the last.

Why were the popes left so alone in resistance to the liberal revolution? Although it becomes difficult to conjecture what the causes may have been due to the complexity of historical circumstances, nonetheless it seems certain that the principal responsibility was borne by the popes themselves because of their policy of ralliement, which always had as its deadly consequence that only liberal bishops were elected to direct the dioceses, as the only ones capable of a polite discourse with revolutionary governments. This was a strategy akin to suicide, because not only did they permit episcopal authority, a major obstacle to their own papal authority, to interpose; but the liberal bishops, strong in number and stronger in boldness—for “the children of this world are wiser in their generation than the children of the light” (Lk. 16:8)—did not wait long to place one of their own on the Roman See. The Holy Spirit does not always prevent the necessary consequences of our negligence.

To this more immediate reason for the clamor to democratize the anachronistic Roman monarchy we may add another, later one, which appeared at the dreamed-of moment when the tiara was placed on a liberal head. The power of the pope, as it was established, was very efficacious, but could only be used in the Traditional sense, which left no room for regress of any type. When the dream came true with the election of Cardinal Roncalli as John XXIII, he could not change much in his pontificate until he called together the General States in his Vatican palace. In the great program of aggiornamento which he proposed to the Council, the “updating” of his own authority was no small chapter.

2. A touch of parliamentarianism

Could ecclesiastical authority receive a democratic spin without changing all the institutions of the Church from top to bottom? If this had been necessary, the Council could have done nothing. But it is a frequent error to believe that liberal thought always demands a democratic form of universal suffrage.

Political liberalism does not identify with the proposal of a specific form of government, because it consists of a conception about political principles, applicable to any type of regime. Historically, it has adopted monarchical, aristocratic—or rather oligarchic—and democratic forms. Of these, the one that has most become impregnated with its spirit is the English aristocracy, or oligarchy, which indeed has ruled from 1688 until the beginning of the 20th century, building itself up on the archetype of the liberal government.”[175]

England was able to assume all the values of modernism in a peaceful manner, leaving their kings their heads and their places.

By means of Parliament, the new (landholding) class first set conditions of rule for the monarch and, later, when a permanent risk of return to past situations was seen in the king’s independence—a risk that seemed very near when James II, who had become Catholic, assumed the throne—they submitted the crown to direct vassalage, deposing James and placing on the throne the husband of his eldest daughter, Mary: the Dutch Calvinist William of Orange… And thus, since 1688, the history of England is the history of liberalism in power: the empire it created had commerce as its lifeblood and its impulse to expand, and its presence in the farthest ends of the world implied the expansion of doctrinal and pragmatic liberalism as well.[176]

If in the Church there was a species of aristocracy, the bishops, associated by divine institution to the Vicar of Christ, was it not natural to accentuate their episcopal function more and bring the Primate’s position nearer to that of a parliamentary monarchy?

The liberal spirit would need to impose two things to make any governmental regime democratic, one in the speculative order and one in the practical: First, break the doctrinal rigidity of traditional thought with an injection of moderate subjectivism, imposing a healthy ideological pluralism; and second, create effective means to control the holders of power from the grassroots, so that the “government of the people” (that is, of the occult powers that manage these “grassroots”) should not be a simple fiction: “[In the democratic state],” says the patriarch of “new humanism,” “the fiscalization of the state by the people, even though the state tries to avoid it, is written in the principles and constitutional armor of the body politic. The people have regular means, established by law, to exercise their vigilance.”[177]

With the more or less definite support of the conciliar popes, especially that of Paul VI, the democratic spin that the “spirit of the times” demanded was imposed upon the Church; although perhaps that spin could not be as complete as was claimed. With regard to the teaching office, the exercise of a true magisterium was substituted by “dialogue,” which theological pluralism canonized, and a multitude of commissions for dialogue were created, in particular the International Theological Commission, to “fiscalize” from below the functions of the Holy Office, which would become the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. And regarding the office of government, there was an attempt to democratize the exercise of the Papacy by means of “collegiality,” which would solidify in a restructuring of the Papal Curia, and the exercise of the episcopacy was democratized by the institution of bishops’ conferences, where lay commissions must have a special place.

3. Primacy and ecumenism

To the necessities, arisen ab intra, of doing away with the Roman totalitarianism that had impeded the modernization of the Church for more than a century, the conveniences ab extra of ecumenism were added, whose major obstacle was, beyond a doubt, the Primacy itself. If the Council offered the other Christian communities a more democratic view of the papacy, this obstacle would diminish substantially. It is very different to renounce one’s own autonomy to depend thenceforth on such an absolute power as that of the Roman pope, than to enter into a confederacy where there is no need to relinquish one’s own liberty. Besides, not only the reformed groups had already a democratic mentality but also the schismatic Orthodox, due to the influence of Protestantism.

But, however much modernist as it might be, the best thing it could do to modernize the Church was to highlight “collegiality,” because any effort to touch the institution of the papacy and the diocesan bishops would seem a frontal attack on the most sensitive points of Catholic tradition. And, to make matters worse, the Protestant Reformation had not preserved the priesthood; Leo XIII had declared the Anglicans’ episcopacy invalid, and the Orthodox bishops had always been considered illegitimate. What could be done to gather them into the episcopal Parliament? As far as the Protestants, there was nothing to do but highlight the common priesthood of the baptized, but there was still a long way to go to get them to accept the pope with his college. Regarding the Anglicans, a revision of the judgment of Leo XIII about the invalidity of their episcopacy is in progress, but the principal problem is that, although there is no lack of Catholic theologians prepared to declare it valid thanks to the new theology on the sacraments, the Anglicans themselves do not believe it and prefer to be reordained. And as to the legitimacy of the Orthodox, the principal doctrinal difficulty was rooted in the scholastic distinction between power of orders and power of jurisdiction. Here it became necessary, then, to re-confuse what had been clarified, to be able to receive the schismatic bishops with dignity.

4. Collegiality in Vatican II

A democratic society is fundamentally a society of equals. An assembly of wise men can charge one of themselves to keep the minutes of their discussions and delegate another to represent themselves, and thus particular offices appear among them; but these are ministerial functions subordinate to the group considered as a whole. The secretary must not write, nor the representative speak except in accord with the general thought of the group.[178]

In a strictly democratic vision of the Church, on Pentecost Day the Holy Spirit would have descended upon the assembly of the faithful to convey to them, as to one unit, the priesthood and mission of Jesus Christ, establishing it (the assembly) as a society of equals. As this common priesthood of the Church requires particular offices to maintain order and unity, from within the priestly assembly, ministers ordained to the service of the community would be distinguished, from among whom a few would be chosen to exercise the unifying office of bishops, and from whose college the pope would be chosen as general moderator, servus servorum populi Dei. The priesthood and the mission, then, belong firstly and directly to the Church, that is, to the assembly of the faithful freely gathered in acceptance of the faith. The Church would delegate functions to the ordained priests, especially in the college of bishops, who are then its ministers. And to serve the unity of the bishops and the Church, special functions for the pope would be acknowledged, seeing the Vicar of Jesus Christ in the singularity of his person.

As we have seen, this vision, upheld by the conciliabulum of Pistoia, had already been condemned as a heresy in 1794 by the Bull Auctorem Fidei: “the proposition which states ‘that power has been given by God to the Church, that it might be communicated to the pastors who are its ministers for the salvation of souls’; if thus understood that the power of ecclesiastical ministry and of rule is derived from the COMMUNITY of the faithful to the pastors, is heretical.”[179] Vatican Council I defines the Primacy for this very reason, to meet the democratic error head-on: “We teach and declare that, according to the Gospel evidence, a primacy of jurisdiction over the whole Church of God was immediately and directly promised to the blessed apostle Peter and conferred on him by Christ the Lord. […] At open variance with this clear doctrine of Holy Scripture, as it has ever been understood by the Catholic Church, are the perverse opinions of those who, while they distort the form of government established by Christ the Lord in His Church, deny that Peter, in his single person, preferably to all the other Apostles, whether taken separately or together, was endowed by Christ with a true and proper primacy of jurisdiction; or of those who assert that the same primacy was not bestowed immediately and directly upon Blessed Peter himself, but upon the Church, and through the Church on Peter as her Minister.”[180] As the canon accompanying this chapter emphasizes, this antiliberal doctrine is summed up in the precise idea of “primacy of jurisdiction”: “ If anyone, therefore, shall say that Blessed Peter the Apostle was not appointed the Prince of all the Apostles and the visible Head of the whole Church Militant; or that the same, directly and immediately, received from the same, Our Lord Jesus Christ, a primacy of honor only, and not of true and proper jurisdiction; let him be anathema.”[181] This doctrine would be developed later by Leo XIII in the encyclical Satis Cognitum, of the 29th June, 1896; and by Pius XII in Mystici Corporis, of the 29th June 1943.

The Second Vatican Council introduced with certainty and decision a democratic vision of the Church, but walked with great caution so as not to tread on the mines of any of these anathemas. Although the democratic turn demanded the introduction of many innovations, such as that of the common priesthood of the faithful, nonetheless the principal effort was placed on democratizing the relationship between the bishops and the pope, now by way of the imprecise idea of “collegiality.” The battle was fought most especially on this matter, because while, from a doctrinal point of view, the notion of “common priesthood” was more fundamental and all-encompassing, nonetheless, “collegiality” was fundamental from the practical point of view. Because until the Council the popes possessed an enormous authority really and effectively, augmented still more, as we have said, since Vatican I; and the clamors for democracy would remain mere words if some power were not removed from them in favor of the bishops. Afterward it became easier to dilute episcopal authority via the episcopal conferences. Hence, as one well-informed witness said, “the most important and dramatic battle waged in the Second Vatican Council was not the wide-spread polemic on religious liberty, but that of collegiality, which mainly took place backstage.”[182] The pope lost this battle because he turned against himself, although he did not lose it totally because he could not act too openly against Tradition.

Lumen Gentium expounds on the doctrine of the episcopacy in its third chapter, and the first thing that must be pointed out is that it comes on the heels of Chapter II on the “People of God.” This is very significant. Jesus Christ would have first instituted the new people, subject of the popular priesthood and the common mission, and only after, distinguished the hierarchy, with the ministerial priesthood, from simple laity. It is not the hierarchy but the sacerdotal people as a whole who “have as their final end the expansion of the kingdom of God,” being the “sure seed of unity, hope and salvation for the whole human race.”[183] In a clearly democratic vision, and one against all traditional doctrine—against the evangelical facts themselves—it would not be the Apostolic hierarchy that formally established and unified ecclesiastical society; rather, it would be something subsequent to a society already built and endowed with a priesthood and a mission. It is only necessary to understand that the authority of Christ had been deposited first in the People of God and, from it, would pass to the hierarchy.

Chapter III of Lumen Gentium encompasses numbers 18 to 29 and bears the title “On the Hierarchical Structure of the Church, and in Particular on the Episcopate.” No. 18 claims to reaffirm the doctrine of Vatican I on the primacy of the Roman Pontiff and complete it with that of the episcopacy.[184] No. 19 begins by saying that Our Lord “formed [the Apostles] after the manner of a college or a stable group.” The noun collegium comes from the verb colligo, composed of cum + lego. Lego signifies to choose, and colligo means to choose several things, placing them together, from which comes collection and college. In the strict sense, then, it means a collection of things of the same type, chosen for the same reason. The Diccionario de la Real Academia has as the last meaning of “college” the following: “Society or corporation of men of the same dignity or profession.” But we may take it also in a broader sense, as any group, without necessarily implying the equality of its members. To say, then, that the Apostles, including St. Peter, were chosen “after the manner of a college” is easier to accommodate to an egalitarian estimation of the same, but with the addition of “or a stable group—cœtus stabilis—,” the strict sense seems to be avoided: “During the Council, the conservatives had protested against the use of the word ‘college,’ which in a juridical sense designates an assembly of equals. The form finally adopted seems equivalent to a compromise, because it is called ‘collegium seu cœtus,’ and thus one could not object sic et simpliciter to the use of this expression; even less so today if we consider the precision of the Nota prævia in no. 1: the term college must be interpreted in the broad sense.”[185] But if they wanted to introduce a democratic vision, they had adopted a very adequate term to serve as a vehicle for it.

To the cited proposal about the collegial mode, follows another about the primacy: “[The Lord] formed them after the manner of a college or a stable group, over which He placed Peter chosen from among them” (Jn. 21:15-17). Here the same occurs as with the people and the hierarchy: Our Lord instituted first the college and then the primacy, choosing Peter “from among them.” It is notable that the text referenced to the primacy is not the fundamental text of Matthew 16: Tu es Petrus, but rather that of John 21: Simon Joannis, diligis me plus his?, which occurs after the resurrection and, therefore, after the consecration of the Twelve on Holy Thursday.

In no. 20 is stated that the function of the apostolic college is perpetuated in the bishops; no. 21 deals with the sacramentality of the episcopate, and no. 22 returns to collegiality, now considered as between the bishops and the pope.[186] It was no easy task to justify in greater detail a democratic vision of something so distant from it as the ecclesiastical hierarchy. And this time the twist—placed in no. 21—had to be coarser, such that the art of sleight-of-hand would not suffice to cover it. As we have already advanced, to sustain doctrinally the democratization of the Church and open channels for ecumenism, they had to base the power of order and jurisdiction on one and the same thing. But, in contrast to all the other tricks we have and will point out, which are subtle and hidden, the confusion of this fundamental distinction of Catholic doctrine had something brutal about it and could not pass without noise.

Before the Council, there was a discussion among the theologians as to whether the episcopacy had or lacked a “sacramental” character. An extreme position, already unsustainable, placed episcopal consecration as belonging exclusively to the power of jurisdiction, without any consequence regarding the power of Orders.[187]The other opinions maintained that a character was imprinted, but disagreed on whether it merited the classification of “sacrament.” Without resolving this last matter, in no. 21 Lumen Gentium defends the certain theory:

[The] Sacred Council teaches that by Episcopal consecration the fullness of the sacrament of Orders is conferred, that fullness of power, namely, which both in the Church’s liturgical practice and in the language of the Fathers of the Church is called the “high priesthood,” the “supreme power of the sacred ministry.” […] [F]rom the tradition, which is expressed especially in liturgical rites and in the practice of both the Church of the East and of the West, it is clear that, by means of the imposition of hands and the words of consecration, the grace of the Holy Spirit is so conferred, and the sacred character so impressed, that bishops in an eminent and visible way sustain the roles of Christ Himself as Teacher, Shepherd and High Priest, and that they act in His person.

But the problem is not there—and we could even think that thus the paragraph was given a more traditional air—but rather, in the words we omitted, where not only the conferring of the power of holy Orders is attributed directly to the episcopal consecration, but also the offices proper to the power of jurisdiction: “But Episcopal consecration, together with the office of sanctifying [power of Holy Orders], also confers the office of teaching and of governing [power of jurisdiction], which, however, of its very nature, can be exercised only in hierarchical communion with the head and the members of the college.” The magical gesture has just been completed, and only two mysterious words have been added to hide it: “hierarchical communion.” Because if anyone should object—as we do now—that the part of power that the pope communicates through jurisdiction is not distinguished, they answer that this is supposed on saying that episcopal offices “can be exercised only in hierarchical communion.”

Let the reader not believe that we are passing ourselves off as subtle and distrustful. Let him hear the then-Father Ratzinger, in his contribution to one of the most approved commentaries of the conciliar Constitution:

An evolution of a scope difficult to foresee[188] is expressed in these two affirmations [the one we just quoted and another from no. 22 that repeats the same]. In fact, the rigid line of demarcation that had stood for centuries between the power of order and that of jurisdiction, in the spirit of most Western theologians, has become passable, and the strong bond between the two realities, which at bottom are only one, appears to view. The separation of the two was the reason that the theology of the Middle Ages believed it must refuse to acknowledge a sacramental character in episcopal consecration [→ false accusation]. It was also the point of departure of the different position that law took, apropos of the structure of the (Latin) Church, in the second millennium as compared to the first. In fine, it has been a determining factor in the development of the relationship between the pope and bishops, because over time it threatened to suffocate the collegial feeling of the patristic era.[189]

The audacity that the modern theologians have shown never ceases to astonish. The great Franzelin, in his Theses de Ecclesia Christi, an incomplete work published posthumously, maintains from the very beginning of his treatise: “Verissima et maxime necessaria [est] solemnis divisio inter potestatem ordinis et iurisdictionis— the solemn division between the power of order and jurisdiction is supremely true and greatly necessary” (Thesis V). If order and jurisdiction were merely two aspects of the same thing and are conferred with episcopal consecration, everything changes. Because it is true that, as far as episcopal consecration go, the Bishop of Rome is no more a bishop than the rest nor does he consecrate bishops with greater intensity, whence we may well speak of the Episcopal College as a “hierarchical communion”: “As that hierarchical bond is based on the sacramental order which is a common reality for all, it explains that it is defined as a communion and not a subordination.”[190] Besides, as any bishop may consecrate another, it may no longer be said that his incorporation into the episcopal college comes from any special communication of jurisdiction on the part of the pope. And if schismatic communities preserve valid consecration, how can we deny the vitality of their episcopal power? For schismatic bishops, too, we must perforce speak of a certain “hierarchical communion,” not full, but a communion in the end.

According to traditional Catholic doctrine, then, episcopal consecration is merely a material, operative condition so that one can belong to the episcopal hierarchy. Formal belonging is granted by delegation, on the part of the pope, of the power of jurisdiction over some part of the flock of Christ. The communication of authority comes from Christ to St. Peter and his successors in the Roman See, communicated later by each pope to the bishops with pastoral charges. According to the new doctrine of collegiality, which associates the communication of governing power directly to episcopal consecration, Jesus Christ would have communicated His power to the episcopal college as a whole (if not that He communicated it to the assembly of the faithful and they to the college, as some would have it), and this power would not be transmitted from generation to generation by the sole nomination of the successors of Peter, but by the multiple consecrations that renew the episcopal College: “Hence, one is constituted a member of the Episcopal body in virtue of sacramental consecration and hierarchical communion with the head and members of the body” (Lumen Gentium, no. 22).

