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Logic as a Liberal Art

Logic as a Liberal Art

Description

The Way of Logic, p. 031 describes LAALA :

Although Logic as a Liberal Art was first offered in an early state to the Toronto Semiotic Circle in 1985, then mostly written by 1992, but with three extra chapters and other material added by 2007. John's manuscript still remained unfinished, due partly to the ever-ongoing modifications, but mostly due to the incomplete state of the final chapter (Chapter 22) which lacked explicit rules for the task (discovered by John) of semiotic “validation”: namely, the logical analysis of an invalid argument “so as to make explicit the valid consequences it actually contains”.


06/27/26: 52

Logic is a part of rhetoric, to be sure, but that part leaves out of account as far as possible the emotional, psychological, sociological, political, and commercial factors,

Do these factors need to be understood to kniw what logic is not?

06/27/26: 55

the reason for studying logic is that we are human beings, possessed of minds and the capacity to think, possessed as well by the need to interact and communicate with other human beings who both influence and are influenced by the way we think and behave.

06/27/26: 57

"we can perceive that good reasoning and good morals are closely allied", Peirce observes ( c.1902: CP 1. 576)

cf. JP2 Veritatis Splendor

06/27/26: 62

Peirce (1902e: CP 2.203) considers it to "generally be conceded" that the central problem peculiar to logic "is the classification of arguments, so that all those that are bad are thrown into one division, and those which are good into another, these divisions being defined by marks recognizable even if it be not known whether the arguments are good or bad. Furthermore, logic has to divide good arguments by recognizable marks into those which have different orders of validity, and has to afford means for measuring the strength of arguments".

ML can do this binary classification, but ∃ degrees of logical validity?

06/27/26: 81

From his early studies in Paris, Soto introduced into the Spanish and Portuguese university world th~ custom of treating of signs in the early part of formal logic \cith the publication of his influential Summulae in 1529.

06/27/26: 85

Because of this inherently interdisciplinary thrust of the semiotic enterprise, there is good reason to consider that the development of semiotics today is a phenomenon comparable in importance and scope to the establishment and rise, smce the seventeenth century, of modern science.

06/27/26: 89

"contraries belong to the same " I genus

06/27/26: 89

Poinsot ( 1631: 60a30-34): "Et quia oppositorum eadem est ratio, sub hac definitione inductionis, quae est per ascensum, intelligitur oppositum eius, quod est descensus, id est ab universali ad singularia progressio."

06/27/26: 90

The notion that logic is in any way concerned with it is a fallacy closely allied to hedonism in ethics.

how?

06/27/26: 91

(In this diagram, of course, it is purely accidental that death should occur at a deductive moment, since it could occur at any point, and since, in any event, in a living semiosis, the three phases compenetrate each other as if in a single process.

reminds me of 3 ages of interior life

06/30/26: 93

In Peircean terms, a sign is anything which stands in a relation to a second thing, called its object, in such a way as to determine a third thing, called its interpretant, to stand itself in that same relation to the object.

What is the sign, object, interpretant for Duhem’s conception of physical theory?

06/30/26: 93

the interpretant is in every case itself a sign,

06/30/26: 94

The concept as sign determines the mind as interpretant to have an awareness of the horse as object.

06/30/26: 98

True, they sometimes speak of the "reference" or ( in acknowledgement of Frege, who in fact is supremely unhelpful on this point) "referent" of the sign, by which they mean the putative and problematic idea of a mind-independent physical thing as referred to by the sign.

why Frege unhelpful?

07/01/26: 100

Those partial ideas are really not in the first idea, in itself, though they are separated out from it.

abstraction?

07/01/26: 102

the semiotic nature of language as a symbolic form and of logic itself within that language is what gives focus to logic as a liberal art.

07/01/26: 104

interpretants connect signs with objects which engender further interpretants by themselves becoming signs, and so on, also ad infinitum, in the process of cognitive growth and development we call learning.

07/01/26: 104

represigns, dicisigns, and suadisigns provide the subject matter of logic as a liberal art.

