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
JOHN CAHILL O.P.

THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE THEOLOGICAL CENSURES
AFTER THE COUNCIL OF TRENT

(1563-1709)

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"Satis non est haeticam pravitatem evitare, sed oportet illos quoque errores diligenter fugere, qui ad illam plus minusve accedunt; quare omnes debent etiam constitutiones et decreta servare quibus pravae huiusmodi opiniones a Sancta Sede proscriptae et prohibitae sunt".

(C. I. C., can. 1324.)

PREFACE

The idea of this work first presented itself to me when I was teaching dogmatic theology at Tallaght, Co. Dublin. The fact that not all the propositions condemned by the Church are heretical, but that there are greater and less degrees in heterodoxy and corresponding dogmatic censures, then took on for me a new force and a particular significance. A study having for its object the nature of these censures seemed feasible, not from the point of view of their actual application, but in virtue of the fact that opposites throw light on each other. In other words, a study of the different modes of heterodoxy should enlighten us on orthodoxy. An investigation into the nature of the dogmatic censures should bring out more clearly the nature of orthodox theology according to the mind of the Church.

Later, I put this idea before Fr. Hoffmann O. P. at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland, and he gave me every encouragement. I now take the opportunity of thanking him for his help and direction in this undertaking, and also Fr. Stirnimann O. P., professor at the same university, for many valuable suggestions. The Commission of the *Studia Friburgensia* has been pleased to accept this work for inclusion in its collection. It is now offered in the hope of making some contribution, no matter how small, in the domain of theology and to the advancement of truth.

JOHN CAHILL O. P.

SIGLA

- DTC** = Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique.
Dz = Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridion Symbolorum, ed. 24-25, Barcelona 1948.
Hurter N. L. = Hurter S. J., Nomenclator Literarius Theologiae Catholicae, ed. 3, Oeniponte 1907.
Msi = Mansi, I. D., Sacrorum Conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio, Florentiae 1759 seqq.
T. C. C. = Migne, J. P., Theologiae Cursus Completus, Parisiis 1839.

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the nature of the more important theological censures which are less than heresy. The theological or dogmatic censures — as distinct from ecclesiastical censures — represent different modes of deviation from Catholic truth. Heresy is naturally the greatest form of deviation, in so far as it represents immediate and direct opposition to what the Church holds to be doctrine of faith. However, there are different degrees of error which do not imply such blatant opposition to faith as the heretical proposition, and it is these lower degrees of heterodoxy which we wish to investigate.

From the earliest times the Church has always been vigilant in defending the deposit of faith, and has condemned as heretical a host of perverse doctrines which appeared in the course of centuries. However, it was not only the censure of heresy which the Church applied. There is ample evidence of opinions being condemned as *haeresi proxima*, *haeresim sapiens*, *de haeresi suspecta*, etc.

The origin of the lesser dogmatic censures is lost in antiquity. They were applied by the universities and theologians long before they were officially used by the Church in dogmatic condemnations. However, as we shall presently see, no serious effort was made to determine their meaning until the sixteenth century.

The Church never explained officially the meaning of these lesser censures. This was left to the interpretation of the theologians; so that to-day there are many and varied opinions regarding the nature of the lesser doctrinal censures. It is in the hope of gleaning some concrete information from the most reliable sources that we undertake our present investigation. In this way it may be possible to construct an authoritative definition and description of each censure.

It is hardly necessary to stress the utility and importance of our project. These censures are intimately connected with faith and the

very principles of theology. Consequently, it is imperative that the theologian should be equipped with an authoritative interpretation of the theological censures to enable him to understand the mind of the Church, as expressed in so many dogmatic condemnations. Likewise, from the point of view of giving a theological judgment on questionable doctrine, a knowledge of the doctrinal censures is indispensable.

The title of this dissertation suggests that we have selected the post-Tridentine period for special investigation, and that we are going to trace the development of the censures during that time. While all this is quite true, there is still need for clarification. Firstly, though the post-Tridentine period is the main field of our research, we are not confining ourselves to it. As we shall presently see, it will often be necessary to investigate opinions which were advanced both before and long after the Council of Trent. Secondly, though we shall proceed in chronological order, our aim is not purely historical. As stated in the very first line of the introduction, the purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the nature of the lesser theological censures, and not just an historical study. However, the best way to investigate the nature of these censures is to trace their development after the Council of Trent. In short, the selection of the post-Tridentine period and the tracing of the development of the censures is a means to an end. It is our contention that this is the best means to suit our purpose. This relationship between the means and the end will become much clearer if, at this stage, we give the results of our preliminary research.

The Council of Constance (1414-1418) is of great importance for many reasons. There is one aspect of this council, however, which is very rarely stressed and yet, from the point of view of theological censures, it may be termed as epoch-making. It is not so much the fact that so many articles of Wyclif and Huss were condemned, as the mode in which these propositions were censured. Here the Church applied cumulative censures, or as it was termed in the language of later theologians, condemned the propositions *in globo*. In this special mode of condemnation instead of censuring each error specifically, a list of the unorthodox propositions was drawn up and to it was affixed a number of theological censures. This meant that there was no proposition which did not incur at least one of the censures, and that each censure named could be applied to at least one of the given articles. As to which censure each proposition merited, however, the Church

did not determine. That was a matter which was left to the interpretation of the theologians. In the mind of the Church it sufficed that such errors should be condemned, and thus the faithful were put on their guard against them.

It was only natural that the curiosity of the theologians should have been aroused as to the nature of these censures which were thus applied by the Church. We are not surprised, therefore, in finding this question discussed in most of the theological treatises which were written immediately after the Council of Constance¹. It was in his consideration of heresy that the theologian usually enquired into the nature of the doctrinal censures which are less than heresy.

In the post-Constance period, the main authorities on these censures were S. Antoninus O. P. († 1459), Turrecremata O. P. († 1468), Silvester Prierias O. P. († 1523), Alphonsus de Castro O. Min. († 1558), and Jacobus (Didacus) de Simancas († 1583). These theologians were pioneers in interpreting the lesser theological censures. They were obviously groping in the dark, seeking out the most likely explanation in each case. We shall see that most of the opinions put forward between Constance and Trent were totally abandoned in later years. However, they served as a starting point for subsequent theologians who gained at least some negative knowledge from the mass of conflicting views.

Immediately after the Council of Trent, considerable progress was made regarding the interpretation of the theological censures in the doctrine of Melchior Cano O. P. He minutely examined and rejected the main opinions which existed before his time, and made full use of every piece of evidence which he could glean from the condemnations issued at Constance to guide him in his project. Unlike his predecessors, Cano was not satisfied with a few lines of explanation. He gave an adequate description of each censure, and brought forward arguments to establish his doctrine.

¹ It was often taken for granted by these theologians that the first dogmatic condemnations *in globo* took place at the Council of Constance. This supposition was false, however, since this mode of censuring was observed by the Church in the condemnation of the Fraticelli in the year 1318 (cf. Dz 484-490); Marsilius Patavini and Ioannes de Ianduno in the year 1327 (cf. Dz 495-500), and in the condemnation of Ekard in 1329 (cf. Dz 501-529). Admitting that the lower censures and the particular mode of condemnation which was termed *in globo*, were officially used by the Church before Constance, nevertheless, it was this council which put them before the public eye and aroused speculation as to their nature.

However, writing at such an early date with nothing but the decrees of the Council of Constance to guide him, Cano was at a great disadvantage and made many mistakes, as became evident in the light of subsequent condemnations. Nevertheless, his exposition began a new epoch in the development of the censures. After him, theologians had something more definite to work on in so far as many outstanding difficulties were now solved. Ideas gradually became clearer and more definite until the year 1709, when Antonio de Panormo's *Scrutinium Doctrinarum* appeared. We refer to the years which intervened between Cano and Panormo as the post-Tridentine period. It was during this time that all the main opinions regarding the censures were put forward. After Panormo, theologians were content merely to quote from their predecessors, and their doctrine differed according to the authority which they used.

We have now set out three great periods in the history of the theological censures. Firstly, there was the post-Constance period (1418-1563 A. D.). Hardly any opinion which was advanced at this stage survived in later years. Secondly, there was the post-Tridentine period which began with the publication of Cano's *De Locis Theologicis* (1563) and lasted until the year 1709, when Panormo's *Scrutinium Doctrinarum* appeared. During these years the problem of interpreting the lower theological censures was seriously considered. Thirdly, we have the modern period which began after Panormo. In this period very little advance was made, and theologians were content to depend on their predecessors rather than give the problem serious attention themselves.

Thus far it has been explained why our choice fell on the post-Tridentine period to investigate the evolution of the censures. But now another problem arises; which theologians are to be consulted? This difficulty is easily solved since the number of authors in this period who wrote on the censures and made a real contribution towards their correct interpretation, is comparatively small. The main opinions were advanced by the following theologians: Melchior Cano († 1560), Jacobus de Simancas (in the second edition of his *Institutiones Catholicae*), Banez († 1604), Petrus de Lorca O. Cist. († 1606), Franciscus Suarez S. J. († 1617), Joannes de Lugo S. J. († 1660), the Carmelites of Salamanca (their tract on faith was written in 1676 and first published in 1679), Laurentius Brancatus de Lauria O. Min. Conv. († 1693) and Antonio de Panormo, (it is not known when he died, but he certainly was

living in the year 1714). The authority of each one of these authors will be made clear when we examine their doctrine in detail. Some were more important than others, and made greater contributions towards giving a clear interpretation of each censure.

Even though the above mentioned theologians are the main authorities, we shall not confine ourselves to them. For instance, to understand correctly the doctrine of Cano it will be necessary to examine the opinions which preceded him and the difficulties he had to face. Likewise, it will often be necessary to go beyond Antonio de Panormo and see how a particular interpretation fared in later years. However, the main authorities are those we have cited above. These were the only opinions which were referred to in later years. Consequently, in examining the post-Tridentine period we are simultaneously examining and judging a host of opinions which were advanced in the modern period because, as we have stated, the modern authors blindly followed the opinions of the earlier theologians.

So far we have determined the period of our investigation and the authors who are to be consulted. Here another problem arises; how are we to judge the individual opinions? We have already pointed out that the Church never determined the nature of the lower censures but left this matter for the theologians to interpret. As we shall presently see, there was no unanimity regarding the nature of each censure. Since our purpose is to find out the most authoritative interpretation in each case, we must have some criteria to judge the individual opinions.

Firstly, we ourselves shall make a careful analysis of each opinion, and closely examine the arguments brought forward in its support. Then we shall see the theologians discussing the opinions of one another and advancing arguments for and against in each case. We shall carefully note such criticism, and when we think that a particular doctrine or opinion is sufficiently disproved, we shall abandon it as a suitable explanation of the censure in question. However, the greatest criterion we shall use will be the official or dogmatic condemnations of the Church.

The interest of the theologians regarding the nature of the theological censures was first aroused when the Council of Constance condemned several articles of Wyclif and Huss *in globo*. After Constance, this interest was kept alive by many subsequent similar condemnations. This mode of censuring *in globo* did not end with the Council of

Constance. As we shall presently see, it continued until the eighteenth century when Pope Clement XI used it for the last time in condemning the errors of Quesnel. The theologians carefully considered all these condemnations in the hope of gleaning any evidence available to help them in interpreting the censures. If, for instance, two censures were applied in the same dogmatic condemnation, this was a sign that according to the mind of the Church these censures are distinct from each other. Likewise, the theologians considered the enumeration of the censures in each cumulative condemnation. If the censure of *error* was listed immediately after heresy, (as is the case in the condemnations applied by the Council of Constance) this constituted a sign that *error* is the next gravest censure after heresy. Further down we shall make a list of all the dogmatic condemnations which took place between Constance and 1713 A. D., and in which the lower theological censures were applied. We shall carefully examine the text of each decree, and then when we discuss the doctrine of any theologian, we shall take into account what dogmatic condemnations were available to him, and what evidence was at hand. If his doctrine should be in contradiction to later decrees of which he was not aware, then we shall abandon it as a suitable explanation of the censure in question.

As we shall see later on, a number of theologians based an interpretation of a censure on the use of a particular word in a dogmatic condemnation. In such a case, we shall examine later condemnations to see if their theory was corroborated. If, for instance, we should see Melchior Cano holding that the erroneous proposition is contrary to *doctrina catholica* because the Council of Constance stated that some of the articles of Wyclif and Huss were '*non catholici sed erronei*', we shall make a careful study of this condemnation to see if the term '*non catholici*' governs the erroneous propositions alone. Then we shall examine later dogmatic condemnations to see if they used similar expressions.

These then are our criteria for judging the different interpretations of the theological censures: firstly, we shall make a careful analysis of each opinion ourselves; secondly, we shall study the criticisms which theologians make of one another's doctrine; thirdly, we shall compare each opinion with the evidence which is available from the dogmatic condemnations of the Church. In this way we hope to be able to seek out the most authoritative interpretation of the censures, *error*, *haeresi*

proxima, haeresim sapiens, de haeresi suspecta, male sonans and *piarum aurium offensiva*. It will be noted that there is a gradation in gravity in these censures. This will become more apparent when we consider each one in detail.

In spite of the fact that we are treating of six different theological censures in this dissertation, we shall see that they are intimately connected with each other. In fact, it is easier to treat of six than to treat of just one, because the same notions which some theologians suggested to explain a particular censure were applied by others to explain something totally different. In treating of all six censures together, we shall be better equipped to judge each opinion. Once we have determined the most authoritative interpretation of one censure, we can reject any opinion which puts forward the same notion to explain something else.

Nothing now remains but to give the list of dogmatic condemnations which took place between the Council of Constance and the condemnation of the articles of Quesnel in 1713 A. D., and which influenced the different interpretations of the censures¹. Before concluding our introduction, however, we would like to remark that the principles we have laid down thus far will be justified in the following chapters. In the course of our investigation, our choice of period, theologians and criteria will be vindicated. It is obvious that these cannot be examined more closely at this early stage.

¹ In this list we are omitting the dogmatic condemnations of moral doctrines which took place under Pope Alexander VII in the year 1666 (cf. Dz 1101-1145), and under Pope Innocent IX in 1679 (cf. Dz 1151-1215). In the former condemnation all the propositions are censured together as 'ut minimum tanquam scandalosae', and in the latter, the propositions are censured as 'tanquam scandalosae et in praxi perniciosae'. It is obvious from the matter condemned in these two decrees, and from the nature of the censure affixed in each case, that they are of no value to us in our present investigations.

**Dogmatic Condemnations in which the
Lower Theological Censures were Used
1418-1713 A. D.**

1° The Oecumenical Council of Constance, 1414-1418 A. D.

a) Session VIII.

Forty-five articles of Wyclif were condemned as follows:

"... quibus articulis examinatis, fuit repertum (prout in veritate est) aliquos et plures ex ipsis fuisse et esse notorie haereticos, et a sanctis patribus dudum reprobatos; alios non catholicos, sed erroneos; alios scandalosos et blasphemos, quosdam piarum aurium offensivos, nonnullos eorum temerarios et seditiosos."

Cf. Dz 581-625; Msi, t. 27, col. 634.

b) Session XV.

Thirty articles of Huss were condemned as follows:

"... articulos infrascriptos... non esse catholicos, nec tanquam tales esse dogmatizandos; sed ex eis plures esse erroneos, alios scandalosos, aliquos piarum aurium offensivos, pluresque eorum esse temerarios et seditiosos, et nonnullos eorumdem esse notorie haereticos..."

Cf. Dz 627-656; Msi, loc. cit., col. 752.

c) In the papal bull, '*Inter Cunctas*' (22nd Feb. 1418), Pope Martin V drew up certain interrogations for the followers of Wyclif and Huss. One of these interrogations concerned the condemnations issued by the Council of Constance. It reads as follows:

"Item specialiter litteratus interrogetur, utrum credat sententiam sacri Constantiensis Concilii super quadraginta quinque Ioannis Wicleff, et Ioannis Hus triginta articulis superius descriptis latam, fore veram et catholicam: scilicet, quod supradicti quadraginta quinque articuli Ioannis Wicleff et Ioannis Hus triginta non sunt catholici, sed quidam ex eis sunt notorie haeretici, quidam erronei, alii temerarii et seditiosi, alii piarum aurium offensivi."

Cf. Dz 661.

2° Pope Leo X (15th June 1520) condemned 41 Lutheran errors as follows:

"Praefatos omnes et singulos articulos seu errores tanquam, ut praemititur, respectue haereticos, aut scandalosos, aut falsos, aut piarum

aurium offensivos, vel simplicium mentium seductivos, et veritati catholicae obviantes, damnamus, reprobamus, atque omnino reicimus.”

Cf. Dz 741-781.

- 3° Pope S. Pius V (1st Oct. 1567) condemned 79 articles of Baius as follows:

“... in rigore et proprio verborum sensu ab assertoribus intento haereticas, erroneas, suspectas, temerarias, scandalosas, et in pias aures offensionem immittentes respective... damnamus.”

Cf. Dz 1001-1080.

- 4° The Holy Office (28th August 1687) condemned 68 errors of Molinos. This condemnation was afterwards reiterated by Pope Innocent XI.

“Damnatae tanquam haereticas, suspectas, erroneas, scandalosae, blasphemae, piarum aurium offensivae, temerariae, christianae disciplinae relaxativae, eversivae, et seditiosae respective.”

Cf. Dz 1221-1288.

- 5° In August 1690, the Holy Office condemned two propositions; the first pertaining to the goodness of human acts, and the second pertaining to the culpability of a philosophical sin. This was a specific condemnation in the sense that each article was censured separately. The condemnations were as follows:

- a) Declarata et damnata uti haeretica.
- b) Declarata et damnata uti scandalosa, temeraria, piarum aurium offensiva, et erronea.

Cf. Dz 1289-1290.

- 6° The Holy Office (7th Dec. 1690) condemned 31 propositions of the Jansenists as follows:

“Damnatae et prohibitae tanquam temerariae, scandalosae, male sonantes, iniuriosae, haeresi proximae, haeresim sapientes, erroneae, schismaticae, et haereticas respective.”

Cf. Dz 1291-1321.

- 7° Pope Innocent XII (12th March 1699) condemned 23 propositions of Fénelon as follows:

“Damnatae et reprobatae tanquam sive in obvio earum verborum sensu sive attentata sententiarum connexione, temerariae, scandalosae, male sonantes, piarum aurium offensivae, in praxi perniciosae ac etiam respective erroneae.”

Cf. Dz 1327-1349.

8° Pope Clement XI (Sept. 1713) condemned 101 propositions of Quesnel as follows:

"Declaratae et damnatae tanquam falsae, captiosae, male sonantes, piarum aurium offensivae, scandalosae, perniciosae, temerariae, Ecclesiae et eius praxi iniuriosae, neque in Ecclesiam solum, sed etiam in potestates saeculi contumeliosae, seditiosae, impiae, blasphemiae, suspectae de haeresi ac haeresim ipsam sapientes, necnon haereticis et haeresibus ac etiam schismati faventes, erroneae, haeresi proximae, pluries damnatae, ac demum haereticae."

Cf. Dz 1351-1451.

CHAPTER ONE

The Erroneous Proposition

ARTICLE I

The Censure of "Error" as Applied in the Condemnations of the Church

Before considering the different explanations of the censure of *error*, it will first of all be necessary to see how it was used in the official condemnations of the Church. As we have already stated in the introduction, the interest of theologians in the nature of these censures was first aroused by the Council of Constance (1418), which applied a cumulative censure to certain propositions of Wyclif and Huss. This interest was kept alive by subsequent similar condemnations which we have already outlined in the introduction. We shall now see how the censure of *error* was applied in each case ¹.

1° a) In the condemnations of the errors of Wyclif in the eighth session of the Council of Constance, *error* is applied together with heresy and five other theological censures. It must be remembered that for the theologians, this was a sign that according to the mind of the Church all these censures were distinct from one another. It is also to be noted that in this decree, *error* occupies the next place to heresy, coming before all the other censures.

b) In the fifteenth session of the same council, the condemnation applied to the errors of Huss is almost identical with that which we have just seen above. However, in this case the list begins with *error* and ends with heresy; all the other censures coming in between.

¹ Here we refer to the outline of these condemnations which is to be found in the introduction. If this outline is used in conjunction with the following observations, unnecessary references will be avoided.

c) In the interrogations prescribed by Pope Martin V (1418), the suspected heretics were to be asked if they believed in, and agreed to the condemnations of the errors of Wyclif and Huss. Here in the interrogations the censures relating to the two sets of propositions are repeated in a general way, and once again we see the censure of *error* being listed immediately after heresy.

2° In the condemnation of Luther's errors by Pope Leo X (1520), there is no mention of the censure of *error*.

3° In a similar condemnation of seventy-nine propositions of Baius by Pope S. Pius V (1567), heresy and *error* were once again applied. *Error* is listed immediately after heresy, and before *suspecta* i. e. suspicion of heresy.

4° When Pope Innocent XI condemned sixty-eight propositions of Molinos (1687), heresy and *error* were again used, but this time the censure *suspecta* is listed after heresy and before *error*.

5° During the pontificate of Pope Alexander VIII (1690), the Holy Office condemned two propositions. The first, pertaining to the goodness of human acts, was condemned as heretical, while the second, dealing with the culpability of a philosophical sin, was censured as erroneous. This is the only specific condemnation which falls within the scope of our present investigation, and for this reason it is of considerable importance. This condemnation afforded a concrete example of what the Church deemed to be an erroneous proposition.

6° Also during the pontificate of Pope Alexander VIII, there was a cumulative condemnation attached to thirty propositions of the Jansenists. Here again heresy and *error* are to be found, but the censure *schismatica* is placed next to heresy, thus separating it from *error*. This condemnation is important because the censures *haeresi proxima* and *haeresim sapiens* are here applied for the first time, and both are distinguished from *error*.

7° In the condemnation of twenty-three propositions of Fénelon during the pontificate of Pope Innocent XII (1699), the censure of *error* was applied once again, but this time, there was no mention of heresy.

8° The last of the cumulative condemnations took place during the pontificate of Pope Clement XI (1713), when over a hundred propositions of Quesnel were condemned. Here we find that all the important theological censures (of which we are treating in this dissertation) were used and thus distinguished from one another. It is to be noted, however, that here the censure *haeresi proxima* occupies first place, coming next to heresy and before *error*.

As may be seen from this list, in all the above mentioned condemnations with the exception of one, the censure of *error* is used. It appeared in the very first cumulative condemnation which was applied by the Council of Constance¹. We have already mentioned that these decrees greatly influenced the theologians in their efforts to explain the theological censures. Consequently, it will always be necessary to state exactly which condemnations were available to the individual authors. Then, for instance, if we should find a theologian identifying *error* with the censure *haeresi proxima*, we must examine the official condemnations of the Church to which he had access and find out if he had ever seen these two censures applied, and furthermore, if he had seen them in the same dogmatic condemnation.

In our brief outline of the censure of *error* in the condemnations of the Church, we have seen that in most cases it is placed very close to heresy in the list of censures applied. At first sight it would seem

¹ We do not mean to suggest that the censure of *error* was for the first time used by the Church in the Council of Constance. We can point to the following instances when propositions were condemned as erroneous by the Church, long before the Council of Constance took place. In 1327 A. D., this censure was used against the articles of Marsilius Patavini and Ioannes Iandune. (cf. Dz 495-500). In 1347 A. D., this censure was used against the articles of Nicholas of Autrécourt. (Dz 553-570.) Finally, in 1368 A. D., three propositions of Dionysius Foullechat were condemned as false, erroneous, and heretical. (Dz 575-577.)

In this dissertation, however, we are not concerned so much with the condemnations of the Church which were issued before Constance, for the simple reason that in all our investigations and research, we have never found a theologian referring to them. It was Constance which first aroused interest as to the nature of the theological censures, and it was to this council and subsequent condemnations that the theologians looked for guidance in their efforts to explain the censures. Whether these previous condemnations were unknown or unavailable, it is difficult to say. The main point is, however, that the theologians never referred to them. Consequently, in our efforts to ascertain the possible circumstances which may have influenced the different opinions, we are not directly concerned with any condemnation which was issued before the Council of Constance.

that there is an hierarchic order in these lists, because they always either begin or end with heresy which is almost invariably followed by *error*. Against this, however, is the fact that in the last condemnation mentioned above¹ the censure *haeresi proxima* comes between *error* and heresy, while in the condemnation of the Jansenistic errors² this order is reversed, *error* coming next to heresy.

It is difficult to argue, therefore, from the order of the censures in these condemnations as to which is the more serious. For all information on this point, as well as on the nature of each censure, we must depend upon the interpretation of theologians.

ARTICLE II

The Erroneous Proposition as Explained before Melchior Cano

We have stated in our introduction that we wish to begin our investigation regarding the interpretation of the different theological censures with Melchior Cano. In our estimation, he was the first great authority to treat of them with any air of definiteness. To appreciate Cano's position, however, it is necessary to examine, if only briefly, the different opinions which existed before his monumental work *De Locis Theologicis* appeared (1563).

Ever since the Council of Constance (1418), the interest of the theologians had been aroused as to the nature of the theological censures. However, of all the theologians who wrote between this council and the publication of Cano's work, very few were afterwards cited as authorities regarding the theological censures. Usually their opinions were referred to only to be disagreed with. Among these theologians some were more eminent than others and were referred to more frequently in later years. We shall now consider these in chronological order, with special attention to their interpretation of the censure of *error*. This, we trust, will put us in a better position to appreciate Cano's doctrine, which we hope to consider more fully later on.

¹ Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 8.

² *Ibid.*, no. 6.

A. The opinion of S. Antoninus O. P. ¹ (1477 A. D.)

The first theologian of note to be considered is S. Antoninus. When treating of heresy in his *Summa Theologica*, he devoted a special chapter to the ways in which one may deviate from Catholic truth short of being heretical. There we find his doctrine regarding the nature of of the erroneous proposition ².

Of all the condemnations of the Church which we have listed above, S. Antoninus had access only to one, i. e. the condemnations of the Council of Constance ³. It is not surprising, therefore, if we see him examine but a few of the theological censures. Besides heresy, he confines himself to *error* and the temerarious proposition.

For S. Antoninus, these three censures are intimately connected. Each heretical proposition is simultaneously erroneous and temerarious. This is not reciprocal, however, and it cannot be said that each temerarious proposition is both erroneous and heretical, or that each erroneous proposition is necessarily heretical ⁴.

According to S. Antoninus, it is temerarious to assert anything relating to theology and faith without sufficient argument either from authority or reason to prove it. Even if the proposition be true, it is still temerarious to assert it without the requisite authority ⁵.

Over and above the temerarious mode, the erroneous proposition

¹ S. ANTONINUS O. P. (1389-1459 A. D.), Archbishop of Florence. His principal work is the *Summa Theologiae Moralis*. Neither HURTER (N. L., t. 2, p. 957) nor MANDONNET (DTC, t. 1, col. 1450) give any definite information as to when the first edition of this work appeared. Both of these authors, however, give lists of the different editions to prove the frequent publication and popularity of the work, and in each case, the earliest date given is that of the Venice edition, 1477 A. D.

² Cf. S. ANTONINUS, *Summa Theologica*, tit. 12, cap. 5. Veronae (1740) col. 1162 et seqq.

³ Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 1.

⁴ Cf. S. ANTONINUS, op. cit., tit. 12, cap. 5, col. 1162 A. "Sciendum, quod circa ea quae sunt fidei vel etiam morum, quorum notitia necessaria est ad salutem, ista tria habent se per ordinem, scilicet, temerarium, erroneum et haereticum. Non enim omne quod est temerarium est erroneum, nec omne quod est erroneum est temerarium et haereticum; sed e contra, quod est erroneum est temerarium, et quod est haereticum est erroneum et temerarium."

⁵ Ibid., col. 1162 B. "Temerarium ergo in huiusmodi est asserere tamquam certum illud, quod non potest ratione vel auctoritate probari efficaciter, sicut asserere quod mundus terminetur post centum vel ducentos annos: quamvis enim hoc possit esse verum; tamen, hoc asserere tamquam certum, est temerarium, quia ad hoc, nec auctoritas nec ratio efficax habetur."

includes falsity in matters of faith¹. At first sight this explanation of *error* seems to correspond to what is normally held to be heretical. It will be interesting, therefore, to see what extra elements S. Antoninus requires for a fully-fledged heretical proposition.

Mere falsity in matters of faith is not sufficient to constitute an heretical proposition. Such falsity must be notorious, and to it must be joined subjective pertinacity which is necessary for the sin of heresy. It is one thing to stray inculpably from the faith, but quite another to do so willingly and be heretical².

It is obvious from all this that according to the doctrine of S. Antoninus, the strict heretical proposition must depend on the subjective dispositions of its assertor. If pertinacity is not correlated to such a proposition, then it cannot be called heretical but erroneous.³

¹ Ibid., "Erroneum autem addit super temerarium, falsitatem, quia errare est recedere a via recta. Et quia habere veritatem in talibus pertinet ad viam ducentem ad beatitudinem, omnis autem falsa assertio recedit a rectitudine veritatis; ideo falsa assertio in talibus vocatur error, sicut erroneum est dicere quod Christus fuerit homo in triduo sepulturae suae; quod tamen Magister Sententiarum asserit in Tertio Sententiarum."

² Ibid., col. 1162 C. "Haereticum autem addit super errorem simplicem, quod falsitas sit notoria, et quod tali falsitati adhaereatur pertinaciter. Non enim omnis error est haeresis, alioquin non diceret Augustinus: errare potero, haereticus non ero."

³ This peculiar doctrine of S. Antoninus which correlates the sin of heresy to the heretical proposition, was upheld by a number of later theologians. For instance, MELCHIOR CANO (*De Locis Theologicis*, cap. 6.), after giving a lengthy examination of this problem, concludes that for the strict heretical proposition, the subjective sin and pertinacity of the assertor must be taken into account. Material opposition to truths of faith will not suffice. Pertinacity enters into the sin of heresy, and consequently, is required also for the heretical proposition.

According to this peculiar doctrine, no proposition may be censured as heretical, unless it can be proved that the assertor has all the subjective dispositions which are necessary for the sin of heresy. It is to be noted, however, that while Cano follows S. Antoninus regarding the nature of the heretical proposition, he does not uphold his opinion regarding the erroneous proposition, i. e. that it is a false statement in matters of faith, without the subjective elements which are necessary for heresy. Later, we shall discuss more fully Cano's doctrine on the censure of *error*.

Like Cano, BANEZ also upholds the doctrine of S. Antoninus regarding heretical propositions. (Cf. BANEZ in 2/2 S. Thomae, q. 11, a. 1.) If these subjective dispositions are not taken into account, he states, then the proposition may be said to be heretical only *secundum quid*, and not *simpliciter*.

SUAREZ (de fide, disput. 19, sect. 2, no. 2-10), disagrees with this opinion, and points out that the corresponding theological note is called doctrine of faith, without reference to the subjective faith of the Christians who may be here and now believing it. This latter opinion which is here proposed by Suarez, is commonly taken for granted to-day.

B. The opinion of Cardinal Turrecremata O. P. (1489 A. D.)¹

Later theologians, when treating of the theological censures, very often had occasion to refer to Turrecremata. This does not imply, however, that he is to be regarded as an authority on this question. If we examine these references more closely, we shall find that more often than not his opinion is quoted only to be rejected. It must be remembered that Turrecremata, like S. Antoninus, was at a great disadvantage when explaining these censures. As yet, very little had ever been written on the matter, and the chief dogmatic condemnation he had for guidance was that of the Council of Constance². It is not surprising, therefore, to find that his exposition of the theological censures is a rather short one. He treats of them all in two short chapters in his *Summa de Ecclesia*³.

Regarding the censure of *error*, he has very little to say except that the erroneous proposition asserts something which is false⁴. Unlike S. Antoninus, he does not state the difference between heresy and *error*. In explaining the heretical proposition, he merely cites seven ways in which revealed truth may be contradicted, according as the doctrine of faith is found in Sacred Scripture, divine tradition, or defined by the Church, etc. From this short exposition, therefore, it would seem that for Turrecremata the erroneous proposition has a wide signification, embracing all doctrine which is false, including heresy.

Before concluding our examination of the doctrine of Turrecremata, there is one last remark which is worthy of note. When he has finished outlining his seven degrees of heresy he states that there

¹ JOANNES DE TURRECREMATA O. P. (1388-1468 A. D.), may be ranked as one of the most illustrious theologians who flourished in Spain in the 15th century. He became Master of the Sacred Palace under Pope Eugene IV and was later created cardinal. Twenty-seven of his works have been edited, while fourteen still remain unpublished. The work for which he is most noted to-day is his *Summa de Ecclesia*, which first appeared in Rome, in 1489 A. D. It is in this book that we find his short exposition of the theological censures.

² Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 1.

³ Cf. TURRECREMATA, *Summa de Ecclesia*, lib. 4, pars 2, capp. 10-11. Venetiis (1561) pp. 383-4.

⁴ *Ibid.*, cap. 11. "Propositio erronea dicitur propositio asserens aliquid quod est falsum, unde Augustinus, Libro de Academicis dicit; error est falsi pro vero approbatio."

are some propositions which, while not being absolutely heretical, come rather close to being so. Such propositions, he notes, may be termed *haeresim sapientes*, and the perverse doctrine which they enunciate, even though not heretical, will certainly culminate in heresy when another true principle is taken into account. To explain this he gives an example. The proposition which states that everyone living in Rome is in the state of mortal sin, is not heretical. Yet, when another known fact is taken into account, e. g. this infant, newly baptised, is in Rome, then heresy necessarily follows, i. e. this infant, newly baptised, is in the state of mortal sin. This conclusion is heretical, because it denies the efficacy of the sacrament of Baptism¹.

If we substitute a more simple example for this rather involved one of Turrecremata and employ the same principles, we shall have a clearer idea as to what the author means by the censure *haeresim sapiens*.

The proposition which states '*Christus est risibilis*', is not of faith. Yet if this fact is denied and another known principle — '*Omnis homo est risibilis*' — is taken into account, then heresy follows.

Christus non est risibilis,
Sed omnis homo est risibilis,
Ergo, Christus non est homo.

It seems clear from this that for Turrecremata, the denial of a theological conclusion will merit the censure *haeresim sapiens*. We mention this here because, as we shall see later on, the theological conclusion became intimately associated with the censure of *error* in later years.

¹ *Ibid.*, cap. 10. "Praeter autem has species haeresum distinguitur quaedam species falsae assertionis, videlicet assertionum quae etsi absolute haereticæ non sint, sunt tamen *haeresim sapientes* quia haeresi propinquæ, qualis est quæ assertit dogma perversum ex quo cum notorio vero quod negari non potest, sequitur haeresis proprie dicta. Verbi gratia, ista propositio, omnis homo existens Romæ est in peccato mortali, potest dici sapere haeresim, quia ex ea cum aliquo vero coassumpto, videlicet quod infans noviter baptizatus est Romæ, sequitur quod infans noviter baptizatus Romæ sit in peccato mortali, quod est haereticum. Nam in Baptismo omnis homo sive parvulus sive magnus moritur peccato..."

C. The opinion of Silvester Prierias O. P.¹ (1516 A. D.)

There is nothing new regarding the censure of *error* to be noted in the doctrine of this author. Not only does he adhere to the opinion of S. Antoninus, but he states it in the same words².

D. The opinion of Alphonsus de Castro O. M.³ (1547 A. D.)

Of all the theologians who wrote on the theological censures before the publication of Melchior Cano's *de Locis* (1563), Alphonsus de Castro is, without doubt, the greatest authority. In his much quoted work *De Justa Punitione Haereticorum*, he devotes the third chapter of the first book to a consideration of the theological censures⁴. We are now about to consider this chapter in detail to ascertain his doctrine regarding the erroneous proposition.

At the outset, Castro candidly admits that he is at a loss to explain the difference between heresy and *error*. He notes that if we confine ourselves to a consideration of the name of this latter censure, then it has a very wide and generic signification, including even heresy. Generally speaking, error means the approval of falsity for truth or the rejection of truth for falsity. The erroneous proposition is necessarily false, and such a proposition in matters of faith—*error in*

¹ SILVESTER PRIERIAS O. P. († 1523), so called because of the place of his origin, Prierio, Piedmont, Italy. Like his predecessor Turrecremata, he was Master of the Sacred Palace. He was one of the first theologians to write against the errors of Luther. His principal work was the *Summa Summarum*, or, as it is also called, the *Summa Silvestrina*. This was first published at Cremona in 1516 A. D. In this *Summa*, the subject matter is arranged alphabetically, and we find his exposition of the theological censures in his consideration of the word 'heresy'.

² Cf. *Summa Silvestrina*, pars 1, 'haeresis', no. 3. Lugduni (1593), p. 478.

³ ALPHONSUS DE CASTRO O. Min. († 1558) A. D., was a Spanish theologian who attended the Council of Trent. His principal work was the compilation and alphabetical arrangement of all heresies which existed in the Church from the earliest times to his own day. This compilation was first published in Paris in 1534 A. D., under the title, *Adversus Omnes Haereses*. The work with which we are concerned here, however, is *De Justa Punitione Haereticorum*, where Castro examines the theological censures. This book was first published at Salamanca in 1547 A. D.

⁴ Cf. CASTRO, *De Justa Punitione Haereticorum*, lib. 1, cap. 3. (*Opera Omnia, Parisiis* 1571, col. 1051 et seq.)

fide — is in contradiction to truth which is of faith¹. How, he asks, can this be distinguished from heresy²?

The difference between these two censures, he states, is either non-existent or so occult that it has escaped the detection of all previous theologians who have written on the subject³. He notes that most

¹ We note that Castro here introduces a slightly new terminology by referring to the censure as *error in fide*, instead of simple *error*. It is clear from the context, however, that both mean the same thing. Afterwards, we find Suarez (de fide, disput. 19, sect. 11, no. 11) using the same terms, '*error in fide*', and likewise in this case, when we examine the context it becomes perfectly clear that *error in fide* and simple *error* are meant to signify the same thing. The exact words of Suarez are; "In secundo gradu damnabilium propositionum proponitur propositio erronea SEU error in fide."

We note this point to avoid confusion with another terminology which seems to have arisen in modern times. To cite but one example, we refer to a recent publication where this new terminology has been used. FR. CATHECHINI S. J. (*De Valore Notarum Theologicarum*, Romae 1951, p. 51 et seqq.), considers *error in fide* as a special censure corresponding to the theological note, *de fide divina*, (as distinct from *de fide catholica*). In this way, it is distinguished from *error in theologia* which corresponds to *theologicæ certum*.

The author points out that it is possible to have divine faith without any reference to the magisterium of the Church, as in the case of many Protestants, and as also in the case of the old testament before the advent of Christ. A denial of such faith cannot be censured as heresy, because there is no relation to the expressed teaching of the Church. To meet this difficulty, the censure *error in fide* is applied, which indicates a grave sin against faith, but which is not heresy in the juridical sense.

Though all the foregoing may be conceded, it is very difficult to admit *error in fide* as a theological or dogmatic censure, at least in the way we are considering such censures here. A theological censure, when applied by the Church, has a dogmatic value for all the faithful, and not just for the person who may have uttered the perverse doctrine. It is difficult to see how the censure *error in fide*, as understood by Fr. Catechini, could be applied to a proposition and then proposed as a dogmatic condemnation for the universal Church. Of its very nature, such a censure concerns individuals and their intimate relations with God, just as the corresponding theological note, *de fide divina*, signifies faith without the intermediary action of the Church. For these reasons we cannot consider *error in fide*, as understood in this modern sense, to be a distinct censure. Likewise, it has never been officially used by the Church.

² Cf. CASTRO, loc. cit., col. 1052 A. "Sed difficultas est non parva agnoscere quo pacto inter se differunt haeresis et error in fide. Quoniam, si est propositio erronea in fide, oportet ut falsitas illius sit contra veritatem fidei. At falsum quod veram fidem oppugnat, nescio qua via eximi possit, ne haeresis dicatur."

³ Ibid., "... quo fit, ut nullum sit inter illa duo (i. e. haeresis et error) discrimen: et certe si aliquod est, tam occultum est illud ut omnes qui de hac re scripserunt, latuerit. Quoniam nullus eorum qui de varietate propositionum damnabilium scripsit, quidquam docuit unde haec diversitas possit agnosci."

of his predecessors, like Turrecremata, took the easy way out by giving *error* such a wide signification as to make it include heresy. Against this, however, he points to different condemnations, and especially to the decrees of the Council of Constance¹, where the censure of *error* and that of heresy are distinguished from each other in the same condemnation². Seeing that the Church has made such a distinction in these dogmatic condemnations, Castro is convinced that there must be a greater difference between the heretical and erroneous proposition than the theologians have hitherto admitted. Now he puts forward his own opinion as to what constitutes this difference.

It is clear from the way Castro introduces his own opinion that he is not at all certain as to its theological value. Seeing that previous theologians had not held for a clear-cut distinction between heresy and *error*, he has no authority to quote. The only argument on which he can base his explanation is the fact that the Council of Constance used both censures separately. Castro's doctrine may be stated as follows.

In the deposit of faith there are two types of *credibilia*. Firstly, there is supernatural truth, e. g. the mystery of the Blessed Trinity which exceeds the natural power of the human intellect. Such truth is the proper object of the supernatural virtue of faith, and its contradiction means heresy in the strict sense. Secondly, there are truths which, of themselves, do not exceed the human intellect, e. g. the existence of God, the unity of God, etc., but nevertheless are revealed because of the difficulty which man experiences in their comprehension. A contradiction of this latter type of truth will merit the censure of *error*³.

¹ Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 1.

² Cf. CASTRO, loc. cit., col. 1052 C. "Ex aliquibus tamen variarum universitatum et diversorum conciliorum censuris, videtur aliquod esse inter illa duo discrimen, quoniam de variis assertionibus illi definientes aliquas censent esse haeticas, aliquas in fide erroneas. Quod autem ita res habeat, ex his quae in Concilio Constantiensi definita sunt, convinci potest."

³ Ibid., col. 1052 E. "Si tamen cogor fateri aliquod esse inter propositionem erroneam in fide et propositionem haeticam discrimen, dicam quod sentio: paratus tamen meliora docenti obedire. Ut autem quod dixerim apertius fiat, admonere prius oportet diversa esse credibilium genera. Quaedam enim sunt talia, quod superant virtutem nostri intellectus, ita ut ad illa intelligenda non possit pertinere noster intellectus, nisi prius crediderit... Et ista sunt, circa quae proprie versatur fides. Assertio autem, quae haec credibilia oppugnat, haere-

This explanation of Castro is the first to make a real distinction between the two censures. The difference is founded on the two types of *credibilia* which are revealed. We recall that for S. Antoninus the erroneous proposition was, in fact, the heretical proposition without the requisite pertinacity. The distinction was not placed between the truths which are denied but with regard to the internal dispositions of the assertor. For Castro, however, the distinction between the heretical and erroneous proposition is more objective, as we have just seen.

If at this point Castro had finished his exposition of the censure of *error*, his doctrine could be regarded as having made a considerable advance in distinguishing *error* from heresy. We note, however, that before ending his explanation, he adds that if the doctrine which is denied by the erroneous proposition were also to be found in the deposit of faith, then such a proposition would be simultaneously heretical and erroneous¹. Here we point out that in his previous description of the erroneous proposition, he stated that the truth which is denied, while not absolutely exceeding the power of the human intellect, *is nevertheless revealed*. His exact words were:

Alia sunt credibilia quae non omnem virtutum intellectus superant, et sunt illa quae intellectus ex virtute sua... attingere potest: sed peccatis obscuratus intellectus cognoscere non potest, et propter hoc Deus nostri miseratus, illa per Scripturam Sacram nobis innotescere voluit... Assertio ergo talis, quae est contra credibilia quae naturali ratione probari possunt, erronea in fide dicitur.

From this it seems that for Castro, it is impossible to have a proposition which is merely erroneous and not heretical at the same time. By stating that the denial of the revealed natural truth would also mean heresy, Castro minimises to a great extent the distinction

sis proprie dicitur. Alia sunt credibilia quae non omnem virtutem intellectus superant, et sunt illa quae intellectus ex virtute sua... attingere potest: sed peccatis obscuratus intellectus cognoscere non potest, et propter hoc Deus nostri miseratus, illa per Scripturam Sacram nobis innotescere voluit.. Assertio ergo talis, quae est contra credibilia quae naturali ratione probari possunt, erronea in fide dicitur."

¹ *Ibid.*, col. 1053 D. "Si autem credibile aliquid huiusmodi fuerit, ut praeter rationem naturalem possit etiam probari per Sacram Scripturam, aut Ecclesiae determinationem, aut per alias vias, quibus ea quae credere tenemur, probari possunt, assertio quae illud credibile oppugnat, dicitur haeretica simul et erronea in fide."

which he has already made. True, he does not claim that it is possible to have a proposition which is merely erroneous, nor does he explicitly state that the erroneous proposition must of necessity be heretical. However, the latter position is the logical outcome of his doctrine which states that the object of the erroneous proposition is in contradiction to revealed natural truth.

We have already noted that Castro is not at all certain as to the value of this doctrine, and that he rather hesitantly introduces his opinion as a possible explanation. Now he ends on the same note of uncertainty by stating that he has no wish to argue with anyone who might disagree with his view on the censure of *error*. He would ask the dissenter, however, to put forward a better explanation than the one he has given above ¹.

E. The opinion of Jacobus de Simancas ² (1552 A. D.)

Simancas was another theologian of this period whose doctrine on the theological censures was very often cited in later years. His short exposition is to be found in his work *Institutiones Catholicae* ³. We shall now examine this with regard to the censure of *error*, and see if any progress has been made in the five years which have elapsed since the publication of Castro's *De Justa Punitioe Haereticorum*.

Whatever Simancas may have said regarding the other theological censures, his exposition of the erroneous proposition is definitely disap-

¹ Ibid., col. 1054 B. "Si cui hae distinctiones inter propositionem haereticam et erroneam in fide non placent, ego adversus illum contendere nolo: sed rogo illum, ut offerat meliorem."

² JACOBUS (Didacus) DE SIMANCAS († 1582), bishop of Zamora, Spain. He was first and foremost a jurist, but has also some theological works to his name as, for instance, *De Dignitate Episcoporum*, (Venetiis 1568) and *Institutiones Catholicae* where he treats of all the means which are necessary to prevent and extirpate heresy. It is in this latter work that he treats of the theological censures. The first edition appeared in 1552 (Vallisoleti), and was followed by a second edition in Rome 1575 A. D. Hurter remarks that this work is now very rare. However, we have been fortunate in finding both editions at the *Bibliothèque Nationale*, Paris. Here we shall cite from the first edition. Later on, we shall have occasion to consider the second edition, as considerable changes were made by the author. In this second edition, for example, he gives an analysis of Cano's doctrine which had appeared in the meantime.

³ Cf. SIMANCAS, *Institutiones Catholicae*, cap. 52. Vallisoleti (1552), p. 190.

pointing. In this first edition of his work, he is content merely to quote the opinions of Castro and S. Antoninus, and makes no further comment. He does not even take sides with either of these theologians¹.

F. Concluding remarks

We have now concluded our survey of the different opinions regarding the erroneous proposition, which appeared between the Council of Constance and the publication of Cano's *De Locis Theologicis* (1563). The theologians mentioned above were not chosen at random, but selected only after careful consideration. These are the authorities which were afterwards most frequently cited and, with the exception of some minor theologians, were the only authorities who even considered the problem.

The opinions which these authors put forward to explain the erroneous proposition are far from being satisfactory. We have seen that not one of them succeeded even in distinguishing *error* from heresy. S. Antoninus, we recall, placed a mere subjective difference, i. e. regarding the dispositions of the assertor. Turrecremata gave the erroneous proposition such a wide signification as to include heresy. Castro noted that there should be a more objective distinction placed between *error* and heresy but, as we have seen, failed to do so. According to Castro's doctrine, it is impossible to have an erroneous proposition which is not simultaneously heretical.

It seems that the main obstacle which confronted these theologians was the name of the censure, i. e. '*error*'. Seeing that the condemnations of the Church dealt with faith and morals, they naturally concluded that the censure meant error or falsity in matters of faith. If it is regarded in this way, then the task of distinguishing it from heresy becomes almost impossible. All the authorities whom we have considered above were trying to justify the distinction which was made by the

¹ Ibid., no. 5. "Propositio erronea, inquit eodem loco Alphonsus, fere nil distat ab haeretica, nisi discrimen constituatur inter credibilia, quibus propositiones adversantur: ut illa dicatur haeretica, quae est contra credibilia quae superant omnem virtutem intellectus: erronea vero sit contra credibilia quae naturali ratione probari possunt. Sed (S. Antoninus) distinguit erroneum ab haeretico, dicens erroneum esse quod habet falsitatem, haeticum vero addit super errorem, quod falsitati adiungit pertinaciam."

Council of Constance. At the same time, however, they were over anxious to identify the erroneous and heretical propositions, because they regarded *error in fide* in this exaggerated sense. It is only natural that a situation of this kind should have produced opinions like that of S. Antoninus who placed a subjective difference between the two censures; as if the Council of Constance took special cognizance of the fact that Wyclif and Huss had heretical dispositions for some of the propositions which were condemned, and that they inculpably erred with regard to others.

Having thus reviewed the different opinions which were put forward after the Council of Constance, we are now in a better position to appreciate the doctrine of Melchior Cano who was the first major authority to give an adequate exposition of the theological censures.

ARTICLE III

The Censure of "Error" According to Melchior Cano¹ 1563 A. D.

In the twelfth book of *De Locis Theologicis*² Cano gives his exposition of the nature of theology and of theological method. In chapter five, he treats of the theological notes by which questions of faith may be

¹ MELCHIOR CANO (1509-1560 A. D.), was one of the most illustrious of the Dominican theologians who flourished in Spain during the sixteenth century. He was at the height of his fame during the Council of Trent, but premature death in 1560 A. D., left many of his works inedited, and his monumental work, *De Locis Theologicis*, incomplete.

Cano was a disciple of Francis de Vittoria O. P. He himself numbered amongst his pupils, Banez and Medina, who at a later date were also destined to make a profound impression on the theology of sixteenth century Spain.

