

A Class Manual in the Philosophy of Human Society

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This Book is Dedicated

To

“A friend long tried and ever dearer grown,”

The Reverend Michael Joseph Ready

Of the Executive Staff of the National Catholic
Welfare Conference,

*with the prayer that his splendid work may bless
Church and Country for many years, and with the
confident hope that his most serious employments
are sometimes enlivened by the strains of Attic
melody in which he was an early and a competent
master.*

*O 8e 8H *lypaxpa* . . .

PREFACE

If there is one part of this manual doomed to be chosen, out of a wealth of possibilities, for adverse remark, it is, I feel, the section called *Fundamental Principles*. That a textbook in sociology should recklessly invade the fields of theodicy, Christian evidences, and rational psychology, may be considered so unusual as to be a breach of the proprieties. And yet I am convinced, after many years of teaching this subject, that the part in question is far and away the most important in the book. And this, not as theodicy, evidences, and psychology, but as part and parcel of sociological science itself. It is unquestionably a major fault of many textbooks in sociology that basic doctrine is scamped; oftentimes it is blandly assumed, and is presented as a collection of "postulates." Yet many a Catholic student comes to his classwork in sociology without the technical knowledge of absolutely indispensable doctrine which the postulates presume. And so, from the first, he is all too likely to drift into a sentimental view of humanity, and to follow feelings instead of changeless principles in evaluating social situations or framing social programs. For he lacks the means of

“tying in” this science to its place in his “scheme of things entire”; no number of postulates can supply such means. It was a callow undergraduate—but one whose grip on reality was admirable—who said that the postulates of sociology are thin ^nd inadequate anchor-lines on an enormous ^nd ever-swelling balloon which struggles to be off into the freedom of the void.

The arrangement of material in this manual is meant to be strictly logical, but not mechanical. Some questions that, at first glance, seem to call for treatment in the section called *The Problems of Society* are discussed in the chapters which deal with *The Structure of Society*, particularly in that chapter which treats of the nature and functions of the family. The reason for placing these discussions in their present setting is, quite simply, that they belong there. The nature and function of a social group is not to be adequately studied without some notice of the more important or striking “phenomena” which fulfil or thwart that nature, which help or hinder that function. As for the section on *The Problems of Society*, this is a purposely brief and pointed study of certain necessary matters that have not called for direct attention in the earlier chapters; further, it is a reminder and a resume of some questions of outstanding importance which have already been discussed.

This volume is not a series of statistical studies,

nor is it a book of detailed social programs or a survey of social service. It is a textbook designed to give to the young collegian an understanding of the meaning and the importance of social science, to equip him with principles which will serve him in his further studies, and to map out for his ready grasp, in general but clearly drawn lines, the field of social action. A studious effort has been made to include in the book all the essentials for a fundamental course in sociology while keeping the volume compact enough to serve as a text for a one-year course. A further effort has been continuously expended to make this treatise meet the reasonable requirements of the reviewer of a series of sociological papers, who wrote in *The Sign* for August, 1934, that such studies "should be so presented as to be grasped by the ordinary intelligence without such difficulty as to cause positive aversion."

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INTRODUCTION

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| i. Name | 2. Definition | 3. History | 4. Object |
| | 5. Importance | 6. Division | |

I. NAME

The name *sociology* was coined in 1838 by Auguste Comte (1798-1857) to designate his newly formulated "science of the associated life of humanity."

The term is derived from the Latin *socius*, "companion, fellow, partner," and the Greek *logos*, "science." Thus, by virtue of its name, sociology means "a science of companions or partners." It is a scientific study of man in association with his fellowmen. It is a science of human *society*. It is a *social* science.

The terms *society* and *social* are themselves derived from *socius*. A *society* is a stable union of human beings, bonded together under a common direction or authority to attain a common end by the use of common means. There are many societies in the world, some *natural* (the family, the State), some *free* (such as a workmen's union, a debating club, a sodality), and one *supernatural* (the true Church). But humanity itself is a society; indeed, it

is of humanity at large that we speak when we employ the general term *society*. For, in spite of differences in races and nations, in colors and cultures, all men of all times constitute one society, the active members of which, at any given moment, are the living peoples of the earth, and the individual persons who compose them. And humanity is justly called a society, for all human beings are bound together by the tie of a common nature; all men have reason, which manifests duty or authority directing them in the achievement of their end; all have the same end, which is God, the Supreme Good, and endless happiness; all have understanding and free-will by which to labor for the attainment of that end. Thus mankind is a true *society*. Therefore, the adjective *social* is properly employed to designate what pertains to humanity, to the relations of its members one towards another, and to the duties, requirements, goods, and resources of mankind at large. And the sciences that study such matters are properly called *social sciences*. Important among these sciences are the following: *Social Ethics*, which manifests the fundamental norms of social morality, or right conduct, of justice, equity, and charity among men; *Political Science*, which studies the structure and functions of just government and the administration of civil laws; *Economics*, which discusses the production, distribution, exchange, and consumption of wealth; *Sociology*, which we are now to define.

2. DEFINITION

Sociology is *the science of human welfare as guarded and promoted by the reasonable regulation of man's activities with reference to his fellowmen.*

a) Sociology is a *science*, that is to say, it is a body of connected data, relatively complete and systematically arranged and integrated, together with the reasons which show these data to be true and certain. It is a *practical* science, inasmuch as its data serve as the norm and guide of reasonable action; it aims at *something to be done* for the protection and furtherance of human welfare. Sociology is thus distinguished from *speculative* or *theoretical* sciences, which study truth for the enrichment of the mind and the enlargement of culture, and not for the immediate purpose of discovering a direction and norm for action.

b) Sociology is a science of *human welfare*. It seeks to help man to attain his last end (which is God and eternal happiness) by making his temporal relations with his fellowmen just, peaceable, happy, and mutually helpful. It seeks to remove from man's earthly life the obstacles that prevent the reign of justice and equity and so destroy the peace and happiness of mankind and hinder men in the attainment of their last end. Sociology seeks to direct man in the exercise of *the social virtues*, which are well indicated in the lists of the Corporal and Spiritual Works of Mercy. Sane sociology does not try to

supply a substitute for religion. It does not teach men to ignore God, and to look for their heaven here upon earth. It does not make the "world a better place to live in," the end-all and be-all of human existence. It does not teach the topsy-turvy philosophy of Abou Ben Adhem. It does not spread a sticky sentimentalism over human relations, and teach men to talk of "service" without a true knowledge of what service means, and where and why it should be rendered. Sane sociology, ever mindful of man's true character as a child of eternity, tries to make his earthly sojourn peaceable, well-ordered, happy, and suitable to the dignity of God's image, by protecting and promoting the reign of justice, equity, and charity. To this end sociology studies the fundamental principles which must govern human lives and human activities, and, in the light of these principles, it makes plans and formulates programs for the betterment of human existence. Thus sociology is a *science of human welfare*,

c) Sociology is a science which directs the activities of man *with reference to his fellowmen*. This characterization of sociology is loose and unsatisfactory, but it is not possible to put into a brief formula the clearly determined function of sociology as distinct from other social sciences. For sociology impinges so heavily upon these sciences, and borrows so largely from them, that a detailed investigation is

needed to show the line of distinction which marks off sociology from religion, ethics, political science, and economics, and to indicate the debt of sociology to psychology, theodicy, and history. While we cannot pause to make such a detailed investigation here, it may be well to indicate the more obvious lines by which sociology is marked off from these other sciences.

Religion (that is, the true religion) serves human welfare by regulating man's relations with God, thus carrying him directly towards his supernatural last end. Sociology, subserving the ends of true religion, promotes human welfare by regulating man's relations with his fellowmen, thus carrying man directly towards the natural and temporal end, called *earthly well-being*.

Ethics serves human welfare, but it is a general science which does not enter into a detailed study of actual contemporary social conditions and circumstances with a view to their betterment; ethics lays down principles; it has no programs to offer; it shows, in general, what is to be done, but does not explain how it is to be accomplished. Sociology, resting upon sound ethical principles, makes a detailed study of social conditions and proposes plans for their betterment.

Political Science serves human welfare in the restricted domain of government and just administra-

tion of true laws. Sociology, while fostering sane government and honest legislation, has much more within its scope.

Economics serves human welfare, but in the single domain of commodities or wealth. Sociology, while promoting economic justice, reaches far into other fields.

Further: sociology borrows from psychology the knowledge of man, whom it seeks to serve. From theodicy (or natural theology) sociology takes its fundamental recognition of God, and learns that the world in which it works is God's world, and that man is God's child, with a dignity and destiny that are not to be ignored in any social plan or program. From history sociology takes the light of human experience to guide it in formulating practicable programs for social betterment.

3. HISTORY

We make a clear distinction here. The history of true sociology, which we have defined and explained above, is one thing; the history of sociology as it has existed under that name since 1838, is another.

In 1838, Auguste Comte invented a beautiful name for an evil thing. For his *sociology*, or science of the associated life of humanity, rules out God, makes humanity divine, and establishes the "service of humanity" (*humanitarianism*) as the only religion. Comtism was spread through the world by many in-

fluences, important among which were the writings of Hippolyte Taine (1828-1893) and Ernest Renan (1823-1892). Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) gave impetus and direction to the development of Comtist sociology by his doctrine of *social evolution*, which regards the whole human race as one growing and developing *organism*.

Thus, from the beginning, Comtist sociology has been materialistic and evolutionistic. The sociologists have devoted themselves to the task of developing their science with energy and zeal—and with a complete absence of humor. Solemn investigations have been inaugurated for the purpose of dissecting the social organism and determining the elements of its "anatomy." Studies have been made of "primitive forms" of human association, and an evolutionary progress has inevitably been traced through family, clan, tribe, and nation. Some sociologists have sought illumination in the study of statistics, and have set up comparative lists of figures which indicate facts or phases or fancies relative to races, religions, and nationalities, and which bear upon crime, pauperism, and other "social phenomena." Stress has been laid upon the importance of recognizing one "master principle of social phenomena," and this has been variously asserted to be "a modification of struggle by alliance," "contract or compact," "imitation," "instinct," "inherited prejudice," and many another strange and fanciful thing.

Now, in all this, the Comtist-Spencerian sociology (which is *modern* sociology, as it is taught, and talked, and preached, and acted out to-day) is wrong, is evil, is an affront to the mind and a damage to the soul. That modern sociology has been productive of some accidental good, we are not concerned to deny; but it has been productive of much more evil, and its evil is not accidental, but essential. It has given offence to the mind and wrought harm to the spirit. Its view of mankind is a degraded view. Its influence appears in closely succeeding waves of scientism and sentimentalism, but the steady tide beneath the waves is a cruel and inexorable inhumanity.

Even the accidental good which modern sociology has accomplished has come, in last analysis, from its infidelity to its own principles, and from its temporary and unconscious agreement with the requirements of logic and of Christianity, with neither of which, in theory, has it anything in the world to do. For modern sociology (which is Comtist-Spencerian sociology; which is materialist-evolutionist sociology) wants to do good to man while refusing to understand what man is. Not only does modern sociology falsify man's position in the universe, limiting his existence to time and bounding his well-being with earthly horizons, but it falsifies man's very nature. It makes man an animal and nothing more—granted, a superior animal that requires something other than manger and stall. It seeks to supply the needs of the

human animal and to promote his well-being—granted, these be superior needs and a refined well-being. But it is not true that man is animal merely—granted, a superior animal. It is not true that human well-being is earthly well-being divorced from anything further and finer. Man is not only animal; man is rational. Man is not only body; man is soul and body. Man is not only temporal; man is also eternal. To see man as animal merely is not to see man as he is. To serve worldly and bodily ends, ignoring the soul and its requirements, is not to serve man as he needs to be served. Divide the decaying animal from the enduring mind; divorce soul from body; sever the eternal from the temporal element, and you destroy man. Modern sociology destroys man; then seeks to serve him. Thus, in its essential structure, modern sociology is a contradiction, an offence against logic, a damage to the mind. Its humanitarianism is not scientific, but scientistic. It is inexorably cruel, for it tends to herd men as animals, to breed men to desirable varieties, to weed out ruthlessly the defective and ineffective human animals—as witness its legislation for civic betterment, for eugenics, birth control, sterilization. It is yet more cruel to immortal man in its sinister influence, which teaches him to disbelieve in the life of the soul, the responsibility of the individual to Almighty God, and the eternal sanctions of the moral law. Yet this cruel thing is stickily sentimental, especially in point of its

terminology; it offers man a prospect of "welfare," "uplift," "progress," "betterment"; it breathes poetically of "euthanasia," "eugenic measures," "evolutionary progress of culture"; it points smilingly to a humanitarian (and utterly horrible) paradise.

Even pseudo-science has long since abandoned the hope of some day finding *homunculus* in the retort of the deified laboratorian. But modern sociology, the super-pseudo-science, has made a laboratory of the world, and pretends to have produced man, for all to see and understand, from an apparatus of materialism and evolutionism. Modern sociology turns out its monster; it studies his needs; it seeks to serve him. Let modern sociology serve its monster; it can never serve man. For unless man be seen as more than an organism, however produced, man is not seen at all. Unless man be studied against the background of eternity, man is not studied at all. Unless man's earthly welfare be understood as something that subserves his eternal interests, man's earthly welfare is not understood at all. Man is an image; until you know whose image, you do not know man; you do not know what *man* means. To know man, you must recognize God.

Now, there is something in the world which does know man because it recognizes God. There is something in the world which can sanely plan for man's earthly well-being because it understands his eternal well-being, and knows why his earthly existence was

bestowed. This thing is the Catholic Church. Let sound minds be earnest to see this fact; for it is a fact. Let honest reason, turning from the taunt of materialists and the half-witted sneer of sciolists, speed to the defence of this truth; for it is truth. It is no sectarian claim, no pietistic attitude. It is a fact. It is a fact for reason to recognize, for it stands clear-cut in human history; it stands undeniable in the logic of human existence; it stands inevitable in the pathway of the honest mind through the recorded experience of the ages. If—as Hilaire Belloc remarks in concluding his admirable study of the historic claims of the Catholic Church—if this fact be mere seeming, then all is void.

The Catholic Church, divine mother of men through long centuries, recently heard the name *sociology* fall from human lips. She saw that fair name abused in monstrous misapplication. She took that name—not officially, but through the ministration of her scholars—and applied it where it has the right in justice to be applied. She redeemed the name from abuse. She did not baptize a pseudo-science modernly pagan; she saved a worthy name for proper use. And to the pseudo-scientists, the modern sociologists, she indicated the proper field in which their forms and forces might be fruitfully employed. She directed them, and still directs them, to bring their fine energy, ardent with plans and programs and investigations and statistics, to the service of the great end

which she herself has been serving during all the years that she has lived and labored on earth.

Thus we come to the second phase of our history, the history of true sociology.

True sociology was born into the world with Christianity, and its history is part and parcel of the history of the Catholic religion. True sociology has its centre and soul in Christ crucified for His fellow-men. Before that Figure on the Cross the world lies in its true light. No longer is the earth a place of bond and free, for the soul of the slave is as precious as the soul of the master; the life of the serf is as valuable as the life of the sovereign. No longer are the poor to be neglected, the sick and maimed to be destroyed, the bonds of marriage to be the shameful links of a passing allurements, the begetting of children to be a mere physical function discharged without clearly understood responsibilities, or thwarted by evil means.

From her first days, the Church of the Crucified Redeemer, the Catholic Church, sent sons and daughters to carry to savage peoples the culture of Christianity and the refinement of the arts and sciences. Great religious Orders were founded; monasteries and schools arose side by side; hospitals and asylums were multiplied; wild souls were tamed and taught the meaning of human existence; dull minds were enlightened; awkward hands were trained to skill; suffering humanity was taught to endure for

Christ. In a word, the Corporal and Spiritual Works of Mercy were made working actualities. The Sacraments sanctified human life, raised up the fallen, fired the hopeless with abounding courage, purified life of dross, fed human souls with the eternal Bread of Life, which is God Himself. Here is service of human welfare. Here is rational and ennobling regulation of man's activities with reference to his fellows. Here, in a word, is applied *sociology* a science worthy of the splendid name that Comte and Spencer attached to an evil thing.

4. OBJECT

Every science treats of a certain subject-matter, works in a definite field. This subject-matter, this field of inquiry, constitutes what is called its *Material Object*. And every science treats of its subject-matter (that is, its Material Object) in a special way, and with a special end in view. This special and definite aim of a science constitutes what is called its *Formal Object*.

The Material Object of sociology is the associated life of mankind. This is the subject-matter of the science, the field in which it works. And the Formal Object of this science is the regulation and improvement of social life to the end that man's relations with his fellows may be just, equitable, peaceable, helpful, and happy.

Briefly, the Material Object of sociology is so-

ciety. The Formal Object of sociology is *the well-being of society*.

5. IMPORTANCE

The study of man's relations with his fellowmen has always been recognized as an important part of Christian ethics. That this study, enlarged in scope, particularized by special considerations and practical applications of principles, fortified by tabulated results of studies and investigations, enriched by the actual test of current problems, is now given a new form in the science of sociology, does not mean that the subject is new to Catholic scholars, or that its importance is likely to be underestimated among them. All that concerns man and man's life and activities is of prime importance in the view of the Christian philosopher.

Man is a social being; he has need of his fellows. Humanity is a society, not because of some primeval agreement among men to band together for their common benefit, but by reason of the requirements of human nature itself. Humanity is, therefore, a natural society, not an artificial one. It is man's natural state and condition to live as a member of human society. Any serious study of this natural state is a matter that is worthy, noble, and highly important. Sociology is, therefore, a science of great importance.

The pseudo-science called "modern sociology" en-

gages the fervid attention and interest of thousands who have no clear knowledge of Christian principles, no wish to be guided by them, and no interest in the Catholic's perfect understanding of human life and its glorious purpose. Hence the study of sociology is, at the present moment, not only a matter of interest and utility for educated Catholics; it is a matter of plain duty.

6. DIVISION

In manuals of sociology it is usual to mention certain basic truths, proved in other branches of philosophy, as "postulates," that is, as truths known for certain and hence justifiably *assumed* by the sociologist as the basis of his science. We deem it well, in this manual, to present a short statement and proof of these basic truths, and not merely to assume them as postulates. This part of our study we shall call "Fundamental Principles." The second part of the manual treats of the structure of society. The third and final part discusses important social problems. The major divisions of this manual are, therefore, arranged as follows:

Book First

Fundamental Principles

Chap. I. God and Christ

Chap. II. Man's Soul

SOCIOLOGY

Book Second

The Structure of Society

- Chap. I. The Social Element
- Chap. II. The Social Unit
- Chap. III. The Social Groups

Book Third

Problems of Society

- Chap. I. Problems of the Family
- Chap. II. Problems of the Community
- Chap. III. World Problems

BOOK FIRST

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

This Book presents a brief account and proof of truths that are of basic importance for sociology. We evidence the following facts: 1. That there exists one, infinite, all-perfect God, the Creator and Ruler of all things. 2. That Jesus Christ is true God as well as true man, the Redeemer of the human race, the Founder of the one true and necessary Church. 3. That man has a spiritual and immortal soul, endowed with understanding and free-will, which is subject to the obligation of religion and virtue and responsive to the supernatural influence of divine grace. These matters are discussed in the following Chapters:

Chapter I. God and Christ

Chapter II. Man's Soul

CHAPTER I

GOD AND CHRIST

This Chapter offers a brief study of the existence, nature, and action of God. It further presents a summary proof of the divinity and the humanity of Jesus Christ, and an account of Christ's work on behalf of mankind. No sociological theory has value unless these fundamental matters are thoroughly understood and fully recognized.

The Chapter is divided in two Articles:

Article i. God

Article 2. Christ

Article i. God

- a) The Existence of God
- b) The Nature of God
- c) The Action of God

a) THE EXISTENCE of god

Modern unbelief is often the result of the pride or priggishness of the half-educated. It is seldom a forthright atheism; it is mostly a formless agnosticism. It is the ignoring of God rather than ignorance of God's existence.

No normal person can come to the full and practised use of his faculties and remain in utter ignorance of the existence of a supreme and infinite Being, nor can he fail to recognize something of God's control of the world. The full proof of this

assertion belongs to the philosophical sciences of Theodicy (or Natural Theology) and Apologetics. Here we offer only a brief summary of the traditional—and irrefutable—proofs for the existence of God.

i. *The Argument from Sufficient Reason.*—Everything that exists must justify its existence, that is to say, each thing that exists must have a *sufficient reason* for existing. Now, manifestly, this reason will be found either in the existing thing in question, or it will be found in some other thing. If the reason for existence is found in the existing thing itself, then this thing is so perfect that it involves existence in itself; it requires existence; it must exist and cannot be non-existent; existence is of its very essence; it is a *self-existent thing*. We call such a thing *necessary*. And, on the other hand, a thing which does not involve in itself the necessity for existence is called non-necessary or *contingent*. Now, contingent things justify their existence by other things, that is, by the things that give them existence. And if these latter things be contingent, then they justify their existence by yet other things. This dependency of contingent things on other contingent things cannot be an endless chain; at the beginning of it there must be a *necessary* being, a being so perfect that it must exist, a being that is self-existent. This being we call God. Since the things we see around us here on earth are con-

tingent things (for they change and appear and disappear, which would be impossible if they *had* to exist), and since the world itself is contingent (for it is full of movement and change), we rightly conclude that the world and all things in it cannot justify their existence without an appeal to *other* being, and ultimately to *necessary* being. Now, *necessary being* is God. Therefore, God exists.

2. *The Argument from Efficient Causality.*—Every contingent thing is *efficiently caused*, that is to say, it is produced. This is obvious; it is the very definition of a contingent thing: for that which exists is either self-existing or it has been *produced*. The whole experience of life impresses upon us the existence and the operation of cause and effect. Since a contingent thing is produced, it is *an effect*, and that which produced it is its *cause*, or, more accurately, its *efficient cause*, that is, its making cause, its effecting cause. Now, if the efficient cause of a thing is itself the effect of a further cause, then we must seek that further cause; and if this also is found to be an effect, we press on to find a still further cause. The chain of cause and effect cannot be endless. The sane mind refuses to accept the possibility of an endless series of links beginning nowhere. And it is a defective mind that will accept as scientific a blind refusal to carry the quest of causes back to the beginning. In a word, the mind recognizes the necessity of a *first* cause. Now, this first cause

cannot be itself an effect; else it is not *first*, for its own cause would be prior to it. The first cause must exist, *and it must be itself uncaused*. But an uncaused being which exists must have existence of itself; otherwise it would have existence from something else, from a further cause, and would not be *first*. Hence the first cause is a *necessary* being, that is, a being so perfect that it must exist and cannot be non-existent. This being we call God. Now, the world is a tissue of causes and effects; the world is contingent; the world is produced; the world and all things in it are *effects*. We must get back to the first and necessary cause, which is God. Therefore, God exists.

3. *The Argument from Motion*.—Motion is change from one state or condition to another. The most manifest kind of motion is the movement of a bodily thing from one place to another; this is called *local motion*. But there is motion other than that of bodies in space. There is motion in any change. Hence there is motion in learning, in thinking, in willing, for all these things involve change. There is motion when a substance changes from hot to cold, from small to large or large to small, from living to dead or lifeless to living. Now, wherever there is motion of any kind whatever, there is a source of motion; in a word, there is a *mover*. And the mover is something other than the thing moved. Motion is never self-originating. The world is full

of motion; things move into existence and out of it; lifeless things are full of molecular and atomic motion; life itself is almost definable in terms of motion. This motion requires a mover distinct from the world and all that is in it. And, while one thing which is set in motion may at times convey this motion to other things, motion is not justified to the mind until it is traced to its *first mover, itself unmoved*. This will be found to be the *necessary being and first cause* or God. Hence motion in the world demonstrates the existence of God.

4. *The Argument from Design*.—The world and all things in the world are built upon plans that are most intricate, delicate, complex; plans that exhibit a wondrous power and intelligence in the mind which framed them. Harmony and order are here, unity and complexity, balance and poise amid the greatest variety. Now, where order and plan exist, *design* exists. And where there is design, we have the work of a *designer*. Ultimately we must trace design to a *first designer*, for design, like everything else, must have its first cause. And where design is the expression of a wondrous power and intelligence, these perfections must be attributed to the designer. Hence, there is a first designer of this wonderful world, a designer of surpassing power and intelligence. This designer we call God.

5. *The Argument from Conscience*.—All men of all times have a clear knowledge of a duty incumbent

upon them to do good and to avoid evil. We call this *the natural law*, that is, *the moral law* as known by human reason or conscience. This is an indubitable *law*, and while men may violate it, they cannot be ignorant of it. Now, where there is an indubitable law, there is an indubitable *lawgiver*, and ultimately a *first* lawgiver. Convention or custom cannot account for universal moral convictions; for conventions can be changed, and it is unthinkable that the moral law should change; that murder, for example, should come to be universally recognized as good, or theft as virtuous. Laws passed by human legislatures or rulers cannot explain moral notions; for human law may be repealed and even reversed, and it is absolutely unthinkable that men should universally accept a law making treason a good deed or disobedience to parents requisite. Moral notions cannot be explained away by mentioning diverse interpretations or applications of the moral law. It does not affect the universality and changelessness of morality to instance the fact that the Kanakas of the Hawaiian Islands once regarded as evil the action of stepping upon the shadow of the king, or the fact that a Roman householder considered himself justified in killing a disobedient slave. The point is that men have always recognized *the existence of good and evil*, however wildly and perversely fallen human nature may have applied the moral law. All men have ever recognized the moral law as *there* to be

applied, no matter what monstrous applications of it were made. If the Kanaka regarded the simple action of stepping on the king's shadow as evil, it was because he knew that certain things are, as a fact, evil, and others good, and that evil is to be avoided. If the Roman householder felt that it was right and good to kill a slave, his conviction is absolute evidence that he had the concept of right and wrong—that is, of morality—however badly or stupidly he applied that knowledge. In a word, it was because the evil action was evil that the Kanaka was impelled to avoid it (independently of the question of penalty for offence), and it was because the Roman regarded the killing of a slave as within his rights that he could do such a thing with untroubled conscience. Back of these monstrous matters, the true light of morality is apparent, although it shines with distorted rays through man's misapplication of its law. Thus, respect for authority is right and good, even though the observance of that respect take fanciful and ridiculous forms. And murder is always wrong, as the Roman would admit, even though blindness to the human dignity of all men can give rise to the stupid and inhuman conviction that killing an inferior is no murder. Examples to prove that moral notions have changed are always futile; they are always examples of varying applications of unchanging notions; they are always proofs of what they seek to disprove, namely, that man has always

and everywhere known and recognized the existence of right and wrong, has felt the existence of the moral law, has recognized the authoritative voice of conscience. And, as we have said, if man has always recognized the existence of a law, he has perforce recognized the existence of a lawgiver, and must admit that ultimately there is a first lawgiver, distinct from man's nature and superior to it, who requires of man's will (although he does not compel or force it) changeless and absolute adherence to good, and changeless avoidance of evil. This lawgiver we call God. Therefore, God exists.

6. *The Argument from Universal Consensus*,—All men of all times have an inevitable knowledge of the existence of divinity, or, in plain terms, of God. Even though this notion may be developed into absurd conclusions—such as the belief in many gods, or the belief that the world or the sun is divine—the basic notion is always there. Professed atheists are few, and even they are unable to state their position without implicitly denying it. The statement that there is no God cannot stand alone; the world must be explained, and the atheist is required to offer some reasons for its existence apart from the God whom he denies. He is thrown into the inescapable position of deifying the universe, or himself, or vague "energies" or "forces" or "nature," and so to declare the existence of some inadequate divinity in place of the adequate God whose existence is dis-

tasteful to him. The study of history, of philology, of archaeology, evidences the fact that no race or tribe of men ever lived who were without what Cicero calls "*deorum opinio* " or the conviction of existing divinity. Languages and cultures, monuments and temples, priesthoods and sacrifices, festivals and sacred rites, all give testimony that some idea of divinity has always and everywhere held captive the minds of men.—Now, what is the value of this universal consensus among men? Can all men be wrong? They can, if their universal consent is a mere surface judgment upon the hidden causes or character of obvious physical facts. Thus all (or nearly all) men once believed that the earth is flat, and that the sun moves across the heavens every day while the earth stands still. But in a *judgment of reason* upon data that are clearly understood, all men cannot be wrong. If they could, then there is no value in human thinking at all, and all science perishes. In this case, all our certainties become mere opinions; and even then, believers in God have the best of it, for their opinion is a much pleasanter opinion than its ruinous opposite. But men, as a fact, cannot be universally in error in a judgment of rational nature. Men may be wrong in assuming that the sun moves about the earth; they cannot be wrong in concluding that motion requires a mover. Men may all be wrong in judging from appearances that a given triangle is equilateral; they cannot be wrong

in the reasoned judgment that the angles of a triangle are equal to 180° .—Now, the judgment of all men that divinity exists is a *reasoned* judgment. Manifestly, it is not a judgment about material or physical phenomena, such as the movement of the sun or the flatness of the earth. It is a judgment exacted by reason in the face of an existing world and of an obviously purposive human existence. It is a judgment reasoned with mathematical exactness from notions of necessity and contingency, from causality, from motion, from design in the universe, from moral notions and convictions, from human history. The data from which this judgment is deduced are certain, manifest, inescapable; the process of deduction is logical and exact; therefore, the judgment is a reasoned conclusion from certain data. And in such a judgment the universal consensus of mankind cannot be wrong. For such a judgment is the very voice of rational nature, and upon its validity depends all the value of human thinking. If such a judgment can be wrong, then nothing can be known with certitude, science is destroyed, and man must lapse into the imbecile and self-contradictory silence of universal skepticism.—Reason, even in the uncultured man and the savage, requires the acknowledgment of an existing power, superhuman and supramundane, and ultimately self-sufficient. This is the basic judgment in which all men agree, and with this judgment alone is our

argument concerned. It does not affect the argument in the slightest that some men have developed the basic idea of divinity into fantastic and absurd conclusions. For, although reason leads inevitably to the knowledge of existing divinity, it leads to detailed knowledge of God's nature and attributes only by means of close and intricate thinking. Now man is mentally lazy and prone to avoid difficult thinking—for close and connected thinking is just about the hardest work that a person can be called upon to perform. Fallen man, injured in his mental alertness and industry by original sin, is all too ready to dispense himself from sustained effort of mind and to supply its lack by fancy and fable. The simple fact that some divinity exists is a judgment of reason that is almost obvious. The fact that God is one, infinite, all-perfect, is also a judgment of reason, but it is not simple and it is not obvious; it is rather like the judgment with which we conclude a demonstration in geometry. Hence, while all men are at one in acknowledging some divinity, their development of this idea is not always a consistent and a logical development. This fact explains the widely and wildly various conceptions of God and gods that have been held by different men of different places and different eras. But, as we have seen, the point of this present argument is the demonstrable fact that humankind as such has ever had some notion of divinity. This notion is the fruit of rea-

spned judgment drawn from certain data. Such judgment cannot possibly be erroneous; it is the unanimous consensus of humanity; it is the very voice of rational nature. Therefore, God exists.

7. *The Argument from Practical Consequences.*—History is our witness that belief in God is fundamental in the proper conception of human responsibility and of all that gives decency and nobility to human lives. Daily experience confirms the witness of history. Common sense bears out the testimony of both history and experience and declares that the thing must be so. Apart from the exceptional instances in which the idea of God was degraded and debased into a brutal polytheism (as among the Greeks in the days of decline and among the ancient Carthaginians) the influence of the concept of divinity has ever been as noble and beautiful as it has been powerful. Nay, even the exceptional cases prove our point by force of the ancient dictum, "*corruptTM optimi pessima*" (which, freely, amounts to saying, "The finer a thing is, the more horrible is its abuse or its fall") ; for belief in divinity, changed by human passion into something abominable, shows only what a noble thing has been overthrown. To see the beauty and the necessity of the worship of the true God, one has but to contemplate the horrible inhumanity of devil worship.—The denial of divinity reduces morality to a set of conventions to which human nature, with its prideful flair for utter in-

dependence, cannot long submit. Take away the creator and ruler of the universe, deny the judge of the world, and you rob human life of its meaning, its dignity, its value; you reduce moral conduct to a form of etiquette; you make of conscience a mere fear of the police. And why should men endure the irritating exactions of this etiquette and this servile fear of public authority? Indeed, men would not endure it for a fleeting moment, were it not for the fact, already instanced, that all men have a natural and normal conviction of divinity, no matter how loudly they disclaim it.

8. *The Argument from the Impossible Alternative.*—Those who deny God inevitably set up something in His place. The denial of God is never a simple removal; it is always a replacement. Some god or other men *must* have, even though they refuse to have God.—The god of the moment may be *mankind*, and his religion *humanitarianism*. Modern sociologists like this divinity, but, as we have seen, it will not do. Humanitarianism is a sentiment which offers itself with silky persuasiveness to unwary minds, but basically it is a cruel thing; humanitarianism, in a word, is utterly inhumane.—The god of the moment may be *self*, and his religion *hedonism*, which, in plain language, means a high old time for everyone and all barriers down. This is indeed a doctrine more acceptable to normal minds than the Pecksniffian pretensions of

humanitarianism, but it labors under one essential difficulty: human nature simply will not endure it. Apart from the chaos which such a doctrine, if generally adopted, would introduce into the world, it is unacceptable because it is insufferably fatiguing. There is no effort so full of dead weariness as the unbridled quest of a good time. Human life, thrown back upon itself for its end and aim, is quickly found to be insufficient; it is an end not worth pursuing. Obviously, the altar of this divinity cannot stand.—The god of the moment may be *the man of the future*, to whose development the present generation must bend every effort, sacrificing self and self-interest. But only a very few men can be induced to give their lives and energies to the vague business of developing what they have no notion of how to develop, and what they would probably not like if it were here now. Men in general have not the slightest interest in a superman or super-race in whose existence they would have no remembered or recompensing part. This divinity satisfies neither mind nor heart; it is wholly unacceptable.—The god of the moment may be *the clock and the calendar*, and his religion the cult of *modernity* and *prideful scientism*. Proud men feel that we are coming to cope with the universe in quite adequate fashion, and they conclude, with almost idiotic inconsistency, that we therefore need no God. They think that belief in a personal God is outmoded, behind the times, not up

to date. They experience a kind of shame for the human race in the fact that most persons persist in accepting so ancient a thing as belief in God. They feel that the acceptance of such a belief is unworthy of modern excellence and modern achievement. These proud and scientistic moderns are always talking of beliefs suited to modern needs, modern minds, modern advance in science—as though truth itself were a changing and evolving thing. They might as well talk of heads suited to modern hats, and require the shaping of human skulls to conform with the latest decrees of fashion in point of headgear. They are fond of murmuring, “But this is the twentieth century!” as a kind of mystical protest against the sane submission of minds to eternal truth. Of course, as one critic has pointed out, they might as rationally murmur, “But this is Thursday afternoon!” or, “But it is nine o’clock in the morning of December fourth!” Admitting, with praise and gratitude to God, that modern man has learned much about the world that his ancient brethren did not know, and that he has done many things that his ancestors could not do, even if they had thought of doing them, there is not the slightest trace of evidence in such things to carry us away from the idea of God and the conviction of His existence. On the contrary. For, surely, our increasing knowledge of the marvels of the universe must bring the normal mind to an increased appreciation of the power and wisdom of

the Creator. If a fortunate family were given a beautiful and comfortable house to live in, they would be in no manner of doubt about the fact that the house had a designer and builder. And if the interested members of the family were to make almost daily discoveries of new parts and conveniences about the house, and of objects that could be turned to continual new uses, it is natural to suppose that their admiration of the foresight and thoughtfulness and skill of the builder would increase even unto amazement. But the modern exponents of scientism seem to conclude that the amazing number and intricate detail of the objects in this house of the world are evidence that the house had no builder at all! There is only one word to describe this attitude of mind, and the word is *idiotic*. And a religion that amounts to idiocy cannot stand.—All concepts of divinity except that of one, infinite, all-perfect, all-powerful, personal God, are wholly inadequate to meet the demands of reason in its inevitable effort to account for the universe. Besides the false gods already considered, there have been, in the course of ages, fantastic and even monstrous divinities set up for the adoration of men. To instance examples: Men have worshipped the universe itself (*pantheism*); they have bowed in adoration before graven images (*idolatry*); they have worshipped hypothetical spiritual powers in sticks and stones and plants and beasts (*religious animism*); they have adored

brute animals as divine (*zoolatry*); they have worshipped charms and talismans (*fetichism*) ; they have adored the sun, the moon, and the stars (*Sabdeism*). In our own day, the worshippers of false and futile gods are largely devotees of the Clock and Calendar, of whom we have already spoken. These modern idolaters like to call themselves *agnostics* (that is, they profess ignorance about supramundane Divinity, and declare that what they *will* not know, no other person *can* know), and some of them claim to be *atheists*, sincerely perhaps, but with unconscious self-deception.—No matter what false beliefs men may hold, no matter what form false worship may assume, no matter what gods may be set up or knocked down, there is always one constant, inevitable notion of *ultimate and all-controlling Divinity* behind the gods, "like the sky behind the clouds." Thus, alternative divinities are found to be no alternatives for God at all; they are mere misapplications, and futile limitations, and inadequate expressions of the notion of *true and unique Divinity*, that is, of *the Infinite Supreme Being*; and to this the questing mind, in its honest and logical inquiry, must ever ascend. A real alternative, a real rival for God, turns out to be an impossibility.

b) THE NATURE OF GOD

We have learned something of God's nature in our study of His existence, for it is impossible to

recognize, or even to conceive, the existence of a thing without knowing, in general terms, what it is that exists. Thus we know that God is the First Cause, the First Mover, the Producer and Designer of the Universe, the Ruler of Men by conscience, the Necessary Being. Turning our attention to what we thus know of God, we may bring to explicit knowledge further facts about the Divine Nature.

1. *God is Self-Existent*.—Reason requires that the chain of causality (of cause and effect) which is observable all about us, must lead back to a First Cause Itself Uncaused. Now the existence of a truly *First Being* can be traced back to no other being—[†] there *is* no other being beyond the First. Hence the First Being *must exist of itself*; it must be Necessary Being; it cannot be non-existent; it is subject to no causation; it is *self-existent* Being.

2. *God is Infinite*.—A being which is not subject to causation can have nothing added to it and nothing taken away, for such addition and subtraction are *effects* and imply causation. Nor can self-causation be adduced to account for possible increase or diminution in such a being; for self-causation is a contradiction in terms. Further, there is nothing outside such a being to be added to it, for it is *First Being* (which produces all other being) ; and such a being can have nothing taken away from it, for there is no existing cause outside the First Being to affect it by such subtraction: besides, such a being is *neces-*

sary and can lose nothing. Now, a being which cannot be decreased or added to, a being which is the producing (creating) cause of all other perfection or being; a being which is so perfect that it *must* exist—such a being has the fulness of all perfection; such a Being is absolutely without bounds or limits in perfection. In a word, such a Being is *infinitely perfect*, or, more simply, is *infinite*.

3. *God is Unique.*—To say that God is *unique* is to say that there is only one God and that He is without an equal. God is infinite, and there cannot be a plurality of infinite beings. For consider: should there be two such Beings, there would be a distinction, a line of demarcation, a *limit*, between them; the perfections of Being-A would be its own and distinct from those of Being-B. Being-A would *lack* the perfections proper to Being-B, and such perfections could conceivably be *added* to Being-A. But an infinite Being has no limits; by definition it is such Being as cannot conceivably have anything added to it; it cannot conceivably lack any perfection. Thus, either Being-A and Being-B are identified (and hence are *one*, and not *two* Beings), or neither A nor B is infinite. There can be only one infinite Being. God is infinite. Hence, there can be only one God. Hence God cannot have an equal.—We know from Revelation (which can be scientifically shown to be the actual word of the all-perfect God, who, being Infinite Truth, cannot deceive) that

in the one God there are Three Distinct Divine Persons. Reason, however, is powerless to deal directly with this matter; reason cannot prove or disprove the Trinity. But reason, recognising the infallible character of the known word of God, is furnished with incontestable evidence of the truth of Three Distinct Persons in the God who is one in essence, nature, and attributes. This is a point to remember, and to call to the wandering attention of such ill-educated persons as indulge in bromidic falsehoods about Faith being blind and servile. This is not the place to develop the point, but it is demonstrably certain that nothing is so completely and perfectly reasonable, nothing so free from blindness and servility, as our Faith.

4. *God is a Spirit.*—By *spirit* we do not mean a vaguely pervading atmosphere of sentimental minds. By *spirit* we mean a substance that is not made of bodily parts. Since God is infinite, He is simple (that is to say, *uncomposed*, free from the limitation of dependence upon a union of *parts*). Now every bodily being has parts, and is the sum-total of its parts. Every bodily being is, therefore, a thing made of a *number* of *limited* parts, for a part as such is limited. But God is without limits, and no number of limited parts can equal His infinity. Hence God is not bodily. He is a non-bodily, infinite substance. In other words, *God is a Spirit infinitely perfect.*

5. *God is Eternal, Immeasurable, Everywhere*

Present, and Changeless.—Since God is perfectly infinite, it follows that He is without limit or boundary in *time*, *space*, and *place*. Further: since He is infinitely perfect and admits neither addition nor subtraction in His Being, He is without change, for every change is a loss or subtraction of a previous state and the acquisition (addition) of the subsequent state; every change involves loss and gain, which is unthinkable in an infinite being.

6. *God is All-Knowing and All-Wise*.—God is infinite in all perfection; and knowledge and wisdom are perfections. Hence God is all-knowing or *omniscient*, and all-wise. To say that God is all-knowing is to say that nothing actual or possible is hidden from His complete and perfect understanding. To say that God is all-wise is to say that God knows most perfectly how best to attain the achievement of His holy will and to direct all things in His universe.

7. *God is Perfectly Free, All-Powerful, All-Holy*.—All these perfections follow upon God's infinity. Boundless in *all* perfection, He has these perfections in an infinite degree. Since God is infinitely free, He is not forced to create or to do that which He chooses, in boundless wisdom, to perform. Since God is all-powerful or *omnipotent*, He can do all things in which there is no self-contradiction (self-contradictory things are really not *things*, but denials of things, and amount to nothingness: "a square

circle," for instance, is a circle that is not a circle; its parts cancel one another; the result is zero). Since God is all-holy, He is infinitely *just*, *truthful*, and *faithful*, as He is infinitely *good* and *merciful*.

8. *In God, Essence and Perfections are Identified*.—When we say that God is infinitely perfect, we do not mean that He *has* or *possesses* perfections, but that He *is* His perfections. Nor are His perfections really distinct from one another, but all are one with one another and with His one undivided essence and nature. This follows upon the fact that God is Self-Existent Being, One, Indivisible, absolutely Simple.

c) THE ACTION OF GOD

Here we study the action of God upon His world. God acts upon the world by producing it, by preserving it in existence, and by governing it. God produced the world by *creation*; His preservation of it is called *conservation*; His government of it is called *providence*. With reference to the last-named action (*vis.*, *providence*), it is more accurate to say that *providence* is God's plan and purpose for the directing of all things to their due ends by suitable means, while the actual carrying out of the plan and purpose in this world is God's *government* of the world.

i. *God Created the World*.—The world is changing, and hence is *contingent* and not *necessary being*. Only necessary being explains itself; contingent be-

ing must be referred to its causes, and ultimately to the First Cause Itself Uncaused, *i. e.*, *God*. Hence the world must be referred to God, its First Cause. Now, the First Cause is really *first*; there is no pre-existing matter out of which things could be made under the action of the First Cause: for nothing pre-exists to that which is *first*. Therefore, God must have made the world in one of two ways: (a) out of His own substance or (b) out of nothing. But He could not have made it out of His own substance, for He is infinite, spiritual, indivisible, all-perfect, and therefore not *perfectible* by assuming new forms. *Pantheism*, which makes the world an out-pouring or emanation of God, is therefore inadmissible. It remains that God must have made the world out of nothing. But to make a thing out of nothing is to *create* that thing. Therefore, God created the world. Creation is "the producing of a thing in its entirety without use of any already existing materials; it is the production of a thing out of nothing."—Even if the world has gone through a long series of changes, even if it has been gradually developed from some sort of primeval matter, there is still the same necessity of asserting that God *created* that primeval matter and gave it the power to develop as it has done.—Creation is a productive action which requires infinite power, for only boundless power can call things into existence, out of nothingness, by a simple, non-laborious act of the will.

God alone is infinite power. Therefore, God alone can create. Thus, then, does our strict reasoning proceed: The world was created; God alone can create; therefore, *God created the world*.

2. *God Preserves the World*.—What is drawn out of nothingness by the creative act has its only basis of being in the power that drew it forth. In a word, what is created cannot endure unless that power which gave it being *keeps* it in being. A created thing has no reality except such as is *given* to it, and it has no capacity in itself (since it has no *necessary* existence) to hold fast to the existence it has received; existence must be *preserved* in it. Hence it follows that *the power which made the world preserves the world*. For the existence of a contingent thing (and the world is contingent) involves *essential dependence* upon that which gives it existence, and when this latter withdraws its power, the contingent thing must cease to be. For this reason the preservation of the world has been accurately, if somewhat poetically, described as "a continuous creation."—The creative power belongs to God alone. The creative power is necessary to conserve the world in being. The world is here; it endures. Therefore, *God preserves the world*.

3. *God Governs the World*.—God created the world. Now, God is boundless *wisdom*, and hence does nothing without a purpose and means for

achieving that purpose. In other words, God made the world for an end (*i. e.*, an end in view, a purpose), and He, the Infinite Wisdom, must therefore have arranged *means* for achieving that end, and must apply these means to their function. But to arrange means and apply them is to *govern*. Therefore, *God governs the world*.—We see order and regularity in the world around us: in the movements of the earth and heavenly bodies, in the succession of seasons, of night and day; in the physical laws of cohesion, gravity, inertia; in the constancy of structure and tendency in plant, beast, and man. Everywhere we behold harmony, order, balance, although the world is most various and amazingly complex. Hence, the government of the world is a fact—a fact of universal experience.—God governs the bodily world of lifeless things by *physical* laws, and by the same laws he governs *living bodies*. But among living bodies there is one that is more than a body; there is man, who is made of a body and a spiritual soul. As a *bodily being*, man is subject to physical laws. As a being with understanding and freedom (by reason of his soul) man is governed by *the natural law*, that is, the *moral law*, which puts him under obligation to do good and avoid evil, although it does not coerce or force him to obedience.—The existence of what we call evils and imperfections in the world is in no sense an argument against God's

absolute government of the world unto its final end. To the agnostic the *physical evils* of existence (such as sickness, famines, death) and the so-called imperfections of the world (like deserts, malarial swamps, harshness of climate) present an insoluble mystery. But to the Christian these evils are perfectly explained: they are the outcome of the primal sin which hurt the world. And they are not really evils or imperfections at all, but fresh evidences of Divine Government in the world. For, were the world now free from physical evils and so-called imperfections, it would keep fallen man from attaining his true end. Its very beauty and satisfactoriness would so delight man that he would forget the purpose of his existence, which is to know, love, and serve God, and to attain to happiness with God in Heaven. We need the whip of adversity across our shoulders; we need harshness in nature. By these things we find our dull minds constantly taught that we have not here a lasting abode, but seek one that is to come; by these things our weak wills are steeled against sin, and made to cling to ennobling hope and saving labor.—*Moral evil* or *sin* is man's work; it is not to be ascribed in any manner to God. Sin is a possibility inevitably bound up with man's freedom, of which it is not the use, but the abuse. Yet even the dark realm of sin evidences God's government of the world. Out of sin God frequently draws great bene-

fits for mankind. Thus, out of the sin of persecutors He draws the heroic virtue of martyrs, which means salvation for the martyrs and a powerful good example for all men. Thus, out of the treason of Judas, God drew the Redemption of the human race. And the sociologist, of all men, should know how the injustice of men (for example, of certain employers) gives occasion for the exercise of the highest social virtues in the opportunity it furnishes for bestowing care and love upon its victims.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE

In this rather lengthy Article we have studied matters absolutely essential for the sociologist. Without the knowledge of these truths, the sociologist has no true "background" for his science; without them, the sociologist works blindly, guided only by sentiment or prejudice or unthinking allegiance to some set of arbitrary rules. The first lesson the sociologist must learn is that there is a God, to whom the world, including man, belongs by absolute right of ownership. If the justice of this primal claim be unrecognized, how shall the sociologist know what is justice for man?

We have studied and proved the *existence* of God. We have investigated His *nature*. We have discerned His action upon the world as *creation, preservation, and government or providence*.

Article 2. Christ

- a) The Divinity of Christ b) The Humanity of Christ
- c) The Work of Christ d) The Church of Christ

a) THE DIVINITY OF CHRIST

Our Lord Jesus Christ *made definite claim to be true God* as well as *true man*; and He *proved His claim* by works and prophecies.

1. *The Claim of Christ.*—In the twenty-sixth chapter of the Gospel according to St. Matthew, we read the claim of Christ before the Jewish High Priest: "And the high priest said to him: I adjure thee by the living God, that thou tell us if thou be the Christ, the Son of God. Jesus saith to him: Thou hast said it." In calling Himself the Son of God, Christ claimed to be God, and the Jews so understood Him. For, when He had said, "Thou hast said it" (that is, "I am"), "the High Priest rent his garments, saying: He hath blasphemed," and the people cried, "He is worthy of death." Only the claim to be divine, that is, to be God, could have aroused this rage against blasphemy and this cry of the populace for the blood of the claimant. The claim of Christ is thus seen to be a *literal* claim; it means precisely what the words indicate. To be the Son of God, the infinite and indivisible, is to be God Himself; and this it is what Christ claimed to be.

Christ claimed to be *equal* with God the Father (*John v, 19-21; xvii, 10*) and so claimed to be God:

for God, being supreme and infinite, cannot have an equal other than Himself. (See also *John x, 38; xiv, 9-10*).

Christ claimed to be *one* with God the Father: "I and the Father are one" (*John x, 30*). The Jews were in no doubt about the meaning of this claim, for "they took up stones to throw at him."

Christ commended the Apostles for *confessing Him to be God*, thus making positive claim to be God. "Simon Peter answered and said: Thou art Christ, the Son of the living God. And Jesus answering said to him: Blessed art thou, Simon Bar-Jona: because flesh and blood hath not revealed it to thee, but my Father who is in heaven." (*Matthew xvi, 16-17*).

Christ claimed to be *the supreme lawgiver* for mankind and all the world (*Matthew v, 21-22; xii, §*). He claimed to be *the supreme judge* of men (*Matthew xxv, 31-32*). He claimed and exercised *the uncommunicated power of forgiving sins* and supported His claim by miracles (*Mark ii, 5; Luke vii, 48*). Each of these claims is a claim to the prerogatives of God, a claim which none but one who *is* God could justly make.

2. *The Proof of the Claim.*—The personal character of Christ, His wondrous power as a teacher of men, and His marvellous virtues, proclaim Him as the most noble and perfect member of the human

race that ever trod the earth. So He is admitted to be, even by those who deny His divinity. But consider: if His character is the admiration of all ages; if His teaching is the manifestation of matchless wisdom; if His virtues are the resplendent glory of the race, *can we doubt His word and reduce Him to the status of a common faker and conscienceless deceiver?* Yet that is what we must admit Him to be if He is not God. For He claimed to be God, and if that claim is false, then He has deceived countless minds and souls, and has taught millions to degrade themselves by following a false religion, turning away from the worship of the true God. It will not do to pay thin compliments to Christ as a notable teacher and leader and model for men, and then to deny His divinity. Human reason sees but two conclusions possible about Christ. Either take Him as God, or take Him as the worst and most abandoned villain that the world has ever known. If Christ is not God, Christ is not good. "Really," says Mr. G. K. Chesterton, "if Jesus of Nazareth was not Christ (that is, *the* Christ, the Messiah, God), He must have been Antichrist." Manifestly, no honest mind can regard Christ as evil and as an arch-deceiver. The inescapable testimony of history, and the indubitably beautiful and ennobling influence of Christianity upon human lives, make such a conclusion impossible. Therefore, there is only one thing

that can be admitted: *Christ is true God*. His claim is proved.