07/03/26: 118

the "outside" physical subjects have in part a further objective existence "inside" experience precisely as signified by the ideas within the organism-which be it noted, are emphatically not the objects known, but merely the foundations within psychological subjectivity for the relations to objects which include but are organized differently than even

07/03/26: 119

the parts of the physical subjectivities of the environment that enter into cognition at any given time.

structural realism

07/03/26: 124

auf gehoben

?

09/03/26: 132

Peirce's point that "since the very first conception from which logic springs is that one proposition follows from another" (1883: 2.710), then, "Quite clearly, the Aristotelian syllogistic omits something ..." (1893: 2.532).

09/03/26: 137

The copula "is" ( absent entirely in this form from the Greek languages presiding over the Aristotelian and Stoic origins of logic, or from modem Russian or from the Hebrew language, for example)

09/03/26: 142

Thus comprehension determines extension; extension presupposes and is determined by comprehension. Comprehension is the relatively independent variable, extension is the relatively dependent variable.

09/03/26: 143

Thus comprehension is what the definition of a term expresses, whereas extension is the objective diversity to which that definition applies. We will say more in later chapters about definition, which, along with division and reasoning, is considered one of the three basic ways of coming to understand ( "modi sciendi") in the liberal arts tradition.

09/07/26: 150

Univocity is, of course, by its very nature an artificial and temporary achievement, inasmuch as it is impossible to encode a sign vehicle in such a way that only a single understanding of it becomes possible for all time.

09/07/26: 169

We have already had occasion to remark in our opening chapters that the scholastic logic, like that of the ancient Greeks, dealt with natural language, whereas contemporary logic substitutes for natural language an artificial one.

AI brings natural language back

09/09/26: 171

Quine 1980: 80. Quine here remarks that "there is little hope of drawing up complete and unfailing rules for the translation of words into symbols" (i.e., of natural language into a wholly stipulated logical symbolism),

not even with LLMs?

09/09/26: 173

(Poinsot 1631, 30a15: siquidem etiam in propositione falsa datur suppositio

09/09/26: 175

we cannot licitly say that, since man is an animal and a threeletter word, therefore some animals are three-letter words

suppositional fallacy

09/09/26: 177

discussion of infinite process in The Human Use of Signs (Deely 1994).

mentions ∞ regress problem?

09/09/26: 182

Supposition makes nonsense of the idea (Quine 1980: 5-6) that, by methods of technical analysis, any given statement can be rendered uniformly true or false independent of context.

09/09/26: 190

a sign "determines something else ( its interpretant) to refer to an object to which it itself refers ( its object) in the same way, the interpretant becoming in turn a sign, and so on ad infinitum" ( 1901: 2. 303)

09/09/26: 190

ad infinitum"

no ∞ regress problem here?

09/10/26: 192

Aquinas, c.12651267: q. 7, art. 9, writing from the perspective of a physicist in the medieval sense, says that "only what is independent of the soul pertains to the categories".)

09/12/26: 222

logicians customarily distinguish between division and classification.

09/12/26: 222

Joseph comments on this point ( 1916: 116) that "in actual practice our thought moves in both directions at once; and the process of dividing a genus is at the same time one of classifying the things in the genus".

09/12/26: 223

Just as there are practical guidelines or rules for the formulation of good definitions, so there are such guidelines for working out classifications and the drawing up of good divisions.

09/12/26: 223

in the early days of biology, organisms were classified on the assumption that the various species were fixed in type. Gradually, the accumulation of evidence arranged on the basis of this assumption forced the assumption itself into question, and led to the • attempting of new arrangements based on the assumption of descent with modification, i.e., evolution rather than fixity of species, which was found to work.

09/12/26: 226

The dichotomous division of number would be into odd and not-odd, or into even and not-even. In this case, the mere form of the division alone, and not the understanding of the subject matter as a whole, is what guarantees the exclusiveness of the divided parts. But the form of the division also imposes a distortion on the understanding of the subject matter, by representing co-ordinate species ( in this case, odd and even) as if they were subordinate to one another.

