

**Shafarevich Decries 'Russophobia,' Jewish Nationalism***90UN0831A Moscow NASH SOVREMENNIK in Russian Jun, Nov 89 pp 167-192*

[Article by Igor Shafarevich: "Russophobia"; first two paragraphs are unattributed source note]

[No 6, Jun 89 pp 167-192]

[Text] About the author: Igor Rostislavovich Shafarevich, born 1923, mathematician, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Lenin Prize winner, member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, foreign member of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, the London Royal Society, the Leopoldine German Academy, and the National Academy dei Lincei (Italy), honorary doctor of the University of Paris, and winner of the Heinemann Prize (FRG).

The author of basic works on algebra, numbers theory and algebraic geometry, as well as on issues in sociology and history. The article published here was written in the early 1980s, but as the reader will see, it has not lost any relevance.

**1. Purpose of the Work**

How is our people's spiritual life presently going? What sort of views, sentiments, sympathies and antipathies are there, and in which of its strata is people's attitude toward life being formed? To judge from personal impressions, the scope of the explorations (and, could it be, castings back and forth?) is exceptionally broad: one hears about Marxists, monarchists, Russian *pochvenniki* [those who affirm the primacy of the Russian "soil," or indigenous traditions], Ukrainian or Jewish nationalists, supporters of theocracy or free enterprise, etc., etc., and, of course, about numerous religious schools. But how is one to know which of these views is more widespread than others, and which merely reflect the opinion of a lone, active individual? Apparently no sociological studies are being done on this topic, and it is doubtful that they would provide an answer, anyway.

But here the unforeseen has happened: in the 1970s an explosion of activeness occurred precisely in this area. In a flood of articles that were passed from hand to hand here or published in Western magazines, authors disclosed their world view and their views on various aspects of life. It's as though fate lifted the pot lid in which our future was being cooked and gave us a peek into it. Consequently, an absolutely unexpected picture was revealed: amidst a primordial chaos of the most diverse opinions, which for the most part contradicted one another, one clear-cut concept was delineated that can naturally be considered the expression of the views of an established, cohesive school. It has attracted many authors; it is supported by most Russian-language emigre magazines; it has been accepted by Western sociologists, historians and the mass media in their assessments of Russian history and our country's

present-day situation. Upon taking a closer look, one can note that these same views are widespread in our life: they can be encountered in the theater, cinema, the songs of bards, the tales of variety-stage story-tellers, and even in jokes.

The present work arose as an attempt to explain to myself the causes that gave rise to this school of thought and the goals that it sets for itself. However, as will be evident later on, here we inevitably encounter a certain question that has been placed absolutely off-limits in all present-day humanity. Although no ban on it can be found in any codes of law, although no such ban has ever been written down anywhere, or even stated, everyone knows of it, and everyone submissively stops his thoughts before the forbidden line. But things will not always be that way; humanity will not eternally wear such a spiritual harness! It is in hope of a possible reader, if only in the future, that this work has been written (it has also been written partly for myself, in order to sort out my thoughts).

The school of thought that interests us has been reflected in the most clear-cut, complete form in literary works, and they are what we will draw on most frequently as a source. Let us indicate more specifically what sort of literature we are talking about. It is very vast and keeps growing with every year, so we will name only the principal works, in order to trace its outlines. The appearance in *samizdat* of a collection of essays by G. Pomerants<sup>1</sup> and an article by A. Amalrik<sup>2</sup> at the end of the 1960s can be considered the beginning. The basic propositions, which have subsequently been repeated in almost all the other works, were developed more fully in four pseudonymous articles written here and published in the Russian magazine *VESTNIK RUSSKOGO STUDENCHESKOGO KRISTIANSKOGO DVIZHENIYA*, which is published in Paris. Explaining the general theoretical, programmatic nature of these works, an editorial article anticipated: "These are not voices, but a voice, and they are not just speaking generally about what is happening in Russia, but offering a profound reflection on its past, future and present in light of Christian revelation. It is necessary to emphasize the exceptional importance of this event, as one would like to call it...." As the flow of emigration picked up, the center of gravity shifted toward the West. B. Shragin's book "Protivostoyaniye dukha" [The Challenge of the Spirit]<sup>3</sup>, A. Yanov's books "Detente After Brezhnev" and "The New Russian Right,"<sup>4</sup> and several collections of articles came out. Kindred views have been developed in most of the works of contemporary Western specialists in Russia's history. We shall take as an example R. Pipes's book, "Russia Under the Old Regime,"<sup>5</sup> which is especially closely related to the school of thought that interests us in terms of its basic precepts. Finally, numerous articles in the same vein have appeared in magazines founded in the West by recent emigres from the USSR: *SINTAKSIS* (Paris), *VREMYA I MY* (Tel-Aviv) and *KONTINENT* (Paris), as well as in Western magazines and newspapers.

Here is a very condensed exposition of the basic propositions expressed in these published works.

*Russia's history, starting with the early Middle Ages, has been defined by certain "archetypal" Russian traits: a servile mentality, the lack of a sense of self-worth, intolerance toward foreign views, and a lackeyish mixture of feelings of malice, envy and admiration toward foreign power.*

*Running parallel to Russian history, ever since the 15th century, there have been dreams of some sort of role or mission for Russia in the world, the desire to teach something to others, point out some sort of new way, or even save the world. This is "Russian messianism" (or more simply, "universal Russian arrogance"), the origin of which our authors see in the concept of "Moscow as the Third Rome," which was expressed in the 16th century, and whose present-day stage they see in the idea of the world socialist revolution begun by Russia.*

*As a result, Russia has continually found itself in the power of despotic regimes and bloody cataclysms. The proof lies in the ages of Ivan the Terrible, Peter I and Stalin.*

*But Russians are unable to understand the reasons for their misfortunes. Looking with suspicion and hostility on everything foreign, they are inclined to blame everyone conceivable for their woes—Tatars, Greeks, Germans, Jews—as long as it is not themselves.*

*The 1917 revolution stemmed naturally from all Russian history. In essence, it was not a Marxist revolution. Marxism was distorted by the Russians, altered and used to restore old Russian traditions of a strong regime. The cruelties of the revolutionary era and the Stalinist period are attributed to the distinctive features of the Russian national character. Stalin was a very national, very Russian phenomenon. His policies were a direct continuation of Russia's barbarous history. Stalinism is traced at least four centuries back in Russian history.*

*The very same tendency continues to manifest itself even now. Freeing itself from the alien Europeanized culture it has never understood, the country is coming to increasingly resemble the Muscovite kingdom. The chief danger looming over our country at present lies in the attempts that are being revived to find some sort of unique path of development of our own—this is a manifestation of age-old "Russian messianism." Such an attempt will inevitably result in an upsurge of Russian nationalism, the revival of Stalinism, and a wave of anti-Semitism. It is mortally dangerous not just for the peoples of the USSR, but for all humanity. The only salvation lies in recognizing the pernicious nature of these tendencies, eradicating them, and building a society according to the exact model of the present-day Western democracies.*

*Some authors belonging to this school of thought express an uncompromisingly pessimistic viewpoint that rules out any hope of any sort of sensible existence for Russians: they never had any history at all, they merely had an*

*"existence outside of history," and the people turn out to be an illusory magnitude; Russians have only demonstrated their historical impotence, and Russia is doomed to imminent collapse and destruction.*

This is the very crudest outline. Further on in the course of our investigation we will have to quote, very frequently, the authors belonging to the school we are examining. One must hope that the reader will then be able to get a clearer feeling for the spirit of these works and the tone in which they are written.

Such vigorous literary activity accompanied by clearly delineated views unquestionably reflects the attitudes of a much wider circle: it expresses the ideology of an active, sizeable school. This school has already conquered Western public opinion. By proposing clear, simple answers to central questions associated with our history and future, at some moment it may also exert decisive influence on our country's life. Of course, history is not moved by theories and concepts, but by much deeper and less rational experiences connected with the people's spiritual life and its historical experience. Most likely, the attitude toward the history and destiny of one's people, the real-life dispositions that are most important to our future have been maturing for centuries, are continuing to be developed even now, and are stored somewhere in the depths of the soul. But until all these national character traits, traditions and feelings find an outlet in the sphere of reason, they will remain amorphous and relatively ineffectual. They must be given concrete expression and connected with the real problems of life. On the other hand, a clear-cut, categorical, vividly formulated schematic idea may temporarily grip the people's consciousness—even though it be utterly alien to its spiritual makeup—if that consciousness is unprotected and has not been prepared for the encounter with schematic notions of this sort. That is why it would be so important to understand and assess this new school of thought in the realm of world view. It is that school itself and the social stratum that has given rise to it that will be of principal interest to us, and the literature it has created will be drawn in merely as material to help us analyze the school. The authors who we will quote are scarcely widely known even now, and in 10 years it is possible that no one will know them. But the social phenomena reflected in their works will undoubtedly have a powerful influence on our country's life for a long time yet to come.

The work plan is this. The views set forth above are grouped around two topics: the assessment of our history, and the assessment of our future. We will analyze them, dividing them up in this way, in the following two sections. In the remaining part of the work we will attempt to understand the origin of these views: What sort of spiritual school could give rise to them, and why?

## 2. View of Russian History

One must begin, of course, with a discussion of the specific arguments with which the authors of the school

that is under examination support their views. Such a discussion has already been undertaken repeatedly, and that makes my task easier. Let us make a brief survey of the ideas that have been expressed in the process.

*It is difficult to find any facts to back up the thesis proclaimed by many authors concerning the Russian's "servile soul" and the notion that his sense of self-worth has been less developed than inhabitants of the West. Pushkin, for example, believed that the correlation was just the opposite. The views of visiting foreigners who saw Asiatic despotism in Russia and saw its inhabitants as slaves can be countered with the views of other foreigners who were struck by the Russian peasant's sense of self-worth, or even saw in Russia "an ideal land full of honesty and simplicity." Most likely, both groups of visitors knew the real Russia very little.*

*The attitude toward authority in Muscovite Rus in no way tallies with "slavish submission." The term "autocrat" [samoderzhavets], which was part of the Russian tsar's title, did not signify recognition of his right to arbitrary actions and unaccountability, but merely expressed the idea that he was the Sovereign and owed tribute to no one (specifically, not to the khan). According to the notions of that time, the tsar was answerable before God and religious and moral norms, and a tsar who violated them was not supposed to be obeyed, even if it meant that one had to endure torments and death. A vivid example of the condemnation of a tsar is the judgment of Ivan the Terrible expressed not just in the chronicles but in folk legends, one of which, for example, says that "The tsar deceived God." Similarly, among the people Peter I was known as the Antichrist and Aleksey as a martyr for the faith.*

*The concept of "Moscow as the Third Rome," which was formulated in the early 16th century by the Pskov monk Filofey, reflected the historical situation of that time. After the union of Florence with Catholicism and the fall of Constantinople, Russia remained the only Orthodox Christian kingdom. The author was calling on the Russian tsar to recognize his responsibility in that new situation. He recalled the fate of the First Rome and the Second (Tsargrad), which in his view had perished because of their defection from the true faith, and he predicted that the Russian kingdom would stand forever if it remained faithful to Orthodox Christianity. This theory had no political aspect and did not urge Russia toward any sort of expansion or Orthodox missionary role. In the popular mind (for example, in folklore), it was not reflected at all. The claim that the idea of the "Third Rome" and 20th-century revolutionary Marxist ideology constitute a single tradition belongs to Berdyayev, who evidently was particularly captivated by the consonance of Third Rome with Third International. But neither he nor anyone else attempted to explain how that concept had been passed on over the course of 400 years without manifesting itself in any way during that time.<sup>6</sup>*

*It is impossible to discover any hatred of foreigners and foreign influences that is specific to Russians and distinguishes them from other peoples. Fears for the purity of their faith, and suspiciousness toward Protestant and Catholic missionary activities were strong. In this one may see a certain religious intolerance, but that trait in no way distinguishes Russia of that time from the West, whose level of religious tolerance is characterized by the Inquisition, Bartholomew's Night and the Thirty-Years War.*

*Reducing the entire prerevolutionary history of Russia to Ivan the Terrible and Peter I is a schematization that completely distorts the picture. It is the same thing as representing the history of France as consisting solely of the executions of Louis XI, Bartholomew's Night, the persecutions of the Protestants under Louis XIV, and the revolutionary terror. Such a selection of facts pulled out of context cannot prove anything. It cannot even prove the thesis that the revolution was a specifically Russian phenomenon and natural consequence of Russian history. And if that were the case, how could one explain the revolutions in China or in Cuba, Marxism's sway over the minds of the Western intelligentsia, or the influence of the Communist Parties of France and Italy?*

To these arguments, borrowed from the aforementioned works, I shall add several of my own, in order to call attention to one very important aspect of the question.

1. Just how little the attitude toward the regime in the Russian pre-Petrine age resembled "slavish submissiveness" and "an urge to think and feel just as it did" is demonstrated by the Schism, when minor and dogmatically insignificant changes in rituals that were introduced by the regime were rejected by the majority of the nation, and people fled by the thousands into the forest and endured torture and death and self-immolation—and in 300 years the problem has not lost its controversial nature. It is interesting to compare that to a similar situation in the classic country that has affirmed the principle of personal freedom and human rights—England. Henry VIII created an utterly new religious faith by taking something from Catholicism and something from Protestantism, and he even altered it several times, so toward the end his subjects did not even know clearly what they were supposed to believe in. And yet Parliament and the clergy proved submissive, and the majority of the people accepted the faith that had been concocted out of political and personal considerations. Of course, in Western Europe in the 16th-17th centuries religious divisions played no less a role than they did in our country, but they evidently were more interwoven with political and material interests. Thus, R. Pipes is struck: "The secularization of church lands (in 18th-century Russia—I.Sh.), which was probably the greatest cause of the European Reformation, took place in Russia as calmly as if nothing were involved but a simple bookkeeping operation." The situation codified in the religious Peace of Augsburg, which was expressed in the formula, "cuius regio, eius religio" (he who holds the power determines the religion), whereby the faith of

the subjects was determined by their secular rulers, would have been inconceivable in Russia of that time. Some authors belonging to the school we are analyzing believe that the subordination of the church to the state in the form of the synodal administration of the church introduced by Peter I is a particularly vivid manifestation of the servile traits of the Russian national character. In the book by R. Pipes that has been cited, one chapter is in fact titled along these lines: "The Church as the Handmaiden of the State." A. Shragin writes: "The Russian psychological predisposition toward unanimous obedience was reflected most vividly and, so to speak, archetypically<sup>7</sup> in the church's subordination to the state in the forms it took during the synodal period." If anyone, they—a historian and a philosopher—should know perfectly well that these forms of subordination of church to state arose in the Protestant countries, from which Peter I copied them exactly. So not only is there nothing "archetypical," there is nothing even typical of Russians in them.

2. Another interesting observation is connected with the view that R. Pipes expresses. He believes that the legislation of Nicholas I served as a model for Soviet legislation, from which Hitler, in turn, supposedly copied the laws of the Third Reich (!), so in the final analysis the legislation of the times of Nicholas I turns out to be the source of all the 20th century's antiliberal tendencies. He even proclaims that the importance of Nicholas's legislation to totalitarianism is comparable to the importance of the Magna Carta to democracy! R. Pipes's concept, of course, is nothing but an anecdote, albeit one that is typical of his entire book, but that is interesting that a closer examination of this question leads to conclusions that are directly opposite of those toward which he tends. The entire concept of a totalitarian state (in both its monarchist and its democratic variants) that places not only its subjects' economic and political activities, but their intellectual and spiritual life, as well, under its control, was fully developed in the West—and had it not been so thoroughly developed, it could not have found embodiment in life.<sup>8</sup> Thus, back in the 16th century Hobbes portrayed the state in the form of a single creature, the Leviathan, an "artificial person," a "mortal God." To it he applied the words from the Bible: "There is none on earth to compare to him; he is created fearless; he looks boldly on everything lofty; he reigns over all the sons of pride." And more specifically, the Sovereign possesses power that is totally unconditional. Everything that he does is just and right. He may dispose of his subjects' property and honor, and he may be judge of all teachings and ideas, including matters of religion. Among the chief dangers to the state, Hobbes counted the views ("diseases") that held that a private person was the judge of which actions were good and which are bad, and that everything a person did against his own conscience was a sin. In his view, the subjects' attitude toward the Sovereign was best expressed in the words "you will be his slaves." In that same century Spinoza was demonstrating that moral categories were, in general, inapplicable to state authority, that the state could

not, in principle, commit crimes, and that it had the complete right to violate treaties, attack its allies, etc. In turn, any decision by the state as to what was just and unjust was supposed to be the law for all its subjects. In the 18th century Rousseau developed the democratic version of that concept. He believed that the supreme authority belonged to the people (also called the Sovereign), and now IT formed a "collective being" in which all separate individuals were completely dissolved. Once again the Sovereign possessed unlimited power over the citizens' property and persons, it could not fail to be right, etc. From the Sovereign, every individual "receives his life and his existence." The Sovereign was supposed to exchange a person's "physical existence" for "partial existence."

"It is necessary for it to take a person's own forces away and given him, in exchange, others, which for him are alien and which he cannot utilize without the assistance of other people." Just what could be added here by the legislation of Nicholas I, which appears pale against this background?! Yet one can precisely trace how these principles were borrowed in Russia from the West. The proposition to the effect that the subjects renounce their own will and give it to the monarch, who may order them to do anything he wants, is expressed in "The Truth of the Monarch's Will," composed by Feofan Prokopovich at Peter's instruction. It quotes Hobbes almost verbatim and contains all the principal elements of his theory, such as, for example, his notion of the "contract" that the subjects conclude among themselves, giving up their own will and turning it over to the monarch.

3. "Messianism," that is, the belief by a certain social group (nation, church, class, party) that it is destined to determine the fate of humanity and become its savior, is a very old phenomenon. The classic example, from which the name itself is derived, is the teaching contained in Judaism concerning the Messiah (the Anointed King) who will establish the "Chosen People's" rule over the world. Such a concept has arisen in a great many social movements and doctrines. The Marxist doctrine concerning the special role of the proletariat belongs to the tradition of "revolutionary messianism" that developed in Europe in the 19th century. Recent very thorough research into this tradition describes its various stages (Saint-Simon, Fourier) up to and even including the concept of the "Third Rome" (Mazzini's "Roma Terzio"), but it mentions Russia only at the very end of the book in connection with the fact that toward the end of the century Western "revolutionary messianism" also swamped Russia.

4. Finally, the thesis that holds that the revolution in Russia was predetermined by the whole course of Russian history must be verified with regard to the question of the origin of Russian socialism, since without that ingredient, such a radical change in the entire social and spiritual way of life would be impossible—something that is demonstrated by numerous precedents, such as our Time of Troubles, to name just one. Yet socialism, evidently, had no roots in Russian tradition right up

until the 19th century. In Russia there were no authors of the type of More and Campanella. The radical sectarianism that was the breeding ground for socialist ideas in Western Europe played a much smaller role in Russia, and only in exceptionally rare cases does one encounter, in heretical teachings, views that could be considered forerunners of socialist concepts (for example, the desire for property to be held in common). This is even more true of attempts to realize such views in practice: there was nothing in Russia remotely resembling the "Muenster Commune." Another source where one might seek the embryos of socialist ideas—folk social utopias—also provides nothing that socialist tradition could have been based on. They are striking by virtue of their gentleness and lack of militant aggressiveness. They offer the condemnation of Evil, the opposition of Truth to Falsehood, dreams of the "kingdom of Truth," appeals for the brotherhood of all men in Christ, and the proclamation of love as the supreme law of the world.

Socialism was entirely brought into Russia from the West. In the 19th century it was so unambiguously perceived as something foreign that, in speaking about the socialist doctrines that were contemporary to him, Dostoyevskiy often referred to them as "French socialism." And the movement's founders were two emigrants—Bakunin and Herzen, who started developing socialist ideas only after they emigrated to the West. On the other hand, Western society of the new, post-Renaissance type was born with the dream of socialism reflected in More's *Utopia* and Campanella's "City of the Sun," and a whole flood of socialist literature.

Thus, many phenomena that the authors of the tendency we are examining proclaim to be typically Russian prove to be not only not typical of Russia but altogether *non-Russian* in origin, imported from the West: that was the payment, as it was, for Russia's entry into the sphere of the new Western culture.

Many more such arguments could be brought in, but these are probably enough to provide an assessment of the concept we are analyzing: IT COMPLETELY COLLAPSES IN THE FACE OF ANY ATTEMPT TO COMPARE IT TO THE FACTS.

Let us take note of yet another feature of the works we are examining: their indifference to the factual aspect of the matter, and their use of remarkably superficial arguments, so that a moment's reflection should have shown the author's their obvious invalidity. For example, Pomerants cites as an example of how the Russia soul "was intoxicated by the cruelty of power," the "Povest o Drakule" [Tale of Dracula], which was disseminated in manuscript form in the 16th century, when in fact it was concerned with the *exposure* of cruelty, and in some manuscripts Dracula is called the devil. One work devoted to the criticism of this concept points out this circumstance. But in an "anticriticism" that came out subsequently in samizdat, Pomerants declares that he does not particularly insist on his interpretation of the tale. On the other hand, he says, he knew one author who

signed his samizdat works with the pseudonym "Skuratov." And so the Russians' devotion to cruel authority is proven all the same!