Christ proved Himself to be God by wondrous works, which we call *miracles*. Now, a miracle is a marvellous event, outside the usual course of nature, and produced by Almighty God. That miracles are possible is manifest to the thinking mind. They involve no contradiction in themselves; they imply no imperfection in God; and they are wholly suitable as striking lessons calculated to make stupid man turn to God and the achievement of salvation. Miracles are not "corrections" of an imperfect plan and "exceptions" made to meet deficiencies in an imperfect law. Miraculous events are part and parcel of the *eternal* decrees of God (who is wholly outside time); they are as everlastingly foreknown and decreed as the law which they momentarily set aside.—The miracles of Christ were many: He healed the sick by a word; He raised the dead to life by a touch; He expelled evil spirits from afflicted men by a simple act of His will. Now, these events can be explained by no "hidden powers" in nature itself; for in much they cut directly across the course of nature; and nature is not a contradiction in itself. Even if the impossible theory of "hidden powers" were admissible, the miracles of Christ would still be miracles; for it would be a true miracle to make the "hidden powers" function at a word, and to apply them by a touch of

the hand or by an act of the will.—The miracles of Christ are known with certainty as historical facts; the testimony which evidences them is not to be escaped, even by an unwilling mind. Further, these miracles are known with certainty as events outside the usual course of nature; the point is self-evident. Finally, these miracles are known to be the work of Almighty God; they are so proved by the character of Christ who performed them, the humble prayers to God offered by those for whose benefit they were performed, and the effect and influence which the miracles exercised upon the minds and lives of men. Thus the miracles of Christ meet the definition of true miracles at every point: they are marvellous events, outside the ordinary course of nature, and produced by the power of God. Now, a work which is truly a manifestation of God's power sets the divine seal of approval upon the doctrine which such a work is performed to support. The miracles of Christ were performed to support His doctrine, the central point of which is the fact of His own divinity. Therefore, the divine seal of approval has been set upon the truth that *Christ is God*. His claim is proved.

Christ proved Himself to be God by showing in His *true prophecies* that He possessed knowledge which God alone can have. Now, a prophecy is a certain foreknowledge and pronouncement of a future free event. It is *certain* foreknowledge and pro-

nouncement, not a mere guess or conjecture; this characteristic of true prophecy is manifested by its exactness and its details, all of which are verified in the event predicted. It is a prediction of a future *free* event, that is, of an event which depends for realization upon the choice of free-will, and which, in consequence, cannot be forecast, even with probability, by any natural means.—Christ made many prophecies which are complete and detailed pronouncements of complex events. For example, He foretold the circumstances and details of His own Passion and Death. He told His disciples that, when they had completed a certain journey to Jerusalem, He would be betrayed, condemned to death, mocked, scourged, crucified (*Matthew xx*) ; He named His' betrayer (*Matthew xxvi*, 25) and foretold the exact sum that Judas would receive for his treachery (*John xiii*, 21, 26) ; He foretold the threefold denial of Peter (*Matthew xxvi*, 34) ; He predicted that His Apostles would run away from Him and forsake Him in His hour of sorrow (*Matthew xxvi*, jz). These predictions of future free events were fulfilled to the very letter; hence the predictions were true prophecies. True prophecies manifest knowledge that only God, or one to whom God imparts it, can possess. Hence Christ is God or has had the knowledge of God imparted unto Him. But it is unthinkable that the knowledge of God should be imparted to an impostor who falsely claims that he

himself is God. Christ's claim must be true, else He were no true prophet. But He was a true prophet, and hence His claim *to be God* must be a true claim. His claim is proved.

The Resurrection of Our Lord from the dead is at once His crowning *miracle* and the fulfillment of His most solemn *prophecy*. Miracles and prophecy are the seals of divine approval; they are the marks of absolute truth: and both these seals are set upon the Resurrection. The miracle of the Resurrection of Christ by His own power from the dead proves Him to be God for two reasons: first, it is a stupendous miracle, and stamps the seal of divine truth upon Christ's doctrine that He is God; secondly, it proves Christ to be God by showing His mastery over life and death, justifying His claim that He had power to lay down His life and to take it up again.—The *miracle* of the Resurrection is a true miracle if Christ *really died*, and *really rose again to life* by His own power. Now, Christ really died. All the Evangelists record His death; the soldiers who came to break the legs of the crucified robbers saw that Our Lord was dead, and one of them opened His side with a spear, inflicting a wound which itself would cause death if He were not already dead. Our Lord had suffered a bloody agony, a night of cruel and inhuman torture involving great loss of blood, an exhausting journey under the heavy cross, and three terrible hours of crucifixion, during which the

last drop of His life-blood was poured out. The Jews who had so long plotted and planned for this execution were not likely to allow it to fail in the event; they knew well that Christ was dead when they appeared before Pilate, bent upon taking precautions against a pretended resurrection. There can be no doubt that Christ *really died*. And Christ really rose again to life by His own power. The Apostles gave testimony of the fact, though they had nothing to expect from their declaration but persecution and death. Christ appeared to many: to the holy women; to the disciples at Emmaus; to the disciples gathered together when Thomas was absent, and again when Thomas was present and was permitted to touch Our Lord and make certain of His palpable reality. And Christ appeared to more than five hundred on one occasion (Z *Corinthians xv*, 6). Even the enemies of Our Lord knew that He was risen. They were in consternation because of the Resurrection, and they tried frantically to find grounds for a denial of what they knew was a fact. So great was their confusion that they did not see the absurdity of their attempt *to hire sleeping witnesses* to swear that the body of Our Lord had been stolen from its tomb. It is indubitably certain that Christ really rose from the dead.—Christ rose from the dead by His own power, thus proving Himself to be God, the only master of life and death. Nor will it change this conclusion to say that God in Heaven raised

Our Lord to life. For, if that be the case, then God manifests His approval of Christ and His doctrine: and the doctrine of Christ is that He Himself is God. Therefore, in any case, the result is the same. *Christ is God*. His claim is proved.—The Resurrection is the fulfillment of Our Lord's solemn prophecy. After the Transfiguration, Our Lord had said to Peter and James and John: "Tell the vision to no man *till the Son of man be risen from the dead*" (*Matthew xvii*, p). And He had said to the Jews: "Destroy this temple, *and in three days I will raise it up*. . . . He spoke of the temple of his body" (*John Hiv* ip). And in St. Matthew's Gospel (*xx*, 18-19) we have a detailed prophecy of the events of the Passion and a solemn prediction of the Resurrection: "Behold, we go up to Jerusalem, and the Son of man shall be betrayed to the chief priests and the scribes, and they shall condemn him to death, and shall deliver him to the gentiles to be mocked and scourged and crucified, *and the third day he shall rise again*"—Thus the Resurrection, both as *miracle* and as *prophecy*, sets upon Our Lord's claim to be God the divine and absolute seal of truth. *Christ, therefore, is true God*. His claim is proved.

b) THE HUMANITY OF CHRIST

It would seem to most Christians, and to every Catholic, that the humanity of Our Lord is such an obvious fact that any discussion of it is wholly need-

less. Yet the ancient heresy of the Docetae amounted to the assertion that the humanity of Christ was a phantom or merely apparent thing without reality; and the Apollinarians of the fourth and fifth centuries went to such extremes in their opposition to Arianism, which denied the divinity of Our Lord, that they came to deny His true humanity. And if these ancient errors seem of little importance to-day, one has but to consult the writings of recent converts—like Mr. Arnold Lunn, for example—to find that clear conviction of the true humanity of Christ is not a general and consistent mark of the non-Catholic mind.

Of course, if one were only logical, it would be instantly apparent that the Redemption loses its character as an atonement in strict justice if the true humanity of Christ be doubted or denied. But most minds are not logical. It is, therefore, in order to offer here a brief discussion of the true human nature of Our Lord.

Christ said He was true man. He called Himself "the Son of Man" as well as "the Son of God." He acknowledged Our Lady as His true mother, and of her He was truly conceived and born according to God's word, although this conception and birth were so miraculous as to preserve the mother's virginity intact before, during, and after His birth. Further, Christ said He would suffer and die. Hence, on His own testimony, Christ is true man; for only true

man can be the "son of Man," can have a true human mother, can suffer and die. Now, the testimony of Christ is the infallible testimony of God. Christ, therefore, is true man.

Christ had a human ancestry, clearly indicated in Scripture. He is a true descendant of David. He grew up like other children, advancing "in wisdom, and age, and grace, with God and men." He acted as man, talking, eating, drinking, sleeping, hungering, thirsting. He was fatigued by travel. He was glad, was troubled, was sorrowful. He prayed as man to God, giving thanks, imploring graces for His followers, exercising acts of obedience and humility. He commended His human soul into the hands of His Heavenly Father when He performed the last great action which, of itself, proves Him to be man: His suffering and death upon the Cross.

Christ, therefore, is true man. He is also true God. Yet He is not two persons. He is one person, and that person is the eternal Second Person of the Blessed Trinity. Being eternally God the Son, He assumed to Himself a true human nature (true human body and true human soul with its human understanding and human free-will), uniting this nature to His Divine Nature in the unity of the Second Person of the Trinity. This is called *the Hypostatic Union*, and it was effected by *the Incarnation*, that is, by the joining of the eternal Divine Nature with human nature in the spotless bosom of the Immacu-

late Mother. The Incarnation took place in that instant when "the Word (*r. e.*, the Son) was made flesh." When Christ, true God and true man in One Person, was born of the Blessed Virgin Mary, the world beheld the marvel of *the Virgin Birth*. In passing, it may be well to say for the enlightenment of non-Catholics who, in spite of wide culture and education, persist in misunderstanding the term, that *the Virgin Birth* is *not* the same as *the Immaculate Conception*. The Immaculate Conception means that the Mother of Christ, from the first moment of *her* conception in the womb of St. Anne, her mother, was preserved free from the taint of original sin. On the other hand, the Virgin Birth means that Christ was born of Mary while she remained a virgin, and that He had no human father.

c) THE WORK OF CHRIST

Christ came to *redeem* mankind, to *teach* men to take advantage of the Redemption, and to maintain for them in *His Church* the fruits of the Redemption. He came to *redeem* man, that is, to buy back, at the price of His sufferings and death, the opportunity for men to earn Heaven, an opportunity which the human race had lost through original sin. He came to *teach* mankind the infinite love of God for souls, the need of doing penance, avoiding sin, acquiring virtue. He came to teach men that He himself is God and also man, their Redeemer, their

Mediator, their only hope. He came to teach men to recognize His own power and authority in His priests and His Church. Christ came *to establish His Church*, with which and in which He is to remain with men, not "leaving them orphans" until the end of the world; and He came to commit His saving Sacraments to the care and ministration of His Church, that through their power, the fruits of Redemption might be carried to the faithful of every age while time endures. This, then, is the work of Christ: to die for men, to teach them, to establish His Church among them. In this present study we shall discuss *the work of the Redemption*, which was accomplished by the death of Christ for men. In another section we shall study the Church of Christ which He established to carry on His teaching and to preserve to men the fruits of the Redemption.

We shall study the Redemption in its occasion, its accomplishment, and its effects.

I. *The Occasion for the Redemption.*—God made man in His own image and likeness, dowering him with understanding and free-will, and manifestly intending that man should use these great gifts to know and love and serve God, the all-Good and all-True. But man abused the gifts; he chose to reject God; he disobeyed the direct command of the Almighty, thus refusing the service for which God had made him. In a word, man turned definitely away

from God and Heaven, and in that instant Heaven was closed against mankind. Since all men are radically contained in the first father of the race, all men fell with Adam. This original sin with its terrible effects for the whole of humankind was the occasion of the Redemption. God willed to open Heaven anew to mankind, and to restore to all men the opportunity lost in the sin of Adam. But God also willed that the offence of Adam's sin should be atoned for, completely, perfectly, so that redeemed men could, after receiving a gratuitous first grace, actually merit and earn further graces, and ultimately Heaven itself. Now, the sin of Adam was *infinite* in malice or badness, for it was an offence against the infinite God, and an offence is measured primarily by the dignity and perfection of the person offended. Man's sin was infinite, and atonement for such offence must, *in strict justice*, be infinite also. But man could not make an infinite atonement, for all that man can do is finite, and atonement takes its measure and value from the one who atones. Here, then, was the situation: Man owed an infinite debt which he could not pay; only God could pay the infinite debt, but God did not owe it. This situation was the proximate occasion for the Atonement and Redemption. For God, willing to redeem man by accepting an atonement in the measure of strict justice, gave him a Redeemer *who is both God and Man*: He is *God*, and can pay man's infinite debt; He is *Man*, of the race

that must pay. The God-man, the Redeemer, is Jesus Christ Our Lord.

2. *The Accomplishment of the Redemption*,—Our Lord is God, and therefore, any act of His, offered in atonement for mankind, is of infinite redemptive value, and suffices to open Heaven anew to men. But if Christ had made any atonement short of the offering of His whole life and the enduring of death as the rejected of men, His work would have been futile. For fallen man not only requires that Heaven should be open for his achieving, but he needs all possible helps and urgings to enable him to take advantage of his opportunity of achieving it. Man needs to be taught the worth of his soul, the meaning of life, the necessity of virtue, the importance of salvation, above all, the dignity of poverty and suffering endured for God, the indispensable character of "the faith that looks through death." And man, dull and stupid since the Fall, could never learn these lessons if Christ had not done *all that God-made-Man could do* to teach them to him. Thus, to make Redemption effective for man, Our Lord endured all hardship, rejection, and death. He poured out the last drop of His blood, He gave the last ounce of His strength, He breathed the last gasping word, that man might know how dear and precious is a soul to God, and how important is the work of our salvation. It was, therefore, upon the Cross that the

work of Atonement was rounded out and effectively accomplished. And it was only in His final prayer that Our Blessed Savior, who had already foretold the approaching Passion and embraced it in His will, could say to His Eternal Father, "I have finished the work which thou gavest me to do" (*John xvii, 4*). The Atonement became a final and complete Redemption with the Resurrection and Ascension of Our Lord and the vitalizing of His Church by the coming of the Holy Ghost. The death of the Redeemer made infinite atonement for man's sin; the other glorious realities (the Resurrection, Ascension, Descent of the Holy Ghost) definitely opened Heaven to man, showed the clear way thither, and set the feet of the faithful directly in the way of salvation.

3. *The Effects of the Redemption.*—The fact that the Redemption made an atonement *in strict justice* for the primal sin which marred the race, put man in position to work out his salvation and to earn his way, granted that the first grace must be God's free gift to him. Thus, given the first grace, and given the Redemption in strict justice, man may now use his wondrous gifts of intellect and will, and all his powers, to earn Heaven as God had meant him to do when he created him. The first effect of the Redemption was *the rehabilitation of mankind*. And this would never have been achieved had God merely for-

given the original sin by an act of divine mercy, or had He accepted anything short of an atonement in the measure of absolute justice.—All human works that have a value unto salvation, have that value in and through the boundless merits of Our Redeemer. He is in very deed the “Mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus.”—The Redemption was a work of *absolute perfection* and *superabundant merit*. It was universal in scope, offering satisfaction to God for *all men*, so that all might be saved, if they willed to accept God's grace, and work out salvation in the Church established by the Redeemer, using, to that great end, diligent prayer, the practice of virtue, and the saving Sacraments.

d) THE CHURCH OF CHRIST

Jesus Christ, *who is true God* as well as true man, *founded a Church* to carry to all men of all ages the fruits of the Redemption. His Church is God's own Church. All men are, therefore, under obligation to find this Church, to become loyal and worthy members of it, and to use the means which it affords. For, if they ignore God's own institution for their salvation, how can they hope to be saved? Christ made St. Peter (and his lawful successors, each in turn) His vicar on earth, clothed not only with the honor of being “first bishop” in the Church, but with true jurisdiction over the whole Church, and dowered with the essential prerogative of infallibility in

official pronouncements to the whole Church in matters of faith and morals.

The true Church calls insistently for the attention of the sociologist. For, manifestly, it is futile to propound and disseminate doctrines looking to man's welfare which ignore, or come in conflict with, God's own institution for man's welfare. Nor will it do to assume that man's earthly well-being may be consulted without reference to the institution divinely established for his eternal salvation. Man runs a single course; his earthly existence is but the first stage of eternal existence, and the character of his future lot is changelessly determined by his life on earth. Therefore, every direction and influence which beats upon human existence—every "factor" of life, to use a term in fashion—has an eternal significance.

1. *The Founding of Christ's Church.*—A church is a society, an organized body, of those who accept one doctrine and worship, and recognize a common religious authority. If Christ founded such a society, He founded a church. But, as a matter of fact, Christ *did* found such a society. For He formed a special group of His followers, calling them Apostles (*Luke vi, 12–16*). He gave to this group the special task or ministry of baptizing men; of teaching and governing all men; of offering the Sacrifice of His Body and Blood for them; of forgiving their sins; of ex-

exercising over them the authority of Christ Himself (*Matthew xxviii, 18–20; John xx, 21, and xxii, 1p*). Thus was established Christ's *teaching Church*, and its ministry was to establish the *Church taught*; both elements being the single *believing Church* of Christ, which is to endure for all men until the end of the world (*Matthew xxviii, 20*). Thus, by command of Christ, all men are to be brought under a common religious authority, to be taught a common doctrine and joined in a common true worship. Christ, therefore, *founded a Church*, and He *requires all men to belong to it*.

2. *The Authority and Infallibility of Christ's Church*.—Christ's Apostles and their successors, the bishops, constitute the teaching Church, which all men are to hear as Christ Himself; for Christ said to them: "Going, therefore, teach ye all nations, . . . teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you: and behold *I am with you all days* even to the consummation of the world" (*Matthew xxviii, 20*). Now, Christ is God, and Christ's appointed teachers have *authority* for their mission. And if God is with them always, they will never be able to lead men astray—thus defeating the purpose of the ministry divinely established to save men—but will *infallibly* teach the truth. Thus, the Church of Christ has *authority* and *infallibility*.

3. *The Identification of Christ's Church.*—There is in the world only one Church which claims to be the authoritative and infallible Church of Jesus Christ. This Church and this Church alone claims to have the attributes which God's Church *must* have. This Church alone is one in doctrine and in worship, and has been one since the days of Christ and the Apostles. This Church alone knows no boundaries of race or class or nation; it is a *world-figure*. In a word, this Church alone is one, holy, catholic, apostolic, infallible, authoritative. But Christ's Church must have all these characteristics, and therefore, this one Church is Christ's Church: it is the Roman Catholic Church. The claims of the Roman Catholic Church are themselves an indication, unmistakable and sufficient, that it is Christ's Church; for surely the Church of Christ will *claim to be what it is*; and no other church makes the claim. But the Roman Catholic Church also *proves* its claim by reason and history. The Roman Catholic Church alone is the one true Church of Christ.

4. *The Head of Christ's Church.*—Christ is the Head of His Church, for He is with it "all days even to the consummation of the world." But Christ made His Church a visible society, and it needs a visible head. Since Christ ascended into Heaven, He is no longer visible. But He has left a visible head of the

Church on earth to take His place, to be His vicar. He named St. Peter for this office, and the successor of St. Peter holds that office to-day. Christ singled out St. Peter as the rock of foundation for His Church (*Matthew xvi, i§*). Christ conferred upon St. Peter the keys of the kingdom of heaven—His Church—giving him therewith the supreme power of ruling the followers of Christ, of loosing and binding with the power of Christ (*Matthew xvi, ip*). Christ made St. Peter, in most solemn manner, the chief shepherd of souls, commissioning him to feed the whole flock of Christ, the sheep and the lambs (*John xxi, 15-17*)- Now, the rock of foundation must not crumble; the holder of the keys has full authority; the chief shepherd of souls cannot lead them to the poisonous pasturage of error. In a word, the first authority and the first shepherdship conferred upon St. Peter dowered him and his office with *authority and infallibility*. History attests the fact that St. Peter, and each of his successors in turn, actually exercised the infallible teaching and governing office.—Authority and infallibility belong to the teaching Church (the bishops) and to the head of the Church, the Pope. Yet the authority and infallibility of Christ, bestowed on His Church, is *one*; hence there can be no conflict between the body of bishops and the Pope in point of authority and infallible teaching. The bishops constitute one moral unity with the Pope, and *together with the Pope* they

are infallible; singly, however, the successors of the Apostles are not infallible. The bishops of the world, gathered in general council, are infallible only when summoned to meet by the Pope, when presided over in their sessions by the Pope in person or by his appointed representative, and when their decisions are officially approved by the Pope and promulgated by his authority. The Pope, either alone or in council with the bishops, has the prerogative of infallibility, which, in all cases, is exercised only when pronouncement is made for the entire Church, *in matters of faith or morals*. If the Pope could err in such pronouncements, the Church of Christ could be led into error, and the words of Christ, "I am with you all days," and "The gates of hell shall not prevail against it [the Church]," would be falsified. But Christ's word cannot be falsified, for it is the word of God Himself. Therefore, the Pope, the head of the Church on earth, the vicar of Christ, has the official prerogative of infallibility when, as teacher of the universal Church, he pronounces on matters of faith or morals.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE

In this Article we have proved that Christ, Our Lord, is true God as well as true man. We have seen that Christ made claim to be God, and proved His claim by His personal character, His wondrous works, His prophecies, and by His Resurrection

from the dead. We have seen that Christ came to redeem mankind, restoring to men the opportunity of achieving the end set for them in creation, but which had been lost to them by original sin. We have seen that Christ founded a Church to carry to all men of all ages the fruits of the Redemption. We have considered the obligation which rests upon all of finding this true Church and of becoming loyal and worthy members of it. We have identified this Church as the Roman Catholic Church alone, and have considered certain essential attributes of this Church and of its visible head on earth.

CHAPTER II

MAN'S SOUL

This Chapter undertakes to prove that man has a spiritual and immortal soul, endowed with understanding and free-will and subject to the obligations of religion and virtuous living. The Chapter includes a brief consideration of the influence of divine grace upon man's life and conduct. No sociologist is equipped for the delicate work of handling human lives and directing human efforts and aspirations, unless he has a clear and correct knowledge of these fundamental matters. The Chapter is divided into three Articles:

Article i. The Existence and Nature of Man's Soul

Article 2. Human Understanding and Free-Will

Article 3. Divine Grace in Human Lives

Article 1. The Existence and Nature of
Man's Soul

- a) Meaning of *Soul* b) Its Existence c) Its Spirituality
- d) Its Immortality

a) MEANING OF *SOUL*

By *soul* is meant *the principle of life and vital action in a living body*. Any bodily thing which is *alive*, be it plant, beast, or human being, has something which makes it live, something other than its bodily structure in entirety or portion, something

whereby it is *alive*, and in the absence of which it is *dead*. This *something* is substantial; it is not a mere quality or accident of the organism; and this substantial something is called *soul*. True, in our day, the term *soul* is not ordinarily applied to the life-principle of plant or beast; the term is usually restricted to the human life-principle, which, as we shall see, is spiritual and deathless. In a word, *soul* usually means *the human soul*.

For interesting reasons which we shall not pause to discuss, the term *soul* is peculiarly obnoxious to the modern scientific mind. The word is only a term for a reality, but somehow the term itself, as a term, is hateful to many, even to many who put themselves to considerable mental effort and strain to find a substitute—usually a ponderous and unattractive substitute, like "entelechy," or "biotic energy," or "life force," or "bathmic urge." There are even biologists and psychologists who put themselves to the bizarre inconvenience of speaking of "the something over," rather than utter the hateful word "soul." Perhaps, if one must have an alternative term, "psyche" is as good as any, although its constant use, even by those who pronounce it correctly, is not without a touch of pedantry and priggishness. There is in this peculiar avoidance of the term *soul* something reminiscent of the thin-lipped brigade which once found the word *purgatory* wholly detestable, while admitting a sentimental fondness for "a mo-

Merit of silent recollection and prayer” on behalf of the departed—an observance familiar in the recollection of all who lived through the World War.

b) EXISTENCE OF THE HUMAN SOUL

Manifestly, there is something which makes a man live. And man's life has three departments or classes of functions: *vegetal*, *animal*, and specifically *human* or *rational*. The questions that concern us here are, therefore, the following: has man a soul which is a substantial reality distinct from his body; and has man three souls or only one?

1. *Man Has a Soul*,—Man is alive. There is something, therefore, that makes him live. This is his *soul*. The soul is something other than the material out of which the body is made, and it is something other than the organic body itself. In other words, life-actions do not stand explained either by body-mass or body-structure.—*Matter* cannot be the principle or source of life in man, nor in any living creature. If matter were the principle of any life, all bodies would be alive, which is not the case. Further: matter is, in its own nature, passive and inert, and hence cannot be the principle of that which is active as life is active.—Nor can *the organism itself* (the body-structure) be the principle of man's life. For the organism lives and functions *by reason of* the life-principle; the organism is the *effect* of the life-

principle; and an effect is not its own cause. The organism is elaborated, built up, from a primitive cell, in which the life-principle already existed and functioned, and the organism results from the functioning of the life-principle. More: the organism is kept in being and activity by the life-principle, which continually acts to build up and conserve, even after the organism has reached mature growth. Further: when life departs, the organic structure is often left unimpaired; it does not break down entirely until life has gone; and were this structure the well-spring of life, life could not depart while it endured.—The soul of a man is, therefore, neither *matter* nor *the organism itself*. It is something other than the material organic structure of the living and functioning body. It is that reality *by which* the body is constituted as organic, living, functioning.

The life-principle of living bodies, and hence of man, is not to be explained in terms of chemistry or physics or mechanical action. For granted that forces of a chemical, physical, and mechanical nature are at work in the living body, the effect produced by their aid is manifestly under the direction and management of some power other than themselves. The chemist and physicist do not even pretend to produce in their laboratories a living leaf or blade of grass or sensitive nerve or muscle. And whenever claims have been made for the existence of a "chemical plant,"

it has always been found that the "growth" of such a body is merely the accretion of matter from without and not the product of a moving and directing power from within. There is no more "growth" in such things than in the increase of a snow-drift or the enlargement, through coalescence, of a mass of crystals. But a *living* body has a unity and a drive of function that are fostered and furthered by the action and management of an inner power, which we call *the soul* or *the true life-principle*.

This power called the *soul* is not merely an accidental or a quality resident in the living body. Rather, the soul is a *substantial reality* which *has* and *exerts* the power of life-activity. The soul is not an accident, like the shape of a body or its temperature or its bulk; it is not an accident at all; it is a *substantial* thing. For if the soul were merely an accident, its removal would not induce a substantial change in the body whence it is taken. But the removal of the soul does induce such a change. Take away life, and the whole nature of the body changes; its functions are altered; its entire character undergoes a modification and a complete reversal. When alive, the body grows, or, if mature, maintains structure and function; when dead, it does no such thing. When alive, it holds its identity, unified, purposeful in its function; when dead, it submits to dissolution and decay, its parts fall asunder and are absorbed, its

functions are no longer exercised. We must conclude that the soul is a substantial reality, and not a mere accidental.

To sum up: man, who is a living body, has a soul. The soul is a life-principle distinct from the body-matter and the body-structure. The soul is a substantial reality, and not a mere mark, characteristic, or quality of the body-structure or body-mass.

2. *Man Has Only One Soul.*—Every living body has its life-principle or soul. Now, there are three kinds of living bodies, and these are three *grades*. First, the lowest form of life is that of the plant; it is called *vegetal* or *vegetative* life, and its functions are *nutrition*, *growth*, and *reproduction*; that is, it takes food or nourishment from other bodies and changes this into its own substance, it grows to a definite state of maturity and maintains itself therein, and it tends to reproduce or generate its kind.—The second grade of life is called *animal* or *sentient* life. This grade of life includes the functions of plant-life and adds to these the specific functions of *sentientcy*, *appetition*, and *locomotion*. That is to say, a body with animal life has all the functions of the plant plus: (a) sense-knowledge through one or more *senses*; that of touch or feeling being fundamental; (d) appetency or the power of responding to sense-knowledge by a tendency towards what is sensibly known as desirable and away from

its opposite; (c) the power of moving, with greater or less readiness, from place to place, thus actualizing the tendency of appetition or appetency.—The third and highest grade of life in bodies is that called *rational* or *human*. This grade of life includes the functions of plant and animal and adds the specific functions of *intellection* and *volition*, that is, of understanding and free-will.

Now, man has all three grades of life. He takes food, grows, propagates, as does the plant. He has senses and bodily appetites and the power of local movement, as has the animal. He has understanding and free-will. The question arises: Has man then *three* souls, a plant-soul, a sentient soul, and a rational soul? The answer is: No, man has only one soul, and that the rational soul, which is the principle of his threefold life and all his functions, vegetal, sentient, rational. The reason for this assertion may be stated as follows: (a) It is the rational soul which makes the bodily being *human*, constitutes the *human substance* by its substantial union with matter. As St. Thomas points out, whatever belongs to a thing over and above its completed substance, belongs accidentally. The human soul, the rational soul, would be merely an accidental if the bodily man were already substantially constituted by the vegetal soul; so, too, the sentient soul would be a mere accidental. But, as we have just said, it is the rational soul which makes man *man*, constitutes the human substance as

human, and not as a mere plant or animal body. Hence the human rational soul is not an accidental, but a substantial thing, substantially united with the material of the body, completely constituting it as human; in philosophical phraseology, the human rational soul is *the substantial form* of the body. Now, there cannot be in one and the same being a plurality of substantial forms. Consequently, there is no vegetal substantial form or animal substantial form in man; in other words, there is no plant-soul or animal soul in man. There is but one soul, and that rational. Hence, the rational soul possesses, in addition to its own perfections and functions, the perfections and functions of the minor grades of life; and this one soul is, in man, the source or principle of his three-fold life-activity, (b) There is such an interdependence of function in man's threefold life that this life must flow from a single principle. If man had three distinct souls, each would function in its own sphere without let or hindrance from the others; but this is not the case. Bodily disorders (of sentient or vegetal character) upset the thinking mind, and, conversely, a mind that is alert and active has its reaction upon bodily organs and functions. A headache is a sentient experience; but it may come from a vegetal source, such as a disorder in nutrition; and though thinking or reasoning is a rational function, it is hampered by the headache. Man, therefore, has but one life-principle. That this must be the rational

soul is obvious. For vegetal life does not demand sentiency, since we find vegetal life without sentiency in plants. Nor does sentient life require rationality, for we find sentient life without reason in brute animals. But sentiency does require vegetal life, and rationality (in living *bodies*) does require sentiency. In other words, the higher grade includes the lower, but the lower does not necessarily demand the higher; just as a man on a ladder need not ascend to any higher rung, but must have the elevation of all the rungs below him. Since man has the higher grade of life, since he is *substantially* a human being, he has the perfections of the lower grades of life. He is substantially what he is by reason of the higher form, not the lower forms; hence his one soul is the rational soul. There is a danger to be avoided here, a danger involved in the analogy of the ladder: it must be remembered that the distinction between the three grades of life is not alone a distinction of *degree*, but of *essential difference*. The superiority of sentient life over vegetal life, and of human rational life over both others, is a superiority of essential *kind* as well as of *degree*. While man has all three grades of life, he is one being with one rational soul. We might amend the analogy, and consider three ladders in a row, a short one, a slightly longer one, and a very long one. The man who climbs the third ladder to its height has all the elevation afforded by the other two, and some additional height besides. The point we

make is that vegetal, sentient, and rational life are not so much three rungs (which differ only in *degree* of height), but three ladders (differing in *kind* as well as in degree).

c) THE SPIRITUALITY OF THE HUMAN SOUL

In its first definition of the term, the unabridged Webster gives us the amazing misinformation that *spirit* means "life, or the life-principle, conceived as a kind of breath or vapor animating the body, or, in man, mediating between body and soul." Philosophically, *spirit* means nothing of the kind. A breath or vapor, however tenuous, is *bodily*, not spiritual; and, in man, there is no medium whatever to serve as a connecting link between body and soul: soul and body are united in a single substance.

By *spirit* we mean a substantial reality which is not dependent upon matter (i. e., upon bodily being) for its existence or its own proper functions. A spirit is not a "breath or vapor"; a spirit has no bodiliness, no bulk, no dimensions, no parts. Yet a spirit is a *substance*, a reality fitted to exist *itself*, and not as a mere inherent quality, modification, mark, or characteristic of some other thing.

We assert that the soul is a spirit, and we shall offer evidence for the assertion presently. The soul is a spirit, but it is, in mortal life, united with the body *substantially* so that, as a result of the union, a man is a single *individual human being*. The soul

does not dwell in a man as a bird in a cage or a prisoner in a cell. Nor does the soul flit about the organism as a director, manager, and controller, with some such relation to the body and its organs as that which the pianist has to his instrument and its keyboard, or the motorist to the car and the controls. Soul and body in man are united so as to constitute *one human substance*. Therefore, we do wrong to conceive the soul as "a kind of breath or vapor." For the soul is no vaporous image or shadow-man indwelling within the walls of human flesh. Man is not to be defined as a fleshly structure with a spirit enclosed, nor, as Cousin would have it, is he a spirit served by organs. Man is not body; man is not soul; man is *soul-and-body*, a single, if compound, substance. By an analogy, sufficiently inaccurate, we may illustrate the substantial union of soul and body in a man by comparing it to the union of elements in water. The analogy will be criticized later and its points of failure indicated. But, for the present, consider this: Water is not oxygen; water is not hydrogen; water is not a mere mixture of the two like a mixture of sand and sugar; water is *oxygen-and-hydrogen*, a single, if compound, substance. So the soul and the body of a living man are united in a single, if compound, substance, and the Catechism is scientifically correct when it defines man as "a creature composed [*i. e.*, compounded] of body and soul." For the function of a substance reveals the character

of the substance; "function follows essence," is an ancient axiom. And the functions of a man, whether of soul or body, are, in each case, the operations of one individual substantial being. One rightly says, "I see; *I* grow; *I* feel; *I* understand; *I* appreciate; *I* choose." One does not say, "My *body* grows and feels; my *soul* understands and chooses."

Now, although the soul is thus substantially united with the body in man, it is nevertheless a *spirit*, and does not depend upon the body for its existence nor for its own proper spiritual functions, granted that in the state of union with the body it takes the occasion and "the materials" for its action from the bodily senses. But the point we stress just now is this: the soul in its union with matter constitutes man as a living, sentient, bodily substance, endowed with understanding and free-will. And, at the same time, the soul remains a spirit, capable of separation from the human body—which it makes a *human*, as well as an *existent* body—and of independent existence. Indeed, the soul is not only capable of such separate existence; it actually enters into it when a man dies.

The human soul does not lose its identity in its union with the body, as hydrogen and oxygen lose their identity in water. The soul, while substantially united with the body, preserves its own being, its own actuality, as an undivided, undiluted, undimensional *spirit*. And, at the same time, this spiritual

soul makes the matter with which it is united *an existent, living, sentient, human body*. Is there mystery here? Is there mystery in this union, substantial, yet not obliterating the identity of the united elements? Yes, there is mystery, but there is also *fact*. Mystery is not a synonym for fog. Mystery has nothing to do with vague and shadowy things, but with solid and undeniable realities which we recognize and know as facts, but which we cannot *fully explain*. If we are going to draw the line at mystery, we may as well "take in our sign," shut up our mental shop at once, and retire into the dark and eerie madhouse of complete skepticism. You cannot turn on the electric light, or draw a puff from a cigarette, or move hand or foot, or attack the morning grape-fruit, or say "Boo" to a goose or "Bosh" to an atheist, without involving yourself in deep and even desperate mystery. These commonplace things are plain facts of undeniable reality; but try, for once in a way, to carry any one of them the whole distance of *adequate explanation*. Explain, in last detail, the nature and workings of electricity; explain lung-action, and the precise nature of the pleasure of smoking; explain the almost effortless control of bodily members; present an adequate interpretation of appetite, and exhibit in intelligible terms the subtle appeal of grape-fruit; explain the exclamation and the goose; nay, with heroic resolution, attempt an adequate explanation of the atheist. You will find your task

somewhat exhausting. Yet these matters are simple facts, plain and undeniable as the nose on your face! Precisely; for the nose on your face is a mystery.

Mysterious as this union of body and soul is, it is nevertheless an undeniable fact. We have seen that the human substance is, in each person, a single substance, though a compound or composed one. We are now to evidence the fact that the spiritual element of this compound substance is a true spirit. Once that is known, it follows inevitably that the spiritual element in man does not lose its identity in composition or compounding with the body; for a spirit has no bulk or extension, no parts or elements, which could be merely mingled and fused with matter in such a way as to absorb the identity of the human elements. In a word, once the spiritual character of the human soul is evidenced, it will be apparent that the substantial union of body and soul in a man is, while admittedly mysterious, an undeniable reality.

As we have already noticed, the nature of a thing is evidenced by its function. A reality shows infallibly what it is by the things that it does. "Function follows essence/ If, therefore, man has operations which are in their nature independent of matter, of bodiliness, and above the reach of merely bodily powers, then it follows of necessity that there is an essential and substantial element in man which is itself independent of matter or bodiliness in its very

being; it follows, in a word, that there is an element in the human substantial compound which is a true *spirit*. Now, as a fact, man *has* operations which are in their nature independent of matter or bodiliness and are above the reach of merely bodily powers. Man has understanding and free-will, and in the exercise of understanding the mind is capable of perfectly reflecting upon itself. You cannot explain in terms of physics and chemistry and mechanical action, nor in terms of nerve and muscle, the action by which the mind grasps the *essence* of a thing. The eye may behold a man or a tree, but the mind knows what *a* man or *a* tree is, and not merely the individual men or trees that happen to fall within the reach of the eye. No merely bodily power could do that. Further, the mind knows things that are not bodily, and understands the meaning of such realities as spirit, soul, God, and of such things as beauty, goodness, truth, justice. No bodily power could have a knowing grasp of these realities. More: the mind can make itself and its operations the object of its action, that is to say, the mind can *reflect*, and this is a function totally removed from the capacity of a material or bodily faculty. For while a bodily being may bend back partially upon itself, overlapping one part with another, it is wholly impossible for such a being to bend back totally upon itself, overlapping itself with itself. Nor can a bodily knowing-power do this. The eye cannot see itself seeing; the ear cannot hear it-

self hearing. But the mind can and does know itself knowing; it understands that it is understanding; the mind can make itself and its operations the object of its own attention and study. Finally, the nature of a man has in it something that reaches out after realities which wholly exceed the capacity of bodily powers to know and to achieve. Man wants wisdom, knowledge, justice; man proposes to himself ideals to be achieved; man tends towards ultimate and perfect happiness. Therefore, we are fairly compelled to acknowledge that a man is not wholly bodily. There is in him an essential and substantial element which, by its operations of understanding, willing, reflecting, tending towards non-material ideals, shows itself to be truly spiritual. And these spiritual functions are proper to man as man, not to man inasmuch as he is a bodily being with functions like those of brute animals. Those functions which are spiritual, come from a spirit; those functions which are human, come from substantial man. Man, therefore, has, as an essential part of his compound substantial being, a true and undeniable spirit. This we call the human soul. The human soul is, therefore, a spiritual substantial reality.

d) THE IMMORTALITY OF THE HUMAN SOUL

To say that the human soul is *immortal* is to say that it cannot die. Immortality means deathlessness. Immortality belongs of absolute necessity to that

Being which *must* exist, which is infinite and self-subsistent; that is to say, immortality belongs of necessity, and of indispensable or absolute necessity, to God. We call God's immortality *absolute immortality*. But the immortality which reason forces us to ascribe to the human soul is known as *natural* immortality. That God did not need to create the soul, is a fact which requires no proof: the soul is not something that *must* have existence; the soul is not necessary being but contingent being. However, given existence, the soul is of such *nature* that it has no tendency towards dissolution or death; indeed it has no possibility for extinction beyond the possibility that the Power which made it can, speaking absolutely, also destroy it. That the soul is *naturally immortal*, we evidenced in the present study.

We have already seen that the soul is an existent, living, substantial, and spiritual reality. It is a spirit. Now, a spirit has been defined as that which does not depend for existence or function upon matter or bodily being. The fact, therefore, that a spirit leaves a body with which it has been substantially united does not mean the extinction or death of the spirit; on the contrary, in losing the body, the spirit has lost that upon which *it did not depend* for its being or existence. When a plant or brute animal dies, its life-principle (or "soul") ceases to be, because, as is quite evident from vegetal and sentient functions, the plant-soul and brute-soul *do* depend upon the organic

body for being and function, and they have no function to exhibit in plant-life and brute-life which is not a matter completely within the scope of bodily life-powers. But the human soul, as we have seen, has functions which are not merely of the body; the human soul does not depend upon the body for its functions and hence does not depend on the body for existence. Therefore, the taking away of the body from the human soul (which happens when a man dies) does not take from the soul itself what it must have to exist and to function. Hence the death of a man does not mean the death of his soul.

The soul is a spirit. Now, a spirit has no parts, no bulk, no elements. It is, therefore, indivisible, since divisibility means separation of parts, and the soul has no parts. But a living and substantial reality which has no parts into which it may be broken or divided is *deathless*; it is *naturally immortal*. For death is neither more nor less than the breaking up of a living thing into its essential parts. Man dies because his essential parts (body and soul) are sundered, are broken out of their substantial union. But a man's *soul* does not die because it has no essential parts which can be sundered. Therefore, the soul, being an indivisible spirit, is immortal by its very *nature*; that is to say, the soul is *naturally immortal*.

We might supplement this sufficient proof by considering man's natural desire for an endless happy existence. The suicide who tries to "end it all" does

not really long for extinction, but for release from the troubles of life. He actually proves by his horrible crime the human tendency for lasting peace and happiness. Normal men are quick to admit that the whole drive and tendency of rational human nature is for endless life. Abnormal persons, and such as aspire to notice (a childish phenomenon familiar to all of us) for startling remarks or shocking views, may claim that they wish nothing but extinction. Yet they continue to bear the whips and scorns of time; they are not willing to fly to ills which they know not of; the bare bodkin remains safely sheathed. The very fact that a person lives and bears life's burdens, is proof sufficient that he holds a deep-seated, though sometimes unconscious, conviction that Plato has reasoned well, and that there is in man a longing after immortality, and a conviction of its reality.

If we needed any evidence for the fact that men of all times have held a firm and reasoned conviction of human immortality, we have it in every page of human history. Alone among the animals, man cares for his dead; he erects monuments; he compiles memoirs; he exhibits a religious care for the sorry remains of what was once a living man. Indeed, so general is the conviction of human immortality, not merely as a sentiment, but as a *reasoned* conviction, that we cannot avoid the impact of a compelling argument, namely, that the voice of rational nature itself proclaims the immortality of the soul. And, if

this be so, we are driven to accept the fact or to deny to human thinking all value and validity, and to lapse into skepticism.

We have said that the soul has in itself no possibility of extinction beyond the possibility that the Power which made it might also destroy it. In a word, the only way in which the human soul can cease to be is by *annihilation*. Now, annihilation consists in the withdrawing of the creating and conserving power, the power of God. As God is the only Being that can create, God alone can withdraw the creative power. Hence God alone can annihilate, or reduce to nothingness.

But, although annihilation is a possibility, absolutely speaking, it is not a possibility when we take into consideration the perfections of the creating and conserving God. God is infinitely *wise*; and it would not be wisdom to create a being capable of endless existence merely to destroy it in time. It would not be wise to make a being naturally deathless and at the same time to destine it for death, or, more precisely, for extinction. Again, God is infinitely *good*; and it would not be consistent with boundless goodness to make a soul which naturally longs for life and happiness and then to stifle this natural tendency in utter extinction. Finally, God is infinitely *just*; and it would not be a work of boundless justice to allow good men to suffer and wicked men to prosper, as is often the case in this life, and

then to bring both to a common extinction with the scale forever unbalanced. God, therefore, *can* annihilate the soul, if we consider the possibility as dependent upon His *power* alone; but He *cannot* annihilate it, if we consider His absolute perfections of wisdom, goodness, and justice. To put the matter tersely, if less correctly, God *can* annihilate, but He *will not* do so. The soul, in itself naturally deathless, will endure deathlessly.

The denial of a truth points to consequences which show that the truth is indeed a truth. The denial of immortality in the human soul points to consequences which show that immortality *must be* a fact. For consider: if this life is all; if there is no future and lasting state; then the part of human wisdom would be to gather rosebuds while life lasts; to trample on decency, on ennobling love, on the rights of others; to follow every low lust and passion; to "get out of life" every sorry drop of pleasure. And if all men were to pursue such a course, chaos would result; states and governments would perish; the earth would be a shambles. "By their fruits ye shall know them" is a test of doctrines as of doctrinaires. And by the fruits, logically foreseen, of a general denial of immortality, we know that such denial must be wrong.

Nor will it do to say that the soul will have a future state of reward or punishment, but that eventually, after its temporary heaven or hell, the soul

will be annihilated. On the one hand, nothing short of endless existence will answer the normal tendency and desire of the human spirit; and, on the other, nothing short of eternity will square with the requirements of the perfections of the Creator and Preserver of men. Nothing but endless happiness or woe gives what Father Ronald Knox calls "the background of finality" to human hopes and aspirations. Nor would a merely temporary existence after death suffice to hold weak wills in line with virtue here on earth; the evils which would come of a denial of the future state would infallibly come of a denial of its endlessness.

Reason forces us to the conclusion—massing arguments from all sides—that the human soul is immortal.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE

In this Article we have studied the meaning of *soul*, and, in particular, of *the human soul*. We have proved that the human soul *exists*, and that it is in man the principle of his threefold life, *vegetal, sentient, rational*. We have seen that a man has only *one* soul, even though it be multiple in its functions. We have studied the nature of the *union* of body and soul in man, and have seen that this is a *substantial*, and not a merely *accidental* union. We have studied the meaning of *spirit* and have discovered that the human soul is demonstrably a true

Article 2. Human Understanding and Free-Will

- Man has a power of knowing things which do not fall within the range of the senses. Man knows what is meant by *substance, reality, being*; man understands what is meant by *unity, goodness, truth, beauty*; man has a knowing grasp of *virtue, honor, patriotism, religion, duty, ideals*. Now, manifestly, these are realities which cannot be tasted or smelled or heard or seen or touched. These are realities

which, of their nature, elude the grasp of bodily powers, of sentient faculties. But if man grasps these things—and nobody can doubt that he does—then he has a *power* or *capacity* or *faculty* for grasping them. This faculty is called the intellect, the mind, or the *understanding*.

Man knows even sense-objects in a manner superior to that exhibited by the senses. The senses deal with objects in their singular or individual concreteness, but the mind or understanding deals with even sense-objects in abstract and universal essence. Thus I see a bodily object called a tree; but my mind knows not only that this is a tree (we speak of a mind already in possession of the *idea* tree), but knows this because it knows what *a* tree is, what *any* tree is, what *every* tree is as a tree. I see a picture of a triangle drawn in white chalk on a blackboard, but the mind, not limited to this single picture in all its concrete details of size and color and position, understands that this is a triangle because it knows what a *triangle* is, what each and every triangle is and must be to be a triangle at all. Now the tree and the picture are bodily objects which are grasped by the sense of sight. But the understanding of *tree* and *triangle* is manifestly something further and higher than the sense-grasp of these objects. Man has, therefore, a power for knowing even sense-objects in a manner superior to that of the senses.

This power we call the mind, the intellect, or the understanding.

The highest of bodily powers are the senses, external and internal. Hence the power of grasping things that lie beyond the reach of the senses, and of grasping even sense-objects in a manner superior to sense, is not a bodily power. It is a spiritual power, a faculty of the soul. If we grant that man has understanding, ^v^e grant simultaneously that this understanding is a power or faculty of the soul. We, therefore, define the understanding or intellect as a suprasensuous (r. e., spiritual) knowing-power which apprehends non-material (r. e., non-sensible) things, and which apprehends sensible things in a manner free from the limitations of sense-knowledge.

It is true, of course, that in this life of a united soul and body, the soul-faculty of *mind* or *understanding* derives its *elements* of knowledge from the findings of the senses. I must have sense-knowledge of tree and triangle, I must see some trees and some pictured triangles, or I must be instructed by word or image in these things, before my mind can formulate its essential grasp of these realities. But given the experience of the senses, the mind or understanding beholds far more in this experience than the senses can, and its findings are not mere associations or complexities of sense-experiences. Intellectual knowledge, knowledge of mind or understand-

ing, is not only different in *degree* from sense-knowledge; it is also different in *kind*.

We know that man has a soul-power or soul-faculty of understanding because, as a matter of fact, man *exercises* such a faculty. He could not exercise it unless he had it. Man, therefore, has an *understanding*.

Man has the power of knowing realities in a suprasensuous manner. He has a further extension of the same power by which he *works with* these understood realities, comparing, combining, dividing, reflecting—a power of seeing these realities in their relations, in fact. In a word, man has not mere *ideas* of things, but he combines ideas into *judgments*, and from these thinks out or *reasons* further judgments. To illustrate: from my knowledge of what an *angle* is and of what *equality* means, I can grasp the meaning of *equal angles*. And from my knowledge of *parallel lines* and of a *straight transversal* cutting these lines, I can conclude to equal functions in equal situations. And so I reason out the truth that when parallels are cut by a transversal, the alternate-interior angles are equal, and the interior-exterior angles are equal, and the opposite angles are equal. These are conclusions of *reason*. Now, reason is but another name for understanding in a special function. Reason is understanding inasmuch as it works out or thinks out conclusions from given data, from understood premisses. When the understanding forms a

judgment without having to think it out; when the ideas combined in a judgment are such that their union is inevitable once the mind views them together, then the judgment is called *immediate*, and is said to be recognized by *intelligence*. But intelligence is not a faculty distinct from the understanding; it *is* understanding or intellect inasmuch as this faculty recognizes a self-evident truth.

To sum up. Man has mind, understanding, or intellect. In its special function of thinking things out, this power is called *reason*. In its special function of recognizing self-evident and necessary judgments or propositions, this power is called *intelligence*. But, in every case, mind, understanding, intellect, reason, intelligence, are only different names for the one suprasensuous faculty which is usually called *the understanding*.

b) FREE-WILL

Wherever a knowing-power is found, there is also found a *tendency to act upon the knowledge* gathered by that power. Indeed, if this were not true, we should not know how to distinguish living bodies into sentient and non-sentient. If the dog sniffs his food and then takes it or refuses it, it is because his knowing-power of smell and taste have functioned to attract him to desirable food or to repel him from what is not desirable, either in itself or in relation to his own state of hunger or repletion, of health or

sickness. It is the sense of touch manifested by certain one-celled beings which enables us to know that they are sentient and not merely vegetal, and the sense is manifested by their movement away from uncomfortable stimulus and towards that which is desirable. There is always a *tendency to action* where there is any sort of *knowledge*.

Now, we have seen that man has not only the lowest form of knowledge, that is, sensuous knowledge, but that he has suprasensuous knowledge as well. He has not only the knowledge of the senses; he has intellectual knowledge or knowledge of the understanding. The tendency to follow sense-knowledge (towards desirable objects and away from those that are undesirable) is called *appetency* or *appetite*. The tendency to follow intellectual knowledge is called *intellectual appetency* or *the will*.

We are justified by common, hourly, human experience in stating that man has a will. Each of us can verify the assertion by a thousand ready examples. If I am tired when the alarm-bell rings, I find the bed *good*, I have a tendency to prolong my time of rest. This is appetency or appetite, and in itself it is sensuous appetite. But I have consciousness of my power to approve this appetite and remain at rest, or to refuse to follow it and rise for the day's duties. My knowledge of duty may prove a sufficient incentive to induce me to overcome the *sense-appetency* which inclines me to rest, and thus my

intellectual appetency for what the mind knows to be right and *good* can prevail. My intellectual appetency is called *the will*. No man who has ever dragged himself wearily from bed can rationally doubt the existence of the will.