09/15/26: 236

logic as a liberal art is by no means the highest or final form of logical study, or the most complete, but it is the most fundamental. To the pure logic of relatives goes the honor of logic in its highest form, going well beyond the forms of natural language to explore intellectual possibility for its own sake, not just as circumscribed in the physical environment as relativized through experience to specific sociocultural worlds sustained by linguistic traditions and embodied in the psychology and personality of individuals and in the institutions of public life, but also as embodied in the machine "languages" and possibilities labeled "Artificial Intelligence".

09/15/26: 236

"Artificial Intelligence".

09/15/26: 238

To signify truly or falsely is not the essence of a dicisign, but only so to signify an object that on the basis of the signification a judgment of true or false might be made.

09/15/26: 238

truth and falsity are not the substance, but accidents of the dicisign.

09/15/26: 238

what is essential is that the represented object be signified in a way concerning which judgment is possible, and this requirement is what separates the order of dicisigns from the order of rhemes or represigns within language.

09/15/26: 239

Lejewski 1967: ~19), that the Aristotelian logic was a "logic of terms" in contrast to the Stoic "logic of propositions", but such a view is oversimplified,

09/15/26: 240

Prior 1967: 43) that the Stoics were "the first 'modern' logicians", in contrast to Aristotle". Prior nicely summarizes the contrast between Aristotelian tradition and the modem revitalization of the Stoic approach as follows ( ibid. 35-36)

09/15/26: 249

part and parcel

09/15/26: 251

Colligation is a very important part of reasoning, calling for more genius than any other part of the process.

09/15/26: 251

distinction between the highest dicisign and the lowest suadisign as such, Mates notes [ 1953: 43], was also observed in ancient Stoic logic.)

09/19/26: 255

(Poinsot 1632: 54a48-b4): "The truth of a conditional does not require that any of its parts"-i. e., the categoricals virtually present in the antecedent and consequent respectively-" be true, but that the consequence be good", i. e., valid, or inescapable (given this antecedent, that consequent would follow, whether this antecedent be given being another question) ; "and for the falsity of a conditional it suffices that the consequence be bad", 1. e., not a I necessary one.

Applies ∀ reasoning? Is all reasoning hypothetical/conditional à les Stoics?

09/19/26: 255

For it is one thing to say that the truth of a colligation "depends on the truths categorically stated " in the parts entering into its dicisignificative unity, and quite another to say that the truth of a colligation "depends on the manner itself of the colligation regardless of the truth or falsity of the categorical assertions colligated". If the former is given as the reason for calling all colligational dicisigns "hypothetical", then it clearly does not apply to the conditional dicisign; and yet the conditional dicisign was generally regarded as the paradigm case and most provocative example of a compound proposition!

indeed !

09/19/26: 255

There is a further and curious petitio principii in the traditional designation of minimal dicisigns as " categorical " and colligational dicisigns as "hypothetical".

09/19/26: 256

This petitio is expressly invoked, for example, by Poinsot at 1632a: 158a30-b2.

09/19/26: 259

The world is far too interesting and various to be looked at solely and at all times from a truth-functional point of view anyway,

really?

09/19/26: 259

Shakespeare has created a concatenation of about thirty-six minimal dicisigns ( six subjects, six predicates) in modal form.

?

09/28/26: 266

Colligational dicisigns, as Poinsot put it ( 1631a: 150a23), insofar as they are colligational, "are able to have their truth and falsity distinct from the categorical, because their verification does not come about through the predication of one thing of another, but through the copulation or disjunction of several categoricals".

09/28/26: 267

Differing both as to their mode of union (predication vs. colligation) and as to the nature of the extremes they unite within a dicisignification ( represigns vs. other dicisigns) , minimals and colligationals also signify what is true and what is false in mutually irreducible manners.

09/28/26: 271

the reduplicative compressed colligation conveying an allegation of cause need not be true: it need be, like all colligations insofar as logic alone studies them, only supposed or represented as true, in order to become subject to evaluation as valid or invalid.

09/28/26: 274

It seems that a disjunctive colligation should be considered falsified also if both parts are true: for if both parts can be true, there is no true disjunction, logically speaking, and the representation of one is a misrepresentation.

