Concerning the Union of the Word Incarnate

Secundo quaeritur utrum in christo sit una tantum hypostasis vel suppositum, aut duo. Et videtur quod non sit una tantum.	Article 2: Whether there is only one hypostasis or suppositum in Christ or two? It seems that there is not only one:
Dicit enim Augustinus in libro Contra Felicianum: in mediatore Dei et hominum, aliud Dei Filius, aliud hominis filius fuit. Sed nihil quod est unum supposito vel secundum hypostasim, est aliud et aliud. ergo in Christo non est unum suppositum tantum vel hypostasis.	Objection 1: For, Augustine says in the book "Against Felicianus" (c.xi) "In the mediator of God and of man, the Son of God was one thing and the son of man another". But, nothing that is one in suppositum or according to hypostasis differs from one another. Therefore, in Christ there is not only one suppositum or hypostasis.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in libro De Trin. quod in Christo utrumque est Deus propter suscipientem Deum, et utrumque homo propter susceptum hominem. Sed nihil quod est unum supposito vel secundum hypostasim est duo, ut possit dici utrumque. Ergo in Christo non est una hypostasis tantum sive suppositum.	Objection 2: Further, Augustine says in the book On the Trinity that each [of the natures] in Christ is God on account of God who receives, and each is man on account of the man received. But nothing that is one in suppositum or according to the hypostasis is two, in such a way that it may be called both. Therefore, there is not only one hypostasis or suppositum in Christ.
Praeterea, natura humana in Christo quaedam substantia est. Sed non fuit substantia universalis, quia substantia universalis non est extra animam. Ergo fuit substantia particularis. sed substantia particularis est hypostasis. Ergo in Christo humana natura fuit hypostasis. Sed humana natura in Christo est aliquid praeter hypostasim verbi Dei. Ergo in Christo est aliqua hypostasis praeter hypostasim verbi Dei; et ita in Christo sunt plures hypostases.	Objection 3: Further, the human nature in Christ is a certain substance. But, it was not a universal substance, because a universal substance does not exist beyond the mind. Therefore, it was a particular substance. But, a particular substance is a hypostasis. Therefore, the human nature in Christ was a hypostasis. But the human nature in Christ is something beyond the hypostasis of the Word of God; and thus there are many hypostases in Christ.
Praeterea, hoc nomen homo univoce dicitur de Christo et de Petro. Sed cum dicitur de Petro, nihil aliud importat quam aliquid compositum ex anima rationali et corpore. Ergo neque etiam cum dicitur de Christo. Sed praeter animam et corpus est in Christo hypostasis vel suppositum verbi Dei. Ergo in Christo aliud est hypostasis vel suppositum humanae naturae, et aliud hypostasis vel suppositum divinae. Et sic in Christo non est una tantum hypostasis vel suppositum.	Objection 4: Further, this name "man" is said univocally of Christ and of Peter. But when it is said of Peter it entails nothing other than something composed of a rational soul and a body. Therefore, it also [entails this] when it is said of Christ. But, beyond the soul and the body, in Christ there is the hypostasis or the suppositum of the Word of God. Therefore, in Christ the hypostasis or suppositum of the human nature is one thing and that of the divine nature is another. And, thus, there is not only one hypostasis or suppositum in Christ.
Praeterea, nihil infinitum contineri potest sub natura finita. Sed suppositum vel hypostasis Dei verbi infinitatem habet. Ergo non potest contineri sub natura humana, quae est finita. Sed omne suppositum continetur sub natura cuius est suppositum. Ergo suppositum quod est verbum Dei non potest esse suppositum humanae naturae, sed necesse est esse aliquod aliud suppositum. Ergo in Christo est aliquod aliud suppositum praeter suppositum quod est verbum Dei. Sunt ergo in Christo duo supposita vel hypostases.	Objection 5: Further, nothing infinite can be contained under a finite nature. But, the suppositum or hypostasis of the Word of God possesses infinity. Therefore, it cannot be contained under a human nature which is finite. But, every suppositum is contained under that nature whose suppositum it is. Therefore, the suppositum which is the Word of God cannot be the suppositum of a human nature, but there must be some other suppositum. Therefore, there is some other suppositum in Christ beyond the suppositum which is the Word of God. Therefore, there are two supposita or hypostases in Christ.