But it is not enough that we recognize the appeal to man of suprasensuous motives. It is not enough to assert and to prove the *existence* of the will. We have also to establish the fact that the will has *freedom in its choice*. Indeed, the example just given,—the example of the reluctant riser—is an evidence not only of the existence of the will, but also of its freedom. But we shall defer for a moment our further study of the interesting and somnolent gentleman and look more deeply into the question of *freedom* or *liberty*.

Freedom is always a kind of immunity, an immunity from force, from compulsion, from determination to action. A great many things in this world of ours are not free, and man, inasmuch as he is bodily and sentient, finds himself subject to determinateness of being and action. Man is not free to disregard the force or law of gravity and to fly at will through the heavens without mechanical aids which help him use the law against itself. Man is not free to grow a foot or an inch merely by taking thought. Man is not free to have the digestive function operate in a manner other than that naturally required, or to violate the "law" of the circulation of

the blood and still retain life. Nor is man free to annihilate the *tendency* which follows normally upon sense-knowledge. A hungry man will feel the appetite for food, whether he likes it or no; an upright man will experience the tendency to follow selfishness or greed or anger or sloth or lust. But the hungry man, however great his appetite, can refuse the food, as, for example, the Irish patriot refused it for weeks, moved to fast even until death by a motive that only the mind could grasp and of which the senses had, and could have, no knowledge whatever. The upright man can instantly resist the sway of temptation, refusing, for motives which the mind alone can grasp, consent and action in a thing of vileness. *This* is human freedom; *this* is freedom of the will; *this* is the crowning glory of man amohg all the creatures of the bodily universe.

The power of choosing, within the field of objects made known by the understanding, or by sense with recognition of the understanding, to do or to leave undone an action for the performance of which all is in readiness—this is the freedom of the will. An illustration or two will be in order.

In one of the tales of O. Henry, a despicable beach-comber, reduced to the last and lowest extremity, determines to blackmail an honest citizen. He enters the citizen's house, is treated kindly, and is offered that which his shaken body craves above all—whiskey. He drinks eagerly. Then, about to launch into his wicked

proposal, he suddenly recalls some remnants of his code of decency. With the words at his very lips, he pauses, stops definitely, and says to himself: "No; I can't do it. A gentleman can't blackmail the man he drinks with." There came another day when the craving for alcohol drove the wretch almost to madness. Again he entered the honest citizen's house; this time, without ado, he made his threat, and was told that he would be given money for his silence. The citizen left the room to procure the money, remarking as he stepped to the door, "The decanter is on the side-board; help yourself." With hands that trembled in eagerness, the sorry villain poured out a glass of liquor. With nerves tingling, with appetite calling wildly, he raised the glass. Every cell in his tortured body was calling for that drink. And yet, with the glass at his lips, he stopped and put it down. "No," he said, "I can't do it. A gentleman can't drink with the man he blackmails." This is not a very elevating example, but it is a striking one—perhaps the more striking for the character of the chief actor—of what we mean by freedom of the will. We mean the freedom to *do* or *not do* a thing for motives which the mind alone can grasp (and the result of such motives is *intellectual appetency*) when all is in readiness for the action.

St. Agnes, a little child in years and bodily growth, was led to the altar of the pagan god. She knew that her life was at stake. She could save it by the slight

action of taking a few grains of incense from the vessel offered her and tossing these into the altar-flame. Every bodily appetite cried out for life and against torture and violent death. All was in readiness for the simple act. Yet, in the face of death, and despite the cajoleries and fair promises made her if she would accept life, she refused the action, and died a martyr. Here is what we mean by freedom of the will: the power to *do* or *not do* a certain thing when all is in readiness for its performance. This is the *freedom of choice*, and this is the freedom which we call *freedom of the will*.

One final illustration: David with a small group of followers was a fugitive from King Saul. He came near his own city of Bethlehem, but the town was held by the Philistines, and he dared not enter. David was weary and terribly oppressed by thirst. "And David longed, and said: O that some man would get me a drink of the water out of the cistern that is in Bethlehem by the gate. And three valiant men broke through the camp of the Philistines, and drew water out of the cistern . . . and brought it to David; but he would not drink, but offered it to the Lord, saying . . . Shall I drink the blood of these men that went, and the peril of their lives?" Here again, the will of David was free to choose; he could drink or refuse to drink. And even though every sensible motive called for the water, the higher motive of showing appreciation for devotion and no-

bility in his soldiers made David rather endure the thirst than seem to value his own comfort more than the lives of his men. He chose *not to do*, even though every circumstance for *doing* was present. This is what we mean by freedom of the will.

The choice of the free-will is not always noble. If David had chosen to drink, if St. Agnes had chosen to live as an apostate, the will, in each case, would have been demonstrated free by their choice. To return to our sleepy friend. The motive which induces him to heed the alarm may not be high or noble. He may fear the loss of his job; he may fear the jibes of his family; and these motives may suffice to make him turn reluctantly from his rest. Or, on the contrary, he may mentally approve the bodily tendency and, casting care of consequences to the winds, he may return to his slumber. In any case his will has chosen. In any case, he has made *free* choice, and for motives which only the mind could know, or only the mind approve. So a sinner in deliberately submitting to temptation is still free, and his evil choice is a demonstration of freedom of the will. Freedom is demonstrated not only in the things that are hard to do (although it is more clearly and forcefully illustrated in such things), but in those which are easy as well. Esau, following the hunger of body with mental approval (for the mind can focus on certain motives, even the lowest, and so shut out the attractive power of those that are higher and stronger),

gave up his rich inheritance for a single meal, and, in so doing, proved the freedom of his will quite as completely as the holy Susanna did when she accepted the loss of her good name rather than offend Almighty God.

We have given these examples of what we mean by free-will. Now, it is a matter of experience, a matter of everyone's consciousness, that this thing which we mean is a fact. For consciousness is our witness that we are masters of our deliberate actions. The testimony of this witness is heard unmistakably *before, during, and after* our action. Before action we are wont to weigh motives, to ponder what had best be done, to "make up our minds"; and if we omit this process, so naturally and humanly preparatory to sane action, we are perfectly conscious that the omission is our own doing. While performing the action, we are still aware that it is *ours*, and that we are doing it because we choose to do it. After the action, we are conscious of self-approval for having done it, or of regret and remorse. If we are placidly indifferent, we are still aware that this is due to the fact that the action itself involved no serious issues, or to the fact that we have hardened ourselves by drifting into what spiritual writers call tepidity and what the ordinary person would call, not without good warrant, stupidity. But no normal person will deny for a moment that this consciousness, this open awareness, of self-mastery and responsibility is a

fact. He may deny the value of consciousness as a witness and proceed logically by that process of denial into the impossible and self-contradictory state of skepticism. Or he may admit its value as an undeniable and universal factual experience, which has value if any awareness or thinking has value, and so he must come to the admission that free-will is really free.

The testimony of consciousness to the freedom of the will is not merely an individual experience of every human being. The whole social structure is built up upon the solid conviction that man is, as a fact, free. The existence of laws and governments, for example, is proof positive of this conviction. We do not make laws for trees or horses; the gardener does not petition the legislature to pass an ordinance against weeds; the owner of a canary does not hang out a sign, "No cats allowed," or, if he does, he does not expect the cats, but the human owners of cats, to pay attention to the proscription. The whole point of a law is that man who is *free* must be urged to choose wisely and in a manner consistent with public peace and security; the whole essence of a law—as G. K. Chesterton says somewhere—is that it may be broken. But necessitated things cannot keep a law or break it; only a free being can do that. Man can do that, and man, therefore, is free. In the full expression, man is endowed with *freedom of choice* or *free-will*.

Carry the argument from the social structure a bit farther. Human society is made up of a vast multitude of individuals who are busily presenting, every moment of their waking lives, incontrovertible evidence for human freedom. For everywhere human beings are seeking advice or giving it; they are contracting bills or paying them; they are delivering exhortations, promising rewards, threatening punishments, urging people to buy or sell, to speak or be silent. Now, all these things are so many proclamations of the universal acquiescence of mankind in the truth that the human will is free. Why ask advice, if one is not free to follow or reject it? Why give counsel, if it can have no possible effect? Why should my grocer or baker trust me, if I am fated to refuse payment, for aught he knows? Why should I trust the dollar bill or the coin I accept in payment, if the government, for anything I can tell, is fated to render such things worthless by repudiating its obligations? Why should I praise a fine action and blame a cowardly one, if neither came by freedom, but both by necessity? Why should the criminal be punished, if he had no freedom and hence no responsibility in his criminal action? Denial of human freedom is a possibility in theory; it is an absurdity in practical social life. And, if this fact of freedom, universally and inevitably recognized among men, is an illusory thing and no true fact, then there remains no value in human knowledge at all, and we are all doomed to the

intellectual madness of complete skepticism. For, after all, there is some value in the words *plain, manifest, obvious*. And if so manifest a thing as human freedom be unreal, no human knowledge can be trusted for a moment. For no item of human knowledge is more manifestly a fact than this, *that the human will is free*.

There is a philosophical proof for the freedom of the will, a proof of the greatest value and most conclusive power. But it is not an argument to read with a running glance. Some careful attention is here required. A *faculty* is a power for doing or receiving something. Our knowing-powers are faculties. So is our choosing-power, even if, for the moment, we suppose that it is not free. Now, no faculty is *necessitated* unless its object is so complete and perfect that it fills up the capacity of the faculty in such a thorough way as to leave no possible tendency of that faculty unsatisfied. Such an object *does* necessitate a faculty, for it meets the nature and requirements of the faculty at every point. It is what the faculty is *for*, and, in consequence, it is an object to which the faculty necessarily responds. A faculty is a living tendency for something and a power to achieve that something; and the perfect object of the faculty meets the tendency perfectly, satisfies it, renders its achievement so complete that not even a *possible* element of its natural striving is left unmet and unsatisfied. Such an object is *perfect truth* with ref-

erence to the understanding, and perfect truth is infinite Truth; it is God Himself. Such an object is *perfect good*, the *Summum Bonum*, with reference to the tendency which we have called the human will. And the *Summum Bonum* is God. Such an object thoroughly fulfills the capacity of the will, and there is not even a possibility of its having a shred or scrap of its natural tendency unsatisfied in such Good. God is the necessary final object of the whole of life, and to God, the *Summum Bonum*, the human will ever tends in all its deliberate actions. Even the sinner in his act of sin is tending towards what he perversely regards as somehow *satisfactory*, that is, as somehow partaking of the nature of *good*, and so in line with the boundless good, the *Summum Bonum* or God. Sin, of course, does not satisfy, but brings emptiness and remorse. But it is satisfaction, it is the quest of *good*, that explains the sinner's perverse and mistaken choice. Similarly, if a man is actually looking for diamonds, and perversely insists on seeking them in a muck-heap, it still remains true that *it is diamonds he is after*. To such a seeker we rightly say, "Not there, you fool! You will never find gems in that stinking filth." But the fact remains that, in spite of his perverse and deliberately mistaken choice of his field of search, he is really seeking diamonds. So the sinner, in spite of his perverse and deliberately mistaken field of choice, is actually looking for *good* (and ultimately the *Summum Bonum*) in the muck-

heap of moral filth. He will never find what he seeks in that place; but the point we make is that what he is seeking is *good*. For the will tends towards good, the *Summum Bonum*. In this the will is not free; this is its natural and inevitable bent; this is what the will is *for*. Now, only the *Summum Bonum* or Infinite Good can so fill up the will-tendency as to leave no possibility of further desire. Hence, only the Infinite Good can necessitate the will. Here upon earth, however, the *good* that attracts man's will is ever finite. Therefore, here upon earth there is no object which can necessitate the will. As a consequence, the will remains free.

Nor can it be objected that the will of a good man tends directly to God, the *Summum Bonum*, even in this life. This is true, but it constitutes no objection. For the tendency towards God which a virtuous person exercises does not find its object with perfect grasp in this world, and there are ever other objects which, under the aspect of good, seek to lure the will away from its final goal; such objects are, for instance, one's own convenience or comfort (for the quest of the true goal is, in this world, a very real labor, and calls for endurance under stress); the presence and immediate appeal of objects which offer pleasure to the mind or promise satisfaction to strong bodily appetites.

The absurdities which follow upon the denial of human free-will are such as to indicate beyond quibble

the utter impossibility of finding truth in such denial. For, if man is not free, if he is not master of his deliberate conduct, then he is not *responsible* for his actions. And, if there is no human responsibility, there is no such thing as good and bad conduct, no such thing as virtue or vice, no morality in fact. And if all human conduct comes thus from an irresponsible and necessitated nature, governments and laws are but means of oppression and enslavement. No sane mind can accept these conclusions. Yet they are logically necessary if free-will is not a fact. We are thus driven by reason itself to accept free-will as a fact.

C) FUNDAMENTAL DUTY

A *duty* is an obligation, incumbent upon one who has free-will, of doing, or omitting to do, or avoiding something. Now, an obligation incumbent upon one who has free-will is called a *moral* obligation. *Duty* stands correlated with *right*, and one possessed of free-will has a *duty* to do or to avoid that which another (and, ultimately, his Absolute Superior) has a *right* to require him to do or to avoid. Duty answers right; right gives rise to duty.

The understanding grasps the reasoned fact that this world (and man who is the only free inhabitant of the bodily universe) has been made, and made for a purpose, by the infinite and all-perfect God. All worldly creatures except free man tend to their appointed end by natural and inevitable processes, which

we call physical laws. But man has free-will, and if he is to tend to his appointed end by his human conduct, he must freely choose to do so. Reason shows him that there is a *requirement* incumbent upon him to choose rightly. For the infinite and all-perfect God has made man for Himself and for endless beatitude, and He has a *right* to require man to use free-will for achieving that end. To this right of God corresponds fundamental *duty* in man.

The Creator and Ruler of the universe has established it in *order*, and man is the only creature who can disturb that order; he can do so because he is free in his deliberate human acts. Yet reason shows him that he *ought not* to disturb the order divinely decreed, but *ought* to preserve it. This function of reason is called—in every individual instance in which free-choice is made—by the name *conscience*. God's eternal Law of order, and human conscience (or reason) applying that Law—these are man's guides in the way of duty.

Man knows by reason that what is in line with the order he apprehends in the universe is *good*; and what is out of line with that order is *evil*. At an early age, each human person comes to an understanding of the law, "Good is to be done, and evil avoided."

Now, reason shows man that *justice* is good, and is to be done. And justice requires that everyone be given his due. Reason declares that *honor* is due to excellence, *obedience* to lawfully constituted author-

ity, *love* to what is most worthy and perfect, *gratitude* to the giver of great and necessary gifts. Justice, therefore, requires free man to render, in full measure, honor, obedience, love, and gratitude to God, who is the supreme Excellence, Authority, Perfection, and Bestower of necessary gifts. But to render these duties to God is to practise *religion*. Religion is, therefore, a *duty*, and an obvious and fundamental duty, of man, the creature ennobled by free-will.

In the exercise of the duty of religion man must practise *virtue*. Religion is itself a virtue in the man who observes this duty, and the recognition of the divine Excellence, Authority, and Perfection implies the exercise of every virtue. Man is, therefore, bound by a moral obligation from which, as reason shows him, there is no justifiable escape, *to practise religion and to live virtuously*.

Obviously, in a muddled world stupefied by sin, the many forms of religion which clamor for man's attention are not all of equal value. Man is to find and practise the *true* religion. This is but a logical extension of the duty which reason makes obvious—the duty of practising religion. For, in the last analysis, there is only one religion which deserves the name. This is the religion objectively established by God Himself when He walked the earth as Man. Men are not morally free (though physically they are) to choose the way in which *they* please to recognize God; men are morally bound (though not physically

coerced) to find out what *God* wills in this matter, and to get in line with His established decrees. Now, as we have seen, God became man and founded a Church, to which all men are called. It is a man's fundamental duty, therefore, to find that Church and to practise the religion it prescribes. Hence, if a man is not perfectly sure that the form of religion which he professes is the one and only true religion of Jesus Christ (who is God and Man), then reason indicates the duty, imperative and absolute, of his seeking for the true religion until he finds it. This task, being imposed by infinite Wisdom as well as infinite Justice, a man will not find too exacting; if he is sincere and earnest, he will quickly discover what he seeks. For the rest, we have already seen that the one true Church of Christ is the Roman Catholic Church. Reason, therefore, requires every man to recognize and enter the Catholic Church, and to profess the Catholic religion with loyalty and fervor. This statement will not please non-Catholics; but our purpose is not to please or to displease, but to establish the truth by cold reason. The statement expresses truth; it expresses a fact; and the fact remains a fact even for those who shrink from facing it.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE

In this Article we have defined *understanding* or *intellect*, and have studied brief but compelling evidence for the fact that man possesses this faculty.

We have shown what is meant by *free-will*, and have proved by concrete example as well as by abstract reasoning that free-will in man is a fact that cannot be rationally denied. We have seen that *duty* is consequent in man upon his character as *free*, and we have indicated and justified the fundamental human duties of practising the true religion and living virtuously.

In all this we have studied much that is important, and important above others for the sociologist. Many modern sociologists, and notably "field workers" fail to recognize that the "cases" with which they deal so impersonally are human beings with understanding and free-will, not herd-animals or mechanical robots. Too many modern sociologists discount free-will altogether, attributing to heredity and environment the characters and personal qualities of those with whom they deal. Consequently, they make no appeal to free-will, they open up no avenues for its readier functioning, in the remedial measures which they take for "social betterment." In this failure they are demonstrably unscientific, as we have seen in our present study. No sociologist is worthy of the name, none is worthy of his work with men, who does not recognize in those whom he directs and provides for, reasoning creatures capable of grasping and freely pursuing noble and ennobling ends.

Article 3. Divine Grace in Human Lives

- a) Meaning of Divine Grace b) Existence and Influence of Divine Grace

a) MEANING OF DIVINE GRACE

By *divine grace* we mean a supernatural gift which God bestows upon human souls (through the merits of the Redeemer, Jesus Christ) for their salvation. It is a help which God gives to men to enable them to get to Heaven. The help is twofold. There is a grace which constitutes a man in the *state* of holiness, a grace which excludes the state of sin and remains with a man until he expels it by his own deliberate and serious sin. This grace is called *habitual* or *sanctifying* grace. There is another grace which comes and goes, presenting itself as a man requires it to help him avoid particular evils and to perform particular good acts. This grace is called *actual grace*.

Sanctifying grace may be compared to friendship, deep and devoted, which unites friends whether they be together or apart, neighbors or sundered by long distance, awake or asleep, at work or at play, while thinking of one another or while absorbed in other things. So sanctifying grace, once bestowed, endures, whether the person who has it be awake or asleep, at work or play, thinking directly of God and His service or absorbed in the business of this life. The friendship endures until one or all of those whom it unites break it off by quarrel, wilfulness, or utter

neglect. Sanctifying grace endures until the person who has it drives it out by mortal sin. God never breaks, by any act of His own, this glorious bond of divine love and friendship.

Actual grace may be compared to the help which a watchful mother gives to her toddling child. As long as the way is plain and smooth, the mother walks beside the child, observant and careful. But when the way becomes steep or rough, she reaches out a saving hand. And if the child, ignoring the proffered assistance, falls to the ground, the mother is quick to help it to its feet again. So actual grace, prepared by our watchful and loving Father in Heaven, is beside us, so to speak, in every circumstance of life. There is no temptation to sin, there is no opportunity of winning merit, but has its special grace which, like the outstretched divine Hand, offers the help a man needs to turn the occasion into spiritual success. If man ignores grace and falls—even if the fall be serious—the hand of actual grace is still ready to lift him up, if he will, to repentance and to help him recover sanctifying grace, which his serious fall has lost to him.

b) EXISTENCE AND INFLUENCE OF DIVINE GRACE

It is impossible, of course, to present here a metaphysical proof for the existence of grace and its influence upon human lives. But it is entirely possible to suggest considerations which have power to convince honest minds, and which, taken fairly, amount

to positive proof of the existence and influence of divine grace.

There is hardly a person to be found who can honestly declare that he has never experienced a conviction of support and of strength not wholly his own. No one can truly say that he has never been helped by sound counsel, by good example, by reaction against what is low and vile. Now, whence have these things power and influence? In themselves they are but experiences of life, things to be listed with the "phenomena" of which pseudo-scientists like to talk. It will not do to declare that man's appreciation of his character and dignity explains these experiences, for the question recurs: whence the appreciation of self and whence its power? These things, inasmuch as they are inspirational and a factor in conduct, are something other and something higher than the human being as such, for the human being as such, while still the image of God, is damaged by the primal sin and further debased by actual sin and repeated weaknesses of conduct. It may be saying too much to call the inspirational aids of which we speak by the full name of *actual graces*, and yet in one view of humanity they are certainly truly so called.

It is a common experience—and St. Paul confesses that even one in the exalted office of Apostle is not immune from it—that there is "another law" in the members, which wars against "the law of the spirit." There is in men, since the Fall, a weedy

growth of pride which is never completely uprooted in this life; there is a tendency to selfishness, to unworthy ambition, to things of passion and sense. And what man but has felt in his life the aid of a power, not entirely of himself, which carried him to conquest in the recurrent wars he must wage with these weaknesses? Was it the thought of a pious mother; a sudden appreciation of ennobling ideals; a murmured prayer; the stimulus of a good word or good reading? And how can such things influence a merely animal man? These things are of the spirit, yet they are not wholly subjective; they are helps from without, and their character and influence show them to be helps from above. In a word, they are *actual graces*.

The agnostic declares that the divine aid (i. e., grace) which one feels one has acquired—by prayer, for instance—is only a form of auto-suggestion. But the agnostic will find that he has a troublesome task on hand if he honestly tries to explain by that theory the lives of men as they are lived, and not as they are recorded in books of modern sociology. The type of person likely to be a consistent victim of auto-suggestion is pretty readily recognized. Nor is auto-suggestion a thing that, ordinarily speaking, can be very lasting or widespread in its effects. No one denies the existence of auto-suggestion. It is not uncommon, as an isolated phenomenon, and it very often arises from what psychologists of a generation ago liked

to call "expectant attention," although they probably know it to-day by some more breezy and up-to-the-minute name. In any case, and under whatever name, the thing *does* exist. But there is only a small part, a microscopically small part, of human conduct that auto-suggestion can adequately explain.

When St. Paul was struck suddenly to the ground, and was told that his life and activities were all wrong and must be entirely changed, he received *a grace*, granted that it came in a most unusual manner. By the influence of that grace, his life was so completely transformed that in much it was flatly reversed. Auto-suggestion will certainly not explain this conversion. Auto-suggestion implies a definite, and usually a very gradual and persuasive course of self-deception. It involves the will or the wish to do or to be a certain thing or a certain character. And this wish is engendered either by a series of external circumstances which affect the latent tendencies of the person who entertains it, or it is born of a confident faith in some voodooist or astrologer or Coue or like "medicine man." Now, no one would dare to assert that St. Paul had latent leanings towards Christianity. His was an honest, earnest, and manly nature, and he certainly regarded Christianity as a false and dangerous religion. "Breathing out threatenings and slaughter against the disciples of the Lord," he set out for Damascus, well fortified with writs and legal warrants for the apprehending of Christians. Nor was

St. Paul a character likely to be influenced by anyone who would work, however carefully, to bring about a gradual change in his views. St. Paul was not the man to take direction easily, and he was far too alert and clear-minded to be deceived by any subtle attack upon his convictions; he was a born leader who would tolerate no interference. And his change was not gradual. It was as sudden as the mysterious lightning-stroke which felled him to the ground. He was converted instantaneously, and instantly he asked the humble question, "Lord, what wilt thou have me to do?" Manifestly, auto-suggestion breaks down entirely when it is offered in explanation of the grace which converted St. Paul. Notice further, that his conversion was complete and life-long in its undiminished effects. Auto-suggestion is something that needs constant rebuilding and encouragement; it has to be supported by repeated processes of self-deception. And even the agnostic must smile at the notion of the zealous St. Paul (undaunted by a thousand racking hardships) doing a spiritual daily dozen to keep himself up in the faith. We can readily imagine St. Paul praying, and asking for prayers, "lest he who had preached to others, should himself become a castaway." But we cannot, however valiant the effort, envision this giant of God rousing himself to fervor by some process of auto-suggestion, such as murmuring over and over, "Every day in every way I'm becoming a better and better Christian." The dif-

ference which even the agnostic will admit, if he is honest, between *grace* as the effect of prayer, and self-deception which comes of auto-suggestion, is well indicated in the normal and natural vision of the Apostle on his knees to God, and the wholly absurd and impossible envisionment of the same Apostle practising Coueisms. Manly, zealous, ardent, wholly admirable, the great Apostle of the Gentiles is a smashing refutation of the insidious "auto-suggestion" theory. After his conversion, and to gain its full fruits, St. Paul went in obedience to the command (which was *a grace*) to the house of retreat in Damascus. He prayed, and his prayer was answered with further grace. Not malice itself can interpret this grace with its marvellous and life-long effects in terms of auto-suggestion. The free-will of man *can* and *does* accept divine grace; human life *can* and *does* show the tremendous influence of grace. Sociologists, who have a way of completely ignoring God's influence (by grace) upon His own children, are respectfully requested to take notice.

When the Apostles came out of the upper chamber in which the marvel of Pentecost had been wrought, they came as *new* men, as men *suddenly* made new. And their newness was the consequence of their free correspondence with *the divine grace* which God the Holy Ghost had given them. Here we have a band of men, timid, conscious of their low social status, aware of their lack of education and qualification for leader-

ship, suddenly proclaiming "Christ and Him crucified" to the whole unsympathetic and hostile population of Jerusalem. St. Peter, who had feared the whisper of a servant-girl, feared it so desperately that he turned traitor to the Lord he loved, now greeted the threatening assembly with these masterful words: "Ye men of Judea, and all you that dwell in Jerusalem, be this known to you, and with your ears receive my words." He who was afraid to be known as a follower and friend of Christ, who trembled when the servant said, "Did I not see thee in the garden with him?" and burst into a blasphemous denial of the truth—this same man now openly proclaimed his allegiance to Christ, and frankly told the Jews that Christ was God as well as man, whom "you, by the hands of wicked men, have crucified and slain." And not only once, but repeatedly, did St. Peter speak in this manner: witness his declaration on the Temple steps a few days later: "You denied the Holy One and the Just, and desired a murderer to be granted to you. But the Author of life you killed." And St. Peter is typical of the whole body of the Apostles. They went through the world, persecution and death ever at their side, and to the end they dauntlessly preached the truth. How does auto-suggestion, or any other forced theory, square with the facts here reviewed? Will it do to say that the Apostles, trembling behind locked doors "for fear of the Jews," had worked out a plan of campaign and had stirred up in

themselves a feverish belief in Christ and a willingness to suffer for His cause? It is needless to criticize so pitiful a suggestion. Fevers die out; bands of devotees who work up a corporate enthusiasm quickly lose it when their group is dispersed and they are individually persecuted. But the Apostles' faith and zeal did *not* die out. Their enthusiasm did *not* disappear when they were scattered to the corners of the earth. Even if this little group of timid and retiring men could have nerved themselves by auto-suggestion to a sham bravery and the sudden facing of the mob—a supposition which the mind refuses to entertain—they would have been quickly shown up and their brief bravado would have been but the occasion for laughter. But these few men actually transformed the face of the earth! Now, if we face the facts honestly, we are compelled to confess that the Apostles were themselves transformed in that upper chamber. They were changed from weak men to strong, from sheeplike followers of a leader to the greatest masters of men that the world has known. And this transformation took place when God came upon them as tongues of fire, and the flames of *divine grace* were set ablaze in their weak but upright wills. Divine grace, therefore, can and does have an effect, and a most marvellous and powerful effect, upon the free-wills of men. Divine grace can and does have a tremendous influence upon human lives. Sociologists who feel that there is nothing in religion but senti-

ment, nothing in prayer but auto-suggestion, and no powerful social influences but those listed in their materialistic manuals, have much to learn about the greatest of all influences for the shaping and directing of human lives—the influence of divine grace.

The touching conversion of St. Mary Magdalen; the winning of the greedy capitalist Zachaeus; the sanctification of the woman taken in adultery—these are further scriptural examples of the imparting of divine grace and of its wondrous effect upon lives. And every Catholic who has made a sincere confession of his sins, with worthy sorrow and purpose of amendment, in the wonderful Sacrament of Penance, can offer direct and certain testimony of the effect of divine grace upon his own life. Nor can this testimony be brushed aside as sentimental or as involving only auto-suggestion. The list of refutations of this unworthy theory is endless. If there is any value whatever in personal experience—and it is admittedly a hard thing to set down in mere words—it has been shown to the world for two thousand years in the lives and testimonies of worthy sons and daughters of the true Church. And this not by moon-calves, by people who roll up their eyes and sigh with imagined rapture, but by the solid and sensible and unimaginative people who make up the strength of humanity. Endless testimony is available from young and old to the saving power of the grace that flows through the divine channels of the Sacraments.—

Sociologists who seek to reform the world by legal ordinances, by programs for carving men up by sterilization, cutting men off by euthanasia, blocking men out by birth-control, breeding men up by eugenics, are recommended to some quiet meditation upon the subject of divine grace and its influence in human lives.

No one is more ready than the Catholic philosopher and scientist to admit the powerful influence exercised upon human lives by associations and example—"environment" is the word in favor. But environment, even when wedded with its mysterious companion, heredity, cannot fully explain human conduct; these forces are always but a partial explanation. The child of drunken and obscene parents may grow up to be drunken and obscene; and again he may not. Grace and free-will may bring a saint out of a home where filth, moral and physical, abounds. No one who knows the inner lives of men, no one who has had the direction of souls, but will testify to the existence of such cases. We do not justify bad environment; on the contrary. But we deny the unscientific sociological assumption that a bad home *necessarily* means a bad product of the home (and, conversely, we deny that a good home *necessarily* means a good product). Free-will and divine grace are factors which the sociologist simply *must* take into consideration, else his work is not scientific; it does not deal with things as they are.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE

In this Article we have made a study of the meaning and nature of *divine grace*. We have learned what is meant by *sanctifying* (or *habitual*) grace and *actual* grace. We have presented examples and arguments to show that divine grace is a most important factor in human lives, one which the sociologist dare not omit to consider if he wishes his work to be scientific and his doctrines to square with fact.

BOOK SECOND

THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY

This Book treats of human society in its essential constitution. It discusses the origin and nature of the individual human being, of the family, and of social groups larger than the family. All of these taken together make humankind or human society. The individual human being is the *element* into which all society is resolvable; the family is the first and basic union of human beings, and so constitutes the social *unit*; the State and the Church and the Community are other important social *groups*. It is of these that we treat in the following Chapters:

Chapter I. The Social Element

Chapter II. The Social Unit

Chapter III. The Social Groups

CHAPTER I

THE SOCIAL ELEMENT

Individual human beings are the elements of which society is made. For society is a union of individual men. Now, we cannot know the nature of society unless we know the nature of its elements, and we cannot undertake the role of sociologists until we know the nature of society. Therefore, we must make a study of man, the individual image of God.

In our preliminary studies we have treated of man's soul and its faculties and we have discussed man's free responsiveness to the most powerful of all factors in human conduct, namely, divine grace. Here we take for our direct study man, the complete composite of body and soul. We seek to know man as individual, and to understand the character and requisites of his nature. When we have mastered this knowledge, we shall be able to make a discerning investigation of the relations of individual human beings in that great body of men which we know as human society.

The Chapter is divided into the following Articles:

Article i. The Origin of Man

Article 2. The Character of the Human Person

Article z. Fundamental Human Rights and Duties

Article i. The Origin of Man

- a) The Theory of Evolution b) Evolution and Sociology
- c) The True Origin of Man

a) THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION

Evolution is the popular name for the hypothetical

process of development of living bodies. The theory of Evolution is called *Evolutionism*. More properly, this theory is called *Transformism*. It is a theory of *development*, and not of *ultimate origins*. Evolutionism presupposes the existence of some bodily being, some primitive mass of matter, and the mysterious infusion into this matter of the thing called *life*. Only when so much is taken for granted does Evolutionism offer itself as an explanation of the variety and gradation observable among living bodies.

In the sixth century before Christ, Anaximander, philosopher of Miletus in ancient Ionia, proposed a doctrine of Evolutionism in his attempt to account for the world as he found it. He taught (gratuitously, and as a mere handy explanation which he could not even try to prove) that there was in the beginning a boundless mass of matter, which he conceived to be a kind of mist or spray, in which minute particles of every kind of bodily substance were held, so to speak, in solution. The elements of heat in this primitive mass exercised a drying influence which caused different things to "separate out." Thus, under the influence of heat, the warmer particles drew off from the colder, and both were condensed. The heat elements took form as the sun and the fiery bodies of the heavens; the cold elements condensed into the earth and its waters. The sun, continuing to shed heat upon the earth, raised up bubbles on its muddy surface, and some of these

broke loose and became fishes. Fishes entered the waters, but some of them were left stranded upon dry land, and developed parts and organs suitable to maintain life there, and so became animals. And from animals came other and still other animals, and finally man. This naive Anaximandrian Evolutionism is not without its defenders even to-day. But the more prominent modern evolutionary doctrines are not much concerned about the origin of life, even animal life; their chief interest and effort lies in the explanation of the development of a higher and more complex animal organism from a lower and less complex. And so, by *transformation of species* they account for the types of animals we find on earth to-day, not excluding the human animal, man.

Transformation of species is a phrase which means the process by which one species of living things is thought by evolutionists to develop into another and "higher" or more complex species. And a *species* is a class of living things that can inter-breed indefinitely in the natural state. A species of plants is known as a *botanical* species and a species of animals is called a *zoological* species. Our interest in the present study is focussed upon the zoological species, and it is that which we shall indicate hereafter by the simple term *species*.

Many definitions of *species* have been formulated, none of which appears to give general satisfaction. These definitions range from the sonorous statement

of Sir William Bateson that a species is a class marked by "morphological discontinuity and inter-specific sterility" to the direct and simple declaration of Professor Poulton that a species is "an inter-breeding community." The point in which all definitions of *species* agree is this: animals of one species are normally capable of inter-breeding indefinitely in their natural state, and they cannot inter-breed indefinitely with members of another species.

In 1859, Charles Robert Darwin (1809-1882) published his famous work, giving it a lordly title, which is usually shortened to its first five words, *On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favored Races in the Struggle for Life*. This book was epoch-making, not in the sense that it achieved a lasting scientific triumph, but that it gave to evolutionists a new inspiration, and set a new direction for their thinking. Darwin taught that the stronger and superior individuals of any litter, or of any species of animals, manage to live, while the weaker and unfit perish. Thus there is a "struggle for life," in which is observed a constant "survival of the fittest," and this survival is a natural process of the triumph of strength over weakness, of competence over inferiority, and so the survival deserves the name of "natural selection." Superior beings survive; they transmit their superiorities to their offspring; the offspring tend, as the parents did in turn, to vary in every possible direc-

tion; weak variations and varieties are stamped out; superior varieties endure, and thus we have an upward evolutionary trend. Darwin believed that man is developed, by force of natural selection, from the higher apes.

While Darwin was unquestionably the most notable popularizer of the evolutionary theory in modern times, he did not propose the theory as something new, but merely offered an explanation of how the evolutionary drive or force carries on its work. Nor was he alone in the field of special theorists. Before Darwin, Jean de Lamarck (1744-1829), eminent French zoologist, had proposed a theory, not of natural selection, but of "adaptation" and "transmission of acquired characteristics." That is to say, according to Lamarck, living things *adapt* themselves to their surroundings or environment, developing such parts and organs as are necessary to their survival in their situation. Thus by adaptation, animals acquire characteristics, and these are *transmitted* to offspring. In this way the species now present on earth came into being. All this was set forth by Lamarck in a book called, *Philosophie Zoologique*, which was published in 1809, just fifty years before Darwin's work on the origin of species startled the scientific and the scientific worlds.

Lamarckians and Darwinians had many a disagreement, and while unable to offer the world anything like convincing evidence in the matter of the

evolutionary origin of species, they presented a striking proof of adaptations and variations among evolutionists. Presently they became Neo-Darwinians and Neo-Lamarckians. And then Hugo De Vries (1848-), Dutch botanist, upset both camps of "Neos" with an entirely new theory of "mutations" or "jumps" instead of steady variations and gradual adaptations in the evolutionary process. De Vries' work, *Die Mutationstheorie*, appeared in 1901.

To-day evolutionists, following a very business-like method of publicity and propaganda, have pretty well convinced the lay mind that Evolution is a fact. But the *fact* of evolution is the only thing evolutionists agree upon. There are many theories as to the *manner* in which Evolution evolves, no one of which is generally accepted by scientists, and no one of which covers all the facts to be explained. Over against the evolutionary assumption of "fact" there is a growing impatience in many quarters with the arrogance of evolutionists. Mr. Arnold Lunn makes ringingly articulate the New Voice of Protest in two articles (published in *The Sign*, 1934) under the caption, "Is Evolution True?" He quotes many scientists, most of whom are convinced evolutionists, on the weakness of the evolutionary position. Among others he cites Yves Delage (1854-1920), noted French zoologist, who admitted that his belief in Evolution was founded rather on personal philosophical opinion than upon natural history, and wrote:

"If one takes one's stand upon the exclusive ground of the facts, it must be acknowledged that the formation of one species from another species has not been demonstrated at all." Mr. Lunn does not hesitate to sum up his scholarly investigation in these bold terms: "There is no direct and no contemporary and no historic evidence for evolution." But the most notable thing about Mr. Lunn's study is its disclosure of the shameful fact that evolutionists, taken generally, are not playing fair with the public in their studies and discussions. He quotes Mr. Dewar, famous contemporary scientist, who has suffered from the practice here condemned: "Those who do not accept this creed (Evolutionism) are deemed unfit to hold scientific offices; their articles are rejected by newspapers or journals; their contributions are refused by scientific societies, and publishers decline to publish their books except at the author's expense. Thus the independents to-day are pretty effectually muzzled." Mr. Lunn continues: "It is high time that those of us who still believe in free thought should unite against the High Priests of Evolutionary Orthodoxy and insist that this fascinating question should be freely discussed."

Mr. Dewar chooses the just expression in referring to Evolutionism as a "creed." For indeed most evolutionists make Evolutionism their religion. They cling to it as a doctrine that must, at whatever cost, be promulgated and defended, instead of presenting

it as a system that must justify itself to all the world. For Evolutionism, even in the lower orders of plants and animals, has not yet justified itself. In fact, it is farther to-day than ever from justification, and the unfair tactics of evolutionists, their artful dodging and their resentful sensitiveness, go a long way to prove it so. Consciously or unconsciously evolutionists feel the weakness of their position, and it is a position that has been so laboriously attained, and suits so well the prideful spirit which has turned much modern science into scientism, that they may fairly be said to show a willingness to do anything, fair or foul, true or false, to maintain it. Against the very thought of being dislodged from their position, evolutionists turn with a venomous resentfulness that is not unmixed with terror. They become nasty, as Mr. Julian Huxley and Mr. H. G. Wells do in *The Science of Life*, where they write: "There is to-day no denial of the fact of organic evolution except on the part of manifestly ignorant and prejudiced and superstitious minds." They do not hesitate to lie, as the same authors do in the same work when they say: "Evolution is a fact as well established as the roundness of the earth"; as the "re-constructors" do when they take a thigh bone, a piece of skull-pan, and a few teeth, and turn out a Pithecanthropus, finished "down to the last detail of hair and habits." Evolutionists preach Evolutionism as a doctrine to be taken on faith, refusing to meet

the difficulties that face it as a scientific hypothesis. They insinuate the doctrine into every department of mental as well as bodily life; they make it the background of human history, of language study, of psychology, of theories of education; they use it as an attack upon the constancy of truth and the changelessness of the moral law; they even explain the concept of an infinite God as an evolutionary growth, derived from early and inferior forms of religious conception. Evolutionists spread their doctrine by means of every available vehicle of propaganda, news sheets, novels, plays, syndicated pabuluni for the groundlings in paragraphs on editorial pages and in featured articles in Sunday supplements. And so thoroughly have the propagandists done their work during the last fifteen or twenty years, that the author of a widely-used textbook in sociology, Mr. C. A. Ellwood, can frankly say: "The doctrine of descent, therefore, stands in all its essentials to-day unquestioned by men of science, and it must be assumed by the student of sociology in any attempt to explain social evolution." In the same textbook (*Sociology and Modern Social Problems*, p. 35), Mr. Ellwood says: "It is evident that the student of society, if he accepts fully the modern scientific spirit, must also assume evolution in this . . . universal sense."

Not all, perhaps not much, of the Evolution-propaganda is recognized in true character by those

who spread it. Many are strong in their faith, strong in the religious creed of Evolutionism, without any conscious grasp of their unscientific attitude. What ails the evolutionists of to-day is not so much a lack of sincerity, as a lack of logic. Yet, as we have seen, some of them, and not the least notable, cannot be excused from the charge of falsification of evidence.

Of what a Catholic may hold in this matter of Evolution, especially as touching human origins, we shall speak in a moment. Here it will not be amiss to mention the distressing fact that some Catholic teachers and writers manifest on the point a disgusting lack of dignity. They turn "pussyfooters," soft-spoken diplomatists; they move about, so to speak, with finger on lip, like the "softy soothing" undertaker in *Huckleberry Finn*, warning non-evolutionists of their own religion, not to speak lest they "stultify themselves" by seeming to be out of tune with the scientific mood of the moment. They assert, with the air of men deeply learned and highly impartial, that Evolutionism is not to be brushed aside "with the wave of a hand"—as though any sane person had thought or could think of doing that! Yet these same suave gentlemen applaud the wave of the hand, not to mention the tap on the forehead, with which the arrogant evolutionist brushes aside the solidly scientific case that stands against him. One wonders who is really "stultified" in face of the facts.

There is another class of Catholic writers that

calls for passing notice. These are the strainers, the compromisers, the adjusters. They expend tireless effort in explaining to Catholics how they can adjust themselves to the mood and mode of scientific fashion. Surely, the energy of these persons is misspent. Science has suffered too much already in definition and practical expression; it might be spared the final indignity of being reduced to a kind of cheap political issue, with Catholic heelers soliciting, in its name, votes and influence for Evolutionism. "Science," as Ruskin truly says, "does not speak until it *knows*." There is no place in science for mere partisans, and no place for trimmers and compromisers. Either Evolutionism is true, or it is not true. If it *is* true, we want it, and wish to know all that can be known about it. If it is *not* true, we cannot accept it. Nor can we be driven to acceptance on the score that to certain highly imaginative people it *seems* to be true. Science, like Hamlet, "knows not 'seems'"; science "does not speak until it *knows*." Why then should we twist and strain in the effort to go along, as far as possible, with those who are merely enthusiastic for the success of the doctrine of Evolutionism and eager for its general acceptance? Let us rather labor to know whether the doctrine be *true*, withholding assent until compelling evidence is brought forward. No such evidence has been produced by the evolutionist to date, and, by his own confession, none is likely to be adduced. For the

evolutionist has a way of basing his argument—as Mr. Chesterton notes—on the gaps in its own evidence, pleading as a reason for Evolutionism the very absence of that geological record which would be required to prove it!

Now Evolutionism may some day be proved true for all living things other than man. True or false, however, it makes not a whit of difference to the Catholic as a Catholic. The question of non-human Evolution does not touch his religion at all. If God chose to make things by a slow process of development rather than by a swift one of direct creation, it still remains true that it is God who has made things. But the Catholic knows that God has not made *man* by any evolutionary process. The peculiar creation of the first man and the formation of the first woman from the first man is a matter of Divine Revelation which—as the Biblical Commission pointed out in its decree of June 30, 1909—cannot be called into doubt. And man's soul is spiritual, a thing in its nature incapable of being produced otherwise than by direct creation in each instance.

Leaving man out of the question, the Catholic may go as far "as who goes farthest" in the matter of Evolution. Of course, there is absolutely no scientific reason why he should go far, or, for the matter of that, go at all. But the whole point and purpose of the Evolution propagandist outside the Catholic Church is to establish the conviction of *human* Evo-

lution in the minds of men. This the Catholic cannot accept. Nor can he sanely accept the modified form of Evolution which would admit the evolutionary production of the human *body* from animal ancestors, declaring that, when the body of one particular animal had been developed to sufficient perfection, God infused into this one animal a human soul, and made it into Adam, our first father. The Catholic has his faith as well as the most solidly scientific reasons to inform him that the human race is marked by *solidarity*, that is, by derivation of all men from a single pair of parents. The doctrine of Original Sin (which Mr. Chesterton once called "the only part of Christian theology which can really be proved") demands this *solidarity of the human race*, and so also do the doctrines of the Incarnation and the Redemption. Science fully supports these doctrines, which we know, supernaturally, to be infallibly true. For human beings are one true species; human nature is the same in all men of all colors, cultures, sizes, dispositions; all men have the same bodily functions and mental processes, the same laws of generation and birth, the same facility of interbreeding; all have the same power of reasoning; all have the reasoned conviction of moral laws and values; all exhibit the same need of religious truth and practice; all have the power of speech and the talent to develop it into an expression adequate for their needs.

Catholics are sometimes urged—by the adjusters and compromisers—to accept the modified Evolutionism we have described. That is to say, they are urged to profess belief in the evolution of one human body from an animal source, a body made human by the inbreathing of a human soul, a body from which the first woman was developed as spouse, and from which, through generation as we know it now, all mankind has descended. But even this somewhat fantastic concession to the evolutionists does not, in any wise, bring one into agreement with the current Evolutionism. For, to the modern evolutionist the term Evolution means human Evolution, and human Evolution means *tribal* Evolution, that is, the development of mankind from *a number* of animals, and not from one humanized male animal. Further, this tribal Evolution usually means, to modern evolutionists, the development of the whole man as we know him from animal origins, with no intervention of a Creator, and no infusion of a spiritual soul. Man, as he is to-day, is regarded by evolutionists as the latest, if not the final, fruitage of a wholly natural process of development. And indeed the part of an Evolver—that is, of a Creator and Sustainer, who started and continues the process, giving to the original materials the power and direction for their evolving—is usually ignored. To many minds the doctrine of modern Evolutionism seems to dispense

with God altogether. It cannot really do so, of course. But to untrained minds it seems to do so, and this seeming is diligently fostered by the scientific gentlemen who espouse the cause of Evolutionism and seek to make it the directive force in human thinking and the main factor in all human life.

To sum up: Is Evolution true? As regards non-human living bodies, no one can say. To many it seems probable; to many it seems unlikely. In any case, Evolution cannot, in the present state of our information, be taken as anything more than a *hypothesis*; it is demonstrably *not* a scientific fact. As regards human Evolution, the answer is direct: Evolution is simply not true.

b) EVOLUTION IN SOCIOLOGY

We have quoted from a popular textbook in sociology the amazing statement that the student of this science *must assume* Evolution as true *if he accepts the modern scientific spirit*. In plain terms, this means that if the student of sociology wishes to be in style, he must take Evolution as the basis of his science. It is hardly necessary to point out the inconsistencies and even the absurdities contained in the quoted statement. Surely, if sociology is built upon a mere assumption, and an assumption that has no more powerful argument to recommend it than the fact that it is the current fashion among scien-

tists, then sociology has no claim whatever to the name of *science*. And indeed modern sociology has no justified claim to that name.

The textbook quoted is typical of its kind—it is, in fact, a very conservative specimen of its kind—and gives us plain evidence of the futility of modern sociology in theory as in practice. For, as we have seen, modern sociology, in making man a purely evolutionary product of animal origin, falsifies the very nature of man. Obviously, the plans and programs of modern sociology are the outgrowth and development of its theoretical principles. And since the theoretical principles are a mere assumption, and unwarranted at that, one does not look for high value in the programs. Indeed, we may justly say that modern sociology destroys the true concept of man and then seeks to serve him in his falsified character. In doing this, modern sociology affronts the mind by its lack of logic, and renders sterile at the outset the plans and programs it offers for the furtherance of man's lasting welfare.

Evolutionism enters into the very warp and woof of the fabric of modern sociology and social service. It falsifies the whole. It appears in discussions of "social Evolution" or the evolutionary development of animal groups which "interact mentally." It appears in the explanation of emerging intelligence and in concepts of morality; thus "the man who lies, cheats, or steals, or who indulges in other unsocial

conduct, sets himself against his group and places his group at a disadvantage as compared with other groups. Natural selection operates upon groups as well as upon individuals, and so is at work in social as well as in organic evolution. The group which can command the most loyal, most efficient membership, and has the best organization, is, other things being equal, the group which survives." The quotation is from Ellwood's *Sociology and Modern Social Problems* (p. 37).

Further: Evolutionism appears in modern sociology (a) in the exaggerated stress laid upon heredity as a social influence; (&) in the theoretical bug-a-boo set out in statistics about reproduction and overpopulation; (c) in the degrading of self-appreciation and of charity to the level of a cold instinct for cooperation as the necessary means to ultimate success in the struggle for existence; (ci) in the explanation of family life as the refinement of animal mating and grouping; (e) in the evolutionary interpretation of war, nationalism, government, social castes or classes, social morality, religion, group-dominance or success in politics, business, and finance. Indeed, modern sociology frankly declares that the development of society (or "social evolution") is so completely a matter of evolutionary processes that, to quote Mr. Ellwood once more, it "rests upon and is conditioned by biological evolution at every point. There is, therefore, scarcely any

sanity in sociology without the biological point of view" (p. 55).

In all this, modern sociology ignores God and refuses to see man either as the child of God with a divinely bestowed dignity and destiny, or as the image of God with a character *essentially* superior to that of brute animals. At the very outset, therefore, the Catholic sociologist and the modern sociologist must part company. Catholic sociology does not recognize human Evolution at all; modern sociology makes human Evolution its very soul and centre. Catholic sociology gives due recognition to the influence upon human lives of heredity and environment, but it does not make these forces the controlling and compelling factors in individual or social life; Catholic sociology recognizes human free-will; it recognizes the fact that there is in a man, however fallen, the image of God, and, in consequence, an almost boundless capacity for fine and noble conduct and for self-improvement in developing or perfecting that image; Catholic sociology recognizes divine grace as a tremendous factor in human well-being, and it knows how to direct men to the fountains of that grace. Modern sociology, on the contrary, makes man the product of heredity and environment; it ignores free-will; it sees in man no image of God, for it ignores God; it knows nothing of divine grace or of how to apply it to men's needs. In a word, mod-

ern sociology recognizes nothing in a man but inherited traits and an evolutionary drive, and nothing outside a man but the shaping forces of his surroundings. Modern sociology feels that it is not sane without the biological point of view.

Now, modern sociology is not sane even *with* the biological point of view. For if human Evolution be taken as a fact (and that is what the "biological point of view" means), it must be taken as an *inevitable* fact. Its processes are not to be controlled in any final sense. To acknowledge human Evolution and then to seek ways to direct human efforts and affairs and lives, is simply silly. If human Evolution be a fact, there is no such thing as a social problem. For man, in the hypothesis, is the victim of an inevitable and inexorable process, and nothing can be done about it. Change circumstances and environments, seek to control heredity by some process of eugenics, seek to weed out ineffective persons by some program of mutilation, prohibition, and genteel murder, and you may only halt and hamper the evolutionary force. Who could know whither the force is ultimately tending? Who could know that what now appears undesirable and burdensome in human society is not some necessary condition for a finer evolutionary fruitage later on? Ultimately the evolutionary drive *must* prevail. And the sociologist (who cannot know whither this drive is tending) is

merely a meddler and an unscientific botcher. Advocates of evolutionary sociology stand confounded by their own doctrine.

c) THE TRUE ORIGIN OF MAN

Even if we had no divinely revealed account of the creation of our first parents, even if we were to accept Evolutionism as the true doctrine of the development of living things other than man (as, perhaps, it may be), we should still be driven, by reason of the unbridged chasm of essential difference between man and brute, to conclude that man is the product of a special creation. That man has bodily resemblances to other animals is manifest; and this is quite normal too, for man *is* an animal. But man is also something other than animal; man is rational; man has understanding and free-will. And there is not a shred or patch of scientific evidence to suggest that any animal except man now has, or ever has had, anything comparable to understanding and free-will. Even if one should accept the modified Evolutionism which holds that the human body of the first man was developed from a brute, the mental and spiritual element in a man could not be so developed; *the special creation of man as a rational being* is still a truth absolutely scientific.

