

THE PONTIFICAL INSTITUTE OF MEDIAEVAL STUDIES

SUBSIDIA MEDIAEVALIA

V

THE MEDIAEVAL LIAR:
A CATALOGUE OF THE
INSOLUBILIA-LITERATURE

BY

PAUL VINCENT SPADE



TORONTO
1975

PONTIFICAL INSTITUTE OF MEDIAEVAL STUDIES

SUBSIDIA MEDIAEVALIA

V



This page intentionally left blank

THE MEDIAEVAL LIAR: A CATALOGUE OF THE *INSOLUBILIA*-LITERATURE

BY

PAUL VINCENT SPADE



PONTIFICAL INSTITUTE OF MEDIAEVAL STUDIES
TORONTO, CANADA
1975

ISBN-0-88844-354-4
ISSN 0082-5328

Copyright by

PONTIFICAL INSTITUTE OF MEDIAEVAL STUDIES
59 QUEEN'S PARK CRESCENT EAST
TORONTO, ONTARIO, CANADA M5S 2C4

PRINTED BY UNIVERSA, WETTEREN (Belgium)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface	9
Bibliography of Printed Works.	11
A. Texts and Translations	11
B. Historical and Biographical Studies	13
C. Catalogues, Reference Works	16
 The Catalogue	 19
I Anonymous (<i>Magister insolubilium</i>)	19
II ——. <i>Puncta de insolubilibus Hollandrini</i>	19
III ——. <i>Insolubilia</i>	21
IV ——. <i>Commentarium in Sententias</i> , III, q. 1, a. 3.	22
V ——. <i>Commentarium in insolubilia Hollandrini</i> . .	23
VI ——. <i>Insolubilia</i>	26
VII ——. <i>Quaestiones libri insolubilium Hollandrini</i> ..	28
VIII ——. <i>Insolubilia</i>	31
IX ——. <i>De insolubilibus</i>	32
X ——. <i>Insolubilia</i>	33
XI ——. <i>Tractatus de diversis insolubilibus, et de significatione et suppositione terminorum et confusione et distributione eorundem, et de modis aequivalentibus signis universalibus, et de arte obligatoria cum aliis incidentibus</i>	34
XII ——. (<i>Pseudo-Heytesbury</i>). <i>Insolubilia</i>	35
XIII ——. <i>Insolubilia</i>	36
XIV ——. <i>Notandum</i>	37
XV ——. <i>Tractatus de insolubilibus</i>	38
XVI ——. <i>Quaestio de insolubili</i>	39
XVII ——. <i>Insolubilia</i>	40
XVIII ——. (<i>Pseudo-Bradwardine</i>). <i>Insolubilia</i>	41
XIX ——. <i>Tractatus de sophismatibus</i>	41
XX ——. <i>Insolubilia</i>	42
XXI ——. <i>Insolubilia</i>	43
XXII ——. (<i>Pseudo-Scotus</i>). <i>In librum primum priorum analyticorum Aristotelis quaestiones</i> , q. 10... .	44
XXIII ——. <i>Insolubilia</i>	46

XXIV	Albert of Saxony. <i>Perutilis logica</i> , I, 6 and VI, 1.	47
XXV	Angelo of Fossambrone. <i>Insolubilia</i>	49
XXVI	Anthony de Monte. <i>Quaedam conclusiones</i>	52
XXVII	Bonaventure. <i>Quaestiones disputatae de mysterio trinitatis</i> , q. 1, a. 1, ad 5.....	53
XXVIII	Cajetan of Thiene. <i>Recollectae super Regulas Hennitbergi</i>	53
XXIX	Gregory of Rimini.....	54
XXX	Henry of England (Harvey of England, Berotus of England). <i>Insolubilia</i>	55
XXXI	Henry Hopton. <i>Insolubilia</i>	56
XXXII	Hugo.....	57
XXXIII	John Buridan. <i>In Metaphysicen Aristotelis quaestiones</i> , VI, qq. 7, 8, 11.....	58
XXXIV	—. <i>Sophismata</i> , ca. 2, 8.....	59
XXXV	John of Constance. <i>Imaginatio</i>	61
XXXVI	John Dumbleton. <i>Summa logicae et philosophiae naturalis</i> , I, 1.....	63
XXXVII	John Duns Scotus. <i>Quaestiones super libros elenchorum</i> , qq. 52-53.....	65
XXXVIII	John of Holland. <i>Insolubilia</i>	66
XXXIX	John Hunter. <i>Insolubilia</i>	68
XL	John Tarteyns. <i>Insolubilia</i>	70
XLI	John of Wesel. <i>Quaestiones de obligationibus</i> ... —. <i>Quaestiones super insolubilibus</i>	71 72
XLII	John Wyclif. <i>De logica: Logica continuatio</i> , tract. 3, ca. 8.....	74
XLIII	—? <i>Insolubilia pulchra</i>	76
XLIV	Lambert of Auxerre. <i>Summulae logicales</i>	77
XLV	Ludolph Meistermann of Lubeck. <i>Quaestiones et propositiones de insolubilibus</i>	78
XLVI	Marsilius of Inghen. <i>Insolubilia</i>	79
XLVII	Paul of Pergula. <i>In regulas insolubilium Heytesbury</i>	80
XLVIII	—. <i>Logica</i> , tract. 6: <i>De insolubilibus</i>	81
XLIX	Paul of Venice. <i>Logica magna</i> , II, 15.....	82
L	Peter of Ailly. <i>Insolubilia</i>	84
LI	Peter (Alboinus) of Mantua. <i>Logica</i>	86
LII	Ralph Strode. <i>Logica</i> , tract. 6: <i>De insolubilibus</i> .	87
LIII		

LIV	Richard of Campsall. <i>Quaestiones super librum priorum analyticorum</i> , q. 10.....	91
LV	Richard Kilmington. <i>Sophismata</i>	92
LVI	Richard Lavenham. <i>Insolubilia</i>	93
LVII	Richard of Sherwood. <i>Insolubilia</i>	94
LVIII	Robert Fland. <i>Insolubilia</i>	95
LIX	Robert Grosseteste. <i>Commentarium in Sophisticos elenchos Aristotelis</i>	97
LX	Robert Holcot. <i>In quattuor libros Sententiarum quaestiones argutissimae</i>	98
LXI	Roger Nottingham. <i>Insolubilia</i>	99
LXII	Roger Roseth. <i>Quaestiones super Sententias</i>	101
LXIII	Roger Swyneshed. <i>De insolubilibus</i>	102
LXIV	Thomas Bradwardine. <i>Insolubilia</i>	105
LXV	Thomas Manlevelt.	110
LXVI	Walter.....	111
LXVII	Walter Burley. <i>Insolubilia</i>	111
LXVIII	Walter Sexgrave. <i>Insolubilia</i>	113
LXIX	William Heytesbury. <i>Regulae solvendi sophismata</i> , ca. 1: <i>De insolubilibus</i>	116
LXX	William of Ockham. <i>Summa logicae III</i> , 3, ca. 38, 45.....	119
LXXI	William of Ockham. <i>Tractatus super libros elenchorum</i>	120
LXXII	Spurious Texts.	120
	Appendix I. Incipits cited.....	121
	Appendix II. Manuscripts cited.....	124
	Index	129

This page intentionally left blank

PREFACE

THE following is a catalogue of the mediaeval literature on *in-solubilia* from the beginning of the thirteenth to roughly the end of the first quarter of the fifteenth century.¹ Some of the information contained in it, especially about the location of MSS, is readily available in modern sources, but to my knowledge it has not hitherto been systematically gathered together in one place. On the other hand, much of the information, particularly regarding the identity of authors and the contents of their works, is new. The catalogue does not pretend to be complete. It lists only those texts that have come to my attention in one way or another.

The entries are arranged alphabetically by author and *incipit*. Anonymous texts have been placed first. I have not thought it necessary in general to give the *incipit* and *explicit* of attributed texts that have appeared in published editions, unless the discovery of additional MSS of the work would be likely to contribute to the establishment of a firmer text. In the cases of texts that have not been edited, I have listed all the MSS of which I know. For texts in early printed editions, I have listed only one such edition, together with the name of a library which contains a copy of that edition in its collection. The locations of other copies and other early editions of such works may be found in the standard catalogues of incunabula.² In the cases of texts published in modern editions, I have listed only the modern source. Information about MSS and early printed editions of these works may be found there. MSS and early printed editions marked with an * are available, on microfilm or otherwise, in the library of the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto.

¹ For the most part, I have included only items that discuss the paradoxes in explicit and fully antinomical form. For the rest of the fifteenth and for the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, see Ashworth [31]; Prantl [64], v. 4, sect. 22; and Roure [67]. (Arabic numerals in square brackets refer to items in the Bibliography.)

² See, e.g., Copinger [80]; Goff [84]; Hain [85]; Pellechet [95].

I have attempted to give brief summaries of the contents of the texts which I have personally examined, together with quotations of certain interesting passages. I have not, however, probed deeply into the positions taken. The summaries are frequently very incomplete and, unavoidably, perhaps unreliable as well. A further analysis will have to await a more detailed study.

An Appendix at the end of the catalogue provides a cross-referencing from the *incipit* of a work to the number of that work in the catalogue. Again, I have not thought it in general necessary to list the *incipits* of attributed published works. A second Appendix includes a list of MSS cited, together with the catalogue numbers of the works that appear in those MSS.

Arabic numerals in square brackets refer to items in the Bibliography. *Roman* numerals in square brackets are cross-references to items in the catalogue.

Except for passages taken from recent editions, I have normalized all Latin quotations according to Lewis and Short's *A Latin Dictionary*.

Indiana University.

Paul Vincent Spade.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PRINTED WORKS

A. *Texts and Translations*

- [1] Albert of Saxony. *Insolubilia* (= *Perutilis logica*, VI, 1), published with his *Sophismata*, Paris: Félix Baligault, 1495 (Hain 582). Copy at Yale Univ. Library.
- [2] Albert of Saxony. *Perutilis logica*, Venice: Petrus Aurelius Sanutus Venetus, 1518. Copy at Paris, B.N., Imprimés, Rés. R. 183.
- [3] Anonymous (Pseudo-Scotus). *In librum primum priorum analyticorum Aristotelis quaestiones*, in John Duns Scotus, *Opera omnia*, Paris: Vivès, 1891-95, v. 2, pp. 81-177.
- [4] Bonaventure. *Quaestiones disputatae de mysterio trinitatis*, in *Opera omnia*, Quaracchi: Typographia collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1882-1902, v. 5, pp. 45-115.
- [5] Braakhuis, H. A. G. "The Second Tract on *Insolubilia* Found in Paris, B.N. Lat. 16.617: An Edition of the Text with an Analysis of Its Contents," *Vivarium* 5 (1967), pp. 111-145.
- [6] Colluccio Salutati. *Epistolario di Colluccio Salutati*, Francesco Novati, ed., "Fonti per la Storia d'Italia," vols. 15-18; Rome: Istituto storico italiano, 1891-1905.
- [7] De Rijk, L. M. "Some Notes on the Mediaeval Tract *De insolubilibus* with the Edition of a Tract Dating from the End of the Twelfth Century," *Vivarium* 4 (1966), pp. 83-115.
- [8] John Buridan. *In Metaphysicen Aristotelis quaestiones argutissimae magistri Joannis Buridani*, Paris: Jodocus Badius Ascensus, 1518. Photoreprint copy at the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto.
- [9] John Buridan. *Sophismata Buridani*, Paris: Antoine Denidel and Nicole de la Barre, [c. 1496-1500] (*Incunabula in American Libraries*, 3rd census, B-1295). Copy at Harvard College Library, incunabula 8325.5.
- [10] John Buridan. "The *Sophismata* of John Buridan," T. K. Scott, ed., Ph.D. dissertation: Columbia University, 1963.

- [11] John Buridan. *Sophisms on Meaning and Truth*, T. K. Scott, tr., "Century Philosophy Sourcebooks," New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1966.
- [12] John Duns Scotus. *Duns Scotus: Philosophical Writings*, Adam Wolter, ed. & tr., London: Thomas Nelson & Sons, Ltd., 1962.
- [13] John Duns Scotus. *Quaestiones super libros elenchorum*, in *Opera omnia*, Paris: Vivès, 1891-1895, v. 2, pp. 1-80.
- [14] John Wyclif. *Johannis Wyclif Tractatus de logica*, Michael Henry Dziewicki, ed., 3 vols., London: Trübner & Co., for the Wyclif Society, 1893-1899.
- [15] Paul of Pergula. *Logica and Tractatus de sensu composito et diviso*. Mary Anthony Brown, ed., "Franciscan Institute Publications," Text Series, no. 13; St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute, 1961.
- [16] Paul of Venice. *Logica magna*, Venice: Albertinus (Rubeus) Vercellensis, for Octavianus Scotus, 1499 (Hain 12505). Copy at Yale University Library.
- [17] Peter of Ailly. *Conceptus et insolubilia*, Paris: Pierre le Dru, for Durand Gerlier, [c. 1495] (*Incunabula in American Libraries*, 3rd census, A-470). Copy at Walters Art Gallery, Baltimore.
- [18] Peter (Alboinus) of Mantua. *Logica*, Venice: Simon Bevilqua, 1 Dec. 1492 (*Incunabula in American Libraries*, P-501). Copy at Yale University Library.
- [19] Peter of Spain. *Peter of Spain: Tractatus Syncategorematum and Selected Anonymous Treatises*, Joseph P. Mullaly, tr., "Mediaeval Philosophical Texts in Translation," no. 13; Milwaukee, Wis.: Marquette University Press, 1964.
- [20] Peter Tartare. *Petri Tatari Parisiensis ... in Summulas (ut aiunt) Petri Hispani subtilissimae enarrationes. Quae apposita erant et de descensu insolubilibusque ejusdem, ...*, Venice: Melchior Sessa, 1571. Copy at Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto.
- [21] Richard of Campsall. *The Works of Richard of Campsall*, v. 1: *Quaestiones super librum priorum analyticorum*, Edward A. Synan, ed., "Studies and Texts," v. 17, part 1; Toronto: The Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1968.
- [22] Robert Holcot. *In quattuor libros Sententiuarum quaestiones argutissimae ...*, Lyons: Johannes Clein, 1518. Photoreprint copy at the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto.
- [23] Roger Nottingham. "The 'Insolubilia' of Roger Nottingham, O.F.M.," Edward A. Synan, ed., *Mediaeval Studies* 26 (1964), pp. 257-270.

- [24] Spade, Paul Vincent. "An Anonymous Fourteenth-Century Treatise on 'Insolubles': Text and Study," M.S.L. dissertation: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1969.
- [25] Spade, Paul Vincent. "An Anonymous Tract on *Insolubilia* from MS Vat. lat. 674: An Edition and Analysis of the Text," *Vivarium* 9 (1971), pp. 1-18.
- [26] William Heytesbury. *Tractatus gulielmi Hentisberi de sensu composito et diviso, Regulae ejusdem cum sophismatibus, Declaratio Gaetani supra easdem ...*, Venice: Bonetus Locatellus, for Octavianus Scotus, 1494 (Hain 8437). Copy at University of Chicago Library.
- [27] William of Ockham. *Logica* (= *Summa logicae*), Paris: [Johannes Higman], 1488 (Hain 11948). Copy at Harvard College Library.
- [28] William of Ockham. *Summa logicae*, Philotheus Boehner, ed., "Franciscan Institute Publications," Text Series, no. 2; St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute, *pars prima*, 1951; *pars secunda et tertiae prima*, 1962.
- [29] William of Sherwood. *Die Introductiones in logicam des Wilhelm von Shireswood* († nach 1267), Martin Grabmann, ed., "Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften," Philosophisch-historische Abteilung, Jahrgang 1937, Heft 10; Munich: Verlag der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1937.

B. Historical and Biographical Studies

- [30] Aschenbach, Joseph. *Geschichte der Wiener Universität im ersten Jahrhunderte ihrer Bestehens*, Vienna: Verlag K.K. Universität, 1865.
- [31] Ashworth, E.J. "The Treatment of Semantic Paradoxes from 1400 to 1700," *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic*, 13 (1972), pp. 34-52.
- [32] Balič, Charles. "Duns Scotus, John," in *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, v. 4, pp. 1102-1106.
- [33] Balič, Charles. "The Life and Works of John Duns Scotus," Bernardine M. Bonansea, tr., in *John Duns Scotus, 1265-1308*, John K. Ryan and Bernardine M. Bonansea, eds., "Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy," v. 3; Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1965, pp. 1-27.
- [34] Bascour, H. "John Buridan," in *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, v. 7, pp. 1037f.
- [35] Baudry, Leon. *Guillaume d'Occam: Sa vie, ses œuvres, ses idées sociales et politiques*, v. 1, "Études de Philosophie Médiévale," v. 39, Paris: Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, 1949.
- [36] Blackley, F. D. "Ralph Strode," in *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, v. 12, p. 71.

- [37] Bocheński, I. M. *Formale Logik*, "Orbis Academicus: Problemgeschichte der Wissenschaft in Dokumenten und Darstellungen"; Freiburg: Verlag Karl Alber, 1956.
- [38] Boehner, Philotheus. "Ockham's Theory of Supposition and the Notion of Truth," in Philotheus Boehner, *Collected Articles on Ockham*, Eligius M. Buytaert, ed., "Franciscan Institute Publications," *Philosophy Series*, no. 12; St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute, 1958, pp. 232-267.
- [39] Boháček, Miroslav. "Un Manuscrit intéressant du 'Compendium' de Werner von Schussenried," *Traditio* 18 (1962), pp. 472-482.
- [40] Brady, I. C. "Bonaventure, St.," in *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, v. 2, pp. 658-664.
- [41] Brampton, C. K. "Traditions Relating to the Death of William of Ockham," *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 53 (1960), pp. 442-449.
- [42] Brück, A. "Johannes Richerath v. (Ober-) Wesel a. Rh.," in *Lexicon für Theologie und Kirche*, Bd. 5, col. 1097.
- [43] Buddensieg, Rudolf. *John Wyclif's Polemical Works in Latin ...*, Eng. ed., vol. 1, London: Trübner & Co., for the Wyclif Society, 1883.
- [44] Dahmus, J. "Wyclif, John," in *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, v. 14, pp. 1050-1052.
- [45] da Valsanzibio, Silvestro. *Vita e dottrina di Gaetano di Thiene, filosofo dello studio di Padova (1387-1465)*, Verona: Scuola tipografica Madonna di Castelmonte, 1948.
- [46] De Rijk, L. M. "On the Genuine Text of Peter of Spain's *Summule logicales*," IV, *Vivarium* 7 (1969), pp. 120-162.
- [47] Doucet, P. Victorin. "Le Studium franciscain de Norwich en 1337 d'après le Ms. Chigi B. V. 66 de la bibliothèque vaticane," *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 46 (1953), pp. 85-98.
- [48] Elie, Hubert, *Le Complexe significabile*, Paris: Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, 1936.
- [49] Emmen, A. "Peter of Ailly (Alliaco)," in *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, v. 11, p. 208.
- [50] Faral, Edmond. "Jean Buridan: Maître ès arts de l'Université de Paris," *Histoire littéraire de la France*, v. 38, Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1949, pp. 462-605.
- [51] Fleming, Brian. "Thomas de Bradwardine: Oxford Scholar, Royal Servant and Archbishop of Canterbury," Dissertation: Université catholique de Louvain, 1964.
- [52] Gál, G. "Gregory of Rimini," in *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, v. 6, p. 797.
- [53] Gál, G. "William of Ockham," in *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, v. 14, pp. 932-935.

- [54] Geyer, B. "Zu den Summulae logicales des Petrus Hispanus und Lambert von Auxerre," *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 50 (1937), pp. 511-513.
- [55] Gollancz, Israel. "Strode, Ralph," in *Dictionary of National Biography*, v. 19, pp. 57-59.
- [56] Heidingsfelder, Georg. *Albert von Sachsen: Sein Lebensgang und sein Kommentar zur nikomachischen Ethik des Aristoteles*, "Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters," Bd. 22, h. 3-4; Münster i. W.: Aschendorffsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1927.
- [57] Klingsford, C. L. "Lavenham or Lavyngham, Richard," in *Dictionary of National Biography*, v. 11, pp. 652f.
- [58] Kneale, William and Kneale, Martha. *The Development of Logic*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962.
- [59] Kretzmann, Norman. "Mediaeval Logicians on the Meaning of the *Propositio*," *The Journal of Philosophy* 67 (1970), pp. 767-787.
- [60] Maurer, Armand. "Marsilius of Inghen," in *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, v. 9, p. 207.
- [61] Maurer, Armand. "Robert Holcot," in *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, v. 12, p. 523.
- [62] Nardi, Bruno. "Paolo Veneto," in *Enciclopedia italiana di scienze, lettere ed arti*, v. 26, p. 242.
- [63] Pompei, A. "Tartaret, Pietro," in *Enciclopedia filosofica*, v. 4, col. 1085.
- [64] Prantl, Carl. *Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande*, 4 vols., Leipzig: Buchhandlung Gustav Fock, G.M.B.H., 1927 (Manuldruck der Originalausgabe).
- [65] Rashdall, Hastings. *The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages*, F. M. Powicke and A. B. Emden, eds., 3 vols., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936.
- [66] Roure, Marie-Louise. "La problématique des propositions insolubles au XIII^e siècle et au début du XIV^e, suivie de l'édition des traités de W. Shyreswood, W. Burleigh et Th. Bradwardine," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 1970, pp. 205-326.
- [67] Roure, Marie-Louise. "Le traité 'Des propositions insolubles' de Jean de Celaya," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 1962, pp. 235-388.
- [68] Spade, Paul Vincent. "The Treatises *On Modal Propositions and On Hypothetical Propositions* by Richard Lavenham," *Mediaeval Studies* 35 (1973), pp. 49-59.
- [69] Thomson, S. Harrison. *The Writings of Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln 1235-1253*, Cambridge: University Press, 1940.
- [70] Thorndike, Lynn. *University Records and Life in the Middle Ages*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1944.

- [71] Tiraboschi, Girolamo. *Storia della letteratura italiana*, 9 vols., Florence: Presso Molini, Laudi, e Co., 1805-1893.
- [72] Weisheipl, James A. "Curriculum of the Faculty of Arts at Oxford in the early Fourteenth Century," *Mediaeval Studies* 26 (1964), pp. 143-185.
- [73] Weisheipl, James A. "Developments in the Arts Curriculum at Oxford in the Early Fourteenth Century," *Mediaeval Studies* 28 (1966), pp. 151-175.
- [74] Weisheipl, James A. "Ockham and Some Mertonians," *Mediaeval Studies* 30 (1968), pp. 163-213.
- [75] Weisheipl, James A. "Repertorium Mertonense," *Mediaeval Studies* 31 (1969), pp. 174-224.
- [76] Weisheipl, James A. "Roger Swyneshed, O.S.B., Logician, Natural Philosopher, and Theologian," in *Oxford Studies Presented to Daniel Callus*, "Oxford Historical Society," New Series, vol. 16; Oxford: Clarendon Press for the Oxford Historical Society, 1964 (for 1959-60), pp. 231-252.
- [77] Wilson, Curtis. *William Heytesbury: Medieval Logic and the Rise of Mathematical Physics*, "The University of Wisconsin, Publications in Medieval Science," no. 3; Madison, Wis.: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1956.

C. Catalogues, Reference Works

- [78] *Catalogue général des manuscrits des bibliothèques publiques des départements*, v. 2, Paris: Imprimerie impériale, 1885.
- [79] *Codices vaticani latini*, Vatican City: Vatican Polyglot Press, 1902-.
- [80] Copinger, W. A. *Supplement to Hain's Repertorium Bibliographicum or Collections towards a New Edition of that Work*, 2 parts in 3 vols., Milan: G. G. Görlich, 1950.
- [81] Coxe, Henry O. *Catalogi codicum manuscriptorum Bibliothecae Bodleianaæ*, v. 3, Oxford: University Press, 1854.
- [82] de Poorter, A. *Catalogue des manuscrits de la bibliothèque publique de la ville de Bruges*, "Catalogue général des manuscrits des bibliothèques de Belgique," II; Gembloux, Belgium: J. Duculot, 1934.
- [83] Emden, A. B. *A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to a.d. 1500*, 3 vols., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957-1959.
- [84] Goff, Frederick R., ed. *Incunabula in American Libraries: A Third Census of Fifteenth-Century Books Recorded in North American Collections*, New York: The Bibliographical Society of America, 1964.
- [85] Hain, Ludwig. *Repertorium Bibliographicum in quo Libri Omnes ab Arte Typographica Inventa usque ad Annum MD*, 4 vols., Milan: G. G. Görlich, 1948.

- [86] Hauréau, B. *Notices et extraits de quelques manuscrits latins de la Bibliothèque Nationale*, 6 vols., Paris: Librairie C. Klincksieck, 1890-1893.
- [87] Iosa, Antonio Maria. *I codici manoscritti della Bibliotheca Antoniana di Padova*, Padua: Typografia del seminario, 1886.
- [88] James, Montague Rhodes. *A Descriptive Catalogue of the Manuscripts in the Library of Corpus Christi College Cambridge*, 2 vols., Cambridge: University Press, 1909-1911.
- [89] James, Montague Rhodes. *A Descriptive Catalogue of the Manuscripts in the Library of Gonville and Caius College*, 2 vols., Cambridge: University Press, 1907-1908.
- [90] James, Montague Rhodes. *A Descriptive Catalogue of the Manuscripts in the Library of Lambeth Palace: The Mediaeval Manuscripts*, Cambridge: University Press, 1932.
- [91] Kaepeli, Th., and Schooner, H.-V. *Les manuscrits médiévaux de Saint-Dominique de Dubrovnik: Catalogue sommaire*, "Institutum historicum FF. Praedicatorum, Dissertationes historicae," fasciculus xvii; Rome: Sainte-Sabine, 1965.
- [92] Kristeller, Paul Oskar. *Iter Italicum: A Finding List of Uncatalogued or Incompletely Catalogued Humanistic Manuscripts of the Renaissance in Italian and Other Libraries*, 2 vols., London: The Warburg Institute, 1963-1967.
- [93] Mohan, Gaudens E. "Incipits of Logical Writings of the xiiith-xvth Centuries," *Franciscan Studies* 12 (1952), pp. 349-489.
- [94] Mohan, Gaudens E. "Incipits of Philosophical Writings in Latin of the xiiith-xvth Centuries," Typescript, St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute.
- [95] Pellechet, M. *Catalogue général des incunables des bibliothèques publiques de France*, Paris: Alphonse Picard et Fils, 1897-1909.
- [96] Schum, W. *Beschreibendes Verzeichnis des amplonianischen Handschriften-Sammlung zu Erfurt*, Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1887.
- [97] Stegmüller, Fridericus. *Repertorium Commentariorum in Sententias Petri Lombardi*, Würzburg apud Ferdinandum Schöningh Bibliopolam, 1947.
- [98] *Tabulae codicum manu scriptorum praeter graecos et orientales in Biblioteca Palatina Vindobonensi asservatorum*, Vienna: Filius Caroli Geroldi, 1864-1899.
- [99] Truhlář, J. *Catalogus codicum manu scriptorum latinorum qui in C.R. Bibliotheca publica atque universitatis Pragensis asservantur*, 2 vols. Prague: Sumptibus regiae Societatis scientiarum Bohemicae, 1905-1906.

This page intentionally left blank

THE CATALOGUE

I

ANONYMOUS (MAGISTER INSOLUBILII) [13C.-EARLY 14C.]³

This author is known only through a brief reference in Thomas Chirmister's *Quaestiones in opus Prisciani*, Cambridge, Gonville and Caius, 688/645.⁴ The reference appears on f. 21r in the reply to the last two objections for q. 7:

Pro duobus ultimis argumentis ponit magister insolubilium istam regulam: *Quandocumque determinata significatio subjecti vel praedicati est ignota vel indeterminata, videndum est utrum propositio in qua ponitur hujusmodi dictio sit omni sensu vera, et tunc est concedenda simpliciter. Si omni sensu falsa, tunc est neganda. Si uno sensu vera et alio sensu falsa, tunc dicendum est: Probanda sic est hujusmodi ‘Alter istorum vocatur Sortes’: Ista enim uno sensu est vera et alio sensu falsa. Dubitandum est tamen de quolibet singulari quounque probetur, et de impositione donec respondens certificetur.*

The application to insolubles is not explicit, but perhaps there is a reference here to a resolution of the paradox according to the fallacy *secundum quid et simpliciter*. The “rule” bears a striking resemblance to Aristotle, *Topics*, 8, 7, 160a23-28.

II

ANONYMOUS [fl. 1st quarter 15C.]

Puncta de insolubilibus Hollandrini [c. 1400-1420]⁵

Inc Circa materiam insolubilium nota quod scientia insolubilium est distincta a scientia obligationum in hoc, quia

³ Based on the date of the MS, probably before 1307. See Synan [21], p. 19. E. A. Synan called my attention to this text. I have made use of his transcription.

⁴ E. A. Synan is preparing an edition of this work.

⁵ The MS was written in 1420 (Thorndike [70], pp. 296f., no. 119). The history of the University of Erfurt makes it impossible that the text was written much before 1400 (see Rashdall [65], v. 2, pp. 245-250).

Ex p Modo illa pro ultima ejus parte est vera. Et sic est finis.

*Erfurt, CA 4° 241, ff. 82ra-83va.

The text seems to be intended as a summary of the things a student had to know about insolubles in order to pass examinations for the Bachelor's degree at Erfurt. The whole of the MS consists of similar "puncta" on the various books required for the degree.⁶ The required text for insolubles seems to have been John of Holland's [XXXVIII], although the organization of the text in the present MS does not seem to be based on Holland's work.

The text gives two features distinguishing the science of insolubles from that of *obligationes*. The term 'insoluble' is discussed in three senses (82ra). The difference between an insoluble *casus* and an insoluble proposition is set out, although the distinction is not exactly parallel to that in John of Holland's text (82rab).

In the course of his discussion, the author sets out the following syncategorematic properties of the word 'praecise' (82rb)?:

Item nota quod differentia est inter significare praecise et praecise significare, quia ly 'praecise' confundit illud terminum 'significare' confuse distributive Exemplum: 'Homo est animal' significat praecise sicut est, et illa 'Homo est asinus' significat praecise sicut est, sed non praecise significat sicut est. Patet primum, quia significat hominem, et etiam asinum, et ita est. Sed secundum patet, quia significat compositionem hominis cum asino. Sed hoc est falsum.

The author observes (*ibid.*):

Dubium utrum omne insolubile falsificat se ipsum. Respondeatur quod omne insolubile est falsum, quia falsificat se ipsum. Et ita (?) est quia significat se esse verum et falsum. Vel dicitur quod omne insolubile est impossibile ideo quia ad ipsum sequitur impossibile, vel ideo quia quaelibet illarum propositionum significat

⁶ See Thorndike *loc. cit.* on the MS as a whole.

⁷ See also John of Wesel's somewhat analogous discussion in his second question on insolubles [XLII].

aliqualiter qualiter non est, sic quod significat se esse falsum et se non esse falsum, et taliter esse est impossibile. Pro illa nota primo quod propositio falsificans se significat se esse falsum. Patet ex quid nominis propositionis falsificantis se. Item, hujusmodi propositio significat se non esse falsum

Two ways of replying to insolubles are distinguished. The first is to allow self-reference. Then insolubles falsify themselves. But “non sequitur: Ipsa propositio significat sicut est; igitur, est vera” (82vab). The second way is to deny the possibility of self-reference. This is the “easier” way (82vb).

III

ANONYMOUS [not after 15c.]

Insolubilia [after c. 1330] ⁸

Inc <C>irca materiam insolubilium puerorum spectantium ad introductionem prius restat negotium.

Exp non tamen omnium contradictiorum alterum est verum. Jam restat solvere⁹

*Cambridge, Gonville & Caius, 182/215, pages 132-134.

The author's position is a summary of Roger Swyneshed's [LXIII]. He defines an insoluble (p. 132): “Insolubile est propositio significans principaliter sicut est vel aliter quam est vel nec principaliter sicut est nec principaliter aliter quam est pertinens ad inferendum se ipsam fore veram vel falsam.” (See Swyneshed's first dichotomy and fourth definition). After explaining the terms of this definition (pp. 132-133), the author observes (p. 133): “Omne insolubile oritur ex proprietate vocis vel ex actu nostro vel ex conjunctione actus nostri cum proprietate vocis.” The terms of this statement are explained (*ibid.*).

⁸ The MS is 15c. See James [89]. Swyneshed's text, on which this tract is based, was written not before c. 1330. See below, n. 189.

⁹ The text seems to be incomplete, although the author has completed all the tasks promised in his short prologue (p. 132). On p. 135 there begins a tract on fallacies, *inc.*: “Quoniam propter ignorantiam”

THE CATALOGUE

Seven suppositions are set out (*ibid.*), corresponding respectively to Swyneshed's first through fifth ands his seventh and eight. On p. 134 Swyneshed's three conclusions are set down in order. Three short objections to these conclusions are given, together with their replies.

IV

ANONYMOUS [fl. after 1327]

Commentarium in Sententias, III, q. 1, a. 3 [after 1327]¹⁰

Inc Circa materiam tertii articuli tractanda est tertia quaestio, quae inquirit de obligatione, unde sit solubilis.

Exp Et multa alia consimilia possent inferri. Et haec de tertio articulo, et per consequens de 9^a quaestione (?).

*Vatican, Vat. lat. 986, ff. 113ra-116ra.¹¹

The author accepts self-reference (113ra):

Prima propositio est contra Ockham in tractatu de obligationibus, et contra Roseth, *Quaestorum*, articulo 2. Et est ita, quod pars potest supponere pro suo toto, et contra (?) opposito, et pro convertibilibus illorum (?).

He cites Roseth's [LXII] objections against this principle, and replies to them (113rab).

The main points of the author's position are contained in the following passages:

1) ... nec istae duae sunt similes in mente, licet appareant in voce similes. Nam prima dicta a Sorte significat se fore falsam. Et hoc non obstante, significat se fore verum. Ideo est falsa Alia autem, puta *b* dicta a Platone, cuius ly 'hoc' demonstrat dictum a Sorte, scilicet, *a*, tantum significat *a* fore falsum. Et ideo est vera, nec infert primam (113rb).

¹⁰ The author refers to Ockham's *Summa logicae* [LXX], which was written c. 1327 (see Boehner [28], p. xii). Since Ockham and others are referred to by name, the text is possibly much later.

¹¹ Weisheipl [73], p. 167, n. 65, has Vat. lat. 896, through a printing error.

