Contents

On Councils

Copyright Info

Author’s Preface

BOOK I

CHAPTER I: The Order of Disputation

CHAPTER II: Those who Wrote on Councils

CHAPTER III: On the term “Council” and its Origin

CHAPTER IV: A Two-fold Partition of Councils

CHAPTER V: Approved General Councils

CHAPTER VI: General Councils that were Condemned

CHAPTER VII: Councils that were partially confirmed, and partially condemned

CHAPTER VIII: On a Council neither manifestly approved, nor manifestly condemned

CHAPTER IX: On the utility or even the necessity of celebrating Councils

CHAPTER X: General Councils are useful and in a certain measure necessary, but not
absolutely and simply

CHAPTER XI: Some Councils of Bishops are simply necessary

CHAPTER XII: Who gathers Councils?

CHAPTER XIII: The arguments of adversaries are answered

CHAPTER XIV: Certain doubts are Answered

CHAPTER XV: Who are the ones that are called to a Council?

CHAPTER XVI: The objections of our adversaries are answered

CHAPTER XVII: How many Bishops are required for a general Council?

CHAPTER XVIII: In Councils, Bishops are not counselors, but judges

CHAPTER XIX: Who is to preside at a general Council

CHAPTER XX: The arguments of our adversaries are answered

CHAPTER XXI: The conditions which the Lutherans require for the celebration of a
Council are refuted

BOOK II

CHAPTER I: The argument and partition of this book.

CHAPTER II: It is proven from the Scriptures that general Councils confirmed by the Pope
cannot err.

CHAPTER III: The same is proven from the Fathers

CHAPTER IV: The same is shown by arguments lead in from reason

CHAPTER V: Particular Councils approved by the Pope cannot err

CHAPTER VI: Arguments produced from the Scriptures are answered

CHAPTER VII: Arguments sought from the testimonies of the Fathers are refuted

CHAPTER VIII: Arguments from the errors of Councils are answered

CHAPTER IX: The objection adduced from reason is answered

CHAPTER X: Particular Councils that were not approved by the Supreme Pontiff do not
in any way make certain faith

CHAPTER XI: General Councils, before they receive confirmation by the Pope, can err
unless the Fathers were to follow the instruction of the Pope in defining

CHAPTER XII: Whether the authority of a Council is greater than Scripture

CHAPTER XIII: Whether a Council is above a Pope

CHAPTER XIV: Different opinions are explained

CHAPTER XV: The Supreme Pontiff is head of the whole Church

CHAPTER XVI: Supreme Power is not in a Council

CHAPTER XVII: The Supreme Pontiff is absolutely above a Council

CHAPTER XVIII: The Pope cannot subject himself to the coercive judgment of Councils

CHAPTER XIX: The responses of our adversaries are refuted

On Councils

Their Nature and Authority

by

St. Robert Bellarmine, S.J.

Doctor of the Church

✠

Translated from the Latin by

Ryan Grant

Mediatrix Press

MMXVII

http://www.mediatrixpress.com

Copyright Info

On Councils: Their Nature and Authority

St. Robert Bellarmine

Translated from:

De Controversiis de fidei Christianae adversus hujus temporis haereticos; Tomus II, De Conciliis

Tri-Adelphorum, Paris, 1614

ISBN-10: 1545111677

ISBN-13: 978-1545111673

© Ryan Grant, 2017

No part of this work may be reproduced for commercial purposes in either electronic or physical
format.

Mediatrix Press

www.mediatrixpress.com

607 E. 6th Ave, Ste. 230

Post Falls, ID 83854

Translator’s Preface

A

NYONE familiar with our other translations will already be used to the style and model
followed there. We have, however, made some changes for this edition that will be
reflected in future translations of the Controversies.

I have had the benefit of feedback from Academics and lay theologians, as well as priests, as
to the format and rendering of certain terms, which will be reflected in this volume on Councils.
The first is in the way of references. In the past, I footnoted the sources which Bellarmine provides
no matter how dizzying the number of notes on a given page. Here, we will switch to parenthetical
notes, or keeping the references in the context of the sentence.

A second change, is, whenever possible, we have adjusted how we render the names of the
authors that Bellarmine cites to be in accord with how they are typically cited rather than using
their Latinized names.

Then, we should look to the question of the relevance of this particular work. How accurate
was Bellarmine? Interestingly, what historians relate today about ancient councils are largely the
same as what Bellarmine relates, although the former know very little of the latter. Bellarmine’s
analysis is based in primary sources, scripture and the Fathers, resulting in a powerful argument
grounded in Catholic tradition. Certainly not every individual thing will be cutting edge for us
today as historical scholarship continues and does not remain ossified in any century, no matter
how brilliant the intellects; nevertheless, the theological import of Bellarmine’s argumentation is
not only valid for us today, but entirely needed for a return to the sources and acts of individual
Councils.

Lastly, we would like to thank all of those who assisted with this translation, most especially
my wife without whose strength and encouragement I would not have finished. Further, I would
like to thank Paul Banducci of the Bulldog Pipe and Cigar Lounge, which has afforded me a classy
and quiet place to work on translating this material where I could also smoke my pipe.

Post Falls, ID

January 2016

Author’s Preface

I

N this book I am going to defend, with all my strength, the authority of the Sacred
Councils, which has always been great in the Church, in opposition to the manifold lies
and calumnies of the heretics. Still, before I approach this matter, I have thought a few
words must be said on the supreme and incredible subtlety that the supporters of Satan
have applied to lessen this authority in our times. For, because the authority of Councils is
sacrosanct in the Catholic Church, as is just, it always served to diminish the greatest disturbances
of affairs, like a sort of salutary lightening, to shine the light in order to dissipate the darkness of
error. As a result, the enemy of the human race reckoned that he could no longer sow discord as
well as schism in the Church, and to preserve and propagate heresy, unless he abolished
Ecclesiastical judgments and would overturn that chair from which Christ himself speaks and
judges through men and settles all controversies and quarrels of faith.

Therefore, he raised up Lutherans, prepared to deceive even as they were prepared to lie, since
in the beginning they believed it would never happen that the Supreme Pontiff could be induced
to call a general Council. So they began with great contention, even as they grievously accused
the Pope at the same time, to appeal to the need for a general Council against the same Pope. They
devised this in such a way that they meant to sprinkle each and every one of the crimes and
disgraces, although false and unbelievable, freely upon the Pope, and that it would be granted to
the Council and all Christian nations to make him guilty of the greatest crimes. These meanwhile,
though not yet recognized as enemies of the Church by all (as they really were), were seen as men
loving piety and faith, since they were zealous for and recognized the authority of Councils. For
that reason, they clearly persuaded many nations with the calumnies and lies that they used to
adorn the vicar of Christ, by both word and letter, that he was no Christian prelate at all, but the
avowed enemy of Christ even to the point that they said he was truly and properly called
Antichrist.

I would most certainly give a lengthy speech were I to review the lies which the heretics of
our time most impudently cast onto the Pontiff of the Apostolic See. For the sake of example, I will
place one or two. Luther said: (lib. de Ecclesia, near the end), “The Pope buried the Sacred Scripture
in mud and ash, and nearly blotted out the whole of Christian doctrine.” There is also extant a
little book titled, de primatu Papae, written in the name of the whole Schmalkaldic Council, though
I believe the author is actually Melanchthon, whereby that particular Council of the Lutherans
commences from this lie: “The Pope arrogates to himself the authority of fashioning laws on
worship, to change the Sacraments, doctrine and wants his articles, his decrees, his laws to be
accounted equal to divine laws; ... The Pope arrogates to himself divine authority, because he takes
for his own the right to change the doctrine of Christ and the worship established by God, and
means for his doctrine and worship to be observed as though it were divine.”

Yet, what Sacrament, what worship established by God, what article of doctrine has the Pope
changed? And who was that Pope who equated his own laws with divine laws? Or do we not see
Pontifical laws abrogated on a daily basis, either by the same ones who imposed them, or by their
successors, if the occasion demanded it? What divine law is read to have ever been abrogated by
any Pope? I refuse to waste any more time on trifles of this sort. I affirm this, that the books of the
Lutherans are full of lies of this kind, and that those found therein are not doubtful matters, but
are celebrated as most certain maxims in the writing and speech of all. Still, from the beginning,
as I was saying, lest it would seem that they were altogether foreign to the Catholic Church, as
much as they detract from the authority of the Pope, so much the more do they attribute it to a
Council. The provocation of Luther for a general Council is still extant. The Imperial diet of
Augsburg, Nuremberg, Spire, Ratisbonne, Worms and several others are extant, in which the
Lutherans very often demanded a general Council.

Furthermore, lest it would be tiresome, if time were to expunge in so many different acts of
assemblies recited, then I would advance to you, O reader, the testimony of their own protestation
that is contained in the beginning of their book titled: Protestatio adversus Concilium Tridentium,
where they say: “We profess and protest that we adhere and have always adhered to the
protestation and appeal of the Reverend Doctor, Father Luther, from the most unjust and violent
judgment of the Pope and of all the judges of his faction, to a free, Christian, and legitimate
Council, gathered in the Holy Spirit. Such protestation proceeded and the appeal was afterwards
unanimously and so many times renewed by our Churches, and even in so many of the imperial
assemblies approved by all states.” These are their words whereby, as you see, they affirm firstly
Luther, then their Churches, lastly even the Princes that have been added to them, also very often
appealed from the Pope to the judgment of the Council.

But, how long do you think they remained of the opinion that they should await a Council?
As long as they hoped there would be no Council. For no sooner did Pope Paul III proclaim a
general Council at Trent and lay the foundations for the same Council, as soon as the beginnings
appeared, then straightaway they [the Lutherans] changed their minds, or rather they feigned
their support beforehand. Then, when it sprung up, they rejected the Council and not only
rebuked the appeal to recent Councils, but even to all the ancient ones as well, and hardly had
Trent begun than they labored to oppress it with invective, censure, protestations, calumnies and
lies, so that, if it could be done, that Council could be answered by the cleverness of the heretics
before the diligence of Catholics could join together.

I say that all are my witnesses that it is so who read the book, de Conciliis, written by Luther
at that time, and the book of Melanchthon concerning the reasons why Lutherans would not go
to the Council (Protestatio, XXXIV). Of ministers: The book of Illyricus, de norma ac praxi Concilii,
Then Martin Chemnitz, examen Tridentini Concilii; (Examination of the Council of Trent), and the
counsel of Charles Molina over not being admitted to the same Council; and the antidote of John
Calvin, against the poison of the same Council. But it will be worthwhile to propose something from
those very authors, whom we have named, so that you might recognize from their words and
testimony how many Councils of the Church they celebrated, which they had agitated for a little
earlier.

Martin Luther, when he became famous, proclaimed a Council; after he seized his pen, he
wrote a book and titled it, de Conciliis. I believe it was so that he would thank God, congratulate
the Church and invite all to the Council. Just the same, the chief point of the book is that there is
no need for Councils, since even the most ancient, holy and celebrated Councils erred and each
Pastor and schoolmaster can be no less in the Church than each of the greatest and most
numerous Councils. It begins without controversy from that very ancient and holy Council which
the Apostles celebrated at Jerusalem: in that Council the Apostles decreed that one must abstain
from blood and animals that had been suffocated. He returns us to these difficulties, that either
we ought to abstain from these foods, or clearly affirm we are free not to obey the greatest and
first Council. Next, he shows in earnest what a calamity it would be were we no longer to eat deer,
rabbits, stags, hares, geese, thrushes and other small birds as well as certain broths which are
seasoned not only with pepper, but even with blood (as he himself says, who is well ignorant of
such things) or mixed with liquid, or fat mixed into sausage.

Yet, because it seems that Luther is in no way prepared to undergo such a loss, thus he effects
that one need not comply with the Apostolic decree, from which again he so concludes that we
are all free to leave behind all other Councils, and thus we are free from all Councils. It is
altogether clear: just as we are not held by that law of the Council, which was the only one given
in that time, so we are not held by the laws of any other Council.

Therefore, he continues to the First Council of Nicaea, the authority of which has always been
the greatest in the Catholic Church. Speaking on the canons of that Council, he says: “All these
articles were grass, straw, twigs and stubble ... On those wooden articles the rest shall remain, just
as some embers, such as the article on the feast of Easter.” This is an example of the honor that
Luther has for the most ancient and celebrated Council, that he calls its decrees twigs, grass, straw
and stubble. But it would be insufficient, if he were to merely say those canons were not necessary
and superfluous, and he would not also contend what is dangerous, impossible and self-contradictory. For, he so rejects the Council, lest they who castrate themselves would be excluded
from holy Orders, and at the same time it commands consecrated men not to have any woman in
their house apart from mother or sister. Luther says: “Here, altogether I do not recognize the Holy
Spirit in this Council. If they are not suitable for Ecclesiastical ministry who castrate themselves
to avoid the burning of lust, and again they are not suitable who have wives or marry to conquer
the goads of the flesh; in which case, will he not, at length, fall? Or, ought a Bishop, or a preacher
sustain the intolerable ardor and heat of illicit love, and not free himself from these dangers by
wedlock or castration?” It seems for Luther there was no middle ground between wedlock and
castration; but then what do we make of Paul, John, James, the other Apostles, Ambrose, Jerome,
Gregory and men without number? What, I say, would we make of so many saints who did not
cut off their member but still lived to the end of their lives without a wife? Without a doubt they
conquered the glorious struggles with prayers, fasting, and assiduous labor, not by the severing
of their members.

But, let us hear with what honor Luther speaks on this same Council of Nicaea at about the
end of the passage: “On the other hand, is there no other business for the Holy Spirit in Councils
than to burden his ministers with impossible, dangerous and unnecessary laws?” Since that is so,
you certainly see, O reader, what Luther makes of the authority of Councils when he does not
hesitate to impudently call the decrees of the Council of Nicaea twigs, unnecessary, dangerous,
impossible, self contradictory, and at length, straw, grass and stubble, even though in comparison
to it not one is praised more by the Fathers. Why he would so diminish all Councils that the
industry of Pastors and the authority of schoolmasters would compare with them, he says: “Do
you think it is not so light, or narrow, the duty of a Pastor or a schoolmaster that they could not
be compared to Councils? I shall say indeed it is more and greater a light of Christian doctrine that
comes from a child’s Catechism than from all Councils. ... And what is necessary for words, if the
decrees of all Councils would be sent through a funnel into your body, still you would not be a
Christian, because they confer too little.” This is rightly an egregious conclusion, and worthy of
so serious a theologian who a little before was seen to call for a general Council in earnest. I pass
over what he says on the second, third and fourth Councils, since they are similar to the first and
I am eager for brevity.

Therefore, I come to those lies which our adversaries babble without any shame to diminish
the authority of the Council of Trent. Not including everything, nor even a great many things, for
that would be a work without end; rather I will advance a few words from many. Luther says:
“These sycophants, who are parasites of the Pope are so demented that they rashly defend this
contradiction, that Councils have the power to make new articles of faith and change the old ones”
(liber de Conciliis). But who are these sycophants? Why is no one named? Where, when, by what
witness did they say or write that articles of faith can be changed by Councils?

Matthew Flacius Illyricus, in his book, de norma ac praxi Concilii Tridentini, says: “They cry
out, that is the Fathers of the Council, the Church, that the Pope with his spiritual powers, is above
the Scripture and that the Pope can dispense against the Apostle and the whole Old Testament
from the plenitude of his power.” But the Council is extant, let it be diligently read; no one will
ever discover portents of this sort.

Martin Chemnitz’s work, in examine Concilii Tridentini, is so rich with lies that in four little
sentences, five lies are found: “The Fathers, that is, of the Council, say that the Pope may have a
will for rule in these matters that he wishes, that he can change the form of the Sacraments
handed down from the Apostles, that he can establish against the epistles of Paul, that he can
dispense against the first four Councils and against the words of the Gospel.” Who would believe
such impudent men could be found, who so boldly lie about the Council of Trent when both the
acts themselves are read everywhere and also that many of those who were at the Council
themselves are still alive!

But another splendid thing altogether remains, and the lie is more often repeated by our
adversaries. For many reasons the Lutherans pursue Cardinal Hosius, a man of eternal memory,
with an implacable hatred, particularly because he presided at the Council of Trent as a legate of
the Apostolic See; moreover, by his industry and wisdom he conferred upon the same Council no
small dignity and benefit. Therefore, that they might at the same time downplay the authority of
the Legate and of the Council, these good men took certain words which the Cardinal quoted in
the book, de expresso verbo Dei, of a heresiarch by the name of Swenckfeld, and disseminated them
everywhere with great loathing as if the Cardinal had said them. Cardinal Hosius had only quoted
them so that he would show how foul the errors of the Lutheran heresy are, like a poisoned fruit
that sprouted forth from a corrupt root; yet we read in the book, Protestatio XXXIV Ministrorum:
“But now let us hear the words of this glorious governor who was present at the assembly [Trent],
how, also following some rule, he and his associates mean to judge and determine on the
controversies of the Church and religion; for thus he breaks out into blasphemous words, saying:
‘but we will wait for the opinion of God from heaven, and both contending with those affairs for
their own, not fearing the judgment of the Scriptures, and we will see the Scriptures go away. It
does not behoove us to be expert in the Law or Scripture, but taught by God. The labor which is
devoted to Scripture is vain. For the Scripture is created, and in need of a certain element, it is not
fitting for a Christian to be too addicted to a creature’.” After reciting these words, the Protestants
add: “This is the nefarious Cardinal legate of Antichrist, and the impious governor of the assembly,
he blasphemes against the living God.”

Illyricus, in his book, On the Norm and Practice of the Council of Trent, after he repeats these
words quoted from the book of the Cardinal, he so prays: “Lord Jesus, stop up with infernal fire
these blasphemous mouths of Antichrist and his slaves, and defend your glory from their tyranny.”
Why does it seem to you, o candid reader, that it is an unheard of crime, and clearly an incredible
boldness to lie so clearly and impudently for an atrocious cause? The book is in their hands, there
is no obscurity in his words, and if the testimony of the author is required, I have heard the most
learned old man himself often saying: “If I so thought, would I write such things? If they were my
words, truly I would be worthy of a public burning.” Still, it was not one or two, but thirty-four
ministers that were pleased to take the words of this great man and so twist them into a foreign
sense, which clearly were of Swenckfeld, and they believed were of the Cardinal, to me it seems
as though someone would contend that the blasphemous words of the Jews concerning Christ:
“Behold a glutton and drinker of wine, this is not a man from God who does not keep the Sabbath;
he is worthy of death; take him, take him and crucify him!” and others like it, to say that since
these are found in the Gospels, they are not the words of the Jews, but of Matthew or John.
Therefore, you see how little account our adversaries reckon Councils, and by how many frauds
and calumnies they will try to abolish their authority, who just a few years earlier seemed to
desire a general Council as a unique remedy for the present disorder.

On the other hand, someone will perchance say that they indeed wanted it, and they still
desire a general Council now, but not of the sort that Trent was. It certainly happens that they
desire a general Council, but such as never was. For Philip Melanchthon explains the conditions
in a little book which he titled: de Caussis cur Lutherani ad Concilium non accesserint,
1 and they are
chiefly two.

On the one hand, that all learned men ought to have the right to make a decisive vote,
whether they are priests or laity; that is something altogether unheard of in the Church of Christ
and such an example cannot be advanced from any Council, especially since when they say
learned men, they mean those who, when they speak or write, they will mix in some Greek or
Hebrew with the Latin.
2 On the other hand, the condition is that safe conduct be given by the
Emperor not only in their persons, but also that their persons would not be punished if they refuse
to submit to the Council, as well as that neither the faith nor the confession of the Lutherans could
be condemned, even if the Lutheran Theologians were unable to defend it; such a condition is
clearly opposed with the first one, and is inept and ridiculous in itself. For, if neither their persons
nor their opinions can be condemned, then the Council will altogether decide nothing.

Therefore, to what end did it attain to ask that even laymen should have a decisive vote if
nothing must be decided in the Council? To what end were so many dangers and labors
undertaken so as to gather Council? To what end are Bishops and Doctors troubled from the
whole world that they should come to a Council? To what end are so many days consumed in
proposed questions of faith, struggles and definitions if after all things have been prepared, yet still
each decree of the Council is called back into controversy? Not only does Philip Melanchthon
teach this, but Martin Luther taught this before him, as well as John Calvin, John Brenz, Martin
Chemnitz, and all Lutherans and Calvinists. Luther says in artic. 115 ex quingentis articulis: “This
Gospel was consigned neither to the Pope nor to Councils, nor to any man in order that he might
conclude something is faith. Therefore, I ought to say you, O Pope, have shut up with Councils,
now I have judgment, whether I would accept it or not.” Moreover, Calvin says in book four of the
Institutes (lib. 4, cap. 9, §8): “As often as a decree of some Council is advanced, I would first
diligently judge in what time it was held, for what reason it was held, and by what counsel such
men were present; next the very matter on which it is treated should be examined precisely
according to the Scriptures, in that manner that the definition of the Council may have its weight;
the nature of the example; still not the examination, which I said, would impede.”

Therefore, Calvin would have it that a judgment of a Council is an example, not of a judgment.
Next everyone, especially private men, can and ought to judge in regard to that teaching.
Chemnitz, Brenz and all others teach this in similar words. But what else is this than to refuse to
let any judgment be made? What else is it but to refuse to ever settle controversies and to refuse
peace and concord, but instead to allow wars, schisms, disagreements and quarrels to flourish
perpetually? But it stands well unless they were to say another thing, that they would escape
notice more easily, for certainly heretics do not conduct themselves so. Moreover, now they so
advance themselves, that plainly anyone who would not see them as heretics is blind. For, since
heresy is so called from the word “choice”, there is no clearer mark, no more certain sign of a
heretical man than that he refuses to acquiesce to Ecclesiastical judgment, but instead will follow
himself as a judge, and choose his own doctrine. Obedience is the companion of faith and humility
a mother. The sister of heresy is contumacy, a proud mother.

Since these things are so, now it will be our part that for the great work, industry, and labor
that the enemies of faith put forth to shake Ecclesiastical authority, so much more we must put
forth to assert and vindicate the same, and because this is seen especially in the Supreme Pontiff
and the Councils of Bishops, we also, now that we have given dissertation on the Pope in five
books, we may do so on Councils as best we can in spite of the lack of our own genius, with
clarity, and the support and direction of God.

BOOK I

On the Nature of Councils

CHAPTER I: The Order of Disputation

TO this point we have disputed on the head of the Church militant, now we will dispute on the
Church herself. Moreover, because the Church can be considered in two ways, both gathered in
Councils and diffused throughout the world, for that reason we will treat first on Councils and
then on the Church herself. Furthermore, we propose the disputation on Councils before the
disputation on the Church, although the natural order would seem to persuade the contrary,
because the disputation on Councils is more connected with the disputation on the Supreme
Pontiff that precedes it than the disputation on the Church.

Therefore, the controversy on Councils has been posited over two matters, over the definition
of a legitimate Council and over the authority of a legitimate Council. The heretics of our time
construct a new form of Councils, and to these they attribute almost no authority. Still, we will
add the third to these two parts.

Furthermore, the whole disputation is divided into three parts. In the first we pass over certain
matters which might appear as though they were added to the disputation itself; such as who
wrote on this matter, what might be a Council, how manifold, how many and which have been
celebrated to this point, etc. For we will treat all the matters without contention by a simple
manner of narration. In the second we will define what the nature of a properly legitimate Council
demands, where we will treat on the matter, form, purpose and efficiency of Councils, and also
on those matters which our adversaries require in Councils. In the third part, we will treat on the
authority of Councils both absolutely and even in comparison to Scripture, as well as to the
authority of the Supreme Pontiff.

CHAPTER II: Those who Wrote on Councils

SO as to begin from the first, the books on the very first Councils treat on this matter but were,
nevertheless, carelessly preserved and are swarming with many defects that must be corrected
from a reading of the Fathers. Thereupon, there are many things extant from the decrees of
Gratian, Ivo, Burchard and Martin of Braga; likewise a few things can be read in St. Hilary in his
book on Councils, in St. Isidore (lib. 6 etymolog. cap. 16); Bede (in lib. de sex aetatibus; in
Constantino IV); Freculph (Chronicum) John Psellus and Photius in his book de septem Synodis.

Apart from these older writers, more recent ones can be consulted: Thomas Waldensis (lib. 2
doctrinal. fide, cap. 26, et 27]; Juan de Torquemada, (lib. 3 Summae de Ecclesia); John Gerson (in
various treatises de potestate Ecclesiae et Conciliorum); Dennis the Carthusian (in three books de
Conciliis]; John of Eck, (in Enchiidio); Jodocus Clichtovaeus in defense of the Council of Senonensis;
Iodocus Tiletanus (in defensione Concilii Tridentini] John Cochlaeus (in libro de Conciliis); John
Fisher against article 28 and 29 of Luther. Cajetan in various opiscula; Albert Pighius (lib. 6
hierarch. Ecclesiasticae); Cardinal Hosius (in explanation Symboli, cap. 24 et lib. 2 contra
prolegomena Brentii); Pedro de Soto in the defense of his confession against Brenz; John Anthony
Delphinus (lib. 2 de Ecclesia); Melchior Cano (de locis Theologicis, lib. 2); Hugh in a work titled
Synodia Hugonia; likewise, Jacobatius in a work on Councils, Gaspar Villalpandaeus in
disputationibus novem pro Concilio Tridentino; Alphonsus a Castro (lib. 4 de haeresibus;) William
Lindanus, lib. 3 cap. 7, Panopliae Evangelicae.

CHAPTER III: On the term “Council” and its Origin

THEREFORE, by the term “Council” the same is meant in the Church as by the term of assemblies
in the state; for just as when controversy arises in the state, the leaders or the magistrates of the
kingdom agree as one, and they establish what in fact must be done, so also in the Church when
some controversy arises in religion, the Prelates of the Churches come together and uniting their
opinions at the same time they establish what seems to be good. In this way, we see what was
done in Acts 15, where the first Christian Councils began to be celebrated, and thereafter in each
age.

Furthermore, although Albert Pighius, in de coelesti hierarchia, lib. 6, cap. 1, contends that this
origin of Councils was human and devised by natural reason, still it is more probable that the
origin is divine. The Council of Chalcedon, in its epistle to Pope Leo, as well as the sixth Council
(act 17), and Pope Celestine, in his letter to the Council of Ephesus, and the 3rd Council of Toledo
teach that Councils are pointed out by the words of Christ himself in Matthew 18:20, “Where there
are two or three gathered in my name, there I am in their midst.”

Next, it is believable that the Apostles, who were filled with the Holy Spirit, did not come
together in the first Council except at the urging of the Holy Spirit himself. Wherefore, they also
say: “It has been seen by the Holy Spirit, as well as us, etc.” (Acts 15:8). Besides, even if natural
reason would have determined that in doubtful matters the Prince consults learned men, that only
Bishops would be called and these would not be counselors, but judges, such does not seem to be
an invention of human reason alone. At length, it is certain that the celebration of Councils, which
has happened in the Church in every century, descends from Apostolic tradition; but I would
certainly not dare to call Apostolic traditions the inventions of men. That is enough on the origin,
now on the names in one word.

The Latin term “Concilium” is discovered everywhere in the Old Testament as well as the New
for gatherings of the Jews, but the Greek term, σύνδος (synodos) is not discovered in the
Scriptures, for where we read concilium in the Latin, we always find in the Greek text συνέδριον
(synedrion) or συναγωγη (synagogē). Moreover, the term “Synod” is discovered first in the canons
of the Apostles, can. 38, where Bishops are commanded to celebrate Councils twice a year. Next,
it is discovered in Eusebius (hist. ecc., lib. 5, cap. 23) and thereafter in all authors.

CHAPTER IV: A Two-fold Partition of Councils

THERE are four kinds of Councils: there are some that are general, national, provincial, and some
that are diocesan. St. Augustine mentions the first three in de Baptismo contra Donatistas, lib. 2,
cap. 3, where he says that the Councils of the provinces, or even greater ones, such as of regions,
are emended by plenary Councils. He calls to mind the last section of the Council of Toledo, IV,
cap. 25.

They are called General in which the Bishops of the whole world can and ought to be present
unless they are legitimately impeded, and in which no man rightly presides but the Supreme
Pontiff, or another in his name. From there they are called ecumenical; that is, Councils of the
whole world.

National Councils are so called, in which Archbishops and Bishops of one kingdom come
together, or of a nation in which some Patriarch presides, or a primate, such as many Roman
Councils, Spanish and African, on which it must be noted that although they are really distinct
from general Councils and provincial ones, still they are often called by both names.

Often Councils are called “universal”, as is clear from the Roman Councils under Symmachus,
where it is always said: “Symmachus, presiding over the general Council, etc.” and still only the
Bishops of Italy were present. Thus in the 3rd Council of Toledo, cap. 18, it is said: “This holy and
universal Council commands,” and still only the Bishops of Spain were present. The same thing
is seen in the 4th Council of Carthage, Therefore these are called general or universal, because they
are general in that kingdom, but not because they are general absolutely. Moreover, these same
are called provincial by Gratian in dist. 3, can. Porro, because they are held in certain provinces,
but do not pertain to all Christians, just as a truly general Council.

They are called Provincial, in which the bishops of one province come together, in which an
Archbishop or Metropolitan presides, and the volumes of Councils are full of a great many of this
kind. Concerning these it appears the Seventh Council spoke, when it said that it embraces even
the decisions of local Councils (action 3).

Diocesan Councils are those in which only the priests of one Episcopate come together, and
a Bishop presides over them. Very few of this sort are extant, and for good reason, for they can
hardly be called Councils when in them there is ordinarily no one who has jurisdiction apart from
one Bishop.

The second division of Councils embraces four groups: there are some approved by the
Apostolic See and received by the universal Church, there are some altogether reprobated, and
some partly approved, while partly reprobated, and some neither approved nor reprobated. The
last group chiefly has place in particular Councils.

CHAPTER V: Approved General Councils

HITHERTO, there have been 18 approved general Councils.
3 The first is Nicaea, which was
celebrated in the year 327-330, held in the 15th year of Pope Sylvester and the 20th of Constantine
the Emperor. There, 318 bishops came together, among which were the Patriarchs, Alexander of
Alexandria, Eustratius of Antioch and Macarius of Jerusalem, as well as Metrophanes of
Constantinople, although these last two were not Patriarchates in that time, receiving that dignity
long afterwards. Indeed Metrophanes, not for himself, but through the legate Alexander, who
afterward succeeded him in the Episcopate, wished to be present. See Metaphranes in the oration
on the deeds in the Council of Nicaea.

Two controversies were especially defined, one on the day of Easter, the other on the divinity
of Christ against the Arian heresy; Arius, the chief heretic, died ten years later while using the
lavatory and thus died in his own filth.

But, because all these can be called into doubt due to the different opinions of the writers, each
must be shown in a few words. 1) There is a marvelous diversity of opinions on the time of the
Council, but the truth of our opinion can be confirmed by the following reason: The Council of
Nicaea was received in the 20th year of the Emperor Constantine. For, Eusebius writes this (de vita
Constantini, lib. 3) as well as Socrates (historiae, lib. 1, cap. 12), that Constantine began to rule in
the year 311.
4 Therefore, it effects that the year 330 A.D. will have been the twentieth of
Constantine, and the end of the Council of Nicaea.

Likewise, Socrates in his history, (lib. 1, cap. 9, and 13) and Nicephorus in lib. 8, cap. 26, relate
that it was begun while Paulinus and Julian were consuls. Moreover, it endured for three years,
as the same sources attest. Hence, Cassiodorus records the consulship of Paulinus and Julian as
beginning in the 17th year of Constantine, from which it follows that the Council was ended in his
20th year, hence it began in the year 327 and ended in 330. Onuphrius Panvinus correctly places
the beginning of the Council of Nicaea in the year 325, since he places it in the consulate of
Paulinus and Julian.

Therefore, the time of the Council fell during the pontificate of Pope Sylvester, not of Sylvester
and Julius, as Photius teaches (de septem synodis), or of Julius alone, as Sozomen writes in lib. 1,
cap. 16, and Calvin from Sozomen (Instit. cap. 7, §1) and Joachim Camerarius in his history of the
Council of Nicaea, where he affirmed that he was a very diligent reader of ancient writers, as can
easily be shown. For, as we said above, in the 20th year of Constantine the Council came to an end,
which Camerarius also affirms (loc. cit.) Moreover, Sylvester was created Pope in the sixth year
of Constantine (Chronicus Eusebii et Hieronymi), and was in the Apostolic See for over twenty
years, as Damasus, Onuphrius and all writers witness; thus, the 20th year of Constantine
necessarily means the Council took place under the Pontificate of Sylvester.

Besides, Milthiades, the predecessor of Sylvester, sat while Constantine was a general, as
Optatus (Contra Parmenianum, lib. 1), and Augustine (epist. 162 et 165) witness, as well as
Constantine himself, quoted by Eusebius in hist. lib. 10, cap. 5. So, Sylvester could not have
obtained the Apostolic See except after the beginning of Constantine’s reign. Therefore, in the
twentieth year of Constantine, which was the last of the Council of Nicaea, Sylvester, not Julius,
ruled the Apostolic See. This is why many historians (Damasus, Pontificalis; Jerome, Chronicus;
Theodoret, lib. 1, hist. cap. 3, sexta Synodus, act. 18; Concilium Florentium, sess. 3), wrote that the
Council of Nicaea occurred in the times of Pope Sylvester.

Opinions seem to vary on the number of Bishops who were present at that Council. Eusebius
says that it was more than 250, in de vita Constantini, lib. 3, while Athanasius said that there were
a little less than 300. (lib. de sententia Nicaenae Synodi). Eustachius, (quoted by Theodoret, lib. 1,
cap. 8 hist.), says they were numbered over 270, and the historian Sozomen places the number
around 310. (lib. 1, cap. 16.) Nevertheless, the true and common opinion is that it was 318.
Epiphanius wrote that even in his times the names of each of the bishops were preserved and that
it was precisely 318. Hilary and Ambrose (prafatio liberorum de fidei, mysticum et sacrum) also say
the number of the Fathers of the Council was 318, and was prefigured in the 318 soldiers with
whom Abraham brought back victory over the five kings. Next, Jerome, in his Chronicum,
Sulpitius in lib. 2, hist., Theodoret (lib. 1, cap. 7), and all others constantly posit this number.

Now, there were two reasons for this Council: The question on the date of Easter, and the
question on the divinity of Christ, as Eusebius (de vita Constantini, lib. 3), Athanasius (liber de
Synodis Arimini et Seleuciae), and Epiphanius (Haeresi 70) make clear.

Next, it is not altogether certain whether the Council of Nicaea was celebrated before the
shameful death of Arius. Epiphanius clearly writes that the Council was celebrated after the death
of Arius, in Haeresi 69, but the historians write to the contrary, such as Ruffinus, in lib. 10, cap.
13, and Socrates (lib. 1, cap. 19 et 25) and the rest, nor can these opinions be reconciled if we were
to say there were two men named Arius, as Sulpitius tries to show (Sacrae Historiae, liber 2). Even
if there were two men named Arius, still there would only be one who perished on the toilet.
Moreover, Epiphanius places this very one before the Council, but Ruffinus and the rest place him
after the Council, and the historians seem to have sensed this better, especially since it was treated
in the fifth Council whether it would be lawful to condemn heretics after their death, because
certainly they would not have been able to doubt this if the Council of Nicaea had condemned
Arius after he was already dead. Yet, this matter is not of importance, and it would behoove us not
to waste any more time on it.

The second Council is that of Constantinople, which was celebrated against the Macedonians
who denied the divinity of the Holy Spirit while Theodosius the elder was emperor, and Damasus,
the supreme Pontiff. Then, 150 Bishops came together from different provinces, and from the
Patriarchs, Nectarius of Constantinople, Timothy of Alexandria, Meletius of Antioch and Cyril of
Jerusalem.

Moreover, the time of this second Council was during the consulship of Gratian and
Theodosius Augustus, in the year 383 (Prosper of Aquitaine, Chronicum), or in the following year
as Socrates would have it (lib. 5, hist. cap. 8). He writes the Council came together under the
Consulship of Syagrius and Eucherius, in the year 384, or if one would follow the reasoning of
Onuphrius, in the year 381. Psellus, in his book on the seven Councils, places an interval of 56
years between the first and second Council. Still, if you were to add the number of 56 years to 327,
when we said the first Council began, one would make 383, which is the number which Prosper
notes down in his Chronicle.

It must also be noticed in this Council that there was no one present from the West.
Accordingly, Damasus, the Pope of Rome, compelled a western Council, and also invited Bishops
to that place who had come together at Constantinople, that in the same manner the fullest
Council would be celebrated at Rome. But, because the Eastern Fathers could not come to Rome
for just causes, Damasus received their excuse and the acts of the two Councils were joined, as if
they were one and the same. Due to this joining the Council of Constantinople was held to be one
of the legitimate Ecumenical Councils. See Theodoret, hist., lib. 5, ca. 9 et 10.

The third Council is Ephesus I, which was compelled by the Emperor Theodosius the younger
and Celestine I the Supreme Pontiff. 200 Bishops came together, among which were Cyril of
Alexandria, who even obtained the place of the Roman Pontiff, as well as John of Antioch and
Juvenal of Jerusalem, although John, because he was still on the way when the decree of the
Council was made, began in the beginning to disagree with Cyril, but afterward was reconciled
and agreed to the same thing. The reason for the Council was that Nestorius, the Bishop of
Constantinople, had coined a new heresy whereby he divided Christ into two persons.

The Council was celebrated while Bassus and Antiochus were consuls, as Prosper witnesses
in his Chronicle, and Socrates as well (lib. 7, ca. 34), namely in the year 434. Why should Psellus
be followed, who places only the interval of forty years between the second and third Council, and
Onuphrius, who remarked that this Council was celebrated three years earlier during the
thirteenth consulate of Theodosius, and the third of Valentinian, I cannot say, especially when in
the second volume of the Council itself, chapter 1, we read the Synod began in the 13th consulate
of Theodosius and the third of Valentinian; nor could Onuphrius ignore the fact that the thirteenth
of Theodosius and the third of Valentinian were not the same before and after.

Add that Vincent of Lérin, in his book on the profane novelties of speech, about the end, says:
“Before nearly three years a Council was celebrated in Asia while the excellent men Bassus and
Antiochus were consuls.” What could be clearer? Concerning this whole Council see Libertus in
his Breviarium, cap. 5-8; Socrates, lib. 7, cap. 34; Evagrius, lib. 1, cap. 4, as well as the Council itself,
preserved from the Greek in the Latin language, and it is contained in the volumes of Councils.

The fourth Council is Chalcedon, which was gathered against the heresy of Eutyches the
Archimandrite, who asserted that there is only one nature in Christ after the incarnation. This
Council took place while Leo I was Pope, and Martianus the emperor, during the consulate of the
same Martianus, as is clear in the first action. Moreover the consulate of Martianus fell in the year
454, according to the reckoning of Matthew Palmerius and Gregory Haloandrus, or 453 according
to Marianus Scotus and Sigebert, or even 452 according to Onuphrius in his book on Roman
Pontiffs. Psellus interposes 30 years between the third and fourth Council, but just as he took off
ten years in the previous number and placed forty for fifty, so now he added ten years and placed
thirty for twenty, unless it is an error of copyists. Next, there were 630 Bishops present among
whom were the Patriarchs Dioscorus of Alexandria (who was soon thrown out), Maximus of
Antioch, Anatholius of Constantinople, and Juvenal of Jerusalem. One can see Liberatus in his
Breviary, ca 11 et seq., and Evagrius, lib. 2 hist., cap. 2-4.

The fifth general Council was not, as many think, the one that was celebrated under Agapetus
and Mennas, the four actions of which are contained in the second volume of Councils under the
name of the “Fifth Council”, for that was a local Council that preceded the fifth, as John Zonaras
in the Vita Justiniani and Nicephorus in lib. 17, cap. 9, clearly show.

Moreover, the true fifth Council was carried out in Constantinople while Vigilius was Pope
and Justinian the elder was Emperor, in the twelfth year after the consulate of Basil, as we read
in the beginning of the same Council which is the year 553 or 556 according to Psellus, who would
have it that the fifth Council is 102 years later than the fourth. Psellus likewise hands down that
165 Bishops gathered, among whom were the Patriarch of Constantinople Eutychius, Apollinaris
of Alexandria, Dominus of Antioch and Eustochius of Jerusalem, although he was not present
himself but through legates. Moreover, the Supreme Pontiff was neither present himself nor
through Legates. Still, he confirmed this Council, as Nicephorus writes (lib. 17, cap. 27).

This Council was gathered to oppose the heresy of Origen, which was then growing in
strength. Therefore, the Council condemned Origen, and at the same time Dydimus and Evagrius
his followers. It also condemned the writings of Theodore of Mopsuestia, Theodoret and some
epistles of Ibas of Edessa.
5 The historians tell us more on these matters (Zonaras, loc. cit.;
Nicephorus, lib. 17, cap. 27; St. Gregory the Great, lib. 1 epist. 24; Evagrius, lib. 4, cap. 38; Liberatus,
breviarium, ca. 23 et 24. What Liberatus says must be read very cautiously, either because it was
not genuine or he was deceived by a false relation. Certainly what he says does not agree with the
narrations of other Catholics.).