At this time, partly due to the influence of the Renaissance, theology was undergoing a change in Spain. A new method was introduced by Vittoria which was characterised by patristic erudition and the expression of theological thought in a very literary style, altogether different from the old scholastic simplicity. Vittoria's method had a great influence on Cano, as is evident from *De Locis*. Cano himself admits this indebtedness to his master. (Cf. intro. to bk. XII of *De Locis*.)

With regard to the elevated style introduced by Vittoria and perfected by Cano, it did not last long afterwards, as far as we can judge. Banez, the disciple of Cano, wrote in the simple scholastic vein. MANDONNET (DTC t. 2, col. 1537

judged. All this chapter is taken up with the consideration of the different way in which revealed truth may be recognised. In chapters six, seven and eight, he deals with heresy. Finally, in chapter nine he examines the theological censures which are less than heresy¹.

At a glance, this lengthy chapter indicates that Cano has at least devoted more space to the consideration of the theological censures than any of his predecessors. Likewise, judging by the way he was so frequently quoted afterwards, we may expect great developments in his exposition. It is true that Cano was not always quoted to be agreed with. Considering the time in which he wrote and the little authority he had to go on, this could hardly be expected.

Before examining Cano's doctrine on the erroneous proposition, we must first of all point out the official condemnations of the Church of which he was aware. Of all those we have outlined in the introduction, he knew of only one other condemnation besides that of the Council of Constance, i. e. the condemnation of Luther's errors by Pope Leo X in 1520 A. D.² Curiously enough, this is the only one in which the censure of *error* is not applied. It was in subsequent condemnations that the majority of the censures first appeared, and were thus dis-

et seqq.) asks whether this elevated style lent itself easily to a clear expression of theological thought. He does not answer this question himself, but we must candidly admit that in our opinion, it did not. We have often found considerable difficulty in trying to ascertain what exactly Cano taught, precisely because of his literary style.

That which placed CANO in the first rank of classical theologians was, above all, his monumental work, *De Locis Theologicis*. In this he was a pioneer in theological development, in so far as he perfected a separate branch of theology which was later to be called by the same name as his famous book. This work was indeed a creation, something new. His purpose was to establish scientifically the very foundations of theology, and his success may be measured by the immortality of his name and the endurance of his work as a classic, even to this present day. His premature death impeded the completion of this work, which was, however, posthumously published at Salamanca in 1563 A. D.

¹ The edition of *De Locis Theologicis* to which we refer in this dissertation is that which is included in Migne, *Theologiae Cursus Completus*, t. 1. (Parisii 1839.) It is to be noted that according to the different editions of this work, the enumeration of the chapters of book twelve changes, according as the introduction to this book is counted as a chapter, or not. To avoid confusion, we shall give our references to the column in Migne, and give the title of the chapter when necessary.

² Cf. CANO, *De Locis Theologicis*, lib. XII, cap. 9. *De propositione erronea, sapiente haeresim, piarum aurium offensiva et temeraria*. (Migne T. C. C., t. 1. col. 615 et seqq.)

³ Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 2.

tinguished from each other. From the point of view of guidance from the Church, therefore, we may say that Cano was in the same position as his predecessors, whose doctrine we have already outlined.

In his examination of the censure of *error*¹, Cano states at the outset that there is no unanimity of opinion among the theologians as to what constitutes the erroneous proposition. Some, he states, interpreted the censure as used by the Council of Constance in a very wide sense, so much so, as to consider it as a genus in relation to heresy and any other type of deviation from orthodoxy. Interpreted in this way, there would be only a mental distinction between *error* and heresy; the same distinction which exists between a genus and a component species. Cano does not name the theologians who held for this opinion, but here we immediately recognise the doctrine of Turrecremata which we have already considered, as well as the doctrine of S. Antoninus which is very much akin to this.

A. Cano on the distinction between heresy and error

Cano does not agree with this opinion, and now sets out to disprove it. At the same time, we shall see him giving solid arguments to show that there is a real distinction between the erroneous and the heretical proposition.

First of all, he examines the condemnation which was affixed by the Council of Constance to the articles of Wyclif². This decree states that of the articles under consideration for censure, some are notoriously heretical, others not Catholic but erroneous, others scandalous, and others offensive to pious ears, etc. Cano notes that the wording of this condemnation would be absurd if the erroneous proposition were to be interpreted in a generic fashion, so as to include heresy and every other type of error³. Such condemnations are not made at random, and it is only after exhaustive investigation and with a delicate

¹ Cf. CANO, loc. cit., coll. 615-617.

² Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 1a.

³ Cf. CANO, loc. cit., col. 615. "Sed concilium, ut dixi, ab hac usurpatione longe abest: id quod statim planum faciam, si verba Patrum adscribam: Com-pertum est, inquit, ex praefatis articulis plures esse notorie haereticos, alios non catholicos, sed erroneos, alios scandalosos, quosdam piarum aurium offensivos, nonnullos temerarios. Quae forma sermonis esset et falsa et absurda, si propositio erronea pro quocumque errore communiter sumeretur."

choice of words that such decrees are issued. This is the first argument which Cano brings forward to show that the difference between *error* and heresy is not that of a genus in respect of its component species, but rather the difference which exists between one species and another ¹.

In our examination of the opinions which were in vogue before Cano, we have seen that it was the name of this censure, "*error*", which misled the theologians into insufficiently distinguishing it from heresy. It must be admitted that this word, taken in its obvious signification, has a rather wide and generic meaning. The first argument which Cano gave against this interpretation was by way of a *reductio ad absurdum*, i. e. by pointing to the words of the Council of Constance, as we have just seen. He also gives a more positive proof which consists in a closer examination of this word, and showing the different meanings it may have. He does this by way of analogy with the philosophical term "*dispositio*".

The name of a genus is often given to denominate the most imperfect species which it contains. Take, for instance, the generic term "*dispositio*". This contains first of all the species of *habitus*, and then the species of *dispositio* which is the most imperfect.

$$dispositio \text{ (genus)} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} habitus \text{ (species)} \\ dispositio \text{ (species)} \end{array} \right.$$

i The relationship which exists between *dispositio* (genus) and *habitus*, is that of a genus with regard to its species. In other words, there is only a mental distinction between them. In the same way, *dispositio* (genus) is related to *dispositio* (species). However, the relation between *dispositio* (species) and *habitus*, is not that of a genus with regard to its species, but the relation which exists between one species and another from which it is really distinct. Consequently, Aristotle considered *habitus* and *dispositio* (species) as two different predicaments ².

¹ Ibid., col. 616. "Sine dubio igitur erronea propositio ab haeretica secernitur, non tanquam genus a specie, quod esset discrimen rationis, sed tanquam una erroris species ab altera; quae vera rerum non modo vocabulorum, distinctio est."

² Ibid. "Nec nostro more nos ita loquimur, sed est etiam hoc in more positum sermoneque majorum, ut nomen generis speciei illi absolute tribuant, quae est in eo genere imperfectissima. Sic Aristoteles in praedicamentis dispositionem sejunctit ab habitu: cum tamen dispositio alias habitus ipsius genus sit. Virtus quippe quam habitum esse nemo est qui nesciat, dispositio est perfecti ad opti-

After considering the above example, Cano now applies the same division to the different notions of error. This word "error", when taken in its wide sense so as to include even heresy, must be regarded as a genus. Within this genus there are two species, heresy and *error* (species).

It is clear from this that the difference between heresy and *error* (species) is not that of a genus in relation to its species, but the real difference which exists between one species and another.

By this analogy, Cano clarifies the concept of *error*. From the maze of confused ideas he brings forward this clear-cut distinction between error as a genus and error as a species. His whole doctrine on this point may be summarised as follows. The Council of Constance clearly makes a real distinction between heresy and that which is called the erroneous proposition. Consequently, the term "*error*", as used by the council, cannot be taken in its generic sense so as to include heresy, but rather in some specific sense in which it is sufficiently distinguished from the heretical proposition. Then, by way of analogy, he shows how the word "*error*" can be accepted in this restricted way. Nothing now remains for Cano but to state what will exactly constitute the censure of *error* understood in this specific manner.

This famous distinction between the generic and specific signification of the word "*error*" is the greatest contribution which Cano made to the correct interpretation of the censure. We have already seen that it was this difficulty which misled his predecessors into identifying it with heresy. Castro, as we have already noted, realised that *error*, as used by the Council of Constance, could not have such a wide interpretation as that which Turrecremata and S. Antoninus attributed to it. But he did not give us anything like the clear concepts of Cano to distinguish *error* in a generic and specific sense. Furthermore, when Castro came to stating what exactly constituted the erroneous proposition, he did not succeed in fully distinguishing it from heresy. It will be interesting, therefore, to examine Cano's doctrine on this point, and see if that which he puts forward as constituting the erroneous proposition will make it specifically distinct from heresy.

mum... A qua consuetudine ne Paulus quidem abhorruit, quum animale
hominem dixit, quasi brutum expertemque rationis. Patres item concilii
Constantiensis hoc sensu videntur esse locuti, si accurate eorum voces expandamus."

The theological notes which correspond to the erroneous proposition

After examining the signification of the term "error" as used by the Council of Constance, and after determining that a real distinction exists between the heretical and erroneous proposition, Cano goes on to explain how this censure may be incurred.

As the same science deals with contraries, he decides that the best way to explain the erroneous proposition is to determine the theological note which corresponds to it. Instead of one theological note, however, we find Cano placing three, which correspond to three grades of erroneous propositions. We shall now examine these three grades of *error* and their opposite theological notes.

B. The first grade of error

The theological note corresponding to the first grade of *error* is a peculiar notion which Cano calls *doctrina christiana* or *doctrina catholica*. To help us understand this concept, he gives a division of Catholic truth¹.

There are certain truths, he states, the denial of which will entail a necessary denial of faith. This category is referred to by Cano as the *fidei veritates*. Below this there is another category of truth which is also Catholic and universal, the denial of which, however, will not destroy faith but weaken it. This body of truth which is distinguished from the *fidei veritates*, is called *doctrina catholica*, and its denial will merit the censure of *error*.

So far, this division is not very enlightening. We note in the text, however, that Cano seems to indicate that he has already treated of this division. He does not give any reference, but in all probability he is recalling a division of Catholic truth which he has already made at the end of chapter four of his *De Locis*². We shall now go back

¹ Ibid. "Quaedam enim sunt catholicae veritates, quae ita ad fidem pertinent, ut his sublatis, fides quoque ipsa tollatur. Quas nos usu frequenti, non solum catholicas sed fidei veritates appellavimus. Aliae veritates sunt etiam ipsae catholicae et universales, nempe quas universa ecclesia tenet, quibus licet eversis fides quaeritur, sed non evertitur tamen. Atque in huiusmodi veritatum contrariis erroribus supra dixi fidem obscurari, non extinguí, infirmari, non perire. Has ergo nunquam fidei veritates censui vocandas, quamvis doctrinae christianae veritates sunt."

² Ibid., cap. 4, col. 579. "Fidei porro quaestio bifariam intelligitur. Una quae immediate ad fidem attinet, ut vere attinent omnia, quae Deus Ecclesiae suae

and consider this previous division in the hope of getting some further light on the concept of *doctrina catholica*, which is here put forward as the theological note corresponding to the first grade of *error*.

Firstly, there are truths of faith which are immediately revealed either in Sacred Scripture or Tradition. Secondly, there are *truths of faith* which are *mediately* revealed. These are not revealed in themselves, but only in so far as they are contained in principles which are immediately revealed. This category comprises all the conclusions which may be logically deduced from immediate revelation. Even though such conclusions are said to be only *mediately* revealed, they are nevertheless truths of faith, and their denial will entail an indirect denial of faith... *qui eas negat, is fidem negare hoc modo dicitur*. Thirdly, there are the *appendices fidei* which cannot be called truths of faith in the same way as immediate and mediate revelation. When these appendices are denied, there is no necessary direct or indirect denial of faith. Nevertheless, because of their close affinity to revealed doctrine, their denial will certainly weaken the faith.

After considering this division which appears in the fourth chapter of *De Locis*, we are now in a better position to understand what Cano means by *doctrina catholica* which he places as the theological note corresponding to the first grade of *error*, in chapter nine.

Catholic doctrine is not only distinguished from truth which is immediately revealed, but also from the conclusions which may be

aut verbo edidit, aut scripto; altera quae mediate fidei est, cuiusmodi sunt omnes conclusiones quas ordine disciplinae ex illis prioribus colligere et definire possumus. Quae quoniam non in seipsis sed in aliis tanquam principiis revelata a Deo sunt, mediate fidei dicuntur esse, et qui eas negat, is fidem negare hoc modo dicitur. Atque equidem illud etiam animadverto, eas non abs re forsitan quaestiones fidei vocari, quae vehementer ad Ecclesiae doctrinas pertinent fideique sunt propter affinitates appendices; non quod aut ex eis pendeat fides, aut iis sublatis funditus illa tollatur sed quod affecta aegraque sit, si harum rerum veritas labefiat, quae illi haerent et adiunguntur. Oportet nempe in Ecclesia sanam doctrinam esse et verbum sanum, ut Apostolus ait. Quemadmodum autem morbi quidam lethales sunt, alii vero non interficiunt quidem hominem, sed afficiunt tamen valetudinem: sic errores quidam non fidem extinguunt, sed obscurant: non evertunt, sed infirmant: morbumque afferunt non exitum. Sicut ergo quod saluti est noxium, vitae id quoque noxium est: ita quodcumque sanae doctrinae adversatur, hoc fidei est etiam quodmammodo adversum. Ex quo intelligitur, quaestiones illas, quae ad doctrinae ecclesiasticae sanitatem spectant, ad fidem suo quodam modo spectare. Sed nos huius generis controversias non in fide proprie sed praeter fidem esse dicimus: nec qui in his errant, eos in fide, sed praeter fidem errare existimamus."

deduced from it. There can be no doubt about the identification of *doctrina catholica* in chapter nine with the *appendices fidei* which are mentioned in chapter four. The very words used in the description of both concepts are almost the same. Catholic doctrine as understood by Cano may be said, therefore, to comprise the appendices of revealed truth, i. e. doctrine which is intimately connected with the faith, and universally held throughout the Church. Its denial will not entail a direct or indirect denial of faith. Nevertheless, the faith is weakened when this lesser category of Catholic truth is denied.

To help us understand this concept of *doctrina catholica*, Cano gives two examples ¹.

1° Special prayers which are applied to one person by religious or by prelates are more beneficial to that person than general prayers.

2° It is licit for friars to be mendicant, as they are not obliged to earn their living by manual labour.

These propositions are neither immediately nor mediately revealed. Yet they are universally believed to be true and belong to that category of truth which guards the outward rim of revelation, i. e. Catholic doctrine. A denial of such propositions will incur the censure of *error*.

This concept of the erroneous proposition makes for a specific difference between heresy and *error*. Cano has succeeded, therefore, where Alphonsus de Castro failed. We have seen that Castro held for this specific difference, but when he came to stating what exactly would merit the censure of *error*, his explanation failed to distinguish sufficiently the erroneous from the heretical proposition. Cano's position is more logical, as this concept of Catholic doctrine makes for a clear-cut distinction between the two censures. Whether he was correct or not in this interpretation is a matter which remains to be seen.

One thing which strikes us on reading Cano's description of the erroneous proposition is that there is no authority brought forward to support his interpretation. His concept of Catholic doctrine and its relation to the censure of *error* seems to be something personal which is there put forward for the first time. At such an early stage in the development of the censures, this is not to be wondered at. We

¹ *Ibid.*, cap. 9, col. 616.

have seen that the main opinions of the theologians who preceded Cano were all personal, without any proof from authority. What then, we may ask, influenced Cano in this notion of Catholic doctrine and its relation to *error*? This question cannot be answered with certainty. We shall give our own view, however, which is based on certain clues which we find in his exposition.

It must be remembered first and foremost that Cano was insistent that the erroneous proposition should be explained in such a way as to make it specifically distinct from heresy. It was imperative, therefore, that the theological note corresponding to *error* should be placed well outside the pale of revealed truth. As we shall afterwards see, for Cano truth of faith is twofold, i. e. that which is immediately and mediately revealed. To distinguish clearly *error* from heresy, the corresponding theological note had to be placed outside this boundary.

We noted that when Cano wished to prove the specific difference between the heretical and erroneous proposition, he quoted the condemnation which the Council of Constance affixed to the articles of Wyclif. This condemnation reads as follows¹.

... quibus articulis examinatis, fuit repertum (prout in veritate est) aliquos et plures ex ipsis fuisse et esse notorie haereticos, et a sanctis patribus reprobatos; alios *non catholicos*, sed *erroneos*; alios scandalosos et blasphemos, quosdam piarum aurium offensivos, nonnullos eorum temerarios et seditiosos.

It will be noted from the phrasing of this condemnation that the term "*non catholicos*" seems to qualify the term "*erroneos*," and that alone. A semi-colon is placed after the word "*erroneos*," which seems to indicate a break from the remaining censures which are mentioned. It may be gathered from this that the erroneous proposition is non-Catholic. In other words, the theological note corresponding to *error* is something which is Catholic. Immediate and mediate revelation are already ruled out, so Cano conceives the notion of a certain category of truth outside revelation, which is nevertheless universally believed in the Church. We recall that when Cano examined the hierarchy of Catholic truth, he stressed the point that *doctrina catholica* is no less Catholic and universal than that which is revealed.

We put forward this theory as being a probable explanation of Cano's concept of the erroneous proposition. Whether he was correct

¹ Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 1 a.

in thinking that the term "*non catholicos*" qualifies the censure of *error* and that alone, is a matter which we will now discuss.

It has already been pointed out that when Cano wished to prove the specific difference between the heretical and erroneous proposition he cited the condemnation which was affixed to the articles of Wyclif. Another condemnation, very rarely quoted, was applied by the same council to the articles of Huss. It reads as follows ¹.

Articulos infrascriptos... non esse catholicos, nec tanquam tales esse dogmatizandos; sed ex eis plures esse erroneos, alios scandalosos, aliquos piarum aurium offensivos, pluresque eorum esse temerarios et seditiosos, et nonnullos eorundem esse notorie haereticos.

It is obvious from this citation that the term "*non catholicos*" qualifies not only the erroneous propositions, but also all the other censures which are listed after them.

After the Council of Constance, Pope Martin V drew up certain points of doctrine on which suspected heretics were to be interrogated. One of these interrogations concerned the condemnation of the articles of Wyclif and Huss. It reads as follows ².

Item, specialiter litteratus interrogetur, utrum credat, sententiam sacri Constantiensis Concilii super quadraginta quinque Ioannis Wicleff, et Ioannis Hus triginta articulis superius descriptis latam, fore veram et catholicam: scilicet, quod supradicti quadraginta quinque articuli Ioannis Wicleff et Ioannis Hus triginta non sunt catholici, sed quidam ex eis sunt notorie haeretici, quidam erronei, alii temerarii et seditiosi, alii piarum aurium offensivi.

It is obvious from the wording of this interrogation, that the term "*non catholici*" refers to all the articles of Wyclif and Huss which were condemned, and not just to those which are erroneous.

If Cano was influenced by the first condemnation of Constance in placing the notion of *doctrina catholica* as the theological note corresponding to *error*, he was mistaken. From the second condemnation of the same council and from the above mentioned interrogation of Pope Martin V, it is quite evident that the term "*non catholici*" is not restricted to *error* alone.

Before passing on to consider what Cano calls the second and third degrees of the censure of *error*, there is one last remark regarding

¹ Ibid. no. 1 b.

² Cf. Dz, no. 661.

doctrina catholica which we wish to make. After his division of Catholic truth, he points out that propositions which are in opposition to what he calls *doctrina catholica*, while not being heretical, are nevertheless *haeresi proxima*¹.

The censure *haeresi proxima* was used by the Church for the first time when the Holy Office condemned the propositions of the Jansenists in 1690 A. D.², i. e. over a hundred years after Cano's death. In his exposition of the theological censures, Cano does not treat of *haeresi proxima*, and the only mention of this term is to be found here, where he treats of the erroneous proposition.

We cannot say, therefore, that for Cano, the censure of *error* and that of *haeresi proxima* meant the same thing. When he used the term "*haeresi proxima*" here, he merely wished to state that the erroneous proposition, while not being heretical, comes close to being so, in so far as the doctrine which is denied is closely connected with revelation.

At the outset, we noted that Cano placed three theological notes corresponding to the erroneous proposition. Consequently, he holds for three grades of the censure of *error*. We shall now pass on to examine the second and third grades.

C. The second grade of error

The theological note corresponding to what Cano calls the second grade of erroneous propositions, may be explained as follows. There are certain truths which theologians generally regard as being of faith. Such truths, however, are not defined by the Church, neither have they been proved to be of faith by any certain argument. Opposition to doctrine of this nature, according to Cano, will merit the second grade of the censure of *error*³.

¹ Cf. CANO, *De Locis Theologicis*, lib. XII, cap. 9, col. 616. "Quae igitur propositiones huius posterioris generis veritatibus contradicunt, (i. e. doctrina catholica) eas equidem erroneas appello; quae quoniam doctrinae catholicae adversantur, errores sunt haeresi proximi, haereses non sunt."

² Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 6.

³ Cf. CANO, loc. cit., col. 617. "Quum enim veritas aliqua, sapientum quidem opinione vehementi, fidei veritas est, sed non est plane ab Ecclesia definita, nec certo argumento demonstrata; tunc veritati illae adversari non est haereticum sed erroneum."

In this case, the truth which is denied may, in fact, be revealed and contained in the deposit of faith. The opposing proposition cannot be censured as heretical because there is not absolute certainty that the doctrine denied is of faith. Nevertheless, this uncertainty which rules out heresy, will not excuse from grave sin, nor from the censure of *error*¹.

To consider this notion in more detail, we note that the doctrine denied is generally regarded as being of faith. The exact words of Cano are: "*sapientum quidem opinione vehementi, fidei veritas est*". We take it that the word "*sapientum*" indicates theologians, and not just ordinary theologians, but those who enjoy considerable authority. The use of the adjective "*vehementi*" indicates the strength of the opinion. Seeing that Cano does not expressly allow for any exceptions among the *sapientes*, we must presume that he wishes to indicate that the opinion is unanimous amongst grave theologians.

There is quite a difference between this theological note and the *doctrina catholica* which he placed as corresponding to the first grade of *error*. This latter comprises a body of truth which exists outside revelation, while the theological note corresponding to the second grade of *error* may, in fact, be of faith.

We note that Cano succeeds in preserving his specific distinction between heresy and *error* even in this second grade. The element of uncertainty which excludes heresy, is sufficient to constitute a specific distinction between the two censures.

D. The third grade of error

The third grade of erroneous propositions differs very little from the second. Here there is also question of faith, a common opinion among grave theologians, and a lack of absolute certainty which excludes heresy. In this case, however, the doctrine which is opposed is certainly of faith, and the doubt concerns the opposition between the two propositions. In other words, there is no absolute certainty that the censurable proposition is opposed to faith. Nevertheless, the consensus of opinion

¹ Ibid. "Ita licet veritas illa ad fidem suapte natura pertineat, quia tamen nec hoc certum nec expeditum est, haeretica pertinacia abest, error gravis et periculosus non abest."

holds that it is, and while this authority makes it almost certain that the opposing doctrine is heretical, the lack of absolute certainty requires that a lesser censure be applied ¹.

The second and third grade of *error*, as understood by Cano, may be briefly explained as follows. Two conditions must be complied with before any doctrine may be censured as heretical.

1° The truth which is contradicted must *certainly* be contained in the deposit of faith.

2° The censurable proposition must be in *certain* and *evident* opposition to the truth which is of faith.

If there is not absolute certainty regarding the first of these two conditions, then the second grade of *error* is constituted. On the other hand, if the lack of absolute certainty is in respect of the second condition, then we have the third grade of *error*.

In spite of the fact that in the first grade of *error*, it is merely *doctrina catholica* which is denied, it seems that for Cano this constitutes a more serious censure than the second and third. It must be remembered that in the first grade there is a certainty regarding the exact position of the truth which is contradicted and the opposition entailed, which is not to be found in either of the other two.

We have already noted that in his explanation of the first grade of erroneous propositions Cano was quite original, in the sense that no authority was quoted to support this doctrine. The same may be said regarding his exposition of the second and third grades. We may ask, therefore, why he thought it necessary to introduce a second and third degree of *error*, and why these concepts were not included under some other censure.

The notions which Cano puts forward as representing the second and third grades of *error* indicate a doctrinal deviation which is too serious to be placed under *haeresim sapiens*, which is the next censure after *error* of which he treats. Seeing that heresy and *haeresim sapiens*

¹ Ibid. "Similiter et propositio erronea tertio quodam gradu vocari potest, quae certae veritati catholicae fidei adversatur, non manifeste quidem, sed sapientum omnium longe probabili ac ferme necessaria sententia. Eius quippe erratio gravis est, qui hoc defendit contumaciter, quod viri omnes docti sentiunt periculum grande catholicae fidei conflare."

are ruled out, he places these notions under *error*, and includes a second and third grade within this censure to cope with these additions.

In Cano's entire exposition of the theological censures, there is no explanation of *haeresi proxima* to be found. Seeing that this censure was not used by the Church until 1690 A. D., the omission on Cano's part is not surprising. In later years, however, when the theologians began to explain *haeresi proxima*, they placed it between *error* and *haeresim sapiens*. We shall see in due course that what Cano here includes under the second and third grades of *error*, was regarded by very many later theologians as being *haeresi proxima*. It was Cano's ignorance of this censure, therefore, which necessitated his placing a second and a third grade of *error*.

We have now examined Cano's doctrine on all three grades of the censure, and expressed our own opinion as to the factors which influenced him in interpreting the erroneous proposition the way he did. Before concluding our exposition of his doctrine, there is one other important problem which remains to be solved. Under which of the censures does Cano place the denial of a theological conclusion? This question is important, because in later years the theological conclusion became intimately connected with the censure of *error*. To be perfectly clear, therefore, as to Cano's mind on this subject, we shall outline his doctrine on the theological conclusion as follows.

E. The theological conclusion according to the doctrine of Cano

1° For Melchior Cano, truth of faith may be either mediate or immediate, according as the doctrine in question is either mediately or immediately revealed. Mediate revelation comprises theological conclusions which are not revealed in themselves, but only in so far as they are contained in principles which are immediately revealed. Because of the intimate connection between these theological conclusions and immediate revelation, both are called truths of faith. However, when Cano uses this terminology in respect of theological conclusions, he is always careful to qualify with the words "*mediate revelata*"¹.

¹ Ibid., cap. 4, col. 579. "Fidei porro quaestio bifariam intelligitur. Una quae immediate ad fidem attinet, ut vere attinent omnia, quae Deus Ecclesiae suae aut verbo edidit aut scripto; altera quae *mediate* fidei est, cuiusmodi sunt omnes

2° Mediate revelation or theological conclusions are not of faith in the strict sense of the term. They pertain to theology, while the principles which are immediately revealed pertain to the supernatural virtue of faith¹.

3° Theological conclusions, however, may be defined by the Church, and then they must be regarded in the same way as truth which is immediately revealed. After such a definition, the denial of these conclusions will mean heresy in the strict sense of the term².

4° When Cano speaks of theological conclusions which may be defined by the Church as being of faith, he means proper theological conclusions, i. e. those deduced by means of two principles of faith, or those which are acquired by means of one premise of faith and another known by the light of natural reason. For Cano, these are theological conclusions in the strict sense of the term, and they are distinguished from another type which may be called theological conclusions in an extended sense only, i. e. doctrine which is already immediately revealed, but needs to be made more explicit by the *magisterium* of the Church³.

conclusiones quae ordine disciplinae ex illis prioribus colligere et definire possumus. Quae quoniam non in seipsis sed in aliis tanquam in principiis revelata a Deo sunt, *mediate* fidei dicuntur esse, et qui eas negat, is fidem negare hoc modo dicitur."

¹ Ibid., cap. 5, col. 588, '*octava praeceptio*' "Sed ne quis sit admiratus, cur, etiam inter omnes fere theologos constet, a meque ipso saepe affirmatum sit, eiusmodi conclusiones, quae ex fide per explicitam consecutionem derivantur, theologiae proprie esse non fidei, nunc ita confundam quasi theologia et fides eadem virtus sint. Si enim error conclusionis theologicae error fidei est, ut est revera, si eam negare sit haeresis, sequitur fidem ac theologiam ad eandem pertinere virtutem, quandoquidem errores utriusque facultati contrarii ad idem pertinent vitium. Sunt enim utriusque haereses. Sed non erit difficile ei qui superiora relegit, hanc obtinere contundereque callumniam. Diximus enim, fidem, licet non immediate, sed versari tamen circa eas conclusiones, quae per evidentem et necessariam consequentiam ex articulis fidei colliguntur. Quare necesse est ut infidelitas mediata quoque circa conclusiones theologiae contrarias versetur."

² Ibid., col. 586, '*septima praeceptio*' "Si vel Ecclesia vel Concilium, vel Sedes Apostolica, vel etiam sancti una mente eademque voce aliquam theologiae conclusionem et confecerint et fidelibus etiam praescriperint, haec veritas catholica ita censebitur ut si esset per se a Christo revelata; et illi qui adversetur, aequae erit haereticus, ac si sacris litteris traditionibusve Apostolorum refragaretur. Conclusionem sane theologiae hic appello eam proprie quae ex principiis huius facultatis certa et firma consecutione ducitur."

³ Ibid., lib. V, cap. 5, col. 297, '*ad postremum argumentum*' "Duplex conclusionum genus posse in concilio defini. Unum earum quae sunt propriae theo-

5° One may be presumed a heretic for the denial of an undefined theological conclusion. This holds especially when the natural truth used in the deduction is self-evident. Then, one is not regarded as being ignorant of the natural self-evident principle, so the obvious presumption is that the denial of the conclusion is caused by the rejection of the principle which is of faith ¹.

We see from this brief outline that according to the doctrine of Cano, the denial of a defined theological conclusion will merit the censure of heresy. If an undefined conclusion is denied, one may be *presumed* a heretic. The presumption of heresy, however, is not a theological censure. It is in respect of the *person* and not the doctrine which is denied. Which of the censures does Cano apply to the actual proposition which denies a theological conclusion? This question must be left unanswered, because the undefined theological conclusion is completely neglected by Cano in his entire exposition of the censures.

We note this omission on Cano's part, because very soon after the publication of *De Locis Theologicis*, the theological conclusion began to be associated with the censure of *error*.

We now bring our examination of Cano's doctrine to a close. His exposition of the censure of *error* was certainly original, as we have seen. He made a complete departure from every explanation which had been given before his time. It will be interesting, therefore, to see how his doctrine fared in later years.

logiae facultatis, quoniam vel ex duobus principiis per fidem creditis, vel alio credito, alio lumine naturae cognito colliguntur. Alterum autem genus est earum quas Spiritus Sanctus ipse revelavit quidem Apostolis, Evangelistis, et Prophetis, sed quoniam non erat id perinde manifestum, a synodo declaratur."

¹ Ibid., lib. XII, cap. 5, col. 588, '*octava praeceptio*' "Quamobrem Ecclesia, tametsi intelligit eiusmodi conclusiones non e fide solum, sed e principiis quoque naturae pendere; quia tamen non putat, hominem rationalem ea quae rationi perspicua sunt et manifesta negare, eum qui illas inficiatus sit, haereticum judicat. Sumit enim, maximaque ex causa sumit, illum non in naturae ratione, quae erat evidens, sed in fide claudicare."

ARTICLE IV

Cano's Explanation under Scrutiny

After Cano, the next major authority who gives a thorough examination of the problem of erroneous propositions is Francis Suarez S. J. His treatise on the theological virtues, where his explanation of the censures is to be found, was first published at Coimbra in 1621 A. D., fifty-eight years after the publication of Cano's *De Locis*.

Before treating of Suarez' doctrine, however, we wish to note certain points of interest and developments which took place in the intervening period. After the publication of *De Locis Theologicis* (1563), Cano's doctrine on the erroneous propositions was examined and discussed in almost every treatise which touched on the theological censures. In the period which we are now about to examine, we shall see his interpretation under scrutiny.

A. Jacobus de Simancas (1575 A. D.)

When treating of the different opinions which preceded Cano, we examined the doctrine of Simancas on erroneous propositions. After the publication of *De Locis*, Simancas brought out the second edition of his *Institutiones Catholicae* in Rome 1575 A. D., and in this he examined the doctrine of Cano.

Having made a summary of the opinions of S. Antoninus, Turrecremata and Castro, Simancas notes that Cano, unlike all the foregoing, places a specific difference between the heretical and the erroneous proposition. He is pleased with this distinction of Cano, and agrees that this is the only way in which the condemnation of the Council of Constance can be interpreted¹. Nevertheless, he rejects Cano's interpretation of the erroneous proposition, and singles out the concept of *doctrina catholica* for special attack.

The denial of truths which are Catholic and universal, Simancas notes, should be censured as heretical and not merely as erroneous. The erroneous proposition differs from heresy in so far as it does not

¹ Cf. SIMANCAS, *Institutiones Catholicae*, tit. 54, no. 9. Romae (1575), p. 425.

contain *manifest* heresy. Likewise, it is not in opposition to Catholic truth which believed by all¹. It seems, therefore, that it was Cano's insistence on the universal character of *doctrina catholica* which displeased Simancas most. He could not understand how anything pertaining to Catholic truth and so universally believed could not be of faith. Consequently, its denial should merit the censure of heresy.

It is clear from this that Simancas did not understand Cano's doctrine regarding *doctrina catholica*. Time and again, Cano stresses the fact that this concept represents Catholic truth outside the limits of revelation. If Simancas had rightly understood this point, he would not have stated that the denial of *doctrina catholica*, (as understood by Cano), should be censured as heretical.

B. Dominicus Banez O. P. (1584 A. D.)

Banez' commentary on the *secunda secundae* of S. Thomas was first published at Salamanca in 1584 A. D.². In his exposition of q. 11, a. 1, he treats of the theological censures less than heresy. We shall now examine his doctrine on the erroneous proposition and see if he differs in any way from his former master, Melchior Cano³.

In reading Banez' explanation of the erroneous proposition, not only do we recognise the doctrine, but almost the very words of Cano. We find the same three grades of *error* and the corresponding theological notes. Banez tells us that this doctrine is Master Cano's opinion with which he readily agrees.

This agreement, however, does not imply a merely mechanical endorsement of Cano's doctrine. Banez makes one very important correction, or to be more exact, supplement to his master's doctrine:

¹ Ibid. "Deinde alia subiungit (Cano), quae mihi non omnino probatur. Nam propositiones contra veritates catholicas et universales, et quae doctrinae christianae veritates sunt, erroneas esse, sed non haereticas, id vero est quod mihi displicuit: illud autem probo, erroneam propositionem, minus quippiam continere, quam haereticam manifestam, atque adeo erroneum esse asserere aliquid contra veritatem ab ecclesia nondum plane definitam: vel contra veritatem catholicam, non omnibus manifestam, aut certe ab eo ignoratam, qui propositionem erroneam dixit."

² Cf. HURTER N. L., t. 3, p. 389.

³ Cf. BANEZ, in 2/2, q. 11, a. 2, '*circa hos articulos*' Lugduni (1588), col. 447 et seqq.

while agreeing with Cano's three grades of *error*, he observes that the most important type of erroneous proposition is altogether neglected by Cano, that is, the question of the denial of an undefined theological conclusion¹.

We note that he merely supplements Cano's doctrine with this extra notion. He does not disagree with the explanation which Cano has given, but merely introduces something which was omitted by his former master. This was a serious omission, however, since Banez now claims it to be the most important type of erroneous proposition.

He does not claim that this addition to Cano's doctrine is original on his part. On the contrary, he states that it is commonly held by theologians that the denial of an undefined theological conclusion constitutes the most serious grade of erroneous proposition. Unfortunately, he gives us no references to justify this assertion. If this doctrine was the common opinion of theologians in 1584 A. D., how can we explain the fact that Petrus de Lorca, writing on these censures thirty years afterwards, gave an entirely different opinion regarding the erroneous proposition, and like Banez, claimed it to be the common doctrine?

The main point to be noted, however, is that in Banez' exposition of this censure we find the erroneous proposition being associated with the denial of a theological conclusion for the first time. We shall presently see that it took some time after Banez before these two concepts were definitely related to each other by the common opinion of theologians.

Banez is explicit in stating that it is the *undefined* theological conclusion which is associated with the censure of *error*. Like Cano, he held that such conclusions may be defined by the Church as being of faith, and after that, their denial would be heretical rather than erroneous².

¹ Cf. BANEZ, loc. cit. "Nihilominus notandum nobis videtur, quod primus et potissimus gradus propositionis erroneae secundum communem loquendi modum theologorum est, quando quis dicit contrarium manifeste conclusioni theologicae, quae per evidentem consequentiam colligitur ex fide: quae nondum est definita ab Ecclesia nec proposita tanquam traditio apostolica vel Sacra Scriptura."

² Cf. BANEZ, in 1, q. 1, a. 2, '*ad tertium argumentum*' (Lugduni 1588, col. 19.) "Quoniam ab Ecclesia non est hactenus definitum quod Christus est risibilis. At vero si ab Ecclesia definiretur, risibilitatem pertinere ad perfectionem humanae naturae, quamadmodum definitum est, Christum habere duplicem voluntatem, humanam et divinam, iam qui negaret Christum esse risibilem esset haereticus. Quia repugnaret doctrinae Ecclesiae, quae columna est, et firmamentum veritatis."

C. Petrus de Lorca O. Cist. (1614 A. D.)¹

Before giving his own opinion as to what constitutes an erroneous proposition, de Lorca reviews the doctrine of those theologians who preceded him. He considers Cano's opinion and then proceeds to reject it.

Unlike Simancas, de Lorca rightly understood what Cano wished to convey by the notion of *doctrina catholica*. He notes, for instance, that according to Cano, this concept represents a body of truth outside the boundary of revelation, yet piously believed throughout the Church. Its denial will not destroy faith, but weaken it. Like Simancas, he confines himself to examining what Cano called the first grade of *error*, and makes no mention of the second and third².

In spite of the fact that he rightly understood Cano on the notion of *doctrina catholica*, de Lorca rejects his explanation of the censure of *error* for the following reasons. The Council of Constance, he states, regarded erroneous propositions as being *non-Catholic*³. This signifies that such propositions are in no way Catholic, and doctrine which is no way Catholic is obviously that which is opposed to faith. In other words, if the erroneous proposition is *non-Catholic*, it must contain something which is contrary to divine faith. Cano's conception of *doctrina catholica* does not fall in with this description, since a denial of that which is just piously believed throughout the Church may still be called Catholic, in the sense that it contains nothing contrary to faith⁴.

We see from this that one of the main reasons why de Lorca rejects Cano's explanation is because the Council of Constance considered

¹ PETRUS DE LORCA O. Cist. († 1606 A. D.) His *Commentaria et Disputationes in Secundam Secundae S. Thomae* was first published at Madrid in 1614 A. D. In his treatise on faith, disput. 40, we find his exposition of the theological censures.

² Cf. LORCA, *Commentaria et Disputationes in Secundam Secundae S. Thomae*, de fide, disput. 40, no. 5. *Matriti* (1614), p. 259.

³ Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 1.a.

⁴ Cf. LORCA, loc. cit. "Quod Concilium Constantiense erroneas propositiones absolute dixit non esse catholicas; nihil autem absolute dicitur non catholicum, nisi quod fidei ipsae contrarium est, nam non catholicum idem est quod nullo modo catholicum; negatio enim praeposita omnia destruit, ut non album, nullo modo album; non homo, nullo modo homo: et illa sola nullo modo catholica sunt, quae fidei adversantur: nam quae pia credulitati solum opponuntur, aliquo modo catholica sunt, idest, non contraria fidei."

the erroneous proposition as being non-Catholic. We have already considered this qualification as used by the council, and proved beyond doubt that the term "*non-Catholic*" not only governs the erroneous propositions, but all the other propositions which are censured. This is clearly stated in the condemnation affixed to the articles of Huss¹, and in the subsequent interrogation which was drawn up by Pope Martin V².

Having stated that the qualification "*non-Catholic*" governs the erroneous propositions alone, de Lorca goes on to say that which is *non-Catholic* must necessarily be contrary to faith. Not only is this weak logic, but is also disproved by the two decrees which we have just cited, where the term "*non-Catholic*" is applied to all propositions censured below heresy. From all this it is apparent that de Lorca's rejection of Cano's explanation cannot be taken too seriously. He was obviously misled by the wording of the condemnation affixed to the articles of Wyclif, and by presupposing that anything which is not Catholic must necessarily be contrary to divine faith.

After his examination of Cano's doctrine, de Lorca expresses his own view regarding the censure of *error*, which he claims to be the common opinion among theologians. The erroneous proposition, he states, is in direct opposition to truth of faith. It has this characteristic in common with heresy. The differentiating factor, however, is that the erroneous proposition is not manifestly and notoriously opposed to faith, as heresy must be³. To illustrate this notion, he points to the fact that many truths which are now dogmas of faith were once held in doubt before their definition by the Church. In this state of uncertainty, the denial of such doctrine would merit the censure of *error*. After definition, however, denial would entail the censure of heresy⁴.

¹ Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 1 b.

² *Ibid.*, no. 1 c.

³ Cf. LORCA, loc. cit., no. 7, p. 259. "His ergo definitionibus omissis, vera est definitio quam communis sententia tradit, erroneam propositionem esse, quae directe quidem doctrinae fidei adversatur, sed non manifeste et notorie; ut in hoc differat erroneum ab haeresi, quod haeresis est error manifestus in fide, erroneum vero, error in fide, sed non manifestus."

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 260. "Exempla huius gradus sunt omnes propositiones de quibus aliquando in Ecclesia dubitatum est, et postea definitae sunt; non enim potuerunt esse haereses post definitionem, nisi prius essent errores."

S. Antoninus is the first authority quoted by de Lorca to support this explanation. We recall that according to the doctrine of the former, the two factors which distinguish the heretical from the erroneous proposition are notorious opposition to revelation and pertinacity. Here, de Lorca makes no mention of the second condition but stresses the first; the heretical proposition must be notorious and manifest. We have already seen that this explanation of S. Antoninus was later endorsed by Sylvester de Prierias and quoted by Simancas. All these authorities are brought forward by de Lorca to prove that his doctrine constitutes the common opinion of theologians. He even goes so far as to state that Cano, in a way, holds this view. In all probability, he is referring to Cano's explanation of the second and third grade of *error*.

The main authority for this opinion is S. Antoninus, who stated that the heretical proposition must be notorious. In our estimation, the factor which influenced him in placing this condition for heresy was the terminology used by the Council of Constance in condemning the articles of Wyclif and Huss¹. In these condemnations it was stated that some of the articles were *notoriously heretical*, while others were not Catholic but erroneous, etc. From this it would appear that *notorious heresy* is distinguished from *error*. In the interrogations which were later drawn up by Pope Martin V, this same terminology is used². We note, however, that in all the subsequent condemnations, (which may be seen outlined in the introduction), the term '*notorious*' was never again used in relation to the censure of heresy. S. Antoninus could not have been aware of this, but the same excuse cannot be brought forward for de Lorca, because in the condemnation of the seventy-nine articles of Baius by Pope S. Pius V (1567 A. D.), simple heresy was distinguished from plain *error*, without any qualifying terms such as '*notorie*', or '*non catholici*'³. All this goes to show that the explanation put forward here by de Lorca has not the weight of authority which he thinks it has, in spite of the fact that such an eminent theologian as S. Antoninus is cited as being of the same opinion.

When examining Banez' doctrine on this censure, we noticed that

¹ Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 1, a and b.

² *Ibid.*, no. 1.c

³ *Ibid.*, no. 3.

the theological conclusion was introduced as one of the notes corresponding to the censure of *error*. He claimed this to be commonly accepted by the theologians. In de Lorca's explanation, however, we find no mention of the theological conclusion in relation to the erroneous proposition. Nevertheless, it is not completely neglected, and we shall now consider how he applies it as a theological note corresponding to an entirely different censure.

Having explained the type of proposition which merits the censure *haeresim sapiens*, de Lorca goes on to state that the denial of a theological conclusion (whether deduced by means of two premises of faith, or one premise of faith with another known by the natural light of reason) could also be placed in this category. He points out, however, that there is a special censure which deals with propositions in opposition to such conclusions, and this he hopes to explain further down ¹.

Soon afterwards we find de Lorca explaining the censure *haeresi proxima*. He points out that the name of this censure suggests that the doctrine denied comes very close to faith. Seeing that a theological conclusion, logically deduced from faith, enjoys the next grade of certainty, he places it as the theological note corresponding to *haeresi proxima* ².

This is the first time we have seen *haeresi proxima* explained as a separate censure. Lorca had never seen it used by the Church ³, neither did any of those theologians whom he quotes and whom we have already considered, regard it as a separate censure.

We recall that Banez placed the theological conclusion as a note corresponding to the censure of *error*, and stated that this was generally

¹ Cf. LORCA, loc. cit., no. 10, p. 261. "Ad hoc genus reduci possunt propositiones illas, quae adversantur conclusionibus, ex principiis fidei deductis, sive deducantur ex una de fide et altera naturali, sive ex utraque de fide... Sed quamvis huiusmodi assertiones quae adversantur conclusionibus theologicis, sapientes haeresim appellari possunt, aliam quoque censuram habent, quae prior et germanior est illis, quam statim exponam."

² Ibid., no. 11, p. 261. "Dixi aliam esse censuram quae proprie convenit assertionibus quae contrariae sunt veritatibus ex principiis fidei, proxima et necessaria consecutione illatis; quia nimirum huiusmodi assertiones proximae haeresi, vel errori, suo iure appellari debent, quia veritates oppositae proximae ad certitudinem fidei accedunt. Nec video quibus aliis haec censura convenienter aptari possit, servata vocum proprietate."

³ The censure *haeresi proxima* was for the first time officially used by the Church in 1690 A. D., when thirty-one propositions of the Jansenists were condemned *in globo*. Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 6.

taken for granted by the theologians. Now, thirty years afterwards, we find de Lorca placing it in relation to *haeresi proxima*.

Having examined this intervening period between the publication of *De Locis* and Suarez' commentary on faith, (1563-1621 A. D) we may sum up the main points of interest as follows. Simancas rejected Cano's explanation of the erroneous proposition because he misunderstood the concept of *doctrina catholica*. Lorca, on the contrary, rightly understood this notion of Cano, but was forced to reject his explanation of *error*, thinking that the Council of Constance used the term "*non Catholici*" as governing the erroneous propositions alone, and furthermore, thinking that anything which is not Catholic must necessarily be contrary to faith. In their own explanation of the erroneous proposition, both of these theologians went back to the doctrine of S. Antoninus.

Unlike these, Banez agreed with the explanation of Cano, but at the same time he introduced the theological conclusion as a theological note corresponding to *error*. This is perhaps the most important advance which was made in the whole period. In subsequent years, as we shall see, this relationship between the theological conclusion and the censure of *error* was taken more and more for granted by the theologians.

ARTICLE V

The Erroneous Proposition According to Suarez ¹ 1621 A. D.

In *disput.* 19 of his tract on faith, Suarez treats of the different types of infidelity, and of heresy in particular. He devotes the second section of the *disputatio* to the consideration of theological censures, so this will be the subject of our special study with regard to his interpretation of the erroneous proposition ².

¹ Like Cano and Banez, Suarez was also a professor at Salamanca for some time. Hurter tells us that his works were published between 1594-1655 A. D. Père Monnat (DTC, t. 14, col. 2648) says that his commentary on the *secunda secundae* of S. Thomas, was posthumously published at Coimbra in 1621 A. D. It is in this work that we find Suarez' treatise on the theological censures.

² Cf. SUAREZ, *In Secundam Secundae Divi Thomae*, de fide, disput. 19, sect. 2. (Vivès, t. 12, p. 426 et seqq.)

There is no doubting the fact that Suarez is one of our major authorities on the explanation of the theological censures. We shall presently see that he is not satisfied with merely giving the opinion of others. On the contrary, he makes a special study of each censure, bringing logic and reason to bear on all the evidence which is available. At the same time he has the greatest respect for authority, and before giving his own view, usually makes a good examination of other opinions. At the beginning of his exposition of the censures, he notes the main authorities who had written on the subject before him. In this list we see that almost all those authors are included whom we have already studied.

Before considering Suarez on the censure of *error*, let us first of all see what evidence was at his disposal from the official condemnations of the Church. Seeing that he died in the year 1617, he was aware of the condemnation of the articles of Baius, which was made by Pope Pius V in 1567 A. D., seven years after the death of Cano. These articles were censured as heretical, erroneous, suspected of heresy, temerarious, scandalous and offensive to pious ears¹. We note that in all the cumulative condemnations of the Church which were known to Suarez², the censure of *error* appears immediately after heresy. With this in mind, we shall now consider his exposition of the erroneous proposition³.

Suarez begins his explanation by discussing the meaning of the term "*error*". Following Cano, he holds for a specific distinction between the heretical and the erroneous proposition, and on this principle he rejects the opinions of S. Antoninus, Turrecremata, and all others whose explanation does not tally with this fundamental tenet.

There is one interesting fact regarding the significance of the word "*error*" which Suarez points out and of which we have not been made aware before this. The most common meaning of the term "*error*", he states, is falsity. When the word is used in a scientific sense, however, it signifies something much more than mere falsity; a certain type of falsity is indicated, which distinguishes it from the commonplace meaning of the word. When, for instance, an opinion is

¹ Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 3.

² Ibid., no. 1, 2, and 3.

³ Cf. SUAREZ, loc. cit., no. 11-15.

evidently false and contradicts the very principles of a science, it is termed erroneous. In theology, likewise, a proposition is said to be erroneous when it contradicts doctrine which is certain and commonly taken for granted¹.

We have seen that Cano was the first to demand and explain the specific distinction between the heretical and the erroneous proposition. He showed with the aid of analogy that the term "*error*" can have a generic and specific meaning, and that if it is to be regarded as a distinct censure, the specific signification must be employed. However, he did not explain why this particular word "*error*", more than any other, should be used to indicate the censure which comes immediately after heresy. Suarez does so by pointing out that the specific meaning of the term which connotes the censure, must be taken in the scientific sense, that is, indicating manifest and blatant falsity in matters which are commonly taken for granted.

Before giving his own interpretation of the censure of *error*, Suarez discusses some opinions. The doctrine of Cano is singled out for special examination, which shows that Suarez regarded it as being the most authoritative of all opinions which preceded him.