The Catholic student is not to be distressed by the impatience or displeasure of the modern sociologist over this logical process of reasoning and this use

of the term "scientific truth." The modern sociologist likes to rule out argument and fact which deal with God or creation, as "unscientific." This is because the modern sociologist, like the pseudo-scientists in general, has defined the terms "scientific" and "unscientific" for his own purposes, limiting their meaning arbitrarily to exclude from discussion the realities which do not lie subject to handling in a laboratory. If you allow the modern sociologist or pseudo-scientist to make up his own terms, he will invalidate your argument before you present it; that is, he will nullify its force by dodging it altogether. But it is not logical to dodge facts or valid argument; it is not sane to frame a set of terms to an arbitrary meaning and then deny the reality of what lies beyond the limits of that narrow meaning. To deny the scientific character of arguments about things super-sensible (such as God, or creation, or man's special character) because you cannot get these things into a test-tube or under a microscope, is as irrational as to deny the existence of poetry because you cannot weigh it on hay-scales. The superstition that "scientific" means "capable of laboratory demonstration," and that nothing is of value unless it have such "scientific" backing, is growing stale; but it has been a mighty and a widespread superstition, and its influence has been a calamitous evil for the mind, notably for the school-trained mind.

The true origin of man is *the special creative act*

of God which gave man being. Man was formed, as we know from Revelation, from the slime of the earth. The modified Evolutionism which makes the first man's body an animal product holds that the forming of man from the slime of the earth was indirect; and, of course, if the slime of the earth were modified gradually through a series of changes into an animal form, it would still be true that the final product (man's body) is made of the slime of the earth. But the point here is that man came into being when the soul was created and joined with matter, which itself had been first created. "The Lord God formed man of the slime of the earth: and breathed into his face the breath of life, and man became a living soul." (*Genesis ii, 7*).

To *create* is to produce without having any materials or seedlings or elements to shape into a thing. To *create* is to make entirely out of nothing. It is, of course, a demonstrable fact that all creatures are ultimately and formally explained only by the fact of creation. No alternative doctrine is acceptable; indeed none is thinkable, except the doctrine called *Pantheism* and that called *Materialism*, and neither can stand investigation. Pantheism makes the First Cause share its actual being with creatures, so that all things are God; and this doctrine makes finite the infinite First Cause and identifies good and evil; thus reason cannot accept it. Materialism denies the existence of non-bodily things, and so stands powerless

to explain a non-contingent beginning of things contingent (for bodily things are always contingent) or to establish a First Cause which does not contradict itself by turning out to be an *effect*. Rejecting—as we must if we are reasonable—the doctrines of Pantheism and Materialism, we are forced to accept Creationism as the only alternative. Nor does reason dislike this requirement; it squares with rational nature as wholly reasonable, wholly acceptable, wholly consonant and consistent with the reasoned explanations of things in the universe. Thus, the statement that man has his origin in creation is a scientific statement; it is not presented as something to be taken on faith. But we stress the *special* creation of man, for man is essentially different from all other things in the universe, and, while he has the elements and properties of all sorts of bodily things in his make-up (chemical, mineral, vegetal, animal), he has the mental and spiritual element which is like no other thing in the world, and which raises him above all visible creation. From the first man, directly created, we know, by Revelation only, that the first woman was formed. And from these, by the generative or reproductive process as we know it now, all other men have descended. Yet human parents are not the creators of their offspring; the marvellous and mysterious formation of the child is explained by physical processes which only the Creator could establish and only the Creator can maintain. And

the human soul, being a spirit, cannot be explained by any reproductive process; it is, in every instance, the direct and immediate product of God's creative act. Nor is the soul first created and afterwards infused into its body. The doctrine of such a *pre-existence* of the soul is theologically reprobated and philosophically unsound. The soul is created and infused at one and the same indivisible instant. Each soul (directly created by God, and in no sense derived from parents) exists at the moment of its creation in substantial union with the body, just conceived. The first moment which finds a human soul existent *without* a body, is the moment it *leaves* the body when a man dies.

In passing, it is interesting and profitable to notice that, while *the soul* is not derived from parents, *human nature* is so derived. The whole man, the complete human being, is born of a human mother. Thus a man takes his nature (under God) from his parents. And the original sin which affects human nature is thus transmitted to all men, unless, as in the case of the Blessed Mother, God's power intervenes to preserve the person from contamination, or, as in the Incarnation, God Himself becomes man without process of human paternity.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE

In this Article we have learned that the doctrine of Evolutionism or Transformism is merely a hy-

pothesis and not at all a scientific fact. We have seen also that Evolution (even in the unlikely supposition that it should be proved even for lower life-forms than that of man) does not touch the question of human origin and does not enter into any explanation of the nature of a man. We have noticed the lamentable fact that the inadequate (and, touching man, the demonstrably false) hypothesis of Evolution is generally accepted to-day as the true explanation of the development of all living things, including man, although it cannot pretend to explain first origins. We have seen that unscientific propaganda, and the prideful determination of men to ignore God's place and work in His world, are the causes of this widespread and unfounded belief. We have seen that Evolution holds a central position in modern non-Catholic sociology, and we have offered a rational criticism in proof of the fact that the evolutionary assumption renders such sociology inept, sterile, and scientistic. We have learned that the true origin of man is, ultimately, God's creation of the first parents, and, proximately, the human reproductive process together with the immediate divine creation of each individual human soul. We have noted that the pre-existence of Jiuman souls is an untenable doctrine.

Article ii. The Character of the
 | Human Person

- a) Meaning of *Person* b) The Dignity of Man
 c) The Root Principle of Sociology

a) **MEANING OF PERSON**

The term *person*, as a mere word, has an odd and interesting derivation. It comes from the Latin *personare*, "to sound through," and has reference to the mask worn by a player on the stage—a mask through which the sound of the actor's voice is carried to the audience, or through which the represented character "sounds" to the playgoers. The real meaning of *person* is very far removed (although possibly circuitously derived) from this literal or etymological sense of the term.

A *person* is a complete substantial being (not a part or element of another substance), which is endowed with understanding and free-will. In philosophical language, a *person* is "a complete, individual, autonomous substance of the rational order." This definition calls for a word of explanation.

First of all a person is a *substance*. A substance is a reality (and, strictly understood, a *created* reality, a *finite* being) which is fitted to exist *itself*. That is, while it requires a Creator and Preserver, it does not require some creature other than itself in which to have or hold existence as a mark, quality, characteristic, or modification. Realities which do require

another thing as a subject or substrate in which to hold their own existence, are called, not *substances*, but *accidentals* or, more technically, *accidents*. And we may classify all finite reality with approximate exactness as *substances* and *accidents*. An apple, for example, is a *substance*; its color, size, shape, flavor, texture, position, rest or movement, are *accidents*. The apple exists *itself*; the other things mentioned exist as marks or determinations *of the apple*. Color, to exist, requires some bodily thing (some *substance*) which is colored, that is, the surfaces of which can have or hold or reflect color. Size is manifestly not a thing existent in itself; it can exist only as the mark of some measurable bodily thing. So also with the other accidents mentioned; these are not things fitted to exist in themselves or by themselves, but to exist as the modifications, marks, or characteristics of other things. Accidents may qualify other accidents (as the velocity of an arrow is an accident or qualification of its movement, which movement in turn is an accident of the arrow), but the basis of accidents is always a substance. Substance is not directly perceivable by any of the senses, but it is understood by the mind; it is that reality which is qualified by the accidents which the senses do perceive, and which the intellect understands as things not fitted for existence by or in themselves. A substance is either *bodily* or *spiritual*. The complete man is a bodily substance; the soul is a spiritual

substance, as we have seen in an earlier Chapter. (*Cl. Book First, Chap. II, Art. I, b*).

Secondly, a person is a *complete* substance. A complete substance is one that is not naturally framed for existence in fusion or substantial unity with another substance. An animal or a tree or an apple is a complete substance. An *incomplete* substance tends to union with another substance, so that the two are fused into a single substantial compound or *composed substance*. Sometimes an incomplete substance, unless it be spiritual, cannot exist without the other substance with which it is naturally united to form a composed or compound (and therefore *single*) substance. But it is not to be confused with an *accident* on this account; for an accident exists *in* a substance as its mark or characteristic or qualification, but an incomplete substance exists *with* its co-substance, and is no mere mark or qualification of the latter, but an essential component part of the resultant compound, even as the co-substance is. When, therefore, we say that a person is a *complete substance*, we mean that a person is not merely an essential element of a compound; is not merely an essential *part* of a composed substance; we mean that the person *is* the substance in question, and that the substance in question is not merely the essential part of something else.—It is to be noted that we are speaking here of created substances and creatural persons. If we extend substance to include the

Infinite (r. e., *God*) there is nothing contradictory in the idea of such substance, one and indivisible in itself, subsisting in a plurality of persons. That there are Three Persons, distinct and co-equal, in the one undivided Divine Substance, we know by faith; that there is no contradiction or inherent impossibility in this fact, we know by philosophy. But our discussion is not concerned with matters of theology; we are speaking now of finite substances and created persons.—To illustrate: a *man* is a complete substance; his *body* (as human) and his *soul* are incomplete substances. The body of a man cannot exist (as a human body) unless the soul be substantially united with it; the soul, however, can exist, as *this human soul*, but not as the entire *man*, when death separates these incomplete co-substances. Body and soul substantially unite to form one complete substance, which is the man. The body, after a man's death, is a parcel of various physical and chemical substances, but it is no longer a truly *human* thing, although it may for a time retain the outer shape of a man. Thus the body is an incomplete substance. The soul, after a man's death, exists, but it is not the whole man. The soul, therefore, is a complete substance *as a human soul*, but it is incomplete *as a man*. An angel is a complete substance, for it is a spirit which is not formed for union with another substance in such wise that the resultant compound is one composed substance. An angel is a person; a man is a person.

A man's body is not a person; a man's soul is not perfectly a human person. Created persons are these and only these: *men* and *angels*. The reason why animals, plants, and inanimate things are not persons will appear in a moment.

Thirdly, a person is *autonomous*. The old Latin phrase for this requirement of substantial personality is *sui juris*, "of one's own right." The phrase indicates the fact that the substance which it describes is, so to speak, master of its own proper activities and operations and does not share their control with any other finite substance. A man is autonomous or *sui juris*, for a man is a substantial unit, complete and finished, and not a mere part or element of another substance which controls him. A man's hand is a substantial thing; it is a substance; but, apart from the man who uses it, the hand has not the control of its operations as a hand; therefore, the hand is not autonomous or *sui juris*. A plant is *sui juris*, but the twig or branch of the plant is not. The twig exercises its plant-functions of growth and fruitfulness by reason of its integral union with the plant; it is the plant that grows and flourishes, and it manifests these functions in and by means of each twig and branch and part. Should the twig be broken off, it is *sui juris*, either as a new plant (supposing it capable of living and growing if planted), or as a dying or dead substance with the activities proper to such things (cohesion, response to gravity, inertia, etc.).

Many substances are complete and autonomous without being persons, but completeness and autonomy are requisites for substantial personality.

The crowning note in the definition of *person* is found in the phrase, "of the rational order." The phrase means that a person has *understanding and free-will*. For "the rational order" is that classification of living things which marks them as having *understanding* or *rational power* or simply *reason*. And reason involves free-will. For where understanding or reason exists, the natural appetency proper to such power as its consequent, or rather concomitant, must also exist, and this appetency is free-will. We have already explained this matter in our studies of man's soul. (*Cf. Book First, Chap. 2, Art. 2, &*). *A person, therefore, is a complete, autonomous substance, endowed with understanding and free-will*. Thus animals, plants, and inanimate substances—while they may be complete and autonomous—are never *persons*; such things fail of personality because they do not belong to "the rational order."

Every human being, from the first moment of conception, has full personality and full human dignity. Nor is personality lost through idiocy, insanity, delirium, or unconsciousness. Personality comes with the creation and infusion of the human soul and is never lost thereafter. Death brings a break, it is true, but the soul retains the most important elements of

personality, and though not a full-fledged *human* person, it is yet a spiritual person, for, as a soul, it is a complete autonomous substance of the rational order, even though, *as a man*, it is incomplete. Thus the immortal soul endures in endless personality. By faith we know with certainty what philosophy indicates as most probable, namely, that the soul will be joined with its body again, and the complete human personality of every man will endure eternally.

Every person is *of the rational order*. *Rational* means equipped with the faculties of understanding and free-will; but it does *not* necessarily mean having the *use* of understanding and free-will. Thus, a new-born baby is *rational*, so is an insane man, so is an unconscious man, so is a man in delirium, so is a person asleep. These persons are not actually *using* reason; various things prevent such use—immaturity, insanity, delirium, unconsciousness. But these persons would inevitably use reason were the obstacles which thwart its use removed, and so they belong to the rational order and are called *rational beings*.

b) THE DIGNITY OF MAN

In all this bodily universe we find no being to meet the requirements of the definition of *person* except human beings. Plants and beasts are wonderful and splendid things, surpassing all inanimate na-

ture, which is itself most amazingly wonderful. Plants and the animals other than man have marvellously complex and refined structures; they exercise operations of such intricate and involved character, and withal are so exactly balanced and so delicately adjusted, that they are at once the admiration and the despair of the scientific investigator. They have the mysterious thing called *life*, which no one has ever satisfactorily defined; they exercise vital functions, each in its own determined way, in a manner perfectly suited to their requirements; they exhibit in structure and function alike the most useful, the most beautiful, balance and delicacy, order and harmony, plan and purpose. But man, while he has all that is marvellous and beautiful, in structure or function, that plants and beasts possess—and indeed in a much higher and more complex degree—has something *essentially different* from the perfections of these lower forms of life, something *essentially superior* to them, something that makes him an essentially different *kind* of being from animal or plant. This "something" is the spiritual soul, by reason of which he is *rational*, that is to say, equipped with understanding and free-will. And the spiritual soul with its splendid rational faculties does not merely make man peculiarly and superbly autonomous during his worldly life; it assures his unending existence; it dowers him with immortality. And

so does man stand out as the greatest of the works of bodily creation, the king of this material universe, wherein he dwells for a time as one who "has not here a lasting city."

Man is equipped with understanding to direct his course, with will to choose it. And while these high gifts are capable of abuse that involves endless ruin, the fact remains that they are inexpressibly glorious endowments and are naturally meant, not for defeat and ruin, but for wondrous achievement. Man, in a word, is equipped for the task (under God) of winning endless happiness and glory, of fulfilling the capacities of his being in the fadeless rapture of the Vision of God in Heaven. So has man an eternal and a most ennobling destiny.

By reason of his spiritual soul, his rational faculties, his glorious and immortal destiny, man is of incomparably greater value than any other bodily creature. The old name for human worth or value is *dignity*. Manifestly, we do not here employ the term *dignity* as it is used in casual speech. Men talk of a person's dignity when they mean his seriousness, or his noble bearing; men speak of dignities in the sense of important duties or high positions. But we use dignity here to signify *worth* or *value*, and this in no terms of worldly wealth, grandeur, or service; we mean *inherent* worth or value; we mean worth or value that belongs to a human being *as such*, whether he be young or old, refined or boorish, cultured or

uncouth, sick or well, sane or insane, law-abiding or criminal, bond or free. For the worth or dignity of a man is so intimately and essentially bound up with his very nature that there is no severing the two. Human dignity is an essential attribute of the human person, the individual man. It is not an attribute of society as such, but of each member of society. The *personality* of each individual human being involves transcendent worth, incalculable value, and a dignity that is, in one sense, infinite.

When we ascribe man's dignity to his *personality*, we mean his substantial personality. We do not use the term *personality* as it is used in the modern discussions that are loosely described as psychology. The indefiniteness and ineptitude of such discussions have got current the notion that *personality* is a mere charm of manner, an indefinable aura that is sometimes called *color* or *glamor*; and sometimes the term suggests a power of impressing or swaying others, a natural or acquired ability to please, to lead, to dominate. As we have said, we use the term in no such sense. By *personality* we indicate the character of every human being; one has *personality* by being a person; and the *personality* of each person is of the same nature- in each, not subject to degrees. The *personality* of an insane criminal is as great, philosophically, as that of the master of mñh who has but to appear to command enthusiastic approval, and whose very word wins him an ardent following.

c) THE ROOT-PRINCIPLE OF SOCIOLOGY

The principles of a science are the fundamental truths upon which the science rests and out of which it is developed. The principles of sociology are the truths which are fundamental to any theorizing about man and his welfare, and which give direction to any practical measures adopted or recommended by sociologists for the well-being of society. The principles of sociology constitute the philosophy of sociology.

Now, all that we have learned in this study of God, of Christ, of man's soul, of man's origin, nature, and personality, are principles of sociology. But some of these principles, while of incalculable importance theoretically and practically, are more or less remote from the immediate work-in-hand of the sociologist. But there is one principle which the sociologist finds everywhere and always in his work, whether of theory or of active plan and program; one principle is so fundamental, and, at the same time, so far-reaching, that there is not one single social project that may be properly undertaken without giving it full consideration and drawing clearly upon its light and power. This is *the principle of human dignity or worth*.

The sane sociologist can never for an instant forget that he is dealing with men, with persons, with beings that have, *as individuals*¹ an inherent dignity which precludes all thought of handling them like

herds of animals, or of treating any single one of them as anything less than the image of God. Modern sociology, based as it is upon false and inadequate principles, very generally ignores human dignity, and is, in so far forth, a contradiction in itself and an agency of evil. For if each human person is not seen in true character, man is not known as he is, and cannot then be served. Modern sociology will not recognize man as he is, yet seeks to serve him. In this is modern sociology a contradiction and an evil thing.

The modern sociologist too frequently loses sight of the individual person in the mass of men. We have all heard of the inability of certain minds, befuddled by detail, to envision a whole problem and work effectually towards its solution. We have heard this state of mind described as the inability "to see the forest for the trees." But much worse is the inability, much more blind, much more havoc-working, which tries to handle some problem of forestation without recognizing the fact that a forest does actually consist of trees. If one does not see the forest for the trees, one does at least see trees, and trees are something solid and actual and valuable. But if one does not see the trees for the forest, one has no grasp of reality at all; for the forest without the trees is not a forest; it may be a mere dark smudge on the horizon to be interpreted as whim or baseless fancy may suggest. And out of such suggestion nothing of

value, theoretical or practical, can ever emerge. So with humanity. It is admittedly an inadequate view which cannot see society for its members; but it is a much more inadequate view—indeed, a calamitous view—which cannot see individual men for society; which loses the persons of men in the mass of humanity. Yet it is currently the fashion among modern sociologists to speak much of society and of its rights and claims, and to speak little and think less of the individual persons who make up society. Let the student remember that, absolutely speaking, it is the individual man who is the more important, and the mass of men *as such* that is less important. It is the individual man who has the surpassing worth or dignity of substantial personality; society as such does not possess this dignity. The individual man does not exist for society; he exists for God and for the attainment of his own individual destiny. The institutions of society, nay society itself and its divisions, natural, civil, supernatural, exist for individual men.

It is true, of course, that each individual man is called upon to make many sacrifices, and to expend much energy, for the sake of the common weal. He is *required* to devote interest and effort to the peace, security, and progress of all mankind, and notably of his family, his immediate neighbors, and co-nationalists. But the sacrifice and the energy and the interest and the effort are not devoted to some

shadowy and superhuman thing called *society*; these things are devoted by each worthy individual to the well-being of *other individual men like himself*. This is a most important thing for the sociologist to remember. If it be forgotten, there is danger—nay, there is certainty—that the dignity of the individual man will be obscured; men will be so many "cases" for the sociologist to consider; human beings will be viewed in group, and some groups (such as the afflicted, the destitute, or "the unfit") will be regarded as of less value or dignity than other groups (say, the educated, the wealthy, the powerful).

A short time ago an educated man, a professional man, and (we confess it in sorrow) a Catholic, remarked in a gathering of university men that a certain criminal then in detention, whose attorneys were offering the familiar plea of insanity in his defence, should be executed, whether sane or insane. "This man," he said, while his auditors nodded approval, "committed a horrible murder. Sane or insane, he is useless to society. Why should he be allowed to live?" Speaker and hearers forgot *the fundamental principle of human dignity*. The criminal, foul murderer though he was, was a man, and inherent in him was the dignity which marks the person. He did not exist for society, or to be of use to society. Inasmuch as he was guilty of a capital offence, he deserved, if sane, to die. But he deserved to die because he had killed a fellow human being, because he placed in

jeopardy the peace and security of other individual men, and distinctly *not* because he had offended "society." The criminal had not offended society; he had offended God, had outraged his own rational nature, had violated the basic right of a fellowman, had made himself an evil example to others. Of course, it is convenient to speak of "society"; the term is a handy group-name for all individual men; but the point we stress is the danger of allowing this handy term to make a harmful change in our very concept of humanity. Against that danger we repeat a most emphatic warning.

People at large are wholly misguided by the loose use of "society" as a group-name. They imagine that society is some sort of overshadowing and ominous thing, gigantesque, powerful, all-important. Or they enthrone "society" as a god, to be served by mere crawling creatures called individual men. They suffer much the same hallucination in the question of "the State" as contrasted with "the citizen." These misguided views are not corrected by the modern sociologist; on the contrary. And thus does modern sociology do harm to human minds and human lives and human dignity, which, be it ever remembered, is the dignity of substantial personality in the individual image of God.

Consider the following citation (made with slight adaptations) from a contemporary novel which has enjoyed great popularity. And remember as you read

that doctrine of this kind is being constantly spread abroad by every agency of publicity, newspapers, romances, magazines, the theatre, and even by the scientific journals of modern sociology and by sociological textbooks. "You ask me if I am not glad that Merton is dead. Look here, John, I'm not a sentimentalist. I don't subscribe to this modern stuff about the sanctity of human life. The ancients were wiser. They didn't consider any human life sacred but that which was valuable to the community, and when they considered it of greater benefit to the community that even such a life should be sacrificed, they didn't hesitate; they promptly took it. Well, if the sentimentalists can find anything valuable or sacred in the life of such a cad as Merton—a seducer, a waster, a professional adulterer—I can't. There are some men who should be shot on sight, it should be accounted justifiable homicide to do it, and Merton was one of that sort. TH not descend to the conventional hypocrisy of pretending that I have any regret that a life that was not only useless to society, but a positive menace, has been ended. And if you want to hear so, here you are: I'm *glad* that Merton is dead."

There is summed up in this short paragraph from a modern novel more false and harmful sociological doctrine than could be expressed and explained in many pages of prosy modern sociology. Apart from the fact that the modern sociologist—being evolu-

tionistic—would have to emit many words to explain how, in the continuous unfolding of social perfection, the ancients could have wiser theories than the moderns, the whole citation is right in line with the false and ruinous modern sociology. Human life is looked at in relation to "society" or "the community," and its value is solely determined from that relation; the individual personal worth of a man is wholly forgotten, indeed it is derided; unchanging morality is sneered at as "sentimentalism" and "convention." Of course, the sociologist, even of the modern sort, would insist that some process of law should be observed in bringing the evil Merton to his death; the sociologist would not, unless ultra-modern, admit as justifiable homicide the shooting of a man, even though a rouse or libertine, on sight. But for the rest, the modern sociologist would offer no objection to the inhuman theory of life and morality offered in the citation. And yet the modern sociologist offers his services to progress and the uplifting of humanity!

We repeat: the root-principle of all sane sociology is *the principle of human dignity*. And the truth contained in this principle enters intimately and essentially into every social action. The principle is but the expression of what a man actually is. It merely states plain truth, plain fact. It maintains that man is God's image, that man is a person, that his worth is incalculable, that his life and his honor and bodily

and spiritual well-being are to be respected. The principle does not mean that a criminal is not to be punished. On the contrary, it insists that individual men have a right to the security which the criminal menaces or destroys, and that, in consequence, crime is to have due and proper punishment, even if it extend, in extreme cases, to the taking of the culprit's life by public authority. But it does not lose sight, in view of extreme punishment, of the dignity of human life and nature, even that of the criminal who is executed. Our own Constitution is sane, and in line with the principle of human dignity, when it proscribes "cruel and inhuman punishments" for offenders, that is, such punishments as would tend to degrade them or make them bestial, and which would induce in others the opinion that a man may be handled as a beast or as goods and chattels.

Incalculable harm is done by the explicit denial or implicit ignoring of the principle of human dignity. We might instance countless examples of such harm. A few will suffice: "sweating"; oppression of laborers; child labor, in mills or factories particularly; indecent conditions (unhygienic and immoral) for laborers; disregard for the virtue of others; carelessness about human life; birth control; divorce; abortion; sterilization of criminals or "the unfit"; lobbies against just and necessary social legislation; needless exploratory operations; the marketing of labor; inadequate wages; the treating of those afflicted men-

tally or physically as of less value than other men—these and many other social evils arise from the modern disregard for the principle of human dignity.

One final word. We have insisted upon the importance of the individual human being as the image of God, endowed with glorious faculties, and set for high and lasting achievement. But our true doctrine is not to be warped into the ugly and ruinous social philosophy called *Individualism*, which seeks to free individual man from all restraints and responsibilities, to loosen the bonds of morality, to strike at the stability of family-life, which calls for great individual self-sacrifice and tireless individual devotion, and to make the State with its laws and agencies a servant of individual whim, caprice, and passion. We must keep steadily in mind the fact that man is the image of God; and we must keep in equally clear view the fact that man is an *image*, and not God Himself. Individualism would make of individual man a god to be served and pleased, instead of a human creature who is bound to serve God.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE

In this Article we have defined *person*, and have offered a philosophical explanation of the definition. We have learned that the substantial personality of every human being invests him with a worth and value that is not to be calculated or expressed in cold terms of speech. We have seen that all sane sociology

must begin with the clear recognition of human worth, and must shape its theories and plan its programs in a manner consonant with the requirements of this recognized principle. We have noticed the modern disregard of *the principle of human dignity*, and have instanced social evils directly consequent upon this disregard. Of some of these evils we shall have a word to say in subsequent Chapters.

Article 3. Fundamental Human Rights and Duties

- a) Meaning of Terms b) Religion c) Life d) Liberty
e) Labor f) Property

a) MEANING OF TERMS

Here we are to define the terms *right* and *duty*, to set forth a summary classification of rights and duties, and to indicate the nature of the virtues of *justice*, *charity*, and *equity*, upon which rights and duties are founded.

1. A *right*, in general, is *that which is just*. As we employ the term, it means *a just moral power, resident in a person, of doing, possessing, or exacting something*. It is a *moral* or *will-power*; it is not a *physical* power of muscle or sinew or whip or chain. It is a power resident in *a person*, and if it resides in a group of persons, this is due to their common requirements as *a plurality of individuals*, and not

because they constitute a thing called *community* or *society* as an entity different from the elements of substantial personality which compose such groups.

Right is founded upon *law*. For a right in one person means an obligation in all men of respecting that right in so far as this involves no disrespect of still other rights. And such obligation is imposed only by *law*. Now, all true law is ultimately based upon the Eternal Law, that is, the Divine Ordinance which has established the order to be observed in the universe, and which forbids man to disturb that order. Thus all true right is traceable to God's perfections of Intellect and Will which impose the Eternal Law, and so, since the perfections of God are identical with His essence, all right is ultimately based upon God Himself. God is *the origin of rights*—not *the State*, not *society*, not *public opinion*.

Right, founded upon law, takes its classification from the classification of laws themselves. Thus a right is *natural* if founded on the natural law, that is, the Eternal Law (which, with reference to free human activity, is *the moral law*), as manifested to man by reason or conscience. Contrasted with natural right is *positive* right, founded upon positive or statute law; and this is, in turn, *ecclesiastical* or *civil*, according as its basis is the statute law of Church or State. The "statute law," so to speak, set forth in Divine Revelation (notably the Commandments of God) is the basis of *divine* right. To illus-

trate: A man's right to life is *natural*; his right to immunity from lawless murder is *divine*, as well as *natural* in view of the Fifth Commandment; his right to vote is a *civil right*; his rights as established by Canon Law are *ecclesiastical*.

A right to possess and use material goods and to dispose of them at will is a right of *property*; a right to make laws, to rule and govern subjects, is a right of *jurisdiction*. A right which cannot be ceded or renounced is *inalienable* (such, for instance, is the right of a man to offer true worship to God). A right which may be lawfully renounced at will is *alienable* (such, for instance, is the right to property, for property may be given away, or right to it transferred by sale). A right is *juridical* or *perfect* when it is founded upon strict justice; it is *moral* or *imperfect* when it is founded upon charity or equity and so constitutes a *claim*.

A right ceases to be a right when it collides with a greater right. The greater must prevail. And the "greater" is that right which is concerned with the graver matter, or belongs to the more universal order (touches more human individuals), or is founded upon a stronger title or claim. Thus the right of an employer to a very large profit must cede to the right of the employee to a living family wage, because the right to life and its necessities touches a graver matter than the right to non-essential property. Again, the right of *the many* (call them

the public, or the State, or the community or *society*, if you will; but remember that these terms do not indicate something superhuman which absorbs the individual person and rises superior to him; the terms mean only collections or pluralities of individual human persons with their individual and collective requirements) may take precedence over the right of *the few* or *the one*. Thus, for general public advantage, a highway may be built through a man's field even if he is unwilling to sell or cede the property for this purpose. This "right of eminent domain" is of more universal order (*i. e.*, concerns more persons and their needs) than that of the owner of the field. Similarly, in times of war or extreme economic stress, the State (*i. e.*, the public through its government) may take over the control and even the ownership of railways or privately owned businesses or enterprises. Ordinarily, due compensation is to be made to the persons whose rights are thus ceded (though they be unwilling to cede them) to the right of eminent domain or common weal. Finally, the right of a devoted relative to inherit the goods of a man who dies without making a will, prevails over the right of an equally devoted friend or a faithful servant. For blood-relationship is a stronger basis of right than friendship or service.

2. A *duty* is something one is obligated to do or to omit doing. It is properly defined as a *moral obli-*

gation incumbent upon a person of doing, omitting, or avoiding something. It is a *moral* obligation and binds the *will*; it is not a *physical* obligation or bond which exercises power of compulsion over the body or its members. Since duty binds the *will*, it binds only *a person*, for only a person has free-will. And if duty is common or public or general, as it often is, this is not because *the public* or *society* has a corporate will distinct from the individual wills of those who compose the group; it is because the group is composed of individual human persons, each with identical requirements.

A *duty* is the correlative of a *right*. One has the *duty* of doing or omitting something because the right (of God or men) requires such performance or omission. A duty in one person answers a right in another or others; a right in one imposes a duty on others of respecting that right and not violating it. Duty, like right, is based upon law, and ultimately upon the Eternal Law, and on God Himself. Thus the true *origin of duties* is God and His Eternal Moral Law, not *the State* or *society* or *the community* or *public opinion*. The State and the community and society do make requirements upon individual men; these groups of individuals have collective needs and rights which impose true *duties* on individuals; and, conversely, the nature and needs of the individual call for the attention and action of the groups, and so the State and society have their duties

too. But (again the student is warned of the need of keeping clear-cut and accurate concepts) these relationships of individual and group, and the consequent duties and rights involved in them, are ever matters that concern individual human persons, each of whom is cast in the image of God, and each of whom has a dignity which no group *as such* possesses.

A duty imposed by the natural law is *a natural duty*; such, for example, is the duty incumbent upon parents of caring for the needs of their children. A duty imposed by positive or statute law is *a positive duty*; such, for example, is the duty of obeying traffic laws or paying taxes; such also is the duty of Catholics to hear Mass on Sundays and holydays of obligation.

A duty which requires the positive performance of an act is *an affirmative duty*; such, for instance, is the duty of paying taxes. A duty which requires the omission or avoidance of a thing is *a negative duty*; such, for example, is the duty of avoiding sin. An affirmative duty is to be fulfilled, but its requirements are not binding upon a person at every single moment of his existence; one must pay taxes, but not every day and hour and moment; one must hear Mass, but not at every instant. A negative duty places its requirement upon a person at every single instant of his existence; thus one must avoid sin always, everywhere, every day and hour and moment. Hence

one may be exempted from the performance of *an affirmative duty* when extreme or grave necessity requires it (and so, for example, one is exempted from the duty of restoring ill-gotten goods so long as one has not and cannot get money to make the payment) ; but one is never, under any circumstances, exempted from the performance of *a negative duty* of the natural order (and so, for example, one is not exempted from the duty of not denying the true faith, even if one faces the alternative of torture and death).

It is to be carefully noted that exemption from an affirmative duty requires not only a high degree of stress or necessity, but also *the exclusion of any involved violation of a negative duty*. Sometimes a law is set forth in affirmative terms, yet implies a negative obligation, from which there is never an exemption. Consider the law, "Honor thy father and mother." As far as terms go, this is an affirmative prescription imposing an affirmative duty; but the law also involves a prohibition or negative duty, *viz.*, "Do not dishonor father or mother." Hence, while the affirmative prescription of this law does not exact active observance at every moment (for a man must often be engaged in pursuits in which he is not even thinking of his parents), its negative requirement binds at every instant (and thus never, at any moment, is it lawful to dishonor one's parents). Exemption from affirmative duty is, therefore, never

permissible, no matter what the necessity, if it involves an implicit violation of a negative duty imposed by natural or divine law.

A duty which binds in strict justice is *perfect*; one which does not bind in justice, but in charity or other virtue, is *imperfect*.

Where duties seem to collide, *the greater* prevails and *the lesser* ceases to be a duty. The greater duty, like the greater right, is that which, when compared with another or brought into apparent collision with another, is seen to be imposed by the higher law, or to be concerned with the graver matter, or to be based on the more valid title. Thus if a man were forbidden by civil law or by order of his parents to worship God, the duty of obedience to civil and parental authority would cease in face of the divine authority which requires worship; the divine law is the higher law. Again, the duty of taking care of life and health ceases when one risks them for the sake of safeguarding one's virtue; thus the martyrs suffered torture and execution rather than apostatize: the care of the soul is a graver matter than the care of health and life. Finally, the exposing of one's life to extreme danger for the sake of saving another who has no claim in nature to such service, is not imposed by duty (unless it be in the order of one's freely undertaken office, as in life-guards, policemen, etc.), although it is one's right and an act of heroic virtue; for, in ordinary cases, the care of one's own life rests

upon a more valid title than the care for the life of another.

3. Rights and duties are, as we have seen, based upon law, that is, upon *the natural law*, which is the Eternal Law as manifested to man by sound reason or conscience. Inasmuch as the natural law is ultimately identified with the divine perfections, and so with God Himself, we have rightly declared that the true origin of rights and duties is Almighty God. Now, dealing more immediately with men and their human conduct, we find that the requirements of the natural law, whether basic or derived, exact the adjustment of human activity to their norm, demand that human conduct be *just* in line with them. This fact and the terms *adjustment* and *just* give some suggestion of the meaning of the virtue called *justice*. But the full meaning of *justice* among men, the fundamental requirement of the natural law (upon which all human laws and most social obligations rest), is found in the following definitions. *Justice*, taken subjectively, that is, as resident in the person or *subject* who has it, is *a virtue or unfailing intention of giving to everyone that which is his due*. Taken objectively, or as a thing or object, *justice is the rule or law which requires all men to recognize the fundamentally equal dignity of all human beings, and so binds all to equality and proportion in their mutual dealings*.

The requirements of justice among men are supported by *sanctions*, that is, by inducements which are sufficient to make a reasonable man observe these requirements. Sometimes the sanctions are *moral* (such as the guilt and the impending punishment for sin) and sometimes they are *civil* (such as the penalties prescribed for the evasion of taxes or the violation of speed-laws). Sometimes—indeed, very often—civil and moral sanctions are attached to the same requirements of justice; thus both the moral law and the civil law forbid stealing, each under its own penalties.

Justice is itself a single thing. But there are various names for justice, according to the various human relationships which it regulates. Hence we have the following classification of justice: (a) *Legal Justice* governs the relations of the individual man to the many (State, community, the public, society). Legal justice requires the citizen to observe the statute laws. Inasmuch as legal justice also requires the citizen to show an active interest in the common weal, to have spirit and to expend energy for the common good, it is called *Social Justice*.—(b) *Distributive Justice* governs the relations of the many (State, community, society) towards families and individuals. It regulates the activities of the group towards its constituent members. It requires that the burdens of community-life be properly *distributed*, so that each member may have his

proportionate share to carry. Equitable systems of taxation are, for example, prescribed by the requirements of distributive justice. Further, distributive justice requires that the honors and emoluments, the offices, benefits, and dignities of the community-group be properly *distributed*, that is, assigned to individuals who are capable and worthy. Appointive offices, therefore, are to be given only to those who deserve them and are able to discharge their duties effectually. Elective offices are to be bestowed by voters, and the latter are not to be deceived by lies, tricks, dirty politics, or deceiving campaigns. Finally, distributive justice requires that punishments for offences be lawfully, reasonably, rightly, and promptly imposed, and perfectly executed, without let or hindrance, and without distinction of persons based on wealth or social influence. In this latter function, distributive justice is frequently called *Retributive Justice*.—(c) *Commutative Justice* governs the relations of person to person. Here the term *person* has a twofold meaning, *viz.*, first, a single human being, and, secondly, a group (business, firm, corporation, government, college, religious community, etc.), which, for purposes of social action, *must be considered as an individual*. A single human being is a *physical* or a *natural* person; a group or body considered as individual is a *moral* person. If, for instance, Jones sues Smith, the action is between man and man; physical persons are involved.

But if Jones sues the Paradise Railroad Company, or sells a farm to the Cosmopolitan Country Club, the action concerns a physical person on the one hand (Jones), and, on the other, a moral person (Company, Club). If, finally, the College of St. John buys the property of Community Farms, Inc., the action concerns two moral persons. In all social action between persons, whether physical or moral, commutative justice requires suitable and equitable procedure, balance, proportion. The term *commutative* comes from the Latin *commutare*, which means "to change or exchange, to barter or trade." Commutative justice regulates the give-and-take among members of society, whether these be physical or moral persons, in business, law, and personal relations. A man who will not pay his just debts violates commutative justice; so also does a man who injures his neighbor's reputation by slanderous talk.

4. *Justice* is the necessary and wholly indispensable basis of all right human relations and of social action. But justice is not in itself sufficient for the needs of man and the rounded well-being of society. Justice needs the support of supplementary virtues, the chief of which is *charity*.

* *Charity* is a word of Latin origin; *love* is derived from Saxon roots; and the terms are synonyms. Love or charity is not mere affection in the sense of tender feeling. It is a virtue of the will (and may

or may not be associated with tenderness), which steadily tends either *to possess*, or *to do good to its* object. The love or charity which tends to possession is called love *of desire*; the love which tends to do good to its object is called love *of benevolence*. It is chiefly *the love of benevolence* which engages our attention in the present study, and to which we refer when we employ the term *charity*.

If justice is the reasonable or rational basis of social action, charity is the virtue which renders such action properly human. If justice is, so to speak, the head, charity is the heart. Justice is coldly and rigorously right; charity is warmly and humanly right. Justice and charity are never opposed; they are supplementary, or, more precisely, charity supplements—and presupposes—justice. Justice sheds a clear but impersonal light upon human affairs; charity brings to this undiminished and undistorted light the warmth and glow of personal humanity and blood brotherhood.

Charity is not merely a fine and gracious thing, which men do well to practise. It is a *duty*, imposed by the natural law, clearly recognized by reason. By force of this duty, man must love God (by love of desire) above all things, for His own sake, and (by love of benevolence) must love all other men as he loves himself, that is, he must wish, and in due measure seek to obtain, the same sort of good for his neighbor that he seeks for himself. This require-

ment of human nature and of society finds its expression and place in social relationships. It plays a notable role in regulating the relations of governments and peoples, keeping nationalism within due bounds, and preventing sane persons from regarding any race or nationality as "a lesser breed without the law." Charity fosters forbearance and goodwill among people of differing colors and creeds. It obligates the wealthy to consider, not only the needs, but also the thoughts and feelings, of those less amply supplied with worldly goods; thus it forbids vulgar and vain display, selfish lavishness, bizarre and inhuman luxury. A few years ago, a parvenu millionaire signalized the entrance of his young daughter into polite society by conducting a reception of regal splendor. He made it his proud boast that the "party" had cost thirty thousand dollars. Such extravagant expenditure, for a single evening's pleasure and display, of means that would have procured a comfortable living for many families for an entire year, could not but arouse bitterness and resentment in many of the millionaire's poor neighbors, especially in persons of socialistic, communistic, or anarchistic tendencies. Of course, the millionaire spent his own money in his own way; justice was not violated. But charity was violated. And such violations of charity hurt the well-being of men in society; they promote restlessness and discontent; they plant seeds of revolutionary and destructive upheavals.

The Catholic must recognize the law of charity as part and parcel of the one thing necessary for men on earth, as proposed by Our Lord Himself, when He said that the whole law and the prophets depend upon love of God and love of neighbor. And this charity or love is not a matter of the feelings, or of the will alone; it must be carried into action. "If you love me," said Christ, "*keep my commandments*" In other words, if you have charity, let it appear in your conduct, your thoughts, words, deeds. And if the love of God be so to appear, so also the love of neighbor. It is impossible to stress too strongly the real obligation which rests upon all men of practising true charity. It is equally impossible to overestimate the role of charity in the due regulation of social relations.

To most people the term *charity* suggests the giving of alms. This is a very important form of the virtue, it is true, but it by no means exhausts the meaning of the term. Charity is as wide as love, for it *is* love; and love is a virtue of the widest and most varied expression, extending from the thinking of kindly thoughts to the most ardent labors on behalf of one's fellowmen. The man who gives alms, directly or through agencies, practises charity; the employers who are available to their workers, not holding themselves aloof and regulating the labors of men through great impersonal organizations, practise charity; employers who plan together to prevent

periods of unemployment, practise charity; workers who refuse to join organizations which are built upon hatred and stress the distinction of classes, practise charity; workers who join unions justly and reasonably formed to protect their rights, and not to destroy the rights of others, practise charity. These are but a few aspects of the social function of this necessary virtue.

5. There is another virtue which supplements *justice*, and which bears some resemblance to *charity*, though clearly distinct from it, and the name of this virtue is *equity*. *Equity*, like justice, is, at least sometimes, enforceable by processes of law; charity is not so enforceable. *Equity*, like charity, regulates human conduct and social relations where the application of cold justice is not clearly apparent. *Equity* may be described as a fine and splendidly human spirit of interpreting the requirements of justice where these are dubious; it is of the *spirit* of justice, not the frigid *letter*. St. Thomas describes this virtue of equity as a species of justice, and declares that it is a virtue which moves a man to forego what he might claim in the strict letter of the law, but which would be unfair or damaging to a neighbor.

To illustrate: In 1933 a gifted young singer sought the help of an acquaintance in gaining a position with a large broadcasting company. Said the

singer: "I'll agree to pay you, for the next ten years, one-third of all I make in excess of \$100 a week." The agreement was formally drawn up, signed, and witnessed. Within a year the singer was earning the amazing salary of \$7000 a week. He objected to the payment of \$2300 a week to the friend whose word had procured him, not the high-salaried position, but the opportunity which led to it. Here we see an obvious inequality or disproportion. Leaving out of account the question of whether any entertainer is entitled to such a princely salary as \$7000 a week, it is manifestly out of all reason to maintain that the mere word of recommendation of a friend is worth \$2300 a week. Yet the contract called for that amount; justice, according to the letter, called for the fulfillment of the contract. If the friend insisted, like Shylock, on "his bond," a court of equity could set aside his claim, and give an official interpretation of the real meaning or spirit of the agreement. Possibly a lump sum would be assigned to the friend, and his claim ended once for all with its payment. Or a much smaller amount than \$2300 might be assigned as the weekly fee to be paid by the singer. Here cold justice is not sufficient to regulate the seemingly relations of the contractors. Charity might urge its claims in vain for benevolence to one whose salary is so very large. Equity is manifestly required for the balance and equalization of rights, claims, and duties.

A further illustration: A man buys a property for \$10,000, borrowing the sum from a Building and Loan Company. He makes return payments, with interest, to the Company, until his debt is reduced to \$1000. The depression comes; his income is barely sufficient for his family's needs; he cannot meet the requirements of his contract in point of either interest or principal. Now, according to the terms of his contract with the Loan Company, his property may be taken, unless all payments are made as agreed. But surely the spirit of justice (*r. e.*, equity) dictates that he has a very solid claim to the property which has been almost paid for, but not entirely. Cold justice here would see the man dispossessed; charity could not be enforced by any public and authoritative means. Only equity can see to the proper regulation of this "social phenomenon," this unhappy situation, too familiar in our times, of a distressed householder and his family at the mercy of a cold and impersonal corporation.

The illustrations suggest the importance of the part played by equity in the regulation of social action. Further illustrations will certainly present themselves to the thoughtful student who turns over in mind the stirring and oft-times heart-rending events of the "hard times" of 1929-1934. Moratoriums for those whose homes or farms are mortgaged; concessions to struggling home-owners; mitigation of unbearable tax-burdens; industrial and old-

age pensions; industrial group-insurance; relief-measures for workmen by firms that have no present employment to offer; plans for profit-sharing—these and many other familiar measures illustrate the function and the value of *equity* in the relations of men in society.

b) RELIGION

That man has the duty of living virtuously and of practising the true religion, we have already seen. (*Cf. Part First Chapter II, Art. 2, c*). We merely recall the matter here for logical completeness in the present study. We bring again to mind the important fact that the duty of religion and virtue is a matter of *justice*; it is a debt of our very nature, and must be paid. Therefore, the man who professes indifference in religion is a defaulter, a debtor who will not pay his debts. He damages himself, as every debtor does, and the fact that his obligation is involved with eternal issues makes his offence the greater. He also damages his neighbor by evil example, and so offends not only in *justice* against God, but in *charity* against his neighbor. The man who seeks directly to dissuade others from the practise of religion, also offends in *justice* against his fellowmen.

If the primal debt of religion be not paid, then there is no hope that the merely temporal conditions of men can be rightly regulated. Social evils have

always at their foundation and source the evil of the neglect of God and the ignoring of the true religion. Plans and programs, theories and suggestions, will never bring mankind to full peace and well-being upon earth, if all plans and theories are robbed of point and meaning at the very outset by the iniquitous denial to Almighty God of that which is His due, and the equally iniquitous denial to men of that which is the direct and the only means of their achieving the end for which they exist. Any direction of human affairs that does not lie, as mathematicians say, "in the same plane" as the direction given to creatures by their Creator, is a futile and a false direction. Vainly, therefore, does the sociologist labor and plan and promote schemes for human betterment, if he leaves out of account that which indicates the true nature and the true goal of human life. As we have said before, unless a man be seen against the background of eternity—that is, unless he be seen together with the bonds of religion and virtue which bind him to the service of God—he is not seen at all; and if he be not seen, how shall he be served? Manifestly, there is no true sociology, no sociology of lasting achievement, that is not interwoven throughout, warp and woof, with matters of true religion and virtue.

c) LIFE

A man has the duty of preserving his life and the

integrity of his body. For a man does not own his body, nor is he the master of his life; these things belong to God, and man is entrusted with their care and must stand responsible for their use. For this reason one must make use of ordinary and normal means to avoid death, mutilation, needless danger, intemperance, and all unreasonable use of objects or practices which are harmful to life, limb, or health. One has the further duty of bending one's energies to acquire what is necessary for the maintenance of life and decent sustenance for oneself and one's dependents, and to provide, in so far as serious attention and effort may avail, for future needs in times of sickness, age, or unemployment.

A man's duty in this matter is also an inalienable right. The right is not, however, *absolutely* inalienable, for in certain circumstances it is lawful, nay praiseworthy, for a man to incur great risk or to offer his life for a high cause. But normally and ordinarily the right (and duty) of life and bodily integrity is not to be surrendered.

This right of a man to life and integrity indicates a corresponding duty in others of allowing its exercise and of doing nothing to thwart its action. The social significance of this requirement appears clearly in matters of industry. Those employers offend against man's life and the means of supporting it who require workers to labor in unhygienic surroundings; who exact of women or children duties unsuited to

their state and condition; who ignore the duty of instructing laborers in the exercise of watchfulness and care; who refuse to install safety devices where the use of such things would mean a real protection; who demand inhumanly hard services, or require too long a working day, or press workers to intense effort to "speed up" production. Those also offend who refuse to pay their employees a living wage, that is, such a wage as will enable a prudent and frugal man to maintain himself, to marry and found a family, and to provide decently for his children, their rearing and education, and for himself and all dependents in times of sickness or unemployment.

The right to life is not, as we have said, *absolutely inalienable*, although it is inalienable in ordinary and normal circumstances. It is not lawful for a man to dispose of his life at will, as he would dispose of a piece of property. A man may not take his own life, for suicide is an offence against God, the one master of life and death; it is an offence against all other men (society), inasmuch as it upsets the order and damages the integrity of the group of which a man is a natural member; it is an offence against the person who commits it, for it contradicts nature and destroys the opportunity for attaining the true end of life. But, while a man may not dispose of his life at will, he may forfeit the right to live. For certain heinous offences a man may lawfully be

sentenced to die. The reason for this fact lies in the principle, already learned, which (as a dictate of natural law) declares that where rights collide, the greater prevails and the lesser ceases to be a right. Now (other things being equal) that right is greater which concerns the greater number; and where *the execution of a criminal* is exacted for the well-being and security of all other men, his right to life ceases, and he may be lawfully put to death.

Notice carefully, however, that the right to life is never forfeited except by reason of *crime* and *heinous guilt*. An innocent person may never be lawfully executed even to save the whole world. There is no more damnable doctrine than that summed up in the words of the Jewish High Priest, "It is expedient that one man die for the people." The innocent man—whether he be a menace to health, such as a leper; or a menace to comfortable living, such as an unwanted child; or a menace to peace and security, such as an insane person—never forfeits his right to live. It cannot be taken away from him for the convenience or the comfort of society. Again, the student is reminded that the dignity of personality resides in *the human individual* and not in society as such.

It is sometimes lawful for a private individual to take the life of a human being; this is the case when the *direct* protection of one's own life (or virtue, or liberty) involves *indirectly* the killing of *an unjust*

aggressor. But it is never lawful *directly* to take the life of another, apart from the legal punishment of heinous crime.

Offences against the right to life and integrity of members are always anti-social; for to injure the members of society is to injure society itself. Thus abortion, sterilization, euthanasia, are not only crimes against human persons, but crimes against the social group. Sociologists who espouse the "betterment" of society by such means are not sociologists at all, but enemies of society.

d) LIBERTY

A man—since he is the child of God and is dowered with the dignity of personality—has the natural right to freedom of person and freedom of action as long as he does not violate the laws of God or the rights of other men. This being so, it follows that there is a duty incumbent upon all (whether individuals or States) of recognizing essential human freedom or liberty, and of doing nothing to limit or destroy it.

As a man may forfeit his right to live by committing terrible crime, so, even for lesser crime, he may forfeit his right to personal bodily liberty, and be subjected to lawful imprisonment. Sometimes too—or at least it so appears—a man may be lawfully deprived of freedom for enforced military service, but this only when his country is conducting a neces-

sary war of defence, or faces the certain danger of such a war, and adequate troops cannot be enlisted without conscription. Compulsory military service as a matter of national policy, such as we see it to-day in many States of Europe, is a manifest violation of the right of personal liberty.