From one of R. Pipes' discussions it follows that he supposes that in Muscovite Rus there was no private property! In another place in his book he cites the proverb, "Another person's tears are water" as proof of the "cruel cynicism" and selfishness of Russian peasants. Evidently he understands it not as a condemnation of selfishness but as a moral maxim. And he claims that in pre-Petrine Rus there were no schools, and the vast majority of the servant class was illiterate. Yet back in 1892 A.I. Sobolevskiy wrote: "We are accustomed to thinking that among Russians of that time (15th-17th centuries) there were very few literate people, that the clergy was relatively uneducated and part of it entirely illiterate, that in the higher social class literacy was not very widespread, and that the lower class constituted an illiterate mass." He cites numerous calculations from which it follows that the secular clergy was universally literate, and that the literacy level was at least 75 percent among the monks, at least 50 percent among the landowners, 20 percent among the tradespeople, and 15 percent among the peasants, and that there were numerous "academies" for instruction in reading and writing throughout the entire country. D.S. Likhachev believes that the level of literacy in 17th-century Russia in all strata of the population was no lower than in the West. And here a prejudice that was refuted 90 years ago is presently being repeated by a leading U.S. specialist in Russian history!

Such places are especially numerous in the works of A. Yanov (possibly for the reason that he draws in specific arguments more frequently, while the other authors mainly limit themselves to declarations). Thus, he believes that the "GULAG Archipelago" was a constant companion of Russian history that would appear in it on a regular basis, and he points to 1825 as the date of its previous appearance. At first you do not even realize that he is referring to the Decembrists' uprising—an attempt at armed overthrow of the government and assassination of the tsar (and according to some plans, to destroy the entire royal family), in which Petersburg's Governor-General Miloradovich was killed—as a result of which 5 people were executed and about 100 exiled. And this is when at the same time in Spain, Naples, Sicily, Piedmont and Lombardy the same sort of attempts at military coups were made (1820-1823) and were accompanied by the same sorts of executions after they had been suppressed. In England in 1820 the Thistlewood conspiracy, which aimed at assassinating cabinet members, was uncovered. The conspiracy's five leaders were executed and the rest of its participants were sent to do hard labor in a penal colony. So there is nothing typical of Russian history here. It was not "backward" Russia but "advanced" France that showed how to deal with such disturbances! Thousands were shot following the suppression of the uprising in Paris in 1848, and tens of thousands after the suppression of the Paris Commune.

Or, wishing to show that even Russian national tendencies, such as Slavophilism, that may at first glance seem innocent lead to the Black Hundreds and pogroms, he examines for proof, as followers of the Slavophiles, only Danilevskiy, Leontyev, a third-rate public-affairs essayist of the early 20th century named Sharapov, and a very shady intriguer named V.I. Lvov (whom he for some reason calls a prince), the chief procurator of the Synod in the Provisional Government who emigrated and then returned and, toward the end, joined the Union of Militant Atheists. But if he had considered that the Slavophiles' ideas were developed by Dostoyevskiy as a writer, Solovyev as a philosopher, Tikhomirov as a public-affairs essayist, and A. Koshelev, Yu. Samarin and other figures of the reform era, and later, D. Shipov as politicians, he would have come up with an entirely different picture; and if he had made yet another selection—yet a third picture. Here's a device one can use to prove absolutely anything one wants!

In discussing the question of the acceptability for Russia of a democratic form of government, Yanov deflects indications of certain shortcomings of that system with the argument that "democracy as a political invention is still a child. It is not 1,000 years old, but barely 200." It is hard to imagine a person who is discussing history and has not heard of democracy in Greece, Rome or Florence, and who has not read the pages devoted to it in Thucydides, Plato, Aristotle, Polybius and Machiavelli! Finally—an utterly curious case—Yanov classifies Belinskii among the "classic Slavophiles"! For such an answer a schoolchild would receive a "D," yet this is written by a candidate of philosophical sciences and current professor at the university of Berkeley.

We are inescapably coming to the question on the answer to which the entire further direction of our reflections depends: *Are these authors interested in the truth at all?* It is an unpleasant question: there are "rules of the game" according to which one should discuss arguments and not the conscientiousness and motives of one's opponent. It has become equally tiresome to raise the questions, "Who does it benefit?" and "Whose mill is it grist for?" But on the other hand, a debate with authors who are interested in neither fact nor logic really does turn into some sort of game. Therefore, before going further, let us check our doubts once again using one example: the assertion encountered in nearly all the works we are examining concerning the cruelty and barbarism that are supposedly specific to all Russian history.

As though a people existed that could not be reproached for that! The Assyrians covered the walls of the cities they conquered with the skins of their residents. We read in the Bible:

"And they committed to destruction everything in the city, the men and the women, the young and the old, the oxen, the sheep and the asses, destroyed (everything) with the sword." (Joshua, VI, 20)

And about King David:

"And he led out the people who were in it, and he put them under the saws, under iron hammers, under iron axes, and he cast them into kilns. Thus he acted with all the cities of the Ammonites." (2 Kings, XII, 31)

Even the radiant and beautiful ancient Greeks, during the time of their internecine wars, destroyed the populations of whole cities (on their scale—states): they killed all the men and sold the women and children into slavery. And thus it goes throughout all of History: not only in the dark Middle Ages, but in the age of the triumph of Reason, as well. Cromwell destroyed a third of the population of Ireland, and only the uprising in Scotland prevented him from carrying out his original plan of putting an end to the Irish as a nation. In the United States the pious Puritans destroyed the Indians like wolves: a bounty was placed on their scalps. And what about the slave trade, in which kings participated and which Parliament defended, denying human rights, and which cost Africa 100 million lives! And the French Revolution, the number of whose victims some contemporaries placed at a million—and that was when France's whole population numbered 28 million! And finally Hitler! Of course, there have also been many cruelties in our history, yet one must completely abandon conscientiousness in order to ascribe cruelty to the Russians as some sort of specific trait! No, it seems, there is not a single one of the aforementioned authors who has failed to triumphantly mention the oprichina! But a present-day historian who specially studied the number of the oprichina's victims writes: "Traditional notions of the scale of the oprichina's terror need to be revised. The figures on the death of many tens of thousands of people are extremely exaggerated. According to the church records on the disgraced, which reflected authentic oprichina documents, during the years of mass terror about 3,000-4,000 people were destroyed." (This refers, of course, to the number of killed. Famine, epidemics, raids by the Crimeans and flight from unbearable taxation reduced Central Russia's population by hundreds of thousands.) And on Bartholomew's Night, which was close in time, more people were destroyed in *several days* (in Paris and the province).

The authors examine Russian history exclusively on the plane of present-day consciousness, totally ignoring the requirements of *historicism*. Yet they are all people with an education in social science and the humanities, and the facts that we have recalled should be perfectly well known to most of them. One must admit that we are dealing here not with sincere efforts to understand the meaning of Russian history, and not with "historical-philosophical reflections." What we are confronting is activity of an entirely different type: it is *public-affairs journalism and propaganda* that strives to instill certain preconceived ideas and feelings in the reader. But in that case, it must be studied as propaganda. And all propaganda has a definite purpose. We are coming to an extremely important question: just what is the PURPOSE of all this literature, and why was it necessary to

impress a view upon readers according to which *Russians are a nation of slaves who have always worshiped cruelty and grovelled before powerful authority, hated everything alien, and been hostile to culture, and Russia is an eternal hotbed of despotism and totalitarianism that is dangerous to the rest of the world.*

It would be possible to avoid puzzling over this question if we were dealing simply with the feelings of emigres. But we will later be persuaded that such is not the case. We are simply seeing the tip of the iceberg: the fact that the literature we are considering has for the most part been published in the West is attributable only to the fact that it is safer and easier to publish there. And these attitudes themselves have their roots there; granted, they also manifest themselves here, albeit not so straightforwardly. After all, one must recognize that if that concept inculcates itself in the national consciousness, that would be tantamount to spiritual death: a people that assesses its own history IN THAT WAY cannot exist. We are dealing here with a phenomenon that vitally affects us inhabitants of this country.

### 3. Plans for Russia

The examination of a second group of views developed by the authors belonging to the tendency that interests us—how they assess the present situation in the country and what course they propose for the future—will help answer the question raised in the previous section. If the proposition we have stated is correct—that interest in Ancient Rus, the elder Philofey, Ivan the Terrible, Peresvet, etc. stems not from the authors' penchant for historical research, but from certain interests and feelings that are highly relevant to the present day—it is obvious that their opinions concerning the present day should particularly clarify their motives.

All of the viewpoints that have been stated here are concentrated for the most part around two propositions: the dangerousness and impermissibility of the Russian national principle's influencing the life of the state, and the need to precisely follow the model of the present-day Western democracies in building society.

Our authors react very sharply and with great distress to any attempts to look at life from a Russian national viewpoint, that is, to approach present-day problems from the viewpoint of Russian spiritual and historical traditions.

"...Not a national revival but a struggle for freedom and spiritual values should become the central creative idea of our future" (Gorskiy, a pseudonym). The same author warns:

"The new national consciousness should not be built on unconscious patriotism..." (as it was evidently built for the 20 million who laid down their lives in the past war). The author considers reflection on the MEANING of

Russia's existence, that is, the very presumption of the INTELLIGIBILITY of Russia's destiny, to be a dangerous temptation. He says with condemnation:

"The Russian person, if he is even capable of thinking independently, still agonizes over the question: What is Russia? What is the meaning of its existence? What is its purpose and place in World History?" (It is interesting that, according to the meaning of this statement "Gorskiy" does not count himself among "Russian people," at least not among those who "think independently"!)

Yanov regards the anonymous authors whose works appear in the VESTNIK RSKhD [RUSSKOGO STUDENTSKOGO KHRISTIANSKOGO DVIZHENIYA], No 97 ("Gorskiy" et. al.) with great sympathy. He even believes that Russia's future depends to a considerable degree on which political orientation is adopted by the "Russian Orthodox Renaissance" movement. Here he distinguishes two tendencies: one, which is kindred to him in spirit, he calls the "liberal-ecumenical." It is hard to invest this cautious and tactful turn of phrase with any content besides *nationally neutral*. In fact, in the preface to another book by Yanov, Breslauer emphasizes that Yanov's sympathies are with the COSMOPOLITAN stratum of Soviet society. One must find a name for the other tendency in the "Orthodox Renaissance"; in essence it is NATIONAL, but here Yanov does not sustain the role of a professor dispassionately analyzing an interesting social phenomenon; he loses patience: it is "TATAR-MESSIANIC" and a threat to the "world political process."

In this opposition Yanov sees the basic problem of present-day Soviet life: "The decisive watershed passes between the *nationalists* and the *non-nationalists*." It is superfluous to make the qualification that the "nationalism" he has in mind is not Armenian, Lithuanian or Jewish, but only Russian. And it is obvious which side of the watershed the author stands on. Moreover, he makes the charge against his opponents that if their ideas concerning Russia's future were realized, there would be no place there for the ANTIRUSSIAN OPPOSITION! I shall not attempt to judge whether this charge is fair, but it very vividly demonstrates the author's concerns.

Yanov's concepts manifest themselves with maximum clarity in his debate with the samizdat magazine VECHE, which was published in the early 1970s. As an illustration of "blind refusal to see what is going on," he cites an article from that magazine: "Even the problem of civil rights in the USSR is LESS important at the given historical moment than the problem of the perishing Russian nation." It is instructive to recognize just what Yanov's own position is. If that viewpoint is incorrect, and the "problem of the perishing Russian nation" is less important, just what will happen if we concentrate our efforts on the more important problem, and the nation perishes? (The article he cites asserts that the number of Russians is declining.) For whose rights will one fight them? It's certain that it won't be for the rights of Russians!



Finally, this problem is discussed once again on a higher level. Concerning a certain samizdat article, Yanov writes: "At the risk of profaning the article's metaphysical enthusiasm, let us formulate its meaning simply: humanity is quantized, so to speak, not into separate individualities, as the 'humanistic consciousness' has hitherto naively supposed, but into nations."

However, "profaning metaphysical enthusiasm" is completely beside the point here; what Yanov does has a much simpler name: the substitution of one idea for another. An excerpt from the article under discussion, which Yanov himself cites before the passage quoted above, states: "nations are ONE level in the hierarchy of the Christian cosmos..." (my emphasis, I.Sh.), that is, to use Yanov's terminology, humanity is quantized INTO NATIONS, TOO. The converse viewpoint, which Yanov evidently holds, is that humanity is quantized ONLY INTO SEPARATE INDIVIDUALS, and not into nations. It is not a new viewpoint. Humanity dispersed (or "quantized") into individual units that are totally unconnected to one another—such, evidently, is Yanov's ideal.

But there exists a yet more radical tendency of thought. Instead of struggling against nationalism and warning of its dangerousness, it claims that there is actually nothing to argue about, since THE PEOPLE DOES NOT EXIST AT ALL. We have already quoted the assertion: "the people turns out to be an illusory magnitude" ("Gorskiy"). This idea has been developed in particular detail and particularly lovingly by Pomerants:

"The people no longer exists. There is a mass that has preserved the vague memory that at one time it was a people and bore God within itself, but is now absolutely empty.

"The people in the sense of the god-bearer, the source of spiritual values, does not exist at all. There are neurasthenic members of the intelligentsia, and there are the masses.

"In our country only traces of the people remain, like traces of snow in the spring.

"What is usually called the people in our country is not the people at all, but the philistines [meshchanstvo]."

And so, if in the past the Russian people had no history, in the present there is no Russian people at all.

These thoughts naturally flow from the concepts examined in the preceding section. Our authors see nothing in Russian history but tyranny, slavery and senseless, bloody convulsions. Pomerants explains:

"That's how, in general, history is made in Russia. The Russian people trembles and grovels before the dread autocrat, who cuts the people into parts, like Ivanushka, and fuses it together again. Then, when it is fused, it acknowledges its master as its own and serves him faithfully."

Or Galich puts it in poetic form:

"Every year's a time of troubles,

Every liar's a Messiah."

If you accept this view, it is true that any attempt to build the future on the foundation of SUCH traditions could end only in another disaster. The opinion of one author that "Russia had no history" might possibly be rejected by the others as a polemical exaggeration, but in essence all their views come to this conclusion: Russia, according to their viewpoint, had no history in the sense of the womb in which the people's future is developed. What, then, can the country's future be built on? The answer is provided by the second basic thesis advanced by the literature we are examining: on the basis of someone else's experience, by borrowing modern Western multiparty democracy as a model. It is precisely the fact that this is *someone else's* experience that has not developed organically from Russian history that makes it attractive, since this provides a guarantee that it has not been corrupted by the poisons with which the authors believe our entire past is suffused. Conversely, the search for any sort of path of our own will inevitably result, they believe, in a chain of new disasters. Yanov, for example, believes this to be the principal question "that now, as it did many generations ago, divides the Russian dissident movement—is Russia a European country, or does a special path of development exist for it that is uniquely its own...."

Thus, it is precisely the SEARCH for our own path (of course, without any restriction on its direction, so the result, for example, could turn out to be some sort of form of democracy of our own) that is rejected here. The reason, in these authors' view, is that *in general, only two solutions exist, and a choice must be made between only two options: modern Western-type democracy, or totalitarianism*. In speaking of the same basic question as in the excerpt cited above, Yanov asks:

"Doesn't it consist in the search for an alternative to European democracy? And doesn't that search inevitably lead even noble and honorable thinkers into the embraces of authoritarianism, for so far history has never known any sort of 'special' Russian alternative democracy. Furthermore, doesn't the logic of the struggle against democracy (as doctrine and as political reality) ultimately lead to the justification of the most extreme, totalitarian forms of authoritarianism?"

Let us note this characteristic trait that will later be useful in analyzing our authors' views: they presuppose a choice between only two possibilities: either "European democracy," or "authoritarianism"—"authoritarianism," moreover, in its "most extreme, totalitarian" forms. Real life hardly fits such an oversimplified pattern. In society there have been and presently are so many forces—the monarchy, the aristocracy, the bourgeoisie and other classes, the church or churches, corporations, parties, national interests, etc., etc., that a continuous spectrum of state forms, and not just those two EXTREME points between which it is proposed that we



choose, is capable of arising (and continually does arise) from combinations of these forces. And often the mechanism that is used to form the state authority turns out to be by no means the most important distinguishing feature of society. Otherwise, we would have to recognize the Roman empire in the "Golden Age of the Antonines" and the Chinese empire of Qin Shi Huang Di, with its universal slavery, corruption and burning of books, as kindred regimes. In our century, present-day Yugoslavia and Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge are both single-party states, while both South Africa and Switzerland are multiparty states. The system that existed in England when it defeated Louis XIV, withstood a quarter of a century of wars with revolutionary France and Napoleon, and became the "workshop of Europe" and model of a free society was so different from present-day democracy that it hardly makes sense to unite them under a single term. It was based on very limited suffrage. Parliament consisted of people who were closely associated by common interests and even kinship; debates in it were of a technical nature; and demagoguery and the attempt to influence public opinion played no significant role. [Zombart] compares it with the board of a joint-stock company that discusses how to run an enterprise in whose success everyone has an identical stake, and about whose affairs everyone is more or less well informed. Most members of Parliament were, to all intents and purposes, appointed by the large landowners, and seats were also often bought. Nonetheless, the court of History has shown that this Parliament to some extent received the people's support. Just as in 1912 the Russian people, evidently, unanimously supported the autocratic regime, and the American people, during the Vietnam war, which required comparatively few sacrifices of them, refused to support a government that had been elected according to all the canons of Western democracy. And how is one to judge which expressed the will of the American people to a greater extent: the party machine that had nominated presidents Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon, who carried on the Vietnam war, or the leftist circles that, relying on the mass media, brought about the president's resignation and capitulation in that war?

Here a very profound problem arises. The search for a better means of identifying the people's will tacitly presupposes that such a concept as "will of the people" exists and is interpreted in the same way by everyone. Yet it is precisely this supposition, which is almost never discussed, that requires close analysis. Speaking in contemporary scientific jargon, the people is a "large system." But by no means every large system has a property that can be called "will." For example, it is known that a computer, no matter how complex it may be, does not have one; and it is absolutely unclear whether will can be ascribed to living nature as a whole, or to an individual species, or to a biocenosis—and only with regard to an individual human being or the higher animals do we have no doubts as to the existence of will. In real life the people manifests itself not through the formulation of its will but through uprisings or an

upsurge of economic activity, through a rise or fall in the birth rate, through the flourishing of culture or the spread of alcoholism and drug abuse, through steadfastness and sacrifice in war, or easy capitulation. It is precisely the endless combinations of such features that show whether the popular organism is healthy. Of course, working out the form of state system that is most organic for a given people at a given moment in its history is a necessary condition for the people's healthy existence. But it is by no means the sole condition, and often not the most important.

As for Western-type democracy, which the authors we are analyzing so insistently propose as the universal solution to all social problems, *in its present condition* it raises a number of doubts that must be thoroughly discussed before recommending it without qualification as the only solution to our problems. Let us cite a few of them.

1. This system is evidently not all that natural. The transition to it has usually been associated with an agonizing and bloody cataclysm: obviously, some sort of violence to the natural historical process is required. Such was the civil war in England. In France the civil war and terror were only the beginning. For almost a century after that, the country was shaken as though it were in a fever: the Napoleonic wars, revolutions, the Second Empire, the Commune. In our country the attempt in February 1917 to introduce this system proved unsuccessful. In Germany such an attempt, made during the Weimar Republic, resulted in the victory of National Socialism, as a reaction. (In his memoirs, such a disciple of democracy as Churchill expresses the opinion that Germany's fate would have been different if the monarchy had been preserved in 1918).

Can we now undertake the risk of yet another such cataclysm in our country? Is there any chance that it would endure it? Yet our authors propose this course with an ease that raises the suspicion that these apprehensions do not concern them in the least.

2. The founders of Western liberal thought (for example, Montesquieu and the authors of the U.S. Constitution) proceeded from the concept of *limited power*. This concept traces its roots to the medieval religious world view. In the age of absolutism, the doctrine of unlimited power was developed—first with respect to the power of an unlimited monarch, and then with respect to unlimited popular sovereignty (compare the ideas of Hobbes, Spinoza and Rousseau cited in the previous section). Attempts were made to achieve a limitation of power on the basis of the principle of separation of powers: when, for example, the legislature is not subject to the power of a constitutional monarch, or the judiciary is not subject to the will of the people. But in order for such a system to function, there needs to be a power limiting all these branches, and for that to happen, there must exist in a society norms of behavior, traditions, and moral and religious, which are often unwritten and even unconscious, that occupy a higher place in the scale of values

than the authority of any power, so that actions by the regime that contradict them are perceived as illegal. And that is the only reliable means of limiting power in principle. The lack of such values that stand above the authority of the regime automatically gives rise to a society of the totalitarian type. That is precisely why states based on unlimited popular sovereignty so easily give rise to totalitarianism: in Germany, the Weimar Republic, or in France the regime of the Constituent Assembly in 1789-1791. This law was noted a very long time ago. Plato wrote that democracy degenerates into tyranny. Both he and Aristotle believed that unlimited popular sovereignty cannot be considered a form of state system at all. Edmund Burke, who observed the initial stage of the French Revolution, wrote that unlimited democracy is just as despotic as unlimited monarchy. Yet the present-day Western democracies are based entirely on the principle of unlimited popular sovereignty: any decision adopted by the majority of the population is legal. (And that spirit has been captured by the authors we are examining; for example, in the introduction to the collection "Demokraticheskiye alternativy" [Democratic Alternatives], "democracy in the realm of law," i.e., the subordination of the law to the decision of the majority, is proclaimed.) Many liberal critics of present-day democracy see in this a sign of its decline and the failure of the attempt undertaken 200 years ago to build a free society based on the principles of popular sovereignty. At the present, in their judgment, in Western society liberties exist by dint of inertia, and not as the result of the principles on which that society was built.

