

The Principles of Catholic Apologetics

A Study of Modernism based chiefly on the Lectures
of Père Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P. "*De Revelatione per
Ecclesiam Catholicam proposita*" adapted and re-arranged

By

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"Fides quaerens intellectum."

S. ANSELM ("Proslogium").

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PREFACE

THE present compendium based chiefly on the works of Père Garrigou-Lagrange is a defence of Divine Revelation "*sub directione Fidei*." It is intended to be a supplement to the *Principles of Christian Apologetics* published in the Westminster series of Messrs. Longmans, Green & Co. The aim of the latter volume was to shew the rational grounds on which rest truths of the first importance regarding God, man and the relations between God and man. Its aim was also to stress the fact that advance in the various branches of Natural Science, so far from being a hindrance, is distinctly a help to Religious and Supernatural belief. More than thirty years ago the late Professor Huxley, ablest of English Agnostics, wrote: "The extant forms of supernaturalism . . . in these latter days have to cope with an enemy whose full strength is only just beginning to be put out, and whose forces, gathering strength year by year, are hemming them round on every side. This enemy is Science" ("*Essays upon some Controverted Subjects*," p. 29). He proceeds: "The first chapter of Genesis teaches the supernatural creation of the present forms of life; modern science teaches that they have come about by evolution" (p. 31). Would not the Professor have been astonished if he had been told that great Fathers of the Church, such as Gregory of Nyssa and Augustine held views on that question which leave room for Evolution in its fullest form—an Evolution from inorganic matter right up to the body of man, no special intervention of God being necessary? "The conservation of creatures, the *concursus* with their activity and finally the creation of the human soul when the disposition of matter calls for it, are the three acts of the natural government of the world by God. . . . Thus the necessary order of development of the world is included in what St. Gregory of Nyssa terms the primary impulse of the Divine Will." (Cf. *Darwinism and Catholic Thought*, p. 117, by Canon Henry de Dorlodot, Professor at Louvain University.)

This is a typical case where the supposed conflict between Religion and Science is due to ignorance of the teaching of those who are accredited representatives of Religion. Professor Huxley proceeds to point out that whereas the late Mr. Gladstone interpreted the first chapter of Genesis as giving a chronology of the creation of organisms—a chronology in harmony with Science (*viz.*, 1. Plants; 2. Aquatic and Aerial Animals; 3. All Terrestrial Animals) Science shews that plants and animals, aquatic, aerial and terrestrial existed contemporaneously. The Catholic position on this matter is that the author of Genesis had no intention to write a scientific statement. He aimed at emphasising the Divine origin of the world, the mode being outside his purview. In confirmation of this fact, amongst the decrees of the Pontifical Commission for Biblical studies published on the 30th June, 1909, we find the following: "Since it was not the intention of the sacred writer to teach the inmost constitution of visible things, or the complete order of creation, in a scientific manner, but rather to give to his countrymen a popular notion, conformable to the ordinary language of those times, and adapted to their opinions and intelligence, we must not always and regularly look for scientific exactitude of language when interpreting this chapter." Were Professor Huxley alive to-day, it would be interesting to know on what grounds he, undoubtedly a lover of truth, would withhold his assent from this, the Catholic interpretation of Mosaic cosmogony. Again, regarding the geographical universality of the Flood, Father Hetzenauer writes: "The Fathers, neither directly nor indirectly, put forward the geographical universality of the Flood as the sense of the church, or as a doctrine of faith or morals; therefore tradition in the strict sense does not teach this universality."

But there is one question of present-day interest to which more attention must be given. Is the early history of man, so far as it may be read in geological records, in harmony with the teaching of Divine Revelation as set forth in the Book of Genesis? In order to answer this question satisfactorily I venture to give a brief account of the various human relics which have been discovered so far, and which belong chiefly to the Pleistocene period. The diagram (Fig. 1) reproduced from Sir Arthur Keith's *Antiquity of Man* (Second Edition, 1925) with the kind




Fig. 1.

permission of Author and Publishers (Messrs. Williams and Norgate) indicates the different periods of the Pleistocene and portion of the Pliocene period. *B* is a magnification of the later periods of *A*. The human remains belonging to each period are given in the chronological order of discovery.

EUROPE

Neolithic Culture.

- (1) 1883. Tilbury, skeleton; cranial capacity 1,500 c.c. 5ft. 4in in height; river-bed type.
- (2) 1910. Coldrum Monument (Kent), fragments of twenty-two individuals; only five skulls complete enough for examination; men 5ft. 4½in., women 5ft. 1in. in height; brain capacity of male skulls 1,600 c.c., of female 1,450 c.c.; some long-headed, some medium-headed. Before the beginning of the Neolithic period great numbers of round-headed people had come into Central Europe. Agricultural and settled communities were inventions of the Neolithic age.

Palæolithic Cultures.

I.—Azilian (from Mas d'Azil in the Pyrenees) 1909. Cranial fragments from Spain; probably of river-bed type.

II.—Magdalenian (named after La Madeleine, a rock shelter on the river Vézère).

- (1) 1888. Chancelade (near Périgueux), skeleton; probably round-headed; brain-capacity 1,530 c.c. Professor Sollas suggested that the Chancelade type may be ancestral to the Eskimos.
- (2) 1903. Cheddar (Mendip Hills, Somerset), skeleton; river-bed type; long-headed; brain-capacity 1,450 c.c.; height 5ft. 4in.
- (3) 1907. Ofnet (fifty miles south-west of Nürnberg), thirty-three skulls; mostly round but some long-headed; the round skulls are of Mongoloid form, the long-headed skulls are of Nordic type. Evidently round-headedness (now dominant in Central

Europe) had begun at this period to prevail over long-headedness.

- (4) 1914. Obercassel (near Bonn), skeletons of a man and a woman; Nordic type (still dominant in North-Western Europe); man 5ft. 3in. in height; brain-capacity 1,500 c.c.; woman's brain-capacity 1,350 c.c.

III.—Soloutrean (named from Soloutré, near Maçon)

- (1) 1892. Predmost (fifty miles east of Brünn), forty skeletons; long-headed; in stature tall like the men of Cromagnon.
- (2) 1922. Avellines Hole (Mendip Hills, Somerset), three skulls; skull *A*'s brain-capacity is 1,450 c.c.; skulls *B* and *C* are round-headed. The wave of round-headedness which was ultimately to impress itself on the greater part of the population of Europe, which commenced apparently in the East, had reached the West of England at this period.

IV.—Aurignacian (from Aurignac in Haute Garonne, where remains were found in 1860).

- (1) 1822. Paviland Cave (near Swansea), skeleton, but skull not found; perhaps of Cromagnon race.
- (2) 1833. Engis (Liège), skull found by Dr. Schmerling. It was of river-bed type; long-headed; brain-capacity 1,500 c.c. Huxley wrote: "This skull might have belonged to a philosopher, or might have contained the thoughtless mind of a savage." Sir Arthur Keith remarks: "Huxley's statement refers to the average brain, which is equal to the needs of both philosopher and savage. It does not in any way invalidate the truth that a small brain with a simple pattern of convolutions is a less capable organ than a large brain with a complex pattern."
- (3) 1868. Cromagnon (near the village of Les Eyziès, Dordogne), five skeletons, four being adults; height 5ft. 11in.; long-headed; brain-capacity 1,660 c.c.; limbs negroid in their proportions; not of the river-bed type.
- (4) 1878. Cissbury (near Worthing), two skeletons, one of a man 5ft. in height; long-headed; brain-

capacity 1,350 c.c.; the other skeleton of a woman, stature 5ft.; brain-capacity 1,732 c.c.; both of the river-bed type.

- (5) 1891. Brünn (Czecho-Slovakia), skull; long-headed; brain-capacity 1,600 c.c.; variant of Cromagnon. The present day Patagonian skulls are similar—a fact which seems to show that the Patagonians are a survival of a Palæolithic race, who made their way into America from Mongolia in Palæolithic times.
- (6) 1895-1902. Grimaldi (Mentone), fifteen individuals in seven Grimaldi caves. In the "Grotte des Enfants" (at the level of the second hearth) was found the skeleton of an old woman of small stature; (at the level of the third hearth) skeletons of two young children; (at the level of the eighth hearth, 23ft.) skeleton of very tall man (6ft. 2½in.)—a representative of the Cromagnon race; (at the level of the ninth hearth) two skeletons—one of a woman of middle age, and the other of a youth of about sixteen years. The last two are perhaps the earliest Aurignacian settlers discovered in Europe, and represented a negroid, or, perhaps, a variant of Cromagnon race; brain-capacity of woman 1,375 c.c.; stature 5ft. 2¾in.; brain-capacity of boy 1,580 c.c.; stature (at 16 years of age) 5ft. 1½in., both long-headed.
- (7) 1909. Combe-Capelle (Dordogne), skeleton; long-headed; brain-capacity 1,440 c.c.; of river-bed type; 5ft. 2in. in height.

Thus we see that at the beginning of the Aurignacian period ("at the beginning," because one of the implements which lay near the skeleton was a Mousterian "point"—a flint scraper) the men in the Dordogne valley were people of modern types—the Cromagnon people tall, the Combe-Capelle short.

- (8) 1909. Langwith (near Cresswell Craggs, Derbyshire), skull; river-bed type; brain-capacity 1,250 c.c.
- (9) 1911. Ipswich, skeleton; 5ft. 10¾in. in height; brain-capacity 1,430 c.c.; long-headed. These remains were at one time referred to the early Pleistocene period, but Mr. Reid Moir found at

about the same level or horizon (as that occupied by the skeleton) scanty remains of an ancient floor "probably referable to the early Aurignacian period."

- (10) 1912. Halling (Kent), skeleton; river-bed type; long-headed; brain-capacity 1,500 c.c.; 5ft. 4in. in height.
- (11) 1914. Baker's Hole (Kent), skull; long-headed; brain-capacity 1,490 c.c.
- (12) 1923. Soloutré (near Maçon), skeletons of three adults and two babies; one man (No. 2) 5ft. 10.8in. in height; the other (No. 1) 5ft. 9in.; woman 5ft. 1in. Both the male skulls are round-headed; the woman was medium-headed; brain-capacity of taller man 1,550 c.c.; of less tall 1,472 c.c.

Hence the Aurignacian men of Europe included five types: (1) tall, lank, rather negroid Cromagnon type; (2) robust large-headed Brünn type; (3) the river-bed type of Engis; (4) the Nordic type of Obercassel; (5) the rounded-headed type of Soloutré and of Ofnet.

Negroid Aurignacians may have been the remote progenitors of the Bushmen; but the remains found at Boskop (to be described presently) indicate more direct ancestry.

V.—Mousterian (named from Le Moustier, Vézère).

During the Mousterian period, Neanderthal men were widely distributed. The Neanderthal characteristics were:

- (a) Platycephalic or low-domed skulls like those of such anthropoids as the gorilla and chimpanzee.
- (b) Eyebrow ridges—a supra-orbital torus.

Neanderthal man was a flint artisan, used fire, and buried his dead with implications of life beyond death of the body.

- (1) 1848. Gibraltar skull of a woman; brain-capacity between 1,200 and 1,300 c.c.; medium-headed; face not prognathous; the supra-orbital ridge formed a prominent continuous bar of bone.
- (2) 1857. Neanderthal (near Düsseldorf), vault of a skull; right and left thigh bones, right and left humerus and other fragments; long-headed.

Huxley judged that Neanderthal man was an extreme variant, but not a separate species. Others thought that he was not only specifically, but even generically, distinct from *Homo Sapiens*.

- (3) 1866. Naulette (Valley of Lesse, Belgium), mandible of a woman.
- (4) 1886. Spy (near Namur), two male skeletons of Neanderthal type; large, robust skulls holding brains which, in point of size, were above the average of the modern European.
- (5) 1899-1906. Krapina (Croatia), ten individuals; short-headed race. The Neanderthal species included long-headed, medium-headed and short-headed races. Amongst the Krapina remains are those of children, whose Simian eyebrow ridges are not as massive and characteristic as they appear in later adolescence. "Neanderthal women were less distinctly marked off from the modern type of mankind than was the case with the men."
- (6) 1908. Le Moustier (Vézère), skeleton of boy about sixteen years of age; head remarkably large and capacious.
- (7) 1908. La Chapelle-aux-Saints, skeleton; buried in such a way as to manifest hopes and beliefs as to what happened after death; skull on the border line which separates long-headed and medium-headed groups; brain-capacity was 1,600 c.c., i.e., 120 c.c. above the modern average; height 5ft. 4in. The Neanderthal was not a tall race.
- (8) 1909. La Ferrassie (four miles above the point where the Vézère joins the Dordogne), skeleton; brain large.
- (9) 1910. La Ferrassie skeleton of woman.
- (10) 1911. La Quina (Charente), skeleton of woman; long-headed; brain-capacity 1,350 c.c.; 5ft. in height. Also skull of a child of about eight years old showing supra-orbital ridges.
- (11) 1914. Ehringsdorf (Weimar), human jaw (female), prognathous, ape-like face.

VI.—Acheulean (from St. Acheul, near Amiens, in the valley of the Somme).

- (1) 1863. Moulin Quignon (Abbeville), human jaw; first discovery of the "river-drift," terrace-gravel

man; shows characteristics of modern European type, and was therefore rejected, because it was assumed that men of modern type could not have been in existence before the Mousterian period.

- (2) 1882. Bury St. Edmunds, fragment; part of vault of human female skull; round-headed; brain-capacity 1,340 c.c.; characters indicate a head of modern type.
- (3) 1902. Dartford (Kent), skull; brain-capacity 1,740 c.c.; long-headed; modern type; "we cannot cite it as evidence that men of modern type lived in England during the Acheulean period; yet we cannot reject it, for it may be authentic."

VII.—Chellean (Chelles lies in the valley of the Marne, eight miles east of Paris).

- (1) 1863. Olmo (Upper Arno), skull; exact cultural horizon cannot be fixed with certainty, but the skull is certainly older than the Mousterian period; modern type; long-headed; brain-capacity 1,560-1,600 c.c.
- (2) 1868. Clichy (Paris), skeleton; brain-capacity about 1,500 c.c.; modern type; evidently in earliest Palæolithic times, the peoples in the valleys of the Seine and Thames were very much alike.
- (3) 1888. Galley Hill (Kent), skeleton; modern type; 5ft. 3in. in height; long-headed; "most of the Palæolithic Europeans, especially of the Aurignacian period, had exceptionally long heads. In any large modern population on the Western side of Europe, individuals with heads of a very similar size and shape could still be found"; brain-capacity 1,500 c.c.; skull thick; thus the Western European type has come down through (according to some geologists) 100,000 years, and yet has undergone but minor changes in structure.
- (4) 1907. Heidelberg; mandible of Neanderthal race.

VIII.—Pre-Chellean.

- (1) 1860. Castenedolo (six miles south-east of Brescia), fragment of skull.
- (2) 1880. Castenedolo, fragments of skeletons of two children, and skeleton of woman; woman long-headed; brain-capacity 1,340 c.c.; modern types.

- (3) 1912. Piltdown (Sussex), skull; there are doubts as to whether the somewhat simian-like mandible belongs to the skull; skull probably that of a woman of brain-capacity 1,400 c.c. This early Pleistocene or Pliocene form was more like ourselves than was the Neanderthal type of mid-Pleistocene times. "In general conformation, in actual dimensions, in brain-capacity, the head of the Piltdown race was remarkably similar to that of modern races." The mandible is marked by simian traits, the molar teeth, whilst showing simian characteristics, are essentially human; the canine tooth (discovered by Father P. Teilhard de Chardon in 1913) is ape-like; the Piltdown race tended towards round-headedness.

AFRICA

(A) Later Pleistocene.

- (1) 1913. Boskop (Transvaal), skull-cap; right-temporal bone, a large part of the left half of the lower jaw and some other fragments; brain-capacity 1,630 c.c.; long-headed; race ancestral to Bushmen and Hottentots.
- (2) 1914. Oldoway (south of Lake Victoria, Africa), skeleton of negro.
- (3) 1921. Tzitzikama (100 miles west of Port Elizabeth), remains of twenty-three individuals; skull of woman; all members of the Boskop race; woman's skull long-headed; brain-capacity 1,750 c.c.

(B) Early Pleistocene.

1921. Broken Hill (Northern Rhodesia), skull; more ape-like, more gorilla-like, than any of the modern man's variants, living or extinct; brain-capacity 1,300 c.c.; stature 5ft. 10in.; medium-headed; separate species; supposed to be the ancestral type of modern races; not a *direct* ancestor of any living race; foreshadows many features of the modern type, particularly of the Australian Aborigine.

ASIA

(A) Later Pleistocene.

1890. Wadjak (Java), two skulls; brain-capacities

1,550 and 1,650 c.c. respectively; related to Rhodesian and Talgai (Australian) types but later and higher than either of them.

(B) Early Pleistocene or Pliocene.

1894. Trinil (Java), *Pithecanthropus erectus*; was he ape-like man, or man-like ape? Brain-capacity 900 c.c. Some biologists are of opinion that a brain of at least 1,000 c.c. is necessary for human action. The mean brain-capacity for male gorillas is 518 c.c.; for Europeans 1,450 c.c. Hence the 900 c.c. of *Pithecanthropus* is supposed to furnish the "missing link."

1925. Lake of Galilee. Fragment of Neanderthal skull found in cave near Tiberias.

AUSTRALIA

1914. Talgai (Queensland), skull of boy; brain-capacity 1,300 c.c.; ancestral to modern aborigine; older than Wadjak and Boskop remains. Some claim this relic to be the earliest form of *Homo Sapiens* yet discovered. The Tasmanian native (now extinct) in spite of his woolly hair came from the same stock as the Australian Aborigines.

NORTH AND SOUTH AMERICA

Human remains, hitherto discovered, are of later Pleistocene period, and are all of the same American-Indian type. The Patagonians are survivals of a Palæolithic race. They seem to be representatives of the proto-Mongolian type.

Fig. 2, which represents a hypothetical genealogical tree, is useful as a résumé of the most important finds described above.

CRITICAL REMARKS

In addition to the classification just given of human remains assigned to their periods, mention must be made of "eoliths" (i.e., chipped flints, chipped by Man or by Nature) discovered at St. Prest, in Kent, on the uplands of Belgium, and under the crag deposits of East Anglia.




Fig. 2.

If these eoliths are of human workmanship (there are authorities of weight for and against) then the words of Abbé Breuil addressed to a friend are undoubtedly true: "*Mon cher, cela vieillit beaucoup l'Humanité.*"

The bearing of these facts on Divine Revelation has been set forth in the *Principles of Christian Apologetics*, chap. ix. Hence it will be sufficient to state the following conclusions:

(1) It is an interesting discovery that the brain-capacity of primitive races was, as a rule, higher than the average (1,450 c.c.) for the modern male European. Sir Arthur Keith writes of the Piltdown skull: "I cannot detect any feature in the frontal, parietal, or occipital areas which clearly separates this brain cast from modern ones; nor can I recognise any feature which has a distinct claim to be regarded as simian or primitive." Putting aside *Pithecanthropus* as too problematical, the characteristics of Rhodesian man seem to favour the theory of Evolution. The appearance and disappearance in mid-Pleistocene times of *Homo neanderthalensis* is a fact on which no light can at present be thrown.

(2) The numbers of years assigned by scientists for the Antiquity of Man vary so much that they must be regarded as little more than guess-work. Professor Penck's 1,500,000 years and Dr. Frederick Wright's 30,000 years (both eminent men in geological science) eloquently attest the truth that data are wanting to form even an approximate estimate. Sir Arthur Keith (following Professor Sollas) put down in the first edition of his work 400,000 years for the Pleistocene period. In the second edition the estimate has been reduced by half, and a further reduction is anticipated. From the standpoint of Divine Revelation it should be remembered that there was no intention on the part of Inspired Writers to give an accurate chronology of events from Adam to Abraham.

(3) If the theory of Evolution and the consequent great antiquity of man be rigorously proved no conflict ensues with Divine Revelation. The Church has never condemned the hypothesis of the existence of pre-Adamites.*

* It is obvious that the only tenable theory of the existence of pre-Adamites is that if human beings existed before Adam they must have ceased to exist before the creation of Adam. Remains (for example) of *homo neanderthalensis* have been found in Europe, Asia, Africa, etc., and the race completely and mysteriously disappeared.

(4) It is of the first importance to remember that the evolutionary development of organisms suggested by SS. Gregory of Nyssa and Augustine is not in conflict with the doctrine of Creation as set forth in the book of Genesis. The final developments of an organic form whereby (through the action of discontinuous variation) it becomes possessed of brain-capacity capable of functioning in human fashion, and thus becomes fit for the reception of a rational soul—these final developments are in the truest and strictest sense a creation of man. The material element was originally drawn from no pre-existing material, the potentiality of the matter to develop was absolutely God-given, the soul created by God was infused when suitable development on the physical side was reached and, as time does not exist from the Divine standpoint, the Mosaic narrative of man's creation is in complete harmony with the hypothesis which SS. Gregory and Augustine suggested.

The miracles of the New Testament were next attacked. The main indictment was that the Gospels, far from being contemporaneous records, belonged to the middle of the second century A.D. This contention of the Tübingen school is now discredited, and Professor Harnack, leading critic of New Testament chronology, has reverted to the Catholic position that the Synoptic Gospels were written between 50 and 70 A.D. In many other instances the supposed conflict between Religion and Science has vanished, and the conclusion is borne in upon fair-minded critics that (to use the words of Professor J. Arthur Thomson) "there is no fundamental antithesis between empirical description and transcendental interpretation. The one view seeks for the empirical Lowest Common Denominator, the other seeks for the transcendental Greatest Common Measure." Dean Inge (*Outspoken Essays: Second Series*, p. 38) writes: "The conflict of religion is not with Science, but with materialistic philosophy, built upon Science, a philosophy which takes an abstract field of enquiry for the whole of reality, and ignores those spiritual values which are just as much a part of our knowledge as the purely quantitative aspects of reality with which the natural Sciences are concerned."

Alas! this admirable statement is not in harmony with

later utterances. Writing the concluding essay in *Science, Religion and Reality* (Sheldon Press, London, 1925), the Dean states: "Those Churchmen who airily declare that there is no longer any conflict between Christianity and Science are either very thoughtless, or are wilfully shutting their eyes. There is a very serious conflict, and the challenge was presented not in the age of Darwin, but in the age of Copernicus and Galileo" (p. 357). "Heaven and Hell were geographical expressions. The articles in the Creeds on the descent of Christ into Hades, and His ascent into Heaven affirm no less; and it is evident that the bodily resurrection of Christ is intimately connected with the bodily ascension" (p. 357). "Among all the stars, planets, satellites and nebulae we can hardly imagine that one has been chosen as the abode of the Creator and the site of the heavenly Jerusalem" (p. 358). Comparing these statements, the reader must conclude that whilst the Dean maintains that there is no conflict between Science and Religion, there is in his view a serious conflict between Science and the fundamental doctrines of Christianity! *Non tali auxilio!*

Professor Thomson in his recent work, *Science and Religion*, is responsible for the following statement: "The data of Science cannot furnish a basis for the transcendent inference that there is a God. They may suggest the belief, strengthen it, even ennoble it, but they cannot be its foundation" (p. 113). "It is not by Science that we can pass from Nature to Nature's God. The pathway is that of Religious experience." This statement, based on the principle of Immanence, comes curiously enough from one who has written impressively and beautifully of the wonders which Science reveals. In one place he reminds us that through Science we are made aware of "an intelligible cosmos, an orderly flux, an advancing movement in which we share, a process in which there is progress, a world instinct with beauty" (p. 168). Elsewhere he notes: "The nerve cells in our cerebral cortex number more than five times the population of the earth, and every cell is a microcosm. Within each cell there is an orderly laboratory, in which there take place oxidations, reductions, hydrations, condensations, fermentations, up-buildings, down-breakings, all proceeding at great speed, all very close together, and yet not interfering with one another. We admire a complex machine and honour its

inventor; why not extend our admiration more generously to the organism and our honour reverently to its Creator?" (pp. 102, 103). "What potency in a bacillus, less than one five-thousandth of an inch in length, that can duplicate itself every half-hour, and that could in five days fill the whole ocean down to the depth of a mile" (p. 34). Again "matter is not so much a screen hiding God as a medium in which the Divine Art finds expression:

Trees in their blooming,
Tides in their flowing,
Stars in their circling
Tremble with song.

God on His throne
Is eldest of poets;
Unto His measures
Moveth the whole."—(p. 42.)

And yet the validity of the transcendent inference is questioned! The object of the present as well as of the earlier *Apologetic* is to show that the Natural and Supernatural Revelations, so far from manifesting fundamental antithesis, do, when properly understood, support each other in such a way that the transcendent inference is perfectly valid. As St. Cyril of Alexandria reasoned: "the wider our contemplation of Creation, the greater will be our conception of God"—a truth which a modern Indian philosopher stresses by inviting us to "hear the music of the great *I AM* pealing from the grand organ of creation through its countless reeds in endless harmony."

On the publication of the *Principles of Christian Apologetics*, a suggestion was made to me from a high ecclesiastical quarter that a similar book, treating expressly on Divine Revelation, would be acceptable. Meanwhile, the lectures of Père Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., delivered in the Collegio Angelico at Rome were published in two large volumes. They are intended for the theological student, and the name of the author is sufficient guarantee of the excellence of the work. It seemed to me that a *résumé* of these lectures would (under competent direction) be a help to University students and advanced pupils of Secondary Schools. Such students are called upon sooner or later to associate with those who hold agnostic views on matters, which, from the Catholic point of view are of primary importance. I venture to think that whilst the Religious Instruction given to Catholic senior students

is admirable as a practical guide to duty, there is need that greater attention should be given to the philosophical foundation upon which Religion is based. Knowledge of Catholic Philosophy will assuredly (under the influence of Divine grace) safeguard the student from the shock of associating with able men and women, whose views on matters religious are frankly negative. Nowadays, the value of Catholic Philosophy is widely appreciated outside the Church. Alone has the traditional teaching of the Schools withstood the test of ages, and the repeated onset of attacks led by adversaries both numerous and subtle. Is it not time that these treasures of philosophical wisdom should be known and utilised more generally in the household of the Faith? I have ventured to rearrange the matter of Père Garrigou-Lagrange's lectures to meet this need, and hope that the section which I entitle *First Principles* will be thoroughly assimilated. Words written elsewhere continue to have relevance: "If students are called upon to unravel the intricacies of Differential and Integral Calculus in order to obtain University degrees, it is surely not too much to expect that the metaphysical principles which are the support of Natural and Supernatural Religion should have some share of their attention."

Père Garrigou-Lagrange has graciously given permission for the *Résumé* herein attempted, for which kindness I offer him sincere thanks. I wish to thank also the Right Rev. Monsignor Canon Moyes for the *Summary of Catholic teaching on Divine Faith*, Chap. XV., Art. V. Necessarily, owing to its aim, the Compendium shows omissions and additions. The additions comprise a chapter on the philosophy of M. Bergson—a system of vivid interest in itself, of wide acceptance, and withal admirably adapted for the application of the principles of Catholic Philosophy. I have endeavoured also to emphasise the objections against Divine Revelation, which proceed from English schools of thought, so as to give the treatise more "actuality" for the English-speaking student.

I avail myself of the opportunity afforded by the publication of the present *Apologetic* to offer my sincere thanks to critics, inside and outside the Church, who, when the earlier work appeared, wrote words which were not only a sign of their approval, but a strong encouragement to further effort in the same direction. They appreciated

PREFACE

especially the use made of the conclusions of science for apologetic purposes. In truth the attitude of the Catholic Apologist is expressed in the well-known lines :

" Let knowledge grow from more to more
But more of reverence in us dwell ;
That mind and soul, according well,
May make one music as before,
But vaster."

T. J. W.

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SECTION I

FIRST PRINCIPLES

PRINCIPLES OF CATHOLIC APOLOGETICS

CHAPTER I

CATHOLIC APOLOGETICS

THE word "Apologetic" is derived from the Greek "*ἀπολογία*" which means "defence." Hence the expression "Catholic Apologetics" implies the defence of Catholic belief. An apologetical treatise may confine itself to the setting forth of the rational grounds which are the bases of Christianity—such as the witness of reason to the existence of God, to the endowments of man and to the relations between God and man, concluding with a general defence of Divine Revelation. In the development of such an Apologetic an opportunity is given whereby the assured conclusions of the various sciences which bear upon the origin of man and upon the history of the earth which he inhabits receive especial attention. But an Apologetic which proposes for its specific object the defence of Revelation continues to make use of reason, but reason *sub directione fidei* as its main instrument, presupposes the truths of Natural Religion already established, and proceeds to the detailed and philosophical exposition of the nature, possibility, necessity and cognoscibility of Divine Revelation as set forth by the Catholic Church "pillar and ground and truth." Thus the formal object or aim of a treatise on Catholic Apologetics is the philosophical defence of Divine and Supernatural Revelation, and is the logical sequel to the *Principles of Christian Apologetics*. The relation of such a treatise to the science of Theology may be briefly stated. The subject matter of Theology—i.e., its formal object—is God as supernaturally revealed, and as the treatise in question defends by reason the nature, possibility, necessity and cognoscibility of the supernatural knowledge thus revealed, it is

clear that "Catholic Apologetics" form a fundamental and integral portion of Sacred Theology. But the development of this subject does not cover the whole field of Fundamental Theology. Note the following divisions:—

Fundamental Theology. { Defence of Divine Revelation—i.e., Catholic Apologetics.
Sources of Divine Revelation—i.e., the theological *loci*.

And if the question be asked what are the theological *loci*, they are set forth in the following chart:—

Theological Loci.	Internal	Apodeictic:	{ Sacred Scripture. Divine Tradition. Authority of the Church. Authority of General Councils. Authority of the Roman Pontiff.
		Probable:	{ Authority of the Fathers. Authority of Theologians.
	External	Apodeictic:	Reason.
		Probable:	Philosophy and History.

From which divisions the conclusion is clear that Fundamental Theology is a science ("the knowledge of things through their causes") of wide extent, and one which entails varied and accurate scholarship.

"Catholic Apologetics" may be simply defined as "the rational defence of Divine Revelation." This defence is made by reason "under the direction of Divine Faith." Not indeed that a Catholic Apologist may use Faith to enforce reason and reason to establish Faith, but he chooses under the direction of Faith the special rational arguments put forward to defend Revelation, and develops their probative force wholly by means of the light of reason. Regarding the necessity of such a treatise, as the fact of Revelation is not immediately evident to us, we need the establishment of its truths because of their intrinsic value, and because of the momentous consequences for time and eternity which follow therefrom.

The division of the subject matter usually followed by Catholic Apologists is as follows:—

I. Theoretical Part (against Philosophical Rationalism).

- (a) Possibility of Revelation.
- (b) Congruity and necessity of Revelation.
- (c) Cognoscibility of Revelation from certain signs.

II. Positive Part (against Biblical Rationalism).

- (a) Historical testimony of Christ regarding His Divine mission and regarding the institution of the Church.
- (b) Confirmation of this testimony drawn from
 - (1) Satisfaction of human aspirations afforded by the teaching of Divine Revelation.
 - (2) Sublimity of the doctrine revealed.
 - (3) Marvellous life of the Church.
- (c) Confirmation of this testimony by miracles and prophecy.
- (d) Comparison of Christianity with Mosaic and other religions.
- (e) Consequent obligation of accepting Divine Revelation.

Enumeration of the chief divisions of this treatise shews that Catholic Apologetics is not a subject specifically distinct from Theology. As Père Gardeil reminds us, just as Metaphysics has its epistemology (criteriology) whereby the objective character of knowledge is established, so Theology has its supernatural epistemology—i.e., Apologetics—demonstrating the truth of Divine Revelation. Regarding its attitude to other sciences, Apologetics presupposes the truths of Metaphysics, Natural Theology, Psychology, and Cosmology; the truth also of the history and exegesis of Holy Scripture—not of course as a work divinely inspired. Inspiration of the Bible can be proved only by the decision of an infallible authority.

The foregoing division of the subject is suggested by the constitution *de fide catholica* of the Vatican Council. In quoting the decisions of Councils we wish the student to understand that such quotations are given because they are authoritative declarations of Catholic doctrine. Needless to say that in a treatise, which appeals to reason alone, conciliar definitions (though infallible from another point of view) are outside the argumentative scope contemplated in this work. The Vatican Council under titles "Revelation" and "Faith" suggests the division of the subject matter: 1. Possibility of Revelation and its congruity (D.* 1807). 2. The Council asserts the cognoscibility of the fact of Revelation, i.e., credibility of the mysteries of Faith and the validity of the motives of credibility

* References are to Denzinger's tenth edition.

(D. 1811, 1812, 1813). 3. The Council defends the freedom of the supernatural act of Faith and its irrevocability when once acquired (D. 1814, 1815), thus declaring the existence of Revelation to be proved from miracles historically certain. Here is an instance of what is meant by argumentation *sub directione fidei*. The order of this treatise will be that suggested by the Vatican Council, *viz.*, possibility, cognoscibility and existence of Revelation so that two great errors may be confuted—philosophical rationalism which denies the possibility of revelation, and biblical rationalism which explains away the miracles of the Gospel. The Church is not content with indicating the true method to be followed, but condemns erroneous methods:—

1. Method of the Early Protestants who, whilst accepting Revelation confirmed by miracles, denied the infallibility of the Church.
2. Method of Liberal Protestantism which accepts only truths conformable to the aspirations of the religious sense.
3. Method of Modernism.

Pius X in his Encyclical *Pascendi* condemns:

- (1) The foundation of Modernistic method, *i.e.*, Agnosticism and the doctrine of Immanence.
- (2) The method of historical interpretation which Agnostics affect.
- (3) The method of Immanence.

The cardinal doctrine of Agnosticism is that human knowledge is knowledge only of phenomena. The law of causality is resolved into a mere succession of antecedent and consequent, and knowledge of the existence of God which depends on the law of causality cannot be established.

Modernists claim that there is a mysterious unknown element in Christianity—a hidden element—which constitutes the object of Faith, *i.e.*, of religious experience. Dogmatic teaching should be subject to correction, because the truths and logic of life are different from the truths and logic of reason. According to Hegel, even the principle of contradiction is only a law of logic and not a law of reality.

The method of Immanence which presupposes in human nature an exigency for the Supernatural is condemned. Two claims are made by advocates of the doctrine of Immanence:—

- (a) Mutability of dogmatic teaching.
- (b) Subjection of Faith to Science.

As an instance of supposed change of dogmatic teaching the two concepts of God as Judge and Father are mentioned. As a change of teaching due to the advance of science, Modernists assert that the original conception of the personality of Christ was that of "rational substance consubstantial with the Father," whereas psychologists nowadays place the essence of personality in self-consciousness. The vivid consciousness which Christ possessed of dependence on the Father constituted His sonship and divinity!

Having indicated the method of procedure in the development of this Apologetic it will be instructive to investigate if the said method is "scientific." The logical processes of induction and deduction are both necessary in the pursuit of truth. Advance from the complex to the simple is accomplished by Induction or Analysis. For example: water (H_2O) is by analysis resolved into simpler constituents, hydrogen and oxygen. On the other hand, hydrogen and oxygen unite in definite proportions of volume and weight to form water—a fact which illustrates synthesis. Again, Sir Isaac Newton recognised in the fall of an apple a complex phenomenon. It was one of many such phenomena. And by the study of numerous such instances he evolved the simple law of Gravitation—simple inasmuch as it links together innumerable instances of a similar kind, and reveals them as subject to the same natural tendency, however mysterious in itself the nature of the tendency remains. Induction and analysis are thus cognate processes; deduction and synthesis are similarly correlated. Perhaps the very best example of the combination of induction and deduction in scientific discovery is shewn in the history of observations of the planet Mars in its revolutions round the sun. From a certain number of observations (right ascensions and declinations), *i.e.*, from a certain enumeration of instances, a hypothetical orbit was assumed. Herein is the inductive or analytic process—the advance from the complex to the simple. From the hypothetical orbit thus assumed the position of Mars at some future time was calculated and predicted. This is a striking instance of deduction. If the predicted position was found to agree with the real one, strong confirmation would be obtained of the truth of the hypo-

thesis. But if, as really happened, there was a divergence, then the astronomer began a new and more numerous set of observations, *i.e.*, a better enumeration of instances, and formed a second hypothesis based upon the wider experience. In this way, after many attempts and many failures, the orbit of Mars was discovered to be not circular but elliptical.

The science of Catholic Apologetics is based upon the true scientific method. There is in the first place a searching analysis of :

- (1) The true notion of Mystery and Revelation,
- (2) The exact idea of Credibility,
- (3) The validity of the motives of Credibility.

To shew the necessity of this analysis, compare in the following table the findings of Catholic theologians compared with those of the Modernistic school.

CATHOLIC TEACHING	MODERNISTIC TEACHING.
1. Mysteries of Faith are supernatural.	1. Mysteries of Faith are not supernatural.
2. Divine Revelation is external.	2. Divine Revelation is immanent.
3. The motive of Faith is the authority of God.	3. The motive of Faith is the religious sense
4. Mysteries are to be believed because revealed by God.	4. Mysteries are to be believed because they are conformable to human aspirations.
5. The motives of credibility are chiefly external.	5. The motives of credibility are chiefly internal.
6. Religion is divine and supernatural.	6. Religion is human and natural.

It is clear that a searching analysis of the mysteries of Divine Revelation is necessary, inasmuch as divergencies of opinion are so great. Perhaps the greatness of the divergency is not an unmixed evil, for "error is more dangerous the more of truth it uses for the commendation of itself." The idealistic rationalism of Kant and Hegel is more insidious than materialism.

The synthetic part of Apologetics sets out from the existence of Divine Revelation proposed by Christ and by the Church, and shews that such Revelation exhibits true notions of mystery, has legitimate claims on human credibility because supported by valid rational motives; that in fact the truths proposed for belief realise, and more than realise, the ideal which previous analytic examination desiderated.

Thus the method of proof adopted by approved Catholic Apologists is analytico-synthetic and corresponds, as far

as difference of the subject-matter allows, with the method which has been so fruitful in the advancement of physical science.

In physical science, experience is the supreme test, the supreme motive of credibility. It is essential for the enumeration of instances; it is likewise essential for the verification or otherwise of results which follow from hypothetical inference. In Apologetics, motives of credibility are both external and internal. Here too experience is necessary, whether it be the experience of the senses or the mental experience of various emotions. The following table gives an enumeration of the motives of credibility:—

Motives of Credibility	external to consciousness	extrinsic to religion	{ miracles
			{ prophecy
	internal to consciousness	intrinsic to religion	{ sublimity of doctrine.
			{ wonderful life of the Church
		universal:	satisfaction of human aspirations.
		individual:	interior peace

The probative force of these motives, singly or in combination, will be considered subsequently. It will be sufficient at this stage if we point out how consistent has been the appeal to these motives from the time of Moses to the present day.

St. Polycarp, Bishop of Smyrna. Epistle. A.D. c. 110.

Papias, Bishop of Hierapolis (Phrygia). A.D. c. 130.

A. All these Fathers appeal to miracles and especially to the fulfilment of prophecy in defence of the Christian Faith. They stress the fulfilment of prophecy as being more effective in winning Jewish converts.

(2) Second Century. The Apologists.

St. Justin (100-165 A.D.) wrote two "Apologies" and the "Dialogue" with Trypho.

Tertullian wrote his Apologetic c. 200 A.D.

St. Irenæus wrote against the Gnostics c. 180 A.D.

A.B. These Apologists, recording calumnious charges made against the Faith, confute them by arguments drawn from the purity of the lives of Christians. The appeal of Tertullian (*Apologeticum* c. 1) to the internal motive drawn from the "testimony of a soul naturally Christian" is well known. The Apologists appeal also to miracles and the fulfilment of prophecy, and to the moral miracle of the world's conversion. (Cf. S. Justin I., *Apologia* n. 32; *Dialogue* n. 69. S. Irenæus, Bishop of Lyons, "*Adversus Hæreses*" c. 180 A.D., especially Book IV.)

(3) Third Century.

A.B. Clement of Alexandria who wrote about 200 A.D. in his *Cohortatio ad Græcos* and in his *Pædagogus* contrasts the fullness and purity of the truth which Christ taught with the turpitude, superstition, and impiety of paganism. In his *Stromata* (Book VI. c 15) he appeals to miracles, to the fulfilment of prophecy and to the wonderful diffusion of the Christian Faith.

A.B. Origen (185-253 A.D. *Contra Celsum*, Book I. c. 2) appeals especially to the miracle of the Resurrection, but he also makes use of intrinsic criteria.

(4) Fourth and Fifth Centuries.

A.B. Lactantius (+ 325 *Institutiones Divinæ*), Eusebius of Cæsarea (*Demonstratio Evange-*

CHAPTER II

CONTINUITY OF APOLOGETIC TEACHING

IN the present chapter, for the sake of brevity, the external extrinsic motives will be indicated by the letter A, the external intrinsic by B, and the internal motives by C.

I.—Prophets of the Old Testament proved their Divine mission in three ways :

A. Miracles and prophecy :

(a) Miracles. Ex. iv. 1-19; 3 Kings xvii. 23-24.

(b) Fulfilment of prophecy. 3 Kings xviii.; Jeremias xxviii. 8-9; 15-17.

B. Excellence of their religious teaching.

II.—Christ and the Apostles.

(1) Christ.

A. (a) Miracles. Matt. xi. 4; Mark ii. 10.

(b) Prophecy. John v. 39; Luke xxiv. 25.

B. Matt. v., vi., vii.; John vii. 46.

C. John xiv. 27. Luke xxiv. 32.

(2) The Apostles.

A. St. Peter : Acts ii. 22-24; iii. 14-16.

St. Paul : 1 Cor. xv. 4-8.

SS. Matthew, Mark, Luke and John argue from miracles and prophecies fulfilled.

B. 2 Cor. iii. 2. The Apostle claims that the Christian life of the faithful is a sign which confirms the doctrine taught.

C. Testimony of the Spirit. Rom. viii. 9-16.

Fruits of the Spirit. Gal. v. 22-23.

Peace of God. Phillip. iv. 7.

III.—Fathers of the Church.

(1) Apostolic Fathers.

St. Clement. Epistle. A.D. c. 96.

St. Barnabas. Epistle. A.D. c. 100.

St. Ignatius of Antioch. Seven Epistles. A.D. c. 110.

lica), St. Cyril of Jerusalem (315-386 A.D.), St. John Chrysostom (347-407 A.D.)—all appeal to the probative force of miracles and prophecy.

- A.B. Augustine (354-430 A.D.) especially in three C. works, *De Vera Religione*, *De Utilitate Credendi* and *De Civitate Dei*, appeals to arguments external and internal in proof of the divinity of the Christian Faith. The "City of God" might be described as a commentary on the words of the Vatican Council: "The life of the Church is a great and perpetual motive of credibility, and affords irrefragable proof of its Divine message."

IV.—Scholastic writers.

(1) The Thirteenth Century.

Avicenna in the East and Averroës in the West, Arabian philosophers, who professed Mahometanism, interpreted Aristotle against the

- A. Christian Faith. Fr. Raymund Martin, O.P., in his *Pugio fidei adversus Mauros et Judæos* wrote against them, and proved the truth of Christianity from the fulfilment of prophecy.

A.B. St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) in his *Summa*

- C. *Contra Gentiles* (Book I. c. 6) appeals to:

- (a) Miracles of Our Lord.
- (b) Conversion of nations.
- (c) Fulfilment of Old Testament prophecies.
- (d) Wonderful life of the Church, dispensing nowadays from the necessity of miracles, though God still works miracles for the confirmation of Faith.

Elsewhere he appeals to internal criteria:

- (a) Action of the Holy Ghost leading to Faith (11^a 11^{ae} q 2, a 9 ad 3).
 - (b) Influence of the light of Faith towards confirmation of the judgment of credibility (11^a 11^{ae} q 1, a 4 ad 3).
 - (c) Experimental knowledge of Divine truths by the gift of wisdom—a knowledge which strengthens Faith already received. (11^a 11^{ae} q 8, a 2).
- A. Richard of St. Victor writes (*de Trinitate* lib. 1, c. 2): "Lord, if there is error, by Thee are we deceived; Thy doctrines are confirmed by so

many signs and wonders and of such a nature that only by Thee can they be done."

(2) The Fourteenth Century.

There is no notable Apologetic. Ockam and Nominalists unduly minimise the powers of reason, and prepare the way for the fideism of Luther.

(3) The Fifteenth Century.

A.B. Savonarola in his *Triumph of the Cross* written (1497) shortly before his death appeals to motives extrinsic and intrinsic.

- B. Marsilius Ficinus, who became so infatuated with the reviving study of Greek that he addressed his congregation sometimes as "Beloved in Plato," maintained in his *De religione christiana et fidei pietate* that Plato was in a sense a precursor of Our Lord. He appeals chiefly to the intrinsic motives. On the other hand Ludovicus Vivès

A.B. appeals to criteria extrinsic and intrinsic.

V.—Apologetic Method from the Reformation period to the appearance of the Kantian philosophy.

1^o Adversaries of the Christian Faith.

The origin and spread of Rationalism was due to the use of private judgment in religious speculation. Hence the origin of Socinians whose heirs are present-day Unitarians. If there be no authoritative exponent of doctrine, it is clear that the sequel will be "*quot homines, tot sententiæ*." Rationalism almost immediately exhibited two forms—Philosophical and Biblical. Philosophical rationalism underwent a subdivision into spiritualistic and empirical schools.

PHILOSOPHICAL RATIONALISM (SPIRITUALISTIC SCHOOL).

The deists Voltaire and Rousseau and the pantheist Spinoza are justly placed in this category. Voltaire openly ridiculed Holy Scripture, and J. J. Rousseau rejected miracles, prophecy, and all supernatural truths. And yet in the third of the *Lettres de la Montagne* Rousseau admits the possibility of miracles, whilst in *Emile* (Book IV. *Profession de la foi du vicaire savoyard*) there is a well-known laudatory and oft-quoted passage on Christ and the Gospels.

Spinoza denied a real distinction between God and the world. In his *Ethica* and *Tractatus theologico-politicus* the truth of Scripture is declared to be merely allegorical and symbolic.

Wolf, "professor of the human race," acknowledged the existence of God, but rejected all supernatural truth which could not be proved by intrinsic arguments from the idea of God and morality.

PHILOSOPHICAL RATIONALISM (EMPIRICAL SCHOOL).

Hobbes and Hume, being sensists, denied the validity and necessity of the first principles of reason. In the *English Men of Letters* series, the life of Hume has been written by the late Professor Huxley, who devotes the main portion of the work to the defence of Hume's philosophy. Amongst other tenets of Hume, Huxley defends the well-known argument against miracles—an argument which will receive due consideration later in this book. In France, Diderot, d'Alembert and the Encyclopedists denied even the truths of Natural Religion, and many became materialists.

PHILOSOPHICAL RATIONALISM (BIBLICAL SCHOOL).

The authority of Old and New Testaments was called in question. In England Bolingbroke and Shaftesbury, and in Germany Lessing and Reimarus pursued the destructive criticism associated with the name of Spinoza. The reader will remember that Spinoza's teaching emphasised the *immanence* of the Deity in His creation, but failed to realise the complementary truth that God is withal *transcendent*.

2° Protestant Apologists.

- (1) Some Protestant Apologists employ both external and internal criteria:

Duplessy-Mornay: *De La Vérité de la Religion Chrétienne* (1579-1581).

Hugo Grotius: *De veritate religionis christianæ* (1627).

Lardner (1684-1768): *Credibility of the Gospel History*.

Paley (1743-1805): *Horæ Paulinæ; Evidences of Christianity*.

Leibnitz (1646-1716): *Systema theologicum*.

- (2) Most Protestant Apologists appeal to internal motives.

Locke (1632-1704): *Reasonableness of Christianity; Essay concerning Human Understanding*.

Clarke (1675-1729): *Being and attributes of God*.

Butler (1692-1752): *Analogy*.

Internal motives are more suitable for private judgment and subjectivism, and agree better with the subjective theory of justification, and with the Lutheran notion of predestination implied in the famous dictum: "*pecca fortiter, crede fortius*."

It is interesting to follow the phases of Protestant opinion in regard to Faith:

- (a) The early Protestants having rejected the authority of the Church put forward Scripture alone as the rule of Faith. They maintained that the guidance of the Holy Spirit is given to each one for the interpretation of the Sacred Writings. Hence the subjectivity and variety of their belief. Faith was identified with religious experience and developed into pietism—a corruption of genuine piety.
- (b) Moreover Protestants profess a personal faith, more properly called confidence, whereby they are assured that their sins have been forgiven through the merits of Christ. This is the faith which, according to Protestant teaching, justifies without works.
- (c) Luther's adoption of Nominalism and the empiricism of Ockam made doubtful the rational grounds supporting the truths of Natural Religion, *e.g.*, the existence of God, etc. According to Ockam all truths which transcend experience are accepted on faith—hence fideism.
- (d) The Reformers claimed, as did Baius and Jansenius later, that elevation of our nature to association with God was due to the original gift of integrity, and therefore should not be called supernatural. Hence revealed mysteries respond, not only to human aspirations, but to human needs. Note the contrast of protestant and pelagian errors. In Pelagianism error arose from exaggeration of the power of human faculties; in Protestantism, error is due to the exaggeration of human needs. Pelagians denied original sin; Lutherans maintained the corruption of human nature through original sin.

3^o Catholic Apologists.

- A.B.C. 1. Bossuet in the second part of his work, *Discours sur l'histoire universelle* (1681) makes use of all criteria as S. Augustine does in his *Civitas Dei*.
- A. 2. Huet in *Demonstratio evangelica* (1679) stresses the argument drawn from prophecy. He is not sufficiently critical.
- A.B.C. 3. Pascal in *Les Pensées* shews the divine origin of Christianity from external and internal criteria. Sometimes the tendency of his thought is Jansenistic.
- A.B.C. 4. Concina O.P. directs his attack against all forms of unbelief. (*Della religione revelata contra gli athei, deisti, materialisti, indifferentisti.*) Also Bergier, Gotti, S. Alphonsus, Cardinal Gerdil, etc.

VI.—Apologetic Method from publication of the Kantian philosophy onwards.

1^o Adversaries of the Christian Faith.

- (a) Philosophical Rationalism appears now under idealistic empirical forms.

Idealists. Kant attempted to reconcile the empiricism of Hume with the spiritualism of Wolf. He teaches the subjective necessity of first principles of speculative and practical reason (*Categories*), but denies the possibility of speculative knowledge of the existence of God, of human liberty, and of the immortality of the soul. He accepts these truths by a sort of moral faith as postulates of practical reason (*Categorical Imperative*). All supernatural truths he rejects, retaining only truths of Natural Religion.

Pantheists. Fichte, Schelling and Hegel were pantheists. Hegel declares that there is nothing superior to human nature—in fact, human nature is “God in the making”!

Eclectics. In France, Cousin, Jouffroy, and Jules Simon were deists.

Empiricists and Positivists. Comte, Littré, Taine, Stuart Mill and Spencer, limit human knowledge to “states of consciousness” and “laws of experience.”

The Kantian theory of faith and morality now claims attention:

- 1.—Speculative reason cannot attain certitude of the

ontological (*i.e.*, objective) value of first principles. The principle of causality, for example, is only subjectively necessary (*i.e.*, a principle synthetic *a priori*). Hence speculative reason cannot prove the existence of God, immortality of the soul, freedom of the will, binding force of moral obligation.

2.—Practical reason recognises the binding force of moral obligation as an internal rational fact. The first principle of practical reason (“do as you would wish all men to do”) has not an objective foundation, but is merely a “formal law subjectively necessary.” To recognise an obligation from an objective source would involve the servitude of the will.

3.—Moral faith cannot exist without freedom of will, immortality of the soul, and existence of God.

Therefore (1) since man cannot fulfil moral obligation without freedom, we “morally” ought to admit the existence of free-will although speculatively unprovable.

(2) The perfection required by the Categorical Imperative can be obtained only by an infinite series of approximations. Hence the necessity of a future life.

(3) Inasmuch as a man who follows out in all things the obligation of the moral law deserves happiness, and as stable happiness is not found on earth, hence “morally” the existence of God the rewarder ought to be admitted.

The certitude of these truths is *subjectively* and *practically* sufficient, because subjectively deduced from the Categorical Imperative, but the certitude is *objectively* and *theoretically* insufficient. Kant substituted the Categorical Imperative for the protestant supposed guidance through “instinct of the Holy Spirit.”

(b) Biblical Rationalism.

Biblical rationalism of the Nineteenth Century appeared in a twofold form:

- (1) Mythicism. De Wette (+ 1849) and Strauss (+ 1874) regarded the historical events of both Testaments as comparable to the mythical legends of Romulus and Remus. De Wette attacked the Old Testament, and Strauss, in his *Leben Jesu*, judged the character and works of Christ as fables due to an idealising tendency on the part of the human imagination.

- (2) Evolutionary criticism of Baur (+ 1860) leader of the Tübingen School. Adopting Hegelian philosophy, he reduced Christianity to a synthesis of two opposite systems—Petrinism favouring Jews and Paulinism favouring Gentiles. Baur regarded the fourth Gospel (falsely, in his opinion, attributed to St. John), as the synthesis of the two systems. To this school belong Ewald (+ 1875), Hitzig (+ 1875), Knobel (+ 1863), E. Reuss (+ 1891) and Wellhausen.

2° Protestant and Semi-Rationalist Apologists.

(1) Protestant Apologists.

- C. (a) Conservative writers who desire to safeguard Supernatural Revelation: Tholuck, Delitzsch, Baumstark, Ebrard, defend the authenticity of the Gospels and other books of the New Testament. They appeal chiefly to internal criteria.
- C. (b) Liberal writers appeal exclusively to internal criteria. Influenced by the teaching of Kant and Hegel, they reject the supernatural character of Revelation.

Schleiermacher (1767-1834) asserts that God may not be distinct from the universe. It is sufficient if we recognise the Infinite in some way. Revelation is only a new idea of the Infinite, *e.g.*, conception of God the Father. Christ's claim to divinity was due to His greater consciousness of the Infinite.

A. *Ritschl* (1822-1889) relegates the Inspiration of Scripture to the judgment of the religious sense. The truth of Scripture statements is shewn by the approbation of the religious sense. Christ is the Son of God because specially conscious of His union with God. Miracles are extraordinary events, and witnesses of Divine benevolence. Hence one and the same fact may be natural from the standpoint of Science, and supernatural from the standpoint of Faith.

A. *Sabatier* (+ 1901) in *Les Religions d'Autorité et la Religion de l'Esprit* wrote in the same strain.

(2) Semi-Rationalists.

Some Catholic theologians, *e.g.*, Hermes, Günther, Frohschammer, though they do not deny Supernatural Revelation, wrote under the influence of Kantian and

Hegelian philosophy, and maintained that in Divine Revelation all mysteries, even those of the Trinity and Incarnation, may be proved by human reason. The foundation of Hermes' philosophy is the Kantian insufficiency of speculative reason and the autonomy of practical reason. He goes on to assert that a Catholic may regard the truths of Faith as doubtful until he discovers a scientific proof of those truths. The formal motive of Faith is not the authority of God, but its practical need.

Catholic Traditionalists. Bautain and Bonnetty on the other hand minimised the power of natural reason to such an extent that, in their view, reason could not prove the existence of God, the spirituality and consequently immortality of the soul, or freedom of the will. Such are the errors of Fideism and Traditionalism. True Catholic teaching holds the golden mean between writers who err "*per excessum*" and those who err "*per defectum*"; "*in medio tutissimus ibis.*"

3° Catholic Apologists.

- (a) Theologians who use primarily external criteria reinforced by internal. Frayssinous, Lacordaire, Hettinger, Perrone, Zigliara, Tanquerey, etc., etc.

(1) They appeal to external-intrinsic criteria to shew the excellence of Christian teaching. They appeal also to the wonderful life of the Church

B. "irrefragable testimony of its divine mission."

(2) They appeal to external-extrinsic criteria.

A. Nicolas, Brugère, Frayssinous, Hettinger, etc.

C. (3) They appeal to internal criteria.

Chateaubriand: (*Le Génie du Christianisme*, 1802).

Lammenais: (*Essais sur l'Indifférence en Matière de Religion*, 1817.)

Lacordaire: (*Conférences*).

Bougaud: (*Le Christianisme et les temps présents*, 8 ed., 1901).

Card. Deschamps: (*Entretiens sur la Démonstration Catholique*, 1861).

Card. Newman (who stresses the argument based on the dictates of conscience).

(b) Philosopher-Apologists.

Some Philosopher-Apologists judge that the

most effective method of convincing unbelievers *C.B.* is by an apologetic which appeals to internal and *later* external-intrinsic criteria. In their opinion the

A. use of external-extrinsic criteria comes later. (Ollé-Laprune, Fonsegrive and Brunetière).

(c) Blondel and Laberthonnière, who look upon Apologetics not as belonging to Fundamental Theology, but to the philosophy of religion. These writers propose to develop a new Apologetic which, they hold, will be more efficacious in controversy with Agnostics, and with those who regard the "immanent" to be the sole valid method in sacred science. The double foundation of the method is (1) the principle that "speculative reason cannot defend its own ontological (*i.e.*, objective) value except in accord with the practical needs of human action." By action, speculative thought becomes an objective reality. Hence the definition of truth is no longer the time-honoured one: "equation between the mind and the object perceived," but "equation between the mind and life." (2) The second foundation is the assertion that religious truth, even though supernatural, cannot be imposed from an external source. Man must assent to no teaching except such as is required for the perfect development of his faculties. Hence religious truth, even supernatural, must be recognised as an inward need for the perfect evolution of our action.

This theory of Blondel differs from Immanentism. According to the Immanentists religion comes from an immanent source—the religious sense. Blondel does not deny the supernatural character of Revelation, but maintains that it is intrinsically needed by our nature. Supernatural religion exceeds the powers but not the needs of nature. Blondel's apologetic may be fairly described as Semi-Immanentism.

Before proceeding to note how the advocates of this new Apologetic regard criteria external and internal, the reader will distinguish between (i), the doctrine of "immanence," *i.e.*, God's intimate presence in His creation of which the complementary truth is God's transcendence—acknowledged teaching of Catholic philosophy, and (ii), the

doctrine of "immanence" in apologetics which accepts the internal religious sense as the only valid criterion of religious truth—one of the fundamental tenets of Modernism.

In regard to the criteria, these new Apologists maintain the following views:

- (1) Criteria external-extrinsic. Speculative reason apart from the exigencies of human action cannot establish objective reality. Hence miracles as such have no probative force. They have a symbolic value for minds disposed to recognise a divine element in nature. Thus the probative force of miracles is subordinated to internal criteria.
- (2) The criterion external-intrinsic, *i.e.*, the wonderful life of the Church, has only a symbolic value in manifesting the presence of Divine action in the world and especially in the Church. The Church is proved thereby to be only a superior form of religious evolution, but not supernaturally founded by God Himself.
- (3) Internal criteria. Blondel and his followers much exaggerate their force. They acknowledge that supernatural religion is not *due* to human nature. Nevertheless, supernatural revelation is sought for, nay, asked for by human nature in order to secure the perfect evolution of our faculties. We cannot reach the Infinite Being without His aid, hence the need of the Supernatural. In Christianity and Catholicism alone are the aids to be found. Thus the divine origin of Catholicism is made *practically* certain through experience aided by Divine grace.

CRITICISM OF THE NEW APOLOGETIC

1.—It is founded on Semi-Agnosticism, *viz.*, untrustworthiness of speculative reason.

2.—It is founded also on an aspect of the doctrine of immanence. If Catholic Faith is *demandé* by our nature, that Faith is not supernatural. In truth the Supernatural is above not only the powers but the exigencies of human nature. These Apologists fail to see that it is *natural happiness* arising from the natural knowledge and love of God that our nature strives to attain.

3.—The formal motive of Faith consists in the authority of God who reveals, and not in religious experience.

CHAPTER III

VALUES, ONTOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL, OF PRIMARY NOTIONS AND PRINCIPLES : DOCTRINE OF ANALOGY

It is quite clear that knowledge of supernatural truth is impossible unless a foundation of natural truth exists. Hence the necessity, at the outset of a treatise on supernatural religion, to establish the truth that primary notions and primary principles of human reason have (1) an objective (ontological) value, and (2) a transcendental value.

I.—Defence of the ontological value of primary notions and principles of reason.

A *direct* proof of an intuitive truth is not possible. When the connection between subject and predicate is *immediate* there is no place for a middle term. Everyone has an intuitive perception that the principle of non-contradiction is not only a logical law of reason, but an ontological (objective) law of reality. It is immediately evident that an absurdity (*e.g.*, a square circle) not only cannot be thought of, but cannot exist. Equally immediate is the evidence of the truth that a contingent universe postulates a necessary cause.

But if a *direct proof* of the ontological (objective) value of primary notions and principles of reason is not possible, a direct defence based on the explanation of the terms enables the mind to see the evidential character of the intuition.

(A) Direct defence.

Major: Primary ideas and principles of reason which do not express objects *per se* sensible, but objects sensible *per accidens* and intelligible *per se* and resolvable into intelligible being have a value not only phenomenal but ontological.

Minor: The primary notions of being, essence, existence, unity, truth, goodness, substance, causality, finality and correlative principles do not express objects *per se* sensible (like colour, sound and other phenomena) but

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objects sensible *per accidens* and intelligible *per se* resolvable into intelligible being.

Conclusion: Therefore primary notions and their correlative principles have a value not only phenomenal but ontological.

Explanation of the Major:

When the eye sees (*e.g.*) an orange, the colour of the orange is the direct object of the faculty of sight; the eye perceives the sensible quality *per se* (directly). But the intellect directly perceives under the sensible qualities the essence of the orange and the essence, abstracted from sensible qualities, is the direct object of the intellect. Hence the object of the intellect (*i.e.*, essence) is intelligible *per se*, and sensible *per accidens*. If I see a man speaking I apprehend by the intellect his life, and I can say that I see he is alive, although life is not sensible *per se* like colour and other phenomena. Thus notions which express sensible qualities *per accidens* and intelligible essence *per se* have a value which is not merely phenomenal but ontological, because they apprehend the essence, substance or being which underlies the phenomena.

Explanation of the Minor:

The primary notions and their correlative principles intelligible *per se* and sensible only *per accidens* are resolvable into being. *Unity* is individual being, *truth* is being conformable to the intelligence on which it depends, *goodness* is desirable being, *substance* is a form of being, *causality* is the realisation of being, *finality* is the *raison d'être* of means to reach being, etc. The intellect does not apprehend or judge anything unless in relation to being. In every judgment the essential relation is indicated by the word "is" which imports "being." Hence a judgment is not an association merely of names, but an association of things.

Should someone object that the idea of being is a subjective form of the understanding, the difference may be pointed out between the idea of being and ideas which express purely subjective notions (conceived but not capable of realisation) such as notions of universality, specificity, whiteness, etc. Or the objection may be met by contrasting the ontological form of the principle of non-contradiction: "it is impossible that the same thing should exist and not exist" with the logical form of the

same principle: "it is impossible to affirm and deny the same predicate of the same subject in the same relation." The second form expresses only the inconceivable character of the absurd, the first form expresses its real impossibility. To reduce the notion of being to a subjective form of the mind, and the principle of non-contradiction to a logical law and not to an ontological law is to identify two notions manifestly distinct—the impossible and the inconceivable. If the principle of non-contradiction is only a logical law, then a square circle is inconceivable but may exist in *rerum naturâ*. To shew the importance of stressing this fundamental truth, the following words of M. Le Roy are relevant: "the principle of non-contradiction is not as universal and as necessary as is supposed . . . supreme law of speech and not of thought in general, it has hold only upon that which is static. . . . But there is contradiction in the world as there is identity, as, for example, in fleeing mobilities, becoming, duration, life." (*Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, 1905, pp. 200, 204).

(B) Indirect defence.

If the ontological value of primary notions and principles be denied, knowledge of any kind becomes impossible. The necessity and universality of first principles cannot be explained by empiricist agnostics. Idealistic agnostics (followers of Kant) have recourse to "judgments synthetic *à priori*," which since they are neither wholly *à priori* nor wholly from experience are blind, motiveless, irrational.

Moreover, the negation of the ontological value of primary notions and principles makes the essential elements of intellectual knowledge to be absurd. For example:

- (1) Object. One cannot distinguish between the object of direct intelligence (*e.g.*, Causality) and the object of reflex intelligence (*e.g.*, Idea of Causality). But the reflex act pre-supposes the direct act, and cannot be identified with it without formal contradiction.
- (2) Idea. If the idea is that which is known (*medium quod cognoscitur*) and not that whereby the object is known (*medium quo cognoscitur*) then the idea or representation has no relation to the represented object (*i.e.*) is the idea of nothing.

- (3) Principles. The principle of (*e.g.*) non-contradiction disappears and therewith the value of any statement.
- (4) Intellectual faculty. An act of intelligence becomes unintelligible in two ways:
 - (a) Kant denied the passivity of the intellect in regard to intelligible being. Hence the motiveless, blind, "judgments synthetic *à priori*."
 - (b) Fichte denied the passivity of the intellect not only in regard to intelligible being but in regard to phenomena. Hence the human intellect creates its own cognitions and becomes the cause of things.

II.—Defence of the transcendental value of primary notions and principles.

The transcendental value of primary notions and principles enables us to know not only being underlying phenomena, but God Himself, the first transcendent Cause, and such knowledge is not merely metaphorical or symbolic but real. Some agnostics admit that God may be known symbolically and that dogmatic formulas have a metaphorical value so that the statement "God is wise" is only a metaphorical statement like "God is angry."

The transcendental value may be defended directly and indirectly.

Before formulating the syllogism which proves the transcendental value of primary notions and principles, it is necessary to remember that the moderate realism of Aristotle and St. Thomas is a middle way between the extreme realism of Plato leading to pantheism and the nominalism of Agnostics. Hence the doctrine of St. Thomas on analogy (a consequence of moderate realism) holds a middle path between the univocal sense of being leading to pantheism and the equivocal sense which leads to the agnosticism of Nominalists.

(A) Direct proof.

Major: Notions of perfections which are analogous and imply no imperfection (*perfectiones simpliciter simplices*) are not unsuitable to express analogically and at the same time really absolutely perfect Being, and *de facto* do express this Being if the universe postulates an Infinite Cause possessing these perfections.

Minor: Primary notions of being, unity, truth, good-

ness, efficient cause, final cause, intellect, will, wisdom, justice, mercy, etc., express perfections which involve no imperfection and are analogous.

Conclusion: Therefore these first notions and principles are not unsuitable to express, analogically and really, absolutely perfect Being, and in fact enable us to know Him with truth if the universe postulates an Infinite Cause which possesses these perfections.

The *Major* is explained and proved.

There are certain perfections (*perfectiones simpliciter simplices*) which involve no imperfection in their nature although they exist in a finite way in the creature, e.g., being, wisdom, life, etc.

On the other hand there are perfections (*perfectiones mixtæ*) which involve imperfections in their nature, e.g., animality involves corporeity, and discursive reason implies the passing from power to act.

Analogous perfections are opposed to those that are *univocal* and to those that are *equivocal*. *Univocal things* are those which have a common name and the same nature, e.g., animal is predicated univocally of worm, horse and man, because the nature signified by animal (i.e., a body living a sensitive life) is the same notwithstanding the inequality of specific differences extrinsic to the genus.

Equivocal things are those which have a common name, but whose natures are absolutely different. The name "dog" for instance is the name of the domestic animal, of a fish and of a constellation.

Analogous things have a common name and different natures, but from a certain point of view they are similar. Thus the pulse, atmosphere, medicine, food, animal, may all be described as healthy by analogy. Analogy is two-fold—analogy of proportion or attribution and analogy of proportionality. The relation (e.g.) of 2 to 1 is a relation of proportion; the relation of two proportions (e.g.) $\frac{4}{2} = \frac{6}{3}$ is a relation of proportionality.


(a) Analogy of proportion or of attribution indicates an extrinsic relation of one or of several things to one principal thing or idea. The relation may be exclusively extrinsic or extrinsic and intrinsic.

Thus (1) Medicine and colour are called healthy because of their relation or proportion to the health of a man. In this case the predicate "healthy"

analogically applied to medicine and colour is extrinsic.

(2) Quantity and quality are called "beings" because of their relation to substance. In this case the predicate "being" analogically applied to accidents is extrinsic, but "being" belongs to them intrinsically at the same time. Similarly "being" belongs to a creature only contingently, to God necessarily. Hence a creature compared to God is only analogically a being, though "being" belongs to the creature intrinsically at the same time. Thus "being" may be attributed analogically to substance and accident, since there is proportion between substance (i.e., being in itself) and accident (i.e., being in another). "Being" can also be attributed analogically to God and the creature, since there can be formed between the nature and attributes of God and the nature and attributes of the creature a similitude of proportion, i.e., proportionality.

Note the following chart of the analogy of proportion or of attribution:



(b) Analogy of proportionality indicates the likeness of proportion which different things manifest amongst themselves. Analogy of proportionality exists between those things which have a common name and whose natures signified by the name, though diverse, are similar proportionately, i.e., according to the likeness of proportions.

The analogy of proportionality is either metaphorical or real—metaphorical if the relationship is intrinsic and real

in the one case and only metaphorical in the other. A king is truly called a king of men, but a lion is only metaphorically king of brute beasts. But the analogy of proportionality holds: as a king is to men so is a lion to brute beasts. When the statement is made "God is angry," anger is attributed only metaphorically to God. Hence the error of Maimonides and of modern Agnostics who say that all attributes are applied to God only metaphorically. They do not distinguish between perfections which imply no imperfection like wisdom, and perfections with a connotation of imperfection like anger. The analogy of proportionality is real when the relationship is intrinsic and real in both cases, though perchance more perfect in the one case. Being is really and intrinsically attributed to substance and accident, hence substance in relation to its being is analogous to accident in relation to its being. If we understand the symbol "=" to indicate not mathematical equality, but similitude of analogy, then we may say:

$$\frac{\text{created substance}}{\text{in relation to its being}} = \frac{\text{accident}}{\text{in relation to its being}}$$

The analogy of real proportionality is subdivided into cases where there is and is not a definite distance between the analogous proportions. Thus between a created substance (*e.g.*, orange) and its accident (*e.g.*, colour) there is a corporal proportion implying a definite distance. But between sensation and intelligence there is no determined distance, and yet sensation and intelligence are both with real and intrinsic analogy called cognition. Hence:

$$\frac{\text{Sensation}}{\text{in relation to its sensible object}} = \frac{\text{Intelligence}}{\text{in relation to its intelligible object.}}$$

Again:


$$\frac{\text{Sensitive Love}}{\text{in relation to sensible good}} = \frac{\text{Rational Love}}{\text{in relation to rational good.}}$$

Thus, according to the analogy of real proportionality without determined distance, it is not repugnant that some quality should be ascribed to God and a creature intrinsically and really and not merely metaphorically. Hence:

1° Notions of perfections which imply no imperfection may express in some real way infinitely perfect Being, because nothing is repugnant to infinitely perfect Being unless on the ground of imperfection.

2° Notions which express perfections without suggestion of imperfection, and which are analogous in the created order, are not unsuited to express infinitely perfect Being analogically and really, because proportionality does not necessarily postulate a determined distance. The proportionality is metaphysical not mathematical, founded not on quantity but on being.

Note the following chart of analogy of proportionality:



The minor of the syllogism is explained and proved. Primary notions of being, unity, truth, goodness, efficient cause, final cause, intellect, will, wisdom, prudence, justice, mercy etc., express perfections which imply no imperfection and are analogous. The notion of "being," for example, involves no imperfection, because it does not suggest matter, it does not involve limitation, and it is analogous with implication of subsistent and accidental being. The same applies to unity which is undivided being, to truth which is being conformable to the intellect, to goodness which is perfect and desirable being. The epithet "good" by virtue of analogy of real proportionality is applied to material and spiritual goodness, and because it does not involve imperfection or limitation, it is not repugnant that "good" should express infinitely perfect Being

according to analogy of real proportionality without determined distance. Thus we have "good fruit," "a good horse," "a good moral act," "Being infinitely good." Again efficient and final causes involve no imperfection and are analogous terms. They are extrinsic reasons of being. To create "being" involves no imperfection whereas to produce heat, which is a modality of being involves limitation. As an efficient cause has a relation to its effect and is called "cause of that effect" it is not repugnant that infinitely perfect Being should have a relation to the most universal effect—being of things—and should be called analogically and really the cause of such being, *i.e.*, First Transcendent Cause.

Similarly knowledge, love, intellect, will involve no imperfection and are analogical. Hence the following proportionalities:

Sense	=	Created Intellect	=	Uncreated Intellect
in relation to sensible object		in relation to created intelligible object		in relation to uncreated intelligible object
Sensitive Love	=	Rational Love	=	Uncreated Love
in relation to sensible good		in relation to rational good		in relation to uncreated good.

We speak accordingly of Divine and human knowledge. In man the created form of knowledge is generically a quality, specifically a habit and is measured by things. In God wisdom is not an acquired habit, but is identical with the Divine essence, and is not measured by things but is the cause of things. Human love is aroused by the perfection of outward objects, Divine love creates and infuses perfection in created things.

(B) Indirect demonstration of the transcendent value of primary notions and principles.

If the transcendent value of primary notions and principles be denied, doubt of God's existence ensues, doubt also of the principle of causality. If the principle of causality is doubtful, something may come into being without a cause, existing neither of itself nor through another, *i.e.*, it is something and nothing at the same time. In this way the principle of non-contradiction disappears, and knowledge of any kind becomes impossible.

The transcendent value of primary notions and principles

has been demonstrated. It will be of advantage to consider briefly one objection. In the equations given above, between the terms of which an analogical similitude (represented by the symbol "=") is claimed, are there not in each equation which introduces Divine attributes two unknowns, and are not the equations consequently of no value? Does not the following expression symbolically represent their value:


$$\frac{?}{?} = \frac{a}{b}$$

Answer: In the equations given above the Divine attributes are known *positively* from the fact that there is a real proportionality with corresponding created perfections, and their divine mode is known *negatively* and *relatively*. Hence there are not two unknowns in the equations.

As a *résumé* of the reasoning given in this chapter, it is interesting to follow the results of applying equivocal, univocal and analogical attributes to the Deity.

- (1) Maimonides and Modern Nominalist Agnostics claim that God's nature and attributes are entirely different from created perfections. Goodness and wisdom are only virtually (causaliter) in God. As the being of God is absolutely different from created being, God becomes unknowable.
- (2) Duns Scotus, an extreme realist, claimed that created perfections should be predicated univocally of God. In this hypothesis God is knowable, but there must be in Him an actual-formal multiplicity of perfections (which is contrary to Divine simplicity). It is interesting to note that Duns Scotus defended the univocal application of perfections by asserting that no syllogism is valid unless the middle term be used univocally. He was wrong. Unity of proportionality is sufficient for the valid use of middle term.
- (3) The moderate realism of St. Thomas and his doctrine of analogy result in the ascription to God of perfections between which and corresponding created perfections there is a real proportionality. Divine perfections are identical with the Divine essence since there is only a virtual distinction between them, and thus God is shown to be absolutely simple, and analogically knowable.

The following illustrations shew how in each case the creature using his conception of being attempts to gain some knowledge of the Deity. Concept of being which has absolute unity, *i.e.*, taken univocally is represented by the symbol O, taken equivocally by symbol Θ. Concept of being which has unity of proportionality, *i.e.*, taken analogically, is represented by the symbol ∞.