Praeterea, sicut se habet genus ad speciem, ita se habet species ad individua. Sed eadem species non potest esse in diversis generibus. Ergo unum individuum non potest esse in diversis speciebus. Sed hypostasis est substantia individua, et similiter suppositum. Ergo non potest esse una hypostasis vel suppositum humanae naturae et divinae, quae non sunt unius speciei.	Objection 6: Further, just as a genus is related to the species, so the species is related to an individual. But, the same species cannot be in different genera. Therefore, one individual cannot be in diverse species. But, the hypostasis is an individual substance, as is the suppositum. Therefore, there cannot be one hypostasis or suppositum of the human and divine natures, as these do not [belong to] one species.
Praeterea, sicut in trinitate est una natura in tribus personis, ita in Christo sunt duae naturae in una persona. Sed tres personae sunt unum propter unitatem naturae, secundum illud Ioan. x: Ego et Pater unum sumus. Ergo Christus est duo propter dualitatem naturarum. Sed de nullo quod est unum supposito vel secundum hypostasim, potest dici quod sint duo. Ergo Christus non est unum supposito vel secundum hypostasim.	Objection 7: Further, just as there is one nature in three persons in the Trinity, so there are two natures in one person in Christ. But, the three persons are one on account of a unity of nature, according to John 10:30: "I and the Father are one". Therefore, Christ is two on account of the duality of natures. But, nothing which is one in [its] suppositum or according to [its] hypostasis, can be called two. Therefore, Christ is not one in [his] suppositum or according to [his] hypostasis.
Praeterea, Christus secundum quod est Filius Dei, habet aliquid commune cum Patre; secundum autem quod dicitur filius hominis, nihil habet cum Patre commune. Ergo in Christo aliud est Filius Dei, et aliud filius hominis; non est ergo unum supposito vel secundum hypostasim.	Objection 8: Further, Christ has something in common with the Father insofar as he is the Son of God, and insofar as he is the son of man, he has nothing in common with the Father. Therefore, in Christ the Son of God is one thing and the son of man is another, so he is not one in suppositum or according to the hypostasis.
Praeterea, id quod est de se incommunicabile non videtur de se posse fieri communicabile; sicut nec quod de se est impossibile, potest fieri possibile, ut Commentator dicit in x Metaph. Sed humana natura secundum quod est in Christo, de se est incommunicabilis, cum sit aliquid particulare. Ergo non potest communicari supposito divinae naturae: non ergo potest esse idem suppositum humanae naturae et divinae.	Objection 9: Further, what is incommunicable of itself [i.e. by virtue of its nature] does not seem to be able to become communicable by itself. Just as, what is impossible of itself cannot become possible, as the Averroes says in X Metaph. But, insofar as the human nature is in Christ it is incommunicable of itself, since it is something particular. Therefore, it cannot be communicated to the suppositum of the divine nature; so the suppositum of the human and of the divine nature cannot be the same.
Praeterea, unumquodque resolvitur in ea ex quibus consistit. Si ergo detur per impossibile quod verbum Dei deponeret humanam naturam; iam humana natura haberet hypostasim propriam et suppositum. Ergo et adhuc unita habet propriam hypostasim et suppositum; non ergo est ibi una hypostasis tantum, vel suppositum unum.	Objection 10: Each thing is resolved into those things out of which it consists. Therefore, if it were granted, through some impossibility, that the Word of God set aside the human nature, then the human nature would have its own hypostasis and suppositum. Therefore, in the united state [i.e. in the hypostatic union] it has its own hypostasis or suppositum united. Therefore, there is not only one hypostasis or one suppositum here. (Translator's note: The argument of the objection is that if there would be two supposita when the natures are seperated, then there are two when they are united. This is relevant to the medieval debate about the ontological status Christ's human nature would have if God disolved the hypostatic union at some time after uniting the human nature to the Divine nature).