It is true that Lumen Gentium does not say that the pope receives his power from the college of bishops, because then it would have stepped on the mine of an anathema for heresy; but it explicitly denies that the episcopal college receives its power from the pope. It leaves a rather unintelligible position, in which power over all the Church belongs as much to the college as a whole, as to the pope individually: “But the college or body of bishops has no authority unless it is understood together with the Roman Pontiff, the successor of Peter as its head. The pope’s power of primacy over all, both pastors and faithful, remains whole and intact. In virtue of his office, that is as Vicar of Christ and pastor of the whole Church, the Roman Pontiff has full, supreme and universal power over the Church. And he is always free to exercise this power. The order of bishops, which succeeds to the college of apostles and gives this apostolic body continued existence, is also the subject of supreme and full power over the universal Church, provided we understand this body together with its head the Roman Pontiff and never without this head” (Lumen Gentium, no. 22).

What sense does it make to say that the subject of supreme authority is the college, which includes the pope, if the pope is already subject of that same authority, without the rest of the college? If the pope exercises his authority individually, the college has no recourse but to obey and its authority is purely nominal. If the pope should always have to exercise his authority collegially, his individual authority would be purely nominal, and we would have a parliamentary monarchy—which is no monarchy—in which the pope rules but does not govern. If the pope fulfills certain duties necessarily in an individual manner—as the Nota Prævia suggests—and others necessarily in a collegial fashion, neither the pope nor the college have full power. If the pope exercises his authority sometimes individually and sometimes collegially, according to his whim—as follows from the text of Lumen Gentium—we have a deranged ecclesiastical constitution, which skips from monarchy to aristocracy and from aristocracy to monarchy. “It is difficult to deny it: the text of Lumen Gentium resembles an amalgam of two heterogeneous positions, that of traditional doctrine and that of episcopalism.”[191]

In this way the anathema with which Chapter 1 of Pastor Aeternus closes is avoided: “Canon. If anyone, therefore, shall say that Blessed Peter the Apostle was not appointed by Christ the Lord as the Prince of all the Apostles and the visible Head of the whole Church Militant; or that the same, directly and immediately, received from the same, Our Lord Jesus Christ, a primacy of honor only, and not of true and proper jurisdiction; let him be anathema.”[192] But while Lumen Gentium 22 does not fall under the letter of this anathema, it does contradict the chapter which this canon sums up. Because in the text of the chapter there is an exclusive particle used which was not reprised in the final canon:

Because only to Simon (unum enim Simonem) did the Lord speak with these solemn words: [….] I shall give thee the keys […] and only on Simon Peter (uni Simoni Petro) did Jesus confer the jurisdiction of pastor and supreme rector over all His flock, after His Resurrection. […] At open variance with this clear doctrine of Holy Scripture, as it has ever been understood by the Catholic Church, are the perverse opinions of those who, while they distort the form of government established by Christ the Lord in His Church, deny that Peter, in his single person, (solum Petrum), preferably to all the other Apostles, whether taken separately or together, was endowed by Christ with a true and proper primacy of jurisdiction.[193]

The conciliar constitution states and repeats that not only Peter received the primacy, but also the college: “For our Lord placed Simon alone (unum Simonem) as the rock and the bearer of the keys of the Church, (Mt. 16:18–19) and made him shepherd of the whole flock (cf. Jn. 21:15ff); it is evident, however, that the power of binding and loosing, which was given to Peter (Mt. 16:19), was granted also to the college of apostles, joined with their head (Mt. 18:18; 28:16–20).”[194]

5. A new form of the Primacy

Beyond the texts, the clear intention of the Council was to democratize the exercise of power in the Church as much as possible. With the goodwill of the bishops and the pope, the incoherencies and ambiguities of the conciliar documents would be made precise in practice.

It would be interesting to detail the fluctuation of effective power—magisterial, liturgical, disciplinary—which, after the Council, passed from the Vatican not to the bishops, but to the episcopal conferences. Papal encyclicals became theological opinions worth considering, while the importance of the common feeling of theologians grew by way of the ITC, just as that of the bishops through the Roman synods. The supposed necessity of regional inculturation conferred an almost absolute liturgical autonomy on the episcopal conferences. The Roman tribunals have granted so much autonomy to the tribunals of the Conferences that they can no longer avoid that some become, for example, divorce agencies.

Within the Roman Curia itself, perhaps even worse, Paul VI made a first act of good will in the effective resignation of his personal authority with the reform of the Curia, promulgated in the Constitution Regimini Ecclesiæ, 15th August 1967. Then and there, the Secretary of State changed from being just that, the secretary of the pope, to being a sort of prime minister with an effective power nearly parallel to that of the pope.[195]

And the gravest threat, such that we trust that Divine Providence will not permit it, is that the ecumenical temptation is making our latest popes wonder if they should not resign the very concept of the primacy on the altars of a super-community with neither feet nor Head. Says John Paul II in Ut Unum Sint:

“Whatever relates to the unity of all Christian communities clearly forms part of the concerns of the primacy. As Bishop of Rome I am fully aware, as I have reaffirmed in the present Encyclical Letter, that Christ ardently desires the full and visible communion of all those Communities in which, by virtue of God’s faithfulness, his Spirit dwells. I am convinced that I have a particular responsibility in this regard, above all in acknowledging the ecumenical aspirations of the majority of the Christian Communities and in heeding the request made of me to find a way of exercising the primacy which, while in no way renouncing what is essential to its mission, is nonetheless open to a new situation.”

III. “COMMUNIO”

1. The breadth of conciliar thought about the Church

At the end of the Council, one had to ask: What is the Church, then? Because after so many and mysterious redefinitions, a more determined answer should be expected. And perhaps it is surprising that, in conclusion, the post-conciliar Church should define itself as a “communion”: “Immediately after the Second Vatican Council,” said Cardinal Ratzinger in presenting the letter Communionis notio,[196] “the concept of communion in reference to the Church, together with the concept of a People of God, was one of the notions that most attracted the interest of theologians.”[197]

It may be surprising, we say, because while the concept of “communion” was often used in the texts of the Council, nonetheless it did not have the importance in these that it achieved “immediately after.” But after a little thought, one should not be all that surprised. The conciliar confusion of the redefinitions of the Church—it is Sacrament and Mystery, but the Mystery is and is not the Sacrament; the People of God is the Kingdom, yet is not, but rather makes it present; the mystical Body is the Church, yet is not, but rather subsists in; etc.—was such that the only certain thing that can be preached about Her was the broadest and, thus, most vague notion that could be conceived: that the Church is a “common union.” It is not even a genre with a univocal meaning, but a very ample analogous notion.[198]

The first conclusion, then, that we must take from the usage of this concept to define the Church is that, after the Council, that is, after the Church finished “carry[ing] out an act of reflection about herself, to know herself better, to define herself better,”[199] she only knows that she knows nothing about Herself: she is “a sort of communion.” But this was the ideal framework for peaceful coexistence in doctrinal pluralism.

2. Communion and dialogue

The bonds that establish the Communion that is the Church are multiple, and open to a multiple interpretation. There are vertical links to God, and horizontal between men (cf. Communionis Notio no. 3), visible and invisible (ibid. no. 4); among the visible ones are hierarchical ministers, the sacraments, the “elementa Ecclesiæ,” the “semina Verbi”; among the invisible, a certain quodammodo union of all men with Christ. But, if we wish to find the binding notion necessarily associated to that of Communion which should have the same breadth and the same meaning, we need not seek it in the entitative order (for what things are in themselves is under discussion today, and freedom of opinion reigns), but in the operative order: it is “Dialogue” (which is not argued, because it is an argument). It is true that if we consider what a dialogic community is, Humanity appears rather than the Church, because dialogue is proper to man as a social animal. But then we understand that we are not on the wrong track, because conciliar humanism is seeking this very identification.

The true bond that, as a sacrament instituted by the Council, signifies and realizes the unity of the Church in Humankind, is the most sacred Dialogue:

- Dialogue ad intra. It is no longer the infallible Magisterium which establishes and maintains the fundamental bond of the Church, faith in Revelation, but rather the dialogue of the ecclesiastical communion.[200]

- Dialogue ad extra. It is no longer the evangelizing Mission that converts souls and incorporates them through baptism into the ecclesiastical community, but ecumenical dialogue that unites religions and cultures in respect of diversity.

3. “Said the serpent to the woman: Thou shalt not die”

Let us make one last observation. The dialogue mentioned is that of an optimistic subjectivism, that is, a dialogue that believes it always progresses by overcoming simple and plain contradiction, not in the scholastic manner but in the Hegelian fashion. So, it is a dialogue without adversaries, that always unites and never provokes division.

This essential aspect of conciliar thinking is perverse, for it constitutes the framework of a new “Communion of Saints” (that is, of all men) and the foundation of its hope. Yes, to us it seems the most perverse because it believes that the progress of the Communion is not found in the sum of equals, who can add nothing new, but in the complementarity of contradictions. But then, the growth of truth is sought through the addition of falsehood, and the augmentation of good by the contribution of evil.

Unfortunately, these are no metaphysical wanderings. We are beholding now the worst assertion of the Council, speaking of “the help that the Church receives from the modern world.” It maintains that: “Indeed, the Church admits that she has greatly profited and still profits from the antagonism of those who oppose or who persecute her” (Gaudium et Spes, no. 44). It is a great Catholic truth that heresies caused the progress of the doctrine of the Church and persecutions brought the growth of her holiness, but they are not causes per se that we should thank for such effects! It is horrible to express it, but—should the Virgin have thanked Caiaphas for the crucifixion of Her Son, which brought all good to mankind? It is a Satanic mockery of the question of evil, but this is how Hegelian dialectics think and act; contradictions are causes per se of the victorious synthesis. The Council thanks the French Revolution for having guillotined her clerics, because the Church took advantage of this to become more democratic; she thanks Islam for having torn apart her faithful, because she became more ecumenical.

This system of theory and practice leads the current hierarchy to systematically betray the faithful and amicably dialogue with their persecutors. It ignores the Uniate Russians and dialogues with the schismatics; it silences the martyred Catholics of China and converses with the “patriots”; it avoids the anti-Communist Cubans and smokes a Havana cigar with Fidel Castro. It is thus that it called together the Communion of Assisi and excommunicated Tradition. The Council has resumed Eve’s dialogue with the serpent, who calls into question the veracity of God.

[82] Joseph Ratzinger, Mi vida. Recuerdos (1927-1977), Ediciones Encuentro, Madrid 1997, p. 99: “There was, to be sure, a tacit consensus about the fact the Church was the principal theme of the conciliar assembly, which would, in this way, resume and bring to its conclusion the pathway traced by Vatican Council I, interrupted prematurely by the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. Cardinals Montini and Suenens drew up plans for a vast-ranging theological implant of the conciliar works, in which the theme of ‘the Church’ must be articulated in the forms ‘the Church inwards’ and ‘the Church outwards.’ The second expression would permit us to confront the great questions of the present from the point of view of the Church-world relationship.”

Bishop B. Tissier de Mallerais, Marcel Lefebvre. Une Vie, Clovis 2002, p. 298-299: “From March 1962 onwards, Suenens complained to John XXIII of the ‘abusive’ number of schemata: no less than seventy. John XXIII, who had not given any guidance to the preparatory work, and who did not want to challenge Ottaviani, sent Suenens to quietly clear the field. Suenens’ plan consisted in reusing all the preparatory schemes and re-elaborate them within a bipartite framework: what the Church needed to say to Her children ad intra, and what She needed to say to the world ad extra. The second part was, evidently, a revolutionary novelty.”

[83] We have not found a more complete exposition of the Biblical notion of the Kingdom of God than that in the Dictionnaire de la Bible, published by Vigouroux. The article “Royaume de God ou Royaume des Cieux” (which occupies columns 1237 to 1257 of the fifth volume, 1912) was edited by Father J-B Frey, member of the Biblical Commission in Rome. He studies this concept first in the Old Testament, then in Jewish literature, and finally in the New Testament.

[84] In St. Matthew, the phrase “kingdom of God” appears 4 times and “kingdom of heaven” 32 (St. Matthew wrote to the Jews and follows the custom of not pronouncing the Name of Jehovah, replacing it by the reference to His royal seat); St. Mark uses “kingdom of God” 14 times and St. Luke 32. In St. John it appears only twice; in Acts, 6, and in the rest of Scripture 5 times. The use of the term “Church” has an inverse frequency; in the Gospels it appears only twice in St. Matthew, while Acts mentions it 23 times, St. Paul 64 and the Apocalypse 20. Church, , means assembly or gathering of faithful, and the Church of the Christians, realization of the Kingdom of God, was only consolidated at Pentecost, whence, after that, it began to replace the reference to the Kingdom.

[85] Francisco de B. Vizmanos, S. J. and Ignacio Riudor, S. J., Teología Fundamental Para Seglares, BAC Madrid 1963, p. 565.

[86] Commentary on the Sentences, Book IV, dist. 49, q. 1, a. 2 E, corpus.

[87] Comisión Teológica Internacional, “Temas selectos de eclesiología” (1984), en Documentos 1969-1996, BAC 1998, p. 371.

[88] Ibid., p. 372.

[89] Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Declaration Dominus Iesus, 6th August, 2000, no. 19.

[90] Timotheus Zapelena, S. J., De Ecclesia Christi, Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, Rome 1930, p. 4.

[91] Ioachim Salaverri, S. J., “De Ecclesia Christi” in Sacræ Theologiæ Summa, Vol. I, 2nd ed. BAC Madrid 1952, p. 544.

[92] Such a love of God for the personality of every human person is upheld that, if we believe in divine omnipotence, we must conclude that all are saved. But at the same time the “possibility” of damnation is upheld, not only because to deny it would be explicit heresy, but also so as not to reduce the margins of liberty of modern man, who would have the right to go, if he likes, to hell.

[93] Gaudium et Spes, no. 22: “Since human nature as He assumed it was not annulled, by that very fact it has been raised up to a divine dignity in our respect too. For by His incarnation the Son of God has united Himself in some fashion with every man.”

[94] Teilhard de Chardin would explain the “quodammodo” via evolution, De Lubac by the Thomistic natural desire of God, Karol Wojtyła would also give his version. If the reader lacks imagination to invent his own explanation, he may take any one of these.

[95] Lumen Gentium, no. 48; Gaudium et Spes, no. 45. Warning. The Council gave no explanation of its fundamental principle that Christ is united with all men, leaving that to pluralism; but it dared to explain the Church with the idea of a sacrament-mystery, because that explanation had been successful. Had we succeeded in refuting it, it would be let fall, returning to the mists of a plurality of opinions. Subjectivism transforms conciliar doctrine into a hydra, which, when one head is cut off, grows four more. The only immortal head is that of subjectivism itself, and the one Hercules capable of slaying it is St. Thomas.

[96] …

[97] Although later it has also begun to mean “seed”—in Latin, semen—the proper meaning of the Latin term germen is “bud, stem or offshoot from a plant” (De Miguel, Latin Dictionary)

[98] Comisión Teológica Internacional, “Temas Selectos de Eclesiología (1984),” con Prefacio del Cardenal Ratzinger, en Documentos 1969-1996, BAC 1998, p. 374.

[99] Cf. P. Álvaro Calderón, “L’Église sacrement universel du salut,” en La Religion de Vatican II, Premier Symposium de Paris, 2002, p. 117-144.

[100] As we shall explain in the last chapter, in the new theology which invaded the Church with the Council there hovers a way of speaking of the Hypostatic Union which must decidedly be inscribed in the Nestorian heresy, and which, through the analogy here proposed, translates to this imbroglio of distinctions between the Catholic Church, the Kingdom of God and, as we shall see, the Church of Christ.

[101] Jn. 12:31; 14:30; 16:11.

[102] In II Send., dist. 44, exposition textus: “A superior and inferior power can be related in two ways. Either such that the inferior power springs entirely from the superior; and then the whole power of the inferior is founded upon the power of the superior; and then one must simply and in all things obey the superior power rather than the inferior; just as also in natural things, the first cause has greater influence upon the thing caused by the second cause than even the second cause itself; and the power of God is thus related to every created power; thus also is the power of the Emperor related to the power of the proconsul; thus also is the power of the pope related to every spiritual power in the Church: because by the pope himself are the diverse degrees of dignities in the Church both appointed and ordained; whence his power is a certain kind of foundation of the Church, as is clear from Matthew 16. And thus in all things we are bound more to obey the pope than the Bishops or Archbishops, or a monk his Abbot, without any distinction.”

[103] Ibid. “Again, a superior and inferior power can be related such that both spring forth from one supreme power, which subjects the one to the other according as it wishes; and then one is not superior to the other except in these things in which the one is placed under the other by the supreme power; and in these only must one obey the superior rather than the inferior: and in this way are the powers both of the Bishop and of the Archbishop, which descend from the power of the pope.”

[104] Plato, The Republic, 473. The philosophers of whom Plato speaks are certainly theologians, who must rule the City according to the ideal of Good. Cf. Fr. Álvaro Calderón, “The government of philosophers: The Christian Solution to Plato’s Dilemma,” in A La Luz de un Ágape Cordial, SS&CC Editions, Mendoza 2007, pp. 101–132.

[105] The union of ecclesiastical and political ministries has been compared by the theologians and the Magisterium to that of body and soul. If here we compare it to marriage it is, firstly, because it is comparable, as with the husband and wife “the two become one flesh” (Gen. 2:24). Besides, because it is based precisely on the sacrament of Matrimony, by means of which ecclesiastical power sanctifies the political order (Our Lord instituted five sacraments to order the lives of individuals; whereas for the life of the community He instituted the Sacrament of Holy Orders, through which the ecclesiastical hierarchy was established, and the Sacrament of Matrimony, in which the cell of all civic order is sanctified and incorporated into the Church; the Sacrament of Matrimony is, therefore, the sanctifying principle of all the social fabric, because all civil powers are a sort of continuation of the patriotic power). Lastly, because modernism is founded on the divorce of this most fruitful marriage.

