Bernard Montagnes

The Doctrine
of the
Analogy of Being
according to
Thomas Aquinas

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Andrew Tallon, editor

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The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being according to Thomas Aquinas

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Author's Preface

The present work was presented as a doctoral thesis at the Institut Supérieur de Philosophie at the University of Louvain on 2 March 1962. It is the fruit of research undertaken in view of my teaching responsiblities first at Saint-Maximin, then at Le Saulchoir. The 1957-58 academic year spent at Louvain permitted me to study at the Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, to profit from the guidance of its professors, and to work at the Centre DeWulf-Mansion. I am particularly grateful to Canon Verbeke who generously accepted to make me the beneficiary of his guidance and advice, and to Canon Van Steenberghen, who agreed to include my publication in the series under his direction.

Editor's Note

Numbers in square brackets thus [123] refer to the page in the French. Montagnes's footnotes were often a full page long; they have been converted to endnotes and placed the end of the chapter.

Gender neutral language has also been adopted, and the titles Saint and Father dropped.

All words in French in square brackets were placed in the text by the translator to show the original. The translator has supplied and translated texts to which Montagnes refers but does not quote; the English is first, and the French in parentheses follows the translation.

Page numbers for the *Index of Names* and for the *Index of Thomist Texts* refer to the French edition.

Author's Introduction

[7] Several recent worthwhile works have come to revive interest in the Thomist doctrine of analogy—which unfortunately has become a subject of somewhat hackneyed scholarly interest and upon which, it seems, too much has already been written. Is it still necessary, after these recent works, to run the risk of adding a new title to a bibliography whose discouraging mass would rather suggest to us abandoning such an enterprise? Does the contribution made by these recent studies leave any room for a new study?

Three books deserve to hold our attention: that of H. Lyttkens,[1] that of G. P. Klubertanz[2] and that of C. Fabro.[3] Each touches quite directly the thought of Thomas on the subject of analogy.

H. Lyttkens is a historian who does not belong to any Thomist school and who, in an article published eight years after his masterpiece,[4] formulates the most express reservations about neothomist philosophy. He is therefore independent as regards [8] the different Scholastic traditions, but this independence has as a trade-off a lesser familiarity with Thomas's philosophy. Further, the author's preoccupations are chiefly of a theological order and his inquiry is oriented toward a knowledge of God by means of analogy, a concern which does not directly consider the place that analogy holds in the philosophy of being. H. Lyttkens's contribution is two-fold. First of all, he shows that the doctrine of contemporary Thomists, who hearken back to Cajetan and who accord a privileged place to the analogy of proportionality, does not conform to that of Thomas and hardly can hearken back to him. To be sure, H. Lyttkens is not the first to make this point, but the observations of an author who is not himself a partisan in the debates that divide the Thomists ought not to be neglected. In the second place, the historical researches he has undertaken on the Greek sources of the Thomist doctrine show the decisive role that neoplatonism has played: in fact, whatever the intermediaries through which they might have influenced the thought of Thomas, it is the Neoplatonic commentators on Aristotle who enriched and developed the Aristotelian doctrine of unity ἀφ' ἑνὸς καὶ πρὸς ἕν in the direction of participation in the perfection of the primary instance on which the participants depend. Under the Aristotelian vocabulary of analogy by reference to a primary instance, declares H. Lyttkens, Thomas would

express an authentically Neoplatonic content.[5] Can one accept such an interpretation of Thomism without reserve? After it was claimed taht the thought of Thomas could be reduced to Aristotelianism, it would be no less extreme to make it over into a re-edition of neoplatonism, for what constitutes Thomas's philosophical originality would then be missed. As for the doctrine of analogy by reference to a primary instance, it would take three forms in Aquinas: first, as analogy of extrinsic attribution between God and creature, without the divine perfection being really communicated; then, [9] as an analogy by which a created perfection imitates a divine perfection in the way an image is like its original; finally, as an analogy according to which the first cause is named from the standpoint of its effects. Do these divisions exactly account for the thought of Thomas? They are not literally inexact and they even present the advantage of setting in relief the relation of likeness which is the basis of analogy,[6] but it seems that they do not embrace the fullness of Thomist doctrine which appears to us at once more complex and more unified. Perhaps H. Lyttkens was wrong to tackle the study of Thomas following the perspectives outlined by the discussions among the commentators;—they developed the logical aspects of the doctrine disproportionately and have some-what neglected its ontological foundation.

Klubertanz had the merit of going back to the texts and of basing his analysis upon an exhaustive inquiry across the entire work of Thomas. Though incomplete—and it is almost impossible for it to be otherwise—the repertory of texts relative to analogy suffices to give an idea of the complexity of the doctrine and of the technical vocabulary that expresses it. If the texts gathered cannot by themselves settle the debates that Thomas's thought has provoked, their number and variety ought to enlarge and enrich the discussion. From Klubertanz's research it is clear that the analogy of proportionality, on which the disciples of Cajetan exclusively focused, appeared at a definite point in Thomas's career and then disappeared.[7] The analogy of proportionality would thus be a provisional solution, later abandoned in favor of another explanation. Klubertanz found other indications of an evolution of Thomas's thought on analogy;[8] nevertheless one must [10] recognize that these indications are minor and do not seem to have much doctrinal significance. The ones most remarkable for their philosophical import seem to have escaped the author's notice; I shall point them out in due course. Be that as it may, Klubertanz's observations essentially

converge with and complement those of H. Lyttkens. They suggest a two-fold evolution: the one in Thomas's thought from the *De veritate* to the later works; the other in the Thomist school, from Thomas to Cajetan. These are two hypotheses that we have to check carefully, and whose doctrinal significance we must investigate by bringing to light the different metaphysical conceptions that the observed variations betoken.

But of all the recent works devoted to the Thomist doctrine of analogy, the most satisfactory is that of C. Fabro; for he shows precisely the metaphysical import of this theory. Participation, causality, and analogy are three aspects under which philosophy approaches being—the first two concerning the reality itself of being, the third relating to the concepts by which being is represented. Thus analogy is presented by the author as the semantics of participation. And, if there has been so much discord even within the Thomist school, it is because the theorists on analogy have been much more concerned with the logico-semantic aspect of the problem than with its metaphysical foundation. Now analogy is intended to represent the diversity and multiplicity within being, and we ought to return to this fundamental perspective. "The problem of analogy is intimately bound up with the general structure of Thomist metaphysics, and it develops with a continual and strict harkening back to principles involving the tension of two groups coming together—from act and potency (Aristotle) and from participant and participated (Plato). The two groups evidently require a *reductio ad unum.* The priority and the principal role that the so-called analogy of attribution (*proportionis*) takes in Thomist thought as opposed to the purely formal and posterior analogy of proportionality are based on the very principle of thomism, viz., on the priority of act over potency (Aristotelianism) and of the act of e*sse* over every other act [11] (Platonism)."[9] Consequently, the fundamental analogy is that by reference to a primary instance and the pre-eminence that Thomists have sometimes accorded to proportionality results from a formalist conception of being.[10] Still, the author later attempts to reconcile the two theories of analogy by bringing them back to participation which unites similitude and causality within it. "If one can say that the analogy of proportionality underscores the Aristotelian moment of the immanence of being within beings, the analogy of attribution underscores the Platonic aspect of the radical static dependence of participants on the participated 'separate' perfec-

tion."[11] If the theory of proportionality is bound to a conception of being alien to Thomas's thought, it is perhaps less easy to recover it than the last cited lines might suggest. Fabro had the great merit of pointing out the metaphysical significance of the doctrine of analogy, but one might regret that he had not taken account of the progress of the thought of Thomas on this point, although this progress is tied, as we shall see, to the discovery of the governing positions of the Thomist metaphysics.

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[12] Given the positive contributions of the works we have just assessed and which we do not pretend to re-do, we propose to develop our own researches in two directions—one of a historical and the other of a doctrinal nature. The first pertains to the analysis of the texts, and it ought to furnish an answer to the following question: are there several Thomist doctrines of analogy? On the one hand this means: do we find a progress in Thomas's thought on analogy, and what are its stages? On the other hand: does the doctrine that has become classic among Thomists under the influence of Cajetan conform to that of Thomas or depart from it? The two hypotheses are not new; they have even been advanced often in the countless discussions that the theory of analogy has occasioned, but they have not been verified as rigorously as might be wanted. We thus need to take the trouble to re-examine them, given that the variations that can be observed on the subject of analogy, whether in Thomas's thought or between Thomists and their master, far from being isolated, are tied to the formation of the central notions of metaphysics. This last remark leads us in the second direction of our research. Given the place that the analogy of being holds in metaphysics, each doctrine of analogy is a manifestation of a certain conception of being, of causality, of participation, of the unity of beings in being. To grasp the precise significance of the doctrines that we are going to study, we must not content ourselves with a merely historical approach: it is necessary to bring to light the philosophical background that the theories of analogy permit one to grasp. We have to undertake this research into the metaphysical significance for each of the stages through which Thomas's thought has passed and we must do the same for the system of Cajetan. At the end of these journeys, we shall be in a position to compare the metaphysics of the Thomists

to that of Thomas according to what the study of the doctrines of analogy will have taught us about both positions.

In researching the metaphysical significance of analogy, we must take care to avoid the reef of reducing the metaphysics of Thomas to just one of its elements. For some wanted [13] in turn to reduce the essence of Thomism to the composition of essence and existence (Del Prado), or to potency and act (Manser), or finally to participation and to the analogy of being. Now each of these themes exists in the synthesis but only in part; none by itself can entirely express the philosophy of being, since we can embrace the simplicity and depth of being only by multiplying our points of view and representations. A realist philosophy, aware of the limits of its conceptual equipment, ought to respect the specificity and the convergence of these various themes. The riches contained within being can be obtained only at the end of many approaches, none of which ought to be sacrificed. We do not claim to reduce all of metaphysics to the analogy of being, but we would like to clarify the Thomist conception of being starting from what the theory of analogy yields.

Another reason encourages us to respect the diversity and the convergence of the three themes of composition, participation, and analogy. When each is taken separately, none seems original in the doctrine of Thomas, and one risks reducing his thoughts to the Aristotelian, Neoplatonic, or Avicennian elements from which it was formed. By confusing them, one would no longer grasp what Thomas owes to his predecessors nor what constitutes the originality of his most personal philosophical path. Now Thomas's philosophical choices are most often hidden or inexplicit: it is necessary to divine them behind the constructed system and only patient analyses allow us a hint of them. In Thomas's thought, what is the most philosophical has been buried as a foundation: to uncover it requires an attentive reading. The researches that we are undertaking on the subject of analogy are intended as a contribution to a better understanding of the conception of being at the heart of Thomist metaphysics.

Now that we have presented the historical and doctrinal objectives of our project, it is time to show what the stakes are. We must investigate the correspondence [14] that exists between the unity of the idea of being and the real structure of being. Given what our understanding

is, for us, to think is to unify. We impose the unity of the concept upon the diversity of the real, and being, as Cajetan remarked,[12] is the most general form under which we gather all reality into unity. Now by what right can we unify the totality of the real in being? Is the unity of the idea of being apparent but illusory, assuming that it covers an irreducible diversity? Or does it reflect undivided unity under the variety of phenomena, assuming that beings are related to each other as the species of a unique genus or that they constitute the modes of one unique substance? Thus we encounter the metaphysical problem of the unity and the multiplicity of being.

A path must be opened between absolute monism and radical pluralism, since either extreme ruins metaphysics. For radical pluralism, this is quite evident, for knowing exists only as a single unified act, and the fundamental project of philosophy is to reduce the many to the one. But the Parmenidean monistic solution is no less ruinous, as has been perceived since *The Sophist* of Plato, and philosophers must either resign themselves to "parricide" or else retreat into silence. Platonic participation and the Aristotelian theory of the diversity of the genera of being represent two attempts to reduce the totality of the real to unity without sacrificing diversity to the one nor the one to diversity. Medieval philosophy has largely been inspired by both sides.

Aristotle could believe that the theory of the multiple meanings of being by reference to substance satisfactorily answered the aporiae brought up by Parmenides and Antisthenes for their successors. Once creation was known, however, the partial character of such a solution has to be recognized, for the reduction of diverse beings to unity by relation to God becomes the essential problem. Aristotle reduced the many to the one at the horizontal level of the categories by connecting the [15] accidents to substance, but it still remains to reduce the different substances themselves to unity from a transcendental point of view. For Aristotle substances are unified in virtue of their subordination, with regard to motion, to the substance from which all motion originates: in sum, the unity of the cosmos is like that of a machine. Now from the fact of the doctrine of creation, Christian thought conceives an even deeper dependence of all beings with respect to what is the fulness of being: all that they are they owe to that which is the source of all being and the cause of all reality. External relations no longer procure unity: now unity proceeds from participation by creatures in the divine being. Henceforeward the problem of the one

and the many takes on a new urgency: how to conceive the relation of beings to Being? If they are homogenous with it, the monism that results leads necessarily to pantheism. And if they are heterogeneous to it, the mind comes up against a pluralism such that makes God unknowable. A God too close or too far, pantheism or agnosticism: how can we find a passage between these two dangers?

Here is what is at stake in the apparently Scholastic question: is being equivocal or univocal? The doctrine of analogy is supposed to answwer that question by showing what the unity of being is at the level of categories, then among the different substances. For Thomas, the first reduction to unity, that which operates among the categories, was discovered by Aristotle and he holds this solution as definitive. He will touch it in passing, he will even clarify it, but he never will attempt to establish it. Each time he will content himself with directing the reader to Aristotle, most often by a simple allusion. This is what has sometimes given the impression that there was no explicit doctrine of analogy in Thomas and that this doctrine would still have to be developed. This is absolutely not so, since our Doctor presupposes the Aristotelian theory. This is why we will focus on Thomas's first works, in which this Aristotelian element is more explicit. The second reduction to unity—the one that ought to establish transcendental unity—raises the subtlest of difficulties, for it involves our knowledge of God. For what good is the language that we [16] apply to God? Entirely borrowed from our universe, it can help us to say of God only what has been manifested of Him by creatures. Now can one affirm that beings are like God? Two beings are like each other by what they have in common, and, if they have nothing in common, they cannot be like each other. But what is there in common between the created and the creator? And what likeness remains where there is nothing in common? In other words, if the created names that we apply to God are univocal, the divine transcendence is annihilated; if they are equivocal, our language is vain and we have to give up knowing God. Here again analogy must intervene to escape these two extremes. But can the theory that Aristotle worked out to reduce categories to unity still be of any help to us to take account of the transcendental unity of being between creatures and God? Does transcendental analogy depend upon unity of order, as does that which binds accidents to substance, or upon unity of proportion? On this point we shall report the hesitations through which Thomas passed before discovering a

general theory of the analogy of being which applies to transcendental unity as well as predicamental unity.

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When one passes from the reading of Thomas to that of the Thomists who have treated of analogy, one experiences a certain surprise. For one could believe oneself to be far away from the metaphysical preoccupations that we have just called forth, for the Thomists have deemed it possible to detach analogy from all real content so as to treat it as a logical form. Supposing that this attitude is legitimate, to what extent does it conform to Thomas's thought? This is not yet the place to study it in detail, but this methodologocal a priori lets us understand why the discussions wherein the Thomists are opposed to each other have such an abstract and formal character.

Besides, the disciples of Thomas are far from being in agreement among themselves; it suffices to go through the countless works already devoted to our subject to notice the divergences that [17] separate them. It is one thing that there is a Scotist theory of univocity since Scotus is, after all, a stranger to Thomas. But how can the Thomists be in disagreement on positions that govern all of metaphysics? And to increase the confusion, they all claim to find support in the texts and to be faithful to the thought and to the letter of their master. Now it seems hard for them all to be able to be right at the same time: the lively polemics they have aroused should suffice to warn us from the start.

In sum, one can reduce to three the positions among which Thomas's followers are divided. (1) The first position is represented by Cajetan. For him analogy is essentially proportionality. To be sure, he also knows the so called analogy of "attribution" (i.e., the Aristotelian theory of unity by reference to a primary instance); but this latter is, according to him, necessarily extrinsic and cannot be applied to the unity and diversity of being. Cajetan's theory can be summarized as follows: the analogy of attribution is always extrinsic; the sole intrinsic analogy is that of proportionality. Taken over by John of Saint Thomas and repeated in the manuals, this explanation has become classic amongst the Thomists. Works such as those of Ramirez (at least in 1921-22) and of Penido have contributed to sunstantiating and disseminating this position.

Nevertheless not all Thomists have fallen into step with Cajetan and (2) a second tendency is discernible among them, the leader of which is the commentator on the *Contra Gentiles*, Sylvester of Ferrara, and this tendency is represented in the recent literature by the articles of Blanche or Van Leeuwen. These authors attempt to do justice to the various texts of Thomas and to recognize the place that belongs to the analogy of attribution at the side of or even ahead of the analogy of proportionality. Starting from there, they tried to show that every analogy involves a gradation and an order in relation to a principal analogate that is really and numerically one. In some respects this theory is closer to the letter of Thomas; but to the extent that it takes its starting point in Cajetan's theory to correct it by introducing a primary analogate, it orients the [18] discussion to a secondary point and does not even resolve it satisfactorily (for it is doubtful that proportionality of itself requires the presence of a primary analogate). It seems difficult to rejoin the thought of Thomas by taking Cajetan's problematic as one's starting point.[13]

Suarez adopts an interpretation of the texts of Thomas diametrically opposed to Cajetan's. It has been taken up again in our own day by Descoqs. According to the Suarezians, analogy of proportionality is never primary but it is based upon a previous likeness that can be accounted for only by an analogy of intrinsic attribution. This latter expresses the participation of the prime analogue by the secondary analogates. In the eyes of Thomists, however, this intrinsic analogy has long been looked upon as a typical Suarezian invention. Even for Blanche "the analogy of attribution, unless it loses its formal purity, allows no real participation of the analogue by the secondary analogates."[14] Another Thomist, Ramirez, in an article appearing in 1953 which, unfortunately, has passed almost unnoticed, has done justice to these simplistic interpretations and has aptly shown that the authentic thought of Thomas must be sought midway between the opposite errors of Cajetan and Suarez.[15] The most recent works that we have examined above are oriented toward a likely conclusion recognizing that—aside from the *De veritate* which would represent a provisional solution that was quickly abandoned—Thomas gives preference to analogy by reference to a primary instance.

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[19] The divergences and disagreements among Thomas's disciples render it desirable to have a study free of any polemical intention so as to examine what belongs to Thomas's thought as well as the way it was constituted. The liveliness of past discussions shows that the project is fraught with difficulty and that one cannot flatter oneself with the belief that the discussion is over. We think, however, that the underlying metaphysical positions that are at stake ought to be brought to light. Perhaps we could at least agree on the obvious sense of the texts, even if we have to declare later that we deem the thought of Thomas unsatisfying and prefer some other solution. The metaphysical choices that govern the various theories of analogy would thus take center stage instead of hiding behind the exegesis of texts.

What method can we adopt for an inquiry? Can we rely on a purely lexicographical investigation?[16] Is it sufficient to point out the texts in which the words analogia, proportio, proportionalitas occur? To be sure, there is a certain interrelation between doctrine and vocabulary, but for our purpose the meaning of the terms cannot be established by a mere lexicographical investigation, since the definition of the words [20] itself constitutes the difficulty. For the term *analogia* in the language of Thomas covers two distinct Aristotelian theories; on the one hand, conforming to its etymological sense, it refers to the unity of proportion, but it applies equally to the unity of many meanings by reference to a primary instance, i.e., to the unity of order that is called analogy of "attribution" following the Arabic-Latin translation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.[17] In short, *analogia* designates sometimes the unity of proportion, sometimes the unity of order, and one will respectively speak of analogy of proportionality or analogy of attribution. Since neither of these two expressions—although classic,—is beter than the other, the second because it is misleading, the first because it is incorrect, we shall follow the usage proposed by Blanche[18] and shall speak of analogy of proportion (*analogie de proportion*) and analogy of relation (*analogie de rapport*). We shall preserve the commonly used expressions only when we examine the Cajetanian theory to which they are inseparably bound. The equivalences of the terms are sufficiently clear to avoid any risk of confusion.

Those who want to take as the starting point of their investigations the etymological sense of analogy and thence to go back to the texts of Aquinas and then those of Aristotle have encountered an insoluble difficulty. For this notion accounts only for the texts from the *De Veri-*

tate and not those in which analogy designates something completely different than proportional unity. Why would it be necessary to reduce these latter texts, [21] which are far more numerous, to the theory of *De Veritate?* The difficulty into which this method falls increases still more when one examines the texts of Aristotle, for the proportion that Aristotle makes much use of in his biological writings is never applied to being, as the investigations of G.L Muskens have shown.[19] Was Aristotle unaware of the analogy of being, as some Scholastics have not hesitated to affirm? By contrast, it is within the Platonic tradition that one finds an analogy of proportion between the region of the visible and that of the invisible. Yet the analogy of being passes for Aristotle's principal discovery.

The contradictions in which it is involved condemn the method we have just described and compel us to give up the idea that we could search *a priori* for a definition of analogy that would subsequently have to be verified in the texts and to which everyone would have to agree. On the contrary, one ought to start with the doctrinal problem of the unity of being and hence to clarify the language that one ought to use. Now the source of the philosophical speculations on the subject of analogy is found in the Aristotelian theory of the multiple meanings of being unified by reference to a primary instance, which Aristotle never calls analogy.

This is the reason why, in our first chapter, we shall have to examine in the first place those Thomist texts in which the Aristotelian theory is taken up, commented, and developed. We shall then study the enrichment that the introduction of the platonic doctrine of participation brings to bear. Once this enquiry has been accomplished, we shall be able to formulate a first definition of the analogy of being. In the second chapter we shall observe the points of hesitation and progress through which Thomas's thought on transcendental analogy has passed and we shall see that our Doctor did not immediately get to adjust the Aristotelian scheme according to the relation of the created to the Creator. We shall then be in a position to show what conception of being governs the Thomist doctrine of analogy. In the third chapter we shall compare [22] the doctrine of Cajetan to that of Thomas so as to bring to light the historical and doctrinal reasons that have presided over the formation of a new theory, commonly accepted by contemporary Thomists. This comparison will allow us, at the end of this investigation, to reveal the two directions in

which the Thomist metaphysics can be developed. From there our investigation will lead on to the fundamental problems that confront the philosophy of being.[20]

Notes

1   H. Lyttkens, *The Analogy between God and the World. An Investigation of its Background and Interpretation of its Use by Thomas of Aquinas*. Uppsala 1952. See the review by L.—B. Geiger in BT 9 (1954-56) no. 771.

2   G. P. Klubertanz, *Thomas Aquinas on Analogy. A Textual Analysis and Systematic Synthesis*. Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1960. See our review in BT 11 (1960-62).

3   C. Fabro, *Participation et causalité selon S. Thomas d'Aquin*. Louvain 1961. French translation of *Partecipazione e causalità secondo S. Tommaso d'Aquino*. Turin 1960. We are using the French version. The theory of analogy is found in the third part, section II: The semantics of Thomist participation, pp. 509-622. See our review in BT 11 (1960-62) no. 762.

4   H. Lyttkens, *Nythomistisk filosofi*, in *Särtryck ur Ny Kyrklig Tidskrift*, 1960, pp. 1-47.

5   "He describes what is really a Neoplatonic analogy by the direct analogies he has found in Aristotle" (H. Lyttkens, *The Analogy between God and the World*, pp. 352-353).

6   As Lyttkens emphasizes, *ibid.* pp. 187-188.

7   The author even specifies that the texts of Book IV of the *Sentences* and those of the *De Veritate* relative to proportionality date from 1256-57: *Thomas Aquinas on Analogy*, p. 27 and p. 94.

8   *Ibid.*, pp. 20-34. We shall later on discuss the observations relative to analogical *ratio* (p. 103, note 70) and to double exemplarity (p. 51 and p. 58).

9   C. Fabro, *Participation et causalité*, p. 527.

10 *Ibid.*, p. 510.

11 *Ibid.*, p. 636.

12 We do not deem it necessary to mention the older book by M.T.L. Penido, *Le rôle de l'analogie en théologie dogmatique*, Paris 1931, which in the absence of any other similar work, has long enjoyed an ill-deserved reputation. As the author himself explained, he is concerned neither with a philosophical work nor a historical work, but, as the title indicates, a theological work. Neverthless one cannot discuss the role of analogy in theology without explaining what one understands by analogy. To it the author devotes his first chapter of "philosophical preliminaries." Despite the numerous texts of Thomas brought forward by the author, the chief outlines of the exposition and its guiding principles are borrowed from

Cajetan, in virtue of the debatable claim according to which the theory of Cajetan extends and develops the doctrine of Aquinas. In short this is to be taken as an exposition of the thought of Cajetan and not that of Thomas, although the author does not seem to make any distinction between the two. See also by the same author a complementary article: "Cajetan et notre connaissance analogique de Dieu," in RT 39 (1934-35) 149-192.

13   *In De ente et essentia*, q. 1; Laurent ed., p. 11: "Conceptus entis est forma generalissima ipsius intellectus, sicut forma corporeitatis est forma generalissima ipsius materiae... Est etiam conceptus entis quasi naturalis ipsi intellectui, sicut et cognitio primi principii."

14   Let us mention that the attempts, such as those of Garrigou-Lagrange and especially E. Laurent, to reconcile the doctrine of the *De veritate* with that of Thomas's later works, involve the same difficulty.

15   F. A. Blanche, "Une théorie de l'analogie. Eclaircissements et développements," RP 32 (1932) p. 38.

16   S. Ramirez, "En torno a un famosa texto de Santo Tomás sobre la analogia," Sap 8 (1953) 166-192.

17   The lexicographical method applied to the study of a philosophical topic can be informative, but it presents serious drawbacks, for it runs the risk of staying on the hither side of what the texts contain. See L.-B. Geiger's remarks on this subject in BT 8 (1947-53) n° 539: "When one undertakes a study on a doctrinal topic one very soon realizes that the lexicographic method is very tricky to handle. If one begins with a materially complete collection of all the texts where the word whose meaning one wants to determine as well as the related words occur, one very soon finds oneself in the presence of a crushing heap of documents when a set of works like that of St. Thomas is at stake. Besides important and significant references, one finds a large number that would at first glance appear to be negligible. But is this impression justified? As soon as one begins to reflect on the value of the texts one has gathered, particularly as soon as one begins any classification, indubitably doctrinal criteria come into play. From that moment on, everything depends on the philosophical penetration of the texts, and this penetration obviously depends on the sharpness of the philosopher's mind . . . One can then ask oneself whether a collection of citations that is made on too material basis might not perplex the philosopher rather than provide him clarification." ("Quand on entreprend une étude relative à un thème doctrinal, on s'aperçoit très vite que la méthode lexicographique est très délicate à manier. Si l'on commence par un relevé matériellement complet de tous les textes où figurent le mot dont on veut déterminer le sens et les mots apparentés, on se trouve très vite en présence d'une documentation écrasante, quand il s'agit d'une œuvre comme celle de S. Thomas. A côté

de références importantes et significatives, il s'en trouve un grand nombre qui, à première vue, paraissent négligeables. Mais cette impression est-elle justifiée? Dès qu'on commence de réfléchir à la valeur des textes qu'on a recueillis, dès qu'on commence surtout à opérer un classement quelconque, des critères interviennent dont le caractère doctrinal ne peut faire de doute. Dès ce moment tout dépend de la pénétration philosophique des textes, et cette pénétration dépend évidemment de l'acuité de l'esprit du philosophe... On peut alors se demander si un relevé des citations, fait trop matériellement, n'égare pas le philosophe plutôt qu'il ne l'éclaire."

[18] See the Appendix on the literary and doctrinal sources of the *De principiis naturae.*

[19] F. A. Blanche, "Sur les sens de quelques locutions concernant l'analogie dans la langue de S. Thomas d'Aquin," RSPT 10 (1921) 54. Blanche points out that the analogy of attribution is so-called "not as one might believe because the name that properly pertains to a real characteristic, or to the principle analogue possessing this characteristic, may be extended by derivation, by attribution to other analogues, but rather because the diverse analogues are all related (*attribuuntur*) to one and the same characteristic realized in the principle analogue alone" ("non pas, comme on pourrait le croire, parce que le nom qui convient proprement à un caractère réel, ou à l'analogue principal possédant ce caractère, serait étendu par dérivation, par attribution, aux autres analogues, mais bien parce que les divers analogues sont tous rapportés [*attribuuntur*] à un même caractère réalisé seulement dans l'analogue principal") (*ibid.*, p. 53). This remark is to be kept in mind, even though the author presents the analogy of attribution as extrinsic.

[20] G. L. Muskens, *De vocis ajnalogiva" significatione ac usu apud Aristotelem.* Groningen 1943.

[21] After this essay was conpleted, Ralph M. McInerny's book, *The Logic of Analogy: An Interpretation of Thomas* (The Hague 1961) was published. For the author of that book, analogy belongs essentially to logic; it is a logical relation proper to common names just like the other second intentions: it is a *nomen intentionis*, not a *nomen rei*. That is why analogical attribution must not be confused with the real dependence of accident upon substance nor with that of creatures in regard to God. For analogy is the property of a common name which does not signify totally different notions, but which designates them according to an order *secundum prius et posterius* by relation to a primary instance. Now "*per prius*" is most often taken by relation to our knowledge and does not coincide with the real cause. In line with these reflections, the author criticizes Cajetan for having turned analogy into a metaphysical theory and indeed for having uselessly multiplied the types of analogy, as if logical relations were dif-

ferentiated on the basis of their real content. In any case, the analogy of proportionality is not a special type of analogy; it lets us know that the things are similar only by the way in which the common name is applied to them. It is not necessarily intrinsic either, contrary to what Cajetan thought. The only division of analogy is that into analogy *unius ad alterum* and that of *duorum ad tertium*.

 On certain details, we share the conclusions to which the author's analyses have led, but we still believe that, for Thomas, analogy is not a pure logical form that one could separate from all real content, especially if one does not reduce analogy to proportional unity. For our part, we would address Cajetan with a criticism from the opposite direction from that of the author and we would criticize him for having excessively separated the logic of analogy from its metaphysical foundation.

CHAPTER 1
THE ELEMENTS OF THE THOMIST DOCTRINE OF ANALOGY

The doctrine of analogy arises from a synthesis of two topics, the one of Aristotelian inspiration, that of the unity of order by reference to a primary instance, the other of Platonic provenance, that of participation. The first, which will permanently underlie all the doctrinal developments is treated in its own right in the expositions of Aristotelian metaphysics contained in the two opuscula *De principiis naturae* and *De ente et essentia* as well as the *Commentary on the Metaphysics*. These texts offer the advantage of belonging to the beginning and the end of Thomas's career; they allow us to check the continuity of the theory of analogy from the earliest works right up to one of the last. The second theme, that of participation, which enriched and completed the first, appears in the great personal works from the *Sentences* to the *Summa theologiae.* We shall not consider it for its own sake, as Fathers Fabro and Geiger have already done; it will interest us to the extent that it appears in the accounts related to analogy. The chronological order of the works will enable us to grasp a doctrinal development indicative of Thomas's most personal philosophical positions on the communication of being. At the end of these two series of analyses we shall obtain a first definition of the analogy of being, thanks to which in the following chapter we shall be able to examine how the theory of the transcendental analogy between the created being and the divine being is worked out progressively.

I. The unity of order in relation
to a primary instance

Before we engage in the analyses of Thomas's texts, let us proceed to a quick survey of the doctrinal elements that these texts bring into play and note their provenance. First one must note that analogy is

a property of common names and concepts. This is why the various accounts of analogy that we shall encounter use the division of predicates into three groups: univocal, equivocal, and analogous predicates (the latter forming an intermediate class). Everyone knows that this division, having become banal in medieval Scholasticism, does not appear as such in Aristotle, but arises from Arab Aristotelianism.[1] The other elements of the theory of analogy are borrowed from Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. Let us review them briefly. To start with there is the doctrine of the unity and diversity of intrinsic principles that one finds in *Met. L*, 4 and 5, 1070a31- 1071b1: "the causes and principles of different beings are, in one sense, different, but in another sense, if one speaks generally and by analogy (κατ' ἀναλογίαν, proportionally), they are the same for all the other beings" (1070a31-33).[2] Then there is the enumeration of the different types of unity that one encounters in *Met. D*, 6, 1016b31-1017a2 and *D*, 9,1018a13. "That which is one is <so> either with respect to number, or species, or genus, or by analogy... By [25] analogy, all things that are the one to the other as a third thing is to a fourth." Finally, the most important doctrinal source is the Aristotelian theory of the unity of the object of metaphysics: being is said in many ways but ways that are unified by reference to a fundamental meaning which is that of substance.[3] Thomas takes the examples from Aristotle; whenever he brings up health, medicine and being which is said of accident in relation to substance, one can see there most likely a way to direct the reader to the classic texts of *Met. G*, 2, 1003a33-b15; *Z*, 4, 1030a34-b3, and *K*, 3, 1060b31-1061a10. In summary, the direct borrowings from Aristotle's *Metaphysics* concern the unity and diversity of the constituting principles, the enumeration of the types of unity and especially the ordered diversity of the meanings of being. How did Thomas use these elements?
[26]

A. The "*De principiis naturae*"[4]

This *opusculum* is of interest to our project for two reasons: first, because it is probably Thomas's first work and then because it contains a chapter devoted *ex professo* to the theory of analogy. For these two reasons the *De principiis naturae* allows us to see what the starting point of Thomas's thought on the subject of analogy was. A study of the literary and doctrinal sources that appears in the appendix allows us to conclude that the vocabulary of the opusculum is borrowed from the Arabic-Latin version of the *Metaphysics*, whereas the treatment is

an almost literal summary of Averroes's commentary. Would the first observation provide evidence for dating the *De principiis* before the *Sentences*, as J. J. Pauson thinks,[5] if it is true that the *Sentences* cites a Greek-Latin version? This latter fact does not seem sufficiently established for one to be able to draw any conclusion. Roland-Gosselin has shown that the *De ente* was drafted after the *De principiis* and before book II of the *Sentences*.[6] Our own investigations [27] confirm this relative chronology: the *opusculum* shows no originality and the peculiar vocabulary that it uses (*attributio, attribui* to designate relation to a primary instance) will never again be found in the work of Thomas. In short, we can accept the following chronological order: *De principiis naturae, De ente et essentia, Sentences.*

The last chapter of the *opusculum* is devoted to the analogy of principles and causes. Since natural beings are constituted by two intrinsic principles, matter and form, we should examine in what sense the principles of different beings are the same and in what sense they are other. How are the principles common to all beings? To resolve this problem one appeals to the following axiom: The type of community and diversity of principles is identical to the type of community and diversity of the beings of which they are the principles.[7] We can recognize four degrees of unity and diversity: numerical unity of the individual, specific unity among numerically distinct individuals, generic unity among specifically distinct beings, and unity of analogy among beings that belong to different genera and that nevertheless have a certain unity amongst themselves. Thus substance and quantity do not belong to an identical category, although they are united in being; being is not a genus nor a univocal predicate: it is an analogous attribute.[8] In short, the principles of the different categories can have only an analogical unity, i.e., only a proportional one. Consequently, so far, *analogia* is understood in the etymological sense of proportion. [28] In order to explain what the unity *secundum analogiam* that was just under discussion is, Thomas now goes on to appeal to the Aristotelian theory of the attribution of health and being by reference to a primary instance. To define analogical unity, he relates the unity of proportion, which has been under discussion up to this point, to the unity of order.

A common predicate, explains Thomas, can belong to several beings in three ways, according as it is univocal, equivocal, and analogical. The definition of a univocal belongs equally to all those things to which

one attributes it. The equivocal is only a common name fortuitously attributed to totally different realities. The analogical applies to different beings each of which has its own nature and a distinct definition, but which have in common the fact that they are all in a relation to the one among them to which the common meaning primarily belongs.[9] Thus, the Aristotelian example of health, so well known that we can dispense with reporting it. An analogical denomination is common to several in virtue of the reference of each to a primary instance. In the wake of Averroes who himself clarifies Aristotle's theory, Thomas understands this reference to a primary instance as a relation of ontological causality tying the analogates to the primary instance. In other words, analogical unity rests upon the causality that the primary instance exercises toward the analogates. But the causality of the primary instance is not uniform. Sometimes it plays the role of final cause: in this way the different meanings of the term "healthy" designate realities that are ordered to the health of a living being as their end; sometimes it is efficient cause: in this way the meanings of the term "medical" are taken by derivation from the medical practitioner who is the agent; sometimes it is the receptive cause: this is the case with being, which is said primarily of substance, then secondarily of quantity, quality, and the other accidents by reference to the substance which is their subject, their material cause. This is why being is not a genus, because it is attributed unequally (*per* [29] *prius et posterius*) to the various categories.[10]

   Thus Thomas connects proportional unity to unity of order and define analogical unity by reference to a primary instance. Thence all the terms in the enumeration of the various sorts of unity are defined; namely, numerical, specific, generic, and analogical unity. The end of the chapter will apply the distinctions just drawn to the problem of the unity of the intrinsic principles (matter and form) of different categories and answers the question posed at the start: how are the principles common? The same holds for the unity and diversity of principles as for the unity and diversity of the beings of which they are the principles. To beings that are numerically, specifically, or generically one there belong principles presenting the same degree of identity. At the last rank of the list, realities that are analogically one have principles that are analogically common. Thus, the matter, the form, and the privation of substance are different from those of the other accidental categories. And yet they are proportionally similar,

they have an analogical unity—*secundum proportionem*. Taking into account the explanations about analogy just given, this analogical unity of intrinsic principles signifies two things: proportional unity and unity of order. There is first a proportional unity, since the principles of being for each category are different—things that pertain to different genera do not have the same causes—but are also proportionally similar. More fundamentally, the unity of the principles of being is a unity of order, for the causes of a substance are also the causes of the substance's determinations. *Sicut tamen substantia est causa caeterorum, ita principia substantiae sunt principia omnium aliorum.*[11] [30] The chapter devoted to the analogy of principles and intrinsic causes concludes with this affirmation of the fundamental role of substance.

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Upon reading the text that we just analyzed, it appears that analogy serves first to designate proportional unity, in conformity with the etymological signification of the term, i.e., the similarity of relation which unites pair-wise the terms of two or more couples; but analogy also serves to express the unity of many meanings ordered in relation to a primary instance which, for short, we call the unity of order. This unity of order receives no special name in Aristotle, and, in any case, is never by him called analogy. As G.L. Muskens pointed out,[12] in Aristotle analogy as proportional unity is never applied to being; on the contrary the unity of being is always presented as a unity of order by reference to substance, which is the fundamental being. In Thomas, on the other hand, the two sorts of unity receive the same name,[13] but this name undergoes a modification, since analogical unity is first and foremost the unity that is established by the ontological relations of final, efficient and material causality with respect to a primary instance, whence proportional likenesses result among the analogates. In other words, proportional unity is not primary: it is reduced to the unity of order, which is more fundamental. In short, the two senses of the term "analogy" are neither unrelated nor merely juxtaposed: the one is subordinated to the other, since proportional unity depends upon unity of order.[14]

[31]

So, for Thomas, the name "analogy" passes from proportion to relation: analogy is the theory laid out by Aristotle in Book IV of the *Metaphysics* to explain the diversity and unity of the meanings of being

and secondarily mathematical proportion, i.e., the likeness of two or more relations. Each time that Thomas refers to the example of health and of the being of accident and substance, he alludes implicitly but indisputably to Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and he understands analogy as unity of order by reference to a primary instance.

The theory we find in the *De principiis naturae* is not limited to the analogy of being, but extends also to other applications. For our purpose let us focus on what touches on being. First of all, analogy is considered only at the level of the categories—between the accidents and substance. The different ways of being that the categories convey are unified by relation to the fundamental being, which is that of substance. The common notion of being that belongs to all the categories is neither univocal, since it does not belong to them equally, nor equivocal, because among the categories there is a unity by reference to substance. In this way both the diversity and the unity of being are respected at the predicamental level. Hence being belongs primarily to substance and secondarily to the accidents, whose entire being depends upon that of the substance: *ens dicitur per prius de substantia et per posterius de aliis.*[15] Thus there is an exact reciprocity between attribution by reference to a primary instance and attribution according to the prior and the posterior. We are [32] therefore justified to speak of analogy when the texts employ the one or the other of these equivalent expressions. These remarks will guide our analysis of the *De ente et essentia*, in which the term *analogia* does not occur, although there is an extensive inquiry in it regarding the attribution of being *per prius et posterius.*[16]
[33]

B. The "*De ente et essentia*"[17]

The analogy of being develops in two directions: the horizontal one is that of the divisions of being according to the categories; the other, vertical dimension, is that of the degrees of being constituted by the substances themselves. Let us call them predicamental analogy and transcendental analogy. The first is outlined in the *De principiis naturae;* we have not yet addressed the second. The *De ente et essentia* develops both the one and the other. We shall not follow Thomas's analysis which goes from the simple to the complex, from the essence to the being (*ens*) and which considers the analogy of essence and that of being separately. The general pattern is the following: being is present primarily in substances and derivatively in accidents. The

substances themselves also have a hierarchy, since the simple substances are superior to the composite substances of which they are the cause. Such are the two directions, predicamental and transcendental, of the analogy of being.

The predicamental analogy of being is that which binds accidents to substance. Substance is the fundamental and principal being because ontologically autonomous, whereas accident belongs to relative being, entirely ordered to the substance of which it [34] is the perfection and on which it depends for being. Being involves a real diversity since it is either absolute and subsistent, or relative and inherent, but this diversity is not detrimental to unity, because accidental being is subordinated to substantial being. This time the causality of substance vis-à-vis accidents is conceived in a broader way than simple material receptive causality: substance, our opusculum affirms, is cause of accidents because it is *maxime et verissime* being and the maximum in any genus is the cause of everything that participates in this genus.[18] The idea is the following: in the order of being, there is a gradation by relation to a maximum which is cause: the perfection of being, realized without restriction in the substance, is participated derivatively by the accidents.[19] The unity of order that relates accidental being to substantial being [35] is no longer confined to an external relation of inherence; it is deeper: it is based upon a common nature, the *ratio entis*, unequally participated among the substance and the accidents.[20] The predicamental analogy is now rendered in terms of participation: if substance is the primordial being, it is no longer merely as subject of accidents, but as maximum degree of a perfection that the accidents possess by participation of a lesser degree. At the level of the categories, the unity of order rests on a relation of participation.

Transcendental analogy is constituted by the degrees of substantiality and by the formal hierarchy that they include—an idea that Thomas owes to Aristotle, but profoundly changes.[21] At the lower level, we find hylomorphic substances, characterized by a two-fold composition of potency and act, that of essence (composed of matter and form) and that of being (the *esse* is received within the essence). These substances are diversified into species themselves hierarchized (in the passage Thomas drew from Aristotle the idea of a hierarchy of living things from the plants up to the higher animals, passing through all the intermediates[22]), and the [36] species comprise different individu-

als. Number is introduced under two forms: as formal multiplicity of specific degrees and as numerical multiplicity of individuals; the first flowing from the entitative composition, the second resulting from hylomorphic composition.

Created intellectual substances hold an intermediate level. Their essence is immaterial and simple; it is pure form, but it is not identical to the *esse* that actuates it. Consequently their being is composed of potency and act. These substances are multiplied both as species and as individuals because each is a pure form. They differ from each other by their degree of perfection and their perfection increases to the extent that there is less potentiality in them.

The supreme level is the divine being, perfectly simple, since its essence is to exist, necessarily unique and distinct from all the others by the plenitude of perfection of its being, possessing in itself in a pre-eminent way all the perfection and value that is in the other beings. The hierarchy of being culminates in it and its perfection sets it apart from all other beings, according to the Proclean axiom: *individuatio primae causae quae est esse tantum, est per puram bonitatem ejus.*[23] Thus beings are arranged in an ordered hierarchy (*ordo et gradus*)[24], from the supreme perfection of the first being down to the inferior realizations, near the indetermination of matter. God is purely in act, the higher immaterial substances are closer to Him owing to their actuality, whereas the human soul occupies the lowest level of the spiritual forms. Then come the different forms involved in matter according to their hierarchy. From pure act to pure potency passing through all the intermediate degrees of the composition of potency and act—that is how the degrees of being unfold.

The idea of a hierarchy of substances, borrowed from Aristotle, is, as we said, profoundly transformed by Thomas. This can be seen in the fact that the hierarchy is conceived by the author of the [37] *De ente* as the gradation of a common perfection unequally possessed, i.e., the perfection of being. To the extent that one remains at the predicamental level, there are not degrees; there are only specifically or generically distinct forms, and individuals or species to which these forms belong in a uniform and univocal way (the inequalities that can be encountered in it among individuals of the same species or among species of the same genus do not break up the formal univocity). Nor should the hierarchy of substances be confused with the accidental degrees of a single specific form possessed more or less intensely by

a subject (a person more or less virtuous, water more or less hot), since an inequality of this sort does not suppress formal univocity. No gradation whatever *secundum magis et minus* would be enough to establish analogy by reference to a primary instance.[25] For substances to be hierarchized among themselves in virtue of what they are, one must consider the specific natures as just so many unequal degrees of one common perfection, the *ratio entis* or the *genus entis*.[26] Beyond the specific or generic differences that establish their formal multiplicity, the diverse substances are unified in a common perfection unequally possessed by each, somewhat as the accidents receive being in a diminished manner at the predicamental level. In short, it is only within a transcendental perspective that different natures can be considered as hierarchical realizations of one self-same perfection.