The sixth Council was celebrated at Constantinople in the twelfth year of Constantine IV, as
Paul the Deacon witnesses in the life of the same emperor, which was the year 681 or 685
according to Psellus, who places 129 years between the fifth and sixth Council. On the other hand,
it is generally ascribed to the twenty-eighth year of the same Constantine; this is not an error of
the copyists, as Illyricus thinks (Cent. 7, cap. 9). Even if Constantine IV did not rule but seventeen
years after the death of his father, nevertheless he ruled with his father for many years, as Zonaras
showed, while he said he was crowned by his father before he departed for Sicily. Therefore, the
Council numbered the years of Constantine from that first coronation, while Paul the Deacon
numbers them from the death of Constantine’s father.

Two hundred eighty-nine bishops came together, as Paul the Deacon witnesses, and that
number agrees with what is contained in the seventh Council, act 3. Still, Bede, in libro de sex
aetatibus, Tumginus, (lib. 1), Ado of Vienna, and Freculph only number one hundred fifty fathers.
There were two Patriarchs: George of Constantinople and Macarius of Antioch; only legates were
present from the Churches of Alexandria and Jerusalem. The Supreme Pontiff, Agatho, was
present through legates and presided. In that Council they condmened the heresy of those who
taught that there was only one will in Christ. On this Council see other cited authors, Albert
Pighius in diatriba; Francis Turrianum in Apologia pro VI et VII Councils. Albert contends that the
sixth and Seventh Council, in the forms that are extant, have been adulterated and are not
genuine. On the other hand, Turrianus teaches that they are true and genuine. What seems more
true to us has been related in our treatise On the Roman Pontiff. (Book IV, ch. 11).

The seventh Council was gathered in Nicaea in the eighth year of Constantine and Irene, as
Paul the Deacon writes in Rerum Romanarum, lib. 23, as well as Cedrenus. (Compendium
historiarum). This was in the year 761 AD if we believe Paul the Deacon, or 786 AD if we believe
Cedrenus. Onuphrius places it in the tenth year of Constantine and the year 789 A.D., while
Psellus would have it that there were only 60 years between the Sixth and Seventh Council, but
this in no way agrees with the truth. Thus some men reckon that it is a mistake of the copyists,
and that Psellus himself wrote 100. The same Psellus holds that 350 Bishops were present, and one
Tharasius of Constantinople; the rest of the Patriarchs were present only through legates. Pope
Adrian presided by legates and together with the rest of the Council condemned those who
deprived images of Christ and the saints of all honor. If one wishes to see more about this Council,
then look to what we treat on the Council of Frankfurt in the disputation on the cult of images.

The eighth Council is the fourth Council of Constantinople, which was celebrated by Pope
Adrian II and the Emperor Basil in the third year of that same emperor, as is made clear by that
Council in its first act, which was in the year 870 A.D. One Patriarch was present, Photius, and
then Ignatius, both of Constantinople, while the rest were present through legates.

In this place we must advert that there were three Councils celebrated at Constantinople on
the case of Photius, one, in the time of Pope Nicholas and the Emperor Michael, in which Ignatius
was deposed and Photius ordained in his place. Zonaras calls this Council to mind in the life of the
Emperor Michael, nor is it doubtful that this was a profane Council, as is clear from the epistles
of Nicholas I and Adrian II.

The second Council of this name is that which we have called the eighth, which is extant
although imperfectly in the tomes of Councils, in which after Photius was deposed, Ignatius was
again restored; Zonaras records this in his life of the Emperor Basil.

The third is that which Pope John VIII, the successor of Adrian, celebrated in the time of the
same emperor, in which, with Ignatius dead, Photius was again restored and, if what the Greeks
said in the Council of Florence, (Sess. 6, cf. Franciscus Turrianus, libro de actis VI, VII, et VIII
Synodi), is true, the acts of the preceding Council under Adrian were rescinded. It was also stated
that the particle Filioque was abolished from the Creed, but this does not have the appearance of
truth. I am easily persuaded of this, because either all these things were made up, which are said
about John VIII, as St. Antoninus teaches (Summa Historiali, part 3, tit. 22, c. 13, §10), or certainly
it is true that Photius was restored by John VIII through his Legates in the See of Constantinople
after the death of Ignatius, but the rest was supposed, adulterated and made up by the Greeks, as
Turrianus shows from Manuel Calleca in the book that we cited.

Moreover, I am strengthened in this opinion, because Zonaras, where he calls to mind the
restoration of Photius, still says nothing of the abrogation of the eighth Council nor the removal
of that particle [Filioque] from the creed. Next, the Greeks at the Council of Florence (Sess. 6), did
not recognize the Council held under John VIII as an Ecumenical Council, even though it would
be a great benefit to them if it were a proper and legitimate Council. Now that is all for the Eastern
Councils, so let us briefly add the Western Councils.

The ninth Council is the First Lateran Council, which had 900 Bishops present and was held
in the year 1123 against the Saracens for the recovery of the Holy Land, in the time of Calixtus II
and Henry V, the Emperor. Platina, as Onuphrius is not extant.

The Tenth is Lateran II. It had a thousand bishops in the year 1139 against Antipopes and for
the right of Clergy, in the time of Innocent II and the Emperor Lothaire. Platina. Onuphrius
records nothing.

The eleventh Council is Lateran III, which had nearly 300 Bishops for the reform of the Church
and against the Waldenses, in the year 1153 in the time of Alexander III and the Emperor
Frederick. Platina, Onuphrius, likewise William of Tyre, who was present (lib. 20 de bello sacro,
cap. 26).

The twelfth Council is Lateran IV, which had 1,283 Fathers, from which there were 473
Bishops in the year 1215, against various heresies and for the Holy Land, in the time of Innocent
III and Frederick II. (Mathew Palmerius, Onuphrius, Platina).

The thirteenth Council is the First Council of Lyons, in the year 1245, against the Emperor
Frederick and for the Holy Land, in the time of Innocent IV and Frederick II. Mathew Palmerius,
Platina, Onuphrius; some decrees of this Council are extant in the Sixth of the decretals.

The fourteenth is the Second Council of Lyons, which had nearly a thousand Fathers, from
which nearly 500 were bishops, in the year 1274, against the error of the Greeks in the time of
Gregory X and Rudolph the Emperor. (Mathew Palmerius; Platina; Onuphrius). Some things from
this Council are extant in the Sixth decretal.

The fifteenth is the Council of Vienne, which had three hundred Bishops in the year 1311,
against various heresies, in the time of Clement V and the Emperor Henry VII. (Palmerius; Platina;
Onuphrius). Decrees from this Council are those that are called “Clementine”.

The sixteenth is the Council of Florence, (omitting Pisa, Constance,
6 and Basel, on which we
will speak later), in the year 1439, which had 141 Fathers that had subscribed, and many others
who left before the subscription, that it would be noted in the end of the Council, against the
errors of the Greeks, in the time of Eugene IV and the Emperor Albert. (Mathew Palmerius;
Platina).

The seventeenth is Lateran V. One hundred-fourteen Fathers were present against schism and
for other types of business in the time of Julius II and Leo X, as well as Maximilian the Emperor;
it began in the year 1512, and finished in 1518.

The eighteenth is the Council of Trent, begun in the year 1545 and completed in the year 1563,
against the heresies of the Lutherans, in the time of Paul III, Julius III, Pius IV as well as the
Emperors Charles V and Ferdinand. The number of Fathers is described in these words by Gaspar
Villalpandaeus, in his fifth disputation on the Council of Trent. “Six Cardinals, four Legates, three
Patriarchs, 32 Archbishops, 228 Bishops, five Abbots, seven minister Generals of religious orders,
and a great many procurators of Bishops.”

From these Councils, there is not one that was not approved by the Pope or is not received by
Catholics; for on the first eight Councils it is certain from the decree, dist. 16, can. Sancta octo. On
the nine following Councils, they were clearly approved because the Supreme Pontiff was present
at all of them. On the last it is clear from the confirmation of Pius IV; the Greeks only receive the
first seven Councils, as it was noted in the Council of Florence (sess. 5 &6). The Lutherans only
received the first six, as is clear from the Centuries of Magdeburg (Cent. 8, c. 9; and cent. 9 cap. 9).
The Monophysites, who still are found in Asia, only receive the first three. The Nestorians, who
are also found in the East, only receive the first two. The “Trinitarians,” who live in Hungary and
Poland in our day, receive none.

CHAPTER VI: General Councils that were Condemned

THE first general Council that was condemned is the Council of Antioch held in the year 344, in
the fifth year of Constantius, as Socrates the Historian says (lib. 2, cap. 5), as well as Sozomen (lib.
3, cap. 5), in which Athanasius was condemned by the general opinion of the Arians, and the way
was open to overturn the first Council of Nicaea.

It must be noted that this Council is confused by the summa Conciliorum, with others, since
there were six Councils of Antioch. The first and second were against Paul of Samosata in the time
of Pope Dionysius, around the year 269 (See Eusebius, lib. 7 Histor. c. 23, 24, &25). The third of the
Arians, held in the time of Julius I, in the year 345, as we said above. The fourth is of the
Macedonians, for their heresy in the year 367, in the time of Pope Liberius (Jerome, in Chronico).
The fifth was a Catholic provincial Council of thirty Bishops, whose 25 canons are contained in
the first volume of Councils. It seems to have been in the time of Jovinian and Liberius (See
Sozomen, lib. 6, ca 4). The sixth was inserted in act 14 of the Council of Chalcedon.

The second general Council to be condemned is that of Milan, where more than 300 Bishops
were present in the year 354, in the time of the same Constantius in which the Catholic Faith was
indirectly condemned. Ruffinus (lib. 10, ca. 20; Socrates, lib. 2, ch. 29).

The third is the Council of Rimini, with 600 Bishops present under the same Constantius in
the year 363, as Jerome notes (in Chronico), in which the term ὁμοούσιος was abolished from the
creed; a certain part of this Council was at Seleucia in the East. (See August., lib. 3, contra
Maximian., c. 14; Jerome contra Luciferianos; Ambrose, Epist. 32; Ruffinus, lib. 10, c. 21; Socrates
lib. 2, cap. 29; Basil, epist. 52 ad Athanasium).

The fourth Council to be condemned was the second Council of Ephesus, which was
condemned in the time of the Emperor Theodosius the younger, in the year 449, in which St.
Flavius, the Bishop of Constantinople, was murdered by the faction of Dioscorus, and the Legates
of Pope Leo were put to flight. At length that Council confirmed the Monophysite heresy. This
Council was condemned by Leo in his epistle to the clergy and people of Constantinople. Likewise,
to the Emperor Theodosius, as well as Pulcheria, the empress, which are numbers 22, 23, 24 and
25 (See the Breviarium of Liberatus, c. 12; and Evagrius, lib. 1, c. 9 &10).

The fifth Council to be condemned is the Council of Constantinople held under Leo the
Isaurian against sacred images, in the year 730, which was the thirteenth of that Emperor’s reign.
The Council was condemned, for there was no Patriarch present, with the exception of St.
Germanus, who still did not consent, and therefore he was thrown out of his seat of
Constantinople.

The sixth is the Council of Constantinople held under Constantine Copronymus, and in the
year 755, when 338 Bishops came together, but no Patriarch was present with the exception of a
Pseudobishop of Constantinople. This Council defined that images of Christ and the Saints must
be abolished. And this Council was condemned by the Seventh Ecumenical Council, act. 6. (See
what Paul the Deacon relates on these two Councils of Constantinople, rerum Romanarum, lib. 21
and 22, and Zonaras in annalibus).

You will also observe that Several people call this Council the third of Ephesus, such as the
author of the Summa Conciliorum, in the beginning of the seventh Council, as well as Sixtus of
Siena (Bibliotheca Sanctca, lib. 5, annot. 247). For all the ancients call it of Constantinople, and it
is most obvious that it is called this by the Council itself, the insert of which was read in the
Second Council of Nicaea, act. 6. The reason for the error seems to have been that Theodosius, the
Bishop of Ephesus, presided at this profane Council.

The seventh is the Council of Pisa, gathered in the year 1511 by the Emperor as well as the
King of France, and several Cardinals against Julius II, and it was condemned a little after in the
fifth Lateran Council, under Julius II (Sess. 1 & 3).

The Council of Wittenberg can be numbered as the eighth, which the Lutherans call a general
Council. It had three-hundred pastors over which Luther presided in the year 1536. (See
Cochlaeus, in actis Lutheri, and Surius, in commentario rerum in orbe gestarum, anno 1536).

CHAPTER VII: Councils that were partially
confirmed, and partially condemned

The first general Council to be partly confirmed and partly condemned is that of Sardica, at
which 376 Bishops were present in the year 351, in the time of Constantius and Pope Julius I, from
which 300 western bishops confirmed the Catholic faith, which Hilary relates in his book on
Councils; the remaining 76 Eastern Bishops subscribed to the Arian faith (See Socrates, lib. 2, cap.
16; Sozomen, lib. 3, histor. cap. 10 & 11; Theodoret, lib. 2, cap. 7 & 8).

The second is the Council of Sirmium, which was celebrated five years after Sardica, namely
in the year 356, while Liberius was the Supreme Pontiff, and Constantius the Emperor. In this
Council, two formulae of faith dissenting from each other were published. One Marcus Arethusius
composed in Greek, who famously endured martyrdom under Julian the Apostate, and it seems
to be the case that when Hilary relates the event near the end of his work on Councils, he was a
Catholic. Others composed another formula in Latin full of clear blasphemies, which Hilary
condemned in his book on Councils, not far from the beginning. Also, in the same Council the
Photian heresy was condemned, and such a condemnation all Churches approved (See Socrates,
lib. 1, c. 24 et seq.; Sozomen, lib. 4, cap. 5 & 6; also Epiphanius, haeresi 71, although he seems to
have fallen in that he received Sardica for Sirmium).

The third is the Quini-sext Council,
7 in which the Canons of Trullo are contained. It must be
known from the disputation of Tharasius in the seventh Council, act. 4, the sixth Council, which
was celebrated in the time of Constantine IV, published no canons, but after so many years in the
time of the emperor Justinian the Bishops returned to Constantinople and the Palace, which is
called in Trullo, and Theodore Balsamon calls it the Quinisext Council, because it is neither the fifth
nor the sixth, but added canons to the fifth and sixth Council.

Exactly when this Council was held is not altogether certain. For a certain historian named
Theophanes, whom Franciscus Turrianus cites in his book on the sixth Council, teaches that this
Council was celebrated 27 years after the dissolution of the true sixth Council, namely, in the
second year of the restored Emperor Justinian. But Tharasius in the seventh Council (Act 4), &
Epiphanius in the same Council (act. 6, tomus 1), says it was five years after the dissolution of the
Council these canons were published, which certainly seems more probable to me; for otherwise
I do not see when that erratic Council of Constantinople was held by Justinian in the time of Pope
Sergius, and which the same Pope condemned (as Bede witnesses in his book de Sex Aetatibus, Paul
the Deacon, lib. 6, cap. 4; Otho of Frisia, lib. 5, c. 13; Rhegione, lib. 1, and Ado of Vienna, in
Chronico). In the twenty-seventh year from the dissolution of the sixth Council, Sergius did not
sit, rather, it was Pope Constantine, and certainly Bede and Tharasius are more ancient than this
Theophanes, since Bede also lived in the very time in which Pope Sergius sat.

Therefore, we say these canons are partly condemned, because the Supreme Pontiff was
present neither in his own person nor through legates when these acts took place. And clearly
Pope Sergius, who then sat, condemned the Council as erratic, just as Bede says (lib. de Sex
aetatibus, in Justiniano). Moreover, it was partly approved because even if these canons have no
force of themselves, nevertheless some of them were later approved by the Pope or by other
legitimate Councils, such as canon 82 on painting images, which was received by Pope Adrian and
the seventh Council, as is clear from the seventh Council itself, act. 1, and 4 (See what we asserted
against this Council in On the Roman Pontiff, book 2, ch. 18).

The fourth is the Council of Frankfurt, which was celebrated in the year 794, according to
Rheginus (lib. 2), Pope Arian I, and Charlemagne, King of the Franks, because the Council was
confirmed by Adrian, in as much as that part in which Christ was defined to not be the adoptive
Son of God, and it was condemned by the same Pope in regard to the other part, in which the error
condemned at the seventh Council was present (See what we have said in On Councils, book 2, ch.
9).

The fifth Council is the Council of Constance. Nearly a thousand Fathers were present from
which over 300 were Bishops. It was begun in the year 1414 under [anti-pope] John XXIII, and in
the year 1418 it was ended by Pope Martin V and Sigismund the Emperor (Platina, Palmerius). This
Council was condemned in regard to its first sessions, where it defined a Council was above a Pope
both by the Council of Florence and the last Lateran Council, while in regard to its last sessions,
all of which were approved by Pope Martin V, it is received by all Catholics.

The sixth is the Council of Basel, begun in the year 1431 and continued at Basel, then later at
Lausanne even to the year 1449, in which time Pope Nicholas V put an end to it, as both the
Council and [anti]Pope Felix V were created in schism there. See acta Concilii & Bullam annexam
Nicolai V Pontificis. Nothing was ratified and approved by this Council except certain dispositions
in regard to Ecclesiastical Benefices that had been made by the Council, which (for the sake of
peace and unity), the aforesaid Nicholas approved. But the Council itself was condemned at the
fifth Lateran Council, sess. 11.

CHAPTER VIII: On a Council neither manifestly
approved, nor manifestly condemned

The Council of Pisa seems to be a Council neither approved nor condemned; in 1409 it deposed
Gregory XII and Benedict XIII and elected Alexander V. Accordingly, St. Antoninus (Summa
Historalis 3. part. tit. 22., cap. 5, § 2 & 3) asserts it was an illegitimate Council, and not a true
Council of the Church, and the event seems to show the same thing. The Council was convened
to abolish schism, and still it did not do that, but increased it. Moreover, without a doubt it was
condemned by Alexander VI (who was not the sixth but the fifth), and it is nearly the common
opinion that Alexander and those who succeeded him were true Popes. But certainly from the
three who then claimed to be Pope, they were venerated as true Popes.

This is enough on General Councils.

On particular Councils, see the volumes of Councils, as well as the Decretals of Gratian, dist.
16, canon Sexta Synodus, and dist. 20, canon de libellis. Additionally, the Chronicum of Onuphrius,
and the second book of the Chronographia of Genebrardi.

CHAPTER IX: On the utility or even the necessity of
celebrating Councils

THEREFORE, with all of this noted, we must explain in what things legitimate Councils consist,
and these can be reduced to four: 1) the end; 2) efficiency; 3) matter and; 4) the form of Councils.
Now let us begin with the end, which is the first of the reasons. It will be the first reason that must
be briefly explained on account of which Councils are usually celebrated; then from those it will
be determined whether a gathering of Councils is necessary or merely useful. Moreover, the
particular reasons, on account of which Councils are celebrated, are usually numbered as six.

a) The first reason is a new heresy, i.e. something that had never been judged before, which
is the very reason the first seven Councils were convened. The Church always so dealt with the
danger of new heresies, that she did not think it could be resisted otherwise than if all or certainly
a great many leaders of the Churches, once their strength was joined as if it were made into a
column of soldiers, would rush upon the enemies of the faith.

b) The second reason is schism among Roman Pontiffs; for a Council in the time of Pope
Cornelius was celebrated for this very reason. Likewise, another in the time of Pope Damasus and
again in the times of Symmachus, Innocent II and Alexander III, as well as Pisa and Constance in
the times of Gregory XII and Benedict XIII, for there is a no more powerful remedy than a Council,
as has so often been proved.

c) The third is resistance to a common enemy of the whole Church; in this manner Councils
were convened by Urban II, Calixtus II, Eugene III, and other Popes, for war against the Saracens.
Likewise, to depose an emperor, Gregory III celebrated Councils against Leo III the Iconoclast, as
did Gregory VII against Henry IV, and Innocent IV against Frederick II.

d) The fourth reason is suspicion of heresy in the Roman Pontiff, if perhaps it might happen,
or if he were an incorrigible tyrant; for then a general Council ought to be gathered either to
depose the Pope if he should be found to be a heretic, or certainly to admonish him, if he seemed
incorrigible in morals. As it is related in the 8th Council, act. ult. can. 21, general Councils ought
to impose judgment on controversies arising in regard to the Roman Pontiff—albeit not rashly. For
this reason we read that the Council of Sinvessano in the case of St. Marcellinus, as well as Roman
Councils in the cases of Pope Damasus, Sixtus III, and Symmachus, as well as Leo III and IV, none
of whom were condemned by a Council; Marcellinus enjoined penance upon himself in the
presence of the Council, and the rest purged themselves (See Platina and the volumes of Councils).

e) The fifth reason is doubt about the election of a Roman Pontiff. For if the cardinals could
not or would not create a Pope, or certainly if they all died at the same time, or a true doubt should
arise for another reason to whom an election of this sort would pertain, would look to a general
Council to discern in regard to the election of a future Pope, although it does not seem to be
realistic to expect this would ever happen.

f) The sixth reason is the general reformation of abuses and vices which crept into the Church;
for even if the Pope alone can prescribe laws for the whole Church, nevertheless, it is by far more
agreeable for matters to be done with the approval of a general Council when the Pope prescribes
laws of this sort. Hence, we see nearly all general Councils published canons on reformation (See
Juan Torquemada, lib. 3, cap. 9 &10).

CHAPTER X: General Councils are useful and in a
certain measure necessary, but not absolutely and
simply

FROM these reasons, on account of which Councils are gathered we said it will be easy to judge
in what way they might be useful, whether Councils are plainly necessary for preservation of the
Church. And indeed I so state on general Councils, convocations of Councils of this kind are very
useful, and in a certain measure necessary, still they are not absolutely and simply necessary. I am
easily persuaded of it: first for the very reason that in the first three centuries the Church lacked
general Councils and yet did not perish. Just the same, in those three hundred years the Church
remained unharmed, for without question it could endure another three hundred and again
another six-hundred and another thousand, for it was not in want of heresies in that time, and
there were many schisms and many vices, and also abuses. Nevertheless, all of which could not
overthrow the Catholic Church even if she was destitute of the assistance of general Councils.

Next, it also happens that because none of the reasons for holding a general Council are
enumerated it convicts the case. For the first, correction of vices and abuses, (that we might begin
from the last reason), it can happen with sufficient suitability, both by laws of the Supreme Pontiff
and by decrees of provincial Councils, although it would be more agreeable, as we said, to do it
through general Councils.

Furthermore, those reasons cannot be made for the election of the Supreme Pontiff, if we
speak morally, not metaphysically, if it ever were to come into use. For who would believe that
there is going to be a time when the Cardinals would not or could not create a Pope? But if any
of this were to happen there could hardly be a doubt as to whom the election would pertain. For
when the Roman Episcopate was carried to the supreme Pontificate of the Church, without a
doubt, it fell to those, whose duty it is to choose the Roman Pontiff. Moreover, of those whose task
it is to choose the Roman Bishop, there could be no more doubt in the absence of constitutions of
Popes, just as it pertains to choose the Bishops of other cities. But this matter must be addressed
elsewhere.

It is certain that hitherto a Council has never been called for this purpose. The same can be
said about the fourth reason. For on account of suspicions on the doctrine and life of Popes, no
Council has been convened apart from provincial or national Councils. Nor does it seem necessary
for a greater Council; for while the Pope is truly a Pope, he cannot be judged by any Council,
unless perhaps he himself were to grant the power to a Council of examining his case, and it could
impose a judgment of Council but not a coercive judgment; consequently, the Pope can equally
give power to a particular or general Council.

Indeed, the third reason does not necessarily consider the two-fold name “general Council”.
In the first place, it is not absolutely necessary to resist a common enemy, such as the Turks. For
if the Church could be preserved under the savage persecution of Nero, Domitian, Decius, and
Diocletian, why could it not also under the persecution of the Turks? Who does not see even
without a general Council war can be declared upon a common enemy, just as it often has been
done?

Next, neither the first nor second reason necessarily demands the convocation of a general
Council, as past times witness. For, if to extinguish seven heresies seven general Councils were
celebrated, more than a hundred heresies, were extinguished by the Apostolic See alone, with the
cooperation of particular Councils: and if one schism was abolished by the general Council of
Constance, more than fifty-eight schisms were abolished without a general Council.

But on the other hand, St. Augustine, in book 4 Contra Duas Epistolas Pelagianorum, ca. 12,
affirms that there were very few heresies for which it was necessary to have a general Council of
West and East to overcome them. St. Leo also praises Martianus Augustus (epist. 43 ad Martianum)
because he demanded a general Council, and he also determined it was necessary.

St. Isidore, in his preface to his book on Councils, writes that before the times of Constantine,
the Christian Church was divided into different heresies, because the persecutions of the emperors
would not allow the Bishops to celebrate Councils. There it is beyond all doubt that he is speaking
about general Councils. For it is certain before the times of Constantine, many particular Councils
were celebrated. This is why Isidore seems to mean that general Councils are necessary simply
to extirpate heresies.

Likewise, St. Eugenius, the Bishop of Carthage, as Victor is a witness (lib. 2, de persecutione
Vvandalica), that when it was urged by King Hunericus, that he confer on faith with the Arian
Bishops, he responded that the cause of faith is common to the whole Catholic Church, hence it
is for the Roman Church to convoke Bishops from all parts of the Church, and especially to define
the whole matter, since it is the head of all Churches. But such a response Eugenius meant to
explain that a general Council is altogether necessary to explain questions of the faith.

Next, on that ancient question, were those that had been baptized by heretics not to be
rebaptized? It could never be defined, until the opinion of a general Council were to be added,
even if many decrees of particular Councils as well as of the Apostolic See had preceded it; it
seems, therefore, a general Council is necessary simply to put an end to controversies of faith. St.
Augustine speaks thus on the matter, “The obscurity of this question, that in earlier ages of the
Church, before the schism of Donatus, has caused men of great weight, and even our fathers, the
bishops, whose hearts were full of charity, so to dispute and doubt among themselves, saving for
peace, that the several statutes of their Councils in their different districts long varied from each
other, until at length the most wholesome opinion was established, to the removal of all doubts,
by a plenary Council of the whole world, because it was thought very beneficial to be strengthened
even from remote doubts” (De Baptismo contra Donatistas, lib. 1, ca. 7). In ch. 18 he says: “We
piously believe about baptism what the universal Church safeguards from the sacrilege of a remote
schism. Nevertheless, if different men still held different opinions on the point, then let them so
think, save for peace, until some one clear and simple decree should have been passed by a
universal Council, it would have been right for the charity which seeks for unity to throw a veil
over the error of human weakness.” And in book 2, ch. 4, he says: “Nor should we ourselves dare
to assert anything of the kind, were we not supported by the unanimous authority of the whole
Church, to which he [Cyprian] himself would unquestionably have yielded, if at that time the
truth of this question had been placed beyond dispute by the investigation and decree of a plenary
Council.”

But to the first testimony of Augustine, it is not overly difficult to respond, since Augustine
does not teach that general Councils were ever simply necessary at any time, but only in a certain
time, this is, that a more pleasing and agreeable peace were rendered to the Churches. If indeed
Augustine wrote in some place that to crush a certain heresy, i.e. Arianism, a general Council was
necessary, he wrote in the same place about the Pelagian heresy, and several others, saying that
it could be crushed without a general Council. Moreover, if you were to ask why did the case of
the Arians require a general Council more than that of the Pelagians, Augustine will not respond
that the question introduced by the Arians was more obscure than that brought by the Pelagians,
since that does not seem to be true, since there are many more clear testimonies in the Scriptures
for the divinity of Christ against the Arians, than for original sin against the Pelagians; but God
so willed and arranged that the heresy of the Pelagians was condemned in short order by the
universal Church, when the Apostolic See at Rome decreed it with peace and consent, as well as
Councils of the East in Palestine, and of the West in Africa. The Arian heresy had many Bishops
give it patronage in its beginnings, that did not appear to be easily set at rest unless they would
be crushed by the supreme authority of the Church. Therefore, a general Council was not
necessary to extinguish the Pelagian heresy because it could be suitably and easily subdued by the
Apostolic See in cooperation with provincial counsels of different places. The Arian heresy could
also have been subdued by the Apostolic See and provincial Councils, but not suitably and easily,

The same answer can be given to the testimony of St. Leo. He judged that the ecumenical
Council of Chalcedon was necessary, that by its authority, what had been wrongly done at the
second Council of Ephesus could be destroyed by this new Council’s authority. This was not an
absolute necessity, but precisely something like the clear invalidation of the Council of Ariminium.
For the Council of Ariminium was by far more general and populated, as well as more famous,
than the second Council of Ephesus, and still it was invalidated by Pope Damasus without the
assistance of any general Council. On that businesses, see the epistle of Pope Damasus to the
Bishops of Illyricum, as well as epistle 52 of Basil to Athanasius.

In the same mode, we are compelled to explain the testimony of Isidore. For what he says, that
before the rule of Constantine the Church was divided into different heresies because the right to
gather into Councils, and thereby to teach the people, was not given to Bishops, if it were
understood absolutely it is clearly false. For, even before the times of Constantine a great many
heresies were altogether abolished and extinguished by Councils of Bishops, and after the times
of Constantine there were not a lack of new heresies which had cause to disturb the Church for
the longest time. Certainly the heresies of Nestorian and Monophysite heresies could never be
altogether eradicated, and still they arose after the times of Constantine, and still general Councils
labored more often in extirpating them. Therefore, Isidore only meant that in the time of
Constantine general Councils began to be celebrated, and a very useful thing came into being to
crush heresies.

On what St. Eugene meant, the same Victor of Utica explains. For he writes that Eugene made
mention of a general Council, and of the Churches beyond the sea, since he was called to confer
about the faith with the Arians; not because there were no learned men in Africa, who could safely
confer with the Arian bishops, but because he thought the learned men from across the sea, if they
came into Africa, would act more freely for the sake of the faith since they were not subjects of
the Vandal kings, to whom the Africans were subject. Still, Eugene did not lie when he said that
the cause of faith is common, and could not take up that cause without Bishops from across the
sea; for even if it were absolutely permitted for him to confer with the Arians about faith, as
Catholics in the same region otherwise did with the Donatists, nevertheless, it was not expedient
in that time, and hence, it was not lawful without manifest danger. Therefore, Eugene could not
truly take up that province without his colleagues from beyond the sea, not because he lacked
authority, but because he lacked opportunities; nor was it iniquity, but prudence, to elude the
petition of that tyrant with ambiguity of teaching.

The last objection remains, on the baptism of heretics, which is answered in two ways. The
first perhaps is not true, which St. Augustine thought, that the question could not be defined
before the opinion of a general Council. For the first general Council was celebrated at Nicaea in
the time of Constantine. Moreover, St. Jerome writes in his Dialogue against the Luciferians, that
the Bishops themselves, who decreed with Cyprian that heretics must be rebaptized, later
advanced the contrary decree. From which it is gathered that those Bishops, at length, acquiesced
to the Roman Pontiff, Stephen, yet who all died before the times of the Council of Nicaea.

Jerome also writes the same thing in his book, on Ecclesiastical writers, that Dionysius of
Alexandria conceded the teaching of St. Cyprian on rebaptizing, which Eusebius (lib. 7 historiae,
c. 4) also indicates; still it is certain the same Dionysius changed his teaching a little later, nor did
he dare to rebaptize a certain man whom it was certain was baptized by heretics, as Eusebius
related (lib. 7 historiae, c. 8). Why would even Augustine himself (epist. 48 ad Vincentium) suspect
that Cyprian retracted his teaching? It is probable then that, even before the Council of Nicaea,
by the authority of the Apostolic See, that question was settled among all Catholics; but even if
the question was not defined even to the determination of a plenary Council, as Augustine says,
still, it would not be necessary thence to gather that it could not have been defined. Although the
authority of the Apostolic See cooperating with provincial Councils defining that matter was not
lacking, still those holy Popes preferred to delay it for a time that was more opportune for an
absolute determination of that question which separated so many great men from the Church;
because the opportunity of time had not yet advanced itself, in the way that the Council of Nicaea
was celebrated, on that account Augustine repeats himself so often, that question was at length
defined in a full Council of the whole world.

But, someone will say, Pope Stephen, when a certain particular Council had gathered,
commanded that no one be rebaptized and those who did should be excommunicated, as Dionysius
of Alexandria writes (witnessed by Eusebius, lib. 7 hist. cap. 4, and Augustine in his book on
Baptism, chapter 14). Therefore, the Pope wanted to define the question with his particular
Council, but could not. Hence general Councils seem altogether necessary.

I respond: Just as I responded to this matter in my treatise On the Roman Pontiff (book 4, cap.
7), Stephen indeed commanded that men should not be rebaptized if they were baptized by
heretics, and he also thought those that rebaptize should be excommunicated; still, he did not
really excommunicate them, which is clearly understood from many ancient authorities. Especially
Cyprian himself, who does not say in his epistle to Pompeius that Stephen excommunicated them,
but that he thought they should be excommunicated who acted against it: “He thinks those
safeguarding the truth of God, Christ and the Church must refrain.” And in his letter to Iubaianus,
he says that he held his peace, along with those who thought the contrary, but he certainly would
not have said this if either Stephen had excommunicated them, or they had excommunicated him:
“We, in as much as it is in us, on account of heretics, with our colleagues and fellow-Bishops, do
not contend the divine peace with them, and we hold the Lord’s peace.”

Jerome, in his Dialogue with the Luciferians, speaks this way about Cyprian: “He remained in
communion with those who thought the contrary.” Augustine (lib. 1 de Baptismo, c. 7) says that
great men and Fathers of the Church, Bishops, i.e. Stephan and Cyprian, dissented save for peace
and charity. Pacianus (epis. 2 ad Sympronianum) says: “Cyprian, in concord with all and common
peace, suffered in the flock of confessors.” St. Vincent of Lérin, in his little book, Orerum, says: “A
marvelous alteration! The authors of the same opinion are Catholics, but their adherents are
judged heretics. The teachers are absolved, the students condemned; the writers of the books will
be sons of the kingdom; those asserting their propositions will receive hellfire. For who would
doubt that this light of all saints and Bishops, as well as martyrs, Cyprian, will reign with Christ
in eternity with the rest of his colleagues? Or who, on the other hand, would be so sacrilegious,
that would deny that the Donatists and other plagues, that boasted that they rebaptized on the
authority of a Council, are going to burn in eternity with the devil?”

CHAPTER XI: Some Councils of Bishops are simply
necessary

Moreover, although general Councils are not absolutely necessary, still, some Councils,
whether general or particular, are altogether necessary for the good governance of the Church,
and this question can scarcely be called into doubt. For, if “it is necessary that scandals would
come,” as the Lord says in Matthew 18:7, “and it is necessary that there be heresies,” as the Apostle
says in 1 Cor. 11:19, certainly it is also necessary that in the Church there be a certain judgment,
whereby both scandals could be removed and heresies condemned, otherwise in a short time the
universal Church would have been torn into parts and perish, for “every kingdom divided against
itself will be despoiled.” (Matthew 12:25).

But even if the Supreme Pontiff is the judge, in place of Christ, of all controversies, universal
fraternity ought to be submissive, as Cyprian says (lib. 1 epis. 3) and we in our books on the
Roman Pontiff have shown in many kinds of arguments; still, the Pope ought not, in judging
controversies of faith, either trust in his judgment alone, or to await divine revelation, but to apply
diligence, as much as such a matter demands, and the ordinary means, and at length, to await the
assistance of the Holy Spirit as well as divine direction.

Hence, the ordinary means, and moreover a necessary one, is a Council, great or small, one
or many, exactly as he will judge; this can easily be proven.

First, from the divine promise of Matthew 18:20, “Where two or three are gathered in my
name, there I am in their midst.” Hence, the Council of Chalcedon understands about Councils (in
epist. ad Leonem et aliae Synodi) which we shall advance in the following books.

Secondly, from what was done by the Apostles, who could also define controversies by
themselves, but still, lest they would appear to neglect the ordinary means, and what was shown
by Christ himself, did not wish to define a controversy on the legal matters that arose at Antioch
without a Council (Acts 15).

Thirdly, from the custom of the whole Church, and also of all ages. For the Church has always
had the custom of holding Councils of Bishops to explain doubtful matters. The Roman Pontiffs
themselves never condemned a new heresy without a new Council, as one will be able to gather
either from reading the volumes of Councils or the ecclesiastical histories. However, what was
always done by all, who will dare to deny it can be called, and really is, ordinary?

We find confirmation from the Fathers. St. Cyprian (lib. 2 epist. 1 ad Stephanum) says: “We
had necessity to compel many priests to gather into one place to celebrate a Council.” Gelasius,
in his tome on the bond of anathema, says: “If the Pope has already given consent, it is taught by
some that where it is done, if it celebrated according to the rule of the Church, if it has proceeded
from paternal tradition, if it is advanced from the Fathers, if it is produced from competent
examination where it must be required without doubt, if it is celebrated in a Council that has been
gathered, such as in the reception of a condemned matter and in the warding off of a Catholic,
because it is a new case, it becomes most certain.”

Lastly, the Council of Toledo, XI, in its very preface, proves by many words the necessity of
Councils in the Church. But that is the chief point; if there were no Councils it is necessary that
forthwith all things would be filled with vices and errors. Therefore, if God could preserve his
Church without Councils by absolute potency, still, according to his ordinary providence, Councils
are necessary for the good governance of the Church.

CHAPTER XII: Who gathers Councils?

WE have given exposition to the purpose, now it is fitting that we explain the efficient cause.
Therefore, it is suitable between us and our opponents, that Diocesan Councils ought to be
convoked by a Bishop, Provincial Councils by an Archbishop, National Councils by a Patriarch or
Primates. For all Catholics affirm it to be true with Augustine (epist. 217 ad Victorinum). Calvin
affirms the same thing in the Institutes (lib. 4 c. 7 § 8) and Illyricus (cent. 4 c. 7 col. 534).

But on a general Council there is the greatest controversy; if certain Catholics would have it
that the duty of calling a general Council properly pertains to the Roman Pontiff, but in this way
another could summon a Council, with the consent of the Pope, that it would also be sufficient if
the summoning were made, he later held it ratified and confirmed it; but if neither he nor someone
else at his command or consent summons the Council, or he would at least not approve the
summoning, it is not a Council, rather perhaps an assembly.

Moreover, the heretics of this time attribute that authority to the Emperor. Luther says it in
his book on Councils (pag. 58) where he also says that universal Councils are called because they
were compelled by the universal lord and emperor of all. Charles Dumoulin in his Consilio de
Concilio Tridentino non recipiendo, § 6, thence shows that the Council of Trent must not be
received because it was not summoned by the Emperor, but by the Pope. Likewise, the little book
of Protestants, in which they render the account as to why they would not come to the Council
of Trent. Calvin and the Centuriators teach the same thing (loc. cit.); and just the same, Brenz in
his Prolegomena contra Petrum a Soto, and above all others, Nilos Cabásilas in his book, de Primatu
Papae.

However, it is really for the Pope, not the Emperor, to gather a general Council; firstly, it can
be proven from the Scripture that a Council of the Church is not legitimate unless it were gathered
in the name of Christ, as it is said in Matthew 18, and Calvin admits in the Institutes (lib. 4 ca. 9
§ 1 and 2) that, to be gathered in the name of Christ, it seems nothing other than to be gathered
on the authority of Christ, i.e. from him who has the authority from Christ to gather it. For what
Calvin says, to be gathered in the name of Christ is to be so gathered as if Christ alone were to
preside and have no colleague, but all as subjects. This is not according to the Scriptures, nor is
it a sufficient note to discern legitimate Councils; it is not, I say, according to the Scriptures. For
in the Scriptures, that, “In the name,” wherever it is received for that which is, from authority, as
in the last chapter of Mark: “In my name they will cast out demons,” and John 5: “I have come in
the name of my father,” Matthew 7: “Did we not prophecy in your name?”, Acts 4: “In what power,
or in whose name do you do this?” Nor does any place perhaps occur where someone does
something in the name of Christ and it means Christ holds the presidency without a colleague.
But whatever the case with this, it is certain that a legitimate Council could not be discerned by
this note, for it is indeed true that it is necessary in a legitimate Council for Christ to so preside
that there would be no colleague for him, rather all are subjects, but who will judge, who will
discern whether Christ so presides when a Council is called, or not? For Christ does not preside
in Councils in a visible form.

Calvin responds that one can easily discern it since Christ then presides without a colleague
when the whole assembly is guided by the word and its spirit, i.e. when the Bishops define nothing
by their head, but everything according to the rule of Scripture.

This is ambiguous and obscure, for even our adversaries in their Councils, and Catholics in
theirs, affirm they devise nothing from their own head but produce everything from Scripture.
Who, therefore, will judge whether they made a true Council? How, if they are gathered in the
name of Christ, is it that Christ holds the presidency, as Calvin explains it? It could not happen
that we could discern legitimate Councils from illegitimate ones. Therefore, it remains what we
said, to be gathered in the name of Christ is nothing other than to be gathered by one who has the
authority from Christ to gather them.

Moreover, Christ, when he ascended into heaven, and withdrew the visible presidency of the
Church, did not consign the governance of the Church to the Emperor Tiberius, who reigned at
that time, but to Peter the Apostle, to whom he said: “Feed my sheep.” Therefore, those who are
gathered by him who succeeds Peter are gathered in the name of Christ, but not those who are
gathered by those that succeed Tiberius. For this purpose, Peter and those who legitimately
succeed Peter, is the Pastor of all the sheep of Christ, hence, even of Kings, Emperors, priests, for
he embraces all and excepts none, when he said: “Simon, son of John, feed my sheep.” Wherefore,
St. Leo (Serm. 3, on the Anniversary of the Assumption of the Pontificate) says: “One Peter was
chosen from the whole world, who was also put in charge of the calling of all nations, and all the
Apostles, of all the Fathers of the Church, that although there might be many priests in the people
of God, and many pastors, still Peter properly rules them all, whom Christ principally also rules.”
But is there anyone who could not discern whether it would be more fitting for the sheep to gather
shepherds, or rather more for the shepherd to gather the sheep? Therefore, the Pope is the pastor,
the Emperor a sheep, the duty to convoke Episcopal Councils looks not to the Emperor but to the
Pope.