[106] Encyclopedia of the Catholic Religion, vol. 2, col. 1044: “In the neighborhood of Rome (the Milvian Bridge) the battle would take place that decided the fate of the world and Christendom. Constantine conquered, and his rival Maxentius met his end drowning in the Tiber. The greater part of the fighting forces of the victorious emperor was comprised of Christian soldiers, who fought with abandon. The reports of the historians of that era concur that in the course of this expedition the Cross appeared in the sky, with the inscription ‘In hoc signo vinces,’ and that after this Constantine made an act of adherence to Christianity and commanded the monogram of the ‘Labarum’ (Chi Rho) of Christ to be placed on his standards.”

[107] R. Morcay, Nouvelle histoire de l’Église, Lanore, Paris 1937, p. 175: “The attack of Anagni. The second conflict was graver. It exploded in 1301. As Philip the Fair had imprisoned a Papal legate, Bernard de Saisset, bishop of Pamiers, the pope protested in the Bull Ausculta, fili, where he requested the release of the bishop and denounced in energetic terms the demands of the King. The latter called together the representatives of the three orders of the nation, nobility, clerics and people, which constituted the first General Estates of France. He made them believe that the pope wished to consider France a fief of the Holy See and govern it temporally. This memorable assembly, which gathered in Notre-Dame, gave its approval to the king and requested the convocation of a general council which would judge the disagreement. It was almost a denial of Papal authority. The pope could not remain silent. In October 1302 he published a famous bull, Unam Sanctam, to which the enemies of the Church often refer. He said there: ‘There are two swords, the spiritual and the temporal. Both swords, then, are in the power of the Church, the spiritual and the material. But the one must be wielded in favor of the Church, the other by the Church herself. One by the hand of the priest, the other by the hand of the king and his soldiers, albeit at the indication and with the consent of the priest. But it is necessary that sword be under sword, and that temporal authority submit to spiritual’ [Denzinger-Hünermann 469]. Innocent III did not think any differently. It is certain that Boniface VIII did not intend to invade the king’s legitimate authority, but in his vehemence, he did not always avoid terms that wounded uselessly. Furious, the king of France accused the pope of the worst of crimes, and then, with a presentiment that Boniface VIII was preparing an excommunication against him, decided on a coup. He sent one of his lawyers, Guillaume de Nogaret, to Italy. He allied himself with the personal enemies of Boniface VIII, in particular with Sciarra Colonna. With their soldiers they marched to Anagni, a small town 40 km. from Rome, where the pope lived, and invaded his residence. It is not confirmed that Nogaret beat the pope, but they took him prisoner. Great in adversity, Boniface, while he awaited them, had robed himself in his pontifical vestments and placed the tiara on his head. Freed shortly after by the townspeople of Anagni, Boniface returned to Rome, but exhausted with fatigue and grief, died a month later, the 11th of October of 1303. He was 86 years old. Philip the Fair was triumphant. The pontifical power, so great in the XIII century, emerged from this fight considerably weakened. The States felt more independent. But there, Christendom lost because there was no longer a moral power over the people capable of arbitrating certain conflicts and defending the right.”

[108] Dante Alighieri, De Monarchia, Book III, XVI (translation by Aurelia Henry, Houghton Mifflin,1904): “Man may be considered with regard to either of his essential parts, body or soul. If considered in regard to the body alone, he is perishable; if in regard to the soul alone, he is imperishable… If man holds a middle place between the perishable and imperishable, then, inasmuch as every mean shares the nature of the extremes, man must share both natures. And inasmuch as every nature is ordained for a certain ultimate end, it follows that there exists for man a two-fold end, in order that as he alone of all beings partakes of the perishable and the imperishable, so he alone of all beings should be ordained for two ultimate ends. One end is for that in him which is perishable, the other for that which is imperishable. Ineffable Providence has thus designed two ends to be contemplated of man: first, the happiness of this life, which consists in the activity of his natural powers, and is prefigured by the terrestrial Paradise; and then the blessedness of life everlasting, which consists in the enjoyment of the countenance of God, to which man’s natural powers may not attain unless aided by divine light, and which may be symbolized by the celestial Paradise. To these states of blessedness, just as to diverse conclusions, man must come by diverse means. To the former we come by the teachings of philosophy, obeying them by acting in conformity with the moral and intellectual virtues; to the latter through spiritual teachings which transcend human reason, and which we obey by acting in conformity with the theological virtues, Faith, Hope, and Charity… Wherefore a twofold directive agent was necessary to man, in accordance with the twofold end; the Supreme Pontiff to lead the human race to life eternal by means of revelation, and the Emperor to guide it to temporal felicity by means of philosophic instruction.”

[109] Teófilo Urdanoz, O.P. Introducción a las Obras de Francisco de Vitoria, Relecciones Teológicas, BAC 1960, p. 224: “The master from Salamanca is one of the first representatives of the modern age who, being a theologian of the Church, decidedly opposes the medieval, theocratic and unitarian concept. His Thomistic mentality and formation lead him to take, as a point of departure and supreme principle of all his theological-juridical system, the Aquinian distinction of a double order, natural and supernatural, in the world, the basis of the net distinction of the two powers, spiritual and temporal, with two social structures and two independent orders of law: Church and State. Vitoria is the modern man who assists at the birth of the true modern State, in whose juridical foundation he would play such an important part.” Formed in nominalism, Vitoria later flips back to St. Thomas, but remains rather humanist than Thomist. St. Thomas certainly distinguishes natural and supernatural orders, but there is nothing more anti-Thomistic than attributing a natural end to the State.

Menendez-Rigada, Vitoria, Francois de, in DTC, col. 3142: “Vitoria was the first to fix, with all the necessary precision, the power of the pope in temporal affairs, although he had some predecessors on this point, such as Torquemada, who had already pointed the matter in the true direction. Starting from the Thomistic doctrine of the fundamental distinction between the natural and supernatural orders, Vitoria extends this same distinction to the two powers, of which neither may absorb or diminish the other.”

[110] From now on Catholic theologians must defend the necessity of political law founding itself on natural law, declared by philosophical reason, but—save a few honorable exceptions—they shall say nothing of the need for it to base itself also on divine law, stated by the Magisterium of the Church.

[111] Urdanoz, op. cit., p. 39: “Vitoria denies the theory of Armacano that Christ, as a man, would have been king by hereditary succession, obtaining the throne of David by legitimate inheritance through Mary and St. Joseph. Neither by this nor by any other human right was He King, but only by His title of redemption. This permits him to conclude that Jesus Christ was only spiritually King of the world, since the Redemption is directed toward the only spiritual end, salvation. And he denies categorically that Jesus was a temporal King and had obtained direct dominion over all things and all the creatures of the universe. His Kingdom is not of this world. In the fragment De regno Christi, his attitude is less negative and seems to concede the indirect temporal power or dominion of Christ over the world. The same that He had communicated to Peter and his successors: ‘Temporal power over kings and emperors, insofar as is necessary for the purposes of spiritual government.’ This singular opinion of Vitoria’s was passed on to a group of later theologians, such as Medina, St. Robert Bellarmine, Valencia and Becan. But it is also found in similar terms in the work of Jean de Paris when he impugned the theocratic idea of the temporal supremacy of the pope. In later theology—and still more in the present after the encyclical Quas Primas of Pius XI—it is already a certain doctrine that Christ the Man was and forever remains universal King of the world and of all creatures, animate and inanimate, in both the spiritual and temporal senses.”

[112] Menendez-Rigada, Vitoria, Francois de, in DTC, col. 3133: “Because of his ideas regarding civil society and the State, [Vitoria] perhaps also deserves the name of father of modern political law. He shows himself no less ingenious when he studies the concept, the foundations, the realization of power of the Church and the pope, particularly in what concerns the temporal, because, in this order of ideas, Vitoria’s doctrine was integrated into Catholic knowledge as something definitive, while before him the greatest confusion still reigned about these problems.”

[113] Denzinger-Hünermann 3675; Quas Primas, Pius XI, 11th December 1925 (no. 7).

[114] The work most typical of this trend is that of the Jesuit, Marechal, Le Point de Depart de la Métaphysique.

[115] The devout Cardinal Mercier, for example, would attenuate the strength of the Thomistic renewal with these doubtful concessions to modern thought. He also manifested a certain tendency toward ecumenism in the “Conversations of Malines” with the Anglicans, carried out under his patronage.

[116] The following are the works almost infallibly cited by those who later touch on these themes, and all decidedly maintain positions similar to that of Maritainian humanism: Rivière, Le Problème de l’Église et de l’État au temps de Philippe le Bel, Paris-Louvaine, 1926, whose works carry a lot of weight due to his great erudition; J. Leclerc, L’Argument des Deux Glaives, 1931-1932; Henri de Lubac, Le Pouvoir de l’Église en Matière Temporelle, 1932; Ch. Journet, La Juridiction de l’Église sur la Cité, 1931; H.-X. Arquillière, L’Augustinisme Politique. Essai sur la Formation des Théories Politiques du Moyen-âge, Paris 1934; Glez, Pouvoir du Pape Dans l’Ordre Temporal, in DTC, 1935. Maritain said nothing new when he published l’Humanisme Intégral in 1936.

[117] The best among them is Cardinal Billot who, although he aligned his doctrine with Thomism, still followed mainly Suarez on the relation of Church and State. Billot clearly defends Maurras and Action Française, but the modern thesis of a philosophical state leads him surely (we haven’t asserted this in the texts) to be too much in conformity with a “natural” politician like Maurras, who accepted the good influence of the Church without professing her faith. If one observes his treatise De Habitudine Ecclesiae ad Civilem Societatem, one finds an excellent exposition of the error of liberalism, but nowhere does he expose the doctrine of Christ the King. He only exposes the “indirect subordination” according to Suarez and the apologetic argument which obliges to profess the faith and defend the Church. The only excuse he has is that Quas Primas had not yet been promulgated.

[118] Charles Journet, La Juridiction de l’Église sur la Cité, Desclée, Paris 1931, p. 28-29: “We must call temporal, along with all the theologians, what is ordained, as to a first and immediate end, toward the common good (material and moral) of the earthly city, a good which substantially is concerned with the natural order… and we must, with the theologians, call spiritual, that which is ordered, as to its first and immediate end, toward the supernatural common good of the Church.”

[119] A suggestive title: La Théocratie, l’Eglise et le Pouvoir au Moyen-âge, (Theocracy, the Church and Power in the Middle Ages), Marcel Pacaut, Aubier Paris 1957.

[120] Cardinal Billot was not at all liberal, and he realized the havoc that liberalism was wreaking in society, but when he had to expound on the indirect subordination of ecclesiastical and political powers, he did so according to Suárez and wound up disparaging the importance of economical and political aspects with regard to the supernatural end. He says in his Tractatus de Ecclesia Christi (Prati 1910, vol. II, p. 74): “The inferiority of temporal good to spiritual resides precisely in a total disproportion, which not only does not support the reasoning of a middle way, but positively excludes it… What does having healthy sons, well-dressed daughters, full granaries, abundant flocks, no ruin, no tumult and clamor in the squares, but quiet, peace, cities and houses full of goods, do for the good of virtue, for the perfection of the soul, for the end of eternal blessedness? Certainly this happiness per se does not lead to the other, is not a ladder to the same, does not dispose us to it by virtue of its form. Thus, it is not an end directly, but rather is the last end in its own order, beyond which we cannot proceed in a direct line.” If the full granary does not matter greatly to the achievement of virtue, why did he become so indignant at the pontifical error of condemning Action Française? Satan has reconquered Christendom by directing the fashion of its daughters and seizing the key of its granaries.

[121] J. Maritain, Humanisme Integral, p. 83: “This attitude of the saint, which, definitely, properly speaking, is not an attitude of contempt for things, but rather assumption and transfiguration of them, in a higher love of things, is that which—if we suppose it as a generalized love, made common and even commonplace in the Christian psyche—would respond to this rehabilitation of the creature in God that seems to us characteristic of a new era of Christianity and a new humanism” (translation of the translation by A. Mendizábal, Ediciones Ercilla, Santiago de Chile, 1947, p. 84).

Gustave Thils, Historia doctrinal del Movimiento Ecuménico, RIALP, Madrid, 1965, p. 277: “In modern times, the ‘consistency’ proper to temporal realities has been better understood and highlighted, in reference to the relationship between nature and super-nature, without denying in any way its ‘radical order-ability’ to a supernatural order.”

[122] J. Maritain, Humanisme Integral, p. 83.

[123] Gaudium et Spes, no. 2. The admiration that the Constitution manifests for the World merits other descriptions that we can hardly resist using. For it, the agony we are suffering is a “crisis of growth” (no. 4), it is a “social and cultural metamorphosis, which has repercussions on man’s religious life as well,” which for the optimism of the Constitution is nothing but the change from caterpillar to butterfly. Technology “has already conquered outer space,” when it has barely reached the moon and is ruining the earth; “the human intellect is broadening its dominion over time,” knowing the past and predicting the future (no. 5), when the media are making up even the present; the sciences “are regulating population growth” (ibid.) by filling Limbo with murdered little souls. Gaudium et Spes overflows with joy and hope for the creature bred by the Revolution—a blind guide leading the blind into the pit!

[124] The human being, no. 13; community, no. 25; work, no. 37.

[125] “Since man’s freedom has been damaged by sin, only by the aid of God’s grace can he bring such a relationship with God into full flower” (no. 17). “An improvement in attitudes and abundant changes in society will have to take place if these objectives are to be gained. God’s Spirit, Who with a marvelous providence directs the unfolding of time and renews the face of the earth, is not absent from this development” (no. 26). “The Christian norm is that all human activity, constantly imperiled by man’s pride and deranged self-love, must be purified and perfected by the power of Christ’s cross and resurrection” (no. 37).

[126] The error here committed, we repeat, is that which was implicit in the indirect subordination of a natural political order to the supernatural ecclesiastical order, because it is a subordination that subordinates nothing: grace would enclose nature without affecting it at all in regard to its own ends. The Catholic physician and the Jewish would rule themselves by exactly the same laws of medicine. Which is a sovereign lie, because knowing that a child cannot be saved without baptism leads to very different ways of dealing with possible interventions in a birthing emergency.

[127] Lumen Gentium, no. 9: “God gathered together as one all those who in faith look upon Jesus as the author of salvation and the source of unity and peace, and established them as the Church, that for each and all it may be the visible sacrament of this saving unity.”

[128] Cf. Gustave Thils, Historia doctrinal del Movimiento Ecuménico, RIALP, Madrid 1965.

[129] Unofficial report of the Lausanne Conference, cited by G. Thils, op. cit., p. 37.

[130] Subjectivism is always skeptical, but it can avoid pessimism for a time. Taken with optimism, it allows us to convince ourselves that the doctrinal differences are secondary and lack major practical consequences. When reality undeceives it, it falls into what is now called post-modernism.

[131] The Holy Office had condemned, by its letters of the 16th September 1864 to the bishops of England (Denzinger-Hünermann 2885), the “branch theory” by which the Anglicans generously offered us a part of the Church of Christ, along with themselves and the schismatic Greek Orthodox. It also forbade Catholics to enter the Association for the Promotion of the Reunion of Christendom.

[132] Michael Schmaus, Teología Dogmática, vol. IV, RIALP Madrid, 1962, p. 405: “The question remains afoot of whether non-Catholic ecclesial communities may not pertain in some way to the only Roman Catholic Church, whether they may not partake in the only Roman Catholic Church in a way analogous to that in which baptized non-Catholic individuals do so. J. Gribomont, O.S.B. believes he can answer our question in the affirmative. He speaks of a visible, but imperfect union of non-Catholic Christian groups with the Church. To substantiate it he adduces that they have authentic vestigia Ecclesiæ, for example, Baptism and the Scriptures, along with other Sacraments.” Schmaus maintains the liberal reduction of the Church, distinguishing between the Church and the Kingdom, but does not accept the ecumenical reduction, refuting the opinion referred to in the citation. In any case, the thesis that would finally triumph does not say that they belong to the Roman Catholic Church, but to the Church of Christ.

[133] Gustave Thils, Historia Doctrinal del Movimiento Ecuménico: “The study of the “elements of the Church”—vestigia Ecclesiæ—and their ecclesiological meaning, is proper to the twentieth century… The theory of the elements of the Church is complex, because it is intimately united to the very definition of the Church. It may be considered as a chapter of Catholic ecclesiology important in itself and capable of providing some clarity in ecumenical meetings” (p. 239). “Can there not be, in all the Christian communities arisen from the Reformation, religious and Christian realities of an ‘ecclesiastical’ nature?” (p. 243). “The conferences given by Cardinal A. Bea, President of the Secretariat for Unity, have once again given a vivid brightness, if not to the of the ‘elements of the Church,’ at least to the concrete description of said elements” (p. 244).

[134] Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Declaration Dominus Iesus, 6th August 2000.

[135] III, q. 82, a. 7.

[136] The trick is well planned because, although the traditional position is unanimous in considering them ineffective, the particular discussion is complex. A schismatic baptized as a child receives faith and grace; when does he lose them? If he has not lost them, on communicating devoutly with the validly consecrated Host, he receives the fruit of the sacrament. At the root, the difference between the Catholic and modernist positions is in their pessimism or optimism: the Catholic is pessimistic about the possibility of spiritual health in a community where the aids that the Catholic has are absent (all the benefits of priestly ministry) and all the influences that formalize heresy are present (scorn and even hatred of all things Catholic); meanwhile the modern humanist maintains the most unflappable optimism. And yet, why did sainthood never blossom outside Catholic lands?

[137] “But the society structured with hierarchical organs and the Mystical Body of Christ, are not to be considered as two realities, nor are the visible assembly and the spiritual community, nor the earthly Church and the Church enriched with heavenly things; they form one complex reality, which coalesces from a divine and a human element.”