The Aristotelian idea of hierarchy undergoes a second transformation as a consequence of the first. The unity of the hierarchy is obtained by reference to a primary instance; the degrees are based upon [38] the eminence and causality of a primary instance and the latter is such because it is constituted by the perfection of being: *Deus, cujus essentia est ipsum suum esse*.[27] All that exists of perfection more or less inferior in degree in other things is found in an eminent and unified form in God. Since the degrees proceed from composition and potency, God is the first in the order of being because God is pure act, without mixture of potency. Moreover, under its unequally limited forms, being proceeds from that which is pure being and which, as such, is at the origin of all communication of being, *oportet quod sit aliqua res quae sit causa essendi omnibus rebus ex eo quod ipsa est esse tantum*.[28] All that which is has being from this first cause: *habet esse a primo ente quod est esse tantum*.[29] The enrichments that Thomas brings to the Aristotelian theory of unequal substances, which are hierarchized and subordinated to the first in virtue of an external causality, at once motive and final, are the following: a real community of the perfection of being, and a communication of being by the causality of the first being. Here there is a new field of application for the theory of analogy. Nevertheless the *De ente et essentia* does not go beyond the simple suggestion, and the causal relation between beings and God is not explicitly interpreted with the aid of analogy by reference to a primary instance. We shall soon see that the passage from transcendental analogy to participation does not proceed without difficulties.

C. The *Commentary on the Metaphysics*

Since the *Commentary* is situated toward the end of Thomas's career[30] and arises in a work where the author, while following Aristotle line by line and word by word, does not hesitate to introduce personal developments and to take a position on debated questions, we can find the final state of the theory of analogy in it and determine how it [39] conforms to the doctrine of his first works. The most developed treatments—which are found in Book I, Lecture 14, nos. 223-224, in Book IV, Lecture 1, nos. 534-543 (the commentary on *G*, 2) in Book VII, Lecture 1, nos. 1246-1259 and Lecture 4, nos. 1334-1338 (commentary on *Z*, 1) and finally in Book XI, Lecture 3 (commentary on *K*, 3)—present the predicamental analogy of being as a unity of order by relation to this primary form of being, which is substance. We find the idea of participation, as in the *De ente* and without many more explanations: when one perfection belongs unequally to two beings, to the one essentially, to the other by participation, we are no longer within the order of equivocity (*aequivoca a casu, aequivoca simpliciter*), since the perfection we attribute to the second by participation belongs to it by reference to the first, to which it belongs essentially. The analogical multiplicity is unified in virtue of the relation to a primary instance, to which the common denomination belongs essentially,[31] in such wise that predicamental analogy can be expressed in two equivalent ways: being is said of substance and accident *per prius* and *per posterius*, or again *per se* and *per participationem*.

A second observation confirms the homogeneity of the doctrine of the *Commentary* with that of the earliest works. When Aristotle enumerates the four degrees of unity—individual, specific, generic, analogical—the latter designates proportional unity; all things that are the one to the other as a third is to a fourth are one by analogy. Now Thomas systematically reduces proportional unity to unity by reference to a primary instance. We saw this in the *De principiis naturae*; we also notice it in the *Questions on the De Trinitate of Boethius*, q. 5, a. 4, first and second redaction.[32] The *Commentary* does not explain things any differently. In Book V, Lecture 8, n° 879, we read that proportion or analogy is the form of unity that relates pairs of terms taken two by two. Now analogical unity is presented in two ways: either, two things are bound by different relations [40] to one and the same term, following the example of health; or else, a self-same relation unites two pairs of terms: the calm of the sea is like the serenity of the sky (calm is

for the sea what serenity is for the sky). Let us note that Thomas does not start from unity by reference to a primary instance subsequently to extend analogy to include proportion among four terms, but he extends the meaning of the term analogy, from proportion, which it originally designated, to the unity of order,[33] in such fashion that the Latin term *proportio* designated the one as well as the other.

Nevertheless, two texts from the *Commentary* raise a question: is the unity of being at the predicamental level not understood as unity of proportion? In Book V, Lecture 12, n° 916, we find the classic enumeration of four degrees of unity. For the fourth, the author cites the unity of quantity and quality in being: *aliqua duo quae … conveniant … in aliquo uno secundum proportionem, sicut quantitas et qualitas in ente*. Which unity is he concerned with? The unity of proportion or the unity of order? The context inclines us to think that it is the unity of proportion, as is the case in a text more explicit, but unique, from Book III of the *Sentences* and whose context is similar: *… vel unum analogia seu proportione, sicut substantia et qualitas in ente: quia sicut se habet substantia ad esse sibi debitum, ita et qualitas ad esse sui generis conveniens.*[34] The second text relative to this same question is more precise; it shows that the proportional unity among the categories derives from the unity of order which ties the accidents to the substance: *propter hoc enim quod omnia alia praedicamenta habent rationem entis a substantia, ideo modus entitatis substantiae—scilicet esse quid—participatur secundum quamdam similitudinem proportionis in omnibus aliis praedicamentis.*[35]

[41]

From the texts that we have just cited, it would appear that the predicamental analogy of being involves both sorts of unity—unity by reference to substance, which in Thomas is formally at issue, and unity of proportion, more discretely hinted at but not absent. The one does not exclude the other and nothing indicates that one must choose between the two. But the one is more basic, the other subordinate, since proportional unity results from the unity of order as a dialectical function of its ontological foundation.

In conclusion, it would appear that from one end of the work of Thomas to the other, the fundamental analogy of being for him, at least at the predicamental level, is the theory that Aristotle worked out in his *Metaphysics* to explain the diversity and the unity of being. Whether it be explicit or implicit, this theory is the constant presup-

position of all the developments that Thomas has devoted to analogy. If he deepened and transformed it, it is, as we shall see, in the direction of a metaphysics of participation. And if he hesitated a bit in the *De veritate*, to recognize a universal scope for it, it is only because of special difficulties that the transcendental analogy between beings and God raises.[36]

[42]

II. Participation

The topic of participation more directly concerns the transcendental analogy of being, or, more precisely, the communication [43] of being according to degrees, from the divine being in which being subsists without restriction right down to partial realizations in the different substances. One can imagine the participation of being in an ascending direction as the gradual progress [44] of inferior and superior beings toward a maximum without limit, or in a descending direction as a progressive degradation of the plenitude of being which is in the primary instance and which all the others participate, each according to its own measure. More generally, to participate is to have partially that which another is without restriction. Hence comes the convergence of transcendental analogy and participation; for since being is participated by degrees starting from that which is being by essence, there is at once an essential diversity of participants and unity by reference to the primary instance from which they obtain their common perfection. In short, analogical unity and unity of participation merge. Now analogical unity is formed in virtue of the bonds of causality that tie the analogates to the primary instance. The transcendental analogy of being does not escape this rule and we ought to ask ourselves on which causal dependence of beings with regard to God transcendental analogy is based. Many authors have pointed out[37] that the *Sentences* often appeal to the notion of a *causa efficiens exemplaris* (which appears more rarely in subsequent works) to explain divine causality, as if exemplarity were lumped together and almost confused with efficiency; conversely, the dependence of beings with respect to God is presented there in the same way as that of an image with respect to the original. Lyttkens notes that transcendental analogy by likeness (of Neoplatonic inspiration) appears only in Thomas's earliest works and that it was subsequently abandoned.[38] In fact, the *Sentences* puts the imitation of God by created beings in the foreground and emphasizes

participation by likeness; later on in Thomas the communication of being will be presented primarily as a production of created being by God's efficient causality. Of course, the texts, conforming to the axiom of likeness *omne agens agit sibi simile*,[39] never radically separate exemplarity from efficient causality, and there could never [45] be any question of imputing to Thomas a Platonic way of thinking that he has always rejected. Nevertheless, the *Sentences* accord priority to exemplarity and imitation, thus emphasizing a relation belonging to the order of formal causality, while later on productive causality will be stressed. We shall have to examine the philosophic significance of this change. Before, we shall present the two forms that the doctrine of participation takes.

A. Participation by likeness in the *Sentences*

Two beings are similar when they possess one and the same form.[40] Likeness is first located in the univocal order, and we speak of participation by likeness between two beings when in the one the form is found fully and without restriction, while the other imitates the first without being equal to it.[41] There is between the two beings, then, no longer the unity established by the equal possession of one and the same form, since the form is in the primary instance *per essentiam* and in the secondary *per participationem*; it is a fundamentally unequal unity which rests upon the formal relation of imitation. Let us note two particularly precise expressions: *unum quod participative habet formam imitatur illud quod essentialiter habet*[42]; *unum per* [46] *se est simpliciter, et alterum participat de similitudine ejus quantum potest.*[43]

This general theory applies to the transcendental analogy of being. Here is how.

The unity between the creatures and the creator is not univocal but analogical. How?—In this way: the created being proceeds from the divine being and imitates it: *a primo ente descendit, ens primum imitatur*.[44] Beings are bound to God by a relation of exemplarity, and each imitates its model according to the measure of its own nature[45]; in virtue of the finite measure according to which each receives being, the created image is an imperfect and inadequate representation of the divine exemplar.[46] In communicating themselves, the divine attributes are found in a lower degree; within the beings here below, they cannot be found such as they really are, but only under the form of an image diminished *per aliquem modum imitationis et similitudinis.*[47] In short,

between the created thing and God there is neither radical heterogeneity nor confusion in one self-identical form; the analogical unity that unites them consists in the fact that the creatures imitate God to the extent that they can, to the extent that their nature permits, without attaining the fullness of the divine perfection.[48] This is why the relation of likeness is not reciprocal; it goes only from the created thing toward the Creator.[49] The *De Veritate* also appeals to participation by imitation: the attributes [47] common to the created thing and to God (e.g., knowledge) are not equivocal because they designate the way in which the creature imitates the creator;[50] there is therefore no common form that God and beings participate each in their own way, but God is Himself the form that the created being participates by imitation.[51] Hence, in the earliest works, one cannot separate participation from imitation, nor distinguish, as Klubertanz thought it possible to do, analogy of imitation and analogy of participation. Both the one and the other designate the same formal relation which ties beings to God and gathers them in unity.

The likeness of the effect to the cause is a general law of causality, and the diverse types of likeness that we mentioned—univocal likeness and analogical imitation—are connected with the division into univocal and equivocal causes.[52] Causality is univocal when the form according to which the agent acts and which it communicates to the patient so as to impress its own likeness upon it is found as such in the patient; the agent and the effect have one form of the same species and the likeness is reciprocal. So the causality of the agent is received without restriction within the patient; both the one and the other are on the same ontological level. Equivocal causality, by contrast, is characterized by an essential inequality between the effect and the cause;[53] the form of the agent is superior to that of the patient; so the latter receives a form which is not that of the agent, a form that is inferior to it but which resembles it. Equivocal causality is a diminished communication of the perfection of the agent [48] which the patient receives partially. Hence the likeness is not reciprocal; it is unidirectional from the effect toward the agent.[54] It sometimes, though more rarely,[55] happens that Thomas proposes a three-fold division of causality, traced out on the basis of the predicates, to emphasize that equivocal causality is not uniform and that it in fact encompasses several sorts of unequal likeness between cause and effect.

First of all, this likeness can be generic, as is the case with the point which generates the line and with the line which generates the surface,[56] and with the causality of the sun, at least as it is presented in some texts.[57] Two other types of likeness between an effect and its equivocal cause must to hold our attention. The form, diminished in the effect, is present eminently in the agent either virtually or formally. There is virtual presence when the cause produces the effect in virtue of a form other than that of the effect; Thomas gives the example of the sun which has the power to produce heat, though it is not itself hot.[58] There is formal presence when the form in virtue of which the agent acts is communicated to the effect; the effect then resembles its cause in virtue of an intrinsic and formal participation: it is present in the cause according [49] to a superior but intrinsically similar form.[59] The transcendental communication of being fulfills this condition. When the form of the effect is present in the cause only virtually, the likeness is expressed in terms of a proportional unity,[60] to which Thomas opposes the analogical likeness of the effect to the cause in which it is formally contained.[61] To these two sorts of likeness correspond the two forms of analogy that we have located: to virtual likeness there corresponds the analogy of proportion; to formal likeness, analogy by reference to a primary instance.[62] [50]

We have just analyzed a two-fold equivocal causality, the one virtual, the other formal. These notions serve to analyze divine causality and allow us to uncover a two-fold exemplarity of God with respect to beings. One can consider beings, as we saw, from two points of view: that of their predicamental determination, and that of their transcendental perfection. As for me, my manner of being is being man; in other words the transcendental perfection of being is measured by my nature: man; conversely, being man is the finite way in which I participate the perfection of being. Perfection and determination coincide. Still, my determination is exclusive of every other; it is that by which I am what I am and am only what I am, whereas the perfection of being can be realized by degrees under other determinations, up to and including under the determination of being without limit. When one considers beings from the point of view of perfection, the notion that one forms—first of all, that of being as well as that of the properties coextensive with being (the transcendentals)[63]—includes neither matter nor limitation; perfection belongs first to God and secondarily to beings: *quia bonus est, ideo bona facit*,[64] or again, *ab ente*

sunt entia.[65] In short, God is formal cause of the perfection of being. But the limited determination itself under which the perfection of being is realized nevertheless does not escape the divine causality: God is cause of the limitation as well as the perfection. The finite measure according to which beings participate in the divine perfection depends no longer upon a formal causality but upon a virtual causality: matter and limitation do indeed depend upon the divine causality, and yet cannot be found in God. One can not go so far as to say: *quia homo est, ideo hominem facit.* Now virtual causality is defined in such a way that it excludes exemplarity, [51] since exemplar causality is that which an extrinsic formal cause exercises. Does this mean that God would be only the exemplar cause of transcendental perfections, and in no way of their finite determination?

In order to show the universality of God's exemplar causality, Thomas deepens his analysis and discerns two sorts of exemplar causality—that of nature and that of ideas, according to the biological pattern of generation and the man-made pattern of fabrication: following the first, the agent assimilates an effect to its very own being; following the second, it assimilates it to its own directive idea. By His nature God is exemplar cause of the participated perfection; by His idea, He is exemplar cause of the finite determination according to which the perfection is participated.[66] Correlatively, in each being two ways of being in the image of God answer to these two forms of exemplarity: the participated perfection is in the image of the divine nature; the measure according to which it is participated, in the image of a divine idea.[67] At the start, the analysis which distinguishes formal causality from virtual causality only brings to the fore the exemplarity of nature alone; yet God's formal causality acts also upon predicamental determinations by means of the ideas.[68] At the end, one can reconcile the formal causality [52] of the exemplarity of the nature and the virtual causality of the exemplarity of the idea: they present similar characters. Formal causality involves an intrinsic participation of the cause in the effect: because God is being, there are beings; because He is the Good, they are good, and so on. By contrast, virtual causality produces less likeness, since it introduces into the effect only an assimilation to the idea of the agent. In that way, returning to the central theme of the likeness of effect to cause, we can conclude that beings are like God in two ways: (1) in virtue of the participation by which they are like an attribute of the divine nature; (2) in virtue of the proportionality

according to which we attribute metaphorical names to God.[69] For-
mal participation by deficient likeness and proportional likeness of
effects are the two ways in which beings imitate their creator. Likeness
secundum participationem and likeness *secundum proportionalitatem*
are expressed respectively by the proper and the metaphorical divine
names. (One should note, in the *Sentences*, [53] the identification of
analogy of proportion with metaphor.)[70]

Participation by likeness is a complex theory whose elements we
have just analyzed. From this it follows that participation establishes
a relation of formal causality between beings and God and that anal-
ogy conveys at the conceptual level the unity of order by reference
to a primary instance that the analogates imitate and whose likeness
they bear. A formulation of Thomas summarizes this doctrine: *omne
ens quantumcumque imperfectum a primo ente exemplariter deducitur*.[71]
There is a community of analogy between beings and God because
creatures imitate God as best they can.

B. Participation and analogy in the mature works
(starting with the *Contra Gentiles*)

If there were no likeness between beings and God, the apparently
common notions would in fact be equivocal, since there would be
no real unity in being. On the other hand, if being is one common
form, God is no longer transcendent and the notions are univocal.
Hence, as we have seen, it is necessary to envisage an intermediate—an
imperfect likeness based upon the unequal participation of a form.[72]
In this context, one recognizes the participation by likeness that was
just under discussion,[73] and Thomas will speak of an *analogia imita-
tionis*.[74] This language[54\ is therefore not confined to the *Sentences*.
Further, participation by imperfect similitude is explicitly associated
with attribution *secundum prius et posterius*[75] and *secundum magis et
minus*.[76] Thus far, nothing new has appeared in the works posterior
to the *Sentences*. Analogy and participation are presented as a formal
relation between beings and God. Much more characteristic, on the
other hand, is the fact that participation may be conceived as a com-
munication of act to a subject in potency. Starting with the *Contra
Gentiles*, the role played by act and potency reveals a new conception
of causality and being.

As a general rule, the subject that participates is related to the participated perfection as potency to act.[77] This is why the participated perfection cannot by itself constitute the participating subject: there is no participation of the act without a proportioned potency that can receive it. It is in this sense that Thomas enunciates the axiom of composition (which he invokes to distinguish essence from *esse* in creatures): *quandocumque aliquid praedicatur de altero per participationem, oportet ibi aliquid esse praeter id quod participatur*.[78] In other words, participating is not only partially having the form that subsists fully in another; it is also having, precisely as part, the act that constitutes another in totality. The limitation of the perfection being participated in the subject that receives it consists not only in an imperfect likeness, say in a formal lessening; it also involves a composition of participated act and receptive potency. The participated perfection is the act of the subject in potency which receives it, and it is limited to the measure of this subject. This is why the act received is indefinitely diversified according to the nature of the potency.[79] Should it be said that the composition is the ultimate reason[55] for the limitation? That is an entirely different question. If composition is the necessary condition for limitation, it does not follow that it is the sufficient condition. One final element must be added: there is no participation without a relation of productive causality, following the axiom: *quod per essentiam dicitur, est causa omnium quae per participationem dicuntur*;[80] *omne quod est per participationem, causatur ab eo quod est per essentiam*.[81] Now the cause is a cause only because it is in act; that is why the axiom of similarity—*omne agens agit sibi simile*—is no longer the primary axiom but is connected with one still more fundamental, that of the actuality of the agent: *omne agens agit in quantum actu est*.[82] In short, the primacy of act and the priority of efficient causality go hand in hand.[83] Exemplarity does not disappear; it is subordinated to efficiency. In sum, participation is presented as the communication of act to a subject in potency. The act is communicated by a productive causality that assimilates the effect to the agent. The act received is limited by the potency that receives it (and gradually, since the [56] potency is not unique). Finally, the participating subject is composed of the act received and the receptive potency.

The theory thus presented is applied to the participation of being. A being (*id quod est*) can participate because it is in potency; being (*ipsum esse*) cannot, precisely because *esse* is an act. Now God is *esse*

without admixture of potency: He has nothing by participation but He is what He is in virtue of His essence, *per essentiam*.[84] By affirming of God that He is *esse*, we have said it all, since the perfections participated according to their diverse modes and degrees are summed up in the unique perfection of being: *omnium perfectiones pertinent ad perfectionem essendi*.[85] As act free from potentiality, God grounds all participation and causes all beings. On the other hand, *esse,* which is infinite when it is not received within a potency, can be participated according to the indefinitely varied measures that the different essences are; beings are to the extent that they participate *esse*, and they are more or less perfect according as they participate more or less the perfection of being that pertains to God by essence.[86] Their measure of being establishes their degree of likeness to the one who is *ipsum esse*. Thus, every subject that receives *esse* without being identical to it possesses being by participation.[87] This is why the essence of such a substance is to the *esse* that it participates as receptive potency to the act received.[88] One should not conceive an undifferentiated and unique *esse* that would actuate different essences as it were from outside: in reality the participated being is limited by the potency which receives it[89] and the act of being is multiplied and differentiated as many times as there are potencies to receive it by proportioning itself to each of these potencies.[90] Since act is primary, both from the point of view of participation and from that of efficiency, the relation of the created entity to God is that of the effect to its cause [57] and of potency to act.[91] This relation establishes a diminished likeness between beings and God. The fundamental idea of this whole theory of the communication of being is that of a certain community of nature: *quodcumque ens creatum participat, ut ita dixerim, naturam essendi, quia solus Deus est suum esse*.[92] The being that subsists in God without restriction communicates itself in virtue of the divine causality in a more or less limited way according to the measure of each being, and it is intrinsically and formally participated on each occasion. Indeed, it is participation which excludes all univocity of the *natura essendi*: being is intrinsically diversified without its unity being completely shattered, since all the beings get their limited perfection from the primary instance in which it subsists without limit. An intrinsic participation of *esse*, a causal and formal dependence with respect to *ipsum esse subsistens:* such is the ontological situation expressed by transcendental analogy.[93] Being is not univocal, because it is participated and, to the two dimensions of

participation (transcendental and predicamental), there respectively correspond two forms of the analogy of being, the one between the creature and God, the other between accident and substance.

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[58] What is to be concluded from the preceding remarks regarding the relations between participation and analogy in the two periods of Thomas's teaching? In the late works one finds formulas completely conforming to the exemplarist doctrine of the *Sentences* (including, contrary to what Klubertanz claims, the exemplar causality of nature and of ideas), and in the early works potency and act are not absent. To stick to the letter of the text, one might with equal plausibility hold that no appreciable variation of doctrine can be observed, or, on the contrary, that exemplar causality, initially put in the foreground, subsequently gives way and is subordinated to efficient causality. The texts of Thomas relative to being present a similar difficulty, since some interpreters hold that no change could be detected from the early works to the later ones, whereas others assert that the notion of being conceived as an intensive act (*actus essendi*) appears only beginning with the *Contra Gentiles*. Norris Clark's observations regarding the limitation of act by potency pertain to the same line of thought; such a limitation is not absent from the first works but plays a fundamental role only beginning with the *Contra Gentiles*.[94] These facts—and the list is not closed—show that Thomas, while using identical formulas, progressively fills them with a meaning that they did not originally have.[95] Thus, the identity of expressions may hide a doctrinal enrichment that can be discovered by patient analyses, and a long familiarity with the complete works of Thomas. We think that the same goes for the axiom *omne agens agit sibi simile*, upon which the theory of analogy rests. The use that is made of it in the *Sentences* reveals a formalist conception of causality and being. Causality is presented as the communication of a [59] form, whereas subsequently it is that of an act. According to the first perspective, the agent acts in virtue of its form, and causality consists in imprinting its likeness; according to the second, the agent acts in as much as it is in act and does so in order to bring a new being into existence. Correlatively, the perfection received by the effect is limited either owing to its imperfect likeness or as an act received by a potency. Now the predominance of formal causality in order to explain transcendental participation and to found

the corresponding analogy runs the risk of either excessively bringing together or excessively separating beings from God: similitude, defined as the possession of one and the same quality, tends as Fabro observes, to equalize and unify the subjects within this form;[96] one must avoid confounding in a self-same form created being and the divine being. Thomas appeals to the idea of participation by imitation precisely so as thereby to exclude every common form. He thus restores the opposition by emphasizing the distance between the copy and the model. One escapes from one difficulty only to fall into another; for, according to a pertinent remark of the same author, for a formalistic metaphysics "the relation of God to essence as such is that of exemplar cause, and therefore remains at an infinite distance."[97] On the other hand, when Thomas first appeals to efficient causality, he insists upon the presence of the creative cause in the innermost of each of its effects. The two orientations that we have noted are also noticeable in the way that Thomas interprets the Aristotelian adage: *finiti ad infinitum nulla est proportio*, as we shall see in the following chapter.

In summary, in the works of Thomas two different orientations can be found according as emphasis is accorded to exemplarity or to efficiency. They are characterized by the greater or lesser importance that they accord to the two aspects of causality, but they are not mutually exclusive and it would be inaccurate to claim that Thomas had first chosen [60] exemplarity and rejected efficiency and then taken up efficiency and abandoned exemplarity. Nevertheless, though he never separated the two causalities, one is has to recognize that he first puts the notion of form in the foreground and that later on the notion of act becomes fundamental.[98] The progress of Thomas's thought on causality reveals a deepening of his conception of being: the notion of *actus essendi* appears beginning with the *Contra Gentiles*, where we meet the decisive affirmation: *esse actus est*.[99] Thus, the different variations that we have analyzed separately (participation, causality, limitation, analogy) are coordinated around the discovery of being as act.

III. First definition of the analogy of being

In order to elaborate a coherent and unified theory of the analogy of being, Thomas is strove to apply the predicamental analogy discovered by Aristotle to the relation of beings to God, i.e., to transcendental

analogy. By doing this the unified diversity that one encounters at the horizontal level of the categories and that one finds on the vertical plane of substances pertain to one and the same principle of explanation: analogy by reference to a primary instance.

In the first place we must note in what respect the analogy of being resembles that of health and how it differs from it. For the latter is manifestly extrinsic; it involves no intrinsic formal participation, since health in fact can belong only to a living thing. If the analogy of being had to be understood in this way, all being would belong exclusively to the primary instance, whether to substance [61] or to God. These consequences are particularly serious for transcendental analogy; for then it would be necessary to affirm that God is the only being, the only perfect thing, and that all the others have being and perfection only by extrinsic denomination. To emphasize divine transcendence one would deprive the universe of all reality. The analogy of health does not apply to the order of being because it is extrinsic; it is, as Thomas says, *secundum intentionem tantum et non secundum esse*, whereas the analogy of being is an intrinsic analogy *secundum intentionem et secundum esse.* In short, analogy by reference to a primary instance is of two sorts: the one, that of health, is extrinsic; the other, that of being, intrinsic— according as the analogically common notion does or does not designate a really common perfection. The second differs from the first in this—that it involves an intrinsic participation; it is defined simultaneously by causal dependence upon the first being and by intrinsic possession of the perfection of being.[100]

For Thomas, the *ad unum* relation defines analogy.[101] Analogical unity arises from the common term; diversity, from the different relation that each of the analogates maintains with [62] the primary instance;[102] and the primary instance must, he specifies, to be really and numerically one.[103] The analogy of being gathers into a unity a real diversity that is far from being superficial, a diversity of predicamental modes and substantial degrees. If there is any unity in being, it is because there is a primary instance that is really one. Thus all the multiplicity is connected to the unity of the primary instance, which is is substance in the case of predicamental analogy or God in the case of transcendental analogy.

The *ratio entis*, as Thomas says, with a word borrowed from the conceptual realm, or, if one prefers a more realistic expression, the *natura essendi*, establishes an intrinsic and formal bond between the primary

instance to which it belongs *per essentiam* and the other analogates which receive it from the primary instance *per participationem*. This fundamental inequality is expressed in still another way: being, he says, is attributed *per prius et posterius*, or again, more rarely, *secundum magis et minus*.[104] Thereby one intends to designate above all the opposition between the one who is the fullness of being and those that receive being from it. It is incidental to analogy the secondary analogates in their turn are unequal and hierarchized.[105] The primary and most [63] fundamental diversity that the analogy of being indicates on the predicamental level is that of accidental being and substantial being and, on the transcendental level, that of created being and divine being. But accidental being on the one side and created being on the other themselves involve an essential hierarchy. So that one can affirm that being is diversified by degrees that are unified in virtue of their intrinsic and formal dependence upon the primary instance and that God is eventually the ultimate term of reference for all the meanings of being.

Finally, let us to note one last consequence which lies at the origins of the discussions that we shall recount in the following chapter. Taken separately, the analogates may be defined each on its own account, independently of each other; considered from the point of view of analogical unity, they may be defined in terms of the primary instance. Hence a question arises: since God is the ultimate term of reference for all the meanings of being, won't created beings have to be defined by the divine being just as accidental being is defined by substantial being? As a general rule, as a result of its ontological priority, the primary instance is of itself more intelligible than the things that are referred to it; even if it does not enter into their definition, it does truly account for them: it is at once the source of being and of intelligibility. Now these two functions of the principle can be distinguished: it may happen that what is first for our knowlwdge does not enjoy priority in the order of being. Hence there are two sorts of reduction *ad unum*: in the real order, to that which is ontologically first; in the order of knowing, to that which is more known to us. Thus the being most accessible to us and the one to which we in first place attribute the analogically common name is often also that to which the definition and its real content belong only in the last place, because it is last in the order of being. The order *per prius et posterius* followed by our knowledge is the reverse of the ontological relation. Has Thomas

thereby solved all the difficulties that the transcendental application of analogy by reference to a primary instance presents? We are going to see that Thomas hesitated a bit to conceive the relation of created being to divine being on the Aristotelian model of predicamental analogy.

Notes

1. For the texts of Aristotle, see L. Robin, *La théorie platonicienne des idées et des nombres*, p. 159, note 171, IV.—For Arab Aristotelianism, the texts have been studied by H. A. Wolfson, "The Amphibolous Terms in Aristotle, Arabic Philosohy and Maimonides," HTR 31 (1938) 151-173. According to Wolfson, Arstotle himself mentions an intermediate category of terms that are neither equivocal nor univocal (*Top.*, I, 15, 106a9: II, 3, 110b16-17: *Met. G*, 2, 1003a33-34: *Z*, 4, 1030a34-35). The name 'ambiguous' or 'amphibolous' (ἀμφίβολα was given to them by Alexander of Aphrodisias in his *Commentary on the Topics* (*In Topica*, ed. Wallies, p. 17, 22-23; p. 152, 7-8). In Alfarabi, Avicenna, Algazel, Averroes (and in the medieval Latin translations), the ambiguous terms designate predicates attributed according to an order of priority. These ambiguous terms (an expression which never appears in Thomas) will subsequently be called sometimes analogous, and sometimes equivocals *a consilio*.

2. On *Met. D*, c. 4 and 5, see G. L. Muskens, *De vocis* ἀναλογίας" *significatione ac usu apud Aristotelem*, pp. 87-88.

3. "La dénomination de l'être est de signification multiple, impliquant cependant une relation avec quelque chose d'un, avec une seule et même nature: ce ne n'est pas une appellation équivoque (ou homonyme), mais une appellation pareille à celle de 'sain,' qui implique toujours une relation avec la santé, tantôt parce que la chose appelée saine conserve la santé, tantôt parce que la chose appelée saine conserve la santé, tantôt parce qu'elle produit la santé, ou parce qu'elle est le signe de la santé, ou encore parce qu'elle en est le sujet récepteur. De même, tout ce qui est dit 'médical' est dénommé ainsi par relation avec l'art médical. Car tel être est appelé médical parce qu'il possède l'art médical, tel autre parce qu'il est naturellement bien disposé pour posséder cet art, tel autre parce qu'il est l'œuvre de l'art médical. Au reste, nous pourrions trouver encore d'autres dénominations employées de la même manière que celles-là.—Pareillement donc, la dénomination de l'être est employée en plusieurs sens, mais toujours par relation avec un seul et même principe. Car tels êtres sont appelés ainsi parce qu'ils sont des substances, tels autres parce qu'ils sont des accidents de la substance, tels autres parce qu'ils sont un acheminement vers la substance, ou des corruptions, ou des privations, ou des qualités, ou des agents productifs ou générateurs, soit de la substance, soit d'êtres

dénommés par relation avec la substance, ou bien des négations, soit d'une de ces choses-là, soit de la substance elle-mème. Ainsi disons-nous, même du non-être, qu'il est non-être" (*Met.*, *G*, 2, 1003a33-b10; trans. Colle, p. 4). [I render Colle's version as follows: "The name being has several meanings, although implying a relation with something that is a one, i.e., with one and the same nature. It is not an equivocal (or homonymous) name but a name like 'healthy,' which always implies a relation to health, sometimes because the thing called healthy preserves health, sometimes because it produces health, or because it is a sign of health, or again because it is the subject receiving it. In the same way, everything that is called 'medical' is so denominated by relation with the medical art. For one such being is called medical because it possesses the medical art, another such because it is naturally well disposed to possess this art, another such because it is the work of the medical art. Besides, we could find still other names used in the same way as those.—Similarly, therefore, the name being is used in many senses, but always with relation to one and the same principle. For some beings are so called because they are substances, others because they are accidents of substance, others because they are a path to substance, or corruptions, privations, qualities, or productive agents or generators, either of substance or of beings named by relation to substance, or even negations, either of one of these things or of substance itself. Thus do we say even of non-being that it is non-being."–Trans.]

4   The text of this opusculum is found in the following two editions: J. Perrier, *S. Thomas Aquinatis. Opuscula omnia necnon opera minora.* T. I: *Opuscula philosophica*, Paris 1949, pp. 1-17. John J. Pauson, *S. Thomas Aquinas. De principiis naturae*, Fribourg-Louvain 1950. The edition we are citing is that of Pauson, ch. 6, pp. 101-104.

As for the value of the text of these editions, see the critical review of the Perrier edition by Canon C. Van Steenkiste in DTP 53 (1950) 339-547 and in BT 8 (1947-53) pp. 17-30 (cf. BT 8, n° 68) and that of the Pauson edition by P. O'Reilly in BT 8, n° 72, pp. 143-151. O'Reilly concludes that this last edition is no better than that of Perrier.

For the date of the opusculum, the basic information is given by J. Perrier, p. 2; John J. Pauson, pp. 69-70; C. Vansteenkiste, BT 8, p. 28, n.1.

5   John J. Pason, *Op. cit.*, p. 70 and note 3.

6   M. D. Roland-Gosselin, *Le "De ente et essentia" de S. Thomas d'Aquin.* Texte établi d'après les manuscrits parisiens. Introduction, Notes et Etudes historiques (Biliothèque Thomiste VIII), Le Saulchoir 1926, pp. xxvi-xxviii. "A comparison of these three writings allows us to establish their chronological relations more precisely. The *De principiis naturae* is earlier I believe than the *De ente et essentia*, and this last little work apparently had to have been written before the commentary on the second

book of the *Sentences* toward the time when St. Thomas was commenting on the twenty-fifth distinction of the first book." ("La comparaison de ces trois écrits permet d'établir d'une façon plus précise leurs rapports chronologiques. Le *De principiis naturae* est antérieur, croyons-nous, au *De ente et essentia*, et ce dernier opuscule doit vraisemblablement avoir été écrit avant le commentaire du[27] IIe livre des *Sentences*, vers le moment où S. Thomas commentait la XXVe distinction du Ier livre") (p. xxvi).

7   "Secundum convenientiam et differentiam principiatorum est convenientia et differentia principiorum" (Pauson ed., p. 101, 13-14). Compare with Met., XII, lecture 4, n° 2483: "Oportet quod secundum quod descendit communitas principiatorum, descendat communitas principiorum."

8   "Quaedam autem sunt diversa in genere, sed sunt idem secundum analogiam; sicut substantia et quantitas, quae non conveniunt in aliquo genere, sed conveniunt solum secundum analogiam. Conveniunt enim solum in eo quod est ens; ens autem non est genus, quia non praedicatur univoce, sed analogice" (ed. cit., pp. 101, 15-102, 7).

9   "Praedicatur de pluribus, quorum rationes diversae sunt, sed attribuuntur alicui uni eidem" (*ed. cit.*, p. 103, 1-2). Note the use of the verb *attribui* to indicate relation. See the study in the appendix on the provenance of this special usage.

10   Ed. cit., 103, 7-104, 3.

11   "Materia enim et forma et privatio, sive potentia et actus, sunt principia substantiae et aliorum generum. Tamen materia substantiae et quantitatis, et similiter forma et privatio, differunt genere, sed conveniunt solum secundum proportionem in hoc quod, sicut se habet materia substantiae ad substantiam, ita se habet materia quantitatis ad quantitatem. Sicut tamen substantia est causa caeterorum, ita principia substantiae sunt principia omnium aliorum." (ed. cit., p. 104, 12-19).

12   *Op. cit.*, p. 90. Cf. the review of this work by Geiger in BT 7 (1943-46) n° 185.

13   How did the two types of unity become divisions of "analogy"? Apparently under the influence of Boethius's commentary on the *Categories* of Aristotle, which enumerates four sorts of equivocals *consilio* <by design>: (1) secundum similitudinem; (2) secundum proportionem; (3) ab uno; (4) ad unum (PL 64, 166B). The equivocal terms *a consilio* have been identified with the analogous terms.

14   The reduction of proportional unity to unity of order appears in a parallel text (annoyingly truncated in Klubertanz's collection,[31] p. 202, 11.6): "Omnium autem entium sunt principia communia non solum secundum primum modum, quod appellat Philosophus in XI Metaph. omnia entia habere eadem principia secundum analogiam, sed etiam secundum modum secundum, ut sint quaedam res eaedem numero existentes omnium rerum

principia, prout scilicet principia accidentium reducuntur in principia substantiae, et principia substantiarum corruptibilium reducuntur in substantias incorruptibiles, et sic quodam gradu et ordine in quaedam principia omnia entia reducuntur" (*Exp. de Trin.*, q. 5, a. 4). The corresponding passage of the *Commentary on the Metaphysics* confines itself to a simple enumeration (*Met.*, XII, lecture 4, n° 2485).

[15] *Ed. cit.*, p. 103, 17-18.

[16] The vocabulary of analogy in the *De principiis naturae* is constituted principally of the following terms: 1) *Analogia*; 2) *Attributio*; 3) *Proportio*; 4) *Per prius et posterius*.—1) The term *analogia* is taken in two different meanings, first, that of proportion in the mathematical sense, and then that of relation to the primary instance (the latter becoming the principal meaning). —2) This relative meaning of the term *analogia* is also expressed by the terms *attribui* and *attributio* which came from the Arabic-Latin version of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. (F. A. Blanche in his article "Les mots signifiant la relation dans la langue de S. Thomas d'Aquin," RP 32 (1925) 363-388, points out the special meaning of *attributio*, pp. 386-387).—3) To translate proportional unity, the most appropriate term is *proportio*, but sometimes this term serves to designate a relation and is taken as a synonym for *attributio*. One passage of the opusculum indicates these equivalences: "ea quae conveniunt secundum analogiam, idest in proportionae, vel comparatione, vel convenientia" (p. 103, 7-8). Like *attributio*, the terms *proportio* and *comparatio* are found in Averroes's commentary on the *Metaphysics*, to translate the relation: *secundum comparationem et proportionem* (*Met.*, XII, co. 22; Venice ed. 1562, f° 145 ra 9-10), *secundum comparationem et respectum* (*ibid.*, co. 28, f° 147 ra 10). The most curious expression of the list is the last: *convenire … in convenientia*. Albert knows it: "Quaedam vero analoga sive proportionata, quae apud Arabos vocatur convenientia...Analoga autem sunt proportionaliter dicta, aut Arabes dicunt convenientia, et sunt media inter univoca et aequivoca" (*De praedicabilibus*, Tr. I, cap. 5; Borgnet ed., I, p. 11). Cortabarria thinks that he got it from a citation of Alfarabi's commentary on the Organon ("Las Obras y la filosofía de Alfarabi en los escritos de san Alberto Magno," CT 77 (1950) 376).—4) The last expression characteristic of analogy expresses the inequality that it necessarily involves: an analogous predicate is attributed *secundum prius et posterius*. In the thought of Aristotle, "the relation of Anterior to Posterior is essential to things whose multiplicity, though drawn from a single principle, nevertheless cannot be reduced to the unity of one genus" ["La relation d'Antérieur à Postérieur est essentielle aux choses dont la multiplicité, relevant d'un principe unique, ne se laisse pourtant pas ramener à l'unité d'un genre"—Macierowski trans.], L. Robin, *La théorie platonicienne des Idées et des Nombres*, p. 171; see in

this work pp. 154, 165, 196-198, 528, 612-626). As to the Latin terms used, the *Media* gives *prius et posterius*, the *Nova* translates *ante et post* (Cf. M. Bouyges, "La Métaphysique d'Aristote chez les latin au XIIIe siècle. Le Sermo de Ante et Post." RMAL 5 (1949) 127-131).

[17] Like the *De principiis naturae*, the *De ente et essentia* is a summary of metaphysical topics borrowed from Aristotle, Avicenna, and Averroes, as the researches of Roland-Gosselin have shown. One can say that this opusculum summarizes Book *Z* of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. Roland-Gosselin notes "the parallelism of progress followed in the *De ente* with the first chapters of book *Z* whose Aristotelian title is also περὶ οὐσίας καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὄντος." Cf. *Met.*, I, 1053b16" [Macierowski trans. of ed. Roland-Gosselin, p. 2, n. 3]. And again: "At the beginning of Met. Z (c. 2), Aristotle anticipates the distinction of two orders of substance and applies himself first to sensible substance and its composition: the study of immaterial substance is taken up in book *M*. Thus, we find in book *Z* not only one of the titles given to Thomas's opusculum, but issues entirely similar to those of the *De ente* ... and an identical order" [Macierowski trans. of *op. cit.*, p. 5, note 2].

We cite the *De ente* according to Roland-Gosselin's edition, but we follow current usage for the orthography.

[18] "Sed quia illud quod dicitur maxime et verissime in quolibet genere, est causa eorum quae sunt post in illo genere..., ut etiam in II Metaphysicae dicitur, ideo substantia, quae est primum in genere entis, verissime et maxime essentiam habens, oportet quod sit causa accidentium quae secundario et quasi secundum quid rationem entis participant" (ed. cit., p. 44, 7-14).

On the text of the *Metaphysics* that Thomas cites (Met., *a*, 1, 993b 24-994a1), see two divergent interpretations: V. de Couesnongle, "La causalité du maximum. (1) L'utilisation par S. Thomas d'un passage d'Aristote. (2) Pourquoi S. Thomas a-t-il mal cité Aristote?" in RSPT 38 (1954) 433-444 and 658-680.—G. Ducoin, "S. Thomas commentateur d'Aristote," in AP 20 (1957) 78-117, 240-271, 392-445; see especially pp. 240-249.

[19] The causality of the maximum refers to analogy, as de Couesnongle shows. "Parler de premier ou de maximum revient au même dans tous ces textes (où est cité cet axiome), car c'est du premier ontologique qu'il s'agit, du premier analogué, donc de l'être le plus parfait du genre" (RSPT 38 (1954) 434, note 2; [Macierowski trans.: "To speak of a primary instance or a maximum comes down to the same thing in all these texts (where this axiom is cited), for what is in question is the ontological first, the primary analogate, and so of the most perfect being of the genus."] The Aristotelian text clearly indicates something of this sort, since it discusses a "synonymous" attribute belonging unequally to many by reference to

a primary instance to which it principally belongs. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 439: "Le καθ' ὅ doit être rendu en terms de rapport. De fait cette expression ne fait pas intervenir directement l'idée de causalité. D'ailleurs τὸ συνώμενον évoque la doctrine d'Aristote sur l'analogie." [Macierowski trans.: "The expression καθ' ὅ must be translated in terms of relation. This expression does not actually introduce the idea of causality directly. Besides, the phrase τὸ συνώμενον recalls Aristotle's doctrine on analogy."]—Taking an opposite stance, Ducoin reads in the text in question not only relation but also causality (*op. cit.*, p. 439) and he shows that Thomas, in his Com-[35] mmentary, really does understand it in this way: "S. Thomas a bien vu qu'il s'agissait d'attribution, que le point de départ de la démonstration était l'affirmation qu'un des êtres auxquels convient une qualité quelconque était la cause de l'attribution de cette qualité aux autres êtres, et que la conclusion menait à reconnaître le degré suprême de cette qualité dans la cause" (op. cit., pp. 213-214); ; [Macierowski trans.: "Thomas clearly saw that attribution was at stake, that the starting-point of the demonstration was the assertion that one of the beings to which any quality belongs was the cause of the attribution of this quality to the other beings, and that the conclusion led one to recognize the highest degree of this quality in the cause."] Whatever may be the divergences between these two interpretations, whether it be a question of simple relation or true causality, the text at any event concerns analogy by reference to a primary instance.

[20] Cf. the text cited in note 18: "Substantia est primum in genere entis, (accidentia) secundario et quasi secundum quid rationem entis participant."

[21] Aristotle does not speak of degrees of substantiality, but he presents a division of substances (Met., *L*, 1, 1069a30-b2), some mobile and corporeal (whether corruptible or incorruptible), others immutable and incorporeal, where the first are subordinated to the second in the order of the moving cause. Thomas considers the hierarchy from the point of view of being, with a dependence upon that which is the first in the order of being.

[22] Ed. cit., pp. 41, 21-42, 1 (citation from the *History of Animals*; cf. ibid., note 1).

[23] *Ed. cit.*, p. 38, 7-8.

[24] *Ed. cit.*, p. 37, 5-6.

[25] "Neque oportet has differentias esse accidentales, quia sunt secundum majorem vel minorem perfectionem quae non diversificant speciem: gradus enim perfectionis in recipiendo eamdem formam non diversificat speciem, sicut albius et minus album, in participando ejusdem rationis albdinem; sed diversus gradus perfectionis in ipsis formis vel naturis participatis diversificat speciem, sicut natura procedit per gradus de plantis ad animalia per quaedam quae sunt media inter animalia et plantas, secundum Philosophum in octavo de Anaimalibus" (*ed. cit.*, pp. 41, 21-42,1).

[26] Cf. *supra*, notes 18 and 20.

[27] *Ed. cit.*, p. 37, 13-14.

[28] *Ed. cit.*, p. 35, 13-14.

[29] *Ed. cit.*, p. 35, 17-18.

[30] Cf. J. J. Duin, "Nouvelles précisions sur la chronologie du Commentum in Metaphysicam de S. Thomas," RPL 53 (1955) 511-524.

[31] *Met.*, I, lecture 14, n° 224.

[32] Cf. p. 30, note 14.

[33] Cf. *Met.* III, lecture 10, n° 465; XII, lecture 4, n° 2477, 2480, 2483-2486.

[34] III, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1, n° 12 (Moos ed.).—On the other hand, it would be a mistake to cite the following text in favor of the proportional analogy of being: "diversa habitudo ad esse impedit univocam praedicationem entis" (*De Pot.*, q. 7, a. 7), since the context without any doubt refers to analogy by reference to substance.

[35] *Met.*, VII, lecture 4, n° 1334; cf. VII, lecture 1, n° 1246-1259.