Clearly the controversy which raged amongst Paris students—Nominalists, Realists and Conceptualists—during the twelfth century has not been without fruit for the validity of knowledge.

Having grasped the value, ontological and transcendental, of primary notions and principles, the student may profitably study the relation of first principles one to another.

(A) The fundamental principle of reason is the principle of Contradiction (sometimes called “principle of Non-contradiction.”)

This principle is immediately founded on the idea of being with its implication of non-being. The logical form

may be thus stated: “It is impossible to affirm and to deny the same attribute in regard to the same thing in the same relation.” The ontological form is as follows: “It is impossible that the same thing should be and not be at the same time.” The logical form asserts that an absurdity (*e.g.*, a square circle) cannot be *conceived*, the ontological form claims that the absurdity cannot *exist*. *A* is not not-*A*. Descartes wrote unwisely in his *Discours sur la Méthode* that a square circle though inconceivable by us might be conceived as really existing by an omnipotent Being. If that is so, Descartes’ principle “*cogito, ergo sum*” has no value, inasmuch as thought and non-thought, life and non-life would be compatible.

(B) The principle of Identity.

The fundamental supreme principle of Contradiction can be expressed in positive form: *A* is *A*, and in this form is called the principle of Identity. It is not tautologous. It is a positive affirmation of the identity of being, and of its opposition to non-being—the affirmation of the absolute and immutable value of truth. “Let your speech be yea, yea: no, no.” In more explicit form the principle may be thus expressed: “every being has a definite essence,” “every being is a thing.” This latter form is not tautologous, for whilst “being” connotes existence, “thing” connotes essence.

(C) The principle of Substance.

If the unity and identity of a thing be regarded from the standpoint of its variable phenomena, the principle of Identity takes on a new meaning. The essence of the thing in question is now regarded as a substance, and the new principle may be formulated: “every being is a substance,” *i.e.*, every being is one and the same under its variable phenomena if it has phenomena. A phenomenon is only the accident by which a being appears. These three principles of Contradiction, Identity and Substance come from the intrinsic, constitutive, specific cause, *i.e.*, the formal cause of the being. Other principles come from extrinsic causes, *viz.*, efficient and final, and from the intrinsic material cause.

(D) Principle of Reason of Being (*Raison d’être*).

Every being must have a reason why it should exist rather than why it should not exist. This principle, like

the foregoing three, is immediately evident and therefore cannot be directly proved. It can be proved indirectly (extrinsically) by *reductio ad absurdum*, for if a thing has no reason of being it becomes nothing. Subjectivists like Kant derive this principle from a reflex act of reason upon itself, but the principle is intuitive.

Another form of the principle is: every being has the reason of its being either in itself or in another. If it has the reason of its being in itself (if essence necessitates existence) the being is necessary. But if the reason of its being is in another, such reason is its extrinsic cause. There are two extrinsic causes—efficient and final. Hence the principle of Reason of Being leads to the principles of Causality and of Final Cause.

(E) Principle of Efficient Cause.

A contingent being is one which may or may not exist. Hence follows the principle of Efficient Cause. Every contingent being is caused by another being. This immediately evident principle may be proved indirectly, for if a contingent being is not caused by another, its being must be from itself, *i.e.*, it is not contingent but necessary.

(F) Principle of Final Cause.

"Every agent acts for an end." The end is not merely the result of the action, but the reason on account of which the agent acts. The eye sees; sight is its end. The ear hears; hearing is its end. The acorn would not produce an oak tree rather than a pear tree, if it were not directed to produce that effect. Passive tendency of an irrational agent presupposes direction of a rational agent. An arrow tends to the mark because directed by the archer.

This principle—immediately evident—can be proved indirectly. When an agent produces an effect—an effect suitable to its activity, if the agent did not tend to produce that effect the suitability of the effect would be without a reason of being (*raison d'être*). The effect, determined and suitable, produced by an agent is intentional. Chance is an accidental cause. A gravedigger in digging a grave finds a treasure. The digging of the grave is intentional; the burying of the treasure was intentional. Chance is the accidental conjunction of two intentional causes.

(G) The principle of Change.

This principle comes from the material cause—the

matter, and may be thus formulated: "All change presupposes a subject capable of change." The idea of change suggests the important philosophic conception of the passage from power to act, from potentiality to achievement.

The principle may be proved indirectly: change without a subject changed would be a change of nothing, *i.e.*, a change and not a change at the same time. Creation is not a change as it is the production of the totality of being from no pre-existing material.

All these principles fall under four causes, formal, efficient, final and material. All are fundamentally dependent upon the principle of Contradiction.

CHAPTER IV

PANTHEISTIC EVOLUTION

ART. I.—*Statement of Various Views.*

I.—General Idea.

According to this doctrine, the Principle of all things does not exist of itself, is not eternal, nor really distinct from the world, but is a "Becoming"—a constant evolution which, determining itself, constitutes the universe of things. God is Creative Evolution!

In this system of absolute evolution there is a negative and a positive element.

(A) Negative element.

1° Denial of existence of God the Creator. The first principle is an immanent tendency to development, and there is no need of a transcendent Creator.

2° Denial of the order of Supernatural truth and life. Human reason is a participation of the immanent principle. There is no need of supernatural intervention.

3° Denial of the possibility of miracles. The immanent principle is not really or essentially distinct from the universe, and therefore cannot intervene.

(B) Positive element.

All religious phenomena are explicable by the development of the religious sense. Religious truth changes as man changes.

II.—Empirical Evolution, i.e., Monism.

Matter is the principle of all things; from matter come life and rationality.

Haeckel in his *Die Welträtsel* lays down the general and the religious philosophy of Monism.

(A) General Philosophy.

There is nothing above or beyond phenomena.

(a) An indirect proof is drawn from the Conservation of Energy. It is claimed that this physical and chemical principle would be rendered false if vegetative, sensitive

and rational life had an influence on the physico-chemical order. Hence vegetative, sensitive and rational life are mere results or developments of material laws.

(b) A direct proof is drawn from resemblance between spiritual and material phenomena. For example, mutual affinity between hydrogen and oxygen is a rudimentary inclination, which, by development, leads to affinities in higher organisms.

(B) Religious Philosophy.

(a) Negative part. Denial of the Supernatural order.

(b) Positive part. Science can satisfy the needs of speculative reason, and will later on be able to satisfy the needs of the human heart. Until then, religion is useful! Positive religion consists in the cultivation of the true, the beautiful, the good. Christianity, based on the Supernatural, is not true. Art as such does not belong to Christianity. The good in Christianity consists in observance of the precepts of the Natural Law, and is therefore independent of Christianity. The true, the beautiful, the good constitute respectively Science, Art and Sociology. Education should be entirely secular.

III.—Idealistic Evolution.

The supporters were Spinoza, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. Zeller and Fischer have written the history of this system. In Germany, Baur, Ewald, Reuss, Knobel and Wellhausen have applied the principles to Hermeneutics. In France, Renan and Loisy wrote from the standpoint of Hegelianism.

In this system the Principle of development is no longer matter, but an idealistic principle named the Absolute. In human reason the Absolute became conscious of itself. If the history of Idealistic Evolution be traced backwards, the germ of the system will be found in Gnosticism.

1° Gnosticism

God does not act directly upon the world, but acts through æons sprung from Him. Æons emanate from the Divine Substance. A demiurge made spirit, but associated matter with spirit. Hence a spirit (Christ) superior to the demiurge came to reconcile the world to God.

2° Pantheism of Spinoza.

His views are found in his *Tractatus Theologico politicus* and in his *Ethica*.

(a) Theory of Substance.

The "Universal" of the mind has an objective existence. Thus extreme realism leads to Pantheism. There is only one Substance. Substance is not merely "being subsisting of itself" (*ens per se subsistens*), but "being subsisting from itself" (*ens a se subsistens*). Substance is therefore uncreated, eternal, *i.e.*, God.

(b) Theory of Knowledge.

The human mind has a natural intuition of the Divine essence. Hence no need of a Supernatural order. This Onotlogism of Spinoza is found also in works of Malebranche, and to some extent in those of Rosmini.

(c) Theory of Happiness.

The love of the human mind for God is a part of the infinite love whereby God loves himself. Personal immortality is therefore impossible.

3° Pantheism of Fichte (1762-1814).

The pantheism of Fichte is derived partly from Kant and partly from Spinoza. Fichte very justly found a difficulty in applying the subjective categories of Kant to objective phenomena. Why should reason, he asked, apply to certain phenomena the category of causality rather than some other category, *e.g.*, substance? Must it not be from objective considerations perceived in the phenomena and how therefore can the category of causality be purely subjective? Moreover Fichte observed that in the Kantian system the objective reality of those things perceived by the sense (*i.e.*, their mere existence, as according to Kant extension, duration, etc, are subjective) is taken for granted. Fichte laid down the following principles:

- (1) We have knowledge only of our conscious states.
- (2) We objectify the laws by which our activity is limited and call the limitation matter.
- (3) So-called higher truths, *e.g.*, existence of God, are purely subjective ideas.

Fichte taught that the ego and non-ego mutually determine each other. He endeavoured to span the gulf between the ego and the non-ego by distinguishing in the subject a twofold ego—one finite and empirical, the other

transcendent. The transcendent ego is something real and ideal, *viz.*, "practical reason of human society." He allowed that the non-ego may be a nonentity.

The critic may ask: may not the ego be also a nonentity? Thus Fichte's earlier system ends in nihilism. Fichte taught later the reality of the ego and the non-ego, and the identity of both, *i.e.*, an absolute subject-object. Hence whatever we experience within ourselves, or whatever we see without are both alike manifestations of one and the same absolute mind, *i.e.*, of the Deity—not merely creations of His power, but actual modifications of His essence.

As an instance showing how difficulties arise from the application to God of human attributes in their univocal and not in their analogous sense, Fichte in *Critica cujuslibet Revelations* (Opera V.) writes: "The living God is Humanity itself. I shrink from a religious conception which regards God as a personal being . . . a personal God would be as a percipient subject limited by the object known, and thus God would not be infinite." In Catholic philosophy the attribute of personality is applied to God only in an analogous sense.

4° Pantheism of Schelling (1775-1841).

Schelling stresses the error in Fichte's teaching by pointing out that the transcendent ego cannot produce the non-ego, *i.e.*, the object. Ego and non-ego are correlative. Both presuppose the absolute. Both are one and the same essence running parallel to each other. Hence the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of spirit, both having their root in the Absolute.

In Schelling's system the infinite mind (absolute) passes through various forms of objective and unconscious development as seen in matter, motion, organism and attains to a state of self-consciousness in sensation, reflection, freedom and is carried by practical movement (individuality, society, history) to the highest point of self realisation—'Art. Herein is the unity of ideal and real. It is clear that all difference between God and the universe is lost in this system. There is one enormous chain of necessity.

Schelling tried later to modify his pantheistic views by writing what he named *Positive Philosophy*. He found in Christianity the same threefold movement which runs through the whole system.

First Movement. Catholicism : religion of Peter, objective in its nature.


Second Movement. Protestantism : religion of Paul, which appeals to subjective consciousness.

Third Movement. Perfect Religion : religion of John : union of all in love.

Schelling's system is founded :

- (1) Upon an illusion—the process of mental generalisation is made into a real and essential principle of things themselves.
- (2) Upon a paralogism. Order of knowledge and order of existence are confounded.
- (3) Upon an exaggeration. The harmony which exists between intelligence and reality is made into an identity.
- (4) Upon an hypothesis. It is a gratuitous supposition to place all truth in the reason and thus to make reason equal to God.

Note the development of these systems :



5° Pantheism of Hegel (1770-1831).

The absolute with Hegel is not infinite substance as with Spinoza, nor the infinite subject as with Fichte, nor the infinite mind as with Schelling : Hegel's Absolute is a perpetual process, an eternal thinking without beginning and without end.

According to Hegel there are three movements of the logical process :

I.—Bare thought. Hence logic with its (1) doctrine of being ; (2) doctrine of essence ; (3) doctrine of notion.

II.—Thought externalising itself. Hence philosophy of nature ; (1) of mechanics ; (2) of physics ; (3) of organism.

III.—Thought returning to itself. Hence philosophy of mind (1) subjective (anthropology, psychology, will) ; (2) objective (jurisprudence, morals, politics) ; (3) absolute (art, religion, philosophy).

Hegel's teaching turns upon two fundamental points : (a) the unity of contradictories and (b) identity of being and thought.

(A) Hegel's criticism of Schelling.

Hegel judged rightly that the Absolute of Schelling explains nothing. Transition from unity of the Absolute to multiplicity of phenomena is not explained in Schelling's scheme. Hegel proceeds to explain how multiplicity of phenomena comes logically and necessarily from primitive unity, and his explanation is summed up in the statement : "The Absolute is nothing else than the process of universal becoming and especially the ideal process."

(B) Logic and Metaphysics of Hegel.

Spirit is better known than matter. We have an immediate cognition of spirit but not of matter. Hence in the development of spirit and of thought, not in development of matter, is found the exemplar and cause of all phenomena. Hegel identifies logic and metaphysics.

How does development of ideas proceed? The first idea is that of universal being. But universal being is at the same time non-being because indeterminate. Hence being is non-being, and from this contradiction comes logically and necessarily the "becoming"—the synthesis by which are reconciled thesis and antithesis, *i.e.*, being and non-being. Being becomes nature when it externates itself, and becomes spirit when by the help of consciousness it makes itself the object of its thought. Thus the principle of the identity of contradictories is the law of higher reason and reality, whereas the classical principle of contradiction is the law only of lower reason, which makes use of abstract and static ideas.

(C) Hegel's Philosophy of Nature.

The process of "becoming" when not as yet conscious of itself is matter in which attraction and repulsion are opposed. From matter come vegetative, sensitive and finally rational life.

(D) Hegel's Philosophy of Spirit and Religion.

The subjective or individual spirit was the first appearance of spiritual life in men of primitive times.

The objective or social spirit appeared later in history.

The social spirit made legitimate the penalty of death, indissolubility of the marriage bond, waging of just war, etc. The Greeks in their day led the process of evolution. They were succeeded by the Romans, and now there is a "people chosen by God." (Surely Chauvinism gone mad!)

The absolute spirit guides development of social from individual spirit. Absolute spirit is true spiritual life and appears in three forms—Art, Religion and Philosophy.

Art appeared first and its development is in accordance with the degree in which matter is eliminated. Hence come, in the ascending scale, Architecture, Sculpture, Painting, Music and Poetry.

Religion is the antithesis of Art. Art deals with that which is material, Religion with the spiritual. In the East, Religion ignored material things. In Greece, Religion became a species of humanism. Finally, Christianity is the synthesis of Oriental and Grecian inspiration, inasmuch as the object of Christian worship is a God-man.

Philosophy (speculative) is the synthesis of Art and Religion. Antithesis between Sophists and Socrates led to Platonism. Antithesis between Plato and Aristotle led to the emanation theory of Plotinus. Antithesis between Greek philosophy and Christianity was synthesised by St. Augustine according to Plato's ideas, and by St. Thomas according to the teaching of Aristotle. Antithesis between the Sensism of Hume and Spiritualism of Descartes was synthesised by Kant. Antithesis between Fichte and Schelling was synthesised by Hegel. Transcendentalism of Hegelian philosophy is so called in opposition to Empiricism. But from the standpoint of Theism, Hegel's transcendentalism is identical with Immanentism.

HEGELIAN PHILOSOPHY AND CHRISTIANITY

(1) In Hegel's judgment, from the dogma of creation the truth should be retained that the infinite exists with the finite. Hegel identifies infinite and finite in the process of "becoming"—a contradiction of lower but not of higher reason.

(2) From dogma of the Trinity the truth should be retained which suggests a threefold relationship—the subject knowing, the object known, and the knowledge itself, *i.e.*, union of subject and object. Hence thesis, antithesis,

and synthesis. Günther (Semi-Rationalist) afterwards tried to demonstrate the doctrine of the Trinity, claiming that in God there must be Subject, Object (or Word), and the union of both, *viz.*, the Holy Spirit.

(3) From the dogma of the Incarnation something should be retained. A most excellent form of spiritual life was manifested in Christ. But the miracles attributed to Him are not credible.

(4) In the doctrine of Redemption, God "emptied Himself" (*exinanivit se*) became man and afterwards by His passion and death drew all things to Himself. Here again is the fundamental law of Evolution in a contradiction which is fruitful.

Before proceeding to make a general critique on Pantheistic Evolution, it will be well to indicate the insuperable objections under which Hegelianism labours.

(1) Whence does the process, the great rhythm of existence proceed? Hegel pretends to have solved the whole secret of being, to have no realistic starting point; to begin with zero and deduce everything. This pretension is not fulfilled. The law of existence is still assumed and unaccounted for.

(2) There is hopeless confusion between the logical process of thinking and the real process of things themselves. The logical idea commencing with nothing simply by its own inward movement or self-unfolding creates the universe! We may *in thought* begin with the most abstract notion and go on adding attribute to attribute till we have placed the whole concrete universe before us. But this can never be put down as identical with the process of creation itself.

(3) The system of Hegel is utterly inconsistent with the results of psychology. Human freedom vanishes. Man is but the mirror of the Absolute, personality is sunk in the Infinite. Moral obligation perishes.

(4) In Hegelianism, the Deity is a process ever going on but never accomplished; nay, Divine consciousness is absolutely one with the advancing consciousness of mankind! The hope of immortality perishes, for death is but the return of the individual to the infinite. In the case of some of Hegel's followers, Strauss, Bruno, Baur, Conradi, Feuerbach, Pantheism attains the point at which it ever tends, that, namely, in which it becomes fully synonymous with atheism. The New Testament is so rationalised upon

that the whole of the historical portion is regarded as a designed mythology in which are conveyed to us important truths.

Art. II.—Critique on Pantheistic Evolution.

1° Denial of principle of Efficient Cause.

Pantheistic Evolution teaches that the principle of the universe is neither perfect of itself nor exists from eternity, but is evolved and passes from an imperfect state to one more and more perfect. In materialistic evolution, from brute matter come vegetative, sensitive and intellectual faculties. In idealistic evolution, from the idea of universal indeterminate being come all subsequent higher forms. Hence the more perfect comes from the less perfect—a conclusion utterly opposed to the principle of Causality, because the excess of perfection arises from no cause.

On the other hand, the principle of Efficient Causality claims that if being, life, intelligence, morality exist they postulate the existence of Necessary Being who possesses in an eminent way all the perfections visible in the universe.

2° Denial of principle of Final Cause.

Evolutionary process, in its materialistic form, is attributed to the material cause (*i.e.*, matter). In matter is the potency of development. The process is at first unconscious and blind. Hence there is no place for final cause.

The process, in its idealistic form, supposes an unconscious tendency whereby lower forms develop into higher. But this tendency has no *raison d'être*.

3° Negation of the principle of Change

Pantheistic Evolution identifies the subject of change and the change itself. Both are confounded in the process of "becoming." Matter is physical energy or activity always in motion. Hence motion does not need an extrinsic First Mover, but is itself the principle of development of all things. But as already shewn the principle of change requires a subject distinct from the change, otherwise there would be as it were flowing without a fluid, flying without wings, thought without a thinking subject. The subject of change is matter which does not exist of itself, *i.e.*, is contingent, and as such postulates finally an Infinite Cause for its creation. Evolution cannot be "Creative Evolution" which is Evolution without a cause, without an end, without a subject.

4° Denial of the principle of Reason of Being.

Pantheistic Evolution has not reason of being (*raison d'être*) either in another or in itself. Not in another, because according to the system there is no transcendent cause, nor in itself, because evolution is a transition from indetermination to determination (from power to act), and this transition has not in itself a reason of being. Indetermination is not determination, nor does it contain determination in any higher way. Power cannot of itself become act—there is need of the agency of an extrinsic cause, itself in act.

5° Denial of the principle of Substance.

Phenomena presuppose the noumenon, *i.e.*, sensible qualities presuppose the substance in which they inhere. But advocates of Pantheistic Evolution maintain that there is no substance, but only a universal "becoming" without a subject. Material bodies are bundles of accidents (phenomena) bound together by some unknown law.

6° Denial of principles of Contradiction and Identity.

These principles postulate: being is being, being is not not-being. But again followers of Hegel teach that being and not-being are the same in the process of "becoming." Truth is only relatively true; error is only relatively erroneous. The definition of truth is not the time-honoured "equation of intellect and object," but "equation of mind and life," and as life changes, so must truth.

Thus Pantheistic Evolution denies all the first principles of reason, and the four causes correlative to them. This process of evolution is without a subject, without an efficient cause, without an intentional end, and jumbles together as identical contraries and contradictories. Denial of first principles is admitted and defended on the ground that the law of contradiction is a law only of lower reason—a law which makes use of abstract and static ideas, and not a law of higher reason which regards reality as always changing and in which contradictories are the same.

In opposition to this tissue of absurdities, Catholic philosophy shews that the first cause of all things is subsistent Being, absolutely simple, immutable, infinite, essentially transcending the universe. God is seen in the mirror of sensible things by reflexion from the light of first principles. Pantheistic Evolution is an irrefragable proof *per*

absurdum of the existence of God, who transcends the universe and is the source of the Supernatural Order.

Two objections drawn from views of Twentieth Century writers will be briefly considered.

1.—The first objection stated in syllogistic form runs as follows:

Major: That which is greater cannot be produced from that which is less.

Minor: But motion is greater than immobility.

Conclus.: Therefore motion cannot be produced from immobility, but exists of itself and is the principle of all things.

Answer: The difficulty arises from the ascription to God, who is infinite, of finite qualities without the necessary corrections. So-called antinomies of Kant and Spencer are due to the same error. Unchangeableness and immobility in God—the Unmoving *Energeia* of Aristotle—mean that God does not pass from power to act, from potentiality to achievement. He is Pure Act. Therefore His immobility is not the immobility of inertia, but the immobility of infinite perfection. This idea is enshrined in the words of the liturgical hymn:

*Amor Patris Filiique
Par Amborum, et utrique
Compar et consimilis:
Cuncta replet, cuncta fovet,
Astra regis, cælum movet,
Permanens immobilis.*

ADAM OF ST. VICTOR.

The answer to the syllogism is therefore clear:

The major is true.

The minor needs distinction. Motion is greater than the immobility of inertia, but not greater than the immobility of infinite perfection.

The same distinction is needed for the conclusion.

2.—Second objection.

Major: If an effect is produced extrinsic to the First Cause, there is more of being than existed before.

Minor: But by Creation created things were produced extrinsic to the First Cause.

Conclus.: Therefore after Creation, there was more of being than existed before, *i.e.*, more is produced from less.

Answer: Since God who is plenitude of being contains in an infinitely higher way all the perfections of creatures actual or possible, and since creatures derive their perfections from Him, God and creatures are not more perfect than God alone. The Infinite is not made greater by the addition of the Finite. After Creation there are more beings, but not more being. St. Thomas writes: "Created goodness compared to Infinite Goodness is like a point compared to a line." A point is position without magnitude, and the addition of such to a line does not increase its quantity. Students who grasp the teaching of St. Thomas do not make his teaching more perfect. The comprehension of the Saint's marvellous and illuminating reasoning increases the number of the wise, but does not augment the sum of wisdom. St. Augustine writes: "If thou art without God, thou art less; if thou art with God, God is not greater. Not through thee is God greater, but thou without Him art less."

CHAPTER V

AGNOSTICISM AND RATIONALISM

I.—Agnosticism in General.

(A) Definition :

Agnosticism is the system according to which human reason has knowledge only of phenomena. All beyond phenomena is unknowable.

"Thou canst not prove the Nameless, O my son,
Nor canst thou prove the world thou movest in,
Thou canst not prove that thou art body alone,
Thou canst not prove that thou art spirit alone,
Nor canst thou prove that thou art both in one;
Nor canst thou prove thou art immortal, no,
Nor yet that thou art mortal—nay, my son,
Thou canst not prove that I, who speak with thee,
Am not thyself in converse with thyself,
For nothing worthy proving can be proven,
Nor yet disproven: wherefore thou be wise,
Cleave ever to the sunnier side of doubt,
Cling to Faith beyond the forms of Faith!"

TENNYSON, *The Ancient Sage*.

John Stuart Mill regarded the existence of the world as dubious. Herbert Spencer admitted the existence of an external world on account of the resistance of bodies: the world is symbolically knowable, but its real nature is not knowable.

The origin of the name is given by the late Professor Huxley—one of the ablest of the Agnostic School:

"When I reached intellectual maturity and began to ask myself whether I was an atheist, a theist, or a pantheist; a materialist or an idealist; a Christian or a free-thinker; I found that the more I learned and reflected, the less ready was the answer; until, at last, I came to the conclusion that I had neither act nor part with any of these denominations, except the last. The one thing in which most of these good people were agreed was the one thing in which I differed from them. They were quite sure that they had attained a certain 'gnosis,'—had, more or less

successfully, solved the problem of existence; while I was quite sure I had not, and had a pretty strong conviction that the problem was insoluble. . . . So I took thought, and invented what I conceived to be the appropriate title of 'agnostic.' It came into my head as suggestively anti-thetic to the 'gnostic' of Church history, who professed to know so much about the very things of which I was ignorant. . . . Agnosticism is not a creed, but a method, the essence of which lies in the rigorous application of a single principle. . . . Positively the principle may be expressed: In matters of the intellect follow your reason as far as it will take you without regard to any other considerations. And negatively: In matters of the intellect do not pretend that conclusions are certain which are not demonstrated or demonstrable." (*Essays on Some Controverted Questions*, pp. 354, 355, 356, 362. Macmillan & Co., 1892).

(B) Foundation of Agnosticism.

The fundamental principle of Agnosticism is the denial of the ontological and transcendental value of the primary ideas and primary principles of reason. By transcendental value is meant (as has been shown) the power primary notions and principles possess of guiding human reason to the knowledge of a transcendent Cause.

(C) Consequences of Agnosticism in Religious Philosophy.

Negative (a) Existence of God unknowable.

(b) No possibility of miraculous intervention.

(c) Even if Revelation existed it would be only symbolic or metaphorical.

Positive (a) The religious sense, immanent in human nature, is the source of all religion.

(b) This religious sense is gradually evolved.

II.—Empirical Agnosticism. (Hume, Mill, Spencer, Huxley, Comte, Ribot, W. James, etc.)

1° General Philosophy.

An idea (e.g., of dog) is only a confused image of the imagination to which a common name (dog) has been given. This is the teaching of extreme Nominalism. Condillac inferred that "science is well-constituted language." Hence ideas represent only sensible phenomena.

Judgment is an association of two images. The exercise of reason results in an empirical conclusion drawn from sensible images.

Substance is merely a name for a collection of external phenomena bound together by an unknown law.

Personality is experience of internal phenomena, and is best defined as "consciousness of oneself."

Causality is the mere succession of antecedent and consequent: there is no influx from the one to the other.

2° Religious Philosophy.

(A) Negative side.

(a) First Cause unknowable. Human notions have only a phenomenal value, and cannot be applied to God. If so applied, antinomies ensue. The following are the antinomies which appealed to Spencer:

(1) Divine simplicity and Divine consciousness are opposed, inasmuch as consciousness implies duality of subject and object.

(2) Divine immutability and Divine liberty are not compatible, because a free act adds something contingent and mutable.

(3) Infinite Power and Goodness seem opposed to the permission of evil.

(4) Infinite justice and infinite mercy cannot be reconciled.

All hypotheses (Atheism, Pantheism, Theism) concerning the nature of the Absolute involve contradictions.

Answer: As indicated previously, Kant's and Spencer's antinomies are the result of ascribing human perfections to the Deity in their univocal, and not in their analogous sense.

(b) Miraculous intervention impossible.

(c) Revelation only symbolical and metaphorical.

(B) Positive Side.

(a) Herbert Spencer: All forms of religion are struggles of the human spirit to acquire representations of the unknowable. The conceptions are only symbolic, but they awaken the religious sense. In the development of the religious sense, the moral element prevails over propitiatory rites, and religion becomes an indefinite consciousness of the Absolute.

(b) Comte. Religion is moral and social life. Science

and philosophy are not sufficient to preserve the social bond. Hence the utility of religion. Certain truths of Christianity should be preserved, such as the existence of God and the immortality of the soul. God in this system of Comteism is humanity itself, and the immortality of the soul is impersonal—a life in the memory of the living. The chief precept of this positivist religion—the religion of humanity—is "live for others" (Altruism from *autrui*). In this religion the positivist trinity is venerated:

1. Great Being—humanity.
2. Great Temple—the earth.
3. Great Medium—space.

(c) Empirical psychologism of Ribot and others. Religious phenomena are the unconscious projection of human affections and desires towards an imagined object. There is no distinction between true and false mysticism, between the type of St. Theresa and that of Madame de Guyon.

(d) William James.

The fundamental characteristic of religion is the spirit of prayer and confidence whereby man thinks he has association with the Supreme Being. Later comes evolution of dogma. The value of religious experience should be judged from its results (pragmatism). Holiness is sometimes immoderate, but generally helps development of morality, which neither science nor sociology can effect. Dogmas cannot be proved, but they are useful in overcoming egoism. The existence of a personal God, of a particular Providence, cannot be proved, but if they are useful, they are practically true.

III.—Idealistic Agnosticism. (Kant, Renouvier, Schleiermacher, Ritschl, Sabatier, etc.)

1° General Philosophy.

The aphorism of Locke will be remembered: "*Nihil in intellectu nisi prius fuerit in sensu*," to which Leibnitz replied: "*Est intellectus ipse*." Kant was on the side of Leibnitz in his contention that necessary truths do not come from experience. Kant distinguished an analytic judgment which affirms the existence of an essential and obvious property ("every triangle has three sides") from a synthetic judgment which declares the existence of an attribute which does not *actually* belong to a notion, but which our minds are led by some kind of evidence to attribute to it. He subdivided synthetic judgments into two kinds:

Synthetic *à posteriori* derived from experience, *e.g.*, men are mortal.

Synthetic *à priori* of which the justification is a mental category, *e.g.*, every quality exists in some substance; every contingent being has an efficient cause.

Kant's categories—two for sensation (time and space), twelve for the understanding under four general heads (quantity, quality, relation, modality), and three great generalisations of reason (Soul, Universe, God) laid the foundation for subjectivism. The law of Causality, for example, is only a mental category applied to experience and consequently has no objective value. But the categories bind phenomena together, and constitute a science of phenomena subjectively necessary and universal. According to Kant (and herein he was right in his conclusion though his premises were false) Empiricism inasmuch as it fails to explain the existence of necessary truths should be rejected. It may be well to remind the student that Catholic philosophy defends the existence of necessary truths, not because of subjective categories, but because the mind sees their necessity and universality intuitively.

2^o Religious Philosophy.

(A) Negative Side.

(a) No speculative proof of the existence of God can be given, because primary principles (*e.g.*, principle of Causality) have no ontological value.

(b) Neither miracle nor revelation is possible.

(c) Dogmas cannot have a transcendental value, because they are expressed in accordance with human ideas which are not transcendental.

(B) Positive Side.

Practical reason affirms the existence of God by an act of natural faith. This faith attains to certitude, subjectively sufficient but objectively insufficient, of God the Rewarder who will crown virtue with happiness.

The Trinity signifies, not three persons, but three attributes of God.

The Incarnation is the manifestation of perfect moral life in Christ, who was only a just man.

Redemption through the death of Christ is only a sublime example of moral fortitude.

Original sin is nothing more than the conflict between spirit and flesh.

Sacraments are only symbols of moral ideas.

Kant's Philosophy is the source of the agnosticism of (a) many liberal Protestants such as Scheleiermacher, Ritschl, Harnack, and (b) of Modernists like Le Roy, Tyrrell and Loisy.

(a) Liberal Protestants.

Schleiermacher: "Revelation cannot be made credible by external signs; men are moved to faith by internal experience alone" (*Der Christliche Glaube*).

Ritschl: "Religion consists in the religious sense. Dogmas do not reveal God, but our sentiments of faith, hope and love towards God" (*Theologie and Metaphysik*).

Harnack: "Christianity is a higher form of natural religion. The essence of Christianity lies in the Fatherhood of God and brotherhood of man" (*Dogmengeschichte*).

Sabatier (Auguste): "Revelation is progressive knowledge of God in the consciousness of each individual. Knowledge of God comes from internal emotion of adoration. From this emotion springs prayer. From emotion of fear comes conception of Divine Justice, from emotion of love the idea of Divine goodness and paternity. Hence dogmas represent emotions, they symbolically express religious experience. Certain simple doctrines are immutable such as the Fatherhood of God. Other dogmas change (a) by desuetude, such as belief in eternity of punishment; (b) by intussusception, *i.e.*, development of new meaning, *e.g.*, Trinity; (c) by renovation of old or creation of new conception, *e.g.*, justification by faith" (*Les Religions d'Autorité et la religion de l'esprit*).

(b) Modernists.

Modernism was treated philosophically by E. Le Roy (*Dogme et Critique*), spiritually and mystically by Fr. Tyrrell (*Christianity at the Cross-roads, etc.*), historically by Abbé Loisy (*Autour d'un Petit Livre, etc.*).

Le Roy: "Existence of God cannot be proved because the principle of Causality is only a relation between phenomena. Religious experience gives assurance of God's existence. A miracle is an effect of lively faith. Dogmas, from the speculative standpoint, cannot have a positive sense, because the ideas they express have no ontological or transcendent value. Dogmas have a negative sense, and from the practical standpoint a positive

sense. For instance 'God is a Person' means negatively that God is not corporeal nor a mere idea, and means positively: act towards God as if He were a Person. The resurrection of Christ signifies only His spiritual influence after death."

Tyrrell: "Religion is the internal experience of God's presence and of His paternity. This experience is universal; hence revelation and faith are identical. The experience is expressed at first imaginatively. Christ is described by St. Peter as the Messiah, by St. Paul as the Second Adam, by St. John as the Word, by the first faithful as the Son of God. The experience is expressed later intellectually. The Nicene Council approved the formula: 'Word substantial with the Father.' These formulas are not absolutely true. The Church has erred in regard to dogmatic formulas. The primary rule of faith is conscience. New ideas in religion are condemned at first, but adopted later."

Schell: In Germany, Schell taught that the authority of the Church must be accepted by the learned with restrictions.

Loisy: (Modernist Exegist). Loisy regards the New Testament as a human document, and explains away all supernatural features in allegorical and psychological interpretation. The non-intervention of God in history is an axiom with Modernists. "*L'historien*," says M. Loisy, "*n'a pas à s'inspirer de l'agnosticisme pour écarter Dieu de l'histoire; il ne l'y rencontre jamais*" (*Simple Réflexions*, p. 211).

"*Erit enim tempus cum sanam doctrinam non sustinebunt, sed ad sua desideria coacervabunt sibi magistros prurientes auribus, et a veritate quidem auditum avertent, ad fabulas autem convertentur.*" (2 Tim. iv. 3).

The basic principle of Agnosticism, the principle which denies the ontological and transcendental value of primary notions and principles has already been refuted. In England, Sensism and Hegelianism are on the decline. Pragmatism (negation of all philosophy!) has a dubious following. There seems to be a growing appreciation of the sanity and cogency of Scholastic Philosophy, especially as interpreted by the luminous teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas. *Quod felix faustumque sit!* It will be sufficient to indicate briefly some of the chief difficulties which Agnosticism involves.

Critique.

I.—Against empirical Agnosticism.

(a) Intelligible things *per se*—objects of primary notions—cannot be expressed in sensible images. A sensible image represents only phenomena in juxtaposition. Empiricists regard substance as a collection of phenomena. An orange to them is colour, fragrance, weight, shape, taste, etc., all these accidents being bound together by some unknown law. Causality to the empiricist is a mere succession of events, whereas causality imports the idea of effective production.

(b) The necessity and universality of the first principles of reason are not accounted for by empiricism. If, for example, the principle of causality is only a law of experience, its universality and necessity cannot be explained.

(c) The conviction of the objective value of human judgments becomes an insoluble difficulty. Illusion is something accidental, whereas this conviction is universal.

(d) The illative value of syllogistic reasoning disappears to the empiricist. John Stuart Mill's criticism of the syllogism is well known:

*All men are mortal,
John is a man,
Therefore John is mortal.*

The conclusion, according to Mill, is already contained in the major premiss.

In reply it is necessary to point out that the major proposition is universal, and therefore beyond the power of empiricism to formulate. Again, though individual instances are implicitly contained in a general proposition, the explicit statement of an implicit truth is a gain in knowledge.

(e) The foundation of Induction, *i.e.*, the statement of a truth of universal application derived from individual instances is beyond the reach of empiricism. The principle of Induction is founded on the necessary principle of Reason of Being: "The same cause in the same circumstances produces the same effect," otherwise the variation of effect would be without a reason of being (*raison d'être*). But as empiricism denies all necessary principles, Induction becomes impossible.

(f) The trustworthiness of memory is a truth necessarily

accepted prior to experience. Any attempt to prove the trustworthiness of memory involves the assumption of the truth to be proved. Mill handsomely acknowledged that the necessity of this assumption gives a destructive blow to empiricism.

II.—Against Idealistic Agnosticism.

Three insoluble difficulties :

- (a) The universal opinion of the objective validity of primary notions and principles of reason.
- (b) The necessity of recourse to judgments synthetic *à priori* which, since they are neither wholly *à priori* nor wholly from experience, are blind judgments.
- (c) Arbitrariness of the application of Kantian categories. If amongst phenomena we are led to apply the category of Substance rather than the category of Causality, the reason is because our intellect apprehends in these phenomena substance rather than causality, and thus the subjective category is useless.

RATIONALISM

The foregoing errors have their root in Rationalism.

I.—Definition of Rationalism.

Rationalism is the teaching according to which human reason is the only judge of what is true or false, of what is good or evil. The essence of Rationalism is the claim that reason is autonomous. Hence there is no need of supernatural truth; nothing should be called true which is not evidently or demonstrably so. Historically, Rationalism is a development of the Lutheran principle of private judgment.

II.—Foundation of Rationalism.

Naturalism, *i.e.*, the system which denies the existence of supernatural life and truth is the foundation of Rationalism. Naturalism denies the possibility of elevation of *human nature* to the supernatural order; Rationalism is the application of this doctrine to *human reason*; Liberalism in religion is the application of the same doctrine to the *human will*.

III.—Consequences of Naturalism.

From the standpoint of the intellect Rationalism is opposed to Christian Faith. From the standpoint of the will, Liberalism is opposed to Christian Obedience. From

the standpoint of human sympathy and affection, Humanitarianism or Altruism is opposed to Christian charity. From the standpoint of lower faculties, sensualism is opposed to Christian self-denial, and finally from the standpoint of collective humanity, Socialism is opposed to the Kingdom of God in society.

Hence the fruits of Naturalism are as follows :—

Naturalism	{	Rationalism.
		Liberalism.
		Humanitarianism or Altruism.
		Sensualism.
		Socialism.

These fruits are opposed to those of the Supernatural Order :

Supernatural Grace	{	Christian Faith.
		Christian Obedience.
		Christian Charity.
		Christian Self-denial.
		Kingdom of God in Society.

A few Catholic writers—Semi-Rationalists—(Günther, Hermes, Frohschammer) have attempted to reconcile Rationalism with Catholic Faith. They held that Supernatural Mysteries can, after revelation, be proved by reason. Another attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable was made by F. de Lammenais who confounded Supernatural Faith with the traditional faith of the human race.

IV.—Spirit of Rationalism.

Frequently in rationalistic writings may be read commendation and advocacy of sincerity in the investigation of truth, advocacy of development of the natural religious sense, and even an admission of the truth of Christian mysteries if naturally interpreted. Whilst no judgment is passed on individual writers, the essential principle of their system is impious—the principle that human reason is so independent that even God cannot impose faith upon it. This is the spirit of infidelity and rebellion—the “pride of life” as St. John names it (1 John ii. 16.).

“*Corruptio optimi pessima!*” Rationalism is the corruption of charity and of religious Faith under the guise of broad-minded tolerance and the reconciliation of varying forms of religious belief.

V.—Different forms of Rationalism.

Some writers deny even the existence of the supernatural order: others deny its cognoscibility; others again deny

the intervention of God in human affairs. The following chart comprises these varying systems :

Rationalism denies possibility of Supernatural Revelation.	denial of its existence	Pantheistic Evolution	{ idealistic, <i>e.g.</i> , Fichte, Hegel, etc. empiric, <i>e.g.</i> , Haeckel
	denial of cognoscibility	Agnosticism	{ idealistic, <i>e.g.</i> , Kant, Sabatier, Ritschl. empiric, <i>e.g.</i> , Hume, Spencer, Comte, W. James.
	denial of Divine intervention	Deism	{ Cherbury, Voltaire, Cousin, J. Simon, etc

The treatise on the existence of Revelation confutes the error of Deism.

CHAPTER VI

"CREATIVE EVOLUTION": RÉSUMÉ OF THE TEACHING
OF M. BERGSON

M. HENRI BERGSON was born at Paris in the year 1859. He published his first work, "*Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness*," as a thesis for the doctorate at the Sorbonne in 1889. Seven years later (1896), his second work appeared, "*Matter and Memory*," and in 1907 he gave to the world his most characteristic production—"Creative Evolution."

Amidst much in his philosophic writings that is arbitrary and indefensible, one meets with statements that are profoundly true, and others promising and suggestive. "Kant wished to raise an impassable barrier between the world of phenomena which he handed over to the understanding, and the world of realities, entrance to which was forbidden. But possibly this distinction is emphasized too much, and the barrier may be easier to surmount than people suppose" (*Les Données*, p. 187). Again, "we live and move and have our being in the absolute (*i.e.*, the real). The knowledge of the absolute which we have is no doubt incomplete, but not external or relative. We reach to reality itself in its depth by the combined and progressive development of Science and Philosophy." (*C.E.*, p. 210. *References are to the Eng. Trans. by A. Mitchell, Ph. D.*).

The cardinal principle of the Bergsonian philosophy is contained in the statement: "Being does not exist, all is 'Becoming,'" *i.e.*, all is in a state of perpetual and integral change: πάντα ῥεῖ καὶ οὐδὲν μένει.

Certain results follow from the universal fluidity of being:

(a) Metaphysical results.

There is no substance, only attributes without substance; there is no category save movement.

(b) Logical results.

There is no principle of identity; no principle of contradiction; $2 + 2 = 4$ does not express absolute and

definitive truth, but the formula is useful, since it has succeeded.

(c) Criteriological results.

Since all is change, the faculty of abstract thought, which gives fixed principles, is deceitful.

In order to gain some knowledge of Bergsonian teaching, it will be well, first, to examine what is taught on certain subjects, and later to make a synthesis of such teaching, at any rate in regard to important points.

I.—Time.

M. Bergson contends that the ordinary conception of time is false because spatial. Time is not a homogeneous medium like space. *La Durée* (i.e., Real Time) is a heterogeneous, qualitative multiplicity of conscious states—a stream of consciousness. To use M. Bergson's words, *La Durée* is a "wholly qualitative multiplicity, an absolute heterogeneity of elements, which pass over into one another." (*Les Données*, p. 176). Such a time cannot be measured by clocks, but only by conscious beings, for "it is the very stuff of which life and consciousness are made." Intellect does not grasp Real Time, we can only have an intuition of it.

The fundamental self is a qualitative multiplicity of conscious states flowing, interpenetrating, melting into one another and forming an organic whole, a living unity or personality. Altering the old classical phrase "*sub specie aeternitatis*" to suit his special view of time, Bergson urges us to strive to perceive all things "*sub specie durationis*." *La Durée* is the continuous progress of the past which gnaws into the future:

Our past still travels with us from afar,
And what we have been makes us what we are.

It does not matter whether we regard our inner life as having *La Durée*, or as actually being *La Durée*. If we have *La Durée*, it is only an aspect of reality, but if our personality itself is *La Durée*, then time is reality itself.

CRITIQUE

The Aristotelian definition of time (adopted by St. Thomas) is "*mensura motus secundum prius et posterius*," i.e., measurement of motion from the stand-

point of before and after.* M. Bergson claims that time is a succession of *qualitative* changes. He denies the quantity and divisibility of time. Now, if time is a succession of heterogeneous qualities—qualities in perpetual and essential change—two instants of time cannot be alike, and the duration of time disappears. M. Bergson overlooks the fact that time is in part real, and in part ideal—real, because each of the successive parts has an existence and a real order of succession; ideal since the order is formally understood as a synthesis only by the mind. Hence without intelligence there would be no time, as Aristotle and St. Thomas assert. To identify time with human personality is to identify a modification of being with being itself.

II.—Human Freedom.

Having suppressed psychological duration in which freedom moves, M. Bergson proceeds:

"Some say we must follow the strongest motive, and hence freedom of the will is impossible. Others point out that the strongest motive may have become such from our free choice, and therefore freedom remains. But since in psychological duration there is no multiplicity of motives, the conflict of motives is illusory."

M. Bergson claims for freedom of the will the testimony of consciousness: "Human freedom is a fact, and amongst facts capable of proof, there is none clearer than the truth of human freedom." (*Les Données*, pp. 161, 165, 168). But his proofs are not only unsatisfactory, but destructive of freedom. All agree that a free act is one which is not necessarily determined by its cause. When the principle of causality is introduced into the discussion, Bergson, criticising the statement that "the same cause in the same circumstances produces the same effects," denies the assumption that causes or circumstances can be the same. In one sense he is right, but is the change in causes and circumstances essential or accidental? A hen never lays the *same* egg, and yet all the eggs have the

* St. Augustine writes (*Confessions* XI., 14): "Quid est tempus? Si nemo a me quærat, scio; si quærenti explicare velim, nescio." He notes that the world was created not *in* time, but *with* time. Bishop Gore makes the surprising statement that St. Thomas judged human reason to be unable without the help of Revelation to prove the existence of God (*Cf. The Holy Spirit and the Church* p. 190.) What St. Thomas held was that human reason needs Revelation to prove that God did not create *from* eternity

same characters of species, race, etc. Similarly the leaves of a tree resemble one another, despite their individual distinction.

What then is M. Bergson's proof of human freedom? Liberty cannot be defined. Every definition would favour determinism. To define liberty would be to deny it. "Briefly, we are free, when our acts come from our entire personality, when they express it, when they have with it the indefinable resemblance which one finds between the work and the artist." (*Les Données*, pp. 131, 132). In regard to which we say that this description of freedom is:

- (1) Too narrow. When I write or read I am free, though the action does not express my whole personality.
- (2) Too wide. The pursuit of happiness is the profoundest desire of human nature, and yet it is not free.

If M. Bergson was not an anti-intellectualist, he could show that intelligence in man is the root of freedom. The ideal conceived by the intellect enables us to see imperfections in created things, thus giving us motives for rejection. Moreover, if intelligence is not necessary for freedom, why are not the lower animals free?

III.—Union of Soul and Body.

M. Bergson has had the courage to disregard the veto of Kant, according to whom the problem of the union of the human soul and body is insoluble. He has had the courage also to maintain that "perception goes indefinitely beyond the cerebral state (*Matière et Mémoire*, p. 199), i.e., that cerebral states are not the cause of perception. He teaches that "Les corps sont des images," by which he means (notwithstanding the doubtful suitability of the terminology) that bodies have a real objective existence. "Une image peut être sans être perçue" is a statement in contradiction to the conclusion of Berkeley summed up in the phrase "*esse est percipi*"—a conclusion which witnesses to the bishop's uncompromising Idealism.

When M. Bergson examines the meaning of the word "soul," he disregards the intellectual operations, and fixes upon memory as being practically identical with spirit: "Memory manifests the mind." He contends that in passing from perception to memory, we pass from matter to spirit. He makes what is virtually the scholastic

distinction between the memory of images and the memory of ideas, though he fails to note that the memory of images is organic and is localised organically. The opposition of soul and body is the opposition of the unextended to the extended.

How does he effect the union?

Matter, he tells us, is a succession of very rapid moments. Spirit or Memory binds together this succession. The humblest rôle of the mind is to bind together the successive moments of the duration of things; it is in this operation that mind makes contact with matter. But how? His assertion contains "*voces et verba, praeterea-que nihil.*" Instead of seeking to unite in one subject entities which are opposed but complementary, he tries to identify them by finding middle terms between the two extremes, which will reduce differences of kind to differences of degree: "*Le physique n'est que du psychique inversé.*" Scholastics on the contrary stress the dualism of material being, made up as it is of an extended and passive principle and one that is unextended and active. The scholastic theory unites contraries without identifying them.

IV.—"Pure Becoming"—formula of universal change.

Aristotle notes that nature is the totality of things that move (*Phy.*, Book III, c 1). And by movement is meant not only movement of translation but of transformation. Thus movement or change is an universal phenomenon. What is the explanation of this characteristic? Three different schools of thought have given three different solutions.

(1) Eleatic School of Zeno.

Zeno denied the objective reality of movement. His example of Achilles and the tortoise is well known. Zeno held that "being" alone exists. But to make movement an illusion is to explain the obscure by something more obscure—*obscurum per obscurius*. To deny the evidence of the senses is, as Aristotle reminds us, an infirmity of thought—*ἀπρωστία τίς ἐστι διανοίας* (*Phy.*, Book VIII, c. 3).

(2) Ionian School of Heracleitus.

Heracleitus contended that movement is the sole reality. "Being" does not exist.

(3) Peripatetic Schools of Aristotle.

Aristotle taught that both "being" and "movement" exist. Passing phenomena are the manifestation of persistent being.

Bergson, like Hegel, chooses the teaching of Heraclitus, and speaks repeatedly of "the fluid mass of existence," "the perpetual flux of things," whilst his disciple M. Le Roy maintains that "'becoming' is the only concrete reality" (*Revue de Méta. et de Morale*, 1901, p. 418).

The teaching of M. Bergson fails in its application both to the world of matter and the world of thought.

(A) The world of matter is a spectacle diametrically opposed to that of a perpetual flux. There exist solidity, stability, permanence. The law of inertia has become the fundamental principle of physical science. In order to change in figure, quality, or even in position, every mass, every molecule requires an external impulse or attraction. "Being" is stable in itself, and changes only accidentally. The laws of Conservation of Energy, Indestructibility of Matter, shew that under the flux of change there is a stable and permanent foundation.

(B) The world of sensations, feelings, volitions, ideas remains the same when the variations are only accidental and imperceptible. We are certain of the permanence of our personal identity of the "noumenon," τὸ ὑποκείμενον, substantia. M. Bergson denies the existence of substance, being so far in accord with the phenomenalist school of which John Stuart Mill was one of the ablest protagonists.

Substance is the being or reality, which not only supports its attributes but produces them. Hence substance or being has a double function—static and dynamic. The static function consists in being the substratum of phenomena; the dynamic function produces the phenomena.

How can this teaching regarding substance be proved?

(1) From the "ego," i.e., from experience of personality.

(a) The conscious "ego" perceives itself as a permanent subject under the contingent flux of sentiments and volitions. How can the past be remembered unless the "ego" persists?

(b) The conscious "ego" perceives itself as the cause of these phenomena.

(2) Reason compels us to believe that attributes such as colour, weight, extension, etc., cannot exist of themselves, but require a substance in which they inhere, and of which they are modifications. On this subject, reasoning such as that of Taine, is manifestly fallacious. He asserts that "the ego is only a verbal entity, a metaphysical phantom," and he supports this statement by the following example: A board is cut up into squares, triangles, circles, etc. As the board is only the continuous series of its successive divisions, so the ego is only the continuous web of successive experiences (*De l'Intelligence*, p. 345).

A single sentence is sufficient to reveal the fallacy. The parallelism does not hold, because the board is a case of the whole and its parts, whereas the ego and its states are a case of cause and effect.

(C) The Bergsonian thesis that only movement exists makes science impossible.

Plato (*Cratylus*) through the mouth of Socrates has exposed the essential fallacy in this teaching. "If Being is constantly changing, it will not be possible to say what it is. Whilst we speak, it will have changed and lost its first form." Definition becomes impossible, and proof, which rests on necessary principles, likewise becomes impossible, because the principles of Identity, Contradiction and Causality vanish. The Bergsonian philosophy, however, does not hesitate to sacrifice these principles: "What is 'becoming'?" (writes M. Le Roy) "but a perpetual flight of contradictories which coalesce?" "Becoming" is only intelligible through the being which becomes.

V.—Evolution of Worlds.

EXPOSITION

M. Bergson's keen and subtle critical faculty has exposed the weakness of more than one form of evolution. He characterises the evolutionism of Spencer as false, because "it consists in cutting up present reality, already evolved, into little bits no less evolved, and then recomposing it with these fragments, thus positing in advance everything that is to be explained" (*C.E., Intro. p. xiv.*). He very justly points out that, in Darwinism, evolution is explained by external and accidental causes—by mechan-

ism—whereas the interior cause of evolution—the original vital impulse and its preferential direction—is rigorously excluded. He shows in words of power and cogency, illustrated by one of his splendid metaphors, the insufficiency of adaptation to environment as the *directing* cause of evolution: "We do not question for a moment that adaptation to environment is the necessary condition of evolution. It is quite evident that a species would disappear, should it fail to bend to the conditions of existence which are imposed on it. But it is one thing to recognise that outer circumstances are forces evolution must reckon with, another to claim that they are the directing causes of evolution. The latter theory is that of mechanism. It excludes absolutely the hypothesis of an original impetus, I mean an internal push that has carried life, by more and more complex forms, to higher and higher destinies. Yet this impetus is evident. . . . The truth is that adaptation explains the sinuosities of evolution, but not its general directions, still less the movement itself. The road that leads to the town is obliged to follow the ups and downs of the hills; it *adapts itself* to the accidents of the ground; but the accidents of the ground are not the cause of the road, nor have they given it its direction" (*C. E.*, pp. 107, 108).

Neo-Darwinism is slightly more scientific, inasmuch as it appeals for the explanation of variations to differences inherent in the germ. But M. Bergson cannot admit that these differences are accidental and individual. Every moment, he writes, right before our eyes, nature arrives at identical results by entirely different embryonic processes. For example, fixing our attention upon the eye of vertebrates and that of molluscs, "we may point out that the retina of the vertebrate is produced by an expansion in the rudimentary brain of the young embryo. It is a regular nervous centre which has moved towards the periphery. In the mollusc, on the contrary, the retina is derived from the ectoderm directly, and not indirectly by means of the embryonic encephalon. Quite different, therefore, are the evolutionary processes which lead in Man and in the pecten to the development of a like retina" (*C. E.*, p. 79). Again as regards the claim that the variations inherent in the germ are purely accidental, "the theory of Mutations (due to *De Vries*) is modifying Darwinism profoundly."

Turning to the question of heredity, facts show that

the hereditary transmission of acquired characters is the exception and not the rule—that is to say that Lamarckism and neo-Lamarckism are no more able than any other form of evolutionism to solve the problem how development has taken place, *e.g.*, from the pigment spot of the infusorian to the eye of the mollusc and the vertebrate.

M. Bergson's splendid ability is seen to advantage in his destructive criticism of various forms of evolution, but when he proceeds to formulate his own views, he becomes vague and unconvincing, because of his failure to recognise the validity of primary notions and principles. Note the haziness of the following:

"At a certain moment, in certain parts of space, a visible current has taken rise; this current of life traversing the bodies it has organised, one after another, passing from generation to generation, has become divided amongst species, and distributed amongst individuals, without losing anything of its force, rather intensifying in proportion to its advance" (*C. E.*, p. 27).

"The evolution movement proceeds like a shell, which suddenly bursts into fragments, which, being themselves shells, burst in their turn into fragments destined to burst again, and so on for a time incommensurably long. . . . When a shell bursts, the particular way it breaks is explained both by the explosive force of the powder it contains and by the resistance of the metal. So of the way life breaks into species and individuals. It depends, we think, on two series of causes: the resistance life meets from inert matter, and the explosive force—due to an unstable balance of tendencies—which life bears within itself" (*C. E.*, p. 103).

"Bifurcations on the way have been numerous, but there have been many blind alleys besides the two or three highways; of these highways themselves only one, that which leads through the vertebrates up to man, has been wide enough to allow free passage to the full breath of life" (*C. E.*, p. 105).

M. Bergson notes the various hypotheses which attempt to show the relation between matter and spirit:

- (a) Mind is determined by things. (Materialism.)
- (b) Things are determined by mind. (Idealism.)
- (c) Between mind and things there exists a mysterious agreement. (Pre-established Harmony.)

(d) The Bergsonian hypothesis. The same inversion of the same movement creates at once the intellectuality of mind and materiality of things.

"The mind can go in two opposite ways. Sometimes it follows its natural direction: there is then progress in the form of tension, continuous creation, free activity. Sometimes it inverts the direction, and this inversion, pushed to the end, leads to extension, to the necessary reciprocal determination of elements externalised each by relation to the others, in short, to geometrical mechanism" (*C.E.*, p. 235).

"What then is the principle that has only to let go its tension—may we say to defend—in order to extend, the interruption of the cause being equivalent to a reversal of the effect? For want of a better word we have called it consciousness. But we do not mean the narrowed consciousness that functions in each of us. Our own consciousness is the consciousness of a certain living being, placed in a certain point of space; and though it does not move in the same direction as its principle, it is continually drawn the opposite way, obliged, though it goes forward, to look back" (*C.E.*, pp. 249, 250).

"Hence physics is simply psychics inverted . . . the two terms are of the same essence, but move each in the direction inverse of the other" (*C.E.*, pp. 213, 214). "Intellectuality and materiality are of the same nature and have been produced the same way" (*C.E.*, p. 231).

CRITIQUE.

(A) An obvious difficulty appears: since spirit and matter are two antagonistic movements, how can they come from the same original impulse?

In M. Bergson's system there is no efficient cause. All change requires a cause, especially a change which is a passage from possibility to existence. It is not an explanation to assert that "God is not a substance, agent, cause, only a centre whence worlds spring" (*C.E.*, p. 262).

M. Bergson's philosophy is Pantheistic Monism though not materialistic. Vital impetus (*élan vital*) is an action and requires an agent. Otherwise it would be an evolution without anything which evolves, a perpetual creation without a creator, an autcreation which gives incessantly

to itself the existence which it does not possess! The Bergsonian "becoming" is a movement towards increase, a "power" in process of becoming an "act," and therefore an essential symbol of imperfection and contingency.

(B) M. Bergson hesitates as to the necessity of a final cause. If there is a contemporary writer, who has proclaimed openly the failure of mechanism—Cartesian, Spinozian, Liebnitzian, Spencerian, Kantian, etc.—surely M. Bergson is he. And yet he writes of "two ready-made garments that our understanding puts at our disposal, mechanism and finality; we show that they do not fit, neither the one nor the other, but that one of them (finality) might be recut and resewn, and in this new form fit less badly than the other" (*C.E.*, *Intro.* pp. xiv., xv.). "Whether we will or no, we must appeal to some inner directing principle in order to account for the convergence of effects" (*C.E.*, p. 80).

The original impulse has or has not a direction. If it has not, it can do nothing, for there is no movement without direction. If it has direction, it tends towards a goal, towards the realisation of an idea, of a plan, and we come back of necessity to finality. The representation of an end is not in the germ or embryo, but in the original impulse of the Creator. The end of a clock is not in the mechanism of the clock, but in the thought of the clockmaker.

To sum up: creative evolution without a creator and without an end, actions without an agent, effects without a cause, free actions without direction or aim are in opposition to the primary principles of Causality and Finality.

VI.—Perception.

Dr. Wildon Carr writes: "The important doctrine that perception is part of reality, that it actually exists whether it comes to consciousness or not, that it is not an independent and particular kind of inner or mental experience representative of external reality is most ably expounded by Bergson in *Matter and Memory*" (*Philosophy of Change*, p. 97).

"If rays of light come from a point P., this point and the rays which it emits, together with the retina and nervous elements affected in the process of Perception, all form a single whole. The point P. is an indispensable factor in this whole, and it is really in P. and not anywhere

else that the image of P. is formed and perceived" (Cf. *Bergson and His Philosophy*, by J. Alexander Gunn, p. 33).

Thus according to Bergson and the New Realism perceptions are non-mental realities. Take the case of the mind's perceiving the floor, the floor perceived is the mind's percept. All that the mind does is to exercise, owing to the stimulation of the floor, its power of perceiving in reference to the floor; it does not create or have created within it some modification of itself called a perception by means of which it is able to infer the existence of a floor.

Bergson's argument for the validity of this view is as follows: "Eliminate the image which bears the name 'material world' and you destroy, at the same time, the brain and the cerebral disturbances which are parts of it. Suppose, on the contrary, that these two images—the brain and the cerebral disturbance—vanish; *ex hypothesi* you efface only these, that is to say, very little—an insignificant detail from an immense picture—the picture in its totality remains. To make of the brain the condition on which the whole image depends is a contradiction in terms, since the brain is, by hypothesis, a part of the image" (*Matière et Mémoire*, pp. 3-4). His argument may be stated in another way. There is a system of images which we term "external world." My body is one of them. But within the body occurs affection, *i.e.*, sensation. Because of this distinction between images and sensations, Bergson affirms that the totality of perceived images subsists, even if our body disappears, whereas we cannot annihilate our body without destroying our sensations. The affection or sensation is the subjective aspect of the perception, the image its objective aspect. The one is within, the other is without the body. The perception does not represent but is reality.

Dr. Wildon Carr notes that the New Realism resembles the old idealism rather than the old realism, because for it perceptions are real, but it differs both from the old realism and the old idealism in saying that the perceptions are outside of and not in the mind. Bergson calls objects of which one is conscious "images," because the perception is a physical fact, and not a mental something from which we may infer a physical fact. The "image" is not something detached from the thing, something that resembles

or represents it, or is a truthful copy of it, but the object or thing itself.

The position which Bergson and the New Realists take up in regard to Perception differs very little from the scholastic view. Both systems insist that "we have an *immediate* perception of the outward world, that sense-impressions are not directly perceived, but determine the sense to the immediate perception of the outward object" (Cf. *Principles of Christian Apologetics*, p. 4). And both systems stress the fact that what the sense organs perceive is true, but not the whole truth. The universe is an infinite system of radiating energy, all radiation being wave-movement, and all difference in the universe being a difference of wave length. To certain ranges of wave lengths alone can we be susceptible, because our organs are fitted to react to these.

Finally, in answer to the question: what is it that perceives? Bergson replies it is the mind. The brain and movements of the brain are themselves perceptions, objects perceived; they cannot be also the act of perceiving.

VII.—Intellectual Knowledge.

(A) The Intellect.

M. Bergson is an anti-intellectualist, or shall we rather name him a supra-intellectualist? He maintains that the intellect cannot grasp movement, life, or continuity, because it is not made for speculation but for action.

(a) M. Bergson alleges that the intellectual conception of movement is a series of immobilities put together; because the intellect can form a clear conception only of immobility. "The intellect does not pretend to reconstitute movement such as it actually is; it merely replaces it with a practical equivalent" (*C. E.*, pp. 163, 164). Let us test the truth of this statement.

Aristotle defines movement as a "change or passage from one state to another state" (The change may be of place or quality or quantity). This passage is not something negative but positive—an incomplete act. Again movement is defined as "passage from power to act" (from potentiality to achievement); "act of power as such"; "act of becoming as such" (*Aristotle, Phys., Book III., c 1, § 6 and 9*). As Monsignor Farges writes: "*C'est le devenir en marche.*" It is clear from these

definitions that the philosophy of the schools contemplates movement as such, and not the juxtaposition of a series of immobilities. M. Bergson claims the identity, the homogeneity of being and non-being, act and power. Hence his expression "pure mobility." The dual element "act" and "power" is necessary for movement. Suppress this duality and movement itself is suppressed.

(b) The intellect cannot understand life.

In defence of this thesis, it is alleged that thought "created by life in definite circumstances to act on definite things cannot embrace life, of which it is only an emanation or an aspect." Is it only the whole which can know and understand one of its parts? In that case the intellect must be equal to the universe to understand the least detail. No sound philosophy claims that the intellect grasps the nature of any being in the totality of its energy and qualities. But the intellect sees some of the essential characteristics of entities, and is enabled thereby to build up the edifice of scientific truth. When Bergson notes that "life is above all a tendency to act upon matter . . . a certain effort to obtain certain things from brute matter," he fails to grasp the essential characteristics of life: (1) immanent activity, and (2) spontaneity.

(c) The intellect can grasp only discontinuity.

This statement is in direct conflict with personal experience. Each conscious intellectual being recognises himself as one and undivided, and this type of continuity is an immediate perception. Aristotle's definition of continuous bodies shows that he had adequate knowledge of the same: "continuous bodies are those whose extremities are one," i.e., the parts are united in such a way that the end of one is the beginning of another (*Phys. VI., c. 1*).

(B) Concept.

In the philosophy of the schools, the function of the Intellect is described as twofold—Abstraction and Generalisation. M. Bergson characterises abstraction as *morcelage*—an illegitimate division of Things, whereas he regards generalisation as a solidifying of the flowing stream of nature.

(a) "Morcelage."

The Bergsonian philosophy is monist. All is one. The universe is an immense continuity, from which the intellect cuts distinct parts like you and me. "If I want to

mix a glass of sugar and water, I must wait till the sugar melts. This little fact is big with meaning. The time I have to wait is not mathematical time, but a certain portion of my duration. What can this mean except that the glass of water, the sugar and the process of melting are abstractions?" (*C. E., p. 10*).

In answer to this contention, it is sufficient to say that the real distinction of cosmic things is an undeniable fact. Science is occupied with such divisions. Spatial continuity there may or may not be, but not substantial continuity. The denial of discontinuity in nature results in the elimination of all knowledge. Regarding which fact Bergson writes: "Matter is made to appear to our thought as an immense piece of cloth, in which we can cut out what we will, and sew it together again as we please (*C. E., p. 165*).

(b) "Solidification."

A concept, being crystallised, is dead.

If so, how do concepts give rise to science, morality, and art? M. Poincaré asserts that Science is made up of concepts. Morality arises from concepts of truth, perfection and love. The principles of the Fine Arts are embodiments of concepts. In truth every object has a twofold aspect—one, mobile and fugitive, the other, stable. M. Bergson has seen in a concept only its character of fixity and immobility, and as he maintains that all is flowing, a concept must be an instantaneous view taken from moving reality, the rapid succession of such instantaneous views giving the appearance of moving reality as in the cinematograph.

This statement invites criticism:

(1) A view is never absolutely instantaneous. There is necessarily an interval of time, which involves a quantity (however small) of motion.

(2) If they were instantaneous, it would be an image and not a concept. An image represents the singular, temporal, fleeting; whereas a concept represents the general, abiding.

(3) A concept is not a stable view derived from the instability (the flowing stream) of things, but a stable view based on the stable element of things, i.e., their necessary and abiding forms.

M. Bergson claims that a general notion or concept is

only a word. He is a nominalist for all concepts except that of time, in regard to which he is an ultra-realist, since he makes time the substance of things in his continuous universe.*

VIII.—Intuition.

We have already alluded to M. Bergson's anti-intellectual or supra-intellectual attitude. In his view the intellect can furnish us with symbolic knowledge only; it is a "lantern glimmering in a tunnel" and has been unwisely made into a "sun which can illuminate the world."

To understand what is meant precisely by Intuition is not easy. It is "knowledge from within that can grasp facts in their springing forth instead of taking them as already sprung, that can dig beneath a space and spacialised time" (*C.E.*, p. 382).

"The feeling we have of our evolution and of the evolution of all things in pure duration forms around the intellectual concept properly so called an indistinct fringe that fades off into darkness. Mechanism and Finalism agree in taking account only of the bright nucleus shining in the centre. They forget that this nucleus has been formed out of the rest by condensation, and that the whole must be used in order to grasp the inner movement of life. Indeed, if the fringe exists, however delicate and indistinct, it should have more importance for philosophy than the bright nucleus it surrounds. For it is its presence that enables us to affirm that the nucleus is a nucleus, that pure intellect is a contraction, by condensation, of a more extensive power" (*C.E.*, p. 49).

"We shall be aided by the fringe of vague intuition that surrounds our distinct—that is, intellectual—representation. For what can this useless fringe be if not that part of an evolving principle which has not shrunk to the peculiar form of our organisation, but has settled around it unasked for, unwanted? It is there accordingly that we must look for hints to expand the intellectual form of our thought; from there shall we derive the impetus necessary to lift us above ourselves" (*C.E.*, p. 52).

* M. Bergson wrote before the realisation of the principle of Relativity Professor Eddington remarks: "the detailed frame of space and time in which we are accustomed to locate events happening around us belongs not to the external world, but to a particular presentation of it namely to those observers who are travelling with the same velocity as the earth." (*Science, Religion and Reality* p. 193).

But the question arises: How can we study the fringe except by means of the intellect? M. Bergson notes the difficulty, but fails to give a satisfactory answer.

"Intuition is the *élan vital*, the vital impetus which has evolved into animal instinct, then into intelligence. The transition from instinct to intelligence has been made by a sharp leap, so that intelligence differs from instinct not in degree but in kind. The intellect is characterised by a natural inability to comprehend life. Whilst intelligence tries everything mechanically, instinct proceeds, so to speak, organically. If the consciousness that slumbers in it should awake, if it be wound up into knowledge instead of being wound off into action, if we could ask and if it could reply, it would give up to us the most intimate secrets of life" (*C.E.*, p. 174).

"Intuition is mind itself and, in a certain sense, life itself; the intellect has been cut out of it by a process resembling that which has generated matter" (*C.E.*, p. 282).

"Intuition is a lamp almost extinguished, which only glimmers now and then, for a few moments at most. But it glimmers wherever a vital interest is at stake. On our personality, on our liberty, on the place we occupy in the whole of nature, on our origin, and perhaps also on our destiny, it throws a light feeble and vacillating, but which nonetheless pierces the darkness of the night in which the intellect leaves us" (*C.E.*, p. 282).

CRITIQUE

(A) If intuition pierces the darkness of the night in which the intellect leaves us, how can the intellect be the luminous nucleus? In truth, M. Bergson's system cuts mental life in two, which thus becomes the exercise of a double faculty of intuition and thought. Herein is *morcelage* indeed which has momentous consequences. Moreover, intuition has absolute need of concepts; concepts are not a makeshift to replace intuition.

(B) M. Bergson's attempt to prove the existence and the functioning of a special faculty of intuition fails, because, as the philosophy of the schools has long pointed out, the intuitional process is a function both of sensitive perception and of intellectual conception. The truths are widely recognised that:

- (1) Man has an immediate intuition of the external world,
- (2) An immediate intuition of himself (ego), and
- (3) An immediate intuition which penetrates beneath phenomena, and perceives the underlying nature or substance.

(C) The intuitional power of the intellect is well described in the following passage: "From time to time Nature raises up souls more or less detached from practical life, seers of visions and dreamers of dreams, men of Intuition, with powers of great poetry, great music, or great painting. The clearest evidence of Intuition comes to us from the works of these great artists. What is it that we call the "genius" of great painters, great musicians, and great poets? It is simply the power they have of seeing more than we see and of enabling us, by their expressions, to penetrate further into reality ourselves. What makes the picture is the artist's vision, his entry into the subject by sympathy or Intuition, and however imperfectly he expresses this, yet he reveals to us more than we could otherwise have perceived" (*Bergson and his Philosophy*, by J. A. Gunn, p. 108).

IX.— Problem of Contingence and of Human Destiny.

In the philosophy of the schools, everything that begins to exist (*i.e.*, has a cause) is contingent. Before attacking the contingency of being, M. Bergson attacks the contingency of one of the modes of being, namely, order.

"When I enter a room and pronounce it to be in disorder, what do I mean? The position of each object is explained by the automatic movements of the person who has slept in the room, or by the efficient causes, whatever they may be, that have caused each article of furniture, clothing, etc., to be where it is: the order in the second sense of the word is perfect. But it is the order of the first kind that I am expecting, the order that a methodical person consciously puts into his life, the willed order and not the automatic: so I call the absence of this order disorder" (*C.E.*, p. 245). M. Bergson goes on to argue: The idea of disorder is only a pseudo-idea raising a pseudo-problem, *viz.*, the origin of order. But disorder, being automatic order, does not exist. Hence order is not contingent, but necessary. "In analysing the idea of

disorder thus subtilised, we shall see that it represents nothing at all, and at the same time the problems that have been raised around it will vanish" (*C.E.*, p. 235). But granted that we must find either the willed or the automatic order everywhere, why should we find one rather than the other? The choice is contingent. Again in presence of an intentional order, the choice of a definite plan from a great number of plans will also be contingent. The problem of contingency cannot be eliminated.

He proceeds to attack the contingency of being. "Nothing is a pseudo-idea raising a pseudo-problem: What is the cause of being."

To this statement we answer: Aristotle and St. Thomas are emphatic that the idea of being is the first that the intellect grasps, and that the idea of nothing is conceived only in the second place negatively and by contrast. But granted that all existence cannot be denied, what follows? That some being is necessary, but not that all beings are necessary. Thus again the problem of contingency arises. In a letter to Père Tonquédec, M. Bergson admits the insufficiency of this argument: "The reasoning results in showing that something has always existed. But regarding the nature of this something, there is no positive conclusion."

Creative Evolution has little to say on the destiny of man. "A principle of creation has been put at the base of things" (*C.E.*, p. 291). Is this principle Pure Duration? Accepting the statement of the principle of creation, we must infer that man and other creatures are contingent. If man is contingent, what is his destiny? We are told that immortality is a dogma affirmed by Intuition, but denied by Intelligence and by Science: "When a strong instinct assures the probability of personal survival, (spiritualists) are right not to close their ears to its voice; but if there exist 'souls' capable of an independent life, whence do they come? When, how, why do they enter into this body, which we see arise, quite naturally from a mixed cell derived from the bodies of its two parents?" (*C.E.*, p. 283).

Whence come souls? From Him who creates them—an answer more intelligible than the auto-creation and absolute commencements without cause of which M. Bergson writes.

Why do souls come into bodies? To live a complete

life, since they need corporeal organs for vegetative, sensitive, and indirectly for intellectual life.

How do souls enter bodies? They come from without and enter into bodies as active principles or forms.

When do souls enter into bodies? Some authorities say that at the union of sperm and ovum the soul is infused; others say when the body assumes human shape.

The assertion that these spiritualistic statements are the negation of science lacks even the semblance of proof.

The word "soul" has no meaning in M. Bergson's philosophy. It does not signify an agent, or a substantial principle of psychic activity, since in his view, actions are without agents, attributes without subject, modes of being without being. Hence the soul is only a "movement," a pure phenomenon, a shade without any pretence to immortality. Whereas the schoolmen taught that the soul is a simple and spiritual substance, incorruptible in nature, and sufficiently independent of matter to live on after the death of the body.

The Bergsonian "person" is the "continuity of a movement." No guarantee here of immortality. "The matter that consciousness bears along with it, and in the interstices of which it inserts itself, alone can divide it into distinct individualities. On flows the current, running through human generations, subdividing itself into individuals. The subdivision was vaguely indicated in it, but could not have been made clear without matter. Thus souls are continually being created, which, nevertheless, in a certain sense pre-existed. They are nothing else than the little rills into which the great river of life divides itself, flowing through the body of humanity" (*C.E.*, p. 284). A body cuts a soul from psychical totality, and if it persists after separation from the body, it returns to its origin—to the nirvana of impersonal immortality.

