Commentary on Aristotle's Politics

Description

The first complete translation into modern English of Aquinas unfinished commentary on Aristotle's Politics, this translation follows the definitive Leonine text of Aquinas and moreover reproduces in English those passages of William of Moerbeke's famously accurate yet elliptical translation of the Politics from which Aquinas worked. Bekker numbers have been added to passages from Moerbeke's translation for easy reference.

cf. "Dysfunctional Democracy" for a quote from it (taken from this transl. of De regno):

[Pol. III , 6-10: The names of the perverted constitutions.]
[...] They are as follows: The perversion of kingship is called tyranny ; the perversion of aristocracy, oligarchy (which means: power of the few); finally democracy (meaning; power of the people, or rather the vulgar mass) is the perversion of that polity in which the many dominate but on the basis of at least one virtue, viz. , military bravery. Hence, Aristotle concludes, tyranny is the dominion of one man aiming at his own interest; oligarchy is the dominion of a few aiming at the interest of the rich; democracy is the dominion of many aiming at the interest of the poor. None of these constitutions takes thought for the common good [...]

[Ibid. 8; 1279b 34-1280a 6: The criterion of number is not adequate.]
[After closer examination of these definitions] it appears that, in the case of democracy the large number of the holders of power is an accidental circumstance; and likewise, in the case of oligarchy the small number is merely accidental. For it is nothing but a fact that everywhere there are more poor than rich people. The above mentioned names, therefore, owe their origin [not to a universally valid reason but] simply to a fact which happens to be true in most of the cases. Since, however, a specific differentiation cannot be obtained on the basis of what is merely accidental, it follows that, per se, the distinction between oligarchies and democracies cannot be made in virtue of the larger or smaller number of the rulers. Rather their specific difference results from the difference between poverty and riches. If a regime is ordained to the increase of the possessions of the rich, its very species is determined by this end and it is for this reason that it differs specifically from a regime whose end is liberty, which regime is democracy. Hence, wherever the rich hold political power, no matter whether they are many or few, there will be oligarchy; and wherever the poor hold this power, there will be democracy; and that the latter are many and the former few is nothing but an accidental circumstance. For only a few have riches yet all partake of liberty. This is why both classes fight each other. The few want to dominate for the sake of their possessions and the many want to prevail upon the few since they believe that, by the criterion of liberty, they have just as good a right to political power as the rich.

Also on usury [bk. 1, lect. 8 "Moneymaking in Theory (2)"; pp. 54-60, PDF pp. 65-71]:

[Sententia Politic. lib. 1 l. 8 n. 13:]
And there is another kind of moneymaking, interest (called τόκος in Greek), whereby money increases itself. And so the Greeks called it τόκος, since that means offspring. For we perceive that things generated by nature are like the things generating them. And so there is a kind of generation when money increases from money. And so also such acquisition of money is the most contrary to nature, since it is according to nature that money is acquired from natural things, not from money. Therefore, one kind of moneymaking is praiseworthy ["that acquires money from natural things (e.g., crops and animals)"], and three kinds [the other two: (1) "commerce…transformed from what is a necessity of nature to what desire demands" and (2) "lending money for a fee"] contemptible, as he has said.

Spartans and Druids ("Celts") practiced such a radical separation of the sexes that even husbands and wives came together only once per year. St. Thomas commentates, Politics bk. 2 ch. 13 (PDF p. 160):

if most citizens should be forced to abstain too much from women, they then fall into a shameful vice, namely, homosexuality

[S ententia Politic. lib. 2 l. 13 n. 7:] si cogatur multitudo civium, ut nimis contineat a mulieribus, sequitur quod labantur ad turpe vitium, scilicet ad coitum masculorum

The opposite extreme is Socrates's regime, where, like Marx with his "community of women", he holds that wives are public, common property (PDF pp. 97ff.).
Christianity made friendship, "the foundation of every created society" (Integralism ref:8.94), possible between men and women (cf. Rader Breaking Boundaries: Male/Female Friendship in Early Christian Communities).

Thales showed philosophy can have practical applications: Politics [Aristotle's text: pp. 61-2; St. Thomas Aquinas's commentary: p. 65] I, 1285b45ff. [Chapter 9: Moneymaking in Practice].