[36] In Thomas there is one text, the only one of its kind, in the *Commentary on the Ethics* (I, lecture 7), which seems to prefer the analogy of proportion and to present it as intrinsic while in that case the analogy of relation [*rapport*] would be extrinsic. If such were the thought of Thomas, the only correct interpretation would be that given by Cajetan. Accordingly it is necessary to consider the precise scope of this passage.

Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, translated by C.I. Litzinger O.P. (Notre Dame, Indiana: Dumb Ox Books, 1993): "Thomas is commenting on a text of Aristotle which disputes the Platonic idea of the good: 'In what way then are they to be called good? Not as things purely equivocal. Are they at least to be compared as things referring to one principle or as all tending to one end? Or still better, should we say according to analogy? Indeed, as sight is the good of the body so intellect is the good of the soul, and so of other things.' But perhaps we should now leave these subjects, for a precise determination of them properly belongs to another branch of philosophy." (*Eth. Nic.*, I, 4, 1096b26-30; trans. C.I. Litzinger, p.28 and p.33).

"Mais alors, que veut dire, en fin de compte, le mot de 'bien'? Il n'a pas l'air en effet d'un terme équivoque, au moins s'il s'agit de ce type d'équivoque qui vient de ce que les choses diverses reçoivent par hasard le même nom. Mais par contre n'a-t-il pas tout l'air d'un terme équivoque s'il s'agit, cette fois, des choses diverses qui reçoivent le même nom parce qu'elles procèdent toutes d'un principe unique ou parce qu'elles concourent toutes à une fin unique? Ou mieux encore, s'il s'agit des choses qui reçoivent le même nom par analogie? Car ce que la vue est pour le corps, l'intellect l'est pour l'âme, et ainsi de suite. Mais sans doute est-il préférable de laisser cette

question de côté pour l'instant (sa solution rigouresuse est du domaine propre d'une autre partie de la philosophie)" (*Eth. Nic.* I, 4, 1096b26-30; R. A. Gauthier trans., p. 11).

[42] In this text, Aristotle proposes no firm solution and defers to first philosophy; it belongs to metaphysics to determine exactly what is meant by the word "good." Still, Aristotle seems to prefer "analogy" to the second type of equivocal, i.e., unity of proportion to unity of order. Is this Aristotle's last word on the subject of the good or of being? Or is this a provisional solution, useful to combat Platonic univocity? The first is the solution proposed by Hamelin, *Le système d'Aristote*, Paris 1920, p. 405, and by Rodier, *Etudes de philosophie grecque*, Paris 1926, pp. 165-169. The second is the one Robin allies himself with, *La théorie platonicienne*, pp. 160-164, note 171, VI-VII. According to the latter, the *Ethics* refers to the *Metaphysics*, indeed particularly to Book *G*, c. 2, which represents the most perfect expression of Aristotle's thought. R. A. Gauthier, who summarizes the two solutions in his commentary, adds: "It is surely the latter point of view (that of Robin) which is better grounded historically; Rodier's treatment in particular is a construction—vigorous, to be sure, but without textual foundation" (R. A. Gauthier, *L'Ethique à Nicomaque*, Tome II. Commentaire. Première partie. Livres I-V, p. 47 <Macierowski trans.>). We have reported these interpretations in order to show that the meaning of Aristotle's text is as problematic for modern commentators as it was for Thomas. Here is how he understands it.

A name is common to many in two ways, he explains: either it corresponds to totally different notions, in which case there is equivocity, or it renders notions that are not entirely different but which have a certain unity. This unity arises either from the primary instance to which the others are related by different relations of causality, according as the primary instance is productive, final or receptive cause (*secundum proportiones diversas ad idem subjectum*, he says for this last case), or else from the self-same relation among many subjects: what the eye is for the body, the intellect is for the soul (*secundum unam proportionem ad diversa subjecta*). Thus analogy of proportion is set along side of analogy of relation (Cf. *Met.*, V, lecture 8, n° 879). How then, Thomas asks himself, is Aristotle's text relating to the analogy of the good to be explained? The good, he replies, is attributed according to two sorts of analogy: by reference to a primary instance (*ab uno* and *ad unum*) as well as according to proportion. Now Aristotle seems to prefer this latter analogy, based upon the sameness of the relations. Why? Aristotle does not say. Thomas attempts to account for it for himself. The goal is to avoid an extrinsicist conception of participation: beings are good in virtue of a goodness which[43] comes to them from one first principle of the good, and this is what is indicated

by analogy *ab uno* and *ad unum*, but they are good intrinsically, and this is what is rendered by analogy of proportion.

"Sic ergo dicit (Aristoteles) quod bonum dicitur de multis non secundum rationes penitus differentes, sicut accidit in his quae sunt casu aequivoca, sed inquantum omnia bona dependent ab uno primo bonitatis principio, vel inquantum ordinantur ad unum finem. Non enim voluit Aristoteles quod illud bonum separatum sit idea et ratio omnium bonorum, sed principium et finis. Vel etiam dicuntur omnia bona magis secundum analogiam, id est proportionem eamdem, sicut visus est bonum corporis, et intellectus est bonum animae. Ideo hunc tertium modum praefert, quia accipitur secundum bonitatem inhaerentem rebus. Primi duo modi, secundum bonitatem separatam a qua non ita proprie aliquid denominatur" (*Eth.*, I, lecture 7, 1096b26-28; text established by Gauthier).

The explanations we have just read call for two observations. First of all, they constitute an interpretation of Aristotle's text and not a personal commitment on the part of Thomas. It seems more probable that Aristotle is inclined to favor proportion, because, being closer to pure equivocity, it is more removed from Platonic univocity. In the second place, as to the communication of the good and of being, Thomas in his personal works affirms that there is no contradiction between being good both in dependence upon God, the source of all good, and in virtue of an inherent form. "Unumquodque dicitur bonum bonitate divina, sicut primo principio exemplari, effectivo et finali totius bonitatis. Nihilominus tamen unumquodque dicitur bonum similitudine divinae bonitatis sibi inhaerente, quae est formaliter sua bonitas denominans ipsum. Et sic est bonitas una omnium; et etiam multae bonitates" (Ia, q. 6, a. 4). In other words, it is not contradictory to receive an intrinsic denomination by reference to a primary instance (*De Ver.*, q. 21, a. 4, c. and ad 2). He never independently connects dependence upon the prime instance to analogy of relation and intrinsic participation to analogy of proportion.

Hence, one should not to look for Thomas's thought on the analogy of the good and of being in the *Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics*. Whatever the date of the *Commentary*, one cannot see in it the principal source (not to say unique—since the *De Veritate* appeals to proportion for other reasons) where to look for the Thomist theory of analogy and according to which all the other texts would have to be interpreted.

[37] In the wake of T. Delvigne, "L'inspiration propre du traité de Dieu dans le *Commentaire des Sentences* de S. Thomas," Bull. Thom., Notes et communications, 1932, pp. 119*-122*.

[38] H. Lyttkens, *The Analogy between God and the World*, p. 345.

[39] An axiom often advanced in the *Sentences*:: I, d. 36, q. 2, a. 3; II, d. 14,[45] q. 1, a. 2, ad 3; d. 15, q. 1, a. 2 ad 4; d. 44, q. 1, a. 1, arg. 4; III, d. 11, q.

1, a. 1, n° 14; d. 23, q. 3, a. 1, sol. 1, n° 233; d. 33, q. 1, a. 2, sol. w, n° 63; IV, d. 5, q. 2, a. 2, sol. 2, n° 108; d. 8, q. 2, a. 1, sol. 3, ad 1, n° 152' d/ 49. q. 2, a. 6, ad 6.

40 "Conformitas est convenientia in forma una, et sic idem est quod similitudo, quam causat unitas qualitatis, ut in V Met. dicitur" (I, d. 48, q. 1, a. 1).

41 "Quandoque autem qualitas aliqua est proprie et plene in uno, et in alio est tantum quaedam imitatio illius secundum aliquam participationem" (I, d. 19, q. 1, a. 2). "Similia sunt quae in eadem forma communicant; sed contingit quod illam formam non uniformiter participant quaedam, quia quod est in uno deficienter, in altero est eminentius, et hoc oportet inveniri secundum Dionysium in omnibus causis essentialibus; et hoc ideo ipse dicit quod sol praeaccipit in se omnia ea quae divisim per ejus actionem in aliis causantur" (II, d. 15, q. 1, a. 2, ad 4).

42 I, d. 48, q. 1, a. 1, c.

43 II, d. 16, q. 1, a. 2, ad 5.

44 Prol., q. 1, a. 2, ad 2.

45 "Cum creatura exemplariter procedat ab ipso Deo sicut a causa quodammodo simili per analogiam (eo scilicet quod quaelibet creatura eum imitatur secundum possibilitatem naturae suae), ex creaturis potest in Deum deveniri tribus modis quibus dictum est, scilicet per causalitatem, remotionem, eminentiam" (I, d. 3, q. 1, a. 3).

46 I, d. 22, q. 1, a. 2.

47 I, d. 34, q. 3, a. 1.

48 "Creaturae imitantur ipsum prout possunt" (I, d. 24, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4). "Alia analogia est secundum quod unum imitatur aliud quantum potest, nec perfecte ipsum assequitur; et haec analogia est creaturae ad Deum" (I, d.35, q.1, a. 4). "Unum per se est simpliciter, et alterum participat de similitudine ejus quantum potest" (II, d. 16, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3).

49 "Sicut dicit Dionysius causata deficiunt ab imitatione suarum causarum quae eis supercollocantur" (*De Ver.*, q. 4, a. 6).

50 *De Ver.*, q. 2, a. 11, ad 8.

51 "Creatura non dicitur conformari Deo quasi participanti eamdem formam quam ipsa participat, sed quia Deus est substantialiter ipsa forma, cujus creatura per quamdam imitationem est participativa" (*De Ver.*, q. 23, a. 7, ad 10). Cf. II, d. 1, q. 2, a. 2: "Divina bonitas (est) in infinitum creaturas excedens, et ideo non acquiritur in creaturis secundum se, ita ut sit forma ejus; sed aliqua similitudo ejus, quae est in particpatione alicujus bonitatis."

52 The principle of exemplarity does not apply to the instrumental cause (IV, d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, sol. 1, ad 4, n° 135).

[53] "(Forma) est in uno deficienter, in altero est eminentius" (II, d. 15, q. 1, a. 2, ad 4). "Non eodem modo... sed eminentiori" (II, d. 14, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3).

[54] A final difference: the equivocal cause is cause of the species; the univocal cause, of the individual (II, d. 18, q. 2, a. 1).

[55] I, d. 8, q. 1, a. 2.

[56] IV, d. 41, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 5.

[57] II, d. 1, q. 1, a. 2; d. 18, q. 2, a. 1. The example belongs to an obsolete physics, but it is necessary to grasp its point, if one wishes to understand the accounts that it illustrates. To understand the precise meaning of this theory of the sun's causality according to the Aristotelian and Thomist physics, see J. de Tonquédec, *Questions de cosmologie et de physique chez Aristote et S. Thomas.* I. Le système du monde, pp. 63-67.—The texts of Thomas that appeal to the sun's causality present certain difficulties of interpretation that have been studied and satisfactorily resolved by G. Girardi, *Metafisica della causa esemplare in S. Tommaso d'Aquino*, pp. 54-55.

[58] "Sicut sol facit calorem, qui non est calidus" (I, d. 8, q. 1, a. 2). "Calor aliquo modo est in sole, non quidem denominans ipsum, ut dicatur calidus *formaliter*, sed *effective*, secundum virtutem calefaciendi quae in eo est" (II, d. 14, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3). Cf. II, d. 15, q. 1, a. 2, ad 4.

[59] "Quidquid est entitatis et bonitatis in creaturis, totum est a Creatore... Quod autem est causa alicujus, habet illud excellentius et nobilius; unde oportet quod omnes nobilitates omnium creaturarum inveniantur in Deo nobilissimo modo, et sine aliqua imperfectione... Et inde est quod ipse non est causa rerum omnino aequivoca, *cum secundum fomam suam producat effectus similes* non univoce sed analogice, sicut a sua sapientia derivatur omnis sapientia, et ita de aliis attributis, secundum doctrinam Dionysii. Unde ipse est exemplaris forma rerum, non tantum quantum ad ea quae sunt in sapientia sua, scilicet secundum rationes ideales, sed etiam quantum ad ea quae sunt in natura sua, scilicet attributa" (I, d. 2, q., 1, a. 2).

[60] IV, d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, sol. 4, n° 155. Cf. I, d. 34, q. 3, a. 1, ad 2; III, d. 2, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 1, ad 3, n° 24.

[61] I, d. 3, q. 1, a. 3; cf. note 45.

[62] Here we see how the two divisions of causality line up with each other—the one binary (univocal and equival cause), the other ternary (univocal, equivocal, and analogous cause):

Univocal cause		Univocal cause
Equivocal cause	**in which the effect is present *effective***	**Equivocal cause**
	in which the effect is present *formaliter*	**Analogous cause**

The equivocal cause to which the effect is virtually similar corresponds to the equivocal cause in the strict sense; the equivocal cause to which the effect is formally similar corresponds to the analogous cause. Only the latter is strictly speaking an exemplary cause.

For the first division, as well as for the analysis of the properties of univocal and equivocal causality, see: I, d. 35, q. 1, a. 4, ad 1; II, d. q, q. 1, a. 2; d. 14, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3; d. 18, q. 2, a. 1; IV, d. 5, q. 2, a. 2, sol. 2, n° 108; d. 41, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 1, ad 1; ibid., sol. 5; d. 43, q. 1, a. 2, sol. 1; d. 44, q. 3, a. 1, sol. 3, ad 2; d. 46, q. 2, a. 2, sol. 1.

[63] In fact, the notions that do not of themselves involve any imperfection are not restricted to the transcendentals, but include other less universal attributes as well, such as life, understanding, wisdom; this is why they are sometimes called pure perfections or absolute perfections (For this last term, see below, ch. II, note 65).

[64] I, d. 2, q. 1, a. 3; IV, d. 46, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 3, ad 3.

[65] II, d. 16, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2.

[66] "Exemplar rerum est in Deo dupliciter:—vel quantum ad id quod est in intellectu suo, et sic secundum ideam est exemplar intellectus divinus omnium quae ab ipso sunt, sicut intellectus artificis per formam artis omnium artificiatorum;—vel quantum ad id quod est in natura sua, sicut ratione suae bonitatis qua est bonus, est exemplar omnis bonitatis; et similter est de veritate. Unde patet quod non eodem modo Deus est exemplar coloris et veritatis" (I, d. 19, q. 5, a. 2, ad 4).

[67] I, d. 42, q. 2, a. 1. Cf. I, d. 34, q.3, a. 1, ad 4; d. 36, q. 2, a. 3; d. 38, q. 1, a. 1; II, d. 16, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2; d. 18, q. 1, a. 2; III, d. 27, q. 2, a. 4, sol. 3, ad 1, n° 176; d. 32, q. 1, a. 1, ad 5, n° 20.

[68] The notion of a *causa efficiens exemplaris* (I, d. 18,q. 1, a. 5; d. 24, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2; d. 38, q. 1, a. 1) designates the causality of the divine attributes, i.e., the causality of the divine nature: "Causalitas efficiens exemplaris extenditur tantum ad ea quae partipant formam actu suae causae exemplaris. Et ideo causalitas entis, secundum quod est nomen divinum, extenditur tantum ad entia, et vitae ad viventia" (I, d. 8, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2. Cf. I, d. 2, q. 1, a. 2; a. 3, sed c. 2; d. 3, q. 2, a. 2, arg. 3; d. 10, q. 1,[52] a. 5, ad 4; d. 19,q. 5, a. 2, c. and ad 4). What does this restriction about being mean

in the text we have just cited? It is related to the correspondence between our concepts and the divine attributes, as becomes clear in the following text: "Cum in aliis creaturis inveniantur esse, vivere et intelligere, et omnia hujusmodi, secundum diversa in eis existentia, in Deo tamen unum suum simplex esse habet omnium horum virtutem et perfectionem. Unde cum Deus nominatur ens, non exprimitur aliquid nisi quod pertinet ad perfectionem ejus, et non tota perfectio ipsius; et similiter cum dicitur sciens, et volens, et hujusmodi. Et ita patet quod omnia haec unum sunt in Deo secundum rem, sed ratione differunt, quae non tantum est in intellectu, sed fundatur in veritate et perfectione rei" (I, d. 35, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2). Despite the precison—or the correction—that this last text brings to the foregoing, one is still far from the conception of the divine perfection such as is found in Ia, q. 4, a. 2.

69   "Similitudo est duplex:—quaedam per participationem ejusdem formae, et talis similitudo non est corporalium ad divina....—Est etiam quaedam similitudo proportionalitatis, quae consistit in eadem habitudine proportionum, ut cum dicitur sicut se habent octo ad quatuor, ita sex ad tria; et sicut se habet consul ad civitatem, ita se habet gubernator ad navem. Et secundum talem similitudinem fit transumptio ex corporibus in divina" (I, d. 34, q. 3, a. 1, ad 2).

70   "Duplex est similitudo creaturae ad Deum:—una secundum participationem alicujus divinae bonitatis...—alia similitudo est secundum proportionalitatem" (III, d. 2, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 1, ad 3, n° 24).

71   II, d. 3, q. 2, a. 3, ad 2; cf. I, d. 43, q. 1, a. 2, ad 1; II, d. 3, q. 2, a. 1, ad 3; IV, d. 24, q. 3, a. 2, sol. 1, ad 3.

72   Ia, q. 42, a. 1, ad 2.

73   CG I, 22; 40; 75. The expressions for it are particularly numerous in the *Ia Pars*; here are some of them: *participare per modum assimilationis* (I, q. 44, a. 3); *participare de similitudine* (I, q. 9, a. 1, ad 2; q. 14, a. 9, ad 2); *participare similitudinem* (I, q. 105, a. 5); *participare per similitudinem* (for metaphor; I, q. 13, a. 9); *participata similitudo* (I, q. 12, a. 2; q. 89, a. 4); *similitudinis participatio* (I, q. 13, a. 9, ad 1); *participatio et assimilatio* (I, q. 103, a. 4).

74   Ia, q. 44, a. 3.

75   CG I, 32, 6°; Ia, q. 13, a. 6 and a. 10; cf. *De Pot.*, q. 7, a. 7, ad 2.

76   *De Pot.*, q. 7, a. 7, ad 3; cf. I, d. 35, q. 1, a. 4, ad 3.

77   CG II, 53; Ia, q. 75, a. 5, ad 4.

78   *Quodl.* 2, a. 3.

79   "Potentia autem, cum sit receptiva actus, oportet quod actui proportionetur. Actus vero recepti, qui procedunt a primo actu infinito et sunt quaedam participationes ejus, sunt diversi" (Ia, q. 75, a. 5, ad 1.).

80   CG II, 15.

[81] Ia, q. 61, a. 1.— In the two formulations of the axiom of causal participation that we have just cited, let us note the use of *causa* and *causare* to designate efficiency. For this is the most obvious form of causality, that to which the notion of cause belongs *per prius*, at least as far as our knowledge is concerned.

[82] "Cum omne agens agat in quantum est actu, et per consequens agat aliqualiter simile, oportet formam facti aliquo modo esse in agente"" (*De Pot.*, q. 7, a. 5). "De natura actionis est ut agens sibi simile agat, cum unumquodque agat secundum quod actu est" (CG I, 29). The many uses of this axiom in the two Summas have been displayed in the Leonine edition's tabulation (T. XVI, p. 376, col. c). It would be erroneous to suggest that the axiom does not appear in the earliest works of Thomas (cf. II, d. 25, q. 1, a. 1; d. 34, q. 1, a. 3; III, d. 3, q. 2, a. 1, n° 77; d. 14, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 2, n° 32; a. 2, sol. 2, n° 92; a. 4, n° 174; d. 33, q. 1, a. 2, sol. 2, n° 63; De Ver., q. 20, a. 4, ad 1), but at at that time the act desinates the formal determination of the agent: the perfection of the agent is purely and simply identified with its form. Hayen, *La communication de l'être d'après S. Thomas d'Aquin.* II. *L'ordre philosophique de S. Thomas*, p. 64, note 4, calls attention to a progress even in the formulation of a similar image in the *Contra Gentiles* from the first to the second edition (II, 53).

[83] "Omne agens facit esse actu" (CG III, 66).

[84] CG I, 38; *Quodl.* 3, a. 20.

[85] Ia, q. 4, a. 2.

[86] CG I, 43.

[87] Ia, q. 3, a. 4.

[88] CG II, 53.

[89] Ia, q. 75, a. 5, ad 4.

[90] Ia, q. 75, a. 5, ad 1.

[91] Ia, q. 12, a. 1, d 4; a. 1, c. and ad 1; q. 61, a. 1.—Thomas affirms several times that being is divided analogically into substance and accident, then into act and potency. The division is inspired by that of Aristotle when he enumerates the various meanings of being. One might still ask whether in Thomas we do not have, on the one hand, the predicamental analogy and, on the other, the transcendental analogy of being. (*Sent.*, prol., q. 1, a. 2, ad 2; II, d. 42, q. 1, a. 3; *De Pot.*, q. 3, a. 4, ad 9; *De Malo*, q. 7, a. 1, ad 1).

[92] Ia, q. 45, a. 5, ad 1. Note the restriction: *ut ita dixerim*. Of itself, the community of nature is of a univocal order. But since the communication of being must be conceived and discussed by means of our language, which is fundamentally univocal, we may, for want of anything better, use this notion of a *natura essendi*, as if being were one common nature.

93 "Quamvis inter Deum et creaturam non possit esse similitudo generis vel speciei, potest tamen esse similitudo quaedam analogiae, sicut inter potentiam et actum, et substantiam et accidens" (De Pot., q. 3, a. 4, ad 9).—For the connection between participation and analogy, see CG I, 32, 6°; *De Pot.*, q. 7, a. 7, ad 2; Ia, q. 4, a. 3, ad 3; *Periherm.*, I, lecture 8, n° 6; *De subst. separatis*, c. 8.

94 W. N. Clarke, "The Limitation of Act by Potency: Aristotelianism or Neoplatonism," NS 26 (1952) 167-194.

95 On the other hand, he sometimes keeps expressions originally loaded with a meaning that he rejects and for which he substitutes his own meaning; e.g., the formula *esse sequitur formam*, which comes from Albert, for whom it is tied to a type of essentialism that Thomas never completely accepted, not even in the *Sentences*.

96 C. Fabro, *Participation et causalité selon S. Thomas d'Aquin*, p. 525.

97 *Op. cit.*, p. 638.

98 Hence the meaning that the theory of participation takes on, as E. Gilson rightly pointed out: "La relation de participation à Dieu dans l'ordre de l'existence est d'une extrême simplicité dans la doctrine de S. Thomas. Elle se réduit au rapport d'effet à cause dans l'ordre de la causalité efficiente" ("La possibilité philosophique de la philosophie chrétienne," RevSr 32 (1958), p. 170); <Macierowski trans.: "The relation of participation in God within the order of existence is very simple in the teaching of Thomas. It amounts to the relation of effect to cause within the order of efficient causality.">

99 CG I, 38.

100 I, d. 19, q. 5, a. 2, ad 1; cf. *De Ver.*, q. 21, a. 4, ad 2, which opposes the purely extrinsic analogy of health to the analogy of the good, which is intrinsic. The most satisfactory explanation of the *Sentences* text is due to Ramirez, "En torno a un famoso texto de santo Tomás sobre la analogía," Sap 8 (1953) 166-192. This is the one we have adopted.— The text of the *Sentences* includes a third division *secundum esse et non secundum intentionem*: univocity of notion along with real inequality. This is what Cajetan called the analogy of inequality: a generic notion is attributed equally to the species, although the species are unequal realizations of the genus. As a matter of fact, the differences that specify the genus are contraries, and the opposition of contrariety never obtains without the opposition of privation and possession; whence occurs the real inequality of the species (II, d. 34, a. 1, a. 2, ad 1). The logical equality of the generic notion conceals a real hierarchy of species; whence the logician is more aware of the notional unity, whereas the metaphysician is more attentive to the real diversity. On the analogy of inequality, see the work of C. Fabro, *La*

nozione metafisica di partecipazione secondo S. Tommaso d'Aquino, 2d ed., Turin 1950, pp. 161-179.

[101] *Met.*, VII, lecture 4, n° 1337; VIII, lecture 3, n° 1707.

[102] *Met.*, IV, lecture 1, n° 544.

[103] I-II, q. 20, a. 3, ad 3; *Met.*, IV, lecture 1, n° 535: "Illud unum ad quod diversae habitudines referuntur in analogicis, est unum numero et non solum unum ratione."

[104] II, d. 3, q. 1, a. 5; *De Pot.*, q. 7, a. 7, ad 3; Ia, q. 13, a. 6; *Met.* VII, lecture 4, n° 1336.

[105] "Attribution *secundum prius et posterius* is essential to analogical perfection itself. The latter is found essentially realized in one of the analogates, and either by participation or by attribution alone, in the other. *Attributio per prius et posterius* ought to be understood essentially from the opposition between the principle analogate to which the analogical term is attributed per prius, and the secondary analogates, to which the same term is attributed only by attribution or participation, and hence *per posterius*. Most if not all of Thomas, texts ought to be interpreted in this fashion, and not simply understood from the opposition amongst the secondary analogates even though the latter are also not put into a hierarchical order according to a *per prius et posterius* relation. But this is a secondary hierarchy, accidental even, although if it did exist, the analogy would, facing the principle analogate, in essence preserve only a mode of secondary analogates. (L'attribution *secundum prius et posterius* est essentielle à la perfection analogique elle-même. Celle-ci se trouve réalisée essentiellement dans l'un des analogués et, soit par participation soit par attribution seulement, dans l'autre. *Attributio per prius et posterius* doit s'entendre essentiellement de l'opposition entre analogué principal, à qui le terme analogique est attribué *per prius*, et les analogués secondaires, à qui le même terme n'est attribué que par attribution ou par participation, donc *per posterius*. La plupart, sinon la totalité des textes de S. Thomas doivent s'interpréter en ce sens, et ne pas s'entendre simplement de l'opposition entre les analogués secondaires, encore que ceux-ci également se hiérarchisent selon un ordre *per prius et posterius*. Mais c'est une hiérarchie secondaire, accidentelle même, puisque l'analogie serait sauve, pour l'essentiel, s'il n'existait, face à l'analogué principal, qu'un seul mode d'analogués secondaires") (L.-B. Geiger, BT 6 (1940-42) p. 257).

CHAPTER 2
THE TRANSCENDENTAL ANALOGY OF BEING

The theory of the analogy of being was elaborated in the first place at the predicamental level; it was intended to account for the diversified unity of being which rules between accidents and substance. Can one have recourse to the same explanation when one considers the transcendental unity of beings in relation to God? Do predicamental analogy and the transcendental analogy of being belong to one and the same type? Till now we have appeared to suggest that the answer is 'yes,' but we have not yet examined the question in its own right. That is what we must do now.

Thomas faces the difficulties that transcendental analogy presents when he examines the question of the "divine names." He asks what the exact bearing of human language is when it is applied to God. This is not so much a problem of what terms to employ to speak about God as it is of the content of concepts and the value of representation. Can we embrace, under one and the same notion, the finite and the infinite, the created and the uncreated? Now, as language and representations are based on reality, the preceding question ultimately comes down to this: what sort of unity is there between the beings that surround us and the divine being? Thus we are brought back to our essential metaphysical preoccupation, that of the unity and diversity of being.

The texts that we are to examine are presented in a parallel series, arranged in the following chronological order:

I Sent., d. 35, q. 1, a. 4: *Utrum scientia Dei sit univoca scientiae nostrae*.

De Veritate, q. 2, a. 11: *Utrum scientia, aequivoce praedicetur de Deo et nobis*.

[66] *Contra Gentiles* I, c. 34: *Quod ea quae dicuntur de Deo et creaturis dicuntur analogice*.

Comp. theol. I, c. 27: *Quod nomina de Deo et aliis non omnino univoce nec aequivoce dicuntur.*[1]

De Potentia, q. 7, a. 7: *Utrum hujusmodi nomina dicantur de Deo et creaturis univoce vel aequivoce.*

Ia, q. 13, a. 5: *Utrum ea quae dicuntur de Deo et creaturis univoce de ipsis dicantur.*[2]

These texts consider sometimes the case of a particular attribute, sometimes that of the divine attributes in general. None is directly and explicitly connected with the attribution of being, but the solution each time appeals to principles that bring the analogy of being into play with respect to both its predicamental and transcendental dimensions. We shall have to examine the [67] doctrinal evolution that the parallelism of the texts reveals; then we shall have to study the philosophical significance of the variations observed. For a long time the solution of the *De Veritate*[3] has been at the center of all the discussions relating to the doctrine of analogy; since it is presented as a provisional solution, to which Thomas subscribed only for a short period of time, we shall have to examine why he adopted it and why he later abandoned it. As this is done, it will be possible to shed light upon the implicit, underlying metaphysical positions that govern this doctrinal evolution and which lead to the definitive form that the theory of the analogy of being takes.

I. Parallelism of the texts and evolution of the doctrine

With the exception of the *Compendium theologiae*, whose response is less developed, the texts we have just enumerated are strictly parallel.[4] They are all developed according to an identical pattern: the divine names are neither univocal, which would destroy the divine transcendence, nor equivocal, which would render God unknowable, but analogous. Now analogy is of two sorts: the first, closer to univocity, must be brushed aside; the second belongs only to the relations of created being to divine being. It is on this last point, on the two forms of analogy, that the texts perceptibly diverge and that one finds several solutions: that of the *Sentences*, that of the *De Veritate*, and that of the group of[68] later works: *Contra Gentiles, De Potentia,* and the *Prima Pars*. Let us quickly examine each of the three conclusions: the divine names are neither univocal nor equivocal, but analogous.[5]

First of all, the divine names are not univocal. The principal argument that Thomas invokes in the *Sentences* and in the *De Veritate*[6] is

drawn from the distinction between quiddity and *esse*: *esse* is proper to each thing and incommunicable; the nature can be common to many. Thus one and the same human nature pertains to all human beings, although each exists on its own account. This unity of nature is rendered by the univocal common name that one attributes to several beings separated by their *esse*. Since *esse* is that by which beings of the same nature differ from each other, it follows that *esse* is never univocally common and that being (*ens*) is not a univocal predicate. Now in God, the nature is identical to the *esse*; hence He cannot have anything univocally common with something created. The argument is presented as a noetic consequence of the metaphysical distinction borrowed from Avicenna.[7]

The *De Potentia*[8] also appeals to the same presupposition, but develops it in a more original way, it seems, by insisting on the diversity of *esse*. Being is not univocal on the predicamental level because *esse* is not uniform; for substance subsists, i.e., exercises the act of being autonomously, whereas accident has the act of being only relatively, by inhering in substance. *Diversa habitudo ad esse impedit univocam praedicationem entis*.[9] Now, in virtue of the same principle, being is not univocal on the transcendental level, either: God possesses *esse* completely otherwise than do creatures, since He is His own *esse*. In short, the way proper to each being for exercising the act of being universally excludes all predicamental and transcendental univocity. [69]

We can also get to the same conclusion by appealing to the special characteristics that attribution *secundum prius et posterius* presents, as does the *Contra Gentiles*: *quod praedicatur de aliquibus secundum prius et posterius, certum est univoce non praedicari*.[10] Now the predicamental attribution of being is not univocal, since it involves a hierarchy according to the prior and the posterior (between substance and accident). As the transcendental attribution of being does not include any less inequality since being (*ens*) belongs to God by essence and to the rest by participation, it is not univocal either. In sum, since being is actually never uniform, it is not a univocal predicate either, whether at the predicamental or transcendental level.

In the second place, the divine names are not equivocal. The argument that one finds in all the texts of the series is based on the definition of equivocity.[11] When two beings receive the same name by chance, it is impossible to know the one by starting from the other. Such would

be the case if the divine names were equivocal: there would be nothing in common between beings and God—the latter would be the wholly other, beyond being and knowledge. Now nothing could be more contrary to the inalienable requirements of Christian thought than this manner of conceiving the divine transcendence: biblical revelation makes sense only if beings are like the God who has created them, and if, starting from these beings, one can get to know God to at least some small degree. Too close, God ceases to be transcendent; too far, He vanishes into an inaccessible transcendence. In one case He is no longer God; in the other He is no longer real. In virtue of this argument, if we unfold its metaphysical content, we have to say that if being were equivocal, one could not attribute it simultaneously to God and to a created thing. It would belong to the one necessarily and to the other not at all: if the realities of this world qualify as being, then God is not being, but beyond being; and if God is being, being belongs to Him only, and nothing truly is a being aside from Him. Equivocity would introduce a definite rupture in the domain of being.

[70]

Now where there is a relation of the one to the other there is no rupture, as the *Contra Gentiles* shows:[12] "Among the names that chance renders equivocal, one discovers no order, no relation of one to another: it is entirely by accident that one and the same name is attributed to different realities; the name given to one does not mean that it has a relation to the other. But it is not the same for the names that one attributes to God and to creatures. For in these common names one considers the relation of cause to effect. This is why the names common to God and to the other beings are not equivocal." Far from being separated from God, beings are bound to Him by a relation of causal dependency, from which there results a certain community of analogy. The noetic argument is thus re-inforced with a metaphysical argument; but let us note at once that the latter appears only beginning with the *Contra Gentiles*: it is absent from the *Sentences* and from the *De Veritate*, where the argument is based only on the requirements for a knowledge of God. According to the metaphysical argument, being is not univocal; it is really common because causality establishes a communication of being between the effect and the cause, i.e., between beings and God.[13]

Third conclusion: since the divine names are neither univocal nor equivocal, it follows that they are analogous.[14] Now[71\ not just any sort of analogy can suitably express the unity that binds beings to God—consequently there arises the distinction of two sorts of analogical community, one that is rejected and the other that is accepted.[15] Now these two forms of analogy are not presented in the same way in his various works.[16] In the [72] *Sentences* Thomas sets aside a type of analogy that would suppose a common form unequally possessed by God and by creatures; he keeps only participation by imperfect likeness. In the *De Veritate* he excludes all analogy by reference to a primary instance and keeps only the analogy of proportion in four terms. Finally, in the later works, he comes back to analogy by reference to a primary instance and distinguishes the analogy of *duorum ad tertium* (which he rejects because being would embrace God and beings and would be superior to them) and the analogy of *unius ad alterum*, which he adopts because it expresses the immediate relation of created being to divine being. As can be seen, the solution of the *De Veritate* is reducible neither to that of the *Sentences*, which it does not continue, nor to Thomas's works subsequent to the *De Veritate*, which it does not prepare for, either. The progress of the doctrine can not be drawn as a regular, rising curve; it would be better represented as line with a gap, since the *De Veritate* seems discontinuous with what precedes as well as with what follows. It is true that some Thomists, misled by the literal parallelism, believed to have found an identical theory rendered in different language and have thought that all the texts could be grouped within a single synthesis governed by the solution of the *De Veritate;* one could then no longer speak either of a rupture or of progress, since one and the same thought would be found from one end of Thomas's work to the other. But this excessively simple solution does not stand up to a careful reading of the texts nor especially to an examination of the reasons upon which Thomas bases his doctrine.

Let us now to compare precisely the three solutions that Thomas successively advances for the analogy of being. The teaching of the *Sentences* is characterized by the opposition of two sorts of analogy, of which the one involves a common form possessed *secundum prius et posterius*, and the other is based upon participation by imperfect likeness (to imitate the primary instance, or to participate its likeness

to the extent that one can). Now, the predicamental attribution and the transcendental attribution of being do not pertain to the same type of analogy: at the level of the categories, being is presented as a common form unequally participated by substance and by acci-[73] dent,[17] which Thomas will explicitly reject in the *Contra Gentiles*.[18] On the other hand, this first analogy is excluded at the transcendental level, since it is impossible to conceive being as a sort of genus common to all that is, comprising the creator and the creature at once; for, if being were to include both God and beings, it would be prior to and simpler than both, as a genus specified respectively by the divine difference and by created difference; but nothing can be prior to God nor simpler than He.[19] It remains that beings receive from Him that which they are by an imperfect likeness. In short, the *Sentences* does not offer a unified theory of the analogy of being; the general schema is indeed that of unity by reference to a primary instance, but this primary instance is sometimes being prior to accident and substance, sometimes God Himself communicating His likeness to other things. In all this Thomas's thought does not seem to be original, for the opposition of the two analogies (possessing one and the same form *secundum prius et posterius*, imitating the primary instance and participating its likeness to the extent that it can) as well as associating predicamental analogy with the first and the transcendental analogy of being with the second are already found in Albert; Thomas's *Sentences* literally take over the doctrine and even the expressions of Albert.[20] [74]

In sum, in the period of the *Sentences*, analogy by reference to a primary instance seems to suffice for explaining the relations of the creature to God. Based upon the intrinsic participation of the divine attributes, this analogy expresses the imperfect likeness of beings to their model. Provided that we set aside every attempt to posit any measure common to God and to beings, analogy by likeness expresses both the dependency of beings upon God, whom they imitate, and also the intrinsic possession of the participated perfection. Transcendent-[75] al perfection is an intrinsic analogy (*secundum intentionem et secundum esse*) by likeness and participation (*participare de similitudine*). By means of these complementary precisions, the theory of the unity of order can be applied under one form, to accidents and to substance, and, under another, to beings and to God; predicamental analogy relies

upon a common form; transcendental analogy requires participation by likeness.[21]

In the *De Veritate*, q. 2, a. 11,[22] analogy is presented under [76] two forms, one of which must be excluded, whereas the other applies to the relations of beings to God—the first which he names *convenientia proportionis* and the second, *convenientia proportionalitatis*, and which we can designate as community of relation [*la communauté de rapport*] and community of proportion [*la communauté de proportion*].[24] [77]

Community of relation is defined by a determinate distance and a strict bond between two terms; the model is provided by the mathematical relation between two magnitudes when the value of the one determines by itself alone that of the other; for example, a strict relation exists between a number and its double. The next part of the text shows that the determinate relation Thomas is thinking of is not confined to the mathematical relation between two numbers, but it also includes reference to the primary instance by which the Aristotelian analogy of health and being is established. The community of relation comprises both the numerical relation of the double to the single as well as the reference of accident to substance. Moreover, the two forms of analogy recognized in the *Sentences* are only two varieties of the unity of relation (ad 4m and ad 6m). This community of relation is applicable to predicamental analogy, but Thomas rejects it when he deals with transcendental analogy because it does not respect the requirements of the divine transcendence: since it involves a definite distance (*determinata distantia*), a strict relation (*determinata habitudo*), it follows that, starting from created being, one could, in virtue of this relation, define the divine perfection, just as starting from a given number one can determine the value of its double. In short, the community of relation would suppress the infinite distance that separates beings from God; thus we have a situation in which Thomas seesm to conclude by identifying the absence of a definite relation [78] which permts one to determine the divine perfection, with the absence of any direct relation (numerical or otherwise) between beings and God.[24]

For this reason he appeals to the community of proportion. The latter is defined as a likeness among four terms taken two by two: a is to b as c is to d; thus the mathematical proportion according to which 6 is to 3 as 4 is to 2, where 6 and 4 have this in common—being the double of 3 and 2 respectively.[25] The terms of the two relations are

not directly bound among themselves; they come together in virtue of the likeness of the two relations. Thus defined, proportion is not confined to the mathematical order but extends to other domains, as the examples Thomas uses show: what sight is for the body, intellect is for the soul;[26] what the pilot is for the ship, the prince is for the city.[27] This is how transcendental analogy must be conceived between beings and God: without any determinate direct relation (*nulla determinata habitudo*), but as a proportion; there is no relation of the finite to the infinite, but the relation of the finite to the finite is like the relation of [79] the infinite to the infinite.[28] Thus divine knowledge is to infinite being what created knowledge is to finite being. Hence creatures do not directly resemble God; rather the likeness that the analogy renders is that of two relations that beings and God sustain respectively with regard to certain characteristics that belong to them. What beings are to their attributes, God is to His.

In summary, predicamental analogy and transcendental analogy are treated separately as in the *Sentences*, no longer by appealing to two sorts of analogy of relation, but by applying the analogy of relation exclusively to the predicamental level and the analogy of proportion to the transcendental level. Nevertheless, the reason why analogy by reference to a primary instance is set aside from the relation of beings to God does no longer lie, as it was in the *Sentences*, merely in the fact that being would be prior to and simpler than God, but rather in the fact that such an analogy involves a direct relationship to the primary instance; Thomas believes that, by admitting a relation of this sort, one can no longer safeguard the divine transcendence. Without saying it, Thomas thus adopts a new position which contradicts what he had held in the *Sentences*, since he eliminates participation by likeness; for analogy by imitation he substitutes analogy of proportion. At the transcendental level, the analogy of relation is useless, because it would diminish the distance that separates beings from God. The analogy of being is explained differently according as one examines the horizontal plane of the categories, for which the Aristotelian theory of the unity of order is satisfactory, or the vertical plane of the degrees of being, for which one has to appeal to the unity of proportion; the latter will provide the minimum of likeness needed to escape equivocity.

Why did Thomas adopt this position? We shall soon have to explain it. But let us first compare the solution one encounters [80] in the later works to the solution in the *Sentences* and the *De Veritate*. Thomas

distinguishes in these later works, as before, two sorts of analogy that we shall name analogy of *duorum ad tertium* and analogy of *unius ad alterum,* following the usage of Cajetan inspired by the terms of the *De Potentia*. Now in either case we clearly recognize the analogy by reference to a primary instance, as is indicated first by the brief definition of the *Contra Gentiles: analogice hoc est secundum ordinem vel respectum ad aliquid unum*, and then by the allusions to the Aristotelian theory of health and of being; the distinction in question appears to be a more precise analysis of Aristotle's theory. For a medicine and nourishment are called healthy because they restore or preserve the health of an animal, which serves as a third term with respect to them, but one can also consider the direct relation of causality which directly ties a medicine to the health of the animal. In the same way, being is said of two accidents, such as quality and quantity, because they are each related to substance, but one can just as well consider the direct relation of an accident to substance. In the first case, we have an analogy *duorum ad tertium*, in the second an analogy *unius ad alterum*. From a logical point of view one could say that in the first case the analogical denomination belongs to the two secondary analogates because they are each related to the principal analogate; the analogy *duorum ad tertium* is that which exists among the secondary analogates. In the second case, the analogical denomination belongs to the secondary analogate in virtue of the direct relation that binds it to the principal analogate; the analogy *unius ad alterum* is established between a secondary analogate and the primary instance. But what does this logical distinction cover within the order of being? What it means is that on the categorical level accident and substance do not receive the attribution of being by reference to a form common to each term, namely being; there is nothing prior to substance, and being is either substance in the first place (*per prius*) or else accident subsequently *(per posterius): ens de substantia et accidente dicitur secundum quod accidens ad substantiam respectum habet, non quod substantia et accidens ad aliquid tertium referantur*.[29] In the same way, [81] on the transcendental level, being does not encompass both beings and God, since being is not prior to God. It is God who grounds the analogy of being, since beings receive by participation what He is by essence; there is no primary instance of being other than He.

We have now a coherent and unified theory of the analogy of being. On the one hand, analogy by reference to a primary instance, which was worked out at the categorical level, can also explain the relation of beings to God; on the other hand, predicamental analogy and transcendental analogy pertain to one and the same type of analogy *unius ad alterum*. The definitive position of Thomas marks an indisputable reversal compared to the solution of the *De Veritate*: on the whole, the new solution would be closer to that of the *Sentences*, but is not identical with it either. The fact that Thomas abandons the language he used in the *Sentences* (*imitari, participare de similitudine*) cannot be explained as a mere adjustment of the technical vocabulary. What changes is the importance accorded to exemplar causality in the one instance and the other.

In order to show irrefutably a doctrinal evolution through the comparison of the three solutions (*Sentences, De Veritate, Contra Gentiles, – De Potentia, – Ia Pars*) we must examine in the first place how Thomas in his mature works resolves the difficulties that led to the solution of the *De Veritate;* in the second place we have to explain how he came to adopt the analogy of proportion in the *De Veritate* and why he subsequently abandoned it.

II. The different ways of conceiving transcendental analogy

First of all, we have to establish that the *De Veritate* and the later texts are examining exactly the same difficulty and offer a completely distinct solution for it, lest someone might object against us that the last texts have treated a different problem and that the solution which they propose does not in any way contradict that of the *De Veritate*. We have therefore to prove that the texts in the *Contra Gentiles – De Potentia – Prima Pars* group and those of the *De Veritate* [82] contain two different solutions to one identical question and that Thomas, far from reconciling them, has preferred the one over the other. The *De Veritate* appeals to the analogy of proportion, whereas subsequently it is the analogy of relation that Thomas appeals to: the major difficulties that made him set aside this solution in the *De Veritate* are re-examined and the partial truth that they contain can be admitted without being constrained to use the analogy of proportion. With a view to retracing Thomas's route and understanding its significance, we are

shall compare the reasons why he preferred the *De Veritate* solution of these difficulties to the solutions that he later gave.

Why, in the *De Veritate*, did Thomas prefer the analogy of proportion to the analogy of relation to account for the unity that ties beings to God? These reasons clearly appear in the arguments that introduce the debate at question 2, article 11 and in the replies that are made to them. We shall select five of them that seem the most decisive. These are the second, the third, the fourth, the fifth, and the sixth.

Second argument. There is no likeness without relation [*rapport*]: *comparatio*); but there is no relation of the finite to the infinite.[30]

– Reply. According to Aristotle, in the *Topics* I, 17, 108a 7-17, there are two types of likeness, one for things that belong to different genera, the other for those that belong in the same genus. The first is proportional likeness: what one term is to a second, a third is to a fourth. The second is direct likeness based upon the possession of one and the same form by many.[31] The first requires no determinate relation between the two terms, whereas the second does require such a relation.[32] This is why the first likeness between beings and God can be retained, whereas the second must be set aside. Only the proportional likeness does not involve a determinate relation between the finite and the infinite.

