a. 6: utrum adam peccaverit in spiritum sanctum. | Article 6: Whether Adam Sinned Against the Holy Spirit. |
ad sextum sic proceditur. videtur quod adam in spiritum sanctum peccaverit. | It would seem that Adam sinned against the Holy Spirit. |
non enim peccavit in patrem, quia non peccavit ex infirmitate; neque etiam in filium, quia non ex ignorantia; cum infirmitas et ignorantia ante peccatum non fuerit. ergo relinquitur quod peccavit in spiritum sanctum. | Objection 1: For he did not sin against the Father since he did not sin by reason of weakness. Nor did he sin against the Son since he did not sin by reason of ignorance. Since there was no weakness and ignorance prior to (this first) sin, therefore it remains that he sinned against the Holy Spirit. |
praeterea, nimia praesumptio de dei misericordia, est peccatum in spiritum sanctum. sed adam peccans de dei misericordia cogitavit, ut augustinus dicit, et supra, dist. 22, habitum est. ergo videtur in spiritum sanctum peccasse. | Objection 2: Furthermore, excessive presumption concerning the mercy of God is a sin against the Holy Spirit. But Adam while sinning understood the mercy of God, as Augustine say, and as is related above in Distinction 22. Therefore he seems to have sinned against the Holy Spirit. |
contra, peccavit appetendo scientiam. sed scientia appropriatur filio. ergo magis peccavit in filium quam in spiritum sanctum. | 1st. on the contrary: On the other hand, he sinned by desiring knowledge. But knowledge is appropriated to the Son. Therefore he sinned against the Son rather than against the Holy Spirit. |
praeterea, augustinus dicit, quod quamvis adam non fuerit seductus in hoc in quo mulier, tamen in hoc seductus est quod credidit veniale quod mortale erat. sed peccatum quod est ex seductione, est peccatum in filium. ergo peccavit in filium. | 2nd. on the contrary: Furthermore, Augustine says that although Adam was not seduced into this (sin) into which the women (had already fallen), nevertheless, he was seduced in so far as he believed what was mortal to be venial. But the sin that is effected by way of seduction is a sin against the Son. Therefore he sinned against the Son. |
item, videtur quod primus angelus in spiritum sanctum peccaverit. irremissibilitas enim est proprietas peccati in spiritum sanctum. sed peccatum primi angeli fuit irremissibile. ergo fuit in spiritum sanctum. | Objection 3: In a like manner, it seems that the first angel sinned against the Holy Spirit. For unforgiveness is proper to the sin against the Holy Spirit. But the sin of the first angel was unforgivable. Therefore it was against the Holy Spirit. |
praeterea, eodem genere peccati quo tunc peccavit diabolus, etiam nunc peccat. sed nunc peccat in spiritum sanctum, quia invidet gratiae quae in sanctis operatur. ergo et tunc in spiritum sanctum peccavit. | Objection 4: Furthermore, the devil committed the same kind of sin then as he does now. But he continues to sin against the Holy Spirit because he envies the grace which is at work in the holy. Therefore he sinned (in his first sin) against the Holy Spirit. |
sed contra, peccatum primi angeli fuit ex hoc quod potentiam inordinate appetiit. sed potentia appropriatur patri. ergo peccavit in patrem. | 3rd. on the contrary: On the other hand, the sin of the first angel came about in so far as he desired power inordinately. But power is appropriated to the Father. Therefore, he sinned against the Father. |
praeterea, poena non praecedit culpam. sed malitia computatur inter poenas peccati. ergo ex malitia non potuit esse primi angeli primum peccatum, quod nullum peccatum praecesserat. | 4th. on the contrary: Furthermore, a penalty does not precede blame. But malice is counted among the penalties of sin. Therefore, the first sin of the first angel cannot have been by reason of malice, because he had not previously committed any sin. |
respondeo dicendum, quod quidam dicunt, quod peccatum primi hominis et peccatum daemonis non fuit neque in patrem neque in filium neque in spiritum sanctum; hae enim non sunt differentiae peccati absolute accepti, sed peccati quod contingit in natura corrupta. infirmitas enim et ignorantia et malitia, ex peccato naturam corruptam consequuntur. sed sciendum, quod quamvis infirmitas nullo modo in natura integra inveniri possit, et ita nec peccatum in patrem: tamen ignorantia aliquo modo in natura integra inveniri potuit, non secundum quod ignorantia dicitur privative, sed secundum quod dicitur negative: sic enim est defectus consequens intellectum creatum, inquantum creatus est: ex hoc enim deficit a perfecto lumine intellectus increati, ut non omnia sciat, vel saltem non omnia actu consideret: et ex tali nescientia peccatum proveniens, peccatum in filium dici potest. et similiter etiam malitia ex qua peccatum in spiritum sanctum procedit, non oportet quod sit poena, sed est aliquis actus peccati, ut supra dictum est; unde et in natura integra potuit esse peccatum in filium et in spiritum sanctum. sciendum tamen, quod primus actus peccati primi hominis et angeli non fuit in spiritum sanctum, prout peccatum in spiritum sanctum est speciale peccatum: quod patet ex ipso objecto peccati: uterque enim peccavit, altitudinem propriam appetendo. et ideo quantum ad genus peccati