Praeterea, non magis dependet natura a supposito quam suppositum a natura. Sed non potuit a verbo Dei assumi suppositum humanae naturae, quin assumeretur ipsa natura humana. Ergo neque etiam potuit assumi natura humana, quin assumeretur suppositum humanae naturae. Sed assumens non est assumptum. Ergo suppositum humanae naturae non est ipsum suppositum verbi Dei; ergo in Christo sunt duo supposita.	Objection 11: Further, nature is not more dependent upon the suppositum than the suppositum is upon the nature. But the suppositum of the human nature could not be assumed by the Word of God, without the human nature itself being assumed. Therefore, neither could [the Word of God] assume human nature without also assuming the suppositum of the human nature. But, the thing assuming is not the assumed (Cf. Leonine text of Quodlibet IX,1 for references on this statement). Therefore, the suppositum of the human nature is not the suppositum of the Word of God, and therefore there are two supposita in Christ.
Praeterea, anima et corpus in Christo non fuerunt minoris virtutis aut dignitatis quam in nobis. Sed in nobis ex compositione animae et corporis constituitur hypostasis sive suppositum. Ergo et in Christo. Non autem suppositum vel hypostasis verbi Dei, quod est aeternum cum praedicta unio sit temporalis. Ergo in Christo sunt duo supposita vel duae hypostases.	Objection 12: The soul and the body were not less powerful or dignified in Christ than in us. But, in us a hypostasis or suppositum is constituted from the composition of the soul and the body. Therefore, this also happens in Christ. But, the suppositum or hypostasis of the Word of God, which is eternal, [cannot be so constituted] since the aforesaid union is temporal. Therefore, there are two supposita or hypostases in Christ.
Praeterea, in Christo sunt tres substantiae: corpus, anima et Deus. Sed anima non est suppositum corporis. Ergo Deus non est suppositum humanae naturae.	Objection 13: Further, there are three substances in Christ: body, soul and God. But the soul is not the suppositum of the body. Therefore, God is not the suppositum of the human nature.
Praeterea, secundum Porphyrium, individuationem facit aggregatio proprietatum quas impossibile est in alio reperiri. Sed in Christo fuit aggregatio proprietatum pertinentium ad humanam naturam, quae non possunt in alio reperiri. Ergo fecerunt individuationem verbi Dei, quod non est susceptivum accidentium. Ergo in Christo est aliud individuum, sive suppositum, quam suppositum verbi Dei; sunt ergo in Christo duo supposita.	Objection 14: Further, according to Porphyry, an aggregation of properties which cannot be found in another thing produces individuation. But, in Christ there was an aggregation of properties pertaining to the human nature, which cannot be found in another. Therefore, they would have produced the individuation of the Word of God which does not receive accidents. Therefore, there is another individual or suppositum in Christ than the Word of God. Therefore, there are two supposita in Christ.
Praeterea, in his quorum non est aliqua proportio, non potest fieri unum. Sed divinae naturae, quae est infinita, nulla est proportio ad humanam, quae est finita. Ergo non potest ex duabus naturis fieri una hypostasis, vel unum suppositum.	Objection 15: Further, those things without some proportional relationship are not able to be one. But, there is no proportion [between] the divine nature, which is infinite, and the human, which is finite. Therefore, one hypostasis or one suppositum cannot be brought about from two natures.
Praeterea, generatio terminatur ad suppositum; particulare enim est quod generatur. Sed in Christo est duplex nativitas, temporalis scilicet et aeterna. Ergo in Christo est duplex suppositum, et non unum tantum.	Objection 16: Further, generation is terminated in the suppositum; for a particular is what is generated. But, there is a two-fold nativity in Christ. Namely, a temporal and an eternal one. Therefore there is a two-fold suppositum in Christ, and not merely one.
Praeterea, verbum Dei assumpsit corpus et animam, non quidem ut separata, sed ut unita. Sed suppositum humanae naturae nihil est aliud quam anima et corpus prout sunt unita. Ergo in Christo est aliud suppositum praeter suppositum verbi Dei.	Objection 17: Further, the Word of God assumed a body and a soul not, indeed, as separated, but as united. But the suppositum of the human nature is nothing other than the soul and the body as united. Therefore, in Christ there is another suppositum beyond the suppositum of the Word of God.
Praeterea, non potest esse idem simplex et compositum. Sed suppositum humanae naturae est compositum, cum humana natura sit composita; non enim suppositum potest esse simplicius quam natura cuius est suppositum. Ergo, cum suppositum divinae naturae sit simplex, erit in Christo aliud suppositum praeter suppositum divinae naturae.	Objection 18: The same thing cannot be both simple and composite. But, the suppositum of the human nature is composite, since the human nature is composed. For the suppositum cannot be more simple than the nature whose suppositum it is. Therefore, since the suppositum of the Divine nature is simple, there will be a suppositum in Christ besides the suppositum of the divine nature.