[138] “Haec [Christi] Ecclesia, in hoc mundo ut societas constituta et ordinata, subsistit in Ecclesia catholica.”

[139] Mystici Corporis: “If we would define and describe this true Church of Jesus Christ—which is the One, Holy, Catholic, Apostolic and Roman Church—we shall find nothing more noble, more sublime, or more divine than the expression “the Mystical Body of Christ.”

[140] The last black pearl of this maleficent No. 8 is the blasphemous reference to the sins of the Church: “the Church, embracing in its bosom sinners, at the same time holy and always in need of being purified, always follows the way of penance and renewal.” It goes against the explicit warning of Mystici Corporis: “Certainly the loving Mother is spotless in the Sacraments…in the faith…in her sacred laws…in those heavenly gifts and extraordinary grace… But it cannot be laid to her charge if some members fall, weak or wounded…”

[141] In the same way (as the pope) each “bishop is the visible principle and foundation of unity in his particular church, fashioned after the model of the universal Church, in and from which churches the one and only Catholic Church comes into being” (Lumen Gentium No. 23).

[142] In Unitatis Redintegratio Nos. 1 & 3.

[143] Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, August 6, 2000, No. 4: “The Church’s constant missionary proclamation is endangered today by relativistic theories which seek to justify religious pluralism…” (There follows a frightful list of heresies that are circulating among “Catholics”).

[144] March 11, 1985, Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. In his book, L. Boff says that just as the Church of Christ subsists in the Catholic Church, so it also subsists in other Christian Churches. The Notification responds to that: “The Council had chosen the word ‘subsistit’ precisely to clarify the existence of a sole ‘subsistence’ of the true Church. Meanwhile only ‘elementa Ecclesiae’ exist outside of her visible structure, which—being elements of the same Church—tend towards the Catholic Church and lead to Her.”

[145] Dominus Jesus, No. 16.

[146] The December 9, 2005, Spanish edition of L’Osservatore Romano, No. 49, p. 8-10. Wikipedia’s article on “Karl Josef Becker” (English edition) says: “According to John L. Allen, Jr., Becker enjoyed the respect and trust of Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, the former Prefect of the Doctrinal Congregation. More than one theologian with problems was advised ‘to go and see Fr. Becker’.”

[147] “Among the many reasons that have led to this [multiplication of interpretations foreign to the Council], it seems that the most relevant is a problem the Council left open. It ultimately deals with reconciling two statements that the Council made with the same clarity. First, the Church of Christ is the Catholic Church and it remains in her forever in its plenitude. This has been, is and will be the doctrine of the Catholic Church before, during and after the Council. Secondly, ecclesial elements of truth and sanctification, which belong to the Catholic Church, exist in other Christian communities and impel toward unity with Her.”

[148] “Why are these ‘elements’ called ‘ecclesial’? A first answer could be because they belong to the Catholic Church. This would be a repetition of conciliar doctrine. A second answer could be that they are ‘ecclesial’ because they give Christian communities a collective nature, and that this nature deserves the mention of ‘Church’ or at least the title of ‘ecclesial’.” It is true that these communities have a collective characteristic, but it has to be proven that this characteristic deserves the title of Church. They cannot even justify it by an alleged “presence and operation” of the church of Christ—which is the Catholic Church—in these communities.

[149] L’Osservatore Romano, No. 50, December 16, 2005.

[150] We have caricatured the argument. It reads like this: “A possible manner of reflection is that it refers to the true presence of the Primate of Peter (and the Episcopal College) in non-Catholic Churches, based on the unity of the ‘one, indivisible’ episcopate, a unity that cannot exist without communion with the Bishop of Rome.” What a shock for the orthodox patriarch to discover that there is no way to prevent his communion with the pope! They would have to stop being bishops!

[151] Alexandra von Teuffenbach, Becker’s disciple, has confirmed this thesis in her study of S. Tromp’s diary of the Council, Konzilstagebuch Sebastian Tromp SJ mit Erläuterungen and Akten aus der Arbeit der Theologischen Kommission, 2006, Gregorian Pontifical University. Credit cannot be given to the version that makes Wilhelm Schmidt, Pastor of the Protestant Church of Santa Cruz in Bremen-Hom, the author of “subsistit in,” who had suggested it to Fr. Ratzinger himself, Cardinal Frings’ theologian during the Council. As we shall see later, Cardinal Ratzinger said that this expression comes from scholastic thought, and a Protestant pastor is not usually very scholastic.

[152] In his article, Becker suggests a certain state of nervousness in Tromp: “The recording gives more information. It shows that Schauf rejects adest because to him it is hardly precise. Tromp immediately replies: ‘Possumus dicere: itaque subsistit in Ecclesia catholica, et hoc est exclusivum (in a very loud voice), in quantum dicitur: alibi non sunt nisi elementa. Explicatur in textu.’ [We can say: therefore it subsists in the Catholic Church and this is exclusive (in a very loud voice) inasmuch as is said: in another place there are only elements. It is explained in the text.]”

[153] L’Osservatore Romano, Spanish edition, No. 34, August 25, 2000, p. 9, 2nd col.

[154] Michael Schmaus in his Teología Dogmática, III. Dios Redentor (2nd ed. RIALP, Madrid 1962, p. 140-144), uses notions infinitely distant from the way St. Thomas understood them. He especially does not attribute “subsistence” to the person but rather to the nature.

[155] In fact, there is another one, based on logic, because the first “something” should indicate a subject that can subsist, while the second “something” should be a nature. It is correct to say “The Word subsists in the humanity” but not “The Word subsists in the man.” For it is contradictory to say that a subject that subsists, i.e., which is in itself, could be simultaneously in another as in its subject. By saying that a concrete subject (the Church of Christ) subsists in another concrete subject (the Catholic Church), the conciliar expression makes one think that the verb “subsist” means “remains.” Then “to subsist in something” only serves as the content in the container, because it is only allowable to say of two concrete subjects: the wine remains or subsists in the bottle. And although they will never recognize it, nevertheless, I am bold enough to say that the rash instigators of this expression wanted to play with this ambiguity, because the majority of simple-minded ecumenists imagine the Church of Christ as a spiritual content that is found in several invisible containers, the Catholic Church and others besides.

[156] “What is proper to the divine person is that, due to His infinitude, several natures can coincide in Him, not accidentally, but according to His subsistence” (III, q. 3, a. 1 ad 2).

[157] John XXIII, opening address of the Council, 11th October of 1962: “Unfortunately, the entire Christian family [the total Church] has not yet fully attained this visible unity in truth… If one considers well this same unity which Christ implored for His Church, it seems to shine, as it were, with a triple ray of beneficent supernal light: namely, [1] the unity of Catholics among themselves, which must always he kept exemplary and most firm; [2] the unity of prayers and ardent desires with which those Christians separated from this Apostolic See aspire to be united with us; [3] and the unity in esteem and respect for the Catholic Church which animates those who follow non-Christian religions.”

[158] We have dealt with this point more extensively in La lámpara bajo el celemín. See, in article 4, “On the Relationship Between Magisterium and Government”: “A man may not claim to lead others without showing that he possesses the knowledge of the common good and instructing his subjects to order themselves toward it. This is the most divine aspect of authority, because this knowledge is true theology, which belongs not to men but to God” (p. 156). Also “On Liberal Government and its Relationship with the Truth”: “The discipline of every government, as we have said, is necessarily informed by a doctrine of a theological range and necessarily transmitted by the exercise of its magisterial function… The Machiavellianism of a liberal government, then, consists of that, in place of arranging its politics to the higher ends of true religion, it arranges religion to political ends; which, although unspoken or unwanted, still surely constitutes a new religion whose supreme good is power, a free and autonomous power that answers to no other God than one’s own Ego” (p. 170–171).

[159] Apocalypse 13:5: “And there was given to him a mouth speaking great things, and blasphemies: and power was given to him to do two and forty months (three years and six months).” Cf. Dan. 12:11: “And from the time when the continual sacrifice shall be taken away, and the abomination unto desolation shall be set up, there shall be a thousand two hundred ninety days (43 months of 30 days). Blessed is he that waiteth and cometh unto a thousand three hundred thirty-five days (another month and a half).” Of this time of Daniel, St. Thomas says: “The number [of days] given in Daniel must not refer to a certain number of years until the end of the world, or until the preaching of the Antichrist, but must refer to the time in which the Antichrist will preach, and the length of his persecution” (In IV Sent. D. 43, q. 1, a. 3, qla 2 ad 2). The time of the preaching and triumph of the Antichrist corresponds to that of the preaching of Christ Himself, some three and a half years. Although, as Van Noort says, the literal interpretation of this time is not imposed: “That the reign of Antichrist will not last long is deducible from Sacred Scripture, especially because of the lines ‘propter electos breviabuntur dies illi’ (Mt. 24:22). Based on the explanations of many Fathers and exegetes, many theologians consider that reign will last three and a half years because of the computation from Daniel and the Apocalypse. But, from the symbolic character of many parts of these books, the grave doubt arises whether these numbers should be taken literally” (Tractatus de Novissimis, no. 111b).

[160] It is notable that this process has had three periods marked by four triumphs. Its beginning can be marked in the 14th century with the affront of Anagni, when the kings broke the yoke of the Papacy: “Thou hast broken my yoke, thou hast burst my bands, and thou saidst: I will not serve” (Jer. 2:20). So was the link broken that made a nation Christian, for the authority of the pope was the soul of Christendom. Two centuries later came the Reformation, when kings and subjects alike broke their religious obedience to the pope in the midst of Christendom. Two centuries more, and the revolution destroyed the natural political order, capable of being informed anew by ecclesiastical power. And two centuries later, in Vatican II, Paul VI grew ashamed of his own authority, divesting himself of the papal tiara. If we take these three epochs as those given to Satan to persecute the Church (Apoc. 12:14), he would have half an epoch left, that is, another century from the time of the Council. But it would not do to entertain these mathematic-apocalyptic speculations too much…

[161] The humanism of the 14th century, with its return to the sources instead of the theologians and preachers, was favored by the introduction of paper in the 12th and 13th centuries. The Lutheran reformation would not have been possible without the invention of printing in the 15th century. Nor would the French revolution have occurred without the flood of pamphlets that the “Enlightenment” distributed. And, evidently, neither would Vatican II have been what it was sans radio and television.

[162] Commentaries on the Code of Canon Law, vol. I, BAC, Madrid 1963, no. 412, p. 384.

[163] Merriam-Webster English Dictionary, first definition.

[164] Diccionario de la Real Academia Española, 2nd meaning of “laico” (laical): “Said of the school or education that dispenses with religious instruction.”

[165] Lumen Gentium, no. 17. An ingenuous scholastic would understand “Church” as the hierarchy and see no problem with this phrasing. But in reality, here we need not reduce the term “Church,” which refers to the whole Church, but should broaden the term “Apostles,” meaning not only the Twelve but all the disciples of Christ.

[166] We say “confessional” and not merely “Catholic” because—as we have seen—to conciliar ecumenists the Catholic Church is only the part in which the Church of Christ subsists, because the latter also comprises every visible religious community. Modernly, to be Catholic, Lutheran or Muslim is interpreted as we traditionally understood being a diocesan, Dominican or Jesuit priest—that is, as different clerical vocations. Well, the comparison is a bit extreme, but unfortunately it is not totally incorrect.

[167] Cf. “The Personalist Inversion of the Common Good,” “What Conciliar Humanism Formally Is,” Chapter 1, Part IV.

[168] Gaudium et Spes gracefully thanks the world for this lesson, no. 44: “Since the Church has a visible and social structure as a sign of her unity in Christ, she can and ought to be enriched by the development of human social life, not that there is any lack in the constitution given her by Christ, but that she can understand it more penetratingly, express it better, and adjust it more successfully to our times.” The enrichment here mentioned is, certainly, democracy.

[169] See the second proposition of the Synod of Pistoia, condemned by Pius VI in the constitution Auctorem Fidei, 28th August, 1794: “The power attributed to the community of the Church, in order that by this the power may be communicated to the pastors. The proposition which states ‘that power has been given by God to the Church, that it might be communicated to the pastors who are its ministers for the salvation of souls’; if thus understood that the power of ecclesiastical ministry and of rule is derived from the community of the faithful to the pastors, is heretical” (Denzinger-Hünermann 2602; Auctorem Fidei, art. 2).

[170] The quantity of theological articles and writings on this topic in the years preceding the Council is infinite, the majority defending the thesis of “universal priesthood,” an opinion that was not restricted to the limits of the new theology. Romano Amerio, for example, in Iota Unum, accepts this thesis as dogmatic (Iota Unum: A Study of Changes in the Catholic Church in the 20th Century, Salamanca 1994, no. 83, p. 141; English edition, Angelus Press, Saint Marys, KS, no. 83): “Catholic doctrine sees within the priesthood an essential, not merely a functional, difference between the priest and the layman: an ontological difference due to the character impressed upon the soul by the sacrament of orders. The new theology revives old heretical doctrines, which came together to produce the Lutheran abolition of the priesthood, and disguises the difference that exists between the universal priesthood of baptized believers and the sacramental priesthood which is proper to priests alone… The tendency of the theological innovators is to dissolve the second priesthood in the first, and to reduce the priest to the same level as all Christians.” As we will see, Lumen Gentium is very careful to distinguish essentially and, if you will, ontologically between the two priesthoods, which does not impede it at all in achieving its object. But, as we clarify at the end of this paragraph, this distinction is proper neither to dogma nor to good theology. Pius XII does not explicitly condemn this theory in Mediator Dei but he deliberately omits any reference to this supposed priesthood.

[171] Cf. Roman Catechism, On the Sacrament of Holy Orders, p. II, c. 7, no. 23: “Two priesthoods are described in the Holy Scriptures, one internal and the other external. In regard to the internal Priesthood, all baptized faithful are called Priests. We may speak of priesthood because they may perform all their acts of virtue with a religious spirit, as sacrifices united to the Sacrifice of Our Lord, and because through prayer and fraternal charity can constitute them as mediators between men and God. But only in the improper sense, because the only public sacrifice accepted by God in the New Testament is that of Christ renewed in the Mass, and because the layman does not exercise a priestly mediation with the authority of God, but a mediation of friendship according to the rights that love grants.—In the liberal vision of the ‘priesthood of the Church,’ the priestly office, just as it is there understood, belongs more truly to the layman, who is in direct contact with the world. The ordained minister is at his service to strengthen him. If we compare it to an army, the layman is the priestly vanguard and the ordained ministers are in charge of logistical services. A clear example are the numeraries of Opus Dei; they are the true priests before the world, consecrated by poverty, chastity and obedience to their secular professions. The ordained ministers are hidden in their chapels and feed them with the Sacraments for them to continue with this battle of the modern ‘consecratio mundi.’ As we can see, the theology of the Paschal Mystery deeply deforms the Catholic doctrine of the priesthood.”

[172] H. Mazzella, Prælectiones Scholastico-Dogmaticæ, vol. 1, 6th edition, Torino 1937, p. 388.

[173] Vatican Council I, Const. Dogm. Pastor Aeternus, c. 3, Denzinger-Hünermann 1831.

[174] St. Pius X, Encyclical Pascendi Dominici Gregis, 8th September 1907, Denzinger-Hünermann 2091.

[175] Juan Antonio Widow, El Hombre, Animal Político, El Orden Social: Principios e Ideologías, Nueva Hispanidad 2007, p. 264.

[176] J.A. Widow, op. cit., p. 278.

[177] Jacques Maritain, El Hombre y el Estado, Club de Lectores, Buenos Aires 1984, p. 81. Of course the “people” that think, desire and work are not the common people, but those small cliques of power that know how to dominate these public instruments—and other hidden ones—under pressure.

[178] In a tribal community composed of a few families of similar condition, a democratic regime formed by the heads of family is justified. A larger community becomes more complex, and it is normal that some families of better status predominate over the rest, forming an aristocratic regime. But the normal and better regime is a hereditary monarchy, in which a family consecrates itself totally to government, educating its members from a young age for this exacting office. Although, as St. Thomas points out, given human fragility, it is good to moderate the monarchy with something of aristocracy and democracy, so it will not fall into tyranny. The mendacious liberal democracy would have us believe that all are equally ready to govern at the age of 18 or 21 years.

[179] Denzinger-Hünermann 2602.

[180] Vatican Council I, Dogmatic Constitution Pastor Aeternus, Chapter I, Denzinger-Hünermann 1822. In the schema De Ecclesia Christi that was given to the Council Fathers but did not go so far as to be approved, there was a canon prepared which read: Canon 11. Si quis dixerit, Ecclesiam institutam divinitus esse tanquam societatem aequalium; ab episcopis vero haberi quidem officium et ministerium, non autem propriam regiminis potestatem, quæ ipsis divina ordinatione competat, quæque ab iisdem sit libere exercenda; anathema sit.—Should any say that the Church instituted by God is a society of equals, and that from the bishops it holds an office and a ministry, but not a power of jurisdiction properly so-called, which belongs to them in virtue of a divine ordination, and which they can freely exercise, let him be anathema” (Mansi, vol. 50, p. 418a).

[181] Dogmatic Constitution Pastor Aeternus, Chapter I, Denzinger-Hünermann 1823.

[182] Ralph M. Wiltgen, S.V.D., The Rhine Flows Into the Tiber, (Hawthorn Books, 1971 or TAN Books, 1991).

[183] Lumen Gentium no. 9. As we have pointed out already, the Kingdom of God here is not identified with the priestly people, but rather with humanity.

[184] Michaël Demierre, “Episcopacy and collegiality in Chapter 3 of Lumen Gentium” in Spiritual Unity of the Human Race in the Religion of Vatican II, Third Paris Symposium, 2004, p. 194: “The §18 of Lumen Gentium, taken as is, presents traditional doctrine in apparent continuity with Pastor Aeternus of Vatican I. However, in Pastor Aeternus, these same affirmations were not preceded by Chapters 1 and 2 of Lumen Gentium [common priesthood]. Also, they were not followed by §19 and §20 of this Chapter 3 [collegiality]. Therefore, the context of §18 imposes a reading that is not traditional in the slightest.”