Secondly, a general Council ought to be summoned from an authority that can compel
everyone; but the Emperor has never had the whole Church as a subject, even in regard to civil
actions, as the Pope has in regard to spiritual actions; for the Emperors ruled broadly in the time
of St. Leo and St. Prosper, and still then the Christian world was more subject to the Pope than the
Roman world was subject to the Emperor. For So St. Leo Speaks in sermon 1 on Sts. Peter and Paul:
“By the sacred seat of Peter Rome, having become the head of the world, presided more broadly
in divine religion than by earthly dominion.” And Prosper of Aquitaine so sings in his liber de
ingratis:

The seat of Peter at Rome, made head of the world

for pastoral honor, holds by Religion

whatever it did not possess by arms.

Moreover, now, the Emperor could scarcely compel the Bishops of one province let alone the
fact that Italy, Spain and France are not subjects of the Emperor, but have their own kings or
temporal princes. What if there were no emperor, nay more, even no Christian prince, would it
be the case that Councils could not happen?

Thirdly, provincial Councils are summoned by a Metropolitan, and national ones by a Primate
or a Patriarch, as we showed above, even by the testimony of our adversaries. Therefore, general
Councils must not be summoned by the Emperor, but by the Supreme Pontiff. For if the Emperor
ought to summon general Councils, then a king or duke or a civil Magistrate ought to summon
provincial or national Councils. For, as the Emperor of the whole world stands in regard to a
general Council, so does a king or duke of one province to a Council of that province or nation.
Just the same, since they affirm that provincial Councils are not convoked by a political prince of
that province, but by the Ecclesiastical one, why would they not affirm by the same reasoning that
general Councils ought not be compelled by a political prince of the whole world, but by the
Ecclesiastical one? Moreover, the Roman Pope is the Ecclesiastical Prince of the whole Christian
world, as we heard earlier from St. Leo, and we have proven as profusely as possible in the books
On the Roman Pontiff.

Add that, if the Roman Pontiff were not also a true prince and ecclesiastical monarch, as we
teach, but were only the Bishop of the first see, or a primus inter primarios Patriarchas as Nilos
reckons, still the right to summon general Councils would pertain to him. For, primates do not
properly command other bishops, yet because they hold the first place among the bishops of their
nation, they can summon national Councils in their own right. For the Metropolitan summons a
provincial Council, because he is in charge of the whole province, but the Supreme Pontiff is in
charge of the whole world, as is clear from Leo (Serm. 3 de anniversario die assumptionis suae ad
Pontificatum and epist. 84 ad Anastasium).

Fourthly, it is proven from the most ancient canon that Councils cannot be celebrated contrary
to the opinion of the Roman Pontiff; for Pope St. Marcellus writes of this apostolic canon in an
epistle to the Bishops of the province of Antioch. The first Council of Nicaea renewed the same,
as well as the Council of Alexandria witnesses in their epistle to Felix, as well as Julius I in his
epistle to the Oriental Bishops, which Socrates calls to mind (lib. 2 cap. 13), Sozomen (lib. 3 cap.
9) and Nicephorus (lib. 9 c. 5). Therefore, if it is not lawful to celebrate Councils without the
consent of the Roman Pontiff, it follows he is chiefly the one to convoke them.

Calvin responds, however (loc. cit.), that this canon only means that the Roman Pontiff ought
to be called to the Council, because he was one from the particular Patriarch. But if that were so,
then the canon could also have been made to the effect that Councils could not be compelled
contrary to the consent of the Bishop of Alexandria or Antioch, for they were also particular
Patriarchs, and they would be equal or greater than the Roman Pontiff according to Calvin.

The Centuriators (cent. 4. c 7, col. 533) devised another solution. They say the words of
Socrates do not mean Councils ought not be celebrated contrary to the consent of the Roman
Pontiff, but Churches ought to be dedicated. For it is held in Greek: Μη δειν παρα γνώμκω του
επισκόπου ρώμης κανονιζειν τας Εκκλσίας. But the Centuriators are deceived, for κανονιζειν
τας Εκκλσίας cannot mean to dedicate Churches, but to convoke a canonical body or to summon
a Council, just as Pope Marcellus and Julius say, who seem to have written in Latin, and how
Socrates and Sozomen render from Latin the Tripartite history of Cassiodorus (lib. 4 c. 9 and 19),
as well as how Nicephorus also understood it (loc. cit.).

But the whole matter can be very clearly proven from the epistle of Julius I, which Socrates
adduces. Accordingly, in that epistle Julius rebukes the Orientals because they celebrated a Council
in Antioch without his consent; moreover, wishing to give an account why he so rightly rebuked
them, he adduces that canon into the midst. Therefore, either this canon ought to be understood
on the celebration of a Council, or it is necessary that Julius was foolish. But who does not see
which one is truer? Add, that none of the Fathers mention a canon whereby they are forbidden
to dedicate a Church without the consent of the Roman Pontiff: on the contrary, there was never
nor is there, in use in the Church such a canon.

Fifthly, it is proven from the Council of Chalcedon, (act. 1) where Dioscorus of Alexandria is
bidden not to sit among the Bishops because of the fact that he dared to make a Council without
the authority of the Apostolic See: “Which,” it says, “was never lawful and has never been done.”
We have a similar thing in the seventh general Council, act. 6, where what had been decided at
a certain Council held at Constantinople was invalidated because it was compelled by the Emperor
without the consent of the Roman Pontiff.

Sixthly it is proven from the fourth Roman Council held under Symmachus, during which
King Theodoric said he had convoked the Council so that he might judge the case of Pope
Symmachus. All the Bishops answered that the Council ought to be called by the Pope and not by
the king, even if it were to accuse the Pope. But the king said that he convoked it with the consent
of the Pope, but the Bishops did not acquiesce until the King produced the letters of the Pope and
the Pope himself when present testified that it was so.

Seventhly, it is proven from the testimony of the ancient Popes. St. Leo (epistola ad Turbium,
which is 93, c. 17) says, “Having sent letters to our brothers and fellow Bishops, and to others, we
have summoned them to a general Council.” Pelagius II (in epist. 1 ad Orientales): “The authority
to convoke a general Council was entrusted to the Apostolic See of Blessed Peter by a singular
privilege.” Sixtus III, who also preceded Pelagius and Leo, in his epistle to the Orientals, says:
“Valentinianus Augustus convoked a Council by our authority.” Adrian II, in his letter to the
Emperor Basil, which was read in the 8th Council (act 1) said: “We will, by the industry of your
piety to convoke a numerous Council at Constantinople.”

Add to these Valentinianus the Emperor, who was asked by other Bishops to permit them to
celebrate a Council, who responded, as Sozomen relates it: “It is not lawful for me who stands in
the lot of the people to investigate such things; it is priests to whom these cares pertain, let them
will to gather in some place” (Sozomen lib. 6 c. 7). Lastly, many other canons are added that are
held in dist. 17 and many accounts, which Juan Torquemada makes (lib. 3 cap. 6) as well as the
Lateran Council held under Pope Leo X, sess. 11, where it is asserted that it is for the Roman
Pontiff to summon general Councils. Such a decree was made in the year before the Lutheran
heresy arose.

CHAPTER XIII: The arguments of adversaries are
answered

IT remains to answer the arguments whereby the truth will also be more confirmed. The
arguments of Calvin and the Centuriators are taken from the summons of the first general
Councils, which were summoned by the emperors, not by the Popes. Ruffinus says about the first
Council of Nicaea (lib. hist. c. 1), “And Constantine convoked a Council in the episcopal city of
Nicaea.” Theodoret witnesses that the first Council of Constantinople was summoned by
Theodosios I (lib. 5 Historiarum, c. 9). Evagrius witnesses in lib. 1 cap. 2 hist. that at the nod of
Theodosius II the first Council of Ephesus was convened. At Chalcedon, as St. Leo witnesses in
epistle 43, as well as a few others, a Council was called by the emperor Martianus. Theodoret
asserts in lib. 2 cap. 4, that Sardica was also called by the Emperor Constantius.

Nilos Cabásilas confirms this with the testimony of St. Leo I. For he (in epist. 42 ad Theodosius
the Emperor) begs the emperor to call a provincial Council in Italy. The Centuriators strengthen
the same argument with the testimony of Pope Liberius, who conceded to the emperor the power
to convoke Councils (cited by Theodoret, lib. 2 cap. 16). Charles Dumoulin strengthens it again,
in the Consilio de non recipiendis decretis Concilii Tridentini, § 6, with the testimony of St. Jerome
(lib. 2 Apologiae contra Ruffinum), where, speaking about a certain Council, Jerome says: “Tell me
who is the emperor that commanded this Council to be convoked?” We might add a fourth
confirmation, from the fact that general Councils were first compelled at the same time as the
emperors began to be Christian, for if they could be celebrated without the emperors, why were
none celebrated in the first three hundred years?

I answer these, firstly, that we can rightly scorn these arguments, since our adversaries reject
efficacious arguments taken up from traditions or the custom of the Church, but only accept them
from Scripture, however, these arguments are sought from mere tradition and the ecclesiastical
practice without any testimony of Scripture.

Secondly, I say, we can oppose custom to custom: for if emperors summoned four or five
Councils, the Popes have summoned more than twelve, as even our adversaries confess. Thirdly,
I say a general Catholic Council summoned by the Emperor alone is null, i.e. without the consent
and authority of the Roman Pontiff, and I shall briefly show this from each of them one by one.

Thus, first about Nicaea we read in the sixth Council (act. 18) that Constantine and Sylvester
gathered the great Council at Nicaea. And Ruffinus (lib. 10 histor. ca. 1) says Constantine
summoned the Council by the opinion of priests. From such we do not only have what we want,
but even gather in passing that it is false, what Pighius says (lib. 6 cap. 1 de Ecclesiastica hierarchia)
that the convocation of general Councils is found in Constantine the great, for he did not devise
this by himself but followed the opinion of priests.

Theodoret relates about the first Council of Constantinople that Theodosius did not summon
it as much as he sent the letters of Pope Damasus, whereby he summoned the Bishops to the
Council. In this way the Bishops gathered in that Council wrote to Pope Damasus (cited by
Theodoret hist. lib. 5 ca. 9): “At your reverence’s command in the letters sent to the most holy
emperor Theodosius in the previous year, we were prepared to make the journey to
Constantinople.” Therefore, although Theodosius had summoned the Council, nevertheless, he did
so at the command of Apostolic letters. This is why in the sixth Council, act. 18, the Fathers say
Theodosius and Damasus opposed Macedonius by means of the second Council, just as it was said
a little earlier, that Constantine and Sylvester gathered the first Council to resist Arius.

Prosper of Aquitaine, in his Chronicle, indicates on the first Council of Ephesus, that it was
summoned by the industry of St. Cyril, and the authority of Pope Celestine. It is also certain from
Evagrius (lib. 1 cap. 4) and from the epistle of Celestine to Cyril, which is held among the works
of Cyril, and from Photius in his book on the seventh Council, that Cyril set out for the Council
as a legate of the Apostolic See, which is a certain argument that the Council was not gathered
without the consent of the Pope.

On Chalcedon it is certain from the epistle of the Emperor Martianus to Pope Leo, which is
contained before the Council of Chalcedon, in which the Emperor, being about to summon a
Council, asked the Pope to come and conduct the Council, or if he refused to come, if he would
show by a letter what he willed to be done and in the end concluded that he would write to all the
Bishops to come together at a certain place: “And such things are beneficial to the religion of
Christians and the Catholic Faith as your holiness has defined according to the Ecclesiastical rules,
they [the Bishops] will declare in their arguments.” (Epistle 76). There is also extant among the
epistles pertaining to the Council of Chalcedon, a certain epistle of the Bishops of lower Moesia
to the Emperor Leo, where they say: “In the city of Chalcedon many Bishops came together at the
command of Leo the Roman Pontiff, who is truly the head of Bishops.”

Lastly, Gelasius, in his epistle to the Bishops of Dardania,
8 says that only the Apostolic See
decreed by its authority that Chalcedon would become a Council. Here we must note an error of
the Centuriators, since in Centur. 5. cap. 7 col. 786 they did not understand what the word “only”
(sola) excluded and thought it excluded the Emperor, and therefore called Gelasius an impudent
liar. But Gelasius, by the word only did not exclude the Emperor, but only other episcopal Sees.
For the Sees of Alexandria, Antioch or Jerusalem, or even Constantinople, did not will it to become
a Council. Rather, only the Roman See, and it really brought that to effect, although not without
the assistance of the pious Emperor Martin.

Concerning the Council of Sardica, which was summoned by Pope Julius I, it can be
understood from Socrates (lib. 2 ca. 16) where he says that the Oriental Bishops directed the fault
of their absence from the Council to Julius the Bishop of Rome, due to the fact that he had
commanded it to be held in too short a time. From that it seems clear that the Council was not
called by the Emperor alone, but also by Pope Julius, and chiefly by him.

Therefore, we have the first Councils summoned by emperors, but also by the opinion and
consent of the Pope. Moreover, the reason why the Pope did not summon them alone, as was done
later, was not because the authority of the Council would not be ratified by Christians without the
authority of the emperor, as our adversaries dream up, but as St. Athanasius clearly says in his
letter to those leading a solitary life: “When ever did you hold something to be of the authority of
a judgment of the Church from the emperor?” Next, it was on account of many other just causes,
the first of which was that at that time an ancient Imperial law was in force which forbade all
gatherings and frequent assemblies of men without the authority of the emperor for the reason
that the Emperors feared sedition would arise from them. See l. 1 ff. de colegiis illicitis, and l.
conventicula, c. de Episcopis et Clericis.

The second reason is because even if that law did not exist, because the emperors ruled the
world in a time of great peace a Council could not be held unless it were in some Imperial city, but
no reasoning permits that an assembly could be held in some place in the whole world without
the license of the master of that place. The manner would be the same if a Council were not held
in the Papal States, but in France, Spain or Germany, without a doubt the consent of the one whose
city or province it is would be sought.

Third, because in that time general Councils were conducted with public expenses taken up,
especially in regard to the journey of Bishops to the place of a Council; for a journey with horses
or vehicles of cities, without expense to the Churches, as is certain from book three of the life of
Constantine, where Eusebius also adds that all the Bishops lived on expenses of the emperor
during the whole time of the Council. The same thing is also clear from Theodoret (lib. 2 cap. 16),
where we read that when Liberius sought a general Council, a certain man answered that the
public wealth was insufficient to provide for the travel of the Bishops. Likewise, from the epistle
of Constantine IV to the Roman Pontiff, which is contained at the beginning of the sixth Council
makes plain the same thing.

The fourth reason is because in that time, the Pope, even if he was the head of all in spiritual
matters, even of emperors, still in temporal matters he was subject to the emperors, and therefore
he could not act against the will of the emperor, especially when he ought to seek help from the
emperor to convoke a Council, or that he would permit a Council to be convoked. Nevertheless,
because he acknowledged him as his temporal lord, he begged that he would command a Council
to be convoked. After those times all these causes were changed, for neither was that law in force
nor did the emperors rule the whole world, nor were Councils conducted at public expense, nor
are there nations that could impede it, and the Pope, who is the head in spiritual matters, is not
subject in temporal matters, since even he is the supreme temporal prince of his domains, just as
other kings and princes are, which came to pass by divine providence so that the Pope could freely
exercise his office.

I respond to the first confirmation from Nilos, whose book Illyricus translated into Latin, that
there are two frauds in that testimony of St. Leo which he advances, one of Nilos and the other
of Illyricus. For St. Leo, in epist. 24 and 25 to Theodosius seeks a general Council in eloquent
words: “that you would bid a general Council to be celebrated in Italy.” Nilos, however, referring
to this sentence in Greek, placed ιδικην, i.e. his own or particular, when he ought to have said
οικουμενικην) And because that word Nilos used, namely ιδικην, could be explained in a good
sense, that it would mean a particular Council, that is, gathered for a special cause, Illyricus
wanted to eliminate all ambiguity, so he translated ιδικην into provincialem, as we are necessarily
compelled to understand that St. Leo asked not for a general Council but a particular one.

But this fraud is refuted both from the words of Leo already cited, and also from the epistle
of Valentinian to the same Theodosius, which is contained in the preamble to the Council of
Chalcedon where Valentinianus says, speaking on the same Council, that St. Leo wanted the
Bishops of the whole world to come together in Italy. Lastly, in that very epistle of Leo to
Theodosius, wherein he asks for a Council in Italy, he wrote that a provincial Council had already
been convoked at Rome, so the inscription has it: “Bishop Leo and the holy Council, which came
together in the city of Rome greet the always August Theodosius.” Therefore, if Leo had already
convoked a provincial Council in Italy, why would he ask for one from the emperor? Rather, he
was really asking for a general Council from the emperor, as we already said.

Now I speak to the second confirmation. The Centuriators lie when they say that Liberius
conceded the power to the emperor to convoke a Council, that is, to acknowledge that power to
be proper to the emperor, as they understand it, for in the whole Dialog of Liberius with the
emperor, no mention of this question is made, of whose right it is to convoke a Council; rather,
Liberius only asks from the emperor, who was all-powerful and an Arian (and hence dangerous
to him), that a Council would be held because he knew it could not be done against the will of the
emperor.

To the third confirmation, I say that Jerome says that really then, on account of the aforesaid
causes, the emperors were calling Councils, but not without the consent of the Popes.

To the fourth confirmation I say that no general Councils were held before Constantine, not
because there was no authority to hold them, but because there was no opportunity: for it was not
lawful for Christians from many provinces to gather into one place due to the assiduous
persecutions, as Isidore remarks in liber 6 Egymologiarum, c. 16.

CHAPTER XIV: Certain doubts are Answered

APART from these arguments of the heretics, Catholics customarily propose certain doubts. One,
whether or not it is lawful for a Council to be summoned by anyone other than the Pope, when
it is necessary for the Church, and still the Pope refuses to summon it. The second, whether or not
it is lawful for a Council to be summoned by anyone other than the Pope when the Pope should
not summon it, for the reason that he is a heretic or a schismatic. The third doubt, whether or not
it is lawful for a Council to be summoned by someone other than the Pope when the Pope cannot
summon one, for the reason that he is captive to infidels, or dead, or became insane or renounced
the Papacy.

To the first, Torquemada responds (lib. 3 c. 8) that it is scarcely a probable case: for it is not
believable that any Pope would be so bad that he would refuse a Council to be celebrated if it were
clearly certain that it is necessary for the preservation of the Church, because if he were such of
himself, still God, who preserves the Church, without a doubt would either change his mind or
remove him from this life. He says secondly, if none of these would happen, he could be held as
suspect of heresy, for as it is said in dist. 83, can. Error, as well as in the others following, one who
does not resist a manifest error when he may and must, is thought to approve it.

To the second and third, I respond that in no cause can a true and perfect Council (such as we
make our disputation on here), be convoked without the authority of the Pope, because he has the
authority to define questions of faith. For, the particular authority is in the head, in Peter; to whom
it was commanded to confirm his brethren, and therefore for whom the Lord himself prayed lest
his faith would fail (Luke 22). Still, in those two cases an imperfect Council could be gathered
which would suffice to provide for the Church from the head. For the Church, without a doubt,
has the authority to provide for itself from the head, although it cannot, without the head, make
determinations on many things on which it can with the head, as Cajetan rightly teaches in his
little work, de potestate Papae, c. 15 and 16, and much earlier on the priests of the Roman Church
in their epistle to Cyprian, which is 7 in the second book of the works of Cyprian. Hence, that
imperfect Council can happen, if either it is summoned by the college of Cardinals, or the Bishops
themselves come together in a place of themselves.

CHAPTER XV: Who are the ones that are called to a
Council?

TO this point we have made our dissertation on the final and efficient cause of Councils. Now we
must treat on those causes from which Councils are particularly constituted; the material causes,
as it were. One, is that the universal Church contains four kinds of men; some are clergy, others
lay, and again from the clergy, some are prelates and some are not. Likewise, from the laity, some
are princes and some are private citizens. This distinction, although on the one hand, the heretics
of this time do not receive it, still on the other they do since they also profess to be certain men
dedicated to the ministry of the Word, for whom it is fitting by their office to teach and shepherd
the people that call them ministers and again, between those other greater ones, whom they call
superintendents, others minors, whom they only call ministers.

The second is, in many Councils on the causes some can be present, others are as judges who
are said to have a decisive vote, others that they might examine difficulties in disputation, who
are said to have a consultive vote; others, that they would defend the Council and labor that inside
and out all will be peaceful. Therefore, the question is, who are the ones from these four kinds of
men that must be called to a Council, and for what reasons?

Our adversaries say two things. First, some from every kind of man ought to be present who
are educated, and all ought to be judges, and also have a decisive vote, whatever might be the
other duties. Luther clearly writes in his book on Councils, part 2, pg. 264, where he would have
it that, from every place, men learned in sacred Scripture ought to be gathered, up to 300 men. The
protestants write the same thing in that book which they titled: Caussa cur Electores et caeteri
Confessioni Augustanae addicti, ad Concilium Tridentinum non accedant. For, after they argued for
their first reason, namely that the Council was summoned by the Pope, they place a second reason,
because nobody will have a vote in it unless they are Cardinals, Bishops, Abbots and Generals of
Orders, when all learned men, even if they are lay, ought to have a decisive vote. Charles
Dumoulin in his plan for why the Consilio de Concilio Tridentino non recipiendo, §28, altogether
teaches the same thing. The Centuriators (Centur. 1 lib. 2 cap. 9 col. 548) say the same thing, and
explain the history of the Council of the Apostles from Acts 15, and say that in that Council, after
the opinions were given, votes were conferred upon the whole Church and it was defined by a
judgment of all that man is justified by faith alone without works.

Secondly, they say that a Council of the Church is not constituted except from truly pious and
chosen men, that clearly Brenz teaches in the Wirtemberg Confession, in the chapter on Councils,
where, after he had said that Councils ought to yield to the Scriptures, he renders the reason is
because we are certain from the Scriptures what is and is not of infallible truth: but on Councils
it is not the same, because each body of men is not the true Church, since it is not the faith of all,
nor are they all elect; the Confessionists and Calvinists are held to say the same thing, as we will
see below, who would have it that only the elect and the saints pertain to the Church, and
certainly a Council of the Church is not constituted even if it is from men of the Church.

But the teaching of Catholics is that only greater prelates, that is Bishops, ordinarily have a
right to a decisive vote in general and provincial Councils, while from privilege and also custom,
even Cardinals, Abbots and the Generals of Orders, even if they are not Bishops. Furthermore,
from priests and other lesser clergy only some learned men are called who assist in the
disputation, or in other ministries. Princes are called both to defend the Council and to be
conscious witnesses to the decrees of a Council, and afterward to punish contumacious
transgressors with corporal penalties. Lastly, from private laity, some are only called who seem
useful or necessary to some ministry of a Council. This teaching of Catholics is clear both from
the persons that were present at the Council of Trent, and from Juan Torquemada (lib. 2 cap. 21
and 15), as well as from other Catholic authors.

Now, we shall constitute the proof of our teaching and the refutation of the contrary. First, the
second opinion of those we just related does not need refutation; both because it must be refuted
in the question on the definition of the Church, and because it is so false that it destroys itself.
Really, when it says that a Council is constituted from the elect and the saints, it affirms
something to be a Council and nothing to be a Council; for it posits there is a Council, when it
explains it is constituted from certain men; no indeed, Brenz presupposes it to so exist that he says
the authority of Councils is great, and still when he says it is constituted from the elect, he is
compelled to say there is no Council. For to make a Council, it is for men to be joined and
cooperate as one, but the elect in this world cannot be joined together since nobody knows who
is truly of the elect, because if some of our adversaries do not require the election of true members
of the Church, still they require internal faith and piety, and hence they cannot ever show any
Council which could certainly be called a Christian Council since nobody can see internal faith
and piety.

Moreover, the first opinion must now be refuted, firstly, by reason taken from Sacred
Scripture: to define in Councils those things which must be believed or done is the proper office
of pastors, for it is properly to shepherd, to teach, and so teach that others would be held to
believe. Hence, to teach is to shepherd, as is clear from Jeremiah 3: “I will give you shepherds
according to my heart, and they will shepherd you with knowledge and doctrine.” Likewise from
Ephesians 4: “But some are pastors and teachers.” Jerome notes on this verse, as well as Augustine
(epist. 59 ad Paulinum) the name of shepherd is joined with the name of teacher, because it is
proper for pastors to teach. But laymen are not pastors, nor any Ecclesiastics, but only Bishops;
for we so read in Acts 20, “Attend to the whole flock in which the Holy Spirit has placed you as
Bishops to rule the Church of God.” And the last chapter of John, where it is said to Peter: “Feed
my sheep.”

If anyone would contend that all Christians are Bishops, and what is said to Peter was said to
all Christians, he ought to show who they are that are called sheep in the Church; for if everyone
is a pastor, where are the sheep? What if some are pastors, that is, Bishops, and some are sheep,
that is laymen, and only pastors ought to come together in Councils to define what are good
pastures and what are harmful ones; certainly it follows that Councils are not made up of the laity,
but the priests. Add that Melanchthon (in Locis, ca. de numero Sacramentorum) and Calvin (Inst.
lib. 4 c. 14 § 20) place the ordination of pastors who are dedicated to shepherd, i.e. to teach the
people, among the sacraments of the Church. And Calvin clearly says this sacrament is not
common to the whole Church but only to certain men who are initiated to it, hence by their
confession, the laity are not ordained pastors, but only sheep, therefore it is not suitable for them
to teach, especially by the authority that is done in Councils.

Secondly, it is proven from the testimonies of the Fathers. The first Councils in the Church
were celebrated in the times of Pope Victor over the question of Easter. Eusebius speaks of these
in hist. lib. 5 ca. 23: “On account of which assemblies of Bishops and Councils were convoked in
each individual province.” He says not every educated man you like, but Bishops were gathered
into Councils; Cyprian teaches the same thing in the beginning of his letter to Jubianus, and Hilary
in his book on Councils, Ambrose (epist. 32), Jerome (lib. 2 Apologia contra Ruffinum), Augustine
(epist. 119), Leo (epist. 16) and following. Ruffinus, hist. lib. 10 cap. 1, Athanasius in his epistle to
those leading a solitary life, and other Fathers, who everywhere assert that Councils are made of
Bishops.

Besides, Theodosius II, in his epistle to the Council of Ephesus, which is extant in the first
volume of this Council, ch. 32, says: “It is illicit for one who is not in the order of the most holy
Bishops to mix in Ecclesiastical tractates.” Pulcheria, the empress, in her epistle to the general of
Bithynia, which is contained before the Council of Chalcedon, commanded that clergy, monks and
laity also be repelled by force from the Council, with the exception of those few whom the Bishops
bring with them. In the Council of Chalcedon, act. 1, when it was sent to the Archimandrite
Martin that he would subscribe, responded that it was not his place, but for Bishops alone to do
so. And in the same Council, when the laity entered on behalf of Dioscorus the monk, the Fathers
frequently shouted: “Send the crowd outside, this is a Council of Bishops.”

Thirdly, it is proven from the Councils celebrated to this point: the decrees of all the Councils
were made by Bishops alone, as is clear from the subscriptions, for everywhere only Bishops are
found to have subscribed, with a few general exceptions, in which the Emperor also subscribed,
but in a different manner from the Bishops; the Bishops in defining did so as judges while
emperors subscribed by confessing, and also a few others, as at Florence, the Lateran Council and
the Council of Trent, in which Abbots and the Generals of Orders subscribed: the rest, even if they
were the best and learned, were never admitted except to consult, with the exception of the
Council of Basel, where priests were admitted to a decisive vote, but in violation of and against
all antiquity, nor was that Council legitimate, as we said above.

Fourthly, it is proved from reason. In the first place, the Ecclesiastical and public business must
be treated by Ecclesiastical and public persons, as is known, but such are only Bishops. Next, if all
learned men ought to be admitted, there would never have been general Councils because all
learned men of the whole Church could scarcely be gathered, or if at length they were gathered,
it would be impossible to govern such a Council on account of the exceeding multitude; besides
then, without a doubt, there would be more inferiors in the Council than superiors and the greater
would conquer the better teaching, and superiors in the Church would be ruled by inferiors, not
vice versa, which is an absurdity. Likewise, if it were so, then one prince could easily, if a Council
were held in his region, define whatever he would want; for could he not easily gather all the most
learned men and priests of his province and introduce them into the Council, which other princes
who are very far away could not do? Lastly, there is no republic which, by the teaching of natural
reason, did not have some order in assemblies, so that no common member of the citizenry would
have a place and a vote, but only the princes and heads of the rest.

CHAPTER XVI: The objections of our adversaries are
answered

YET, the Protestants object firstly, in the little book we have already cited, that the testimony of
Luke in Acts 15, where St. Luke speaks about the first Council of the Apostles, says: “The Apostles
came together as well as the elders to see about this word.” And further on, “Then it pleased the
Apostles and the elders with all the Church,” where we see that even priests and laity were
present in the first Council.

I respond: In that Council the Apostles were present as judges to define, and priests to consult,
but the people were not called, but still were present and consented not by defining or disputing,
but only by listening and not protesting. That this is so is proven in two ways: 1) from the custom
of the Church which is the best interpreter of Scripture; for since in all Councils which were
celebrated after Apostolic times, it is certain that this order was observed, namely that only
Bishops were judges, although there were man others either clergy or laity present, and we ought
to believe the same order was altogether preserved as in the Apostolic Council. For the universal
Church would never depart from the examples of the first times, especially from the example of
the Apostles.

Then, this same thing can be shown from the very context; that only the Apostles and priests
were called is clear from that which is said: “The Apostles and the elders came together to see on
this word,” where no mention is made of the people. Then, that both the Apostles and the elders
spoke, until the controversy was struck, it is gathered from those words (“and that it were done
with great inquiry”) that after the disputation, in which the Apostles and elders spoke, only the
Apostles spoke a definitive opinion. It is clear from the fact that only Peter, Paul, Barnabas and
James are introduced as speaking by Luke. The fact that no others gave their opinions, is clear
from the continuation of the text, for after the opinion of Peter, it is soon added: “But the whole
multitude fell silent and listened to Paul and Barnabas.” Then, it is added: “And after they were
silent,” namely Paul and Barnabas, “James responded saying,” and as soon as James finished his
speech, it is added: “Then the Apostles were pleased, etc.”

Therefore, it is a lie which the Centuriators say, that all who were there gave their opinion
because of what follows: “The Apostles and elders were pleased, with all the Church,” is
understood on the tacit consent, which ought to be given to all things which are in a Council. See
the Council of Carthage in the works of Cyprian, for even in that Council many priests, deacons,
and laity were present with the Bishops, and still only the Bishops gave their opinions.

Secondly, they object in the same place that a general Council represents the universal Church,
therefore, there ought to be there men from every kind, i.e. Bishops, priests, princes, private
citizens, clergy, laity, etc.

I respond: Something can be represented in many ways, but the best way is in which the
people are represented by princes. For just as in general assemblies of many states, consuls or lords
of cities are usually gathered, so also in general assemblies of the Church all Bishops are gathered,
for each Bishop manages the person of his Church, as is clear from Cyprian (lib. 4 epist. 9) where
he says the Church is in the Bishop. Moreover, Eusebius (de vita Constantini, lib. 3) calls the
Council of 318 Bishops a gathering of the whole world. And St. Augustine (de Baptismo lib. 1 c. 18)
calls the consent of the same Council the consent of the whole Church.

Thirdly, they object in the same place that common cause must be assisted by common votes
and strength, but the cause of faith is common to all Christians, for the faith pertains no less to
the laity than to the clergy, therefore, the laity also pertain to Councils.

I respond: The cause of faith pertains to all, but in a different mode; for it pertains to prelates
as teachers, to the rest as students, just as in war the cause of victory pertains to the whole army,
nevertheless there is a general to command and lead the army, and it is for the rest to fight.

If anyone would object with the words of Nicholas I (epistola ad Michaelem, which are held
also in dist. 96, c. ubinam): “Wherever you read that your predecessor emperors were present in
conciliar gatherings, unless perhaps in certain ones where it was treated on faith, is it not
universal, which is common to all, which is not only for clerics but even for the laity, does it not
altogether pertain to Christians?” The response can be made that Nicholas, from that “because
faith is common to all,” rightly gathered that emperors ought to be present, but not as a judge, but
as one to whom it is incumbent to defend the common faith with edicts and laws, and if it were
necessary, even with the sword.

Fourthly, the same as well as Charles Demoulin (loc. cit.), and Brenz (Witemberg confession, c.
de Conciliis), and Herman Hamelmann (lib. 3 Prolegomena, c. 6) object that more often the opinion
of one man, even of the laity, was proposed for the opinion of the whole Council, because it was
more fortified by the authority of Scripture and without a doubt later must be proposed, therefore
even laity and whoever else ought to be called to a Council.

They prove the foregoing: 1) from Gratian (36, q. 2 can. ult.) where we read the authority of
Jerome was fortified by Sacred Scripture, and was prejudicial to a whole general Council; 2) from
Panormitanus, in cap. Significati, de election and from John Gerson (par. 1 de examinatione
doctrinarum) of which he says the opinion of one private man must be put before the opinion of
a Pope if the private man is moved by better doctrines or the authorities of the Old and New
Testament, for he teaches that every learned man may and must resist a whole Council if he would
see it err from malice or ignorance.

This argument is confirmed because the reason why Bishops are especially called is because
they are reckoned more learned than others, therefore if many laymen are found more learned
than Bishops, or equally learned, why ought they not be called to a Council?

I respond to the first: The opinion of one private man can be placed before the opinion of a
general Council before a definition, while a reason is discussed, for in discussion, erudition, not
authority of the person, holds the first place; besides, even after a definition, when it is certain that
Council was illegitimate, but in no manner after the decision of a legitimate Council.

To that from Gratian, I say: 1) Herman lies when he says that, according to Gratian Jerome
was put before a general Council, for Gratian does not speak of a general Council but a particular
one. I say: 2) those words which Gratian attributes to Jerome are not found in Jerome’s works, nor
do they seem to be his words. I say: 3) Gratian made a mistake in that citation, for Jerome and the
Council did not fight, as Gratian thought. For Jerome only spoke according to an old law that it
was permitted for an abductor to marry a woman that he had abducted if her father would
consent. Moreover, the Council stated that not withstanding that old law, which is judicial, it does
not obligate Christians, thus it is not lawful for an abductor to marry a woman that he had
abducted.

To that from Panormitanus and Gerson, I say: 1) they spoke conditionally, just as the Apostle,
when he says: “Even if we or an Angel from heaven would preach a different Gospel, etc.”
(Galatians 1). Therefore, just as from a conditional sentence of the Apostle it is not permitted to
understand that therefore the Apostles and the Angels could preach a gospel that is contrary to
the Gospel of Christ, so also, from that which Panormitanus and Gerson say, it is lawful for
anyone to resist a Council or a Pope if he sees them err, it is not lawful to gather therefore that
Councils and Popes could absolutely err, and therefore private men must be called to Councils. I
say: 2) they speak on resistance which can be made to a Council or a Pope, in a time of discussion
before a decision or even after when a Council is illegitimate.

I say for confirmation, Bishops indeed ought to be chosen that are the most learned and the
best; nevertheless, they have the authority to judge not because they are learned, but because they
are public persons, namely princes having ecclesiastical jurisdiction, in the very same way that
it is required for secular princes and judges to have jurisprudence and an upright life, but on no
account would it be lawful for a private man that is better and more learned to topple the prince
or judge from his seat and occupy it.

Fourthly, Herman Hamelmann objects (lib. 3 Prolegomena, c. 10) with many old testimonies
which were disputed at length on a matter of faith in the presence of the people as a judge. They
so argue about Peter and Simon Magus (cited by Clement, lib. 1 and 2, recognitionum), Bishop
Archelaus and Mani (cited by Epiphanius, haeresi 56), Pope Sylvester and the Jews (cited by
Zonaras in the life of Constantine), Athanasius and Arius (cited by Bishop Vigilius the Bishop of
Trent), Augustine and Maximinus (cited by Augustine lib. 1 cap. 1 contra Maximinum), and also
in the Council of Nicaea there were many learned and eloquent laymen, as is clear from
Nicephorus (lib. 8 cap. 14). Lastly, that the people were a judge, Ambrose clearly says in epistle 32,
where he says: “Someone may refuse a case of faith to be carried out in the Church: if anyone
trusts, let him come here.” And a little after: “That people may judge, who have the divine light
and not a human one in their heart; the law was not written with ink, but the spirit of the living
God.” And further: “But Auxentius is certain that you are not ignorant of the faith, he flees your
examination.”

Two things must be noted for the answer. 1) There is a twofold judgment, public and private.
It is public which is advanced by a public judge with authority, so that the rest would be held to
acquiesce to that judge. It is private, that opinion which everyone choses as true, but obliges
nobody, in the same way as in the disputations of Theologians and Philosophers, the students are
the judges, after hearing each side they choose what they wish, but nobody can compel anyone
to think likewise.

2) A public judgment in a cause of faith is never attributed to the people, but a private
judgment was sometimes attributed also to pious and holy men, but then only when something
else could not be done, for the people are held to follow the judgment of their pastors:
nevertheless, when heretics live with Catholics unpunished and seduce many, it is expedient
whenever public disputations with them are begun in the presence of the people, to relinquish
judgment to the people that it would follow what seems to rest upon better reasons. This is what
Elijah did (3 Kings 18) who when he could not otherwise recall the people from the cult of Baal,
he instituted a contest with the prophets of Baal, with the people present, and said: “Who will hear
through fire, he that is God, if the Lord is God, follow him, if Baal is God, follow him.”

With these things being noted, I say to all those citations, that in those disputations private
judgment was given to the people, not a public one, and this because it could not be done
otherwise. That is what can be understood from the Epistle of Ambrose, for he says: “Let anyone
who is present, openly come to the Church, let them hear with the people, not that anyone should
reside as a judge, but that each one of his own affect should have an examination, and choose
whom he will follow.” There you see a public judgment is denied to the people, rather a private
one is given. Moreover, the reason that a private one was given, is because then at Milan the
emperor favored the Arians, and it could not otherwise be obtained. This can be said in general
to all the cited passages. But in particular, to that about the Council of Nicaea, it must be known
that laymen were not called nor were present in the acts of the Council, but came of themselves,
that they would dispute with Bishops outside the Council, whom they heard came from the whole
world. See Ruffinus (lib. 10, cap. 3).

CHAPTER XVII: How many Bishops are required for a
general Council?

BESIDES these arguments of the heretics, Catholics bring up one of their doubts about those
who ought to be present in a Council: either all the Bishops of the world are required to make a
general Council, or only some; if all, therefore there never was a general Council to this point, nor
does it seem there ever will be; if only some, what is that number? For there does not seem to be
a better reason for one or another.

I respond: This question cannot be answered better than from the custom of the Church, from
those Councils which were general by the consent of all, such as the first four. Moreover, we
gather from the custom of the Church four conditions that both suffice and are required for a
general Council. 1) The evocation shall be general, so that it is known to all the greater Christian
provinces. For it is certain it was always held that even the seventh Council judged that the
Council of Constantinople against images was not general because its noise had not gone out to
all the earth.

2) That no Bishop would be excluded, no matter from where he would come, provided it is
certain he is a Bishop and has not been excommunicated.

3) That the four patriarchs, apart from the Supreme Pontiff, would be present either
themselves or through others, namely, that of Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem,
because all other bishops are under them; that is clear both from use, and from the seventh
Council, act. 6, where it is censed that the Council of Constantinople against images was not a
general Council because it did not have the Patriarchs, and in the eighth Council, act. 9, where the
vicar of the Patriarch of Alexandria is received with joy, as if without him something would
detract from the fullness of the Council. This third is not altogether necessary, but only judged to
be good. The third Council condemned Nestorius of Constantinople without the Patriarch of
Antioch, and the Council of Chalcedon concluded nearly everything without the Patriarch of
Alexandria, and not because these Patriarchs are not necessary but because they are heretics or
certainly schismatics.

4) That some should arrive from at least a greater part of the Christian provinces, and if the
Council were in the east, it always seemed to be sufficient if many Bishops from all the provinces
of the east would come together, but from the west some would be sent by the Pope who would
supply for the place of others. And on the other hand, if it were celebrated in the west, many
Bishops come together from all the provinces of the west, but from the east some few would come
in the name of others. So in the Council of Nicaea, only two priests from the west were sent from
Italy, one Bishop from France and one from Spain, as well as one from Africa. In the second and
third Councils, there were no Bishops from the west but still Popes Damasus and Celestine
confirmed those Councils in their name as well as that of other Bishops of the West which they
gathered in Rome. In the fourth Council, there were only legates for Pope Leo, and besides he sent
the consent of the other Bishops of Spain, France and Italy, who, when they had celebrated
Councils in their provinces, wrote to Leo that they would follow his opinion in all things. See the
volumes of Councils.

On the other hand, to the Councils of the west, such as that of the Lateran under Innocent III,
Lyons under Gregory X, Vienne under Clement V, and recently to Trent, numerous Bishops came
from the whole west, but from the east merely a certain few. From which it follows, there can be
national Councils that are much greater than general ones in regard to the number of Bishops, and
still lesser in regard to their authority, for the second Council only had 150 Bishops from different
provinces and nations, but the national Council of Carthage from Africa alone, in the time of St.
Augustine, had 217 Bishops, as Prosper of Aquitaine relates in his Chronicum for the year 450.