Sed contra. Est quod Damascenus dicit in iii libro: in Domino Iesu Christo unam hypostasim cognoscimus.	To the contrary, 1. is what Damascene says in book III On the Orthodox Faith: "we know that there is one hypostasis in the Lord Jesus Christ."
Praeterea, eorum quae differunt supposito, unum de altero non praedicatur. Si ergo in Christo esset aliud suppositum hominis et aliud Dei, non posset dici quod homo sit Deus, vel Deus est homo; quod est erroneum. Non ergo in Christo est aliud suppositum Dei et aliud hominis.	2. Further, [in] those things which differ in suppositum, one is not predicated of another. Therefore, if the suppositum of man and of God were different in Christ, it could not be said that man is God or that God is man; which is an error. Therefore, the suppositum of man and God do not differ in Christ.
Respondeo. Dicendum quod quidam volentes evitare Nestorii haeresim, ponentis in Christo duas personas, posuerunt in Christo unam personam, sed duas hypostases, sive duo supposita. Dicentes hunc hominem, demonstrato Christo, esse suppositum et hypostasim humanae naturae, non autem divinae; quia per hoc quod dicitur hic homo, nihil aliud importatur quam quaedam particularis substantia ex anima et carne composita. Pertinere tamen dicebant humanam hypostasim vel suppositum ad personam verbi, propter hoc quod est a verbo assumpta. Et haec est opinio, quae ponitur prima in vii distinctione iii Sentent.	I answer that, certain men wanting to avoid the heresy of Nestorius, i.e. the heresy of positing two persons in Christ, posited one person in Christ, but two hypostases or supposita. They said that this man, pointing to Christ, is a suppositum and a hypostasis of the human nature, but not of the divine nature; because of the fact that he is called "this man", nothing else is entailed than a certain particular substance composed from a soul and flesh. Yet, they say that a human hypostasis or suppositum pertains to the person of the Word, because it was assumed by the Word. And this is the opinion which is posited first in III Sentences, distinction VII.
Sed qui hoc posuerunt, primo quidem, vocem propriam ignoraverunt. Hypostasis enim nihil aliud est quam individua substantia, quae etiam significatur nomine suppositi. Dicit autem Boetius, in libro De Duabus Naturis, quod persona est individua substantia rationalis naturae. Sic ergo patet quod non potest esse hypostasis rationalis naturae, quin sit persona. Manifestum est autem naturam humanam esse rationalem naturam; unde, si in Christo sit propria hypostasis humanae naturae vel proprium suppositum praeter hypostasim vel suppositum verbi Dei, consequens est quod sit propria persona humanae naturae in Christo praeter hypostasim verbi. Et sic non differt haec positio a positione Nestorii.	But, in the first place, those who posited this were ignorant of the proper word. For a hypostasis is nothing other than an individual substance, which is also signified by the name "suppositum". Now Boethius says, in the book On the Two Natures that a person is an individual substance of a rational nature. So, therefore, it is obvious that it there cannot be a hypostasis of a rational nature, unless it is a person. Now it is clear that the human nature is a rational nature; hence, if there is a proper hypostasis or proper suppositum of the human nature in Christ beyond the hypostasis or suppositum of the Word of God, it follows that there is a proper person of the human nature in Christ beyond the hypostasis of the Word. And, thus, this position would not differ from the position of Nestorius.
