Dossier Pierre Duhem
| Authors | various |
| Series | Transversal [2.0] |
| Tags | historiography, Duhem, open access |
| Publisher | International Journal for the Historiography of Science |
| Published | 27 giu 2017 |
| Date | 05 lug 2017 |
| Languages | eng |
| Identifiers | oclc: 993450379, uri: https://www.historiographyofscience.org/index.php/transversal/issue/view/6, issn: 2526-2270 |
| Formats |
Description
No 2 (2017)
Dossier Pierre Duhem
Pierre Duhem’s Philosophy and History of Science
Full Issue
View or download the full issue | PDF
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Table of Contents
From the Editors
Historiography of Science: The Link between History and Philosophy in Understanding Science Mauro L. Condé, Marlon Salomon | PDF 01
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Dossiers (Issue-specific topics)
Introduction Fábio Rodrigo Leite, Jean-François Stoffel | PDF 03
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Duhem’s Analysis of Newtonian Method and the Logical Priority of Physics over Metaphysics Eduardo Salles de Oliveira Barra, Ricardo Batista dos Santos | PDF 07
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The French Roots of Duhem’s early Historiography and Epistemology Stefano Bordoni | PDF 20
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Duhem’s Critical Analysis of Mechanicism and his Defense of a Formal Conception of Theoretical Physics José R. N. Chiappin, Cássio Costa Laranjeiras | PDF 36
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Anti-Scepticism and Epistemic Humility in Pierre Duhem’s Philosophy of Science Marie Gueguen, Stathis Psillos | PDF 54
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Duhem: Images of Science, Historical Continuity, and the First Crisis in Physics Michael Liston | PDF 73
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Duhem in Pre-War Italian Philosophy: The Reasons of an Absence Roberto Maiocchi | PDF 85
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Was Pierre Duhem an Esprit de finesse? Víctor Manuel Hernández | PDF 93
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Was Duhem Justified in not Distinguishing Between Physical and Chemical Atomism? Paul Needham | PDF 108
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Bon sens and noûs Roberto Estrada Olguin | PDF 112
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Duhem’s Legacy for the Change in the Historiography of Science: An Analysis Based on Kuhn’s Writings Amélia Oliveira | PDF 127
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Poincaré and Duhem: Resonances in their First Epistemological Reflections João Príncipe | PDF 140
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Dossier - Book Reviews
Pierre Duhem: Between Physics and Metaphysics Dámian Islas Mondragon | PDF 157
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The New French Edition of Pierre Duhem’s The Aim and Structure of the Physical Theory Jean-François Stoffel | PDF 160
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When Historiography Met Epistemology Jean-François Stoffel | PDF 163
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Articles
A Development of the Principle of Virtual Laws and its Conceptual Framework in Mechanics as Fundamental Relationship between Physics and Mathematics Raffaele Pisano | PDF 166
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Michael Scot and the Four Rainbows Tony Scott | PDF 204
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Galileo and the Medici: Post-Renaissance Patronage or Post-Modern Historiography Michael Segre | PDF 226
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Interviews
Interview: Helge Kragh Gustavo Rodrigues Rocha, Helge Kragh | PDF 233
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Book Reviews
Galileo as a Critic of the Arts Hallhane Machado | PDF 238
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A Contribution to the Newtonian Scholarship: The “Jesuit Edition” of Isaac Newton’s Principia, a research in progress by Paolo Bussotti and Raffaele Pisano Gustavo Rodrigues Rocha | PDF 242
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ISSN: 2526-2270
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
About footnote #6 of Duhem’s Critical Analysis of Mechanicism and his Defense of a Formal Conception of Theoretical Physics {Gueguen & Psillos (2017)}:
Recall that Frege’s 1884 definition of number (in Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik: Eine logisch-mathematische Untersuchung über den Begriff der Zahl) is predicated upon the concept of function. His theory of number is a second-order functional calculus with individual variables (terms/objects/arguments denoting truth-values) and function variables (formulas denoting the “extension” or class of a given numerical object under a specific concept). That’s how he thinks of “abstraction” in his war against psychologism and subjectivity in mathematical theory.
For example, a binary function of two variables x and y , denoted F((x), (y)), will stand for a class of objects falling under a given concept F if F((x), (y)) is always a truth-value. In that kind of statements, the function operation replaces the classical predication.
As for Russell’s theory of types, it is predicated upon a set theoretical view of variables of “concatenated” higher-orders. That’s how his theory may be thought of as having to do with abstraction of several degrees. For example, a variable for individuals, another for sets of individuals, another yet for sets of sets of individuals, etc.
The parallel you further highlight by quoting Duhem from Prémices philosophiques (to clarify the Frege-Duhem connection footnoted in the Anti-Scepticism and Epistemic Humility in Pierre Duhem’s Philosophy of Science article, p. 57) does make a lot of sense when talking about Duhem’s view of the use of abstraction as essentially equivalent (as you point out) to “Oresme’s discovery of how to assign numbers (analogically) to qualities.”
With reference to Frege, I would recap it by saying that there seems to be a legitimate connection between the Fregean view of numbers in terms of “extensions” (--> relations of analogy between classes, a number [in the Fregean sense] being a class of similar classes) and the Duhemian/Oresmean view about the epistemological function of “abstraction” in relation to physical theories.
I’m not aware of any direct influence of Oresme’s own “triangle” on Pascal’s triangle arithmétique. I know not of any place Pascal may have mentioned he knew of Le Livre du ciel et du monde. But he very well might have, and even actually referred to it—without me knowing it, as I haven’t gone through a detailed reading of Pascal’s entire corpus, which also includes many letters (notably to Fermat in mid-1654, precisely on his triangle).
It is associated to some extent with “the so-called intuitionism and formalism debate in mathematics.” But, more specifically, the anti-psychologism stance Frege and others took in relation to foundational problems in mathematics hinges around the objectivity of logic (of logical truth), which Frege expressly emphasized demonstrably obtains apart from empiricism and the psychological determinisms influencing mental processing.
His discussion of “analogy” is not so clearly identified as being about “analogy.” But whether with respect to what he understands and defines bedeutung (reference) to mean in functional logic or to the definition of a number as a class of similar classes, the notion of analogous modes of representation (“extensions”) for a given referent is quite intrinsic to his semantic theory and its epistemological implications. In that regard, it may be said not to be without connection with (as I wrote before) the Duhemian/Oresmean view about the epistemological function of “abstraction” in relation to physical theories, even though Frege did not “discuss analogy directly, in the process of [indicatively] understanding how to assign numbers to qualities.”