CHAPTER XVIII: In Councils, Bishops are not
counselors, but judges

THE last question follows from the form of Councils, which will be bipartite. Firstly, for it occurs
it must be explained, whether Councils have a form of judgment or only of inquiry?

Secondly, after this has been defined, that it has a form of judgment, what order ought there
to be among the judges, as the form is said to be a form in the body, or the order of all the
members in their place of positions, so that in the body of men the form is said to be a certain
order in which the one who ought to be in charge is in charge, and the one who ought to be
subject is subject. Therefore, this is the first part of the question: Is a Council a true judgment and
Bishops true judges, so that their opinions must be so favored because they so favored them, just
as the opinion of a judge in political cases; or would it be only a certain inquiry and would a decree
of a Council only be valid in as much as its reasoning avails, in the way in which we speak on the
decisions of Doctors, which they make either in the schools or in their commentaries?

The heretics of this time nearly all agree on this, that a Council is nothing other than inquiry
and that Christ alone and his written word has a decisive vote. Therefore they say the number of
those voting must not be attended to, and often one must be more followed who advances the
Scripture for himself than the whole rest of the Council. And thence they also deduce that it is
lawful for anyone to examine the decrees of a Council and receive or not receive as he wills.
Luther teaches this in his assertion of the articles, 29, and cited by Cochlaeus in 500 articles, art.
115. Calvin teaches the same thing (Instit. lib. 4 cap. 9 § 8). Brenz writes the same thing in the
Wirtemberg Confession, c. de Scriptura, and Chemntiz also in his examination of the Council of
Trent, 4 sess., where he everywhere rebukes Catholics because they attribute to Bishops judicial
authority to judge on controversies.

Lastly, the aforementioned little book of the Protestants, where they explain the reasons why
they would not come to the Council, clearly teach that Councils ought not to be convened so that
they might define questions by votes, but that someone would be found among so many who
shows from the Scripture what must be followed and proposes such a thing to the very numerous
Council, even if the number of teachers would convict him. By this opinion the heretics show how
little they make of Councils and that they truly desire nothing other than that questions would
never be defined.

Therefore, we say that an assembly of Bishops in legitimate Councils is a true assembly of
judges, and their decrees and laws must necessarily be followed. Firstly, it is proven from the
Scriptures. 1) Deut. 17, where those who have doubts are commanded to have recourse to the
Councils of priests, and: “Let those who do not obey their judgments be condemned to death.” 2)
Matthew 18, “If he will not listen to the Church, let him be to you as a heathen and a publican.”
This passage, even if it admits different explanations, still, “the Church” can properly be called a
Council by the consent of all; this explanation cannot be rejected in any way, whereby we assert
the Lord commanded that we should obey the teachings of a legitimate Council. 3) Acts 15 and 16,
where Paul, encompassing different cities, commanded them to preserve the dogmas which were
decreed by the Apostles in the Council of Jerusalem. On that Council three things must be noted.

First, in that Council it was not from the Scriptures, rather the question was defined by a vote
of the Apostles. For the question was not, as our adversaries imagine, whether faith alone would
justify, but whether circumcision and the remaining legal ceremonies were necessary for
Christians. It is manifestly gathered from the occasion of the Council, from what St. Luke says in
Acts 15: “Certain men rose up from the heresy of the Pharisees who believed, saying ‘that it was
necessary for them to be circumcised, and to command them to preserve the law of Moses.’ And
the Apostles and the elders came together to see about this word, etc.” And from the epistle of the
Council, in which nothing is commanded except for abstinence from blood, strangled animals and
those immolated to idols, and that the Gentiles would be freed from all other Jewish ceremonies.
Certainly none of these are contained in the Scriptures, for where, I ask, was it written that the
Gentiles should not keep the laws with the exception of the command on abstinence from blood,
suffocated animals and those immolated to idols?

The second thing that must be noted is the teaching of the Apostles was not consigned to the
disciples for the examination, rather, they were simply commanded to obey it, as is very clearly
constituted from the cited passages of Acts 15 and 16; why do our adversaries, who would have
it that the teaching of Councils is examined by any private man, so manifestly oppose the
Scripture?

The third is the definition of the Council of the Apostles. It was a true law binding in
conscience, on which matter we treated above in the fourth book On the Roman Pontiff, and Luke
showed it well enough when he calls upon precepts with a mode, decrees with the mode and
dogmas.

Secondly, it is proven from the Councils themselves, for all Councils say anathema to those
who do not obey; they call their decrees canons or ecclesiastical laws; when the Bishops subscribe,
they say: “I N., defining, subscribed.” Besides, in the Council of Chalcedon, act. 4, when ten
Bishops of Egypt refused to acquiesce, they were held as heretics by the judgment of the greater
part, all of which are the clearest arguments that Councils are true judgments.

It is proved thirdly, for if votes were not taken in Councils, but merely disputations, it would
be done wrongly that only Bishops would impose sentence when the duty to dispute would be of
learned men, whether they were bishops or not, the contrary of which we showed above. For in
vain are some bishops called unlearned and simpletons, such as some were in the Council of
Nicaea as Ruffinus writes (lib. 10 hist. c. 3). Add that the Protestants in their little book clearly
oppose themselves, for in that book they teach that laity ought also to have a decisive vote with
Bishops, and a little later, in the same place, they say that in Councils something ought not to be
defined from the multitude of votes, but only by the testimonies of the Scriptures. We will advance
many other things later, when we take up the dispute as to whether Councils can err.

But they object with the example of Paphnutius, who is cited by Socrates (lib. 1 c. 8) and
Sozomen (lib. 1 cap. 22), that when the whole Council of Nicaea wished to forbid priests the use
of a wife, he alone freely resisted and prevailed. Luther (art. 115 from the 500 cited by Cochlaeus,
Septicipite, c. 34) says: “The matter is insane that Councils mean to conclude and establish what
must be believed, when often there is no man there who gets a whiff of the divine Spirit, just as
happened in the Council of Nicaea where they treated and wanted to fashion laws on the
Ecclesiastical state, that they could not marry, already they were all false, then one Paphnutius
advanced, and refuted the whole body and said this is not so, this is not Christian, then the whole
Council needed to desist from that conclusion of theirs.”

I respond: Firstly, this story is uncertain since the more ancient writers, Eusebius, Athanasius,
Epiphanius, Ruffinus, etc. make no mention of it. Secondly, if the tale is true, Paphnutius resisted
before the definition of a Council, as the authors themselves witness, hence this example is not
to the purpose. Thirdly, I say Paphnutius does not allege a Scripture, but only contended on his
own authority, and for that reason, by the judgment of our adversaries, he ought not to be heard.
Fourthly, I add, Paphnutius only desired that the use of a wife ought not to be forbidden to those
who had them; still, the Council exhorted that it was severely forbidden for priests and Monks to
marry after their sacred Ordination or profession, as Socrates and Sozomen witness, from which
it is a marvel if the Lutherans are not ashamed, since they marry against the opinion of
Paphnutius, even if they were monks and priests.

Some Catholics object secondly, if all Bishops are judges, the Pope would be held, who presides
in a Council, to follow the decrees made by a greater part of the Bishops; but it is false, since
Damasus invalidated the acts of the Council of Armenia, in which a greater part of the Bishops
consented, as is clear from the letter of Damasus to the Bishops of Illyria; and Leo invalidated a
certain decree of the Council of Chalcedon, to which even a greater part of the Council had
consented, as Leo himself witnesses in epistles 53, 54 and 55.

I respond: firstly, it perhaps never happened that the Pope followed the lesser part in a Council
when they gave their opinions without fraud or deceit. What I say, I say on account of the
Councils of Armenia and Chalcedon, which did not lack some deceit, for in the Armenian Council
Catholics were deceived by the obscurity of a Greek word, as Ruffinus shows (lib. 10 c. 21).
However, in the Council of Chalcedon there was fraud, which is clear from act. 16 of that Council,
where the vicars of the Roman Pontiff complained that the decree was fraudulently made while
they were absent.

I say secondly, the president of a Council, as president, ought to follow in the greater part of
the votes in forming a decree; still the Pope, not as president, but as supreme prince of the whole
Church can retract that judgment, and consequently, if he were the president of the Council, he
can, not as president, but as the supreme Prince, not follow the greater part just as in temporal
judgments a president that is constituted by a king ought to follow the greater part of the judges,
still the King, as the superior, can invalidate the whole judgment. And this especially holds place
in the Pontiff, whose right it is to confirm and direct his brethren, and to have this assistance of
the Holy Spirit lest he would err, according to that of Luke 22, “I have prayed for thee, etc.” See
Juan Torquemada, lib. 3 ca. 63 and 64; Melchior Cano, lib. 5 c. 5 qu. 2.

CHAPTER XIX: Who is to preside at a general Council

The other part of the question is whether someone ought to preside and who it should be. The
heretics of our time teach that the emperor ought to be the ordinary president of Councils, or
someone sent by him, or if he sends no one, it ought to be constituted by the Council itself. And
really, they say that in the ancient Councils the Roman Pontiff was never in charge, but either the
Emperor or his deputies, or the older Patriarch, or the bishop of that place, where the Council was
held. The Centuriators teach this (Cent. 4 cap. 7 col. 536), Calvin (inst. lib. 4, cap. 7 § 1 and 2),
Charles Demoulin (consilium de Concilio Tridentino non recipiendo, § 4) who clearly lies when he
says the legates of the Pope always sat behind all the Bishops in Councils, when in no Council are
they discovered in the last place. Further, Herman Hamelmann, (lib. 3 Proleg. ca. 8) and Brenz
(Proleg. contra Petrum a Soto).

All Catholics teach that this office is proper to the Supreme Pontiff, to preside over a Council
either by himself or by legates, and as the Supreme Judge to moderate all things. Moreover, we say
by himself or by legates, because the Supreme Pontiff was never present at the Eastern Councils
by himself, nor was it done in a certain case, but for a certain reason, as is clear from epistle 17 of
Leo to Theodosius, and 47 to the Council of Chalcedon, where he says he is not coming to the
Council because custom does not suffer it; nor did he have any examples on this matter from his
predecessors.

Add, that Pope Vigilius was at Constantinople when the fifth general Council was taking place
in the city, but he confirmed the acts of the Council through a little book, as Photius writes in his
book on the Seven Councils. The emperors themselves, when they summoned Councils, called all
other bishops by an edict, but invited the Bishop of Rome that he may deign to come if he pleased,
as is clear from the epistle of the Emperor Martian to Pope Leo, which is held before the Council
of Chalcedon. Moreover, what would be the reason for this matter is uncertain. Juan Torquemada
(lib. 3 cap. 11) posits several reasons, which do not seem to prove much to me.

I suspect that these two were different reasons among others. One, because it did not seem to
be fitting for the head to follow the members, when rather more the members ought to follow the
head; therefore, on that account the Pope was present at the Roman Councils, and certain others
which he convoked to himself, i.e. to the place where he was, but he did not wish, nor ought, to
go to Councils gathered in other places.

The other reason is because in the eastern Councils the Emperor was always present, or some
of his legates, and although neither the emperor nor his legates presided over the Council properly
as a judge, nevertheless, he presided at least in regard to the material place, and even if the
Supreme Pontiff would have been there, still he would have wanted him to preside in some
manner, as is clear from the Council of Florence, in the beginning, where the Greeks altogether
contended that the Emperor should have the highest place, and the Supreme Pontiff would precede
him. But although it would have been tolerable to some extent, as secular princes would sit in the
Council before other bishops, still it was in no way fitting before the Supreme Pontiff himself, lest
therefore either this would be tolerated or a tumult aroused, he did not go to these Councils, but
only sent legates.

But after all these have been omitted, the right of presidency in general Councils pertains to
the Supreme Pontiff, and it is proved firstly by reason sought from the Scripture. The Supreme
Pontiff is the Pastor and father of the universal Church, even as all Bishops and princes, in respect
to the Supreme Pontiff, are called sheep and sons, as is known from that last chapter of John: “Feed
my sheep.” And it is confirmed from the fact that the Councils call the Pope father, and he
sometimes calls Bishops gathered into Councils sons, as is clear from Theodoret (lib. 5 hist. c. 10),
where Damasus, responding to the Bishops of the second general Council, so begins: “That you
would show due reverence to the Apostolic See, it is for you with great honor, most honored
sons.” Likewise, from the epistle of the Council of Antioch to Pope Julius, which so begins: “To the
most blessed and honorable lord and father, Julius, etc.” Stephen, the Archbishop of Carthage, so
writes with three Councils: “To our most blessed lord and holy father of fathers, Damasus, etc.”
And the Council of Chalcedon, in the epistle to Leo, said: “We ask that your strength would fulfill
by your decrees the honor of our judges, which is fitting.” But who, I ask, can be ambiguous as to
whether fathers ought to preside over sons, and pastors over sheep, or the other way around?

Secondly, it is proven from the Apostolic Council, in Acts 15, in which Jerome affirms that
Peter presided in his epistle to Augustine, which is 11 among the epistles of Augustine and he
gathers the same thing from it; that Peter rose first, spoke first, defined the first question, and all,
as Jerome said, followed his opinion.

It is proved thirdly from the acts of the eight general Councils, for even our adversaries affirm
the Roman Pontiff was in charge of others. The first was at Nicaea, on the presidency of this
Council there are four opinions. Some would have it that the Emperor presided, such as Brenz.
Others that it was Eustathius of Antioch; such as the Centuriators (loc. cit.), and Luther (liber de
Conciliis, parte secunda). Others, that Athanasius presided, such as Calvin (loc. cit.). Others that
Bishop Hosius of Cordova, and Vitus and Vincentius, priests and legates of the Roman Pontiff.

The first opinion is absolutely false. In the first place, Constantine subscribed after all the
Bishops, as the Emperor Basil witnessed at the end of the eighth Council, but the president
subscribed in the first place. Then Constantine did not dare to sit except in a lower place than the
Bishops, and those assenting to the Bishops, as is gathered from Theodoret (lib. 1 c. 7 Hist.) and
Eusebius (lib. 3 de vita Constantini). Besides, Constantine professed in that very Council that he
ought to be judged by the Bishops, and subject to them, not put in charge of them, as Ruffinus
writes (lib. 10 cap. 2). Therefore, how could he oppose himself if he meant to preside in episcopal
judgment?

Ambrose says to this (epist. 32) that Constantine, at the Council of Nicaea, did not make
himself a judge, but left a free judgment to priests. Likewise, Athanasius, in his second Apologia,
says that he could not be present at the Council in which it was not a Bishop, but a Count that
presided. And in his epistle to those leading a solitary life, he forcefully about that Constantius,
because he meant to hold the first place in Councils, “If the judgment was of Bishops, what does
the Emperor have in common with it?” And Hosius wrote to the same Constantius in which he
relates of his predecessor: “So that he would not be a teacher for us in this kind of thing, but rather
more learn from us, God consigned to you imperium, but he entrusted these matters which are in
the Church to us.” And not far from the end: “For who, when they saw that he made himself a
head of Bishops to make judgments and to preside over ecclesiastical judgments, would they not
say rightly, that the very thing is the abomination of desolation, which Daniel foresaw?” There
clearly he calls Constantius antichrist, because he dared to preside in Ecclesiastical judgment.
Suidas also writes in the life of Leontius, that when Leontius saw Constantius presiding in the
Council and speaking, he said to him that he marveled that he would furnish so curious a sight,
while neglecting his own affairs, namely wars and other civil business, he was among foreigners,
namely Ecclesiastics. But certainly, neither Athanasius, nor Hosius, nor Leontius would have
rebuked Constantius for desiring to preside over the Council if his father Constantine would
already have presided over the Council of Nicaea.

That Eustathius was not the president is proven, firstly because in the subscription he is not
found first, nor second, nor even third; rather, he was placed lower. Secondly, because when
Alexander, the bishop of Alexandria, was in the Council he was greater and more worthy than the
patriarch of Antioch, no reason permitted that he should be in charge.

But the Centuriators say, citing Eusebius (de vita Constantini lib. 3), we read him who sat first
to the right of the Emperor, gave a speech in praise of the Emperor; but he, who gave the speech
was certainly Eustathius, from what Theodoret says in his history, lib. 1 cap. 7.

I respond, Eustathius was the first at the right of the order of bishops, as Eusebius says, but
still he was not immediately first after the Emperor. It is certain from Athanasius, in his epistle for
those leading a solitary life, that Hosius was the chief of this Council, and thence sat before
Eustathius.

Therefore (if one may be permitted to conjecture) there were three orders of those sitting in
the Council; one from the right, the other from the left, and the third in the head of the whole
assembly, and certainly in this third the emperor sat in between the Bishop Hosius, the legates of
the Pope, and bishop Alexander of Alexandria; still Vitus and Vincent were likewise Apostolic
legates. Then, the first of its order, who was at the right, sat Eustathius, the Bishop of Antioch. The
second of that order, who was at the left, was first Macharius, the Bishop of Jerusalem, and by this
account the order of the dignity of the primary Patriarchs was preserved, which was certainly very
probable that it was preserved in the Council; or certainly, if it was pleasing, we could respond
that a worthier place was granted to Eustathius on account of antiquity and the merit of his
sanctity, but that he did not, on that account, preside over the Council; for otherwise the Emperor
would have presided over the fourth and sixth Council, in which he sat in the lowest place.
Therefore, the presidency must not be gathered from the place as much as from the subscription,
for often someone sits as first for the sake of honor who really does not hold first place.

But that Athanasius was not the president hardly needs proof, for only Calvin asserts it, and
without any reason. Besides, it is certain that Athanasius was only a deacon and went to the
Council with his Bishop, Alexander, and did not sit nor subscribe. See Ruffinus (lib. 10, hist. cap.
14) and Sulpitius (lib. 2 Sacrae Historiae), Gregory Nazanzien (Oratio in Athanasius) and Athanasius
himself (in secunda Apologia). Moreover, that a deacon would sit, much more preside in a Council
of Bishops, even if he held the place of his bishop, is altogether unheard of. But Athanasius did not
stand in place of his Bishop, since Bishop Alexander himself was present presiding; lastly among
the subscriptions, the subscription of Alexander, the Bishop of Alexandria is found, placed after
the subscription of the priests of the Roman Pontiff, but no subscription of Athanasius is found.

Therefore, the fact that Bishop Hosius, as well as the priests Vitus and Vincent, the legates of
the Pope, were the presidents is proved, firstly from the subscriptions. For these three were the
first of all to have subscribed. Secondly, from Cedrenus in his Compendium Historiarum and
Photius in his book de Septem Synodis, who say that Sylvester conferred authority on the Council
of Nicaea by legates. Thirdly, from Athanasius, in his epistle to those living a solitary life, where
he says that Hosius was the chief in that Council, and that it was he that composed the Creed
which is called Nicene. Moreover, since Hosius was a simple Bishop, and hence was inferior to all
the Patriarchs that were present in the Council, without a doubt, he would never have had first
place unless in turn he managed it for the Roman Pontiff. Therefore, in the aforesaid Council of
Sardica, which is contained in the first volume of Councils, and is perhaps by Dionysius Exiguus,
a very learned man, he says precisely that Hosius of Cordova acted as a legate of the Roman
Pontiff at the Council of Nicaea. The fact can also be understood from the Greek codex which the
Vatican library holds, whose testimony can be seen in the second book on the Council of Nicaea,
published by Alphonsus of Pisa of the Society of Jesus, at Cologne in 1581.

The second general Council was the first Council of Constantinople, in which it is certain the
Emperor did not preside, but only sent the letters of the Roman pontiff to Bishops, whereby they
were called to the Council (Epistle of the Council to Damasus, cited by Theodoret, lib. 5 c. 9). It is
also certain that the Roman Pontiff did not preside, rather, Nectarius, the Bishop of
Constantinople. The reason for this is because the Roman Pontiff was not present, either himself
or through legates. For Pope Damasus called together the Bishops of the East at Constantinople,
but later wanted them to come to Rome from there, where he would summon a Council of western
Bishops, so that the fullest Council would take place at Rome. The remainder of the eastern
Bishops excused themselves on account of just causes, and joined their mind and teachings with
the western Bishops, but not their physical presence. See the epistles of Damasus to the Council
of Constantinople, and of the Council to Damasus, contained in Theodoret, lib. 5 cap. 9 and 10.
Moreover, what if Damasus were present? Without a doubt he would have presided, as is clear
from the same epistles, where they acknowledge Damasus as their head, and he calls them sons.

The third Council was the first of Ephesus, in which it is certain that the Emperor did not
preside, rather the Roman Pontiff through legates. The fact that the emperor did not preside, nor
anyone else in his name, is clear from the epistle of Theodosius the younger to the Council of
Ephesus, which is contained in volume 1 of that Council, c. 32, where he says that he sent his
constable Candidianus to the Council, not that he would mix in ecclesiastical questions, but for
the defense of the Council. See the epistle of Nicholas I to the Emperor Michael. That the Roman
Pontiff Celestine presided through his legate St. Cyril, all historians witness (Evagrius, lib. 1 cap.
4; Photius in libro de septem Synodis; Prosper, Chronicum; Nicephorus, lib. 14 cap. 34 and
Liberatus Abbas in Breviariuo, c. 15; lastly Justinian in his edict and Nicholas I in his epistle to the
Emperor Michael, and Celestine himself in his epistle to Cyril which is extant in this Council, tom.
1 c. 16, and among the works of Cyril).

But Calvin responds that Celestine, by some artifice, sought at least the name of the
presidency when he could not hold it in fact and therefore sent his own there, to Cyril, who
otherwise was going to hold the presidency, to delegate in their place, that he would at least
appear to preside through him.

But this is a figment of Calvin, which he advances without any reason and it is easily refuted.
First, from Prosper, who says that Nestorius especially resisted the industry of Cyril and the
authority of Celestine. Secondly, from the epistle of Celestine in which we see that authority was
entrusted to Cyril in place of the Roman Pontiff; much earlier than the other legates were sent.
Thirdly, from Nicepherous (loc. cit.) who says that the great eastern Bishops confirmed this
privilege given to Cyril from Celestine, that later Cyril received a mitre and the name of Pope, and
was called judge of the whole world, and these ornaments he also transmitted to his successors.

Fourthly, from the epistle of Cyril to the people of Constantinople, in which he says that if
Nestorius did not come back to his senses within the limit set by Pope St. Celestine, he would be
deprived of communion with the Church. Fifthly, from the Council itself, which (as Evagrius
relates in liber 1, cap. 4) and from the very sentence which is held in volume 2, cap. 10 of this
Council, when it meant to pronounce the condemnation against Nestorius, it prefaced the decree
with other canons of the Church, and especially the letters of Pope Celestine necessarily compelled
to so severe a sentence. Lastly, an epistle is extant from the Council to Celestine, in which they
reserve to the judgment of Celestine himself the case of Bishop John of Antioch, as he was of the
same opinion. All such are certain arguments that Celestine really was the president and chief in
that Council.

The fourth Council is of Chalcedon, in the beginning of which, that is in the first action, the
Emperor Martianus was present and sat in the first place, but he did not preside as a judge, and
he himself witnesses to the fact in his speech to the Council, which is extant in the first act, where
it says that he came to confirm the faith, just as formerly Constantine the Great had done, i.e. to
not have come to explain the faith and judge controversies, but of this purpose, that the faith
should be explained by the Council, and should be constituted firm and safe, defended by the aid
and authority of the Emperor. Then, certain secular judges were present in the name of the
Emperor in the other actions, who were not judges of controversies of faith, but were only present
that everything would be conducted legitimately, without force, fraud or tumults. This is because,
in the second Council of Ephesus, the Bishop Dioscorus, after he had introduced troops, compelled
the Bishops to subscribe by force. Either the emperor or his vicar were present at this Council to
impede the violence. This appears from the whole Council, for they never imposed sentence, never
subscribed and they acquiesced in all the teachings of the Bishops.

Moreover, the legates of Pope Leo were really ecclesiastical judges. For they are named first
in every action; they sat first, spoke first, subscribed first, and they advanced a definitive sentence
against Dioscorus in the name of the Pope and the whole Council in act 3, in these words: “The
most holy and blessed Pope, head of the universal Church, through us his legates, with the
approval of the Holy Council, provided with the dignity of Peter the Apostle, who is named the
foundation and rock of faith as well as porter of the heavenly kingdom, made Dioscorus an exile
from Episcopal dignity and every priestly work.” Then, blessed Leo and the whole Council
affirmed it. Leo so said in epistle 47 to the Council of Chalcedon: “In these brethren, Paschasinus
and Lucentsius, Bishops, Boniface and Basil, priests, who have been guided by the Apostolic See,
let your fraternity view me as presiding over the Council.” The Council of Chalcedon, in a letter
to Leo, contained in the third action, (while in certain other copies it is after the end of the
Council): “Over whom [the Bishops of the Council] you indeed presided as a head over these
members, who hold your order, preferring benevolence. But the Emperors presided to arrange
things in a most becoming manner, etc.”

Calvin responds that the legates of the Pope presided in the Council because Pope Leo had
extorted this privilege from the Emperor. “When the second Council of Ephesus took place Leo
did not dare to seek the first seat in the Council, but sent legates and suffered them to be under
Dioscorus, the bishop of Alexandria, as president. Since the matter fell out badly, and Dioscorus
did not rightly govern the ship, Leo received the occasion and sought from the Emperor that he
would permit another Council to be held over which his legates would preside. The emperor,
because he saw there were no Bishops in the east suitable for such a burden, permitted the
presidency of the Roman legates from a defect of persons.”

This history, which Calvin recites without any proof, is full of lies, for in the first place, that
Leo did not dare to seek the first seat in the Ephesine Council is a lie. Liberatus writes that the
legates of the Roman Pontiff refused to sit in the Council when they saw Dioscorus preside, and
the presidency was not given to the Roman See. (Breviarium, c. 12). Hence, Dioscorus extorted that
presidency from the Emperor, against what was right, as Zonaras (in vita Theodosii) and Evagrius
(lib. 1 c. 10) write. Wherefore, Leo also (epist. 24, 25 and 26 to Theodosius and Pulcheria)
frequently repeats that Dioscorus claimed the presidency for himself, where he also witnesses that
Flavianus, the Bishop of Constantinople, appealed from that Council to the Apostolic See, and
handed a petition of appeal to the Roman legates; how, therefore, did Leo not dare to seek the
presidency in that Council, from which it was appealed to him as though to a greater person?
Then, that Leo sought from the Emperor that his legates would preside in the Council of
Chalcedon, and that the Emperor conceded it on account of defect of eastern persons, is the most
impudent lie, since nothing of the sort is related by anyone, nay more, we see that Leo absolutely
sent legates to preside, and sought consent from no one, still less by favor or permission.

The fifth Council was the second of Constantinople, in that Menas did not preside (as Calvin
falsely teaches) for the Council Menas celebrated was a particular Council, not a general one, as
we proved above; rather Eutychius, the successor of Menas, who acknowledged and professed that
the presidency should go to the Roman Pontiff if he should wish to be present at the Council.
Zonaras says in the life of Justinian: “Under this, the fifth Council gathered 165 Bishops, of whom
the chief was Vigilius, the Roman Pope.” And Eutychius himself, the Patriarch, in his epistle to
Vigilius, which is contained in the end of the first conferral of the fifth Council: “We ask to discuss
and confer with your Beatitude as our president on the three chapters.” Such words of the
Patriarch not only refute the lie of Calvin, who wrote that Menas presided in that Council, but also
that of Illyricus, who, in Cent. 6, c. 9 col. 509 asserted that Pope Vigilius refused to be present at
the Council lest he would be compelled to sit near Eutychius as second. But who could fear this,
when Eutychius offered him the presidency?

The sixth Council was the third of Constantinople, in that the legates of the Roman Pontiff,
Agatho, Peter and George, priests, and John the deacon. Zonaras affirms this fact in the Life of
Constantine IV, and besides it is clear from the Council itself where they were named; they spoke
and they subscribed first of all in each action. The Emperor Constantine IV was also present at this
Council, and although he presided over such famous men, i.e. in the first seat, still he was not in
any way a judge or formally president, for he imposed no sentence, and subscribed last of all, not
defining, but assenting.

The seventh Council is the second of Nicaea, in which legates of Pope Adrian I were
presidents without controversy. For these first are named and they were the first to subscribe. The
emperor is read to have done nothing in this Council.

The eighth Council is the fourth of Constantinople, in which the legates of Pope Adrian II
presided without controversy, namely Donatus and Stephen, Bishops, and Marinus a deacon, who
are the first to be named, to have subscribed, and in the first action itself were asked by the
Council to show the letters of the Pope, whereby the presidency would be given to them, which
they did right away. Lastly, at the end of the Council the first so subscribes: “I, Donatus, Bishop
of Ostia, by the grace of God, holding the place of my master, Adrian, universal Pope, presiding
over this holy and universal Council, have subscribed and promulgated all the things which are
read above.” Moreover, the Emperor Basil was present, but at the last part of the Council he clearly
witnessed with a long speech that it was not for him, nor of any layman to mix in ecclesiastical
judgments, and at length he subscribed after all the Patriarchs, not defining, but receiving and
confessing the aforementioned formula. He also ought to have subscribed after all the Bishops, as
formerly Constantine, Theodosius and Martianus had done, still he subscribed immediately after
the Patriarchs, because the Bishops wanted to move him with such an honor.

Therefore, if we were to add to these the rest of the general Councils, in which the Roman
Pontiff presided without any controversy, we will have from the continual custom of the Church,
that the office of presidency in general Councils properly pertains to the Roman Pontiff. On the
rest, which pertain to the form of Councils, such as their order, on which the rest ought to sit, on
the garments of Bishops in a Council, on the mode of procession, etc., see Juan de Torquemada (lib.
3 cap. 26 and 27); Council of Toledo, IV cap. 3; XI c. 1 and the beginning of the Councils of
Constance and Basel.

CHAPTER XX: The arguments of our adversaries are
answered

THE arguments of Calvin are taken from the practice of the Church. He puts forth five Councils
in which the Roman Pontiff did not preside. Certainly the Council of Nicaea, where he says
Athanasius presided; the fifth Council, over which he says Menas presided; the second Council
of Ephesus, over which Dioscorus presided; the sixth Council of Carthage, over which Aurelius
presided (even if legates of the Pope were present), and Aquileia, over which not Damasus, but
Ambrose presided. We have already responded to the first three in the last chapter.

To the fourth, I say that it is only necessary for the Roman Pontiff to preside over a general
Council, for in provincial or national Councils, of the sort as all the Carthaginian Councils were,
we do not doubt that the presidency ought to be given to the Archbishop, or the primate of that
place. Hence, the legates of the Roman Pontiff were not sent to the Council to preside, but to treat
on a certain matter with that Council in the name of the Roman Church.

To the fifth I say, the argument is constituted from two lies of Calvin that are the major and
minor proposition, whereby it can be gathered except that it is a lie? The first lie is that the
Council of Aquileia was a general Council; firstly, if it were general, it would be the second and
hence Constantinople which followed after it would not have been second but third. Then, there
were hardly thirty Bishops which certainly does not suffice to make a general Council. Next, in
the epistle of this Council to the emperor, the Fathers say it was not necessary to gather a general
Council, but it was abundantly sufficient for that purpose for which they were called, especially
since those few Bishops were from various provinces of the west. Therefore, the Council was
provincial, but assisted by a few legates of certain other provinces.

The second lie is that Ambrose presided. The Bishop, Valerian of Aquileia, was named first,
Ambrose of Milan second, which is the argument, that the first place was given to Valerian, nor
is it opposed to this that Ambrose disputed nearly alone with heretics, for the office of disputation
is not for the president, but is customarily demanded from the most learned Bishop.

Brenz looks to arguments from the Old Testament, in which it is certain that princes or kings
were special judges even in spiritual matters, as is clear from Moses, Joshua, David, Solomon,
Hezechia, and Josiah. It happened that God consigned custody of the divine law to the princes, as
it is said in Romans 13:4, “If you do evil, be afraid; for he does not carry the sword without cause.
Therefore, it is for princes to judge concerning the law of God, how it is to be kept and to punish
transgressors. But we already answered this argument in the third book On the Word of God, and
in the first book On the Roman Pontiff. Still, because our adversaries are not pained to often repeat
the same arguments we will not be at pains to more often also repeat the answers.

Therefore, I respond firstly: Moses was not only a prince but also the high priest, as is clear
from Psalm 98 (99):6, Moses and Aaron among his priests.” Moreover, Joshua, David, Solomon and
others were not only kings, but also prophets to whom God entrusted certain things
extraordinarily, which otherwise were considered to belong to the priests by their office. In this
way, King Solomon removed Abiathar from the priesthood and constituted Sadoc in his place (3
(1) Kings, 2:35), for he did this not as a king but as a prophet by divine inspiration, wherefore the
reason is added in the same place, “That the word of the Lord would be fulfilled, which he spoke
over the house of Heli in Silo.” But on account of this extraordinary law what we read about the
general law in Deuteronomy 17:9 was not blotted out, in which all are commanded when in doubts
to have recourse to the priests, nor that of Malachi 2:7, “The lips of the priest will guard
knowledge and the they will seek the law from his mouth.”

I say secondly, other kings of the Synagogue, who were good, never mixed in priestly business,
and whenever they did so, they were punished, as is clear from the best king, Josaphat, who in 2
Chronicles 19:11 clearly distinguished offices, and says: “Amarias the priest and Pontiff will
preside in all things which pertain to the Lord; hence Zabadius, who is a general in the house of
Judah, will devote himself to the matters which pertain to the office of the king.” On the other
hand, King Hoziah, in 2 Chronicles 26, when he meant to usurp the office of the priest, soon after
he was struck by God and became a leper, and this disease remained even to his death.

I say in confirmation, kings are custodians of the divine Law, but not interpreters and hence
it pertains tot heir office that they command the faith to be held in their edicts and laws, which
the priests teach must be held, and compel heretics to ward off from the Church with temporal
penalties, as Augustine teaches in his epistles (48, 50 and 166) and the pious emperors Constantine,
Theodosius, Martianus, and others often did, as is clear from l. Cunctos populos, C. de summa
Trinitate et fide Catholica, and from the whole title on heretics in the same code.

The arguments of Herman are taken from various examples of the Fathers. His first is from
a disputation of Athanasius with an Arian, while a judge named Probus presided, a layman and
not yet a Christian whom the Emperor Constantine assigned, which is extant in an incomplete
work in the works of Athanasius, but is completed in the works of Bishop Vigilius of Trent, who
lived around the year 500 A.D.

I respond: Such a disputation was never really held; rather, Vigilius composed it in the manner
of a Dialogue, and in that way he wrote against the Arians, as he himself affirms in book 5 against
Eutyches, not far from the beginning and besides the matter speaks for itself; for the disputation
is held among four men, Sabellius, Arius, Phtinus and Athanasius, then a Bishop, as is clear from
the letter of the Emperor which he made up in the beginning of the disputation sent to Probus; but
Sabellius died before any of the three are made known to the world, as is clear from Eusebius, book
7, hist. cap. 5. Arius also died in the time of Constantine, before Constantius began to reign, as is
clear from Socrates (lib. 1 cap. 25), therefore he could not have met Athanasius in the time of
Constantine, as he makes up here. Moreover, certain men say there were two Arius’s, and
Athanasius only disputed with the later one, but it is refuted by Vigilius himself, who in the
beginning of his disputation clearly witnesses that he spoke on that Arius, who first devised the
Arian heresy.

But someone will say, even if the dialogue were fictitious, still it did not seem absurd to
Vigilius if a lay judge would preside in a disputation on religion.

I respond: Vigilius so composed the Dialogue to show how great the force of Catholic truth
is, that it could even convict under a non-Christian judge.

The second example is taken from Zonaras in the life of Constantine, where we read that at
the petition of Helen, who tried to drag her son Constantine to Judaism, thus Pope Sylvester
disputed with the Jews in the presence of certain senators who acted as judges at the
Constantine’s command.

I respond: This story seems uncertain, for all the Fathers praise Helen as a most Christian
woman, and not only Catholics; even the Centuriators mock this story as fabulous (Cent. 4 col.
694), and it is gathered from the Chronicum of Eusebius for the year 325 that Helen discovered the
true Cross, and Marianus Scotus under the year 327 writes that the disputation fell upon the works
of Helen, then a persecutor of Christ, which does not make sense in any way.

The third example is taken from Optatus of Miletus and St. Augustine, who writes in many
places that the Donatists demanded judges from the Emperor in the case of Caecilianus. But the
Emperor gave them the Bishop of Rome, with certain other Bishops, yet they appealed them, and
received other judges in Gaul from the Emperor; when they appealed again the Emperor himself
gave judgment, therefore, the Emperor is the supreme judge in cases of Bishops.

I respond: It is well that the heretics take their argumentation from the deeds of their elder
heretics, for the fact is they acted badly in having recourse to the Emperor as a judge, and again
acted worse by appealing to him, as Optatus, Augustine and the Emperor themselves witness.
Augustine (epist. 48) says thence rightly the Donatists were rebuked because in the presence of
the emperor they accused Caecilianus, when rather more they ought to convict him with Bishops
from across the sea. He adds in the same place that the Emperor acted more orderly who remitted
the Donatists coming to him to the judgment of Milthiadis the Bishop of Rome.

Optatus (lib. 1 contra Parmenianum) relates that the Emperor so shouted: “O rabid boldness
of wrath, they have introduced an appeal just as it is usually done in the cases of the Gentiles.”
Likewise, Augustine, in epist. 162, says: “In such a matter, just as he detested them, Constantius
listened and would that he cause them to cease, that for that reason afterward he judged Bishops
would afterward seek pardon from holy bishops, so even these at some time would yield to the
truth.” There you see Constantius did not take well to an appeal made to himself, and judged that
after Bishops should be gathered to either so break the fury of the Donatists, since they saw
themselves to be condemned by all others, and besides, Constantius understood that he cannot
judge by his own right, but only in that hope that later Bishops would give him pardon, from
whom he was going to seek it. That such was the mind of Constantius outside of the points of
necessity, is clear from Ruffinus (lib. 10 Histor. cap. 2) where he asserted that he ought to be judged
by Bishops, not to judge them.

The Fourth example is taken from the Brief Conference with the Donatists, near the beginning,
where Augustine so spoke: “When Catholic Bishops and the party of Donatus conducted
disputation among themselves in the presence of Marcellinus (the tribune and notary more known
by his habits), at the command of the Emperor, he conferred, etc.” And at the end of the Brief
conference, he asserted that Marcellinus, as a judge, imposed sentence for Catholics against the
Donatists.

The fifth example is taken from Sozomen (lib. 4, cap. 5) and from Epiphanius (haeres. 71) who
writes that Photinus sought and begged judges from the emperor in whose presence he would
argue his case.

I respond to the fourth example, from the doctrine of Augustine himself, that the conference
with the Donatists was extraordinary, and was received from a certain necessity. When the
Pelagians wanted works of the emperor to compel Catholics to a conference in the manner in
which the Catholics had earlier compelled the Donatists, Augustine responded that the Catholics
held that conference with the Donatists in an extraordinary manner born from necessity, to the
extent that they infested the whole of Africa, nor could they be otherwise repressed or compelled
to a Council except by the temporal powers, and then it was done (lib. 3 contra Julianum, ca. 1).

Besides, I say that judge was not such a judge as we are arguing about, for Marcellinus did not
so judge that his sentence would oblige the whole Church, but only that he would repress the
boldness of the Donatists; for the opinion of Marcellinus was that these Donatists were so refuted
by the Catholics, that they had nothing with which they could respond. Just as also when
Augustine disputed with Pascentius the Arian, with Laurence on free will, as is clear from epistle
174 and 178, the teaching of Laurentius was not conducted on a matter of faith, but only availed
for the confusion of Pascentius, who was pronounced conquered; and the same thing must be said
on the disputation of the heretic Photinus, and on similar disputations. For they were never held
for legitimate definitions in the Church, such as the decrees of Councils are.

The sixth example is taken from Socrates (lib. 5, c. 10) and Sozomen (lib. 7 c. 12) where we read
that the Emperor Theodosius commanded that individual princes of various religions, that is,
Catholics, Arians, and Eunomians, should advance for themselves a written formula of their faith,
and when it would come to pass, the Emperor zealously prayed to God that he would direct his
mind to choosing the true faith, and then at length after having read all the confessions, approved
only the Catholic and commanded it to be kept.

I respond: Theodosius did not undertake to define some new controversy, nor to make himself
a judge in a case of faith by any means, as is clear: 1) because that question had already been
defined in the Council of Nicaea, of which he was so strenuous a follower, that he refused to be
baptized by the Bishop of Thessalonika unless he would first understand that he was of the faith
of Nicaea, as Socrates cites (lib. 5, c. 7), therefore he could not hesitate as to whether the Arian or
Catholic faith were truer.

Secondly, because Ambrose says in his thirty-second epistle, that it is not for emperors to judge
in a case of faith, and he proves this from the testimony of Constantine, Valentinian the elder and
Theodosius, likewise in the Council of Aquileia, Ambrose says the same thing, the Emperor
Theodosius left free judgment to the priests. Therefore, Theodosius judged nothing in a case of
faith, but only read the confessions of those following different faiths, that he would acquiesce to
them and satisfy them lest it would seem he condemned them unheard without a reason.