Secundo, quia si detur quod persona addat supra hypostasim in rationali natura proprietatem aliquam ad dignitatem pertinentem, sicut dicuntur aliqui personatum habere quasi aliquam dignitatem habentes, sequetur quod unio humanae naturae ad verbum non sit facta nisi in aliquo accidentali, idest in aliqua proprietate ad dignitatem pertinente: quod etiam Nestorius posuit. Unde sciendum est, hoc esse haeresim damnatam in quinto Concilio apud Constantinopolim celebrato, ubi sic legitur: si quis introducere conatur in mysterio Christi duas subsistentias, seu duas personas in unam personam dici secundum dignitatem et honorem et adorationem, sicut Theodorus et Nestorius insanientes conscripserunt; talis anathema sit. Nec enim abiectionem personae vel subsistentiae suscipit Sancta Trinitas incarnato uno de Sancta Trinitate Dei verbo.	Second, because if it is granted that the person adds to a hypostasis in a rational nature some property pertaining to dignity, just as all wearing a mask are said to be like one having some dignity, it would follow that the union of the human nature to the Word was not brought about except in something accidental, namely, in some property pertaining to dignity: which is what Nestorius also posited. (St. Thomas' account of person here relies on the traditional etymology of person given by Boethius cit. loc.) Hence, it must be known that this heresy was condemned in the fifth Council carried out at Constantinople where it is read (in the following words): "If anyone tries to introduce two subsistences into the mystery of Christ or to argue that two persons are said to be one person according to dignity and honor and adoration, as Theodorus and Nestorius wrote foolishly; let them be anathema. For the Holy Trinity did not receive a person or subsistence cast away in the one incarnation of the Holy Trinity from the Word of God.
Ut igitur sciri possit quid in talibus concedendum sit et quid negandum, considerandum est quod nominum ad individuationem pertinentium, sive sint nomina primae impositionis, sicut persona et hypostasis, quae significant res ipsas, sive sint nomina secundae impositionis sicut individuum, suppositum, et huiusmodi, quae significant intentionem individualitatis, quaedam eorum pertinent ad solum genus substantiae, sicut suppositum et hypostasis, quae de accidentibus non dicuntur, et persona in rationabili natura, et etiam res naturae secundum acceptionem Hilarii. Quaedam vero pertinent ad individuationem in quocumque genere, sicut individuum, particulare et singulare, quae etiam in accidentibus dicuntur. Est autem substantiae proprium ut per se et in se subsistat; accidentis autem est in alio esse. Et ideo illa nomina quae pertinent ad individuationem substantiae, in illis solum locum habent quae per se et in se subsistunt. Et propter hoc etiam de partibus substantiarum non dicuntur, quia non sunt in seipsis sed in toto, quamvis non sint in subiecto. De quibus tamen dici possunt nomina ad individuationem pertinentia convenienter tam in substantiis quam in accidentibus. Non enim potest dici quod haec manus sit persona, vel hypostasis aut suppositum; quamvis dici possit quod sit aliquid particulare, singulare, vel individuum. Manus enim etsi pertineat ad genus substantiae, quia tamen non est substantia completa in se subsistens, non dicitur hypostasis aut suppositum vel persona.	Therefore, in order that it may be known what must be conceded and what denied in these matters, it is necessary to consider which of the names pertain to individuation, whether they are names of first imposition, such as 'person' and 'hypostasis', which signify things themselves, or whether they are names of second imposition, such as 'individual', 'suppositum', and others of this kind, which signify the intention of individuality. Some of these pertain only to the genus of substance, such as 'suppositum' and 'hypostasis', which are not said of accidents, and person in a rational nature, and also a thing of nature according to the understanding of St. Hillary. But, others pertain to individuation in every genus, such as 'individual', 'particular' and 'singular', which are also said of accidents. Now, it is proper to a substance that it subsists through itself and in itself (per se et in se); but it is the character of an accident to be in another. And thus, those names which pertain to the individuation of a substance, only have a place in those things which subsist through themselves and in themselves. And for this reason also these names are not said of the parts of substances, since they are not in themselves but in a whole, although they are not in a subject. Yet, the names pertaining to individuation as much in substances as in accidents can fittingly be said of those things. For it cannot be said that this hand is a person, or a hypostasis or a suppositum; although it can be said that it is some particular, singular or individual. For even if a hand pertains to the genus of substance, yet because it is not a completed substance, subsisting in itself, it is not called a hypostasis or a suppositum or a person.