Man's *conscience* is his reason pronouncing upon matters of right and wrong, of good and evil. It is the natural guide of a person, and, if *sincere* and *certain*, one may never act against it. Therefore, man has a natural and inalienable right to freedom or liberty of conscience. It may happen, however, that a person, led by an *erroneous* conscience (though he himself is sincere and certain of its conclusions), may perform actions which violate the rights of others, and for such actions he may be punished. A person of abnormal or subnormal mind may, for example, practise nudism with the conscientious conviction that he is doing a lawful or even a meritorious thing. Yet he violates the most important rights of others, for he is setting an example of indecency which of its nature is harmful, particularly to the young, and he turns the minds of his fellows to things that, since the Fall, are too likely to exercise an influence for what is lawless and vile. Therefore, he may be prevented, nay, even punished. For a person must remember that while conscience is inviolable, other men have consciences too. This is a profitable subject for the studious attention and

‡ meditation of people (especially those of high-school and college age) who think that matters of dress and conduct in public are "their own business" and must not be interfered with by persons whom they please to call "fogies." What a person does (or wears) in public is everybody's business.

Intimately connected with freedom of conscience is the liberty of choosing one's own state in life. In this matter everyone is bound to consult the will of God and the manifest intentions of His providence. One's moral and physical fitness, one's inclination and aptitude for the work, are normal indications of the divine plan with reference to the state of life. But the human decision in this question belongs to the individual concerned. Since the choice of a state of life involves the most intimate and sacred interests, freedom in the matter is an inalienable right. For the lawful exercise of this right, one must have attained an age sufficient to warrant a prudent and reasonable choice, and one should give consideration to the advice of parents and other elders who have one's true interests at heart. But one should not submit to disproportionate influence or interference. Catholics know that they must, in this matter, obey the laws of the Church, for the Church is truly their mother, and she is directly commissioned by Our Lord to lead them to their true end and destiny. Further, Catholics will take prudent

counsel with their confessors or spiritual directors regarding the choice of a state of life.

The right to personal liberty is violated by those who enslave human beings. Absolute slavery is always a horrible evil, for it usurps the rights of God, who alone owns men, and transfers this ownership to slave-holders. Sometimes a modified serfdom may be tolerated as a temporary measure exacted by inevitable conditions; but such conditions are not to be allowed to endure, and steady effort must be made towards the full and complete emancipation of serfs; meanwhile the serfs are to be guaranteed all essential personal rights. It is the fashion to-day to think and speak with pity of the ancient days of feudalism and serfdom. Yet, even in the land of the free, there is now in existence a system of industrial serfdom which is far more debasing, far more a violation of human freedom, than anything recognized as just in medieval times. The man who has no choice in matters of employment or rate of pay, but must take the job or leave it at the wage offered, is in no sense free; for he must submit to imposed conditions or starve. He must report at a certain hour; he must punch a time-clock; he must observe a military system of routine; he may be discharged from the employer's rolls and from his care or responsibility at a moment's notice and for any or no reason; he has no guarantee that he will be

taken care of in sickness or old age. The medieval serf had no such exacting conditions to meet, and he was secure in his prospects; for the feudal lord could not throw off responsibility at will. People of radical tendency like to talk of the modern "wage-slave." The radicals are wholly wrong in their theory of the proper mode of emancipation, but they are right in their terminology. For, beyond serious question, millions of American workers are precisely what the radicals call them—"wage-slaves." This is a matter to engage the attention of true sociology. We shall have occasion to say more of it later.

Not only is a man rightfully free in matters of conscience, in the choice of a state of life, in personal life and action as opposed to enslavement; he is also free to choose the sort of work he wishes to do. Sometimes, however, a man may be called upon to sacrifice his own desires for the well-being of other men, but it is normally not within the province of just public authority to apportion jobs and to decide what each citizen must take up as his steady employment. There is a tendency to-day, against which the sociologist must direct his best efforts, towards *absolutism* in governmental control. More and more, men are being taught to rely upon public direction in all things. This is inevitable in a civilization shaped by industry and its requirements; for men who must take what work is offered, no matter what their personal preferences may be, are soon

trained to accept direction meekly in almost everything. Thus, for example, free citizens allow the State to dictate courses of education, and even to determine the text-books used by their children. Thus even alert young men and women are taught to rely upon bureaus for "vocational guidance," and to accept direction almost as if it had the force of absolute law. Sometimes, indeed, direction and guidance is a valuable thing, but when it becomes—as it easily does—a meddlesome interference with personal liberty on the part of States or public bureaus, it is an evil capable of tremendous growth, and its end is absolute enslavement of the individual. Let the student call once more to mind the fundamental principle of sociology; let him remember that *the human individual* has personal dignity; not *society*, not *the State*. Man is not made for society or for the State; these institutions exist for man, and their function is not to thwart his just activity and shape him to some governmental ideal; the function of society and the State is to *serve* man, to keep his personal dignity sacred, to foster and further his worthy activity, to help him to his final and eternal end by rendering equitable, peaceful, and secure his time of sojourn here on earth.

e) LABOR

If man has a right to life and the duty of living, he has the right and the duty of doing what is re-

quired for the preservation of life. In a word, he has the right and the duty of working, of laboring. This is a clear prescription of the natural law, for man has needs which only labor can supply. Food, clothing, shelter, means for the training of mind and heart and will—these are purchased by work and not by idleness. If further proof of the natural necessity of human labor were needed, it is found in the fact that laziness and inactivity deprive a man, ordinarily, of the decent requirements of bodily life, and have a debasing effect upon his mind and will.

Now, if a man has the right and duty of working, he must not be unjustly denied the opportunity of fruitful work. The lazy idler cannot rightly say, "The world owes me a living"; but all men can say, "The world owes me the chance to work, so that I may live." We live on a planet that is a richly stored treasury of all we need for bodily life and decent comfort. That many are denied opportunity for work is not due to the earth, nor to the Creator, but to the neglect of the Christian faith and its requirements. Unemployment, depressions, and "hard times" are the fruit of an unchristian civilization and of an industrial policy which trains men to merely artificial tasks, which, for the most part, supply not basic needs, but conveniences and comforts. Thus workers are lured from the land to the factory; they no longer have the opportunity or the knack of win-

ning a living from the soil and from labor in the home. Unemployment leaves them stranded and helpless, their right to labor contradicted and denied. Here is a most important subject for the study and the energy of the sociologist. Industrialism has done great harm to men in point of thwarting their fruitful labor and in teaching them to desire things that are non-essential. For some opaque reason, the outcome of this influence of industrialism has come to be called "a higher standard of living." The phrase, of course, means only that men of the industrial era have learned to want comforts and conveniences, and have been taught to squander their earnings upon many things that they would be better without. In a word, industrialism has taught men to live more expensively and to get less lasting values for their money. A glance through the advertising columns of almost any magazine will show what things people of our day are interested in, what they want and are prepared to pay for. Here is a list compiled from the one hundred advertisements in one issue of a very popular weekly fiction-magazine in the summer of 1934:

Automobiles and accessories	24
Articles for toilet and personal use	22
Wearing apparel a la mode.....	11
Soaps, paints, polishes, utensils, etc., for use in the home	17
Typewriters, pencils, paper, duplicators	8

Sports, travel, entertainment.....	9
Canned foods	4
Life insurance	4
Services of patent lawyer	1

The list needs discussion (which we have not space to give in full) to manifest the fact that nearly all its items are luxuries, comforts, and conveniences, rather than necessities. Granted that the automobile has become necessary for many persons, it remains a means of pleasure and convenience for more than half of those who use it daily. The articles for toilet and personal use listed are, in nearly every case, non-essential; the household articles advertised are almost all little luxuries priced outrageously. Summing up, it may be fairly stated that at least seventy-five of the hundred items listed answer no pressing need and confer no very valuable benefit upon the purchaser. Yet these are the things that people buy; these are the things called for by our "high standard of living"; the steady call for these things keeps the wheels of industry going; the manufacture and distribution of these things (omitting, of course, the poor "patent lawyer" with his little card in a dim corner of the magazine) give employment to a tremendous number of workers. Now consider: when money becomes "tight," when unscrupulous Capitalism messes things up in the stock-market, when, in a word, hard times come upon the populace, most people perforce do without the

luxuries and conveniences which mean work and bread and butter for the masses. Unemployment follows; man's natural right to labor gainfully is denied him, not indeed by this person or that, by this employer or that exploiter, but by the converging forces which arise from the fact that man of the industrial age has no roots for his employment in real essential human needs. The industrial employee depends for his work upon the current desire for non-essentials and upon the ability of the people at large to indulge their taste in them. Manifestly, while this state of things continues, no permanent prosperity can be secured. The sociologist is recommended to do some serious thinking upon the remark, made to Mr. G. K. Chesterton by a Bulgar (a waiter in a fashionable American hotel), whose sad eyes spoke his longing for his home and his native way of life: "From the earth we come; to the earth we return; when people get away from that, they are lost."

The labor of a man's hands is a noble thing, and equally noble is the labor of a man's mind. No labor, whether of body or mind, can bear lasting fruit without the expenditure of great effort, of persevering toil, and even suffering. The poet and the musician, the professional man and the artist, all labor as truly as the tiller of the soil and the factory employee. And in one way or another, all men must feel and fulfil the duty of laboring for the maintenance of life and the culture of the soul.

f) **PROPERTY**

Property means external goods or objects capable of being distributed among men and possessed for exclusive ownership and use by individuals. Lands and animals, tools and implements of labor, houses and furniture are *property*, as are food and clothing, books and paintings, and all that a man normally speaks of as his own. The term *property* is an apt name, for it derives from the Latin *proprius*, which means, "peculiar, special, not common, *one's own* "

The right of property is not the right of each individual to a portion of the earth and the objects, natural and artificial, to be found upon it. It is the right *to acquire*, by lawful means, the possession and ownership of property, and *to hold it thereafter* for exclusive use and disposal. Such a right is the natural heritage of every human being.

That the right of property is a natural right is evident from the fact that it answers a natural need. Man must preserve life and health; he must take care of his family and dependents; he must provide for the requirements of old age and the uncertainties of the future, such as unemployment, incapacity, sickness. But a man cannot fulfil this natural duty if he is not allowed to own things and to dispose of them at will. A man must, for the security and independence which attach to personality, be able to strike root, to have some stable assurance not only

for the moment or the day, but for the long and uncertain reaches of the future. Only the right of property meets this natural human requirement. Again, man must labor, and by his labor he attaches something of his own, something almost of *himself*, to the products of his toil. The man who tills the soil puts into the product something of his own, which is thereafter inseparable from it; the man who works at bench or machine, even if he does no more than handle a lever or push a button, contributes something of his own to the output, and this element is part and parcel of the product. Certainly, then, man has a right, in due measure, to the fruits of his labor; this right is natural, and is neither more nor less than the right of ownership, or private property. The right, therefore, of property is a natural right of man.

A man may lawfully acquire property: (a) by *occupation* of that which does not belong to anyone else and is not in itself required by the natural need of all; (&) by *finding*, if the true owner of the object found cannot be discovered by an effort proportionate to its value; (c) by *accession*, or natural increase of property without damage to others, as when land is extended by alluvial deposits, or herds and flocks increase by propagation; (d) by *prescription* through uninterrupted and undisturbed possession of property, which the holder honestly

believes to be his own, for a period of time fixed by statute law; (e) by *transfer* through free contract (buying, selling, gifts, wages, etc.).

Man's right to acquire and hold property is natural and, normally, inalienable. But, like all human rights in externals, it is limited by the rights of others. Therefore, a man may not set out with unbridled greed to gain possession of a wholly disproportionate share of the land, nor may he use his property in such wise as to endanger the property of others. The natural right of a man in the domain of property is pretty well defined by normal human *needs*; when one goes beyond these, the statute law, as well as the natural law, may justly affix limits to the extent, and even the use, of property that one may acquire and hold for exclusive disposal. But no authority on earth can take away from man the right he establishes by his *lawful* and *personal* exertions, that is, by his own labor. Nor can a man be justly hindered from lawfully obtaining and possessing what is required for his present and future needs and those of his dependents.

The right of individual ownership of property is denied by those who profess the theories that may be summed up (inadequately) as *Communism*, the chief form of which is *Socialism*. Socialistic theories are invalid, for they come in conflict with the natural requirements of individual man, who is prior to the State or Commune, and who is dowered with a per-

sonal dignity which the group does not possess. Further, socialistic doctrines point to a kind of evil peace and equality of misery in which individual life would be distorted, liberty destroyed, happiness made impossible, and morals subverted. The most satisfactory, and the most scientific, criticism of socialistic theories is to be found in the famous Encyclicals, "*Rerum Novarum*" of Pope Leo XIII, and "*Quadragesimo Anno*" of Pope Pius XI. To these documents the student is referred for the full discussion of the right of private ownership, especially of the land.

The fundamental error of all communistic theories lies in the denial of man's natural right to acquire property, especially land, by first occupation. The denial of valid individual ownership of land is common to all the various forms of Socialism, the Democratic or Industrial Socialism of Karl Marx (1818-1883) as well as the Agrarian Socialism of Henry George (1839-1897). Against these theories, Pope Leo XIII writes as follows: "Man . . . the master of his own acts . . . governs himself by foresight under the eternal law and power of God. . . . Therefore, it is in his power to exercise his choice not only on things which regard his present welfare, but also on those which will be for his advantage in time to come. Hence man not only can possess the fruits of the earth, *but the soil itself*, for of the products of the earth he has to lay up provision for

the future. Man's needs do not die out, but recur; satisfied to-day, they demand new supplies to-morrow. Nature, therefore, owes to man a store-house that is unfailing in supplying his daily wants. And this he finds only in the inexhaustible fertility of the earth." Further, speaking of the desirability of more owners for more properties, the Holy Father writes: "If working people can be encouraged to look forward to obtaining a share in the land . . . the gulf between vast wealth and sheer poverty will be bridged over and the respective classes brought nearer to each other."

Wise men of all ages have believed that the ideal social order can prevail only when States are composed largely of small landowners, especially small farmers or peasants.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE

In this rather lengthy Article we have learned many important things. We have defined the terms *right*, *duty*, *justice*, *charity*, *equity*, and have reviewed essential principles connected with these powers and virtues. We have indicated the natural duty incumbent upon every man of worshipping God in the recognition and practice of the true religion. We have considered the right and duty of life and bodily integrity, and have noted the social significance of this right in matters of industrial activity. We have seen the evil of self-murder, and the anti-social char-

acter of certain measures which are recommended by modern sociologists in violation of the right to life and integrity of members. We have studied the question of personal liberty and have discerned its proper field, noticing certain modern violations of this fundamental right. We have discussed man's natural right to labor, and his right to acquire property, the normal requirement for fulfilling the duties of life and labor.

CHAPTER II

THE SOCIAL UNIT

Individual man is the *element* of which society is composed. The fundamental group of individuals, the fundamental *unit* of society, is *the family*. The State, that naturally necessary group of citizens under rule of their civil government, is, first and foremost, a group of families. The Church, the supernatural society divinely founded for the endless welfare of men, calls for the loyal and loving membership of each individual; yet the Church, humanly speaking, finds her stay and bulwark in the Christian family. The family has been called the "social cell"; for as every organic body is made up of cells, which variously unite to form tissues and organs, muscles, sinews, bones, and every natural part of the organism; and as the cells are not simple in themselves, but complex; so the "cell" of every social group or community—city, canton, commune, parish, county, State, Church—is not so much the elemental individual as the complex *family unit*. The "cell" is purely figurative; we make no concessions to literal-minded evolutionists. But the figure is apt.

This Chapter discusses the family, its origin and nature, and its social functions.

The Chapter is divided into the following Articles:

Article i. The Origin and Nature of the Family

Article 2. Social Functions of the Family

Article i. The Origin and Nature
 of the Family

- a) Meaning of *Family* b) Marriage c) Characteristics of Marriage

a) MEANING OF FAMILY

When a man and a woman marry, husband and wife constitute a *conjugal society*. When their marriage is blessed with offspring, the conjugal society becomes a *family*. A family is a social group composed of father, mother, and child or children. This is the strict meaning of the term *family*, and in this sense particularly we shall employ the word in our study. Sometimes *family* is enlarged in sense to include the entire *domestic society* which is a group of relatives living together, with their servants and others who habitually make their home with them.

The family is a natural society, prior in nature as in existence to every kind of civic group, or State, or nation, and vested with rights and duties proper to itself which no civil power can abrogate or unjustly limit.

To account for the family, evolutionists ascribe its origin to the parallel development of biological, mental, and social processes. So, from loose groups of half-human animals, propagating promiscuously, mankind has progressed by successive upward stages to the recognition of the modern family-group as sacred and ideal. Notable among futile theorists who

offer such an explanation of the family are Lewis Morgan (1818-1881) and Herbert Spencer (1820-1903). There is absolutely no evidence worthy of the name scientific to support the evolutionistic theory of the family; indeed, what evidence there is, is very much the other way. It may be safely declared, without recourse to the revelation of God and the Christian consciousness of peoples, that the family has been monogamous (i. e., one wife and one husband) from the beginning, and that promiscuity in greater or lesser degree, as well as plurality of spouses, has always been recognized as exceptional, and was never a general human practice.

b) MARRIAGE

The family has its origin in *marriage*. *Marriage is a stable union entered into by solemn, irrevocable, and exclusive contract, by a single (or widowed) man and a single (or widowed) woman, for the purpose of begetting children, and for mutual support and helpfulness.*

The definition indicates *the primary end* of marriage as the begetting of children, that is to say, *the founding of a family*. The *secondary end* of marriage is the happiness of the spouses, their mutual support and helpfulness. Of course, both primary and secondary ends are subordinated to the ultimate end of all human acts and institutions, that is, God and unending beatitude. Marriage is meant to help man

to this ultimate end, and fidelity to its proper ends will inevitably have that effect, while it renders earthly existence happy and fruitful.

Marriage is a *natural* institution, and it is also an institution of the divine positive law. It is natural, for nature inclines man towards it, and the human race could not get on without it. Children could, indeed, be born out of wedlock, but without the stable institution of marriage and the resultant *family*, children could not be properly reared and trained; children could not, without marriage and the family, be given the fulness of opportunities for physical, mental, and spiritual development which their nature calls for. For, if the begetting of children is the primary end of marriage, the term *begetting* means more than conceiving children and giving them birth; it means the bringing of children *to existence and maturity* in a manner consonant with the requirements of right reason and normal human inclinations. Therefore, the primary end of marriage may be restated as *the good* of offspring; and this *good* includes conception, birth, loving care, training, unceasing affection and interest; and to give these things to children is the fundamental reason (dictated by the law of nature) which brings a man and a woman into the rounded, beautiful, and complete humanity of "two in one flesh."

Marriage is also a *divine* institution. In Genesis (ii, 18-24), we read: "And the Lord God said: It is

not good for man to be alone: let us make him a help like unto himself. . . . And the Lord God cast a deep sleep upon Adam: and when he was fast asleep, he took one of his ribs, and filled up flesh for it. And the Lord God built the rib which he took from Adam into a woman: and brought her to Adam. And Adam said: This now is bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh. . . . Wherefore a man shall leave father and mother and shall cleave to his wife: and they shall be two in one flesh." It is obvious from the very words here quoted that the marriage of Adam and Eve, divinely brought about, was a most close and intimate union, of itself perpetual, for begetting and rearing children. If any doubt as to the purpose of this marriage lingers in the mind of a skeptical person, it will be dispelled by consulting the context (*Genesis i, 27, 28*): "And God created man to his own image . . . male and female he created them. And God blessed them, saying: *Increase and multiply*, and fill the earth. . . ."

Marriage is the normal earthly destiny of most human beings. Yet is it a contract, and a contract is ever free in the sense that one need not make it; once it is made, however, it binds according to its nature and terms, and these, in the case of marriage, require its exclusiveness and perpetuity. But if a man choose not to marry, he may not be compelled. On the other hand, if a man choose to marry, he has the natural law on his side to justify his act, and no

program of social "betterment" may violate his in-born right by preventing him, or mangling his body by sterilization so that he may not qualify to discharge the functions of valid marriage. A man marries for God, for children, and for his own well-being; and, while the best results accrue to the State from normal and decent marriage, it must always be remembered that man does not marry primarily for the State. Nor does the State have the right to direct or control marriages for its own interests (truly or falsely interpreted). Man is prior to the State and does not belong to the State; the family, founded by marriage, is also anterior to the State and is not in the essential control of the State. Therefore, those sociologists have the wrong viewpoint who seek to make marriages and families subservient to the ends of State policy. Programs framed with such a purpose cannot but be harmful and unjust. No matter what social good may be envisioned as the outcome of controlled marriages, and no matter what evils may (in theory) be avoided by sterilization and other "eugenic" measures, there is never a lawful reason for doing what is wrong in itself. And it is wrong in itself to deprive a man, guiltless of crime, of his natural rights, or to thwart and hamper their exercise. Hence, unless a man forfeit his right by crime, and so, for the period of imprisonment, be prevented from marrying; or unless a man lack the necessary qualifications (such as age, freedom,

physical ability to perform the basic function of the wedded state, normality or sanity in such degree as permits his free association with fellowmen) he may not be lawfully prevented or prohibited if he wishes to marry. Summing the matter up, we may say: To marry is the inalienable right of every human being who is capable of exercising the functions and discharging the basic duties of the married state; to take away such a right is evil in itself. And it is a changeless precept of the natural law that one may *never*, under any circumstances whatever, do that which is evil in itself (however slightly evil) so that good (however great) may come of it. The end does *not* justify the means.

One who is physically or mentally defective, yet not incapacitated, may not, apart from punishment for crime, be prevented from marrying. Nor may such defectives be lawfully segregated.

On the subject under discussion, Pope Pius XI (*Encyclical "Casti Connubii" 1930*) makes the following authoritative statements: "Public magistrates have no direct power over the bodies of their subjects. Therefore, when no crime has taken place and there is present no cause for grave punishment, they can never directly harm or tamper with the integrity of the body either for reasons of eugenics or for any other cause. . . . The family is more sacred than the State, and men are begotten not for the earth or for time, but for Heaven and eternity. Although

often these individuals (that is, defectives and the unfit) are to be dissuaded from entering into matrimony, it is certainly wrong to brand men with the stigma of crime because they contract marriage, on the ground that, though they are in every way capable of matrimony, they will give birth only to defective children. . . ."

The sentimental sociologist who likes to paint a piteous picture of a poor, sordid, and overcrowded home—with, perhaps, a drunken father and a mother crushed under an intolerable accumulation of duties—and to exclaim: "Would it not be better if these hapless children, robbed of every opportunity for decent rearing, had never been born?" should be sharply checked with a decisive, "No!" Human life is valuable in itself, and if it is begotten in lawful wedlock, it is never to be regarded as a thing regrettable; nay, even the illegitimate child, once begotten, is so valuable and so desirable that no reason or sum of reasons can justify its destruction; and the regrettable thing about it is not its life or existence or lack of opportunities, but the sin against God and reason which preceded its conception. Of course, if the sociologist is a materialist and an evolutionist, that is, in more accurate and less genteel terms, a breeder of human cattle, his position, however false, is logical in view of his principles. But for the Christian sociologist to grow tearful over conditions that have their origin, at least partly, in the greed and selfish-

ness of the so-called "upper and more desirable" classes, and to seek their cure in a further oppression of the poor and less gifted, is the height of unreason. Christ Our Lord named only one sort of person whose birth must be regarded as a regrettable thing; and this was not the poor man, nor the defective, nor the child of an overcrowded or sordid home; it was the person who does harm to minds and souls, a type perilously close in character to the modern materialistic sociologist. For the rest, while the child has a natural right to decent and normal opportunities, the^e may be in some measure supplied, no matter what the conditions or circumstances of birth; but if birth itself be denied, nothing can supply what is taken away. Again and yet again the student is reminded that essential personal value or dignity attaches to the individual human being from the moment of his conception; it does not attach to society, nor to human opportunities, nor to desirable circumstances for birth and rearing. The true sociologist keeps his scale of values properly balanced, and is never swayed by loose, facile, and fallacious sentiment. See a man as he is; see a human being against the light of eternity for which he is made; conceive in proper terms the value of human existence in itself, and you will never be misled into the absurdity which regards a child born to poverty, or a child diseased, deformed, defective, as one that had better not been born. You will not, seeing things clearly as

they are, be disturbed by the whine of modern sociologists that defective and "superfluous" children are a burden to society. As though society had any rights apart from those of human beings! As though society had any function other than bearing the burdens of mankind and making them lighter! As though society had any claim to existence apart from that of acting as the natural and necessary servant of all! Therefore, let not the sociologist, with that bland and boorish impudence which is so maddening in many of the breed, go about preaching up plans and programs that would limit the right of men to marry and beget children; offering, against human rights and human liberty and human lives, the argument that if such or such men marry, society will be burdened with the care of children, probably defective and certainly poor and lacking in opportunities. The sociologist who favors this sort of argument has four things to learn, and they are fundamental in the science he professes to understand and apply: he has to learn the value of human life and dignity; he has to learn the true function of society; he has to learn that no lack of opportunities includes deprivation of the one opportunity that really matters; he has to learn the meaning and power of divine grace and divine providence. The sociologist who aims only at making men to suit the State, or breeding children in such manner and measure as will save society from the bother and expense of taking care

of those who lack normal advantages, is a bad sociologist, and his influence can never make for lasting human welfare; in a word, he is not a sociologist at all. True, children have a natural right to certain opportunities. We have instanced this right as a conclusive argument for the existence of the normal family. But if this right cannot be met adequately in this or that individual family, it can be at least imperfectly supplied by other families, and by those social institutions which exist because human reason recognizes the necessity of family-life and establishes means to supply it, as well as may be, when it is lacking. Further, if the right to normal opportunities cannot always be met, it will not remedy matters to take away still other and far more urgent rights, *vis.*, the right to marry and beget children, and the right of children to exist.

The discussion of marriage and its history usually involves a list of terms—not highly important for sociology itself—with which the student should be familiar. For this reason we append the more ordinary names given to true marriage and to exceptional and debased forms of marriage.

(a) *Monogamy* (from Greek *monos*, "one; single," and *gamein*, "to marry") is marriage to one person at a time. It means, "one husband, one wife."

(&) *Polygamy* (from Greek *poly*, "many," and *gamein*) indicates a plurality of marriages simul-

taneously. "One husband, several wives; or one wife, several husbands."

(c) *Polygyny* (from Greek *poly*, and *fyne*, "woman") means a plurality of wives. "One husband, several wives."

(d) *Polyandry* (from Greek *poly* and *aner* [stem, *andr*] "man") means a plurality of husbands. "One wife, several husbands."

(e) *Monandry* (from *monos* and *aner*) means a single husband, that is, the possession by a woman of only one husband at a time.

(f) *Monogyny* (from *monos* and *gyne*) means a single wife, that is, the possession by a man of only one wife at a time.

(g) *Endogamy* (from Greek *en* "in; within," and *gamein*) is a system which requires one to marry within the relationship, or clan, or other social group.

(h) *Exogamy* (from Greek *ek* or *ex* "out; without," and *gamein*) is a system which requires one to marry outside the relationship, clan, or social group.

c) CHARACTERISTICS OF MARRIAGE

The marks or characteristics of marriage are exclusiveness and permanence, or, to use the more technical terms, *unity* and *indissolubility*.

I. *The Unity of Marriage*.—By the *unity* of mar-

riage is meant the stable union of one man and one woman, in which the wife is exclusively the wife of this man, and the husband is exclusively the husband of this woman. Opposed to unity are *polygyny* and *polyandry*, both of which are states in conflict with the natural law. Marriage is, as we have seen, a natural institution and office, and, therefore, whatever is opposed to its ends in their essential perfection, is opposed to the natural law. Now, *polyandry* would make it impossible to determine the father of each child or to fix responsibility for the child's rearing, insuring to the child that care and attention which is its natural right. Further, polyandry would defeat the secondary end of marriage, for it is unthinkable that a woman and a *group* of husbands should dwell together in mutual love and esteem, lending one another steady support and aiding one another unto lasting peace and happiness. Finally, polyandry is obviously not required for the rounded perfection of humanity discerned in the union of the complementary sexes; for this perfection, the union of *two* in one flesh is manifestly all that is needed or even admissible. *Polygyny* is also opposed to the ends of marriage and so to the natural law. It is a manifest degradation of woman; it is not required for the adequate propagation of the race; it is not required for the perfection achieved by the union of the complementary sexes; it is (as its history proves) the fer-

tile source of jealousy, domestic strife, and unhappiness.

2. *The Indissolubility of Marriage*.—By the unity of marriage we mean the union of one wife with one husband. By the *indissolubility* of marriage we mean its unbroken and unbreakable endurance as long as both husband and wife are alive. That marriage is indissoluble means that no earthly power can break it, or invalidate its contract, once it has been validly established. The indissolubility of marriage is neatly expressed in the phrase: "Husband and wife are inseparably husband and wife *until death does them part*"

That marriage must have permanence is a requisite of the natural law, for without such permanence (i. e., indissolubility), the ends of marriage cannot be achieved. Marriage is not only for the procreation of children, but also for their rearing unto maturity; this is its primary end. And to achieve this end, many years are required, so that even the parents of a single child are normally beyond the age of procreating by the time the child has attained full manhood or womanhood. And at this time the secondary end of marriage begins, in a special way, to be realized. It is when children have grown up, and perhaps have gone away to found homes of their own, that the aging parents become to each other a consolation

and support, and a source of mutual peace and happiness that could be found in no other union. Nay, even childless parents find the secondary end of marriage realized in greater and greater degree as the years advance. We speak, of course, of normal persons, and rightly so, for from the normal tendencies of decent men and women we safely judge the intent of nature itself. Thus, facing the facts fairly, we must inevitably conclude that the natural law requires the permanence or indissolubility of marriage. By the natural as well as the divine law, therefore, we recognize the imperative necessity of obeying the prescription, "What God hath joined together, let not man put asunder."

Opposed to the indissolubility of marriage is the abominable theory and practice of *divorce*, and the lustful device called *Companionate Marriage* or *Trial Marriage*. Equally opposed to this necessary attribute of true marriage is the sentimental (and sexual) notion that *romantic love* justifies the abandoning of one's spouse for the person who happens, at the moment, to arouse the passion of desire. Being opposed to a necessary and natural requirement of marriage, these evil theories and practices are directly in conflict with the natural law and are therefore never justified.

Divorce is opposed to the natural law for the following reasons: (a) it is opposed to the naturally necessary attribute of marriage, called indissolubil-

ity; (&) it is a breach of honor, and makes a mockery of the most solemn human vows; thus it tends to destroy mutual trust among men and to take away the value of a man's word, and the thing that does this is a fundamentally evil and destructive force in society; (£) it inflicts a grave evil upon society, for it tends to destroy the monogamous family upon the permanence of which society absolutely depends for peace, order, and welfare; (d) it is the most fruitful source of all social ills, for the records of courts, schools, reformatories, and prisons, prove beyond question that delinquency and crime, especially among the young, is due in very large measure to the breaking up of homes and families by divorce; (§) it "opens the floodgates to immorality."

Some people offer in justification of divorce the fact that it was divinely granted in ancient times. They quote Scripture to prove the point. But what God does, man cannot do. Besides, as the same Scripture testifies, marriage is in itself indissoluble. In St. Mark's Gospel (*x*, 6-p) we read: "From the beginning of creation, God made them male and female. For this cause a man shall leave his father and mother; and shall cleave to his wife. And they shall be two in one flesh. Therefore now they are not two, but one flesh. What therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder." And with direct reference to divorce we read (*Mark x*, 11-12): "And he [Christ] saith to them: Whosoever shall

put away his wife and marry another, committed! adultery against her. And if the wife shall put away her husband, and be married to another, she committed! adultery." In the First Epistle of St. Paul to the Corinthians we read (*vii, io -ii*; 59) : "But to them that are married, not I, but the Lord commanded!, that the wife depart not from her husband. And if she depart, that she remain unmarried, or be reconciled to her husband. And let not the husband put away his wife. A woman is bound by the law as long as her husband liveth; but if her husband die, she is at liberty: let her marry to whom she will; only in the Lord." Nothing, therefore, can be clearer than the Scriptural condemnation of divorce. As for the divorce which was permitted to the Jews of old, Christ Himself says (*Matthew xix, <?*) : "Moses by reason of the hardness of your heart permitted you to put away your wives: *but from the beginning it was not so* " And, as we have remarked, what Moses did by divine command was God's work. God made the bond of marriage; God can take it away. But the point is that *man* cannot take it away. What God hath joined, let *man* not sunder. No human power can enact a valid divorce.

The sociologist inquires: "What is to be done against this terrible evil of divorce? It goes on increasing. It grows in favor, being no longer re-

garded as something shameful. What can be done to stop it?"

Divorce certainly does go on increasing. During the last fifty years the rate of divorce has increased from something less than ten percent of the marriage-rate to something near twenty percent, perhaps over twenty percent. It has been estimated by statisticians that the present acceleration of the divorce-rate will, if it remain constant, bring it to fifty percent of the marriage-rate before the current century is out.

Some sociologists would remedy the evil of divorce by establishing uniform divorce-laws. They would make divorces hard to obtain, requiring, as valid grounds, most serious reasons, such as desertion and infidelity. But, while legislation in the matter is important, it is not sufficient. And such legislation as merely aims at reducing a radical evil can serve no ultimate good purpose; if a thing is fundamentally wrong, it must be extirpated. Legislation which looks merely to the reduction of the number of divorces is, while well intentioned, socially short-sighted. Besides, the history of restraining laws against divorce is not encouraging. Civil enactments for the limitation of divorce are sprinkled through the pages of the laws of all nations and times, from ancient Rome to modern France, from the *Lex Julia* of Augustus, the decrees of Constantine, and the

Code Napoleon, to the restriction on alien petitioners enacted in France in 1927. Lasting good has not come of these ordinances, for the evil of divorce is more rampant to-day than ever before.

Surely the only sensible way of attacking the social cancer of divorce will be indicated by a study of its causes. And, fundamentally, the cause of the divorce-evil, as of all social evils, is the refusal of men to hear the words and heed the commands of Jesus Christ. In other words, the fundamental cause of social ills is the rejection, by a large majority of men, of the rule of faith and morals established by the God-Man in the Catholic Church. For, once men have lost sight of the essential truth which must illumine minds and hearts unto salvation; once the law divinely set for human wills and human conduct is ignored, society, morally speaking, goes all to pieces, and social ills of every sort afflict mankind. Without authoritative guidance, men are inevitably led by whim or passion. Without God's law and the Cross, men unfailingly follow license in the name of liberty. Christ came to save the world for time as well as for eternity, and if fallen man will not have the Savior, fallen man cannot be saved. Fundamentally, therefore, the attack upon divorce, as upon all radical social evils, must consist in an energetic renewal of Catholic faith and practice among Catholics themselves. What is basically required for the battle against social evils is an earnest, whole-souled, per-

severing effort on the part of all Catholics to lead the Catholic life perfectly, and to work by prayer, example, pious association, and direct word, to spread Catholic faith and Catholic morality throughout the world. It is usual, in our day, to state this requirement succinctly by saying that what is needed is Catholic Action. "This is the victory which overcometh the world, your faith."

The general objective, therefore, in the attack on any radical social evil is the spread of the Catholic faith and Catholic morality—which, as we have elsewhere seen, means the one true faith and the one perfect and unchanging morality. Special objectives which subserve the general end indicated are many, and the sociologist, above others, must turn his earnest attention to them.

With special reference to divorce, let the sociologist be watchful against legislation which would make easier the obtaining of divorces; let him frame and promote the enactment of measures looking to the abolition of the evil. Let him seek the establishment of the Catholic practice of making public announcement of prospective marriages, proclaiming banns, advertising the lists of licenses issued, requiring the issuance of license several days before the marriage-ceremony may be legally performed. By such measures many hasty and secret marriages, which so frequently end in divorce, could be prevented.

Further, let the sociologist and every decent citizen actively resist the influence of agencies, such as newspapers, magazines, novels, cinemas, which teach people in general, and the young in particular, that divorce is natural and desirable. Day after day newspapers give us stories of gay divorcees; and the shelving of a series of husbands is reported casually, as though nobody of sense could possibly object to so normal a procedure. Besides, many newspapers promote sex-consciousness and stimulate sex-impulse by page after page of feminine nudity displayed in the news and advertising columns. Out of such an influence proceeds, in a notable measure, the general spirit of restlessness and passion which renders futile the hope of universal stability even among married people. Against this newspaper evil, sociologists should promote campaigns of protest to editors and owners of papers, and, this failing, they should establish and further associations of Christian citizens who would agree to cancel their subscriptions to offending newspapers and to boycott the shops and the products which make use of indecent advertisements. It is not too much to say that the average daily newspaper can, in the space of a single month, do more harm to the morals and the spiritual tastes of young and old in a modern home, than all the books of all the atheists and anarchists could accomplish in the same home in a quarter-century. And out of such harm to morals and spiritual refinement

come many social evils, sexual in character, which, at least indirectly, strike at the sacredness and stability of marriage. Magazines too, especially the more popular fiction-magazines (three-fourths of which are frankly pornographic), are equally offensive and dangerous. Yet there are parents—and Catholic parents too, sad to say—who would not think of going without their daily paper; who allow their children this daily diet, amplified with weekly or fortnightly magazines that are unfit for a sty or a brothel! Such parents, if appealed to, may dismiss the matter with a shrug, or may declare that one *must* (God knows why) keep up with current events and current "literature." As if there were no decent reviews, Catholic and secular! As if there were no decent fiction to be found by interest and effort! Parents would not allow their children to be fed by contract, accepting filthy and disgusting food as daily prepared and delivered without care for the needs or tastes of the consignees. Yet they will and do accept the filthy and disgusting newspaper and magazine as the daily and weekly diet of their children's minds and souls! The sociologist who makes his life-work consist in converting such parents to a right and reasonable view, is a sociologist in the highest and finest sense.

At the moment, the cinemas of the country are a powerful influence for evil and for divorce. Not only in the fact that many of the favored pictures repre-

sent (like the novels aptly criticized by Bertie Wooster) "married couples who find life grey, and can't stick each other at any price," but also, and chiefly, in the fact that most patrons—especially young patrons—of the moving-pictures are fully and affectionately conversant with the lives of the actors whom they admire, and these lives are almost always a living story of frequent, facile, and whimsical divorces. The heroes and heroines of the screen are both idols and ideals to millions of youths and maidens in America. And if marriage means little to one's idol or in one's ideal, what wonder that it is regarded as a passing and inconsequential thing in one's practical career? The boycotting of bad motion-pictures is urgently needed to-day. In 1934 a Catholic movement of the kind was inaugurated on a nation-wide scale. No more important or valuable sociological program has ever been enacted in America.

Anything which tends to stress things sexual, to make sex a subject of curious interest, to obtrude it upon the notice of individuals, special groups, or people generally, tends also to hurt the sanctity of marriage and to imperil its stability. For sex has no legitimate use or meaning outside marriage. Loose and vicious notions on the subject cannot fail to influence those who are married, or who are to marry, to an improper estimation of the conjugal state and its exactions of exclusiveness, permanence, and un-

flinching fidelity. Therefore, the sociologist should set himself to curb, by whatever lawful means lie at his disposal, the restless and selfish modernity which seeks unbridled pleasure, and exalts bodily beauty, bodily fitness, bodily display, all of which have a decidedly sexual tinge. The sociologist will labor to bring into disfavor the indiscriminate and intimate mingling of the sexes, married and unmarried, divorced and hopeful of divorce, in places of private as of public amusement and entertainment. He will do what he can to direct the trend of style in dress away from its present course towards semi-nudity, recalling with Newman that, since the Fall, and especially for "civilized" (i. e., nervously alert) people, adequate clothing of the body is almost a part of nature. To these ends, associations, particularly of Catholic women and girls, could be organized and promoted. If even one-third of the present number of Catholic women and girls in America would unite to combat, by example and ardent word (and, above all—a point which even Christians so often neglect—by *prayer*), the evils that have so largely destroyed Christian modesty, and which react so violently against stability in marriage, we should quickly experience a great change for the better; we should breathe a cleaner air; we should find more and more persons happily, peacefully, and fruitfully married; we should hear of fewer and fewer divorces. Our Catholic academies and colleges for women should

be encouraged to take the lead in forming and vitalizing such associations. This is no pious recommendation of something desirable; it is a bare indication of something absolutely requisite. "Tor," says Father Gillis, and his words express the unvarnished truth, "unless civilization reverts to the law of Christ, it will once again be destroyed by the swiftly increasing evil of divorce."

Companionate Marriage and other forms of Trial Marriage, and of pairing without marriage, are neither more nor less than fornication and concubinage hiding behind "parlor names." Degrading sentimentalism seeks to justify the debasing service of the flesh, and the safest way to accomplish such justification among a people content with meaningless words as an explanation, is to invent an appealing name and concoct a sticky apologetic for the evil thing. Of course, trial marriages and soul marriages and companionate marriages and all the rest of the evil litany are no marriages at all. They are one and all strictly against the natural law; for, be it repeated, sex has no meaning and no lawful use outside strict, monogamous, exclusive, permanent, faithful marriage.

The sentimentalists have a wrong idea of marriage. They regard it as a matter of mating for ardent feeling, for romance; their idea of it can be gathered any day or hour by listening to two or three popular songs delivered on the air for the millions

by singers who seem to suffer a good deal of physical pain in their vocalizing. But the married state, while admitting the rapture of clean and noble romance, is, like every decent state of man, a matter of sacrifice, hard work, persevering purpose. In a word, marriage means the cross, as does every decent vocation. And, "no cross, no crown." Christ did not hesitate to require hard service. "Take up the cross daily," He cried. His requirements for decent human life find expression in the piercing question, "Can you drink the chalice that I shall drink?" His prescription for ultimate success is patient endurance under the weight of hourly cares and trials and temptations: "He that shall *persevere to the end*, he shall be saved." This earth is not Heaven, but the place to work for Heaven; and Heaven is not secured by sentimentalism or lawless sexuality, but by hard work. "The kingdom of heaven suffereth *violence*, and the violent bear it away." And only hard, faithful, and sinless labor brings the happiness and peace which the licentious seek in sham marriage, easy divorce, and service of sex. This is the truth, yet a truth too paradoxical for the world to understand. It is the truth expressed divinely in the startling words that tell us that he who seeks his life (or his "good time") shall not find it, but he that shall lose his life (or make sacrifices for a decent observance of the law of nature and of God) shall find happiness.

We have listed the marks or characteristics of

marriage *tzs* *unity* and *indissolubility*. These are attributes of marriage; they attach by natural necessity to its character as a natural institution and office, consisting essentially in a lifelong and irrevocable contract—a contract which has been supernaturalized and made sacred by Our Redeemer, and has been committed for ministration to His true Church. Now, there is another quality which attaches necessarily to the marriage-contract, a quality which touches the spouses and their conduct rather than the marriage itself. This necessary quality is *fidelity*. The virtue of *fidelity* has a twofold meaning with reference to a married couple. It means that their love and their interest and their marital function must admit no third party, but must ever be a matter of decency and duty between themselves exclusively. Further, *fidelity* means that the husband and wife must fulfil their function perfectly, without unnatural avoidance or hindrance of its effect. In a word, *fidelity* means that husband and wife must be true to each other, and must be true to their marital duty.

We need no argument to prove that spouses who are unfaithful to each other offend against both the natural and the divine law. But we do need—such is the mental density and spiritual degradation of our times—to prove that infidelity to marital duty is contrary to law, and a thing evil in itself and never permissible. Now, infidelity to marital duty is summed up in one foul phrase, "Birth Control." We must

show that Birth Control is an evil, a social evil, a ruinous evil, which the sociologist must sturdily and steadily combat.

Birth Control has been aptly defined by Mr. G. K. Chesterton as "fewer births and no control." That sums it up neatly. It does *not* mean (unless carefully interpreted in a special sense) the permissible, and often praiseworthy, abstention from the marriage function. If both spouses freely consent to such abstinence, they offend against no law. What Birth Control means is that spouses do not abstain from the marital right, but employ physical, chemical, mechanical, or other artificial means to prevent the normal and natural effect of their action. In a word, it means that the spouses practise what is called *contraception* in the "parlor dialect" of modern filth-mongers, and what Mr. G. B. Shaw more properly (if more brutally) calls "reciprocal masturbation."

Birth Control, whether practised by use of contraceptive devices or by *onanism* (read *Genesis xxxviii*, 5-10), is directly against the obvious intent and purpose of nature, and hence is in conflict with the natural law. It defeats the primary end of marriage, which is the begetting and rearing of children; therefore, it is against the natural law. It is contrary to the secondary end of marriage, for its practice inevitably leads normally decent people to an utter disgust with their state and with each other, and so they cannot possibly be to each other a source of comfort,

happiness, and peace; therefore, it is against the natural law. Contraception is against the divine law, for in uniting the first man and woman in wedlock, God Himself gave the command: "Increase and multiply and fill the earth." Birth Control is a refusal to increase and multiply, coupled with a mode of action which, if unhindered, would fulfil the law; it is thus a mockery of the law. St. Paul says (*I Timothy ii* 14-15) : "And Adam was not seduced; but the woman being seduced, was in the transgression. Yet she shall be saved through child-bearing; if she continue in faith, and love, and sanctification, with sobriety." How shall the wife be saved if, while performing marital acts, she refuses the duty of child-bearing? How shall the husband be saved if he is guilty, in fact or effect, of the "detestable thing" (*Genesis xxxviii, 10*) for which God slew the offender?

Now, an evil that is in direct conflict with the natural law or the positive divine law cannot be tolerated on any pretext whatsoever. All argument is vain. If the thing is an evil in itself, no reasons will avail to make it permissible. A thing that is evil in itself is a thing like murder, for instance; and such a thing is no more permissible than murder is permissible. People may say, "We can't afford children," but they say it in vain in the face of the natural and divine law; they might as well say, "We can't afford to refrain from murder." A man may say,

“The doctor says my wife will die if she has another child,” but he says it in vain in the face of the law. To the first complainant we may say: “Abstain then from the marriage-act. It can be done. There is such a thing as grace. And there is such a thing as abstaining from occasions and situations which invite the act. But why not follow a normal marital life, and take the children as God sends them? You will manage to get through. Faith in God and reliance on His providence are not mere pious phrases, but actual and workable realities. But if you insist in attending to matters after which the heathen seek, not minding first the kingdom of God, accept the cross and the sacrifice of the one legitimate way that is free to you. But be sure you do not offend by forcing such a course of action upon an unwilling spouse.” To the distraught husband with the second complaint we may reply: “Doctors are not infallible, nor are they legislators for human conduct. God’s law is above the rule of a physician. Besides, if your wife should die doing her duty, what more could she ask of life? Is it not a glorious death, and a martyrdom? It will mean hardship for you and the children, should she be taken, but you both risked that when you swore your solemn vows to abide by your duty 'for better or for worse, in sickness, in health, till death? And who led you to expect that married life would be other than a life of continual hardships? You entered it with open eyes. Be man enough to stand by your

bargain. But if you insist on avoiding the crucial issue, there is the way of abstinence open, provided your wife freely concurs in following it."

Artificial Birth Control is, therefore, radically and essentially evil. Nothing can make it good or right. And the sociologist, who knows that this evil is rampant to-day, and furthered by large and powerful agencies, sees his way to service. And let him consider what a source of social devastation and degradation this evil is.

The advocates of Birth Control seek to take the management of human life out of the hands of Almighty God. Indeed, they ignore God and scoff at His law, and usually also at His very existence. This is a radical social evil. Further, Birth Control is preached up by easily available agencies (Father Gillis instances the fact that many little girls, aged about fourteen, procure and read the pamphlets and books describing this foul and inhuman thing), and thus it is a horrible evil in its effects upon young minds and souls. Again, Birth Control is a direct and powerful means for arousing disgust and even hatred between married couples; the natural reaction from any act of impurity is one of spiritual (and sometimes physical) nausea, and continuance means utter disgust. Thus this practice kills the love and respect that alone can secure the permanence of marriage. Birth Control is at the root of many divorces and broken homes. Not only does the practice of

Birth Control lead to marital unhappiness, hatred, and divorce; it so debases the *individual* who is guilty of it that it kills all that is fine and manly or womanly in the heart, it destroys the appreciation of human life, it ruins the sane estimation of what sex and marriage are for, it leads a person to weigh as in a balance his own convenience, comfort, and low pleasure against the infinite and all-beautiful God and to find his own baseness a greater value than the Almighty. In a word, Birth Control brutalizes the person who practises it. And, like all impurity, it kills the virtue of divine faith. Further, it makes the home where it is practised a foul nest of vice, and the children in such a home—if any—cannot but be debased by its very atmosphere and infected by its contagion. There can be no doubt that the practice of Birth Control is the basest and most brutalizing of all social influences. There is nothing human in it; there is only lust and low love of convenience. There is no word to describe its vileness; the term *bestial* will not serve, for beasts do not practice it.

The sociologist must be alert to prevent legislation which would open the mails to the advertisements, books, and pamphlets recommending the practice (and describing methods) of Birth Control. He must promote boycotts of such stores and shops as have contraceptive devices for sale. This was effectively done in 1934 by the Reverend Doctor Coakley of Pittsburgh, who, with one single threat to publish

from his pulpit the names of offenders within his parish district, brought about a complete removal of such devices from the shops of the territory; the merchants knew their man, and they realized perfectly that what he said he would do, that he would unfailingly do. The sociologist must act positively to arouse a decent appreciation of the meaning and purpose of marriage, and must spread abroad, by the printed and the spoken word, the knowledge of the social ruin which must follow upon the continuance or the enlargement of the abominable practice of Birth Control. Educators must descend from the serene summits of academic lore to impart practical knowledge of high duty in this matter; and our Catholic institutions of higher learning must send us annually bands of splendidly instructed men and women prepared to do apostolic sociological labor against this devastating evil, and to give the world the benefit, in their own later married lives, of a living example of unblemished purity, and fidelity unshakable by any human consideration.

Catholics must recognize the natural and the divine law, and accept the truth that marriage is inescapably an exclusive and permanent union that must be borne with perfect and stainless fidelity. To many non-Catholics this is "a hard saying," and they refuse to hear it. Their refusal is a declaration that they will be guided neither by reason nor by revelation. Their rejection of the natural and the divine re-

quirements for married life is a piece of mental as well as spiritual insanity. And it is also social insanity, for, as we have seen, it points inexorably to the ruin of civilization and of supportable human life.

But, it is objected, are not some unions found to be intolerable? Does not this doctrine of *unity*, *indissolubility*, and *fidelity*, sometimes bind a man, and more frequently a wife, to a contract too burdensome to be supported by human strength? Are not some marriages utterly vile and degrading to one of the parties, and must such shame be endured inescapably till death? The objection is no poser; its validity is mere seeming. When conditions become intolerable, separation is possible, but not divorce. Hear Pope Leo XIII on this subject: "When matters have come to such a pass that it seems impossible for them [husband and wife] to live together any longer, then the Church allows them to live apart, and strives at the same time to soften the evils of the separation by such remedies and helps as are best suited to their condition; yet she never ceases to endeavor to bring about a reconciliation, and never despairs of doing so." Separation "from bed and board" is legally permissible (and should have, for Catholics, the express approval of ecclesiastical authority in each case) when conditions are so bad as to warrant it, and when no injustice is thereby inflicted upon children or fellowmen.

