RALPH McINERNY

Studies in Analogy

MARTINUS NIJHOFF
THE HAGUE

STUDIES IN ANALOGY

STUDIES IN ANALOGY

by

RALPH MCINERNY
University of Notre Dame

THE HAGUE
MARTINUS NIJHOFF
1968

ISBN 978-94-015-0334-1 ISBN 978-94-015-0880-3 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-015-0880-3

SORORIBUS FRATRIBUSQUE

MEIS:

Roger
Raymond
Austin
Dennis
Mary Margaret
Theresa
Maurice
Stephen

PREFACE

The present volume brings together a number of things I have written on the subject of analogy since the appearance of *The Logic of Analogy* in 1961. In that book I tried to disengage St Thomas' teaching on analogous names from various subsequent accretions which, in my opinion, had obscured its import. The book was widely reviewed, various points in it were rightly criticized, but its main argument, namely, that analogical signification is a logical matter and must be treated as such, was, if often confronted, left finally, I think, standing. The studies brought together now reflect the same concentration on the teaching of Aquinas. I am not of the opinion that everything important on the question of analogy, and certainly not everything of importance on those problems which elicit the doctrine of analogy, was said by Thomas Aquinas. But it was my decision, for my personal work, first to achieve as much clarity as I could with respect to the teaching of Thomas, and then to go on to other writers, both ancient and modern. I am currently engaged in working out the relations among equivocation, analogy and metaphor in Aristotle. When that study is completed, I shall turn eagerly to some quite recent contributions to the nature of religious language. In short, the present work, which is by and large a prolongation of my attempt at an exegesis of Thomistic texts, marks the end of one phase of my research into the problem of analogy.

Three of the essays brought together here have appeared in English in the same form, the essays which make up Chapter Two, Four and Five. The date and place of their previous appearance is noted in the appropriate place and I wish to thank the editors who first published them for permission to reprint them. A version, considerably shorter, of the first essay appeared in print, but it was so truncated that I feel it fair to say that *this* essay has not before been published. Chapter Six appeared in French; Chapter Three had been read on a number of occasions but this is its first appearance in print.

Scholarly research is a lonely task but, as everyone who has engaged

in it knows, it is as well an intensely social if not necessarily gregarious enterprise: one's cohorts are numbered among both the quick and dead and one's gratitude, accordingly, must traverse that grim boundary. I shall not list here all those to whom I am grateful. They know who they are, however, and being what they are, neither desire nor require my poor thanks. I commend them in my prayers to the dispenser of the ultimate accolade.

RALPH MCINERNY
Notre Dame, Indiana
November, 1966

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

THE 'RATIO COMMUNIS' OF THE ANALOGOUS NAME

Since the analogous name is one which signifies in a manner midway between that of pure equivocation and univocation,[1] it will participate something of the modes of these extremes. Things are said to be named equivocally which have a common name but the notions signified by the name are diverse; things are said to be named univocally which have a common name which signifies the same notion in each case. The affinity of the analogous name with the equivocal as well as with the univocal name is brought out by saying that the notions signified by the analogous name *partim sunt diversae et partim non diversae.*[2] This "in between" character of the analogous name has been responsible for difficulties which arise again and again in the minds of students of St. Thomas. If there is something the same in the many notions signified by the analogous name, can't we extract that common note and say that, insofar as the term is taken to signify it, the term is univocal? Thus, while the *ratio substantiae* differs from the *ratio accidentis*, it is argued that there must be something common to both, a *ratio communis* and, if "being" is taken as signifying the latter, it is univocal; if taken to signify the diverse *rationes* of substance and accident, it is analogous. It is this thought that seems to have suggested the teaching of Duns Scotus that "being" is univocal insofar as it signifies a *ratio communis.*[3] He takes as a sign of our recognition of such a common notion of "being" the fact that we can know that a thing is without being sure that it is a substance or that it is an accident.

A second difficulty concerning analogous names is based on the fact that such names signify many different notions. Because of this, it is

[1] "Et iste modus communitatis medius est inter puram aequivocationem et simpliciter univocationem." — *Ia*, q. 13, a. 5.

[2] *In IV Metaphysic.*, lect. 1, n. 535.

[3] Cf. Alan B. Wolter, O.F.M., *The Transcendentals and their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus*, Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1952; C. L. Shircel, O.F.M., *The Univocity of the Concept of Being in the Philosophy of Duns Scotus*, Washington, 1942; T. Barth, O.F.M., *De fundamento univocationis apud Duns Scotum*, Romae, 1939. Of these, Fr. Wolter's study is perhaps the best, not least because he undertakes the defence of Scotus' position against various Thomistic criticisms.

argued, an analogous term cannot enter into a syllogism without entailing the fallacy of equivocation, for it may be understood according to different significations in each occurrence and we would then have a four term syllogism.

Both of these difficulties are stressed by Scotus and it is hardly surprising that Cajetan attempts to defend the analogous name against a reduction to univocity and against the charge that, as analogous it is the source of the fallacy of equivocation.[1] In the present study our purpose is not to examine the doctrine of Scotus or the rebuttal of Cajetan; rather we want to see whether there is cause in the writings of St. Thomas for the difficulties Scotus has and, if so, what in those same writings is the indicated solution. If our purpose is attained, we will have shed, perhaps, some more or less oblique light on the controversy between Scotus and Cajetan.

It is the presence or absence of a *ratio communis* of the analogous name which must first be established. When one reads St. Thomas, he is sometimes confronted with texts which seem to assert that the analogous term has no *ratio communis*, while other texts seem to speak quite clearly of such a common notion. Since this is so, a fitting way for us to begin will be to set down representative texts some of which reject and others of which assume a *ratio communis* for the analogous name. In this way the difficulties are heightened, but as well we will see the manner of the resolution required. "Auditorem enim oportet iudicare de auditis. Sicut autem in iudiciis nullus potest iudicare nisi audiat rationes utriusque partis, ita necesse est eum, qui debet audire philosophiam, melius se habere in iudicando si audierit omnes rationes quasi adversariorum dubitantium."[2]

I. TEXTS WHICH REJECT A RATIO COMMUNIS

Of words which are said in many ways (*πολλαχῶς λεγόμενα*), "being"

[1] Cf. *De nominum analogia*, (ed. P. N. Zammit, O.P. and P. H. Hering, O.P.), Romae, 1952, cap. X et XI.

[2] *In III Metaphysic.*, lect. 1, n. 342. It has recently been argued that the difficulty we pose ourselves in this study is a fictitious one, since St Thomas changed his mind on the matter. That is, while in early writings we find him speaking of *una ratio analogice communis*, in his more mature writings he speaks only of diverse notions signified by the analogous name. Cf. George P. Klubertanz, *St Thomas Aquinas on Analogy*, Chicago, 1960, pp. 23-4. It would seem to be a faulty interpretation of what is meant by one notion analogically common which prompts this view that St Thomas changed his mind. Our own view does not depend on any putative shift of attitude on the part of St Thomas, since our problem is posed both in early and late writings of St Thomas. Nevertheless, as will become clear, if by *one notion* or *common notion* we think only of what is signified by the univocal name, we will find hopeless confusion throughout the writings of St Thomas.

is the most notable instance; Aristotle often points out the multiple signification of this word and in commenting on such texts St. Thomas provides us with statements relevant to our present interest. Thus, in the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle writes: "There are many senses in which a thing may be said to be, but all that is is related to one central point, one definite kind of thing, and is not said to be by mere ambiguity."[1] St. Thomas states the argument of this passage as follows. "Whatever things receive in common the predication of one name, even though it be predicated analogically and not univocally of them, fall to the consideration of one science; but 'being' is predicated in this way of all beings; therefore all beings fall to the consideration of one science which considers being as being, namely both substances and accidents."[2] To accept the argument, we must understand the premises, so St. Thomas goes on to discuss the minor and the major. "Being, or what is, is said in many ways."[3] To manifest what this statement means, we first look at what is predicated univocally and equivocally. Something said of many according to a *ratio* in every way the same, is said to be predicated univocally of them, e.g. animal of horse and cow. When something is predicated of many according to wholly diverse rationes, it is said to be predicated equivocally of them, e.g. dog of star and animal. Thus far it is clear that the "something" which is predicated is a word; if we should understand the *aliquid* in any other way, say nature or concept, it would be impossible to make sense out of these definitions. It would have been better, therefore, to state the examples in this way: "animal" of horse and cow; "dog" of star and animal. Whether we begin our definition with things, as Aristotle does in the *Categories*, or with names as St. Thomas does here, there are always three elements in the discussion of these different types of signification: the word, the thing and the *ratio substantiae* (*λόγος τῆς οὐσίας*), i.e.

[2] *Metaphysics*, IV, 2, 1003a33-4: *τὸ δὲ ὂν λέγεται μὲν πολλαχῶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἓν καὶ μίαν τινὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐχ ὁμωνύμως*,

[1] *In IV Metaphysic.*, lect. 1, n. 534. "Quaecumque communiter unius recipiunt praedicationem, licet non univoce, sed analogice de his praedicetur, pertinent ad unius scientiae considerationem: sed ens hoc modo praedicatur de omnibus entibus: ergo omnia entia pertinent ad considerationem unius scientiae, quae considerat ens inquantum est ens, scilicet tam substantias quam accidentia."

[2] *Ibid.*, n. 535: "Dicit ergo primo, quod ens sive quod est, dicitur multipliciter. Sed sciendum quod aliquid praedicatur de diversis multipliciter: *quandoque* quidem secundum rationem omnino eamdem, et tunc dicitur de eis univoce praedicari, sicut animal de equo et bove. — *Quandoque* vero secundum rationes omnino diversas; et tunc dicitur de eis aequivoce praedicari, sicut canis de sidere et animali. — *Quandoque* vero secundum rationes quae partim sunt diversae et partim non diversae: diversae quidem secundum quod diversas habitudines important, unae autem secundum quod ad unum aliquid et idem istae diversae habitudines referuntur; et illud dicitur 'analogice praedicari,' idest proportionaliter, prout unumquodque secundum suam habitudinem ad illud unum refertur."

that which we know of the thing and what the name is imposed to signify immediately. And, whether we are concerned with univocals, equivocals or analogates, we have things which share a common name; it is not the signification which renders the word one, since, if this were so, there could be no purely equivocal names.[1] The analogical term is predicated according to notions which are partly diverse, partly not diverse. Their diversity arises from the fact that diverse relations are expressed; their similarity from the fact that there is some one thing to which these relations refer. Lest we think the unity involved here is one of notion, St. Thomas adds a warning.

> Note that with respect to analogous terms the one to which the diverse relations refer is one in number and not only one in notion as is the case with the one designated by the univocal name. Therefore he (Aristotle) says that although being is said in many ways it is not said equivocally, but with respect to one—not to something one in notion alone, but to some one nature.[2]

There is, then, no *ratio communis* of the analogous term; rather there are many notions expressing different relations to some numerically one nature.

The same point is stressed in the discussion of the major premiss of the argument. There can be one science not only of things which are named univocally, i.e. according to a notion in every way one, but also of things named analogically because of the one nature to which reference is made in the diverse relations.[3] It is just this which explains the primacy of substance in metaphysics: it is the point of reference of all other things which are said to be.[4] There is no generic notion, no *ratio*

[1] "Manifestum est autem quod unitas *vocis* significativae vel diversitas non dependet ex unitate vel diversitate *rei significatae*; alioquin non esset aliquid nomen aequivocum: secundum hoc enim si sint diversae res, essent diversa nomina, et non idem nomen." — *Quodl. IV*, q. 9, a. 2.

[2] "Item sciendum quod illud unum ad quod diversae habitudines referuntur in analogicis, est unum numero, et non solum unum ratione, sicut est unum illud quod per nomen univocum designatur. Et ideo dicit quod ens etsi dicatur multipliciter, non tamen dicitur aequivoce, sed per respectum ad unum; non quidem ad unum quod sit solum ratione unum, sed quod est unum sicut una quaedam natura." — *In IV Metaphysic.*, lect. 1, n. 536.

[3] *Ibid.*, n. 544: "Hic ponit maiorem primae rationis; dicens, quod est unius scientiae speculari non solum illa quae dicuntur 'secundum unum,' idest secundum unam rationem omnino, sed etiam eorum quae dicuntur per respectum ad unam naturam secundum habitudines diversas. Et huius ratio est propter unitatem eius ad quod ista dicuntur; sicut patet quod de omnibus sanativis considerat una scientia, scilicet medicinalis, et similiter de aliis quae eodem modo dicuntur."

[4] *Ibid.*, n. 546: "Hic ponit quod haec scientia principaliter considerat de substantiis, etsi de omnibus entibus consideret, tali ratione. Omnis scientia quae est de pluribus quae dicuntur ad unum primum, est proprie et principaliter illius primi, ex quo alia dependent secundum esse, et propter quod dicuntur secundum nomen; et hoc ubique est verum. Sed substantia est hoc primum inter omnia entia. Ergo philosophus qui considerat omnia entia, primo et principaliter debet habere in sua consideratione principia et causas substantiarum; ergo per consequens eius consideratio primo et principaliter de substantiis est."

communis entis which engages the metaphysician's attention first of all; rather the community of "being" indicates that his first and chief task will be an investigation of the principles and causes of substance.

If "being" does not signify a *ratio communis*, it is not surprising to find that "good" does not. Aristotle points out that if this had been recognized by the platonists they would not have posited an Idea of the good, since they did not hold there was one idea of things related as prior and posterior.[1] But this is the case here "since 'good' has as many senses as 'being' (for it is predicated of substance, as of God and of reason, and of quality, i.e. of the virtues, and in quantity, i.e. of the useful, and in time, i.e. of the right opportunity, and in place, i.e. of the right locality and the like), clearly it cannot be something universally present in all cases and single, for then it could not have been predicated in all the categories but in one only."[2] St. Thomas makes the point in the terminology which interests us now.

From which it follows that there cannot be one Idea of things of which there is no one common notion. But there is no one common notion of the diverse categories, for nothing is predicated of them univocally.[3]

The analogous name signifies many notions, one primarily, the others with reference to it, so what the name principally signifies is included in the secondary notions.[4] So it is that substance chiefly is and is first named by the term 'being'; whatever else is or is said to be is referred to substance.[5] In things named analogically, then, there is no notion

[1] Cf. *In III Metaphysic.*, lect. 8, nn. 437-8; *Q.D. de ver.*, q. 21, a. 4.

[2] *Nicomachean Ethics*, I, 6, 1096a24 ff.

[3] "Ex quo sequitur quod eorum quorum non est una ratio communis, non possit esse una idea. Sed diversorum praedicamentorum non est una ratio communis. Nihil enim univoce de his praedicatur." — *In I Ethic.*, lect. 6, n. 81.

[4] *Ia*, q. 13, a. 6: "Respondeo dicendum quod in omnibus nominibus, quae de pluribus analogice dicuntur, necesse est quod omnia dicantur per respectum ad unum: et ideo illud unum oportet quod ponatur in definitione omnium." — *Ibid.*, a. 10: "...univocorum est omnino eadem ratio: aequivocorum est omnino ratio diversa: in analogicis vero, oportet quod nomen secundum unam significationem acceptum, ponatur in definitione eiusdem nominis secundum alias significationes accepti. Sicut *ens* de substantia dictum, ponitur in definitione entis secundum quod de accidente dicitur (...) Et sic manifestum est quod alia et alia est significatio nominis, sed una illarum significationum clauditur in significationibus aliis. Unde manifestum est quod analogice dicitur." — *Ibid.*, a. 5: "Neque enim in his quae analogice dicuntur, est una ratio sicut est in univocis; nec totaliter diversa, sicut in aequivocis: sed nomen quod sic multipliciter dicitur significat diversas proportiones ad aliquid unum..."

[5] Cf. *In IV Metaphysic.*, lect. 1, n. 539. "Manifestum est autem quod illud quod est ens per seipsum, scilicet substantia, est naturaliter prius omnibus his quae non habent esse nisi in comparatione ad substantiam, sicut est quantitas, quae est mensura substantiae, et qualitas, quae est dispositio substantiae, et ad aliquid, quid est habitudo substantiae. Et idem est in aliis generibus, quae omnia assimilantur propagini entis, idest substantiae, quae est principaliter ens, a qua propaginatur et derivantur omnia alia genera. Quae etiam in tantum dicuntur entia, inquantum accidunt substantiae. Et ex hoc concludit, quod non potest esse quaedam communis idea boni." — *In I Ethic.*, lect. 6, n. 80.

common to the various analogates; rather there is some first and proper signification and other secondary significations which make reference to the primary signification. In the case of 'being' this would mean that we should look for no *ratio communis* thanks to which it would name something over and above substance and accidents. If the word is used without qualification, it must be taken to name substance.[1] Thus, if we take any of the *expositiones nominis entis*, (id quod habet esse, quod est, habens esse), the term names substance primarily.[2] Perhaps one of the most striking statements of this is to be found in the *Contra Gentiles* where St. Thomas argues that if "being" were said univocally of substance and accident, substance would enter into its own definition insofar as it is named being[3] The force of this argument depends on the truth that what "being" names when used without qualification is substance.

A further sign that the analogous term does not signify a common notion but rather many notions related as primary and secondary is had in the warning that when a term "said in many ways" is used in an argument, discourse can be vitiated if we don't make clear which meaning of the term we have in mind.[4] It is just this that makes Parminides' argument so difficult to assess.[5] How fitting then that Aristotle in the

[1] *In I Periherm.*, lect. 5, n. 19: "...*ens* non dicitur proprie aequivoce, sed secundum prius et posterius; unde simpliciter dictum intelligitur de eo, quod per prius dicitur.' Cf. *Q.D. de ver.* q. 7, a. 5, ad 3.

[2] *In XI Metaphysic.*, lect. 3, n. 2197: "Et similiter est de multiplicitate entis. Nam ens simpliciter dicitur id quod in se habet esse, scilicet substantia. Alia vero dicuntur entis, quia sunt huius quod per se est, vel passio, vel habitus, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Non enim qualitas dicitur ens, quia ipsa habeat esse, sed per eam substantia dicitur esse disposita. Et similiter est de aliis accidentibus. Et propter hoc dicit quod sunt entis. Et sic patet quod multiplicitas entis habet aliquid commune, ad quod fit reductio." "Nam ens dicitur quasi esse habens, hoc autem solum est substantia, quae subsistit. Accidentia autem dicuntur entia, non quia sunt, sed quia magis ipsis aliquid est; sicut albedo dicitur esse, quia ens subiectum est album. Ideo dicit, quod non dicuntur simpliciter entia, sed entis entia, sicut qualitas et motus." — *In XII Metaphysic.*, lect. 1, n. 2419; Cf. *IIIa*, q. 11, a. 5, ad 3.

[3] "Quod praedicatur de aliquibus secundum prius et posterius, certum est univoce non praedicari, nam prius in definitione posterioris includitur; sicut *substantia* in definitione accidentis secundum quod est ens. Si igitur diceretur univoce *ens* de substantia et accidente, oporteret quod substantia etiam poneretur in definitione entis secundum quod de substantia praedicatur." — *I Contra Gentes*, cap. 32.

[4] "Et dicit quod quando aliqua multipliciter dicuntur, contingit quandoque quod illa multiplicitas nullam differentiam inducat quantum ad rationem quae proponitur, quando scilicet in illa ratione sumitur nomen solum in una significatione: tunc enim multiplicitas differentiam facit in ratione, quando nomen sumitur in diversis significationibus. Sed tamen, licet nulla differentia fiat quantum ad rationem, tamen intellectus audientis confuse se habet, si aliquis utatur nomine quod multipliciter potest distingui, tanquam distingui non potest: quia quando aliquis utitur indistincte nomine multiplici, non est manifestum secundam quam significatam accidit conclusio." — *In I De coelo et mundo*, lect. 24, n. 2. This is not to say that what the name primarily signifies would not come immediately to mind, but that, when one is aware that the name is used of other things due to their reference to what is primarily signified, he will want a clear statement as to which meaning is at issue.

[5] "Sed in hoc decipiebantur, quia utebantur ente quasi una ratione et una natura sicut

Metaphysics, where words common to all things are used, devotes a whole book to distinguishing the various meanings of key common terms.[1]

The only conclusion to be drawn from such texts as we have just examined is that the analogous name does not have a *ratio communis*. If it did, the implication is, it would be a univocal term and being, for instance, would be generically common to the categories. Doubtless this is why the analogous name is spoken of as a type of equivocal term,[2] one by design as opposed to mere chance,[3] since, though it signifies not one notion but many, the many notions signified are related *per prius et posterius*. When faced with such a term, our first task is to distinguish its several meanings and be quite explicit as to which meaning we have in mind, a counsel also applicable to the use of a purely equivocal term. If the analogous term involves a type of community which is midway between pure equivocation and univocation, the texts we have been looking at would suggest that it has greater affinity with the purely equivocal term. What would cause us to shift the balance towards the opposite pole would be the presence of a *ratio communis*, but this is what the analogous term is said not to possess.

II. TEXTS WHICH IMPLY A RATIO COMMUNIS ANALOGI

The matter, however, is not so simple. There is a plethora of texts in which St. Thomas speaks quite clearly of a *ratio communis* of the analogous name. Indeed this seems to be involved in texts where substance and accident are discussed as modes of being differing from the transcendental modes.[4] Being is that which our intellect first grasps and into

est natura alicuius generis; hoc enim est impossible. Ens enim non est genus, sed multipliciter dicitur de diversis." — *In I Metaphysic.*, lect. 9, n. 139.

[1] "Et quia ea quae in hac scientia considerantur, sunt omnibus communia, nec dicuntur univoce, sed secundum prius et posterius de diversis, ut in quarto libro est habitum, ideo prius distinguit intentiones nominum, quae in huius scientiae consideratione cadunt." — *In V Metaphysic.*, lect. 1, n. 749.

[2] *Ia*, q. 13, a. 10, ad 4.

[3] *In I Ethic.*, lect. 7, n. 95.

[4] Cf. *Q.D. de ver.*, q. 1, a. 1: "Illud autem quod primo intellectus concipit quasi notissimum, est ens... Unde oportet quod omnes aliae conceptiones intellectus accipiantur ex additione ad ens. Sed enti non potest addi aliquid quasi extranea natura, per modum quo differentia additur generi, vel accidens subiecto, quia quaelibet natura essentialiter est ens; unde etiam probat Philosophus in III *Metaphys.* quod ens non potest esse genus, sed secundum hoc aliqua dicuntur addere supra ens, in quantum exprimunt ipsius modum, qui nomine ipsius entis non exprimitur. Quod dupliciter contingit: uno modo ut modus expressus sit aliquis specialis modus entis. Sunt enim diversi gradus entitatis, secundum quosaccipiun tur diversi modi essendi, et iuxta hos modos accipiuntur diversa rerum genera. Substantia enim non addit supra ens aliquam differentiam, quae significet aliquam differentiam super-

which all other conceptions are resolved. Resolution is the breaking up of something into its parts, the reduction of the secondary to the primary. Resolution to being, consequently, implies that all other concepts involve addition to that of being. What is the manner of this addition? It cannot be the addition of a nature extraneous to being, as difference is extraneous to genus, since every nature is essentially being. Being is not a genus and a concept can add to it only in the sense that it expresses a mode of being that the term "being" itself does not express. Thus far we would seem to be given to understand that "being" expresses a common notion and that though something may be added to it the added note is not some nature.[1] There are two ways in which words can express being in a way "being" itself does not: first, such that a special mode of being is expressed. This is the case with each of the categories. Secondly, a term can express a mode of being which belongs generally to being and is not confined to a given category. This suggests a *ratio communis entis*, say "that which has existence," a notion which expresses no determinate mode of being, but is common to each of the special, categorical modes. Moreover, the *ratio substantiae* will express more than the *ratio communis entis*, there will be at least an addition *ratione* and thus the apparent equation of the notion of substance and that of being said without qualification, an equation suggested by the texts examined in the previous section, is called into question. Prior to the notions of substance and accident, there is the notion of being and insofar as "being" is taken to signify this first and fundamental grasp of reality, it signifies a *ratio communis*.

Much the same point is made by St. Thomas in his discussion of the transcendental name "good," although this time he makes the point even more forcibly by citing a threefold way in which something can be added to something else.[2] They are: (1) the way in which accident adds

additam enti, sed nomine substantiae exprimitur quidam specialis modus essendi, scilicet per se ens; et ita est in aliis generibus. Alio modo ita quod modus expressus sit modus generaliter consequens omne ens..."

[1] *Q.D. de ver.*, q. 10, a. 11, ad 10: "...ens quod est primum per communitatem, cum sit idem per essentiam rei cuilibet, nullus proportionem excedit; et ideo in cognitione cuiuslibet rei ipsum cognoscitur."

[2] *Q.D. de ver.*, q. 21, a. 1: "Dicendum quod tripliciter potest aliquid super alterum addere. *Uno modo* quod addat aliquam rem quae sit extra essentiam illius rei cui dicitur addi; sicut album addit super corpus, quia essentia albedinis est praeter essentiam corporis. *Alio modo* dicitur aliquid addi super alterum per modum contrahendi et determinandi; sicut homo addit aliquid super animal: non quidem ita quod sit in homine alia res quae sit penitus extra essentiam animalis, alias oporteret dicere, quod non totum quod est homo esset animal, sed animal esset pars hominis; sed animal per hominem contrahitur, quia id quod determinate et actualiter continetur in ratione hominis, implicite et quasi potentialiter continetur in ratione animalis... *Tertio modo* dicitur aliquid addere super alterum secundum rationem tantum; quando scilicet aliquid est de ratione unius quod non est de ratione alterius: quod

to substance, (2)the way in which addition leads to a contraction and determination of the common, e.g. "man" contracts and determines what "animal" signifies; (3) the way in which something purely of reason is added to something. Thus, when we say "blind man," we are not adding some real nature, but a lack in the real order. However, though what is added *is* in mind alone, the addition of "blind" enables us to contract "man" since not all men are blind. No such contraction is gotten by adding "blind" to "tree" since no tree can see. Which of these modes can be involved in an addition to *ens universale*? Not the first since there is no natural thing which is "outside the essence of universal being" though, of course, one thing can be essentially different from another particular thing. With certain qualification, the second mode of addition is involved in the distinction of the categories: unlike species with reference to genus, this contraction and determination of "universal being" is not had by the addition of any difference which is outside the essence of being, but by expressing a determinate mode of being (*modus essendi*) which is founded in the very essence of the thing. Such addition cannot explain such terms as "good," however, since good like being is divided equally into the ten categories.

What is suggested, accordingly, is a *ratio communis entis* other than and superior to the *rationes* of substance and accident. Moreover, since they too escape confinement to one category, the so-called transcendental notions will be shown to add something of reason to the common notion of "being." From this one might want to conclude that, while metaphysics may be concerned first of all with substance when it turns to the special modes of being, it can first occupy itself with the notion of being which is prior to the categories and establish the transcendental properties of being as being. Indeed, it might even be maintained that this is proper level of metaphysical considerations. Nor would it be surprising to be told that concern with the *ratio communis entis* is characteristically thomistic as opposed to the Aristotelian penchant for substance, which is only a special mode of being. Occupation with the *ratio communis* leads to a deduction of the transcendental properties from *esse*, since there is little else to work with in that common notion; this, more than anything else, would recommend the acceptance of the *ratio communis* to many contemporary thomists for it would seem to involve that "putting

tamen nihil est in rerum natura, sed in ratione tantum, sive per illud contrahitur id cui dicitur addi, sive non. Caecum enim addit aliquid supra hominem, scilicet caecitatem, quae non est aliquid ens in natura, sed rationis tantum, secundum quod ens est comprehendens privationes; et per hoc homo contrahitur, non enim omnis homo caecus est; sed cum dicimus talpam caecam, non fit per hoc additum aliqua contractio."

of the accent" on *esse* which is said to separate the metaphysics of St. Thomas from all others, including that of Aristotle, which look to essence as source of intelligibility in philosophical wisdom, thereby putting a premium on "conceptual" thought.

In the previous section we cited the procedure of the fifth book of the *Metaphysics*, in which Aristotle distinguishes the various meanings of common names, as indication that there is no common meaning of such names. However, if we look somewhat more closely at this process of distinguishing, we notice something which suggests support for the present side of our *aporia*. To take a few random examples: in discussing the various meanings of "disposition," St. Thomas cites a *ratio communis* of the name.[1] At the end of the analysis of the meanings of "principle," St. Thomas writes, "And he reduces all the foregoing modes to something common; he says that what is common in all the mentioned modes is that that is said to be a principle which is first either in the being of the thing, as the first part of a thing is said to be a principle, or in the becoming of a thing, as the first mover is said to be a principle, and in knowledge of the thing."[2] So too what is common to all modes of "element" is to be first in something.[3] The discussion of "one" is begun with this statement: "...those things which are wholly indivisible are especially said to be one: because all other modes are reduced to this one, since this is universally true that whatever things have no division are because of this said to be one."[4] So, in the discussion of "prior and posterior": "First he assigns the common notion of the prior and posterior."[5] And there is a reduction of all modes of "possible" to one.[6] Indeed, when speaking of the subject of metaphysics, St. Thomas speaks of "being" as prior to substance. "The subject of this science, however, can be taken either as it is commonly considered in the whole science, and in this way it is being or one, or as to that which is its principal concern, substance."[7]

[1] *In V Metaphysic.*, lect. 20, n. 1058: "...et ponit rationem communem huius nominis Dispositio, dicens, quod dispositio nihil est aliud quam ordo partium in habente partes."

[2] *Ibid.*, lect. 1, n. 761: "Reducit omnes praedictos modos ad aliquid commune; et dicit quod commune in omnibus dictis modis est, ut dicatur principium illud, quod est primum, aut in esse rei, sicut prima pars rei dicitur principium, aut in fieri rei, sicut primum movens dicitur principium, aut in rei cognitione."

[3] *Ibid.*, lect. 4, n. 807.

[4] *Ibid.*, lect. 8, n. 866: "...illa quae sunt penitus indivisibilia, maxime dicuntur unum: quia ad hunc modum omnes alii modi reducuntur, quia universaliter hoc est verum, quod quaecumque non habent divisionem, secundum hoc dicuntur unum, inquantum divisionem non habent."

[5] *Ibid.*, lect. 13, n. 936: "Primo assignat rationem communem prioris et posterioris."

[6] *Ibid.*, lect. 14, n. 975: "Reducit omnes modos possibilis et impossibilis ad unum primum."

[7] "Subiectum autem huius scientiae potest accipi, vel sicut communiter in tota scientia

Elsewhere as well, St. Thomas speaks of the *ratio communis* of the analogous name. "Origin, however, can be considered in two ways: either according to the common notion of origin, which is for one thing to be from another, and thus one notion is common to the origin of persons and the origin of creatures, not indeed by a community of univocation but of analogy: and similarly too the name 'principle'."[1] Mortal and venial sin share a common notion, albeit analogously.[2] "Person" can be taken to signify a notion which abstracts from the things to which it is analogously common.[3] So too the analogous cause of truth communicates with its effect in name and a common notion.[4] The term "passion," which is said in many ways, has a common meaning.[5] Finally, with respect to the use of an analogous term in an argument, we can cite a text mentioned in this connection by Cajetan,[6] a text in which St. Thomas points out that, although "generation" and "production" are not univocally common to God the Son and creatures,

considerandum, cuiusmodi est ens et unum: vel sicut id de quo est principalis intentio, ut substantia." — *Ibid.*, lect. 7, n. 842.

[1] "Potest autem origo considerari dupliciter: aut secundum communem rationem originis, quae est aliquid ab aliquo esse, et sic una ratio est communis ad originem personarum et originem creaturarum, non quidem communitate univocationis, sed analogiae: et similiter etiam nomen principii." — *I Sent.*, d. 29, q. 1, a. 2, sol. 1.

[2] *Q.D. de malo*, q. 7, a. 1, ad 1: "...duplex est divisio: una qua dividitur genus univocum in suas species, quae ex aequo participant genus, sicut animal in bovem et equum; alia est divisio communis analogi in ea de quibus dicitur secundum prius et posterius; sicut ens dividitur per substantiam et accidens, et per potentiam et actum; et in talibus *ratio communis perfecte salvatur in uno*; in aliis autem secundum quid et per posterius; et tale est divisio peccati per veniale et mortale." — Cf. *ibid.*, ad 2: "...veniale est differentia diminuens de ratione peccati; et talis differentia invenitur in omnibus quae participant aliquod commune imperfecte et secundum quid." Cf. *ibid.*, ad. 7. — *II Sent.*, d. 42, q. 1, a. 3: "...alia vero divisio est ejus quod est commune per analogiam, quod quidem secundum perfectam rationem praedicatur de uno dividentium, et de altero imperfecte et secundum quid, sicut ens dividitur in substantiam et accidens, et in ens actu et in ens potentia: et haec divisio est quasi media inter aequivocum et univocum; et talis divisio est peccati in mortale et veniale: quia ratio peccati perfecte in mortali invenitur; in veniali vero non nisi imperfecte et secundum quid." Cf. *ibid.*, ad 1. — *IaIIae*, q. 88, a. 1, ad 1: "...dicendum quod divisio peccati venialis et mortalis non est divisio generis in species, quae aequaliter participant rationem generis: sed analogi in ea de quibus praedicatur secundum prius et posterius. Et ideo perfecta ratio peccati... convenit peccato mortali. Peccatum autem veniale dicitur peccatum secundum rationem imperfectam, et in ordine ad peccatum mortale; sicut accidens dicitur ens in ordine ad substantiam, secundum imperfectam rationem entis."

[3] "...dicendum quod ratio personae importat distinctionem in communi; unde abstrahitur a quolibet modo distinctionis: et ideo potest esse una ratio analogice in his quae diversimode distinguuntur." — *I Sent.*, d. 25, q. 1, a. 2, ad 5.

[4] *In II Metaphysic.*, lect. 2, n. 294: "Nomen autem veritatis non est proprium alicui speciei, sed se habet communiter ad omnia entia. Unde, quia illud quod est causa veritatis, est causa communicans cum effectu in nomine et ratione communi, sequitur quod illud, quod est posterioribus causa ut sint vera, sit verissimum."

[5] *IaIIae*, q. 22, a. 1: "...pati dicitur tripliciter. Uno modo, communiter, secundum quod omne recipere est pati, etiam si nihil abiiciatur a re..."; cf. *Q.D. de ver.*, q. 26, q. 1, a. 2; *III Sent.*, d. 15, q. 2, a. 1, sol. 2; *infra* IV, 2.

[6] *Op. cit.*, n. 107.

a common notion of these words is possible thanks to which the Son and creatures communicate in the distribution of the term.[1]

We began by noticing that analogical signification is said to be midway between univocation and pure equivocation and that it participates something if these extremes; indeed insofar as the analogous name is thought of as more closely ressembling pure equivocation, the accent will be placed on the many *rationes* signified and cautions expressed as to the use of an analogous name in an argument since we may shift from one meaning to another and end up with a four term syllogism. The texts we looked at in the previous section stress the multiplicity of the notions signified by the analogous name and seem not to allow for a *ratio communis*. The texts we have just examined, on the other hand, do speak of a *ratio communis* although, when they do, they are careful to distinguish it from the common notion signified by the univocal name. If there is a *ratio communis* of the analogous name it is not equally common to its inferiors. This is check enough, surely, against assuming that wherever there is a common notion there is univocity. Nevertheless, there remains at least a *prima facie* opposition between these groups of texts and we must ask how they can be reconciled. In pursuit of an answer to this query, we will first recall the doctrine of analogical signification with particular reference to the terminology St. Thomas uses to describe it. Once this has been done, we shall examine the contexts of many of the texts already quoted by investigating the doctrine that being is not a genus. That investigation, together with a detailed tracing of the extension of some selected analogous names, should enable us to arrive at some generalities with respect to St. Thomas' doctrine on the nature of the *ratio communis* of the analogous name.

III. THE ANALOGY OF NAMES

Clearly the difficulty we have posed for ourselves will find its solution in a proper understanding of the nature of analogical signification. The texts we have set down above and the preliminary remarks we have made concerning them imply an understanding of a number of connected matters. We have spoken of words, of naming, of different ways

[1] *Q.D. de pot.*, q. 2, a. 5, ad 6: "...dicendum quod generatio Filii et productio creaturarum non sunt unius rationis secundum univocatione, sed secundum analogiam tantum. Dicit enim Basilius quod accipere Filius habet communi cum omni creatura; et ratione huius dicitur 'primogenitus omnis creaturae' et hac ratione potest eius generatio productionibus creaturae communicari sub una distributione."

things can be named, of the notions signified by a word; most importantly, we have spoken of analogous, univocal and purely equivocal names as if these were quite manifest in their nature. Doubtless to many all these matters are clear and evident; however, while in no way pretending to say all that must be known if such matters are to become clear, we must, given our problem and our mode of posing it, attempt to set forth some of the more obvious elements of the matters just mentioned. If our presentation is accurate, it will be of great help in the sequel; if, on the other hand, our understanding of these presuppositions to any solution of our problem should unfortunately be false or basically misleading, the solution we shall propose can be rejected in its roots and another offered against the background of a correct statement of the presuppositions.

1. *The Imposition of Names*

At the outset of his work *On Interpretation*, Aristotle points out that written words are signs of spoken words and spoken words are signs of concepts[1] (or "passions of the soul"—we shall return to this terminology), whereas concepts are likenesses of things. It is significant that while words are called *signs*, concepts are called similitudes, likenesses or images, for a sign is, properly speaking, a sensible thing. If we should be asked what is meant by "sign," we might point to the red octagonal metal pieces erected at street corners; or to those plaques placed alongside highways on which are emblazoned curved arrows, etc. (perhaps the common road signs used throughout Europe would be the best example—if we were Europeans). As anyone knows who takes a driver's test, the shape of these signs, or the images on them, are supposed to tell us sometning. Should someone be asked in such a test what a given sign is and answer that it is an octagon, he would show that he knows something, of course, but not how such a shape functions as a sign. A sign is something which, when it is known, makes something else known. Thus, smoke is a sign of fire; the turning of the leaves is a sign that winter is coming; footprints in the sand are signs that someone has been here before. If all our examples are of sensible things which are signs, this is because the sign is, properly speaking, sensible; if a sign is what is first known and yet makes something other than itself known, it must be more obvious and more easily known than that of which it is a sign. It is because sensible things are most obvious to us that they can function as signs. As we shall point out presently, if we say of something

[1] 16a6-7.

which is not sensible that it is a sign, we shall have to explain what we mean by going back to what is most properly a sign, namely sensible things.

We have discussed the notion of sign by means of examples of conventional and natural signs. No decision on our part, no act of will, constitutes smoke as a sign of fire; that is all we mean by calling a sign natural. Language, like traffic signs, involves human chocie in order that certain sensible things be constituted as signs. We are now interested only in common nouns and how they come to be signs. The term "imposition" is used in this connection and, in ordinary English, to impose on someone is to do violence, to a greater or lesser degree, with more or less politeness. To speak to another person of something of great interest to us and of no interest to him is an imposition. This use of the term is not very relevant to our purposes. *Imponere* suggests putting on, adding to, and connotes the voluntary on the part of the one doing the imposing. Something like that is involved in talk of the "imposition of a word to signify." What is material in the word, the spoken word which is primary, is noise emanating from the throat. Some such noises are signs straight off, without further ado from us: a groan, a sigh, a scream signify in quite natural fashion subjective states of the one emitting them. (Peter and the Wolf is not a threat to this, but rather a confirmation of it.) This type of vocal sign can be said to be common to man and brute. Human language, specifically human vocal sounds, has its source in practical intelligence and will. It is agreed that such and such a sound will mean so-and-so.[1] Thus "man," for example, is an artificial sign which can be used to stand for such things as Plato, Socrates, etc. Unlike smoke with reference to fire, something must mediate between this noise and these things for it to be a sign of them, a mediation which Aristotle speaks of in terms of "passions of the soul"; that is, what we know of such things. A word is not *immediately* a sign of things in the way in which smoke is a sign of fire; rather it is immedi-

[1] Although statements about the conventional character of the signification of words conjure up the image of a primitive group, capable only of grunts and groans, sitting in silent council to impose in some wordless way noises on notions, we should not be misled by this and rush to the extreme which would maintain that language is natural and that some noises naturally have certain meanings. What is the reply to the question: who decided "father" would mean father? The implication of the question is that if no *one* decided this, it wasn't decided. Perhaps appeal should be made to something like Durkheim's "collective representation"? Not at all. The explanation of the conventional signification of language is not something which can be *accomodated* to the view that language evolves out of the group in a hit or miss manner: rather it depends on just that. If language is an instrument of communication, we would be wrong to look for an "imposer of names" — he would be an imposter. Language is convention in the root sense, a coming together, an agreement in practise and context, as to the signification of sounds.

ately a sign of what we know which, in turn, is a likeness of what these things are. Language is properly a sign since it is sensible (audible primarily, visible secondarily), and it is an artifical sign because it is *imposed* to signify, thus implying choice, arbitrariness, convention.[1] When we say that the word is immediately the sign of what we know, this must not be understood as necessarily implying that the signification is of a thing *as it is known*. We are presently engaged in the analysis of a logical intention, i.e. conventional signification. This involves reflection on what we do when we use language insofar as this is a sign of the order among things as known. Thus we say that what a word signifies is a notion or *ratio*; *ratio* is a relation of the concept to the word imposed to signify it. In our use of words (i.e. *nomina rerum*),[2] we do not attend to the status of things as known, but to what things are. This leads to a point we mentioned earlier.