3. Our authors recommend Western-type democracy as an alternative to the single-party communist state. But is it capable of being such an alternative? After all, one system will not be replaced by the other with a wave of the magic wand; evidently, some sort of competition is presupposed. And is the democratic system in its present form capable of such competition? Increasingly, Western democracy has been yielding, again and again, to its antagonist. Whereas the part of humanity inhabiting countries with a single-party communist system was 7.5 percent in 1920 and 8.5 percent in 1940, it amounted to more than 45 percent in 1960 and is presently no less than half. And the process has been going in only one direction! The time is long past when the Western democracies were a dynamic force, when the number of countries following that path was growing, and when they were imposing their principles on others, as well. Now everything is just the opposite! Hardly a single one of the newly arisen states has chosen a state system of the Western type. And in the Western democracies themselves the number of opponents of their state system is steadily growing. On the other hand, its supporters usually resort to the argument that no matter how bad it may be, the rest are even worse. Such an argument can hardly inspire anyone to defend that system. That is not the sort of thing that was being said 200 years ago! If you take classical democracy for comparison, we will see that it was a short-lived form. 200 years was its maximum life

span. But that is precisely how long multiparty democracy has existed in Western Europe and the United States. By all indications, the Western multiparty system is a social system that is on its way out. Its role in History might be assessed very highly: it brought with it the guarantee of domestic peace, protection against government terror (but not against the "Red brigades"), and a rise in material well-being (and the threat of environmental crisis). But to return all humanity to it is as hopeless as dreaming of a return to an Orthodox Christian kingdom or to Kievan Rus. History is clearly refashioning this system into something new. One can attempt to influence what it is refashioned into and by what means, but reversing this process is hopeless.

And do these authors we are analyzing have a definite concept of the "Western democracy" that they are proposing we take or reject in ready form, without allowing us to discuss possible variations of it and alternatives to it? It seems to follow from their works that this concept is extremely vague in their minds. It often seems that they have the classical form of multiparty democracy in mind, such as the one that currently exists in the United States (for example, Shragin and Yanov). But then, for example, Krasnov-Levitin<sup>9</sup> wants to introduce "full property equality," while L. Plyushch<sup>10</sup> claims that state planning should be preserved all the way up until the attainment of communism: yet present-day Western democracy by no means sets such goals for itself! Furthermore, Plyushch writes:

"I do not understand you, if you do not sympathize with the terrorists who destroy their people's hangmen. Individual terror is immoral, if it is directed against innocent people."

Yet it is impossible to assume that the author suffers from such a degree of intellectual underdevelopment that he has failed to ask the question of just WHO will distinguish between the "innocent" and the "guilty." To this day terrorists have never resorted to a court of arbitration, but have carried out such judgment themselves. Most likely the Basque terrorists (whose example Plyushch cites with sympathy) believe when they fire at a policeman that he is guilty, if not personally, then as a representative of a guilty state. Yet any class or racial terror is based on such views. Obviously, we have here an apology—granted, still a timid one—for political terror. But how, then, is that to be linked to the ideals of Western democracy? Moreover, most of the authors in the collection "Demokraticheskiye alternativy" express their attachment to socialism, and the collection concludes with the document, "Russian democratic socialists abroad." What we evidently have here are some sort of different democrats: *socialist* ones. Yet that is no longer present-day Western democracy, but some sort of ALTERNATIVE to it, that is, precisely what Yanov so passionately fights against. How, then, is one to understand his participation in this collection? If he believes that the argument that "so far history has never known any sort of special Russian alternative democracy" is so decisive, shouldn't he first of all address that argument

to those who share his views and his coauthors in the collection? For after all, so far history unquestionably has never known a synthesis of Western-type democracy with socialism (for example, with "full property equality").

And so, evidently it is not an attraction to democracy, which they understand in widely diverse ways, that unites these authors. What they really all have in common is annoyance at the thought that Russia might SEEK some sort of path OF ITS OWN in history, and the desire to use every means possible to prevent the people from taking a path that it works out and chooses for itself (of course, not with the help of the secret ballot, but through its own historical experience). It is a dream of turning Russia into a mechanism, a robot that has been deprived of all the elements of life (historical traditions, some sort of goals for the future) and is controlled by a program that has been developed on the other side of the earth and installed in it. And democracy plays the role of such a "program," a "control unit" that has no organic connection whatsoever with the country. So if one were to make the fantastic supposition that the authors turned to the Americans with their ideas, they would have to demand of them the unqualified acceptance of monarchy.

The very same schematic idea, the same notion of the phantasmal nature of our life as merely the pale reflection of real, Western life assumes a somewhat grotesque character in Pomerant's article in the collection titled "Samosoznaniye" [Self-Consciousness]. Interpreting the development of the culture of ALL the world's countries except Britain, the Netherlands, Scandinavia and France as mere COPIES of the latter's culture, the author emphasizes what distortions, omissions of entire stages, and mergers of several stages into one occur in this connection. But he does not attempt to discuss his axiom. Yet if he had taken as an axiom the notion that European poetry is a distorted copy of Persian, he would probably have had to resort to cleverer constructions in order to explain why Firdousi, Omar Khayyam and Hafiz are reflected in such distorted fashion in the form of Dante, Goethe and Pushkin.<sup>11</sup>

All these issues—both plans for Russia's future and their national aspect—are presented in a somewhat simplified but very vivid form in the theory that Yanov has advanced and expounded in a number of articles and two books. In the classical spirit of the "analysis of the alignment of class forces," he divides our society into two strata—the "establishment" and the "dissidents." Each of them gives rise to both "leftist" and "rightist" tendencies. The author pins all his hopes on the "leftists." The "establishment left" (the author's term) consists of the "party aristocracy" or "elite" and the "cosmopolitan managers." It requires reconstruction and the "modernization of their archaic ideology," and to that end, it needs to form an alliance "with Russia's most brilliant minds, which are presently concentrated in the dissident movement," that is, in the "dissident left." For that to happen, it is necessary to overcome the "intelligentsia's egalitarian and moral maximalism" and "the

intellectually and ethically flawed new class's arrogant intolerance." But—and here the author comes to the central point of his concept—THEY ARE INCAPABLE OF DOING THAT ON THEIR OWN.

"However, that contradiction has gone so far that it is impossible to resolve it without an arbiter whose authority is acknowledged by both sides. Western intellectual society may serve as such an arbiter. It can work out a precise and detailed program in order to reconcile all the USSR's positive sociopolitical forces, a program that will unite them for a new step forward...."

So here is Yanov's secret, his basic concept. And in order to express it more comprehensibly, the author proposes as a model—OCCUPATION:

"This is an undertaking of enormous, one might say, historic complexity. However, in essence it is analogous to that which MacArthur's 'brain trust' encountered at the end of World War II.<sup>12</sup>

"Was it likely that the autocratic Japan could be transformed from a dangerous potential enemy into a friendly business partner without a fundamental reorganization of its internal structure? Let's apply the same principle to Russia...."

Yanov also very precisely characterizes the stratum on which this "enormous undertaking" will rely within the country, citing as an example the hero of a certain satirical novella. It involves a parasite who has preserved almost no human features (other than purely superficial ones) and whose entire efforts are directed at preventing real life from breaking through the barrier of bureaucracy anywhere. For him, genuine life consists of trips to the West and the purchases he brings back from there. His dream is to bring some sort of extraordinary "stereophonic toilet bowl" back from America. "Let's suppose that he wants a stereophonic toilet bowl," Yanov reasons, "is it likely that he wants a world war?"

You can't deny the boldness of this picture: spiritual (for the time being) occupation by the "Western intellectual community," which will become our arbiter and teacher, relying within the country on the stratum of "cosmopolitan managers," who are supplied, in return, with an abundance of stereophonic toilet bowls! This can be taken as a laconic and vivid resume of the ideology of the school we are examining.

#### 4. The Lesser People

The views examined in the two previous sections merge into a single system. Moreover, they are based on a whole philosophy of history—a particular view of the nature of the historical process. It is a question of whether history is an organic process similar to the growth of a living organism or to biological evolution, or whether it is deliberately designed by people, like some

sort of mechanism. In other words, the question is how society is to be viewed—as an organism or a mechanism, as living or dead.

According to the first viewpoint, human society developed as a result of the evolution of “behavioral norms” (in the broad sense, technological, cultural, moral and religious norms). These “behavioral norms,” as a rule, were not deliberately invented by anyone but arose as the result of a very complex process in which each new step is based on all previous history. The future is the child of the past and of history, and by no means of our own designs. Just as a new organ of an animal did not arise because the animal realized its usefulness in advance, so a new social institution was usually not created deliberately, for the attainment of a specific goal.

The second viewpoint claims that society is built logically by people, out of considerations of expediency, on the basis of a decision made in advance. Here it is perfectly possible, and often necessary, to ignore historical traditions, the character of the people, and the value system that has been developed over the course of centuries. (Voltaire’s statement was typical: “You want good laws? Burn up your own and write some new ones.”) Instead, the decisive role is played by those who possess the necessary knowledge and skill: these are the true creators of History. They are the ones who are supposed to first draw up the plans and then force intractable life to conform to those plans. The entire people turns out to be mere material in their hands. Like a carpenter working with wood or an engineer working with reinforced concrete, they take that material and erect a new structure, the design of which they have drawn up in advance. Obviously, according to such a view, there is a gap between the “material” and the “creator,” and the “creators” cannot regard the “material” as people like themselves (which would prevent them from working it), but are fully capable of feeling antipathy and irritation toward that material if it refuses to understand its role correctly. The choice of one concept or the other forms people of two different psychological types. Adopting the first viewpoint, a person feels himself to be a helper and collaborator of forces that far surpass him. Adopting the second, he feels himself to be the independent creator of history, a demiurge, a small god and, ultimately, a rapist [nasilnik]. This is a path on which a society emerges that is lacking all freedom, no matter what democratic trappings such ideology might be furnished with.

The views we have examined in the two previous sections represent the consistent application of the second viewpoint (society as a mechanism) with regard to our country’s history. Let us recall how much effort has been expended to denigrate our people’s history and whole character. One can see what annoyance is aroused in our authors by the fear that our future will be based on this country’s historical traditions. Practically foaming at the mouth, they try to prove to us that Western-type democracy is absolutely alien to the spirit and history of our people—and they insist with equal fervor that we

adopt precisely that form of state. The project that Yanov develops for spiritual occupation by the “Western intellectual community” is visually embodied in the image of Russia as a vehicle onto whose driver’s seat a nimble driver leaps and turns on the ignition, and the vehicle tears off. It is also typical that for our future a choice is offered between just two possibilities: “Western-type democracy” and “totalitarianism.” Neither the growth of an organism nor the behavior of the living world as a whole has ever been based on a choice between two possibilities; rather it has always been based on a choice among an infinite number of alternatives that merge continuously into one another. On the other hand, the element of a computer must be designed precisely in such a way that it can be in only one of two states: on or off.

And here is the necessary conclusion from that concept: the singling out of a “creative elite,” and the view of the people as a whole as material for that elite’s creativity are very vividly reflected in our authors. Let us cite several examples of how they characterize their circle’s attitude toward the rest of the population. In this connection, we shall encounter the following difficulty—these authors use various terms to characterize the circle with which they plainly identify themselves: intelligentsia (usually), dissidents (less frequently), elite, “chosen people,” etc. I propose completely ignoring this terminology temporarily and proceeding on the assumption that we have here a stratum that for the time being is unknown to us, certain features of which we wish to establish. As to this stratum’s relation to the intelligentsia, dissidents, etc., we shall return to that question later, once we have a clearer picture of it.

And so, here is how “Gorskiy” understands the situation:

“...The old contradiction between the ‘rootless intelligentsia’ and the people appears today as a contradiction between the creative elite and the stupefied and corrupted masses, which are aggressive in their attitude toward freedom and higher cultural values.”

Moreover, at the same time:

“It is also necessary to note that the new opposition intelligentsia, for all their divorce from the popular masses, nonetheless represents the masses that have given rise to them and are the organ, as it were, of their awareness.”

Shragin’s viewpoint is the following:

“Besides a thin layer of European-educated and democratically inclined intelligentsia, the roots of the dissident movement have come up against a thick stratum of permafrost.”

Moreover:

“The member of the intelligentsia in Russia is a sighted person among the blind, a responsible person among the irresponsible, a sane person among the insane.”

And so, the "European-educated and democratically inclined intelligentsia" has matured to the point of declaring the majority of the people to be INSANE! And what place is there for the insane but a psychiatric hospital?

Finally, Pomerants's view:

"Religion has ceased to be a trait of the people. It has become a trait of the elite." "Love for the people is much more dangerous (than love for animals): here there is no threshold preventing it from descending to all fours." "Something new will replace the people." "Here ...the backbone of a new people is taking shape." "Only around a new intelligentsia can the masses crystallize anew into something people-like."

For the author the concept of an elite, a "chosen people" is an undiscussed dogma; the only thing that is discussed is where the elite is to be found:

"The reason I count on the intelligentsia is by no means that it is good...Intellectual development, in and of itself, only increases the capacity for evil...My chosen people is bad, and I know it...but the rest are even worse."

Along this path our authors must inevitably encounter an obvious logical difficulty, so you wait impatiently for them to run into it. After all, if the Russian consciousness is so suffused with servility, worship of cruel authority and the dream of a Master, and if legal traditions are absolutely alien to us, just how can a democratic system be inculcated in such a people *by democratic methods*, and in the near future, to boot? But it turns out that there is no difficulty for our authors here, either. In that case, it is simply necessary to make the Russians democratic, even though it be done by *nondemocratic methods*. (Rousseau calls that: *forcing people to be free*.) As Shragin writes:

"Under despotisms it is not the majority that decides. Of course, that contradicts the ideals of democracy. But even the best of ideals degenerates into a utopia when it lacks room to accommodate reality."

And that statement, which is so striking for its candor, seemingly drew no reaction whatsoever in the emigre press, which so emphatically stresses its democratic nature in other cases!

We are confronted here with some sort of stratum that is very clearly aware of its unity, which is emphasized particularly vividly by the sharp contrast between itself and the rest of the people. It typically thinks in antitheses: the creative elite versus the stupefied and corrupted masses; the chosen people versus the philistines; the European-educated and democratically inclined intelligentsia versus the permafrost; the sane versus the insane; a tribe of giants versus the human pigsty (this last antithesis comes from a samizdat article by Semen Telegin titled "What Is to Be Done?") This stratum is united in the awareness of its elite status and the certainty of its right and ability to determine the country's

destiny. Evidently, it is in the existence of such a social stratum that the key to understanding the ideology we are examining lies.

This social phenomenon would probably become more comprehensible if it could be placed in a broader historical context. And indeed, in at least one historical situation, the age of the Great French Revolution, a similar phenomenon has been described in vivid detail.

One of the most interesting students of the French Revolution (in terms of both the freshness of his ideas and his remarkable erudition), Augustin Cochin paid special attention in his works to a certain social, or spiritual, stratum he called the "Lesser People." In his opinion, the decisive role in the French Revolution was played by a circle of people that had been established in the philosophical societies and academies, Masonic lodges, clubs and sections. The specific features of that circle consisted in the fact that it lived in its own intellectual and spiritual world: the "Lesser People" among the "Greater People." He could have said the *antipeople* among the people, since the world view of the former was based on the principle of the obverse of the latter's world view. It was there that the type of person necessary for a revolution was developed, a person for whom everything that constituted the nation's roots, its spiritual backbone—the Catholic faith, honor of the nobility, loyalty to the king, pride in one's own history, and attachment to the distinguishing features and privileges of one's native province, one's estate or one's guild—was alien and disgusting. The societies that brought together the representatives of the "Lesser People" created a kind of artificial world for their members, a world in which their entire life took place. Whereas in the ordinary world everything is tested by experience (for example, historical experience), there the general opinion decided everything. What was real was what others believed; what was true was what they said; what was good was what they approved of. The ordinary order was reversed: doctrine became the cause, rather than the effect, of life.

The mechanism by which the "Lesser People" is formed is what at that time was called "liberation from the dead weight," from people who were to subject to the laws of the "Old World": people of honor, deeds and faith. To that end, "cleansings" (corresponding to the "purges" of our era) were continually being conducted in the societies. As a result, an increasingly pure "Lesser People" was created, a "Lesser People" which was moving toward "freedom" in the sense of increasing liberation from the concepts of the "Greater People": from such superstitions as religious or monarchical sentiments, which can be understood only through the experience of spiritual communion with them. Cochin illustrates this process with a fine example—the image of the "savage" that was so widespread in the literature of the age of the Enlightenment: Montesquieu's "Persian prince," Voltaire's "Huron," Diderot's "Tahitian," etc. Usually this was a person who possessed all the material accouterments and formal knowledge represented by civilization,

but who had absolutely no understanding of the spirit that gave all of that life, and for that reason everything in life shocked him and seemed stupid and illogical. In Cochin's view, this image was not an invention but was taken from life, except that these "savages" were found not in the forests of Ohio but in the philosophical academies and Masonic lodges; this was the image of the sort of person whom they wanted to create, a paradoxical creature for whom the environment in which he lived was a void, just as for others it constituted the real world. He saw everything and understood nothing, and abilities among these "savages" were measured precisely by the depth of their incomprehension.

A truly marvelous existence awaited a representative of the "Lesser People" if he traversed the entire path of his education: all the difficulties and contradictions of real life vanished for him; he was seemingly liberated from the chains of life, and everything seemed simple and comprehensible to him. But that had its obverse side: he no longer could live apart from the "Lesser People"; in the world of the "Greater People" he suffocated like a fish out of water. In this way, the "Greater People" became a threat to the existence of the "Lesser People," and the struggle between them began: the Lilliputians tried to tie up Gulliver. That struggle, in Cochin's opinion, occupied the years preceding the French Revolution and the revolutionary period. The years of the Revolution (1789-1794) were five years of the "Lesser People's" power over the "Greater People." The "Lesser People" called only itself the people and formulated only its own rights in the "Declarations." This explains the paradoxical situation whereby the "victorious people" found itself in the minority, and the "enemies of the people" in the majority. (This assertion was constantly found in the language of the revolutionaries.)

We are encountering a world view remarkably similar to the one that has been the subject of our analysis in this work. This includes the view of one's own history as complete savagery, coarseness and failure—all those "Henriades" and "Maids of Orleans." And the desire to break all the ties, even external ones, that linked one with historical tradition: the renaming of cities, the change in the calendar. And the conviction that everything rational had to be borrowed from without—at that time, from England; this conviction suffuses, for example, Voltaire's "Philosophical Letters" (sometimes called "Letters from England"). And, in particular, the copying of a foreign political system—English parliamentary government.

I think that this remarkable concept is not only applicable to the age of the French Revolution but sheds light on a much wider range of historical phenomena. Evidently, at every critical turning point in a people's life there emerges the same sort of "Lesser People" whose essential beliefs are OPPOSITE to the world view of the rest of the people. For whom everything that has organically grown up over the course of centuries, all the roots of the nation's spiritual life—its religion, its traditional state system, its moral principles and its way of life—are

all hostile and seem to be ridiculous and dirty superstitions that need to be relentlessly eradicated. Being totally cut off from any spiritual connection with the people, the "Lesser People" regards it solely as material and regards its processing as a purely TECHNICAL problem, so its solution is not restricted by any moral norms, compassion or pity. This world view, as Cochin notes, is vividly expressed in the fundamental symbol of the Masonic movement, which played such a role in paving the way for the French Revolution—in the image of the construction of the Temple in which individual people appear in the role of stones that are mechanically laid side by side according to the "architects'" blueprints.

We shall now cite several examples in order to support our guess that we really are dealing here with a universal historical phenomenon.

1. In turning to the age that preceded the one Cochin studied, we encounter CALVINISM, which, in the form of the Huguenots' movement in France and the Puritans' movement in England, had such an influence on the life of 16th- and 17th-century Europe. In its ideology, especially in the case of the Puritans, we can readily recognize the familiar features of the "Lesser People." Calvin's teaching asserted that even before the creation of the world God had predestined some people for salvation and others for perdition. A person could not influence this decision, which had already been made, through any of his deeds. Only a few had been elected: a tiny group of "holy" amid a sinful and suffering humanity that was doomed to eternal torment. But no sort of communication with God was accessible even to the "holy," "for the finite can never have contact with the infinite." Their elect status was manifested only in the fact that they became the *tool* of God, and the more faithful their election was, the more effectively they acted in the sphere of their worldly activity, casting aside attempts to understand the meaning of that activity.

This striking doctrine, which was really a new religion, created among the "holy" a sense of complete isolation from and opposition to the rest of humanity. Their central experience was a sense of their elect status, and even in their prayers they thanked God that they were not the same as "the remaining mass." The idea of emigration played a colossal role in their world view. Partly because of the fact that the Puritan movement was originated by a group of Protestants who were fleeing persecution in the period of the Catholic reaction under Mary Tudor: in a state of complete isolation and disconnection from their homeland, they laid, under the influence of Calvin's teaching, the foundations of the theology and psychology of Puritanism. But it was also partly because even after they had returned to England they remained emigrants, aliens, in terms of their views. A favorite image in their literature was the wanderer, the refugee, the pilgrim.

The narrow communities of the "holy" were continually subjected to purges and excommunications, which at times encompassed the majority of the communities.