Sic igitur, quia humana natura in Christo non per se separatim subsistit sed existit in alio, id est in hypostasi verbi Dei (non quidem sicut accidens in subiecto, neque proprie sicut pars in toto, sed per ineffabilem assumptionem), ideo humana natura in Christo potest quidem dici individuum aliquod vel particulare vel singulare, non tamen potest dici vel hypostasis vel suppositum sicut nec persona. Unde relinquitur, quod in Christo non est nisi una hypostasis vel suppositum, scilicet divini verbi. Dici vel hypostasis vel suppositum sicut nec persona. Unde relinquitur, quod in Christo non est nisi una hypostasis vel suppositum, scilicet divini verbi.	Thus, therefore, since the human nature in Christ does not subsist separately through itself but exists in another, i.e. in the hypostasis of the Word, (indeed not as an accident in a subject, nor properly as a part in a whole, but through an ineffable assumption), thus the human nature in Christ can indeed be called some individual or particular or singular, yet it cannot be called a hypostasis or suppositum, just as it cannot be called a person. Hence, it remains that in Christ there is only one hypostasis or suppositum, namely the Divine Word.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod de Christo dicuntur et divina et humana; et si quaeratur id de quo dicuntur, unum et idem est; si autem consideretur id secundum quod praedicantur, aliud et aliud est, ut Augustinus dicit in i De Trinit. Quia secundum naturam divinam de Christo praedicantur divina quidem secundum naturam divinam, humana vero secundum naturam humanam. Cum ergo dicitur quod in Christo aliud est Dei Filius et aliud hominis filius, alietas non est referenda ad id de quo utrumque praedicatur, quod est unum suppositum utriusque filiationis, sed ad id secundum quod praedicatur. Et ideo Augustinus ibidem subiungit: aliud, inquam, pro distinctione substantiae, id est naturae; non alius pro unitate personae.	1. Human and divine things are said of Christ; and if it is asked what they are said of, [the answer is] one and the same thing. But, if one considers that according to which they are predicated, [this] is one thing and another, as Augustine says in On the Trinity, cap.vii, since divine things are predicated of Christ according to the divine nature, but human things are predicated of Him according to the human nature. Therefore, when it is said that in Christ the Son of God is one thing and the son of man another, this otherness must not be referred to what both are predicated of, that is one suppositum of each filiation, but to that according to which predication takes place. And, thus, Augustine in the same place adds "I say 'other' [aliud] on account of a distinction of substance," i.e. of nature, "not other [alius] on account of the unity of person."
Ad secundum dicendum quod de Christo praedicatur quidem divina natura; sed humana natura de eo praedicari non potest, sicut nec de Petro, cum quo est univoce homo. Unde non potest dici, quod christus sit duo, vel utrumque, quamvis sint duae naturae. Suppositum autem humanae naturae praedicatur quidem de Christo; sed non ponit in numerum cum supposito divinae naturae, ut ostensum est. Unde relinquitur quod, cum Christus dicitur utrumque, intelligatur materialiter. Sicut cum dicitur, paries et tectum sunt domus, quia utrumque ad unam domum concurrit. Unde et Augustinus, in libro Contra Felicianum, dicit quod unus atque idem homo, et corpus dicitur et animus. Vel potest dici quod hoc quod dicitur utrumque, referendum est ad numerum nominum duas naturas significantium. Homo enim Christus dicitur et Deus et homo, sicut et Deus verbum, dicitur Deus et homo. Et hoc est quod dicitur utrumque Deus, propter suscipientem Deum; quia scilicet hoc nomen Deus praedicatur et de Deo et de homine; et utrumque homo, propter susceptum hominem, quia hoc nomen homo de utroque praedicatur.	2. In fact, the divine nature is predicated of Christ, but the human nature cannot be predicated of him, just as it cannot be predicated of Peter, with whom [Christ] is univocally a man (On account of the real distinction between being and essence, it is false to say "Peter is his humanity" or "Peter is human nature") . Hence, it cannot be said that Christ is two or both, although there are two natures. But, a suppositum of a human nature is indeed predicated of Christ; but it does not combine in number with the suppositum of the divine nature, as was shown. Hence it remains that when Christ is called both, it is understood materially, just as when it is said that walls and a roof are a house, because both coincide in one house. Hence, Augustine also says, in the book Against Felicianus that one and the same man is called both body and soul. Or it can be said that what is called "both" must be referred to the number of names signifying the two natures. For the man Christ is called both God and man, just as God the Word is called both God and man. And this is why both are called God, on account of receiving God, since, of course, this name 'God' is predicated both of God and of man; and also both are called man on account of receiving man, because this name 'man' is predicated of both.