A. Suarez examines the interpretation of Cano²

Suarez certainly interpreted Cano correctly on the second and third grades of *error*. This is obvious from the clear description he gives of Cano's doctrine on these two notions. We cannot say the same, however, regarding his interpretation of the first grade. It seems that Suarez was completely misled in his conception of Cano's *doctrina catholica*. He says that the only way it differs from truth of faith is that it is neither expressly revealed, nor defined by the Church³. To

¹ Ibid., no. 11. "... juxta communem autem loquendi modum, error quasi per antonomasiam in unaquaque materia significare solet, non quodcumque judicium falsum, sed per quamdam exaggerationem, quod evidentius vel certius falsum est; et ita in philosophia vocatur error vel opinio erronea, non omnis falsa opinio aut minus probabilis, sed quae est contra principia vel axiomata communiter in philosophia recepta. Sic ergo error in doctrina sacra per antonomasiam dicitur propositio falsa, et contraria doctrinae certae, ac communiter receptae a sacris doctoribus."

² Ibid., no. 13.

³ Ibid. "Primus (gradus) est, errorem in hoc convenire cum haeresi, quod

illustrate this he does not adhere to the simple examples of Cano, but introduces two others which are more in keeping with his own interpretation. These two examples are; *a*, the Assumption of Our Lady, and *b*, the fact that she never even venially sinned (i. e. considering this doctrine before the Council of Trent.)

For Suarez, Cano's second and third degrees of *error* are just explicit forms of the first. This is clear from the way he introduces them once he has finished treating of *doctrina catholica*: « alter modus rem hanc explicandi est... »

We cannot agree with this interpretation of Cano's doctrine. We have pointed out time and again that *doctrina catholica*, as understood by Cano, comprises truths outside the boundary of immediate and mediate revelation, yet piously believed by the faithful throughout the universal Church. If this concept were rightly understood by Suarez, there would have been no necessity to change Cano's examples which are as follows.

1^o Special prayers which are applied to one person by religious or prelates, are more beneficial to that person than general prayers.

2^o It is licit for friars to be mendicant, as they are not obliged to earn their living by manual labour.

It is obvious that there is a considerable difference between these examples and those which Suarez substituted.

Having interpreted Cano's doctrine in this way, Suarez does not reject it outright, but merely states that it is probable. He points out, however, that while Cano succeeded in distinguishing *error* from heresy, he did not succeed in distinguishing it from the other theological censures ¹.

opponatur catholicae doctrinae, id est, ita receptae communi consensu Ecclesiae, ut nullus pius ac vere doctus de illa dubitare audeat. Differt tamen quia interdum aliqua propositio est hoc modo recepta ab Ecclesia, quamvis non sit expresse revelata aut definita, et tunc, inquirunt, propositio contraria est erronea, non tamen haeretica, quia non est contra expressam fidem."

¹ Ibid. "... atque omnes isti modi probabiles quidem sunt, satisque distinguunt propositionem erroneam ab haeretica; nihilominus non videntur satis illam distinguere a propositione sapiente haeresim, et aliis statim tractandis."

B. Suarez' own explanation of the erroneous proposition

After examining Cano's doctrine, Suarez gives his own opinion as to what constitutes the erroneous proposition. This is perhaps the simplest explanation we have seen so far, since he holds that the censure of *error* is incurred by the denial of a theological conclusion, and that alone¹. What Suarez here understands as a theological conclusion is that which is evidently deduced from a principle of faith, with the aid of a premise known by the natural light of reason. Conclusions of this nature, he states, have the next grade of certainty to doctrine of faith. Their denial will consequently merit the next gravest censure after heresy, which is *error*². If the erroneous proposition is understood in this manner, then it is equally distinguished from heresy and all the lower theological censures.

This is not the first time we have seen the theological conclusion being associated with the erroneous proposition. We recall that Banez also related these two concepts, but with this difference; he placed the denial of a theological conclusion as one of many theological notes corresponding to the censure. He did not reject Cano's doctrine, but only supplemented it by introducing the theological conclusion. Suarez, on the contrary, supplants the three grades with this simple explanation.

So far, when examining the different notions which theologians put forward to explain the erroneous proposition, we have always tried, as far as possible, to ascertain the factors which influenced them in interpreting the censure the way they did. We found that sometimes their opinions were based on the use of a particular word used by the Church, or the slightest evidence which they could use as authority. We shall now give our own opinion as to what influenced Suarez in placing the theological conclusion as the theological note corresponding to *error*.

¹ Ibid., no. 14. "Quapropter addi potest alius modus propositionis erroneae nimirum ut sit illa quae opponitur veritati certae theologiae certitudine, quae non attingit gradum certitudinis fidei, quia nullo modo est immediate revelata, ut supponitur, sed est conclusio evidenter illata ex una de fide, et ex altera evidente lumine naturali; nam quod talis conclusio sit certa certitudine theologiae, manifestum est, quia est scientifica in illo ordine."

² Ibid. "Hoc ergo supposito, manifeste sequitur propositionem contrariam tali propositioni non attingere gradum propositionis haereticæ, quia non habet

We have already noted that in all global condemnations of the Church of which Suarez was aware, *error* occupies the next place to heresy in the gradation of censures. This indicated that the erroneous proposition came next to heresy in gravity. Likewise, the very name of the censure, "*error*", corroborated this. For Suarez, the word "*error*", when used in scientific matters, indicates manifest or notorious falsity, or the denial of something which is commonly held as certain. All this went to show that the erroneous proposition comes immediately after heresy.

To fit in with this, a theological note had to be found which would occupy the next grade in certainty to doctrine of faith. This obviously meant the theological conclusion which is mediately revealed, and the denial of which entails a mediate denial of faith.

There is something very logical about this explanation of Suarez which we have not seen in any other exposition considered so far. The principle underlying his doctrine is the fact that the erroneous proposition comes immediately after heresy. From this he argues that the corresponding note must be the theological conclusion, which comes immediately after faith.

We notice that Suarez is far from being dogmatic about this explanation of the erroneous proposition. He does not claim it to be the common opinion of theologians, and in fact, does not so much as cite one authority to support his doctrine. We noticed that when he had examined Cano's explanation of *error* he did not reject it outright, and even went so far as to say that it was a probable opinion.

The concept of the erroneous proposition has now been very much simplified. There is no certainty as yet, however, as to this new interpretation. We must wait and see how it was accepted by later theologians. Before passing on to consider these, we wish to investigate Suarez' doctrine on theological conclusions more fully. This will help us to have a still clearer idea of his interpretation of the erroneous proposition.

summam oppositionem cum propositione fidei, qualis est immediate; quod autem sit erronea, manifestum est, quia post haeticam propositionem habet summam repugnantiam cum veritate fidei, scilicet, mediatam, per evidentem illationem, et ita distinguitur ab inferioribus gradibus propositionum damnabilium, ut videbimus."

C. Theological conclusions according to Suarez

When Suarez gives his own opinion on the erroneous proposition, he does not expressly say that it is constituted by the denial of an *undefined* theological conclusion. This is not necessary, since he has already laid down that such conclusions may be defined by the Church and become doctrine of faith. After such a definition, their denial would be heretical¹.

He expressly states that the theological conclusion which corresponds to the censure of *error* is that which is evidently deduced by means of one premise of faith and another known by the natural light of reason. He regards conclusions which are acquired by means of two premises of faith as being within the pale of immediate revelation, and consequently their denial may be censured as heretical. He admits, however, that conclusions deduced in this way may not always be the object of an act of faith, that is, if the reason for the assent happens to be the evident deduction rather than the divine testimony².

According to Suarez, therefore, the theological conclusion which corresponds to the erroneous proposition is that which is evidently deduced from a principle of faith with the aid of a premise known by the natural light of reason, and which has not yet been defined by the Church. Furthermore, he states that virtual revelation, or the true theological conclusion, is in respect of properties which are *not* formally contained in the revealed subject but only *in radice*, as the

¹ Cf. SUAREZ, de fide, disput. 3, sect. 11, no. 11. "Nihilominus dicendum est tertio, conclusionem theologicam, quae prius tantum virtute continebatur in rebus revelatis, postquam per Ecclesiam definitur, esse formaliter et propriissime de fide, non mediate tantum, sed immediate; quia jam non habetur illa veritas tantum ut virtute et mediate revelata, sed ut revelata formaliter et in se." A little further down, he explains the mode of transition from mediate to immediate revelation, as follows:

"Ratio vero est, quia quod Ecclesia definit, Deus per Ecclesiam testificatur; Ecclesia autem definit talem veritatem in se ac formaliter; ergo jam Deus illam in se ac formaliter testificatur; ergo eo ipso est constituta sufficienter sub objecto formali fidei; nam testimonium divinum idem est, et aequè certum, sive per seipsum, sive per Ecclesiam, vel alium ministrum Deus illud praebeat, ut supra ostensum est."

Both Cano and Banez held for this transition, but were not quite so explicit as to the way it may come about. The explanation of Suarez just quoted is tantamount to saying that the Church is capable of making new revelations.

² Ibid., no. 6.

property *risibilitas* is contained *in radice* in human nature¹. This suggests that Suarez limits the notion of virtual revelation and the strict theological conclusion to physical properties which are contained *in radice* in the revealed subject. It cannot be said that metaphysical properties are contained *in radice* in the revealed subject, as these are identified with it, and it would be absurd to say that anything is contained in itself *tanquam in radice*.

The concept of the theological conclusion which Suarez placed as corresponding to the erroneous proposition is much more explicit than any we have seen so far. That which concerns us most, however, is his interpretation of the censure of *error*, which has now been very much simplified. If we were to treat fully of Suarez' doctrine on theological conclusions, and its subsequent effects on the history of theology, we fear that it would take us too far afield. In recent years, this has been the subject of a very thorough study by Fr. Marin-Sola O. P., who claims that Suarez' innovations regarding the theological conclusion, began a new epoch in the history of theology².

¹ *Ibid.*, no. 5. "Revelatio autem virtualis est respectu proprietatis quae nullo modo continetur formaliter in re dicta, sed tantum in radice, ut in exemplo de risibilitate, et similibus."

² Cf. MARIN-SOLA O. P., *L'Evolution homogène du Dogme catholique*. Fribourg/Suisse, (1924).

Marin-Sola's examination of Suarez' doctrine on the theological conclusion may be seen in t. 1, chap. 2, no. 65 et seqq. According to Marin-Sola, Suarez was confronted with two opinions which were opposed in the extreme. The first was the traditional Thomistic doctrine which stated that theological conclusions are not of faith before they are defined by the Church. The second was that of Vasques and Vega, who held that such conclusions are of faith, even before definition. Instead of taking sides with either of these opinions, Suarez devised a *via media* which partly agreed with one school of thought, and partly with the other. To bring about this *via media*, he introduced a new division of formal revelation, formal-explicit and formal-confused.

In the category of formal-confused revelation, Suarez placed not only conclusions deduced by means of improper reasoning, such as mere explanation of terms, etc., but also the metaphysical properties of the revealed subject. These metaphysical properties are identified with the revealed essence, and only conceptually differ from it. They are distinguished from physical properties which not only express a distinct concept, but a distinct reality from the revealed essence. According to Marin-Sola, Suarez restricted virtual revelation to this latter type of properties, which are merely physico-connected with revelation. In this way, Suarez brought about the *via media*. He was able to agree with the traditional Thomistic view by stating that the strict theological conclusion, (i. e. understood in respect of physical properties) is not of faith before definition by the Church, and that

ARTICLE VI

Lugo Endorses the Interpretation of Suarez
(1646 A. D.)

After Suarez, our next authority on the theological censures is Cardinal de Lugo S. J. (1583-1660 A. D.)¹. His very thorough exposition is to be found in his tract on faith, where he examines the sin of heresy². This consideration of Lugo's doctrine brings us forward twenty-five years after the publication of Suarez' commentary on the *secunda secundae*. In the intervening period, there were no condemnations issued by the Church in which the lesser theological censures were applied. From the point of view of guidance from this official source, therefore, we may say that Lugo was in the same position as his predecessor Suarez.

The publication of Lugo's tract on faith constituted a great advance in the interpretation of the theological censures. He gives the entire problem a thorough examination, and we find such detail and clarity in his exposition as we have not met before this.

In his explanation of the erroneous proposition³, he first of all treats of the name of this censure and its distinction from heresy. He then reviews all the important opinions, and here we are happy to note that we have already studied the doctrine of each theologian

the theological conclusion understood in a broad sense, (i. e. in respect of metaphysical properties) is of faith before being defined.

Marin-Sola's contention is that Suarez' limitation of virtual revelation and the true theological conclusion to mere physical properties, began a new epoch in the history of theology. It was against the traditional doctrine which held that true virtuality concerns the metaphysical properties — which differed only in concept from the revealed essence. This change of Suarez, Marin-Sola states, was the cause of immense confusion in later years, and presented insurmountable difficulties in explaining the homogeneous development of dogma.

¹ The *Opera Omnia* of Lugo was first published at Lyons in 1652 A. D. Hurter gives no specific date for the first publication of his tract on faith. However, in the general preface to the Vivès edition, this date is given as 1646 A. D. Lugo's dedication to Pope Innocent X, placed at the beginning of the tract on faith, is dated the first day of May, 1645 A. D.

² Cf. Lugo, *Disputationes Scholasticae et Morales, tractatus de virtute fidei divinae*, disput. 20, sect. 3. (Vivès, t. 2, p. 1 et seqq.)

³ Cf. Lugo, loc. cit., no. 73-78.

whose opinion is analysed by Lugo. Finally, he gives his own interpretation as to what constitutes the erroneous proposition. We shall now examine his doctrine on all these points.

A. The erroneous proposition constitutes a distinct censure ¹

In discussing the signification of the name of this censure and its distinction from the heretical proposition, Lugo has nothing new to add to the doctrine of Cano and Suarez on these points. Immediately he goes on to discuss the main opinions on the erroneous proposition, and the first theologian mentioned is S. Antoninus O. P.

B. Lugo on the interpretation of S. Antoninus ²

We have already considered the opinion of S. Antoninus and seen that the main difference he placed between the heretical and the erroneous proposition was a mere subjective one, i. e. the pertinacity of the assertor. This interpretation was unacceptable to Cano and others since it did not tally with the official pronouncements of the Church, especially the decrees of the Council of Constance which seemed to place a more objective distinction between these two censures. Lugo now reiterates this rejection of the saint's explanation, and points out that such condemnations do not concern the sins of those who originally asserted the articles, but rather the objective propositions in themselves. There is one other interesting argument against the opinion of S. Antoninus which Lugo brings forward here, referring to the bull of Pope S. Pius V condemning the articles of Baius. This argument could not have been used by Cano who died in 1560 A. D. Lugo now brings it forward to discredit for good the opinion of S. Antoninus on the censure of *error*.

When Pope S. Pius V condemned the articles of Baius ³, Lugo states, he applied both the censures, heresy and *error*. There is no mention of pertinacity in this condemnation, and in fact, there could not be since Baius always remained a Catholic and obedient to the Church.

¹ *Ibid.*, no. 73.

² *Ibid.*, no. 74.

³ Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 3.

On the other hand, when the Council of Constance condemned the articles of Wyclif and Huss¹, both of whom were obdurate heretics, it found the same pertinacity in all the condemned articles, and yet distinguished between the heretical and erroneous proposition. This proves without doubt that subjective pertinacity does not enter into the distinction between the censures of heresy and *error*.

The Church has never given an official interpretation as to the meaning of the individual theological censures. This was a matter which was left to the theologians to work out. Consequently, in our efforts to understand these censures, it is to these we must go, always bearing in mind that the greater the theologian, the greater will be his authority. There is no doubting the fact that S. Antoninus bears great theological weight, and perhaps it was because of this that his opinion received so much attention. We are anxious to examine every criticism of the saint's doctrine, because it cannot be rejected unless strong and cogent arguments are brought against it. It seems now, however, that these arguments are at hand, and we may safely say that the doctrine of S. Antoninus on the erroneous proposition is untenable.

C. Lugo considers the opinion of Alphonsus de Castro²

When considering the various opinions on the erroneous proposition which were in vogue before Cano, (art. 2 of this chapter) we had occasion to study the doctrine of Alphonsus de Castro. Lugo now examines the same opinion, which shows that even at this late date, Castro's doctrine was still of considerable importance.

We recall that according to Castro, the censure of heresy may be applied when purely supernatural truths are denied. From these he distinguished natural *credibilia*, that is, doctrine which does not transcend the natural intellectual powers, but which is nevertheless revealed. Denial of this latter type of truth constitutes the erroneous proposition for Castro.

Lugo rejects this opinion on the grounds that it makes for no distinction between heresy and *error*. Once these natural truths are revealed, he states, their denial will constitute heresy.

In our own analysis of Castro's doctrine, we saw that he insisted

¹ *Ibid.*, no. 1 (a, b, c).

² Cf. Lugo, *loc. cit.*, no. 75.

on the revelation of these natural truths, the denial of which constitutes the erroneous proposition. Soon afterwards, he went on to explain that if such a natural truth is revealed, its denial will be simultaneously heretical and erroneous. Either Castro contradicted himself in this, or else he held that it is impossible to have an erroneous proposition which is not, at the same time, heretical.

D. Lugo considers the doctrine of Cano ¹

Ever since the publication of *De Locis Theologicis* (1563), the doctrine of Cano on the theological censures was regarded as being of the highest authority. We have seen that in every treatise we have considered since then, his opinion on the erroneous proposition was examined. In Lugo's lengthy treatise of the censure of *error*, the greater part by far is taken up with his examination of Cano's doctrine. As yet, we have seen no critical analysis of this. Suarez considered it, but neither rejected nor accepted it. He concluded by saying that it was probable. It now appears, however, that Lugo makes a better examination of Cano's thought, and we shall presently see that he leaves no doubt as to whether it should be accepted or not.

At the outset, Lugo notes that Cano places the concept of *doctrina catholica* as a theological note corresponding to the erroneous proposition. This body of truth, he notes, is not of faith, yet universally believed so that no one truly pious and learned would doubt it. The term "Catholic doctrine", he states, has a much wider meaning than doctrine of faith. The word "Catholic" signifies universality, and consequently, any doctrine which is universally believed throughout the Church, may be called Catholic.

Though Lugo agrees with Cano with regard to this terminology, he disagrees with him in placing this notion as a theological note corresponding to the erroneous proposition. We shall now examine his reasons for this rejection.

In all the official condemnations of the Church in which these censures were used ², the erroneous proposition is always enumerated immediately after heresy. From this it is clear that according to the

¹ *Ibid.*, no. 76-77.

² The condemnations of which Lugo was aware and to which he made special reference, are those which are numbered as 1 (a, b, c.), 2 and 3, in the outline of condemnations in the introduction.

mind of the Church it is next in gravity to the heretical proposition. It cannot be said, therefore, that the censure of *error* may be incurred by the denial of something which is commonly believed throughout the Church. This concept is far too vague to constitute *error* as a special censure. The scandalous and temerarious propositions are also in opposition to truth which is commonly believed, and yet they are generally regarded as being distinct from *error*. If the erroneous proposition is to be distinguished from these other censures, a theological note more intimately connected with divine faith, must be found¹.

The censure which is called *error in fide* must entail opposition to doctrine which is, in some way, connected with faith. According to Cano's notion of *doctrina catholica*, this connection with faith is an extrinsic one, founded on a common belief. There is, however, a greater connection than this, namely the intrinsic connection which may be clearly seen by way of deduction. If the common assent of the faithful regarding some doctrine which is not of faith is founded on reasons other than the evident intrinsic connection with revelation, opposition to such a common assent will incur a censure lower than *error*².

In short, Cano's idea of *doctrina catholica* cannot be admitted as a theological note corresponding to the erroneous proposition; firstly, because it is not sufficiently connected with revealed truth, and secondly, because it is not sufficiently distinguished from the theological notes corresponding to the lower censures, especially the temerarious and scandalous propositions.

In this analysis of Cano's first grade of *error*, Lugo introduces the very important distinction between an intrinsic and extrinsic connection with faith. The extrinsic connection is founded on authority, whereas the intrinsic connection is nothing other than the logical

¹ Cf. Lugo, loc. cit., no. 76. "Caeterum, quia error in praesenti materia proximum gradum post haeresim videtur habere, et ideo in Concilio Constantiensi et bulla pontificia supra allegatis, post haereticas nominantur immediate propositiones erroneae, non videtur satis ad errorem proprie, et in rigore sumptum, quod adversetur doctrinae quam omnes pro certa tenent. Nam temeraria etiam et scandalosa propositio, videtur adversari doctrinae quam omnes indubitanter tenent, alioquin non esset temeraria, vel scandalosa."

² Ibid. "Error enim in fide, opponi debet aliquo modo cum ipsa fide, quatenus saltem negat aliquid, quod propter connexionem cum fide nemo negare audeat. Quando vero communis ille consensus fidelium aliunde oritur, et non ex connexionem rei illius cum principiis fidei, non videtur proprie erronea doctrina, quae rem illam negat; sed aliam censuram habebit ex infra adducendis."

evidence which may be clearly seen by way of deduction. These are important concepts for the interpretation of the censure *haeresi proxima*, which is mainly concerned with extrinsic evidence.

The arguments which Lugo brings forward against Cano's first grade of *error* seem quite cogent. They are founded on the principle that the censure of *error* comes immediately after heresy. It seems that Cano also held for this principle since he treated of the erroneous proposition immediately after heresy, and the Council of Constance, which was his only authority, also enumerated the censures in this gradation. The notion of *doctrina catholica* does not seem to fit in with this. Something much more intimately connected with faith must be placed as the theological note corresponding to the censure which comes immediately after heresy.

After this exposition of the first grade of *error*, Lugo proceeds to examine the second and third grades of erroneous propositions as understood by Cano. Before considering his analysis, however, it would be well to recall briefly what Cano taught with regard to these.

Two conditions must be fulfilled before an heretical proposition is constituted; a) the doctrine which is denied must *certainly* be of faith, and b) the censurable proposition must be in direct and *certain* opposition to the doctrine which is of faith. If there is any reasonable doubt about the certainty of the first condition, then the second grade of erroneous propositions is constituted. If, however, the doubt should be with regard to the second condition, then we have the third degree of *error* as understood by Cano.

Lugo does not agree with these notions as theological notes corresponding to the erroneous proposition. Doctrine which is censurable in this way, he states, does not, in effect, differ in substance from heresy. If, for instance, a theologian were fully aware of the opposition which a proposition of this nature has to doctrine of faith, and if he could not prudently doubt this on the authority of the few theologians who hold the contrary, then, in adhering to such doctrine he could not escape heresy before God¹.

¹ Ibid., no. 77. "... participant enim substantiam haeresis, quae est oppositio immediata cum fide, et ideo diximus supra, eum cui certo constaret ea oppositio, ita ut nec per principia extrinseca prudenter posset dubitari, de illa oppositione cum fide, et cum communi fidelium sensu, non posse sine haeresi assensum eis praebere, licet apud aliquos sit dubium an sint haereses."

Even though such propositions do not differ in substance from heresy, they differ in mode. This special mode is caused by the fact that there is no absolute certainty as to whether they are of faith or not. For Lugo, however, propositions of this nature correspond to the censure *haeresi proxima*, and not to *error*¹.

The last argument which Lugo brings against Cano's doctrine in this matter is by way of a *reductio ad absurdum*. If these propositions, which differ only in mode from heresy, were to be censured absolutely as erroneous, then it could never afterwards be said that they are, in fact, heretical. Before the application of the censure of *error*, the majority of theologians held such propositions to be heretical. Once they are censured as erroneous, however, the opinion of the majority of theologians immediately becomes false².

After examining these arguments which Lugo brings forward against Cano's doctrine on the second and third degrees of *error*, it seems that his main objection is that these notions correspond to the censure *haeresi proxima*. Cano never treated of the censure *haeresi proxima*. However, these notions had to fit in somewhere, so he put them under *error*, since they came far too close to divine faith to be put under what he thought was the next censure, *haeresim sapiens*. Lugo does treat of *haeresi proxima* as a separate censure, and in due course we shall have occasion to consider once again those very concepts which he rejects here as corresponding to the censure of *error*.

We have now considered Lugo on the three grades of erroneous propositions as proposed by Cano. Suarez, as we saw, also considered Cano's doctrine, but left us without any definite rejection or approbation. He merely said it was a probable explanation. Lugo, on the contrary, completely rejects it, and the arguments he brings forward seem quite cogent. This is the first time we have seen a thorough examination

¹ Ibid. "Differunt ergo ab haeresi non tam in ipsa substantia, quam in modo, hoc est, in certitudine an sint haereses, et ideo vocari possunt proximae haeresi, quatenus non ab omnibus, sed a pluribus aestimantur haereses."

² Ibid. "Frequenter etiam opinio affirmans contrarium esse de fide et illam esse haeresim erit vera: si ergo opinio illa vera est, propositio illa erit revera haeretica: . . . Alioquin si propositio illa nunquam sit haeretica, sed solum error, nunquam erit vera, sententia docens illam esse haeresim et contrarium esse de fide, nec possent unquam esse opiniones circa hoc punctum: quia ubi primum aliqui dubitarent, an sit haeretica ea propositio, eo ipso non jam esset haeretica, atque adeo falsa esset quaelibet sententia dicens esse haeticam."

of Cano's doctrine on the erroneous proposition. Like S. Antoninus, he also was a theologian of the first rank, and consequently, his authority cannot be lightly disregarded. We think, however, that the arguments which Lugo brings against his interpretation give sufficient grounds for rejecting his opinion on what constitutes the censure of *error*.

E. Lugo's interpretation of the erroneous proposition ¹

When considering Lugo's examination of *doctrina catholica* and the first grade of *error*, we saw that he held that the erroneous proposition comes immediately after heresy. Likewise, he stated that the greatest connection which any doctrine may have with faith, is the intrinsic connection which may be seen by evident deduction. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that when he comes to state his own interpretation of the erroneous proposition, he holds that it is constituted by the denial of a theological conclusion ². Thus he corroborates the opinion of Suarez, and for the same reasons. He is more definite than Suarez, however, about this opinion, stating that it is now commonly received amongst the theologians.

It is to be noted that Lugo explicitly states that the theological conclusion which he places as corresponding to the erroneous proposition is that which is evidently deduced from a principle of faith with the aid of a premise known by the light of natural reason. He states that if the conclusion is obtained with the aid of two premises of faith its denial incurs the censure of heresy, and not just *error*. He holds that the object of such a conclusion is formally contained in the two revealed premises ³.

Elsewhere in his tract on faith, Lugo discusses the theological conclusion at much fuller length. He explicitly states that virtual revelation and the true theological conclusion concerns physical properties

¹ Ibid., no. 78.

² Ibid. "Restat ergo quintus et ultimus modus explicandi satis communis et probabilis, quod error proprie sit, qui non opponitur immediate, sed solum mediate doctrinae fidei, quatenus negat immediate propositionem, quae non est de fide, sed conclusio solum theologica, deducta evidenter ex una de fide, et altera evidenti lumine naturae."

³ For a fuller treatment of this problem, cf. Lugo, de fide, disput. 1, sect. 13, no. 278-297.

which are connected with the revealed subject. The metaphysical properties which are identified with the revealed subject, he considers as being within the realm of immediate revelation ¹.

Finally, we note that Lugo, following Cano, Banez and Suarez, also holds that theological conclusions may be defined by the Church as being of divine faith, and after such definition, their denial will incur the censure of heresy ².

¹ Cf. Lugo, de fide, disput. 1, sect. 13, no. 265. Here Lugo considers the difficulty which states that a denial of the theological conclusion, *Christus est risibilis*, will entail heresy, since this necessarily includes a denial of Christ's humanity. The difficulty is solved as follows: "Potest autem facile responderi, hominem sine radice risibilitatis esse chymaeram: neque hoc negari de Christo a negante esse risibilem, sed potius affirmari, dum asserit esse hominem: tunc enim conceptu confuso concipit omnia praedicata realia identificata cum vero homine, et ideo altera propositio est falsa, qua negat hominem esse risibilem, quia de homine vero conceptu ex parte subjecti cum radice risibilitatis in confuso negat explicite risibilitatem in actu secundo, in quo solo errat, quod tamen non est formaliter revelatum."

It seems clear from this text that for Lugo, the metaphysical property of *risibilitas* is in the campus of immediate revelation, while the physical property, *risibilitas in actu secundo*, constitutes the theological conclusion.

It is also evident from Lugo's doctrine on virtual revelation, (loc. cit., no. 259) that for him, the true theological conclusion is in respect of physical properties connected with the revealed essence from which they may be separated by the absolute power of God.

² Ibid., no. 270. While Lugo agrees with Suarez that even strict theological conclusions may be defined by the Church and become doctrine of faith, he does not agree with his explanation of this transition, since it is tantamount to saying that the Church is capable of making new revelations.

His own explanation of this transition, (loc. cit., no. 257) states that if the Church were to make such a definition, e. g. defining *Christus est risibilis*, then it is to be believed on divine faith; not because of a new revelation, but because this proposition becomes a conclusion deduced by means of two premises of faith which are as follows:

- a) Spiritus Sanctus assistit Ecclesiae definiendi Christum esse risibilem.
- b) Non potest esse falsum id quod proponit et definit Ecclesia assistente illae Spiritu Sancto ne erret.

Lugo claims that this explanation upholds Suarez' doctrine that theological conclusions may be defined as of faith, and yet safeguards the limits of revelation.

For a criticism of this theory, cf. SALMANTICENSIS, de fide, disput. 1, dubium 4, no. 145 and MARIN-SOLA, *L'Evolution homogène du Dogme catholique*, t. 1, no. 79.

ARTICLE VII

The Salmanticenses and the "More Common Opinion" ¹
1679 A. D.

The exposition which the Carmelites of Salamanca give of the theological censures seems rather disappointing at first sight. There is no evidence of originality, and most of their conclusions we have met before in the works of other theologians. In spite of this, however, we do not hesitate to include the Salmanticenses among the authorities on theological censures. We shall presently see that this apparent lack of originality has a very special purpose, and is, in fact, a point in their favour.

In an introductory paragraph to their exposition of the censures, the Salmanticenses point out that most authors, especially the more recent ones, are not of one mind with regard to the meaning of the different theological censures. Very often, they state, theologians are more interested in criticising the opinions of others, and this makes it rather difficult to understand the individual censures, and to select a suitable definition.

The Salmanticenses adopt a completely different attitude: recognising that the interpretation of the censures is a matter which depends on authority, they search out the common opinion in each case, and when this is not possible, at least the more common opinion, or the interpretation which is more widely received ².

We do not often find the Salmanticenses cited as authorities on the theological censures, and because of this, one might easily overlook their great contribution in this field. However, their special atti-

¹ Cf. DEMAN O. P., DTC, t. 14, coll. 1017-1031. The Salmanticenses wrote their tract on faith in 1676 A. D., and it was first published at Lyons in 1679 A. D. Their exposition of the theological censures is to be found in this tract, disput. 9, dub. 4.

² Cf. SALMANTICENSES, *Cursus Theologicus*, de fide, disput. 9, dub. 4, no. 42. "Tandem observandum est, auctores, et praecipue recentes, non semper convenire in describendo propriam uniuscuiusque censurae rationem; sed plurimum studium in eo praesertim esse, ut definitiones ab aliis traditas carpant, et impugnent, ut difficile est lectoribus legitimum dicendi modum eligere. Nos vero contrariam sequemur viam adducendo censurarum descriptiones secundum communes sententias, et si eae non semper constant, secundum communiores, et magis receptas."

tude towards the interpretation of these censures, coupled with the great weight of authority which they themselves enjoy as theologians, make it imperative for us to consider their doctrine. We shall see their opinion on the censure of *error*, or that which they judge to be the more widely received interpretation of the erroneous proposition¹.

A. The more common opinion

It is generally taken for granted, the Salmanticenses state, that the erroneous proposition constitutes a distinct censure which has not the same gravity as heresy. With regard to its explanation, however, the same unanimity of opinion is not to be found. Faithful to their promise, the Salmanticenses now seek out the doctrine which is most widely received, and we see that their selection falls on that particular interpretation which was introduced by Banez, endorsed by Suarez, and finally adopted by Lugo. The more common opinion, they state, is that the erroneous proposition is constituted by evident, immediate, and direct opposition to mediate revelation; in other words, that which is evidently and immediately opposed to a theological conclusion².

It is interesting to note that the Salmanticenses judge this to be the *more common opinion*. In all probability, it was out of reverence to such great theologians as S. Antoninus, Turrecremata, Cano and others, that they reduced the authority of this doctrine to *more common*, instead of rating it simply as the *common opinion*.

We recall that Banez was the first theologian we saw to relate the erroneous proposition to the theological conclusion. In doing so, he claimed that this was commonly accepted amongst the theologians of his time. Suarez was more cautious and less dogmatic, admitting the opinion of Cano to be probable. Lugo claimed this interpretation to be commonly received, and now we see the Salmanticenses very carefully stating that it is the *more common opinion*.

After giving us the result of their investigations, the Salmanticenses quote S. Thomas (2/2, q. 11, a. 2), Banez, Suarez and Tapia as au-

¹ Ibid., no. 48.

² Ibid. "Ille autem videtur verior, et communior dicendi modus, qui asserit propositionem erroneam esse, quae immediate, et evidenter opponitur veritati a Deo revelatae mediate, et secundario, sive quae immediate, et evidenter adversatur conclusioni theologiae, ut haec propositio, Christus non est risibilis."

thorities for this explanation. We notice that they conclude this list with the following words: "*Et communiter doctores moderni.*" From this we gather that that which they call the more common opinion of all theologians was, in fact, the common opinion of the more recent theologians, i. e. after Banez.

All this goes to prove that it was the doctrine of S. Antoninus, Turrecremata, Cano, and the other dissenting opinions we have considered, which prohibited the Salmanticenses from absolutely stating that the *common opinion* of theologians regarded the erroneous proposition as being in direct opposition to the theological conclusion.

B. The theological conclusion according to the Salmanticenses

We have seen that for the Carmelites of Salamanca the censure of *error* is incurred by the direct and evident denial of a theological conclusion. They do not go into more detail about the nature of the theological conclusion here, when treating of the censures. We must go back to the beginning of their tract on faith, therefore, to get more precise knowledge on this point.

According to the Salmanticenses, doctrine which is deduced by means of two premises of faith is not a theological conclusion in the strict sense of the term. On the contrary, such a conclusion is formally revealed and may be believed on divine faith. In this, the Salmanticenses are of one mind with Suarez and Lugo¹.

Likewise, conclusions which are merely explicit forms of doctrine which is already formally but confusedly revealed, are not theological

¹ Cf. SALMANTICENSES, de fide, disput. 1, dub. 4, no. 127-132. The Salmanticenses give a very thorough examination of this problem of conclusions deduced by means of two premises of faith. In no. 132 of the reference given above, they point out that the two revealed premises contain the medium of demonstration and formally express its connection with both extremes which are enunciated in the conclusion. However, this union between the medium of demonstration and both extremes cannot be expressed unless at the same time, the union between the extremes themselves (i. e. the actual conclusion) is at least implicitly shown. In this way, the Salmanticenses show that the conclusion is already formally revealed in the two premises. Cf. SALMANTICENSES, loc. cit., no. 132. "Ratio vero est, quia causa naturalis praedictae veritatis, (i. e. the conclusion) est medium demonstrationis, ex quo inferitur; praemissae autem non solum includunt medium demonstrationis, sed etiam exprimentur unionem illius cum extremitatibus, quam non possunt exprimere, quin eo ipso significant saltem implicite unionem extremitatum inter se, in qua consistit ipsa conclusio."

conclusions in the strict sense of the word. The reasoning employed in the deduction of such conclusions is not strict theological syllogism, but rather a clarification of confused knowledge¹.

The strict theological conclusion for the Salmanticenses is that which is evidently deduced by means of rigorous reasoning from a principle of faith, with another principle known by the natural light of reason. To understand what they intend by rigorous theological reasoning, we must consider the famous distinction of the Salmanticenses between *discursus illativus* and *discursus explicativus*.

Rigorous theological reasoning (*discursus illativus*) implies an intellectual movement from the known to the unknown, whether this be from principles to effects or from effects to principles. This type of reasoning means real discovery and progress.

On the other hand, "improper" reasoning (*discursus explicativus*) merely explains and makes more explicit that which is already confusedly known, and does not imply the same progress and intellectual movement from the known to the unknown. In short, it gains no new knowledge from the premises, but only perfects and illustrates that which is already known².

Thus far, there is nothing very extraordinary to note about the doctrine of the Salmanticenses on the theological conclusion. Most of it we have already seen before. However, we are now about to consider one great change introduced by the Salmanticenses and which concerns the censure of *error* very intimately.

Most of the theologians we have considered so far expressly stated that a theological conclusion, once defined by the Church, becomes doctrine of faith. Consequently, whenever there was question of the erroneous proposition, those theologians who associated it with the theological conclusion were careful to state that it is the denial of

¹ Cf. SALMANTICENSES, de fide, disput. 1, dub. 4, no. 116-119.

² Ibid., no. 122. "... discursus est duplex, proprius scilicet, et improprius. Prior importat motum intellectus a principiis ad effectus, vel ab effectibus ad sua principia; est enim progressus a notis ad ignota. Posterior vero non includit huiusmodi motum, sed quasi in eodem puncto persistens, tantum explicat in consequenti, quod in praemissis non ita perspicue significatum habebatur. Ob idque illius consequentia non dicitur illativa, et probativa, sicut appellatur consequentia antecedentis, sed tantum explicativa. Et merito, quia non est apta nata generare diversam specie notitiam a cognitione praemissarum, quod videtur proprium esse discursus; sed tantum hanc perficit, et illustrat."

an *undefined* theological conclusion which merits the censure of *error*. This distinction is not necessary for the Salmanticenses, since they have already categorically laid down *that the theological conclusion, understood in the strict sense, can never become doctrine of faith*¹.

Cano, Banez, Suarez and Lugo expressly state that such conclusions, understood even in the strict sense, may be defined by the Church and become doctrine of faith. Consequently, an erroneous proposition may, in the course of time, become heretical. Now we see the Salmanticenses ruling out the possibility of such a transition².

¹ *Ibid.*, no. 146. "Ecclesia enim nunquam definit ut dogma fidei id, quod non praesupponitur illius definitioni revelatum formaliter in Sacris Litteris, saltem confuse et implicite."

A little further on (*Ibid.*, no. 147) we find the following: "... id autem quod solum includitur in propositione revelata sicut effectus in causa, non sit a Spiritu Sancto dictum, et attestatum, non potest ab Ecclesia ut fidei dogma definiri."

Apropos of Suarez' explanation of the transition of the theological conclusion to doctrine of faith, the Salmanticenses (*Ibid.*, no. 144) state: "Caeterum haec solutio haud est consentanea veritati, falliturque illius auctor dum eam dicit communem theologorum; vix enim ullus est, qui ei subscribat: nam etsi omnes concedant ea, quae Ecclesia definit ut dogmata esse proprie de fide; nullus tamen asserit hoc ideo esse, quia Deus per Ecclesiae definitionem aliquid denuo nobis revelet, quinimo hic dicendi modus ab omnibus rejicitur."

Likewise, the Salmanticenses reject the explanation of Lugo. Cf. SALMANTICENSES, loc. cit., no. 145. "Nec refert id, quod in hac solutione adjecit ipse Lugo, scilicet Ecclesiae definitionem efficere ut propositio quam definit, contenta fuerit in revelatione divina universalis; id enim est prorsus impossibile, ad praeteritum enim non datur potentia."

² MARIN-SOLA (*L'Evolution homogène du dogme catholique*, t. 1, ch. 2, no. 80) considers this stand taken by the Salmanticenses on the possibility of the theological conclusion becoming doctrine of faith, and attributes it to the influence of Suarez and Lugo. Like the Jesuit theologians, the Salmanticenses regarded virtual revelation as being in respect of physical properties of the revealed essence. In their description of virtual revelation, they state that it is related to faith as an effect is related to its cause. Cf. SALMANTICENSES, de fide, disput. 1, dub. 4, no. 124. "Dicendum est tertio, revelationem virtuales alicuius veritatis in sua causa adaequata vel inadaequata, qualiter v. g. *Christus esse visibilem*, revelatum est in illa propositione, *Homo factus est*, non sufficere ad rationem sub qua habitus fidei, adeoque praedictam veritatem non esse de fide, sed conclusionem theologiam.

Afterwards (cf. SALMANTICENSES, loc. cit., no. 132), in referring to this same text, the Salmanticenses make it clear that it is a physical or natural cause they have in mind. "Respondetur negando majorem intellectam de causa naturali, sive in esse, et apparere, de qua loquuti sumus in nostra tertia conclusione."

According to Marin-Sola, virtual revelation or the theological conclusion, when understood as a physical effect or property of the revealed essence, is only physico-connected with revelation and exists outside it. Consequently, the Salmanti-

C. Concluding remarks

After considering the doctrine of the Salmanticenses on the censure of *error*, we wish to recapitulate the main points as follows:

The fundamental principle underlying their exposition of the theological censures is that the correct interpretation of these censures is a matter which depends on common opinion and authority in general.

They set out to find the most widely received explanation of the erroneous proposition, and the result of their investigation is that it is constituted by direct and evident opposition to a theological conclusion.

The Salmanticenses judge this opinion to be the *more common* interpretation of the censure of *error*. If, however, only the more recent authors are considered, i. e. after Banez, then this explanation may be called the *common opinion*.

What they consider to be the strict theological conclusion is that which is evidently deduced from a principle of faith with the aid of a premise known by the natural light of reason. In this they agree with Suarez and Lugo. They differ, however, in stating that such conclusions may never become doctrine of faith, and consequently, the denial of these can never merit more than the censure of *error*.

ARTICLE VIII

Antonio de Panormo¹

1709 A. D.

The period which we have selected to investigate the different interpretations of the theological censures, ranges between the years 1563 and 1709. Both of these dates indicate great moments in the

censures, having understood the theological conclusion in this way, were much more logical than Suarez and Lugo, in stating that such conclusions can never become doctrine of faith.

This great problem of the theological conclusion is still an open question even to-day. The doctrine of the Salmanticenses has many partisans, and in recent times its greatest upholder was Fr. R. SCHULTES O. P., in his famous book, *Introductio in Historiam Dogmatum*. (Parisiis, 1922.)

¹ Cf. HURTER, N. L., t. 4, p. 684. — QUILLET, DTC, t. 2, col. 2113. — TERTIERT, DTC, t. 14, col. 1987.

development of doctrine on the censures. In 1563, Cano's *De Locis Theologicis* was first published at Salamanca, and in 1709, Antonio de Panormo's *Scrutinium* was published at Rome.

Antoninus Sessa, or as he is more commonly called, Antonio de Panormo, was a Franciscan friar and professor of theology at Rome at the beginning of the eighteenth century. He worked for many congregations of the Holy See, and was one of the theologians appointed to examine and censure the different works of Quesnel, from which a hundred and one propositions were selected and finally condemned in 1713 A. D. ¹.

It was Panormo's work, *Scrutinium doctrinarum qualificandis assertionibus thesibusque atque libris conducentium*, which earned for him a place in the history of theology. In this book, he examines sixty-nine theological censures, and makes a thorough examination of each one.

Before Panormo, the theological censures were usually treated in connection with the virtue of faith. When the theologians came to consider heresy, they would often consider the problem of the lesser censures. Now, however, we see Antonio de Panormo devoting this entire work solely to the consideration of these censures. To the best of our knowledge, this was the first time any exclusive study was made with regard to this problem.

Writing at the beginning of the eighteenth century, Panormo had many advantages over his predecessors. He had access to the works of other theologians who had been trying to find suitable explanations of these censures for over a period of two hundred years. Likewise, from the official condemnations of the Church there was more evidence at hand. In 1690 A. D., two propositions were specifically condemned by the Holy Office. The second one of these was condemned as erroneous, so this afforded a concrete example of an erroneous proposition ². In the same year, thirty-one propositions of the Jansenists were condemned, and in this condemnation the censure *haeresi proxima*, among others, was officially used for the first time by the Church ³. Then in 1699 A. D., twenty-three propositions of Fénelon were condem-

¹ Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 8.

² Ibid., no. 5.

³ Ibid., no. 6.

ned¹. All this extra guidance from the Church was a great advantage to Panormo. We shall now see if he made full use of it in his interpretation of the censure of *error*.

A. The erroneous proposition is opposed to mediate revelation

When we come to consider the doctrine of Antonio de Panormo on the erroneous proposition, we are not surprised to find him correlating it to mediate revelation. Ever since we examined the doctrine of Banez on this point, we have seen this interpretation becoming more popular among the theologians. Panormo now canonizes this theory.

He begins his exposition of the censure of *error* by asking if the erroneous proposition is constituted by mediate opposition to revealed truth? His answer is in the affirmative, and he states that this is the common opinion of theologians. The erroneous proposition is in opposition to doctrine which is contained in revelation, *in terminis illative aequipollentibus*. In other words, that which is denied differs from the revealed object only in so far as it does not imply *the same formal signification*. This other signification, however, is essentially connected with revelation².

In chapter five of his *Scrutinium Doctrinarum*, where Panormo treats *ex professo* of the censure of *error*, he does not go into further detail about mediate revelation or the theological conclusion. The reason for this omission is that he has already treated fully of this matter earlier in his book. In order to have a clear knowledge of his doctrine on virtual revelation, we shall first of all go back and consider his earlier exposition of this point. So far, we have seen that while many theologians held that the erroneous proposition is in opposition to mediate or virtual revelation, not all of them were of the same mind as to the nature of virtual revelation.

¹ *Ibid.*, no. 7.

² Cf. ANTONIO DE PANORMO, *Scrutinium Doctrinarum*, cap. 5, art. 4, Romae (1709), p. 318 "Affirmative respondendum censemus cum theologorum communi, quorum aliquos recenset et sequitur Cardinalis De Lugo, cohaerenter ad ea, quae dicta sunt cap. 3, art. 5, ad excludendam a nota haeresis propositionem oppositam alteri contentae in sacris paginis in terminis illative aequipollentibus, idest non importantibus idem formale significatum cum objecto revelato, sed aliud cum illo essentialiter connexum, adeo ut ad convertentiam valeat illatio, sive a priori ea fit, sive a posteriori."

For Panormo, conclusions which are deduced by means of two premises of faith do not constitute virtual or mediate revelation. Such conclusions, considered in themselves, are immediately revealed, and their denial may be censured as heresy¹. True virtual revelation, therefore, and the strict theological conclusion, is that which is deduced by means of one premise of faith and another known by the natural light of reason. In this, Panormo is in agreement with Suarez, Lugo and the Salmanticenses.

We have seen that Panormo opens his exposition of the censure of *error* by stating that the erroneous proposition is in opposition to mediate revelation. He describes mediate revelation as that which is contained in the deposit of faith *in terminis illative aequipollentibus*. By considering his doctrine on virtual revelation, we now hope to get more precise knowledge as to what is intended by these words.

A proposition is said to be *aequivalens illative* in respect of another proposition, when it has *a different formal signification*, and yet the objects enunciated by both propositions are identified *in re*. In other words, both propositions express different concepts, and yet the objects enunciated and represented in the concepts are ontologically identified².

Terms which are formally equivalent (*formaliter aequipollentes*) are those which express the same concept, and differ only in words or

¹ Ibid., cap. 3, art. 19, p. 257. "Parum in resolutione huius quaestionis immorandum nobis est, quia nullam fere discrepantiam agnoscimus a posteriori parte asserti articuli praecedentis propugnata, ut propterea dicendum putemus propositionem oppositam alteri deductae ex praemissis revelatis esse quidem haereticam specificative sumptam, minime vero, si consideretur sub reduplicazione illa, qua propositio deducta et illata consideretur *ut talis*. Et ratio est eadem, ob quam propositio deducta, sic inspecta, non est de fide, utpote cui assensum praebemus, non praecise propter divinam Veritatem dicentem, sed etiam propter connexionem conclusionis cum praemissis lumine naturali cognitam, quam mixtionem excludit fides."

² Ibid., cap. 3, art. 5, no. 2, p. 129. "Dicitur itaque propositio aequivalens illative, ea quae non eundem cum altera exprimit formaliter obiectivum conceptum significatum, sed aliud formaliter diversum; quia vero res, aut formalitas per eam, seu verius per eius terminos importata, realem importat identitatem cum re, aut formalitate, seu cum significato alterius, inde sequitur ex hac illam inferri posse, et vice versa, et eatenus illative aequivalentiae denominationem assumit. Cuiusmodi ad invicem se habent essentiae et proprietates rerum, quae reciprocam suscipiunt illationem, hoc discrimine, quod ex essentia ad proprietates illatio est a priori, et tamquam a quasi-causa ad quasi-effectum; a proprietatibus vero ad essentiam, illatio est a posteriori, et veluti a quasi-effectu ad suam quasi-causam."

in the manner of expressing the same formal signification, (*idem formale significatum*). For example, the terms 'homo' and 'animal rationale' convey the same idea, and both of these words may be used indiscriminately to mean the same thing¹.

On the other hand, terms which are merely virtually the same (*illative tantummodo aequipollentes*), convey different concepts. In spite of the fact that objects enunciated by these terms are ontologically identified, they differ in their formal signification, and consequently, they cannot be used indiscriminately. It is true, for example, that the essence of man is ontologically identified with the metaphysical property of *risibilitas*. Yet, the proposition which states "*risibilitas est hominis essentia*", is false².

This description which Panormo gives of mediate or virtual revelation is of paramount importance. It is clear from the foregoing that he considers virtual revelation to be in respect of metaphysical properties which are ontologically identified with the revealed essence. We have already considered the idea of virtual revelation according to the doctrine of Suarez, Lugo and the Salmanticenses, and have seen that these theologians were more concerned with the physical properties, placing the metaphysical properties of the revealed object within the pale of immediate revelation.

According to the theory of Fr. Marin-Sola, the traditional Thomistic view on virtual revelation held that it was in respect of the metaphysical properties of the revealed object. Accordingly, the true theological conclusion expressed an object which differed only conceptually from revelation, since it was ontologically identified with it. When the theological conclusion was understood in this way, Fr. Marin-Sola says, there was no difficulty in explaining the homogeneous evolution of dogma and the fact that such conclusions have been defined by

¹ Ibid., no. 4.