Even the "doomed," according to the Puritans' views, were supposed to be subjected to the discipline of their church, and here compulsion was perfectly permissible. The gap between the "holy" and the "doomed" left no room for mercy or help for the sinner—all that remained was hatred for the sin and its bearer. Peasants who had lost their land and been sent by the throng to the cities in search of work, often turning into vagrants, were a particular object of denunciation and hatred in Puritan literature. The Puritans demanded increasingly strict laws: they extolled whipping and branding with a hot iron. And the main thing was that they demanded that the "righteous" be protected from contact with the poor vagrants. It was precisely the spirit of Puritanism in the 18th century that gave rise to the terrible system of "work houses," in which the poor were kept practically in the position of prisoners.

The Puritans' literature strived to divorce the "holy" from historic traditions (which were the traditions of "people of the world"), and for the "holy," all established customs, laws and national, dynastic or estate attachments had no force. It was in its very principle a nihilistic ideology. And indeed, the Puritans really did call for a complete remaking of the world and all existing "laws, customs, statuses, ordinances and constitutions." A remaking, moreover, according to a plan known to them in advance. The appeal to "build on a new foundation" was backed up in their case by the image, which is already familiar to us, of the "building of the Temple"—this time, the restoration of the Temple of Jerusalem after the Jews' return from captivity.

As Max Weber asserts, Calvinism's real role in economic life consisted in destroying the traditional system of farms. In the English revolution its decisive role consisted in the fact that, by relying on the Puritans and even more extreme sects, the new stratum of the wealthy succeeded in overthrowing the traditional monarchy, which until then had enjoyed the support of the majority of the people.

2. In the age that followed the French Revolution, one can observe a very similar phenomenon. Thus, in the '30s and '40s of the 19th century in Germany all spiritual life was under the influence of philosophical and political radicalism: "Young Germany" and "left Hegelianism." Its purpose was the destruction (as it was put at the time: "merciless criticism" or "revolutionizing") of all the foundations of German life of that time; Christianity, philosophy, the state, society. Everything German was renamed "Teutonic" or "Prussian" and became the object of abuse and mockery. We encounter assertions, which are familiar to the reader, to the effect that Germans lacked a sense of their own dignity, that they were characterized by hatred for everything foreign, that their history was a chain of base acts, and that it was difficult, in general, to consider them human beings. After Goethe, Schiller and German romanticism, [Ruge] wrote: "We Germans are so profoundly backward that we have yet to create a human literature."

German patriotism was identified with reactionarism; conversely, everything Western, especially French, was despised. The term "pro-French antipatriotism" was in vogue. Hopes were expressed that the French would once again occupy Germany and bring it liberty. Emigration to France was popular, and 85,000 Germans lived in France. Heine was a typical representative of this tendency. The primary object of his continual, malicious, often dirty and, for that reason, no longer witty, attacks was Christianity. For example, the following artistic image: "Certain spiritual insects emit a stench if you crush them. That's the way with Christianity: that spiritual bedbug was crushed 1,800 years ago (the crucifixion of Christ?), and it is still poisoning the air for us poor Jews." And the second object was the German character, culture and history: thus, at the end of the narrative poem "Germany is a Winter Tale," he compares Germany's future to the foul odor that emanates from a chamber pot. And not because he was simply such an irritable, skeptical person: He worshiped Napoleon to the point of idolatry, and he admired everything French and even called himself the "leader of the French party in Germany."

3. In Russia in the second half of the 19th century the same features are very distinctly evident in the liberal and nihilistic tendency. V. Zaytsev, the well-known public-affairs writer of the 1860s wrote about Russians: "Abandon any hope; slavery is in their blood." The same Zaytsev was responsible for the following idea:

"...They want to be democrats, and that is all, and it makes no difference to that there are only beasts in a human image to replace the aristocracy and bourgeoisie...The people are crude, obtuse and, consequently, passive. Therefore, good sense requires that, without being confused by the grand pedestal onto which the democrats have elevated the people, we act vigorously against them."

As we see, Shragin's idea that under despotisms it is the minority that should make decisions, and that "the principles of democracy lack room to accommodate reality" had already been stated back then. Moreover, Dostoyevskiy relates:

"'The people will not permit it,' a person who was speaking with a fervent Westernizer said two years ago about a certain matter. 'Then destroy the people,' the Westernizer replied calmly and majestically."

A remarkably contemptuous attitude toward their own culture, such as German radicals had in the 1830s, was combined with the admiration of Western, especially German, culture. Thus Chernyshevskiy and Zaytsev declared Pushkin, Lermontov and Gogol to be untalented writers who had no ideas of their own, and Tkachev added Tolstoy to that list. Saltykov-Shchedrin, mocking the "Mighty little heap," portrayed a certain natural-born composer (Musorgskiy!) as poking his fingers at the keys at random and then finally sitting down



with his whole rear end on the keyboard. And these were not exceptional examples: that was the general style.

In his "Diary of a Writer" Dostoyevskiy is constantly carrying on polemics against a certain, clearly-defined ideology. And when you read him, it seems that he has in mind the very literature that we have been analyzing in this work: there is so much coincidence in everything. There is the assertion about the Russian muzhik's servile soul, about how he loves the rod, the claim that "the history of our people is absurd" and, consequently, that "it is necessary that a people such as ours have no history, and what it has had under the guise of a history, it should completely forget, in its entirety, with revulsion." And the goal is to get the people "to feel ashamed of its past and curse it. Whoever curses his past is ours, that's our formula!" And the principle that "besides the European truth," "there is no other truth and can be no other." And even the claim that "in essence, there is no people, but there is and continues to exist that same inert mass," as though Dostoyevskiy had taken a look into the works of Pomerants. And finally, emigration, the reason for which, according to that ideology, was that "the blame lies with those same Russian ways of ours, our clumsy Russia, in which a decent man to this day can do nothing." How contemporary are Dostoyevskiy's own ideas!

He expresses a frightening supposition: that separation, "breaking away from" one's country leads to hatred, that these people hate Russia, "so to speak, naturally, physically: for its climate, its fields, its forests and its ways, for the emancipation of the muzhik, for Russian history, in short, for everything; they hate it for everything."

L. Tikhomirov, who followed the course of a terrorist up to the point of becoming one of the leaders of People's Will, and then left that tendency, paints a very similar picture in his last works. In his words, the world view of those circles of young people from whom terrorists came was based on a break with past culture. They proclaimed the dethronement of all authorities and the following of their "own reason" alone, which led, to the contrary, to the domination of the most base and primitive authorities. The significance of materialism and antinationalism was elevated to a religious level, and the epithet "renegade" was a boast. These circles' ideas were so limited that young people emerged who claimed that there was no need to read anything at all—they were called "troglodytes." And indeed, all they could take from the literature that was offered them was the confirmation of ideas with which they were already familiar. Consequently, emotional emptiness and depression developed. There were numerous cases of suicide; they "felt that they were confronting darkness." They were prepared to throw themselves into anything at all, and they threw themselves into terror.

"Do not expect from them any concessions to either common sense, or human feeling, or history. It was

indignation against real life in the name of an absolute ideal. He cannot rest easy, because if his ideal is impossible, then there is nothing on earth worth living for. He would rather exterminate 'all evil,' that is, the entire world and everything that exposes his chimera, than give in."

The repetition of such a particular set of ideas over the course of 400 years in various European countries can hardly be accidental—we are obviously dealing with a very specific social phenomenon which constantly arises in a persistent, standard form. One may hope that this observation will help us to understand this contemporary problem, to which this work is dedicated.

The last centuries have greatly narrowed the scope of those concepts, which we are able to use in discussing historical and social questions. We readily acknowledge the role in society's life of economic factors or political interests, we cannot help acknowledging (albeit with a certain perplexity) the role of international relations, and we will agree, at least, not to ignore the role of religion—but mainly as a political factor, for example, when religious discord manifests itself in civil wars. In actuality there are evidently far more powerful forces of a spiritual nature that are active in history—but we are unable to discuss them, and our "scientific" language does not grasp them. Yet they are precisely what accounts for whether life is attractive to people, and whether a person can find his place in it, and they are what gives people strength, or deprives them of it). In particular, it is from the interaction of such factors that the enigmatic phenomenon of the "Lesser People" arises.

### 5. The Present-Day Version of the 'Lesser People'

What grounds are there for believing that this phenomenon of the "Lesser People" manifests itself in our country? In the first place, of course, the literature that we have been analyzing. The whole standard complex of ideas of the "Lesser People" is represented in it: belief that the people's future, like a mechanism, can be freely designed and restructured; in this connection, a contemptuous attitude toward the history of the "Greater People," up to and including the assertion that it has not existed at all; the demand that the basic forms of life be borrowed in the future from outside, and that we break with our own historical tradition; the division of the people into an "elite" and an "inert mass," and the firm belief in the right to use the latter as material for historical creativity; and finally, outright revulsion toward representatives of the "Greater People" and their psychological makeup. And these traits are manifested in our present-day "Lesser People" no less vividly than in its previous versions. For example, never before has one encountered such a vivid symbol of the "Lesser People's" domination of the "Greater People" than in the model of occupation proposed by Yanov. And Pomerants's subtle image—"...the intelligentsia's place is always at the half-way point...Spiritually, all present-day members of the intelligentsia belong to a diaspora.

Everywhere we go we are not entirely foreigners. Everywhere we go, we are not entirely at home"—splendidly conveys the world outlook of the "rootless people" who make up the "Lesser People."

Dicta from the literature of the present-day "Lesser People" often coincide to such an extent with the ideas of their predecessors that it seems that the former are quoting the latter. This is especially striking when one compares the present-day "Lesser People" with its predecessor 100 to 120 years ago, which developed within the liberal, nihilistic, terrorist and revolutionary movement in our country. After all, it is strange, indeed: in the literature of the present-day "Lesser People" one can encounter ideas that are practically quotations from Zaytsev, Chernyshevskiy or Trotskiy, although at the same time its representatives speak out as dedicated Westernizing democrats who completely reject the ideals and practice of the "revolutionary age" of Russian history, assigning all that to the traditions of "Russian totalitarianism."

Thus, Zaytsev and Shragin, separated from one another by a century, are completely unanimous in recognizing that in relation to the people as a whole, the framework of democracy is "excessively narrow." "Slavery is in their blood," says Zaytsev, and Pomerants repeats: "a lackeyish mixture of malice, envy and worship of authority."

And if the poet O. Mandelshtam's widow N. Ya. Mandelshtam, condemning those who avoid the struggle for spiritual freedom, wrote in her memoirs, "One must not drink to the point of senselessness... One must not collect icons and pickle cabbage," and Trotskiy (in "Literature and Revolution") referred to the peasant poets (Yesenin, Klyuyev, et. al.) as "playing the muzhik" and said that their nationalism was "primitive and reeks of cockroaches," after all, in both cases it is one and the same attitude that is being expressed. When Pomerants writes:

"The intelligentsia is the measure of social forces—progressive and reactionary. Opposed to the intelligentsia, the people as a whole merges into a reactionary mass," this is practically a repetition (it would be interesting to know whether conscious or unconscious) of the proposition in the famous Gotha Program.

"In relation to the proletariat, all the rest of the classes merge into a single reactionary mass."

It is obvious that there is something more here than a coincidence of individual turns of phrase and ideas. After all, if we squeeze out the basic core of the literature of the present-day "Lesser People" and attempt to reduce its ideas to several basic thoughts, we obtain the very familiar concept of the "cursed past" and of Russia as the "prison of peoples," and the assertion that all of our present-day woes are attributable to "vestiges" and "birthmarks"—granted, not of capitalism but of "Russian messianism" or "Russian despotism," and even of the "devil of Russian tyranny." On the other hand, "great-power chauvinism" as the chief danger is literally

preserved, as though it had been borrowed by the literature of the "Lesser People" from the reports of Stalin and Zinovyev.

Here is yet another specific confirmation. Shragin declares that he does not agree that our people's consciousness has been crippled by brain-washing aimed at forcing it to be ashamed of its own history and forget about that history's existence, a process in which Russia was represented as the "gendarme of Europe" and the "prison of peoples," and its history was reduced to the notion that "it was continuously beaten."<sup>13</sup> "Everyone has forgotten the time when that was done," he says, "Just let someone try getting those words—'gendarme of Europe'—past the present-day Soviet censor, even though they applied to the Russian past."

But on that same page he himself writes: "Was Russia the 'gendarme of Europe'? Was it conceivably not? Was it the 'prison of peoples'? Who will have the conscience to deny it? Was it continuously beaten for its backwardness and boastful complacency?—It's a fact."

So "the time when this was done" has not been forgotten at all, particularly by Shragin himself. Only the soloist has been changed—what we have before us is like a well-rehearsed orchestra in which the melody, developing, shifts from one instrument to another. And at the same time, the picture is painted for us of two antagonists, two paths that are, in principle, mutually exclusive. And we are offered only a choice between those two paths—for, as we are assured, there is no third way. Once again, a very familiar situation!

Never, in no incarnation of the "Lesser People," has such complete conviction in one's own ability and right to determine the life of the "Greater People" stopped at the purely literary level. Thus, Amalrik already compares the current emigration with the "emigration of hope" that preceded 1917. And of course, one can rest assured that in the event of any crisis they would once again be here in the role of ideological leaders who had earned the right to leadership by suffering the torments of exile. It is no accident that the legend is so stubbornly upheld that they were all "exiled" or "expelled," even though they spent a long time pestering the visa department trying to get their visas.

Another indication of the existence of a certain stratum that is suffused by elitist, cliquish feelings, has no desire to enter into contact with the main social strata of the population, and even shuns them can be derived, I think, from the observation of our societal life and from various speeches, declarations, etc. I have in mind the remarkable characteristic that they are very, very often directed at the problems of a MINORITY. Thus, the question of freedom to emigrate, which may be relevant for a few hundred thousand people, at the most, has aroused an incredible intensity of passions.<sup>14</sup> In the nationality area, the fate of the Crimean Tatars draws far more attention than the fate of the Ukrainians, and the fate of the Ukrainians—more than the Russians. If it is

the persecution of believers that is being reported, much more is said about representatives of relatively small religious tendencies (Adventists, Jehovah's Witnesses, Pentecostals) than about Orthodox Christians or Muslims. If it's the situation of prisoners that is being discussed, it is almost exclusively the situation of political prisoners, although they hardly constitute more than one percent of the total number. One might think that the plight of the minority really is harder. That is absolutely untrue: the problems of the majority of the people are in no way less acute, but one must take an interest in them, of course; if one ignores them, it's as though they won't exist. And perhaps the most striking example is a statement made several years ago to foreign correspondents to the effect that children of the intelligentsia are prevented from receiving a higher education (it was broadcast over several radio stations). And this is when, to the contrary, the opportunity to enter higher school is greater for children of the intelligentsia, especially in big cities, than for others: because of the attitude instilled in them in the family that one must obtain a higher education, because of the family's greater level of culture, which compensates for the inadequacies of the secondary schools, and because of the opportunity to hire tutors. What a disgrace such a statement would have seemed in the eyes of the intelligentsia of the previous century, which believed it owed a debt to the people! Now, however, the objective is to grab a place for one's own children at the people's expense.

There is yet another sign pointing in the same direction—it is the "cult of emigration." The attention that is given to freedom of emigration, and the declaration that the right to emigrate is "first among equals" cannot be explained simply by the fact that the protesters themselves want to leave, since in some cases that is not the case. Here emigration is perceived as a certain principle, a philosophy of life. First and foremost, as a demonstration of the fact that "it is impossible for a decent person to live in this country." But even more, as a model of an attitude toward life here, a feeling of disgust with it and of isolation and divorce from it. (Dostoyevskiy noted of Herzen that some people exist who were born emigrants and are capable of living their entire lives that way, without even necessarily ever going abroad.) The following two examples show how sensitive, even painful, this topic is.

1. At one press conference the idea was expressed that emigration, all the same, is no heroic exploit, and that the people who leave are those who have severed their spiritual ties with their homeland and, for that reason, are hardly capable of making a great contribution to its culture. Rebuttals and protests absolutely poured out in the Western and emigre press and on the radio. One writer living here wrote a huge article for the well-known French newspaper LE MONDE in which he asserted, in part, that "separation from one's homeland" is always a heroic exploit and that "we(?) who remain have blessed those who have left."

2. The Russian-language magazine KONTINENT, which is published in Paris, in its first issue, which presents the magazine's program and proclaims its intention to speak on behalf of the "Continent of Eastern Europe," carries an article by one of its founders and an influential member of its editorial board A. Sinyavskiy<sup>15</sup> (under the pseudonym Abram Terts). "Emigration is presently on the agenda," the author writes. He understands it broadly. "But everyone keeps fleeing"—not just people, for example; it coincides with the fact that "manuscripts keep leaving Russia." And the article ends with a picture:

"When we were leaving, and we were doing it on the quiet, along with the Jews, I saw books jumping about on the board floor of the truck in the direction of customs. The books were jumping about in a bundle like frogs, and I caught sight of titles: 'Poets of the Renaissance,' 'Saltykov-Shchedrin.' By that time I had already shaken everything off myself. But they just kept jumping...The books were also leaving.

"I felt only glad, looking at the packet of brown books, that Mikhail Evgrafovich Saltykov-Shchedrin himself, tucking in his ears, was leaving together with me.

"We were leaving forever. Everything was finished and forgotten...The way ahead was open to our adventures. And the books were jumping. And Mikhail Evgrafovich Saltykov-Shchedrin himself, in person, tucking up his ears, was hopping to it!"

This is a kind of hymn to emigration, an apotheosis of flight: the author himself, "had shaken everything off myself," but that was not enough—not only people but manuscripts and books were fleeing, and even great Russian writers—Russian Literature—were "hopping to it."

And we can constantly observe that same psychology of the "Lesser People" in our own life. Popular singers, famous story-tellers—from tape recorders, television sets and the stage—hammer into our heads the image of the Russian as alcoholic, scum, "beast with a human face." A fashionable theater with a reputation for liberalism stages a play from the Russian past. The understanding public subtly exchanges glances: "how bold, how keenly observed, how it alludes to the present day; it's true, in this country it has always been that way and cannot be otherwise." In the cinema we see films in which our past is represented now as unrelieved gloom and horror, now as a farce and comic operetta. Moreover, at every step one can encounter this ideology. For example, in the following verse, which sets forth the concept of the Revolution in four lines:

What a pity, that Marx's legacy  
Landed in the Russian baptismal font,  
Where the end justifies the means,  
And the means circum...ed the end.

Or in the joke about how two worms, a newborn and its mother, crawled out of a dung heap into the world. The

newborn liked the grass and sun so much that he said: "Mama, why are we digging around in the dung? Let's crawl over there." "Shush," his mother answered, "that's our Homeland!" These anecdotes themselves are not born; someone thinks them up, and for some reason.

The arguments set forth above lead to the following conclusion: *the literary school that is being examined in this work is the manifestation of the ideology of the "Lesser People" and a reflection of its war against the "Greater People."*

This viewpoint explains all the traits of this literature that we have noted throughout our work: the antipathy for Russia (the "Greater People") and Russian history; the annoyance that is aroused by any attempt to look at life from a Russian national viewpoint; the insistent demand to break with our past ideologically and design a future without reference to our own historical experience. Here Cochin's image seems particularly appropriate: the Lilliputians creeping up on the tied-up Gulliver and strewing him with poisoned arrows.

This conclusion, however, immediately gives rise to another question: who does this "Lesser People" consist of, and which strata of our society does it inhabit? In this section we shall do only the preparatory work, looking at the terms that the ideologists of the "Lesser People" themselves use when they speak about the social strata with which they identify themselves. Two such terms, which are at least a little bit concrete, are used: "intelligentsia" and "dissident movement."

Unquestionably, the authors of the works we have been examining are "writing" people and therefore belong to the intelligentsia by any understanding of that word. Similarly, the people whom they are addressing are the readers of samizdat or people who are capable of obtaining Russian magazines published in the West and who also, most likely, belong to the intelligentsia. Therefore, it is plausible that our "Lesser People" consists of a certain part of the intelligentsia. However, there are no grounds for identifying it with an entire social group of "educated people"—for example, "people with a higher education." Millions of teachers, physicians, engineers, agronomists, etc. have entirely different views on life. But unfortunately, we have inherited from the 19th century a bad habit of regarding the intelligentsia only as a unified whole. One example of such a sweeping judgment was the concept of the "intelligentsia, which opposed itself to the people." If that judgment were taken precisely, one would have to dismiss from the intelligentsia the Slavophiles, Dostoyevskiy, Solovyev, Musorgskiy (and moreover, practically all Russian music) and Mendeleyev (who, because of his nationalistic, conservative views, was not even chosen as an academic). Yet they wrote for someone, and had their readers and audience, so won't it turn out that the majority of the intelligentsia does not belong to it? In Russian public-affairs writing the term "order" was often applied to the intelligentsia (by P. Annenskiy, F. Stepun, N. Zernova). For example, Annenskiy wrote:

"The intelligentsia represents a militant order that has no written charter but knows all its members scattered throughout our land, and that by some sort of agreement has always gone against the entire current of contemporary life."

It would be very strange to apply that image to the district doctors, high-school teachers or engineers. Isn't it natural to assume that the author had in mind a certain very specific circle within the educated part of society, one which highly resembles the "Lesser People"? It is interesting to see how this question is treated in the famous collection "Vekhi" [Landmarks], which is subtitled: "Sbornik statey o russkoy intelligentsii" [A Collection of Articles on the Russian Intelligentsia]. P. Struve makes the qualification that he has in mind not the entire intelligentsia, but a certain part of it that is characterized by a "disdainful rejection of the state"—a feature very similar to the characterization of the "Lesser People." Berdyayev mentions at the beginning of his article that he has in mind the "intelligentsia that belongs to circles," and he even proposes a new term for it: "intelligentshchina." He says: "a strange group of people, alien to the organic strata of Russian society." Hershenson's characterization: "a throng of sick people, isolated within their own country." Frank calls the member of the intelligentsia a "militant monk in the nihilistic religion of atheism," and the intelligentsia "a little bunch of monks who are alien to the world and contemptuous of it."