Though M. Bergson protests that he is not a pantheist or monist, it is difficult to interpret his teaching in any other sense: "God is a centre from which worlds shoot out like rockets in a fireworks display—provided, however, that I do not present this centre as a thing, but as a continuity of shooting out. God thus defined has nothing of the already made; He is unceasing life, action, freedom. Creation so conceived is not a mystery; we experience it ourselves when we act freely" (*C.E.*, p. 262). It is clear that M. Bergson is not a monist in

the sense that he regards all things as one and homogeneous; again, he is not a materialistic monist. His psychic monism may be best described as evolutionary—a monism giving rise to successive states "always new and irreducible to the preceding." "The whole of humanity, in space and in time, is one immense army galloping beside and before and behind each of us in an overwhelming charge able to beat down every resistance, and clear the most formidable obstacles, perhaps even death" (*C.E.*, p. 286).

CONCLUSION

The essential errors of the Bergsonian philosophy may be summarised as follows:

1.—Negation of Being: all is "Becoming," *i.e.*, actions without agent, attributes without subject, accidents without substance, modes of being without being. The apostle of "pure becoming" regards potentiality as greater than realisation, power as greater than art, whereas the Catholic philosophical conception of God, amply justified by argument, is Pure Act.

2.—Negations of the principle of Identity and Contradiction. These principles are allowed to be laws of discourse, but not of reality. In the supra-logical region to which M. Le Roy (a devoted student and accredited representative of Bergson) appeals, logical contradictions are reconciled.

3.—Negation of the principle of Causality.

Creative Evolution is a moment which creates itself, by incessantly giving to itself the existence which it does not possess.

4.—Negation of the real multiplicity of things. All is one; subject and object, cause and effect, father and son, matter and spirit are only illusions of our "*postulat du morcelage*."

5.—Negation of the primacy of reason, and consequent divorce of philosophy from science.

"Let us try to see no longer with the eyes of the intellect alone, which grasps only the already-made, and which looks from the outside, but with the spirit, I mean the faculty of seeing (Intuition), which is immanent in the faculty of acting, and which springs up somehow by the twisting of the will on itself, when action is turned into

knowledge, like heat, so to say, into light" (*C.E.*, p. 264).

6.—Bergsonian principles are incompatible with Divine Faith.

M. Maritain has well summarised the essential conflict: "A philosophy which blasphemes the intellect will never be Catholic" (*La Revue de Philosophie*, Sept. 1911, p. 539). One of M. Le Roy's sentences further stresses the incompatibility: "*Pour nous, Dieu n'est pas, mais il devient.*" On the other hand Catholic philosophy and theology fully recognise the primacy of reason. Faith is a superstructure raised on the motives of Credibility. Hence the expression of St. Anselm: "*Fides quærens intellectum*," and that of St. Paul: "*Rationabile obsequium nostrum.*"

The popularity of M. Bergson's writings is due to the following characteristics:

1.—His teaching is a reaction against Kantism.

2.—He has a competent knowledge of biological science.

3.—His thought is spiritualistic, elevated, mystical. He defends liberty against determinism, he is the uncompromising foe of materialism, but all is engulfed in what W. James in another connexion calls "the unintelligible monster of Monism."

4.—M. Bergson's style is often fascinating. He makes use of metaphors "*à jet continu.*" He is poetic rather than truly philosophic. His literary music has been compared to the song of the lark.

5.—An attempt to explain "the riddle of the Universe"—an attempt recommended by originality of thought and beauty of style,—appeals to the present-day interest in Philosophy.

SECTION II

IDEA OF SUPERNATURAL REVELATION

CHAPTER VII

DIVINE REVELATION

Art. I.—Catholic and non-Catholic ideas of Revelation.

The word "revelation" suggests the removal of a veil from some truth that is hidden. The same idea is attached to the corresponding Greek word ἀποκάλυψις (*Matt. xvi. 17*). We speak of natural revelation, indicated in *Rom. i. 19*, but revelation, in its strict sense, signifies the manifestation of truth by Divine intervention outside the order of nature (*1 Cor. ii. 10*).

Revelation is supernatural *substantially* if the truth revealed exceeds for its comprehension the power of created intelligence, *e.g.*, the doctrine of the Trinity; it is supernatural *modally* if the manner of revelation is supernatural, though the truth revealed may not exceed the power of the human mind to discover, *e.g.*, the goodness of God, the immortality of the soul, etc.

Revelation and Inspiration are distinct. Inspiration does not necessarily mean the manifestation of a new truth, but indicates the divine impulse to judge and write infallibly about truths naturally known. St. Matthew wrote down facts of the life of Christ which he had personally witnessed. But owing to Inspiration, St. Matthew's Gospel (as the other three) "*Deum habet auctorem.*"

A scientific definition ("*cognitio per causas*") of Divine Revelation may be thus formulated: "Divine action free, and essentially supernatural, whereby God in order to guide the human race to its supernatural end, which consists in the vision of the Divine essence, speaking to us through His prophets and last of all through Christ, manifested, with some obscurity, supernatural mysteries and truths of natural religion, so that thenceforth they might be proposed infallibly by the Church throughout all time without any change of meaning."

This definition is based upon the causes of Revelation.

Note the following chart :

Revelation	Final cause.—The Beatific Vision.
	Efficient cause.—(1) Principal: God, author of the supernatural order.
	(2) Instrumental: prophets and Christ as man (<i>Heb. i. 2.</i>)
	(3) Condition: infallible teaching of the Church.
	Formal cause.—Divine communication manifesting supernatural mysteries and truths of natural religion.
	Material cause: (subject): the human race.

(1) Final Cause.

The end reveals the final cause which is the first of causes. The end of revelation is the future vision of God. St. Thomas notes that "man cannot attain to the supernatural vision of God unless he takes God for his teacher." Hence as teaching is gradual, Revelation is progressive and obscure until the attainment of perfect knowledge is reached.

(2) Efficient Cause.

(a) The principle efficient cause is God revealing, *i.e.*, God as author of the supernatural order.

(b) The instrumental causes are the prophets and Christ as man (*Heb. i. 2.*)

(c) To secure the integrity of Revelation, the infallible teaching of the Church is needed. This action of the Church is a condition, not a cause, of Revelation, as the Church does not reveal even instrumentally, but merely safeguards Revelation.

(3) Formal cause is the action, free and supernatural, whereby supernatural mysteries and truths of Natural Religion are revealed obscurely by means of speech.

The action is free because Revelation is not due to human nature.

The action is supernatural, essentially and not merely modally, because it concerns the intimate life of God, utterly beyond the reach of human reason. The action is described as a "speaking" ("*locutio*" *Heb. i., 1*). Hence Revelation differs from the infusion of the light of Faith. It may be an external "*locutio*," *e.g.*, through a preacher, or God may speak to the heart internally as suggested by the Psalmist: "I will hear what the Lord God will speak to me" (*Ps. 84-9*).

(4) Material cause—the human race. Hence it is not a question of private revelation.

The true idea of Revelation will be still further elucidated by a brief review of heterodox ideas on the subject. The ideas err either "*per excessum*" producing a pseudo-supernaturalism, or "*per defectum*" reducing Revelation to naturalism.

Heterodox notions of Revelation	{	Pseudo-Supernaturalism of some Protestants and of Catholic Traditionalists.	
		{	Rationalism { Evolutionism of Hegel.
			Agnosticism of Kant and of Modernists.
		Semi-Rationalism: Hermes, Günther, Frohschammer, etc.	

1.—Pseudo-Supernaturalism.

(A) So far from exalting Revelation, the pseudo-supernaturalism of early Protestants degenerated into Rationalism.

(a) As regards the exposition of Revelation they substituted for the infallible teaching of the Church an internal criterion. Luther and his disciples held that the meaning of Scripture was shewn to each one by private inspiration of the Holy Spirit. This doctrine led to private judgment.

(b) As regards the nature of Revelation they held that it is *due* to human nature and consequently natural and not supernatural.

(B) The error of pseudo-Supernaturalism appears also amongst Catholic Traditionalists ("*Fideists*") like Bautain, who taught that reason alone cannot prove the existence of God nor the fact of Revelation.

2.—Naturalism.

There is a twofold following: (A) of those who deny the supernatural character of Revelation, and (B) of those who essentially lower it:

(A) Absolute Rationalism.

(a) Pantheistic Evolution identifies the nature of God with the nature of the created universe. This Hegelian teaching regards Revelation as "the progressive evolution of our reason and of our natural

religious sense." Christianity is a stage in the process. The Trinity is nothing more than an instance of the fundamental law of evolution, *viz.*, thesis, antithesis, synthesis!

(b) Agnosticism knows nothing beyond phenomena. Hence external criteria of Revelation have no meaning, and men are thrown back upon their own mental experience, because religion is a form of life. Sabatier writes that Revelation is "the sentiment of God's presence in us awaking our souls to the life of justice and love."

(B) Semi-Rationalism. Some Catholic writers admitted the supernatural character of Revelation, but supernatural only modally. In their view all dogmas, even that of the Trinity, may be proved by reason after Revelation.

Art. 2.—Analysis of the Catholic idea of Revelation.

I.—Revelation is formally a supernatural communication ("*locutio*") from God to man—a communication made immediately to the prophets, and through them mediately to others. The word "*locution*" is, of course, taken analogically in the analogous sense known in logic as the analogy of proportion. Goudin explains that an analogy of proportion (metaphorical or real) exists between things whose name is identical when the meaning signified by the name, though diverse in its application, is nevertheless similar from the standpoint of proportion. We use expressions "God spoke" and "man spoke." There is a similarity of proportionality between human speech in relation to its effect as compared with Divine speech in relation to its effect. To illustrate still further this analogy of proportionality, the examples of sensitive cognition and intellectual cognition may usefully be considered. Sensitive and intellectual cognition, though both named "cognition," are distinct, but there is a likeness of proportionality between them. As the sensitive faculty bears a relation to its sensitive object, so, correspondingly, the intellect bears a relation to its intellectual object. Again the analogy of proportion may be real or only metaphorical. It is real when the attribute indicated by the name (*e.g.*, wisdom) exists formally and truly in both subjects ("God is wise; man is wise"), even though

there is an infinite distance between the unbounded wisdom of God and the limited wisdom of man. The analogy of proportion is metaphorical when the attribute joined to the subject—an attribute suggestive of imperfection—is real in the one case ("anger of man") and merely metaphorically attributive in the other.

Applying this distinction, the word "*locution*," understood in its literal sense as a human utterance, is attributed only metaphorically to God, but understood in its spiritual sense as a manifestation of thought it may be applied to God analogically in a true and real sense.

II.—The notion of Divine Revelation as described in the Old and New Testaments is a spiritual communication of God to men and an exercise of His magisterial power. "I will listen to what the Lord may say" wrote the Psalmist (*lxxxiv. 9*). "God, who at sundry times and in divers manners spoke in times past to the fathers by the prophets, last of all in these days has spoken to us by His Son" (*Heb. i. 1-2*). That Our Blessed Lord spoke magisterially as Teacher is evident from the testimonies of St. Matthew and St. John. "The people were in admiration at His doctrine, for He was teaching them as One having power, and not as the Scribes and Pharisees." "You call me Lord and Master and you say well, for so I am" (*Matt. vii. 28, 29; John xiii. 13*). That the word "*locution*," taken analogically, is correctly applied to Divine Revelation has been defended by St. Thomas "When we speak, we give utterance not to the thing the notion of which we desire to convey, but to the sign of that thing. So God, when He gives His interior inspiration, does not reveal Himself, but gives some sign of Himself, some spiritual likeness of His wisdom." And because of His infinite wisdom, His communication is necessarily magisterial.

III.—Divine Revelation is given by (1) a supernatural manifestation of the truth and (2) by the gift of supernatural light necessary for its recognition.

St. Thomas has written on the art of teaching. He holds a middle course between Plato's system of innate ideas and the empiricism of the sensist school. According to Plato, instruction is a revival of knowledge; according to the empiricists, knowledge is possible only of phenomena and of succession of phenomena. But St. Thomas points out that the art of teaching consists in making a

proposition clear and convincing in itself by showing its dependence on first principles. To teach is to help the intellect to see the truth, just as a physician helps nature to regain its normal healthy state. Hence two conditions are necessary for knowledge: (1) Statement of a truth; (2) Intellectual light either to recognise the truth in itself, or to accept it on the authority of one who is competent to judge.

In this way the truth becomes either intrinsically evident or reasonably credible, and the power of intellectual comprehension is developed and assisted by effective human teaching.

But when the teaching is Divine, inasmuch as many supernatural statements are beyond human comprehension, the authority and infallibility of the teacher are the guarantee of their truth. Here, too, two conditions are necessary: (1) The proposition of the truth; (2) Supernatural light. And the proposition must enunciate:

- (a) A *hidden* truth, because Revelation is distinct from Inspiration.
- (b) The truth must be taught in a determinate sense.
- (c) The divine origin of the Revelation must be clearly manifested.

Finally, if intellectual light is needed for the comprehension of the truths of nature, supernatural light will be needed for the acceptance of truths divinely proposed.

Art. 3.—Different kinds of Revelation.

- (1) Revelation may be supernatural in substance (*e.g.*, doctrine of the Trinity) or merely in the mode of its manifestation.
- (2) Revelation may be given through the senses, the imagination or the intellect.
- (3) Revelation may be active (the illuminating influence of the Holy Spirit) or passive (the perception of the Divine illumination).
- (4) Revelation may be immediate or mediate—immediate to the prophets, mediate through the prophets to others.
- (5) Revelation may be public or private, *i.e.*, made for the general benefit, or for the benefit of one or of a few individuals.

CHAPTER VIII

MYSTERY AND DOGMA

Art. I.—Catholic and heterodox views.

A *Mystery* strictly interpreted is a truth which no created intellect, human or angelic, can understand, inasmuch as the truth is above (not against) reason.

A mystery has therefore three characteristics:

- (1) It is beyond the comprehension of any created intellect.
- (2) It requires Revelation for its knowledge.
- (3) It remains obscure even after the revelation of its truth.

A *dogma* is a statement contained in Scripture or Tradition and promulgated by the church as divinely revealed, either by a special decree of the church, or by her universal and ordinary magisterium.

HETERODOX IDEAS OF MYSTERY AND DOGMA

(A) *Rationalists* reject supernatural mysteries or reduce them to natural truths cognoscible by reason. Kant explained the doctrine of the Trinity as indicating three attributes of God which can be known by reason. Hegel explained the same mystery as three aspects of evolution—thesis, antithesis, synthesis. To the rationalist, reason alone is the measure of truth, and dogma, at the most, is only a symbolical expression of a natural truth or mystery. Dogmas consequently vary in sense in accordance with the progress of science.

(B) *Modernists* too claim the application of the varying sense. The formula of the hypostatic union was true at the time of the council of Nicæa, because comfortable to the philosophic knowledge of the period, but is no longer true because of a new conception of personality.

(C) *Semi-Rationalists*, such as the Catholic writers Hermes, Günther, Frohschammer, have taught that mysteries were supernaturally revealed, but after revelation

may be proved by reason. The Vatican Council has condemned the demonstrability of mysteries, and also the proposition of Rosmini that the mystery of the Trinity can be indirectly proved after revelation.


Art. II.—Theological explanation of mystery and dogma.

I.—The word “mystery” taken in a wide sense may be described as a secret truth beyond our knowledge, but worthy of our knowledge.

A *natural* mystery is one which may be known, as far as its existence is concerned without supernatural revelation.

A *supernatural* mystery cannot be known even as far as its existence is concerned without supernatural revelation.

Note the following divisions :



The late Professor Huxley wrote: “The mysteries of the church are child’s play compared with the mysteries of nature. The doctrine of the Trinity is not more puzzling than the necessary antinomies of physical speculation.”

It is interesting to note the ubiquity of natural mysteries beyond human comprehension such as in the

- (1) Physical order: nature of matter, of energy, of electricity, or gravitation, etc.
- (2) Biological order: the processes of assimilation, reproduction, etc.
- (3) Psychological order: nature of sensation, of free-will, etc.

- (4) Metaphysical order: nature of a transient act, etc.

If we are thus surrounded by mysteries in the created natural order, can we wonder that in the uncreated natural order there are absolute mysteries such as compatibility of Divine simplicity with plurality of perfections, compatibility of Unchangeableness of God with Divine freedom, compatibility of Infinite power and goodness with permission of evil, compatibility of Infinite mercy and justice. Much less cause for wonder that the supernatural order should present mysteries which transcend created intelligence.

It has been said that a wayside flower is a natural sacrament—an outward sign of inward mysterious power—an idea beautifully expressed in the following stanza.

“Were I, O God, in churchless lands remaining,
Far from all voice of teachers or divines,
My soul would find in flowers of Thy ordaining,
Priests, sermons, shrines!”

II.—Intelligibility of mysteries and their inter-connexion.

(A) Supernatural mysteries are incomprehensible and undemonstrable, but analogical knowledge of them is possible.

(1) Mysteries are not unintelligible. Those things are incomprehensible which are not fully comprehended, *e.g.*, the attribute of Divine omnipotence. Those things are undemonstrable which cannot be deduced either from evident principles (demonstration *à priori*) or from facts of experience (demonstration *à posteriori*). That which is probable cannot be proved but is nevertheless intelligible. On the other hand that which is unintelligible is opposed to reason either because it is evidently absurd, or because it has no meaning.

Supernatural mysteries are incomprehensible and undemonstrable, but they are not unintelligible. A statement regarding them has an intelligible subject and predicate, though the connexion between subject and predicate remains inevident.

(2) Mysteries are intelligible analogically. Divine revelation makes use of human ideas naturally acquired—ideas which express directly something created and analogically something uncreated. The idea of paternity is applied to God the Father, the idea of natural filiation is applied to the Divine filiation of the Second Person of

the Trinity. This analogy is the analogy of proportion and is not metaphorical (as when God is called "Sun of the Universe") but real. The doctrine of the Trinity is expressed by analogical ideas of nature, person, generation, word, spiration, love, etc.

(3) Intelligibility of mysteries is not formally grasped apart from illumination and inspiration of the Holy Ghost. Supernatural truths, because supernatural, cannot become intelligible without the aid of Divine grace. Without this gift they can be known only materially. A man, for example, without a musical ear hears a symphony from the standpoint of sound, not from the standpoint of harmony. A man may interpret as mechanical something which is vital. A man may judge a truth as empirical, whereas it is really intuitive. Hence the contrast between formal and material apprehension of the mind.

(B) The inter-connexion of mysteries.

All mysteries are subordinated to the supreme mystery of the intimate life of God, *i.e.*, the Trinity. Hence the following inter-connexion:

Trinity—participation in the life of God, *i.e.*, Divine grace—loss of grace through original sin—Incarnation of the Second Person—Redemption and establishment of the Church—Mission of the Third Person—recovery of Divine grace—Faith, Hope, and Charity leading to the vision of the intimate life of God, *i.e.*, the Trinity.

III.—Immutability of dogma and development of doctrine.

(A) After the time of Christ and the Apostles, Revelation, being complete, could not be increased or diminished. So-called private revelations do not belong to the infallible doctrine of the Church. The Church throughout the ages has proposed for the belief of the faithful only truths revealed in Scripture or Tradition. As occasion required, more explicit formulation was made of particular doctrines. Thus the Church teaches "*nove*," not "*nova*." The original formula describing the Incarnation was "the Word was made flesh." A more explicit formula came later: "the Word consubstantial with the Father was made man." Again, the formula describing the sinlessness of the Blessed Virgin was originally "*gratia plena*." The fulness of grace was later declared to include the grace of her Immaculate Conception.

Development of doctrine has taken place in a threefold way:

- (1) By scientific statement. The doctrine of the Trinity was explicitly held from the beginning, but in a popular way. The science of theology stressed later the consubstantiality of the Three Persons.
- (2) By explicit statement. The "fulness of grace," for example, implicitly includes the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception, which in 1854 was explicitly declared.
- (3) By definite and clear statement of truths which had been taught only incidentally or in practice. Under this head comes the decision regarding the validity of baptism conferred by heretics.

(B) Before Christ the doctrine of Faith, substantially the same, was more explicitly manifested by successive revelations. St. Thomas tells us that certain primary truths were revealed—"God exists," "God is a rewarder to them that seek Him," etc.—which implicitly contained other truths to be revealed later, such as the Incarnation, Redemption, Trinity, etc. The Faith* was always specifically the same, because truths explicitly believed later were believed implicitly from the beginning.

* Faith under the Old Testament was substantially the same as Faith under the New, because under both Testaments the primary formal object of Faith (the intimate life of God) and the formal motive of Faith (the authority of God revealing) were identical (*Cf. 11a, 11ae, q1, a 7*). St. Thomas writes: "*Quæcumque posteriores crediderunt continebatur in fide præcedentium Patrum, licet implicite*." When it is stated that the doctrines, "God exists," "God is a rewarder to them that seek him," contain *implicitly* the doctrines of the Incarnation, Redemption, etc., the use of the word "implicit" should not be accepted in precisely the same sense as its use in regard to the development of doctrine subsequent to Apostolic times. The student will see the distinction in the following examples:—

(1) The notion of being contains actually implicitly the less general notions of the modalities of being, and contains nothing outside being, because outside being there is nothing. Being is not a genus, for a genus contains only virtually (not actually implicitly) the specific differences extrinsic to the genus, as rationality is extrinsic to animality. Similarly the intimate life of God contains actually implicitly the supernatural mysteries subsequently revealed—*e.g.*, Incarnation, Redemption, etc., which are not extrinsic to the intimate life of God.

(2) A doctrine may be known at first confusedly, and later distinctly. In the second case the development of the doctrine is accomplished not by the addition of new ideas, but by the clearer apprehension of the original idea. It is in this sense that the "fulness of grace" of the Blessed Virgin implicitly contains the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception. After the time of the Apostles the deposit of Faith was closed, and no doctrine (beyond what is implicitly contained in the deposit of Faith) has been or can be proposed by the Church.

CHAPTER IX

THE SUPERNATURAL*

Art. I.—Catholic and heterodox ideas of the Supernatural¹.

I.—Preliminary statement.

Analysis of the meaning of the words "Revelation," "Mystery" and "Dogma" having been made, it is necessary to examine into the nature of the Supernatural and of the Supernatural order. Possibility of the existence of supernatural mysteries and of their revelation will be proved against Rationalists. It will be shown that Christianity is not a "superior form of the natural evolution of the religious sense," but a religion essentially supernatural and infallibly true.

Nominal definition of the supernatural explains the meaning of the words: "that which is above nature." The word "nature" in this connexion means "the complexity of all things in the universe interdependent according to fixed laws." Hence the Supernatural is above the laws of nature. A supernatural effect cannot be produced by a natural cause; a supernatural truth cannot be deduced by the natural power of the intellect.

Pantheists who maintain that the nature of God and the nature of the universe are identical must and do deny the existence of the supernatural order. According to their teaching God is the immanent principle of all natural evolution.

Deists admit an essential distinction between God and the universe, but deny the action of God in human affairs, *i.e.*, deny the possibility of a miracle.

Semi-Rationalists admit an essential distinction between God and nature and admit also the possibility of miraculous intervention, but deny, as regards God, the distinction between the order of natural mysteries (*e.g.*, the compatibility of Divine immutability and Divine freedom) and the order of supernatural mysteries (*e.g.*, the Trinity). Hence they admit the possibility of a supernatural effect—a

*[For the meaning of the word "preternatural" Cf. the *Principles of Christian Apologetics*, p. 167.

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miracle—but deny the possibility of supernatural truth (Trinity, etc.).

II.—Catholic teaching regarding the Supernatural and the Supernatural order.

The Supernatural is defined as that which is above created nature, inasmuch as it exceeds the powers and exigencies of any created nature, although it does not exceed the passive perfectible capacity of created nature, nor the suitability of created nature to receive it.

The Supernatural is twofold:

1° Supernatural miracles which exceed the power and exigency of created nature, but do not exceed the cognoscibility of the human intellect.

2° Supernatural mysteries in the strict sense and supernatural grace and glory. These exceed not only the power and exigency, but even the cognoscibility and appetitive desire of any created intellectual nature.

III.—Heterodox ideas of the Supernatural.

1° Regarding supernatural mysteries of life and of Christianity.

Naturalism lowers supernatural mysteries to natural mysteries and claims that their existence can be known without Revelation. The Christian life is lowered to a life lived in accordance with the natural law.

Semi-Rationalism reduces supernatural to natural mysteries, and claims that they can be proved after Revelation.

Pelagianism reduces the Christian life to natural morality, and maintains that after Revelation man can live a Christian life without the aid of internal grace.

Pseudo-Supernaturalism on the contrary teaches that there is an exigency for the Supernatural in human nature, and that as a consequence the Supernatural is neither above nature nor gratuitous.

2° Regarding the Supernatural character of miracles.

(A) Determinists claim the same necessity for the laws of nature as they claim for the axioms of mathematics. According to them a miracle (if it exists) is only an "extraordinary natural fact" which has not been explained, and which the religious sense attributes to the Deity. Thus a miracle has no ontological (objective) value, but may have a symbolical value if it helps the mind to see the conformity of religion with the aspirations and exigencies of our nature.

(B) Certain Agnostics opposed to Determinism judge that the fixity of the laws of nature is a subjective impression. Science, they say, is concerned with that which *is*, not with that which may be possible or impossible. As we do not know all the laws of nature, we cannot say that a particular happening is beyond their power. Hence a miracle is beyond human knowledge.

(C) A few Catholic writers seem to agree with those who hold that a miracle, in the sense of an unusual natural phenomenon, may have only a symbolic value, inviting the mind to the consideration of religion, and to the recognition of its conformity with the aspirations and exigencies of our nature (*Blondel*,* *L'Action*, p. 396).

Art. II.—The Supernatural from the standpoint of theological science.

I.—Definition of the Supernatural.

(A) In order to understand the Supernatural it is necessary to have a clear idea of what is meant by the word "nature."

The nature of a thing is its essence, *i.e.*, the radical principle of the active and passive powers which belong to it. Hence "natural" signifies that which belongs to a thing according to its nature, *viz*:

- (1) Essence, *e.g.*, essence of man is his body and rational soul.
- (2) Passive powers which are affected by agents proportionate to the nature.
- (3) Active powers or faculties flowing from essence, *e.g.*, intellect and will in man.
- (4) Exigencies, *i.e.*, whatever is required for the attainment of its end. Catholic philosophy teaches that the "Divine Concursus" is necessary so that a secondary cause may act.
- (5) Merit in a rational nature—merit due to legitimate natural action constituting a right to proportionate reward—in other words a right to attain its natural end.

(B) Thus the Supernatural is that which exceeds the limits of nature, and which can gratuitously perfect nature. The Supernatural is suitable to nature, not from

* Cf. Criticism of M. Blondel by Professor Aliotta (*Science, Religion and Reality*, pp. 169-172 and 177-178.)

the standpoint of the essence or powers (active or passive) of nature, but because nature has the capability of accepting a perfection not naturally due. St. Thomas gives the example of a piece of wood being carved so as to represent a human being.

(C) The Supernatural is not against nature; it is above nature and perfects it. It is true that the supernatural life is contrary to the evil inclinations of nature which come from sin and are destructive of nature itself. "If you live according to the flesh you shall die; but if by the spirit you mortify the deeds of the flesh, you shall live" (*Rom. viii. 13*). "If anyone wishes to come after me, let him deny himself and take up his cross and follow me" (*Matt. xvi. 24*). But the supernatural life is not against nature as such. In truth there is admirable harmony between nature and grace as shewn in the life of Our Blessed Lord and in the lives of the Saints.

II.—Division of the Supernatural.


The Supernatural is divided into that which is essentially supernatural, and that which is modally supernatural. That which is essentially supernatural exceeds the limits, and even the cognoscitive faculties of any created nature. That which is modally supernatural is some natural fact or quality produced or arranged in a supernatural way. The resurrection of Lazarus, for example, was natural in itself as nature gives life, but supernatural in the manner of its accomplishment. The virtue of temperance is a natural virtue which deserves a natural reward, but when informed by a supernatural motive it deserves a supernatural reward. Scientific division of the Supernatural is based upon three of the four great causes. The four great causes are the two intrinsic (matter and form) and the two extrinsic (final and efficient). St. Thomas writes: "The character of the Supernatural may belong to anything from a threefold principle, *viz.*, from the efficient, final and formal causes, but not from the material cause, since the material cause is the subject in which the Supernatural quality is received."

From the standpoint of efficient cause a fact accomplished—even a natural fact—becomes supernatural if performed in a supernatural way, *e.g.*, resurrection of Lazarus, giving of sight to the blind, etc.

From the standpoint of final cause a fact or quality becomes supernatural when extrinsically directed to a supernatural end, *e.g.*, an act of temperance informed by a supernatural motive.


From the standpoint of formal cause an entity is supernatural when from its formal specific nature it regards a supernatural object.

Hence the following division:




Corollary I.—Though the work accomplished by a miracle is essentially natural, it can be effected only by God and in a supernatural way. Hence a miracle is strictly supernatural but only modally, even though it be “a miracle in relation to the substance of the fact” as in prophecy. But the miracle of the conversion of St. Paul, involving as it did the infusion of Divine grace was essentially supernatural.

Corollary II.—It is well to have clearly in mind the various kinds of supernatural knowledge.



Corollary III.—Graces given for the instruction of others (*gratiæ gratis datæ*) are not as high as the graces which justify (*gratiæ gratum facientes*). St. Paul (1 Cor. c. 12) enumerates the former. They may be classified as follows:



III.—Natural and Supernatural orders.

(A) The Natural order is the arrangement of created things relatively to God as their Author and Final End.

God is the extrinsic efficient cause and the final cause of the natural order. He is not the intrinsic or immanent principle—a pantheistic idea identifying the Divine substance with the substance of the universe.

From the standpoint of efficient cause, Creation, Conservation, Divine Concursus belong to the natural order. For man the natural order comprises:

- (a) *Formal End.* The formal end is the possession of God not by intuitive vision, but by the discursive faculty of reason.
- (b) *Agents.* The supreme agent is God, Author of our nature, giving His concursus for the accomplishment of natural works. Man, using his natural faculties is the secondary agent.
- (c) *Means.* The objective means are created things naturally known. The subjective means are the light of reason and the exercise of faculties, especially of intellect and will.
- (d) *Law.* The law is the natural law—source of natural merit and of natural reward.

(B) The Supernatural order is the arrangement, relatively to God their Author and Final End, of those things which exceed the limits of the natural order.

For man the Supernatural order comprises :

- (a) *Formal End.* The formal end is the possession of God by intuitive vision.
- (b) *Agents.* The supreme agent is God, Author of grace and of glory. The secondary agent is man raised to the Supernatural state.
- (c) *Means.* The objective means are Divine Revelation, Sacraments, etc. Subjective means are the light of Faith, and the exercise of supernatural virtues under the influx of actual grace.
- (d) *Law.* The law is the positive law of God.

(C) Since both orders proceed from God, the source of truth, there cannot be dissension between them. The natural order is subordinated to the supernatural and from it receives its perfection.

SECTION III

DEFENCE OF SUPERNATURAL REVELATION AND ITS NECESSITY

CHAPTER X

POSSIBILITY OF SUPERNATURAL REVELATION IN GENERAL AND ESPECIALLY OF THE REVELATION OF THE NATURAL TRUTHS OF RELIGION

Art. I.—Possibility of Immediate Revelation.

It may seem that surely there is no necessity for supernatural revelation in regard to truths which reason can discover, and that to discuss the possibility of such revelation is superfluous. Later it will be seen that there is a moral necessity for the revelation even of the natural truths of Religion in order (to use the words of the Vatican Council) that they may be known "by all, quickly, with certitude and with no admixture of error."

The possibility of Immediate Revelation is proved by reason.

Revelation, as already indicated, is "formal Divine magisterial instruction given objectively through the supernatural statement of a truth, and subjectively by the infusion of supernatural light, whereby infallible judgment may be made concerning the truth divinely proposed."

The possibility of the supernatural revelation of the Natural Truths of Religion may be set forth in the following syllogism :

Major: An action which is not repugnant from the point of view of object, subject or agent is possible from the standpoint of reason.

Minor: But supernatural revelation of the natural truths of Religion is not repugnant in any of these respects.

Conclusion: Therefore supernatural revelation of the natural truths of Religion is possible from the standpoint of reason.

• Proof of Minor proposition :

1° From the standpoint of object.

Truths may be discovered by reason or may be taught by one who knows them. The truths themselves are indifferent to either mode of cognition.

2° From the standpoint of the subject.

If man is taught by man, why should it be impossible to receive Divine instruction? The autonomy of reason offers no objection, for such autonomy is relative not absolute. Subordination to infallible truth is not servitude but honour. "If you continue in my word . . . the truth shall make you free" (*John viii. 31, 32*). Just as sensitive faculties are directed by the rational, why should it be impossible for the rational to be directed by Divine Revelation?

3° From the Divine standpoint.

No legitimate objection arises from the fact that supernatural revelation is miraculous. When God intervenes in human affairs, there is no interference with the laws of nature, as we shall see in the discussion on miracles. There is no difficulty in supposing that supernatural light (*supernatural* in the manner given) is vouchsafed, which is all that is necessary for the knowledge of natural truths.

Art. II.—Possibility of Mediate Revelation.

(A) From the Divine standpoint.

God governs men by men, in order that He may communicate the dignity of causality to creatures. Powers and rights, which belong to human authority, belong *à fortiori* to God. Human authority rules subjects through ministers, whose commands must be formally accepted as the commands of authority. Surely therefore God can convey instruction through the instrumentality of others.

(B) From the standpoint of man.

It is natural that in human society man should learn from man. Grace perfects nature, and at the same time safeguards the characteristics of nature. It is fit therefore that men should be instructed in Divine things by God's ministers. Few men could discover without the help of a master even the elementary truths of Geometry. Pascal, who unaided discovered many such truths, was an extraordinary genius.

Objection may be raised that the salvation of mankind would be accomplished more effectively by immediate revelation through mental religious experience, in which case revelation would reach all men. But it is a well-

known truth that for salvation God does not require impossibilities. Amongst pagan nations, if a standard of morality and virtue is reached—a standard measured by opportunities of light and difficulties of environment—in that case salvation is secured.

CHAPTER XI

SUPERNATURAL MYSTERIES

Existence of an order of Supernatural truth and life in God, i.e., of an order of Supernatural mysteries.

I.—Heterodox opinions and the teaching of the Church.

(1) Rationalists, Pantheists and Semi-Rationalists deny the existence of any order which exceeds objectively the powers of human reason.

(2) Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians deny that the Supernatural Order exceeds subjectively the powers of reason: if, for instance, external revelation be supposed, internal grace would not in their opinion be necessary for belief, or at least for the beginning of Faith.

(3) Early Protestants, as well as Baius and Jansenius, deny that the Supernatural Order exceeds the exigency of our nature; they claim that grace is *due* to nature.

These errors have been condemned. Catholic doctrine holds: (1) that not even by the absolute power of God could an intellect be created which, by its natural powers, could see God as He is in Himself, nor (2) could there be created a supernatural substance to which the light of glory would be natural.

II.—On the proof of the existence of a Supernatural Order of truth of life in God.

1° Is this proof possible?

How can it be shown that there exists in God not only an order of natural mysteries (*e.g.*, prescience of future contingent events, compatibility of Divine liberty and Divine immutability, etc.), but an order of Supernatural mysteries (*e.g.*, Trinity) which, unless revealed, cannot become known, and after revelation remain undemonstrable?

As the Supernatural cannot be known naturally either in itself or in its effects, no direct proof of its existence can be given; an indirect proof drawn from the limitations of a created intellect may be given. This proof will

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manifest the existence of such an order not positively, but negatively and relatively, namely, that there is in God an order of truth and life exceeding the limits of natural knowledge. But since the proof takes the form of defence after the fact of Revelation, it will be more accurate to say that by reason alone a defence can be given of the truth that there are in God not only natural mysteries, but an order of Supernatural mysteries.

2° What are the limits of human knowledge?

The limits are twofold: (1) as regards extension, (2) as regards intention or penetrative power.

Future contingent events exceed the extension of our natural knowledge, but when they come to pass they do not exceed the penetrative power of the intellect, if their cause be easily known. On the other hand the metaphysical doctrine of Aristotle often exceeds the penetrative power of students, whose intelligence is not yet sufficiently developed.

Whence then come the limits?

(a) The limits of the extension of knowledge come from its objective medium. The objective medium is that through which knowledge reaches different objects—a telescope, for instance, enables the sensitive faculty of sight to see many objects otherwise invisible; again, a principle, in which conclusions are virtually contained, enables the intellectual faculty to extend its knowledge so as to reach explicit comprehension of implicit truths. Extension of knowledge is as wide as the extension of the objective medium used by the intellect. The objective medium is that *which* is known, and also that *through which* other truths are known, whereas in the discussion of sensitive perception treated in Epistemology, the subjective medium of knowledge (a representative image for example) is that *by which* an outward object is known. An illustration of this teaching is given in the fact that the order of vegetative life cannot be known from principles of physics and chemistry. These principles (objective *media*) are not sufficiently extended to include the nature of vital action. The order of intellectual life cannot be known from the principles of Sensism. Hence the failure of Empiricism, contrary to the teaching of which an idea is *not* a compound image, a judgment is *not* an association of images, reasoning is *not* merely the attainment of empirical conclusions.

Is there then in God an order of truth exceeding the virtuality of the natural principles of reason? The Church teaches that the intimate life of God transcends the order of natural reason, as vegetative life transcends mechanical order.

(b) Limits of intension or of penetrative power arise from the vigour of the intellectual faculty and from its training. The same teaching given to several auditors is understood by some and not by others. Natural penetrative power is, like the poet, born not made, but improvement of penetrative power undoubtedly comes from study and training.

The question therefore is twofold:

- (1) Does there exist in God an order of truth exceeding the objective medium of created intellect?
- (2) Does there exist in God an order of truth exceeding the penetrative power of created intellect?

If the first response is affirmative, the second will also be affirmative, because that which exceeds the natural objective medium of a faculty exceeds also the natural penetrative power of the faculty. Thus a metaphysical conclusion exceeds the objective medium of mathematics, and consequently mathematicians grasp with difficulty a metaphysical demonstration, because they accept quantitatively what should be understood qualitatively.

3° What argument may be adduced from the standpoint of God?

Some writers argue thus from God's infinitude: The order of supernatural truth is an order exceeding the natural knowledge of any created intellect. But God because of His infinitude exceeds the natural knowledge of any created intellect. Therefore there exists in God an order of supernatural truth.

This syllogism proves that there exists in God an order of natural mysteries, the *nature* of which exceeds any created intellect, but the *existence* of which is naturally knowable without revelation, *e.g.*, prescience of future contingent events. From the infinitude of God it follows that every Divine attribute naturally knowable has an eminent and infinite mode of being, and this mode cannot be known naturally in a positive way, but only in a negative way, (*e.g.*, wisdom, not finite) and in a relative way (*e.g.*, supreme wisdom). Hence because of the imper-

fection of natural knowledge, every Divine attribute is a natural mystery, and the intimate compatibility of attributes remains hidden, although we know without revelation that all Divine attributes are compatible and indeed identical in God.

But is there in God an order of supernatural mysteries, which, unless revealed, cannot be known, and which remain after revelation undemonstrable?

Argument on this subject must be drawn from the intimate life of God. It is not sufficient to reason from the infinitude of God, unless infinitude is understood, not as a mode of being of Divine attributes, but as a negative expression of the Deity as such.

III.—Demonstration of existence of a supernatural order exceeding objectively the natural powers of created intellect.

Major: God in His intimate nature cannot be known positively from creatures.

Minor: But the natural objective medium of every created intellect can only be a creature.

Conclusion: Therefore no created intellect from its natural objective medium can possibly know those truths which belong to the intimate life of God, and these truths constitute an order of supernatural truth.

The major is proved:

From creatures God is known positively as regards those perfections which are analogically common to Him and to creatures, but as regards perfections which belong exclusively to Him, He is known only negatively and relatively. Now, God, in His intimate nature, is regarded from the standpoint of perfections exclusively belonging to Him. Therefore He, in His intimate nature, cannot be known from creatures positively.

(A) Creatures are so inferior to God that they cannot have with Him any resemblance either generic or specific, but only analogical.

(B) Perfections which belong exclusively to God can be known from creatures only negatively and relatively:

God is Being, *not* finite, *not* changeable, *not* temporal, etc.

God is Being, supreme, first, most perfect, etc.

Hence God in His intimate life cannot be known positively from creatures, just as mechanics cannot make known the life of a plant, nor vegetative life explain

sensitive, nor sensitive the higher perfection of rational life.

The minor is proved:

The natural objective medium of a created intellect must be a creature.

(A) Indirect proof.

If the natural objective medium of created intellect is not a creature, but the Divine essence immediately seen, then the created intellect would receive its specification from the same formal object as the Divine intellect. But things which are specified by the same formal object are of the same nature. Hence the created intellect would be of the same nature as the Deity, *i.e.*, God would be a creature.

(B) Direct proof (*St. Thomas, 1^a q 12 a 4*).

A spiritual essence, whose mode of immateriality exceeds the mode of immateriality of the nature that knows, cannot be known by that nature naturally and immediately. But the Divine essence has a mode of immateriality infinitely exceeding that of every created intellect. Therefore the Divine essence cannot naturally and immediately be known by any created intellect, and it follows that only a creature can be the objective medium of a created intellect.

The natural objective medium of a created intellect will be a creature either concretely accepted or abstractedly, *e.g.*, genera, species, transcendentals, etc. Even an angel naturally knows God not immediately, but as it were in a mirror, because angelic nature mirrors to some extent the Divine perfections (*1^a q 56 a 3*). "Behold the great God who vanquishes our knowledge" (*Job xxxvi. 26*).

"King of kings and Lord of lords who inhabiteth light inaccessible" (*1 Tim. vi. 16*).

"What man knoweth the things of a man but the spirit of man that is in him? So the things also that are of God no man knoweth but the Spirit of God" (*1 Cor. ii. 11*).

IV.—The Supernatural Order exceeds subjectively the penetrative power of any created intellect.

This thesis is formulated against Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians who taught that external revelation by Gospel preaching is sufficient for believing the mysteries of Faith, or at least for the beginning of Faith and that the internal light of Faith strengthening the intellect is not necessary.

The penetrative power of a cognositive faculty receives its specification from its natural objective medium and is

proportioned to it. A faculty has an essential relation to its act, and the act receives its specification from its object. But the intimate mysteries of Divine life exceed the natural objective medium of created intellect. Hence they exceed also its penetrative power. In order that a created intellect should see God there is need not only of the objective manifestation, but of subjective strength. Hence the "*lumen gloriae*."

V.—The Supernatural Order exceeds the exigency of the creature.

This thesis is directed against Baius, Luther, Calvin, Jansenists and Modernists.

That which absolutely exceeds the natural objective medium of created intellect exceeds at the same time its natural end, and that which exceeds its end and natural perfection exceeds its exigency.

VI.—Between natural and supernatural truths there can be no conflict.

1^o No conflict. Thesis directed against:

Averroists of XIII Century, and followers of XV Century.

Semi-Rationalists. XIX Century. (Günther claimed that philosophy might understand God and the soul better than Faith understands them).

Fideists and Bonnetty XIX Century (who claim that reason is so weak as possibly to lead us to opinions contrary to Faith).

The Vatican Council points out that the semblance of conflict is due to one of two contingencies, either (1) dogmas of Faith are not understood according to the mind of the Church, or (2) false opinions are taken as pronouncements of reason.

There can be no conflict, because supernatural truths are founded upon the intimate life of God, and natural truths are founded on God the author of nature. If being is taken in an equivocal sense, *i.e.*, to signify things essentially different and not even analogically similar, then the principle of contradiction would not have validity, and contradiction and confusion would ensue between the two orders.

2^o No pantheistic confusion between the two orders.

If being is taken in an univocal sense, there would be no essential difference in being, because univocal things (like

generic) are not distinguished except by extrinsic differences. Consequently just as being, taken equivocally, leads to contradiction between natural and supernatural orders, so being, taken univocally, leads to pantheistic confusion between them.

3° There is harmony and subordination between natural and supernatural truth. The whole treatise on Divine Revelation abundantly testifies to this fact.

VII.—Examination of Ontologism.

The essential principle of Ontologism may be thus expressed. God is the first object which the human mind constantly and immediately sees from the beginning of its creation. Ontologists do not explain this immediate intuition in the same way.

1° Ontologism of Père Malebranche (1638-1715). Necessary and universal truths are seen by us in God. God is the immediate cause of our sensations of which exterior things are only the occasions. (Occasionalism.) We do not see the Divine essence as it is in itself. The Divine essence is seen as the archetype of those things which fall under sensitive and intellectual cognition. The Divine archetypal ideas of man, substance, spirit, mathematical quantity, etc., and attributes relative to them are seen. These Divine ideas and attributes are really one and the same as the Divine essence, but are distinguished virtually from it, and this distinction suffices for the visibility of Divine ideas and attributes whilst the Divine essence remains invisible.

Malebranche's argument may be stated thus: material objects cannot act upon the immaterial soul. What is higher cannot be affected by what is lower. Accordingly corporeal objects are only the occasion of our vision; God is the cause. Moreover the necessary, universal, eternal element in intellectual knowledge cannot come from individual contingent things. Hence a clearer and simpler explanation of our thoughts is to say: we see all things in God. All intelligible things are in God in a necessary, universal and eternal way, and God is intimately present to us. Since God is the first loved, He ought to be the first known.

St. Thomas anticipated the errors of Ontologism.

(1) The abstraction of the universal from individual things cannot be questioned.

- (2) God is intimately present to us as Cause, but not as object known.
- (3) God is our last end, but not, therefore, the first object known or loved.
- (4) Ontologism makes the sense organs useless.
- (5) There is no intrinsic distinction between Divine ideas and Divine essence.

Thus Ontologism confuses natural and supernatural orders, and leads to Pantheism. If God alone works, it follows that God alone exists. "*Operatio sequitur esse.*" Malebranche's fundamental error consists in confusing "being in general" with "Divine being." "Being in general" is the natural adequate object of our intellect, the object in which we know first principles.

2° Moderate Ontologism.

The individual object—immediate object of the sense—is seen in itself contrary to Malebranche's teaching, but the universal which is necessary, eternal, immutable, must be in God, and is seen in God by immediate intuition. Ubaghs and others held this view.

3° Ontologism of Rosmini.

That which other Ontologists taught concerning universals, Rosmini applied to transcendental being, which falls first under the apprehension of the intellect.

Rosmini (1) confounds "being in general" with Divine being. His system (2) depends upon extreme realism. Universal or transcendental being has in his system an objective formal existence, and is identified with Divine being. Hence (3) being is not predicated analogically of God and creatures, but univocally—a view which leads to Pantheism.

CHAPTER XII

REVELATION OF SUPERNATURAL MYSTERIES POSSIBLE FROM
THE STANDPOINT OF AGENT AND SUBJECT

I.—Statement of difficulties.

An objection is considered by St. Thomas: "A corporeal sense cannot be elevated so as to understand an incorporeal substance which is above the nature of sense; if therefore to see God be above the nature of created intellect, it is clear that no created intellect can see the Divine essence."

Scotus urges the following objection: "If the knowledge of the Divine essence be above the nature of our intellect, the blessed will never see God. No faculty can be elevated above its specific object. The faculty of sight for example cannot be elevated so as to understand. Otherwise the faculty would go beyond the limits of its essence, and would not remain the same specifically."

Modernists object: if the Supernatural Order is at an infinite distance objectively and subjectively from the faculties and exigencies of our nature, in that case elevation to the Supernatural would be against the inclination of our nature, *i.e.*, would be destructive (*Cf. E. Le Roy, *Revue Biblique, Jan., 1906, p. 21*). Supernatural revelation would consist of unintelligible mysteries, and their expression would be only metaphorical and symbolic.

II.—No proof can be given showing the impossibility of the revelation of Supernatural Mysteries from the standpoint of agent and subject.

Since elevation to the Supernatural Order is an essentially supernatural endowment, the possibility of such cannot be proved by reason alone. Neither can the possibility be disproved. In order to disprove the possibility of Revelation from the standpoint of agent and subject, it would be necessary to show the absurdity of at least one of the four conditions necessary for revelation:

- (1) God from the standpoint of His intimate life can act freely "*ad extra*."

* *Cf. Professor Aliotta's criticism on the views of M. Le Roy (Science, Religion and Reality, pp. 172, 173-176.)*

- (2) Human ideas express analogically supernatural mysteries so as to make them credible.
- (3) Supernatural light can raise the vitality of the human intellect so as to assent to supernatural mysteries.

- (4) There is an obediential faculty in our nature which can be raised to the Supernatural Order.

(A) It is not repugnant that God should give to us participation in His Divine nature ("*Divinae consortes naturæ*," 2 *Pet. i., 4*). Nothing can be denied to God—infinitely perfect Being—except on the ground of imperfection. To act freely in regard to those things outside His Divine Nature implies no imperfection. God does not act to secure benefit to Himself, but to secure benefit to His creature. St. Thomas writes: "The higher a nature the more intimate its communication." God is Pure Act and Highest Good, and it is in absolute accordance with His nature that God should communicate some participation of His intimate life. "*Summum Bonum est sui diffusivum*."

(B) It cannot be proved that no idea of our mind is capable of expressing analogically and really (as opposed to metaphorical and symbolic expression) supernatural mysteries *as credible*. It has been already shown that human ideas cannot express mysteries of the intimate life of God as truths *to be understood*, or truths *to be proved*. But for revelation it is sufficient that they should be expressed analogically and really as truths *to be believed* on the testimony of God obscurely revealing and not on intrinsic evidence. No imperfection follows from the attribution to God of notions of Paternity, Filiation, Procession, Spiration, etc., whereby we receive obscure instruction regarding the supreme supernatural mystery of the Trinity. The same reasoning applies to notions of the Incarnation, Redemption, Eucharist, etc.

(C) Nor is there repugnance as regards the supernatural light necessary to accept infallibly and supernaturally mysteries of the intimate life of God. This light is an accident which raises and strengthens the intellect. It does not and cannot represent the essence of God as He is in Himself, but it tends essentially to God as He is in Himself, and in this way raises the human intellect.

- (D) Existence of an obediential faculty which elevates

human nature to the supernatural order cannot be disproved. St. Thomas writes: "A sense because it is wholly material cannot be elevated to anything immaterial. But the intellect, human or angelic, somewhat raised from matter, can by Divine grace be further raised to a higher stage. As the human intellect sees under concrete accidents the nature of an object, it can be raised by Divine help so as to apprehend Subsistent Being."

III.—Existence of obediential capacity whereby human nature may be raised to the Supernatural Order follows from the consideration of the adequate object of the human intellect.

The following syllogism epitomises the teaching of the Thomistic School:

Major: To secure knowledge of reality there is in human nature an obediential capacity which may exceed the proper object of our intellect, but not its adequate object.


Minor: God in His intimate life does not exceed the adequate object of our intellect which is being in its widest extent.

Conclusion: Therefore there is within us an obediential capacity for the knowledge of the intimate life of God, i.e., of supernatural mysteries.

Explanation of this teaching:

1° What is obediential capacity?

Note the following divisions:



St. Thomas first distinguishes capability (which is mere possibility or non-repugnance to being) from subjective

capability. Subjective capability may be active or passive. Passive capability may be natural or obediential. Obediential capacity may be such in relation to a created agent of a superior order. Thus wood and not water has an obediential capacity to the wood-carver. Obediential capacity may be in relation to God either (1) as Author of nature (from God as the Author of nature man receives capability of miraculous power), or (2) as Author of supernatural life.

2° What is the proper object of the intellect?

The proper object of the intellect is intelligible being existing under sensible conditions. Our intellectual knowledge is acquired through species not innate, but abstracted from sensible objects. Hence if the sensitive faculty cannot act, the intellectual idea is never acquired. A man born blind has no notion of colour. The intellect acquires knowledge of the soul and God in the mirror of sensible things.

3° What is the *adequate* object of our intellect?

The adequate object of our intellect is being in its widest extent, so far as it is analogically cognoscible in the mirror of sensible things. It is difficult to prove that the adequate object of our intellect is being in its widest extent even exceeding what is knowable in the mirror of sensible and spiritual creatures. The following reasoning is *probably* true:

Major: In the human intellect distinction should be made between the active faculty of intelligence (specific to man) and a passive capacity in which the soul is like to God.

Minor: But this passive capacity is greater than the soul's active power, and is not limited to any order of intelligible things.

Conclusion: Therefore it is not repugnant that the capacity should be raised to the knowledge of the most perfect intelligible being.

Bannez holds that there is in the soul a threefold capacity:

- (1) Specific, whereby we know sensible things.
- (2) Generic, whereby we know (as we do after death) purely spiritual natures like the angelic.
- (3) Analogical, by virtue of which we may know supernatural mysteries, and herein especially lies the likeness of our soul to God

Is not the highest capacity of the soul essentially spiritual? "My soul doth magnify the Lord, and my spirit hath rejoiced in God my Saviour."

4° God, even in His intimate nature, does not exceed the adequate object of our intellect. As a higher analogous idea is contained within the content of an analogous idea (Divine wisdom and human wisdom are within the content of wisdom in general), and as God in His intimate life is a higher analogous idea of the general analogous idea of being, it follows that God, even in His intimate life, is contained in the widest idea of being, which is the adequate object of our intellect.

IV.—Existence of Obediential capacity is suggested from consideration of our natural desire to see God in His Divine essence.

The desire to see God has been misinterpreted by certain Modernists. This desire implies in human nature its capacity and suitability for the reception of supernatural truth, but does not imply an exigency as if the supernatural were due to nature.

1° Argument of St. Thomas.

"If the human intellect knows the essence of any created effect, and knows of God (its cause) only that He exists . . . there remains the natural desire to investigate the cause." For complete happiness, therefore, it is necessary that the intellect should reach the essence itself of the First Cause.

2° Error of Baius and the Jansenists.

Their contention was that in human nature there is a natural and efficacious desire of the beatific vision, so that the vision is due to our nature. Beatific vision and Divine grace are consequently natural.

Their arguments were :

(1) The well-known words of St. Augustine: "Thou hast made us for Thyself, and our hearts are unquiet until they find their rest in Thee."


(2) The teaching of St. Thomas just quoted. But St. Augustine means that nature, elevated by Divine grace and illuminated by Faith, tends to God, and St. Thomas does not imply that the desire of seeing the Divine essence is a natural efficacious desire. He teaches elsewhere that there cannot be a natural efficacious desire unless in regard to a benefit proportioned to human nature and due to it.

Hence the desire is not efficacious, not innate, but is elicited by the will and proceeds from the knowledge of the created effects of the First Cause.

Note chart in following paragraph.

3° Statement of theologians examined.

(A) Terminology.



Appetite is natural when it comes from a natural principle and tends to an object proportioned to nature. Appetite is supernatural when it springs from a supernatural principle, *e.g.*, Grace, Charity, Hope, and tends to an object exceeding proportions of nature. Natural appetite is a natural tendency towards a suitable good—a tendency which anticipates the apprehension of the good, *e.g.*, a plant tends to the sunlight necessary for its well-being.

Elicited appetite is that whereby one, who apprehends a good, moves towards its acquisition.

A necessary elicited appetite is that which acts without deliberation on the apprehension of the good. Such appetite is found in irrational animals. 'A free elicited appetite is that whereby a rational nature, after deliberation and estimation of the merits of a benefit, inclines itself to it.

Finally, reasoned appetite may be efficacious or inefficacious—efficacious when the benefit is regarded as attainable, conditional and inefficacious when the benefit is judged to be beyond acquisition.

Inefficacious appetite is only a *velleity*.

(B) Augustinian School of the XVIII Century.

According to the teaching of this school the intuitive vision of God is natural as far as appetite is concerned, but is a supernatural end as far as attainment and means of attainment are concerned. Though the means are supernatural and strictly not due, yet in a sense they are due owing to the goodness of Providence, who does not withhold means necessary for an end.

It is clear from these statements that natural and supernatural orders are confused. God as author of nature has implanted in us an appetite for an end to which as author of nature He does not wish to lead us.

(C) Opinion of Scotus.

For intuitive vision of God there is within us a natural appetite innate and inefficacious. But from this statement it follows that there is in human nature a natural innate appetite for happiness in general. If the appetite is innate, it should be efficacious because an innate appetite does not come from knowledge, but from nature itself, and corresponds to the powers and exigencies of that nature.

(D) Opinion of Cajetan.

From knowledge of created things there is no natural desire of seeing God, but there is a connatural desire of seeing God from knowledge of effects of grace and glory, and by the word "connatural" he means conformable to nature, even when supernatural effects are experienced. But the desire which proceeds from supernatural effects of grace must be supernatural, and not "connatural" as Cajetan supposed.

"How great would be the happiness of man, if he were able to gaze immediately upon the Highest Good!" (Cf. Plato: "*Convivio*" c. 29).

(E) Thomist teaching.

Man naturally desires by a desire not innate but elicited, conditional and inefficacious, to see the essence of God author of nature.

This desire is:

- (a) Subjectively: elicited, not innate, because it springs from knowledge of effects of the First Cause, and is not a tendency of our nature anticipating knowledge. It is conditional: "I would like to see the essence of God, if that benefit were possible." It is inefficacious. The desire is free, because the clear vision of God is not in this life the adequate object of the will.
- (b) Objectively: the vision of the essence of God is desired, not as He is three in Person, but as He is one in nature—author of the natural order.

Natural knowledge of God reveals difficulties in regard

to Divine attributes naturally knowable, e.g., compatibility of Divine justice and Divine mercy. "From this knowledge there arises the natural desire which wishes more and more to see the Divine Substance" (*Contra Gentes*, Bk. III., c. 50).

CHAPTER XIII

SUITABILITY AND NECESSITY OF REVELATION

Art. I.—Heterodox opinions and the teaching of the Church.

I.—Heterodox opinions.

1° Rationalists deny the suitability of Revelation on the following grounds:

(A) Revelation is superfluous in regard to the natural truths of Religion. Reason alone can discover them. Moreover, Revelation would obstruct the progress of Science by imposing an unchanging doctrine expressed according to the ideas of a particular period.

(B) Revelation of Supernatural truths implies the abdication of Reason through obligation of believing unintelligible mysteries.

Semi-Rationalists admit the suitability of revelation of natural truths, but reject revelation of supernatural mysteries.

2° Traditionalists and Fideists maintain that the supernatural revelation of *natural* truths is *absolutely* necessary. Revelation is transmitted by tradition.

The following authors have developed this idea:

Joseph de Maistre (1753-1821) precursor of Traditionalism.

Vicomte de Bonald (1753-1840).

Félicité de Lammenais (1772-1854). A milder form of Traditionalism was taught by P. Ventura (1791-1861), Bautain, Bonnetty.

II.—The Church's doctrine.

1° Revelation of the natural truths of Religion is not *absolutely* necessary.

Reason alone can from created things acquire sure knowledge of existence of God, etc.

2° Revelation of the natural truths of Religion is morally necessary, so that all the truths may be known "quickly, with firm certitude, and with no admixture of

PRINCIPLES OF CATHOLIC APOLOGETICS 145


error by all." The totality of these truths does not exceed the physical power of human reason, but exceeds its moral power because of many impediments.

3° Revelation of supernatural truths is *absolutely* necessary on the supposition of the gratuitous elevation of man to a supernatural end.

Art. II.—Rational defence of the Church's doctrine.

I.—Revelation is not even morally necessary in order that men may know some natural truths relating to God.

Note different kinds of Necessity:



The first principles of reason are naturally known without tradition or revelation, and as, from these principles, reason is led to knowledge of God's existence, therefore human reason without the help of revelation may easily know some natural truths concerning God. Theologians commonly deny the possibility of invincible ignorance regarding the primary principles of the Natural Law and the existence of God.

II.—Revelation is morally necessary for knowledge of the totality of the truths of Natural Religion.

Moral necessity means a necessity which arises from the ordinary conditions and limitations of human nature involving great difficulty in the achievement of certain ends. It is clear that in ordinary conditions of life men cannot without revelation overcome difficulties in the way of knowing firmly and without error the sum of the truths of Natural Religion. St. Thomas assigns the qualities of sacred knowledge which make Revelation morally necessary: (1) Knowledge quickly acquired; (2) Knowledge more widely spread; (3) Knowledge firmly believed.

CONFIRMATION :

1° From the history of Philosophy.

(a) Amongst the Greeks.

Heracleitus and Democritus were materialists. Parmenides and Anaxagoras taught more spiritual principles, but with great admixture of error. Socrates, Plato and Aristotle evolved a true method of philosophy, but with many errors intellectual and moral.

Epicureans and Stoics relapsed into materialism.

Pyrrhonists became sceptics.

Neo-Platonism degenerated into Pantheism.

(b) In modern times, many errors have prevailed :
Sensism and materialism in England.

Exaggerated idealism of Descartes and his followers.

Agnosticism of Kant and his school.

Pantheism of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel.

Positivism of Comte.

2° From history of nations and religions.

(1) Degradation of idea of God.

(2) Degeneration of worship into licentious rites.

(3) Immortality of soul denied.

(4) Crime rampant.

III.—Revelation of supernatural mysteries is hypothetical but strictly necessary.

1° Necessity proved.

It is strictly necessary that an end should be known in order that human actions may be directed thereto. And as a supernatural end cannot be known without revelation, it follows that the revelation of this end, and of the means necessary thereto, is strictly necessary on the assumption of gratuitous direction of man to this end.

2° It is suitable that Revelation should be at first obscure.

If God were to reveal His essential nature the worship of the creature would be no longer free and meritorious.

IV.—Suitability of the gratuitous direction of the human race to a supernatural end.

1° From the standpoint of God and His infinite goodness.

It is befitting to Highest Good, *i.e.*, to God to communicate to His creatures what is intimate in Him. In God the Divine nature is most intimate. Hence it is befitting

that God should give His creature participation in His Divine nature, *i.e.*, supernatural grace.

"The higher a nature is, the more intimate his gift."

"*Summum Bonum est sui diffusivum.*"

2° From the standpoint of man.

An elevation without which our natural desire, conditional and inefficacious, cannot be satisfied is befitting, and at the same time gratuitous. But without elevation to a supernatural end our natural desire, conditional and inefficacious, of seeing God as He is in Himself cannot be satisfied. Therefore elevation of man to a supernatural end is befitting, and at the same time gratuitous.

The elevation is gratuitous because it exceeds the exigency of our nature. At the same time it is highly befitting, founded not on an inclination or direction to a supernatural end, but on the obediential capacity of human nature. After such elevation there ensues a positive inclination to a supernatural end, founded on the infused theological virtues of Faith, Hope and Charity.

V.—In a state of pure nature would the revelation of the sum of the natural truths of Religion be morally necessary ?

(a) In a state of pure nature, man could have reached his natural end by knowledge of the principal truths of Natural Religion. Human nature would have been subject to ignorance and concupiscence, but would not have been wounded in its faculties as original sin wounded them.

(b) In a state of integrity of nature man, though not elevated to supernatural life, would have received from God the full perfection of nature, and modally supernatural privileges, *e.g.*, immunity from ignorance, concupiscence, death and the conflict of passions. In this state there would have been a modally supernatural revelation in respect to the sum of the truths of Natural Religion.

Hence Revelation of the totality of the truths of Natural Religion is morally necessary, not in a state of pure nature, but in our present state, *i.e.*, on the presumption of man being directed to a supernatural end.

Rationalists should remember that whilst supernatural truths are incomprehensible and undemonstrable, they are not irrational or unintelligible. In every statement of supernatural truth, we know, at least analogically, what subject and predicate signify.

SECTION IV

CREDIBILITY OF THE MYSTERIES OF FAITH

CHAPTER XIV

DIVINE FAITH

Art. I.—Catholic and Heterodox ideas of Faith.

I.—Catholic notion of Faith and of an Act of Faith.


(A) The virtue of Faith is a supernatural virtue whereby we believe truths revealed by God, and believe them on the authority of God revealing. It is to this "evidence" that the Apostle alludes, when he describes Faith as "the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things which do not appear" (*Heb. xi. 1*). We believe, not because of the intrinsic truth of things seen by the natural light of reason, but because of the Divine authority which guarantees their truth.

(B) An Act of Faith is a supernatural assent of the intellect, most certain and free, whereby we believe a truth revealed by God on His Divine authority. Hence it is:

- (a) An *intellectual* assent under dominion of the will and therefore free.
- (b) *Supernatural*, because of the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit.
- (c) *Absolutely certain and irrevocable*, based on the authority of God. The assent is more certain than the antecedent judgment of credibility.
- (d) An act of Faith requires an *antecedent judgment* of credibility that God has spoken.
- (e) An act of Faith is *free*, even after the certain knowledge of motives of credibility. The freedom is not only that of believing or of not-believing (*libertas exercitii*), but also that of believing or disbelieving (*libertas specificationis*).

II.—Heterodox opinions regarding Divine Faith.

Note the following chart :



1° Pseudo-Supernaturalism.

(A) Early Protestants.

- (a) Luther and Calvin rejected the authority of the Church, and placed their basis of Faith in the immediate inspiration of the Holy Ghost.
- (b) They believed also that by faith sins are remitted, and justification obtained without works.
- (c) Luther was a nominalist. He did not believe in miracles, but only in the intrinsic motives of credibility.
- (d) Supernatural gifts (so-called), being due to the original integrity of human nature, are really natural.

(B) Fideists. Bautain, Bonnetty and Traditionalists. Reason cannot prove even the existence of God. Tradition is required.

2° Naturalism and Semi-Naturalism.

(A) Naturalism.

- (a) Kantian theory of faith resulted from (1) speculative Agnosticism, and (2) autonomy of reason and will. Hence the "moral faith," whereby we believe the postulates of practical reason deduced from the Categorical Imperative. This faith is subjectively sufficient and objectively insufficient.
- (b) Liberal Protestant theory (Schleiermacher, Ritschl, Sabatier, Harnack) reduce faith to the religious sense. Mysteries are credible if conformable to this sense.
- (c) Modernists appeal also to the religious sense. The credibility of mysteries is recommended by the fact that there is some unknown element in the history

of the Church, which responds to the exigency of human nature.


(B) Semi-Naturalism.

- (a) Pelagians held that when external revelation is given, internal grace is not necessary for belief. Semi-Pelagians held that internal grace is not necessary, at least for the beginning of Faith.
- (b) Semi-Rationalists teach that after revelation all the mysteries of Faith can be proved by reason. Hermes' theory is Kantian. The motive of Faith is the exigency of practical reason.
- (c) Semi-Immanentists (Blondel and Laberthonnière). Truth is the equation of mind and life, and is on that account changeable. Miracles have a symbolic, not an ontological value. Faith is identified with religious experience.

Art. II.—Analysis of an Act of Faith from the standpoints of object and subject.

I.—Faith and an Act of Faith from standpoint of object.

(1) The object *which* is believed is either material or formal. The material object is the totality of Revelation. It is divided into the object of Faith *per se*, which cannot be known without revelation, and the preambles of Faith. The object of Faith *per se* is either formal and primary, *i.e.*, intimate life of God, or secondary, *i.e.*, other truths of Revelation. Hence the following chart :



(2) The formal object of faith is the authority of God revealing.

The authority of God implies (1) His truthfulness; (2) His infallible knowledge.

The assent of Faith is not discursive.

Revelation itself, as the uncreated and free act of God, probably belongs to formal motive of Faith. The testimony of the Church does not belong to the formal motive, but is only a condition.

II.—Faith and an Act of Faith from the standpoint of subject.

1° Analysis of belief.

(A) Belief in general.

"Belief in an act of the intellect moved by the will to assent." An assent is a judgment which may be doubtful, probable or certain.

Judgment	{	doubt	:	intellect not more inclined to accept a statement than to accept its contradictory.		
		opinion	:	intellect inclined to accept a statement, but with fear of error.		
	{	certitude	{	from evidence of object	{	immediate, <i>e.g.</i> , first principles.
						mediate: <i>e.g.</i> , knowledge discursively reached.
			from will	:	object not evident, but accepted on the statement of credible witness.	

Since the intellect believes at the command of the will the act of belief is free, because the object believed is not evident, and the motive is only one which influences the will to move the intellect to assent reasonably and firmly.

(B) Belief on the authority of God.

Belief on the authority of God is an assent of the intellect to truths revealed by God—an assent commanded by the will.

2° Divine Faith, including its act and beginning, must be intrinsically supernatural.

(A) The Virtue of Faith must be supernatural and infused. Since the primary object to be believed (God in His intimate life) is essentially supernatural, the intellect of the believer must be proportioned to this object by a power essentially supernatural; belief must be infused by God and not acquired by man; and this is true not only for the faith of one in a state of grace, but for the faith of one in sin. Faith of demons is natural, acquired and reaches supernatural truths only materially, i.e., as far as the natural sense of words goes. In the same way, a listener without a musical ear hears only materially a symphony of Beethoven.

(B) For an act of Faith actual grace is required. Again there must be proportion between the act and the supernatural object believed. An act receives specification from its object.

(C) As the beginning of Faith is essentially supernatural, grace is required.

(D) How Thomists differ from Scotists and Molinists regarding the supernatural character of Faith.

Thomists and Suarez hold: "Man cannot accept supernatural truths based on the formally supernatural

motive of Divine Revelation without a special internal grace affecting intellect and will." They allow that a man can without special grace know and accept supernatural truths with an imperfect assent based on some human motive (as heretics believe).

Scotists, Nominalists and Molina hold that the assent of Faith from motive of Divine Revelation is essentially natural, and supernatural only in regard to its manner. Grace would be necessary for acceptance of Supernatural Mysteries on the authority of God, i.e., for their acceptance with the pious adherence which salvation requires. Necessity of grace would thus depend on the extrinsic end of an act of Faith. Faith would not be intrinsically supernatural.

3° Compatibility of freedom with the certitude of an Act of Faith.

(A) Difficulty of the question.

On the one hand an act of belief is said to be free not only as regards assent or non-assent (*quoad exercitium*), but also as regards assent or dissent (*quoad specificationem*) (cf. Acts xvii. 32).

By the Vatican Council, liberty of assent or dissent is declared to remain even after the certain knowledge of motives of credibility. Hermes admitted the possibility only of assent or non-assent.

On the other hand the assent of Faith is defined to be most certain, i.e., infallible on the ground of motive (Authority of God), and most firm from standpoint of adhesion due to motion of will illuminated and inspired by the Holy Ghost.

Hence a twofold difficulty:

(1) Presuming rational certitude of Divine Revelation, how does liberty of dissent remain?

(2) If an act of Faith is free and not necessary, how can it be most certain?

(B) Solution of St. Thomas.

(a) Liberty of assent or dissent remains because of the invidence of the object to be believed.

(b) Assent of Faith is *in itself* more certain than any natural (even necessary) assent, but *from standpoint of human intellect* is less certain.

Assent of Faith is *in itself* more certain than any natural assent, because it has a more certain cause. But the necessarily obscure knowledge associated with Divine

Faith is less proportioned to the human intellect. Hence doubt is possible not from standpoint of the cause of Faith (Divine Authority), but from standpoint of the intellect. Exclusion of *deliberate* fear of error belongs to all certitude, and Divine Faith is firmer than natural certitude owing to its formal motive. But *indeliberate* fear of error is more excluded by an assent naturally certain through evidence (*e.g.*, assent to an evident principle) than by assent of Faith. Similarly, metaphysical certitude is in itself firmer than physical, and yet the latter based on objects of sense makes a stronger appeal to many minds.

Is it not true therefore that Faith is only theoretically more certain, but really less certain than natural knowledge? No. Faith is, when accepted, more certain *in* itself and *in us* owing to its formal motive and to the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Ghost. At the same time, truth, based on evidence, is more natural and more proportioned to our intellect, and more naturally therefore excludes any movement of hesitation and doubt.

(C) Cardinal de Lugo's solution.

According to the Cardinal, the proposition "Revelation exists" is certain, inasmuch as it excludes prudent doubt, but it is not evident as it does not exclude imprudent doubt. Since Revelation is not evident although the Authority is evident, there is not evidence of the truth of the object revealed, and as long as this inevidence remains, there is nothing which necessitates assent of Faith.

CRITIQUE. From this opinion it follows that liberty of Faith would be destroyed, if human reason, without even imprudent doubt, should know the fact of Revelation. But reason can be certain of the fact of Revelation without any fear of error, and yet Supernatural Mysteries remain obscure. Hence the necessity of intervention of human liberty under God's grace.

(D) Solution of Suarez.

Suarez is of opinion that "the same truth, looked at in the same way, can be *seen* and *believed* by the same individual."

CRITIQUE. The Authority of God revealing cannot be seen and believed (*i.e.*, not seen) by the same individual, unless God be regarded in the one case as Author of nature, and in the other case as Author of grace and glory. Suarez, however, does not make this distinction.

Art. III.—Revelation as formal motive of infused Faith.

I.—Difficulty of the question.

Is a natural knowledge of the authority of God revealing sufficient, or is a supernatural knowledge of this formal motive of Faith required?

Cousin wrote: "Final analysis of the Certitude of Faith consists in the rational evidence of credibility; consequently philosophic reasoning is superior to Faith." (*Introduction à l'histoire de la philosophie, 1^{re} leçon*).

Does the soul, without internal light of grace, remain blind concerning the formal motive of Faith, or does the soul see in a confused way this motive, so that grace is necessary only to know it more firmly and to believe with such pious affection of soul as is necessary for salvation?

Thomists answer: Natural knowledge can be obtained of truths concerning God, Author of nature, and of the fact of Revelation as something *modally* supernatural, exteriorly manifested and confirmed by miracles; but Revelation *substantially* supernatural proceeds from God, Author of grace, is attained by Faith alone, and is the formal motive of Faith, inasmuch as it is that *which* is believed, and that *by which* belief is attained.

(A) What the Church has defined.

The Church has not defined that the formal motive of infused Faith owing to its supernatural character is inaccessible to our reason without infused light.

The Church has defined that the faithful must accept the fact of Revelation most *firmly* as it is infallibly proposed by the Church herself under the assistance of the Holy Spirit, that this Revelation is strictly supernatural, and has been confirmed by miracles properly so called of which the Church finally judges with certitude higher than natural certitude.

According to St. Thomas, it is not impossible to accept the fact of Revelation from signs (miracles) historically certain, and to believe it because of the infallible testimony of the Church.

(B) Views of Theologians.

Thomists and Suarez write: Revelation as formal motive of infused Faith exceeds the powers of reason, and must be known in a supernatural way; Revelation is both that *which* is believed, and that *by which* belief is attained; otherwise Divine Faith would not be essentially

supernatural, nor infallible, nor more certain than any natural knowledge, but would be resolved into natural certitude.

Scotists, Nominalists, Molina and some modern theologians write: The formal motive of infused Faith does *not* exceed the natural powers of reason, and it is sufficient to know naturally the infallibility and truth of God and the fact of Revelation. This knowledge is essentially natural, and is confirmed by declarations of the Church and by the infused light of Faith.

In the latter view, the rational character of Faith is safeguarded, but are its supernatural character and certitude secured?

II.—Teaching of Scripture and of early Tradition.

(A) Sacred Scripture.

Faith is "substance of things to be hoped for" (*Heb. xi. 1*), i.e., the beginning of eternal life and therefore essentially supernatural.

The formal motive of Faith is referred to many times in the New Testament as the voice of the Father, or of the Son, or as the testimony of the Holy Ghost.

"You have not heard His voice at any time" (*John v. 37*).