[185] Michaël Demierre, “Episcopacy and Collegiality in Chapter 3 of Lumen Gentium,” p. 195.

[186] For a detailed discussion of these points see the excellent work of Fr. Michaël Demierre.

[187] It was even accepted that, in case of necessity, a simple priest could ordain another by supplied jurisdiction.

[188] They were conscious of the fact that it was not “evolution,” but a revolution that would derange the entire constitution of the Church.

[189] Joseph Ratzinger: “La Collégialité Épiscopale. Développement Théologique,” in L’Eglise de Vatican II, vol. III, Unam Sanctam, Les éditions du Cerf, 1966, p. 767

[190] Michaël Demierre, “Episcopacy and collegiality in Chapter 3 of Lumen Gentium,” p. 196.

[191] Michaël Demierre, “Episcopacy and Collegiality in Chapter 3 of Lumen Gentium,” p. 208.

[192] Vatican Council I, Dogmatic Constitution Pastor Aeternus, Chapter 1, Denzinger-Hünermann 1823.

[193] Vatican Council I, Dogmatic Constitution Pastor Aeternus, Chapter 1, Denzinger-Hünermann 3053–3054.

[194] Lumen Gentium, no. 22. We have not referred to the “Explanatory Note” which Paul VI had added, because it changes nothing of what is said. It makes four observations. In the first, he clarifies that “the term college is not understood in a strictly juridical sense, that is, as of an assembly of equals.” The second point tries to justify that “the character of a member of the college is acquired by episcopal consecration,” but never refers to the distinction between power of order and of jurisdiction, nor does it say that jurisdiction comes from the pope, but that the power received through episcopal consecration is not “ready to be exercised” and needs a simple “determination” according to the “norms approved by the supreme authority” (that is, the pope or the college). The third begins with a singular statement: “It is said of the college, which cannot exist without its Head, that ‘it is also subject to the supreme and full power over the Universal Church.’ We must admit this affirmation so as not to endanger the fullness of power of the Roman Pontiff (?!).” The only thing that is clarified, as the fourth observation says, is that “lacking the action of the Head, the bishops cannot act as a college, as the very notion of a ‘college’ proves.”

[195] Maître Roger Lefebvre, “De l’Action Extraordinaire de l’Épiscopat,” in Tradition, Doctrine, Actualité, magazine of the General Headquarters of the SSPX, January 2000, nº 1, p. 46-49: “The general presidence over the entire Curia, constitutionally attributed to the Secretary of State by Regimini Ecclesiae, has become a duplication of the supreme authority… Hardly had he expressed reserves and precisions contained in this explanatory note (prior to Lumen Gentium), Paul VI did exactly the opposite, by an act of positive law, which did not change explicitly the divine constitution of the Church, but which reached the same practical result by setting up new governmental structures, which paralyzed the defense of the deposit of the faith against errors, subjected the affirmation and diffusion of the doctrine to the criterion of opportunities, rendered the Church ungovernable and reduced the function of the Pontiff to that of a shadow sovereign duplicated by a practically plenipotentiary regent… This division of the monarchical function into two separate roles, more and more independent, becomes constitutional in the monarchies called ‘constitutional and representative,’ invented in the 19th century to combine the democracy with the appearance of monarchy… What do we see today in the government of the Church? It is basically the same thing. From the Council onwards, and more clearly since the reform of the Curia made to execute the resolutions of the Council, the papacy has aligned itself with the model of the so-called constitutional and representative monarchies. The solemn functions are left to the apparent sovereign whereas the exercise of power is in other hands.”

[196] Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Letter Communionis Notio, On some aspects of the Church considered as a Communion, 29th May 1992.

[197] Discourse of Cardinal Ratzinger at the presentation of the Letter, 15th June, 1992.

[198] Communionis Notio no. 3: “If the concept of communion, which is not a univocal concept, is to serve as a key to ecclesiology…”

[199] Paul VI, Closing Address, 7th December 1965.

[200] We have expanded on the nature and consequences of this dialogue in the second article of La lámpara bajo el celemín.

CHAPTER IV

A NEW RELIGION?

Religion is the collection of dispositions and acts through which we render worship to divinity. Religion is true when worship is rendered to the true God in the proper way. The end of true religion, then, is the One and Triune God, and the proper means is Jesus Christ, “because there is no other name under heaven given to men, by whom we should be saved” (Acts 4:12).

Given the depth of the changes introduced by the Second Vatican Council into the Catholic religion, can it be said that it has established a new religion? This is what we shall study in this last chapter. The change to a new religion could occur if a substantially new manner of offering worship to the true God were established; or, worse, if that worship were directed to an idol instead of to God. First, we shall consider the mode of the religion of the Council, so as to be able to later answer the second question.

The true religion is called Christian because it renders worship to God through Jesus Christ. Our Lord Jesus Christ is the only Mediator, established by God as Supreme and Eternal High Priest; the action by which He gave due worship was His Sacrifice, and men must unite themselves to His religion through faith in Revelation and through the sacraments. To judge, therefore, if the Council has substantially changed the mode of our religion, we shall study those elements, beginning by Revelation. Thus, four topics present themselves for our consideration:

A. What the Council understands by Revelation.

B. What relationship the Sacraments have to Sacrifice, according to the new Paschal Mystery.

C. What Jesus Christ is for the Council.

D. Whether the Council continues to worship the Holy Trinity.

A. Revelation and Tradition

According to the Council

Man, individually and socially in the Church, unites himself to the work of Redemption carried out by Jesus Christ through the faith and the sacraments; and in this way he renders to God the cult of glorification due to Him and, at the same time, attains his own salvation:

- Faith in Revelation—Revelation fulfilled by the Incarnate Word Himself—is, at once, the fundamental disposition of the soul for Jesus Christ to lead us to the fullness of Truth, the final end of man, and the substance of cult, because by it we make to God the offering of our intellect. Hence, we can say with St. Thomas that Christian worship consists, in sum, in the profession of faith.

- The Sacraments are signs instituted by Christ, which also have the double end of sanctification and worship, because they effectively infuse grace into souls—ex opere operato, that is, by virtue of the rite itself being performed and not by the virtue of the minister that performs it—to lead them to the fullness of Life and constitute the means by which men may unite themselves to the same cult of religion of the Incarnate Word.

“The Word was made flesh and dwelt amongst us, full of grace and truth, and of His fullness we have all received” (Jn. 1). We receive, then, truth through faith and grace through the sacraments.

The new humanism of Vatican II sowed, in the conciliar documents, the seeds of very deep changes in the way of understanding sanctification and the Christian cult, which bore fruit in the later reforms. Looking at the fruits, we shall distinguish the seeds in the texts.

Let us consider, then, in this point, how the Council interprets Revelation and its transmission to us through Tradition. We will consider the place of the Eucharist and the other sacraments in the next point, when we deal with the Paschal Mystery.[201]

I. REVELATION BY THE WORD, NOT BY WORDS

1. The object of Revelation

Conciliar subjectivism, as we said in the second chapter, considers every conceptual formulation as a human product, depending on culture and history, inadequate to express reality (natural or supernatural). Hence it always speaks of divine Revelation as a mysterious manifestation of a reality (ontological truth), and never as a communication of verbal propositions (logical truth), which would always be something human. The object of Revelation, then, is a res occulta, a mysterious thing and not a doctrine.

In speaking of the object of Revelation, Dei Verbum says: “In His goodness and wisdom God chose to reveal Himself and to make known to us the hidden purpose of His Will”; what “transmits this revelation” is the “deepest [→ ontological] truth about God and the salvation of man” (no. 2). But what the content of Revelation may be, we will discuss later, in the last point. Dei Verbum spends more time on the mode than the object of Revelation.

2. The means

Catholic humanism, we have also said, denies, along with all modern thought, the universality of concepts to preserve freedom of opinion; but to keep on the middle ground, it also denies pure subjectivism and maintains, against wind and tide, that it is possible to pass from phenomenon to foundation, that is, from what man perceives subjectively to the reality that founds that perception. New theology favored the solution offered by the notion of “sacrament-mystery” for its traditional aura; the phenomenon is the “sacrament,” that is, a perceptible sign that makes its foundation effectively present; and the foundation is a “mystery,” that is, a hidden truth that is halfway manifested through the experience of its sacramental sign, which is like its “word.” Yet, even with this, not everything is mended by this, and there are several loose ends left.[202]

To the Constitution Dei Verbum, Jesus Christ is the Sacrament that manifests the Mystery. It is true that it is not the new word “Sacrament” that applies to Jesus Christ, but the traditional “Word”; but to understand the constitution, know that this is the concept. Revelation is not through many words that signify doctrinal propositions (logical truths), but through one single Word, for which “to signify” is to make present the mystery of God (ontological truth). Jesus Christ had not come to fulfill revealed doctrine, but He Himself is Revelation, in His person, deeds and words: “To see Jesus is to see His Father (Jn. 14:9). For this reason, Jesus perfected revelation by fulfilling it through His whole work of making Himself present and manifesting Himself: through His words and deeds, His signs and wonders, but especially through His death and glorious resurrection from the dead and final sending of the Spirit of truth” (no. 4).

Of course, it is Catholic to say that Christ is the revelation of God, but we also have to say that this revelation was translated into doctrinal propositions. Because, if we deny this, what happens to those who have not seen Him, and only have what is told to us about Him to believe? It was of us that Jesus Christ said, “Beati qui non viderunt et crediderunt—blessed are they who have not seen and have believed” (Jn. 20:29).

II. LIVING TRADITION

1. Tradition

If the Council maintains that Revelation is not given through doctrine but through presence, evidently it will interpret in another way the transmission of Revelation to other generations who did not live with Our Lord, that is, Tradition.

Tradition is not, then, the transmission of doctrine, but an extension of the Sacrament that makes present the Mystery of God. After the death and resurrection of Christ, the perceptible sacrament becomes the Church from then on, in its person, words and deeds. The Church is the sacrament of Christ and Christ is the sacrament of God. God is a mystery hidden and revealed in Christ, and since the Resurrection, Christ is a mystery hidden and revealed in the Church. Of course, we must recall that we are speaking of the Church that subsists in the Catholic Church but is not reduced to Her.

Evidently, Tradition understood this way is almost confused with Revelation; it is Revelation in continuous act. It is clear that this notion obliges us to reinterpret all the related ideas as well:

- It makes little sense to say that Revelation ended with the last Apostle; but if pressed, it can make some sense.

- Neither is it clear why there is so much insistence on preaching: “Go and preach,” and that faith is “ex auditu”; but we can always give a broader meaning to preaching.

- Even less can one understand the importance of the Apostles as qualified witnesses, and that of the charism of the magisterium received by their successors; but with a little imagination, everything can keep its place.

Chapter II of Dei Verbum, which deals with the “Transmission of Divine Revelation,” does not say things quite as clearly as we do here. But read it with a traditional mindset and many strange expressions can be found; reading it again in light of these signs, everything becomes clear:

God, who spoke of old, uninterruptedly converses [continuous revelation] with the bride of His beloved Son; and the Holy Spirit, through whom the living voice of the Gospel resounds in the Church, and through her, in the world, leads unto all truth those who believe and makes the word of Christ [→presence] dwell abundantly in them.

2. Living Tradition

An adjective that distinguished the new notion of Tradition, by way of a specific difference, from the Catholic notion, is that of “living” Tradition.[203] It is true that a scholastic would never classify Tradition as “dead,” but the life that we must attribute to it is not characterized by movement. To Catholic theology, Revelation is (also) a divine doctrine that was completed with the death of the last Apostle, and later, unlike human doctrines, no longer progresses. The difference between human things and divine is just that the latter are immutable because they are perfect, whereas the former are always in motion because they can always be perfected. The Gospel is sufficient to illuminate all people and all times until the return of Our Lord. Their truths do not grow greater with time, but our comprehension of them does.

To the new theology, Tradition earns the title of “living” on two points. First, because the “mystery” that is transmitted is a living Presence; but above all, because the sign or “sacrament” that communicates it is also something living: the Church itself. And if the first has divine life and can be called immutable, the second has human life, which is constantly in movement. The sign or “sacrament” that puts us in touch with divine Truth is a community of men (the Church) that lives in the midst of mankind (the World). However, this human sign necessarily depends on the cultural hic and the historical nunc. If the Church did not adapt to the manner of being of the World in which it is, it would not be fulfilling its “sacramental” mission of making the immutable mystery of God present to Humanity. We cannot speak the language of Don Quixote to the Spaniards of today. Therefore, as the Church does not signify with what she says but above all with what she is, she must not only adapt her preaching (always inadequate), but also her organization, her liturgy, her customs.

III. FAITH, SCRIPTURE AND MAGISTERIUM

1. The Faith

To the new theology, faith is a certain disposition of the spirit that permits us to interpret the Sacrament and be in touch with the Mystery that it enfolds. The faith of the Apostles and disciples allowed them to be in contact with God through and in Christ; the faith of Catholics, Christians (Lutherans, etc.) and other religions (Jews, etc.) allows them to have the experience of God in Christ, because the religious Community to which each of them belongs is a perceptible sign that makes the Kyrios, that is, Christ glorified, efficaciously present. Yes—it seems that Christ does not mind to become Himself present when there are two or three gathered in the name of something religious.[204]

Regarding the divine Mystery, faith is experience; with regard to the Sacrament, the interpretation is found in vital communion, because the Sacrament is the Community itself and one can only understand what a Community signifies by participating vitally in it. The expression in conceptual formulas is something later and consequent, because only after having lived the sign and experienced the divine mystery, can one say what he thinks about it.[205]

All these errors had already been explicitly condemned by St. Pius X in Pascendi, but they began to be cloaked in more sophisticated garments. The very doctrine of a sacrament-mystery, which, if we read the authors who support it, seems at once super-new and super-traditional, is no different from the heretical modernist symbolism.[206]

2. Sacred Scripture

The first Community of disciples and apostles (all were apostles, not only the Twelve) was the one that received that experience of God in Christ which founded the Church. When the perceptible presence of Christ was taken away with His death and resurrection,[207] this same Community, in its life and works, became a sacrament of salvation, because it continued to make God in Christ present. In it, the experience of faith was expressed in formulas and fixed in writing, completing the Holy Scriptures.[208] The Scriptures thus become a memorial of the foundational experience of the Church, to which the vital experience of every particular Church in every cultural hic and historical nunc must conform, to assure the diachronic (a word invented by the International Theological Commission) continuity of the People of God.

If we understand well this way of thinking, we may realize that it makes no sense to discuss whether all the revealed Deposit is in Scripture, or part comes only through Tradition. As to the new theology, the Deposit is not a certain number of truths but the mystery of God in itself; it does not have parts. Sacred Scripture is a sacrament—everything is a sacrament!—which makes present the Mystery as a whole, and Tradition is no more than continuity of the Presence in the sacrament of the ecclesiastical Communion. If the neo-theologian must always look at Sacred Scripture, it is to conform the present experience with the foundational experience of the first Community (and who can judge in what that conformity consists?).

3. Magisterium and Communion

New theology attributes to the ecclesiastical Communion the functions that traditional theology recognized in the ecclesiastical Magisterium. It is the whole Communion that preserves the revealed Deposit (not doctrine but presence), that infallibly transmits and interprets it, that discerns truth and falsehood, good and evil. The double infallibility of the sensus fidei and the hierarchical ministry only has force in conjunction with the single infallibility of thought in Communion. The hierarchy only has a function of unification in service to the Communion by means of dialogue. If a theologian wants to be sure of his orthodoxy, he must conform his thinking to “vital communion.” He has no reason to submit to the hierarchical ministry, as a child to its teacher, but must be aware that his thinking conforms to that of the ecclesiastical community through dialogue, because insofar as he enters into the common mindset, in that same measure would he belong to Christ and be assisted by the Holy Ghost.

According to this manner of thinking, the only heretic is the schismatic, who separates himself from the Communion to think. For this reason, for the conciliar popes, Archbishop Lefebvre was more heretical than all the members of the meeting at Assisi.

4. Community of Worship

The life of the Communities which comprise the People of God—in a diaspora greater than that of the Old Testament, until ecumenism should reunite them—would not appear in the earthly sphere of the nations of men, but in the near-celestial sphere of the assembly of worship. Where two or three are gathered in the name of religion, the sacrament-communion would be valid, and God in Christ would effectively become present. It is principally there that the Community would receive Revelation; whence the Liturgy would be the medium of Tradition par excellence.

Traditional theology believed that the principal organ of Tradition was the Magisterium, but it seems that it was mistaken to think that Revelation is a doctrine. With the liturgical movement the relationship between Tradition and Liturgy became more clearly visible, until it was understood that the true Chair of truth was not that which presided over the table of doctors and councils, but that which presides over the table of the Word and the Eucharist. After all, was it not there that the bishop’s cathedra was always placed? To the modern subjectivist, faith must be life first to become doctrine later.[209]

IV. CONCLUSION

Forty years after Vatican Council II, we need not too many prophetic lights to estimate the consequences of this upheaval in the ideas of Revelation and Tradition. Man is an animal that, unlike the rest, lacks instincts to direct him in the proper behavior and must order his own behavior in the light of reason. God manifests Himself to man according to his condition, revealing His Name and His Will in a human language, that is, in doctrinal propositions that uncover essential aspects of the nature of God and our path to salvation. This revealed Doctrine, whose preservation, explanation and application is entrusted to the ecclesiastical hierarchy, and for which it received the charism of infallibility, is the strictly universal rule—independent of the hic et nunc—which must measure the truth of all human doctrine and the goodness of all behavior. The sensus fidei of the flock of Christ is nothing but the indefectible docility of faith to the revealed doctrine offered by the Magisterium of the Church.