Words are signs of concepts, Aristotle has said, and concepts are likenesses of things. Why doesn't he say that concepts are signs of things? Two very good reasons why this is not done are, first, that the concept is immaterial and not sensible[3] and, secondly, that we do not first know concepts and find ourselves led on to knowledge of something else. Because it is neither sensible nor *magis notum nobis*, the concept is not properly a sign.

2. *Id a quo nomen imponitur*

We have said that we name things as we know them. Now what are easily and first known to us are sensible things, which are complex, and our concrete names, while they signify the whole, will be taken from what is obvious to us in these things. Thus, St. Thomas often distinguished between *that from which* our names are imposed to signify, and *that which* they are imposed to signify. His favorite example in manifesting this distinction is the term *lapis*. That from which the term is imposed to signify is an effect,[4] namely to bruise our feet when we stumble against it (*laesio pedis*), but this is not what the term signifies, for then anything we stumble on would be called a stone.[5] Rather, the term is imposed to signify a certain kind of body. It will be noticed that *that from which* the name is imposed is what we would call its etymology. As a general rule, a name's signification and its etymology differ.[6] When

[1] *Q.D. de ver.*, q. 4, a. 1.
[2] Cf. *Ia*, q. 30, a. 4.
[3] Cf. *IV Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 2.
[4] Cf. *Q.D. de pot.*, q. 9, a. 3, ad 1.
[5] A scandalous suggestion. Cf. *Ia*, q. 13, a. 2, ad 2.
[6] *IIaIIae*, q. 92, a. 1, ad 2; *I Sent.*, d. 24, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2.

the name is taken to signify *that from which* it is imposed to signify, it is said to signify *minus proprie*.[1] Where there is this difference between *what* the term signifies and *that from which* it is imposed, the latter will always be something sensible and manifest and can provide a fitting bridge to what the term signifies when this is something abstract and difficult to know. As instruments of teaching, words must lead the learner naturally and easily from what is already evident to him.[2]

There are some words in which there appears to be no distinction between *that from which* they are imposed and *what* they signify. "If indeed there are some things which are known to us in themselves (*secundum se*), such as heat, cold, whiteness and the like, they are not denominated from other things. In such things therefore what the name signifies is the same as that from which the name is imposed to signify."[3] If anything can be said to be directly and immediately known by us, it will be the proper sensibles, and what is thus most basic in our knowledge will not be denominated from something else, since this would imply appeal to something more obvious. "Heat" is denominated from the very sensible quality it signifies: so too with "cold," "smoothness," etc.

There is another way to speak of denomination, namely insofar as the thing is denominated from that which is formal in it, that is, from the specific difference. "A name however is said to be imposed from that which is as the constitutive difference and not from the notion of the genus."[4] Thus the name "man" is imposed from the difference rational. Now when *that from which* the name is imposed to signify is not an accident or effect, but the difference, the name which names from it will be said to signify the difference primarily. The emphasis here is on "primarily" which does not, of course, mean exclusively since then the name of the species and that of the difference would be synonyms. Rather when the name is imposed from that which is most formal in the thing, it is imposed from that which completes the *ratio* signified by the name.[5]

[1] *Ia*, q. 18, a. 2.

[2] For example, in teaching the doctrine of induction, the logician may want to cite the Latin etymology of the word and go on to speak of the induction of someone into the army to establish a basis for discussing the transition from the singular to a larger whole.

[3] "Si qua vero sunt quae secundum se sunt nota nobis, ut calor, frigus, albedo, et huiusmodi, non ab aliis denominantur. Unde in talibus idem est quod nomen significat, et id a quo imponitur nomen ad significandum." — *Ia*, q. 13, a. 8.

[4] *I Sent.*, d. 4, q. 1, a. 1.

[5] *Q.D. de ver.*, q. 4, a. 1, ad 8: "Dicendum quod nomen dicitur ab aliquo imponi dupliciter: aut ex parte imponentis nomen, aut ex parte rei cui imponitur. Ex parte autem rei nomen dicitur ab illo imponi per quod completur ratio rei quam nomen significat. Et hoc est quod principaliter significatur per nomen. Sed quia differentiae essentiales sunt nobis ignotae, quandoque utimur accidentibus vel effectibus loco earum... et sic illud quod loco differentiae essentialis sumitur, est a quo imponitur nomen *ex parte imponentis*."

The *res significata* of the name "man" will be a compound to whose components the integral parts of the *ratio nominis*, e.g. genus and difference, answer in a certain fashion.[1]

3. *Ways of Signifying*

Human nature comprises body and soul and if the soul is as form to the body, the whole nature is formal with respect to such individuals as Socrates and Plato. There are different ways of signifying this same thing, human nature, something which can be brought out by considering the difference between "man" and "humanity." Both these terms signify the same thing, the same nature, but they do so in different ways. These ways are designated as the concrete and abstract, respectively.[2] The concrete name of the nature signifies it as subsistent by not prescinding, in its mode of signifying, from the individuals in which the nature is found, by allowing for individual characters, (although, of course, they are not expressed). Thus "man" can be directly predicated of Socrates, whereas "humanity" cannot. "It is thus evident that the essence of man is signified by this name *man* and by this name *humanity*, but in different ways, as has been said, because this name *man* signifies it as a whole, in that it does not prescind the designation of matter, but implicitly and indistinctly contains it, as the genus has been said to contain difference; therefore this name *man* is predicated of individuals; but this name *humanity* signifies it as a part, because it contains only that which is of man insofar as he is man, and prescinds all designation of matter; hence it is not predicated of individual men."[3]

4. *Ways of Being Named*

Having looked at the different ways in which the nature or essence can be signified, we turn now to the way in which things can have a name or be named. It is here that we shall endeavor to discern what is meant by an analogous name, and, as we have already pointed out, such a name is discussed with reference to univocal and equivocal names.

Things are said to be named equivocally when they have a name in

[1] Cf. *De ente et essentia*, cap. 2; *In VII Metaphysic.*, lect. 9.

[2] *Ia*, q. 13, a. 1 ad 2.

[3] "Sic ergo patet quod essentia hominis significatur hoc nomine *homo* et hoc nomine *humanitas*, sed diversimode, ut dictum est: quia hoc nomen *homo* significat eam ut totum, in quantum scilicet non praecidit designationem materiae, sed implicite continet eam et indistincte, sicut dictum est quod genus continet differentiam: et ideo praedicatur hoc nomen *homo* de individuis; sed hoc nomen *humantias* significat eam ut partem, quia non continet nisi id quod est hominis in quantum homo, et praecidit omnem designationem materiae, unde de individuis hominis non praedicatur." — *De ente*, cap. 3.

common but not one signification. That is, the community is solely one of the word, since once we ask what the word signifies quite different things would be mentioned. By things here, we mean diverse rationes: that is why the equivocal name is said to be divided by the *res significatae*. "Things" here does not mean individuals to whom the name is applied, of course, for then the univocal term would have to be called equivocal.[1] Multiple signification is not had in terms of diverse suppositis in which the nature signified by the name is found, and of which, consequently, it can be predicated, but in terms of *res significatae*, i.e. diverse *rationes* signified by the name. For example, in these propositions, "He stood fast" and "He broke his fast," the word "fast" does not *mean* the same thing, though the pronoun might stand for Alcibiades in both cases, since the signification of the word is different in these two uses. If our example is well taken, we would be hard put to it to explain why the same word has been used to signify such utterly different things. (Our perplexity would be increased if we were asked to relate these meanings of "fast," fixity of position, non-consumption of food, with a third: great rate of speed.)[2]

To understand the equivocal term is already in some way to understand what is meant by the univocal term. Things are said to be named univocally which share not only a name but a single meaning. We say John is a man and Peter is a man; or man is an animal and horse is an animal, and "man" and "animal" mean the same thing in the two instances of their predication. The univocal name, and this applies only to the generic name, is said to be divided by differences: thus while man and horse are alike in what is signified by "animal," they differ by something not expressed by that term, namely in this that the one is rational and the other is not.

The analogical name is one which does not fit in either of the above classifications. "With those things which are said in the way mentioned, the same name is predicated of diverse things according to a notion (*ratio*) partly the same and partly diverse: diverse with respect to diverse modes of relation, the same, however, with respect to that to which the relation is made. For to be a sign and to be causative of, are diverse, but health is one. On account of this they are called analogates, because they are proportioned to one."[3] "And this mode of community is mid-

[1] *Ia*, q. 13, a. 10, ad 1.

[2] I take this example from C. S. Peirce.

[3] *In XI Metaphysic.*, lect. 3, n. 2197: "In his vero quae praedicto modo dicuntur, idem nomen de diversis praedicatur secundum rationem partim eamdem, partim diversam. Diversam quidem quantum ad diversos modos relationis. Eamdem vero quantum ad id ad

way between pure equivocation and simple univocation. For in things which are said analogically, there is neither one notion, as is the case with univocals, nor totally diverse notions, as with equivocals, but a name which is thus said in many ways signifies diverse proportions to some one thing, as *healthy* said of urine signifies a sign of the health of the animal, but said of medicine it signifies a cause of the same health."[1] Because it signifies different things, the analogous name is sometimes called equivocal, but this is to take "equivocal" in a wide sense (i.e. analogously, as we shall see),[2] so that it no longer means "purely equivocal'" In the strict sense of "equivocal," it is impossible, as we suggested earlier, to discover any reason why the same name has come to mean the different things it does. It is with this in mind that one would say that it just does or it *happens* to signify these different things. With the analogous name, however, there is good reason why the same word is used with many meanings, as the example of "healthy" shows so well. The variety of meanings of this term, we would feel, didn't come about just by chance, but purposely.[3] Let us now look at a comparison of the analogous and univocal names.

The most succinct statement of their difference is this: "...when something is predicated univocally of many, it is found in each of them according to its proper signification (*ratio propria*), as *animal* in each species of animal. But when sometning is said analogously of many, it is found according to its proper signification in only one of them from which the others are denominated."[4] In order to grasp the meaning of this comparison, we must establish the meaning of *ratio propria.*

We saw above, in our discussion of that from which the name is imposed, that on the part of the thing, this will be the specific difference. Such a difference completes the *ratio* of the thing the name signifies,[5] as rational completes the definition of man. The definition "rational

quod fit relatio. Esse enim significativum, et esse effectivum, diversum est. Sed sanitas una est... Et propter hoc huiusmodi dicuntur analoga, quia proportionantur ad unum."

[1] "Et iste modus communitatis medius est inter puram aequivocationem et simplicem univocationem. Neque enim in uis quae analogice dicuntur, est una rationis, sicut est in univocis; nec totaliter diversa, sicut in aequivocis; sed nomen quod sic multipliciter dicitur, significat diversas proportiones ad aliquid unum; sicut *sanum* de urina dictum, significat signum sanitatis animalis, de medicina vero dictum, significat causam eiusdem sanitatis." — *Ia*, q. 13, a. 5.

[2] Cf. *Ia*, q. 13, a. 10, ad 4.

[3] *In I Ethic.*, lect. 7, n. 95.

[4] *Ia*, q. 16, a. 6: "...quando aliquid praedicatur univoce de multis, illud in quolibet eorum secundum propriam rationem invenitur, sicut animal in qualibet specie animalis. Sed quando aliquid dicitur analogice de multis, illud invenitur secundum propriam rationem in uno eorum tantum, a quo alia denominantur."

[5] *Q.D. de ver.*, q. 4, a. 1, ad 8.

animal" appropriates to the thing defined a *ratio communis*, namely the genus. Thanks to the addition of the proper difference, the genus is contracted and made proper to a species. All of the things of which the specific name is said univocally receive the name precisely because it can be said of them according to that *ratio propria et completa.* It would be a great mistake to interpret "illud in quolibet eorum secundum propriam rationem invenitur" in terms of intrinsic form or intrinsic denomination, for then we would deny the possibility of univocal predication in those categories of accident which arise from extrinsic denomination.[1] The specific name of an individual, then, would signify the *ratio propria* (not just difference, but principally the difference; this is what makes it a proper notion), the generic name a *ratio communis*, although the subalternate genus is named by a name which signifies a *ratio propria* with respect to a higher genus. This is the first and most obvious way of understanding the phrases *ratio propria* and *ratio communis*: the latter is more universal and less determinate in content than the former in the line of univocal predicates.

When it is a question of things named analogously, the *ratio propria* of the name is said to be saved in one of them alone. To exhibit the meaning of this, we want to examine a case of analogy that arose earlier, the signification of the word "sign." What is a sign? St. Thomas adopts the definition given by Augustine in the *De doctrina christiana: signum est quod, praeter speciem quam ingerit sensibus, facit aliquid aliud in cognitionem venire.*[2] This is the *ratio propria* of the term and only what saves this notion without qualification will properly be called a sign and, together with other things which save the *ratio propria*, be named sign univocally. Only sensible things will be properly called signs since only they can save the definition of the term. What we first know are the sensible effects or accidents of material substance and these lead us to knowledge of the substance. But can't we put it more generally and say that any effect is a sign of its cause? Let us look at a fairly lengthy statement of St. Thomas devoted to this very question. "Anything is principally denominated and defined by that which belongs to it first and of itself and not by that which belongs to it thanks to something other. Now the sensible effect of its very self leads to knowledge of another, as that which first and of itself becomes known to man, since all our knowledge has its beginnings in sense. But intelligible effects don't lead to knowl-

[1] Cf. *In III Physic.*, lect. 5 ,(ed. Pirotta), n. 619: "Tertius autem modus praedicandi est quando aliquid extrinsecum de aliquo praedicatur per modum alicuius denominationis."

[2] *IIIa*, q. 60, a. 4, ad 1.

edge of another except as manifested through something else, namely through something sensible. That is why what is presented to the senses are first and principally called signs, as Augustine says (...see above). Intelligible effects, however, have the nature of sign only insofar as they are manifested by some sign."[1] It is not the relationship of effect to cause which is proper to sign, let it be noted; what is proper is that what is a sign is sensible, more known to us and conducive to knowledge of something else, whether this other be its cause or its effect.[2] Where some of these notes are lacking, say that of being sensible, the thing cannot be called a sign in the proper sense of the term. To call such a thing a sign will be to use the word in a wide sense, less properly, *communiter*.[3]

In the light of this, we can better appreciate why, at the outset of *On Interpretation*, we read that words are *signs* of concepts and concepts are *likenesses* of things. Words are signs properly speaking, indeed they are more perfect signs than natural things (not with respect to the *ratio nominis*, but from the point of view of efficaciousness);[4] they are sensible things which are known in themselves and lead on to knowledge of something else. Concepts are not sensible and are not first known to us so that they cannot be called signs, properly speaking, "quia si aliquid eorum sunt de ratione alicuius auferatur, iam non erit propria acceptio."[5]

5. *The Extension of the Name*

What are first known by us are sensible things and these are the first things we name. When we come to know non-sensible things, we could impose any noise to signify what we know, but should we proceed in such an arbitrary fashion we would not be fabricating an apt instrument of communication. Let us imagine that, when a philosopher came to the recognition of the existence of the agent intellect he decided to

[1] *Ibid.* "...dicendum quod unumquodque praecipue denominatur et definitur secundum illud quod convenit ei primo et per se: non autem per id quod convenit ei per aliud. Effectus autem sensibilis per se habet quod ducat in cognitionem alterius, quasi primo et per se homini innotescens: quia omnis nostra cognitio a sensu initium habet. Effectus autem intelligibiles non habent quod possint ducere in cognitionem alterius nisi inquantum sunt per aliud manifestati, idest per aliqua sensibilia. Et inde est quod primo et principaliter dicuntur signa quae sensibus offeruntur: sicut Augustinus dicit... quod 'signum est quod praeter speciem quam ingerit sensibus, facit aliquid aliud in cognitionem venire.' Effectus autem intelligibles non habent rationem signi nisi secundum quod sunt manifestati per aliqua signa."

[2] *Q.D. de ver.*, q. 9, a. 4, ad 5.

[3] "Sed communiter possumus signum dicere quodcumque notum in quo aliquid cognoscatur; et secundum hoc forma intelligibilis potest dici signum rei quae per ipsum cognoscitur." — *Q.D. de ver.*, q. 9, a. 4, ad 4.

[4] *Q.D. de ver.*, q. 11, a. 1, ad 11.

[5] *Ibid.*, q. 4, a. 2.

call it the *blik*. In order to know what he means by this word, we would have little choice but to submit ourselves altogether into his hands, rid ourselves of all our presuppositions (among them the language of daily life), and learn what could only be called a jargon.[1] Such a procedure is quite contrary to the way in which the phrase "agent intellect," for example, purposely keeps us in contact with ordinary experience: "agent" through more obvious earlier impositions, "intellect" by its etymology. Words are inevitably sensible and thereby retain their link with what is obvious to us; if to this is added the retention of the same word that signified the sensible when we want a term to signify something non-sensible in some way similar to the word's first signification, well then the word will carry along with it the reminder of the trajectory of our knowledge. And, if we take our words from ordinary language (as opposed to inventing a language), we must respect the meanings they have there when we give them new meanings. So soon as ordinary terms are taken over by the philosopher and, by whimsy or caprice, imposed to signify what is not even remotely similar to what they ordinarily signify, we have an instrument, not of communication, but of confusion.[2] St. Thomas often makes this point. "I reply that it should be said that since, according to the Philosopher, names are signs of what is understood, it is necessary that the process of our naming follow the process of our cognition. Our intellectual knowledge, however, proceeds from the more known to the less known and therefore names are transferred by us from more known things to signify things less known. So it is, as is pointed out in *Metaphysics* X, that the word "distance," from signifying with respect to place, is extended to whatever contraries: in the same way we use names pertaining to local motion to signify other motions because bodies which are circumscribed by place are most known to us. The word 'circumstances' is derived in this way from localized things and extended to human

[1] Unfortunately, this is what the study of philosophy too often amounts to, even in institutions where St Thomas is taken as guide. I say "even" with irony, not smugness, since St. Thomas himself has so much to say about the nature of efficacious philosophical language, nearly all of which is ignored by those of us most eager to be known as Thomists. It is not surprising to find the encyclical *Humani Generis* urge that special attention be paid to the language used in the presentation of the traditional doctrine. English and other modern languages present special problems in this regard, since so much of philosophical terminology has been gotten by borrowing from Latin and Greek, without the carry-over of the flavor and history which underlay the selection of a given term to play a philosophical role.

[2] Of course, if a somewhat surprising use has become customary in the philosophical tradition, we must respect this. "Sed tamen, quia nominibus utendum est ut plures utuntur, quia, secundum Philosophum, usus maxime est aemulandus in significationibus nominum; et quia omnes Sancti communiter utuntur nomine verbi, prout personaliter dicitur, ideo hoc magis dicendum est, quod scilicet personaliter dicitur." — *Q.D. de ver.*, q. 4, a. 2.

acts."[2] The same point is made with respect to "see" which in its first imposition signifies the act of sight and then is extended to the acts of the other senses as in "see how it tastes."[2] In each of these examples, the *ratio propria* of the word is found only in one of the things it is taken to name and is said of that *per prius*, first of all.[3] It is said of the others because of some relation to what saves the *ratio propria* and to these secondary meanings we can apply the phrase: *semper prius salvatur in posteriori*.[4] It is not the case that what saves the name most properly, with the most propriety, is the most perfect of the things named by the same word.[5] This is clear enough when the name of an effect or sign is transferred to its cause or what it indicates. Thus, the word "word" is first imposed to signify what is more known to us, the spoken word, and then extended to signify the *verbum cordis* or "that which is actually considered by the intellect."[6] The latter, because it is immaterial is more perfect than the uttered word; it is, moreover, its efficient and final cause. Nevertheless, the *ratio propria* of "word" is saved most perfectly by the spoken word. So too in speaking of prophecy through imaginary (i.e. sensible) and intellectual visions, St. Thomas will say that the former more properly receives the name "prophecy" since that word implies obscurity and remoteness from intelligible truth.[7] Nowhere is this more strikingly evident than in words which are extended from creatures to signify God. God is infinite perfection and yet the very word "perfection" cannot be said of Him if it is taken strictly.[8] When

[1] *IaIIae*, q. 7, a. 1: "Respondeo dicendum quod quia nomina, secundum Philosophum, sunt signa intellectuum, necesse est quod secundum processum intellectivae cognitionis, sit etiam nominationis processos. Procedit autem nostra cognitio intellectualis a notioribus ad minus nota. Et ideo apud nos a notioribus nomina transferuntur ad significandum res minus notas. Et inde est quod... ab his quae sunt secundum locum, processit nomen distantiae ad omnia contraria; et similiter nominibus pertinentibus ad motum localem, utimur ad significandum alios motus, eo quod corpora, quae loco circumscribuntur, sunt maxime nobis nota. Et inde est quod nomen *circumstantiae* ab his quae in loco sunt, derivatur ad actus humanos."

[2] *Ia*, q. 67, a. 1'

[3] *Ia*, q. 33, a. 3: "Respondeo dicendum quod per prius dicitur nomen de illo in quo salvatur tota ratio nominis perfecte, quam de illo in quo salvatur secundum aliquid: de hoc enim dicitur quasi per similitunibem ad id in quo perfecte salvatur, quia omnia imperfecta sumuntur a perfectis."

[4] *Ia*, q. 60, a. 2.

[5] *Q.D. de ver.*, q. 1, a. 2. Think of the analogy of "sin."

[6] *Ibid.*, q. 4, a. 1.

[7] *IIaIIae*, q. 174, a. 2, ad 3: "...nihil prohibet aliquid esse simpliciter melius, quod tamen minus proprie recipit alicuius praedicationem: sicut cognitio patriae est nobilior quam cognitio viae, quae tamen magis proprie dicitur fides, eo quod nomen fidei importat imperfectionem cognitionis. Similiter autem prophetia importat quandam obscuritatem et remotionem ab intelligibili veritate. Et ideo magis proprie dicuntur prophetae qui vident per imaginarian visionem, quamvis illa prophetia sit nobilior quae est per intellectualem visionem: dum tamen sit eadem veritas utrobique revelata."

[8] *Q.D. de ver.*, q. 2, a. 3, ad 13: "...perfectionis nomen, si stricte accipiatur, in Deo non potest poni; quia nihil est perfectum nisi quod est factum."

the name is extended to things which do not save its *ratio propria*, it will be said to signify them *minus proprie* or *communiter* and it will always be necessary, if we are to explain the use of the word to signify them, to go back to what saves the *ratio propria*. Since the *ratio propria* will be such that it is more known to us, this reference backward in any extended use of the word makes it a more perfect instrument for leading us from the obvious and well known to what for us is neither. This is why there is no need to look in the writing of Aristotle and St. Thomas for a special "metaphysical" vocabulary; the same words, and a remarkably small number in all, are used in the *scientiae praeambulae*[1] and in metaphysics, each taking on a series of meanings which reflects the progress of our knowledge and insures against a sterile abstractness, an unanchored jargon, in pursuing the term of philosophy. It is our failure to make vernacularpresen tations of Aristotle and St. Thomas match this modest but effective vocabluary of the masters arising out of ordinary language, which makes introductions to the *philosophia perennis* very much like courses in foreign languages.

IV. SOME ANALOGOUS NAMES

In order to show that the previous remarks on analogous names accurately reflect the thought of St. Thomas, we intend to examine in some little detail several examples of the extension of a name whereby it becomes analogous. We have deliberately chosen words which do not often figure in such discussions with the hope that customary and perhaps misleading schemas will be forgotten. This section will raise quite naturally the problem of metaphor to which we will afterwards turn.

1. "*Virtue*" *as Analogous Name*

One need find no great difficulty in the bewildering number of habits which are called virtues by St. Thomas, since there are also many substances which fall under one supreme genus and are arranged hierarchically in such a way that the common name can be said univocally of each of them. But it is disturbing to find different virtues on different occasions singled out as the principal virtue. Thus, wisdom is said to be the chief intellectual virtue[2] and since intellect has a more perfect mode of operation than will,[3] it follows that wisdom will be more perfect than virtues which have appetitive powers

[1] *In Boethii de trin.*, q. 3, a. 1.
[2] *IaIIae*, q. 57, a. 2, ad 2.
[3] *Ia*, q. 82, a. 3.

as their subject. Nevertheless, we read elsewhere that prudence, whose subject is practical intellect, *habet verius rationem virtutis*,[1] and this because of its dependence on moral virtues which are in the appetitive part of the soul. Many habits are called virtues and this would lead us to believe that they save the definition of "virtue"; indeed, St. Thomas will say, when he has examined the elements of the definition of virtue given by St. Augustine, "All of these, however, belong to moral, intellectual and theological virtue, whether acquired or infused."[2] This would seem to suggest that when temperance, justice, prudence, art, science, wisdom and faith are named virtues that the name is univocally common to them. This is far from being the case, however. As we shall see, "virtue" is analogously common and is said of all these *per prius et posterius*.

The definition of virtue, one that is involved in calling anything a virtue, is drawn from Aristotle: "quae bonum facit habentem et opus eius bonum reddit."[3] What is formal in this definition is the good and it is because they are diversly ordered to the good[4] that different habits receive the name "virtue" in different ways. Now there are two fundamentally different ways in which something can be ordered to the good: formally, that is to the good as good, and materially, as when a habit is ordered to something which is good but does not look to it insofar as it is good (*sub ratione boni*). In order to grasp the meaning of this distinction, we must first recognize that human virtue will have to do with the good of man as man and what makes man to be man is the fact that he is rational. Thus the good of man must be a rational good. The rational or intellective part of man comprises both a cognitive and appetitive faculty; moreover just as will, the intellectual appetite, follows on the apprehension of intellect, so, in the sensitive part of the soul, an appetite is consequent on sense cognition and insofar as this appetite, divided into the concupiscible and irascible, obeys the command of reason it can be said to be consequent on intellect and thus partici-

[1] *Q.D. de virtutibus in communi*, a. 7.

[2] *Ibid.*, a. 2: "Haec autem omnia conveniunt tam virtuti morali quam intellectuali, quam theologicae, quam acquisitae, quam infunsae."

[3] *Nicomachean Ethics*, II, 6, 1106a15.

[4] *Q.D. de virt. in com.*, a. 7: "...virtus in unaquaque re dicitur per respectum ad bonum; eo quod uniuscuiusque virtus est, ut Philosophus dicit, quae bonum facit habentem, et opus eius bonum reddit; sicut virtus equi quae facit equum esse bonum, et bene ire, et bene ferre sessorem, quod est opus equi. Ex hoc quidem igitur aliquis habitus habebit rationem virtutis, quia ordinatur ad bonum." — Cf. *ibid.*, a. 12: "Illud autem quod est completivum et ultimum formale in definitione virtutis, est bonum: nam virtus universaliter accepta sic definitur: virtus est quae bonum facit habentem, et opus eius bonum reddit. Unde et virtus hominis, de qua loquimur, oportet quod diversificetur secundum speciem secundum quod bonum ratione diversificatur."

pate in reason.[1] In terms of the distinction between the cognitive and appetitive, we can see the meaning of the distinction between relating to the good formally and relating to it materially. The good *sub ratione boni* is the object of appetite alone, for the good is that which all things *seek*. Thus only those habits which are in the appetitive part as in their subject[2] or which depend upon appetite in a special way are ordered formally to the good. It is such habits that will save the definition of virtue most perfectly.[3] Habits which are neither in the appetitive part as in their subject, nor dependent on it, can be materially ordered to that which is good, but not formally insofar as it is good; because of this they can only be said to be virtues in a less proper sense of the term.[4]

All of this raises a problem with respect to what are called intellectual virtues. How can they be called virtues if the definition of virtue implies an ordination to the good which is the object of appetite? In order to understand how intellectual habits can be called virtues, if less properly so than moral virtues, we must acquire a more determinate understanding of that ordination to the good which is such materially and not *sub ratione boni*. As has been already hinted, the problem is thought to be less pronounced with respect to some habits of intellect, namely those which depend in a special way on appetite. Other intellectual habits, however, are said to be perfected absolutely and in themselves such that they precede the will and are not consequent upon it. With these, the application of the term "virtue" constitutes a serious problem.[5] How do they save the *ratio virtutis* at all?

[1] *Ibid.*, a. 12: "Cum autem homo sit homo inquantum rationale est; oportet hominis bonum esse aliqualiter rationale. Rationalis pars, sive intellectiva, comprehendit et cognitivam. Pertinet autem ad rationalem partem non solum appetitus, qui est in ipsa parte rationali, consequens apprehensionem intellectus, qui dicitur voluntas: sed etiam appetitus qui est in parte sensitiva hominis, et dividitur per irascibilem et concupiscibilem. Nam etiam hic appetitus in homine sequitur apprehensionem rationis, inquantum imperio rationis obedit; unde et participare dicitur aliqualiter rationem. Bonum igitur hominis est et bonum cognitivae et bonum appetitivae partis."

[2] On this phrase, cf. *Ibid.*, a. 3.

[3] Bonum autem sub ratione boni est obiectum solius appetitivae partis; nam bonum est quod omnia appetunt. Illi igitur habitus qui vel sunt in parte appetitiva, vel a parte appetitiva dependent, ordinantur formaliter ad bonum; *unde potissime habent rationem virtutis.*" — *Ibid.*, a. 7; cf. *ibid.*, a. 12: "Non autem secundum eamdem rationem utrique parti bonum attribuitur. Nam bonum appetitivae parti attribuitur formaliter, ipsum enim bonum est appetitivae partis obiectum; sed intellectivae parti attribuitur bonum non formaliter, sed materialiter tantum. Nam cognoscere verum, est quoddam bonum cognitivae partis; licet sub ratione boni non comparetur ad cognitivam, sed magis ad appetitivam; nam ipsa cognitio veri est quoddam appetibile."

[4] "Illi vero habitus qui nec sunt in appetitiva parte, nec ab eadem dependent, possunt quidem ordinari materialiter in id quod est bonum, non tamen formaliter sub ratione boni; unde et possunt aliquo modo dici virtutes, non tamen ita proprie sicut primi habitus." — *Ibid.*, a. 7.

[5] *Ibid.*: "Sciendum est autem, quod intellectus tam speculativus quam practicus potest

In the *Summa*, St. Thomas speaks of habits which are virtues *simpliciter* and those which are such only *secundum quid*. Virtues in the perfect sense are those which make the one having them good and make his work good. Only habits of the appetitive part can do this. *Secundum quid*, habits of the speculative and practical intellect can be called virtues even without any ordination to will.[1] How can there be a reference to the good without will? Some ordination to the good is necessary if a habit is going to be called a virtue. It is here of course that ordination to the good *materialiter* comes in, but what does that mean? Insofar as truth is the end of intellect, it is its good; to know the truth is the good of intellect and habits which determine it to this end can be called virtues. This is an ordination to the good *materialiter*, however: truth as a good is the object of appetite.[2] Intellectual habits, therefore, do not perfectly save the *ratio virtutis* and "are not called virtues absolutely because they do not render a good work except insofar as they give a certain capacity, nor do they make the one having them good simply speaking."[3] For this reason, science and art, while they are sometimes numbered among the virtues, are at other times divided against them.[4] It is thanks to his good will that one having the science of grammar and thus the capacity to speak well, actually speaks well.[5] Thus, the *use* of the intellectual virtues of art, understanding, science and wisdom pertains to the will insofar as their objects are chosen as goods.[6] This

perfici dupliciter aliquo habitu: uno modo, absolute et secundum se, prout praecedit voluntatem, quasi eam movens; alio modo, prout sequitur voluntatem, quasi ad imperium actum suum eliciens: quia, ut dictum est, istae duae potentiae, scilicet intellectus et voluntas, se invicem circumeunt."

[1] "Subiectum igitur habitus qui secundum quid dicitur virtus, potest esse intellectus, non solum practicus, sed etiam intellectus speculativus, absque omni ordine ad voluntatem." — *IaIIae*, q. 56, a. 3.

[2] "Dicendum quod bonum uniuscuiusque est finis eius. Et ideo, cum verum sit finis intellectus: cognoscere verum est bonus actus intellectus; unde habitus perficiens intellectum ad verum cognoscendum, vel in speculativis, vel in practicis, dicitur virtus," — *Ibid.*, ad 2. "Nam cognoscere verum, est quoddam bonum cognitivae partis; licet sub ratione boni non comparetur ad cognitivam, sed magis ad appetitivam: nam ipsa cognitio veri est quoddam appetibile." *Q.D. de virt. in com.*, a, 12.

[3] *IaIIae*, q. 56, a. 3: "...non simpliciter dicuntur virtutes: quia non reddunt bonum opus nisi in quadam facultate nec simpliciter faciunt bonum habentem."

[4] Cf. *ibid.*

[5] Cf. *Q.D. de virt. in com.*, a. 7: "Illi igitur habitus qui sunt in intellectu practico vel speculativo primo modo, possunt dici aliquo modo virtutes, *licet non ita secundum perfectam rationem*; et hoc modo intellectus, scientia et sapientia sunt in intellectu speculativo, ars vero in intellectu practico. Dicitur enim aliquis intelligens vel sciens secundum quod eius intellectus perfectus est ad cognoscendum verum; quod quidem est bonum intellectus. Et licet istud verum possit esse volitum, prout homo vult intelligere verum; non tamen quantum ad hoc perficiuntur habitus praedicti. Non enim ex hoc quod homo habet scientiam, efficitur volens considerare verum; sed solummodo potens; unde et ipsa veri consideratio non est scientia inquantum est volita, sed secundum quod directe tendit in obiectum."

[6] *IaIIae*, q. 57, a. 1: "...possunt quidem dici virtutes,i nquantum faciunt facultatem bonae

dependence on will for their use is accidental to intellectual habits.[1]

There are some intellectual habits, as we have already several times indicated, which have a special dependence on will and consequently are more properly called virtues than are art, understanding, science and wisdom: the intellectual virtues we are presently concerned with, namely prudence and faith, *habent verius rationem virtutis*.[2] Such intellectual habits follow on will and give not only the capacity of acting well but the will to do so. Let us look first at faith. Faith perfects the speculative intellect insofar as it is commanded by will, something clear from its act: "homo enim ad ea quae sunt supra rationem humanam, non assentit per intellectum nisi quia vult; sicut Augustinus dicit, quod credere non potest homo nisi volens."[3] The object of faith is determined for it by the will. Now prudence is not dependent on will in this way, namely for its object, but only for the end, for it seeks its own object. Presupposing the end of the good from will, prudence seeks ways in which the good can be achieved and conserved.[4] Of the intellectual habits, then, prudence and faith save more properly the definition of virtue because they depend in a special way on the will and thus relate more closely to the good *sub ratione boni* which is what is formal in the definition of virtue.

We have, therefore, an unequal participation in the *ratio virtutis*. Virtues which have appetite as their subject, such as temperance and justice, participate most properly in the definition of virtue: *potissime habent rationem virtutis*. Habits which have intellect, whether practical or

operationis quae est consideratio veri, hoc enim est bonum opus intellectus; non tamen dicuntur virtutes secundo modo, quasi facientes bene uti potentia seu habitu. Ex hoc enim quod aliquis habet habitum scientiae speculativae, non inclinatur ad utendum; sed fit potens speculari verum in his quorum habet scientiam. Sed quod utatur scientia habita, hoc est movente voluntate."

[1] "Nam quidam in nullo a voluntate dependet, nisi quantum ad eorum usum; et hoc quidem per accidens, cum huiusmodi usus habituum aliter a voluntate dependeat, et aliter ab habitibus praedictis, sicut sunt scientia et sapientia et ars. Non enim per hos habitus homo ad hoc perficitur, ut homo eis bene velit uti; sed solum ut ad hoc sit potens." — *Q.D. de virt. in com.*, a. 7; cf. *Q.D. de ver.*, q. 14, a. 3, ad 3: "...bonum illud ad quod virtus ordinatur, non est accipiendum quasi aliquod obiectum alicuius actus; sed illud bonum est ipse actus perfectus, quem virtus elicit. Licet autem verum ratione a bono differat; tamen hoc ipsum quod est considerare verum, est quoddam bonum intellectus..."

[2] *Q.D. de virt. in com.*, a. 7.

[3] *Ibid.*: "Ita est similiter erit fides in intellectu speculativo, secundum quod subiacet imperio voluntatis; sicut temperantia est in concupiscibili secundum quod subiacet imperio rationis. Unde voluntas imperat intellectui, credendo, non solum quantum ad actum voluntatis in determinatum creditum intellectus assentit; sicut et in determinatum medium a ratione, concupiscibilis, per temperantiam tendit."

[4] *Ibid.*: "Prudentia vero est in intellectu sive ratione practica, ut dictum est: non quidem ita quod ex voluntate determinetur obiectum prudentiae, sed solum finis; obiectum autem ipsa perquirit: praesupposito enim a voluntate fine boni, prudentia perquirit vias per quas hoc bonum et perficiatur et conservetur."

speculative, for their subject, if they depend on will as do prudence and faith, participate properly in the definition of virtue; others participate in the definition, *licet non ita secundum propriam rationem.*[1] "And although all in some way can be called virtues, more perfectly and properly these last two (i.e. prudence and faith) have the notion of virtue; but it does not follow from this that they are more noble habits or perfections."[2] This remark indicates that more and less proper participation in the *ratio* of a given name is not an absolute judgment on the relative perfection of the things named. As a matter of fact, intellectual virtues are more perfect than habits of the appetitive part.[3] This is the resolution of the riddle we posed at the outset of our discussion of "virtue": prudence is named virtue more properly than is wisdom; wisdom is more perfect than prudence.[4]

Since it is the view of St. Thomas that there are three genera of virtues, the moral, intellectual and the theological, it is not surprising that they are not covered univocally by the term "virtue," but only analogically, *per prius et posterius.* It is just this inequality among the things named virtue that we have been examining. The *ratio virtutis* is not shared equally, but most properly by the moral virtues, less properly by intellectual habits. "It should be said that when a univocal genus is divided into its species, then the parts of the division are equal with respect to the generic notion, although according to the nature of the thing one species may be more perfect and prior to the other, as man is to the other animals. But when there is a division of something analogous, which is said by way of the prior and posterior of many, then nothing prevents one to be more perfect than the other even with respect to the common notion, as substance is more properly called being than is accident. And such is the division of the virtues because the good of reason is not found according to the same order in all."[5]

[1] *Ibid.*

[2] *Ibid.*: "Et licet omnes quoquo modo possint dici virtutes; tamen perfectius et magis proprie hi duo ultimi habent rationem virtutis; licet ex hoc non sequatur quod sint nobiliores habitus vel perfectiores."

[3] "Et quia bonum magis congrue competit parti appetitivae, propter hoc nomen virtutis convenientius et magis proprie competit virtutibus appetitivae partis quam virtutibus intellectivae; licet virtutes intellectivae sint nobiliores perfections quam virtutes morales, ut probatur in VI Ethic." — *Q.D. de virt. in com.*, a. 12; cf. ibid., a. 7, ad 1.

[4] Cf. *IaIIae*, q. 61, a. 1, ad 3; *ibid.*, q. 66, a. 3.

[5] *IaIIae*, q. 61, a. 1, ad 1: "Dicendum quod quando genus univocum dividitur in suas species, tunc partes divisionis ex aequo se habent secundum rationem generis; licet secundum naturam rei una species sit principalior et perfectior alia, sicut homo aliis animalibus. Sed quando est divisio alicuius analogi, quod dicitur de pluribus secundum prius et posterius; tunc nihil prohibet unum esse principalius altero, *etiam secundum communem rationem*, sicut substantia principalius dicitur ens quam accidens. Et talis est divisio virtutum: eo quod bonum rationis non secundum eundem ordinem invenitur in omnibus."

2. "*Passion*" *as Analogous Name*

We have already looked at the discussion of signification at the outset of *On Interpretation* where words are said to be signs of concepts. Now, as it happens, Aristotle there uses the phrase "passions of the soul" (*παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς*) for concepts. This is a somewhat surprising use of the term "passion" and St. Thomas remarks that it is possible due to an extension of the word's signification.[1] By following the extension of the meaning of "passion" we will be analysing another analogous name.