Still, it is objected, separation leaves the parties without the possibility of lawfully following normal tendencies. Even so. And to the objection we offer the fine criticism wasted by Petruchio upon a trifle of ornament: "Eie! 'tis lewd and filthy!" The celibate life, despite the denials of those who have never tried it, is not only a possibility, but for those who will take God's ready grace, it is "a property of easiness." Mr. George Bernard Shaw mulled over this matter and made the following honest, if somewhat puzzled, statement: "If you go to a Catholic priest and tell him that a life of sexual abstinence means a life of utter misery, he laughs, and obviously for a very good reason." (Cf. Gillis, *The Catholic Church and the Home*, p. 82). Persons who never look to God for Lid or direction of life cannot understand how celibacy is possible, or, if possible, not a heavy burden. Nkturally so. "Without me," says Our Lord, "you can do nothing." But the celibate who, in the scriptural figure, has made himself a eunuch for the sake of Christ, knows that the requirements of his life are not really heavy, and he never adverts to them as a burden or a cross. Like the great St. Paul, he can truly say: "I can do all things in him who strengtherieth me." Moreover, the objectors are not sincere in ^heir refusal to believe in the possibility of a celibate life. Do they believe, or, believing, do they take it for a natural and tolerable thing, that their sons and daughters, once puberty is reached, are

quietly indulging in sexuality as a matter of regular custom? Are they content to think that? Does the thought stir no apprehension in the breast of a normal parent? And is there in all the human family one decent and unmorbid husband or wife who calmly accepts the conviction that absence or protracted illness in one spouse entitles the other to indulge in infidelity? Does a decent son or daughter think that of father or mother? *All* human beings are called upon for celibacy or perfect continence, and for long periods of time. But what is possible for long periods, is possible for life. What shred or patch of common sense is left in the stupid statement that perfect and life-long celibacy is impossible or very burdensome? The person who makes the statement is either a fool, or is very frank in confessing what manner of a man he is.

As to this business of "normal tendencies," let it be recalled (as Mr. G. K. Chesterton finely shows in one of his essays) that, since the Fall, no man is wholly normal or natural. Human nature has been injured, and there are only two possibilities now left to us: to be *supernatural* or to be *unnatural*. There is no excusing sexuality on the ground that it is "natural"; outside the realm of lawful wedlock, sexuality is unnatural, and its impulse and invitation is to be overcome by recourse to God and the use of grace, which makes a man supernatural.

Now, in the fact so much deplored by the senti-

mentalists, the emotionalists, the perverts, and other morbid persons, in the fact, namely, that marriage is a "world without end bargain" and a contract demanding exclusiveness, permanence, and fidelity, there is something supremely satisfying to all that is noble in heart and mind and will. There is here something of glorious *finality* that answers, as nothing else can, the finest fundamental requirements and tendencies of the undying soul. All decent lovers feel it, and they glory in pledging to each other a devotion that stops not short of eternity in its vows. Nay, even indecent lovers feel it, and their amours would lose all attraction beyond that of a moment's lust, were they to admit, even to themselves and in the face of past philandering, that *this* love could ever die. Good, bad, and indifferent regard the thing which they dignify with the name of *love* as a vision and promise of unending Paradise. With poor William Sylvanus Baxter (aged seventeen) they rapturously sigh, "The *real* thing! *At last!*"

But enough of argument and example. The fact that marriage is necessarily to be regarded (by force of natural and divine law) as marked by *unity*, *indissolubility*, and perfect *fidelity*, and the further fact that these necessary requirements are ignored or derided so largely to-day, indicate the social evil which the Christian sociologist must combat by personal life and effort, and by forming and promot-

ing agencies for destroying divorce, Birth Control, and marital infidelity.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE

In this Article we have learned the precise meaning of *family*. We have indicated its character as an institution anterior to every other social group, vested with rights and duties which no State can limit or take away. We have considered the *origin* of the family, and have found that this is not an evolutionary process, but the institution of *monogamous marriage* which came into the world with the creation and mission of the first man and wife. We have seen that marriage is both a *natural* and a *divine* institution, which is the normal earthly destiny of most human beings, yet is not compulsory upon all, for those who choose may lead a life of single continence. We have considered the fundamental importance of the family, and have discerned the essential evil of institutions and devices which tend to forbid it: *sterilisation, prevention, segregation*. We have discussed the attributes of marriage (*unity* and *indissolubility*) and have shown the anti-social character of *divorce* (and evils that lead to and favor divorce). We have shown that marriage is not a matter of sentiment or passing attraction, but an enduring contract, which calls for perfect *fidelity* on the part of the spouses. We have seen, in consequence

Article 2. Social Functions of the Family

- ### a) THE FAMILY AND THE HOME

At the very beginning of this study we may remark that to the phrase which describes a home, *viz.*, "the family living together under one roof," we might properly add, "and within their own four walls." It is possible, indeed, to find a true home in an apartment-house, or a flat, or a duplex, or a "double house," or other structure meant to save ground and expense at the cost of human deprivation. But such a home is a hampered home. There is something in

the human heart that calls for, if it does not absolutely require, a home-dwelling rooted like a living thing in the soil, with light and air about its corners, and walls like sturdy ramparts around the sacred shrine of domestic privacy. Nothing that mechanical and architectural genius has devised will quite do as an adequate substitute for this human need. There is something far more spiritually satisfying in the plainest family cottage than in the most expensively and elaborately appointed suite of rooms. No quantity of mere conveniences, no number of electrical devices for refrigeration, or sweeping, or washing, or controlling temperature, or boiling eggs, will make up to the family the lack of that elemental blessing—a house of their own, standing in its own grounds. And for the fulness of this blessing, the house and grounds must really be their own. The springing vine may mount high upon the wall that shelters many strangers; but deep roots of fruitful life are found only in the fragrant earth. When the home is the family's own; when it stands upon its own bit of land; only then can the family find its true identity, strike its roots deeply, give to its members a sense of security and peace, and to society and the State the assurance of that stability and permanence which they require. Sociologists and economists have always to deal with the problem of "housing." But, no matter what influences are working towards the establishment of more and more

apartment dwellings, and no matter what arguments are proffered to justify them, or explanations given to show that they are inevitable, the social desideratum is still summed up in the phrase, "Every family in its own house on its own grounds." Only when the family is so situated, may the home function perfectly as the most essential of purely human social institutions.

Within the home itself, the interaction of the members of the family constitutes a basic social function; for, while the family is the "social cell," it is also a society in itself. The first social function of the family is that of *protecting its members and of affording them the normal human requirements*. We shall briefly consider this function of the family with reference to its several members.—(cr) *The child* has a claim to a normal home. It is to find its support, protection, and training at the hands of father and mother. And the child can find these requisites perfectly only in a *monogamous* home, where the parents are united in exclusive, permanent, and faithful wedlock. Homes broken by divorce or desertion; homes stained by infidelity of spouses; homes spoiled by the nauseating contagion of Birth Control, do incalculable damage to the child. For, while grace and individual free-will can conquer all disadvantages, it is still true that, in general, the failure of the home means the failure of the child. Thus the sociologist perceives that those who preach

the lawfulness of divorce with remarriage, and those who favor Birth Control, sin gravely against the sacred interests of the child. Without a normal home a child is almost sure to lack the equipment necessary to make him a valuable member of society; and, while the child does not exist for society, it has a place in society and a stern duty to fill that place properly. If civilization is to endure and to improve, if human well-being is to be served, the claims and rights and interests of the child must be regarded as of paramount social importance; and to meet these claims and rights, and to serve these interests, a normal and enduring home is requisite. The sociologist has, therefore, the duty of bending his efforts towards the conserving and upbuilding of normal home life. But no merely secular plan or program will be of very great service in this matter; the direct aid of religion must be engaged to make the home what it should be, so that the child may be what he should be. The Catholic Church stands before the world as the grandest of social agencies, the best of social servants. For the Church with her divinely established Sacrament of Matrimony; her unswerving requirement of unity, indissolubility, and fidelity in marriage; her incessant preaching of the duties of parents in pulpit and confessional, is the champion and savior of homes, and the indispensable guardian of childhood. Is it any wonder that we call the Church by the affectionate title of

"Our Holy Mother"?—(&) *The mother* finds in the family and the home her glory, her kingdom, and her bulwark of safety and protection. There is little of the panoply of medieval chivalry about the modern home; little display of its sacred affections before the eyes of the world. And yet the essential chivalry is there. The lady has her knight, her sworn lover and protector. For her he labors; her safety is his dear concern; her fidelity, his joy to serve and his recognized duty to cherish and defend. The true home is a haven of safety to the wife and mother. In this day of loose morals and lost ideals, when so many women have damaged their sweet gentleness and cast away their ennobling dignity, one may expect but scoffing laughter at the mention of "the weaker sex." But, despite co-education and its illegitimate offspring, the athletic woman, it remains true that woman is normally physically weaker than man. And in the play of passion, she is the prey and man the attacker. She is, therefore, at a disadvantage and requires defence. And in the home she has her defender. Woman is, in a spiritual way, a tower of mighty strength; but she is a strong citadel to be defended, even while her strength and her power are the inspiration of those who ward off her enemies. The permanent home, the product of monogamous marriage with all its attributes, is a real necessity for the wife and mother. Without mothers, the race would perish. Therefore, what serves to cherish and

protect motherhood renders an essential social service. And such service is not rendered by temporary marriages, or marriages to be broken by divorce, or marriages to be stained and rendered loveless by Birth Control. Only true marriage—monogamous, exclusive, permanent, faithful—can establish a socially valuable family. Only such a marriage can protect and defend the mother and render her the normal human requirements. And, therefore, in such a marriage we discern a social institution that is absolutely requisite.—(c) *The father* finds in the family the steadying and stabilizing influence which ennobles his manhood, makes him a responsible man and citizen, and turns the tendencies of his nature from what is low and gross. The true, monogamous family safeguards the dignity of the father. It affords him inspiration and incentive for activity valuable to himself, his wife, his children, and the community at large. Such a family makes, through its influence upon the father, for a worthy and healthy propagation of the human race. It wards off from mankind the evils of illegitimacy, widespread prostitution, resultant disease, and the debasing of human character.

Thus we see that the social function of the family, directly with reference to its own members, and, through them, to society at large, is a most potent function, and, at the same time, one of incalculable importance. Sane sociology must look, first and fore-

most, towards the establishment of normal family life in normal homes. For if this be lacking, or impossible of achievement, the effort of sociology is doomed to failure at the outset, and all "science of human social welfare" becomes illusory and the baseless figment of a dream.

The family conducts the business of living, according to standards of decency, effectiveness, love, and interest, in a manner impossible to any other institution. It is a veritable school for life, and so it is the training-ground for the members of society and for society itself. Where, but in the life of home and family, with its loving yet authoritative and most effective government, could children learn justice, generosity, forbearance, unselfishness, sacrifice of their own likes and preferences? The give-and-take of family life trains children in these essentials for individual and social decency. And the records of courts and reformatories are eloquent in their strong declaration that where normal family life is denied to children, we may expect delinquencies, injustice, and even crime, in their adolescent and adult life. Ordinarily we do not find such anti-social activities in the children of normal homes, that is, of homes established by monogamous, exclusive, permanent, and faithful marriage. The monogamous home is in very truth "the social school."

Even in point of sheer economics, the family is the most effective agency in existence, and thus

serves society by keeping down public expense, and also by affording it a working-model which it may often follow in handling general public problems. The maintenance of a child in terms of dollars and cents comes to much less in a normal home than in any public or charitable institution—to something less than one-fourth as much, in fact. The home-group is a model economic group. Here we find adequate division of labor, together with loving interest in the work, inspiration and spirit in the service. Who does not know how wonderfully well the prudent housewife can manage on a comparatively small income? But this economic wonder is observed only when spouses are bent upon the business of a whole lifetime, not looking forward to a break or interruption. In other words, the family operates as a model economic unit only when it is a true and monogamous family. If all marriages resulted in the establishment of such families, there would not be, as now there is, consternation among employers at the mention of "a living family wage for every worker," nor would there be declarations of the impossibility of paying such a wage when its amount is presented in figures by calculators and statisticians. On the other hand, if it were not for the fact that so many families are decent and normal, and thus situated for solidly economical functioning, society would be quickly made bankrupt, and civilization would be lost in predatory savagery. Here once more

the sociologist sees how fundamentally necessary are the social functions of the normal family. Here again he discerns his noble task of fostering normal family life and of battling against the destructive forces of divorce, infidelity, and irresponsible sexuality'

To exercise what may be called its intramural functions with full force, vigor, and effect, the family normally requires more than one child. And as the extramural, or fully social, functions of the family depend absolutely upon the intramural, the importance for society of these latter activities is instantly apparent. Where there is only one child, the give-and-take of home life is much restricted, and the social education which depends upon this function is accordingly denied. Only a *group* of brothers and sisters, living under the loving and alert care of devoted parents, can make the home ideal and produce ideal social results. The only child is usually a selfish and self-willed child. Two or three children are hardly enough to give to each the requisite training in sacrifice, self-repression, forbearance, and just dealing with others—all virtues socially essential. A family of boys alone is apt to lack that refinement and spirit of chivalry without which true civilization cannot exist. A family of girls alone is likely to exhibit selfishness, shrewishness, and jealousy. Of course, parents are not the creators of their children, and they have no choice in the

matter of the sex of their offspring. But the providence of God is over all, and if some families are denied children, and if others have not the balanced proportion of boys and girls which they desire, these defects may be discounted by the wise devotion and instruction of prudent parents. Even where there is a desirable and sufficiently large group of brothers and sisters, neglect and weakness on the part of parents can spoil the normal social fruits of the home. But the fact remains that the *ideal* home-group is a group made up of father, mother, several sons, and several daughters.

The foundation of family social service is love, particularly the love of parents for each other and for their children, although the love among brothers and sisters is by no means unimportant or even unessential. Now, the only expression that true love knows, is *sacrifice* and the *spirit of service* which its object demands. The married life is a very hard and self-sacrificing life, and, while it has its beautiful consolations and is meant to be a continuously happy state, its consolations and its happiness can come only from the selfless devotion of parents, and especially mothers, to the unfailing bearing of its burdens and the unflinching meeting of its exactions. Persons who marry for their romance alone, or for ease, or social position, or comfort and convenience, will not found true and socially serviceable homes. The girl who expects with marriage a house well-

furnished, a garage supplied with modish motors, a bank account of her own for requirements of elaborate dress and the payment of bridge-debts, a social calendar fully dated, and a husband as a minor appendage, will not make a sociologically successful wife and mother. But there are no such girls, one says. Here is an excerpt from a boiled-down edition of an article by the Professor of Economics at Mount Holyoke College (*Reader's Digest*, June 19345 condensed from *Current History*): "In the prosperous late 1920's . . . it seemed that for every graduate of the women's colleges there was waiting around the corner a bond-salesman husband, a honeymoon trip to Europe, and a three-car garage. But in the 1930's . . . there are many long years through which young people must wait for even a one-car garage." Here be high ideals for the prospective bride! The garage is more than the home, and the bond-salesman more than the husband! What prospects are here indicated for the true home, the home which is the temple of undying self-sacrifice and devotion, the home which is to shelter children and train them, and save humanity for decency and civilization? Truly, the high humanity of our ideals has been, in many quarters, strangely debased.

The establishing of a family is not, in these days of industrialism, without its considerable expense. Indeed, the money question presents the most com-

mon, and the most stubborn, difficulty to those who contemplate marriage and to married couples who weakly wish to be dutiful, but lack the sense to call upon God's help and to trust His providence. Yet this difficulty is outrageously exaggerated. Many, if not most, of the solidly established families of what is often called "the middle class" are the product of marriages entered upon with a bare minimum of essentials. Husband and wife, with but a room or two, and the simple requisites for clean and decent living, worked together in a spirit of sacrifice, and built tip the home, taking the children as God sent them, and meeting each day's difficulties as they came. And such marriages were almost invariably happy, and eventually prosperous, even in a material sense. There was then no ardent expectation on the part of the prospective bride of a three-car garage, or a one-car garage, or a bond-salesman. If a man had a steady job, even though a poorly paid one, he did not delay to marry. And he was right, as events have amply proved. But the spirit of our day is, on the one hand, an influence for prodigality, expansiveness, and expense; and, on the other, of a too canny consideration of material prospects for the future. Voltaire's sneering witticism about the foibles of his day, "*Le superflu, chose si necessaire*," is, it appears, a simple statement of fact in our own times. Young people, rapidly losing claim to the adjective, see the years come and go, and still post-

pone marriage because sufficient money is not in sight. Meanwhile, there is little planning or sacrifice to garner the amount foolishly supposed to be necessary. The young lady must have her flowers, and her candy, and her dances, and her theatre parties. The young man must maintain a "car," must show himself a good spender. Both dress in an expensively stylish manner. The marriage is indeed intended, but it continues to be indefinitely postponed, while the parties concerned make little or no sacrifice to bring it to definiteness and actuality. Foolish parents, forgetful of the true happiness of their own days of struggle, declare that their children must not have the hardships which they experienced, and encourage the meaningless and fruitless delay.

Another difficulty, allied closely with that just mentioned, comes from the fact that many girls are gainfully employed in offices and shops, and they find it hard to give up the "independence" which comes with one's own pay-check. Sometimes, with the foolish notion that they can have their cake and eat it too, they marry and still retain their position. This, for the couple, and for its social force and influence, is an unmitigated evil. It makes, on the one hand, for slighted duties in the home, and is a strong incentive to the filthy evil of Birth Control; on the other hand, it robs the husband of self-respect, for it shows him to be an incompetent, and it encourages in the wife a spirit of overbearing

pride towards her spouse. Children—if such couples permit them to be conceived and born—are robbed of their natural heritage of a normal home, and are doomed to suffer neglect and an improper rearing. Far better a home maintained in grinding poverty, the husband earning what he can, and the wife and mother devoted exclusively to her indispensably important duties in the bosom of the family, than ease and affluence with both spouses gainfully employed, while essential duties are left undone and children are unnaturally orphaned.

Too much stress cannot be laid upon the advisability (even the necessity) of early marriage. The money difficulty, the reluctance of the woman to leave her salaried position, the selfish unwillingness of young people to make a definite decision which involves finality and sacrifice, the willingness of couples to prolong the pleasant term of courtship—all these are evil influences, not only for the persons concerned, but for society as well; they are definitely *anti-social* in character. For early marriage is in accordance with nature, and is normally fruitful. Couples who marry in youth have usually the opportunity of rearing their family to full maturity. Women are normally best prepared for motherhood in their last 'teens or early twenties; later, they enter upon the duties of this sacred state with greater difficulty and sometimes with considerable (albeit perfectly justifiable) risk. And there are few sadder

sights than that of an aging father playing the role of Foxy Grandpa to his first offspring, especially if he forgets to be what nature means and what the child wants—a *father*—and essays (poor addlepated dotard) to be to his child that revoltingly unnatural thing, "a pal."

Notable among the many influences which bear strongly upon selfishness and unworthy ambition to prevent early marriages is *modern higher education*, particularly *co-education* of college or university grade. So many years are taken for the mechanical amassing of credits; so little attention is paid to the native abilities and attainments of the individual, that education for the professions is becoming more and more of a life-time occupation. Suppose a lad wishes to become a physician. Finishing grade-school at thirteen, let us say, he spends four years in high school, four years (unless he follows a scamped course in pre-medics) in college, and three or four years in university. Now, at twenty-five, he enters upon an internship of one or two years. At twenty-seven, he is permitted by law to hang out his shingle and to begin the weary work of setting up a practice. Normally, he will be well over thirty before he is able to marry and support a family. And consider the girl, victim of a school psychologist or vocational guide. Her maidenly heart is set upon winning a Ph.D., perhaps—only Heaven knows why. Or she will be a lady lawyer, it may be.

School, high school, college, university—twenty long years of sitting on oaken school benches, and she is qualified for her profession. Manifestly, she means to work at it, after such a weary period of preparation. And so she moves gracefully into her thirties before she is willing to entertain any serious thought of marriage. And when she comes to marriage, she comes under great handicaps. She is physically not at her best for the duties of the married state; she has no training in the matter of home-building; she has a wrong scale of values, for she has given years to technical training in courses poorly suited to her sex, and has allowed the great purpose of her earthly being to be put into the background as relatively unimportant. Co-educational universities have been mentioned as especially anti-social in their influence for late marriage; and with reason. For, very frequently, attachments leading to marriage are formed on the campus. Mary (or would it be Jacqueline?) will not think of hampering John's (or Bernie's) career by marrying him and imposing the domestic burden upon his athletic shoulders before he takes his degree and becomes established. Meanwhile the courtship continues. And since long courtships—especially such as are marked by the daily meetings and unchaperoned intimacies which campus-life encourages—are notoriously dangerous, the couple are fortunate indeed if they come through it unscathed and unstained. Human welfare is offended by un-

lawful sexuality, and by the needless risk of it; human welfare is hurt by late marriages, normally of little fruit. And thus the influences here discussed deserve the name of *anti-social factors* in modern life.

Co-education is anti-social in another way, too: it is founded on the wholly inadmissible assumption of *equality* in the sexes. Things complementary, as the sexes are; things necessary to each other, yet essentially different in structure and function, cannot be equal. Neither can they be unequal. There is no equality in the lock and the key. There is no inequality in the relations of violin and bow. These (like the sexes) are simply different things, each of which is required in a work of mutual service, and each of which has its own distinct and distinctive function. You can train men and women together for the professions, but you cannot train them together for life. Co-education does not look to life; it looks to the professions. And in this it is worldly and materialistic; it knows no goal or heaven but success in matters of money or position in polite society. And since all agencies of true social service must look to man's earthly welfare, as seen in the white light of his eternal destiny, co-education is manifestly not such an agency; on the contrary, it is anti-social.

Colleges for women are not entirely without fault for their neglect of the essential training which girls

require. Girls need to be trained for life, and not for a position merely. They need careful instruction and guidance in the high meaning and purpose of their existence. They need to be trained with a view to their work of building homes, of discharging worthily the duties of motherhood, of devoting themselves to their divinely given task with that unsparing self-sacrifice which is not only the glory of their sex, but the solitary hope of humanity. And they will not receive this training in a few class-hours of "domestic science." Nor will they gather a hint of it from courses that are frankly patterned after professional curricula suitable for men. There may be justification for the too-ready criticism of old-fashioned institutions for "female education," where girls learned to play the harp, and to paint on silk, and to do miracles of fine needlework. But such institutions, however defective, did stress things distinctively feminine; they did train women to be womanly; and so they served souls and served human society.

The sane sociologist will not raise the banner of revolution in the world of business, industry, and education, to the end that we may have more early and fruitful marriages and more saving home-life. But he will work perseveringly to that end by effecting such gradual adjustments and changes as are possible without depriving women of their livelihood or suddenly turning their educational institutions

topsy-turvy. His work must be the more gradual and politic for the fact that it is almost impossible to present arguments in this matter without arousing bitterness and unpleasant personalities. Yet the personalities, as is usual with such things, are likely to be as unjust as they are bitter. The Christian sociologist does not deny that many homes have been maintained by the gainful occupation of women, that many are so maintained to-day, and would not be maintained at all if women could not hold salaried positions or earn daily wages. He does not deny that many and many a professional man has achieved his present place by reason of the loving generosity, and the earnings, of devoted sisters. He does not deny that the college-trained woman of business, or the laboring woman, works tirelessly—and for much less than would be paid to a man in the same employment—for noble ends: for the support of parents, or the maintenance of younger brothers and sisters. The objection of the sociologist to the unnatural function of women in industry and business (and in most professions) does not touch these fine things at all, and is not answered by calling them to his attention. For the sociologist recognizes and appreciates these things. He objects, not to persons and their high purposes, but solely to *the abnormal state of social affairs which makes it necessary for women to hold a place in the ranks of wage-earners*. It is not the fact that Mary's earnings

are putting brother Johnny through college (even if Johnny were better out of college, which is frequently the case) that stirs the true sociologist to opposition; the sociologist has nothing but the deepest admiration for Mary and for her selfless devotion. But he does object to *the social situation which requires such work and such ill-paid sacrifice*. Mary putting Johnny through college is a noble Mary. But Mary, given her rightful opportunity of marrying young and of rearing her own Johnny, not at the cost of earnings, but at the incalculable cost of her very self and all her powers, is a much more noble Mary, a sublime Mary. Industrial life has robbed us of the power to estimate realities clearly, even as the smoke of the industrial era has robbed our bodily eyes of unclouded vistas. We have come to measure everything—even souls and their destiny—in terms of figures on a pay-check. Now, it is not well for us that this is so; it is not well for individual images of God, and it is not well for society. Therefore, the sane sociologist, setting his face against this evil situation, will labor in season and out of season to effect salutary changes. He will not seek to have women thrown out of their employments; he will not, with titanic effort, upset the curricula of women's colleges. *But he will labor tirelessly to get current the conviction that present-day conditions are not admirable or desirable; that; if society owes every man the opportunity of earning an*

income sufficient for himself and for founding and maintaining a family, society owes every woman the opportunity of concurring in this necessary and exacting social function. Not, indeed, that every woman is called to the married life. Some are called to the glory and the sacrifice of consecrated virginity. Some are, physically, not equipped for the exactions of married life. Some (to speak bluntly) are not asked to undertake it. But all these constitute so small a minority that their case may be called exceptional. That is to say, *normally and naturally* these women constitute a very small minority. Thanks to the office, and the factory, and the professions, and the modern technical training of women, the minority has become something like a parity in our unnatural times, or even a majority. Now, the sociologist has to turn the minds of human beings against what is unnatural and abnormal. And, even in normal social situations he must first attend to what is requisite for the race in general, and then, if need be, he will consider the matter of exceptions. Meanwhile he must not be dismayed nor thwarted by the current unsound argument which employs personal and sentimental appeals for the maintenance of an evil *status quo*.

One sociological writer has declared: "It would be silly to think that all working women and girls could be sent back to the home to spend their time in idleness, deprived of the necessities and decencies

and conveniences of life." Quite silly, indeed. Almost as silly, in fact, as to make such a shortsighted and inconsequential statement. The work of the true sociologist—he it repeated—does not consist in getting women and girls discharged. *His work is the spreading and—in a good sense—the popularizing of the true philosophy of life.* It is his hope, of course, that the office-girl and the factory-woman will one day cease to be servile factors in the social tangle. But he sees very clearly that that day is far off, generations off in fact. And he has no intention of committing girls and women to idleness and want. What he seeks is *a fundamental adjustment, which will put society into its natural and divinely intended order, thus insuring its permanence and preventing the ruin which existing conditions, if long continued and aggravated, are sure to bring to social peace and stability, and to civilization itself.* No, the sociologist does not seek to have women discharged; he seeks to inaugurate socially healthful trends which will bring about (after much time, no doubt) *the liberation of women from the enslaving conditions which obtain at the present time*, and the establishment of women, not in idleness and want, but in dignity and honor, in the busy, active, self-sacrificing functions of the normal home. This fine objective cannot be attained by so simple a procedure as that apparently envisioned by the author from whom quotation was made at the head of this

paragraph. It will be the outcome of many and various changes, of changes "all along the line," as the saying is; it will be the fruit of far-reaching social adjustments. But the point is that these changes must eventually be made, and these adjustments must be effected, if society is to endure.

It is a difficult and a graceless task to explain to a working woman that the employment to which she gives her time, her strength, and her very life, so that she may live decently and support her dependents, is not a socially serviceable thing. Nor, indeed, would it be quite accurate to put the matter in such blunt terms. The difficulty is the greater, as we have indicated, for the fact that the woman in question is almost sure to regard the argument or explanation as impertinent and offensive to her personally. But, somehow or other, women must be led to consider this matter dispassionately and impersonally. For there is a great social evil here, a radical evil, a truly calamitous evil; and women must somehow be got to see it, and to work for its eradication. If you tell a modern business woman that over nine millions of women are working for wages in America at this minute, she is apt to say, "Well, what of it?" If you add that of these nine millions, over two millions are married women, most of them with children, she may reply, "Who will support the children if the mother does not work?" If you tell her that most women employees are outrageously over-

worked, many of them unsuitably employed, and that married women in industry inevitably neglect home duties, she may say, "A person must take what she can get; and a woman can't be everywhere at once." If you explain that the employment of women means the enforced idleness of many able-bodied men who could, if given the opportunity, marry and support a family, she may answer, "Too bad; if the great, hulking creatures had any spirit, they could get employment." If you patiently explain that many close-fisted employers are only too glad to have the cheaper and often far more effective labor of women, she may proudly declare, "Of course; everybody knows that women are more intelligent and clever than men. Why shouldn't employers hire them?" If you show her that the employment of women in business and industry means a growing dearth of women for work which they alone can do, she is likely to turn scornful and say, "Oh, you mean housework. Well, let the girl who likes be a kitchen-slavey for starvation wages and the abuse of snobbish housewives. I'll stick to the office." If you point out the fact that the seeming independence of women workers implants wrong ideals in the minds of young girls, she may exclaim, "Do you mean to say that *I* am a bad example to the young?" If you indicate the fact that the employment of women loosens home-ties and often disrupts the family, she may flatly refuse to believe it, and

may quote you rapidly a list of a dozen families that have not been harmfully affected by the fact that the daughters go out daily to work. If you argue that it is unnatural, and unfair to both parties concerned, for men and women to compete for the same positions, she may answer, "So that's it! The men, poor dears, know that they are unequal to the competition, and they ask us to retire from the field! Fine chance!" Your objections have all been answered; but your objections have not been met. Not one of them has been met. But the fact that valid arguments can be answered so glibly, and with such plausible reason, indicates at once the difficulty of making requisite social adjustments, and the difficulty of making the average working woman recognize the fact that such adjustments must be made. Nor will it avail to preach to the modern working woman on the subject of marriage and home-building. She will say, "Well, what am *I* to do about it? Can I go into the street and throttle the first eligible man who passes, and force him to marry me?" As Shylock says, "What! Are you answered?"

But the sociologist is *not* answered. Discouraged he well may be, but not answered in the sense of being silenced, or, what is much worse, converted to the belief that any social evil is a matter of fated necessity, a thing as inevitable as death and taxes. He knows perfectly well that the function of women in business, industry, and most of the pro-

fessions, is an unnatural function, and therefore a function that must not permanently endure. He knows that the employment of large numbers of women is the biggest obstacle in the way of establishing a living, marrying, family wage for men. He knows that there is a sound psychological or spiritual reason for the fact (and it *is* a fact) that the woman "with a job" has far less opportunity than the home-girl for early and desirable marriage. He knows that, because a woman is naturally whole-souled and self-sacrificing, she will bring these fine qualities to "the job," thus misdirecting their use and debasing them, for they are meant for family-life and the good of mankind, not for factory-life or office-life and the good of capitalistic employers. And in the face of this knowledge, the Christian sociologist will not weakly surrender to the charge of impertinence, gracelessness, or even ingratitude, when he calls attention to the fundamentally anti-social character of women's labor in business, industry, and the professions.

But what plans has the sociologist to offer? What program has he to suggest? Many plans and many programs, some of them valuable, some of doubtful worth. These range all the way from the establishing by law of a minimum living family wage for men, to the founding of pensions and dower-funds for women. But, as we have many times insisted, the question here pondered is not to be solved by the

sudden application of a ready-made set of rules or plans or laws. The present work of the sociologist is to make people recognize the fact that the industrial and professional work of women is basically a harmful thing for the women themselves, and so for the human race. Once this truth is fully and generally grasped, we may look for a general social reconstruction—and it must be *general*—which, if it come gradually and not with destructive revolutionary swiftness, will bring human energies once more to the service of real human needs. Meanwhile it will not do to taunt the sociologist and deride his efforts because there is not available an obvious program of reform, definite in every detail and wholly practicable. To do so would be to act in the foolish manner of the sick man who should say to his physician, “But after I get rid of this fever, what will there be for me to do?” There is such a thing as social health, only most of us have forgotten, or have never learned, what it is. And social health, like bodily health, is a thing desirable in itself. The normal person will know well enough how to put it to use and to enjoy it, once he has got it. Here, as in the face of every radical and subtle social evil, the main effort of the sociologist must be to revive and foster among men the truly Christian concept of life and the proper estimation of the principle of human dignity. Men must be taught to recognize, not the “equality” of the sexes, but their

essential diversity, together with the absolute equality of human value in man and woman, boy and girl and infant, and the indispensable human requirement of normal home-life.

Passing now from the absorbing yet difficult subject of women's labor and its effect upon the home and family, we turn briefly to another question touching the family and the home. We ask, "Is the modern home a home or merely a boarding-house?" Far too many parents, and far too many children, make the family residence a place in which to eat and sleep, a place in which they expect eventually to be sick and to die; but they do not make it a place in which to *live*. When evening comes, both parents and children in far too many families "go to places and do things." There is a feverish unrest in young and old. To "stay at home" is a kind of sentence and punishment, not frequently to be endured. The evening hours do not find the modern American family united in that peaceful, delightful companionship in the privacy of the home, which poets and patient mothers used to call the acme of human happiness here upon earth. If grave Alice pops in for the children's hour, she is far too likely to find that Father has popped out to his club, or has gone, to restore his fatigued mental tissues, to a musical review. If laughing Allegra comes all prepared to spend an evening with Mother, she may have to do

her laughing in solitude, while Mother views the movies, or boosts the attendance at some local meeting of matrons for "social uplift"! If Edith expects caressing fingers to toy with her golden hair, she may find herself driven to seek the services of a marcel-artist. But it is not likely that the modern Alice, Allegra, and Edith will notice their deprivation of family joys. Most probably the girls are "dated up" for every evening. You will find them, duly squired, in motor-twosomes on the highways, or, perhaps, "flinging a dashed efficient shoe" in some wayside dance-parlor, with jazz-orchestra in attendance and beer on tap. And if you expect to see them ascending the broad hall-stair, you are recommended to choose for your expectant vigil the darkest hour that's just before the dawn. This sort of thing is not, thank heaven, the usual or average "family-life" of America, but it is extremely common, particularly in cities and larger towns. And, even in families of young children, it is quite customary for parents and children to spend two or three evenings every week at the motion-pictures, or to seek escape from the home in aimless touring of streets and roadways in the family car. Now, all this is of great significance for humanity, for society, and it must engage the earnest attention of the student of sociology. This restlessness and this abandonment of peaceful, quiet home-life, bodes ill for society. It inordinately develops the love of

pleasure. It induces an actual fever of selfishness in the quest for fresh entertainment. It loosens the saving and sanctifying ties of home. It kills the native ability of young and old to make their own entertainment, and teaches them that the only pleasures worth while are those bought for money. It makes strongly for mental and spiritual dissipation. It spoils the fine spirit, of altruism and sacrifice upon which man's earthly welfare depends, and encourages young and old in the belief that the end of existence is that cheapest and most debasing of all cheap things, "a good time." Almost the only effective agency at work to-day against the social evil here considered is the Catholic Church, with her wondrous Sacraments that sanctify the home, and her ceaseless admonitions which keep young and old reminded of the duties of "their particular state of life," and which warn all mankind that we have not here a lasting city, but seek one that is to come. The student of sociology cannot make a more valuable contribution to the work of serving human welfare than a strong personal determination to appreciate his home, to spend as much time as he can there, and to encourage brothers and sisters to do the same.

The government of the home, by natural as well as divine ordinance, is vested first and foremost in the husband and father. With him the wife and mother holds an equal dignity, but the husband has

the place of command. He is to remember that his wife is not his servant, but his full equal, and the primacy of authority that is vested in him is not a matter for boasting or ostentation, but a stern and exacting responsibility. The wife and mother is second in command. Parents who allow their children to take over the control of family-life, and to dictate its program, fail in their duty, and almost certainly bring ruin to the home-life. Therefore parents who seek to serve God, their own interests, and the welfare of their children and of all society, will take their duties seriously, enforce their gentle rule effectually, and abandon the modern notion that sentimental softness and the effort to be the "pals" of their children will constitute a full discharge of their duty. This notion of being "pals" with one's children is a malignant and disgusting social evil. And no one more than the normal child wants his parents to be parents, and not "pals." There is a certain dignity of position and office in the status of parents which the child has a normal right, and a natural desire, to see manifested.

One final word about the family and the home. We have seen in another place that divine grace is a most potent factor in the shaping of human lives. It is, therefore, the part of the scientific sociologist to promote practices that win this grace for men and for families. Now, there is no means of grace but prayer and, for Catholics, the Sacraments.

Christian parents who hope for normal home-life will not neglect the duty of prayer—personal prayer and family prayer. This is a plain duty, not only to God and to children, but to society. And Catholic parents will not fail to go with their children, to receive, frequently and fervently, the divinely bestowed food of souls in Holy Communion. The Catholic home, the members of which are faithful to personal and family prayer and to the devout and frequent reception of the Sacraments, is a home where peace has a chance to dwell in the midst of the insane modern restlessness; it is a home in which uncharity does not make the staple of conversation; in which selfishness is not the motive of activity, nor meanness the principle of domestic rule. Such a home is the hope of society. Now, all this is not a paragraph borrowed from a book of devotions; it is strictly in place in a manual of scientific sociology. Students of sociology will please see that this fact is not discounted or discredited.

b) THE FAMILY AND THE STATE

The family is the social unit, the "social cell." And just as sound living tissue, just as organ, and limb, and the whole living body, depend for structure and function upon healthy cell-life, so does the community or State depend for sound structure and normal function upon healthy family-life. But the value of the biological metaphor ceases here. For

while the cell in a living body exists for the body and to serve its functions, the family does not exist for the community or State. On the contrary, the State exists for the family and for the individual human person. This being clearly understood, there are nevertheless duties as well as rights which individuals and families have with reference to the State or civil power.

The rights of the civil power or State with regard to the family have their origin in the fact that the State is a collection of families. Peace and good order are to be maintained for the sake of the many, and are not to be disrupted at the pleasure of one or a few families. Hence in maintaining its rights in matters touching the family, the State (within the due bounds of its just authority) is fostering and protecting the rights of all families. Thus the State is the servant of families, and not their owner or absolute master.

The State has, for example, the right to regulate marriage and the founding of families in so far as civil and purely social circumstances and effects are concerned. Thus the civil power can lawfully require persons wishing to marry to procure a license and to have their marriage entered on the public records. Further, the State may justly require parents to give their children the minimum education requisite for their normal social equipment. Again, in cases where the ignorance, negligence, or

inability of parents works definite injustice to children in point of health, employment, or moral training, the State may intervene to right the wrong and see justice done. But in this latter function the State must proceed with the utmost care and caution, not exceeding its role of true servant of families and individuals. The faulty theories of modern materialistic sociology, coupled with the impertinence and fussiness of many social workers and civil officials, often lead to abuses in this matter, and to open oppression of the poor. Therefore, the right of the State to intervene in family affairs is not to be invoked easily or arbitrarily. Such intervention is lawful only when it is manifestly necessary to prevent or remove definite injustice. Even then, it must remain within its limits as a *help* to those whom it serves, and not expand its powers possessively to the detriment of human liberty.

The family has rights of its own which the civil power is bound to respect. For the family is not a State institution; it is anterior to the State, and its rights are not derived from the State. Hence it would be unjust and tyrannous on the part of the State to usurp control over matters of fundamental family right. The family has, for example, the right to freedom of conscience and religion, and with this right the State cannot justly interfere. If the family, however, manifests its religion by *outward practices* harmful to public peace or sound morality (nudism,

for instance, or polygamy) these may be justly prevented by the civil power. But over the consciences of its citizens the State exercises no lawful control. Nor is the State justified in bringing influences to bear upon the religious convictions of its citizens, prohibiting, for example, the attendance of children at religious or private schools. So long as such schools are equipped to give pupils adequate training and instruction for the ordinary civil and social requirements of life, they have every right to exist, and parents must be allowed to send their children to them, if they so desire. State interference in this matter has been effectually snubbed in America by the decision of the United States Supreme Court, handed down June 1, 1925, in settlement of the Oregon case. A law passed in Oregon in 1922 requiring all children of elementary school age to attend State schools (commonly but improperly called "public schools") was declared unconstitutional. Another instance of family right is that of the transfer of property to children by way of inheritance. With this basic family right the State cannot lawfully interfere, although it may place a heavy tax on abnormally large inheritances, the maintenance of which within small groups of relatives would constitute a definite menace to public welfare.

The family must be properly considerate of all other families, and therefore it must be a conservative and reasonable unit of society, eager for the

fulfillment of all social justice. On the other hand, the family must be jealous of its fundamental rights, and alert to see to it that the authority of the State is not expanded into tyranny. The State, on its part, must zealously serve the true interests of the families and citizens who make it up. It must not become paternalistic—and it has ever a tendency to become so—nor must it be callously indifferent to injustice and public evils which have their source in the conduct of individuals or families.

c) THE FAMILY AND EDUCATION

Parents have the right and the duty of educating their children. Thus education is distinctly a family matter and not a civil or State affair. Still, the State is the servant of families and citizens, and it must, therefore, place at the disposal of parents the facilities which will enable them to discharge their natural functions in a manner most profitable to society. For this reason the State will foster education, will be its steady patron and support. But the State must not usurp the rights of parents in the matter; it must not indicate certain schools to which children have to be sent; it must not dictate courses of study or choose textbooks. Nor shall the State make unreasonable requirements in the matter of compulsory schooling for a long term of years. The only compulsion justified is that which the State may bring to bear upon parents who neglect altogether to give their children the op-

portunity for a minimum of education—and the minimum may be fairly expressed as "a grade-school education." Notice carefully that the State cannot compel parents to send their children to school; if parents are qualified to instruct their children in the common school subjects at home, they may surely do so; or they may have their children taught by private instructors or tutors. The State may only see that the children have their opportunity of learning the ordinary subjects of study which modern social life requires; in other words, the State may see that parents attend to the duty of educating their children—nothing more.

Education means, of course, much more than schooling. It means the training of the child in body, mind, and soul. *Physical education* is attained by the due development of bodily powers and the normal promotion of health. Parents have, therefore, the natural right and duty of seeing that their children are properly nourished, clothed, and sheltered; they must provide for their children—to the best of their ability—ample air, sunlight, and exercise; they must take diligent care of weak or sickly children. *Intellectual or mental education* is imparted by instruction in truths that man must know, and in those which will serve him well in point of grace and general culture. Parents have, therefore, the duty of seeing to it that their children are equipped with such knowledge as will enable them to make

their way in life, to support themselves, and to bring their mental powers to a degree of perfection in development. *Moral education* trains the will to embrace and fulfil the great duties of life, which intellectual education makes known to the mind. It trains the child in the exercise of virtue; it builds character; it sets the child's feet in the path which leads to the only success worthy of the name—eternal salvation.

Now, the first and greatest of educational institutions is the home. For education—intellectual, physical, and moral—begins with life itself. The little lad or lassie who creeps unwillingly to school at the age of six or seven has already undergone six or seven years of very important and effective educational processes. And even during the years of schooling, the child is under the care and instruction of school-teachers only five hours in twenty-four, only five days in seven, and only thirty-two or thirty-four weeks in fifty-two. Yet its education is going steadily forward all the time, during every waking hour. Parents must, therefore, not lean too heavily upon the school, nor may they shift to the school the responsibility for the full training of their children. School-hours are important hours; they have a very great effect in the education of the child. But the home-hours are even more effective, and they outnumber the school-hours by over ten to one, counting as home-hours all that are spent out of

school. Parents must, therefore, see to the education of children in the home-hours. They must give their children the benefit of noble example; they must supervise the children's work and play with loving care, yet without too much officiousness or interference; they must be especially vigilant in guarding their little ones from evil companionship; they must inculcate love of home and respect for the kindly and affectionate, yet firmly effective, home authority.

Parents must answer to God for the training of their children. And Catholic parents know that they must also answer to God for their conduct on the score of obedience to the Church, which God has established on earth for the sanctification and salvation of mankind. To the Church has Our Lord committed the task of feeding the lambs and the sheep of God; to the Church He said, "He that heareth you, heareth me." Now the strict command of the Church in the matter of education is plain and unmistakable. The Church requires Catholic parents to send their children to Catholic schools, where such schools are available; and this under dire penalties. If Catholic parents disobey their divinely appointed Mother Church, they have little right to expect obedience and reverence from their own children. Such parents are socially inadequate. Their homes will not be true homes, and their function in society will not be a proper and helpful function.

The law of the Church touching education and

Catholic schools is not restricted to Catholic grade schools. Indeed, the school as an aid to home education, has the greater influence as age and experience widen childish interests and lessen the direct and absolute power of the home. Hence, children of high school age are in far greater need of Catholic schooling than children of elementary school age. Nor are those Catholic parents without grave sin who send their children to secular and State colleges and universities, where God is denied or ignored, and His law derided. Godlessness is always anti-social; it is the most destructive and malignant of all anti-social forces. And the secular colleges and universities of our day are, in the main, thoroughly godless.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE

In this Article we have considered many important sociological questions. We have defined *family* and *home*, and have indicated necessary and desirable conditions for the adequate functioning of the home as a social institution. We have studied the "intramural" activities of the home, discerning in these a truly social character; we have investigated the relations of *father*, *mother*, and *child*. We have seen that the family in the normal home is the best *social school*, and the model *economic society*. We have indicated the fact that, for ideal functioning, the family should have *several* children and a

due balance of sons and daughters. We have studied the current *social evils* that militate against normal and effective family life, dealing in some detail with the *financing* of marriage, the reluctance of couples *to marry early* because of a worldly spirit of *independence*, and the demands of *higher education*. We have dwelt at length on the question of *women in industry and business*, and have seen that this phenomenon of our days is fundamentally anti-social. We have indicated the fallacious character of the feminist theory of (*equality of the sexes*) showing that, while all human beings are equal in dignity and value, the sexes are *complementary* and not identical, and have their distinct and distinctive requirements. We have studied the *loosening of home ties* common in our time, and the tendency to turn the home into a boarding-house, and thus to strike a basically destructive blow at human society. We have seen that the *government* of the home is vested in the parents, and, first of all, in the father. We have indicated the place of *divine grace* in the activities of the family and have stressed the necessity (based on truly scientific reasons) of family devotion to prayer and the Sacraments. We have discussed *the relations of the family with the State or civil power*, indicating the place and function of each, and noticing the sociological importance of clear distinctions and stresses in this naturally necessary relationship. Finally, we have discussed the right and duty of the

family in the work of *education*, distinguishing the respective services of parents and State in the matter, and indicating the imperative character of *Catholic education* for Catholic children of all ages and grades.

CHAPTER III

THE SOCIAL GROUPS

This Chapter discusses the most important social groups, other than the family, larger, and unified by different bonds. Such societies or social groups are two: the *State*, a natural society, and *the Church*, a supernatural one.

The Chapter is, therefore, divided into two Articles:

Article i. The State

Article 2. The Church

Article i. The State

- a) Meaning of the State b) Origin of the State
- c) Function of the State

a) MEANING OF THE STATE

The State is a perfect natural union of families, established for their common temporal welfare under a definite government.

There are different types of States, as there are different principles back of their functioning, and therefore some sociologists classify States as *Pagan*, *Christian*, *Liberal* (or materialistic or agnostic), and *Socialistic*. Again, States may be classified according to the structure or form of their govern-

merits as *Aristocratic*, *Oligarchic*, *Monarchical*, and *Republican* (or democratic).

What the man in the street refers to as "a country" or "a people" or "a nation" is what we mean by a *State*. Here in our portion of America we have a group of States constituting one larger and federated State. When we speak of *the State*, and choose illustrations or point examples or indicate activities, with reference to our own country, we mean both the individual units of the United States and the Federal Union itself; the reference more often indicates the Union rather than the separate commonwealths.

Speaking of *the State* in general, we refer to any definite group of individuals and families who dwell in a clearly defined territory and constitute a recognized body of citizenry under their established public authority. Thus, for example, Italy is a State; the United States of America is a State; France is a State; Portugal is a State, and so on through the lengthy litany of "countries" or "peoples with their respective governments." And when we speak of activities of the State, we refer chiefly to *governmental* or *civil* functions in any State.—The examples here given of *States* are all *modern* States. Now, we must not imagine that the populating of the earth was a process accompanied by a swift and definite division of men into States as we know them to-day. In older days, there were other types

of States. Ancient Greece had States that were but single cities. And all Europe was once practically a single State, ruled by an *Imperator* or Emperor, although it was made up of many peoples of different civil cultures, some of them only remotely connected with the central governing power, and many of them hardly conscious of their place and function in the great State or Empire of which they were a part.

The State is *a natural society*. It is definitely required by man's very nature. For men are moved by an impulse and urge of rational nature to form civil groups and establish governments: this is manifestly a requirement for achieving and maintaining the order, stability, peace, and harmony among men, which reason demands for a decent and properly human earthly existence. Rational nature does not dictate the precise *form of government* to be set up, and men may be ruled by an absolute monarch, a senate, an elected leader, a president, or other manager or ruler. Different forms of government are determined by differing circumstances and influences, but *some* workable form of government is always requisite. Thus, in saying that the State is *a natural society*, we indicate the necessity, manifest to rational nature, which brings men (families) into definite territorial units under their respective governments, however various in form those governments may be.

The State is a *perfect society*. That is to say, the State is complete in its own sphere, and does not depend for the discharge of its peculiar functions upon any other society. The State is thus distinguished from *imperfect societies*, which are not by nature fitted for complete independence, but exist and function in some sort of dependency. A municipality, a township, a county, a professional society, a labor union—these are *imperfect societies*, for, while they have their own officials and governing bodies, and make their own ordinances, rules, and regulations, they depend upon the larger and self-sufficing organization of the State itself in which they exist. A municipality or county does not maintain its identity without allegiance to any other social group; it does not claim to "have full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce, and to do all other acts and things which independent States may of right do." Even the essential social unit, the family, is an imperfect society, inasmuch as its function requires a certain guarantee of peace and order, of justice and protected rights, which it is unable to furnish for itself. The State is the only perfect natural society. There is but one other perfect society, and that is the super-natural society called *the Church*.

The State exists for *the common good or welfare* of its members. It exists, first and foremost, for the temporal or earthly good of its citizens and

families. But the temporal good of man is always strictly in line with his ultimate and eternal good, and hence that State falsifies its nature and function which ignores or denies in its rule the requirements of the natural moral law. No State which denies God, or refuses to recognize the human right of liberty of conscience, can truly serve the welfare—even the true temporal welfare—of its members; and a State which attempts such a course, is no true State at all. Further, the State exists for the *common* temporal good of its members; it must function according to the requirements of distributive justice, not favoring one citizen or class of citizens above another.

The State has *a definite form of government*. This, as we have seen, may be one of many possible forms. But what is the best form? There is no absolute and unconditioned answer to this question. States are stable institutions, yet they are of this world, and hence they are temporary and transitory; they rise and fall, they emerge and disappear. There is no determining what form of government is ever and always the best form. Sometimes and under some circumstances, one form appears the best; yet, under different circumstances or with people of different temperaments and aspirations, that same form would be less desirable. Relatively, that form of government is best which is most effectually suited for the requirements of a given people, at a

given time, and under given circumstances and conditions.

b) ORIGIN OF THE STATE

The State is a *natural* society. Men naturally require it for decent and normal human existence. Hence the true origin of the State is found in man's rational nature.

When there were but few men on earth, the family-group was sufficient for man's social and civil needs. But in the multitude of men and families, of cultures and trends, which characterize humanity as we know it now, each household is not sufficient unto itself for the purposes of human well-being. Man, since the Fall, is apt to be inhuman towards his brother man; individuals and families need guarantees of order and peace, and protection of rights. Families require food and clothing and shelter, and (especially in a well populated earth with its crowded cities and towns) there is further need of means of ready transportation, roadways, open waterways, means of communication such as postal service, etc. Obviously, individual families or households cannot supply all these necessities for themselves. These and other instruments of human service require the cooperation of many families under the directing and unifying supervision of a central control; in a word, these human requirements demand *the State*. Nor will it do to say that

man can manage to exist as an individual without these things; *for man is, by his very nature, social*. It follows that the institution which serves his social needs is a *natural* institution. The State is, therefore, a natural society; its origin is found in man's very nature.