But St. Paul warns us that an inevitable conflict exists. As baptism does not extinguish, in this life, the fire of concupiscence, another law remains in the Christian whose demands are opposed to evangelical Law, and make it feel like a yoke. As the Church reached a high degree of spirituality in the thirteenth century, humanism, as we have said, was the reaction of laziness against the demands of sanctity. We insist that integral humanism is a Catholic illusion, that would conform the exigencies of the Gospel with those of its innards. Our Lord had already warned us: “Ye cannot serve two masters,” and humanism constantly proves this assertion, because each of its renunciations ended in an atheistic humanist movement. But it constantly attempts to manage a new agreement between its belly and the Gospel, because man without religion becomes depressed and wants a more accommodating God.

The officialization of Catholic humanism achieved by Vatican II seems to have made reality the dreams of the Renaissance. It was not a matter of denying Christian Revelation, which has so much good in it, but of ensuring that it should always be at the service of man. The manner of managing it consisted of adding to the old, individual humanist principles the other social principles promoted since the French Revolution, adapting them by analogy to the People of God:

- The fundamental principles are: moderate subjectivism, which communicates plasticity to doctrine; the supremacy of freedom, which places this plastic doctrine at the service of action (Machiavellianism); the erection of conscience as supreme court of morality, which always preserves peace with God.

- The social principles are those of democracy, in which authority submits to the popular conscience, expressed by public opinion.

To adapt these concepts to ecclesiastical society, the conciliar hierarchy humbly advised the Holy Ghost to direct Himself henceforth to the People of God, who would listen to Him via dialogue. This is because modern man has lost confidence in doctrines and authorities, and only believes in personal experience.

The immediate result of this operation is now before our eyes: the Church has become charismatic. The new movements, whose prototype is charismaticism, respond to the new manner of interpreting Revelation. They began with clearly non-Catholic experiences, but the conciliar hierarchy exerted itself to enclose them in a very elastic dogmatic and disciplinary frame. Now the shepherds chase after the flock, trying to keep every sheep from going off in its own direction, but without themselves deciding where they should go.

What is still not plain to see is the end-result. What is revealed in a community that does not submit to the rule of revealed doctrine is not the Holy Spirit. In the best of cases it may be the human spirit, which is wounded by sin. But we know that democratic dialogue lies in the hands of the occult forces that dominate propaganda and govern without compromising with truth or personal responsibility. Hence, we must fear that the spirit revealed in the new charismatic Church is not even that of the flesh, but that of darkness. Under its influence, in a great part of the flock of Christ, goaded by blind shepherds, the maddened sheep are running straight toward the cliff.

B. The Paschal Mystery

The only thing humanism needed to make the Gospel amiable and exploit its goodness was to dissolve the Cross of Christ. For integral humanism, the great—perhaps the only—defect of medieval Christianity was having centered the mystery of Christ in Sacrifice, coloring religion with its negative hue, so repugnant to the heart of men.

Encouraged by the gentleness of its subjectivism, the new theology began to prepare a positive reinterpretation of Christianity, more adapted to modern man, which it baptized with the lovely name of the Paschal Mystery. It believed that it had synthesized the most efficacious antidepressant for atheistic humanism: Christian joy without the side-effects of the sacrificial spirituality of the Middle Ages.

Let us first consider the Paschal Mystery in itself and then how we participate in it through the sacraments.

I. THE ABOLITION OF THE CROSS

Catholic doctrine teaches that the sacrifice of the Cross became necessary by divine preordination, as it was the best means to repair the consequences of sin. Through the disobedience of sin, men did not give God the glory they owed him and earned the penalty of death. The Word became flesh to satisfy the debt of men to God, because by His obedience unto death He glorified Him beyond all measure and opened to sinners the possibility of redemption.

To abolish the need for the blood price, the humanist wizards annulled the bill of debt. If sin does not leave us indebted to God, the sacrifice of the Cross is an unnecessary detail in the mystery of Christ, and we can ignore it.[210]

1. Sin does not leave us in debt to God

The trick that allows us to whisk away the invoice of our debt is not far to seek. God is immutable, wherefore the good acts of men add nothing to Him, and the bad ones take away nothing. Man becomes good for his own profit and bad to his own damage. God is a good Father—this, we have said, is the first principle of Catholic humanism—who has created us for our own sake, is happy for us when we progress, worries about us when we endanger ourselves; but we add and subtract nothing from Him. The worst sinner is to God—according to blasphemous humanism—a dear little child that has hurt himself.[211]

2. Salvation is a work not of justice, but of love

There is no debt to God, so there can be no necessity of satisfaction. The Anselmian doctrine of the penal satisfaction of Jesus Christ,[212] then, would be merely a medieval anthropomorphism. Christ would have passed through torment and death out of simple solidarity with us, to show that nothing human is foreign to Him.

What is more, although it is certain that sin may leave man indebted to other men, Jesus came to tell us that His Father is a God of mercy and not of justice, who forgives without taking account of damages, wherefore men should forgive men without demanding satisfaction: even as God does not consider our debts, neither let us consider those of our debtors. If the men of the religious sphere did not give the example to men of the universal love that does not discriminate between the just and sinners, we would never reach solidarity in the political sphere of the nations.

This thought that we have just expressed is subtle, but blasphemous. It does not speak of a mercy that goes beyond justice and perfects it, but of an unjust mercy, indifferent to good and to evil. It corresponds to the Hegelian positive vision of the contradictions that we have referred to above; it is indispensable to be able to speak of universal brotherhood among men, and above all, it unbinds action from its compromises with the truth. Now the thief may ask forgiveness while keeping what he stole, and the pope wholeheartedly receives the persecutors of the Church into the Vatican.

3. The Savior is not Jesus Christ, but God the Father

Revealed truth teaches us that, while the Incarnation was a most merciful initiative of God, the Redemption by the Cross was the work of Christ as man and in the name of His sinful brothers, because He gave satisfaction for our sins. For this reason, St. Thomas says,[213] “to be the Redeemer belongs immediately to Christ as man, although the Redemption itself can be attributed to the Trinity as first cause.”

In removing the dogma of vicarious satisfaction, the new theology sees salvation (the name “redemption” no longer fits) as a work of which Christ is a simple minister or instrument, so it must be attributed directly to God the Father, Who is He who sent Him. Now it is no longer said that Jesus Christ is our Savior, but God Who saves us in Him: “In Him [Christ] God reconciled ourselves to Himself and each other, and freed us from the slavery of the devil and sin” (Gaudium et Spes, no. 22).

4. Salvation was not achieved at Christ’s death but at His glorious Resurrection

Catholic doctrine teaches that the life of Jesus Christ centered on the sacrifice of the Cross. The new theology replaces the mystery of the Cross with the Paschal Mystery, in perhaps its best-managed magical pass. For a Catholic with any sort of liturgical life, the name is enchanting, because it brings to mind the pure joy reached after Good Friday. Pasch signifies passing, and the new theology reduces the meaning of Christ’s death to a simple passage to the glory of the Resurrection. This final event will be, from now on, the central one of the mystery of Christ.

This is a trick that has some genius to it, to find an exemplary cause for the anthropocentric turn. The sacrifice of the Cross is the work of man to glorify God, whereas the Resurrection is the work of God for the glorification of man. Our Lord Jesus Christ worked all His life for the love of His Father and completed His work in offering the Sacrifice of glorification of God, through His obedience unto death: “Consummatum est.” The glorious resurrection is the response of the Father, just toward Christ, and merciful to us: “He humbled Himself, becoming obedient unto death, even the death of the Cross; wherefore God exalted Him” (Phil. 2:9). The perpetual intention in the life of Our Lord was the Cross for the glory of the Father, and not His own resurrection: “I seek not my own glory; there is One that seeketh and judgeth” (Jn. 8:50). Humanism, however, inverts the purposes: it no longer seeks to sacrifice itself for the glorification of God, but that God would sacrifice Himself for the glorification of man.

II. THE LITURGY OF THE PHARISEE

We participate in the mystery of Christ through the faith and the sacraments, especially through the Eucharist. As the life of Christ is centered on the Cross, Christian life centers on the celebration of the Eucharist, which is the renovation of His Sacrifice, so that the faithful may offer it with the same intention of adoration and propitiation, and offer themselves together with the divine Victim in satisfaction for their faults.

Humanist thought, however, does not feel that it owes God any satisfaction, as God is a good Father who is satisfied with man himself. Rather it is God that is in debt to man, because when man works for his own glorification, this redounds to the glory of God. Hence the celebration of the Eucharist, which for the new theology is the renovation of the Paschal Mystery, ends by being a cult of glorification of man, because the grandeur of man aggrandizes God.

It sounds blasphemous, and is; but this satanic turn—as we have said—can be very well hidden. According to the liturgy of the Mass reformed by the Council, Christ glorified (the Kyrios) is made present as soon as the sacramental sign is put in place, that is, as soon as the liturgical assembly is gathered; or better, the assembly itself is Christ glorified. The glory of man is freedom, because through it he becomes like God; the men who gather are religious men, in whom shines the image of God—that is, they are men who have freed themselves. The Eucharist is the thanksgiving canticle of Moses after crossing the Red Sea and freeing himself from slavery. In it “the fruit of the earth and of the work of men” is offered, because man suffered working with the goods of the earth to free himself from misery and from all tyranny—for the medieval concept of suffering with Christ to passively merit being glorified with Him, is substituted the positive modern concept of working to actively gain the glory of freedom; we need not commiserate, but collaborate. Now indeed the song of triumph and thanksgiving may be sung.

The new liturgy is the liturgy of the Pharisee: “O God, I thank thee that I am not as other men” (Lk. 18:11). Not only does he not adore nor ask pardon, but there is not even impetration. He is satisfied with himself, and it is clear that the act of thanksgiving is not really directed to God, but rather suggests that God is the one that should be grateful. It is very significant that in the New Mass the traditional ritual should have been omitted in which the priest paused before ascending the altar and bowed down to ask forgiveness like the publican.[214]

C. Jesus Christ: Perfect Man

Two conciliar documents speak of Jesus Christ in a more direct way: Gaudium et Spes and Ad Gentes, both promulgated on the last day of the Council, the 7th of December 1965. Both consider the relationship of the Church with the world, but each with a different focus, that could even be considered contradictory. Because the first, Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, proposes a relationship of coexistence and mutual relations, whereas the other, Decree on the Missionary Activity of the Church, proposes one of conversion and conquest. They have, besides, another difference which can be summarized in two words: the first is stupid and the second intelligent. This explains how the third difference is only apparent, and not real: the second seems to be more Catholic. In truth, both maintain the same doctrine, but the first one exposes it foolishly and the second conceals it with skill. This latter document, which won the record of approbations in the final vote (2,394 placet against 5 non placet), was composed in one shot by the two champions of the Council, Karl Rahner and Yves Congar.

The Catholic Faith teaches that the Son of God became man so that men might become the sons of God. The Divine Word became flesh and suffered on the Cross to redeem us from the abyss of sin and return to us our participation in His divine sonship. To reach divine glory, then, man must sacrifice with Christ the human glories that bind him to sin.

But the new humanism is the recoil of the old man against the horror of the cross, in which he hides the talent of grace he was given, preferring to be a simple man in peace than a son of God with suffering.[215] The new humanist—the integral, not the atheist—knows that peace comes only with Christ, so he does not wish to renounce Him and tries to persuade Him to alter the aim of His mission: “Absit a te, Domine, non erit tibi hoc!”[216] The trick is simple, and we have already pointed it out: man is in the image of God, because it belongs to man to be free, and also belongs to God; hence, man is the more divine the more he is human. Without rejecting the traditional formula, conciliar humanism gives it a new interpretation: the Son of God became man so that man might become true man.[217]

Jesus Christ, true God and true man, would be presented by Gaudium et Spes as the perfect Man, the exemplary man that comes to humanize humanity. Ad Gentes, on the other hand, seems to be the conciliar document that finally tells us that Christ is also God. But, by an obscure necessity that we cannot totally understand, Christ sees His divinity diminished by the conciliar magisterium, which clearly shows itself as touched by a certain neo-Nestorianism and neo-Arianism.

I. JESUS CHRIST, PERFECT MAN

The conciliar Constitution Gaudium et Spes has a preliminary exposition and two parts, one general and the other particular. The general part, more doctrinal, has four chapters, dedicated respectively to the human person, to society, to work and to the relationship between the Church and the world. Each of these chapters ends by referring the matter under discussion to Christ, which offers us a fairly complete idea of what Jesus Christ is to the Council.

The last section of the first chapter, dedicated to “The Dignity of the Human Person,” under the subtitle “Christ, the New Man,” discovers to us who Jesus Christ is:

The truth is that only in the mystery of the incarnate Word does the mystery of man take on light. For Adam, the first man, was a figure of Him Who was to come, namely Christ the Lord. Christ, the final Adam, by the revelation of the mystery of the Father and His love, fully reveals man to man himself and makes his supreme calling clear. It is not surprising, then, that in Him all the aforementioned truths find their root and attain their crown. He Who is “the image of the invisible God” (Col. 1:15) is Himself the perfect man. To the sons of Adam He restores the divine likeness which had been disfigured from the first sin onward. Since human nature as He assumed it was not annulled, by that very fact it has been raised up to a divine dignity in our respect too.[218] For by His incarnation the Son of God has united Himself in some fashion with every man. […] The Christian man, conformed to the likeness of that Son Who is the firstborn of many brothers, received “the first-fruits of the Spirit” (Rom. 8:23) by which he becomes capable of discharging the new law of love. Through this Spirit, who is “the pledge of our inheritance” (Eph. 1:14), the whole man is renewed from within, even to the achievement of the redemption of the body (Rom. 8:23). […] All this holds true not only for Christians, but for all men of good will in whose hearts grace works in an unseen way.

Before commenting on this point, which is presented as a sort of synthesis of Revelation, it is necessary to consider one aspect that must have divided the thoughts of the Council Fathers who approved it. Does it claim to be a complete and definitive synthesis of Christianity, or only a partial and momentary, apologetical exposition, directed to the unbelieving humanist? Because it could be thought—and we believe that many Council Fathers consoled themselves by thinking it—that it is suitable to present lovers of mankind with Christ as “the perfect Man,” who “fully shows man to himself,” to later lead them to the love of God, “ut dum visibiliter Deum cognoscimus, per hunc in invisibilium amorem rapiamur.”[219] But to think this is a false illusion, because that later never came: neither Gaudium et Spes, nor the rest of the Council documents, nor the post-conciliar magisterium ever departed from this presentation of the new Religion—for such it is. The title of the section is clear: De Christo Novo Homine. It does not say The New Adam, which suggests the traditional context of sin and redemption, but The New Man, in a clearly humanist context.

The first paragraph speaks of the revelation of three mysteries: the mystery of the Father, the mystery of the incarnate Word and the mystery of man. Should we get our hopes up thinking that it has an apologetical focus, we would say that we speak to the unbelieving of the mystery of man, the only one they face in their incredulity, to lead them to the mystery of the Incarnation and from there, to the complete revelation of the mystery of the Father, that is, of the Most Holy Trinity. But the section says just the opposite. The mystery of the Father is the mystery “of His love,” that is, of His love for men, which is revealed in the mystery of the Incarnate Word; but what manifests the mystery of the Incarnation to men, is the “Mystery of Man.” This, then, is presented as the last and final content of Revelation. God, our benevolent Dad, knows that man is only interested in the mystery of his own bellybutton, and thus sent the Word to explain it to him.

This first chapter begins, at no. 12, speaking of the mystery of man as center of creation: “Believers and unbelievers generally agree on this point: all the goods of earth must be ordered to the needs of man, center and pinnacle of them all. But what is man?” and the immediate response, by which atheistic humanism is conquered, is that he is the “image of God.” Thus, given this major premise, when in no. 22 it says: “He who is the image of the invisible God, is also the perfect man,” the following syllogism is assumed: Man is the image of God; however, the Son is the perfect image of God; therefore, Christ is “the perfect man.” It is curious, because we were accustomed to have the syllogism the other way: man is the image of God (the more he participates in the divine nature); the Son is the perfect Image (because He does not participate in, but has a divine nature); thus, Jesus Christ is perfectly God. But this inversion is the consequence of the anthropocentric turn in Christ Himself: as God is at the service of man and grace is subordinated to nature, the principal point of the movement of the Incarnation is not that a man should be GOD, but that God became MAN. As the rest of the Constitution shows, “perfect man” is left as a definition of Jesus Christ.

If we think it over, there is complete coherence, because there must be proportion between the cause and the effect. But let the old-fashioned Reader beware, because we know from experience that it is hard to stop making mistakes. Because there it is said that the effect of the Incarnation was “to restore the divine likeness to Adam’s descendants, raising human nature to a sublime dignity.” The Catholic formed in the old way, accustomed to distinguish nature and grace, understands that Christ restores the supernatural organism over human nature. But the Council judges it unsuitable to make such a distinction, for which it says that human nature itself is raised up to a sublime dignity. Because, as St. Thomas says—for this reason they are Thomists—that human nature itself is an image of the divinity, they conclude that it is itself damaged by sin and is itself restored by grace, a grace that is no other thing than perfect freedom. Therefore, if we understand that the restoration of man is made by the addition of a supernature, which is participation in the divine nature, it follows that the proximate cause should be a Man-God; but if it is human nature in itself that must be restored, the cause provided is a perfect-Man.

Immediately following, we find one of the pearls of greatest price of the Council: on assuming human nature, Christ unites Himself quodammodo—in a certain way—with all men (cum omni homine). How this is done, let every man meditate. Towards the end it is said that grace works invisibly in “all men of good will.” The matter that must be analyzed is whether the Incarnation makes all of us “of good will.” If we consider that the Incarnation restored human nature in itself, we may well think so, because it is not natural that man should incline to evil. Conciliar optimism inclines us to think thus: “In the [structure of every human being] the values of intelligence, will, conscience and brotherhood stand out; all of which are based on God the Creator and have been wonderfully healed and elevated in Christ” (no. 61).