² Ibid., no 5, p. 130. "Non sic, cum termini sunt illative tantummodo aequipollentes; non enim in his diversitas est, vel in solis vocibus, vel in modo significandi idem formale significatum, sed in ipsa re significata, quae etsi pro statu reali identico sit eadem, non tamen, ut formaliter per dictos terminos designata. Unde sicuti licet in se essentia sit eadem cum proprietatibus, adhuc tamen non potest dici: risibilitas, e. g. est hominis essentia, ad eum modum quo dicitur de rationalitate; ita ex identitate eadem non valeat enuntiari, ut eodem modo, ac immediate sit revelata risibilitas, etiam ex hypothesis quod sit immediate revelata rationalitas."

the Church. All the confusion and difficulty began when Suarez first limited virtual revelation and the theological conclusion to mere physical properties of the revealed essence. This presented insurmountable difficulties in explaining the transition of the theological conclusion to doctrine of faith. Both Suarez and Lugo put forward theories to explain this transition, but these proved inadequate. The Salamancaenses understood virtual revelation in the same manner as the Jesuit theologians, but were more logical in denying the possibility of the theological conclusion becoming doctrine of faith¹.

We are not concerned here with Fr. Marin-Sola's theory about the traditional Thomistic view regarding virtual revelation, nor with his explanation of the homogeneous evolution of dogma. But we note as a point of interest, that the explanation which we have seen Panormo give of virtual revelation is exactly the same as that which Fr. Marin-Sola holds to be the traditional Thomistic view. It will be interesting to see, therefore, if Panormo goes so far as to hold that the theological conclusion may become doctrine of faith. If he does, then his doctrine is in perfect accord with Fr. Marin-Sola's theories regarding the nature of virtual revelation and the problem of the homogeneous evolution of dogma².

In spite of the fact that Panormo holds that virtual revelation is in respect of metaphysical properties, he denies that the theological conclusion may be defined as of faith. He notes the opinion of Suarez and others who hold for this possibility, but rejects it on the grounds that the Church cannot augment the deposit of faith, but merely declares that which is already revealed³. If the Church were to define such a theological conclusion, he states, even then, its denial could never merit more than the censure of *error*. If, however, the infallibility of the Church in making such a definition were denied, then there would be question of formal heresy⁴.

¹ Cf. *supra* p. 59, notes 1, 2.

² MARIN-SOLA does not consider the doctrine of Antonio de Panormo, in his book, *L'Evolution homogène du Dogme catholique*.

³ Cf. PANORMO, *Scrutinium Doctrinarum*, cap. 3, art. 5, no. 20, p. 134. "Cum enim Ecclesia non habet auctoritatem condendi novos fidei articulos, novaque dogmata, sequitur ea solum posse ut talia declarare et consequenter proscribere tamquam haeretica, ipsis opposita, de quibus revelatio divina immediate est habita, nam si id faceret per novam revelationem, jam de novo conderet dogmata..."

⁴ *Ibid.*, cap. 3, art. 18, no. 4, p. 254. "Si Ecclesia definirer Christum esse risi-

After this consideration of Panormo's doctrine on virtual revelation, we are now in a better position to understand his interpretation of the erroneous proposition which he gives at the beginning of chapter five of his *Scrutinium Doctrinarum*, where he treats *ex professo* of the censure of *error*. This will also serve as a key to understanding some other observations which he makes in this same chapter, and which we are now about to consider.

B. Are the censures of error and heresy mutually exclusive?

Each of the theological censures indicates a distinct grade of deviation from Catholic truth, or from its correct mode of expression. It is generally admitted that these censures may double up, so that several of them may be simultaneously applied to the one proposition, since the same proposition may be simultaneously found wanting in many respects. Suarez discusses this problem¹, and admits that these censures may be cumulatively applied to the same doctrine. He makes an exception, however, for the censures of *error* and heresy. He holds that these two censures are incompatible, because of the different type of opposition which each of them has to divine faith. In other words, a proposition cannot be simultaneously immediately and mediately opposed to faith. We recall that Suarez holds for a transition from mediate to immediate revelation, brought about by the Church defining a theological conclusion as being of faith. Logically, he must also hold for a similar transition between the erroneous and the heretical proposition. Panormo now considers this problem, and we shall presently see that he entirely departs from Suarez' opinion on this point.

According to Panormo, strict theological conclusions can never be defined as of faith by the Church. Consequently, he admits of no transition between the erroneous and the heretical proposition in this way. Mediate revelation can never become immediate revelation by

bilem praeise ex revelatione mediata virtuali et in causa, qua de fide est esse hominem, qui negaret Christum esse risibilem habendus foret erroneus; qui tamen negaret Ecclesiae infallibilitatem in dicta definitione condenda, formalissime haereticus; quia hic negaret fidei objectum immediate revelatum, quale putamus esse infallibilitatem Ecclesiae, ne dnm in rebus tamquam de fide habendis, definitis, sed et in ipsismet definitionibus rerum infra fidem tenendis."

¹ Cf. SUAREZ, de fide, disput. 19, sect. 2, no. 21.

the definition of the Church, and consequently, strict *error* can never become heresy.

Panormo admits of one possible mode of transition, however, and this is not a strict transit from *error* to heresy, but rather from implicit to explicit heresy. It often happens in the course of time that a particular doctrine passes from the state of implicit to explicit revelation. This is a common occurrence in the life of the Church, when some dogmas are latent for centuries and then finally defined as of faith. Before such a definition, the doctrine in question could be regarded as a theological conclusion in connection with some other truth explicitly revealed. In circumstances such as these, its denial would merit the censure of *error*. After definition, however, when there is no longer any doubt about the revelation of the doctrine in question, then its denial would mean heresy. However, this transit from *error* to heresy is accidental in so far as the doctrine which is denied, both before and after the definition of the Church, is immediately revealed. There was never a transit from mediate to immediate revelation, nor from *error* to heresy, as such¹. This is the only transition between the erroneous proposition and heresy which Panormo will admit.

Unlike Suarez, Panormo holds that the censures of *error* and heresy are not incompatible, and a proposition may be simultaneously erroneous and heretical. He admits that there is no evidence of such a condemnation in the official decrees of the Church, and considers this problem merely as a possibility.

To prove this, Panormo takes two propositions; *Christus est homo*, and *Christus est risibilis*. The first is immediately revealed and of faith, while the second is a theological conclusion, evidently deduced from the first, and necessarily connected with it.

If the proposition which states *Christus est risibilis*, were immediately revealed by God, i. e. in such a way that the doctrine itself would be revealed but not its connection with Christ's humanity, then its denial

¹ Cf. PANORMO, op. cit., cap. 5, art. 5, p. 331. "Ex quo elucere innuimus transitum praedictum minime habitum, praecise per hoc, quod propositio relata ex erroneitate ad haeresis quidditatem, sed quod ab implicito et ignoto haeresis statu, in quo erat, ad explicitum et manifestum devenerit. Alias quantumvis erronea ea exstitisset, per nullam subsequentem definitionem evadere potuisset haeretica..."

could be censured as heretical and erroneous. It would be heretical, because immediate revelation is denied, and erroneous, because something *connected* with immediate revelation is denied. In other words, such a proposition would enjoy the certitude of faith and of theology, in so far as it may be considered as revealed or connected with revelation. Depending on either of these two points of view, the denial of that proposition may be censured as heretical or erroneous. It is important to note that in this hypothesis, even though the proposition *Christus est risibilis* is immediately revealed, its connection with *Christus est homo* is not revealed, and because of this, its denial may still be censured as erroneous¹.

We note once again that Panormo discusses this problem as a mere possibility. He explicitly states that these two censures have never been officially applied by the Church to the same proposition. In considering this problem, however, Panormo was not as far removed from reality as he thought. We can point to at least one condemnation where the censures of heresy and *error* have been applied to the same proposition. In the dogmatic constitution of Pope Urban V (28th Dec. 1368), three propositions of Dionysius Foullechat were condemned, and each one was specifically censured as "*falsa, erronea, haeretica*"².

C. The erroneous proposition in relation to heresy

All the theologians, excluding Panormo, we have considered so far unanimously held that the censure of *error* comes immediately after heresy. None of them, however, had ever seen the censure *haeresi*

¹ Ibid., no. 9, p. 333. "De fide est Christum esse hominem, non tamen ipsum esse risibilem, sed certum dumtaxat certitudine theologica, quod per evidentem illationem sequatur ex revelata humanitate, cum qua necessario connectitur. Revelet iam Deus Christum esse risibilem revelatione quae immediate afficiat risibilitatem, non quae afficiat connexionem risibilitatis cum humanitate; hoc casu, risibilitas esset quidem fidei objectum, considerata ut divinitus immediate revelata, non inde tamen, vel connexionem cum humanitate dependeret, vel haec redderetur immediate revelata, et proinde non obstante immediata risibilitatis revelatione adhuc risibilitas considerari posset, ut connexa cum humanitate, etiam immediate revelata, et proinde dici certa ex certitudine fidei ob immediatam sui revelationem, et certitudine theologica ob revelationem immediatam humanitatis. Quo posito, patet propositionem oppositam, et fore haeticam ob oppositionem immediatam cum risibilitatis revelatione, et erroneam, propter mediatam cum revelatione humanitatis."

² Cf. Dz 575-577.

proxima officially used by the Church. Panormo, on the contrary, was aware of the condemnation of the Jansenistic propositions which was issued by the Holy Office in 1690, in which this censure was applied ¹.

In spite of the fact that Panormo had seen the censure *haeresi proxima* being officially applied by the Church, and that the name of this censure indicates proximity to heresy, he expressly states that mediate opposition to divine faith is the gravest after heresy. Consequently, the censure of *error* comes closer to heresy than any other ². We shall discuss this doctrine at greater length when we come to consider *haeresi proxima*.

D. A proposition judged erroneous on extrinsic evidence

We have already noted that Panormo falls into line with the majority of theologians who wrote after Cano, in holding that the erroneous proposition is in opposition to mediate revelation or the theological conclusion. This agreement notwithstanding, he introduces a very important change even in this doctrine. Most of the other theologians, and especially Lugo, stipulated that the theological conclusion in question should be evidently deduced from a principle of faith with the aid of another premise known by the natural light of reason. In other words, the intrinsic connection between the theological conclusion and the truth of faith must be obvious.

Panormo thinks that this explanation restricts the erroneous proposition too much ³. If this intrinsic connection is evident, then a denial of such a theological conclusion will certainly merit the censure of *error*. However, Panormo notes, there are many truths which are universally regarded by the theologians as being theological conclusions and yet have not this evident intrinsic connection with revelation. As an example, Panormo (writing in 1709) brings forward the doctrine of Our Lady's Immaculate Conception. This truth, he states, is universally

¹ Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 6.

² Cf. PANORMO, op. cit., cap. 5, art. 4, no. 1, p. 319. "In huiusmodi siquidem propositionibus ex una parte non habetur ea immediata oppositio, quae satis sit ad eas tenendas tamquam haereticas; et ex altera extat repugnantia mediata, quae est gradus oppositionis immediatae proximior, et proinde constituens propositionem censura notandam, qualibet alia, haeresi magis affini, cuiusmodi non est nisi erronea."

³ Ibid., cap. 5, art. 4, no. 5, p. 320.

regarded as being a theological conclusion, deduced from the dogma of the divine maternity of Our Lady. The intrinsic connection between these two truths, however, is not evident, but this is made up for by extrinsic authority, i. e. the universal consensus of opinion among theologians.

According to Panormo, the denial of theological conclusions which depend on extrinsic authority for their connection with revelation, will also merit the censure of *error*. In the first category of theological conclusion; i. e. where the intrinsic connection with revelation is evident, the opinion of theologians is not necessary, and the proposition may be censured as erroneous without it. In the second category, however, the extrinsic authority of theologians is necessary to supplement the defect of intrinsic evidence¹.

Mediate opposition to revelation, therefore, may be had in two ways: firstly, when the truth which is denied is evidently connected with revelation, and secondly, when such evidence of the connection with revelation is not apparent, but nevertheless, the majority of theologians hold that the doctrine thus denied is, in fact, a theological conclusion².

This doctrine of Panormo very much enlarges the scope of the erroneous proposition. He brings forward a good argument to prove his point in saying that if the majority of theologians hold that such a doctrine is a theological conclusion and the contrary constitutes an erroneous proposition, they must be believed without hesitation. In matters of this nature, so intimately connected with faith, God would not allow the Church to be deceived³.

¹ Ibid., no. 6. "In secunda (hypothesi) vero, redditur necessarius dictus communis consensus, qui veluti sit suppletivus defectus evidentiæ mediatae connexionis inter objectum fidei et objectum cui contradicit propositio erroneitatis nota inurenda."

² Ibid. "... vel nempe quia aliqua propositio alteri opponitur, quæ sit de objecto, quod evidenter lumine naturæ constat connecti cum alio, quod est fide divina tenendum, ac divinitus revelatum. Vel deficienti huiusmodi evidentiæ, adhuc talis est dicta connexio ut ab omnibus theologis admittatur."

³ Ibid., no. 7, p. 321. "Quæ connexio, etsi in se ipsa evidens non sit, et ex suis terminis nota, talis æquivalenter fit ab extrinseco, ex quo firmiter tenemus Deum non permissurum quod circa propositiones, quas vel amplecti obstringantur fideles tamquam de fide, aut fidei proximas et ad fidei munimen conducentes, vel eas rejicere, ut fidei noxias et adversantes, decipiantur a theologis; quoties hi unanimes omnes sint, sive in asserenda propositione aliqua tamquam de fide, aut fidei affini, sive in rejicienda alia tamquam hæretica, erronea, etc."

E. Examples of erroneous propositions

An outstanding feature of Antonio de Panormo's exposition of the censure of *error* is the concrete examples he gives to illustrate the erroneous proposition. Up to this, the only example of mediate opposition to revelation which we have seen, is the proposition which states: '*Christus non est risibilis*'. Now, however, we see Panormo considering more concrete examples, in so far as he examines propositions which were actually condemned by the Church. In his opinion, these are examples of *error*, so he shows how they are in mediate opposition to faith and in immediate opposition to a theological conclusion.

Panormo is not quite original in these examples, however. Most of them are taken from Laurentius Brancatus de Lauria O. Min. Conv., who also held that the erroneous proposition is in direct opposition to mediate revelation, and selected these examples to illustrate his doctrine¹. Panormo admits his indebtedness to de Lauria for these examples.

The first example considered is the third proposition of Huss, which was condemned with twenty-nine others *in globo* by the Council of Constance².

"Praesciti non sunt partes Ecclesiae, cum nulla pars eius finaliter excidat ab ea, eo quod praedestinationis caritas, quae ipsam ligat, non excidat."

In the opinion of both de Lauria and Panormo, this proposition merits the censure of *error*. Panormo makes the following analysis to show how it is in direct opposition to a theological conclusion.

¹ LAURENTIUS BRANCATUS DE LAURIA O. Min. conv. (1612-1693 A. D.) He wrote commentaries on the third and fourth books of the Sentences of John Duns Scotus, which were published at Rome between 1653 and 1682 A. D. For his exposition of the theological censures, cf. his *Commentaria in Tertium Librum Sententiarum Mag. Fr. Joannis Duns Scoti*, t. 3, pars 1, disput. 16, art. 2.

After discussing a number of opinions regarding the interpretation of the erroneous proposition, Lauria states his own doctrine as follows (cf. LAURIA, loc. cit., no. 30; Romae 1673, p. 853.): "Melius ac facilius declaratur doctrina erronea, si dicatur esse illa, quae est contraria alicui propositioni deductae vel deductibili evidenter, ac theologice, ex argumento constante ex una de fide et alia naturaliter evidente." Immediately after this, he gives the examples which we have seen Panormo considering above.

² Cf. Dz 629.

"Omnis qui Christum induit per sacramenti regenerationis lavacrum, fit membrum Ecclesiae. (Major, which is of faith.)
 Atqui praesciti revera Christum per Baptismum induerint, qui fuerit rite collatus, (Minor, a natural premise.)
 Ergo, praesciti sunt membra Ecclesiae." (Theological conclusion.)

The second example is also taken from Huss and the same condemnation¹.

"Oboedientia ecclesiastica est oboedientia secundum adinventionem sacerdotum Ecclesiae praeter expressam auctoritatem Scripturae."

To show that this is a denial of a theological conclusion, Panormo constructs the following syllogism:

"Omnis anima potestatibus sublimioribus subdita sit; et episcopi sunt tales potestates. Atqui, laici et minores sunt eis subditi, Ergo..."

He does not explicitly state the conclusion in this case, but it seems to be the proposition which states that the laity and minors must be subject to the bishops and ecclesiastical authority. This example is not as clear as the first.

The third example is the twenty-fourth proposition of Wyclif, which was condemned with forty four others *in globo* by the Council of Constance².

"Fratres tenentur per laborem manuum victum acquirere, et non per mendicitatem."

According to Panormo, this constitutes a denial of a theological conclusion which is deduced from faith as follows:

"Ut aliquis operam daret vitae perfectae, licitum est omnia dare pauperibus, et mendicare. (Of faith.)
 Atqui fratres dant operam vitae perfectae. (Natural premise.)
 Ergo licitum eis est omnia dare pauperibus et mendicare." (Theological conclusion.)

Thus far, Panormo has depended on de Lauria for these examples. The fourth and last example, however, is his own.

On the 24th of August, 1690 A. D., the Holy Office condemned two propositions³. The first, pertaining to the goodness of human acts, was condemned as heretical. The second, regarding the nature of the

¹ Ibid. 641.

² Ibid. 604.

³ Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 5.

so called "philosophical sin", was condemned as scandalous, temerarious, offensive to pious ears and erroneous. Unlike the other propositions which were condemned *in globo*, this condemnation afforded a perfect example of an erroneous proposition. Panormo now considers this as his fourth and last example¹.

"Peccatum philosophicum seu morale est actus humanus disconveniēns naturae rationali et rectae rationi; theologicum vero et mortale est transgressio libera divinae legis. Philosophicum, quantumvis grave, in illo, qui Deum vel ignorat vel de Deo actu non cogitat, est grave peccatum, sed non est offensa Dei, neque peccatum mortale dissolvens amicitiam Dei, neque aeterna poena dignum."

In spite of the fact that this condemnation afforded a certain example of the censure of *error*, Panormo does not dwell on it for long, nor does he give the same analysis of this, as we have just seen him give of the other examples.

It is revealed doctrine, he states, that the eternal law of God is impressed on Man's mind, and represented by the dictates of reason. For this he quotes the authority of Sacred Scripture; '*Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui Domine*' (Ps. 4/7), and '*Gentes naturaliter ea quae legis sunt, faciunt*' (Rom. 2/14). It may be deduced from this, he states, that any sin against the dictates of reason, is also against the law of God. In other words, every philosophical sin must necessarily be a theological sin. This is all Panormo has to say about such an important condemnation. We note that he does not make a full syllogism to show how the theological conclusion is deduced, as he did for the other examples. However, if we consider just the two observations which he makes with regard to this condemnation, we can construct a hypothetical syllogism as follows:

If the eternal law of God is represented to man by the dictates of reason, then any sin against the dictates of reason is also against the law of God. (Major, a natural premise.)

But the eternal law of God is represented to man by the dictates of reason. (Minor, of faith.)

Therefore, any sin against the dictates of reason is also against the law of God. (Theological conclusion.)

In this syllogism we got the minor and conclusion from Panormo, and the major we supplied ourselves. It is rather surprising that he

¹ Cf. Dz 1290.

does not make more capital out of this example, especially since the proposition was specifically censured as erroneous. At the same time, however, we must admit that this example is not so straightforward as it appears at first sight. The concept of a purely philosophical sin presents great difficulties, especially when we consider that it is generally regarded as being an impossibility.

Just a year before the publication of Panormo's *Scrutinium Doctrinarum*, another work written by Dominicus Viva S. J. was published at Naples, and had for a title *Damnatarum Thesium Theologica Trutina*¹. In this book, Viva examines the propositions which were condemned by Popes Alexander VII, Innocent IX, and Alexander VIII. He makes a thorough analysis of the proposition which Panormo gives as the fourth example, i. e. regarding the philosophical sin, and also explains how it is in opposition to mediate revelation². It is not

¹ Cf. AMANN, DTC, t. 15, col. 3144. *Damnatarum Thesium Theologica Trutina* was first published at Naples in 1708 A. D., and had many subsequent editions.

² Cf. DOMINICUS VIVA S. J., *Damnatarum Thesium Theologica Trutina*, pars. 3- Francofurti ad Moenum (1711), p. 9. et seqq. Viva explains how the condemned proposition is opposed to a theological conclusion, as follows (loc. cit. p. 10):

"Est autem erronea, utpote quae non immediate adversatur doctrinae revelatae, sed mediate; opponitur enim dumtaxat conclusioni theologiae erutae ex una praemissa de fide, et altera naturaliter cognita: de fide enim est, reum esse odii divini, ac gehennae, qui Deum offendit; naturaliter vero apertissime cognoscitur, ut mox explicabimus, Deum offendere, saltem tanquam supremum Legislatorem, qui advertit operationem quam ponit, esse disconvenientem naturae rationali, et rectae rationi, atque adeo a supremo Legislatore prohibitam (cum divinae prohibitionis veluti praeco sit dictamen rationis) etiam si tunc Deus ignoretur sub conceptu entis optimi, et a se, aut primae causae; aut de illo sub tali explicito conceptu actu non cogitetur. Vel saltem est lumine naturae notum dari Deum, illumque prohibere, quae rectae rationi adversantur, adeo ut in praesenti providentia moraliter contingere non possit, quod detur invincibilis Dei ignorantia, aut inadvertentia, dum peccatur. Est itaque conclusio theologica, quod peccatum philosophicum sit etiam theologicum, hoc est offensa Dei, dissolvens eius amicitiam, et poena aeterna dignum, saltem in praesenti providentia; ut proinde propositio opposita, quae hic proscribitur, sit erronea."

Further on, Viva explains the sense in which this proposition was condemned. (loc. cit., p. 23.) "...sensus enim proscriptionis huius thesis est universalis, ac si diceret, quaecumque ignorantia Dei sive vincibilis, sive invincibilis excusat a Dei offensa operantem contra rectam rationem; unde eius contradictoria (quae est vera) debet esse particularis, videlicet, aliqua Dei ignorantia, sive vincibilis, sive invincibilis non excusat ab offensa Dei..."

For a more recent consideration of this condemnation, cf. H. BEYLARD S. J., *Le péché philosophique*, Nouv. rev. théol. 62 (1935), p. 591 et seqq.; p. 673 et seqq.

surprising to find that Panormo makes no reference to Viva's work, because for all practical purposes the publication of these two books may be regarded as simultaneous.

We now come to conclude our examination of Panormo's doctrine on the erroneous proposition. We may sum up the salient points as follows.

1° He holds that the erroneous proposition is in direct opposition to mediate revelation or the theological conclusion. In this he agrees with the common opinion of theologians who wrote on this problem after Melchior Cano. Panormo is very explicit as to the nature of mediate or virtual revelation, and we noted as a point of interest that his doctrine in this matter is identical with that which Fr. Marin-Sola holds to be the traditional Thomistic view, at least before Suarez introduced his new theory.

2° For Panormo, a theological conclusion can never be defined as of faith. Consequently, he does not admit of a transition between the erroneous proposition and heresy. In this he departs from the doctrine of Cano, Banez, Suarez and Lugo, and agrees with the Salmanticenses.

3° He explains that in the course of time an erroneous proposition which is, in fact, latent heresy, may become explicit heresy. However, this is not a direct transit from *error* to heresy, as such.

4° He shows that the censures of *error* and heresy are not incompatible. Consequently, a proposition may be erroneous and heretical at the same time, but under two different aspects. In this he departs from the doctrine of Suarez.

5° Like his predecessors, Panormo holds that the erroneous proposition comes next to heresy, since mediate opposition to faith is the greatest after immediate opposition which heresy entails. Panormo had seen the censure *haeresi proxima* officially applied by the Church, and explained it as a separate censure. At the same time, however, he insisted that it comes after *error*.

6° A very important observation made by Panormo, and which we had not seen before, was that the true theological conclusion need not necessarily be evidently connected with divine faith. If the con-

sensus of opinion among theologians holds that a particular proposition is a theological conclusion connected with a certain revealed truth, then, according to Panormo, its denial will merit the censure of *error*. In this case, the weight of extrinsic authority supplements the defect of intrinsic evidence.

7° We noticed that one of the main characteristics of Panormo's treatment of the censure of *error* was the concrete examples which he gave to illustrate the erroneous proposition. Up to this point, we had to be content with *Christus non est risibilis* as the only example of direct opposition to mediate revelation.

In short, Panormo endorsed the interpretation of *error* which was introduced by Banez and which later became commonly accepted among the theologians. However, while agreeing in substance with this, he clarified many points which were still rather vague, and in all, made a very worthy contribution towards the full explanation of the erroneous proposition.

ARTICLE IX

Recapitulation and Conclusion

Between the Council of Constance (1418) and the year 1563 when *De Locis Theologicis* was first published, theologians who tried to explain the censure of *error* were obviously battling with a great problem. The Council of Constance had used the term '*error*' or '*error in fide*' as a separate censure, and seemingly had distinguished it from heresy. This distinction had to be explained, and the difficulty was all the greater since error in matters of faith seemed to be synonymous with heresy.

In face of this difficulty, Turrecremata (1489) took the easy way out, and said that the term '*error*', as used by Constance, was to be taken in a generic sense, including heresy and every other form of deviation from Catholic truth. This was a very simple explanation, but avoided the difficulty. Why did Constance use this term and seemingly distinguish it from the other censures which were applied?

S. Antoninus (1477) distinguished the erroneous proposition from heresy, in so far as he held that *error* is constituted by a denial of revealed doctrine, which denial, however, is not notorious and does not imply subjective pertinacity which is necessary for the sin of heresy. This distinction was more subjective than objective, as if Constance judged Wyclif and Huss to have had heretical dispositions for some articles, and to have inculpably erred with regard to others.

Alphonsus de Castro (1547) was not satisfied with any of these explanations, and pointed out that the wording of the condemnation which was made by the Council of Constance seemed to indicate that a more objective distinction existed between the erroneous and the heretical propositions. He candidly admitted his own perplexity in trying to make an objective distinction between *error in fide* and heresy, since these terms seemed synonymous. With great misgivings he put forward his own explanation, stating it was at least as good as any other he had seen. At the same time, he made it clear that he was quite willing to abandon it in favour of any other explanation which would prove more suitable. This attitude of Castro is characteristic of all the theologians who wrote on the erroneous proposition before Melchior Cano. There was an air of uncertainty about every theory which was put forward. They were obviously groping in the dark, trying to distinguish two terms which seemed to mean the same thing.

The greatest contribution which Melchior Cano (1563) made towards establishing an explanation of the erroneous proposition, was his insistence on the fact that the term '*error*' may be regarded in a generic and specific sense. To show how this is possible, he made an analogy with the philosophical notions of *habitus* and *dispositio*. The Gordian knot was now cut, since it was clearly shown that *error in fide* need not necessarily mean heresy. According to this distinction of Cano, the term '*error*' may be applied to both heresy and the censure of *error*, preserving a specific distinction between the erroneous and the heretical propositions.

In his explanation of the erroneous proposition, i. e. understood as the second theological censure, Cano was absolutely original. He departed completely from any explanation which had been put forward before his time, and based his theory solely on the little evidence which the condemnations of Constance afforded. We have seen that he placed three theological notes corresponding to the censure of *error*. The

most important of these was the first, *doctrina catholica*. To make sure that the censure of *error* would be specifically distinguished from heresy, he explained *doctrina catholica* as being well outside the pale of revelation, but as Lugo and Suarez afterwards pointed out, he failed to distinguish it from the lesser censures, especially the temerarious and scandalous propositions. We have already put forward our own theory as to what influenced Cano in selecting this notion. It seems to us that he was misled by the words '*non catholici*', which were used in the condemnation of the articles of Wyclif. Cano interpreted these words as applying solely to the erroneous articles, but we have proved beyond doubt that this qualification applied to all the censured propositions. The second and third theological notes which Cano placed as corresponding to *error*, later became associated with the censure *haeresi proxima*. Cano had never seen *haeresi proxima* applied by the Church, nor did he mention it in his explanation of the theological censures.

Cano's interpretation of the erroneous proposition did not enjoy popularity for long. Nevertheless, when his doctrine on *doctrina catholica* was subsequently rejected, and when his explanation of the erroneous proposition had become of mere historical interest, his authority on the specific distinction between the heretical and erroneous propositions was always cited. This was Cano's greatest contribution towards a logical interpretation of the censure of *error*.

After Cano put forward his explanation of the erroneous proposition, later theologians had something definite to go on in their efforts to explain this censure. His opinion was afterwards discussed and analysed in almost every treatise which touched on the theological censures. Banez (1584) considered his doctrine and agreed with it. He made one important correction, however, in so far as he supplemented Cano's doctrine with yet another theological note, the theological conclusion. According to Banez, the denial of an undefined theological conclusion constitutes the greatest grade of *error*. Cano had entirely neglected the undefined theological conclusion in his distribution of the theological notes which correspond to the censures. Banez supplemented his doctrine by introducing this, and stated that the denial of an undefined theological conclusion constitutes the greatest degree of *error*. This supplement of Banez introduced a new era in the interpretation of the censure of *error*. From then onwards, the theological conclusion became more

and more associated with the erroneous proposition, until it was finally regarded as the only theological note corresponding to the censure.

Suarez (1621) held that the censure of *error* is merited by the denial of an undefined theological conclusion, and that alone. Mediate opposition to revelation, he stated, comes next to immediate opposition which heresy implies. Seeing that the censure of *error* occupies the next place to heresy, its theological note must be that which enjoys the greatest certainty after faith. That meant the undefined theological conclusion. This became the greatest argument of later theologians who wished to show that the erroneous proposition is intimately connected with the theological conclusion. We say, however, that Suarez was not at all certain about his explanation of *error*, and went so far as to say that the interpretation of Cano was probable.

Lugo (1646) was more emphatic than Suarez in associating the theological conclusion with the erroneous proposition. This interpretation was not merely probable, he stated, but the common doctrine. We noted that the most important contribution of Lugo's exposition of this censure was his examination of the doctrine of S. Antoninus, Castro and Cano. These three theologians offered the only dissonant explanations of the erroneous proposition. In our judgment, the critical analysis which Lugo made of each of these went a long way in establishing the theory of Banez and Suarez, that the censure of *error* is to be explained in relation to the theological conclusion.

The Salmanticenses (1679) took a very special attitude towards these censures, and set out to find the doctrine which was more widely received. They decided that the theory which associated the censure of *error* with the theological conclusion, constituted *the more common opinion* at the end of the seventeenth century. We noted that they would regard this interpretation as *the common opinion*, were it not for the dissenting views of S. Antoninus, Turrecremata, Castro and Cano.

The erroneous proposition was once again correlated to the theological conclusion in the exposition of Antonio de Panormo (1709), who had no scruples about calling this interpretation the common opinion. He made great capital of Suarez' argument, that mediate opposition to revelation comes next to the immediate opposition which heresy implies. Consequently, since *error* comes after heresy, it must be related to mediate or indirect opposition to faith, in other words, to the theological conclusion.

In spite of the fact that we have seen so many theologians holding that the censure of *error* concerns the denial of a theological conclusion, there were many accidental differences in the individual explanations. For instance, not all were of one mind as to what constituted virtual revelation, and consequently, the theological conclusion. Similarly, not all agreed as to whether such a theological conclusion can be defined and become doctrine of faith. In spite of these differences, however, they agreed that the erroneous proposition was in direct opposition to mediate revelation¹.

We have already noted that the Salmanticenses (1679) claimed this explanation to be *the more common opinion*. They would not go so far as to call it *the common opinion* because of the disagreement of some grave theologians. The correct interpretation of these theological censures is a matter which largely depends on authority. Consequently, when such great theologians as S. Antoninus, Turrecremata, Castro and Cano held contrary views, the Salmanticenses did not wish to call the theory which was later accepted, *the common opinion*. However, we have considered in detail the doctrine of each of these dissenting theologians, and we have seen the opinion of each one under critical scrutiny in later years. Strong and cogent arguments were brought against each of these dissenting views, so that we can now safely disregard them as being suitable explanations of the erroneous proposition.

Almost all the theologians who had other explanations for the erroneous proposition, rather than direct opposition to mediate reve-

¹ As already pointed out, direct opposition to mediate revelation is equivalent to indirect opposition to that which is immediately revealed. When one directly denies a theological conclusion (mediate revelation), an indirect denial of the premise of faith is necessitated. Consequently, it may be truly said that the censure of *error* concerns indirect denials of a dogma. This aspect of the censure leads us to another problem, viz the denial of a dogmatic fact. The denial of a dogmatic fact may necessitate an indirect denial of a dogma, e. g. if one were to deny the legitimacy of the election of Pope Pius XII, would not this necessitate an indirect denial of the dogma of the Assumption of Our Lady?

We refer to this difficulty without any intention of treating of it here, but only to point out an interesting problem which deserves investigation in its own right. Such an investigation, however, would presuppose an enquiry into the nature of dogmatic facts, their relationship to the theological conclusion, and the difference between their denial both before and after the Church has pronounced on them.

lation, were those who were pioneers in treating of the theological censures. They were labouring under a great disadvantage, in so far as they had very little evidence and authority to go on. However, once the erroneous proposition was related to the theological conclusion, this theory became more and more popular, and in fact, was the theory which eventually survived¹.

The underlying principle of this explanation is that the censure of *error* comes immediately after heresy, and concerns doctrine which

¹ Cf. CLAUDE MONTAIGNE, *De Censuris, seu de Notis Theologicis, et de Sensu Propositionum* (in Migne, T. C. C., t. 1, col. 1162). Note: this work of Montaigne was first published in 1732 A. D.

After discussing various opinions regarding the censure of *error*, Montaigne gives the following as the true doctrine. "Tandem, Banez, de Lugo, Suarez, Castro, Turianus, Panormo aliique communiter theologi censent propositionem erroneam formaliter constitui per oppositionem mediatam cum doctrina divinitus revelata, eamque esse definiunt quae opponitur veritati certae theologica certitudine, id est, veritati quae non sit in se immediate revelata, sed ex uno fidei placito et altero naturali certo et evidenter eruitur. Unde sicut haeresis directe et immediate opponitur fidei, ita et error proprie ac theologice sumptus, directe et immediate adversatur conclusioni theologicae. Arridet haec sententia."

The main proof which Montaigne gives for this opinion is as follows: "Pressius proponitur istud ratiocinium: repugnantia mediata veritati revelatae est gradus oppositionis immediatae proximior et proinde constituens propositionem censura notandam qualibet alia haeresi magis affini; porro non est propositio quae magis accedit ad haereticam quam erronea."

Cf. JOS. GAUTIER S. J., *Prodromus ad Theologiam Dogmatico-Scholasticam*, dissert. 2, cap. 2, art. 3, no. 3. Coloniae et Francofurti, (1756) p. 118. "Altera sententia eaque communior, ac verisimilior, quam tenent Suarez, etc... Propositionem erroneam specificè sumptam, dicunt, illam esse, quae directe et immediate opponitur conclusioni theologicae pure tali, sive illi veritati, quae esto non sit immediate revelata in seipsa, certo tamen et evidenter eruitur ex una praemissa de fide, et altera naturali, certa quoque ac evidenti. Quapropter erronea propositio habet oppositionem immediatam quidem cum conclusione theologica pure tali: mediatam tamen cum doctrina divinitus immediate revelata."

Cf. GASPARE JUENIN, *Institutiones Theologicae*, dissert. 5, q. 2, concl. 4. Antwerpiae (1759), p. 443. "Propositio erronea strictè sumpta, est ea, quae negat veritatem quam communis Ecclesiae consensus iudicat esse mediate revelatam, quamvis Ecclesia id nondum expresse definierit."

Cf. CAMILLUS MAZZELLA S. J., *De Virtutibus Infusis*, disput. 2, art. 10, no. 531. Romae (1879), p. 279. "... videtur dicendum cum Suarez, propositionem erroneam dici illam quae directe et immediate opponitur alicui conclusioni theologicae certae, ac proinde indirecte et mediate fidei, quemadmodum feret si e. g., aliquis negaret propositionem virtualiter contentam in doctrina explicite revelata, seu quae hanc consequitur, sensu jam supra explicato."

Cf. DE GROOT O. P., *Summa Apologetica*, q. 10, art. 5. Ratisbonae (1906), p. 381. "Erronea (propositio) dicitur, quae immediate opponitur veritati mediate

is in the next grade to heresy. It is true that in the majority of condemnations where these censures are listed, *error* is always enumerated after heresy. However, we cannot hold this to be a definite proof, since there are some official condemnations of the Church where this order is not observed. Nevertheless, we think that this fundamental principle is well established. Even though there were different opinions as to the interpretation of the erroneous proposition, all the theologians between S. Antoninus and Antonio de Panormo were unanimous in this one point, that the censure of *error* comes immediately after heresy, and concerns doctrine which is in the next grade to heresy.

revelatae seu conclusioni theologicae. Exempli gratia, haec propositio: *Christus non est visibilis*, dicitur erronea; eruitur enim ex praemissa de fide; *Christus est homo*; et ex praemissa lumine naturae nota: *homo est visibilis.*"

Cf. BILLOT S. J., *De Ecclesia Christi*, thesis XVII. Romae (1927), p. 413.

Cf. GARRIGOU LAGRANGE O. P., *De Deo Uno*, q. 1, art. 2, dub. 4. Torino (1950), p. 46.

Cf. SCHEEBEN, in *Katholik*... 11 (1867), p. 487 seq.

CHAPTER TWO

The Proposition which is 'Haeresi Proxima'

The censure *haeresi proxima* was not applied by the Church in its dogmatic condemnations until the year 1690, when the Holy Office condemned thirty-one propositions of the Jansenists¹. It is not surprising, therefore, that most of the earlier theologians whom we considered apropos of the censure of *error*, did not so much as mention *haeresi proxima* in their exposition of the theological censures. The first theologian of note who treated of this censure was Cardinal de Lugo, and even he had never seen it used in the official condemnations of the Church.

In spite of the fact Lugo is our first authority on the interpretation of the censure *haeresi proxima*, we wish to devote the first article of this chapter to the consideration of any references in the works of previous theologians either to the name or notion of this censure. After that, we shall examine the interpretation of Lugo in the second article, and finally, that of Antonio de Panormo in the third article.

ARTICLE I

Interpretations of 'Haeresi Proxima' before Lugo

A. Melchior Cano O. P. (1563)

We have already seen that Melchior Cano was the first outstanding theologian who gave adequate consideration to the problem of interpreting the theological censures. He did not treat of *haeresi proxima*,

¹ Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 6.

however, nor did he consider it as a separate censure. This is not surprising, since the Council of Constance, which was his guide in these matters, had made no mention of it. S. Antoninus, Turrecremata and Castro did not so much as once use the words '*haeresi proxima*' in their treatment of the theological censures.

Even though Cano did not consider *haeresi proxima* as a special theological censure, there are two references in his exposition of the erroneous proposition which we wish to examine. In the first case, he uses the words '*haeresi proxima*' with regard to articles which are erroneous. In the second case, he treats of a notion which in later years became associated with *haeresi proxima*, considered as a separate and distinct censure.

Having explained the notion of *doctrina catholica* as the first theological note corresponding to the censure of *error*, Cano states that propositions which are in opposition to this, even though not heretical, are nevertheless in the next grade to heresy, i. e. *haeresi proxima*. His exact words are as follows¹:

"Quae igitur propositiones huius posterioris generis veritatibus contradicent, (i. e. doctrina catholica) eas equidem erroneas appello; quae quoniam doctrinae catholicae adversantur, errores sunt haeresi proximi, haereses non sunt."

This is the only use of the words '*haeresi proximi*' which we find in all Cano's exposition of the theological censures. In our opinion, it is impossible to argue from this reference that for Cano, the censures of *error* and *haeresi proxima* are identified. It is clear from the context that all he wished to say was that the erroneous proposition comes immediately after heresy, and that the words *haeresi proximi* are used in a purely material sense, without any reference to a theological censure which could be named as such.

We recall that Cano, when explaining the censure of *error*, placed three theological notes corresponding to the erroneous proposition. Lugo rejected the second and third, on the grounds that they pertain to the censure *haeresi proxima* rather than to *error*. We shall now examine these two notions of Cano in detail.

According to Cano, the second grade of *error* obtains when truths generally regarded as being of faith by the theologians are denied.

¹ Cf. CANO, *De Locis Theologicis*, lib. XII, cap. 9, in T. C. C., t. 1, col. 616.

Such truths, however, are not defined by the Church, neither have they been proved to be of faith by any certain argument. Cano's exact words in describing this notion are as follows¹:

"Est et propositionis erroneae alius item gradus. Quum enim veritas aliqua, sapientum quidem opinione vehementi, fidei veritas est, sed non est plane ab Ecclesia definita, nec certo argumento demonstrata; tunc veritati illi adversari non est haereticum, sed erroneum."

From this we gather that the doctrine which is denied is regarded as being of faith by all grave theologians. The use of the word "*sapientum*" seems to indicate that the theologians in question enjoy more than ordinary authority. We note that he does not expressly allow for any exception among these *sapientes*. Furthermore, the use of the words "*opinionem vehementem*" indicates the strength of the opinion. Cano states that doctrine of this nature may, in fact, pertain to faith. However, its denial cannot be censured as heretical, because of the lack of absolute certainty. Nevertheless, this lack of certainty will not excuse from grave sin².

The third grade of *error*, as understood by Cano differs very little from the second. In this case the doctrine which is denied is definitely of faith, and the doubt is with regard to the opposition between the two propositions. In other words, there is no absolute certainty that the censurable proposition is *opposed* to the doctrine which is of faith³.

Both of these notions which Cano puts forward to explain the second and third grades of *error* are very similar. In either case, the great weight of authority holds that the opposing proposition is heretical. However, this censure cannot be applied because there is not absolute certainty, either with regard to the opposed proposition being of faith, or concerning the contrary proposition being in opposition to what is certainly of faith. Both of these ideas, though very

¹ Ibid., col. 617.

² Ibid. "Ita licet veritas illa ad fidem suapte natura pertineat, quia tamen nec hoc certum nec expeditum est, haeretica pertinacia abest, error gravis et periculosus non abest."

³ Ibid. "Similiter et propositio erronea tertio quidam gradu vocari potest, quae certae veritati catholicae fidei adversatur, non manifeste quidem, sed sapientum omnium longe probabili ac ferme necessaria sententia. Eius quippe erratio gravis est, qui hoc defendit contumaciter, quod viri omnes docti sentiunt periculum grande catholicae fidei confiare."

similar to each other, are completely different from what Cano holds to be the first grade of *error*.

No theologian before Cano had ever placed more than one degree of erroneous propositions. Cano gave no reason why he placed three grades, but merely stated his doctrine without citing any authority. In our opinion, it was necessary for Cano to invent a second and third grade of *error*, because he was not aware of *haeresi proxima*, considered as a distinct censure. These extra notions which he included under *error*, were far too serious to be placed in the category of *haeresim sapiens*, which is the next censure after *error* of which Cano treats. Consequently, he placed them all under *error*, and to avoid confusion, invented three separate grades of this censure.

We may sum up our investigation of Cano's doctrine by saying that while he was ignorant of *haeresi proxima* as a separate censure, he applied this terminology to the first grade of erroneous propositions. What he included under the second and third grades of *error*, later became associated with *haeresi proxima*, considered as a separate and distinct censure.

B. Petrus de Lorca O. Cist. (1614)

Petrus de Lorca is the first theologian we have seen to consider *haeresi proxima* as a separate and distinct censure. There was no evidence in any of the condemnations of the Church to guide him in this, because, as we have already stated, this censure was officially applied by the Church for the first time in the year 1690. From this point of view, therefore, we may consider Lorca's invention as a considerable advance. However, from another point of view, as we shall presently see, his doctrine in this matter only added to the confusion which already existed.

When explaining the censure *haeresim sapiens*¹, Lorca states that in this category the denial of a theological conclusion, deduced by

¹ Cf. PETRUS DE LORCA, *Commentaria et Disputationes in Secundam Secundae Divi Thomae*, disput. 40, no. 10. Matrini (1614), p. 261. "Ad hoc genus reduci possunt propositiones illae, quae adversantur conclusionibus ex principiis fidei deductis, sive deducantur ex una de fide et altera naturali, sive ex utraque de fide... Sed quamvis huiusmodi assertiones quae adversantur conclusionibus, sapientes haeresim appellari possunt, aliam quoque censuram habent, quam statim exponam."

means of a principle of faith and another principle known by the natural light of reason, may also be included. Such a denial is at least *haeresim sapiens*. Nevertheless, he states, there is a separate censure to cope with this form of deviation from theological orthodoxy, which he hopes to explain later on. Soon afterwards, we find Lorca treating of *haeresi proxima* as a separate censure which has the theological conclusion for its theological note¹.

Lorca's reason for placing the theological conclusion in connection with *haeresi proxima* is that such conclusions enjoy the next grade of certainty to that of faith. Consequently, their denial merits the next censure to heresy, which is *haeresi proxima*, as is evident from the name. It is interesting to note that in spite of all this, Lorca does not hold that *haeresi proxima* is a graver censure than *error*. When the majority of theologians after Banez began to hold that the censure of *error* is merited by the denial of a theological conclusion, Lorca did not fall into line. He held out for the old explanation of S. Antoninus, in stating that the erroneous proposition is, in fact, heresy, and differs from it only in so far as it is not *manifest* heresy. Consequently, when Lorca states that the censure *haeresi proxima* is merited by the denial of a theological conclusion which enjoys the next grade of certainty after faith, he does not depart from the common opinion of all the theologians who wrote before him, and who held that *error* is more intimately connected with heresy than any other censure. For Lorca, the erroneous proposition is heresy, provided, however, that such heresy is not notorious.

Considering the conclusions which we reached in our first chapter regarding the censure of *error*, we must consider Lorca's explanation of *haeresi proxima* as devoid of all probability. The same theological note cannot correspond to two theological censures which are specifically distinct.

¹ Ibid., no. 11. "Dixi, aliam esse censuram quae proprie convenit assertionibus quae contrariae sunt veritatibus ex principiis fidei proxima et necessaria consecutione illatis; quia nimirum huiusmodi assertiones proximae haeresi, vel errori, suo iure appellari debent, quia veritates propositae proxime ad certitudinem fidei accedunt. Nec video quibus aliis haec censura convenienter aptari possit, servata vocum proprietate."

C. Franciscus Suarez S. J. (1621)

Like Cano, Suarez does not treat of *haeresi proxima* as a separate theological censure. However, in an isolated passage of his exposition, he mentions the term in passing. We now wish to examine this reference, and find out if it is accidental or by design.

When explaining the censure *haeresim sapiens*, Suarez wished to show that this term may be taken in a specific or generic sense. Understood in the former manner, the term applies to one theological censure which is specifically distinct from all others. Understood in a generic fashion, however, this term comprises all propositions which, though not being heretical, point to heresy in any way. In this broad sense even the erroneous proposition may be called *haeresim sapiens*, and in fact is more so than the censure which is specifically termed as such, because the denial of a theological conclusion contains the *sapor haeresis* in the greatest degree. Because of this, Suarez adds, the erroneous proposition may be called *haeresi proxima*¹.

From this isolated reference we cannot say that Suarez identifies the censures *error* and *haeresi proxima*. It seems obvious that the words here used by Suarez are to be taken in a material sense, i. e. not indicating any specific censure. It is quite true to say that the erroneous proposition is *haeresi proxima*, just as it is true to call it *haeresim sapiens*. However, this does not rule out the possibility of another censure specifically termed *haeresi proxima* and distinguished from *error*, just as the fact that the erroneous proposition may be called *haeresim sapiens* does not rule out the possibility of a lower censure which is specifically termed as such. In short, Suarez' use of the words '*haeresi proxima*' in this text is to be taken in a very broad sense, and has no reference to the censure which is so termed and of which Suarez did not treat.

It is interesting to note that all these references which we have considered in the writings of Cano, Lorca and Suarez tend to confuse

¹ Cf. SUAREZ, de fide, disput. 9, sect. 11, no. 16. "Tamen in hoc sapore, ut sic dicam, possunt esse gradus, et in propositione erronea est in summo, et ideo potius dicenda est proxima haeresi; potest autem esse alia propositio magnam quidem speciem haeresis habens, in minori tamen gradu, et haec recte dicitur sapiens haeresim, applicando nomen generis ad inferiorem seu minus gravem speciem."

haeresi proxima with the erroneous proposition. Once again we note that none of them had seen this censure in any official condemnation of the Church, and neither Cano nor Suarez even suggested the existence of a separate censure called *haeresi proxima*.

Such inaccurate use of the term *haeresi proxima* led to considerable confusion in later years. A number of subsequent writers either identified the censures *haeresi proxima* and *error*, or did not sufficiently distinguish them, and the reason for this confusion was the authority of the three theologians whom we have mentioned above.

To take one example, let us consider the interpretation of *error* which is given by Cardinal Gotti O. P. (1664-1742). We hope to show that this eminent theologian was misled by Cano into thinking that the censures of *error* and *haeresi proxima* are identified.

The first tome of Gotti's *Theologia Scholastico-Dogmatica*, in which he treats of the theological censures, was published in 1727 A. D. We may assume, therefore, that he was aware of the condemnation of the thirty one Jansenistic propositions by the Holy Office in 1690 A. D.¹ In this condemnation, the censure *haeresi proxima* was explicitly distinguished from *error*.

According to Gotti, the erroneous proposition is that which is in opposition either to doctrine which the Fathers and theologians commonly hold to be of faith but which is not defined by the Church, or to an undefined theological conclusion². As an example of such an undefined theological conclusion, he gives the old favourite, *Christus est risivus*. A denial of this, he states, will merit the censure of *error* and *haeresi proxima*³.

There is no doubt but that Gotti was misled by Cano into this position. Immediately after his statement of doctrine which we have

¹ Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 6.

² Cf. GOTTI O. P., *Theologia Scholastico-Dogmatica*, t. 1, q. 1, dub. 4, no. 9. Bononiae (1727), p. 43. "Dico, propositionem erroneam in fide esse illam, quae opponitur veritati, seu doctrinae, quam unanimis SS. Patrum ac Doctorum consensus iudicat esse revelatam, sed nondum per Ecclesiam definita est: vel illam, quae opponitur doctrinae non quidem per Ecclesiam definitae, aut formaliter et expresse revelatae, communiter tamen a Doctoribus per discursum necessario illatae ex revelatis."