To find the proper meaning of 'passion,' we must turn to motion which is shown to involve action and passion. In his teaching on the nature of motion, Aristotle makes the point that motion is always between contraries, for what is received in the patient is contrary to what the patient or moved thing loses. The reception on the part of the patient is what assimilates it to the agent or mover. Properly speaking, then, passion involves a contrariety and a loss on the part of the patient. Before discussing the nature of this loss, we must make it clear that passion in its proper sense is saved only in motion according to quality, that is, alteration, for in local motion there is no reception of something immobile: rather the mobile thing is received in a certain place. In augmentation and decrease, motion according to quantity, there is no reception or loss of form but of something substantial, such as food, which brings about a change of quantity. In generation or corruption there is neither motion nor contrariety save by reason of the preceding alteration. Only in alteration, consequently, is there properly passion where a form is received and its contrary expelled.[2]

Let us go back now to the notion of the loss involved in passion. Obviously the patient, in the medical sense, loses something if the ministrations of the doctor are successful, namely his illness, and this can only be called good riddance. We wouldn't commiserate with one who had lost a cold. The patient, in this example, is not the subject of passion in the most proper sense of the term: that is had when what is

[1] *In I Periherm.*, lect. 2, n. 6: "vel quia extenso nomine passionis ad omnem receptionem, etiam ipsum intelligere intellectus possibilis quoddam pati est."

[2] "Omnis motus est inter contraria; oportet illud quod recipitur in patiente, esse contrarium alicui quod a patiente abiicitur. Secundum hoc autem, quod recipitur in patiente, patiens agenti assimilatur; et inde est quod *proprie accepta passione*, agens contrariatur patienti; et omnis passio abiicit a substantia. Huiusmodi autem passio non est nisi secundum motum alterationis. Nam in motu locali non recipitur aliquid immobile, sed ipsum mobile recipitur in aliquo loco. In motu autem guamenti et decrementi recipitur vel abiicitur non forma, sed aliquid substantiale, utpote alimentum, ad cuius additionem vel subtractionem sequitur quantitatis magnitudo vel parvitas. In generatione autem et corruptione non est motus nec contrarietas, nisi ratione alterationis praecedentis; et sic secundum solam alterationem est proprie passio, secundum quam una forma contraria recipitur, et alia expellitur." — *Q.D. de ver.*, q. 26, a. 1.

lost is better for the subject than the contrary gained as the result of an alteration. "*Et hic est proprissimus modus passionis.*"[1]

Passion as implying loss is seen to involve a corporeal transmutation and we must ask how the term "passion" can be understood in the phrase "passions of the soul." Since the soul, by definition, is incorporeal it will have passion in the proper sense said of it only accidentally.[2] The most proper animal passion will be read in terms of a change for the worst.[3] None of this enables us to grasp the meaning of the phrase used at the outset of *On Interpretation* since intellectual cognition does not entail any consequent transmutation in the body. To understand that phrase, we are going to have to see a number of uses of the term "passion" as said of living sensitive things, i.e. animals, uses which will exhibit a scale of diminishing propriety with respect to the most proper sense of the word established in terms of physical motion.[4]

St. Thomas often introduces us to the fact that a term has taken on extended meanings by saying at the outset that it can be used in several ways; so when he is speaking of *pati*, he says immediately that it is used in three ways: *communiter*, *proprie*, *propriissime*.[5] We have already seen what the most proper sense of "passion" is: when the term is used commonly it means any reception and is no longer restricted to the corporeal order. In terms of this, we can say that "passion" is applied to activities of sense appetite, will, sense cognition and intellection in such a way that there is a gradual falling away from the proper sense of the term.[6]

First, St. Thomas argues that passion is found more properly in the appetitive than in the cognitive part of the soul.[7] The word "passion" implies that the patient becomes like the agent and since appetite is ordered towards things as they are in themselves (the good is in things) whereas the apprehensive is such that it assimilates the thing known to the mode of the knower (truth and falsity are in the mind), "unde patet quod ratio passionis magis invenitur in parte appetitiva quam in parte

[1] *IaIIae*, q. 22, a. 1; *In V Metaphysic.*, lect. 20, n. 1067: "Et ideo magis proprie dicitur pati, cum subtrahitur aliquid de eo quod sibi congruebat, et dum agitur in ipso contraria dispositio, quam quando fit e contrario. Tunc enim magis dicitur perfici." Cf. *ibid.*, lect. 14, n. 958.

[2] "Si ergo passio proprie dicta aliquo modo ad animam pertineat, hoc non est nisi secundum quod unitur corpori, et ita per accidens." — *Q.D. de ver.*, q. 26, a. 2.

[3] "Quando huiusmodi transmutatio fit in deterius, magis proprie habet rationem passionis, quam quando fit in melius. Unde tristitia magis proprie est passio quam laetitia." — *IaIIae*, q. 22, a. 1.

[4] Cf. *IaIIae*, q. 22, a. 1, ad 1.

[5] *IaIIae*, q. 22, a. 1.

[6] Cf. *Q.D. de ver.*, q. 26, a. 3.

[7] *IaIIae*, q. 22, a. 2.

apprehensiva."[1] Secondly, because sense appetition entails a bodily transmutation, which is passion properly speaking, whereas willing does not, sense appetite saves the notion of passion better. "Unde patet quod ratio passionis magis proprie invenitur in actu appetitus sensitivi quam intellectivi..."[2] Thirdly, sense knowledge is said to be a certain passion. "Est enim sensus in actu, quaedam alteratio: quod autem alteratur, patitur et movetur."[3] "Passion" here must be understood *communiter* and *minus proprie*,[4] as any reception: just as what receives is in potency to what it receives, so sense is as potency to its operation. Fourthly, intellection can be called a passion.[5] Intellection is less properly called passion than is sensation: "...passio et alteratio *magis proprie* dicitur in sensu quam in intellectu, cuius operatio non est per aliquod organum corporeum."[6] Intellection then will involve passion in the most remote and least proper sense of the word. As for the phrase "passion sof the soul," this would more properly designate operations of appetite than operations of sensation or intellection,[7] although it is generally true that "passion" will signify something of soul only equivocally.[8]

"Passion" emerges as an analogous name whose signification is saved properly only where there is a corporeal alteration for the worse and less properly as the term is applied to animate operations until as used of intellection we have the most remote meaning of the term. *Communiter loquendo* in this discussion clearly means the least proper, most diluted meaning of the word. The *ratio* which is common *per prius et posterius* is the definition which is saved in physical alteration *ad deterius*. It is not common in the sense that it is saved perfectly and properly in every use, but in that some of it is involved in every extended use of the word, something which calls for a reference back to the full and proper notion. In other words, it seems suggested that *pati communiter* is not the *ratio communis passionis*; and, while the use of the word "passion" to speak of intellection runs the risk of an interpretation of it as passion in the strict sense, i.e. univocally, when we realize that the term is being

[1] *Ibid.*, cf. ad 1: "Et sic etiam in priori vi animae, scilicet apprehensiva, invenitur minus de ratione passionis."
[2] *IaIIae*, q. 22, a. 3.
[3] *In II de anima*, lect. 10, n. 350.
[4] *Ibid.*, lect. 11, n. 366.
[5] *In III de anima*, lect. 7, nn. 675-6: "Ex hoc autem sequitur quod cum sentire sit quoddam pati a sensibili, ait aliquid simile passioni, quod intelligere sit vel pati aliquod ab intelligibile, vel aliquid alterum huiusmodi, scilicet passioni. *Horum autem duorum secundum verius est.*"
[7] *In VII Physic.*, lect. 4, n. 1833.
[6] *In II Ethic.*, lect. 5, n. 291.
[8] "...passio aequivoce in anima sicut et actio..." — *Q.D. de anima*, a. 6, ad 7.

extended and is not to be taken *proprie*, the reference back to the most proper meaning is a reference to what is more evident and can therefore be a principle of manifestation of what we are attempting to say about intellection. The many things named passion are not made equal in a common notion, but rather participate *per prius et posterius* in a notion so that extended uses are explicable only in terms of the full, strict, proper notion and a hierarchy of meanings of "passion" is recognized. Just as with "virtue," what saves the *ratio passionis* most properly is not the most perfect from the point of view of reality: indeed, it is precisely the perfection of the mode of intellectual cognition which prevents it from saving the *ratio passionis* except in the most tenuous and diluted sense of the word.

3. "*Word*" *as Analogous Word*

An examination of the analogy of *verbum* has a double advantage for our purposes in that it reveals something common to words while casting light on the doctrine of the analogy of names. Moreover, there are terminological features of St. Thomas' discussions of *verbum* which give the texts added interest.

Verbum is imposed to signify from something sensible, a reverberation in the air,[1] which is more easily known by the one imposing the name. Thus, according to the first imposition of the name, something is named *verbum* which does not best save that which the word is imposed to signify, the *res significata*.[2] The distinction of imposition and signification is also expressed in terms of the *interpretatio nominis* and the *res significata*.[3] *Verbum* is taken to signify first of all the spoken word. By saying "first of all" we are suggesting, of course, that something is said to be a *verbum* in many ways. "Ad cuius evidentiam, sciendum est quod *verbum* tripliciter quidem in nobis proprie dicitur: quarto autem modo, dicitur improprie sive figurative. Manifestius autem et communius in nobis dicitur verbum quod voce profertur."[4] St. Thomas indicates here that any non-metaphorical use of *verbum* is proper, though this does not preclude

[1] *Q.D. de ver.*, q. 4, a. 1, ad 8; cf. *I Sent.*, d. 27, q. 2, a. 1, obj. 1.

[2] "Dicendum quod nomina imponuntur secundum quod cognitionem de rebus accipimus. Et quia ea quae sunt posteriora in natura, sunt ut plurium prius nota nobis, inde est quod frequenter secundum nominis impositionem, aliquando nomen prius in aliquo duorum invenitur in quo um altero res significata per nomen prius existit; sicut patet de nominibus quae dicuntur de Deo et creaturis, ut ens, et bonum et huiusmodi, quae prius fuerunt creaturis imposita, et ex his ad divinam praedicationem translata, quamvis esse et bonum prius inveniantur in Deo." — *Q.D. de ver.*, q. 4. a. 1. Notice the use of *translata* which indicates that the word is not restricted to describe metaphorical uses of terms.

[3] *I Sent.*, d. 27, q. 2, a. 1, ad 1.

[4] *Ia*, q. 34, a. 1.

a scale of greater and lesser propriety; metaphor here is characterized by the adverb *improprie*. Another point of interest in this text is the way the first imposition of the word is described: it is *manifestius* and *communis*. "More common" does not seem to refer to our problem of the *ratio communis*, however, but simply indicates that the more obvious, familiar and manifest meaning of "word" is the spoken word and consequently that that is what will usually and commonly be meant by *verbum*.

The extension of *verbum* is carried on in terms of the cause of what is first named such, namely the inner word which is both the final and efficient cause of the spoken word. "*Finalis* quidem, quia verbum vocale ad hoc a nobis exprimitur, ut interius verbum manifestetur: unde oportet quod verbum interius sit illud quod significatur per verbum exterius. Verbum autem quod exterius profertur, significat id quod intellectum est, non ipsum intelligere, neque hoc intellectum quod est habitus vel potentia, nisi quatenus et haec intellecta sunt: unde verbum interius est ipsum interius intellectum."[1] The spoken word is not simply a reverberation of air, nor simply a noise emanating from the throat, a *vox*, but also a *vox significativa ad placitum*. That is, to understand the first imposition of *word* is to understand that it is expressive of what is understood by the mind.[2] Now since what is understood is what is formal in the first imposition of *verbum*, it is not surprising to learn that what is understood should also be called a word.

The inner word is also said to be the efficient cause of the spoken word: what is involved here is the working up in the imagination of what is to be spoken. "Similiter etiam voces significantes naturaliter, non ex proprosito aut *cum imaginatione* aliquid significandi, sicut sunt voces brutorum animalium, interpretationes dici non possunt."[3] "Primo, ponitur *vox* per modum generis, per quod distinguitur nomen ab omnibus sonis, qui non sunt voces. Nam vox est sonus ab ore animalis prolatus, cum imaginatione quadam..."[4] From this point of view, the spoken word is an artifact and, as such, has the will as a principle. There must then preexist an exemplar of the spoken word.

[1] *Q.D. de ver.*, q. 4, a. 1.
[2] Cf. *In evang. Ioann.*, cap. 1, lect. 1, nn. 25-6.
[3] *In Periherm.*, proem., n. 3.
[4] *In I Periherm.*, lect. 4, n. 3; "Operationes enim animales dicuntur, quae ex imaginatione procedunt. Et sic patet quod vox non est percussio respirati aeris, sicut accidit in tussi. Sed id cui principaliter attribuitur causa generationis vocis, est anima, quae utitur isto aere, scilicet respirato, ad verberandum aerem, qui est in arteria, ad ipsam arteriam. Aer ergo non est principale in vocis formatione, sed anima quae utitur aere, ut instrumento, ad vocem formandum." — *In II de anima*, lect. 18, n. 477. This would seem to be that first form of the word mentioned by St Albert, *In praedicament.*, tract. 1, cap. 2; the second form would be that which makes it a *vox significativa ad placitum*: cf. St Thomas, *In I Periherm.*, lect. 4, n. 3.

Et ideo, sicut in artifice *tria* consideramus, scilicet finem artificii, et *exemplar* ipsius, et ipsum artificium iam productum, ita etiam in loquente *triplex* verbum invenitur: scilicet *id quod* per intellectum *concipitur*, ad quod significandum verbum exterius profertur: et hoc est verbum cordis sine voce prolatum; item *exemplar* exterioris verbi, et hoc dicitur *verbum interius* quod habet imaginem vocis; et *verbum exterius expressum*, quod dicitur *verbum vocis*. Et sicut in artifice praecedit intentio finis, et deinde sequitur excogitatio formae artificiati, et ultimo artificiatum in esse producit; ita verbum cordis in loquente est prius verbo quod habet imaginem vocis, et postremum est verbum vocis.[1]

The *vox* is said to be a word only insofar as it is taken to be significative of what is grasped by the mind and the order of the three modes of *verbum* distinguished is this: "Sic igitur primo et principaliter interior mentis conceptus verbum dicitur: secundario vero, ipsa vox interioris conceptus significativa: tertio vero, ipsa imaginatio vocis verbum dicitur."[2] Since the *verbum cordis* enters into the notions signified by *verbum* in the other two cases, the word "word" obviously applies *per prius* to it, *per posterius* to the others. Now this is productive of no small problem, since "word" is first imposed to signify the spoken word *secundum impositionem nominis*, which is the order *secundum nominis rationem*,[3] the spoken word is the *per prius* of "word." This gives us one *per prius* too many, of course, and we must wonder how there can be a reduction to one of the modes of *verbum*. Fortunately, St. Thomas faced this problem formally as such.

Sciendum est autem, quod reductio aliorum modorum ad unum primum, fieri potest dupliciter. Uno modo secundum ordinem rerum. Alio modo, secundum ordinem qui attenditur quantum ad nominis impositionem. Nomina enim imponuntur a nobis secundum quod nos intelligimus, quia nomina sunt intellectuum signa. Intelligimus autem quandoque priora ex posterioribus. Unde aliquid per prius apud nos sortitur nomen, cui res nominis per posterius convenit: et sic est in proposito. Quia enim formae et virtutes rerum ex actibus cognoscuntur, per prius ipsa generatio vel nativitas naturae nomen accepit, et ultimo forma.[4]

When we are concerned with the *per prius secundum ordinem rerum*, we must not think that this thing necessarily saves the *ratio nominis per prius*, since often this is not the case.[5] There is involved in all this a difficulty which exercized Sylvester of Ferrara because it is posed in the *Contra*

[1] *Q.D de ver.*, q. 4, a. 1. The production of the artifact which is the word involves a practical syllogism, as St Thomas explains elsewhere: "...ut quasi videatur esse quidam syllogismus cujus in parte intellectiva habeatur major universalis, et in parte sensitiva habeatur minor particularis, per virtutem motivam imperatam; ipsa enim operatio se habet in operabilibus sicut conclusio in speculativis..." — *I Sent.*, d. 27, q. 2, a. 1.

[2] *Ia*, q. 34, a. 1.

[3] *I Contra Gentes*, cap. 34.

[4] *In V Metaphysic.*, lect. 5, n. 825; cf. *Q.D. de malo*, q. 1, a. 5, ad 19.

[5] Sic igitur, quia ex rebus aliis in Dei cognitionem pervenimus, res nominum de Deo et rebus aliis dictorum per prius est in Deo secundum suum modum, sed ratio nominis per posterius. Unde et nominari dicitur a suis causatis." — *I Contra Gentes*, cap. 34.

Gentiles.[1] In discussing the order of the *ratio* and *res* in terms of "healthy," an example to which St. Thomas appeals in the text and where these orders differ, it is pointed out that the power of healing in the medicine is naturally prior to the quality of the animal, as cause is prior to effect; nevertheless, animal is first of all named healthy because the quality is first known by us.[2] Now it seemed to Sylvester that "healthy" is not exactly like names common to God and creature nor does it seem to be like "nature" and "word" as these are analogous names. What is the difference? Well, one difference surely is that we would not say that the animal is denominated healthy from medicine, though, in the case of names analogously common to God and creature, where God saves the *res nominis per prius*, we sometimes say the creature in denominated such-and-such from the divine perfection[3], just as we might say that the spoken word is denominated from the *verbum cordis*. But could we say that medicine saves the *res significata* of "healthy" best *secundum ordinem rerum*? Surely not, if *sanitas* is the *res significata* of *sanum*, as it is.

It is because what is most formal in the first imposition of *verbum*, the notion of manifestation, is better saved by the *verbum cordis* that the latter is *per prius secundum ordinem rerum*.[4] In somewhat the same way, the word "light" has as what is formal in its signification the notion of manifestation. According to its first imposition, the *ratio propria* of the name, "light" signifiies the principle of manifestation in visual perception; if we consider only *principium manifestationis* as the signification of "light," we have a *ratio communis*.[5] What makes "light" an analogous name is the fact that when considered as common to the sun, say, and intellectual evidence, the *ratio propria* of the name if found in one alone

[1] *In I Contra Gentes*, cap. 34, nn. IV-V.

[2] *I Ctntra Gentes*, cap. 34.

[3] Cf. *In Scti Pauli epist. ad Ephesios*, cap. 3, lect. 4 apropos of "Ex quo omnis paternitas in caelis et in terra nominatur."

[4] *Q.D. de ver.*, q. 4, a. 1, ad 7: "...ratio signi per prius convenit effectui quam causae, quando causa est effectui causa essendi, non autem significandi, sicut in exemplo proposito accidit. Sed quando effectus habet a causa non solum quod sit, sed etiam quod significet, tunc, sicut causa est prius quam effectus in essendo, ita in significando; et ideo verbum interius per prius habet rationem significationis quam verbum exterius, quia verbum exterius non instituitur ad significandum nisi per interius verbum." Mention must be made here of the remarkable series of articles by Bernard Lonergan, S. J., "The Concept of *Verbum* in the Writings of St Thomas Aquinas," *Theological Studies*, VII (1946), pp. 349-92; VIII (1947), pp. 35-79, 404-44; X (1949), pp. 3-40, 359-93. These articles form the textual background for Fr. Lonergan's ambitious tome, *Insight*, Longmans, Green & Co., London, 1957. Whatever one may think of the author's assessment of St Thomas and of his own fairly independent views, the articles mentioned are a veritable thesaurus of texts with often penetrating comments. For a critique which captures some of the flamboyant style of its target, see Cornelius Ryan Fay, "Fr. Lonergan and the Participation School," *The New Scholasticism*, XXXIV (1960), pp. 461-87.

[5] *II Sent.*, d. 13, q. 1, a. 2.

and the other is denominated from it. So too with *verbum*: the *ratio propria* of the name is saved by the spoken word alone and the others recieve the name from it. And, though the spoken word is a word to the degree that it signifies the *verbum cordis*, that the concept should be called a *verbum* entails an extension of the name from what it is first imposed to signify. So too in the case of "nature": though generation implies matter and form,[1] to call the latter natures involves an extension of the word from its first signification. In other words, to be naturally prior as cause to effect is not synonymous with being most perfectly the *res significata* of the name.

With respect to the difficulty of Sylvester of Ferrara, then, we should point out that several things are said to be named analogically when they have a common name which is saved in one alone according to its proper notion and the other or others are denominated from that thing. This has to do with the *rationes* signified by the common name and it is true equally of "healthy," "word," "virtue," "passion," and of names common to God and creature. If there are dissimilarities, these are not such as to disturb the universality of the foregoing description of the analogous name. Particularly when it is question of the *res significata* of the name, it should not be thought that when this is found in both analogates, as wisdom is found in both creature and God, that this entails that the *ratio propria* of "wise" is saved in both, for then the name would be univocal.[2] The *ratio propria*, the notion first and properly and more commonly associated with the name will be saved first of all in creatures and God will be denominated such from creatures. And, as in the case of *lux*, we can say that He receives the name according to a common notion (*ratio communis*) which will be other than what *manifestius* and *communius*[3] is meant by the name. The order *secundum rem*[4] need not be the same as that established by the successive impositions of the name, particularly when causes are denominated from their effects. And where the species of cause and grade of cause differ, there will be important differences between the things named analogically by one name and things named analogically by another name. However, these differences will be accidental to the analogy of names, that is, will not arise from the fact that these things are named analogically. For this reason, we would not want to elevate these differences into formal differences of the analogous name as if they constituted species of it.

[1] Cf. *In V Metaphysic.*, lect. 5, nn. 825-6.
[2] *Ia*, q. 16, a. 6.
[3] *Ia*, q. 34, a. 1.
[4] *I Contra Gentes*, cap. 34.

Were we to do this, the names common to God and creature would not be instances of analogical naming, but a special type of analogous name; moreover, one might want to go on to erect each name common to God and creature into a special type—but that way lies madness, and we would not so much as set foot on it if we became clear at the outset as to what it is for things to have a name analogically in common.

Our discussion of "word" has made several appeals to texts concerning the analogy of "nature," so we need not concern ourselves with a separate development of the latter, something which would, moreover, take us very far afield. Perhaps the three instances of analogy we have discussed will provide us with an adequate base for indicating the fundamental unity of St. Thomas' various remarks on the analogous name, though the terminology in which he sets forth the doctrine is supple and fruitfully various. That variety, however, can obscure the answer to our central question. We have encountered the phrase, "*communiter loquendo*" which is opposed to *proprie loquendo*; we have seen the first imposition of a term referred to as what is *communius*,[1] though the same word, "word," is said to be used *proprie* in three ways as opposed to a fourth which is *figurative* and *improprie*.[2] So too we find the extended meaning of such a word as *lux* referred to as a *ratio communis* opposed to the *ratio propria* of that term. If it were not for that common notion, *lux* would be said only metaphorically of spiritual things, we are told, but we have also been told that what is named *improprie* is named metaphorically. Does this mean that what is said to be such-and-such *improprie* is spoken of metaphorically? If this were the case, we would have to say that things *extra animam* are said to be true metaphorically. "Si autem accipiatur veritas *improprie dicta*, secundum quam omnia di cantur vera, sic sunt plurium verorum plures veritates; sed unius rei una est tantum veritas."[3] That is, we would be faced with the somewhat unsettling recognition that to speak of true as convertible with being involves a metaphorical use of "true."

Later on we will make explicit that all the elements for an answer to our central question (namely, "Is there a *ratio communis* of the analogous name?)," have been given in the texts already cited, though this is something the discerning reader will long since have seen. Before spelling out that resolution, however, we want first to examine the relationship between analogy and metaphor in order to sharpen a

[1] So too moral virtue is virtue *communius*. Cf. *Q.D. de ver.*, q. 14, a. 3, ad 1.
[2] *Ia*, q. 34, a. 1.
[3] *Q.D. de ver.*, q. 1, a. 4.

difficulty which emerges from the texts already considered. After that, we shall examine the doctrine that "being" is not a generic name, since this will bring out important issues for the discussion of the *ratio communis* of the analogous name, a matter to which we can then turn.

V. ANALOGY AND METAPHORICAL USAGE

When we were discussing the way in which intellection can be called *quoddam pati*, we referred to a text which makes the point in a significant way.[1] There we were given an option between saying that intellection is a certain kind of passion or something else similar to passion. Of these, the text continued, the second is truer because intellection is said to be a passion by analogy with sensing and the latter is not properly passion. Could this be taken to mean that, since "passion" as applied to intellection involves such a diluted meaning that the word is used metaphorically? This is explicitly suggested of the extension of "motion" to intellection. "Minimum autem de proprietate motus, *et nihil nisi metaphorice*, invenitur in intellectu."[2] That which least and most commonly saves the *ratio* of the name is said to involve a metaphor, as if it does not so much save the notion but is similar to what does.[3] Elsewhere, "motion" is said to apply to intellectual operations insofar as it is taken *communiter*. What precisely is the relation between a word's being taken analogously and metaphorically, and why is it that we might say of the same extended use of a word that it is analogous or metaphorical?

To approach this problem, we want to examine a word which is both analogous and has metaphorical uses. The word is "potency" which has a multiplicity of meanings: "Sed ista multiplicitas quantum ad quosdam modos est multiplicitas aequivocationis, sed quantum ad quosdam analogiae. Quaedam enim dicuntur possibilia vel impossibilia, eo quod habent aliquod principium in seipsis; et hoc secundum quosdam modos, secundum quos omnes dicuntur potentiae non aequivoce, sed analogice. Aliqua vero dicuntur possibilia vel potentia, non propter aliquod principium quod in seipsis habent, et in illis dicitur potentia

[1] *In III de anima*, lect. 7, nn. 675-6.

[2] *In I de anima*, lect. 10, n. 160.

[3] *Ia*, q. 18, a. 1, ad 3: "...dicendum quod aquae vivae dicuntur, quae habent continuum fluxum: aquae enim stantes, quae non continuantur ad principium continue fluens, dicuntur mortuae, ut aquae cisternarum et lacunarum. Et hoc dicitur per similitudinem: inquantum enim videntur se movere, habent similitudinem vitae. Sed tamen non est in eis vera ratio vitae: quia hunc motum non habent a sepsis, sed a causa generate eas; sicut accidit circa motum aliorum gravium et levium."

aequivoce."[1] Equivocal uses of "potency" are had in mathematics (e.g. three to the second *power* is nine) and logic, where possible propositions are those whose opposites can be true.[2] These are said to be powers, potencies, possibles, *per quamdam similitudinem.* Elsewhere, these equivocal uses of "potency" are said to be metaphorical.[3] Now these equivocal modes or metaphorical uses of "potency" are contrasted with a *multiplicitas analogiae*, i.e. a variety of modes which are related *per prius et posterius.* Four such modes are distinguished:[4] first, an active principle which is a principle of transmutation in another as other; secondly, passive potency which is the correlative of the active principle. "Haec autem potentia reducitur ad primam potentiam activam, quia passio ab agente causatur."[5] Thirdly, a disposition not to be changed for the worse—a principle of resistance to active potency. "Unde, cum passio ab actione dependeat, oportet quod in definitione utriusque illorum modorum ponatur definitio 'potentiae primae,' scilicet activiae."[6] Fourthly, insofar as the one having active potency can act well and easily, or something be acted on easily and resist easily: "Unde manifestum est quod in definitione harum potentiarum, quae dicuntur respectu bene agere vel pati, includuntur rationes primarum potentiarum, quae dicebantur simpliciter agere et pati: sicut in bene agere includitur agere; et pati in eo quod est bene pati. Unde manifestum est, quod omnes isti modi potentiarum reducuntur ad unum primum, scilicet ad potentiam activam. Et inde patet quod haec multiplicitas non est secundum aequivocationem, sed secundum analogiam."[7] Thus, if potency is taken to signify the common notion "principle of change" (ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς).[8] the active principle saves the notion *per prius* and whatever else is called a potency is referred to what first and primarily receives the name. Clearly, then, the name is not univocally common.

Except in the case of pure equivocals, things receive the same name because of a known similarity between them. Thus Socrates and Plato are both named man because they have the same nature, the nature

[1] *In IX Metaphysic.*, lect. 1, n. 1773.
[2] *Ibid.*, nn. 1774-5.
[3] *In V Metaphysics.*, lect. 14, n. 974: "Ostendit quomodo potentia sumatur metaphorice; et dicit in geometria dicitur potentia secundum metaphoram. Potentia enim lineae in geometria dicitur potentia secundum metaphoram. Potentia enim linease in geometria dicitur quadratum lineae per hans similitudinem: quia sicut ex eo quod est in potentia fit illud quod est in actu, ita ex ductu alicuius lineae in seipsam, resultat quadratum ipsius."
[4] *In IX Metaphysic.*, lect. 1, nn. 1776-1780; *In V Metaphysic.*, lect. 14, nn. 955-960.
[5] *In IX Metaphysic.*, lect. 1, n. 1777.
[6] *Ibid.*, n. 1779.
[7] *Ibid.*, n. 1780.
[8] 1046a12.

signified by the common word; so too they and dogs and cats are called animals because they are alike in what the word "animal" signifies. Things are named analogically when they participate more and less perfectly in the notion signified by their common name with those that save it less perfectly referred to what is most perfectly named by it. Now it may appear that the metaphor falls under this description of the analogous name. Consider Aristotle's definition of metaphor: *μεταφορὰ δέ ἐστιν ὀνόματος ἀλλοτρίου ἐπιφορὰ*.[1] When we say that someone is a tiger, don't we explain this use by including what "tiger" properly signifies in our definition? St. Thomas seems to suggest just this.

Dicendum quod per prius dicitur nomen de illo in quo salvatur tota ratio nominis perfecte, quam de illo in quo salvatur secundum aliquid: de hoc enim dicitur quasi per similitudinem ad id in quo perfecte salvatur, quia omnia imperfecta sumuntur a perfectis. Et inde est quod hoc nomen *leo* per prius dicitur de animali in quo tota ratio leonis salvatur, quod proprie dicitur leo, quam de aliquo homine in quo invenitur aliquid de rations leonis, ut puta audacia vel fortitudo, vel aliquid huiusmodi; de hoc enim per similitudinem dicitur.[2]

Few would doubt that the example is one of metaphor and yet St Thomas is concerned here with the way in which "father" can be said of God's relation to creatures and to His divine Son, which few would doubt involves analogy. Thus metaphor would seem to be the analogical use of a name. Furthermore, when St Thomas asks whether names common to God and creatures are said *per prius* of God,[3] he proceeds in such a way that metaphorical names seem included among analogous names. He first sets down a general rule for analogous names, namely that many are said to be such-and-such with reference to one, and then seems simply to apply it differently to names said metaphorically and non-metaphorically of God. Despite the seeming implications of these texts, we shall argue that metaphors are not instances of analogous names but must be divided against them.

[1] *Poetics*, 1457b6-7.

[2] *Ia*, q. 33, a. 3.

[3] *Ia*, q. 13, a. 6: "Dicendum quod in omnibus nominibus quae de pluribus analogice dicuntur, necesse est quod omnia dicuntur per respectum ad unum; et ideo illud unum oportet quod ponatur in definitione omnium... Sic ergo omnia nomina quae metaphorice de Deo dicuntur, per prius de creaturis dicuntur quam de Deo, quia dicta de Deo nihil aliud significant quam similitudines ad tales creaturas. Sicut enim ridere dictum de prato nihil aliud significat quam quod pratum similiter se habet in decore cum floret, sicut homo cum ridet, secundum similitudinem proportionis; sic nomen leonis dictum de Deo nihil aliua significat quam quod Deus similiter se habet ut fortiter operetur in suis operibus, sicut leo in suis. Et sic patet quod secundum quod dicuntur de Deo, eorum significatio definiri non potest, nisi per illud quod de creaturis dicitur. — De aliis autem nominibus, quae non metaphorice dicuntur de Deo, esset eadem ratio, si dicerentur de Deo causaliter tantum... Sic enim cum dicitur Deus est bonus, nihil aliud esset quam Deus est causa bonitatis creaturae; et sic hoc nomen bonum, dictum de Deo, clauderet in suo intellectu bonitatem creaturae. Unde bonum per prius diceretur de creatura quam de Deo..."

St Thomas sometimes asks if light is found properly in spiritual things.[1] Before replying, he invites us to consider that a name must be taken either according to its first imposition or according to subsequent usage. For example, "to see" is imposed to signify the activity of one external sense, but we also use it to speak of the other senses ("See how warm this is," "See how it tastes to you.") and indeed of the intellect (Blessed are the clean of heart for they shall see God). So too with "light."

Nam primo quidem est institutum ad significandum id quod facit manifestationem in sensu visus; postmodum autem extensum est ad significandum omne illud quod facit manifestationem secundum quamcumque cognitionem. Si ergo accipiatur nomen luminis secundum suam primam impositionem, metaphorice in spiritualibus dicitur, ut Ambrosius dicit. Si autem accipiatur secundum quod est in usu loquentium ad omnem manifestationem extensum, sic proprie in spiritualibus dicitur.[2]

On the basis of this text one might want to say two things. First, that while metaphor may be an analogous name, it is distinguished from other analogous names in terms of *proprie* and *improprie*. Or one might wish to quarrel with the implied description of metaphor; metaphor is here distinguished from the use of a word, but surely metaphor itself involves using a word. Quite obviously the objection is well taken, but more than the mere use of a term is involved in the usage mentioned in the text.[3] The *usus loquentium* of which St Thomas speaks suggests regularity and convention and, indeed, the extension of the very signification of the name. When St Thomas takes up this same question elsewhere, the discussion contains a number of additional notes.[4] First of all, speaking of the position of St Ambrose and Pseudo-Dionysius, St Thomas distinguishes metaphor from analogy. Their position, that "light" is said only metaphorically of spiritual things, seems truer "because nothing per se sensible belongs to spiritual things save *metaphorically*, because although something can be found *analogically* common to spiritual and corporeal things, something per se sensible cannot." Thus "light" is said of spiritual things "either equivocally or metaphorically." Of equal interest is the statement as to what is common to the conflicting views of Ambrose and Augustine.

Notice that corporeal things are transferred to spiritual because of some similarity, which is indeed a similarity of proportionality, and it is necessary to reduce this similarity to some community of univocation or of analogy; and so it is here, for that

[1] Cf. *Ia*, q. 67, a. 1.
[2] *Ibid.* On why sight of all the senses should be so extended, see *In I Metaphysic.*, lect. 1, nn. 5-8.
[3] Cf. *Ia*, q. 29, a. 4, *in fine corporis* for the distinction between use and signification.
[4] *II Sent.*, d. 13, q. 1, a. 2.

is called light in spiritual things which is to intellectual manifestation as bodily light is to sensible manifestation. Manifestation however is more truly in spiritual things and given this the statement of Augustine is true... that light is more truly in spiritual than in corporeal things, not according to the proper notion of "light" but according to the notion of manifestation.[1]

In other texts as well St Thomas distinguishes analogy from metaphor, the *similitudo analogiae* from the *similitudo proportionalitatis*.[2] In analogous names an in univocal names there is similitude in terms of what the name signifies, that from which the name is imposed to signify *ex parte rei*. The similarity involved in the metaphor is of a most indirect kind. "Ea quae proprie de ipso dicuntur, vero in eo sunt; sed ea quae metaphorice dicuntur de eo per similitudinem proportionabilitatis ad effectum aliquem, sicut dicitur ignis Deuter. IV eo quod sicut ignis se habet ad consumptionem contrarii, ita Deus ad consumendum nequitiam.[3] Here there is no similarity of nature or in that from which the name is imposed to signify: the metaphorical use of a name does not imply reference to that from which the name was imposed to signify in its first imposition (*id a quo ex parte rei*), but rather the thing named lion metaphorically has a property or effect similar to an effect or property of what which the term properly signifies. As the lion acts audaciously so too does the man. Obviously, no metaphor would be involved in saying, "Socrates is audacious"; only "Socrates is a lion" poses the problem. Thus on the basis of lion: audacious::Socrates: audacious, it is the transfer of "lion" that constitutes the metaphor, since Socrates cannot be properly supposed for by "lion." It may be, of course, that the effect is a sufficient sign of the leonine nature, but again it is not a

[1] "Sciendum tamen quod transferuntur corporalia in spiritualia per quamdam similitudinem, quae quidem est similitudo proportionabilitatis; et hanc similitudinem oportet reducere in aliquam communitatem univocationis vel analogiae; et sic est in proposito: dicitur enim lux in spiritualibus illud quod ita se habet ad manifestationem intellectivam sicut se habet lux corporalis ad manifestationem sensitivam. Manifestatio autem verius est in spiritualibus; et quantum ad hoc, verum est dictum Augustini... quod lux verius est in spiritualibus quam in corporalibus, non secundum propriam rationem lucis, sed secundum rationem manifestationis..." — *Ibid.* cf. *In evang. Ioann.*, cap. 1, lect. 3, n. 96: "Ubi primo considerandum est quod, secundum Augustinum et plures alios, nomen lucis magis proprie dicitur in spiritualibus quam in sensibilibus. Ambrosius tamen vult quod splendor metaphorice dicatur de Deo. Sed in hoc non est magna vis facienda: nam de quocumque nomen lucis dicatur ad manifestationem refertur, sive illa manifestatio sit in intelligibilibus, sive in sensibilibus. Si ergo comparentur manifestatio intelligibilis et sensibilis, secundam naturam prius invenitur lux in spiritualibus; sed quoad nos, qui nomina rebus imponimus ex earum proprietatibus nobis notis, prius invenitur in sensibilem quam intelligibilem; quamvis secundum virtutem prius et verius conveniat spiritualibusg uam sensibilibus."

[2] *II Sent.*, d. 16, q. 1, a. 2, ad 5: "...proprietates divinae ostenduntur in creaturis dupliciter: vel secundum similitudinem analogiae, sicut vita, sapientia et hujusmodi, quae analogice Deo et creaturis conveniunt, et sic divinae proprietates praecipue ostenduntur in rationali natura; vel secundum similitudinem proportionalitatis, secundum quod spirituales proprietates corporalibus metaphorice designantur..."

[3] *I Sent.*, d. 45, q. 1, a. 4.

question of the name of the effect being transferred.[1] The metaphor must be based on the obvious and manifest, hence on the sensible; St Thomas gives this as the reason why God cannot be called an angel even metaphorically.[2]

The analogous name differs from the metaphor in this that the former is not only used of something which does not perfectly save its meaning, but thanks to usage, the name is understood to be extended in meaning as well, so that thanks to a new *ratio* (related to the *ratio propria*), the things fall under the signification of the word, are signified by it, though less properly than that which saves the *ratio propria* perfectly. That is why St Thomas speaks of *propriisime*, *proprie* and *communiter*, or *stricte* and *communiter*,[3] *proprie* and *largo modo*.[4] Because these extended meanings differ from the *ratio propria*, the analogous use of a name can be judged metaphorical by one who thinks only of the first and proper meaning, as Ambrose did with "light." The extended meaning is always less proper.[5] As we have seen, sometimes so little of the *ratio propria* is saved that what is named such-and-such *communiter loquendo* is said to be named metaphorically. This will be because the analogous name in that case reveals so little of the proper nature of that to which it is applied.[6] This is why Aristotle objects to Plato's mode of speech,[7] since one cannot argue with metaphors.[8]

VI. BEING IS NOT A GENUS

We want to come at the object of our concern from another point of view now. It is a commonplace in the writings of St Thomas that being is not a genus.

It should be noted that being cannot be contracted to something determinate in the way a genus is contracted to species through differences, for difference, since it does not participate in the genus, is outside the essence of the genus. But nothing can be

[1] "...effectus qui est signum alicuius secundum proprietatem in uno, est signum eiusdem secundum similitudinem in altero, in omnibus quae metaphorice dicuntur." — *I Sent.*, d. 45, q. 1, a. 4, ad 2.

[2] *I Sent.*, d. 34, q. 3, a. 2, ad 3: "...nec etiam metaphorice, quia metaphora sumenda est ex his quae surt manifesta secundum sensum: et ideo numquam invenimus Deum in Scriptura nominatur vel seraphim vel aliquid huiusmodi."

[3] *I Sent.*, d. 33, q. 2, a. 1, ad 5.

[4] *In X Metaphysic.*, lect. 8, n. 2092; *Q.D. de ver.*, q. 1, a. 4, ad 8.

[5] "Sed hoc non erit secundum propriam verbi acceptionem quia si aliquid eorum quae sunt de ratione alicuius auferatur, iam non erit propria acceptio." — *Q.D. de ver.*, q. 4, a. 2.

[6] "Sed tamen si aliquid dicere non sufficit ad cognoscendam naturam rei: quia res naturalis per similitudinem quae assumitur in metaphora, nou est manifesta." — *In II Meteorol.*, lect. 5, n. 84.

[7] *In In I Metaphysic.*, lect. 15, n. 231.

[8] *In II Post. analytic.*, lect. 16, n. 8.

outside the essence of being that by addition to being would constitute some species of it, for what is outside of being is nothing and cannot be a difference.[1]

What is being said is that being as known does not provide an adequate foundation for the second intention of genus. The known nature to which such a relation of reason attaches is such that it is predicated of many specifically different things with respect to *what* they are. If being as known does not found the relation of genus, it does take on the second intention of analogous signification. The logical nature of the denial that being is a genus is clear from St Thomas' presentation of what he takes to be the fundamental statement of the argument in the third book of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.