In the references to Jesus Christ of the other chapters, we have the same ideas: Christ is the perfect man and His work is the restoration of all the divinity that is in man, that is, all the humanity (for there is the jest: that which is human is that which is divine, for man is the image of God):

- “Indeed, as the redeemer of all, He offered Himself for all till death. ‘Greater love than this no one has, that one lay down his life for his friends’ (Jn. 15:13). He commanded His Apostles to preach to all peoples the Gospel’s message that the human race was to become the Family of God, in which the fullness of the Law would be love” (no. 32).

- “God’s Word, through Whom all things were made, was Himself made flesh and dwelt on earth. Thus, He entered the world’s history as a perfect man, taking that history up into Himself and summarizing it. He Himself revealed to us that ‘God is love’ (I Jn. 4:8) and at the same time taught us that the new command of love was the basic law of human perfection and hence of the world’s transformation. To those, therefore, who believe in divine love, He gives assurance that the way of love lies open to men and that the effort to establish a universal brotherhood is not a hopeless one”[220] (no. 38).

- God’s Word, by whom all things were made, was Himself made flesh so that as perfect man He might save all men and sum up all things in Himself” (no. 45).

II. JESUS CHRIST: IMPERFECT GOD

If a pagan were to turn to the texts of Vatican II to form an idea of who Jesus Christ is to Catholics, it seems certain to us that he would not see that we believe He is God, but some inferior entity. The plain and simple profession of this fundamental truth is omitted, and the constantly used expressions make us think, on one hand, of a distinction of subjects of attribution between Jesus Christ and God—which belongs to the Nestorian heresy—and, on another, that the Son is not God simpliciter—which belongs to the Arian heresy. And this dreadful impression is not dispelled but accentuated in the magisterium that succeeds the Council.

1. Omission of the profession of faith in the divinity of Jesus Christ

We have only found two places in the documents of the Council that explicitly affirm that Jesus Christ is God, and both are cases of expressions obiter dicta (said in passing). In Unitatis Redintegratio it appears as a common profession of faith between Catholics and reformed Christians: “Our thoughts turn first to those Christians who make open confession of Jesus Christ as God and Lord and as the sole Mediator between God and men, to the glory of the one God, Father, Son and Holy Spirit” (no. 20). The profession flows smoothly for a believer formed in his catechism, but it is not clear at all to the unbeliever, because Christ is set up at once as a divine extreme and as something in-between: God, and Mediator between God and men. A pagan would understand that Christ is an inferior god, with a middle position between men and the superior God.

We find the second statement in Ad Gentes: “Jesus Christ was sent into the world as a real mediator between God and men. Since He is God, all divine fullness dwells bodily in Him (Gal. 2:9). According to His human nature, on the other hand, He is the new Adam, made head of a renewed humanity, and full of grace and of truth (Jn. 1:14)” (no. 3). The affirmation is strong: “Cum Deus sit,” but it would have been better to write “according to His divine nature” for it to parallel what follows: “according to His human nature.” Besides, it is accompanied by the quote that Nestorius would have chosen, who affirmed that Jesus was God because God lived in Him as in His temple, and not because He was God personaliter et hypostatice.

These two expressions are not sufficient as a profession of dogma, because the direct attribution “Christ is God” is not enough to declare it, as it may be understood that He is God in an improper or metaphorical manner. Something must be added that signifies that Christ is God truly and properly. But the proper term for the dogma, hypostatic union, never appears—of course—in the conciliar texts, because any expression that smacks of scholasticism has been neatly evaded (except subsistit in), nor are there any equivalent phrases. Nor is the simplest and clearest expression in the Catholic catechism ever used: Jesus Christ is true God and true Man. And although a council has no reason to reaffirm each and every one of the truths of the Faith, this one is fundamental, and the conciliar texts offer an infinite number of opportunities to do so.[221]

2. An air of Nestorianism

Not only is the clear profession of the dogma of the divinity of Christ omitted, but Jesus Christ is constantly distinguished from God as different subjects of attribution, with very frequent references to what “God in Christ”[222] does. It is not wrong in itself, and in Sacred Scripture it occurs, because for “God” we may read “God the Father”; but a truly Catholic mindset seeks always to maintain all the extremes of dogma, compensating for expressions of distinction with those of identification. This omission and tendency may still be observed in the texts of the magisterium after the Council, and in a still more marked and concerning manner, in the nearly-official documents of the International Theological Commission.

But the Nestorian conception is more especially implied in the attribution to Jesus Christ of the new notion of “sacrament” that, while it is not explicitly mentioned in the documents of the conciliar and post-conciliar magisterium, is implicitly mentioned, and has continued to be made explicit by the new theologians.

The heresy of Nestorius consisted in denying the union of the human and divine nature in the single person of the Word, which, as it occurs in the union of person or hypostasis, has been named the hypostatic union. Said the Council of Florence in its decree to the Jacobites:

The most Holy Roman Church anathematizes also Theodore of Mopsuestia and Nestorius, who affirm that humanity united itself to the Son of God by grace, and that therefore there are two persons in Christ, as they confess that there are two natures, being incapable of understanding that the union of humanity with the Word was hypostatic, and therefore they deny that He should receive the subsistence of the Word. Because, according to this blasphemy, the Word was not made flesh, but the Word, by grace, dwelt in the flesh; that is, that the Son of God did not become man, but rather that the Son of God dwelt in man.[223]

Therefore, all the opinions that lead us to suppose that there are two individuals in Christ, to one of which is attributed what belongs to the divine nature and to the other what belongs to human nature, fall under the anathema of Nestorianism.

Now, to consider Jesus Christ as the “sacrament” of God, and even of the Word of God, leads us to affirm that Jesus Christ is God because God or the Word is present in Him, where the human individual, which is a sacrament or sign, is distinguished from the divine, which is the mystery that becomes present as it is signified. They are, therefore, decidedly Nestorian expressions, especially when they are spoken about the Word of God, totally equivalent to that which affirms that the man Christ is God because God dwells in man.[224]

3. A breath of Arianism

Arius denied the perfect consubstantiality of the Son with the Father, making of the Word a diminished god: “The Holy Roman Church,” said the same Council of Florence, “condemns the Arians, Eunomians and Macedonians, who say that only the Father is truly God and place the Son and the Holy Spirit in the order of creatures. It also condemns whatsoever others should place degrees or inequality in the Trinity.”[225] However, it can also be observed in the magisterium of the Council and later, that “God” is only said directly (simpliciter) of the Father, whereas it is not said in the same way of the Son and the Holy Spirit; we no longer say “God the Father, God the Son and God the Holy Ghost,” but “God” is only used in apposition (in recto) to the Father, whereas regarding the Son and the Holy Ghost it is placed in obliquo: Son of God and Spirit of God. That “the Son is God” continues to be affirmed, but generally after beating about the bush: because He is the Son. This necessity of adding an explanation to affirm that “the Son is God” has an air of Arianism to it, because it is not considering Him as God simpliciter but secundum quid, that is, according to a certain aspect or consideration.[226]

For example: the affirmation of the divinity of the Son in Ad Gentes, cited above, comes after a paragraph in which God, simpliciter dicto, is identified as “He who sends the Son,” which would make us think that the Son is God only in a certain sense, secundum quid:

“God [simpliciter dicto], in order to establish peace or the communion of sinful human beings with Himself, as well as to fashion them into a fraternal community, did ordain to intervene in human history in a way both new and finally sending His Son [other than God?], clothed in our flesh, in order that through Him He might snatch men from the power of darkness and Satan and reconcile the world to Himself in Him. Him, then, by whom He made the world, He appointed heir of all things, that in Him He might restore all. For Jesus Christ was sent into the world as a real mediator between God and men. Since He is God [in what sense?], all divine fullness dwells bodily in Him [is He God because God dwells in Him?].” (no. 3)

This is the constant language of the conciliar magisterium.

Let us add that these tendencies are difficult to point out, because they appear within the subjectivist pluralism of modern thought, whose manner of expressing itself fluctuates according to the circumstances. When the new teachers (popes, institutions, or theologians) wish to highlight their continuity with traditional doctrine or direct themselves to Catholic audiences, they adapt their language to this mentality, using more traditional formulas. When the context is different, another language appears. Thus, we will not waste time on demonstrating with more texts: whoever takes the trouble of reading the new documents with these precautions—which we would not advise anyone to do—will not fail to ascertain it.[227]

D. The Religion of Man

Having reached the end of our work of explaining Vatican II, we must return to the beginning: the purpose of the Council. The end is the first in intention and the last in execution; hence in observing how the work of the Council ends, we confirm what was in its intention from the beginning. About this we shall say two things and ask a third. First, conciliar humanism proposed as the last end the dignity of man as such; however, second, all that is considered as a last end necessarily conforms a religion; but third, as the indignity of man without the grace of God is so obvious, how has man been able to fall into such an atrocious illusion?

I. HUMAN DIGNITY AS SUPREME GOOD

1. Man as an end

The Council sought the “advancement of man”—as Paul VI recognized in his closing address—as a true and proper end in himself. It did not seek the advancement of the Catholic, nor even of good and just men, but of man as such, because it considers the human condition as full of dignity in itself:

- That this dignity does not stem from the Catholic character is clearly manifested by ecumenism, which recognizes the dignity of man beyond religion.

- That this dignity does not stem from any moral value is manifested by the lack of discrimination between the just and the sinner, supposedly imitating the benignity of God toward all men.

This end is true and proper, because it is not an apologetical strategy nor a misunderstanding in the verbal expressions:

- It is not an apologetical strategy through which the end of atheistic humanism would be provisionally granted in order to show later, in a second moment, that man’s promotion must necessarily aim at serving God. It is demonstrated in that, after five decades after the Council, there has been no attempt to pass on to a new conclusion.

- It is not an error in the expression of concepts due to, for example, a defective personalist formation. All the subsequent reforms and actions show that words respond to what is in the mind and, above all, in the heart of conciliar humanism.

2. God subordinated to man

Considered individually, as we said at the beginning, this enormous sin of pride is easy to commit, and every sustained sin tends to elaborate its own intellectual justification. The heart of man easily grows selfish and wishes that the universe along with its Creator be subject to his own good.

The intellectual justification of this Promethean inversion is not difficult to make, because it is enough for us to consider the divine Craftsman after the manner of human craftsmen. In the human order, the work of art is always, in a certain sense, greater than the artist. The artist who makes a self-portrait begins to realize himself as an artist when he conceives in himself the exemplar of what he will portray, and does not fully realize himself in his artistic condition until he has finished his work. And although the work has come from him, it exists outside of him and is, in a certain way, greater than he is, because it perfects him as an artist. A sign of this is that the artist would prefer to disappear rather than that his work should disappear, because in his work is the best of him.

The real foundation of what we have said is that the exemplary idea that a true human artist conceives of himself is a participation in the idea that God has of him. The light of our intellect is a partaking in the light of the Divine Intelligence, and when we look upon ourselves with humility, we let the Truth judge us, making what we have in ourselves of good or ill shine before our eyes, as the lights and shadows of our own self-portrait. When the inspired artist portrays himself in his work, he manifests the judgment of God on his person, making not his own glory, but the glory of God to shine before men. Every human creator easily takes note that in his work, if it is true, there is something that is not his own, but comes from above. Because of this, man is fulfilled in his works, inasmuch as through them he reaches greater perfection, assimilating himself, as far as he can, to the Creator. But all this applies to created agents and not to the Creator, who is the perfect Agent. The exemplary Idea in God is His own divine essence, and He is in no way perfected in His work but communicates His own perfection ad extra.

Let us explain the same with another comparison. A good son glorifies his father insofar as he makes himself into his image, not only as regards nature by generation, but also and even more so, regarding his spirit by education. Yet, he does not only manifest what the father had and gave him, but always adds something to it by multiplication, and many times the child acquires other virtues that the father did not have, so that the father partakes in the glory of the son. But it is never thus with the Fatherhood of God.

Conciliar humanism regards God as a human artist, who has consecrated himself to making man his self-portrait and is pleased in contemplating him. However, metaphysical errors are unforgiving. When the Council says from the heart that God has made things for man, and man for his own sake (Gaudium et Spes), it places man as the end of God and necessarily considers man as the completion and perfection of God Himself. Now God can disappear, for if Man remains, the best of Him remains as well. This is why Paul VI found no opposition between his humanism and atheistic humanism.

3. Freedom as the supreme value

To confer a certain coherence to this supreme sophistry, humanism does not consider being or truth as the supreme value, but freedom.[228] Because from this principle, two consequences follow necessarily:

- God would not achieve full blessedness by being essential Being, Truth and Goodness because He is all these necessarily; nor would He reach it by the procession of the Word or by the spiration of the Holy Ghost, because these also are necessary processions. God would reach His perfection through Creation, the only act in which His freedom is in play, having the choice of creating or not.

- God, in reproducing His image in the human creature, would surpass Himself (alas, we are writing the worst of blasphemies!) because the creature achieves a fullness of freedom that He cannot reach. Because if freedom is the supreme value, evidently it should not be subordinated to being, truth or good, but be of higher value than all of these. But the freedom of the Divine Persons is subordinated to Being, Truth and Goodness, while humans are free to choose evil, falseness and nothingness. So, the Image surpasses the Exemplar in freedom.

The Reader may well feel repulsed by this strictly diabolical sophistry, in which the non serviam of Satan appears as surpassing of the very Being of God, and it may seem totally exaggerated to claim it is the explanation of the Council. But let him take stock and see that it is an immediate and necessary consequence of the first principles of humanism. In the atmosphere of humanism (alas, we should begin to call it Satanism!) that invaded the Council, one breathes in the “immense sympathy” to which Paul VI referred, for those men so free that they were capable of maintaining their power of choice even before the fire of the Inquisition (and of Hell!). God Himself would delight with paternal pride in those of His sons who carried their freedom so far as to dare to become independent and put Him to death.[229]

II. THE IDOLATRY OF MAN

What a man considers as the highest good, be it true or apparent, necessarily radiates its value over everything, so that every other good is so in the measure that it participates in it, and all other means are useful in the measure that they lead to it. It is so in the Common Good, and necessarily it acquires a divine character, becoming the object of worship and forming a religion.

The Catholic Church has maintained a religion that with all correctness is called Christian, because it is the religion of Jesus as Christ, that is, as Anointed with the oil of divinity, of which we can only partake inasmuch as we are anointed in Him through Baptism. And the oil of this unction is none other than the very nature of God, which Jesus Christ has in that He is the Word in person, and of which we may partake through the grace that the sacraments communicate to us.

But we have seen, in the course of our explanation, that conciliar humanism with its anthropocentric spin has proposed not the divine but the human as its new supreme good, understood in a way that can be constituted as an absolute value; that is, with an all-encompassing freedom superior to being, truth and goodness. And this new oil consecrates a new anointed one: Man.

This new supreme good has effectively irradiated a new humanist valuation on all things, even the most precious matters of the Christian religion, such as Grace, Jesus Christ and the Eucharist:

- Grace is no longer participation in the divine nature, which certainly does not remove human nature, and which elevates it to a sublime dignity; rather, it is the perfecter of things human, in that it removes all obstacles to freedom, so that man in the state of grace is not man made nearly divine, but man made truly human.

- Jesus Christ is no longer the Man-God who came down to divinize us, but the perfect-Man who made Himself present to humanize us.

- The Eucharist is no longer the Sacrifice of Jesus Christ, Priest and Victim, renewed by the priest in the double consecration, to which the baptized unite themselves; but the pharisaical Thanksgiving of a Humanity that believes itself to be the crown of its Creator; pharisaical, we say, because while it is grateful that God created it, it considers that God should be more grateful to it because it glorifies Him so much (as might be legitimate regarding an excellent son relative to his mediocre father).

It does not seem necessary to prolong the demonstration. The Vatican Council replaced Christian religion with a new religion, the Religion of Man. And as the Council itself recognizes that man is only the image (ei¨dwlon) of God, it would have to acknowledge that it has established a new idolatry.

III. MYSTERY OF INIQUITY

There is something that is clearly lacking in our explanation, which we can only acknowledge here. As we expose the doctrine of this new religion in a simplified manner, without the linguistic cosmetics that its theologians use to disguise it, it is clearly clumsy and even ridiculous. It might be accepted that a proud little friar, confused by his fasts and the deceits of the devil, should believe himself to be the center of the universe; but that thousands of bishops gathered in council should sing the glories of Humanity, when it had just come out of the night of two World Wars, was still living the darkness of the Soviet Gulags and was headed with eyes wide open toward still deeper abysses, cannot be explained merely by doctrinal confusions.

To find the propter quid that we lack, we would have to return to the intentions we pointed out in speaking of the democratic turn of the Council[230]:

- In its first origins, humanism is a diabolical deceit, through which Satan scornfully entangles us in sophistries analogous to those in which he entangled himself with his non serviam.

- In its final consequences, humanism is the doctrine that we have attempted to expound on in the course of our work, a doctrine that, had it not caused such grave damage to the Church of Christ, we would describe as very silly.

It is manifest that this doctrine was not imposed on the majority of dopey Catholics (a term of endearment) by the quality of its arguments, but by the force of propaganda. Vatican II without television would have been impossible. But in between the first origin and the final consequences we may point out two links:

- In immediate relation to the dopey faithful are the elite of the Machiavellian modernists, the carnivorous sheep. They—as we have mentioned—are half-deceived; they maintain their doctrines in part as a mind-game, accentuating above all a pretty skeptical subjectivism (as any self-respecting subjectivism must be), and in greater part as an instrument of action against traditional Catholicism (here is their Machiavellianism), because the only thing that is clear is what they wish to deny. They know that they do not interpret the feeling of the faithful, but (in the best of cases) the feeling that the faithful ought to have, were they not so silly.