The "Vekhi" collection evoked a stormy reaction from the liberal part of the intelligentsia. As a reply, the collection "Intelligentsia v Rossii" [The Intelligentsia in Russia] was published, to which prominent representatives of the liberal tendency contributed: Kovalevskiy, Milyukov, Tugan-Baranovskiy, etc. And just how do they interpret the term "intelligentsia"? Milyukov considers the "intelligentsia" the *nucleus* of the "educated class"; "the initiative and the creativity belong to it." Characterizing it, he writes: "Practically from the time of its very emergence the Russian intelligentsia was antigovernment"; it "formed its own patriotism of a state within the state, a special camp surrounded by enemies." He notes the "emigrant attitude" of the intelligentsia. Ovsyaniko-Kulikovskiy writes about the member of the intelligentsia of non-noble birth [raznochinets]: "He looks with extreme revulsion on the historical forms of Russian life, amid which he feels himself to be an utter renegade."

It would seem that these traits identify a certain, very narrow and specific stratum or tendency. But sometimes authors quite definitely assign them to all "educated society." The question of "just who is the intelligentsia?" is somehow circumvented, and there is no definite viewpoint on it. Evidently, the collection's authors were confronting a social phenomenon that was very hard to define. They vaguely sensed its uniqueness, but they did not even set themselves the task of characterizing it more precisely. Subsequently even that sense disappeared. A

very amorphous, undifferentiated concept of the "intelligentsia" that reflected a complex real-life situation in a very distorted fashion took root. Unfortunately, this stereotype was preserved, has survived until our time, and is preventing a correct assessment of our reality. In particular, one must admit that the term "intelligentsia" provides an utterly incorrect interpretation of the "Lesser People" phenomenon that interests us. But one should remember that this term is nonetheless widely used in the literature of the "Lesser People" itself and, when encountering the term "intelligentsia" in the literature that is being analyzed, we can understand it as the "Lesser People."

Shragin and Yanov (and, it seems, only they) sometimes use the term "dissidents" to designate the school of thought with which they identify themselves. This term is even less specific than "intelligentsia." And it has been put into common use by foreign correspondents who understand very little about our life. But by any understanding of it, you would never call either Yanov or Shragin dissidents: as long as they lived here they were typical "ideological-sector workers." Nor are the four anonymous authors (who have still not identified themselves) in Issue No 97 of the VESTNIK RSKhD dissidents, and R. Pipes certainly is not.

Other terms, which are used, for example, by Pomerants—"elite," "chosen people"—are even vaguer. So, I think, the terminology that the ideologists of the "Lesser People" themselves use offers no possibility of pinning down this "people" in a way that is at all precise. We must seek some other ways of accomplishing this task.

## 6. The National Aspect

The direction in which this solution must be sought can be indicated by one very distinct feature of the literature we are examining: its saturation with national and, above all, anti-Russian emotions. The authors, while ostensibly writing as objective researchers and thinkers—historians, philosophers or sociologists—who are seeking the truth, often cannot sustain their line and burst into purely emotional attacks against not just Russian history, but Russians in general. The reader may have already noted this specific feature of the quotations that have been offered above ("universal Russian arrogance," "Russians' lack of a sense of their own self-worth," "lackeyish mixture of malice and envy," "archetypically Russian psychological predisposition to unanimous obedience," and "the Russian soul was intoxicated by the cruelty of power"). Here are just a few examples, which could be put together under the heading THEM ABOUT US:

"Russia has brought more evil into the world than any other country" (N.N.)."

"An age-old stench of desolation in a holy place disguised in the garb of messianic 'election,' the centuries-old arrogance of the 'Russian idea'" (same author).

"The people has turned out to be an illusory entity, fit today only for myth-making" ("Gorskiy").

"Their own national culture is absolutely alien to the Russian people" (same author).

"The unfinished work of Byzantium and the Tatars (regarding pre-Petrine Russia)" (Pomerants).

"(In Rus), Christian depths were practically always interwoven with the abysses of moral vileness" (same author).

"A country that for centuries has risen and spread out like sour dough, and that sees no other tasks for itself" (Amalrik).

"A country without faith, without traditions and without a culture" (same author).

"And the fact that Russians themselves are worse off than anyone in that prison is both logical and just" (Shragin).

"(In prerevolutionary Russia) the 'working masses' were suffused with an acquisitive spirit of the worst bourgeois sort in combination with a moral cynicism and political reactionaryism" (Pipes).

"...Fulfillment of the dream of 'order' and a 'Master' that already stirs the people's minds" (Yanov).

"...the people's traditional devotion to a 'Master'" (Yanov).

(The mixing up of the population in the USSR is good for the fact that) "it knocks the ground from under the Russophiles' feet." It is proposed that the words "Russia" and "Russian people" be abandoned are replaced by the terms "Soviet nation [narod], Soviet people [lyudi], etc. (Belotserkovskiy).<sup>16</sup>

In general, in the literature of this school only the Russian people, of all the peoples, is the target of complaints. For example, Russian implies "nationalism," with no qualifications whatsoever (see, for just one example, the selection of quotations titled "The Spectrum of Neonationalism" in "Demokraticheskoye alternativy" [Democratic Alternatives]). And in this connection Plyushch even declares: "I think it abnormal to calculate who has played what percentage of dirty tricks on the Russians over a thousand years." This is in the collection "Demokraticheskoye alternativy," where such "calculations" and reproaches are directed only at the Russians!

In order to avoid creating the impression that the word plays some sort of special role here, let us cite two examples where the same feelings are conveyed through painting.

1. A picture by the artist Vlad Ovchinnikov is reproduced on the cover of the magazine TRETYA VOLNA [Third Wave] (No 6, 1979), which is published by A. Glezer. A little hut and muzhik are portrayed against the

background of a cemetery covered with crosses. The picture is titled "Dog Cemetery."

2. The lavishly published catalogue for an exhibit titled "Contemporary Russian Painting" contains the reproduction of a picture by Aleksandr Zlotnik titled "Heavy Sky." The picture depicts some sort of headless creature standing with legs spread and giving birth to a monster with three dog's heads. From the first creature urine, a whole lake of urine, is flowing, giving rise to a river, which is flowing into the church of St. Basil's, which is serving as a chamber pot.

The peasants arouse special distaste in these authors. We have already mentioned R. Pipes's view of the Russian peasants' proverbs, the meaning of which, in his opinion, is "primitively simple: think only of yourself and do not think of others." Meyerson-Aksenov<sup>17</sup> says the following about their religion:

"...the belief in magic and the superstition of peasant Orthodoxy" (and this is written by a person who has been ordained as an Orthodox Christian priest!).

Pomerants has the following opinions:

"The peasant cannot be reborn except as a character in an opera. Peasant nations are hungry nations, and nations in which the peasantry has disappeared (sic!) are nations in which hunger has disappeared."

A. Amalrik writes:

"And if language is the fullest expression of the spirit of the people, then who is more Russian—the 'little Negro' Pushkin and the 'little Jew' Mandelshtam, or the muzhik in the beer hall who, wiping his spittle across his unshaven cheeks, bellows: 'I'm a Russian!'"<sup>18</sup>

This list could be continued endlessly.<sup>19</sup> It is difficult to characterize the feelings that move the authors as anything other than RUSSOPHOBIA (whereby both meanings invested in the term "phobia"—fear and hatred—are perfectly apt). And hatred for one nation is usually associated with a heightened sense of one's belonging to another. Doesn't this make it likely that our authors are under the influence of some sort of powerful force rooted in their national feelings? I propose taking this thesis as a working hypothesis and seeing whether it doesn't help us understand the entire phenomenon.

If we adopt this "working hypothesis" and ask, JUST WHOSE national feelings are manifesting themselves here, for a person acquainted with our country's life there can be no doubt as to the answer. There is only one nation whose concerns we hear about almost daily. Jewish national emotions are putting not just our country but the whole world into a feverish state: affecting disarmament negotiations, trade contracts and international ties among scientists, causing demonstrations and sit-in strikes, and coming up in practically every conversation. The "Jewish question" has assumed an incomprehensible power over minds, obscuring the problems of the Ukrainians, Estonians, Armenians and

Crimean Tatars. And apparently the existence of a "Russian question" is not recognized at all.

The fact that the authors we are examining are often under the influence of strong Jewish national feelings is confirmed by many features of this literature. For example, by the place that is occupied in it by questions that concern only the Jewish national movement: the problem of exit, and the fear of anti-Semitism—they surface in practically every work. Another feature is even more universal and characteristic. The works under consideration might give the impression that the national aspect of life, in general, is alien to their authors, and that they even regard it with antipathy. But here is what is striking: although the authors are for the most part Jews, they NEVER try to apply to their own people and its state the criticisms that they level at Russians and Russia. For example, practically all the authors accuse Russians of "messianism" and of the arrogance of feeling themselves to be a "chosen people." Whether Russians have such feelings and how strongly they have manifested themselves is a debatable question. But after all, "Messiah" is not a Russian word! Berdyayev said that any messianism is only an imitation of Jewish messianism. It is precisely among the Jews that the notion of themselves as the "Chosen People" and the anticipation of the Messiah constitute the indisputable basis of their religion, and that religion—the basis of the state of Israel; and not a single one of our authors sees anything morbid or unnatural about THAT.

These aspects emerge most clearly in the works of Yanov (in the preface to one of Yanov's books, Breslauer, believing it to be a very important feature in characterizing Yanov, stresses the fact that he is a Jew). He very sincerely depicts his confusion and perplexity in the 1960s when "new and strange times" began in the USSR: instead of vacationing in sanatoriums in the Crimea and Caucasus, members of the intelligentsia started to wander around from village to village collecting icons and even expressing concern over the fact that the peasant population was disappearing! How he strived to persuade all "honest and thinking people" that by inclining toward Russian nationalism they were embarking on a dangerous and dark path! But evidently it did not seem strange to him that his fellow tribesmen were at the same time setting off not for a nearby village, but for a remote tropical country—not on vacation, but forever—and that they were drawn not by the icons to which their fathers and grandfathers had prayed, but by a Temple that had been destroyed nearly 2,000 years ago! Or in one case Yanov depicts a Russian nationalist group that proclaimed in its program the inviolability of individual liberty, freedom for all methods of disseminating the truth, demonstrations and rallies, etc. Nonetheless, Yanov believes that this is the beginning of a path that will inevitably lead to despotism—only because they have spoken about spiritual rebirth and the Russian way, using the term "Great Russia," and have proposed to provide a special role for Orthodox Christianity in a future Russia. Yet all these traits—and not in

the form of the dreams of 30 young people, but in reality—can be observed in the state of Israel! Does Yanov believe that it will inevitably embark on the path to despotism? However, Israel is mentioned only once in his works—and as the example of a democratic state. Yanov believes that Russians' traditional way of thinking consists in asking, with regard to any matter that comes up, "who is to blame for it?", and to try to dump the blame on others in "the presumption of national innocence." (His conclusion is not absolutely persuasive—after all, one also frequently notes an inclination toward *repentance* that is typical of Russians and is expressed in the personality types of the "penitent member of the gentry" and "penitent member of the intelligentsia," in the assistance Russians gave to the Polish uprising in 1863, etc.) On the other hand, in his books and articles, the concept of "anti-Semitism" plays an exceptionally large role. Yet the content of this concept is expressed best of all by his term: "presumption of national innocence," by the question, "who is to blame?" for the misadventures of the Jews, and by the answer—everyone else, from the inhabitants of the ancient Elephantine or classical Alexandria, to present-day Russians. And Yanov sees no parallels whatsoever here! Some arguments are such that they only make sense at all if they are addressed to people of the same views who look at all questions from the standpoint of Jewish nationalism. Thus, Yanov introduces as a document that is supposed to show the negative features of Russian nationalism a letter disseminated among the staff of a certain Western radio station. The letter's authors claim that most of the staff of the Russian editorial bureau are Jews who are conducting a policy of Russophobia. (Yanov borrows this information from an article by Belotserkovskiy, the same one who wanted to "knock the ground from under the Russophiles' feet." He reports nothing about the content of that article.) But what can an impartial reader see in the letter that is reprehensible? Yanov himself believes that the chief evil is to introduce moral judgments into politics, and he acknowledges as democrats only those who fight for their rights "in the economic and political spheres." So here are Russians fighting for their rights in a Russian editorial bureau! After all, the recent criticism by the Jewish Antidefamation League that the percentage of Jews employed in the American banking business is insufficiently high did not arouse indignation! Yanov indignantly notes that the author goes so far as to "investigate blood (that is, racial origin)," evidently believing that it is impermissible to speak about that (Although why? In the "open society" whose strength, we are assured, is that *everything* is discussed and nothing is kept quiet?) But at the same time Yanov proves that he himself can do the same thing, only better, when he corrects the author: two of those he has named as Jews are actually not.

Only the supposition of a nationalistic Jewish underpinning can explain the mystery of why Yanov's article about the Slavophiles was published in Tel Aviv! Alas, few people in Moscow are interested in the Slavophiles, so who cares about them in Tel Aviv? But from the

proposed point of view the situation becomes understandable. The author wants to say: "Do not trust the freedom-loving, spiritual visage of the Russian national movement! In the final analysis it will lead to results that are harmful to us. That is what happened before, and that is how things will always be." And indeed, the motif of "anti-Semitism" comes up on the last page of the article.

Finally, if one uses the translation we have noted, whereby "intelligentsia" equals "Lesser People," the ideologists of the "Lesser People" frequently make statements that assume the meaning of proclaiming the special, central role that the Jewish nucleus plays in our present-day "Lesser People." Thus, N. Ya. Mandelshtam (the poet's widow) writes:

"Today's Jews and half bloods are a newly arisen intelligentsia." "All lives in our age are multifaceted, and it occurs to me that every true member of the intelligentsia is a little bit Jewish...."

Evidently this is no chance idea, since we encounter it in other authors. For example, Boris Khazanov (a pseudonym; the author indicates that he lives here) says:

"Such is the situation of the Russian Jewry, as it seems to me. I see no contradiction between my 'blood' and the fact that I speak Russian; between the fact that I am a Jew, and the fact that I am a member of the Russian intelligentsia. To the contrary, I find that combination natural. I am convinced that to be a member of the Russian intelligentsia at the present time inevitably means being a Jew."

The author does not accept emigration as a way out (at least for himself). Nonetheless, he declares:

"...I triumphantly place a cross on the theory of assimilation, the philosophy of assimilationism...I accept as something natural the fact that I am alien here, and therein lies my liberation...I do not recognize myself as a prodigal son for whom the time has come to return to his father's home; my home is with me, no matter where I wander; I have no need to recognize myself as a Jew; I am a Jew, anyway, from head to foot. You say: and your soil? How can you live with an abyss under your feet? But the lot of Russian Jews is to walk on water."

Declaring that he does not intend to emigrate, the author says:

"Patriotism in the Russian understanding of the word is alien to me. The Russia that I love is a Platonic idea that does not exist in nature. The Russia I see about me I find repulsive."<sup>20</sup>

At the same time, the author undertakes to point out a certain mission, a certain role for Russian Jewry (or at least a certain part of it):

"Filling the vacuum formed by the disappearance (!) of the Russian intelligentsia, Jews themselves have become that intelligentsia. At the same time, they have remained



Jewish. Therefore, it is given to them to experience the situation from within and simultaneously see it from the outside. Russian people lack that advantage, as they have repeatedly demonstrated."

Shragin also emphasizes the national coloring of his understanding of the intelligentsia ("Lesser People"):

"The national makeup of the member of the Russian intelligentsia has little in common with the national makeup of the peasant, worker or bureaucrat." "Hershenson noted back in his time that the member of the Russian intelligentsia was even anthropologically a different type than the man of the people."

And Yanov, in expounding his project for the spiritual occupation and transformation of Russia by the "Western intellectual community" does not forget to add that a "new Baruch or Marshall" will be needed to carry out this grandiose plan.

An idea expressed by Pomerants seems to me to be especially instructive:

"Even Israel I would like to see not as a purely Jewish state, but as a refuge for every 'displaced person,' for every person who has lost his homeland, as the center of a universal international diaspora (which is growing and widening). If after 3,000 years of history the Jewish people has a certain role, it is rather in that than in simply surviving and being like all the rest."

It would be interesting to understand just who these "displaced persons" are. Most likely the image is not used literally; for example, it is not the Arab refugees from Palestine. Rather it implies persons who have lost their native soil on the analogy of "people who have lost their homeland." The image of Israel as a capital or Vatican uniting an international diaspora of "rootless" people who have lost their native soil and homeland accords fully with the concept of the "Lesser People," which in our era exists under the dominant influence of one of the schools of Jewish nationalism.

Obviously, Jewish national feelings are one of the principal forces presently motivating the "Lesser People." So, can it be that what we are dealing with is a purely national school? It seems that this is not the case—the matter is more complex. The mentality of the "Lesser People"—wherein a crystal-clear concept relieves a person of the burden of choice and of personal responsibility before the "Greater People" and gives him a sweet feeling of belonging to the elite—that mentality is not directly connected with any social or national group. However, the "Lesser People" "embodies itself": it utilizes a certain group or stratum that at a given moment has a tendency toward spiritual self-isolation and a tendency to oppose itself to the "Greater People." It may be a religious group (the Puritans in England), a social group (the Third Estate in France), or a national group (a certain school of Jewish nationalism in our country). But just as the nobility in France also played a prominent role in the revolution, so in our country one can

encounter Russians or Ukrainians among the leading public-affairs writers of the "Lesser People." The strength of that mentality actually consists in such openness: otherwise the entire movement would become isolated in a narrow circle and could not exert such influence on the entire people.

Evidently, the Jewish influence plays an exceptionally great role in the life of the "Lesser People" that currently inhabits our country: judging from the extent to which all the literature of the "Lesser People" is suffused with the views of Jewish nationalism, it is natural to think that the central nucleus around which this stratum crystallizes consists precisely of nationalistic Jews. Their role can be compared to the role of a catalyst that accelerates and directs the process of the formation of the "Lesser People." However, the category itself of the "Lesser People" is broader: it would exist even without that influence, although its activeness and its role in the country's life would probably be much smaller.

### Conclusion

We see that today's situation has its roots far in the past. Terrifying memories of the more recent past are being imposed onto traditions of 2,000 years of isolation, and they are oppressing the present-day consciousness, which strives to reject them and reorient the feelings that arise on their basis. That is what gives rise to the morbid national complex to which one must evidently attribute the harshest overtones in the present-day literature of the "Lesser People" and the irritated attacks against Russians and Russian history.

But for us—Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians—this cluster of painful questions is of burning relevance to the present day and can in no way be reduced solely to a judgment of our history. It manifests itself most tragically of all in the situation of young people. Unable to find points of view that would help them sort out the problems put forward by life, they hope to find fresh ideas and learn new facts—from foreign radio. Or they try to get hold of a ticket to a fashionable theater with an aura of independence in order to hear words of truth from its stage. In any event, they play tapes of the songs of Galich and Vysotskiy. But from there pours and is imposed on them, as the only view that is at all conceivable, that same ideology of the "Lesser People": an arrogantly ironic, derisive attitude toward everything Russian, even Russian names; the concept that "in this country that's how it has always been, and there can't be anything good," and the image of Russia as a "Land of fools."<sup>21</sup>

And in the face of this refined technique of brain-washing that has been tested in practice and improved through long experience, confused young people find themselves ABSOLUTELY DEFENSELESS. For, after all, no one who might be an authority for them will warn them that what they are dealing with is simply a new version of propaganda, albeit a very toxic one, that is based on an extremely fragile factual basis.

Once again the ominous silhouette of the "Lesser People" is emerging on our horizon. It would seem that our historical experience should have developed an immunity against it, sharpened our vision, and taught us to discern this image—but I fear that it has not taught us. And one can understand why: the connection among generations has been severed; experience has not been transmitted from one generation to the next. And so now we face the threat that our experience will not become known to the next generation.

Knowing the role that the "Lesser People" has played in history, one can imagine the potential danger of its new manifestation: such distinctly proclaimed ideals are being realized: the establishment of the mentality of the "displaced person" and of a life without roots, and "walking on water," that is, THE FINAL DESTRUCTION OF THE RELIGIOUS AND NATIONAL FOUNDATIONS. And at the same time, at the first opportunity, a heedless and decisive manipulation of the people's destiny. And as a result—a new and final disaster, after which there will probably be nothing left of our people. The appeal cited at the very end of the previous section sounds timely: to make a choice between the status of foreigners without political rights and citizenship based on love for the homeland—it is logically addressed to the entire "Lesser People." Every one of those whom we have so often quoted, from Amalrik to Yanov, has the right to despise and hate Russia, but beyond that they want to determine its destiny, are drawing up plans for it, and are prepared to undertake their implementation. Such a combination is typical in the history of the "Lesser People" and is precisely what brings it success. The isolation from the psychology of the "Greater People" and inability to understand its historical experience, things which in ordinary times might be taken as primitive traits and defects, provide, in situations of crisis, the possibility, of severing and cutting up its living body in especially bold fashion.