Moreover, Socrates writes that Theodosius asked God by prayers that he would direct him in
the choosing a faith, I think is false. For when he prayed in secret, as the same Socrates affirms,
who could know what he prayed for? And besides, it is certain that he did not so pray because by
so praying he would commit the sin of infidelity, by doubting the faith, which he once received;
and still made no sin in this deed, but acted in a praiseworthy manner as all affirm. Therefore, he
prayed not that he would be directed in the choice of faith, but that he would be directed in that
business not to do something imprudently and perhaps asked forgiveness of God that it seemed
he occupied someone else’s right; and at the same time he prayed lest he would be deceived by
reading the confessions of so many heretics.

The seventh example is taken from Theodoret (lib. 5, cap. 23) where we read that when the
Roman Pontiffs refused Flavianus to be the bishop of Antioch, still Theodosius the emperor judged
otherwise and commanded Flavianus to be the Bishop at Antioch.

I respond: this history wonderfully shows the primacy of the Roman Pontiff, and nothing
clearly impedes the present case. Therefore, I say the Pope refused by right that Flavianus would
be the Bishop, but the Emperor did it from power, not from justice. I prove that because, as
Socrates relates (lib. 5 c. 5) when there was a schism in the Church of Antioch, and Meletius and
Paulinus sat at the same time, it at length pleased all that they would sit at the same time; but
when one of them would die the other would be the sole Bishop, succeeding no dead bishop, and
they confirmed it by swearing an oath; just the same, after Meletius died Flavianus succeeded in
his place, while Paulinus was still living, against the oath, and hence it was illicit as is known to
all. Therefore, why would it be any wonder if Pope Damasus was displeased?

In that regard, St. Ambrose (epist. 78 to Theophilus of Alexandria), speaking on this affair, so
said: “Your holiness writes that Flavianus went back on the judgment to an imperial rescript;
therefore, the labor of such priests is in vain, to again return to the judgments of this world. ... We
think this must rightly be referred to our holy brother, the priest of the Roman Church.” Besides,
Chrysostom was also at Antioch and was ordained a priest not by Flavianus, but by Evagrius the
successor of Paulinus, as is cited by Socrates (lib. 6 c. 3) because he would never suffer to have held
Flavianus for a true Bishop. Likewise, Theophilus the Bishop of Alexandria, as Socrates relates (lib.
5 cap. 15) asked the Roman pontiff through his legate to forgive the sin which Flavianus received.
And later Chrysostom labored on a similar work with the Pope, as is clear from Sozomen (lib. 8
c. 3). Whereby it is abundantly clear that Flavianus sinned and his judgment was that the Roman
Pontiff was superior. Likewise Jerome, in his epistle to Damasus on the name of hypostasis,
speaking about the same schism, asks from the Pope with which of these bishops he should
communicate, and asserts that he will communicate with the one that the Roman Pontiff
communicates with.

Besides, the three best and holiest Popes, Damasus, Syricius and Anastasius, as Theodoret
writes (lib. 5 c. 23) freely rebuked the emperor in that case and said that it is enough if he
diligently oppresses tyrants who rise up against him, but in those who exercise tyranny against
the law of God, to depart with them unpunished. Certainly Popes as holy as these would never
have applied so fierce rebuke unless it seemed to them that the emperor gravely erred. Why would
the emperor, moved by that rebuke, as Theodoret relates in the same place, not judge the Roman
Pontiffs, but twice command Flavianus to sail to Rome so that he would oppose himself in the
presence of the Pope?

Lastly, as Theodoret relates in the same place, even if the emperor acted from his power, as
we said, he did not from justice, for he willed Flavianus to be a Bishop, still he never put an end
to that case, nor did he will the Bishops of the west and of Egypt to communicate with Flavian,
until after Evagrius died and the Roman Pontiff forgave the crime of Flavianus and promised to
admit his legates to himself, so Flavianus sent the most famous priests and deacons of Antioch in
a legation to Rome.

Therefore, we have what is required for a legitimate Council. Now, briefly in the place of an
appendix, we will take up what kind of Council the Protestants require in that book which they
titled: Caussae cur Electores, Principes, aliisque addicti Confessioni Augustana ad Concilium
Tridentinum non accedant?
9

CHAPTER XXI: The conditions which the Lutherans
require for the celebration of a Council are refuted

THE Lutherans, who call themselves Protestants, propose eight conditions for celebrating a
Council. Since Gaspar Villalpando has made a sufficient dissertation on these, we will briefly
refute them here.

Firstly, therefore, they require that before the Council occurs all the acts of the Council of
Trent be invalidated. Secondly, that the Council be conducted in Germany; for there the canon
Ecclesiasticus, cited by Cyprian (lib. 1 epist. 3) says that suits should be judged in the places where
they arose. Thirdly, that the Roman Pontiff should not summon the Council, nor preside in it, but
that it should be on the other side of those litigating, just as when someone is accused and no man
is at the same time the judge and the accusing party. Fourthly, that sentences should be imposed
only from the divine Scripture, not from Traditions. Fifthly, that the decision should not be made
in the power of a plurality of votes, but pronounced according to the norm of the divine word.
Sixthly, that the Roman Pontiff would absolve all prelates from the oath of fidelity, in which they
have been bound. Seventhly, that theologians of the principles and statutes of the Augsburg
Confession, no less than Bishops in the Council, be permitted decisive opinions and voices.
Eighthly, that safe conduct be granted by the emperor, not only to persons, but even to those
principal cases, i.e., that neither can persons be punished if they refuse to assent to the Council,
nor the faith and confession of the Lutherans can be condemned, even if the Lutheran theologians
cannot defend it. They say with these conditions that they desire a Council with all their heart,
and they call this a truly pious and free Council.

The first condition is unjust because nothing ought to be held invalid unless it is condemned
by a legitimate judgment. Moreover, the Council of Trent is accused by heretics but has not been
condemned by any legitimate judge. Therefore, just as the second Council of Ephesus was
condemned at the Council of Chalcedon, and the Council of Constantinople against images was
condemned at the seventh Council, so also the Council of Trent, if it must be condemned, ought
to be examined and judged in another Council, but not invalidated before the judgment of another
Council.

The second condition is also unjust, for the Lutherans seem to seek the right for themselves
that the Council not be conducted in Italy, where Catholics prevail, so Catholics can rightly
demand that it not be conducted in Germany, where the Lutherans prevail, and really a better and
more suitable place could not have been chosen than Trent, which is on the borders of Germany
and Italy, even if this question were relinquished to the judgment of a heathen man.

Moreover, to the canon which is cited by Cyprian, I say that canon is understood on particular
cases, i.e. on crimes of particular men, which ought to be judged where they are committed,
because there witnesses can be discovered more easily; but on cases of faith which pertain to the
whole Church, there is another reason. The question on the cessation of the law arose at Antioch,
but it was finished in the Council of the Apostles at Jerusalem (Acts 15); the Arian heresy arose
at Alexandria in Egypt, but it was judged at Nicaea in Bithynia; the heresy of Nestorius rose at
Constantinople, but it was condemned at Ephesus; the Monophysite heresy was born at
Constantinople, it was condemned at Chalcedon; the heresy of the Originists, Didymus and
Evagrius was judged in the fifth Council at Constantinople, but it hardly arose there; the
Monothelyte heresy was born in Alexandria, Cyrus being its author, and was condemned first at
Rome in the Council of Pope St. Martin, then at the sixth Council in Constantinople; lastly, the
heresy of the Iconoclasts, which arose at Constantinople, or at least was wonderfully increased
and had been strengthened there, was judged and condemned at the second Council of Nicaea in
Bithynia, and before also at Rome in a Council.

Add that the Lutherans have also had not a few provincial Councils such as at Cologne,
Moguntinus, and others in which they were condemned. Our adversaries should not object if these
Councils were made up of Papists, for all heretics could make the same objection. In the Church
it has always been preserved that those who were then Bishops would judge controversies, and
new Bishops were not created because of new questions.

The third condition is unjust, because the Roman Pontiff cannot be deprived of his right to
summon Councils and preside over them, in whose possession this right has already been for 1500
years, unless he were first convicted by the legitimate judgment of a Council and is not the
Supreme Pontiff. Moreover, what they say, that the same man ought not be a judge and a party,
I say has place in private men, but not in a supreme prince. For the supreme prince, as long as he
is not declared or judged to have legitimately been deprived of his rule, is always the supreme
judge, even if he litigates with himself as a party.

Therefore, private men, when they litigate with their prince, usually appeal from the prince
badly represented, to represent the same better, and it is confirmed from the ancient histories, for
when Marcellinus sinned, and on account of it he gathered a Council, all the Bishops said he could
not be condemned by anyone, rather he ought to be the judge, and the defendant, as Nicholas I
relates in his epistle to the Emperor Michael. Likewise, Sixtus III, when he was accused of adultery,
the Emperor gathered a Council with the Pope’s consent, but in that Council no man dared to
strike up the case of the Pope unless first he would have said that he willed the case to be
discussed, even if he would be judged by his own judgment, but not judged. It is clear both from
the acts of that Council and from the epistle of the same Sixtus to the Bishops of the east.

Next, in the fourth Roman Council under Symmachus, we read that all the Bishops said the
Council could not be summoned by right unless it were by the Pope, even if he were the one that
were accused. For this purpose, did not Arius litigate with Alexander on the faith? And still in the
Council of Nicaea Alexander sat, because he was a Bishop as a judge. Likewise, in the third
Council Cyril presided in episcopal judgment, still it was said on the side of the Nestorians to have
the side of those litigating. So also in the fourth Council, legates of Pope Leo presided, although
the whole case turned the dispute between Leo and Dioscorus. It happens also that the Pope in a
Council is not only the judge, but has many colleagues, that is, all the Bishops who, if they could
convict him of heresy, they could also judge and depose him even against his will. Therefore, the
heretics have nothing: why would they complain if the Roman Pontiff presides at a Council before
he were condemned?

The fourth condition is unjust, because that which was once defined ought not be recalled into
doubt, according to the law of the Emperor Maritanus, l. nemo; c. de summa Trinitate et fide
Catholica. It is certain, however, in the seventh general Council that it was defined that unwritten
traditions must not be received. Although, however, that condition is so unjust; still it could be
admitted as long as again it were not legitimately defined in a Council that these must be received
for the word of God. Hence, the Council of Trent, before it progressed to other things, defined the
Scriptures and the Apostolic Traditions received for the word of God.

The fifth condition altogether abolishes the form of Councils that we showed above, and on
that account it cannot be done that at some time it would arrive at the end of controversies unless
place were given to the greater side of those with a vote, for when both sides advance testimonies
of the Scriptures, how can it be understood what the teaching of the Council is unless it is
gathered by a vote, and the opinion of the greater would prevail?

The sixth condition is unjust and impertinent. Unjust, because inferiors ought not be free from
the obedience to superiors, unless first he were legitimately deposed or declared not to be a
superior, just as it would be unjust that as often as imperial assemblies were conducted, the
Emperor ought to make the oath of fidelity that all the princes must offer in subjection to him free.
Moreover, it is no new or recent thing that Bishops should furnish an oath of obedience to the
Pope, as is clear from St. Gregory (lib. 1 epist. 31) and from cap. Significasti, extra de elect. Likewise,
from the eleventh Council of Toledo (ca. 10). Furthermore, it is impertinent because that oath does
not take away the freedom of the Bishops, which is necessary in Councils, for they swear they will
be obedient to the supreme Pontiff, which is understood as long as he is Pope, and provided he
commands these things which, according to God and the sacred canons he can command; but they
do not swear that they are not going to say what they think in the Council, or that they are not
going to depose him if they were to clearly prove that he is a heretic.

The seventh condition, if it were understood to be on a properly decisive vote in a form of
judgment, it is opposed to the fifth condition, and is against the form of all Councils, as we showed
above; if it were understood improperly, and a “decisive voice” were called the divine Scripture
in testimony of some teaching brought to the fore, then the condition is most just and was never
denied to the Protestants, nay more it was offered to them three times in the Council of Trent,
namely in session 13, 15 and 18.

The last condition for the first part, i.e. what attains to the safe conduct of persons, was offered
to the Protestants, as is clear from the same places of the Council of Trent, namely sessions 13, 15
and 18; for the second part it is altogether inept and ridiculous, for it is as if they were to have
clearly said we want the Bishops of the whole Christian world to be troubled, and take up
expenses and suffer great labors to come to the Council, and nevertheless, when they come we will
refuse anything to be established, nor quarrels ever to be settled.

BOOK II

On the Authority of Councils

CHAPTER I: The argument and partition of this book.

HITHERTO, we have made our disputation on the definition and causes of a Council, so as to
make the beginning brief; the authority remains and because both from those Councils that are
extant, and from book 4 of On the Roman Pontiff it is certain that Episcopal Councils judge
controversies both of faith and morals which arise in the Church at some time. With that question
omitted, we will only take up the explanation of this point: whether or not the judgments of
Councils are infallible?

Moreover, the disputation on the authority of Councils will be bipartite. For the first part, the
authority of Councils must be understood absolutely, then compared with other similar principles
of faith, i.e. with Scripture, and decrees of the Pope.

On the authority considered absolutely there are two questions. One, whether Councils
confirmed by the Supreme Pontiff could err. The second, whether Councils that have not yet been
confirmed by the supreme Pontiff, but are otherwise altogether legitimate, could err. For on
Councils that have been condemned or partly approved and partly condemned, there is nothing
which we will say since they erred beyond any doubt, however, on those the judgment is the same
as others, which were either confirmed or condemned.

CHAPTER II: It is proven from the Scriptures that
general Councils confirmed by the Pope cannot err.

SO that we might begin from the first question, the heretics of this time would have it that there
has never been a Council that could not err. Luther asserts this in article 28 and 29, and in his book
on Councils. Brenz, in the Wirtemberg Confession, in the chapter on Councils; Calvin in the
Institutes, lib. 4 cap. 9 § 8, and in the Institutione minore, cap. 8 § 163 et seqq. But all Catholics
constantly teach that general Councils confirmed by the Supreme Pontiff cannot err, either in the
explication of the faith, or in handing down precepts of morals common to the whole Church. But
in regard to particular Councils, it seems there is some dissension among Catholics, for since the
whole strength of those sort of Councils nearly depends upon the strength of the Pope, those who
say the Pope can err, consequently ought to say that even Councils of this sort can err. To explain
it more easily and clearly, we shall constitute two propositions.

The first proposition is: It must be held with Catholic faith that general Councils confirmed by
the Supreme Pontiff can neither err in faith nor morals. It is proved first, from the testimonies of
divine Scripture, which can be reduced to four classes. In the first, there will be proper testimonies;
in the second, those which prove the Church cannot err; in the third, those which prove the Pope
cannot err; in the fourth, those which prove that all the Bishops and Doctors of the Church cannot
err.

The proper testimonies are three: 1) Matthew 18:20, “Where there are two or three gathered
in my name, there I am in their midst.” Calvin does not make much of this testimony because it
seems it can be proven from it that a Council of two men cannot err. Yet, while he does not scorn
this testimony, he observes that the argument is not taken simply from these words, but from
these words continued from what came a little before, and on that account with added
argumentation from the minor to the major. For previously the Lord had said in regard to an
incorrigible man: “Say it to the Church, and if he will not listen even to the Church, let him be to
you as a heathen and a publican.” But lest someone would think that the Church or a gathering
of prelates must be condemned, he immediately added: “Amen I say to you, whatever you will
have bound upon earth will be bound in heaven also, etc.”

And so that no one would be uncertain about the assistance of God, when the Bishops have
been gathered to condemn something, or absolve, he added: “For where two or three are gathered
in my name, there I am in their midst.”

This is the meaning of such words: if two or three are gathered in my name, they always
obtain what they ask from God, namely wisdom and light which is sufficient for them to discover
what is necessary for them. Thus, how much more will all Bishops gathered in my name obtain
what they justly seek, i.e., wisdom and light to judge those things which pertain to the direction
of the whole Church?

Therefore, whether few or many, whether private men or Bishops gathered in the name of
Christ, all have Christ present, helping, and they obtain what is suitable for them to obtain. But
in the gathering of the few and private men Christ is present to help them in small and private
matters; in a gathering of Bishops, however, he is present to help them in great and public matters.
The Council of Chalcedon explains this passage the same way, and uses this argument in its
epistle to Pope Leo, which is after the end of the third action of the same Council. Likewise, the
sixth Council, act. 17; the third Council of Toledo, not far from the beginning. Likewise, Pope
Innocent, cited by Gratian (dist. 20, ca. de quibus).

2) John 16:13, “The Spirit of truth will teach you all truth.” And lest we would think this is said
to the Apostles alone, and not also their successors, in chapter 14 the Lord clearly witnesses that
the Holy Spirit is going to remain with the Apostles forever, i.e. perpetually with them and their
successors. But the Holy Spirit does not teach Bishops standing apart all truth, therefore he will
at least teach all Bishops gathered into one, and rightly since in the Church there is no greater seat
whereby God shall teach us than that of the Supreme Pontiff, joined with the consent of a general
Council. If this chair could also be deceived, although it teaches the universal Church, I do not
know how that promise, “He will teach you all truth,” would be true.

3) Acts 15:28, where the first Council confidently said: “It has been seen by the Holy Spirit, and
us.” Moreover, if that Council, from which all other Councils receive their form, asserts its decrees,
they are decrees of the Holy Spirit; certainly the other legitimate Councils can assert the same
thing, which prescribe rules of belief and action for the universal Church. For the Holy Spirit was
present in that Council because it was necessary for the preservation of the Church; but it is and
will be no less necessary in other times when new heresies arise.

The second class of testimonies contains all those passages with which it is proved that the
Church cannot err either in belief or in teaching, such as these: “Upon this rock I will build my
Church; the gates of hell will not prevail against it” (Matt. 16); “I am with you even to the end of
the age” (Matt. 28:20); lastly, “The Church of the living God is a column and firmament of truth.”
(1 Tim. 3:15).

From these passages it is clearly gathered that approved general Councils cannot err, and in
two ways: 1) Because formally, the whole authority of the Church is in none but prelates, just as
it is seen formally of the whole body, it is only in the head; consequently, it is the same thing that
the Church cannot err in defining matters of faith and that the Bishops cannot err. It is otherwise,
as we said, if they are individuals for then they can err; therefore, they cannot err when they are
gathered into one.

2) Secondly, a general Council represents the universal Church, and so has the consent of the
universal Church; this is why if the Church cannot err, neither can a legitimate and approved
ecumenical Council err. Thus, the universal Church is represented by a general Council, although
Calvin rejects this, it can easily be proved. For in the first place, in 3 Kings 8:22, an assembly of
princes is clearly called the whole Church of Israel, which had come together with Solomon, for
it cannot happen that all Israel, which took pride in the number of thousands upon thousands of
men, would be together in the temple at the same time; and in the beginning of the chapter we
read that the priests gathered before the king, and the heads of individual tribes.

Additionally, Athanasius, in epist. de Synodis Arimin. et Seleuciae, and in epist. ad Episcopos
Africanos; Epiphanius in fine Ancoratus, Eusebius, lib. 3 de vita Constantini; Augustine lib. 1 contra
Donatistas, c. 18 and lib. 2 c. 4 c. 6; Gelasius in epist. ad Episcopos Dardaniae; Gregorius lib. 1 epist.
24 ad Ioannem Eulogium, and other Patriarchs argue this. Then, the eighth Council, act. 5, calls
a general Council a gathering of the whole world, or the consent of the whole Church. Besides,
Martin V, at the end of the Council of Constance, bids those suspect of heresy to be questioned
whether or not they believe a general Council represents the universal Church. Likewise, St.
Cyprian, in lib. 4, epist. 9, when he says the Church is in the Bishop, without a doubt he
understands that all Churches are in all Bishops. Lastly, if in each kingdom or republic, that which
establishes a senate or assemblies, it is said to be for the whole kingdom or republic, why would
the same not be said about Ecclesiastical decrees, which are made with the consent of all the
Bishops?

The third class of testimonies contains all those places which prove the Roman Pontiff cannot
err in faith: such as that of Luke 22:32, “I have prayed for thee that thy faith would not fail,” and
if there are some others, they are explained in another place, for from these it is clearly gathered
that a Council confirmed by the Pope cannot err. Although there are some Catholics who think
the Pope can err, still they say then he can err only when he does not apply all diligence; but when
a general Council is convoked, without a doubt he applies all diligence in investigating that matter,
for what more can he do? Therefore, at least then, by the consent of all, he will not err.

The fourth class of testimonies contains those passages which teach that Bishops must be held
as pastors, listened to as teachers and followed as leaders. In Luke 10:16, “He who hears you, hears
me;” and Hebrews 13:17, “Obey those put over you and be subject to them.” Likewise, those
passages where they are called pastors, Acts 20:28, and Ephesians 4:11, for when they are bid to
feed the flock, we are bid to follow them to pasture; especially since the Apostle says they were
constituted as pastors for that end in the Church. Likewise, those passages in which they are called
doctors, in Matthew 28:19, “Teach all nations;” and 1 Timothy 3:2 as well as Titus 1:9, accordingly
by some precept they are bid to teach, in the same we are bid to listen. Likewise, those where they
are called watchmen: “I have given you as a watchmen over the house of Israel,” (Ezechiel 33:7).
Jerome and Gregory explain that this passage refers to Bishops. This is why the eighth Council
of Toledo (cap. 4) and Ambrose (lib. de dignitate sacerdotali cap. 6) are not wrong when they call
Bishops “eyes”, and certainly, so if Bishops are commanded as watchmen, and the eyes show us
the path, then we are bid to embark on that path which they show us. Lastly, those passages
where Bishops are called fathers and the rest are called sons, such as Galatians 4:19 and 1 John 2:1.

From all such places, we can reason that: If we are commanded by God to listen and follow
Bishops as overseers, pastors, doctors, watchmen and fathers, then certainly they cannot deceive
us or err at some point, and whenever they disagree among themselves that we would not know
which of them must be followed; therefore, at least all of them, being gathered at the same time,
especially in the name of the Lord, when they teach us unanimously, cannot err.

CHAPTER III: The same is proven from the Fathers

WE add the second testimony, the tradition of the ancient fathers. The Church and the fathers
write many things about Councils, from where it is certain that they thought general Councils
cannot err. First, they affirm that the teaching of a general Council, in a case of faith, is the last
judge in the Church, from which one cannot appeal, nor be invalidated or retracted in any way.
Hence it most clearly follows that Councils of this sort cannot err, for otherwise it would be very
unjust to compel Christians to not appeal from that judgment if it could be erroneous.

Moreover, this first opinion is cited very frequently in the Fathers. Athanasius, in his letter to
Epictetus, which Epiphanius also relates in heresy 77, marvels how some dared to question matters
already defined at the Council of Nicaea, since the decrees of Councils of this sort cannot be
changed unless they were in error. Augustine, in epist. 162, says the last judgment of the Church
is a general Council. Leo, in epistle 50 to Martianus, asks that what was once defined in general
Councils would not be retracted. The same Emperor Martianus ratified this with his own law in
l. nemo, c. de sum. Trinit. et fide Catholica. Leo also teaches the same thing in epist. 61 to the
Council of Chalcedon as well as epist. 62 to Maximus the patriarch of Antioch. Likewise, Gelasius
in his epistle to the Bishops of Dardania. The same is established in the Council of Ephesus, near
the end, and in the Council of Chalcedon, act. 5, can. ult.

Secondly, the fathers and Councils teach that all those who do not acquiesce to plenary
Councils are heretics and must be excommunicated. It manifestly follows from this that they
thought that Councils could not err, and also that and all general Councils that in particular
declare anathema to anyone that would contradict it, as Athanasius witnesses about Nicaea in his
letter to the Bishops of Africa, and it is clear from their other acts.

Gregory Nazianzen, because the Apollinarists denied that they were heretics and said that
they were received in a certain Catholic Council, said in his first letter to Clidonius: “Let them
show this, and we will acquiesce, the particular mark will be if they will assent to right doctrine,
for the matter cannot stand otherwise if they do not act accordingly.” St. Leo, in epistle 78 to the
Emperor Leo, teaches that those who resist Nicaea or the Council of Chalcedon cannot be
reckoned as Catholics, and he commands a certain priest named Atticus to either acquiesce to the
Council of Chalcedon or be excommunicated. Basil explains the faith in epistle 87, in which he
teaches that those suspect of heresy must display the decrees of the Council of Nicaea, thence it
will be clear whether they are heretics or Catholics. Besides, Augustine, in de Baptismo, book 1 ch.
18, only excuses Cyprian from heresy for this reason, because still in that time a general Council
did not exist from which that question on the baptism of heretics could be defined. Likewise,
Gregory, in lib. 1 epist. 24, says anathema to those that do not receive the five general Councils,
which were the only ones celebrated in that time.

Thirdly, the Fathers teach that the decrees of legitimate general Councils that have been
published are divine and from the Holy Spirit. From that it follows that they cannot be guilty of
error. So Constantine, in his epistle to the Churches (which is cited by Eusebius, lib. 3 de vita
Constantini) calls the decrees of the Council of Nicaea heavenly commands. Athanasius, in his
epistle to the Bishops of Africa, says: “The word of the Lord remains eternal through the
ecumenical Council of Nicaea.

Gregory Nazianzen in his oration on Athanasius, says the Bishops were gathered at the
Council of Nicaea by the Holy Spirit. Cyril in book 1 de Trinitate calls the decree of the general
Council of Nicaea a divine and most holy oracle. Leo in epistle 53 to Anatholius and 54 to the
Emperor Martianus, affirms that the canons of the Council of Nicaea were drawn up by the Holy
Spirit. And in epist. 37 to the Emperor Leo, he asserts that the Council of Chalcedon was gathered
by the Holy Spirit. St. Gregory affirms in book 1, epist. 24, that he venerates the first four Councils
like the four Gospels. Nicholas I, in his epistle to the Emperor Michael, calls the decrees of
Councils divinely constituted, inspired teachings. Lastly, the Councils themselves affirm that they
are gathered in the Holy Spirit.

Fourthly, they teach that it is better to die than to recede from the decrees of the general
Councils. Ambrose speaks this way in epistle 32: “I follow the tract of the Council of Nicaea from
which neither death nor the sword could separate me.” Moreover, Hilary really suffered exile on
account of the faith of Nicaea, as he witnesses at the end of his book on Councils. And Victor of
Africa in the three books on the Vandal persecution, describes many famous martyrdoms of the
saints who died for the faith explicated in a general Council. Jerome, in his book against the
Luciferians, while speaking about Athanasius, Hilary, Eusebius and other holy confessors, says:
“How could they act against the Council of Nicaea, on account of which they suffered exile?”

CHAPTER IV: The same is shown by arguments lead in
from reason

LASTLY we add the argument from natural reason. First, if general Councils could err, there
would be no firm judgment in the Church from which controversies could be settled and unity in
the Church would be preserved, for there is nothing greater than a legitimate and approved
general Council.

Secondly, if the judgment of Councils of this sort were not infallible, all condemned heresies
could rightly be recalled from doubt. For Arius said the Council of Nicaea erred, Macedonius that
Constantinople erred, Nestorius that Ephesus erred, Eutyches that Chalcedon erred.

Thirdly, there would be no certitude on many books of Sacred Scripture; for the epistle to the
Hebrews, 2 Peter, 3 John, James, Jude and on the Apocalypse, which books even the Calvinists
receive, at length were in doubt until the matter was declared by a Council.

Fourthly, if all Councils could err, it would certainly follow that they would all admit
intolerable error, and hence would be worthy of no honor. For it is an intolerable error to propose
something to be believed as an article of faith on which it is not certain whether it is true or false;
yet particular Councils, such as Nicaea, Constantinople, Ephesus, and Chalcedon published a new
creed of faith, or certainly new opinions, which they willed to be held as articles of faith.
Moreover, who will dare to say that those four Councils contained intolerable error and were
worthy of no honor when we see they are received with honor even by our enemies, and are often
adduced in testimony to true doctrine? Therefore, it remains that we ought to believe their
judgments are firm and infallible.

CHAPTER V: Particular Councils approved by the
Pope cannot err

THE second proposition: Particular Councils confirmed by the Supreme Pontiff cannot err in faith
and morals. This proposition is not received as equally as the first. Therefore, for that reason, we
do not affirm this proposition must be held with Catholic faith since we do not yet see the authors
who think the contrary to have been condemned by the Church as heretics. It is also certain from
Eusebius (lib. 7 hist. ca. 2, 3, et 4). Pope Cornelius, with a national Council of all the Bishops of Italy
established that heretics ought not be rebaptized, and the same was later approved by Pope
Stephen who commanded that heretics would not be rebaptized. And at the same time it is certain
from the same Eusebius, that St. Cyprian thought the contrary and tenaciously defended it, which
he declared in his epistle to Pompeianus, where he argued that Pope Stephen was in error, and still
Cyprian has always been held in the number of Catholics.

But whatever about this, upon which we spoke in another place when were treating about the
Pope, it is certainly temerarious, erroneous and proximate to heresy to think that particular
Councils confirmed by the Pope can err. This first is proven from those arguments with which we
showed above that the Supreme Pontiff in judging affairs which pertain to faith and good morals,
cannot err. For if the Supreme Pontiff cannot err, certainly even the scantiest Council approved
by him could not err.

Secondly, the same is proved from the fact that if Councils of this sort could err, many heresies
which were condemned by particular Councils alone could again be called into doubt, such as that
of the Pelagians, Priscillanists, Jovinians and others.

Thirdly, to this point a Council of this sort which erred has never been discovered.

Fourthly, in the seventh Council, act. 3, and the eighth Council, in the last act, can. 1, the
fathers say they venerate and receive even the decrees of local Councils; nay more, in the same
seventh Council they called decrees of this sort divinely inspired. It remains that we propose the
arguments of our adversaries and refute them.

CHAPTER VI: Arguments produced from the Scriptures
are answered

OUR adversaries make objections to us with four types of arguments. They seek one from the
Scriptures, the other from testimonies of the Fathers, the third from the Councils themselves,
which seem to often oppose other Councils or the Scriptures. The fourth is from natural reason.
But the first have nearly no force, therefore they will be refuted briefly.

Calvin objects in the Institutes (lib. 4 cap. 9 §3) with those passages of the Old Testament
wherein pastors and priests, as well as prophets, are rebuked not only for wickedness but even for
ignorance and error. One is from Isaiah 56:10, “All his watchmen are blind, and they do not know
anything, they are all mute dogs that do not bark but lying down sleep and love dreams, and the
shepherds themselves know nothing nor understand.” Likewise that of Hosea 9:8, “The watchmen
of Ephraim was with my God; the prophet is become a snare of ruin upon all his ways, madness
in the house of God.” And that of Jeremiah 6:13, “From the prophet even to the priest, everyone
follows lies.” And chapter 14:14, “The prophet prophecies a lie in my name.” Lastly that of Ezechiel
22:25, “The conspiracy of the Prophets in his midst are just as a roaring lion and some take prey,
his priests violate my law, and they profane my holy things.”

But all of these can be answered in three ways. First, it happens very frequently in sacred
things that all are rebuked on account of some bad ones, while on account of some good men all
are praised, in such a way that both the rebuke and the commendation are more forceful. St.
Augustine records in his book de Unitate Ecclesiae, cap. 12, that there are many examples from the
divine Scriptures, but this one will suffice. The Apostle writes to the Philippians 2:21, “All seek
those things which are the things of Jesus Christ.” And still, in chapter 1:15, he had already said
certain men from contention, certain ones from charity, declare Christ. And in chapter 3:17, he
says: “Be imitators of me and observe those who so walk that you have our form, for many walk,
whom I have often spoken to you of, but now I say weeping, that they are enemies of the cross
of Christ.” And which follow. If therefore, certain men announced Christ from charity, and walked
according to the form of the Apostle, so that they would also be worthy, whom the Philippians
would imitate and observe; therefore, all do not seek what is their own and still in that mode, i.e.
by the figure of understanding, all sought what is their own, as the Apostle says. Therefore, the
testimonies of the Scripture do not compel that we would understand pastors and priests and
prophets of the Old Testament to have all been liars at the same time and that they were wicked,
but only a few.

Then, since none of these were said against a Council of priests, but against shepherds and
prophets, who deceived the people separately; these testimonies do not seem to affect our
argument; another reason is in a Council of pastors gathered by the public authority and who are
called in the name of God to diligently examine questions; another reason is of those dispersed and
who, while they sit in their own places give way to their own judgment. This is why the same
Scripture, which so frequently inveighs against wicked shepherds and warns us to beware of false
prophets, sends those who are uncertain about some matter to a Council of priests and commands
that they observe that which the priests will have said, “who preside in the place which the Lord
has chosen” (Deut. 17:10).

Then, even if we were to have nothing of these, still one may not, thereupon, transfer all those
things that are said against Prophets and priests in the Scriptures of the Old Testament to the
priests of the New Testament, especially those gathered in a Council. The Church has more certain
and greater promises of God than the Synagogue. For, we have never read about the Synagogue
what Christ says about the Church in Matthew 16:15, “Upon this rock I will build my Church and
the gates of hell will not prevail against it.” Nor that which the Apostle says in 1 Timothy 3:15,
that it is “a pillar and firmament of truth.” Nor was it written about Caiaphas, but Peter: “I have
prayed for thee that thy faith shall not fail” (Luke 22:32).

Calvin objects secondly (Ibid., §4) with these passages of the new Testament: 2 Peter 2:1, “But
there will be pseudo-prophets among the people, just as even among you there will be liars as
teachers, who will introduce sects of perdition;” Acts 20:29, “I know that ravenous wolves will
enter after my departure among you, not sparing the flock and from you men will arise speaking
perverse things so that they would lead away disciples after themselves;” and Matthew 24:24,
“Pseudo-Christs and pseudo-prophets will rise and give great signs and wonders, so that, if it could
happen, even the elect would be led into error.”

But it is a marvel if Calvin, while he proposes these, does not turn his gaze to himself and say:
What if I myself am one from the number of these unhappy pseudo-prophets? For, even a blind
man can see that Christ, Peter and Paul are describing heretics while using the term of false
prophets, who, opposing the doctrine which is preserved in the Church by Bishops in an ordinary
succession do not fear to introduce sects and lead away disciples after themselves, and they make
a name for themselves on earth such as Lutherans and Calvinists are named. But at length, it is
simply not the case that those passages, which warn us to beware of false prophets, should be
understood about Councils of Bishops, as it is the other way around; this is the ordinary cause of
a Council, that false prophets would be uncovered and refuted so that ravenous wolves would be
kept far away from the sheepfold of Christ.

CHAPTER VII: Arguments sought from the testimonies
of the Fathers are refuted

IN the second place they advance testimonies of the Fathers, and first off, Calvin brings to the
fore St. Gregory Nazianzen, who, in a letter to Procopius, so speaks: “If I must write the truth, I
am so minded that I would flee all Councils of Bishops because I have never seen a happy and
prosperous end to a Council, nor that it was ever an occasion for the repulsion of wicked men
rather than their entrance and increase.”

I respond: Nazianzen does not deny legitimate Councils make certain faith, rather, in his time
it was a question of whether no Council could be completed that was legitimate on every side. That
is the truest thing. For in the age of Gregory it happened that in the time between the first and
second general Council, numerous Councils were held, which, on account of the multitude of
Bishops favoring heretics, had an unfortunate end, such as the Councils of Seleucia, Tyrense,
Armenia, Milan, Sirmium, etc. Therefore, since he saw so many bad Councils in his time, and none
good, and yet was still called by Procopius in the name of the emperor to a certain Council, he
applied two excuses: 1) that he despaired of seeing a legitimate Council in that time; 2) the chief
reason, that he was detained by so serious an illness that daily he thought he would die. This
response is confirmed by St. Basil, who lived at the same time, i.e. after the first Council and before
the second. And, writing in epist. 52 to Athanasius, he says it seemed impossible to him that in
that time a legitimate Council could be held, and so it was fitting to write to the Roman Pontiff
asking him to invalidate the acts of the Council of Armenia by his own authority.

Next, it is abundantly clear what Gregory thought about legitimate Councils, both from his
opinions cited above and also from the fact that he was so strenuous a preacher of the Council of
Nicaea, that the Church in which he preached at in Constantinople was called αναστασία,
[anastasia] i.e. the Resurrection, because there the faith of Nicaea, which before had been
extinguished for a time by the Arians, rose again by the work of Gregory, he relates (historia
Tripartita, lib. 9 cap. 9) and then, because later he was present in the second general Council as is
clear from the subscription and from the sermon he gave to 150 Fathers.

Another testimony is that of Augustine, who says in Contra Maximinum, lib. 3, cap. 14:
“Neither ought I to advance the Council of Nicaea, nor you that of Armenia, as if to prejudice the
matter, nor will I be detained by the authority of the latter, nor you by the former, etc.”

I respond: Augustine does not mean that Maximinus was not held in any way by the authority
of the Council of Nicaea, but that he is not held in that disputation, whereby Augustine promised
that, because Maximinus objected to the Council of Nicaea, and the Council of Armenia by
Augustine, it seemed to him a waste of time to show the Council of Nicaea was legitimate and that
of Armenia not, when he had better arguments from the Scriptures, so he said: “No, neither will
I be held by the authority of former Councils nor you of the latter, in other words, I refuse no that
we be held by the authority of Councils. Let us omit the Councils and come to the Scriptures.” Yet,
the fact that Augustine thought otherwise, that the Council of Nicaea was of the greatest authority
and that it behooved all to acquiesce to it, is clear from the preceding words, where he so says:
“This is the term homousion, which was confirmed in the Council of Nicaea against the Arian
heretics by Catholic Fathers, by the authority of truth, etc.” For what is truth of authority except
true and certain authority?

He advances another testimony from Augustine’s de Baptismo, c. 3, where Augustine says that
earlier plenary Councils are emended by later ones, nor can it be said that he speaks improperly
about plenary Councils, i.e. of national ones, for a little earlier he said regional Councils, and
provincial ones ought to yield to plenary ones, and then adds, among plenary Councils themselves,
that they are corrected by later ones. Here, Hermann exults (lib. 3 cap. 16, Prolegom.): “For if the
earlier most ancient Councils need correction, how many errors bubble out of more recent ones?”

I respond: Firstly, perhaps Augustine speaks about illegitimate Councils which are later
corrected by legitimate ones, as happened to the second Council of Ephesus, which was corrected
at Chalcedon. I say, secondly, if he speaks on legitimate Councils, he argues on questions of fact,
not of law, since, in such questions there is no doubt a Council can err and certainly Augustine
seems to argue on questions of this sort, for the particular question of Catholics with the Donatists
was about Caecilianus, whether he should hand the sacred books to the enemies of faith, or not?
It can be said thirdly, if our adversaries contend that he spoke on all questions, when he said
earlier Councils are corrected by later ones, then it was in regard to precepts of morals, but not
in regard to dogmas of faith. Precepts are changed according to the changes of times, places and
persons, and these changes are called corrections, not for a matter that was bad in the time in
which it was established, but because they began to be bad with the change of circumstances. Each
answer is sufficiently confirmed from the words of Augustine, who says then Councils are
corrected; when what had been closed is opened by some experiment. For by experiment questions
of fact are opened, either on morals or when they are not universal questions of law.

Thirdly, Calvin advances Leo the Great, who, in epistle 53 to Anatholius and 54 to Martianus,
as well as 55 to Pulcheria, recognizes that the Council of Chalcedon was legitimate, and still does
not hesitate to attribute ambition and injudicious temerity to it, therefore he thought that a
legitimate Council could err.

I respond: A legitimate Council can err in these matters which are not done legitimately and
err on a question of fact, when it is condemned by the Apostolic See; such is that, on which the
Council of Chalcedon was rebuked by Pope Leo. For it is clear from the last action of the same
Council, and from epist. 61 of the same Leo, which is to the Council of Chalcedon, that decree in
which the Bishop of Constantinople is placed ahead of the Patriarch of Alexandria and Antioch,
was made while the legates of the Roman See were absent, and not without deceit, and was
rebuked by Leo because it was contrary to the constitution of the Council of Nicaea.

To these things, Hermann adds (liber 3 cap. 13, Prolegomena) that Isidore, who asserted with
Gratian (distin. 50, can. Domino Sancto), that when Councils disagree with themselves, the more
ancient and approved must be favored; such a rule is contrary to the earlier rule of St. Augustine
who places later Councils ahead of earlier ones, and besides, it is gathered from that rule that at
some point Councils oppose themselves and thus some of them can err.

I respond: Isidore speaks on Councils of which the authority is not certain, namely, which
have not been expressly confirmed by the Pope; we do not deny that such Councils can oppose
themselves and err. Nor is Isidore opposed with Augustine, for Isidore speaks about the doctrine
of Faith, whereas Augustine about questions of fact or precepts of morals.

Luther, in his book on Councils (pag. 54) shows Councils oppose themselves from the title of
a decree of Gratian, concordantia discordantiarum.

I respond: he speaks about apparent disagreements but not true ones, for if they were true
disagreements there could be no reconciling.

Some other men add lastly that Gratian, who in dist. 18, can. 2, says that Episcopal Councils
are invalid to define and constitute, but not to correct. I respond, Gratian does not call any Council
you like an Episcopal Council, but only provincial ones; for those are properly Episcopal in which
only Bishops come together, not Archbishops or Patriarchs. Moreover, these Councils are
ordinarily not begun to constitute dogmas of faith, for that is proper for general Councils, rather
only to restore Ecclesiastical discipline and correct morals. Therefore, of itself, and ordinarily, they
are invalid to constitute dogmas of faith, still if by some urgent necessity they were to define
something on faith, and their decree were approved by the Apostolic See, nothing stands in the
way for them to be valid.