09/28/26: 275

the minimal to be incorporated with another minimal into a colligation is designated " premiss " and the colligational whole is designated "conclusion". This is a misuse of terms, for the relation of mi.nimals to colligates within the order of dicisigns is not a relation of premiss to conclusion, even where the supposed truth or falsity of the minimal has a determining effect on the possible truth or falsity of the colligation into which it is assumed.

09/28/26: 276

one of the best possible definitions of validity is that given by Peirce when he says ( 1893: 2.445) "To say that an argumentatio'n is valid is to say that it is as truthful as it pretends to be", for all reasoning makes a pretension, and if that pretension is true, the reasoning is valid.

Seems as tautological as Newton’s 1st Axiom. How can argumentation pretend?

09/28/26: 276

the relation of truth to logic is one of the most confused points in the whole modem doctrine of quantification and analysis by truthtables.

09/28/26: 276

Poinsot's observation cited earlier (1631a: 150a35ff.): "Wherefore, if a conditional or the other like dicisigns [i.e., the other forms of explicit colligation] are taken in the precise force of their consequence, they do not convey truth, but inference; an inference, however, is said to be valid or invalid, not true or false."

09/28/26: 280

it is most fundamental to the clarificatory nature and role within natural language that needs to be played by logic as a liberal art ( a role which it most certainly cannot be played by logic reduced to a calculus of symbols arranging patterns of compossibly true but empty propositional functions).

So AI can’t do logic?

09/28/26: 281

It is not just that the two dicisigns, grammatically different, logically "say the same thing", as "If anything is a man it is mortal" says the same as "All men are mortal". The sameness goes deeper than that. For, as we will see, whether an inference scheme is formed beginning with a disjunctive or whether it is formed beginning with a conjunctive, exactly the same schema, formally speaking, results in both cases; and this is not what happens when an inference scheme is formed in one case from a minimal categorical dicisign and in another case from a hypothetical conditional colligation.

09/28/26: 281

The sameness goes deeper than that.

Can angels use reason/logic?

10/01/26: 290

"A sign which represents a relation or connection in something else by embodying a similar relation or connection in itself is a diagram (c.1902: CP 2.277).

So a physical theory (à la structural realism) is a diagram?

10/01/26: 291

The "logic of relatives" is a modern topic of the greatest importance, in which Peirce was one of the pioneers. It is this branch of logic that is at play, for example, in the development of computer languages and programs.

Really? Not Boolean?

10/01/26: 295

[Editor's Note: Although Chapter 15 used to contain a much longer treatment of A, E, I, and O categorical propositions, as the most minimal types of dicisign formation, those sections were edited out of Deely's most recent copy of the manuscript, presumably because of their great length but minimal interest.]

Might be worth looking at original ed.

10/01/26: 296

"The very first conception from which logic springs is that one proposition follows from another" (Peirce 1883: 2.710).

10/01/26: 296

it is called "the doctrine of inference".

10/01/26: 299

logic is not a science of facts, but a science of how one thing leads to another according to how they are understood.

10/01/26: 301

The law under which a sign must be true is the law of inference;

10/01/26: 301

the illative relation is the primary and paramount semiotic relation.

10/01/26: 302

"what I could never admit, that logic is primarily conversant with unexpressed thought and only secondarily with language" ( 1893: 2.461nl).

10/01/26: 305

inference as based on represignificative consequence, that is to say, the consequences deriving from the represign's comprehension which constitutes it as a represign in the first place,

10/01/26: 305

dicisignificative consequence, that is to say, the consequences deriving from the formation of the dicisign,

10/01/26: 305

suadisignificative consequence, that is to say, the relation among the parts of a suadisign which determines whether the

10/01/26: 306

reason it purports to express for accepting or rejecting the assertion it also represents as conclusive really does necessitate the acceptance or rejection of the assertion in question.

10/01/26: 306

consequences attendant upon the formation of dicisigns

10/01/26: 306

minimal consequences,

10/01/26: 306

colligational consequences.

10/01/26: 306

Only through colligational consequences, as we will see, can suadisigns he reached.