"My sheep hear my voice" (*John x. 27*).

"Thou hast hidden these things from the wise and prudent and hast revealed them to little ones" (*Matt. xi. 25*).

"Everyone who hath heard of the Father and hath learned, cometh to me" (*John vi. 45*).

"No man can say Lord Jesus but by the Holy Ghost" (*1 Cor. xii. 3*).

From the above texts, it is clear that they who resist the grace of Faith cannot recognise the voice of the Father, although they see miracles wrought, and hear the literal word of the Gospel.

(B) Early Tradition (a few examples):

St. Basil: "No one can think of the Son, unless he has been enlightened by the Holy Spirit" (*M.G. t 32 col 329-330*).

St. John Chrysostom: "How can unbelievers sin if they have not been enlightened? Because they have not shown themselves worthy to receive that illumination" (*M.G. t 55 col 322*).

St. Cyril of Alexandria: "Since it does not belong to common wisdom to acknowledge God in human form, Christ says that no one can come to Him, who has not received light from God the Father" (*M.G. t 73 col 605-606*).

St. Augustine institutes a comparison between a blind man and a Pharisee: "The sun will shine upon the face of the Pharisee and the blind man; both are shone upon in the flesh, but the eyesight of both does not receive the light, because the blind man is deprived of the faculty of sight. Thus also heavenly light shines upon the intelligence of believer and non-believer; reason in both cases is shone upon (by the evidence of miracles), but in the one case the eye of the soul is not illuminated, because the unbelieving man has not the 'eyes of the heart enlightened' (*Eph. i., 17, 18*) (by the inspiration of Divine grace). Internal grace is necessary to recognise the light" (*Gospel of St. John c. viii. 14*).

The Council of Orange defined against Semi-Pelagians that it is not possible to accept the Gospel message without illumination and inspiration from the Holy Ghost.

III.—Teaching of Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries.

Abelard (+ 1142): Formal motive of Faith is not the authority of God, but rational proof. Hence Faith is only a reasonable opinion (*ML t 178 col 1050, 1051*).

Hugh of St. Victor (+ 1141) stresses the need of internal illumination as well as the extrinsic motive of miracles. (*ML t 176 col 217*).

St. Bernard (+ 1158): Faith is supported by certain and firm truth and is recommended by the manifestation of miraculous power (*ML t 182 col 1061-1062*).

William of Auxerre (+ 1231): Supernatural Faith comes by illumination. When Faith is present a man cannot believe for the reasons which he previously entertained; those reasons do not beget Faith in him, but confirm and augment this gratuitous gift (*In iv. Sent. b III*).

William of Auvergne (+ 1249) Certitude of Faith is founded upon the testimony of God (*De Fide, Part I*).

Alexander of Hales (+ 1245): Rational grounds dispose the soul for reception of light, whereby man assents

to the first truth for its own sake (*Summa III^a p, q 68 m II*).

Albertus Magnus (+ 1280): Faith from the fact that it is a simple light similar to the first truth gives simple knowledge of credible truths (*In Sent. Bk. III*).

St. Bonaventure (+ 1274): No man assents to Divine Authority, for its own sake and above all things, except by Divine illumination (*In iv. Sent. Bk. III*).

Hence theologians before the time of St. Thomas and those co-temporary with him teach that formal motive of Faith is "first truth known by supernatural light."

IV.—Teaching of St. Thomas.

Commentary on the Sentences (*c. 1253*):

"Formal motive of Faith is uncreated first truth not seen but believed" (*Comm. Sent. III. d 23 q 3 a 3*).

"Faith does not assent to any truth unless on the testimony of uncreated first truth not seen but believed" (*Comm. Sent. III d 24 q 1 a 1*).

De Veritate. q 14 (*c. 1261*).

"Formal motive of Faith is uncreated first truth existing in the Divine Knowledge."

"Divine Revelation is at the same time that *by which* belief is reached, and that *which* is believed, just as light is that which is seen and that by which sight is accomplished."

St. Thomas does not say that a believer has a perception or intuition of uncreated first truth, but that he assents to uncreated first truth by his intellect and will.

Commentary on Boethius' Trinity: "Just as intuition of first principles follows upon sensitive knowledge notwithstanding that the light whereby first principles are known is innate, so Faith comes from hearing and yet the habit of Faith is infused" (*q 3, a 1, ad 4*).

V.—History of problem after the time of St. Thomas.

(A) Before the Council of Trent.

Scotus (+ 1307) maintained views summed up in the three following propositions:

1^o Natural and supernatural acts may have the same formal object.

2^o Infused Faith is not necessary because of the supernaturality of the object; the formal object of theological Faith does not exceed acquired Faith.

3^o Infused Faith is resolved into acquired Faith by which we believe (owing to miraculous signs) that the church is divine.

Durandus (+ 1334) and Nominalists (Ockam, etc.), held the same views. Early Thomist theologians, Capreolus (+ 1444), Cajetan (+ 1534), Ferrariensis (+ 1528) defend the doctrine of St. Thomas.

(B) After the Council of Trent.

The Council of Trent teaches that the supernaturality of infused Faith is of the same order as the supernaturality of sanctifying grace.

Melchior Cano (+ 1560): "If assent of Catholic Faith depended on acquired Faith, the assent would not be absolutely firm." Necessary truths of mathematics are ultimately seen by their own light, though certain conditions are previously required, *e.g.*, sensitive knowledge, explanation of a teacher, etc. (*de Locis Theologicis Bk. II c 8*).

Bannez (+ 1604): "The ultimate resolution of Faith and of the Act of Faith is to the Holy Ghost revealing" (*1^a 11^{ae} q 1 a 1 dub. IV*).

Suarez (+ 1617) is in agreement with Thomistic teaching, but it is difficult to reconcile his position with his view on "simultaneous concursus" and "active obediential faculty" (*De Fide, Part I, disp. III*).

Joannes a S. Thoma (+ 1664): "Divine testimony is the formal reason of believing the things testified and the testimony itself" (*De Gratia, Vol. V, disp. 20, a 1, n 7*).

VI.—Teaching of St. Thomas is proved.

Divine Revelation coming from God, Author of grace, and constituting the formal motive of Faith is that *by which* belief is reached, and that *which* is believed; the fact of Revelation, however, only *modally* supernatural, confirmed by miracles can be naturally known, just as the existence of God, Author of nature, is naturally known.

1^o Proof drawn from objective infallibility of Faith.

The Church has defined that Divine Revelation is, in the strict sense, supernatural. Therefore the faithful must believe *supernaturally* the fact of Divine Revelation, otherwise they would not have a certitude objectively infallible, superior to all natural certitude.

St. Thomas points out that it is possible to know the

fact of Revelation naturally from historical testimony, and to believe it on the infallible proposition of the church. The fact of Revelation is reached by Faith inasmuch as Revelation is *essentially* supernatural, whereas the fact of Revelation is reached by reason in so far as Revelation is *modally* supernatural.

Again, proof through miracles does not give intrinsic evidence, and hence Faith regarding the same object is possible. The Apostles knew of Christ's resurrection from evidence of the senses, and at the same time believed it because of the infallible testimony of Christ and of the Scriptures.

2° Proof drawn from the subjective firmness necessary to the knowledge of the motive of Faith.

The faithful adhere to the declaration of the Church regarding fact of Revelation with a certitude subjectively infallible. This firmness of belief transcends natural reason.

3° Proof drawn from the essential supernaturality required in this knowledge.

Revelation as formal motive of essentially supernatural Faith should be itself essentially supernatural. But what is essentially supernatural can be known only supernaturally by supernatural Faith. Therefore Revelation as the formal motive of Faith is that *by which* belief is reached and that *which* is believed.

The following table shows the genesis, motive and object of an act essentially supernatural, an act modally supernatural, an act of rational cognition and an act of sensitive perception.

SOURCE	ACT	MEDIUM OR OBJECTIVE MOTIVE	OBJECT
1. Habit of Faith.	Act of Faith,	Revelation, essentially supernatural	mystery essentially supernatural
2. Mind of prophet,	prophecy,	Revelation modally supernatural	future contingent event
3. Reason,	rational act,	principles of reason,	conclusion
4. Sense,	sensation	sensible light,	colour.

Hence certitude of Faith is not resolved into the light of first principles of reason (on which Divine truth and

miracles confirming preaching of the Gospel ultimately depend), but objectively into the uncreated light of active Revelation, and subjectively into infused light of Faith by which the human intellect is elevated.

OBJECTIONS :

(1) The objection may be raised that the Gospel message indicates that Divine Revelation comes from God, Author of grace. But this message may be known by the exercise of natural faculties. Therefore the authority of God revealing may be known naturally.

Answer: A reader of the Gospel will know supernatural mysteries but only materially, not formally as supernatural, just as a student may know a metaphysical principle only materially, but may fail to see the necessity and universality of the same. Again, he who lacks a musical ear hears a Beethoven symphony only materially, but he misses the soul of the symphony.

(2) The same truth under the same aspect cannot be *known* and *believed* by the same person. But the authority of God revealing is *known* to many. Therefore it cannot be *believed* by them.

Answer: Authority of God revealing as it applies formally to God, Author of grace, cannot be proved, and under this higher aspect is the formal motive of Faith. Under a lower and extrinsic aspect, it is proved by miracles which are the seal of God, Author of nature.

(3) The fact that no one can tell with certainty whether his act is supernatural or not is not an argument against the supernatural character of the formal motive of Faith. A supernatural act is necessarily accompanied by a natural act, and it is difficult to distinguish between the supernatural and natural elements. But according to the teaching of the Church: No one can believe, with belief effective for salvation, unless aided by the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Ghost.

CHAPTER XV

CREDIBILITY

Art. I.—Rational Credibility.

I.—Catholic notion of Credibility (D. 1812, 1790).

1° (From objective standpoint). The mysteries of Faith are rationally credible, inasmuch as the Divine origin of the Christian Faith can from most certain signs be rightly proved.

2° (From subjective standpoint). Human reason can certainly know before acceptance of Faith the Divine origin of the Christian Religion (D. 1622-1637).

3° *Scientific* proof of Credibility is not required for each one of the faithful (D. 1815).

4° Probable knowledge of Credibility (D. 2025), purely subjective knowledge (D. 1273), internal experience (D. 1812), private inspiration—all these are insufficient.

II.—Heterodox notions of Credibility.

False Notion of Credibility	{	Pseudo-Supernaturalism	{	Early Protestants.
				Fideists.
	{	Naturalism	absolute	{ Kant Liberal Protestants Modernists.
			non-absolute	{ Hermes Semi-Immanentists.

(1) Pseudo-Supernaturalism.

(A) Early Protestants, *e.g.*, Luther, Calvin, etc., maintained that the faithful should themselves discern the Word of God by the immediate testimony of the Holy Ghost (D. 767).

(B) Fideists and Traditionalists (Bautain, Bonnetty, etc.), appealed to the faith of humanity founded on tradition and positive revelation. Human reason had been so injured by original sin, that it is incapable of proving even the existence of God (1622, 1627, 1650). Fideism regards the Supernatural as *due* to nature.

(2) Naturalism and Semi-Naturalism lay down varying bases for Faith :

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(A) Kant: "Moral faith is founded on the exigencies of practical reason." Existence of miracles cannot be clearly proved.

(B) Liberal Protestants (Schleiermacher, etc.): Basis of Faith is "sense of religion." Divinity of the church cannot be proved by miracles (D. 1813).

(C) Modernists rely on "aspirations and exigencies of the religious sense" (D. 2072, 2101, 2103).

(D) Hermes regarded "exigencies of practical reason" as the credentials of Faith. But Semi-Rationalists do not deny, as Kant did, the fact of revelation and the influx of grace.

(E) Semi-Immanentists (Laberthonnière and Blondel) claim that there is in human nature an exigency for the supernatural order (D. 2103).

III.—Theological explanation of the Catholic notion of Credibility.

Credibility of mysteries of Faith is defined: "Aptitude for belief of those truths which, from most certain signs, appear to our reason to have been revealed by God."

(A) Comparison with human belief.

Human faith rests on the testimony of witnesses worthy of credit, *i.e.*, of witnesses who (a) know what they affirm, (b) are truthful, (c) really affirm.

Divine Faith rests on God who can neither deceive nor be deceived.

(B) Catholic Credibility depends on previous truths, *viz.*, that an act of Faith is not a species of religious experience, but assent of intellect to truths revealed by God on His Divine authority.

(C) Other definitions of Credibility (such as credibility based on conformity with human aspirations) are insufficient.

(D) Evidence of Credibility is not the same as evidence which an apostle had, when he saw miracles worked in confirmation of our Lord's mission.

Evidence of Credibility is moral certitude based on human testimony.

(E) Properties of Rational Credibility.

1° Credibility is common to all revealed truths.

2° Truth of Credibility is *extrinsic* to revealed truths.

3° Truth of Credibility is that which is known as speculative-practical.

4° Evident Credibility is a condition *sine quâ non* of an Act of Faith.

Art. II.—Necessity of Rational Credibility.

Thesis: In order that mysteries of Faith should be rationally credible, reason ought to know with at least moral certitude the fact of Revelation so far as it is modally supernatural. Revelation as the uncreated and essentially supernatural action of God is believed supernaturally and infallibly as formal motive of Faith, *i.e.*, as the motive by which belief is secured and at the same time that which is believed.

I.—Difficulty of the question.

How reconcile the supernatural character with the rational obedience of Faith? If reason can prove that mysteries have been revealed by God, reason can know the formal motive of Faith, which would not in that case be essentially supernatural.

The answer is suggested in the thesis. Reason can know the fact of Revelation so far as it is modally supernatural. Revelation, so far as it is essentially supernatural, belongs exclusively to Faith.

II.—Testimony of Scripture and of the doctors of the Church.

(A) *John xx. 30, 31*: "Many other signs also did Jesus in the sight of His disciples, which are not written in this book. But these are written that you may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God; and that believing you may have life in His name."

1 Cor. xv. 17: "If Christ be not risen your faith is vain."

1 Pet. i. 16: "For we have not by following artificial fables made known to you the power and presence of our Lord Jesus Christ; but we were eye-witnesses of his greatness."

(B) St. Justin, St. Clement of Alexandria, Eusebius, St. Augustine, St. Chrysostom, St. Hilarius, St. Ambrose, say that the supernatural certitude of Faith is higher and firmer than the rational certitude of Credibility. They hold that the formal motive of Faith is known under internal illumination and inspiration of the Holy Ghost.

(C) Hugh of St. Victor, St. Bernard, Alexander of Hales, Albertus Magnus, St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas,

Thomists and Suarez maintain that the formal motive of infused Faith can only be known through illumination and inspiration of the Holy Ghost.

III.—Rational undoubting knowledge of the fact of Revelation is necessary.

Major: Nothing is rationally credible by Divine and unchangeable Faith unless it is evidently, and not merely probably, credible by this Faith Divine and unchangeable.

Minor: But nothing is evidently such unless reason recognises from miracles that it has been supernaturally revealed by God.

Conclusion: Therefore that the mysteries of Faith may be rationally credible, reason should from signs recognise the fact of Revelation, at least so far as it is modally supernatural.

Reason can recognise through miracles the fact of Revelation so far as it is a miraculous intervention of God, *i.e.*, modally supernatural. But reason cannot grasp Divine Revelation so far as it is essentially supernatural. Under that aspect, Revelation is held by Faith. Hence in Scripture such expressions as "voice of our Heavenly Father," "voice of the Son," "testimony of the Holy Spirit," etc.

Can an object of Faith be something seen? No. Thomas the Apostle *saw* one thing and *believed* another: "*vidit hominem et cicatrices, et ex hoc credidit divinitatem resurgentis*" (St. Thomas in Joan xx. 29 lect. vi., fine).

IV.—Moral certitude is sufficient.

Although scientific proof of Credibility, *i.e.*, scientific proof of the Divine origin of Christianity, is most useful for the collective faith of the Church, it is not required in any individual case; moral certitude is sufficient.

1° Scientific certitude (which implies leisure, mental ability, etc.) is not possible for all. Certitude of natural reason, such as that which men generally have of the existence of God is sufficient.

2° Physical certitude is not possible for all, *i.e.*, the certitude, *e.g.*, of those who witnessed the resurrection of Lazarus.

Just as metaphysical certitude is founded on the absolute necessity of that which is asserted, and on the impossibility of the contradictory proposition, so physical certitude depends on the uniformity of the laws of nature. Moral certitude depends on human testimony, *e.g.*, it is

morally impossible that such a witness should in such circumstances testify falsely.

3° Divine Faith does not require a higher certitude of credibility than moral.

For moral action, in affairs of the natural order, moral certitude is sufficient. But Divine Faith requires a judgment of credibility as something certain in the natural order—something which justifies moral action. Hence Divine Faith requires a judgment of credibility which shall be at least morally certain.

The assent of Faith may accordingly be resolved into (1) formal, intrinsic, supernatural certitude based on Divine Revelation, infallibly and supernaturally believed as the formal motive of Faith; (2) material, extrinsic, modally supernatural certitude, based on evidence of credibility as a necessary condition on the part of the subject. There is a second necessary condition on the part of the object, *viz.*, infallible proposition of Revealed Truths through the Church. This proposition is not formal motive of Faith but only a condition.

An objection may be urged: moral certitude of credibility does not suffice, because *per accidens* it can be about something false, *e.g.*, if a witness invincibly errs by recording false miracles as true.

Answer: Moral certitude is sufficient *per se*. There may be *per accidens* an illegitimate persuasion which is very like moral certitude, but is not certitude, as it can be shown that the persuasion lacked foundation, which never happens in the case of real certitude. Material heretics hold false beliefs by human opinion, whilst they assent by Supernatural Faith to certain Divine Truths.

V.—Moral certitude of credibility can be gained by all men, at least with the help of grace, although grace is not absolutely necessary.

(A) As regards those who hear Catholic doctrine. The judgment of the Universal Church confirms the words of the preacher. The Church is an "irrefragable testimony of its own Divine mission." Motives of Credibility lead to Faith, and Faith subsequently enables the believer to appreciate better the cogency of the motives of credibility. "*Lumen fidei facit videre ea quæ creduntur*" (St. Thomas 11^a 11^{ae} q 1, a 4, ad 3). In this sense (as will be presently explained) should be interpreted the sayings of St. Anselm, "*Credo ut intelligam*," and "*Fides*

quærens intellectum." The internal grace of God helps hearers of the Gospel, so that they may realise the motives of credibility; grace does not supply any deficiency in the external proposition of the Faith, but it *inclines the attention* of the hearer to the true motives of credibility, and *corrects his intention* so that he may form an unbiassed judgment. "Was not our heart burning within us, whilst He spoke in the way?" (Luke xxiv. 32).

(B) What is the teaching regarding those who are in invincible ignorance of Catholic truth?

It is of faith that all men exercising the use of reason receive sufficient grace (at least, remote) to find the way of salvation. Heretics may know the principle mysteries, and the needful motives of credibility through the teaching of their particular denomination. As regards "*aliquis nutritus in silvis*," who knows nothing of Christianity, if he follows the lead of natural reason in the pursuit of good and evil, it is most certain that God will reveal by internal inspiration those truths which must of necessity be believed, or He will send some preacher of the Faith, to him as He sent Peter to Cornelius (St. Thomas, *de Veritate*, q 14, a 11, ad 1^m).

(C) Why is internal grace not absolutely necessary for the certain judgment of Credibility?

Because the motives of Credibility are naturally knowable, just as in the case of a miracle.

Art. III.—Function of judgment of Credibility in the genesis of an Act of Faith.

I.—Acts which lead to an Act of Faith.

An Act of Faith is a human act, deliberate, elicited by the intellect and ordered by the will under the inspiration and illumination of the Holy Ghost.

Before enumerating the acts which lead to an Act of Faith, it will be useful to recall the succession of acts which concur to the deliberation and execution of a proposal.

(1) Acts of intellect and will regarding the attainment of some end.

ORDER OF INTENTION

ACTS OF INTELLECT

- 1° Judgment: this end is desirable
- 3° Judgment: this end can and must be obtained.

ACTS OF WILL

- 2° Desire (inefficacious)
- 4° Efficacious intention: I desire this end.

(2) Acts regarding means of attainment.

A.—ORDER OF CHOICE

- | | |
|--|----------------------------|
| 5° Deliberation: these means seem apt for the end. | 6° Consent to these means. |
| 7° Practical judgment regarding the best method. | 8° Choice of this method |

B.—ORDER OF EXECUTION

- | | |
|---|---|
| 9° Command: the means chosen must be applied. | 10° Active use of the will moving faculties. |
| 11° Attainment of end desired. | 12° Fruition of will, the end being attained. |

GENESIS OF AN ACT OF FAITH

(1) Acts relating to attainment of last end, *i.e.*, Salvation.

ORDER OF INTENTION

ACTS OF INTELLECT

ACTS OF WILL

- | | |
|---|---|
| 1° Judgment: last end known at least implicitly as desirable. | 2° Desire of salvation. |
| 3° Judgment: end attainable and of necessity to be attained. | 4° Intention: I sincerely desire to attain my last end, my salvation. |

In case of converts, Acts 3 and 4 are performed under the illumination and inspiration of internal grace.

Auditus Fidei: Here comes logically, if not historically, the intervention of the Divine message, confirmed by miracles.

(2) Acts relating to means of attainment.

A.—ORDER OF CHOICE

- | | |
|--|---|
| 5° Deliberation. | 6° Consent to credibility (not as yet efficacious). |
| (a) Speculative judgment, "this is credible," remotely practical. | |
| (b) Speculative—practical judgment "this must be believed" | |
| judgment of credentia. | |
| 7° Judgment practico-practical of credentia: "this must be believed by me here and now." | 8° Supernatural choice of the act of belief. |

B.—ORDER OF EXECUTION

- | | |
|------------------------------|--|
| 9° Judgment: Believe! | 10° Active use of will. |
| 11° Act of Faith: I believe! | 12° Fruition arising from attainment of Faith. |

II.—Distinction between the judgment of Credibility and the practical judgment of Credentia.

The principal difference lies in this fact that the judgment of Credibility and the judgment speculative-practical of Credentia are found not only in those who reach Faith, but even in those who with full advertence commit the sin of infidelity. On the contrary the judgment practico-practical of Credentia is not found except in the case of those who attain to Faith. Hence this judgment *per se* requires some help of grace.

Video meliora (speculative judgment).

Proboque (speculative-practical judgment).

Deteriora sequor (practico-practical judgment).

"The judgment in the character of extrinsic formal cause directs the will so that it may choose in a definite way; the will in the character of efficient cause applies the intellect in regard to action so that it may judge in a definite way" (*Salvaticenses de Angelis disp. x. dub. viii. n. 270*). According to the Thomist school, the judgment practico-practical of Credentia, and the supernatural choice of the act of belief are intrinsically supernatural.

An Act of Faith is not the conclusion of an apologetic syllogism. The syllogism terminates at the following judgment of Credibility.

Major: Whatever God reveals is rationally credible.

Minor: But God has revealed Christian teaching as is clear from the miracles by which it is confirmed.

Conclusion: Therefore Christian teaching is rationally credible.

Art. IV.—Compatibility of the reasonable obedience of Faith with its obscurity, freedom and supernaturality.

A difficulty has been raised regarding the certitude of Faith and formulated thus:

Unless the fact of Revelation be only probable, the obscurity, freedom and supernaturality of Faith cannot be established.

ANSWER:

(1) Probability of the fact of Revelation does not suffice for rational belief.

(a) If it be alleged that the probable judgment of credibility is sufficient, the answer is at once sug-

gested: not in a matter the consequences of which are so grave (*Vide* Pascal, "*Pensées*," Art. x.).

- (b) If it be alleged that ignorant men and children rely on the testimony of pastor or parent, which is only of probable value, the answer is clear: testimony of pastor or parent is only the condition which makes known the universal testimony of the Church.

(2) Certitude of Credibility is reconciled with the liberty of an Act of Faith.

The proofs of Credibility are extrinsic, not intrinsic, and are therefore compatible with freedom. "Only that species of proof excludes Faith by which the object of Faith becomes intrinsically evident or extrinsically visible. (*St. Thomas*, 11^a 11^{ae} q 5 Art. 1).

The certitude of Credibility does not diminish the merit of Faith. When Our Lord said: "Unless you see signs and wonders you do not believe," He condemned the sceptical spirit which asks for unnecessary signs, but He did not condemn the attitude of mind which requires the Mysteries of Faith to be rationally credible.

(3) Certitude of Credibility is compatible with obscurity of Faith.

The statement, "The Word was made flesh," is credible owing to *extrinsic* testimony, but *intrinsically* it remains a mystery.

(4) Certitude of Credibility is compatible with the supernatural character of Faith.

The higher certainty of supernatural truth cannot be resolved *formally* and *intrinsically* into the lower certainty of Credibility, but it can be so resolved *materially* and *extrinsically*. Analogously, the metaphysical certitude of first principles presupposes the lower certainty of sensitive knowledge.

When the statement is made that Revelation is that *by which* Faith is reached and that *which* is believed, Revelation must be taken as Revelation *intrinsically* supernatural. Revelation *modally* supernatural may be partly *known*, in so far as it is a miraculous intervention on the part of God.

Hence the following:

- (1) Certitude of Credibility founded on miracles is a condition of Faith, from the standpoint of the subject who aspires to Faith.

- (2) Infallible proposition of the Church is a condition of Faith from the standpoint of the object to be believed.
- (3) Formal motive of Faith is the authority of God revealing.

Art. V.—Summary of Catholic teaching on Divine Faith.

1^o An Act of Faith.

The essence of an Act of Faith is believing in something that God has said, just because He has said it. To put it concretely, if God should appear to me, and tell me that in His one Divine nature there are three distinct Persons, and that the Second of these became Incarnate in our Blessed Lady, and died on the cross for my salvation, and I, knowing that God who tells me these things is truthful and trustworthy, believe what He has said, my act of believing is Faith. The truths I thus believe are Articles of Faith (*objectum materiale*), and the reason or motive on which I have believed is God's veracity (*objectum formale*).

2^o Equality of Faith.

It is clear that in this case I believe, not upon intrinsic evidence, *viz.*, by perceiving the identity of subject and predicate (as I do when I say that $2 + 2 = 4$, or that the three angles of a plane triangle equal two right angles), but on what is called extrinsic evidence, namely, the authority and infallibility of the teacher. This is what makes the *equality of Faith*. For if a hundred persons were with me when God appeared to me and told me the above-named truths, and they, like me, believed what He said because He said it, their act of belief is Faith, precisely as mine is, no matter what might be the difference of education or intellectual capacity. Ten of them might be experts in Divinity or exegesis; ten others highly versed in secular learning; ten others fairly educated, and the rest stupid or illiterate. Yet all would be capable of knowing that God had spoken and of knowing what He had said, and that He could not deceive, and the Act of Faith in all is essentially the same. It is thus that in the Catholic Church, there is no difference of Faith, as far as Faith is concerned, between the most learned theologians and the most illiterate layman, between the Pope and the simplest child or the poorest peasant.

3^o Reasonableness of Faith.

It is also true that this Act of Faith common to all and by God's grace made by all upon the same reason and the same footing, so far from being "blind belief" or "abdication of our reason" rests upon the surest and highest of all reasons, and is essentially the noblest use of our reason, and the truest form of our "reasonable service," since nothing can be more reasonable than to believe the God of reason, and thus to share in the light of the Divine Reason Itself. Thus Faith is the union of the mind of man with the mind of God, which explains its infusion of peace and joy.

4° God's external and internal teaching.

When the truths of Faith are presented to the mind, the intellect perceives the reasonableness of believing what God has said and that He has said it, and the will enjoins assent. In this perception by the intellect and in this impulse by the will, God, by His grace, acts upon the soul, from the outset enlightening the one and moving the other, so that grace is prevenient, concomitant, and complete in the Act of belief. In that act we have God for our Teacher (*Isaiah liv. 13*), and God's method of teaching is surpassingly vital and perfect. For He not only teaches us by His voice from without—as a human teacher might—but at the same time, by His Holy Spirit, teaches us from within, disposing us internally to receive and believe what He teaches us externally. This would be the explanation why motives of Credibility which might be relatively insufficient (as in the case of children who believe by confidence in their parents, or savages who believe by confidence in the missionary) become sufficient under the influence of grace, which is the infusion of the Divine Reason into their reason, or as theologians have expressed it "*ubi deficit ratio, sufficit gratia.*"

5° The Work of Intellect as distinct from Faith.

When we, by God's grace, believe the truths which God teaches us, because He teaches them, our Act of Faith is all-sufficient and complete, and we can have no higher or surer grounds of belief. Nevertheless our intellect may proceed to act upon the body of truths thus received, to examine them, to see into them (for that is the function of the intellect, *intus legere*), and thus realise their beauty and reasonableness to co-ordinate them and grasp their synthesis and order—to note their harmony with truths and facts of the natural order—to look around for arguments

which would support them, or answers to refute objections urged against them, so that I may not only rejoice in my own assent, but, by adding to their clearness, to help to win for them the assent of others. In all this I bring the truths which my Faith has given me under the operation of my intellect, for the purpose of making plain their import and reasonableness, and their relation to other truths. This is Faith seeking understanding, or what St. Anselm describes as "*Fides quærens intellectum*," and to which he alludes in his well-known sentence: "*Credo ut intelligam.*" We have herein the domain of Theology as marked off from that of Faith. It pertains not only to the professional theologian, but to every intelligent Catholic who follows the counsel of St. Peter, and seeks to be ready to satisfy others by giving a reason "for the hope that is in him" (*1 Peter iii. 15*). In that zealous use of his intellect, he is helped by the grace of Understanding given him by the Holy Ghost in his Confirmation.

6° Inequality of the Work of the Intellect.

It is evident that the work of the intellect, unlike the work of Faith, is far from being equal in all, depending as it does, with grace, upon the intellectual capacity and equipment and research of each individual.

7° No "*examen dubitativum*."

It is also to be observed that the work of examination by the intellect can never be dubitative or suspensive of the assent of Faith, which rests on the teaching of God. If my God is pleased to teach me a doctrine, I cannot say to Him: "I must wait until I see whether You are telling me the truth or not." Rather do we say: "I believe absolutely once and for all and for ever what You teach me, and I will hold it ever against all the reasons that men may ever allege, for theirs is the word of man, and yours is the Word of God—and now that I believe I will use all the powers of my soul to realise the beauty, goodness and truth of what you have taught me, and see how it harmonises with all your work, and thus bring out of our Faith-given treasure 'old things and new.'" Thus our Faith seeks understanding, and our understanding serves to appreciate our Faith.

8° Motives of Credibility antecedent to Faith.

In the above example I have supposed that God appeared to me, and revealed the truths of Faith. I should require

to know that it *was* really God who speaks, and that He has said what I understand Him to say. In the actual fact, He speaks to me mediately, *viz.*, He becomes man and teaches me through His church. Hence for the fact of Revelation by God through Christ, and the infallibility of the church, we require motives of Credibility or the prolegomena of Faith. That must be the work of reason helped by grace. It is "*intellectus quærens Fidem*," rather than "*Fides quærens intellectum*." As noted above the cogency of the motives of Credibility is relative in its sufficiency, and God accommodates His light to the soul, revealing to little ones what He has hidden from the wise and the great "for so it was pleasing in His sight."

SECTION V

MOTIVES OF CREDIBILITY

CHAPTER XVI

MOTIVES INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL-INTRINSIC

Art. I.—Motives of Credibility in general.

I.—For the collective Faith of the Church there is a moral necessity that the fact of Revelation should be proved. Certitude based on universal opinion is in the strict sense sufficient. But scientific proof founded (1) metaphysically, on the probative force of motives of Credibility, and (2) historically, on the existence of such motives, is morally necessary, i.e., such proof is highly suitable and useful. The suitability is shown a posteriori from the fact that objections drawn from philosophical and historical sciences should be answered, and a priori from the consequence that if the signs of Revelation are irrefragable, then the Church should be able to defend irrefragably the cogency of such signs.

II.—Existence and character of the proof.

- (a) The Vatican Council declares that the proof is not only possible but exists (D. 1813, 1799, 1624, 1637).
- (b) Scientific proof, in the strict sense, is drawn *à priori* from cause, or *à posteriori* from effect. Inasmuch as in the case of Revelation both cause and effects are supernatural, scientific proof, in its strictest sense, cannot be given. But in a wider and more indirect sense, scientific proof, drawn from extrinsic signs wrought in confirmation of Revelation, exists. It is a proof known as "*reductio ad absurdum*," the absurdity being the supposition that God would work miracles in confirmation of false doctrine. Even in mathematics the cogency of the "*reductio ad absurdum*" is frequently recognised and invoked.

III.—Motives of Credibility, Credentity, and Faith.

Motives of Credibility are signs or marks whereby Revealed Religion is made evidently credible for Divine Faith. The judgment of Credibility is founded on these signs.

Motive of Credentity signifies the Divine right constituting the obligation of belief.

Motive of Faith is the authority of God revealing.

Hence a motive of Credibility must possess three qualities:

- (1) Certainty in itself.
- (2) Certainty as due to the special intervention of God.
- (3) Certainty as to its function of confirming Revelation.

IV.—Different kinds of Motives of Credibility.

(A) The Church's teaching.

The Church appeals (1) to external signs of Divine Revelation, viz., miracles and prophecy (D. 1790), (2) to the wonderful life of the church (D. 1794) and (3) to internal motives (D. 1790). But the church has condemned the view that internal motives *alone* can be the basis of Divine Faith (D. 1812).

(B) All the motives are arranged in the following chart:

Motive of Credibility	External to the consciousness of the believer or of one seeking Faith	Extrinsic { miracles* to religion { prophecy*
		Intrinsic { sublimity of doctrine to religion { wonderful life of the church
	Internal to the consciousness of the believer or of one seeking Faith	Universal: fulfilment of aspirations of mankind
		Individual: individual experience of the peace and joy which the world cannot give

Art. II.—Value of Internal Motives.

I.—Those who adopt the method of Immanence do not make right use of the internal motives.

(A) Some Rationalists invoke them to show that the doctrines of Christianity correspond to human aspirations. They do not admit the supernatural origin of Christianity. Kant and Hegel reject all supernatural dogmas, or interpret them in a symbolic sense.

(B) Liberal Protestants and Modernists also make use of internal motives. They regard Christianity as a higher form of religious evolution and consequently changeable. They too regard dogma as only of symbolic value.

(C) Certain Catholic writers, who favour the method of immanence (Blondel, Laberthonnière) hold of course that

the Catholic Faith is supernatural. They go on to assert that because Catholicism alone satisfies the internal desire for religion, the practical necessity of embracing Catholicism follows. They give only a symbolic, not an ontological, value to miracles. In their estimation a miracle is an extraordinary sensible symbol attracting the attention of the unbeliever, so that he should examine the Catholic religion, and find therein conformity with the aspirations and exigencies of nature. A development of this mental attitude is their definition of truth, viz., conformity of the intellect with life, with the exigencies of nature.

CRITIQUE

- (1) Divine Faith is reduced to religious experience.
- (2) The method of Immanence diminishes the probative force of miracles.
- (3) This method exaggerates the natural desire of supernatural life. It sees in human nature not only a capacity and suitability for the supernatural order, but a real exigency.
- (4) The method fails to show the Credibility and Divine origin of Christianity.

II.—Individual internal motives may produce probability, but not certitude in regard to Credibility.

(a) They may produce probability: A man seeking Faith and reading: "My peace I leave you, my peace I give you: not as the world gives do I give unto you" (*John xiv. 27*) may find peace so deeply in conformity with his higher aspirations, and so gratuitously offered as to seem to come from God alone. Similarly in regard to the sublimity of Our Lord's teaching: "When Jesus had finished his discourse, the multitudes were in admiration of his doctrine" (*Matt. vi. 28*). Hence in individual cases internal motives may manifest the credibility of the mysteries of Faith, and without doubt they help when joined with external motives.

(b) Ordinarily, internal motives are not sufficient. Internal peace and joy are not necessarily a supernatural effect; they may be merely natural. Three qualities are required so that a fact should be a sufficient motive of Credibility; internal motives fail to show these qualities.

*Some miracles and some prophecies are *intrinsic* to Religion. Cf. p. 214.

Accidentally and in extraordinary cases, internal motives may suffice, in which cases grace supplies the function of the external motives.

III.—The universal internal motives taken together can produce moral certitude regarding Credibility. These motives arise from the satisfaction of the moral and religious aspirations of humanity. To these universal internal motives correspond objectively the external motives drawn from sublimity of doctrine and the wonderful life of the Church.

(A) The Universal internal motives produce *per se* moral certitude of the fact of Revelation. Men cannot quickly and without error acquire a knowledge of all the truths of Natural Religion. Hence if all legitimate aspirations, even the higher aspirations of our nature, are satisfied by a system of religious belief, this fact is a sign of the Divine origin of the religion. But for the possibility of this moral certitude three conditions are required:

1° The ontological validity of first principles (*e.g.* of efficient and final causes) must be acknowledged, otherwise there is no valid inference from effect to cause.

2° The conformity must be so extraordinary—a moral miracle—as to seem to come from God.

3° The argument must be drawn from all aspirations—negative and positive—taken together.

(a) Aspirations to know, hope in, and love God, to give Him internal and external worship.

(b) Aspirations regarding prudence, justice, temperance, fortitude.

(c) Aspirations towards eternal happiness and desire, conditional and inefficacious, of seeing God essentially.

In Christian teaching the knowledge given of God and of His intimate life satisfies the aspiration of Faith. The mysteries of the Incarnation and Redemption increase the aspiration of Hope, the Eucharist exceeds the highest aspirations of Charity, etc. Lacordaire, using his marvellous gift of oratory, argued for the divinity of the Christian Faith from the Christian ideals of Charity, Humility, and Virginity.

It is well to note that the internal experience of peace which characterised the Saints differs from the peace which the world gives: (1) Peace which the Saints enjoy is

directed to eternal goods, peace of the world to the undisturbed enjoyment of temporal goods; (2) Peace which comes from God is internal and external; peace which the world gives is merely external.

(B) These motives give moral certitude, but must not be separated from correlative external motives intrinsic to religion, joined with which, they constitute an irrefragable argument.

Art. III.—Value of the external motives intrinsic to Religion.

I.—Teaching of the Church.

“The Church itself because of its admirable propagation, its extraordinary sanctity and its inexhaustible fecundity in the promotion of all that is good, because of its Catholic unity and unshaken stability, is a great and perpetual motive of Credibility, and an irrefragable witness of its own Divine mission” (*Vatican Council, D. 1794*).

The Church is a moral miracle which can be produced only by God.

(1) From standpoint of efficient cause, “because of its wonderful propagation”—hence the mark of Apostolicity.

(2) From standpoint of final cause, hence the mark of Sanctity.

(3) From standpoint of formal and material causes, hence the marks of Unity and Catholicity.

The Council mentions also the Church’s “Unshaken Stability” as a sign of the perfection of the whole work.

Thus the Providence of God has provided for His Church marks which appeal to learned and unlearned alike, and which are quite sufficient to produce the fullest certitude of Credibility.

II.—The external-intrinsic motives, taken together, constitute an irrefragable argument.

(A) Negatively considered, they insure immunity from error, contradiction, fraud and immorality. Hence a strong presumption of the Divine origin of the Christian Faith.

(B) Positively considered, the motives imply:

1. Purity and sublimity of doctrine.

2. Sanctity of Founder, Apostles and Martyrs.

3. Wonderful propagation.
4. Fecundity in results.
5. Catholic unity.
6. Unshaken stability.

These notes cannot exist collectively without the special intervention of God.

Before the discussion of each of these points, the question arises: What is meant precisely by "harmony" and "sublimity"?

Harmony is the perfection of order; and is one of the qualities of the beautiful. The beautiful has three qualities:

1. Integrity (from standpoint of at least virtual multitude).
2. Suitable Proportion, *i.e.*, Harmony (from the standpoint of unity of order).
3. Clarity (from standpoint of manifestation of order in plurality of parts).

The Sublime appears especially in the highest and most intimate union of different things widely separated: *e.g.*, association of Infinite Mercy with human misery, union of Infinite Justice and Mercy, union of heroic fortitude and perfect meekness in a martyr; St. Paul speaks of the sublimity of the Church and the Church's doctrine in *Ephesians iii. 17, 18, 19*: "Being rooted and founded in Charity you may be able to comprehend with all the Saints what is the breadth and the length and the height and the depth, to know also the Charity of Christ which surpasseth all knowledge."

1° Purity and Sublimity of doctrine.

(a) The doctrine in itself.

It unites things highest and lowest, supernatural and natural, the riches of Divine mercy and the misery of mankind; it safeguards the rights of justice, it is proposed to all nations at all times, it joins things ancient and new, its truths are intimately connected amongst themselves and with the last end of man.

(1) From the standpoint of natural truth, Christian doctrine excels all systems of philosophy and all other forms of religion. It proposes nothing contrary to reason. It teaches perfectly all that belongs to natural religion—that all that relates to God, to man and to relations between God and man.

(2) From the standpoint of Supernatural Mysteries the Divine origin of the Christian Faith is shewn by the fact that the Supernatural Mysteries are in perfect harmony with the attributes of God known to reason, and with the aspirations of human nature. Pascal notes that the argument is strengthened inasmuch as the misery of man and the nobility of his desires are explained, and a remedy provided for the misery. Doctrine distinguished by these wonderful characteristics is Divine.

"It is morally impossible," writes Zigliara, "that man relying on his own powers should reach the truth in all things, for sometimes he falls into error, he often hesitates between opposite opinions, and is involved in contradictions. Where the truth always exists, where there is no opposition in those things which are taught by one, or (more wonderful still) by many, who say that they speak by Divine inspiration, there is the sign that the doctrine does not come from man, but from God, especially if the teaching should be about the highest mysteries of God" (*Propaedeutica ad Sacram Theologiam, Book II., chap. ix. n iv.*).

(b) The doctrine as preached.

(1) The preaching of the Faith manifests wonderful power of illumination, whereby the highest Mysteries are taught with authority, simplicity and humility.

(2) It attracts by its unction even though it proposes difficult precepts.

(3) It has an efficacy which is extraordinary. Multitudes of simple and learned hearers are affected, and the doctrine has maintained its influence throughout the ages.

(c) The doctrine from the standpoint of its origin.

It is a historical fact that Christian teaching appeared without human preparation. St. Thomas places above physical miracles as something more miraculous that "simple men (Apostles) filled with the gift of the Holy Ghost attained highest wisdom and eloquence instantaneously." Moreover the preachers of the Faith suddenly began to speak in various languages previously unknown to them.

2° Sanctity of Founder, Apostles and Martyrs. (The character of Our Blessed Lord will be considered later.)

Sanctity is a virtue which implies a soul untouched by earthly faults, implies close union with God, and directs

all acts of virtue to God. Sanctity is apparent in the heroic exercise of *all* virtues.

Benedict XIV teaches that four conditions are required for the proof of heroic virtue:

- (1) The work achieved must be difficult, *i.e.*, above the ordinary capabilities of men.
- (2) The work must have been done promptly.
- (3) Done with pleasure.
- (4) There must be frequent instances of such work.

Martyrdom amongst all virtuous acts most perfectly manifests the perfection of Charity, for life is man's dearest possession, and the sacrifice of life accompanied by horrible torture is a sign of the highest charity (*John xv. 13*). The word "martyr" means witness, for the Martyrs were witnesses of the Christian Faith.

For heroic sanctity, the exercise of virtues which are unlike is necessary, *e.g.*, fortitude and meekness. Mere natural temperament might dispose towards the exercise of a particular virtue, *e.g.*, meekness. It may be objected that men who are not religious are capable of heroic endurance. Quite true, but Supernatural fortitude is accompanied by Charity, Humility, prayer for persecutors, etc.

3° Admirable propagation of the Christian Faith. There was an absolute disproportion between the wonderful conversion of the world and the instruments used. St. Paul appeals to this fact *1 Cor. i. 25*: "For the foolishness of God is wiser than men: and the weakness of God is stronger than men. . . . But the foolish things of the world hath God chosen, that He may confound the wise: and the weak things of the world hath God chosen, that He may confound the strong. And the base things of the world and the things that are contemptible hath God chosen: and things that are not, that He might bring to nought things that are: that no flesh should glory in His sight. . . . that, as it is written, He that glorieth may glory in the Lord."

History testifies that the vitality of the Church has been increased by persecution. "*Sanguis martyrum, semen Ecclesiae.*"

4° Fecundity of the Christian Faith in all benefits.

This fecundity should be considered in relation to the individual, the family and society.

- (a) As regards the individual: his intellect has been freed from error concerning God, the human soul,

the world; his will has been strengthened against the corruption of paganism.

- (b) As regards the family: the dignity of woman has been vindicated, protection and education of children secured, slavery gradually abolished.
- (c) As regards Society: the authority of government has been founded on God, and at the same time liberty, charity and the rights of nations secured.

From the beginning of Christianity works of mercy have been manifest. In all these holy effects the end of Religion is shewn; withal the Divine motive of Religion is also shewn, in accordance with the axiom: "*Ordo agentium correspondere debet ordini finium.*"

5° Catholic Unity.

Another argument is drawn from the Catholicity or Universality of the Church (from standpoint of material cause, *i.e.*, members of the Church) and from its unity (from the standpoint of formal cause). Notwithstanding diversity of languages, characters, ideas, governments, men of all times and nations are united in Faith, Hope and Charity, in ecclesiastical government and worship—surely this fact requires the intervention of God.

St. Thomas writes that the Church is Catholic, "because it has been accepted by men of every condition." The Christian Faith is not Catholic or universal because it embraces all individuals of different classes, but because it embraces all the different classes under which individuals are placed ("*non propter singula generum, sed propter genera singulorum,*" *de Trinitate Boetii q 3 a 3*).

6° Unshaken stability of the Christian Faith.

Nations, political forms of government, religions, philosophical systems—all appear and disappear, "for the fashion of this world passeth away" (*1 Cor. vii. 31*).

Only one form of Religion has remained indefectible. No change in belief, in government, in worship. This characteristic is a sign of Divine origin, a participation in Divine immutability. "*Cælum et terra transibunt: verba autem mea non præteribunt*" (*Matt. xxiv. 35*). False religions remain either in the immobility of death as Islamism, or they vary according to the exigency of the age as Protestantism.

Conclusion: If the Faith in which all these characteristics are united be not from God, there would be an effect

without a cause. The characteristics are extraordinary, and postulate the extraordinary intervention of God. Real effects manifest a real cause, supernatural effects a supernatural cause. Richard of St. Victor wrote: "Cannot we say to God with all confidence: Lord, if there is error, we have been deceived by Thee; for this doctrine has been confirmed by such signs and wonders as can have been wrought by Thee alone" (*de Trinitate, Book I. c. 2*).

Modernists admit that these characteristics cannot be fully explained by the laws of evolution. "Something unknown is hidden" and this something is not proved to be supernatural, but perhaps only a product of the highest form of religious evolution.

Answer: Modernists doubt the ontological and transcendental value of first principles. Under these circumstances even the existence of God, Author of nature, cannot be established. The supernatural is therefore ruled out, and recourse is had to "some hidden natural element" to explain what are in fact supernatural effects.

III.—Relation of motives inter se: Unity of Apologetics.

(A) Those who favour the method of Immanence claim that the internal motives come first not only in time, but in value. (*L'Action*, pp. 425-492). They reject the ontological value of miracles.

(B) In traditional Apologetics:

(1) Internal motives are subordinated to external.

(2) External motives, extrinsic to Religion, *i.e.*, miracles and prophecy are more easily recognised by us, but the external motives, intrinsic to Religion, are higher in themselves.

(3) Strongest of all are the great miracles, intrinsic to Religion, in which prophecy is fulfilled, and future happiness announced. For example, the Resurrection of Christ is:

- (a) A Mystery of Faith (Resurrection of the Word).
- (b) Sensible miracle of the first order.
- (c) Fulfilment of several prophecies.
- (d) Victory of Christ over sin.
- (e) Example of strength gained through persecution.
- (f) Pledge of our future happiness.

As regards the first statement—the subordination of internal to external motives—the supreme criterion of truth must be objective not subjective. Moreover internal

motives divorced from external give rise to illusions. It is true that internal motives often dispose an enquirer to consider other motives; in which cases they have priority of time. Again they confirm other motives.

With reference to the second statement, the wonderful life of the Church is higher than a physical miracle, but not so easily recognised. Aristotle wrote: "Truths most intelligible in themselves are difficult to be known by us, because our intellectual knowledge proceeds from sensible truths." From our standpoint the external-extrinsic criteria are easier and safer to recognise. But the life of the Church, being a moral, is higher than a physical miracle.

As far as we now living are concerned, the perpetuity and wonderful life of the Church are of the highest apologetic value. In these qualities the effects of the Resurrection are manifest: *Christus vivit, Christus regnat, Christus imperat*.

Corollary. Unity of Apologetics.

By unity in the science of Apologetics is meant the organic unity of the motives of credibility. The true order of arguments is determined by the end to which the science tends, *i.e.*, to the evident credibility of the Mysteries of Faith as revealed by God. Hence priority of *value* belongs to the method which approaches nearest to the end, *i.e.*, the external method. It is quite possible however that in many cases it would be advisable to begin by the use of the internal method which would thus be given priority of time. Hence the following order:

- (1) Internal motives drawn from human aspirations.
- (2) Excellence of Christian doctrine and the wonderful life of the Church (External-Intrinsic).
- (3) Miracles and prophecy (External-Extrinsic).
- (4) All motives are confirmed by experience of the gifts of the Holy Ghost (Internal peace and joy, etc.).

CHAPTER XVII

MIRACLES

Art. I.—Nature of a miracle.

I.—The meaning of the word "miracle" apparent from etymology, is "a fact or event causing wonder." St. Thomas (C. Gentes, Bk. III., c. 101) gives a definition which may be regarded as nominal: "Those facts or events are called miracles which are accomplished by God outside the order of nature commonly observed."

II.—Miracle as a motive of credibility.

The Vatican Council (D. 1790) describes a miracle as a "Divine fact clearly showing the omnipotence of God." A miracle therefore is above the powers of created, including angelic, nature, and is distinguished from extraordinary natural facts, and from diabolic deceptions. A miracle is marked off from ordinary Divine events (such as the constant creation of souls) which are in accordance with the usual order, and which cannot be a sign of Revelation.

Some Catholic writers (Le Grand, Brugère, La Hogue) have unwisely defined a miracle as some fact or event above human power, but not above angelic or diabolic power.

III.—Heterodox notions of a miracle.

(A) According to Determinist teaching a miracle is an extraordinary natural fact not as yet scientifically explained. The physical laws of nature are as unchangeable as mathematical or metaphysical laws. On this ground Spinoza denied the possibility of a miracle. Deists claim that God does not attend to particular or individual cases, as the doctrine of miracle implies. Malebranche was of opinion that some miracles might be due to angelic agency. Other miracles, like the Incarnation, were undoubtedly Divine. Leibnitz's view was practically identical with that of Père Malebranche. The change of water into wine at Cana might be due to angelic power. If God worked a miracle surpassing the powers of nature, He would change the course of the universe, because of

the connexion of matter with matter. But Leibnitz admitted miracles such as the Incarnation. Houtteville maintained that a miracle was a natural effect, inasmuch as it comes from the order of nature or the laws of motion, but *supernatural* inasmuch as by the sole powers of nature it cannot be foreseen by man. Schleiermacher, Ritschl, Sabatier hold that an event may be *natural*, i.e., in accordance with unknown laws of nature, and *miraculous* as an effect of Divine benevolence.

(B) The Agnostic view is that a miracle is not an infringement of the laws of nature, but an infringement of our subjective view of these same laws. M. Poincaré in his work *La Science et l'Hypothèse* (p. 113-119) regards the idea of the stability of the laws of nature as due to our subjective mode of regarding them. Hence an exception to the laws of nature is not a miracle. As we do not know all the laws of nature, we cannot be sure of the intervention of a Cause who transcends the phenomenal order.

Messieurs Blondel and Laberthonnière characterise miracles respectively as "*dérégulations aux apparences anthropomorphiques*," and "*dérégulations à un ordre illusoire*." M. Le Roy regards a miracle as an extraordinary effect of vehement Faith.

IV.—Catholic idea of miracle.

The definition, not merely nominal but real, of a miracle is as follows: "A sensible fact produced by God in the world, which fact is beyond the order of action of entire created nature." This definition is based on St. Thomas's exposition (1^a q 110 a. 4):

- 1^o "A sensible fact."
- 2^o "Produced by God" as principal cause, who sometimes uses creatures as His instruments.
- 3^o "In the world" inasmuch as miracles are intended to affect mankind.
- 4^o "Beyond the order of nature," but not beyond the order of Divine Providence.
- 5^o "Beyond the order of action of entire created nature," and not merely beyond the inclination of a particular created nature, otherwise to throw a stone upwards would be a miracle. Again a miracle is beyond the order of *action*, but not beyond the order of *being* of entire created nature. A miracle exceeds *effectively* all the powers of nature. It is supernatural

modally, whereas grace is supernatural *intrinsically*, and is therefore beyond the order of *being* of entire created nature.

From the explanation just given, it is clear that a miracle is different from (a) natural extraordinary facts which are fortuitous from the standpoint of secondary causes, but not from the standpoint of Divine Providence; (b) diabolic deceptions which are intended to be like miracles; (c) ordinary Divine works, e.g., conservation, "præmotio," creation of souls, justification of the sinner, etc.; (d) ordinary facts called providential—often an answer to prayer.

Properties of a miracle.

A miracle must be:

- 1° *Difficult* because it exceeds the power of nature.
- 2° *Beyond the hope of nature*, but not beyond the hope of grace.
- 3° *Unusual*, not because it may not frequently happen, but because it is beyond natural experience.
- 4° *Not against nature*: it is not a violation of the laws of nature.
- 5° A *sign* manifesting supernatural teaching, or witnessing the sanctity of some servant of God.
- 6° A *portent* soliciting attention.

V.—Division of Miracles.

Miracles exceed the power of nature in a threefold way:

- (1) As regards the nature or substance of the fact, e.g., two bodies occupying the same space,* as when Our Lord came into the Cenacle, the doors being closed, or the miracle popularly described as the standing still of the sun. These are absolutely beyond the power of nature.
- (2) As regards the subject in whom the miracle is worked, e.g. giving sight to the blind, giving life to the dead. Nature can give life and sight but not to one who is dead, or congenitally blind.
- (3) As regards manner of action, e.g., *instantaneous* cure from fever, *instantaneous* change of water into wine, etc.

The student must not confound the "miraculous as to substance" (the first category of miracles just given) with

* "We mean by matter something such that two portions of it cannot be in the same place at the same time—that is probably the best definition of matter which we can give." Dr. W. Brown in *Science, Religion and Reality*, p. 325.

the "supernatural as to substance." A miracle as to substance is only effectively or modally supernatural. Supernatural as to substance means that which is intrinsically or essentially supernatural, e.g., sanctifying grace.

Art. II.—Possibility of a miracle.

I.—Possibility of miracles denied.*

1° Determinists like Spinoza deny the freedom of God to work miracles. Deists deny the exercise of God's particular Providence. Leibnitz, like Spinoza, maintained that God's choice of action was morally necessary.

2° Agnostics hold that nature's powers are not fully known, and that it is impossible on that account to characterise a fact or event as miraculous. Others say that the laws of nature are contingent, and that therefore an exception in the working of the laws is not miraculous.

3° Huxley's argument against miracles is thus expressed: "When repeated and minute examination never reveals a break in the chain of causes and effects; and the whole edifice of our practical life is built upon our faith in its continuity; the belief that that chain has never been broken and will never be broken becomes one of the strongest and most justifiable of human convictions. And it must be admitted to be a reasonable request, if we ask those who would have us put faith in the actual occurrence of interruptions of that order to produce evidence in favour of their view, not only equal, but superior, in weight to that which leads us to adopt ours." (Cf. *Hume, English Men of Letters Series, chap. vii., p. 129*). An answer to this objection will presently be given.

II.—Proof of the possibility of a miracle.

St. Thomas states the proof in syllogistic form:

Major: A free cause on whom depends the application of laws only hypothetically necessary, and who is not bound to them, can act independently of and above them.

Minor: But God is an omnipotent free Cause on whom

* The agnostic view claims that, as instalments of knowledge $a+b+c+\dots$ become known, the conception of the universe is represented by: $a+b+c+\dots+x$, where x represents the, as yet, unknown elements. The scientific ideal is to get rid of x . Professor Simpson points out that a more correct representation of these phenomena would be $a+b+c+\dots$

where x represents the continual sustaining and control of all things by God. (Cf. J. Y. Simpson "The Spiritual Interpretation of Nature" p. 297.)

depends the application of laws only hypothetically necessary, nor is He bound to the present natural order.

Conclusion: Therefore God can act independently of, and above, the whole course of created nature, *i.e.*, can work a miracle.

In this syllogism there are three propositions to be proved—the Major and the two statements in the Minor.

Proof of the Major.

1° (A) (*à posteriori*). A man throws a stone upwards. He suspends, for the time being, the effect of the law of gravitation. He does not violate the law. A composer of genius produces a sublime symphony beyond and above the ordinary laws of his art. Such instances are suspensions of the ordinary laws owing to the action of a special cause, and the exception confirms the law because it is not against it but above it.

(B) (*à priori*). God can exercise not only the "liberty of exercise" (*libertas exercitii*), *i.e.*, He can act or not act, but also the "liberty of specification" (*libertas specificationis*), *i.e.*, He can decree this or that effect, since He is in no way bound to the present order.

2° Absolute necessity is independent of any condition, and is founded on the essence of a thing, *e.g.*, the angles of a plane triangle equal two right angles. Mathematical laws and great principles of Metaphysics (*e.g.*, principles of contradiction, causality, etc.) are necessary.

Hypothetical necessity is that which must be because of some extrinsic cause, efficient or final. Granted that such an agent acts under natural conditions, then the effect is necessary. Fire burns, because God freely determined so, but the action can be suspended by the same Cause who freely instituted physical laws. The laws of nature express the manner of action which created beings follow. Therefore the laws are such because of their efficient cause, and are only hypothetically necessary. A stone naturally tends to fall to the ground. If supported by the hand the tendency still remains. If miraculously supported, there is no violation of the law of nature, inasmuch as the tendency to fall remains. St. Thomas noted this distinction with his usual perspicacity: "*In igne fornacis, remanebat ordo ad comburendum, licet non combureret tres pueros in camino*" (*de Pot. q VI., a 1 ad 20*). Hence absolute necessity excludes the possibility of a miracle, but not hypothetical necessity.

Proof of the Minor. God is an omnipotent free Cause, on whom depends the application of laws hypothetically necessary, and He is not limited to them.

(A) God is omnipotent free Cause.

(a) God is the supreme immaterial and intelligent First Cause. The Divine will follows the intellect, and is free regarding individual goods, which are not needed for Infinite Perfection. Hence God is free regarding works *ad extra*, *e.g.*, in creating or in not creating. The nature of created things is determined, and hence their actions (free or necessary) are confined within certain limits through necessity of nature. But the Divine nature is not determined, and effects come from Him in accordance with the free choice of will and intellect.

(b) God is infinite in power as in other respects, and can accomplish anything which is not intrinsically impossible.

(B) Application of laws, only hypothetically necessary, depends on the Divine will, which is not bound to them.

(a) Just as God is free to create or not, He is free to withhold His concursus necessary for the operation of a created agent. Hence it is not repugnant that fire should not burn, if God withholds His concursus.

(b) When an end is proportioned to things made for that end, the wisdom of the maker is limited to a determined order. But Divine Goodness is an end, which exceeds created things out of all proportion. Hence Divine Wisdom is not determined to any certain order of things, so that another order cannot come from Him. Thus comes the freedom not only of exercise (*exercitii*), but of specification (*specificationis*).

Conclusion: God can act negatively and positively as regards natural laws. Negatively by impeding the natural action of things, *e.g.*, fire, and positively in the threefold way mentioned in the classification of miracles.

Object of miracles: The proof of salutary truth is an end of sufficient importance that God should act beyond and above the order of nature.

Corollary: No creature can work a miracle by his own power. When a creature works a miracle, he receives from

God a transient supernatural power, and uses at the same time his own power.

Can an evil man work a miracle as an instrument? To one who preaches the true Faith and invokes the name of Christ, even though he may not be a good man, the power of working a miracle may be given in confirmation of the doctrine preached.

Hume's objection against miracles may be stated as follows: There is *physical* certitude of the uniformity of Nature's laws. There is only *moral* certitude based on human testimony in favour of the occurrence of miracles. Now physical is stronger than moral certitude. Consequently the justification of belief in miracles disappears.

Hume's objection overlooks the distinction between suspension of a law of nature and violation of the same law. Experience justifies us in regarding the non-violation of the laws of nature as (to use Professor Huxley's words) "one of the strongest and most justifiable of human convictions." But suspension of nature's laws is of frequent occurrence. Hundreds of instances occur daily of the suspension of the law of gravitation and of other physical laws. A miracle therefore does not involve a conflict of two kinds of certitude. Physical certitude safeguards the non-violation of a law of nature, but the certitude has no relevance in the case of a miracle which does not involve such violation. For the credibility of a miracle, therefore, is required adequate testimony. Professor Huxley in his work on Hume (*English Men of Letters Series*) rightly deprecates the description of a miracle as a violation of a law of nature. Huxley's own objection against the occurrence of miraculous interposition is based on the presumption that the Supernatural does not exist.

A miracle, not being a natural event, cannot be tested by the ordinary methods of physical science, *viz.*, by repetition. If it could be so tested, then the alleged miracle, repeated at will, would at once lose its miraculous character, becoming a purely natural event. The only remaining method of establishing events is by testimony, and even physical science is not without examples of incidents which by their very nature are incapable of universal demonstration, but nevertheless are accepted upon the testimony of a few observers. This testimony does not need to possess the extraordinary characteristics demanded by Hume, and in practice rarely does so. A miracle by its very nature

precludes the possibility of Hume's demands being satisfied, without invoking conditions no less miraculous than the event itself. To meet legitimate demands of credibility, alleged miracles, *e.g.*, at Lourdes, are most carefully examined by a Commission of medical experts, before a pronouncement is made endorsing their miraculous character.

Objection on the ground that a miracle would involve a contradiction of the Second Law of Thermodynamics is not valid, for this law applies only to purely physical events, and in addition definitely excludes external agency from activity in the event selected, whereas a miracle essentially involves an external agent.

Objection on the ground that a miracle would contradict the law of Conservation of Energy is not valid, for this law also applies only to purely physical events, and in any case the immense amount of energy normally dissipated exceeds demands occasioned by the performance of miracles.

Professor Ernest W. Hobson (*The Domain of Natural Science*, 1923), writes: "The fact that we have no assurance that all possible forms of energy, which may occur in physical phenomena, are known to us makes it impossible to conceive that the principle (of the Conservation of Energy) should admit of anything like complete empirical verification."

Art. III.—Discernibility of a Miracle.

I.—Question involved.

Renan in the introduction to the *Life of Christ* writes: "We do not say that a miracle is impossible: we say that up to the present time no miracle has been proved." Kant and his Agnostic followers hold the same view.

Mr. H. W. Paul in his sketch of the life and writings of Matthew Arnold passes the following criticism in regard to educated laymen of the Established Church (*p.* 173): "Christianity without miracles and without dogmatic theology is not only practicable, but has sufficed for some of the best Christians that ever lived. It is probably the religion of most educated laymen in the Church of England to-day."

M. E. Le Roy and some Modernists hold that Faith alone can discern a miracle.

The principal objection against the discernibility of a

miracle is: "We do not know all the powers and laws of nature."

Hermes following Kant maintained that only a "practical moral certitude" can be obtained regarding miracles (D. 1637).

II.—Teaching of the Church.

The Vatican Council teaches that miracles can be certainly known, and are most certain signs of Divine Revelation accommodated to the intelligence of all (D. 1790, 1813).

III.—Degrees of Certitude

Certitude is a "firm adhesion of the mind to a truth without fear of error, the exclusion of fear of error being due to a suitable motive." It is not the same as persuasion which is sometimes erroneous.

Certitude admits of degrees, not as regards the exclusion of doubt, but as regards the firmness of adhesion. This firmness may be founded either on metaphysical, physical, or moral necessity.

Certitude	metaphysical	intrinsic: e.g., whole is greater than part.
		extrinsic: e.g., a contingent being is caused.
	physical	regarding a present fact, e.g., the Sun has risen.
		regarding a future fact, e.g., the Sun will rise to-morrow.
	moral	speculative: regarding truth.
		prudential: regarding action.

In *metaphysical certitude*, the relation between subject and predicate is absolutely necessary. It is *intrinsic* when directly founded on metaphysical necessity; it is *extrinsic*, when some fact physically or morally certain cannot be denied without *indirectly* involving some metaphysical impossibility, e.g., that a contingent being should be without a cause. *Physical certitude* is based on physical necessity of the laws of nature, which are hypothetically necessary. *Moral certitude* is based on moral necessity, e.g., I am certain that my father, whose truthfulness I know, does not speak falsely, when he tells me of the death of my brother.

Moral certitude may sometimes be resolved into extrinsic metaphysical certitude, e.g., a moral certitude based on the

testimony of mankind, if false, would be without a reason of being.

IV.—Discernibility of a miracle in regard to its supernatural character.

"We do not know all the powers of nature."

(1) Reply of some recent Apologists.

It is not necessary that we should know all the powers of nature, it is sufficient that we should be able to judge practically what in certain circumstances cannot be done. The laws of nature in certain circumstances are fixed for the production of one effect, whereas in the case of a miracle, the agent in the same circumstances produces quite a different effect. Diseases which are clearly organic (the dividing line between the organic and the functional is not always clearly marked, but in some cases there is not the slightest doubt as to classification) are not cured by the power of imagination, nor by hypnotic influence. As regards diabolic power, the following signs should be considered:

- (a) The nature of the work accomplished, which sometimes (as in the case of restoration to life) exceeds all created powers.
- (b) The moral character of the work, personality of the agent, manner of performance, effects, teaching with which it is connected.

CRITIQUE

This reply is true, but it does not argue sufficiently deeply from the nature of miraculous work. Moreover some of these Apologists affirm too much when they judge a miracle from the prayer whereby in their opinion it has been obtained.

It is suggested that prayer is the moral cause of a particular miracle, and that God is the physical cause. Antecedent prayer is considered generally by theologians as one of the circumstances whereby a miracle is discerned, but it does not constitute the primary criterion for the discernment of a fact, which exceeds even the unknown powers of nature.

(2) Deeper solution.

We do not know positively all the powers of nature, but we know negatively what nature cannot do. From the combination of oxygen and hydrogen we do not get chlo-

rine; by sowing wheat, we do not obtain roses; a human voice will not calm storms, or resuscitate the dead. Certain effects can be produced only by God; they exceed all created powers, even those that are unknown.

1° Proof from natural reason, *i.e.*, common consent of mankind.

Common consent of mankind of every time and nation cannot be false. But this universal consent recognises that certain effects postulate the action of God, such as, raising from the dead, giving sight to one born blind, healing of incurable diseases, multiplying a material substance, instantaneous change of one substance into another, knowing secrets of hearts and future contingent things, sudden strengthening of a human will to the performance of heroic acts, etc.

2° Proof from philosophic reason.

(A) Evidence to shew that the supernatural character of many miracles of first, second, and third order is metaphysically certain.

Major: It is metaphysically certain that God alone can produce and change *immediately* being as such, *e.g.*, matter, material substances without the help of accidents, intellectual soul, etc.

Minor: But many miracles of the first, second and third order necessarily and clearly imply these immediate changes.

Conclusion: Therefore it is metaphysically certain that these miracles can be wrought by God alone.

The Major is proved:

For the proof of the Major, it is necessary to shew that the effects enumerated belong to God alone, and that no inferior cause can produce them. It is well to note that only a universal cause, which can *immediately produce* a universal effect, can *immediately change* the effect, because *immediate* change of being presupposes the same universality of causal power as *immediate* production.

(a) God alone can produce being as such, *i.e.*, create. A universal effect must be ascribed to a universal cause. Being is the most universal effect. Hence it must be ascribed to the most universal cause, *i.e.*, God.

Again more power is required in an agent in accordance with the degree in which potentiality in the given case is remote from achievement. It follows that the power must

be infinite, if there is no potentiality, as in the case of creation, *i.e.*, "*productio totius rei ex nihilo sui et subiecti*"—the production of substantial being without the aid of pre-existing material. Hence creation postulates an infinite cause, and God alone, who creates, can change being as such.

(b) Divine power is also required to exercise immediate subjective influence on the substance of the intellectual soul, and upon faculties of intellect and will. An immediate action upon the soul (*e.g.*, reunion of body and soul at the general resurrection) requires the power of Him who created the soul. Intellect and will are essentially directed to universal truth and universal good. They can be subjectively moved only by the sole universal agent, *i.e.*, God.

The Minor is proved: "Many miracles of first, second, and third order necessarily and clearly imply immediate changes of being."

Miracles of the first order:

The Catholic Church teaches that in the Mass the miracle of transubstantiation is wrought. Here we are concerned only with the implication of this teaching. (Elsewhere the teaching is vindicated.)

(a) Transubstantiation* essentially implies change of being as such. The change is not merely formal, the matter remaining the same, but it is a change of the whole being of bread into the whole substance of the Body of Christ. Created agents can effect only changes of form. All changes made in conformity with the laws of nature are only formal changes. But God is infinite, and His action extends to the whole nature of being.

(b) Co-existence of two bodies in the same place (*e.g.*, Christ's entry into the Cenacle, the doors being closed) requires Divine power, so that a material substance may remain distinct from another substance without a place of its own.

It is interesting to note that St. Thomas holds that bi-location is not possible by miracle, as it involves a contradiction. In recorded cases (the credibility of which depends on testimony) where testimony justifies belief, the

* Transubstantiation not being a *sensible* miracle cannot be quoted for apologetic purposes. It is mentioned here to show that God's action may extend to the whole nature of being.

body is really present in one place, and only its appearance (produced by God or by an angel) in another.

Miracles of the second order :

The implication of (*e.g.*) the resurrection of Lazarus may be set forth in syllogistic form.

Major: The soul is united to the body by its substantial being as the form of the body.

Minor: But resurrection is a substantial union of a separated soul with the matter of a body without the mediation of previous accidental dispositions.

Conclusion: Hence resurrection implies immediate power on matter and the substantial being of the soul, and therefore postulates Divine action.

The Minor gives the recognised definition of resurrection. The truth of the Major is established by the following principles :

- (1) The soul is the radical principle of vegetative, sensitive, and rational action.
- (2) From the soul the specific difference of man is derived.
- (3) Unless the soul is united to the body by its substantial being, the natural unity of man would be destroyed.

Miracles of the third order :

Sudden change of water into wine is the immediate production of the form of wine from the potentiality of matter, and cannot be accomplished except by One who has immediate power over matter.

St. Thomas is of opinion that probably the multiplication of loaves was accomplished not by creation, but by addition of matter changed into bread, *i.e.*, by a *formal* change of extraneous matter, not a transubstantiation which is a change of the whole being, formal and material.

(*B*) The supernatural character of other miracles of the third order is generally known with moral certitude from physical and moral circumstances.

Wonderful achievements can in some cases be accomplished by created beings. Hence the question arises, is the agent good or bad? The question is solved by a consideration of the circumstances physical and moral :

1° The solution of St. Thomas.

Miracles wrought by good agents (as instruments of God) bear a threefold mark :

- (1) Efficacy of power; simulated miracles (so-called) wrought by evil agents do not last.
- (2) Utility; simulated miracles are useless or hurtful.
- (3) End; miracles accomplished by good agents make for edification.

2° Benedict XIV in his great work *On the beatification of the servants of God* lays down the following physical conditions as criteria of a true miraculous cure :

1. Grave illness, the cure of which is impossible or difficult.
2. The illness must not be in a stage when a favourable change may be expected.
3. Medicine either not taken, or useless.
4. Cure sudden.
5. Cure perfect.
6. Without preceding notable decrease or crisis.
7. No return of disease.

3° The moral circumstances, which help to determine the character of a miracle, are shewn in answer to the well-known queries : *Cur, quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, quomodo, quando.*

1. *Cur*: End or object of the miracles should be the glory of God.

(a) Miracles wrought in the name of God, in confirmation of some revealed truth to be accepted by all, cannot be false.

(b) True miracles are known by their fruits: *e.g.*, if worship of God is promoted, and reformation of morals accomplished.

2. *Quis*: By whom is the miracle worked? Is his or her virtue and teaching beyond suspicion?

3. *Quid*: If the work accomplished be contrary to truth or virtue it cannot come from God.

4. *Ubi*: Environment and associates must be blameless.

5. *Quibus auxiliis*: Has the miracle been accomplished through invocation of Divine name?

6. *Quomodo*: How accomplished? With reverence and humility?

7. *Quando*: It is not a miracle, if there is no necessity nor usefulness in the work accomplished.

V.—Discernment of a miracle as to its real existence.

(1) The supernatural character of a miracle regards only its mode of production. The fact (restoration of sight, speech, etc.) is obvious to the senses.

(2) The existence of certain miracles was physically certain to those who witnessed them.

(3) Some miracles of the third order seem to be only morally certain, both as to their existence, and as to their supernatural character.

(4) Human testimony gives moral certitude of the existence of miracles. If the testimony regarding Our Lord's resurrection be disbelieved, all historical certitude disappears.

(5) Some miracles (*e.g.*, the resurrection of Christ) were known to witnesses with *physical* certitude as to their real existence, and with *metaphysical* certitude as to their supernatural character. We have *moral* certitude of these miracles based on adequate historical testimony.

VI.—False miracles.

I.—Magic, Spiritism and Hypnotism.

(a) Magic may be either natural (due to sleight of hand, etc.) or diabolic. Some diabolic achievements deserve belief (*Cf. Ex. vii. 7; Acts viii. 9, xiii. 8; xvi. 16*).

(b) Phenomena of Hypnotism and Spiritism may be classified as follows:

(1) Mechanical phenomena: table-turning, movement of heavy bodies, etc.

(2) Physiological and sensitive phenomena. In the hypnotic state the senses are sometimes morbidly acute.

According to the *La Salpêtrière* school hypnotism induces a threefold state: lethargy, catalepsy, and somnambulism.

(3) Intellectual phenomena: power of declamation, of speaking fluently in languages imperfectly known, etc.

CRITIQUE

Many so-called achievements of Spiritism are cases of fraud; but some are so well attested that they cannot be questioned. The answers given through mediums are

usually trivial, sometimes impious and heretical, and cases have been known of downright obscenity. The origin of such communications is manifest: "by their fruits you shall know them."

II.—Theories in explanation of hypnotism and spiritism.

Many theories, such as the materialistic theory of magnetic fluid, theory of the power of imagination, theory of animism (occult powers of the soul), theory of metempsychosis, fail to explain the phenomena. When, in cases of spiritualistic séances, the element of fraud is eliminated, the residue must be attributed to evil spirits.

III.—Powers of spirits to produce wonderful effects.

(1) Existence of spirits is proved by Scripture and reason.

(2) There are good and bad spirits (*2 Pet. ii. 4*).

(3) Evil spirits can simulate miracles.

(a) They can move bodies locally.

(b) They can attempt and sometimes succeed in influencing the human imagination extrinsically.

Art. IV.—Probative force of a miracle.

I.—Teaching of the Church.