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Third argument. There is no likeness without a common form equally or unequally possessed, which is impossible between beings and God, since then there would have to be something simpler than God.

– Reply. Created being is not like God in virtue of one common form possessed equally or unequally; this hypothesis has just been excluded; the likeness in question is only proportion.

Fourth argument. The greater the distance between two beings, the less they are alike; but the distance from a creature to God is infinite. To assert that beings are like God would amount to suppressing the distance that separates them.

– Reply. To maintain the infinite distance from beings to God two decisions will suffice: first, to deny all direct likeness whether by possession of one and the same form or in virtue of a determinate relation; and, second, to substitute for it a proportional likeness which is independent of the distance, since it holds true between two objects at a small distance as well as between two beings very far apart. Only

proportional likeness does not suppress the infinite distance that separates beings from God.

Fifth argument. There is more distance between the created and God than between the created and non-being; but there is nothing in common to being and non-being except by equivocation.

– Reply. If the distance between the being and the non-being does not prevent the latter from being called "being" by analogy, as Aristotle teaches, the distance between the creature and God does not prevent analogical community either.

Sixth argument. As a general rule, two analogates may be defined either the one by the other (as accident by substance, or potency by act) or the one and the other by some third (as healthy climate and healthy food by relation to the health of an animal). Now the creature and God can be defined neither the one by the other nor each by some third term. Since the general rule of analogy is inapplicable, there is no analogy between beings and God.

– Reply. This law of analogy according to which one term is defined by the other, e.g., accident by substance, or two terms may be defined by a third, e.g., quantity [84] and quality by substance, is valid only for the analogy of relation and does not apply to the analogy of proportion. But the first has been excluded.

At the end of the preceding discussion, we saw that Thomas carefully safeguards the divine transcendence without falling into equivocity. He sees no other solution for this than the analogy of proportion; for, in the perspective of a formalist ontology, like that of the *Sentences* (which the *De Veritate* does not put into question), the analogy of relation seems to lead to univocity. If beings and God are not to be confused, one must emphasize the infinite distance that separates them from Him. The arguments cited partially overlap, but they all tend to manifest the major inconvenience that analogy of relation presents when the relation of being to God is conceived in terms of imitation and exemplarity, i.e., when it belongs to the order of form. These arguments can be summarized in the following way:

1. There is no likeness of beings to God in virtue of a common form, even if it were received *secundum magis et minus* (arg. 3). To the same difficulty the *Sentences* replies with the theory of imitation and participation by likeness.[33] This answer is no longer deemed to be sufficient and the *De Veritate* proposes a more radical solution by

rejecting direct likeness and by substituting for it proportional likeness.

2. Between the finite and the infinite there is no direct determinate relation. This argument is based upon the Aristotelian adage: *finiti ad infinitum nulla est proportio*,[34] which Thomas invokes each time he deals with the relations between the creature and God.[35] Thomas here accepts the argument without discussion. Between the finite [85] and the infinite there is no *proportio*, perhaps, but there is a *proportionalitas*: though there is no direct relation [*rapport*], there is nevertheless a proportion.[36] Why this distinction? It is, as we have already noted, because direct relation would permit one to define one of the terms by starting with the other and because it definitely implies a univocal likeness. In short, Thomas discovers no determinate relation and indeed no relation at all.[37]

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3. Between beings and God there is an infinite distance which would be diminished by the analogy of relation but which might be preserved by the analogy of proportion.

4. It is useless to want to distinguish two sorts of analogy of relation, as was done in the *Sentences*; one ought to get rid of them both.

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If Thomas subsequently adopts a different solution, it is because he is in a position to reply in another way to the difficulties we have just enumerated.[38]

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To the first difficulty, that of the common form, he replies that the likeness of beings to God is not identical to univocal likeness for two reasons drawn from the metaphysics of participation.[39] First, because this likeness does not depend upon participation of a common form; as a matter of fact, the attributes that are common to created beings and to God belong to God *per essentiam* and to creatures *per participationem*. Secondly, because the form participated by the creature is not identical to the divine perfection: the latter communicates itself only in a deficient way. The fullness of the divine perfection is fragmented within distinct perfections none of which can equal the divine reality.[40] Likeness by deficient formal participation entirely suffices to prevent univocity while laying the foundation for the analogy of relation: what God is by essence, beings receive by participation.

Does participation *secundum magis et minus* necessarily entail univocity, as the *De Veritate* claims? — Yes, if it is a participation of one identical perfection to a greater or lesser degree (e.g., between two objects more or less white); no, if there is an essential inequality as that which separates the perfection subsisting *per essentiam* from a perfection received *per participationem*. If the perfection that belongs to God *per essentiam* is received in the creature *per participationem*, this suffices to fend off univocity without a need to have recourse to proportion. In this [88] case, one must say that the participated perfection belongs to God *modo eminentiori*.[41]

To the second difficulty, on the relation between the finite and the infinite, one finds two responses. At the stage of the *De Veritate*, Thomas sometimes distinguishes a relation in the strict sense, the model for which is numerical ratio [*rapport*], which is established between two finite beings belonging to the same species, and a relation [*rapport*] in the broad sense, which can be applied to the relation [*rapport*] of beings to God. Still these texts offer no decisive reply to the objection; for what is this *proportio* which binds beings to God despite the infinite distance that separates them? Subsequently, Thomas no longer admits the adage: *finiti ad infinitum nulla est proportio*. There is, he states, a direct relation between beings and God, and it is this that efficient causality establishes. The texts that relate this solution must be taken into consideration, for they testify to a definite reversal: *est proportio creaturae ad Deum ut causati ad causam*,[42] *nihil prohibet esse proportionem creaturae ad Deum … secundum habitudinem effectus ad causam*,[43] *potest esse proportio creaturae ad Deum, in quantum se habet ad ipsum ut effectus ad causam*.[44] Since there is a causal relation between beings and God,[45] it becomes unnecessary, from now on, to have recourse to proportional likeness; for the direct likeness of the effect to the cause suffices to safeguard the divine transcendence. The relation between efficiency and participation does not entail any of the vexing confusions that the relation of exemplarity involves.

Third difficulty: the infinite distance from beings to God. The idea of distance is borrowed from the physical order and from there is transferred to the metaphysical order. Two beings are at a distance when they are separated from each other by a spatial interval.[46] To speak of a distance between creatures and the creator [89] is a metaphorical way to translate the diversity that opposes beings to God and to assert that the divine names are not univocal.[47] In his first works,

Thomas often claims that beings are at an infinite distance from God,[48] and, in a formalist perspective, to diminish this distance would run the risk of confusion. Still, the metaphor in question is not without drawback either, for two beings separated by an interval are exterior to each other. Can one say that beings are distant from God, that God is exterior to them? The intervention of efficient causality alleviates these difficulties: God is immanent to all beings not as form but as cause. By His creative presence, He is not far but quite near: *est in omnibus per essentiam, inquantum adest omnibus ut causa essendi*.[49] We can still speak of 'distance,' provided that we understand it no longer as an absence or being far off, but simply as an expression of dissimilarity.[50] Understood in this way, distance is in no way an obstacle to analogy by reference to a primary instance.

Fourth difficulty: the analogates are defined by the primary instance. Thomas accepts the general rule of analogy of [90] relation. But the possibility that God and creatures be defined by a third common term, which would be being, is excluded. So, according to analogy *unius ad alterum*, must beings be defined starting from God or God starting from beings? This question calls for two complementary replies. Our knowledge follows an order *per prius et posterius* which goes from beings to God. It never coincides with the ontological order of creative causality: what is first for us is never first in itself. Whatever we know of God we know by means of beings, by ascending from the effects to their cause. In short, for us, the primary analogate is the creature.[51] But since beings receive by participation what God is by essence, they depend upon Him as the primary instance from which they have what they are. Of itself, being does not include dependence upon a cause in its definition, otherwise one would have to say that God is not a being, since He is not caused. Still, if being pertains to God *per prius* and to creatures *per posterius*, one must conclude that beings cannot be defined independently of their dependence upon God, as the effects of creative causality: *esse quod rebus creatis inest non potest intelligi nisi ut deductum ab esse divino*.[52] The causal dependence on God creates the relation necessary for analogy by [91] reference to a primary instance without risk of confounding beings and God in one and the same form or notion.

The preceding observations show that after the *De Veritate* Thomas's doctrine on the subject of transcendental analogy has changed: the theory of the analogy of relation permits us satisfactorily to resolve the difficulties that drove us to call upon the analogy of proportion. In order to conclude the comparison we have just made and to bring to the fore the philosophical significance of the doctrinal progress it reveals, we can say that the *De Veritate* functions as an extension of the *Sentences*. There Thomas accepts the same formalist conception according to which the principal relation of beings to God is that of imitation, but he grasps the danger that it presents: more or less to confuse the creature with the creator and to succumb to the univocity to which our conceptual processes incline us. There is only one means to eliminate this danger: to accentuate the distance, to deny all direct likeness, to refuse every sort of determinate relation. At what price, then, does one safeguard the divine transcendence? By radically separating beings from God, by accentuating the distance to the point of rupture, by running the risk of equivocity and agnosticism. Neither theologically nor philosophically is this a satisfactory solution: it annihilates our knowledge of God; it eliminates the unity of being. The cause of this is the underlying metaphysics which inspires this solution. To escape the impasse, one had to conceive being no longer as form but as act, and causality no longer as the likeness of the copy to the model but as the dependence of one being upon another being which produces it. Now this is exactly what efficient causality implies: exercised by a being in act, it makes a new being exist in act, which being is not confounded with the first, since the effect and the cause each exist on its own account, but which communicates with it in the act, since the act of the agent becomes that of the patient. At the same time the act is that which the effect has in common with the cause and that by which it is not identified with it. Thus, it is by a veritable [92] communication of being that God produces creatures and creative causality establishes between beings and God the indispensable bond of participation so that there might be an analogy of relation between them. It will no longer be necessary to have recourse to analogy of proportion, and Thomas will never come back to the theory of the *De Veritate*.

To resolve the question of transcendental analogy Thomas wavered and had recourse to several solutions. Ought we to say to two or to three? If we confine ourselves to mere description, we can enumerate,

as we have above, three solutions that succeed each other in time, but, proceeding in this manner, we would let the doctrinal import of the observed waverings slip by. As to their logical structure, we could affirm that we encounter two solutions, one which has recourse to analogy of proportion and the other to analogy of relation, first in the *Sentences* and then in the mature works. By this superficial reconciliation we would not grasp the reason why in the *De Veritate* Thomas adopted an apparently aberrant solution, since it breaks the trajectory of a development that seems continuous. If we put ourselves at the standpoint of their metaphysical significance, one has to say that there are two solutions in Thomas: one governed by the formal relation of exemplarity, accepted in the *Sentences* (whence the analogy of imitation), rejected in the *De Veritate* (whence the analogy of proportion), and the other founded upon productive causality and the communication of act (whence the analogy *unius ad alterum*).[53]

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Why did Thomas adopt the solution of the *De Veritate*? Because he perceived the dangers participation by likeness is exposed to. In the *De Veritate* he keeps the formalistic conception of causality and of being which he had initially accepted in the *Sentences* and which is, as we recall, that of Albert. He strives to avoid their unacceptable consequences without putting the metaphysical presuppositions in question.

Why then did he abandon the solution of the *De Veritate*? Doubtless because of the awkwardness it presents, for it posits a cleft between beings and God at the risk of making God unknowable. Now what good is it to rend the unity of being, given that creative causality is communication of being and production of act? The decisive reason for the progress noted is this: unlike formal causality, efficient causality establishes a relation between beings and God by which the latter is most intimately present to all that is without ceasing to be transcendent. The change of metaphysical perspective, a new conception of causality and of being command the solution to which Thomas definitively commits himself: there is an analogy *unius ad alterum* between beings and God. Inversely, the successive variations that the theory of transcendental analogy presents reveal in a special way how the conception of being as act is formed, upon which conception Thomas's metaphysics rests.

III. Philosophical significance of the theory of the analogy of being in its definitive form

Up till now we have observed that the theory of the analogy of being takes its definitive form thanks to the substitution of the notion of act for that of form. The evolution that we perceive on the subject of analogy marks the progress of Thomas's thought as regards being: it is the result of it. In bringing to the fore the [94] connection between these two doctrines, we indirectly shed light on the philosophical significance of the theory of analogy and its place in the philosophy of being. It still remains to point out what the direct philosophical content of it is. Now the theory of the analogy of being concerns the relation between the conceptual unity and the real unity of being. How does Thomas conceive of each?

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As for the nature of this conceptual unity, one must admit that Thomas is less explicit than we might hope and, to uncover his thought on this point, we have to unfold the latent presuppositions implied in the definition of analogy as attribution *secundum prius et posterius* as well as within the division of analogy into *duorum ad tertium* and *unius ad alterum*.[54] Let's take up the text of *Contra Gentiles* (I, 34) which we have cited several times; for it contains what is essential for a reply to our first question. "What is attributed to God and to beings is attributed neither univocally, nor equivocally, but analogously, i.e., by relation or reference to a primary instance. Two situations present themselves. In the first case, several things are referred to a single term: thus, by reference to a single health, an animal is called healthy as subject, a medicine as productive cause; food, as a conserver; urine as a sign. In the second case, there is a relation or reference of two beings, not to some third term, but of the one to the other. It is in this way that being (*ens*) is attributed to substance and to accident inasmuch as accident is referred to substance, not insofar as substance and accident might be related to a third. The names that one attributes to God and to the other beings are not, then, attributed according to the analogy of the first mode—for then it would be necessary to have [95] something prior to God,—but according to the second mode."

Immediately on reading the preceding text we can formulate a preliminary impression: both on the predicamental level and on the

transcendental level, there is no element which would be common in the fashion of a genus and which would be perfectly one in itself; being is never an encompassing superior which would stand above accidents and substance, nor a form which would be participated in turn by creatures and by God. Thomas explicitly sets all these hypotheses aside. By what right then can we have recourse to one single notion of being for thinking all that is real? What does the unity of the concept under which is encompassed all that is in fact cover?[55] — Not a pure diversity, otherwise the concept of being will be equivocal, but yet a real diversity, since being is either accident or substance, creature or God; and an ordered diversity, since the accidents depend upon substance and the creatures upon God. The unity on the predicamental level and on the transcendental plane is neither that of a generic nature nor that of a proportion; it is a unity of causality and participation which binds accidents to substance and beings to God. The concept of being is not univocal, since it applies to a diversity; nor is it equivocal, since this diversity is ordered by relation to a primary instance. Hence the analogical concept has a totally special unity; it does not stand above its inferiors but it applies to them without any intermediary, and it does not represent them equally but applies to them *per prius et posterius*.

Now to say that the analogical concept belongs principally to the one and secondarily to the other amounts to asserting that it represents the one directly and it designates the other to the extent that the other has a relation to the first. Taken separately, the analogates are each defined in their own way and they are represented by distinct concepts; but one can also consider them in terms of what they have in common, i.e., according to the relation which unites them [96] to the first. Thus, in knowing the primary instance, we grasp the secondary analogates in what they have really in common with it, namely their relation to it. Accidents and substance, creatures and God are gathered in the unity of being only in virtue of the relation of causality and participation which binds the second term to the first, the accidents to the substance, the creatures to God. Being stands above neither predicamental nor transcendental diversity; it belongs *per prius* to God and *per posterius* to creatures. The concept of being immediately designates God or creatures, substance or accidents, not separated and disjoint, but considered within the unity of the relation that binds

them to the primary instance. For predicamental analogy, there is no primary instance other than substance, and for transcendental analogy no primary instance other than God, the ultimate term of reference of all the meanings of being, the principle of order by relation to which all else is unified. In short, the unity of being hangs upon the real unity of the First Being.[56]

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Since the analogates are tied directly to the primary instance, we grasp the analogical unity when we consider an analogate as related to the primary instance or else the primary instance as term of the relation by which the analogates are related to it. From then on, one can pass directly from the knowledge of the one to that of the other; starting from the one we directly know the other within the unity of the relation that binds them without needing to have recourse to the mediation of the concept that Cajetan's disciples call the "transcendental analogue."[57] All polemic [98] intention aside, their theory permits them to compare two quite different conceptions of analogical unity.

According to them, the analogates are united "in this perfection which is common to them, not with an equivocal community (*sic*), but with a proportional community. It alone constitutes the formal link between otherwise totally diverse beings, and it is expressed conceptually in the transcendental analogue. Each of the ten categories, for example, considered absolutely in its own proper structure, excludes the others and gives no knowledge of them; considered in its relation with being, it does give knowledge of the other categories, which hold various relations with being as well. That which unifies the diversity is the proportional idea of being."[58] In other words, the transcendental analogue represents the perfection in itself, independently of its divine or created, substantial or accidental modes. Why is this intermediary necessary? All Thomists agree in saying that the analogy of relation involves many coordinated concepts which imply each other. But this analogy, claim the disciples of Cajetan, is always extrinsic.[59] Under this hypothesis, starting from one of the analogates I cannot obtain an intrinsic knowledge of the other; I can attain it only in a relation of external causality. In short, if one does not want to reduce analogy to a nominal community, one has to appeal to [99] the proportional unity of the concept; it alone permits one to attain the analogically known thing according to the proper significance of the concept. Now to this it is sufficient to reply that, for Thomas, the analogy of

relation is sometimes extrinsic, sometimes intrinsic. In the first case, the conclusions that have just been reported are incontestable, but the same does not go for the second, which is precisely that of being. In the second case, beginning from the one, I know what the other intrinsically and formally is, not by means of a concept analogous in itself, but in virtue of the relation of participation which links this analogate to the primary instance. In summary, what we regard as unacceptable in the Cajetanian theory is not that it should recognize[*] the plurality of concepts within the analogy of relation, but rather that it should define the latter as always extrinsic; were the latter to have been established, one would quite validly conclude that, starting from one of the analogates, one can obtain only a poor awareness of the other.

Another argument has been brought up in support of the theory we have just criticized, an argument which must be examined since it directly concerns our subject. "This doctrine of transcendental analogy has a solid basis in Thomas. For it is clear that the Angelic Doctor is always distinguishing the '*modus* ' and the '*ratio*,' that he opposes the names that signify a perfection along with its created mode to those that express it 'absolutely' without including a mode … The perfections 'signified absolutely' are the content of the transcendental '*ratio*,' common proportionally to God and to the creature."[60] What is Thomas's thought on the subject of the *ratio-modus* couple?

The names that we attribute to God, explains Thomas,[61] are all drawn from created beings, though they are not all taken figuratively. For some names include within their very definition a material condition that renders them inapplicable to the divine reality in any other way than metaphorically, as when Scripture calls God a rock or a fortress. Others, on the other hand, signify a perfection understood independently [100] of every imperfect condition of realization, as when we say that God is, that He is good, that He is living, etc. The latter attributes belong to God in their proper sense. From this explanation it follows that the *ratio* is the common perfection defined independently of the conditions under which it exists in such or such a being, while the *modus* pertains to the conditions of existence and says how the common perfection is realized. "The notion of *modus*," Geiger points out, "is characteristic of formal inequality. It very exactly expresses this purely qualitative diversity within a non-univocal unity."[62]

To dissociate the *ratio* from the *modus* is not to disengage a perfection in itself, stripped of every mode and disengaged from every limit, a perfection that would be above all beings and that would be common to creatures and to God;[63] it is thanks to an effort of judgement, simply to discern within the reality that we immediately grasp that which belongs to the perfection as such and could be found again elsewhere, from that which depends upon the particular conditions under which we attain it.[64] It is out of the question that we could form an abstract notion of the created or uncreated mode, since we can know the perfection only under a determinate mode; nevertheless the particular condition under which we attain it does not define this perfection. This distinction allows us to catch a glimpse of how the *ratio entis* that is grasped in a creature can belong to God in virtue of the relation of causality which binds them together and how it can be verified within the *ratio deitatis* in a way that escapes us.

What belongs to the perfection as such, independently of the conditions of existence which it has here or there (and which are not [101] included in its definition), is called the *perfectio absolute (considerata)*.[65] This way of considering the perfection is in a certain way comparable to the abstraction of a species or a genus, as can be seen in the *De ente et essentia*,[66] since it is concerned with the content of a definition. Nevertheless it is totally different from abstraction, since there is, properly speaking, no common nature and since the notion is not above the different modes it involves, for we discern it in one of these modes and, from there, we can grasp something of the other realizations to the extent that they are in [102] relation with the one that we know in the first place. From this two consequences flow relating to the transcendental use of concepts: first of all, these concepts necessarily involve a created mode of signifying, inseparable from the material analogates from whence we know the analogous notions;[67] consequently, the concepts most appropriate for conceiving anything of the divine reality are those that are least determined and most common. Among these, the concept of being without qualification (as well as the name *Qui est*) enjoys the privilege of not explicitly designating any mode of being and of being open to them all.[68] In other words, we attain the *esse divinum* only by the mediation of the *esse commune*, i.e., the being common to the created analogates.[69] [103]

In no way do we have the power of abstracting a notion—not even that of being—by which we would rise above the created and the uncreated; this Thomas formally excludes by rejecting every analogy *duorum ad tertium*. The *ratio deitatis* remains within an inviolable transcendence.[70]

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[104]

To reduce the diversity of reality to the unity of being, it does not suffice to form a concept which encompasses the totality of beings; one must still uncover unity at the very level of reality. The reduction back to the one is accomplished in two phases: being is diversified by degrees and these degrees are hierarchized according to an order; now there is no order without a principle nor a hierarchy without a primary instance. So long as metaphysicians have not managed to relate the multiplicity of degrees to the real unity of their principle, their reasoning remains incomplete; if they are unable to complete their reasoning, they fail in their enterprise, since multiplicity is no longer reduced to unity, unless it be that of a concept. Now the fundamental question, as we have just shown, is precisely to know what the unity of the concept covers.

Thomas's essential metaphysical intuition is expressed in the perspective of the degrees of being. In this, one can certainly see the influence of a Platonic theme and can notice the important role that the Neoplatonic triad of participated perfections—being, life, knowledge—plays. But the historical influences doubtless go alongside with an immediate experience, such as the experience of knowledge. "By rational knowledge man possesses a type of knowledge, while sensation—which belongs to him in common with the animal—appears as another realization, another mode, of this knowledge. Rational knowledge is distinguished from sensible knowledge not because it adds a new difference to a univocal common foundation, but rather because, in being knowledge just as the act of sensation is knowledge, it differs from it precisely as a type of knowledge."[71] The same observation can be repeated on the subject of life. A plant, an animal, and a man each live [105] in their own respective style, by being (each in its own way) a principle of an operation which they do not undergo from outside but which they exercise of themselves—the plant by the operations of biological life, the animal by sensation, and the man by

thought. The degrees of knowledge are less extensive than the degrees of life. The latter can, in their turn, be seen as higher degrees of a common perfection, the perfection of being, participated by some as simple bodily existence, by others under the form of biological and then of animal life, finally by the others as spiritual consciousness. From thence we go on to a consideration of the degrees of the most universal perfection, that of being, possessed unequally since beings are unequally perfect.

Among beings neither absolute equality nor incoherent disorder prevails. Across their diversity we notice that the perfection of being is common to all, that it is both what brings them together and what separates them (since that by which they are opposed to each other is not outside being). Being is a principle both of unity and diversity. One must conceive this diversity as a formal multiplicity of irreducible essences that are opposed to each other by a true otherness and not by a simple difference.[72] Thomas explains this in a text of Platonic character where he shows that multiplicity eventually arises from otherness. Let there be two substances that belong to the same genus, says he, e.g., man and ass; they are opposed to each other by their specific differences (reasonable–nonreasonable), but these differences are not reducible in their turn to prior simpler forms. They differ from each other as two simple forms opposed according to privation and possession; i.e., they are at once other and unequal. The same goes for the diversification of being. If one being is not identical to another being, this is not with respect to the fact that they both are, but rather quite precisely in the fact that the one is not the other (beings are opposed, as Plato had seen, by this relative non-being [106] which is otherness).[73] Now the individuals of one and the same species form a material multiplicity: the same specific nature, determined by one and the same form, is multiplied according to their matter. We discover formal multiplicity only when we consider the diverse specific essences determined by so many irreducible forms. One can, to be sure, still unite them under a common genus; one can include all beings (God excepted) within the highest unity of one common genus under the notion of substance, but the logical unity ought not disguise the real diversity, since the degrees of Porphyry's tree do not correspond to distinct forms. The beings that belong to different species are opposed to each other by their form—one would even say by their whole form if the expression

were not improper, since the form is indivisible—; hence, the diverse specific essences constitute a formal multiplicity.

Formal multiplicity is nevertheless not an irreducible plurality. It would indeed be an irreducible plurality if we confine ourselves to the consideration of its quiddity, for in this order things are what they are and are only what they are. The quiddity tolerates no variation according to the more and the less: when anything is added to or subtracted from it, one gets another quiddity.[74] In the order of definition one being is invariable and indivisible. It is so true that we have to conceive a plurality of ideas in God as so many prototypes of the various essences. To reduce the formal multiplicity to unity, the essences must be considered in their relation to being: the unification, which is impossible under the relation of quiddity, can [107] be achieved only within the order of being. But this claim can cover two quite different metaphysical attitudes. One could appeal to the relation that each essence has with the act of being that it receives under the aspect of its potency: the act is as varied as the potency within which it is received, but in each instance the relation is analogous. The unity thus obtained would be that of a proportion confusedly represented by the concept of being. Still, without at all denying the real distinction between essence and *esse* or the relation of potency to act, which unites them, we think that Thomas establishes the unity of being in another way. To discover the unity which relates the beings among themselves, essences must be considered as the modes and degrees of the perfection of being. From this point of view, they are comparable among themselves: they are unequally perfect according as they more or less closely approach the perfection of the primary instance. Considered in this way, their exemplar cause must be sought in the unique divine nature, which is the supreme degree of the perfection of being.

The two conceptions of the unity of being that we have just found depend on two ways of understanding the role of essence: if the essences are incommensurable among themselves, not only in the order of intelligibility and definition—which is that of quiddity—, but also in the order of being, one can discover unity only in the proportional likeness of the diverse relations of potency to act between the essence and *esse*; in short, in the order of being, the essence will above all be defined as the potency receptive of the act of being. On the other hand, if the essences are conceived as the degrees and modes of the perfection of being, then they are such first and foremost not as receptive

potency but primarily as formal determination of the act of being.[75]
In other words, one does not emphasize the [108] negative function
of limitation, which is accidental to the essence;[76] one focuses on the
positive value of the specification which constitutes it. The essence
does not receive this positive value from the act of being although it
exercises the specification only by it. One speaks of a *modus essendi* to
designate the two-fold function of essence as regards *esse*: it determines
esse by specifying it and it limits it by receiving it.[77] One cannot confuse
determination with limitation nor potency with essence; otherwise
it would be necessary to accord all the perfection to *esse* and say that
essence is the source of imperfection. To be sure, in God perfection is
summed up in the *Ipsum esse subsistens*, but in created beings essence
and *esse* are complementary. Essence is defined by its positive value of
formal determination, but it can perform this formal determination
only by the actuation of *esse*. In its turn, *esse* does not confer upon
the essence its formal determination, but it gives it the wherewithal
to exercise it really. Under this relation, the essence is potency with
regard to the act of being; essence is subordinated to it and is really
composed with it. One can recognize the perfection and the primacy
of the act of being without undervaluing the essence, provided that
one does not reduce essence to mere potency and limit, and does
not make of it that by which beings are other than God. Further, if
one considers the different beings as hierarchized, one realizes that
the [109] potential limitation and the positive determination vary
in inverse proportion to each other and that, at the limit, essence is
pure positivity coinciding with the act of being. In God the essence
is identified with the *esse*. In sum, there are degrees of being because
the perfection of being is measured by the essences according to their
formal determination and limited by them according to their receptive
capacity.[78]

—◦—

[110]

   The last step in the reduction of the many to the one connects the
degrees of perfection to a primary instance which is the maximum
of the perfection under consideration, following the principle upon
which the *quarta via* rests: *magis et minus dicuntur de diversis, secundum
quod appropinquant diversimode ad aliquid quod maxime est.*[79] Still, the
axiom according to which one can conclude from the observation of
certain degrees to the existence of a maximum is not taken [111] as

a general rule whose minor premise would express certain particular applications to the transcendent perfections. There is a real maximum only in the order of the degrees of being and the general properties of being. The principle does not permit one to conclude that there exists a primary instance in virtue of a logical necessity inscribed within the universal rule, but it justifies the conclusion because it applies to the domain of transcendent being and to the degrees of the perfection of being. Thus the axiom signifies that the greater or lesser degree of perfection received arises from a greater or lesser proximity to the source of the perfection. This bond between the degrees and the greater or lesser proximity to the first is expressed in another way: *quanto aliquid magis appropinquat principio in quolibet genere, tanto magis participat effectum illius principii.*[80] This second formulation is the converse of the first: both the one and the other affirm that realization by degrees is the result of the greater or lesser proximity of the cause. One might say either that the greater or lesser proximity to the cause of the perfection measures the degree of the perfection received, or else that the degrees of perfection arise from the greater or lesser proximity to the cause from which this perfection is received. In the *Prima Pars*, Thomas does not give the slightest justification for this axiom, and he applies it equally to the degrees of goodness, truth and perfection to conclude that there is a supremely true, supremely good and supremely perfect something which is consequently the supreme being, the *maxime ens*. The different limited realizations of the perfection of being are as many participations of that which the first is by essence, and there would be no degrees of being without a primary instance which is the fullness of being and from which the rest receive their perfection.

The relation of the degrees to the primary instance is examined more explicitly in the *De potentia.*[81] When a perfection is realized by degrees, one can imagine three scenarios: (1) either one and the same perfection is present in distinct subjects, or (2) it is realized in these [112] subjects by degrees, or else finally (3) it is not present in these subjects according to the whole plenitude which it is capable of having. Thus one will establish three ways of reducing the degrees to the one and of relating them to their principle; Thomas attributes the first to Plato, the second to Aristotle, and the third to Avicenna.

1. A common perfection—such as the perfection of being—cannot belong to many in virtue of their essence, since by their essence

they are opposed to each other and are divided. It cannot properly constitute each of them, for there is an exact reciprocity between the subject and that which formally constitutes it. In other words, the perfection thus specified can belong only to a single unit whose essence it formally constitutes. Now everything that does not belong to a being by reason of that which it is belongs to it through some cause.[82] Hence the subjects that possess the common perfection receive it from another of which this perfection is essence.[83] Now *esse* is the perfection common to all beings *par excellence*, uniting them all,[84] as Thomas says, *in ratione essendi*; this is why there has to be a common principle which is the *causa essendi* for them all,[85] and which is in itself *Ipsum esse* (which is to say that the perfection of being common to the others is its essence, that which formally constitutes it). It alone possesses the perfection of being *per essentiam*; all the others receive this perfection from it by participation and in a limited way. On this road, one starts from the unity of the perfection of being common to all beings and ends with the absolute and simple unity of the first cause of being. The principle is the pure and unmixed One. [113]

2. The common perfection is realized by degrees. Now, following Aristotle, since essences are like numbers, nothing that constitutes the essence of a being or its inseparable properties can undergo variations or involve degrees. "Just as if one of the parts of which a number is constituted is subtracted or added, it is no longer the same number but another number, howsoever small the addition or diminution, so too do neither the definition nor the quiddity remain the same if any element is subtracted from or added to it."[86] Consequently a common perfection participated by degrees can be neither the essence nor the property of the subjects that possess it.[87] Now that which belongs to a being without constituting its essence is caused. It follows that the subjects get the perfection of a cause which is extrinsic to them. Since the perfection of being is graduated, it points us to a common cause. Now the cause of the perfection of being does not possess this perfection in a degraded and limited state; it has it without restriction, or, more precisely, it is this perfection itself. By the road from degrees, one thus concludes to the existence of a first cause which is the supreme degree of every graduated perfection. The Principle is the Sovereignly Perfect.

3. A perfection that involves degrees is possessed by the subjects that receive it in a limited and imperfect manner and not according to the fullness that it is capable of having. Now every limited perfection has the cause of its limitation from another; on the other hand, if the perfection is not caused, it is not limited. In other words, the limitation is not due solely to an internal principle of limitation (which is the potency); it is explained first off by the efficient causality of God.[88] Now since the perfection of being comes in degrees, it is limited in diverse ways (otherwise there would only be a unique plenitude of being), but it is such because it depends on that which is the [114] plenitude of the perfection of being. The limited degrees of perfection point to the first cause of being which is the fullness of being. The Principle is the *Plenitudo essendi.*

At the end of these reasonings, it appears that, in the last analysis, the unity of being rests upon the unity of the first cause of being. The unity that one discovers is not only that of the concept of being, but also the real unity of the Principle of being. Hence, the structure of analogy and that of participation are rigorously parallel: they correspond to each other as the conceptual aspect and the real aspect of the unity of being. As long as one has not returned to the real unity of the Principle, the multiplicity of beings has not yet truly been reduced to the One. In short, the analogy of being is not supposed to substitute the proportional unity of a concept for the real diversity of beings; it is supposed to reproduce the unity of order which ties beings up with their Principle. Thus and thus only does the realistic and critical character of the theory of the analogy of being show up within Thomas's philosophy.

Notes

1 It is believed that the first part of the Compendium theologiae (the De fide) is more or less contemporaneous with the Contra Gentiles. Cf. J. Perrier, in BT 10 (1957-59) n° 141. The chapter relating to the analogy of divine names bears a positive indication of this, since it appeals to the relation of causality between beings and God as a basis for analogy: "alias res comparamus ad Deum sicut ad suam primam originem" (Comp., I, c. 27).

2 Clearly we shall not limit ourselves to the texts that we have just enumerated, but will appeal to parallel or complementary passages that can be found in the works cited. Cf. Appendix II, A Concordance of Passages.

As to the relative chronology of these works, the date of the first 53 chapters of *Contra Gentiles*, Book I, has been established by A. Gauthier as prior to the summer of 1259 (Cf. *Contra Gentiles. Livre premier*. Texte de l'édition léonine. Introduction de A. Gauthier. Traduction de R. Bernier et M. Corvez. Paris 1961. The date of the Parisian redaction is studied on pp. 20-34). As to the date of question 7 of the *De Potentia*, it should be noted that questions 7-10 constitute a whole (unity of doctrine, reference from one question to another). Question 10 was written during the negotiations on union between Urban IV and Michael Palaeologus, i.e., in 1263-64 (Cf. P. Glorieux, "Autour du 'Contra Errores,'" in *Autour d'Aristote*. Louvain 1955, pp. 499-502, 511. See the review by H.-F. Dondaine, in BT 10 (1957-1959) n° 142). Hence one has to date this group of questions, at the latest, from 1262-1264.

Here is the chronology that we adopt: 1254-56, *Sentences*.—1256-59, *De Veritate*.—1259, *Contra Gentiles* I, 1-53.—1262-64, *De Potentia*, qq. 7-10.—1267-68, *Ia Pars*.

3   By "the solution of the *De Veritate,*" we understand transcendental analogy presented as unity of proportion. Now we must note, as will be seen later (note 22), that this solution figures in only three or four passages of the *De Veritate* and that all the other texts of this work, particularly q. 1 on the true and q. 21 on the good, appeal to the unity of order. When we speak of the doctrine of the *De Veritate*, therefore, we must make it clear that this means what is formally discussed at q. 2, a. 11. [67]

4   Given that the *Compendium* contains nothing original and that the distinction between the two sorts of analogy is not found there, we shall leave it aside.

5   See Appendix II, Concordance of arguments, pp. 181-183.

6   Cf. the Concordance of arguments against univocity, 1°.

7   Cf. I, d. 8, q. 1, a. 1, c.; II, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1, c.; *De Ver.*, q. 8, a. 8. In these texts, the argument is explicitly attributed to Avicenna.

8   Cf. the concordance of arguments against univocity, 2°.

9   Compare this formulation with that of the Sentences: "Quandocumque forma significata per nomen est ipsum esse, non potest univoce convenire, propter quod etiam ens non univoce praedicatur" (I, d. 35, q. 1, a. 4, c.).

10   CG I, 32, 6°; Cf. the concordance of arguments against univocity, 7°.

11   Cf. The concordance of arguments against equivocity, 5°.

12   CG I, 33, 1°; cf. the concordance of arguments against equivocity, 4°.

13   "Consideratur in hujusmodi nominum communitate ordo causae et causati" (CG I, 33, 1°); "... secundum similitudinem quae est inter causatum et causam" (*De Pot.*, q. 7, a. 7, ad 5 and ad 6 contra); "quidquid dicitur de Deo et creaturis, dicitur secundum quod est aliquis ordo creaturae ad

Deum ut ad principium et causam in qua praeexistunt excellenter omnes rerum perfectiones" (Ia, q. 13, a. 5). For the *Compendium*, see the text cited in note 1.

[14] Note that the texts we are concerned with either do not define analogy or else confine themselves to some laconic formula:

Sentences: "analogice dicitur" (no definition).

De Veritate: "secundum analogiam quod nihil est aliud dictu quam secundum proportionem."

Compendium: "secundum analogiam, id est secundum proportionem ad unum."

[71]

Contra Gentiles: "analogice, hoc est secundum ordinem vel respectum ad aliquid unum."

De Potentia: "praedicantur analogice" (no definition).

Ia Pars: "secundum analogiam id est proportionem."

The general theory of analogy is presupposed as known.

[15] Only the more concise *Compendium* does not mention the division of analogy.

[16]

SOLUTION DISCARDED	SOLUTION KEPT
Sentences	
—Quaedam (analogia) secundum convenientiam in aliquo uno, quod eis per prius et posterius convenit. (I, d. 35, q. 1, a. 4, c.)	—Alia analogia est, secundum quod unum imitatur aliud quantum potest, nec perfected ipsum assequitur.
—Aliqua participant aliquid unum secundum prius et posterius. (Prol., q. 1, a. 2, ad 2)	—Unum esse et rationem ab altero recipit.
—Similia participant unam formam. (I, d. 48, q. 1, a. 1)	—Unum quod participative habet formam imitatur illud quod essentialiter habet.
—Convenientia duorum participantium aliquid unum. (II, d. 16, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3)	—Unum per se est simpliciter, et alterum participat de similitudine ejus quantum potest.

De Veritate (q. 2, a. 11)

—Convenientia proportionis.   —Convenientia proportionalitatis.

Later Works

—Multa habet respectum ad aliquid unum. (CG I, 34)	—Duorum attenditur ordo vel respectus non ad aliquid alterum
—Aliquid praedicatur de duobus per respectum ad aliquod tertium. (De Pot., q. 7, a. 7)	sed ad unum ipsorum.
	—Aliquid praedicatur de duobus per respectum unius ad alterum.
—Multa habent proportionem ad unum. (Ia, q. 13, a. 5)	—Unum habet proportionem ad alterum.

[73]

17 "Quaecumque conveniunt in uno genere... analogice, participant aliquid idem... secundum prius et posterius, sicut substantia et accidens rationem entis" (Prol., q. 1, a. 2, arg. 2). "Aliqua participant aliquid unum secundum prius et posterius, sicut potentia et actus rationem entis, et similiter substantia et accidens" (Ibid. ad 2). "Quaecumque conveniunt in aliquo uno, habent aliquid prius et simplicius se, sive sit convenientia analogiae sive univocationis; est enim ens prius substantia et accidente sicut animal prius homine et equo" (II, d. 16, q. 1, a. 1, arg. 3).

18 "Ens de substantia et accidente dicitur secundum quod accidens ad substantiam respectum habet, non quod substantia et accidens ad aliquid tertium referantur" (CG I, 34).

19 Cf. the concordance of arguments against univocity, 11°.

20 St. Albert opposes the analogy of the theologian to that of the philosopher. The first is the analogy between creatures and God, the second that between accidents and substance.

    1. The analogy of the philospher is always an analogy *ad unum*; it puts [74] into play notions attributed *per prius et posterius*. Analogical community is distinguished from generic or specific community as follows: For generic or specific community, the things that belong to the same genus or to the same species participate the genus or the species equally (*aequaliter, eodem modo*) and are differentiated from each other either by their specific differences or by matter. For analogical community, one and the same thing is participated in diverse ways (*diversis modis*) by several, e.g., being by substance and by accident, or health by man and by urine. It is a question of inequality *per prius et posterius*: one primary instance possesses *per se et primo* that which is participated in diverse ways by the others and the latter are all referred to it. The case of being is not, however, identical with that of health: in the first case, being is really participated by all the participants; in the second, we only have a denomination resulting from a real relation of sign to signified or from cause to effect.

2. The analogy of creatures to God differs from that of accidents to substance in this respect: for the second, there is something really common to the substance and to the accident, namely, being, which is contracted according to different modes; for the first, this is not possible, since there can be nothing in common between creatures and God, for this common element would have to be prior to them and God would be composite.

According to the analogy of the theologian, the creature receives from God that which it is and it imitates Him as best it can, according to the *virtus* which is proper to it. It is a deficient likeness, an imperfect image of the first Cause.

Texts used: I *Sent.*, d. 1, a. 8; d. 2, a. 2, ad 1; d. 2, a. 12, q. 1, a. 3, ad 4; d. 3, a. 2, ad 1; d. 8, a. 7, a. 8, a. 24; d. 35, a. 1; d. 46, a. 11, a. 12, a. 17. *Com. on the Divine Names*, texts edited by F. Ruello in AHDLMA 26 (1959): t. 1, p. 186; t. 3, pp. 186-187; t. 8, p. 189. In this unedited commentary, see as well questions 25, 256, and 356. Here is a passage from question 348 following the transcription of *Vat. lat.* 712 made by Théry.

"Solution: 'unum' quod est in creaturis est deficiens ab 'uno' quod [75] dicitur de Deo et imitatur illud quantum potest, sicut etiam de aliis attributis.

"Ad alium (2m) dicendum quod Deus proprie non potest connumerari alicui rei, quia scilicet non est aliquid sibi commune et creaturis, quia neque per speciem, neque per genus, neque per analogiam, quia in communitate generis et speciei est aliquid unum in pluribus eodem modo per diversas differentias, vel diversas partes materiae; in communitate autem aanlogiae est aliquid unum in pluribus diversis modis, sicut ens in substantia et accidens, et sanum in homine et urina. Sed non potest aliquid unum esse in Deo et in quodam altero, quia oporteret quod contraheretur in utroque, et sic videtur quod Deus esset compositus et esset in ipso universale et particulare. Et ideo non est in Deo aliqua communicatio ad aliquid aliud, sed est tantum aliquis modus analogiae ipsius ad creaturas, non quod idem sit in utroque, sed quia similitudo ejus quod est in Deo invenitur in creaturis secundum suam virtutem, et sic est intelligendum cum dicitur quod Deus et hoc sunt duae res."

[21] "What about the analogy of proportion?" one might ask. In the *Sentences* this expression always designates metaphor; nowhere does it serve as a complement to the analogy of relation, still less as a substitute for it. Even more, one can see an opposition between *similitudo analogiae* and *similitudo proportionis* (II, d. 16, q. 1, a. 2, ad 5) or again between *similitudo per participationem ejusdem formae* and *similitudo proportionalitatis* (I, d. 34, q. 3, a. 1, ad 2; III, d. 2, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 1, ad 3, n° 24; IV, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 5, ad 3, n° 57; d. 45, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 1, ad 2), between *dici proprie*

and *dici metaphorice* (I, d. 45, q. 1, a.4), between *dici analogice* and *dici metaphorice* (II, d. 13, q. 1, a. 2). In all these texts, metaphor is opposed to analogy and identified with proportion.

22 Aside from the *De Veritate* q. 2, a. 11, one finds the same position only in a small number of texts: III, d. 1, a. 1, a. 1, ad 3, n° 19; IV, d. 49, q. 2, a. 1, ad 6; *De Ver.*, q. 2, a. 3, ad 4; q. 3, a. 1, ad 7; q. 23, a. 7, ad 9. There are in all two passages from the Sentences (the first, moreover, concerning only predicamental analogy, the second alone provides a true parallel to the *De Veritate*) and three passages from the *De Veritate*.

23 Lexicographical note on the distinction between *proportio* and *proportionalitas*. The terms that Thomas uses to formulate this distinction are borrowed from a Latin translation of Euclid, Book V, definitions 3 and 5: "Proportio est duarum quantitatum quantaecumque sint ejusdem generis quantitatum alterius ad alteram certa habitudo... Proportionalitas est similitudo proportionum" (Venice, *Bibl. Marciana, Zan. lat.* 332 (1647), Euclides libri XV geometriae, ff. 86-233; the texts cited are on f. 212v. Communication from Kenzeler). These definitions are presupposed in several texts of the *Sentences* and questions of the *De Veritate* and clarify their meaning.

In the strict sense, there is proportion [*rapport*] only between two quantities of the same species: "Non oportet omnium finitorum accipere *proportionem* aliquam, sicut lineae et numeri nulla est *proportio*, quia, ut in V Euclidis dicitur, *proportio est certitudo mensurationis duarum quantitatum ejusdem generis*" (II, d. 24, q. 3, a. 6, ad 3). "Haec duo (conversio mortalis et venialis peccati) non sunt proportionabilia, quia non sunt ejusdem generis; *proportio enim est commensuratio quantitatum ejusdem generis*, ut dicitur in V Euclidis" (II, d. 42, q. 1, a. 5, ad 1). The different sort of proportion <proportion>, according to genus, species, and number, are indicated in II, d. 9, q. 1, a. 3, ad 5. Two examples: "Aequalitas est species proportionis; est enim aequalitas proportio aliquorum habentium unam quantitatem" (I, d. 19, q. 1, a. 2, ad 4). "Triplicitas significat proportionem inaequalitatis: est enim species proportionis inaequalis, sicut patet per Boetium in Aritmetica I, c. 23" (Ia, q. 31, a. 1, ad 3). See also *De Veritate*, q. 20, a. 4, ad 1.