fuit peccatum superbiae; sed quantum ad circumstantiam peccati utrumque fuit peccatum in filium: quia uterque peccavit ex hoc quod non consideravit ea quae consideranda erant ad evitationem peccati; non autem fuit peccatum primum eorum ex hoc quod propria voluntate repugnarent spei, vel alicui hujusmodi, sicut fit in peccato in spiritum sanctum. | Response: Some say that the sin of the first man and that of the demons were not against the Father, the Son or the Holy Spirit. For these are not absolutely accepted as the differences of sin, but of sin which belongs to (our) fallen nature. For weakness, ignorance and malice follow upon the fallen nature by reason of sin. But it should be recognized that although weakness in no way can arise within an unfallen nature, and that likewise neither can the sin against the Father, nevertheless, ignorance, in a certain way, can arise in the unfallen nature, that is, not in so far as ignorance is said privatively, but rather as it is said negatively. For it is a defect following upon a created intellect in as much as it is created. By reason of this, the created intellect prescinds from the perfect light of the uncreated intellect so that it does not know everything, or at least it does not actually consider all things. By reason of this kind of unknowing, a sin which arises can be called a sin against the Son. In like fashion, too, malice, by reason of which the sin against the Holy Spirit arises, is not necessarily a penalty, but is, rather, an act of sin, as was said above. Whence, there could be, in the unfallen state, a sin against the Son and the Holy Spirit. It should be noted, however, that the first act of the sin of both the first man and angel was not against the Holy Spirit, as the sin against the Holy Spirit is a definite (kind of) sin, which is evident by reason of the very object of this sin. For both sinned by desiring (in a disordered way) their own greatness. With respect, then, to the genus of sin, there was the sin of pride. But with respect to the circumstance of sin, both committed a sin against the Son because both sinned by reason of the fact that they did not consider those things which were to be considered so as to avoid sin. However, their first sin did not come about in so far as they rejected hope by their own will, or some other like thing, as is the case in the sin against the Holy Spirit. |
ad primum ergo patet responsio per ea quae dicta sunt. | Response to Objection 1: The response is clear from what has been said above. |
ad secundum dicendum, quod quamvis adam peccans cogitaret de dei misericordia, non tamen peccavit peccato praesumptionis, quia non cogitavit se misericordiam consequi sine poenitentia; sed simul de misericordia et de poenitentia cogitavit, ut augustinus ibidem dicit. | Response to Objection 2: Although Adam, as he sinned, thought about the mercy of God, nonetheless he did not commit the sin of presumption because he did not consider the mercy that would follow without his repentance. But he did consider both this mercy and (his) repentance concomitantly, as Augustine says in the same place. |
alia duo concedimus, quamvis primum eorum non recte concludat, ut post dicetur. | Response to the 1st and 2nd on the contraries: We concede these two, although the first of these does not rightly conclude, as is said below. |
ad quintum dicendum, quod peccatum angeli non habuit irremissibilitatem ex genere peccati, sed magis ex statu peccantis, ut supra dictum est: et ideo ratio non procedit. | Response to Objection 3: The sin of an angel does not have the aspect of the unforgivable by reason of the kind of sin it is, but rather because of the state of the one who sins, as was said above. For this reason, the argument does not proceed. |
ad sextum dicendum, quod ad primum actum peccati in angelo, qui fuit actus superbiae, consecutae sunt multae aliae deformitates peccatorum, ut invidia, odium, et hujusmodi; et inter illa potuit esse peccatum in spiritum sanctum. | Response to Objection 5: With respect to the first act of the sin of the angel, which was an act of pride, there followed many other deformities of sins, such as envy, hatred, and others. And among these, there could have been the sin against the Holy Spirit. |
ad septimum dicendum, quod peccatum in patrem non dicitur ex objecto, sed potius ex causa: et ideo quamvis potentiam appetierit, non sequitur quod in patrem peccaverit, quia non ex infirmitate peccavit. unde et ratio illi similis, per quam ostendebatur quod homo primus in filium peccaverit, non concludebat. | Response to the 3rd. on the contrary: The sin against the Father is not designated by reason of its object, but rather by reason of its cause. Thus, although he had desired power, it does not follow that he had sinned against the Father because he did not sin by reason of weakness. And so, arguments like these, through which it has been shown that the first man had sinned against the Son, do not conclude. |
ad octavum dicendum, quod malitia, ex qua peccatum in spiritum sanctum esse dicitur, non oportet ut sit poena peccati, ut dictum est; et ideo ratio non procedit, quamvis conclusio sit vera. | Response to the 4th. on the contrary: It is not necessary that malice, by reason of which the sin against the Holy Spirit is designated, be a penalty of sin, as has been said. For this reason, the argument does not proceed, even though the conclusion is true. |