With what can we counter this threat? It would seem that one could combat ideas with ideas and words with words. However, the matter is not so simple. From just the examples of the literature of the "Lesser People" that have been cited in our article, one can see that this literature is by no means the result of objective thought and does not appeal to real-life experience and logic. What we are encountering here is some sort of different form of conveying ideological concepts, a form, moreover, which has been characteristic of all the historical variants of the "Lesser People."

Such very specific efforts to "direct public opinion" were evidently already being established in the 18th century and were described by Cochin. They include, for example, a colossal but short-term concentration of public attention on certain events or people, and usually on the denunciation of certain aspects of surrounding life—from the Calas trial, when the monstrous injustice of the sentence, exposed by Voltaire, shocked Europe (and concerning which historians assure us that there

was no judicial error at all), to the Dreyfus and Beylis cases. They also include the fabrication and support of authorities who are based exclusively on the power of hypnosis. "They create reputations and force people to applaud the most boring authors and false books, if only they are their own," says Cochin. People can be forced to watch a poor play thanks to a claque. "This claque, planted by the 'societies,' is so splendidly trained that it seems sincere, and so well distributed throughout the hall that the members of the claque do not know one another, and often every member of the audience takes them for the ordinary public." "At present it is hard to imagine that the moralizing of Mably, the political investigations of Condorcet, the history of Raynal and the philosophy of Helvetius—that vacuum of tasteless prose—could sustain publication and find even a dozen readers; yet everyone read them or at least bought them and talked about them. One may say that that was the fashion. Of course! But how does one understand this proclivity for heavy-handedness and pomposity in the age of taste and elegance?" In precisely the same way the influence of Freud as a scientist and the fame of the composer Schoenberg, the artist Picasso and the writer Kafka or poet Brodsky will be beyond the comprehension of our descendants.

Thus, logic, facts and ideas alone are powerless in such a situation, as the whole course of History shows. Only a people's individual historical experience can help distinguish the truth from falsehood. But if such an experience exists at all, it is precisely our people that has it! And therein, of course, lies the main guarantee that we will be able to resist the new manifestation of the "Lesser People." Our experience—tragic but also extremely deep—has unquestionably altered the deep underlying layers of the people's psyche. It is necessary, however, to BECOME CONSCIOUS OF IT—to put it in a form that is accessible not just to the emotions but to thought, and to work out, relying on it, our attitude toward the main problems of the present day. It seems to me that this is precisely the chief task of Russian thought today.

Therefore, we simply have no right to allow the barely inchoate yearning to interpret our national path to be trampled down and reviled, to allow it to be shoved onto the road of strident journalistic polemics. How, then, shall we protect our national awareness and, especially, young people's awareness against the "we-are-doomed" complex that is being forced upon it, against the view that is being impressed on it according to which our people is capable only of being the material for someone else's experiments?

The people's spiritual character is formed and organically interrelated customs of social existence develop over the course of many centuries, and only by relying on them can historical evolution create stable forms of life that are natural for that people. For example, the essayists of the "Lesser People" often emphasize that a strong state played a great role in Russian history, and in that regard they are evidently right. But that means that if, following their advice, the role of the state were to

somehow suddenly be eliminated, leaving totally unrestricted economic and political competition as the only forces operating in society, the result could only be rapid and complete collapse. The very same arguments lead to the obverse conclusion: that the state should evidently play a large role in our country's life for a long time yet to come. Just what sort of role, specifically, only life itself can tell. Of course, certain functions of the state could be limited and transferred to other forces. But in and of itself, the powerful influence of the state is by no means necessarily ruinous—just as it is not necessarily fruitful. The state contributed to the enslavement of the peasants in Russia in the 17th-18th centuries, but it also carried out the emancipation of the peasants in the 19th century. One can cite numerous examples of indisputably positive, important actions that have been taken thanks to the strong influence of the state on life. For example, the labor legislation introduced in Russia in the late 19th and early 20th centuries was on a par with contemporary Western legislation, and if one compares it to the phase of the country's industrial development, it was far ahead of it and was drawn up much faster. Only England and Germany had more progressive laws, while in France and the United States the legal status of workers was worse. The state, like other forces operating in the people's life—parties, churches, national movements, etc.—has its danger and the potential for morbid development (or the temptation). For the state, that means the attempt to subject the citizens' *souls* to its power. But it is fully capable of remaining strong while avoiding that morbid path. The picture is the same with regard to almost every question—it is always possible to find a way out that does not represent a break with historical tradition, and only that way will lead to a viable, stable solution, since it rests on the wisdom of traits and customs of the popular organism that have developed over the course of many centuries and been tested, selected, and ground to fit into one another. The concrete awareness of this viewpoint is precisely the force with which we can counter the "Lesser People" and which will protect us against it.

A thousand years of history have forged such national character traits as a belief that the destiny of the individual and the destinies of the people are inseparable in their deepest underlying layers and, at fateful moments of history, are merged; and such traits as a bond with the land—the land in the narrow sense of the word, which grows grain, and the Russian land. These traits have helped it endure terrible trials and to live and work under conditions that have at times been almost inhuman. All hope for our future lies in this ancient tradition. And it is what is being fought for against the "Lesser People," whose creed was divined by Dostoyevskiy: "Whoever curses his past is already ours—that is our formula!"

A person is born and dies, as a rule, amidst his people. Therefore, he perceives his surroundings as something perfectly natural, and they usually raise no questions in him. But in actuality the people is one of the most

striking phenomena and mysteries on our Earth. Why do these communities arise? What sort of forces support them for centuries and millennia? So far all attempts to answer these questions have so clearly missed the mark that we most likely are dealing here with a phenomenon to which present-day science's standard methods of "understanding" are completely inapplicable. It is easier to point out why individual people need peoples. Belonging to his people makes a person a participant in History and privy to the mysteries of the past and future. He can feel himself to be more than a particle of the "living matter" that is for some reason turned out by the gigantic factory of Nature. He is capable of feeling (usually subconsciously) the significance and lofty meaningfulness of humanity's earthly existence and his own role in it. Analogous to the "biological environment," the people is a person's "social environment": a marvelous creation supported and created by our actions, but not by our designs. In many respects it surpasses the capacity of our understanding, but it is also often touchingly defenseless in the face of our thoughtless interference. One can look at History as a two-sided process of interaction between the individual and his "social environment"—the people. We have said what the people gives the individual. For his part, the individual creates the forces that bind the people together and ensure its existence: language, folklore, art, and the recognition of its historical destiny. When this two-sided process breaks down, the same thing happens that happens in nature: the environment turns into a dead wilderness, and along with it the individual dies, too. More specifically, the individual's interest in work and in his country's fortunes disappears, life becomes a meaningless burden, young people seek a way out in irrational outbursts of violence, men turn into alcoholics or drug addicts, women cease to bear children, and the people withers away...

Such is the end to which we are being urged by the "Lesser People," which is working incessantly on the destruction of everything that supports the existence of the "Greater People." Therefore, the creation of weapons for spiritual defense against it are a question of national self-preservation. Only the people as a whole is capable of accomplishing such a task. But there is a more modest task that we can accomplish only as individuals: TO SPEAK THE TRUTH, to pronounce, finally, words that have been kept quiet in fear. I could not die in peace without attempt to do that.

#### From the Editors

The article is published in abbreviated form. In order to save space, its scholarly apparatus has also been reduced. However, let us inform readers that all the quotations were checked by the author against their original sources.

[No 11, Nov 89 pp 162-172]

[Text] *The magazine has received numerous letters of gratitude for the publication of I. Shafarevich's article "Russophobia" (No 6, 1989). At the same time, readers*

*have reproached us for the cuts we made in it. They are right—at a time of glasnost, texts, especially those that have already acquired renown, should be published in full. Fulfilling readers' wishes, we are publishing the chapters previously omitted. We realize that they will draw a mixed reaction. It may be that the absurd charge of anti-Semitism, which was recently heard from a high rostrum, will surface once again. However, in our view the elimination of "blank spots" in internationality relations is the guarantee that an atmosphere of mutual trust and goodwill.*

## 7. A Painful Question

But even if one accepts the premise that the heightened Russophobic nature of the literature of the "Lesser People" is attributable to the influence of some sort of Jewish nationalist tendencies, the question still remains: why can a certain school of Jewish nationalism be suffused with such irritation, not to say hatred, toward Russia, Russian history, and Russians in general? The answer will be obvious if we pay attention to the problem that practically every work of Russophobic literature touches on in one way or another: WHAT SORT OF INFLUENCE ON THIS COUNTRY'S FATE HAS BEEN EXERTED BY THE UNPRECEDENTED INFLUX OF JEWISH NATIONAL FORCES INTO ITS POLITICAL LIFE IN PRECISELY THE ERA OF THE GREATEST CRISIS IN ITS HISTORY? This question should be very painful for the Jewish nationalist mind. Indeed, there has hardly ever been another case in the history of any country in which people from the Jewish part of its population have had such an enormous influence on its life. Therefore, in any discussion of the role of Jews in any country, Russia's experience should be one of the principal arguments. And especially in our country, where we are doomed for a long time yet to come to try to untangle the knots that were tied in this era. On the other hand, this question is becoming increasingly relevant throughout the entire world, especially in America, where right now the Jewish nationalist "lobby" has attained such inexplicable influence: whereby, in principal issues of policy (for example, relations with the USSR or the petroleum-producing countries) decisions are influenced by the interests of a numerically small group of the population, or whereby congressmen and senators reproach the president for the fact that his actions may weaken the state of Israel—and the president, instead of reminding them that they are supposed to be guided by American, rather than Israeli, interests, apologizes and tries to prove that he will not do any damage to Israel. In that sort of situation a natural desire may arise to take a look at the consequences that a similar influence has produced in another country's fate.

As far as I know, this problem has never yet been raised by the Russian side (here, and not in emigration). But it clearly concerns the other side and constantly surfaces in the literature of the "Lesser People" and in the works of the latest emigres. Although the problem is often cited, it is either formulated in such a way that the absurdity and

inappropriateness of the question itself become perfectly obvious, or discussion of it is immediately shut off with the help of the first argument that turns up. For example, "the revolution was not the work of Jews alone," asserts one anonymous author, brilliantly refuting the view that the "revolution was the work of Jews alone" (which, however, no intelligent person could have expressed). Another author in KONTINENT admits the participation of Jews in the revolution at the level of 14 percent (!)—"and so, let us answer for those 14 percent"! Here is another example: the play "Utomlennoye solntse" [Weary Sun] (which is remarkable, in general, for its seething hatred for Russians), which was published in a Russian-language magazine that comes out in Tel Aviv. The author is Nina Voronel, a recent emigrant from the USSR (could it be that the play was actually written here?). In the play the coward and scoundrel Astrov argues with the pure, principled Venya. Astrov screams: "...you bear no responsibility, but you arrange a revolution for us, abolish our god, destroy churches." "And what are you worth, if someone else can arrange a revolution for you!" parries Venya. Many authors reject the idea of a strong Jewish influence on Russian history as offensive to the Russian people, although that is the only point on which they are prepared to show such tactfulness toward Russians. In a recent work Pomerants keeps circling around this "cursed question." First he asks whether the Jews who took part in the revolutionary movement were really Jews, and he admits that the question is unresolved: "And just who was Vragel? (that is, was he a German?), or Trotskiy? That depends on your political views, reader." Then he discovers a universal law of Russian life—that non-Russians have always played the leading role in it. "Even in the novels of Russian writers, what sort of surnames do the businesslike, energetic people have? Konstanzhoglo, Insarov, Stolz... Right here a place for Levinson was prepared in advance." He even poses the following "mental experiment": if the member of the oprichina Fedka Basmanov were transferred to our age and appointed people's commissar of railroads, under him, the author claims, the trains would unfailingly derail, while "under the scoundrel Kaganovich the trains ran on schedule (as they had earlier under Kleynmikhel)." Although the author should recall the primordial chaos that reigned on the railroads when they were under the management of the "iron people's commissar"! And finally he hints that if there was something that was, well, not quite humane, there, it is the Russians who are to blame, since that's the sort of country they have: "A Blyumkin who draws up a list of people for the firing squad while drunk is unthinkable in Israel: there is neither drunkenness nor firing squads" (with the exception, perhaps, of the firing squads that execute Arab peasants, as in the village of [Deyr-Yasin]?—I. Sh.). This last argument can be detected as a subtext in all the Russophobic literature: if there was something, it is the Russians themselves who are to blame for it all; cruelty is in their blood; that's what their whole history is like. This is precisely the leitmotif that gives such a vivid anti-Russian tinge to the ideology of our present-day "Lesser People," and that is

precisely why the need arises to prove the cruelty and barbarism of Russians again and again.

However, there is nothing specifically Jewish about that sort of reaction: in the past of every individual and every people there are episodes that they do not care to recall, and it is much easier for them to tell themselves that there is nothing to recall. What is a greater cause for human amazement is that there actually have been honest and courageous attempts to sort out what took place. One such attempt was the collection "Russia and the Jews," which was published in Berlin in 1923. There have been other such attempts, as well. They give us hope that relations between people can be determined not by selfishness and mutual hatred, but by repentance and goodwill. They lead to the important question: do we need to reflect on the role of the Jews in our history, and don't we have enough of our own sins, mistakes and problems? This is unquestionably the higher point of view, and there is no getting away from our own historical mistakes, no matter how hard it may be, especially in the face of malicious and unscrupulous attacks such as those that we have cited in abundance. But it is perfectly obvious that humanity is far from sufficiently mature yet to limit itself to that path alone. If we are confronting a painful problem on the understanding of which the fate of our people may depend, the sense of national self-preservation does not permit us to turn away from it and forbid thinking about it in the hope that others will solve it for us. Especially since that hope is very fragile. After all, even the attempts to analyze relations between the Jews and other peoples that we have mentioned failed to draw any wide response. The authors of the collection "Russia and the Jews" very vividly describe the hostile attitude that they encountered in the Jewish emigrant milieu; people wrote that they were the "dregs of Jewish society." And the same sort of thing is true now; for example, A. Sukonik, who published a short story in KONTINENT in which an unlikable Jew was depicted was immediately accused of "anti-Semitism."

It would be possible simply to disdain all this, if it were a question of the fate of each of us individually, yet we are also answerable to our people, so no matter how painful this problem may be, it is impossible to evade it.

And it is not easy to discuss it. Life in a country where so many nationalities clash and national feelings have been strained to the limit develops, often even unconsciously, the habit of cautiously circumventing nationality problems and not making them the subject of discussion. In order to express one's views on this matter, one must overcome a certain inner resistance. However, the choice has already been made—by the authors whose views and statements we have cited. Indeed, it is impossible to suppose that one people and the distinctive features of its history, national character and religious views would be discussed (often, as we have seen, in an extremely nasty and unceremonious matter), while the discussion of others would be impermissible.

But here our path is blocked, as though by a huge boulder, by the deeply rooted and instilled prohibition that makes any attempt to analyze this question almost hopeless. It consists in the fact that any idea that at some time or place the actions of any Jews caused harm to other peoples, or even any sort of objective research that does not rule out from the very outset the possibility of such a conclusion, is declared reactionary, unfitting to a member of the intelligentsia, and indecent.

Relations between any nations—the Germans and the French, the English and the Irish, or the Persians and the Kurds—may be freely discussed, and one may objectively point out cases in which one side suffered at the other's hands. One may speak about the selfish position of the gentry, about the bourgeoisie's pursuit of profits, or about the deeply rooted conservatism of the peasantry. But with regard to the Jews, any such discussions from that standpoint, regardless of whether they are warranted, are forbidden in principle. Such a prohibition, never clearly stated and never written, is strictly observed by all of present-day civilized humanity, and this is all the more striking the more free and "open" a society claims to be, and most striking of all in the United States.

A vivid example of the naked application of this principle occurs in a recent article by Pomerants. In one article he discovers the sentence: "The apparatus of the Cheka [Extraordinary Commission] abounded with Latvians, Poles, Jews, Magyars and Chinese," and in this regard he writes:

**"He lists, with no partiality, Latvians, Poles, Jews, Magyars and Chinese. The *dangerous* word is stuck in in such away that it could not be pulled out for quotation."**

The emphasis on the word "dangerous" is mine. One would very much like to understand how Pomerants explains why it is precisely that word, "stuck in the middle," that is dangerous, and not, for example, the word that stands at the end, although there are 50 times more Chinese in the world than Jews. And it would not be dangerous at all for him to call Russians "ne'er-do-wells" and "lackeys." It is very typical that Pomerants by no means disputes the fact itself; he is even ironic about the author's cautiousness:

**"However, is it possible that Jews really played such a tertiary role in the Russian revolution? Less than Poles and greater than Magyars? Contemporaries took a different view of these things...."**

He is simply warning that the author is approaching the boundary that it is impermissible to cross.

And in that regard Pomerants is right—the "word" really is dangerous! The charge of "anti-Semitism" comes down on anyone who dares violate the aforementioned

ban. The candid Yanov makes this threat in an especially overt fashion. Mentioning the "nationalists," he says:

**"...they will object to me that anti-Semitism is the atomic bomb in their opponents' arsenal. But if that is the case, they why not deprive their opponents of their chief weapon by publicly renouncing...." and so forth.**

This "chief weapon" of the "opponents of nationalism," whom Yanov does not identify more precisely, really is a "weapon of deterrence" comparable to the atomic bomb. It is not for nothing that in our time the dangerous topic is skirted by the most principled thinkers and that the bravest people fall silent here.

And just what does that "atomic bomb" represent? Everyone knows that anti-Semitism is dirty and uncouth, and that it is the shame of the 20th century (as, by the way, of all other centuries). It has been attributed to the savagery and undeveloped nature of capitalist relations—or, conversely, to the decay of capitalism, or, beyond that, to the envy of less talented nations for a more talented one. Bebel considered it a special variety of socialism: the "socialism of fools," while Stalin called it the "vestiges of cannibalism." Freud attributed it to the antipathy aroused by the circumcised in the uncircumcised (who subconsciously associate circumcision with the unpleasant idea of castration). Others have considered it a vestige of the Marcionite heresy, which was condemned by the church in the second century, or as blasphemy against the Virgin Mary. But no one has ever explained what one should seemingly begin with: what is anti-Semitism, and what does the word imply? In essence, what is involved here is that same ban: do not allow even the hypothesis that the actions of certain Jewish groups, tendencies or individuals could have negative consequences for others. But one cannot, of course, formulate it so openly. Therefore, it is also vain to try to get an answer; none will be given, for herein lies the explosive power of the atomic bomb: in the fact that the question is removed from the sphere of reason to the realm of emotions and suggestion. We are dealing with a symbol, a sign whose function is to mobilize irrational emotions and arouse, on signal, a tide of aggravation, indignation and hatred. Such symbols or stereotypes that are the signals for a spontaneous reaction are a well-known element of the control of mass consciousness.

And usually the stereotype of "anti-Semitism" is used precisely as a means of influencing emotions while deliberately ignoring logic and attempting to escape any contact with it. Vivid examples can be encountered in an author who, in general, is greatly concerned with this topic: A. Sinyavskiy. In the article that we have already cited in Issue No 1 of KONTINENT he writes:

**Here it is appropriate to say a few words in defense of anti-Semitism in Russia. That is: what is well concealed in a psychological sense in the Russian unfriendliness, to put it mildly, toward Jews."**

And he explains that no matter how many disasters a Russian has caused, he is simply incapable of comprehending that all of this has resulted from his own actions, so he heaps blame on some sort of "wreckers"—in particular, the Jews. But further on, rising to an emotional pitch, the author exclaims regarding Jewish emigration (to which, of course, the Russians have brought the Jews): "Mother Russia, Bitch Russia, you will answer, too, for this latest child, reared by you and then cast onto the rubbish heap (?)."

You see, the author even takes Russians under his protection and tries, to the extent it is possible, to excuse their anti-Semitism and even find something "good" in it, for after all, they know not what they do, or in more modern terminology, are insane (although Bitch Russia will still answer for that and for some other things, too). And from such a defender the reader takes on faith, without the least bit of proof, the assertion that the Russians' "unfriendliness" toward the Jews as a nation really does exist, and does not reflect on whether Jews are always "friendly" toward Russians.

On what other issue would someone get by with such a trick? Yet here those ideas are deemed so important that they are conveyed to the American reader in an English translation.

A later article by the same author cites several statements by "the writer N. N.," such as the statement that anti-Jewish pogroms even existed at the time of Monomakh, or that Jews presently constitute 80 percent of the Moscow Organization of the Writers' Union. Making no attempt to assess the accuracy of such a figure, or what influence such a state of affairs might have on the development of Russian literature, the author asserts that N. N. calls to "gird ourselves with Monomakh and begin the pogroms," and he even claims that "we are dealing ... with Orthodox fascism." It is obvious that the goal is to divert the reader from a ground of facts and reflections that is uncomfortable for the author. Instead, an attempt is made to instill the image of Russians as practically insane half-educated people, and any unpleasant statements are painted as calls for a pogrom. In the Russophobic literature we have encountered such confident accusations that Russians lack respect for other people's opinions! The authors have so frequently proclaimed "pluralism" and "tolerance" that we seemingly might count on finding such traits in them themselves. However, when they encounter questions that are painful for them, they not only show no tolerance and respect for the other person's opinion, they come right out and call their opponents fascists and practically murderers. Yet it is only in difficult and painful situations that "pluralism" and "tolerance" are really put to the test. If one attempts to use this model to understand what the authors mean by freedom of thought and speech, it may seem that they understand it as freedom for *their own* thought, and freedom of speech only to express it!