There have been, in times past, teachers and leaders who stoutly maintained that the State is not a natural institution at all, but a wholly artificial one, founded by men as a mere convenience. Thus Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), an English philosopher, declared that man is by nature a savage and belligerent solitary, a self-willed and self-seeking individual, his hand ever against his brother man. "Man," he said, "is a wolf to man; *homo homini lupus*" But the solitary life is a difficult life; it is not easy for the human wolf to find ready prey, to conquer it single-handed, and to keep it for his own use when procured. Nor is such a life peaceful, or suited to other than the man of wild and unconquerable spirit. Thus it came about that many men—weak, or lazy, or fatigued by the stern exactions of their natural way of existence—banded together for greater effectiveness in their work and for greater security in their achievements. This union of men in civil society was the expression of an implicit compact or *contract*, by the terms of which individual man surrendered many of his natural prerogatives,

ceding his birthright for peace, effective action, and security. We of later days inherit the conditions and limitations imposed by the primordial *social contract*; we form States and set up governments, and we are under their absolute and unconditioned control. But this is not our natural way of life.—Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), French materialist, and John Locke (1632-1704), English philosopher, agree with Hobbes in the *theory of social contract* as the true explanation of the origin of the State, although they explain the formulation of the contract in different terms, have different opinions of its scope and obligation, and entertain different views about the desirability of returning to the primitive human state of individual freedom. *The social contract theory* is to-day almost universally regarded as a mere philosophical curiosity; it is recognized as a theory wholly gratuitous, divorced from solid historical fact. And rightly so. For there is no scrap of real historical evidence upon which it can rest and claim validity. The State is a primitive, constant, universally present phenomenon of human society; it has existed at all times among all sorts of men, alike only in their common nature; and it can have no explanation apart from that nature. For the rest, we have already seen that the State is a truly natural society, and needs no *contract theory* to explain it.

C) FUNCTION OF THE STATE

From the fact that the State is a natural society, existing for the common welfare of its members, we gather a general impression of its *function*. The State is to serve its members; it is to do them good. It is not to own or possess them; to coerce them for whim or caprice or policy; to thwart or limit their natural and inalienable rights.

The State is to do its members (families and individual citizens) *good* by protecting them in the possession and exercise of their rights, and by positively promoting their peace, prosperity, and happiness. Thus the State has a *negative* (protecting) function in seeing that human rights are not violated. It has also a *positive* (promoting) function in furthering the welfare of its members. In the exercise of either function, the State must observe justice and moderation, avoiding possessiveness and paternalism on the one hand, and callous indifference to the needs of its members on the other.

To exercise its functions—both negative and positive—the State must have *authority*, and this, as we have seen, must be used in just moderation, being kept within due *limits*. We shall briefly study all these matters in a series of paragraphs.

i. *State Authority*.—Since the State must have authority (that is, a just moral power of exacting obedience to its ordinances) in order to exercise its

functions, and since these functions are required by a natural necessity of man, it follows that the God who made man with the need of the State, is back of just State authority. In other words, the true authority of the State comes from God. Now, God does not contradict Himself; He does not establish an authority upon earth that shall contradict or contravene His own authority which directs men to their last end and destiny. Hence, true and just State authority can never be in conflict with the requirements of the natural law.

To say that State authority comes from God simply means this: God has equipped his human children with the ability to meet their natural needs. Men are, therefore, capable of setting up governments, choosing presidents or kings, thus establishing a power which is needed and just, and which they themselves must obey. The just authority thus vested in the ruler or ruling body *comes from God through the people to the ruler*. But we do not maintain that the ruler, once established in place and power, is infallible or impeccable. The doctrine that "*the king can do no wrong*" is a false doctrine, anti-Catholic in origin. The Catholic Church knows well that the king *can* do wrong, and it has often told him so in no unmistakable terms. Henry IV, shivering in the snows of Canossa, and bluff "Hing Hal" of England, trembling with baffled rage at the Pope's refusal of divorce, are sufficiently pointed examples

of what the Catholic Church thinks of the impeccability of kings. In saying that the authority vested in the head of the State comes from God, we indicate that God, through the people, justifies an established ruler in his place, and requires that the subjects obey him in all that is just and equitable, even at the cost of sacrifice for the common good. Nay, even injustice must sometimes be borne for the sake of general stability and peace; but, as we shall see, there are definite limits to State authority, and when it transgresses these grossly and tyrannously, it may be justly resisted and overthrown.

The authority of the State (i. e. civil authority) is exercised by the *legislative* and *executive* government: the legislative function of government is exercised in the framing of laws; the executive function is exercised in the applying and enforcing of laws. Now, a *law* is defined as *an ordinance of reason promulgated for the common good by one who has charge of a society*. It is an ordinance of reason; it must be *reasonable*; hence a law, to be a true law at all, must be just; it must contravene no higher law; it must be possible of fulfillment by ordinary human effort and good will; it must serve a real use; it must be relatively permanent, and not a fleeting or whimsical decree; it must be promulgated, that is, it must be brought duly and suitably to the attention and knowledge of those who are bound by it. Further, a law is for the *common good* (wherein it

differs from a *precept*, which is an ordinance binding one or a group for their individual or private good) and is meant to protect and promote true liberty among the members of the State, not to impose needless restrictions and hardship upon them. Just laws do make exactions, but these are not hampering forces, they are truly liberating forces. In the same way, roadways and streets are limiting things, for a man may feel that he is hindered by them from taking a course across hill and dale; yet the finished roadway really makes it possible for a man to get freely and easily to his destination: the limiting character of the road is really a liberating thing. Laws are meant to insure the unhampered and unthwarted exercise of rights and of free human acts among all subjects. Now all just laws, all civil ordinances which meet the requirements of the definition of law, are expressions of just civil authority, which, ultimately, is from God. Civil laws are, if truly laws, interpretations and applications of the natural law. Hence, in general, civil laws are to be regarded as binding the conscience of citizens, as obligations which men have a duty to recognize and fulfil.

2. *Limits of State Authority.*—The State exists to be the safeguard of individual and family rights, and to be the effective servant of its members. It has thus a definite function to perform, and this

function itself defines the limits or extent of its authority. Any use of civil power for purposes other than the welfare and happiness of the members of the State is an abuse, and not a lawful use, of State authority.

The State must not interfere with the rights of families and individuals. Sometimes, indeed, it may *intervene* in family or personal affairs, but only when families or individuals are incapable of coping with a situation which imperatively demands settlement, and then only in so far as is truly requisite. And once such intervention has attained its end, the State must withdraw; for it has no claim to a permanent foothold within the domain of family or personal rights by reason of the fact that it has rendered a helpful service in that domain. Should the State intervene without necessity, or should it seek to make just intervention the excuse for holding a place in fields not its own, it would *interfere* with human rights, and interference is never tolerable. State interference is likely to be *paternalism*, and, if widespread and insistent, it may become *tyranny*.

Nor must the State interfere with the rights of the Church. The realm of proper State activity is that of the temporal well-being of man. But the State must ultimately serve man's eternal interests, which are the direct concern of the Church. Hence, the State falsifies its own function, and also vio-

lates justice, if it interferes with the supernatural function of the Church. That institution does not serve man in any lasting way, even temporally, which interferes with his spiritual activities and interests.

In brief, the duty of the State is to safeguard and promote the rights of individuals, families, and the Church; its duty does not extend to unseemly dictation and unjust interference.

The Declaration of American Independence very adequately states the limits of State authority in these words: "We hold . . . that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights . . . that *to secure these ends* governments are instituted among men . . . when any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it. . .

3. *Negative Function of the State*,—The State must protect the rights of its members. Hence, it must maintain peace and order, for without these the exercise of human rights in society is impossible. To this end the State must protect persons and property from harm and theft. It must define crimes and civil offences, and prescribe and apply definite punishment. It must define and prescribe forms for the exercise of contract rights and the exchange of property. Further, the State must preserve its in-

tegrity among States, and adopt means adequate to prevent unfair aggression or annexation. These and other more detailed activities constitute the protecting or negative function of the civil State.

4. *Positive Function of the State.*—The State must further the well-being and happiness of its members. Hence it must promote industry and trade by due regulation, furnishing a coinage and standards of measurement; it must establish suitable navigation laws and set up a proper scale of customs on imports. The State must promote the fruitful labor of citizens, and so must render them facilities for the production and disposal of goods: roadways, waterways, other means of transportation; gas and electric power; postal service, telegraphs, telephones, radio. The State must look after the healthful and hygienic conditions in which citizens live and labor, and so must require decent "sanitation." It must promote and foster education. It must take care of those who cannot care for themselves—the poor, the aged, the incapacitated, the physically and mentally unfit. Further, the State must look after the general and common possessions and resources, cultivating forests, keeping waters supplied with fish, and so on.

Among the positive services which the State is to render its members is that of *justified intervention*. For sometimes the State *is* justified in intervening in private affairs. Rugged individualism,

which makes the State a mere police-power, is not a sane State policy; nor is that economic system known as State Socialism, which would make the State the absolute owner and controller of all public utilities, a sound theory of State function. *Limited and justified intervention* on the part of the State is the safest and most reasonable doctrine in this matter.

The State has the right and the duty of intervening to supply to its members that which they must have and which individual or organized effort among them cannot adequately provide. Thus the State rightly intervenes to prevent industrial accidents, to compel employers to install requisite safety-devices in shops and factories and to adopt measures that will insure just compensation to disabled workers. Again, the State should intervene to demand the establishing of health-insurance for employees, and to have public clinics and dispensaries set up to take care of families and citizens who have need of them. Further, the State must look after those who would suffer neglect and deprivation of their natural rights, if the civil power and public funds did not provide for them— orphaned and abandoned children, dependent widows, the aged, the feeble-minded and insane, the destitute, invalids unprovided with proper care, and others. For in all these cases, individual or organized effort among the members of the State is inadequate; the State must act to prevent

or to alleviate what otherwise would constitute an intolerable social evil.

Yet in all instances, especially in those of a private rather than an industrial nature, the State must *intervene*, not *interfere*. Where private enterprise and interest (especially among relatives, friends, and neighbors of the sick, the poor, the deficient) can supply what is required, or can be made to do so, the State must not insist upon supplanting such care with its own devices. Social order and balance is a human thing; it is not to be made a rigid matter of card-index accuracy and business-office detail in order to suit a cold and formal State policy. Therefore, when kindness and neighborliness work at least passably well to maintain the social order, State intervention would be State interference; and interference is *never* justified. The principle of limited and justified State intervention may be stated in the following terms: *the State has the right and the duty of intervening to aid the efforts of its members only when an evil condition of affairs affects or threatens a notable number of families or citizens, and no other agency can deal adequately with the situation*. For, be it ever carefully remembered, the State is the servant of its members; it exists to *help* its members, not to possess them and to put their activities under arbitrary rules.

Members of the State (families first; and, secondarily, individual citizens and residents) must guard

themselves against two false and socially harmful attitudes towards the State. On the one hand, they must never regard themselves as the slaves or bondmen, the goods and chattels, of the State, nor must they submit to such State activity as would induce this attitude of mind in the rising generation. On the other hand, the members must not regard the State as an institution established to support them, to look after them with paternal care, and to relieve them of personal responsibility and effort in the struggle with social and industrial evils. In other words, members of the State must neither submit supinely to paternalism on the part of civil authority, nor must they think to cure all social ills, real and imagined, by the enactment of laws and appeals to State authority for intervention.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE

In this Article we have defined *the State*, and have indicated its character as a *natural* society, *perfect* in its own sphere, established with its *definite form of government*, to *protect* and *promote* the well-being of its members, who are, first, *families*, and, secondarily, *individual persons*. We have found that the State has its *origin* in man's natural and normal needs, and not in some form of primeval *social contract*. We have defined *State authority*, have seen where its *limits* lie, and have explained what is meant by the *negative* and the *positive* func-

tion of the State. We have given special attention to the State-function of *justified and limited intervention* in the affairs of its members, and have stated the rational principle which justifies such intervention and indicates it as the *right* and the *duty* of the State. We have illustrated the matter of intervention by citing pertinent examples.

Article 2. The Church

- a) Nature and Function of the Church b) The Church and the State c) The Church and Society

a) NATURE AND FUNCTION OF THE CHURCH

In a former Chapter we proved the existence of God. Further, we proved that Christ is God, and that He established upon earth *a Church*, to keep current among men the gifts and graces that redeemed them. All men are manifestly called upon, in strict justice, to belong to the Church which God Himself founded (when He walked this earth as Man) for their salvation. Now, the Church which the God-Man founded is the Roman Catholic Church, and no other. All men are, therefore, strictly required to belong to the Catholic Church. This is a requirement of cold reason; it is no impudent claim; nor does the fact that many misinformed persons think the claim impudent, nay, even monstrous, make it so. The logic of the Catholic po-

sition is unassailable. Only those who do not know the true nature of that position, and who will not investigate it, can fail to see how inevitably right and necessary it is. Truly has Mr. Belloc said, "If the Catholic Church is not what she lays claim to be, then all is void."

In speaking, therefore, of *the Church*, we speak of the Catholic Church. We do not employ the term *the Church* in that vague, intangible sense in which it is used in modern books, reviews, and newspapers. In other words, we do not use the term to signify the body of all those persons who have some sort of religious *feeling*, accompanied or unaccompanied by definite religious *beliefs*, and who recognize Christ as a sort of model and leader among men. By *the Church* we mean *the society of all those who, being baptized, profess the faith of Christ, and are governed by their lawful pastors under one visible head*. In a word, we mean *the Catholic Church*.

The function of the Church may be summed up as follows: the Church exists to teach men truths that are necessary to their eternal well-being, and which cannot be ignored by any agency which looks to men's material and temporal welfare, since the temporal well-being of men looks ever to their supernatural and endless destiny and "lies in the same plane" with the latter. Further, the Church exists to promote and foster right *morality*, which is neither

more nor less than the adjustment of lives to the requirements of the Natural and Eternal Law, the law of God.

The Church is a *perfect* society. That is to say, it contains within itself all that is requisite for the full discharge of its function, and does not depend upon any other earthly establishment. True, the Church must have men as members, and exists on account of them and to serve their most intimate and important needs; and men need the State; and so the Church permeates all States and peoples, and is meant to be truly universal in membership. But this is not *dependency* in the sense that excludes perfection in a society or social group; such dependency, for instance, as a town or county has with reference to the State in which it exists. This is merely structure, and not extrinsic dependency. Manifestly, every society (even the State, which is a perfect society) depends upon its membership for existence.

To function properly the Church requires, in its supreme government, a certain earthly independence and temporal sovereignty, and without it, the Church is unjustly hampered. The Church enjoyed such temporal sovereignty of old, but was deprived of it, by civil encroachment, from 1870 to 1929. In the latter year, however, the temporal sovereignty was restored to the Church by the Treaty of the Lateran (commonly referred to as "The Vatican Accord" or

“The Settlement of the Roman Question”), and the Pope, the head of the Church, is now an independent temporal sovereign with his recognized place and prerogatives among the rulers of the world.

b) THE CHURCH AND THE STATE

The basic principle which must guide sane minds in this interesting and much debated question is the following: *the State exists to serve man's temporal needs; the Church exists to serve man's spiritual and eternal interests; in so far as the temporal affairs of mankind have no bearing upon things spiritual, they are the concern of the State alone; in so far as the spiritual needs of men involve things temporal, the Church is supreme and must be accorded the submission, concurrence, and cooperation of the State.*

The Church and the State are not to be regarded as rivals for power. They are necessary societies, each with its own proper sphere. Where their provinces appear to overlap, the situation is to be accurately determined, and, if doubt endures, the Church, as a divine institution concerned with the most important interests and issues that can affect mankind, is to be recognized as supreme. God made man, man requires society, and society involves the State. God also made the Church to serve man's eternal needs. Manifestly, God is not contradicted

in His works; He is not the author of conflicting things. In their true nature and ideal functioning, Church and State can never conflict.

The fact that many men deny God's existence or his right to rule the world; the fact that thousands will not recognize the true Church, and refuse to investigate her perfectly justified claims; the fact that some few churchmen in the course of history have been forgetful of their character and proper sphere of action; the fact that fallen human nature is always pridefully resentful of spiritual rule—these facts account for the lamentable bickerings, quarrels, and even persecutions that have soiled the pages of history and have spread abroad a fallacious notion of the nature and the relations of Church and State.

The State, while supreme in purely secular and temporal affairs, is ever subject to the rule of right morality and the requirements of the natural law. The State must give its own proper worship to Almighty God. Now in these matters the State needs the direction of religion and the Church. Hence the State *requires* the Church, and, without her, is no true State. Further, the State must protect the Church, and assist her in her indispensably important function among men. On her part, the Church must assist the State, promoting, by her instructions and the example of her officials, submission and obedience to justly established civil authority, and train-

ing her children in true Christian patriotism. The Church must also promote the spirit of justice and Christian charity among rulers, guiding them in their great duty of working always for the peace and prosperity of their subjects.

While true and harmonious *union* of Church and State is the ideal condition, it cannot endure throughout a world that will not recognize God or His Church. A second-rate system must, therefore, be accepted in most States. In some States a condition called *separation of Church and State* obtains; but it is never a true separation, for the State inevitably infringes upon the province of the Church, in matters, for example, touching marriage and the duties of married persons. It is quite obvious that Church and State cannot be truly separate, for they rule the same people in the same territory, people whose interests for time and eternity are so intermingled and interwoven, that it is impossible to deal adequately with the one without some consideration of the other.

c) THE CHURCH AND SOCIETY

"It must not be supposed," writes Pope Leo XIII in his famous Encyclical "*Rerum Novarum*" issued May 15, 1891, "that the solicitude of the Church is so taken up with the spiritual concerns of her children as to neglect their temporal or earthly interests. Her desire is that the poor, for example, should rise

above poverty and wretchedness and should better their condition in life, and for this she strives." Thus we see that the Church has a place in affairs that are usually called purely social or even purely economic. For nothing that affects men, or their earthly interests, is absolutely divorced from their eternal well-being, which is the first and direct concern of the Church. Therefore, the Church has a place and a function in the affairs of human society which are temporal and earthly.

Indeed, the Church has by right (though the right be largely unrecognized in an unchristian world) the most important, prominent, and influential place among social agencies. All the evils and threats of evil which afflict human society are sometimes referred to by the handy phrases, *the social question* and *the social problem*; and the Church alone holds the full answer to the question and the full solution of the problem. Pope Pius XI rightly declares in his Encyclical "*Quas Primos*" that society will lack the blessings of true liberty, good order, peace, and harmony, until men and nations recognize the supreme kingship of Jesus Christ; and to obtain this recognition the Church labors tirelessly. The same Pontiff declares in the Encyclical *a Quadragesima Anno*," that the remedy for social evils is to be found only in the frank and sincere return of all men and States to the teachings of the Gospel; and the Church exists to preach the Gospel and to bring its benefits to

souls. The Church alone, among societies that exist upon earth, ever and always places God *first*, and recognizes Him as the supreme end and goal of all created activities. All created goods and all created institutions are seen by the Church as instruments of a service that is ultimately the service of God. Now, this is but saying that the Church alone sees things, not only as they should be, but simply as, in point of fact, *they are*. Groups of men, and human society itself as such, are therefore impotent as true forces and agencies for social welfare, if they refuse to align their views and aims with those of the Church, and to accept from the Church that light and guidance which is necessary to render their work truly fruitful.

The light and guidance which the Church offers to human institutions, and to all human society, are found in her safely guarded treasure of true and infallibly pronounced *moral principles*. The Church sees man as he is; the Church knows her own character as the divinely appointed teacher of men; the Church steadfastly observes her duty of regulating human conduct in men and nations. Thus the Church guards from obscurity and teaches with clearness the basic truths which society employs as its very roots and sources of energy and life. She inculcates justice, the recognition of the dignity and rights of human persons, and the duties and rights of rulers and ruled. She steadily indicates to men the unself-

ishness that makes for social peace, and calls upon all for the exercise of real charity. She incessantly preaches the value and necessity of Christian home-life. She insistently teaches the virtue of Christian patriotism and love of country. Above all, she indicates to men and to society the first and greatest duty of *religion*, and the due recognition of God as the true end of every human activity. Thus the Church alone knows the remedy for social ills, and she labors in season and out of season to apply that remedy effectually.

Even in matters that are purely economic and industrial, the Church has her place and her work. She tries always to better the condition of the workman; she preaches the only socially sound doctrine in point of property and the rights of the laborer; she defends the sane doctrine of *interdependence*—functioning on Christian principles—of Capital and Labor. The Church has ever at heart the care of the poor, and by her societies and congregations she establishes means for their support, striving to spare them indignity, and to maintain them in honor as her most dear children and her treasure.

Thus we see that the Church has a truly indispensable function in earthly and temporal society. In vain will sociologists scheme and plan; in vain will they labor at investigations and studies and the compilation of statistics; in vain will they promote legislation and guide fashion and custom, if they fail

to recognize the place and power of that Church which God Himself has established on earth to lead men to Heaven through a tolerable and decent human existence. To recognize the place of the Church in society is not only a matter of duty—it is a requirement of common sense and sound reason. To refuse such recognition, renders sterile at the outset all social plans and programs and schemes for human betterment.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE

In this Article we have defined *the Church*, and have indicated her first function as the spiritual care of men. We have noticed that the direction of temporalities among men is inevitably bound up with issues that are spiritual and eternal. Thus we have seen that the Church has a true place and service in the earthly affairs of society. We have shown that the Church is a *perfect society*, and that she requires a measure of earthly independence and temporal sovereignty for the unhampered discharge of her duties. We have investigated the relations of *Church and State* and have explained the principle of sound reason which must guide men in their estimation of the place and function of these necessary social groups. Finally, we have studied, in brief detail, the actual work of the Church in society.

BOOK THIRD

THE PROBLEMS OF SOCIETY

A problem, in the sense accepted by sociology, is a social situation which calls for attention, study, and action. It usually means a social evil, or threat of such an evil, which must be remedied or prevented. This Book studies important social problems which affect the family, the community, and the world-group of States. This Book is accordingly divided into three Chapters, as follows:

Chapter I. Problems of the Family

Chapter II. Problems of the Community

Chapter III. World Problems

CHAPTER I

PROBLEMS OF THE FAMILY

It will be convenient, although not strictly accurate, to divide the social problems which we are here to consider, into two general groups, to wit, those which are predominantly *moral* in their implications, and those which are notably *economic* in character. Of course, none of these problems is without real moral significance, and scarcely one lacks economic aspects; yet the division is justified as a classification based on the *outstanding* features and characteristics of the problems considered.

The Chapter is divided into two Articles:

Article i. Moral Problems of the Family

Article 2. Economic Problems of the Family

Article 1. Moral Problems of the Family

- a) The Problem of Stability b) The Problem of Property
- c) The Problem of Labor

a) THE PROBLEM OF STABILITY

We have already studied the family, and have seen its importance as "the social unit" and "the social cell." Truly has the family been called "the social world in miniature," and well have sociologists agreed that upon the family and family-life depend all other human institutions. Anything, therefore, which hurts the family or hampers its function, is a social

evil of the most radical description. On the other hand, every good agency which makes for the stability of home and family, and which enhances the estimation in which the family and the home are held, is a means and instrument for social action of which the true sociologist will be eager to avail himself.

Stable family-life means a firm and sure foundation for all human society. And against the requisite stability, many modern evils are exercising greater and greater influence. Among the most notable social evils which strike directly at the stability of the family are divorce and Birth Control, both of which are rampant at the moment, and are admittedly on the increase. Indeed, there are strong organizations of unchristian people who advocate these evils as means of social welfare and "liberation," and who, by the spoken and printed word, are daily instructing thousands—and notably the young—in beliefs and practices which, unless checked, will bring ruin and disaster to family-life. We have spoken at length on the nature of these social ills (*cf. Book Second, Chap. II, Art. I, c*) and have no need to repeat here the evidence which shows them to be intrinsically evil. We mention them now to indicate the fact that they constitute an acute *social problem* in the domain of the family, and to urge upon the student of sociology the importance of recognizing the true solution of this problem.

The problem is basically a *moral* problem. For the chief influence at work to promote both divorce and Birth Control is undoubtedly the spirit of godless self-seeking, which manifests itself in an unbridled quest of pleasure and ease, a refusal to submit to inconvenience, a frank determination to indulge animal tendencies, a rejection of responsibility to God, a refusal to think of the hereafter or to take it into account, a debased view of life, and a conviction that romantic and sexual love is the ultimate human happiness. The evil spirit which makes for these low ends is everywhere powerful to-day, and, while its effects are seen in every social field, it constitutes in itself a *moral issue*. Manifestly, the cure of this social disease is the concern of *religion* above every other social agency. Modern sociologists, deploring the dissolution and decay of family-life, tell us that *education* is the one remedy. But education, divorced from religion, is wholly impotent in the field of radical morality. The notion that "knowledge is power" is fallacious, for knowledge is power only in him who wills to use and apply his knowledge; it is the will which requires motive and support, and these are furnished by the true religion. Mere instruction and exhortation can accomplish nothing of lasting value. The world needs Christ and Him crucified; men need to be accustomed to bear the cross of daily duty: in particular, they need to learn to bear the heavy burdens of the married state with

unflinching fidelity and life-long perseverance. Only religion can supply men with *the knowledge and the power* which they need to stabilize the family and save civilization. The problem of the stability of the family will not be solved until the Church is recognized, and her insistent requirement of exclusive, permanent, faithful, monogamous marriage is accepted and observed.

The Catholic sociologist must, therefore, endeavor to promote true Catholic life and to promulgate true Catholic morality. In his own life, first of all, he must exemplify the Christian ideal. By word and work and prayer he must be instant in furthering the doctrine of finality and permanence in marriage, and of loyal fidelity in discharging its duties. He must be active in bringing his influence to the support of decency, and to the prevention of evils which make for loose and harmful notions about marriage and sex. He must not tacitly support, but must steadily combat, the customs of our day which strike at personal purity and thereby injure the stability of marriage and the family. Such evil customs are many; it will here suffice to name a few of them: the quasi-promiscuity of the young, which is seen in their free association in every walk and activity of life, particularly in their amusements, in the almost-nude, at beaches and resorts; company keeping merely for thrill; kissing and animal demon-

strations of passing affection. All these practices cheapen the self-respect which is the natural basis and support of personal purity; they tend to induce a carelessness and levity which unfit the young for the heavy responsibility of the married state. No Catholic can have part in such things without betraying the cause of Jesus Christ—a cause which perfectly coincides with that of human happiness and social welfare.

The Catholic sociologist will keep clear of the attitude of the sanctimonious reformer. He will do his work quietly, manfully, perseveringly, but will never be a mere "preacher" or doctrinaire. In his private life and conversation he will never descend to banalities and the discussion of silly or sentimental subjects. He will not, for example, be drawn into private and personal discussion of such a subject as, "Is kissing sinful?" He knows well that nine-tenths of it is sinful, even as he knows that more than nine-tenths of those who propound the question are merely seeking to indulge in sentimental talk about a dangerous subject. In his private life the sociologist will avoid "frank" discussions, mindful that many subjects may not be handled without defilement, and that there are things which should not be "so much as named" among decent people. In his more public work the Catholic sociologist may have to mention evil things, to debate them, to combat

them. Yet his expression will never be brutal or vile, nor will it cover grossness and boorishness with the assumed name of "frankness."

Further to combat the evils which lead to an unstable and impermanent family-life, the Christian sociologist will seek the help of associations, guilds, societies, sodalities, to inculcate a lively respect for the family and the home, and to foster devotion to true family-life. If he has a gift for clear and persuasive writing, he will make use of it. If he has a ready and eloquent expression, he will not be silent. Yet in all public utterances, written or spoken, he will be careful to avoid the mere airing of opinions, and will make sure that his message is the embodiment of solid and everlasting truth. The world has a right to expect of the graduates of Catholic colleges the doctrine and direction that will save society. And yet many gifted men and women in our colleges have no higher ambition, in the way of literature and expression, than the writing of a cheap story for some magazine, or the composition of a scenario which will prove acceptable in Hollywood, or the mastery of speech that will mean an engagement for stage or platform and the consequent role of public entertainer or secular instructor. This is a grave evil. Let Catholic educators look to it.

To the sociological endeavor of personal Catholic life and example, associated effort, writing, and speaking, the sociologist will join the alertness and

interest of the loyal citizen. He will be watchful to oppose legislation (and to organize opposition) when measures are proposed which would make divorce easy to obtain, or would give public countenance to marital infidelity, or would permit the dissemination of books and pamphlets recommending Birth Control, or would legalize the manufacture and sale of contraceptive devices. On the other hand, he will be earnest in promoting just legislation for the stabilization of the family. And such legislation is badly needed. Every day and hour we are beset with appeals for justice to the farmer, to the laborer, to the employer. But we seldom hear of justice to the family, or appeals on the part of legislators for measures designed to protect the family, to preserve its integrity in domestic security, and to encourage its fertility.

The godless attitude of mind and the loose conduct of life which strike directly at the stability of the family are strongly supported by the current doctrines (almost universally accepted in America) of *Individualism* and *Liberalism*. Individualism tends to neglect the family as the basic social unit, and to stress the individual as the only being with which the government has to deal. Liberalism tends to cast off all responsibility to God, all obligations of morality, and in the name of freedom to demand license, for the press, for private utterance, for thought, religion, and conscience. Between them

these fallacious systems have pretty well destroyed the popular recognition of the fundamental social importance of stable family-life. They even pretend—as Pope Pius XI indicates in his Encyclical “*Casti Connubii*” (December X930)—to furnish a *scientific* justification for loose and immoral living. Against these pernicious systems, the Catholic scholar must take arms. For the intellectual defence and furtherance of true social philosophy is of even greater importance for mankind than the “field work” of the practical sociologist, which seeks direct adjustment of bad social conditions and the establishment of good ones.

b) THE PROBLEM OF PROPERTY

While the subject of property is manifestly a matter of economics, it has *moral* aspects also, and these we will consider here.

Inasmuch as the present condition of* family-property constitutes a moral problem, it is closely allied with the subject of stability, just now discussed. For the stability of the family is necessarily hurt by forces which prevent the ownership of goods required for the proper support of the family; it is also injured by agencies which keep the family from establishing its own homestead.

A man has the right to marry and to found a family. He has the further right to a *fair opportunity* of earning for himself and his family the

means of livelihood, *and maintaining a permanent home*. The industrial or social forces which keep a man poor, which compel him to live in localities where a privately owned home is neither a possibility nor a desirable thing, which make for a closely centralized city-life and the consequent loss to the family of that freedom, dignity, and independence which come with life on the soil—all these are forces which injure the stability of the family, violate fundamental rights, and in so far constitute a *moral* problem.

It is obvious that the family homestead, owned permanently with its grounds, is a strong support to family-life and a guarantee of stability. Such a homestead gives to all members of the family a sense of security and peace, of self-reliance and seemly independence. It makes for a lively interest, on the part of its members, in the affairs of the community of which the homestead is a fixed and stable part. Families housed in alien dwellings, families which live at the mercy of a landlord, families compelled to huddle in tenements or to grovel in slums, are *hampered*, and tend to become socially ineffective. For its proper social functioning the family requires strong roots, and such roots are lacking to the floaters, the boarders, the apartment dwellers, and the tenement families. Only the privately owned homestead can supply these necessary roots. Hence the social conditions which prevent the average man, the ordinary

citizen, from housing his family in its own homestead, are conditions which are not only economically unsound, but morally bad. Thus we see that the problem of family-property is a moral problem as well as a problem of economics, and as such it presents itself to the attention of the Christian sociologist.

If men are to continue to be herded about great factories in crowded cities; if they are to be paid for their work only enough to cover the family expenses of food, clothing, and rent, they will never be able to establish permanent homesteads. There is no room for homes in the crowded industrial centres; there is no desirable site for homes in such places, even if room were available; and the return for factory labor is usually insufficient to enable a frugal and provident family to establish a homestead, even if no difficulty in point of space and location has to be overcome. Some sociologists advocate a general return to the land and the rural home. In these days of fast motors and good roads, such a plan is not wholly impracticable. Even if industry continues to engage the efforts of most bread-winners, it would be possible for the family to have its homestead in a small community, or on a small farm, near the centre of industry, and for the members of the family who work in factory or office to journey daily to and from the city. Indeed, the army of such "commuters" is even now a sizable one.

It has been suggested by some sociologists that,

if the opportunity for establishing a homestead cannot be at once afforded to every family, some benefits of the stable and rooted home might be accorded to families by establishing a system of gardens on common grounds near the cities. Each family could own or use a definite part of such grounds, and could send members to cultivate them and to reap their harvest. Such a plan, however, could hardly be a permanent thing, especially for the larger cities; but it is a plan that might be tried, and it would have the effect of winning many a convert to the ranks of those who wish to have their own homesteads outside the crowded cities.

Whatever the plan suggested or followed, the sociologist must recognize the need of some action to adjust a bad economic condition of affairs and to right a moral wrong. Legislation could do much to favor and foster the establishment of permanent homesteads. Public lands could be thrown open; small properties could be made available at generous terms; taxation could be regulated in such wise as to put the least possible burden on the small landholder; regulation of contracts could prevent the land-grabber from taking the property and homestead of the family in distress. These and other measures might well be advocated, to the end that the problem here discussed may be properly and permanently solved. But perhaps the greatest effort of the sociologist will be exacted in showing to the leg-

islaters, and to the citizens, that the problem is a problem, and that its solution is a thing of urgent necessity. Yet this is the case, and any effort which helps men to recognize the fact is sociological effort of the greatest merit.

c) THE PROBLEM OF LABOR

We have seen that man has the right to life, and the further right to marry and to found a family. Hence, man has the right to the means of livelihood and the support and rearing of his family. Therefore, man has the right to labor; for labor is the sole ordinary means of gaining the necessities of life. The world, as we have said in another place, does not owe every man a living, but it does owe every man the opportunity of laboring to gain a livelihood. Social conditions and agencies which deny to men this requisite opportunity, are economically evil and morally wrong.

Unemployment, or enforced idleness, is a social evil of the worst description. It has been justly called "the most terrible disease which afflicts the body politic." The very word "unemployment" calls to mind a most distressing picture of families in dire need, of strong men eager for work and finding none, of bodies ill-clothed and ill-nourished, of minds in an agony of helplessness before the menace of a merciless future. The word summons up a picture of upright minds turned base, of manly

hearts become angry and rebellious. For when unemployment holds a citizenry in thrall, every thought and impulse and effort of suffering men is pervaded with the maddening conviction that this thing need not be; that the rich earth is still a treasure-house offering store sufficient for the support and comfort of many times its population; that the lords of business and industry, who have taught all men to admire them, have blundered or sinned, and have botched the management of affairs under their control. During times of unemployment, commoners, who must live by daily toil and are now denied it, feel by the most just of instincts that injustice is being done. No amount of argument, no explanation of cycles and of supply-and-demand, no bosh about the situation being "psychological," will kill that instinct or quiet its sure conviction. And out of such conviction bitter resentment easily arises, and men are all too likely to repel injustice with injustice, to meet a bad situation with a worse, if only they may make the overlords of finance, who feel no pinch of want, fall with them into a common necessity or even a common destruction. So come revolutions and systems of political and social control which are humanly insupportable and which reduce men to serfdom and even absolute slavery—Communism, Socialism, Sovietism.

When unemployment is widespread, we say that we are passing through a season of "depression" or

are come upon "hard times." Economists and sociologists are ever laboring manfully to discover and set down in order the causes of depressions. They commonly reach some such conclusions as these: (a) Good times and hard times follow each other in fairly regular cycles, and at approximately calculable intervals of years, (b) Minor cycles of prosperity and depression are observable within the larger cycles, and indeed within each year, and seem to depend upon seasonal changes more than upon any other discoverable factor, (c) Inventions of new machines, and other industrial occurrences, often turn loose a great number of workmen, and, for the time, the supply of labor is much greater than is needed for adequate production. Now, these familiar statements may be true, but it is surely illogical to regard them as an adequate expression of the *causes* of depressions. They are not so much *causes* as *characteristics* of the movement of industrial affairs. Cycles of employment and unemployment, of prosperity and depression, are not cosmic cycles, like the cycles of stars and the courses of comets; they are movements of business that human activity controls and human activity can change. It is purest nonsense to talk of "cycles" in this connection, as though they were inevitable and uncontrollable. Seasons, indeed, we cannot control, but we can control the activities of industry and contrive to make these less dependent upon seasonal changes. And the third point men-

tioned—the excess-supply of labor—is manifestly a thing which admits of management and adjustment. It will not do for the blundering captains of industry to tell us that our prosperity is their doing, and then that depressions and unemployment come from inevitable "cycling" of the times. It will not do for the lords of finance to preach up a spendthrift activity to make good times, and then to tell us that we cannot possibly unmake bad times. It will not do because it is not true. We make times good and we make them bad, and if we have a grain of sense, we shall try to see what activities of ours are truly the causes of these things. To explain recurrent depressions in terms of cycles is like explaining the darkness by an elaborate statement of the fact that night comes after day, and day after night. That much we know; the fact of the cycles we know; what we do not clearly recognize is the true cause of the cycles. And until we have discovered that cause, we can make no successful move to adjust or control them.

Now, the cause of depressions is discoverable; nay, it has been long recognized by sane men. The cause in question is the greed and ambition of fallen mankind. It is the unbridled lust for gain and power, in those especially who have in possession or control the most of the world's medium of exchange, and who always want more of it. Pope Pius XI rightly says, in his Encyclical "*Quadragesima Anno*

"Capital diverts business and economic activity entirely to its own arbitrary will, without regard for the human dignity of the worker, the social character of economic life, social justice and the common welfare." The rank and file of the people are left in want, while the handlers of wealth plan and plot and wrangle in the effort to corner more cash. The resources of the earth lie undeveloped, or its rich products are so clumsily managed that they are unavailable to persons and families who need them most, while the captains of industry and the kings of business are engaged in the same ugly and inhuman activity. Money, which is meant to serve men as the necessary instrument of exchange, is made an end in itself, a goal and even a god. Here we have the true cause of depressions and unemployment.

Only the acceptance of Christian teachings and the general recognition of the requirements of the natural law can bring the problem of unemployment to a final and satisfactory solution. Meanwhile legislation can do much.

Civil laws can be framed and enforced to the end that citizens be given a just opportunity for steady labor and the winning of a permanent livelihood. Nor should the sociologist who labors for the enactment of such legislation be deterred from his high purpose by the whining of money-lords or their frantic declarations that "rugged individualism"

must be left to its own devices, unhelped and unhindered by intervention on the part of the State. We have seen that the State has the right and the duty of intervening in social affairs when things are come to a desperate pass, and no other means of righting them is to be found. And these conditions for intervention are surely verified in the case of wide-spread unemployment and lasting depressions. In 1933 and 1934 the Federal Government of the United States wisely inaugurated measures—many of which were necessarily tentative and experimental in character—for the employment of millions of citizens.

Public Employment through agencies established by the civil power is one means of preventing unemployment. Individual States of the Union have established employment offices at various times, with consistently beneficial effect. Ohio led the country in this worthy movement by setting up such an office in 1890.

Another means for curing and preventing depressions is the furthering of *Public Works*, such as irrigation, reclamation of waste lands, reforestation, building of highways and bridges, construction of dams for water-supply or the manufacture of electric power, dredging of river-channels and harbors, construction of public buildings, etc.

A means of preventing the hardships incidental to

times of depression is *Unemployment Insurance*, which guarantees to the laborer whose work is temporarily taken away, some little income to help him through the period of unemployment. Many individual industries have already adopted some form of Unemployment Insurance.

By these and other means the State must intervene to help men exercise their inborn right to labor and to maintain their families.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE

In this Article we have discussed several problems which affect the family, and which have a notably *moral* character. We have briefly stated the problems, and have indicated the general direction in which sociological effort must move for their solution. We have spoken of the problem of the *stability of the family*, and have discussed its causes and its one adequate means of solution. We have studied the question of *family property* and have shown the urgent social need of permanently established and privately owned homesteads. We have discussed the problem of *labor and unemployment*, and have indicated the causes of depressions and their only available cure.

Article 2. Economic Problems of the
 Family

- a) Founding the Family b) Maintaining the Family

a) FOUNDING THE FAMILY

Strictly speaking, the family is founded when the first child is conceived. For at that moment the *conjugal society* of husband and wife is changed into the true *family group* of father, mother, and child. Still, it is usual and eminently practical to consider the phrase "founding of the family" in a somewhat wider meaning, and to include in it the establishing of conjugal society by valid marriage.

Young people who look forward to married life and the rearing of children are faced in our day with no little difficulty in point of economics. In plain words, they need money. And somehow a great deal of money (or what it will buy) seems necessary nowadays before marriage and the establishing of a home can be seriously thought of. This fact, more than any other perhaps, accounts for the great number of delayed marriages, and the long and indefinite engagements, which constitute a modern social difficulty. We have already discussed these matters in their moral and purely social aspects; it will be profitable here to consider their economico-social character.

No secular plan or program can be offered by sociology for the satisfactory settlement of the dif-

Acuity faced by the couple which wishes to marry and feels that sufficient means are not at hand. Religion must meet the difficulty, not by supplying the necessary funds, but by changing the viewpoint of the couple to a more just and reasonable angle. Faith in God, reliance upon His providence, estimation of one's proper state in life as of more importance than its material conditions—these are not mere phrases or shadowy ideals; they are workable realities, and any number of couples has put them successfully to work. In a word, young people who wish to marry must learn to seek Arst the Kingdom of Heaven. This statement may draw a smile from modern materialistic sociologists, but it is soundly scientiAc for all that. Still, there is much for sociology to suggest and sociologists to accomplish to lessen the material or monetary difficulty which stands in the way of founding a family.

First, there is the matter of work and wages. We have already studied the problem of labor and unemployment, and we shall have occasion before long to consider the question of the family-wage. Here we must turn briefly to what may be called the marrying-wage.

A man has the right to labor and to possess the fruits of his labor in the form of payment or wages. Pope Leo XIII, in his famous Encyclical "*Rerum Novarum* " has this to say on the amount of wages due for labor: "Let it be granted that, as a rule,

workman and employer . . . should freely agree as to wages. Nevertheless, there is a dictate of nature more imperious and more ancient than any bargain between man and man, that the remuneration must be enough to support the wage-earner in reasonable and frugal comfort." Now, the wage-earner, however frugal and reasonable, has normally the lawful desire to establish his own home and rear a family. He wishes to marry. And therefore his frugal and reasonable requirements include that of means sufficient to enable him to marry, to care decently for his wife, and to maintain his home. The natural law itself demands a wage that may fairly be called a marrying-wage for every young man. That the present scale of wages is often insufficient to enable the most frugal and reasonable man to set up a home, is undeniable. Economists and sociologists have much to do in working for fair wages, and perhaps much more to do in bringing into some sort of reasonable balance and ratio the wage-scale and the scale of prices for necessary commodities.

Let it be noticed that the marrying-wage is such as will suffice for the frugal and reasonable requirements of the worker. There can be no doubt that much of the difficulty in point of money, which prevents early marriages and thwarts the efforts of young people to gather a fund sufficient for the founding of a home, is due to carelessness and improvidence upon the part of the couples themselves.

There is much to invite this improvidence in the very temper of the times. For somehow people of all classes, rich and poor, learned and unlearned, seem to have submitted completely and supinely to the current superstition that life to-day is "complex" and exacts a "higher standard." In other words, people generally seem to acquiesce in the belief that, because there is to-day a bewildering number of ways in which to spend money for pleasures and luxuries as well as necessities, and a bewildering number of voices urging all to spend freely, much money must actually be spent. This mistaken notion finds ready support in the weakly human tendency to keep pace with the styles, and to live as expensively as the others in one's social group. Against this damaging state of affairs something may be done quickly and effectively by a combination of good sense, education, and Christian moderation. Nor is it necessary, to remedy the evil of improvidence, to train young people to niggardliness or meanness, or to ask them to be cheap or shoddy. A decent interest, a moderate spirit of carefulness, a willingness to do a little work and to apply oneself in order to know how to do it well—these requisites make for neither meanness nor cheapness, and they may make all the difference between hopeless unreadiness for marriage and a due preparedness. If the young man knows how to care for his needs properly and without waste, if the young woman knows something of needlework and

is not afraid of labor, if the couple has anything of the spirit of repose to set against modern feverishness and the modern tireless quest of expensive entertainment, it is very likely that, no other obstacles preventing, they will come early to their marriage, and come prepared to undertake its heavy duties with a sufficient, though not elaborate, equipment. But if the young man feels that he must maintain "a car," must have five or six outfits of clothing a year, must indulge without any thought of self-denial his tastes in liquor and tobacco and his likings for the diversions of theatre and dance-hall; and if the young woman clothes herself expensively and requires an elaborate wardrobe, if she expects and exacts constant entertainment and diversion of the type which calls for tickets and admission-fees, and railway fares, and "gas"; if both require occasional long trips and expensive vacations; if neither thinks of setting up a home until they have a furnished house or a fully equipped apartment—then it is likely that the "engagement" will drift on for weary years, and at long last will terminate in a marriage of little fruit, small promise of happiness, and weak social effectiveness.

Christian moderation, the spirit of self-denial, the due estimation of the married life as one of heavy but happy obligation—these are requisites for solving the problem of founding a family, and no Catholic can be excused for lacking them. Further,

schools for girls and women may do much to ease the solution of the problem by training their pupils in the ancient homely arts, especially that of needle-craft.

b) MAINTAINING THE FAMILY

The problem of maintaining the family is rather a fearsome one if its component items are listed and viewed without reference to the various means that are normally available to meet their requirements. There is here no mere question of food, clothing, and shelter; there are other things to add to the daily needs, and, while these may be called occasional or extraordinary, their requirements in the way of money are so considerable as to make the problem of family-maintenance one of weight and magnitude.

First, there is the problem of getting the child safely into the world. In an older day children were usually born at home, the family physician in attendance, or, perhaps, a neighbor or two lending kindly if unskilled assistance. To-day, in our cities at least, the hospital-birth is usual, and there is no denying that it offers advantages for mother and child far greater than any that can be had at home. But the expense is considerable, and sometimes frankly outrageous. For a few days of pre-natal care, attendance at delivery, and two weeks of care after birth, the hospital fees are frequently as high as two or even three hundred dollars. And two or

three hundred dollars is a vast amount of money for the ordinary family, which depends for its income upon the daily labor of a breadwinner. It is easy to see that the great expense of having a child safely born is an influence which makes for the horrible social evil of artificial Birth Control. The sociologist has a notable task to perform in procuring reasonable service at reasonable cost in obstetrical hospitals. Some cities have hospitals in which obstetrical care is given without charge, and these institutions do a great deal of good and are agencies of sound social action. But there is also need for hospitals that will charge a moderate rate; for many mothers are unwilling to be regarded as "charity patients," and a decent self-respect impels the average man and wife to "pay as they go." We need obstetrical hospitals in which a sufficient, but moderate, charge is made. The thing can be done, and indeed it has been done. Boston presents a notable instance of its feasibility. There is, in that city, an obstetrical hospital, founded by private enterprise, in which the patient is given three days of care before the birth of the child, the attendance of skilled obstetricians at delivery, and two weeks' care after the birth, and the total charge is sixty dollars. And this institution is maintained, without endowments or appropriations, by the fees of the patients alone. Nor is it regarded as a hospital for the poor. It receives rich and poor at the same rate, and is pa-

tronized by the wealthy as well as by commoners, for it is staffed by obstetricians of national, and, indeed, of world-wide, reputation.

Once born into the world, the child requires food, clothing, shelter; and it is almost certain, as days go by, to require medical care in sickness, and perhaps a surgical operation, or special attention to correct defects of sight or hearing. And these almost inevitable requirements exact an outlay, in most cases, of a considerable amount of money. Again, the child must be educated; school-fees in one form or another, and in increasing amounts as the child advances through secondary and collegiate stages of instruction, make a steady demand upon the family purse. All these items of expense, multiplied by the number of children that come normally to the average family, and augmented by the outlay required for the maintenance of the parents themselves in health and sickness, justify our statement that the problem of supporting a family is, economically considered, rather a difficult one. But the economic magnitude of the problem is exceeded by its social necessity: it is of incalculable importance that the problem be rendered capable of solution by the average man, the ordinary husband and father.

Manifestly, the solution of the problem depends, first and foremost, upon an adequate and steady income. A man has the right to a *living-wage* in order to maintain himself in decency and frugal comfort;

he has the further right to a *marrying-wage*, that he may follow the reasonable and lawful tendency of nature, and so marry and found a family; he has also the right to a *family-wage* sufficient, with prudent management, to procure for his family not only the bare requisites for existence, but adequate for the decent maintenance of husband, wife, and children, in the ordinary and the occasional (or extraordinary) circumstances of life, and sufficient to permit something to be laid by for times of unemployment, age, sickness, and incapacity. It is not necessary to offer proof for this assertion. Grant that a *living-wage* is a requirement based upon the demands of natural law, and the necessity of a *marrying-wage* and a *family-wage* is at once apparent. For the same natural law that justifies a man's claim to life and the means of supporting it, must extend to the normal physical and moral needs of life. A man has not only the right to live; he has the right to live *humanly*, and to carry out in life the wholesome and socially essential tendencies of his nature. In a word, he has the right to marry and found a family; and if this is so, he has the right to the means of supporting his family. A family-wage is certainly recommended if not absolutely exacted by the natural law itself.

It is not now possible to set down the amount of a family-wage in terms of dollars and cents. Attempts have been made to determine it for a given locality

in quantities of food and clothing, amounts of rent, costs of ordinary household supplies, rates of transportation, etc. This is the right way to go about the work, and, in time, we may hope to have the living-wage for families set down in scale according to locality and number of members in the family, and with very close approximation to exactness. A carefully kept family-record of expenditures and the preparation of a detailed family-budget at the beginning of each year would indicate with pretty close accuracy the amount of the family-wage requisite for a given family.

To secure the living family-wage, workers should unite in lawful and reasonably controlled unions; employers should obey the precepts of justice and charity; workers and employers should cooperate in schemes of collective bargaining; just minimum wage laws should be enacted by the civil power.

In computing the amount of the family-wage, the economist and the sociologist should not fail to include in their calculations the expense inevitably to be incurred when death enters the home. If a birth involves a great outlay of money, a death in the family involves an even greater. Indeed, it too frequently happens that a family which manages to maintain its members decently in life, finds itself plunged heavily into debt when one of them is called by death. For the expense of the simplest funeral is sure to be considerable. Therefore, the family-wage

should be sufficient to enable the family to procure and maintain a modest insurance-policy for each member. The premiums for such policies need not be large, particularly if husband and wife are insured when they are young, and if the children are insured soon after their birth. It is part of the reasonable and frugal plan upon which family-life should be conducted to prepare beforehand for extraordinary but unavoidable outlays. Families should be urged to practice this sane preparedness, and life-insurance offers a simple and effective means for their use. Two dangers, however, are to be carefully avoided in the matter by families whose maintenance constitutes a domestic, if not a social, problem. The first danger is discerned in the tendency (likely to be fostered by insurance-agents) to take out a policy in too large an amount. It would be best not to exceed, on this score, a sum sufficient to cover the expense of a decent and simple funeral. The second danger is carelessness about paying premiums promptly, and of postponing such payments for the mere convenience of using the money for non-essentials. The family-policies should, therefore, be moderate in benefits and premiums, and they should never be allowed to lapse. Further, apart from the most unusual and extreme circumstances of need, these policies should never be used as collateral for loans.

Many of the evils which make against the sufficiency of family-income may be remedied by sound

legislation. But only good sense and a proper appreciation of responsibility on the part of parents can prevent or cure the hardships which come of carelessness, selfishness, and improvidence. Many a family is kept in poverty, and in debt, by poor management, by foolish outlays for needless articles, by silly addiction to the "installment plan" in paying debts, by the modern practice of seeking ordinary amusement and recreation outside of the home, by encouraging children (through powerful example) in the false belief that the most desirable things in life are those bought for money and that the lack of funds for the fulfillment of one's own selfish desires is life's greatest misery. The greatest sociological force available for careless, improvident, and selfish managers of the family is to be found in the ardent practice of the true religion. Parents and children trained in the love of One who made poverty His deliberate choice will soon learn to turn a deaf ear to the world which tells them that money is the one thing desirable, even while withholding it from their hands. Indeed, religion is the most potent source of social good in every circumstance of life, and its strong aid is to be invoked by those who feel the weight of poverty, whether it be in any degree their own fault, or come from evil industrial conditions. Truly does Pope Pius say, in his Encyclical on Christian Marriage (*"Casti Connubii"* December, 1930) : "There is no possible circumstance in which husband and wife

cannot, strengthened by the grace of God, faithfully fulfil their duties. . .