10/01/26: 307

The consequence represented in a conditional dicisign, for this reason, is of its very nature provisional, whereas the consequence represented in a suadisign is of its very nature valid or invalid-that

10/01/26: 308

"the doctrine of consequences" is probably the best single formula to express what logic is, while the "doctrine of inferences" serves equally well if we wish to stress the principal end of logic as being ordered to the analysis of ~uadisigns.

10/01/26: 309

immediate consequence,

10/01/26: 309

mediate consequence

10/01/26: 309

the passage within the suadisign is required, while the passage from one to another formation of dicisigns as such is permitted, compatible with what is asserted, though nothing compels it.

10/01/26: 309

nothing compels it.

so dicisigns are non-neccesary

10/01/26: 309

Immediate consequences determine how one may proceed from one dicisign to another, while mediate consequences determine how one is obliged to proceed.

10/02/26: 316

obversion confronts us once again with the peculiar problem of negativity as a distinctive characteristic coextensive with all knowledge.

10/05/26: 334

Rectification of Terminology: Inversion, Intraversion, Intraposition, Direct Conversion, Obversion, Contraposition, Indirect Conversion

10/05/26: 334

what is needed is a nomenclature covering all five of the indirect consequences,

10/05/26: 336

It may seem surprising that "All men are mortal" and "No men are immortal" formally imply that "Some beings other than men are immortal".

10/06/26: 338

becomes instead pure mathematics and a substitute for thought rather than its instrument.

10/06/26: 345

completely determinate or "strongest" opposition of minimal varieties is called contradiction.

10/06/26: 346

incompatible in truth although compatible in both being possibly false. This is the relation called contrary opposition or contrariety,

10/06/26: 346

subcontraries, are compatible in truth, but incompatible in falsity-that

10/06/26: 346

Minimal dicisigns which are compatible in truth and in falsehood, but according to an inverse pattern of determination, are called subalternates

10/06/26: 347

four types of opposition directly exhibited in the eightfold set of relations

10/06/26: 348

l. Contradiction,

10/06/26: 348

2. Contrariety,

10/06/26: 348

3. Subcontrariety,

10/06/26: 348

4. Subalternation,

10/07/26: 353

logic is concerned properly with truth as the consequences of conceiving an object in this or that way, not truth as a conformity to a given way of conceiving it.

10/07/26: 353

the correctness or incorrectness is not the immediate aim of the logical analysis; the immediate aim is the showing of consequences.

10/07/26: 354

"The difference between asserting and not-asserting the existence of the subject ought to be the distinction between Universals and Particulars", he says (1893: 2. 456),

Peirce thinks universals don’t exist? I thought he was a realist, not nominalist!

10/07/26: 365

Logical truth, or truth in its logical dimension, concerns the development and consistency of discourse ( "truth as coherence ") ,

10/07/26: 366

assuming this or that starting point as being the case ( "truth as correspondence"). It is not a question of "two types of truth", but of two aspects and phases which apply to any truth and pertain to its full understanding within the order of finite knowledge.

10/07/26: 367

too much has been made in traditional logic of the bare idea that from a true antecedent a true consequent must follow.

10/07/26: 367

the truth of an antecedent is not the direct concern of logic. Logic concerns the consequences which follow on and from an antecedent, whether it be assumed true or assumed false.

10/07/26: 367

The doctrine, propounded at least as far back as the 1400s and in fashion today, . according to which any proposition whatever may be assigned as consequent to a false proposition-the doctrine that anything whatever follows from a proposition as false-turns the whole relation of logic to discourse about the world inside out, manifesting in the process a thorough incomprehension of the distinction between consequence and correspondence. Truth integrally considered requires both, but truth as restrictively logical is validity as determined by consequence, thanks to which alone correspondence itself is sometimes determinable.

cf. my Philosophy SE question

10/07/26: 368

not only must a true conclusion follow from true premisses, but also can a true conclusion follow from flatly false premisses, as in "All human beings are stones and all stones are organisms, so all human beings are organisms".