But proportion [*rapport*] can also be understood in a broad sense: "Proportio,—secundum primam nominis institutionem significat habitudinem quantitatis ad quantitatem secundum aliquem determinatum excessum, vel adaequationem;—sed ulterius est translatum ad significadum *omnem habitudinem cujuscumque ad aliud*, et per hunc modum dicimus quod materia debet esse proportionata ad formam" (IV, d. 49, q. 2, a. 1, ad 6; see a study of this and later parallel texts by Motte in the *Bull. Thom.*, 1931, "Notes et communications," pp. 56*-58*). The same distinction

is found in *De Ver.*, q. 8, a. 1, ad 6; q. 26, a. 1, ad 7. For the parallels, see *Exp. de Trin.*, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3; *Quodl.* 10, a. 17, ad 1; CG III, 54; Ia, q. 12, a. 1, ad 4. Two texts interpret relation [*rapport*] in this broader sense as a proportion: "alio modo dicitur proportio habitudo ordinis... et hoc secundum proportionabilitatem quamdam" (III, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3, n° 19). [77 "Nomen proportionis translatum est ad quamlibet habitudinem significandam unius rei ad aliam rem, utpote cum dicimus hic esse proportionum similitudinem: sicut se habet princeps ad civitatem, ita gubernator ad navim" (*De Ver.*, q. 23, a. 7, ad 9, first part). To tell the truth, these texts belong rather to the topic of *proportio—proportionalitas*.

Thomas opposes proportion to relation [*rapport*] whether in the strict sense or the broad sense: "Aliquid dicitur proportionatum alicui dupliciter:—uno modo quia inter ea attenditur proportio, sicut dicimus quatuor proportionari duobus, quia se habet in dupla proportione ad duo.—Alio modo per modum proportionalitatis, ut si dicamus sex et octo esse proportionata, quia sicut sex est duplum ad tria, ita et octo ad quatuor: est enim proportionalitas similitudo proportionum" (*De Ver.*, q. 2, a. 3, ad4). For the parllel texts, see IV, d. 49, a. 2, a. 1, ad 6; *De Ver.*, q. 2, a. 11, c.; q. 3, a. 1, ad 7; q. 23, a. 7, ad 9.

[Translator's addendum: In Euclid, the Greek terms underlying *proportio* and *proportionalitas* are respectively λόγος and ἀναλογία. Thomas L. Heath translated the former as "*ratio*" and the latter as "proportion" within this mathematical context. Montagnes similarly stipulates that he will use the French word "*rapport*" to render the Latin *proportio* and the French "*proportion*" to provide a domesticated equivalent for the Latin *proportionalitas*. In fact, however, he drifts back and forth between "relation" and "*rapport*" because modern mathematical usage does not line up with classical and medieval terminology. I have translated his French term "*rapport*" by the English word "relation" rather than "*ratio*," since, as Montagnes rightly points out, Aquinas is attempting to extend the mathematical meaning to terms outside the category of quantity. The difficulty is that by so doing the etymological transference from mathematics to metaphysics is concealed.]

[24] This identification between *proportio* and *determinata habitudo* shows up clearly in De Ver., q. 2, a. 3, ad 4: "In omni proportione attenditur habitudo ad invicem eorum quae proportionari dicuntur secundum aliquem determinatum excessum unius super alterum." In the text we are concerned with (q. 2, a. 11), Thomas therefore does not distinguish between a strict mathematical relation, which he would set aside, and a more general relation, which he would accept, as he does elsewhere, either when he identifies relation in the broad sense with *proportionalitas* (III, d.

1, a. 1, a. 1, ad 3; *De Ver.*, q. 23, a. 7, ad 9, 1°), or when he simply resorts to the two meanings of the term *proportio* (Cf. the texts cited in note 23). The two notions of absence of relation and infinite distance between beings and God occur in the same way in the opuscula *Super primam et secundam decretalem* as as they do in the *De Veritate*; see G. P. Klubertanz, *St. Thomas on Analogy*, p. 205, texts 13.1 and 13.2.

[25] One finds the same numerical example in *De Ver.*, q. 23, a. 7, ad 9, 2°.

[26] *De Ver.*, q. 2, a. 11 citing Aristotle *Topics* I, 17, 108a7-12, a text that the reply ad 2 refers to explicitly.

[27] *De Ver.*, q. 23, a. 7, ad 9, 1°.

[28] "Sicut quoddam finitum est aequale cuidam finito, ita infinitum est aequale alteri infinito" (*De Ver.*, q. 2, a. 3, ad 4). "Sicut infinitum est aequale infinito, ita finitum finito. Et per hunc modum est similitudo inter creaturam et Deum, quia sicut se habet ad ea quae ei competunt, ita creatura ad sua propria" (*De Ver.*, q. 23, a. 7, ad 9, 2°).

[29] CG I, 34 (See p. 73, note 17 to compare this with the position of the *Sentences*).

[30] "Dei ad creaturam nulla potest esse comparatio, cum creatura sit finita et Deus infinitus."

[31] "Quando idem diversis inest."

[32] "Comparatio secundum determinatam habitudinem."

[33] "Inter Deum et creaturam non est similitudo per convenientiam in aliquo uno communi, sed per imitationem" (I, d. 35, q. 1, a. 4, arg. 6 and ad 6).

[34] I *De caelo et mundo*, t. 52; A, 7, 275a14.

[35] Allusions to this adage are found in *De Ver.*, q. 21, a. 4, sed c. 3; Ia, q. 105, a. 8, arg. 2. Explicit mentions occur in I, d. 37, q. 4, a. 3, ad 3; IV, d. 5, q. 1, a. 3, sol. 3, ad 5, n° 70. The difficulty that the relations between the creature and God present, because of the incommensurable distance that separates the finite from the infinite, is examined for its own sake in a discussion on the hypostatic union (III, d. 1, [85] q. 1, a. 1, arg. 3, n° 8), on the knowledge of God by a created spirit (IV, d. 49, q. 2, a. 1, arg. 6; cf. *De Ver.*, q. 8, a. 1, arg. 6; qu. 21, a. 4, sed c. 3; q. 23, a. 7, arg. 9), on the knowledge of creatures by God (*De Ver.*, q. 2, a. 3, arg. 4; q. 3, a. 1, arg. 7).

[36] "Quia in omni proportione attenditur habitudo ad invicem eorum quae proportionari dicuntur secundum aliquem determinatum excessum unius super alterum, ideo impossibile est infinitum aliquod proportionari finito per modum proportionis. Sed in his quae proportionata dicuntur per modum proportionalitatis, non attenditur habitudo eorum ad invicem, sed similis habitudo aliquorum ad alia duo; et sic nihil prohibet proportionatum esse infinitum finito, ita infinitum est aequale alteri infinito" (*De*

Ver., q. 2, a. 3, ad 4). "Quamvis non possit esse aliqua proportio creaturae ad Deum, tamen potest esse proportionalitas" (*De Ver.*, q. 3, a. 1, ad 7). "Finitum et infinitum, quamvis non possint esse proportionata, possunt tamen esse proportionabilia" (*De Ver.*, q. 23, a. 7, ad 9, 2°; cf. note 28). See T.L. Penido, *Le rôle de l'analogie*, p. 178.

[37] Here is an inventory of texts from q. 2, a. 11, relating to this determinate relation <relation>. First of all, in order to define analogy by reference to a primary instance:

—determinata distantia vel alia habitudo ad invicem (c.),

—unum ad alterum habitudinem habet (c.),

—determinata habitudo inter ea quibus est aliquid per analogiam commune (c.),

—comparatio secundum determinatam habitudinem (ad 2),

—communitas analogiae secundum determinatam habitudinem unius ad alterum (ad 6),

—unum habet habitudinem determinatam ad aliud, ex qua scilicet ex uno alterum comprehendi possit   per intellectum (ad 4),

—nulla creatura habet talem habitudinem ad Deum per quam possit divina perfectio determinari (c.).

By contrast, the analogy of proportion is defined by the absence of determinate relation: nulla determinata habitudo (c.).

The division leaves no place for an analogy based upon a direct relation that would not be determinate and would not permit adequate knowledge of the primary instance starting from one of the analogates.

[38] For a fuller comparison, here is a tabulation of the concordances between the arguments of *De Veritate*, q. 2, a. 11, with the parallel texts:

Arg. 1 and ad 1: CG I, 33, 2°

               De Pot., q. 7, a. 7, sed contra 3 and 4 ; ad 3c. and ad 4 c.

Arg. 2 and ad 2: I, d. 35, q. 1, a. 4, arg. 6 and ad 6

               De Pot., q. 7, a. 7, arg. 4 and ad 4

               Cf. CG I, 33, 1°

               Cf. Ia, q. 13, a. 5, c.

Arg. 3 and ad 3: (Cf. q. 23, a. 7, arg. 10)

               I, d. 35, q. 1, a. 4, arg. 6 and ad 6

               CG I, 32, 4° and 5°

               CG I, 34 (to set aside analogy *duorum ad tertium*)

               De Pot., q. 7, a. 7, c.

Arg. 4 and ad 4: Cf. CG I, 33, 1°

               Cf. Ia, q. 13, a. 5, c.

               Ia, q. 13, a. 5, sed contra 2

               Cf. *De Pot.*, q. 7, a. 7, arg. 4 and ad 4

Arg. 5 and ad 5: no literal parallel, but the argument is related to the

preceding and is a development of it; see the parallels
cited for it.

Arg. 6 and ad 6: Cf. CG I, 32, 6° (against univocity)

Cf. CG I, 33, 1° (against equivocity)

Cf. Ia, q. 13, a. 6 and a. 10

Arg. 7 and ad 7: I, d. 35, q. 1, a. 4, arg. 7 and ad 7

De Pot., q. 7, a. 7, sed contra 2 and ad 2 contra

sed contra 5 and ad 5 contra

sed c. 7 and ad 7 c. (cf. Ia, 13, 5, sed c.2)

Arg. 8 and ad 8: Cf. Ia, q. 13, a. 10, sed contra 1 and ad 4.

[39] *De Pot.*, q. 7, a. 7, ad 2.

[40] The reason here invoked has a technical meaning: it signifies more precisely that the *ratio* of the participated perfection is not adequate to the divine *ratio*: "ipsa forma in creaturis participata deficit a ratione ejus quod Deus est." In the *Prima Pars* Thomas relies on the same reasoning to prove that the divine names are not univocal: what human notions represent is verified within the divine reality, but the latter cannot be adequately represented by notions that it transcends and that cannot delimit it. "Cum hoc nomen 'sapiens' de homine dicitur, quodammodo circumscribit et comprehendit rem significatam; non autem cum dicitur de Deo, sed relinquit rem significatam ut incomprehensam et excedentem nominis significationem. Unde patet quod non secundum eamdem rationem hoc nomen 'sapiens' de Deo et homine dicitur" (Ia, q. 13, a. 5, c.).

[41] *De Pot.*, q. 7, a. 7, ad 3.

[42] *Exp. de Trin.*, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3.

[43] CG III, 54, 6°.

[44] Ia, q. 12, a. 1, ad 4.

[45] "Ordo causae et causati" (CG I, 33, 1°). See the texts cited on p. 70, note 13.

[46] IV, d. 49, q. 1, a. 4, sol. 3; Ia, q. 67, a. 2, ad 3; I-II, q. 7, a. 1; *De Pot.*, q. 10, a. 1.

[47] In Ia, q. 13, a. 5, sed c. 2, the idea of distance is called in to show that the divine names are equivocal. This merely proves, answers Thomas, that they are not univocal. "Deus plus distat a creaturis quam quaecumque creaturae ad invicem. Sed propter distantiam quarundam creaturarum, contingit quod nihil univoce de eis praedicari potest: sicut de his quae non conveniunt in aliquo genere. Ergo multo minus de Deo et creaturis aliquid univoce praedicatur, sed omnia praedicantur aequivoce.—Ea quae sunt in contrarium, concludunt quod non univoce hujusmodi nomina de Deo et creaturis praedicentur, non autem quod aequivoce."

[48] Cf. I, d. 8, Exp. Iae partis textus; d. 44, q. 1, a. 2; d. 44, q. 1, a. 3, sed c., ad 3, ad 4; IV, d. 5, q. 1, a. 3, sol. 3, ad 5, n° 67-70; *De Ver.*, q. 2, a. 3, ad

16; q. 12, a. 3, ad 14; *Exp. de Trin.*, Prol (Decker ed., p. 45, 12-13); q. 1, a. 2; q. 2, a. 1, ad 7; *Super primam et secundam Decretalem* (Klubertanz, op. cit., p. 205, 13.2).

[49] Ia, q. 8, a. 3.

[50] "Nihil est distans ab eo, quasi in se illud Deum non habeat. Dicuntur tamen res distare a Deo per dissimilitudinem naturae vel gratiae, sicut et ipse est super omnia per excellentiam suae naturae" (Ia, q. 8, a. 1, ad 3).

[51] "Quia ex rebus aliis in Dei cognitionem pervenimus, res nominum de Deo et rebus aliis dictorum per prius est in Deo secundum suum modum, sed ratio nominis per posterius. Unde et nominari dicitur a suis causatis" (CG I, 34). The same explanation is found in *Comp. theol.*, c. 27; Ia, q. 13, a. 6.

[52] "Licet causa prima, quae Deus est, non intret essentiam rerum creatarum, tamen esse quod rebus creatis inest non potest intelligi nisi ut deductum ab esse divino" (*De Pot.*, q. 3, a. 5, ad 1). "Licet habitudo ad causam non intret definitionem entis quod est causatum, tamen sequitur ad ea quae sunt de ejus ratione; quia ex hoc quod aliquid per participationem est ens, sequitur quod sit causatum ab alio. Unde hujusmodi ens non potest est quin sit causatum, sicut nec homo quin sit risibile. Sed quia esse causatum non est de ratione entis simpliciter, propter hoc invenitur aliquod ens non causatum" (Ia, q. 44, a. 1, ad 1). A similar theory is already found in the *Sentences*, but of a formalistic inspiration: "Creatura non habet esse nisi secundum quod a primo esse descendit, unde nec nominatur ens nisi in quantum primum ens imitatur" (I, prol, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2).

[53] This shift from exemplarity to efficiency is clear in the following two parallel texts, where the question is broached as to why the likeness of creatures to God is not reciprocal.

"Sicut Dionysius dicit in IX° cap. *de Div. Nom.*, Deus nullo modo similis creaturae dicendus est, sed creaturae similes possunt dici Deo aliquo modo. Quod enim *ad imitationem alicujus fit* si perfecte id imitetur, simpliciter potest ei simile dici, sed non e converso... Si autem imperfecte imitetur, tunc potest dici simile et dissimile *id quod imitatur ei ad cujus imitationem fit*" (*De Ver.*, q. 2, a. 11, ad 1).

"Deus nullo modo dicitur esse similis creaturae, sed e contrario, quia, ut dicit Dionysius, *in causa et causatis* non recipimus similitudinis conversionem, sed solum in coordinatis. Homo enim non dicitur similis suae imagini, sed e contrario... Et ideo Deum creaturis similem non dicimus, [93] sed e contrario. Cum dicitur 'nulla creatura est similis Deo' ut eodem cap. dicit Dionysius, hoc intelligendum est secundum quod *causata minus habent a sua causa, ab ipsa incomparabiliter deficientia*" (*De Pot.*, q. 7, a. 7, ad 3 c., ad 4 c.).

54 This indirect method will allow us to clarify the meaning of the texts wherein Thomas states that analogy sometimes involves a unique *ratio*, and sometime several. See some texts on each side of the isssue in G. P. Klubertanz, *Thomas Aquinas on Analogy*, pp. 23-24.

55 Thomas sometimes names this concept *ens commune* or else *esse commune* (this latter expression can be found in the *De ente et essentia*, Roland-Gosselin ed., p. 38, 8-12). Cf. p. 101, note 65 at the end.

56 Thus the doctrine implicitly contained within the texts we have referred to is identical to that which is explicitly formulated in the passages where the general theory of analogy is found.

"In his vero quae praedicto modo (analogice) dicuntur, idem nomen de diversis praeidcatur secundum rationem partim eamdem, partim diversam. Diversam quidem quantum ad diversos modos relationis. Eamdem vero quantum ad id quod fit relatio. Esse enim significativum, et esse effectivum, diversum est. Sed sanitas una est. Et propter hoc hujusmodi dicuntur analoga, qua proportionantur ad unum. Et similiter est de multiplicitae entis" (*Met.*, IX, lecture 3, n° 2197; cf. IV, lecture 1, n° 535).

According to the theory that we just read, the analogates are distinguished from each other because the relations that bind them all to the primary instance are not identical and are multiplied according to the types of causality (productive, receptive, exemplary, final). It is not possible to conceive the analogical unity of being in this manner, since the relation that ties accidents to substance or beings to God is not diversified according to types of causality: the relation [*rapport*] of a quality or a relation [*relation*] to substance, or that of a man or an angel to God, are of the same type in each instance (receptive causality in the first case and creative causality in the second). This is why Thomas transposes Aristotle's theory in order to explain the unity of being. There is no intention to get several types of being into play to distinguish the analogates among themselves, but the analogates are bound to the primary instance in virtue of a relation [*rapport*] [97] of participation which is diversified according to the extent to which the perfection of the primary instance is participated differently on each occasion. Hence the analogates are unequal among themselves and are hierarchized according as they are more or les perfect, i.e., more or less close to the perfection of the primary instance (Cf. Ia, q. 13, a. 6).

57 The Cajetanian theory has been defended by M. T. L. Penido. Here is how he presents it (Penido's emphases):

"From the genetic standpoint it is quite clear that our theodicy derives from concepts expressing the created that we go to God through the creature. But on the other hand it is false that we should view the divine perfection directly in and through the human perfection as if the latter were the principle analogue defining the former. No, the process is entirely

different and we believe that no theological investigation could end if we did not admit from the start within our mind a power of abstraction which permits us to think in the transcendent. For example, to deceive the divine goodness we must abstract form the created goodness a transcendent idea, which is no longer formally (but only proportionally) the concept of created being, and it is this idea which we proportion to God, it is through and within this universal idea that we know the subsistent goodness. It is impossible to say henceforward that the created pair defines the divine pair since the analogous notion is nothing more than the created notion taken proportionally; there we have in reality a transcendent concept which dominates both relations and abstracts inadequately both from the one and from the other: there is a principle 'unum proportione,' neither exclusively divine nor exclusively created but which encompasses both of the two proportionally." ("Au point de vue génétique, il est de toute évidence que notre théodicée dérive de concepts exprimant le créé, que nous allons à Dieu au travers de la créature. Mais d'autre part il est faux que nous regardions la perfection divine *directement* dans et par la perfection humaine, comme si celle-ci était l'analogue principal définissant celle-là. Non, le processus est tout autre, et nous croyons qu'aucune recherche théologique ne peut aboutir ... si l'on admet pas d'emblée, en notre esprit, un pouvoir d'*abstraction* qui nous permette de penser dans le *transcendant*. Par exemple, pour concevoir la Bonté divine, nous devons *abstraire* de la bonté créée une idée *transcendante*, qui n'est plus *formellement* [mais seulement proportionnellement] le concept de bonté *créée*, et c'est *cette* idée que nous proportionnons à Dieu, c'est par et dans cette idée *universelle* que nous connaissons la bonté subsistante. Impossible de dire, dès lors, que le couple créé définit le couple divin, puisque la notion analogue n'est plus que proportionnelllement la notion créée; nous avons là, en réalité, un concept transcendant qui *domine* l'un et l'autre rapport, et abstrait inadéquatement de l'un comme de l'autre: il y a un principe 'unum proportione' ni exclusivement divin, ni exclusivement créé, mais qui vise tous les deux, proportionnellement") (M. T. L. Penido, *Le rôle de l'analogie*, pp. 189-190).

Then Penido calls upon the speculations of A. Gardeil on being as being reached by " . . . an intellect which would be formally neither the divine intellect nor a created intellect-an intellect in itself. This would be . . .' continues Gardeil as cited by Penido, " . . . a sort of common intellect of a community of analogy extending to the created intellect and to the divine intellect, just as its object, being as being, is common, with a community of analogy, to created being and to divine being. As to being as being it would be conceived as bifurcating over its two analogates, the superior the divine intellect, the inferior the created intellect.

"From this doctrine,"adds Penido, "It becomes evident that to conceive the divine intellect with any chance of truth we must haul* ourselves up to the intellect in itself; it is therefore formally through the intellect in itself and not through the created intellect that we must think the divine intellect if we want to obtain a minimum of objectivity if we want to avoid anthropomorphism and mere metaphor" ("un intellect qui ne serait formellement ni l'intellect divin, ni un intellect créé,—un intellect en soi. Ce serait," continues Gardeil as cited by Penido, "une façon d'intellect commun, d'une communauté d'analogie s'entend, à l'intellect créé et à l'intellect divin, comme son objet, l'être en tant qu'être, est commun, d'une communauté d'analogie, à l'être créé et à l'être divin. A l'instar de l'être en tant qu'être, il serait conçu comme bifurquant sur ses deux ana-logués, le supérieur [98] l'intellect divin, l'inférieur l'intellect créé." "De cette doctrine," adds Penido, "il découle à l'évidence que, pour concevoir l'intellect divin avec quelques chances de vérité, il nous faut nous hausser jusq'à l'intellect en soi; c'est donc formellement à travers l'intellect en soi, et non à travers l'intellect créé, que nous devons penser l'intellect divin si nous voulons atteindre un minimum d'objectivité, si nous voulons échap-per à l'anthropomorphisme et au métaphorisme")(*ibid.*, pp. 190-191).

The preceding text is reused, explained, and developed in an article by the same author: "Cajetan et notre connaissance de Dieu," RT 39 (1934-35) beginning on p. 165. There Penido, following J. Maritain, *Les dégrés du savoir*, p. 433, note 1, substitutes the term "analogue transcendantal" for "perfection en soi" (*op. cit.*, p. 167).

58   M. T. L. Penido, "Cajetan et notre connaissance de Dieu," p. 171: "In this perfection which is common to them, not with an equivocal community, but with a proportional community. It alone constitutes the formal link between otherwise totally diverse beings, and it is expressed conceptually in the transcendental analogue. Each of the ten categories, for example, considered absolutely in its own proper structure excludes the others and does not make them known, but considered in its relation with being it makes the others known, and they also hold various relations with being. That which unifies the diverse is the proportional idea of being" ("en cette perfection qui leur est commune, non d'une communauté équivoque, mais d'une communauté proportionnelle. Elle seule constitue le lien formel entre des êtres par ailleurs totalement divers, et elle s'exprime conceptuel-lement dans l'analogue transcendantal. Chacune des dix catégories, par exemple, considérée absolument, en sa structure propre, exclut les autres et ne les fait pas connaître, mais considérée en son rapport avec l'être, elle fait connaître les autres, qui soutiennent aussi avec l'être des rapport variés. Ce qui unifie le divers, c'est l'idée proportionnelle d'être)."

59 "L'attribution (which I have called analogy of relation [*analogie de rapport*]) is established according to an extrinsic denomination; proportionality, on the other hand, according to an intrinsic participation ("se fait selon une dénomination extrinsèque; la proportionalité, au contraire, selon une participation intrinsèque") (op. cit., p. 154).

[Translator's note: Reading the verb *reconnaisse* for the noun *reconnaissance* as required by the syntax.]

60 *Op. cit.*, p. 174: "Cette doctrine de l'analogue transcendantal a un fondement assuré en S. Thomas. Il est constant, en effect, que le Docteur angélique distingue perpétuellement le 'modus' de la 'ratio,' qu'il oppose les noms signifiant la perfection avec son mode créé à ceux qui l'expriment 'absolute,' sans inclure de mode... Les perfections 'absolument signifiées' sont le contenu de la 'ratio' transcendantale, proportionellement commune à Dieu et au créé."

61 Ia, q. 13, a. 4, ad 1.

62 L.-B. Geiger, *La participation dans la philosophie de S. Thomas d'Aquin*, p. 242 and note 1: "The notion of modus is a characteristic of formal inequality. It expresses very precisely that purely qualitative diversity within a non-univocal unity" ("La notion de *modus* est caractéristique de l'inégalité formelle. Elle traduit très exactement cette diversité purement qualitative à l'intérieur d'une unité non univoque)."

63 Thomas, as we have see, asserts precisely the contrary. Cf. p. 87, note 40.

64 For example, sensation is an awareness. Within it, we can distinguish that which belongs to sensation as awareness (which is then designated as *cognitio*) and that which is proper to it as sensation (which can then be designated as *sensus*) (I, d. 22, q. 1, a. 2). Thus we see that it is the very same thing that is sometimes thought of as a perfection, and at other times as a restriction.

65 Where does the the notion of a perfection considered *absolute* come from? To answer this question, we must refer to the *De ente et essentia* (as well as to the texts of Avicenna that inspired Thomas, which can be found in the edition of Roland-Gosselin, p. 24, note 1). Here is how Thomas presents the two ways of considering a specific nature: "Natura autem vel essentia sic accepta potest dupliciter considerari.—Uno modo s*ecundum rationem propriam, et haec est absoluta consideratio ipsius,* et hoc modo nihil est verum de ea nisi quod competit sibi secundum quod hujusmodi; unde quidquid aliorum attribuatur sibi, falsa est attributio....—Alio modo consideratur s*ecundum esse quod habet in hoc vel in illo,* et sic de ipsa aliquid praedicatur per accidens, ratione ejus in quo est" (Roland-Gosselin ed., p. 24, 1-6, p. 25, 4-6). <Translator's addition: For an English version, see Thomas Aquinas, *On Being and Essence*, trans. Armand Maurer, 2d ed., reprint

(Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1983), p. 46, n° 2, 1-5 and n° 3, 1-2.>

In the *De ente*, as well as in the later texts relating the same doctrine (*Quodl.* 8, a. 1; *De Pot.*, q. 5, a. 9, ad 16; *Com. de Anima*, II, lecture 12, n° 378; *Com. Nom. Div.*, c. XI, lecture 4, n°378), the essence under discussion is the specific essence, whose conditions of existence are singularity and universality. But the texts relating to the divine attributes show that Thomas extends the distinction between the *absoluta consideratio secundum rationem propriam* and the *(consideratio) secundum esse quod habet in hoc vel in illo* and applies this dictinction beyond the categorial order to perfections that are not in a genus. Thus, in the *Sentences*: I, d. 4, q. 1, a. 1; d. 19, q. 2, a. 1, ad 3; d. 22, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2; d. 34, q. 3, a. 2, ad 3; d. 42, q. 2, a. 1. In the *De Veritate*: q. 5, a. 8, ad 3; q. 21, a. 2, ad 8; q. 21, a. 4, ad 9; q., 21, a. 5. In the *De Potentia*: q. 9, a. 5. In the *Summa Theologiae*: Ia, q. 13, a. 3, ad 1; a. 9, ad 3; a. 11, c., 2° (compare this last text relating to the divine name *Qui est* with that of the *Sentences* I, d. 8, q. 1, a. 1, c., 2a ratio and ad 4).

The texts relating to the distinction between *esse commune* and *esse divinum* (*De ente*, Roland-Gosselin ed., p. 38, 2-12; I, d. 8, q. 4, a. 1, ad 1; *De Ver.*, q. 10, a. 11, ad 10; CG I, 26; *De pot.*, q. 7, a. 1, ad 6; Ia, q. 3, a. 4, ad 1) ought to be interpreted in light of the preceding explanations: *ens commune* designates the perfection of being independently of the conditions under which it is realized.

[66] See the preceding note.

[67] "Ista nomina quae proprie dicuntur de Deo, important conditiones corporales, non in ipso significato nominis, sed quantum ad modum significandi. Ea vero quae metaphorice de Deo dicuntur, important conditionem corporalem in ipso suo significato" (Ia, q. 13, a. 3, ad 3).

[68] "Hoc nomen 'Qui est' ... est maxime proprium nomen Dei... Secundo propter ejus universalitatem. Omnia enim alia nomina vel sunt minus communia, vel si convertantur cum ipso, tamen addunt aliqua supra ipsum secundum rationem; unde quodammodo informant et determinant ipsum. Intellectus autem noster non potest ipsam Dei essentiam cognoscere in statu viae, secundum quod in se est; sed quemcumque modum determinet circa id quod de Deo intelligit, deficit a modo quo Deus in se est. Et ideo quanto aliqua nomina sunt minus determinata et magis communia et absoluta, tanto magis proprie dicuntur de Deo a nobis... Quolibet enim alio nomine determinatur aliquis modus substantiae rei; sed hoc nomen 'Qui est' nullum modum essendi determinat, sed se habet indeterminatum ad omnes; et ideo nominat ipsum pelagus substantiae infinitum" (ia, q. 13, a. 11, c., 2°).

69 The divine *esse* should not be confused with *esse commune*, since the latter can represent different beings without receiving any determination, whereas the divine *esse* has no need of any other determination, since God is purely *esse*. "Hoc enim esse quod Deus est, hujus conditionis est quod nulla sibi additio fieri possit. Unde per ipsam suam puritatem est esse distinctum ab omni alio esse... Esse autem commune, sicut in intellectu suo non includit additionem, ita non includit in intellectu suo aliquam praecisionem additionis, quia si hoc esset, nihil posset intelligi esse in quo super esse aliquid adderetur" (*De ente et essentia*, Roland-Gosselin ed., p. 38, 2-13). As can be seen, the definition given of *ens commune* coincides with the reason why the best divine name is *Qui est*: to wit, the notion of being is the least determinate and the most "absolute" of all, the one most disengaged from its modes.

70 Can we find an evolution in Thomas's thought regarding the unity of the analogical concept? Klubertanz thinks there is (*Thomas Aquinas on Analogy*, pp. 23-24). He shows that in the *Sentences* there is a single *ratio* and then, in the other works, there are many *rationes* referred to that of the primary instance. As for the *Sentences*, the textual reasons on which Klubertanz relies do not seem convincing and Thomas's position indicates hesitation. For there to be analogy, one does need a common *ratio*, whose unity preserves the mean between the pure and simple identity of univocity and the total diversity of equivocity: *una ratio est communis, non quidem communitate univocationis, sed analogie* (I, d. 29, q. 1, a. 2, sol. 1, c., ad 1, ad 3; cf. I, d. 2, q. 1, a. 3, sed c. 3; d. 22, q. 1, a. 3, ad 4; II, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1; III, d. 8, q. 1, a. 4, sol. 1, ad 3, n° 48; d. 10, q. 3, a. 1, sol. 2, n° 117; IV, d. 49, q. 3, a. 1, sol. 2, ad 3). "*Aliquid habet de identitate rationis et aliquid de diversitate*" (I, d. 21, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 2). Now the unity of the *ratio* involves an inequality *secundum prius et posterius* that is essential to analogy: "*Quantum ad rationem... illa ratio est una secundum analogiam, per prius in Deo, per posterius in creaturis existens*" (I, d. 22, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3).

The same explanation appears in the text in which Thomas defines analogy *secundum intentionem et secundum esse*: "et hoc est quando neque parificantur in intentione communi, neque in esse; sicut ens dicitur de substantia et accidente; et de talibus oportet quod natura communis habeat aliquod esse in unoquoque eorum de quibus dicitur, sed differens secundum rationem majoris vel minoris perfectionis" (I, d. 19, q. 5, a. 2, ad 1).

The texts wherein he betrays hesitation are those very rare ones that speak of the *ratio* abstracted from its modes; subsequently this abstraction of the *ratio* will no longer be an issue, and doubtless a change can be observed on this point. Here are the two texts that we have found:

"Quaecumque dicuntur non secundum unam rationem, aequivoce dicuntur. Sed non est eadem ratio unitatis personalis et essentialis.—Ratio unitatis ponit ens indivisum simpliciter: unde abstrahit a quolibet modo distinctionis; unde secundum unam rationem communem dicitur persona una et essentia una, quamvis sit non una ratio distinctionis in speciali. Unde ex hoc non habetur quod aequivoce praedicetur" (I, d. 24, a. 2, a. 1, arg. 3 and ad 3).

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"Persona significat distinctum in natura aliqua. Sed non est eadem ratio distinctionis in divinis, angelis et hominibus... Ergo persona aequivoce dicitur de his.—Ratio personae importat distinctionem in communi; unde abstrahitur a quolibet modo distinctionis, et ideo potest esse una ratio analogice in his quae diversimode distinguuntur" (I, d. 25, q. 1, a. 2, arg. 5 and ad 5).

Cajetan's warning, *De nominum analogia*, n° 120-121, is undoubtedly concerned with the texts we have just cited. Cf. p. 144, note 95.

71 L.-B. Geiger, *La participation dans la philosophie de S. Thomas d'Aquin*, pp. 219-220: "Man possesses by his rational awareness a type of awareness of which sensation, which is common to him along with the animal, seems like another realization another mode. Rational awareness is distinguished from sensible awareness not in this respect, not because it adds a new difference to a univocal common base, but rather in this: that being an awareness just as the act of sensation is an awareness it differs from it precisely as a type of awareness" ("L'homme possède, par la connaissance rationnelle, un type de connaissance dont la sensation, qui lui est commune avec l'animal, semble comme une autre réalisation, un autre *mode*. La connaissance rationnelle se distingue de la connaissance sensible non pas en ceci, qu'à un fond commun univoque elle ajoute une différence nouvelle, mais en ce qu'étant connaissance comme l'acte de sensation est connaissance, elle en diffère précisément comme type de connaissance").

72 See the distinction that Thomas makes between difference, which presupposes something in common, and pure diversity (Ia, q. 3, a. 8, ad 3).

73 "Non potest autem hoc esse, quod ens dividatur ab ente in quantum est ens; nihil autem dividitur ab ente nisi non ens. Unde et ab hoc ente non dividitur hoc ens nisi per hoc quod in hoc ente includitur negatio illius entis" (*Exp. de Trin.*, q. 4, a. 1).

74 Thomas askes if God could have made things better than they are. Now, as to its own nature, a being is just what it is and cannot be improved without being changed: a better being is another being, just as the number four cannot be increased without getting a number higher than four. Adding an additional specific difference to an essence would be tantamount to adding a unit to a number (Ia, a. 25, a. 4).

[75] This metaphysical topic is expressed in many ways: relation [*lien*] between the form and the act of being (*esse seqitur formam*; see the texts collected by Fabro, *Particiaption et causalité selon S. Thomas d'Aquino*, pp. 344-362), essence endowed with a *virtus essendi* (CG I, 15; *De Pot.*, q. 5, a. 4, ad 1; *De caelo et mundo*, I, lecture 6, n° 5. On this last text, the Leonine edition contains a note (p. 23) by the careful editors of [108] 1886, which they believed good to add so as to attenuate the scope of Thomas's text and to prevent anyone from using the *virtus essendi* as a pretext to deny the real distinction). The foregoing doctrine is clearly formulated in the *Commentary on the Metaphysics*: "Esse enim rei, quamvis sit aliud ab ejus essentia, non tamen est intelligendum quod sit aliquid superadditum ad modum accidentis, sed quasi constituitur per principia essentiae. Et ideo hoc nomen 'ens' quod imponitur ab ipso esse significat idem cum nomine quod imponitur ab ipsa essentia" (*Met.*, IV, lecture 2, n° 558). Discussions relating to the real distinction have somewhat caused scholars to neglect this doctrine of the formal determination that the essence contributes to *esse*.

[76] If the negative function were to belong to the very definition of essence, one would have to conclude that God does not have an essence at all, since there is neither imperfection nor potency in Him. But Thomas has always rejected this conclusion.

[77] For this two-fold signification of the *modus essendi*, see for example *De Ver.*, q. 1, a. 1 (positive determination) and *De Ver.*, q. 21, a. 6, ad 5 (potential limitation).

[78] According to the preceding explanations, it must be said that there are as many degrees of being as there are specific essences. We can nevertheless ask whether these degrees may not be grouped into certain sets whose boundaries might mark off the appearance of new ontological properties and might indicate gaps in the hierarchy. Are these degrees summed up according to the three Neoplatonic orders of corporeal being, of life, and of thought? or according to the three levels of substantiality recognized by Aristotle (*Met.*, L, 1, 1069a30-b2)?

Although it is often cited, the Neoplatonic division *esse-vivere-intelligere* does not play an organic role in the thought of Thomas; it serves to indicate the hiearchy of participated perfections and the inclusion of a lower level within a higher level (an idea that is found in Aristotle, albeit with a somewhat different meaning, in the *De anima*, II, 3, 414b20-23; cf. L.-B. Geiger, *La Participation*, p. 274 and note 1). It is quite otherwise with Thomas who accords the importance to the Aristotelian division of substances into terrestrial or celestial sensible substance and immutable and immaterial substance (cf. G. P. Klubertanz, *Thomas Aquinas on Analogy*, pp. 100-103, and R. M. McInerny, *The Logic of Analogy*, pp. 98-122. The

first holds this theory in little esteem; the second concerns himself only with its logical dimension). For the logician, explains Thomas, the term "corporeal substance" (*corpus*) is said univocally of terrestrial bodies, which are corruptible, and of celestial bodies, which are not (Aristotle calles the latter eternal substances). In the same way, the term "substance" is attributed univocally to corporeal substances and to incorporeal substances. In fact, this is enough to form a concept sufficiently general for its extension to include all substances. Now this concept is univocal, but it covers radically different things. Univocal for the logician, this concept is not at all so for the metaphysician (II, d. 3, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2; *Exp. de Trin.*, q. 6, a. 3; Ia, q. 88, a. 2, ad 4).

The first division, that of corporeal substances into corruptible and incorruptible, is clearly obsolete, but it is not the most import one. It remains to examine the more fundamental division, which opposes corporeal substances and incorporeal substances, the latter including [110] the human soul and the pure forms, which are the angels. Now, like Aristotle, Thomas thinks that corporeal substances belong to physics and immaterial substances to metaphysics, so much so that, if there were no substances other than corporeal ones, there would be no other philosophical knowledge besides physics (*Com. Met.*, IV, lecture 5, n° 593; VI, lecture 1, n° 1165, 1170; XI, lecture 7, n° 2267; XII, lecture 2, n° 2427). Hence the division of substances into corporeal and immaterial is basic for constituting the object of metaphysics. Moreover, this division marks an ontological break between hylomorphic substances and simple substances from the viewpoint of *esse*: for the former, that which subsists is the composite subject to generation and corruption, where being appears and disappears by the play of natural causes; for the latter, the act of being belongs to the form insepararably: this form can be neither generated nor destroyed, but it appears only by the influence of a creative causality and would disappear only if God should annihilate it. The human soul, at the meeting-point of these two orders, is not a complete substance, since it is the form of a body, but is a subsistent form, since it is immaterial. It is even the only spiritual reality of which we could have any direct knowledge.

Consequently, the transcendental analogy of being is not limited to the general relation [*rapport*] between created substances and God; it is found as well among the various substantial degrees, and fundamentally, between corporeal and spriritual beings. Anyhow, to uncover the object of metaphysics, one must be in a position to claim that being is of itself neither exclusively corporeal nor exclusively spiritual, but that it involves each of these modes within its analogical unity.

In Ia, q. 12, a. 4, there is a beautiful text describing the *multiplex modus essendi rerum* in terms of three degrees: corporeal substances, which exist

in individual matter; immaterial substances, which subsist in themselves but which receive the act of being; God, who subsists by being his very own act of being.

79 Ia, q. 2, a. 3.—Among the studies on the quarta via, noteworthy are that of V. de Couesnongle, "Measure et causalité dans la 'quarta via,'" RT 58 (1958) 55-75, 244-284; and that of F. Muniz, "La 'quarta via' de Santo Tomás para demostrar la existencia de Dios," RevF 3 (1944) 385-433; 4 (1945) 49-103.

80 IIIa, q. 27, a. 5. Cf. IIIa, q. 7, a. 1: "Quanto aliquod receptivum est propinquius causae influenti, tanto magis participat de influentia ipsius."

81 *De Pot.*, q. 3, a. 5.

82 "Omne enim quod alicui convenit non secundum quod ipsum est, per aliquam causam convenit ei, sicut album homini: nam quod causam non habet, primum et immediatum est, unde necesse est ut sit per se et secundum quod ipsum" (CG II, 15).

83 Ia, q. 65, a. 1; CG II, 15.

84 "Si autem dicatur quod ens non est praedicatum univocum, nihil minus praedicta conclusio sequitur. Non enim de multis aequivoce dicitur, sed per analogiam; et sic oportet fieri reductionem in unum" (CG II, 15).

85 "Omnia autem contraria et diversa, quae sunt in mundo, inveniuntur communicare in aliquo uno, vel in natura speciei, vel in natura generis, vel saltem in ratione essendi: unde oportet quod omnium istorum sit unum principium, quod est omnibus causa essendi" (*De Pot.*, q. 3, a. 6)

86 Aristotle, *Met.*, H, 3, 1043b36-1044a2, translated by W.D. Ross, in *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, p. 816: "And as, when one of the parts of which a number consists has been taken from or added to the number, it is no longer the same number, but a different one, even if it is the very smallest part that has been taken away or added, so the definition and the essence will no longer remain when anything has been taken away or added." (Tricot trans., t. II, p. 467): "De même que si l'une des parties dont le nombre est constitué est retranchée ou ajoutée, ce n'est plus le même nombre, mais un nombre autre, si petite que soit l'augmentation ou la diminution, ainsi ni la définition ni la quiddité ne restent les mêmes, si on en retranche ou si on y ajoute quelque élément."

87 "Quod alicui convenit ex sua natura et non ex aliqua causa, minoratum in eo et deficiens esse non potest" (CG II, 15).

88 CG I, 43; *De Pot.*, q. 1, a. 2.

CHAPTER 3
FROM SAINT THOMAS TO CAJETAN

About 220 years separate the death of Thomas (1274) from the beginning of Cajetan's career at Padua (1493). We cannot retrace here the history of this period, both long and not quite well known. Still we must situate Cajetan's thought within the context where it was formed and which permits us to grasp its significance. As to the problem before us, the primary concern of our Thomist is to block Duns Scotus's opposing doctrine. Just as Scotus in his turn had written against Henry of Ghent, the preoccupations that govern the thought of Cajetan and sometimes carry him far from Thomas are partially clarified when one studies the turns in the dialogue between Scotus and Henry, then those between Cajetan and Scotus.[1] In the first place, we shall present the historical and doctrinal situation that Cajetan had to face, then we shall set forth Cajetan's theory as it develops and justifies itself in succeeding works. Then we shall be in a position to ask ourselves to what extent the Commentator's doctrine is faithful to and in conformity with that of Thomas.

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[116] I. The position of Henry of Ghent and that of John Duns Scotus

Henry of Ghent

At first glance, Henry of Ghent's[2] solution is quite close to that of Thomas. For Henry, between the creature and God there is a certain community based upon the presence of a form. This is not at all a community of likeness (*convenientia similitudinis*) supposing the possession of a form of the same nature, such as that which brings together two white beings or two humans, but a community of imitation (*convenientia imitationis*) relying upon two distinct forms, that of the model and that of the copy, or again that of the cause and that of the effect.[3] Between the creature and God, all reciprocal likeness

which might require a univocal common form must be eliminated. On the other hand, the creative causality of God establishes a relation of imitation between the form of the created thing and that of the creator. Thus one can at once eliminate equivocity, since being does not belong in a disparate way to the created thing and to God, and univocity, since the form of being of the created thing and that of God are not confused. Analogy expresses the relation of subordination and imitation which binds the former to the latter. The analogically common nature represents two realities each possessing a distinct form and bound together by a relation of causal dependence. Thus, the notion is not applied to them equally, but it belongs principally to the cause and in a subordinate way to the effect. This analogy already works at a [117] lower level for the community of being between accident and substance and, more perfectly, for the unity of created being with the divine being. Being is therefore not a form really common to the created thing and the creator, but creatures imitate God and this relation is enough to preserve a minimum degree of unity. Thus all danger of equivocity is eliminated, while the relationship of imitation excludes the risk of equivocity.