In a more rational and carefully argued fashion, the same prohibition is expressed in the following form: any judgment about an entire people is unwarranted; it

denies the autonomy of the human individual, and some people become responsible for the actions of others. But if we accept that viewpoint, we should reject any application of general categories at all—estate, class, nation, state—in history. However, for some reason such objections are not aroused by such ideas as that “Russia has brought more evil into the world than any other country,” or by the demands that have recently been heard in the United States (by Jewish authors) that more treatment be given to Jews’ contribution (positive, of course) to American culture (which is also, after all, a judgment concerning an entire nation!).

But the main thing is that there is no negation of individuality here at all. For example, we have cited arguments above to support the contention that the Russophobic literature we have been examining is under the strong influence of Jewish nationalistic feelings. Yet not all Jews contribute to that literature! There are also those who object to it (some of whom we have named above). So full freedom for the manifestation of one’s individuality remains here, and no one is being saddled with responsibility for actions he has not committed.

Since we have spoken the word “responsibility,” let us allow ourselves one more explanation. In this work we reject, in general, all “value judgments” derived from asking the question “who is to blame?” (and to what extent). In what follows we shall attempt only to understand: just what has happened? How has the role that certain strata of Jewry played in the course of the “revolutionary age”—from the mid-19th to mid-20th centuries—been reflected in our country’s history?

### 8. The Jewish Influence in the ‘Revolutionary Age’

At the end of the 19th century the stable, isolated life of the religious communities to which practically all the Jews living in Russia belonged started to rapidly fall apart. Young people were quitting the religious schools and patriarchal home and entering into Russian life—the economy, culture and politics—and exerting an increasing influence on it. By the beginning of the 20th century this influence had reached such a scale that it had become a significant factor in Russian history. If it was great even in the economy, it was especially striking in all the currents that were hostile to the way of life of that time. In the liberal-denunciatory press, in the leftist parties and terrorist groups, Jews occupied a position in terms of both their numbers and their leadership role that was absolutely disproportionate to their numerical share of the population.

“...an undeniable fact that must be explained but that is senseless and pointless to deny,” objective Jewish observers have written about this (in the collection “Russian and the Jews” that is cited above).

Naturally, the whole process became especially intensified when the revolution broke out. In the same collection we read:

“Now the Jew is in every corner and on every rung of power. A Russian sees him at the head of the original capital Moscow, at the head of the capital on the Neva, and at the head of the army, the most highly perfected mechanism of self-destruction. He sees that St. Vladimir Prospect bears the glorious name of Nakhimson, and that the historic Liteynyy Prospect has been renamed as Volodarskiy Prospect, and Pavlovsk renamed as Slutsk. The Russian now sees the Jew as judge and hangman....”

Nonetheless, the idea that the “revolution was the work of Jews alone” is nonsense, which was probably invented in order to make it easier to refute. Moreover, I see no arguments for the notion that Jews, in general, “made” the Russian revolution, that is initiated it, even in the form of a leading minority.

If one begins the history of the revolution with Bakunin, Herzen and Chernyshevskiy, there were no Jews at all among the people who surrounded them, and Bakunin regarded Jews, in general, with antipathy. When the first revolutionary proclamations (“To young Russia,” etc.) came out in the period of “going to the people,” and when a turn toward terror occurred after its failure, Jews were the rare exception in the revolutionary movement. At the very end of the 1870s there were several Jews (Goldenberg, Deych, Zundeleovich, Gesya and Gelfman) in the leadership of People’s Will, which resulted in an explosion of popular indignation directed against the Jews after the assassination of Aleksandr II. But just how weak the Jews’ influence was in the organization’s leadership is shown by the fact that the People’s Will broadside ENDORSED those disorders, attributing them to the people’s indignation against Jewish exploiters. By the end of the 1880s the situation had changed somewhat. According to a collection of statistics put together by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Jews constituted a little more than one-third—51 of 145—political emigres known to the ministry. It was only after the establishment of the Socialist Revolutionary Party that the Jews formed a solid majority of the leadership of that movement. Here, for example, is a brief history of the Militant Organization of Socialist Revolutionaries: it was founded and led from 1901 to 1903 by Gershuni, led from 1903 to 1906 by Azev,<sup>21</sup> and led from 1906 to 1907 by Zilberberg. After that Nikitenko became the leader, but after two months he was arrested, and in 1908 it was disbanded (when Azev’s role came out). Azev’s reports, which were subsequently published, provide extensive material in this regard. In one of them he lists the members of the foreign committee: Gots, Chernov, Shishko, the married couple Levit, Gots’s wife, the Minors, Gurevich and Chernov’s wife; and in another he lists a “narrow circle of party leaders”: Mendel, Vittenberg, Levin, Levit and Azev. We see an analogous evolution in the Social Democrats, as well. The idea that not the peasants but the workers could become the main revolutionary force was expressed with regard to Russia not by Jews but by Yakubovich and, especially, Plekhanov, who started transplanting Marxism on Russian soil. In the Social Democratic Party there were at first many



more Jews among the Mensheviks than among the Bolsheviks (in his note on the Fifth Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party, Stalin wrote that the vast majority of the Menshevik faction consisted of Jews, while the vast majority of the Bolshevik faction consisted of Russians, and he cited a well-known "joke" to the effect that it would not be a bad idea to arrange a little anti-Jewish pogrom among the Russian Social Democrats; not until right before the October coup [perevorot] itself and, especially, in its aftermath, did Jewish forces begin an influx into the Bolsheviks—from the Mensheviks, from the Bund (many of the Bund's leaders went over to the Bolshevik party), and from people unaffiliated with any party. For several days after the coup the head of state was Kamenev, and after that Sverdlov was head of state until his death. Trotsky was head of the Army, Zinoviev the leader of Petrograd, and Kamenev the leader of Moscow. The Comintern was led by Zinoviev, and the Profintern by A. Lozovskiy (Solomon Drizo), while the Komsomol was led by Oskar Ryvkin and, at first—for several months—by Efim Tsetlin, and so forth.

One can imagine the situation in the 1930s, for example, by looking at lists cited in Dikiy's book. Whereas the number of Jewish names in the very top leadership was declining, in subordinate offices the number subsequently increased and grew deeper. In the important People's Commissariats (the OGPU [Unified State Political Directorate] and the people's commissariats of foreign affairs and heavy industry) and among the top executives (the people's commissars and their deputies, members of their collegiums), Jews held the dominant position and constituted what we know was more than half. In certain fields, the leadership consisted almost exclusively of Jews.

But all these are only quantitative assessments. What was the *nature of the influence* that such a radical role on the part of the Jewry exerted on that era? One is struck by the especially large concentration of Jewish names at the most painful moments among the directors and administrators of actions that particularly drastically reshaped life and contributed to the breakdown of historical traditions and destruction of historical roots.

For example, from most memoirs of the Civil War times a strange picture emerges: when members of the Cheka are mentioned, Jewish surnames come up with striking frequency, whether the reference is to Kiev, Kharkov, Petrograd, Vyatka or Turkestan. And that is at a time when Jews constituted only one to two percent of the population of Soviet Russia! Thus, Shulgin gives a list of employees of the Kiev Cheka: it contains almost exclusively Jewish surnames. And he tells about the following example of its activity: in Kiev before the Revolution there was a "Union of Russian Nationalists"—its members were shot on the basis of lists.

This feature emerges especially vividly in connection with the execution of Nicholas II and his family. After all, this was not a matter of a claimant to the throne eliminating his predecessor—like the murder of Peter III or Paul I.

Nicholas was shot precisely *as a tsar*, and through this ritual act an era of Russian history was brought to an end, so it can only be compared with the execution of Charles I in England or of Louis XVI in France. It would seem that the representatives of an insignificant ethnic minority ought to have kept as far as possible away from such an extreme act, which left its trace on all history. But what sort of names do we encounter? Yakov Yurovskiy personally directed the execution and shot at the tsar himself, the chairman of the local soviet was Beloborodov (Vaysbart), and general direction at Ekaterinburg was exercised by Shaya Goloshchekin. Added to the picture is the fact that on the wall of the room in which the execution was carried out, a couplet was found written (in German) from a poem of Heine about the King Balthazar, who offended Jehovah and was killed for doing so.<sup>23</sup> Or take another era: the makeup of the top executives of the OGPU during the period of the dispossession of the kulaks and the construction of the White Sea Canal, at a critical turning point in our history—when the fate of the peasantry was being decided (it is cited in a book by a British scholar, who by no means wants to emphasize the nationality aspect): the chairman was Yagoda (Iguda), his deputies were Agranov and Trilisser, and later Frinovskiy; the chief of the operations department was Valovich, and later Pauker; and the director of the GULAG was Matvey Berman and, after that, Frenkel; the director of the political department was Lyashkov; the economic department was directed by Mirnov; the special department by Gay, and the foreign department by Slutskiy, whose deputies were Boris Berman and Shpilgelgass; the transportation department was directed by Shanin. And when Yagoda was replaced by Yezhov, his deputies were Berman and Frinkovskiy. Or, finally, the destruction of the Orthodox Church: in the 1920s the process was directed by Trotsky (whose closest assistant was Shpitsberg), and in the 1930s by Yemelyan Yaroslavskiy (Miney Izrailevich Gubelman). The period in which the campaign assumed a truly grandiose scale is treated in a samizdat letter from the late Ukrainian academician Beletskiy. He cites, for example, a list of the principal authors of atheist literature: Yemelyan Yaroslavskiy (Gubelman), Rumyantsev (Shnayder), Kandidov (Fridman), Zakharov (Edelshteyn), Ranovich, Shakhnovich, Skvortsov-Stepanov and, at a later time, Lentsman and Menkman.

But the most fateful feature of this entire age that can be ascribed to the ever-increasing Jewish influence consisted in the fact that often liberal, Westernizing or internationalist terminology was used to cover up antinationality tendencies. (Of course, many Russians, Ukrainians and Georgians found themselves drawn into this.) Herein lies a fundamental difference from the French Revolution, in which Jews did not play any sort of role. There "patriot" was a term that signified revolutionary, while in our country it signified counterrevolutionary, and it could be encountered in a death sentence: executed by firing squad as a conspirator, monarchist and patriot. This trait did not appear right away in Russia, either. There were certain national elements in Bakunin's thinking, and he dreamed of an anarchic

federation of free Slavic peoples. The bait that lured most young people into the revolution was love and compassion for the people, which at that time meant for the peasantry. But the reverse tendency also began early. Thus, I. Tikhomirov says about V. A. Zaytsev (we have already cited him in the fourth section, for example, to the effect that "slavery is in Russians' blood"): "A Jew and revolutionary member of the intelligentsia, he hated Russia with some sort of frenzied malice and would literally curse her, so it was repulsive to read him. He wrote, for example: 'Rot, damn you.' Concerning Plekhanov, Tikhomirov writes that he 'bore in his breast an ineradicable Russian patriotism.' And then, after returning from the February Revolution to Russia, he discovered that his great influence had evaporated. Plekhanov simply could not have brought himself to exclaim, as Trotskiy did: 'Patriotism be damned!' This 'antipatriotic' attitude dominated in the 1920s and 1930s, a time in which Zinovyev called to 'cut the head off our Russian chauvinism' and 'to take a hot iron and sear every place there is the slightest hint of great-power chauvinism'; Yakovlev (Epshteyn) complained that 'a base great-power Russian chauvinism is suffusing the apparatus.'

Just what was understood by the term "great-power chauvinism," and what did combating it mean? Bukharin explained: "...as a great-power nation we should ... place ourselves in an unequal position in the sense of even greater concessions to national tendencies." He demanded that Russians be put "in a lower position compared to the others..." And Stalin declared time after time, starting with the 10th Congress and ending with the 16th, that "great-power chauvinism" was the chief danger in the realm of nationalities policy. At that time the term "RUSOPYAT" [a pejorative colloquial term for a jingoistic Russian] was perfectly official and could be found in many speeches by leaders of that time. An "antipatriotic" attitude suffused literature, as well. Bezymenskiy dreamed: Bezymenskiy dreamed:

Oh, will the little Rasshian soon be brushed  
Out of the way with a harsh hand?

There are endless variations on this theme:

Rus! Rotten? Dead? Croaked?  
Oh well, may you rest in peace.

Or:

I propose melting down Minin, Pozharskiy.  
Why give them a pedestal?  
We've glorified  
The two shopkeepers enough—  
October caught them  
Behind their counters.  
They were lucky  
We didn't wring their necks.  
I know it would have fit just right,  
Just think,

They saved Rasshia!  
But maybe it would have been better not to save  
it?

Any treatment of Russian history included, as a mandatory element, the pouring of slops on everyone who had played any sort of role in Russia's fortunes—even at the price of contradicting the scholar's own convictions: for whether Peter the Great was a syphilitic or a homosexual had no influence on the "commercial capital" "whose interests he expressed." Through literature and the schools, this attitude has also penetrated into the souls of present generations—and so here, for example, L. Plyushch calls Kutuzov a "reactionary figure"!

It is appropriate here to consider the objection that is often made: The Jews who took part in this school belonged to the Jewry only by blood, but in spirit they were internationalists; the fact that they were Jews had no influence on their activities. Yet these authors declare Stalin, for example, a "continuer of the policies of the Russian tsars," although in his speeches he was constantly denouncing "great-power chauvinism." If they do not take Stalin at his word, why do they believe Trotskiy and consider him a pure internationalist? This is precisely the viewpoint that Pomerants, for example, has in mind when he writes that if one considers Trotskiy a Jew, Vrangl must be considered a German. What were they, in reality? "I think this question is unresolved," Pomerants says. At the same time, at least with respect to Trotskiy, the situation does not seem so hopeless. For example, in one of his biographies we read:

"From every indication, the rationalistic approach to the Jewish question that the Marxism he professed demanded of him in no way expressed his genuine feelings. It even seems that he was in his own way 'obsessed' with that question; he wrote about it almost more than did any other revolutionary."

The comparison with Vrangl is, in fact, instructive: Trotskiy's deputy was Efraim Sklyanskiy, and Vrangl's was Gen Shatilov, who was by no means a German. And there are no known indications of any special sympathy toward Vrangl or attempt to rehabilitate him on the part of German public-affairs writers, while matters with Trotskiy are different: for example, that same Pomerants compares Trotskiy's labor armies with the present-day practice of sending students to harvest potatoes! And this is when Trotskiy himself used an entirely different comparison—with *serfdom*, which he declared perfectly progressive for its time. Or V. Grossman in his novel "Vse techet" [Forever Flowing], debunking both Stalin and Lenin, writes about the "brilliant," "tempestuous, magnificent," "practically genius Trotskiy."<sup>24</sup>

Not only is this example of Pomerants's unsuccessful, many examples can be cited of how both liberal and revolutionary figures of Jewish origin were under the influence of powerful nationalistic feelings. (Of course, it does not follow that this was true of all of them.) For example, Vinaver, one of the most influential leaders of

the Constitutional Democratic (Cadet) Party, turned into an extremely active Zionist after the revolution. Or take the moment at which the Socialist Revolutionary Party was established. One of the leading figures of that time (and later a leader of the French Communist Party, Charles Rappoport, writes in his memoirs:

"Khaim Zhitlovskiy, who together with me founded, in Berne, the Union of Russian Socialist Revolutionaries, from which the future Socialist Revolutionary Party subsequently grew.<sup>25</sup> ... This flaming and sincere patriot tried to persuade me in a friendly way: "Be whatever you like—a socialist, communist, anarchist, and so forth—but first and foremost be a Jew and work among Jews; the Jewish intelligentsia must belong to the Jewish people."

Rappoport's own views were the following: "The Jewish people is the bearer of all the great ideas of unity and human community in history. ... The disappearance of the Jewish people would signify the death of humankind, the final transformation of man into a wild beast."

It is very hard to imagine that the activities of such politicians (whether as Constitutional Democrats, Socialist Revolutionaries, or French Communists) did not reflect their national feelings. The traces of this actually can be seen, for example, in the history of the Constitutional Democratic Party. Thus, the two most famous terrorist acts, which required the greatest concentration of effort by the Militant Organization, were directed against Pleve and Grand Prince Sergey Aleksandrovich, whom rumor accused of anti-Semitism. (Pleve was considered responsible for the Kishinev pogrom; there was even a legend to the effect that he wanted to settle the Jews in ghettos; Grand Prince Sergey Aleksandrovich, as Moscow Governor-General, restored certain restrictions on Jews' residence in Moscow Gubernia that had previously been rescinded.) Zubanov recalled that in a conversation with him, Azev, "trembling with anger and hatred, spoke about Pleve, who he considered responsible for the Kishinev pogrom."<sup>26</sup>

The same thing is indicated by Ratayev. One of the Socialist Democratic Party's leaders, Sletov, tells in his memoirs how the party's leaders in Geneva reacted to the news of Pleve's assassination:

"For several minutes everyone spoke at once. Some men and women went into hysterics. Most of those who were present embraced one another. There were cries of joy all around. I can see N., who was standing a little to one side, as though it were now: he smashed a glass of water on the floor, gritted his teeth, and shouted: "That's for Kishinev!"

Here is another example: The soviet historian M. N. Pokrovskiy relates:

"... I knew that back in 1907 the Constitutional Democratic Party newspaper NOV in Moscow had been subsidized by a kind of syndicate of the Jewish bourgeoisie, which was concerned more than anything else with the

nationality aspect of the matter and, finding that the newspaper did not adequately defend the interests of the Jews, came to see our Bolshevik public-affairs writer M. G. Lunts and proposed that he become editor of the newspaper. He was extremely surprised, saying: What do you mean? Why, that's a Constitutional Democratic newspaper, and I'm a Bolshevik. They told him: That doesn't matter. We think that your attitude toward the nationality question is better defined."

The thought that a political revolution could be an instrument for attaining national goals is not alien to the Jewish mind. Thus, Vitte tells that when he was conducting talks in 1905 in America concerning the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan, he was visited by a "delegation of Jewish bigwigs" that included [Jacob Schiff], the "head of the Jewish financial world in America." They were concerned about the situation of the Jews in Russia. Vitte's words to the effect that "granting them equality all at once would cause more harm than good" "evoked a sharp objection from [Schiff]." Shulgin cites, with a reference to the original source, the version of one of the Jewish participants in that meeting as to what [Schiff's] "objection" was. In his words, [Schiff] said: "...in that case the revolution will create a republic, with the help of which their rights will be obtained."

As a continuation of this story one can cite another, which occurred in 1911-1912. In those years a stormy protest campaign was being waged in America against the fact that, according to Russian laws of that time, the entry of American Jews into Russia was limited. Demands were made that the 1832 Russian-American trade treaty be abrogated. (The treaty actually was abrogated, just as in our time a trade treaty was not signed because the *exit* of Jews from the USSR to the United States was restricted.) Speaking at a rally, the [Food Secretary Herman Loeb] (the aforementioned [Schiff] was chief director of the bank of [Kuhn, Loeb,] and Co.) said that abrogation of the treaty was good, but it would be even better to ship contraband weapons to Russia and send hundreds of instructors:

"Let them teach our boys; let them teach them to kill the oppressors like dogs. Cowardly Russia was forced to give in to the little Japanese. It will also give in to God's Chosen People. ... Money will help us achieve this."

One could cite many more such examples; they are inadequate, of course, to understand just how national feelings influenced Jewish activists, but they show that in many cases such influence indisputably existed.

## 9. The Past and the Present

Why did it happen that it was precisely people from the Jewish milieu who proved to be the nucleus of the "Lesser People" to which it fell to play such a fateful role in the crisis era of our history? We shall not try to uncover the underlying meaning of that phenomenon. Most likely, the foundations are religious, related to belief in the "Chosen People" and its predestined power

over the world. What other people has been reared from generation to generation on such precepts?

"...The Lord your God will lead you into that land which he swore to your fathers Abraham, Isaac and Jacob that he would give you, with large and good cities that you did not build.

"And with houses filled with all manner of goods with which you did not fill them, and with wells dug from stone that you did not dig, and with vineyards and olive trees that you did not plant" (Deuteronomy, VI, 6-11).

"Then the sons of foreigners shall build your walls, and their kings will serve you; for in my wrath I struck you down, but in my goodwill I will be merciful to you.

"And your gates will always be open, and will not be shut either day or night, so that the property of the peoples can be brought to you, and their kings brought to you..

"For the people and the kingdom that will not serve you will perish; and those peoples will be utterly destroyed" (Isaiah, 60, 10-12).

"And foreigners will come and will watch your flocks; and the sons of foreigners will be your farmers the keepers of your vineyards" (Isaiah, 61, 5).

"And kings will be your nursing fathers, and queens your nursing mothers; they will bow down to you with their face to the earth and will lick the dust of your feet" (Isaiah, 49, 23).

Among whom can one encounter such feelings?

"Of the other peoples who have descended from Adam, You said that they are nothing, but like spittle, and you likened the whole multiplicity of them to drops dripping from a vessel" (Third Book of Yezdra, 6, 56).

"If this age has been created for us, why do not receive our legacy with the age? And how long will it take?" (Third Book of Yezdra, 6, 59).<sup>27</sup>

It is precisely this world view of the "Chosen People" that served as the prototype of the ideology of the "Lesser People" in all its historical incarnations (which is especially clearly evident in the case of the Puritans, who even used the same terminology; among the most recent authors, Pomerants uses it).