10/07/26: 368

the truth in the conformity sense of a conclusion within a suadisign, asserted or assumed, can by no means be taken as an index of the truth of the antecedent. But if the conclusion is consequent by a valid consequence, the necessity of the connection between premiss and conclusion is valuable in reverse: the falsity of the conclusion assures falsity in the premisses.

10/08/26: 371

irrelevant to all of them and constituting a discursive universe closed unto itself and extrinsic to all others, as with the symbolic calculi.

symbolic calculi don‘t have a fundamento in re?

10/08/26: 376

The suadisign thus is a new level and type of colligation, wherein the parts are so arranged that one bears upon the other as providing a reason for accepting or rejecting what is asserted about the object represented.

10/08/26: 376

one bears upon the other as providing a reason for accepting or rejecting what is asserted about the object represented.

but no individual premise does this alone, does it?

10/08/26: 379

That colligation is the denominator common to higher order dicisigns and suadisigns alike is a point that was not well understood in much of traditional logic,

10/08/26: 379

Maritain. "Our mind does not see the consequent in the propositions· which constitute the antecedent considered separately", he notes ( 1923: 150), "it sees the consequent by means of these propositions",

10/08/26: 383

"Whence for something true to follow from something false is one thing, for something true to be proved through something false is quite another thing [ which] can never be, as is best treated by St. Thomas in his Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, Book I, lectio 2. Whence ... the true is said to follow from the false only insofar as, supposing the admission of the false premises, a connection with a true conclusion can yet stand, because the falsity of the premises does not always destroy every consequent truth; for an evil does not destroy every good" (ibid.: 197b21-36)

cf. my Philosophy SE question

10/08/26: 384

the truth or falsity of the conclusion as a dicisign in its own right can manifest a deficiency in the premisses to which it is connected, but cannot provide a warrant for their sufficiency ( their correspondence truth, or "soundness") as dicisigns.

10/08/26: 385

This formula-that the false cannot come by inference from the true-is everywhere repeated in logic, but almost nowhere has it been explained.

10/08/26: 385

both levels of truth ( correspondence and coherence)

10/08/26: 385

.in speaking of a formal consequence, that is, a consequence which infers by virtue of its form and disposition, there is no such thing as a probable and apparent, but a consequence either is valid or invalid ( not true or false, evident or probable)

10/08/26: 385

we err and equivocate if we think that a consequence and an argument, which are vastly different, are the same thing; the reason is that an argument pertains to proof, but a consequence to the inference [illatio] itself and to the form of one thing following from another.

10/08/26: 389

Aristotle himself neglected to treat of conditional arguments at all and focussed exclusively· on arguments formed of minimal dicisigns.

10/08/26: 389

the logical mechanism of the conditional syllogism

10/08/26: 389

presuppose the logical mechanism of the categorical syllogism

why?

10/08/26: 389

Maritain continues a Jong-standing bias in favor of the categorical syllogism

10/08/26: 389

An equally pernicious but opposite prejudice has taken hold among more recent logicians, who like to think that Frege marked a new beginning in logic by reintroducing the Stoic viewpoint which takes colligations rather than terms as the basic unit in the formation of logical inferences.

10/08/26: 389

Stoic viewpoint

10/08/26: 390

Peirce (1878: 323): Because all inference may be reduced in some way to Barbara, 1 it does not follow that this is the most appropriate form in which to represent every kind of inference. On the contrary, to show the distinctive characters of different sorts of inference, they must clearly be exhibited in different forms peculiar to each.

10/08/26: 390

as Peirce observed in Chapter 9 of his Grand Logic ( 1893: 2.445) : "It is easy to over-rate the importance of syllogism", but "it is also easy to under-rate it; as many have done", particularly among our contemporaries,

10/09/26: 400

the "illative conditional"

10/09/26: 400

can be applied to particular cases and even to singular individuals directly.

10/09/26: 400

argument from conditional hypotheses is so common in natural discourse.

10/12/26: 418

the principle of the mediating third:

10/13/26: 428

Figure 21.3 The Reductively Recalcitrant Second and Third Figure Moods. Respectively, "Baroco" and "Bocardo"

10/13/26: 428

Aristotle and the medievals overcame the recalcitrance of Baroco and • Bocardo in a quite different and ingenious way, the way of so-called " reductio per impossibile " or " indirect reduction", as defined above.