Nevertheless, upon closer consideration, Henry's solution leaves a certain metaphysical uneasiness, and one can ask oneself whether it really escapes the two dangers that it aims to avoid. For Henry hearkens back to Avicenna and admits, with him, the priority of the idea of being.[4] "If the idea of being is presented to the intellect before it is diversified into an idea of God or an idea of the creature, then we must surely find within the initial idea a certain irreducible content to which the subsequent ideas are accommodated. Indeed such is the exact point of the theory of univocity, glimpsed at least vaguely by Avicenna and explicitly developed by Duns Scotus."[5] Beings might well differ from each other, but how can the idea of being encompass them all without involving a common core, a univocal content? If Henry refuses to go so far, it is because, for him, the idea of being does not designate a determination anterior to created being or divine being: there is no simple concept common to God and creature that might be distinct from the proper concept of the one or the other. The idea of being necessarily represents either being by essence or being by participation, and, in the latter case, either substance or accident. Being has no other reality than that of these entirely different objects. How then can the latter be grasped within the unity of one and the same

representation? Under the condition that they be confused under the same idea. Being is always divine being or created being, substantial being or accidental being, but the representation that I make of it is indeterminate: it can belong to distinct realities because it does not represent such and such an object determinately. Once determined, it cannot [118] apply any longer to them all; it represents one of them and it alone. Moreover, this indetermination of the idea of being is not identical, since, for God, this idea excludes every other determination, whereas for the creature, it needs further determination: divine being is indeterminate by exclusion; created being by privation.[6] These two sorts of indetermination are therefore not identical; yet they are so close to each other that the mind, incapable of discerning them, confuses them within a unique representation. *Natura enim est intellectus non potentis distinguere ea quae propinqua sunt, concipere ipsa ut unum, quae tamen in rei veritate non faciunt unum conceptum.*[7]

Does the unity of the idea of indeterminate being, obtained at the price of this sort of confusion, not disguise the radical duality of notions carelessly confused? It seems that the thought of being oscillates dangerously between the duality of the content and the unity of what surrounds it. To safeguard the unity, while protecting oneself from the extreme consequences to which Avicenna leads, Henry of Ghent appeals to the Augustinian theory of knowledge: the idea of God is prior to the idea of the creature and grounds it; there are two distinct notions, but at the noetic level they are held together by a relation of causality parallel to the relation of ontological dependence: the idea of God is the source of every other idea in us just as the being of God is the cause of all the other beings.[8] Thus one can summarize, as J. Paulus did, Henry's thought on this point with two conclusions: "1) the general notion of being is not truly *one* concept, but *two*, wrongly confused; 2) these two concepts evoke or engender each other, whence the confusion that results."[9]

It remains to ask oneself if such a solution avoids equivocity, and it is upon this point that Duns Scotus's critique is directed. In fact, the analogical community between the essence of God and the created es-[119] sence is among the most reduced. As Henry conceives it, analogy "results from the imprecision of our ideas which arbitrarily confound—because the one engenders the other—objects that the totality of their natures force apart; analogy is excluded from a thought

that has become distinct and true. Henry's last word, then, would be a radical equivocity of the creator and the creature, at the level of knowledge as well as that of being."[10]

At the end of this analysis, if we compare the doctrine of Henry of Ghent to that of Thomas, it appears that the problem of the analogy of being in all its dimensions has been transferred from the real unity of being to the unity of the idea of being. For Thomas, being precedes knowing: if beings are gathered under one common representation, it is because they are related to each other by ontological relations of causality. For Henry, the unity of the analogical concept rests upon noetic causality in virtue of which the idea of the creature is engendered in us by the idea of God, the first object attained by our knowledge. The analysis thus passes from the level of being to that of knowing. Thus, his reflection finds itself engaged in a path at the end of which logic will take over from metaphysics.

John Duns Scotus

The univocity advocated by John Duns Scotus is directly opposed to the analogy of Henry of Ghent.[11] Since we know that the latter [120] is the principal interlocutor of the Franciscan master, we understand why Scotus took care to safeguard the unity of the concept of being which is formally neutral as regards the created and the uncreated, all the while conceding the radical diversity of the things to which it applies.[12] The debate remains at the conceptual level. Henry's solution harbors a dualism that in no way allows for safeguarding knowledge of God.[13] To know God, it is not enough to conceive Him in a concept analogous to the concept of a creature but distinct from the latter; one needs a concept univocal to the creature and God. What does this mean? Every univocal concept is sufficiently one that it would either be contradictory to affirm and deny it of the same thing, or else, if taken as the middle term of a syllogism, that the two other terms would be bound together by it without sophistical equivocation.[14] In other words, we do not truly know God unless the idea of being keeps an identical meaning whether we attribute it to the creature or to the creator. Scotus's arguments in favor of univocity are summarized in an opposition in principle to the solution proposed by Henry: the axiom according to which every multiplicity must be reduced to unity is equality valid for concepts.[15] Hence it is not enough to say that two

different concepts are confused in virtue of their analogical proximity, since a unity thus obtained is illusory.[16]

The meaning and import of the theory of univocity will become clear by going through the arguments that Scotus opposes to Henry.[17] According to the first argument, a concept that is certain is distinct from a doubtful concept. Now, in our present condition, we can conceive being and apply it to God without being certain that the being is finite or infinite, created or uncreated. Therefore the concept of being is distinct [121] in the one case and the other; of itself it is neither the one nor the other, but neutral as regards these modes. Its own proper content is univocal; it encompasses everything that is, including uncreated being.[18]

The second reason appeals to the requirements of our knowledge of God. If, to know God, we had to form a second concept (that of the divine being) analogous to the first (that of the created being), we would find ourselves in an impossible situation, since all our concepts originate from phantasms and the agent intellect. How will we be able to produce a concept which, according to the hypothesis under consideration, could not be univocal with our sensible representations? This is tantamount to asserting that we shall be unable to have any concept of being at all, which is unacceptable. It follows that our concept of God is unique and consequently univocal.[19] Either we know God by means of just a necessarily univocal concept, or else, as Henry claims, there must be two concepts in a relation of analogy, and God remains inaccessible.[20]

The fourth argument (or the third, if one does not count the argument added afterward by Scotus at no. 36-37) relies upon the fact that we attribute "simple perfections" to God, e.g., wisdom or goodness. Three hypothetical situations can be considered: either [a] such concepts involve a perfection common to God and the creature; or [b] they exclusively represent a created perfection; or [c] they designate the divine perfection. The last two solutions are to be set aside, since, by definition, in each of the two cases no concept of this sort could be attributed to God. Hence the concept should be univocal.[21] The way we form [122] concepts of simple perfections confirms this way of looking at it. "Every metaphysical inquiry about God proceeds in the following manner: one considers the formal character [*raison*] of something; one eliminates the imperfection that this formal character would have in creatures; one posits this formal character separately by

attributing to it the absolutely supreme perfection; and one attributes it to God in this form. For example, the formal character of wisdom (intelligence) or will: considered in and for itself, it includes neither imperfection nor limitation; once the imperfections that accompany it in creatures have been eliminated, one attributes it to God by carrying it to the supreme degree of perfection. Every inquiry about God therefore supposes that the intellect has the same univocal concept there as it draws from creatures."[22]

In short, we can know God only if the concept of being is univocal to the created and the uncreated; for this it must already be univocal to substance and accident.[23] Scotus is not unaware of the difficulties that can be opposed to the univocity of being in the name of Aristotle, by citing the texts referring to the multiplicity of the meanings of being and to the division of the categories in Book IV of the *Metaphysics* and Book I of the *Physics*.[24] To this he replies that, for Aristotle, the unity of order by relation to a primary instance is found among the species of one and the same genus without damaging the unity of the generic concept;[25] as to the argument against Parmenides, it remains conclusive even if one admits univocity and one cannot identify without sophism the plurality of the meanings of being with the non-univocity of being.[26]

Henry of Ghent advanced another argument against univocity: where there can be only a unity of order (*unitas attributionis*), there is no place for univocity. Now the unity of being between the creature and God is of this sort.[27] The reason proposed completely conforms to the traditional Aristotelian doctrine, [123] toward which Scotus had to take a position towards. The unity of relation is, he concedes, less than univocal unity. But if one cannot infer the more from the less, it does not follow that the less is incompatible with the more. From a unity of relation [*rapport*] one cannot conclude to univocal unity, but the latter is not necessarily at odds with the former. Let us keep the following declaration in mind: *concedo quod unitas attributionis non ponit unitatem univocationis, et tamen cum ista unitate attributionis stat unitas univocationis.*[28] Now the unity of being is indeed of this sort. It is a question of a unity of relation but one whose related terms involve a stricter unity which allows them to be compared among themselves with respect to the more and the less or the prior and the posterior; in short, there is a diversified and graduated common form upon which the unity of relation [*rapport*] and univocal unity inseparably rest.

There would be no unity in being if nothing brought beings together, and what allows them to be united despite their real diversity is the univocity of the idea of being.[29] The doctrine of analogical unity by reference to a primary instance is compatible, for Scotus, with the univocity of the concept.[30]

In his great work on Scotus, E. Gilson tries to clear up—or at least to explain—the fundamental misunderstanding that muddles the discussions between Scotists and Thomists on the subject of the univocity of being. Their controversies seem to presuppose that the interlocutors are talking about the same "being." If, as seems likely, this hypothesis is not quite right, "it is possible that the one <being> is analogous and that the other is univocal, because the one is that of Aristotle deepened by Thomas Aquinas and the other that of Avicenna."[31] Scotistic univocity is not concerned with the diversity of concrete beings; it designates the concept of being purified [124] from every existential determination, and being thus understood is of itself neither finite nor infinite. On the other hand, Thomas's being, defined in relation to existence, is inseparable from its real modes; at this level there is no unity that is not diversified. This observation, which Gilson justifies at length, allows him to conclude that "the Scotist univocity of being does not contradict the analogy of Thomist being."[32] Thus, will it be enough to be opposed to Scotus in order to recover Thomas's thought? Nothing is less certain, as the sequel of this story will show.

Nevertheless the antiscotist polemics did not ineluctably lead to the theories developed by Cajetan. In fact two trends rapidly developed amongst the Dominican Thomists, represented on the one side by Thomas of Sutton, as well as by Thomas of Claxton, and on the other by John Capreolus. The former, while always referring to Thomas, stray off from him and adopt the analogy of proportion; in this respect they figure as precursors of Cajetan.[33] The latter opposes [125] Scotus with the analogy of relation, provided that it be understood at the level of being and not at that of the concept; to bring the discussion back onto the metaphysical ground that is proper to it according to Thomas, Capreolus introduces a distinction that will subsequently become influential—that between the objective concept and the formal concept. Our representation of being is unique, and it is common to the creature and to God, as well as to accident and substance. But what does this unity cover in reality? Being is not a common form,

participated by creatures and by God as a generic form participated within its various species; but being involves unity because created being imitates the divine being and is related to it, just as accidental being is related to substantial being.[34] It is difficult to be more faithful to the letter of [126] Thomas.[35] But Cajetan was going to lead the Thomistic school in a completely different direction. We are now going to see how.

II. The position of Cajetan

Is Cajetan's teaching on analogy in conformity with that of Thomas? This is a question upon which there is far from complete agreement. There are three types of answer.

For some, the agreement of the disciple with the master is beyond dispute. Cajetan simply wanted to expound the theory of analogy that Thomas constantly used without ever explaining how he understood it. The Commentator coherently and homogeneously completes the Thomist doctrine on a point that calls for an elaboration destined to make up for the silence of [127] Thomas. The successor develops what his predecessor had left obscure. (Thus M. T. L. Penido, who, in virtue of the presupposed accord, explains the doctrine of Thomas in cajetanian terms, or, in the other direction, A. Goergen, who wants to show how Cajetan's thought conforms entirely to that of Thomas.)

Others think that Thomas's practice does not conform to Cajetan's theory. The latter does not then have the right to present itself as a homogeneous development of authentic Thomism; but how can we be assured of discovering the thought of Thomas Aquinas, given that he had never explained his doctrine of analogy in its own right? Accordingly, the theory that he presupposes would have to be verified in use, but we would undertake this research at our own peril, without ever being sure at the end whether we might have ascribed thoughts to the author that might never really have been his own.

As for us, we think that there is a true doctrine of analogy in Thomas, sufficiently explicit for its character to be determinable on a textual basis, and quite different from that of Cajetan. It remains, then, to understand why Cajetan, so careful to be a faithful Thomist, could wander significantly from the theory of his master even while he was claiming to explain his teaching. In point of fact, the name "Commentator" ill befits Cajetan: the fact that he was a Thomist by

conviction and intention does not keep him from being a thinker in his own right. How can one blame him for that? But it is a fact whose consequences it is better to recognize. In addition, this thought is situated in time and space; to wish to turn it into a timeless absolute is to risk losing track of its significance.

Giacoppo de Vio was born in Gaeta in the kingdom of Naples in 1469. In 1484 he entered the Order of Preachers of Gaeta under the name of Brother Thomas. He began his studies in philosophy at Bologna, but soon had to interrupt them because of illness. In 1491 he was sent to the *Studium generale* of Padua to complete his studies. It was there that he began his career as professor. On 21 January 1493, he was named to the conventual chair of theology by the Master General, and on 19 March he [128] was promoted bachelor of the University. He was named to the chair of metaphysics for the 1493-94 academic year. The *Commentary on the De ente et essentia* dates from this time. In 1497 he was named to the chair of theology at the University of Pavia and remained there until the end of 1499. The *De nominum analogia* was completed on 1 September 1498, but it was appended [or: it was close {*il se rattache*}— Editor's note], as we shall see, to the *Commentary on the De ente* and it pertains to the historical and doctrinal context of the University of Padua.[36]

There were two currents of intellectual life at Padua: the Averroistic Aristotelianism which Laurent studied in order to situate Cajetan's *De Anima*, and the Scotism of the Friars Minor and the Augustinians. The predominant figure is that of the Minor Antonio Trombetta, public professor of metaphysics probably starting from 1475; his most accessible work consists of questions on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, the title of which indicates its polemical intention: *Opus in Metaphysicam Aristotelis Padue in thomistas discussum*. One of these Thomists whom he is fighting is designated by name: *Questiones metaphysicales … edite, lecte et disputate ad concurrentiam M. Fratris Neritonensis O.P.*[37] Among the Preachers, we find Francesco di Nardi (+ 1489), against whom the questions of Trombetta are directed, then Valentino de Camerino (or Perugia) professor of metaphysics starting from September 1489, the teacher and immediate predecessor of Cajetan. We do not know [129] the works of these two professors; they have most likely been lost.[38]

The rivalry between the representatives of Scotism and of Thomism shows up both in philosophy and theology. In the faculty of theology,

the Scotus chair was entrusted to one of the Friar Minors; starting from 1490, a Friar Preacher was assigned to teach Thomism. "This fact quite explains the choice of Cajetan for officially teaching theology along the lines of Thomas (three years after the creation of this chair); it also helps us to understand the particular orientation of Cajetan's writings. At Padua, one necessarily is thinking against someone else—whether in philosophy or in theology. One has to take a position in the Averroist controversey and, further, to opt either for Thomas against Scotus or for Scotus against Thomas."[39] Cajetan's first writings—those that are of interest to our researches—are directed against Scotus and against Trombetta. This context permits us to grasp better the origin of Cajetan's doctrine of analogy, as we are about to reconstruct.

The Commentary on the "*De ente et essentia*" (1494)

Cajetan's first thrust at Scotus is found in ch. I, question 2: How is *being* applied to the categories—immediately or mediately?[40] Under this rubric we can recognize a question that we have already encountered with Scotus: does being have a proper content, distinct from accidental being and substantial being, that one might abstract separately?

Cajetan replies by distinguishing mental representation and real foundation, or, to use the terms accepted by both the Scotists and the Thomists, formal concept and objective concept. We have a single formal concept of being to represent substance and accident, God and creature. Indeed, beings which present a [130] real, albeit simply analogical, likeness can be represented by a unique concept expressing that which brings them together. Now created being is like the divine being, and accidental being is like substantial being, in virtue of the relation of causality which in each instance ties the first term to the second (a relation of exemplarity for what is created, of emanation for the accident).[41]

If we now consider the real foundation of this unique representation, two complementary conclusions have to be drawn:

1. Being—the objective concept, says Cajetan—is more universal than the categories, since the latter constitute mutually exclusive partial determinations of being. 2. Nevertheless being is not a level superior to the categories in the fashion of a supreme genus divided by differences, since being is included within each predicament. *Conceptus objectalis entis sunt naturae genericae et specificae ut habentes esse.*[42]

Being immediately encompasses the categories instead of super-imposing itself upon them, since they are the different concrete ways of existing. As such, they have an analogical unity that gathers them under a unique representation to the extent that the formal determination of each category serves as a basis for a certain mode of existing. Thus, each concrete being can be designated either by the formal determination that distinguishes it from all the rest or by the transcendental perfection that reconciles it with the others. Now the latter is not added afterward to the supposedly already constituted essence. Hence being cannot be abstracted from the categories as one abstracts a genus from species. Thus being applies immediately to substance and to accident and cannot designate any other content. Thereby [131] asserts Cajetan, the Scotist theory of the abstraction of being is set aside, but the analogical likeness of which we have just spoken must still be defined.

In ch. 2, question 3, Cajetan applies himself to offering such a definition: Is being attributed to substance and accident univocally or according to a gradation *per prius et posterius*?[43]

To start with, we have to define the meaning of the question so as to avoid a misunderstanding that would favor Scotus. The species of one and the same genus are unequal among themselves, yet it remains that the generic notion is univocal, since it belongs to them equally. This one may well grant to Scotus. But analogy begins with the inequality of the formal content, when the predicate belongs to a primary term absolutely (i.e., not relatively) and to a second term by relation to the first: thus the Aristotelian example of health. The question to resolve comes down to this: does being belong to substance absolutely and to accident in virtue of the relation that it has with substance? From the point of view of being, is substance defined in itself and accident by relation to substance?

Cajetan then appeals to the *De Veritate*: there are two sorts of analogy, one which results from a determinate relation between two realities and which involves a unity of order by reference to a primary instance, the other which is expressed under the form of a mathematical proportion. For the first, the diversity comes from the different relation that each of the analogates has with the primary instance. For the second (the unity of proportion), the diversity belongs to the proper nature of each being engaged in a different but proportionally similar relation. Two conclusions follow: the analogy of being at the level of the categories

is two-fold, both that of relation [*rapport*] and that of proportion; on the other hand, the analogy between the creature and God is that of proportion only. We shall examine these two propositions of Cajetan in turn.

First of all, the analogy between accident and substance is simultaneously one of relation and one of proportion, as Aristotle teaches in *Metaphysics*, Book IV, text 2, for the unity of order, and in Book XII, text 28, for the unity of proportion. Nevertheless the one is [132] more fundamental than the other, and Cajetan will insist on that of proportion, against Scotus. For if the unity of order is compatible with univocity, the same is not true for the unity of proportion. *Illa non sunt univoca, quae nullam identitatem habent nisi proportionis.*[44] By definition proportional likeness supposes relations whose terms are different on each side. So if the unity among the categories is exclusively that of proportion, then all risk of univocity is found to be eliminated. Now this is how Aristotle conceives the unity of principles among the diverse categories.[45]

In summary, Cajetan resigns himself to follow in part Scotus and tacitly concedes to him that the unity of order does not exclude univocity. How then can he defend analogy of relation? Holding this last position to be a lost cause, Cajetan falls back to a second solution that he judges to be immune to attack: if there is no other sort of unity aside from that of proportion, univocity is immediately eliminated. Does this strategic withdrawal shelter the Commentator from any difficulty? It seems not. First of all he would have to prove that proportional unity is always incompatible with univocity, a claim that he assumed to be self-evident, thereby dispensing himself from proving it: *Major est nota ex terminis: si enim nullam aliam identitatem habent nisi proportionis, oportet quod careant unitate univoca.*[46] This assertion is so little evident that the opposite seems equally true: in the uses that Aristotle makes of it in biology, the structural or functional analogy of the organs, upon which comparative anatomy and physiology are based, relies on univocity; in the same way, mathematical proportions, from which the most frequent examples are drawn, are, according to the Aristotelian account, species of a univocal genus. The fundamental presupposition is therefore far from being incontrovertible. [133]

The minor premise is no less debatable. Cajetan asserts that the only unity among the principles of the categories is that of proportion. To

justify this claim he cites the authority of Aristotle and Averroes. Now the latter, in the passage in question, associates the proportional unity of the principles with the unity of order which relates accidents to substance, and Thomas takes up this theory in his *De principiis naturae* as well as in the *Commentary of the Metaphysics*. We find ourselves then in the presence of a serious divergence, since Cajetan subordinates everything to the unity of proportion, whereas for Thomas the unity of relation is more fundamental. Ultimately Cajetan's demonstration would contradict the wording of the conclusion: if there is no non-univocal unity other than that of proportion, how can one maintain that the predicamental analogy of being is also an analogy of relation? Since being is not univocal, there ought not, it seems, be any other predicamental analogy than the analogy of proportion.

We can therefore ask whether the polemical reasons for which Cajetan prefers proportion to relation have not carried him too far. Now, later on, he will be led to justify with doctrinal reasons the alternative that he had adopted to combat Scotus.

The second conclusion pushes the first still further: between the creature and God there is no other unity than that of proportion. The relation that God has with His being is similar to that which the creature has with its own: *Sicut Deus se habet ad suum esse, ita creatura ad suum*.[47] How is this last assertion to be justified? Cajetan says that he will later deal with this question on its own and in a more developed way, a promise he keeps in the *De nominum analogia*. Meanwhile, he is content to appeal to the authority of the *De Veritate*, where Thomas discards analogy by reference to a primary instance and keeps only the analogy of proportion between the creature and God.

Starting with these brief remarks, continues Cajetan, one can understand what unity there is to the concept of being. If one speaks of the formal concept, it is unique and represents [134] unequally substance and accident, God and the creature. If one is concerned with the objective concept, its unity comes about either from the unique term to which the others refer, or from the proportional identity which the relations have amongst themselves.

This second conclusion merely makes the alternative governing the first go still further. For, if unity of order does not seem sufficient to combat Scotistic univocity, it remains to select those texts of Thomas where the analogy of proportion is preferred to that of relation. But when one appeals to the authority of texts, why, aside from all the

polemic with Scotus, prefer the *De Veritate* to the *Contra Gentiles—De Potentia—Ia Pars* sequence? This choice led Cajetan to interpret the texts of the second series according to the position of the *De Veritate* and ultimately to reduce the whole Thomist theory of analogy to the unity of proportion. This will be the task of the *De nominum analogia*.[48]

[135]

The "*De Nominum Analogia*" (1498)

The little work *De nominum analogia* contains the theoretical explanation promised in the *Commentary on the De ente*; he presents a very systematic theory destined to identify analogy with unity of proportion.[49] This prejudice stands out from the first lines of the work, when the author attempts to define the term *analogia* by going back to the meaning of the corresponding Greek word, which designates mathematical proportion, i.e., the equality of two relations [*rapports*].[50] Once this first nominal definition has been laid down, the debates obscured by the confusion that reigned till now ought, Cajetan asserts, to be clarified, and the different uses of the term can be classified from the vaguest senses to the strictest.[51] Whence there arises a hierarchy of the different sorts of analogy: (1) the analogy of inequality; (2) the ana- [136] logy of attribution (which we have called analogy of relation [*rapport*]); (3) the analogy of proportionality (which we have called the analogy of proportion). Thus from the start, the first decision of Cajetan—in the name of a rigorous definition and the etymological meaning—runs counter to what we can observe in Thomas. The latter is careful to subordinate the unity of proportion to the unity of relation. One can, to be sure, regret that the expression *dici multipliciter per respectum ad unum* had received the name of *analogia*, and judge this now-current usage to be unfortunate. But a pure and simple return to the original sense of the term *analogia* considered as fundamental inevitably results in subordinating the unity of relation to the unity of proportion, since the latter alone strictly deserves to be called analogy *secundum veram vocabuli proprietatem*.[52]

The three-fold division of analogy which forms the structure of the work is inspired by the one that is found in Thomas in Book I of the *Sentences*.[53] Cajetan identifies the analogy *secundum esse et non secundum intentionem* with the analogy of inequality,[54] the analogy *secundum intentionem tantum et non secundum esse* with that of attribution, and the analogy *secundum intentionem et secundum esse* with that of

proportionality. Now, in the text Cajetan appeals to, Thomas has in mind only analogy by reference to a primary instance and separates the case of health from that of being. The analogy *secundum intentionem tantum et non secundum esse* is extrinsic; the analogy *secundum intentionem et secundum esse* is intrinsic. In other words, for Thomas, analogy by reference to a primary instance is not founded exclusively upon extrinsic relations; it can also involve intrinsic relations and can be based on a common perfection unequally participated. Cajetan recasts the Thomist division of extrinsic and intrinsic analogy, no [137] longer as two forms of analogy of relation, but by identifying the first with the unity of order[55] and the second with the unity of proportion.[56] From thence follow the characteristics recognized by Cajetan as belonging to each of the two sorts of analogy. For the analogy of attribution, the predicate is common to many by extrinsic denomination. Only the primary analogate formally possesses the designated perfection, and the predicate belongs to it properly, although the other instances receive the name of the primary one in virtue of the relations that they have with it.[57] Thus the analogy of proportionality entirely sweeps over the analogy of attribution, not only because the name of analogy belongs properly to it,[58] but especially because it alone is intrinsic.[59] Ultimately, the unity of order is called analogy only by an abuse of language,[60] just like the analogy of inequality.[61] Furthermore, Thomas, in his *Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics*, opposes it to analogy properly so called.[62] In short, the only true analogy is analogy of proportionality.

Still, Cajetan is not unaware that one finds in Thomas a theory of the analogy of being and of the good according to which one can affirm at the same time that the analogates possess the common perfection intrinsically and that they receive it from the primary instance. How can one explain this fact once analogy by reference to a primary instance has been defined as necessarily extrinsic?[63] To get himself out of difficulty without changing the definitions that he has just laid down, Cajetan introduces a distinction quite indicative of his plan to treat analogy as a pure logical structure whose laws abstract from all content. With regard to being or the good, he explains, the extrinsic relation [138] that the analogates have with the primary instance in virtue of the formal structure of analogy is one thing, and the intrinsic participation which ties them together in virtue of the ontological content of the analogy is another. In other words, analogy can be

considered either from the point of view of its logical structure—and in this respect relation is always extrinsic—or from the point of view of its material content, and in this respect the analogates sometimes possess the common nature intrinsically, e.g., the perfection of being, whereas sometimes the designated perfection is proper to the primary instance and is not communicated to the others. If then the analogy of being and of the good is intrinsic, this is not because it is concerned with the analogy of attribution but because one finds oneself in the presence of a "mixed analogy": attribution marking dependence upon the primary instance, proportionality expresses intrinsic belongingness [*appartenance*].

This whole construction rests upon a rather narrow and quite fragile foundation, since it is based only upon the two-fold definition of the analogy of attribution as extrinsic and the analogy of proportionality as intrinsic. To challenge this two-fold definition is to put the whole edifice into question. If there is room for an analogy of relation that is intrinsic, one immediately sees that the preference accorded to the analogy of proportion is no longer justified. On the other hand, the division of the analogy of relation into that of *duorum ad tertium* and that of *unius ad alterum*, which holds such an important place in the doctrine of Thomas, is treated as a simple logical difference between the analogy of the secondary analogates among themselves and that of any secondary analogate to the primary instance, but it no longer plays a fundamental metaphysical role.[64]

Now let us examine how Cajetan conceives the analogy of proportionality, the definition that he gives of it and the characteristics that he attributes to it. Thus we shall see the consequences of the initial options of his system play themselves out. The analogy of proportionality, he explains, originally designates the likeness of two numerical relations, but one subsequently understands it in a broad sense of any proportional likeness whatever, [139] which allows making use of it in philosophy.[65] It is either metaphorical, if the feature signified is said of one of the analogates in the proper sense and of the other in a figurative sense,[66] or proper, when the feature signified strictly belongs to each analogate.[67] The analogy of proper proportionality is the only intrinsic analogy.[68] This is the reason why it permits one to know the perfections of being, of good, of truth, etc. formally possessed by different realities.[69] Among the numerous characteristics that belong to this sort of analogy, let us confine ourselves to the most significant:

1. Analogical unity; 2. the abstraction of the analogous concept; 3. the attribution of the analogous concept to the analogates; 4. the inequality inherent in analogy.

  1. Analogical unity first has to be considered from the point of view of its real foundation and then from the point of view of its conceptual expression. Let us first examine the real unity before turning to the conceptual unity. In reality, essences are diverse and irreducible (*diversarum rationum sunt simpliciter*),[70] but they are alike in that each receives *esse* in its own way. The unity of being is therefore not that of a common nature; it is only that of a proportion: beings are incommensurable directly, and the diversity of essences is reduced to unity only indirectly, in virtue of the proportionally similar relation of each essence to its own proper act of being.[71] The conceptual unity reflects the real likeness: thanks to the proportional similarity which relates the beings, an imperfect common concept which belongs to all the analogates can be formed. By representing the one, it can also represent the [140] others,[72] albeit imperfectly, since each can be perfectly represented only by its own proper concept and, in this sense, many concepts are needed.[73] In summary, the objective concept,[74] i.e., the real content of the representation, has no other unity than that of proportion: the quiddities are different from each other, but they are similar by the relation that each has with its own proper act of being.[75] The mental concept,[76] i.e., the representation, reproduces in thought a unity conforming to what is discovered in reality; this is why one cannot perfectly detach the concept from the analogates, but the imperfect representation of the one can be applied to the other which represents it proportionally. The proportional unity of the representation corresponds exactly to the proportional unity of reality.

  2. Since being has no other unity than that of proportion, in order to abstract the idea of being one has to disengage the direct, immediate, and common relation of essences to their *esse* from their different realizations. To what extent can one disengage an analogous concept which represents in a confused and global way[77] the proportional likeness of the beings? If this concept is detached from diverse beings and different ways of being, its unity will be simple and perfect, but it will be the unity of the univocal. If, on the other hand, it is inseparable from the creature and from God, from substance and from accident, then what unity will it still retain? We see the [141] two opposed re-

quirements of unity and diversity that the analogous concept of being
has to reconcile. First of all, since the idea of being does not signify a
nature common to substance and accident, but a relation similar to
esse in the one case and the other,[78] it cannot abstract from its inferi-
ors, but it represents their proportional likeness. On this ground, it
does imply a diversity, without this diversity simultaneously entailing
equivocity, for this is not an explicit and distinct diversity. The com-
mon relation of essences to *esse* does presuppose distinct quiddities, but
their diversity is not considered explicitly: only the proportional unity
of the relations is retained. In this way the diversity of the essences
is reduced to the unity of the idea of being without the unity of the
latter being comparable to that of a univocal concept. Nevertheless
the unity is no less real: the concept of being is not that of any of the
particular beings; it has a proper concept which is neither explicitly
that of substance or of accident, nor that of a creature or of God, and
this concept is limited to their proportional likeness.[79] "If it extends
beyond particular concepts, it extends to all and is not properly any
of them. Hence, one might say, it has its own autonomy, its own
individuality as a concept. To be itself, it must indeed be other than
the others, and so distinguish itself from them, and perform a sort of
abstraction from them. But precisely because it extends beyond them, it
also envelops them and contains them. Hence too, to be itself, it must
include their diversity, not completely abstract from it."[80] The idea of
being necessarily and inseparably implies the diversity of the essences
and the proportional unity of the relations. Its unity is not such that
one [142] could abstract it from all diversity, nor is its diversity such
that it might destroy the unity.[81] These particular characteristics, which
keep the idea of being away from univocity as well as from equivocity,
allow it to encompasses all beings,[82] as we shall see.

3. Cajetan examines a logical question, apparently purely technical,
but one which is of great consequence for the analogy of being: is the
analogous concept a predicate superior to and more common than the
analogates, i.e., does it circumscribe the analogates as its inferiors?[83]
More concretely, does the concept of being apply directly to accident
and substance, to the creature and to God, or is it an all-embracing
superior which includes the different beings within its own unity?
Thus posed, the question comes down precisely to asking whether
the analogy of being is of the *duorum ad tertium* type or of the *unius
ad alterum* type. Cajetan's reply flows from the theory that he had just

produced to explain the unity and the abstraction of the analogical concept. Since the analogical concept is proportionately common to the analogates, this is enough to make it a superior concept.[84] For the superior concept is common to many concepts which are its inferiors, and it represents one and the same perfection in each of them (lacking this latter condition, we would have no more than a mere common name, and this would amount to equivocity).[85] If this perfection is purely and simply [143] identical, the superior concept is univocal;[86] if the perfection is proportionally common, the superior concept is analogous.[87] In short, it is sufficient that a concept be one even proportionately for it to enjoy the logical properties of universality and priority, so that it is more general, broader, and higher than its inferiors.[88] The analogous concept, inasmuch as it has unity even though this unity is neither perfect nor simple, governs the analogates and circumscribes them as a more general term. Thus, the idea of being is more common than that of substance or accident; it circumscribes the diverse beings and they are included in it; it surpasses them and extends beyond them,[89] exactly as the idea of man includes and governs Peter and Paul, or that of animal includes man and horse.[90] By means of this logical property, the analogous concept joins up with the univocal concept, since the logical superiority of a concept is a direct consequence of its unity.[91]

Cajetan himself carefully exhibits the consequences that this doctrine entails for the analogy of being.[92] Since the concept of being truly has one content, as has been established above, one cannot say that it immediately designates accident or substance, creature or God; one cannot assert either that it expresses a unique, unequally participated content; ultimately one cannot claim that its unity be a unity of order.[93] The analogical notion of being is a concept [144] and a predicate proportionally one in the way in which concepts and univocal predicates are common, i.e., by encompassing the inferiors within its extension. When I say that man or whiteness or any other reality belongs to being, I do not mean to say that the object in question is a substance or an accident; I affirm simply that it is related to its act of being as the other realities are.[94]

Thomas's texts seem hard to reconcile with the theory that has just been explained, and Cajetan became well aware of the problem. For sometimes these texts seem to assign too much unity among the analogates and to present the analogically common notion as if it could be

detached from the analogates by abstraction.[95] Sometimes, on the other hand, they do not assign enough unity: these are the texts in which Thomas asserts that being is not prior to the primary analogate and where he underscores the diversity of the analogates.[96] Now one has to explain why [145] we find in Thomas points of view so opposed amongst themselves and so different from Cajetan's theory. Our commentator does not consider that the thought of Thomas could have evolved over time, which probably is the case.[97] He appeals instead to doctrinal justifications. The first texts, he declares, underscore the unity of the analogates within the analogically common notion.[98] The second, on the other hand, concern the notion proper to each analogate: in this way, the being of an accident pertains only to the accident, and that of a substance belongs only to the substance. It is quite true to say that in that case there is not a more general or more abstract concept and that there is nothing prior to the primary analogate (to substance or to God, according as he is concerned with predicamental or transcendental analogy).[99] Nevertheless, Cajetan continues, one can maintain that the notion proportionally common to the analogates is logically superior, and prior to them. He thinks he can line his own doctrine up with that of Thomas by means of a surprising distinction: really (*physice loquendo*) nothing is prior to the primary analogate, but conceptually (*logice loquendo*) the analogical notion encompasses all the analogates.[100]
[146]

Despite the quite real difficulties that arise from the texts of Thomas whose doctrine is manifestly different from his own, Cajetan does not hesitate to maintain his own positions and to declare them compatible with those of his Master. Nevertheless the reconciliation at which he arrives is entirely superficial. He has recourse to a separation between the conceptual order and the real order all the more surprising because he had taken so much care to establish a correspondence between the proportional unity of the real and that of the concept. This separation is especially indicative of a theory that transfers analogy from ontology to logic, since the property of encompassing its inferiors to which Cajetan holds so firmly (and which is by definition a property of univocal concepts), pertain only to our representation. The all-encompassing supreme instance within which all beings are unified and under which they all are like each other is none other than the idea of being. The unity of being is that of a concept.

4. Cajetan runs into a last difficulty which bears upon the relations of inequality without which there is no analogy.[101] For, since analogy for Thomas essentially involves an order and gradation, it requires a principle of this order, a primary instance of this gradation. There is no analogy without a hierarchy associated with a principal analogate. Now, of itself, proportion might well express unity within diversity, and even, if one wants, inequality of the analogates (without which there would be no diversity), but it in no way requires a gradation or a primary instance, and it involves no dependence with respect to a principal analogate. How then can one recognize that one analogate is more perfect than the other, that substance is a being more perfectly than accident, or again that God is a more perfect being than created being? Scotus for his part well understood this need for comparison, but he concluded from it that all [147] beings are to be reduced to a common measure which is necessarily a univocal concept.

Cajetan wants to show that there is no comparison unless there is a unique concept (he even asserts that it is incorrect to recognize such a comparison in the analogy of attribution),[102] but that this unique concept is not necessarily univocal: relations of inequality can, he thinks, be based upon the proportional unity of the analogue as well as upon the simple unity of the univocal. In other words, starting from proportional unity one must prove that proportional unity involves inequality *secundum magis et minus,* an order *secundum prius et posterius* and the presence of a primary instance.

For two distinct realities to be comparable and for the one to be declared more perfect than the other, they must have a common element of comparison present in each, according to which a relation of superiority, equality or inferiority is established between them.[103] Now it is enough that the common element have a proportional unity, and in that case the comparison is made within the proportional element.[104] Once this condition is established, one can, by comparing [*rapprochant*] the analogy of proportionality with the analogy of inequality, show that a certain gradation *secundum magis et minus* obtains for univocal concepts and analogous concepts.[105] For the nature "animal" is present in ox and in man, but, although the notion is rigorously identical, the common nature exists more perfectly in the one than in the other, since man is a more perfect animal than ox. In the same way, the common concept of being (having a relation to *esse*) applies proportionally to substance and to accident, although being pertains

more perfectly to the first than to the second, since substance is a more perfect being;[106] in the same way God is a more perfect being than a creature. The two applications that have just been [148] compared still ought not be confused, since they offer notable differences. The inferiors of the univocal concept can be unequally perfect, but the notion under which they are united is attributed to them equally; this notion is not hierarchized, otherwise it would not be univocal. On the other hand, the inferiors of the analogous concept present a hierarchy not only in reality, but also from the point of view of the analogical notion, since the notion itself applies more perfectly to one instance than to another. The analogical notion is verified of the analogates in a manner ordered *secundum prius et posterius*: the notion of being belongs more perfectly to substance than to accident, to God than to the creature.[107] It belongs to the primary instance *simpliciter* and to the others *secundum quid*.[108] This is obvious in the case of predicamental analogy, since an accident has being only by dependence upon substance. This is no less true for transcendental analogy for, although the creature in itself purely and simply belongs to being, in relation to God it is of diminished being and almost non-being.[109] In sum, the notion of being belongs to substance *per prius,* to accident *per posterius,* to God *per* [149] *prius* and to creature *per posterius.* Thus, it is to be concluded that the analogical notion expresses both the proportional unity of the analogates and their order of inequality with regard to the notion of the primary instance among them.[110]

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At the end of a long detour, would Cajetan have managed to rejoin Thomas while giving complete satisfaction to Scotus without, for all that, conceding univocity to him? That is doubtful. The preceding analyses have shown that the significance of Cajetan's theory plays upon the doctrine of the proportional unity of the analogous concept. All the other properties of analogy are a simple consequence of this first position. For, once one grants that there is an analogous concept which is truly one, even if the unity of this concept is imperfect and proportional, one is inevitably led to attribute to it properties that belong to the univocal concept. According to Cajetan, one can abstract an analogous concept endowed with a proper content, different from that of the analogates, although it is not perfectly separable from them; this concept encompasses them and is higher than they are; it includes

them within itself in such fashion that it is prior and superior to the primary divisions of being; this concept unifies the multiplicity of reality within the unity of the idea of being; starting from the unity of the idea one has to discover the inequality and the hierarchy of the analogates as well as the function of the primary instance among them. In short, even this last property, recognized both by Thomas and by Cajetan, does not have the same meaning for each of them. For Cajetan, one goes from the unity of the analogous concept to the inequality of the analogates; according to Thomas, one goes from the hierarchized diversity of beings to the real unity of the primary instance. For the one, the hierarchy is a consequence; for the other, a point of departure. It seems then that every effort to reconcile the two theories is doomed to fail and that, starting from the initial [150] options, the divergences constantly increase. These divergences could not disappear except by questioning the point of departure chosen by Cajetan as cause, i.e., the primacy of the analogy of proportionality.[111]

III. Cajetan over against Scotus and Thomas

At the end of the foregoing analyses, it is time to take stock of the debate between Cajetan and Scotus, then to examine whether Cajetan's position can be warranted by any of the solutions proposed by Thomas; finally, we shall inquire about [151] the conception of being that Cajetan's system presupposes.

For Scotus, if there were no concept common to all beings and to all categories of being, there would be no science of being as being and no knowledge of God starting from creatures, and this concept can only be univocal. For there is no intermediary between univocity and equivocity, and every attempt to introduce a third term which would be analogous does not stand up to examination. If the analogue has a *ratio* truly common to its inferiors and which applies *per prius* to substance and *per posterius* to accidents, the concept of being is univocal. If, on the other hand, the *ratio* belongs formally only to the one and is said of the other only in virtue of a certain proportional likeness (i.e., definitively in a figurative sense), the concept of being is equivocal. Thus, the univocal and the equivocal are contradictory opposites, without there being any mean. Now it is impossible that being be equivocal—that would mean the ruin of metaphysics; it is therefore univocal to the creature and to God, to accident and to

substance. Accordingly there is an objective concept of being, common to all its inferiors, distinct from the concept of each of them since it is not identical to any, contracted by certain differences (finite and infinite, accidental and substantial), or, more exactly, by certain intrinsic modes, for being is not a genus and has no differences, properly speaking. In summary, Scotus's arguments tend to prove that one needs a common and unique concept and that this concept is necessarily univocal, since univocity alone answers to all the conditions that have been laid down.

To this argumentation Cajetan replies by agreeing that there must indeed be a common distinct concept but by denying that one can infer from there the univocity of this concept. It belongs to the property pertainng both to univocal and to analogical terms, he believes, that the concept is distinct and that there is a common *ratio*; still, one difference opposes them to each other, which prevents them from being confused together: univocal concepts are distinct from their inferiors because they are separate from them, although the analogous concepts include them and are not separable from them. Nevertheless, it remains that there is a *ratio entis* common to all the predicaments and to all beings, but its unity is simply [152] proportional.[112] Thus reduced to essentials, Cajetan's position, is, it is important to recognize, not entirely free from ambiguity, since this common concept, which he along with Scotus admits, oscillates between the univocity of the distinct content and the equivocity of diverse proportions. Consequently, we shall be less surprised to see a Scotist like John de Rada treat Cajetan with some irony as an unwilling ally of Scotus, since the Dominican commentator, overcome by the vigorous argument of his opponent, concedes, Rada avers, the principal point, namely the existence of an abstract concept, although he denies the univocity of this concept.[113] To be sure, John de Rada, in his haste to win Cajetan over to Scotism, does not take account of a profound divergence (against Scotus, Cajetan denies that the analogous concept is separate from its inferiors), but yet his thinking is no less revealing, since what Cajetan takes from Scotus with the one hand, he give it back to him with the other. In taking recourse to proportional unity, he asserts either too much or too little; he [153] leans sometimes toward the equivocity of diverse realities which proportion brings together, sometimes toward the univocity of the concept which expresses proportional likeness. In short, Scotus has been granted dangerous concessions.

Is Cajetan's theory, for all that, in conformity with that of Thomas, not to that of his last works—which is manifestly impossible—but to that of the *De Veritate*, which it appeals to? It is not. For similar terminology, i.e., 'proportionality,' conceals quite different preoccupations. For the *De Veritate* admits that there is a unity of order between the being of accident and that of substance, and it denies this form of analogy only between created being and divine being. Transcendental analogy is opposed to predicamental analogy because there is a determinate relation of accident to substance, whereas there is none between the creature and God. The divine transcendence, the disproportion of the finite with regard to the infinite, the unlimited distance which separates the creature from God—these do away with the unity of order and the analogy of relation. Yet between beings and God there does remain a minimum of likeness, which is expressed by proportion. Thomas uses the analogy of proportion to emphasize the distance without letting it go to the point of equivocity.

The solution of Cajetan, on the other hand, relies on two presuppositions foreign to Thomas. The fundamental analogy of being is not that of attribution first because the latter is always extrinsic,[114] second because it does not involve a common *ratio*.[115] For these two reasons, Cajetan prefers to the analogy of being the analogy of proportionality, which is necessarily intrinsic and is summed up in a concept encompassing all the analogates. While Thomas in the *De Veritate* distinguishes transcendental analogy from predicamental analogy in order to emphasize the separating role of the first, Cajetan [154] unites them into a single one,[116] the analogy of proper proportionality, to which he attributes a unifying function and which is closer, all things considered, to the univocity of Scotus than to the analogy of Thomas. In fine, even if, *per impossibile*, one wanted to associate Cajetan's theory with the Thomist solution of the *De Veritate* and to present it as a simple extension thereof, the conformity of the commentator's teaching to that of his Master still would not cease to provoke questions, since the culminating thought of Thomas is to be looked for in the works after the *De Veritate*. It is better to recognize that we find ourselves in the presence of two irreconcilable theories that betoken two distinct conceptions of being and of the unity of reality.

The historical circumstances of the polemic which opposed Cajetan to Scotus played a not insignificant role in the genesis of Cajetan's theory. Still, they do not explain everything. A philosophical doctrine

can never be entirely reduced to the circumstances within which it appeared. Intellectual decisions have an influence which is, in the last analysis, more decisive. Great metaphysical theories, like that of analogy, tend to confirm these observations. One can grasp their significance fully only by illuminating the conception of being which governs them and of which they are the consequence. Now Cajetan's doctrine of analogy has given rise to the most opposed, not to say contradictory, interpretations. For, according to some, the whole question of analogy would be transferred to the realm of essence;[117] one of Cajetan's most fervent and most faithful disciples expressly declares that the analogy of attribution is that of existence, while the analogy of proportionality belongs to essence.[118] Hence one can conclude [155] that the privileged role accorded to the latter results from a conception of being according to which essence is primary. For others, on the other hand, there would be no proportionality if one did not consider the relation of each essence to its act of being; the whole theory of analogy would rest then upon the distinction of essence and existence conceived as that of potency and act.[119] Hence *esse* would have the first place, the one that functions as act, and essence would be subordinated to it. Let us add that for Descoqs, who has proposed this interpretation, such a conception of being would have nothing in common with the thought of Thomas? In short, for those on the one side, the thesis of proportionality is an indicator of a metaphysics of essence; for the others, the result of a metaphysics of existence. But the conception of being that it expresses would, under either hypothesis, be foreign to that of Thomas. Now assuming that—in order to be faithful to Thomas—being must be conceived as act, must one then reject the analogy of proportionality [156] on the ground that it might be infected with essentialism, or adopt it on the ground that it would be required by an existential metaphysics?