CHAPTER VIII: Arguments from the errors of Councils
are answered

LASTLY, our adversaries enumerate errors of Councils, and especially Hermann (lib. 3 cap. 15 and
16 Prolegomenorum) as well as the book of the Protestants that we have already cited. But from
the great number of the errors, only a third needs some discussion. The errors that our adversaries
observe in Councils are only three. Certain errors are true and crass, but only of illegitimate
Councils, and were condemned by Popes, such as that of Ariminium, Seleucia and the second
Council of Ephesus, which they enumerate in vain, since they cause no harm to our position. See
what we said above on condemned Councils, in book 1, ch. 7-8.

Then the other errors are not true errors, but feigned of legitimate and approved Councils; for
everything that they do not approve of, they call errors. In this way they say the Council of
Chalcedon erred, in which consecrated religious are forbidden to violate a vow of continence, and
the fifth Council of Carthage in which it is established that altars may not be raised without relics
of the martyrs, but while they say these things, they assume what must be proved.

Next, they observe errors in true and legitimate Councils, which really seem to have some
species of error, i.e. they seem to contain opinions of this sort which are judged to be erroneous
both by us and them, and to this extent we ought to examine and refute them.

1) Calvin brings up the Council of 150 Prophets who all erred while protesting that God had
placed a lying spirit in their mouth (3 Kings 22:23). I ask, however, what sort of Council was this?
First, they were not Prophets of the Lord, for when these 150 Prophets spoke their opinions, we
read that King Josaphat sought from King Ahab whether there was some prophet of the Lord
through whom the Lord could be asked? But Ahab answered: “One remains, but I hate him.”
Thereupon, Councils ought to be made up of priests, not of prophets. Lastly, that Council was
gathered by King Ahab, not by the High Priest, hence it will be no wonder if they erred.

Secondly, Calvin and Brenz propose a Council of the Jews, while Caiaphas, the high priest,
presided, in which everyone that confessed Jesus was the Christ were excommunicated (John 9)
and later, Christ was judged guilty of death in John 11:47 and Mark 14:64.

I respond: Some say the question was of fact, not of law, which that Council judged, namely
whether Jesus must be killed, for in judgments of this sort there is no doubt that Councils can err.
But that question, even if it were of fact, still involved a most serious question of faith, namely,
whether Jesus was the true Messiah and the Son of God, and also the true God. For that reason
Caiaphas erred most grievously in faith with a universal Council, since he judged Jesus
blasphemed because he called himself the Son of God.

Others say the high priest and the Council erred in as much as it was an error of their own
mind, but still not in the opinion which it advanced. For truly Jesus was guilty of death because
he received our sins so as to purge them in himself, and truly it was expedient that he die for the
people. This is why in John 11:51 it says Caiaphas prophesied. But although they receive the words
of Caiaphas in a good sense, not everything that he said about Christ. “He has blasphemed; what
need have we of witnesses?” (Matt. 26:15). Then certainly he did not prophesy, but committed
blasphemy.

Others say that the Council erred because it did not proceed according to the custom of a
legitimate trial, but by a tumultuous conspiracy. After suborning false witnesses, it condemned
Christ: that which was not known to all, that even Pilate knew he had been handed over to him
by the priests out of envy, as we have it in Matthew 27:18, and this is indeed a probable response.
Yet, because it is not for an inferior to judge whether superiors legitimately proceed, unless it was
absolutely manifest that he committed an intolerable error, it is also credible that God did not
permit that the Councils, over which the High Priest presided, proceeded legitimately. Therefore,
we respond that the priests and Councils of the Jews could not err before Christ came, but they
could while he was present; nay more, it was foretold that the Jews would err and deny Christ in
Isaiah 6:9, Daniel 9:26 and other passages. For just as it was not necessary that the vicar of the
Pope could not err when the Pope rules the Church, and defend it from error, so also it was not
necessary that the Pontiffs of the Jews would not err when Christ, the supreme Pontiff of the
whole Church, was present and he administered the Church by himself.

Thirdly, it seems Luther rebukes the Council of the Apostles that took place in Acts 15, for he
says in his assertion of the articles, n. 29, that James changed Peter’s judgment. For it is certain
that the teaching of Peter, who judged that the gentiles should not be compelled to the laws, was
good and true, for Paul upheld it in his whole epistle to the Galatians, therefore the opinion of
James, which the whole Council followed, was bad and false, namely which commanded the
gentiles to abstain from blood and suffocated animals, which is nothing other than to Judaize.
Likewise, Luther in his book on Councils, in the first part, says many things on this law of the
Apostles, and although he did not dare to assert it was evil, still from there he tries to show that
the Council was of no benefit because that law cannot be defended unless we would say that a
Council does not oblige.

I respond: There are not lacking Church fathers who would deny that the Council of the
Apostles gave any precept on abstinence from the eating of blood and suffocated animals.

Irenaeus (lib. 3 cap. 12), while bringing up this passage twice always omits suffocated animals
and seems to understand homicide for the word blood. Cyprian (lib. 3 to Quirinus, near the end)
clearly says that the Apostles only commanded that they should abstain from idolatry, fornication
and the shedding of blood. Chrysostom and Oecumenius understand blood in this passage to mean
homicide. Just the same, in all Greek and Latin codices we discover blood and suffocated animals,
and it is certain from Tertullian in his Apologeticus, ch. 9, and from the Council of Gangrense, can.
2, that this was kept as a precept in the Church for many years, so that Christians would not eat
blood or suffocated animals. Besides, there was no reason why the Apostles should forbid
homicide, for they only meant to forbid certain things on which the gentiles were uncertain as to
whether they were sins; but all confessed that homicide was a sin.

Therefore, we respond that the Apostles especially forbade fornication because this did not
seem to be a sin to the gentiles since it was punished by no law; then they commanded abstinence
from anything immolated to idols, as well as blood and suffocated animals, not as an observance
of the old law but as their own, namely Apostolic precepts. The purpose for this law was to make
it easier for the Church to make a unity of the Jews and Gentiles, for in these beginnings the Jews
could not have a common society with the Gentiles if they saw them eat meat immolated to idols,
or blood or suffocated animals, from which they vehemently recoiled. Later, as the Church rose
and the purpose of that law ceased, the law also ceased in itself. St. Augustine speaks on this
matter (lib. 32 contra Faustum, c. 13): “Then, if the Apostles commanded Christians to abstain from
the blood of animals and not to eat the meat of suffocated animals, it seems to me they chose an
easy matter for a time, and by no means an onerous observance, in which with the Israelites the
Gentiles also on account of that cornerstone, building two walls in themselves, commonly
observed something. ... With the passage of time, while these two walls came together, the one
from circumcision, the other of the foreskin, although they would build upon the cornerstone, still,
they stood out more distinctly from certain properties, and where the Church was so effected of
the nations that no fleshly Israelite remained, no Christian feels bound to abstain from thrushes
or small birds because their blood has not been poured out, or from rabbits because they are killed
by a stroke on the neck without shedding their blood. Any who still are afraid to touch these
things are laughed at by the rest.”

Thus, neither did the Council err, nor James change the teaching of Peter, but before the
matter was defined he thought this precept must be added to Peter’s judgment, both at that time
and later when it was defined by the common opinion. See Jerome in his letter to Augustine,
which is 11 among the epistles of Augustine, where he says that James and all others acquiesced
to the teaching of Peter.

Fourthly, they advance the Council of Neo-Caesarea, confirmed by Leo IV (dist. 20, ca. De
libellis) and received in the Council of Nicaea as it is said in the Council of Florence (sess. 7), for
in this Council, can. 7, an explored error is discovered in which second marriages are forbidden:
“A priest [says the Council] shall not be a guest at the nuptials of persons contracting a second
marriage; for, since the bigamist is worthy of penance, what kind of a priest will he be, who, by
being present at the feast, sanctioned the marriage,” which still the Apostle concedes in 1 Cor. 7:
“If her husband sleeps, she is free to marry whom she will, but in the Lord”?

I respond: The Council speaks on one who has two wives at the same time, as the Gloss
correctly explains (31 q. 1 can. de his qui frequenter). Or, it can be said secondly, it is not forbidden
according to matrimony, but according to the solemnity of matrimony, for such a solemnity is not
suited to the name of marriage, as Ambrose witnesses about Abraham (lib. 2 de Abraham, cap. 9).
Therefore, that canon forbids a priest to be present at the celebration of a second marriage,
because he ought to enjoin penance upon them instead, who apply a celebration of this sort in a
second marriage against the custom of the Church.

Fifthly, they advance the first Council of Nicaea, about which Luther says he does not see the
Holy Spirit in that Council (de Conciliis, pars prima). For in one canon it says that those who have
been castrated are not suitable to be priests, while in another it forbids priests to have wives, and
he concludes at length, on page 92, “Does the Holy Spirit have any other business in Councils than
to bind and burden his ministers with impossible and unnecessary laws?”

In the same place, Luther relates an erroneous Canon of the Council of Nicaea that the
Paulians must be rebaptized, and a similar one from the Council of Iconium related by Eusebius
in book 7 of his Ecclesiastical History, ch. 6. Likewise, Luther, Brenz and Hermann assert that
military service was condemned in the same Council of Iconium, although it was certain that it
is licit from the approval given by John the Baptist in Luke 3:14. Moreover, canon 11 of that
Council holds: “Those who truly, by the grace of God, were called to show their faith, by having
lain aside their military gear, yet after this return to their own vomit so as to make money and
again return to military service shall live for ten years among the penitents, after they have been
with the “listeners”, that is, the Catechumens, for three years.”

I respond: The Council of Nicaea was always held in authority by the Fathers, so it is a wonder
if it could come into Luther’s mind that he would write something against this Council. But
without a doubt, it so behooves the heretics to advance so as to rebuke those things which every
Catholic Church always approved. Still, to the matter. Luther is displeased by the law enjoining
ecclesiastical men to continence, and therefore he declares the Council erred. But to us it seems
that Luther erred both in word and in deed, not the Council, but the disputation on this matter will
be established in its proper place.

Still, when he rebukes the canon on rebaptizing the Paulians, he advances his ignorance. The
Paulians believed that Christ was a mere man; they publicly rejected the Trinity, and did not
baptize in the name of the Trinity. Hence, they do not truly baptize. Moreover, the Council of
Iconium was a particular Council, and condemned by the Supreme Pontiff, just as the Council of
Carthage celebrated under Cyprian, and we scarcely defend Councils of this kind.

Now with what attains to military service: the Council of Nicaea did not forbid military service
except insofar as at one time it was a sign of idolatry. It must be known that at one time the marks
of military service were a great honor and also suitable on account of the great privileges conceded
to soldiers, and for that reason, those ancient heathen emperors, in the time of persecution,
customarily took away these marks to dishonor anyone discovered to be a Christian who refused
to deny the faith. This fact is clear from Eusebius (lib. 8 Hist. cap. 10), who also says Licinius, from
the beginning of his persecution expelled Christians from the palace and from all military service.
Likewise, Ruffinus, who in his history (lib. 10 cap. 32) speaks about Julian the Apostate, that he
commanded the marks of military service not to be given except to those that sacrificed to idols.
He also says (lib. 11, cap. 2) that Valentinianus received rule from God, because he removed all
military garb in the time of Julian for the sake of his faith.

Because then certain Christian soldiers laid aside military honors for the love of the faith,
preferring rather more to live without honor than the faith; but then, seduced by the devil, again
wore these honors and were prepared to deny the faith, the Council constituted this severe
penance against them. That this is so is clear, firstly, from Theodore Balsamon and Zonaras, who
explained it this way in their commentaries on these canons. Secondly, from Ruffinus, who in book
10 of his history, ch. 6, while enumerating the canons of the Council of Nicaea posits: “Who cast
off military service for the sake of the confession of faith, etc.” Thirdly, from the canon itself, since
in the whole canon it is argued on those that fell, and first indeed to those who fell on account of
fear for their life, or of losing wealth, fell by denying the faith, the Council enjoined a penance of
ten years, then on those who took up military service again which they scorned for the faith, he
enjoins them a penance of thirteen years, because without a doubt these fell more seriously, for
the former simply denied the faith, while the latter, after denying the grace after the confession
in which a greater ingratitude toward God is discovered.

In the sixth place, Hermann advances the second Council of Arles, where it is said in the
second canon: “It is not fitting for someone to be taken up to the priesthood while continuing in
the bond of matrimony unless he will have promised to convert.” Here, Hermann Hamelmann
notes two errors. 1) That it is not lawful for priests to have use of wives since it is against the
Council of Gangrense, and in canon 4 of which they are excommunicated that refuse to be present
at Mass which is offered by a married priest. Moreover, this Council was received by Leo IV, dist.
20, can. De libellis. Nay more, it is also against the Council of Nicaea wherein the opinion of
Paphnutius was approved, who thought that Ecclesiastics should not be forbidden their own wives
by custom, as is clear from Socrates (lib. 1 cap. 8) from which it necessarily follows that the
Council of Arles erred, or else Gangrense and Nicaea did. 2) He notes the error in the word
“convert,” for we do not convert from something unless it is bad, therefore whoever bids a married
man to convert condemns wedlock, which is a heresy condemned in the same Council of
Gangrense, can. 1.

I respond: Those Councils are not opposed with themselves nor did any of them err; for the
Council of Gangrense published canons against those who thought marriage, as well as the eating
of foods, were absolutely evil and from the devil, which was the Manichaean heresy, and later,
Eustachius Sebastenus, against whom the Council of Gangrense was celebrated. Therefore,
because these heretics so abhorred marriage that they could not bear priests that had wives, even
if they would not have them (at least as wives), that Council also thought this canon must be
added. From there, it is so held in the very canon: “Whoever discerns that it is not fitting to
partake in the Sacrifice [of Mass] from a priest that had a wife whenever he offers it, anathema
sit.” There you see it is a question of one who had, a wife not who has one.

As for that about the Council of Nicaea above, we answer that the history was not faithfully
related by Socrates and, so as to pass over other arguments, it is gathered enough from that
Council of Arles, for this Council was celebrated soon after the conclusion of the Council of Nicaea
and received all of its canons as is clear from the fact that this Council repeats nearly everything
that was in it. Therefore, since we even find this here, without a doubt it was either also in the
Council of Nicaea or at least was not contrary to it, for Catholics never opposed the Council of
Nicaea.

I say to the last argument that conversion is not only said from a bad state to a good one, but
also from a good to a better. This is why Gregory the Great (lib. 2 epist. 100) calls the profession
of monastic life a conversion, and there is extant a title in canon law on the conversion of spouses.

In the seventh place, Hermann Hamelmann advances the Council of Sirmium, which seems
to have been received because the heresy of Photinus was condemned in it, yet, clearly the Airan
heresy was confirmed in this Council. The same can be said on Sardica, that it was received by Leo
IV (dist. 20 can. De libellis). And still, St. Augustine says: “Learn what you do not know, Sardica
was a Council of the Arians, etc.” (contra Cresconium, lib. 3 cap. 34).

I respond: These arguments proceed from ignorance of history. Accordingly, many confessions
were published in the Council of Sirmium besides the condemnation of Photinus, some Catholic,
others of heretics, as we taught above, and is clear from Hilary in his book on Councils. Moreover,
Sardica was soon divided into two parts, one part, being composed of 300 western bishops, with
whom there were legates of Pope Julius on the side of the Catholic faith and the restoration of
Athanasius. This is clear from Hilary in his book de Synodis, as well as from Athanasius in his
Second Apology, and Leo IV confirmed this party. The other part was of 70 eastern bishops who,
coming together separate from the others, condemned the Catholic faith and St. Athanasius. And
Augustine speaks about the latter. Moreover, it does not appear that Augustine read anything
from the Council of Sardica than that which the eastern bishops sent to Africa to unite themselves
with the Donatists.

In the eighth place, Hermann Hamelmann advances the Council of Laodicaea, in the first
chapter of which it is established that, following an indulgence, communion should be given to
those who are joined in a second marriage, from which it seems the Council earlier had taken
away communion from those who married a second wife and later condoned sin by restoring it
to them; for it signifies it with, “following an indulgence”.

I respond: firstly, perhaps the Council speaks about those who apply solemnity in a second
marriage, as we said on the Council of Neo-Cesarea. Secondly, I say the Council did not err, even
if it spoke on a second marriage, rather it corrected an error; for it appears in this place that some
particular Bishops, from zeal but not according to knowledge, denied communion to someone
married twice, which error the Council corrected and commanded those married twice to be
restored to communion; therefore in the beginning of the canon it calls second marriages free and
legitimate. But that “following an indulgence” is taken from Paul in 1 Cor. 7:6, where he says that
he does not command the use of a spouse, but forgives. When he says he forgives the use of a wife,
he did not mean that he forgives a sin, but that he concedes a lesser good, although he desired that
they would embrace a greater good; so this Council says it forgives second marriages, i.e. concedes
them as a lesser good, although it would prefer widowhood to be chosen, which is a certain good
that is more excellent than wedlock.

In the ninth place, Hermann Hamelmann advances the second general Council, in canon 5 in
which two errors are discovered opposed with the decrees of other Councils: 1) is that
Ecclesiastical Primacy is of the Roman Pontiff. 2) The other is that the Bishop of Constantinople
ought to follow immediately after the Roman Pontiff, which was again renewed in the Council of
Chalcedon in the last act. The first error is opposed with the Council of Nicaea, in the seventh
canon of which it attributes primacy to the Bishop of Jerusalem, and with the third Council of
Carthage, ch. 26, where it is discerned that no man ought to be called prince of priests, or supreme
priest.

The second error is opposed with the Council of Nicaea, can. 6, where second place is given
to Alexandria, third to Antioch, and Pope Leo I frequently cites this canon (epist. 53, 54 &55).

I respond: First it is neither an error nor opposed to any Council. But what Hermann adds
from canon 7 of the Council of Nicaea is of no avail, for there some honor is attributed to the
Bishop of Jerusalem, but not primacy in every Church; nay more, the See of Jerusalem is not only
subjected in that Council to the Roman See, but also to those of Alexandria and Antioch, and even
Caesarea which was the Metropolitan See of Palestine, as is clear from canon 6 & 7 of that very
Council, and from Leo (loc. cit.) as well as from St. Jerome in his epist. to Pammachius on the errors
of John of Jerusalem. Still, what he adds from the Council of Carthage is even more impertinent,
since that Council was a national Council, nor did it impose laws for the universal Church, but
only for the Bishops of Africa: therefore it neither did nor could forbid the Roman Pontiff to be
called a prince of priests, or supreme priest, but merely lest any Metropolitan of Africa would be
so called.

The second error cannot properly be said to be an error; for that decree on the honor of the
Sees, just as it was done at the Council of Nicaea, could in like manner be changed by a similar
Council; still, because it was changed without a just reason by the Council of Constantinople and
later by Chalcedon, the Roman Pontiffs, Damasus and Leo, refused to approve it, and no decree
in the times of those popes commanded it to be put into execution, as is clear from the epistle of
Pope Leo to Anatholius, where, speaking on the decree of the Council of Constantinople he says:
“The consent of certain bishops was advanced in vain, for which the succession of so many years
denied the effect.” And in epistle 55 to Pulcheria, speaking on the decree of the Council of
Chalcedon he said: “We make void the agreement of the Bishops opposed to the rules of the holy
canons enacted at Nicaea, by the piety of your faith united with ours, and through the authority
of Blessed Peter the Apostle we altogether invalidate it by a general definition.”

In the tenth place, Hermann Hamelman advances the third Council of Carthage, can. 47, where
certain Apocryphal books are numbered in the Canon, such as Tobit, Judith, Baruch, Wisdom,
Sirach and Maccabees, against the authority of the last Canon of the Council of Laodicea, where
all these books are rejected from the Canon.

I respond: In the first place, the Council of Carthage is of greater authority than Laodicea both
because it is later, and also because it was a national Council of 44 Bishops that was later confirmed
by Pope Leo IV (dist. 20 can. De libellis). But Laodicea was a provincial Council of 22 Bishops and
was not confirmed by the Pope. Consequently, here is what Augustine says can have place, that
earlier Councils are corrected by later. Nevertheless, I say secondly that neither Council erred. The
Council of Laodicea placed in the canon those books on which the Bishops of that Council were
certain; they omitted others, however, certainly not denying them to be canonical, but refusing to
define a doubtful matter; but the Council of Carthage discussed the matter at greater length and
defined that which an earlier Council left in doubt.

In the eleventh place, he advances the first Council of Toledo, where it is written in its 17th
canon that someone that has a concubine can be admitted to communion, provided he were not
married; this Council was celebrated at the command of Pope Leo I, as is clear from cap. 21. I
respond: In this place a wife is called a concubine, who was married without a dowry and external
solemnity, as Gratian correctly noted (dist. 34, can. Omnibus); which is in conformity with civil
law, as is clear from Novella 18 of Justinian. Genesis says the same thing about Hagar (25:6), and
Cethura are called the concubines of Abraham who were still true wives, as is clear from Genesis
16:3 about Hagar, and 25:1 about Cethura.

But someone will object that St. Leo, who commanded this Council to take place and approved
it in ep. 92 to Rusticus of Narbonne in chapter 4, speaking about a wife and a concubine, says: “A
concubine is not truly a wife nor does a union with her make a sacrament or matrimony; and for
this reason that woman, who marries a man having a concubine, does not sin as though she wed
a married man, because the man having the concubine, is not said to be married. I respond that
Leo receives the term concubine in a different sense than the Fathers of this Council received it,
for he calls someone a concubine that is taken as a consort to the bed without mutual consent to
live together forever; but the Council calls a woman a concubine that is wed with this consent but
privately and not by public means.

But someone might say, if Leo was the author of this Council, how did he absolutely deny a
wife could be called a concubine? I respond that Leo was not the author of this Council, but of the
last canon. For from the beginning, it is said of the Council that this Council was gathered in the
time of the emperors Honorius and Arcadius, Leo was not yet Pope in that time; for he was created
in the time of Theodosius the younger, thirty years after the death of Arcadius, as is clear from
the Chronicum of Prosper. Then in the last canon some explanation of faith is placed, which was
made at the command of Pope Leo, which cannot make sense unless we were to say that the
Council of Toledo was held before the times of Leo, but later, in his time, that explanation of faith,
was finished, and connected to the same Council, because the same Bishops subscribed to this
explanation who were in the Council earlier. And certainly there can be a great conjecture of this
matter which we shall see, before that explanation of faith the subscriptions of the Bishops were
placed, among whom the Council came to an end. Then, again, the other subscriptions of the same
after that explanation of faith. Therefore, St. Leo did not confirm this Council except for that last
Canon made in his time.

In the twelfth place, Hermann Hamelmann advances the Council of Worms, in canon 3 of
which an explored error is discovered. It commands that secret thieves be discovered by reception
of the Holy Eucharist, which St. Thomas teaches is an error (3 q. 80 ar. 6 ad 3). I respond, the
Council was provincial and not confirmed, nay more it is rather more condemned, in regard to that
canon, by the Supreme Pontiffs, as St. Thomas shows in that place.

In the thirteenth place, he advances Canons of the sixth Council, since these seem to be
received, for Adrian I in his epistle to Tharasius, which is in the second action of the seventh
Council, says these canons were divinely and legally predicated. Likewise, Nicholas I in his epistle
to the Emperor Michael, as well as Innocent III, cap. A multis, extra de aetate ordinandorum, and
the seventh Council in act. 2, 3, 4 5 and 6 uses these canons. But great errors are discovered in
these canons. Canon 2 receives the Council under Cyprian on rebaptizing heretics, which St.
Augustine proved was erroneous in his seven books on Baptism, likewise, 72 canons are judged
to be invalid and dissolve marriages of Catholics with heretics, which is an express error; even if
a Catholic sins in marrying a heretic, still the marriage is a sacrament on account of the character
of Baptism which heretics retain and therefore such a wedlock cannot be broken.

I respond: Not only these two, but even many other canons are erroneous among these canons,
but they were not published by any legitimate and approved Council. For it is certain from
Tharasius in the seventh Council, act. 4, that these canons were not published by the sixth
Council, which took place in the time of Pope Agatho and the Emperor Constantinus, but many
years after under the emperor Justinian II, at which Council the Roman Pontiff was not present
either in himself or through legates, and he did not later confirm the Council but clearly
condemned it, as Bede witnesses in his book de sex aetatibus in Justinian, as well as Paul the
Deacon in his life of the same Justinian, and Platina in the life of Sergius.

I respond to the words of Adrian: here he only recites the opinion of Tharasius, nor does he
refute it, because that 82nd Canon on pictures was useful in the time for which that question was
argued. I respond to Nicholas, that his words were for us, for he says he cited that canon of the
Greeks in the way that Paul cited the words of heathen poets. I say to Innocent, there he defined
nothing in regard to these canons, but only cited one canon from them; moreover, the fact that he
cited them in the name of the sixth Council happened either because they were so-called
commonly, although they were not truly from that Council; or because Innocent received them
from Gratian, dist. 32, can. Si quis. Moreover, Gratian often erred in this regard, attributing a work
to those of whom they were not. I say to the seventh Council, these canons were always cited by
private men in that Council during disputation, but nothing was defined by the whole Council,
for the definition of the Council is contained in act 7 only. There, however, no mention is made
of these Canons. See Francis Turrrianus in his book on the seventh Council, and those which
argued on these canons in book 2 of On the Roman Pontiff, ch. 14.

In the fourteenth place, Hermann Hamelmann (lib. 3 Prolegom. can. ult.), Calvin (Inst. lib. 1
cap. 11 § 14 and following), lib. 4 cap. 9 § 9; and even the Centuriators (8 cap. 9) advance the
seventh Council, that second of Nicaea, which they say is opposed with two Councils: the one
earlier, that is of Constantinople under Constantine Copronymus, the other later, of Frankfurt
under Charlemagne, so that one must either follow the rule of St. Augustine in de Baptismo book
2, cap. 3, who would have it that earlier Councils are corrected by later ones, or the rule of St.
Isidore cited by Gratian, dist. 50, can. Domino sancto, which teaches the more ancient Councils
must be placed ahead of more recent ones, either way it would be necessary to reject this Council
of Nicaea.

The fact that Nicaea II is opposed with the earlier Council of Constantinople is clear from
Nicaea II, act. 6, where the Fathers in the time of the more recent emperor at the Council of
Constantinople defined that images were not to be venerated in any matter, which is opposed with
the later Council of Frankfurt, in which even the legates of the Roman Pontiff were present; our
adversaries prove: 1) from Ado, Aimonio, the Abbot of Ursberg, Platina and other historians who,
when they speak on the times of Charlemagne and Adrian, say that in the Council of Frankfurt
the seventh Council of the Greeks was condemned; 2) they show it from four books of
Charlemagne which were recently published in the year 1549, and there Charlemagne uses many
words against images and opposed the seventh Council, and in the same place we read those
books were approved in the Council of Frankfurt.

I respond: Nicaea II is not opposed to any legitimate Council. First, what attains to the Council
of Constantinople under the emperor Constantine Copronymus, it is certain that it was neither
general nor legitimate in any way, since the Roman Pontiff is not found at it in himself or through
legates, as John Zonaras and Cedrenus relate in the life of Constantine Copronymus, and the
Centuriators affirm the same thing (Cent. 8 cap. 9 col. 551). Yet, without the Roman Pontiff
ecumenical Councils cannot be celebrated, as is clear from the rule of the Council of Nicaea which
Socrates cites (lib. 2 cap. 13). The fact that the other three patriarchs were not present, namely of
Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem, as is clear from the same Zonaras, Cedrenus and the
Centuriators. Therefore, how can it be called a general Council to which neither the east, nor the
west, nor the south consented, but merely a few bishops from the north? Then, as many historians
as are extant, both Greek (such as Zonaras, Psellus, Photius, Nicetas, Cedrenus), and Latin (such
as Rheginus, Sigebert, Ado, Paul the Deacon, the Abbot of Ursberg) and many others, all either
clearly condemn this Council or refuse to number it among the Councils of the Church.

Moreover, on the Council of Frankfurt, which our adversaries especially depend upon, I say
three things. Firstly, whatever that Council defined, it is not made greater, since there is no
question that the second Council of Nicaea must be placed before it, which certainly was more
universal, more ancient, and without controversy approved by the Supreme Pontiff. For it is
certain from the Council itself, legates of Pope Adrian were present and again that it was approved
by Leo III is clear from Ivo of Chartres, 4 part. cap. 147.

I say secondly, if it is true what the Centuratiors say (Cent. 8 cap. 9 col. 639) this Council does
not harm our position. For they say Adrian and his legates did not consent to the Council of
Frankfurt but condemned it; but it is certain that a Council which the Roman Pontiff condemns
is of no authority, as is clear from Gelasius in his volume on the bond of anathema, as well as from
experience. No Council was ever held as legitimate which the Roman Pontiff condemned. What
of the fact that this Council of Frankfurt teaches this thing, for that is clear from the Carolingian
books, the Council of Frankfurt decreed that the last judgment of controversies pertains to the
Roman Pontiff, and especially by this argument tried to refute the seventh Council because it
thought that it was celebrated without the authority of the Roman Pontiff; therefore the Council
of Frankfurt destroys the position of the Centuriators by its own testimony.

Besides, the Centuriators say in the same place that the Council of Nicaea was confirmed by
Adrian, and that the Council of Frankfurt condemned a Council completed without the authority
of the Pope, therefore in the judgment of the Centuriators, it is not our Nicaea, but some other
which is condemned by that Council. Next, the Centuriators teach in the same place that the
Council of Frankfurt did not define that images must be removed from Churches, but that in
churches they should remain but not be worshipped; therefore, why remove images from
Churches? Why break them? Why not preserve the decree of Frankfurt? From all this, the lie of
the Apology of the English is refuted, since it teaches that in the Council of Frankfurt there was
a decree that images be destroyed, while on the other hand, the Council of Frankfurt, by the
testimony of the Carolingian Books, Hincmar of Reims and of the Centuriators themselves,
anathema was pronounced upon those who would destroy images. Besides, the matter itself shows
the same thing; if that Synod established it, why was it not done? For who in the western Church
would resist a decree of all Bishops and an all-powerful king? Moreover, the fact that it did not
happen is more certain because no historian relates it, nay more, Jonas Aurelianensis relates it as
a new thing and a sacrilege that Claudius Taurinensis wanted to destroy images in his diocese.

Thirdly, I say the matter is most uncertain which was established on images in the Council of
Frankfurt, for ancient authors have not proven it. In the first place the very decree of this Council,
which is cited in the preface of the Carolingian Books witnesses that in the Council of Frankfurt,
a Council that had convened at Constantinople and had commanded images to be worshiped was
condemned. Since it names Constantinople, it seems to speak about the Council of the heretics
against images, but when it says there was a decree that images should be worshipped, it seems
to speak about the Council of the Catholics [at Nicaea].

For equal reason, these Carolingian books say in the Council of Frankfurt a Council was
condemned that was held in Constantinople in Bithynia without the authority of the Pope, for the
adoration of images; after it names Constantinople and says that this Council did not have the
authority of the Pope, it seems to speak about a Council of heretics; moreover, since it says in
Bithynia the Council was celebrated for images, it seems to speak about our Nicaea. For Nicaea
is a great city in Bithynia, but Constantinople is in Thracia.

Indeed, Hincmar of Reims, in cap. 20 of his book against Hincmar of Laon, who lived in nearly
the same time, says a Council which convened at Nicaea without the Pope’s authority was
condemned in the Council of Frankfurt, where he also unites two contrary things, as is clear.
Aimonius (lib. 4 cap. 85) on the deeds of the Franks and the Abbot of Ursperg in his Chronicum for
the year 793, writes that in the Council of Frankfurt the seventh Council of the Greeks was
condemned, which had convened at Constantinople under Constantine and Irene. There they also
join contrary things between themselves. Moreover, many recent historians say that in the Council
of Frankfurt, the Council that abolished images was condemned, which the Greeks call the seventh
General Council. So does Platina in the life of Adrian, Blondus, decadis 2, lib. 1, Sabellicus lib. 8;
Enneadis, 8; Paulus Aemilius lib. 2, de gestis Francorum.

On account of this confusion Alanus Copus, in his Dialogue (4 and 5), teaches that in the
Council of Frankfurt only the heretical Council of Constantinople was condemned, but not only
was Nicaea not condemned, rather it was also confirmed. I would desire such an opinion to be
true, nevertheless I suspect it is false.

1) Because these Carolingian books, although they are falsely attributed to Charlemagne, as
we will say, were nevertheless written in his times, as is clear from the refutation of the same
books which Adrian I published; and they seem to have been written in the Council of Frankfurt,
and they also contain the acts of this Council. Hincmar asserts that the author was of this time and
the books themselves represent this: moreover, the fact that the Council, which is refuted in these
books, is really the Second Council of Nicaea cannot be doubted if either the books themselves,
or the response of Adrian were read.

2) Because all ancient authors agree on this, that in the Council of Frankfurt the Seventh
Council was condemned which had decreed that images must be adored. So teach Hincmar,
Aimonius, Rheginus, Ado and others; but to say that all of them lied or that their books were
corrupted, as Copus says, seems to me a little too hard.

3) Because if these authors spoke on the false seventh Council, that is the Council of
Constantinople against images, certainly they would also have remembered Nicaea II in their
histories, but they do not mention any seventh Council except for this one which they say
condemned images. It is also not opposed that the Carolingian books, as Abbot of Ursperg and
Aimonius say, condemn the Council held at Constantinople; for the Abbot followed the
Carolingian books, as also Aimonius, but the author of these books either had a lapse of memory
or from inexperience placed the name of Constantinople in place of Nicaea; for otherwise when
he says a Council celebrated in the province of Bythinia, where Nicaea is, not Constantinople, it
seems to show enough that he spoke about Nicaea, and likewise the Abbot and Aimonius when
they say a Council celebrated under Constantine and Irene, clearly they show that they are
speaking about Nicaea II, even if through an error they named Constantinople.

And it is not opposed that Hincmar and the Carolingian books say the Council was
condemned at Frankfurt was convened without the authority of the Pope, which is false about
Nicaea and true about Constantinople. For Hincmar followed the Carolingian books, as he shows,
for the author of those books fabricated this lie with many others that he would impose upon the
Council of Frankfurt, as we will say in a little while.

Lastly, it is not opposed that Platina, Blondus, Sabellicus and Paulus Aemilius say that a
Council forbidding images was condemned, for in the first place all of these are more recent. Then,
what they say does not oppose the sayings of the old historians since two Councils are condemned
in the Council of Frankfurt, namely Constantinople against Images and Nicaea II for images, as
is clear from the Carolingian books and from Hincmar, and perhaps this is the reason why some
of the ancient historians name Nicaea, some Constantinople, when they say a Council of the
Greeks condemned at the Council of Frankfurt.

Therefore, it seems to me that in the Council of Frankfurt Nicaea II was truly condemned, but
in error and materially, in the same way as once the Council of Ariminium condemned the term
homoousion. For the author of the Carolingian books inflicted upon the Council and blocked it up
with two lies. One lie was that in the Council of Nicaea it was defined that images should be
adored with the cult of latria. The other is that the decree was made without the consent of the
Roman Pope. Since it held these two lies as true, the Council of Frankfurt condemned, and rightly
if these two things were true, the Council of Nicaea as profane and illegitimate.

The fact that these two lies persuaded the Council is clear from he Carolingian books
themselves, for the preface clearly says: “A new question has been brought [to the Council’s
attention] from a Council of the Greeks, which they made at Constantinople concerning the
adoration of images, in which it was decreed that those who would not so devote service and
adoration of images of the saints deified as the Trinity, will be judged anathema, which moreover,
our Fathers refusing to devote service to them, scorned and condemned those consenting to it.”
Also, in the work, Constantine, the Bishop of Cyprus is introduced at the second Council of Nicaea
speaking anathema against anyone that does not adore images with the same cult in which the
most Holy Trinity is adored. There you clearly have the first lie.

The same author clearly teaches that judgment of controversies of faith pertains to the Pope,
and therefore, that Council would avail nothing for the adoration of images which lacked the
authority of the Pope.

Besides, these ancient authors, who say they condemned the false Council which had decreed
images must be adored, without a doubt understand “must be adored with latria” for “must be
adored”, for they also teach images must be venerated and still that Council rebuked those that
commanded images to be worshiped. Ado, in his Chronicum for the year 696, says that at Rome,
on the day of the exaltation of the Cross, the Cross was kissed by the whole people, and given
customary adoration and even in the same work for the year 717, he calls an image which the
heretic Philippicus overturned and the Catholic emperor Theodosius restored something that must
be venerated. Rheginus, in book 1 of his Chronicum, near the end, recognizes the adoration of the
Cross and called the toppling of images by Leo the Iconoclast a crime. John Aventinus (lib. 4,
annalium) says that at a sign from the Emperor Charlemagne, his image in the Church was
venerated by all present. The Abbot of Ursperg, in his Chronicle, inveighs against Leo the Isaurian
and Constantine Copronymus, on account of the casting out of images and calls them impious and
precursors of Antichrist; and on the other hand he praises Pope Gregory and calls him a holy man
because he excommunicated the emperor on account of the destruction images of Christ and the
Saints.

The fact that these are truly lies, namely that Nicaea II lacked the authority of the Pope and
that it decreed images must be adored with the cult of latria is most certain. In the Second Council
of Nicaea itself, act. 2, they recite the epistles of Pope Adrian favoring images and in all actions
the legates of the Pope are the first to subscribe. Then with what attains to cult, in the first act
Basil of Ancyra, who was previously a heretic, when he had become reasonable again published
a Catholic confession with the attention and approval of the whole Council, said he certainly
worships images, but not with the cult of latria, since this is due to God alone. The Bishop
Constantine of Cyprus spoke likewise in the seventh Council, act. 3. All the rest say the same
thing in act. 4 and 7.

And one ought not marvel that the author of the Carolingian books would have blocked up
the Council of Frankfurt with such manifest lies about Nicaea II held a little earlier. If today the
Centuriators and Calvin dare to write that we worship images with divine honors as gods when
so many books of Catholics and a Latin Council celebrated in German lands at Trent all clearly and
eloquently declare the contrary, what marvel is it if the same was made up about a Greek Council
which was celebrated in the east and few could read?

Yet, what if someone were to say that at least the Council of Frankfurt, which was very well
attended and legitimate could err?

I respond: It could err and did err not in a matter of law but on a question of fact, and besides,
it would be no wonder if it could err for the Roman legates did not consent, as the Centuriators
say. For the Pope not only withheld his consent, but even refuted the decree of Frankfurt, as is
clear from the book of Adrian on images to Charlemagne, where all the lies of those Carolingian
books are refuted.

Next, the fact that they advance these accounts from those books as though they were of
Charlemagne, which serves as the foundation of this case. I say those books are neither of
Charlemagne nor can any trust be placed in them.

That they are not of Charlemagne is proved 1) because the book of Pope Adrian I to
Charlemagne is extant, in which these books are accurately refuted and it is especially understood
that those books were composed by a heretic and sent by Charles to the Pope so that he would
respond to them. Moreover, there is this book of Adrian, which is extant in the third volume of
Councils, and it can also be understood from Ivo of Chartres, who transfers many things from this
book in the name of Adrian in the fourth part of his decree.

2) It is certain from the Greek and Latin historians, Zonaras and Cedrenus in the life of Leo
the Isaurian, still Paul the Deacon in the life of the same, that the Roman Pontiffs Gregory III,
Adrian I and Leo III defected from the Greek emperors, excommunicated them, forbade taxes to
be sent to them from Italy, and consigned themselves to the protection of the Franks, and also at
length transferred the empire to them especially for the reason that the Greek Emperors gave
patronage to the heresy of Iconoclasm, since conversely, the kings of the Franks were steadfast
in the ancient faith. How could it have the appearance of truth that the Emperor Charlemagne
labored in the same heresy and favored the error of the Greeks against which the Roman Pontiff
wrote? Rather, let us hear the words of Zonaras: “Therefore, Pope Gregory forsook obedience of
the emperor on account of the perversity of his opinion, made peace with the Franks since they
had previously often given assistance that he might recall Emperor Leo from hatred of God by
letters, and lead him back to the cult of sacred images.” And then on the life of Irene: “After the
death of Adrian, the Pope of old Rome, Leo was appointed Pope, a revered and honorable man,
who, consigned himself to Charles, the king of the Franks, and from that time Rome was in the
power of the Franks, and Charles, after being crowned by Pope Leo, was called Emperor of the
Romans.” For Pope Gregory would have nothing to do with the impious governors of the Church
of Constantinople, and made peace with the Franks.

3) John of Arles writes in book 1 de cultu imaginum (and he lived in the time of Louis the
Pious, the son of Charles), that Claudius Taurinensis, the patron of that heresy for the whole time
in which Charlemagne lived, never dared to utter a sound. And in the same place, he calls the
Emperor Charlemagne that most pious man, and of holy memory. Therefore, if the Iconoclasts,
living at the same time as Charlemagne did not dare to preach their heresy, if the defenders of
images venerated Charlemagne as a pious and holy emperor, how impudent is it to attribute these
books against images to Charlemagne?

4) Paulus Aemilius writes in book 2 of his history of the Franks, just as Rheginus in his
Chronicus, in Council compelled by a certain heathen, King Peppin, the father of Charlemagne,
confuted the error of the Greeks against sacred images with the legates of the Greek emperor
present; from the same Paulus it is certain that not long after Pope Stephen celebrated a Council
at Rome against the same error of the Greeks to which Charlemagne sent twelve bishops from
particular parts of his kingdom. So what boldness do our adversaries rest upon to transform this
most Christian prince into an Iconoclast? Especially when the Centuriators assent on the side of
Paulus Aemilius? (Cent. 8, cap. 9 col. 570).