However, I will point out here only the most obvious reason—nearly 2,000 years of isolation and a suspicious, hostile attitude toward the surrounding world. Of course, the question of the causes and meaning of that isolation arises. For example, such a careful and objective researcher as Max Weber believes that the Jews' isolation was not forced but voluntarily chosen, long before the destruction of the Temple. The Soviet historian S. Lurye agrees with him on this point in his work "Antisemitizm v drevnem mire" [Anti-Semitism in the Ancient World]. He believes that in the age preceding the destruction of the Temple most Jews already lived in the

diaspora, and Judea played the role of a religious and national center (obviously, somewhat similar to present-day Israel).

But in order to avoid getting any deeper into this chain of enigmas, we shall take its final link—dispersion and isolation—as a given. Twenty centuries have been lived among alien peoples in complete isolation from all influences of the external world, which is perceived as "tref" and a source of infection and sin. There are well-known statements in the Talmud and in commentaries on it that explain from various viewpoints that a gentile (akum) must not be regarded as a human being, and that for this reason there should be no fear of defiling their graves; that in the event that a gentile servant dies, one should not offer consolation to his master but express the hope that God will replace his loss, as in the case of the death of livestock; that for the same reason, marriage with a gentile has no force; that his seed is the same as the seed of livestock, and that gentiles are animals with human faces, etc., etc. For thousands of years, each year on the holiday of Purim Jews have celebrated their destruction of 75,000 of their enemies, including women and children, as written in the book of Esther. And it is celebrated to this day—in Israel a merry carnival is held on this occasion! For comparison, let us imagine that St. Bartholomew's night were celebrated annually! Let me cite, finally, a source that can in no way be suspected of hostility toward the Jews: In his book about Reuchlin, Max Brod, the well-known Zionist, friend of Franz Kafka and executor of his estate, reports a Jewish prayer he knows against gentiles that calls on God to destroy their hopes, scatter them, cast them down, and *destroy them in a moment* and "in our days." One can imagine what an indelible trace must be left on the soul by such upbringing, begun in childhood, and by a life lived according to such canons—and by this sort of thing from generation to generation for 20 centuries!

One can attempt to recreate from tiny features scattered among many sources the sort of attitude toward the surrounding population that can grow up on this soil. For example, in his diary the young Lassalle, who repeatedly expresses indignation over the oppressed state of the Jews, says that he dreams of taking over their leadership with weapon in hand. In connection with the rumors about ritual killings, he writes:

"The fact that such accusations are brought forward in every corner of the world, I think, portends that the time will soon come when we really do liberate ourselves through the shedding of Christian blood. The game has begun, and it is up to the players."

If one further takes into account the malice and rancor that are evident on every page of this diary, it is easy to imagine that such experiences must have left a trace to last a lifetime.

Or Martov (Tsederbaum), recalling the fear he experienced at the age of three while expecting a pogrom (the

mob was broken up by the Cossacks before it reached the Tsederbaums' house), reflects: "Would I be what I have become if Russian reality had not hastened to impress its coarse fingers on my malleable young soul, and under the veil of the pity that had been aroused in my child's heart, to carefully sow the seeds of a saving hatred?"

One can find more overt evidence in literature. For example, "saving hatred" is widely diffused throughout the verse of Kh. Byalik, a Jewish poet living in Russia:

Let the unavenged blood seep into hell,  
And let it dig in the darkness and corrode like  
poison,  
Eating away the pillars of the universe.  
"Let our grief become  
like a bone to a vicious dog,  
Stuck, insatiable, in the throat of the world;  
And let it water the skies, and the whole surface of  
the earth,  
And the steppe, and the forest with burning  
venom,  
And let it live with us, and bloom,  
and wither,—  
And blossom even more powerful";  
"That is why, o man, I have shut  
Your moaning up in your throat;  
Do not defile, as they do, the sacred pain of your  
Sacred suffering with the water of sobbing,  
But husband it untouched.  
Nurse it, hold it more dearly than a treasure  
And build a castle to it in your breast,  
Build a fortress out of the hatred of hell—  
And feed it not but with the venom  
Of your insults and wounds, and wait,  
And the nurtured seed will grow,  
And will yield a fruit burning and full of venom—  
And on the terrible day,  
when the time is accomplished,  
Pluck it and throw it into the people!"  
"From the abyss of Avadonn, raise the song  
of Devastation,  
Which, like your spirit, is black from the fire,  
And scatter among the peoples,  
and poison everything in their cursed home  
With the suffocation of smoke;  
And let everyone sow the grain fields with the  
seed of collapse  
Everywhere he treads and goes.  
If only the purest of the lilies touches their garden,  
It will blacken and wither;  
And if your gaze falls on the marble  
of their statues—  
They will crack, broken in two;  
And take with you a laughter  
bitter and cursed,  
In order to destroy everything living."

Contempt and disgust for Russians, Ukrainians and Poles as creatures of a lower type, as subhumans, can be felt in practically every story of I. Babel's "Konarmiya" [Red Cavalry]. Only in the image of the Jew in that book

does one encounter a full-fledged human being who evokes the author's respect and sympathy. He depicts with unconcealed revulsion a Russian father's slashing up his son, and then a second son's slashing up the father ("A Letter"); and a Ukrainian's admitting that he does not like to kill by shooting but prefers to kill by stomping to death ("The Painting of Matvey Rodionych Pavlichenko"). But the story "The Rabbi's Son" is particularly characteristic. The author is riding in a train along with the retreating army. "And monstrous Russia, unreal-seeming as a flock of clothed lice, was tramping in bast shoes along both sides of the train cars. Typhus-ridden muzhiks were rolling before them the familiar coffin of a soldier's death. They would jump up onto the platforms of our train and then fall away, knocked off by gun butts."

But here the author sees a familiar face: "And I recognized Ilya, the son of the Zhitomir rabbi." (The author had stopped by the rabbi's home on the evening before the sabbath—although he is a political worker in the Red Army—and had noticed "a young man with the face of Spinoza," in the story "Gidali.") He, of course, is immediately taken into the editorial staff's train car. He is sick with typhus and breathing his last, and he dies right there in the train. "He died, the last prince, amid his verse, phylacteries and foot wrappings. We buried him at a forgotten station. And I, barely containing the tempest of my imagination in my ancient body, I received my brother's last sigh."

A cold alienation from the surrounding people is often conveyed by the poetry of E. Bagritskiy, and extreme hatred actually bursts out in his poem "February." The protagonist becomes an assistant to a commissar after the revolution:

My Judaic pride sang  
Like a string stretched to the limit...  
I would have given a lot, for my forebear,  
In his long smock and fox-fur cap,  
From beneath which, his forelocks fell  
In a gray spiral, and the dandruff flew  
In clouds over his squared-off beard...  
For that forebear to have recognized his descendant  
In the strapping fellow standing like a tower  
Above the flying headlights and bayonets  
Of the truck that was shaking the midnight.

Once during an attack on a suspicious house the author recognizes a girl he had seen back before the revolution. She had been a high-school student and had often walked past him, and he had sighed, not daring to approach her. Once he had attempted to say something, but she had driven him away. Now she has become a prostitute.

I—Well? You recognize me?  
Silence.  
What do you get for a session?  
And quietly,  
Without parting her lips, she said:

"Pity me! There's no need for money."  
I shoved her the money,  
I tumbled down,  
Without taking off my boots, or my holster,  
Without unbuttoning my shirt.  
I'm taking you for the fact that my age  
Has been too timid, for the fact that I've been shy,  
For the shame of my homeless forebears,  
For the chirping of a bird that chances to fly by!  
I'm taking you as revenge on the world,  
From which I couldn't get away!  
Take me into your empty bowels,  
Where the grass cannot take hold,  
Maybe my nocturnal seed  
Will fertilize your wilderness.

It seems to be that it is time to revise the traditional view of the novels of Ilf and Petrov. They by no means represent the amusing mockery of the vulgarity of the NEP era. In a mild but clear form, they develop a concept that, in my view, constitutes their main content. Their action takes place, as it were, amidst the wreckage of old Russian life; members of the gentry, priests and members of the intelligentsia figure in their books, and they are all portrayed as some sort of absurd and dirty animals that evoke disgust and revulsion. They are not even ascribed any traits for which one might condemn a person. Instead of that, a stamp is placed on them whose aim is to either diminish or destroy the sense of having anything in common with them as human beings, and to alienate the reader from them in a purely physical sense: one is depicted naked with a drooping fat belly covered with red hair; it is said of another that he is beaten for not turning off the light in the bathroom. Such creatures arouse no compassion, and destroying them is something like a merry hunt where you breathe deeply and fully, your face flushes, and nothing spoils your pleasure.

These feelings, borne by yet another generation, have come down to our days and often burst out in the songs of bards, poems, novels and memoirs. A stormy explosion of the same emotions can be seen in the works of recent emigrants. Here, for example, is a poem by D. Markish, who recently emigrated, which has published in Israel in the magazine SION:

I speak of us, sons of Sinai,  
Of us, whose look has been heated with a different warmth.  
Let the Russian people follow a different path,  
What do we care for their Slavic business.  
We have eaten their bread, but paid with blood.  
The accounts have been kept, but not summed up.  
We will avenge ourselves—with flowers at the bedside  
Of their northern land.  
When the varnish sample fades,  
When the din of the red cries dies down,  
We will stand by the birch coffin  
In an honor guard. ...

In an article published in another Israeli magazine we read:

"For the 'god-bearing' people a vast, conformist country is not enough; it also needs the pearl, i.e., the Holy Land. ... It wants this holiness that is inaccessible to it, and although it, sunk in contempt for itself and for everyone else, does not even know what to do with this holiness, because in its pagan Christian understanding holiness is not living and cannot sanctify the world, it still awaits its hour as a petty tyrant-hangman. And in its dark instinct this has given rise to and continues to give rise to monstrous outbursts of hatred for Israel—the bearer of living holiness."<sup>28</sup>

As we approach our conclusion, let us quote an excerpt from a magazine published in Russian in Toronto:

"Do not remain silent, Lord, stand up for your chosen ones, not for our sake, but for the sake of your vow to our fathers Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. Loose upon them the Chinese, so that they may glorify Mao and work for him as we have for them. Lord, let the Chinese destroy all Russian schools and rob them, and let the Russians be forcibly Sinofied, and let them forget their language and their writing. And let the Chinese organize for them a Russian National Okrug in the Himalayas."

One often hears the following argument: Many of Jews' actions and feelings can be understood if one recalls how much they have experienced. For example, some of Byalik's poems were written under the impression of the pogroms, D. Markish's father was shot under Stalin in the "Zionists' trial," while others recall the Pale of Settlement, quotas, or certain other, later offenses. Here it must be stressed once again that in this work we do not intend to condemn, accuse or exonerate anyone. Even raising such a question hardly makes sense: does the humiliation of the Germans under the Peace of Versailles justify National Socialism? We would merely like to get an idea of what took place in our country, which social and national factors influenced its history, and how.

Starting with the postreform years of the 1860s in Russia, the word "revolution" was on everyone's lips. This was a clear sign of an impending crisis. And as another sign of it, the "Lesser People" started to be formed with all of its characteristic features. A new type of person was created, like the young person (Tikhomirov tells about him) who stated with pride, "I am a renegade," or like Ishutin's group known as Hell, whose program stated: "To replace personal joys with hatred and malice, and to learn to live with that." But one can understand what an agonizing operation this was, how hard it was to tear a person away from his roots and turn him inside out, as it were, and how cautiously one had to go about this, indoctrinating him in the new teaching step by step and overwhelming him with the force of authorities. And how much simpler it all was with the mass of Jewish young people, who not only were not bound to this country by common roots and a common people, but who from their very childhood had learned

hostility to precisely those roots; wherein a hostile alienation from the spiritual foundations of the surrounding world was not acquired from books and papers, but was absorbed from early childhood, often quite unconsciously, from tones in adults' conversations, from critical remarks overheard by chance and remembered for all one's life! And although most likely by no means all Jews felt the feelings reflected in the excerpts cited above, it was precisely the school that was suffused with them that intruded itself into life with unprecedented energy and that was able to exert an especially powerful and unhealthy influence on it.

It must be admitted that the crisis in our history took place at an absolutely unique moment. If at the moment that it broke out Jews had been living the sort of isolated way of life that they had, for example, in France during the Great Revolution, they would not have exerted a significant influence on its course. On the other hand, if the life of the small-town communities had started to break up much earlier, some ties might have had time to take hold between Jews and the rest of the population, and the alienation caused by 2,000 years of isolation might not have been so strong. Who knows how many generations are needed to erase the traces of a 2,000-year-old tradition? But we were scarcely given a single year; the influx of Jews into the terrorist movement coincided almost precisely with the "emancipation," with the beginning of the breakup of the Jewish communities, and with their emergence from isolation. Pinkhus Akselrod, Gesya Gelfman and many other terrorist leaders came from strata of the Jewry where it was impossible to hear any Russian spoken at all. They set off with bundles over their shoulders to study "goyish science" and soon found themselves among the leaders of the movement. The coincidence of two crises had a decisive influence on the nature of that era. Here is how it was seen by a Jewish observer (from that the aforementioned book, "Russia and the Jews"):

"And of course, it was no accident that Jews, who are so inclined to rationalistic thinking, who for the most part were not connected by any traditions with their surrounding world, and who often saw in those traditions trash that was not only useless but even harmful for the development of humanity, found themselves in such proximity to those revolutionary ideas."

And as a predictable result:

"We were struck by what we expected least of all to encounter in the Jewish milieu: cruelty, sadism and acts of violence that were seemingly alien to a people that was remote from a physically militant life; people who only yesterday had not known how to use a gun found themselves today among the directors of the cutthroats."

This remarkable book ends with the words:

"One of two things: either foreigners without political rights, or Russian citizenship based on love for the homeland. There is no third possibility."

But a school has turned up that has chosen precisely a third path, which from the author's viewpoint is "impossible." Not only dislike for the homeland, but complete alienation and active hostility toward its spiritual foundations; not only the repudiation of political rights, but the concentration of all one's will and efforts to influence the country's life. Such a combination has proven strikingly effective; it has created a "Lesser People" that in its effectiveness has surpassed all other versions of that phenomenon that have appeared in History.

#### Footnotes

1. We shall provide the briefest information about the authors of the works that will be discussed here. G. Pomerants is a Soviet specialist in Eastern studies. He was arrested in Stalin's times. He has set forth his historical and social views in collections of works that have been distributed in samizdat and subsequently published in the West, as well as in lectures and reports at seminars. Several of his articles have appeared in the West in magazines published in Russian.

2. A. Amalrik studied in Moscow State University's Division of History and subsequently changed occupations a number of times. Soon after publication of the work mentioned above, he was arrested and sentenced to two years, and after he had served his term, he was sentenced to another term by the camp court. After a statement explaining his views he was pardoned and emigrated.

3. B. Shragin is a candidate of philosophical sciences. He was a member of the CPSU and even a secretary of his organization. He has published a number of articles in samizdat and abroad under various pseudonyms. For signing several letters of protest, he was expelled from the party and emigrated. In emigration he has contributed to a collection titled "Samosoznaniye" [Awareness] and written for emigre magazines.

4. A. Yanov is a candidate of philosophical sciences and journalist. Prior to emigrating he was a member of the CPSU and favorite author of the magazine MOLODOY KOMMUNIST. Since emigrating he has been a professor at a university in New York and a Sovietologist. He has published a large number of works in English- and Russian-language magazines and newspapers.

5. R. Pipes (Pipes or Pipesh) is from Poland, and American historian. He is considered a leading specialist on Russian history and a Sovietologist. An extremely close adviser of former President Reagan.

6. In contrast to Berdyayev and those who have repeated the idea of the authors cited above, present-day professional historians evidently do not support this concept. The extensive literature devoted to this question agrees in acknowledging that even in the 16th century the concept of "Moscow as the Third Rome" had no influence on the Moscow tsarist regime's political thought, and that its last traces manifested themselves in the 17th century.



7. We preserve the spelling of the original, although the reference is evidently to K. Jung's concept of the archetype.

8. This observation was reported to me long ago by A. I. Lapin.

9. A. Krasnov (A. A. Levitin) is a church figure who in the 1920s took an active part in the "renewalists" movement aimed at splitting the Orthodox Church: he was secretary to the movement's leader A. Vvedenskiy. After the "renewalists" movement had come to naught, he returned to the Orthodox Church. In connection with his church activities, he was arrested. In the 1960s he protested against the mass closing of churches under Khrushchev. He was arrested again and sentenced to three years. After serving his term, he emigrated. In several works he develops the idea of the joining together of Christianity and socialism.

10. L. Plyushch is a Marxist but has been critical of certain aspects of Soviet life. He wrote several works in that spirit and was a member of the "Initiative Group for the Defense of Human Rights." He was arrested, deemed insane and put in a psychiatric hospital. His arrest aroused a broad movement in the West. (...) Plyushch was freed, emigrated, and continues to develop his Marxist views in the West.

11. It is interesting that in this regard the author himself actually lags behind the development of Western thought. Pomerant's "Eurocentric" viewpoint on the West has for the most part been overcome, is regarded as the reflection of 19th-century imperialism, and would most likely be rejected if any attempt were made to apply it to some African country.

12. General MacArthur was the commander in chief of the U.S. occupying forces in Japan.

13. Although, it would seem to be an unlikely sort of gendarme, if it is constantly being beaten. Evidently what is reflected here is a desire to wound Russia simultaneously with two arguments, albeit mutually contradictory ones.

14. Yet even more recherche problems are debated: the right to free choice of the month of emigration (three months in advance, or later), the right to free choice of invitation (whether to emigrate on the basis of an American or an Israeli invitation).

15. A. D. Sinyavskiy published several short stories and novellas in the 1960s in the West under the pseudonym Abram Terts. He was tried and sentenced to five years. He served four years, was pardoned and emigrated. In Paris he was a founder of the magazine KONTINENT. He has published several books, of which "Progulki s Pushkinym" [Strolls With Pushkin] enjoyed a scandalous success (a typical review referred to it as "The Strolls of a Boor With Pushkin"). He currently publishes the magazine SINTAKSIS in Paris.

16. V. Belotserkovskiy is a recent emigrant, contributor to the collection "Demokraticheskiye alternativy" [Democratic Alternatives], and author of public-affairs works. He lives in the FRG and has had cases initiated against certain other public-affairs essayists on charges of anti-Semitism (there is a law on the matter in the FRG), but has not won them.

17. M. G. Meyerson-Alsenov is a historian by education. He has published several works in samizdat and in the West (often under pseudonyms). He emigrated and graduated from the seminary in the United States. He has been ordained in the American Orthodox Church.

18. I beg your pardon for an omission in the quotation, but I simply cannot bring myself to write the foul words used by the author.

19. It is precisely to these emotions, and not to elementary ignorance, that one must probably attribute the crude logical and factual errors to which we called attention in the second section. It is unlikely, for example, that Yanov believed that Belinskiy was a "classic representative of Slavophilism." This is more likely a manifestation of a disdainful revulsion according to which both the Slavophiles and the Westernizers are equally loathsome.

20. These are not empty words—his book is suffused with a revulsion toward Russia and Russians that spews forth from practically every page.

21. Of course, authors living here among Russians cannot always permit themselves such strong expressions as in the works of emigre literature that have been cited in the preceding sections. The usual form is such that one could argue: that is a drunkard, a hooligan, an obtuse bureaucrat in general, and not just a Russian. And the names are native Russian names that are nowadays even rarely encountered. Yet Galich (Ginzburg) should be far more familiar with the type of the go-getting playwright and screen writer (by no means necessarily such an indigenous Russian) who knows how to worm his way into fashion and has received a prize for scenarios for a film about Chekists and acquired fame for songs with dissident air. But for some reason this image does not attract him.

22. It seems that his name should be pronounced as Azev, and not Azef.

23. A recent book by two British journalists represents a rather candid attempt to obscure precisely this aspect of the Ekaterinburg tragedy. But in another connection we learn from it that inscriptions in Yiddish were found on the walls of the building where the execution of the tsarist family took place!

24. V. S. Grossman was a Soviet writer and public-affairs essayist. Together with Erenburg and Zalsavskiy, he was a leading propagandist in Stalinist times. At the same time, in secret, he wrote several books, which were published after his death. In one of them, "Vse techet,"

he harshly denounces Stalin and Lenin and comments very sympathetically on Trotskiy (it is from there that the quotation cited above is taken). In the same book he asserts that all Russian history is the history of slavery and that the Russian soul is a thousand-year-old slave that has perverted freedom-loving ideas imported from the West (although in his official wartime public-affairs writing he spoke with an entirely different language: he saw in the Russian soul "an indestructible, furious force," the "iron force of Avvakum, which can be neither bent nor broken," etc.). Thus, V. Grossman may be regarded as a forerunner of the school that is the object of examination in the present work.

25. The author somewhat exaggerates: the Socialist Revolutionary Party grew out of the merger of several organizations, including the aforementioned "Union."

26. In Azev's fate there is, in general, a great deal that is enigmatic. Why was he not killed following his exposure, when the party executed people for much lesser deeds, including mere attempts at betrayal (for example,

Gapon)? It was believed that he went into hiding, but Burtsev found him and interviewed him! Azev died a natural death in 1918. It is hard to think of any other explanation than the fact that the party leadership knew about his collaboration with the authorities and sanctioned in on certain terms.

27. The Third Book of Yezdra is not part of the Jewish canon: it belongs to the Jewish apocalyptic school. It is believed that the beginning and end are interpolations by a Christian transcriber, and that the central part (from which the quotations have been taken) reproduces the original Judaic material (see, for example, J. Hastings' "Biblical Dictionary").

28. The author evidently senses absolutely no irony in the fact that he is accusing someone else of "outbursts of hatred," although he could hardly be surpassed in this regard.

COPYRIGHT: "Nash sovremennik", 1989.