10/13/26: 430

Aldrich ( 1691) , described by the great De Morgan ( 1847: 130) as "the magic words by which they [ the different moods] have been denoted for many centuries, words which I take to he more full of meaning than any that ever were made":

10/13/26: 431

Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferioque prioris: Cesare, Camestres, Festino, Baroco, secundae: Tertia, Darapti, Disamis, Datisi, Felapton, Bocardo, Ferison, habet: Quarta insuper addit Bramantip, Camenes, Dimaris, Fesapo, Fresison.

10/13/26: 431

Barbari, Celaront, Cesaro, Camestrop, Calemop ( see Bochenski 71-72)

10/13/26: 431

only the letters l, n, r, and t, are "meaningless" simply, while b and d are "meaningless" only when they are not the initial letter of a name.

10/13/26: 432

complete set of instructions, for reducing the suadisign named to the first figure! 1

Instructions here need to be added to my Philo StackExchange answer.

10/13/26: 432

Joseph (1916: 290-291) sums up what is magical about the names very well: "Whether, in reducing a syllogism of any imperfect mood, the premisses need transposing; which, if any of them, must be converted; whether we have to convert the conclusion obtained in the syllogism of reduction, in order to recover the original conclusion; and in which mood of the first figure the validating syllogism will be-all these matters are indicated by the consonants of the mood-names."

10/13/26: 433

Figure 21.4 The Four Figures and Twenty-Four Moods of Valid Minimal Suadisigns

10/13/26: 434

The 1st is the only figure able to prove conclusions expressed in each of the types o( minimal dicisign, A, E, I, 0.

I think he means Barbara specifically.

10/13/26: 435

there are many arguments which are natural in other figures besides the first, arguments that become very awkward and unnatural when reduced to the first ( see especially the discussion in Joseph 1916: 314-325; consult also Keynes 1906: 326-327);

10/13/26: 437

In this regard, it i:;eems to have been an unfortunate by-product of the widespread adoption of mnemonic devices that the way was cleared for an emphasis on technique that risked losing sight of the point of the suadisign, which is not only to introduce order into complex material, but to do so in order to clarify our thoughts and enlarge our understanding. The notion of validity became so tied to the mechanical possibilities afforded by the figures and moods that many logicians lost sight of the fact that a living argument may have a point to make even when its immediate suadisignificative expression is technically deficient on the side of form.

Duhem made this point in Da Vinci vol. 3.

10/13/26: 437

Instead of concentrating on ways to determine whether an initially invalid suadisign might yet be asserting something that could be validly expressed using the very materials of the invalid expression, attention focused narrowly instead on showing what was wrong with a given suadisign.

Did Duhem conclude this, too?

10/13/26: 438

valid moods determined thence; their formulation is the result of an investigation of the valid moods conducted without them" (Joseph 1916: 264).

so inductively, à la Euclid’s axioms

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On the part of the writers of logic, these rules are well-understood and uniformly applied, but it is actually somewhat surprising to find that there remains no single enumeration, either as to the number or as to the order in which these rules are given.

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to Maritain also must go the championship prize for the attempt to give the least number of explicit rules necessary to follow in order to determine invalidity in a minimal suadisign.

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1. no syllogism may have more than three terms;

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2. from two negative premisses no conclusion follows; 3. from two particular premisses no conclusion follows.

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the principles of the mediating third and comprehensive consequence)

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Figure 21.5 Rules Governing the Valid Formation of a Minimal Suadisign

Deely’s improved, non-poetic formulation

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Thomas Aquinas pointed out in his work on the subject, De fallaciis ( 1244-1245)

authentic?

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Validation may be defined accordingly as the process of analysing an invalid suadisign so as to make explicit

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the valid consequences it actually contains.

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Peirce calls the exchange of position within a suadisign between conclusion and a premiss contraposition ( see 1866: 507),

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PRIOR, A. N.

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1967. "Logic, Traditional", in Edwards 1967: 5.34-45.