The Vatican Council defined that miracles are most certain signs of Divine Revelation (*D. 1790, 1813*), (*Cf. John x. 25-38, xv. 24*).

II.—Nature of the proof.

Proof by miracle is neither *à priori* nor *à posteriori*, but indirect proof from a most certain sign. "When one brings letters signed by the royal seal, the subject matter of the letters manifestly comes from the Sovereign" (*Cf. III.^a q 43, a 1*).

III.—Miracle—a most certain motive of Credibility.

(A) Foundation of its probative force.

Should a miracle be wrought in confirmation of false doctrine, God, Source of truth and holiness, would witness to that which is false.

(B) Condition of its probative force.

The condition is the declaration, explicit or implicit, of the connexion of the miracle with the truth to be confirmed.

of God, are most certain signs of Divine Revelation, and are accommodated to the intelligence of all." Prophecy differs from a miracle inasmuch as it belongs to the intellectual, whereas a miracle belongs to the sensitive order.

CHAPTER XVIII

PROPHECY AS A MOTIVE OF CREDIBILITY

Art. I.—Nature of Prophecy.

I.—Meaning of the word.

De Quincey writes: "Primarily the word prophet means, and Scripturally it means—*interpreter of the Divine purposes and thoughts*. If those purposes and thoughts should happen to lurk in mysterious doctrines of Religion, then the prophet is simply an *exegetes*, or expounder. But, it is true, if they lurk in the dark mazes of time and futurity unrolling itself from the central present, then the prophet means a seer or reader of the future, in our ordinary modern sense. But this modern sense is neither the Mahometan sense, nor that which prevails in the New Testament. Mahomet is the prophet of God—not in the sense of predictor from afar, but as the (supposed) organ of communication between God and man, or revealer of the Divine will. In St. Paul, again, gifts of prophecy mean uniformly any extraordinary qualifications for unfolding the meaning of Scripture doctrine, or introducing light and coherency amongst their elements, and perhaps *never* the qualifications for inspired foresight" [*De Quincey's Works (Masson) Vol. V., p. 289 note*].

Hence the Greek word *προφήτης* corresponds to the Hebrew word *nābi* and indicates one who is of enthusiastic spirit, and speaks on behalf of God to men. According to St. Thomas *προφήτης* is from *προφαίνεῖν* which signifies "to appear," "*quia scilicet eis (prophetis) aliqua, quæ sunt procul, apparent.*" Others derive the word from *προφάναι* which suggest either "to announce beforehand" or "to announce on behalf of another," *i.e.*, on behalf of God. Hence prophecy means Revelation. But in a special sense, prophecy is taken to mean "the pre-knowledge and prediction of future events divinely given to the soul."

II.—Motive of Credibility.

The Vatican Council defines prophecies as "Divine facts which, since they shew clearly the infinite knowledge

III.—Heterodox notions of Prophecy.

Rationalists reject the idea of prophecy. Some identify it with the tendency to divination which exists in all forms of religion, and which is based on credulity. Others say that the predictions were nothing more than the *a priori* assumption that God will bless the just and punish the wicked. Auguste Sabatier writes: "The Hebrew seers (like the Sibyls and the soothsayer Tiresias) never possessed the miraculous gift of reading the future. The superiority of their inspiration is from another source. It is due to a purer idea of God, to a more elevated ideal of justice, to a religion essentially moral, to their indefectible faith in the triumph of the Law, and of the holy and merciful will of the Eternal. Resting on the one hand on the sovereignty of their God, and on the other on the inflexible law of moral conscience, they announced with certainty the chastisement of the wicked, the consolation of the oppressed, the return of captives, the healing of the sick, the salvation of all who repent and amend. The Kingdom of God would be the effect of this conversion of hearts and wills. Such were the prophecies of John the Baptist, such were those of Christ Himself: they do not in any way proceed from a special gift or miraculous power of divination, but from a firmer moral conviction, a more profound life in God, a more sincere and disinterested piety. . . . The moral idea of prophecy remains, but the miraculous element has gone" (*Esquisse d'une philosophie de la Religion d'après la psychologie et l'histoire*, p. 94. So also Spinoza, Renan, etc.).

IV.—Catholic idea of Prophecy.

What is the proper object of prophecy?

Things are distant: (1) locally; (2) because of want of knowledge (*e.g.*, supernatural mysteries hidden in God); (3) because of their indetermination, such as future contingent events, which constitute the proper object of prophecy. Hence the definition of prophecy: "Infallible foretelling of a future contingent event, which can be certainly foreseen by supernatural light alone."

- (a) Infallible—to eliminate mere conjecture.
- (b) Foretelling of a future contingent event, such as those which depend on freedom of the will.
- (c) Requiring supernatural light, inasmuch as a future contingent event is indifferent either to being or to non-being.


1st Corollary: The prophetic light is a transient impression (*Cf. 4 Kings iv. 27*).

2nd Corollary: Prophetic knowledge implies two things:

- (1) Representation of the future contingent event, and
- (2) Infallible judgment concerning it.

3rd Corollary: The principal element in prophetic revelation is the supernatural light—not the representation of a future contingent event. Representations were given to Pharaoh, to Nabuchodonosor, to Baltassar, etc., and they were not prophets.

V.—Different kinds of Prophecy.



(A) From standpoint of the object known.

(a) As regards extent of the knowledge concerning the future event, there are four grades:

- 1° Most perfect: future event, exact time, Divine origin of prophecy, and meaning of future event—all known, *e.g.*, Our Lord's announcement of His Passion and Resurrection.
- 2° Future event, its meaning, Divine origin of prophecy known, *e.g.*, Our Lord's prophecy of the end of the world. The destruction of Jerusalem is foretold as a figure of the catastrophic destruction of the world (*Cf. Matthew xxiv. 1-36*).

3° Future event and its meaning known. A prophet may speak from a sort of instinct as well as from definite revelation. When he speaks from instinct the Divine origin of the prophecy is not clear.

4° Future event known. Both Divine origin and meaning are unknown, *e.g.*, Caiphas' prophecy as narrated in John xi. 49 sq.

Regarding the meaning of the predicted event, it may be supernatural, *e.g.*, Incarnation, Mission of the Holy Ghost, etc., or a future contingent event of the natural order *e.g.*, destruction of Jerusalem.

(b) The nature of the future contingent event supplies a twofold division.

1° Prophecy of prescience (unconditioned).

2° Prophecy of commination (conditioned), *e.g.*, Prophecy of Jonas (*Jonas iii. 4*); Prophecy of Isaias to Ezechias (*Is. xxxviii. 2*).

(B) From standpoint of mode of cognition.

The mode may be taken:

(a) Formally.

1° Intellectual vision.

2° Picture in the imagination, *e.g.*, God, angel or man speaking, words heard, etc.

3° Sensitive image, *e.g.*, seven full ears of corn.

(b) Materially.

1° In a state of wakefulness.

2° In ecstasy or rapture.

3° In sleep.

Art. II.—Possibility of Prophecy.

I.—God can communicate prophetic knowledge to man.

Major: God can communicate to man those things which He knows.

Minor: But He knows infallibly future contingent things.

Conclusion: Therefore He can communicate to man the knowledge of future contingent things.

Major is proved. Knowledge of a future contingent event exceeds the capacity of our intellect, not because the future event possesses an intrinsic supernatural character (as in the case of the mystery of the Trinity), but because of its contingency or indetermination. God can direct human concepts to such an event by the infusion

of prophetic light. Light modally supernatural (*i.e.*, light corresponding to a miracle of the first order) is sufficient.

Minor is proved. If God did not know from eternity all future contingent things, He would pass from power to act (*i.e.*, from potentiality to achievement)—a consequence opposed to His infinite perfection. Eternity, which exists simultaneously, comprises the whole of time in a changeless present. The prescience of God in regard to future contingent things does not affect freedom. "Since the Divine will is most efficacious, it not only follows that those things are done which God wishes to be done, but it follows that they are done in the manner in which God wishes—some necessarily and some freely" (1^a 19, 8).

II.—God alone can by His power give to man prophetic knowledge of future contingent things. God is the absolutely universal Cause, unchangeable, and hence He alone can infallibly know future things.

III.—God alone can communicate to man certain knowledge of the secrets of hearts. This knowledge is described by St Paul as "discernment of spirits" (1 Cor. xii. 10), Secret thoughts in the mind and affections in the will as such, apart from their effects, are known to God alone, because both intellect and will are subject to Him. The interior life is the special domain of God., History can tell nothing of the interior life of St. Joseph and of the Blessed Virgin. "God hath hidden me in His tabernacle" (Ps. xxvi. 5).

Art. III.—Discernibility of Prophecy.

Rationalists claim that even if supernatural prophecy were possible, it could not be discriminated from conjecture.

The Vatican Council (D. 1790) teaches that "prophecies are Divine facts, which, since they clearly shew the infinite knowledge of God, are most certain signs of Divine Revelation and accommodated to the intelligence of all."

I.—The prediction of a future contingent event and its subsequent fulfilment are facts quite within the power of the human mind to verify.

II.—Many prophecies may with certainty be differentiated from human conjecture and from the divination of spirits.

1^o Common opinion.

In cases where (1) minute circumstances regarding future contingent events are clearly announced, (2) the

events being remote, (3) many and complex, (4) dependent on the free-will of several, (5) when, as sometimes happens, a miracle depending on Divine free-will is foretold—prophecies with these characteristics can be discriminated with certainty from human conjecture.

The theory of probability shews that in regard to a number of circumstances, the probability of the fulfilment of each being ten to one, the probability of the fulfilment of two is a hundred to one, of three a thousand to one, and so on. The possibility of fortuitous occurrence is soon practically eliminated.

2^o Philosophic Reason.

Major: It is impossible with certitude to predict, naturally or fortuitously, long before the event, to predict too with minute circumstances future contingent events, the greater number of which depend on human freedom, and some on Divine freedom.

Minor: But many predictions are of such a nature, *e.g.*, propagation of Monotheism, Davidic origin of the Messiah, characteristics of the Messiah, passion and death of the Messiah, conversion of Gentile nations, etc.

Conclusion: Therefore these predictions are beyond human power and postulate the infinite prescience of God.

(A) How prophecy differs from chance occurrence. Chance is the accidental meeting of causes. A man digs a grave and unexpectedly find treasure. The digging of the grave is intentional. The hiding of the treasure was intentional. The accidental meeting of the causes (hiding and digging) constitutes chance. In the following five cases the possibility of chance is eliminated.

(1) Many things cannot *by chance* concur to the formation of one perfect result. Otherwise the perfect result (*e.g.*, faculty of vision) would be without a reason of being.

(2) From one principle, many parts, connected *inter se*, cannot come *by chance*, *e.g.*, from an acorn, the different parts of an oak.

(3) From one principle there cannot come *by chance* some definite effect, *e.g.*, an act of intelligence from the intellectual faculty, or an act of vision from the sensitive faculty. Chance, *i.e.*, the accidental conjunction of causes, is eliminated by the simplicity of both *terminus a quo* and *terminus ad quem*.

(4) Things which happen invariably or frequently are

not caused by chance, otherwise the constancy would be without a reason of being.

(5) Chance cannot be the *first cause* of the disposition of things, inasmuch as a cause *per accidens* presupposes a cause *per se* to which it is an accident. Otherwise the order of things would come from the absence of order.

These principles illustrate the difference between the fulfilment of a true prophecy, and fortuitous occurrence based on natural conjecture.

(a) In the fulfilment of many prophecies, various elements concur to the realisation of one contingent effect clearly predicted.

(b) From the primitive and simple promise of a Redeemer came many results admirably connected *inter se*.

(c) From one principle there cannot come *by chance* the *unity* of the consummation and perfection of innumerable souls. From the promise of a Redeemer comes the consummation of the Judaic-Christian Religion which has brought and brings to unity in Christ countless souls of good-will.

(d) Similar things which happen frequently or invariably cannot proceed from chance. In various prophecies of the Old Testament, similar events are foretold, especially the Messiah and His works.

(e) The Jewish religion is a prophecy of the Christian religion. The orderly development and fulfilment of this great historical prophecy cannot be due to chance, otherwise order would come from disorder—organic development of a unique kind would be due to an accidental cause.

(B) How prophecy is discriminated from conjecture which is fortuitously verified.

Renan wrote that the Messianic hope caused expectation on the part of the Jews, and when Christ appeared His friends gave Him the name and attributed to Him the qualities of the Messiah. Christ at first had no consciousness of being the Messiah, but gradually the conviction came. His disciples tried to shew that in Him the Messianic prophecies were fulfilled.

CRITIQUE

(a) Just as the order of the world does not come from blind necessity, so the order of prophecy and its ful-

filment do not come from natural necessity without the arrangement of Divine Providence.

(b) Prophetic announcement is concerned not with a future necessary occurrence, but with a future contingent event, depending on the free-will of many.

(c) Moreover in some cases the future contingent event is a miracle to be attributed to Divine Free-will, e.g., Incarnation, Resurrection, Mission of the Holy Ghost, propagation of the Church, perpetuity of the Church, etc.

(d) The Messianic hope did not naturally appear amongst the Jews. The Jews frequently refused to believe the prophets and killed them. The Apostles and Evangelists were not alone in shewing that Christ fulfilled prophecy. The fulfilment was and is a historic fact.

Moreover Divine Providence would not allow false prophecy in all its minute circumstances to be fulfilled. Otherwise God would permit men to be invincibly deceived in matters which concern their salvation.

III.—Some prophecies, taken individually, can be discriminated from human conjecture or divination of spirits only with moral certitude.

This moral certitude is based on the consideration of circumstances.

Do the circumstances point to honesty, seriousness, virtue? If the prophet be a man of holy life, one may believe that a prophecy fulfilled has come from God.

Art. IV.—Probative force of Prophecy.

I.—Teaching of the Church.

“Prophecies are most certain signs of Divine Revelation” (D. 1790). The Apostles and especially St. Matthew appeal to the fulfilment of prophecies of the Old Testament.

II.—The probative force of prophecy is proved by reason.

A Divine sign—the seal of God—most certainly confirms Divine Revelation, and prophecy is undoubtedly a sign which can come from God alone.

Prophecy fulfilled *directly* shews the infinite knowledge of God, as a miracle shews the Divine omnipotence.

Prophecy fulfilled *indirectly* shews the Divine origin of

Revelation. Otherwise God would be a witness to false teaching.

The connection between the prophecy and the revealed doctrine to be confirmed is declared by the prophet explicitly or implicitly (*Cf. Matt. xii. 39*).

Some prophecies are intrinsic to Religion, *e.g.*, those announcing the Incarnation, Passion, Resurrection, Indefectibility of the Church, etc. Similarly some miracles, *e.g.*, Resurrection, Ascension, etc., belong intrinsically to Religion and not merely extrinsically as the giving of sight to the man born blind.

SECTION VI

TESTIMONY OF CHRIST

CHAPTER XIX

EXISTENCE OF REVELATION

INTRODUCTION

§ 1.—On the Method and Division of this Treatise.

I.—Two methods are possible : progressive and regressive.

The religious systems of the present day are chiefly three—Christianity, Islamism and Buddhism. There can be no doubt of the supremacy of the Christian Faith, and if there is a Revelation, it must be first sought in the religion established by Christ. In this religion there are three stages—Primeval, Mosaic, and Christian.

(A) Up to the Nineteenth Century many apologists used the progressive method, and tried to prove the Divine origin of (1) the Primeval stage; (2) the Mosaic, confirmed by the miracles of Moses and prophets, and (3) of the religion of Christ and the Catholic Church. Recently Ottiger has attempted this task. But the long treatment involved, and the many difficulties raised against the Books of the Old Testament (difficulties better and more fully solved by commentators on Holy Scripture) forbid the exclusive use of this method.

(B) Hence during the Nineteenth Century many Apologists had recourse to the regressive method, beginning by an examination of the religion of Christ, and in this way illustrating, by the light of the New Testament and the fulfilment of prophecy, primitive testimonies and documents of the Old Testament. Some (*e.g.*, Brugère) establish the truths of Christianity and of Catholicism separately. Others (*e.g.*, Lacordaire, Card. Deschamps, Didiot, etc.) find in the marks of the Church “a great and perpetual motive of Credibility and irrefragable testimony of its Divine mission. Hence the Church, as ‘a standard to the nations,’ both invites to itself those who have not as yet received the Faith, and makes her own children more certain that the Faith which they possess rests upon

a solid foundation" (*Vat. Council*, D. 1794). These Apologists using the testimony of the Church illustrate with clearer light the historical part of Apologetics—the life, doctrine, miracles of Christ and the Messianic prophecies. Finally the testimony of Christ vouches for the Divine origin of the Mosaic and of the primeval stages. The regressive method, proceeding as it does from the complex fact of the life of the Church to its principles, is analytic in character, whereas the progressive method is more or less synthetic.

II.—Value of the regressive method.

This method is suitable for many reasons, but should not be exclusively used.

(A) Regressive method suitable in many respects. it is:

- (1) Easier, as the method sets out from the better known.
- (2) *Shorter and more convincing* inasmuch as the solution of historical and critical questions on the origin of Christianity is strengthened by the tradition of the Church.
- (3) More conformable to the idea of "Catholic Apologetics," as it marshals rational arguments "under the direction of Faith."
- (4) Shews that "Christian Apologetics" and "Catholic Apologetics," for whatever purpose they may be provisionally distinguished, are really identical.
- (5) Seems more in accordance with the words of the Vatican Council, which asserts that the Church is a "perpetual motive of Credibility, and an irrefragable proof of its own Divine mission."
- (6) Is traditional, as the distinction between Christianity and Catholicism arose subsequent to the Reformation.

(B) The regressive method should not be exclusively used.

- (1) The Vatican Council affirms the probative force of the miracles and prophecies of Moses and of Christ *before* it considers the Church.
- (2) Leo XIII writes (Encyclical, "*Providentissimus Deus*"): that since the magisterium of the Church rests on the testimony of Sacred Scripture,

belief in Sacred Scripture as authentic and genuine documents must be vindicated.

- (3) It is more natural to set forth the historical testimony of Christ regarding His Divine mission, the mysteries to be believed, precepts to be observed, institution of the Church, before motives of Credibility are considered. These motives, especially the life and marks of the Church, confirm such testimony.

III.—Union of both methods.

As in physical science analytical and synthetic methods are united, so, in the science of Apologetics, it is best to unite the regressive and progressive methods. Accordingly the testimony of Christ regarding His own Divine mission will have first place, followed by the motives of Credibility best known to us, namely, life and doctrine of the Church; and finally, the mind of the enquirer will be directed to weigh the evidence of miracles and prophecy in the past. Thus the second part of *Catholic Apologetics* will be divided as follows:

Introduction on Method and on the Historical Authority of the Gospels.

Testimony of Christ regarding His Divine mission, mysteries and precepts to be believed, and the institution of the Church.

Confirmation by internal motives.

Confirmation by sublimity of doctrine and life of the Church.

Confirmation by miracles and prophecy.

Christianity compared with Mosaic religion.

Christianity compared with other forms of religion.

Conclusion: Necessity of embracing the Catholic Faith.

§ 2.—Historical Authority of the Four Gospels.

Art. I.—Preliminary remarks.

The teaching and history of Christ are found in the New Testament, and especially in the Four Gospels. To prove the existence of Christian Revelation, it is sufficient to prove the historical authority of the Gospels. Many Rationalists no longer question the historical character of the principal epistles of St. Paul, *e.g.*, 1 Thessalonians, Galatians, Corinthians, Romans, Philippians. Harnack and Jülicher acknowledge that these epistles were written about A.D. 49-59 or A.D. 53-64.

The Inspiration of the Gospels is not considered here; the question to be considered is their historical value: (1) Are they genuine and authentic, *i.e.*, written by the authors to whom they are attributed and therefore authoritative; (2) are they "integral," *i.e.*, in substantial agreement with the original documents; (3) are they historically trustworthy as to the narration of facts, *i.e.*, is the character of the Evangelists such that they were neither deceived nor themselves guilty of deception. The full and adequate treatment of this question is found in the writings of Biblical scholars (Lepin, Cornely, Durand, Jacquier, etc.).

Only the principal arguments are given here.

I.—Method.

The genuineness, integrity and historicity of a book may be proved by extrinsic arguments (*i.e.*, by the testimony of writers who lived about the same time), or by intrinsic arguments drawn from the books themselves.

(a) Extrinsic arguments give historical certitude of the authenticity of a book, if it is clear that the witnesses are suitable, and that their testimony has not been falsified.

(b) Intrinsic arguments do not, as a rule, sufficiently determine the author and the exact time of composition; they furnish only probability and confirmation of external proofs.

(c) Rationalists exaggerate the value of the intrinsic, and minimise the value of the extrinsic method. They find confirmation of *à priori* judgments in their examination of intrinsic qualities. Harnack, for example, judged the essence of Christianity to be the conception of God as Father; whereas Loisy found the essence of the Gospel message in the preaching of the Kingdom of God, and the nearness of the end of the world (*Parousia*). Loisy excludes the institution of the Church as not compatible with the *Parousia*. Leo XIII in his Encyclical "*Providentissimus Deus*" points out that by the sole or exaggerated use of the internal method each critic finds confirmation of his own *à priori* views.

II.—Opinions of Adversaries.

There are four principal adverse systems:

(a) Naturalism: Paulus (1761-1851) admitted the genuineness of the Synoptic Gospels, but characterised the miraculous element as Oriental exaggeration.

(b) Mythism: Strauss (1808-1874), whose book *Leben Jesu* was translated into English by Miss Marian Evans (known later as George Eliot), maintained that the miraculous element in the Gospels is mythical—invented 150 years after the death of Christ.

(c) Evolutionism: The Tübingen school whose founder was Baur (1792-1860) held that Christianity is the synthesis of two opposite tendencies. "Thesis" and "Antithesis" are (according to the Hegelian idea) rendered compatible in "Synthesis." The doctrines of Peter and Paul (thesis and antithesis), enshrined respectively in the Gospels of St. Matthew and St. Luke, are unified in a higher synthesis in the Gospels of St. Mark and St. John. To this school belong Zeller, Schweigler, Ritschl, Pfleiderer.

(d) Modernism: The modern critical school holds that the teaching of Christ was gradually idealised. Hence different stages of judgment regarding Christ. He is (1) Son of God; (2) equal to the Father; (3) miraculously born of a Virgin, etc. The genuineness and historical character of the Gospel of St. John is usually denied. (This school includes Reuss, Renan, Sabatier, A. Réville, J. Réville, Stapfer, Harnack, H. Holtzmann, O. Holtzmann, Jülicher, Cheyne, Loisy, and other Modernists). Of these critics Adolph Harnack is undoubtedly the ablest. His recent judgments are that the Gospel of St. Mark was written about 65-70 by a disciple of Peter; the Gospel of St. Luke 78-83, perhaps earlier, 60-70, and is genuine; the Gospel of St. Matthew (*i.e.*, the Greek version) 70-75 by an unknown author; the Gospel of St. John 80-110 by a priest named John (not the Evangelist).

III.—Teaching of the Church.

The Biblical Commission (June 19th, 1911, and June 26th, 1912) teaches the genuineness, the chronological order of composition (*i.e.*, 1st, Aramaic Gospel of St. Matthew; 2nd, St. Mark; 3rd, St. Luke) and the historical character of the Synoptic Gospels. The Commission allows the hypothesis regarding the priority of the Gospels of St. Mark and St. Luke to the Greek version of St. Matthew to be tenable. The Commission disapproves of the attitude of those who, "resting on no testimony of tradition or historical argument, adopt the hypothesis of two sources to explain the composition of

the Greek version of St. Matthew and of the Gospel of St. Luke from their dependence on the Gospel of St. Mark and on the so-called 'Sayings of the Lord.'"

On May 29th, 1907, the Commission with the approbation of the Pope declared the genuineness and historical character of the Fourth Gospel.

About fifty years ago, the critics of the Tübingen school were accustomed to assign the books of the New Testament to comparatively late dates and to unknown authors. In recent years there has been a reaction led by Harnack. In his *Chronology of Ancient Christian Literature*, published 1897, he writes: "The most ancient literature of the Church is, on all chief points and in the majority of details, veracious and worthy of belief from the point of view of literary history. . . . In our criticism of the most ancient sources of Christianity, we are, without any doubt in course of returning to tradition" (*"Chronologie," Leipzig, 1897, Vol. I., pp. viii-x.*). The *Chronology* was followed by his works on St. Luke and the Acts, entirely reversing previous opinions, and returning to the traditionary view (Cf. *"Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums, by Edward Meyer, 1921*).

Regarding the Gospels:

1.—St. Matthew composed in Aramaic a collection of Our Lord's discourses with connecting narrative, and some unknown author not long after A.D. 70 used this collection in combination with St. Mark's narrative and some other material to produce our First Gospel "according to St. Matthew."

2.—John Mark, author of the second Gospel, lived in his mother's house at Jerusalem. Some think (it is only conjecture) that the Cenacle was in this house. In his Gospel (xiv. 51-2) the incident is narrated of the young man in a linen cloth, who was a spectator of Our Lord's arrest. This young man was in all probability Mark himself. He was closely associated with St. Paul and St. Barnabas (Mark was cousin to Barnabas) in the early stages of St. Paul's first missionary journey. But he left them before they went inland from Perga to Pisidian Antioch. Later a discussion occurred between St. Paul and St. Barnabas as to the advisability of taking Mark with them a second time (Acts xv. 39). St. Barnabas and St. Mark sailed to Cyprus. In the history of St. Mark there is then a gap of

about ten years. Mark is next found at Rome—a trusted friend of St. Paul who was a prisoner. In St. Paul's second captivity he wrote to Timothy, who was at Ephesus, asking him to bring Mark with him to Rome, "for he is profitable to me for the ministry." St. Peter in his first epistle (1 Pet. v. 12-13) written at Rome speaks of Sylvanus "a faithful brother" and of "my son, Mark," who is with him. During the ten years' gap in Mark's life, just alluded to, Mark followed St. Peter, taking notes of his teaching, and thus preparing material for his Gospel.

The date of the publication of St. Mark's Gospel (the material most probably existed for some years before publication) is probably about the year of St. Peter's death, 67 A.D. The suggestion of the Tübingen school of a second-century date is now abandoned.

3.—Concerning the authorship of the third Gospel and of the Acts, the following points are certain:

- (1) The Acts is the work of one of St. Paul's travelling companions, who was often present at the incidents and scenes described.
- (2) The Gospel and the Acts were written by the same author.
- (3) Amongst St. Paul's travelling companions Luke, "the beloved physician," to whom tradition ascribes the books, was pre-eminent.
- (4) The language of the book presupposes an educated author, and most probably a physician, because of the use of medical terms.

The Acts terminates at the end of the second year of St. Paul's imprisonment at Rome, A.D. 63. The Gospel was the first of St. Luke's two books, and consequently was written before A.D. 63, and as it seems to imply knowledge of St. Mark's Gospel, the material of the latter must have been accessible about A.D. 60.

The conclusion emphasised by Sanday, Harnack, and many others is that the materials of the Synoptic Gospels were practically all in being before the destruction of Jerusalem (A.D. 70), and that the after-time had no serious effect upon them.

The Biblical Commission disapproves of the hypothesis of "two sources" adopted on "no testimony of tradition or historical argument" to explain the composition of the

Greek version of St. Matthew and of the Gospel of St. Luke. It is well to know the hypothesis to which the Commission alludes. It is claimed that a large part of St. Luke's narrative, consisting mainly of Our Lord's sayings, is common to him with St. Matthew. Some critics suppose that both Evangelists (St. Matthew and St. Luke) drew upon a document, which is usually known as Q (Quelle, *i.e.*, source). Besides using St. Mark and Q (which is questionable), St. Luke undoubtedly derived information contained in Chapters I and II from the Blessed Virgin.

In the Ecclesiastical History of Eusebius (*Bk. III., c. 39*) it is related that Papias, bishop of Hierapolis in Phrygia, wrote five books entitled *Interpretation of oracular utterances of Our Lord*, a fragment of which Eusebius preserves. Concerning the first Evangelist, Papias writes: "Matthew compiled the *logia* in the Hebrew speech." The word *logia* in pre-Christian and post-Christian writers meant "oracles," "Divine utterances," "Divine Revelation." Hence Dr. Wescott judged that the sense of this passage is best expressed as follows: "Matthew composed his Gospel in Hebrew." The primary meaning of *logia* is of course "oracles" or "Divine utterances," but as the distinction between the mental, oral and written word is easily unobserved, in Dr. Westcott's opinion, the expression in this passage is equivalent to Gospel—a *written* record chiefly of the words, but, also of the works of Our Lord. Dr. Lightfoot has also given reason to conclude that the word *logia* (oracles) refers to a Gospel, containing incidents and discourses like our First Gospel.

Of the passage of Papias regarding St. Mark, Wescott gives the following translation: "For he (Mark) neither heard the Lord nor followed Him; but subsequently, as I said, attached himself to Peter, who used to frame his teaching to meet the (immediate) wants of his hearers, and not as making a connected narrative of the Lord's discourses." Dr. Westcott prefers the reading *λογων* to *λογίων*, *i.e.*, "discourses" instead of "oracles," whereas in the passage regarding St. Matthew, he judges *logia* to be the correct reading and to be equivalent to "Gospel" (*Cf. Wescott, "A general survey of the history of the Canon of the New Testament," 3rd edition, 1870, pp. 64, 65n, 66n.*)

Art. II.—Genuineness and Integrity of the Gospels.

I.—Extrinsic arguments.

First Century:

1.—First Epistle of St. Clement to the Corinthians (A.D. c. 96) contains six texts taken from the Synoptic Gospels. The sense is given, not the literal words.

2.—Didache, *i.e.*, doctrine of the Twelve Apostles (A.D. 80-100) discovered in 1873 in the library of Constantinople by Philotheus Bryennius, cites words taken from St. Matthew and St. Luke.

3.—Epistle attributed to St. Barnabas (c. A.D. 98-100), contains allusions to St. Matthew, St. Mark and St. Luke.

4.—St. Ignatius, Martyr (+ c. A.D. 110), borrows sentences from St. Matthew and St. John.

5.—"Pastor" of Hermas (c. A.D. 140) quotes several texts from each of the four Evangelists.

6.—Epistle of St. Polycarp also mentions passages from the four Gospels.

7.—As already related, Eusebius (*Book III., c. 39*), quotes a fragment from a work of Papias, bishop of Hierapolis in Phrygia (c. 130 A.D.) who was a disciple of St. John, friend of St. Polycarp and master of St. Irenæus. Papias mentions the Gospels of St. Matthew and St. Mark.

Second Century:

(A) Patristic testimony.

1.—St. Justin (*Apologia I., 66*) narrates that at Christian meetings the Gospels were read. In his *Dialogue with Trypho* (n. 103) he states that the Gospels were written by Apostles and Disciples. Again in *Apologia I., 15*, he cites about twenty verses from the Sermon on the Mount; he refers to Messianic prophecies contained in the First Gospel. He describes the Annunciation and many incidents of the birth of Christ contained in St. Luke.

2.—Tatian, disciple of St. Justin, a Syrian, wrote the *Diatesseron*—a harmony of the four Gospels—about A.D. 170.

3.—The Muratorian Canon (a fragment found by Muratori in the Ambrosian Library in 1749) composed before 200 A.D. mentions St. Luke's Gospel as the third, and St. John's Gospel as the fourth.

4.—St. Irenæus, Bishop of Lyons, wrote his book *Adversus Hæreses* about A.D. 180. He has the following

words: "Matthew published his Gospel (written in the Hebrew tongue) when Peter and Paul were preaching at Rome and founding the Church. After their death, Mark, disciple and interpreter of Peter, handed down in writing to us the truth that Peter taught. And Luke, follower of Paul, wrote in a book the Gospel preached by him (Paul). Afterwards, John, disciple of the Lord, who reclined upon His breast, published a Gospel, whilst he stayed at Ephesus in Asia." St. Irenæus was a disciple of St. Polycarp, who was a disciple of St. John (Cf. "*Adversus Hæreses*," Book III., c. 1, n. 1).

5.—Tertullian (c. A.D. 200) regarded the claim to be beyond controversy that the four Gospels had been in the possession of the Church since the time of the Apostles. "Matthew and John being Apostles; Mark and Luke disciples of Apostles" (*Adv. Mariconem*, Book IV., c. 2 and 5).

6.—Clement of Alexandria in his *Stromata* (c. A.D. 200) mentions the names of the four Evangelists, and discriminates their writings from Apocryphal works ("*Stromata*," Book III. 13; Book I. 21).

7.—Origen (c. A.D. 200) writes that the four are the only Gospels approved by the Church (*Luc. hom. I.*).

(B) Testimony of heretics.

Many of the Gnostics admitted the genuineness of the fourth Gospel, from which they tried to deduce their doctrine of "Æons" (e.g., Basilides and Valentinus). Marcion chose the Gospel of St. Luke as the expression of the original doctrine rightly set forth by St. Paul. Celsus stated that heretics tried to change the words of the Gospel in defence of their errors (Cf. *Origen, Contra Celsum II. 13-16*).

Conclusion: It is clear that the four Gospels were in use at the end of the Second Century in churches far apart, and that their genuineness was acknowledged without question. If these four Gospels are not genuine, several morally impossible results, indicated in the following questions, ensue:

- (1) Why did Apostolic Fathers, Bishops and faithful receive as their rule of Faith the Gospels if apocryphal?
- (2) Why did not heretics and pagans deny their genuineness?

(3) How was it that the different churches received the Gospels as Apostolic?

(4) If the Gospels are not genuine, who are their authors, when and where were they written?

II.—Intrinsic Arguments.

The genuineness of the Gospels is confirmed by intrinsic criteria.

(A) As regards the Synoptic Gospels, examination shews that their authors were illiterate Jews, who knew not Greek and used many Hebraisms. They belong to the First Century, inasmuch as (in their description of places, manners, things and persons) they relate very minute circumstances without error, which would have been impossible for writers of their very moderate ability after the destruction of Jerusalem and of the Temple. Moreover in the Synoptic Gospels, the prophecy of the destruction of Jerusalem is associated with the end of the world, which proves that the prophecy was written before A.D. 70.

M. Rackham in his *Commentary on the Acts* writes: "St. Luke is equally at home with the Sanhedrin and its parties, the priests and the temple guard, and the Herodian princes at Jerusalem, with the proconsul of Cyprus and Achaia, the rulers of the Synagogue and the first men of Antioch in Pisidia, the priest of Zeus at Lystra, the prætors, lictors, and jailer at Philippi, the politarchs of Thessalonica, the Areopagus of Athens, the Asiarchs with the people, assembly and secretary at Ephesus, the centurions, tribune and procurator of Judæa, the first man of Malta, and the captain of the camp at Rome. Such accuracy would have been almost impossible for a writer compiling the history fifty years later. In some cases where his statements had been impugned, St. Luke has been signally vindicated by the discovery of inscriptions, as in the case of the politarch of Thessalonica and the proconsul of Cyprus" (*Acts*, p. xlv.).

To sum up, Catholic critics conclude (Harnack regards the opinion as probable) that the Synoptic Gospels were written between the years 50 and 70, probably about the year 60, and the fourth Gospel between 80 and 100 A.D.

(B) The Fourth Gospel.

Internal evidence shows that the author was:

- (1) A Jew. There are many Hebraisms, and the Jewish customs and Messianic idea are perfectly described.

- (2) An eye-witness, because of his vivid descriptions of various characters, *e.g.*, John the Baptist, Peter, Mary Magdalene, Martha, Samaritan woman, man born blind, etc.
- (3) An Apostle. He knew minute details of the life of Our Lord, His thoughts and prayers, His secret interview with Nicodemus, with the Samaritan woman, etc.
- (4) John, son of Zebedee. He is never "John" in the Fourth Gospel, but the disciple "whom Jesus loved."
- (5) In the last chapter, the authenticity of which is not disproved, it is said of the disciple whom Jesus loved: "This is that disciple who giveth testimony of these things, and hath written these things, and we know that his testimony is true."

Differences of arrangement and matter between the Fourth and the Synoptic Gospels prove nothing against its genuineness, but show that:

- (1) John wished to supply what was wanting in the other Gospels. Hence he describes the Judean ministry, teaches more explicitly the Divinity of Christ, and for this purpose makes choice of the miracles and words of Our Lord.
- (2) Differences are also due to the gifts of the writers, to which St. Paul alludes *1 Cor. xiii. 4*. St. John's special gifts were interpretation of the words of Christ, and the "word of wisdom" mentioned in *1 Cor. ii. 6-10*.
- (3) Apparent discrepancies are really a proof of the genuineness of the four Gospels. Brugère argues thus: If the books associated with the names of the Apostles are the works of subsequent writers, the books were written either frankly and without intention of fraud, or deceitfully with such intention. If the first, why so many and such minute instances of agreement, if the latter, why differences of arrangement and matter?

III.—Integrity of the Gospels.

In order to establish the Divine origin of Christianity, it is sufficient to defend historically the substantial integrity of the Gospels as to doctrine and principal facts. Nowadays after diligent examination of manuscripts, versions, citations from the Fathers, non-Catholic critics

allow that there was no substantial alteration of the text of the Gospels from the time of the last revision, *i.e.*, A.D. 70-90 for the Synoptic Gospels, and A.D. 110-120 for the Fourth Gospel. There are various readings, but most are only verbal transpositions, or synonymous terms, or modifications in orthography. About ten passages* refer to doctrine, but these passages contain nothing essential affecting the preaching of Christ, and the principal facts of His life.

Art. III.—Historical character of the Gospels.

Some Rationalists (*e.g.*, Baur) did not hesitate to accuse the Evangelists of deliberate and conscious deceit. Renan and others attributed their views to hallucination. Modernists assert that Christ's historical person was transfigured by a process of idealisation due to the faith and enthusiasm of His disciples. (D. 2076.)

I.—Historicity of the Synoptic Gospels.

(a) The hypothesis of hallucination.

How could *all* the Evangelists in regard to the same facts, throughout their lives, and in the same way have suffered from hallucination? Nay, the deadliest enemies of Christ must have been affected in the same way, as they could not deny, and did not attempt to deny, the miracles. This hypothesis is clearly absurd.

(b) Equally absurd is the hypothesis of wilful deceit. The goodness and simplicity of the Apostles are apparent. They could hope for no gain, temporal or eternal, from falsehood, but on the contrary persecution and suffering. They sealed their testimony with their blood. They died martyrs, *i.e.*, witnesses, shewing no fanaticism, but humility and patience. How has it come to pass that the supposed fraud has been fruitful for nineteen centuries in sanctity and beneficence?

(c) Process of Idealisation.

(1) The supposed process cannot be admitted. The Synoptic writers relate, in a historical and literal way, the political, moral and religious state of the Jews. Why should their narrative of the words and works of Christ be less accurate? Transformation and deformation of the

* The authenticity of the following passages has been questioned: (1) Mark xvi. 9-20; (2) Luke xxii. 43-44; (3) John vii. 53—viii. 11; (4) Matthew xxviii. 19; (5) Attribution of Magnificat to Mary, Luke i. 46; (6) John v. 3-4.

history of Christ appear in the Apocryphal Gospels, in which we read that Christ, as a child, performed countless stupendous miracles. But there is nothing of this idealisation in the simple and grave words of the Evangelists.

(2) Idealisation was morally impossible. To change the texts of the Synoptic Gospels between the years A.D. 60 and 90 was impossible, inasmuch as witnesses of the facts were still alive. Hence Strauss assigned the composition of the Gospels to the end of the Second Century—a supposition no longer held by any critic. Moreover, as J. J. Rousseau and John Stuart Mill allow, Galilean fishermen, or early Christian writers, could not possibly excogitate and write down the words of Christ, or describe His life and character as they appear in the Synoptic Gospels. There is a union of sublimity and simplicity, which postulates a different origin.

(3) The supposed idealisation is contrary to facts. The Synoptic writers do not stress the Divinity of Christ, or the meritorious value of His death as much as St. Paul, and yet St. Paul began to write about the year A.D. 53. The first three Gospels note rather the human side of Christ, His sorrows and sufferings. They do not hide the weaknesses and prejudices of the Apostles. They would have adopted a different method if they intended to transfigure the words and deeds of Christ. When St. Paul refers to His Divinity (*e.g.* "in whom the fulness of the Godhead dwelleth corporally," *Coloss. ii. 9*) he wrote concerning a truth, which was already accepted and believed by the whole Christian community.

II.—Historicity of the Fourth Gospel.

In regard to the Fourth Gospel, Modernists assert: The narrative of John is not really history, but a mystical contemplation; the words attributed to Christ in this Gospel are theological meditations on the mysteries of salvation, and are destitute of historical truth; the Fourth Gospel gives exaggerated prominence to miracles, not that they should appear more extraordinary, but that they might be more apt to signify the works and glory of the Incarnate Word; John claimed to be a witness unto Christ, but in truth he is only a striking witness of Christian life, or of the influence of Christ in the Church at the end of the First Century (D. 2016-2018).

Answer: The principal aim of the Fourth Gospel is dogmatic. The Evangelist wishes to shew clearly that Jesus is the Son of God (*Cf. John xx. 31*). But it does not follow that the words and works of Christ narrated in this Gospel are not historically true. To prove a truth of such moment, a sincere author will bring forward only deeds and words absolutely unexceptionable as to truth and weight.

(A) Historicity of the Facts.

The objection has been made: Many facts narrated in this Gospel do not appear in the Synoptic Gospels, and are therefore not historical.

Answer: (a) The facts peculiar to the Fourth Gospel are not narrated as allegories or parables, but as real events.

(b) Some facts common to the Fourth and to the Synoptics are related practically in the same way as they appear in St. Matthew, St. Mark and St. Luke (*Cf. Testimony of St. John the Baptist, ejection of sellers from the Temple, walking upon the waters, anointing of Jesus in Bethany, triumphal entry into Jerusalem, history of the Passion*).

(c) Moreover, St. John aimed at supplementing the narratives of his predecessors. Accordingly he passes over quickly the Galilean and narrates facts of the Judean ministry. He does not repeat the circumstances of the institution of the Eucharist, but describes the promise of the same. He passes over the raising to life of the daughter of Jairus, and of the widow's son at Naim, he omits the confession of St. Peter, but he records the miracle at Cana, the secret visit of Nicodemus, the interview with the Samaritan woman, the giving of sight to a man congenitally blind, the cure of the paralytic at the probatic pool, the raising of Lazarus to life. All these facts he describes with details of place and time, noting usage and tradition of the Jews. Allegorical suggestion in regard to these facts is as void of foundation as in regard to incidents narrated by the four Evangelists.

(B) Historicity of the Discourses.

Modernists and Rationalists object that there is a great difference between the discourses recorded in the Fourth Gospel, and those which appear in the Synoptics, both as regards doctrine and style. It is claimed that the Synoptic writers record moral precepts in a simple style,

whereas John teaches sublime dogmas in an elevated style.

Answer: (a) In the Synoptics we have often merely the substance of the discourses of Christ. Compare St. Luke's account of the Sermon on the Mount with that of St. Matthew. This instance suggests that it should not be matter of wonder if John records discourses more at length, especially when he touches on higher mysteries.

(b) Moreover, the dogmatic aim of the Fourth Gospel should be considered. St. John stresses the Divinity of Christ, which at that time was denied by the gnostic Cerinthus and by the Ebionites. To meet this denial, St. John chose for narration words and deeds of Christ in which His glory and power are reflected. The Synoptics, too, express His Divinity, but less explicitly.

(c) Again, St. John's mode of writing is suitable as an expression of the sublime doctrine which he teaches. His style is more ornate, more vivid; his temperament and special calling are reflected therein; he was the "disciple whom Jesus loved," who rested his head upon the breast of Christ at the last Supper, to whom Christ, when dying, commended the care of His mother. But in the words attributed to Christ, St. John does not introduce his own ideas; indeed, in some cases, he carefully discriminates his own reflections from the words of Christ. (*Cf. ii. 21; xii. 33; vii. 39*).

(d) With reference to apparent contradictions between the Fourth Gospel and the Synoptics, even non-Catholic critics, who assume their reality, allow that they are accidental, and do not affect the substance of the history of Christ, or His doctrine, but are concerned with details of chronology, and the number and order of His miracles. In these supposed discrepancies, there is a clear proof of the sincerity of the Evangelists, for if they were not sincere, they would have removed all appearance of contradiction. Interesting corroboration of their accuracy appears in some instances of supposed divergence. For example, the Synoptics write of the Pharisees and Sadducees where St. John mentions High Priests and Pharisees. At that period it can be proved that the High Priests were Sadducees.

Conclusion: Few profane books of antiquity can boast a historicity as well supported as that of the Gospels. The first mention of Herodotus was made by Aristotle

one hundred years after the death of the historian; the second mention appears in Cicero, who lived three hundred years later. Thucydides is first mentioned by Cicero. Strauss acknowledged that he did not contest the genuineness of the Gospels on historical grounds (*Leben Jesu xxii.*). So also writes Renan (*Vie de Jésus vi.*). Zeller asserted that he would not believe the Resurrection of Christ even if supported by most certain testimonies (*"Vorträge und Abhandlungen," Erste Sammlung, Leipzig, 1875, p. 543*). It is not therefore historical considerations which move Rationalists to reject the Gospel testimony regarding the Supernatural.

CHAPTER XX

TESTIMONY OF CHRIST REGARDING HIS DIVINE MISSION AND HIS DOCTRINE

§ 1.—His Mission.

I.—Heterodox Opinions.

Some Rationalists (Wellhausen, Schmidt, Wrede, etc.) deny that Christ claimed to be the Messiah. They assert that a declaration of Messiahship was ascribed to Him by His disciples after His death, inasmuch as they believed in His Resurrection. Other Rationalists (Harnack, O. Holtzmann) allow that Christ declared that He was the Messiah. Others again (Weiss, Loisy) formulate their view in this way: Christ had not at first the consciousness of His Messianic dignity, and when He exercised His ministry He did not say that He was the Messiah, nor had His miracles any such implication. But towards the end of His life, He taught that He was the Messiah, or rather that He would be King of the heavenly kingdom, which, with the destruction of the world, was close at hand (D. 2028, 2033).

II.—Christ taught most emphatically that He was the Messiah announced by the prophets.

At the beginning of His ministry, He testified that He was ambassador of God, and later more and more explicitly asserted that He was the Messiah and Redeemer.

Messiah (*Hebrew*, "masiah"; *Septuagint*, "χριστός"; *John i. 41*; *iv. 25, 26*, "Μεσσίας"; *Vulgate*, "Christus") means "anointed," i.e., anointed by God for His high office. In the Old Testament record, priests, prophets and kings were anointed (*Lev. iv. 3, 16*; *3 Kings xix. 16*; *Ps. xvii. 51*).

The Jews had corrupted the notion of Messiah and expected a great political leader, who would restore the kingdom of Israel and conquer all nations. Hence the fear of Herod (*Matt. ii. 13*). Christ corrected this erroneous prejudice, and taught His disciples that the Messiah

announced by the prophets was described as humble, patient, and was to give His life a redemption for many (*Matt. xx. 28*). Because of the false belief of the Jews, Christ did not at once disclose Himself, as He did not wish to give countenance to the notion of temporal ruler. St. John records their readiness to make Him king (*John vi. 15*). He wished to instruct the Jews so that gradually they might lay aside their erroneous belief, and recognise His exclusively spiritual mission. Christ many times asked those whom He had healed to be silent regarding the benefit, lest the Jews might misinterpret the exercise of His power as a sign of earthly kingship. Hence in the progressive manifestation of His personality and work there are two stages:

(A) The beginning of His ministry.

(a) His public declarations.

1° Christ declared His doctrinal and Messianic mission when He preached that "the time is accomplished, and the Kingdom of God is at hand: repent and believe the Gospel" (*Mark i. 15*). He chose His disciples and said to them: "Come ye after me, and I will make you to be fishers of men" (*Matt. iv. 19*). "And Jesus went about all Galilee, teaching in their synagogues, and preaching the Gospel of the Kingdom: and healing all manner of sickness, and every infirmity among the people" (*Matt. iv. 23*). In the Sermon on the Mount He added to and perfected the Mosaic Law on His own authority: "It was said to them of old—but I say to you." "He taught as one having power" (*Matt. vii. 29*).

2° He said to the Pharisees that He was "Lord even of the Sabbath" (*Matt. xii. 8*), that He was greater than Jonas and Solomon (*Matt. xii. 41, 42*), greater than David (*Mark xii. 35-37*).

3° In the synagogue of Nazareth, when He had read the words of Isaiah regarding the future Messiah, He said: "This day is fulfilled this scripture in your ears" (*Luke iv. 18-21*).

4° After the cure of the paralytic at the probatic pool, Christ declared not only His Messiahship, but His Divinity. He was so understood by the Jews, who sought to kill Him (*John v*).

(b) His private teaching.

Speaking to His intimate friends, Christ revealed His Messiahship at once.

1° Andrew, when he had heard the testimony of John the Baptist and had spoken to Christ, sought his brother and said: "We have found the Messiah which is, being interpreted, the Christ" (*John i. 41*). Philip and Nathaniel confess: "Rabbi, thou art the Son of God, thou art the King of Israel" (*John i. 49*).

2° Christ gave wonderful power to His twelve disciples: "Heal the sick, raise the dead, cleanse lepers, cast out devils. . . . It is not you who speak, but the Spirit of your Father that speaketh in you. . . . He that receiveth you receiveth me; and he that receiveth me receiveth Him that sent me" (*Matt. x. 1, 8, 20, 40*).

3° When in prison John the Baptist, hearing of the works of Christ, sent two of his disciples to ask: "Art thou He that art to come, or look we for another?" And Jesus making answer said to them: "Go and relate to John what you have heard and seen. The blind see, the lame walk, the lepers are cleansed, the deaf hear, the dead rise again, the poor have the Gospel preached to them" (*Matt. xi. 2-5*). These words are the fulfilment of the prophecy of Isaiah, which the Jews regarded as Messianic (*Is. xxxv. 5-6*).

4° In His conversation with Nicodemus, ruler of the Jews, Christ told him that He had come down from heaven, and was the only-begotten Son of God (*John iii. 13-18*), thus clearly teaching His Messiahship and His Divine Filiation.

5° In His conversation with the Samaritan woman who alluded to the Messiah, Christ said: "I am He who am speaking with thee" (*John iv. 25-26*). Later the Samaritans said: "We ourselves have heard Him and we know that this is indeed the Saviour of the World" (*John v. 42*).

(B) The last year of His life.

1° He revealed to His disciples His Messianic dignity and uses expressions which imply His Divinity. Witness the confession of St. Peter, who replied to the question "Who do you say that I am?" (*Matt. xvi. 13-19*) "Thou art Christ, Son of the living God." These words were approved by Christ as being inspired by the Father.

2° On the festival days of the Jews, Christ went up into the Temple and taught. "And the Jews wondered saying: How does this man know letters, having never learned? Jesus answered them and said: My doctrine is

not mine, but His that sent me. . . . Jesus therefore cried out in the Temple, teaching and saying: You both know me and you knew whence I am, and I am not come of myself; but He that sent me is true whom you know not. I know Him because I am from Him and He hath sent me." The Pharisees and rulers sent ministers to apprehend Him, and the ministers returning said: "Never did man speak like this man" (*John vii. 14-16, 28-29, 32, 46*).

On the following day Jesus taught in the Temple saying: "I am the light of the world: he that followeth me waketh not in darkness, but shall have the light of life. The Pharisees therefore said to him: Thou givest testimony of thyself: thy testimony is not true. Jesus answered. . . . I am one that giveth testimony of myself: and the Father that sent me giveth testimony of me. . . . And He that sent me is with me, and He hath not left me alone; for I do always the things that please Him. . . . If you continue in my word . . . the truth shall make you free. . . . I speak that which I have seen with my Father. . . . If God were your father, you would indeed love me. For from God I proceeded and came: for I came not of myself, but He sent me. . . . Which of you shall convince me of sin? If I say the truth to you, why do you not believe me? He that is of God heareth the words of God. . . . Amen, amen, I say to you: if any man keep my word, he shall not see death for ever. The Jews therefore said: Now we know that thou hast a devil . . . art thou greater than our father Abraham who is dead? . . . Jesus said to them: Amen, amen, I say to you, before Abraham was made I am" (*John viii. 12, 13, 18, 29, 31, 32, 38, 42, 46, 47, 51, 52, 53, 58, 59*). These last words assert more than His Messiahship. The Jews interpreting His words as blasphemy "took up stones to cast at him."

Later, the Jews came round Him and said: "How long dost thou hold our souls in suspense? If thou be the Christ, tell us plainly. Jesus answered them: I speak to you and you believe not: the works that I do in the name of my Father, they give testimony of me. But you do not believe, because you are not of my sheep" (*John x. 24-26*).

Jesus asserted a greater than Messianic dignity when He said "I and my Father are one. The Jews therefore took up stones to stone him. Jesus answered them. . . .

Do you say of him whom the Father hath sanctified and sent into the world : Thou blasphemest because I said, I am the Son of God " (*John x. 30, 31, 32, 36*).

3° Triumphant entry into Jerusalem.

The multitudes cried, saying : " Hosanna to the Son of David : Blessed is He that cometh in the name of the Lord : Hosanna in the highest " (*Matt. xxi. 9*). " And some of the Pharisees from amongst the multitude said to him : Master, rebuke thy disciples. To whom he said : I say to you, that if these shall hold their peace, the stones will cry out " (*Luke xix. 39, 40*).

The same day He entered the Temple, and ejecting the sellers said : " It is written, My house shall be called the house of prayer, but you have made it a den of thieves " (*Matt. xxi. 13*). Many Rationalists (*e.g.*, Harnack, O. Holtzmann, etc.) allow that Christ's entry into Jerusalem clearly shews that He claimed for Himself the office and name of Messiah.

4° During His passion.

Before the Sanhedrin, the high-priest said to Him : " I adjure thee by the living God that thou tell us if thou be the Christ the Son of God. Jesus saith to him : Thou hast said it. Nevertheless I say to you, hereafter you shall see the Son of Man sitting on the right hand of the power of God, and coming in the clouds of heaven. Then the high-priest rent his garments, saying : He hath blasphemed." In this reply Jesus declared that He was the Messiah, and that to Him belonged the prerogative of sitting at the right hand of the Father, and of judging men (*Matt. xxvi. 63-65*) ; *Cf. Mark xiv. 61-64*).

5° After His resurrection.

Speaking to the disciples going to Emmaus, He said : " O foolish and slow of heart to believe all things which the prophets have spoken. Ought not Christ to have suffered these things and so to enter into His glory ? And beginning at Moses and all the prophets he expounded to them in all the scriptures the things that were concerning him " (*Luke xxiv. 25, 26, 27, 44, 45*). Here is a clear declaration of His Messiahship. Again He said to His disciples : " As the Father sent me I also send you " (*John xx. 21*).

Conclusion : All these testimonies as Harnack allows (*L'Essence du Christianisme*, p. 140) against Wellhausen are so interwoven with the narrative, that if they

were removed, practically nothing would remain of the life of Christ, and His death could not be explained. There was no time for a process of idealisation, as the Apostles from the day of Pentecost taught that Jesus was the Messiah and the Author of life (*Acts ii. 36 ; iii. 15*). Catholic and conservative critics hold that the " Acts " were written by St. Luke before A.D. 70. Harnack gives two dates A.D. 78-83 or perhaps A.D. 60-70. It cannot be said with Loisy that Jesus only affirmed that He would be the Messiah of the future kingdom. In many texts already cited He declares Himself to be the Messiah. " The kingdom of heaven is like to a grain of mustard seed . . . which is the least of all seeds, but when it is grown up . . . becometh a tree " (*Matt. xiii. 33*). The Kingdom of God began by the preaching of Christ, was made glorious by His resurrection and ascension, and will be consummated after the last coming of the Messiah.

§ II.—Synthesis of the Teaching of Christ.

Modernists claim that Christ did not teach a body of doctrine, but simply began a religious movement. Others say that the teaching was at first Judaic, later Pauline, later still Johannine, and finally Greek and universal. Both propositions are condemned (*D. 2059, 2060*).

Art. I.—Teaching of Christ on God and the Trinity.

I.—The Synoptic Gospels.

(1) Christ presupposes and confirms the teaching of the Old Testament regarding God the Creator :

" Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy God is one God " (*Mark xii. 29*).

" He created creatures " (*Mark xiii. 19*).

" Lord of Heaven and earth " (*Matt. xi. 25*).

" Heaven the throne of God " (*Matt. v. 34*).

" The earth is his footstool " (*Matt. v. 35*).

" Your heavenly Father is perfect " (*Matt. v. 48*).

" One is good, God " (*Matt. xix. 17*).

" Things that are impossible with men are possible with God " (*Luke xviii. 27*).

" Thy Father who seeth in secret " (*Matt. vi. 4, 6, 18*).

" Your Father knoweth what is needful for you before you ask him " (*Matt. vi. 8*).

(2) Relatively to man God is our Father, most provident, merciful and just.

"Be you perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect" (*Matt. v. 48*).

"Thus therefore shall you pray: Our Father who art in heaven" (*Matt. vi. 9*).

"Behold the birds of the air . . . your heavenly Father feedeth them. Are not you of much more value than they?" (*Matt. vi. 26*).

"Ask and it shall be given you" (*Matt. vii. 7*).

"Your Father is merciful" (*Luke vi. 36*).

He requires labour proportioned to the talents of each (*Matt. xxv. 14 sq.*).

He gives to each according to his works: "Come ye blessed of my Father, possess you the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world" (*Matt. xxv. 34*).

"Depart from me you cursed into everlasting fire prepared for the devil and his angels" (*Matt. xxv. 41*).

He seeks the lost sheep (*Luke xv. 1-7*).

He mercifully and joyfully receives the penitent prodigal (*Luke xv. 24*).

(3) God has a Son equal to Himself.

"No one knoweth the Son but the Father: neither doth anyone know the Father but the Son, and he to whom it shall please the Son to reveal Him" (*Matt. xi. 27; Luke x. 22*).

(4) The Holy Ghost.

"I send the promise of my Father upon you" (*Luke xxiv. 49*).

"When they shall deliver you up, take no thought how or what to speak . . . it is not you that speak, but the Spirit of your Father that speaketh in you" (*Matt. x. 19, 20*).

"The Holy Ghost shall teach you in that hour what you must say" (*Luke xii. 12*).

"Who speaketh against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world or in the world to come" (*Matt. xii. 32; Mark iii. 29*).

The distinction and equality of the three Divine Persons is asserted by Christ, when He said to His Apostles:

"Going, therefore, teach ye all nations: baptising them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost" (*Matt. xxviii. 19*).

II.—Gospel of St. John.

(1) Regarding God.

"God is a spirit, and they that adore him must adore him in spirit and in truth" (*John iv. 24*).

(2) God has a Son equal to Himself.

"My Father worketh until now; and I work" (*John v. 17*).

"As the Father raiseth up the dead and giveth life, so the Son also giveth life to whom he will" (*John v. 21*).

"As the Father hath life in himself: so he hath given to the Son also to have life in himself" (*John v. 26*).

"God so loved the world as to give his only-begotten Son" (*John iii. 16*).

"I and the Father are one" (*John x. 30; xvii. 11, 21*).

(3) The Holy Ghost.

"But when the Paraclete cometh, whom I will send you from the Father, the Spirit of truth who proceedeth from the Father, he shall give testimony of me" (*John xv. 26*).

The Paraclete, Spirit of Truth, "shall abide with you and shall be in you . . . he will teach you all things, and bring all things to your mind, whatsoever I shall have said to you" (*John xiv. 17, 26*).

The Spirit of Truth "shall glorify me: because he shall receive of mine, and shall shew it to you. All things whatsoever the Father hath are mine. Therefore I said, he shall receive of mine, and shall shew it to you" (*John xvi. 14-15*).

From this teaching it is clear that the Holy Spirit is God, personally distinct from Father and Son, by whom He is sent. The mystery of the Trinity is explicitly revealed by Christ. The same doctrine is found in the Epistles of St. Paul.

Towards the end of the First Century when Pope Clement of Rome wished to repeat the Old Testament affirmation "As the Lord liveth," he wrote: "As God liveth, and the Lord Jesus Christ liveth and the Holy Spirit" (*Clem. ad. Cor. lviii. 2*).

Art. II.—Testimony of Christ in regard to His Divine Filiation and the redemptive value of His death.

I.—Heterodox opinions.

Modernistic views:

The Divinity of Christ is not proved from the Gospels,

but is a dogma which Christian feeling has deduced from the idea of the Messiah.

In all texts of the Gospels, the name "Son of God" is equivalent to the name "Messiah," and by no means implies that Christ is the true and natural Son of God. The teaching regarding the expiatory death of Christ is not evangelical but Pauline doctrine (D. 2027-2038).

Many Rationalists (Renan, Weiss, Wendt, Harnack) acknowledge Divine filiation in Christ higher than His Messiahship, but they deny that Jesus, in virtue of this filiation, is true God. Renan writes: Jesus is the individual who has made the greatest step towards Divinity.

Our Lord is called in the Gospels "Son of God" more than fifty times. In what sense has this expression to be taken? The term may be understood in a wide sense of those who are upright and God-fearing; in a strict sense it is used of the Second Person of the Trinity $\delta \nu \iota \delta \varsigma \tau \omicron \upsilon \theta \Theta \epsilon \omicron \upsilon$, "the only-begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father" (*John i. 18*). The name "Son of God" is sometimes equivalent to "Messiah," when the term was applied by those who had not as yet recognised His Divinity (*Mark iii. 12*). But in the Synoptic Gospels alone, it is certain that Jesus declared that He possessed the Divine nature, and not merely a participation of the same by grace, as in the case of good Christians, whom St. Peter describes as "partakers of the Divine nature" (*2 Peter i. 4*).

II.—Synoptic Gospels.

In the Synoptic Gospels, Jesus declared His Divinity:

- (a) By claiming rights and privileges which belong to God alone;
- (b) By affirming that He was Son of God in the strict and literal sense.

(A) He claimed Divine rights. There are seven instances.

1° He claimed to be greater than any creature: greater than Jonas and Solomon (*Matt. xii. 41, 42*), greater than David who called Him Lord (*Mark xii. 36*), greater than Moses and Elias who appear in attendance at His transfiguration (*Matt. xvii. 3*), greater than John the Baptist (*Matt. xi. 3, 11*), greater than Angels "who ministered unto Him" (*Mark i. 13*), who belonged to Him (*Matt. xvi. 27; xxiv. 31*).

2° He claimed the exercise towards Himself of Faith, Obedience, Love, even to the sacrifice of all other affections, nay, even to the sacrifice of life. "He that loveth father or mother more than me is not worthy of me; he that loveth son or daughter more than me is not worthy of me" (*Matt. x. 37*). These words would be an indication of intolerable pride, if Jesus were not God. "Amen I say to you, there is no man who hath left . . . father or mother or children . . . for my sake and for the Gospel who shall not receive a hundred times as much, now in this time . . . and in the world to come life everlasting" (*Mark x. 29, 30*). "He that is not with me is against me; and he that gathereth not with me, scattereth" (*Matt. xii. 30*). "Blessed are ye when they shall . . . persecute you . . . for my sake" (*Matt. v. 11*).

3° He speaks as Supreme Legislator:

"You have heard that it was said to them of old. . . . But I say to you, etc." (*Matt. v. 21-48*). He prohibits divorce which Moses, because of their hardness of heart, permitted (*Matt. v. 32; xix. 9*). He claims to be Lord of the Sabbath (*Mark ii. 28*).

4° He works miracles in His own name.

"He said to the man sick of the palsy, Arise" (*Matt. ix. 6; Mark ii. 9; v. 41; Luke vii. 14*).

"He said to the sea: Peace, be still. And the wind ceased" (*Mark iv. 39*).

The Apostles work miracles in the name of Jesus (*Matt. vii. 22; Acts iii. 6; iv. 10*).

5° He claims the power to forgive sins.

"Be of good heart, Son, thy sins are forgiven thee" (*Matt. ix. 2-7*).

"Come unto me all you who labour and are burthened and I will refresh you" (*Matt. xi. 28*).

He communicates to others the power of forgiving sins (*Matt. xviii. 18*).

6° He judges the living and the dead.

"You shall see the Son of Man sitting on the right hand of the power of God, and coming with the clouds of heaven" (*Mark xiv. 62; viii. 38; xiii. 26*).

"And he (the Son of Man) shall send his angels with a trumpet and a great voice; and they shall gather together his elect from the four winds, from the farthest parts of the heavens to the utmost bounds of them" (*Matt. xxiv. 31*).

7° He promises to send the Holy Ghost.

"I send the promise of my Father upon you" (*Luke xxiv. 49*).

He accepts adoration (*Matt. viii. 2; xxviii. 9, 17*). Whereas St. Peter, St. Paul, St. Barnabas, and even Angels refuse adoration because they have no claim (*Acts x. 25-26; xiv. 14; Apoc. xix. 10; xxii. 8*).

(B) In the Synoptic Gospels, Jesus affirms several times that He is Son of God in its strict and literal sense.

1° All things are delivered to me by my Father. And no one knoweth the Son but the Father; neither doth any one know the Father but the Son, and he to whom it shall please the Son to reveal him" (*Matt. xi. 27; Luke x. 21, 22*).

The authenticity of these texts is admitted by the majority of critics. Equality of Father and Son as to knowledge is stated, and this equality implies con-substantiality. St. Thomas writes (*in Matt. xi.*): the substance of the Father is beyond comprehension of created intelligence; so likewise is the substance of the Son, which is known only by the Father. Loisy admits (*L'Evangile et l'Eglise, p. 47*) that the sense is the same as in *John i. 18*, and though Rationalist critics accept the authenticity of the texts (Weiss, Keim, Wendt, O. and H. Holtzmann, Stapfer, etc.) Loisy attributes both texts and meaning to later Christian tradition.

2° Reply of Christ to Confession of St. Peter:

"Simon Peter answered and said: Thou art Christ, Son of the living God. And Jesus answering said to him: Blessed art thou, Simon Bar Jona, because flesh and blood hath not revealed it to thee, but my Father, who is in heaven" (*Matt. xvi. 16, 17*).

Some critics say: It cannot be proved historically that Peter affirmed more than Christ's Messiahship, inasmuch as in *Mark viii. 29*, the words recorded are "Thou art Christ," and in *Luke ix. 20*, "Thou art the Christ of God." But from the reply of Our Lord, it is clear that Peter affirmed more than Messiahship. Messianic signs had been manifest to the Apostles from the beginning of Our Lord's ministry. Andrew, Philip, Nathanael (*John i. 41, 49*) openly recognised them. Our Lord enumerated the signs to the disciples of John the Baptist (*Matt. xi. 4*). Hence simple Messiahship did not require so great a revelation. From the text cited above: "No one knows

the Son but the Father," it may be argued: if Peter could know only from the Father what he affirmed of the Son, this shews that he affirmed Divine Filiation. It does not follow that Peter at that time knew by Faith the nature of the Divine Filiation as explicitly as the Church later defined it.

3° Formula of Baptism (*Matt. xxviii. 18, 19, 20*).

"And Jesus coming spoke to them saying: All power is given to me in heaven and on earth. Going, therefore, teach ye all nations, baptising them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. Teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you: and behold I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world."

From which text it is clear:

- (a) He to whom all power is given in heaven and on earth has power over every creature—a prerogative which belongs to God alone.
- (b) In the formula, the Son is equal to the Father and to the Holy Ghost.
- (c) He promises aid unto the end of the world which God alone can accomplish. "I am with you all days" is the realisation of the prophecy "they shall call his name Emmanuel, which is interpreted 'God with us'" (*Isaias vii. 14; Matt. i. 23*).

Regarding the authenticity of this text, Loisy without justification denies it, though he admits that it is found in the *Didache vii. 1*, and that it was universally known in the Church at the beginning of the Second Century A.D. 100.

4° Reply of Christ to Caiphas (*Matt. xxvi. 63, 64, 65*).

When Christ appeared before the Sanhedrin, the high priest said to Him: "I adjure thee by the living God that thou tell us if thou be the Christ the Son of God. And Jesus saith to him: Thou hast said it. Nevertheless I say to you hereafter you shall see the Son of Man sitting on the right hand of the power of God, and coming in the clouds of heaven. Then the high priest rent his garments, saying: He hath blasphemed: what further need have we of witnesses? Behold now you have heard the blasphemy."

In this reply, Jesus appears more than Messiah, for to the simple dignity of Messiah, Divine Filiation, a seat at the right hand of God, the exercise of supreme power do

not belong. Hence Caiaphas rent his garments and cried out: "He hath blasphemed," as is recorded in the three Synoptic accounts. Compare with this incident the action of the Jews (*John v. 18*). "The Jews sought the more to kill him, because he did not only break the Sabbath, but also said God was his Father, making himself equal to God." Again when Our Lord said: (*John x. 30*) "I and the Father are one. The Jews took up stones to stone him." Hence as recorded in *John xix. 7*, the Jews answered Pilate: "We have a law: and according to the law he ought to die, because he made himself the Son of God" (*Cf. Mark xiv. 61; Luke xxii. 66, 70*).

5° The question of Jesus to the Jews regarding Christ son of David (*Matt. xxii. 42 sq.*).

"The Pharisees being gathered together, Jesus asked them, saying: What think you of Christ: whose son is he? They say to him 'David's.' He said to them: How then doth David in spirit call him Lord, saying: The Lord said to my Lord, sit on my right hand, until I make thine enemies thy footstool? If David then called him Lord, how is he his son? And no one was able to answer him a word" (*Cf. Luke xx. 44; Mark xii. 37*). David's Lord is superior to David, and equal to the Lord God.

The authenticity of this text is admitted by Wendt, Dalman, Weiss, Stapfer, Wernle, O. Holtzmann. Loisy does not regard the text as genuine, because in his view, the Divinity of Christ, asserted in the text, was later teaching, gradually deduced by Christian feeling from the idea of Messiah.

6° Parable of the Vineyard and Husbandmen (*Mark xii. 1-12; Matt. xxi. 33-46; Luke xx. 1-19*).

The application of the parable is clear: the servants sent by the Lord of the Vineyard represent the prophets (*Cf. Matt. xxiii. 31 sq.*). His "most dear Son and Heir" was more than prophet, more than Messiah. Compare with the parable the opening words of the Epistle to the Hebrews: "God, who at sundry times . . . spoke . . . by the prophets, in these days hath spoken to us by his Son, whom he hath appointed heir of all things, by whom also he made the world. Who being the brightness of his Father's glory, and the figure of his substance . . . sitteth on the right hand of the majesty on high."

Conclusion: in the Synoptic Gospels, the declarations

of Jesus regarding His eminent dignity transcend the rôle of Messiahship and express Divine Filiation, which makes Christ equal to God, *i.e.*, God Himself, second Person of the Trinity.

III.—Confirmation from Acts of the Apostles.

It cannot be maintained that the doctrine of the God-head of Christ was gradually evolved by a process of idealisation after His death. The time necessary for this supposed idealisation was wanting, as it is certain that the Apostles from the day of Pentecost taught that Jesus was not only Messiah but God. St. Luke in the "Acts" bears witness to this fact. All Catholic critics, many non-Catholic critics (Barde, Blass, Plummer, Headlam, Zahn, etc.) and even many pronounced Rationalists (Renan, Reuss, Harnack, etc.) attribute the whole book of the Acts of the Apostles to Luke, companion of St. Paul. The Acts were written probably about A.D. 63-64, at any rate before A.D. 70. The Tübingen school used to assign A.D. 150 as its proximate date, but Harnack, one of the greatest authorities on early Christian chronology, influenced by historical evidence, assigns its composition to the years A.D. 78-83 or possibly to A.D. 60-70.

The discourse of St. Peter recorded in *Acts iii. 13-16*, has the following words: "The God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob, the God of our fathers, hath glorified his Son Jesus. . . . But the Author of life you killed, whom God hath raised up from the dead." The Author of life can be only God.

When Peter was interrogated by the high priest and the ancients by what name he had wrought the miracle (*Acts iv. 10-18*) Peter replied: "By the name of Our Lord Jesus Christ of Nazareth whom you crucified, whom God hath raised from the dead, even by him this man standeth here before you whole. This is the stone which was rejected by the builders: which is become the head of the corner: Neither is there salvation in any other. For there is no other name under heaven given to man, whereby we must be saved." A little later, when the Apostles were liberated by an angel from prison, being again interrogated, Peter replied: "We ought to obey God rather than men. The God of our fathers hath raised up Jesus, whom you put to death, hanging him upon a tree. Him hath God exalted with his right hand, to be prince and saviour, to give repentance to Israel, and

remission of sins" (*Acts v. 29-31*). St. Peter's teaching is clear: Jesus alone is Saviour of souls, giving remission of sins.

At the Council of Jerusalem, which decreed that the Gentiles should not be bound by Mosaic Law, Peter said: "Now therefore why tempt you God to put a yoke upon the necks of the disciples, which neither our fathers nor we have been able to bear? But by the grace of Our Lord Jesus Christ, we believe that we are saved in like manner as they also" (*Acts xv. 10, 11*).

Several times Jesus is called by Peter "Lord" (*Acts ii. 36; xi. 20*), "Lord of all" (*Acts x. 36*), "appointed by God to be judge of the living and of the dead" (*Acts x. 42*). The Apostles in the name of Jesus work miracles, confer baptism, and St. Stephen, dying, cried out: "Lord Jesus receive my spirit" (*Acts vii. 58*).

In these speeches of St. Peter, delivered immediately after Pentecost, appears the faith of the primitive church. Christ is believed to be Son of God, Author of life, Lord of all, Saviour of all, Judge of the living and of the dead. There could be no process of idealisation between primitive documents and the composition of the Gospels. Let Rationalists explain how the doctrine of the Divinity of Christ—in their view, a new doctrine—could have been introduced and accepted against their will by convert Jews whose faith was supremely monotheistic, how the supposed new doctrine was accepted equally against their will by primitive Christians, and diffused throughout the Church. Absolutely opposed to this view is the historical fact that it was heretics—Ebionites—who denied the Divinity of Christ, and were, as the Apostolic Fathers relate, unanimously condemned by the Church.

IV.—Confirmation from Epistles of St. Paul.

St. Paul, when he expressly affirms the Divinity of Christ, does not announce it to the Church as a new and unheard of dogma, but as one already received. Many Rationalists, amongst whom are Harnack and Jülicher, allow that the Epistles to the Thessalonians (i. and ii.), to the Galatians, the Corinthians (i. and ii.), Romans, Ephesians, Colossians, Philippians, were written between the years A.D. 48-49 or 50-64.

Some of the principal testimonies of St. Paul are given: "Concerning his Son, who was made to him of the seed

of David according to the flesh. Who was predestinated the Son of God in power according to the spirit of sanctification, by the resurrection of Our Lord Jesus Christ from the dead" (*Rom i. 3-4*).

"God, sending his Son in the likeness of sinful flesh" (*Rom. viii. 3*).

"He spared not even his own Son: but delivered him up for us all" (*Rom. viii. 32*).

"And when the fulness of time was come God sent his Son, made of a woman, made under the Law, that he might redeem them, who were under the Law: that we might receive the adoption of sons. And because you are sons, God hath sent the spirit of his Son into your hearts, crying: Abba, Father" (*Gal. iv. 4-6*).

Hence Jesus is Son of God according to the spirit of sanctification, and is from the seed of David according to the flesh.

