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Minerd's n. 41 of his transl. of Fr. G.-L.'s Sense of Mystery ref:11.223-7 cites Fr. Woodbury's distinction between "an explicative and an illative syllogism", pp. 239–41 (nos. 299–300) [PDF pp. 246-8]:

In every syllogism properly so-called, from one truth is inferred ANOTHER TRUTH. Therefore, whenever by a syllogism there is not inferred a NEW TRUTH, this is a syllogism improperly so-called. The syllogism improperly so-called is twofold, to wit: the expository syllogism and the explicative syllogism. … From the expository syllogism must be distinguished the explicative syllogism; whereof, this is an example: “Man is mortal. But a rational animal is a man. Therefore, a rational animal is mortal.”

Here, [the middle term] is universal, and therefore there is a true illation. Nevertheless, it is not a syllogism properly so-called, because it does NOT infer in the conclusion another truth, i.e. a judgment other than in the premises. For here, the conclusion expresses the same truth but explicates it BY OTHER CONCEPTS. For these two propositions, “man is mortal,” and, “rational animal is mortal,” express the same truth, but the latter expresses it by more distinct concepts than the former. Wherefore, to this is rightly given the name of EXPLICATIVE syllogism.

In the explicative syllogism, the conclusion is IDENTICAL AS REGARDS ITSELF (quoad se) with the major but NOT AS REGARDS US (non quoad nos); and therefore, there is a formal illation, but not an objective illation. {He cites here R.-M. Schultes, Introductio ad historiam dogmatum (Paris: Lethielleux, 1922) [cf., e.g., EPUB ref:18.26 on illative vs. explicative syllogism].}

OBSERVE that the major [premise] and the conclusion of an explicative syllogism are in THE SAME MODE OF SAYING “PER SE”; otherwise, there would be had, not an explicative syllogism but a syllogism PROPERLY SO-CALLED. In the example given above, both these propositions are IN THE SECOND MODE of saying “per se.” But the case is otherwise with this syllogism: “A rational animal is capable of science. But man is a rational animal. Therefore, man is capable of science.” Here, the major [premise] is in the FOURTH mode of saying “per se”; otherwise, the syllogism would be employed to no purpose. But the conclusion is in the SECOND manner of saying “per se.” Wherefore this is a syllogism properly so-called.

our intellect […], in the positive sciences [only?], knows ESSENCES only in external, empiriological signs — as, for example, it knows the essence 'silver', not in itself, but only in the external, observable or measureable signs […], is necessarily concerned with ESSENCES, i.e. necessarily understands ESSENCES (just as sight necessarily sees colours)

* p. 294 (PDF p. 301), an excellent definition of induction; induction is not syllogistic (cf. §307, pp. 246-49, PDF pp. 253-6; also: [Duhem, who argued, *pace* Poincaré, that mathematical induction is not syllogistic, either](https://books.google.com/books?id=UofBybolmREC&lpg=PP1&pg=PA222#v=onepage&q&f=false)):

a2b2b1. WHENEVER THIS ASCENSION BY SUBSTITUTION FROM SUBJECTIVE PARTS TO THE UNIVERSAL IS HAD, THEN INDUCTION IS HAD; or, in other words, WHENEVER A MORE UNIVERSAL ( 'melts at 960.5 degrees') IS PROVED OF A LESS UNIVERSAL ('silver') BY THE USE OF A STILL LESS UNIVERSAL ('some silver' or 'silver in some cases' or 'silver 1 and silver 2 and silver 3 etc'), THE PROCESS IS INDUCTIVE, not deductive or syllogistic.

Realism of the object and subject necessariy for induction; natures known by and explain the constancy of external signs; p. 295 (PDF p. 302):

c1c. […] the ultimate foundation of the certitude of induction is, ON THE PART OF THE OBJECT, the existence of NATURES, having determinate properties; which natures:
c1c1. although in scientific induction,
c1c1a. they be not known in themselves.
c1c1b. but only in external signs,
c1c2. nevertheless explain the constancy of the signs.


Austin Maloney Woodbury S.M. (1899-1979) was born on 2 March, 1899 at Lower Mangrove (Spencer), New South Wales, Australia. He was the sixth child of Austin Herbert Woodbury and his wife Margaret, nee Maloney, who had eleven children. His family was devoutly Catholic. Four of his sisters joined religious orders. From an early age Woodbury showed great intellectual promise and a love of learning. He discerned a vocation to the religious life and entered the Society of Mary (Marist Fathers) in 1918, completing his secondary studies at the juniorate in Sydney and Mittagong (1919-20). On 7 March 1921, the feast of St Thomas Aquinas, he entered the New Zealand Marist Novitiate at “Greenmeadows” Seminary in Hawkes Bay, Napier and took his first vows on 2 February, 1923. Woodbury was sent to Rome in 1926 for further studies at the Pontifical University of St Thomas Aquinas in the City (Angelicum). There he was taught by the prominent Dominican theologian Fr Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange O.P (1874-1964). He completed two doctorates in a very short space of time between 1927-1928. During his time in Rome he was ordained to the priesthood on 31 July, 1927. On his return from Rome in 1928 he was sent to New Zealand where he taught at St Patrick’s College, Wellington and then at Greenmeadows (1930-36). From 1938 to 1943 he became founding rector of Bl. Peter Chanel Seminary, Toongabbie, NSW.

On 7 March, 1945 Dr Woodbury established the Aquinas Academy in Sydney. The Academy was a school of philosophy and theology open to the laity, which, as the name suggests, sought to especially promote the teachings of St Thomas Aquinas. During the period 1945 to 1974 Dr Woodbury taught courses in both philosophy and theology, and at the height of his teaching an average of 600 students would enrol each year. He retired from the Academy in 1974 and died in Sydney on 3 February, 1979.

Sources:

J. Thornhill, Australian Dictionary of Biography , Vol. 16, (MUP), 2002.

A. Woodbury. Introduction to Philosophy ed A.F. Wood. St John Centre for Biblical Studies, Sydney, 2015.