- 2) Si Sortes dicat istam 'Sortes dicit falsum,' tunc ista non est ejus contradictoria 'Sortes non dicit falsum' — immo sunt simul falsae Ex hoc patet quod tertia conclusio [i.e., Roseth's] in hoc est falsa, quando dicat quod in materia insolubilium contradictoria possunt simul esse falsa (*ibid.*).
- 3) Omnis propositio significans se non esse veram, vel se esse falsam, significat se fore veram (113va). He appeals to Bradwardine's [LXIV] second supposition.
- 4) Omnis talis propositio est falsa (114ra).
- 5) Talis propositio significat sicut est (*ibid.*).
- 6) Talis propositio significat sicut non est (*ibid.*). On the basis of these points, the author rejects Kilmington's position [LV], mentioned by name.
- 7) Omnis talis propositio aequivalet copulativaee (*ibid.*).
- 8) Some insolubles arise "ex proprietate vocis," some "ex actibus nostris," some from a mixture of the two (114rb).

V

ANONYMOUS [fl. not before last half 14c.]

Commentarium in insolubilia Hollandrini
[not before 3rd quarter 14c.]¹²

Inc Circa notitiam insolubilium sunt aliqua dubia per ordinem. Primum dubium est utrum notitia insolubilium praesupponit artem oblisticam.

Exp Illud est ultimum insolubile magistri Hollandrini, in quo primo ponitur casus insolubilis, et postea insolubile cum solutione ejusdem. Postea replicat (?) uno argumento contra solutionem. Et dicit sicut patet in littera.

? Cracow, Biblioteka Jagiellońska 2132 BB. VI 5.¹³

*Vienna, Nat. Bibl. 4953, ff. 86r-118v.

I have used the Vienna MS for all quotations.

This long and very interesting tract is a survey of positions on

¹² John of Holland began his regency in arts at Prague in 1369. But it seems he had previously studied at Oxford, and read Heytesbury, Bradwardine, Burley, Dumbleton and Swyneshed. See Emden [83], v. 2, p. 951.

¹³ Identification uncertain. Mohan [94] cites the *Inc* as: Circa notitiam insolubilium sunt aliqua dubia

insolubles. It takes the text of John of Holland [XXXVIII] as a starting point,¹⁴ and raises a number of *dubia* suggested by the contents of his tract. The author's own position cannot be determined fully without a further study of the text, but it seems that he departs substantially from John of Holland.

The first *dubium* (86rv) is as above. The author refers to a "Magister Hugo" [XXXII] who answers affirmatively (86r). But the author argues to the contrary (86rv). He further maintains (86v):

non omne insolubile est falsum, nec omne insolubile falsificat se
.... Divisio qua dicitur "Insolubile est propositio habens re-
flexionem falsitatis supra se ratione cuius sequitur eam esse
falsam" est mala.

The second *dubium* (86v-87r): "Quid sit insolubile, et an possibile sit fieri insolubile sine casu, et quid sit casus?" (86v). The author describes an insoluble (*ibid.*): "omnis propositio ex qua, admisso certo casu cum propositione exprimente eam praecise sic vel sic significare, sequitur eam esse falsam est insolubilis." This is a broad definition, for it includes such cases as this: "ponatur quod Sortes dicat illam 'Deus est' et nullam aliam, qua praecise significat Sortem dicere falsum" (*ibid.*)

With regard to a *casus*, the author says "Impossibile est esse casum sine admissione" (87r), and "Possibile est esse aliquod insolubile sine casu" (*ibid.*).

The third *dubium*: "quae sunt opiniones probabiliores de insolubilibus, et quis sit modus respondendi ad insolubilia secundum quamcumque istarum" (89r). The author first surveys Heytesbury's opinion [LXIX], mentioned by name (89r-90v). He argues against Heytesbury's refusal to specify the additional signification of insolubles (90v):

Fundamentum illius viae est quod ad omne insolubile con-
cernat certa obligatio, et quod insolubile propter casum factum
nullo modo aliter significat, licet oporteat concedi ipsam aliter
significare Sed contra illam viam instant aliqua. Primo sic: Nam
responsio illius viae videtur esse fuga, eo quod non vult dicere

¹⁴ John was required reading at the University of Vienna. See Aschenbach [30], p. 90.

qualiter aliter insolubile significat. Sic ergo facile esset respondere ad omnia vel solvere omnia. Quia dicerem quod homo currit, et numquam dicerem quis esset ille homo. Secundo: Nam aliud insolubile esset sine obligatione; igitur, oporteret hominem in tali casu certificare quaestionem quale insolubile aliter significat.

There is a second opinion (90v-93v):

propinqua tamen huic, quae non admittit casum si apponatur ly ‘praecise’; sed alias admittit casum et certificat quaestionem qua quaeritur qualiter aliter significat insolubile. Primo dicit illa via quodlibet insolubile esse mentale hypotheticum copulativum compositum ex tribus categoricis. Verbi gratia, stante casu de insolibili pro illa ‘Sortes dicit falsum,’ haec non contradicit sibi ‘Sortes non dicit falsum,’ quia ambae sunt falsae; sed haec ‘Non Sortes dicit falsum,’ quia aequivalet huic disjunctivae ‘Sortes non dicit falsum vel haec non est vera ‘Sortes non dicit falsum’ vel haec non est falsum ‘Sortes dicit falsum’ Notandum ulterius quod quodlibet insolubile est impossibile Dicit enim quodlibet insolubile esse falsum Dicit illa via quod propter casum insolubilem unum insolubile significet aliter quam prius, et quod ibi sit vera impositio, licet expresse non sit significatum impositum, sed virtualiter (90v-91r).

The third opinion (93v-96r)

est opinio Buridani [XXXIV] quae primo ponit quod quaelibet propositio implicat virtualiter in se quod sit vera, sic quod ad omnem propositionem cum propositione exprimente ejus significationem sequitur eam esse veram. Verbi gratia, sequitur bene: Sortes dicit falsum; et haec ‘Sortes dicit falsum’ praecise significat Sortem dicere falsum; igitur, haec est vera ‘Sortes dicit falsum’ (93v).

The fourth opinion rejects self-reference in insolubles (96r-97r).

The fifth (97r-98v)

dicit quod si casus sit falsus, tunc insolubile significat praecise in casu sicut extra casum. Et respondet ad insolubile secundum artem oblisticam, casu existente falso, ita quod diligenter respicit quid sit pertinens sequens ad eam, et hoc concedit, et quid sit pertinens repugnans, et illud negat Item, illa via concedit quod qualitercumque per insolubile significatur, ita est in re, et negat consequentiam quod igitur insolubile sit verum (97r).

Some of the other *dubia* discussed in the tract are these:

- 4) Utrum omne insolubile significat se esse verum? (98v).
- 5) An sit definitio communis omni propositioni verae [*i.e.*, both affirmatives and negatives]? (98v-100v).
- 6) Utrum pars insolubilis sit insolubilis, et similiter, utrum pars propositionis sit vera? (102v-105v).
- 7) Utrum alicujus insolubilis extrema supponant pro eodem? (106r-108v).
- 7a) subsidiary *dubium*: An possibile sit partem insolubilis praecise significare sicut totum insolubile? Videtur quod non. Dubitatur communiter an possibile sit aliquod syncategorema esse in propositione et non esse partem ejusdem? (108v).
- 8) An possibile sit eandem propositionem in numero esse simul veram et falsam? (109v-111r).
- 8) [repetitive enumetation]: Utrum omne insolubile verum natum sit habere mentalem veram, et similiter utrum omnis propositio vocalis vel scripta vera nata sit habere mentalem veram? (112v).

VI

ANONYMOUS [fl. mid 13c.]

Insolubilia [mid 13c.]¹⁵

Inc. <C>irca tractatum de insolubilibus, primo sceindum quod hoc nomen *insolubile* dicitur tripliciter.

Exp. Et cum inferit: “ergo falsum est me dicere falsum” solvendum est adhuc ac si dixisset: *Ego dico falsum*.

Marie-Louise Roure, “La problématique des propositions insolubles au XIII^e siècle et au début du XIV^e, suivie de l'édition des traités de W. Shyreswood, W. Burleigh et Th. Bradwardine,” *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 37 (1970), pp. 248-261.

Grabmann attributes this tract to William of Sherwood,¹⁶ and so, with a question mark, does Roure.¹⁷ But De Rijk argues convincingly that the attribution is spurious.¹⁸

¹⁵ See De Rijk 171, p. 93.

¹⁶ Grabmann 129, p. 21.

¹⁷ Roure [66], p. 248.

¹⁸ De Rijk, *loc. cit.*

The author defines an insoluble as an “*oratio ‘secundum quid et simpliciter’ ex reflexione eiusdem supra se cum natura oppositionis habens difficultatem*” (par. 0.02). He refers to the three *radices* of insolubles: “*ex actu nostro*,” “*ex actu ipsius vocis*,” and “*ex repugnantia intellectuum*” (0.03).¹⁹

The author discusses and rejects the opinion of the *cassantes*, in the form described by Bradwardine [LXIV] as the sixth opinion in his list (1.01-2.06). The opinion of the *restringentes* is also rejected (3.01-4.10). It is described as follows: “*dicunt quod ly falsum non potest supponere pro hac oratione cuius est pars, nec similiter pars pro toto*” (3.01). The author replies (4.01-4.10) by setting out unproblematic instances of self-reference, and by distinguishing between an integral whole and a universal whole.²⁰

The third opinion solves the paradox according to the fallacy *secundum quid et simpliciter*. Some hold that he who says ‘*Ego dico falsum*’ says something *simpliciter*. Some deny that he says something *simpliciter*, and also that he says nothing *simpliciter*. On the contrary, he says something only *secundum quid*. Those who hold this second view do so for one of two reasons. Some maintain that the expression is an expression *simpliciter*, but that to speak it is not to speak *simpliciter*. Others deny that the expression is *simpliciter* an expression (unnumbered par., pp. 253f.). The author considers the opinion which grants that it is *simpliciter* an expression, but denies that to speak it is to speak *simpliciter* (5.01-7.09). He rejects this opinion,²¹ giving among other reasons (7.06):

Item cum dico: *hoc dicitur, ly dicitur* non determinatur per *ly hoc*, quia nunquam subjectum est determinatio praedicati; ergo praedicatur ibi *dici simpliciter*, ergo infert aliquid dici.

The author next considers the position that the utterance is not a proposition, and that one who utters it says nothing. This appears to be a variant of the position of the *cassantes*, which the

¹⁹ Roure reads: *intellectum*. Compare Bradwardine’s rejection of this trichotomy [LXIV], ca. 6, 1st dichotomy.

²⁰ Compare John Duns Scotus [XXXVII], ad q. 52.

²¹ Contrary to De Rijk [7], p. 92.

author described earlier. It is likewise rejected (8.01-10.12. See also 11.10).

The author sets out his own position, which treats the paradox as a fallacy *secundum quid et simpliciter*. In the insoluble sentence the term ‘false’ can stand only for other false sentences. Or, alternatively put, the term can stand for the sentence in which it appears only *secundum quid*, not *simpliciter* (11.01-11.05).²²

The tract ends with two procedures for forming hypothetical insolubles (12.01).²³

Est igitur tenere quod vero copulato cum insolubili totum manet insolubile, falso disjuncto ab insolubili totum manet insolubile.

VII

ANONYMOUS [fl. early 15c.?]

Quaestiones libri insolubilium Hollandrini
[not before early 15c.?]²⁴

Inc Circa tractatum de insolubilibus quaeritur primo utrum ad propositionem esse veram sufficiat et requiritur ita esse sicut per eam significatur.

Exp ... ad rationes patet quid sit dicendum ex dictis. Haec de insolubilibus. Explicant quaestiones libri insolubilium Hollandrini.

*Erfurt, CA 4° 280, ff. 179ra-186rb.²⁵

Although the *Exp* says that this series of four questions deals with John of Holland’s *Insolubilia* [XXXVIII], and although there are reference to “magister in textu” (e.g., 185rb), John’s doctrine seems to enter into the discussion only insofar as it agrees

²² On supposition *secundum quid*, see also Lambert of Auxerre [XLV].

²³ Compare, e.g., Anonymous [IX] and Walter Burley’s rules in [LXVII].

²⁴ The MS is probably to be associated with the University of Erfurt. The fact that the text is falsely described as dealing with John of Holland’s work is perhaps a reflection of the fact that Holland’s text was the required one at Erfurt in the early 15c. (Thorndike [70], pp. 296f., no. 119). If the text originated at the University of Erfurt, it could not have been written much before 1400 (Rashdall [65], v. 2, pp. 245-250).

²⁵ Fl. 182v-183r are blank, except for glosses.

with Heytesbury [LXIX], and then it is attributed explicitly to Heytesbury, not to John (e.g., 181ra, rb, 184ra, 185va, vb).²⁶ Besides Heytesbury, the text refers by name to the positions of Bradwardine [LXIV] (184ra, 186rb), Thomas Manlevelt [LXV] (181ra "magister Thomas," 181va, 184ra, 186rb), Swyneshed [LXIII] (185rb, vb), and a certain "magister Hugo" [XXXII] (185vb) and a "magister Walter" [LXVI] (184vb).

Question 1 (179ra-181va) is as above. The author gives three opinions on truth-conditions of propositions, and rejects them all (179rb-vb). He then states four conclusions of his own. The first two deal with truth-conditions of assertoric categoricals (179vb-180ra), and the others with modal categoricals (180rab). These conclusions play little role in what follows, and are moreover rather obscure in themselves. They seem perhaps to treat quantifier words in categoricals as part of the subject term.

The author turns to a discussion of 'Sortes dicit falsum' (180 rb-181va). He sets out Heytesbury's opinion, and argues against Heytesbury's third rule (181rb-va). Furthermore, he says, according to Thomas Manlevelt, the respondent does have to specify the additional signification of insolubles (181va).

Question 2 (181va-183vb): Communiter quaeritur secundo utrum omnis propositio categorica affirmativa significat subjectum et praedicatum ejus supponere pro eodem.

The author sets out four conclusions (181vb). The main points are that every spoken or written proposition *may* be taken so to signify, since it signifies *ad placitum*. But in general not every proposition so signifies, for then the mental proposition 'Omnis propositio est particularis' would be impossible. More conclusions follow, the first of which is (182rb): "Ad placitum utentis est accipere propositionem vocalem vel scriptam sic quod significet se esse veram."

Question 3 (183vb-184vb): Communiter quaeritur tertio utrum omne insolubile significat se esse falsum.

In his reply, the author quotes essentially Heytesbury's definition of an insoluble proposition, and attributes it to Brad-

26 On the use of John of Holland's tract at Erfurt, see Thorndike, *loc. cit.*

wardine, Heytesbury and Manlevelt. But other “moderns” disagree (184ra):

Illi aliter definiunt, quia in fine variant definitionem Heytesbury, et dicunt sic: “Sequitur eam esse veram et (?) eam esse falsam, aut vere aut apparenter multum.

It is not known who these “moderns” are.

The author concludes “Non omne insolubile significat se esse falsum” (184rb). A discussion of insolubles without *casus* follows (184vab).

Question 4 (184vb-186rb): Communiter quaeritur quarto et ultimo utrum omne insolubile <est verum>.

The author’s conclusion is: “Aliquod insolubile est verum” (184vb). Thus, ‘Sortes dicit falsum,’ under the *casus* that Sortes also says ‘Homo est asinus,’ is true. Nevertheless (*ibid.*):

facto casu de insolubili, de quolibet insolubili concedendum est quod ipsum falsum, et hoc innuit magister Walter [LXVI], qui dicit quod omne insolubile est falsum.

According to one master, insoluble *casus* are to be admitted even if they posit that the insoluble *precisely* signifies as its terms pretend. In such a *casus*, the insoluble is to be conceded, and it is to be denied that it is true (185ra). The identity of the master referred to is unknown, but see Hugo [XXXII].

Arguments are raised against this opinion, the same arguments that can be raised against Swyneshed (185rab). But Swyneshed says, and so may one say on behalf of the opinion under consideration, that these objections are to be admitted, yet there is no “inconvenientia” in the case of insolubles (185rb).

VIII

ANONYMOUS [fl. 1368]

Insolubilia [1368]

Inc Circa tractatum de insolubilibus tria sunt notanda per ordinem.
Exp ... et Plato dicat illam, et tamen dicat falsum. Et sic respondeatur ad secundum sophisma. Et sic sit finis de insolubilibus in ista materia. Explicant insolubilia nova et noviter compilata 1368 anno domini.

Paul Vincent Spade, "An Anonymous Tract on *Insolubilia* from MS Vat. lat. 674: An Edition and Analysis of the Text," *Vivarium* 9 (1971), pp. 1-18.

The author gives five rules:

- 1) numquam insolubile debet admitti, quando cum insolibili ponitur quod propositio significat <praeceps> sicut termini praetendunt (par. 4).
- 2) insolubile semper est admittendum, quando ponitur cum casu quod propositio significet sicut termini communiter praetendunt. Et, si postea proponatur, debet admitti (par. 5).
- 3) insolubile positum sine casu debet admitti ac si poneretur cum casu quod propositio significet sicut termini communiter praetendunt (par. 6).
- 4) quaelibet propositio insolubilis aequivalet uni propositioni copulativa, sicut ista 'Sortes dicit falsum' aequivalet huic 'Sortes dicit falsum et haec est vera 'Sortes dicit falsum'' (par. 7).
- 5) oppositum cujuslibet propositionis insolubilis aequivalet vel debet esse una disjunctiva (par. 8).

The author gives two definitions of insolubles, according as the whole argument is referred to, or the insoluble proposition only (par. 9). The first definition is Bradwardine's [LXIV]; the second is essentially Heytesbury's [LXIX].

He observes that some opinions deny self-reference, while others allow it. He says that both positions may be held, by distinguishing between a part as part, and a part as a predicate whole (pars. 10-14).

The author applies his five rules to examples. He considers first categorical insolubles (pars. 15-24), and then composite ones: copulatives (pars. 25-33), disjunctives (pars. 34-39), con-

ditionals (pars. 40-46), causals (pars. 47-50), temporals (pars. 51-56), exclusives (pars. 57-61) and exceptives (pars. 62-65).

IX

ANONYMOUS [late 12c.-early 13c.]

De insolubilibus [late 12c.-early 13c.]

Inc Cum tractandum sit de insolubilibus et prior sit naturaliter affirmatio negatione, prius videndum est quid sit solubile et quid solutio

Exp Propter hoc debet dici quod non est enuntiabile. Et hec sufficient de insolubilibus.

L. M. De Rijk, "Some Notes on the Mediaeval Tract *De Insolubilibus*, with the Edition of a Tract Dating from the End of the Twelfth Century," *Vivarium* 4 (1966), pp. 83-115.

The author observes (p. 105):

quod talium insolubilium tres sunt partes: prima est actus hominis, secunda qualitas instrumenti, tertia essentia ipsius enuntiabilis.

The author maintains the position listed by Bradwardine [LXIV] as the sixth of the previous opinions. He says (p. 106):

dicendum: "*nil dicit*," cum generaliter omne id sit cassandum circa unumquodque enuntiabile quo supposito accidit insolubile circa id.

Rules are given for hypotheticals²⁷:

- 1) Si enuntiabile insolubile copuletur vero enuntiabili per disiunctivam coniunctionem, id totale est solubile (p. 109).
- 2) Si insolubile copuletur falso enuntiabili per disiunctivam coniunctionem, id totale est insolubile (p. 110).
- 3) Notandum quod si insolubile copuletur vero enuntiabili per copulativam coniunctionem, id totale est insolubile (*ibid.*).
- 4) Si insolubile copuletur falso insolubili per copulativam coniunctionem, id totale est solubile (*ibid. & f.*).

²⁷ Compare these rules with Anonymous [VI] and Walter Burley [LXVII].

X

ANONYMOUS [fl. probably mid 14c.]

Insolubilia [after 1335]²⁸

Inc <D>e insolubilibus tractaturus eorum causam finalem primitus intuendam, ut juxta naturam et dispositionem finis ordinentur ea quae sunt ad finem.

Exp Et ideo de talibus, non hic, sed convenienter in obligationibus, quae sentio et de aliis, inferam, prout possum. De insolubilibus igitur in se sufficient quae dicuntur. Expliciunt insolubilia.

Paul Vincent Spade, "An Anonymous Fourteenth-Century Treatise on 'Insolubles': Text and Study," M.S.L. Dissertation, The Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1969.

The author considers four previous opinions. The first is that of John Dumbleton [XXXVI] (pars. 3, 4, 5-23), the second that of Bradwardine [LXIV] (pars. 3, 4, 24-44),²⁹ and the third Ockham's [LXX] (pars. 3, 4, 45-64). The fourth opinion is based on a "causal" theory of truth. The truth or falsehood of what is signified by a proposition is the cause of, and therefore prior to, the truth or falsehood of the proposition itself. Thus insolubles are neither true nor false (pars. 3, 4, 65-102).³⁰

The principles of the author's position are these:

Dichotomies (par. 104):

- 1) Omnis suppositio in propositione est materialis vel significativa.
- 2) Quaelibet propositio simplex categorica est vera vel falsa.
- 3) Omne insolibile est categoricum vel hypotheticum.

Suppositions:

- 1)-2) (pars. 105-106) A simple categorical affirmative assertoric proposition in the present tense is true if and only if it signifies precisely as things are, and false otherwise.
- 3)-4) (pars. 107-108) A negative proposition which is in other respects like the above is false if and only if it signifies primarily as things are. If it signifies primarily as things are not, then it is true. (This is the force of the negative particle in the proposition.)

²⁸ See Spade [24], Introduction, p. *47.

²⁹ In Spade [24], I had not yet identified this opinion.

³⁰ See the ninth previous opinion discussed by Anonymous [XXIII]. Compare and contrast also Roger Nottingham [LXI].

5) (par. 109) *Omne insolubile, sive categoricum sive hypotheticum, ortum habet ex casu aliquo vel suppositione ordinata ad tale insolubile.*

Descriptions (par. 111):

- 1) A simple categorical insolubile is one in which the terms *seem* to stand for, or to signify, precisely a proposition.
- 2) A hypothetical insolubile is one in which one part seems to stand for a proposition.

Conclusions:

- 1) (pars. 112-115) *Quaelibet species termini in voce vel in scripto existens in anima est praecise agentis propriae et sui ipsius naturaliter ostensiva.*
- 2) (pars. 116-118) *Nullum extreum propositionis extra animam aliquid ex impositione significat, nisi quod naturaliter et a priori significat extreum propositionis mentalis.*
- 3) (pars. 119-121) *Quidquid aliqua propositio vel ejus extreum denotat significare, ipsum necesse est quod actualiter significat.*
- 4) (pars. 122-129) Self-reference is not possible in mental propositions.
- 5) (pars. 130-132) Self-reference is not possible in spoken or written propositions.

The author's application of these principles is as follows. If Socrates says only 'Sortes dicit falsum,' the term 'falsum' in that proposition has nothing for which it can stand significatively, *ex casu*. Thus it cannot stand in personal supposition. It must stand in material supposition, and the insoluble may be glossed 'Sortes dicit "falsum,"' which of course is true by the very fact that the term is part of the proposition which Socrates utters.

XI

ANONYMOUS [fl. mid 14c.?]

Tractatus de diversis insolubilibus, et de significatione et suppositione terminorum et confusione et distributione eorundem, et de modis aequivalentibus signis universalibus, et de arte obligatoria cum aliis incidentibus [after 1321]³¹

Inc De sophismatibus quae non re sed nomine insolubilia existunt superest tractare.

³¹ The MS is in a 14c. hand. See Weisheipl [75], p. 211. On f. 4ra the author quotes Bradwardine's [LXIV] first conclusion. Bradwardine's text was not written before 1321. See the note on the date, item [LXIV].

Exp Et idem dicendum probabiliter de omni propositione falsa posita (?) et proposita (?).

*Oxford, Merton 306, ff. 3ra-8ra.³²

This text has been ascribed to John Dumbleton [XXXVI], but Weisheipl has shown that the attribution is probably false.³³ The text is a commentary on an unidentified logical *Summulae*.³⁴ It is either a very sketchy commentary or an incomplete one, for it refers to the "second" and "third" opinions (3ra), but it is not clear what these are. The section on insolubles ends on 4rb.

The author states two conclusions concerning insolubles (3ra):

- 1) Solum reflexio actus animae supra se habetur in consequentia cuius antecedens vel consequens pro se vere vel appareret significat.
- 2) Nulla propositio significans pro re extra falsificat se.

XII

ANONYMOUS (PSEUDO-HEYTESBURY)³⁵
[probably fl. after 1335]

Insolubilia [probably after 1335]³⁶

Inc Incipiunt insolubilia optima. Insoluble est propositio affirmativa vel negativa aliqualiter esse vel aliqualiter non esse significativa

Exp Et ad omnia talia respondendum est per praedicta sufficienter. Et sicut dictum est ad illa insolubilia, sic dicendum est ad omnia consimilia. Explicant insolubilia valde utilis secundum Heytesbury.

*Padua, Bibl. univ. 1123, ff. 22vb-24rb.

The treatise omits any discussion of previous opinions. It defines an insoluble *casus* and an insoluble proposition as Heytesbury [LXIX] does (22vb). A distinction is made between simple and composite insolubles (23ra). There is no corresponding distinction made in [LXIX]. Simple insolubles are considered

³² Weisheipl [75], p. 211, gives ff. 1-7v, according to a different folio numbering. The text in fact ends on the recto side of the previous folio, 6ra according to Weisheipl's numbering, 8ra by ours.

³³ Weisheipl [74], p. 204.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, n. 6.

³⁵ Attributed to Heytesbury by Weisheipl [75], pp. 212f., on the basis of the *explicit*.

³⁶ Heytesbury's text was written in 1335. See the note on the date, item [LXIX].

first. These are insolubles which are grammatically categorical sentences. Three rules are set out for simple insolubles, together with examples (23rab). These rules are the same as the first three rules in [LXIX]. The author goes on to consider insolubles which are universal affirmatives, and those which are universal negatives, as well as certain insolubles in which the antinomy arises only indirectly (23rb). Rules are given corresponding to the fourth and fifth rules of [LXIX], and the rules are applied to examples (23va; 23vab).

The treatise turns to a consideration of composite insolubles. Disjunctives, copulatives, exclusives, and exceptives are considered (23vb; 23vb-24ra; 24ra; 24rab). In the first two cases, a method is given for constructing insolubles of the sort under consideration. The treatise closes with a consideration of the insoluble 'Hoc est falsum' (24rb).

Although the tract is said to be "secundum Heytesbury," the phrase is ambiguous. It could mean that the tract is only "in accordance with Heytesbury." In this connection, it is noteworthy that the author says, in discussing the third rule, that an insoluble is implicitly a copulative — e.g., 'Sortes dicit falsum' implicitly says that Socrates speaks falsely and that the sentence 'Sortes dicit falsum' is true (22rab). This is just the additional signification which Heytesbury explicitly refuses to specify in [LXIX]. Since this refusal was taken to be the characteristic feature of Heytesbury's position, the attribution of the present tract to Heytesbury seems very doubtful.

XIII

ANONYMOUS [Italian, 1st half 15c.?]³⁷

Insolubilia [1st half 15c.?]

Inc In materia insolubilium prima regula opinionis Heytesbury
Exp ... isto posito, *a* pondus est maximum pondus quod Sortes potest
 portare. Quod probatur, quia *a* Sortes sufficit portare et nullum
 majus.

*Vatican, Vat. lat. 2154, ff. 29va-34vb.

³⁷ This conjecture is based on the fact that the author appeals in one place to Peter of Mantua [LII], and in another to Paul (i.e., of Venice [L?] of Pergula [XLVIII]-[XLIX?]).

The text appears to be incomplete. It begins by stating the five rules of Heytesbury's tract [LXIX] and arguing against each in turn (29va-30ra; 30rab; 30rb-31ra; 31ra-vb; 31vb-32va). The author has Heytesbury's first two rules in reverse order.³⁸ The fourth and fifth rules are labeled "Tertia regula" and "Quarta regula" in the MS. This is clearly a scribal error, for the author had already quoted Heytesbury's third rule as "Tertia regula". In arguing against Heytesbury's second rule (the first in the author's listing), he raises objections analogous to those raised by Heytesbury himself against the insufficiencies of his own position. The arguments against Heytesbury's third rule include various forms of the paradox 'This sentence is not to be conceded.'

After arguing against Heytesbury's rules, the tract turns to a consideration of the first three previous opinions discussed in Heytesbury's tract. They are described as they appear there, and in the same order (32va-33vb; 33vb; 33vb-34vb). The first such opinion is explicitly ascribed to Swyneshed [LXIII]. The second and third are unascribed.³⁹ The author argues against each of these opinions. The third opinion is given a particularly extensive treatment. The text breaks off abruptly. The author's own position is not set out.

XIV

ANONYMOUS [fl. c. 1300?]

Notandum [probably before 1307]⁴⁰

*Cambridge, Gonville & Caius, 668/645, f. 76r.

The text follows Burley's questions on the *De interpretatione* in the MS.⁴¹ It is brief enough to quote here in full:

Notandum quod, si fiat insolubile et negetur ista consequentia
vel consimilis: 'Hoc dicitur a Sorte; et hoc est falsum; igitur,

³⁸ Compare Angelo of Fossambrone [XXV].

³⁹ Contrast Cajetan of Thiene's commentary [XXVIII].

⁴⁰ Synan [21], p. 19. E. A. Synan called my attention to this text.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 310.

falsum dicitur a Sorte,' potest argui, inquam, quaerendo: aut Sortes dicit verum aut dicit non verum. Si dicat non verum, et non dicit duplum nec multiplex; igitur, dicit falsum; igitur, falsum dicitur a Sorte. Nec potest dare quod dicat verum, quia per te dicat hoc falsum et nihil aliud ab hoc.

Et dicendum: quando quaeritur "aut dicit verum aut non verum," dicendum quod neque sic neque sic, sed dicit hoc non verum. Et quando dicitur "Sortes dicit aliquid; igitur, illud aut est verum aut non verum," dicendum quod illud est non verum. Et tunc non valet argumentum: "Hoc est non verum; et hoc dicitur a Sorte; igitur, non verum dicitur a Sorte," quia sicut illud est circulare 'falsum dicitur a Sorte' et 'falsum aliud ab hoc dicitur a Sorte,' sic illud est circulare 'non verum dicitur a Sorte' et 'non verum aliud ab hoc dicitur a Sorte.'

XV

ANONYMOUS [late 14c.-15c.]

Tractatus de insolubilibus [c. 1361-15c.]⁴²

Inc. Pro superficiali notitia insolubilium

Exp. universalis affirmativa tamen ly 'falsum' ... (incomplete).

*Prague, Univ. 906, ff. 38r-49r.

The author adopts essentially Wyclif's position [XLIII]. He sets out three general rules (38r):

- 1) Cujuslibet propositionis verae significatum primarium est veritas.
- 2) Cujuslibet propositionis categoricae significatum primarium attenditur ex habitudine praedicati ad subjectum mediante copula.
- 3) Tam in materia insolubilium quam non insolubilium, non est inconveniens partem supponere pro suo toto, licet hoc multis non placet.

⁴² The MS is 15c., part of it from before 1455. Cf. Truhlář [99]. Wyclif's *De logia*, which the author seems to use, was written probably c. 1361. Cf. below, n. 128.

The author distinguishes five ways in which a proposition may be said to be true (38r). The five ways constitute a finer analysis of Wyclif's three grades of truth.

Three things are necessary for an insoluble. If any of these is lacking, the proposition concerns the art of *obligationes*, not of insolubles (38v):

- 1) Primum est quod unum dicens falsum sit omne dicens talem. (E.g., "Unus Sortes sit omnis Sortes.")
- 2) Unum dictum tale sit omne dictum tale. (E.g., "Si Sortes dicit istam propositionem 'Sortes dicit falsum', quod solum illam et nullam aliam.")
- 3) In qualibet tali propositione termini significant sicut sunt impositi ad significandum a principali institutione.

The author considers and rejects the first six opinions that Wyclif considers (42v-43r). The remainder of the tract applies the author's principles to cases.

On 41v the author sets up an example in which he shifts from 'Ego non habeo denarium' to 'Martinus habet denarium' in such a way as to suggest that his own name is "Martinus". The indication, however, is hardly conclusive.

XVI

ANONYMOUS [14c.]

Quaestio de insolibili [14c.]⁴³

Inc Probo quod aliqua propositio insolubilis sit vera, quia sumo istam

...

Exp et tamen quod dicit non est propositio vera et falsa.

*Venice, San Marco Z 301 (1576), f. 25r.

There are three brief notes on f. 25r. The second and third deal with *obligationes*, and are only a few lines each. The first however is a brief but complete *quaestio* on insolubles. Four

⁴³ The MS is in a 14c. hand.

arguments are set out purporting to show that an insoluble proposition may be true. The author sets out four theses, and then replies to the preliminary arguments. The four theses are not very informative — indeed, the fourth seems unintelligible as it stands. But the replies to the last two preliminary arguments are curious:

Ad aliam dico quod *a* propositio significat esse sicut est, et tamen non significat aliqualiter esse sicut est.

Ad aliam dico quod Sortes dicens *a* dicit verum et falsum, et *a* est verum et falsum. Et tamen *a* non est propositio vera et falsa, nec convertitur ‘verum et falsum’ et ‘propositio vera et falsa.’ Et ideo dico quod Sortes dicit *a*, quod est verum <et> falsum, et tamen dico quod non est propositio vera et falsa.

This seems to be the position that an insoluble is a “propositio plures.”⁴⁴

XVII

ANONYMOUS [14C.?]

Insolubilia [14c.?]

Inc Quattuor sunt divisiones propositionum quarum prima est haec.
Exp Nam sequitur immediate: “Illa non significat sicut est; igitur, illa non significat sicut est.” Expliciunt insolubilia.⁴⁵

*Cambridge, Corpus Christi 244 (245), ff. 59r-76v.

*Cambridge, Corpus Christi 378, ff. 77r-80r (incomplete).⁴⁶

This text bears a close resemblance to Roger Swyneshed's *De insolubilibus* [LXIII], and may perhaps be an abbreviated version of it.

44 Compare Anonymous [XVIII], Peter of Ailly [LI], and Peter of Mantua [LII].

45 The *Inc* and *Exp* are taken from Corpus Christi 244 (245).

46 Mohan [94] cites also Oxford, Bodl., 676, f. 126. I have been unable to verify any MS of this description in the Bodleian MSS catalogues. Mohan also suggests an attribution to Richard Swyneshed, but no grounds are given.

XVIII

ANONYMOUS (PSEUDO-BRADWARDINE)
[date unknown]

Insolubilia [date unknown]

Inc Quia a pluribus quaeratur facilius invenire, maxime si humilitas et concordia adjunctim

Exp ... aliqua propositio est universalis aut particularis secundum vocem tantum, et <secundum> significationem est propositio plures, aut copulativa aut disjunctiva, et non nulla propositio nec particularis. Et hoc forte in pluribus valet. Explicit insolubilium tractatus.

*Vatican, Vat. lat. 2154, ff. 22va-24rb.