Moreover, St. Paul affirms the eternal pre-existence of the Son of God before the Incarnation:

The minds of unbelievers are blinded "that the light of the gospel of the glory of Christ, who is the image of God, should not shine unto them" (*2 Cor. iv. 4*).

The "Son of His love" "who is the image of the invisible God, first-born of every creature: for in him were all things created in heaven, and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones, or dominations, or principalities, or powers: all things were created by him and in him. And he is before all, and by him all things consist. And he is the head of the body, the church, who is the beginning, the first-born from the dead: that in all things he may hold the primacy: because in him it hath well pleased the Father that all fulness should dwell: and through him to reconcile all things unto himself" (*Col. i. 15-20*).

In this text the Son of God is called "Creator," and in Romans xi. 36, it is written of God the Creator: "Of him and by him and in him are all things." Clearly the Son of God is equal to the Father.

"We preach Christ crucified, unto the Jews indeed a stumbling block, and unto the Gentiles, foolishness. But unto them that are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God . . . of him (God) are you in Christ Jesus, who of God is made unto us wisdom and justice and sanctification and redemption" (*1 Cor. i. 23-30*).

"In him (Christ) dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead corporally" (*Coloss. ii. 9*).

"Let this mind be in you which was in Christ Jesus: who being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal to God: But emptied himself taking upon him the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men, and in habit found as a man" (*Philip. ii. 5-7*).

In this expression "form of God," the word "form," "*μορφῇ*" means "essence" or "Divine nature," as follows from the words "equal to God." No clearer statement could be given of the glorious pre-existence of the Son of God before the Incarnation. "I wished myself to be an anathema from Christ for my brethren . . . of whom is Christ according to the flesh, who is over all things God blessed for ever, Amen" (*Romans ix. 3, 5*). There is a difficulty of punctuation in regard to this text. The Tischendorf-Gebhardt, edition reads: "Of whom is Christ according to the flesh. Who is over all things God blessed for ever, Amen." If the full-stop be placed after flesh, the following sentence is an invocation made to God. But the editions Nestle, Westcott-Hort, Weymouth, Weiss and many others retain the comma after "flesh." All the Fathers of the Church see in these words an affirmation of the Divinity of Christ.

"In these days (God) has spoken to us by his Son, whom he hath appointed heir of all things, by whom also he made the world. Who being the brightness of his glory and the figure of his substance, and upholding all things by the word of his power, making purgation of sins, sitteth on the right hand of the majesty on high" (*Hebrews i. 2-3*).

"Thou in the beginning, O Lord, didst found the earth, and the works of thy hands are the heavens" (*Hebrews i. 10*). Thus Christ is superior to prophets, Moses, Angels. He is mediator and priest for ever: "He is able to save for ever them that come to God by him: always living to make intercession for us" (*Heb. vii. 25*).

Catholic critics (e.g. Jacquier) hold that St. Paul is author of the Epistle to the Hebrews (though he made use of amanuenses). Harnack suggests St. Barnabas as its author, and the date of composition as 65-96 or perhaps before A.D. 70.

V.—Gospel of St. John. Testimony of Christ in regard to His Divinity.

Several times in the Fourth Gospel, Jesus calls himself "Son of Man"—an indication of His humility and of the subjection of His human nature to His Father; but He also affirms repeatedly that He is "Son of God," and "Lord."

"You call me Master and Lord: and you say well for so I am" (*John xiii. 13*).

"Father, the hour is come, glorify thy Son, that thy Son may glorify thee. As thou hast given him power over all flesh, that he may give eternal life to all whom thou hast given him . . . all my things are thine, and thine are mine" (*John xvii. 1, 2, 10*).

"Hereupon therefore the Jews sought the more to kill him, because he did not only break the Sabbath, but also said God was his Father, making himself equal to God. Then Jesus answered and said to them. . . . As the Father raiseth up the dead and giveth life: so the Son also giveth life to whom he will. For neither doth the Father judge any man: but hath given all judgment to the Son. . . . As the Father hath life in himself: so he hath given to the Son also to have life in himself" (*John v. 18-26*).

"You are from beneath, I am from above. You are of this world, I am not of this world" (*John viii. 23*).

"From God I proceeded and came: I came not of myself, but he sent me" (*John viii. 42*).

"I came forth from the Father, and am come into the world: again I leave the world and I go to the Father. . . . I am not alone because the Father is with me" (*John xvi. 28-33*).

"Amen, amen, I say to you, before Abraham was made, I am" (*John viii. 58*).

"And now glorify thou me, O Father, with thyself, with the glory which I had, before the world was, with thee . . . because thou hast loved me before the creation of the world" (*John xvii. 5-24*).

"Not that any man hath seen the Father, but he who is of God, he hath seen the Father" (*John vi. 46*).

"As the Father knoweth me, and I know the Father" (*John x. 15*).

"All things whatsoever the Father hath, are mine. Therefore I said, he (the Spirit of Truth) shall receive of mine and shew it to you" (*John xvi. 15*).

"Philip, he that seeth me seeth the Father also. . . . Do you not believe that I am in the Father, and the Father in me?" (*John xiv. 9, 10*).

"I and the Father are one. The Jews then took up stones to stone him" (*John x. 30, 31*).

"I am the way and the truth and the life. No man cometh to the Father but by me" (*John xiv. 6*).

These declarations of Christ express the same truth as the words recorded in St. Matthew and St. Luke: "All things are delivered to me by my Father. And no one knoweth the Son but the Father; neither doth anyone know the Father but the Son, and he to whom it shall please the Son to reveal him." This testimony is not less clear than the words of St. John in the prologue of his Gospel: "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. . . . And the Word was made flesh and dwelt amongst us, and we have seen His glory as it were of the only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth. . . . No man hath seen God at any time: the only-begotten Son who is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him."

To sum up briefly: At the beginning of His ministry Jesus was regarded by His disciples as the "Christ," *i.e.*, the Messiah, but even as the Christ He had for them the "values" of God. After His Resurrection Jesus was the "Lord," and finally St. Paul explicitly shewed that Jesus was the pre-existing Son of God. But the explicit declaration of Christ's Divinity was accepted by all without demur, inasmuch as it corresponded with their implicit belief.

In view of the testimonies given above we can estimate the value of the three chief schools of Rationalist critics, who differ so profoundly amongst themselves in regard to the "Jesus of History." With all three the miraculous, and generally the supernatural, is not rationally credible.

(a) The Liberal Protestant School.

Professor Harnack is the chief representative. According to him, the combination of such ideas as "God the Father, Providence, position of men as God's children, infinite value of the human soul," constitutes the whole Gospel (*Das Wesen des Christenthums*. English transla-

tion, "*What is Christianity?*" p. 70; Williams & Norgate). The power of healing was accomplished by suggestion. The doctrines of the Resurrection of Christ, Incarnation, Trinity, Visible Church, etc., are alien to the spirit and intention of Jesus. The Christ of Pauline and Johannine theology, even the Christ of the Acts, stands already at a great distance from the Jesus of history—an ethical teacher.

(b) The Apocalyptic School.

The "Christ" of the Gospels is not an earthly person, but one to be manifested in glory from heaven according to the picture in the *Similitudes* of Enoch (written about 100 B.C.). Our Lord on earth was not the Christ, but believed Himself to be destined to become the Christ on the Day of Judgment, which He regarded as immediately coming. "Jesus of History" was only an apocalyptic seer (*Cf. "Principles of Christian Apologetics," Chap. xvii.*).

(c) Hellenistic School.

I have ventured to describe the teaching of Bousset in Germany and Kirsopp Lake in England as "Hellenistic." In their view the idea of the "Jesus of History" underwent a twofold transformation:

- (1) The historical Jesus became the Apocalyptic Christ—a transformation due to the community and not to Jesus. Jesus Himself preached only a "message of the Kingdom of God, and the duty of fellowship in righteousness and love and mercy and forgiveness."
- (2) The second transformation occurred in Hellenistic Churches such as Antioch, Tarsus, and Damascus. There the Pagan world was largely occupied with "mystery cults" involving sacramental and ceremonial elements. It was St. Paul's genius, which, on a basis of old Jewish monotheism and apocalyptic beliefs and these new Hellenic ideas of religion, developed a doctrine of Jesus the Lord. The theology and sacramental system of the Catholic Church were founded on this basis. The "Jesus of History" was a dim figure of no original power as a teacher.

Notwithstanding Dean Inge's statement (quoted elsewhere) that "the conflict of religion is not with science," he writes: "Science has been the slowly advancing Nemesis which has overtaken a barbarised and pagan

Christianity. She has come with a winnowing-fan in her hand, and she will not stop till she has thoroughly purged her floor" (*Outspoken Essays, First Series, p. 169*).

The only teaching common to the three schools is the *à priori* rejection of the miraculous and Supernatural character in religion.* (*Cf. Kyrios Christos*, by Wilhelm Bousset. Göttingen, 1921. Also *Landmarks of Early Christianity*, by Dr. Kirsopp Lake, and the *Beginnings of Christianity*, by Kirsopp Lake and Foakes Jackson).

VI.—The Atonement.

Modernists assert that the doctrine of Atonement is not found in the Gospels, but is Pauline in origin. Against this assertion note the following:

(A) Synoptic Gospels.

"The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, wherefore He hath anointed me to preach the Gospel to the poor, He hath sent me to heal the contrite of heart" (*Luke iv. 18; Mark i. 38*).

"I am not come to call the just but sinners" (*Matt. ix. 13; Mark ii. 17*).

"The Son of Man is come to save that which was lost. . . . It is not the will of your Father who is in heaven that one of these little ones should perish" (*Matt. xviii. 11, 14*).

"The Son of Man is not come to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give His life a redemption for many" (*Matt. xx. 28; Mark x. 45*).

"The Son of Man shall be betrayed to the chief priests and the scribes, and they shall condemn Him to death, and shall deliver Him to the Gentiles to be mocked and scourged and crucified, and the third day he shall rise again. . . . Can you drink the chalice that I shall drink?" (*Matt. xx. 18-22; Mark x. 34*).

"This is my body which is given for you. Do this in commemoration of me. . . . This is the chalice, the New

* Dr. Major, principal of Ripon Hall, Oxford, the leader of English Modernists, speaking in Philadelphia, described Christ as "the supreme unveiling of the Divine nature under human conditions in the person of Jesus." Unitarians would accept this statement. Speaking at Harvard University, Dr. Major alluded to a second class of dogmas as *historical*, such as that Jesus was born of the Virgin Mary, was crucified, died and was buried, rose from the dead on the third day. "The christian religion might survive without these dogmas." (*Cf. Church Times*: Jan 8th, 1926 p. 29.)

Testament in my blood, which shall be shed for you" (*Luke xxii. 19, 20; Matt. xxvi. 28; Mark xiv. 24*).

(B) Gospel of St. John.

"I am the good shepherd. The good shepherd giveth his life for his sheep" (*John x. 11*).

"My sheep hear my voice and I know them and they follow me. And I give them life everlasting" (*John x. 27, 28*).

"I am the light of the world: he that followeth me walketh not in darkness, but shall have the light of life" (*John viii. 12*).

"I am the resurrection and the life: he that believeth in me although he be dead shall live: And every one that liveth and believeth in me shall not die for ever" (*John xi. 25, 26*).

"Amen, amen, I say unto you: he that believeth in me hath everlasting life. I am the bread of life" (*John vi. 47, 48*).

"Abide in me and I in you. As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself unless it abide in the vine, so neither can you unless you abide in me. I am the vine and you are the branches: he that abideth in me and I in him, the same beareth much fruit for without me you can do nothing" (*John xv. 4, 5*).

"No man cometh to the Father but by me" (*John xiv. 6*).

"God so loved the world as to give His only-begotten Son, that whoever believeth in Him many not perish, but may have life everlasting" (*John iii. 16*).

"I lay down my life for my sheep" (*John x. 15*).

"Greater love than this no man hath that a man lay down his life for his friend" (*John xv. 13*).

"And I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men to myself" (*John xii. 32*).

Thus clearly and openly did Christ teach the doctrine of the Redemption.

(C) St. Paul.

"All have sinned and do need the glory of God. Being justified freely by his grace, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus, whom God hath proposed to be a propitiation through faith in his blood" (*Romans iii. 23-25*).

"For as by the disobedience of one man, many were

made sinners : so also by the obedience of one, many shall be made just " (*Romans v. 19*).

God "spared not even his own Son : but delivered him up for us all " (*Romans viii. 32*).

"Christ also hath loved us, and hath delivered himself for us an oblation and a sacrifice to God for an odour of sweetness " (*Eph. v. 2*).

These words of St. Paul explain the popular appeal made by the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass, the propitiatory character of which is well expressed in the following lines :

*"And now, O Father! mindful of the love
That bought us, once for all, on Calvary's tree,
And having with us Him that pleads above,
We here present, we here spread forth to Thee
The only offering perfect in Thine eyes,
The one true, pure, immortal sacrifice."*

(D) Sacraments instituted for the application of Redemption.

"Going therefore teach all nations, baptising them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost " (*Matt. xxviii. 19*).

"And taking bread he gave thanks and brake and gave to them saying : This is My Body which is given for you. Do this for a commemoration of Me " (*Luke xxii. 19*).

The Eucharist presupposes the Sacrament of Orders.

"Receive ye the Holy Ghost : whose sins you shall forgive they shall be forgiven them, and whose sins you shall retain they are retained " (*John xx. 22, 23*).

(E) Good Angels : Evil Spirits.

(1) Good Angels.

"Thinkest thou that I cannot ask my Father, and He will give me presently more than twelve legions of angels ? " (*Matt. xxvi. 53*).

"Angels in heaven " (*Mark xii. 25*).

Angels guard children : "their angels in heaven always behold the face of my Father, who is in heaven " (*Matt. xviii. 10*).

"There shall be joy before the angels of God upon one sinner doing penance " (*Luke xv. 10*).

"Angels . . . shall separate the wicked from the just " (*Matt. xiii. 49*).

"The Son of Man shall send His Angels " (*Matt. xiii. 41*).

"Whosoever shall confess me before men, him shall the Son of Man also confess before the Angels of God " (*Luke xii. 8*).

(2) Evil Spirits.

"He cast out the spirits with His Word " (*Matt. viii. 16*).

"Unclean spirit " (*Matt. xii. 43*).

"He gave them power to heal sicknesses and to cast out devils " (*Mark iii. 15*).

"This kind is not cast out but by prayer and fasting " (*Matt. xvii. 20*).

"If I by the Spirit of God cast out devils, then is the Kingdom of God come among you " (*Matt. xii. 28*).

"Simon, Simon, behold Satan hath desired to have you that he may sift you as wheat. But I have prayed for thee, that thy faith fail not " (*Luke xxii. 31*).

Satan "prince of this world " (*John xvi. 11*).

Art. III.—Testimony of Christ regarding the Christian Life.

Relation of the New Law towards the Old, and the chief Christian precepts, virtues and counsels.

I.—The New Law of Christ perfects the Mosaic Law.

"Do not think that I am come to destroy the law or the prophets, I am not come to destroy but to fulfil " (*Matt. v. 17*).

From the beginning of His ministry, Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount expurgates the Old Law from the interpretation of Scribes and Pharisees, and completes and perfects it as regards moral precepts. Not only is homicide sinful, but anger towards a fellow man ; evil thoughts as well as evil deeds are forbidden ; marriage is indissoluble ; oaths must not be lightly taken ; enemies must be forgiven ; pure intention is necessary for good work. Christ from the beginning of His ministry teaches implicitly the abrogation of ceremonial observances. "Do not put new wine into old bottles " (*Matt. ix. 17*). He foretells the destruction of Jerusalem and therewith its ceremonial (*Luke xix. 44*). "God is a spirit and they that adore him must adore him in spirit and in truth " (*John iv. 24*). As St. Thomas writes : "The Old Law is eternal in its moral teaching ; its ceremonial precepts endure, until the fulfilment of the truth prefigured " (*1^a 1^{ae} q. 103 a 3 ad. 1*).

II.—Christian Virtues.

(1) True Sanctity.

Sanctity is a special virtue—the virtue of religion—but general in its outlook. It refers all works of virtue to God; it disposes the soul by means of these works of virtue for the worship of God. It implies two qualities necessary for the application of the mind to God—innocence and firmness (*1^a 11^{ae} q. 81 a 8*).

“Seek ye first the Kingdom of God and His justice” (*Matt. vi. 33*).

“Be perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect” (*Matt. v. 48*).

“Not every one that saith to me, Lord, Lord, shall enter the kingdom of heaven, but he that doth the will of my Father” (*Matt. vii. 21*).

“Take up my yoke upon you, and learn of me because I am meek and humble of heart, and you shall find rest for your souls. For my yoke is sweet and my burden light” (*Matt. xi. 29, 30*).

“Whosoever shall do the will of God, he is my brother and my sister and my mother” (*Mark iii. 35*).

“Blessed are they who hear the Word of God and keep it” (*Luke xi. 28*).

Those who give alms, fast, pray, to be seen by men, “have received their reward” (*Matt. vi. 5*).

Herein is shewn the necessity of purity of intention. The above admonitions manifest the *end, exemplar, rule, mode of reaching the end*, and the *fruits* of Christian life.

(2) Faith.

(A) Synoptic Gospels.

“He who believeth not shall be condemned” (*Mark xvi. 16*).

External confession of Faith is required (*Matt. x. 32*).

“Thy faith hath made thee whole” (*Luke xvii. 19*).

“O thou of little faith, why didst thou doubt?” (*Matt. xiv. 31*).

“Where is your faith?” (*Luke viii. 25*).

“Thy faith hath made thee safe, go in peace” (*Luke vii. 50*).

(B) St. John's Gospel.

(a) Necessity of Faith.

“If you believe not that I am He, you shall die in your sins” (*John viii. 24*).

(b) Object of Faith.

“All things whatsoever I have heard of my Father I have made known to you” (*John xv. 15*).

(c) Cause of Faith.

“This is the work of God, that you believe in him whom he hath sent” (*John vi. 29*). Motives of credibility are manifest: “though you will not believe me, believe the works” (*John x. 38*).

(d) Effects of Faith.

“The truth shall make you free” (*John viii. 31, 32*).

“Amen, amen, I say to you: He that believeth in me, hath everlasting life” (*John vi. 47*).

(3) Hope.

“Ask and it shall be given to you . . . what man is there among you, of whom if his son shall ask bread, will he reach him a stone? . . . how much more will your Father who is in heaven give good things to them that ask him?” (*Matt. vii. 7-11*).

(4) Charity.

(a) Towards God.

“Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole mind” (*Matt. xxii. 37*).

(b) Towards neighbours.

“Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself” (*Matt. xxii. 39*).

A stranger, even an enemy, who needs help, is our neighbour (*Luke x. 25-37*).

(5) Prayer.

(a) Its necessity.

“We ought always to pray” (*Luke xviii. 1*).

“Pray, lest you enter into temptation” (*Luke xxii. 40*).

(b) Conditions.

Right intention (*Matt. vi. 5*). Humility (*Luke xviii. 14*). Faith and Confidence (*Matt. xxi. 22*). Perseverance (*Luke xi. 8*). Charity (*Mark xi. 25*).

(c) The Lord's Prayer: short, perfect, efficacious, simple.

(6) Humility, Mortification, Self-denial, Patience.

Humility: “Learn of me to be meek and humble of heart” (*Matt. xi. 29*).

Mortification: “Except you do penance, you shall all likewise perish” (*Luke xiii. 5*).

Self-denial: "If anyone wishes to come after me, let him deny himself" (*Matt. xvi. 24*).

Patience: "In your patience you shall possess your souls" (*Luke xxi. 19*).

(7) Prudent Diligence, Fidelity to Divine Grace, Vigilance, Zeal.

Prudent Diligence: Parable of Talents (*Matt. xxv.*).

Fidelity to Grace: "Well done, good and faithful servant, because thou hast been faithful over a few things, I will place thee over many" (*Matt. xxv. 21*). "None of those men that were invited, shall taste of my supper" (*Luke xiv. 24*).

Vigilance: "Watch ye therefore, because ye know not what hour your Lord will come" (*Matt. xxiv. 42*). Also the Parable of the Virgins (*Matt. xxv. 1-13*).

Zeal: "I am come to cast fire upon earth, and what will I but that it be kindled?" (*Luke xii. 49*).

(8) Beatitudes.

The Beatitudes enumerate merits and rewards. Merits are works of virtue and of the gifts of the Holy Ghost. Rewards begin in this life and are perfected in heaven.

"Blessed are the poor in spirit"—a rebuke to cupidity and pride.

"Blessed are the meek"—a contrast to those who cherish angry and hostile feelings.

"Blessed are they that mourn"—a contrast to those who find their consolation in pleasure and vanities, and who do not grieve for their sins.

"Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice": This beatitude describes active life in the service of God.

"Blessed are the merciful": Active work must be saturated with the mercy and compassion which God exercises towards His creatures and specially commends.

"Blessed are the clean of heart": This beatitude describes the contemplative life. All human affection is secondary to the love of God.

"Blessed are the peace-makers": In the contemplative life, peace, which the world cannot give, is gained and communicated.

"Blessed are they that suffer persecution for justice sake": This beatitude describes the heroic service of the saints.

There is no comparison between the Christian standard of ethical conduct and the pagan. Our Blessed Lord stresses the difference: "If you love them that love you, what reward shall you have? . . . And if you salute your brethren only, what do you more? Do not also the heathens this? Be you therefore perfect, as also your heavenly Father is perfect" (*Matt. v. 46-48*).

Art. IV.—End of the World; Last Judgment; Eternal Life.

I.—End of the World.

Modernists of the "Apocalyptic" school (Schweitzer, Loisy, etc.) assert that Christ announced the *immediate* end of the world. Jesus is represented as an enthusiastic fanatic, who believed that He would be manifested immediately from heaven as the Christ or the Son of Man (of the Book of Enoch) to judge the present, and to inaugurate the next, world. As His testimony was not realised, the claim of Divinity for Him must be abandoned.

(A) Signs of the end of the world, and of the second coming (*παρουσία*) of the Messiah.

(1) "There shall be false Christs and false prophets."

(2) "As the lightning cometh out of the East and appeareth even into the West, so also shall the coming of the Son of Man be."

(3) "They shall see the Son of Man coming in the clouds of heaven with much power and majesty" (*Matt. xxiv. 23-31; xxvi. 64; Cf. Mark xiii. 21-27; Luke xvii. 20-36; xxi. 25-27*).

(B) The time of the last coming of the Son of God is uncertain.

"Of that day and hour no one knoweth, no not the Angels of heaven, but the Father alone" (*Matt. xxiv. 36*).

"Of that day or hour no man knoweth, neither the Angels in heaven nor the Son, but the Father" (*Mark xiii. 32*).

The text means that the Son had not a commission to reveal the day (*Cf. John xii. 49; Acts i. 7*).

Many Rationalists and Modernists (Renan, Stapfer, O. Holtzmann, de Pressensé, Reuss, A. Réville, Loisy, etc.) argue from three texts especially to prove Christ's prediction of the immediate end of the world—the "Parousia."

(a) Matt. xxiv. 34. After the prediction of the destruction of Jerusalem and of the day of Judgment, Christ said: "Amen I say to you that this generation shall not pass till all these things be done."

(b) Matt. xvi. 28. Before His Transfiguration Christ said: "Amen I say to you there are some of them that stand here that shall not taste death till they see the Son of Man coming in his kingdom."

(c) Matt. x. 23. "When they shall persecute you in this city, flee into another. Amen, I say to you, you shall not finish all the cities of Israel, till the Son of Man come."

In the thirteenth chapter of St. Mark and elsewhere Christ speaks in the same discourse of the destruction of Jerusalem and of the end of the world, and since the first event is a figure of the second, it is not easy to determine the words which belong to the first, and those which belong to the second. But the words of one who is wise must not be understood as to seem contradictory. Many non-Catholic exegetes (Godet, Sanday, etc.) as well as Catholic critics shew that the Rationalist and Modernist interpretation is not founded on the text of the Gospel, but is clearly opposed to it (*Cf. Principles of Christian Apologetics, Chap. xvii.*).

1° Christ said: "The kingdom of heaven is like to a grain of mustard seed . . . which (*i.e.*, in process of time) becometh a tree, so that the birds of the air come and dwell in the branches thereof" (*Matt. xiii. 31-32*). It is clear that an indefinite length of time is required for the expansion of the Church—the Kingdom of God. He sends His apostles not only to the people of Israel, but to the whole world: "Go ye therefore into the whole world and preach the Gospel to every creature" (*Mark xvi. 15; Matt. xxviii. 19; Luke xxiv. 47*). He says expressly that before the Second Coming "unto all nations the Gospel must first be preached" (*Mark xiii. 10*). He predicts that "many shall come from the East and from the West, and shall sit down with Abraham, and Isaac and Jacob in the kingdom of heaven" (*Matt. viii. 11; Luke xiii. 29*).

Again He said to Peter: "Thou art Peter and upon this rock I will build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it" (*Matt. xvi. 18*).

2° It does not follow from the words of Christ that the end of the world will take place immediately after the destruction of Jerusalem. He prophesied a speedy coming in judgment on Jerusalem. He also threw this "doom" upon the background of a final coming or Day of Judgment. But St. Luke in two passages deprecates the immediacy of the Second Coming: "Jerusalem shall be trodden down by the Gentiles, till the times of the nations be fulfilled" (*Luke xxi. 24*). And again: "He spoke a parable . . . because they thought that the Kingdom of God should immediately be manifested" (*Luke xix. 11*). In *Matt. xxiv. 29*: "Immediately after the tribulation of those days the sun shall be darkened, etc., the words 'immediately after' refer to the signs of the end of the world just enumerated (lightning coming out of the East and appearing even in the West, etc.), and not to the destruction of Jerusalem."

3° Christ up to the time of His Ascension said to His Apostles: "It is not for you to know the times or moments, which the Father hath put in his own power" (*Acts i. 7*) as He had said before His passion: "Of that day or hour no man knoweth, neither the Angels in heaven nor the Son, but the Father. Take ye heed, watch and pray. For you know not when the time is" (*Mark xiii. 32, 33*). St. Jerome wrote that Our Lord wished the end to be uncertain, that man might always watch and pray.

4° The words recorded in *Matt. xxiv. 34* which come after the prediction of the destruction of Jerusalem and the end of the world: "This generation shall not pass till all these things be done," are understood to mean either the generation of all the faithful and the end of the world, or the actual generation of men then living, and the destruction of Jerusalem. Others understand "generation" as meaning the nation (*gens*) of the Jews. In many places of Scripture "generation" stands for "nation" or "people."

St. Peter, speaking of the Day of Judgment writes: "One day with the Lord is as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day" (*2 Peter iii. 8*). God sees all things in eternity, and the prophet is sometimes en-

abled to regard future things as they are in the Divine mind.

5° The words recorded in Matt. xvi. 28: "Some that stand here shall not taste death, till they see the Son of Man coming in his kingdom," are referred by some commentators to the Transfiguration, by others to the destruction of Jerusalem and the growth of the Church.

6° The words of Matt. x. 23 probably mean: Never stay anywhere to press the Gospel on those who do not want it. There will always be unevangelised places to be given their chance, before the Gospel is preached in the whole world and the end comes.

7° St. Paul writes (2 Thess. ii. 2): "Be not frightened . . . as if the day of the Lord were at hand." St. Paul goes on to assert that a revolt must first come, and the man of sin be revealed, so that he "sitteth in the temple of God as if he were God."

It is quite clear, from the above statements, that the time of the last coming of Christ remains uncertain. (Cf. Card. Billot: *La Parousie*.)

II.—The Last Judgment.

"They that have done good things shall come forth unto the resurrection of life, and they that have done evil, unto the resurrection of judgment" (John v. 29).

"The Son of Man shall send his angels, and they shall gather out of his kingdom all scandals, and them that work iniquity. And shall cast them into the furnace of fire: there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth. Then shall the just shine as the sun in the kingdom of their Father. He that hath ears to hear, let him hear" (Matt. xiii. 41-43).

"Woe to thee Corozain, woe to thee Bethsaida. . . . It shall be more tolerable for Tyre and Sidon in the day of judgment than for you" (Matt. xi. 21, 22).

"Every idle word that men shall speak, they shall render an account for it in the day of judgment. By thy words thou shalt be justified, and by thy words thou shalt be condemned" (Matt. xii. 36, 37).

"The Son of Man . . . shall render to every man according to his works" (Matt. xvi. 27).

In regard to lost souls, Christ teaches: "they shall go into everlasting punishment" (Matt. xxv. 46).

Angels "shall cast them into the furnace of fire" (Matt. xiii. 42).

Christ speaks of "the hell of unquenchable fire, where the worm dieth not, and the fire is not extinguished" (Mark ix. 42-47).

III.—Eternal Life.

"They that shall be accounted worthy of that world and of the resurrection from the dead shall neither be married nor take wives, neither can they die any more; for they are equal to the angels and are the children of God, being the children of the resurrection" (Luke xx. 35, 36).

"The just shall shine as the sun in the Kingdom of their Father" (Matt. xiii. 43).

"They shall see God" (Matt. v. 8).

"Their reward is very great in heaven" (Matt. v. 12).

"In my Father's house, there are many mansions" (John xiv. 2).

The life of grace, which Holy Communion nourishes, is the beginning and seed of eternal life. "He that eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood hath eternal life, and I will raise him up at the last day" (John vi. 55-59).

Regarding the doctrine of the Resurrection the Church teaches the following truths:

(a) The risen body will be the same both specifically and numerically as in life.

(b) Numerical identity is sufficiently secured by the identity of the soul. Because of this identity of soul the boy and the man continue to be the same individual, notwithstanding change of material.

(c) Hence the risen body may not possess a single particle of the matter which constitutes its structure before death. The body which a man bears at death, has, after death, no nearer connexion with him than the material which he acquired and shed during life.

(d) When the Fathers and Councils insist that the resurrection shall be in the flesh which man bears in life and in which he lives and moves, they do not wish to teach the material identity of the flesh, but they intend to exclude the error of those, who, following Origen, taught that risen bodies will be spiritual, neither visible to sight, nor palpable to touch.

(e) The Church honours the dead body, but this

honour is directed to the person who has died as a member of the Church, for whom supplication is made that he or she may enjoy a happy immortality complete in nature, *i.e.*, with body as well as soul. The Church does not assert or deny that the body committed to earth may furnish material for the body to be assumed for eternity.

(f) Cremation—a pagan custom, renewed in the hatred of the Christian rite of burial, and to encourage the idea that death is the termination of individual existence—has been condemned by the Church, and is forbidden under severest penalties.

(g) Each human being shall have such a body as in life he would have attained, if nature had not erred or failed.

(h) Because the Body of Our Lord, after His death, remained hypostatically united to the Word, that identical Body rose from the dead. This truth needs assertion, as it seems to be either unknown or misunderstood even by capable apologists. Thus Sir Oliver Lodge writes: "to rise again from death to life on the third day . . . seems to mean resuscitation after the manner of Lazarus. . . . But an attempt to link the whole Christian Faith inextricably with an anatomical statement about flesh and bones is rash" (*Cf. Man and the Universe*, p. 255).

CHAPTER XXI

THE INSTITUTION OF THE CHURCH

HAS Christ instituted a living and infallible magisterium to protect and propagate His doctrine? What has He said regarding the marks of His Church? Is the testimony of Christ regarding the Church an infallible part of His doctrine? Is the Church as founded by Christ a hierarchical society?

I.—Various Opinions.

1° Rationalists and Liberal Protestants (Harnack, Höfding, A. Sabatier, Stapfer, Ménégoz, Inge, etc.) assert that Christ did not found a Church in the sense of a visible religious permanent society, because He believed in the immediacy of the Second Coming. An article on the subject of divorce written by Dean Inge to the *Evening Standard* (December 21st, 1922) has the following: "He (Christ) was not legislating even for the Church; there was no Church to legislate for; none of His disciples had any suspicion that 'the Church' was anything more than a brief stop-gap till the Messianic Kingdom of God should come." Harnack and A. Sabatier judge that the Kingdom He founded was only internal—dispositions of penitence, faith and filial love towards God.

2° Modernists (Loisy, Tyrell, etc.) put forward the view that the Kingdom of God preached by Christ was eschatological, *i.e.*, to be realised after the destruction of the world (a catastrophe in His opinion to come immediately) when the Messiah will appear in the clouds of heaven. They allow that Christ formed a society whence came the Church, but deny that it is infallible (D. 2006, 2052-2056, 2091, 2104).

3° Conservative Protestants do not accept the institution of a Supreme and infallible Authority. Scripture, in their view, is the only rule of faith. Lutherans used to hold that the real Church of Christ is invisible. But after the publication of Rothe's *Anfänge der Christlichen Kirche* (1837)

the invisibility of the Church ceased to be maintained in Germany. Calvinists and Presbyterians are of opinion that the Church is visible, and is ruled by elders appointed by the people. Anglo-Catholics seemingly believe all Roman teaching, except the doctrine of the infallibility of the Pope. Anglo-Catholic clergy and laity are distinguished for their earnestness and zeal. May the words of Christ in their regard be realised betimes: "them also I must bring, so that there may be one fold and one Shepherd."

4° "Orthodox" Greeks recognise an infallible authority in the collective episcopate. They deny the primacy of jurisdiction of the Roman Pontiff to be of Divine right. They acknowledge the authority of the first seven œcumenical Councils.

5° Catholics believe in the institution of the Church—a hierarchical and monarchical society, of supreme authority, infallible in matters of faith and morals. This infallibility resides not only in the body of bishops, but in the Roman Pontiff who is vicar of Christ (D. 960, 1550, 1821, 1793). The questions therefore to be discussed are:

- (a) What was the Kingdom of God preached by Christ?
- (b) Did He found a hierarchical and perpetual Church?
- (c) Did He endow the Church with infallibility for the safeguarding and propagation of Divine Revelation?
- (d) Did He give the Church visible marks?

II.—Kingdom of God preached by Christ.

1° It is a Spiritual Kingdom.

At the time of Our Lord, the Jews, interpreting the Messianic prophecies materially, expected a temporal and national kingdom. Hence Herod feared the coming of the Messiah (*Matt. ii. 3*). As evidence of their nationalist proclivities the Jews, after the miracle of the multiplication of the loaves, wished to make Our Lord king (*John vi. 15*). When the Pharisees asked: When will the Kingdom of God come? Our Lord replied: "The Kingdom of God cometh not with observation. Neither shall they say: behold here or behold there. For lo! the Kingdom of God is within you" (*Luke xvii. 20, 21*). Again Christ said to Pilate: "My Kingdom is not of this world" (*John xviii. 36*).

For membership of this spiritual kingdom, faith is required: "The Kingdom of God is at hand: repent and believe the Gospel" (*Mark i. 15*).

Charity is necessary. The Commandment to love God is the greatest (*Matt. xxii. 38*), the love of neighbours is obligatory (*Matt. xxii. 39*). There is an obligation of loving even our enemies: "that you may be the children of your Father who is in heaven" (*Matt. v. 44, 45*). "Unless your justice abound more than that of Scribes and Pharisees you shall not enter the Kingdom of Heaven" (*Matt. v. 20*).

2° The Kingdom of God is also external, visible, social.

The Kingdom of God is described as a flock: "Fear not, little flock, for it hath pleased your Father to give you a Kingdom" (*Luke xii. 32*). In this flock are Apostles to whom Our Lord has said: "Come after Me and I will make you become fishers of men" (*Mark i. 17*). This society is called a Church "*ἐκκλησία*," the Septuagint equivalent of the Hebrew "*Qahal*." In regard to this Church, Christ said: "If he will not hear you tell the Church. And if he will not hear the Church, let him be to thee as the heathen and publican" (*Matt. xviii. 17*).

If the Church were merely internal, it would consist only of the good, whereas in it are good and bad, as the parable of the cockle shews (*Matt. xiii. 36-50*). The Kingdom of Heaven is like to a net cast into the sea, gathering together all kinds of fishes. When it was filled the fishermen drew it out, and sitting by the shore, they chose out the good into vessels, but the bad they cast forth (*Matt. xiii. 47, 48*).

3° The Kingdom of God is not merely a future or eschatological kingdom.

(a) When the Pharisees enquired when the Kingdom of God should come, Christ answered them: "The Kingdom of God cometh not with observation," whereas Christ coming in the clouds of heaven will come with observation. "The Kingdom of God is within you, i.e., *ἐντὸς ὑμῶν*, in *medio vestrum* (*Luke xvii. 20, 21*).

(b) The Kingdom of God is progressive like the development of the grain of mustard seed (*Matt. xiii. 32*). "The Gospel of the Kingdom shall be preached in the whole world, for a testimony to all nations, and then shall the consummation come" (*Luke xxiv. 14*). "Many shall come from the East and the West" (*Matt. viii. 11*).

Regarding the time of "consummation": "Of that day and hour no one knows, no, not the angels of heaven, but the Father alone" (*Matt. xxiv. 36*).

(c) The association of good and bad in the Kingdom proves that it was not eschatological.

Hence the Kingdom of Christ was already present, partly hidden in the souls of the just, partly visible in ecclesiastical society, and its consummation was announced to take place in heaven after the end of the world.

III.—Christ instituted the Church as a hierarchical and perpetual society.

A society is a collection of men, united for a specific purpose. A spiritual movement maintains itself in being, either by embodying the teaching in a book (which Christ has *not* done), or by founding an institution to perpetuate the teaching. The word "hierarchy" (*ἱερά ἀρχή*) means "sacred government"—government instituted by Divine right. The Catholic Church is a society instituted by Christ, hierarchical and monarchical, governed by one head, who has supreme power.

Renan spoke of the "Divine institution of the hierarchy" as being especially stressed by St. Luke, and P. Sabatier characterised the conciliar decree in the Acts as savouring of "hierarchical pretensions" (Renan, *Les Apôtres*, p. xxxix.; P. Sabatier, *La Didaché*, p. 155).

Conservative Protestants admit that Christ gave to Peter and the Apostles the power of teaching, ruling, and sanctifying the faithful, but deny that this power was given in perpetuity to the successors of Peter and the Apostles.

Liberal Protestants admit the perpetual hierarchy, but attribute the idea not to Christ, but to Christian teachers at the end of the First Century.

1° Christ instituted a hierarchical and monarchical society, conferring on the Apostles the triple power of teaching, ruling, and sanctifying the faithful, and conferring immediately on Peter the primacy of magisterial power, and the primacy of jurisdiction.

(A) After the death of John the Baptist, when it became clear that the Jews and their leaders would reject Our Lord, He chose twelve Apostles, and devoted Himself to their training. The twelve were the Israel that was to be—the nucleus of His Church. He sent the Apostles to

preach the Kingdom of God first to the children of Israel: "Jesus sent the twelve . . . saying . . . go ye rather to the lost sheep of the house of Israel; going preach saying, the kingdom of heaven is at hand. Heal the sick, raise the dead . . . cast out devils: freely have you received, freely give" (*Matt. x. 5-8; Mark vi. 7-13; Luke ix. 1-6*).

(B) At Cæsarea Philippi, when Peter proclaimed his belief as to the personality of Christ, Our Lord made the promise: "Thou art Peter (*kepha*—rock) and upon this rock (*kepha*) I will build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it. And to thee I will give the keys of the kingdom of heaven. Whatsoever thou shalt bind upon earth shall be bound also in heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt loose upon earth shall be loosed also in heaven" (*Matt. xvi. 17-19*). Thus Peter is promised primacy, not merely of honour, but of jurisdiction. Peter shall be the foundation of the Church; he shall receive keys of the kingdom of heaven; whatsoever he shall bind upon earth shall be bound also in heaven. Hence Peter has the right of imposing various obligations in the spiritual order, *i.e.*, he has primacy of jurisdiction.

Primacy of magisterial (teaching) power is explicitly expressed in Luke xxii., 31, 32, when Christ, before His Passion, said to Peter: "Simon, Simon, behold Satan hath desired to have you that he may sift you as wheat. But I have prayed for thee that thy faith fail not: and thou being once converted, confirm thy brethren."

(C) About the middle period of His public life Christ said to the twelve: "Amen, I say to you whatsoever you shall bind upon earth shall be bound also in heaven: whatsoever you shall loose upon earth shall be loosed also in heaven" (*Matt. xviii. 18*). In these words Christ promises the power of binding and loosing, *i.e.*, of ruling the Church. It is necessary, however, to note that to Peter alone is promised the same authority as is promised to the other Apostles forming one body with him.

To the Twelve is promised also the special assistance of the Holy Ghost in preaching the Gospel: "The Paraclete, the Holy Ghost, whom the Father will send in My name, He will teach you all things, and bring all things to your mind whatsoever I shall have said to you" (*John xiv. 26*). "He will teach you all truth" (*John xvi. 13*).

(D) After His resurrection, the power which Christ had

promised He gave to Peter and to the Apostles. To the Apostles He gave the power of teaching, ruling, and sanctifying the faithful: "All power is given to me in heaven and in earth. Going, therefore, teach ye all nations, baptising them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost: teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you" (*Matt. xxviii. 19, 20; Mark xvi. 15; Luke xxiv. 44-49*). "Peace be to you. As the Father hath sent Me, I also send you. When he had said these words He breathed on them and He said to them: Receive ye the Holy Ghost, whose sins you shall forgive they are forgiven them: and whose sins you shall retain, they are retained" (*John xx. 21-23*).

On Peter is conferred the supreme power already promised: "Simon, Son of John, lovest thou Me more than these? . . . Feed my lambs. . . . He saith to him again: Simon, son of John, lovest thou Me. . . . Feed My sheep" (*John xxi. 15-17*). These words were said to Peter alone and confer primacy upon him. For by the word "feed" (*βόσκει, ποιμαίνει*) is meant, in both profane and sacred authors, power in a society. Moreover, power is given over the whole church, for the words, "lambs and sheep," include all disciples of Christ, no matter what their dignity might be.

Hence the Church is hierarchical. On the Apostles is conferred the power of teaching, ruling and sanctifying the faithful. On Peter is conferred primacy of magistratum and of jurisdiction. After the Ascension, Peter exercised supreme authority in the Church (*Cf. Acts i. 15 sq; ii. 14; iii. 6; ix. 32; x. 20; xv. 7, 12*).

St. Paul writes: "After three years I went to Jerusalem to see Peter, and I tarried with him fifteen days" (*Gal. i. 18*). Nor does the text *Gal. ii. 11* deny Peter's authority, but St. Paul feared that St. Peter's indulgence towards the Jews and their legal observances might turn Gentiles from acceptance of the Christian Faith. St. Paul teaches that the church is built upon the "foundation of the Apostles" (*Eph. ii. 20-22*), and that it is the mystical body of Christ, in which a perfect hierarchy is found (*Eph. i. 22, 23; Rom. xii. 4-8*).

2° Christ instituted a perpetual hierarchical society.

"I am with you all days, even to the end of the world" (*Matt. xxviii. 20*). "You shall be my witness . . . unto the uttermost parts of the earth" (*Acts i. 8*). The

office of teaching, ruling and sanctifying the faithful is passed on to the successors of the Apostles. St. Paul declares that such power was given to Timothy and to Titus by the imposition of hands. He writes of bishops in various churches: "The Holy Ghost hath placed you bishops to rule the Church of God, which he hath purchased with his own blood" (*Acts xx. 28*).

Christ wished the primacy to be perpetual: "Thou art Peter and upon this rock I will build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it." The Church is clearly indefectible, but it cannot persist without a foundation and supreme power. The primacy of Peter and the pre-eminence of the Roman Church was acknowledged both in theory and in practice during the first three centuries, and afterwards it was so expressly taught that doubt was not possible (*Cf. De Groot, de Ecclesia, q. xiv. xv*).

IV.—Testimony of Christ regarding the infallibility of the Church.

Doctrinal infallibility implies not only truth of statement or fact, but also a divinely given source of truth. It differs from Inspiration which implies a positive impulse to write infallibly, and from Revelation which supposes the manifestation of a truth hitherto unknown.

Modernists and Rationalists deny to the Church the endowment of infallibility. (In their view dogma changes in accordance with the advance of philosophy and science).

1° Christ conferred the prerogative of infallibility on the College of the Apostles and their successors.

(A) When He sent them to preach the Gospel throughout the world, He added: "I am with you all days" (*Matt. xxviii. 19, 20*). The special assistance of Christ in the teaching of the truths of Faith is a guarantee of infallibility. In *Mark xvi. 16* Christ bids the Apostles "go throughout the world and preach the Gospel, and He adds: "He who believeth not shall be condemned."

(B) Christ promised the gift of infallibility to the College of Apostles when He said: "I will ask the Father and He shall give you another Paraclete, that He may abide with you for ever—the Spirit of truth. He will teach you all things and bring all things to your mind whatsoever I shall have said to you" (*John xiv. 16, 17, 26*).

"When the Spirit of truth is come, He will teach you all truth" (*John xvi. 13*).

(C) The Apostles understood the promises of Christ in this sense. In formulating decrees they wrote: "It has seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us" (*Acts xv. 28*); in preaching they claimed, "we are witnesses of these things and of the Holy Ghost" (*Acts v. 32*); in the condemnation of errors they said, "though an angel from heaven preach a gospel to you besides that which we have preached to you, let him be anathema" (*Gal. i. 8*). St. Paul speaks of the Church as "Church of the living God, pillar and ground of truth" (*1 Tim. iii. 15*). No longer are we "children tossed to and fro and carried about with every wind of doctrine" (*Eph. iv. 14*). "Therefore, brethren, stand fast and hold the traditions which you have learned whether by word of mouth or by our epistle" (*2 Thess. ii. 14*).

Later, the Fathers in refuting heresies argue from the infallible magisterium of the Church—teaching of Apostles and bishops—of which teaching œcumenical councils are regarded as the authentic expression.

2° Christ conferred the gift of infallibility directly and immediately on Peter and his successors.

The Bishops of the Church, assembled at the Vatican Council, to whom the gift of infallibility has been promised, solemnly declared that on Peter and his successors the gift of infallibility was conferred when he received primacy of magisterium and of jurisdiction.

(A) "Thou art Peter and upon this rock I will build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it" (*Matt. xvi. 18*). If Peter when he speaks *ex cathedrâ* on matters of faith were not infallible, the foundation of the Church would not be stable.

(B) "I have prayed for thee that thy faith fail not, and thou, being once converted, confirm thy brethren" (*Luke xxii. 32*). Peter could not truly and effectively confirm the faith of his brethren, if he could err in matters of faith, or if his definitions were not themselves infallible apart from the consent of the Church.

(C) "Feed my lambs . . . feed my sheep" (*John xxi. 15-17*). To feed the flock of Christ requires the gift of infallibility.

In the first four centuries, the Roman Church was regarded as the centre of unity and source of orthodoxy.

St. Irenæus wrote his book *Adversus Haereses* about A.D. 180. In Book III. ch. 3 he writes: "With this (Roman) Church all churches—the faithful everywhere—must agree because of its more powerful leadership." He goes on to say: "through the instrumentality of this Church the tradition, handed down by the Apostles, has been maintained by the faithful everywhere." From the Fifth Century onwards the prerogative of infallibility has been more and more clearly affirmed by Popes, Fathers of the Church and Councils.

V.—Christ furnished His Church with visible marks.

(A) Marks are visible signs whereby the Church of Christ is differentiated from other visible societies. These marks are essential properties and belong exclusively to the Church.

The Church in the Nicene-Constantinopolitan symbol (A.D. 381) mentions four marks: Unity, Holiness, Catholicity, Apostolicity (D. 86).

When Christ instituted the Church as a visible society, in which authority is exercised in a visible way (in teaching, ruling, sanctifying by the administration of Sacraments) He wished the members to be united by visible bonds—by the external profession of the same Faith, by external obedience to the same pastors, by participation in the same Sacraments.

1° Unity.

Unity is a visible property whereby the Church in her profession of Faith, in government and worship is undivided in herself, and differentiated from other societies.

Unity is a consequence of the hierarchical and monarchical constitution of the Church, placed under one Supreme Head. Christ compared the Church to a kingdom, a city, a flock, a house—all which figures suggest unity. He said: "every kingdom, divided against itself, shall be made desolate" (*Matt. xii. 25*). Again He said: "Other sheep I have that are not of this fold: them also I must bring, and they shall hear my voice, and there shall be one fold and one shepherd" (*John x. 16*). Immediately before His passion He made this solemn prayer: "Holy Father, keep them in thy name whom thou hast given me, that they may be one as we also are one" (*John xvii. 11*). "Not for them only do I pray, but for

them also who, through their word, shall believe in Me, that they may be one as thou Father in me and I in thee, that they may be one in us, so that the world may believe that thou hast sent me. The glory thou hast given me I have given to them, that they may be one as we also are one. I in them and thou in me: that they may be made perfect in one, and the world may know that Thou hast sent Me" (*John xvii. 20-23*).

Unity belongs to the Church essentially from the standpoint of the Church's constitutive form.

Christ desired unity (1) in profession of Faith: "teach ye all nations . . . to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you" (*Matt. xxviii. 19, 20*); (2) in government: "Thou art Peter . . . to thee I will give the keys . . . feed my sheep" (*Matt. xvi. 18-19; John xxi. 17*); (3) in worship—unity of baptism: "baptising them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost" (*Matt. xxviii. 19*); Unity of the Eucharist: "Do this in commemoration of Me" (*Luke xxii. 19*).

Hence in the Acts of the Apostles (*Acts iv. 32*) it is said of the nascent Church: "The multitude of believers had but one heart and one soul." (St. Paul teaches the same doctrine, especially in *Eph. iv. 3-17*; and St. John in *2 John i. 10, 11*.)

2° Christ wished that His Church should be characterised by manifest and extraordinary sanctity.

Sanctity implies innocence of life and firm union with God. A society is said to be visibly and eminently holy if it has principles and means efficacious for the attainment of sanctity, and *de facto* shows continuously the fruits of extraordinary sanctity—shows in many members a high degree of virtue, and in some heroic virtue, beyond the natural moral capability of humanity. These virtues are visible in their effects—wholehearted love of God, great self-denial, great charity towards others.

Sanctity belongs essentially to the Church from the standpoint of the Church's end or aim.

Our Lord prayed that this mark should be conferred upon His Church: "Holy Father, keep them in Thy name whom Thou hast given me . . . sanctify them in truth . . . for them do I sanctify myself that they also may be sanctified in truth" (*John xvii. 11, 17-21*). Already at the beginning of His ministry, in the Sermon on the Mount, He had said: "Unless your justice abound

more than that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven" (*Matt. v. 20*), and, in His explanation of the New Law, He commended, in the Beatitudes and Counsels, a lofty standard of virtue—of humility, chastity, self-denial, charity, charity even towards enemies. To procure this sanctity He instituted the Eucharist: "The bread which I shall give is My flesh for the life of the world . . . he who eateth My flesh and drinketh My blood hath eternal life . . . he abideth in me and I in him" (*John vi. 51, 54, 56*). He promised the Holy Ghost: "I will ask the Father and He shall give you another Paraclete, that he may abide with you for ever" (*John xiv. 16*).

Our Lord wished the sanctity of the Church to be visible: "You are the light of the world. A city seated on a mountain cannot be hid. Neither do men light a candle, and put it under a bushel, but upon a candlestick, that it may shine to all who are in the house" (*Matt. v. 14, 15*). "Every good tree bringeth forth good fruit" (*Matt. vii. 17*). "I have chosen you and appointed you that you should go and bring forth fruit, and that your fruit should remain" (*John xv. 16*). "I am come to cast fire on earth, and what will I but that it be kindled?" (*Luke xii. 49*). Our Lord prophesied that the preachers of the Faith should manifest extraordinary signs of their own sanctity, and extraordinary signs of the Divine origin of the Gospel: "In My name they shall cast out devils: they shall speak with new tongues: they shall take up serpents: and if they drink any deadly thing, it shall not hurt them: they shall lay their hands upon the sick, and they shall recover" (*Mark xvi. 17, 18*). These promises have been fulfilled as may be seen by reading the lives of missionaries of the Faith. St. Paul alludes to this note of sanctity in *Eph. v. 25-27*. The sanctity of the Church will be consummated in heaven. On earth there are, in the Church, sinners as well as saints, just as the cockle grows amongst the wheat (*Matt. xiii. 30*).

3° Christ wished that His Church should be Catholic or universal—spread throughout the whole world.

The word "catholicity" (*καθ' ὅλον*) means universality. Virtual Catholicity (*catholicitas juris*) is the aptitude of the Church to spread to all nations. Actual Catholicity (*Catholicitas de facto*) implies the Church's

visible progressive diffusion, so that amongst the principal races a notable number should gradually become members of the Church. This progressive Catholicity is called formal inasmuch as it is associated with the mark of unity. The mark of Catholicity belongs essentially to the Church from the standpoint of membership, *i.e.*, of material cause.

Our Lord on many occasions signified His wish that the Church should be universal, not only *de jure* but *de facto*.

(1) Catholicity *de jure*.

Christ compares the Church to a grain of mustard seed, which when grown up "is greater than all herbs and becometh a tree" (*Matt. xiii. 32*).

"God so loved the world as to give his only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him may not perish" (*John iii. 16*).

St. Paul writes of Christ "who will have all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth. For there is one God and one mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus, who gave himself a redemption for all" (*1 Tim. ii. 4-6*).

(2) Catholicity *de facto* is ordained by Christ.

"You shall be my witnesses . . . even to the uttermost ends of the earth" (*Acts i. 8*). "Go into the whole world and preach the Gospel to every creature" (*Matt. xvi. 15*). "Go teach all nations . . . I am with you all days even to the end of the world" (*Matt. xxviii. 19*). "Many shall come from the East and the West and shall sit down with Abraham, Isaac and Jacob in the kingdom of heaven" (*Matt. viii. 11, 12*). In the parable of the Sower: "He who sows good seed is the Son of Man. The field is the world" (*Matt. xiii. 37, 38*). On the feast of Pentecost, the disciples began to speak in various tongues (*Acts ii. 4, 8*). Peter is sent by the Holy Ghost to the Gentiles (*Acts x. 20*). Paul becomes Apostle of the Gentiles: "As many as have been baptised in Christ have put on Christ. There is no longer Jew or Greek . . . you are all one in Christ Jesus" (*Gal. iii. 27, 28*). Christ did not foretell an absolute and physical, but a moral and relative, catholicity: "The light is come into the world, and men loved darkness rather than the light, for their works were evil" (*John iii. 19*). "Many false prophets shall arise and shall seduce many . . . the

charity of many shall grow cold" (*Matt. xxiv. 11, 12*). Nevertheless "this Gospel of the kingdom shall be preached in the whole world for a testimony to all nations, and then shall the consummation come" (*Matt. xxiv. 14*).

4^o Christ wished that His Church should be Apostolic—that it should be the same society as that which the Apostles founded.

Apostolicity is a question of the legitimate, public, never interrupted succession of pastors from the time of the Apostles—a succession in the identity of Faith, Sacraments and rule. Hence Apostolicity must be not only material but formal succession, involving the notes of unity and catholicity.

The succession is visible especially as regards rule. This note of the Church is taken from the standpoint of its efficient instrumental cause—the Apostles.

Apostolicity is an essential property of the Church of Christ. He made His Church a hierarchical perpetual society, in which authority and jurisdiction might be transmitted without interruption.

"Thou art Peter and upon this rock I will build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it" (*Matt. xvi. 18*). Hence a Church, not built on this foundation, separated from the authority of Peter and his successors, is not the true Church of Christ. St. Paul wrote to the Ephesians: "Now therefore you are no more strangers and foreigners, but fellow-citizens with the saints and domestics of God, built upon the foundation of Apostles and prophets, Jesus Christ himself being the chief corner-stone" (*Eph. ii. 19, 20*). St. Paul asks in regard to preachers of the Faith: "How shall they preach unless they be sent?" (*Rom. x. 15*). Hence as recorded in Acts xiv. 22, Paul and Barnabas "ordained to them priests in every Church," and Paul wrote to Titus: "For this cause I left thee in Crete . . . that thou shouldest ordain priests in every city as I also appointed thee" (*Titus i. 5*).

5^o Conclusion.

The association of these four marks in the Catholic Church constitutes a great moral miracle, which proves it to be the Church of Christ. Unity is its *formal*, sanctity its *final*, Catholicity its *material*, and Apostolicity its *efficient* instrumental cause.

VI.—The testimony of Christ regarding the Church is in complete accord with His preaching.

Christ preached the Kingdom of God, salvation for all, the Eucharist, remission of sins, etc. How could this doctrine of Christ be preserved and propagated, unless there be an authority which we can trust? A religious society, like every other society, cannot persist without a living Supreme Authority. Dogmas are difficult to grasp and therefore easily misunderstood; precepts are austere and consequently easily neglected; rites may degenerate into superstition; sacred Scripture, though inspired, requires a living infallible magisterium for its interpretation. Thus the testimony of Christ regarding the Church is in absolute agreement with His doctrine.

CHAPTER XXII

VALUE OF THE TESTIMONY OF CHRIST

THE Messianic and doctrinal testimony of Christ is recommended to our acceptance by His extraordinary wisdom and sanctity. Some Rationalists (Harnack, Renan) hold that He was mistaken to some extent in His views, inasmuch as His supposed mission was due to vivid consciousness of His union with God.

I.—Christ's testimony regarding His mission is emphatically taught as a doctrine to be believed by all. From the beginning of His public life to the end, Christ expressly asserted that He had been sent by God to reveal to men doctrine necessary for salvation. Many critics of the Liberal School (Dalman, Wernle, etc.) acknowledge that Christ never appeared uncertain regarding His mission.

"He who heareth my word and believeth Him that sent me hath life everlasting" (*John v. 24*).

"He that believeth in me hath life everlasting" (*John vi. 47*).

"He that believeth in Him (the Son of God) is not judged. But he that doth not believe is already judged, because he believeth not in the name of the only-begotten Son of God" (*John iii. 18*).

"He that believeth and is baptised shall be saved: but he that believeth not shall be condemned" (*Mark xvi. 16*). In this last text the question is expressly about the necessity of believing the Divine mission of Christ, in whose name men are baptised. As St. Thomas notes, the Apostles understood that to suffer martyrdom rather than deny Christ was a duty (*Quodlibet iv. q. x. a. 20*). "He that shall deny Me before men, I will also deny him before my Father who is in heaven" (*Matt. x. 33*).

If Christ were deceived in this affirmation, the hallucination would have been perpetual, and would imply an enthusiasm equivalent to insanity. No sane man could persuade himself that he was a Divine ambassador,

greater than all the prophets, in whom all must believe under pain of damnation, unless he had received from God most certain internal or external signs of His Divine mission. The possibility of such a pathological state is excluded by the consideration of Christ's wisdom and sanctity.

II.—The wisdom of Christ excludes the possibility of error.

(a) All allow that Christ must be included amongst the wisest of men, as is clear from His doctrine and work. Surpassing all philosophers, He has given us a wonderful solution of essential problems regarding God, man and future life. He taught the highest mysteries, precepts and counsels with the greatest simplicity.

(b) The admiration which He aroused is noted several times in the Gospels. When a child of twelve years of age "all that heard him were astonished at his wisdom and his answers" (*Luke ii. 47*). After the Sermon on the Mount "the people were in admiration at his doctrine" (*Matt. vii. 28*). The ministers of the Pharisees, being sent to apprehend Him, said "never did man speak like this" (*John vii. 46*).

(c) His prudence and perspicacity are apparent in His answers to Pharisees and Sadducees. They asked questions regarding the woman taken in adultery (*John viii. 7*), the tribute due to Cæsar (*Matt. xxii. 15-21*), the resurrection (*Matt. xxii. 23-32*). Christ so answered that "neither durst any man from that day forth ask him any more questions" (*Matt. xxii. 46*).

(d) He judges all things with the greatest tranquillity of soul even when afflicted with deep injury (*Matt. xii. 26*).

(e) In all humility He shows the reason of His right judgment: "I cannot of myself do anything. As I hear, so I judge: my judgment is just, because I seek not my own will, but the will of Him that sent me" (*John v. 30*). "My doctrine is not mine, but His that sent me" (*John vii. 16*).

(f) Christ spoke with the authority of a supreme teacher when He said: "Amen, amen, I say to you, if any man keep my word, he shall not see death for ever" (*John viii. 51*). "I am the light of the world: he that followeth me walketh not in darkness" (*John viii. 12*). "I am the way, the truth and the life. No man cometh to the Father

but by me" (*John xiv. 6*). "He was teaching as one having power and not as their scribes and Pharisees" (*Matt. vii. 29*).

III.—The sanctity of Christ confirms His testimony. The lives of philosophers frequently fail to correspond with the ethical doctrine which they teach. In Christ Our Lord there was perfect harmony between His teaching and His life. Humility, magnanimity, meekness, fortitude, mercy, justice—all these virtues were conspicuous. Sanctity implies two characteristics: (a) absence of sin and of imperfection; (b) presence of the virtues and especially of firm and constant union with God.

(A) Christ was without sin or defect.

To the Jews who sought to kill Him, He could say: "which of you shall convince me of sin?" (*John viii. 46*). "The chief priests and the whole council sought false witness against Jesus that they might put Him to death, and they found not" (*Matt. xxvi. 59, 60*). The assertion of His Personality was regarded by the High Priest (owing to his prejudice) as equivalent to blasphemy (*Matt. xxvi. 65*). Judas said: "I have sinned in betraying innocent blood" (*Matt. xxvii. 4*). And Pilate said: "I am innocent of the blood of this just man: look you to it" (*Matt. xxvii. 24*).

The holiest of men grieve over their sins and imperfections. Christ, though most humble, was not conscious of sin. His disciples, who knew His private and public life, knew Him in sadness and in joy, wrote: "Who did no sin, neither was guile found in his mouth" (*1 Peter ii. 22*). "In Him there was no sin" (*1 John iii. 5*). "He knew not sin" (*2 Cor. v. 21*). He was "tempted in all things like we are, without sin" (*Heb. iv. 15*).

(B) Christ manifested the practice of all virtues in His life, even the practice of those virtues which seem diverse, and the virtues of Christ were heroic in degree.

(a) Charity and filial devotion of Christ towards God were most perfect: "I must be about my Father's business" (*Luke ii. 49*). "My meat is to do the will of Him that sent Me, that I may perfect his work" (*John iv. 34*). "I do always the things that please him . . . I honour my Father . . . I seek not my own glory" (*John viii. 29, 49, 50*). Before His passion Christ prayed: "Father, the hour is come, glorify Thy Son, that Thy Son may glorify

Thee. . . . I have glorified Thee on earth: I have finished the work which Thou gavest Me to do" (*John xvii. 1-4*). At the crisis of His sacrifice He prayed: "Father, if it be possible, let this chalice pass from Me, but not my will but Thine be done" (*Matt. xxvi. 42*). "He became obedient unto death, even to the death of the cross" (*Philipp. ii. 8*). His last words were: "Father, into Thy hands I commend my spirit" (*Luke xxiii. 46*).

In pseudo-mysticism, the false love of God often destroys the love due to men, and leads to spiritual pride. But in Christ, the love of all men is strengthened by His love of God.

(b) Charity and mercy towards men.

Christ's charity was profound, universal, efficacious, and was directed chiefly towards the noblest part of man—his soul, made in the image of God and ordained for eternal life. He is the "shepherd of souls" and He knows them and leads them (*John x. 3-14*). He loves all—Jews, Gentiles, sinners, the poor, infirm, afflicted. Even Judas is His "friend."

His charity is efficacious: "Greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends" (*John xv. 13*). "I am the good shepherd. The good shepherd giveth his life for his sheep" (*John x. 11*). "God so loved the world as to give His only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him may not perish, but may have life everlasting" (*John iii. 16*). "The Son of Man is not come to be ministered to, but to minister and to give His life a redemption for many" (*Matt. xx. 28*). "This is My body which is given for you . . . this is the chalice, the new testament in my blood, which shall be shed for you" (*Luke xxii. 20*). Christ said to the penitent thief: "This day thou shalt be with me in paradise" (*Luke xxiii. 43*), and to His torturers: "Father, forgive them for they know not what they do" (*Luke xxiii. 34*).

Christ's charity never degenerated into weakness. With Christ fraternal correction is an act of charity (*Matt. xviii. 15*). He showed just and inflexible severity towards obstinate Pharisees (*Matt. xxiii. 13-36*), towards the sellers in the temple (*John ii. 14, 15*). In Christ severity of justice and immense mercy were united: "Mercy and truth have met each other; justice and peace have kissed" (*Ps. lxxxiv. 11*).

(c) Self-denial, humility, meekness of Christ.

"He who wishes to come after me, let him deny himself, take up his cross and follow me" (*Matt. xvi. 24*). "Learn of me to be meek and humble of heart" (*Matt. xi. 29*). He lived for thirty years in obscurity; He forbade His miracles and His Transfiguration to be made known; He sought not His own glory, but the glory of His Father; He preached to the poor; He chose ignorant men for His Apostles; He washed their feet at the Last Supper. Together with this humility and meekness, He united dignity, magnanimity, perfect sincerity.

(d) Fortitude, perseverance, patience of Christ.

His firmness remained unshaken, even in the torture of His passion, wherein He manifested heroic patience, praying for His persecutors and recommending His soul to His Father. The Centurion said: "Truly he was a just man" (*Luke xxiii. 47*). "If the life and death of Socrates were those of a wise man, the life and death of Jesus were assuredly those of God" (Rousseau, *Emile*, Book IV, *Profession of Faith of the Vicar of Savoy*).

(e) The harmony and stability of heroic virtues in Christ constitute a moral miracle.

Sanctity is from God. The sanctity of Christ is super-human. That one should manifest the exercise of all virtues in the highest degree—fortitude, meekness, love, justice, mercy—points to extraordinary help from God. Moreover to persevere unshaken in all heroic virtues is impossible without special intervention from God. The sanctity of Christ is miraculous.

God does not witness by miraculous intervention to that which is untrue. Hence the testimony of Christ that He is the ambassador of God is established by Divine authority, and commends itself to our belief.

SECTION VII

*CONFIRMATION OF THE TESTIMONY OF
CHRIST*

CHAPTER XXIII

CONFIRMATION FROM INTERNAL CRITERIA, AND FROM AN
EXTERNAL CRITERION INTRINSIC TO RELIGION: SUBLIMITY OF
DOCTRINE

§ 1.—Internal Criteria: Wonderful Fulfilment of Human Aspirations.

I.—The question involved.

If all legitimate aspirations, including the higher aspirations of our nature, are satisfied and more than satisfied by a religious system of doctrine, it is morally certain that such religious system comes from God. That men should reach this fulfilment by their natural powers is morally impossible. It is not sufficient to argue, as Modernists frequently argue, from the conformity of Christian doctrine with our *natural* aspirations—such an argument could only prove that Christ founded a perfect *natural* religion.

What are the principal aspirations of our nature?

(A) The religious and moral aspirations of human nature are as universal as humanity itself. Such aspirations are nothing else than the seed or source of natural virtues which have relation to man's end and to the means necessary to attain it.

With regard to the last end of man we desire to know with certitude the existence of God, we hope for help from God necessary to attain future happiness, we desire to love God above all things, not only affectively but effectively, so that the whole of our moral life may be referred to our last end. It is impossible as St. Thomas writes (*1^a 11^{ae} q. 2, a. 8, q. 3, a. 1*) for man to find complete happiness in any created good; for the object of the will is universal good, and universal good does not exist in any creature, but is found in God alone. In like manner there is an inclination to give to God the internal and external worship due to Him.

Regarding means necessary for the attainment of our last end, there are in human nature inclinations to moral virtues—prudence, justice, fortitude, temperance and virtues connected therewith.

(B) Natural desire of future life.*

The existence of this desire is proved:

- (a) From consciousness. The soul experiences a desire to live, even though the body is mortal.
- (b) From reason. Desire follows cognition: "*nil volitum nisi cognitum*." The cognition of the senses is particular being. But the intellect apprehends absolute being. Hence every being endowed with intellect desires immortality (1^a q. 75, a. 6). Moreover, in this life, the wicked prosper, the virtuous suffer. We hope, therefore, for a future life, in which there will be manifestation of justice and of the moral order.
- (c) All forms of religion witness to the desire of immortality.

(C) There is in man a natural desire of seeing God as He is in Himself.

The most perfect natural knowledge of God fails to explain certain obscurities. We cannot clearly understand the compatibility of Divine attributes like Justice and Mercy, nor can we explain satisfactorily the existence of evil, moral and physical. Hence man wishes to see God, not only in the mirror of creatures, but intuitively and immediately. As already explained this natural desire is conditional and inefficacious—a velleity, the condition being, if God wishes to raise us to the supernatural vision of His essence.

Such are the principal aspirations—intellectual, moral, religious—of our nature.

II.—Imperfect solutions.

To the aforesaid aspirations an imperfect response is given: (a) by natural reason; (b) by philosophic systems; (c) by other religions.

(a) Natural reason cannot attain a *firm, ready, accurate* knowledge of the natural truths appertaining to religion. It can reach to certitude regarding the existence of God, but the essential attributes of God and the conditions of our future life remain obscure.

(b) Philosophic systems.

* The natural desire of future life is *innate*, whereas the natural desire of seeing God is *elicited*.

Some are absolutely erroneous, *e.g.*, materialism, pantheism, agnosticism. They destroy the higher aspirations of the soul.

Other systems which come nearer to the truth—those of Plato and Aristotle for example, are not without manifest error concerning certain attributes of God, *e.g.*, Divine freedom. These systems do not speak of the future life with certitude, but confound it with metempsychosis. Their ethical teaching is also in many ways erroneous.

(c) Other Religions.

Buddhism teaches nothing concerning God, and maintains that man is subjected to metempsychosis, until he reaches perfection in "Nirvana"—a sort of annihilation. Polytheism and idolatry are features of Buddhism.

Mahometanism contains true beliefs borrowed from Judaism and Christianity, *e.g.*, monotheism, immortality of the soul, resurrection of the body. But its paradise is one of carnal and sensual delight.

Protestants are hopelessly divided. Conservative Protestants hold Scripture to be the rule of faith. But since the rule is not complete, nor obvious, nor suited to settle doubts, innumerable sects have arisen. Liberal Protestants acknowledge no authority. They are Rationalists. Some deny even the Divinity of Christ.

III.—Catholic Solution.

Catholic teaching not only satisfies the natural aspirations of the soul, but exceeds them. Note the following table:

Natural Aspirations	To know God . . . satisfied by ..	Christian Faith, Gift of Wisdom, Beatific vision.
	To hope in God	Incarnation, Redemption, Eternal Glory.
	To love God	Intimacy of Charity, Eucharistic Communion.
	To internal and external worship	Sacrifice of the Mass, Sacraments, Prayer of the Church.
	To virtue	Cardinal Christian virtues and virtues connected therewith.
	To happiness	Christian beatitudes, Gifts and Fruits of the Holy Ghost, Peace and Joy.

1^o To the aspiration to know God with certainty corresponds the doctrine of Faith divinely revealed, confirmed by divine signs and proposed by an infallible magisterium.

This revelation gives us in the present life knowledge of the secrets of our heavenly Father, gives us wisdom inspired by the Holy Ghost, and as regards the future life promises direct beatific vision of the Divine essence—all which benefits exceed man's natural desire: "It hath not entered into the heart of man to conceive what God has prepared for those who love Him" (1 Cor. ii. 9).

2° Natural hope of future happiness suggests expectation of help from God to lead a naturally good life, and natural happiness in the life to come. The Incarnation of the Word of God, Redemption, Eternal Glory are far beyond natural hope.

3° Natural inclination to love God above all things could never aspire to familiar friendship with God realised especially in Eucharistic Communion—pledge of eternal life. What more conformable to our aspirations and at the same time what more gratuitous? Herein appears the harmony which God alone can effect. Harmony is unity in diversity, and is greater the more intimate the union, the more marked the diversity. In the Eucharist there is absolute diversity between its utter gratuitousness and its profound conformity.

Supernatural differ from natural gifts of God, because of their gratuitousness, and differ from the ravings of false mysticism because of their conformity with natural reason. Hence Christ said to the Samaritan woman: "If thou didst know the gift of God, and who he is that saith to thee, Give me to drink; thou perhaps wouldst have asked of him, and he would have given thee living water . . . he that shall drink of the water that I will give him, shall not thirst for ever. But the water which I will give him, shall become in him a fountain of water springing up into life everlasting" (John iv. 10, 13, 14). St. Augustine wrote: "Thou hast made us for Thyself, and our hearts are unquiet until they find their rest in Thee" (Conf. Book I., c. 1).

So also the natural love of our fellowmen is far exceeded in Christian Faith, because our neighbour must be loved for God's sake, so that our brethren may be with us members of the mystical body of Christ in this life, and participators with us in eternal glory hereafter.

4° Worship.

Internal worship in the religion of Christ is described

as "adoration of God in Spirit and in truth." Subordinate to internal is external worship. The supreme expression of external worship is the Sacrifice of the Mass. The Mass is the commemoration of the Sacrifice of the Cross, and the offering of Himself by Christ Our Lord as priest—a victim of infinite value. The sweetness of the personality and mysteries of Christ are beautifully expressed in the prayer and hymns of the Church:

Jesus, the thought alone of Thee
With sweetness fills my breast,
But sweeter far it is to see
And on Thy beauty feast.

Jesus, our hope when we repent,
Sweet source of all our grace,
Sole comfort in our banishment,
O what when face to face!

No art, or eloquence of man
Can tell the joys of love;
Only the saints can understand
What they in Jesus prove.

5° The inclination of our nature to virtue is not only satisfied but exalted in Christianity.

Christian prudence, directing all things to God and avoiding excessive solicitude for temporal things, infinitely exceeds not only worldly prudence founded on utilitarianism, but natural prudence which aims at natural virtue.

Christian justice is associated with Charity, and indefinitely raised by the association.

Christian fortitude draws not only upon the strength of nature, but likewise upon that of Divine Grace.

Christian temperance exceeds natural temperance which aims at the health of the body by bringing the body into subjection.

6° We desire happiness in the present life.

The gifts of the Holy Ghost make Christian virtues perfect and lead to lasting happiness.

The fruits of the Holy Ghost are so many guarantees of mental peace.

St. Paul's exhortation is well known: "Rejoice in the Lord always; again I say to you, rejoice . . . may the peace of God, which surpasseth all understanding, keep your hearts and minds in Christ Jesus" (Philipp. iv. 4).

§ 2.—An External Criterion Intrinsic to Religion : Sublimity of the Teaching of Christ.

Art. 1.—Wonderful Harmony of Christian Teaching.

The essence of Sublimity—an aspect of beauty in its highest manifestation—lies in the union of elements notably diverse. Hence it is a sign of something beyond the reach of human achievement—of Divine origin in fact—if doctrine, proposed in the name of God, unites that which is highest and lowest, supernatural and natural, riches of Divine mercy and misery of the human race, things old and new, obscurity of mystery and withal wisdom accommodated to the intelligence of a child.

But this characteristic is apparent in (1) natural truths concerning God and man; (2) supernatural mysteries; (3) precepts and counsels; (4) the whole body of religious truths in harmonious development.

I.—Natural truths concerning God and man.

(A) Truths concerning God.

Major: Right reason teaches that there is one God, beginning and end of all things, self-existent, pure spirit, eternal, infinitely perfect, really and essentially distinct from the universe, most wise and provident, good, merciful, just legislator and rewarder.

Minor: But Christianity teaches all these truths explicitly, and more perfectly than other religions and philosophical systems.

