Wisdom in the Face of Modernity: A Study in Thomistic Natural Theology (2nd ed.)

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Re: pp. 210-216, where White, O.P., cites Ashley, O.P.'s Way toward Wisdom, White's second point (pp. 211-213): White says that the study of ens mobile presupposes metaphysical notions. "Only once such perceptions [or 'principles', i.e., 'the axioms of non-contradiction, identity, and causality'] are acknowledged as our already given starting points is any constitutive theoretical science possible" (p. 212). But how does this show the science of metascience is necessary before doing physics?

In S.T. I-II q. 94 a. 2 co., St. Thomas calls the principle of non-contradiction the "first indemonstrable principle" ("primum principium indemonstrabile "), "which is based on the notion of 'being' and 'not-being'" ("quod fundatur supra rationem entis et non entis "). It is indemonstrable. Physicsts needn't attempt to demonstrate such principles before using them; he justifies their use "by other self-evident principles" ("per alia principia per se nota "), as St. Thomas wrote in his Commentary on Boethius' 'De Trinitate' q. 5 a. 1 ad 9.

St. Martin de Pores, O.P., pray for us.

[S]uch principles as 'the axioms of non-contradiction, identity, and causality' need not be "metaphysical notions." Intellectual presuppositions to properly (i.e. rationally) “speculari verum in his quorum habet scientiam” (ST I-II q. 57 a. 1) are neither metaphysical nor physical. The metaphysician and the physicist will equally “consider the truth in those matters of which he has knowledge” relying on the proper conditions of possibility (the right intellectual presuppositions) of sound speculative reasoning and rational discourse (both being ingredient to science as well as metascience).

What do you make of St. Thomas saying the principle of non-contradiction is the "primum principium indemonstrabile ", "quod fundatur supra rationem entis et non entis " (S.T. I-II q. 94 a. 2 co.)? How can something indemonstrable be founded on anything?

It’s really interesting, because I do think (beyond the explanation St. Thomas gives in his commentary on IV Metaphysics, l. 6) that what he means about the nature of this principle is connected to its special primacy, the first fatal transgression of which (as I once pointed out to you*) is seen in the Scriptural account of original sin.

/…/ Perhaps some thinkers may be tempted to imagine “an exception to the law of non-contradiction” (as, in effect, did Adam and his wife in the Garden) because they imagine its application to be limited to situations governed exclusively by two-valued logic: e.g. descriptive logic, (p ∨ q)∧¬(p ∧ q*), and computer programming, (0, 1).

Adam and his wife in the Garden transgressed the limit which governs the condition of possibility of true knowledge (Gen 3:6, the transgression ensuing as a form of delusive direct/unmediated knowledge, as seen in the following verse: “Et aperti/פָּקַחְ [a root which also means “clear-sighted,” “clever,” “smart,” “prudent”]sunt oculi amborum ;cumque cognovissent/יֵּדְעוּ …”), as one would likewise do were he for example to deny (by passing over it) the matter of a sacrament so as to directly “grasp” at the hidden substance.

The principle of non-contradiction works like an “indemonstrable” means to know (a modus or ratio cognoscendi) for one who is not God (i.e., one whose knowing is not another himself and is not a creative knowing, but a receiving/recipient knowing). St. Thomas probably saw that, and I believe that that’s what he generally means—his view of knowledge being in harmony with a deep understanding of the revealed content of Sacred Scripture—with his definition of the principle of non-contradiction as “primum principium indemonstrabile.”

Meaning, it is nothing other than the condition of possibility (which as such escapes demonstration) of soundly knowing (and loving), which is of the essence of man made in the image and likeness of God (Gen 1:26). The same principle is itself “fundatur supra rationem entis et non entis,” because this fundamental discrimination is predicated upon as primary condition of indirect (created) knowledge of reality. We can only know to the extent that this foundational distinction (1/entis , 0/¬ entis) allows us to in the first (primum) place—since we don’t have scientia per ipsum et in ipso ; just like we can only see on the basis of a preexisting, given contrast (“this/x ” is not the same as “that/y ,” which is why I can distinctly see x and y). We would discriminate nothing in uniformity.

“Quid tibi vis faciam? Caecus autem dixit ei : Rabboni, ut videam.”(Mk 10:51)