The debate engaged in this manner rests, we believe, upon a misunderstanding and raises a false problem. One cannot explain Cajetan's theory by getting caught up in the sham opposition between a philosophy of essence and a philosophy of existing. On the contrary, it is the role of essence within the constitution of a being which, it seems to us, is chiefly at stake, and precisely upon this point serious divergences arise between Cajetan and Thomas. For Cajetan, essences are truly incommensurable among themselves, and their diversity is absolute and irreducible; they are unified only indirectly, in virtue of

the relation of potency to act that each one maintains with its own proper *esse*, since each, under the aspect of potency, receives the act of being. In this perspective essence is defined as that of which *esse* is the act, and no longer as that by which a being possesses *esse*.[120] Thus if the essence belongs to the order of potentiality and limit, being can no longer be defined at once and inseparably by its formal determination and by its terminal actuality,[121] but it is then reserved to *esse* to the detriment of the essence. Such seems to us to be the option of Cajetan, when in a famous remark he settles the question of knowing whether being must be understood in the nominal sense, as the essence in act, or in the verbal sense, as the act of the essence:[122] *Mihi autem aliter dicen-*[157] *dum occurit. Dico enim quod ens participialiter est id quod est transcendens, divisum in decem predicamenta.*[123] Once being has been thus defined, unity is no longer that of degrees measured by the formal determination of the essence; it is simply that of the unique proportion binding the indefinitely varied proportions of each potency with regard to its own act. Hence the proportional analogy of being flows from the composition of essence and *esse* which is supposed to furnish the pairs of relations without which there would be no analogy. According to the order of arguments, the analogy of being comes then immediately after the real distinction and follows from it.

The primacy that Cajetan accords to the analogy of proportion and the role that it plays in the real composition are associated in the last analysis with his conception of being as act of [158] the essence, of what he names *ens participialiter*.[124] On each of these points, the thought of the Commentator does not accord with that of Thomas. For Thomas, as we have shown, the theory of the degrees of being, of their unity by relation to a real, unique primary instance, of analogy by reference to a principle, depends on a doctrine of being which gives an entirely different place to essence and which considers being as essence in act or essence as the measure and degree of being.[125] For Cajetan, analogy derives directly from the real distinction; for Thomas, it is based immediately upon the degrees of being: two conceptions of being command two metaphysical perspectives. As the elements of the one and the other are most often identical, one might be tempted to reconcile the disciple with his master, a bit too cheaply. Yet the order of reasons does not coincide, the conclusions are sometimes opposed to each other, and these are sure indications of a profound divergence in the very conception of being. From the disagreement between

Cajetan's doctrine and Thomas's theory of analogy, one must go back to the ultimate presupposition of each of them, which is located at the starting point of metaphysics.

Notes

[1] See, for example, J. Gómez Caffarena, *Ser participado y subsistente en la metafísica de Enrique de Gante*, Rome 1958, who compares the theory of the concept of being as found in Cajetan with that proposed by Henry of Ghent, pp. 191-192.

[2] The best research tool for studying the positions of Henry of Ghent and comparing them with those of Duns Scotus on the question of analogy is supplied by the notes with which the editors of the Scotistic Commission have augmented the new edition of Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, t. III, distinction 3, and t. IV, distinction 8. For Henry of Ghent, *Summae Quaestionum Ordinarium*, we have used the 1520 edition, reproduced in the collection Franciscan Institute Publications, Text Series n° 5, St. Bonaventure, New York, 1953. We had recourse to the works of J. Paulus, *Henri de Gand. Essai sur les tendances de sa Métaphysique*, Paris 1938, and J. Gómez Caffarena, cited in the preceding note.

[3] Summae, art. 21, q. 2: Utrum Deus in esse communicat cum creaturis, f° 123E-125U.

[4] f° 124G.

[5] J . Paulus, *op. cit.*, p. 55: "If the idea of being is presented to the intellect before it is diversified into an idea of God or an idea of the creature then we must surely find within the initial idea a certain irreducible content to which the subsequent accommodate themselves indeed such is the exact point of the theory of univocity at least as glimpsed by Avicenna and explicitly developed by Duns Scotus" ("Si l'idée d'être se présente à l'intellect avant qu'elle se diversifie en idée de Dieu ou en idée de la créature, il faut bien que nous trouvions dans la notion initiale un certain contenu irréductible dont s'accommoderont les suivantes. Et telle est l'exacte portée de la théorie de l'univocité, entrevue à tout le moins par Avicenne, et dévelopée explicitement par Duns Scot)."

[6] f° 124P (ad 3m).

[7] f° 125S.

[8] "...Ut sic (Deus) sit principium et finis omnium rerum in esse cognitivo, sicut est principium et finis earum in esse naturae." Art. 24, q. 7, f° 144H.

[9] J. Paulus, *op. cit.*, p. 59: "First the general notion of being is not truly one concept, but two wrongly confused; second these two concepts evoke or engender each other whence the confusion that results" ("1° La notion

générale de l'être s'est point véritablement *un* concept, mais *deux* confondus à tort; 2° Ces deux concepts s'évoquent ou s'engendre l'un l'autre, d'où la confusion qui en résulte").

[10] Ibid., p. 63: "Results from the imprecision of our ideas which—because the one engenders the other—arbitrarily confound objects that the totality of their natures force apart; it is excluded form a thought that has become distinct and true. Henry's last word then would be a radical equivocity of the creator and the creature at the level of knowledge as well as that of being" ("résulte de l'imprécision de nos idées qui confondent arbitraire-ment—parce que l'un engendre l'autre—des objets que la totalité de leurs natures force à séparer; elle s'exclut d'une pensée devenue distincte et vraie. Equivocité radicale du créateur et de la créature, sur le terrain du connaître aussi bien que de l'être, tel serait donc le dernier mot d'Henri").

[11] See E. Gilson, *Jean Duns Scot. Introduction à ses positions fondamentales.* Paris, 1952. Ch. I, III. Common being, pp. 84-115. As E. Gilson is pre-occupied with situating Scotus against Thomas, his point of view is quite different from ours. "Duns Scot a dialogué avec plusieurs autres théolo-giens, entre lesquels on peut dire qu'Henri de Gand est son interlocuteur de prédilection. Pour lui, Henri était plus important que Thomas; pour nous, et en soi, le contraire est vrai... Notre Duns Scot, dont l'interlocuteur principal est Thomas d'Aquin, n'est pas une réalité historique" (p. 20); <Macierowski trans.: "Duns Scotus engaged in dialogue with many other theologians, among whom, one might say that Henry of Ghent is his preferred interlocutor. For him, Henry is more important than Thomas; for us, and in reality, the contrary is true.... Our Duns Scotus, whose principal interlocutor is Thomas Aquinas, is not an historical reality."> A survey of the researches on the doctrinal history of Scotistic univocity is to be found in the article by Balic, "Circa positiones fundamentales Joannis Duns Scoti. 3. De univocatione entis." Ant 28 (1953) 278-285.

[12] *Ordinatio* I, dist. 8, pars 1, q. 3, n° 81-82; t. IV, . 190.

[13] Henry's theory is precisely summarized by Scotus in *Ordinatio* I, dist. 3, pars 1, q. 1-2, n° 20, 22; t. III, pp. 12, and 14.

[14] *Ibid.*, n° 26, p. 18.

[15] n° 44. p. 29.

[16] n° 30, p. 20.

[17] Cf. T. Barth, "De univocationis entis scotisiticae intentione principali necnon valore critico," Ant (1953) 72-110.

[18] T. III, n° 27-29, pp. 18-19.

[19] n° 35, pp. 21-24.

[20] "Objectum autem creatum non continet increatum essentialiter vel vir-tualiter, et hoc sub ea ratione sub qua sibi attribuitur, ut 'posterius essen-tialiter' attribuitur 'priori essentialiter,'—quia contra rationem 'posterius

essentialiter' est includere virtualiter suum prius, et patet quod objectum creatum non essentialiter continet increatum secundum aliquid omnino sibi proprium et non commune; ergo non facit conceptum simplicem et proprium enti increato," n° 35, pp. 23-24.

[21] n° 38, pp. 25-26.

[22] n° 39, pp. 26-27; from Gilson's translation, *op. cit.*, p. 103: "Toute enquête métaphysique sur Dieu procède de la manière suivante: on considère la raison formelle de quelque chose, on ôte de cette raison formelle l'imperfection qu'elle aurait dans les créatures, on pose cette raison formelle à part en lui attribuant la perfection absolument suprême, et on l'attribue à Dieu sous cette forme. Soit par exemple la raison formelle de sagesse (d'intelligence) ou de volonté: considérée en elle-même et pour elle-même elle n'inclut ni imperfection ni limitation; une fois écartées les imperfections qui l'accompagnent dans les créatures, on l'attribue à Dieu en la portant au suprême degré de perfection. Toute enquête sur Dieu suppose donc que l'intellect y ait le même concept univoque, qu'il tire des créatures."

[23] n° 139, pp. 86-87.

[24] n° 153, p. 94 and n° 156, p. 95.

[25] n° 162, p. 100.

[26] n° 166, p. 103.

[27] *Ordinatio* I, dist. 8, pars 1, a. 3, n° 48; t. IV, p. 172.

[28] T. IV, n° 83, p. 191.

[29] n° 83, pp. 191-192.

[30] "Si autem aliqui proterviant unum esse conceptum entis et tamen nullum esse univocum isti et illi,—istud non est ad intentionem istius quaestionis, quia quantumcumque illud quod concipitur sit secundum attributionem vel ordinem in diversis, si tamen conceptus de se unus est ita quod non habet aliam rationem secundum quam dicitur de hoc et de illo, ille conceptus est univocus," n° 88, p. 195.

[31] E. Gilson, *Jean Duns Scot*, p. 88: "il se peut que l'un soit analogue et que l'autre soit univoque, parce que l'un est celui d'Aristote approfondi par Thomas d'Aquin et l'autre celui d'Avicenne."

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 89. Further on, E. Gilson characterises Thomism as a doctrine of the *judgment* of analogy and Duns Scotus's theory as an analogy of the *concept* (p. 101). Perhaps the divergence just noted may well come down to this: in Thomas, analogy is a structure of real being; Scotus, on the other hand, is above all preoccupied with the unity of the concept of reality. The one belongs to the level of things; the other, to that of thought.

[33] The text of the *Disputed Questions* of Thomas of Sutton has been published by M. Schmaus, *Zur Diskussion über das Problem der Univozität im Umkreis des Johannes Duns Skotus*. Munich, 1957. See also J. J. Przezdziecki,

"Thomas of Sutton's Critique on the Doctrine of Univocity" in *An Etienne Gilson Tribute.* Milwaukee, 1959, pp. 189-208.

Thomas of Sutton, who wrote at the beginning of the XIVth century, was aware of the analogy *unius ad alterum*, but he leaves it aside for a reason of direct interest to our project: because such analogy is concerned with the real structure of being and not the signification of names. In other words, it does not apply at the level of concepts, where the whole anti-Scotistic polemic took place. "Et illud (dici analogice secundum respectum unius ad alterum) bene dictum est considerando ad res, de quibus dicuntur haec nomina. Omnes enim res creatae habent ordinem ad Deum sicut ad suam causam. Sed considerando ad significationem nominis, secundum quam principaliter attenditur analogia, non isto modo dicuntur nomina de Deo et rebus aliis" (Schmaus ed., pp. 76-77). For, he continues, the divine names are first borrowed from creatures and then attributed to God. The onl [125] acceptable explanation has to go back to the analogy of proportion (pp. 77-80). Furthermore, this last mode of attribution is prefereable because it does not depend upon a simple relation [*rapport*], which would, it seems, be extrinsic. "Aliter est de analogis quae dicuntur ad unum, et aliter de analogis ex proportione, quae propriisisime dicuntur analoga... Sed analogum ex proportione dicitur absolute absque tali habitudine... et isto modo dicuntur nomina de Deo et aliis" (Ad 6m, p. 82).

With Thomas of Claxton, about a century later, who also wrote against Scotus, on finds two theories juxtaposed with each other, since, after having reported the distinction between *proportio* and *proportionalitas* drawn from the *De Veritate*, he subsequently appeals to the analogy *duorum ad tertium* and *unius ad alterum* from the *Ia Pars*, without bothering either to reconcile them or to show any preference for the one over the other. Still, let us note in this author the double identification between analogy of relation [*rapport*] and extrinsic analogy on the one hand, and analogy of proportion and intrinsic analogy on the other—a theory sketched out by Sutton and developed by Cajetan. "Quod est analogum primo modo (secundum proportionem) non dicitur formaliter de his quae habent attributionem ad aliud, sed solum de illo ad quod alia habent attributionem. Sed illud quod est analogum secundo modo (secundum proportionalitatem) potest dici formaliter de omnibus suis analogatis." The text was edited by M. Grabmann, "Thomae de Claxton OP (ca. 1400), Quaestiones de distinctione inter esse et essentiam reali atque de analogia entis," APARSTA 8 (1943) 92-153.— The above text appears on p. 139.

Did Cajetan know these authors and read these texts? This is doubtful, since their names never appear in his writings.

34 Capreolus was a contemporary of Thomas of Claxton; his *Commentary on the Sentences* dates from 1408-1411. He may be counted among the [126] most faithful Thomists. Here is the essential passage from his discussion against Scotus:

"Ad omnes ejus probationes (scil. Scoti), dicitur generaliter quod utique bene probant quod ens habeat unum conceptum communem Deo et creaturis et decem praedicamentis, sumendo conceptum pro conceptione quam intellectus format dum concipit ens.—Si autem loquamur de conceptu objectali, qui non est aliud quam intelligibile quod objicitur intellectui formanti dictam conceptionem, sicut natura humana diceretur conceptus objectalis illius intellectionis qua intelligitur homo inquantum hujusmodi, tunc distnguendum est de unitate.—Quia, vel potest intelligi de unitate attributionis, eo modo quo multa habentia attributionem ad unum, dicuntur unum attributive; vel potest dici de unitate quae attenditur penes aliquam formam vel naturam quae participatur a multis, qualis est unitas generis vel speciei... Si loquamur de primo modo unitatis, sic conceditur quod ens habet unum conceptum communem Deo et creaturis objectalem: unum quidem, non per indivisionem alicujus formae in eis participatae, sed unum per attributionem, quia creaturae dicuntur entia ex imitatione et attributione ad Deum; et ulterius accidens, ex imitatione substantiae et attributione ad illam. Et ideo ille conceptus objectalis non est unus tanta unitate quanta conceptus objectalis generis dicitur unus, vel conceptus speciei, sed multo minore" (*In I Sent.*, d. 2, q. 1, 4; Paban-Pègues ed., t. I, p. 141).

35 Still, the formalistic language of the *Sentences* is what underlies the foregoing explanation. The most personal metaphysical intuition of Thomas is hardly ever found even among the most faithful disciples.

36 The necessary historical information appears in the following works: J.-G. Brotto and G. Zonta, *La Facoltà teologica dell'Università di Padova*. Parte I, Padua 1922.—M.-J. Congar, "Bio-bibliographie de Cajetan." In a special number of the Revue Thomiste dedicated to Cajetan, RT 39 (1934-35) 3-49.—M.-H. Laurent, "Introduction" to the *De Anima* of Cajetan. Rome, 1938: "If one wants to grasp the living reality of Cajetan's work," he writes, "if one wants to perceive his profound originality, it is necessary to consider it not in itself, detached from its environment, but it is indispensable to put it back within the age in the presence of which it had been worked out an initial investigation is therefore required: to examine in summary fashion the philosophical systems that Cajetan could have known and which either by their doctrine or by their method they could have influenced the elaboration of his own work" ("Si l'on veut saisir la réalité vivante de l'œuvre de Cajetan," writes the last-named author, "si l'on veut percevoir sa profonde originalité, il est nécessaire de la considérer non

pas en elle-même, sans attache avec son milieu, mais il est indispensable de la replonnger dans ce siècle en présence duquel elle a été élaborée... Une première recherche s'impose donc: examiner sommairement les systèmes philosophiques que Cajetan a pu connaître et qui, soit par leur doctrine, soit par leur méthode, ont pu avoir une influence sur l'élaboration de son travail" (pp. viii-ix).

[37] These are the two titles borne by the 1502 edition, f° 1r and f° 2ra.

[38] Their *Commentaries on the Metaphysics* are mentioned in Quétif-Echard, *Scriptores O.P.*, t. I, p. 857 for Francesco di Nardi and t. II, p. 32, for Valentino de Camerino.

[39] M. J. Congar, "Bio-bibliographie de Cajetan," p. 5: "This fact completely explains the choice of Cajetan to teach theology officially along the lines of Thomas (three years after the creation of this chair); it also helps us to understand the peculiar orientation of Cajetan's writings. At Padua, one is necessarily whether in philosophy or in theology thinking against somebody. He must take a position in the Averroist battle and further to opt either for St. Thomas against Scotus or for Scotus against St. Thomas" ("Ce fait donne toute sa valeur au choix de Cajetan pour enseigner officiellement la théologie selon l'orientation de S. Thomas [trois ans après la création de cette chaire]; il nous aide aussi à comprendre l'orientation particulière des écrits de Cajetan. A Padoue, soit en philosophie, soit en théologie, on pense nécessairement contre quelqu'un. Il faut prendre position dans la bataille averroïste et, de plus, opter pour S. Thomas contre Scot ou pour Scot contre S.Thomas").

[40] Thomae de Vio Caietani, *In de Ente et Essentia D. Thomae Aquinatis Commentaria*, M. H. Laurent ed., Turin 1934, pp. 23-29, n° 11-14.

[41] "Cum enim esse creaturae assimiletur esse divino a quo exemplatum est, et esse accidentale assimiletur esse substantiali a quo emanat, similitudo producta in intellectu ab esse substantiali sive accidentali inquantum assimilantur, erit omnium repraesentativa imago, et cum conceptus non requiratur ad intellectionem nisi ut objectaliter repraesentet rem, unico conceptu intellectus in Deum et creaturam in eo quod ens feretur, et similiter in substantiam et accidens" (ed. cit., p. 26, n° 14).

[42] *Ibid.*, p. 28, n° 14.

[43] *Ibid.*, pp. 32-40, n° 17-22.

[44] *Ibid.*, p. 38, n° 21.

[45] "Et haec auctoritas est notanda contra Scotistas quia, si concedant ens habere identitatem analogam, dicunt cum hoc quod habet etiam identitatem univocam.—Cujus oppositum Aristoteles dicit, solam identitatem proportionis inter principia praedicamentorum sumens" (*ibid.*, p. 38). Clearly this interpretation of Aristotle is very far from that proposed by Thomas.

[46] *Ibid.*, p. 38.

[47] *Ibid.*, p. 38.

[48] As to the unity of the formal concept, which was just at issue, if it represents the being of substance and that of accident, as well as the being of God and that of a creature, together, though unequally, then it appears as univocal representation, and we can ask whether Cajetan does not thereby reintroduce the analogy *duorum ad tertium* that Thomas took such care to discard.

The same ambiguities are found in the way in which Cajetan discusses Scotus's arguments, which he literally summarizes pp. 33-34, n° 21a. Here is a summary of this discussion:

Scotus's first argument. The concept of being is univocal, because it has a content distinct from that of infinite being and that of finite being, and it is prior to every determination.—Reply of Cajetan: This argument proves only one thing, that I form another concept, but not that this different concept is univocal. Scotus proves that being is a third concept, and that is all. Hence Scotus's argument can be conceded to him, since it does does conclude that the concept of being is univocal. Accordingly, Cajetan seems to admit that there is a concept of being distinct from the finite and the infinite, and thereby to reintroduce the analogy *duorum ad tertium.*

Scotus's second argument. If being is not univocal, God is unknowable by means of a simple concept. Now how can one, starting from a concept of being drawn from the sensible order, form a completely distinct concept of being, anlogous to the first, and which would then be applicable to God?—Cajetan's reply: Scotus's inference is false; expressed otherwise, if being is not univocal, it does not at all follow that God is unknowable. To prove the latter proposition, Cajetan goes on to show that the concept of divine being is included within that of created being once abstracted from phantasms. [135] Since every effect participates the effectiveness of the cause that produces it, creatures virtually contain God *participative*; now it not necessary that what is so contained should be prior, but rather the other way around.—Is the proposed solution effective or just ambiguous? At the level of being, we have recourse to an effect's participation in its cause, and that is just fine. But the debate stands on the ground of concepts and representations. There, for Cajetan's solution to get the better of Scotus, the representation of created being would have to be produced by that of uncreated being; in short, the Augustinian posiiton of Henry of Ghent would have to be accepted. Moreover, my representation of created being would have to be a representation (in some fashion or other) of the divine being.

Cajetan's replies to Scotus's third and fifth arguments confirm the impression that the preceeding solutions had left on us: the commentator admits

the existence of a unique formal character [*raison*] common to the finite and the infinite, provided that it be declared non-univocal. All the while he defends himself from Scotus, Cajetan is led to grant him concessions that drag him far from Thomas.

49 We cite the *De nominum analogia* following the edition of P. N. Zammit, Rome 1934. There is an English translation of the opusculum accompanied with useful notes by E. A. Bushinski and H. J. Koren, 2d edition, Pittsburgh, 1959. The two editions have identical paragraphing numbers and the paragraphs are short enough for us simply to cite the numbers of the text.

50 *Op. cit.*, n° 1.

51 "A minus proprie analogis ad vere analoga procedamus" (*ibid.*, n° 2).

52 *Ibid.*, n° 3.

53 I, d. 19, q. 5, a. 2, ad 1. Cf. p. 61 and note 100.

54 The analogy of inequality is treated disdainfully by Cajetan. It is an abuse of language, he explains, to speak of analogy to designate the real inequality between the species of one genus, since the generic notion is attributed equally to the species. Cajetan takes advantage of this in passing to deny the equivalence between *dici analogice* and dice *per prius et posterius* (n° 7).

55 *Ibid.*, n° 21.

56 *Ibid.*, n° 30.

57 "Primum analogatorum tantum est tale formaliter, caetera autem denominantur talia extrinsice" (n° 10).

58 *Ibid.*, n° 28.

59 *Ibid.*, n° 27.

60 *Ibid.*, n° 21 and 23.

61 *Ibid.*, n° 7.

62 "Hujusmodi nomina contra analoga distinguuntur" (n° 20).

63 *Ibid.*, n° 11.

64 *Ibid.*, n° 17 and 18.

65 *Ibid.*, n° 24.

66 *Ibid.*, n° 25.

67 *Ibid.*, n° 26.

68 *Ibid.*, n° 27, n° 29.

69 *Ibid.*, n° 29.

70 *Ibid.*, n° 36.

71 "Et quia cum hoc quod non solum eorum quidditates sunt diversae, sed etiam primo diversae, retinent similitudinem in hoc quod unumquodque eorum secundum suam proportionem habet esse, ideo et in rerum natura non secundum aliquam ejusdem rationis in extremis, sed secundum pro-

prias quidditates ut commensuratas his propriis esse, fundant analogam id est proportionalem similitudinem" (n° 35).

72 "Quia enim unum analogatorum ut sic simile est alteri, consquens est quod conceptus repraesentans unum repraesentet alterum, juxta illam maximam: Quidquid assimilatur simili ut sic, assimilatur illi cui illud tale est simile" (n° 36).

73 *Ibid.*, n° 37, 38.

74 *Ibid.*, n° 39.

75 "Ens autem significat ambas quidditates, ut similes secundum proportiones ad sua esse; et hoc est dicere ut easdem proportionaliter" (n° 39).

76 *Ibid.*, n° 40.

77 *Ibid.*, n° 54 and 57: "Sicque non sola significationum in voce confusio analogo convenit, sed confusio quaedam conceptuum seu rationum fit in identitate eorum proportionali, sic tamen ut non tam conceptus quam eorum diversitas confundatur."

78 *Ibid.*, n° 46.

79 "Non quia quamdam rationem eis communem dicat, quia hoc est fatuum; nec quia illae rationes sint omnino eaedem, aut eas omnino uniat: quia sic non esset analogum sed univocum; sed quia eas proportionaliter adunans, et ut easdem proportionaliter significans, ut easdem considerandas offert, annexa inseparabiliter, diversitate quasi seclusa; ed identitate proportionali unit et confundit quodammodo diversitatem rationum" (n° 56).

80 A. Marc, "L'idée de l'être chez S. Thomas et dans la Scolastique postérieure," *Archives de Philosophie*, X, 1, p. 62: "If it starts from the particular concepts it extends to all and is not properly any of them. Hence one might say it has its own autonomy its own individuality as a concept. In order to be itself it is indeed necessary that it be other than the others and so distinguish itself from them make some sort of abstraction from them but precisely because it begins them it also envelops them and contains them. Hence to be itself it must include their diversity not completely abstract from it" ("S'il déborde les concepts particulier, il s'étend à tous et n'est en propre aucun d'eux. Il a donc, pourrait-on dire, son autonomie, son individualité comme concept. Pour être lui-même, il faut bien qu'il soit autre que les autres, donc s'en distingue, en fasse en quelque sorte abstraction. Mais justement parce qu'il les déborde, il les enveloppe aussi et les contient. Donc encore, pour être lui-même, il doit inclure leur diversité, n'en pas faire complètement abstraction").

81 "Haec enim non solum compossibiliter, sed necessario sibi simul vindicat identitas proportionalis; quoniam et extrema uniri omnino non patiens, ab eis abstrahi omnino non permittit; et extrema aliqualiter indivisa et eadem ponens, ut eadem ea considerabilia et reduplicabilia exigit" (n° 55).

[82] "Unde nihil aliud est dicere ens abstractum a naturis praedicamentorum abstractione formali, quam dicere naturas praedicamentales proportionales ad sua esse ut sic praecise; a specialibus autem seu singulis analogiae rationibus extremis, non tertio conceptu simplici, sed voce communi et identitate proportionali earumdem, quodammodo abstrahit " (n° 58).

[83] *Ibid.*, n° 59-72.

[84] *Ibid.*, n° 61.

[85] *Ibid.*, n° 59 and 69.

[86] *Ibid.*, n° 64.

[87] *Ibid.*, n° 67.

[88] *Ibid.*, n° 66-67.

[89] *Ibid.*, n° 66.

[90] *Ibid.*, n° 68.

[91] *Ibid.*, n° 67.

[92] *Ibid.*, n° 71.

[93] "Ex praedictis autem manifeste patet quod analogum non conceptum disiunctum, nec unum praecisum inaequaliter participatum, nec unum ordine, sed conceptum unum proportione dicit et praedicat" (n° 71). From the very first lines of his opusculum, Cajetan takes to task those who, through ignorance or error, have held such a theory of analogy: "Quod si ullo usquam tempore accidit, hac aetate id evenire clara luce videmus, dum analogiam, vel indisiunctionis, vel ordinis, vel conceptus praecisi unitate cum inaequalis participatione constituunt" (n° 1). Athough no [144] ancient edition of the opusculum supports this conjecture, one must most likely read *disiunctionis* instead of *indisiunctionis*, as in the parallel passage n° 71.

[94] "Unde cum dicitur de homine, aut albedine, aut quocumque alio, quod est ens, non est sensus quod sit substantia vel accidens, sed sic se habens ad esse" (n° 71).

[95] *Ibid.*, n° 120: "S. Thomas quoque pluries dicit, in ratione alicujus analogi, puta paternitatis communis divinae et humanae paternitati, omnia contenta esse indivisa et indistincta; et quod paternitas, verbi gratia, abstrahit a paternitate humana et divina, quia utitur analogo ex parte identitatis." To which texts of Thomas is Cajetan alluding? The modern editions cite only one reference: Ia, q. 33, a. 3, but this is not appropriate. The old editions that we have been able to consult contain no clue. We think that the author is alluding , on the one hand, to texts relating to a common *ratio*: I, d. 7, q. 1, a. 3 (*potentia generandi, potentia creandi*); d. 21, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 2 (*paternitas in Deo et creaturis*); d. 29, q. 1, a. 2 (*principium divinae personae et creaturae*), and, on the other hand, to texts that present the common *ratio* as abstracted from its modes: I, d. 24, q. 2, a. 1, ad 3

(*unitas personalis et essentialis*); d. 25, q. 1, a. 2, ad 5 (*persona in divinis, angelis et hominibus*). These last two texts are cited on p. 103, note 70.

[96] *Ibid.*, n° 123: "S. Thomas etiam ens prius non esse primo analogato, ni-hilque Deo prius secundum intellectum esse, dicit pluries, utens analogo ex parte diversitatis rationum ejus." The texts at issue are those in which Thomas rejects the analogy *duorum ad tertium*.

[97] Cf. p. 103, note 70.

[98] "Nec tamen falsae sunt aut abusivae preadictae locutiones et similes; sed amplae potius et largae... Salvatur siquidem in analogis identitas nominis et rationis, in qua non solum analogata, sed etiam singulae analogi rationes uniuntur, et quodammodo confunduntur, utpote abstrahentes aliqualiter ab earum diversitate" (n° 121).

[99] "Quaelibet siquidem ejus ratio secundum se, quia proprium analogatum in se claudit, et in sui abstractione illud secum trahens, cum illo convertitur, ut supra diximus; ideo prior secundum consquentiam, aut abstractior suo analogato negatur. Ac per hoc, primo analogato et Deo nihil est prius, quia ejus ratio secundum analogi nomen, quae ipso prior secundum se non est, sed convertitur, caeteris prior est rationibus" (n° 123).

[100] "Cum his tamen stat quod ratio illa in Deo ut eadem est proportionaliter alteri rationi, secundum idem nomen superior, et secundum consequen-tiam prior logice loquendo sit, ut ex dictis patet. Dico autem logice, quia physice loquendo, analogum non est prius secundum consequentiam omnibus analogatis (quia ab eorum propriis abstrahere non potest, quamvis ut salvatur in uno sit prius altero), nec potest esse sine primo analogato, ubi analogata consequenter se habent" (n° 124).

[101] "Difficultas etiam non parva, quae multos invasit ac superavit, de com-paratione in analogo, dilucidanda est. Creditum enim est a quibusdam, quod non posset, analogia posita, sermo ille nisi extorte exponi, quo unum analogatum magis aut perfectius tale secundum analogi nomen diceretur. Verbi gratia: substantia est magis aut perfectius ens quam quantitas" (n° 84).

[102] *Ibid.*, n° 94.—The remark is otherwise perfectly correct, once one consid-ers the analogy of attribution as always extrinsic.

[103] *Ibid.*, n° 87.

[104] *Ibid.*, n° 87: "Comparatione non univoca sed analoga."

[105] *Ibid.*, n° 88.

[106] *Ibid.*, n° 98.

[107] "Analogata vero, quae analoga divisione constituuntur, non solum secun-dum se, sed *etiam in ipsius analogi quod dividitur ratione, ordinem habent,* et aliud prius, aliud posterius est; adeo ut in uno eorum tota ratio divisi salvari dicatur, in alio autem imperfecte et secundum quid" (n° 100).

[108] "Quod non est sic intelligendum quasi analogum habeat unam rationem quae tota salvetur in uno, et pars ejus salvetur in alio. Sed cum totum idem sit quod perfectum, et analogo nomine multae importentur rationes, quarum una simpliciter et perfecte constituit tale secundum illud nomen, et aliae imperfecte et secundum quid, ideo dicitur quod analogum sic dividitur quod non tota ratio ejus in omnibus analogatis salvatur, nec aequaliter participant analogi rationem, sed secundum prius et posterius" (n° 100).

[109] "Cum grano tamen salis accipiendum est analogum simpliciter salvari in uno et secundum quid in alio. Sufficit enim hoc verificari: vel *absolute,* ut patet in divisione entis in substantiam et accidens (illa enim absolute loquendo dicitur ens simpliciter, hoc autem ens secundum quid); vel *in respectu,* ut patet in divisione entis in Deum et creaturam. Utrumque enim, licet ens simpliciter sit et dicatur, absolute loquendo, creatura tamen in respectu ad Deum ens secundum quid et quasi non ens est et dicitur" (n° 101).

[110] "Cum illa analogi ratio ex multis constituatur rationibus, ordinem inter se et proportionalem similitudinem habentibus... Ordinem enim ad primam nulla (ratio analogati) subterfugere potest" (n° 103).

[111] It would be worthwhile to study whether Cajetan subsequently maintained so rigorously and integrally the theory that he defends in the *De nominum analogia*. He seems to have added two important modifications to it, all the while maintaining the essence of his position intact. 1. In his letter to Francesco di Ferrara published under the title *De conceptu entis* and dating from 1509, he seems to admit two analogous concepts, one formed immediately upon one of the analogates which it represents directly and which for this reason implicitly represents the others (in virtue of their proportional likeness), the other which would rise above the analogates and would correspond to what Cajetan's contemporary disciples called the transcendental analogue. Thus we have two concepts for being—one which is a concept of material being, i.e., material substance, and which indirectly represents the other predicaments and the other substances which also are of being; the other, purely nominal, represents in an entirely general way "that which is" and is obtained by abstraction from the first. But if I can form the first concept, what good is the second? (See J. Isaac's reflections on this subject in BT 8 (1947-53) n° 2674). 2. In his *Commentary* on the *Summa*, Cajetan accepts the idea that the analogy of relation [*rapport*] is not necessarily always extrinsic: *In Iam*, q. 6, a. 4, VIII; q. 13, a. 5, XIV; q. 13, a. 6, IV. "Inter Deum et creaturam est similitudo formalis imitativa... inter animal vero sanum et urinam non est similitudo, sed relatio significationis. Et propterea ibi est analogica communitas secundum praedicationem formalem; hic autem proprie est communitas attributionis

ad unum secundum praedicationem quamcumque, sive extinsece sive intrinsece, etc... (*In Iam*, q. 13, a. 5, XIV).—These two concessions might lead to putting into question about the principles upon which Cajetan's system rests. But in fact nothing of the sort happens, and Cajetan without reservation maintains his preference for the analogy of proportionality.

[112] See a summary of Scotus's arguments and Cejetan's reply in the Commentary on the Summa, *In Iam,* q. 13, a. 5, IX and X. "Cum enim dicitur Deus est perfectius ens creatura, comparatio fit *in ratione entis* una secundum analogiam, et sic communi utrique."

[113] "Argumentum Scoti probat conceptum entis esse unum objectivum conceptum et communem omnibus entibus, distinctum a quocumque conceptu inferioris. Quod melius percepit Caietanus, et ideo concessit vi argumenti victus quod ens dicit conceptum praecisum a conceptu substantiae et accidentis, Dei et creaturae; sed decipitur cum ait ex hoc non sequi quod talis conceptus sit univocus. Nam si ille est conceptus obiectivus unicus, praescindens a conceptu Dei et creaturae, substantiae et accidentis, et in ipsis inclusus intrinsece et quidditative, ergo est univocus: quia talis conceptus vere per se et formaliter inest substantiae et accidenti secundum nomen et rationem ejus. Praeterea, quia de ratione univoci est et sufficit quod dicat unam rationem communem suis inferrioribus, in quibus vere reperiatur, ergo si ens hujusmodi rationem unicam importat erit univocum" (John de Rada, *Controversiae theologicae inter S. Thomam et Scotum super quartos Sententiarum libros*, Prima Pars, Venice, 1618, p. 431). J. Isaac, in the remarks already cited in note 111 (BT 8 (1947-53) n° 2674), also admits that the common conept that Cajetan is talking about is in reality univocal. Nevertheless, to do justice to Cajetan, it must be noted that he denies that the analogical concept prescinds from every determination, contrary to what John de Rada affirms; thereby he thinks that he has escaped univocity.

[114] Cajetan bases himself for this claim upon the text of Thomas in the *Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics*, I, lecture 7, which we have examined on p. 41, note 36, and which does not seem convincing to us, since it resolves a simple question of Aristotelian exegesis. Cajetan makes frequent use of it: n° 28, n° 54, n° 74, n° 92, and, by way of allusion, n° 109.

[115] *De nominum analogia*, n° 15, 51, 52, 54.

[116] Contrary to what J. Hegyi claims in *Die Bedeutung des Seins bei den klassischen Kommentatoren des heiligen Thomas von Aquin, Capreolus, Silvester von Ferrara, Cajetan*, p. 139.

[117] J. Hegyi, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

[118] M. T. L. Penido, *Le rôle de l'analogie en théologie dogmatique*, pp. 50-51: "In that which concerns the analogy of being one must not lose sight of the fact that it is presented to us under two aspects: being-essence and

being-existence. The order of existences being eminently relative and contingent, one is obliged to climb toward a first existent which is the subsistent being, omnibus causa essendi (CG II, 15). Hence the theologian affirms, and rightly a unique term (*unum numero*) to which everything is related in that line of being-existence. But there is still the being-essence of the metaphysician which is divided into ten categories. Here we recognize indeed an analogy of attribution between this or that accident and the substance of each, in short, in a general manner between accident and substance, the latter serving as unique term; nevertheless, *that is not all*: substance and accident are related to being, but in which way? Is it as to a unique term just as the created being is related to the first existent and accident to substance? No, for being belongs to accident and to substance in accordance with an intrinsic participation, this means that the substance is in relation no longer with being *unum numero*, but with *its own* being, and the accident with its being: here being is no longer strictly one—a unique term—it is *unum proportione*, the being of the substance not being that of the accident" [the italics are those of the author]. ("Il ne faut pas perdre de vue, en ce qui concerne l'analogie de l'être, qu'elle se présente à nous sous un double aspect: l'être-essence [155] et l'être-existence. L'ordre des existences étant éminemment relatif, contingent, on est obligé de re- monter à un premier existant qui est l'être subsistant, *omnibus causa essendi* (CG II, 15). Le théologien affirme donc, et avec raison... un terme unique (*unum numero*) auquel tout se rapporte dans cette ligne de l'être-existence. Mais il y encore l'être-existence du métaphysicien, lequel se divise en dix catégories. Nous y reconnaissons bien une analogie d'attribution entre cet accident et sa substance, cet autre et la sienne, bref, d'une manière générale, entre l'accident et la substance, celle-ci faisant fonction de terme unique; cependant *ce n'est pas tout*: la substance et l'accident se rapportent à l'être, mais de quelle manière? Est-ce comme à un terme unique, comme tantôt l'être créé au Premier Existant, et l'accident à la substance? Non pas, car l'être convient selon une participation intrinsèque à l'accident et à la substance, ce qui veut dire que la substance est en rapport, non plus avec l'être *unum numero,* mais avec *son* être, et l'accident avec le *sien*: l'être ici n'est plus strictement un,—terme unique—il est *unum proportione*, l'être de la substance n'étant pas celui de l'accident" [The emphasis is that of the author])

[119] P. Descoqs, *Praelectiones theologiae naturalis,* t. II, p. 809: "Its own proper leverage (that of proportionality) comes from the distinction between essence and existence in the creature which alone assures the diversity of the creature from the creator. We understand them that here the esse has pride of place, but in the most systematic sense not that of a perfection in general but the act of a perfection considered as potency, in the absence of

which the relations which enter into the proportional scheme no longer have any sense."   **(** "Son levier propre [celui de la proportionnalité] est la distinction d'essence et d'existence dans la créature qui, seule, assure la diversité de celle-ci d'avec le créateur. On comprend donc que l'*esse* y ait la première place, mais au sens le plus systématique non pas de perfection en général, mais d'acte d'une perfection considerée comme puissance, faute de quoi les rapports qui entrent dans le schème proportionnel n'ont plus aucun sens.")

[120] "Essentia dicitur secundum quod per eam et in ea ens habet esse" (*De ente et essentia*, Roland-Gosselin edit., p. 4, 15-16). For Thomas this definition of essence applies to God as well as to created substances; it has a transcendental import.

[121] "Esse enim rei, quamvis sit aliud ab ejus essentia, non tamen est intelligendum quod sit aliquid superadditum ad modum accidentis, sed quasi constituitur per principia essentiae. Et ideo hoc nomen 'ens,' quod imponitur ab ipso esse, significat idem cum nomine quod imponitur ab ipsa essentia" (*Met.*, IV, lecture 2, n° 558). Cf. above, p. 107.

[122] It would be inaccurate to claim that, among Thomists, being in the nominal sense is identified with essence and being in the verbal sense with *esse*. For being can be reduced neither to essence nor to *esse*. Whether it is understood in the nominal sense or in the verbal sense, being is defined both by the principle of formal determination and by that of terminal actuality. It is nevertheless legitimate to examine the role that belongs to each of [157] the two principles needed to constitute a being [*étant*]. The two solutions conceive the function of essence differently. In the nominal sense, being [*être*] is that which is in the act of being, i.e the essence in act, exercizing and measuring *esse*; in the verbal sense, on the other hand, being is the act received by the essence as in a potency. The ultimate perfective character of the act of being is not at issue, but *esse* is considered by the one group chiefly as exercized by the essence, and by the other as received by it. Whichever solution be adopted, both sides recognize that the relation of *esse* to essence is that of act to potency, but the real distinction does not hold the same place and is not located in the same spot within the order of arguments according as being is understood in the nominal sense or in the verbal sense. The difference between the two positions becomes especially manifest with regard to the limitation of being: for those who understand being in the verbal sense, the real compositon is the ultimate reason for the limitation; for those who take being in the nominal sense, the compositon is a necessary condition for limitation, but not the sufficient reason. The same results follow for the doctrine of analogy: according to the former, analogy is a direct consequence of the real distinction; according to the latter, analogy is directly based upon the hierachy of degrees and thence,

indirectly, upon the composition, this composition being one of the pre-conditions for the existence of the degrees. The difference between the two positions is by no means superficial; it does not just come down to a difference between two points of view that do not always coincide, but is rather, as we shall show in the conclusion, an indication of two distinct Thomist metaphysics, each coherent in its own orientation but opposed to the other in their main positions.

[123] *In De ente et essentia*, Laurent edit., p. 88, n° 56.

[124] Thereby, far from deserving the reproach of essentialism bestowed upon him these days, Cajetan would rather turn out to be a precursor of the "existential" interpretation of Thomist thought being propagated by E. Gilson.

[125] In defending *ens nominaliter,* the man from Ferrara seems to us closer to the authentic doctrine of Thomas. See our review of the book by J. Hegyi, *Die Bedeutung des Seins*, in RSPT 44 (1960) 368-369.

CONCLUSION

The theory of analogy allows us to grasp at the level of a fully settled metaphysical system the implications of the fundamental decisions upon which it rests, and especially the conception of being that it implies. The two doctrines of analogy whose internal logic we have pointed out, that of Thomas and that of Cajetan, show that the philosophy of being can be developed in two strictly parallel directions and be constructed under the form of two accounts whose solutions are neither interchangeable nor convergent. It remains to discern better the structure and inspiration proper to each of these two Thomist accounts, by observing the internal logic according to which they are deployed.[1]

1. The first divergence becomes visible when one asks how being, the object of metaphysics, is known: is it by the formal abstraction of a concept, or by a negative judgment [160] of separation?[2] Is there an "intuition" of being, or do we grasp being at the end of an induction?[3]

2. Being, the object of metaphysics, is that which is; it involves both a formal aspect and an existential aspect, a principle of determination and a principle of actualization. What is their respective role? Is being to be conceived as the act of the essence or as the essence in act? As ens ut participium or as ens ut nomen?[4]

3. The essence and the existence of the beings that we know are not identical to each other; apart from God, no being exists in virtue of its own essence, and each one has only a perfection of being limited by the capacity of its own essence. In other words, every limited being is composite. But is limitation ultimately explained by composition, or is composition only the necessary albeit not the sufficient condition of limitation? [161] Is the limitation of a being the result of the composition of act and potency; or of the formal hierarchy of essences?[5]

4. Is the perfectio essendi identical with esse, which would be limited and diminished by being adjoined with essence, or does it not at the same time include the essence as formal determination, the *esse* as ultimate act, and the subject which performs the act?[6]

5. Since metaphysics is concerned with the perfectio essendi, is it going to be polarized by the esse divinum or does it meet God only

as cause of esse commune? Is metaphysics principally theology or ontology?[7]

[162]

6. Metaphysics attempts to reduce the multiplicity of reality to the unity of being. But is the unity of being that of the concept of being, founded upon the relations of each essence to its own act of being, common to all that which is, emcompassing both predicamental and transcendental differences? Or again is this unity a unity of the degrees of being constituted by the formal measure of each essence in the act of being, hierarchized by relation to the primary instance on which they are intrinsically dependent?

7. Is analogy, which concerns the correspondence between the conceptual and the real unity of being, to be conceived as the proportion which unites pairs of relations generated by the essences receiving their act of being, or as the order which binds the degrees to the primary instance by the relations of causality and participation?[8]

Each of the great questions posed by a philosophy of being can thus receive two responses between which Thomists part ways. But the divergences that one encounters in each instance are neither fortuitous nor scattered; they pertain to the internal logic of a system, whatever be the names of the [163] protagonists.[9] They provoke an inescapable question: are there two ways of being a Thomist? —and even: are there two Thomist metaphysics? The thought of Thomas presents a quite remarkable coherence, but on these decisive points, it is subject to interpretations that belong to a completely different metaphysical perspective and which are—all things considered—hard to reconcile with the authentically Thomist solutions. It is in this sense that one can speak of two metaphysics. Now the researches on the subject of analogy allow us to uncover the principle around which each of the two systems is articulated and the reason why they are opposed to each other. For, in metaphysics, once the absolute monism and the radical pluralism that conjure away one of the terms of the problem have been set aside, an attempt can be made to reduce the diversity of beings to the unity of being. For this, two methods present themselves: the one consists in discovering the unity of beings in the relations of causality which binds them to the primary instance [164] among them; the other attempts to reduce the many to the one conceptually, within the unity of the idea of being. These two solutions we shall call a *metaphysics of the degrees of being* and a *metaphysics of the idea of*

being, respectively, For the first, the unity is given *a parte rei* within the very diversity of reality; for the other, the unity is constructed on the plane of representation, although reality remains diverse.

It remains to show the internal logic of the two positions. Let us begin with the second.