Conclusion: Therefore Christianity teaches most perfectly all truths concerning God dictated by right reason. The major is supported and justified by the "*communis sensus hominum*." It is a statement of the principal truths of Natural Religion (Cf. "*Principles of Christian Apologetics*": cc. III. and V.)

The minor is proved (*i.e.*, Christianity teaches certain truths):

1° One God, infinitely perfect, exists.

"God is a Spirit" (*John iv. 24*), self-existent (*Ex. iii. 14*), immutable (*James i. 17*), eternal (*Rom. xvi. 26*), omnipresent (*Matt. v. 34, 35*), source of life (*Acts xvii. 28*), all-seeing (*Matt. vi. 4*; *1 John iii. 20*), most wise (*Rom. xvi. 27, xi. 33*), omnipotent (*Matt. xix. 26*; *Eph. iii. 20*), most free (*Eph. i. 1*; *Rom. ix. 16*), most holy (*Matt. xix.*

17; *John viii. 12*), most happy (*Acts xvii. 25*; *1 Tim. i. 11, vi. 15*).

2° God is Creator; most provident, merciful, just.

Creator (*Acts iv. 24*; *xiv. 14*; *Eph. iii. 9*; *Apoc. i. 8*). The Christian doctrine of Creation is free from Pantheism, Dualism, Determinism.

God is Providence (*Matt. vi. 26*, *1 Peter v. 7*). The Providence of God is concerned with every being, and is opposed to Mahometan fatalism and Calvinistic pessimism. God is most just (*Rom. ii. 6*), most kind (*Matt. vi. 26-30*), most merciful (*Luke xv. 20*, *Eph. ii. 4*).

Thus Christian doctrine teaches all the Divine attributes without any compromise or diminution.

(B) Truths concerning man.

Major: Right reason teaches that man is mortal, has a soul which is spiritual and consequently immortal, a soul which is free, subject to the moral law founded on God as supreme legislator and rewarder.

Minor: But Christianity teaches these truths more perfectly than other religions and philosophical systems.

Conclusion: Therefore Christianity teaches all truths concerning man which are dictated by right reason.

Again the major is supposed and justified by the common consent of mankind—the "*communis sensus hominum*."

The minor is proved:

Man is created in the image of God (*Eph. iv. 24*; *Gen. i. 26*; *Wisdom ii. 23*). Man is not made of body alone which men can kill (*Matt. x. 28*), but of a spiritual soul likewise, which God can consign to punishment (*Matt. x. 28*), which is called to a glorious life (*Rom. viii. 18*; *2 Tim. iv. 7, 8*). Man was created to know God, love Him, keep His Commandments and attain to eternal life (*John xvii. 3*; *1 Tim. ii. 4*; *Matt. vi. 33*; *vii. 21*; *xxv. 46*).

Christianity teaches these truths with certitude. And this fact gives moral certitude of the Divine origin of Christianity. Morally speaking, men cannot, without special help of God, know firmly, quickly, correctly the sum total of natural truths appertaining to Religion.

II.—Supernatural Mysteries.

The sublimity of Christian doctrine is shown by the fact that Supernatural mysteries, notwithstanding their obscurity, appear to us as the "light of life," because of

their conformity with the attributes of God naturally known, and with human aspirations. The element of sublimity resides in the intimate union of the life of God with the minds and hearts of men of good will, through the Redemption wrought by Christ.

1° Trinity.

The mystery of the Trinity is the highest and most obscure of all, but its obscurity has no element of absurdity or incoherence. In this mystery there is harmony and light, but too powerful for the scrutiny of created intellect. God is one in nature and threefold in person.

Theologians show the congruity and harmony of this mystery by a twofold principle:

- (a) Supreme Good is essentially communicative.
- (b) The higher the nature, the more intimate is its communication.

The word, which the human intellect conceives, is intimate indeed, but contingent, mutable, imperfectly expressing the faculty whence it proceeds. The higher in the scale of being, the more intimate is vital action. In God, life is absolutely perfect and immanent and the term of His fecundity is a communication of His whole nature, so that the Word which proceeds from Him, remains united to Him by numerical identity of nature. This generation is accomplished through the Divine intellect, but there is another procession whereby Father and Son give expression to their mutual love, and communicate their whole being to the Holy Ghost.

2° Mystery of our elevation to the supernatural order.

The congruity of this elevation is shown (a) from the standpoint of human nature. Knowledge of God gained in the mirror of creatures is imperfect and obscure, especially as regards compatibility of certain Divine attributes. Hence on the part of man there is a natural desire (conditional and inefficacious) of seeing God essentially. The congruity is also shown (b) from the standpoint of God. It is characteristic of Him, who is Infinite Good, to communicate Himself in the most intimate way, namely, by a communication of His Divine life; (c) The first man was established in a perfect state as to nature and grace. Having lost this perfection and original justice by sin, the higher aspirations remain, and as St. Thomas notes (*Cf. C. Gentes l. iv. c. 52*) the sorrowful opposition

between our present condition and our aspirations is a *probable* sign of original elevation.

3° Mystery of Original Sin.

"By the disobedience of one man many were made sinners" (*Rom. v. 19*).

Original sin is not voluntary through our personal wills, but through the will of our first parent. It is not a personal sin, but a "sin of human nature," contracted by us, inasmuch as we receive from our first parents human nature deprived of original justice, so that according to Eph. ii. 3 we are "by nature children of wrath." Hence original sin consists essentially in the privation of original justice voluntary to us through the will of our first parents. The Catholic doctrine is midway between the extremes of Pelagianism, which denied original sin, and Lutheranism, which exaggerated its effects so as to destroy free-will.

The mystery, accepted in the sense of the Church, is not repugnant to reason.

(a) It is not repugnant from the standpoint of Divine justice.

Original sin is the privation of grace and preternatural gifts, *i.e.*, of benefits not due to nature. The following example will elucidate the distinction between the supernatural and the preternatural: "A king gives to his ambassador certain powers necessary for his diplomatic duties. These powers are natural. If the king gives him further powers increasing his dignity and influence, but not superseding ambassadorial functions, these powers are 'preternatural.' Finally should the king share with him his royal prerogative, and make him adopted son and heir to his kingdom, such privileges would be 'supernatural'" (*Cf. Principles of Christian Apologetics, p. 168*). God may give His grace to the human race on the condition that Adam, head of the race, should not sin. God may extend the heredity and solidarity as regards natural gifts which subsist between a father and his descendants to supernatural and gratuitous gifts.

(b) The mystery of original sin is not repugnant to Divine wisdom and goodness.

St. Thomas argues (*III^a q 1 a 3 ad 3*) God permitted evil that He might elicit therefrom greater good. "Where sin abounded, grace did more abound" (*Rom. v. 20*). In the blessing of the paschal candle, the words occur: "O

felix culpa," "O blessed fault which has merited such and so great a Redeemer!" "For if by one man's offence death reigned through one: much more they who receive abundance of grace, and of the gift, and of justice, shall reign in life through one Jesus Christ" (*Rom. v. 17*).

(c) The present condition of the human race is better explained by acceptance of the doctrine of original sin.

Mankind suffers various penalties corporal and spiritual. Amongst corporal troubles are sickness and death, amongst spiritual is the weakness of reason. With probability one may argue that God intended the superior and nobler part of man to rule over his lower nature, and if this superior guiding power of the nobler element is not maintained there must have been fault.

(d) Traditions of various races support this belief, as, for instance, Hesiod's narrative regarding Prometheus. Pascal writes that man without this mystery would offer a greater degree of incomprehensibility than the incomprehensibility of the mystery of man. In the same sense Bossuet wrote: "The impress of God rests upon man—an impress so strong that he cannot lose it, and so weak that he cannot follow it."

4° Mysteries of Incarnation and Redemption.

These mysteries are remedies of both original and of personal sin.

(A) Incarnation.

The Divine Incarnation is the intimate union without confusion of the Divine nature and human nature in one person, so that Christ is truly God and truly man. Union of human soul and body in one person is a somewhat analogous case.

The possibility and congruity of the Incarnation are seen:

(a) From the standpoint of God.

Goodness is diffusive and Infinite Good—*Summum Bonum*—communicates Himself in the highest way. This He has done by uniting in one Person His Divine nature to a created nature.

It is congruous that Divine Mercy should rescue men from sin: "God so loved the world as to give His only-begotten Son, so that all who believe in Him should not perish, but have life everlasting" (*John iii. 16*). It is congruous also that Divine justice should exact suitable satisfaction for sin. Sin is a quasi-infinite offence, because

of the dignity of Him who is offended. Hence the satisfaction must have infinite efficacy.

(b) From the standpoint of man.

Personal union of human nature with God is not inconceivable. Personality is more perfect the more intimately it depends on God and rules over inferior things. Moral personality is stronger in a just man than in a man subject to human passion. St. Paul wrote: "With Christ I am nailed to the cross. I live, now not I, but Christ liveth in me" (*Gal. ii. 19, 20*).

The most perfect union—union of Divine and human natures without confusion in the same person is realised in the Incarnation of the Word. The Incarnation is most effective for the Redemption of the human race: "Greater love than this no man hath that a man lay down his life for his friend." In Christ we have the exemplar of virtue, and an efficacious remedy against pride and presumption.

(B) Redemption.

The mystery of Redemption was consummated on the Cross, and is commemorated in the Sacrifice of the Mass. "God commendeth his charity towards us, because, when as yet we were sinners, Christ died for us" (*Rom. v. 8*). "Christ suffered for us, leaving you an example that you should follow his steps" (*1 Peter ii. 21*). "You are bought with a great price. Glorify and bear God in your body" (*1 Cor. vi. 20*). "Christ delivered himself for us an oblation and a sacrifice to God for an odour of sweetness" (*Eph. v. 2*). "We were reconciled to God by the death of His Son" (*Rom. v. 10*).

On the Cross Infinite Justice and Infinite Mercy met, hence its sublimity and splendour.

The suitability of the Sacraments for the perfection of man in the principal acts of his individual and social life is obvious:

- By Baptism spiritual life is received.
- By Confirmation spiritual life is strengthened.
- By the Eucharist spiritual life is nourished.
- By Penance spiritual life is restored.
- By Extreme Unction spiritual life is cleansed from the remains of sin.
- By Matrimony spiritual life is extended.
- By Holy Orders the human instruments of spiritual life are perpetuated.

The sublimity of Holy Communion is expressed by St. Thomas:

"The Bread of Angels becomes the bread of men." There is a wonderful association of the Infinite Grandeur of God with the lowliest human misery and need:

"O res mirabilis: manducat Dominum
Pauper servus et humilis!"

5° Mysteries of Future Life.

(A) Eternal Happiness.

Eternal happiness is described by Christ as the "kingdom of heaven" which the just will possess, in which the "clean of heart" shall see God. St. Paul and St. John write: "We shall see God face to face, as He is" (1 Cor. xiii. 12; 1 John iii. 2). All the aspirations of our nature shall be satisfied and more than satisfied: "It hath not entered into the heart of man to conceive what God has prepared for those who love Him" (1 Cor. ii. 9).

(B) Eternal Punishment.

Eternal punishment is for those who die impenitent, i.e., die in grave, wilful, and fully-conscious enmity with God. On such the sentence is pronounced: "Depart from Me, you cursed, into everlasting fire . . . into everlasting punishment" (Matt. xxv. 41, 46). Writing on this mystery St. Thomas notes:

- (1) When an impenitent sinner dies, he remains irreparably in grave sin.
- (2) The punishment is proportioned to the gravity of the fault, because sin is a quasi-infinite offence.
- (3) God's mercy is regulated by the order of wisdom, and cannot be extended to the unworthy.
- (4) The penalty is not intended for correction of the condemned sinner, but for reparation of order violated.

The justice as well as the mercy of God is infinite, and both justice and mercy are founded on love. These truths are expressed in the stanza which Dante read on the gates of Hell:

"Guistizia mòsse il mio alto fattore:
Fècemi la divina potestate
La somme sapienza e il primo amore."

(C) Purgatory.

The doctrine of purgatory, and the universal practice of

praying for the dead, manifest both the justice and the mercy of God. Venial faults are atoned for, and souls are helped by the prayers of the living, as the living are helped by the Saints in heaven. Hence the association of the Church militant, triumphant and suffering—the doctrine of the Communion of Saints.

III.—Excellence of the Christian law and life.

The precepts of the Natural Law are contained in the Decalogue. St. Thomas (1^a 11^{ae} q. 106-108) shews the superiority of the New as compared with the Old Law.

(a) The New Law is a law of grace—the grace of the Holy Ghost given through faith in Christ. St. Augustine notes that the Old Law was given extrinsically so that the wicked might be deterred from sin, the New Law was given intrinsically for their justification.

(b) The New Law is a law of love, inasmuch as the supreme motive of action, internal and external, must be the love of God.

(c) The New Law is concerned especially with interior acts: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God"; "thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." The only external acts which Christ enjoins are those necessary for the reception of the Sacraments. Ceremonial in the New is lighter than in the Old Law.

(d) The New Law contains "counsels" as well as "precepts." Observance of the precepts is necessary for salvation. Adoption of the counsels enables one to obtain salvation with greater certainty and expedition. Hence the multitudes of men and women who observe the counsels of voluntary poverty, chastity and obedience.

No more perfect law can be conceived than the New Law, since its principle or source is Divine grace, its end or motive is love, its precepts, when observed, ensure salvation, and its counsels, when adopted, give opportunity for the exercise of heroic virtue.

IV.—Harmony of the whole body of Christian doctrine.

(a) Supernatural mysteries manifest the supreme goodness of God. Internal communication of the intimate life of God is revealed in the Trinity, and external communication in our elevation to the supernatural order, in the Divine Incarnation, Redemption, Glorification.

(b) A bond of union connects supernatural mysteries.

If the Trinity be doubted, the Incarnation and Mission of the Holy Ghost are affected.

(c) Precepts and counsels are logically the outcome of doctrines of Faith.

The synthesis of Christian doctrine may be written as follows to show that all mysteries and our life proceed from the Trinity and return to their source.

TRINITY

1 Creation	13 Eternal Life.
2 Elevation	12 Communion of Saints.
3 Original sin	11 Charity.
4 Incarnation	10 Faith, Hope.
5 Redemption	9 Grace.
6 Church	8 Mission of the Holy Ghost
7 Eucharist	

Sublimity of the Christian Faith is shown by its union of things highest and lowest—riches of Divine mercy and human misery, the supernatural and the natural, the mystical and the practical. St. Paul prays that God may grant us “according to the riches of His glory to be strengthened by His Spirit with might unto the inward man”;—so that we may be able “to comprehend with all the Saints what is the breadth and length and height and depth, to know also the charity of Christ which surpasseth all knowledge,” that we may be “filled unto all the fullness of God” (*Eph. iii. 16, 18, 19*).

Doctrine, endowed with such wonderful characteristics, manifests its Divine origin. The best efforts of human reason could never excogitate a system so original and so sublime.

Art. 2.—Christ's Exposition of His sublime Doctrine.

A preacher of the Faith should so speak (writes St. Thomas, *1^a 1^{ae} q. 177 a 1*) that the Word of God should 1° enlighten the mind; 2° appeal to the heart; 3° efficaciously move the will to the observance of the Divine precepts.

I.—Illumination.

Christ taught with authority and at the same time with simplicity and humility. He taught as “one having power; and not as their Scribes and Pharisees” (*Matt. vii. 29*). He spoke in short, clear, moving, sentences. He spoke as Supreme Master: “I speak that which I

have seen with my Father” (*John viii. 38*). His teaching is characterised by simplicity and humility: “My doctrine is not Mine, but His who sent Me” (*John vii. 16*). Christ preached to the poor. The knowledge which He possessed “without measure” (*John iii. 34*) He gives to men with measure that their weakness many not be oppressed. He recommends humility to His Apostles: “Unless you become as little children, you will not enter into the kingdom of heaven” (*Matt. xviii. 3*). As Bossuet wrote: “Christ's doctrine is both milk for babes, and bread for the strong.”

II.—Unction.

“Out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh” (*Matt. xii. 34*). Christ preached constantly the love of God for men. He came “that men might have life and have it more abundantly” (*John x. 10*). “Come unto Me all you who labour and who are burdened, and I will refresh you” (*Matt. xi. 28*). His unction is united with salutary austerity: “If any man will come after me, let him deny himself, take up his cross and follow me” (*Matt. xvi. 24*). His word is living and effectual: “reaching unto the division of the soul and the spirit . . . a discernor of the thoughts and intents of the heart” (*Heb. iv. 12*). In His teaching concerning the Beatitudes, in His last discourse with His Apostles, the unction of Christ is especially shown.

III.—Efficacy.

“The words which I have spoken to you are spirit and life” (*John vi. 64*). How many men and women since the days of Christ have followed His admonitions, great and numerous difficulties notwithstanding? He alone could make His doctrine perennially living and efficacious in accordance with His promise: “My words shall not pass away” (*Matt. xxiv. 35*). All these characteristics of the preaching of Christ—its power of illumination, of attraction, of efficaciously influencing souls—suggest to us the words of Peter: “Lord, to whom shall we go? Thou hast the words of eternal life” (*John vi. 68, 69*).

Art. 3.—Origin of the Teaching of Christ.

The doctrine taught by Christ was not one excogitated by human genius, nor was it an eclectic system drawn from other forms of religion.

I.—Testimony of Christ and of His contemporaries.

"All things have been delivered to me by my Father: No one knoweth the Son but the Father: neither doth any one know the Father but the Son, and he to whom it shall please the Son to reveal him" (*Matt. xi. 27*).

John the Baptist testifies: "He that cometh from heaven is above all. What He hath seen and heard that He testifieth: . . . He whom God has sent speaketh the words of God: God doth not give the spirit by measure" (*John iii. 31, 32, 34*). In answer to the question: how doth this man know letters, having never learned? Christ replied: "My doctrine is not mine but His that sent me. If any man will do the will of Him: he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God, or whether I speak of myself. He that speaketh of himself seeketh his own glory, but he that seeketh the glory of Him that sent him, he is true and there is no injustice in him" (*John vii. 16-18*). Speaking to His disciples Christ said: "I have called you friends, because all things whatsoever I have heard of my Father, I have made known to you" (*John xv. 15*). The people asked: "How came this man by his wisdom and miracles? Is not this the carpenter's son?" (*Matt. xiii. 54, 55*).

II.—The doctrine of Christ is not a syncretism of Judaism, Oriental religions and ancient philosophy.

(A) The teaching of Christ was not borrowed from Jewish doctors. Though Christianity is related to the Mosaic religion as the perfect to the imperfect, there were so many differences that, for the transit, a special intervention of God was necessary.

1° Mosaic religion was for the Jews; Christianity is for all men.

2° The Jews expected a temporal Messiah; Jesus came—a spiritual Messiah.

3° The fundamental doctrines of Christianity—the Trinity, Incarnation, Redemption through the cross, justification by Faith and good works—were unknown explicitly to the Jews.

4° The teaching of Christ regarding internal dispositions and internal justice differed from the tradition of Jewish elders and Pharisees.

5° The Gospel was not preached by the Baptist. His work was preparatory.

6° The Essenes, stressing as they did legal observances, refusing to be associated with Gentiles, rejecting matrimony, were in opposition to Christian teaching.

(B) The teaching of Christ was not borrowed from Greek or Latin sources.

(a) Pagan teachers had no knowledge of the Trinity, Incarnation, Redemption, etc. Some doubted the immortality of the soul, and the action of Divine providence. These doubts are expressed in the writings of Cicero, who preceded Christ, and in those of Seneca who lived later (*Cf. G. Bossier, "La Religion Romaine," Vol. II., Book II., c. 3-4*).

(b) The ethical pagan system differs absolutely from Christianity which is founded on the love of God, and of one's neighbour for God's sake. Many pagan philosophers sought and found in their benefactions nothing beyond a certain individual satisfaction. Humility they despised. Pride, in the opinion of the Stoics, was a virtue.

(c) Pagan philosophy cared not for the well-being of the people. The words of Horace are well known: "*Odi profanum vulgus et arceo*." Christ's teaching was accounted folly in the pagan world. When St. Paul preached in the Areopagus concerning the resurrection of the dead, "some indeed mocked: but others said, we will hear thee again concerning this matter" (*Acts xvii. 32*). St. Paul wrote to the Corinthians: "The Jews require signs and the Greeks seek after wisdom: but we preach Christ crucified—unto the Jews indeed a stumbling block and unto the Gentiles the foolishness, but unto them that are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God, and the wisdom of God (*1 Cor. i., 22, 23 24*).

(C) The teaching of Christ was not borrowed from Eastern religions.

Gunkel (*Zum religionsgeschichtlichen Verständnis des neuen Testaments*) holds that Christianity is a syncretism, whose principal part is pagan mysticism. It is true that, in the First Century of the Christian era, there existed a pagan syncretism of Greek and Eastern cults, in which were worshipped Zeus, Bacchus, Serapis and Mithra.

But Gunkel can show but few and merely external resemblance between this syncretism and Christianity. There is a resemblance in the death and resurrection of some god, some resemblance as to the symbolism of the rite of initiation and that of baptism, as to sacred banquets,

whereby pagans were supposed to have communion with Mithra or Dionysus.

1° But Pagan rites appeal merely to the imagination and the emotions, and were not unfrequently obscene.

2° The teaching of pagan mystics is polytheistic or pantheistic or dualistic or fatalistic.

3° Uncompromising opposition always existed between Christians and Pagans. St. Paul wrote: "Bear not the yoke with unbelievers. What participation has justice with injustice? What fellowship has light with darkness? What concord hath Christ with Belial? . . . What agreement has the temple of God with idols? You are the temple of the living God" (2 Cor. vi. 14-16).

4° Pagan mysticism has had no moral effect.

Conclusion:

The teaching of Christ: 1° is distinguished by perfection, harmony, sublimity; 2° was preached with authority, simplicity, humility, unction and efficacy; 3° owed its origin to no human source. Such teaching is with moral certitude declared to be supernatural. It has already been shown that man cannot, without supernatural help, discover all the truths of Natural Religion. *A fortiori* one man, Jesus of Nazareth, who never studied in the schools of knowledge, could not without extraordinary help from God discover a body of religious teaching, which satisfies perfectly the aspirations of human nature, which unites harmoniously things highest and lowest, supernatural and natural, justice and mercy, contemplation and action, things old and new—teaching too which so profoundly affected and affects the minds and souls of mankind and which renovates society.

It is metaphysically impossible that Divine Providence should permit teaching so salutary to have been founded in error regarding its Divine origin.

CHAPTER XXIV

THE TESTIMONY OF CHRIST IS CONFIRMED BY THE WONDERFUL LIFE OF THE CHURCH

THE Vatican Council teaches that the Church "because of its wonderful propagation, its extraordinary sanctity, its inexhaustible fecundity in well-doing, its Catholic unity and unshaken stability, is a great and perpetual motive of credibility, and an irrefragable witness of its own Divine mission" (D. 1794).

The words of the Council suggest the division of this chapter: (1) Wonderful propagation of the Church; (2) Its extraordinary sanctity as seen in the constancy of martyrs and in its spiritual fecundity; (3) Its Catholic unity and unshaken stability.

Art. 1.—Wonderful Propagation of the Church.

The force of this argument lies in the disproportion between the propagation and natural causes. This disproportion is shown from a fourfold consideration of (1) the rapid diffusion of Christianity; (2) grandeur of the result obtained; (3) the many and serious obstacles; (4) the weakness of natural means.

I.—Rapid diffusion of Christianity.

(A) Numerically and geographically.

We read in the Acts of the Apostles and in the Epistles that after Pentecost Peter converted 3,000 (*Acts ii. 41*), then 5,000 (*Acts iv. 4*). Later "the multitude of men and women who believed in the Lord was more increased" (*Acts v. 14*). At the time of the martyrdom of St. Stephen persecution began in Jerusalem, and the faithful "were all dispersed through the countries of Judea and Samaria . . . and they went about preaching the word of God" (*Acts viii. 1-4*). Some "went as far as Phenice and Cyprus and Antioch . . . and a great number of believers was converted to the Lord" (*Acts xi. 18-21*). Barnabas and Saul were sent to Antioch for a year and "they taught a great multitude, so that at Antioch the disciples were first named Christians" (*Acts xi. 26*).

Afterwards the Apostles founded churches throughout the Roman Empire, and beyond the limits thereof. About thirty years after the Ascension (A.D. 63-64) Peter wrote a letter "to the strangers dispersed through Pontus, Galatia, Cappadocia, Asia, Bithynia" (1 *Peter* i. 1). About the same time Paul wrote to the Romans: "Your faith is spoken of in the whole world" (*Rom.* i. 8). John in the reign of Domitian towards the end of the First Century wrote the Apocalypse "to the seven churches which are in Asia, to Ephesus, Smyrna, Pergamus, Thyatira, Sardis, Philadelphia, Laodicea" (*Apoc.* i. 11). Thus before the death of the Apostles the number of Christians was great.

After the death of the Apostles the number of the faithful continued to increase. Justin declared (c. A.D. 150) that there were no men, either barbarian or Greek, amongst whom prayers were not offered through the name of Jesus crucified (*Dialog. cum Tryphone*, n. 117). About the same time St. Irenæus testified that churches had been erected in Germany, Spain, Gaul, the East, Egypt, Lybia, Jerusalem and Judæa (*Adv. Hæreses*, Book I., c. 10, n. 2; Book III., c. 3, n. 2). At the beginning of the Third Century (A.D. 200) Tertullian wrote: "We are of yesterday, and we have filled your cities, islands, strongholds, free-towns, market-places, camps, tribes, decurias, the palace, the senate, the forum. We leave to you only your temples" (*Apologet.* c. 37). It was stated by others that the greater part of Carthage was Christian (*Ad. Scapulam* c. 5).

The existence of multitudes of Christians was noted by Pagan writers, such as Tacitus (*Annals*, Book XV., c. 44) and Pliny, junior, who was proprætor in Bithynia and found many Christians there (*Epis.* 97). Harnack admits that at the beginning of the Fourth Century (A.D. 300) Christianity prevailed in Asia Minor, Thrace, Cyprus, Edessa; it was spread in Cœle-Syria, Egypt, in South and Central Italy, in proconsular Africa and Numidia, in Spain, Greece and Southern Gaul (*"Die Mission und Ausbreitung des Christentums in den ersten drei Jahrhunderten,"* 2nd Ed., 1906, Vol. II., Book IV.).

(B) Social diffusion.

Many Christians were of the common people; the prophecy was fulfilled "to the poor the Gospel is preached" (*Is.* xxix. 19). St. Paul writes: "See your

vocation, brethren, that there are not many wise according to the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble: but the foolish things of the world hath God chosen that he may confound the wise: and the weak things of the world hath God chosen that he may confound the strong" (1 *Cor.* i. 26, 27). All the more wonderful that rich men and wise men became Christians.

(a) Rich men and women.

Sergius Paulus, proconsul; Dionysius the Areopagite (*Acts* xiii. 12; xvii. 34). Titus Flavius Clemens and his family and some from the house of Cæsar (*Philipp.* iv. 3, 22). St. Cyprian (*Epist.* 80, 1), writing at the time of Valerian, notes that not a few were Christians amongst centurions, and tribunes. In the epistles of St. Paul and in the Acts of the Apostles many noble women are mentioned, including Priscilla, wife of Aquila (*Acts* xviii. 2, 26; xvii. 4, 12; 1 *Cor.* vii. 12; xi. 5; *Rom.* xvi. 1, 3, 6, 7, 13, 15), and Pomponia Græcina (*Tac. Annal* xiii. 32). Eusebius, in his *Ecclesiastical History* (vi. 21, 36; viii. 1) mentions wives of illustrious men, such as Domitilla, Marcia, Julia, Mammæa, Severa wife of Philip, wife and daughter of Diocletian, wife of the prefect of Rome in the reign of Maxentius. Many suffered martyrdom for the Faith.

(b) Learned men, many of whom defended the Faith.

Dionysius the Areopagite, Apollo of Alexandria, Justin, Athenagoras, Aristides, Irenæus, Tertullian, Cyprian, Clement of Alexandria, Origen and the Alexandrian school. Arnobius (*Adv. Gentes*, Book II., 5) writes: "Orators of high gifts, grammarians, rhetoricians, doctors of law and of medicine, philosophers exploring secrets seek this (Christian) teaching, having surrendered the doctrine they formerly believed."

Hence during the first three centuries, Christianity spread with rapidity throughout the Roman Empire and beyond its limits, and was diffused in all grades of society.

II.—Christianity thus diffused had a wonderful moral effect.

Many men putting aside vicious habits, unnatural crimes, the pride of worldly wisdom, were converted so as to lead a chaste, humble life of poverty. Representatives from every condition of life succeeded in "believing things so obscure, achieving things so difficult, hoping for things so lofty" (*St. Thomas*, c. *Gentes*, Book I.,

c. 6). Family life, the dignity of woman, the condition of slaves—the whole of society was reconstructed in a spirit of charity and justice.

St. Justin wrote: "They who formerly found pleasure in impurity now lead a chaste life. We who used to employ magical arts have consecrated ourselves to God . . . we, who indulged in hatred and murder now live together and pray for our enemies" (1 *Apol. n.* 14).

Lactantius wrote: "Take the case of a man who is irascible, scurrilous, unbridled in passion; through the influence of a few words of God I will make him as gentle as a lamb. Suppose the case of a man who is avaricious, greedy, stingy, I will make him generous, bestowing his money with both hands; a man, who fears pain and death, will despise the cross, the fire, the bull of Phalaris; an impure man, an adulterer, a debauchee will be seen sober, chaste, self-controlled; an unjust, foolish, sinful man will become gentle, prudent, innocent. All wickedness will disappear in the waters of regeneration" (*Inst. div. Book III., c. 26*).

Eusebius bears witness in the case of Persians, Scythians, Bactrians and others, who had indulged in horrible and unnatural sins: "The beastly plague of so many evils has been put to flight by the power of the Gospel law" (*Præparatio Evangelica, Book I., c. 4*).

Pagan writers—the younger Pliny (*Book X., Epist. 97*), Lucianus (*de morte Peregrini*), the Emperor Julian (*Apud Sozom. His. Eccl., Book V., c. 26*) praise Christians for their virtue and charity. Fr. Gatti, O.P., in his *Apologetic* (Vol. III. p. 217) contrasts the pagan idea of virtue, lauded by philosophers, with the Christian ideal directed to the glory and honour of God.

III.—Obstacles to be overcome.

(A) Acceptance of doctrine and worship.

"We preach Christ crucified, unto the Jews indeed a stumbling block, and unto the Gentiles foolishness" (1 *Cor. i. 23*).

(a) Jews.

The Jews expected a temporal Messiah, and they were unwilling to regard as true God Him whom they crucified. They were scandalised at the defeat (as it appeared to them) of Christ. They were unwilling to reject the rites and ceremonies of the Mosaic Law.

(b) Gentiles.

The idea of the death of God, of the voluntary sacrifice made by a just and wise man—such ideas were foolishness to Gentile thought. Moreover, according to Christian teaching, pagan idolatrous statues must be destroyed, pagan temples overthrown, pagan sacrifices and superstitious practices regarded with abhorrence.

(B) Reformation of morals.

The Christian ethical system was hateful to pagan corrupt society, as it declared war on cupidity and pride. St. John wrote: "Love not the world, nor the things that are in the world . . . all that is in the world is the concupiscence of the flesh, concupiscence of the eyes, and pride of life" (1 *John ii. 15, 16*).

(C) Persecutions.

Pagans were willing to tolerate forms of religion which could be reconciled with the worship in vogue throughout the Empire, but the Christian religion, which necessarily excludes all others, was hateful to them. In virtue of the law, Christians of a humble class were thrown to wild beasts, or burned alive; the better class were beheaded. Impediments therefore in the way of acceptance of Christian teaching, and of reformation of morals, were very great in number and severity during the three centuries of persecution.

IV.—Natural means available for the recommendation of Christianity were feeble.

(A) Both the use of violent means and, on the other hand, the inducement of pleasure were impossible: "the weapons of our warfare are not carnal" (2 *Cor. x. 4*).

(B) Natural eloquence and wisdom could not avail. What culture, knowledge of philosophy, power of eloquent exposition did the Apostles possess? St. Augustine notes: "The world believed in a small number of poor, weak, unskilled men, because Divine power itself, through witnesses so contemptible, brought conviction in a very wonderful way" (*de Civ. Dei., Book XXII., c. 5*). St. Paul wrote to the Corinthians: "I, brethren, when I came to you, came not in loftiness of speech or of wisdom, declaring unto you the testimony of Christ. For I judged not myself to know anything among you but Jesus Christ and Him crucified. And I was with you in weakness and in fear and in much

trembling: And my speech and my preaching were not in persuasive words of human wisdom, but in showing of the spirit and power: that your faith might not stand on the wisdom of men, but on the power of God" (1 Cor. ii. 2-5).

Conclusion: The disproportion between natural means and the wonderful propagation of Christianity is manifest. St. Thomas wrote: "It would be more wonderful than all miracles if the world without miracle had been induced by simple and poor men to accept doctrines so obscure, to achieve works so difficult, to cherish hopes so lofty" (*c. Gentes, Book I., c. 6*). St. Augustine has the following words: "If you do not believe in miracles, the one great miracle suffices that the whole world believed without miracles" (*de Civ. Dei., Book XXII., c. 5*).

Such wonderful conversion of multitudes was as it were the Seal of God in confirmation of the Divinity of the Christian Faith.

In Chapter xv. of the *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* Gibbon attempts to account on natural grounds for the rapid propagation of Christianity. He assigns as intrinsic causes (1) the evident truth of Christian ethics, and as a consequence the purity of life of Christians; (2) the promise of eternal happiness; (3) the zeal wherewith Christians preached their faith as being alone true and necessary for salvation. The extrinsic causes assigned were (1) unity of the Roman Empire; (2) the insufficiency of pagan philosophy; (3) the invasion of barbarian races who became Christian.

Answer: As regards supposed intrinsic causes: (1) many Christian dogmas are obscure and incomprehensible; (2) there was threat of eternal punishment as well as a promise of eternal happiness; (3) Jews and Pagans adopted Christianity because they saw evident signs of its truth.

Concerning the supposed extrinsic causes: (1) if unity of the Empire helped the propagation of Christianity, it helped also the persecuting and destructive forces opposed to it; (2) Platonism and Stoicism were widely held under the Emperors Antoninus, Marcus Aurelius, etc.; (3) when the barbarian races invaded the Empire, they found Christianity widely established. They adopted the Christian Faith, like Jews, Romans and Greeks, because of the motives of credibility—miracles, sublimity of

Christian doctrine, extraordinary sanctity attained under the influence of the Church, heroic fortitude of Christian martyrs under persecution, etc. (*Cf. Cardinal Newman: Grammar of Assent*).

Art. 2.—Sanctity of the Church as shewn in its spiritual fecundity, and in the constancy of its martyrs.

Extraordinary and manifest sanctity is a Divine sign, as it can come from God alone. Heroic sanctity implies the prompt, easy, frequent performance of arduous works exceeding the usual capabilities of man.

I.—The Church possesses the principles and means of sanctity for all. This is clear as regards doctrine, worship, and discipline.

(A) Doctrine.

The Church, now as in the first ages of Christianity, teaches the whole doctrine of Christ, as contained in Scripture and Tradition. The Church has opposed errors *per excessum*, and errors *per defectum*—Monophysitism and Nestorianism as regards Christ, Arianism and Sabellianism as regards the Trinity, Pelagianism and Jansenism as regards grace, rigorism and laxity as regards conscience. The Church encourages generous souls to follow the practice of the evangelical counsels, of self-denial, and to imitate, as far as their state of life allows, the example of Christ Our Lord.

(B) Worship.

The Church treasures the Sacrifice of the Mass, in which "the same Christ, is, without the shedding of His blood, contained and offered, who once for all with the shedding of His blood offered Himself on the altar of the Cross" (*Conc. Trid. Sess. xxii., c. 2*). By the Sacrifice of the Mass, the merits of Christ's Passion are applied, and the fruit of Redemption offered to us. The Church treasures the Sacraments as channels of Divine Grace. The Church stresses the need of prayers and of other good works.

(C) Discipline.

Laws of the Church impose duties of hearing Mass on Sundays and Holy days, Annual Communion, fasting and abstinence, etc.

II.—The extraordinary sanctity of the Church appears in the heroic constancy of its martyrs.

1^o Number of Martyrs.

In 1684 H. Dodwell wrote a dissertation entitled *The fewness of the Martyrs*, in which he attempted to prove that the persecutions were not general. Ruinart, in his *Acta Martyrum*, examined and confuted his thesis.

From A.D. 64 to A.D. 313 there were according to Lactantius six persecutions. It is certain that many thousands of martyrs suffered in the city of Rome alone. According to Tacitus (*Annal. xv. 43-45*) "*multitudo ingens*," i.e., a great multitude of Christians were put to death under Nero A.D. 64. Eusebius relates (*Hist. Eccl. iii., c. 33*) that in the reign of Trajan (A.D. 98-117) many suffered, in the reign of Marcus Aurelius (A.D. 164-180) great numbers of martyrs bore their testimony both within and without the boundaries of the Empire (*Hist. Eccl. V., c. 1*). Similarly under Severus, there were martyrs in all the Churches, especially at Alexandria (*Hist. Eccl. VI., c. 1*). So also (*Hist. Eccl. VII., c. 11*) of the persecution under Decius (A.D. 250-251). In the reigns of Diocletian and Maximian (A.D. 250-251) "batches" of Christians were burned, as Lactantius (*De morte persecut. c. 16*), Eusebius (*Hist. Eccl. VIII. c. 3-13*), and Sulpicius Severus (*Historia Sacra II., c. 32*) relate. In the Catacombs, inscriptions have been discovered: "Marcella and Martyrs of Christ ccccl." (550), "CL. (150) Martyrs of Christ," etc. St. Cyprian declared (*De exhortatione Martyrii, c. xi.*) that martyrs were too numerous to be reckoned. Sozomenus estimates (*Hist. Eccl., Book II., c. xiv.*) that in Persia under Sapor 190,000 Christians suffered. Subsequently, in Mahometan countries, in Japan, China, Annam, Asia, Africa, the testimony of blood has been without intermission (Cf. E. Le Blant, *Les persecuteurs et les martyrs*).

2° Social condition of those who suffered.

Martyrs included not only unlettered men, such as Theodotus, Severus, etc., but nobles as Favius Clemens, Appollonius; learned men as Justin, Irenæus, Cyprian; not only men physically strong as the soldiers, Victor, Sebastian, Mauritius, but women, Perpetua, Cecilia, Agatha, Blandina, Potamiana; old men, Polycarp and Simeon; boys and girls as Tharcisius, Quiricus, Eulalia, Agnes.

3° Motive, for the cause of which they suffered, was filial reverence towards God, and faith in Christ, the Son of God.

The Greek word "martyr" means "witness."

As St. Thomas notes "all works of virtue, referred to God, are as it were protestation of Faith. Hence John the Baptist was a martyr, though he died, not because he would not deny the Faith, but because he denounced the adultery of Herod" (1^a 11^{ae} q. 124 a 5).

Christianity was regarded as an obstinate superstition (*Pliny Ep. x. 97*). Occurrence of calamities was attributed to the Christians: "If the Tiber overflows its banks, if the Nile does not spread its waters over the fields . . . if there is famine or pestilence, let the Christians be thrown to the lions" (*Christianos ad leonem*), so wrote Tertullian (*Apolog. c. 40*). Christians were loyal subjects of the Empire. They were persecuted, not for their political, but for their religious, views: "You shall be brought before governors and before kings for my sake for a testimony to them and to the Gentiles" (*Matt. x. 18*).

4° Torments.

Some of the physical tortures are described by Tacitus (*Annal. xv. 41*). Christians were covered with skins of wild beasts, that they might be torn to pieces by dogs; others were crucified; others again burned to death, their bodies having been smeared with inflammable material so that they might serve as lights in the night time. Tertullian (*Apolog. xii.*), Lactantius (*Div. Inst., Book V., c. 11*) and Eusebius (*Hist. Eccl., Book VII., c. 10-12*) bear witness that Christians were thrown to wild beasts, impaled, burned by the application of torches, their limbs broken, their flesh torn so that there was no place for further wounding.

Moral torments were not less severe. Not only were families reduced to extreme poverty, but martyrs were called upon to withstand the tears of parents, wife and children. As prophesied by Our Lord: "He who loveth father or mother more than me is not worthy of me; he that loveth son or daughter more than me is not worthy of me" (*Matt. x. 37*).

5° Heroic Fortitude.

Martyrdom is an act of fortitude which represses fear. To repress fear is a more difficult achievement than to moderate boldness. Fortitude is not a virtue unless in association with other virtues; it must be under the direction of prudence so as to give strength for the achievement of good apart from the obstinacy of pride.

Heroic fortitude accomplishes works exceeding the ordinary capabilities of man, promptly, cheerfully, and if occasion needs, frequently (*Bened. xiv. de Canon Sanct., Book III., c. 21*).

Martyrs endured atrocious torments with the following dispositions: (1) as they were human they felt fear sometimes, but prayed and repressed this passion; (2) they were not carried away by feelings of desperation, but quite tranquilly bore their sufferings; (3) their fortitude was joined to charity, faith, hope, prudence, justice, chastity, humility, meekness, and like Our Lord and St. Stephen they prayed for their executioners; (4) they went cheerfully to death as if they were going to victory, and their joy continued in the midst of torments. Like the Apostles, "they went from the presence of the Council rejoicing that they were accounted worthy to suffer reproach for the name of Jesus" (*Acts v. 41*) (*Cf. Sulpicius Severus, Hist. Sacra. Book II., c. 32; St. Hilarius Tract. in Ps. 65 n. 21; Tertullian Ad. Scapulam, c. 5*).

The words of St. Ignatius (*Ep. ad. Rom. n. 4-5*) are well known: "I am the wheat of God: I shall be ground by the teeth of wild beasts, so that I may become the pure bread of Christ." Words of thanksgiving and of joy were spoken by SS. Polycarp, Irenæus, Cyprian, Felix, Victor, Vincentius, Theodorus, etc. (*Cf. Ruinart Acta Martyrum*). Women bore their testimony in the same heroic way, e.g., SS. Perpetua and Felicitas, Blandina, etc.

6° This heroic fortitude is a miracle of the moral order.

Major: Such fortitude implies heroic acts of the principal virtues often repeated—heroic acts accomplished by countless men, women, girls of every social condition, accomplished cheerfully and constantly in the midst of physical and moral torments, without any hope of temporal reward unless in the abandonment of their faith.

Minor: But heroic acts of the principal virtues cannot be accomplished so often, so cheerfully and constantly, amidst atrocious sufferings by multitudes of all conditions of life, age, and sex, and accomplished without human motive, unless there be an extraordinary intervention of Divine assistance.

Conclusion: Therefore the fortitude of the martyrs, all circumstances considered, is a miracle of the moral order.

The Major of this syllogism is historically certain.

The Minor is proved in a twofold way—indirectly by excluding natural causes as insufficient, and directly, by showing in the constancy of the martyrs extraordinary sanctity—the work of God.

(a) Indirect proof.

Rationalists see in the constancy of the martyrs only fanaticism and the hope of praise.

Fanaticism is blind obstinacy, far removed from the wisdom, prudence, moderation, meekness, which the martyrs manifested. In their case the words of St. Paul were exemplified: "We are reviled and we bless: we are persecuted and we suffer it: we are blasphemed and we entreat: we are made as the refuse of the world, and the offscouring of all even until now" (*1 Cor. iv. 12, 13*).

The hope of praise cannot explain the constancy of the martyrs. They were as humble as they were magnanimous, and this union of virtues points to the special help of God. Moreover, many martyrs were secretly executed, and the hope of praise could not enter in.

(b) Direct proof.

The extraordinary sanctity shewn by the martyrs implies the special help of God. Martyrdom is a sign of the highest degree of charity, and charity joined to other virtues, charity joyful in the crisis of horrible torture, manifests its supernatural origin. Hence the fact to which an appeal is made, is the constancy of martyrs in so far as it is miraculous and manifestly different from the obstinacy of fanatics.

Rationalists object: the constancy of martyrs can be explained by natural causes. Other instances of the same constancy are shewn by soldiers in battle, by the heroism of men like Regulus and Scævola. Again, until recent times, widows in India mounted the funeral pyres of their dead husbands and sacrificed their lives. The Montanists and more modern Anabaptists died for their religious opinions. Recently (in 1885-1886) Protestants in Uganda died for their Christian beliefs.

Answer: The Church teaches that those who in good faith and good dispositions die for their religious beliefs are martyrs in the sight of God. In the other cases cited above, fanaticism, enthusiasm, military discipline, explain the bravery and constancy manifested. The argument based upon the supernatural constancy of the martyrs of the Church includes (1) number of martyrs up to the

present time; (2) their social condition and condition of age and sex; (3) the horrible character of the torments physical and moral; (4) the cheerfulness and serenity wherewith they suffered, joined with charity, humility, meekness, prayer for persecutors; (5) miracles wrought in confirmation of their sanctity.

III.—The Church produces unceasingly heroic saints.

(1) To write down a catalogue of the Saints would require too much time and space. Only a few names can be given:

(a) Great doctors of the Church: St. Ambrose, St. Augustine, St. Jerome, St. Cyril, St. Chrysostom, etc.

(b) Great Apostles of the Faith: St. Patrick in Ireland, St. Augustine in England, St. Methodius in Russia, St. Boniface in Frisia, St. Willibald in Germany, etc.

(c) Saints in the chair of Peter: SS. John I, Felix IV, Agapitus, Sylvester, Gregory the Great, Martin I, Eugenius I, Vitalianus, Agatho, Leo II, Benedict II, Sergius I, Pius V, etc.

(d) Great founders of religious orders: St. Benedict, patriarch of the West; St. Bernard (Cistercians); St. Norbert (Premonstratentians); St. Dominic; St. Francis, etc.

(e) Great scholastics: St. Anselm, St. Thomas Aquinas, St. Bonaventure, etc.

(f) Great preachers of the Faith: St. Vincent Ferrer, St. Bernardine of Siena, St. Anthony of Padua, etc.

(g) Great women Saints: St. Gertrude, St. Hildegarde, St. Clare, St. Catherine of Siena, St. Catherine of Genoa, etc.

(h) Saints and Kings: SS. Louis, Henry, Leopold, Stanislaus, Elizabeth of Hungary, etc.

After the so-called Reformation, the Church has been glorified by SS. Ignatius, Theresa, John of the Cross, Francis of Sales, Francis Xavier, Louis Bertrand, Philip Neri, Charles Borromeo, Vincent of Paul, Paul of the Cross, Alphonsus Liguori, Margaret Mary Alacoque, Curé of Ars, etc.

Compare with these men Luther, Calvin, Zwingli, Henry VIII, Elizabeth—lights of the Reformation!

Compare with the Saints of the Church Photius, M. Cæciliarius, Georgius Cyprinus, Marcus Ephesinus, who were responsible for the Eastern Schism.

(2) Pastoral Clergy, Religious Orders and Institutes.

The Catholic clergy, bound to celibacy, win, now as in the past, the respect and affection of their people throughout the Church.

Religious Orders and Institutes are so many schools of perfection for the attainment of sanctity through the practice of the Evangelical Counsels and earnest endeavour to imitate the example of Christ. Some devote themselves to the active life, *e.g.*, Sisters of Charity, Teaching Institutes, Jesuits, Redemptorists, etc. Others choose the contemplative life, *e.g.*, Trappists, Carthusians, Carmelites, Poor Clares, etc.

(3) The Christian virtues are cherished in the Catholic Church.

No Society cherishes the Christian ideal as the Catholic Church does both by word and example. Père Lacordaire has written on the effect of the practice of Chastity, Humility and Charity. Chastity represses lust (which corrupts the sources of life) and preserves the sanctity of matrimony. Humility expels ambition, boasting, arrogance. Charity conquers egoism, and observes not only the law of justice, but goes far beyond justice in its care of the infirm, the indigent, the fallen, etc.

Luther made the acknowledgment that "the world has become worse. Men are now more desirous of revenge, more avaricious, more remote from sentiments of mercy, more immodest and undisciplined than they were under the Papacy" (*Postilla in Evang. dom. 1 Adv.*). Scandals amongst Catholics occur in the case of those who do not practise their religion, and do not avail themselves of the means of sanctity offered by the Church.

IV.—Inexhaustible spiritual fecundity of the Church.

(1) The Church's influence upon individuals.

The Church has liberated individual men and women from errors regarding God, the world, morality; warns them against materialism, determinism, utilitarianism; preaches the Gospel and offers the means of salvation to all—to the unlettered and poor as well as to the rich and learned.

(2) The Church's influence on family life.

The Church has protected and protects the dignity of woman, and the indissolubility of the marriage tie. Luther, Bucer and Melancthon allowed Philip, landgrave

of Hesse in 1540, to live with Margaret of Saal, whilst his lawful wife Christina was alive. "The most efficacious means of raising man," so wrote de Maistre (*Le Pape, Book III., c. 2*) is to ennoble and exalt woman."

The Church provides for the education of children by founding innumerable orphanages, schools, colleges, universities. Confraternities have been instituted to help young and old to practise virtue and to persevere therein.

The Church secured gradually the emancipation of slaves. The treasures of the Church, which is no respecter of persons, are offered to the lowest as well as to the highest. Slaves have been admitted to the priesthood. A slave—Callistus—became Pope. Christ by his example ennobled labour.

In the Church's attitude towards slavery, the excellence of Christian charity over Pagan ethics is shewn. Aristotle maintained that "one man may be usefully subjected to the rule of a wiser man" (*1 Polit. c. 3*). Indeed before the diffusion of Christianity slavery was regarded as necessary, because the majority of men were not sufficiently wise and rightly disposed to enjoy civil liberty. Religion alone can confer rectitude of judgment and of will on the uneducated, so that they may not abuse their liberty.

(3) The Church's influence on civil society.

(A) The Church has fixed the just relation between social authority and individual liberty, by teaching that all power comes from God, and should be directed to the common good. In this way authority is strengthened: "He that resisteth the power resisteth the ordinance of God" (*Rom. xiii. 2*). Obedience is rendered noble, for obedience given to legitimate authority is obedience given to God.

(B) The Church endeavours to provide for the necessities of the poor and the ailing. Its motto has always been: "Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy." The encyclical of Leo XIII, *Rerum Novarum*, defended the claim of the workman for a wage which will secure *honestam sustentationem*, i.e., a respectable maintenance for himself and his family. On the other hand the Pope, in his encyclical *Quod Apostolici Muneris*, condemned that form of Socialism which does not recognise rights of property and aims at community of goods.

(C) The Church has endeavoured to stabilise amicable

relations between different countries. It places the law of charity and of Christian fraternity above individual laws of nations. The Church's ideal is "Christendom"—a much more statesmanlike aim than "Internationalism." Nationalism, since the so-called Reformation, does not mean patriotism so much as jealousy and hatred of other nations. False nationalism and militarism—evil offspring of evil parentage—have caused the world-tragedy of 1914-1918. Until the "God of peace" who is "King of kings and Lord of lords" is duly honoured and obeyed, there can be no hope for the permanent well-being of nations.

Art. 3.—Catholic Unity and the unshaken Stability of the Church.

If men of all times and all nations, notwithstanding diversities of language, temperament, ideas, governments, are joined in the unity of faith, worship, and ecclesiastical discipline; moreover if this Catholic unity, impediments and causes of ruin notwithstanding, remains in vigour, whilst other forms of religion either split into opposing sects, or stagnate in the immobility of death, such unity is a sign of the special intervention of God, who alone, in the midst of causes that make for diversity, can produce and preserve the extraordinary stability wherewith the Church is endowed.

I.—The Catholic Church alone is one.

1° The Catholic Church is endowed with unity of faith, worship and discipline.

(A) Unity of Faith.

All the faithful, believing what the Church teaches, believe, at least implicitly, the whole body of revealed truth as handed down from the time of the Apostles. They accept the same symbols of faith, interpreted in the same way. In matters which are not of faith, there is liberty of opinion. The Church's position is expressed by the well-known aphorism: "*In necessariis unitas, in dubiis libertas, in omnibus caritas.*"

(B) Unity of worship.

The Sacrifice of the Mass and the Seven Sacraments are accepted and revered by all.

(C) Unity of discipline.

The clergy and faithful ("*ecclesia discens*") are subject to the Bishops and the Bishops to the Pope. The

Pope and Bishops constitute the "*ecclesia docens*." All obey the same laws. In disputed matters the decisions of the Roman Congregations, or of the Pope himself are accepted.

2° Formal unity is absent in other religious systems.

(A) Protestantism.

(a) In matters of faith, there are Lutherans, Calvinists, Anglicans. The system of "private judgment" is essentially fatal to unity. Some Liberal Protestants do not accept even the Divinity of Christ, except in a symbolic or metaphorical sense.

(b) In worship, some believe in two Sacraments, others only in Baptism, others again entirely reject the Sacramental system.

(c) In discipline or government, there are Episcopalians and non-Episcopalians.

(B) The Greek Church.

There is no formal unity. No patriarch is head of the whole Greek Church. There are now amongst the Greeks some fourteen independent churches.

II.—Catholicity belongs exclusively to the "Catholic" Church.

1° The Church is Catholic.

(A) Virtual Catholicity, or Catholicity *de jure* means the aptitude of the Church to universal extension amongst all nations. This aptitude prevails over individualism and nationalism as regards doctrine, rule and worship.

(a) The Church's doctrine must be preached to all men according to the will of Christ. This doctrine transcends the particular characteristics of individuals, of human social conditions, of peoples, places and times.

(b) In its government the Church is not national but international or supra-national. It is subjected to no State and to no Cæsar. It recognises the authority of all legitimate governments whatever their form may be. Its own government and power are purely moral.

(c) In its worship also the Church is universal. The offering of the sacrificial Victim in the Mass, and the grace of the Sacraments are intended for all.

(B) Actual Catholicity, or Catholicity *de facto*.

(a) Geographical extension.

Before the revolt of Luther, the whole of Europe was Catholic. When Protestantism arose, Catholic mission-

aries spread the faith to India, China, Japan. The number of Catholics to-day is not far removed from 300,000,000. South and Central America are Catholic. In the United States, Catholics number more than 16,000,000. In Asia there are 3,500,000; in Africa 3,000,000; in Australia 2,000,000; in the Philippine Islands 6,000,000. Even in Protestant countries, the Catholic Church has many adherents: in Great Britain 5,200,000; in Germany 20,000,000; in Holland 1,790,000; in Switzerland 1,380,000, etc. The list is not exhaustive. It is quoted merely to shew the Church possesses a *moral* universality, *i.e.*, amidst well-known nations, a notable number of men and women have become members of the Church. The super-human mode of diffusion is of greater account than the material number of the faithful, and this mode of diffusion appears from the following characteristic.

(b) The Catholic Church comprises people of all conditions. The poor are evangelised. Lepers, literal and metaphorical, are cared for. Education is encouraged. Sixty-two Universities have been founded under the auspices of the Popes. The Church has been the Alma Mater of the Arts. Architecture, Sculpture, Painting, Music, Poetry, have reached their highest development under ecclesiastical patronage. The Church has favoured scientific research. Only a few of the many Catholic scientists can be given here:

Astronomy: Copernicus, Secchi.
 Biology: Pasteur, Abbot Mendel.
 Crystallography: Abbé Haüy.
 Electricity: Ampère, Volta.
 Inductive Science: Roger Bacon.
 Mathematics: Cauchy, Le Verrier.
 Medicine: Bernard.
 Nature Study: Fabre.
 Physics: Galileo.
 Wireless Telegraphy: Marconi.
 X-Rays: Röntgen.

2° The note of Catholicity is absent in other forms of religion.

(A) Protestantism.

(1) Even virtual Catholicity is absent, because of the spirit of individualism resulting in divisions.

(2) In some place (*e.g.*, England) Protestantism was propagated by persecution.

(3) In Germany, England, Scandinavia, Protestantism depends on the State and is national.

(4) Protestants, though numbering about 150 sects, are numerically fewer than Catholics.

(5) Protestant missionary work is feeble.

(B) Greek Church.

(1) The Greek Church is not *one* and therefore not Catholic. The churches at Constantinople, in Russia, in Greece, and in Bulgaria are independent one of the other; and are largely subject to the State.

(2) These churches excel neither in numbers, extension, or power of propagation. They are destitute of vitality.

III.—The Catholic Church alone possesses unshaken stability.

1° It is stable, many persecutions notwithstanding. The Church has survived:

(a) Persecutions of the first three centuries.

(b) Arianism, which drew many away from the Church.

(c) Julian the Apostate, who used the influence of Pagan philosophy, and the prestige of his position as Emperor to destroy the Church.

(d) The invasion of barbarous nations.

(e) The schism of Photius in the Ninth Century.

(f) The attacks made by Mahomet, Albigenses, etc.

(g) The revolt of Protestantism in the Sixteenth Century.

(h) Philosophism of the Eighteenth Century and the French Revolution.

2° Stability is absent in other churches.

(A) Protestantism.

"Private judgment" is a principle of individualism and change. Even fundamental truths such as the Incarnation, Redemption, Trinity, are sometimes rejected.

(B) Greek Churches.

These churches do not form an organic body. They lie in the immobility of death.

IV.—The foregoing "marks" of the Catholic Church cannot be explained by natural causes. They are the fulfilment of prophecy.

1° These four characteristics—Unity, Catholicity, Sanctity, Stability—found only in the Catholic Church have not been attained and cannot be attained by the

natural means adopted by the other churches for their propagation and conservation.

2° The Sanctity of the Church shewn in its Saints and Martyrs, shewn in its fecundity in beneficent works, is extraordinary and implies the special intervention of God. The philosophic axiom ("*ordo agentium debet correspondere ordini finium*") stresses the principle that the order of action must correspond to the order of intention, and only as the minister of God could the Church lead souls to sanctity.

3° Catholic Unity is a greater achievement than natural causes can produce. The more universal the society, the more difficult the unity. Empires and kingdoms, sprung from natural causes, disappear in process of time.

4° The stability of the Church for nearly 2,000 years should be considered in view of (a) the mutability of human minds, of human institutions, of religious and philosophical opinions; (b) violent and numerous persecutions, unjust demands and confiscations of secular powers, the criticism of Religion based on pseudo-science; (c) the weakness of the natural means available for the Church's support.

5° In this wonderful life of the Church is seen the fulfilment of prophecy:

"Arise, be enlightened, O Jerusalem, for thy light has come and the glory of the Lord is risen upon thee. . . . Gentiles shall walk in thy light, and kings in the brightness of thy rising" (*Isaias lx. 1, 3*).

"Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it" (*Matt. xvi. 18*).

"Other sheep I have that are not of this fold. Them also I must bring, and they shall hear my voice, and there shall be one fold and one shepherd" (*John x. 16*).

"You shall be my witnesses even to the uttermost parts of the earth" (*Acts i. 8*).

"Going therefore teach all nations. . . . I am with you all days even to the end of the world" (*Matt. xxviii. 19*).

The declaration of the Vatican Council is justified: The Church is a "perpetual motive of credibility and an irrefragable testimony of its own Divine mission" (*D. 1794*).

CHAPTER XXV

CHRIST'S TESTIMONY IS CONFIRMED BY HIS MIRACLES

Art. 1.—The Miracles of Christ.

I.—Rationalistic and Modernistic views.

Many Rationalists maintain that miracles are *à priori* impossible, and therefore deny either the historical reality of the Gospel miracles, or their supernatural character. So wrote Paulus (+ 1851) and Strauss (+ 1874). Others like Renan are of opinion that cures were effected by mental suggestion, and that such cures were exaggerated and idealised later on. Harnack's view is practically the same as that of Renan (*Cf.* Renan, *Vie de Jésus*, ch. xvi.; A. Réville, *Jésus de Nazareth*, t. ii.; Stapfer, *Jésus-Christ pendant son ministère*; O. Holtzmann, *Leben Jesu*; Jülicher, *Einleitung in das N. Test*; A. Harnack, *Das Wesen des Christentums*).

II.—Classification of the miracles of Christ.

St. Thomas classifies the miracles as follows :

(a) Miracles in connexion with spiritual substances.

1. Man in synagogue of Capharnaum, possessed by unclean spirit (*Mark i. 23-28; Luke iv. 33-37*).
2. Gerasenes (*Matt. viii. 28-34; Mark v. 1-20; Luke viii. 26-39*).
3. Lunatic (*Matt. xvii. 14-20; Mark ix. 13-28; Luke ix. 37-44*).
4. Deaf-mute (*Matt. ix. 32-34; Luke xi. 14-15*).
5. Blind-mute (*Matt. xii. 22-23*).
6. Daughter of Chananæan woman (*Matt. xv. 21-28; Mark vii. 24-30*).
7. Woman with spirit of infirmity (*Luke xiii. 11-16*).
8. Mary Magdalene (*Mark xvi. 9; Luke viii. 2*).
9. Many possessed with devils (*Matt. viii. 16; Luke vi. 17, 18*).
10. Angels with Christ in the desert (*Matt. iv. 11*).
11. Angel in Garden of Gethsemani (*Luke xxii. 43*).

(b) Miracles in connexion with celestial bodies.

1. Nativity star (*Matt. ii. 2*).
2. Darkness for three hours at death of Christ (*Luke xxiii. 44*).

(c) Miracles wrought on men and women.

1. Resurrection of daughter of Jairus (*Matt. ix. 18-26*).
2. Resurrection of widow's son (*Luke vii. 11-17*).
3. Resurrection of Lazarus (*John xi. 1-45*).
4. Cleansing of eleven lepers (*Matt. viii. 1-4; Mark i. 40-45; Luke v. 12-14; xvii. 12-19*).
5. Cure of three paralytics (*Matt. ix. 1-7; Mark ii. 1-12; Luke v. 18-26; Matt. viii. 5-13; Luke vii. 2-10; John v. 1-9*).
6. Restoration of sight to seven blind (*Matt. ix. 27-31; xx. 29-34; Mark viii. 22-26; x. 46-52; Luke xviii. 35-43*).
7. Cure of woman with issue of blood (*Matt. ix. 20-22; Mark v. 25-34; Luke viii. 43-48*).
8. Cure of Peter's mother-in-law (*Matt. viii. 14-15; Mark i. 29-31; Luke iv. 38-39*).
9. Cure of Ruler's son (*John iv. 46-53*).
10. Restoration of withered hand (*Matt. xii. 9-13*).
11. Cure of dropsical man (*Luke xiv. 1-6*).
12. Multitude healed of diseases (*Luke vi. 17-18*).

(d) Miracles wrought on irrational creatures.

1. Change of water into wine (*John ii. 1-11*).
2. Miraculous draught of fish (*Luke v. 1-11; John xxi. 1-13*).
3. Finding of the stater (*Matt. xvii. 23-26*).
4. Two multiplications of loaves (*Matt. xiv. 15-21; Mark vi. 39-44; Luke ix. 12-17; John vi. 5-15; Matt. xv. 32-38; Mark viii. 1-9*).
5. Calming of the storm (*Matt. viii. 18-27; Mark iv. 35-40*).
6. Walking on the waters (*Matt. xiv. 23-33; Mark vi. 47-52; John vi. 16-21*).
7. Withering of the fig-tree (*Matt. xxi. 18-21; Mark xi. 12-14; 20-22*).

(e) Christ gave to His Apostles the power of working miracles.

(*Luke x. 9; Matt. x. 8; Mark xvi. 17; John xiv. 12*).

"Devils are subject to us in thy name" (*Luke x. 17*).

Miracles are recorded in Acts ii. 43; iii. 8; v. 12; ix. 34-40; xix. 11-12; xx. 9-12.

III.—The miracles of Christ are historically certain.

1. The witnesses who relate the miracles of Christ relate other facts which are not called in question, and they were willing to suffer death, and actually did so suffer, in testimony of the truthfulness of their narrative.

2. The miracles recorded were facts which appealed to the senses, and therefore could be judged by those who witnessed them.

3. The principal miracles of Christ were public. They were seen by such men as Nicodemus, Jairus, the Centurion, Zaccheus, Lazarus, Scribes and Pharisees, Priests and members of the Sanhedrin.

4. Regarding some miracles a juridical enquiry was held by the enemies of Christ (*Cf. John v. 10-16; ix. 1-34; xii. 9-10; Acts iv. 16*).

5. The simplicity of the Gospel narrative bears witness to its sincerity.

6. The miraculous facts are intimately connected with other facts of the life of Christ which cannot be denied. They are connected with His life, preaching, passion and death, so that if the miracles be denied, the Gospel narrative is destroyed not partially, but wholly. "Many believed in His name, seeing the signs which he did" (*John ii. 23*). Certain discourses of Christ were delivered on the occasion of some miracle (*Cf. John v., vi.*). Because of these miracles, and especially because of the resurrection of Lazarus, the chief priests and Pharisees conspired against Him, saying: "What shall we do, for this man doth many miracles?" (*John xi. 47-53*).

7. The epistles of St. Paul, whose authenticity is admitted by almost all Rationalists (the epistle to the Galatians and the two to the Corinthians were written according to Harnack and Jülicher about A.D. 53 or 54) formally assert the performance of miracles by the Apostles—miracles wrought in the name of Christ. *A fortiori* must Christ Himself have performed miracles.

8. The Apostles and the Fathers could not have so confidently appealed to the miracles of Christ if there were any doubt of their reality.

9. Jewish contemporaries and adversaries of Christ did not call in question His miracles, but attributed them to magic arts.

IV.—The miracles of Christ are supernatural.

Rationalists allow that raising from the dead is beyond the powers of nature, and accordingly they deny the historical truth of such miracles. Other miracles they assert to be purely natural effects, regarded as wonderful owing to ignorance of physical, or chemical, or biological, or psychological laws. To these assumptions the following replies may be made.

1. The Pharisees, their hostility notwithstanding, could not deny the resurrection of Lazarus.

2. Scribes and Pharisees attributed Christ's miraculous power to some superhuman agency, *e.g.*, Beelzebub (*Cf. Mark iii. 22 sq.*).

3. Instantaneous restoration of sight to one born blind, cure of leprosy, sudden change of water into wine, multiplication of loaves, resurrection of Lazarus—these achievements are clearly beyond the power of created agents.

4. The Divine origin of these miracles is confirmed by reflection upon the circumstances and results. Christ worked miracles solely for the glory of God, and the salvation of souls.

5. Confirmation also comes from the absurd hypotheses adopted to explain them away. It is well known that the power of mental suggestion by hypnotism or otherwise is effective only in cases of functional disorder, and that suggestion works gradually, whereas Christ wrought His miracles of healing, etc., instantaneously. Again suggestion does not work on those who are absent. Christ healed the Centurion's servant, and the daughter of the woman of Chananæan, though neither was present.

V.—The miracles of Christ were wrought in confirmation of His Divine mission.

(A) This fact has been declared several times by Christ.

When the disciples of John asked the question: "Art thou He that art to come, or look we for another?" Our Lord replied: "Go and relate to John what you have heard and seen. The blind see, the lame walk, lepers are cleansed, the deaf hear, the dead rise again, and the poor have the Gospel preached to them" (*Matt. xi. 4-6*).

Such miracles were foretold by Isaias as Messianic (*Is. xxxv. 5; lxi. 1*). Again "the works that I do in the name of my Father, they give testimony of me" (*John x. 25*).

(B) Christ raised Lazarus from the dead that "they (the people) may believe that Thou hast sent me" (*John xi. 42*). In several places it is recorded that many believed because of the miracles (*Cf. John ii. 11; iii. 2; ix. 35-38*).

(C) Christ shewed this proof of His Divine mission to be most certain and manifest when He spoke of His enemies: "If I had not come and spoken to them they would not have sin: but now they have no excuse for their sin" (*John xv. 22*).

Art. 2.—The Resurrection of Christ.

I.—The Resurrection of Christ is recorded not only in the Gospels but in the Acts of the Apostles, and the statement is made in the epistles of St. Paul that the Resurrection preached by the Apostles is the strongest motive of credibility.

Rationalists and Modernists have suggested at least four theories to explain away the Resurrection—the theories of fraud, exaggeration, hallucination and spiritual vision.

1° With the Deists of the Eighteenth Century, Reimarus resuscitated the explanation of the empty tomb given by Jewish priests and promulgated by Celsus, namely, that the Apostles had removed the body of Christ secretly, and were conscious liars regarding the Resurrection they proclaimed.

2° Some Rationalists, *e.g.*, Weizäcker (*Das Apostolische Zeitalter*) and Martineau (*The Seat of Authority*) maintained that the Apostles declared only in a general way that they had seen the Lord, meaning that they believed in His immortality. Disciples exaggerated the statement, and finally believed that Christ really rose from the dead.

3° Other Rationalists suggest that the Apostles suffered from hallucination (*Cf. Strauss, Renan, Harnack, Réville, Meyer, etc.*).

4° Not a few Rationalists, such as Keim, Ewald, Schenkel, Stapfer, etc., assert that Christ really appeared to the Apostles, but only spiritually. Amongst

Modernists E. Le Roy holds a somewhat similar theory. After death the soul of Christ continued to function, and therefore, according to pragmatic principles, we must act as if Christ had arisen bodily (*Dogme et Critique*). This opinion, based on pragmatism, has been condemned (D. 2026), as well as those of Loisy: (1) that the Resurrection was not a fact of the historical but of the liturgical order, and therefore not demonstrable, and (2) that the original belief in the Resurrection was not belief in the fact itself, but in the immortality of Christ (D. 2036 sq.).

II.—The importance of the Resurrection of Christ according to His own declarations and those of the Apostles.

(A) Christ Himself chose this sign as the seal of His miracles and as an irrefragable argument of His Divine mission.

(a) When the Pharisees said: "Master, we would see a sign from thee," Our Lord answered: "The Son of Man shall be in the heart of the earth three days and three nights" (*Matt. xii. 40; Luke xi. 29*). Again, speaking to Pharisees, Christ said: "Destroy this temple and in three days I will raise it up" (*John ii. 19; Mark xiv. 58*).

(b) To His disciples Christ predicted His Resurrection at least four times:

- (1) After the Confession of Peter (*Matt. xvi. 21; Mark viii. 31; Luke ix. 22*).
- (2) After His Transfiguration (*Matt. xvii. 22; Mark ix. 30*).
- (3) After His triumphal entry into Jerusalem (*Matt. xx. 19; Mark x. 34; Luke xviii. 33*).
- (4) After the Last Supper (*Matt. xxvi. 32; Mark xiv. 28*).

(c) There is further testimony of the prophecy from the blasphemy uttered against Him on the Cross: "Vah, thou that destroyest the temple of God and in three days buildest it up again—save thyself coming down from the cross" (*Matt. xxvi. 61; Mark xv. 29, 30*). After His death the chief priests and Pharisees went to Pilate saying: "Sir, we have remembered that the seducer said, whilst he was yet alive: after three days I will rise again. Command therefore the sepulchre to be guarded until the

third day: lest perhaps his disciples come and steal him away and say to the people, he is risen from the dead: and the last error shall be worse than the first" (*Matt. xxvii.*, 63, 64).

(B) The Apostles appealed to the Resurrection to confirm the truth of their preaching.

Mathias was chosen because he could testify to the Resurrection (*Acts i.* 22). Peter in his first sermon appealed to this miracle (*Acts ii.* 32-36). Paul, speaking to the Athenians, made the same appeal (*Acts xvii.* 31). Paul wrote to the Corinthians: "Christ . . . rose again the third day . . . he was seen by Cephas: and after that by the eleven: then he was seen by more than five hundred brethren at once. . . . After that He was seen by James, then by all the Apostles, and last of all he was seen by me also as by one born out of due time" (*1 Cor. xv.* 3-8). "If Christ be not risen then is our preaching vain and your faith is also vain . . . and you are yet in your sins" (*1 Cor. xv.* 14-17). St. Paul argues that faith in the risen Christ is the root of justification (*Rom. iv.* 25) and if He has not risen, He has not removed sin. Chrysostom, Theophilus and others use the same argument.

In this last declaration of St. Paul the importance of the Resurrection of Christ appears, and its intimate connexion with the principal mysteries of the Christian Faith. "The wages of sin is death" (*Rom. vi.* 23). Therefore He who invisibly takes away the sins of the world should visibly take away death, the effect of sin, so that we may have a most certain sign of His victory over sin and of our Redemption. Under this high aspect, the Resurrection of Christ is a mystery belonging intrinsically to Christianity and an object of Faith, although under its exterior aspect it is a fact of history.

Thus when Rationalists object that the Resurrection is impossible because it is without sufficient reason, St. Paul shows the supreme reason of this fundamental reality. Thus also when Modernists object that a miracle is a sign too extrinsic to Religion and cannot serve to lead men to interior faith, St. Paul shows that the Resurrection is intrinsic to Religion and deeply and wonderfully connected with other mysteries. Thus finally whilst other adversaries assert that no true certitude can be founded on the appearances of Christ, it is clear that the

Apostles possessed absolute certitude of this great mystery (*Acts iii.* 15; *iv.* 10-33), worked miracles in confirmation thereof, and finally shed their blood in witness of its truth.

III.—Christ died.

Jews and enemies of Christianity never doubted the reality of the death of Christ. It was only in the Nineteenth Century that certain Rationalists (Paulus, Schleiermacher, Hase, Herder), suggested that Christ did not really die when crucified, but recovered and afterwards shewed Himself to His disciples. Huxley, in England, adopted this hypothesis. Other Rationalists reject the suggestion as physically and morally impossible. A. Réville (*Jésus de Nazareth*) writes: "This theory of Paulus, which had its period of vogue in the last century, is only a tissue of material and moral improbabilities."

1° The four Evangelists as well as the writers of the Epistles, in fact all Christians have regarded the death of Christ as indubitable, and as the cause of the Redemption of mankind. Very many have shed their blood in testimony of their belief in this truth.

2° Many were ocular witnesses of the death: the Centurion, several soldiers, St. John, the Blessed Virgin, the pious women. Pilate received testimony of the death of Christ from the Centurion (*Mark xv.* 39, 44, 45). When the soldiers saw that He was dead, they opened His side with a lance and "immediately there came out blood and water" (*John xix.* 34). Joseph of Arimathea and Nicodemus "took the body of Jesus and bound it in linen cloths with the spices, as the manner of the Jews is to bury" (*John xix.* 40).

3° The survival of Christ was physically impossible. The scourging, crowning with thorns, carrying of the cross, three hours' agony thereon, the opening of His side—such sufferings made survival impossible. Moreover the sepulchre was guarded.

4° The survival of Christ was morally impossible. Such an hypothesis necessitates either deliberate deception on the part of Christ, or that He allowed His followers to be deceived and permitted a lie to be put forward as the surest argument of the truth of the Christian Faith.

IV.—It is historically certain that Christ arose from the dead.

1° The testimony of St. Paul in his Epistles is prior to that of the Gospels. In the First Epistle to the Corinthians, written about A.D. 57-58, St. Paul records apparitions of Christ, of which he had already informed the Corinthians some years earlier (c. A.D. 52 or 53). "I delivered unto you first of all which I also received: how that Christ died for our sins according to the scriptures: and that he was buried and that he rose again the third day according to the scriptures: and that he was seen by Cephas, and after that by the eleven: then was he seen by more than five hundred brethren at once: of whom many remain until this present and some are fallen asleep: after that he was seen by James, then by all the Apostles, and last of all he was seen also by me as by one born out of due time" (1 Cor. xv. 3-8).