Ad tertium dicendum quod ad rationem hypostasis vel suppositi non sufficit quod aliquid sit particulare in genere substantiae; sed ulterius requiritur quod sit perfectum et in se subsistens, ut dictum est.	3. It does not suffice for the character of a hypostasis or suppositum that something is a particular in the genus of substance; but, further, it is required that it be complete and subsisting in itself as was said.
Ad quartum dicendum quod univocatio et aequivocatio attenditur secundum quod ratio nominis est eadem vel non eadem. Ratio autem nominis est quam significat definitio; et ideo aequivocatio et univocatio secundum significationem attenditur, et non secundum supposita. Et ideo hoc nomen homo univoce dicitur de Christo et de Petro, quia utrobique significat unam naturam, scilicet humanam, compositam ex anima et corpore; sed in Christo supponit suppositum aeternum, quod non supponit in Petro.	4. Equivocation and univocality are found inasmuch as the nature (ratio) of the name is the same or different. For the nature of a name what the definition signifies (This refers to Metaphys. 1012a24-25. In other places St. Thomas usually states this as: "ratio quam significat nomen est definitio." Cf. S.T. I, a. 13, 1) ; and thus equivocation and univocality are found according to the signification, and not according to the supposita. And thus, this name "man" is said univocally of Christ and of Peter, because it signifies one nature in both, namely, human, composed from a body and a soul; but, in Christ it [i.e. the term 'man'] supposits an eternal suppositum in Christ, which it does not supposit in Peter.
Ad quintum dicendum quod esse infinitum convenit supposito vel hypostasi verbi Dei secundum divinam naturam; secundum vero humanam naturam competit ei esse sub natura humana. Unde Dionysius dicit quod intra nostram factus est naturam qui omnem ordinem, secundum omnem naturam substantialiter excedit.	5. Being infinite belongs to the suppositum or hypostasis of the Word of God according to the divine nature; but, according to the human nature it belongs to it to be under a human nature. Hence Dionysius says that he was produced within our nature who substantially exceeds every order, according to every nature.
Ad sextum dicendum quod nomen speciei significat naturam, sicut et nomen generis; unde si una species esset in diversis generibus, sequeretur quod una natura esset duae naturae. Sed individuum importat aliquid quod non pertinet ad naturam; et ideo non est contra rationem individui, quod idem individuum sit suppositum duarum naturarum.	6. The name "species" signifies a nature, just as the name "genus" does; hence, if one species were in different genera, it would follow that one nature was two natures. But "individual" entails something which does not pertain to the nature; and, thus, it is not contrary to the character of an individual, that the same individual is the suppositum of two natures.
Ad septimum dicendum quod natura divina est omnino idem secundum rem cum qualibet trium personarum; et ideo tres personae possunt dici esse unum. Sed humana natura non est omnino idem secundum rem cum suo supposito, et ideo non praedicatur de eo: et sic non potest Christus dici esse duo propter duas naturas.	7. The divine nature is entirely the same as all three of the persons in reality; and thus the three persons can be called one being (esse). But, the human nature is not entirely the same as its suppositum in reality, and so it is not predicated of it, and so thus Christ cannot be said to be two on account of the two natures. (Cf. ad 2)
Ad octavum dicendum quod Filius Dei habet commune cum Patre divinam naturam, non autem hypostasim vel personam; filius autem hominis non habet commune cum Deo Patre nec hypostasim nec naturam. Unde ex hoc non sequitur quod inter Filium Dei et filium hominis sit distinctio in persona vel hypostasi, sed solum in natura.	8. The Son of God has the divine nature in common with the Father, but not the hypostasis or the person; now the son of man does not have either the hypostasis or the nature in common with God the Father. Hence it does not follow from this that there is a distinction in person between the Son of God and the son of man, but only a distinction of nature.
Ad nonum dicendum quod natura humana assumpta a verbo Dei, in quantum est individua, habet quod non possit esse in multis; et secundum hoc dicitur incommunicabilis. Sed, ex hoc ipso quod est natura, habet quod sit in aliquo supposito.	9. The human nature assumed by the Word, inasmuch as it is individual, has the property that it cannot be in many things. And in this respect it is called incommunicable. But from that fact that it is a nature, it has the property of being in some suppositum.