I have been unable to make sense of this tract. The hand is clear enough, but the copy seems to be corrupt. The doctrine is largely opaque, partly because of a licentious use of alphabetic letters, the significance of which is never explained.

The MS ascribes this tract to Thomas Bradwardine (22v top), but there is no reason to regard this as accurate. It is certainly not in the style of Bradwardine's authentic *Insolubilia* [LXIV], which immediately precedes it in the MS.

There seem to be references in the work to chapters of another treatise. Perhaps these refer to Bradwardine's tract, and the present work is meant to be based on Bradwardine's text. This might explain the ascription to Bradwardine.

XIX

ANONYMOUS [fl. probably early 14c.]

Tractatus de sophismatibus
[probably early 14c.]⁴⁷

Inc Quoniam felicitates artis exercitiae et obviativae inquirimus, ...

Exp et ponatur Sortem esse album ... haec est concedenda. [seemingly incomplete]⁴⁸

*Bruges, Bibl. publ. MS 500, ff. 173ra-180va.

⁴⁷ Based on the doctrine and on the other authors appearing in the MS: Heytesbury, Burley, Bradwardine, Ockham, and Swyneshed.

⁴⁸ The *Inc* is illegible in the microfilm, and is taken from de Poorter [82].

The discussion of insolubles runs from the beginning of the text to f. 176rb. The following passages indicate the author's opinion:

- 1) (173rb) In primis (?) pono unam regulam generalem (?): Terminus communis (?) numquam potest supponere pro toto cuius est pars, nisi (?), posito toto loco partis, accidit reflexio ejusdem actus supra se ipsum cum negatione vel cum determinatione privativa.
- 2) (173va) Dico quod sic dicendo nec dico verum nec dico falsum. Non enim est concedendum quod dico verum hoc, quia si esset haec vera, dico falsum cum nihil aliud dico. Nec est concedendum quod dico falsum, quia denotaretur quod dico falsum aliud ab isto, scilicet, 'Ego dico falsum.' Et si quaeratur aut haec propositio 'Ego dico falsum' sit vera vel falsa, dico quod est falsa. Et non valet: 'Haec est falsa, et dico hanc; ergo, dico falsum,' quia sensus conclusionis est: 'Dico falsum aliud ab hoc.'
- 3) (173vb) Sed est fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter.

XX

ANONYMOUS [mid 13c.]

Insolubilia [mid 13c.]⁴⁹

Inc <T>empestive deficiet qui in mendacio confidit, quia non sola veritas sed et falsitas mendacio contradicit.

Exp 'aliud ab hoc,' sed de vi sermonis subintelligitur, ut dictum est.

H. A. G. Braakhuis, "The Second Tract on *Insolubilia* Found in Paris, B.N. Lat. 16.617: An Edition of the Text with an Analysis of its Contents," *Vivarium* 5 (1967), pp. 111-145.

The position maintained in this early treatise is a combination of that of the so-called "restringentes"⁵⁰ with that described by Bradwardine as the fourth in his list ([LXIV], ca. 5). The author argues that "terminus non supponit pro oratione cuius est pars" (p. 132). He also argues that the verb of an insoluble, even though it is in the present tense, refers to some prior time. Nor is this contrary to the force of the present tense, for the author

49 Braakhuis [5], pp. 129f.

50 See Bradwardine [LXIV], ca. 5.

seems to take the present tense to refer to a kind of "specious present," in which there is a distinction between prior and posterior. This seems to be the sense of p. 134, lines 13-18.

The author relies heavily on the notion that truth is a property of sentence-tokens, not of the type, so that two tokens of the same type may have different truth-values.

XXI

ANONYMOUS [fl. 1st half 13c.]

Insolubilia [c. 1225]⁵¹

Inc Termini privatorii inveniuntur dupliciter ab Aristotele sumi.

Exp ... similiter non tenet 'Est vera quantum ad hoc; ergo, est vera simpliciter.'

*Paris, B.N. lat. 11412, ff. 88ra-91va.

The text appears to be incomplete. De Rijk⁵² has given an analysis of its contents. Only a brief account will be given here.

The author mentions the opinion of those who solve the paradox by "interemptio actus." To the insoluble 'Ego dico falsum,' they reply 'Nil dicens' (88rb).⁵³ The author says that this opinion is "secundum commune judicium" (*ibid.*)

The author mentions three *radices* of insolubles, according to the common opinion (*ibid.*):

Prima provenit ex actu hominis qui pertinet ad disputationem Secunda species provenit ex actu qui pertinet ad disputationem, sicut ex consignificatione et consimilibus Tertia species provenit ex substantia alicujus quod debet significari.

The author argues that the first two may be reduced to the third, which is the sole root of insolubles (90vb).

The opinion of the *cassantes* is rejected (91ra). So too is the opinion of those who say "in hac locutione 'Ego dico falsum,'

⁵¹ De Rijk [7], p. 98. Hauréau [86], v. 2, p. 45 suggests that this tract is by John Page (Pagus), but this is only a suggestion, based on the fact that other works by John appear in the same MS. De Rijk, *loc. cit.*, suggests that the author at least came from the same Parisian circle as John Page and Nicholas of Paris.

⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. 93-98.

⁵³ See Anonymous [IX], and the sixth position in Bradwardine's list of previous opinions [LXIV], ca. 5.

iste terminus ‘falsum’ non potest teneri pro tali categorica propositione cuius est pars” (*ibid.*).

The author discusses three ways of solving the antinomy by the fallacy *secundum quid et simpliciter*:

- 1) The insoluble is “equipollent” to a contradiction and so is false *simpliciter*. But, since one side of the contradiction must be true, the insoluble is true *secundum quid*. But, the author observes, this would apply also to any contradiction (91rb).
- 2) ... in hac locutione ‘Ego dico falsum,’ hoc verbum ‘dico’ transit supra hunc terminum ‘falsum’. Et non posset transire supra ipsum, si iste terminus ‘falsum’ solum pro hoc ‘me dicere falsum’ teneretur, quia non potest una et eadem dictio transire supra se. The author rejects this too (*ibid.*).
- 3) The third way is accepted by the author. It agrees with the common way of speaking: “Vulgariter enim dicitur ‘Iste nil facit,’ cum non faciat aliquid eo modo quo debet facere. Eodem modo rusticus respondet ad talem locutionem ‘Ego dico falsum’ *simpliciter* ‘Falsum est,’ quia hoc verbum ‘dico’ determinationem hanc quam debet habere non habet. Debet enim transire supra alias dictiones et non transit. Unde dicitur ‘Nil dicis,’ quia non dicens aliquid eo modo quo debes dicere” (91va).

XXII

ANONYMOUS (PSEUDO-SCOTUS)⁵⁴
[late 13c.-early 14c.?]

In librum primum priorum analyticorum
Aristotelis quaestiones, q. 10
[late 13c.-early 14c.]

Inc Utrum in bona consequentia ex opposito consequentis infertur oppositum antecedentis.

In John Duns Scotus, *Opera omnia*, Paris: Vivès, 1891-1895, v. 2, pp. 103-108.

⁵⁴ See Wolter [12], p. xxi.

The author considers three definitions of a valid consequence (pp. 103f.)⁵⁵:

Primus modus est, quod ad bonitatem consequentiae requiritur, et sufficit, quod impossibile est antecedens esse verum, et consequens, falsum.

Secundus modus dicendi est, quod ad bonitatem consequentiae requiritur, et sufficit, quod impossibile est sic esse, sicut significatur per antecedens, quin sic sit, sicut significatur per consequens.

Tertius modus est, quod ad bonitatem consequentiae requiritur, et sufficit, quod impossibile est antecedente, et consequente simul formatis, antecedens esse verum, et consequens falsum.

He argues against the first two definitions, and against the third he provides the following counterexample (p. 104):

... *Deus est*; igitur ista consequentia non valet, demonstrata eadem. Certum est, quod ista consequentia non valet, ut est possibile eam valere, quia tunc consequens esset falsum, et antecedens verum in bona consequentia. Et quod antecedens sit necessarium, notum est: sed quod consequens sit necessarium, probo; quia impossibile est dictam consequentiam valere, igitur necesse est, sic esse, qualitercumque consequens significat, quia consequens non significat aliud, nisi quod ista consequentia non valet, et hoc de significatione materiali terminorum, et de significatione formalii significat hanc esse veram: haec consequentia non valet, et secundum utramque significationem consequens est necessarium.

On the basis of this, the author provides his own definition (*ibid.*):

Dico igitur quod ad bonitatem consequentiae, requiritur, et sufficit ultimus modus, scilicet impossibile est, antecedente, et consequente simul formatis, quod antecedens sit verum, et consequens falsum, excepto uno casu, scilicet ubi significatum consequentis repugnat significationi notae consequentiae, sicut conjunctionis, quae denotat consequentiam esse, sicut in praecedenti arguento. Unde in praedicta consequentia ista dictio *igitur*, denotat consequentiam esse bonam: cui demonstrationi, vel significationi repugnat significatum consequentis: igitur non oportet quod in isto casu consequentia sit bona

⁵⁵ For a discussion of these passages, see Kneale [58], pp. 286-288. The first and third definitions are considered and rejected by Buridan [9], VIII, soph. 1. See also Buridan [11], pp. 180-183. The second definition is Buridan's own (*ibid.*).

XXIII

ANONYMOUS [fl. before mid 15c.]

Insolubilia [1351-1433]⁵⁶

Inc Utrum insolubile sit subjectum attributionis scientiae insolubilium. Pro responsione dicitur.

Exp propositio potest esse in intellectu objective, ipsa non existente.

*Berlin, Staatsbibliothek 973 (lat. fol. 206), ff. 184rb-187rb.

This text consists of six *dubia*. The first (184rb-vb) is as above. The author's answer is affirmative. The second *dubium* (184vb-185ra) is "Utrum aliquis sit finis proprius scientiae insolubilium, et quis sit iste." The author replies that the proper end of this science is "scire solvere deductiones sophisticas argumentorum insolubilium in quibus non existenter (?) sed valde apparenter sequitur contradictio circa insolubile" (185ra).

The third *dubium* (185rab) asks "Utrum via doctrinae primo debet acquiri scientia insolubilium tantum quam acquiritur scientia obligationum." The author's reply is that it should be just the reverse. The fourth *dubium* (185rb-va) is "Utrum scientia insolubilium sit partialis scientiae in ordine ad scientiam obligationum." The answer is negative.

The long fifth *dubium* (185va-187rb) asks "Utrum casus integer communiter insolubilis sit admittendus." The author lists ten positions "famosiores apud antiquos sophistas" (185vb). The first five answer affirmatively. The first adds that "in materia insolubilium non est inconveniens duo contradictoria sibi invicem contradicentia in eodem instanti et de quolibet parte ejusdem instanti esse simul vera" (*ibid.*). The second through fourth positions (185vb-186ra) seem to correspond to Heytesbury's [LXIX] first three previous opinions. The fifth position (186ra) says that every insoluble is *secundum quid* true and *secundum quid* false, but neither *simpliciter* true nor *simpliciter* false.

The sixth view (186rab) denies the common *casus* as simply impossible. It resembles Heytesbury's fourth previous opinion, the one he adopts. The seventh position (186rb) allows self-reference

⁵⁶ The MS is dated 1433. See Mohan [94]. The author cites Marsilius of Inghen [XLVII]. See below, n. 140.

and admits the *casus*, and says that every insoluble signifies itself to be true and signifies itself to be false. The eighth view (*ibid.*), attributed to Dumbleton [XXXVI], denies the *casus* on the basis of the impossibility of self-reference. The ninth view (*ibid.*) appears to be the same as the fourth previous opinion in Anonymous [X]. The tenth (186rb-187ra) solves insolubles “per artem oblisticam” (186rb). This seems to be the author’s own view. Certain other views are discussed briefly (187rab), including that of Marsilius of Inghen [LXVII] (187ra).

The sixth and last *dubium* (187rb) is “Utrum possibile sit partem supponere pro toto propositione cujus est pars.” The author claims that this question cannot be solved.

XXIV

ALBERT OF SAXONY [1316-1390]⁵⁷

Perutilis logica I, 6, and VI, 1 [1351-1365]⁵⁸

**Perutilis logica*, (Venice: Petrus Aurelius Sanutus Venetus, 1518), ff. 3vb-4rb; 43rb-46va. Copy at Paris, B.N., Imprimés, Rés. R. 183.

An occasionally more reliable text of VI, 1, is published with Albert’s

**Sophismata*, (Paris: Félix Baligault, 1495 [Hain 582]), no folio numbers. Copy at the Yale University Library.

I have used the 1518 edition for the following references, except where otherwise noted.

Tract I, ch. 6, has several references forward to the chapter on insolubles (VI, 1). But there is an important distinction made there that is not made in the later chapter (4rb):

Septimo dico quod omnis propositio significans se falsum esse est falsa. Patet, quia significat eandem propositionem se ipsam esse veram et falsam. De directa enim significatione significat se ipsam esse falsam ...; de consecutiva autem significatione significat se esse veram. Et hoc est falsum, scilicet, quod eadem propositio sit vera et falsa.

⁵⁷ Heidingsfelder [56], pp. 1-44.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

Tract VI, ch. 1, sets out the following principles of Albert's solution:

Descriptions:

- 1) *Propositio vera est quae qualitercumque significat ita est, et cum hoc possibile est eam esse* (1495 ed.).
- 2) *Propositio falsa est quae non qualitercumque significat ita [necessel est, et potest esse* (1495 ed.).
- 3) *Propositio possibilis est quae qualitercumque significat ita potest esse* (1518 ed., 43rb).
- 4) *Necessaria propositio est quae qualitercumque significat ita necesse est esse* (*ibid.*).

Suppositions (*ibid.*):

- 1) *Omnis propositio est affirmativa vel negativa.*
- 2) *Omnem propositionem affirmativam veram esse est idem esse pro quo supponit ejus subjectum et praedicatum, et e converso; et ipsam esse falsam est non esse idem pro quo supponit ejus subjectum et praedicatum, et e converso.*
- 3) *Omnem propositionem negativam veram esse est non esse idem pro quo supponit ejus subjectum et praedicatum, et e converso; et ipsam esse falsam est esse idem pro quo supponit subjectum et praedicatum.*
- 4) *Omnis propositio affirmativa significat idem esse pro quo supponit subjectum et praedicatum. Et hoc manifeste ostendit copula in ea affirmata.*
- 5) *Omnis propositio negativa significat non esse idem pro quo supponit subjectum ejus et praedicatum. Et hoc ostendit manifeste copula negata in ea.*
- 6) *Impossibile est eandem propositionem esse veram et falsam.*

Conclusions:

- 1) *Omnis propositio affirmativa significat se esse veram* (*ibid.*).
- 2) *Omnis propositio negativa significat se esse veram* (*ibid.*).
- 3) *Omnis propositio mundi significat se esse veram* (*ibid.*).
- 4) *Omnis propositio affirmativa significans se esse veram et se esse falsam est falsa* (43rb-va).
- 5) *Omnis propositio negativa significans se esse veram et se esse falsam ipsa est falsa* (43va).
- 6) *Omnis propositio significans se esse veram et se esse falsam est falsa* (*ibid.*).
- 7) *Omni propositioni copulativa contradicit una disjunctiva composita ex partibus contradictibus partibus istius copulativa* (*ibid.*).

These principles are applied to nineteen examples (43va-46va). In replying to the third insoluble, Albert says (44ra):

dico non esse impossibile quod sint dueae propositiones omnino consimiles quarum termini unius supponunt pro eodem pro quo supponunt termini alterius, et tamen unam earum esse falsam et aliam veram, propter hoc quod una falsificat se et alia non.

XXV

ANGELO OF FOSSAMBRONE [fl. 1400]⁵⁹

Insolubilia [probably 1395-1402]⁶⁰

Inc Quia omnis opinio in materia insolubilium ad quam communiter habent nunc respondentes refugium

Exp Et similiter est dicendum in similibus in quibus vel de quibus per haec dicta respondens cum aliquali solertia poterit habere certitudinem in respondendo. Et haec dicta breviter sufficient. Amen.

Klagenfurt, Studienbibliothek, Pap. 168, ff. 61r-67v.⁶¹

Vatican, Vat. lat. 2130, ff. 161-170.⁶²

*Venice, San Marco VI, 30 (2547), ff. 63ra-71va.

Venice, San Marco VI, 155 (3377), ff. 18-31.⁶³

San Marco VI, 30 has been used for the following references.

Angelo first considers the opinion that "pars propositionis aut secum convertibilis non potest supponere pro tota propositione cuius est pars nec pro ejus pertinente" (63ra), and argues against it (63ra-vb). He then sets out his own position (63vb-71va), which is a more elaborate form of William Heytesbury's [LXIX]. He defines an insoluble proposition and its *casus* as follows (63vb-64ra):

59 Wilson [77], p. 26.

60 Angelo taught at Bologna 1395-1400, and at Padua 1400-1402 (*ibid.*).

61 Mohan [94].

62 Wilson [77], p. 192.

63 Mohan [94] cites these last two MSS as Cl. X, cod. 219 and Cl. XI, cod. 18, respectively. On the identification, see Kristeller [92], II, pp. 220, 224. On the confusion of ways of citing San Marco MSS, see *ibid.*, II, pp. 208f., 215f.

Propositio insolubilis est propositio de qua vel secum convertibili principaliter in aliquo (?) casu fit mentio, de quo casu simul cum propositione adaequate et assertive significante ipsam esse veram, cum hoc per se autem quod illa adaequate et assertive significat sicut ejus termini authentice et assertive significant, apta nata est sequi propositio adaequate significans et assertive ipsam esse falsam, et e converso. Casus vero de insolubili est ille in quo fit mentio de tali propositione et taliter se habente Non etiam opportunum est ut ex casu de insolubili solum formaliter deduci possit ex ipsam esse veram, ipsam esse falsam et e converso, sed sufficit quod si ita foret quod, cum illo casu, illa adaequate significet ut termini communiter praetendunt, illud formaliter sequeretur. Unde ille est casus de insolubili, scilicet, posito quod illa est omnis propositio quae est in mundo, scilicet, 'Falsum est,' nihil plus ponendo

He distinguishes among insolubles (64va):

Propositionum insolubilium aliqua est categorica, aliqua hypothetica Categorica insolubilis potest esse quae a toto insolubiliter significat, aut ponitur in aliquo modo insolubili significare, et potest esse insolubilis, quae tamen ponitur in casu aliquo modo aliter quam insolubiliter significare.

Angelo treats of these several types, and also of propositions which seem to be insolubles and are not. In setting out the first of three preliminary suppositions, he distinguishes two kinds of signification (64vb):

Propositionem significare aliquid uno modo solum repraesentative, alio modo assertive. Primo modo dicimus propositionem significare repraesentative quando illud alio aliquo modo virtute considerationis ad illam propositionem aut alicujus partem ejus ab intellectu apprehenditur Propositionem vero dicimus assertive aliquid significare quando adaequate signum significationis illius propter conformitatem significati communis modi significando formaliter sequitur Unde dici potest quod significare repraesentative et assertive habent se sicut superius et inferius, et superius est significare repraesentative. Unde omne quod significat assertive significat repraesentative, et non e converso.

Truth- and falsehood-conditions are given (64vb-65ra):

Ad hoc quod aliqua propositio sit vera, oportet quod quaelibet propositio alicujus ejus significationis assertivae sit vera si for-

maretur Ad hoc quod aliqua propositio sit falsa sufficit quod aliqua alicujus ejus assertivae significationis sit falsa si formaretur, et hoc etiam requiritur.

Angelo then gives five rules corresponding to Heytesbury's five (65ra-67ra). His first two rules correspond in reverse order to Heytesbury's first two.⁶⁴

Objections are raised to these rules (67ra-68ra). In order to reply to them, Angelo explains the meaning of certain terms (68ra):

- 1) *Propositio ab aliquo concedenda est propositio ad cuius oppositum repugnantem non est ille mediate vel immediate formaliter obligatus.*
- 2) *Propositio quam concedendum est ab aliquo esse verum est propositio ad quam non esse veram ille non est mediate vel immediate formaliter obligatus.*
- 3) *Consequentia ab aliquo concedenda est consequentia ad quam ex ejus illatione formali et non alicujus obligationis veritate ille bene respondendo concedet.*
- 4) *Consequentia quam concedendum est ab aliquo esse bonam est consequentia ad quam non esse bonam ille non mediate vel immediate formaliter obligatus, et sine nova impositione bene respondendo concederet esse bonum, vel consequentia[m] ad quam esse bonam ille est mediate vel immediate formaliter obligatus.*

Certain corollaries are drawn from these principles (68rab), and the earlier objections answered (68rb-69va). Angelo then gives additional rules for insolubles "dum imponuntur aliquo modo aliud aliter quam insolubiliter⁶⁵ significandum" (69va). These rules are rather obscure; we shall quote only the first two:

- 1) *Si in casu fiat mentio de propositione insolibili omnino aliter quam insolubiliter adaequate imposta ad significandum, et illud cum quo per impositionem denotatur ipsum simpliciter converti sit omnino impertinens casui, si tunc illud insolubile sit tale quod*

⁶⁴ See above, Anonymous [XIII].

⁶⁵ MS insolubile.

extra casum fuisse dignum concedi, ipsum primo loco propositum est concedendum, quo concessum, negandum ipsum esse verum si proponatur. Et propositio cum qua denotatur ipsum simpliciter converti, si consequenter proponitur, est neganda. Si vero propositio cum qua denotatur per impositionem insolubile converti est primo loco proposita, est concedenda. Tunc, illa concessa, si proposita fuerit, tunc, proposito insolubili, ipsum est negandum, et concedendum est ipsum esse verum.

2) Si in casu fiat mentio de propositione insolubili omnino aliter quam insolubiliter adaequate et assertive ad significandum <imposita>, et illud cum quo denotatur per impositionem converti sit omnino impertinens casui, si tunc illud insolubile est tale quod est omnino impertinens, et extra casum negaretur, ipsum primo loco propositum est negandum. Deinde concedendum ipsum esse verum, et propositio cum qua denotatur ipsum simpliciter converti est concedenda. Si vero propositio cum qua denotatur ipsum converti primo loco proposita sic est neganda, ipsa primo loco proposita negata, consequenter proposito insolubili, ipsum est concedendum, et negandum est ipsum esse verum.

XXVI

ANTHONY DE MONTE [fl. 1395]

Quaedam conclusiones [1395]⁶⁶

*Oxford, Bodl. Canon. Misc. 219, f. 12ra.

These are simply a few notes written by the scribe of the Oxford MS of Henry of England's *Insolubilia* [XXX]. Only the first two have any bearing on insolubles:

- 1) Prima conclusio: Non valet illa consequentia: Illa sibi invicem convertuntur; ergo, non repugnant. The example given is not clear.
- 2) Secunda conclusio: Stat quod ex <vero> sequitur falsum, et hoc in materia insolubilium. He refers to Albert of Saxony [XXIV] and Heytesbury [LXIX] by name.

66 See the *explicit* for Henry of England [XXX].

XXVII

BONAVENTURE [C. 1217-1274]⁶⁷

Quaestiones disputatae de mysterio trinitatis, q. 1, a. 1, ad 5, in *Opera omnia*, (Quaracchi: Typographia collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1882-1902), v. 5, p. 50ab.

The passage in question is this⁶⁸:

Ad illud quod obiicitur contra rationem Augustini, quod contradictoria non infert suam contradictoriam: dicendum, quod verum est secundum quod *contradictoria*; sed intelligendum est, quod propositio affirmativa duplcem habet affirmationem: unam, qua asserit praedicatum de subiecto; aliam, qua asserit, se esse veram. In prima distinguitur a propositione negativa, quae removet praedicatum a subiecto; in secunda vero communicat cum illa, quia tam propositio negativa quam affirmativa asserit, se esse veram. Quantum ad primam attenditur contradicatio, non quantum ad secundam. Cum vero dicitur: nulla veritas est, haec propositio, in quantum negat praedicatum a subiecto, non infert suam oppositam, quae est, aliquam veritatem esse. In quantum autem asserit, se esse veram, infert, aliquam veritatem esse; nec mirum, quia, sicut omne malum praesupponit bonum, sic falsum infert verum. Et ideo hoc falsum, quod est, nullam veritatem esse — cum propter *remotionem* praedicati a subiecto destruat omne verum, et propter *asserationem*, qua asserit, se esse veram, ponat, aliquam veritatem esse — includit utramque partem contradictionis; ideo utraque ex illa potest inferri, et ipsum in se esse falsum et inintelligibile ab intellectu recte apprehendente. Et hoc est quod vult dicere Augustinus.

XXVIII

CAJETAN OF THIENE [1387-1465]⁶⁹

Recollectae super Regulas Hentisbury,
tr. 1 [1422-1430]⁷⁰

**Tractatus gulielmi Hentisbury de sensu composito et diviso, Regulae ejusdem cum sophismatibus, Declaratio gaetani supra easdem* (Venice:

67 Brady [40], p. 658.

68 Mr. James Mensch pointed out this passage to me.

69 da Valsanzibio [45], pp. 1-77.

70 *Ibid.*, p. 23.

Bonetus Locatellus, for Octavianus Scotus, 1494 [Hain 8437], ff. 7rb-12rb. Copy at University of Chicago Library.

Cajetan expounds the first three opinions as Heytesbury does [LXIX]. He says (7va):

Prima harum positionum est Suisset [*i.e.*, Roger Swyneshed's [LXIII]], secunda ponitur a Dulmentone [*i.e.*, John Dumbleton [XXXVI]], tercia est Ricardi Clientonis [*Richard Kilmington* [LV]] in sophismatibus suis.

He sets out Heytesbury's objections against the first opinion, but observes that Swyneshed could answer them (7va-8rb). He does the same with the second and third opinions (8rb-8va). He then sets out Heytesbury's fourth opinion (8va-9ra), the one which Heytesbury adopts, and the five rules (9ra-va). He argues against them at length, and replies to the arguments (9va-12rb).

Cajetan mentions another opinion which glosses Heytesbury's rules as follows:

- 1) Omnes tales propositiones tam affirmativa quam negativa significant copulative, videlicet, 'Haec sic praecise significans non est vera,' 'haec sic praecise significans est falsa' (11vb).
- 2) [*to the 4th rule*]: Et licet oppositum copulati non stet cum casu, tamen casus est admittendus, nec conclusio vult oppositum, sed intellegitur quod quando oppositum copulati non stet cum casu et insolubile est sequens ex casu, tunc casus non est admittendus. Tamen bene est admittendus quando insolubile repugnat casui, quantumcumque oppositum copulati non stet cum casu (12ra).
- 3) [*to the 5th rule*]: Debet ipsa sic moderari, videlicet, ubi insolubile esse falsum non sit sequens ex casu, quia dum est sequens, tunc debet concedi ipsum esse falsum, et negari ipsum esse verum (*ibid.*).

XXIX

GREGORY OF RIMINI [b. end 13c.-d. 1358]⁷¹

I have been unable to locate any text of Gregory's dealing with insolubles, but Peter Tartaret, writing toward the end of the fifteenth century,⁷² says⁷³:

Unde unus modus est qui tenet quod quaelibet propositio insolubilis est propositio plures simul vera et simul falsa. Nam sem-

⁷¹ Gál [52].

⁷² Pompei [63].

⁷³ Peter Tartaret [20], f. 203va.

per subordinatur duabus mentalibus inconjunctim captis quarum una est vera et reliqua falsa. Alius modus est quod quaelibet insolubilis est hypothetica cui correspondent duea mentales conjunctae per conjunctionem. Sed quia isti duo modi parum differunt, ideo reputabimus eos pro eodem, tamen aliqualiter differunt. Nam secundum istum modum omnis propositio insolubilis est falsa, sed secundum primum modum omnis propositio insolubilis est simul vera et falsa.

Aganin⁷⁴:

Primus modus principalis est Petri de Aliaco [LI] in tractatu insolubilium. Secundus est Gregorii de Arimino.

XXX

HENRY OF ENGLAND (HARVEY OF ENGLAND,
BEROTUS OF ENGLAND) [14C.?]

Insolubilia [by 1395]⁷⁵

Inc Solvere vinculum ignorantis non est possibile, ut habetur ^{3º} *Metaphysicae*. Cum ergo ignorantes ejusdem artis quae propter eorum difficultatem insolubilia appellantur, quasi vinculis ligati saepissime videntur⁷⁶

Exp ... quia hic talis finiuntur insolubilia. Expliciunt insolubilia magistri Henrici anglici doctoris artium valentissimi. Deo gratias. Amen. Anno CCCLXXXXVº die martis XXVIIIº mensis septembris scripta per me Antonium de Monte [XXVI] in artibus studentem.

There follows a list of the twelve *casus* discussed in the text.

Klagenfurt, Studienbibliothek, Pap. 168, ff. 8ov-82v.⁷⁷

Oxford, Bodl., Canon. Lat. 311, ff. 33v-34v.⁷⁸

*Oxford, Bodl., Canon. Misc. 219, ff. 9va-11vb.

Paris, B.N. lat. 6668, ff. 4orb-41va.⁷⁹

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, f. 205vb.

⁷⁵ See the *explicit*.

⁷⁶ This *incipit* ought not to be confused with that of Thomas Bradwardine's tract [LXIV].

⁷⁷ See Mohan [94] under the *Inc*: "Solvare vinculum non est possibile ignorantis ut habetur ^{3º} *Metaphysicae*." Attributed to "Berotus de Anglia".

⁷⁸ See Coxe [81]. *Inc*: "Solvare vinculum non est possibile ignorantis"; *Exp*: "talem vero reflexionem possumus invenire in omnibus solutionibus supra dictis, si jugiter advertamus. Expliciunt insolubilia magistri Herveri Anglici."

⁷⁹ See Mohan [94] under the *Inc*: "Solvare vinculum non est possibile ignorantis, ut habetur ^{3º} *Metaphysicae* ... bum (?) quid ignorantis" (unascribed).

I have used Canon. Misc. 219 for all quotations.

There is no discussion of previous opinions. Henry gives four rules (gva):

- 1) In nulla propositione potest fieri suppositio pro se ipsa.
- 2) Si aliquae propositiones sunt convertibles, in neutra illarum potest fieri suppositio vel fit suppositio pro reliqua.
- 3) Si aliquae sint duae propositiones repugnantes, in neutra illarum fit suppositio pro reliqua.
- 4) Omissis suppositio est neganda ex qua sequitur [sequi] aliquam propositionem significare se ipsam esse falsam.

On the basis of the first rule, Henry discusses three sophisms (gva-1orb). His position may be summarized by the following passage (9vb):

Manifestum est ergo quod Sortes non dicit verum nec falsum. Si autem quaeratur quid Sortes dicat, responderi debet quod dixit hoc falsum quod est 'Sortes dicit falsum.' Et tunc non sequitur: Sortes dixit hoc falsum; ergo, Sortes dixit falsum.... Est ergo fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter.

The second rule is applied to four sophisms (1orb-vb), the third to three sophisms (10vb-11rb), and the fourth to two (11rb-vb).⁸⁰

XXXI

HENRY HOPTON [fl. 3rd quarter 14c.]⁸¹

Insolubilia [mid 14c.]⁸²

*In*c Insolubile est difficilis paralogismus secundum quid et simpliciter ex reflexione alicujus actus supra se cum determinatione privativa proveniens. Haec est definitio insolubilis. Et nota quod idem est definitio rei et illa res. Et sciendum quod 'insolubile' accipitur dupliciter, secundum quod 'solubile' sive 'solutio'. Solutio vero quae est corporalis.⁸³

⁸⁰ This position seems to be the same as that of the first previous opinion discussed by Bradwardine [LXIV], ca. 3-4.

⁸¹ Emden [83], v. 2, p. 960.

⁸² *Ibid.* Henry was a fellow of University College in 1357.

⁸³ See Bradwardine [LXIV], ca. 2.

After this start, the MS leaves half a column blank, then begins anew:

Inc Insolubile simplex affirmativa est tale ut ‘Sortes dicit falsum.’

Exp Hoc sequitur quod Sortes dicit falsum, et quod non pertransibit pontem. Item (?), age ergo sicut prius. Expliciunt insolubilia.

*Rome, Angelica 1017 (R. 6.32), ff. 14rb-19vb.

The main points of Henry’s position appear in the following passages:

1) Dubito, quia si proponas illam dictam a Sorte, dico quod haec est falsa; sed si proponas illam propositionem dictam a te, dico quod illa est vera (14rb).

2) Illud insolubile dictum a Sorte significat copulative, et ideo ejus oppositum erit una disjunctiva facta ex oppositis partium sic: ‘Sortes non dicit falsum vel haec non est vera,’ demonstrando per ly ‘haec’ ‘Sortes dicit falsum’ (14va).

Henry considers simple affirmative insolubles (e.g., ‘Sortes dicit falsum’) (14rb-va) and simple negative ones (e.g., ‘Sortes non dicit verum’) (14vab). Turning to composite insolubles, he considers affirmative and negative disjunctives (14vb-15ra; 15rab), affirmative and negative copulatives (15rb-va; vab), exclusives (15vb-16ra), exceptives (16ra-va), and affirmative and negative universals (16vab; vb).

Insolubles sometimes arise “ex proprietate vocis” (16vb-17ra), but they can also arise in an indirect way (17rab). Sometimes, finally, they arise “ex actibus nostris interioribus” (17rb-18ra). Insolubles “de credere” (18ra-va) and “de dubitare” (18vab) are discussed, as well as certain sophisms that seem to be insolubles and are not (18vb-19vb).

XXXII

HUGO

The identity of this author is unknown, but he is referred to by name in the anonymous tracts [V] and [VII]. From these citations, two things are known about his position on insolubles:

1) To the question “utrum notitia insolubilium praesupponit artem oblisticam,” Magister Hugo replies in the affirmative ([V], 86r).

2) Casus de insolubili est admittendus, licet ponatur insoluble praecise significare sicut termini communiter praetendunt. Magister Hugo is grouped together with Swyneshed [LXIII] in holding this position ([VII], 185vb).

XXXIII

JOHN BURIDAN [b. end 13c.-d. after 1358]⁸⁴

In Metaphysicen Aristotelis quaestiones. VI, qq. 7, 8, 11.⁸⁵

**In Metaphysicen Aristotelis quaestiones argutissimae Magistri Joannis Buridani* (Paris: Jodocus Badius Ascensus, 1518), ff. 38ra-41va. Photoreprint copy at the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.

Q. 7: *Quaeritur septimo utrum ad veritatem propositionis affirmativa requiritur compositio in re significata vel in rebus significatis, et ad veritatem negativa requiritur divisio* (38ra).