How can we bring beings together with each other and grasp them in unity? If we consider their real essence—I mean if we regard them otherwise than is done from the logical point of view, which is that of Porphyry's tree, where one gathers the most diverse beings together under the univocity of a more and more extended generic notion—one discovers an absolute diversity, not only of the primary genera, i.e., that of substance and the accidents, but also and still more that of the formal hierarchy of the substances themselves. Since essence is a principle of diversity, it does not allow the reduction of the many to the one. Nevertheless, the diversity is not insurmountable, provided that one stops considering the essences absolutely and comparing them among themselves at the level of determination, but on condition of relating them to the act of being. The unity that one then discovers is that of a proportion: between two beings whose essence is formally different, a proportional likeness is established, since there is a relation similar to the esse in the case of the one and of the other. In short, there is an absolute diversity of essences, but a proportional likeness of relations.

Proportion requires relations between two or more pairs of terms and it expresses the likeness of these relations. If being were not to involve a particular structure, let's say an indefinitely repeated duality, while remaining identical across beings, it would be impossible to discover a unity of analogy within it; one would be in the presence of an irreducible multiplicity. Fortunately, being is really composed of potency and act. Hence, essence and act of being are going to provide the pairs we need to establish proportional unity. [165] Proportional unity corresponds precisely to the conditions required for unifying being: since proportion is based upon a relation between two terms, it admits a certain invariability of the proportion itself in the midst of the variation of terms. Thus, the requirements of analogy tend to accentuate the role that compostion plays and to introduce a new definition of being: being is that which is composed of potency and act, that which has *esse* as act (or that whose act is *esse*), in a word: that which the Scholastics have called *ens ut participium*. Being is

constituted by the relation of essence to *esse*; the function of essence is limited to receiving the act of being and limiting it. One seemingly emphasizes the value of *esse* in this way, but to the detriment of essence, which ceases to be a transcendental. One then runs the risk of conceiving the actuation of the essence by *esse* on the model of extrinsic causality (as an actuation by way of a term and not by way of a form, as John of Thomas asserts).[10] Accordingly, the composition of essence and *esse* appears as the principal character of being. In this perspective, it seems difficult to associate the theory of the analogy of proportion to what is called the "essentialism" of Cajetan; the real reason for this doctrine must rather be sought for in the negative role that is attributed to essence.

For the analogy of proportion, no matter how diverse the terms, the relation remains invariable. Hence it is sufficient to conceive the relation of *esse* to essence in only one being to know it in all, since it is similar in all. Formal abstraction allows one to grasp what beings have in common within a concept which reconciles the widest extension with the richest comprehension. By formal abstraction one can somehow overcome the diversity of beings and, by starting from any one of them whatsoever, one can cross the whole field of being. John of Thomas even claims that to disengage being from matter and potency is to arrive at Pure Act: *abstractio entis formalis est actus purus*,—only to add immediately this prudent restriction, that our abstraction of being is not [166] a formal abstraction.[11] In fact, one could justify such an assertion only by admitting the Platonic axiom *quanto abstractius et universalius, tanto prius et formalius*.[12] Although not all Thomists go so far, what some of them call 'abstraction of the transcendental analogue' belongs to the same metaphysical orientation. It is as though by way of abstraction, without having recourse to inference, we could go beyond the primary object of our understanding and enter straight into the transcendental order.

The metaphysics of the degrees of being proceeds completely differently. Let us follow the reasoning from the starting point.

Essences can be considered from two points of view. The first, the predicamental point of view, is that of the quidditative determination: in this respect, each being is what it is and is only what it is. It is opposed to all other beings. The second, the transcendental point of view, considers the essences under the aspect of degrees and modes of the perfection of being, i.e., as the different participations of be-

ing, essence accordingly being inseparable from *esse*. In this regard, it must be said that *esse* is not only received by the essence, but also that it is specified by it; in short, there is a reciprocal causality of the two principles of *ens*. Essence is no longer primarily defined as the potency and limitation of the act of being. It is from the start its formal measure and this is so right up to and including the situation in God.[13] Accordingly, it is impossible to assign all perfection [167] to *esse* and to reserve all imperfection to essence, as if the essence were "the condition of the very possibility of the existence of finite beings."[14] A being [*l'être*] is *esse* and essence indivisibly: each being [*étant*] realizes the perfection of being [*être*] in its own way; and if the being [*étant*] is finite, it is so both as to its essence and as to its act of being [*être*]. Such is the conception of being that the man from Ferrara calls *ens ut nomen*. There is no "essentialism" since the essence performs its function only under the ultimate actuation of *esse*. This view, however, is not the "existential" interpretation either, which reserves the perfection of being to *esse*.

Each being [*étant* bears within itself the principle of its similarity to and its difference from the others. It has similarity in that one can consider the perfection of being as realized by degrees; it has difference by the essences being considered as *modi essendi*, i.e., as diverse formal measures of being. The unity of perfection ultimately stems from participation (and, outside of participation, no unity will be found other than that of proportion): finite beings [*êtres*] receive *per participationem* what infinite being is *per essentiam*. The unity of order which gathers beings [*les êtres*] together is based both upon the real unity of that which is perfect, which is *Ipsum esse*, and upon the intrinsic communication of its perfection to the participants. The real composition of the latter is not ruled out, since there is no limitation without composition, but it is subordinated, since composition is the necessary but not sufficient condition of limitation. Created beings are similar to the divine being in virtue of the relations of efficient and formal causality and the sum of those relations constitutes participation. It is therefore no longer necessary to base similarity upon simple proportional relations.

This solution respects both the need for unity and the need for transcendence, since it is clearly impossible that starting from finite beings [*êtres*] one could abstract a representation of the infinite being, or at least a representation common to the finite and the infinite.

Nevertheless, the representation that we form is not equivocal either, since the perfection of the effect is contained [168] pre-eminently within the cause. But we can represent the divine perfection to ourselves only by starting from the deficient similarity that the created beings present of the divine perfection, and thanks to an inference based upon causality.

The unity thus uncovered is perhaps less than that which the first theory proposes, but it is more rooted in reality and it does not rest merely upon the unity of our representation of being. To put it in a nut-shell, the metaphysics of the idea of being seems closer to rationalism and less concerned with judging the real import of our concepts than the metaphysics of the degrees of being. The theory of analogy, as we have observed, has shifted from metaphysics toward logic; there is no doubt about the significance of this slippage: a philosophy of concepts is substituted for a philosophy of reality. Such, it seems to us, is the most secret and most powerful inspiration of the two Thomist metaphysics that the analysis of the doctrines of analogy have enabled us to uncover. A veritable conversion to reality is required to rediscover the unity within beings, a unity which is an effect of that of their Principle. This is the price demanded for remaining faithful to Thomas's authentic thought.

Notes

1   The opposition of the two accounts can be represented by the following table:

Formal abstraction or "intuition" of being	1	Separation or induction of being
Ens ut participium	2	*Ens ut nomen*
Limitation by composition	3	Limitation by formal hierarchy
The *perfectio essendi* identified with *esse*	4	The *perfectio essendi* includes essence, *esse*, and the subject
Metaphysics as theology	5	Metaphysics as ontology
Unity of the idea of being	6	Unity of the degrees of being
Analogy of proportion	7	Analogy of relation

2   The theory of formal abstraction is that of the great commentators Cajetan and John of Saint Thomas; it has been revived by those modern Thomists

who bring up the three degrees of abstraction. A summary of this classic postion may be found in M. V. Leroy, "Le savoir spéculatif," RT 48 (1948) 236-327, and the work by the same author appended at the end of the foregoing article: "Abstractio et séparation d'après un texte controversé de S. Thomas," ibid., pp. 328-339. — For the doctrine of separation, see L. B. Geiger, "Abstraction et séparation d'après S. Thomas," RSPT 31 (1947) 3-40; R. W. Schmidt, "L'emploi de la séparation en métaphysique," RPL 58 (1960) 373-393.

3   The knowledge of the object of metaphysics is presented as an intuition of being by J. Maritain, *Sept leçons sur l'être*, 3rd lecture, pp. 51-70. This intuition is sometimes presented as a privileged metaphysical experience and almost as a mystical favor (pp. 54, 56, 71), sometimes as formal abstraction of the third degree (pp. 66-70, 88-96). [Translator's addition: There is an English translation of this text.] See also by the same author: *Court traité de l'existence et de l'existant*, pp. 37-60 (especially p. 51, note 1, on the three degrees of abstraction). — We propose to use the expression induction of being to name the approach needed to ground the negative judgment of separation, so as clearly to distinguish it from this "intuition."

4   The theory of *ens participialiter* is the one that Cajetan defends in his *Commentary on the De ente et essentia*; it is combatted by the man from Ferrara in his *Commentary of the Contra Gentiles* (CG I, 25; VI-XII). Cf. p. 158, note 125.

5   The two theories of limitation are presented by L. B. Geiger, *La participation dans la philosophie de S. Thomas d'Aquin*, Livre premier, *Les deux systèmes de la participation, I, La particpation par composition*, pp. 77-217; *II, La participation par similitude*, pp. 223-307. Geiger's positions on the relations between limitation and composition have been criticized by C. Fabro, *Participation et causalité selon S. Thomas d'Aquin*, pp. 63-73. Fabro takes Geiger to task for setting simple likeness ahead of real composition, for relegating the composition of *essentia* and *esse* to a secondary level, and for admitting that essence might be limited in some other way aside from composition in virtue of participation by likeness; the ultimate reason for Geiger's position would stem, according to Fabro, from a misunderstanding of esse. The argument between these two Thomists, toward which we need not take any stance at the moment, shows the connection between the theses here on trial and sheds light on one of the critical points upon which the two treatments of being that we are attempting to isolate are opposed to each other.

6   E. Gilson defends the first position quite plainly in his *Introduction à la philosophie chrétienne*. "Being (*ens*)," he declares, "is always an act of existing determined and limited by an essence" (p. 61). "The essence is a sort of

lessening, a pulling off, and a sort of scattering of being" (p. 173). It is "a sort of small change of being," "a by product of being; it is the condition of the possibility of beings which may not be the pure act of existing" ("L'étant (*ens*)," he declares, "est toujours un acte d'exister déterminé et limité par une essence" (p. 61). "L'essence est un amoindrissement, une distension et comme un éparpillement de l'être" (p. 173). It is "une sorte de menue monnaie de l'Etre," "un sous-produit de l'Etre; elle est la condition de la possibilité d'êtres qui ne soient pas l'acte pur d'exister") (p. 192). See our review of this book in RSPT 45 (1961), pp. 719-720. — C. Fabro defends a position close to that of Gilson in Participation et causalité, pp. 74-83 ("Originalité de l'esse thomiste. Esse in actu, esse ut actus").

7   A summary of the ancient and contemporary Thomists' theories can be found in the work of T. C. O'Brien, *Metaphysics and the Exis-*[162] *tence of God. A Reflexion on the Question of God's Existence in the Contemporary Thomistic Metaphysics*, pp. 19-95. O'Brien shows the connection between the theory of the formal abstraction of being and that which includes God within the subject of metaphysics ("The position that God is included in the subject of metaphysics would seem to conceive of being as so produced by the process of abstracting that it could embrace God," pp. 171-172), as well as the connection between the definition of being as *esse* and the identification of being as being with the divine being ("Thus, to show the primacy of existence as realized by Thomas through the assistance of revelation, he (Gilson) notes that when left to himself, Thomas defines metaphysics as the science of *Being as Being*, not of being as being" (p. 173). He concludes as follows: "For Thomas, then, metaphysics is not the science of Being as Being; it is the human science which considers being in common, separated precisively, as its proper subject; which consequently attains God solely and exclusively as principle of this subject" (pp. 175-176).

8   For questions 6 and 7, we have shown the bond between the analogy of relation [*rapport*] and the unity of the degrees of being on pp. 93-114, and that between the analogy of proportion and the unity of the idea of being on pp. 150-158.

9   If we refer to the table that appears in note 1, the theses in the right-hand column, headed by the "separation" of being, form a coherent collection and express the major positions of Thomas (sometimes, it is true, in a language other than his own, e.g., these 2 and 5). The theses in the left-hand column, headed by the "abstraction" of being, taken one by one, are opposed to those that Thomas defends. Do they present an analogous coherence? Not one Thomist, to the best of our knowledge, holds them all together, and one may even ask to what point they are mutually compatible, since the

system that they form tends to a sort of Platonism of the concept by theses 1, 6, and 7 (against which Gilson carefully protects himself), or toward an exaggeration of the function of esse to the detriment of essence by these 2, 3, 4 and 5. Descoqs already noted that the predominance accorded to proportionality pertains to a Platonic mentality which is principally interested in exemplar causality (*Praelectiones theologiae natura*lis, t. II, p. 807) and at the same time that it relies on a conception of esse as act of a potency (ibid., p. 809). But how does this second position square with the first? Would John of Thomas not be the most logical representative of this school, when he arrives at the conclusion that esse is less perfect than essence? (*Cursus Theol.*, In Iam, disp. 4, a. 4, n° 23; Solesmes edit., t. I, p. 471). It is regretable that Hegyi did not extend his inquiry that far and that a systematic study of the conception of being in John of Thomas has not, as yet, tempted anyone, for the results of this research would not be without interest.

[10] *Cursus theol.*, In Iam, disp. 4, a. 3, n° 22; Solesmes edit., t. I, p. 457; a. 4, n° 25, p. 472.

[11] *Cursus philos.*, Log., II, q. 13, a. 5; Reiser ed., t. I, p. 500: "Formalis abstractio fit per segregationem potentialitatis et materiae, et quanto universalior, tanto purior et perfectior, sicque abstractio entis formalis est actus purus, si in tota universalitate abstrahat. Sed abstractio entis in communi ut analogum est confusissima, et licet actu includat omnia confuse, ideo potius non est abstractio formalis, quia non fit per segregationem imperfecti, sed per inclusionem omnium sub quadam confusione et caligine."

[12] Cf. Ia, q. 82, a. 3; R. J. Henle, *Saint Thomas and Platonism*, p. 183, text 3.

[13] "Quamvis haec in Deo unum sint verissime, tamen in Deo est quidquid pertinet ad rationem vel subsistentis, vel essentiae, vel ipsius esse: convenit enim ei non esse in aliquo, inquantum est subsistens; esse quid inquantum est essentia; et esse in actu, ratione ipsius esse" (CG IV, 11).

[14] E. Gilson, *Introduction à la philosophie chrétienne*, p. 95.

Appendix 1

The Literary and Doctrinal Sources of the "*De Principiis Naturae*"

It has seemed interesting to us to find out which text of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* Thomas had before him while composing his first treatment of the theory of analogy. The inquiry allows <us> to show that he was reading the Arabic-Latin version and that he was using Averroes's Commentary from which he borrowed certain especially important features.

We are citing the *Metaphysica Media* according to the following manuscript: Paris, *B.N. lat.* 6325 (*Aristoteles latinus,* no. 572) and the *Metaphysica Nova* as well as Averroes's Commentary according to the following edition: *Aristotelis Metaphysicorum libri XIII cum Averrois Cordubensis in eosdem Commentariis et Epitome,* Venetiis apud Juntas 1562.

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The treatment of analogy that one finds in the *De principiis naturae* systematizes three themes borrowed from Aristotle's *Metaphysics*: the unity and diversity of ontological principles, the different types of unity, and the ordered diversity of the many senses of being. For each of these themes, we shall give the text of Thomas according to the edition of Pauson, then we shall compare the two versions of the corresponding passages of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, and finally we shall examine the *Commentary of Averroes*.

[170]

First theme: the unity and diversity of principles

First of all, here is the text of Thomas:

> Eorum quae conveniunt secundum analogiam tantum, principia sunt eadem secundum analogiam tantum, sive proportionem. Materia enim et forma et privatio, sive potentia et actus, sunt principia substantiae et aliorum generum. Tamen materia substantiae et quantitatis, et similiter forma et privatio, differunt genere, sed

conveniunt solum secundum proportionem in hoc quod, sicut se habet materia substantiae ad substantiam in ratione materiae, ita se habet materia quantitatis ad quantitatem. Sicut tamen substantia est causa caeterorum, ita principia substantiae sunt principia omnium aliorum (Pauson ed., p. 104, 12-19).

Now here are the two versions of Aristotle's texts which are related to the question of the unity of principles:

Aristote Λ4, 1070 a 31-36. Textus 19

Media
Causae et principia aliqua aliorum sunt; hi sunt ut si quis dicat universaliter secundum proportionem idem omnium. Dubitabit autem aliquis si eadem sint principia et elementa substantiarum et eorum quae sunt ad aliquid, et aliarum categoriarum similiter. Sed impossible si eadem omnium (f° 217 vb).

Nova
Et principia sunt rerum diversarum et causae, et sunt sicut homo debet dicere universaliter omnia eadem proportionaliter. Et debet homo dubitare, utrum materia et elementa substantiarum et relationum, et omnium praedicamentorum sint similiter eadem. Sed est inconveniens, si principia sint eadem (f° 143 vb, 52-60).

Aristote, 1070 b 26 - 1071 a 2. Textus 25

Media
Quoniam sunt haec separabilia et illa inseparabilia, substantiae illae sunt et per omnia causae haec, quia sine substantiis non sunt passiones et motus (f° 218 ra).

Nova
Et quia quaedam res sunt abstractae et quaedam non abstractae, illae sunt substantiae, et propter hoc inveniuntur istae causae: quia extra substantias non inveniuntur passiones eorum neque motus (f° 145 va, 60-64).

[171]

Aristote, 1071 a 4-5. Textus 26

Media
Amplius alio modo quidem proportionaliter sunt principia eadem ut actus et potentia (f° 218 ra).

Nova
Et etiam alio modo principia proportionaliter sunt eadem, ut potentia et actus (f° 146 va, 15-16).

Aristote, 1071 a 29-35. Textus 28

Media

Quaerere vero quae (sunt) pricipia aut elementa substantiarum et ad aliquid et qualitatum, utrum eadem aut diversa, palam quia multipliciter dictorum sunt singula. Diversorum vero, non eadem sed diversa nisi sic. Et omnium siquidem eadem inquantum proportionaliter, quia materia, species, privatio, movens. Et sic substantiarum causae ut causae omnium, quia destruuntur destructis (f° 218 rb).

Nova

Quoniam autem quaestio nostra, quae sunt principia et elementa substantiae, relationis et quantitatis, utrum sint eadem aut diversa, manifestum est quod sunt quae dicuntur multis modis in quolibet, et cum dividatur, non sunt eadem sed diversa, praeter hoc quod sunt omnium etiam. Sic autem sunt eadem secundum aequalitatem comparationis forma, movens; et sic etiam causae substantiarum, sicut similia eorum omnium, quae auferuntur cum illa auferuntur (f° 146 vb, 34-45).

[172]

> Est quaestio utrum princiipia et elementa decem praedicamentorum sint eadem aut diversa. Et primo ponit quod sunt eadem, et dicit quod causae et principia praedicamentorum, quamvis sint rerum diversarum, bene potest homo ponere ea eadem secundum proportionem. Et quia hoc non apparet, nisi cum declaratum fuerit quod non sunt eadem simpliciter, neque diversa simpliciter, incepit declarare hoc... Et sunt eadem secundum proportinalitatem et non secundum definitionem (f° 144 ra, 1-11).

The comparison of the two versions is in no way decisive, and Thomas does not cite the version he uses literally. The only term which one finds in the opusculum and which is proper to the *Metaphysica nova* is *comparatio* (t. 28): *ea quae conveniunt secundum analogiam idest in proportione vel COMPARATIONE vel convenientia* (Pauson ed., p. 103, 7-8). This argument by itself would be too weak to determine that Thomas had the *Nova* in his hands.[1]

The Commentary of Averroes provides a better basis of comparison. First of all, here is *Comment 19*:More interesting is the comparison to be made with *Comment 25*:

Cum declaravit quod possibile est dicere causas praedicamentorum esse easdem proportionaliter, vult declarare quod substantia aliquo modo est causa omnium. Materia enim quae est in substantia est materia omnium praedicamentorum, et causa eorum; contraria enim similiter quae sunt in substantia sunt causae contrariorum aliorum praedicamentorum... Et intendit per abstracta substantias quae sunt subjecta novem praedicamentorum, et per non abstracta novem praedicamenta... Abstracta sunt substantiae, et non abstracta accidentia substantiae... Declaratum est quod substantia accipitur in definitione eorum, et non e converso: unde substantia videtur causa eorum (f° 145 va, 25-b, 15).

Finally, here is *Comment 28*, which allows the most precise comparison with the text of Thomas:

Cum quaesivit principia praedicamentorum an sint eadem aut diversa, et declaravit modum quo sunt eadem et quo sunt diversa: amplius et quod *principia substantiae sunt aliqualiter sicut principia aliorum praedicamentorum*, vult colligere haec dicendo: Quaestio autem nostra utrum principia substantiae sint eadem aut diversa, manifestum est quod sunt diversa, cum multipliciter dicatur hoc nomen principium de unoquoque istorum; sed tamen *non est intelligendum ex hoc, quod secundum aeqivocationem puram dicatur*, et hoc intendebat cum dicit: multis modis (πολλαχῶς) (f° 146 vb, 53-64). Et quia non perfecte differunt, scilicet quia *non pura aequivocatione dicuntur* haec principia de eis, dicit "praeter hoc quod sunt omnium, etc.," id est, praeter hoc quod videntur eadem *secundum comparationem et respectum*: verbi gratia, quod *respectus formae substantiae ad substantiam est sicut respectus formae qualitatis ad qualitatem, et quantitatis ad quantitatem*, quamvis non idem significet forma in unoquoque eorum, et similiter de privatione et materia [173] et motore; ista igitur principia de eis dicuntur in respectu (f° 147 ra, 6-16). Deinde dicit "et sic etiam causae substantiarum etc.," id est, et etiam causae substantiarum videntur esse causae causarum aliorum praedicamentorum similium cxausis substantiarum; et signum ejus est quod cum causae substantiarum auferentur, auferentur causae aliorum praedicamentorum; materia igitur est causa materiae caeterorum praedicamentorum, et similiter de forma et privatione, quae est in substantia et in movente (f° 147 ra, 18-26).

What can we conclude regarding the first theme? The comparison of the text of the opusculum with the two versions of the *Metaphysics* does not provice any decisive argument in favor of the use of the one or the other version. But the comparison with Averroes's *Commentary* permits us to show that Thomas summarizes it freely, borrowing from it a development which does not occur in the corresponding passage of Aristotle, but which does constitute a literal citation of the Commenator:

… conveniunt solum secundum proportionem in hoc quod, sicut se habet materia substantiae ad substantiam in ratione materiae, ita se habet materia quantitatis ad quantitatem. Sicut tamen materia substantiae est causa caeterorum, ita principia substantiae sunt principia omnium aliorum (p. 104, 15-19).	… videntur secundum comparationem et respectum: verbi gratia, quod respectus formae substantiae ad substantiam est sicut respectus formae qualitatis ad qualitatem, et quantitatis ad quantitatem … (f° 147 ra, 9-13). … et etiam causae substantiarum videntur esse causae causarum aliorum praedicamentorum similium causis substantiarum. … Materia igitur est causa materiae caeterorum praedicamentorum, et similiter de forma et privatione (f° 147 ra, 19-21, 24-25).

Second theme: the different types of unity

Here is the text of Thomas:

Quaedam enim sunt idem numero, sicut Socrates et hic homo, demonstrato Socrate. Quaedam sunt diversa numero, sed idem in specie, sicut Socrates et Plato qui, licet conveniant in specie humana, [174] differunt tamen numero. Quaedam autem differunt specie, sed sunt idem genere; sicut homo et asinus conveniunt in genere animalis. Quaedam autem sunt diversa in genere, sed sunt idem solum secundum analogiam; sicut substantia et quantitas, quae non conveniunt in aliquo genere, sed conveniunt solum secundum analogiam (p. 101, 15-102, 6).

Here are the two versions of the text of *Aristotle*: D 6, *1016b31-1017a2. Textus 12.*

Media	*Nova*
Amplius autem alia secundum numerum sunt unum, alia secundum speciem, alia secundum genus, alia *secundum analogiam*. Numero quidem, quorum materia est una. Specie quorum ratio una.	Et etiam istorum quoddam est unum numero et quoddam unum forma, et quoddam unum secundum aequalitatem, et quoddam unum secundum genus. Et illa quae sunt unum numero, sunt illa quorum materia est una. Et illa quae sunt unum secundum formam, sunt illa quorum totalitas est unum. Et quae sunt unum genere, sunt illa quorum figura praedicamenti est una. Et illa quae sunt quorum proportio est una, sicut proportio alicujus rei ad aliam rem (f° 54 rb, 37-48).
Genere quorum eadem figura praedicationis. Secundum proportionem, quaecumque se habent quasi aliud ad aliud (f° 196 vb).	

As Thomas simultaneously employs the terms *analogia* and *proportio* and given that the second term is purely and simply the translation of the first, one cannot argue from the presence of the first to conclude to the use of the *Media* version. Furthermore, in the *Media*, the term *analogia* designates unity of proportion and in no way applies to unity of order. Averroes's *Commentary* does not provide the slightest clue, since it contains nothing characteristic. Let us cite only what it says about the last sort of unity—that of proportion—which he does not associate with unity of order:

> Deinde dicit: "Et illa quae sunt secundum aequalitatem, etc...," id est, et illa dicuntur unum, quae sunt unum secundum proportio-[175] nalitatem, sicut dicitur quod proportio rectoris ad civitatem, et gubernatoris ad navem est una (f° 54 va, 66-70).[2]

On this point we can conclude nothing except that the convergence made by the *De principiis* between unity of proportion and unity of order is based neither upon the text of Aristotle nor upon any suggestion from Averroes's *Commentary*.

Third theme:
The ordered diversity of the meanings of being

This theme is borrowed from *Met.* Γ 2, 1003a33-b16, Book IV, textus 2. The comparison of the two versions is very interesting:

Media

Ens autem multis quidem modis dicitur, sed *ad unum et aliquam unam naturam*, et non aequivoce, sed quemadmodum salubre omne *ad* sanitatem. Hoc quidem in conservatione, illud vero in actione, aliud quia est signum sanitatis, hoc autem quia illius est susceptibile. Et medicinale *ad* medicinam: hoc[176\ enim habendo medicinam dicitur medicinale, illud vero existendo susceptibile ad eam, et aliud per actus existentium medicinae. Similiter autem alia sumemus hiis dicta. Ita et ens multipliciter dicitur quidem, sed omne *ad unum principium*: hoc enim quia substantiae entia dicuntur, illa vero quia passiones substantiae…

Quemadmodum ergo et salubrium omnium una est scientia, ita haec et in aliis. Non enim circa unum dictorum unius est scientiae speculari, sed et *ad unam dictorum naturam* (f° 190 va).

Nova

Et ens dicitur multis modis, et non dicitur aequivoce, sed *attribuitur uni rei et uni naturae*, sicut omne sanans *attribuitur* sanitati. Quoddam enim dicitur sanum, quia conservat sanitatem; quoddam autem sic, quia facit sanitatem; et quoddam quia significat; et quoddam quia recipit. Et similiter *attribuitur* esse medicum medicinae: quoddam enim dicitur medicum, quia acquirit medicinam; et quoddam quia convenit medicinae; et quoddam quia facit actionem medicinae. Et secundum hunc modum possibile est nobis invenire res, quae *attribuuntur uni rei*, sicut ista quae diximus. Et similiter etiam ens dicitur multis modis, sed omnes illi modi *attribuuntur uni primo*: quaedam enim dicuntur entia quia sunt substantiae, et quaedam etiam quia sunt passiones…

Quemadmodum igitur scientia sanorum est una, sic scientia aliorum similium. Quoniam non est unius scientiae consideratio de rebus quae dicuntur de uno tantum, sed etiam consideratio de rebus, quae *attribuuntur uni naturae* (f° 31 ra, 58 - rb 9, 18-23).

It is not necessary to cite the two versions at greater length. The use of the terms *attributio* and *attribuere* to translate the Greek preposition "pros," which simply indicates relation, is quite characteristic of the *Nova* and does not appear in the corresponding passages of the

Media. Further, this term is not used fortuitously: in *textus* 2, it appears six times (f° 31 ra, 59, 60, 64; rb, 2, 5, 23), in *textus* 3 once (f° 32 ra, 19), in *textus* 4, four times (f° 32 vb, 28, 31, 35, 36), in *textus* 6, seven times (f° 34 ra, 14, 15, 24, 25, 36, 37, 41).

The second important text to which our opusculum refers is that of *Met.* Z 4, 1030a32-b3. Book VII, *textus* 15.

Media	*Nova*
Oportet enim aut aequivoce dicere ea entia aut addentes et auferentes, ut non scibile et scibile. Quoniam rectum est neque aequivoce dicere, neque simpliciter, sed [177] quemadmodum medicinale *ad idem quidem et unum*, non idem vero et unum. Non tamen aequivoce. Non enim medicinale corpus et opus et vas dicitur, nec aequivoce nec secundum unum, sed *ad unum* (f° 203 va).	Oportet igitur ut non dicantur entia eodem modo aequivocationis, sed secundum magis et minus, sicut illud quod est notum et verum, etiam de noto et ignoto. Sermo enim verus, qui non est modo aequivoco, sed secun- [177] dum similitudinem; sicut medicina, quae *attribuitur* alicui, ita quod sit idem, non quia est idem cum eis unum, neque modo aequivoco etiam. Non enim dicitur corpus medicinale et actio medicinalis aequivoce, nec uno modo, sed *respectu unius* (f° 77 vb, 48-60).

In the *Versio Nova*, one must also notice the expression "*secundum magis et minus*" which the Media renders by "*aut addentes et auferentes*" (or, according to an interlinear gloss of the MSS., B.N. lat. 6325, *addentibus et auferentibus*), which is a translation more in conformity with the Greek text. Now the expression used here by the *Nova* will become one of the technical terms of analogy (cf. Averroes's *Commentary* on this passage, f° 78 ra, 20-24).

Now let us compare the text of Thomas with the *Nova* and Averroes's *Commentary* at the places indicated.

First of all, at the beginning of *Comment* 2 of Book IV, the Commentator situates the theory of the multiple meanings of being between two classes of predicates, the equivocal and the univocal:

De principiis naturae	*Averroes*
… Tripliciter aliquid praedicatur de pluribus: univoce,	Hoc nomen «ens» non est aequivocum … Nomen ens dicitur multis mo-

aequivoce et analogice. *Univoce* … sicut animal praedicatur de homine et asino. Aequivoce … sicut canis dicitur de latrabili et de caelesti. Analogice … quod praedicatur de pluribus quorum rationes diversae sunt, sed *attribuuntur alicui uni eidem* (p. 102, 8 - 103, 2).

dis et non *aequivoce*, sicut canis dicitur de latrabili et marino. Neque *univoce* ut animal de homine et asino. Sed est de nominibus quae dicuntur *de rebus attributis eidem*, et sunt media inter univoca et aequivoca (f° 31 rb, 44-50).

Then there follows the definition of analogy, accompanied by the example of health, which comes from Aristotle's text itself, as the following comparison shows:
[178]

De principiis naturae
Analogice dicitur praedicari quod praedicatur de pluribus quorum rationes diversae sunt, sed attribuuntur alicui uni eidem, sicut sanum dicitur de corpore animalis et de urina et de potione, sed non ex toto idem significat in omnibus. Dicitur enim de urina ut de signo sanitatis, de *corpore* ut de subjecto, de *potione* ut de causa… (p. 103,1-6).

Metaphysica Nova
   Et ens dicitur multis modis, et non dicitur aequivoce, sed attribuitur uni rei et uni naturae, sicut omne sanans attribuitur sanitati. Quoddam enim dicitur sanum, quia conservat sanitatem; quoddam autem sic, quia facit sanitatem; et quoddam quia significat; et quoddam qui recipit (f° 31 ra, 58-64).

But the precisions added by the *De principiis* (*de corpore, de potione*) do not appear in Aristotle, although they are found in Averroes's Commentary:

De principiis naturae

Averroès
Quaedam enim dicuntur sana quia attribuuntur sanitati hoc modo, scilicet quia conservant sanitatem, sicut dicimus quod exercitium est sanum quia conservat sanitatem, et quaedam attribuuntur sanitati, quia faciunt sanitatem, sicut dicimus quod *potio*

…sed tamen omnes istae rationes attribuuntur *uni fi-*

ni, scilicet sanitati. Aliquando enim ea quae conveniunt secundum analogiam… attribuuntur uni fini, sicut patet in praedicto exemplo (ibid., 6-9).

Aliquando *uni agenti*, sicut medicus dicitur: et de eo qui operatur per artem, et de eo qui operatur sine arte, ut *vetula*, et etiam de *instrumentis*, sed per attributionem *ad unum agens*, qui est medicina (ibid., 9-12). \179\

Aliquando per attributionem *ad unum subjectum*, sicut ens dicitur de substantia et de quantitate et de qualitate et aliis praedicamentis. Non enim ex toto est eadem ratio qua substantia est ens et quantitas et alia; sed omnia dicuntur ens ex eo quod attribuuntur substantiae, quae quidem est *subjectum* aliorum (ibid., 12-17)

accepta est sana; et similiter dicimus sanum signum quod nuntiat sanitatem, sicut dicimus de criticis laudabilibus; et similiter dicimus sanum illud quod cito recipit sanitatem, sicut *corpus* mundum ab humoribus.

Et cum adduxit ea quae attribuuntur *uni fini*, induxit exemplum etiam de rebus quae attribuuntur *uni agenti*.

…Et intendebat per hoc declarare quod quae attribuuntur eidem, aut attribuuntur *eidem fini*, aut *eidem agenti*, aut *eidem subjecto*, sicut novem praedicamenta substantiae.

Quoddam enim dicitur medicum, quia acquirit artem medicinae, v.g. homo medicus… et quoddam qui facit actionem medicinae, licet non sit medicus, *vetula* enim quae medicabat cum illa herba, sicut dicitur, agebat actionem medicinalem, licet non erat medica (f° 31 rb, 62 va, 16).

Cum dicimus herba medicinalis et *instrumentum* medicinale, attribuuntur eidem, id est medicinae, sed non est eadem intentio medicinae in instrumento, sicut in herba… (f° 78 ra, 42-45; Book VII, com. 15).

Et similiter hoc nomen ens, licet dicatur multis modis, tamen in omnibus dicitur ens, quia attribuitur primo enti substantiae; et istae attributiones in unoquoque eorum sunt diversae. Praedicamenta enim attribuuntur substantiae, non quia est agens aut finis eorum, sed quia constituuntur per illam, et *subjectum* est eorum; et universaliter non dicuntur entia, nisi quia sunt dispositiones entis (f° 31 va, 18-24).

We have cited the texts at length to supply the building-blocks of a sound comparison: it appears that the *De principiis* borrows from Averroes's *Commentary* a portion of the examples that it uses and

which do not show up in the *Metaphysics*: thus, for health, *potio*, *corpus*, and for medicine: *vetula*, *instrumentum* (Of which no mention is made in Met. IV, t. 2, nor in Met. VII, t. 15). Nevertheless this is not the most characteristic feature. More decisive is the argument provided by the manner in which Averroes explains relation to the primary instance, which defines the unity of order. The *Metaphysics* merely says: attribuitur uni rei et omni naturae. For Averroes this relation always expresses some causality of the primary instance: *quae attribuuntur eidem, aut attribuuntur eidem fini, aut eidem agenti, aut eidem sub-* [184] *jecto* (f° 31 va, 7-8), text corrected on the basis of B.N. lat. 6300, f° 49r). The same enumeration is found a little later on in the *Commentary*:

> Res enim quae habent unam scientiam, non tantum sunt quarum subjectum est unum genere aut specie dicto univoce, sed quarum esse *attribuitur uni fini, aut agenti, aut uni subjecto* (ibid., 53-57).

One again finds this insistence upon the causality of the primary instance in *Comment* 15 of Book VII.

One has to conclude, therefore, that the vocabulary Thomas is using for this essential theme comes from the Arabic-Latin version, and that the theory of multiple meanings, in the form in which it is developed by him in our *opusculum*, is inspired by Averroes's *Commentary*, of which it is an almost literal summary. In particular this explains how the role of the primary instance, to which the other analogates are referred according to a causal relation, is described.

Notes

[1] The term might have come from Avicenna's *Metaphysics*, where the last item in the enumeration of the types of unity (numerical, specific, generic, proportional) is designated as *unum comparatione* (*Met.*, tract. III, c. 2; 1508 ed, f° 78 vb).

[2] The metaphor which likens the State to a ship and the head of the city to a pilot is frequently found in Plato. See Pierre Louis, *Les Métaphores de Platon*, Paris 1945, pp. 155-156 and note 19.

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Appendix 2
A concordance of arguments against the univocity of the divine names

1. *Esse* is incommunicable (cf. 3rd argument against equivocity).	I, d. 35, 1, 4, c.	*Ver.*, 2, 11, c.	*Pot.*, 7, 7, sed c. 6 et ad 6 c. (against equivocity) and c. *Pot.*, 7, 7, c.
2. Being is not univocal.			*Ia*, 13, 5, arg. 1 and ad 1.
3. Priority of equivocal cause over univocal cause.		*Ver.*, 10, 13, ad 3.	*Pot.*, 7, 7, arg. 2 and ad 2. CG I, 32, 1°. Ia, 13, 5, c.
4. Disproportion of an effect with an equivocal cause.	I, d. 35, 1, 4, arg. 1 et ad 1.		*Pot.*, 7, 7, c. Ia, 13, 5, arg. 2 and ad 2.
5. Imperfect similarity of beings to God.			*Pot.*, 7, 7, arg. 2 and ad 2.
6. The supereminent similarity of God to beings (cf. the 2nd argument against equivocity).		cf. *Ver.*, 2, 11, sed c. et c. (against equivocity). *Ver.*, 2, 11, arg, 6 et ad 6.	*Pot.*, 7, 7, arg. 5 and ad 5.
7. The attribution *secundum prius et posterius* (=*essentialiter-per participationem*).			CG I, 32, 6°; 33, 1°. *Pot.*, 7, 7, ad 2. Ia, 13, 6, c. and 13, 10, c.
8. Participation *secundum magis et minus.*	I, d. 35, 1, 4, arg. 3 et ad 3.		*Pot.*, 7, 7, arg. 3 and ad 3. *Pot.*, 7, 7, arg. 4 and ad 4.
9. Argument from comparison.	I, d. 35, 1, 4, arg. 6 et ad 6. (against equivocity)	*Ver.*, 2, 11, arg. 2.	
10. Diverse ways of existing of one and the same form *(domus in mente, in materia).*			CG I, 32, 2°. *Pot.*, 7, 7, c. arg. 6 and ad 6.

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		Ver., 2,	CG I, 32, 4°, 5°.
11. *Nihil de Deo prius et simplicius.*	Prol., q. 1, a. 1, arg. 2.	11, arg. 3 and ad 3. (cf. 23, 7, arg. 10).	CG I, 34. *Pot.*, 7, 7, c.
	I, d. 24, q. 1, a. 1, arg. 4.		
12. God as transcendent measure.	I, d. 35, q. 1, a. 4, arg. 6.		Ia, 13, 5, arg. 3 and ad 3.
	I, d. 48, q. 1, a. 1, arg. 3.		*Pot.*, 7, 7, arg. 1 and ad 1.
	II, d. 46, q. 1, a. 1, arg. 3.		
13. Science caused by beings and science as cause of beings.	I, d. 35, 1, 4, arg. 2 and ad 2.		CG I, 32, 3°.
14. Enumeration of the predicables.	I, d. 35, 1, 4, arg. 4 and ad 4.		

A concordance of the arguments against the equivocity of the divine names

1. The resemblance of beings to God		*Ver.*, 2, 11, arg. 1 and ad 1.	CG I, 33, 2°. *Pot.*, 7,7, sed c. 3 and 4; c.
2. Resemblance of the divine perfection to the perfection of other beings of which it is the exemplar (cf. arg 6 against univocity)		*Ver.* 2, 11, sed c. 1. and c. (cf. q. 2, a. 4, ad 2; a. 12, sed c. 5; q. 7, a. 1, ad 11.)	
3. Although *esse* is incommunicable, the effect resembles the cause (cf. arg. 1 against univocity).			*Pot.*, 7, 7 sed c. 6 and ad 6 c.; c. CG I, 33, 1°. Ia, 13, 5, c.
4. *Ordo aut respectus unius ad alterum.*		*Ver.*, 2, 11, c., ad 2, ad 4, ad 6. *Ver.*, 2, 11, c.	*Pot.*, 7, 7, c. CG I, 33, 3°, 4°, 5°. Ia, 13, 5, c.
5. One must be able to know God starting from created beings.	I, d. 35, 1, 4, c.		*Pot.*, 7, 7, c.
		Ver., 2, 11, arg. 4 and ad 4; arg. 5	Ia, 13, 5, sed c. 2 (cf. *Pot.*, 7, 7 arg. 4
6. Distance.		and ad 5.	and ad 4).

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7. Nothing is common to the temporal and the eternal.	I, d. 35, 1, 4, arg. 5 and ad 5.	*Ver.*, 2, 11, arg. 7 and ad 7.	*Pot.*, 7, 7 sed c. 1 and ad 1c. Ia, 13, 5, sed c. 1.
8. Knowing as quality and knowing as substance.			*Pot.*, 7, 7, sed c. 2 and ad 2c. sed c. 5 and ad 5c. sed c. 7 and ad 7c.
	I, d. 35, 1, 4, arg. 7 and ad 7.		
9. Where one form is common to two beings, there can be change from the one to the other.			*Pot.*, 7, 7 sed c. 8 and ad 8c.
10. *Nomen rei non convenit imagini nisi aequivoce.*		*Ver.* 2, 11, arg. 8 and ad 8.	Cf. Ia, 13, 10, sed c. 1 and ad 4.

Arguments 1 to 5 have a positive value against equivocity; if we put after them arguments 6 to 10, which seem more in favor of equivocity, it is because by refuting them St. Thomas precisely refutes the equivocity to which they apparently lead.

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Abbreviations used

AHDLMA	*Archives Histoire Doctrinale et Litthaire du Moyen Age*. Paris
Ang	*Angelicum*. Rome
Ant	*Antonianum*. Rome
AP	*Archives de Philosophic*. Paris
APARSTA	*Acta Pontificiae Academiae Romanae S. Thomae Aquinatis et Religionis Catholicae*. Rome
Blackfriars	*Blackfriars* : Blackfriars. Oxford
BT	*Bulletin Thomiste*. Le Saulchoir
CF	*Cienda y Fe.* Buenos Aires
CT	*La Ciencia Tomista*. Salamanca
DR	*The Downside Review*. Bath
DS	*Dominican Studies*. Oxford
DTC	*Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*. Paris
DTFr	*Divus Thomas*. Fribourg
DTP	*Divus Thomas*. Piacenza
Ed	*Educare*. Messina
EF	*Etudes Franciscaines*. Paris
EsF	*Estudios Franciscanos*. Barcelona
Estudos	*Estudos*. Porto Alegre
FraS	*Franziskanische Studien*. Paderborn. Werl i. W
FranS	*Franciscan Studies*. St. Bonaventure
FZPT	*Freiburger Zeitschrift fur Philosophic und Theologie*. Freiburg (Switz.)
Greg	*Gregorianum*. Rome
HTR	*The Harvard Theological Review*. Cambridge
IER	*Irish Ecclesiastical Record*
IPQ	*International Philosophical Quarterly*. Heverlee-Louvain
ITQ	*The Irish Theological Quarterly*. Maynooth
J P	*The Journal of Philosophy*. New York
JR	*The Journal of Religion*. Chicago
MS	*The Modern Schoolman*. St. Louis, MO
MSt	*Mediaeval Studies*. Toronto
NS	*The New Scholasticism*. Washington
PACPA	*Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*. Washington, DC

PAS   *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.* London
PC   *La Pensée Catholique.* Paris
Pen   *Pensamiento.* Madrid
PJ   *Philosophisches Jahrbuch.* Fulda
PS   *Philosophical Studies.* Maynooth
RCSF   *Rivista Critica di Storia della Filosofia.* Milan
Rev Apol   *Revue Apologktique.* Paris
RevF   *Revista de Filosofia.* Madrid
RevSR   *Revue des Sciences Religiewsea.* Strasbourg
RFNS   *Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica.* Milan
RIMSE   *Revue internationale de métaphysique, de sociologie et*
RM   *d'économie.* Anvers
RMAL   *Review of Metaphysics.* New Haven, CT
RNP   *Revue du Moyen Age Latin.* Strasbourg
RP   *Revue Néo-Scolastiqne de Philosophic.* Louvain
RPF   *Revue de Philosophie.* Paris
RPL   *Revista Portugwsa de Filosofia.* Braga
RSF   *Revue Philosophique.* Louvain
RSPT   *Rassegna di Scienze Filosofiche.* Rorna
RSR   *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Thdologiques.* Le
RT   Saulchoir
RUO   *Recherches de Sciences Religieuses.* Paris
Sal   *Revue Thomiste.* Toulouse
Sap   *Revue de l'Université d'Ottawa.* Ottawa
Sapz   *Salesianum.* Turin
Sch   *Sapientia.* Buenos Aires
SG   *Sapienza.* Rome
Sophia   *Scholastik.* Freiburg i. Br
StC   *Studium Generate.* Berlin.
Symp   *Sophia.* Padua
Theoria   *Studio Catholica.* Nijmegen
Thomist   *Symposion.* Jahrbuch für Philosophic. Freiburg i. Br
TP   *Theoria,* Lund-Copenhagen-Goteborg
TQ   *The Thomist.* Washington
VV   *Tijdschrift voor Philosophie.* Leuven
ZKT   *Theologische Quartalschrift.* Linz
ZPF   *Verdad y Vida.* Madrid
WWeish   *Zeitschrift für Katholische Theologie.* Vienna
             Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung. Meisenheim
             Wissenschaft und Weisheit. Düsseldorf.