5) It is certain from all historians and from the letters and songs of Charlemagne, nay more
even from his deeds, that he was always most united with Pope Adrian. Still, there is an epitaph
extant by the Emperor Charlemagne that is no less elegant than it is piously written, cited by
Onuphrius in his addition to Platina, which begins in this way:

Hic pater Ecclesiae, Romae decus, inclytus auctor

Adrianus requiem Papa beatus habet.

Vir cui vita Deus, pietas lex, gloria Christus:

Pastor Apostolicus promptus ad omne bonum.

...

Post patrem Carolus lacrymans haec carmina scripsit,

Tu mihi dulcis amor, te modo plango pater.

Tu memor esto mei, sequitur te mens mea semper,

Cum Christo teneas regna beata poli.

This father of the Church, ornament of Rome, the illustrious authority

Blessed Pope Adrian has rest.

A man for whom God was life, law piety and Christ glory;

Apostolic Pastor eager for every good.

...

After a father Charles crying wrote these things,

You are sweet love to me, now I a father mourn you,

Remember me, my mind always follows you,

May you hold the blessed kingdoms of heaven with Christ.

How is it believable then, that Charles was of another religion and faith than Adrian? Or that
he wrote so bitterly against Adrian himself when he venerated him in such a way as well as
praised him after his death?

Next, it is certain that Charlemagne was a man learned in Latin and Greek, prudent and
ingenious, but these books are of a barbarous and unlearned man, light and seem plainly stupid.
For to say that Constantinople, a very famous city, was in Bithynia when everyone knows that it
is in Thrace, unless perhaps there were frequent earthquakes there that only changed it. Then, it
asserts that a Council favoring the cult of images was celebrated at Constantinople, although every
man knows that was celebrated at Nicaea unless he reads nothing at all. And how serious is it to
attribute these many things to the fathers of Nicaea II by calumny and a lie, which they never said,
and meanwhile which their adversaries had said, such is that the Eucharist is an image of the body
of Christ, which not only the Fathers of Nicaea II did not defend, as this author dreams up, but
they even avowedly reject. Wherefore Calvin takes up the occasion of another lie. Since the
Iconoclasts said only one image must be adored, i.e. the Eucharist, and this pseudo-Charles
attributed it to Nicaea, Calvin was pleased to so change the matter, as to say: “Moreover, lest the
fable would lack solemn applause a little clause was added (namely by the Council of Nicaea), ‘let
them rejoice and exult who, having images of Christ, offer sacrifice to them’.” This is a most
impudent lie. God forbid that Nicaea II meant for sacrifice to be offered to images, as we see in act.
7 where they declared precisely that true latria is not to be offered to images, but only honorary
adoration.

Finally, it happens that this book, like another Melchisedech, is without a father, mother or
genealogy; for it appeared suddenly into the light, nor is it known when or where or how, or by
whom it was found, nor does it have the name of the author nor of the printer, nor of the place
where it was printed. Such are all the arguments and the marks of deceit. Be that as it may, what
if it were a book of Charlemagne? What, then, would our adversaries gain? Absolutely nothing.
For the author of this book clearly opposes nearly all the dogmas of Calvin when he clearly
teaches that the final judgment on controversies of faith pertains to the Roman Pontiff, and he
holds the primacy not from Councils but from God himself. The same would have it that exorcism
is applied in Baptism, Churches are dedicated with certain rites, prayers must be offered for the
dead, Saints invoked, relics venerated, chrism, water and salt are to be blessed and retained for use
in the Church, that the body of Christ is truly present in the Eucharist and must be worshiped and
offered as a true and proper sacrifice, all of which our adversaries cite as explored heresies.

So, if they want us to believe this author when he teaches that the Council of Nicaea erred,
let them believe the same when he asserts as many things as we have already enumerated. What
if it were certain that Charlemagne himself wrote this book and it agreed in all things with the
Calvinists, what else would they have but the testimony of one lay soldier? To oppose this to a
general Council of Bishops is manifest foolishness. For as St. John Damascene rightly says about
images (orat. secunda), Christ did not consign the Church to kings and emperors, but to Bishops
and pastors.

In the fifteenth place, they advance two Councils opposed between themselves, in which
Roman Pontiffs presided. For the Roman Council under Stephen VII, it invalidated all the acts of
his predecessor, Pope Formosus. Thereafter, the Council of Ravenna under John IX invalidated the
acts of the Council under Stephen and approved the acts of Formosus. See Sigebert in his
Chronicum for the year 903; Matt. Palmerius in Chronicum for the year 899 and Platina in the lives
of these Popes.

I respond: This was a question of fact, i.e. whether Formosus was a true and legitimate Pope
and because Stephen was badly informed, he thought that Formosus was not a Pope and
invalidated his acts. Later, because John truly investigated the matter better, he discovered the
contrary and corrected the error of the earlier Council, according to the rule of St. Augustine
which says: earlier Councils are emended by later ones, without a doubt in particular cases of this
sort.

In the sixteenth place, they advance the Roman Council under Nicholas II, in which it was
defined that not only the sacrament of the body of Christ, but even the true body of Christ itself
is taken up and broken in the hands of the priests and ground by the teeth of the faithful, as is
clear from can. Ego Berengarius, de consec. dist. 2. But this is a manifest error against the glorious
resurrection of Christ, about which the Apostle speaks: “Christ, rising from the dead, does not die
again.” (Romans 6:9) For if the true body of Christ is broken and ground, certainly it is corrupted
and will die.

I respond: It was never a question of whether the body of Christ truly, as it is in itself, would
be broken in the hands and ground up in the teeth; for it was always certain that the body of
Christ, as it now exists, is incorruptible and cannot be broken and ground except in a sign of the
Sacrament, so that it might be said to be broken and ground since its sign, i.e. the species of bread,
is broken and ground. Yet, the question was whether the sign, which is broken and ground, were
an empty sign or whether it truly and really contained the body of Christ, because Berengarius
had taught it was an empty sign. Thus, the Council, while constituting the form of abjuration of
this error, wanted him to say that it is not only a Sacrament, but also the true body of Christ that
is broken and ground. Here, the sense of the words is not that it is ground and broken as an empty
sign, but also as the true body of Christ, that is rather more a sign really having the body of Christ
joined, or rather, even the true body of Christ existing there present, is broken and ground but not
in itself, rather in the sign. This is how we also understand it with what Chrysostom says: “O how
many times they say would that I might see his form and his shoe! You truly do see it, you touch
it, you eat it.” (Homily 83 in Matthew).

In the seventeenth place, Hermann advances the Lateran Council under Innocent III, in which
it was defined that it must be held as an article of faith that the bread and wine are
transubstantiated in the Sacrament into the body and blood of Christ. But at the Council of
Ephesus anathema is said to all those advancing another creed.

I respond: a) the Lateran Council did not compose any Creed, but merely defined one question
on faith, just as many Councils did after Ephesus.

I say: b) The Council of Ephesus declared anathema to anyone advancing another creed, i.e.
against the Council of Nicaea, but not another, that is, one that is new and more explicit. I say: c)
The Council of Ephesus forbade Bishops to compose a new Creed as well as particular Councils,
but not the Supreme Pontiff or a general Council, for no one has the authority to command an
equal or a greater.

In the eighteenth place, they advance the Council of Constance and Basel, for in sess. 13 they
excommunicated anyone that communicated under both species, but conceded both species to the
Bohemians.

I respond: Whatever might be the case on the authority of Councils, I say these are not
opposed in themselves since Constance excommunicated those who communicated under both
species without a license from the Church. So the precepts of the Fathers are understood, but one
that commands does not thereby deprive himself of the authority to dispense. Moreover, the
Council of Basel dispensed with the Bohemians and gave a license to them to communicate under
both species.

Lastly, they advance from the same Councils of Constance and Basel that they ratified the
position that a Council is above a Pope, whose contrary is held in the fifth Lateran Council, sess.
11, but we will speak on this matter below at the end of this book.

CHAPTER IX: The objection adduced from reason is
answered

LASTLY, they object the following from reason. It often happens in every body of a multitude, that
a greater part conquers the better part, therefore, in Councils of the Church, where all things are
defined by a greater vote, it can easily happen that they fall into error. Thus: while legitimate
Councils cannot err, still who knows whether there was ever a legitimate Council? For a Council
is not legitimate unless it is made up of faithful Bishops; yet who can know whether those who
gather together have true faith and true ordination? Then, in the ancient Councils, Bishops
gathered together from many provinces, diligently examined a proposed question, then subscribed
of their own will, not being coerced by some external force and did other things of this sort which
legitimate Councils require; from what source do we know except faith in historians? But
historians (except for divine ones) often lie, and certainly they do not make firm and infallible
faith. Therefore, it remains that all the decrees of Councils are doubtful.

We respond: In human assemblies it sometimes happens that a greater part conquers the
better; but in a Council of the Church, where the Holy Spirit presides and where Christ is in the
midst of them, in whose name they are gathered and where he is present, to whom it was said by
Truth itself: “I have prayed for thee that thy faith would not fail, and when thou has been
converted, confirm thy brethren,” it is not such a thing that ought to be feared. Even if the greater
part resisted the better, as happened in the Council of Armenia and the second Council of Ephesus,
still it never conquered because acts of Councils of this sort were soon invalidated by the one for
whom it is fitting to confirm the brethren by his office, in the same way as we see happened in the
Councils of Armenia and Ephesus II.

Now, to respond to the second objection, it is not necessary that we know the Bishops that
gather together at Councils have true faith and true ordination, rather, it is enough if the contrary
were not certain. For even if the Supreme Pontiff (which we cannot believe would happen), and
all the Bishops who are called to some general Council by the supreme Pontiff, were really heretics
at heart and were only Catholics by external confession, nor truly received the invisible character
of Sacred Order but an empty imposition of hands, nevertheless, we are certain that God would
never permit that a Council of this sort would err in forming its decrees; for the Holy Spirit assists
in a Council not because of the Council itself, but because of the universal Church which is held
by divine precept to not argue with the teaching of the Bishops, rather, to venerate it. Therefore,
divine providence saw to it that the universal Church would not err, so that even a Council of fake
Bishops, whether they want to or not, would propose the truest faith for the Church to follow.
Hence, for some gathering of Bishops to be legitimate it is also said that it is only required that
these Bishops come together, who ordinarily preside in the Church and are true Bishops, and also
are held publicly as Catholics by all, whatever might be the case on the things that they hide in
their hearts.

Still, because we not only know that God has care of the salvation of his Church, but we also
learn from the Scriptures that the providence of God sweetly disposes all things, consequently we
believe for certain that God will never permit that in a Council, which is believed as legitimate by
the Church, that either all, or the greater part of the Bishops gathered there would not be
legitimate or even Catholics, for it would be terribly hard and violent (although it is not impossible
for God, who also rebuked an insipid prophet with a beast of burden) that a whole Council of
heretics, while opposing his will and teaching, would fashion a Catholic decree.

Certain men respond to the last objection, such as Vega (in Concil. Trid. lib. 3, cap. 39) that a
Council is legitimate and held with Catholic faith by the faithful not because of the witness of
historians but because the Council itself defined this; for Councils usually in the beginning of their
acts define their gathering to be legitimate and gathered in the Holy Spirit.

But this certainly does not seem to be a solid response. Firstly, because the old Councils
usually did not witness in the beginning that the assembly was legitimately gathered in the Holy
Spirit; rather certain later Councils, such as Constance, Basel, Lateran V, Trent and others, give
that witness but not as some decree formed de fide. Among the canons, properly so called, no
canon of any Council has ever been found wherein it is defined that the Council itself is legitimate
whereby those canons are fashioned. Secondly, either it is certain to us from another source that
some Council was legitimate, when they meant to define that it was legitimate, or it is not certain.
If it is certain, in vain is such a decree fashioned; if it is not certain, now we will begin to doubt
the decree itself; if it were ambiguous whether a Council were legitimate before it defined that it
was legitimate, it will also be ambiguous as to whether it would have erred in the very decree in
which it pronounced itself legitimate.

So others respond that any Council you like is legitimate from the circumstances present at
that time, and they can be evident without other proof. For they see that the Bishops come
together as one who are held to be true Bishops by all, and come together from different provinces
and are called by one who has the authority and if something else were required for a legitimate
Council, they can also see since, as we said above, nothing invisible is required. Moreover, for
posterity or those that were absent the very thing is known from human faith, but is most certain
and such evidence can be compared by a natural mode. For the sake of example, not merely one
or two historians witness that the Council of Nicaea was legitimate, but many different writers
of that time as well as of the subsequent times and the Church which now is asserts this very
thing; there is not, nor was there, anyone who would think or did think to the contrary.

This is why, in the same way that Cicero was a consul, Julius Caesar a dictator, Octavian
fought with Mark Antony in a naval battle, and other things of this kind, even if they depend upon
human faith, still they are so certain that they seem to have a certain evidence. So also Councils
of the Church, which we say were legitimate, have so many testimonies of all ages that it leaves
absolutely no doubt in our minds whereby we would believe them to be less than what they are
said.

This is why we must hold with Catholic faith that legitimate Councils confirmed by the
Supreme Pontiff cannot err, even from natural evidence, or that we would know from a most
certain human faith that the Council of Nicaea, Constantinople, the first of Ephesus and others of
this sort were legitimate and approved by the Supreme Pontiff, it certainly follows that we should
believe decrees of this with certain faith. Please, see Melchior Cano in book 6 de Locis, last chapter,
in the solution to the tenth argument, for more on this matter.

CHAPTER X: Particular Councils that were not
approved by the Supreme Pontiff do not in any way
make certain faith

NOW, another question follows namely whether Councils that have not been confirmed by the
Supreme Pontiff would make certain faith. This is not a controversy among Catholics and heretics
and scarcely ever among Catholics, therefore we will briefly explain the whole matter and first
about particular Councils, then we will argue about general ones.

We assert two opinions from the common teaching of Catholics, 1) Councils of this sort
absolutely can err; nevertheless they are of great authority, so that it would be rash to not acquiesce
to them. We have, as a witness to the fact that Councils of this sort could err, the Council of
Carthage under Cyprian, which was national, famous, legitimate and of 85 Bishops, of which many
were martyrs or confessors, as is clear from the letter of Cyprian to Jubaianus, and still it erred.
For a second witness, the fifth Roman Council under Symmachus, where we read that provincial
Councils, because they do not have the presence of the Pope, lost their strength.

For a third, we have Prosper of Aquitaine in his Chronicle for the year 420, in which he says
the Pelagian heresy was condemned by an African Council of 217 Bishops, no sooner was that
heresy condemned by the Church of the whole world than Pope Zozimus approved the decrees
of that Council. This is why St. Augustine (lib. 2 Retract. cap. 50) does not say that the Pelagian
heresy was condemned by African Councils, which were particular, but by Popes Innocent and
Zozimus in cooperation with the African Councils. As a fourth witness, the reason why general
Councils cannot err is from a special twofold cause: 1) Because a general Council represents the
whole Church and therefore, if it were to err, the whole Church would err; 2) because a Council
does not become general without the Supreme Pontiff, for whom Christ prayed that his faith
would not fail; but none of these causes have place in a particular Council.

But someone will object that, in cap. Ad abolendam, extra de haereticis, all those who are
judged heretics by the Roman Church or by a provincial or diocesan Council are excommunicated;
therefore, provincial and diocesan Councils make dogmas on faith, otherwise he would not be a
heretic who would deny them.

I respond: One can be judged for heresy in two ways: 1) secundum se, in the abstract as it were,
as when it is asked whether it is heretical to say this or that; 2) in ordine ad hominem haereticum,
as when it is asked whether this man fell into a heresy that was condemned by the Church.
Therefore, although provincial or diocesan Councils cannot constitute dogmas of faith, still they
can judge whether someone falls into manifest heresy, just as inquisitors also judge. The Council
of Aquileia was gathered in the time of St. Ambrose, but nothing was defined there except that a
certain Palladius was a true disciple of Arius and that chapter, Ad abolendam seems to argue this
about heretics. For even if this judgment is not infallible, still it suffices to excommunicate.

Besides, I say secondly that particular Councils can discern about heresy secundum se, when
it is easy and in which nearly all Doctors agree; in the way that the Council of Antioch once made
a judgment concerning the heresy of Paul of Samosata (cited by Eusebius, lib. 7 hist. cap. 24). The
Bishops agreed on every side, not on a doubtful matter, but to expel a manifest wolf from the
sheepfold of Christ. For, even if this judgment is not altogether infallible, still, private men should
acquiesce to the judgment of the same and if they otherwise need, they should be duly
excommunicated provided that the Apostolic See or a universal Council would not judge
otherwise.

Next, I say thirdly that particular Councils can also define dogmas that are truly in doubt, and
its decrees are strong if they do this from a commission of the Apostolic See, as the fathers of the
Council of Araviscanus II and Toledo I did in the time of Leo I and the Council of Alcala in the
time of Sixtus IV (On this see the Summa Conciliorum). Or at least, if they send the decision to the
Roman Pontiff and they receive confirmation from him, just in the way it is certain that it was
done in the Councils of Milevitanus and Carthage (Augustine, epist. 90, 91, 92 & 93). Nay more, it
is believable that no particular Council ever defined something de fide without approval of the
Apostolic See. From all these things that chapter Ad abolendam can be understood.

Furthermore, the fact that a particular Council that was not expressly confirmed would make
the argument so probable that it would be temerarious for one not to acquiesce is obvious: 1)
Because in the seventh Council (act. 3 and in the eighth Council, last act, first canon), the local
Councils are honored and received; but no mention is made there as to whether they were
confirmed or not; 2) because a great many of these Councils, such as Toledo, Braga, Arles,
Hispalensia, etc. seem approved by the use of the Church; 3) Because if a few holy fathers coming
together in the same opinion in a certain case make a probable argument, how much more 50 or
60 Bishops coming together and invoked by the Holy Spirit, establishing something by common
consent?

CHAPTER XI: General Councils, before they receive
confirmation by the Pope, can err unless the Fathers
were to follow the instruction of the Pope in defining

THERE are indeed different opinions on universal Councils. For some of the Parisians think, as
well as all those that teach a Council is above the Pope, and some others besides, that legitimate
general Councils cannot err even before the confirmation of the Pope. Others teach the contrary,
such as Cajetan (in Apolog. part. 2 cap. 21) and Torquemada (lib. 3 cap. 32, 33, 34 & 38).

Note two things. First: Legates are sometimes sent to a Council with the instruction of the
Apostolic See, just as we read happened in the fourth, sixth and seventh Council; sometimes
without instruction, as happened in the Council of Trent. The reason for this is, because in those
first Councils only one question was treated and therefore the Pope could easily explain to the
legates what his teaching was on that question. But in the Council of Trent there were so many
questions and they needed to be treated so differently that he could not suitably have applied an
instruction of this sort.

Secondly, there can be four ways it can happen that a definition of a general Council is made.
1) that the fathers would agree and define while the legates of the Apostolic See dissent; 2) that
they would define with the consent of the legates, but acting against the instructions of the Pope;
3) With the consent of all, even the legates, but they did not have a certain instruction; 4) All
consent with the legates that have and follow the instruction of the Pope.

In respect to 1 and 2 there is no difficulty. For it is certain that such Councils can err. In the
first place the second Council of Ephesus erred de facto because it wanted to define something
against the opposition of the legates of Pope Leo (as is clear from epistle 2 and 25 of Leo), etc.
Likewise, the Council of Constantinople in the time of Nicholas I erred when the legates of
Nicholas acted against the instruction of the Pope, as is clear from the epistle of Nicholas to the
Patriarch and the other Bishops of the east, as well as from Zonaras in the life of the Emperor
Michael. Secondly, Councils of this sort not only should be said to not have been confirmed, but
should also be said to have been condemned, since it is the same thing whether a Pope expressly
condemns a Council, or whether a Council acts against the judgment of the Pope. Moreover, it is
certain that Councils condemned by the Pope have no authority, as Gelasius shows with many
examples in his volume de Anathema, and in his epistle to the Bishops of Dardania. Thirdly, they
cannot be called legitimate Councils which are opposed with their head; and similarly when they
agree with legates acting against their information because in that case the legates do not act as
legates as they would not be acting in the name of the Pope; for St. Leo, in epist. 45 to Pulcheria
and Agatho in his epistle to the emperor (which was read in the sixth Council, act. 4) precisely
affirm they do not give authority to legates except that they would act according to the rules
handed over to them.

Now, in regard to the third mode the matter is under opinion. Still, I think such a Council
could err, nor is its judgment infallible before the confirmation of the Pope. Firstly, because the
teaching of that Council is not the last judge of the Church, and still if it could not err, it would
be the final and intractable judgment. Moreover, that the judgment of these Councils is not the
last is plain. For Councils of this sort are sent to the Pope and the Pope can approve the Council
or condemn it, as is clear from Gelasius in epist. to the Bishops of Dardania, and from Nicholas in
his epistle to the Emperor Michael, as well as from the practice of Councils to seek confirmation;
and namely from the bull of Pius IV in which he confirms the Council of Trent. (On that matter,
see Torquemada, lib. 3 cap. 34).

Besides, secondly, the strength of the Council is born from the consensus and union of the
body with the head, but the head has not yet made its judgment clear. Even if the legates preside
in the name of the Pope, still they are not really Popes, nor know what the mind of the Pope is,
nor do they have the privilege to not err that the Pope has.

Thirdly, the Council of Basel (sess. 2) together with a legate of the Pope established by
common consent that a Council was above a Pope, which certainly is now judged to be erroneous.

Fourthly, a Council can err when it defines something against the instruction of the Pope, as
in fact the Council of Constantinople erred with the consent of the legates of Pope Nicholas to the
error; so it can also err when it has no instruction; for the Bishops in a Council are not held to
follow that instruction, otherwise they would not be judges, nor would their votes be free.

But some object that a Council of this sort is general, legitimate and represents the universal
Church, therefore it cannot err. Melchior Cano responds, that a Council cannot err in that mode
in which the Church cannot err, i.e. just as the Church cannot err in those things on which
everyone in the Church agrees, so also the Council cannot err in those things on which everyone
agrees at the Council. But on the other hand, since the Church cannot err in regard to personal
faith, therefore it cannot err only in that on which all agree. But a Council cannot err in a
judgment of faith, i.e. in forming a decree; moreover, it is a true decree of a Council which is made
by the greater part, otherwise there would be no legitimate decree of a Council since some will
always dissent. Thus, a Council is said to err absolutely when the greater part errs, which forms
the decree. This is why I think the objection must be answered with another reason.

So I say that Council cannot err which is absolutely general and perfectly represents the
universal Church, moreover a Council of this sort does not exist before the judgment of the Pope
would come. For the rest of the Bishops indeed represent the body of the Church, and what they
do the body of the Church is thought to do; but the Papal legates do not so represent the head of
the Church, i.e. the Pope himself, so that what they do the Pope is absolutely thought to have
done, otherwise no confirmation would be required; rather they only represent the Pope as his
vicars and intermediaries ought to refer to him when doubts arise and wait for his judgment and
follow it. And so accordingly, such a Council, since it does not absolutely represent the authority
of the head, only imperfectly represents the whole Church.

What if someone would altogether have it that a Council of this sort absolutely represents the
whole Church, he could respond that the general Council is not thought to be entirely absolute
until after the confirmation of the Pope; but when it is said that a general Council cannot err and
its decrees do not make certain faith, it must be understood when it was altogether absolute and
signed by all.

Secondly, they object that Councils impose anathemas upon those thinking the contrary before
they are confirmed. I respond: They indeed impose anathemas, but it understands the force it is
going to have if it is confirmed by the Pope, just as when a Judge, from whom one can appeal,
imposes the death penalty against someone, it is understood he ought to die unless the prince
retracts the sentence.

Now, on the fourth mode there can be hardly any doubt, for it seems to be certain that such
a Council cannot err; for first, in such a Council express consent of the head and members is
found, and hence of the whole Church, which without a doubt cannot err nor is it opposed that
the instruction given by the Pope does not seem to be a definitive teaching of the Apostolic See.
For when a Council agrees with the judgment of the Pope and a decree is formed by the legates
in the name of the Pope, then it begins to be a definitive judgment and a final one, not only of the
Council but also of the Pope, and the Pope cannot retract it, since he certainly understands his
judgment was from God when it is approved by the Council, as St. Leo says in epist. 63 to
Theodoret: “That which the Lord first defined by our ministry he has made firm by the assent of
all fraternity that he would truly show that he produced what was first formed by the first see of
all, has received the judgment of the whole Christian world so that in this also, the members are
in harmony with the head, etc.”

Now, so that it would be better understood, it must be known that the Pope usually sends
Legates instructed about the judgment of the Apostolic See with that condition, that if the Council
would consent to the judgment of the Apostolic See, the decree will be formed, but if not, the
formation of the decree should be delayed until the Roman Pontiff, after he has been consulted,
shall respond. This fact is clear from the Council of Chalcedon, since in act. 3 when the Council
consented to the judgment of the Pope in regard to the deposition of Dioscorus, the next the
legates formed the decree with these words: “The most holy and blessed Pope, head of the
universal Church, Leo, through us his legates with the consent of this holy Council, provided with
the dignity of the Apostle Peter which is the foundation of the Church and the rock of faith,
named the porter of the heavenly kingdom, has stripped Dioscorus of his episcopal dignity and
made him an exile from every priestly work.”

Next, in act. 16, when the Council meant to establish something against the instruction of the
Pope, the legates said it ought to first be shown to the Apostolic See. So when the Council defined
something, following the express judgment of the Pope it is the same as if it were confirmed.

Add to these that the Council of Chalcedon (in an epistle to Leo which is contained in act. 3),
when it sought confirmation of the decrees it clearly says it wrote to the Pope and sought
confirmation because apart from the decree on faith against Dioscorus, they established certain
other things without the express judgment of the Pope; therefore, they only sought confirmation
of those things which they had defined apart from the judgment of the Pope. Even Leo himself,
in epistle 61 to the Council of Chalcedon, in which he confirms it, shows that it did not need his
confirmation except because some were uncertain whether the decree of the Council was really
made with his consent, and this is the method whereby the Pope also confirmed many similar
Councils, not because they could err, rather, so it would be ratified more certainly for all that what
the legates had done was truly done at the express command of the Pope.

Lasly, in Councils of this sort another confirmation of the Pope was not awaited, next the
execution is made, i.e. those who think the contrary are condemned as manifest heretics and
deposed from the episcopate or priesthood. So in the Council of Nicaea, six Bishops were
condemned and sent into exile together with Arius, as Ruffinus writes (lib. 10 hist. cap. 5); in the
Council of Ephesus Nestorius was deposed and condemned, as Evagrius witnesses (lib. 1 cap. 4);
in the Council of Chalcedon, act. 3, Dioscorus was deposed, and in act. 4 ten Bishops of Egypt were
judged to be heretics because they refused to acquiesce to the decree that had been advanced in
act. 3; at the sixth Council, in the 6th and 8th actions, Macharius, the Patriarch of Antioch, was
condemned and deposed and sent into exile with some of his disciples, and in the 15th action
Polychronius, a priest, was condemned and deposed. But if these Councils could err before the
confirmation of the Pope, they were not manifest heretics who resisted before the confirmation.

CHAPTER XII: Whether the authority of a Council is
greater than Scripture

WE spoke on the authority of Councils considered absolutely, now we must speak on the same
by a comparison to other principles of faith, i.e. the written word of God (and for traditions the
reasoning is the same), and the Pope. The heretics of this time everywhere cry out that we subject
Scripture to Councils. Calvin, in the Institutes, book 4, cap. 9 §14, says: “To subject the oracle of
God in this manner to the censure of men that it would be ratified because it pleases men is an
unworthy blasphemy which is commemorated.” Similar things are discovered everywhere in the
writings of the others. Moreover, this is not our blasphemy, but is their strawman. For Catholics
do not subject the Sacred Scripture to Councils, but places it before them; nor is there any
controversy on this point. But if some Catholics sometimes say scripture depends upon the
Church, or a Council, they do not understand this in regard to its authority, or according to what
it is, but in regard to the explanation and in regard to us.

Therefore, it must be observed that there is a manifold distinction between Sacred Scripture
and the decrees of Councils, from which it is understood that Scripture is put before Councils. 1)
Scripture is the true word of God, immediately revealed, and in a certain measure at God’s
dictation according to what we read in 2 Peter 1:21 “Inspired by the Holy Spirit the holy men of
God spoke,” and in 2 Timothy 3:16 “All Scripture is divinely inspired.” Nevertheless, it is not so
understood to mean that all the sacred writers had new revelations and wrote things of which they
were ignorant beforehand. It is certain that the Evangelists, Matthew and John, wrote those things
which they saw while Mark and Luke wrote those things which they heard, as Luke himself
declares at the beginning of his gospel: “Just as they handed it down to us who saw from the
beginning.” (Luke 1:2).

Therefore, the Sacred Writers are said to have had immediate revelation, and wrote the words
of God himself, because either some new and previously unknown things were revealed by God,
according to that in Psalm 50 (51):8, “You have made known to me the uncertain and hidden
matters of your wisdom”; God immediately inspired and moved the writers to write the things
which they saw or heard and directed them so that they would not err in some matter. Just like
an epistle may truly said to be of a prince and dictated by the prince, even if he that transcribed
the dictation already knew what he was going to write, so it is said to be and really is the
immediate word of God which was written by the Evangelists at God’s inspiration and direction,
even if they wrote the things which they saw or heard. But Councils do not have, nor write
immediate revelations, or the words of God, rather they only declare what indeed the word of God
is, written or handed down, and how it ought to be understood; besides, they deduce conclusions
from it by reasoning. Consequently, when Councils define what are the canonical and divine
books, they do not cause them to be of infallible truth, but only declare that they are such.

So even the Council of Trent, in session 13, c. 1, when it defines that those words: “This is my
body” must be understood properly, not figuratively, it did not publish but declared the word of
God. And when the Council of Nicaea defined that Christ is homoousion (consubstantial) with the
Father, it drew the conclusion from the Scriptures in which it is precisely contained that there is
one God, and the Father is God, as well as the Son, from which it necessarily follows that the
Father and the Son are of the same substance and divinity. Likewise, in the sixth Council, when
it defines that Christ had two wills, divine and human, it drew the conclusion from Scripture in
which it is contained that Christ is perfect God and perfect man.

The second distinction arises from this first, and is that the sacred writers ought not labor
much in in producing these books; for it was enough if they would labor by writing or dictating
if they were giving prophecies; or to the chief point by recalling to memory what they had seen
or heard, and thought the words which they should write, if they were writing histories or epistles
or something similar. But the Fathers in Councils ought to seek the matter itself, i.e. to investigate
conclusions by disputation, reading and reflection. For that reason, we read in Acts 15 in the first
Council that there was a great deal of questioning. Ruffinus witnesses about the Council of Nicaea
in book 10, cap. 5, hist. Ecclesiasticae, in regards to Acts 15 the fathers of the Council say: “It has
been seen by the Holy Spirit and us,” i.e. the Holy Spirit assists our industry and diligence. But the
sacred writers only attribute the things which they write to God and this is why the prophets so
often repeat: “Thus speaks the Lord.”

The third is that in the Scripture there is no error whether it is treated on faith or on morals,
and whether some general thing is affirmed, even common to the whole Church, or some
particular thing pertaining to one man. But it is both certain and of the faith that without the grace
of the Holy Spirit no man is saved, and Peter, Paul, Stephan and certain others truly had the Holy
Spirit and were saved, seeing that the same Scripture witnesses that both are most true, but
Councils can err in particular judgments.

The fourth is that in Scripture not only teachings, but even each and every word pertains to
faith. We believe no word in Scripture is in vain or not correctly placed, but in Councils the greater
part of the acts does not pertain to faith. For disputations that are prefaced, or reasons which are
added, or the things that are advanced to explain and illustrate matters are not de fide, rather only
the bare decrees and not even all of these, but only those which are proposed as de fide. Sometimes
Councils define something not as a decree but as probable, such as when the Council of Vienne
decreed that it must be held as more probable that grace and the virtues are infused into infants
at Baptism, as it is contained in Clem. uni. de Summa Trinitate et fide Catholica. But when a decree
is proposed as de fide, it is easily discerned from the words of the Council because they usually say
they explain the Catholic faith or they must be held as heretics who think the contrary; or what
is most common, they say anathema and exclude anyone from the Church that thinks the
contrary. But when they say none of these, the matter is not certain de fide.

Next, in the very decrees on faith, not the words but only the sense pertains to faith. It is not
heretical to say that in canons of Councils some word is superfluous or not correctly placed, except
perhaps the decree were formed from the word itself, such as when in the Council of Nicaea they
decreed the word ὁμοούσιον must be received, and in Ephesus the word Θεοτόν.

The fifth is, that Scripture does not need the approval of the Pope to be authentic, but only that
its authority would be known; but Councils, even legitimate and general ones, are not ratified until
they are confirmed by the Pope, as we showed in a previous question.

But certain men object. Gratian, in d. 19, can. In canonicis, affirms the decretal epistles of Popes
ought to be numbered among the canonical Scriptures, and in d. 20, can. Decretales, says the
canons of Councils are of the same authority with the decretal epistles, therefore even the canons
of Councils are numbered among the canonical Scriptures; consequently the Scriptures are not
placed before Councils. Besides, St. Gregory says that he venerates the first four Councils as the
four books of the Gospels (lib. 1 epist. 24).

I respond twofold to Gratian.

Firstly, he was deceived from a corrupted codex which he held to be of St. Augustine, for he
attributed that canon to Augustine (lib. 2 doct. Christiana, cap. 8); but the true and corrected
codices of St. Augustine do not have what Gratian relates but differ by far. Augustine does not say
that the epistles that the Apostolic See usually gives or receives are canonical Scripture, as Gratian
read, but a judgment on holy writings that pertain to the Churches and chiefly to those which are
Apostolic Sees or merit to receive epistles, such as are Rome, in which Peter sat and to which Paul
wrote; Ephesus, in which John sat and to which the same Paul wrote, and certain others.

I say secondly, with this error posited, Gratian did not mean to say that decrees of the Popes
are properly sacred and canonical Scriptures like the Gospels or the Psalms, but that they are holy
writings so as to distinguish them from profane writings, and canonical so as to distinguish them
from the sacred writings of the Fathers, which are not rules nor have the authority to oblige.
Although the canons of Popes and Councils are distinguished and placed after the divine Scripture,
nevertheless they may and must be called sacred writings as well as canonical, just as the seventh
Council, in act. 3, calls decrees of Councils divinely inspired constitutions. Nay more, Innocent,
cap Cum Marthae extra de celebratione Missarum, calls the teaching of St. Augustine a sacred
writing: “He does a martyr an injury that prays for him,” serm. 17, from the words of the Apostle.
Moreover, that Gratian felt the decrees of Councils must not be equated with the divine scriptures
properly so called, is clear from 36 caussa, quaest. 2 can. Placuit, where he placed the opinion of
Jerome, because it was fortified with the testimony of divine Scripture, ahead of a decree of a
Council.

I respond to that of Gregory: it sounds like a similitude, not equating, as that of Matthew 5:48,
“Be perfect just as your heavenly father is perfect.” Or if it would sound like equating, it will need
to be said that Gregory does not compare the Councils with the Gospels in all things, but only in
the same certitude whereby it is spoken of in the Scriptures as well as in the decrees of Councils.
Since both are of infallible truth, they can be said to be equally certain; but just as Councils are not
of a greater authority than the Scripture, it remains that we explain at least whether the authority
of an ecumenical Council were greater than that of the Supreme Pontiff.

CHAPTER XIII: Whether a Council is above a Pope

THIS question arose at the time of the Council of Pisa. when there were two Popes who sat at the
same time in schism, Gregory XII and Benedict XIII. They did not seem to think in earnest of
abolishing the schism by a willful abdication, just as before the Pontificate the Cardinals of each
party vowed and swore they would leave Pisa and begin to treat whether it were lawful to call a
general Council against the will of those Popes to depose them. Antoninus calls this disputation
to mind which took place in Florence, in 3 part. Sum. hist. tit. 22 c. 5 §2.

Next, when a little later the Council of Constance was called, and John XXIII, who alone had
come to the Council left it in secret, then the Council remained without a head and the Fathers
began to treat on whether a Council could judge a Pope and depose him against his will. Yet, the
controversy particularly arose in the time of the Council of Basel, because Pope Eugene IV wanted
to dissolve and impede the Council from beginning, lest it would progress any further, so the
Fathers began to ask whether they were held to obey the Pope, or rather more whether the Pope
was held to obey them, i.e. the Council; and because a little earlier they saw two Popes, John XXIII
and Benedict XIII were deposed by the Council of Constance, and imposed an end upon the
greatest schism, they began to fear that if the Pope was not held to obey the Council the schism
would again be renewed and the Church would remain without any remedy. Consequently, on this
occasion, then many entered into the opinion that a Council was above a Pope. But while they
wanted to close the path to schisms, they made a new one, and created the anti-Pope Felix V who
later, after he recognized his error, abdicated the pontificate. Although later at the Council of
Florence and the last Lateran Council the question seemed to have been defined, still, because the
Council of Florence did not so expressly define it, and from the Lateran Council which most
expressly defined the matters, some were uncertain whether it was truly a general Council;
therefore, even to this day the question remains, even among Catholics.

Furthermore, it must be observed that a Pope can be compared with a Council in two ways:
1) that only a true and undoubted Pope were taken on the one hand, on the other a general
Council over which the Pope presides in himself or through legates, so that nothing would be
defined without his consent.

2) In the second mode, that the Pope alone were taken on the one hand, and on the other a
general Council over which he presides neither in his person or in his legates. I do not, however,
understand him to preside through his legates even when he sends a legate to preside over a
Council, if the latter acts against the will of the Pope since then he is not truly a legate, although
he holds himself out as such.

The present question, although it seems to several authors to turn especially on the first
comparison, nay more, those who think a Council without a Pope is not a true Council, and hence,
without a doubt, the Pope is greater than such a Council; still, really the particular question is on
the second comparison. That is clear firstly, because this question was introduced on account of
the deposition of Popes, i.e. it must be inquired whether the Pope could also be judged, condemned
and deposed by a Council against his will. Moreover, for this purpose the question is superfluous,
whether a Council with a Pope were greater than the Pope alone, for whether it is greater or lesser
it will never judge nor condemn nor depose the Pope against his will. For how would this Council
do it when it does nothing without the consent of the Pope? Would the Pope will himself to be
judged and condemned against his will?

Secondly, the same is clear from the Council of Basel, for the Fathers at Basel, who defined that
a Council was above a Pope, asserted that their Council was above Pope Eugene, at a time in
which neither the Pope nor his legate were present at the Council. In fact, they even undertook
to depose the Pope opposing them by all means.

Therefore, this is the particular question, and it must be treated alone. It will be clear from its
explanation what must be said about the first. For those who teach a Pope is above a Council
celebrated without him also teach the authority in the Pope alone and in a Council with the Pope
intensively, although extensively it would be greater in a Council; and hence the Pope cannot be
judged or condemned in such a Council, nor can he be obliged coercively by the decrees of such
a Council, but only as a guidance, and he can dispense against them with the exception of decrees
on faith which are immutable. The reason is because an equal does not have power in an equal
matter. But those who teach a Council without the Pope is above the Pope, consequently also
teach that a Council with the Pope is above the Pope and affirm it obliges the Pope just as a
minister of the Church dispenses against general Councils, but if he badly dispenses, he can be
corrected and punished later by a general Council. Thus, omitting the first comparison, only the
second must be treated.

CHAPTER XIV: Different opinions are explained

HENCE, on the proposed question I find three opinions of the doctors. 1) The position that a
Council is above the Pope, which all the heretics of this time especially assert, namely Herman
Hamelmann, who tries to prove it with many arguments in book 3, cap. 13 Prolegomenorum.
Cardinal Cameracensis, John Gerson, Jacobus Almainus and several others asserted this in their
treatises on the power of the Church. Likewise, Nicholas of Cusa, in his treatise de concordantia
canonica, lib. 2, last chapter. Panormitanus, in cap. Significasti, extra de electione, and in the same
place his teacher, Cardinal Florentius, and Abulensis in cap. 18 of Matthew, quest. 108, and in
defense of three conclusions, as well as certain others.

So, that this opinion would be understood, it must be known that there are two foundations
for it. The first is that the Pope is not properly head of the universal Church gathered together,
but not in the same way as the heretics and other authors understand it. For the heretics would
have it that the Pope is in no way head of the whole Church, but only a Bishop of his particular
Church, and at the most, patriarch of the West.

But the other cited authors teach that the Pope is the head and shepherd of individual
Christians as well as individual Churches, if they are taken separately, but not of the whole
Church gathered together in a general Council. For then the Church receives, as a form of the
body, and the whole power which is separated into different members is united there so that to
compare the Pope with other Christians taken apart is to compare the most noble member with
a less noble one, but to compare the Pope with a Council is to compare a part with its whole, and
hence the lesser with the greater.

And lest we were to say that a Council without a Pope is not wholly perfected but a body
without the head, they add a second foundation, which is that supreme Ecclesiastical power is
both in a Council and in a Pope, but more principally, immediately and immovably in a Council.
They say that Christ immediately gave all power to bind and loose to the Church, and since the
Church will always endure, this power always remains immovably in it; since the Church cannot
always remain gathered and exercise this power by itself, Christ established the Supreme Pontiff
as a general instrument for all the actions of the Church, and placed in him this supreme power
that he would exercise it in the name of the Church.

These authors differ among themselves because some place this power formally and
subjectively in the Pope alone, but place it in the Church as in the end, because it is on account
of the Church as in regulating since it is for the Church to regulate and direct the Pope, since she
cannot err, but the Pope could and thereupon that in supplying, because the Pope lacks it on
account of natural death, or civil, the Church supplies his office.