Quod autem ens et unum non possint esse genera, probat tali ratione. Quia cum differentia addita generi constituat speciem, de differentia praedicari non poterit nec species sine genere, nec genus sine speciebus.

(1) Quod autem species de differentia praedicari non possit, patet ex duobus:
  (a) Primo quidem quia differentia in plus est quam species, ut Porphyrius tradit.
  (b) Secundo, quia cum differentia ponatur in definitione speciei, non posset species praedicari per se de differentia, nisi intelligeretur quod differentia esset subiectum speciei, sicut numerus est subiectum paris, in cuius definitione ponitur. Hoc autem non sic se habet; sed magis differentia est quaedam forma speciei. Non ergo posset species praedicari de differentia, nisi forte per accidens.

(2) Similiter etiam nec genus per se sumptum, potest praedicari de differentia praedicatione per se.
  (a) Non enim genus ponitur in definitione differentiae, quia differentia non participat genus, ut dicitur in quarto *Topicorum*.
  (b) Nec etiam differentia ponitur in definitione generis.

Praedicatur tamen de eo quod 'habet differentiam,' idest de specie, quae habet differentiam in actu. Et ideo dicit, quod de propriis differentiis generis non praedicatur species, nec genus sine speciebus, quia scilicet genus praedicatur de differentiis secundum quod sunt in speciebus. Nulla autem differentia potest accipi de qua non praedicetur ens et unum, quia quaelibet differentia cuiuslibet generis est ens et est una, alioquin non potest constituere unam aliquam speciem entis. Ergo impossibile est quod unum et ens sunt genera.[2]

Having pointed out that the species is constituted by the addition of difference to genus, various relations among these predicables are discussed by St Thomas and from these considerations it is seen to follow that being is not a genus. The key premisses are that species cannot be predicated of difference and that genus cannot be predicated of difference. We want to examine both of these before going on to the conclusino which follows from them.

[1] "Sciendum est enim quod ens non potest hoc modo contrahi ad aliquid determinatum, sicut genus contrahitur ad species per differentias. Nam differentia, cum non participet genus, est extra essentiam generis. Nihil autem posset esse extra essentiam entis, quod per additionem ad ens aliquam speciem entis constituat: nam quod est extra ens, nihil est, et differentia esse non potest." — *In V Metaphysic.*, lect. 9, n. 899; cf. *In III Physic.*, lect. 5, n. 617; *I Contra Gentes*, cap.25; *Q. D. de ver.*, q. 1, a. 1; *Ia*, q. 3, a. 5.

[2] *In III Metaphysic.*, lect. 8, n. 433.

1. *Species cannot be Predicated of Difference*

This point is made in two ways, first by an appeal to Porphyry's *Isagoge*, secondly by an argument. The remark from Prophyry[1] is a curious one since it does not seem true that difference is wider than the species; difference is constitutive of species and if it were found outside its proper genus, it could not be divisive of it per se; if it is found only within the ambit of the genus, it will be exactly as wide as the species it constitutes. St Thomas himself has argued against this claim,[2] but in so doing he indicates the way in which it is true.

Sed dicendum est quod si accipi posset differentia, quae notificaret ipsam formam substantialem speciei, nullo modo differentia ultima esset in plus quam species, ut rationes probant. Sed quia formae essentiales non sunt nobis per se notae, oportet quod manifestentur per aliqua accidentia, quae sunt signa illius formae, ut patet in VIII Metaphys. Non autem oportet accipere accidentia propria illius speciei, quia talia oportet per definitionem speciei demonstrari; sed oportet notificari formam speciei per aliqua accidentia communiora; et secundum hoc differentiae assumptae dicuntur quidem substantiales, in quantum inducuntur ad declarandum formam essentialem, sunt autem communiores specie, inquantum assumuntur ex aliquibus signis, quae consequuntur superiora genera.[3]

It is because the essences of things are unknown to us[4] that we must name their distinctive note from accidents wider than the species. Why this prevents the predication of species of difference is brought out in the argument where the type of predication envisaged is made clear. Obviously we *can* say, "Rational is man," so we must ascertain how it is denied that the species can be said of the difference. We cannot take such a predication as asserting that the predicate belongs per se to the subject. The first mode of perseity[5] is precluded because it is not the predicate which enters into the definition of the subject, but rather the

[1] Apparently chapter 12 of the *Isagoge*; cf. *In VII Metaphysic.*, lect. 15, n. 1621.

[2] *In II Post. analytic.*, lect. 13, n. 6: "Sed videtur quod non requiratur ad definitionem quod quaelibet particula sit in plus quam definitum. Dicit enim Philosophus in VII *Metaphys.* quod quando pervenitur ad ultimas differentias, erunt aequales differentiae speciebus; non ergo oportet quod differentia sit in plus quam species. Quod etiam ratione videtur. Dicit enim Philosophus in VII *Metaphys.* quod ratio quae est ex differentiis, videtur esse speciei et actus, idest formae, quia, sicut ibidem dicitur, differentia respondet formae; cuiuslibet autem speciei est propria forma, quae nulli alii convenit. Videtur igitur quod differentia ultima non excedat speciem. Dicit etiam Philosophus in *VII Metaphys.*, quid nihil est aliud in definitione quam genus et differentiae, et quod possible est definitionem ex duobus constitui. quorum unum sit genus, aliud differentia. Differentia autem non invenitur extra proprium, genus, alioquin non esset divisiva generis per se, sed per accidens. Videtur ergo quod differentia non excedat speciem."

[3] *Ibid.*, n. 7.

[4] *Q.D. de ver.*, q. 10, a. 1.

[5] *In I Post. analytic.*, lect. 10, n. 3: "Primus ergo modus dicendi per se est quando id quod attribuitur alicui pertinet ad formam eius. Et quia definitio significat formam et essentiam rei, primus modus eius quod est per se est quando praedicatur de aliquo definitio vel aliquid in definitione positum (et hoc est quod per se sunt quaecumque insunt in eo, *quod quid est*, idest in definitione indicante *quid est*) sive ponatur in recto sive in obliquo."

other way round. Does that make our proposition per se in the second mode? That type of perseity is had when the subject enters into the definition of the predicate as its proper subject.[1] An example of this would be odd and even with respect to number which must enter into their definitions. Man is not a proper accident of its own difference so our example is not one of the second mode of perseity. Since it saves neither of these modes, we can say that "Rational is man" is an example of per accidens predication.[2]

2. *Genus cannot be Predicated of Difference*

This proposition is proved in the same way as the preceding one, namely by observing that "Rational is animal" involves neither of the first two modes of perseity. That it does not involve the first is expressed by saying that the difference does not participate in the genus. We may wonder if this establishes the point to be made, namely that genus does not enter into the definition of difference, since it is often said that the species does not participate genus,[3] although genus obviously enters into the definition of species. Without going into the various modes of participation here,[4] we can observe that "participate" sometimes means that what is predicated is of the essence of the subject.[5] Thus genus does not enter into the definition of difference. No more does difference enter into the definition of the genus and this comes down to a denial that "Rational is animal" is per se in the second mode. Both the generic name (e.g. "animal") and the name of difference (e.g. "rational") are expressive of the same human nature, but just as the genus is indeterminate with respect to difference, so difference is indeterminate with respect to genus and consequently neither enters into

[1] *Ibid.*, n. 4: "Secundus modus dicendi per se est quando haec praepositio *per* designat habitudinem causae materialis, prout scilicet id cui aliquid attribuitur est propria materiae proprium subiectum ipsius. Oportet autem quod proprium subiectum ponatur in definitione accidentis: quandoque quidem in obliquo, sicut cum accidens in abstracto definitur, ut cum dicimus 'simitas est curvitas nasi,' quandoque in recto, ut cum accidens definitur in concreto, ut cum dicimus 'simus est nasus curvus.' Cuius quidem ratio est quia cum *esse* accident is dependeat a subiecto, oportet etiam quo definitio eius significans *esse* ipsius contineat in se subiectum. Unde secundus modus dicendi per se est quando subiectum ponitur in definitione praedicat, quod est proprium accidens eius."

[2] *Ibid.*, n. 5.

[3] Cf. *In VII Metaphysic.*, lect. 3, n. 1328: "Genus autem non praedicatur de speciebus per participationem, sed per essentiam. Homo enim est animal essentialiter, non solum aliquid animalis participans."

[4] Cf. *Laval théologique et philosophique*, XV, 2 (1959), pp. 242-5.

[5] Cf. *In XI Metaphysic.*, lect. 1, n. 2169; St. Albert, *In IV Topic.*, tract. 1, cap. 4: "Nec videtur secundum veritatem, quod differentia participat genus, sicut id quod directe continetur in genere, genus participat: quia omne quod sic participat, quoad nomen et rationem, est species vel individuum et non differentia: differentia autem quoad hoc quod est consequens esse generis, modum habet praedicationis de genere propriae passionis, et non genus participans."

the definition of the other and neither can be predicated of the other according to the first mode of perseity.

There are two connected difficulties with all this. The first arises from the fact that the genus is said to be predicable of difference as the proper subject of the latter. "Unde dicit Avicenna quod genus non est in differentia sicut pars essentiae eius, sed solum sicut ens extra quidditatem sive essentiam; sicut etiam subiectum est de intellectu passionum."[1] One note of proper accident is that it is convertible with its subject; now if animal is to rational as its proper subject then it would seem to follow that whatever is rational is animal and whatever is animal is rational.[2] But this is clearly false. Secondly, it seems false to say that genus and difference are outside the essence of one another; St Thomas himself seems to reject this elsewhere. "Et etiam propter hoc solvitur, quia non hoc modo advenit differentia generi, ut diversa essentia ab eo existens, sicut advenit album homini."[3]

(1) The first difficulty is easily resolved by an appeal to the notion of disjunctive properties.[4] Even is not a property of number in the way risible is a property of man. "Every man is risible" is simply convertible to "Every risible being is man." But we do not say that whatever is a number is even, but rather that whatever is a number is even or odd and this is convertible to "Whatever is even is a number and whatever is odd is a number." (2) When the proper subject is said to be different in essence from its property, this means that the subject enters into the definition of its proper accident *ex additione*[5] in the way in which body enters into the definition of the soul, not as if body were part of *what* soul is, but simply as its subject. As to the quotation from St Thomas cited above, we must notice what precisely he is denying. He writes that difference does not advene to genus as accident does to substance. The composition of substance and accident does not result in something per se or essentially one, but precisely in an accidental composite. The addition of difference to genus gives rise to a phrase expressing one essence, which is just the point Aristotle and St. Thomas are making in that context. But if genus and difference are constitutive of a notion expressive of one essence, it does not follow that genus is of the essence of difference or vice versa. "Animal" means "what has a body endowed with senses" and is indeterminate with respect to any further perfection

[1] *De ente et essentia*, cap. 3.
[2] Cf. Porphyry, *Isagoge*, chap. 4.
[3] *In VII Metaphysic.*, lect. 12, n. 1550.
[4] See Joseph Bobik, *Philosophical Studies* (Ireland), IX 1959), pp. 75-6.
[5] Cf. *In VII Metaphysic.*, lect. 4, nn. 133 sq.

in the thing of which it is predicated, since it does not, in its mode of signifying, prescind from such further perfection. That is why we can say, "Man is animal"—this does not mean that man is only a sensitive body. So too "rational" means "what is endowed with reason" and it is indeterminate as to whether such a thing is corporeal or not. Form is not matter nor is matter form though together they make one essence; difference, genus and species are related proportionally as are form, matter and essence.[1] The generic notion is said to be taken from matter because it expresses the essence in such a way that it is susceptible of further perfection; the differential notion is taken from form and expresses only perfection. Genus does not express what difference does nor vice versa though they both signify the same essence. This is why St Thomas can say that, though genus is not predicated of difference, it is predicated of that which has the difference, the species, e.g., "Man is animal."

From all this is is clear that being cannot be a genus. Nothing can be said of the things that are of which being cannot be said; that is, there are no differential notions which do not express what 'being' expresses or which express something of which "being" cannot be said. Whatever is is thereby being and will have "being" said of it. "But no difference actually participates the genus, because difference is taken from form, genus from matter, as rational from intellectual nature, animal from sensitive nature. Form is not actually included in the essence of matter, but matter is in potency to it. Similarly difference does not pertain to the nature of genus, but genus has the difference *potestate*. Because of this, difference does not participate in genus, for when I say 'rational' I signify something having reason nor is animal included in the understanding of rational. That is participated which is included in the understanding of what participates and that is why it is said that difference does not participate in genus. Now no difference can be taken in whose understanding being and one would not be included, so one and being cannot have differences and cannot, therefore, be genera since every genus has differences. The truth is that one and being are not genera but are analogically common to all things."[2]

[1] *De ente et essentia*, cap. 3; *In VIII Metaphysic.*, lect. 2, n. 1697.

[2] "Nulla enim differentia participat actu genus; quia differentia sumitur a forma, genus autem a materia. Sicut rationale a natura intellectiva, animal a nature sensitiva. Forma autem non includitur in essentia materiae actu, sed materia est in potentia ad ipsam. Et similiter differentia non pertinet ad naturam generis, sed genus habet differentiam potestate. Et propter hoc differentia non participat genus; quia cum dico rationale, significo aliquid habens rationem. Nec est de intellectu rationalis quod sit animal. Illud autem participatur, quod est de intellectu participantis. Et prop ter hoc dicitur, quod differentia non participat

Sometimes, it is true, being is called a genus, but it is not one, properly speaking, for the reasons we have seen. It can be called a genus analogically insofar as it saves something of the definition of "genus," namely being common to many.[1] We must now look more closely at the way something analogically common to many differs from what is generically common.

3. *Genus and Inequality*

It was pointed out earlier that the difference between the generically common notion and the common notion signified by an analogous name is this that the former is participated in equally by the things of which it is said while participation in the latter is unequal, *per prius et posterius*.[2] For example, man and cow participate equally in the notion signified by "animal": the adverbial phrase *ex aequo* is elsewhere replaced by the verb *parificantur*,[3] to express the relation of the species to their genus. Analogates, on the other hand, are not made equal, reduced to notional unity, in what their common name signifies and "analogy" accordingly connotes inequality, an order of first and second, of perfect and imperfect, of *simpliciter* and *secundum quid*.

Two problems arise here the resolution of which is essential for the overriding question of this essay. First, the statement about things named univocally seems to be contradicted by the common doctrine that the species of a genus are unequal, the one more perfect than the other, in short, that they are related *per prius et posterius*. Secondly, doesn't the very fact that we can speak of a *ratio communis analogi* indicate that in some way and at some stage of our understanding of them analogates *parificantur in intentione alicuius communis?* Clearly those who speak of the univocity of "being" would answer the question affirmatively. Partisans of the analogy of "being" must feel uneasiness at talk of the common notion of an analogous name, for if it is one and common, how does it differ from the notion signified by a univocal name? That we cannot appeal to notions other than the common one to ex-

genus. Nulla autem posset differentia sumi, de cuius intellectu non esset unum et ens. Unde unum et ens non possunt habere aliquas differentias. Et ita non possunt esse genera,cum omne genus habeat differentias. Est autem veritas, quod unum et ens non sunt genera, sed sunt omnibus communia analogice." — *In XI Metaphysic.*, lect. 1, nn. 2169-70.

[1] Cf. *In X Metaphysic.*, lect. 8, n. 2092: "Et non dicit quod sit simpliciter genus, quia sicut ens genus non est proprie loquendo, ita nec unum quod convertitur cum ente, nec pluralitas ei opposita. Sed est quasi genus, quia habet aliquid de ratione generis, inquantum est communus." — Cf. *In IV Metaphysic.*, lect. 4, n. 583; *ibid.*, lect. 2, n. 563; *Q.D. de malo*, q. 1, a. 1, ad 11.

[2] *Q.D. de malo*, q. 7, a. 1, ad 1.

[3] *I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 5, a. 2, ad 1.

plain the inequality of the analogous name is clear from the fact that the generic notion covers that kind of inequality.

Species are said to be made equal in the notion signified by the generic name: man and cow in "animate sensitive substance." However, "omnia animalia sunt aequaliter animalia, non tamen sunt aequalia animalia, sed unum animal est altero maius et perfectius..."[1] This is an extremely paradoxical remark: all animals are equally animals but not equal animals. In what are they unequal? Well, we have already seen wherein they are equal, namely in the notion signified by "animal," so their inequality must be sought elsewhere, in something not expressed by the common notion. "Alicuius generis species se habent secundum prius et posterius, sicut numeri et figurae, quantum ad esse; licet simul esse dicantur inquantum suscipiunt communis generis praedicationem."[2] *Quantum ad esse*—does this mean in their very acts of existence as opposed to what they are?[3] We will see that the significance of excepting the ultimate species from discussions of how the univocal notion can cover an inequality *secundum esse* is precisely that no appeal to raw existence is involved in this or other similar texts. We are faced with a general statement about the relation of species to their genus, for

> Si quis enim diligenter consideret, in omnibus speciebus unius generis semper inveniet unam alia perfectiorem, sicut in coloribus albedinem et in animalibus hominem. Et hic ideo quia quae formaliter differunt, secundum aliquam contrarietatem differunt; est enim contrarietas differentia secundum formam, et Philosophus dicit in X Metaphysicae. In contrariis autem semper est unum nobilius et alius vilius... et hoc ideo quia prima contrarietas est privatio et habitus...[4]

The source of the inequality of things made equal in a generic notion is given in this text: it is precisely the differences which divide the genus and are unexpressed by it. The species are unequal *secundum esse* or *secundum naturam*, that is, when they are considered in their specific natures constituted by differences which are contraries and *ipso facto* related as more and less perfect, e.g. rational and irrational, living and non-living. St Thomas can say *secundum esse* because this inequality is read in terms of that ultimate form by virtue of which alone the thing is, is animal, is man: the form which is the *causa essendi*.[5]

[1] *Q.D. de malo*, q. 2, a. 9, ad 16.
[2] *Ia*, q. 77, a. 4, ad 1.
[3] For a good presentation, though one I believe weakened by the latter-day penchant for discovering an existentialism in St. Thomas, see Armand Maurer, "St Thomas and the Analogy of Genus," *The New Scholasticism* (1955), pp. 127-144. See too Fr. Klubertanz, *op. cit.*, p. 103, n. 33 for a critique of Fr. Maurer.
[4] Cf. *In librum de causis*, (ed. Saffrey), prop. 4a, pp. 31-2.
[5] *In II Post. analytic.*, lect. 7, n. 2.

The inequality of things made equal in a generic notion, an inequality due to the differences which divide the genus, is covered by both the *genus physicum* and the *genus logicum*.[1] To understand this distinction, we must recall the dictum that *genus sumitur a materia*. The generic notion is a grasp of matter under a common perfection such that the notion is material with respect to further perfections, i.e. the differences *quae sumuntur a forma*. The inequality we have been speaking of is had in terms of those further differences, whereas the difference between the *genus physicum* and *logicum* is drawn from *illud materiale unde sumitur genus*.[2] The generic notion contains a formal and a material note and insofar as the matter is ignored and the form alone attended to, we have the formal, abstract notion which is called the logical genus. It is logical in the sense of dialectical; common in that it does not express what is proper to the nature of the things from which it was originally drawn: that is why neither the philosopher of nature nor the metaphysician can be satisfied with it. For example, the notion of body is drawn from terrestial things and it signifies corruptible substances of three dimensions. Only by ignoring the nature of the matter of such things, while retaining what is formal to the generic notion, can "body" be taken to be univocal to terrestial and celestial bodies because of the putative difference of their matter. So too the notion of substance is drawn from material things, but by retaining only what is formal in the concept, angels and men can be called substances univocally, *logice loquendo*.

We must not be misled by the "logical" attached to the word genus in such discussions, nor by the statement that it is common, abstract. Genus is as such a logical intention: whether or not we retain both its formal and material notes. It is a relation attaching to something which is one only due to our mode of knowing, for it is not by the same specific nature that stones and men are substances, or men and cows animals. But it is by the same ultimate form that Socrates and Plato are specifically the same. It is noteworthy that the inequality of species with respect to their genus is not matched by the relation of individuals to their species, for this is instructive as to the meaning of *secundum esse*. "Ad tertium dicendum quod genus praedicatur aequaliter de speciebus quantum ad intentionem, sed non semper quantum ad esse, sicut in figura et numero... Sed hoc in speciebus non contingit... unde ex hoc suffi-

[1] See Ralph M. McInerny, *The Logic of Analogy*, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague (1961), pp. 98-122.

[2] *In Boethii de trin.*, q. 4, a. 2.

cienter posset probari quod non sunt unius speciei, non autem quod non sunt ejusdem generis..."[1] "Impossibile est autem naturam speciei communicare ab individuis per prius et posterius, neque esse, neque post secundum intentionem, quamvis hoc sit possibile in natura generis."[2] The specific notion (ultimate species) is not further divisible formally, so no inequality like that to which specific differences give rise is possible. Moreover, the specific notion will be a *ratio concreta* and will not abstract from such essential notes as the matter of the thing. In conclusion, we can say that the inequality of species due to their specific differences, as opposed to what they have generically and equally in common, does not entail an analogous name. That this is explicitly the mind of St. Thomas is clear from the following extremely important passage.

Sed dicendum quod unum dividentium aliquod commune potest esse prius altero dupliciter: uno modo, secundum proprias rationes aut naturas dividentium; alio modo, secundum participationem rationis illius communis quod in ea dividitur. *Primum* autem non tollit univocationem generis ut manifestum est in numeris,in quibus binarius secundum propriam rationem naturaliter est prior ternario; sed tamen aequaliter participant rationem generis sui, scilicet numeri: ita enim est ternarius multitudo mensurata per unum, sicut et binarius. Sed *secundum* impedit univocationem generis. Et propter hoc *ens* non potest esse genus substantiae et accidentis: quia in ipsa ratione entis, substantia, quae est ens per se, prioritatem habet respectu accidentis, quod est ens per aliud et in alio. Sic ergo affirmatio secundum propriam rationem prior est negatione; tamen aequaliter participant rationem enunciationis, quam supra ponit, videlicet quod enunciatio est oratio in qua verum vel falsum est.[3]

St Thomas is here dimissing the view he attributes to Alexander, namely that affirmation's priority to negation destroys the univocity of "enunciation" and makes it equivocal *ad unum* or what St Thomas himself would call an analogous name.[4] It will be appreciated that his reply indicates that he looks on the relation of genus to its species in the way in which Scotus thinks being is related to substance and accident. Thus, Scotus feels that if we ignore the proper notions of substance and accident, "being" is univocally common to them because it signifies a *ratio communis*. He will agree, however, that if we have in mind the proper notions of substance and accident, they are called beings analogically. If this could be the case, St Thomas would call "being" a univocal term, though it is doubtful that he would then go on to call it analogical be-

[1] *II Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, a. 5, ad 3.
[2] *Ibid.*, a. 4.
[3] *In I Periherm.*, lect. 8, n. 6.
[4] Cf. Ralph McInerny, "Le terme 'âme' est-il équivoque ou univoque?" *Revue philosophique de Louvain*, T. 58 (1960), pp. 481-504.

cause of an inequality read in terms of proper notions or natures, for he is here denying that the inequality of affirmation and negation renders the term "enunciation" analogically common to them. This text is of great importance for the light it casts on the common notion signified by the analogous name. The inequality of things having such a name in common is had in terms of the common notion itself; far from being made equal in the *ratio communis*, their very inequality is revealed in terms of it, for only one of them saves that notion perfectly. If the *ratio communis entis is* "what is," only substance saves this notion *simpliciter*; whatever other than substance is called being must be referred to substance in order to explain the predication. *Ens per se* and *ens per aliud* are not differences of being; "being" must first of all be taken to mean that which has existence in itself; if something else is called being of which this is not true, it will be referred to that of which it is true insofar as it receives the common name. It is as if a generic name qua generic primarily signified one of the species and the other only with reference to the first.[1] But the generic name is not more the name of one species than the other, whereas "being" is rather the name of substance than of accident. *Habens animalitatem* is equally common to man and beast, but *habens esse* is primarily saved by substance, *habens sanitatem* is primarily saved by animal. Medicine cannot be called healthy without reference to animal; accident cannot be called being with reference to substance. To notice that *habens esse* is one phrase tells us nothing of how it is common to the things named being; to insist on its oneness is very much like insisting on the fact that the same word "being" is common to many. The point of interest when we are speaking of analogy and univocity is how the word is common, how a notion it signifies is common. The common notion signified by the analogous name is not common as is that of the univocal name; it is simply wrongheaded to suggest that "being" can be thought of as common to substance and accident in the way "animal" is common to man and beast. Though we formulate a *ratio communis*, it is not saved equally when "being" is taken as predicable of substance and accident; no such shift in the notion signified by the generic name is brought about as it is predicated of different species.

[1] Although a difficulty may seem to be presented by the fact that the genus and one of the species often share a common name as, for example, "animal" taken as generic name and as the name of the species divided against rational animal, and "chance," since the one species does not receive the generic name with reference to the other species the difficulty is apparent only, not real.

4. *Aside on "Ens commune"*

We are told that "one," "true" and "good" are convertible with "being," which means that anything of which "being" is said can be called one, good and true and that whatever is is one, good and true as well. Unity and truth and goodness are sometimes called transcendental properties of being; indeed, being itself is said to be a transcendental. By this is meant that these words signify things not as confined to one category, that they transcend the limitations of any one category, i.e. just as "being" does not signify one type or genus of thing as opposed to others, but something common to whatever is, so unity is not a category of things but common to all. *Ens commune* or transcendental being does not designate some nature over and above the categories, as if its not being determined to one category meant that it is outside all categories. What is meant is that "being" can be said of anything in any category; we cannot conclude from this that there is anything outside the categories. In discussing the fact that being is not a genus, we saw that there is no notion which can so abstract from the different categories that it applies indifferently and equally to them all.[1] Needless to say, the community of "being" is anything but tantamount to the assertion that "being" is the name of something over and above the things which fall into the categories and to which they relate. By the community of "being" we mean neither the community of a generic nature nor that there is some subsistent thing apart from individuals in the category of substance. "Being" is simply a wider, more common or universal name for what could more properly be called a substance, a quantity, a quality, or yet more properly, respectively, a man, a triangle, a color. These names tell us a good deal more than does "being," since this word is imposed from existence, actuality, outthereness, and does not express what is there nor how it differs from everything else that is. The concrete name *ens*, as opposed to its abstract counterpart *esse*, means *quod est, quod habet esse, quod est in actu in rerum natura.* It doesn't express the kind of thing that is: "Non enim significat forman aliquam, sed ipsum esse."[2] "Ens auten non dicit quidditatem, sed solum actum essendi...[3] In short, "being" is the least informative of all names.

[1] "To be in a category" or "to be a predicate" may seem to be exceptions to this, but of course they do not signify anything which pertains to things *in rerum natura.* This is sufficient to dismiss the problem here, but in so doing we are not affirming that these logical names are univocal in the case in point.

[2] *Ia*, q. 13, a. 11.

[3] *I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 4, a. 2, ad 2.

Doesn't this carry us back to something we have previously argued against, namely that "being," if it doesn't express any of the determinations whereby things differ from one another, expresses precisely what they all have in common, that wherein they do not differ? The uninformative vagueness of *quod est* would seem to enable *ens* to name everything indiscriminately and equally. St Thomas, for example, says that when "is" is the only predicate attached to a subject, its meaning is *existit in rerum natura.*[1] But surely this is what all things out-there have in common; that is *parificantur in hac intentione.* Elsewhere he writes, "Res ad invicem non distinguuntur secundum quod habent esse: quia in hoc omnia conveniunt."[2] It is true that what distinguishes one being from another is not the *is* in "what is" just as such; nevertheless, differences in the *what* are productive of differences in the *is.* Thus, continuing the text just quoted, "Si ergo res differunt ad invicem, oportet quod vel ipsum esse specificetur per aliquas differentias additas, ita quod rebus diversis sit diversum esse secundum speciem: vel quod res different per hoc quod ipsum esse diversis naturis secundum speciem convenit. Sed primum horum est impossibile: quia enti non potest fieri aliqua additio secundum modum quo differentia additur generi... Relinquitur ergo quod res propter hoc differant quod habent diversas naturas, quibus acquiritur esse diversimode."[3] If existence is actuality, then we won't look for something that makes actuality actual, but rather will look to what is in act, what is actualized, to find differences in actualities. Thus, actuality or existence is determined, not by the addition of further actuality, but is limited and specified by the kind of thing that is. The generic notion, we remember, was one which could be considered to be material and potential with respect to further actuality: so, once more, *habens esse* is not a generic notion. One being or existent differs from another ,not because some further formal difference is attached to existence, but because the nature of *this* differs from *that* and consequently the existence of this differs from the existence of that.[4] Since the differences of *esse* come from the limiting natures to which it is added and since *habens esse* expresses determinately no nature, "being" expresses none of the differences of things and can be common to all since it does not prescind from these differences.[5] When it comes to determining

[1] *In II Periherm.*, lect. 2, n. 2.
[2] *I Contra Gentes*, cap. 26.
[3] *Ibid.*
[4] Cf. *Q.D. de pot.*, q. 7, a. 2, ad 9.
[5] *Ibid.*, ad 6. St Thomas here compares *ens commune* and *animal commune* in terms of this indifference to further addition, but of course only the latter is open to further formal differentiation.

these differences, one kind of *what* will take precedence over others since things are not said to be in the same way.[1] Thus, if we say "whiteness is" or "humanity is," existence is attributed to that whereby something is white or a man. Only the subsistent something, e.g. this man, has existence or actuality attributed to it properly, but this comes about differently in (1) "Socrates is a man" and (2) "Socrates is white," for in (1) we are attributing *esse substantiale*, in (2) esse *accidentale*. Thus "what is" as the signification of "being" is said to be a common notion, but it is not univocally common to the various categories of being, since there is inequality of participation in it.

From the many difficulties which could be raised here, let us select the following. St Thomas sometimes says that a living thing is more perfect than a merely existent thing, because the living thing is existent and more besides.[2] Now this sounds very much like saying that man is more perfect than beast because he is an animate sensitive substance and more besides, namely rational. In other words, the comparison of *vivere* and *esse* seems to treat being as if it were a genus. At other times, St Thomas will say that *esse* is more perfect than *vivere*. Here is his own resolution of the apparent contradiction.

Dicendum quod esse simpliciter acceptum, secundum quod includit in se omnem perfectionem essendi, praeeminet vitae et omnibus subsequentibus: sic enim ipsum esse praehabet in se omnia subsequentia. Et hoc modo Dionysius loquitur.—Sed si consideretur ipsum esse prout participatur in hac re vel in illa, quae non capunt totam perfectionem essendi, sed habent esse imperfectum, sicut est esse cuiuslibet creaturae, sic manifestum est quod ipsum esse cum perfectione superaddita est eminentius. Unde Dionysius ibidem dicit quod viventia sunt meliora existentibus, et intelligentia viventibus.[3]

This text may seem to increase the difficulty, for we are told of a perfection superadded to being. Nor is this a unique remark. "Ad cuius

[1] *Quodl. IX*, q. 2, a. 2: "Alio modo esse dicitur actus entis inquantum est ens, idest quo denominatur aliquid ens actu in rerum natura. Et sic *esse* non attribuitur nisi rebus ipsis quae in decem generibus continentur; unde ens a tali esse dictum per decem genera dividitur. Sed hoc *esse* attribuitur alicui dupliciter. Uno modo sicut ei quod proprie et vere habet esse vel est. Et sic attribuitur soli substantiae per se subsistenti: unde quo vere est dicitur substantia... Omnia vero quae non per se subsistunt, sed in alio at cum alio, sive sunt accidentia sive formae substantiales aut quaelibet partes, non habent esse ita ut ipsi vere sunt; sed attribuitur eis esse alio modo, idest ut *quo* aliquid est; sicut albedo dicitur, non quia ipsa in se subsistat, sed quia ea aliquid habet esse album. — Esse ergo proprie et vere non attribuitur nisi rei per se subsistenti. Huic autem attribuitur duplex: unum scilicet esse resultans ex his ex quibus eius unitas integratur, quod proprium est esse suppositi substantiale. Aliud esse esse est supposito attributum praeter ea quae integrant ipsum, quod est esse superadditum, scilicet accidentale, ut esse album attribuitur Socrati cum dicitur: Socrates est albus."

[2] *Ia*, q. 4, a. 2, ad 3.

[3] *IaIIae*, q. 2, a. 5, ad 2.

evidentiam, considerandum est quod quanto aliqua causa est superior, tanto ad plura se extendit in causando, semper autem id quod substernitur in rebus, invenitur communius quam id quod informat et restringit ipsum: sicut esse quam vivere, et vivere quam intelligere, et materia quam forma."[1] These texts present two difficulties: first, what is meant by saying that existence includes every perfection; secondly, is not *esse* here spoken of as if it were a genus?

The second problem is dissipated when we observe that the comparison of *existentia* and *viventia* is within the genus of substance. St Thomas brings this out in a text in which he is concerned with explaining the hierarchy in that genus. Observing that God and Prime Matter can be considered as extremes of pure act and pure potency, St Thomas goes on to say that matter is the cause of generic diversity in that, in some things, matter is perfected so that it subsists, in others so that it not only subsists but is living and so forth. In the first case, a form actuates matter so that it exists, in the second so that it exists and lives. "Exists" here means "subsists," then, and what is as subject to the further perfection of living is the generic notion, substance.[2] In much the same way, in the second definition of the soul, the soul is said to be "primum quo et vivimus, et sentimus, et movemur et intelligimus." "To live" is here used to signify vegetative life, though other operations are also vital.[3] This serves to heighten the first difficulty for, far from *esse* including *vivere*, it would seem to be *vivere* which includes *esse*, just as *sentire* includes *vivere*. *Vivere est esse viventibus*.[4] How then can *esse* be said to include all other perfections? "The transition from *vivens perfectius ente* to *esse praeeminet vitae* is the transition from a principally logical to a strictly metaphysical understanding of being.[5] The view suggested in this remark is quite widespread nowadays and it purports to find its base in St Thomas' statement that "esse est actualitas omnium actuum,

[1] *Ia*, q. 65, a. 3.

[2] "Non autem materia ex omni parte aequaliter recipit similitudinem actus primi; sed a quibusdam imperfecte, a quibusdam vero perfectius, utpote quaedam participant divinam similitudinem secundum quod tantum subsistunt, quaedam vero secundum quod vivunt, quaedam vero secundum quod cognoscunt, quaedam vero secundum quod intelligunt. Ipsa igitur similitudo primi actus in quacumque materia existens, est forma eius. *Sed forma talis in quibusdam facit esse tantum, in quibusdam esse et vivere*; et sic de aliis in uno et eodem. Similitudo enim perfectior habet omne id quod habet similitudo minus perfecta, et adhuc amplius." — *In Boethii de trin.*, q. 4, a. 2.

[3] *In II de anima*, lect. 4, n. 273: "Vivere enim refert ad principium vegetativum, quia superius dixerat quod vivere propter hoc praecipuum inest omnibus viventibus." Cf. *ibid.*, lect. 3, n. 258.

[4] *Ibid.*, lect. 7, nn. 318-9; cf. *Quodl. IX.*, q. 2, a. 2, ad 1: "...dicendum quod vivere dicit esse quoddam specificatum, per speciale essendi principium..."

[5] B. Kelly, *The Metaphysical Background of Analogy*, Aquinas Society of London: Aquinas Paper 29, London (1958), p. 5.

et propter hoc est perfectio omnium perfectionum."[1] One author makes the same point in terms of a distinction between what he calls existence as minimal act and existence as maximal act.[2] By minimal act, he means what would be known simply by knowing *that* a thing is without knowing *what* it is, as when we say that we know a thing is and imply that this is all we know. "No doubt *existence* does mean this. But note that it is by one and the same act that X is not nothing, and that it is all that it is; *existence* is maximal act."[3] Such a distinction seems prompted by the desire to account for statements that *esse* includes all other perfections; indeed, it would be safe to generalize and say that "Thomistic Existentialism" is an attempt to unpack everything from *esse* on the assumption that everything is there. Thus the different comparisons of *esse* and *vivere* must be carefully understood, lest we find ourselves unable to resist the allure of existence as maximal act, a view of existence which is said to be the *clef de voûte* of the metaphysics of St. Thomas. Fortunately, St Thomas himself, commenting on Dionysius, faces this same problem. "Cum ipsum esse excedat vitam et vita excedat sapientiam, unde est quod viventia supereminent existentibus et sentientia viventibus...?"[4] St Thomas goes on:

sermo praedicta obiectionis recte se haberet, si ea quae sunt intellectualia supponeret esse aliquis non existentia vel non esse viventia; tunc enim sicut esse praeemineret vitae et vita sapientiae, ita existentia praeeminerent viventibus et viventia sapientibus. Sed divinae mentes Angelorum non carent esse, quinnimo habent excellentius super alia existentia creata et habent vitam super alia viventia...[5]

The eminence of existence is read in terms of its community and it is said to be more noble than life because whatever lives is, though not everything which is lives: "licet viventia sint nobiliora quam existentia tamen esse est nobilius quam vivere: viventia enim non tantum habent vitam, sed cum vita simul habent et esse."[6] *Ipsum esse* participates in nothing; all other things participate in it. Since it is *communissimum* and signifies abstractly, *ipsum esse* "nihil alienum in se habere possint."[7] If this is so, how can we understand the remark, quoted earlier, to the effect that *esse* includes all other perfections? The sequel of the passage just quoted from the exposition of the *Divine Names* provides the answer.

[1] *Q.D. de pot.*, q. 7, a. 2, ad 9.
[2] J. F. Anderson, "On Demonstration in Metaphysics," *The New Scholasticism*, XXXII (1958), pp. 476-94.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 481.
[4] *In Dionysii divinis nominibus*, cap. 5, lect. 1 n. 614.
[5] *Ibid.*, n. 615.
[6] *Q.D. de pot.*, q. 7, a. 2, ad 9.
[7] *Ibid.*; cf. *In Boethii de hebdomadibus*, lect. 2.

St Thomas observes that every form that is received in something is limited by the receiver; for example, a white body does not become whiteness, but participates it. "Sed si esset albedo separata, nihil deesset eo quod ad virtutem albedinis pertineret." This is a contrafactual conditional, of course, but what if there were, besides the things that are (i.e. *entia, ea quae habent esse*), a subsistent *esse*? Well, that would possess all the perfections had in diffusion by things which only participate existence; which exist but are not existence, are actual but are not actuality. "Omnia autem alia... habent esse receptum et participatum et ideo non habent esse secundum totam virtutem essendi, sed solus Deus, qui est ipsum esse subsistens, secundum totam virtutem essendi, esse habet..."[1] God is *esse commune* and contains all the perfections of being supereminently, but He is not the *esse* predicably common to all the things that are. Thus, God who is existence is life, is wisdom, etc., but this does not entail that *vivere* is synonymous with, or part of the meaning, of *esse*, although *vivere est esse viventibus*. The latter phrase indicates rather that *esse* is part of the meaning of *vivere* than vice versa. St Thomas makes the same point in explaining why *per se esse* is said to be prior to and worthier than *per se vita*.[2] From this it is clear that existence as maximal act can only be God: there is nothing among the things that are which could answer to it for there we find only beings which participate existence is a limited fashion; moreover, there is no notion or concept which, when unpacked or meditated on, could reveal the multitude of created perfections. If we say, in order to retain the notion of maximal act, that the *esse* of Socrates is all that he is, what could follow but confusion; strangely enough, partisans of this notion begin by insisting that their intention is simply to draw out all the implications of the distinction between essence and existence. To say that without existence there would be nothing does not imply that in existent things, *their* existence is all that they are, for this would dissolve any difference between existence and essence. One can say, similarly,

[1] *In de div. nom.*, cap. 5, lect. 1, n. 629.

[2] *Ibid.*, n. 635: "Quod autem per se esse sit primum et dignius quam per se vita et per se sapientia, ostendit dupliciter: primo quidem, per hoc quod quaecumque participant aliis participationibus, primo participant ipso esse: prius enim intelligitur aliquod ens quam unum, vivens, vel sapiens. secundo, quod ipsum esse comparatur ad vitam, et alia huiusmodi sicut participatum ad participans: nam etiam ipsa vita est ens quoddam et sic esse, prius et simplicius est quam vita et alia huiusmodi et comparatur ad ea ut actus eorum. Et ideo dicit quod non solum ea quae participant aliis participationibus, prius participant ipso esse, sed, quod magis est, omnia quae nominantur per se ipsa, ut per se vita, per se sapientia et alia huiusmodi quibus existentia participant, participant ipso per se esse: quia nihil est existens cuius ipsum per se esse non sit substantia et aevum, idest forma participata ad subsistendum et durandum. Unde cum vita sit quoddam existens, vita etiam participat ipso esse."

that without form, matter would not exist, but this does not entail that the form of material things is all they are. The great danger of the position in question is that it puts a premium on predicates of great universality, so that "Socrates exists" somehow becomes a more profound and revealing statement than "Socrates is a man," although the latter tells us a good deal more than the former about the kind of being Socrates is and, consequently, of the kind of *esse* he has. *Vivere* is more determinate than *esse* when we are speaking of living things: to prefer *esse* here is a kind of glorifaction of the abstract. Such an "existentialism" becomes the "essentialism" it fears.