³ *Ibid.*, p. 44. "Qui ergo negaret Christum esse risivum, non esset quidem haereticus, quia non negaret veritatem expresse contentam in scriptura, vel definitam ab Ecclesia; esset tamen erroneus et haeresi proximus."

just examined, he quotes Cano as his authority, and once again identifies the censures *error* and *haeresi proxima*¹.

This is but one example of how later theologians were misled by such casual references as those we have examined in the writings of Cano, Lorca and Suarez, into identifying the censures of *error* and *haeresi proxima*, or not sufficiently distinguishing them. Unfortunately, there were others who were misled in the same way.

Once again we note that neither Cano, Lorca and Suarez intended to identify these censures. Lorca considered *haeresi proxima* as a separate censure, but made sure that it was specifically distinct from what he understood to be the erroneous proposition. On the other hand, Cano and Suarez used the words '*haeresi proxima*' in a very broad sense, without suggesting that they may be used to name any particular theological censure.

ARTICLE II

Lugo's Interpretation of 'Haeresi Proxima'

A. Lugo's Interpretation (1646)

So far, though we have seen a number of references to *haeresi proxima*, the only theologian we have seen to consider it as a separate and distinct censure was Petrus de Lorca². In his estimation, it is incurred by the denial of a theological conclusion. Lugo, in his exposition of *haeresi proxima*³, considers this opinion at the outset, and rejects it on the grounds that it is commonly held by theologians that such a denial merits the censure of *error*. If, therefore, a distinction is to be placed between these two censures, another explanation and another theological note must be found for *haeresi proxima*.

According to Lugo, the proposition which is called *haeresi proxima* is constituted by opposition to doctrine which the majority hold to

¹ Ibid., no. 10. Gotti explains in detail the three grades of *error*, as understood by Cano. Apropos of the first grade of erroneous propositions, he states: "... quibus si quis contradicat, erroneus quidem erit, haeresique proximus, sed nondum haereticus." At the end of his examination of Cano's doctrine, Gotti states: "Canus ergo nostrae resolutioni non refragatur, sed eam extendit."

² Cf. supra, ch. 2, art. 1.

³ Cf. Lugo, de fide, dispt. 20, sect. 3, no. 79-86.

be of faith. Doctrine of this nature, he states, is not certainly of faith. However, the majority regard it as being so, which makes it *probably of faith*, or *fidei proxima*¹.

This statement of doctrine which Lugo gives at the beginning of his exposition of the censure is rather vague. For instance, we may well ask what he means to convey by the *majority*, and again, what are we to understand by doctrine which is *probably of faith*? These points become clear as we follow Lugo's interpretation of *haeresi proxima*. However, we shall treat of them here, so that we may have a clear idea as to what constitutes this censure before we begin to compare it with others.

When Lugo states that the majority regard the opposed doctrine to be of faith, he means the majority of grave theologians. Furthermore, he says that they should have a solid argument as a basis for their opinion². It is interesting to note that Lugo requires the consensus of the *majority of grave theologians* and not simply the *majority of theologians*. This means that Lugo admits of some grave theologians dissenting from this view.

Likewise, he states that the doctrine opposed is *fidei proxima* or *probably of faith*, and consequently, the censurable proposition becomes *haeresi proxima* or *probable heresy*. Here the question presents itself; does Lugo hold that the opinion of the few grave dissenting theologians is a probable opinion? It seems that this is so, because elsewhere in his exposition of this censure, he states that a denial of doctrine which is *fidei proxima* cannot be censured as heretical, *because of the contrary probable opinion*³.

¹ Ibid., no. 79. "... hac censura comprehendi propositionem oppositam doctrinae, quae licet non omnino certo, est tamen probabiliter, et ut plerisque videtur, de fide: nam sicut illa propositio est fere, seu proxime de fide, quae plerisque apparet de fide, ita illa erit fere, vel proxime haeresis, quae plerisque apparet haeresis. Idem est de propositione illa, quae opponitur non certo sed plurium iudicio propositioni indubitatae de fide; nam sicut accedit ad oppositionem manifestam cum fide, ita accedit ad haeresim."

² Ibid., no. 81. "Illam ergo solam propositionem iudicarem haeresi proximam, quam non omnes plures tamen graves doctores et cum gravi fundamento dicunt esse haeticam."

³ Ibid., no. 80. "Saepe autem continget propositionem affirmantem esse veram, nam opinio probabilis aliquando, et saepe vera est: tunc ergo vere propositio illa erit haeretica, sed propter opinionem probabilem contrariam, non puto esse iudicandam in iudicio ultimo ut haeticam simpliciter, et sine addito, sed ut haeticam aliquorum iudicio, et simpliciter ut proximam haeresi."

From all this we may state Lugo's doctrine on *haeresi proxima* as follows. This censure is merited when that which the majority of grave theologians hold to be of faith is denied. Their opinion, founded on solid arguments, makes such doctrine *fidei proxima* or *probably of faith*. Consequently, the denial of such doctrine will merit the censure of *haeresi proxima* or *probable heresy*. The censure of heresy cannot be applied to such a denial, since the opposed doctrine is not certainly of faith, and since there is a probable opinion to the contrary, constituted by the dissenting view of some grave theologians.

Now we ask the crucial question with regard to Lugo's interpretation of this censure; is it ever licit to follow the probable opinion of some grave theologians who hold that the opposed doctrine is *not* of faith? If it is licit, then how can such an opinion be condemned as *haeresi proxima*? Here there is an obvious weakness in Lugo's explanation, and we shall not be surprised if he is later brought to task on this account.

When we examined Lugo's doctrine on the censure of *error*, we saw that he studied Cano's interpretation of this same censure, and rejected his notions of the second and third grades of erroneous propositions on the grounds that they pertain to *haeresi proxima* rather than to *error*. It is true that these notions which Cano places as corresponding to *error*, greatly resemble Lugo's interpretation of *haeresi proxima*. However, we note that Cano does not say that there are a few grave theologians dissenting whose opinion may be judged as probable. He makes no allowance for any theologians dissenting, but simply states; *sapientum quidem opinione vehementi, fidei veritas est, sed non est plane ab Ecclesia definita, nec certo argumento demonstrata*¹.

Having considered Lugo's basic interpretation of *haeresi proxima*, we shall now proceed to examine some very interesting points which he makes regarding this censure.

B. The censure of *haeresi proxima* is extrinsic to the condemned proposition

The different theological censures correspond to different forms of deviation from Catholic truth or sound doctrine. For instance, the heretical proposition is that which is in immediate opposition to faith,

¹ Cf. CANO, *De Locis Theologicis*, lib. 12, cap. 9, in T. C. C., t. 1, col. 617.

whereas the erroneous proposition is in mediate opposition to faith, since it entails the denial of a theological conclusion which necessitates an indirect or mediate denial of revelation. Likewise, the other theological censures indicate a special mode of departure from orthodoxy, which is intrinsic to the censurable proposition.

We have just seen that in Lugo's interpretation of *haeresi proxima*, he stated that the majority of grave theologians hold that the opposed doctrine is *of faith*. There is no question as to whether or not they hold if it is *fidei proxima*, but whether or not it is *of faith*.

According to Lugo's interpretation, there is no intrinsic mode of *haeresi proxima*, just as there is of *error* or of *heresy*. The doctrine in question is either heretical or not, just as the doctrine opposed is either of faith, or not. Considered intrinsically, the proposition which is censured as *haeresi proxima* may, in fact, be heretical.

The role which extrinsic authority plays in *haeresi proxima* gives it a peculiar characteristic which sets it apart from all the other theological censures. When doctrine which is *fidei proxima* is denied, it is not so much the objective truth which is taken into account, but the great weight of authority which holds that it is of faith. Consequently, when the censure *haeresi proxima* is applied, it does not concern so much the objective denial, but the almost unanimous opinion of grave theologians who hold that the opposed doctrine is of faith¹. In this way, *haeresi proxima* as understood by Lugo, differs from all the other theological censures. It does not affect the condemned proposition intrinsically, but extrinsically, in so far as it is judged to be opposed to what the great weight of authority holds to be of faith.

C. *Haeresi proxima* in comparison with the censure of error

The very name of this censure, *haeresi proxima*, seems to indicate that it comes closer to heresy than any other. Likewise, according to Lugo's explanation, the only thing which comes between a proposition which is *haeresi proxima* and absolute heresy is the opinion of some

¹ Cf. Lugo, loc. cit., no. 80. "... quae censura (i. e. haeresi proxima) ut supra notabam, non tam videtur intrinseca ipsi propositioni, quam extrinseca propter diversa doctorum judicia, quorum aliqui eam dicunt esse haeresim, alii negant, quam varietatem et controversiam significamus, dum dicimus esse proximam haeresi."

theologians who hold that the doctrine denied is not of faith. In spite of all this, however, we have seen that all the theologians we considered apropos of the censure of *error* held that it occupies the next place to heresy. Lugo now corroborates this opinion, and brings forward some arguments to show that even *haeresi proxima* occupies a lesser place in relation to heresy, than the erroneous proposition.

When a proposition is censured as *haeresi proxima*, it is quite true that in substance it may be heresy. However, there is no absolute certainty about this, and it is possible that the opinion of even the majority of theologians may be false in this respect. Consequently, *haeresi proxima* has a contingent rather than a necessary connection with heresy.

On the contrary, *error* entails a necessary connection with heresy. When a theological conclusion is denied, an indirect denial of the premise of faith is necessitated. The theological conclusion which is associated with the erroneous proposition is that which is *evidently* deduced from a principle of faith with the aid of another *evident* natural principle. Hence, when such a conclusion is denied, it is only because one of the premises or the consequence is denied. In this case, the natural premise and the consequence are evident. Therefore, the necessity arises of denying the premise of faith¹. We can best explain this with that very simple theological conclusion; *Christus est risibilis*, which is deduced as follows:

Omnis homo est risibilis.	(Natural and evident premise.)
Atqui Christus est homo.	(Principle of faith.)
Ergo, Christus est risibilis.	(Theological conclusion.)

Presupposing that there has been a denial of this theological con-

¹ Ibid., no. 83. "Credo, omnibus pensatis graviorem esse censuram erroris: nam qui dicitur haeresi proximus, solum significatur, quod in aliquorum opinione sit haereticus, quae tamen opinio falsa esse potest; et ideo non invenitur in eo necessaria connexio cum haeresi, sed contingens. Qui tamen negat conclusionem theologicam, deductam evidenter ex praemissa certa de fide, et ex alia praemissa evidenti lumine naturae, quae conclusio sine errore negari non potest, eo ipso invenitur habere necessitatem ad negandam praemissam de fide, quantum est ex parte objecti negati, quia praemissa evidens necessitat ad eam non negandam, et aliunde constat non posse conclusionem esse falsam, nisi una ex praemissis sit falsa: cum ergo illatio etiam sit evidens, et negari non possit, invenitur necessitas, quantum est ex parte objecti nisi ignorantia excuset, ad negandam praemissam de fide, quae sola potest libere negari."

clusion, we can argue to an indirect but necessary denial of faith as follows:

Christus non est risibilis
 Sed omnis homo est risibilis,
 Ergo, Christus non est homo.

It may be clearly seen from this that the denial of the theological conclusion necessitates an indirect denial of faith, unless crass ignorance of the natural premise or of the evident deduction intervenes.

In this way, Lugo shows that the erroneous proposition has a more certain and necessary connection with heresy than *haeresi proxima*, and consequently, constitutes a graver censure. Finally, Lugo points out that in the external forum, the obstinate avowal of an erroneous proposition gives a greater presumption of heresy than the proposition which is *haeresi proxima*. If one were to deny obstinately the theological conclusion, *Christus est risibilis*, in the external forum, one could be presumed as denying *Christus est homo*, which is of faith¹.

D. Errori proxima

Before concluding our examination of Lugo's exposition of *haeresi proxima*, we wish to point out that he applies the same principles to the theological conclusion, and gives us a new censure, *errori proxima*. In other words, if the majority of grave theologians hold a particular doctrine to be a theological conclusion, and yet there is not absolute certainty about this because of the dissension of some theologians who hold the contrary, then, according to Lugo, the denial of such doctrine would merit the censure *errori proxima*².

We can find no evidence of the use of this censure in any of the of the official condemnations of the Church. At the same time however, it must be admitted as a possible mode of deviation from Catholic truth. In the introduction to his exposition of the censures, Lugo claims that this idea of *errori proxima*, along with *suspecta de errore*, is original³. Certainly, this is the first time we have seen these censures mentioned. However, as we shall see later on, the notion

¹ Ibid.

² Ibid., no. 84.

³ Cf. Lugo, de fide, disput. 20, sect. 3, no. 72.

which Suarez places as corresponding to the censure *haeresim sapiens* is exactly the same as Lugo's explanation of *errori proxima*¹. We shall consider this more closely when dealing with the doctrine of both these theologians on *haeresim sapiens*. Lugo makes no mention of Suarez here when explaining *errori proxima*.

E. Conclusion

Lugo is the second theologian we have seen to consider and explain *haeresi proxima* as a separate censure. The first was Petrus de Lorca, but since his interpretation is in direct opposition to the conclusions we reached when considering the censure of *error*, we are forced to dismiss it as of little authority.

The notion which Lugo brought forward to explain *haeresi proxima* was not altogether new. We saw that a very similar idea was used by Cano to explain the second and third grades of erroneous propositions². There is this difference, however, between the two concepts; while Lugo allowed for a few grave theologians who hold that the opposed doctrine is *not* of faith and whose dissenting view constitutes a probable opinion, Cano made no such allowance. According to Cano, the weight of authority in this matter is so great, that it cannot be opposed without grave sin. It is difficult to see how Lugo admitted of a probable opinion being censurable as *haeresi proxima*.

Having understood *haeresi proxima* in this way, Lugo showed how extrinsic authority plays such an important role in this censure. It is in respect of this extrinsic authority that the censure is applied, since there is no intrinsic mode corresponding to *haeresi proxima*. A proposition which is censurable in this way is either heretical or not,

¹ Cf. SUAREZ, de fide, disput. 19, sect. 2, no. 16.

² When giving his explanation of *haeresi proxima*, Lugo cites the authority of two theologians, Hurtado, (de fide, disput. 18, parag. 17) and Coninck (de fide, disput. 18, no. 132). It seems, therefore, that Lugo was depending not only on Cano, for the notion which he used to explain *haeresi proxima*, but also on Hurtado and Coninck for the application of this notion to this particular censure. The authors here referred to are: Aegidius Coninck S. J. (1571-1633) and Petrus Hurtado de Mendoza S. J. († 1651). Unfortunately, we have been unable to check the references which Lugo gives to these theologians, so we cannot say to what extent he depends on them for his exposition of the censure *haeresi proxima*.

just as the corresponding theological note, *fidei proxima*, is, objectively speaking, either of faith or not.

One of the most interesting points we noted in Lugo's exposition of this censure was his comparison between *haeresi proxima* and *error*. We were not surprised to find him holding that the erroneous proposition is more serious than that which is *haeresi proxima*, because in examining the different opinions on the censure of *error*, we saw that all the theologians whom we considered were unanimous in holding that the erroneous proposition occupies the next place in gravity after heresy. However, Lugo made a special comparison between *error* and *haeresi proxima*, and brought forward arguments which we had not seen before.

Finally, we note once again that when Lugo wrote his exposition of the theological censures (1646), he had no guidance from the condemnations of the Church concerning *haeresi proxima*. As we have often pointed out, this censure was applied for the first time in 1690 A. D., when thirty one Jansenistic propositions were condemned. Lugo notes, however, that the Council of Constance (1418), in censuring the errors of Wyclif, stated that some of his articles were *notoriously heretical*. In Lugo's estimation, this meant that the articles in question were *certainly* heretical and unanimously held as such by theologians. In this way, Lugo states, the council distinguished between heresy and that which later became known as *haeresi proxima*¹.

After Lugo, our next authority on the theological censures is that of the Salmanticenses (1676). However, we look in vain through their exposition for even a mention of the words '*haeresi proxima*'². The first explanation of their silence which comes to our mind is the special attitude which they take towards interpreting these censures. When examining their doctrine on *error* we noted that they set out to find the common opinion, or at least the interpretation which was more widely received, with regard to each censure. We have already seen that the censure *haeresi proxima* was treated only by very few theologians, and it was not officially used by the Church until 1690 A. D., several years after the Salmanticenses had written their exposition of the censures. Consequently, the first explanation of their silence

¹ Cf. LUGO, loc. cit., no. 80.

² Cf. SALMANTICENSES, de fide, disput. 9, dub. 4, no. 43 et seqq.

which suggests itself to us is that they judged this censure to be lacking sufficient authority, and omitted it altogether.

However plausible this explanation may seem at first sight, there is one argument against it. The Salmanticenses explained *errori proxima*, which had even less authority than *haeresi proxima*. The only other explanation of their silence we can think of is that they identified this censure with *error*. It is very probable that they were misled into this position by the references we have considered in the first part of this chapter.

ARTICLE III

Panormo Corrects the Interpretation of Lugo 1709 A. D.

After Lugo, our next authority on *haeresi proxima* is Antonio de Panormo (1709). In the period intervening between these two theologians, this censure was for the first time officially applied by the Church¹. Consequently, Panormo could never have been in doubt as to whether or not *haeresi proxima* was a distinct censure.

The only opinion which Panormo considers in his exposition of this censure, is that of Lugo. It seems, therefore, that no advance had been made on this in the intervening years. As we shall presently see, Panormo does not supplant Lugo's doctrine in this matter. He retains the fundamental notion, but excludes all the weak points which we have already pointed out in our own examination of his doctrine. We shall now consider Panormo's corrections in detail.

A. Probable heresy, as distinct from *haeresi proxima*

The main objection which Panormo has against Lugo's interpretation of this censure is that it represents *probable heresy* rather than *haeresi proxima*. We have already pointed out that for Lugo, doctrine is said to be *fidei proxima* when the majority of grave theologians hold it to be of faith. He admits of some grave theologians dissenting, whose

¹ Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 6.

view constitutes a probable opinion to the contrary. It follows from this that the opposite opinion is also in the realm of probability. It was this consideration which induced Panormo to correct Lugo's interpretation of this censure. It is an explanation of probable heresy rather than *haeresi proxima*¹.

The notion of *probable heresy* does not indicate a theological censure, but represents a private judgment without any intention to censure those who hold such dubious doctrine. On the contrary, when *haeresi proxima* is applied, an opinion is *condemned*. Furthermore, Panormo points out, opinions which are probable are never censured by the Church. Consequently, when a proposition is condemned as *haeresi proxima*, we may take it for granted that it is devoid of all probability². In this way, Panormo rejects Lugo's interpretation of *haeresi proxima*. He concentrates on the weakness of the argument which allowed of a few dissenting grave theologians, and shows that Lugo identified *haeresi proxima* with *probable heresy*, two very distinct concepts. After this, Panormo proceeds to give his own interpretation of the censure, and we find that while retaining the basic notion of Lugo, he introduces a seemingly slight modification, which serves, however, to distinguish sufficiently *haeresi proxima* from *probable heresy*.

Like Lugo, Panormo also admits the possibility of some dissenting theologians who hold that the doctrine denied is not of faith. There is this great difference, however, that for Panormo these are not grave theologians, and their opinion in this matter is not to be considered as probable, since it is devoid of any solid theological foundation — *utpote nullo gravi motivo innixi, quod fundamentum esse valeat verae probabilitatis*. In this way, he greatly enhances the authority of the

¹ Cf. ANTONIO DE PANORMO, *Scrutinium Doctrinarum*, cap. 6, art. 1, no. 14, p. 340.

² *Ibid.*, no. 15, p. 341. "Quoties enim dicitur *probabiliter* propositio haeretica, vel erronea, toties indicatur, non absoluta propositionis pravitas, sed privatum de pravitate iudicium, ex quo nulla in diversimode opinantes injuria, a qua difficillime liberari potest, qui absolute pronuncietur propositionem haeresi vel errori proximam. Quod adhuc clarius innotescet, si attendamus quod nota proxima haeresi pronunciata, ut vidimus, sit a Romanis Pontificibus, qui nunquam censura inurunt propositiones quae probabiles extant apud doctores, eas relinquo in sua probabilitate, quam habebant. Et proinde eo ipso, quod aliqua propositio haeresi proxima declaratur, omni prorsus necesse est probabilitate destitui, alias si in ea ulla probabilitas maneret, absolute haeresi proxima minime declararetur. Cum vero hinc inde est doctorum opinio, patet nullam ex opinionibus posse omni probabilitate destitutam, et idcirco nullam proximam haeresi."

doctrine which is denied, since all grave theologians hold it to be of faith, and the opinion of those who hold otherwise is not to be seriously considered. In spite of this great authority, however, the doctrine in question is not *certainly* of faith, but almost certainly so. There is still the slight shadow of doubt which is incompatible with divine faith, and which reduces the theological note from *de fide* to *fidei proxima*, and the corresponding censure from *haeretica* to *haeresi proxima* ¹.

To illustrate this notion, and to distinguish it from heresy and probable heresy, Panormo considers three grades of certainty with which we may judge a proposition to be heretical or erroneous ².

1° When it may be clearly seen, without the least doubt, that the doctrine denied is either immediately or mediately revealed. Such certainty obtains when the doctrine in question is obviously contained in S. Scripture or in the definitions of the Church. In circumstances such as these, the denial may be censured as heretical or erroneous, as the case may be.

2° When the majority of theologians hold the doctrine denied to be immediately or mediately revealed. In this case, there are a few dissenting theologians whose opinion, however, is devoid of all probability, since it has no solid theological foundation. In circumstances such as these, the denial of what is commonly held to be immediately or mediately revealed is to be censured as *haeresi proxima* and *errori proxima* respectively.

¹ *Ibid.*, no. 17. "Relate itaque ad extrinsecam auctoritatem desumendam credimus quidditatem propositionis proximaе haeresi, dummodo talis, ac tanta sit huiusmodi auctoritas, ut ob eam propositio, omnibus perpensis, ex communi theologorum mente habeatur haeretica, adeo ut si qui pro haeretica illam non tenent, attendendi non sint, utpote nullo gravi motivo innixi, quod fundamentum esse valeat verae probabilitatis. Cum hac moderatione, prae aliis placet opinio laudati Societatis Doctoris, (i. e. Lugo) qui per extrinsecam auctoritatem non ita distinguit proximam haeresi a reliquis censuris, ac si unice per illam constituatur. Requiritur namque fundamentum immediatae oppositionis propositionis huiusmodi cum revelata; sed quia, vel quod haec sit revelata, vel quod illa revera cum revelata opponatur, non est omnino certum certitudine, quae revelatam absolute fidei objectum reddat, et contrariam ipsi, absolute haeticam, sed fere certum id extet ob commune doctorum catholicorum iudicium ita putantium; et ideo, sicuti revelata dici potest proxima fidei, ita, et opposita proxima haeresi. Sicque discurrendum proportione servata de propositione proxima errori"

² *Ibid.*, no. 18, p. 342.

3^o When there is a division amongst the theologians regarding the status of the doctrine which is denied, so that both opinions are probable. In this case, no censure is to be applied, but the denial of doctrine which is probably of faith, or probably a theological conclusion, may be justly called probable heresy, or probable *error*.

In spite of the fact that Panormo changes the concept of *haeresi proxima*, bringing it much closer to actual heresy, he agrees with Lugo in considering this censure as being less serious than *error*. For both of these theologians the argument is that the erroneous proposition entails a necessary connection with heresy, whereas the proposition which is *haeresi proxima* has a mere contingent connection with it. However, there is this difference, that while Lugo based this contingency on the probable opinion to the contrary, Panormo admits of no such probable opinion. He states that it is the contingency of mere possibility, of metaphysical non-repugnance. However slight this contingency may be, in Panormo's opinion it suffices to make *haeresi proxima* less serious than *error*, which has a necessary connection with heresy¹.

B. An alternative explanation

After correcting Lugo's notion of *haeresi proxima*, Panormo goes on to give an alternative explanation of this censure, which, in fact, differs very little from the first. In this second explanation, he brings *haeresi proxima* still closer to absolute heresy, and describes it as the interpretation which is safer in practice.

According to this alternative explanation, the proposition which is censurable as *haeresi proxima* is in the ultimate stage of being defined as heretical, in so far as all the necessary conditions are present. In this case, there is no longer any controversy or doubt, and all that

¹ Ibid. "Unde ulterius patet, quo sensu est verum, quod erroneitatis censura gravior sit proximae haeresi, quia negans conclusionem theologiam cogitur necessario negare et praemissam de fide; cum tamen sustinens propositionem haeresi proximam, possit non esse haereticus, ex quo opinio asserens illam propositionem haeticam, falsa esse queat, et proinde inter eam et haeresim, non sit necessaria connexio, sed contigens, sumendo videlicet contingens pro contingenti, contingentia merae possibilitatis, seu verius, metaphysicae non repugnantiae, non vero pro contingentia verae et propriae probabilitatis."

is necessary is the formal declaration of the Church to make it an absolute heretical proposition. Panormo gives the following two examples to illustrate this notion: 1) when a general council, not yet approved by the Pope, condemns a proposition as heretical, and 2) when the unanimous opinion of the Fathers and theologians holds a proposition to be heretical¹.

This alternative explanation of Panormo goes so far in eliminating doubt and controversy from the concept of *haeresi proxima*, that it seems to identify this censure with heresy. Take, for instance, his second example given above with regard to the unanimous consent of the Fathers and theologians — does not this seem to constitute absolute heresy? Panormo, however, is aware of this difficulty, and sets out to show that this alternative explanation, while bringing *haeresi proxima* much closer to heresy, nevertheless leaves room for distinction between the two censures.

To meet this difficulty, he makes a distinction between the authentic and unauthentic heretical proposition. The former is that on which the rule of faith is quite explicit, in so far as it is evidently opposed to doctrine contained in S. Scripture, or to truth defined by the Church. With regard to the latter, i. e. the unauthentic heretical proposition, the rule of faith is not so explicit. Nevertheless, all the necessary conditions are present for it to be declared as heretical².

Both these types of heretical proposition have one element in common, immediate opposition to revelation. They differ with regard to the medium by which this immediate opposition becomes known to us. We know the authentic heretical proposition by an infallible

¹ Ibid., no. 19. "Potest et alio modo proxima haeresi explicari, qui forte expeditior videbitur et in praxi tutior, ut nempe ea propositio dicenda sit haeresi proxima, quae est in ultimo, vel fere ultimo constituta definitivitatis gradu, ut declaretur haeretica. Et huiusmodi esset propositio quae vel a concilio generali praecisa Romani Pontificis approbatione et consensu proponitur ut haeretica, vel ab unanimi omnium Patrum aut theologorum consensu."

² Ibid. "Animadvertere juvat, propositionem aliquam haeticam dici posse authenticam et non-authenticam. In priori acceptione, haeretica habetur propositio quoties vel expressa de huiusmodi eius pravitate habetur in sacris literis testificatio, aut clara extet de ea Ecclesiae seu Romanae Cathedrae definitio. In posteriori vero, quoties etsi adeo explicita non habeatur de ea fidei regula, quae ostendat haberi debere ut haeticam, nihilominus concurrunt omnes conditiones quae requiruntur, ut declarari valeat haeretica. ... In hac itaque suppositione, propositio eius generis haberi potest et simpliciter haeretica et haeresi proxima."

medium which enjoys the certainty of faith. Our knowledge of the unauthentic heretical proposition, however, comes through a different medium which has not the certainty of faith, but that certainty which is presupposed by faith. This latter medium cannot be called the rule of faith like the first, but a sign of the rule of faith¹. According to Panormo, therefore, it is the medium of *our knowledge* which makes the difference between heresy and *haeresi proxima*. Both propositions are in direct opposition to faith, but in one case, our knowledge of this comes through an infallible medium which is the rule of faith, while in the other, our knowledge depends on another medium which, though certain, does not enjoy the certainty of faith. Accordingly, *haeresi proxima* may be defined as *propositio haeretica definibilis*. The term "*haeretica*" implies immediate opposition to faith, which element it has in common with absolute heresy. The term "*definibilis*", however, indicates the deficiency of the medium by which such opposition to faith becomes known to us, and which distinguishes it from absolute heresy².

In this alternative explanation, Panormo brings *haeresi proxima* much closer to absolute heresy. Both concepts are basically the same, in so far as there is question of extrinsic authority. In the second explanation, however, the least doubt and uncertainty is ruled out. Consequently, we cannot speak of a contingent connection between *haeresi proxima* and absolute heresy, as we did when considering the first interpretation which Panormo gave of this censure. If all doubt is removed, then there is a *certain* connection between *haeresi proxima* and heresy.

When comparing the censure of *error* with that of *haeresi proxima*, we saw Lugo and Panormo pointing out that the former comes closer to absolute heresy, because of its certain connection with this greatest

¹ Ibid., p. 348. "Inspecta enim oppositione immediata quam importat (i. e. propositio haeresi proxima) cum fide, est simpliciter haeretica... Inspecto tamen modo, quo dictam oppositionem immediatam cognoscimus, non est ex eo praecise simpliciter haeretica, quia non est medium certum in se ipso certitudine fidei, sed certitudine praesuppositiva fidei, quae tamen sufficit ut inde propositio sic agnita ut haeretica, talis simpliciter aestimetur. Ac eatenus eadem propositio haeretica simpliciter habebitur in se ipsa et relata ad Primam Veritatem cui contradicit, et proxima haeresi relate ad medium quo dicta contradictio est nobis nota, quod non est in se ipso regula fidei, sed potius signum regulae fidei."

² Ibid.

form of deviation from Catholic truth. The connection which *haeresi proxima* has with heresy was described as *contingent*. In this second explanation of the censure, however, the question of this contingent connection does not arise, since every shade of uncertainty and doubt is ruled out. Consequently, Panormo changes his opinion with regard to this second interpretation of *haeresi proxima*, saying that if the censure is understood in this way, it comes before *error* and closer to absolute heresy. The fact that all conditions are complied with so that it may be authentically declared as heretical, gives it a certainty, at least equivalent to the certainty which mediate opposition to faith entails. Its connection with heresy, therefore, can no longer be described as contingent, and since there is question of *immediate opposition* to revelation, it takes precedence over *error* and constitutes a more serious censure¹.

Having given this alternative explanation of the censure, Panormo does not determine which interpretation is to be accepted, but leaves the matter open for the reader to select the explanation which seems more suitable². We recall, however, that he considers the second solution to be safer in practice, in so far as it eliminates the difficulty of determining the importance of the few dissenting theologians, and avoids the possibility of rashly applying this censure.

ARTICLE IV

Recapitulation and Conclusion

In comparison with our treatment of the censure of *error*, we have found very little on *haeresi proxima*. This may be explained by the late use of this latter censure in the official condemnations of the Church. The Council of Constance (1418) applied the censure of *error*

¹ Ibid. "Sicque censura proxima haeresi gravior procul dubio erit erronea, quia simpliciter haeretica est, et certo talis, certitudine quae proximam definitam constituit, quaeque aequivalens dici potest certitudini quam habemus de mediata oppositione, quam cum fide sufficienter involvit erronea, licet adhuc non pertingente supremum gradum certitudinis regulae fidei."

² Ibid. "An autem re vera haec prae alia absolute ineunda sit via? aequi doctique lectores determinent."

to some of the articles of Wyclif and Huss. It was not until 1690 A. D., however, that *haeresi proxima* was used, and even though we have considered different explanations of the censure before this date, Antonio de Panormo (1709) was the only theologian who could point to an official source, to show that this was a distinct censure.

We have examined references both to the name and notion of *haeresi proxima*, in the writings of Cano (1563) and Suarez (1621), and have seen how these two theologians unwittingly confused this censure with the erroneous proposition. Petrus de Lorca (1614) was the first theologian we saw to consider *haeresi proxima* as a separate censure, and in doing so, he anticipated the official distinction which was made by the Church seventy-six years later. However, like Cano and Suarez he confused *haeresi proxima* with the erroneous proposition.

In the exposition of Lugo (1646), we saw that a considerable advance was made. The notion of extrinsic authority, which Cano used to explain the second and third grades of *error*, was now applied to explain *haeresi proxima*. If Lugo had adopted this notion as it stood, and as it was put forward by Cano, there would have been no need for the subsequent corrections of Panormo. Instead of this, however, Lugo allowed for some grave theologians holding the opposite view, and finally he confused *haeresi proxima* with probable heresy, two concepts altogether distinct.

In the interpretation of Panormo (1709) we saw *haeresi proxima* being explained as a separate censure, distinct from all others and coming immediately after *error*. Here there was no confusion with probable heresy, and the basic notion of extrinsic authority was retained but enhanced considerably to bring the censure much closer to heresy. Then, in an alternative interpretation, we saw Panormo explaining *haeresi proxima* as a non-authentic heretical proposition. Understood in this way, it comes closer to heresy than the erroneous proposition.

The name of this censure, *haeresi proxima*, suggests that it comes next to heresy. However, we cannot argue from this, because, as we have often seen, the names of these censures may be understood in a generic and specific sense, and it is in this latter way that they indicate the separate censures. The heretical proposition, for instance, is more erroneous than the proposition which is specifically termed as such. Likewise, the censure of *error* has a greater *sapor haeresis* than that which is specifically called *haeresim sapiens*. Consequently,

there is nothing to be wondered at if the censure of *error* comes closer to heresy than the censure which is specifically termed '*haeresi proxima*.' If we consider these words in a generic sense, they may be applied to the erroneous proposition. If, however, we restrict them to their specific signification, then they are applicable only to the separate and distinct censure, *haeresi proxima*.

We have seen that Panormo gave two explanations of this censure. These explanations are basically the same, in so far as they depend on the notion of extrinsic authority. However, according as we adopt one or other of these interpretations, the censure *haeresi proxima* will come before or after *error*. Panormo himself did not make a decision with regard to these two interpretations, but left the question open.

The official condemnations of the Church give no evidence as to the exact position of *haeresi proxima* in relation to heresy. In the very first use of this censure by the Church¹, *error* is listed in the next place to heresy. However, in a subsequent condemnation², *haeresi proxima* comes closer to heresy. We must depend on the authority of the theologians, therefore, as to the gradation and hierarchy of these censures.

We recall that all the theologians we examined apropos of the erroneous proposition were unanimous in stating that the censure of *error* comes immediately after heresy. True, not all of these had considered *haeresi proxima* as a separate censure, but even those who had, including Panormo, held that it was less grave than *error*. When Panormo explained the erroneous proposition, he categorically stated that *error* comes closer to heresy than *haeresi proxima*. There, he made no reservations, and made no mention of the possibility of *haeresi proxima* being the more serious censure. Now, however, if his alternative explanation is to be adopted, this order has to be changed, with *error* taking second place to *haeresi proxima*. All things considered, it seems to us that the bulk of authority holds that *error* is the more serious censure, and consequently, the first interpretation which Panormo gives of *haeresi proxima* is the more plausible. In later years, one or other of these two interpretations, and sometimes both, were adopted by subsequent theologians. However we do not

¹ Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 6.

² Ibid., no. 8.

claim that there was any unanimity of opinion with regard to *haeresi proxima* in later years. The doctrine of Lugo was often put forward as it stood, thus confusing this censure with *probable heresy*¹.

¹ The following are examples of the way *haeresi proxima* was interpreted after Panormo:

¹⁰ MONTAIGNE, *De Censuris, seu Notis Theologicis, et de Sensu Propositionum*, in Migne, T. C. C., t. 1, col. 1175-7. (Note: this work was first published in 1732 A. D.) — Montaigne's doctrine on *haeresi proxima* may be described as a synopsis of Panormo's interpretation.

²⁰ TOURNELY, *Continuatio Praelectionum Theologicarum*, t. 6. Appendix de propositionibus ad moralem disciplinam spectantibus. Parisiis (1745), p. 682: "Propositio haeresi proxima est ea quam major et sanior theologorum pars ex Scriptura aut Traditione iudicat esse haereticam; etsi absolute et simpliciter non audeat pronuntiare eam esse haereticam, eo quod graves quidam theologi contendunt censuram hanc eidem iniuri non debere." — In these few lines, Tournely outlines Lugo's opinion. He makes the same mistake by allowing for some grave theologians who hold that the doctrine in question is not heretical. According to Panormo, this is a description of probable heresy, and not *haeresi proxima*.

³⁰ KILBER S. J., *Institutiones Theologicae*, de virtutibus theologicis, de fide, cap. 3. Wirceburgi (1751), p. 584: "Proxima haeresi vel errori est, quam quidem non omnes, plures tamen et graves doctores cum gravi fundamento dicunt esse haereticam vel erroneam; quia ipsum proximitatis vocabulum maximam indicat propinquitatem, quae aliter explicari nequit." — This description is very general, and seems to depend on Lugo's doctrine.

⁴⁰ GAUTIER S. J., *Prodromus ad Theologiam Dogmatico-Scholasticam*, dissert. 2, cap. 2, art. 4. Coloniae & Francofurti (1756), pp. 119-120. — Like Montaigne, Gautier follows Panormo, and gives even his alternative explanation of *haeresi proxima*.

⁵⁰ FRANZELIN S. J., *Tractatus de Divina Traditione*, sect. 1, th. XII, scholion 2, Romae (1875), p. 161: "Igitur censura propositionis erroneae comprehendit tum eam quae ita, ut dictum est, opponitur conclusioni theologiae certae, . . . tum eam quae opponitur doctrinae ex universali consensione et praedicatione indubitanter tenendae ut verae, quae tamen non simpliciter et certo tamquam de fide proponitur. . . ." — It seems that for Franzelin the censure *haeresi proxima* is a species of *error*.

⁶⁰ DE GROOT O. P., *Summa Apologetica*, q. 10, art. 5. Ratisbonae (1906), p. 380: "Haeresi proxima propositio doctrinae adversatur, quae communi propemodum omnium sententia de fide esse censetur, esto ab ecclesia non sit definita." — This short description seems to resemble the alternative interpretation given by Panormo.

It is obvious from these examples that after Panormo, very few theologians went into any detail regarding the correct interpretation of these censures. There is nothing personal or original about these descriptions which, at the most, are mere repetitions of earlier opinions. For later references regarding the censure *haeresi proxima*, confer the following: PESCH S. J., *Praelectiones Dogmaticae*, t. 1, pars 2, sect. 5. Friburgi Brisgoviae (1909), p. 378; QUILLIET, DTC, t. 2, col. 2106; SCHULTES O. P., *De Ecclesia Catholica*, art. 70. Parisiis (1931), p. 639, etc.

Having now recapitulated all our investigations and conclusions regarding *haeresi proxima*, there is just one other point we wish to explain before concluding this chapter, viz. how this censure differs from *temeraria*. In this work we are not treating ex professo of the temerarious proposition. However, it must be mentioned here to give a fuller understanding of *haeresi proxima*.

We have already stated that in the case of *haeresi proxima* the majority of theologians are unanimous in stating that the doctrine denied is revealed and of faith, and that the few theologians who are not in accord with the majority in this matter, have no sound arguments either from reason or authority to support their claim. It is to be carefully noted that the majority hold the denied doctrine to be of faith, and not just merely hold it to be true. In the latter case, i. e. when the majority of theologians hold a doctrine to be true (not necessarily revealed or of faith), then such doctrine is regarded as being *doctrina communis*, and the corresponding theological censure is *temeraria*. It is clear from this that the two censures *haeresi proxima* and *temeraria* closely resemble each other, and could easily be confused.

CHAPTER THREE

Haeresim Sapiens — De Haeresi Suspecta

The third theological censure which we are to examine is that which was termed *haeresim sapiens* or *de haeresi suspecta*. These words signify something less than heresy and *haeresi proxima*. The "taste" of heresy indicates something much more remote, but which, however, arouses suspicion that there is something far more serious latent in the background.

It will be noted that in the title of this chapter we give two names to this censure: *haeresim sapiens* and *de haeresi suspecta*. This does not mean that we wish to make these two terms synonymous. As we shall presently see, very many theologians held for this, while others placed a difference of degree between them. This will become more evident as we explain the different interpretations later on. For the sake of clarity we shall treat of both of these together from the outset, and when occasion arises, we shall indicate any distinctions which may have been made by individual theologians.

As we have already done in our examination of the censures of *error* and *haeresi proxima*, we shall first of all recapitulate the main opinions which existed before Melchior Cano, and then proceed to examine the evolution of the censure until 1709 A. D., when the *Scrutinium Doctrinarum* of Antonio de Panormo was published. Before considering the theologians, however, it would be well to study the use of this censure in the condemnations of the Church. This will place us in a better position to judge the interpretation of each theologian, in so far as we shall know exactly what guidance and evidence each one had from this official source.

ARTICLE I

Haeresim Sapiens and De Haeresi Suspecta
as used in the Condemnations of the Church

We may outline the use of the censure *haeresim sapiens — de haeresi suspecta* in the condemnations of the Church, as follows:

1° Before the Council of Constance (1418), we can point to at least two occasions on which the censure *suspecta* was applied. a) In 1329 A. D., eleven articles of Ekard were condemned as suspected of heresy¹. b) In 1347 A. D., certain errors of Nicholas of Autrécourt were censured as suspected². In neither of these condemnations is there any mention of the censure *haeresim sapiens*.

2° The Council of Constance makes no mention of either *haeresim sapiens* or *suspecta*. We have already pointed out that it was the condemnations of this council which aroused the interest of the theologians in the theological censures. However, in spite of the fact that it makes no mention of *haeresim sapiens* or *suspecta*, we shall see that these censures were explained by the theologians at a very early date, and distinguished from each other long before any official distinction was made in the condemnations of the Church. It is interesting to note that we have never seen a reference made to condemnations which took place before the Council of Constance. It seems that all the theologians whom we are considering apropos of these theological censures, were either unaware of, or did not take trouble to examine these previous condemnations.

3° In the condemnation of the errors of Baius by Pope S. Pius V (1569), we find the censure *suspecta*, but there is no mention of *haeresim sapiens*³. This was the first occasion in the post-Constance period that the censure *suspecta* was applied by the Church.

¹ Cf. Dz 501-529. The exact words of the condemnation are to be found in no. 529.

² Cf. Dz 553-570.

³ Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 3.

4° In 1690 A. D., the Holy Office condemned thirty one propositions of the Jansenists, and here we find the censure *haeresim sapiens* being applied for the first time in the dogmatic condemnations of the Church. It is distinguished from *error*, *haeresi proxima*, and *male sonans*¹. It is to be noted, however, that in this decree there is no mention of *suspecta*. As yet, therefore, we have seen no official distinction made between these two censures.

5° In the condemnation of a hundred and one propositions of Quesnel by Pope Clement XI in 1713 A. D., both *haeresim sapiens* and *de haeresi suspecta* were applied². Here, at last, is the official distinction between these two censures. We note, however, that it came rather late, in 1713, after the publication of Panormo's *Scrutinium Doctrinarum*. We shall not be surprised, therefore, if we find a certain amount of confusion with regard to the identification of these two censures, especially when we recall that in all the previous condemnations, when one of these censures was applied, the other was omitted. This seemed to indicate that according to the mind of the Church, these terms were synonymous.

ARTICLE II

Haeresim Sapiens According to the Doctrine of Cano (1563)

Having treated of the erroneous proposition, the next censure which Cano sets out to explain is that of *haeresim sapiens*³. We have already seen that he did not treat of *haeresi proxima* as a separate censure, but included what later theologians understood by this under the second and third grades of *error*.

In his exposition of *haeresim sapiens*, Cano does not mention the term *de haeresi suspecta*, nor does he do so when explaining the other theological censures. In all probability, he took *haeresim sapiens* and *de haeresi suspecta* to mean the same thing. We have already pointed

¹ Ibid., no. 6.

² Ibid., no. 8.

³ Cf. CANO, *De Locis Theologicis*, lib. XII, cap. 9, in T. C. C., t. 1, col. 617 et seqq.

out that the Council of Constance, which was Cano's guide in interpreting and distinguishing the censures, makes no mention of either of these terms. In fact, the censure *haeresim sapiens* was not officially used by the Church until 1690, over a hundred years after Cano's death. From the point of view of evidence and guidance from the dogmatic condemnations of the Church, therefore, Cano was very much handicapped. However, he had seen a number of interpretations of *haeresim sapiens* which were put forward by previous theologians. Perhaps these influenced him to treat of it as a special censure. We shall now briefly examine these opinions which existed before Cano, and see if they influenced his doctrine in any way.

A. Different interpretations of *haeresim sapiens* before Cano

Before Melchior Cano, the three main opinions which were put forward as explanations of *haeresim sapiens* were as follows.

1° Turrecremata (1489) held that *haeresim sapiens* is incurred by the denial of a theological conclusion. In other words, he confused it with what later came to be known as the censure of *error*¹.

2° Alphonsus de Castro (1547) identified *haeresim sapiens* with *male sonans*. In his famous definition, he stated that the proposition which is *haeresim sapiens* is that which at first sight and in its proper sense, is heretical. Nevertheless, it is capable of a pious interpretation, and understood in this way, the sense is rendered to conform to Catholic doctrine². According to this explanation of Castro, the pious interpretation of an otherwise heretical proposition reduces the censure from heresy to *haeresim sapiens*. We shall see this doctrine being examined again and again by later theologians. Cano, in his exposition of this censure, does nothing else but refute the opinion of Alphonsus de Castro.

¹ Cf. TURRECREMATA, *Summa de Ecclesia*, lib. 4, pars 2, cap. 10. Venetiis (1561), p. 383. We have already examined Turrecremata's doctrine on this point, when considering the censure of *error*. Cf. supra, pp. 7-8, where he is quoted in full.

² Cf. CASTRO, *De Justa Punitione Haereticorum*, lib. 1, cap. 3. (Opera Omnia, Parisiis 1571, col. 1054 E et seqq.) "Propositio haeresim sapiens, aut male circa ea quae ad fidem pertinent, sonans, est illa quae in prima significatione quam verba prima facie ostendunt, sensum habet haereticum: quamvis pie intellecta, sensum aliquem habeat verum."

As examples of *haeresim sapiens*, Castro gives the following propositions: *Pater est major Filio; Christus est creatura; Tres sunt Dii; Vesci carnibus vel non vesci, impertinens est christianae perfectioni; Philosophi gentiles in sola lege naturae salvari potuerunt.*

3^o Simancas (1552) endorsed the definition of Castro, but made a slight change by adding that a proposition is *haeresim manifestam sapiens* when it is in mediate opposition to divine faith. In other words, he agreed with Castro regarding *haeresim sapiens*, but identified *haeresim manifestam sapiens* with what we now know to be the erroneous proposition ¹.

B. Cano examines the definition of Castro

The only one of the three opinions examined above which Cano mentions in his exposition of *haeresim sapiens*, is that of Alphonsus de Castro. In fact, Cano does nothing else but attack Castro's doctrine on this matter, so that his exposition of the censure is purely negative, telling us what *haeresim sapiens* is not, rather than what it is. It is interesting to note that he does not mention Castro by name in his rejection of this opinion, but merely refers to it as that which was held by "some theologians".

At the outset, Cano gives Castro's definition of the censure, and notes that it requires two senses for the proposition which is censurable as *haeresim sapiens*: the first and proper sense is heretical, while the second and metaphorical sense is Catholic. Cano very simply dismisses this theory by pointing to a proposition which, for him, is certainly *haeresim sapiens*, and yet does not conform to the rules of this definition, since it cannot be piously interpreted in any Catholic sense. This famous example of Cano reads as follows: '*Ridiculum est*

¹ Cf. SIMANCAS, *Institutiones Catholicae*, cap. 52, no. 3. Vallisoleti (1552), p. 190. "Illa propositio sapit haeresim, quae in prima verborum significatione et prima facie, sensum habet haereticum: quamvis pie intellecta, possit habere sensum catholicum, ut ait Alphonsus (i. e. Castro.) Illa vero sapit manifestam haeresim, ex qua et quibusdam veris, quae nulla tergiversatione possunt negari, sequitur haeresis manifesta..."

In the second edition of this work (Romae 1575), Simancas gives the same doctrine, in spite of the fact that Cano had bitterly attacked Castro's doctrine in the meantime. (Cf. op. cit., Romae 1575, tit. 54, no. 6, p. 424.)

Eucharistiae sacramentum solemniter per vias publicas circumferre. He judges this to be a perfect example of *haeresim sapiens*, because, while not being heretical, it smacks of the Lutheran doctrine which denies the Real Presence ¹. It is on this example alone that Cano bases his rejection of Castro's definition. He makes no mention of the fact that this particular doctrine had already been considered by the Council of Trent ². As we shall see later on, subsequent theologians regarded this example of Cano as being far more serious than *haeresim sapiens*.

It is not Castro's definition alone which displeases Cano, but all his examples as well. For Cano, these are outright heresy, and consequently cannot be censured merely as *haeresim sapiens* ³.

Thus far, Cano's exposition has been mostly negative, in so far as it consists of a refutation of Castro's interpretation. There is very little positive doctrine to be found which would help us to construct a definition of *haeresim sapiens* according to Cano's mind. In fact, Cano deliberately refrains from giving any rules for the interpretation of this censure, and time and again insists that it is not a matter for rules and definitions, but rather for the *gustus* and prudence of a wise theologian ⁴.

There is but one positive element to which we can point in Cano's exposition of this censure, and that is his insistence on the fact that

¹ Cf. CANO, *De Locis*, lib. XII, cap. 9, in T. C. C., t. 1, col. 617. "Quae definitio nec vocabuli potestatem exprimit, nec rei definitae vim naturamque declarat, nec mutuo nexu cum illa est copulata. Quis enim dubitet illam propositionem: Ridiculum est Eucharistiae sacramentum solemniter per vias publicas circumferre, Lutheranorum haeresim sapere, qua negant in Eucharistia corpus Christi verum contineri? Et tamen in nullo pio sensu vera est."

² Cf. Dz 888.

³ Cf. CANO, loc. cit., in T. C. C., col. 618. "Itaque, ut mea fert opinio, propositiones illae ac caeterae eiusmodi non tanquam sapientes haeresim, sed tanquam haereticas a Nicaenis Patribus sunt damnatae. At propositionem haereticam et sapientem haeresim eandem esse, mihi quidem non sit verisimile. Stultus nempe haberetur is, qui quam rem vinum esse constaret, hanc vinum sapere, nisi per jocum et ridiculum, diceret."