But others would have it that it is formally and subjectively principally in the Church, but
instrumentally in the Pope, still all agree on this: they teach this power is immediately in the
Church and hence, when the Pope dies or is deposed, or when he refuses to be present at a
Council, a Council is not on that account an imperfect body, but a perfect one and has the Papal
power to define on faith, ratify laws, grant indulgences, etc., from which they deduce that a
Council is above a Pope and can judge and punish him; it is the same thing to ask whether a Pope
is greater than a Council as if one were to ask whether a part were greater than the whole.

Next, they would have it that the Pope is in the Church in the way that the Venetian Doge is
in the Republic of Venice, or a superior general in some religious order. For it is certain the
Venetian Doge is above individual magistrates, and above individual senators and citizens of
Venice, still, he is not above the whole senate gathered together; when the Doge dies, it is certain
that his whole authority is in the senate. In the same way a superior general is over individual
religious and even priors, provincials, etc., still, he is not above the general congregation, since he
ought to obey it and not command it.

Now, the second opinion is of some canonists, who would have it that the Pope is above a
Council and can be judged by no man against his will, yet he can subject himself to a Council and
grant it power over him; if he did this he ought to acquiesce to the judgment of the Council, even
if it were a question of his deposition. So the Gloss teaches in can. Nos si incompetenter, 2. q. 7, and
in can. In Synodo, d. 63.

The last opinion is nearly common, namely that the Pope is so above a Council that he could
not even subject himself to its judgment if it were a question of a properly coercive judgment. This
opinion seems to be of all the old Scholastics, such as Albert the Great, St. Thomas, St.
Bonaventure, Richardus, Paludanus and others commenting on the Sentences (4 dist. 19) where
it is argued on the keys, even if they did not avowedly dispute this point. Moreover, St.
Antoninus
10 expressly teaches it in Summa Historialis, 3 part. tit. 22 cap. 10 § 4; and Summae
Theologicae, 2 par. tit. 3 cap. 11; Juan Torquemada in lib. 2, cap. 93 and 104 of Summa de Ecclesia,
as well as in response to the orators of Basel on the Supreme Pontiff and a general Council.
Alvarus Pelagius, de planctu Ecclesiae, lib. 1, art. 6; Dominic Jacobatius in book 10 de Conciliis, art.
7, in which he most profusely disputes the question and answers sixty-three arguments of
opponents. Cardinal Cajetan, in his treatise de Comparatione Papae et Conciliorum, and in Apologia
of the aforesaid treatise. Albert Pighius, lib. 6 de hierarchia Ecclesiae. Francis of Ferrara, in lib. 4
contra Gentes, cap. 76. Augustino de Ancona in his treatise de potestate Ecclesiae, and Peter de
Monte in his book de potestate Papae et Concilii. Francis Turrianus in three books in which he
wrote on the question, and nearly all Canonists commenting on cap. Significasti, de electione and
can. Si Papa, dist. 40. John Anto. Dephinus, lib. 2 de Ecclesia, cap. ult.; Thomas Campeggio in his
treatise de potestate Romani Pontificis, cap. 22 et seq. Nicholas Sanders, lib. 7 de visible monarchia,
where he argues about the Council of Constance, pg. 540.

CHAPTER XV: The Supreme Pontiff is head of the
whole Church

INDEED, so as to declare the truth of the matter, we will convey and demonstrate several
propositions, of which this is the first. The Roman Pontiff is pastor and head not only of all
particular Churches, but even of the whole universal Church gathered together, being constituted
immediately by Christ. This is against the first foundation of our adversaries, which, even if it was
profusely proven in the books On the Roman Pontiff, still it also must be briefly proven in this
place.

Therefore, it is proved: 1) from Scripture. Peter is the foundation of the Church, a foundation
which was laid by Christ according to that of Matthew 16:18, “You are Peter, and upon this rock
I will build my Church,” hence head and pastor, for what the foundation is in the house the head
is to the body and the shepherd to the flock. Just as the foundation does not depend upon the
house, but the house on the foundation, so also the head does not depend upon the body, but the
body upon the head, and a shepherd does not depend upon the flock, rather the flock upon the
shepherd. Moreover, in this place the universal Church is understood by the word Church, even
gathered together, as it is in a general Council, which is proven from Matthew 18:17, where Christ
says on the same Church: “If he will not hear them, let him go to the Church.” In such a passage,
our adversaries understand a general Council by “church”.

Besides, once the Church has been gathered, a Council is more properly the Church of Christ,
as even our adversaries concede, for the Church is a congregation of the faithful, therefore, the
more the faithful are gathered and united the more properly they are the Church. Yet, it is stupid
when something is pronounced absolutely on another thing, to remove that which is most
properly meant by it; consequently when Christ says, “Upon this Rock I will build my Church,”
the universal Church gathered together is stupidly removed since it is most properly the Church.

Next, the Church of Christ is always formally gathered together, because it is one kingdom,
one household, one flock, even if it seems to be so much dispersed to a place. Thus, if the Pope is
the shepherd and head of the Church, certainly it is not a dispersed Church, which is null, rather
he is pastor and head of the Church gathered together. The same is held from the last chapter of
John: “Feed my sheep.” For even if our adversaries say that the Lord had said “feed my sheep” not
my Church, still the Church so explains this in the prayer for the Pope: “O God, pastor and ruler
of all the faithful, who willed your servant N. to preside over your Church.” And besides, either
the Church gathered together (or a general Council), pertains to the sheep of Christ, or it does not.
If it pertains, consequently Peter is the pastor of the Church gathered and of a general Council;
if it does not pertain, therefore Christians, through being gathered cease to be the sheep of Christ,
which is most absurd.

2) It is proven from Councils, for in the Council of Chalcedon, in its epistle to Pope Leo, it
declares with precise words that St. Leo was head of that Council, which was the greatest of all,
in which the whole Church was seen gathered together. It says: “Who you preside over as the true
head.” Likewise, the Council of Lyons, as it is held in the chapter Ubi periculum, de elect. in 6, calls
the Pope ruler of the universal Church, not merely the ruler of particular Churches. Similarly, at
the Council of Florence it was defined that the Pope is head of the whole world and received the
fullest power from the Lord to rule the universal Church. The Council of Constance, sess. 15,
condemned the heresy of John Hus, saying that the Pope is not head of the Church.

3) It is proven by reasons. Firstly, the Pope is one head, therefore he is the head of one body,
but particular Churches taken separately are not one body, therefore the Pope is head of the
universal Church. Secondly, the universal Church is one visible body, consequently, it ought to
have one visible head, otherwise it would appear to be a monster. But it produces no other head
than the Pope. Therefore, the Pope is head of the whole Church at the same time. Thirdly, the Pope
is immediately Vicar of Christ, as is held in the cited Councils of Lyons and Florence, and also in
the Council of Constance, sess. 8, where the heresy of Wycliffe is condemned, saying the Pope is
not immediate vicar of Christ; nor do our adversaries deny it, as a result he presides over all of
them in place of Christ, over whom Christ himself invisibly presides; but Christ presides and
would do so visibly if he were visibly present, not only over particular Churches, but even over
the whole universal Church and general Councils; therefore even the Pope presides over the
universal Church.

CHAPTER XVI: Supreme Power is not in a Council

NOW for the second proposition: Supreme Ecclesiastical Power is not in the Church or a Council
without the Pope either formally or supplied. This is against the second foundation of our
adversaries and that supreme power is not formally in the Church or in a Council in the way it
is in the Pope is clearly gathered from the Scriptures. According to the Scriptures, the Church is
not a democracy, or an aristocracy, but a monarchy, or the kingdom of Christ, according to that
of Psalm 2:6, “I have been set up as King by him over mount Sion, his holy mountain.” And in Luke
1:33, “Of his kingdom there will be no end.” and John 18:37, when Christ is asked “Are you a
king?”, he does not say “I am not”, or my kingdom is not in this world, rather he says: “My
kingdom is not of this world,” i.e. it is indeed in this world, but it is not such a kingdom as you
think of, such as that of Herod and similar kings. Thereupon, Scripture everywhere calls Christ
a King and the Church his kingdom, from which it follows that the Church herself ought to be
ruled by one, not by many just as all kingdoms are governed.

But that this authority in the Church is not supplied is shown by this reason. The Church does
not hold this authority of itself, nor from another, therefore, in no manner does it hold it. A
distinction between the kingdom of Christ and other kingdoms manifestly shows that the Church
does not hold this authority of itself. For, the Church is not such a kingdom as the kingdoms of
this world in which supreme power is in the king, rather, the same power, proceeding and derived
and hence radically supplied by the people is in the kingdom, because the people make the King
who would otherwise be a private citizen, just as the rest, for all men are naturally free and equal,
nor can one command the rest unless they would subject themselves to him and concede power
to him.

But Christ is God and man, and to the extent that God is naturally the lord and king of all
creatures, insofar as he is man he has all power from God, nor was he made king by the Church,
rather he made himself its king. Apocalypse 5: “You have made us a kingdom for our God,” hence
it is that in Scripture, the kingdom of Christ is the Church. Now, lest someone would think it were
like other kingdoms, it is also compared to a household: “Who is a faithful and prudent servant
whom the Lord constituted over his household?” (Matthew 24:45); and in Hebrews 3:2, St. Paul
says that Moses was faithful in the whole house of God as a servant, but Christ was faithful in the
whole house as the Lord. For it is certain that the householder does not have any authority from
the household, but of himself; because a father is not constituted by the family, rather he makes
the family for himself by begetting sons and correcting servants. For that reason, a householder,
even if he were the worst, can never be judged by the household or expelled, just as a king can
when he degenerates into tyranny. The Church is also compared to a sheepfold in John 10:1,
likewise to a body and a spouse in Ephesians 4 and 5, that we would understand that a pastor does
not receive authority from the sheep, nor the head from the body, nor a man from his wife, so
neither does Christ from the Church.

From these, we hold that the Church of itself has no authority, rather all is in Christ and those
to whom Christ communicated it. Moreover, that it does not have it from another, namely from
Christ, is proven. For Christ is read to have given the keys of the kingdom of heaven to Peter in
Matthew 16:18, and to have put the same in charge of his sheepfold in the last chapter of John, he
also gave power to the other Apostles to preach, Baptize, forgive sins and do certain other things
which look to the Episcopal office, but this power Christ gave to individuals so that everyone
would be able to exercise all these without the gathering of all, as is known; but that he gave some
power to the Church itself, i.e. to the corporate body of the faithful in itself, that is, by reason of
its totality is read nowhere; nay more we read the contrary, the people are commanded to be
obedient and subject to their pastors (Hebrews 13:17). But if no authority were given to the
corporate body of the Church therefore, neither was it to a general Council, to the extent in which
it represents the whole Church. Therefore, supreme authority is not in a Council, nor Papal, but
only Episcopal or Archiepiscopal, exactly as the persons are who come together there. At least
supreme or Papal authority is not placed in a Council by our adversaries, except insofar as the
Council it manages the universal Church in his place. If, therefore, the universal Church, without
the Pope, does not have papal authority, as a result so much the less does a Council have it.

Secondly it is proved: If a general Council without the person of the Pope would have Papal
authority formally, or supplied, it would not need the confirmation of the Pope. But that is false,
as it is certain that all general Catholic Councils sought confirmation.

Thirdly, a Council without the Pope can err even in decrees of faith, as is clear in the Council
of Sirmium, to which Hosius subscribed. Likewise, Milan, Armenia, Ephesus II, Constantinople
under Justinian II, Constantinople under Leo the Isaurian, and another under Constantine
Copronymus. But a Council with the Pope cannot err; therefore, it cannot do all things without
the Pope which it can with the Pope. Nor can one respond that these Councils erred because they
were not legitimate, for many of them lacked nothing other than the assent of the Pope; nay more,
Ephesus II was altogether similar to Basel; for both were summoned by a Pope and in both a legate
of the Pope was there in the beginning; shortly after the Papal legate departed at both Councils,
the Pope was excommunicated at both, and all of these things were certain at Basel from its deeds
described by Aeneas Sylvius. Moreover, in regard to the Council of Ephesus, it is certain from the
epistles of Pope Leo, 12, 13, 15, 21, and 22 as well as from the Council of Chalcedon, act. 3; but just
the same our adversaries cannot deny the second Council of Ephesus erred.

Fourthly, if supreme power were principally in the Church, but instrumentally in the Pope, as
in a minister of the Church, as they themselves say, it would follow that the Pope is not the
immediate vicar of Christ, rather he would be a mediate one; for the Church would immediately
be the vicar of Christ, but the Pope would be the mediate vicar of the Church, which is expressly
against the Council of Constance, sess. 8, where the heresy of Wycliffe was condemned, that said
the Pope is not the immediate vicar of Christ.

CHAPTER XVII: The Supreme Pontiff is absolutely
above a Council

THE third proposition. The Supreme Pontiff is simply and absolutely above the universal Church as
well as above a general Council, so that he would recognize nothing on earth above his judgment.
This is also truly de fide, and proven. 1) From the two preceding propositions; for if the Pope is
head of the universal Church, even when it is gathered together, and the universal Church
gathered together does not also have any power by reason of its totality, then it follows the Pope
is above a Council and above the Church, not vice versa.

2) It is proven from reason, and founded in the scriptures; for all the names which are given
to Christ in the Scriptures whereby it is certain that he is above the Church, all the same are
attributed to the Pope. First, Christ is the householder in his house, which is the Church, the Pope
in the same house is the supreme steward, i.e. in the place of Christ the householder: “Who is a
faithful steward, and prudent, whom the Lord constituted above his household, etc.” (Luke 12:42)
Here, by steward, or oeconomon, as it is in the Greek text, the Fathers understand a Bishop.
Ambrose, as well as Hilary and Jerome (in cap. 24 Matth., where a similar sentence is contained)
understand this passage in the same way. And although the Fathers do not speak expressly about
the Roman Bishop, nevertheless, without a doubt the teaching of that Scripture is: as particular
Bishops are supreme stewards over their Churches, so the Roman Bishop is in the universal
Church. Wherefore, Ambrose, on 1 Timothy 3. That you would know how you ought to be
preserved in the house of God, etc., he says: “The Church is called the house of God, whose ruler
today is Damasus.” And Chrysostom, in lib. 2 de sacerdotio, near the beginning, cites this passage:
“Who is a faithful servant,” etc., explaining that it is about Peter.

However, the supreme steward is over the household, and he cannot be judged and punished
by it, as is clear from the same passage, for the Lord says: “whom the Lord constituted over his
household ... But if the servant would say in his heart: ‘the master delays his coming’, and would
begin to strike the servants and the maidservants, to eat and drink and be drunk, the Master will
come on a day in which he hopes not, and divine him and place his lot with the infidels.” There
you see the Lord saves that servant for his judgment and does not consign him to the judgment
of the household. The use of all household teaches the same thing; for there is no household in
which it would be lawful for inferior servants to punish even when gathered together, or expel the
steward, even if he were the worst, for it pertains to the Lord of the household alone.

The second name of Christ is shepherd, “I am the good shepherd, etc.” He shares the same with
Peter in the last chapter of John: “Feed my sheep.” It is certain, however, that a shepherd is so in
charge of the sheep that he cannot be judged by them.

The third is “head of the Body of the Church,” (Eph. 4:15-16), and he shares the same with
Peter, as we have it in the Council of Chalcedon, act. 3, where the legates pronounce sentence
against Dioscorus, and in the epistle of the Council to Leo. Moreover, that the head would be ruled
by the members and not rather rule them is against nature, just as also it is against nature for the
members to cut off their head when it is gravely sick.

The fourth is husband, or bridegroom (Ephesians 5:25), “Men, love your wives just as Christ
loved the Church and gave himself up for it, etc.” The same agrees with Peter, for in the general
Council of Lyons, as it is found in c. Ubi periculum, de electione, in Sexto, the Council speaks on the
election of a Roman Pontiff: “Let a useful provision make haste for the necessary things of the
whole world, for a suitable bridegroom to speedily be given to the Church.” But it is against the
Apostle in Ephesians 5:25 as well as against the order of nature that the bride would be in charge
of the bridegroom, and not rather subject.

In the second place, it is proven from the express words of Councils and Popes; for although
the controversy is on the power of Councils and of Popes, if Councils and Popes agree between
themselves, why is it necessary for us to argue? First, the Council of Sinvessano under Marcellinus
is extant, in the end of which we read: “The first see is judged by no one.” A little after, the Roman
Council under Sylvester stands out, in the last canon of which we read likewise: No one will judge
the first see.”

Besides, it is gathered from the Council of Chalcedon that a Pope is greater than a Council,
for in act. 3 many written epistles are cited from different places to the Council, which all so begin:
“To the most holy, blessed and universal Patriarch of great Rome, Leo, and to the holy universal
Council gathered in the city of Chalcedon, etc.” But there was no man in the whole Council that
cried out and said that the Pope ought not be placed before the whole Council. Nay more, in the
end of that action there is extant an epistle of the Council to the same Leo, in which they
acknowledge him as their head and father. Besides, in the same action Dioscorus was condemned
along with the whole second Council of Ephesus, not only for different reasons, but especially
because it had dared to judge and condemn the Roman Pontiff, Leo. For, as Nicholas I says in his
epistle to Michael, Dioscorus was not condemned so much for heresy as for the horrendous
presumption in which he dared to impose sentence against the Supreme Pontiff. There it must be
noted that if Dioscorus, who was the Patriarch of Alexandria, that is, the first after the Roman
patriarchate, could not lawfully judge the Roman Pontiff with a general Council, clearly it follows
that a Council is not above a Pope. For why could it not judge the Pope if it was above him, nay
more his judge as our adversaries would have it?

Likewise, the fifth Roman Council under Symmachus received and approved as if they were
its own decrees, a book of Ennodius the deacon, in which we so read: “God willed the cases of
other men to be concluded by men. The prelate of this See without question he reserved to his
own judgment, for he willed that the successors of Peter the apostle ought to have their innocence
judged by heaven.” In the eighth general Council, act. 7, we read the Roman Pontiff judges in
regard to the prelates of every Church, while on the other hand no man ever judged him. Here it
must be understood legitimately, so that a judgment of this kind was received by the Church.
Platina, in vita Leonis III, and Paulus Aemilius in lib. 3 historia Francorum write that when
Charlemagne came to Rome to discern the case of Pope Leo III, against whom many crimes had
been objected, and at the same time he convened a great Council of Bishops, all the Bishops cried
out in one voice that no man is allowed to judge the Supreme Pontiff; then Charlemagne desisted
from that office of judgment, and Leo purged himself with an oath.

Besides, the Lateran Council under Alexander III, as it is held in c. Licet, extravagantes, de elect.
says: “In the Roman Church, something is specially constituted because recourse may not be had
to a superior.” There, the Council teaches that the Roman Pontiff should be chosen with greater
caution than other Bishops, because if a bad Bishop were chosen, he can be corrected and deposed
by the Roman Pontiff; but if a bad Pope were chosen, there is no remedy, for he has no superior
whereby he could be deposed. Likewise, at the Council of Constance, a Bull of Martin V was
published with the approbation of the Council, in which anyone suspect of heresy is commanded
to be interrogated as to whether or not they believe the Roman Pontiff has supreme power in the
Church of God. But certainly it is supreme, in which there is no greater and for whom there is no
equal.

Next, the fifth Lateran Council under Leo X, in its eleventh session, precisely and avowedly
taught that the Pope is above all Councils and rebuked the contrary decree published at the
Council of Basel: “It is evident that the Roman Pontiff alone, as one having authority over every
Council, and the right and power to summon Councils, transfer them, and dissolve them, not only
by the testimony of Sacred Scripture, the aforesaid Holy Fathers and other Roman Pontiffs, but so
much more even by the very confession of the same Councils.”

There is no response to this passage, except that it was not a general Council or was not
received by the Church, or that it did not define this de fide. Yet, it can scarcely be said that it was
not a general Council, for even if there were few Bishops (as it did not attain to 100), still it was
clearly a Council to all, and all were called to it, and in it the true and unquestioned Supreme
Pontiff presided. But that it was not received it is hardly related, since the decrees of Councils do
not need the approval of the people, since they do not receive their authority from them. It is true
that decrees on customs, if they were not received and the Pope would turn a blind eye to them,
at length are abrogated by custom; but this does not happen because those things needed the
approval of the people, rather because the decrees were mutable and when the Pope sees that after
a long time they are not preserved, and is silent, he is considered to abrogate them. But decrees
on faith are immutable, nor can they be abrogated in any manner, once they have been established.
But such is this, on which we are arguing. But the Council did not so define the matter, properly,
as a decree that must be held with Catholic faith, so there is a doubt and therefore they are not
properly heretics who think the contrary, but they cannot be excused from great temerity.
11

Now we add thirdly, Popes. Leo the Great, in epist. 48 to Anastasius, says: “By the great
disposition of God it has been provided lest everyone would have to defend all things themselves,
rather there would be in each province individuals of whom among the brethren would have the
first judgment, and again certain men were constituted in the greater cities that received a greater
solicitude, through which to the one See of Peter the care of the universal Church would be
brought, that no one would ever be at variance from its head.” Now, if care of the universal
Church pertains to Peter, certainly also of a Council, which in turn acts for the universal Church.

Pope Gelasius, in his epist. to the Bishops of Dardania, says: “The Church through all the
world knows that the most holy Roman See has the right to judge all things, nor is it lawful for
anyone to judge its judgment.”

Nicholas I, in his epistle to the Emperor Michael, repeats the same thing: “It is clear that there
is certainly no authority greater than that of the Apostolic See, whose judgment is retracted by
no man.”

St. Gregory in his epistle to Theotista (lib. 9 epist. 39) says: “If Blessed Peter, when he is
reproached by the faithful, were to attend to the authority which he received in the Holy Church,
he could respond that the sheep ought not dare to rebuke their shepherd, but if in the quarrel of
the faithful he were to say something of his power, he would not be a mild doctor; therefore he
placated them with humble reason.”

Pope Paschal, as it is held in c. Significasti, extra. de electione, says: “They say in Councils it is
not found stated as if the law of the Roman Church was set in front of any Councils, since all
Councils are made and are fortified by the authority of the Roman Church, and in their statutes,
the authority of the Roman Pontiff is clearly received.”

Innocent III, in serm. 2 de consecr. Pontificis, says: “In so great a matter, it is necessary that I
have faith, since I have God as a judge on the rest of my sins, only on account of sin which is
committed against faith, could I be judged by the Church.”

Boniface VIII, in extravag., Viam Sanctam, tit. de major. et obed., says: “If earthly power would
stray, it will be judged by the spiritual power. If the spiritual would stray, the lesser by the greater.
But if the supreme power would stray, it can be judged by God alone, not by man.” He adds the
testimony of St. Boniface, the Bishop of Fulda, who, even if he was not a Pope, still was of great
authority. Therefore, it is held in dist. 40, can. Si Papa, where he says: “He that will judge all must
be judged by nobody unless he is found to have deviated from the faith.”

It is proven fourthly, from the appeals from a Council to the Pope. A lesser can always appeal
to a greater without any controversy; that one can appeal from a Council to a Pope, not the other
way around, is clear from the epistle of Gelasius to the Bishops of Dardania: “To the Apostolic See
one may appeal from every part of the world, but nobody is permitted to appeal from it.”

And lest we might think he speaks on appeals from some Bishop, not from a Council, he adds
that often the Roman Pontiffs absolved those whom Councils had unjustly prosecuted. Famous
examples of this fact are extant. For, Athanasius, the Bishop of Alexandria, and Paul, the Bishop
of Constantinople, were deposed by a Council; they appealed to Pope Julius I, and they were
restored to their Sees by him, as the author Sozomen notes (lib. 3, hist. cap. 7), and similarly
Flavian, the Bishop of Constantinople, appealed from the second general Council of Ephesus to
Pope Leo, as Leo witnesses in epist. 25 to the Emperor Theodosius. Likewise, Theodoret, the
Bishop of Cyprus, appealed from the same Council to the same Pope Leo, as is clear from Liberatus
in his Breviarium, cap. 12, and from that epistle of Theodoret which is extent at the end of the
works of Leo. Lastly, John Chrysostom was deposed by a Council and he appealed to Pope
Innocent, as Gelasius witnesses (loc. cit.) and the same is gathered from the epistles of Chrysostom
to Innocent.

It is proved fifthly from the approval and condemnation of Councils; for all are recalled, at
length, to the examination of the Roman Pontiff, and those which he approves are received, but
those which he condemns are rejected, as Gelasius witnesses in the same epistle to the Bishops
of Dardania, and even that the Pope approved many Councils at their request is clear from the
deeds of these very Councils, especially the first, second, third, fourth and sixth Councils.

Moreover, that the Popes at some time condemned the decrees of Councils, which is a clear
sign of superiority, is certain from St. Basil, who writes in an epistle to St. Athanasius (which is
number 52), that it seemed good to him that the Pope might be asked to send some men into
Greece to invalidate the Council of Armenia in his name. Pope Damasus himself, in his epistle to
the Bishops of Illyria condemned that Council. Likewise, Leo, in epist. 55 to Pulcheria, says: “We
make void the agreement of the Bishops opposed to the rules of the holy canons enacted at Nicaea,
by the piety of your faith united with ours, and through the authority of Blessed Peter the Apostle
we altogether invalidate it by a general definition.” St. Gregory the great says: “All the acts of that
Council opposing the Apostolic See have been scattered.”

CHAPTER XVIII: The Pope cannot subject himself to
the coercive judgment of Councils

THE fourth proposition. The Supreme Pontiff cannot consign himself either to the coercive judgment
of a Council or any man, rather, only to discretionary judgment. Now, in a perfect judgment two
things are required. Firstly, the power to discus the case and to discern or judge what must be
done. Secondly, the power to compel him who falls in the case to obey the judgment imposed
against him. Both are found in a judge properly so called, such as a prince is, or a judge constituted
by the prince. But the first is only found in arbiters, whose judgments, even if men are held to
stand from the law of nature, because they are held to keep their promises, still not from the force
of the sentence, because arbiters cannot compel.

Now, the Supreme Pontiff cannot constitute a judge, properly so called, over himself, but only
in the manner of arbiters, whose judgment if he is not held to obey, he might do what he ought
not, but not what he cannot.

The first part is proven. Firstly, because the power of the Pope is above all, and of divine law
as is clear. But the Pope cannot dispense against divine law. Secondly, because an inferior cannot
consign judgment to someone that is reserved to a superior. A Bishop cannot consign to his
penitentiary that he would absolve in cases reserved to the Pope; but judgment in the case of a
Pope is reserved to God, as we taught above. Thirdly, because it would follow that the Pope is a
superior and not a superior in respect to the same thing, which is a tautology. It is shown to follow
from this reason. The Supreme Pontiff, when he consigns himself and his case to the judgment of
another, does not cease to be Pope, consequently, he does not cease to be the superior of every
Christian; but just the same, if he can be compelled then he is not a superior, rather an inferior.
Therefore, he would be a superior and not a superior at the same time.

The second part is clear from Sixtus III, Leo III, Symmachus, Leo IV and others, who when
they were accused, wanted their cases to be discussed in a Council of Bishops, just as is clear from
can. Mandastis, and can. Auditum, 2. q. 5, as well as from the fourth Council under Symmachus;
still the Bishops did not dare to judge such things. For this reason, in the fourth Council under
Symmachus, all the Bishops subscribed, and affirmed that they relinquished the whole judgment
to God.

CHAPTER XIX: The responses of our adversaries are
refuted

IT remains to answer arguments. In the first place are those of Hermann, who objects in book 3,
c. 12 Prolegomenorum with some old examples. Secondly, certain arguments from Gerson; thirdly,
something else from the Council of Basel.

1) The example of Marcellinus, who in the Council of Sinvessano was condemned by the
Bishops and deposed. I respond: a) Marcellinus was accused of an act of infidelity, in which case
a Council can discuss the case of the Pope and if they were to discover that he really was an
infidel, the Council can declare him outside the Church and thus condemn him. b) I say the
Bishops did condemn Marcellinus, but only after the very man had condemned himself, i.e. he
abdicated the Papacy, for before they had often declared: “The first see will be judged by no one,
you are guilty, you are the judge, do not be judged by us, etc.” See Nicholas I in his epistle to
Michael.

2) The next is the example of Pope Miltiades. After he had imposed judgment the Bishop of
Arles judged the very same case, as Augustine witnesses in epist. 162 to Glorius and Eleusius,
where he also adds: “Behold, we think the Bishops that judged at Rome were not good judges. Still
a plenary Council of the universal Church remained, where even with these judges the case could
be argued. So that if they are found to have judged badly their sentence will be lifted.”

I respond: To that of the Bishop of Arles from the same Augustine and in the same place, not
because it needed to be done, but because the Emperor wished to acquiesce to the Donatists who
were begging for another judgment, so that maybe the guilty party would be cleansed in two
judgments. To that about a general Council, I say Augustine did not discuss a Pope without a
Council so as to support a Council without a Pope, as we recently discussed, rather he discusses
a particular Council over which the Pope would preside, then a general Council, over which also
the Pope would preside. Moreover, there can be no doubt that a case judged by the Pope in a
particular Council can again be judged by the same in a general Council, especially in a question
of fact, which depends upon information and in which the Church can err, such as the question
was that was being argued then. Nay more, even ordinarily, after a general Council has been
summoned, if formerly there were particular Councils held earlier in individual provinces—even
at Rome, and later the matter which was treated in those particular Councils was defined in a
general Council, then the final judgment and definitive sentence of the Roman Pontiff with the
assent of a Council is imposed.

3) The example of Liberius, whom the Emperor deposed and later restored in his see, bidding
him to rule the Church of Rome with Felix, and the Council of Sirmium commanded the same
thing, after letters were given to Felix, as Sozomen relates (lib. 4, cap. 14).

I respond: An Arian emperor did this unjustly and tyrannically, in the way that Nero also
killed Peter and Paul. But the Council of Sirmium did not command, rather it only sent exhortatory
letters to Felix asking him to suffer Liberius to sit at the same time as himself. Add the fact that
the Council was especially made up of Arians, and is of no importance.

4) The example of St. Leo, whose epistle in the Council of Chalcedon was examined by many
Bishops, as Evagrius relates in lib. 2 cap 18, and Leo also boasted, in epist. 63 that his epistle was
approved by the Council.

I respond: From here it does not follow that a Council is above a Pope. Leo had sent his epistle
to the Council not as something containing a final and definitive sentence, but merely as an
instruction, whereby bishops are assisted to judge better. Moreover, after they all consented to the
epistle of Leo, then at length a final definition was published in the name of the Pope and the
Council. That is enough for examples.

In the second place, he proposes arguments of John Gerson: 1) The first is that of Matthew 18,
where it is said: “If your brother sins against you, etc., tell it to the Church.” But the Pope is also
our brother, since he is a Christian, and ought to say the Our Father, therefore, the Pope can be
called to judgment, moreover he can be judged by the Church and punished; but the Church does
not do anything except by its prelates, therefore the Pope can be judged by a Council of prelates.

I respond: By the word Church, either a Bishop is understood, as Chrysosotom explains on this
passage, as well as Innocent III in c. Novit, extra, de judiciis, and the praxis of the Church
demonstrates this. Daily they are denounced to a Bishop, on whom the Lord said: “Tell it to the
Church”; or it would mean the body of the faithful with their head. As Cyprian says in his letter
to Florentius, which is the ninth in book 4: “The Church is the people united to the priest and a
flock adhering to its shepherd.” This is why in each episcopate sinners are brought to the Church
and the Bishop of that place, but if the Bishop were to sin, he cannot be brought to that Church
unless he were to be brought to himself, since he would be the head of the same Church; rather
he must be brought to some higher Church, over which an Archbishop or a Patriarch presides; but
if the Patriarch were to sin, he cannot be brought to his own Church but to a greater one, that is
to the Roman Church, or a general Council, over which the Supreme Pontiff would preside. Still,
if the Supreme Pontiff himself were to sin, he must be reserved for the judgment of God, for there
is no other Church to which he could be brought, since without him no Church would be
discovered with a head.

But again, they insist. These words: “Speak to the Church”, were said to Peter, therefore even
Peter and his successors ought to bring sinners to the Church, therefore he ought to acknowledge
a certain tribunal of the Church greater than his own.

I respond: When these things were said to Peter, he was not yet the Pope, but a private man,
hence what was said to him is fitting to those who acknowledge some superior. I add besides, in
his own way the Pope can fulfill this precept: first he ought to privately correct one who is a
sinner, then apply witnesses, lastly speak to the Church, that is himself, as the president, and to
the Church over which he presides, i.e. to publicly excommunicate him. This is how St. Gregory
understood this passage, in lib. 4, epist. 38 to John, the Bishop of Constantinople.

2) The Pope is a member of the Church, therefore he is lesser than the whole, which is the
Church, and may and must be cut off if he would corrupt the Church because it is from natural
law that members corrupting the whole body must be cut off.

I respond: in regard to the first consequent, when the Church is gathered, it is either received
with the Pope or without the Pope, thus, the Pope, as a member, is lesser than the Church which
is a whole. If the Church were received without the Pope, it is false that it is whole, for it is not
whole, but a part, and indeed a greater part than the head, like a boulder in magnitude, but lesser
in the magnitude of strength, or authority, as is clear in every body. Yet, what our adversaries say,
that the authority of the head remains in the Church as an assistance, was already refuted earlier.
But if the Church were received with the Pope, then, as we otherwise said, the authority of the
Church is extensively greater than that of the Pope alone, intensively, however, it is equal. Just
as being, as it embraces God and creatures is not greater than if it were only God intensively even
if extensively it is greater since there are many goods, so also Christ, as man, is the head of a
homogenous Church, and hence part of it, and still the whole Church is not greater than Christ
alone.

But they insist against this: “All power to act is more principally in the whole than in the
parts, which are instruments of the whole; for a man is said to see more principally than the eye,
this is why when the Pope is also included in the Church, it makes a certain whole, and the Pope
is a certain part and instrument of this whole, so it follows supreme ecclesiastical Power more
principally fits the Church itself than the Pope.”

I respond: a judgment on the body of the Church is one thing, and on natural bodies another;
for in natural bodies the power proceeds from the essence to the powers, therefore, it is said more
principally the whole acts rather than any part or power; but in the body of the Church the power
does not proceed from essence to the powers, or parts, but from an outward power. For the Pope,
who is head of the Church, does not hold authority from the Church, but from God, and so the
principal agent is not the Church, but God. In the second place, it may be said that the principal
agent in whatever body you like is always supposed to be the very thing which sustains and
moves all the members. Hence, for the body of the Church Christ is supposed, as when we say this
is the body of Peter, or Paul, it declares it is supposed of Peter or Paul, so when we say the Church
is the body of Christ, it declares that of Christ is supposed. Nor is it opposed that Christ is also the
head of the Church, for Christ, as flowing into all the members, is called the head that he would
sustain and move all things, it can be supposed, and in this way we concede the Pope is the
instrument of the body of the Church, and in a certain measure less than the whole itself, just as
without a doubt we include Christ himself in the whole, as supposed.

To the second consequent it can be said: firstly, on the law of nature, that putrid members
should be cut off with the exception of the head. For it is better to have a putrid head than none.
But this answer avails little, for in natural bodies the head ought to be cut off because by that
amputation the whole body dies. But the body of the Church does not die when the Pope does, and
for that reason we also see in temporal states that if the King degenerates into a tyrant, it will be
permitted for the head of the kingdom to be deposed and another chosen. So I say secondly, in a
natural body and in temporal states corrupting members are cut off because they depend upon the
body and have their force from it; but the body of the Church does not have the same
arrangement, whose head does not receive authority from the body, but from God, just as even
it is not lawful for a household to depose the supreme steward, even if he is the worst, because he
was not set up by the household, but by the master.

But they will say, therefore, only the Church is without remedy if it has a bad Pope, and the
Pope can disturb all things unpunished, and destroy and no one will be able to resist.

I respond: No wonder, if the Church remains without an efficacious human remedy, seeing that
its safety does not rest principally upon human industry, but divine protection, since God is its
king. Therefore, even if the Church could not depose a Pope, still, it may and must beg the Lord
that he would apply the remedy, and it is certain that God has care of its safety, that he would
either convert the Pope or abolish him from the midst before he destroys the Church.
Nevertheless, it does not follow from here that it is not lawful to resist a Pope destroying the
Church; for it is lawful to admonish him while preserving all reverence, and to modestly correct
him, even to oppose him with force and arms if he means to destroy the Church. For to resist and
repel by force of arms, no authority is required. See more on this with Juan Torquemada, lib. 2 cap.
106.

The third argument of Gerson, related by Herman, is taken from the Council of Constance.
Constance defined, in session 4, that a general Council has authority immediately from Christ,
which all are held to obey even if it is provided with papal dignity. Either this Council is approved
or not; if it is approved, therefore it is true and must be received, because it defined it; if not, it
wrongly deposed John XXIII, Gregory XII and Benedict XIII and chose Martin V, whom all other
Popes succeeded thereafter. Add, Pope Martin V, in the last session, confirmed all the decrees of
this Council that were on faith, moreover, this decree seems to pertain to faith.

I respond: 1) The Council of Constance was legitimate and approved, but that is not opposed
to those things which we said. For it did not define absolutely that general Councils have power
from Christ over Popes, but only in a case, that is, in a time of schism when it is now known who
is the true Pope; for a doubtful Pope is held for no Pope, and so to have power in that case is not
to have power against the Pope. So think Torquemada, Campeggio, and Sanders (ll.cc.)

2) The response can be made that the Council of Constance was not, when it asserted
something of this kind, that it could define questions of faith; for in the first place it was not yet
a general Council then, since only a third of the Church was present, i.e. only those prelates who
obeyed the anti-Pope John XXIII, for those who obeyed Gregory and Benedict opposed the things
which were being done by the Council. Next, a certain Pope was not present in the Church,
without which doubts on faith could not be defined; thus there was no Pope in the Council. For
John XXIII, who began the Council, already departed when the fourth session was being held.

Nor is it true that Martin V confirmed this decree. For he precisely said that he confirmed only
those decrees on faith which were done Conciliariter, that is, by the custom of other Councils, after
the matter was diligently examined. Furthermore, it is certain this decree was made by the Council
without any examination. Consequently, Martin, when he confirmed decrees on faith that were
concluded in a conciliar fashion, understood only the condemnation of the heresies of Wycliffe
and Hus.

And it does not follow that if the Council erred in this, it also erred in deposing Gregory XII,
John XXIII and Benedict XIII. For, even if the Council without a Pope cannot define new doctrines
of faith, still it can judge in a time of schism who is the true Pope and prove to be a true shepherd
for the Church when there is not one, or there is a doubtful one, and this is what the Council of
Constance rightly did. Besides, John and Gregory were not deposed against their will, for even
they renounced the Papacy freely, as is clear from the acts of the Council in session 12 and 14.
Moreover, Benedict did not yield, but after his death Clement VIII, his successor yielded to Martin
V, who all the Church venerated as a true Pope.

Lastly, Herman advances the Council of Basel, which in sess. 33 defined that it must be held
with Catholic faith that a Council is above a Pope. Moreover, this Council was summoned by
Martin V, as we see in sess. 1, and then declared legitimately continued from its beginning in sess.
16 by Eugene IV. Lastly, it was confirmed by Nicholas V with its acts.

I respond: The Council of Basel was legitimately begun, but illegitimately completed. Moreover,
it is a clear lie of Hermann that it was confirmed by Nicholas V with its acts. For Nicholas, as is
obvious from his Bull connected to the same Council, only confirmed those things which the
Council did in regard to benefices and ecclesiastical censures. Such things, however, as the Council
of Basel had defined on its authority over the Pope, no Pope approved, rather condemned
avowedly, especially Pope Eugene IV, as is clear from the Council of Basel in sess. 38, then Leo X
in the last Lateran Council, sess. 12, and again by the whole Church, which, when the Council
deposed Eugene, always held him as a true Pope. Lastly, those at the Council of Basel and Pope
Felix, whom they created, as Pope Felix at length yielded to Nicholas, Eugene’s successor, and
those at Basel, who transferred the Council to Lausanne and at length subjected themselves to
Pope Nicholas, as Nicholas witnesses in the same Bull. Many other arguments could be proposed
and answered, but these are answered in our treatise On the Roman Pontiff. See also what we will
say about the Council of Basel, in the following book, chapter 16.

End Book II

Footnotes

1

On the reasons why the Lutherans did not come to the Council.

2

Translator’s note: What Bellarmine means is those who insert Hebrew and Greek to show off their learning as a mark of rhetoric
to obscure the points at hand.

3

Translator’s note: Circa 1588.

4

Cf. Chronicus S. Hieronymi; Gregorius Haloandrus, aliisque Chronologis.

5

Translator’s note: Collectively known as the “Three Chapters”.

6

Translator’s note: Constance was considered properly to be an ecumenical Council, and St. Robert certainly held it as such, but he
will consider that under the section of Councils that were partly approved and partly condemned.

7

Translator’s note: Also called the Council in Trullo.

8

Translator’s note: Modern Kosovo.

9

The reasons why the Electors, Princes and others attached to the Augsburg Confession should not come to the Council of Trent.

10

Translator’s note: Although Bellarmine cites St. Antoninus in favor of this opinion, St. Antoninus does not quite say this. Rather,
after he asserted that the Pope is above a Council, he adds three exceptions from the Gloss, of which one is: “When he submits
himself to the judgment of the Church, a Council or another of his own will.” (Summ., part. 2, tit. 3, cap. 11, §10).

11

Translator’s note: While this claim that a Council is above the Pope was hardly tenable after Bellarmine’s time, after the decree
of Vatican I it is properly heretical.