VII. RESOLUTION AND CONCLUSION

From the foregoing diffuse and rather disconnected remarks we can derive the answer to the general question posed by this essay: is there a *ratio communis* of the analogous name? If our first impulse is to answer in the negative, this is because a *ratio communis* would be formulable in one set of words and we would seemingly then be in the position of having to say that the analogous name signifies one and the same notion as predicable of its analogates. Were this the case, however, the analogous name would be indistinguishable from the univocal name. It is by some such procedure as this that Scotus wants to maintain that "being" is univocal for, although the *ratio substantiae* differs from the *ratio accidentis* and the latter is analogous to the former, nonetheless "being" can be taken to signify some one notion apart from these determinate ones, as in the case where we know that something is but don't know whether it is substance or accident. What we know when we simply know that the thing is is what "being" signifies as a univocal term. Now in Section I above, we brought together some representative texts in which St. Thomas gives as the distinguishing mark of the analogous as opposed to the univocal name that it does not signify one notion but several which are related to one another as prior and posterior. But if there is no one notion common to all the analogates, it clearly folows that there is no *ratio communis* of the analogous name or, if there is, that it is quite unlike the *ratio communis* of the univocal name. This second possibility must be entertained because, as the texts cited in Section II indicate, St. Thomas does speak of a *ratio communis* of the analogous name. The *ratio communis* of the analogous name, however, is not some one notion signified without change by the name as it is predicable of its analogates (otherwise it would be univocal): the nature of this *ratio com-*

munis, then, must be clearly understood if we are to maintain the distinction between univocal and analogous names.

We have spoken of the *ratio communis* of the univocal name and by this we meant the one notion which is signified by the name as predicable of many. But this notion is also called a *ratio propria*. "Quando aliquid praedicatur univoce de multis, illud in quolibet eorum secundum propriam rationem invenitur, sicut *animal* in qualibet specie animalis."[1] If the generic name is said to signify a *ratio communis* and the specific name a *ratio propria*, the *ratio propria* here in question *is not that of the generic name*. We are speaking rather of a common and proper grasp of the thing named by both the generic and specific names, e.g. Socrates as named by "animal" and "man." If we look to the generic name itself, it is said of its species *secundum propriam rationem eius*. Now it is just this that is denied of the analogous name vis-a-vis its analogates and we must, by means of the terminology gleaned from the texts already cited, ask what this denial entails with respect to an analogously common notion.

We have seen that, in the case of the generic name, there is no need to distinguish its *ratio communis* from its *ratio propria*: what makes such a name univocal is that it is predicated according to its *ratio propria* of many things, in which sense its *ratio propria communis* or universal. Let us now ask if there is any need, in the analogous name, to distinguish between its *ratio propria* and its *ratio communis*. Consider the word "healthy." The word is imposed from health; it is from health that something is denominated healthy. Thus the *ratio* signified by "healthy" is "that which has health," *habens sanitatem*. Is this a *ratio propria* or a *ratio communis*? Since we can't talk of the univocity or equivocity of a determinate name apart from the determinate things to which it is taken to be common, let us first of all consider the proprositions, "Socrates is healthy" and "Plato is healthy." Here the predicate term can be taken to mean exactly the same thing, *habens sanitatem*, and "healthy," considered as thus predicable, is a univocal name, i.e. *illud in quolibet invenitur secundum propriam rationem*. If we vary the example and consider "healthy" as predicably common to a man and medicine, it will not be common in the same way as it was in our first example, that is, it will not be said of these two things *secundum rationem propriam*, but only of man. "Sed quando aliquid dicitur analogice de multis, illud invenitur secundum propriam rationem in uno eorum tantum, a quo alia denominantur."[2] As said of medicine, "healthy" expressed a reference

[1] *Ia*, q. 16, a. 6.
[2] *Ibid.*

or analogy to what saves the proper notion of the name, what is directly denominated from the *id a quo nomen imponitur ad significandum.* If medicine is called healthy, it is not directly denominated from health but from what is directly denominated from health. Thus the *ratio nominis* is found in one alone *proprie, perfecte, simpliciter, per prius* and in others *minus proprie, imperfecte, secundum quid, per posterius.* From such considerations it seems to follow that the notion which is analogically common is none other than the *ratio propria* of the name. The *ratio sani* is "what has health" and this is founded properly by only one of the things named healthy analogically and is founded less properly, imperfectly, secondarily by other things insofar as they are referred or attributed or proportioned to what saves the notion *per prius.*

This enables us to appreciate the comparison of the generic notion and the analogously common notion in terms of equality and inequality. Species are said to participate equally in the generic notion in that each is directly denominated by the *id a quo* and not by the one being referred to the other. What is called the *ratio analogice communis* is participated in unequally by the analogates in that one is directly and first of all denominated and the others receive the name by reference to what receives it *per prius.* This makes it clear that the "reduction to one" of the many modes of a common name is not to some one notion which would be participated in equally; rather, it is a reduction of secondary notions to the proper notion and, consequently, of things secondarily named to what is first of all denominated. The *ratio communis* of the analogous name is not obtained by picking out the minimal content of all the meanings of the name, but is rather the most proper meaning of the term in question, a meaning which is not properly saved by all the things to which it is considered to be common.

We are now in a position to speak of the relation between the phrases *ratio communis* and *communiter loquendo.* Insofar as the latter phrase refers to a way of receiving an analogous name less properly, it clearly must be distinguished from the *ratio communis.* Something can be named such-and-such *communiter loquendo, minissime proprie,* insofar as it saves very little of the *ratio propria* which is the *ratio communis* of the analogous name. We will see in a moment that this distinction requires some modification in the case of the Divine Names with respect to the *per prius secundum rem nominis.* But what is the relationship between the *res significata* and the *ratio communis?*

As we have already seen, the notion of *res significata* is explained with reference to the mode of signifying the *res.* The *res significata* of "healthy"

is health, but whether we speak of "healthy" or "health" (*sanum* or *sanitas*), a mode of signification is inevitably involved, for "health" signifies abstractly (namely, "the quality whereby one is healthy") and "healthy" concretely (namely, the one so qualified). Nevertheless, what takes on either mode is what the name principally signifies and from which the recipient of the name is denominated. Thus the *res significata* is the same as the *id a quo ex parte rei*. What is the relationship between the *res significata* and the *ratio propria* of the name? From the point of view of univocal and analogous names, the thing signified must be signified concretely, since, as signified abstractly, it cannot be predicated of what has the perfection and the question of univocity or analogy would not arise. In the Divine Names, this distinction between modes of signifying is not so important since we can say either "God is wise" or "God is wisdom." However, although we cannot say, "Socrates is wisdom," we would nevertheless say that wisdom is what "wise" chiefly signifies and that substances of a certain sort participate in it. Not that participation is restricted to accidental forms: we can also say that what is named man participates in humanity, just as what is named *ens* participates in existence. In the case of names predicated of God, where these signify abstractly, we may think we thereby free them from all such imperfections as the composition implied by the concrete name. But the abstract name too involves a mode of signifying thanks to which it comes under the scope of the statement that, with respect to mode of signifying, *omne nomen cum defectu est*[1] when applied to God. Thus, "wisdom" will mean a quality of a certain kind, that is, an accident distinct from the substance which participates in it, something it cannot mean when applied to God. Thus, the notion signified by "wise" or "wisdom" cannot be the same when they are applied to God and creature. In the case of some names, however, names such as "wisdom," it can be said that *quantum ad rem nominis* they are said *per prius* of God. *Quantum ad rationem nominis*, however, the creature saves such names *per prius* and it remains true that the analogous name is said according to its proper notion of one alone.

It may be well at this point to restate the difference between the analogous name and the metaphorical use of a name. We have seen that the analogous name is said according to its proper notion of only one of the things of which it is predicable and that it is said of others insofar as they refer to what saves the *ratio propria*. But isn't this true of the metaphor as well? A name is used metaphorically of what does not

[1] *I Contra Gentes*, cap. 30.

save its proper notion but which refers to what does save that notion. For example, I say "John is a tiger." In this case, although John does not save the proper notion of "tiger," the point of the metaphor is his similarity to what does save that notion. On this showing, then, metaphor seems identical with analogy. In reply to this, we call attention to the similarity to tiger which prompts our calling John a tiger and suggest that the underlying simile is something like "John is fierce as a tiger." Now, since fierceness is not part of the notion signified by "tiger," our solution is that, although a thing which receives a metaphorical name is referred to what saves the proper notion of the name, *it is not referred to it as saving the proper notion*, and that it is in this that metaphor differs from analogy.

Exception might be taken to this solution by citing the admitted metaphor involved in speaking of "living waters." The waters are referred to living things insofar as water, like living things, seems to possess self-movement. But "life" is imposed from self-movement which must, consequently, figure in the proper notion of "living" and our distinction of metaphor from analogy collapses. This difficulty is removed by invoking the important distinction between the *id a quo ex parte imponentis* and *id a quo ex parte rei*. Only the latter is the form chiefly signified by the term and since self-movement is an example of the first kind of *id a quo nomen imponitur*, it is not what the name chiefly signifies and our earlier solution is unaffected by the objection.

A more serious difficulty, one already discussed in Section V above, arises from the fact that what is sometimes said to save a name *communiter loquendo* is at other times said to be named *metaphorice*. When a name is said to be saved only *communiter loquendo* it can also be said to signify *minissime proprie*. Thus, since the reference to what saves the proper notion is extremely tenuous and remote, one may either insist on the propriety, however minimal, or ignore it and, to emphasize the distance and paucity of propriety, say a metaphor is involved. In our attempt to name God, we seem ever faced with this choice, although, when we want to insist that some names are said of God *proprie*, we distinguish them quite rigorously from metaphors. Yet even with names said properly of God, we know so little of what we would speak that our terms seem improper, metaphorical.

It is now clear that there is no opposition between the texts cited above in Sections I and II: what St Thomas calls the *ratio communis* of the analogous name is not like that signified by the univocal name and, in-

deed, is common in such a way that the unequal participation in it is productive of many secondary notions. There is, of course, no need to speak of a change of mind on the part of St Thomas—unless we misunderstand the nature of the common notion signified by the analogous name. More importantly, our investigation has shown that the terminology St Thomas uses to speak of the second intention of analogy is itself replete with words which signify analogically.

CHAPTER II

METAPHOR AND ANALOGY

There seems little reason to doubt that within the Thomist tradition it is assumed that a metaphor is one thing, an analogous term another, and that while metaphor is justifiable—certainly in poetry, but as well if for different reasons in Scripture—it is, generally speaking, something the philosopher should take pains to avoid, since it can vitiate arguments and obscure issues. St Thomas himself often characterizes the metaphor as improper usage, thereby of course opposing it to proper usage. The question arises, however, when we consider the texts carefully, whether metaphor is opposed to the analogous name or whether proper and improper usage of the kind at issue are subtypes of something more commodious embracing them both; that is, it appears from a reading of some texts that St Thomas does not so much oppose metaphor to analogy as that he contrasts the analogous usage which is metaphorical because improper to the analogous usage which is proper. Cajetan's division of analogy of proportionality into proper and improper responds to this suggestion of St Thomas, and if the great commentator tends to regard metaphor as someting less than a full-fledged analogy, well surely that does not mean that it is in no way an analogy.[1]

If it seems possible to say that the opposition between analogy and metaphor is not one between analogy and non-analogy but an opposition between modes of analogy, it seems equally possible to consider "metaphor" as a term common to the analogous term and the metaphor opposed to it; that is, as common to proper and improper usage. This can be based on the way in which Aristotle and St Thomas speak of the extension of the name "nature" to signify any essence whatsoever; Aristotle used the dative, *μεταφορᾷ*; St. Thomas the phrase, *secundum quamdam metaphoram*,[2] yet I think no one would want to say we are speaking metaphorically, in the sense of improperly, when we talk of the nature of the triangle, for example.

[1] Cf. *De nominum analogia* (ed. P. N. Zammit, O.P and P. H. Hering, O.P., Romae, 1952), cap. 3.

[2] *Metaphysics*, Delta, 4, 1051a11; St. Thomas, *ad loc.*, lectio 5, n. 823.

These few remarks serve to indicate that the relative status of metaphor and analogy is somewhat problematic. The *aporia* can be tightened by recalling that Aristotle, in the *Poetics*, enumerates four species of metaphor only one of which is *κατ' ἀναλογίαν*.[1] Does this mean that only one species of metaphor is in play in the foregoing considerations? If that be true, any resolution of the questions which arise as to the opposition of metaphor to analogy as proper usage would not as such enlighten us on the nature of metaphor without qualification, i.e., the genus of which the metaphor based on analogy is a species.

Although we have introduced this discussion as if it were merely a matter of clarifying alternate classifications suggested by texts of Aquinas, it is obvious that such an effort, if seriously pursued, must inevitably go beyond the fairly superficial plane on which it presents itself. What we are finally after here is an answer to the question, "What, for Aquinas, is a metaphor?" and our way of broaching it serves to call attention to the fact that an answer to the question presumes that we can answer the equally or more difficult question, "What is analogy?" Our opening paragraphs prepare us, moreover, for the likelihood that the answer to the question about metaphor may well begin, "Metaphora dicitur multipliciter..."

I. CAJETAN ON METAPHOR

Before turning to the texts of St Thomas, we shall first of all say a few things about Cajetan's teaching on the nature of metaphor, and this without apology given Cajetan's generally admitted influences on this and related discussions. It is well known that in the *De nominum analogia*, Cajetan links metaphor with proportionality rather than with what he calls analogy of attribution. Having explained what is meant by proportionality. Cajetan writes, "Fit autem duobus modis analogia haec: scilicet metaphorice et proprie. *Metaphorice* quidem quando nomen illud commune absolute unam habet rationem formalem, quae is uno analogatorum salvatur, et per metaphoram de alio dicitur."[2] It is unfortunate that this cannot be considered a good definition because of the occurrence of *per metaphoram* in what purports to be an explication of metaphor. It should be noticed, moreover, that Cajetan's failure to define metaphor is not without its impact on his attempt to

[1] *Poetics*, chap. 21, 1457b9, 16.
[2] *Op. cit.*, n. 25.

define proper proportionality: "*Proprie* vero fit, quando nomen illud commune in utroque analogatorum absque metaphoris dicitur."[1]

When we turn to the discussions of chapter seven of Cajetan's opusculum, we find further statements about metaphor of which the following is most important. "In analogia siquidem *secundum metaphoram*, oportet unum in alterius ratione poni, non indifferenter; sed proprie sumptum, in ratione sui metaphorice sumpti claudi necesse est; quoniam impossibile est intelligere quid sit aliquid secundum metaphoram nomen, nisi cognito illo, ad cuius metaphoram dicitur."[2] Now, as Cajetan points out in the following paragraph as well as in his commentary on the *Summa theologiae*,[3] in this the socalled analogy of improper proportionality and analogy of attribution are as one, since this is the third condition of Cajetan's analogy of attribution.[4]

If we ask why Cajetan has multiplied entities here rather than making what he calls attribution coalesce with his improper proportionality, the answer would seem to be the necessity for a proportionality in metaphor and its absence in attribution. The text on which Cajetan relies here is, of course, *Q.D. de veritate*, q. 2, a. 11, although it seems ambiguous on the question whether metaphor is a kind of analogy. Consider the phrase "Sed tamen hoc dupliciter contingit" which occurs after the description of analogy as implying no determinate relation between things sharing a common name. But the first member of the division is stated thus: "quandoque enim illud nomen importat aliquid ex principali significatione, in quo non potest attendi convenientia inter Deum et creaturam, *etiam modo praedicto*; sicut est in omnibus quae symbolice dicuntur de Deo, ut cum dicitur leo, vel sol, vel huismodi, quia in horum definitione cadit materia, quae Deo attribui non po-

[1] *Ibid.*, n. 26.

[2] Cap. 7, n. 75. Cajetan doubtless has in mind here such remarks as that in *De veritate*, q. 7, a. 2, c.: "In his quae translative dicuntur, non accipitur metaphora secundum quamcumque similitudinem, sed decundum convenientiam in illo quod est de propria ratione eius cuius nomen transfertur."

[3] *In I^am*, q. 13, a. 6, n. IV: "Ad hoc breviter dicitur, quod analoga inveniuntur duobus modis. Quaedam enim significant *ipsos respectus* ad primum analogatum, ut patet de sano. Quaedam vero significant *fundamenta* tantum illorum respectuum; ut communiter invenitur in omnibus vere analogis, proprie et formaliter salvatis in omnibus analogatis. Propositio ergo illa universalis in antecedente assumpta, intelligenda est universaliter in primo modo analogiae: ita quod sensus est, quod in omnibus nominibus quae de pluribus analogice, idest secundum diversos respectus, dicuntur, oportet poni unum. In quaestione *de Veritate* de secundo modo analogiae dixit oppositum. Et haec responsio est universalior ea quam alibi assignavimus, ex Qu. de Ver., quia ista responsio habet locum in analogis secundum proportionalitatem, metaphorice tamen dictis: in his enim etiam unum ponitur in ratione alterius." — As he had pointed out in his opusculum (n. 76): "Et propter hoc huiusmodi analoga prius dicuntur de his, in quibus proprie salvatur, et posterius de his, in quibus metaphorice inveniuntur, et habent in hoc affinitatem cum analogis secundum attributionem, ut patet."

[4] *Op. cit.*, cap. 2, n. 14.

test." To what does *etiam modo praedicto* refer? Does the occurrence of *attribui* in the denial mean that it is Cajetan's analogy of attribution which is being set aside? This seem unlikely, even if we are willing to grant the accuracy of Cajetan's division of analogy. What the text suggests is that a name is sometimes predicated of God on the basis of a proportionality which, because of its principal signification, argues for no similarity between God and creatures so named with respect to that principal signification. Does this make metaphor a kind of analogous name? Does it mean that for St. Thomas, unlike Aristotle, the metaphor is always based on a proportionality? Whatever the answer to these questions, it must be said that the remarks of Cajetan we have consulted are not very illuminating on the nature of metaphor. To give the great commentator his due, we quote a definition he gives in his commentary on the first question of the *Summa*. "In titulo, *uti metaphoris* est uti locutionibus quae non verificantur de his de quibus dicuntur, secundum propriam significationem, sed secundum aliquam similitudinem ad propria significata: ut cum dicitur quod 'Deus noster ignis consumens est,' utimus metaphora; quia Deus non est vere ignis, sed se habet ad modum ignis consumentis."[1]

This appeal to Cajetan serves as an oblique introduction to some of the problems which await us when we turn to St Thomas. It will be noticed that if there is no formal connection between metaphor and proportionality at least one member of Cajetan's suggested division of analogy is gratuitous and unnecessary. Moreover, what Cajetan calls analogy of attribution would then be indistinguishable from metaphor and, since most discussions of analogy in St Thomas include examples which for Cajetan are examples of analogy of attribution, the whole matter of a distinction between metaphor and analogy becomes considerably obscured. But then the way Cajetan handles difficulties presented to his division of analogy by Aquinas' discussions of analogy indicates that that division is not formal. Thus, when Cajetan asks us to notice that St. Thomas gives an example of so-called analogy of attribution in discussing names common to God and creature, he suggests that intrinsic and extrinsic denomination are really irrelevant when we want to know what an analogous name is.[2] But we have expatiated elsewhere on the deficiencies of Cajetan's treatment of analogy and need not repeat those criticims here.[3] In short, our employment

[1] *In I^am*, q. 1, a. 9, n. 1.
[2] *In I^am*, q. 13, a. 5, n. XIV, *in fine*.
[3] *The Logic of Analogy*, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961.

of Cajetan here is intended to intensify our problem rather than to commend the Cajetanian interpretation.

II. ANALOGY VS. METAPHOR

We are asking whether metaphor is a kind of analogous name or is to be distinguished from the analogous name. Some of our foregoing considerations give credence to the contention that metaphor is an analogous name. This is corroborated by St Thomas' procedure in question thirteen of the *Prima Pars*, since in article three, when he asks if any name is said properly of God, the opposition brought into play is between usage *proprie* and *improprie* with the latter identified with metaphor.[1] Then, in article six, when he asks if names common to God and creature are first said of creatures, the distinction *proprie/improprie* seems to be a subdivision of analogous name. St Thomas begins by saying that "in omnibus nominibus quae de pluribus analogice dicuntur, necesse est quod omnia dicuntur per respectum ad unum: et ideo illud unum oportet quod ponatur in definitione omnium. Et quia ratio quam significat nomen per prius dicitur de eo quod ponitur in definitione aliorum, et per posterius de aliis, secundum ordinem quo appropinquant ad illud primum vel magis vel minus." This is exemplified by the old reliable, "healthy." "Sic ergo omnia nomina quae metaphorice de Deo dicuntur per prius de creaturis dicuntur quam de Deo: quia dicta de Deo, nihil aliud significant quam similitudines ad tales creaturas."[2] St. Thomas notices the similarity of proportion (*similitudo proportionum*) implied in "smiling meadow" and in calling God a lion. When he goes on to talk of other names "quae non metaphorice dicuntur de Deo," the clear impression is that he is talking of other instances of analogous names than metaphors.

Are there texts where St Thomas opposes metaphor and analogy? If we turn to the commentary on the *Metaphysics*, we find St Thomas distinguishing "potency" into analogous and equivocal modes. "Potency" means a number of things. "Sed ista multiplicitas quantum ad quosdam modos est multiplicitas aequivocationis, sed quantum ad quosdam analogiae."[3] The equivocal modes of potency are exemplified by the way we speak of 3 to the third power and of the cube as the power of the line. "Et propter hoc per quamdam similitudinem dicitur potens in quadratum, sicut dicitur materia potens in rem."[4] Once

[1] I^a, q. 13, a. 3, ad 3^m.
[2] *Ibid.*, a. 6.
[3] *In IX Metaphys.*, lect. 14, n. 1773.
[4] N. 1774.

more a proportionality notice. That these equivocal modes are indeed metaphors is clear from the parallel passage in Book Delta in commenting on which St Thomas begins, "Ostendit quomodo potentia sumatur metaphorice."[1] Why are these modes metaphorical and not analogical? "His ergo modis praetermissis, considerandum est de potentiis, quae reducuntur ad unam speciem, quia quaelibet earum est principium quoddam, et omnes potentiae sic dictae reducantur ad aliquid principium ex quo omnes aliae dicuntur."[2] In short, St Thomas here opposes metaphor to analogous uses of a name because the latter and not the former involve a reduction to what is primarily denominated by the word in question whereas, should it need pointing out, in the text of the *Summa* we considered a moment ago, the metaphor was not distinguished from the extension *proprie* on this basis. Or is it the manner of the reference to what is principally signified by the name which distinguishes metaphor from analogy, usage *proprie* from *improprie*? Things named metaphorically are, after all, taken to be similar to what the name properly signifies.

An *aporia* has clearly emerged, therefore, and its resolution can only be had by determining what a metaphor is and what an analogous name is. Answers to these questions should enable us to understand the apparently conflicting statements of Aquinas. What we shall be looking for is some way of justifying the fairly common distinction of metaphor and analogy such that no appeal is made to Cajetan's division of analogy into attribution and proper proportionality.

III. RATIO PROPRIA NON INVENITUR NISI IN UNO

We have seen St Thomas distinguish metaphor from the proper use of a term and clearly we can understand the meaning of *improprie* only if a meaning of *proprie* be established. Now metaphorical usage is distinguished from the variety of meanings of a term which refer to what is principally signified by the term in question. That is, in what at least sometimes St Thomas calls a *multiplicitas analogiae*, it would seem that each meaning permits proper usage. This may seem sur-

[1] *In V Metaphys.*, lect. 14, n. 974.

[2] *In IX Metaphys.*, lect. 1, n. 1776. In n. 1780, St. Thomas gives a most explicit statement of what constitutes the community of analogy. "Unde manifestum est quod in definitione harum potentiarum, quae dicuntur respectu bene agere vel pati, includuntur rationes primarum potentiarum, quae dicebantur simpliciter agere vel pati: sicut in bene agere includitur agere; et parti, in eo quod est bene pati. Unde manifestum est, quod omnes isti modo potentiarum reducuntur ad unum primum, scilicet ad potentiam activam. Et inde patet quod haec multiplicitas non est secundum aequivocationem, sed secundum analogiam."

prising since St Thomas distinguished the univocal term from the analogous term by saying that, when things are named univocally, the *ratio propria* is found in each of the things so named, whereas when things are named analogically, *ratio propria non invenitur nisi in uno*[1] How can a thing be named *proprie* by a term whose *ratio propria* it does not save? It is just this puzzle that seems to have led Cajetan to write his incredible commentary on the passage in which our phrase occurs; he there maintains, in direct opposition to the text before him that in truly analogous names the *ratio propria* is found in all the things named. "Esse ergo nomen aliquod secundum propriam rationem in uno tantum, est conditio nominum quae sunt *ad unum* aut *ab uno*, etc. et non nominum proportionaliter dictorum."[2] Cajetan thereby assigns the distinction in the text between univocals and analogates to a new role; now analogy in the strict sense, analogy of proper proportionality, is grouped with univocity and opposed to analogy of attribution. In order to separate analogy of proper proportionality from univocation. Cajetan says that while things named analogically in the full sense of the term all save the *ratio propria* of their common name, unlike things named univocally they do not do so *secundum eamdem rationem*. What prompts this prestidigitation is clear from the following remark. "Quoniam si analogum in uno tantum secundum propriam rationem salvatur; et ex qu. xiii constat omnia nomina communia Deo et aliis esse analoga, et consequenter veritatem analogice inveniri in intellectu divino et aliis intellectibus, sequitur quod in multis intellectibus non sunt multae veritates, sed omnes intellectus sunt veri una sola veritate, scilicet intellectus divini."[3] Cajetan may be taken to mean that unless the *ratio propria* of a word is saved by that of which the word is said or predicated, we will be speaking improperly and metaphorically and we see once more the affinity of metaphor to what Cajetan calls analogy of attribution. If Cajetan is mistaken here, and we will see that he is, the text does demand that we look for a way in which, when things are named analogically, the proper notion of the name is saved by only one of them and yet the others are named properly as opposed to improperly.

IV. THE SIGNIFICATION OF NAMES[4]

Cajetan cannot accept St Thomas' description of things named

[1] *I^a*, q. 16, a. 6, c.
[2] *In I^am*, q. 16, a. 6, n. IV.
[3] *Ibid.*, n. III.
[4] Cf. Louis Lachance, O.P., *Philosophie du Langage*, Ottawa, Montreal: Les Éditions du

analogically as things which share a common name but the *ratio propria* is found in only one of them, the one from which the others are denominated. Cajetan has trouble here because he is thinking of the many places where St Thomas says that in names analogically common to God and creature, the *res significata* is found in both. Now if the *ratio propria* of a name were the same as the *res significata*, St Thomas would be in contradiction with himself; therefore, is it just that identification, apparently assumed by Cajetan, that must be questioned.

St Thomas accepts the view of Aristotle that the spoken word signifies a thing through the mediation of an intellectual concept. In short, what is immediately signified by the name is the *conceptus* which is, also called the *ratio nominis*. This view of signification is triadic: word, concept, thing. The triad may seem immediately threatened when we consider that there are words or names whose very signification indicates that they signify nothing "out there." For example, the meaning of the term, *genus*, is precisely a relation among concepts, among things as they are known. The *ratio* of such a name does not purport to have anything answering to it, as such, in things as they exist. When we think of the names of fictions, e.g. *centaur*, it is even more clear that not all words signify even mediately things out-there.[1] The difficulty is resolved, I think, by calling attention to the characteristic procedure of St Thomas. *Word* or *name* is first of all described or defined in terms of a most obvious instance where the triad mentioned is easily verified. That this is the best known, the most familiar, seems suggested by the fact that we have problems about logical and fictional words, and others, because they do not seem to behave as words should. It may then seem necessary either to redefine *word* or to rule against calling *genus* and *centaur* names. St Thomas does not honor the exhaustiveness of the implied division. He prefers to take an obvious instance, assign a definition on its basis, and consider other things to be called by the same name insofar as they approximate more or less to that normative case. Not all names fulfill perfectly the definition of *name*, but to the degree they do they deserve the appellation.

The question as to the meaning of the phrase *res significata* arises if

Levrier, 1943; Franz Manthey, *Die Sprachphilosophie des hl. Thomas von Aquin*, Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoeningh, 1937. The latter is a rather uninspired yet painstaking arrangement of textual citations (unfortunately by way of outmoded convention) under various headings; the former is popular and somewhat too personal to be considered an analysis of St. Thomas. What is wanted is a book which will combine the verve of Lachance and the scholarship of Manthey.

[1] Cf. *I Sent.*, d. 2, q. 1, a. 2, where Thomas distinguishes "real" words, logical words and fictional words.

we ask whether when "animal," "man" and "rational" and "substance" are all taken as names of Socrates, they thereby have the same *res significata*. The problem is less acute, of course, when we consider the thing as the recipient of several synonyms. Thus, if I call my coat clothing, apparel and, less likely, vestment, I am naming the same thing and the various names have the same meaning. When we speak of the *res significata*, do we mean the thing named or the meaning of the name? What has already been said about signification indicates that the *res significata* in the first sense is the meaning or concept. Does this suggest that Cajetan's identification of the *ratio propria nominis* and the *res significata* is well-founded?

The *res significata* is distinguished from the *modus significandi*; the two together make up the *ratio nominis*. What a name signifies must be distinguished first of all from its etymology. The latter is often what is meant by the phrase, *id a quo nomen imponitur*, and St Thomas' standard example is *lapis*, whose etymology he takes to be *laedens pedem*. That is, the stone is denominated from the fact that we can trip over it, but what we are naming is not a menace to pedestrians, since we can trip on many things which are not called stones. Thus, the etymology is a description, a citing of various accidents, which enable us to indicate what we want to name. The etymology of *breakfast* is not what is named—we may break our fast with lunch or before breakfast. When the etymology is called the *id a quo nomen imponitur*, the meaning is said to be *id ad quod nomen imponitur ad significandum*. At other times, the phrase *id a quo nomen imponitur* refers not to the etymology of the term but rather to the denominating form. Whatever the etymology of *sanum*, its *id a quo* in the sense of what it principally signifies is *sanitas*. The *id a quo*, in the sense of the principal signification of the term, is opposed to *id cui nomen supponitur*; that is, to that for which the name supposes because it falls under the *res significata*. The denominating form is always signified in a given manner, according to a *modus significandi*. *Sanum* and *sanitas* have the same *res significata* but they signify it differently: concretely and abstractly, respectively. The concrete name signifies the form as "that which has health"; the abstract name as "that whereby healthy things are healthy." Every name involves a mode of signifying, a way in which the denominating form is meant. This is of crucial importance for analogous names.[1]

When St Thomas wants to say how univocal, equivocal and analo-

[1] For textual justification of the preceding paragraphs, cf. the work mentioned in note 3, p. 70 above.

gous names are divided, he writes, "Aequivocum enim dividitur secundum res significatas, univocum vero dividitur secundum diversas differentias; sed analogum dividitur secundum diversos modos."[1] When a name is common to many things equivocally, it is imposed to signify from different denominating forms, different *res significatae*. We see here that the *res significata* cannot be that for which the word supposes, since then the univocal term would be equivocal.[2] Since the *res significatae* of the equivocal name differ, there is no need to go into a discussion of the modes of signifying those forms to establish the difference involved in *bark's* meaning part of a tree and a canine noise. The univocal word is divided by differences; that is, by further denominating forms which determine the generic perfection thus revealed as material. When considered as named by the generic name, certain things are named univocally and the word has the same *res significata* as said of each. Specific names, imposed from more determinate forms, divide the generic perfection. The analogous name is one which is predicable of many things thanks to the same denominating form or *res significata*, but the ways that form is signified, the *modi significandi*, vary and give rise to an ordered diversity of signification insofar as the *res significata* signified in one way makes up the *ratio propria* of the term in question: its familiar, usual, normative, focal meaning.

We can do no better than appeal to the familiar example of *healthy* to illustrate these remarks about the analogous name. The denominating form, the *res significata*, of "healthy" in its analogous modes is always the same: health. It is the way health is signified that causes a variation in the meaning of "healthy": what has health, what signifies health, what causes health whether by restoring it when lost or preserving it when had. The *res significata*, then, remains the same while the modes and *rationes* change. But this is not all; the various *rationes* of the common name are said to be related *per prius et posterius* in such fashion that one *ratio*, one way of signifying the denominating form is taken to be regulative and constitutes a focal meaning. This meaning reveals its priority by the fact that it enters into the subsequent *rationes*. The same state of affairs is present in the case of the analogous term, *being*. *Esse* is that from which the word *being* is imposed to signify; it is what *ens*

[1] *I Sent.*, d. 22, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2[m].

[2] "...aequivocatio inducitur ex diversa forma significata per nomen, non autem exdiversitate suppositionis: non enim hoc nomen *homo* aequivoce sumitur ex eo quod quandoques upponit pro Platone, quandoque pro Sorte. Hoc igitur nomen *homo*, et de Christo et de aliis hominibus dictum, semper eandem formam significat, scilicet naturam humanam." — *IV Contra Gentiles*, cap. 49.

principally signifies. But the ways of signifying it vary, the meanings of the common term vary—it is an analogous term.

V. RATIO COMMUNIS AND RATIO PROPRIA[1]

We have suggested that the *ratio propria* of a term comprises the *res significata* and the usual, familar mode of signifying it and that the *ratio propria* is discoverable by looking for that mode of signifying which enters into the other modes of signifying the same *res significata*. But we often find St Thomas speaking of the *ratio* communis of the analogous name. How, we must ask, does such a common notion relate to the proper notion of the same name? Let us approach the problem by getting hold of a distinction of common and proper notions in things named univocally. It seems clear that things are considered to be named univocally with respect to a name signifying a common notion; if that name is generic, not all such things would be considered to be named by a word signifying a subalternate proper notion. That is, some things may be considered to be named univocally by *animal* which would not be named by *man*. We are calling what *animal* signifies a *ratio communis*, what *man* signifies a *ratio propria*. Since the proper notion is not a meaning of the generic term, this distinction between common and proper notions involves different names and not one name.[2] In the case of things named analogously, it is the same name whose *ratio communis* is apparently opposed to its *ratio propria*, and while the name does not change there seems to be suggested an appropriation, a shrinking, as it were, of the common notion.

Let us pose this question with reference to *sanum*. The *ratio propria* would seem to be "subject of the quality, health." Would the *ratio communis* then be, "related in some way to health"? In the case of *ens*, the proper notion is "id cui debet esse in se et non in alio" and the common notion *habens esse* in whatever mode. The common notion is a kind of blank check, almost a propositional function: "existence (x)". Scotus, noticing this, felt that *ens* could be univocally common to substance and accidents but the great difficulty with that suggestion is that it fails to take into account that we want the mode of signification

[1] Cf. "The *ratio communis* of the Analogous Name," *Laval théologique et philosophique*, vol. XVIII, no. 1 (1962), pp. 9-34 and *Supra*, Chap. 1.

[2] But what are we to make of those not infrequent cases where the same word is used as genus and to signify one of the species of that genus, e.g. "animal" as generic name but also used as the name of a species of animal? Since in the two cases "animal" is imposed from different *res significatae*, this is a case of equivocation.

to vary as we predicate the term. What permits us to speak of the *ratio communis* of the analogous name is the *res significata*; what prevents this common notion from giving rise to univocation is the fact that the things denominated from the form are not denominated in the same way; they are unequal with respect to what the name principally signified.[1] As predicated, the analogous term must always involve some mode of signifying as well as the denominating form and, unless otherwise specified, this will constitute the *ratio propria*. The proper notion, again, will relate to the common notion as what states the usual or more obvious mode of the form in question. For this reason, Aristotle and St Thomas hold that he who would study being as being must, since *being* is analogous, chiefly concern himself with the principal mode of being, substance.

VI. PROPRIE, COMMUNITER, METAPHORICE

Earlier we saw St Thomas making apparently conflicting remarks about metaphor. On the one hand, he speaks of the way in which the metaphorical use of a term involves reference to its proper meaning; on the other hand he contrasts metaphorical or equivocal modes to analogical community by saying that the latter and not the former involves reference to the proper meaning. We are now in a position to say quite formally what the reference to the proper notion entails: it is a reference on the part of something named by a given word to the most familiar mode of signifying the denominating form of the word. The question now arises: is this or is this not a difference between metaphor and analogy or, if you prefer, between the proper and improper use of a term? Consider the following remark: "...per prius dicitur nomen de illo in quo salvatur tota ratio nominis perfecte, quam de illo in quo salvatur secundum quid: de hoc enim dicitur quasi per similitudinem ad id in quo perfecte salvatur, quia omnia imperfecta sumuntur a perfectis."[1] St Thomas seems clearly to be speaking of metaphor here.

[1] "Sed dicendum est quod unum dividentium aliquod commune potest esse prius altero dupliciter: uno modo, secundum proprias rationes, aut naturas dividentium; alio modo, secundum participationem rationis illius communis quod in ea dividitur. Primum autem non tollit univocationem generis, ut manifestum est in numeris, in quibus binarius secundum propriam rationem naturaliter est prior ternario; sed tamen aequaliter participant rationem generis sui, scilicet numeri: ita tamen est ternarius multitudo mensurata per unum, sicut et binarius. Sed secundum impedit univocationem generis. Et propter hoc *ens* non potest esse genus substantiae et accidentis: quia in ipsa ratione *entis*, substantia, quae est ens per se, prioritatem habet respectu accidentis, quod est ens per aliud et in alio." — *In I Periherm.*, lect. 8, n. 6.

[2] *Ia*, q. 33, a. 3, c.

"Et inde est quod hoc nomen *leo* per prius dicitur de animali in quo tota ratio leonis salvatur, quod proprie dicitur leo, quam de aliquo homine in quo invenitur aliquid de ratione leonis, ut puta audacia vel fortitudo..."[1] We have already cited *Q.D. de ver.*, q. 7, a. 2, c., where St Thomas said that metaphor is based on a similarity "in illo quod est de propria ratione eius cuius nomen transfertur."

That metaphorical usage involves such a reference to the *ratio propria*, one which is part and parcel of what he means by analogical signification, also seems implied by the adverbial scale Aquinas often employs in speaking of the range of the analogical term. This scale sometimes goes, *propriissime, proprie, communiter;* sometimes, *proprie, minus proprie, minime proprie.*[2] At least once, when he is speaking in this second fashion. St Thomas suggests that metaphor is simply a trailing off into impropriety because of the remoteness of its reference to the *ratio propria* of the word. "Nam tripliciter invenitur motus in operationibus animae. In quibusdam enim invenitur motus proprie, in quibusdam minus proprie, in quibusdam vero minime proprie."[3] And then this rather startling remark: "Minimum autem de proprietate motus, *et nihil nisi metaphorice*, invenitur in intellectu."[4] The thing named metaphorically, we want to say, is not named or denominated from the *res significata* of the name in question although it is referred to what is denominated from it: the thing which is spoken of metaphorically is not named properly because it does not fall under the range of the principal signification of the term in question. We shall have to return to this, of course, but first we will examine a case where, from different points of view, we can say either that a thing is being spoken of metaphorically (*improprie*) or analogically (*proprie*).

St Thomas asks if light is found properly in spiritual things, but before replying invites us to consider that a name may be taken either according to its first imposition or according to subsequent usage. For example, "to see" is imposed to signify the activity of one external sense, but we also speak of the activities of the other senses, as seeing, e.g. "See how warm this is" and "See how it tastes." Indeed, we speak of seeing in the case of intellectual activity itself: Blessed are the pure of heart, for they shall see God. So it is with "light."

Nam primo quidem est institutum ad significandum id quod facit manifestationem in sensu visus; postmodum autem extensum est ad significandum omne illud quod

[1] *Ibid.*
[2] Cf. e.g., I^a-II^{ae}, q. 22, a. 1, c.; *Q.D. de virtutibus in communi*, a. 7.
[3] *In I de anima*, lect. 10, n. 157.
[4] *Ibid.*, n. 160.

facit manifestationem secundum quamcumque cognitionem. Si ergo accipiatur nomen luminis secundum primam impositionem, metaphorice in spiritualibus dicitur, ut Ambrosius dicit. Si autem accipiatur secundum quod est in usu loquentium ad omnem manifestationem extensum, sic proprie in spiritualibus dicitur.[1]

With respect to the *usus loquentium* invoked here, we must distinguish the mere use of a word—surely metaphor is a use of a word—from usage which suggests regularity and convention and thus results in the extension of the very meaning of the word.[2] Without such an extension of meaning, St Thomas is saying, the use would be metaphorical. He elaborates this in a parallel text where he begins by distinguishing metaphor and analogy. Ambrose and Denis maintain that "light" is used only metaphorically of spiritual things and this seems true "because nothing per se sensible belongs to spiritual things except *metaphorically*, for though something can be *analogically* common to spiritual and corporeal things, something per se sensible cannot." Thus "light" is said of spiritual things "either equivocally or metaphorically." It is interesting to read how St Thomas expresses the common ground between Ambrose and Denis, on the one hand, and, on the other, Augustine who held that light is found properly in spiritual things.