St. Paul does not intend to chronicle all the apparitions. He confines himself chiefly to those which the Apostles beheld. The last appearance was that vouchsafed to St. Paul on his journey to Damascus. On that occasion he saw Christ "last of all," a statement which would be false, if he meant merely an appearance in vision, as such an appearance in vision was seen by Ananias later (Acts ix. 10). Neither does St. Paul mean to write only of the immortality of Christ. He speaks again and again of the resurrection of the body, which he puts forward as the exemplar of our future corporeal resurrection (Cf. 1 Thessal. i. 10; iv. 13).

2° Testimony of the Evangelists.

SS. Matthew and John were witnesses of several apparitions. St. Mark records the preaching of St. Peter and therefore his testimony. St. Luke probably received his information regarding the Passion and Resurrection of Christ from Joanna, wife of Chusa, the steward of Herod (Luke viii. 3; xxiii. 7-12; xxiv. 10).

(A) All affirm that the tomb was found empty. All relate that Joseph of Arimathea went to Pilate and asked for the body of Christ, that Joseph wrapped the body in a clean linen cloth and having placed the body within the sepulchre rolled a great stone to the door (Cf. Matt. xxvii. 56-66; Mark xv. 42 sq.; Luke xxiii. 53; John xix. 38). With the permission of Pilate, the Pharisees sealed the monument and placed guards (Matt. xxvii. 66). When

the women and disciples came in the early dawn after the Sabbath, they found the stone rolled from the monument and the tomb empty. An angel told them that Christ had arisen (Cf. Matt. xxviii. 1 sq.; Mark xvi. 1 sq.; Luke xxiv. 1 sq.; John xx. 1 sq.).

A. Réville (*Jésus de Nazareth*) suggests that the chief priests had taken the body of Christ, so that it might not be venerated by the disciples. Stapfer, another Rationalist, replies (*La Mort et la Résurrection de Jésus-Christ*): "Nothing can be cited in support of this hypothesis; not a fact or text or allusion, however fugitive, gives it support. It is supremely unlikely, for it would have been singularly stupid that the high priest should himself furnish the Apostles with a pretext for believing in the Resurrection." Loisy's hypothesis that the body of Christ was thrown into a ditch is without any foundation, and contrary to the united testimonies of St. Peter and St. Paul and of the Evangelists (Cf. 1 Cor. xv. 4; Romans vi. 4; Coloss. ii. 12; Acts ii. 24-32).

(B) All the Evangelists together with St. Paul agree that Christ appeared to the eleven Apostles.

Twelve apparitions are recorded:

1. To Mary Magdalene near the sepulchre (Mark xvi. 9; John xx. 11-18).
2. To women returning from sepulchre (Matt. xxviii. 9, 10).
3. To Simon Peter (Luke xxiv. 34; 1 Cor. xv. 5).
4. To two disciples going to Emmaus (Luke xxiv. 15-35).
5. To Apostles, Thomas being absent (Mark xvi. 14; Luke xxiv. 36-43; John xx. 19-23).
6. To Apostles, Thomas being present (John xx. 24 sq.; 1 Cor. xv. 5).
7. To five Apostles and two disciples at Sea of Galilee (John xxi. 1-24).
8. To the eleven Apostles who had gone to Galilee (Matt. xxviii. 16 sq.).
9. To more than five hundred brethren (1 Cor. xv. 6).
10. To James (1 Cor. xv. 7).
11. To the eleven Apostles in Jerusalem and Bethania on the day of the Ascension (Mark xvi. 19; Luke xxiv. 50-52; Acts i. 1-12).

12. To St. Paul near Damascus (*Acts ix. 3 sq.; 1 Cor. xv. 8*).

Moreover it is stated that to His Apostles Christ "shewed himself alive after His passion, by many proofs, for forty days appearing to them, and speaking of the Kingdom of God" (*Acts i. 3*).

An objection may be raised. Christ foretold that "the Son of Man will be in the heart of the earth three days and three nights."

Answer: The prediction was made in this form only once (*Matt. xii. 40*), whereas Christ foretold on three recorded occasions that He would rise the third day (*Matt. xvi. 21; xvii. 22; xx. 19; xxvii. 63; Mark viii. 31; ix. 30; x. 34; Luke ix. 22; xviii. 33; 1 Cor. xv. 4*).

The expression "three days and three nights" is explained by likeness to the sign of Jonas the prophet. As St. Augustine and St. Thomas note, the part is placed for the whole by synecdoche. It is a *modus loquendi* because of the similitude between figure and reality.

3° The Evangelists did not suffer from hallucination.

Strauss and Renan supported this suggestion. The Apostles, writes Renan, could not believe that Christ had been conquered by His enemies. They examined the Scriptures and found prophecies of the Resurrection. Vehemently desiring the triumph of Christ, their imaginations were affected, and they believed in the Resurrection. Meyer wrote in a similar strain (*Die Auferstehung Christi*).

(A) It is historically certain that Apostles and disciples did not expect the Resurrection.

Nicodemus and Joseph of Arimathea placed the body in the sepulchre. Mary Magdalene and the pious women came with spices to anoint His dead body. They were amazed when they saw the empty tomb. When the women announced the Resurrection, their words seemed to the Apostles as "idle tales and they did not believe them" (*Luke xxiv. 11*). The disciples, who journeyed to Emmaus, had lost all hope. The incredulity of Thomas is well known.

(B) From a psychological point of view there was no room for hallucination.*

* (Cf. W. N. Rice "Christian Faith in an Age of Science" p. 369.)

- (a) There was no exaltation of the imagination, no vehement desire or fear.
- (b) They saw, heard and touched the risen Christ.
- (c) Hallucination for forty days would be equivalent to stark madness, which certainly was not the condition of the Apostles.
- (d) Hallucination is corrected by reflexion; whereas the Apostles were convinced that they had seen the Lord bodily, and gladly suffered martyrdom to testify the sincerity of their conviction.
- (e) Is it possible that the spread of Christian Faith and morality has been based upon an hallucination?
- (f) What explanation can be given of the empty tomb?

4° Christ appeared to the Apostles not merely spiritually but corporally.

When Christ appeared to the Eleven on the Resurrection day, the Apostles "being troubled and affrighted supposed that they saw a spirit. And he said to them why are you troubled, and why do thoughts arise in your hearts? See my hands and feet that it is I myself: handle and see for a spirit hath not flesh and bones as you see me to have. And when he had said this he shewed them his hands and feet. But while they believed not and wondered for joy, he said: have you anything here to eat? And they offered him a piece of broiled fish and a honeycomb. And when he had eaten before them, taking the remains he gave to them" (*Luke xxiv. 37-43*). Thus not only Thomas but the Apostles touched Our Lord's body. Moreover, if His body had not been re-animated, the sepulchre would not have been empty, and St. Paul's argument concerning the future resurrection of bodies, based on the corporal resurrection of Christ, would fall to the ground. St. Paul on the way to Damascus saw Christ "corporally" (*Cf. Matt. xxviii. 9; Luke xxiv. 39-40; John xx. 27*). St. Thomas writes: "Christ manifested the glory of His resurrection to the disciples by the fact that He entered when the doors were shut. . . . Similarly it is a property of a glorified body to vanish suddenly from their sight" (*III^a q. 55 a. 5 and 6*).

5° The reality of the bodily resurrection of Christ is confirmed by its influence upon the Apostles and by the conversion of St. Paul.

In the case of the Apostles there was a change from uncertainty, timidity, despair to wisdom, fearlessness, constancy. Peter said to princes, ancients and scribes: "We cannot but speak the things which we have seen and heard"; "We ought to obey God rather than men" (*Acts iv. 20; v. 29*); the Apostles "went from the presence of the council rejoicing that they were accounted worthy to suffer reproach for the name of Jesus" (*Acts v. 41*). The sudden conversion of St. Paul and his enthusiasm for work and suffering in the cause of Christ were due to the corporal appearance of his risen Saviour.

An obvious difficulty suggests itself. How could the Resurrection have been an article of supernatural Faith to the Apostles since they saw the risen Christ?

Answer: The Resurrection of Christ was not only a miracle known naturally by certain signs (*e.g.*, the wounds), but a mystery of Faith. And this mystery consisted not only in the re-animation of the body, but in the raising of Himself to life by His own power—the power of the Son of God—whereby the Resurrection is associated with the mysteries of Redemption and of future glory. This aspect transcends reason, and is believed on the authority of God who reveals. St. Thomas writes of the Apostle Thomas: "He saw one thing and believed another; he saw the wounds of Christ and believed Him to be God" (*III^a q. 55 a. 5 ad 3*). Faith is said to be *seen* (*oculata*) when some external circumstance of a mystery is visible. Hence the mystery of the Resurrection is *historically* certain with moral certitude, and *supernaturally* certain, because of the infallible testimony of the Church (*D. 2036*).

Art. 3.—Miracles still take place in the Catholic Church and in the Catholic Church alone.

I.—Christ promised that miracles would continue in the Church.

"Amen, amen, I say to you, he that believeth Me, the works that I do, he also shall do and greater than these shall he do" (*John xiv. 12*).

When Christ said to His Apostles: "Go ye into the whole world and preach the gospel," He added "In my name they shall cast out devils, they shall speak with new tongues, they shall take up serpents, and if they drink

any deadly thing it shall not hurt them: they shall lay their hands upon the sick and they shall recover. But they going forth preached everywhere, the Lord working withal, and confirming the word with signs that followed" (*Mark xvi. 17, 18, 20*).

II.—In the Catholic Church miracles have continued and are wrought nowadays.

Incidents of miraculous healing are recorded in the Acts and in the Epistles of St. Paul (*Acts v. 12-26; iv. 10; vi. 8; Romans xv. 18; 1 Cor. xii. 28*).

The Apostolic Fathers—SS. Barnabas, Clement of Rome, Ignatius of Antioch, Polycarp—speaking for the second century record miracles.

SS. Irenæus, Justin, Cyprian, Origen and Tertullian are witnesses for the third century.

Eusebius, SS. Jerome, Ambrose, Augustine, testify for the fourth century.

The writings of Ruinart and of the Bollandists reveal the reality of heroic sanctity and miraculous power in every age. The Congregation of Rites institutes a searching inquiry into the miracles submitted for the canonisation of Saints.

The miracles wrought at Lourdes are examined by a medical commission. Bertrin writes: "Cures of nervous disorders number only one-thirteenth of the whole, *i.e.*, 180 cases out of 2,600. There have been 571 cures of tubercular diseases; 394 cases of diseased digestive apparatus; 68 of circulatory apparatus; 99 of respiratory organs; 383 of brain trouble; 95 of diseased bones; 15 of cancer; 27 of wounds; 34 cures of blind; 28 of deaf-mutes, etc. (*Cf. "Histoire critique des événements de Lourdes," Paris 1905*).

III.—In other forms of religion, the miraculous element is absent.

Both Luther and Calvin disclaimed miraculous power. Luther wrote: "From us, who deny free-will, miracles cannot be expected" (*"de servo arbitrio"*). Calvin, in his letter to the King of France declared that "they do wrong who demand miracles from us."

The same may be said of the Greek Church (*Cf. Martinov: Revue des Questions historiques, Jan. 1884, p. 272*).

IV.—By these miracles the Divine origin of the Catholic Church is manifested.

As already shown, miracles are so many Divine testimonies to the truth of Catholic teaching.

Should the objection be raised that more miracles were wrought in the early ages of the Church than at the present time, St. Thomas answers: "The wonderful conversion of the world to the Christian Faith is a most certain proof of past miracles, so that it is not necessary to repeat them, since they appear evidently in their effect. God does not cease even in our times to work miracles through His saints for the confirmation of the Faith" (*C. Gentes, Book I and VI*).

CHAPTER XXVI

CONFIRMATION THROUGH THE FULFILMENT OF PROPHECY

Art. 1.—The testimony of Christ is confirmed by His Prophecies.

I.—Prophecy

As already explained a prophecy is a certain prediction of a future contingent event which cannot be foreseen naturally. If the future contingent event happens to be (1) remote, (2) predicted with minute circumstances, (3) complex in character, (4) free, and especially if (5) the predicted event happens to be a miracle and dependent therefore on Divine free-will, it can be said with certitude that the prophecy is absolutely beyond the power of human conjecture. A prophecy of this character, if fulfilled, points to the infinite prescience of God, and constitutes a most certain motive of credibility.

The prophecies made by Christ come first for consideration. The Messianic prophecies of the Old Testament are considered in Art. 2.

Rationalists assert that when Christ announced the destruction of Jerusalem, He joined with this event a prophecy in regard to the immediate end of the world. He was mistaken in the latter prediction, and therefore no confidence can be placed in the fulfilment of other prophecies.

II.—Christ predicted many future contingent events which have been fulfilled to the letter.

1° He knew with certitude the secrets of hearts.

"Some of the scribes said within themselves: He blasphemeth. And Jesus, seeing their thoughts said, why do you think evil in your hearts?" (*Matt. ix. 3, 4; xii. 24, 25; xvi. 7, 8; Mark ii. 8; Luke vi. 8; vii. 39, 40; xi. 17*).

"Jesus knowing their wickedness said: Why do you tempt me ye hypocrites?" (*Matt. xxii. 18; xxvi. 10; Luke v. 21, 22; ix. 46, 47*).

"He knew what was in man" (*John ii. 25*).

"Jesus knew from the beginning who they were that did not believe, and who he was that would betray him" (*John vi. 65; vii. 20; xiii. 11; xvi. 19*).

Christ was cognoscent of events which took place at a distance: "Before that Philip called thee, when thou wast under the fig-tree I saw thee" (*John i. 48*).

He told the Samaritan woman all that she had done (*John iv. 29*).

He said to Peter: "Go to the sea and cast in a hook and that fish which shall first come up, take; and when thou hast opened its mouth thou shall find a stater: take that and give it to them for me and for thee" (*Matt. xvii. 26*).

2° He foretold His Passion and Resurrection.

"Jesus therefore knowing all things that should come upon him went forth" (*John xviii. 4*).

He foretold His Passion and Resurrection at least three times, clearly, minutely, and with certitude when the events could not be foreseen:

- (1) After the confession of Peter (*Matt. xvi. 20-23; Mark viii. 30-33; Luke ix. 21, 22*).
- (2) After the cure of the lunatic (*Matt. xvii. 21, 22; Mark ix. 29-31; Luke ix. 44, 45*).
- (3) After the relation of the parable of the workmen sent into the vineyard (*Matt. xx. 17-19; Mark x. 32-34; Luke xviii. 31-34*).

St. Mark gives the prediction as follows: "The Son of Man shall be betrayed to the chief priests and to the scribes and ancients, and they shall condemn him to death and shall deliver him to the Gentiles, and they shall mock him and spit on him, and scourge him and kill him, and the third day He shall rise again" (*Mark x. 33, 34*).

St. Matthew adds the circumstance of crucifixion (*Matt. xx. 17-19*).

The Pharisees said to Pilate: "Sir, we have remembered that that seducer said while he was yet alive: after three days I will rise again" (*Matt. xxvii. 63*).

All these prophecies were fulfilled (*Cf. Matt. xxvi. 57; Mark xiv. 64; Matt. xxvii. 2, 26, 30*).

3° Christ foretold many circumstances regarding His disciples.

(a) He foretold to His disciples the graces of the Spirit whom "they should receive who believed in him" (*John vii. 39*).

He foretold persecutions (*John xv. 18-20; Matt. x. 17-22; Matt. xxiv. 9-13; Mark iv. 17; x. 39; Luke xi. 49; xii. 1-11; xxi. 12, 13*).

The Acts of the Apostles and Ecclesiastical History witness to the fulfilment (*Acts iv. 1-8; v. 17-41. etc.*).

(b) To the Apostles He foretold their flight during His Passion and their meeting in Galilee after the Resurrection (*Matt. xxvi. 31; John xvi. 32; Matt. xxvi. 56; xxviii. 16*).

He promised to give them the power of converting sinners, the grace of miracles, the gift of tongues, the gifts of the Holy Ghost; He predicted opposition and final victory (*Cf. Matt. iv. 18-20; x. 1-19; Mark i. 17; xvi. 17; Luke x. 19; xxi. 14, 15; xii. 32; Matt. xix. 28; John xv. 16*).

(c) To Peter He predicted his apostolate, primacy, triple denial, martyrdom (*Luke v. 10; Matt. xvi. 17-19; John i. 42; Matt. xxvi. 34; Mark xiv. 30, 71; John xiii. 36*).

(d) He predicted to His disciples the incident of the ass and colt (*Matt. xxi. 2*), the incidents bearing upon preparation for the Supper (*Matt. xxi. 3 sq.*), the world-wide appreciation of the charity of Mary Magdalene (*Matt. xxvi. 13; Mark xiv. 9*).

4° Predictions regarding the Church.

(a) Christ predicted that the Apostles would receive the communication of the Holy Ghost (*Acts i. 8; ii. 4*).

(b) He predicted the wonderful propagation of the Church and its indefectibility (*Matt. xvi. 18; xxviii. 19, 20*).

(c) He predicted also the conversion of the Gentile nations: "Many shall come from the East and the West, and shall sit down with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob in the Kingdom of Heaven (*Cf. Luke xx. 16; Matt. xiii. 31, 32; Luke xiv. 24; Matt. viii. 10 sq.; xxiv. 14; Luke xiii. 29*).

5° Christ foretold many things to the Jews.

He foretold (a) the treason of Judas (*Matt. xxvi. 21*); (b) the punishment of the Jews (*Mark xii. 9-12*); (c) the taking away of the kingdom (*Matt. xxi. 42-44; xxiii. 34-39; xi. 23*).

6° Christ foretold the destruction of Jerusalem.

To understand the enunciation of this prophecy, its parts must be distinguished: (1) The prediction; (2) A twofold question of the Apostles regarding (a) the destruction of Jerusalem, and (b) the signs of the end of the world;

(3) Reply of Christ to the first question; (4) His reply to the second question; (5) Detailed prediction of the destruction of Jerusalem.

The reply to (4) is not easily recognisable in St. Matthew's Gospel, probably it begins at Matthew xxiv. 27; the reply is shorter in Luke xxi. 25-28, because it is answered elsewhere, namely, in Luke xvii. 20 sq.

(1) The prediction: "Do you see all these things? Amen, I say to you, there shall not be left here a stone upon a stone that shall not be destroyed" (*Matt. xxiv. 2; Mark xiii. 2; Luke xxi. 6*).

(2) The twofold question: "The disciples came to him privately saying: Tell us when shall these things be? And what shall be the sign of Thy coming and of the consummation of the world?" (*Matt. xxiv. 3*).

St. Thomas notes that in St. Luke's Gospel (*xxi. 7*) only one question is asked, namely, regarding the destruction of Jerusalem, because the disciples believed that Jerusalem would not be destroyed before the Second Coming. Hence they asked (*Acts i. 6*): "Lord, wilt Thou at this time restore again the kingdom to Israel?"

(3) Christ answers the first question which regards the destruction of Jerusalem. He gives three signs of that event.

(a) Many will come in my name saying I am Christ: and they will seduce many . . . many false prophets shall arise" (*Matt. xxiv. 5-11; Mark xiii. 3-6; Luke xxi. 7, 8*).

Before the destruction of Jerusalem, Elymas and Simon (magicians) and Theodas, etc., appeared (*Cf. 2 Peter ii. 1-20; 1 John ii. 18; Acts xiii. 6-11; viii. 9-10; v. 36*).

(b) "You shall hear of wars and rumours of wars . . . nation shall rise against nation and kingdom against kingdom, and there shall be pestilences and famines and earthquakes in places. Now all these are the beginning of sorrows" (*Matt. xxiv. 6-8; Mark xiii. 7, 8; Luke xxi. 9-11*).

Josephus relates that before the destruction of Jerusalem, there was civil war in every state of Palestine (*Bell. Jud. II, xvii. 10; xviii. 1-8*). In the Roman Empire there were wars in Gaul, Germany, in the regions of the Danube, in Britain, in the country of the Parthians (*Tacitus, Hist. I, ii.*). Between the years A.D. 60-70 there

were earthquakes at Laodicea A.D. 61 and Pompeii A.D. 63. There were pestilence and famine not only in Judea, but in the whole Roman Empire (*Acts xi. 28; Tacitus, Annal. xvi. 13; Josephus, Bell. Jud. V, xii. 3; VI, i. 1*). In the year A.D. 65 terrible portents appeared at Jerusalem (*Josephus, Bell. Jud. VI, v. 3; Tac. Hist. V, 13*).

(c) "Then shall they deliver you up to be afflicted, and shall put you to death, and you shall be hated by all nations for my sake, and then shall many be scandalised and shall betray one another" (*Matt. xxiv. 9-14; Mark xiii. 9-13; Luke xxi. 12-19*).

Between A.D. 30 and A.D. 67 St. Peter, St. John and other Apostles were cast into prison. Christians were dispersed. St. Stephen and St. James were martyred. St. Paul was imprisoned, stoned, beaten with rods, brought before Gallio, Felix, Festus, Agrippa, Nero. Heresies sprang up and the Apostles preached everywhere (*Matt. xxiv. 14; Mark xiii. 10; xvi. 20*).

(4) The reply of Christ to the second question, which is eschatological, has already been considered and will be again discussed in this article under No. IV. It will be sufficient here to indicate that the answer is given in *Matt. xxiv. 27-31; Mark xiii. 19-27; 32-37; Luke xvii. 20-37; xxi. 25-28*.

(5) Detailed prediction of the destruction of Jerusalem (*Cf. Matt. xxiv. 15-22; Mark xiii. 14-18; Luke xxi. 22-24*). The cause of this terrible punishment was stated by Our Lord when He wept over Jerusalem (*Luke xix. 42-44*).

All these prophecies were fulfilled. The Jews revolted against Rome in A.D. 66 and 67. Vespasian began the attack and killed many Jews. He became Emperor in A.D. 69, and his son Titus continued the war. Christians fled to Pella. Titus besieged Jerusalem. Josephus relates (*Bell. Jud. IV, ix. 3*) that 1,100,000 Jews perished either by the sword or from famine, and 97,000 were sold into slavery. Later, the remainder were sold into slavery by Hadrian. The temple and city were burned and destroyed. The "abomination of desolation" was in the temple, for, during the siege, it was converted into a citadel, and after the siege the Romans used the temple to offer sacrifices to their gods (*Bell. Jud. VII; VI, iii. 6; VI, vi. 1*). These events took place A.D. 70, and thus were fulfilled the words of Christ: "Amen, amen, I say to you, this generation shall not pass away till

all these things be accomplished" (*Matt. xxiv. 34*). The triumphal arch of Titus in Rome, the writings of Josephus, Tacitus and Suetonius witness to the fulfilment of the prophecies (*Cf. Tacitus, Hist. V, 1-13; Suetonius, Vesp. 4; Titus, 4*).

III.—The prophecies of Christ are most certain motives of Credibility.

Christ's prophecies are utterly beyond the power of natural prevision. Moreover, the prophecies regarding the Resurrection and the unshaken stability of the Church are not only future contingent events, but are miracles and therefore dependent on Divine free-will. In other cases the prediction of minute circumstances preclude the possibility of fortuitous occurrence.

Our Lord said: "At present I tell you before it come to pass: that when it shall come to pass you may believe that I am he" (*John xiii. 19; xiv. 29*). If the mission of Christ be not Divine, God has borne witness to error—which is impossible.

The gift of prophecy has not ceased. Many Saints possessed this endowment, as may be read in the volumes of the Bollandists and elsewhere.

IV.—Two Rationalistic Objections.

(1) Rationalists object against the validity of the prophecy regarding the destruction of Jerusalem. They claim that because of its detailed character the description of the destruction must have been written after the event. They admit that Christ foresaw in a general obscure way the coming catastrophe but not in detail (*Stapfer, O. Holtzmann, Renan, A. Réville, etc.*).

Answer: To have foreseen the destruction of Jerusalem was in itself an instance of extraordinary prevision. The Jews were living peaceably under the Roman Empire as Pliny notes (*H.N., v. 15*), and Jerusalem was the best known of the cities of the East. Again the prophecy of the destruction was so well known that the Christians of Jerusalem left the city and went to Pella three years before the siege (*Cf. Eusebius: Hist. Eccl., Book III, v.; S. Epiph., Haeres xxix. 7*). Moreover, if the prophecy had been made after the event, the writers would not have associated the catastrophic end of the world with the destruction of Jerusalem, and they would have related that the temple was burned before being utterly destroyed.

Weiss (*Das Leben Jesu*) admits that St. Mark wrote before the event.

(2) Rationalists argue that Christ erred in prophesying the immediate end of the world, when He said: "This generation shall not pass away till all these things be fulfilled" (*Matt. xxiv. 34; Mark xiii. 30; Luke xxi. 32; Matt. x. 5-6, 23; xvi. 28; xxvi. 64*).

(A) These texts are difficult because Christ speaks both of the destruction of Jerusalem and of the end of the world, and as the first event is a figure of the second, it is not easy to determine what belongs to the first and what to the second. If as Rationalists contend Christ announced the immediate end of the world, He contradicted Himself, for in many places He spoke in an opposite sense:

(a) He said of the day of judgment: "Of that day or hour no man knoweth, neither the angels in heaven, nor the Son, but the Father. Take ye heed, watch and pray. For ye know not when the time is" (*Mark xiii. 32, 33; Matt. xxiv. 36*). At the time of the Ascension He said to His disciples: "It is not for you to know the times or moments which the Father hath put in his own power" (*Acts i. 7*).

(b) Christ foretold the spread of the Gospel amongst all nations: "This Gospel of the kingdom shall be preached in the whole world, for a testimony to all nations, and then shall the consummation come" (*Matt. xxiv. 14; Mark xiii. 10; xvi. 15*). Moreover, the kingdom is compared to a grain of mustard seed, which gradually increases.

(c) The spread of the Gospel could not take place before the destruction of Jerusalem. The Jews "shall be led away captives unto all nations, and Jerusalem shall be trodden down by the Gentiles till the times of the nations be fulfilled" (*Luke xxi. 24*).

The object of Christ's utterances regarding the end of the world was to emphasise the need of watchfulness: "Watch ye therefore, because ye know not what hour your Lord will come" (*Matt. xxiv. 42; Mark xiii. 33; Luke xii. 39*).

(B) These principles having been established, it will be easier to explain the words: "This generation shall not pass away till all these things be fulfilled."

Chrysostom, Theophylus, Euthymius, understood "this

generation" to mean the human race. St. Jerome (Hieron. in *Matt. xxiv. 34*) interprets the expression in the sense either of the whole human race or of the Jewish race. Others judge that the words refer, not to the end of the world, but to the destruction of Jerusalem (P. Lagrange *St. Marc, p. 325*).

Others again hold that the words "this generation" have a twofold meaning. With reference to the destruction of Jerusalem they mean the generation of Jews living in those days, whereas with reference to the end of the world they signify the Jewish race (Fillion: *St. Matt. xxiv. 34*).

The word "generation" is often used in the sense of "race" (*Cf. Num. x. 30; Ps. xlv. 19*).

Cardinal Billot has treated the question in *La Parousie*, also Lepin in *Jésus Messie et Fils de Dieu, pp. 401-403*.

(C) The words of *Matt. xvi. 28*: "Some that stand here shall not taste death till they see the Son of Man coming in his kingdom," refer to the destruction of the temple and the expansion of the Church.

(D) Certain critics infer from *1 Thessal. iv. 15* that St. Paul regarded the end of the world as immediate. But comparison with the text *2 Thessal. ii. 2* corrects this impression.

Art. 2.—The Divine Mission of Christ is confirmed by Messianic Prophecies and their Fulfilment.

I.—Method of treatment

(A) Value of this confirmation.

Christ addressing incredulous Jews said: "Search the Scriptures . . . they give testimony of me . . . if you believed Moses you would perhaps believe me also. For he wrote of me" (*John v. 39-47*). "Abraham your father rejoiced that he might see my day: he saw it and was glad" (*John viii. 56*).

Christ Himself explained the prophecies to the disciples going to Emmaus: "Beginning at Moses and the prophets He expounded to them in all the scriptures the things that were concerning him" (*Luke xxiv. 27*). He said to His Apostles after the Resurrection: "All things must needs be fulfilled which are written in the Law of Moses and the prophets and in the psalms concerning me. Then he opened their understanding that they might grasp the scriptures. And he said to them: thus it is

written and thus it behoved Christ to suffer and to rise again from the dead the third day" (*Luke xxiv. 44-47*).

The Apostles also argued from Messianic prophecies (*Cf. 2 Peter i. 19; Acts viii. 30 sq.*). The oft-recurring expression "that the scriptures might be fulfilled" points to the traditional argument drawn from prophecy. The Vatican Council stresses the value of this motive of credibility (D. 1790, 1707).

(B) Rationalists set out with the assumption that supernatural prophecy is *à priori* impossible. Ewald, Reuss, Kuenen, regard instances of prophecy as only the natural phenomena of ecstasy. Darmsteter (*Les prophètes d'Israel*), and Renan (*Vie de Jésus, c 1*) suggest that the Messianic hope was due to the state of subjugation of the Jews, and was the natural hope of a race which desired the attainment, not only of national independence, but of universal domination. They go on to say that the character of Messiah was thrust on Christ, and that He was at first quite unconscious of that dignity.

It will be sufficient to say here that in Jewish history the Messiah was regarded as one who would extend the teaching of Monotheism throughout the world. But this conception must have been due to Revelation, as the Jews abhorred the Gentiles, and were unwilling to share their privileges with them. The Messianic hope sprang from, and was nourished upon, Messianic prophecy (*Matt. ii. 5; Luke i. 70; John i. 45*).

(C) Method of argument.

1° It is not necessary to defend the genuineness of the prophetic books. Such a task belongs to Hermeneutics. It is sufficient to know, which no critic of weight denies, that all Messianic prophecies were written at least 300 B.C.

2° It is not advisable to argue from prophecies which are applicable only in a spiritual or typical sense. Hence prophecies verified only in a typical sense (as in *Matt. ii. 15, 18*) are not quoted.

3° It will be convenient to set forth first prophecies in general as they describe the Messianic kingdom. Next comes the classical exposition of special prophecies general and special.

II.—Exposition of Messianic prophecies

(A) In general.

Prophecies of the Old Testament agree in three statements:

1° All the prophets taught for 1100 years Monotheism, and the moral law promulgated in the name of God. They preached faith in one God infinitely perfect, holy, just, merciful, exercising providential care of His people and rewarding them.

2° All the prophets foretold the universal and spiritual kingdom of God. They announced the propagation amongst all nations of Monotheism (*Is. ii. 2-4; xviii. 7; xix. 23-25; xli. 18-25; xlii. 6-7; Mich. iv. 1-5*). The kingdom was foretold as one not merely external but internal (*Osee. ii. 7-19; xi. 1-5; xiv. 2-5; Is. iv. 4-6; xxx. 18-22; Ezech. xi. 19, 20; xxxvi. 25-27*).

3° All the prophets foretold the Messiah, prince of the Kingdom of God, mediator between God and men. They described more or less explicitly his origin, endowments, functions, passion and triumph.

(a) Origin: Family of David (*Amos ix. 11-12; Is. xi. 1; Jerem. xxiii. 5; xxxiii. 14-18; Osee. iii. 5; Ezech. xxxiv. 23, 24*). Bethlehem shall be his birthplace (*Mich. v. 2, 3*).

(b) Endowments and Functions: He shall be called "Son of God" (*Ps. ii. 7*). "God the mighty, Father of the world to come, Prince of peace" (*Is. ix. 5-7; ii. 3, 4*).

He will judge his people in justice and equity (*Is. xi. 3-5*). He will write his law in the hearts of the faithful (*Jerem. xxxi. 33*).

(c) Passion and Death: He will save his people by humble obedience, sorrowful passion and death (*Is. liii. 2, 3; xlii. 1-4; xlix. 1-6; l. 1-9; lii. 13-15; Pss. 21, 68*).

(d) His triumph (*Is. liii. 10, 11; Ps. ii. 1-4; Is. xxiv.-xxviii*).

(B) Special prophecies. Their development in the three successive periods of Patriarchs, Kings, and Prophets.

1° The Patriarchal period.

The coming of the Saviour of the world and his origin from the seed of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob and Juda are foretold.

(a) In Genesis iii. 15 an illusion is made to the enmity placed between the seed of the woman and the seed of the serpent.

(b) In Genesis xii. 3, God said to Abram: "In thee shall all the kindred of the earth be blessed."

(c) In Genesis xxvi. 4, God said to Isaac: In thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed."

(d) Jacob, substituted in place of Esau (*Gen. xxviii. 14*), heard the words: "In thee and thy seed all the tribes of the earth shall be blessed."

(e) Jacob about to die prophesied of Juda (*Gen. xlix. 10*): "The sceptre shall not be taken away from Juda, nor a ruler from his thigh, till he come that is to be sent: and he shall be the expectation of nations."

(f) Balaam prophesied: "A star shall arise out of Jacob and a sceptre shall spring up from Israel" (*Num. xxiv. 17*).

(g) Moses foretold the coming of the great prophet: "The Lord thy God will raise up to thee a prophet of thy nation and of thy brethren like unto me. Him thou shalt hear" (*Deut. xviii. 15*).

2° The period of Kings.

The Messiah is now described as King, Son of God, priest; his passion and sacrifice are foretold.

(a) David in Ps. 71 wrote: "All the kings of the earth shall adore him: all nations shall serve him . . . in him shall all the tribes of the earth be blessed: all nations shall magnify him."

(b) In Ps. 2 (of which Lagrange writes: "This psalm is the Messianic psalm *par excellence*, and the first Hebrew document which contains the technical term 'Messiah'") the king is called Christ (*v. 2*) which means the anointed one, *i.e.*, the Messiah. He is also called "Son of God" (*v. 7*).

(c) In Ps. 109 the Messiah is described as priest and lord of all.

(d) In Ps. 39 the Messiah is represented as the voluntary victim for sin. "Sacrifice and oblation thou didst not desire . . . then said I: behold I come."

(e) In Ps. 21 the sufferings of the Messiah are foretold: "I am a worm and no man: the reproach of men and the outcast of the people (*v. 7*) . . . they have dug my hands and my feet, they have numbered all my bones (*vv. 17, 18*) . . . they parted my garments amongst them, and upon my vesture they cast lots" (*v. 19*).

(f) In Ps. 68 the following words occur: "They gave gall for my food and in my thirst they gave me vinegar to drink" (*v. 22*).

3° The period of the Prophets.

There is a more explicit description of the origin, endowments, functions, and sacrifice of the Saviour.

(1) An example from one of the minor prophets:

Micheas (v. 2) marks the place of the nativity of the Messiah: "Thou Bethlehem Ephrata art a little one among the thousands of Juda: out of thee shall he come forth unto me that is to be the ruler in Israel, and his going forth is from the beginning, from the days of eternity."

"Ephrata" was the original name of Bethlehem (*Gen. xxxv. 16*).

(2) Isaias.

Isaias describes many details in regard to the Messiah:

(a) The nativity of the Messiah: "Behold a virgin shall conceive and bring forth a son, and his name shall be called Emmanuel" (*vii. 14*). From *Is. viii. 8* and *viii. 10*, it will be seen that "Emmanuel" means "God with us."

(b) Divine functions of the Messiah: "Mighty God, Prince of peace (*ix. 6*); the Spirit of the Lord shall dwell upon him (*xi. 2*); he shall exercise universal dominion (*xxiv.-xxvi.*); God himself will come and save you. Then shall the eyes of the blind be opened, the ears of the deaf shall be unstopped . . . and the redeemed of the Lord shall return, and shall come into Sion with praise, and everlasting joy shall be upon their heads" (*xxxv. 4, 5, 10*). The preaching of John the Baptist is announced: "The voice of one crying in the desert: Prepare ye the way of the Lord, make straight in the wilderness the paths of our God . . . the glory of the Lord shall be revealed, and all flesh together shall see that the mouth of the Lord hath spoken" (*xl. 3, 5*).

(c) The virtues and works of the servant of Jahve are described: "The bruised reed he shall not break, and the smoking flax he shall not quench. . . . I have given thee for a covenant of the people, for a light of the Gentiles" (*xliv. 3, 6; xlix. 6*).

(d) The sacrifice of the Saviour: "I have given my body to the strikers, and my cheeks to them that plucked them. I have not turned away my face from them that rebuked me and spit upon me. The Lord God is my helper, therefore am I not confounded" (*l. 6, 7*). The details of the Passion of Christ are described in *liii. 1-7*.

(e) The triumph of Christ is set forth in *liii. 10*: "If he shall lay down his life for sin, he shall see a long-lived

seed: and the will of the Lord shall be prosperous in his hand." In *lx. 1-3* occur the words: "Arise, be enlightened, O Jerusalem, for thy light has come, and the glory of the Lord is risen upon thee . . . the Gentiles shall walk in thy light, and kings in the brightness of thy rising."

(3) Jeremias foretold the origin of the Saviour from the seed of David (*xxiii. 5-8*). Ezechiel describes the Saviour as the Good Shepherd (*xxxiv. 23-31*). Daniel records a vision of the Son of Man, to whom was given power and glory and a kingdom, and "all peoples, tribes and tongues shall serve him." The well-known prophecy of the time when the Messiah would come appears in *ix. 24*. The meaning of the message of the archangel Gabriel seems to be that God would mercifully recompense His people for their captivity at Babylon by a new possession of their land for seven times that period, until the whole history of the nation should be crowned and its religious institutions finished by the advent and sacrifice of the Messiah. From the final edict of Artaxerxis (about 457 B.C.) to the year A.D. 30 the seventieth week of years was reached, in the middle of which (c. A.D. 30) Our Lord was crucified.

(4) At the close of the prophetic period some further details were foretold regarding the Messianic kingdom and the Messiah.

Aggeus (*ii. 1-10*) spoke of the greater glory of the Second Temple, to which the Desired of Nations would come.

Zachary (*ix. 9*) describes the humble coming of Christ: "Behold thy king will come to thee, the just and Saviour: He is poor and riding upon an ass, and upon a colt the foal of an ass."

Malachy foretold the precursor of the Lord (*iii. 1*), and the Sacrifice of the New Law (*i. 11*).

The Divine origin of these prophecies is manifest even before their fulfilment.

(A) The Jews accepted the prophecies as divinely revealed, inasmuch as the preaching of the prophets was confirmed by miracles. The miracles of the rod of Aaron, of the ten plagues, of the passage of the Jordan, of the ruin of the walls of Jericho, of Elias, etc., were so many Divine confirmations of prophetic teaching.

(B) The prophesying cannot be explained by natural causes.

- (a) The prophets, who were men of integrity, affirmed that the doctrine they taught was divinely revealed.
- (b) Their preaching was not in accordance with the views or prejudices of the times.
- (c) Their doctrine could not have been borrowed from neighbouring peoples, because Monotheism was unknown outside the Jewish race.

III.—Fulfilment of Prophecy.

(A) In general.

1° In Christianity is fulfilled the prediction of the universal propagation of Monotheism.

2° In Our Lord are fulfilled the prophecies relating to the Messiah. Jesus was born of the family of David, in Bethlehem, and was recognised as the Son of God, the mighty God, Prince of peace. He saved His people by His Passion and Death. He saw a "long-lived seed," and all nations adore Him.

These two principal prophecies were contrary to the natural desires and expectations of the Jews, who did not wish to share their privileges with the Gentiles, and it was with difficulty that the Apostles understood the necessity of Christ's Passion and Death for the inauguration of the spiritual and universal Kingdom of God (Cf. *Matt. xvi. 22; Luke xxiv. 25; 1 Cor. i. 23*).

(B) In particular.

Fulfilment of individual prophecies:

- 1° Native town of the Messiah: Bethlehem (*Mich. v. 2; Matt. ii. 6; John vii. 42*).
- 2° Lineage of the Messiah: of the family of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Juda, David (*Gen. xii. 3; xxii. 18; xxvi. 4; xxviii. 14; xlix. 8-12; Matt. i. 2-6; Luke iii. 31-34*).
- 3° Mother of the Messiah a virgin: (*Is. vii. 14; Matt. i. 18-25; Luke i. 27-34*).
- 4° Homage of Kings: "Kings of Tharsis and the islands shall offer presents, kings of the Arabians and of Saba shall bring gifts" (*Ps. lxxi. 10; Is. lx. 3-6; Matt. ii. 1-11*).
- 5° Precursor of the Messiah (*Mal. iii. 1; iv. 5; Luke i. 5-27; 57-80*).

- 6° Beginning of the preaching of the Gospel (*Is. ix. 1; Matt. iv. 13-15*).
- 7° Miraculous healing (*Is. xxxv. 5-6; Matt. xi. 5*).
- 8° Preaching of the Gospel (*Is. lxi. 1; Luke iv. 18*).
- 9° Gentleness and humility of the Saviour (*Is. xlii. 1-3; Matt. iii. 17; Matt. xii. 18; xvii. 5*).
- 10° Triumphant entry into Jerusalem (*Zach. ix. 9; Matt. xxi. 4-5*).
- 11° Institution of a new Sacrifice of a new Priesthood (*Mal. i. 11; Ps. cix. 4; Ps. xxi. 27-30; Matt. xxvi. 26-29; Luke xxii. 15-20*).
- 12° Infidelity of the Jews (*Is. vi. 9; Matt. xiii. 13; xxi. 42; Ps. cxvii. 22; Acts iv. 11; Rom. ix. 33; 1 Pet. ii. 7*).
- 13° Sorrows of the Passion (*Ps. xxxiv. 11, 12; Is. l. 6; liii.; Matt. xxvi. 67, 68; Ps. lxviii. 22; Matt. xxvii. 48; Ps. xx.; Matt. xxvii. 35-44*).
- 14° Resurrection of the Messiah (*Ps. xv. 10; cf. Acts ii. 29-32; xiii. 36, 37*).
- 15° Remission of sins (*Zach. xiii. 1; Matt. ix. 2; Acts ii. 38*).
- 16° Ascension (*Ps. cix. 1; Acts ii. 34*).
- 17° Mission of the Holy Ghost (*Joel ii. 28, 29; Acts ii. 17 sq.*).
- 18° Conversion of the Gentiles (*Is. lx. 1-4; Luke ii. 29 sq.; cf. Acts xi. 18; 1 Tim. ii. 4-7*).
- 19° Victory of Christ (*Is. liii. 11, 12; Ps. cix. 2; John xvi. 33*).
- 20° Eternal reign of Christ (*Is. ix. 7; Ps. ii.; xlv.; cix. 3; John xviii. 36; Matt. xvi. 18*).

IV.—Probative force of Messianic prophecy.

The fulfilment of prophecy cannot be ascribed (a) to chance, or (b) to natural necessity.

(a) As already shewn, it is impossible that many circumstances should concur by chance to correspond to one contingent definite prediction. The virtues of the Messiah, the principal facts of His life, the details of His Passion and Death cannot accidentally concur to the fulfilment of the prophecy of Isaiah. *A fortiori* a series of such prophecies and their fulfilment cannot be set down to chance.

(b) Because the predictions are of future contingent

events, which depend on the free-will of many individuals, their fulfilment cannot be ascribed to natural necessity.

Thus the probative force of prophecy arises from the fact that the predictions could not by any possibility have been made without the special intervention of God.

An objection: Did not the prophets foretell the temporal prosperity and the inauguration of the Kingdom of Israel?

Answer: Often in Scripture, divine and spiritual things are conveyed under the likeness of material images. In Messianic prophecy two things must be distinguished: 1° spiritual future happening, *e.g.*, inauguration of the universal Kingdom of God; 2° the material figure of the predicted event, namely, the temporal prosperity of Israel. But it is clear that the latter element was only figurative, because (a) in some prophecies it is entirely absent, *e.g.*, in those when the Messiah is described as about to suffer and to die, and because (b) the Kingdom of God is predicted as universal, including all nations, and therefore separable from the temple and city of Jerusalem.

SECTION VIII

COMPARISON OF CHRISTIANITY WITH OTHER
FORMS OF RELIGION; DUTY OF EMBRACING
DIVINE REVELATION AS PROPOSED BY THE
CATHOLIC CHURCH.

CHAPTER XXVII

CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH OTHER FORMS OF RELIGION

Art. 1.—Comparison of Christianity with the Mosaic Religion.

I.—Extrinsic arguments which show the Divine origin of the Mosaic Religion.

1° Christ and the Apostles cite many times as divinely inspired the books of the Old Testament, in which the articles of the primitive and Mosaic Religion are contained. Our Lord called those books "Scripture," and asserted that they contained the doctrine of salvation and foretold His coming (*John v. 39; Matt. xxii. 32; Matt. iv. 4, 7, 10; Luke xvi. 16; Matt. xi. 13; xxii. 40*).

St. Peter (*2 Pet. i. 21*) explicitly states that the prophets wrote under the inspiration of the Holy Ghost. Similarly St. Paul (*2 Tim. iii. 16*) alludes to Scripture "inspired of God."

Moreover, Christ approved specifically the principal historical facts of the Old Testament, the Mosaic Law and the prophecies:

(a) Christ commemorates as certain the death of Abel, the deluge, the promises made to Abraham, the destruction of Sodom, the apparition of God to Moses, the manna in the desert, the brazen serpent, the miracles of Elias and Eliseus, etc.

(b) Christ did not abrogate the Mosaic Law as such. He abrogated only the ceremonial precepts. "Do not think that I am come to destroy the law or the prophets. I am not come to destroy, but to fulfil" (*Matt. v. 17, 18; John vii. 19*).

(c) Christ, by invoking the principal prophecies of the Old Testament, confirms them by His authority (*John v. 46*). He confirms the promises made to Abraham regarding the Messiah (*John viii. 56*), and cites different prophets, especially Isaias.

2° Miracles and Prophecies of Moses and the Prophets.

The Biblical Commission issued a decree (23rd June, 1905) regarding the historical books of Scripture. According to this decree such books must be taken to narrate historical facts objectively true, unless it can be proved by weighty arguments that under the form of history they set forth a parable, allegory, or other metaphorical sense distinct from the literal and historical signification of the words.

In a reply given the 27th June, 1906, the same Commission decreed that the arguments brought forward to prove that the books of Pentateuch are due to sources later than the Mosaic age are not of such weight as to justify the assertion that Moses was not their author. The opinion is tenable that Moses under Divine inspiration made use of written or oral traditions, and that he may have entrusted to others the task of writing the divinely inspired ideas which he conceived, subject of course to his approbation. The opinion is also tenable that, apart from the substantial authenticity and integrity of the Pentateuch, certain modifications may have occurred in the lapse of time.

Miracles and Prophecies of Moses and the Prophets witness to the Divine origin of the Mosaic Religion.

(A) As regards Moses, it will be sufficient to recall the Burning Bush (*Ex. iii. 1-iv. 23*), the ten plagues (*Ex. vii. 1-xii. 32*), the miraculous crossing of the Red Sea (*Ex. xiv. 16-31*), the pillar of fire (*Ex. xiii. 21, 22*), the manna (*Num. xi. 4-9*), the water miraculously sprung from the rock (*Num. xx. 7-13; Deut. i. 37*), the destruction of Core, Dathan and Abiron (*Num. xvi. 1-33*).

Moreover, Moses had foretold the chief miracles of those just enumerated, e.g., the plagues (*Ex. viii. ix. x.*), passage of the Red Sea (*Ex. xiv. 13*), death of Core, Dathan, and Abiron (*Num. xvi. 28 sq.*), manna (*Ex. xvi. 4, 5, 12*), and others (*Num. xiv. 29, 30; xxvi. 64, 65*).

(B) The Prophets worked miracles in confirmation of their Divine mission (*4 Kings v. 1-14; v. 27; 3 Kings xvii. 19-24; 3 Kings xviii. 42-45; 3 Kings xviii. 37-39; Dan. vi., etc.*).

Elias predicted a drought of three years and six months (*3 Kings xvii. 1*), Isaias foretold the massacre of the Assyrians (*4 Kings xix. 19-37*), Jeremias foretold the death of Hananias (*Jer. xxviii. 16, 17*), the destruction of

Babylon (*Jer. l.*) the seventy years' captivity of the Jews (*Jer. xxv.*).

Micneas and Daniel foretold the fate of various people (*Mich. i. 1-16; iii. 12; iv. 10; Dan. vii. 1-12*).

II.—Intrinsic arguments which shew the Divine origin of the Mosaic Religion.

1° The Mosaic and primitive Religion is in substantial agreement with Christianity and predicts its advent.

(A) Primitive Religion.

Of the Primitive Religion revealed to our first parents and to the patriarchs, a summary may be given as follows:

(a) Unity of God, Creator of heaven and earth (*Gen. i. 1 ff.*).

Polytheism is excluded.

All things created by God are good. Hence exclusion of dualism (*Gen. i. 10, 12, 18, 21*).

God is provident Ruler, supreme Legislator, Judge who will reward the good and punish the wicked (*Gen. ii. 16, 17; iii. 14 ff.*).

(b) Man was made in the image of God (*Gen. i. 26, 27*) and was therefore endowed with a spiritual and immortal soul (*Cf. Gen. ii. 7; xlvii. 9; Heb. xi. 13-16; Gen. xv. 15*). He was created in a state of original justice and made lord of all things (*Gen. i. 31; ii. 25; ii. 8-15, 17, 19; iii. 8-10*), capable of good and evil (*Gen. ii. 15, 16*), united in indissoluble marriage with Eve (*Gen. ii. 24*), transgressed the Divine command, and lost, he and his descendants, the privileged state (*Gen. iii. 1-24*). God held out hope of forgiveness and redemption (*Gen. iii. 14-15*).

(c) The precepts were either those of the Natural Law or positive precepts.

God must be adored, loved, feared, thanked, obeyed (*Gen. ii. 16; iii. 13 ff.*). Sacrifices were offered to God from the time of Abel (*Gen. iv. 3, 4*), the rite of circumcision was laid upon Abraham as a sign of the covenant between God and the chosen people (*Gen. xvii.*).

St. Thomas notes (*11^a 11^{ae} q 1 a 7*): "All articles of Faith are implicitly contained in primitive teaching, namely, that God exists, and exercises providential care for the salvation of men according to Heb. xi. 6: 'he that cometh to God must believe that he is, and is a rewarder to them that seek him.'"

(B) The Mosaic Religion.

When primitive Religion had become corrupt, God chose the family of Abraham and the people of Israel as the guardians of Revelation, so that true Religion might be preserved. Hence the origin of the Mosaic Religion—a renewal of the primitive and a preparation for Christian Revelation.

(a) God's unity and nature are wonderfully taught: "I am who am" (*Ex. iii. 4*); idolatry and superstition are forbidden (*Ex. xx. 3*); God is declared to be Creator, Ruler, Lord of all things (*Ex. xx. 1 ff*), eternal, omnipotent, omniscient, ubiquitous, most holy, zealous for the observance of His law (*Ex. xx. 5; xxxiv. 14*), "merciful and gracious, patient and of much compassion, and true" (*Ex. xxxiv. 6, 7*), "who doth judgment to the fatherless and the widow" (*Deut. x. 18*).

(b) Man was created in God's image, so that through the love and fear of God, and the observance of His commandments, man might establish a nearer association with Him. Moses presupposes the immortality of the soul, when he forbids "seeking the truth from the dead" (*Deut. xviii. 11*). Moreover, Christ authoritatively laid down the sense of *Ex. iii. 6*: "I am the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac and the God of Jacob" as indicating the immortality of the soul, for He "is not the God of the dead, but of the living" (*Matt. xxii. 31 ff; Mark xii. 26 ff; Luke xx. 37 ff*).

(c) Precepts.

The precept, first in importance, was love of God, and next, the love of one's neighbour (*Deut. vi. 5; xi. 13; Lev. xix. 18, 33; Matt. xxii. 40*).

From these two fundamental precepts came the precepts of the Decalogue (*Ex. xix*) which is a compendium of the Natural Law. Kindness towards the poor, widows, servants, the old, the deaf and blind, strangers, enemies and animals is commended (*Ex. xxiii. 10, 11; Deut. xv. 7 ff; Lev. xix. 13-33; Ex. xxiii. 4; Deut. xxv. 4*).

(d) Worship.

Sacrifices were enjoined to acknowledge the supremacy of God, to preserve faith, to cherish justice, and to promote the love of God (*Lev. xxiii., xxv.*). Priests and Levites were consecrated to the service of God (*Lev. viii. 1 ff; Num. xvi. 5 ff*). God promised that He would send prophets to the people of Israel (*Deut. xviii. 9 ff*).

(e) The Mosaic Religion announced the coming of Christianity.

The Mosaic Religion, as the utterances of the prophets shew, is preparatory to, and figurative of, Christianity. Before the prophets had spoken, Moses said: "The Lord thy God will raise up to thee a prophet of thy nation and of thy brethren like unto me. Him thou shalt hear" (*Deut. xviii. 14-20; Cf. John i. 45; iv. 25; v. 46; vi. 14; vii. 40; vii. 37, 38; Acts iii. 22ff*).

St. Thomas notes that "the Divine law is divided into Old and New—not into two different species, but into the imperfect and perfect of the same species (*1^a 11^{ae} q 107 a 1, 2, 3*).

²⁰ The Divine origin of the Mosaic and Primitive Religion is shewn from its excellence, and from its prediction of Christianity.

(A) Excellence of the Monotheism of the Jews.

(a) Negatively.

The Mosaic dogmas, precepts and worship cannot be characterised as unworthy of God.

(b) Positively.

Although the doctrine of Monotheism can be known and demonstrated by reason, Revelation is *morally* necessary in regard to the truths of Natural Religion, so that they may be known quickly, with certitude, and with no admixture of error. The Israelites, and the Israelites alone, embraced Monotheism and the truths of Natural Religion quickly, with certitude, and with no admixture of error. Hence it is clear that Divine Revelation was vouchsafed to them. Even Plato and Aristotle, who affirmed the existence of One most perfect God, did not attain to the doctrine of Creation or of Divine Providence (*1^a q 44 a 2*).

Evolutionists who claim that Monotheism was reached through animism, totemism, fetishism, polytheism, etc., make gratuitous assertions devoid of foundation. Gunkel, in his controversy with Delitzsch, wrote with truth: "The popular Monotheism of Israel is undoubtedly a wonder in the midst of the religions of the ancient East."

(B) The Divine origin of the Religion of Israel is shewn from its announcement of Christianity.

The prophecy of the universal propagation of Christianity, and of the coming through Christ of the Kingdom

of God exceeded the natural power of human foresight, and postulates Divine intervention. St. Thomas notes: "To dispose to an end and to lead to the attainment of that end are functions of the same person—functions accomplished either by himself or through his subjects. . . . Hence the same God, through whom (Christ being mediator) the salvation of men has been accomplished, promulgated the Old Law (*1^a 11^{ae} q 98 a ii*).

III.—Difficulties.

(1) Why did God permit the corruption of primitive Revelation?

The permission of evil, moral and physical, is a mystery. St. Augustine attempts an answer: "Since God is infinitely good He would not have allowed the oncoming of evil in His work, if it were not that He is so omnipotent and holy as to draw benefit from evil" (*Enchiridion c. xi*). St. Paul, earliest of Apologists, had suggested the same idea in Rom. v. 20: "Where sin abounded, grace did more abound (*Cf. Principles of Christian Apologetics, p. 95 ff*).

(2) Why were ceremonial observances so many and so minute under the Old Law?

Ceremonial observances were necessary to guard the people of Israel from idolatrous practices in vogue amongst nations all round, and to train them gradually for a more spiritual worship. Christ announced the worship of the New Law to be one "in spirit and in truth" (*John iv. 23*). Thus the development of worship ascended from sensible to spiritual things, from the multiplicity of figures to the unity of Divine reality.

(3) Why did not the Mosaic Religion stress the immortality of the soul?

The Mosaic Religion did undoubtedly stress the immortality of the soul and the future life:

- (a) It teaches that man was made in the image and likeness of God, that God breathed into his face the breath of life (*Gen. ii. 7*).
- (b) Patriarchs speak of the time "of their pilgrimage" (*Gen. xlvii. 9*).
- (c) Jacob mourning for Joseph said: "I will go down to my son into Scheol." The word cannot mean grave, because Jacob thought that a wild beast had devoured Joseph (*Gen. xxxvii. 35*).

- (d) Jacob dying said: "I will expect thy salvation, O Lord" (*Gen. xlix. 18*).
- (e) The dead are said to have gone to their fathers, to their people (*Num. xx. 26; xxxi. 2, etc.*).
- (f) Moses forbade "seeking of truth from the dead" (*Deut. xviii. 11*).
- (g) Job's testimony is explicit (*xix. 25*).
- (h) Daniel's testimony is equally explicit (*Dan. xii. 2, 3; Cf. Is. xxvi. 19; 2 Mach. vii. 9; xii. 44*).
- (4) In what sense can the Mosaic Law be said to be perfect?

Not perfect absolutely, but perfect for the time and people concerned.

(5) Does not Delitzsch (*Babel und Bibel, 1902*) maintain that the biblical narrative of Creation comes from Babylonian and Assyrian myths?

- (a) The Biblical narrative is monotheistic; Gentile cosmogonies (even in the laws of Hammurabi) are polytheistic.
- (b) In Genesis the doctrine of creation, where no pre-existing material existed, is taught; in Gentile narrative matter is pre-existent.
- (c) Likenesses in various cosmogonies regarding the original state and the sin of the first man, etc., come from primitive tradition. The superiority of the Biblical narrative is most striking, and points to Divine guidance.

Art. 2.—Buddhism.

I.—Brief history of Buddhism:

Brahmanism, the doctrines of which are contained in the very old books (1000 B.C.) called the Vedas, originally taught in an obscure way the existence of a Supreme Being, to whom sacrifices were offered in order to obtain benefits. Later Brahmanism became pantheistic. Brahma (neuter) was interpreted to mean the universal germ, whence God, the world and all things are evolved. Hence came the God Brahma (masculine) from whom proceed different classes of men. Brahma, Vishnu and Siva were three hypostases of a trinity. Men after death go into the bodies of animals, until they acquire immutability and are absorbed by Brahma. Since sin is the cause of sorrow and change, it must be avoided. The ethical system

teaches in theory a rigid asceticism, which in practice degenerated into impure rites. In the Sixth Century B.C., Brahmanism was much changed by Siddharta, who is called Cakyamouni (Sakya-mouni) or Buddha. The Sakyas were an Aryan tribe, the word "*mouni*" means "sage." Cakyamouni was born about 557 B.C. He left home and friends in order to study and acquire wisdom through meditation and mortification. His doctrine spread in India, Ceylon, Siam, China and Japan, and has at the present date about 125,000,000 adherents.

II.—Dogmatic and Ethical teaching of Buddhism.

(A) Dogmas.

- 1° Nothing certain can be known about the existence of God.
- 2° All beings are essentially equal, and are constantly changing. Hence spirituality and immortality of the soul are excluded.
- 3° Metempsychosis is a fundamental dogma.
- 4° Law is immutable, and therefore good actions merit reward, evil actions punishment.
- 5° All evil arises from the desire to live. This desire must be strenuously opposed.
- 6° Man ultimately, after many changes, reaches Nirvana—a state of immobility and practically of annihilation.

(B) Ethics.

Man must renounce concupiscence. The means are meditation, moderate mortification, confession of faults. But of prayer and grace there is no mention, since the existence of the Deity is uncertain. Cakyamouni enjoined universal sympathy.

III.—Criticism of Buddhism

Resemblances and Differences between Christianity and Buddhism.

(A) Resemblances are confined to certain rites and practices, which do not touch dogma. They may be summarised as follows:

1. Consciousness of the sufferings of this life.
2. Mortification of the flesh and of concupiscence.
3. Institution of Monks.

4. Voluntary poverty, continence, benevolence.
5. Confession of faults.
6. Practice of meditation.
7. Desire of attaining the ultimate end.

But the aim of Christianity to reach to perfection and to the vision of God through Sacraments, Prayer and Supernatural Merit is wholly different from the aim of Buddhism, which is equivalent to annihilation. Thus the likenesses are merely external, and proceed from the general aspirations of mankind.

(B) Differences.

(a) Dogma.

Buddhism teaches nothing concerning God, Divine Providence, spirituality of the soul. Its doctrine is pessimistic.

(b) Ethics.

The benevolence enjoined does not proceed from love of God, but from natural sympathy. Humility is despised. Polygamy, divorce and even polyandria flourish.

(c) The miracles alleged in proof of Buddhist doctrine are absurd.

(d) Propagation of Buddhism is explained both by its qualities and its defects. Nor was it the propagation of one form of religion, as some Buddhists are agnostics, others atheists, others pantheists, others polytheists.

Art. 3.—Mahometanism.

I.—Brief history of Mahometanism.

Mahometanism or Islamism ("*Islam*" means submission or resignation) is the religion founded in Arabia by Mahomet (Arabic : *Mohammed*) in the Seventh Century A.D.

The Ancient Arabs, descended from Heber and Abraham, had accepted the religion of the Patriarchs, but afterwards fell into polytheism. Mahomet was born about A.D. 570. He was first a shepherd, then a merchant, and later married a rich widow. He claimed that the angel Gabriel appeared to him, and told him that he was chosen to be a prophet with a divine mission. In 622 he left Mecca for Medina. He prevailed with the people of Medina, and by their help in money and alms spread his religion throughout Arabia. He died in 632. Islamism was afterwards spread by the sword in Asia, Africa, and

part of Europe. Originally Mahomet seemed to be sincere, but later he announced false revelations, so as to be able to gratify his lust and ambition.

II.—Doctrine of Islamism.

(A) Dogmas.

- 1° One God exists—Allah (Trinity excluded).
- 2° Angels are ambassadors of God and protectors of men.
- 3° There has been a divine mission of prophets of whom Mahomet is the greatest.
- 4° The Revelation is contained in the sacred book *Al Coran*.
- 5° Human souls are immortal, and bodies will rise again. Paradise is a place where carnal pleasure may be gratified.
- 6° Fatalism is taught in some places of the Coran, and elsewhere human liberty is asserted.

(B) Precepts.

- 1° Wine, swine flesh, images, games of chance are forbidden.
- 2° Prayer, five times a day, is enjoined.
- 3° Fasting is prescribed, especially during the month of Rhamadan.
- 4° Pilgrimages, alms, circumcision are of obligation.
- 5° Polygamy and divorce are permitted.

III.—Criticism of Islamism.

From Judaism and Christianity, Monotheism was adopted. But the doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation were rejected. No supernatural signs (miracles) are claimed in witness of the truth of Mahometanism. It was propagated by the sword, and its propagation was helped by the promise of sensual rewards in the Mahometan paradise.

Thus the doctrine, institutions, miracles, prophecies, wonderful propagation, unshaken stability, unity, and fecundity in blessings of Christianity are revealed more clearly as motives of credibility from comparison with other forms of religion.

CHAPTER XXVIII

THE DUTY OF ACCEPTING DIVINE REVELATION AS PROPOSED BY THE CATHOLIC CHURCH

Art. 1.—Indifferentism and Liberalism.

I.—Absolute Indifferentism.

This doctrine denies the necessity of any, even of Natural, Religion (D. 1703). It is the fruit of Atheism or Agnosticism or Pantheism. The practical application of these principles may be read in such books as *La Foi Laïque*, by F. Buisson. Jaurès, in a discourse made in the Chamber of Deputies (11th February, 1895), said: "Si Dieu lui-même se dressait devant les multitudes sous une forme palpable, le premier devoir de l'homme serait de refuser l'obéissance, et de le considérer comme l'égal avec qui l'on discute, non comme le maître que l'on subit."

II.—Moderate Indifferentism or Latitudinarianism.

This form of belief recognises some duties to God and some form of worship. That the worship must be nebulous in character is shewn by the fact that some (*e.g.*, Jules Simon) deny the utility and efficacy of prayer. Félicité de Lammenais held that: "If moral life is lived in accordance with what is right, eternal salvation of the soul can be reached by the profession of any faith" (D. 1613, 1617). As thus expressed the doctrine can only be characterised as "Indifferentism."

III.—Liberalism.

Liberalism defends the civil liberty of every form of worship and may be defined: "the doctrine according to which the civil and social authority is not bound to accept Divine Revelation sufficiently proposed, but may adopt a neutral attitude in regard to true and false religions, without submission to Divine positive laws supernaturally revealed."

There have been three periods of Liberalism.

First Period.

Félicité de Lammenais founded in 1830 the paper called *L'Avenir* to defend the rights of the Church. He proposed separation of Church from State to secure freedom for the Church, and he defended the civil liberty of every form of worship as a means of reconciling Faith and Science.

Gregory XVI in his Encyclical *Mirari Vos* (1832) condemned this opinion as paving the way for Indifferentism. The disciples of de Lammenais at once accepted the condemnation. De Lammenais himself at first accepted, but afterwards attacked the Church in his book *Paroles d'un Croyant*, which was condemned (1834). De Lammenais died in 1854 without any sign of submission.

Second Period.

After the discourse given by Montalembert at the Congress of Mechlin 1863, Pius IX again condemned Liberalism in his Encyclical *Quanta Cura* (1864). With this Encyclical was published the Syllabus of modern errors.

Third Period.

Leo XIII in his Encyclical *Immortale Dei* (1885) confirmed the teaching of Gregory XVI and of Pius IX. But he also stresses the principle that there can be no compulsion regarding the adoption of the Catholic Faith, and quotes St. Augustine: "*credere non potest homo nisi volens.*"

Again, in the Encyclical *Libertas* (1888) Leo XIII condemns unrestrained liberty for different forms of religion.

Finally, Pius X in Encyclical *Pascendi* (1910), in letters regarding the errors of *Le Sillon*, and in Encyclical *Vehementior Nos* confirms the condemnations already pronounced. Continuity of doctrine may be seen by comparison of these utterances with those of Boniface VIII in *Unam Sanctam* (D. 469), of Martin V (D. 640-682), of Leo X (D. 773), etc.

Art. 2.—The duty of professing the truths of Natural Religion.

I.—There is a moral obligation binding each individual to profess Natural Religion.

(a) First Argument. Man needs religion to attain to his natural end.

Major: The end to which man is naturally directed is

the knowledge of Supreme Truth and the love of Supreme Goodness.

Minor: But to reach this knowledge and love, man must endeavour to think rightly of God, to obey Him, and to manifest to Him interiorly and exteriorly subjection and love, in which manifestation religion consists.

Conclusion: Therefore man needs religion to attain to his natural end.

The Major is proved (1) from the standpoint of intellect and (2) from the standpoint of will.

(1) The intellect is directed to the knowledge of truth. But no truths are more necessary than the knowledge of the First Cause of our nature, of the Supreme Law of moral action, of the Source of help necessary for right living. Therefore our intellect is naturally directed to the knowledge of God, Author of nature, in so far as He is knowable from the works of creation.

(2) The will is directed to the love of that which is good as shewn by the intellect. But the intellect knows not only particular goods but good in general, and cannot find the fulness of good except in the Supreme Goodness of God. ("*Inquietum est cor nostrum donec requiescat in Te!*") Therefore the will is naturally directed to love God, Author of nature, above all things.

The Minor is proved.

Unless man endeavours to reach the knowledge and love of God by thinking rightly of Him, and manifesting to Him subjection and love (which are acts of the virtue of religion), the knowledge remains merely speculative, and has no influence on life.

(b) Second Argument. By the law of nature there is due to God internal, external and social worship. To Him who is Supreme Lord, Greatest Benefactor and Highest Good there are due the sentiments of subjection, honour, gratitude and love. But man by the law of nature depends on his Creator, by whom he is preserved and helped. Accordingly by the same law of nature he owes to God sentiments of subjection, honour, gratitude and love.

Subjection, honour, gratitude and love constitute internal worship. There is need of external worship, as God is the Author of the body as well as of the soul. If internal worship be really sincere, it will externate itself.

Finally there is need of social worship as God is like-wise the founder of society.

Because worship is *due* to God, the virtue of religion is said to belong to the cardinal virtue of Justice.

II.—Corollaries.

1^o Our duties towards God are of first importance because they are immediately founded upon the Eternal and Natural Laws. The highest virtues are the theological virtues of Faith, Hope and Charity which directly regard God. Next in importance is the virtue of Religion.

2^o Our duties towards God are the indispensable foundation of all other duties. If the Eternal Law and the Natural Law, which is a reflex of the Eternal, be disregarded, there is neither foundation nor sanction for family, social, or civil responsibilities.

III.—Chief acts of Natural Religion.

Prayer and Sacrifice are the chief acts of Natural Religion—prayer, in recognition of God's supremacy and of human needs; sacrifice in atonement for human faults.

Art. 3.—The duty binding the individual to accept Divine Revelation sufficiently proposed, and to seek it, if there is a serious probability of its existence.

I.—Proof derived from the law of God.

Revelation, sufficiently proposed, comes from God, Creator, Lord, Source of truth. Hence the duty of acceptance. If the objection be raised that the obligation of accepting Divine Revelation is supernatural and not natural, and therefore is not based on the Natural Law, St. Thomas replies that it is clearly against the Natural Law (because an act of disobedience) to oppose an interior grace or an external grace which may come through the ministry of preaching, even though grace be supernatural. The unbeliever who resists supernatural grace, contravenes *directly* the Supernatural Law and *indirectly* the Natural Law.

II.—Proof derived from the end of man.

Major: Man by the law of nature is obliged to strive to attain his last end, whether natural or supernatural.

Minor: But without acceptance of Divine Revelation man cannot efficaciously attain his last end.

Conclusion: Therefore he is bound to accept Divine Revelation.

The Major is proved: The Natural Law *directly* obliges man to strive to reach his last end—the knowledge of God from creatures, and natural love of God above all things. But the Natural Law *indirectly* obliges man to tend to his supernatural end, inasmuch as it obliges man to obey God when He imposes positive precepts for a supernatural purpose.

The Minor is proved: As already shewn, Revelation is *morally* necessary for such knowledge of the truths of Natural Religion as shall be speedily acquired, certain and without admixture of error. Revelation is *absolutely* necessary for the knowledge of supernatural truths, on the acceptance of which salvation depends.

III.—There is grave obligation of seeking after Divine Revelation, when there is serious probability of its existence. Both the law of God and the end of man establish the necessity.

IV.—“Out of the Church there is no salvation.”

This is a time-honoured principle, and it is of importance to understand precisely what it implies.

Origen wrote: “Outside the Church no one is saved” (*Hom. iii. in Josue n. 5*).

St. Cyprian wrote: “He cannot have God for his father, if he has not the Church for his mother” (*De unitate Ecclesiae n. 6*).

St. Augustine wrote: “Who denies that there is no salvation outside the Church?” (*De Baptismo. Book IV c. 17*).

Theologians distinguish between the body and the soul of the Church.

To the body of the Church belong the baptised who profess the Catholic Faith under the magisterium of the Roman Pontiff.

To the soul of the Church belong those who preserve internal Faith and Charity.

Those who *culpably* remain outside the body of the Church cannot be saved.

Those who *inculpably* remain outside the body of the Church can be saved, if by Faith and Charity or through perfect contrition they belong to the soul of the Church.

Hence for salvation it is absolutely necessary (*necessitate medii*) 1^o to belong really to the soul of the Church,

2° for adults to belong to the body of the Church either really or in desire, for infants to belong really to the body of the Church through valid baptism (Cf. D. 1674).

V.—Difficulties.

(1) Is there not an element of truth in all forms of Religion?

The element of truth which may exist in false doctrine is not the soul of the doctrine, but the servant of error.

(2) Does not the obedience of Faith clash with the independence and dignity of reason?

The "independence" of reason is limited by truth. It is not a sign of rational independence to claim the liberty of believing that $2 + 2 = 5$. Reason is only genuinely free, when its conclusions are in accordance with truth. As Auguste Nicolas has written: "To be free is to do what one wishes in doing what one should."

Art. 4.—The obligation binding the civil authority and society to accept Divine Revelation sufficiently proposed.

I.—Proof drawn from the law of God, Author of civil society.

God is Creator, Lord, Benefactor of society. Hence society owes to God social worship and the obedience of Faith if God clearly reveals supernatural truth.

II.—Proof based on the end of society.

The end of society—the temporal well-being of citizens—depends on their spiritual well-being. Accordingly civil society cannot neglect to take notice of Revealed Truth, provided that the genuineness of the Revelation is clear.

III.—How the civil authority should accept Divine Revelation.

1° Negatively.

The State should make no decree in prejudice of Revealed Religion. The State has no just right to prevent the preaching of the Word of God, the administration of the Sacraments, the celebration of Divine worship, judgment regarding the morality of human acts, the education of ministers of Religion, the well-being of Religious Communities, etc.

The State cannot deny the indissolubility of marriage, nor sanction divorce (D. 1739-1753, 1767).

2° Positively and indirectly.

The State ought to defend in the temporal order not only Natural but Revealed Religion. St. Thomas writes: "Unbelievers who have never received the Faith, such as Jews and Gentiles, are not to be forced to believe, because to believe is a matter of the will." Writing of a Catholic state in medieval times and of apostates from the Faith: "Such should be compelled even by corporal punishment to fulfil what they promised, and to hold what they at one time accepted." He goes on to argue that if coiners and other malefactors were condemned to death by secular princes, much more should apostates be not only excommunicated but put to death. The Church was merciful and therefore did not condemn unless after a first and a second admonition. If admonitions were useless, the Church excommunicated, and left further action to the secular power (11^a 11^{ae} q 10 a, 8; q 11 a, 3).

3° Positively and directly.

The State should cherish Revealed Religion by:

- (1) The encouragement of the preaching and propagation of the Faith.
- (2) The building of churches.
- (3) The immunity of clerics from military service.
- (4) Participation in Divine worship, thus securing public veneration for the names of God and of Christ.

Constantine the Great wished to be known as an "external bishop" (*episcopus ad extra*), and Charlemagne as "the devoted defender and humble helper of Holy Church."

What can the Church demand from (a) an heretical (b) an indifferent, or (c) an unbelieving state?

- (a) From an heretical State the Church can demand that Catholics living therein should be free in the profession of their religion.
- (b) An indifferent State should regard the Church as a legitimate society, and hence not to be opposed but protected.
- (c) An unbelieving State should not prevent the preaching and propagation of the Christian Faith.

IV.—Difficulties.

(1) May the Catholic State tolerate the worship of unbelievers and of heretics?

The State cannot tolerate *per se* (i.e., without a just cause) that which is evil and injurious to God. *Per accidens* the worship of unbelievers and of heretics may be tolerated to avoid greater evil. But the Catholic State cannot sanction by law freedom of worship. "The Church is intolerant in principle because she believes; she is tolerant in practice because she loves. The enemies of the Church are tolerant in principle because they do not believe; they are intolerant in practice because they do not love."

(2) Is not the duty of the Catholic civil authority to look after the temporal well-being of its subjects, and therefore to be neutral in matters religious?

Temporal well-being is essentially subordinate to spiritual well-being. The natural and the supernatural should not be separated.

Under the illuminating guidance of Père Garrigou-Lagrange, we have explored the errors of Modernism, and found its roots in Agnosticism, Pantheism and Rationalism. Surely the examination of these errors manifests by contrast the sanity and beauty of Catholic Teaching. May we be worthy of the blessings which are ours! The earliest of Christian Apologists reminds us that we, if worthy of our destiny, "shall be delivered from the servitude of corruption into the liberty of the glory of the children of God" (*Rom. viii. 21*). And Our Blessed Lord indicates the means whereby we shall reach this glorious consummation: "If you continue in My word, you shall be My disciples indeed, and you shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free" (*John viii. 31, 32*).

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