⁴ *Ibid.*, col. 619. "Quamobrem, quid haeresim sapiat, quid non sapiat, non tam finitione et argumentatione speculatricis disciplinae, quam sensu quodam, gustuque prudentiae iudicatur."

A little further down, we find; "Itaque non praeceptis et regulis, sed prudentia et sagacitate dijudicantur." And he ends his exposition of the censure with a final warning; "Saporem igitur propositionum, ut dixi, non tam scientia quam prudentia dijudicat. Quocirca, quae propositio haeresim sapiat, quae contra non sapiat, non theologi quivis, sed prudentes solum atque experientes poterunt iudicare."

circumstances count considerably when a proposition is to be censured as *haeresim sapiens*¹. We have seen that Castro made no mention of circumstances with regard to this censure, but gave a definition which should suitably fit every proposition censurable as *haeresim sapiens*. For Cano, on the contrary, the circumstances, such as the person, place and time of utterance, are all important. His great insistence on these led him to scorn any definition of the censure and any hard and fast rules by which it might be governed.

Having considered Cano's doctrine on this censure, we have, as yet, very little to go on, except a refutation of Castro's definition and the fact that circumstances are all important in censuring a proposition as *haeresim sapiens*. Before passing on to examine Suarez' interpretation of this censure, we shall briefly consider the doctrine of Banez (1584) and Lorca (1614), and see if they were influenced in any way by Cano in giving their opinions with regard to *haeresim sapiens*. We recall that when tracing the development of the censure of *error*, we noticed that Banez, while faithfully following his master Cano, made a big advance in associating this censure with the denial of a theological conclusion. We shall now see if he makes a similar contribution with regard to *haeresim sapiens*.

C. Banez interprets the mind of Cano (1584)

In explaining the theological censures, Banez always keeps very close to the doctrine of Cano. When he comes to give his opinion on *haeresim sapiens*, he notes how Cano disagreed with the interpretation of Castro, and then goes on to give a résumé of Cano's thought. One might pass quite easily over this outline, but on closer examination it proves to be a perfect definition of the censure according to the mind of Cano himself! We have seen how Cano again and again rejected

¹ Ibid., col. 620. "Atque ut idem vinum ex vase uno sapit picem, ex altero non sapit, et res eadem illud olet, unde sit, e coeno male, ex arcula muliebri bene; sic una et eadem oratio ex uno corde et ore odorem spirat jucundissimum, ex altero terribilissimum; ex uno saporem suavem servat, ex altero insuavem. Quemadmodum etiam videmus, aquam e radicibus et canalibus, per quos transit, aliud atque aliud et olere et sapere. Non itaque e rerum ipsarum orationumque natura sapor, odorve omnis existimandus est, sed tum res, tum orationes ipsae a venis aliquando et viis, per quas permeant, saporem et odorem accipiunt."

any definition and any hard and fast rules which might govern this censure. Now we find Banez making a résumé of his doctrine, and constructing a perfect definition of the censure according to Cano's mind, avoiding all the disagreeable elements which Cano rejected. This résumé of Banez is a masterpiece of condensation, and deserves quotation in full¹.

Propositio sapiens haeresim illa est, quae quamvis non appareat haeresis manifesta, quin potius *aliquando* poterit habere aliquem bonum sensum; tamen ex quibusdam circumstantiis, vel ex parte asserentis vel ex temporum calamitate, saporem quandam habet haeresis et suspicionis, iudicio prudentum et sapientum.

The use of the word "*aliquando*" is to be noted. In the definition which was rejected by Cano, it was stated that the censurable proposition (i. e. as *haeresim sapiens*) should *always* be capable of a pious and Catholic interpretation. Cano pointed to at least one example of *haeresim sapiens* which is incapable of any metaphorical sense, but he did not altogether rule out the possibility of a double sense. Now, Banez by using the word "*aliquando*", avoids the pitfall of Castro, and in the second part of his definition, embodies all Cano's doctrine on the important role which circumstances play with regard to *haeresim sapiens*. Then, in the very last phrase of the above citation, he brings in Cano's doctrine regarding the prudence which is necessary when this censure is to be applied.

D. Petrus de Lorca (1614)

Like Banez, Lorca wholeheartedly agrees with Cano's doctrine on *haeresim sapiens*. He rejects Castro's definition, and says that it disagrees with the very name of this censure².

¹ Cf. BANEZ, in *Secundam Secundae*, q. XI, art. 2. Lugduni (1588), col. 448.

² Cf. PETRUS DE LORCA, *Commentaria et Disputationes in 2/2 Divi Thomae*, de fide, disput. 40, no. 9-10. Matrini (1614), p. 260.

ARTICLE III

Haeresim Sapiens According to the Doctrine of Suarez
(1621)

Like his predecessor Cano, Suarez does not treat of *haeresi proxima* as a special theological censure, and after he has finished explaining the erroneous proposition, he immediately considers *haeresim sapiens* ¹.

From the point of view of guidance from the condemnations of the Church, Suarez had one advantage over Cano. In 1567 (seven years after Cano's death) Pope S. Pius V condemned seventy-nine propositions of Baius, and in this condemnation, the censure *de haeresi suspecta* was applied for the first time in the post-Constance period ². We shall presently see Suarez referring to this to prove that *haeresim sapiens* is distinct from the censure of *error*.

Suarez' exposition of *haeresim sapiens* may be divided into three parts; 1) his examination of the opinion of Simancas, 2) his examination of the opinion of Castro, and 3) his own interpretation.

A. Suarez on the opinion of Simancas

When considering the different opinions on *haeresim sapiens* which existed before Cano, we outlined the position of Simancas (1552) and saw that for him, doctrine which is *haeresim manifestam sapiens* is that which denies a theological conclusion. In other words, he identified it with what we now know to be the censure of *error*.

In the beginning of his exposition ³, Suarez admits that these two censures have very much in common, but nevertheless insists that they are specifically distinct. To prove this, he cites the condemnation of the errors of Baius by Pope S. Pius V ⁴, and points out that in this decree, the two censures, *error* and *haeresim sapiens*, are distinguished from each other.

When we examine this condemnation of Baius, however, we find that it makes no mention of *haeresim sapiens*. We have already pointed

¹ Cf. SUAREZ, de fide, disput. 19, sect. 2, no. 16-17. (Vivès., t. 12.)

² Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 3.

³ Cf. SUAREZ, loc. cit., no. 16.

⁴ Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 3.

out that the first use of this censure was in 1690, when the Holy Office condemned the errors of the Jansenists¹. However, in the bull of Pope S. Pius V, there is mention of *de haeresi suspecta*, and in all probability it was this which Suarez had in mind when he referred to that condemnation to prove that *error* and *haeresim sapiens* are distinct censures. We must take it, therefore, that for Suarez, the terms *haeresim sapiens* and *de haeresi suspecta* are synonymous.

Suarez takes great pains to point out the difference between *error* and *haeresim sapiens*, because the erroneous proposition is, in fact, much more *haeresim sapiens* than the censure which is specifically named as such. To explain this, he has recourse to that famous distinction originally introduced by Cano, between the generic and specific signification of these terms. If we take the words "*haeresim sapiens*" in their generic sense, they may be applied to the erroneous proposition, just as the term '*error*', taken in this same way, may be applied to heresy. However, the name of the genus may be applied to its lowest species, as in the case of *habitus* and *dispositio*, and in this way the words "*haeresim sapiens*" indicate a separate censure, specifically distinct from *error* and all the others². Thus, with the aid of Cano's famous distinction, Suarez disproves the opinion of Simancas, and shows how *haeresim sapiens* is specifically distinct from the censure of *error*.

B. Suarez on the opinion of Castro

The only other opinion which Suarez discusses concerning the censure *haeresim sapiens*, is that of Alphonsus de Castro. It is interesting to note that he makes no mention of Cano's refutation of this doctrine.

¹ Ibid., no. 6.

² Cf. SUAREZ, loc. cit., "... quocirca, sicut supra diximus, nomen erroris generice et specifice sumi, et primo modo comprehendere haeresim, secundo autem modo ab illa distingui, ita de nomine propositionis sapientis haeresim, judicandum censeo; nam potest esse genericum, et significare omnem propositionem, quae, licet non sit haeretica, multum redolet haeresim, et hoc modo non est dubium quin propositio erronea sapiat haeresim. Tamen in hoc sapore, ut sic dicam, possunt esse gradus, et in propositione erronea est in summo, et ideo potius dicenda est proxima haeresi; potest autem esse alia propositio magnam quidem speciem haeresis habens, in minori tamen gradu, et haec recte dicitur sapiens haeresim, applicando nomen generis ad inferiorem seu minus gravem speciem."

First of all, Suarez explains how Castro required that the proposition which is censurable as *haeresim sapiens* should be capable of two interpretations, one heretical and the other Catholic. He then proceeds to analyse Castro's definition of the censure, and reasons as follows: if both senses, Catholic and heretical, are proper (as distinct from metaphorical) then we have an equivocal proposition which cannot incur any censure graver than *male sonans*. If, however, the heretical sense is the proper interpretation, while the Catholic sense is merely metaphorical, such a proposition merits a more serious censure than *haeresim sapiens*. The pious and metaphorical interpretation will not save it from the more serious censure which it deserves¹. As an example of this, Suarez cites the Council of Basle which condemned the proposition "*Christus quotidie peccat*" as erroneous². This proposition is capable of a pious or metaphorical interpretation, in so far as it may be understood to refer to the Mystical Body of Christ. However, this did not save it from the censure of *error*.

There is a considerable difference between Suarez' refutation of Castro's opinion and that put forward by Cano. Suarez takes the definition and analyses it, and then shows that it cannot be upheld. On the other hand, Cano rejects it by pointing to an arbitrary example which does not comply with the definition. From this point of view, the criticism given by Suarez has more value. However, we notice that Suarez makes no reference to the part played by external circumstances in judging a proposition which is *haeresim sapiens*. We recall that this was very much stressed by Cano, and was one of his main

¹ Ibid., no. 17. "Primo, ut uterque sensus sit proprius secundum aliquam propriam significationem verborum, et sic nimium rigorosa videtur illa censura; nam talis propositio simpliciter est aequivoca, et ideo de se in meliori sensu accipienda, vel certe ad summum erit male sonans, . . . Alio modo potest propositio esse contra fidem in sensu proprio, et solum in metaphorico ab errore liberari, et tunc magis videtur pertinere ad secundum gradum, quam ad hunc tertium."

² Cf. Msi., t. 29, col. 109. "Et potissime scandalosam illam assertionem erroneam in fide, in ipso libello contentam, quam piae fidelium aures sine horrore audire non possunt, videlicet: Christus quotidie peccat, et ex quo fuit Christus quotidie peccavit, quamvis de Capite Ecclesia Christo Jesu salvatore nostro dicat se non intelligere, sed ad membra sua, quae cum Christo capite unum esse Christum asseruit, intelligentiam eius esse referendam dicat."

There is no unanimity of opinion as to whether the Council of Basle was oecumenical or not. However, the majority of theologians seem to hold that it was not, in spite of the fact that it was convened as such. Cf. BAUDRILLART, DTC, t. 2, col. 113 et seqq.

objections to Castro's clear-cut definition. From this point of view, therefore, Cano's refutation of Castro scores over that of Suarez. Taking the two criticisms together, we conclude that the interpretation of *haeresim sapiens* put forward by Alphonsus de Castro is an untenable explanation of the censure.

C. Suarez gives his own interpretation of *haeresim sapiens*

Having considered Suarez on the doctrine of Castro and Simancas, we now come to examine his own interpretation of *haeresim sapiens*. In a few words, he states his opinion as follows¹.

Dicendum ergo est propositionem illam sapere haeresim, ex qua coassumptis aliis principiis, sequitur haeresis, quando vel illa alia principia non sunt omnino certa, licet in Ecclesia sint valde recepta et fere certa, vel etiam illatio non est evidens, cum tamen probabilissima sit, et communiter probata.

The foregoing citation may be divided in two at the words "*quando vel illa alia*", and then the first part gives us a perfect definition of the censure of *error* or the denial of a theological conclusion. This is best explained by an example. If one were to state '*Christus non est risibilis*', this statement would clearly lead to heresy, especially when another principle, '*omnis homo est risibilis*', is taken into account.

Christus non est risibilis.

(The denial.)

Sed omnis homo est risibilis.

(External principle.)

Ergo Christus non est homo.

(Heresy.)

In the case of the erroneous proposition, '*Christus non est risibilis*', which we have just examined, the external principle which is introduced is absolutely certain, as also is the reasoning used in the syllogism. The first part of Suarez description, therefore, gives us a definition of the erroneous proposition; '*propositio ex qua coassumptis aliis principiis, sequitur haeresis*', or in other words, mediate denial of divine faith.

We have already seen, however, that Suarez insists on a distinction between *error* and *haeresim sapiens*. The latter part of the above quotation brings out this distinction; '*quando vel illa alia principia non sunt omnino certa, etc.*'. In this qualifying phrase, Suarez shows that there is a certain diminution in *haeresim sapiens* which serves

¹ Cf. SUAREZ, loc. cit.

to distinguish it from *error*. This diminution may be brought about in either of two ways; 1) the external principle introduced, even though commonly received, is not absolutely certain, or 2) the reasoning which leads to heresy, even though most probable, is not altogether evident. By this explanation Suarez shows how closely *haeresim sapiens* approximates to *error*. The difference between both of these censures is small, yet sufficient to distinguish them specifically.

We notice that in his exposition of this censure, Suarez makes no mention of Cano, nor does he insist on the value of circumstances or the prudence which is required when the censure *haeresim sapiens* is to be applied.

He takes it for granted that *haeresim sapiens* comes immediately after *error*. We recall that he did not treat of *haeresi proxima* as a separate censure, but applied this terminology to *error*. In order to bring *haeresim sapiens* as close as possible to the erroneous proposition, he selected this slight diminution which we have explained above. This also serves to distinguish these censures from each other ¹.

The notion which Suarez puts forward to explain *haeresim sapiens* is not altogether new to us. In the previous chapter, when examining the censure *haeresi proxima*, we saw this same idea being given by Lugo and the Salmanticenses to explain *errori proxima*. Later, Panormo used it to explain *probable error* ². It is to be noted, however, that all these theologians came after Suarez. As already pointed out, Suarez did not treat of *haeresi proxima* or *errori proxima* as separate censures.

The main point of Suarez' exposition is his consideration of the opinions of Castro and Simancas. His own interpretation of the censure is of little importance. It was soon forgotten and hardly ever again referred to, as we shall afterwards see.

¹ Ibid. "... non potest autem consecutio certa requiri; nam hoc pertinet ad gradum erroneae propositionis; ergo necesse est ut ab illa certitudine deficiat, quamvis ad eam proxime accedat."

² Cf. LUGO, de fide, disput. 20, sect. 3, no. 84. (Vivès, t. 2.) — Cf. SALMANTICENSIS, de fide, disput. 9, dub. 4, no. 49. (Palmé 1879 t. 2.) — Cf. ANTONIO DE PANORMO, *Scrutinium Doctrinarum*, cap. 6, art. 1, no. 14. Romae (1709), p. 341. "Ex eo namque, quod aliqua propositio appareat plerisque doctoribus inferri evidenter ex praemissis, quarum una sit de fide, altera naturali lumine nota, solum sequitur, quod illa sit habenda probabiliter erronea, semelposito, quod alii doctores graves, uti supponimus, gravi ducti motivo, evidentem illationem non teneant."

ARTICLE IV

A Distinction Introduced by Lugo
(1646 A. D.)

After explaining *haeresi proxima*, the next censure which Lugo considers is *haeresim sapiens*¹. Unlike most of his predecessors, he does not regard this censure as coming immediately after *error*. We have already seen in the preceding chapter that Lugo was one of the first theologians who considered *haeresi proxima* as a distinct censure, and placed it between *error* and *haeresim sapiens*.

At the beginning of his exposition of *haeresim sapiens*, Lugo considers some opinions. However, we find nothing here which we have not seen before. We shall pass on immediately, therefore, and examine his own interpretation.

The greatest contribution Lugo made in explaining this censure was the distinction between *haeresim sapiens* and *suspecta* which he discovered. We have seen that before his time, these two terms were taken as synonymous. As yet, Lugo had not seen *haeresim sapiens* being used in the dogmatic condemnations of the Church. The two terms, *haeresim sapiens* and *suspecta*, did not appear in the same dogmatic condemnation until 1713 A. D.² Consequently, Lugo was very much ahead of his time when he suggested, as early as 1646, that a difference existed between the two censures.

First of all, Lugo points out that *haeresim sapiens* and *suspecta* have much in common, in so far as a proposition censured in either way gives sufficient reason for fearing that its assertor is imbued with heresy. In neither case, however, is there sufficient proof to censure the proposition as heretical. In this respect, *haeresim sapiens* and *suspecta* are very much akin³.

Both *haeresim sapiens* and *de haeresi suspecta* give sufficient cause

¹ Cf. Lugo, de fide, disput. 20, sect. 3, no. 87 et seqq. (Vivès, t. 2.)

² Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 8.

³ Cf. Lugo, loc. cit., no. 88. "Utraque quidem dat ansam timendi, ne lateat haeresis; neutra dat fundamentum sufficiens alicui judicandi absolute esse haeresim, vel errorem: dat tamen fundamentum sufficiens ad suspicandum, vel timendum quod auctor illius propositionis habeat apud se haeresim aliquam, vel errorem, ex quibus illa propositio oriatur."

for suspecting latent heresy. This cause, however, is not something indivisible which does not admit of greater and less degrees. It depends on the words of the proposition and all kinds of circumstances. Sometimes these circumstances will be so great as to permit us to make a probable judgement that the assertor is imbued with heresy which influences the statement under scrutiny. In such a case, the proposition is to be censured as *haeresim sapiens*. If, however, it should happen that the circumstances do not give cause for such a probable judgement, but serve only to arouse suspicion, then, according to Lugo, the censure *de haeresi suspecta* is to be applied¹.

It is clear from all this that Lugo's distinction between these two censures is based solely on circumstances, according as they are greater or less. In this, his doctrine very closely resembles that of Cano. True, Cano considered *haeresim sapiens* and *suspecta* as being synonymous terms, but we have seen the importance which he attached to circumstantial evidence. It is also interesting to note that Lugo does not mention a double sense being required for the proposition which is *haeresim sapiens* or *suspecta*. All this is in keeping with Cano's interpretation.

Lugo does not mention Suarez' opinion on this censure, and when he explains *errori proxima*², he does not draw attention to the fact that the interpretation which he suggests is the same as that which Suarez has already put forward as an explanation of *haeresim sapiens*. This is just one example of how Suarez' doctrine on *haeresim sapiens* was soon forgotten and hardly ever again referred to.

We have already pointed out that there is a basic similarity between Cano's notion of *haeresim sapiens* and that which was afterwards held by Lugo. It seems, however, that this similarity is not intentional. There is reason to believe that Lugo had not considered Cano's expla-

¹ Ibid. "Hoc tamen fundamentum non consistit in indivisibili, sed habet latitudinem secundum magis et minus, et ideo dixi posse secundum illum excessum distingui duos gradus; aliquando enim fundamentum sive propter verba, sive propter materiam, sive propter locum, tempus, personam loquentis, et alias circumstantias, tale erit, ut probabiliter possit judicari, aliquam aliam haeresim esse in auctore, ex qua haec alia assertio procedat: aliquando vero fundamentum non erit tantum, sed solum sufficet ad id suspicandum. In primo casu poterit propositio appellari *sapiens haeresim*, ... In secundo autem casu poterit appellari *suspecta*..."

² Cf. LUGO, loc. cit., no. 84-86.

nation of this censure. Towards the end of his exposition of *haeresim sapiens*¹, Lugo notes that Lorca (1614) gave the following example of this censure: '*stultum et inutile est, sacramentum Eucharistiae solemniter per plateas circumducere*'. He disagrees with this example of *haeresim sapiens*, saying that it is outright heresy and condemned as such by the Council of Trent². The point we wish to stress, however, is that this is the famous example which was originally suggested by Cano. Lugo would certainly have recognised this if he had considered Cano's exposition of *haeresim sapiens*.

Before concluding his examination of *haeresim sapiens* and *suspecta*, Lugo points out that the same principles may be applied to the erroneous proposition, thus giving two new censures, *errorem sapiens*, and *de errore suspecta*³. We recall that when explaining *haeresi proxima*, Lugo made a similar analogy, and invented the censure *errori proxima*. We have no evidence of any of these three censures, *errori proxima*, *errorem sapiens*, and *de errore suspecta*, being officially used in any of the dogmatic condemnations of the Church. However, it must be admitted that they represent possible modes of deviation from Catholic truth.

To conclude our examination of Lugo's doctrine, we wish to point out once again that the greatest contribution he made was in distinguishing *haeresim sapiens* from *de haeresi suspecta*. This distinction, however, seems to be one of degree rather than of species. According as the circumstances permit of a greater or less suspicion, the censure will be either *haeresim sapiens* or *suspecta*.

ARTICLE V

The Salmanticenses Combine the Doctrine of Cano and Lugo 1679 A. D.

When treating of the censure of *error*, we stated our reasons for considering the Salmanticenses on the theological censures. They are not often quoted as an authority in this respect. Yet for us their doc-

¹ Ibid., no. 89.

² Cf. Dz 888.

³ Cf. Lugo, loc. cit. no. 90.

trine is of paramount importance, because of the special attitude they take towards this entire question. The Salmanticenses decided to seek out the common opinion with regard to each censure, or at least that explanation which was more widely received. In considering their doctrine on *haeresim sapiens*, therefore, we are being presented with what they deem to be the opinion which enjoys the greatest authority. Considering the role which is played by authority in the interpretation of these theological censures, and taking into account that authority which the Salmanticenses themselves enjoy, their opinion as to what constitutes *haeresim sapiens* and *suspecta* will be of great importance.

From the point of view of guidance from the dogmatic condemnations of the Church, the Salmanticenses were in the same position as Suarez and Lugo. Their tract on faith was written in 1676 and first published at Lyons in 1679 A. D. However, the first official use of the censure *haeresim sapiens* by the Church took place in 1690¹, and both *haeresim sapiens* and *suspecta* were not applied and distinguished in the same dogmatic condemnation until 1713².

A. The Salmanticenses on *haeresim sapiens*³

At the beginning of their exposition of this censure, the Salmanticenses give the following definition⁴:

"Talis (i. e. *haeresim sapiens*) vero appellatur, quae etsi non sit, aut manifeste non appareat haeresis, affert tamen eius saporem ob convenientiam saltem in vocibus, aut accidentibus alicui haeresi peculiaribus."

In analysing this definition, we see that, for the Salmanticenses, the proposition which is censurable as *haeresim sapiens* may in itself be capable of a true Catholic sense; "*quae etsi non sit, aut manifeste non appareat haeresis*". It is to be noted, however, that there is a big difference between this statement and the doctrine of Alphonsus de Castro, who held that every proposition which is *haeresim sapiens* must be capable of a Catholic sense. The use of the word '*etsi*' in the

¹ Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 6.

² Ibid., no. 8.

³ Cf. SALMANTICENSES, de fide, dispnt. 9, dub. 4, no. 50.

⁴ Ibid.

definition brings out this difference. Furthermore, later on when explaining this definition, the Salmanticenses expressly state that it is possible to have a proposition *haeresim sapiens* which is absolutely incapable of even a metaphorical Catholic sense¹. Accordingly, a proposition censurable in this way may or may not be capable of a Catholic interpretation. In this respect, the Salmanticenses are in agreement with Cano and Banez against Castro who held that such propositions must always be capable of two senses, one heretical and the other Catholic.

With regard to the second part of the definition quoted above, the Salmanticenses here embody all the doctrine of Cano and Banez on the important role which circumstances play when a proposition is to be judged *haeresim sapiens*. The material proposition, considered in itself, may or may not be censurable as *haeresim sapiens*. In the last analysis, however, we must rely on the different circumstances for guidance².

To illustrate this description of *haeresim sapiens*, the Salmanticenses give the following example: "*fides justificat*". This sentence, when considered in Sacred Scripture, has a perfectly Catholic sense. When found in the writings of the Lutherans, however, it arouses suspicion of the heresy which states that faith alone justifies. Consequently, ever since the rise of this heresy, the sentence must be qualified as follows: "*fides justificat dispositive, sive ut radix et fundamentum justificationis*".

We have seen that the doctrine of the Salmanticenses on *haeresim sapiens* is identical with that which Cano had put forward to explain

¹ Ibid. "... non negamus dari aliquas propositiones, quae ex seipsis saporem haeresis afferant. Talis est illa quam pro exemplo huius censurae affert Cano: Ridiculum est circumferre Sacramentum Eucharistiae per vias publicas. Quia licet opposita propositio: Decet, et oportet circumferre Sacramentum Eucharistiae per publicas vias, non sit immediate de fide, nec esset conclusio theologica, nec alia assertio ex principiis fidei certo moraliter deducta...., nihilominus propositio illa affinitatem quandam importat cum haeresi vel negantium realem praesentiam Christi in Eucharistia, vel impugnantium sacros ritus, et caeremonias Ecclesiae."

² Ibid. "Ad qualificandum vero aliquam propositionem isto censurae gradu non semper sufficit considerare propositionem secundum se acceptam, sed necessarium est attendere plures circumstantias, ex quibus dependet, quod aliquid sapiat haeresim, utputa liber in quo reperiatur, aut tempus, et occasio, in quibus profertur."

the same censure. Like Banez, the Salmanticenses succeed in making a definition of *haeresim sapiens* according to Cano's mind, in spite of the fact that Cano himself was bitterly opposed to any definition or rules which might govern this censure. We note that the Salmanticenses do not state that they are following Cano in this matter. They give us the doctrine which, in their opinion, enjoys the greatest authority among the theologians. We recognise this as the interpretation which was originally suggested by Cano, and later upheld by Banez and Lorca.

We note that the Salmanticenses make no mention of Suarez' interpretation of this censure, and when they give their opinion on the censure *errori proxima*, they do not state that the interpretation which they suggest is identical with that which Suarez had originally put forward to explain the censure *haeresim sapiens*¹.

B. De haeresi suspecta

We have already seen that neither Cano, Banez nor Suarez mentioned a distinction between *haeresim sapiens* and *suspecta*, and that Lugo was the first to suggest this, placing a difference of degree between the two censures. The Salmanticenses endorse this distinction of Lugo, and select it as the doctrine which enjoys the greatest authority among the different opinions. They do not state that their opinion in this matter is that which was originally suggested by Lugo. However, on reading their description of *de haeresi suspecta*, there cannot be the slightest doubt but that it is identical with Lugo's doctrine. They place the same difference of degree between *haeresim sapiens* and *suspecta* — a difference which depends on the greater or less suspicion which may be aroused by circumstances².

The doctrine of the Salmanticenses on these two censures, therefore, tells us nothing which we have not already known before. They

¹ Ibid., no. 49.

² Ibid., no. 51. "Sed non negamus, quod aliquo modo differant: nam sicut suspicio importat leve fundamentum, sapor vero affert grave indicium secundum experientiam; ita ut propositio sit suspecta, minus requiritur, quam ut sapiat haeresim, sed ad hoc posterius desideratur plurium circumstantiarum concursus. Unde non eo ipso, quod in aliquo auctore catholico notetur aliqua propositio ut suspecta, notatur etiam ut haeresim sapiens, sed alia considerari debent. Quod legitimum, aut qualificantium prudenti iudicio relinquimus."

depend on Cano for their interpretation of *haeresim sapiens*, and on Lugo for their interpretation of *suspecta*. However, it is to be carefully noted that they do not put forward their opinion as a mere repetition of the doctrine of these theologians — in fact, they do not so much as mention these authors — but as that which, in their opinion, enjoys the greatest theological authority.

ARTICLE VI

The Opinion of Antonio de Panormo

1709 A. D.

When considering the development of the censure of *error*, we noticed that Antonio de Panormo was somewhat influenced by the doctrine of de Lauria (1673), at least with regard to the examples which he brought forward to illustrate the erroneous proposition. Before considering the doctrine of Panormo on *haeresim sapiens*, therefore, we shall briefly examine Lauria's exposition of this censure, and see if there is a similar dependence in this case.

A. Lauria on *haeresim sapiens* (1673)

Lauria identifies the censures *haeresim sapiens* and *suspecta*, saying that they are synonymous terms¹. By way of argument for this, he points to the fact that these censures have never been applied in the the same dogmatic condemnation. Whenever *haeresim sapiens* has been used, *suspecta* has been omitted, and vice versa².

According to his own interpretation of the censure, the proposition which is *haeresim sapiens* (or *suspecta*) is that which is equivocal, capable

¹ Cf. LAURENTIUS BRANCATUS DE LAURIA, *Commentaria in Tertium Librum Sententiarum Mag. Fr. Joannis Duns Scoti*, t. 3, par 1, disput. 16, art. 2, no. 59. Romae (1673), p. 857 "Doctrina sapiens haeresim, eadem est ac suspecta de haeresi; ita quod synonymae sunt."

² Ibid., no. 60. "In neutra damnatione facta a Concilio Constantiensi, neque in damnatione facta a Pio et Gregorio, reperiuntur notae istae tamquam diversae, immo in prioribus non reperitur suspecta, aut sapiens haeresim, in postrema vero reperitur suspecta tantum; neque aliam video authenticam damnationem doctrinarum factam ab Ecclesia, in qua reperiuntur tamquam notae diversae, ut reperiuntur coeterae."

of both a Catholic and an heretical sense¹. Lauria makes no mention of the distinction between *haeresim sapiens* and *suspecta* which was introduced by Lugo (1647), nor does he make any reference to the important role played by circumstances in this censure, a point emphasised by Cano. Lauria's doctrine resembles that of Castro, in so far as he demands a double sense for the proposition which is *haeresim sapiens*. However, it differs in one respect. For Castro, the heretical sense is the proper interpretation, while the Catholic sense is merely metaphorical. For Lauria, however, there is no question of a metaphorical interpretation, and he seems to hold that both the Catholic and heretical senses are proper, thus giving a purely equivocal proposition.

B. Panormo is influenced by Lauria

At the beginning of his exposition of *haeresim sapiens* and *de haeresi suspecta*, Panormo considers the problem of distinguishing these two censures². He reviews the whole situation and briefly describes the distinction which was introduced by Lugo, and afterwards held by others³. At the same time, he notes that no such distinction was

¹ Ibid., no. 58, p. 857. "Et quidem mihi videtur tunc maxime apparere suspectam, quando aliquo modo, etsi aequaliter aequivoco convenit cum formula, seu modo dicendi haereticorum, in ea materia. Quod si talis doctrina non sit expresse haeretica; quia non in omnibus similis, cum modo dicendi haereticorum; neque sit contraria conclusioni theologicae, necessario deductae ex una de fide et alia naturaliter evidente; remanet cum sola nota suspectae de haeresi."

To illustrate this censure, Lauria takes seven condemned propositions of Baius. Cf. Dz 1001, 1002, 1003, 1004, 1005, 1007, 1009. Immediately after giving these examples (loc. cit., no. 62, p. 857), Lauria states: "Haec propositiones et aliae plures ex illis 75 Baii, ut legenti patet, non sunt immediate contra Sacram Scripturam, neque contra conclusionem theologicam necessario deductam ex una revelata et alia evidenti naturaliter; ideo nec haereticae nec erroneae dici possunt. Sed quia affinitatem et connexionem aliquam habent cum doctrina Pelagii ac Coelestii; licet ad sensum bonum possent reduci, dicuntur suspectae de haeresi, vel sapientes haeresim."

² Cf. ANTONIO DE PANORMO, *Scrutinium Doctrinarum*, cap. 6, art. 1.

³ Panormo (loc. cit., no. 5) states that Lugo's doctrine in this matter was later upheld by Vinc. Ferre O. P. († 1682). Hurter (N. L., t. 4, p. 360) remarks that the *tractatus theologici* of this theologian have now become very rare works. However, we have the following quotation from tract. 2, q. 16, parag. 5, no. 24, which is to be found in Panormo. In this, Ferre's doctrine on the distinction between *haeresim sapiens* and *suspecta* is clearly expressed.

"Sapere haeresim et redolere haeresim determinate ducit intellectum ad con-

placed by Suarez and the earlier theologians. He himself falls into line with this conservative view ¹, and brings forward the same argument which we have seen Lauria applying above: there is no evidence of such a distinction in the dogmatic condemnations of the Church, but quite the contrary; whenever the censure *haeresim sapiens* is applied, *suspecta* is omitted, and vice versa ².

In spite of the fact that Panormo does not mention the name of Lauria in this respect, it is obvious that he is depending on him when he gives the same argument to prove that no distinction exists between the two censures. For both these theologians, this argument was valid at the time. It was quite true that *haeresim sapiens* and *suspecta* had never been applied in the same dogmatic condemnation, and considering the way the theologians depended on such condemnations for guidance in interpreting the censures, this was a very forceful argument. Four years after the publication of Panormo's *Scrutinium Doctrinarum*, however, such a distinction was made in the condemnation of the errors of Quesnel (1713) ³. Thus was the doctrine of Lugo, the Salmanticenses, Ferre, and others vindicated. Panormo's conservatism in this matter may be considered only as a step backwards.

cupiendum aliquid quod habeat affinitatem cum haeresi, hoc enim est habere saporem haeresis habere affinitatem, seu aliqualem participationem haeresis, et ad hoc concipiendum determinate ducit propositio sapiens haeresim. At propositio suspecta de haeresi non ducit intellectum determinate ad aliquid, quod vel sit essentialiter haeresis, vel solum participative, sed tantum concipientem ducit ad suspicandum quod illud, quod ipsa profert, haeresis est, vel quod eam proferens, haeresim aliquam habeat: et licet multoties aliqua propositio ex hoc, quod haeresim sapiat, ducat concipientem ad dubitandum, vel vehementer suspicandum de haeresi, non tamen idem est formaliter, esse suspectam et haeresim sapere. Tum quia suspecta per hoc tantum definitur, quod suspicionem ingerat de haeresi, sapiens autem haeresim, quamvis suspicari de haeresi faciat, non tamen per hoc definitur, sed tantum per hoc, quod significet aliquid affinitatem habens cum haeresi. Tum secundo quia suspecta tantum est illa, quae potest suspicionem generare in audiente illam; sapiens autem haeresim potest tantum, et tam magnum habere saporem haeresis, quod possit etiam inducere ad aliquam probabilitatem quod aliqua haeresis lateat, vel in illa, vel in proferente. Ex quo credendum, propositionem sapientem haeresim majorem gravitatem habere, saltem per non repugnantiam, quam habeat propositio suspecta, quia potest pervenire ad generandam probabilitatem de haeresi, ad quod suspecta, ut talis, pervenire non valet."

¹ Cf. PANORMO, loc. cit., no. 6. Romae (1709), p. 337 "Quaestionis propositae opinionem identitati faventem ducimus seligendam, cum communiori theologorum..."

² Ibid., no. 7, p. 338.

³ Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 8.

C. Panormo rejects Cano's interpretation

After deciding that *haeresim sapiens* and *de haeresi suspecta* are synonymous terms, Panormo goes on to explain the censure. Before giving his own interpretation, however, he examines the opinions of Castro (1547) and Cano (1563). He dismisses the doctrine of Castro by referring to the way it was refuted by Suarez. He makes a more detailed study of Cano's opinion.

So far, we have seen Cano's explanation of *haeresim sapiens* becoming more and more popular among subsequent theologians. Banez and Lorca agreed with it wholeheartedly. Lugo was also in agreement, but supplemented it with his distinction between *haeresim sapiens* and *suspecta*. The Salmanticenses combined the doctrine of Cano and Lugo in 1679 A. D., judged this to be the opinion which enjoyed the greatest authority. We recall that Cano vehemently attacked the definition of Castro which demanded a double sense for the proposition which is *haeresim sapiens*. According to the latter, a proposition censurable in this way is that which has an heretical meaning at first sight, but which, nevertheless, may be metaphorically interpreted in a Catholic sense. We remember Cano's famous example regarding the public cult of the Blessed Eucharist¹. He pointed to this as a perfect illustration of the censure *haeresim sapiens*, and showed that it is incapable of any pious or metaphorical interpretation. In this way, Cano rejected the definition of Castro which demanded a double sense for the proposition which is *haeresim sapiens*. Since then, with the exception of Lauria, we have seen no other theologians requiring this double sense. We have already pointed out that Panormo also rejects the doctrine of Castro, but this does not make him agree with Cano, as we shall presently see.

Panormo notes that according to Cano's doctrine, it is possible to have a proposition which is *haeresim sapiens*, and which is incapable of any Catholic interpretation. He rejects this, on the grounds that the example which Cano used to prove it is not, in fact, an example of *haeresim sapiens* but of the censure of *error*². Therefore, he abandons

¹ The example which Cano used is as follows: "Ridiculum est Eucharistiae sacramentum solemniter per vias publicas circumferre."

² Cf. PANORMO, loc. cit., art. 2, no. 4, p. 345. "Fortius admittere non possumus

Cano's doctrine on this censure. He does not mention, nor does he seem to realise, that this opinion has gained considerable authority since it was first put forward. We have already seen how it was taken up by such theologians as Banez, Lorca, Lugo and the Salmanticenses. Panormo now rejects it because he is displeased with the example.

D. Panormo gives his own interpretation of *haeresim sapiens*

On reading Panormo's explanation of this censure, we very soon find the reason for his great concern in rejecting the doctrine of Cano. He holds that the proposition which is *haeresim sapiens* (or *suspecta*) must be capable of two senses, one Catholic and the other heretical¹. This reminds us of the explanation of Castro, who also held for a double sense. However, there is this difference, that while Castro held that the Catholic sense of such a proposition is a merely pious and metaphorical interpretation, Panormo holds it to be a proper (as distinct from metaphorical) sense. Thus, according to Panormo, *haeresim sapiens* indicates a proposition which is capable of two proper senses, one Catholic and the other heretical, in other words, an equivocal proposition.

In this we recognise the doctrine of Lauria which we have examined above. Panormo does not refer to him here, but there can be no

doctrinam Cani, qui propugnet non esse attendendum sensum improprium alicuius propositionis, ut ea sapiens haeresim inscribatur, adversus resolutionem supponere videtur posse aliquam propositionem nota praefata dignam autumari, quin ullius Catholici sensus, quatumvis improprie sit capax..."

After this, Panormo gives Cano's example regarding the public cult of the Blessed Eucharist, and notes that Lugo (de fide, disput. 20, sect. 3, no. 89) regarded it as being heresy. Panormo, however, makes it out to be an example of the censure of *error*. "Adhuc propositio sapiens haeresim non est dicenda, sed erronea, ac, ut talis, ad minus a Tridentino proscripita, cum ex ea per necessariam illationem cogi valeat proferens ad negandam fidei propositionem, qua Christus in Eucharistia credi debet adorandus, etiam cultu externo adoratione latriae."

The exact decree of the Council of Trent, here referred to by Panormo, is to be found in Dz 888. "Si quis dixerit, in sancto Eucharistiae sacramento Christum unigenitum Dei Filium non esse cultu latriae etiam externo adorandum, atque ideo nec festiva peculiari celebritate venerandum, neque in processionibus secundum laudabilem et universalem Ecclesia sanctae ritum et consuetudinem solemniter circumgestandum, vel non publice, ut adoretur, populo proponendum et eius adoratores esse idololatrias: A. S."

¹ Cf. PANORMO, *Scrutinium Doctrinarum*, cap. 6, art. 2, no. 6, p. 345.

doubt but that he depends on him for this interpretation, just as he depended on him when explaining the censure of *error* and when identifying *haeresim sapiens* with *suspecta*. With the exception of Lauria, we have seen no other theologian since Castro to require a double sense for the proposition which is *haeresim sapiens*. We must admit, therefore, that this opinion carries very little theological weight. Panormo just states this doctrine, and neither cites authorities nor gives any theological reasons.

Though Panormo depends on Lauria in interpreting this censure, he goes much further in explaining his position. There is no question of a purely equivocal proposition, because this, at the most, could merit only the censure *male sonans*. Panormo has to show, therefore, how such a proposition can come into range of the censure *haeresim sapiens*. He does this with the aid of a distinction and utilizing Cano's doctrine on the importance of external circumstances when any doctrine is to be censured in this way.

According to Panormo, there are two types of equivocal propositions. Firstly, there is the purely equivocal proposition which admits of two proper senses, neither of which can be preferred to the other¹. Understood in this way, such a proposition will merit, at the most, the censure *male sonans*. In the second type of equivocal propositions, while the heretical and Catholic senses are both proper, the former has more weight by reason of different circumstances². Understood in this way, the equivocal proposition in matters relating to faith

¹ Ibid., no. 9, p. 347. "Aliae sunt propositiones aequivocae, quae duplicem involvunt sensum quorum quilibet sit ipsi proprius, ut neuter sit alteri praefereendus, et quidem nedum eis in seipsis inspectis, sed etiam attento earumdem usu, ac etiam omnibus consideratis circumstantiis, virtute quarum alteruter eorumdem vim prae alio habeat, et promiscue aequae in uno, ac in alio sensu usurpari solent. Et hae propositiones non sunt in rigore absolute ulla prava nota censurabiles, nisi ex proferentium, vel operum, aut librorum, in quibus extant, qualitativibus, innotescat eas in pravo sensu prolatae aut scriptae."

² Ibid., no. 10. "Aliae sunt propositiones aequivocae, quae, etsi utriusque capaces proprie sint sensus, sani et pravi, attamen sensum pravum praevalentem involvunt; sive quod verba earumdem, habeant potius, et majori cum proprietate exprimere sensum pravum, quam sanum, sive ob extrinsecas circumstantias, praecisa proferentium conditione, ut patet in propositione: Unus de Trinitate est crucifixus, . . . quae cum vigeret error Severianorum passionem Divinitati tribuentium, erat suspecta de haeresi non quod prolata esset a Severiano, sed simpliciter, quia sic a Severianis explicabatur, et alias dictus sensus ei minime repugnabat."

becomes the subject matter of the censure *haeresim sapiens*. It is to be noted that distinctions such as these were not made by Lauria in his description of this censure.

When examining the different interpretations of the censures *error* and *haeresi proxima*, we noticed that in each case there was a gradual development after Cano, which culminated in the exposition of Panormo. We have seen a similar development with regard to the censure *haeresim sapiens*, but unfortunately it culminates in the doctrine of the Salmanticenses (1679) and goes no further. We recall how the Carmelite theologians set out to find the interpretation which bore the greatest theological authority, and the result was a combination of the doctrines of both Cano and Lugo. If Panormo had continued in the same vein, all doubts regarding the correct interpretation of this censure would have vanished. Instead of this, he chose an entirely different interpretation for which he cited no authority. The only other theologian we have seen to give an explanation of *haeresim sapiens* which resembles that given by Panormo, is Laurentius de Lauria. However, he is a poor substitute for the combined forces of Cano, Banez, Lorca, Lugo and the Salmanticenses.

ARTICLE VII

Recapitulation and Conclusion

The two censures, *haeresim sapiens* and *suspecta*, were not applied in the same dogmatic condemnation until 1713 A. D. It is not surprising, therefore, that there was a considerable amount of confusion as to their distinction before this date. We have seen that the earlier theologians used these terms indiscriminately as if they were synonymous. Lugo (1647) was the first to suggest that they were distinct, and we recall the difference of degree which he placed between them, a difference based on circumstantial evidence. After Lugo, this interpretation became very popular among the theologians, and in 1679, the Salmanticenses combined it with Cano's doctrine on *haeresim sapiens* and judged this to be the opinion which enjoyed the greatest authority.

Not all subsequent theologians agreed with Lugo's distinction between *haeresim sapiens* and *suspecta*. Lauria and Panormo opposed it on

the grounds that there was no evidence for it in the dogmatic condemnations of the Church. They also pointed out that whenever either of these censures was used in an official condemnation, the other was omitted. This omission seemed deliberate and pointed to identity. It must be admitted that before 1713 this constituted a very forceful argument. However, the condemnation of Quesnel vindicated the distinction which was first suggested by Lugo, so now this question is settled, and all arguments to the contrary are useless.

We have seen only one explanation of this distinction between *haeresim sapiens* and *suspecta* — that which was suggested by Lugo. There is no choice then, but to accept this. Accordingly, these two censures differ only in degree. If the circumstances allow a probable judgement that the assertor of the proposition in question is imbued with heresy, then the censure *haeresim sapiens* is to be applied. However, if the circumstances are not so great as to warrant this, but serve only to arouse suspicion, then the censure *suspecta* it to be preferred.

Of the three opinions which existed before Cano, there was only one which was not obviously false — the opinion of Castro. We have seen this examined again and again by subsequent theologians, so now we may safely disregard it as untenable. Suarez' refutation of this doctrine was the most cogent. We recall that he pointed out that a merely metaphorical Catholic sense will not save an heretical proposition from the censure (heresy) which it deserves. Furthermore, he pointed to the Council of Basle which condemned "*Christus quotidie peccat*" as erroneous, in spite of the fact that it can be metaphorically interpreted in a Catholic sense — referring to the Mystical Body. We may disregard, therefore, any interpretation of this censure which was put forward before Cano (1563).

We have seen that almost all the authorities agreed that circumstantial evidence plays a major role whenever the censures *haeresim sapiens* and *suspecta* are to be applied. There was no such unanimity, however, with regard to the material proposition considered in itself, i. e. apart from circumstances and context. All agreed that such a proposition may be capable of a Catholic as well as an heretical sense, (e. g. *fides justificat* and *Pater major me est*) but the question at issue was the possibility of having a particular doctrine censurable as *haeresim sapiens* and incapable of any Catholic or orthodox interpretation. Let us briefly reconsider the evidence and arguments for and against.

Cano, in his refutation of Alphonsus de Castro, was the first to raise this question. We recall his famous example which stated that it is ridiculous to take the Blessed Sacrament in solemn procession through the public streets. For Cano, this statement was a good example of *haeresim sapiens*, in so far as it aroused grave suspicions that its assertor was imbued with the Lutheran heresy which denied the Real Presence. Relying on the authority of this example, Cano was adamant in holding that doctrine which is *haeresim sapiens* does not necessarily have to be capable of a Catholic sense. This view was later upheld by such authorities as Banez, Lorca and the Salmanticenses. Lugo was not explicit on the matter since he was preoccupied with the distinction between *haeresim sapiens* and *suspecta*.

The main upholder of the opposite opinion was Antonio de Panormo who held that all doctrine censurable as *haeresim sapiens* must be capable of a Catholic as well as an heretical interpretation. In his view, the circumstances are the deciding factor as to whether the censure should be applied or not. He had not much authority to support this peculiar stand. Lauria was the only other theologian we saw to be of the same mind, and his doctrine on the matter was anything but explicit. Panormo's sole argument was that the example originally suggested by Cano was, in fact, an example of *error* and not *haeresim sapiens*. It is quite true that this doctrine concerning the cult of the Blessed Sacrament was considered and censured by the Council of Trent. Likewise, it may be true that Cano's example is, in fact, an erroneous proposition, in so far as there is an indirect denial of the dogma which states that the cult of *latria* is due to Christ in the Blessed Sacrament. However, this does not prohibit it from being *haeresim sapiens* as well. This proposition, even though erroneous, conforms to the very name of *haeresim sapiens*, in so far as it "tastes" of the heresy which denies the Real Presence. It arouses the strongest suspicion which will permit of a probable judgement that the assertor is imbued with heresy. Consequently, we think that Cano had every reason for giving it as an example of this censure. If we consider it, as Panormo did, in relation to the dogma which states that the cult of *latria* is due to Christ in the Blessed Sacrament, then it is an erroneous proposition. If, however, we consider it in relation to the dogma of the Real Presence, then it is a good example of *haeresim sapiens*. In view of all this, we cannot accept Panormo's

stand saying that every proposition censurable as *haeresim sapiens* must be capable of both a Catholic and heretical interpretation. It is true that the majority of examples, such as '*fides iustificat*', are capable of a double interpretation. Nevertheless, we judge that the doctrine of Cano which states that this double sense is not necessary, enjoys the greater authority. In later years, a number of theologians gave Panormo's doctrine on *haeresim sapiens* almost verbatim. However, this does not change our opinion, since there were others who expressly held for Cano and the Salmanticenses, while the majority did not go into this minute problem of the double or single sense of the proposition which is *haeresim sapiens*¹.

More than in any other theological censure, circumstances play a vital role when doctrine is to be censured as *haeresim sapiens* or *suspecta*.

¹ The following are examples of the way the censures *haeresim sapiens* and *suspecta* were interpreted after Panormo (1709).

a) GOTTI O. P., *Theologia Scholastico-Dogmatica*, t. 1, in primam partem, q. 1; dub. 5, no. 12. Bononiae (1727), p. 44.

"Propositio sapiens haeresim, (quae non in alio videtur differre a propositione haeresis suspecta, nisi quod illa cum majori, ista cum non adeo magna, multa tamen probabilitate iudicatur haeretica) illa est, quae saporem et suspicionem haeresis ingerit; vel quia in se ad haeresim videtur accedere, vel haeresim redolere. Vel quia licet in aliquo sensu tolerari posset, tamen ex circumstantia personae, loci et temporis adjunctam habet gravem, vel gravissimam suspicionem, aut saporem haeresis."

This description of Gotti is in agreement with the doctrine of the Salmanticenses, and all our own conclusions.

b) MONTAIGNE, *De Censuris, seu Notis Theologicis, et de Sensu Propositionum*, in Migne, T. C. C., t. 1, col. 1179-1182.

Montaigne faithfully follows Panormo, and gives lengthy quotations. He differs only in distinguishing *haeresim sapiens* from *suspecta*. (Note: This work of Montaigne was first published in 1732.)

c) TOURNELY, *Continuatio Praelectionum Theologicarum*, t. 6, *Appendix de Propositionibus ad moralem disciplinam spectantibus*, Parisiis (1745), p. 682.

"Propositio haeresim sapiens ea est quae licet sensus sani et pravi capax sit, attamen sensum pravum, sive ratione sui, sive ratione circumstantiarum, loci, temporis, et personarum, praevalentem involvit, vi cuius nata est grandem suspicionem et probabile iudicium de haeresi ingerere.