Buridan's reply sets out suppositional truth-rules much like those in Chapter 2 of his *Sophismata* [XXXIV]. His fifth rule (38va) is:

quod non sufficit universaliter ad veritatem affirmativa quod termini supponant pro eodem. Et hoc manifestum est in vocatis insolubilibus, ut si in illo folio sit scripta solum illa propositio 'Propositio scripta in illo folio est falsa.' Termini enim pro eodem supponunt, quia illud subjectum 'propositio scripta in illo folio' supponit pro illa propositione quae est scripta in isto folio, et similiter hoc praedicatum supponit pro illa propositione, quia ipsa est falsa et non vera Et ideo ad salvandum dictum Aristotelis, ego dicerem quod ubi non est actus reflexus propositionis supra propositionem requiritur et sufficit illud quod Aristoteles dicebat.

Q. 8: *Quaeritur octavo utrum omnis propositio ex eo est vera, quia qualitercumque significat ita est in re significata vel in rebus significatis (ibid.).*

Buridan says:

Omnis affirmativa vera quae est de praesenti et de inesse ex eo est vera, quia qualitercumque significat esse ita est in re significata vel in rebus significatis (38vb).

84 See Bascour [34] and Faral [50].

85 On the problem of dating Buridan's works, see Faral [50].

Q. 11: Quaeritur undecimo utrum propositio eadem potest simul esse vera et falsa sine aequivocatione (40rb).

Buridan replies:

Notandum quod, licet non omnis propositio significat se esse veram, quia forte nihil est se esse veram, tamen ad omnem propositionem de mundo sequitur quod ipsa est vera (40vb).

It is not clear whether the phrase “de mundo” is meant to play the role of the existence condition in his *Sophismata*. In his reply to q. 9 (39vb), Buridan had already taken note that propositions must exist in order to have a truth-value.

XXXIV

JOHN BURIDAN [b. end 13c.-d. after 1358]⁸⁶

Sophismata, ca. 2, 8.⁸⁷

**Sophismata Buridani*, (Paris: Antoine Denidel and Nicole de la Barre, c. 1496-1500 [*Incunabula in American Libraries*, 3rd census, B-1295]), no folio numberings. Copy at Harvard College Library, incunabula 8325.5.⁸⁸

In Chapter 2, Buridan gives the truth-conditions for categorial propositions. He states explicitly that the *insolubilia* are just the exceptions to the standard rules of truth.

In his Chapter 8, Buridan begins with two sophisms in which he argues that truth and falsehood apply only to sentence-tokens, so that if a token ceases to exist, it cannot be said to be either true or false. Moreover, he gives his notion of a valid consequence:

non sufficit ad hoc quod sit bona consequentia quod impossibile sit antecedens esse verum sine consequente, ipsis simul formatis
Plus ergo requiritur, scilicet, quod non possit esse qualiter antecedens significat quin etiam ita sit sicut per consequens significatur.

⁸⁶ Bascour [34] and Faral [50].

⁸⁷ See above, n. 85.

⁸⁸ Edited by T. K. Scott in [10], and translated in [11].

Buridan's solution to the self-referential paradoxes is most extensively set out in his discussion of the seventh sophism. He refers to several previous opinions, including one which he himself formerly held. He says:

Ad rationes enim aliqui dixerunt, et ita visum fuit mihi alias (?), quod licet propositio secundum significationem suorum terminorum non significat vel affirmat nisi quod omnis propositio est falsa, cum omnis propositio de forma sua significat vel asserit se esse veram, ideo omnis propositio asserens se esse falsam, sive directe sive consecutive, est falsa, quia licet qualitercumque significatur esse ita sit quantum ad hoc quod significat se esse falsam, tamen non qualiter significat esse ita est quantum ad hoc quod significat se esse veram. Ideo falsa et non vera, quia ad veritatem ejus requiritur non solum quod qualiter significat ita sit, sed qualitercumque significat ita sit.

Buridan objects now to this position on terminological grounds, and offers a revised version:

Ideo dicitur aliter propinquius veritati, scilicet, quod quaelibet propositio implicat virtualiter propositionem aliam, ita quod de subjecto pro ea supponente affirmatur hoc praedicatum 'verum'; ergo, implicat virtualiter sicut antecedens implicat illud quod ad ipsum sequitur. Ideo aliqua propositio non est vera si in dicto consequente affirmativo, et subjectum et praedicatum non supponant pro eodem Non enim sufficit ad hoc quod propositio sit vera quod sit ita sicut significat secundum formalem significationem — immo requiritur quod sit ita sicut significat consequens quod in ea virtualiter implicabatur. Unde secundum hoc dicetur quod ubi propositio habet vel potest habere reflexionem supra se, non sufficit ad veritatem affirmativa quod termini pro eodem supponant, sicut alias dixi, sed requiritur quod in tali consequente termini pro eodem supponant. Et tunc oportet, hoc stante, propositionem esse veram. Et per hoc faciliter solverentur rationes.

Buridan still does not agree entirely, and corrects this solution as follows:

Sed haec solutio, quamvis sit proxima veritati, ut puto, tamen adhuc non est perfecta, quia supponit falsum, scilicet, quod ad quilibet propositionem sequitur illud consequens Et ideo, perficiendo istam solutionem, debemus dicere quod ad omnem

propositionem cum illa appositione quod ipsa est sequitur quod illa est vera Modo in proposito nostro de sophismate praesenti appetet quod ista propositio apposita est per casum.

In the eighth sophism, Buridan argues that two vocally similar propositions need not have the same truth-value. Nor need a proposition formed by adding 'non' to a second proposition always have the opposite truth-value. For, if the second proposition is an insoluble, then both it and its negation will be false. The contradictory of an insoluble is not formed by adding the negation only, but by negating the copulative proposition formed from the insoluble and the consequent which it virtually implies.⁸⁹

XXXV

JOHN OF CONSTANCE [fl. 1360]

Imaginatio [1360]⁹⁰

Inc Imaginatio fratri Johannis de Constantia habita secundo anno lectoratus sui in Colonia, qui fuit millesimus trecentesimus sexagesimus. Pro solutione insolubilium Heytesbury et aliorum, si qui sunt, capio unum insolubile.

Exp 18^a: Ex qua sequitur ultima, quod propositio. [*incomplete*]

*Erfurt, CA 2^o 345, ff. 65vb-66va.

The tract is directed against Heytesbury's *Regulae* [LXIX]. The argumentation is very intricate and difficult to follow. The author takes as an example the standard one of 'Sortes dicit falsum.' He distinguishes three different "understandings" of this proposition (65vb):

- 1) The proposition asserts that Socrates utters some second sentence which is false, such as 'Deus non est.' The proposition is verified or falsified according as Socrates does or does not utter such a second sentence.

⁸⁹ T. K. Scott informs me that this edition of Buridan's text will be published in the series "Grammatica Speculativa", edited by Jan Pinborg. (Letter of July 29, 1974).

⁹⁰ See the *incipit*.

2) The proposition asserts that 'Sortes dicit falsum' is itself false because Socrates does not in fact utter some second, false proposition. On this "understanding", the sentence is true just when it is false under the first "understanding".

3) The proposition asserts that 'Sortes dicit falsum' is false, not because Socrates utters some second, false proposition, but because it denotes that it itself is false. John says that "tunc haec est vera vel falsa ad placitum dicentis, non secundum virtutem sermonis." This interpretation plays no further role in the discussion.

John then considers the first two interpretations, playing one against the other. Here the text is extremely difficult to follow, because it is not always clear which interpretation is being considered at any given moment. The upshot, however, is that "hic latet aequivocatio intellectuum hujus propositionis 'Sortes dicit falsum'" (66ra). The problems of the insolubles disappear when these two "understandings" are not confused.

In order to clarify his position, John sets up a diagram illustrating the relations of these two interpretations (66rb). From the diagram, he draws eighteen conclusions. The eighteenth is incomplete in the MS. The most important conclusions are (66rb):

- 1) Aliqua propositio est simul vera et falsa alio et alio intellectu.
- 2) Nulla propositio in eodem sensu capta est simul vera et falsa.
- 6) Impossibile est quod aliqua propositio de qua fit mentio in casu de insolibili, quae significat praecise sicut verba illius communiter praetendunt, in eodem casu sit simul vera et falsa, si capiatur uniformiter in eodem sensu aliquo sensuum praedictorum. This is against Heytesbury's definition.
- 14) Prima opinio de insolubilibus non valet quam recitat Heytesbury. Against Swyneshed [LXIII].
- 15) Omne insolubile est propositio. Against the second opinion in Heytesbury's list.
- 16) Si copula illorum in tali propositione positorum sumitur affirmative, significat quod subjectum et praedicatum supponunt pro eodem. Et, si est ita, propositio erit vera. Si non est ita, propositio erit falsa. Si copula negative sumitur, significat quod subjectum et praedicatum non pro eodem supponunt. Et si sic, ipsa erit vera. Si non, erit falsa.

XXXVI

JOHN DUMBLETON [d. probably 1349]⁹¹

Summa logicae et philosophiae naturalis,
I, 1 [1335-1340]⁹²

Inc prol. Plurimorum scribendum grati labores

Inc pars 1^a: Incipiendum est a primis, cum minimus error in principio in fine maxime est causa

Exp I, 1: Haec verificat se, et tamen significat aliter quam est, cum veritas et falsitas se habent secundum quod res se habent vel non habent.

*Cambridge, Gonville & Caius, 499/268, ff. 1r-162v.⁹³

Cambridge, Peterhouse, 272, ff. 1-111.

Dubrovnik-Ragusa, Dominikanerbibliothek 32, ff. 89ra-222vb.

London, B.L. Royal 10. B. XIV, ff. 1-244.

London, Lambeth Palace 79, ff. 1-212r.

Oxford, Magdalen 32, ff. 1-292.

Oxford, Magdalen 195, ff. 1-131.

Oxford, Merton 279, ff. 4-179.

*Oxford, Merton 306, ff. 9-118.⁹⁴

Padua, Anton. XVII, 375, ff. 1-205.

Paris, B.N. lat. 16146, ff. 2-141ra.

Paris, Universitaire 599, ff. 1-128.

Prague, Capit. Metropol. 1291 (L. XLVII).

Vatican, Pal. lat. 1056, ff. 1-144.

Vatican, Vat. lat. 954, ff. 1-201.

*Vatican, Vat. lat. 6750, ff. 1ra-202rb.

Venice, San Marco VI, 79 (2552), ff. 1-229.

Worcester, Bibl. Cathed., F. 6, ff. 1-165.

Worcester, Bibl. Cathed., F. 195, ff. 91-126v.

These are the known MSS of Dumbleton's *Summa* which contain the section on insolubles.⁹⁵ The following references are taken from Vat. lat. 6750.

⁹¹ Weisheipl [74], p. 199.

⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 202, and Weisheipl [75], p. 210.

⁹³ The Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies has ff. 52-208.

⁹⁴ The Pontifical Institute has ff. 9r-11r only, including part of the section on insolubles.

⁹⁵ For these and other, fragmentary MSS, see Weisheipl [75], pp. 210f. Weisheipl cites the Dubrovnik-Ragusa MS with the folio numbers 89-200. But Kaeppele and Schooner [91] give ff. 89ra-222vb.

The passage of Part I, article 1, which introduces the discussion of insolubles begins: “Cognito distincte de termini significatione, restat solutionem propositionum quae insolubilia dicuntur” (3rb). John considers four previous opinions. The first is that which denies self-reference in all cases (3rb-va). The second opinion is Bradwardine’s [LXIV] (3vb), the third Swyneshed’s [LXIII] (3vb-4ra), and the fourth Heytesbury’s [LXIX] (4ra). He does not make the attributions by name. He argues against all these positions, and then sets out his own position “juxta sententiam Aristotelis” (4va), beginning with two dichotomies:

- 1) Propositionum quaedam denotat esse vel non esse pro re incomplexa, et quaedam pro re complexa. Prima pars subdividitur: quaedam propositiones significant pro re quae dicitur res extra ..., quaedam significant pro re incomplexa, ut ‘Hic est terminus,’ ‘Homo est intentio “homo”’, quorum utrum est incomplexum et neutrum extra (*ibid.*).
- 2) Quaedam sunt insolubilia quae immediate denotant pro complexo ..., quaedam quae significant pro re incomplexa (4vab).

Two suppositions follow:

- 1) Propositio affirmativa verificatur vel falsificatur mediate vel immediate pro re incomplexa. He gives a proof by *processus in infinitum* (4vb).
- 2) Propositiones quae dicuntur contradictoria solum secundum vocem stare simul in veritate non repugnat (*ibid.*).

Five conclusions are posited:

- 1) Nullus terminus significat nisi dum et quatenus est actualis comprehensio per eundem (*ibid.*).
- 2) Non omni termino universalis intentio universalis in anima correspondet. He gives an example of equivocal terms (5ra).
- 3) Nulla propositio in anima secundum intentionem simplicem sed per complexum comprehenditur (5rab).⁹⁶
- 4) Cujuscumque propositionis significantis pro complexo subjectum vel praedicatum est propositio, et alteri vel utriusque propositio correspondet (5va). This follows from the third conclusion.

96 Contrast John of Wesel [XLIII]. q. 3.

5) *a* significat quod verum est solum, et sic est, et *a* non est verum Haec consequentia non valet: '*a* significat verum esse; igitur, omni modo quo verum est, *a* significat.' Stent igitur simul *a* solum significare verum esse et *b* esse verum illo modo quo *a* non significat verum esse (*ibid.*).

John then gives a description of insolubles from which his general approach should be clear. He solves insolubles by denying that their *casus* are possible:

Insolubile est propositio quae ex apparenti casu possibili posito admisso concludetur esse verum et falsum. Haec patet juxta communes casus insolubilium. Primo, posito quod unica sit propositio quae sit haec 'Verum est,' cuius nomen sit *a*, causa veritatis vel falsitatis assignetur quia *a* est propositio significans aliqualiter pro complexo. Patet per secundam et quartam conclusionem subjectum vel praedicatum *a* esse propositionem, vel alteri vel utriusque propositionem correspondere, quare casus non est admissus (5vab).

XXXVII

JOHN DUNS SCOTUS [c. 1265-1308]⁹⁷

Quaestiones super libros elenchorum,
qq. 52-53 [late 13c.]⁹⁸

Inc q. 52: Utrum terminus communis, possit supponere pro toto cuius est pars.

Inc q. 53: Utrum incipiendo sic loqui, Ego dico falsum, sit simpliciter verus in dicendo.

In *Opera omnia*, (Paris: Vivès, 1891-1895), v. 2, pp. 73-76.

Bocheński considers this work spurious.⁹⁹ Balić, however, regards it as authentic.¹⁰⁰ Wolter takes the question to be still open.¹⁰¹

In his solution to q. 52, Scotus says (74b):

97 Balić [33].

98 This date is based on the presumption of the text's authenticity.

99 Bocheński [37], p. 276.

100 Balić [33], p. 16, and [32], p. 1102.

101 Wolter [12], pp. xx-xxi.

In illis¹⁰² enim idem potest esse pars integralis et totum universale: nam haec est vera *Omne totum est majus sua parte*, quae est quoddam totum. Et similiter hic, *Omnis oratio vera est oratio*, et sic de aliis

... Et terminus communis si non contrahatur, potest supponere indifferenter pro eo, quod ejus naturam participat, vel formam significatam per terminum.

To q. 53, Scotus replies that the utterance is false *simpliciter*, but true *secundum quid* (76ab):

Quidam enim ponunt, quod est verus secundum quid, quia circa aliquam orationem falsam exercitur vere actus dicendi. Dicitur aliter, quod sic dicens est verus secundum quid, quia actu exercito, per propositionem intelligitur sicut est in re. Sed quia ab actu exercito non dicitur oratio simpliciter vera, vel falsa, ideo talis oratio dicitur secundum quid vera. Actu enim exercito intelligitur, quod ipse exercet actum dicendi circa falsum, et illud in re est verum.

In some cases, propositions are true *simpliciter* (76b):

... et hoc est in illis, in quibus est veritas in actu signato, et in actu exercito, sed in proposito falsitas est in actu signato, et veritas in actu exercito.

XXXVIII

JOHN OF HOLLAND [fl. last half 14c.]¹⁰³

Insolubilia [3rd quarter 14c.]¹⁰⁴

Inc Restat nunc dicere de insolubilibus, et primo quid sit casus de insolibili; secundo quid sit insoluble.

Exp Igitur, argumenta solvuntur plane, sicut visum est in processu tractatus per diversorum¹⁰⁵ generum dicta. Igitur, de insolubilibus dicta sufficient.

¹⁰² I.e., in terms which signify complexes by way of simple apprehension — e.g., 'propositio' — or in terms which signify complexes and incomplexes alike — e.g., 'unum'.

¹⁰³ Emden [83], v. 2, p. 951.

¹⁰⁴ John began his regency in arts at Prague in 1369. But it seems he also studied at Oxford, and read Heytesbury, Bradwardine, Burley, Dumbleton and Swyneshed (*ibid.*).

¹⁰⁵ MS (Vienna 4698): diversarum.

- Cracow, Biblioteka Jagiellońska 2132 BB. VI 5.¹⁰⁶
 *Erfurt, CA 4° 245, ff. 304v-322r.
 Klagenfurt, Bischoefliche Bibliothek, XXIX e 1, ff. 50r-53r.¹⁰⁷
 ?Melk, 6 (A. 8), ff. 553-560.¹⁰⁸
 Prague, Univ. 906, ff. 30r-37v.
 Prague, Univ. 2605, ff. 81v-88v.¹⁰⁹
 *Vienna, Nat. Bibl. 4698, ff. 78v-87r (with extensive marginal glosses).
 *Vienna, Nat. Bibl. 4953, ff. 86r-118v (interspersed with an anonymous commentary. See [V], above).
 Vienna, Nat. Bibl. 5248, ff. 75r-82r.

The MSS I have seen are unascribed, except Vienna 4953, in which the anonymous commentator several times calls John by name (Hollandrinus). The work was required reading at Vienna,¹¹⁰ and, in 1420, at Erfurt.¹¹¹ I have used Vienna 4698 for the *Inc* and *Exp*, and for the following references.

John defines an insoluble *casus* and an insoluble proposition exactly as Heytesbury does [LXIX] (78v-79r). He gives three rules for insolubles (79v):¹¹²

- 1) Si cum casu insolubili insolubile ponatur praecise significare sicut termini praetendunt, casus est negandus eo quod sequitur contradictio, videlicet, quod eadem propositio est vera et falsa.
- 2) Si insolubile ponatur significare sicut termini communiter praetendunt, et non praecise, tunc casus est admittendus.
- 3) Sed si non limitetur qualiter insolubile significabit, tunc ad insolubile est dubietatem respondere, eo quod dubitatur qualiter insolubile significabit

John asserts that every insoluble is false (80r). It signifies copulatively “ut plures dicunt” (81r). For instance, ‘Sortes dicit falsum’ signifies that Socrates speaks falsely and that Socrates speaks truly (80v).

¹⁰⁶ Mohan [94].

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁸ I cannot positively identify this text as John of Holland's. I know only its *incipit*, which agrees with John's. This information was provided me by N. Häring, who refers to *Catal. codd. manuscriptorum qui in bibliotheca Mellicensis OSB servantur* 1 (Vienna, 1884), p. 18.

¹⁰⁹ Truhlar [99] gives the *incipit* for the two Prague MSS in each case only as: “Restat nunc dicere de insolubilibus.” On the other hand, Vienna 5248 begins: “Restat nunc solvere insolubilia” (see [98]). Nevertheless, there is reason to think that the texts are the same. (Compare the descriptions of the contents of the MSS, in [98] and [99].)

¹¹⁰ Aschenbach [30], p. 90.

¹¹¹ Thorndike [70], pp. 296f., no. 119.

¹¹² Compare these rules with Heytesbury's [LXIX].

He considers categorical insolubles (79v-81r), and then treats of copulatives (81v-82v), disjunctives (82v-83v), exclusives (83v-84r) and exceptives (84r-85r). Certain other insolubles "non tamen communibus" (85r) are treated, among which are several "indirect" insolubles (85r-87r).

XXXIX

JOHN HUNTER¹¹³ [fl. probably middle or late 14c.]

Insolubilia [1335-1390]¹¹⁴

Inc Jam sequuntur regulae de insolubilibus. Et primo videndum est quid sit casus de insolubili, et postea quid sit propositio insolubilis.

Exp Tunc, isto casu posito, eodem modo est respondendum sicut in proximo insolubili. Et sic de insolubilibus similiter de *a* sufficient.

*Erfurt, CA 4° 270, ff. 37r1-39r30.

*Oxford, Bodl., Canon. Misc. 219, ff. 7ra-9rb.

Vatican, Vat. lat. 3065, ff. 28r-30v.¹¹⁵

The Erfurt copy is listed in the MS catalogue as ending on f. 42v, with the *explicit* "affirmative respondens."¹¹⁶ There are however two texts involved here. The first is the *Insolubilia*, beginning and ending as cited above. The second is an anonymous (also John Hunter's?) treatise on *obligationes*, begin-

¹¹³ John Hunter was also the author of a *Logica* preserved in Vat. lat. 2130, ff. 49r-141r. See Kretzmann [59], p. 778, n. 21. For the folio references, see [79]. The *Logica* does not seem to include the *Insolubilia*.

¹¹⁴ The treatise is a reworking of the Pseudo-Heytesbury [XII]. The latter was probably written after 1335, the date of Heytesbury's text [LXIX]. The Erfurt MS was written by 1390 at the latest, according to a date in the colophon of another item in the codex. See Schum [96], p. 514.

¹¹⁵ Mohan [94], under the above *Inc*, cites Padua, Anton. 407 as possibly containing a further copy of Hunter's text. This seems to be an incomplete reference. The MS is not Anton., Scaff. XIX, N. 407. (See Iosa [87], pp. 224f.).

¹¹⁶ Schum, *loc. cit.* See also Mohan [93], p. 464; Weisheipl [75], p. 212.

ning f. 39r31: "<D>e disputatione dialectica inter duae (?) partes ...," and ending f. 42v19: "affirmative respondens." The break between these two texts in the MS is no more strongly marked than are the main subdivisions of either text. The Oxford MS contains only the *Insolubilia*. I have not seen the Vatican MS, but its brevity suggests that it does not include the treatise on *obligationes*.

This text has been attributed to William Heytesbury [LXIX].¹¹⁷ Neither the Erfurt nor the Vatican MS, however, makes any explicit attribution, although it is preceded in the Erfurt MS by Chapters 2-6 of Heytesbury's *Regulae*. The Vatican MS says it is "secundum usum Heusonie."¹¹⁸ On the other hand, the Oxford MS contains the following colophon: "Explicant insolubilia more exonic compilata, edita ab eximio doctore Johanne Venatore." I have taken the following references from this MS.

The text is closely related to the Pseudo-Heytesbury's *Insolubilia* [XII]. Every insoluble considered in this text is treated also there. Much, perhaps most, of the text is *verbatim* that of the Pseudo-Heytesbury. The arrangement of the material, however, differs somewhat, and some of the Pseudo-Heytesbury's discussion is omitted here. Most important, there is nothing in the text to correspond to the fourth and fifth rules of Heytesbury's *Regulae*.

Hunter's treatise, then, appears to be a somewhat abbreviated reworking of the Pseudo-Heytesbury's work. The division of the text is the same, with the following exceptions:

- 1) There is no discussion of rules corresponding to the fourth and fifth of Heytesbury's *Regulae*, as just observed.
- 2) The discussion of insolubles which are universal affirmatives (8vb-9ra), and of those which are universal negatives (9ra) is placed after the discussion of exceptives, and just before the consideration of 'Hoc est falsum' (*ibid.*).
- 3) The discussion of "indirect" insolubles (9rb) is placed after the consideration of the insoluble 'Hoc est falsum', and terminates the tract.

¹¹⁷ See above, n. 116.

¹¹⁸ Weisheipl [75], p. 212.

XL

JOHN TARTEYS [late 14c.-early 15c.]¹¹⁹

Insolubilia [late 14c.-early 15c.]

Inc Quia omnes homines naturaliter scire desiderant

Exp pro clarificatione intellectus requirit. Et tantum de summa insolubilium subtilissimi doctoris magistri Johannis Tartis sufficient.

*Prague, Univ. 1536, ff. 55v-72v.

John sets out his program in three parts (55v):

- 1) De propositionum nominationibus principia generalia.
- 2) Insolubilium quidditatem pertractans de eorum convertibilitate (?) et contradictione principia specialia.
- 3) Ipsa principia insolubili categorico, deinde insolubili hypothetico finaliter sunt applicanda.

John seems to adopt a position similar to Wyclif's [XLIII] and to Anonymous [XV]. He sets out three suppositions (55v) corresponding to the three preliminary general rules of [XV]. There are three kinds of truth (56r)¹²⁰:

- 1) Uno enim modo est propositio vera sicut quidlibet aliud, eo quod ipsam esse, quod est essentia sua, est verum et veritas.
- 2) Secundo modo dicitur propositio vera quia significat ens, sive ipsum ens sit ipsamet propositio ... vel ab ipsa dependens, sive illud ens sit omnino distinctum et independens ab ipsa propositione.
- 3) Tertio modo dicitur propositio vera quia significat primarie ens distinctum et independens ab ipsa propositione.

On 57r John lists the three conditions necessary for a proposition to be insoluble, as in [XV]. On 57v he cites Bradwardine's [LXIV] definition of an insoluble.

¹¹⁹ See James [90], p. 543 (on London, Lambeth Palace 393, containing two other works attributed to Tarteys). The Prague MS comes from the early 15c. (See Truhlář [99]). James, *loc. cit.*, says that Tarteys was from Balliol College. See also Emden [83], v. 3, p. 1849.

¹²⁰ See Wyclif's three grades of truth and the five kinds of truth distinguished in Anonymous [XV].

XLI

JOHN OF WESEL [fl. after 1321]¹²¹

Quaestiones de obligationibus [14c.]¹²²

Inc Quaeritur primo utrum principia artis obligatoriae in disputatione obligata sint necessaria.

Exp Aliae rationes sunt solutae, quia non probant intentum.

*Venice, San Marco Z 301 (1576), ff. 1r-18r.

The text is unattributed in the MS. Nevertheless, the tract following it in the codex, *Quaestiones super insolubilibus* [XLII], is explicitly attributed to John. It seems (21v) to refer to the discussion of self-reference in the second question of the tract on *obligationes*.

There are ten questions on *obligationes*. The second is of relevance to the question of insolubles. It begins (2r): "Communiter quaeritur utrum pars possit supponere pro toto." The *explicit* (4v) is: "quod si sit verum est concedendum, si falsum negandum, etc." In his determination, John distinguishes integral parts from subjective parts (2v). He replies to the question by stating three conclusions (*ibid.*):

- 1) Pars potest supponere pro toto.
- 2) Significatio termini potest dependere ex veritate et falsitate propositionis.
- 3) Terminus in aliqua propositione potest supponere pro toto vel pro opposito sui totius vel etiam pro convertibili oppositi totius.

¹²¹ John seems to refer to Bradwardine's tract [LXIV] in his fourth question *super insolubilibus* [XLII]. Bradwardine's *Insolubilia* was not written before 1321. Since the MS is 14c., John is not to be confused with the theologian John (Rucherath) of Wesel (c. 1425-1481). See Brück [42].

¹²² If, as is likely, the questions on *obligationes* were written at the same time as the questions on *insolubilia*, then the former could not have been written before 1321. See above, n. 121.

XLII

JOHN OF WESEL [fl. after 1321]¹²³

Quaestiones super insolubilibus
[1321-end 14c.]¹²⁴

Inc Quaeritur primo utrum in insolubilibus sit aliqua consequentia bona, et antecedens est verum et consequens falsum.

Exp ... opposito modo partibus prioris, et pro ista parte est vera. Et sic sit dictum ad quaestionem. Ergo expletae sunt quaestiones insolubilium a Johanne de Vesalia pixius (?) disputatae. Deo gratias. Amen.

*Venice, San Marco Z 301 (1576), ff. 18r-24v.

There are five questions. The first (18r-19r) is as above. John's position is that the arguments to the negative beg the question (18v). He accepts Buridan's notion of consequence [XXXIV]: "Sufficit quod non potest sic esse sicut significatur per antecedens quin sic sit sicut significatur per consequens," and adds the conditions that "oppositum consequentis infert oppositum antecedentis ..., oppositum consequentis repugnat contradictorie antecedenti ..., consequens est de veritate (?) antecedentis" (*ibid.*). The rule that a valid formal consequence does not lead from a truth to a falsehood is to be understood to apply to propositions signifying "principaliter sicut est vel significans principaliter qualiter non est," and not to those falsifying themselves. In the latter case, a false proposition is convertible with a true one (19r).¹²⁵

Question 2 (19r-20v): "Communiter quaeritur utrum aliquod insolubile significat praecise sicut verba praetendunt." The first argument for the negative is based on the supposition that every proposition signifies "qualiter ad eam sequitur." The argument for this is that "nulla propositio sequitur ad aliam nisi taliter significatur per illam qualiter significatur per illam ex qua in-

¹²³ See above, n. 121.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*

¹²⁵ Compare Roger Swyneshed [LXIII].

fertur; aliter non magis sequeretur quam omnino impertinens alicui propositioni" (19r).

John's solution is to distinguish between the signification of the terms of a proposition taken separately and the signification of the terms taken as a whole. He gives two conclusions:

1) Nulla propositio significat praecise sicut termini praetendunt. Similiter, intellegendō quod tantummodo significet sicut termini communiter sunt impositi ad significandum, et non aliter. Et loquor solum de terminis illius propositionis. Ista patet, quia ad talem propositionem 'Homo currit' sequuntur multa alia complexa quorum complexorum termini positi in antecedente non significant (20r).

2) Accipiendo communiter quod aliqua propositio significat praecise sicut verba praetendunt, sic exponendo quod significet primo et principaliter sicut verba communiter praetendunt, id est, significat ex impositione <et> ex consequenti qualiter ad illam propositionem sequitur, potest concedi quod aliqua propositio significat praecise sicut verba praetendunt — immo omnis propositio isto modo potest significare praecise sicut verba communiter praetendunt, quia omnis propositio significat qualiter ad eam sequitur, et qualitercumque ad propositionem sequitur taliter termini praetendunt ex complexione unius cum alio (20v).

He adds some additional considerations on the *sensus compositus* and *sensus divisus* (*ibid.*):

Et ex hoc posset poni quod tales propositiones significantes praecise quod deus est, praecise quod homo est animal, sint falsae, sicut sunt istae propositiones 'Praecise deus <est>', 'Praecise homo est animal,' quia ista propositio 'Praecise deus est' significat praecise deum esse et sic patet quod est falsa, cum 'praecise' sit dictio exclusiva Tamen istae sunt concedenda: 'Iste terminus 'homo' significat praecise animal' ... et sic similiter 'Homo praecise est animal.' Similiter, 'Homo currit' significat praecise animal currere,' et sic de similibus.

Question 3 (20v-22r):

Communiter quaeritur utrum aliqua propositio causat intentionem simplicem in anima repraesentantem omnes propositiones. Hoc est, utrum sit aliqua simplex intentione in anima repraesentans omnem propositionem falsam ita quod isti termino 'falsum' in voce vel in scripto correspondeat simplex intentione in anima, et isti termino 'verum' in voce vel in scripto correspondeat una simplex intentione in anima cuiuslibet propositionis verae repraesentativa.

The 'hoc est' should not be taken at face value. There are really three questions here, dealing with the relation between the mental language and the spoken or written language. This becomes clear in the arguments for the affirmative (21rv).

In his determination, John argues that the negative position coincides with the position that a part cannot stand for the whole of which it is a part (21v).¹²⁶ This, he says, is to be rejected "secundum quod prius fuit visum" (*ibid.*) — an apparent reference to the questions on *obligationes* [XLI].

Question 4 (22r-24r): "Communiter quaeritur utrum aliquis casus in materia insolubilium sit admittendus." John takes the affirmative. In his determination he quotes (23r) Bradwardine's second conclusion ([LXIV], ca. 6). To the arguments that if such a *casus* is to be admitted, certain rules of Aristotle have to be denied, he replies (23v):

Solum sequitur quod in aliquibus talibus consequentiis antecedens sit verum et consequens falsum, et hoc conceditur, quia Aristoteles loquitur de propositionibus significantibus simplicem inhaerentiam praedicati ad subjectum, et non plus. Modo quaelibet talis insolubilium significat plus quam inhaerentiam praedicati ad subjectum.

Question 5 (24rv): "Communiter quaeritur utrum aliqua propositione quae dicitur insolubilis sit vera." John takes the negative (24v).

XLIII

JOHN WYCLIF [c. 1330-1384]¹²⁷

De logica: Logica continuatio, tract. 3, ca. 8
[probably c. 1361]¹²⁸

Inc (of the relevant passage): Et hic introducitur materia de insolubilibus, in qua sunt tot opiniones, quot sunt fuge invenibiles movende in eadem.

Exp evenit cuicunque quod scrutando invenit veritatem aliquam quam prius ignorans diuicius fuerat perscrutatus. Ideo sit laus plena domino veritatis!

¹²⁶ For the negative position, see John Dumbleton's third conclusion [XXXVI].

¹²⁷ See Dahmus [44], p. 1050.

¹²⁸ See Dziewicki [14], v. 1, pp. vi-viii.

Johannis Wyclif Tractatus de logica, Michael Henry Dziewicki, ed., (London: Trübner Co., for the Wyclif Society, 1893-1899), v. 2, pp. 194-227.

John lists and rejects six major previous opinions:

- 1) prima dicit quod nullum insolubile est verum vel falsum (p. 194).
- 2) 2^a via dicit quod omne insolubile est verum et falsum, falsificando se (pp. 194f.).
- 3) Tertia opinio ponit nullam partem supponere pro toto cuius est pars (pp. 195f.).
- 4) Heytesbury's opinion [LXIX] (pp. 196f.).
- 5) 5^a via singit diffuse quod nulli tali termino 2^e imposicionis, verum, falsum, proposicio, terminus etc. correspondere potest intentio universalis; sed componendo quod *Sor dicit falsum* oportet singulariter intelligere propositionem falsam que concipitur *Sor dicere*; ut sic: *Sor dicit illam propositionem: homo est asinus, que significat primarie aliter quam est* (pp. 197-199).
- 6) Sexta via ponit in quolibet insolubili 3 concurrere, primo, casum facti; 2^o, antecedens vel causacionem: et 3^o consequens ex 2^o tenet ista posicio pro regula generali quod *omne naturale antecedens est prius aliqua mensura quam suum consequens* Et ita dicit insolubile esse verum post causacionem et falsum ante causacionem (pp. 199-202).¹²⁹

John mentions briefly eight other positions (p. 202), of which the fourth "dicit quod omnis proposicio significat seipsam primarie et sic verum." He sets out the principles of his own position in four suppositions (p. 203). The fourth is the most important:

4^o, suppono quod omnis veritas 2^a mensuretur a prima, que deus est, et in latitudine illarum veritatum sunt tot gradus defectuum vel falsitatum quot sunt gradus deficientie a prima veritate.