Sciendum tamen quod transferuntur corporalia in spiritualia per quamdam similitudinem, quae quidem est similitudo proportionabilitatis; et hanc similitudinem oportet reducere in aliquam communitatem univocationis vel analogiae; et sic est in proposito: dicitur enim lux in spiritualibus illud quod ita se habet ad manifestationem intellectivam sicut se habet lux corporales ad manifestationem sensitivam. Manifestatio autem verius est in spiritualibus; et quantum ad hoc, verum est dictum Augustini... quod lux verius est in spiritualibus quam in corporalibus, *non secundum propriam rationem lucis*, sed secundum rationem manifestationis.[3]

If *lux* has only a *ratio propria*, it is used metaphorically of whatever does not verify that notion. However, if we attend to the *res significata*, the denominating form, manifestation, it is possible to form a *ratio communis*: "whatever causes manifestation" and any mode of manifestation can then be named properly by the term *lux*. In order to grasp these extended meanings, we must have recourse to the proper notion, but these extended meanings, are other denominations from the *res significata*. This is the *similitudo analogiae* which is distinguished from the *similitudo proportionabilitatis*.[4] We are now on the threshold of discovering the peculiar way in which metaphor involves a reference to

[1] *I*^{a}, q. 67, a. 1. On why sight of all the senses should be so extended, see *In I Metaphys.*, lect. 1, nn. 5-8.

[2] Cf. *I*^{a}, q. 29, a. 4, in fine corps., for a distinction between use and meaning.

[3] *II Sent.*, d. 13, q. 1, a. 2; cf. *In Ioannem*, cap. 1, lect. 3, n. 96.

[4] Cf. *II Sent.*, d. 16, q. 1, a. 2, ad 5m; Bernard Montagnes, O.P., *La doctrine de l'analogie de l'être d'après saint Thomas d'Aquin*, Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1963, p. 75, n. 21.

the *ratio propria*, a way which does not amount to a different mode of signifying the same *rem significatam*. Notice how St Thomas expresses himself in the following text. "Ea quae proprie de ipso (i.e. de Deo) dicuntur, vere in eo sunt; sed ea quae metaphorice dicuntur de eo per similitudinem proportionabilitatis ad effectum aliquem, sicut ignis Deuter. IV, eo quod sicut ignis se habet ad consumptionem contrarii, ita Deus ad consumendum nequitiam."[1] Here there is no similarity of nature, or in that from which the name is imposed to signify; rather, the thing named metaphorically has a property or effect similar to an effect or property of that which the term properly signifies. As fire consumes fuel, God consumes evil; as the lion acts boldly, so too does Socrates. Obviously no metaphor would be involved in saying "Socrates is bold." Only "Socrates is a lion" is taken to be metaphorical. Thus, on the basis of "lion: bold: Socrates: bold," it is the transfer of "lion" which constitutes the metaphor and the word is not so transferred because of a new mode of signifying the *res significata*—which is why what is named metaphorically, cannot be properly supposed for by the name in question. It may be, of course, that the effect is a sufficient sign of leonine nature,[1] but it is not the *id a quo* in the sense of the *res significata* of *lion*.

VII. CONCLUDING SUMMARY

By way of summary we want to state (1) how metaphor is opposed to analogy; (2) how analogy is a kind of metaphor, and (3) how metaphor is a kind of analogy. As we have just seen, metaphor consists of the application of the name of one thing to another. Consequently, the metaphorical use of a term entails a reference to the proper meaning of that term. If we are going to speak of an explanation as casting light on a subject, what we are saying depends for its intelligibility on our auditor's knowing what light is, e.g. the sun, a desk lamp. It is that meaning which enables us to say that something like light is operative in intellection because it has an effect similar to light in the proper sense. In its metaphorical use, it is not the denominating form of "light" which comes into play, but an effect of what is denominated from that form. The analogous name, as opposed to metaphorical

[1] *I Sent.*, d. 45, q. 1, a. 4, c. Cf. M. T.-L. Penido, *Le rôle de l'analogie en théologie dogmatique*, Paris: Vrin, 1931, pp. 98-108.

[2] "...effectus qui est signum alicuius secundum proprietatem in uno est signum eiusdem secundum similitudinem in altero, in omnibus quae metaphorice dicuntur." — *I Sent.*, d. 45, q. 1, a. 4, ad 2m.

usage, involves a new way of signifying the *res significata*, a new way in which something is denominated from that form. As analogous it is denominated from that form, not *per prius*, but with reference to what is first of all denominated from it and to which appeal will be made to explain this new meaning. Thus, in analogical signification, while the same *res significata* is involved, there are various modes of signifying it, one of which will be primary, more familiar and proper. Thus, the rule that, in things named analogically, *ratio propria non invenitur nisi in uno* is universal; it is as true of the divine names and *being* as it is of *healthy*. In analogy, but not in metaphorical usage, there is an extension in the meaning of the word, the formation of another *ratio* of the name. This new *ratio*, like the *ratio propria*, will contain the *res significata*, but the mode will vary. It is just the judgment that the *res significata* permits of various *modi significandi* which explains Augustine's position on the propriety of using "light" to speak of spiritual things. Thanks to the recognition of the new way of signifying the denominating form, they are seen to fall under the distribution of the term. Metaphorical usage does not involve a new way of signifying the same form, a proportion to the *res significata* by way of the *ratio propria*; rather, the metaphor refers the thing so named to what is properly named by the term in question because of a similarity of effects or properties. What is named metaphorically is not denominated by the form of the name in question in a manner which, *secundum ordinem nominis*, involves reference to the mode involved in the *ratio propria* of the name. In this fashion, we can distinguish quite properly the metaphor from the analogous name and there is not the slightest need to introduce the notions of intrinsic and extrinsic denomination in the way Cajetan would.

Despite this formal distinction of metaphor and analogy, we can speak of analogy as a kind of metaphor. To do so, we must of course back off from the restricted meaning of metaphorical usage given in the preceding paragraph and go rather to the etymology, μεταφερειν, to transfer. Both metaphor in the narrow sense and the analogical extension of the meaning of a word involve a transfer of the word from a more usual and familiar context. This would seem to explain the passage we cited above concerned with the extension of "nature" to any essence whatever, where the extension in question seems to involve a new way of signifying the denominating form and yet is said to take place by way of metaphor. It could also be argued that the recognition of the analogical extension of the meaning of a term implies that the term had first of all been used metaphorically (in the

narrow sense). Reflection on the metaphor could suggest that not only a similarity of effects is present, but a new way of being denominated from the form of the word. Thus metaphor in the narrow sense could be said to give way to analogy, but the analogy then recognized could still be called a metaphor in the sense of a transfer of the name from what saves its *ratio propria* to what saves the *res significata* in a different mode. Aristotle and St Thomas, who maintain that sensible things are the connatural objects of our intellect and that whereby we come to know whatever else we know, see an unavoidable fittingness in our employment of the names we impose to signify material things to signify any other entities we come to know. As our knowledge of other entities is dependent on our knowledge of sensible things, so the process of naming will reflect the progress of our knowledge and we will have no choice but to extend or transfer the names of material things to immaterial things.

Can we say that metaphorical usage is a kind of analogy? There is certainly no doubt that metaphorical usage is often based on a proportional similitude. We pointed out earlier that, in the *Poetics*, Aristotle mentions one kind of metaphor which is based on an analogy; St Thomas seems always to link metaphor with such proportional similitude. When speaking of metaphors applied to God, this is surely the only species of metaphor we can employ since the three other kinds are based on genus/species relations. It goes without saying that such proportional similarity is not what is meant by the analogous name. If the cup is to Dionysus what the shield is to Ares, we have a proportional similarity and there is of course as yet no question either of metaphor or of an analogous name. It is when the cup of Dionysus is spoken of as his shield, on the basis of the proportional similarity, that the matter of metaphor arises. If, with reference to its ground, such a metaphor is called analogical, well, we can see quite clearly what is and what is not meant.

We may add here, by way of an aside, that when an analogical extension of the meaning of a common term is based on such a proportional similarity, there is a pile-up of meanings of "analogy." That is we could say that the analogy (i.e. analogous name) is founded on an analogy (i.e. proportional similarity). It would be confusion confounded to equate the analogical name with analogy in the sense of proportional similarity, since the latter is not iself an analogous name—it may found metaphorical usage, analogical extension of the meaning of a common name, or neither.

There is another way in which the metaphor may be called an analogy, this time in the sense of an analogous name. In the adverbial scale we spoke of earlier, we saw St Thomas recognize a gradation in the manner of signifying the *res significata* of the common name which ranged from *propriissime* through *proprie* and *communiter*. *Communiter* and *minime proprie* seem sometimes to be equated with *metaphorice* by St Thomas and the suggestion is given that metaphor differs from analogical extension of meaning in degree rather than in kind. There are several possible reasons for this suggestion. One is that such a distance has been traversed from the *ratio propria* that reference to it is almost lost and the word may seem to be used equivocally. Another reason would be that there is involved in metaphorical usage a reference to the *ratio propria*, although this is quite different from that involved in the extension *proprie* of the name.

While we feel that we have arrived at a formal difference between the metaphorical use of a term and its analogical extension as well as reasons for calling analogous terms metaphors and vice versa, we would like to end by stressing the exploratory nature of our effort with respect to the total position of St Thomas. There is much important work to be done if we are to grasp the scope and subtelty of St Thomas' doctrine on language. To mention a few points of interest: the phrase *locutio figurativa* is broader than *locutio metaphorica*;[1] moreover, in speaking of the formula for consecration of the wine in the Mass, St Thomas dwells on the metonymic and metaphorical import of the sentence. Needless to say, if our essay is tentative with respect to Thomas, it is quite inadequate with respect to current discussions. Of these, the contributions of C. S. Lewis and Owen Barfield are of particular importance.[2] Perhaps our effort will help to renew interest in the older treatments of metaphor so that a fruitful encounter with contemporary views will be possible.

[1] Cf. *In Ephes.*, cap. 1, lect. 8; *IV Sent.*, d. 8, q. 2, a. 2, quest. 2.

[2] C. S. Lewis, "Bluspels and Flalansferes," in *Rehabilitations and Other Essays*, London: Oxford University Press, 1939; Owen Barfield, "The Meaning of the Word *Literal*," in *Metaphor and Symbol*, edited by L. C. Knights and Basil Cottle, Butterworths Scientific Publications, London, 1960, pp. 48-63.

CHAPTER III

METAPHOR AND FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY

I propose to discuss the applicability of the notion of metaphor to the way in which philosophy and its language are said to emerge from mythico-religious-poetic thought. "Fundamental ontology" is borrowed from Heidegger, but I am afraid I leave with him the meaning and importance he attributes (or attributed) to it. When I use the phrase, I have in mind nothing more exciting than the historical background out of which philosophy apparently came and much of my concern here could be summed up in the question, "Are dead metaphors the living language of philosophy?" My general guide in the discussion that follows is Aristotle. I shall rely on him for indications of the origins of philosophy and it is with his conception of metaphor that I will be dealing. Later on, certain positions of Owen Barfield will be considered at some little length. It will end by asking whether Aristotle and Barfield are at odds.

In a well known passage of his *Metaphysics*, Aristotle says that wonder lies at the base both of myth and philosophy. Echoing the *Theaetetus*, he writes, "For it is owing to their wonder that men both now begin and at first began to philosophize; they wondered originally at the obvious difficulties, then advanced little by little and stated difficulties about the greater matters, e.g. about the phenomena of the sun and stars and moon, and about the genesis of the universe. And a man who is puzzled and wonders thinks himself ignorant (whence even the lover of myth is in a sense a lover of wisdom, for the myth is composed of wonders)..."[1] Wonder leads to philosophy insofar as it expresses itself in a problem or aporia which is resolved apodictically or, following the Oxford version, in "the language of proof." The philosopher is thereby opposed to mythical theologians like Hesiod. The latter, in attempting to explain the difference between the immortals and mortals says that the former are such due to a diet of nectar and ambrosia. "But into the subtelties of the mythologists it is not worth our while to inquire seriously; those, however, who use the language of proof we must cross-examine and

[1] A,2, 982 b 11 ff.

ask why, after all, things which consist of the same element are, some of them, eternal in nature, while others perish."[1]

Since Schelling[2] it is customary to classify views on myth under three headings: (1) myths are first steps toward a scientific explanation; (2) myths are deliberate allegories and must be interpreted to get at their literal truth, and (3) myths have their own truth which is irreducible to that of science. It is the first attitude which is exhibited in the passage last quoted; it would not be far-fetched to say that what Aristotle objects to in mythical thinking is that it is not literal. This can be gathered, it would seem, at least plausibly, from his criticisms of Plato. For example, he writes, "But, further, all other things cannot come from the Forms in any of the usual senses of 'from.' And to say that they are patterns and the other things share in them is to use empty words and poetical metaphors."[3] To put a literal interpretation on such statements gets one no place, Aristotle seems to suggest, and thus indirectly suggests that philosophy demands literal language.

If Aristotle sometimes treats myth as not yet attaining the austere standards of philosophical language, he also adopts the view that myths are allegories. "Our forefathers in the most remote ages have handed down to their posterity a tradition, in the form of a myth, that these bodies are gods and that the divine encloses the whole of nature. The rest of the tradition has been added later in mythical form with a view to the persuasion of the multitude and to its legal and utilitarian expediency; they say these gods are in the form of men or like some of the other animals, and they say other things consequent on and similar to these which we have mentioned. But if one were to separate the first part from these additions and take it alone—that they thought the first substances to be gods, one must regard it as an inspired utterance, and reflect that, while probably each art and science has often been developed as far as possible, and has again perished, these opinions, with others, have been preserved until the present like relics of the ancient treasure. Only thus far, then, is the opinion of our ancestors and of our earliest precessors clear to us."[4] On the assumption that the world is eternal,[5] Aristotle further assumes that intellectual progress is cyclic, with each science being gained and lost many times; in the barren periods between golden ages all that is left are the fables and myths the

[1] B,4, 1000 a 18-20.
[2] *Introduction à la philosopie de la mythologie*, (trad. S. Jankélévitch) 2 vols. Aubier: Paris, 1945
[3] *Metaphysics*, A,9, 991 a 20 ff.; 997 b 5-12.
[4] Lambda, 8, 1074 a 38-b14.
[5] Cf. *Topics*, I, 11, 104 b 8.

philosophers have concocted to proportion difficult but important matters to plain minds.[1] Myths, then, are seen on an analogy with exoteric writings and they have the value of allegory. That is, symbolic discourse conceals literal truths which can be disengaged. The interesting thing here being that the symbols and metaphors are considered to have been consciously constructed. One recalls Aristotles' belief that the study of philosophy makes the construction of fables easy.[2]

When Aristotle approaches mythical accounts as allegories, he assumes that there are literal meanings lurking about; whether this is compatible with his view that mythological discourse is just bad explanation need not concern us. As to Schellings's third possibility, that myth has an irreducible truth of its own, some approximation to this is to be found in Aristotle's *Poetics*.

Were one to consult Bonitz, he would find that most of the entries under *mythos* or its variants refer to the *Poetics*. It is there of course that *mythos* takes on the meaning of plot. Scholars assure us that this is a new meaning of the term and that Aristotle may be partly responsible for it.[3] *Mythos*, in the *Poetics*, is the structure of events (*συστασις τῶν πραγμάτων*) in the tragic imitation. It is the soul and perfection of the tragedy, its formality. We might say that the plot is the logic of events, since at 1460a27-8, *logos* is used as a synonym of *mythos*. It is the principle of intelligibility of the events depicted on the stage, thanks to which they have a beginning, a middle and an end.

This can of course be quite misleading. The *mythos* of the tragedy is not an appeal to reason alone nor directly; it is what it is because of what is done, what happens, as much as by what is said. The speeches and the diction proper to them are but elements of the tragedy. While talk is a kind of mimesis, the characteristic note of drama is that actions are imitated: the *mythos* is said to be an imitation of *praxis*.[4]

Besides this new meaning of *mythos*, there is another and more familiar sense of the term operative in the *Poetics*. Thus, Aristotle will say that the tragedian takes the old *mythoi* and imposes a *mythos* on them. These old *mythoi* are taken to be the traditional stories and tales and we can understand Aristotle to be suggesting that these tales need only be adapted

[1] Cf. *Metaphysics*, 995 a 3-6; *De coelo*, 270 b 5-9; 248 a 2-13 and b3; *Meteor.*, 339 b 19-30. Plato, *Cratylus*, 397C; *Philebus*, 16C. So too the Fathers of the Church held that revealed mysteries should be veiled lest unbelievers ridicule them.

[2] *Rhetoric*, II, 20.

[3] Cf. Gerald Else, *Aristotle's Poetics*, pp. 242 ff.

[4] *Poetics*, 1450 a 3-4.

for the stage. What was narrative becomes dramatic. While this is true, it is well to recall that tragedy has its ultimate origins in the *Molpe*, which included a mimesis, a dramatic imitation, as well as the telling of a tale.[1] That is, the *Molpe* can be considered as a ritualistic song-and-dance performance. I mention this to indicate the way in which *mythos* in the *Poetics* as the structure of the actions with speeches subservient to deeds has its counterpart in earlier and less conscious myths. As to the irreducible truth of myth, at least in the limited sense myth has in the *Poetics*, Aristotle argues that we should not demand of tragedy (and indeed of poetry in general) a truth like that of science.[2]

We have said this much about the *Poetics* in order that our appeal to what is there said about poetic diction and metaphor will be seen somewhat in context. Insofar as the *mythos* of the tragedy reflects in a sophisticated way primitive rituals, poetic language is but one element of it. Thus, even in his extended use of *mythos*, metaphor will not be coterminous with *mythos* for Aristotle.

Here is Aristotle's definition of tragedy: "the imitation of an action that is serious and also, as having magnitude, complete in itself; in language with pleasurable accessories, each kind brought in separately in the parts of the work; in a dramatic, not in a narrative form; with incidents arousing pity and fear, wherewith to accomplish its catharsis of such emotions."[3] This definition must be recalled so that the embellishments of language, poetic diction, will be seen to be only one element of the mimesis. When we turn to Aristotle's remarks on poetic diction, we find him emphasizing metaphor. "But the greatest thing by far is to have a command of metaphor. This alone cannot be imparted by another; it is the mark of genius, for to make good metaphors implies an eye for resemblances."[4] What is metaphor?

Metaphor falls within a group distinguished from familiar words and usage. The description of it is enigmatically brief. "By a current word (*kurion*), I mean one which is in general use among a people."[5] "Metaphor," on the other hand, "is the application of an alien name by transference."[6] To use the name of Y when speaking of X is metaphorical. Four species of metaphor are distinguished according as the

[1] Cf. Gilbert Murray, *The Classical Tradition in Poetry*.
[2] *Poetics*, chap. 25.
[3] 1449 b 24-8.
[4] 1459 a 5-9.
[5] 1457 b 3-4.
[6] 1457 b 7-8.

name of a species is transferred to its genus, or that of a genus to its species, or that of one species of a genus to another species of the same genus. Finally, a metaphor can be based on analogy. Thus, as night is to day so death is to life. By transference, we are admonished not to go gentle into that good night and night is called the death of day. Sometimes such reciprocal transference is impossible because one of the terms has no name of its own. Still, transference in one direction is possible and then metaphor insures, as the ancients said, that everything will have a name. "Further, metaphors must not be far-fetched, but we must give names to things that have none by deriving the metaphor from what is akin and of the same kind, so that, as soon as it is uttered, it is clearly seen to be akin."[1]

Of course Aristotle cannot give rules for the construction of metaphors; the ability is inborn, a matter of genius. The fittingness of a metaphor rests not just on kinship but on the way it "puts the matter before the eyes." In the third book of the *Rhetoric* this phrase is used again and again before Aristotle, in chapter eleven, attempts to say what he means by it. In order to put the matter before the eyes, the metaphor must signify actuality (*energeia*). "And, as Homer often, by making use of metaphor, speaks of inanimate things as if they were animate" it is by speaking of things as if they were alive or capable of motion that acutality is achieved: Homer "gives movement and life to all, and acutality is movement."

A word used metaphorically is not taken in its usual sense, its literal sense. Metaphor implies, consequently, a fund of words with literal meanings; when the poet sees something like what X literally names and calls that something an X or something usually associated with X, he is creating a metaphor.

Aristotle's theory of metaphor is plausible enough when it is a question of poetic diction. We have brought it up to ask a further question: is metaphor of any use in discerning the rise of philosophical vocabulary? That is, can we accept without quibble the following views? "Every word which is used to express a moral or intellectual fact, if traced to its root, is found to be borrowed from material appearance. *Right* means *straight*; *wrong* means *twisted. Spirit* primarily means *wind*; *transgression*, the *crossing of a line*; *supercilious*, the *raising of the eyebrows.* We may say the *heart* to express emotion; the *head* to denote thought, and *thought* and *emotion* are words borrowed from sensible things, and now appropriated to spiritual nature. Most of the process by which this

[1] *Rhetoric*, III, 2.

transformation is made is hidden from us in the remote time when language was formed." Again: "Throughout the whole field of language, parallel to the line of what may be termed the material language, and expressed by the same words, runs a line of what be termed the immaterial language. Not that to every word that has a material import there belongs also an immaterial one; but that to every word that has an immaterial import, there belongs, or at least did belong, a material one." Both of these remarks are quoted by Owen Barfield in an article to be mentioned shortly; the first is from Emerson, the second from Jeremy Bentham. While it is quite easy to accept this as an explanation of some extended uses, it is not easy to accept as historically accurate the picture this invokes of primitive man. Barfield, perhaps better than anyone else, has pointed out the difficulties which await one who holds that philosophical vocabulary in its entirety arose in this way. For his views, we might make use of his *Poetic Diction*, first published in 1927 and reissued with a new preface in 1951. I prefer the more concise statement to be found in his essay, "The Meaning of the Word *Literal*."[1]

Barfield takes over from I. A. Richards the distinction between vehicle and tenor. In the metaphor, the vehicle is the literal meaning, the tenor is the metaphorical meaning or reference. With respect to the metaphor so viewed, Barfield suggests that there are two schools of thought. A first would maintain that the tenor can be separated from the vehicle and named literally. If the tenor could not be expressed literally, it is maintained, it could not be called a meaning at all. (Susanne Langer is given as representative of this school.) A second school holds that the tenor of a meaningful metaphor cannot always be expressed literally. "However, it may be with codes and allegories, there are also 'creative' or 'seminal,' or anyway some sort of metaphors and symbols, whose tenor cannot be communicated in any other way than through the symbol, and yet whose tenor is not purely emotive."[2]

Turning to the view expressed in the passages from Emerson and Bentham, Barfield suggests that according to it all nouns which today have an immaterial import and no other, e.g. 'transgression,' 'supercilious,' 'emotion,' etc. have a history comprising four stages.

1. A first stage, in which they have an exclusively literal meaning and referred to a material object.
2. A second stage, where they have taken on concomitant meanings,

[1] In *Metaphor and Symbol*, edited by L. C. Knights and Basil Cottle, Butterworths Scientific Publications, London, 1960, pp. 48-63.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 49.

have become vehicles with a tenor but with the vehicular meanings still predominant.

3. A third stage, where the tenorial meaning predominates.
4. A fourth and final stage where the vehicle drops out of consciousness and they become once more exclusively literal.

Barfield distinguishes the first from the fourth stage by calling the former the "born" literal and the latter the "achieved" literal. It is the achieved literal that he first questions. What does a literal word of immaterial import mean? The Positivist might reply that it means nothing, that it names a fictitious entity. The four-staged history suggests that our language is a repository of dead metaphors and that, until we get back to the born literal, we cannot know what we mean or cannot mean anything at all. "Now I believe," Barfield writes, "it will be found that our whole way of thinking about the achieved literal is based on a tacitly assumed analogy with the born literal. We assume that it is not the natural, simple nature of a noun to be a vehicle with a tenor, because nouns did not begin that way. They began life as plain labels for plain objects and that is their true nature. It was only later, as a result of the operation of human fancy in metaphor-making, that they came to be used for a time as vehicles with a tenor; and when that stage is over and they have once more achieved literalness, we feel that they have reverted to their pristine innocence and become once more labels for objects, even if we are firmly convinced that the new objects do not exist. Better a fictitious entity than none at all—for a name to be the name of."[1] What Barfield is really after, it emerges, is the notion of the born literal.

The concept of born literalness entails that all words of immaterial import began life with an exclusively material reference. Barfield attempts to show that neither of the schools he mentioned earlier can accept this. The first school, which holds that the tenor is detachable and nameable literally, will be hard pressed to explain the origin of the names it then proposes to attach to the detached tenor of immaterial import. As for the second school, Barfield's argument consists of little more than a statement of his conviction that history provides us with no warrant for assuming that words begin life as literal labels for physical things. That primitive man (a concept Barfield elsewhere describes as "that luckless dustbin of pseudo-scientific theories") possessed a language the words of which had only literal meanings thanks to which

[1] P. 53.

they referred to material things, does not seem to be able to account for the fittingness with which such supposed literal labels are then used metaphorically. Barfield suggests that such terms were never semantically aloof from the immaterial import they now have. "If there was no prior, no 'given' affinity between the concept of 'wind' and the other immaterial concept of 'spirit,' the latter concept must have been framed without the aid of any symbol. It must moreover, as tenor, have been separable from its vehicle when it acquired one. The first of these two consequences is, in my view, epistemologically untenable on several grounds; but it is enough that the second is pointedly inconsistent with just that 'implicational' type of metaphor (i.e. the second school above) which is the only one we are any longer concerned with, since the explicational type (the first school) has already been shown to be incompatible with born literalness. If, on the other hand, there *was* any prior affinity between the concept of *wind* and the other (immaterial) concept, then the word must already, from the moment of its birth, have been a vehicle with a tenor."[1]

What Barfield is getting at is that a more tenable view or the origins of language would have it that *all* literalness is achieved, that words at the outset have neither a purely material nor a purely immaterial import. Perhaps his point would be better expressed by saying that words do not have at the outset a purely material or a purely human reference: it is the inner and outer worlds that he holds were not originally distinguished. On this view, there is no need to decide on the direction of basic metaphors, whether they consisted in naming the world anthropomorphically or man cosmomorphically. If words do not at first distinctly mean the one world or the other, then to distinguish, to take words as having a vehicular reference to man and a tenorial reference to the world, or vice versa, is itself an accomplishment which *constitutes* the literal meaning of the term. To relate Barfield's point to an element in the title of this chapter, the language of primitive man is one which reflects the fact that the subject-object dichotomy has not yet been recognized. When it is recognized, literal meanings become possible. Then, "That which the physiologist takes to be the literal meaning of the word *heart*, for example, is no less achieved than that which the theologian takes to be the literal meaning of the word *spirit*. Whatever else the word 'literal' means, then, it normally means something which is the end-product of a long historical process."[2]

[1] P. 55.
[2] Pp. 55-6.

There is an undeniable attractiveness in Barfield's theory. Prior to philosophy, man's involvement in the world is such that the line between human and physical nature is simply not clearly drawn. There is a continuum of life, a homogeneity of man and the world and this confusion or original unity carries over into language. When the philologist drives words like *nomos* and *moira* and *dike* back to an original agricultural reference, it is not necessary to understand that they then had some exclusively literal meaning. One's lot in life could be at one and the same time the field he tilled and his portion or fate (*moira*). Cornford has argued that such original mythical concepts carry over into Pre-socratic thought and that it is only gradually that words mean physical things in abstraction from their human and religious tenor.[1] He calls our attention to the significance of Thales' apparent identification of water, the besouled and the divine. Thales is not confusing what he knew to be distinct, the argument runs; the distinctions have simply not yet been made. So too when Simplicius, passing on the one fragment of Anaximander, comments on its poetical style, he is assuming as we need not that Anaximander had distinguished moral judgments in human affairs from judgments of cosmic events and is consciously speaking of the latter in terms of the former.

The difficulty with Barfield's view is that he seems to be suggesting that there is at the outset a simultaneous if confused awareness of the immaterial and material. Doesn't this fly in the face of the known history of the difficulty men experienced in achieving the concept of the immaterial? To be able to distinguish soul from wind is not *eo ipso* to hold that the soul is immaterial. Barfield would perhaps reply: if we didn't already know the immaterial how could we come to know it? And, indeed, his underlying theory goes far beyond the scope of the nature of figurative language. "In the first place, although I have been dealing with words, it cannot be said that my conclusions affect words only. If the word on its very first appearance was already a vehicle with a tenor, then the given affinity which I suggested between the concept of wind and the concept of *spirit* must have been 'given' in the nature of things and not by some kind of friction in the machinery of language."[2] That the very process of naming, of using language, involves the mind of man, which is immaterial, though this need not be recognized to name or to use language; that the things we first know, whatever kind of fusion we assert obtains between the inner and the other, between

[1] F. M. Cornford, *From Religion to Philosophy.*
[2] Barfield, *art. cit.*, p. 56.

man and the world, are in the nature of things signs of and stepping stones to the immaterial—this the Aristotelian would concede Barfield. I think this is all his argument requires. Beyond the level of concession, there is much to be learned from Barfield—and from many other contemporary thinkers—on the matter of what man first knows and consequently first talks about. If man is a being-in-the-world, if in his knowledge and language, at their fundamental and original level, there is a kind of mutual implication of thing and self, the ability to use a term to speak with precision of things as opposed to man or of man as opposed to things, is the *constitution* of literal meanings of the sort the Aristotelian notion of metaphor requires. To speak of this as an achievement should not blind us to the fact that to travel too great a distance from the recognition of our fundamental involvement in the world involves risks which, as Heidegger has warned, affect not merely our theories of language but our very being.

CHAPTER IV

"ANALOGY" IS ANALOGOUS

The claim that "analogy" is analogous has sometimes been made in comparing so-called analogy of attribution with so-called analogy of proper proportionality when the meaning of "primary analogate" in these two putative types of analogous name is questioned. The claim, it has always seemed to me, has a rhetorical if not intimidating ring to it. One is being told, presumably, what analogy is and when he seeks clarification about an element of the explanation he is told that it is analogous. Well, of course, one finds the word "dictionary" in the dictionary but if one were sent to the dictionary to look up the word "dictionary" it would be fair to ask if the trip is necessary. Similarly, if one could be expected to understand the claim that "analogy" is analogous, made in the course of an explanation of analogy, one would scarcely be in need of enlightenment in the first place.

Despite such uses of it, I am convinced that the statement "'analogy' is analogous" makes perfectly good sense. What it comes down to saying is that "analogy" has several meanings one of which is privileged and explanatory of the others. Now, as it happens, to say that is to invoke *one* of the meanings "analogy" has—a meaning which is not the first or privileged meaning of the term—in order to explain the relationship between the several meanings of "analogy." That is, the meaning of "analogy" which enables us to make sense of the statement that "'analogy' is analogous" has to do with the relation between many meanings of a common term. However, not every meaning of "analogy" has to do with the meanings of words.

The preceding paragraph is exact, if complicated, but doubtless the reader will be more struck by its complexity than its exactness. In what follows, I shall attempt a circuit which will bring us back to our beginning; during that circuit I shall first say a few things about the paper of Professor Thomas which appears in an appendix and then go on to attempt a succinct statement of what it means for a word to be analogous. That done, we can apply what we have said to the word "analogy."

Professor Thomas' paper could serve, for those who are unacquainted with the literature of analytic philosophy, as an excellent introduction to this style of philosophizing. The precision with which Professor Thomas' paper progresses, its drive for clarity, its unassuming honesty and lack of pretentiousness, will be apparent to every reader. I will try to summarize the major moments of his analysis in my own less lucid way and indicate why he and I appear to be speaking of somewhat different things when we confront the claim that "analogy" is analogous.

Because he wants to separate linguistic from ontological issues, Professor Thomas proposes the following formula for analogy: "the expression 'a' is like the expression 'b' with respect to C (where C is a property signified by 'a' and 'b' in a given context)." He then introduces the notion of complex property by pointing out that *the property of being human* (what "man" signified) can be analysed into *the property of being animal* and *the property of being rational*. With this as background, Professor Thomas soon finds himself in the embarrassing situation of seeming to have to agree that "man" and "horse" are analogous in meaning. The names of the species of a genus agree in signifying the generic property. What occurs to me here, of course, is that we are faced with talk about analogous meaning where no common name is involved. That is, "man" and "horse," being two different names, cannot qualify as examples of analogy if by analogous meaning we are speaking of the different significations of the *same* term. Professor Thomas seems at this point to indicate that he regards his analysis of "man" and "horse" to be an analysis of the customary view that "animal" is predicated univocally of horses and men. But what he began with was something like "*x* is a man" and "*x* is a horse" and not "man is animal" and "horse is animal." If "animal" too signifies a complex property, as it does, *that* complex property has not been analysed by Professor Thomas. In short, I have difficulty right at the outset with the values Professor Thomas will allow for "a" and "b" in his general formula. They are said to be two expressions and not two tokens of the same expression. For the same reason, his definition of "to be univocal" seems to me too commodious for it can embrace what we nowadays call synonymous terms. (Aristotle's *συνώνομα* is, of course, translated by *univocals*.)

In the second major moment of his paper, Professor Thomas considers what happens when we substitute "analogy" for the variables in his formula numbered (3). Before he can do this, however, he has to

consider some first-order terms of which we can say that they are analogous. Here he considers an example where we have tokens of the same expression: healthy$_1$ and healthy$_2$. "On closer scurtiny 'h_1' and 'h_2,' respectively, turn out to be elliptical for '*x* is the cause of health' and '*y* is the sign of health' where *health* in the expanded expressions is being employed in the primary sense (i.e. as predicated of living organisms)." He then enumerates three characteristics of "analogy of attribution" to which he will later refer as ABC. Terms analogous in this sense have meanings of the form "...R..." and the place before the symbol of relation can be filled by a variable whose value is an individual while the place after the symbol of relation can be filled by "a monadic predicate term employed in its primary sense." That third characteristic seems faulty to me for reasons I will give later. On the basis of this similarity of form on the part of meanings of a term said to be analogous, Professor Thomas concludes that "h_1" is like "h_2" because they share the three characteristics enumerated. If now we should introduce "w_1" and "w_2," analysed in the way "h_1" and "h_2" have been. Professor Thomas asks if they share the three characteristics (ABC) în exactly the same way as "h_1" and "h_2" or not. "Since "a_1" (analyzable into 'h_1' and 'h_2') and 'a_2' (analyzable into 'w_1' and 'w_2') share the characteristics ABC both are univocal in that respect. We have worked our way back to a view of analogy of attribution, at least, that is based on univocity, a position which presumably the dictum '*analogy* is analogical' was originally calculated to avoid." But is that the import of the dictum? Surely not, I should say, and Professor Thomas, foreseeing this, continues on a different tack. This time, he will compare "analogy of attribution" and "analogy of proper proportionality" to see if their comparison enables us to avoid univocity in speaking of analogy. His point here turns out to be that analogy of attribution and analogy of proper proportionality have at least one characteristic in common, that this is grounds for univocal community between them and that, finally, this casts doubt on the dictum that "analogy" is analogous. The characteristic they share, however, namely R*xy*, is so general that Professor Thomas notes it would warrant saying that all dyadic relational terms are analogous. After careful and painstaking analysis, Professor Thomas concludes that he has been unable to find a way to avoid appealing to univocity in speaking of analogy and that this must cause doubts about the claim that "analogy" is analogous.

Despite the misgivings I have indicated, I found Professor Thomas' paper a joy to read. Any student of analogy will recognize the problems

raised by Professor Thomas as inevitable. I want now to address myself to one of his final remarks. "It would appear that we need something sufficiently like analogy to warrant saying '*analogy* is analogous' rather than '*analogy* is univocal' or '*analogy* is equivocal' but not so like it as to blur the distinction between the *commune analogicum* and the *genus univocum*." I hope my approach to it will not seem needlessly oblique.

The immediate signification of a word is called its *ratio* and it must always be something complex.[1] Professor Thomas introduced the notion of complex property which, in the example he used, analyses into a genus and specific difference. I prefer to speak of the complexity of what the word signifies in terms of *res significata* and *modus significandi*; perhaps Professor Thomas could express this in the following way. Any term signifies a property in a certain fashion or manner. Thus, we might say that "man" and "humanity" signify the same property but in different ways, concretely and abstractly, respectively. Other examples would be "healthy" and "health." If Professor Thomas will accept this, I can go on to give definitions of univocal, equivocal, synonymous and analogous terms. (1) Two tokens of the same term are univocal if they signify the same property in the same way in the uses which interest us. Alternatively, we could say that two things are univocal if two tokens of the same term are predicated of them and the tokens signify the same property in the same way. (2) Two tokens of the same term are equivocal if they signify different properties in the uses which interest us. Or, things are named equivocally when tokens of the same term are predicated of them and the tokens signify different properties. (3) Tokens of different terms are synonymous if, though they are tokens of different terms, they signify the same property in the same way in the uses which interest us. Or, something is named synonymously if tokens of different terms are predicated of it and the different terms signify the same property in the same way. (4) Tokens of the same term are analogous if they signify the same property but in different ways and one way of signifying the property is primary and privileged because it enters into our explication of the other ways of signifying the same property, in the uses which interest us. St Thomas sums up what we have been attempting in these definitions by saying that univocal things are divided by differences, equivocal things by *res significatae* and analogous things by *modi significandi*.[2]

[1] Cf. *In VII Metaphysic.*, lect. 9, n. 1460: "Dicit ergo *primo* quod omnis 'definitio est quaedam ratio,' idest quaedam compositio nominum per rationem ordinata..." — *Ibid.*, lect. 15, n. 1614: "Necessarium esse omnem definitivam rationem esse ex pluribus nominibus."

[2] "Ad secundum dicendum quod aliter dividitur aequivocum, analogum et univocum.

What the foregoing implies, of course, is that the analogous term, being a term, has certain characteristics in common with any term whatsoever. Thus, any word within an appropriate range signifies a *ratio* which can be analysed into *res* and *modus*. Univocity, equivocity and analogy come in when we consider the word as predicable of several things. If someone could manage to discuss analogical signification without any reference to univocity or equivocity, he might come up with the *res/modus* analysis as something peculiar to and constitutive of analogy as such. Then, when he came to see that these are involved in univocal and equivocal predication as well, he would be in a position similar to that of Professor Thomas when he reached the point of extracting R*xy* from his analyses of analogy.

Let me now make a hysteron proteron move. Professor Thomas, in his paper, noticed that the meanings of the names of species of the same genus have a common element and restated that to read: species$_1$ is like species$_2$ with respect to that common element. On that basis, he briefly entertained the possibility that "man" and "horse" might be said to be analogous but dropped it in deference to the traditional view that "animal" is univocally and not analogously predicated of its species. My point earlier was that the remark about "animal" is not what militates against speaking of "man" and "horse" as analogous. Rather it is the absence of two tokens of the same term. But let us take what is indeed a term common to man and horse, namely, "animal." This term signifies a *ratio* which is generic to man and horse and the community involved causes us to say that "animal" in this situation is a univocal term. Now, according to our definition of univocal terms, this means that "animal" as predicated of man and horse signifies the same property in the same way. Despite the univocity of the generic term, there has been continued discussion of the so-called "analogy of genus" which answers to Cajetan's analogy of inequality and to the *analogia secundum esse sed non secundum intentionem* of a famous text of St Thomas.[1] How can the generic notion be equally shared by species which are unequal with respect to animality itself? The question is only posed now; I raise it to show that Professor Thomas' difficulty is not a private one.

Like most of us Professor Thomas finds "healthy" a convenient example when speaking of analogy. Personally, I do not share his ap-

Aequivocum enim dividitur secundum res significatas, univocum vero dividitur secundum diversas differentias; sed analogum dividitur secundum diversos modes. Unde cum ens praedicatur analogice de decem generibus, dividitur in ea secundum diversos modos. Unde unicuique generi debetur proprius modus praedicandi." — *I Sent.*, d. 22, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2m.

[1] Cajetan, *De nominum analogia*, cap. 1; St Thomas, *I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 5, a. 2, ad 1m.

parent conviction that the traditional division of analogy into attribution and proper proportionality can stand up to close scrutiny from either a theoretical point of view or from that of textual analysis of Aquinas. But perhaps Professor Thomas is simply accepting the division as good money. We begin with a list of statements.

(1) The dog is healthy.
(2) Food is healthy.
(3) A cold nose is healthy.