[ extra: neque hic neque in futuro. hoc ideo dicitur, quia quaedam peccata in futuro etiam dimittuntur, sicut venialia quaedam, ut gregorius dicit, non solum quantum ad poenam, sed etiam quantum ad culpam. non pro eo dico ut quis oret. si peccatum ad mortem intelligatur peccatum in spiritum sanctum, prout peccatum in spiritum sanctum requirit finalem impoenitentiam, secundum unam opinionem; sic intelligendum est, ut nullus pro talibus oret: quia qui usque ad mortem in peccato mortali perdurat, postmodum orationibus non juvatur. si autem sumatur pro peccato in spiritum sanctum, secundum aliam opinionem, prout non requirit finalem impoenitentiam; sic intelligendum est, ut non oret pro eo quis, idest quicumque: quia talium conversio quasi miraculosa est. unde sicut pro faciendis miraculis non quilibet orat, sed magni et sancti viri; ita nec pro talium conversione. | [ Additional material: (He who has blasphemed against the Holy Spirit, will not be forgiven), either now or in the future. This is so said because certain sins (committed) in the future are pardoned, as certain venial sins are (as Gregory states), not only with respect to the penalty, but also with regard to the blame. I do not speak (thus) so that anyone might pray on (such a sinner's) behalf. If the sin unto death is understood as the sin against the Holy Spirit, especially as this sin requires final impenitence, according to this view, it is understood that no one prays on behalf of such people. For whoever perdures in mortal sin up to death is not helped by prayers afterwards. If, however, the sin against the Holy Spirit be taken according to another view, as it does not require final impenitence, it is understood that one does not pray for him, that is, in any such way. For a conversion of such a kind is, as it were, miraculous. Hence, not just any person prays for miracles to be performed, but rather great and holy men. Likewise, for a conversion of that sort (it is fit that only the great and holy pray for such). |
tamen secundum formam verborum non prohibetur oratio pro eo fieri; sed ostenditur quod praeceptum de orando pro proximis fidelibus non se extendit ad tales peccatores: quia propter sui peccati enormitatem hoc merentur ut a fidelibus relinquantur, sicut ethnici et publicani. qui autem blasphemaverit in spiritum sanctum, non remittetur ei neque hic neque in futuro. glossa ibidem dicit, scilicet matth. 12, quod blasphemia remittitur, spiritus autem blasphemiae non remittitur. blasphemia enim nominat ipsum peccati genus absolute: quod contingit quandoque ex infirmitate, sicut cum quis ex irae passione blasphemat; quandoque etiam ex ignorantia, sicut in his qui errant, male de deo sentientes. sed spiritus blasphemiae est voluntas blasphemandi, quando scilicet ex certa malitia blasphematur: et tunc est peccatum in spiritum sanctum. discuti oportet, an aliud obstinatio, aliud impoenitentia sit peccatum. hujus quaestionis apparet solutio secundum distinctionem impoenitentiae prius positam. si enim impoenitentia sumatur pro actuali duratione in obstinatione usque ad mortem, non est aliud peccatum ab obstinatione, sed circumstantia ejus; si autem impoenitentia sumatur prout dicit propositum non poenitendi, sic est aliud peccatum.] | Nevertheless according to the form of the words (that is to say, with an emphasis upon the particular words used in this context, for this purpose: formam verborum - see ST III.72.3.ad2, and III.78.1.ad1), prayer is not prohibited on his behalf that these things (for which one prays) may come to be. But it is argued that the command that one ought to pray on behalf of his faithful neighbors is not to be extended to sinners of this kind (namely sins against the Holy Spirit). For on account of the enormity of their sin, they merit this (kind of treatment) so that they be removed from the faithful, just as was the case with the foreigner and the publican. He, who has blasphemed against the Holy Spirit, will not be forgiven either now or in the future. The Gloss at Matthew 12 says that blasphemy is forgiven, but not the spirit of blasphemy. For blasphemy denotes a kind of sin absolutely which happens whenever one sins by reason of weakness, as when someone blasphemes by reason of the passion of anger, and whenever one sins by reason of ignorance, as when those err when they speak badly about matters relating to God. But the spirit of blasphemy is the will to commit blasphemy, when, namely, one blasphemes by reason of a definite malice. And then, the sin against the Holy Spirit (is committed). It is befitting to discuss whether obstinacy is one sin, and impenitence another. The solution of this question is evident according to the distinction concerning impenitence put forth previously. For if impenitence is understood as the active duration in obstinacy up to death, it is not a sin distinct from obstinacy, but (differs only with respect to) its circumstance. If, however, impenitence is understood according to the one who puts forth the intention of not repenting, in this way it is a different sin.] |
� Stephen Loughlin
(sjl1@desales.edu)