Ad decimum dicendum quod humana natura quamdiu est verbo unita, quia non secundum se existit, non habet proprium suppositum vel hypostasim praeter personam verbi. Sed si separaretur a verbo, haberet non solum propriam hypostasim aut suppositum, sed etiam propriam personam; quia iam per se existeret. Sicut etiam pars corporis continui, quamdiu est indivisa a toto, est in potentia et non in actu; sed solum facta divisione.	10. As long as the human nature is united to the Word of God, it does not have its own suppositum or hypostasis beyond the person of the Word , because it does not exist in itself. But if it were separated from the Word, it would have, not only its own hypostasis or suppositum, but also its own person; because it would now exist per se. Just as also a part of a composite body, as long as it is undivided from the whole, is [i.e. exists per se] only potentially, not actually; but this is only brought about by separation.
Ad undecimum dicendum quod in supposito includitur natura, non autem e converso; et ideo non potuit assumi suppositum quin assumeretur natura. Potuit enim e converso contingere.	11. Nature is included in the suppositum, but not conversely. And thus the suppositum could not be assumed without the nature. But, it was able to happen conversely.
Ad duodecimum dicendum quod unio animae et corporis in Christo ex hoc ipso est dignior quam in nobis, quia non terminatur ad suppositum creatum, sed ad suppositum aeternum verbi Dei.	12. The union of the soul and the body in Christ is more worthy than in us because it is not terminated in a created suppositum, but in the eternal suppositum of the Word of God.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum quod anima unitur corpori ut forma eius ad constituendum humanam naturam, non sic autem unitur in Christo divinitas humanitati; quia non est facta unio in natura, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo non est similis ratio.	13. The soul is united to the body as its form for constituting the human nature, but the divinity is not united to the humanity in Christ in this way; because the union was not brought about in the nature as was said above. And, thus, the nature [ ratio of the two cases] is not the same.
Ad decimumquartum dicendum quod propriorum accidentium aggregatio sufficienter probat individuationem humanae naturae in Christo; non autem quod habeat rationem suppositi vel hypostasis, quia non per se existit.	14. The aggregation of his own accidents sufficiently proves the individuation of the human nature in Christ; but it does not have the character of a suppositum or a hypostasis because it does not exist per se.
Ad decimumquintum dicendum quod non est facta hoc modo unio humanae naturae ad personam vel hypostasim verbi in Christo, ut adaequetur ei quasi comprehendens ipsam, vel secundum aliquam proportionem certam a persona verbi excedatur; quia adhuc manet persona verbi excedens humanam naturam in infinitum. Qui tamen infinitus excessus non excludit quin quodam ineffabili modo persona Dei humanam naturam sibi copulaverit in unitatem hypostasis. Quinimmo infinita virtus assumentis efficacius ad maiorem unionem operatur.	15. The union of the human nature to the person or the hypostasis of the Word in Christ is not brought about in this way, that it is made equal to [the person of the Word] as if including it or as though the person of the Word exceeds it according to some fixed proportion, since the person of the Word still exceeds the human nature infinitely. Yet, [this] infinite difference does not exclude the person of God joining the human nature to itself in the unity of the hypostasis in an ineffable way. Nay rather, the infinite power of the one assuming works more effectively towards a greater union.
Ad decimumsextum dicendum quod generatio terminatur ad suppositum quidem sicut quod generatur, ad naturam autem sicut ad id quod per generationem accipitur; unde forma dicitur generationis terminus. Et quia generationes et motus secundum terminos distinguuntur, inde est quod Christi sunt duae nativitates secundum duas naturas, sed unum nascens propter suppositi unitatem.	16. Generation is indeed terminated in the suppositum as to what is generated, but in the nature as to that which is received through generation. Hence, form is called the terminus of generation. And since generations and motions are distinguished according to their terms, hence there are two nativities of Christ according to the two natures, but one nativity according to the unity of the suppositum.
Ad decimumseptimum dicendum quod anima et corpus unita constituunt suppositum et hypostasim, si per se existat quod ex utroque componitur; quod in proposito non contingit.	17. The united soul and body constitute a suppositum and a hypostasis, if what is composed from both exists per se; which does not happen in this case.
Ad decimumoctavum dicendum quod Christus est simplex secundum divinam naturam, compositus autem secundum naturam humanam, ut patet per Dionysium i capite De Divinis Nominibus.	18. Christ is simple according to the divine nature, but composite according to the human nature, as is evident from Dionysius in chapter one of The Divine Names.