There are three main grades of truth:

- 1) Primo modo largissime est proposicio vera, quia ens Ymmo, cum omne ens naturaliter significat se esse, proposicio falsissima, cum sit ens, significat se esse naturaliter (p. 204).

¹²⁹ This position bears a certain resemblance to that of Roger Nottingham [LXI]. A further tenet of the position corresponds to the fourth opinion in Bradwardine's list [LXIV], ca. 5).

2) 2º modo, paulo contraccius dicitur proposicio vera, propter veritatem quam primarie significat; sive ipsa veritas sit ipsamet, vel ab ipsa dependens, sive ens omnino distinctum (*ibid.*).

3) Sed 3º specialiter dicitur proposicio vera, quando habet primarie significatum independens ab ipsa, ... Et ex istis patet quod falsum isto modo est verum tam primo nodo quam 2º. Patet etiam quod si quicquam est verum 3º modi, tunc est verum 2º modo; sed non econtra (p. 205).

From this, John says: "omnia vocata communiter insolubilia sunt tam vera quam falsa" — i.e., in the different senses (*ibid.*). There follows an application to cases (pp. 206-227).

Further, "Et hic bene dicitur in materia insolubilium quod insoluble significans pro se ipso non in toto convertitur cum alio consimili de terminis synonymis" (p. 210).

XLIV

JOHN WYCLIF? [c. 1330-1384]¹³⁰

Insolubilia pulchra [probably after c. 1361]¹³¹

Inc Insolubilia pulchra. Quia inter casus logicales aliqui sunt aliis difficiliores

Exp non respiciat tractatum [quem] qui sic incipit "Insolubile est difficilis paralogismus qui sibi reperiet aliam etc." Explicitunt quidam modus solvendi insolubilia secundum magistrum J. Wyclif docorem veritatis evangelicae, cuius animae propicietur deus. Amen. Sic inveni explicit in exemplari in antiquo.

*Prague, Univ. 773, ff. 259v-262v.

The text is a compendium of Wyclif's genuine [XLIII]. Some passages are quoted *verbatim*.

The authenticity of this work is doubtful.¹³² The codex contains five certainly genuine works by Wyclif, followed by several works by other authors. The *Insolubilia* is the last item in the

¹³⁰ Dahmus [44], p. 1050.

¹³¹ I.e., after Wyclif's *De logica* [XLIII]. See above, n. 128.

¹³² The attribution to Wyclif appears to be based solely on the *explicit*.

codex.¹³³ It does not appear in the important Wyclif catalogues in four Vienna MSS.¹³⁴ Moreover, on 259v, near the beginning, the author says that he is going to suppose certain things as "in tertio tractatu logicae magistri Johannis Wyclif." This suggests that the author is not Wyclif himself, but someone using Wyclif. Nevertheless, since the doctrine is Wyclif's, it is just possible that it is Wyclif himself referring to his own *De logica*, and that the name was supplied by a later scribe.

XLV

LAMBERT OF AUXERRE [mid 13c.]

Summulae logicales [1253-1257]¹³⁵

Inc Ut novi artium auditores plenius intellegant quae in summulis edocentur valde utilis est cognitio dicendorum. In primis quaeritur quare artista

Exp Nec sine illa dispositione exteriori potest relativum referre antecedens, eo quod illa dispositio cadit in idem numero cum antecedente ad quod relativum refertur. Pro eodem vero in numero supponere deberet relativum et antecedens, quod non esset si sine sua dispositione ipsam refere<r>et. Explicit Summula magistri Lamberti fratris de sancto Victore.

Cambridge, Mass., Episcopal Theological School, ETS Accession Book, v. 1, p. 277, no. 22025, ff. 1ra-47rb.

Erfurt, CA 8° 66, ff. 14r-57v (ascribed to Walter Burley).

Königswart, 20-H-27, ff. 1ra-64va.

Lamballe (now in Paris, B.N.), 1.

Padua, Bibl. univ. 647.

Paris, B.N. lat. 7392.

Paris, B.N. lat. 13966.

Paris, B.N. lat. 13967.

Paris, B.N. lat. 16617, ff. 64r-131r.

Paris, B.N. Nouv. acq. lat. 827.

¹³³ See Truhlář [99].

¹³⁴ See Buddensieg [43], pp. lix-lxxxiv.

¹³⁵ Geyer [54] puts the date before 1253. But De Rijk [46], p. 162, n. 1, argues that it was composed between 1253 and 1257, and published between 1257 and 1276.

Prague, Univ. 893, ff. 1r-193r (with commentary by John of Prague).

Semur, Bibl. municipale, cod. 2.

Troyes, Bibl. municipale 2402, ff. 1-95.¹³⁶

I have seen only the ETS codex, from which the following references are taken.

Lambert discusses the question in the context of his analysis of the fallacy *secundum quid et simpliciter*. He sets out Aristotle's Perjurer example and the Liar (35vab). It is curious that the perjurer is made to utter only his one oath "Per Deum, ego pejero." The Liar is resolved by observing that "pars non supponit simpliciter pro eo cuius est pars, sed secundum quid solum."¹³⁷ Lambert notes that there is the greatest difficulty in these insolubles, and that the matter requires a further investigation.

XLVI

LUDOLPH MEISTERMANN OF LÜBECK [late 14c.]

Quaestiones et propositiones de insolubilibus
[1393]¹³⁸

Inc De insolubilibus diversae sunt opinione.

Exp de propositione necessitate, possibilitate et impossibilitate, etc.

Explicitunt insolubilia per reverendum magistrum Luderum (?)

Maysterman edita in studio Pragensi feria (?) 1393º.

*Vienna, Nat. Bibl. 5252, ff. 143rb-154ra.

¹³⁶ For most of these MSS, see Grabmann [29], p. 24, 105f., and De Rijk [46], p. 162, n. 1. I am indebted to James Mensch and Leonard Boyle for the Cambridge reference. The folio numbers for the Erfurt MS are in Mohan [98], p. 476. For the Königswart MS, see Boháček [39], p. 473. De Rijk lists the Troyes MS as cod. 2401. Cod. 2402 is correct (see [78]; also *ibid.* for the folio references). Franco Alessio, ed., *Lamberto d'Auxerre: Logica (Summa Lamberti)*, ("Pubblicazioni dell'istituto di storia della filosofia dell'Università di Milano", no. 19; Florence: La Nuova Italia Editrice, 1971) came to my attention after the present work went to press.

¹³⁷ On supposition *secundum quid*, see also Anonymous [VI].

¹³⁸ The title is taken from [98]. The date is based on the *explicit*. The entire MS consists of four logical works by Ludolph. See [98]. The *Insolubilia* is the last item in the codex. The correct and full form of his name is to be found on 143ra.

Ludolph considers and rejects the view that denies self-reference, and also the view of Albert of Saxony [XXIV], presented in schematic form (143rb-144vb). He then sets out his own position in four suppositions and twenty conclusions (144vb-146vb). He concludes (conclusion 17) that some insolubles are possible, and (conclusion 18) that some are even true (146va). The remainder of the tract considers applications to cases.

XLVII

MARSILIUS OF INGHEN [c. 1330-1396]¹³⁹

Insolubilia [after 1351]¹⁴⁰

*In*c Consequenter in dei nomine de insolubilibus pauca tractaturus.¹⁴¹
*Ex*p et propter istam tota copulativa est falsa et ex consequenti sophisma est falsum. Haec de exclusivis. Similiter dicitur de omnibus aliis. Haec de ultimo capitulo principali. Explicant insolubilia reverendi magistri Marsili de Inghen 1457.

*Vatican, Pal. lat. 995, ff. 63r-89r.

*Vienna, Nat. Bibl. 5162, ff. 171v-174v (incomplete).¹⁴²

I have taken the following references from the Vatican MS.

Marsilius' tract is divided into eight chapters. Ch. 1 (63r-70r) gives some preliminary descriptions, suppositions and conclusions, and resolves certain *dubia*. Ch. 2 discusses four previous opinions. The first (70r-70v) is Albert of Saxony's [XXIV]. The second is attributed to Buridan (70v), and seems to correspond to the opinion of which Buridan says "ita visum fuit mihi alias" (see [XXXIV]). The third opinion (70v) is Swyneshed's [LXIII], and the fourth (70v-71r) is summarized:

... hujusmodi propositiones esse falsas quia significant se esse falsas per casum, et e contra significant se esse veras. Quod

¹³⁹ Maurer [60].

¹⁴⁰ Marsilius uses Albert of Saxony's [XXIV] opinion. See above, n. 58.

¹⁴¹ Taken from the Vienna MS. The Vatican MS begins: Consequenter dei juvamine (?)

¹⁴² Unascribed. At the top of 171v is written: Incipit textus insolubilium. Fol. 172v is blank, leaving a lacuna in the text. The text ends abruptly on 174v: esset possibile 'a significat omne'

probant, quia ex eis cum vera assumpta sequitur ipsas esse veras; igitur, significant se esse veras. Consequentia tenet. Antecedens declaratur, quia sequitur ‘Sortes dicit falsum; et haec propositio ‘Sortes dicit falsum’ significat sic; igitur, ipsa est vera’ (*ibid.*).

Marsilius' own view is set out (71r-72r). As a preliminary, he explains “si aliquis de quocumque dicto dicat esse falsum, sensus est quod non est ita sicut illud dictum prima repraesentatione significat” (71r). His position is then stated in six conclusions (71rv). The main point is that propositions falsifying themselves signify themselves to be false, and also signify themselves not to be false, and so are false because each such proposition signifies somehow as is not the case.

The remaining chapters, three through eight (72r-89r), apply these principles to various kinds of cases.

Prantl quotes an anonymous *Insolubilia* printed in the Cologne 1489 edition of Peter of Spain's *Summulae*¹⁴³:

Marsilius autem oppositum sustinens dicit quod non solum significet Socratem dicere falsum, sed etiam significet secundario quod falsum est Socratem dicere falsum.

XLVIII

PAUL OF PERGULA [d. 1451]¹⁴⁴

In regulas insolubilium Heytesbury
[1st half 15c.]

Inc Tua, mi Hieronyme, honesta petitio, domini nostri In primis itaque duas suppositiones hic sophistarum princeps assumit.

Exp Et si quis velit probare quod sit insolubile, responde ut ibi dictum est. Ad laudem dei omnipotentis.

Oxford, Bodl., Canon. Misc. 176, ff. 51-59.

Oxford, Bodl., Canon. Misc. 221, ff. 55-59.

¹⁴³ Prantl [64], v. 4, p. 103, n. 425. This text is the same as that translated by Mullaly [191], pp. 185-189. For the passage quoted, see *ibid.*, p. 136.

¹⁴⁴ Tiraboschi [71], v. 6, part 1, p. 332.

- Vatican, Vat. lat. 2139, ff. 67rb-8ova.
 *Venice, San Marco VI, 228 (2423), ff. 53ra-62va.
 Venice, San Marco VI, 248 (2878), ff. 76-88.
 Venice, San Marco Z 278 (1785).¹⁴⁵

This tract consists of a series of objections to the various parts of the first chapter of Heytesbury's *Regulae* [LXIX], together with replies.

XLIX

PAUL OF PERGULA [d. 1451]¹⁴⁶

Logica, tract. 6: *De insolubilibus*
 [1st half 15c.]

Paul of Pergula: Logica and Tractatus de sensu composito et diviso, Mary Anthony Brown, ed., ("Franciscan Institute Publications," Text Series, no. 13; St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute, 1961), pp. 134-148.

Paul defines an insoluble proposition and an insoluble *casus* essentially as does Heytesbury [LXIX] (p. 134). He states three rules, corresponding respectively to the first three in Heytesbury's *Regulae* (pp. 135f.). But Paul specifies the additional signification of insolubles (p. 137):

et si quaeratur quid ergo significat praecise ista: Sortes dicit falsum, dicitur quod illa significat praecise quod Sortes dicit falsum, et quod ipsa est vera

The relation of the proposition to this second conjunct is one of "assertive" signification (p. 140):

Voco autem significatum assertivum illud quod formaliter sequitur ex aliqua propositione.

¹⁴⁵ For all but the last MS, see Brown [15], p. xii. Brown cites San Marco VI, 228, as San Marco X, 216, and San Marco VI, 248, as San Marco X, 217. Both are cited as "to be investigated." On these identifications, see Kristeller [92], pp. 225, 226. On San Marco Z 278 (1785), see *ibid.*, p. 212. For the folio numbers of the Oxford MSS, see Coxe [81].

¹⁴⁶ See n. 144.

Paul distinguishes a "bona" consequence from one that is "concedenda". In the latter, the antecedent may sometimes be true when the consequent is false, but not in the former (pp. 141f.).

Paul maintains that "nullum insolubile est sine casu explicito vel implicito." (p. 144).

L

PAUL OF VENICE [c. 1372-1429]¹⁴⁷

Logica magna II, 15 [1408-1428]¹⁴⁸

**Logica magna*, (Venice: Albertinus [Rubeus] Vercellensis, for Octavianus Scotus, 1499 [Hain 12505]), ff. 192rb-199vb. Copy at Yale University Library.

Paul first considers a long list of previous opinions (192rb-194vb). The first seven opinions (192rb-192va) are the same as the second through eighth in Bradwardine's list ([LXIV], ca. 5). Some of these are taken *verbatim* from Bradwardine, together with at least some of Paul's replies. The eighth and ninth opinions (192vab) are *verbatim* the second and third in Heytesbury's *Regulae* [LXIX]. The tenth opinion (192vb) solves insolubles by the fallacy *secundum quid et simpliciter*, denying the inference from 'Sortes dicit hoc falsum' to 'Sortes dicit falsum.' This opinion defines insolubles as follows:

difficilis paralogismus secundum quid et simpliciter ex reflexione alicujus actus supra se cum determinatione privativa.

This is Bradwardine's definition ([LXIV], ca. 2), and perhaps the opinion referred to is Bradwardine's, although this is not certain.

The eleventh position (192vb) is Albert of Saxony's [XXIV], the twelfth (192vb-193rb) is Heytesbury's [LXIX], and the thir-

¹⁴⁷ Nardi [62], p. 242.

¹⁴⁸ Paul began his teaching career at Padua in 1408. His abridgement of the *Logica magna*, namely, the *Logica parva* (more commonly known as *Summulae logicae*), was written in 1428 (*ibid.*).

teenth (193rb-va) is a schematic version of Peter of Ailly's [LI]. Paul speaks highly of Peter's position, but refers to

quendam novum scriptorem circa insolubilia imitatorem hujus, qui de toto processu solum tria infert correlaria quintae conclusionis ..., quae non sufficienter declarant materiam istius materiae insolubilium (193va).

It is not clear who is being mentioned here.

Paul mentions another opinion which is like that of Peter of Ailly's (193vb-194ra). This is in fact the position of Peter of Mantua [LII]. It is not clear in just what the likeness is supposed to consist.

The fourteenth opinion (194rab) is that of Walter Sexgrave [LXVIII].

Paul then proceeds to set out his own position in great detail (194rb-196va), which, he says, "scio valentium fuisse anti-quorum" (194rb). The position seems to be an elaboration and correction of Roger Swyneshed's [LXIII]. In this regard, it is perhaps significant that Swyneshed's opinion is conspicuously absent from the list of previous opinions, where it might have been expected to be inserted between the seventh and eighth positions, and corresponded to the first in Heytesbury's list.

Paul first sets out eight dichotomies, together with seven corollaries (194rb-vb).¹⁴⁹ The eighth dichotomy contains the definition of an insoluble (194vb):

Propositio insolubilis est propositio habens supra se reflexionem, suae falsitatis aut se non esse veram totaliter vel participaliter illativa.

The fourth corollary is (*ibid.*):

Non omnis propositio significat se esse veram, nec omnis propositio categorica affirmativa significat suum subjectum et praedicatum supponere pro eodem ... quia non quaelibet talis habet reflexionem supra se.

¹⁴⁹ There are only five corollaries in the Venice edition of 1499, which is the only edition I have seen. It is not clear whether the fifth and sixth are missing, or whether the last, labelled the seventh, is simply misnumbered.

There follow six suppositions, together with two corollaries of the second supposition (194vb-195rb). The first two suppositions give a criterion of truth and falsehood (194vb):

- 1) *Propositio vera est illa cujus significatum adaequatum est verum, et non repugnat ipsam esse veram.*
- 2) *Propositio falsa dicitur esse ista quae falsificat se, aut cujus falsitas non consurgit ex terminis, sed ex adaequato significato falso.*¹⁵⁰

The third through fifth suppositions are standard rules of formal consequences. The sixth supposition allows self-reference, direct or indirect, in mental, spoken or written sentences.

Seven conclusions follow, together with seven corollaries, and an additional corollary from the first conclusion alone (195rb-vb). This last corollary is the same as Swyneshed's third conclusion. The corollary seems to be simply repeated in Paul's second conclusion (195rb). The fifth conclusion allows inference from a true sentence to a false one in a valid formal consequence (195va).

Paul then applies these principles to several instances (196va-199vb). As an example, the standard case in which Socrates utters 'Sortes dicit falsum,' and that only, is solved by conceding the insoluble, while maintaining that it is nevertheless false (196va-197rb).

LI

PETER OF AILLY [1350-1420]¹⁵¹

Insolubilia [1372]¹⁵²

**Conceptus et insolubilia* (Paris: Pierre le Dru, for Durand Gelier, c. 1495 [Pellechet 539]). Copy at Walters Art Gallery, Baltimore.

Peter locates truth in the mental proposition signifying naturally. Propositions signifying by convention (spoken or writ-

¹⁵⁰ Compare Swyneshed's definition [LXIII].

¹⁵¹ See Emmen [49].

¹⁵² See Elie [48], pp. 64f.

ten propositions, but also mental propositions "improperly" so-called — the latter are "cum tacens ore loquatur corde, formando similia quae, si ore loqueretur, proferret exterius" [7vb]) are not to be described as *being* true or false, but only as *signifying* a truth or a falsehood, "quia quaelibet talis significat mentalem proprie dictam veram vel falsam" (*ibid.*).

The discussion of the principles on which Peter's position is based is scattered over several folios, and is difficult to summarize. There are several distinct series of suppositions, conclusions and corollaries. Perhaps Paul of Venice [L], in the description of the thirteenth previous opinion in his list, is as fair as any. He summarizes in part as follows ([L], 193rb-va):

- 1) Nulla res creata potest distinete repraesentare se ipsam formaliter, sed bene objective. To signify *objective* is to be the object of some formal cognition; to signify *formaliter* is to be the formal cognition of some object. Thus any creature may be a sign of itself *objective*, but not *formaliter*. See Peter's third and fourth suppositions, 17rv.
- 2) Nulla propositio mentalis proprie dicta potest significare se ipsam esse veram nec se ipsam esse falsam. For otherwise the first point would be violated. See Peter's first two conclusions, 17vb, 19rb.
- 3) Pars propositionis mentalis proprie dictae non potest supponere pro ipsa propositione cuius est pars, nec pro contradictrio ejusdem propositionis See Peter's first, second and fourth conclusions, 19vb, 20ra.
- 4) Omnis propositio insolubilis est propositio vocalis, scripta vel mentalis improprie dicta. For insolubles are self-referential, and no proper mental proposition can refer to itself. See Peter, 20va.
- 5) Cuilibet propositioni insolubili correspondet aliqua propositio mentalis proprie dicta vera, et aliqua alia proprie dicta falsa. See Peter, 21rb-va.
- 6) Quaelibet propositio insolubilis, et similiter ejus contradictoria, est propositio plures. For it is subordinated to two mental propositions. See Peter, 22ra.
- 7) Propositio insolubilis est simul vera et falsa, et similiter sua contradictoria. See Peter, 23rb.

Peter also allows that proposition-tokens of the same type need not all have the same truth-value (22rb).

LII

PETER (ALBOINUS) OF MANTUA [d. 1400]¹⁵³

Logica [c. 1390-1400]¹⁵⁴

**Logica*, (Venice: Simon Bevilaqua, 1 Dec. 1492 [*Incunabula in American Libraries*, 3rd census, P-501]), no folio numbers. Copy at Yale University Library.

The last chapter of this work is on insolubles, *Inc In difficultatibus autem propositionum quas insolubiles vocant*

Peter first considers the opinions of Albert of Saxony [XXIV] and William Heytesbury [LXIX], and rejects them. Neither is mentioned by name. The opinion of the *restringentes* is described in the strong form in which it appears in Bradwardine's discussion [LXIV]. This too is rejected.

The basic points of Peter's position are then set out:

... dicimus quod duobus modis propositio potest dici vera: uno modo quando verificatur non propter supposita suorum terminorum quorum suppositorum ipsa vel alia propositio est suppositum, scilicet, quod propositio vera non reddatur vera ex eo quod pars ejus supponat pro ipsam nec pro pertinente ad ipsam. (In this sense, a proposition is *simpliciter* true or false.) Alio modo dicitur propositio esse vera quando verificatur pro se vel pro pertinente. Et isto modo haec propositio est vera 'Hoc est verum,' se ipsa demonstrata, non simpliciter sed secundum quid. Sed est falsa primo modo

Peter gives objections to this position, then goes on:

... iste terminus 'verum' est terminus aequivocus, et istae propositiones omnes sunt propositiones plures ... et ideo, cum proponitur 'Non hoc est verum' 'Hoc est falsum,' non est secundum unicam responsonem respondendum. Sed est respondendum quod hoc est falsum secundum primum membrum divisionis positae et verum secundum aliud. Et ita dicitur de suis contradictoriis.

He raises further objections, among which are the "indirect" insolubles. For these, he denies that their *casus* are possible.

¹⁵³ See Collucio Salutati [6], v. 18, pp. 318-325, and notes.

¹⁵⁴ Based on what little is known of Peter's teaching career. See *ibid.*

LIII

RALPH STRODE [fl. 2nd half 14c.]¹⁵⁵

Logica,¹⁵⁶ tract. 6: *De insolubilibus*
[c. 1350-1370]¹⁵⁷

Inc Tractatus insolubilium dividitur in tres partes. In quarum prima positiones discutiuntur. In secunda istarum opinionum quae vera sunt eliciuntur. In tertia diversae species insolubilium ostenduntur.

Exp exterioribus nascentibus sufficere possunt ad praesens.

*Erfurt, CA 4° 255, ff. 1ra-12va.

*Oxford, Bodl., Canon. Misc. 219, ff. 47vb-52vb.

(Corrupt. See below. *Exp* et sic probantur omnes aliae conclusiones, ut faciliter potest patere bene intellegenti. Et sic est finis hujus tractatus. Amen. Amen. Explicant insolubilia magna Rodulphi Strode. Deo gratias. Amen. Et hic est finis logicae Strode.)

Padua, Anton. Scaff. XIX, N. 407, ff. 21r-62v.¹⁵⁸

I have used the Erfurt MS for the following references.

Part One (1ra-gra) of Strode's long text begins with an exposition and refutation of the opinions of the *antiqui* (1ra-3vb). The discussion is a close paraphrase of the first five chapters of Bradwardine's tract [LXIV]. He then turns to the positions of the *moderni* (3vb):

Praedictae namque opiniones fuerunt antiquorum [antiquorum], qui parum vel nihil de insolubilibus recte sapuerunt.

¹⁵⁵ Contemporary of John Wyclif (see Blackley [36]), who was born c. 1330 and died in 1384 (see Dahmus [44]).

¹⁵⁶ Blackley [36] says that Strode's *Logica* is lost (see also Gollancz [55], p. 57.). But the sequence of six logical tracts in Canon. Misc. 219, ff. 13ra-52vb (*De arte logica*, *De principiis logicalibus*, *De suppositionibus*, *Consequentialiae*, *Obligationes*, *De insolubilibus*) is explicitly attributed to Strode and called his *Logica*. I am preparing an edition of the *Logica*.

¹⁵⁷ Mohan, [94] gives the date of the Erfurt MS as 1368-1370.

¹⁵⁸ See Iosa [87], pp. 224f. Iosa does not give the folio numbers. For these, see Mohan [94]. Under the *Inc*: "Tractatus insolubilium dividitur in tres partes in quarum prima positiones discutiuntur," he cites the Padua MS with the above folio numbers, attributes it to Strode, and gives the date 1468. But under the *Inc*: "Sortes dicit falsum. Pono istum casum quod unus Sortes sit omnis Sortes," he again cites the same Padua MS, without attribution, giving the folio numbers 38b-39d, and the date 1469. If the folio numbers are correct in both cases, this latter text is simply a *part* of Strode's tract. The discrepancy in dates seems to be an error, but it is not certain which, if either, is correct.

Post quos surrexit princeps modernorum physicorum, videlicet, magister Thomas Bradwardine, qui aliquid quod valuerit de insolubilibus primitus adinvenit.

Strode then sets out Bradwardine's position at length, stating his dichotomies, definitions, suppositions and conclusions, arguing for them, and applying them to cases (3vb-6ra). The Oxford MS gets only as far as the first dichotomy, citing Bradwardine's point against those who posit a trichotomy (Oxford MS, 51vb31), and then abruptly turns to a consideration of several complicated epistemic sophisms.¹⁵⁹ This last discussion has no parallel in the Erfurt MS, and indeed seems totally out of place. The Oxford MS ends abruptly.

The Erfurt MS follows Bradwardine's Chapter 6 closely in the exposition of his position, but abbreviates the application to examples. Strode then turns to the opinion of Roger Swyneshed [LXIII], mentioned by name, listing his dichotomies, definitions or descriptions, suppositions, and conclusions *verbatim* (6ra-vb). He considers objections and answers them — essentially the same objections that Swyneshed himself raised and answered in his own tract (7rab). He applies Swyneshed's position to examples (7rb-va). Here he departs from Roger's text.

The third "modern" opinion to be discussed is the same as the second in Heytesbury's list of previous positions [LXIX] (7vab). Strode rejects it. The opinion is not ascribed to anyone by name.¹⁶⁰

The fourth "modern" position is the same as the third in Heytesbury's listing (7vb-8ra). It too is unascribed.¹⁶¹ Strode rejects it as well.

The fifth "modern" opinion is Heytesbury's (8ra-9ra). Strode gives Heytesbury's definitions of an insoluble *casus* and an insoluble proposition, calling them *suppositiones* (8ra), and states Heytesbury's five rules in the form of one large dichotomy with

¹⁵⁹ The Oxford MS reads [line 30]: "est quod ista et omnes consimiles sunt proprietates sicut/ [31] a scis esse verum; ergo, hoc quod est a scis esse/." The Erfurt MS has [4ra21]: "[quod est] quae est non esse verum pro se. Et clarum est quod ista et omnes/[22] consimiles sunt proprietates vocis, sicut praemissum est. Item, licet."

¹⁶⁰ Contrast Cajetan of Thiene's [XXVIII] ascription of the opinion to Dumbleton [XXXVI].

¹⁶¹ Contrast Cajetan's ascription of it to Kilmington [LV].

subdivisions (8ra-va). He argues against Heytesbury's contention in the third rule that one is not obliged to say what an insoluble's "additional" signification is (8vb-9ra).¹⁶²

The last opinion, treated briefly (gra), is Robert Fland's [LVIII], although Strode does not ascribe it to anyone by name. After quoting Fland's definitions of an insoluble, of a true proposition, and of a false proposition, Strode remarks that

Post istas definitiones, descendit ad solvendum insolubilia tam secundum positionem magistri Thomae Bradwardini quam secundum positionem Hentisberi.

He has nothing further to say about Fland's position here, but it is clear from what follows that he accepts it in large part.

Part Two of Strode's text consists of an evaluation of the positions of Bradwardine, Swyneshed and Heytesbury (9va-10va). He says that Bradwardine's dichotomies are true, but that his first definition is inadequate. For there are many propositions that signify nothing, e.g., 'Adam fuit', 'Antichristus erit'. He corrects the definition to allow for ampliation (grab).

Bradwardine's suppositions are true, except for the second. Strode distinguishes (on the basis of the last opinion considered in Part One — Robert Fland's opinion) (grb):

Aliquid significare aliud potest intellegi dupliciter, videlicet, primarie et secundario vel ex consequenti. Primarie dicitur aliquid aliud significare quando illud statim, sine aliquo argumentatione vel persuasione vel inductione, tale significatum intelligenti terminos repraesentat Secundario vero aliquid aliud significare dicitur quando <per> aliquid argumentum vel mediante aliqua persuasione vel discursu tale significatum repraesentat.

Bradwardine's conclusions are "probabiles", but the second stands in need of clarification. A proposition of the sort described in that conclusion signifies itself to be true only *secondarily* and not primarily (grb-vb).

As for Swyneshed, the last part of his first dichotomy is unacceptable (9vb-10rb). It violates an important principle of the

¹⁶² Strode seems to be arguing here that an insoluble *can* signify precisely as its terms pretend. But in Part Two of his tract, he denies this and says that he objects only to Heytesbury's refusal to specify an insoluble's additional signification.

philosophers, even when it is revised to account for ampliation. Strode refutes the last part of the dichotomy by arguing from it to nine unacceptable conclusions:

- 1) Swyneshed's first conclusion (9vb);
- 2) His third (*ibid.*).
- 3) His second (9vb-1ora).
- 4) Aliqua est consequentia bona cuius consequens est verum et antecedens nec verum nec falsum (1ora). This is against Aristotle.
- 5) Aliqua est consequentia bona et formalis cuius antecedens est verum et consequens nec verum nec falsum (*ibid.*). This too is contrary to Aristotle.
- 6) Aliqua sunt duo contradictoria quorum unum est verum et reliquum nec significans sicut est nec aliter quam est, et per consequens, secundum istam opinionem, nec verum nec falsum (*ibid.*). Contrary to Aristotle.
- 7) Aliqua duae propositiones convertuntur simpliciter quorum una est falsa et reliqua nec vera nec falsa, et quorum una significat aliter quam est et reliqua nec significat aliter quam est nec sicut est (1orab).

Against this Strode argues:

nulla penitus potest assignari ratio quare una convertibilium potius sit vera vel falsa quam reliqua, vel potius nec sit vera nec falsa quam reliqua, vel potius nec significat aliter quam est nec sicut est quam reliqua (1orb).

- 8) Aliqua propositio est falsa quae aliqualiter significat, quae tamen nec significat sicut est nec aliter quam est. For example, 'Haec significat aliter quam est' (*ibid.*). Contrary to Aristotle.
- 9) Istae duae propositiones stant simul: 'Ita est totaliter sicut Sortes dicit' et 'Non est ita totaliter sicut Sortes dicit' (*ibid.*).

These nine conclusions are essentially the same as Fland's list of nine impossible conclusions which follow from the "opinio plurium sapientium."

Turning to Heytesbury, Strode agrees that an insoluble cannot signify precisely as its terms pretend. (In this Heytesbury agrees with Bradwardine.) But he insists that the additional signification of insolubles must be spelled out (1ova).

The third part of the tract constitutes an application of the principles that have emerged from the first two parts to individual exemplary cases. Strode discusses insolubles arising "ex actibus nostris exterioribus" and those arising "ex actibus

"nostris interioribus" and those "quae in vocis proprietate fundantur," each in simple and composite forms (the latter include the standard disjunctives, copulatives, exclusives and exceptives, affirmative and negative, particular and "alia"—i.e., universal, etc.) (10va-12va).

LIV

RICHARD OF CAMPSALL [d. c. 1350-1360]¹⁶³

Quaestiones super librum priorum analyticorum,
q. 10 [before 1307]¹⁶⁴

In *Quando igitur tres termini. Quaeratur: utrum uniformis de inesse valet?*

The Works of Richard of Campsall, Edward A. Synan, ed., v. 1: *Quaestiones super librum priorum analyticorum.* ("Studies and Texts," no. 17, part 1; Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1968), pp. 162-177.

The relevant passages are in pars. 10.01-10.23, 10.31-10.51. There is also a brief mention of the paradox in connection with q. 4, par. 4.09 (pp. 88f.).

Richard's position solves the paradox as a fallacy *secundum quid et simpliciter*. A term in one of the premisses stands for something for which the similar term in the conclusion does not stand, or vice versa. This thesis is based on a rejection of self-reference (par. 10.36; but see below).

Richard draws the conclusion "quod impossibile est demonstrare omnes propositiones simul" (10.42). He is thinking here of "demonstration" by means of a demonstrative pronoun.

In par. 10.46, Richard allows self-reference in certain innocuous cases:

dicendum quod subiectum aliquando potest supponere pro toto cuius est pars, et hoc est ubi non accidit refleccio in indiffinita et ideo subiectum in ista: 'propositio est vera,' indifferenter supponit pro ista, sicud pro quocunque alia.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶³ Synan [21], pp. 13f.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 18ff.

¹⁶⁵ quocunque alia: *thus in edition. Read: quacunque alia.*

LV

RICHARD KILMINGTON [d. by Mar. 1362]¹⁶⁶

Sophismata [c. 1330]¹⁶⁷

Inc Ad utrumque dubitare potentes facile speculabimur et verum et falsum

Exp Et per hoc potest satis faciliter ad alia insolubilia in quocumque genere fuerint (?) responderi. Deo gratias. Amen.

*Bruges, Bibl. publ. MS 497, ff. 64va-73vb.¹⁶⁸

*Bruges, Bibl. publ. MS 500, ff. 1ra-32va (prologue lost).

Cracow, Biblioteka Jagiellońska 621, ff. 3r-13v.

Erfurt, CA 2° 313, ff. 147-158v.

*Erfurt, CA 8° 76, ff. 37ra-71ra.

Munich, Staatsbibliothek CLM 23530, ff. 182r-210r.

Oxford, Bodl., Canon. Misc. 376, ff. 1ra-20ra.

*Oxford, Bodl., Canon. Misc. 409, ff. 99ra-109va (incomplete).¹⁶⁹

Padua, Bibl. univ. 1123, ff. 65va-79va.

*Paris, B.N. lat. 16134, ff. 56rb-73ra.

Vatican, Vat. lat. 3066, ff. 16ra-25vb.

Vatican, Vat. lat. 3088, ff. 37ra-61vb.

Vatican, Vat. lat. 4429, ff. 45ra-62va.¹⁷⁰

I have used Erfurt CA 8° 76 for the following references.

The discussion of insolubles occurs in the course of arguing the forty-ninth and last sophism (67vb-71ra):

a est scitum a te, supposito quod a sit altera istorum ‘Deus est’ vel ‘Nulla concessa a Sorte est scita a te,’ et concedat Sortes illam et nullam aliam ‘a est scitum a te.’

¹⁶⁶ Emden [83], v. 2, pp. 105of.

¹⁶⁷ Kilmington had his M.A. by 1331, and his B.Th. by 1335 (*ibid.*). His *Sophismata* would almost certainly have been written during his regency in arts. See Weisheipl [72], pp. 163-166.