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE

In this Article we have studied the economic problems which confront the family from the moment it is founded by marriage. We have noticed the many items of expense, most of them steadily recurring through life, which call for an adequate income. Such an income we have called a *living, marrying, family wage*. We have pointed out its character as a wage sufficient to maintain a man and his family in decency and frugal comfort, and we have mentioned forces which work against the establishment and maintenance of such a wage. Some of these forces are industrial and social in a wide sense; others are personal to the managers of the family budget. We have discussed certain extraordinary items of expense, and have briefly indicated means in which these are to be met. We have stressed as means for the solution of the problems discussed, the practice of religion, the establishment of just associations, and the warranted intervention of the civil power.

CHAPTER II

PROBLEMS OF THE COMMUNITY

For the sake of regularity and balance in our treatment of social problems, we shall divide this Chapter as we did the last, and shall study the *moral* and *economic* problems which confront the State or its civic or municipal divisions.

The Chapter is accordingly divided into two Articles:

Article 1. Moral Problems of the Community

Article 2. Economic Problems of the Community

Article 1. Moral Problems of the
Community

- a) Crime and Delinquency b) Social Dependency
- c) Racial Problems

a) CRIME AND DELINQUENCY

A *crime* is an offence against the civil law. If serious, it is called a *felony*; if less serious, it constitutes a *misdemeanor*. Crime is sometimes called *delinquency*, and this term is most frequently employed to designate the crime committed by those whose responsibility is less perfect, the young and the sub-normal.

A general classification of crimes distinguishes

them as offences against (a) peace and order; (&) authority; (c) persons; (c?) property.

Sociologists have long sought to discover and tabulate the causes of crime. Forgetting the fact that every man has a free-will, and is not merely a bundle of nerves and muscles reacting mechanically to external stimuli, certain sociologists and criminologists have looked for the causes of crime in geographical conditions, in climate, in seasonal changes and influences. Others have tried to discover physical marks as determinants of "the criminal type," believing that there is a "criminal class," that is, that criminals are born and not made. Sane sociology has abandoned these theories. For, while outside influences and physical defects may constitute the more or less proximate *condition* or *occasion* of crimes, they are never the true *cause* of the criminal activity of a free man. Mental defect can indeed be regarded as the cause of crime when it is so great as to offer serious injury to normal self-control. But, in cases that are normal or nearly normal, the cause of crime is the free-will of the criminal. "The cause is in my will; I will not come. That is enough to satisfy the Senate." So said Caesar in the immortal play; and he spoke as a sound psychologist should speak. The cause of human conduct is in the will. That granted, it becomes necessary to inquire into the influences which bear strongly upon the will and move it in the direction of crime and social misconduct.

The first and greatest of the influences which make for a bad will and bad conduct which may easily become crime, is *the lack of proper home training*. Homes in which the children have not the benefit of good moral and religious example on the part of parents; homes established in neighborhoods which tend to nullify, by their exemplification of evil living, the lessons imparted by word and example in the family circle; homes broken by divorce; homes spiritually poisoned by the impure atmosphere which surrounds the practice of Birth Control; homes spoiled by an unclean and careless poverty which hurts the finer sensibilities and tends ultimately to cheapen respect for spiritual values and to dull consciences—all such homes are socially ineffective, and out of them come many ill-trained and evilly-inclined persons to swell the ranks of criminals. Of course, many a criminal has had in youth all the advantages of a good home; and many a splendid man and noble woman has managed to achieve virtue and character without the help of a normal home. The "personal equation" is ever to be considered; in other words, free-will and individual responsibility are facts. But, generally speaking, the influence of the home for weal or woe is the greatest of social influences.

Next in importance, as an influence making for social misconduct and crime, is what may be loosely called *the spirit of the times*. It amounts, of course,

to the general decay of religious belief and the conviction that morality is a matter of convention, like table-manners. This spirit grows apace, and is fostered by an impure press, a restless quest of pleasure that somehow usually turns sexual, plays and motion pictures which glorify vice and present gangsters as heroes, books and magazines which make the great modern adventure a matter of escaping the restraints of decency or the clutches of the police. The influence of this *Zeitgeist* or "spirit of the times" is also powerfully augmented by materialistic education. The professor of psychology explains man in terms of physics and chemistry, and makes all his conduct a mere matter of stimulus and response. Meanwhile the professor of sociology, mysteriously stimulated, makes social plans and programs which—as the alert student cannot help but notice—will have no more value than a mechanical or chemical reaction to whatever influence may have brought the stimulus. A student hears in one class that man is but a super-developed ape, and, in another, tries with puzzled frown to discover why he so frequently acts like a beast.

Other influences which make for crime are the acquired habits of intemperance or addiction to drugs; lack of training in a suitable trade, and consequent inability to hold a position which affords a living wage; callous public neglect of defective, afflicted, and impoverished persons; laxity in the exe-

cution of criminal laws, and the multiplication of opportunities for evading capture or conviction for offences; a bad system of punishment for crime which often makes the penal institution a graduate school for criminals; sentimental administration of the laws, and the abuse of the remedial or rehabilitating measures known as *probation* and *parole*.

The spread of the true religion, the revitalizing of Catholic effort and practice, or, in the current phrase, the furtherance of *Catholic Action*, is the first great need of mankind for the solution of the problem of crime. Home-life needs stabilizing; decent surroundings, physical and moral, for dwellings are required; filthy slums need cleaning up; homesteading programs need furthering; there is need of a general establishment of a living family-wage; the bread-winners of the future should have the advantage of training in suitable trades and professions ("vocational training") in their school-days; the system of carefully conducted juvenile courts, with powers to place youthful offenders in suitable foster-homes or institutions and to guide their progress in social rehabilitation, should be extended; penal institutions should be compelled to keep first offenders from associating with older and hardened criminals; laws should be applied with promptness; politics and sentimentalism should be kept out of the courts. These and other measures await the work of the sociologist who wishes to come to grips with the problem of

crime and delinquency. Manifestly, there is no place within the scope of this manual for methods and detailed programs indicated for this work. Each item mentioned in the list of remedial measures demands a lengthy and important study in itself. We mention only one tremendously important point, and this merely by way of reminder: Let the social worker, and the theoretical sociologist as well, remember that every one of the activities studied or promoted for the solution of the problem of crime concerns human beings, not impersonal "cases"; and human beings have free-will, full human dignity, and are responsive to the influence of noble motives and of divine grace. The social scientist who loses sight of this fact in the maze of scientific apparatus and the details of elaborate programs will either fail of permanently successful work or he will do positive harm to society.

b) SOCIAL DEPENDENCY

In this section we discuss the problems which confront the community in the care, maintenance, or relief which must be given to the poor, to paupers, to orphans, and to mental defectives.

Poverty of spirit is placed first in the great list of virtues which win eternal happiness for the soul, and this not by professional sociologists figuring from shoals of dusty data, but by God Himself. Now, poverty of spirit is practised by those who willingly

give up the comforts and the conveniences of bodily life by a religious dedication to a special service of God; it is practised also by those who, deprived of conveniences and even of relative necessities, bear their heavy burden with fortitude, taking, like holy Job, good and evil from the hand of God, sincerely and uncomplainingly accepting His will. That there are many who possess the poverty of spirit, many who "practise poverty" in the first way or the second, is a glorious and a necessary blessing for mankind. There is yet a third class who benefit themselves and society by the practice of poverty of the spirit, and these are the people—rich, poor, or "comfortable"—who refuse to direct their efforts and their lives to a golden goal, and who have put aside wealth-getting as the ideal by which to live. It is not of this splendid poverty of spirit that we speak when we discuss poverty as a social problem.

Poverty, as we understand it here, is the deprivation of the means for normal, decent, socially effective living. It is a condition calling imperatively for relief and, in so far as may be possible, cure. Our Lord, who taught poverty of spirit as a necessary virtue, made the care of the poor His constant concern, taught men to consider the relief of His "least brethren" as the service of God, and told the rich young man to sell his property and give the proceeds to the poor. It is the duty of every man to act as God's steward, and to give of his superfluity to the

support of those who suffer deprivation. We have once more the direct word of God to guide us in the matter, and are divinely taught that the spirit of God does not reside in that man who sees his fellow-man in want and refuses him the aid which it is possible to give. And if poverty be a "phenomenon" of community life, community measures are to be undertaken for its relief.

From *decent poverty*, which is not the fault of the persons who bear it—or, more accurately, is not the fruit of their whole mode of life—we distinguish *pauperism*, which is an abject and spiritless willingness, on the part of those who suffer deprivation of the common necessities, to be carried along by others and to make no effort to improve their condition by their own exertions. This distinction is not always clearly drawn, and sometimes the term *pauper* (which carries a note of reproach) is unfairly applied to one who is impoverished, or even destitute, but eager to do what he can to maintain himself.

In seeking the causes of poverty, some social theorists have propounded plausible but fallacious doctrines. Thomas Malthus (1766-1834), an English economist, declared that poverty is the direct result of the pressure of increasing population on the food-supply. Karl Marx (1818-1883), a German-Jewish Socialist, taught that poverty comes from one cause, and one only, to wit, that the capitalistic employer appropriates the fruits of labor justly due to the

worker, and compels the latter to accept an inadequate wage. Henry George (1839-1897), an American economist, believed that poverty comes from faulty methods of taxation, and would disappear if a "single tax" were imposed upon land, thus taking from landlords the "unearned increment" which, through its present misdirection, impoverishes the people. But there was poverty in the world before the population was large, before capitalistic society was thought of, and before landlordism existed. Hence these theories are all fundamentally unsound.

The *true causes of poverty* are various. Some are found in nature (*e. g.*, earthquakes, floods, epidemics, crop failures, non-productive soil) ; some are found in human beings (*e. g.*, sickness, waste, extravagance, intemperance, mental defect) ; some are found in poorly operative social and industrial institutions (*e. g.*, low wages, unemployment, bad living conditions, deadly monotony of certain industrial employments, competition with low-paid imported labor). Add to these causes the devastating effect of wars, and the list of the causes of poverty will be fairly complete.*

*The following remarks of Father James M. Gillis, **C.S.P.**, are of interest and value: "Or take the problem of poverty. This too is a *bete noire* of the birth-control agitators. 'The poor you have always with you,' said our Savior. And He might have added, 'Because the rich you have always with you.' There is now, and always, much discussion—much wasted discussion—about the causes of poverty. The chief cause looms so large that no one seems to see it. The reason for poverty is wealth. Suther-

The Catholic Church, following perfectly the command of her Divine Founder, has always been the guardian and friend of the poor. No one who is ignorant of this glorious fact has the right to the name of sociologist. The history of the Church is an open book for all to read, and the story of Catholic religious Orders and of lay societies for the relief of the poor, is a record that no merely human institution can ever hope to rival. Men may talk as they please of bloodless "brotherhood," of the aloof and unloving "philanthropy" of the wealthy, of the inhuman "humanitarianism" born into a world trying to be religious without Christ. Men may glory as they please in an "organized charity carefully iced in the name of a cold, statistical Christ." But it is only the Church, divine mother of men, that can bring to the works of mercy that understanding sympathy, that whole-hearted recognition of the equal worth of human souls, that spirit of "faith that

land puts the case graphically. Suppose a hundred acres of land are divided among ten families, each being allotted ten acres. All goes well until one family, by hook or by crook, gets possession of eight other farms besides the one allotted to it. Then one family has ninety acres and nine families have to divide ten acres. The history of wealth and poverty is in that little parable. Even in the United States, 2 per cent of the people own 60 per cent of the wealth. And yet economists pretend to be puzzled by the 'problem' of poverty. As if selfishness, and chicanery, and dishonesty, and injustice were a *problem!* There are, no doubt, contributory and aggravating causes of poverty, but if the main cause, too great concentration of wealth, were removed, poverty would be inconsiderable." (From *The Catholic Church and the Home*, pp. 85, 86).

looks through death," that uneondescending attitude, which make her benefactions a real service to hearts and minds as well as to needy bodies. Recognizing Christ Himself in the persons of the poor, the Church seeks to serve them in a spirit of devotion, love, and reverence. Hers is not the prideful graciousness of one who stoops to aid the unfortunate out of his abundance; hers is not the crisp and frosty efficiency of one who tries to deal with human beings solely by approved methods of business. Hers is not the spacious posturing of those who feel the fineness of their condescending service. No; hers is the devoted and loving work of a mother caring for her children. And this work is shared by all the members of her family, as individuals and in organized groups.

The thing called "*organized charity*" is, of course, not to be sneered at. It has its place, and—civilization being what it now is—its necessary place, in the activities required for solving the problem of poverty and pauperism. But if it be not suffused by the spirit of Christ, which the true Church alone knows how to bring to the works of men, it is likely to give rise to new social problems even as it moves to solve the old. The investigations of the "charity worker" are so likely to be impertinent and prying; the administration of relief is apt to be so impersonally efficient; the treatment of the poor is so frequently offhand and unsympathetic, that the activities of or-

ganized charity are likely to make, on the one hand, for an increased number of those willing to be patronized and handled paternalistically (that is, to be mere paupers), and, on the other hand, these activities tend to arouse a spirit of bitterness and resentment in those who must perforce accept their benefactions.

The work of relieving poverty ought to be carried on with a minimum of "publicity" and "red tape." There should be as little as possible of curious prying into private and family life. There should be few, and brief, questionnaires. The persons aided should not be reduced to the status of names on index-cards or "cases" in the files of a central office. Some measure of these things is doubtless requisite, but the poor persons themselves should not be made so painfully aware of them. For even the poorest and most abject must feel a just resentment at being listed and filed in a public record, his misfortune embalmed for all time in unfading ink. The Catholic spirit in works of charity tends ever to keep these unpleasant requisites at an absolute minimum. Our loving Mother the Church is careful to avoid injuring the spirit of her children. How admirably, for example, does that splendid Society of St. Vincent de Paul—founded by the great Antoine Frederic Ozanam (1813-1853) in 1833 and established in America in 1845—accomplish its works of charity and relief of poverty, without subjecting the beneficiaries to the least in-

dignity. The student of sociology, and, In special, the student of the problem of poverty, could make no more profitable course of study than a detailed investigation of the history and functioning of the Society of St. Vincent de Paul.

The problem of poverty would be rendered much easier of solution by the enactment and application of just laws controlling the hours and conditions of labor, minimum wage, social and employment insurance, cooperative unions, old age insurance, establishment of funds for relief, etc.

With the poor, it is natural to associate orphans, neglected or abandoned children, and the dependent aged. For all of these are—in so far as they present a social problem—poor and in need of care. The religious and secular institutions for the maintenance of these unfortunate persons are doing a notably fine work to-day, and, while it is not perfect, it approximates as well as may be done the normal and natural care which it seeks to supply. Many schemes and plans for the care of dependents, young and old, have been put to test. It seems safe to rate as the best of these social measures "the cottage plan" for orphans and institutionally reared children, and "old age pensions" for the dependent aged. Of course, any plan for the care of the dependent young must, to be of finest value, seek to place children as soon as possible in suitable homes. No institution can bring

to its inmates the benefits of true home-life and home-training which are available in a well-managed household.

Those who are mentally defective constitute a public charge of great weight. But it is false sociology which seeks to destroy these unfortunates by euthanasia, or to render them incapable of propagation by sterilization. Of the former method, which is merely extermination by quiet murder, it suffices to say that God alone is master of life and death, and that murder is never anything but the foulest of crimes. Of sterilization no more need be said here than a word to recall the authoritative pronouncement of Pope Pius XI, mentioned in another Chapter (*Book Second, Chapter II, Art. 1, d*) : "Public magistrates have no direct power over the bodies of their subjects. Therefore, when no crime has taken place, and there is present no cause for grave punishment, they can never harm or tamper with the integrity of the body. . . . Sound sociology seeks to meet and solve social problems, not to shirk them. And the advocates of euthanasia and sterilization are merely trying to get rid of dependent defectives because it means much trouble and expense to take care of them. Sociology of this stamp, if put into practice, would soon devastate the earth in the name of human welfare; the poor, the aged, the deformed, the orphan, the illiterate, including all school children—

in a word, all whose presence here means work or expense for the state or municipality, would be quietly destroyed, and the problem of social dependency would be quickly obviated. If it be said that this is an absurd statement, we answer that it is nothing of the sort. If there is any consistency in human thinking, if there is such a thing as a principle and its application, the absurdity or sanity of the wholesale murder of troublesome and expensive dependents is exactly the absurdity or sanity of the proposal to remove the dependent aged and the unfit by euthanasia, and to block out of existence whole classes of dependents by sterilization.

Here again we need the lesson imparted so wisely and lovingly by the Catholic Church, the mother of men. To this loving mother her afflicted children are as precious as those who are sound in mind and body; nay, the Church, like every good mother, gives even more care and consideration to her less fortunate children than to those more capable of caring for themselves. And her holy example may well teach the world that it is only the presence of those who constitute a public charge and a considerable bother and expense, that gives occasion for the exercise of the splendid "social virtues" without which human nature would lose its last remnant of fineness. It may, indeed, be a fact that our care for troublesome unfortunates may be the one thing which holds off the lightnings of Almighty God from a world

that is reeking with selfishness and foul with vice.

We speak specifically here of the defective persons who must be maintained at public expense, usually in institutions. The care of these defectives is, we repeat, a sacred trust, and must be thoroughly and humanely exercised, even at the cost of heavy taxation. Those in charge of caring for defectives must ever remember that these are children of God, possessing full human dignity, and are never to be treated with cruelty, harshness, or contempt. As to the propagation of defectives, a final word may be said. Those plainly insane are not capable of marrying, for marriage is a contract, and a certain mental ability and maturity are requisite for making a valid contract. But those who are not insane, but "defective," and who, though mentally inferior, are not wholly incapable of normal social life, are not to be mutilated, segregated, or forbidden to marry and propagate.

c) RACIAL PROBLEMS

Mankind is one true society, all the members of which are descended from a common stock, a single pair of parents. Science joins perfectly with revelation in manifesting this truth. It follows that all human beings belong to one immense family, no member of which is naturally of greater value than any other. In the face of this fact it becomes inane to speak of some races as superior and of others as

inferior, to sing the current song of praise to the Nordics (a fabulous race slowly losing grip on mistaken minds) and to slander the Latins, to boast of the glorious destiny of the white man and to disparage the importance of the colored races. Incidentally, the great truth that we are all formed of a common clay should offer an effective check to the boorishness which so frequently exists (and gives rise to social problems) among national groups within the same race.

Inequalities there are among the members of the human family—inequalities of ability, of talents, of opportunities, of possessions. But there is no inequality of human dignity, no greater and lesser in the measurement of human souls. But men are often stupidly proud, and many are prone to judge an inequality in natural worth or importance to be present by reason of the accidental inequalities in cultures or even colors. Sane sociology disregards this mistaken and prideful judgment. But the sociologist is confronted with problems which arise out of its widespread acceptance.

The most notable racial problem in America is the *Negro problem*. There are others, it is true, but they are of local and minor character. The Negro problem, on the contrary, is national in scope. In simple terms the problem amounts to this: The white man in America feels that he cannot meet on terms of equality with the Negro; he wants the Negro to

“keep his place” as one socially inferior, to live with his own kind in definitely segregated districts, called “colored sections,” in cities and towns, and to acknowledge, with seemly courtesy, the superiority of his white neighbors. The Negro resents the attitude of the white man; he dislikes the social barriers that humiliate him; he hates the idea of “segregation.” Here is a bad social situation, and too frequently it occasions actual trouble.

There are more than twelve millions of Negroes in America—a considerable group even in a population of over one hundred and twenty millions. And it is unquestionably true that the Negro is treated unfairly. He was brought to this country against his will, for, despite the belief of many that some Negroes had settled in America before its discovery by Columbus, most of the Negro population to-day is descended from slaves. The Negro was kept in a state of servitude; opportunities of education were denied him; he was treated with scant respect and his moral as well as his mental requirements were often neglected. His sudden liberation, his establishment on a plane of political equality with whites, his spread through the North and West in answer to the call for hard and cheaply paid labor, have all been factors in a social maladjustment which seems effectually to resist almost all efforts to correct it. To-day the Negro has little chance to advance socially. Kept to the poorer parts of cities and towns, left without

the recreational facilities so widely furnished for whites, excluded from normal and proportionate participation in community affairs, he is made to feel that he is a social inferior, one suited to be a hewer of wood and a drawer of water for his white neighbor, but on no terms to be recognized as of full human stature and value. The Negro, on his part, is not without faults, but these are, in the main, the logical consequences of the conditions under which he is forced to live. The Negro definitely suffers wrong; and for this reason the present slight study is listed as a *moral* problem.

The Catholic Church has labored long and well on behalf of the Negro. Not only has the Church carried to her colored children the glorious Faith, but in minor matters she has served their social needs. She has founded schools; she has established religious communities of colored women; she has trained Negroes in her seminaries, and some of them have been raised to the priesthood for work among their fellows; she fosters worthy organizations among Negroes for their social betterment. Secular and lay effort has not been lacking on behalf of the Negro. Many institutions, leagues, and associations are working steadily and powerfully to establish them socially and to remove the barriers which stand in the way of their advancement.

The Negro problem is the more difficult of full solution for the fact that even those who recognize

its importance and gravity are often unsympathetic in their attitude towards it. And not only unsympathetic; many are adversely disposed to such a degree as to give expression, not to ill-will alone, but to damaged logic. We are all familiar with such a remark as the following: "It's very well to talk of fairness to the Negro. I agree that he is a man; that before God he is as valuable as I; that he does actually suffer injustice. But what is to be done? Would you make a Negro your intimate? Would you invite him to your table? Would you have him marry your sister?" The answer to such objections is, of course, obvious. To do justice to one's fellow-man does not necessarily involve making an intimate of him or marrying him to one's sister. There are many considerations to be weighed in choosing one's intimates. Does any man make all his white neighbors his bosom companions? Does he invite all to his table? Does he insist upon the right of any white man to marry into his family? Manifestly not. Yet he concedes to all his white neighbors—however many lines be drawn in point of religion, politics, social caste, business, etc.—the equal *human* status which he denies to the Negro.

Perhaps the greatest obstacle to be overcome is the mental bug-a-boo of a mixed race, of marriage between whites and Negroes. This terrifying thought is in the minds of many as soon as they hear of justice for the Negro. Yet there is small justification

for it. That there are lines between classes of people is a certainty that may as well be acknowledged at once, and the color-line is one of them. While it is entirely possible to ignore these lines, the social effect of such action is seldom happy. Just as a member of the true Church is earnestly dissuaded from marriage, by dispensation, with a non-member, so should a member of one race be dissuaded from marriage with a person of another color. In marriages of either type there is a definite injustice done to children, there are almost inevitable misunderstandings between the parties themselves, and there is sure to be some friction between the families so gracelessly united.

The Negro problem is complicated by the attitude of many Negroes themselves. Not only do they recognize the unkind and unjust attitude of white people in their regard; not only do they resent this attitude; they forget their own dignity and proper pride of race to become cheap imitations of the very persons who mistreat them. Of course, this is no more true of all Negroes than is dislike or contempt for Negroes a mark of all white persons. But it is true of a great many. These dislike their color; they are ashamed of kinky hair; they ape the manners of the more wealthy and prominent whites; they try to break into the "refined" districts in cities and to establish homes there. The very attitude and activities of these unworthy Negroes serve only to in-

crease the scorn and antipathy of unworthy whites.

Those who do social work among the Negroes have a difficult, nay, a heart-rending task. For Negroes are kept so poor; they have such little opportunity for decent housing, for adequate work, for recreation, for play-grounds for their children. Yet much has been accomplished in spite of all difficulties, and much more will be done. It will be done the more quickly if Negroes can be induced to leave off aspiring for recognition by whites and to take a deep interest in advancing themselves *as Negroes*. Instead of regarding themselves as segregated, let them learn to consider their groups as colonies. Let them be taught to leave off imitating any other race, and to develop their own race to its best and finest capabilities. For the rest, sociologists must labor on to procure for Negroes opportunities equal to those accorded to white people: equal facilities for education; equal opportunities for recreation and decent amusement; an equal standing with whites in point of work and wages; an equal status before the courts.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE

In this Article we have dealt with some important problems, markedly moral in character or implications, which confront the social group called *the community*, whether this be State, municipality, or other civic body. We have discussed *crime*, in cause

such contributions, not as the payment for service rendered (else the wealthy and more independent would have little or nothing to contribute), not as rent for land (else many citizens would need to contribute nothing at all; and, as a fact, the government does not own the land and is in no sense a renter or landlord), but as a requisite personal contribution to the common good. Such contributions, fixed according to a definite scale and exacted by public authority, are called *taxes*.

The State is a *natural* society; man requires it; he has, therefore, a natural obligation to support and maintain it. And if this is true, the State has the right, in natural law, to exact of its members the means of support and maintenance. Hence the member of the State, *i. e.*, the citizen, has a *personal* obligation to pay taxes. The amount of taxes justly required of each citizen is determined, on the one hand, by the needs of the State, and, on the other, by the ability of the citizen to contribute. This ability is *relative*, for some citizens are much more able to contribute than others, and hence the amount of taxation must be determined by a sliding or progressive scale which will meet the abilities of all classes of citizens without doing injustice to any. It may be added here that, while all citizens are required to contribute their part to the upkeep of the State, the individual citizen has rights and duties prior to those

of the Commonwealth, and he cannot be made to pay taxes in such amount as would deprive himself or his family of the necessities of life.

It is no easy matter to fix upon a scheme of taxation which will be perfectly fair to all concerned. For this reason the question of taxation is discussed as *a social problem*. And while the moral aspects of the problem are immediately apparent, the maintenance of the State is itself a matter of economics, and for this reason we study taxation as an *economic social problem*.

It requires no very extensive knowledge of the history of nations to recognize the far-reaching social effects of taxation. Unjust or unbalanced systems of taxation have often been potent factors in the spread of poverty, have led to wide-spread unemployment and periods of depression, and have sometimes promoted the spirit of unrest and even rebellion in the citizenry at large. On economic as on moral grounds it is of prime importance for the State to tax its members justly.

For just taxation, the following principles must be faithfully followed: (1) *Taxes must be necessary*. That is, the fund which the taxes are levied to supply must really be needed to serve the common good. Taxes imposed to provide a "pork barrel" for politicians, or to keep needless officials on public payrolls at fat salaries, or to promote works which actually serve no public need or utility, are unjust, and the

State which imposes them places a needless burden upon its members and inevitably prepares for itself social upheavals and possible revolution. Examples of such unjust taxes are those levied to build elaborate armaments, to supply unnecessary fleets of ships and aircraft, to further inept and very expensive schemes of building and equipment in the name of •education, postal service, etc. (b) *Taxes must be proportionate*. That is to say, the taxes imposed must be proportioned to the ability of the citizen to pay. Economists have calculated that taxation which brings in more than 8 percent of the national income are likely to be excessive. In countries where taxpayers have, in general, an income which allows them a comfortable margin beyond the requirements of decent living, a higher rate might fairly be exacted. But, taking the world by and large, a tax which runs to 12 or 14 percent of the annual national income is almost certain to be unjustly excessive. Excessive taxation has been the occasion of untold misery in times past, and it has done harm to the attitude of citizens towards their duty of paying taxes; as Charles Devas points out (*c.f. Political Economy, third edition, p, 579*), it has given rise to "the popular view that to evade the payment of taxes is neither dishonourable nor wrong." Devas, by the way, regards as mistaken the attempt of economists to use the total income of a country as a criterion for fixing a just rate of taxation. It is not, he declares,

the simple income that is properly taxable, but "what is available after absolute and conventional necessities have been satisfied; and the greater this surplus income, the greater the taxable capacity of the country" (*loc. citp.* (c) *Taxes must be equitable.* That is, taxes must represent an equal and impartial burden to all citizens. Thus members of the State must each bear that burden which is suited to his capacity or financial strength. To secure this equality, it seems best that taxable incomes should be subject to a progressive taxation up to a certain amount, and beyond that the rate of taxation should diminish. Thus, if a man who earns \$1500 a year is taxed 4 percent on his surplus income, a man who earns \$5000 a year should be taxed at a higher rate, say 6 percent. As taxable income increases, the rate should increase, until it reaches a definite amount of the income itself—say one-half. At this point the rate of taxation should be fixed (for the very large income which it would affect) or the remainder of the income should be taxed at a much lower rate. Taxes levied on income are called *direct*. These are sometimes supplemented by *indirect* taxes such as those levied on purchases of cosmetics, amusement-tickets, etc. Indirect taxation is not in itself unjust, but it should not be levied on the necessities of life, (d) *The system of taxation should be economically and politically sound.* Taxes should be levied in such wise and on such articles as will stimulate the indus-

try of a country and encourage home trade. They should be levied effectively upon all voters; they should be such as a majority of citizens consider right and fair; they should tend to keep extravagant expenditure at a minimum among the citizenry; they should not become forces, in any case, for the destruction of the right of ownership or property.

b) BALANCE OF POPULATION

It is requisite for the economic welfare of the State that the population be duly balanced between the city and the country. The city will normally have its share, and tends always to have more than its share. This particular economic and social problem turns upon the necessity and the difficulty of keeping the rural population up to its due measure.

In our day industrialism is a powerful magnet drawing people in thick clusters around the great city factories, into shops and offices, and away from the farm and the rural village. Not only has the economic attraction of a steady position with (ostensibly) assured wages brought thousands from the soil to the apartment and tenement; a tremendous moral influence to the same end has been exercised by the current belief that the city-dweller is socially more imposing and important than the rustic, more refined and cultured, more alive to the interests of the day, more alert and clever, better situated to enjoy the pleasures of life and to taste adventure. Against

these two potent influences for an unbalanced population, that is, for an *urbanized* population, the economist and the sociologist must join forces.

People, of course, are free to live where they choose; They cannot be herded into the country if they choose to live in the city. They cannot justly be subjected to a selection by draft or conscription by which an able-bodied and capable army would be sent into the rural districts to do the nation's farming. If the population is to be kept at proper balance, people must be shown the advantages of life on the land; they must be taught the value and the rewards of rural life, as opposed to life in the large city.

NoW—showy and artificial pleasures and employments & part—the country offers many sound attractions which the city cannot offer. The first of these, and by far the most important, is that family-life tends to flourish and bear rich fruits in the country, whereas in the city it tends to decay. A sufficing instance of this truth is found in the fact that the rate of divorce is much higher in the city than it is in the country—fifty percent higher, in fact, and perhaps more. Again, the life of a family in a large city is almost inevitably subject to influences which mar its natural vitality and render it artificial and mechanical; the family-group is never truly self-contained; an ugly individualism tends to draw its members apart; each member has his own employment, his

own friends, his own ideas of an evening's amusement, and the city lays a constant opportunity for self-indulgence at the very door. In the country, these distracting and dividing influences do not exist at all, or exist in a very minor way. Rural employments regularly tend to draw the family together, to promote interdependence with division of labor, to keep the interests of all common. City families die out; country families tend to become more stable. A State in which most of the citizens live in cities while only a relative few are on the soil, is a State that is doomed to early extinction. The "bold peasantry," of which Goldsmith spoke so glowingly, is just as essential to-day as it was in the eighteenth century, when the poet set down the now familiar lines.

The family on the soil usually owns its home and its lands; the city man is usually a renter. The man in the country has in his land the means of life; city property is sterile. The city man is subject to the caprice of the times and of the lords of business and finance; a depression may occur at any time, and once his employment is taken away, he is left dependent upon what little money he may have saved. The man on the soil does not feel the depression so suddenly or acutely, and, even with business at its worst, he has some fertile means of livelihood. The man in the city usually learns no trade; the countryman has what may justly be called his profession. If

more people were on the soil and fewer in the crowded cities, ownership of land would be more widespread, self-employment would be a more notable phenomenon of our social life; a spirit of sane independence and an increase of self-respect would spread abroad through the nation.

Without the productive soil, the city could not exist. The farm is the larder of the city. If the nation is to exist as a self-supporting entity, it must keep a due proportion of its people on the land.

It is true that, on the face of things, the city offers many advantages. The man in the city lives close to church and school. He has the convenience of automobile, bus, and trolley. The telephone is ever at his elbow. His house is likely to be more comfortable (if he be at all prosperous) than the farmer's. He has electric lighting and refrigeration. He drinks purified and filtered water, and there is an abundant supply of it ever ready for his uses. His children have a daily supply of pasteurized milk, fresh and pure, delivered at the door. The morning paper is on his doorstep at early dawn to keep him abreast of the world-wide march of events. If he is sick, a doctor is at hand. If a member of his family should require the prompt attention of surgeons, a hospital is just around the corner. Libraries, museums, lecture-halls, and theatres are close about him. He has the opportunity, now and again, of seeing the notable personages of the world *en tour*, of hearing them

speaking, of acquiring valuable views and opinions at first hand. If he is poor, social workers look after his needs; his children go to a school where capable practitioners attend to their eyes, ears, teeth, and keep a close check on their general health; sickness in the home brings the district nurse and the service of free clinics.

Yet all these advantages (most of which affect the prosperous man rather than the slum dweller) are no longer peculiar to the city. The farmer is no longer a man of the backwoods. Good roads are everywhere, and the poorest farmer has a car. Many farmers have telephones, and all have kindly neighbors, and sudden sickness or need of surgery will bring the doctor or the ambulance to most country places almost as quickly as to the outlying districts of the big city. Many farmers have local generating systems to furnish them with electric light, refrigeration, power for radio and for modern sanitation systems. District schools in the country are no longer of the "little red schoolhouse" type. Splendid modern buildings, properly equipped, serve the educational needs of wide rural areas, and children are brought to the school by auto-bus. The school clinic and health inspection is becoming a commonplace even in remote rural places; district nursing is being extended to the country. Certain "cultural" advantages of the city are yet lacking to the farmer, but the more notable advantages and conveniences, once pe-

culiar to the city, are shared nowadays by city man and country man alike. Churches and "missions" and "stations" bring to the farmer the essential service of the true religion, and the Catholic Church is making daily progress in rural work.

If it be objected that the farmer is never well off in point of ready cash; that we are forever hearing of the farmer's needs, and of his hard way of life, it may be retorted that ready cash is a convenience but not necessary for one who has always an abundance of the main requisites for life and health—food, shelter, clean water, and fresh air. But it is true that the farmer labors under many a disadvantage which proper legislation, scaling of tariffs, fixing of mortgage-contracts, etc., will obviate; and for such legislation and social action sociologists and economists must labor. Again, farming in America has been anything but the activity of a peasantry. We must seek to multiply the numbers of the small farmer, the farmer who does not raise foodstuffs primarily to sell them to somebody else, but to use them for himself and his family. Farming in America has been "industrialized" to such an extent that in many instances it is as much a "big business" as the giant automobile factory. The sort of farmer most needed for the balance of population is the farmer of the type once called a peasant proprietor. Of course, even such a farmer will have plenty to sell, and people who live in the city must have his

produce; but the main motive behind any significant "back-to-the-land" movement must be the motive of living on the soil, and maintaining the family there, not the motive of making the farm a mere business plant, which is expected to win a big return in cash so that the farmer can presently sell out and move to the city to live. What we need for a stable, self-supporting nation, is a great number of farmers who live on the land, and love the land, and are willing to stay on the land. The small farmer of France has existed for a thousand years; the peasant farmer of Canada is likely to exist for a thousand more; but the big business of American farming (which grew with a Puritan and Scotch-Presbyterian culture, and not, as the others, out of an essentially Catholic culture) is in dire difficulties within far less than two centuries. There is a profitable thought for the sociologist in this fact.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE

In this short Article we have discussed two problems of the community which, while involving moral issues, are practical economic social problems. We have discussed *taxation*, and have seen that it is a *natural* requirement for the maintenance of government, and that it imposes a *personal* obligation upon the citizen. We have seen that the problem of taxation arises out of the difficulty of establishing a perfectly just and fair system of levies. We have laid

down general *principles*, which must be followed in solving this social problem. We have studied, in the second place, the problem of a *balanced population*. We have seen that the maintenance of a properly representative and proportional rural population is requisite for the furtherance of family life, for a wider ownership of land, for decent self-employment, and for the existence of a self-supporting nation. We have contrasted city life and rural life, and have mentioned some characteristics of the rural society most needed in America at the present time.

CHAPTER III

WORLD PROBLEMS

This Chapter, like the others of the present Book, is divided into two Articles, which discuss, respectively, *moral* and *economic* problems concerning the world-family of nations. The division is somewhat arbitrary, for there is here no hard and fast line of distinction between moral and economic issues, and the two overlap at many points. But the division is justified, none the less, by the outstanding characteristics of the problems discussed in each Article, as well as by the requirements of order and balance in our study. The Articles are:

Article i. Moral Problems of the Nations

Article 2. Economic Problems of the Nations

Article i. Moral Problems of the Nations

a) Nationalism and Patriotism b) Treaties and Covenants

a) NATIONALISM AND PATRIOTISM

Nationalism is a term of many meanings. Sometimes it indicates the spirit and tendency of people of common blood, language, and tradition, to set up their own government. Sometimes the term means the clannishness of immigrants and their descendants who strive to hold their group intact and to preserve their language and customs while refusing to amal-

gaipate: thoroughly with the common citizenry of the country. Sometimes *nationalism* means merely a lively interest in the political and economic welfare of one's country. But the term usually—and at the present time almost exclusively—means the spirit and tendency to set up one's State or nation as a kind of god, the final goal of human activity, the measure of right and wrong. Needless to say, this sort of nationalism is a pagan and perverse thing, and leads to untold evils.

The spirit of pagan nationalism is the source of wars and injustice among nations. Recently it brought on the World War, and at the present moment it manifests itself in the embroilment of European States. It begets contempt for people of alien nations; it arouses hostility among States; it lives on suspicions and deadly jealousies; it is swollen with Satanic pride; it speaks the language of boorishness, and its normal actions are domineering, inhuman, and cruel. We in America who have at our borders no jealous neighbors likely to encroach upon our territory, can have no adequate idea of the insane intensity which the spirit of pagan nationalism can develop. Yet our relative freedom from this "curse of modern Europe" comes rather from our geographical situation than from any native virtue. For the spirit of this evil nationalism is not unknown among us, and there is current here in America a

tendency to hear and to admire its jingoisms as the expression of true devotion to country. It is now one hundred and eighteen years since Stephen Decatur proposed the shameful toast which dishonors true patriotism; yet his words still live in books of quotation, and are not infrequently heard as a challenge to patriotism. It was in April, 1816, that Decatur, a naval commander in the war of 1812, proposed the toast: "Our country! In her intercourse with foreign nations may she always be in the right; but our country, right or wrong!"

Far removed from the evil nationalism of which we have been speaking is true *patriotism*¹ the sane love of country. Patriotism is a well-ordered love and loyalty; it involves an affectionate allegiance to one's country, without bitterness, hatred, or ill-will for other nations. Patriotism is a glorious and a necessary virtue. The man who lacks it well deserves to "go down to the vile dust from which he sprung, unwept, unhonored, and unsung." It is natural and right that we should appreciate the land of our birth, the place where God's goodness has placed us. It is human and proper to feel an abiding interest in our fellow-countrymen above others, to hold the homeland in deep affection, to be ready to offer our services in defence of our country, its liberty, its integrity, and its worthy institutions.

A nation stands in much the same relation to other

nations as a family does to other families of the same community. A man naturally loves his family but, he does not hate his neighbors because he loves his own. Indeed, a man who appreciates the blessings of a good home will be eager to see that blessing enjoyed by his whole community, and he wishes to see his family a worthy family in a group of worthy families. In a word, he wishes to see his family a happy and respected home-group in a well-beloved home-town. Thus one sees that true patriotism is the basis of a sane *internationalism*. Just as the man who promotes sound and virtuous family-life, promotes sound and virtuous community-life, so the man who promotes true patriotism promotes good-will and the spirit of cooperation among nations.

The jingo nationalist is like a man who would try to make his own family the dominant power and influence in the community, regardless of justice and charity. He would be one to cry, "My family, right or wrong!" The jingo internationalist is like a man who would say, "I love the town so well that I don't wish to see any families in it; let us all burn down our houses and live in one group without special loyalties." The sane patriot is like the man who would say, "My family and my community! May my family deserve well of all others; may it be ever right; but if it be wrong, by God's grace and my unsparing effort, I'll make it right!"

b) TREATIES AND COVENANTS

A *treaty* is a public and formal agreement between or among States. It may be the final settlement of affairs and boundaries at the end of a war; it may be a compact for mutual benefit enacted by States. An agreement of alliance to guarantee peace, or to assure backing in the event of war, is usually called a *covenant*. A compact between Church and State is called a *concordat*.

A treaty is not valid unless enacted by the supreme governing authority of the States concerned, and when the terms are agreed upon by delegates, the treaty itself is valid only if properly ratified. In the United States, all treaties with foreign powers require ratification by the Senate.

Treaties cannot violate the natural law, which is the Eternal Law of God as manifest to human reason. Thus a treaty formed for the purpose of destroying or enslaving a particular State would be invalid on the score of injustice. A treaty which is forced upon a State under conditions manifestly unjust is certainly rescindable, and probably without binding power. But the injustice must be manifest, the duress must be extreme, the rejection of the treaty must be the one means available to escape the injustice which it imposes. Mere inconvenience in fulfilling the requirements of a treaty can have no effect on its validity; nor can even grave inconvenience invalidate a treaty freely agreed upon. Further,

treaties entered upon under duress, but without imposition of gravely unjust conditions, are valid and binding if the parties who make such treaties are personally free.

It is of the greatest social importance that nations enter upon just treaties only, and that they keep perfect faith in seeing them executed. It is true, of course—human nature being what it is—that when passions are aroused and war threatens, a treaty is often only "a scrap of paper." But to the Christian nation, a treaty is a sacred thing. Until the world recognizes the Prince of Peace and His one true religion, there is little hope that treaties will hold nations to fair dealings, prevent wars, promote prosperous peace. Mere "honor" is cheap in pagan ethics; it lacks sanction, and is easily thrown aside for material advantages. And the best human means—such as Leagues and Covenants of Nations—are not strong enough to insure the perfect fulfillment of treaty requirements. The sociologist who concerns himself with international affairs has here, as in every department of effort for social welfare, to work for the spread of the Christian religion and Christian culture, for these alone can give effectiveness to the compacts of nations and offer assurance of justice, charity, fidelity, and peace.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE

In this very short Article we have touched upon

two important points in the relationship of nations, which not infrequently involve social problems. We have defined *nationalism*, distinguishing it from *patriotism* on the one hand, and from *internationalism* on the other. We have seen that patriotism is the basis of sound internationalism, and the exact opposite of the loose and inept political philosophy which usually goes by that name. We have defined *treaties*, have discussed the conditions of their validity, and have indicated the important part which the Christian spirit must play in making international compacts effective.

Article 2. Economic Problems of the Nations

- a) Wars and Armaments
- b) Population and Food-Supply

a) WARS AND ARMAMENTS

When difficulties between nations arise, they are settled by compacts and agreements, or by submitting the matters in dispute to some arbiter after agreeing to accept his decision; but there are instances in which these pacific measures do not, as a fact, serve, and nations attempt to vindicate their rights or claims by force of arms. Now, in spite of the horrible character of war—which has been called, somewhat dramatically but not without show of justice, “legalized wholesale murder”—there are times when a nation is justified in undertaking it. There is such

a thing as *unjust aggression*, which brings a certain threat of ruin, and which cannot be repelled without force. Nations are, in many points, like human individuals, and singularly so in their quarrels and disputes. And as a man would be an intolerable nuisance, and one to be restrained by force, if he went about attacking his neighbors physically, so a trouble-making nation or State is to be restrained, if need be by force of arms, when it seeks to ruin another nation, to enslave it, or to enrich itself at the expense of another. Conversely, a man whose life, liberty, or bodily integrity is the subject of unjust and forceful attack, or whose home and family are suddenly and unjustly threatened with violence, oppression, or destruction of virtue, will naturally and justifiably use force to repel the aggression, even if he foresees that his action of defence will occasion the injury or even the death of the unjust aggressor. And so it is among nations. A nation which attacks another unjustly, or which, without declaration of war, subjects the other to such treatment as amounts to a most grave and unwarranted aggression, may certainly be repelled by armed force. Wars *can* be just—on one side at least. But a just and lawful war has always the nature of defence. And such a war will ever be a just and lawful war in spite of the very laudable efforts of statesmen and sociologists to outlaw war and to disarm the world. But a just war is, we repeat, always a defence; further, it is always the

very last resource, the sole means available to repel most grave, most unjust, and most destructive aggression.

But if war can be just, it can also be unjust. And indeed injustice, on the one side or the other, is always present. Usually, of course, each nation party to an armed conflict feels, rightly or wrongly, that its cause is just. Probably nearly every war involves mingled issues, with justice and injustice found in some measure on either side. Surely, this fact should appeal to governors and governing bodies as a most compelling reason to refrain as long as possible from the declaration of war; it should lead them to sift out the precise nature of each point of dispute, to discern in every detailed instance where justice lies, and to compose the whole matter by seemingly compact or by arbitration. But nations, like individual men, are quickly aroused to anger; they see their wrongs through the distorting lens of fevered imagination; they nurse injuries, real and fancied; they minimize their own faults, try to justify their own crimes, and magnify the dangers that seem to threaten. The jingoist is ever loud in marketplace, council chamber, and sanctum. The nationalist is always ready to feed the growing fever. Some sudden incident is interpreted as a crafty movement of the hated enemy, the first action of a plot that threatens to bring ruin. And so comes war.

Now, war is almost always an inept method of

seeing justice done. A man may repel an unjust attack, meeting force with force, and be entirely successful. But the clash of nations is never so simple a matter as the battling of individuals. The honest historian, reviewing the wars of all the world, weighing their cost in seas of human blood, viewing their effects in human amity destroyed and vicious hatreds spread abroad, studying results achieved in the name of justice and peace, must write against the gruesome litany, not "Success," not "Glory," not "Achievement," but the dismal word "Failure!" Nearly every war terminates in a merely temporary settlement of disputed issues. The treaty of peace which brings a war to an end is almost sure to impose harsh and humiliating requirements upon the conquered nation. The victor hardly ever refrains from placing his heel upon the neck of the fallen foe. Woe to the vanquished! And thus the treaty of peace is usually an effective instrument in preparing another war. Few wars are really finished. We have a striking example of this fact in the World War and its settlement by the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. At the present moment, the fruits of that treaty, and the continuation of that war, are visible in the political and social turmoil which prevails in Europe, and out of this turmoil, sooner or later, may come another war.

While war is undoubtedly a problem of tremendous moral import, we consider it here in its eco-

nomic aspects. The money cost of war is enormous. Merely to quote the billions of dollars that are spent on its destructive implements; merely to state that it impoverishes the world, would not be to put the matter in terms immediately intelligible to the rank and file of us who are not accustomed to dealing in millions and billions. Perhaps the whole matter may be left with a single striking quotation from Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler (cited in *The Reader's Digest*, August, 1934) : "The World War, all told, cost—apart from thirty million lives—four hundred billion dollars. With that money we could have built a \$2500 house, furnished it with \$1000 worth of furniture, placed it on five acres of land worth \$100 an acre, and given this home to each and every family in the United States, Canada, Australia, England, Wales, Ireland, Scotland, France, Belgium, Germany, and Russia. We could have given to each city of 20,000 inhabitants and over, in each country named, a five million dollar library and a ten million dollar university. Out of what was left we could have set aside a sum at five percent that would provide a \$1000 yearly salary for an army of 125,000 teachers, and a like salary for another army of 125,000 nurses."

Sociologists and statesmen seem pretty well agreed that the problem of war will not be solved until nations can be prevailed upon to disarm. The problem of war thus becomes *the problem of armaments*. And

this problem is admittedly a very difficult one. It will not do for one nation to disarm; all must agree—afid must live up to the agreement—to reduce armaments to an absolute minimum or to abolish them altogether. And to have all nations meet in such an agreement seems, at the present time, something of a futile hope. Still, the current agitation for world-wide disarmament is a very good thing. It keeps the public mind on an important subject; it arouses general indignation at the cost of wars and armaments; it tends to make governing bodies slow to incur public displeasure by spending the people's money upon armaments and war preparations which, once highly effective, constitute in themselves an actual danger and a threat of war. For, as the strong and belligerent man will stand no nonsense and may be said to be always "looking for trouble," so the nation well prepared for war and confident in the strength of its armaments, is only too likely to feel the temptation to try its power, and to make proof of its warlike ability at the slightest opportunity.

b) POPULATION AND FOOD-SUPPLY

In 1798 the world was startled by the appearance of a work called *An Essay on the Principle of Population*. The author was Thomas Robert Malthus (1766-1834), an English economist and an ordained minister in the Anglican Church. Malthus declared that the population of the world tends to increase

according to geometrical progression, while the means of sustenance increase only by arithmetical progression, thus:

Population:	i,	2,	4,	8,	16,	32,	64,	128,	etc.,
Food-Supply:	1,	2,	3,	4,	5,	6,	7,	8,	etc.

To keep the peoples of the earth from a miserable end by starvation, Malthus suggested that many persons refrain from marrying, or marry only late in life, and that married couples practise continence. Malthus was a Christian, and he had no thought of spreading the pernicious practice of Birth Control by use of artificial and unnatural means. But those who followed his theory (which, by the bye, is wholly fallacious) were not all Christians, and, in special, the neo-Malthusians of to-day who preach Birth Control and seek to justify it on economic grounds, are anti-Christian in their theory and practice.

It is a gratuitous and a groundless postulate that population increases by geometric progression, and food-supply by arithmetical progression. Production has always kept pace with population. Malthus has been in his grave these hundred years, and to-day we are trying *to keep down* production, for it has run so far ahead of the demand that those whose livelihood depends upon the sale of food-stuffs are impoverished and left in a broken-down business. In 1934, Mr. H. A. Wallace, U. S. Secretary of Agriculture,

declared that unless we can reduce tariffs and, ship our surplus products abroad, *we may have to retire permanently 40,000,000 to 60,000,000 acres of productive land* in the United States alone. So far have intensive farming and improved machinery carried us ahead of the productive possibilities foreseeable in Malthus' day. It is the sober opinion of many economists that the earth could support double or treble its present population without improvement in the present means of production; and, even if no improved methods of production are invented (which is hardly to be thought of), that the world stands in no danger of over-population for two or three centuries to come.

The plain fact is that the world stands in no danger of over-population at all. On the contrary, what now threatens is a rapidly decreasing birth-rate, especially among the people who profess to have the best of blood and culture to pass on to their progeny. Besides, the productive power of the earth is fairly constant, and subject only to the law of diminishing returns, which is offset by new inventions; but there is no constancy in the increase of population. Wars, pestilences, famines, floods, earthquakes, are extraordinary disasters which frequently take terrible toll of the earth's peoples, and these, added to the normal death rate, keep the population even below the possibility of exhausting the produc-

tive powers of the land and the abundant generosity of the waters.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE

In this brief Article we have discussed the economic aspects of wars and armaments, of population and food supply. We have studied the nature and the causes of wars. We have found that wars are mostly unjustified, that they are nearly always inept methods of achieving justice among nations, and that wars beget other wars. We have noticed the tremendous economic cost of wars, and, by an apt quotation from reliable authority, we have seen the tremendous cost of the recent World War; this we have taken as a single and sufficing example of the expensiveness of wars in general. We have discussed the value of the modern effort for worldwide disarmament. Finally, we have given brief notice to the Malthusian doctrine of population and food supply. We have seen that this doctrine is wholly fallacious, and that the danger which the world faces to-day is not over-population but under-population.

THE END

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