- And one link remains between the modernist elite and Satan: that of the wolves, some of whom wear sheepskin. Although it is of a hidden nature, we know it exists, because the antimodern popes themselves have never ceased to denounce the conspiracy of the secret societies against the Church, and it is evident that such an absurd and universal deception as that of Vatican II could never have occurred without their efficacious work.

Catholic

Religion

TRICKS

Transposed Catholic principles

Religion of Man

Revelation

is mystery and doctrine

Transmitted

by the Magisterium

TRADITIONALISM

Tradition is the rule

of doctrinal faith

Dogmatic formulas inadequate to the Mystery

(but adequate for our intelligence)

⇒

hic et nunc

reinterpretation of dogmas

Inculturation (hic) and historicism (nunc)

Revelation

is not doctrine

but Mystery

Transmitted

in Communion

CHARISMATICISM

experiential faith

is the rule of

living Tradition

Sin leaves an

irreparable debt to God

Christ satisfies the

Father with His Death

MYSTERY OF THE CROSS

Propitiation:

cult of the publican

God is immutable:

He loses nothing by sin, nor changes in His love for the sinner

⇒

God loves sinners and just equally

Human justice does not save, only divine love

Sin takes away

man’s freedom

God frees us in Christ through the

Resurrection

PASCHAL

MYSTERY

Thanksgiving:

cult of the pharisee

Christ reveals

the mystery of God

Restores grace in us

CHRIST, PERFECT GOD

Exemplar of

our divinization

Who sees Him,

sees the Father

The Son is the perfect Image of the Father

⇒

To be the image of God belongs to man; therefore, the Son is the perfect man

Christ reveals

the mystery of Man

Restores nature in us

CHRIST, PERFECT MAN

Exemplar of

our humanization

Who sees Him,

sees Man

Through Christ,

with Him and in Him

Ad maiorem

Dei gloriam

RELIGION OF CHRIST

Freedom in Being, Truth and Goodness

God is immutable:

does not gain by

creation

⇒

The purpose of the Creator is the

happiness of man

Through Man,

with him and in him

Ad maiorem

Hominis gloriam

RELIGION OF MAN

“Freedom” in evil, falsehood and nothingness

LAUS DEO VIRGINIQUE MATRI

[201] In what follows we will not refer to the position of any modern theologian in particular (neither the strange theology of John Paul II, nor the more particular musings of Benedict XVI) because, as we have mentioned, more personal expositions get very intricate and are still just that: personal theologies; so that if one refutes them, he has only refuted one person. We seek to discover the general lines of the middle-ground doctrinal expositions, that is, those which claim to preserve a supposed continuity with Tradition, which was certainly the intention that drove the official conciliar and post-conciliar documents.

[202] Thus, John Paul II says in Fides et Ratio no. 83: “We face a great challenge at the end of this millennium, to move from phenomenon to foundation, a step as necessary as it is urgent” (14th September 1998).

[203] The great reproach of John Paul II to Archbishop Lefebvre was just that he “did not sufficiently consider the living character of Tradition” (Ecclesia Dei, 2nd July 1988, Denzinger-Hünermann 4822).

[204] Benedict XVI worked for years, since he was Cardinal Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, to ensure that ecumenism be not referred exclusively to God, circumventing Jesus Christ. However, it is not always easy to explain. For the gathering of Jews in the synagogue it is easy, because their faith in the future Messiah, the Christ, makes Him present among them. To say how an assembly of Buddhists signifies and makes present the glorified Christ is more difficult; the “semina Verbi” have to work hard to manage that.

[205] If there is no communion in the sign, there can never be unity in the conceptual formulations, because only vital historico-cultural communion (apologies for the abuse of adjectives) justifies the consequent conceptual communion (because only thus would the partial universality of concepts be justified). This is why prayer meetings had to precede ecumenical dialogues, as in Assisi.

[206] St. Pius X, Encyclical Pascendi Dominici Gregis, Denzinger-Hünermann 2079 (old numbering): “These formulas [dogmas] have no other purpose than to furnish the believer with a means of giving an account of his faith to himself. These formulas therefore stand midway between the believer and his faith; in their relation to the faith, they are the inadequate expression of its object, [→subjectivism], and are usually called symbols; in their relation to the believer, they are mere instruments. Hence it is quite impossible to maintain that they express absolute truth: for, in so far as they are symbols, they are the images of truth [→sacraments]. and so must be adapted to the religious sentiment in its relation to man; and as instruments, they are the vehicles of truth [make it present], and must therefore in their turn be adapted to man in his relation to the religious sentiment.” After Pascendi, the word “sentiment” was avoided, but the same concepts remained.

[207] We have already noted that the new theology understands that the Risen Christ no longer has a visible form.

[208] Through this influence of the Communion, the inspired author of Sacred Scripture would not actually be whoever held the pen, but the People of God. So says Benedict XVI in Jesús de Nazaret, Planeta, Buenos Aires 2007, pp. 16–17: “At this point we can also intuit from a historical perspective, so to speak, what inspiration means: the author does not speak as a private individual, enclosed in himself. He speaks in a living community and thus in a living historical movement which neither he nor the collective have built, but in which acts a superior driving force… Scripture has arisen in and from the living subject of the people of God on the way, and lives in it. It might be said that the books of Scripture are owed to three individuals that interact among themselves. In the first place, the author or authors to whom we owe a book of Scripture. But those authors are not autonomous writers in the modern sense of the word, but form part of the common subject, ‘people of God’: they speak on its behalf and direct themselves to it, to the point that the people is the true and most profound author of the Scriptures. And still more: this people is not self-sufficient, but knows itself to be guided and called by God Himself, Who is the One who speaks through men and their humanity.”

[209] We do not know if some modernist says this of the cathedrae, but it might well occur to him. We would only show how, with a bit of imagination, all waters can feed the modernist mill. Only modernism sets doctrine and culture at odds. Liturgical cult is primarily a profession of faith, and the doctrinal preaching of the bishop is part of the liturgical cult, to dispose others to participate in the Eucharistic Sacrifice. This is the reason why the doctrinal chair is placed in front of the altar as in its most proper place.

[210] The errors we denounce on this point are amply explained and refuted in our article El Misterio Pascual, in Cuadernos de La Reja no. 4.

[211] We already refuted this error in speaking of the purposes of the Council in Chapter I.

[212] St. Anselm of Canterbury was the first to express this dogma of faith in the more explicit terms of debt and satisfaction.

[213] III, q. 48, a. 5.

[214] We will not linger on this point, because it is well explained in the SSPX study on The Problem of the Liturgical Reform.

[215] Mt. 25:24: “And the one who had received one talent, coming, said, Lord, I know that thou art a stern man, reaping where thou didst not sow, and taking up what thou didst not put down; therefore I was frightened, and went and hid away thy talent in the earth; behold, here is that which is thine.”

[216] Mt. 16:21-24: “From that time Jesus began to show to his disciples, that he must go to Jerusalem, and suffer many things from the ancients and scribes and chief priests, and be put to death, and the third day rise again. And Peter taking him aside, began to rebuke him, saying: Lord, be it far from Thee, this shall not be unto Thee! Who turning, said to Peter: Go behind me, Satan, thou art a scandal unto me: because thou savourest not the things that are of God, but the things that are of men. Then Jesus said to his disciples: If any man will come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross, and follow me. For he that will save his life, shall lose it: and he that shall lose his life for my sake, shall find it.”

[217] The International Theological Commission refers to this interpretation in the conclusions on Theology, Christology and Anthropology, from 1981 (ITC, Documents 1969–1996, BAC 1998, p. 253–254). Under the subtitle: The image of God in man, or the Christian meaning of the “deification” of man, they begin by saying: “The Word of God became man so that man should become God.” This axiom of the soteriology of the Fathers, especially of the Greek Fathers, is denied in our times for various reasons. Some claim that ”deification” is a typically Hellenistic notion of salvation that leads to fleeing the human condition and negating man. It seems to them that deification suppresses the difference between God and man and leads to fusing the two without distinction. At times an adage more coherent with our times is opposed to it: God became man to make man more human. Later comes an explanation of the meaning of deification lacking any ontological support: “The nearness to God [supposed by deification] is not reached so much by the intellectual capacity of man as by the conversion of the heart, by a new obedience and by moral action, which cannot be realized without the grace of God… In the same way that the Incarnation of the Word does not change or diminish the divine nature, neither does the divinity of Jesus change or dissolve human nature, but further affirms it and perfects it in its original creaturely condition.” It is true that it does not dissolve it, but it certainly does change it! Does not the supernatural organism of sanctifying grace and infused virtue modify it? After the explanation, that one would have believed would defend the axiom of the Fathers against the modern one, comes the conclusion: “In this sense, ‘deification’ correctly understood makes man perfectly human: deification is the true and final ‘humanization’ of mankind.” In the humanist mind, the axiom of the Fathers is accepted only because it would mean the same as the modern adage.

[218] The original Latin here reads: “Cum in Eo natura humana assumpta, non perempta sit, eo ipso etiam in nobis ad sublimem dignitatem evecta est.”

[219] Preface of Christmas: “so that, knowing God in a visible manner, we should be swept away by this to the love of things invisible.”

[220] Human love, or divine love? To conciliar humanism, human love is divine, because man is the image of God! Because of this, in its perspective, love is human perfection, that is all; and the new commandment of Our Lord is in no way distinguished from the Masonic commandment of universal fraternity.

[221] If we look at the previous magisterium, this truth is professed at every step. Vatican I barely managed to promulgate two Constitutions, but here it is said of Jesus Christ: “By the authority of the same God and Savior of ours we command you…” (Denzinger-Hünermann 3044). The Council of Trent, in its Session III, began by founding its teaching on the proclamation of the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed. And exceedingly clear statements of this truth are not far to seek: “In the august Sacrament of the Eucharist, after the consecration of the bread and wine, is contained truly, really and substantially our Lord Jesus Christ, true God and true Man” (Denzinger-Hünermann 1635).

[222] Apostolicam Actuositatem, no. 5: “God Himself tends to reassume, in Christ, all the world in the new creation.” Ad Gentes, no. 21: “That all should submit to God in Christ and, at last, God should be all in all things.” Presbyterorum Ordinis, no. 2: “The end that priests seek with their ministry and their lives is to achieve the glory of God the Father in Christ.”

[223] Denzinger-Hünermann 1344.

[224] Fr. Álvaro Calderón, “L’Église Sacrement Universel du Salut,” en La Religion de Vatican II, Premier Symposium de Paris, 2002, p. 131: “If we consider Christ as sacrament-mystery, we can say that His humanity is like the efficacious sign and instrument which contains His divinity and allows it to be known, without denying the intimacy of the hypostatic union between both natures. But, if in place of preaching the idea of a sign only regarding the human part with respect to the divine, we preached it about Christ Himself, saying—as it is now said—that Christ is the sacrament-sign of the Divinity, then we fall into Nestorianism, entitatively dividing that which is Christ from that which is God. The human part may be called a sign, but not all of Christ.”

[225] Denzinger-Hünermann 1332.

[226] In the new Catechism, the expression “God the Father” is used 34 times; “Son of God” 102 times; “Spirit of God” 16; “God the Son” or “God the Holy Spirit” never.

[227] There is no need to go far. In the first paragraph of the prologue to Jesus of Nazareth, by Benedict XVI (italics ours), we read: “In them [‘a series of fascinating works on Jesus’], the figure of Jesus was presented according to the Gospels: how He lived on earth and how—while being a true man—at the same time led men to God, with whom He was one as the Son. So, God made Himself visible through the man Jesus and, from God, the image of the authentic man could be seen” (p. 7). To say that Jesus is one as Son smacks of Arianism, to say that God makes Himself visible through the man Jesus more than smacks of Nestorianism (one would have to say ‘through the humanity of Jesus’), and to say that thus the image of the authentic man (and not the authentic God) could be seen, is humanism.

[228] When it comes to being, the humanist would rather be a free rat than an angel under military obedience; as to truth, he prefers the freedom of a wrong opinion to all knowledge with submission; as regards good, he prefers the freedom to sin to the slavery of perfect virtue.

[229] Have not the conciliar popes shown much more sympathy for the rabbis of deicidal Judaism than for our traditional bishops?

[230] Cf. “2. The purposes of the democratic turn in Vatican II,” p. 119.

Table of Contents

Front Matter

Illustrations

1. Vatican II vs. Catholicism

2. The Christian vs. The New Man

3. Catholic Doctrine vs. Conciliar Doctrine regarding the Kingdom of God

4. Concepts of the Kingdom of God / Church

5. New Version of the Social Kingship of Christ

6. Reduction of the Church

7. The Catholic Church vs. The New Church

8. The Catholic Religion vs. The Religion of Man

Foreword

CHAPTER I: What Was the Second Vatican Council?

A. Definition of the Council

1. First term: Officialization

2. Second term: Humanism

3. Third term: Catholic

4. Integral humanism

B. On the Causes that Explain the Council

I. On the purpose of Vatican Council II

1. The purpose of conciliar humanism according to its promoters

2. Three theological notes: On the final purpose of man

3. The inevitable turn to anthropocentrism

4. The personalism of the new humanism

5. The personalist humanism of Gaudium et Spes

6. The anthropocentric inversion in the conciliar magisterium

7. Conclusion

II. Catholic humanism (Material cause)

1. The supposed evangelical roots of conciliar humanism

2. The necessity for mankind to remain Catholic

3. Conclusion

III. A new exercise of authority (Efficient cause)

1. The modern reinvention of authority

2. A new hierarchy for a “new Christianity”

3. Authority and the common good

4. Conclusion

IV. What conciliar humanism formally is

V. Conclusion

C. The Most Notorious Properties of the Conciliar Spirit

I. The optimism of new humanism

1. An optimist Council

2. Historical optimism

3. To the rescue of humanist optimism

4. The Council’s joy and hope for mankind

II. Inclusivity in the mind of the Council

1. Damages of scholastic “exclusivity”

2. “Inclusivity” in the acts and sayings of the Council

3. Conciliar “inclusivity” is nothing but subjectivism and ambiguity

III. Conciliar innovations

1. A new era for humanity

2. A new incarnation of the Church

D. Division of Our Study on Conciliar Innovations

CHAPTER II: The New Man

A. Liberty: Supreme Value of Human Dignity

1. Humanism falls into liberalism under its own weight

2. Conciliar liberalism

3. Immediate consequence: Supremacy of action over contemplation

4. Final consequence: “non serviam”

B. Subjectivism, Liberator of Thought

1. Humanism is aided by subjectivism

2. Conciliar subjectivism

3. Brief analysis of conciliar subjectivism

4. Consequences

C: Conscience, the Liberator of Action

1. The theft of Prometheus: Autonomy of conscience

2. “Right conscience” according to the Council

3. Conclusion

D. Grace, Liberator of Nature

1. Humanist naturalism

2. Conciliar naturalism

E. Conclusion

CHAPTER III: The New Church

A. The Church and the Kingdom of God

1. Catholic doctrine

2. The conciliar distinction between the Church and the Kingdom of God

3. Reasons for the distinction

4. The Church and Kingdom of God according to Lumen Gentium

5. The Church, “sacrament” of the Kingdom

6. The Church, “sacrament” of Christ

B. The Church and the World

I. Christendom until Unam Sanctam

1. The Christian division of powers

2. The establishment of Christendom

II. Catholic Humanism until Quas Primas

1. Humanism and the separation of powers

2. The “middle ground” of Catholic humanism

3. Quas Primas

III. The New Christendom until Dignitatis Humanæ

1. The “New Christendom”

2. The consistency of temporal realities

3. Conclusion

IV. The Church and the world according to the Council

1. A laical but worthy world

2. Earthly realities and the Kingdom of God

V. At the service of the King of the World

C. The Church and World Religions

I. The Problems of Ecumenism

1. The entity of religions

2. The identity of the Catholic Church

II. The “elementa Ecclesiæ”

1. The gateway to ecumenism

2. A false gateway

III. The Destiny of “subsistit in”

1. How can the Super Church be and not be the Catholic Church?

2. The Vatican II context of “subsistit in”

3. Church, Church, and Churches

IV. Saving “subsistit in”

1. Ratzinger comes to the rescue

2. A trompeuse (tricky) expression

3. An expression which neo-theologians cannot understand

V. The “ad extra” strategy of Vatican II

1. The conciliar illusion

2. Catholic reality

D. The Church-Communion

I. A Priestly People

1. The necessary democratic conversion

2. The purposes of the democratic turn of Vatican II

3. The common priesthood

4. The priesthood of the faithful

5. Priests, prophets and kings

II. Collegiality

1. An anachronistic monarchy

2. A touch of parliamentarianism

3. Primacy and ecumenism

4. Collegiality in Vatican II

5. A new form of the Primacy

III. “Communio”

1. The breadth of conciliar thought about the Church

2. Communion and dialogue

3. “Said the serpent to the woman: Thou shalt not die”

CHAPTER IV: A New Religion?

A. Revelation and Tradition According to the Council

I. Revelation by the Word, not by words

1. The object of Revelation

2. The means

II. Living Tradition

1. Tradition

2. Living Tradition

III. Faith, Scripture and Magisterium

1. The Faith

2. Sacred Scripture

3. Magisterium and Communion

4. Community of Worship

IV. Conclusion

B. The Paschal Mystery

I. The Abolition of the Cross

1. Sin does not leave us in debt to God

2. Salvation is a work not of justice, but of love

3. The Savior is not Jesus Christ, but God the Father

4. Salvation was not achieved at Christ’s death but at His glorious Resurrection

II. The Liturgy of the Pharisee

C. Jesus Christ: Perfect Man

I. Jesus Christ, perfect Man

II. Jesus Christ: imperfect God

1. Omission of the profession of faith in the divinity of Jesus Christ

2. An air of Nestorianism

3. A breath of Arianism

D. The Religion of Man

I. Human dignity as supreme good

1. Man as an end

2. God subordinated to man

3. Freedom as the supreme value

II. The idolatry of Man

III. Mystery of Iniquity