¹⁶⁸ De Poorter [82] says that this copy is incomplete at the end of the fiftieth sophism. But according to the usual numbering, there are only forty-nine sophisms in the complete list. (See Wilson [77], pp. 163-168). The MS in fact indicates fifty sophisms by marginal enumeration, but the sophism numbered 45, “Terminus ‘homo’ est et omnis homo est ille”, is not included in the usual list. The fiftieth sophism — the forty-ninth in the usual list — is indeed incomplete, and contains only part of the discussion of insolubles.

¹⁶⁹ The text breaks off early in the discussion of the 42nd sophism (“*b facit c esse verum*”), and so lacks the passage on insolubles.

¹⁷⁰ All these MSS, with the exception of Bruges 500, are cited in Wilson [77], p. 170 or Mohan [94].

Kilmington's position is briefly summarized in the following passage (69vb):

nullum simile de quo praesens est locutio est simpliciter verum vel simpliciter falsum, sed quodlibet est verum secundum quid vel falsum secundum quid. Verbi gratia, posito quod Sortes dicat illam 'Sortes dicit falsum' et nullam aliam, tunc dico quod iste terminus 'falsum' supponere (?) potest uno modo pro falso secundum quid, et alio modo pro falso simpliciter. Si pro falso secundum quid, concedo. Si pro falso simpliciter, sic est negandum quod Sortes dicit falsum.

Cajetan of Thiene [XXVIII] attributes to Kilmington the third preliminary opinion in Heytesbury's *Regulae* [LXIX], which maintains that "quodlibet insolubile verum vel falsum esse, nullum tamen insolubile verum esse, nec aliquid falsum." This is at best a misleading way of putting it.

LVI

RICHARD LAVENHAM [d. not before 1399]¹⁷¹

Insolubilia [1351-c. 1375]¹⁷²

Inc Sicut nexus amoris quandoque insolubilis dicitur, non quia nullo modo sit solubilis, sed quia cum difficultate sit solubilis, sic propositio aliquando insolubilis dicitur,

Exp Et tunc est consequentia bona et minor neganda. Et sic patet responsio ad insolubilia. Explicit tractatus insolubilium compilatus per reverendum doctorem Lavenham, ordinis Carmelitarum.

*London, B. L. Sloane 3899, ff. 73r-83r.¹⁷³

¹⁷¹ The date of Richard's death was formerly put in 1381 or 1383. (See Klingsford [57]). But Emden [83], v. 2, pp. 110f., refers to a London register according to which Lavenham was prior of London Convent as late as Sept. 1399.

¹⁷² Richard cites (74r) Albert of Saxony's *Insolubilia* [XXIV], which was written between 1351-1365. He was also confessor to Richard II, and friend to Simon Sudbury, Archbishop of Canterbury (see Emden [83], v. 2, pp. 110f.).

¹⁷³ I am preparing an edition of this tract, as well as of other treatises by Lavenham in the Sloane MS. See Spade [68].

Richard first sets out four suppositions:

- 1) Pars supponit pro toto cuius est pars (73r).
- 2) Omnis propositio quae denotatur per aliquem terminum esse falsum pro se ipsa dicitur falsificare se ipsam (*ibid.*).
- 3) Omnis propositio affirmativa significat se ipsam esse veram (*ibid.*).
- 4) Omnis propositio negativa significat se ipsam esse veram (73v).

Four conclusions follow (*ibid.*):

- 1) Omnis propositio mundi categorica significat se ipsam esse veram.
- 2) Omnis propositio insolubilis significat se esse veram et esse falsam.
- 3) Omnis propositio significans se esse veram et se esse falsam est falsa.
- 4) Omnis propositio insolubilis est convertibilis cum una copulativa falsa.

These principles are applied to eleven cases (73v-83r). Richard cites Albert of Saxony [XXIV] (74r) and Thomas Bradwardine [LXIV] (75r) by name in the course of his discussion.

LVII

RICHARD OF SHERWOOD [13c.]¹⁷⁴

Insolubilia [13c.]

Inc Sophismatum quorundam est solutio per aliquem tredecim locorum, quorundam autem non.

Exp Potest enim esse dictio, et vox complex<a> in ea. Explicant insolubilia.

*Cambridge, St. John's, 100, ff. 135ra-138va.

The codex is very tightly bound, and much of the text near the inner margin has disappeared into the center fold. Moreover, the MS appears in the microfilm to have been damaged, possibly

¹⁷⁴ Nothing is known of Richard of Sherwood beyond the attribution of this text to him. (See Grabmann [29]). The MS is 13c.

by water. Accordingly, I can tell very little about the content of the text. Richard adopts the following definition (135ra):

... quid sit insoluble. Et est insoluble difficilis paralogismus secundum quid et simpliciter ex reflexione alicujus actus supra se vel supra suum oppositum proveniens.

He refers to the three *radices* of insolubles: "proprietas vocis" (*ibid.*), "actus nostri" (135rb), and "repugnantia intellectuum" (*ibid.*). It is not clear however whether he accepts this division.

The opinion of the *cassantes*¹⁷⁵ is rejected (135 sqq. *passim*). The *restringentes* are also discussed (135rb).

Richard himself seems to accept a form of the solution *secundum quid et simpliciter*.

LVIII

ROBERT FLAND [fl. after 1335]

Insolubilia [1335-1370]¹⁷⁶

Inc Insolubile est propositio significans primo et principaliter sicut est, et ex consequenti aliter quam est, deducta nova impositione.

Exp Tunc *a* significat quod homo est asinus vel quod hoc est falsum, et ita est quod homo est asinus vel hoc est falsum, demonstrando *a*, et *a* est disjunctiva falsa. Pro solutione ad insolubilia sufficient dicta haec. Explicant insolubilia Fland.

*Bruges, Bibl. publ. MS 497, ff. 43rb-44va.

Robert repeats (43rb) the definition of an insoluble already given in the *incipit* and adds the following two definitions (*ibid.*):

Propositio vera est propositio significans praecise sicut est.
Propositio falsa est propositio significans aliter quam est.

¹⁷⁵ See the sixth previous opinion in Bradwardine's list [LXIV].

¹⁷⁶ All that is known of Fland is based on his three tracts preserved in the Bruges MS. The first is his *Consequentiae* (41ra-43rb), *inc*: "Nota quod consequentia dividitur duobus modis. Nam quaedam est formalis et quaedam materialis"; *exp*: "vel aliud sit impossibile. Explicant consequentiae Roberti Fland." The second tract is his *Insolubilia*. The third is his *Obligationes* (44vb-46ra), *inc*: "Notandum primo est quod obligatio"; *exp*: "Haec autem de obligationibus sufficient. Explicant obligationes Roberti Fland." I am preparing an edition of these three tracts. In his *Insolubilia*, Fland makes use of Heytesbury's position [LXIX]. Heytesbury's tract was written in 1335. On the other hand, Strode [LIII] uses Fland's tract no later than 1370.

He gives examples. In the context of one example, he says (*ibid.*):

Et quando arguitur: ‘*a* est falsum; et unum *a* est omne *a*; ergo, nullum *a* est verum,’ dicitur: concedo consequentiam et antecedens et consequens. Et dicitur quod non oportet quod consequens sit *a*.

Robert sets out two positions which he thinks give acceptable answers to the *insolubilia* (43rb-va):

Unde duae sunt positiones quae ponunt quod insolubile significat aliter quam est. Prima ponit positio quod insolubile significat aliter quam est, et certificat quae sit sua significatio secundaria. Secunda positio ponit quod insolubile significat aliter quam est; respondens non habet certificare quid significat aliter quam est. Unde, posito tali casu quod Sortes dicat talem propositionem et nullam aliam, ‘Sortes dicit falsum,’ quae significet quod Sortes dicit falsum, et sit unus Sortes omnis Sortes, et sit propositio dicta a Sorte *a*, prima positio ponit *a* esse falsum, et ponit quod *a* significat primo et principaliter quod Sortes dicit falsum, et ex consequenti quod Sortes dicit falsum et quod haec est vera: ‘Sortes dicit falsum.’ Secunda positio ponit *a* esse falsum, et ponit quod illa primo significat et principaliter quod Sortes dicit falsum, et ponit quod illa *a* significat aliter quam est, quia non stat cum casu quod *a* significat praecise quod Sortes dicit falsum. Igitur, sequitur ex casu quod *a* significat aliter quam quod Sortes dicit falsum. Sed non (?) est major ratio quare *a* significat quod homo est asinus quam quod nullus deus est. Ideo secunda positio ponit quod *a* significat aliter quam est, non tamen sequitur ex casu quod *a* significat illo modo aliter quam est, quocumque demonstrato. Et si quaeratur qualiter significat aliter quam est, hoc (?) non est certificanda.

The second position is clearly that of William Heytesbury [LXIX]. A little further on, Robert says (43va):

Ideo duae responsiones [*i.e.*, the two set out above] sunt meliores aliis ad insolubilia solvenda. Eligat ergo respondens unum istarum pro sua solutione ad insolubilia. Unde nulla istarum praecedentium admittit (?) casum talem: Sit *a* illa propositio ‘Nullum *a* est verum,’ quae significet praecise quod nullum *a* est verum. Et sit unum *a* omne *a*. Nec talem casum: Dicat Sortes talem propositionem et nullam aliam ‘Sortes dicit falsum,’ et sit unus Sortes omnis Sortes. Quia ex quolibet istorum sequuntur conclusiones impossibilis. Prima conclusio est: Propositio falsa significat

praecise sicut est. Secunda conclusio est: Duo contradictoria sunt simul falsa. Tertia conclusio est quod ex vero sequitur falsum formaliter.¹⁷⁷ Quarta conclusio est quod aliqua consequentia est bona cuius consequens est verum et antecedens non significat sicut est nec aliter quam est. Quinta est: Aliqua consequentia est bona et formalis et antecedens est falsum et consequens neque significat sicut est neque aliter quam est. Sexta est quarum: Sunt duo contradictoria quorum unum est verum et reliquum neque verum neque falsum. Septima est: Qualitercumque significat *a* significat *b*, et [*a*] *b* non convertitur cum *a*. Vel: Propositio nec significans sicut est nec aliter quam est convertitur cum propositione falsa. Octava conclusio est quod propositio falsa nec significat sicut est nec aliter quam est. Nona conclusio est ista: Ita est totaliter sicut Sortes dicit et non est ita totaliter sicut Sortes dicit.

Robert goes on to argue that these conclusions do in fact follow (43vab), and then says (43vb):

Ex quo istae conclusiones sunt contra opinionem plurium sapientium, negantur casus ex quibus sequuntur tales conclusiones vel consimiles.

After discussing simple insolubles, Robert turns to composite ones (44rb-va).

LIX

ROBERT GROSSETESTE [1175-1258]¹⁷⁸

Commentarium in Sophisticos elenchos Aristotelis [1215-1229]¹⁷⁹

Inc De sophisticis autem elenchis et de his quae videntur elenchi, cum dubium sit utrum sit ejusdem continuitatis liber iste

Exp ... indulgeant inventis autem multas referant grates.

*Oxford, Merton 280, ff. 1ra-37va.

¹⁷⁷ Compare these first three conclusions with Swyneshed's [LXIII] first, third and second conclusions, respectively. See also Strode's [LIII] discussion of Swyneshed.

¹⁷⁸ Thomson [69], pp. 192-213.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 81f.

The relevant passage occurs on 33va,¹⁸⁰ in the discussion of the fallacy *secundum quid et simpliciter*. Robert has little to say about the Liar example, but his formulation of Aristotle's Perjurer is curious:

Ergo contingit eundem bene simul jurare. Sit haec data: Non contingit eundem simul bene jurare et pejerare. Contra, sic: Aliquis qui numquam juraret nunc autem dicit hanc propositionem 'Per deum, ego pejero.' Sic jurando, aut pejerat aut non. Si non, ergo falsum est ipsum pejerare; et hoc jurat; ergo, pejerat. Si pejerat, ergo verum est ipsum pejerare; et hoc jurat; ergo, bene jurat. Secundum hoc ergo simul pejerat et bene jurat; ergo, contingit eundem simul bene jurare et pejerare, quod opponitur prius dato. Unde non est peccatum hic in contradictione, sed in hoc, sicut dicit in littera: *Bene jurat hoc, aut pro hoc; ergo, bene jurat.*

LX

ROBERT HOLCOT [c. 1290-1349]¹⁸¹

In quattuor libros Sententiarum quaestiones argutissimae,
lib. I, q. 3, quinto principaliter cum solutione
[c. 1332-1336]¹⁸²

**In quattuor libros Sententiarum quaestiones argutissimae*, (Lyons: Johannes Clein, 1518), no folio numbers. Photoprint copy at the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.

Robert discusses various paradoxical cases that come under the general question "Utrum obligans se sub conditione teneatur, conditione adimpta." He says (section BB):

Omissis conditio repugnans contractui principali in sui adimplectione inficit principalem contractum. Verbi gratia, si vir contrahat cum muliere sub tali conditione "Accipio te in

¹⁸⁰ The folio numbers of the MS are confused. The treatise begins on a folio marked '3' and ends on a folio marked '37'. Yet the tract occupies 37 folios, not 35. The passage in question is to be found on the 33rd folio of the treatise (and also of the codex).

¹⁸¹ Maurer [61].

¹⁸² "completed 1332 or shortly before, revised and amplified 1336." (Emden [83], v. 2, p. 946).

matrimonium¹⁸³ tali conditione, quod numquam reddam tibi debitum," certe contractus nullus est, quia adimpletio conditionis repugnat impletioni contractus matrimonialis, quia ex conditione non tenetur ei reddere debitum, et ex contractu tenetur ei necessario reddere debitum; ideo contractus nullus est.

Again (*ibid.*):

... implere conditionem est facere esse sic totaliter sicut per conditionem denotatur.

I have been unable to locate any other text of Holcot's in which he discusses the paradoxes. But Prantl¹⁸⁴ quotes John Major Scotus:

Accepta illa mentalis "Omnis propositio mentalis est universalis," illud praedicatum non supponit pro hac ipsa propositione; ergo, pars propositionis — immo nulla propositio — potest supponere pro propositione cuius est pars ... Ista sunt rationes ejus [*i.e.*, Peter of Ailly [LI]], quae fuerunt Olkot et Roseti [*i.e.*, Roger Roseth [LXII]] ante eum.

The text seems confused, but it clearly places Holcot among the *restringentes*.

LXI

ROGER NOTTINGHAM [fl. mid 14c.]

Insolubilia (1343)

Inc <C>irca diversorum, frustra intuentium, deliramenta; qui de solvendorum insolubilium recta positione scripserunt somnia, ...
Exp ... ad instantiam tuam simili sermone pro solutione insolubilium me scripsisse sufficient. Explicant Insolubilia data a fratre Rogere Nottingham Oxoniensi bachelario, completa anno domini m^o. ccc^o. xliii circa festum sanctorum apostolorum petri et pauli.

Edward A. Synan, "The Insolubilia of Roger Nottingham, O.F.M.," *Mediaeval Studies* 26 (1964), pp. 257-270.

¹⁸³ Ed. meam.

¹⁸⁴ Prantl [64], v. 4, p. 9, n. 28.

Roger defines an insoluble as follows (par. 1):

Insolubile est propositio, ex cuius primario significato, cum casu insolubilis, sequitur ipsum insolubile fore falsum, vel sic non esse, quando per ipsum primario significatur.

He sets out four “conclusions”:

- 1) Omnis propositio vera eatenus est propositio vera quatenus ipsa aliqualiter primario significat, et naturaliter antecedenter sic est quemadmodum ipsa propositio primario significat (par. 2).
- 2) Quaelibet propositio falsa eatenus est propositio falsa quatenus ipsa aliqualiter primario significat, et non est sic naturaliter antecedenter quemadmodum ipsa propositio primario significat (par. 3).¹⁸⁵
- 3) Nulla propositio pure negativa est insolubilis (par. 4).
- 4) Quodlibet insolubile est falsum (par. 5).

Roger's text is a difficult one, but his position may be summarized as follows. His solution involves a “causal” theory of truth. A proposition is verified in a realm (*ordo*) that is causally prior or the proposition, and to its truth or falsehood. If it is not verified in this antecedent way, it is false. The truth or falsehood of a proposition, and the proposition itself, exist in a realm causally posterior to the realm in which it may be verified. Thus, if a proposition which affirms something about itself were true, it would be verified in that prior realm. But it does not exist in that prior realm, and hence what it affirms about itself cannot hold in that prior realm. Thus the proposition is false.¹⁸⁶

If this summary is an accurate one, it indicates that Roger allowed self-reference, but held that all affirmative self-referential statements are false. Negative self-reference is not explicitly discussed, but see his third conclusion above.

¹⁸⁵ Contrast the first two conclusions with the fourth previous opinion discussed by the anonymous [X].

¹⁸⁶ By contrast, the fourth previous opinion mentioned in [X] maintains that propositions are verified and falsified in a prior realm. By analogous reasoning, then, that position concludes that self-referential propositions are neither true nor false.

LXII

ROGER ROSETH [fl. 2nd quarter 14c.]

Quaestiones super Sententias
[before 1337]¹⁸⁷

Inc Utrum aliquis in casu possit ex pracepto obligari ad aliquid quod est contra conscientiam suam.

Assisi, Biblioteca communale MS 173, ff. 1-62.

*Bruges, Bibl. publ. MS 192, ff. 1ra-44ra.

Brussels, Bibl. royale 1551 (1801-3), ff. 5r-90.

Oxford, Oriel 15, ff. 235r-279v.

Padua, Anton. 238, ff. 1r-34v (incomplete).

Vatican, Chigi BV 66, ff. 5-86.

Vatican, Vat. lat. 1108, ff. 1r-43r, 45r-52v, 96r-102v.

The relevant passage is in q. 1, a. 2:

Inc Secundus articulus hujus quaestio[n]is est quaerere utrum omne illud quod est licitum et non contra salutem animae possit sic rationabiliter praecipi a deo.

Exp Ex praecedentibus dictis paret quid sit dicendum quando quaeritur utrum non licitum possit praecipi.

I have seen only the Bruges MS, where the passage begins 11ra: "Quod autem pars in insolubilibus non potest supponere pro toto cuius est pars patet, quia"

Roger argues against self-reference in insolubles. For to grant it would be to allow a valid consequence to lead from a truth to a falsehood. Also the same proposition would contradict both a true proposition and a false one, and two contradictories would be both false (*ibid.*). Nor can a part stand for the contradictory of the proposition of which it is the part (11vb). It follows that two convertible sentences may have opposite truth-values, and that two propositions that seem to be contradictories need not be, if their respective terms do not stand for the same things (*ibid.*).

Moreover, for the truth of a proposition it is not sufficient that "est totaliter a parte rei sicut significat." Thus, when

¹⁸⁷ Stegmüller [97], p. 369. The Chigi MS was written at Norwich in 1337. For the MSS, see Doucer [47], p. 90.

Socrates says only ‘Sortes dicit falsum,’ signifying exactly that Socrates speaks falsely, that proposition is false, because there is nothing for the term ‘falsum’ to stand for (*ibid.*). Yet, “sic est in veritate a parte rei sicut ipsa propositio significat” (11va).

LXIII

ROGER SWYNESHED [d. before May 12, 1365]¹⁸⁸

De insolubilibus [c. 1330-1335]¹⁸⁹

Inc Dicto de obligationibus, jam restat ut processum ...

Exp ... quod eadem propositio sit vera et falsa, quod non est possibile. Et haec de insolubilibus dicta sufficient Si quid diminutum autem veritati dissonum inveniatur, meae insufficientiae est impugnandum (?). Amen.

This work appears in the MSS after a companion tract *De obligationibus*, with the *incipit*: “Cum in singulis scientiis secundum materiam subjectum sit certitudo quaerenda”

*Bruges, Bibl. publ. MS 500, ff. 143vb-157va.

Oxford, Bodl., Canon. Lat. 278, ff. 78v-80r (incomplete).

Prague, Capit. Metropol. 1645 (O. LXI), ff. 138r-153v.

Vatican, Vat. lat. 950, f. 117v (incomplete).

Vatican, Vat. lat. 2130, ff. 152r-159va.

*Vatican, Vat. lat. 2154, ff. 1r-12va.

Vatican, Vat. lat. 2185, ff. 78rv (incomplete).¹⁹⁰

I have used Vat. lat. 2154 for the quotations and references.

There is no survey of previous opinions. Swyneshed begins with the principles on which his position is based:

Dichotomies:

- 1) Propositionum aliqua significat principaliter sicut est vel principaliter aliter quam est, aliqua nec principaliter sicut est nec aliter quam est (6va).

¹⁸⁸ Weisheipl [76], p. 241. See *ibid.*, *passim* on the identity of Roger and his confusion with Richard and John Swyneshed.

¹⁸⁹ See *ibid.*, p. 247, and the supporting arguments, pp. 244-247.

¹⁹⁰ For the MSS, see *ibid.*, p. 243.

He gives examples of each. The third kind,

id est quae nec est vera nec falsa, est propositio significans aliqualiter esse, et illa sic significando est pertinens ad inferendum se ipsam non significare principaliter sicut est (*ibid.*).

2) Propositionum aliqua falsificat se ipsam, aliqua non. Propositio falsificans se ipsam est duplex. Quaedam falsificat se mediate, quaedam immediate. Propositio falsificans se mediate est propositio significans principaliter sicut est vel aliter quam est, et ipsa sic significando falsificat propositionem aliam a se falsificantem se Propositio falsificans se immediate est propositio significans principaliter sicut est vel aliter quam est pertinens ad inferendum se ipsam fore falsum. Et illa est duplex. Quaedam est pertinens sufficiens, quaedam est pertinens insufficiens (6vab).

Examples are given.

3) Omne insolubile provenit ex proprietate vocis vel ex actu nostro, vel ex mixtione actus nostri cum proprietate vocis Actus nostri sunt duplices, scilicet, interiores et exteriores (7ra).

4) Propositionum alia significat complexe naturaliter, alia complexe actualiter. Primo modo sunt propositiones in anima, si quae sunt. Secundo modo est dupliciter. Quaedam significat actualiter ex impositione vel impositionibus, quaedam non actualiter ex impositione vel ex impositionibus (*ibid.*).

Definitions or Descriptions:

1) Propositio est oratio indicativa congrua naturaliter <aut> ex impositione, vel ex impositionibus, qua vel quibus ultimo fuit imposta complexe ad significandum significativa (*ibid.*).

2) Propositio vera est propositio non falsificans se principaliter sicut est significans naturaliter aut ex impositione vel impositionibus qua vel quibus ultimo fuit imposta ad significandum (*ibid.*).

3) Propositio falsa est oratio falsificans se vel oratio non falsificans se principaliter aliter significans naturaliter aut ex impositione vel impositionibus qua vel quibus ultimo fuit imposta ad significandum (*ibid.*).

4) Insolubile ad propositum est propositio significans principaliter sicut est vel aliter quam est pertinens ad inferendum se ipsam fore falsam vel nescitam vel creditam, et sic de singulis (*ibid.*).

Suppositions:

1) Omnis propositio pertinens ad inferendum se ipsam fore falsam est falsificans se (7rab).

- 2) Omnis propositio falsificans se est propositio falsa (7rb).
- 3) Propositio verificans se est propositio pertinens ad inferendum se ipsam fore veram (*ibid.*).
- 4) Non omnis propositio verificans se est vera (*ibid.*).
- 5) Nulla propositio est suae partes (*ibid.*).
- 6) Nulla propositio vera est falsa, et e contrario (*ibid.*).
- 7) Qualitercumque concipiens propositionem concipit per propositionem, illa sic sibi significat (*ibid.*).
- 8) Propositio in voce vel in scripto solum propter taliter esse qualiter ex impositione vel impositionibus significat est vera vel falsa (7rb-va).

Conclusions:

- 1) Aliqua propositio falsa significat principaliter sicut est (7va).
- 2) Ex aliqua consequentia bona formalis, ex vero sequitur falsum (*ibid.*).
- 3) Duo contradictoria sibi mutuo contradicentia sunt simul falsa (*ibid.*).¹⁹¹

Swyneshed considers various objections to some of these principles, and answers them (7vb-8rb). He turns to insolubles *ex vocis proprietate*, and considers simple insolubles (8rb-9rb), then copulatives (9rb-va), disjunctives, exclusives and exceptives (9va). He then goes on to insolubles *ex actibus nostris*. There are two kinds of such acts (*ibid.*):

quidam ex quibus sine proprietate vocis nata sunt insolubilia provenire, et alia sunt ex quibus sine proprietate vocis numquam sunt insolubilia nata provenire. Actus primi sunt sicut jurare, pejerare, et similia; actus secundi sunt videre, audire, dicere, et similia.

He considers the former kind first (9va-10ra), and then the latter, of which there are three subdivisions (10ra):

- 1) in quo ponuntur signa ex impositione significativa proprietatem vocis et actus, ex quo fit insoluble. (E.g., 'Sortes dicit falsum,' 'Sortes legit falsum,' 'Sortes cogitat falsum.')
- 2) in quo ponuntur signa ex impositione significativa proprietatem vocis et privationem actus, ex quo fit insoluble. (E.g., 'Illa propositio nescitur a te,' 'Omnis propositio nescitur,' 'Illa propositio non creditur.')

¹⁹¹ See the first previous opinion listed by Heytesbury [LXIX].

3) in quo ponuntur signa ex impositione significativa proprietatem vocis et actionem vel privationem actus, ex quo fit insoluble. (E.g., 'Sortes est albus,' 'Sortes est aeger,' 'Sortes est currens' — "aliquibus casibus positis.")

Swyneshed considers each of these types in order (10ra-va; 10vb; 10vb-11ra). He raises objections to the position he has outlined, and answers them (11ra-vb). He concludes his treatise by considering certain sophisms which appear to be insolubles and are not (11vb-12va). Among others, these include 'Ista propositio significat aliter quam est,' 'Illa propositio non significat aliter quam est,' 'Ista propositio non significat sicut est' (11vb).

LXIV

THOMAS BRADWARDINE [c. 1295-Aug. 26, 1349]¹⁹²

Insolubilia [1321-1324]¹⁹³

Inc "Solvare non est ignorantis vinculum," 3^o *Metaphysice* capitulo primo.

Exp rectum in omnibus judicabit et sibi ista sufficient ad omnia insolubilia dissolvenda.

Marie-Louise Roure, "La problématique des propositions insolubles au XIII^e siècle et au début du XIV^e, suivie de l'édition des traités de W. Shireswood, W. Burleigh et Th. Bradwardine," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 37 (1970), pp. 285-326.

This is a long work in twelve chapters. Weisheipl¹⁹⁴ seems to be wrong in placing the beginning of Chapter 1 at "Scias igitur quod insolibile capitulur dupliciter secundum quod solubile vel solutio ...," for "Capitulum primum <vicem> prohemii <habet>." (par. 1.01). "Capitulum secundum continet divisionem et diffinitionem insolubilium et numerat oppiniones in-

¹⁹² Weisheipl [74], p. 189, and [75], p. 177.

¹⁹³ Weisheipl [74], p. 190.

¹⁹⁴ Weisheipl [75], p. 178.

solubilia concernentes" (1.02). Thus, Chapter 1 is the prologue, and it is Chapter 2 that Weisheipl calls Chapter 1.¹⁹⁵

In Chapter 2 it is argued that there are two senses of the term 'insoluble', corresponding to two senses of the term 'soluble' or 'solution'. In each sense, the term may be taken in six ways. The second way, which is the one to be considered in the tract, has two subdivisions, a "general" sense and a "strict" sense. The definition of an insoluble is taken from the strict sense (2.02):

insolubile est difficilis paralogismus "secundum quid et simpliciter" ex reflexione alicuius actus supra se cum determinatione privativa proveniens.

Five major opinions are to be distinguished, but, counting their subdivisions, there are nine in all (2.03-2.04). Bradwardine will adopt what he regards as Aristotle's position, the last in his list.

The first opinion is based on the principle that "pars non potest supponere pro toto suo, nec eius opposito, nec eius convertibili cum aliquo istorum respectu termini privativi" (3.00).

Bradwardine argues against each of the three parts of this principle in turn (3.01-3.07; 3.08-3.11; 3.11).¹⁹⁶ He argues further against this position that it denies certain truths. He appeals to Aristotle's *Sophistici elenchi*. The position cannot be reconciled with Aristotle's treatment of the fallacy *secundum quid et simpliciter* (4.01-4.02). He further argues that this position is an insufficient one, for it leaves many insolubles unsolved. He gives examples (4.04-4.11).

In Chapter 5, Bradwardine considers the second through eighth opinions. The second opinion argues that in the consequence 'Sortes dicit falsum' est falsum; Sortes dicit hoc; ergo,

¹⁹⁵ The edition is based on a single MS, *Erfurt, CA 8° 76, ff. 6ra-21vb. There are numerous other MSS of the work. See Weisheipl [75], p. 178 and Fleming [51], p. 365. Weisheipl (*ibid.*) says that *Erfurt, CA 4° 276, ff. 163ra-167ra, contains the first six chapters only. On the contrary, it begins with the sixth chapter. In *Oxford, Bodl., Canon. Misc. 219, there are two folios 57, labelled respectively 57a and 57b. The text is found on 53ra-57bra. The MS cited by Weisheipl *ibid.* as Venice, San Marco Z 301 (1576), ff. 27r-37r, is cited by Mohan [94] as XI, cod. 12. On their identity see Kristeller [92], v. 2, p. 212. On the confusion of ways of citing San Marco MSS, see *ibid.*, v. 2, pp. 208f., 215f. Fleming cites a MS not noted by Weisheipl: Madrid, Bibl. Nov. Univ. Cent. MS 105, ff. 1-9.

¹⁹⁶ The opinion is the same as that of Henry of England [XXX].

Sortes dicit hoc falsum,' the second occurrence of the term 'falsum' in the first premiss stands for Socrates' statement, while in the conclusion it stands for some other statement. Thus there is a fallacy *figura dictionis*. This position rests on the same principle as the first position, and the same counterarguments apply. Moreover, this position is wrong, because an insoluble is by definition a fallacy *secundum quid et simpliciter* (5.00-5.02).

The third opinion says that in insolubles the antecedent seems to be the cause of the consequent, but is not. Thus there is a fallacy *non causam ut causam*. The same counterarguments apply (5.03).

The fourth position says that 'dicit' in 'Sortes dicit falsum,' although it is in the present tense, stands for a time immediately preceding the time of utterance.¹⁹⁷ Bradwardine argues against this fourth opinion that it is not a general solution, because it applies only to "insolubilia fundata in actu dicendi." Also, on this position, insolubles would not be fallacies *secundum quid et simpliciter*, contrary to Aristotle (5.04-5.042).

The fifth position says that no one can say that he speaks falsely, nor understand that he misunderstands, etc. But this position, Bradwardine says, contradicts the senses and the intellect (5.05).

The sixth opinion says that when Socrates says that he speaks falsely, he says nothing.¹⁹⁸ Bradwardine replies that Socrates says letters, syllables, words and a sentence, and thus not nothing (5.06).

The seventh opinion says that insolubles are neither true nor false, but have some intermediate value. But every proposition, Bradwardine says, is true or false. (5.07)

The eighth position says that when Socrates says that he speaks falsely, if 'speaks' refers to the *actus exercitus*, it is true, if to the *actus conceptus*, it is false. Thus, they posit an equivocation. Bradwardine replies that this position can be refuted by stipulating throughout that we are talking only of the *actus exercitus*. Moreover, like the fourth opinion, this position will not

¹⁹⁷ This position is similar to that argued in [XX]. There, however, the argument is based also on the principle that a part cannot stand for the whole of which it is a part.

¹⁹⁸ See the Anonymous [IX].

work except for insolubles “fundatis in actu dicendi,” and is thus not a general solution. Further, it prevents insolubles from being fallacies *secundum quid et simpliciter* (5.08).¹⁹⁹

Chapter 6 sets out the principles of Bradwardine’s own position. He posits first two dichotomies:

- 1) Insolubles arise either *ex actu nostro* or *ex proprietate vocis*. Moreover, “ex isto autem patet error illorum qui trimembrem divisionem insolubilium posuerunt, dicentes omne insolubile provenire aut *ex actu nostro* aut *proprietate vocis* aut *repugnancia intellectuum*” (6.01).
- 2) Insolubles are either affirmative or negative (6.02).

Next, two definitions (6.03):

- 1) A true proposition is “*oratio significans tantum sicut est.*”
- 2) A false proposition is “*oratio significans aliter quam est.*”

There follow six suppositions (6.04):

- 1) *quilibet propositio est vera vel falsa.*
- 2) *quilibet propositio significat sive denotat “ut nunc” vel “simpliciter” omne quod sequitur ad illam “ut nunc” vel “simpliciter”.*
- 3) *pars potest supponere pro suo toto et eius opposito et convertibilibus earundem.*
- 4) *copulativa et disjunctiva ex partibus sibi contradictibus invicem contradicunt.*
- 5) *ex qualibet disjunctiva cum opposito unius suarum partium infertur reliqua pars.*
- 6) *si aliqua copulativa est vera, [et] quilibet pars est vera, et e contra si est falsa, aliqua pars eius falsa est et e contra. Et si aliqua disjunctiva est vera, aliqua pars eius est vera, et e contra si est falsa, quilibet pars eius est falsa et e contra.*

Two conclusions follow (6.05):

- 1) *quilibet propositio cuius extrellum multa habet supposita significat sive denotat affirmationem vel negationem pro <qualibet> illorum, et, si <unicum habet suppositum> pro isto vel pro illo.*

¹⁹⁹ This position seems reminiscent of Scotus’ [XXXVII]. But Scotus explicitly treats insolubles as fallacies *secundum quid et simpliciter*.

2) si aliqua propositio significat se non esse veram vel se esse falsam ipsam, significat se non esse veram et est falsa.²⁰⁰

Bradwardine provides arguments for both conclusions (6.051-6.056).

In Chapter 7 Bradwardine begins to apply his principles to individual cases. He begins with insolubles *ex nostris actibus*, of which acts there are two kinds: exterior and interior. He will treat of the first kind first, beginning with affirmative simple ones, and then go on to composites (7.00). He discusses the insoluble ‘Sortes dicit falsum,’ and argues that his position does indeed entail that insolubles involve a fallacy *secundum quid et simpliciter* (7.01-7.14).

Bradwardine goes on to consider the “composite” insolubles: disjunctives (8.05), copulatives (8.06), exclusives (8.07-8.072) and exceptives (8.08). “Indirect” insolubles are discussed here too (8.01, 8.091), as well as negative insolubles (8.09-8.13).