"Propositio de haeresi suspecta, est ea, quae licet catholici et heterodoxi sensus capax sit, praebet tamen sive ratione sui, sive ratione circumstantiarum, fundamentum sufficiens non quidem ad iudicandum probabiliter quod auctor sit haereticus, sed solum ad id prudenter et sine temeritate suspicandum."

In this description of the censures, Tournely embodies all the doctrine of Lugo and the Salmanticenses regarding the distinction between *haeresim sapiens* and *suspecta*. In both cases he states that the proposition is capable of a Catholic

This is especially true of the equivocal proposition which is capable of a proper (as distinct from a metaphorical) Catholic interpretation. In such a case, the circumstances such as the person, place and time of utterance, will enable us to judge whether the Catholic or heretical

and heretical sense, but we carefully note that he does not state that this *must* be so.

d) GAUTIER S. J., *Prodromus ad Theologiam Dogmatico-Scholasticam*, dissert. 2, cap. 2, art. 4. Coloniae & Francofurti (1756), p. 120 et seqq.

This author agrees with Lugo's explanation of the distinction between *haeresim sapiens* and *suspecta*, but he is also explicit in holding for Panormo's doctrine regarding the double interpretation.

"Dicitur autem primo, propositionem illam debere esse capacem duplicis sensus proprii; sic nempe, ut secundum aliquam propriam verborum significationem tam in sensu Catholico, quam haeretico accipi possit..."

e) FRANZELIN S. J., *Tractatus de Divina Traditione*, sect. 1, th. XII, scholion 2. Romae (1875), p. 162.

"Haeresim sapiens propositio dicitur, quae grave praebet fundamentum iudicandi, eam cohaerere cum principio haeretico, et profectam esse ex sententia haeretica auctoris; suspecta de haeresi, quae habet aliquid praeposterum ita, ut rationabilem pariat suspicionem implicitae haereseos."

The author does not mention the problem of the double sense, and has nothing more about these censures, other than that which is quoted above.

f) MAZZELLA S. J., *De Virtutibus Infusis*, disput. 2, art. 10. Romae (1879), p. 281.

"Propositio sapiens haeresim est illa, quae duplicis sensus boni et pravi capax est; ratione tamen praesertim circumstantiarum, sensus pravus ita praevalens est, ut prudenter iudicari possit eum esse haeticum... Quod si aliqua propositio ejusdem fere naturae, fundamentum praeberet non quidem iudicandi sed suspicandi prudenter sensum haeticum esse intentum; huiusmodi esset propositio suspecta de haeresi."

It seems that Mazzella adheres to Panormo's doctrine in demanding a double sense for *haeresim sapiens* and *suspecta*.

g) DE GROOT O. P., *Summa Apologetica*, q. 10, art. 5. Ratisbonae (1906), p. 381.

"Haeresim sapiens est propositio, quae dat ansam timendi, ne lateat haeresis; ab ea parum differt propositio de haeresi suspecta, quae tamen ob indicium minus grave dicitur. Sapor autem haereseos multoties ex adjunctis et ob convenientiam saltem in vocibus aut accidentibus, alicui haeresi propriis, dignoscitur. Exempli causa hanc sententiam profero: fides justificat, quae in ore Pauli vera est, inter Lutheranos vero haeresim justificationis per fidem solam sapit. Quaedam autem propositiones ex seipsis haeresim olere videntur, velut haec: Ridelicium est circumferre Sacramentum Eucharistiae per vias publicas; quae haeresim sapit aut negantium in Eucharistia corpus Christi verum contineri aut sacros ritus impugnantium."

In this description of the censures *haeresim sapiens* and *suspecta*, not only do we recognise the doctrine of the Salmanticenses, but even the very words. As may be seen, De Groot is explicit on the fact that it is possible to have a proposition which is *haeresim sapiens*, and incapable of any Catholic interpretation.

sense bears more weight, and consequently, whether the censures *haeresim sapiens* and *suspecta* are to be applied or not. We have seen that Panormo brought out this point very clearly, which was, perhaps, his main contribution to the correct interpretation of these censures.

Another important role played by circumstances is that they help us to decide whether *haeresim sapiens* or *suspecta* is to be applied in a given case. If the circumstantial evidence is so great as to allow a probable judgement that the assertor of the proposition is imbued with heresy, then the appropriate censure will be *haeresim sapiens*. If, however, it merely arouses suspicion without warranting such a probable judgement, then the censure *suspecta* is to be applied.

Almost all the theologians we considered were in agreement regarding the importance of circumstances when there is question of *haeresim sapiens* or *de haeresi suspecta*. Suarez was the only exception, but we recall that he was completely misled regarding these two censures. Not only did he identify them, but confused them with what later became known as *errori proxima*. We have seen how his interpretation was soon abandoned, and hardly ever again referred to¹.

We now conclude our exposition of *haeresim sapiens* and *suspecta*, after examining and analysing the different opinions. In our judgement, the exposition given by the Salmanticenses is by far the best². It agrees with any evidence which is available from the dogmatic condemnations of the Church, and embodies all the most authoritative doctrine which had been developing in the writings of earlier theologians. If we take this exposition of the Salmanticenses in conjunction with Panormo's doctrine on equivocal propositions, we have the most au-

¹ The only theologian of note who followed Suarez in this matter, was DOMINICUS VIVA S. J. Cf. *Damnatatum Thesium Theologica Trutina*, quaestio prodroma, no. 1. (Francofurti ad Moenum, 1711, p. 1.) "Tertio loco est propositio sapiens haeresim, quae solum reddit hominem de haeresi suspectum; quod tunc accidit, quando propositio opponitur conclusioni theologicae non evidententer eratae ex praemissis de fide, sed probabilissime, et juxta communem theologizationem."

In this famous work, Viva makes a theological analysis of the propositions which were condemned by Popes Alexander VII, Innocent IX, and Alexander XIII. It is prefaced by a *quaestio prodroma*, in which the author discusses the different theological censures. This exposition, however, is very disappointing, in so far as each censure is dismissed after a few lines of explanation. It seems that Viva did not take much care in searching out the more appropriate explanations, as is evident from the above quotation where he adopts the opinion of Suarez.

² Cf. SALMANTICENSES, de fide, disput. 11, dub. 4, no. 50-51.

thoritative interpretation of *haeresim sapiens* and *suspecta*. There are certain points in Panormo which we have rejected, such as his identification of these two censures and his doctrine that every proposition which is *haeresim sapiens* must be equivocal. We do not deny, however, that most propositions censurable as *haeresim sapiens* are, in fact, equivocal. In this respect, Panormo's consideration of such propositions is of great importance¹, and supplements the exposition of the Salmanticenses.

¹ Cf. ANTONIO DE PANORMO, *Scrutinium Doctrinarum*, cap. 6, no. 9-10. Romae (1709), p. 347.

CHAPTER FOUR

Male Sonans — Piarum Aurium Offensiva

In the different treatises on the theological censures, we usually find *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva* being explained immediately after *haeresim sapiens*. One may be inclined to wonder why the theologians attached such importance to these two censures and why they took such pains to explain them? At their face value, these censures do not seem to indicate any great deviation from orthodoxy. Indeed, it is difficult to understand why doctrine which is merely "wrong-sounding" and "offensive to pious ears" should be theologically considered at all. In spite of this, in almost all the treatises on the theological censures, we find these concepts being explained immediately after *haeresim sapiens*. Likewise, in the dogmatic condemnations of the Church, they appear quite frequently. We find, for instance, that the Council of Constance applied *piarum aurium offensiva* to the articles of Huss. Perhaps it was this early use of the censure in such an important condemnation, which aroused the interest of the theologians as to its meaning.

As we shall presently see, there is no lack of opinions regarding the interpretation of these two censures. Indeed, almost all the theologians who try to explain them preface their remarks by admitting a considerable amount of confusion regarding the nature and correct explanation of *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva*.

We recall that in the preceding chapter, we treated of two censures together; *haeresim sapiens* and *suspecta*. For quite a long time after the Council of Constance, these were identified by the theologians. There was no evidence from the condemnations of the Church to show they were distinct. On the contrary, when one was applied, the other was omitted, and such an omission gave every sign of being deliberate. Now, with regard to *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva*, we

shall see the same difficulties all over again. A long period elapsed after the Council of Constance before these two censures were applied in the same dogmatic condemnation and thus distinguished from each other. For this reason we shall treat of them together, and follow the same procedure of investigation as in the previous chapter.

ARTICLE I

“Male Sonans” and “Piarum Aurium Offensiva” as Applied in the Dogmatic Condemnations of the Church

The use of these two censures in the dogmatic condemnations of the Church may be outlined in the following points:

1° In 1329 A. D., certain errors of Ekard were condemned as “*male sonantes, temerarios et suspectos de haeresi*”¹. This is the only reference either to *male sonans* or *piarum aurium offensiva* which we have been able to find in the dogmatic condemnations of the Church before the Council of Constance. We have never seen this condemnation being referred to by later theologians.

2° The Council of Constance (1415) condemned some of the articles of Huss as being offensive to pious ears². However, it makes no mention of *male sonans*.

3° In 1520 A. D., Pope Leo X applied *piarum aurium offensiva* to the errors of Luther, but made no mention of *male sonans*³.

4° Likewise, in 1567 A. D., Pope S. Pius V applied a cumulative censure to the errors of Baius. Once again *piarum aurium offensiva* is used, but no mention is made of *male sonans*⁴.

5° When the Holy Office condemned the errors of Molinos in 1687 A. D., once again there was mention of *piarum aurium offensiva*, but *male sonans* was omitted⁵.

¹ Cf. Dz 501-529. The exact words of the condemnation are to be found in no. 529.

² Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 1, b.

³ Ibid., no. 2.

⁴ Ibid., no. 3.

⁵ Ibid., no. 4.

6° In 1690 A. D., certain propositions of the Jansenists were condemned by the Holy Office, and here, for the first time in the post-Constance period, we see the censure *male sonans* being applied. It is to be noted, however, that in this condemnation there is no mention of *piarum aurium offensiva* ¹.

7° Twenty-three articles of Fénelon were condemned in 1699 A. D., and here, for the first time, the two censures *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva* were applied in the same dogmatic condemnation and thus distinguished from each other ².

8° In 1713 A. D., these two censures appeared once again in the same dogmatic condemnation, when a hundred and one propositions of Quesnel were censured by Pope Clement XI ³.

From this outline we note that the official distinction between the two censures was not made by the Church until as late as 1699 A. D. We shall not be surprised, therefore, to meet many conflicting opinions on this point. In the previous condemnations, whenever one of these censures was applied, the other was omitted. All this pointed to identity, especially when we consider that the very names of these censures, *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva*, seemed to convey the same concept.

ARTICLE II

Period of Identity

As already pointed out, the censures *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva* were not officially distinguished in the condemnations of the Church until the year 1699. However, the theologians did not wait for this decree to suggest possible distinctions. As we shall see later on, Suarez (1621) was the first to do so, and this was his greatest contribution towards the correct interpretation of these two censures.

In this article, we wish to examine the different opinions which existed before Suarez. Cano, of course, is our greatest authority in this period, but we shall also outline the different interpretations which preceded and followed him.

¹ Ibid., no. 6.

² Ibid., no. 7.

³ Ibid., no. 8.

A. Different interpretations before Cano

1° Turrecremata (1489) identified both *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva* with *scandalosa*, and treated these three censures as if they were one. In his explanation, he states that a proposition which is censurable in this way gives occasion of spiritual ruin to its hearers. Then he goes further and states that such propositions smack of heresy, even though by a slight modification they may be rendered in a Catholic sense¹.

This description of the threefold censure is, in fact, a description of *haeresim sapiens*. However, there is no contradiction for Turrecremata in this, since he identified *haeresim sapiens* with what later became known as the censure of *error*. Likewise, he may be excused for identifying *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva*, because he was at a great disadvantage writing at such an early date. However, we cannot easily explain his identification of these two censures with *scandalosa*. The Council of Constance, in its condemnation of the articles of Huss, had distinguished between propositions which were scandalous and those which were offensive to pious ears². If Turrecremata had examined this decree, he could not but see his mistake. In view of all this, we are forced to abandon his opinion on these two censures, even at this early stage.

2° Alphonsus de Castro (1547) identified *male sonans* with *haeresim sapiens*³, and *piarum aurium offensiva* with *scandalosa*⁴. Regarding

¹ Cf. TURRECREMATA, *Summa de Ecclesia*, lib. 4, pars 2, cap. XI. Venetiis (1561), p. 384. "Propositio scandalosa aut male sonans sive piarum aurium offensiva, dicitur propositio quae occasionem ruinae praeberet auditoribus, ut propositiones multae licet cum modificatione adjuncta sint verae, per se tamen et absolute sine modificatione prolatae videntur favere propositionibus haereticilibus, ut si quis assereret simpliciter patrem majorem filio, et Deum in incarnatione factum creaturam, et similes quae iuxta doctores magis sunt exponendae quam extendendae."

² Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 1. b.

³ Cf. ALPHONSUS DE CASTRO, *De Justa Punitione Haereticorum*, lib. 1, cap. 3. (Opera Omnia, Parisiis 1571, col. 1054 B.) "Propositio haeresim sapiens, aut male circa ea quae ad fidem pertinent, sonans, est illa, quae in prima significatione quam verba prima facie ostendunt, sensum habet haereticum: quamvis pie intellecta, sensum aliquem habeat verum."

⁴ *Ibid.*, col. 1055 D. "Propositio scandalosa, aut piarum aurium offensiva, est propositio quae auditoribus piis, occasionem ruinae praeberet."

the latter, there was no excuse for Castro since, as we have seen in the case of Turrecremata, the Council of Constance had clearly distinguished between these two censures. It seems that Cano was the first theologian to make an adequate study of the dogmatic condemnations in relation to the theological censures. He made full advantage of every bit of evidence he could glean from this official source. On the contrary, the theologians who preceded him did not take much pains to do this, as is obvious in the case of Turrecremata and Castro.

3^o Simancas, in the first edition of *Institutiones Catholicae* (1552), follows Castro to the letter in interpreting these two censures¹. However, as we shall afterwards see, in the second edition of this work (1575), he changed his doctrine considerably to bring it into line with Cano's teaching in *De Locis* which had appeared in the meantime (1563).

We have now outlined the three opinions which Cano had for reference in his description of *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva*. Out of this confusion he had to bring some clear-cut ideas and some definite notion of the censures. We shall now see if he succeeded in doing this.

B: The Interpretation of Melchior Cano (1563)

For Cano, *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva* constitute the fourth theological censure, which he examines immediately after *haeresim sapiens*². When considering his doctrine regarding this latter censure, we noticed that he took up a peculiar position in refusing to lay down any rules and to give any definition, saying that it was a matter for the *gustus* and prudence of a wise theologian rather than for rules and definitions. Now, when he comes to treat of *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva*, he takes a similar stand³, which makes it rather difficult to ascertain his mind on the subject.

¹ Cf. SIMANCAS, *Institutiones Catholicae*, cap. 52, no. 6-7. Vallisoleti (1552), p. 191.

² Cf. CANO, *De Locis Theologicis*, lib. XII, cap. 9. (Migne, T. C. C., col. 620-622).

³ *Ibid.*, col. 621. "Itaque, ut semel finiamus, cum non sit cuiusvis male sonantem propositionem a bene sonante distinguere, prudentissimi theologi, quod iam iterum ac saepe dixi, consulendi a iudicibus Ecclesiae sunt, nisi volunt in harum rerum iudiciis vehementer errare. Et quamvis nullam nos quidem comprehensionem habeamus, definitionem nullam, qua iudices valeant singulas in specie male sonantes propositiones iudicare."

From the very first line of his exposition, it is clear that for Cano *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva* are synonymous terms, indicating one and the same theological censure — “*Idem vero de propositione male sonante, SEU piarum aurium offensiva dixerim.*” Throughout, he uses both names indiscriminately, and does not even hint at any possible distinction. It is true that both these terms are very similar, in so far as they convey the same idea: any doctrine which has a *malus sonus* will certainly offend pious ears. Likewise, Cano had no evidence from the dogmatic condemnations of the Church to guide him on this point. The decrees of the Council of Constance¹ and the bull “*Exurge Domine*” of Pope Leo X² had applied the censure *piarum aurium offensiva*, but made no mention of *male sonans*. Furthermore, it must be remembered that there was very little authority to go on from the explanations advanced by earlier theologians. Taking these circumstances into consideration, there is every excuse for Cano in identifying these two censures.

We have pointed out that at least two of the three opinions which existed before Cano identified *male sonans* with *haeresim sapiens*. Cano takes special pains to counteract this error, showing how these two censures differ. As usual, he does not mention the names of the theologians who caused this confusion, but we have no difficulty in recognising the doctrine of Castro and Simancas which we have outlined above.

The term *male sonans*, he states, may be considered in a generic or specific sense. In its generic signification, it may be applied to heresy, *error* and *haeresim sapiens*, in so far as all these are wrong-sounding and offensive to pious ears. However, in its specific signification the term *male sonans* indicates a particular censure which is distinct from all others. It concerns doctrine which is expressed with a crudity of language offensive to pious ears, but which does not err against faith in the same way as heresy, *error* and *haeresim sapiens*³. Further down in his explanation, Cano makes a more particular com-

¹ Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 1, a, b, c.

² *Ibid.*, no. 2.

³ Cf. CANO, *loc. cit.*, col. 620. “*Dupliciter ergo de propositione male sonante loqui possumus, uno modo generaliter, quo omnis propositio fidei contraria fidelium aures offendit, eoque magis, quo apertius illam vident fidei catholicae esse contrariam; alio modo specialiter, quo gradum quemdam propositionum constituit ab illo haereticarum supremo distantem.*”

parison between *haeresim sapiens* and *male sonans*, and notes that the latter censure is less serious since it indicates nothing unorthodox in relation to divine faith, but errs only in so far as it conveys a certain *sonus* which is not in keeping with *sana doctrina*¹.

From these comparisons which Cano makes between *male sonans* and other censures, we have gleaned some definite points regarding the nature of doctrine which is wrong-sounding. It contains no error against faith, not even in the same way as *haeresim sapiens* which merely smacks of heresy. However, it errs against sound doctrine. He does not tell us the precise way in which it errs, but uses such phrases as: "*absonum nescio quid atque absurdum*" and "*sonum tamen quemdam absurdum et peregrinum referunt*". We must determine more exactly what he means by these words.

At the very beginning of his exposition of *male sonans*, Cano states that doctrine which is censurable in this way may, in fact, be quite true. Nevertheless, it falls under the censure because it is confusedly expressed — *inconditis verbis*². According to Cano's mind, therefore, it seems that whether the proposition in question be true or false is of secondary importance. The censure *male sonans* is first and foremost concerned with the material words used in the expression of Catholic doctrine.

This incongruous expression is also offensive to pious ears. (We recall that for Cano, *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva* are synonymous terms.) He discusses this question of "*pious ears*" at length, and waxes eloquent in denouncing false piety and pharisaic scandal. He stresses the fact that the ears of the crowd (*turba*) cannot be a criterion in this matter. They must be refined, delicate and

¹ Ibid., col. 621. "... huiuscemodi propositionum duos esse gradus, unum earum quas ante diximus haeresim sapere; videlicet, quae fidelium gustui male sapiunt, eadem male sonant auditui... alter gradus male sonantium propositionum est, quae licet haeresim non sapiant, sonum tamen quemdam absurdum et peregrinum referunt, qui a doctrina sana, sinceroque et solido Ecclesiae sermone discrepare videatur."

² Ibid., col. 620. "Quemadmodum autem non solum res falsae atque perabsurdae, sed graves quoque ac verae sententiae inconditis verbis elatae offendunt aures, acres praesertim et acutas; sic theologorum aures teretes et religiosae non a sententiis modo falsis et haereticis, sed ab iis etiam abhorrent, quas intelligenti iudicio percipiunt male atque absurde sonare, quamvis nullam in eis falsitatem haereseosprehendant."

prudent ears. Piety must be taken in the strict sense, and not the false common piety which easily suffers offence¹.

To end his description of *male sonans*, Cano gives some examples of the censure, most of which are taken from the condemnations made by the Council of Constance. As these examples raised much comment in later years, we shall note them here².

- 1^o Graduationes et magisteria universitatum esse vana gentilitate introducta, et tantum prodesse Ecclesiae quantum diabolum.
- 2^o Sylvestrum et Constantinum errasse Ecclesiam dotando.
- 3^o Ecclesiam Romanam esse synagogam Satanae; electionem papae a cardinalibus per diabolum fuisse introductam.
- 4^o Papam non debere dici sanctissimum propter officium: alioquin diabolus diceretur sanctus, quia est officialis Dei.
- 5^o Plures Romae nunc salvari ex conjugatis quam ex clericis.
- 6^o Monachatum non esse pietatem.
- 7^o Romani episcopi monarchiam post divi Hieronymi tempus exortam esse.
- 8^o Phocam instituisse, Romanam Ecclesiam omnium esse Ecclesiarum caput.

After considering Cano's doctrine on *male sonans*, we now have some definite points to go on. This censure does not concern doctrine which errs in any way against divine faith. Thus it differs from heresy, *error* and *haeresim sapiens*. In fact, doctrine which is wrong-sounding need not necessarily be false, since this censure is primarily concerned with the mode of expression rather than the sense. If the expression is incongruous, so as to be injurious to sound doctrine, the censure *male sonans* is to be applied. It is true that Cano identified *male sonans* with *piarum aurium offensiva*; but he is easily excused for this mistake. At the same time, however, he clearly distinguished these censures from *haeresim sapiens* and *scandalosa*, and established order out of the confusion which existed before him.

Cano does not cite any authority for his interpretation of *male sonans*. There was little or no evidence to be found in the official decrees of

¹ Ibid., col. 621. "... necessarium est, si res has recte et sapienter dijudicare volumus, aurium habere sensum politum, tersum, subtilem, prudentem." And a little further down, he states; "Non est igitur habenda ratio vulgi promiscui, imbecilli, perturbati, imprudentis, sed prudentis, sinceri, pii, incorrupti. Nec theologia modo requirenda est, sed pietas et prudentia, sine qua nullae aures possunt consentaneos sonos abhorrentesque discernere."

² Ibid., col. 622.

the Church, and, as we have seen, the opinions of earlier theologians tended only to confuse the matter. It must be noted, however, that besides the official condemnations made by the Church, these theological censures were applied by the universities and the inquisitors. Perhaps Cano relies on these latter sources for his interpretation of this censure.

C. Influence of Cano on subsequent opinions

Cano's logical explanation of *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva* gave later theologians some definite authority to work on in their efforts to interpret these two censures. We can see the influence of Cano's doctrine on the following three opinions which appeared after the publication of *De Locis Theologicis* (1563) and before Suarez' exposition appeared in 1621 A. D.

1° JACOBUS DE SIMANCAS (1575). We have already noted that in the first edition of his *Institutiones Catholicae* (1552), Simancas followed Castro in identifying *male sonans* with *haeresim sapiens*, and *piarum aurium offensiva* with *scandalosa*. In the second edition, which appeared in 1575 A. D., (twelve years after the publication of Cano's *de Locis*) we notice a slight change in Simancas' doctrine. He no longer identifies *male sonans* with *haeresim sapiens* — Cano is undoubtedly responsible for this — but links *male sonans*, *piarum aurium offensiva* and *scandalosa* together, and considers them as one censure¹. Even though this latter position is far from being correct — Constance had distinguished *scandalosa* as a separate censure — it is, nevertheless, nearer the truth than the first, which identified *male sonans* with *haeresim sapiens*.

2° BANEZ (1584) summarises and approves of Cano's doctrine, and then makes a rather long examination of his examples. He notes that Cano was subsequently criticised for suggesting these propositions to illustrate *male sonans*, since they merit a far more serious censure. Banez himself agrees with the criticism, and states that Cano definitely

¹ Cf. SIMANCAS, *Institutiones Catholicae*, tit. 54, no. 10. Romae, (1575), p. 425. "Propositio male sonans et pias aures offendens est, quae auditoribus, sive lectoribus piis, scandalum et occasionem ruinae praebet."

erred in this respect¹. He points out that the first two propositions are good examples of *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva*, but the remaining six merit a graver censure. It is interesting to note that even though Banez agrees with this criticism of Cano — *et iudicio nostro, merito* — he takes each example in turn and interprets it in a much milder way than it appears at first sight. Then he suggests that perhaps Cano understood these propositions in this mild way. Thus, the faithful disciple makes every effort to justify and excuse his old master!

3^o PETRUS DE LORCA (1614) notes that the terms '*male sonans*' and '*piarum aurium offensiva*' are generally accepted by the theologians to be synonymous, indicating the same theological censure. He himself agrees with this, saying that it is according to the mind of the Church since these two terms have never appeared in the same dogmatic condemnation². He then examines the different opinions and points out that some theologians identified this censure with *haeresim sapiens*, while others identified it with *scandalosa*. He finally selects the doctrine of Cano as being the most likely interpretation of the censure, and remarks that it is not only the sense of a proposition which may be censured, but also the very words in which it is expressed³.

This outline suffices to show the popularity and effect of Cano's interpretation of *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva* on later theologians. At the time, it was in perfect conformity with all the dogmatic condemnations of the Church.

¹ Cf. BANEZ, in *Secundam Secundae*, q. XI, a. 2. Lugduni (1588), col. 449. "De huiusmodi censura harum propositionum, quod scilicet, tantum sint male sonantes vel sapientes haeresim, reprehensus est Magister Cano. Et iudicio nostro merito. Quoniam eius censura fuit nimis levis et mitis, non justa."

² Cf. LORCA, *Commentaria et Disputationes in Secundam Secundae Divi Thomas*, disput. 40, no. 13. Matrili (1614), p. 262.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 15. "... quia non solum sensum, sed et modum loquendi Catholicum, et Catholicis auribus accomodatam observare debemus, et non solum mente, sed verbis etiam veram fidem tenere."

ARTICLE III

Period of Distinction

In the preceding article, we considered different opinions ranging from Turrecremata (1489) to Petrus de Lorca (1614), and we saw that the great weight of authority in that period held that *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva* are identical. In this present article, we shall examine another group of theologians, all of whom placed a distinction between these two censures. The three great authorities in this period are Suarez (1621), Lugo (1646) and the Carmelites of Salamanca (1679). It is to be noted that none of these theologians had ever seen these censures being officially distinguished by the Church. That did not take place until 1699 A. D. ¹.

A. Suarez introduces a distinction (1621)

The greatest contribution which Suarez made towards the correct interpretation of *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva* was in suggesting that a distinction existed between them. He admits that these two censures are very much akin and that the distinction is very slight. Nevertheless, he states that there is a difference in *piarum aurium offensiva*, in so far as it implies an element offensive to the virtue of religion ². It is interesting to note that Suarez is completely unaware that he is introducing something new with this distinction. He even says that it is common doctrine, and quotes Cano as an authority. We have already analysed the doctrine of Cano and have seen that he does not even hint at such a distinction, and uses both terms indiscriminately throughout his exposition. As for Suarez' judgement

¹ Cf outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 7.

² Cf. SUAREZ, de fide, disput. 19, sect. 2, no. 19. "In quinto gradu ponitur propositio piarum aurium offensiva, quae certe parum differt a praecedenti; nam, quod male sonat, aures offendit. Dum vero additur piarum aurium, per pietatem maxime intelligitur vera fidei doctrina. Quia vero pietas ad religionem pertinet, aliquid speciale in hoc gradu addi videtur per ordinem ad religionem; nam specialiter offendit pias aures, quando aliquid indecens vel indignum in materia religionis sentitur vel profertur, et ita videtur hic gradus communiter intelligi, ut in Cano et in aliis videri potest."

regarding the common doctrine, we point to Lorca (1614) who had written a few years earlier. Not only was he silent on any distinction but set about proving from the condemnations of the Church that there was none.

We have stated that this distinction of Suarez was his greatest contribution towards the correct interpretation of these two censures. In fact, it was his only contribution. That which Suarez explained as the censure *male sonans* was what the majority of other theologians regarded as *haeresim sapiens*¹, and what we have explained as such in the preceding chapter. There was no contradiction for Suarez in this, since his interpretation of *haeresim sapiens* corresponded to what the other theologians considered as *errori proxima*. We recall that Suarez' doctrine on *haeresim sapiens* was soon abandoned and hardly ever again referred to.

B. Lugo determines the distinction of Suarez (1646)

Throughout his exposition of *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva*, Lugo constantly refers to Hurtado (i. e. Petrus Hurtado de Mendoza S. J. † 1651) whom he closely follows. Unfortunately, we have been unable to check his references to this author and to determine exactly to what extent Lugo depends on him. However, the fact that Lugo upholds this opinion is much more important than knowing that he depends on Hurtado. Lugo is one of our greatest authorities on the theological censures, and has always been recognised as such by the theologians who came after him.

At the outset, Lugo examines different opinions and various errors regarding these two censures². All of these opinions we ourselves have

¹ Ibid., no. 18. "Et explicatur (male sonans) optime modo supra tacto, de propositione aequivoca, quae in proprio aliquo sensu potest esse haeretica, et in alio etiam proprio catholica; nam illa absolute, et sine distinctione vel declaratione prolata, merito dicitur male sonans. In quo distinctio alia adhiberi potest; nam quaedam propositio dicitur ab extrinseco male sonans, alia ab intrinseco. Ab extrinseco vocatur, quando suspicio vel malus sonus, non ex propositione nude sumpta, sed cum circumstantiis personae, loci aut temporis oritur, ut haec propositio: *Fides justificat*, absolute prolata, olim non male sonabat, nunc autem, ortis haeresibus, male sonat; et similiter prolata a persona suspecta, multo pejus sonabit, quam prolata a persona de cuius doctrina et catholica fide satis constat, quae quidem pro foro externo multum observanda sunt."

² Cf. Lugo, de fide, dispnt. 20, sect. 3, no. 91.

already considered, so there is little use in discussing them again. There is one interesting point, however, in Lugo's outline of opinions: he notes Suarez' position on *male sonans*, and states that Cano's doctrine is the same. It seems obvious from this remark that Lugo had not read *De Locis Theologicis* but quoted Cano from secondary sources. We have seen that Cano widely differs from Suarez on this censure. What Suarez considers as *male sonans*, Cano would place as *haeresim sapiens*. We recall that when treating of this latter censure we noted a similar instance which led us to suspect that Lugo had not first hand knowledge of Cano's exposition of the theological censures¹.

Following Hurtado, Lugo holds that the censure *male sonans* is primarily concerned with the *words* used to express Catholic doctrine: there is no error in them against faith, and the sense of the proposition is unquestioned. However, this sense is expressed in an incongruous and untraditional manner, and solely because of this the censure is prescribed². As an example, Lugo gives the following; "*In Deo sunt tres essentiae relativae*". This proposition, he states, does not arouse any suspicion of heresy, and nobody would doubt that what the author wishes to say is; "*In Deo sunt tres subsistentiae relativae*". Notwithstanding this, the censure *male sonans* is to be applied since the word "essence", (which is always reserved by the theologians to signify that which is common to the Three Divine Persons) is used in an untraditional way.

This opinion of Hurtado, which is here endorsed by Lugo, is nothing else but Cano's doctrine put forward in different words. We have already considered all the points mentioned in the above description of *male sonans* in Cano's exposition of the same censure. The curious fact about all this is that Lugo, having linked Cano with Suarez and cited both of them as holding erroneous opinions, unknowingly followed Cano in his interpretation of this censure. Lugo quoted Hurtado as giving the correct explanation, but he was totally unaware that

¹ Cf. supra, ch. 3, art. 4.

² Cf. LUGO, loc. cit. "Denique Hurtado (de fide, disput. 81, parag. 33) dicit male sonantem esse, quae sensum habet congruentem fidei, verba autem incongrua, ita ut malitia huius censurae non sit in sensu verborum, nec sit argumentum animi infidelis, sed solum in verbis, quia sunt in ea significatione parum aut nihil usitata, ob quod absonant auribus, unde ortum est illud adagium, *ex verbis inordinate prolatis enascitur haeresis*.

Hurtado had based his doctrine on Cano's opinion. Here is further proof that Lugo had not consulted *De Locis Theologicis* on the theological censures.

After giving his opinion on *male sonans*, Lugo goes on to discuss *piarum aurium offensiva*. He notes that many theologians made no distinction between these two censures while Suarez placed a special *nuance* in the latter; an element which is contrary to the virtue of religion. Lugo also notices that Hurtado further determined the distinction of Suarez, saying that the proposition which is offensive to pious ears is none the less true, but expresses something which is disrespectful to God and the saints.

After this outline of the different opinions regarding *piarum aurium offensiva*, Lugo becomes more precise and gives his own explanation. He states that there is a total distinction between *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva* — *differre in rigore*. To prove this, he merely describes each censure, and shows how one totally differs from the other. *Male sonans* is concerned with the abuse of words in so far as they are used with an untraditional signification which is apt to bear an incorrect meaning. On the contrary, there is no such abuse of words in a proposition which is offensive to pious ears. In this case, words are used in their traditional and proper signification, but they express something which is best left unsaid, or express it in such a crude fashion as to be offensive to the piety and reverence of the faithful¹.

We may sum up Lugo's distinction as follows: *male sonans* is concerned with the *words* which are used to express a certain object, while *piarum aurium offensiva* is concerned with the *object* which is expressed.

To illustrate the censure *piarum aurium offensiva*, Lugo conjures up the following situation. Let us suppose that someone who has been

¹ Ibid., no. 94. "Ego existimo, hanc censuram differre in rigore a male sonante, quia male sonans abutitur vocibus extra communiorem significationem, eas applicando ad minus usitatam; quare eius indecentia consistit in usurpatione vocum, quae habent malam significationem, et falsam, licet non usurpentur ad illam, sed ad aliam veram. At vero propositio, quae solum offendit pias aures, usurpat voces in sola propria, et usitata earum significatione, et nihil falsum dicit, nec vocibus habentibus aliam significationem falsam, sed tamen dicit id, vel tali modo, ut fidelium pietatem, et reverentiam, si non extinguat, ad minus ex se tepidiorem reddat: et ideo aures piae horrore huius imminentis tepiditatis, auditis iis vocibus offenduntur."

publicly excommunicated by the Church has died for the faith before receiving absolution in the external forum. Furthermore, let us assume that this person has been declared a martyr and his feast is now being celebrated each year. On the recurrence of this feast, Lugo states, if one were to say, "We honour and celebrate the feast of one publicly excommunicated", this statement, though true, would be offensive to pious ears. This example is certainly rather far-fetched, but it brings out the idea which he is trying to explain — the expression of things which are best left unsaid since they are obnoxious to piety and religion. Another example which Lugo suggests is the following: "*Magdalena meretrix, Matthaeae usurariae et avarae, Petre perjure et apostata, orate pro nobis*"¹.

Having distinguished *male sonans* from *piarum aurium offensiva*, we may now ask which is the graver censure? Lugo deals with this problem, and following Hurtado states that objectively speaking, *male sonans* is the more serious because of the danger of misrepresentation in matters concerning faith. However, from the subjective and moral point of view, *piarum aurium offensiva* is graver, since a proposition which is censurable in this way necessarily presupposes subjective dispositions which are not in keeping with the virtue of religion².

To conclude our examination of Lugo's doctrine, we note again the main points of interest. Following Hurtado, he agreed with Cano's interpretation of *male sonans*. He was unaware that this explanation already enjoyed such authority, and actually listed Cano with Suarez as holding the same erroneous opinion on this censure. Regarding the distinction between *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva*, Lugo went much farther than Suarez who almost identified these censures, placing a trifling distinction between them. For Lugo, there is a total distinction, — *in rigore* — just as much as there exists between any other two theological censures. His description of *piarum aurium offensiva* is precise and clear-cut, and not just a vague statement such as we have seen in Suarez. Having thus clearly described this censure, it was all the easier to distinguish it from *male sonans*.

¹ Ibid., no. 95.

² Ibid., no. 93. "... quamvis hic gradus culpae minor sit, quam male sonantis, quod attinet ad falsitatem, quia sine falsitate et sine incongrua significatione vocis potest propositio offendere pias aures; in genere autem moris esse gravio-rem, quia procedit ab animo procaci, et effrenata lingua."

C. The Salmanticenses select the most authoritative interpretation

1679 A. D.

Once again we state our reasons for considering the doctrine of the Salmanticenses on the theological censures. It is true that they are not often cited as authorities in this respect, and their exposition, at first sight, seems to be devoid of all originality. Nevertheless, in our estimation the Carmelites of Salamanca constitute a first class authority on the interpretation of the censures. They do not set out to be original, since they judge that the correct interpretation of these censures is a matter of authority and common opinion. Consequently, they seek out the explanation of each censure based on the greatest authority among the theologians¹. It will be interesting, therefore, to see the results of their investigations regarding the two censures, *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva*.

In a few words, the Salmanticenses tell us the interpretation of *male sonans* which, in their judgement, is the most authoritative; "*Propositio male sonans est, quae habet sensum congruentem fidei, verba autem non congrua*"². This short definition is in perfect agreement with Lugo's doctrine on this censure. The Salmanticenses even give the same example; "*In Deo sunt tres essentiae relativae*".

There is one important point regarding *male sonans* which the Salmanticenses make explicit, and which we have not seen stressed before this. Even though this censure is primarily concerned with the words rather than the sense of a proposition, it is not merely a question of grammar but a true theological censure. The use of untraditional and incongruous terminology in theology is not a merely grammatical fault. It constitutes a danger to faith in so far as it opens the way for error and misrepresentation. Because of this, *male sonans* must be considered as a theological and not a merely grammatical censure³. They point to different places in Saint Thomas where this idea is made clear⁴. Perhaps it was from this source that the censure *male sonans* was originally conceived.

¹ Cf. SALMANTICENSES, de fide, disput. 9, dub. 4, no. 42.

² Ibid., no. 52.

³ Ibid. "Quae inordinatio non est mere grammaticalis, sed etiam contra bonam theologiam, atque ideo aliquo modo contra fidem, cui illa innititur..."

⁴ Cf. S. T., 1. q. 31, a. 2, "Respondeo dicendum quod, quia ex verbis inordinate

Regarding *piarum aurium offensiva*, the Salmanticenses once again follow Lugo's interpretation, and in a well constructed definition, they include all his doctrine on this censure¹.

(Propositio *piarum aurium offensiva*) est quae licet verum dicat, tamen vel dicit illud quod taceri oportet ob reverentiam ad sancta; vel dicit eo modo, qui illa in contemptum venire facit.

When considering Lugo and Suarez on these two censures, we noticed that there was a difference of opinion regarding the distinction between *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva*. Lugo held for a total distinction, while Suarez placed a mere nuance in *piarum aurium offensiva*, and this was the only differentiating factor. The Salmanticenses do not explicitly go into this question of distinction, but it would appear from the context that they are more in agreement with Suarez than with Lugo. When introducing the censure *piarum aurium offensiva*, they seem to imply that it pertains to the same category as *male sonans* and differs only in so far as it contains a special element which is offensive to religion². In all probability, the Salmanticenses judged that the doctrine of Lugo, regarding the total distinction, had not gained sufficient authority amongst later theologians. We must also remember that before Suarez, these two censures had been commonly identified. In light of this, we can understand why the Salmanticenses, who set out to find the common doctrine and the most authoritative interpretation, were unwilling to accept Lugo's total distinction which was, as yet, comparatively new.

We have now examined this second period, i. e. the period of distinction, which took place in the development of the censures *male*

prolatis incurritur haeresis, ut Hieronymus dicit, ideo cum de Trinitate loquimur, cum cautela et modestia est agendum: quia, ut Augustinus dicit, in 1 de Trin., 'nec periculosius alicubi erratur, nec laboriosius aliquid quaeritur, nec fructuosius aliquid invenitur'."

Cf. 3, q. 16, a. 8. "Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Hieronymus dicit, 'ex verbis inordinate prolatis incurritur haeresis'. Unde cum haereticis nec nomina debemus habere communia: ne eorum errori favere videamur."

¹ Cf. SALMANTICENSES, loc. cit., no. 53.

² Ibid. "Ad praecedentis propositionis qualitatem reducitur propositio *piarum aurium offensiva*; nam eo ipso, quod propositio habeat dissonantiam proxime explicatam, opus est quod offendant aures pias, seu catholicas. Sed quia pietas ad religionem pertinet, videtur hanc censuram aliquid speciale addere ad religionem spectans, nempe aliquid indecens, vel indignum, quod aures pietati assuetas offendit."

sonans and *piarum aurium offensiva*. Regarding the censure *male sonans*, we have seen nothing new. The explanation of Cano was held by the majority of theologians, and though accidental changes may have taken place, the basic concepts remained the same. One important point which was made explicit by the Salmanticenses was that this censure, though primarily concerned with the use of words, is not merely grammatical but theological. The untraditional use of terminology contravenes good theology and prepares the way for error and misrepresentation in matters of faith.

In this period, most of the evolution took place concerning *piarum aurium offensiva*. We have seen it first being gradually separated from *male sonans*, and then in the exposition of Lugo, being made a separate censure, specifically distinct from all others. The Salmanticenses, though retaining Lugo's concept of *piarum aurium offensiva*, did not endorse his doctrine regarding the complete distinction. However, it must be admitted that Lugo based this doctrine on a very solid argument. *Male sonans* is concerned with the abuse of words, in so far as Catholic doctrine is expressed in an incongruous fashion. On the contrary, *piarum aurium offensiva* is not concerned with the abuse of words. A proposition which is censured in this way uses words in their correct and traditional signification, but errs in so far as it expresses something which, though true, is best left unsaid. This description of either censure constitutes a very solid argument for Lugo's specific distinction.

Once again we recall that none of the theologians whom we have consulted in this article had ever seen *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva* being applied in the same dogmatic condemnation and thus being officially distinguished by the Church. From the opinions which we have just considered, however, it seems that there was a definite trend towards this doctrine. Nevertheless, we shall presently see that the controversy was not yet finished. After the Salmanticenses, and even after the official distinction was made by the Church, there were still some theologians who held that *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva* are synonymous terms, indicating one and the same theological censure.

ARTICLE IV

Second Period of Identity

In the preceding article, we considered a development in the interpretation of the censures *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva*, in so far as a distinction was made between them. We recall that there was no unanimity regarding the nature of this distinction, but the important point is that such a distinction was made and different sets of examples were given to illustrate either censure. The official distinction was not made by the Church until the year 1699¹, but, as we have seen, this was anticipated by a number of theologians. It would not be correct to say that in this condemnation the Church was influenced by Suarez, Hurtado, Lugo, the Salmanticenses and others. We must consider the situation from a different point of view, and say that these theologians were so well acquainted with the mind of the Church, as to be found in the right when the official distinction was eventually made. We must always remember that in the everyday life of the Church, these censures had been considered and applied by the inquisitors and universities. Consequently, apart from the dogmatic condemnations, there was this general interpretation which could have influenced and guided the individual theologians.

Before this distinction between *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva* was generally accepted, another stage took place in the development of these two censures. This third stage was by way of reaction to the second one, in so far as it was adamantly held once again that *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva* are synonymous terms. In the present article, we are about to examine this third period which we call 'the second period of identity'. In this there was a great step backwards, and we shall presently describe in detail how it came about. It must be remembered that the opinions which we are now about to consider cannot have the same authority as those we examined in the preceding article. Underlying each explanation is the basic principle that *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva* are identical. This will certainly have a great influence on each interpretation.

¹ Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 7.

We begin our study of this second period of identity with Laurentius Brancatus de Lauria (1673). Chronologically, his opinion should have been considered in the preceding article since he wrote before the Salmanticenses and after Lugo. However, because of his influence on Antonio de Panormo (1709), we consider him as the precursor of the second period of identity. When considering Panormo's doctrine on *error* and *haeresim sapiens*, we noticed how he depended on Lauria. There is a similar dependence regarding the censures now under consideration. Lauria influenced Panormo who, in turn, was followed by a great number of later theologians.

We note that Lauria wrote his exposition of these censures before the official distinction was made by the Church. On this account, he may be excused for his error. However, it will be difficult to excuse the other opinions which we are about to consider, seeing that they all appeared after 1699 A. D., when *male sonans* was for the first time distinguished from *piarum aurium offensiva* in the dogmatic condemnations of the Church.

A. Laurentius Brancatus de Lauria (1673)

For Lauria, *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva* are just different names for the same censure, which he describes as follows¹:

Nota malae sonantis propositionis, et piarum aurium offensivae pro eadem haberi possunt, et consistunt in hoc, quod res fidei aut morum exprimantur, seu pronuncientur per verba aequivoca ad bonum et malum significatum; vel, quod quaedam dicta in re, vera pro aliquo statu ac tempore, in alio statu et tempore, sint male prolata.

He firmly denies that there is any distinction between *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva*, and his main argument is that nowhere in the dogmatic condemnations of the Church are these two censures applied together and thus distinguished. He examines several of these condemnations and points out that when one of these two censures is applied, the other is omitted. This procedure constitutes a good argument that according to the mind of the Church, the terms *male*

¹ Cf. LAURENTIUS BRANCATUS DE LAURIA, *Commentaria in Tertium Librum Sententiarum Mag. Fr. Joannis Duns Scoti*, t. 3, pars 1, disput. 16, art. 2, no. 76. Romae (1673), p. 860.

sonans and *piarum aurium offensiva* are synonymous¹. Lauria also points out that these two names convey the same idea. Anything which is *male sonans* is offensive to pious ears, and vice versa.

Lauria is not clear as to the notion of this censure. From his description which we have quoted above, it seems that he puts forward two concepts: one concerning faith and morals which is equivocally expressed, and the other concerns the utterance of something which, though once true, is now "wrong-sounding" because of the change of circumstances. He does not seem to realise that the first of these concepts is identical with his interpretation of *de haeresi suspecta* (or *haeresim sapiens*)². The second concept is the same as Lugo's explanation of *piarum aurium offensiva*.

He gives a number of examples of the censure, and repeats most of those examples which we have already seen given by Lugo to illustrate doctrine which is offensive to pious ears; *Petre perjure, ora pro nobis*, and *Sancta Maria uxor fabri, ora pro nobis*. Lauria makes a slight difference with regard to these examples, in so far as he states that they must not be uttered *ad injuriam* but because of some other motive. Presumably, he would consider them as meriting a graver censure if they were uttered with intent to be disrespectful. Besides these examples he also points to a number of articles which were condemned by the Council of Constance, and which, in his opinion, merit the censure *male sonans-piarum aurium offensiva*³.

The main point of this exposition is Lauria's insistence on the identity of these two censures. Curiously enough, the arguments which he advanced to prove this were, at the time, very solid. It is obvious that Lauria took pains to examine the dogmatic condemnations of the Church which, in his estimation, are a more authoritative guide than the opinions of other theologians. In spite of this, however, he failed to ascertain the mind of the Church which was soon to be made explicit in the condemnation of Fénelon, 1699 A. D.

¹ Ibid., no. 77. "Si ergo isti, qui sunt regulae fidei, differentiam hanc malae sonantiae ab offensione piarum aurium non agnoscunt, signum est pro eadem utramque habuisse."

² Ibid., no. 58, p. 857. "Et quidem mihi videtur, tunc maxime apparere suspectam, quando aliquo modo, etsi aliquantulum aequivoco convenit cum formula, seu modo dicendi haeticorum, in ea materia."

³ Cf. Dz 590, 601, 613, 619, 649, 654.

B. Panormo depends on Lauria (1709 A. D.)

Panormo's monumental work, *Scrutinium Doctrinarum*, was first published at Rome in 1709 A. D., ten years after the condemnation of Fénelon in which *male sonans* was for the first time officially distinguished from *piarum aurium offensiva*¹. Panormo shows himself to be completely unaware of this condemnation. We shall see him stating that these two censures had never been applied in the same dogmatic condemnation and thus officially distinguished. It is difficult to admit that Panormo could have overlooked such an important condemnation. A possible explanation could be that this work, *Scrutinium Doctrinarum*, had been written many years previously, and publication was delayed until 1709 A. D. Even in this hypothesis, it is still difficult to understand why he did not make the necessary corrections.

At the beginning of his exposition of *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva*, Panormo considers the problem of distinction. In all this he quotes and follows Lauria. He notes that no distinction had ever been made by such authorities as Turrecremata, Castro, Cano, Simancas and others². Finally he points to Lauria, and proceeds to give the same arguments to prove that no such distinction exists.

Panormo refers to the same condemnations as Lauria, and points out that whenever one of these censures was applied, the other was omitted. In his estimation, this constituted a very probable argument for identity³. Again following Lauria, he states that the very names of these two censures convey the same idea⁴.

¹ Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 7.

² Cf. ANTONIO DE PANORMO, *Scrutinium Doctrinarum*, cap. 7, art. 3, no. 1, p. 429.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 6, p. 431. "... probabile habemus argumentum Brancati (i. e. Lauria) indicatum pro identitate male sonantis et piarum aurium offensiva, dummodo ita corroboretur, ut ipsius vis, non ex solis pendeat Constantienti Concilio, et Piana ac Gregoriana constitutionibus, sed a quibuslibet similibus conciliaribus aut pontificiis diplomatibus, nec non et a Patrum, quatenus ad rem extent, locutionibus, in quibus de praedictis censuris, ita sit sermo, ut quoties male sonantis nota exprimitur, toties altera piarum aurium offensivae silentio obducitur, et e contro."

Immediately Panormo goes on to say that he used the same argument to prove that there is no distinction between *haeresim sapiens* and *suspecta*: "... eo ducti principio, quod in causis praecisis sicuti affirmationis est causa, ita et negatio negationis, si debita, et plena, singulosque comprehendens casus, fiat inductio, vi cuius patet non esse universaliter verum quod argumentum ab autoritate negativa non sit conveniens."

⁴ *Ibid.* "Cum praesertim ad praesens neque vocabulorum proprietates distinc-

All these arguments are now useless, and even when they first appeared in Panormo's doctrine they were useless, since the condemnation of Fénelon's doctrine in the year 1699 had thrown them all overboard. It is unfortunate that Panormo followed Lauria so blindly, or that he did not take sufficient care to correct his exposition before publication. As it stands, there is the basic principle of identity underlying his interpretation of these two censures. This lessens its authority.