In our three statements the predicates are tokens of the same term and we want to analyse the meanings of these instances of "healthy." If "healthy" were predicated univocally of the dog, food and a cold nose, it would signify the same property in the same way, i.e. the same *rem significatam* and the same *modum significandi*. We can say that in each of these instances "healthy" signifies the same property, the same *rem significatam*, namely, health. The *way* health is signified by "healthy" differs, however; in (2) it signifies the cause of health and in (3) a sign of health. Professor Thomas wrote, we remember, that "*health* in the expanded expressions is being employed in the primary sense (i.e. as predicated of living organisms)." Now, it seems to me he should have spoken, not of the primary sense of *health*, but of the primary sense of *healthy*, the meaning it has in (1). In (1), "healthy" signifies health in a certain way, namely, the subject of health. If "health" is given a meaning such that it is clear that only a living organism, as a whole, can be the subject of such a property, then "subject of health" is the meaning of "healthy" in (1). And that, as Professor Thomas indicates, is a privileged way of signifying the property for the precise reason that *that* way of signifying it enters into our explication of other ways of signifying the same property.

Let us attempt to cast the content of the preceding paragraph into the terminology of Professor Thomas and then into that of St Thomas. Professor Thomas wrote that the meanings of "healthy" in our (2) and (3) exhibit the common form "...R..." I see no reason not to include its occurrence in (1) under the same form if we can interpret "...R..." as "habens respectum ad sanitatem" or "habens sanitatem" or "id quod habet sanitatem." The participle *habens* and the phrase *id quod habet* provide both "a place marker for an individual variable" (or, perhaps better, give the variable) and indicate its relation to the property which would go in the slot after R. However, and this was Professor Thomas' point, in explicating the meaning of "healthy" in (2) and (3) we would come up with something like "that which is a cause of health in such

things as dogs" and "that which is a sign of health in such things as dogs" where it becomes clear that the explication of the way health is signified when "healthy" is predicated of the dog does not involve reference to other ways of signifying health. Nevertheless, of all these *rationes* of "healthy" we can say that they signify the same *res* but in different ways.

We can now ask what, for Aquinas, is the *ratio analogice communis*? In answering the question we can indicate the root of our dissatisfaction with Cajetan's division of analogous names into analogy of attribution and analogy of proper proportionality. Consider the following passage.

> Sciendum est quod, quando aliquid praedicatur univoce de multis, illud in quolibet eorum secundum propriam rationem invenitur, sicut *animal* in qualibet specie animalis. Sed quando aliquid dicitur analogice de multis, illud invenitur secundum propriam rationem in uno eorum tantum, a quo alia denominantur.[1]

Why does St Thomas speak of the *ratio* signified by "animal" predicated of man and horse as a *ratio propria*? As a generic notion, we should expect him to call it a *ratio communis*. It is the generically common notion that is here called a proper notion; the proper notion common to man and horse insofar as they are called animals involves a *res* and *modus*: the usual and therefore proper way of signifying amimality. What now does *ratio propria* mean in the statement about analogy? What is analogically predicated of many things is said to be found in only one of them according to its *ratio propria*. If we consult Cajetan's commentary on the article in which our passage occurs, we encounter an identification of *ratio propria* and the *res significata* of the term, an identification wich eventually leads Cajetan to reject St Thomas' description of analogy. Actually, Cajetan says, it is a description only of analogy of attribution. Why? Because analogy of attribution is such that the perfection signified by the name (the *res significata*) exists in only one of the analogates and the secondary analogates are named by the name in question only by extrinsic denomination. It is precisely this Cajetan

[1] The following texts are of importance for settling the question of the "analogy of genus" raised earlier. *Ia*, 29.4. ad 4m; Quaest. quodl. III, q. 3, a. 1. The most lucid, perhaps, is this: "Sed dicendum quod unum dividentium aliquod commune potest esse prius altero dupliciter: uno modo, secundum proprias rationes, aut naturas dividentium; alio modo, secundum participationem rationis illius communis quod in ea dividitur. Primum autem non tollit univocationem generis, ut manifestum est in numeris, in quibus binarius secundum propriam rationem naturaliter est prior ternario; sed tamen aequaliter participant rationem generis sui, scilicet numeri: ita enim est ternarius multitudo mensurata per unum, sicut et binarius. Sed secundum impedit univocationem generis. Et propter hoc *ens* non potest esse genus substantiae et accidentis: quia in ipsa ratione *entis*, substantia, quae est ens per se, prioritatem habet respectu accidentis, quod est ens per aliud et in alio." — *In I Periherm.*, lect. 8, n. 6.

takes St Thomas to be saying when he writes "illud invenitur secundum propriam rationem in uno eorum tantum, a quo alia denominantur." Of analogy in the strong sense, Cajetan's analogy of proper proportionality, we must say what St Thomas here says of univocity: "illud in quolibet eorum secundum rationem propriam invenitur." Fortunately, however, there is no need to do such violence to the text.

In the case of the analogous name, can we identify its *ratio propria* and its *ratio communis* as we did in the case of the generic and univocal name? Les us return to "healthy" and ask what its *ratio communis* would be. I suggest the following: *habens aliquem respectum ad sanitatem.* The basis of this suggestion is the oft-repeated *ratio communis entis: habens esse* or *id quod habet esse.* What the *ratio communis* gives us is the *res significata,* health or *esse,* and what Professor Thomas might call a variable whose values would be determinate *modi significandi.* If that is the *ratio communis* of the analogous name, what is its *ratio propria*? I suggest that it is the *res* and a determinate way of signifying it: e.g. "subject of health" and "id cui debet esse in se et non in alio." With these explanations, there is nothing restrictive or mysterious about Aquinas' "illud invenitur secundum propriam rationem in uno eorum tantum." *Invenitur* does not as such require a restrictive and determinate ontological situation; after all, that in which the *ratio propria* of "healthy" is found is still denominated extrinsically by the term. In some analogous names, it may well be that a number of modes of signifying the *res* involve the intrinsic possession of the *res,* but that is not the import of "illud in quolibet eorum secundum propriam rationem invenitur" nor is it precluded by "illud invenitur secundum propriam rationem in uno eorum tantum."

The foregoing interpretation of the *ratio communis* and *ratio propria* of the analogous name seems best to me; nevertheless, mention might be made of the way in which the *ratio propria* of the analogous name is common to all the *rationes* analogically signified by the name. That is, the privileged way of signifying the *res* enters into our explication of the other meanings of the name and can therefore be said to be either what the name means or an element of what it means.

With particular reference to Professor Thomas' paper, I would not want to interpret the statement "*analogy* is analogous" to mean the denial that different instances of analogous naming are instances of the same kind of naming. It seems to me that what St Thomas comes up with in his logical analysis of analogously common names is exemplified by any term he takes to be analogous. That is, I take the description of analogy found in *Ia.*16.6 to be saved and saved in exactly the same way

by every instance of analogous naming. I see nothing to prevent our saying that "analogous" in "*Healthy* is analogous" and in "*Being* is analogous" is univocal. If "analogy is analogous" were a denial of that, the statement would seem to me simply an invitation to vertigo. What then does the statement mean?

We have arrived where we began. I find in Professor Thomas' paper a statement he might have exploited to his profit. He is speaking of proper proportionality. "Both Aquinas' and Cajetan's treatment of proper proportionality is based on the mathematical model 2:4::3:6 with the appropriate weakening of *identity of relations* (here (half of')) to *similarity of relations* in fields of investigation where mathematical precision is impossible." What that remark calls to our attention is this: "analogy" had a use in mathematics which is prior to its use by the logician for whom it means a type of community of the name. St Thomas put it this way. "Dicendum quod proportio dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo, certa habitudo unius quantitatis ad alteram secundum quod duplum, triplum et aequale sunt species proportionis. Alio modo, quaelibet habitudo unius ad alterum."[1] *Proportio* is merely synonym for "analogy" and what this passage is saying is that "analogy" has a number of meanings. Its first meaning, and we can call this its *ratio propria*, is a "determinate relation between quantities." Usage evolves a *ratio communis*, "any relation between things," a determinate mode of which is the relation or proportion or analogy of creature to God as effect to cause. If this is correct, "analogy" has two meanings, one of which is privileged since, if we are asked why we call the relation of creature to God an analogy, we would invoke the quantitative mode to explain our usage. If now we should say "*analogy* is analogous" we have not yet given a meaning of "analogy" which explains the adjective in our remark. What St Thomas did was to employ the term "analogy" to speak about the relation between several meanings of a common term. And it is just this meaning of "analogy" which is invoked when we say that "analogy" is analogous. Let us spell this out. "Analogy" means (1) a determinate relation between quantities; e.g. double, triple, equal; (2) any relation between things, a determinate mode of which is the relation of effect to cause; (3) the relation between several meanings of a common term where all the meanings are ways of signifying the same *res significata* and one way of signifying the *res* is privileged because it enters into the explication of the others, e.g. "healthy," "being," "analogy." That is to say, meaning (3) of "analogy"

[1] Ia. 12.1. ad 4.

explains the way "analogy" signifies (1), (2) and (3). That is what is meant by the statement, "*analogy* is analogous." While complicated, the meaning of the statement is clear. Therefore, although the statement may continue to be used to obfuscate, to postpone explanations, it need not be so used. It has a definite and defensible meaning.

CHAPTER V

REPLY TO A CRITIC

Professor John Beach has taken issue with my book, *The Logic of Analogy*.[1] His criticisms appeared under the title, "Analogous Naming, Extrinsic Denomination, and the Real Order."[2] In replying to Professor Beach, I shall make every effort to be as succinct as possible. This will not be easy, however, because Professor Beach has apparently not thought through the bases of his criticisms and it will be necessary to do this for him in order to make a decisive refutation.

What I wish to say can be gathered under three points. The first has to do with Professor Beach's surprising accusation that I am guilty of the very fault I find in Cajetan. I had taken issue with Cajetan's interpretation of Aquinas' doctrine of analogous naming by arguing that, although the analogy of names is a logical doctrine, Cajetan employs non-logical criteria in distinguishing types of analogy. Professor Beach would have it that it is I who confuse the logical and real orders. Secondly, whatever the fate of Cajetan's interpretation, Professor Beach maintains that it is the manifest sense of texts of St Thomas that the Cajetanian division of the analogy of names, purged of the Cardinal's confusions, must be accepted. Finally, almost inadvertently Professor Beach reveals something of his own understanding of analogy and allied issues. An examination of these lapses into the affirmative leads to an ironic conclusion.

I. CAJETAN AND INTRINSIC AND EXTRINSIC DENOMINATION

Professor Beach pretty well confines himself to Cajetan's distinction between analogy of attribution and analogy of proper proportionality. My own contention was that Cajetan bases his distinction between these two on extra-logical criteria: on whether or not the perfection signified by the name *exists* in all the analogates or in one alone. It seems clear to me that St Thomas defines the analogous name in such a

[1] Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1961.
[2] *Modern Schoolman*, January, 1965, pp. 198-213.

way that nothing at all is said or implied about such determinate ontological matters. In speaking of these two determinate ontological situations, Cajetan employs the notions of intrinsic and extrinsic denomination. The clear impression one gets is that intrinsic and extrinsic denomination name diverse real situations. If that is what intrinsic and extrinsic denomination mean for Cajetan, then analogous naming cannot be distinguished on the basis of these kinds of denomination without transgressing genera.

Does Professor Beach accept this criticism of Cajetan? It is difficult to say. He says that the truth of my remarks on this matter must be conceded.[1] He agrees that Cajetan is confused on extrinsic denomination.[2] However, he rather enigmatically refers to the precise sense of extrinsic denomination employed by Cajetan and Aquinas and overlooked by me. Between these incompatible statements has intervened his *tu quoque*—now I am the one who has identified intrinsic and extrinsic denomination with determinate ontological situations. The way in which Professor Beach establishes my confusion is marvelous. He cites passages in which I am endeavoring to express Cajetan's views as if they revealed my own thoughts on the matter despite the fact that what I am out to do is to criticize Cajetan.

Professor Beach agrees with me that Cajetan defines analogy of attribution and analogy of proper proportionality in terms of ontological properties. He agrees with me that he should not have done this. The language Cajetan uses to express the differing ontological properties is intrinsic and extrinsic denomination. I accepted as good money his identification of these phrases with the ontological. On that basis I rejected Cajetan's distinction between analogy of attribution and analogy of proper proportionality. Professor Beach says that I can do this only if I identify these types of analogy with determinate real situations. To which I can only reply that it is Cajetan who made the identification, I who pointed it out and I who, on this basis, reject his division. Professor Beach accuses me of accepting what I reject or rejecting what I accept.[3]

Consider this equally Wonderlandish parallel. I ask someone if there are species of triangle and he tells me, Yes, there are A triangles and B triangles. I inquire further and am told that A means heavy and B means light. Thereupon I deny that there are A and B triangles because heavy and light are natural properties and triangle is a mathe-

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 202.
[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 204.
[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 207.

matical entity. Along comes Professor Beach to cry, "Ah, foolish McInerny. In rejecting the distinction between A and B triangles you have imported natural properties into a discussion of a mathematical entity." Apart from noticing that Professor Beach had not been paying attention, I would probably assume that he has a more appropriate way of defining A and B.

Now that is just what seems to be going on in Professor Beach's critique. *He* understands intrinsic and extrinsic denomination differently from Cajetan. Despite his vacillation concerning the way Cajetan did or did not understand these types of denomination, his strongest point would seem to be this: Denomination is a logical entity and intrinsic and extrinsic appropriately divide it. Therefore intrinsic and extrinsic denomination are both logical and not, as Cajetan thought, names of ontological situations. Professor Beach would have saved his reader some pains if he had made this point explicitly. He leaves equally implicit his view of the significance of thus salvaging intrinsic and extrinsic denomination as logical. If the analogy of names is a logical entity and if intrinsic and extrinsic denomination are also logical, then... Well, then what? Surely not just any logical entity can aptly divide another logical entity. Professor Beach seems to think that intrinsic and extrinsic denomination, understood logically and not in the Cajetanian fashion as ontological, properly divide the analogy of names. I invite him to pursue overtly this hidden suggestion. I suspect that it will soon occur to him that some univocal names involve intrinsic and some univocal names involve extrinsic denomination and that therefore intrinsic and extrinsic denomination, be they over so logical, are not appropriately divisive of analogous naming. Perhaps in pusuing his investigations he will find useful my treatment of denomination on pp. 90-96 of my book—a section he did not feel compelled to cite in his critique.

II. PROFESSOR BEACH AS EXEGETE

Despite the fact that he—more or less—agrees that Cajetan's way of distinguishing attribution and proper proportionality is confused, Professor Beach purports to find that division fairly leaping from the page when he turns to Aquinas. There is an intriguing innocence in his exegesis of the few texts he mentions. From first to last, despite the recent spate of book-length studies on analogy, despite the fact that the texts he quotes with the *voilà* of a Fundamentalist have been the object

of much painstaking analysis, by myself and others, Professor Beach proceeds as if he had before him something on the level of a McGuffey Reader. He quotes *In I Ethics*, lect. 7, n. 96, scolds me briefly, and asserts that the text mentions three kinds of analogous naming. That bland remark commits him to the view that insofar as the primary analogate is a final cause or an efficient cause there are different kinds of analogous name. Since I, whether well or badly, have already attempted a serious analysis of the text, I think it is fair to invite Professor Beach to favor us with definitions of the kinds of analogy he finds there in such a way that his definitions do not involve a transgression of genera.

Professor Beach cites *Q.D. de ver.*, q. 21, a. 4, ad 2, an extremely difficult text. It is here that he confines himself to the enigmatic—and rhetorical—reference to Cajetan's conception of extrinsic denomination which, from being confused, has unaccountably become precise. Even more breathtaking is Professor Beach's remark, with reference to *I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 5, a. 2, ad 1, that Aquinas is there presenting a logical division of the analogy of names into three kinds. I would be very interested to be shown that this is the case. All Professor Beach gives is the magisterial assurance that it is the case. "Now, the logical character of the above division is indisputable."[1] Surely such an assertion is not likely to occasion profitable dispute; I for one have no idea what Professor Beach means by it. In the elaboration of his own views, which I am suggesting he undertake, Professor Beach might explore my contention that, in the text in question, St Thomas is listing some of the meanings of "analogy" and not types of analogous naming. "Analogy" is an analogous name, one of its meanings has to do with the proportion between several meanings of a common name, and the subtypes of that, of analogous naming, are not given in the text in question. Nearly a quarter of my book was devoted to an analysis of that text; Professor Beach sees fit to quote but one sentence of mine, thereby suggesting that my procedure was as cavalier as his own.

III. PROFESSOR BEACH'S CONFUSION OF THE LOGICAL AND REAL

It is melancholy but true that Professor Beach is himself guilty of the kind of confusion I found in Cajetan and he thinks he finds in me. One is prepared for this by one of those throw-away lines with which Professor Beach's article is filled. He quotes *Ia*, q. 16, a. 6, a text which more

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 210.

and more seems to me the most lucid Aquinas wrote on analogous names and where commentators inevitably reveal their hand.[1]

...sciendum est quod, quando aliquid praedicatur univoce de multis, illud in quolibet eorum secundum propriam rationem invenitur, sicut *animal* in qualibet specie animalis. Sed quando aliquid dicitur analogice de multis, illud invenitur secundum propriam rationem in uno eorum tantum, a quo alia denominantur.

What does Professor Beach have to say of this text? Immediately after quoting it, he writes,

We cannot, of course, accept the statement on analogous naming as necessarily true. What, however, of that on univocity? His argument would appear to be that if, as they are known, things acquire the logical status of being named univocally, they must, as they exist, possess the common nature in a proper way. Much the same can be said of things as intrinsically denominated, as named according to analogy of proper proportionality, as named analogously *secundum intentionem et secundum esse*. We shall, in fact, see that St Thomas draws a similar conclusion in the case of this last analogy. The point is that, in each of these modes of naming, a determinate condition in the real is presupposed. This may well fall outside the province of the logician; but, after all, he merely studies the modes of naming and predication actually engaged in by others, and these others do usually proceed in their task cognizant of what is true of things as they exist.

This passage, singular as it is, is perfectly typical of Professor Beach when he endeavors to be positive. With two exceptions, every sentence in this paragraph is startling in one way or another. Why is it that we cannot accept St Thomas' definition of analogous naming? (For Professor Beach this is a matter of course.) Why should definitions be discussed as if they were arguments? In the definition of things named univocally, which Professor Beach prefers, of course, to concentrate on, where is there any mention of things as they exist? Let us pause here. St Thomas wrote that when something is predicated univocally of many it is found in each of them according to its proper notion. I take that to be a definition and that Professor Beach will concede that the remainder of the sentence gives an example. If so, what component of the definition says anything of things as they exist? Professor Beach apparently regard the definition as an argument. He takes St Thomas to be saying that if, as they are known, things acquire the logical status of being named univocally, they must, as they exist, possess the common nature in a proper way. But the whole definition purports to tell us what it means for things to acquire the logical status of being named univocally. All one can conclude is that Professor Beach understands "illud in quolibet eorum secundum propriam rationem invenitur" to

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 205.
[2] *Id.*

be some kind of consequence of being named univocally. But what then would he mean by being named univocally? He clearly does not see that this definition of univocity is from first to last expressed in logical terminology. That is why, for him, for that which is predicated univocally to be found in each of the univocates according to its proper notion is a statement about things as they exist.

But is this what he means? Doesn't he go on to say that his point is that a determinate condition in the real is presupposed by the definition and, being presupposed, lies outside the province of the logician? Yes, he does; but the only possible candidate for that determinate condition in the real is an essential component of the logical definition of univocity: illud in quolibet eorum secundum propriam rationem invenitur. That is why his final sentence need not detain us—though it confirms our intepretation of what he is trying to say.

Professor Beach's discomfort with St Thomas' definition of things named analogously can now be understood. It can have no other basis than his conviction that "illud invenitur secundum propriam rationem in uno eorum tantum" says something about a determinate condition of the real. That misconception will lead him inexorably to the attitude of Cajetan in his commentary on this text. Nor is this prophecy and conjecture. Professor Beach's fourth sentence can only be taken to mean that he thinks that in "analogy of proper proportionality" the common perfection is found *secundum propriam rationem* in each of the analogates. Like Cajetan, Professor Beach has come to the point where he must use St Thomas' definition of things named univocally to explain his own notion of things named analogously.

His confusion of the logical and real orders is further evident in what Professor Beach has to say about the term *ratio*. His article began with the following sentence. "It may be taken as given that the analogy of names is a logical entity; that is to say, a relation which belongs to things as they exist in the mind." The matter may not be as uncontroverted as Professor Beach thinks, but I at least will give him that. I argued that the term *ratio*, which shows up in the definition of this logical entity, is a logical word and that it thereby stands for things as they exist in the mind, more precisely that it signifies the relation of what is known to the name imposed to signify it. I take that to be a clear case of a non-real, logical relation. We have just seen that Professor Beach deserts the pure position of his opening assertion when he attempts to explicate logical definitions in which *ratio* figures. Beyond that, he concludes his article by objecting to what I had to say about

ratio, claiming that what I say and what St Thomas said are two quite different things. He arrives at this difference by reading what I had written as if when I said that *ratio* is the name of a second intention I meant that the subject of this intention must be itself a second intention. The passage from St Thomas that I was analysing contains such remarks as the following, quoted by Professor Beach. "Unde patet secundum, scilicet quod ratio dicitur esse in re, inquantum significatum nominis, cui accidit esse rationem, est in re: et hoc contingit proprie quando conceptio intellectus est similitudo rei." (*I Sent.*, d. 2, q. 1, a. 3, sol.) Professor Beach understands Aquinas' point to be, in context, that there is a difference between such words as *man* and such words as *genus*. The first signifies an intentional representation of something existing in reality; the second signifies a relation existing among things as known. That is true enough but hardly relevant if *ratio* is like *genus*, which is the point I was making. Professor Beach thinks I maintain that *healthy* signifies second intentions. What I did say—and what Professor Beach said in the opening of his article—was that the relations between the many meanings of such terms as *healthy* is discussed by the logician in a logical way. "Animal is a genus" and "Conducive to health is a meaning (*ratio*) of healthy" I take to be sentences of the same type; both have predicates which are logical. And neither commits me or anyone to the view that their subjects signify second intentions. Professor Beach makes some such suggestion as this. Since the concepts which are the *rationes* of healthy represent things in reality, any statement about the relation among those *rationes* must be just as such a statement about real relations among the things represented. That is the kind of claim that I was out to criticize. Unfortunately, Professor Beach's confused reading of what St Thomas says about *ratio* makes it impossible for him to grasp the significance of my criticism. And, oddly enough, he ends his article with statements that make his opening sentence absurd.

CHAPTER VI

IS THE TERM *SOUL* ANALOGOUS?

At the outset of the *De anima*, Aristotle asks whether all souls are of the same species or, if not, whether they are specifically or generically different. That is, if souls are specifically different, are they or are they not contained in a common genus.[1] Obviously the answers to these questions will determine whether the term "soul" signifies univocally or not. If there is a common genus, there will be a common notion or *logos* and the term signifying it will be predicated univocally of the various species of soul.[2] If there are generically different notions, the common term will be a "homonym," that is, an equivocal term.[3] Moreover, we must ask if the definition of the soul is common in the way the definition of animal is common or if it is different for every species of soul, as the definitions of horse, dog and man differ. Since these specific definitions do differ, the generic definition is either nothing or it is posterior—something true of any common predicate. Aristotle points out that such questions arise when our intention is to define, not just human soul, but to arrive at knowledge of all kinds of soul.

Is "soul" a univocal or equivocal term for Aristotle? It may appear that the question is settled in favor of the former by the very fact that Aristotle likens soul to the genus, animal. Moreover, in the sequel, he is clearly interested in discovering the most common notion signified by "soul,"[4] although, when he has given it, he says that it is merely figurative or descriptive.[5] In a passage of particular interest, Aristotle speaks of the community of the term "soul" by comparing it with the

[1] "We must consider also whether soul is divisible or is without parts, and whether it is everywhere homogeneous or not; and if not homogeneous, whether its various forms are different specifically or generically: up to the present time those who have discussed and investigated soul seem to have confined themselves to the human soul. We must be careful not to ignore the question whether soul can be defined in a single unambiguous formula, as is the case with animal, or whether we must not give a separate formula for each sort of it, as we do for horse, dog, man, god (in the latter case the 'universal' animal—and so too every other 'common predicate'—being treated either as nothing at all or as a later product)." — *De anima*, 402b1-9.

[2] For this doctrine of signification, see *On Interpretation*, 16a3-8.

[3] See *Categories*, 1a1-12.

[4] *De anima*, 412a5-6.

[5] *Ibid.*, 413a9-10.

way in which figure is common to the different varieties of figure. "It is clear therefore that the definition of "soul" is common in the same way as that of figure, for there is no figure apart from triangle and those which are consequent on it; no more is there any soul apart from those mentioned. For should there happen to be a notion common to figures, which belongs to all of them, it is proper to none of them. So too with the aforementioned souls. Therefore it is foolish to seek a common definition of these or other things which would be the proper definition of none, just as it is foolish to seek the proper and atomic while ignoring the common definition. Souls are related in the same way to what is said of them as are figures; for that which is consequent always contains in potency what is prior, both in figures and in souls; as triangle is in square so is the vegetative in the sensitive."[1] It is in this passage that we have to seek the answer to the question whether the term "soul" is common to the different varieties of soul univocally or equivocally. Perhaps it is not surprising that Aristotle seems here to answer the question both ways. Some, notably Alexander of Aphrodisia, hold that the term "soul" is equivocal; others, notably, St Thomas, maintain that it is univocal. We will examine the first interpretation only briefly; that of Aquinas is of particular interest for the light it casts on his doctrine of the analogy of names.

The different types of soul are known and named from their "parts," faculties or powers, and if we confine ourselves to the nutritive, sensitive and intellectual faculties, we see that the plant soul has only the nutritive power, the animal soul has both the nutritive and sensitive, while the human soul possesses nutritive, sensitive and intellectual powers. There is, consequently, an order of priority and posteriority among souls similar to that among figures. For, although the triangle is only a triangle, the square contains the triangle in potency – we can divide the square and arrive at triangles. What does this likening imply concerning the predicability of "soul" and "figure"? Tricot, here and in similar passages, retails the interpretation of Alexander. "Aristote se demande s'il existe une notion (ou une définition) générique de l'âme. Il répond par la négative, en raison de l'impossibilité où nous sommes de donner une définition commune des choses qui, comme c'est le cas pour les différentes variétés d'âmes, admettent entre elles de l'antérieur et du postérieur. Il en sera comme pour la figure géometrique, laquelle n'existe pas en dehors des diffé-

[1] *Ibid.*, 414b20-32.

rentes variétés de figures et dont la définition générique ne peut s'appliquer qu'à ces variétés."[1] When things which admit among themselves priority and posteriority have a common name, like the things called 'being' and 'good,' they are *pros hen legomena* according to Alexander of Aphrodisia.[2] Alexander refers[3] to the *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1096a17ff. for confirmation of this interpretation; Tricot mentions as well *Metaphysics*, 1019a2 ff. and, in both texts, it is clear that the hierarchy exisiting among the things spoken of excludes univocity.[4] It would appear therefore that one can legitimately draw the same conclusion concerning figures and souls.

Nevertheless, this interpretation presents difficulties, particularly when 414b20-32 is compared with its evident parallel at the beginning of the *De anima*, namely 402b1-9. In the latter text, as we have seen, Aristotle raises the problem of the community of the term "soul" by comparing it with "animal." According to the interpretation of Alexander, "animal" would be an equivocal term, though *ad unum*, when said of horse, dog, man, etc. But, in the opinion of Alexander himself, it is not thus equivocal. "Elle est assurément difficile," Tricot writes, "et pour le comprendre il faut supposer, avec Alexandre, qu'Aristote a donné un exemple fictif, puisque, en vérité, le chien, l'homme et dieu rentrent dans le genre *ζῷον* qui est un terme univoque."[5] Of course it is not rare for Aristotle to give an example which is not perfectly adequate to the problem he is treating, but one wonders if the interpretation of Alexander takes sufficiently into account the polemic against the Platonic Ideas which is latent in 402b1-9 and 414b20-32. As Tricot observes, the point made is that there could only be a genus if something like a Platonic Idea, a separate *ousia*, existed.[6] Moreover, if the example of "animal" raises difficulties, those of "figure" and "number" raise deeper ones. For, while it is perfectly clear that no figure exists which is not triangle, square, etc., and no number which is not two, three, etc., this does not prevent their being a generic and univocal notion of figure and number. What presents difficulties is the hierarchy among figures and numbers, but we have to ask ourselves if

[1] *Ad* 414b20-32.
[2] *Ἀποροίαι καὶ λύσεις* I, XI[b], *Suppl.* II,2, pp. 22-24.
[3] *In Metaphysic.*, (996a6), p. 20, l. 13.
[4] The text from the *Ethics* will be discussed later; as for the other, see St Thomas, *In V Metaphysic.*, lect. 13, nn. 950-2.
[5] *Ad* 402b1 ff.
[6] "En résumé, l'âme est un *πολλαχῶς λεγόμενον*. Elle n'admet pas de définition commune proprement dite, mais ses espèces doivent être définies séparément. Et d'une manière générale, n'est pas un genre toute notion *ἐπὶ πολλῶν*, mais seulement ce qui répond à une *οὐσία* réelle, à une nature commune..." *Ad* 402b1 ff.

priority and posteriority exclude a genus and univocity. This is surely the case with "being" and "good," but is the same thing true of "figure" and "number"? *Metaphysics* 999a6 ff. seems to suggest that subalternate genera are always related in an hierarchical fashion and that only what is inferior to the *species specialissima* is not related that way. This poses difficulties when we recall that species of a genus are "simultaneous" and are said not to admit priority and posteriority.[1] I want to develope these difficulties in the context of St Thomas' interpretation of Aristotle.

What does Aquinas have to say about Aristotle's remarks about a common definition of soul? "Aristoteles autem vult quod quaeratur ratio utriusque, et communis animae, et cuiuslibet speciei."[2] As for the remark of Aristotle: *τὸ δε ζῷον τὸ κνθόλον ἤτοι οὐθέν ἐστιν ἢ ὕστερον*,[3] it is to be understood in terms of the different status accorded to universals by Plato and Aristotle. Plato would have it that the universal animal as such exists, prior to this animal and that which are and are animals thanks to participation in the separate animal. Aristotle, on the other hand, accords priority to animal nature as it is found in particular animals; universality, the relation of predicability, is an intention accruing to the nature as it exists in the mind.[4] If the task of the natural philosopher entails seeking a common definition of soul, this is only preparatory to going on to determine what is special to this kind of soul or that, a movement seen to be in keeping with the order of doctrine.[5] The context of this remark has to do with the priority of the definition of the soul with respect to its powers and faculties, which is just the context of the passage (414b20-32) that occasions our discussion.

In order to understand our key passage, we must remember, St Thomas observes, that Plato held that universals exist; he was not, however, indiscriminate in doing this. Thus, if things are so related that one follows on the other (*quae se habent consequenter*), no common idea of them was posited. The examples are figures and lines. There is an order among the species of number, for two is the cause of all subsequent numbers; so too the species of figure are so ordered that triangle is prior to square, square to pentagon, etc.[6] Where there is no such order among things receiving a common name, an Idea is posited, e.g.

[1] *Categories*, 14b32-15a8.
[2] *In I de anima*, lect. 1, n. 13.
[3] *De anima*, 402b7-8.
[4] *In I de anima*, lect. 1, n. 13; *De ente*, chap. 4.
[5] *In II de anima*, lect. 1, n. 211.
[6] *Ibid.*, lect. 5, n. 295.

individual men are not ordered as are numbers and figures, therefore there is an Idea existing apart from Socrates and Plato. It will be noticed that this is an example of individuals and their species, whereas numbers and figures are species of something more common, presumably their genus. This could suggest that individuals are related to species differently from the way species are related to genus, but not that univocity is necessarily excluded from the generic notion. St Thomas continues his preliminary remarks in terms of Platonic separation.

Dicit ergo manifestum esse, quod eodem modo una est ratio animae, sicut una est ratio figurae. Sicuti enim inter figuras non est aliqua figura quae sit praeter triangulum et alias species consequentes, utpote quae sit communis omnium figurarum, ita nec in proposito est aliqua anima, quasi separata existens praeter omnes praedictas partes.[1]

There will be one notion (*ratio*) of soul in the same way that there is one of figure, but in figures there is no figure which exists apart from triangle, square, pentagon, etc. What indeed would such a figure be? Any existent figure will be a figure of some determinate kind. This is a statement applicable to any genus: there is no animal *in rerum natura* which is not a man or horse or dog, etc., but this in no wise prevents the formation of a generic notion univocally common to them all. Its unity and community derive from our mode of understanding. But how can we move from such considerations to a discussion of the soul and its parts? These "parts" are precisely faculties or potencies: the vegetative, sensitive, appetitive, locomotive and intellectual powers.[2] The only way the move can be made is by claiming that no soul is found that does not have at least one of these parts from which it will be denominated such-and-such a kind of soul. We will be coming back to this point.

Sed quamvis non sit figura separata in esse praeter omnes figuras, etiam secundum Platonicos, qui ponunt species communes separatas, tamen invenitur una ratio communis, quae convenit omnibus figuris, et non est propria alicuius earum; ita est in animalibus.[3]

The denial that the genus exists apart from its species does not preclude the formation of a *ratio communis* (*λόγος κοινός*) which can be predicated of each of them. This community is not that of something which exists numerically one part from the things which participate in it; its community and unity follow on our mode of knowing. Thus, if we speak

[1] *Ibid.*, n. 296.
[2] 414a31-32.
[3] *In II de anima*, lect. 5, n. 297.

of separability, it will only be *ratione* (*λόγῳ*).[1] And, although the common notion belongs to each of the things of which it is said, it is common and not the proper notion (*ἴδιος λόγος*)[2] of any of them.

Et ideo ridiculum est, quod homo quaerat unam rationem communem, tam in animalibus (sic), quam in aliis rebus, quae non conveniat alicui animarum quae sunt in rerum natura particulariter. Neque etiam est conveniens quod homo quaerat definitionem animae, secundum unamquamque speciem animae, et dimittat definitionem communem omnibus. Ergo neque definitio communis animae praetermittenda fuit; neque sic est assignanda definitio communis animae quod non convenit singulis animabus.[3]

We find here the reason for St Thomas' earlier statement[4] that we must concern ourselves both with the common definition of the soul and with the definitions of specific types of soul. But it would be ridiculous to seek a common definition which is not verified of the souls that are. Note that we are not being told that the *ratio communis* (*λόγος κοινός*) should be a *ratio propria* (*ἴδιος λόγος*)—this would be a good deal more ridiculous. First of all, it is ridiculous to posit as existing separately the content of the common notion precisely as such; secondly, the common notion cannot substitute for the inquiry into what is proper to this soul and that. Thus, earlier, Aristotle is quite diffident about the explanatory power of his common definition of the soul: *τύπῳ μεν οὖν ταύτη διωρίσθω καὶ υπογεγράφθω περὶ ψυχῆς*·[5] On the other hand, it is ridiculous to attempt to define a specific type of soul without taking into account what every soul has in common. The passage, then, as St Thomas reads it, has a double purpose, being at once a polemic against the Platonic *χωρισμός* and a methodological caution based on a correct understanding of universals. We must inevitably start with what is common, but we should neither reify the common notion nor be satisfied with it, for our purpose is to discover what is specific in the natural world. And yet there is still the similarity between souls and figures to be taken into account.

Et quia dixerat, quod eodem modo se habet ratio animae sicut ratio figurae, ostendit convenientiam inter utrumque: et dicit quod similiter se habent figurae et animae adinvicem: in utrisque enim illud quod est prius, est in potentia in eo quod est consequenter. Manifestum est enim in figuris, quod trigonum, quod est prius, est potentia in tetragono. Potest enim tetragonum dividi in duos trigonas. Et similiter in anima sensitiva, vegetativa est quasi quaedam potentia eius, et quasi anima per se. Et similiter est de aliis figuris, et aliis partibus animae.[6]

[1] 418b29
[2] 413b27.
[3] *In II de anima*, lect. 5, n. 297.
[4] *In I de anima*, lect. 1, n. 13.
[5] 413a9-10. See *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1094a25 ff; 1098a20 ff.
[6] *In II de anima*, lect. 5, n. 298.

Figures are such that there is an order of priority and posteriority among them: the triangle is in the square in the sense that the square can be divided into two triangles. In somewhat the same way, the vegetative soul is in the sensitive soul in that the animal possesses the powers had by living things which are only plants. Before inquiring into this statement, let us ask whether St Thomas is here denying that "soul" is said univocally of vegetative, sensitive and intellectual souls. We have seen that Alexander would make this denial: where things are related as prior and posterior the name common to them will be a *pros hen* equivocal. This is the way "figure" and "number" and also "soul" are predicated. If this were St Thomas' understanding, he would be in a position to say that "soul" and "figure" and "number" are analogous terms.

As is well known, though its consequences are not always appreciated, there is no one-to-one correspondence between Aristotle's use of *ἀναλογία* and St Thomas' use of *analogia*. Indeed, St Thomas, in commenting on Aristotle, will often speak of analogy where Aristotle has made no mention of *ἀναλογία*. For our purposes, a highly significant occurence is in the commentary on Aristotle's remark: *τὸ δὲ ὂν λέγεται μὲν πολλαχῶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕν καὶ μίαν τινὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐχ ὁμωνύμως*.[1] This text occasions one of St Thomas' most extensive statements on what it means for things to be named analogously.[2] Taking his cue from Aristotle himself[3] as well as from a long tradition, St Thomas distinguishes things named equivocally into those which just happen to receive the same name (pure or chance equivocals) and those which, while not named univocally, are intentionally given the same name. The latter receive a common name which refers them to some one nature and are said to be named analogously.[4] Thus, while there is no indication that Aristotle ever took *λέγεται κατ' αναλογίαν* as equivalent to *λέγεται ὁμωνύμως πρὸς ἕν*, for St Thomas something *multipliciter dictum* is said *analogice* whenever it is not a question of pure equivocation. What is more, things named analogously are related *per prius et posterius*. Our question, then, is this: when things related as prior and posterior, or *consequenter*, receive a common name, is that name analogous? Are "figure" and "number" and "soul," in the uses we have been examining, analogous terms?

If we turn now to the passage in the *Nicomachean Ethics* to which

[1] *Metaphysics*, 1003a34-35.
[2] *In IV Metaphysic.*, lect. 1, nn. 535-6.
[3] *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1096b25.
[4] *In I Ethic.*, lect. 7, nn. 95-6.

Alexander refers for corroboration of his interpretation, an affirmative answer to our question seems to impose itself. Aristotle is discussing the notion of an Idea of Good and rejecting it in terms of a canon of Platonism which would render such an Idea impossible. "The originators of this theory, then, used not to postulate Ideas of groups of things in which they posited an order of priority and posteriority (for which reason they did not construct an Idea of numbers in general)."[1] He goes on to argue that, since good is found in each of the categories, good things are prior and posterior and cannot be the basis for an Idea, Good. In commenting on this, St Thomas makes it clear that the priority and posteriority among goods prevents a common notion; consequently "good" is not a univocal name. "Sed diversorum praedicamentorum non est una ratio communis. Nihil enim univoce de his praedicatur. Bonum autem sicut et ens, cum convertatur cum eo, invenitur in quolibet praedicamento... Manifestum est ergo, quod non est aliquid unum bonum, quod scilicet sit idea, vel ratio communis omnium bonorum: alioquin oporteret quod bonum non inveniretur in omnibus praedicamentis, sed in uno solo."[2] The denial of a *ratio communis* here must be the denial of a univocally common notion, since both "being" and "good" signify common notions (*quod habet esse* and *quod omnia appetunt*, respectively). What prevents these notions from being univocally common is the order of priority and posteriority among the things which fall under them. Does this impose the conclusion that "soul" and "figure" and "number" are analogous names for St Thomas? That such a conclusion is not imposed on us is clear from a passage in which St Thomas disputes Alexander's interpretation of things which are τὰ εφεξῆς.

In *On Interpretation*, Aristotle divides speech (λόγος) into the affirmative statement, the negative and the composite.[3] He says that the affirmative statement is prior to the others. What does this mean? St Thomas first recounts the view of Alexander to the effect that this is not a division of a genus into its species, but of a multiple (i.e. analogous) name into its diverse significations. "Genus enim univoce praedicatur de suis speciebus, non secundum prius et posterius: unde Aristoteles noluit quod ens esset genus commune omnium, quia per prius praedicatur de substantia, quam de novem generibus accidentium."[4] Surely this interpretation of Alexander's is reasonable if the presence of

[1] *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1096a18-20.
[2] *In I Ethic.*, lect. 6, n. 81.
[3] 17a8-9.
[4] *In I Periherm.*, lect. 8, n. 5.

πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον among beings prevents "being" from signifying univocally, and the same with goods and "good." Must not the same be true of "speech" here and elsewhere of "soul" and "figure"? St Thomas' reading of the text from *Nicomachean Ethics* could lead us to expect his agreement with Alexander's interpretation of the passage in *On Interpretation.* Nevertheless, he rejects it, and his reasons must be set down in full.

Sed dicendum quod unum dividentium aliquod commune potest esse prius altero dupliciter: uno modo, secundum proprias rationes, aut naturas dividentium; alio modo, secundum participationem rationis illius communis quod in ea dividitur Primum autem non tollit univocationem generis, ut manifestum est in numeris, in quibus binarius secundum propriam rationem naturaliter est prior ternario; sed tamen aequaliter participant rationem generis sui, scilicet numeri: ita tamen est ternarius multitudo mensurata per unum, sicut et binarius. Sed secundum impedit univocationem generis. Et propter hoc ens non potest esse genus substantiae et accidentis: quia in ipsa ratio entis, substantia, quae est ens per se, prioritatem habet respectu accidentis, quod est ens per aliud et in alio. Sic ergo affirmatio secundum propriam rationem prior est negationi; tamen aequaliter participant rationem enunciationis, quam supra posuit, scilicet quod enunciatio est oratio in quae verum vel falsum est.[1]

The first type of priority and posteriority mentioned here does not preclude there being a term univocally common to things so ordered precisely because their inequality is not with respect to what is expressed in the common notion, but with respect to their *rationes proprias*, that is, with respect to their specific differences,[2] which divide the generic notion. Species of a common genus are so related that one is prior to the other, but in terms of the common notion, their genus, they are equal, *parificantur*[3] and are *simul.*[4] The interesting thing here is the example chosen: "number," which is like "figure" to which "soul" has been likened. We find the way opened here for an interpretation of the *De anima* passage which will be quite different from Alexander's. The mode of priority and posteriority which does preclude univocity is that which involves participation in the common notion. Thus, substance primarily is *quod habet esse* and, if accidents are said to be, they receive the common name by reference to what principally verifies it.[5] This is not the case with affirmation and negation. To call the latter "a speech which involves truth or falsity" does not involve reference to affirmation, though affirmation is prior in nature to negation. So too, by

[1] *Ibid.*, n. 6.
[2] See *Q.D. de veritate*, q. 4, a. 1, ad 8.
[3] *I Sent.*, d. 19, q, 5, a. 2. ad 1.
[4] *Categories*, 14b32-15a8.
[5] For an earlier disagreement with Alexander, see *In I Periherm.*, lect. 5, n. 70.

way of anticipation, to call the sensitive soul a soul is to apply to it the common definition, an application which does not involve reference to another kind of soul. The same thing is true for sensitive and intellectual soul. Finally, to call six a number does not involve reference to another number and to call the pentagon a figure involves no reference to another kind of figure.

What St Thomas is doing, in effect, is distinguishing modes of prior and posterior in terms of their import for signification. Priority and posteriority can be a relation among genera which have no common genus, and then the common name cannot be univocal, or it can be a relation among species whose inequality is due to their proper notions, thus ultimately to the differences which divide the genus, and such inequality does nothing to prevent the univocity of a common name.

Corroboration for this interpretation is found elsewhere in Aristotle. In *Metaphysics* 999a6-14, where he is discussing the Platonic refusal to posit a separate Idea of things related as prior and posterior, Aristotle makes the point that species are always so related. Individuals of a species, on the other hand, are not related as prior and posterior. We find here an echo of something suggested in the *De anima*. Only *species specialissimae* present no problem for one who would posit separate Ideas because individuals share equally in their species. But when it is a question of genera, the species are related as prior and posterior and this prevents the positing of a separate Idea responding to the genus. Ross' commentary on this is curious. "If you set number, for instance, on one side as that in which the various numbers agree, and ask what it is in which they differ, you find that this too is number. 'Numberness' does not exist apart from the rest of the nature of numbers, but penetrates their whole nature, and exists only in the various numbers. Remove the genus number, and you remove the differentiae of the numbers as well."[1] While it is easy to agree that no number exists apart from the species of number, it is not easy to see that numbers differ in that which they have in common. Doubtless what is meant is that the genus number expresses the whole of what a specific number is, and not something which could be separated from it, but, while "number" signifies the whole of 2, it does not express that whereby 2 differs from 3. Actually, Ross, without mentioning him here, seems in agreement with Alexander's interpretation. Tricot leaves no doubt that he regards Alexander's interpretation as definitive. Alexander, of course, feels that

[1] W. D. Ross, *Aristotle's Metaphysics*, Oxford (1924), Vol. 1, p. 237, *ad* 999a6-10.

the supposed genera whose species are related as prior and posterior, involve equivocal predication.[1]

St Thomas, on the other hand, would have us see that the genus is always said of things related as prior and posterior and that this does not destroy the univocity of the genus since the order and inequality is computed in terms of what is proper to the species.[2] The interpretation of St Thomas has the obvious advantage of not restricting univocity to *species specialissimae*, an implied result of Alexander's reading of this passage and others like it. Moreover, it is in the light of the inequality of species, *secundum rationes proprias*, that Aquinas interprets Aristotle's allowance that there is a similarity between species and numbers.[3] If 1 is added to 3, a different species of number, 4, is obtained; likewise, if 1 is subtracted from 3.

Et hoc idea, quia ultima differentia dat speciem numero. Et similiter est in definitionibus, et in quod quid erat esse, quod significat definitio; quia quocumque minimo addito vel ablato, est alia natura speciei. Sicut enim substantia animata sensibilis tantum, est definitio animalis: cui si addas et rationale, constituis speciem hominis: si autem subtrahas sensibile, constituis speciem plantae, quia autem ultima differentia dat speciem.[4]

It will be noticed that the addition and subtraction referred to here are understood in terms of the tree of Porphyry in the genus of substance. There is priority and posteriority with respect to differences, but there is as well the scale of subaltern genera and consequently univocity. We shall see that no more than this is envisaged in our key text from the *De anima* and that, consequently, the common definition of soul is such that "soul" is predicated univocally of the various species of soul.[5]

We have already seen that St Thomas views the movement from the common definition of the soul to its "parts" as in accord with the order of doctrine. What is this order of doctrine? As laid down at the outset

[1] See *In Metaphysic.*, p. 210, 11, 3-6.

[2] *In III Metaphysic.*, lect. 8, n. 438: "Si igitur unum de multis sit primum, quod omnia participent, non oportet ponere aliquod separatum, quod omnia participant. Sed talia videntur omnia genera; quia omnes species generum inveniuntur differe secundum perfectius et minus perfectum. Et per consequens, secundum prius et posterius secundum naturam. Si igitur eorum quorum unum est prius altero, non est accipere aliquod commune separatum, si genus praeter species inveniatur, erunt 'schola aliorum,' idest erit eorum alia doctrina et regula, et non salvabitur in eis praedicta regula. Sed manifestum est quod inter individua unius speciei, non est unum prius et aliud posterius secundum naturam, sed solum tempore. Et ita species secundum scholam Platonis est aliquid separatum. Cum igitur communia sint principia inquantum sunt separata, sequitur quod sit magis principium species quam genus."

[3] *Metaphysics*, 1043b32-1044a2.

[4] *In VIII Metaphysic.*, lect. 3, nn. 1723-4.

[5] For a comparison of souls and numbers, see *In II de anima*, lect. 5, n. 288.

of the *Physics*, the order of determination (*ordo determinandi*)[1] moves from the confused to the distinct, from what is most easily known by us, which is a confused whole, to what is distinct, a movement which suggests the movement from genera to species.[2] Thus, we should expect that what St Thomas is getting at is this: first we come to generic knowledge of soul and then we proceed to determine the various species of soul.[3] And yet he speaks not of species of soul but of parts of the soul, that is, not of subjective parts, but of faculties or powers. This is something we will address ourselves to later, for there is a prior problem.

Aquinas describes what goes on in the *De anima* as a consideration of the soul *quasi in quadam abstractione*.[4] An indication of what he means is to be had when we notice that the *De anima* does not concern itself with living being in general, the composite, but with soul, the principle of life. It is as if the *Physics* concerned itself, not with mobile being, but with form. We shall not discuss here the reasons for this procedure,[5] but it can be seen that the soul is defined, at the beginning of Book Two, *ex additione*,[6] since body enters into the definition of soul, not as a part of what it is, but as its matter. Thus, what is being defined is precisely a form and this presents a problem because neither form alone nor matter alone can be the genus of things composed of matter and form.[7] The reason for this is that the genus is predicated of the whole of that of which it is the genus, but man is not soul. Rather the proximate genus of man is animal, and what constitutes this generic notion, formally, is sensitive soul from which the constitutive difference is taken to form the concept: animate sensitive substance. Form or soul, then, do not as such

[1] *In I Physic.*, lect. 1, n. 8.

[2] "Quod autem universalia sunt confusa manifestum est, quia universalia continent in potentia, et qui scit aliquid in universali scit illud indistincte; tunc autem distinguitur eius cognitio, quando unumquodque eorum quae continentur potentia in universali, actu cognoscitur: qui enim scit animal, non scit rationale nisi in potentia. Prius autem est scire aliquid in potentia quam in actu: secundum igitur hunc ordinem addiscendi quo procedimus de potentia in actum, prius quoad nos est scire animal quam hominem." — *In I Physic.*, lect. 1, n. 7; see *Ia*, q. 85, a. 3.

[3] Clearly, this is not a deductive process. See *In I Physic.*, lect. 1, n. 8.

[4] *In de sensu et sensato*, lect. 1, n. 2.

[5] See Charles DeKoninck, "Introduction à l'étude de l'âme," *Laval théologique et philosophique* (1947), Vol. 3, pp. 9-65.

[6] *Metaphysics*, Bk. 7, chapters 4-5.

[7] See *Ia*, q. 76, a. 3, ad 2; *II Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, a. 6. "...dicendum quod si anima sensibilis quae est in homine, collocarentur secundum se in genere vel specie, non essent unius generis; nisi forte logice loquendo secundum aliquam intentionem communem. Sed id quod est in genere et specie proprie, est compositum, quod utrobique est corruptibile." — *Q.D. de anima*, a. 11, ad 14. "...dicendum quod forma non est in aliquo genere, ut dictum est, unde, cum anima intellectiva sit forma hominis, non est in alio genere quam corpus, sed utrumque est in genere animalis et in specie hominis per reductionem." — *Ibid.*, a. 2, ad 10.

fall into genera and species, but they are reducible to them since they are principles of genera and species. This is a point we have to keep in mind when we speak of the way the common definition of soul is generic with respect to species of soul. For though soul is not the genus of the composite, the definition of soul expresses what the soul is; but in determining the predicable hierarchy of souls, we shall have to appeal to the hierarchy of genera which comprise composites. Nor is this surprising since soul is always defined *ex additione*.

There are two considerations preliminary to our main interest. First, we must see how we can say both that the species of a genus are simultaneous, that is, not related as prior and posterior, and, at the same time, maintain that the species of a genus are always such that one is prior to the other. In discussing priority and posteriority in the *Categories*, Aristotle indicates that the removal of what is prior entails the removal of what is posterior, but not vice versa. Thus, with respect to genus and species, if animal is removed so too is man, but not vice versa. Of course, if one posits the genus, a given species is not thereby posited, whereas the positing of a given species is *ipso facto* the positing of the genus. The same sort of thing obtains among certain species and the by now familiar example is number.[1] To posit 2 is not thereby to posit 3, which is consequent upon it, but to posit 3 is to posit 2, which is potentially contained in the consequent number. Now, when Aristotle goes on to talk of what is simultaneous, he gives as example the species of a genus.[2] Must we posit different types of species in order to understand these texts, namely species which are *consequenter se habentes* and those which are not? This is the tendency of the Alexandrian interpretation, but as can be seen, on that view, it is not so much a distinction of different kinds of species as a distinction of things which are species of a genus from those which are not, since things related as prior and posterior have a common name which is predicated of them equivocally *ad unum*. We have already seen that Aquinas disagrees with this by denying that the order *per prius et posterius* among species destroys the possibility of a common genus and univocation.

The species of a genus are constituted by differences and the difference of any genus are contraries and contraries are always related as prior and posterior. Indeed, one contrary will signify possession, the other lack or privation.[3] The species themselves need not be related as

[1] *Categories*, 14a30 ff.
[2] *Ibid.*, 14b32 ff.
[3] See *In X Metaphysic.*, lect. 6; *In I Metaphys.*, lect. 10, n. 7; *In II de coelo*, lect. 4, n. 8.

contraries, though sometimes they are, e.g. black and white, species of color, are considered to be contraries.[1] Man and brute, however, are not contraries, though their differences, rational and irrational, are contraries.[2] This is why St Thomas can say that species of a genus are always such that one is prior to the other. "Sed talia videntur omnia genera, quia omnes species generum inveniuntur differre secundum perfectius et minus perfectum. Et, per consequens, secundum prius et posterius secundum naturam."[3] Because this priority and posteriority of species is drawn from form, since difference is always formal, this type of inequality will not be had among individuals of an ultimate species, since they do not differ formally from one another.[4] Of course, one can be temporally prior to another.[5]

If the species of a genus are always related as prior and posterior, it seems impossible to maintain that they are equal or simultaneous, i.e. not related as prior and posterior. Indeed, we may feel strongly tempted by what seems to be the upshot of Alexander's view, namely that univocity can only be had when it is a question of an ultimate species and the individuals which fall under it. In the case of Aquinas, there seems to be a confusion between the analogous and univocal name if the genus is said of things related *per prius et posterius*. Yet there is no confusion on this score in Aquinas, for he asks us, in effect, to note the difference between a notion which is univocally common to things related *per prius et posterius* and a notion which is common *per prius et posterius*. Moreover, the basis for the difference is clear. Species of a genus are not unequal with respect to what the common notion expresses, but in terms of the differences which divide the genus and are not contained within it. If the differences were actually contained within the genus, it would not be a confused notion, but a contradictory one. This is why Aquinas will say that the species are prior and posterior *secundum naturam*,[6] *secundum esse*[7] or *secundum proprias rationes*,[8] and not according to the common intention which is the generic notion. It is only when the inequality is in terms of participation in the common notion itself that we have an analogous name. From the point of view of the generic notion, then, the species are "simultaneous" or equal: *parifican-*

[1] *In V Metaphysic.*, lect. 12, n. 917.
[2] See *In V Physic.*, lect. 3, nn. 4-5.
[3] *In III Metaphysic.*, lect. 8, n. 438.
[4] *II Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, a. 5, ad 3.
[5] *In III Metaphysic.*, lect. 8, n. 438.
[6] *Ibid.*
[7] *II Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, a. 5, ad 3.
[8] *In I Periherm.*, lect. 8, n. 6.

tur in intentione alicujus communis.[1] If by "number" we mean a multitude measured by unity, 2, 3, 4, etc. are equally numbers. Inequality is discovered only when we compare specific notions, what it is to be 2, what it is to be 3, and this inequality *non tollit univocationem.*[2]

The second preliminary consideration has to do with the hierarchy within the genus of substance and its comparison with that of numbers. The genus is had by considering matter as determined by a perfection such that further perfection is possible. Since the perfection of matter is form and some forms actuate matter so that it is substance which results, but not a living substance, substance can be considered as material with respect to the further perfection, living, and the imperfection, non-living. So too the notion of living substance, animate substance, can be considered as material with respect to the contrary differences, sensitive and non-sensitive. And so on from common and material notions to the specific notion which is not susceptible of further formal differentiation.[3] There are several things to notice about this hierarchy. First of all, though there are some things (for Aristotle, the four elements) which are substance and not alive, the genus, substance, does not signify them to the exclusion of living substance, even though living is not included in the generic notion since, if not expressed, neither is it prescinded from.[4] Indeed, it is because it is not expressed that non-living too is considered to be a difference which is formal with respect to *illud materiale unde sumitur genus.*[5] Secondly, the generic notion signifies, albeit confusedly, the whole of every substance and not just a part, even though a substance may be living, sensitive and rational as well. Thus the genus is said to be drawn from matter, not because it expressed only a part of the composite (or indeed undifferentiated matter), but because it is a notion which is material with respect to further determinations which are drawn from form. St Thomas has no patience with the view of Avicebron, according to whom there are distinct forms in man by one of which he is a substance, by another living, by another sensitive, by yet another rational, since this amounts to a reification of the multiplicity of concepts we require in order to form a distinct notion of man. Man, if a composite, is one and he is one because of one form thanks to which he is rational sensitive animate substance. The brute thanks to one form is sensitive animate substance; plant thanks to

[1] *I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 5, a. 2, ad 1.
[2] *In I Periherm.*, lect. 8, n. 6.
[3] *In Boethii de trinitate*, q. 4, a. 2.
[4] See *De ente*, cap. 4.
[5] *In Boethii de trinitate*, q. 4, a. 2.

one form is animate substance and it is thanks to its form that the element is a substance. It is just this which explains why the species of things can be compared with numbers.[1]

If "sensitive" be subtracted from "sensitive animate substance" (the definition of animal), the result is the definition of plant, just as, if "rational" be added, the definition of man results. So too with numbers: if we add or substract 1 from 3 we get different species of number. Moreover, just as 2 is in a fashion present in 3, so the definition of plant is present in that of animal. We should not be misled by this comparison, however. Above all, we should not take "living body" or "animate substance," the genus, to be identical with the species, plant. The genus is common to plants and animals and men; the notion mentioned could only be the definition of plant if it prescinded from "sensitive" which, as generic, it does not do. Furthermore, though it is a genus which includes man, it is not his proximate genus. Thus, if "animate substance" be taken as a genus which includes plants, brutes and men, it is not the proximate genus of them all, for it is as material first of all to the differences "sensitive" and "non-sensitive" and the genus which results from the addition of "sensitive" is as matter to those differences whereby the species man and brute are constituted.

These preliminary remarks enable us to turn now to the likening of the various kinds of soul to figures and numbers. We have already pointed out that soul as such is not placed in a genus. Were we to locate the common definition if soul[2] in the hierarchy just discussed, it would fall within the genus, animate substance. Just as that genus is univocally common to all living things, so the definition of soul is univocally common to all souls. If we then ask what the relation of this common definition of the soul is to the parts of the soul, this is because the species of soul are known and denominated from these powers[3] which, in turn, are known from operations; operations are distinguished from one another by reference to their objects.[4] The parts or faculties are not themselves subjective parts of soul nor reducible to the same genus as soul, since soul is a substantial principle and its "parts" are accidents, though proper ones.[5] The common definition of soul is material with respect to

[1] See *In VIII Metaphysic.*, lect. 3, nn. 1723-4; *In V Physic.*, lect. 3.

[2] *De anima*, 412a27-8.

[3] "Quibuscumque autem inest unum solum praedictorum (sc. partium) oportet quod illud sit anima. In quibus vero insunt plura, quodlibet est pars animae; sed illa anima denominatur a principaliori, vel sensitiva, vel intellectiva." — *In II de anima*, lect. 4, n. 270.

[4] 415a16-23.

[5] See *Q.D. de spiritualibus creaturis*, a. 11, corpus and ad 2; *De ente*, cap. 3.

the further determinations, sensitive and non-sensitive. "Life," as it enters into the common definition, is appropriated to vegetative life.[1] The sensitive soul is the principle both of vegetative and sensitive operations through the medium of the appropriate powers or parts. Taken as genus, sensitive soul does not prescind from rationality and hence does not pertain to brutes as opposed to man, but to both equally: thus the species, brute soul, is constituted by the difference, irrational.[2] The same must be said of the common definition of soul; as genus it is not to be confused with plant soul, which is a species of it constituted by the difference, non-sensitive, which thereby prescinds from further perfection, something the genus does not do. Thus, though the common definition of soul is the proximate genus of plant soul, it is not the proximate genus of rational soul. On the basis of our previous remarks about numbers and the hierarchy of generic predicates, it can be seen that there is nothing particularly unique in the likening of souls and numbers, or souls and figures.[3] Subtract "sensitive" from "sensitive soul" and the result is, in a sense, the definition of plant soul; add "rational" and the result is the definition of human soul. Again, the genus, which does not prescind from sensitive, should not be confused with the species, plant soul, which does so prescind, anymore than the genus, sensitive soul, should be confused with its species, the soul of brutes. So too, if the sensitive soul is said to have the perfection of plant soul and more besides, this means that all three types of soul give rise to the genus which is the common definition of soul, but that whereas the species, plant soul, is constituted by the imperfection, non-sensitive, both rational and brute soul give rise to the addition, sensitive, which, when made, forms a genus which is material with respect to the further perfection, rational, in the case of the human soul, and to the imperfection, non-rational, in the case of the brute soul. Thus the plant soul which has vegetative powers alone is not a reification of the genus, no more than brute soul is a reification of the genus, sensitive soul. The common definition of the soul, then, is a genus univocally common to the three species of soul in terms of the hierarchy just sketched, and

[1] *In II de anima*, lect. 3, n. 258. This appropriation is clear in the second definition of soul; see *ibid.*, lect. 4, n. 273 (414a12-13).

[2] *Quodl.* XI, q. 5, a. un., ad 4: "...dicendum quod licet anima sensitiva sit communis in nobis et brutis quantum ad rationem *generis*, tamen quantum ad rationem *speciei*, alia est in homine et alia in brutis; et similiter alia in asino, et alia in equo et in bove. Et secundum quod differunt alique specie, ita etiam differt in eis anima sensitiva; et ideo non sequitur, si in brutis educatur de potentia materiae, quod etiam in homine; quia in homine est altioris speciei, et per creationem."

[3] Both comparisons are made in *In II de anima*, lect. 5.

these species are subjective parts. The reason for comparing them with types of figure, and the danger involved in doing so, should now be clear.

It will be appreciated that the relation of the common definition of soul to its subjective parts is a different question from the relation of human soul to its parts, powers or faculties, even though the species of soul are known and denominated from powers. The soul and its species are reductively in the genus of substance,[1] and the general rule that the genus is predicated *in quid* and univocally of its species is applicable to soul and its subjective parts. The parts or powers of soul, on the other hand, are accidents and soul cannot be predicated of them except in the way a subject can be predicated of its proper accidents.[2]

It has not been our purpose to argue that St Thomas' interpretation of Aristotle is the correct one, although we feel this could be shown. Rather, moving from the fact that his interpretation is different from the more influential one of Alexander, we have indicated that both men are consistent in their reading of similar passages, that their conflicting reading of the *De anima* passage is only what we might expect. What is more, we found that an understanding of St Thomas reading of our key passage sheds indirect light on his doctrine of the analogy of names. It is not just any priority and posteriority among things having a common name which renders that name analogous. Indeed, we can see that, if he accepted Alexander's view, the only univocal names he could allow would be those signifying a *species specialissima.* It is not without interest that some have presented Alexander's view that "soul" is equivocally or analogously common to species of soul as the view of St Thomas as well. Were that identification—which is quite without basis—to be coupled with the alleged Thomistic view that the species is analogously common to individuals, because of their different acts of existence, univocity would completely disappear from Thomism. By seeing that the inequality of species, *secundum esse,* does not destroy univocity on the part of the genus, we are in a better position to grasp Aquinas' doctrine on univocity and analogy. The occurrence of the phrase *secundum esse* here ought to give pause to those who find in *esse* the *clef de voûte* of everything Aquinas taught, not least of all of analogy. But surely there should be no need to point out that it is not *esse* that explains analogy; rather, analogy must be invoked to deal with the peculiar behavior of words like *ens* and *esse.*

[1] Insofar as the human soul can exist apart from body it is in some sense a *hoc aliquid.*

[2] For a discussion of soul as a potential whole, see Carl A. Lofy, S. J., "The Meaning of Potential Whole in St Thomas Aquinas," *The Modern Schoolman,* (1959), Vol. 37, pp. 39-48.

APPENDIX[0]

ON THE MEANING OF " 'ANALOGY' IS ANALOGICAL"*

by

JOHN E. THOMAS

In his recent book *The Logic of Analogy*,[1] Ralph M. McInerny makes the repeated claim that "'analogy' is analogous." In the pages that follow this claim will be examined in some detail and an attempt made to fill out McInerny's terse account. The issues raised by the dictum "'analogy' is analogous" are extremely difficult and complicated. This present paper, therefore, does not pretend to solve these problems. The reflections of this paper are offered rather in the hope that the problems may be somewhat clarified and the issues at stake brought once again into clear focus.

To facilitate the examination of the meaning of "'analogy' is analogous," we shall take as our point of departure Austin Farrer's view that analogy presupposes complexity in the things compared.[2] The adoption of this insight commits us to the following general formulation of analogy: "x is analogous to y with respect to z." If sustitute for the word "analogy" the word "like" we shall be further committed, at least tentatively, to treat analogy as a *species* of likeness. It will somewhat simplify matters if the linguistic issues are kept distinct from the ontological issues. We have in mind here McInerny's distinction between *dicuntur* and *sunt* and between *rationes* and *entia*. This qualification demands a revision of the proposed schema so that it reads: the expression 'a' is like the expression 'b' with respect to C (where C is a property signified by 'a' and 'b' in a given context).[3]

* I am grateful to Professor Ralph M. McInerny of the University of Notre Dame for his helpful criticisms of an earlier draft of this paper. I must assume full responsibility for any obscurities that remain particularly where our views tend to differ.

[1] Ralph M. McInerny, *The Logic of Analogy* (the Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961) pp. 4, 33, 168 ff. It is clear from the last two references that McInerny is concerned with the expression "analogy."

[2] One can forsee the problems for this view in the case of God s nature which, according to tradition, is simple. We shall have to advocate at least a notional distinction of, for example, essence and existence in God if our analogical schemata are to have any purchase.

[3] The schema focusses attention on the properties as signified rather than the properties as exemplified.

[0] I am grateful to Professor Thomas for permission to include here this essay. He and I are continuing our discussions and expect to publish more later.

Such a general formulation of analogy is calculated to rule out, at least for purposes of the present paper, the need to consider *things* claimed to be analogous.

The view of analogy proposed here is very much like a definition *per genus et per differentiam* in the following way: both proceed on the assumption that some properties signified by expressions are complex in the sense of being analyzable into two or more properties. We offer as a paradigm for complex property *the property of being human* signified by the word "man." This property can be analyzed into *the property of being animal* and *the property of being rational* (signified, respectively, by the expressions "animal" and "rational" in terms of which "man," traditionally, has been defined).

In addition to providing a paradigm for complex property (and indirectly for complex expression) demanded by the rubric "*x* is like *y* with respect to *z*," the word "man" is useful in carrying the inquiry into the meaning of "'analogy' is analogous" one stage farther.

Employing the L*xyz* formula let us consider what it would mean to say "man" and "horse" are analogous in meaning. Let "man" signify the properties of *being an animal* and of *being rational* (dubbed respectively A and R) and let "horse" signify the properties of *being an animal* and *being a quadruped* (dubbed respectively A and Q). We are now in a position to claim that "man" is analogous to "horse" with respect to A. Customarily, however, the expression "animal" as predicated of horses and men is acknowledgedly univocal.[1] We cannot, therefore, harmonize the general schema of analogy with the claim that "animal" is univocal, for on the latter assumption the comparison of "man" and "animal" is an instance of the rubric "*x* is the same as *y* with respect to *z*" rather than of the rubric "*x* is like *y* with respect to *z*." Nevertheless our example seems to meet Aquinas' criterion that analogy be a *via media* between univocity and equivocity.[2] To be univocal two expressions must have exactly the same signification *i.e.* signify exactly the same properties, (e.g. "a" signifying FG and "b" signifying FG). By parity of reasoning two expressions are equivocal if they signify no properties in common (e.g. "a" signifying FG and "c" signifyin LM). The example offered above avoids both extremes, the expressions "man" and "horse" are partly univocal (i.e. they have A in common) and partly equivocal ("man" signifies R and "horse" signifies Q). The admission of partial univocity, however, seems to be ruled out by

[1] Speaking "*secundum intentionem.*"
[2] *Summa Theologiae* I q 13 a 5.

McInerny's caution (which seems to be well founded in the Thomistic tradition) ..."we must never confuse the *ratio communis* of an analogous name with the *ratio communis* of the univocal name."[1] Granted this proviso, the likeness at the basis of analogical comparisons cannot be univocity. This insight could be made more explicit in the case of the example under consideration as follows:

(1) *m* and *h* are analogous in meaning if *m* signifies A_1R and *h* signifies A_2Q and A_1 is like but not indentical with A_2 *i.e.* $[L(A_1, A_2)] \& (A_1 \neq A_2)$.

The clause $[L(A_1, A_2)] \& (A_1 \neq A_2)$ tells us (a) A_1 is like A_2 (in some undefined sense of "like") and (b) specifies that however "like" is to be defined it must not be defined in terms of identity. The clause fails, however, to furnish any positive clue whatsoever about the nature of likeness which would qualify for incorporation into an adequate definition of analogy.

In his *The Logic of Analogy* McInerny speaks of the..." *commune analogicum* which is opposed to the *genus univocum.*"[2] We shall attempt to understand this within the framework of our proposed schema. Could the *ratio communis* of analogous expressions be analogy?[3] As unpromising as this idea sounds let us pursue it a little farther. For $[L(A_1, A_2)] \& (A_1 \neq A_2)$ let us substitute $AN(A_1, A_2)$. The introduction of this clause in (1) would involve treating the genus of animal as analogical. McInerny does speak of treating genus, in certain contexts, *largo modo*, though it is quite clear that the genus of animal would *not* be included in this category. At this point we shall persist in drawing out the lessons of our chosen example while recognizing that it constitutes an extension of McInerny's genus *largo modo*. The difficulties with treating analogy as the *ratio communis* of analogous expressions can be brought out in the following manner. Generalizing (1) we arrive at the following definition of analogy:

(2) Two expressions *x* and *y* are analogous if *x* signifes G,F and *y* signifies G_2H and $[(L(G_1, G_2)] \& (G_1 \neq G_2)$.

If for $[L(G_1, G_2)] \& (G_1 \neq G_2)$ we substitute $AN(G_1, G_2)$ we derive the following formula:

(3) Two expressions *x* and *y* are analogous if *x* signifies G_1F and *y* signifies G_2H and $AN(G_1, G_2)$.

[1] McInerny *ibid.*, p. 79.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 135.
[3] Put this bluntly the proposal would be rejected by McInerny. Since, however, we are seeking to get at the adjectival form of "analogy" in "'analogy is analogous," if not analogy then something very much like it seems to be called for.

A number of difficulties emerge in connection with (3). *First*, the definition is overtly circular in that it defines analogy in terms of itself. *Second*, if one attempts to avoid the circularity by an appeal to differences of types claiming that the clause AN(G_1, G_2) is concerned with analogous properties rather than analogous expressions, it is difficult to see what has been gained. Presumably what it means to say G_1 and G_2 are analogous is that G_1 and G_2 are analyzable respectively into, say, LM_1 and M_2N. Such an interpretation is open to two objections. In the first place, even if it does not mean the same to say that properties are analogous as to say expressions are analogous, the notion of analogous properties is no clearer than the notion of analogous expressions. No clarity has been achieved by the introduction of the clause AN(G_1, G_2). In the second place, the same difficulties recur in the case of M^1 and M^2 as with G^1 and G_2. To subject M_1 and M_2 to the same analysis of G_1 and G_2 would lead to an infinite regress. Nor could the regress be avoided by claiming that the expressions "s" (signifying G_1) and "t" (signifying G_2) are analogous, since the same claim would now have to be made for, say, "v" (signifying M_1) and "w" (signifying M_2) and so on *ad infinitum*.

Third (and this is directly related to this last comment) if we are to succeed in specifying a meaning for "'analogy' is analogous," it would seem that the expression "analogy" itself must be included among the possible substitution instances for *x* and *y* in (3). Failing this we should be specifying what it means to say that two expressions *other than* the word "analogy" (but falling under the general definition of analogy) are analogous. The moral of this being that a part of what is meant by "'analogy' is analogous" is that the expression "analogy" itself can be a substitution instance for *x* and *y* in (3). We shall now explore this possibility in some detail.

On the basis of the submission just made the claim "'analogy' is analogous" involves a comparison of two occurrences of the expression "analogy" itself. Let us begin with a comparison of "a_1" and "a_2" (two occurrences of "analogy" in the sense of analogy of attribution). We shall first analyze "a_1" along the following lines. The expression "$healthy_1$" and "$healthy_2$" are analogous by analogy of attribution. This claim is to be made good by showing that "h_1" and "h_2" conform to the L*xyz* formula. There is, however, a prior question that demands attention, namely: In virtue of what characteristic or characteristics are "h_1" and "h_2" analogous by analogy of attribution? On closer scrutiny "h_1" and "h_2", respectively, turn out to be elliptical for "*x* is

the cause of health" and "*y* is the sign of health"[1] where *health* in the expanded expressions is being employed in the primary sense (i.e. as predicated of living organisms). We shall now attempt to specify the necessary characteristics of analogy of attribution.[2] They are: (A) "h_1" and "h_2" are dyadic predicate terms of the form "...R..."; (B) the first slot in "...R..." is a place marker for an individual variable; (C) the second slot in "...R..." is a place marker for a monadic predicate term employed in its primary sense.

It is not difficult now to show that "a_1" (the comparison of "h_1" and "h_2") conforms to the L*xyz* formula. The substitution instances for *x* and *y* are dyadic predicate terms of the form "...R..." ("h_1" and "h_2" are such terms) while *z* serves as a place marker for the characteristics ABC. Making the appropriate substitutions we get Lh_1h_2ABC which is clearly of the L*xyz* form. What it means, then, to say that "h_1" and "h_2" are analogous by analogy of attribution is that they are similar with respect to ABC. Strictly speaking we *should* say that "h_1" and "h_2" are *the same* with respect to ABC, but if we do we run afoul of McInerny's caution ..."we must never confuse the *ratio communis* of an analogous name with the *ratio communis* of the univocal name." Have we not done this very thing here? But this is not the only difficulty. So far we have not even succeeded in comparing "a_1" and "a_2". We have been preoccupied with showing that "h_1" and "h_2" are *bona fide* instances of analogy of attribution. To facilitate a comparison of "a_1" and "a_2" we could analyze "$wealthy_1$" and "$wealthy_2$" along the lines of "healthy" above and let this count as an analysis of "a_2". We encounter the same difficulty as before. Since „a_1" (analyzable into "h_1" and "h_2") and "a_2" (analyzable into "w_1" and "w_2") share the characteristics ABC both are univocal in that respect. We have worked our way back to a view of analogy of attribution, at least, that is based on univocity, a position which presumably the dictum "'analogy' is analogical" was originally calculated to avoid.

Possibly the difficulty just raised could be avoided by pointing out that the dictum "'analogy' is analogous" does not legislate for cases where two occurrences of the expression "analogy" with exactly the same signification (*viz.* analogy of attribution) are in question but only

[1] For the justification for this analysis see *Summa Theologiae* I q 13 a 6, *De Nominum Analogia* cap. 2 para. 8 and E. L. Mascall s *Existence and Analogy* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1949), p. 101 ff.

[2] I am not here prepared to do battle for these characteristics. They have been arrived at simply on the basis of generalizing examples taken from Aquinas, Cajetan and Mascall for the purpose of illustrating the *sort* of thing needed to clarify the meaning of "'analogy' is analogous."

for cases where different though related senses of "analogy" are involved. The word "analogous" in "'analogy' is analogous" tries to pick up this "different though related senses" just alluded to. Presumably, then, a comparison of "a_1" (analogy of attribution) and "a_3" (analogy of proper proportionality) would be a fairer sample of the situation for which the dictum prescribes. We shall now explore this possibility.

If we take as definitive Aquinas' claim that analogy of proper proportionality is "a similitude of two proportions,"[1] we can then make some headway in preparing the ground for a comparison of "a_1" and "a_3". Both Aquinas' and Cajetan's treatment of proper proportionality is based on the mathematical model 2:4:3:6 with the appropriate weakening of *identity of relations* (here "half of") to *similarity of relations* in fields of investigation where mathematical precision is impossible.[2] In the familiar proportionality schema – God's essence is to God's existence as a man's essence is to a man's existence – given St. Thomas' proviso we are comparing R_1 (the relation of the divine essence to the divine existence) with R_2 (the relation of human essence to human existence). To facilitate the comparison one could substitute "...is appropriate to..." for R_1 and R_2. Granted difficulties will be encountered in specifying a precise meaning for "...is appropriate to... nevertheless it serves meanwhile to focus attention on the fact that we are comparing two expressions of the form "...R...". As with analogy of attribution we shall attempt to enumerate the characteristics of "a_3" and to show that it conforms to the L*xyz* formula. The characteristics are: (A) *x* and *y* in the L*xyz* formula are place-markers for dyadic predicate terms of the form "...R..."; (D) the comparison of such terms (e.g. "...is appropriate to_1..." and "...is appropriate to_2..." is with respect to "...R... (contrast this with analogy of attribution where R_1 = "...cause of..." and R_2 = "...sign of..."); (E) the slots in "...R..." are place markers for variables ranging over individuals, properties, activities and so on. That "a_3" is of the L*xyz* formula can be shown by making the appropriate substitutions thus L(R_1, R_2) (ADE). We are now in a position to compare "a_1" and "a_3". They are similar with respect to A but different in the following respects – "a_1" has characteristics BC and "a_3", characteristics DE. We now run again into the old Phocian rampart ..."we must never confuse the *ratio communis* of an analogous name with the *ratio communis* of the univocal name." Working within the pre-

[1] ..."*similitudo duarum ad invicem proportionem*"... *De Veritate* II, 11 c.

[2] *Summa Theologiae* I q 13 a 2 c.f. *De Veritate* 9 a 12 and 9 a 13 and *De Nominum Analogia* cap. 3, para. 24.

scribed limits we have set for ourselves, we are committed to the view that "a_1" and "a_3" are the same with respect to A and clearly "the same with respect to A" or "*x* and *y* in the L*xyz* formula are place markers for dyadic relations of the form '...R...'" are as univocal as one can get. Perhaps the way around this difficulty is to attempt to *weigh* the characteristics. That "a_1" and "a_3" exemplify the form R*xy* is such a general property, that given this criterion alone all dyadic relational terms are analogous. But rather than eliminate this characteristic all together perhaps one or more of the other characteristics could be ranked higher in order of importance. On the face of it, it would be a tall order to arbitrate between BC and DE (since these are the respects in which "a_1" and "a_3" are claimed to differ). In principle, one line of analysis is closed to us, namely, the unpacking of AB and DE (treated as complex properties) in the quest for a common core. This is *not* to say that it is impossible to arbitrate between BC and DE or that in singling out BC and DE that the last word has been said on the selection of the characteristics of analogy of attribution and of analogy of proper proportionality. It is safe to say, however, that the task of weighting the given characteristics or the quest for further characteristics, if successful, would solve the problem of analogy. If one can contribute to that ultimate solution even if only by erecting the sign *cul de sac* over certain lines of investigation, then this will be its own reward.

The reader is likely to be as disappointed with this paper as a freshman with one of Plato's dialogues. The problem posed by the dictum "'analogy' is analogical" is still unsolved. It may be objected that the faillure to avoid univocity in the foregoing account springs from (a) the classification of analogy as a species of likeness and (b) from the choice of the man-horse model which is acknowledgedly based on univocity. This objection is not without force. By way of rejoinder, however, it should be pointed out that the alternative classification of analogy as a species of equivocity does not avoid the difficulties encountered above. One would still have to show that "a_1" and "a_3" are not totally equivocal or that they have some property or properties in common. We are at once confronted with our self-appointed task of finding "something common" other than univocity. Furthermore, while it is true that the man-horse model is based on univocity, it primarily functions *negatively* to rule out identifying the *ratio communis* with the *genus univocum*.

While no positive solution to the problems posed by "'analogy' is

analogous" has been achieved in the foregoing pages, the following indications of the direction in which the solution should be sought may prove of value. First, the clue to the understanding of "'analogy' is analogous" is to be sought in a comparison of (at least) two occurrences of the expression "analogy" itself and two occurrences like "a_1" and "a_3" rather than two occurrences like "a_1" and "a_2". This insight emerged where it was suggested that the range of substitution instances for x and y in (3) be extended to include the expression "analogy" itself. Second, this last insight suggests another possibility – that the definition of analogy is self-referential. Third, clearly what stands in the way of specifying the meaning of "'analogy' is analogous" is the failure to solve the problem of the *ratio communis* of analogous expressions. It would appear that we need something sufficiently like analogy to warrant saying "'analogy' is analogous" rather than "'analogy' is univocal" or "'analogy' is equivocal" but not so like it as to blur the distinction between the *commune analogicum* and the *genus univocum*. This sounds like an impossible task, but the limits within which the meaning of "'analogy' is analogous" must be clarified have been set by tradition and not by the present writer. The difficulties encountered in this paper are the direct consequence of these limits.

John E. Thomas
Philosophy Department
McMaster University
Hamilton, Ontario