In Chapter 9, Bradwardine turns from insolubles arising from our exterior acts to those arising from our interior acts. He considers first affirmatives. In the course of the discussion, he gives the following definition and conclusion:

Diffinitio est ista: scire propositionem est scire totaliter sic esse sicut significatur per eam. Conclusio est ista: si aliqua propositio tantum significat se ab aliquo nesciri, vel sicut hoc tantum significat scitum, vel scita ab illo significat nesciri ab illo ipsam ab eodem nesciri (9.03).²⁰¹

Bradwardine notes that a similar definition and conclusion can be given for ‘credere’ (9.032). He briefly treats of disjunctives and copulatives by referring to the previous chapter (9.05), and observes that negative insolubles may be treated like affirmative ones (9.06-9.07). He goes on to consider ‘credere’ and ‘dubitare’ (9.08-9.11).

²⁰⁰ Thus the edition. *Bruges, Bibl. publ. MS 500, f. 137r reads: Si aliqua propositio significat se non esse veram vel se esse falsam, ipsa significat se esse veram, et [falsam vel se esse falsa] est falsa. (The enclosed words are deleted in the MS.) This reading is confirmed by the supporting arguments given in the edition, 6.054 and 6.055.

²⁰¹ Thus the edition. My transcription of *Erfurt, CA 8° 76, f. 16vb is: Si aliqua propositio tantum significat se nesciri ab aliquo, vel si cum hoc tantum significat scitum vel scita ab illo, illa significat nesciri ab illo ipsam ab eodem nesciri. The reading ‘si cum’ instead of ‘sicut’ is suggested also by the argument in 9.032.

In the tenth chapter Bradwardine deals first with *voces incomplexae*, beginning with affirmatives. He takes 'appellare' as an example (10.01-10.02). Negatives are said to be treated in the same way (10.03). In chapter 11, he discusses sophisms that seem to be insolubles but are not (11.00-11.07). In the final chapter he discusses insolubles arising from a property of a complex utterance (12.00-12.03). He ends his tract by solving six insolubles brought up against the first opinion in Chapter 4, which that opinion could not solve (12.04-12.13).

LXV

THOMAS MANLEVELT [dates unknown]

To my knowledge, the only information we have about Manlevelt's teaching on insolubles is conveyed in the anonymous *Quaestiones libri insolubilium Hollandrini* [VII].²⁰² The following passages are relevant:

- 1) Ad hoc respondet magister Thomas [i.e., *Manlevelt?*] quod significare aliquid ex impositione potest dupliciter intellegi, vel absolute vel conditionaliter. Modo verum est quod ista propositio praedicta non significat se esse veram absolute, sed se esse veram conditionaliter (181ra).
- 2) [against Heytesbury's [LXIX] contention that the respondent need not specify the additional signification of an insoluble]: Sed in isto dicto magister Thomas Manlevelt improbat ipsum et dicit quod respondens habet certificare de hoc, et dicit quod significat se esse verum, quia alias qua ratione unum significaret, eadem ratione aliud significaret (181va).
- 3) Nota quod Bradwardine [LXIV], Heytesbury et Manlevelt, et multi alii, definint insolubile sic. ... [There follows Heytesbury's definition of an insoluble proposition, with this addition at the end: "et hoc sine multiplicatione."] (184ra).

²⁰² The text described by Schum [96], pp. 732f., as Manlevelt's *Insolubilia* (*Erfurt, CA 8° 76, ff. 1r-3v) is not about insolubles at all.

LXVI

WALTER [dates unknown]

All that is known about this author is contained in a reference in the anonymous *Quaestiones libri insolubilium Hollandrini* [VII], q. 4 (Erfurt, CA 4° 280, f. 184vb):

facto casu de insolubili, de quolibet insolubili concedendum est quod ipsum falsum, et hoc innuit magister Walter, qui dicit quod omne insolubile est falsum.

This Walter's doctrine disagrees with that of Walter Burley [LXVII] and that of Walter Sexgrave [LXVIII].

LXVII

WALTER BURLEY [c. 1275-after 1344]²⁰³*Insolubilia* [probably before 1320]²⁰⁴

Inc Circa insolubilia quaerantur duo: primo circa insoluble simplex, secundo circa insoluble compositum.

Exp ... non requiritur veritas alterius partis, sed sufficit veritas huius partis.

Marie-Louise Roure, "La problématique des propositions insolubles au XIII^e siècle et au début du XIV^e, suivie de l'édition des traités de W. Shireswood, W. Burleigh et Th. Bradwardine," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 37 (1970), pp. 262-284.

Burley begins with a *quaestio*: "an aliqua propositio contingens simplex sit sic insolubile quod nullo modo potest solvi" (par. o.oo). Burley's answer is to distinguish three senses of the term 'insoluble': that which can in no way be solved; that which is apt to be solved, but is not in fact solved; that which is solvable only

²⁰³ See Weisheipl [74], pp. 174-177 on Burley's life.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 179. The contention that this work was probably written in 1302, because the companion tract *De obligationibus* was written in that year (see, e.g., De Rijk [7], p. 87) seems to be based on a confusion of two of Burley's tracts on *obligationes*. See Weisheipl, *loc. cit.* For MSS of Burley's three tracts on *obligationes*, see Weisheipl [75], p. 196.

with difficulty. There are propositions insoluble in the first sense, but these are not contingent. On the other hand, there are contingent propositions insoluble in the third sense, and these are the ones discussed in tracts on *insolubilia* (2.01).

Burley discusses three previous opinions. The first is that of the *cassantes*, who deny that anyone can say that he speaks falsely, and who say that anyone who makes such an assertion says nothing (2.02).²⁰⁵ Burley gives rudimentary forms of the standard objections against this position (2.03).²⁰⁶

The second opinion is that of the *restringentes*, who say that a part can *never* stand for the whole of which it is a part. Burley rejects this as a general rule, although he will later accept a restricted version of the principle. He gives examples of unproblematic propositions in which self-reference occurs, and observes that an *integral* part may at the same time be a *universal* whole (2.04-2.06).²⁰⁷

The third opinion is that of the *transcasus*. "Et est transcasus quando aliqua propositio mutatur a veritate in falsitatem vel e converso." (2.07). The point of this position is that a verb in the present tense in an insoluble refers to the time immediately preceding the utterance.²⁰⁸ Burley rejects it. (2.08).

There are, according to the *antiqui*, three *radices* of insolubles (3.01):

- 1) ex conjunctione verbi pertinentis²⁰⁹ ad motum cum hac dictione *falsum* vel cum suo convertibili vel cum negatione veri.
- 2) ex proprietatibus vocum.
- 3) ex repugnantia intellectuum.²¹⁰

Burley goes on to set out his own position. The major points are these:

- 1) ... sciendum quod numquam supponit pars pro toto cuius est pars, quando, posito toto loco partis, accidit reflexio eiusdem supra se ipsum cum determinatione privativa (3.03).

²⁰⁵ Bradwardine treats this as two separate positions, the fifth and sixth in his list ([LXIV], ca. 5).

²⁰⁶ See *ibid.*

²⁰⁷ See Scotus [XXXVII].

²⁰⁸ See the Anonymous [XX] and the fourth opinion in Bradwardine's list ([LXIV], ca. 5).

²⁰⁹ Rouré reads: pertinentes.

²¹⁰ Contrast Bradwardine's first dichotomy, and his rejection of the third *radix* (*ibid.*, ca. 6).

2) sciendum est quod aliquod est insolubile affirmativum et aliquod negativum. Et insolubile affirmativum semper est falsum, et insolubile negativum semper est verum Et ideo si aliquis incipiat sic loqui: *Ego dico falsum*, tunc hec oratio est falsa: *Ego dico falsum*; sed si aliquis incipiat sic loqui: *Ego non dico verum*, tunc hec est vera (3.05).²¹¹

After objections and replies, Burley turns to composite insolubles. He gives four rules (5.01)²¹²:

... verum disjunctum cum insolubili totum facit soluble. Similiter falsum disjunctum cum insolubili totum facit insolubile. Similiter falsum copulatum cum insolubili totum facit soluble. Similiter verum copulatum cum insolubili totum facit insolubile.

There follows a discussion of these rules.

LXVIII

WALTER SEXGRAVE [d. by June 1349]²¹³

Insolubilia [before 1333]²¹⁴

Inc Sicut vult philosophus, 2º *Metaphysicae*, non solum debemus grates reddere his qui nobiscum in opinionibus convenient, sed et his qui a nobis dissonant nostrasque opiniones impugnant.

Exp Unde, si non exprimitur illa conditio, tamen intellegitur in illo generali.

*Erfurt, CA 4º 276, ff. 159ra-162ra.

*Erfurt, CA 8º 76, ff. 21vb-34rb.

*Oxford, Bodl., Canon. Misc. 219, ff. 1ra-3va (beginning lost).

I have used Erfurt CA 8º 76 for all references.

After a short prologue (21vb), Walter gives a rather curious definition of insolubles (22ra):

Insolubile igitur de quo praesens versatur intentio non dicitur quia ipsum solvi est impossibile, sed quia illud solvere est difficile,

²¹¹ Compare this position with Ockham's [LXX] and [LXXI].

²¹² See Anonymous [VI] and [IX].

²¹³ Emden [83], v. 3, p. 1664.

²¹⁴ Erfurt CA 4º 276 was written before 1333. See Schum [96], pp. 517-519.

nec omne tale est insolubile, sed illi soli paralogismi dicuntur insolubiles ubi ex singulari infertur sua particularis secundum vocem vel ex universali sua [sua] singularis secundum vocem. Et voco singularem secundum vocem alicujus propositionis quae cum illa conveniat in subjecto et praedicato, ut hic 'Falsum dicitur a Sorte' est singulare secundum vocem hujus particularis 'Falsum dicitur a Sorte.' Nec mirum si tales paralogismi merito dicuntur insolubiles. Expletis enim mediis a quibus capiunt evidentiam, a bonis syllogismis nullatenus differe videntur. Habent enim secundum voces dispositionem tam modi quam figurae, ut hic 'Nullum falsum dicitur a Sorte; hoc est falsum; ergo, hoc non dicitur a Sorte.' Tales igitur, quia causas apparentiae habent maximas, quoniam easdem quas et boni syllogismi, ideo ad solvendum sunt difficillimi.

Of the previous opinions, some say that these inferences are deficient in their matter, some say that they are deficient in their form. The first sect is subdivided. The first subdivision consists of the *cassantes*, who deny the insoluble act of speaking (22ra). Walter goes on (22rb):

Istorum ratio potissima est haec: casu positio, dicunt ipsi "haec est falsa 'Sortes dicit falsum,' sicut planum est; sed non potest esse falsa nisi ex altera istorum causarum, aut quia nihil dicit aut quia aliquid dicit sed illud est verum; sed non ex secunda causa; ergo, ex prima."

Walter rejects this opinion (*ibid.*). He says: "Sed ista positio negat sensum" (*ibid.*).

The second subdivision (22rb-23vb) allows self-reference in all cases (22va), and maintains that "quaelibet propositio significans se non esse veram significat se esse veram" (*ibid.*). In the standard example, Socrates' utterance is false, but a vocally similar utterance uttered by someone else will be true (*ibid.*). Walter rejects this position also (22va-23vb).

Of those who find fault with the form of the paradoxical inferences, some appeal to the fallacy *secundum quid et simpliciter*. Of these there are two sects, but Walter rejects them both (23vb-24vb). He says (24vb):

Quidam dicunt quod dicens se dicere falsum nihil nec aliquale dicit nec propositionem dicit, sed dicit hoc aliquid, et hoc est dicere aliquid secundum quid, et simpliciter hoc aliquale, et non simpliciter aliquale Sed alii concedunt quod sic videns aliquid

videt simpliciter et aliquale simpliciter, et negant consequentiam: ergo, veram simpliciter vel falsam simpliciter.

Others find fault with the form of the inferences, appealing to the fallacy of accident. Walter accepts this position (24vb): “Dico quod omnia insolubilia solvenda sunt penes fallaciam accidentis.” Again (25ra): “Dico quod est fallacia accidentis ex variatione extremonum.” He denies self-reference (*ibid.*):

nisi forte fuerit propositio composita ex terminis repugnantibus, ex qua repugnantia terminorum expressam contradictionem claudit, ut hic ‘Quodlibet impossibile est possibile.’ Sed de talibus nihil ad praesens.

Walter then gives a “definition” of supposition (25rb):

Supponere pro suis suppositis est significare illa esse extrema illius unionis ex parte rei quam significat copula. Et hoc faciunt alii copulate, alii disjuncte, secundum quod diversum modum supponendi habent ex adjunctis.

The following supposition is stated (*ibid.*): “Quaelibet propositio denotat ita esse ex parte rei sicut significat.” Three conclusions follow, although they are not called “conclusions”:

- 1) Quaelibet propositio non includens contradictionem significat ita <esse> ex parte rei sicut ipsa significat, et non significat ita non esse, quia si significat illa duo, expressam contradictionem includeret, quod est contra hypothesis (*ibid.*).
- 2) Quaelibet propositio non includens contradictionem significat ita esse ex parte rei sicut ipsa significat, et non significat ita non esse; sed ita esse ex parte rei sicut ipsa propositio significat et non ita non esse est propositionem esse veram et non falsam, et hoc si illa propositio est; ergo, quaelibet propositio non includens contradictionem cum hoc quod ipsa est significat se esse veram et non falsam (*ibid.*).
- 3) Extrema propositionis tantum illa supponunt pro quibus totum potest denotare se esse verum cum hoc quod ipsum est, et non supponunt talia pro quibus totum hoc quod ipsum est denotaret se esse falsam (25va).²¹⁵

²¹⁵ On the use of the accusative and a *pro*-phrase with ‘supponere’, see the discussion of William of Sherwood in Kneale [58], pp. 249-253.

It is on the basis of this last conclusion that Walter denies self-reference, at least in the case of insolubles. Thus (*ibid.*):

in ista ergo 'Falsum est' non supponit subjectum pro toto, quia tunc posset denotare se esse verum pro se falsa sine contradictione, quod tamen est falsum, quia hoc esse verum pro se falso includit contradictionem.

There follow objections and replies, an application to examples, and a consideration of propositions which seem to be insolubles and are not (25va-34rb).

LXIX

WILLIAM HEYTESBURY [before 1313-1372/73]²¹⁶

Regulae solvendi sophismata, ca. 1:
*De insolubilibus [1335]*²¹⁷

**Tractatus gulielmi Hentisberi de sensu composito et diviso, Regulae ejusdem cum sophismatibus, Declaratio gaetani supra easdem ..., (Venice: Bonetus Locatellus, for Octavianus Scotus, 1494 [Hain 8477]), ff. 4va-7rb.*
 Copy at University of Chicago Library.

The chapter states four previous opinions (4va-6rb). The first opinion says that in insolubles, two contradictories may both be false (4va):

Unum enim significat omnino sicut non est, et ideo sequitur quod ipsum sit falsum; et aliud, quamvis significat praecise sicut est, tamen se ipsum falsificat, quare non poterit esse verum.²¹⁸

²¹⁶ See the outline of Heytesbury's life in Weisheipl [74], pp. 195-199, and [75], p. 212.

²¹⁷ Weisheipl [74], p. 196.

²¹⁸ This position is attributed to Roger Swyneshed [LXIII] by Cajetan of Thiene [XXVIII]. Indeed, the position as stated seems to refer to Swyneshed's third "conclusion". Swyneshed does *not* say that insolubles signify "praecise sicut est," according to Vat. lat. 2154, but rather "principaliter sicut est." Nevertheless, Swyneshed nowhere appeals to an *additional* signification which insolubles have, as Heytesbury does. Thus, Heytesbury may be justified in inserting 'praecise' into his account of this position.

The second position maintains that no insoluble is a proposition, and therefore no insoluble is either true or false (4vb):

Quamvis enim insolubile quodlibet sit oratio indicativa significans sicut est vel sicut non est, ejus significatio tamen ad hoc non sufficit ut ipsam ‘propositio’ nominetur.²¹⁹

The third opinion holds (*ibid.*):

quodlibet insolubile verum vel falsum esse, nullum tamen insolubile verum esse, nec aliquid falsum, quia cum quodlibet insolubile sit propositio, et omnis propositio sit vera vel falsa, sequitur quod omne insolubile sit verum vel falsum; sed ex hoc quod aliqua sit propositio non requiritur quod sit vera, nec quod sit falsa.²²⁰

The fourth position says that there is no possible *casus* which includes something absolutely insoluble, for “ex hoc sequitur falsum esse verum, et ambo contradictoria simul esse falsa” (4vb). Heytesbury observes that this fourth position

inter alias reputo sustinendam; eam vero non in totum satisfacere assero, sicut nec aliquam, quia hoc non video esse possibile; aestimo tamen ipsa inter omnes magis esse propinquam veritati. (*Ibid.*)

Heytesbury observes (*ibid.*) that the first three opinions agree that an insoluble signifies precisely as its terms pretend. He argues against this common ground (4vb-5ra), and then against each of the first three positions in turn (5ra-6ra). He goes on to raise objections against the fourth position, which he will ultimately adopt, and admits that it is difficult or even impossible to answer these objections to full satisfaction (6rb).

Heytesbury turns to an exposition of his own position, which is essentially that of the fourth opinion already considered. He defines an insoluble *casus* and an insoluble proposition as follows (6rb):

Casus de insolibili est ille in quo fit mentio de aliqua propositione quae, si cum eodem casu significet praecise sicut

²¹⁹ Cajetan attributed this position to John Dumbleton [XXXVI], although Dumbleton’s approach to the problem is different.

²²⁰ Cajetan attributes this position to Richard Kilmington [LV], but at best it is a distortion of Kilmington’s view.

verba illius communiter praetendunt, ad eam esse veram sequitur eam esse falsam, et e converso ... Propositio insolubilis est de qua fit mentio in casu insolubili quae, si cum eodem casu significet praecise sicut verba illius communiter praetendunt, ad eam esse veram sequitur eam esse falsam, et e converso.

He sets out five rules for responding to insolubles in disputation, and applies these rules to examples (6rb-7va). The treatise closes with the consideration of a sophistical objection, and a mention of insolubles which concern truth and falsehood only indirectly (7rab). The five rules are:

- 1) Si fiat casus de insolubili, aut ponitur qualiter illud insolubile debeat significare aut non. Si non, proposito isto insolubili, respondendum est ad illud omnino sicut responderetur non supposito illo casu.
- 2) Si ponatur casus de insolubili et cum hoc supponatur quod illud insolubile praecise significet sicut termini istius communiter praetendunt, casus iste nullatenus admittatur.
- 3) Si fiat casus de insolubili et cum hoc supponatur quod illud insolubile significet sicut termini ipsius praetendunt, non tamen sic praecise, admisso isto casu, concedendum est illud insolubile quocumque loco proponatur tamquam sequens, et negandum est illud esse verum tamquam repugnans Si autem quaeratur in isto casu quid significavit ista propositio sic dicta a Sorte aliter quam quod Sortes dicit falsum, huic dicitur quod respondens non habet istam quaestionem solvere seu determinare.
- 4) Si fiat casus de insolubili et cum hoc supponatur illud insolubile significare copulative praecise sicut praetendunt verba illius, ut *a*, et *b* esse, vel aliquid quicquid fuerit, si oppositum illius copulati non possit stare cum toto casu, negandum est casus tamquam claudens contradictoria formaliter.
- 5) Si autem fiat casus de insolubili, et cum hoc supponatur quod illud insolubile significet praecise disjunctive sicut verba praetendunt vel quod *a* est *b*, vel aliquid hujusmodi, nisi illud disjunctum cum illo insolubili possit stare cum toto isto casu, non est casus admittendus Et sicut in omni casu ubi ponitur cum casu de insolubili quod illud copulative significat sicut termini illius communiter praetendunt et sic esse vel sic, ubicumque propositum fuerit est concedendum et negandum est illud esse verum, ita e converso, cum ponitur casus de insolubili, et cum hoc ponitur quod illud insolubile significet disjunctive praecise sicut verba praetendunt vel sic esse vel sic, negandum est illud insolubile quotienscumque proponitur, et concedendum est illud esse verum.

LXX

WILLIAM OF OCKHAM [c. 1285-1347]²²¹

Summa logicae III, 3, ca. 38, 45 [1324-1327]²²²

**Logica* [= *Summa logicae*], (Paris: [Johannes Higman], 1488 [Hain 11948]), ff. 107vb-108ra, 109rb-vb. Copy at Harvard College Library.²²³

Chapter 38 is the first chapter of the section on *obligationes* and *insolubilia* which ends the *tertia pars tertiae partis* of Ockham's *Summa*. He begins by distinguishing six species of *obligatio* (107vb). The first is *institutio*, and it is "alicujus vocabuli nova impositio pro tempore disputationis, et non vult duratura" (*ibid.*). E.g., abbreviations adopted for the duration of an argument. Ockham says that one rule for this species of obligation forbids a part to signify the whole of which it is a part. Ockham points out obvious exceptions to this rule. He goes on (*ibid.*):

Ideo dicendum est quod quamvis pars posset significare totum cuius est pars, tamen talis institutio non est semper admittenda. Quando enim, per illam institutionem mutaretur a veritate in falsitatem et e converso, tunc non est talis institutio admittenda.

He applies this rule to an insoluble (107vb-108ra).

In ca. 45, the chapter on insolubles, Ockham forbids self-reference in insolubles. Thus, affirmative insolubles such as 'Sortes dicit falsum' are false, under the usual *casus*, while negative insolubles such as 'Sortes non dicit verum' are true (109va).

²²¹ See Gál [53]. On the tradition that Ockham died in 1349, see Brampton [41].

²²² Boehner [28], p. xii.

²²³ Boehner's edition [28] stops at the end of the *prima pars tertiae partis*. I have transcribed the relevant parts of III, 3, ca. 38, and all of ca. 45 from the Paris 1488 edition [27], corrected from two MSS, as an appendix to Spade [24], pp. 129-134.

LXXI

WILLIAM OF OCKHAM [c. 1285-1347]²²⁴

Tractatus super libros elenchorum
[before 1328]²²⁵

rca librum *Elenchorum* primo videndum est an notitia syllogismo-
rum sophisticorum sit vera scientia.

Exp Et sic imponere finem operis tam quantum ad primum librum
Topicorum quam ad librum *Elenchorum*.

*Bruges, Bibl. publ., MS 499, ff. 61ra-100va.

Florence, Bibl. nat. B 4 1618, ff. 56rb-94.

*London, Lambeth Palace 70, ff. 268vb-305va.

Oxford, Bodl., Canon. Misc. 558, ff. 93-144.

Paris, B.N. lat. 14721, ff. 96va-121ra.²²⁶

The relevant passage is quoted by Boehner.²²⁷ Ockham sets out essentially the same position as in the *Summa logicae* [LXX]. Self-reference is not possible in insolubles, though it is possible elsewhere. Ockham puts this position into the Aristotelian framework of the fallacy *secundum quid et simpliciter*, rejecting the consequence: 'Sortes dicit hoc falsum; ergo, Sortes dicit falsum.'

LXXII

SPURIOUS TEXTS

Schum [96] lists *Erfurt CA 8° 76, ff. 1r-3v as the *Insolubilia* of Thomas Manlevelt [LXV], *inc*: "Propositio categorica est quae significat"; *exp*: "terminus impediens ea." Folio 5r of the same MS is listed as "Notae de quibusdam insolubilibus conscriptae," *inc*: "Omne corpus est album;" *exp*: "et haec sufficient de consimilibus." Neither text in fact has anything to do with insolubles.

²²⁴ See above, n. 221.

²²⁵ See Gál [53], p. 934. Francesco del Punta is preparing an edition of this text, to be published by the Franciscan Institute.

²²⁶ For the MSS, see Baudry [35], p. 274.

²²⁷ Boehner [38], p. 259, n. 34.

APPENDIX I

INCIPITS CITED

Ad utrumque dubitare potentes facile speculabimur et verum et falsum	LV
Circa diversorum, frustra intuentium, deliramenta, qui de solvendorum insolubilium recta positione scripserunt somnia	LXI
Circa insolubilia quaerantur duo: primo circa insolubile simplex, secundo circa insolubile compositum	LXVII
Circa librum <i>Elenchorum</i> primo videndum est an notitia syllogismorum sophisticorum sit vera scientia	LXXI
Circa materiam insolubilium nota quod scientia in- solubilium est distincta a scientia obligationum in hoc, quia	II
Circa materiam insolubilium puerorum spectantium ad in- troductionem prius restat negotium	III
Circa materiam tertii articuli tractanda est tertia quaestio, quae inquirit de obligatione, unde sit solubilis	IV
Circa notitiam insolubilium sunt aliqua dubia per ordinem. Primum dubium est utrum notitia insolubilium pre- supponit artem oblisticam	V
Circa tractatum de insolubilibus, primo sciendum quod hoc nomen <i>insolubile</i> dicitur tripliciter	VI
Circa tractatum de insolubilibus quaeritur primo utrum ad propositionem esse veram sufficiat et requiritur ita esse sicut per eam significatur	VII
Circa tractatum de insolubilibus tria sunt notanda per or- dinem	VIII
Consequenter in dei nomine de insolubilibus pauca trac- taturus	XLVII
Cum tractandum sit de insolubilibus et prior sit naturaliter affirmatio negatione, prius videndum est quid sit solubile et quid solutio	IX
De insolubilibus diversae sunt opiniones	XLVI
De insolubilibus tractaturus eorum causam duxi finalem primitus intuendam, ut juxta naturam et dispositionem finis ordinentur ea quae sunt ad finem	x

De sophismatibus quae non re sed nomine insolubilia existunt superest tractare	XI
De sophisticis autem elenchis et de his quae videntur elenchi, cum dubium sit utrum sit ejusdem continuitatis liber iste	LIX
Dicto de obligationibus, jam restat ut processum	LXIII
Imaginatio fratri Johannis de Constantia habita secundo anno lectoratus sui in Colonia, qui fuit millesimus trecentesimus sexagesimus. Pro solutione insolubilium Heytesbury et aliorum, si qui sunt, capio unum insolubile	XXXV
Incipiunt insolubilia optima. Insolubile est propositio affirmativa vel negativa aliqualiter esse vel aliqualiter non esse significativa	XII
In materia insolubilium prima regula opinionis Heytesbury Insolubile est difficilis Insolubile simplex affirmativa est tale ut 'Sortes dicit falsum'	XIII
Insolubile est propositio significans primo et principaliter sicut est, et ex consequenti aliter quam est, deducta nova impositione	XXXI
Insolubilia pulchra. Quia inter casus logicales aliqui sunt aliis difficiliores	XLIV
Jam sequuntur regulae de insolubilibus. Et primo videntur quid sit casus de insolubili, et postea quid sit propositio insolubilis	XXXIX
Notandum quod, si fiat insolubile et negetur ista consequentia	XIV
Plurimorum scribendum grati labores ... Incipiendum est a primis, cum minimus error in principio in fine maxime est causa	XXXVI
Prima conclusio: Non valet illa consequentia	XXVI
Pro superficiali notitia insolubilium	XV
Probo quod aliqua propositio insolubilis sit vera, quia sumo istam	XVI
Quaeritur primo utrum in insolubilibus sit aliqua consequentia bona, et antecedens est verum et consequens falsum	XLII
Quaeritur primo utrum principia artis obligatoriae in disputatione obligata sint necessaria	XLI
Quattuor sunt divisiones propositionum quarum prima est haec	XVII
Quia a pluribus quaeratur facilius invenire, maxime si humilitas et concordia adjunctim	XVIII
Quia omnes homines naturaliter scire desiderant	XL

Quia omnis opinio in materia insolubilium ad quam communiter habent nunc respondentes refugium	xxv
Quoniam felicitates artis exercitativa et obviativa inquirimus	xix
Restat nunc dicere de insolubilibus, et primo quid sit casus de insolibili; secundo quid sit insoluble	xxxviii
Secundus articulus hujus quaestione est quaerere utrum omne illud quod est licitum et non contra salutem animae possit sic rationabiliter praecipi a deo	lxii
Sicut nexus amoris quandoque insolubilis dicitur, non quia nullo modo sit solubilis, sed quia cum difficultate sit solubilis, sic propositio aliquando insolubilis dicitur	
Sicut vult philosophus, 2 ^o <i>Metaphysicae</i> , non solum deberimus grates reddere his qui nobiscum in opinionibus conveniunt, sed et his qui a nobis dissonant nostrasque opiniones impugnant	lxvi
“Solvore non est ignorantis vinculum,” 3 ^o <i>Metaphysice</i> capitulo primo	lxviii
Solvore vinculum ignorantis non est possible, ut habetur 3 ^o <i>Metaphysicae</i> . Cum ergo ignorantiae ejusdem artis quae propter eorum difficultatem insolubilia appellantur, quasi vinculis ligati saepissime videntur	lxiv
Sophismatum quorundam est solutio per aliquem tredecim locorum, quorundam autem non	xxx
Tempestive deficiet qui in mendacio confidit, quia non sola veritas sed et falsitas mendacio contradicit	lvii
Termini privatorii inveniuntur dupliciter ab Aristotele sumi	xx
Tractatus insolubilium dividitur in tres partes. In quarum prima positiones discutiuntur. In secunda istarum opinionum quae vera sunt eliciuntur. In tertia diversae species insolubilium ostenduntur	xxi
Tua, mi Hieronyme, honesta petitio, domini nostri In primis itaque duas suppositiones hic sophistarum princeps assumit	lxxiii
Ut novi artium auditores plenius intellegant quae in summulis edocentur valde utilis est cognitio dicendorum.	xlviii
In primos quaeritur quare artista	xlv
Utrum aliquis in casu possit ex praecepto obligari ad aliquid quod est contra conscientiam suam	lxii
Utrum insolubile sit subjectum attributionis scientiae insolubilium. Pro responsione dicitur	xxiii

APPENDIX II

MANUSCRIPTS CITED

An * indicates that a MS or a part of a MS is available on microfilm in the library of the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto.

Assisi, Biblioteca comunale MS 173, ff. 1-62	LXII
*Berlin, Staatsbibliothek 973 (lat. fol. 206), ff. 184rb-187rb	xxiii
*Bruges, Bibl. publ. MS 192, ff. 1ra-44ra	LXXII
*Bruges, Bibl. publ. MS 497, ff. 43rb-44va	LVIII
*ff. 64va-73vb	LV
*Bruges, Bibl. publ. MS 499, ff. 61ra-100va	LXXI
*Bruges, Bibl. publ. MS 500, ff. 1ra-32va	LV
*ff. 143vb-157va	LXIII
*ff. 178ra-180va	XIX
Brussels, Bibl. royale 1551 (1801-3), ff. 5r-90	LXXII
*Cambridge, Corpus Christi 244 (245), ff. 59r-76v	XVII
*Cambridge, Corpus Christi 378, ff. 77r-80r	XVII
*Cambridge, Gonville & Caius, 182/215 pages 132-135 ..	III
*Cambridge, Gonville & Caius, 499/268, ff. 1r-162v	XXXVI
*Cambridge, Gonville & Caius, 668/645, f. 21r	I
*f. 76r	XIV
Cambridge, Peterhouse, 272, ff. 1-111	XXXVI
*Cambridge, St. John's, 100, ff. 135ra-138va	LVII
Cambridge, Mass., Episcopal Theological School, ETS Accession Book, v. 1, p. 277, no. 22025, ff. 1ra-47rb ..	XLV
Cracow, Biblioteka Jagiellońska 621, ff. 3r-13v	LV
Cracow, Biblioteka Jagiellońska 2132 BB. VI 5	v, XXXVIII
Dubrovnik-Ragusa, Dominikanerbibliothek 32, ff. 89ra-222vb	XXXVI
Erfurt, CA 2° 313, ff. 147-158v	LV
*Erfurt, CA 2° 345, ff. 65vb-66va	XXXV
*Erfurt, CA 4° 241, ff. 82ra-83va	II
*Erfurt, CA 4° 245, ff. 304v-322r	XXXVIII
*Erfurt, CA 4° 255, ff. 1ra-12va	LIII
*Erfurt, CA 4° 270, ff. 37r1-39r30	XXXIX
*Erfurt, CA 4° 276, ff. 159ra-162ra	LXVIII
*ff. 163ra-167ra	LXIV

*Erfurt, CA 4° 280, ff. 179ra-186rb.....	VII
Erfurt, CA 8° 66, ff. 14r-57v	XLV
*Erfurt, CA 8° 76, ff. 1r-3v	LXXII
ff. 6ra-21vb	LXIV
*ff. 21vb-34rb	LXVIII
*ff. 37ra-71ra	LV
Florence, Bibl. nat. B 4 1618, ff. 56rb-94	LXXI
Klagenfurt, Bischoefliche Bibliothek, XXIX e 1, ff. 50r-53r	XXXVIII
Klagenfurt, Studienbibliothek, Pap. 168, ff. 61r-67v	XXV
ff. 80v-82v	XXX
Köningswart, 20-H-27, ff. 1ra-64va.....	XLV
Lamballe (now in Paris, B.N.), 1	XLV
London, B.L. Royal 10.B.XIV, ff. 1-244	XXXVI
*London, B.L. Sloane 3899, ff. 73r-83r	LVI
*London, Lambeth Palace 70, ff. 268vb-305va	LXXI
London, Lambeth Palace, 79, ff. 1-212r	XXXVI
Madrid, Bib. Nov. Univ. Cent. MS 105, ff. 1-9	LXIV
Melk, 6 (A. 8), ff. 553-560	XXXVIII
Munich, Staatsbibliothek CLM 23530, ff. 182r-210r	LV
Oxford, Bodl., Canon. Lat. 278, ff. 78v-80r	LXIII
Oxford, Bodl., Canon. Lat. 311, ff. 33v-34v	XXX
Oxford, Bodl., Canon. Misc. 176, ff. 51-59	XLVIII
*Oxford, Bodl., Canon. Misc. 219, ff. 1ra-3va	XLVIII
*ff. 7ra-9rb	XXXIX
*ff. 9va-11vb	XXX
*f. 12ra	XXVI
*ff. 47vb-52vb	LIII
*ff. 53ra-57bra	LXIV
Oxford, Bodl., Canon. Misc. 221, ff. 55-59	XLVIII
Oxford, Bodl., Canon. Misc. 376, ff. 1ra-20ra	LV
*Oxford, Bodl., Canon. Misc. 409, ff. 99ra-109va	LV
Oxford, Bodl., Canon. Misc. 558, ff. 98-144	LXXI
Oxford, Magdalen 32, ff. 1-292	XXXVI
Oxford, Magdalen 195, ff. 1-181	XXXVI
Oxford, Merton 279, ff. 4-179	XXXVI
*Oxford, Merton 280, ff. 1ra-37va	LIX
*Oxford, Merton 306, ff. 3ra-8ra.....	XI
ff. 9-118	XXXVI
Oxford, Oriel 15, ff. 235r-279v	LXII
Padua, Anton., Scaff. XIX, N. 407 ff. 21r-62v	LIII
Padua, Anton., 238, ff. 1r-34v.....	LXII
Padua, Anton., XVII, 375, ff. 1-205	XXXVI
Padua, Bibl. univ. 647	XLV

*Padua, Bibl. univ. 1123, ff. 22vb-24rb	XII
ff. 65va-79va	LV
Paris, B.N. lat. 6668, ff. 40rb-41va.	XXX
Paris, B.N. lat. 7392	XLV
*Paris, B.N. lat. 11412, ff. 88ra-91va	XXI
Paris, B.N. lat. 13966.	XLV
Paris, B.N. lat. 13967.	XLV
Paris, B.N. lat. 14721, ff. 96va-121ra	LXXI
*Paris, B.N. lat. 16184, ff. 56rb-78ra	LV
Paris, B.N. lat. 16146, ff. 2-141ra	XXXVI
*Paris, B.N. lat. 16617, ff. 64r-131r.	XLV
Paris, B.N. Nouv. acq. lat. 827	XLV
Paris, Universitaire 599, ff. 1-128	XXXVI
Prague, Capit. Metropol. 1291 (L. XLVII)	XXXVI
Prague, Capit. Metropol. 1645 (O. LXI), ff. 138r-153v..	LXIII
*Prague, Univ. 773, ff. 259v-262v.	XLIV
Prague, Univ. 893, ff. 1r-193r.	XLV
Prague, Univ. 906, ff. 30r-37v	XXXVIII
*ff. 38r-49r	XV
*Prague, Univ. 1536, ff. 55v-72v	XL
Prague, Univ. 2605, ff. 81v-88v	XXXVIII
*Rome, Angelica 1017 (R.6.32), ff. 14rb-19vb	XXXI
Semur, Bibl. municipale, cod. 2	XLV
Troyes, Bibl. municipale 2402, ff. 1-95.	XLV
Vatican, Chigi BV 66, ff. 5-86	LXII
*Vatican, Pal. lat. 995, ff. 63r-89r	XLVII
Vatican, Pal. lat. 1056, ff. 1-144.	XXXVI
Vatican, Vat. lat. 950, f. 117v.	LXIII
Vatican, Vat. lat. 954, ff. 1-201	XXXVI
*Vatican, Vat. lat. 986, ff. 113ra-116ra	IV
Vatican, Vat. lat. 1108, ff. 1r-43r, 45r-52v, 96r-102v....	LXII
Vatican, Vat. lat. 2130, ff. 152r-159va	LXIII
ff. 161-170	XXV
Vatican, Vat. lat. 2139, ff. 67rb-80va	XLVIII
*Vatican, Vat. lat. 2154, ff. 1r-12va	LXIII
*ff. 22va-24rb	XVIII
*ff. 29va-34vb	XIII
Vatican, Vat. lat. 2185, f. 78rv	LXIII
Vatican, Vat. lat. 3065, ff. 28r-30v	XXXIX
Vatican, Vat. lat. 3066, ff. 16ra-25vb	LV
Vatican, Vat. lat. 3088, ff. 37ra-61vb	LV
Vatican, Vat. lat. 4429, ff. 45ra-62va	LV
*Vatican, Vat. lat. 6750, ff. 1ra-202rb	XXXVI

*Venice, San Marco VI, 30 (2547), ff. 63ra-71va.....	XXV
Venice, San Marco VI, 79 (2552), ff. 1-229.....	XXXVI
Venice, San Marco VI, 155 (3377), ff. 18-31	XXV
*Venice, San Marco VI, 228 (2423), ff. 53ra-62va	XLVIII
Venice, San Marco VI, 248 (2878), ff. 76-88	XLVIII
Venice, San Marco Z 278 (1785)	XLVIII
*Venice, San Marco Z 301 (1576), ff. 1r-18r.....	XLI
*ff. 18r-24v	XLII
*f. 25r	XVI
*ff. 27r-37r	LXIV
*Vienna, Nat. Bibl. 4698, ff. 78v-87r	XXXVIII
*Vienna, Nat. Bibl. 4953, ff. 86r-118v	v, XXXVIII
Vienna, Nat. Bibl. 5162, ff. 171v-174v	XLVII
Vienna, Nat. Bibl. 5248, ff. 75r-82r	XXXVIII
*Vienna, Nat. Bibl. 5252, ff. 143r-154r	XLVI
Worcester, Bibl. Cathed., F. 6, ff. 1-165	XXXVI
Worcester, Bibl. Cathed., F. 195, ff. 91-126v	XXXVI

This page intentionally left blank

INDEX

Footnote numbers are invariably preceded by n. or nn. Thus : 48 & n. 55, 56 means page 48 and note 55, and page 56. Under a man's name, I have listed pages in his Catalogue entry only if that entry is rather long, and only in order to locate particular points in the man's doctrine referred to elsewhere in the Catalogue.