C. Panormo gives his own explanation of the censure

It seems, at first sight, that Panormo's interpretation of *male sonans* (and *piarum aurium offensiva*) coincides with his explanation of *haeresim sapiens*. He states that a proposition which is censurable in this way is capable of an orthodox and unorthodox sense. However, either by reason of the intrinsic nature of the doctrine in question or by reason of the external circumstances, the unorthodox sense is prevalent, and because of this, the proposition is to be censured as *male sonans* or *piarum aurium offensiva*¹. Thus far, this description coincides with his explanation of *haeresim sapiens*². Panormo is aware of this, and goes on to point out a difference. In the case of *haeresim sapiens*, he states, the censurable proposition is in respect of *credibilia*, and the unorthodox sense, considered in itself, is heretical. In the case of *male sonans*, however, there is question of *agibilia*, or if there should be question of *credibilia*, the unorthodox sense is not heretical but indicates an error less than heresy. This difference suffices to make a distinction between the two censures³. In this way, Panormo avoids the pitfall of Lauria who unwittingly identified *male sonans* with *haeresim sapiens*. However, in spite of Panormo's care to avoid such confusion, we cannot

tioni praedictarum censurarum favens ullatenus appareat, quod non minus una, quam altera in ordine ad aurium organum per nobilem metaphoram concipiatur."

¹ Ibid., no. 7. "Quae nempe consistat in eo, quod aliqua propositio ita formetur, ut quamvis in bonum sensum valeat explicari, nihilominus pravus ipsius sensus, sive ex intrinseca natura, sive ex circumstantiis extrinsecis sano praeponderans aures pias offendat, malumque sonum praeseferat."

² Cf. supra, ch. 3, art. 4.

³ Cf. PANORMO, loc. cit., "... hoc solo discrimine hic prae oculis habito, quod suspecta de haeresi, aut haeresim sapiens materiam respiciat credibilium, circa quam sensus praevalens sit penitus haereticus, male sonans vero, aut piarum aurium offensiva, afficit, vel materiam agibilium, vel si materiam credibilium, non ita ut sensus praevalens sit simpliciter haereticus, sed aliqua infra haeresim pravitate infectus, quod sufficit, ut inter unam et aliam admittatur distinctio."

admit his interpretation of *male sonans*, for reasons which we shall now explain.

Apart from Panormo himself, this interpretation enjoys very little authority. Before his time, we have never seen this notion advanced as an explanation of *male sonans* or *piarum aurium offensiva*. Secondly, this explanation has an inherent contradiction. According to Panormo, a proposition is censurable as *male sonans* when it is capable of two proper (as distinct from metaphorical) senses. The unorthodox sense, while not being heretical, contains an error less than heresy. In this way it differs from *haeresim sapiens*. Let us assume that the unorthodox sense is an erroneous proposition, taking *error* in its strict theological signification. In such a hypothesis, should not the proposition in question be called *errorem sapiens* and not *male sonans*? This follows by way of analogy. In the case of *haeresim sapiens*, the unorthodox sense is heresy and the proposition is censured as *haeresim sapiens*. It should follow that in similar circumstances, when the unorthodox sense is *error*, the proposition should be censured as *errorem sapiens*. For these reasons we cannot admit Panormo's explanation of *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva*. Firstly, he identified these censures even after an official distinction had been made by the Church. Secondly, his interpretation departed from all tradition, in so far as he rejected the doctrine which was becoming more and more popular since the time of Cano (1563). Thirdly, Panormo's explanation contains an intrinsic contradiction.

We have taken special care to consider and analyse Panormo's doctrine on these two censures, because of his great reputation on this whole problem of theological censures. We shall presently see that there were later theologians who blindly depended on him concerning the interpretation of *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva*, just as he blindly depended on Lauria. Having totally rejected Panormo's exposition of these censures, it will not be necessary to examine it again when it appears in the writings of later theologians.

D. Montaigne is influenced by Panormo (1732)

Next to Panormo's famous *Scrutinium Doctrinarum*, the most popular treatise on the theological censures is that of Claude L. Montaigne († 1767), *De Censuris seu Notis Theologicis, et de Sensu Propositionum*.

Apart from this work, Montaigne wrote very little himself. However, he edited most of Tournely's works in compendium form, all of which were attributed to Tournely himself for quite a long time. When editing Tournely's *De Opere Sex Dierum*, Montaigne attached his own treatise on the censures as an appendix. This appendix is often attributed to Tournely, but, in fact, it is Montaigne's original work and perhaps his greatest contribution to theology¹. Montaigne's treatise on the censures was later incorporated in Migne, *Theologiae Cursus Completus* (t. 1).

Throughout his treatise on the censures, Montaigne depends on the *Scrutinium Doctrinarum* to a considerable extent. Even though he considers all the more important opinions on the individual censures, Montaigne invariably ends by endorsing the doctrine of Panormo. It is to be noted that his treatise on the censures was first published in 1732 A. D., thirty-three years after the condemnation of Fénelon in which *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva* were for the first time officially distinguished by the Church, and nineteen years after the promulgation of the dogmatic constitution "*Unigenitus*", in which the censures were officially distinguished for the second time². In spite of all this evidence, Montaigne blindly follows Panormo in stating that these two censures were never distinguished in the dogmatic condemnations of the Church. He goes through all Panormo's examples to prove that *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva* are identical³. Just as Panormo blindly follows Lauria on this question, so also does Montaigne blindly follow Panormo. Needless to say, this accounted for some confusion in later years.

Not only does Montaigne follow Panormo on the question of identity, but he also repeats his doctrine regarding the nature of the censure, word for word⁴.

We have now considered this second period of identity, and in our estimation, sufficiently proved that it is not to be taken seriously. It was imperative for us to consider and analyse it in detail, because of the great authorities who brought it about. The names of Lauria,

¹ Cf. HURTER N. L., t. 5, p. 59; LEVESQUE, DTC, t. 10, col. 2337-8.

² Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 8.

³ Cf. C. MONTAIGNE, *De Censuris, seu Notis Theologicis, et de Sensu Propositionum*, in Migne T. C. C., t. 1, col. 1183.

⁴ *Ibid.*, col. 1184.

Panormo and Montaigne bear great weight regarding this question of the interpretation of the censures. If it could not be sufficiently proved that they were wrong on this particular point, then we should never have any certainty regarding the nature of *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva*. In later years, the opinion which was popularised in this second period of identity, was, from time to time, advanced by theologians who did not take the trouble to make adequate investigation on this matter¹.

ARTICLE V

Final Distinction: Jos. Gautier S. J.

(1756)

In the preceding article, we saw how a considerable amount of confusion was caused by some theologians who did not take sufficient care to bring their doctrine into line with the dogmatic condemnations of the Church. Fortunately, this situation did not last long afterwards. The first theologian we have seen to detect and correct the mistake was Jos. Gautier S. J.²

In his exposition of the censure *male sonans*, Gautier follows Lugo to the letter, not mentioning the explanation which had been advanced by Panormo and Montaigne. He states that this censure is concerned with the abuse of words in the expression of Catholic doctrine. When such words are applied with a signification other than that which has been sanctified by tradition, they are apt to open the way for misrepresentation and erroneous doctrine³.

¹ As an example, cf. KILBER S. J., *Institutiones Catholicas*, de virtutibus theologis, disput. 3, cap. 3. Wirceburgi (1751), p. 585. "Male sonans est, quae duos habens sensus proprios, alterum catholicum, alterum haeticum vel quacunq; censura damnabilem, sed in sensu damnabili frequentius sumitur, et nihilominus absque explicatione vel exceptione profertur."

² Cf. GAUTIER, *Prodromus ad Theologiam Dogmatico-Scholasticam*, dissert. 2, cap. 2, art. 7. Coloniae et Francofurti (1756), p. 133 et seqq.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 133. "At vero, quis sit propositionis malesonantis, hoc sensu acceptae, conceptus ab aliis praecisus, non est una omnium istorum auctorum opinio. Magis cohaerenter ad hucusque dicta loqui mihi videntur, qui vel cum Cardinali Lugone dicunt, illam esse quae peccat in abusu vocum, a communi usu, quo solent a fidelibus usurpari, discrepantium; esto sanum sensum admittere possit: vel

When examining the doctrine of the Salmanticenses on this same censure, we noticed that they too agreed with the interpretation of Lugo, and judged it to be the most authoritative of all the explanations. However, they made one important contribution themselves, in so far as they pointed to certain texts in S. Thomas where the notion of *male sonans* is clearly expressed. We now find Gautier making a similar observation, pointing to a text in the opusculum, *Contra Errores Graecorum*, which excellently describes this censure¹.

... multa quae bene sonant in lingua graeca, in latina fortassis *bene non sonant*, propter quod eandem fidei veritatem aliis verbis Latini confitentur et Graeci. Dicitur enim apud Graecos recte et catholice, quod Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus sunt tres hypostases; apud Latinos autem *non recte sonat*, si quis dicat, quod sunt tres substantiae; licet hypostasis sit idem apud Graecos, quod substantia apud Latinos secundum proprietatem vocabuli. Nam apud Latinos substantia usitatus pro essentia accipi solet, quam tam nos quam Graeci unam in divinis confitemur. Propter quod, sicut Graeci dicunt tres hypostases, nos dicimus tres personas...

Of all the authors we have considered so far, Gautier is the only one we have seen pointing to this very important text of S. Thomas. Here, not only does S. Thomas accurately describe the notion of this censure, but almost calls it by its name — *non recte sonat*. It is to be noted that he does not say that the use of the Greek terminology would be heretical, but merely "*wrong-sounding*". By drawing attention

cum aliis apud Cardinalem Gotti, quibus Eminentissimus hic videtur tacite consentire, quae incongrue et inordinate theologice loquitur; ita ut, licet verum sensum habeat, theologice tamen male sonet."

In this citation, Gautier refers to Gotti. For the exact words of the latter on this point, cf. Gotti, *Theologia Scholastico-Dogmatica*, t. 1, q. 1, dub. 4, no. 19. Bononiae (1727), p. 46. "Male sonans propositio, licet a Magistro Cano conjungatur cum offensiva piarum aurium, ab aliis tamen ab ea secernitur, et dicitur illa, quae incongrue et inordinate theologice loquitur; ita ut licet verum sensum habeat, theologice tamen male sonet. Quare si quis diceret, in Deo sunt tres essentiae relativae, sensus catholicus esset, sed inordinate, quia uteretur nomine *essentiae* ad significandum relativum, quo Divinae Personae distinguuntur, contra bonam theologiam, eo utentem solum ad significandum absolutum et naturam, in qua sunt unum."

¹ Cf. S. THOMAS, *Contra Errores Graecorum*, prooemium. (Parmae 1864, t. 15, p. 239.) In the first chapter of this opusculum, S. Thomas describes how the Greek Fathers used the term *causa* in the same sense as the Latins used the term *principium* in explaining the procession of the Son from the Father, and the procession of the Holy Ghost from both the Father and the Son.

to this text, Gautier undoubtedly contributed to consolidating the interpretation of Cano, Lugo, the Salmanticenses and others.

Regarding the nature of *piarum aurium offensiva*, Gautier endorses the opinion which was popularised by Suarez, Lugo and the Salmanticenses. Doctrine which is offensive to pious ears, he states, contains an element contrary to the virtue of religion. It is not necessarily false doctrine, but it expresses something indecent and disrespectful to God and the saints¹.

Gautier has no difficulty in distinguishing *piarum aurium offensiva* from *male sonans*. He simply points to the bull *Unigenitus*² (1713) where these two censures were applied together and thus distinguished. He notes with surprise that Montaigne emphatically stated that these censures never appeared together in the same dogmatic condemnation³. We have already considered this error on Montaigne's part, and shown how he was misled by Panormo.

We consider Gautier's exposition of *male sonans* and *piarum offensiva* as constituting the last stage in the development of these two censures. He was not influenced by Lauria, Panormo and Montaigne, because

¹ Cf. GAUTIER, loc. cit., p. 135. "Itaque, ut observat Suarez, etsi malesonans propositio etiam aures offendant, dum tamen additur, quod sit *piarum aurium offensiva*, per ly *piarum* denotatur ordo quispiam ad religionem, ad quam pietas in hoc sensu proprie pertinet; consequenter propositio quae dicitur *piarum aurium offensiva* aliquid speciale videtur in hoc gradu continere in ordine ad religionem, propter quod aures pias offendant. Hinc describi potest, quod sit ea, quae si falsa non sit, tamen in materia religionis enuntiat, aut praesefert aliquid absonum, indecens, vel indignum, ac indecorum subjecto de quo loquitur, et per quod fidelium merito offendantur. Sicut, inquit Gotti, si de partu Virginis loquens, aliqua indecora misceret; vel actiones humanas Christi, aut partes et membra corporis turpibus explicaret vocibus."

² Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 8. It is interesting to note that we have seen no theologian referring to the earlier distinction made in 1699 A. D., when Fénelon's errors were condemned by Pope Innocent XII. (Cf. outline of condemnations, no. 7.)

³ Cf. GAUTIER, loc. cit., p. 134. "Propositionem *piarum aurium offensivam* haud pauci denuo confundunt cum propositione *malesonante*, praecipue ex eo, quia, inquit Tournelius, non solum Synodus Constantiensis et SS Pontifices Pius V et Gregorius XIII, sed et generatim quaecumque alia concilia, quilibet Pontifices et Patres, quoties *malesonantis* notam exprimunt, toties de altera, *piarum aurium offensiva*, silent, et viceversa. At profecto hic aliquid humanitas ab errore memoriae passus est Tournelius, vel eius continuator: etenim in celebri bulla "*Unigenitus*", duae hae censurae divisim enumerantur, diversisque verbis exprimuntur, perinde ac caeterae. Quapropter enitendum nobis est, ut cum aliis naturam huius propositionis, et a praecedente discrimen paucis exponamus."

he saw that their doctrine did not tally with the evidence available from the dogmatic condemnations of the Church. He went back to the earlier theologians, and we have seen how he depended on Lugo. This was the same interpretation which was originally suggested by Cano, and later endorsed by the Salmanticenses.

We do not claim that there was unanimity of opinion after Gautier. In fact, few subsequent theologians took this problem of the theological censures very seriously, and consequently did not take any great pains to seek out the most authoritative interpretations. Regarding the nature of *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva*, however, there was less confusion and more agreement in later years, than in the case of the other censures¹.

ARTICLE VI

Recapitulation and Conclusion

We have now examined the development of *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva*, and seen that there was no dearth of opinions regarding the interpretation of these two censures. In spite of this diversity, there is not much difficulty in selecting the correct explanation. In the preceding articles we have already done this by a process of elimination. We shall now take a synthetic view of all the conclusions we have reached so far, and of the different stages through which these two censures passed before their interpretation was finally established.

Before Cano, we discovered nothing but confusion regarding the nature of these two censures. They were identified with *haeresim sapiens* and with *scandalosa*, and no attempt was made to establish them as separate categories, distinct from all others. Out of this confusion, Cano brought order. It is true that he considered *male sonans*

¹ In the following authors, we find more or less the same ideas as those here expressed by Gautier: FRANZELIN S. J., *Tractatus de Divina Traditione*, sect. 1, th. XII, scholion 2. Romae (1875), p. 162; MAZZELLA S. J., *De Virtutibus Infusis*, disput. 2, art. 10. Romae (1879), p. 283; DE GROOT O. P., *Summa Apologetica*, q. 10, art. 5. Ratisbonae (1906), p. 381; PESCH S. J., *Praelectiones Dogmaticae*, t. 1, pars 2, sect. 5. Friburgi Brisgoviae (1909), p. 378; SCHULTES O. P., *De Ecclesia Catholica*, cap. 9, art. 70. Parisiis (1931), p. 640.

and *piarum aurium offensiva* as synonymous terms indicating the same theological censure, but in his description of this censure he put forward a notion which distinguished it from all others. From the point of view of previous explanations, this notion of Cano was absolutely new. *Male sonans* (or *piarum aurium offensiva*), he stated, concerns the mode of expression of Catholic truth rather than the sense. If doctrine is confusedly expressed — *inconditis verbis* — and if terminology other than that which is sanctified by tradition is used, then there is a certain deviation from orthodoxy, in so far as the way is prepared for misrepresentation. Cano was careful to point out that there is no question of error against faith. However, incongruous terminology constitutes a danger, and errs against sound doctrine — *sana doctrina*.

We saw this concept of Cano becoming more and more popular with later theologians. In the course of time, it was clarified and made more precise. We recall, for instance, how the Salmanticenses stressed that even though *male sonans* is primarily concerned with *words* used in the expression of Catholic truth, it is not a merely grammatical censure. Incongruous expression, they stated, errs against good theology and consequently merits a theological censure.

After Cano, the greatest development regarding this basic concept was the separation of *piarum aurium offensiva* from *male sonans*. For Cano, the two censures were identical and the element of offense to pious ears was included in the concept of *male sonans*. We saw how this distinction was gradually introduced by Suarez, Lugo and the Salmanticenses, and how it was later vindicated by the official condemnations of the Church. Even in the interpretation of these later theologians who distinguished these two censures, Cano's doctrine was still upheld. His explanation of the quality of the "pious ears" was corroborated, but now this concept was separated from *male sonans* and applied to *piarum aurium offensiva* as a separate censure.

Apart from the few dissenting theologians whose doctrine we have analysed and rejected, Cano's basic interpretation was never abandoned. It was clarified and developed in later years, but fundamentally it remained the same. There is very little in the doctrine of Lugo, the Salmanticenses and Gautier, which is not to be found at least implicitly in the original exposition of Cano.

We have already stated that from the point of view of previous

attempts to describe these censures, Cano's doctrine was absolutely new. However, from another point of view, his doctrine was old and sanctified by tradition. In the course of our investigations we saw different theologians pointing to texts in S. Thomas where this concept of Cano is clearly described. In his opusculum, *Contra Errores Graecorum*, S. Thomas examines the terminology used by many Greek Fathers, and explains that in spite of the fact that such terminology is quite orthodox for the Greeks, it sounds wrong to Latin ears. We noted the exact words of S. Thomas — *non recte sonat*. All this goes to show that Cano was not quite original in explaining the nature of *male sonans* as would appear at first sight. It would be more correct to say that he sought out the traditional explanation. We have already explained that the theological censures were in constant use in the everyday life of the Church. In all probability, this was Cano's source, and not any individual theologian.

The great difficulty which presented itself to most of the theologians who tried to explain *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva* was the problem of identity or distinction. We have seen that it was comparatively late before the Church made the official distinction in the dogmatic condemnations. In fact, until the year 1699 it would seem that the mind of the Church, at least tacitly, held for identity, because each time one of these censures appeared in a dogmatic condemnation, the other was omitted. It must also be remembered that the names of these two censures do seem synonymous. In light of all this, it is not surprising that the earlier theologians did not hesitate to identify them. Before the official distinction was made by the Church, however, a number of theologians succeeded in separating *male sonans* from *piarum aurium offensiva*.

We have rejected the different opinions which were in vogue before Cano. Likewise, we have rejected the doctrine of the theologians who constituted the 'second period of identity', i. e. the interpretation of Lauria, Panormo and Montaigne. There is no alternative, therefore, but to accept the explanation which was originally advanced by Cano and subsequently clarified in the writings of later theologians. This is briefly expressed in the two definitions given by the Salmanticenses: "*Propositio male sonans est quae habet sensum congruentem fidei, verba autem non congrua*", and "*Propositio piarum aurium offensiva est quae, licet verum dicat, tamen vel dicit illud quod taceri oportet ob reverentiam*

ad sancta; vel dicit eo modo qui illa in contemptum venire facit." In the first case, the censure is concerned with the abuse of words used outside their traditional signification, and there is no question of the doctrine or the object expressed. In the second case, however, words are used in their correct and traditional sense, and the censure is concerned with the object expressed. This suffices to show the difference between the two censures.

GENERAL CONCLUSION

We have now completed our examination of the different interpretations of the theological censures, which were advanced in the post-Tridentine period. (1563-1709 A. D.). In accordance with the principles laid down in the introduction, we made a critical analysis of each opinion, and by a process of elimination, sought out the most authoritative doctrine in each case.

As may be seen from the preceding chapters, we did not confine ourselves strictly to this post-Tridentine period. In the case of each censure, we reviewed the main opinions which were put forward between the Council of Constance and Melchior Cano (1418-1563 A. D.), and found abundant proof of the confusion which we mentioned in the introduction. Likewise, we often had occasion to examine the opinions which appeared in the modern period, i. e. after 1709 A. D., and here there was nothing but mere repetitions of doctrine which had already appeared in the post-Tridentine period. The modern opinions differed according to the authority which was followed in each case. In light of all this, we think that our selection of the post-Tridentine period for special investigation has been clearly justified.

We have seen the theologians discussing the doctrine of one another, and in each case the particular opinion which the theologians thought important enough to examine, we ourselves had already analysed. This vindicates our selection of the important opinions which appeared both in the post-Constance and post-Tridentine periods.

We shall now conclude by giving a description of each censure according to the conclusions we have reached in the preceding chapters and according to the most authoritative sources. Although this has already been done in great detail, we shall repeat it in a general fashion, concentrating on the essentials. In this way, we hope to present the results of our investigations in a more tangible and concrete manner.

**A. The censure of error
according to the most authoritative sources**

1° In the very first of the cumulative condemnations which were issued by the Council of Constance, the censure of *error* was applied. In these decrees, the erroneous proposition was distinguished from heresy and the other lower theological censures ¹.

2° In the majority of dogmatic condemnations which were issued between Constance and the year 1713, the censure of *error* is enumerated immediately after heresy. Though this constitutes a sign that *error* is the next gravest censure after heresy, it is not a definite argument. There are some dogmatic condemnations in which this order is not observed ².

3° Though it cannot be argued with certainty from the dogmatic condemnations that the censure of *error* is the next gravest after heresy, there is ample proof of this from other sources. All the main theologians who wrote on the doctrinal censures between the Council of Constance (1418) and the year 1713, even though they differed in their opinions regarding the nature of the erroneous proposition, were unanimous on this one point — that the censure of *error* is the next gravest after heresy ³.

4° The censure of *error* was also referred to as *error in fide*. This terminology was the main obstacle, which impeded the earlier theologians from finding a satisfactory explanation of the censure and sufficiently distinguishing it from heresy. Error in matters of faith and morals seemed to be synonymous with heresy ⁴.

5° The term '*error*', however, may be understood in either of two ways. Firstly, in its broad, generic sense it merely signifies falsity. Understood in this way, the term may embrace heresy and every other form of deviation from orthodoxy. It is clear that the Council of Constance and the other dogmatic condemnations did not intend the

¹ Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 1.

² Cf. *supra*, pp. 1-4.

³ Cf. *sup.*, pp. 81-82.

⁴ Cf. *sup.*, pp. 9-11, esp. p. 10 note 1; p. 14.

word to be taken in this broad sense, otherwise its distinction from heresy in the dogmatic decrees would be absurd.

The second mode of interpreting the term '*error*' is in a restricted signification, in such a way as to be specifically distinct from heresy and all the other theological censures. It often happens that the name of a genus is given to the lowest component species — as in the case of *dispositio* (genus) in relation to *habitus* (species) and *dispositio* (species). This also is true of *error* (genus) in relation to *haeresis* (species) and *error* (species). While there is a merely mental distinction between *error* (genus) and *haeresis* (species), there is a real and specific distinction between *haeresis* (species) and *error* (species). It must be admitted that the decrees of Constance and the other dogmatic condemnations used the term '*error*' in this restricted sense, otherwise these decrees would seem absurd in distinguishing *error in fide* from heresy¹.

6° Having determined that the word '*error*', as applied in the dogmatic condemnations, is to be taken in a specific and restricted sense, we now enquire as to the different significations this term may have in everyday use. When the word '*error*' is applied in a scientific sense, it implies a certain type of falsity. In philosophy, for instance, an opinion is said to be erroneous when it contradicts the very principles of the science. In other words, something certain and commonly taken for granted is denied.

If we transfer this concept to theology, it follows that the censure of *error* concerns the denial of principles (i. e. doctrine of faith), or something so certain that it is commonly taken for granted. We cannot say that the erroneous proposition is in direct opposition to doctrine of faith, since this would confuse it with heresy. Consequently, some other explanation must be found which will distinguish the erroneous from the heretical proposition, and yet retain some kind of opposition to doctrine of faith².

7° After the direct and immediate opposition to faith which heresy implies, the next gravest type is mediate opposition which is entailed by the denial of a theological conclusion³. After doctrine of faith,

¹ Cf. CANO, sup., p. 17 et seqq.; SUAREZ, p. 39.

² Cf. SUAREZ, sup., pp. 39-40.

³ Cf. PANORMO, sup., p. 69.

the next grade of certainty which any doctrine may enjoy is that of the theological conclusion. Such conclusions are said to be *mediately* revealed, and their denial will entail a mediate denial of faith ¹.

Granted that the theological conclusion enjoys the next grade of certainty after doctrine of faith and that the censure of *error* is the next gravest censure after heresy, it follows that the erroneous proposition in theology is that which contradicts a theological conclusion; in other words, that which is in mediate opposition to principles of faith ².

8° The theological conclusion which is associated with the censure of *error* is the strict theological conclusion, i. e. that which is deduced by means of one premise of faith and another premise known by the light of natural reason ³.

9° The intrinsic connection between any proposition and doctrine of faith may not always be evident. However, if such a proposition is universally regarded as being a theological conclusion, its denial is censurable as erroneous. In such a case, the weight of extrinsic authority supplies for the lack of intrinsic evidence ⁴.

10° Conclusions deduced by means of two premises of faith are not theological conclusions in the strict sense of the term. The object enunciated by such conclusions is already within the pale of immediate revelation, and consequently its denial may be censured as heretical ⁵.

11° If we take into consideration all the theologians who wrote on the theological censures between the Council of Constance and the year 1709, the theory which correlates the censure of *error* to the denial of a strict theological conclusion may be judged *the more common opinion*. However, if we exclude the earlier theologians who were misled by the name of this censure — *error in fide* — and who consequently failed to distinguish sufficiently the erroneous from the heretical proposition, then we may call the theory which relates the

¹ Cf. CANO, *sup.*, pp. 21, 28; LUGO, pp. 50, 53; SUAREZ, p. 42.

² Cf. BANEZ, *sup.*, pp. 32-33; SUAREZ, p. 42 et seqq.; LUGO, p. 53; SALMANTICENSES, p. 56; PANORMO, p. 62 et seqq.

³ Cf. SUAREZ, *sup.*, p. 42; LUGO, p. 53; SALMANTICENSES, p. 58; PANORMO pp. 63-64.

⁴ Cf. PANORMO, *sup.*, pp. 69-70.

⁵ Cf. SUAREZ, *sup.*, p. 44; LUGO, p. 53; SALMANTICENSES, p. 57; PANORMO, p. 63.

censure of *error* to the denial of a strict theological conclusion, the *common opinion* ¹.

12° There is no direct transition between *error* (as such) and heresy. That which is merely mediately revealed cannot enter into the pale of immediate revelation. The Church cannot make new revelations, but only declares that which is already immediately revealed ².

13° There is one possible mode by which the erroneous proposition may become heresy in the course of time. However, this is not a direct transition of *error* (as such) to heresy, but rather a transition of implicit heresy to the state of explicit heresy. For instance, a particular doctrine which is, in fact, latent heresy may be considered as a denial of a theological conclusion with regard to some other dogma. In this state, the denial may be censured as erroneous. If in the course of time, however, the said doctrine should become explicit heresy in its own right, then it may be censured as heretical. It is to be noted that this transit is accidental, and not a direct transit of *error* (as such) to the state of heresy ³.

14° The censures of heresy and *error* are not incompatible. A particular doctrine may be simultaneously heretical and erroneous under two different aspects. A proposition which is censured as heretical may also be considered as the denial of a theological conclusion in relation to some other dogma. It is impossible for the same proposition to be immediately and mediately opposed to the same dogma. However, there is nothing to prohibit it from being immediately opposed to one dogma, and mediately opposed to another ⁴.

15° The principles underlying the foregoing explanation of the censure of *error* are the following:

- a) The censure of *error* is the next gravest after heresy.
- b) Doctrine which is mediately revealed, i. e. the strict theological conclusion, enjoys the next grade of certainty after doctrine which is immediately revealed, i. e. doctrine of faith.

¹ Cf. SALMANTICENSES, sup., pp. 56-57.

² Cf. SALMANTICENSES, sup., p. 50; PANORMO, p. 65.

³ Cf. PANORMO, sup., p. 67.

⁴ Cf. PANORMO, sup., pp. 67-68.

**B. The censure *haeresi proxima*
according to the most authoritative sources**

1° It was comparatively late before the Church began to apply the censure *haeresi proxima* in dogmatic condemnations. The first official use of this censure was in the condemnation affixed to the Jansenistic propositions by the Holy Office, in 1690 A. D.¹ Here, the words '*haeresi proxima*' are definitely intended to signify a separate censure, distinct from heresy, *error*, *haeresim sapiens*, and other lower theological censures.

2° Owing to the late appearance of *haeresi proxima* in the dogmatic condemnations of the Church, the earlier theologians did not consider it as a separate censure. Lugo may be said to be the first authority on this censure, and even he had never seen it being officially used in the dogmatic condemnations of the Church.²

3° In the different treatises on the censures which appeared before Lugo, there are many references to *haeresi proxima* and the notion which later became associated with this censure. However, careful analysis proves that in most cases the words '*haeresi proxima*' are used in a material sense, and not meant to indicate a special censure. When describing the erroneous proposition, for instance, Cano and Suarez said that it is *haeresi proxima* in the sense that it is the next censure after heresy. Accidental references such as these were the cause of considerable confusion. Consequently, all references to the censure *haeresi proxima* in the writings of theologians who preceded Lugo are not to be taken seriously. Likewise, the authority of later writers who depended on these theologians for their interpretation of *haeresi proxima*, is of little value.³

4° The name of this censure — *haeresi proxima* — seems to indicate that it is the next gravest after heresy. However, as we have seen in the case of *error*, nothing can be definitely argued from the names of these censures. The erroneous proposition has a greater *sapor haeresis*

¹ Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 6.

² Cf. sup., pp. 83, 104.

³ Cf. sup., pp. 83-90.

than the doctrine which may be specifically censured as *haeresim sapiens*. Likewise, the censure of *error* comes closer to heresy than the censure which is specifically known as *haeresi proxima*. The point to be kept in mind is that the names of these censures may be understood in a generic and specific signification. In the generic sense, these terms may be freely applied to a number of censures. However, in the specific or restricted sense, they indicate one censure, distinct from all others ¹.

5° The theological note corresponding to *haeresi proxima* is *fidei proxima*. The nature of the censure is best explained by an examination of the corresponding theological note.

Doctrine is said to be *fidei proxima* when the majority of theologians hold it to be immediately revealed and doctrine of faith. We say the 'majority' of theologians because there are some dissenting views which exclude absolute certainty. However, those theologians who are not in accord with the the majority are not 'grave theologians', and their arguments for the contrary opinion are devoid of all probability. Nevertheless, the dissenting views of these authors are capable of casting some shadow of doubt on the opinion which holds that the doctrine in question is of faith. Seeing that doubt of any kind is incompatible with the virtue of faith, the doctrine is consequently said to be *fidei proxima*, and the corresponding censure is called *haeresi proxima*, instead of simple heresy ².

6° We have noted that in the case of *haeresi proxima*, the opinion of theologians is almost unanimous in holding that the censurable proposition is outright heresy. We were careful to state that the dissenting theologians are not 'grave theologians' and that their doctrine is devoid of all probability. This is an important condition as otherwise the censure *haeresi proxima* will be confused with probable heresy. If the few theologians who hold the opposite view are grave theologians, and if their doctrine is in any way within the realm of probability, then no censure can be applied, since the Church does not condemn probable opinions.

The notion of probable heresy does not indicate a theological censure,

¹ Cf. sup., p. 105.

² Cf. PANORMO, sup., p. 100.

but represents a private judgment without any intention to censure the upholders of the doctrine in question. On the contrary, when *haeresi proxima* is applied it means that an opinion is *condemned*. As already stated, probable opinions are never condemned by the Church, and it can be taken as a general rule that when any doctrine is censured, it is devoid of all probability¹.

7° Generally speaking, each theological censure indicates a special mode of heterodoxy which is intrinsic to the censurable proposition. For instance, heresy implies immediate opposition to doctrine of faith, and *error* entails mediate opposition or the denial of a theological conclusion. In this respect, *haeresi proxima* differs from the other theological censures — there is no intrinsic mode corresponding to it. Considered in itself, the doctrine which is censured as *haeresi proxima* is either heretical or not. The censure does not so much concern the objective denial as the great weight of authority which is repudiated by that denial. In other words, it is concerned with extrinsic authority rather than with intrinsic evidence.

It is to be noted that in the case of *fidei proxima* the majority of theologians hold it to be *of faith* and its denial heretical. There is no question of these theologians holding it to be *fidei proxima*.

Because of this characteristic which is peculiar to *haeresi proxima* (and *errori proxima*), the censure is said to be extrinsic to the doctrine which it affects².

8° Besides the name of this censure — *haeresi proxima* — there are other aspects which indicate that it is the next gravest censure after heresy. The only difference between *haeresi proxima* and outright heresy is the opinion upheld by a few dissenting theologians whose doctrine is devoid of all probability. Taking all these considerations into account, it would seem that in the hierarchy of doctrinal censures *haeresi proxima* comes immediately after heresy.

Notwithstanding this, the common opinion of theologians holds that the censure of *error* comes immediately after heresy and is the next

¹ Cf. PANORMO, *sup.*, p. 98 et seqq.; LUGO, while considering *haeresi proxima* as a distinct censure, confused it with *probable heresy*. — Cf. LUGO, *sup.*, p. 90 et seqq.

² Cf. LUGO, *sup.*, p. 92 et seqq.

gravest censure. As we have seen, there were many and varied views as to what constitutes an erroneous proposition. However, there was no discord regarding this fundamental principle, that *error* is the next gravest censure after heresy¹.

Doctrine which is *haeresi proxima* may certainly be heresy in substance. However, that is not necessary. It may happen that the opinion of the majority of theologians may be wrong in this respect. This is very improbable, but nevertheless possible, and consequently the proposition which is *haeresi proxima* has a merely contingent connection with heresy. This contingency may be described as the contingency of mere possibility or of metaphysical non-repugnance. Nevertheless, it is contingency and rules out a necessary connection with heresy.

On the contrary, the erroneous proposition entails a *necessary* connection with heresy. Denial of a theological conclusion *necessitates* a denial of faith. In the strict theological conclusion, the reasoning and the natural premise are evident, and consequently cannot be denied. The denial of the conclusion, therefore, necessitates an indirect denial of the premise of faith. Because of this, the erroneous proposition may also be called mediate heresy.

Seeing, therefore, that the censure of *error* entails a necessary connection with heresy, it follows that it comes closer to it and constitutes a more serious censure than *haeresim proxima* which implies a merely contingent connection with heresy².

Another proof that the censure of *error* is more serious than *haeresi proxima* is that in the external forum, the obdurate avowal of an erroneous proposition more easily leads to the presumption of heresy than doctrine which is *haeresi proxima*³.

9° While it may be taken as a general rule that the censure of *error* is graver and comes closer to heresy than *haeresi proxima*, nevertheless there are certain circumstances in which the latter censure is more serious. It may happen that a particular doctrine is in the ultimate stages of being defined as of faith. There is no longer any controversy or the least shadow of doubt among the theologians, and

¹ Cf. sup., p. 93.

² Cf. LUGO, supra, p. 93 et seqq.; PANORMO, p. 101.

³ Cf. LUGO, sup., p. 95.

all the necessary conditions are at hand for the formal declaration by the Church. In circumstances such as these, *haeresi proxima* may be described as '*propositio haeretica definibilis*'. The word '*haeretica*' indicates immediate opposition to faith, an element which *haeresi proxima* in these circumstances has in common with outright heresy. The word '*definibilis*', however, indicates how it differs from formal heresy, i. e. in so far as it becomes known to us by way of an inferior medium. Formal heresy is known by a solemn medium — the rule of faith which tells us explicitly what is heretical and what is not. Regarding *haeresi proxima* in the circumstances described above, the rule of faith is not quite so explicit. As yet, the solemn magisterium has not intervened so that the most that can be said of *haeresi proxima* at this stage is that it is an unauthentic heretical proposition. Once the solemn magisterium intervenes, however, that which was formerly material heresy becomes authentic or formal heresy in the full canonical sense.

In the circumstances just described, the element of uncertainty and contingency is removed from *haeresi proxima* which now has a certain and necessary connection with heresy, in the same way as the erroneous proposition. Understood in this way, *haeresi proxima* comes closer to heresy and constitutes a graver censure than *error*. However, these are exceptional circumstances and it may be taken as a general rule that *error* is the more serious censure¹.

10° The principles which we have laid down for the interpretation of *haeresi proxima* may also be applied to *errori proxima*, *mutatis mutandis*. The censure *errori proxima* may be applied when the majority of theologians hold that the doctrine denied is a theological conclusion, or mediately revealed. There are a few dissenting theologians who hold that the doctrine in question is not a theological conclusion, but their authority is of little weight, and their opinion devoid of all probability. However, they serve to cast sufficient doubt on the opinion held by the majority so that the censure of *error* cannot be applied².

¹ Cf. PANORMO, sup., p. 101 et seqq.

² Cf. PANORMO, sup., p. 100.

C. *Haeresim sapiens* — *de haeresi suspecta*
according to the most authoritative sources

1° The Council of Constance made no mention of either *haeresim sapiens* or *suspecta* in its dogmatic condemnations. In the condemnation of the errors of Baius by Pope S. Pius V (1569), the censure *suspecta* was applied for the first time in the post-Constance period. In this condemnation, however, there was no mention of *haeresim sapiens*. When certain articles of the Jansenists were condemned by the Holy Office in the year 1690, the censure *haeresim sapiens* was applied for the first time ever in a dogmatic condemnation. However, in this decree there was no mention of *suspecta*. The two censures were not used together and distinguished from each other in the same dogmatic condemnation, until the year 1713. It is not surprising, therefore, that many theologians considered *haeresim sapiens* and *de haeresi suspecta* as synonymous terms. It must be admitted that the two names sound alike. However, against the combined authority of all the theologians who held that these two censures are identical, we have the official distinction which was made by the Church. There is no doubting the fact that if the theologians who held the opposite view had seen the dogmatic condemnation in which this distinction was made, they would certainly have brought their doctrine into line with it¹.

2° Even those theologians who treated of *haeresim sapiens* and *suspecta* as distinct censures placed very little difference between them. Consequently, it is much easier to treat of both censures together than to treat of them separately.

3° The words '*haeresim sapiens*' (and '*de haeresi suspecta*') imply a deviation from Catholic truth which is less serious than heresy. Doctrine which is *haeresim sapiens* merely 'tastes' of heresy — or gives certain indications of heresy. However, we must be on our guard against depending too much on the name of the censure when exploring its nature. The erroneous proposition, for instance comes very close to heresy and may certainly be said to 'taste' of it. In fact, of all the theological censures, *error* indicates the greatest '*sapor haeresis*'. In

¹ Cf. sup., pp. 110-111.

spite of this, it is evident from the dogmatic condemnations of the Church that *haeresim sapiens* (and *de haeresi suspecta*) is a separate censure, distinct from *error*. Once again, we recall that the names of the theological censures may be taken in a generic and specific signification. '*Haeresim sapiens*', understood in its wide and generic sense, may be applied to the erroneous proposition. There must be some restricted sense which indicates a separate and lower censure; otherwise the distinction made by the dogmatic condemnations would seem absurd ¹.

4° Doctrine is said to be specifically *haeresim sapiens* when it cannot be proved to be heresy, *error*, or *haeresi proxima*: nevertheless, the said doctrine gives certain indications by way of different circumstances or the particular words used in its expression that the assertor is imbued with heresy which influences the proposition under scrutiny ².

5° Although it is possible for a proposition which is *haeresim sapiens* to be capable of a pious or Catholic interpretation, this is not necessary. The following proposition, '*Ridiculum est Eucharistiae sacramentum solemniter per vias publicas circumferre*' smacks of the Lutheran heresy which denies the Real Presence, and yet it cannot be interpreted in any pious sense ³.

6° As a general rule, however, doctrine which is *haeresim sapiens* is usually capable of both an orthodox and unorthodox interpretation — like the proposition which states, '*fides justificat*'. In this case, circumstances will decide whether the Catholic sense is intended or not ⁴.

7° More than in the case of any other theological censure, circumstantial evidence is all important when the censure *haeresim sapiens* (or *de haeresi suspecta*) is to be applied. As already stated, there is no blatant deviation from orthodoxy in the censurable proposition which may be capable of even a pious and Catholic interpretation. It will be the circumstances which will decide, therefore, as to whether

¹ Cf. SUAREZ, *sup.*, p. 118.

² Cf. BANEZ, *sup.*, pp. 115-116; SALMANTICENSES, p. 125.

³ Cf. CANO, *sup.*, pp. 113-114; BANEZ, p. 116; SUAREZ, p. 119; LORCA, p. 116; SALMANTICENSES, p. 125; pp. 136-137.

⁴ Cf. PANORMO, *sup.*, p. 133; pp. 139-140.

or not the assertor is imbued with heresy, and whether or not such heresy influences the doctrine under scrutiny ¹.

8° As already stated, the two censures, *haeresim sapiens* and *de haeresi suspecta*, have very much in common. All the observations we have made so far may be equally applied to either censure ².

9° The difference between *haeresim sapiens* and *suspecta* is one of degree rather than of species. In either case, the circumstantial evidence gives sufficient cause of fearing latent heresy. This cause, however, is not something indivisible which does not admit of greater and less degrees. If the circumstantial evidence is so great as to warrant a *probable judgment* that the assertor of the proposition under scrutiny is imbued with heresy, then the censure *haeresim sapiens* is to be applied. On the other hand, if the circumstantial evidence does not warrant such a probable judgment, but only serves to arouse suspicion to this effect, then the censure *de haeresi suspecta* is to be applied ³.

10° If all the foregoing principles are applied to the erroneous proposition — *mutatis mutandis* — we have a description of two other theological censures, *errorem sapiens*, and *de errore suspecta* ⁴.

D. The censure *male sonans*

according to the most authoritative sources

1° It was not until the year 1699, when twenty-three articles of Fénelon were condemned by Pope Innocent XII, that *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva* appeared in the same dogmatic decree and were thus officially distinguished by the Church. Before this, whenever one of these censures appeared in a dogmatic condemnation, the other was omitted ⁵. It is not surprising, therefore, that many theologians, and especially the earlier ones who wrote on the theological censures, regarded *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva* as syn-

¹ Cf. CANO, sup., p. 115; BANEZ, p. 116; LUGO, p. 123; SALMANTICENSIS, p. 126; p. 135, pp. 137-139.

² Cf. LUGO, sup., p. 122.

³ Cf. LUGO, sup., p. 123; SALMANTICENSIS, p. 127; pp. 134, 135.

⁴ Cf. LUGO, sup., p. 124.

⁵ Cf. sup., pp. 142-143.

onymous terms¹. Against their authority, however, we have the official distinction which was made by the Church in the condemnation of the articles of Fénelon². If all the theologians who held for the identity of these two censures had been aware of this condemnation, they would certainly have brought their doctrine into line with it. As it was, they were misled by the names '*male sonans*' and '*piarum aurium offensiva*' which seemed to indicate the same idea, and by the fact that in all the dogmatic condemnations which took place before the year 1699, these two censures never appeared together.

2° The term '*male sonans*' is capable of a wide and generic signification, and when understood in this way, may be applied to heresy, *error* and *haeresim sapiens*. Doctrine which is heretical or erroneous may well be called 'wrong-sounding'. However, the use of the words '*male sonans*' in the dogmatic condemnations of the Church proves that they are meant to indicate a separate censure which is specifically distinct from heresy, *error* and *haeresim sapiens*³.

3° The name of this censure — *male sonans* — is misleading in the sense that it does not seem to imply any great deviation from orthodoxy. However, the vast majority of theologians thought the censure important enough to be listed immediately after *haeresim sapiens*⁴.

4° Doctrine which is *male sonans* does not err against faith in any way like heresy, *error*, *haeresi proxima*, or even *haeresim sapiens*. In fact, when a proposition is censured as *male sonans*, it is taken for granted that the sense of the doctrine in question is quite orthodox. This censure primarily concerns the material words used in the expression of Catholic truth. If these words are applied with an untraditional and incongruous signification, then the proposition may be rightly censured as *male sonans*, even though there is abundant proof that no unorthodox meaning is intended⁵.

¹ The following theologians identified *male sonans* with *piarum aurium offensiva*: TURRECREMATA (sup., p. 144), CANO (p. 146), BANEZ (p. 149), LORCA (p. 150), LAURIA (p. 161), PANORMO (p. 162), MONTAIGNE (p. 165.)

² Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 7.

³ In the condemnation of the articles of Quesnel (1713), *male sonans* was distinguished from all these censures, including *piarum aurium offensiva*. Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 8. Also, cf. CANO, sup., p. 146.

⁴ Cf. sup., p. 141.

⁵ Cf. CANO, sup., pp. 146-148; LUGO, p. 153; SALTANTICENSIS, p. 156; GAUTIER, p. 166.

5° The following is a good illustration of doctrine which is *male sonans*. If, for instance, a Catholic theologian were to state, '*In Deo sunt tres essentiae relativae*', this proposition could be censured as *male sonans*. All the circumstances indicate that what the author intends to say is, '*In Deo sunt tres subsistentiae relativae*'. Nevertheless, in substituting the word '*essentia*' for '*subsistentia*', he departed from the traditional usage, and consequently the doctrine may fall under the censure ¹.

6° In spite of the fact that *male sonans* is concerned with the abuse of words applied in the expression of otherwise sound doctrine, it cannot be said to be a merely grammatical censure. The use of untraditional and incongruous terminology in theology is not a merely grammatical fault. Such abuse of words constitutes a danger to faith in so far as it prepares the way for misrepresentation. Consequently, *male sonans* is a theological and not a merely grammatical censure ².

7° The first theologian we saw to describe the censure *male sonans* in any way resembling the outline we have so far given, was Melchior Cano († 1560). Cano's exposition of this censure was very original in so far as he departed from the mass of confused ideas which were put forward by his predecessors to explain *male sonans* ³. However, from another point of view, his doctrine was old and sanctified by tradition. We have seen several texts in S. Thomas which describe the idea of *male sonans* ⁴. Above all, in his opusculum *Contra Errores Graecorum* S. Thomas examines the terminology used by many Greek Fathers, and explains that in spite of the fact that such terminology is quite orthodox for the Greeks, it sounds wrong to Latin ears. We noted the exact words of S. Thomas; '*non recte sonat*' ⁵. All this goes to show that Cano was not quite as original when treating of the nature of *male sonans*, as would appear at first sight. Cano's interpretation was

¹ Cf. LUGO, sup., p. 153; SALMANTICENSIS, p. 156.

² Cf. SALMANTICENSIS, sup., p. 156.

³ Cf. sup., p. 169; pp. 144-145.

⁴ Cf. S. T., 1, q. 31, a. 2; 3, q. 16, a. 8.

⁵ Cf. S. THOMAS, *Contra Errores Graecorum, prooemium*. (Parmae 1864, t. 15, p. 239.) We have already quoted in full, supra, p. 167.

later endorsed and clarified by such authorities as Bañez¹, Lorca², Lugo³, the Salmanticenses⁴, and Gautier⁵.

8° We conclude by giving the concise definition composed by the Salmanticenses; '*Propositio male sonans est quae habet sensum congruentem fidei, verba autem non congrua*'⁶.

E. *Piarum aurium offensiva*

according to the most authoritative sources

1° As already stated, it was comparatively late before *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva* were applied in the same dogmatic condemnation and thus officially distinguished by the Church. It is not surprising, therefore, that these two censures were identified by very many theologians⁷.

2° The ears of the crowd (*turba*) cannot be taken as a criterion when the censure *piarum aurium offensiva* is to be applied. They must be refined, delicate, and prudent ears. There is no question of that common and false piety which easily suffers offense and takes pharasaic scandal⁸.

3° As is evident from the name of this censure, doctrine which is censurable as *piarum aurium offensiva* contains some element which is contrary to the virtue of religion⁹.

4° Doctrine which is offensive to pious ears is not necessarily false. However, it expresses something which is best left unsaid, since it is disrespectful to God and holy things¹⁰.

¹ Cf. sup., p. 149.

² Cf. sup., p. 150.

³ Cf. sup., p. 153.

⁴ Cf. sup., p. 156.

⁵ Cf. sup., p. 166.

⁶ Cf. SALMANTICENSES, sup., p. 156.

⁷ Cf. sup., pp. 142-143.

⁸ Cf. CANO, sup., p. 147.

⁹ Cf. SUAREZ, sup., p. 151.

¹⁰ Cf. LUGO, sup., p. 154; SALMANTICENSES, p. 157; GAUTIER, p. 168.

5° The following is an example of an expression which is offensive to pious ears; *'Magdalena meretrix, Matthaeae usurariae et avarae, Petre perjure et apostata, orate pro nobis'* ¹.

6° This censure may be defined as follows; *'Propositio piarum aurium offensiva est quae licet verum dicat, tamen vel dicit illud quod taceri oportet ob reverentiam ad sancta; vel dicit eo modo, qui illa in contemptum venire facit'* ².

7° Unlike *male sonans*, the censure *piarum aurium offensiva* is not concerned with the abuse of words. On the contrary, the proposition which is offensive to pious ears contains words used in their ordinary traditional sense, but errs in so far as it expresses something which is best left unsaid. *Male sonans* is concerned with the *words* used in the expression of Catholic truth, while *piarum aurium offensiva* is concerned with the *object* itself which is expressed. This suffices to show the difference between the two censures which were for so long identified by the theologians ³.

8° Objectively speaking, *male sonans* is a more serious censure than *piarum aurium offensiva* since it implies a danger of error and misrepresentation in matters of faith. However, from the subjective and moral point of view, *piarum aurium offensiva* is the more serious censure, since doctrine which is censurable in this way necessarily presupposes subjective dispositions which are contrary to the virtue of religion ⁴.

¹ Cf. LUGO, sup., p. 155.

² Cf. SALMANTICENSES, sup., p. 157.

³ Cf. LUGO, sup., p. 154.

⁴ Cf. LUGO, sup., p. 155.