- Actus: animae supra se* 35; *conceptus* 107; *dicendi* 66, 107, 108; *exercitus* 66, 107; *hominis* 32, 43; *nostri* 21, 23, 27, 57, 90-91, 95, 103, 104, 108, 109 (cf. *insoluble*, *sources of*), *exterior* 90, 103, 109; *interior* 57, 90-91, 103, 109; *qui pertinet ad disputationem* 43; *reflexus* 58; *signatus* 66; *vocis* 27; *interemption* 43; *privatio* 104, 105; *reflexio supra se*, cf. *reflection*.
- Ad placitum*: signify 29; *utentis* 29; *verum vel falsum ad placitum dicentis* 62.
- Affirmation: affirmative proposition has twofold 53; naturally prior to negation 32.
- Albert of Saxony 52, 79 & n. 140, 82, 86, 92 n. 172, 94.
- Alessio F. 78 n. 136.
- Ampliation 89, 90.
- Angelo of Fossamborne 37 n. 38.
- Anonymous [V], on Magister Hugo 24, 57.
- Anonymous [VI]: rules for forming hypothetical insolubles 28, 32 n. 27, 113 n. 212; supposition *secundum quid* 28, 78 n. 137.
- Anonymous [VII]: on Magister Hugo 29, 30, 57, 58; or Magister Walter 29, 111, on Thomas Manlevelt 29, 110.
- Anonymous [IX]: *dicendum "nil dicas"* 43 n. 53, 107 n. 198; rules for hypotheticals containing insoluble 28 n. 23, 113 n. 212.
- Anonymous [X], 4th opinion 46, 100 nn. 185-186.
- Anonymous (Pseudo-Heytesbury) [XII], use by John Hunter 68 n. 114, 69.
- Anonymous [XIII] 51 n. 64.
- Anonymous [XV] 70 & n. 120.
- Anonymous (Pseudo-Bradwardine) [XVIII], 40 n. 44.
- Anonymous [XX] 107 n. 197, 112 n. 208.
- Anonymous [XXIII], 9th opinion 33 n. 30.
- Antecedent: and consequent formed at same time 45, 59; be as signifies, but not as consequent signifies 45, 59, 72; natural, prior to consequent 75; opposite of, implied by opposite of consequent 44, 72; or causation 75 true, and consequent false 45, 72, 74, 82; true without consequent 59.
- Antecedenter *sic est, naturaliter* 100.
- Anthony de Monte 55.
- Appellare* 110.
- Apprehension, simple 66 n. 102.
- A priori*, signify naturally & 34.
- Aristotle 58, 64, 74, 90, 106, 107 Liar & Perjurer examples 78, 98.
- Aschenbach, J. 24 n. 14; 67 n. 110.
- Ashworth, E. J. 9 n. 1.
- Assert: directly or consecutively 60; itself to be true, every proposition 53, 60 (cf. proposition, *sequitur*).
- Augustine, St. 53.
- Balić, C. 65 & n. 97, n. 100.
- Bascour, H. 58 n. 84; 59 n. 86.
- Baudry, L. 120 n. 226.

- Berotus of England, cf. Henry of England.
- Blackley, F. D. 87 nn. 155-156.
- Bocheński, I. M. 65 & n. 99.
- Boehner, P. 22 n. 10, 119 nn. 222-223, 120 & n. 227.
- Boháček, M. 78 n. 136.
- Boyle, L. 78 n. 136.
- Braakhuis, H. A. G. 42 & n. 49.
- Brady, I. C. 58 n. 67.
- Brampton, C. K. 119 n. 221, 120 n. 224.
- Brown, M. A. 81 & n. 145.
- Brück, A. 71 n. 121.
- Buddensieg, R. 77 n. 134.
- Cajetan of Thiene 37 n. 39, 88 nn. 160-161, 93, 116 n. 218, 117 nn. 219-220.
- Cassantes* 27, 32, 43 & n. 53, 44, 95 & n. 175, 107 & n. 198, 112 & nn. 205-206, 114 (cf. *interemptio actus, nil dicis*, Thomas Bradwardine's 5th & 7th opinions.)
- Casus*: admit 24, 25, 30, 46, 54, 58, 65, 67, 74, 96, 118; *apparens* 65; deny 46-47, 65, 67, 86, 97; *facti* 75; insolubles without 24, 30, 31, 82; of indirect insolubles are impossible 86; of insolubles 20, 23-25, 30, 31, 34, 35, 46, 49-52, 54, 58, 62, 65, 66-67, 68, 74, 81, 82, 86, 88, 96-97, 100, 105, 111, 114, 117, 118; always to be denied 65, Heytesbury's def. 35, 62, 67, 81, 88, 117-118; *sine admissione* 24.
- Causal theory of truth 33, 100.
- Causation: antecedent or 75; true after, false before 75.
- Cause: final, of insolubles 33 (cf. 46); simple intention in soul representing all propositions 78.
- Certificare* 19, 25, 96, 110.
- Circulare* 28.
- Cognition, formal 85.
- Collucio Salutati 86 nn. 153-154.
- Complex: comprehend by 64; thing, denote for 64. (Cf. signify.)
- Composition: or division in thing or things signified 58 (cf. 115); of man with ass 20.
- Concede 19, 24, 25, 29, 41, 42, 51, 52, 54, 73, 74, 82, 84, 92, 96, 111, 118; insoluble & deny it to be true 30, 52, 84, 118; it to be true, deny insoluble & 52 *simpliciter* 19; 'This sentence is not to be conceded' 37. (Cf. consequence, proposition.)
- Condition: for an insoluble XV, XL; fulfill, def. 99; oblige oneself under a 98.
- Confuse distributive, 'praeceise' confundit significare* 20.
- Conjunction: copulative 32; denoting there is consequence 45; disjunctive 32; mental propositions conjoined by 55. (Cf. copulative.)
- Consequence 25, 35, 37, 44, 45 & n. 55, 51, 52, 59, 65, 72-73, 74, 82, 84, 90, 96, 97, 101, 104, 106-107; formal 72, 84, 90, 97, 104 (cf. sequitur); good, def. 45 & n. 55, 59; mark (*nota*) of 45; to be conceded (to be good), def. 51 truth of falsehood 72-73, 84, 101, 104; valid, def. 45 & n. 58, 59, 72.
- Consequent, virtually implied 60, 61. (Cf. antecedent, signify.)
- Consignification 43.
- Contradicities: both false 22-23, 97, 101, 104, 116, 117; one not imply other 53; propositions seem to be & are not 101 (cf. 22, 24, 61); both true 46-47, 64.
- Contradicts: both true proposition & false 101; senses & intellect 107.
- Contrahatur, terminus communis* 66.
- Conversion: false proposition & true 72, 101; insoluble not with similar proposition in synonymous terms 76; insoluble, & false copulative 94; *simpliciter* 51-52, 90.
- Copinger, W. A. 9 n. 2.
- Copula: affirmed (or denied) 48; signifies union 115; taken affirmatively (or negatively) 62.

- Copulative: conjunction 32; insoluble equivalent to or is 22, 31, 36; mental 25. (Cf. insoluble.)
- Correspondence, of mental & spoken (or written) language 55, 64, 74, 75, 85.
- Coxe, H. O. 55 n. 78; 81, n. 145.
- Credere*: def. 109; insoluble *de* 58.
- Dahmus, J. 74 n. 127, 76 n. 130, 87 n. 155.
- Da Valsanzibio 53 nn. 69-70.
- Deficiency: grades of 72; in form or matter 114.
- Del Punta, F. 120 n. 225.
- Deny, cf. concede.
- De Poorter, A. 41 n. 48, 92 n. 168.
- De Rijk, L. M. 26 nn. 15, 18, 27 & n. 21, 32, 43 & nn. 51-52, 77 n. 135, 78 n. 136, 111 n. 204.
- Determination: privative 42, 56, 82, 106, 112; of predicate, subject is never 27.
- '*Deus est; igitur, ista consequentia non valet*' 45.
- Difficult to solve, insolubles so-called because 93, 112, 113.
- Disjunctive: conjunction 32; opposite of insoluble is (or is equivalent to) 31, 57; syllogism 108. (Cf. insoluble.)
- Doucet, P. V. 101 n. 187.
- Dubietatem respondere* 67.
- Dubitare: de impositione* 19; insoluble *de* 57.
- Duplum: non dicit, nec multiplex* 38.
- Dziewicki, M. H. 75 & n. 128.
- '*Ego dico falsum*' 26, 42, 43, 44, 65, 113.
- Elie, H. 84 n. 152.
- Emden, A. B. 23 n. 12, 56 nn. 81-82, 66 nn. 103-104, 70 n. 119, 92 nn. 166-167, 93 nn. 171-172, 98 n. 182, 113 n. 213.
- Emmen, A. 84 n. 151.
- Ens: est proposicio vera quia* 75; *naturaliter significat se esse* 75.
- Equivocation 59, 62, 64, 86, 107; on 'verum' 86.
- Evil, as presupposes good so false implies true 53.
- Existence of propositions, condition for truth-value 48, 50-51, 59, 60-61, 115.
- Expresse: non, sed virtualiter impositum* 25.
- Expression, *simpliciter* 27-28.
- Fallacy: *accidentis* 115; *figura dictio*nis 107; *non causam ut causam* 107; *secundum quid et simpliciter* 19, 27-28, 42, 44, 56, 74, 82, 91, 95, 98, 106-109 & n. 199, 114, 120.
- False: before causation 75; in one (or every) sense 19; *secundum quid* 93; *simpliciter* 44, 66, 86, 93. (Cf. proposition.)
- Falsifies itself 20, 21, 24, 25, 49, 72, 75, 84, 94, 103-104, 116; nominal definition of a proposition that 21.
- Faral, E. 58 nn. 84-85, 59 nn. 86-89.
- Fleming, B. 106 n. 195.
- Form: signified by term 66; signify by 60. (Cf. deficiency.)
- Gál, G. 54 n. 71, 119 n. 221, 120 nn. 224-225.
- Geyer, B. 77 n. 135.
- Goff, R., *Incunabula in American Libraries*, 9 n. 2, 59, 86.
- Gollancz, I. 87 n. 156.
- Grabmann, M. 26 & n. 16, 78 n. 136, 94 n. 174.
- Grades: of deficiency 75; of truth and falsity 38, 75.
- Habitudo praedicati ad subjectum* 38, (Cf. inherence.)
- '*Haec significat aliter quam est*' 90.
- Hain, L. 9 n. 2, 47, 53-54, 82, 116, 119.
- Häring, N. 67 n. 108.
- Harvey of England, cf. Henry of England.
- Hauréau, B. 43 n. 51.
- Heidingsfelder, G. 47 nn. 57-58.
- Henry of England 52 & n. 66, 106 n. 196.
- Hugo 24, 29, 30.

- Hypothetical: every insoluble is 25, 55; mental 25. (Cf. insoluble.)
- Impertinens*: *casui* 51-52; *propositioni* 73.
- Imply virtually 25, 60-61.
- Imposed: not expressly but virtually 25; to signify 51-52, 73, 103, adequately 51-52.
- Imposition: doubt 19; new 51, 95, 119; second 75. (Cf. signify.)
- Inconjunctim, mentales captae* 55.
- Incunabula and early printed works 9, 47, 53-54, 58, 59, 82, 84, 86, 98, 116, 119.
- Inherence: simple, of predicate in subject 74. (Cf. *habitudo*.)
- Insoluble: additional signification of 24, 29, 36, 81, 89 & n. 162, 89-90, 96, 110, 116 n. 218, 118; affirmative false, negative true 113, 119; all false 20, 23, 25, 29-30, 55, 67, 100, 111; all impossible 20, 25; and negation both false 61; both true & false 40, 54, 55, 75, 76, 85; *casus*, distinguished from proposition 20 (cf. *casus*); categorical 31, 33, 34, 50, 68, 70 (cf. insoluble, simple); causal 32; composite 30-32, 35-36, 57, 91, 97, 109, 111, 113 (cf. insoluble, hypothetical); conditional 31-32; constituents, rules for hypotheticals with 28, 32, 113; copulative 28, 31, 32, 36, 57, 68, 79, 91, 104, 109, 113; *de credere (dubitare)* 57; def. of 21, 24, 27, 29, 30, 31, 35, 50, 56, 62, 65, 67, 70, 81, 82, 83, 88, 89, 96, 100, 103, 106, 110, 113-114, 118, Robert Fland's 89, 95, Thomas Bradwardine's 31, 56, 70, 82, 106 (cf. 27, 29-30, 83, 110), William Heytesbury's 34, 62, 67, 81, 88, 110, 118 (cf. 24, 50, 65); disjunctive 28, 31, 32, 36, 57, 68, 91, 104; equipollent to contradiction 44; equivalent to copulative 23, 31, 36, 94; *ex actibus nostris, ex actu vocis*, cf. *actus*; exceptions to standard rules of truth 59; exceptive 32, 36, 57, 68, 69, 91, 104, 109; exclusive 32, 36, 57, 68, 79, 91, 104, 109; *ex proprietate vocis, cf. proprietas; ex repugnantia in-*
- tellectuum, cf. repugnantia*; hypothetical 28, 32, 33, 34, 50, 70 (cf. insoluble, composite); indirect 36, 57, 68, 69, 86, 109, 118; mental copulative composed of 3 categoricals 25; neither true nor false 33, 75, 100 n. 196, 107, 118, but intermediate value 107, none true 75; no purely negative proposition is 100; not all false 24; not a proposition 27, 117; opposite of is disjunctive 31, 57; part of, whether insoluble 26, whether precisely signifies as does whole 25; proposition or sophism that seems to be, but is not 34, 50, 57, 105, 110, 116; *propositio plures* 40, 41, 54, 85, 86; signify copulatively 54, 57, 67, 118; simple 34, 35-36, 57, 91, 96, 104, 109, 111 (cf. insoluble categorical); senses of term 20, 26, 56, 105-106, 111-112; sources of 21, 23, 27, 32, 34, 43, 57, 90, 95, 103, 108, 112 (cf. *radices*); subordinated to 2 mental propositions 55; temporal 32; true 26, 30, 40, 74, 78, 113, 118, 119, universal 36, 57, 69, 91; without *casus* 24, 30, 31, 82; without *obligatio* 25. (Cf. concede.)
- Institutio, species obligationis* 119.
- Intention: simple 64, 73; universal 64, 75.
- Interemptio actus* 43. (Cf. *cassantes, nil dicis*, Thomas Bradwardine's 6th opinion.)
- Iosa, A. M. 68 n. 115, 87 n. 158.
- James, M. R. 21 n. 8, 40 n. 45, 70 n. 119.
- John Buridan 25, 79; on consequences 45 n. 55, 59, 68.
- John Dumbleton 33, 47; anonymous [XI] ascribed to 35; Heytesbury's 2nd opinion ascribed to 54, 88 n. 160, 117 n. 219; read by John of Holland 23 n. 12; 66 n. 104; third conclusion 64, 74 n. 126.
- John Duns Scotus 27 n. 20, 44, 108 n. 199, 112 n. 207.

- John of Holland 19-20, 23 & n. 12, 24 & n. 14, 28 & n. 24, 29 & n. 26; life 23 n. 12; required at Erfurt 20, 28 n. 24, 29 n. 26, at Vienna 24 n. 14.
- John Hunter, *Logica*, 68 n. 113.
- John Major Scotus 99.
- John Page (Papus) 43 n. 51.
- John of Prague 78.
- John (Rucherath) of Wesel 71 n. 121.
- John Swyneshed 102 n. 188.
- John of Wesel: insolubles 20 n. 7, 71 & nn. 121-122; *obligationes* 74; on 'praecise' 20 n. 7, 72-73; simple intention representing all propositions 64 n. 96, 73.
- John Wyclif 38-39 & n. 42, 70 & n. 120, 76-77 & nn. 131-132, 87 n. 155; catalogues in Vienna MSS 77 first six opinions 39, 74-76.
- Kaeppele, Th., & Schooner, H.-V. 63 n. 95.
- Klingsford, C. L., 93 n. 171.
- Kneale, W. & M. 45 n. 55, 115 n. 215.
- Kretzmann, N. 68 n. 113.
- Kristeller, P. O. 49 n. 63, 81 n. 145, 106 n. 195.
- Lambert of Auxerre 28 n. 22.
- Lewis & Short 10.
- London Convent of Carmelites 93 n. 171.
- Marsilius of Inghen 46 n. 56, 47.
- Matter, deficiency in 114.
- Maurer, A. 79 n. 139; 98 n. 181.
- Mensch, J. 53 n. 68, 78 n. 136.
- Mental: copulative composed of 3 categoricals, insoluble is 25; propositions 22, 25, 26, 29, 34, 55, 64, 83, 85, 99, 103 (cf. 74), properly (improperly) so-called 85; signifying naturally 84; conjoined by conjunction 55, taken *inconjunctionem* 55.
- Mentio in casu, propositio de qua sit* 50, 51-52, 62, 117-118.
- Mixture of *proprietas vocis* & *actus nostri* 23, 103.
- Modal categoricals, truth-conditions of 29 (cf. 48).
- Mohan, G. 24 n. 14, 40 n. 46, 49 n. 61 & n. 63, 55 nn. 77-79, 67 nn. 106-107, 68 nn. 115-116, 69 n. 117, 78 n. 136, 87 nn. 157-158, 92 n. 170, 106 n. 195.
- Mullaly, J. P. 80 n. 143.
- Multiplex*, cf. *duplum*.
- Multiplicatione, sine* 110.
- Nardi, B. 82 nn. 147-148.
- Naturally: antecedently so 100, ostensive 34, prior 32. (Cf. signify.)
- Nature, participate in 66.
- Negation: affirmation naturally prior to 32; insoluble and, both false 61.
- Nicholas of Paris 43 n. 51.
- Nil dicis* 32; 43-44, 114 (Cf. 27, 107 *cassantes, interemptio actus*, Thomas Bradwardine's 6th opinion.)
- Nota consequentiae* 45.
- Number, same in 26, 77.
- Obligationes* 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 33, 39, 46, 51, 57, 68-69, 70, 102, 11 n. 204, 119; insolubles without 25. John Hunter (?) on 68-69; John of Wesel's questions on 74, Roger Swyneshed on 102, six species of 119; Walter Burley on 111 n. 204; William of Ockham on 22, 119.
- Ostensive, precisely naturally 34.
- Paralogism secundum quid et simpliciter* 56, 82, 95, 106.
- Part: as part 31; as predicate whole 31; integral 66, 71, 112 (cf. whole); of insoluble, whether precisely signifies as does whole 26; of insoluble whether insoluble 26; of proposition, whether true 26; stand for (*supponere pro*) whole (or convertible of part, of contradictory of whole, etc.) 22, 27, 38, 42, 43-44, 49, 65, 71, 74, 75, 78, 85, 86, 91, 94, 99, 101, 106, 107 n. 197, 108, 112, 119 (cf. *restringentes*, self-reference); subjective 71; syncategorema in proposition & not part of it 26.
- Participate in nature 66.
- Paul of Pergula 36 n. 37.

- Paul of Venice 36 n. 37; discussion of Peter of Ailly 83, 85; *Logica magna* abridged as *Logica parva (Summulae logicae)* 82 n. 148.
- Pellechet, M. 9 n. 2, 84.
'*Per Deum, ego pejero*' 78, 98.
- Pertinens 21, 25, 49, 86, 103, 112; *ad inferendum* 21, 103; *ad motum* 112; *insufficiens* 103; *repugnans* 25; *sequens* 25; *sufficiens* 103.
- Peter of Ailly 40 n. 44, 55, 83, 99, 104.
- Peter of Mantua 36 n. 37, 40 n. 44, 83.
- Peter of Spain 80.
- Peter Tartaret 54 & n. 73, 55 n. 74.
- Pinborg, J. 61 n. 89.
- Pompeii, A. 54 n. 72.
- 'Praecise': confundit 'significare' confuse distributive 20; *dictio exclusiva* 73; non *admittit casum si apponatur* 25; syncategorematic properties of 20 & n. 7, 72-73.
- Prantl, C. 9 n. 1, 80 & n. 143, 99 & n. 184.
- Predicate: *simpliciter* 27; subject never determination of 27. (Cf. *habitudo*, inheritance.)
- Present: specious 43; tense in insoluble refers to preceding time 42, 43, 107 & n. 197, 112 & n. 208. (Cf. *transcasus*.)
- Prior: affirmation naturally to negation 32; causally, to proposition 100 natural antecedent, to consequent 75.
- Privatio actus* 104-105.
- Privative term 43, 106 (cf. determination.).
- Proposition: def. 103, common to every true 26 every, signifies (asserts, virtually implies) itself to be true 25, 48, 53, 59, 60, 75, 94 (cf. 83); false, def. 48, 84 & n. 150, 89, 95, 103 (cf. truth-&-falsehood conditions); including a contradiction 115; insoluble, distinguished from insoluble *casus* 20; necessary, def. 48; neither true nor false 103 (cf. 33, 71, 100 n. 196, 107); no insoluble is 27, 117; part of, cf. part; possible, def. 48; purely negative, none insoluble 100; syncategorema in, cf. part; to be conceded (to be true), def. 51; true, def. 48, 84, 89, 95, 103 (cf. truth-&-falsehood conditions). (Cf. concede, copulative, disjunctive, hypothetical, insoluble, mental, simple, token, vocal, written, etc.)
- Propositio plures*, cf. insoluble.
- Proprietas vocis* 21, 23, 57, 91, 95, 103-104, 105, 108, 112.
- Qualitas instrumenti* 32.
- Qualitercumque significat ita est (potest esse, necesse est esse)* 25, 45, 48, 58, 60.
- Quantifier, in categoricals 29.
- Quid nominis propositionis falsificantis se* 21.
- Radices insolubilium* 27, 43, 95, 112 & n. 210. (Cf. insoluble, sources of.)
- Ralph Strode 95 n. 176, 97 n. 177; *Logica* 87 n. 156.
- Rashdall, H. 19 n. 5, 28 n. 24.
- Reflection: in *indiffinita* 91; on itself 24, 27, 35, 42, 56, 60, 82, 83, 95, 106, 112 of act, 35, 42, 56, 82, 95, 106; of act of soul 35, of falsehood 24.
- Represent: all propositions 73; itself, distinctly formally (or objectively) 85.
- Repugnantia intellectuum* 27, 95, 108, 112.
- Respondent 19, 29, 96, 110, 118.
- Restrингentes* 21, 22, 25, 27, 31, 34, 42, 43-44, 49, 56, 64, 70, 71, 74, 85, 86, 91, 95, 99, 101, 106, 107 n. 197, 112, 115, 116, 119, 120. (Cf. part, self-reference.)
- Richard II, King of England 93 n. 172.
- Richard Kilmington 23, 54, 88 n. 161, 117 n. 220.
- Richard Swyneshed 40 n. 46, 102 n. 188.
- Robert Fland: definitions 89, 95; extant works 95 n. 176; nine arguments against *opinio plurium sapientium* 90, 96-97; used by Ralph Strode 89, 95 n. 176.

Roger Nottingham 33 n. 30, 75 n. 129.
 Roger Roseth 22, 23, 99.
 Roger Swyneshed 21 & n. 8, 29, 30, 40, 41 n. 47, 58, 62, 64, 72 n. 125, 79, 83-84, 88-90, conclusions 22, 90, 97 n. 177, 104 third, 84, 104, 116 n. 218; definition, fourth 21; of false proposition 84 n. 150, 103 dichotomy, first 21; elaborated by Paul of Venice 83-84; Heytesbury's first opinion ascribed to 37, 54, 104 n. 191, 116 n. 218; nine arguments against 90; on *obligationes* 102; read by John of Holland 23 n. 12, 66 n. 104; suppositions 22.

Roure, M.-L. 9 n. 1, 26 & n. 17, 27 n. 119, 105, 111, 112 n. 209.

Salutati, Collucio, cf. Collucio Salutati.
 Schum, W. 68 n. 114 & n. 116, 69 n. 117, 110 n. 202, 113 n. 214, 120.
Scire propositionem, def. 109.
 Scott, T. K. 59 n. 88, 61 n. 89.
Secundum quid: say something 27, 114. (Cf. false, supposition, true.)
Secundum quid et simpliciter, cf. fallacy, paralogism.
 Self-reference 46-47, 71, 79, 86, 100 n. 186; allowed in some or all cases 21, 27, 31, 38, 43-44, 46-47, 49, 68, 78-79, 84, 85, 91, 94, 100, 108, 112, 114, 119; rejected in some or all cases 21, 25, 27, 31, 84, 47, 56, 64, 71, 78-79, 85, 91, 99, 101, 106, 107 n. 197, 112, 115-116, 119, 120.
 Sense: composed & divided 73; contradict or deny 107, 114; true (or false) in one (or every) 19, 62, 75.
Sequitur: every proposition signifies *qualiter ad eam sequitur* 72, 108; *falsum ex vero* 52, 97, 104 *formaliter* 50, 81, 97 (cf. 51); *impossibile, ad insolubile* 20; *quod sit verum, ad omnem propositionem* 25, 59, 60; *ut nunc vel simpliciter* 108.
 Significate: adequate 84; assertive 81, not expressly but virtually imposed 25; primary 38, 76, 100.

Signification: additional, of insolubles, cf. insoluble; consecutive 47, determinate 19; direct 47; formal 45, 60; material 45; of mark of consequence 45; of terms, can depend on truth-value of proposition 71; taken as whole (or separately) 73; proposition expressing 24, 25; secondary 96.

Signify: absolutely 110; actually 34, 103; adequately 50-51, 84, *ad placitum* 29 (cf. signify by convention); affirmation or negation 108; *a priori*, naturally & 34; as is (or is not) the case (*sicut est, sicut non est, aliter quam est*, etc.) 20, 21, 23, 26, 33, 40, 48, 63, 72, 75, 80, 90, 95, 96, 97, 102-103, 104, 108, 116, 117; as long as actual comprehension 64; assertively 50, 52, 81; as terms pretend 30, 31, 50, 57, 62, 67, 69, 90, 117-118; authentically & assertively 50; by convention 84. (cf. signify *ad placitum*); by form 60; by imposition 34, 39, 78, 103, 104-105, 110; by representation 80 complex 66 n. 102; complexly 103; conditionally 110; copulatively 54, 57, 67, 118; denote to 34; disjunctively 118; *ex consequenti* 73, 89, 95-96; for a complex 64-65; for an external thing 35, 64; for an incomplex thing 64; for itself 35, 76; formally 60, 85; imposed to 51-52, 73, 103; incomplexes 66 n. 102; insolubly 50, 51-52; itself to be, every being naturally 75; itself to be (or not to be) true (and/or false) 20, 21, 22, 23, 26, 29, 30, 43, 45, 47, 48, 50, 56, 59, 70, 75, 79, 80, 81, 83, 85, 89, 94, 109 & n. 200, 110, 114, 115; naturally 34, 75, 84, 103 (cf. signify *a priori*); neither principally as is case nor otherwise than is case 21, 102; objectively 85; precisely 20, 24, 25, 26, 30, 31, 33, 34, 58, 62, 67, 73, 81, 90, 95, 96-97, 116, 117-118, as is the case 20, 95, 96-97, 116, as terms pretend 30-31, 58, 62, 67, 72, 117-

- 118; 'precisely signify' & 'signify precisely', difference 20; primarily (*primo, primarie*) 33, 70, 73, 75, 76, 89, 95-96, 100; principally 21, 69, 95-96, 102-103, 104, 116 n. 218; *qualiter ad eam sequitur* 72, 108; representatively 50; secondarily 80, 89, 96; simple inference 74; subject & predicate to stand for same 29, 48, 62, 83; *ut nunc vel simpliciter* 108.
- Simon Sudbury, Archbishop of Canterbury 93 n. 172.
- Simpliciter*, say 27-28, 114 (Cf. concede, conversion, expression, false, predicate, *secundum quid et simpliciter*, supposition, true.)
- Singularis propositionis secundum vocem* 114.
- '*Sortes dicit falsum*' 22, 25, 29, 30, 31, 34, 36, 56, 57, 61-62, 67, 75, 81, 82, 84, 93, 96, 102, 104, 106-107, 109, 114, 119-120.
- '*Sortes non dicit verum*' 57, 119.
- Soul: act of, reflection on itself 35; proposition in, cf. mental; simple intention in 73; species of spoken or written term existing in 34; universal intention in 64.
- Spade, P. V. 31, 33 & nn. 28-29, 87 n. 156, 93 n. 173, 95 n. 176, 119 n. 223.
- Species of spoken or written term 34.
- Spoken: proposition 22, 23, 26, 29, 34, 61, 84, 85, 104, (cf. 73-74); term 34, 73.
- Stand for (*supponere pro*) the same 26, 29, 48, 58-60, 62, 83. (Cf. part, supposition.)
- Stegmüller, Fridericus 101 n. 187.
- Subject: never determination of predicate 27; of attribution 46; quantifier part of 29. (Cf. *habitudo*, inference.)
- Subordination 55, 85.
- '*Supponere*' construed with accusative and *pro* 115 n. 215.
- Supposition*: def. 115; material 33, 34; personal 34; *secundum quid* 28 & n. 22, 78 & n. 137; significative 33, 34; *simpliciter* 27-28, 78. (Cf. stand for the same.)
- Swyneshed, cf. John, Richard, or Roger Swyneshed.
- Synan, E. A. 19 nn. 8-4, 37 nn. 40-41, 91 & nn. 163-164, 99.
- Syncategorema, whether part of proposition 26.
- Term: common, contracted 66; form signified by 66; privative 43, 106; signifies as long as actual comprehension by it 64; signification of can depend on truth-value of proposition 68; spoken or written, species of 34. (Cf. signify as terms pretend, spoken, written.)
- Thomas Bradwardine 29-30, 33, 34, 41, & n. 47, 55 n. 76, 56 n. 83, 64, 71 n. 121, 82, 87, 88, 90, 94, 110; conclusions: 1st 34 n. 31, 108; 2nd 74, 89, 109; definitions: 1st 89; of insoluble 31, 56, 70, 82 (cf. 110); 1st dichotomy and rejection of 3rd *radix* of insolubles 27 n. 19, 88, 108, 112 n. 210; previous opinions: 87, 106-107, 1st 56 n. 80, 86, 106 (cf. *restringentes*); 2nd-8th 82, 106-108; 4th 42 & n. 50, 72 n. 129, 107, 112 n. 208; 5th 107, 112 nn. 205-206; 6th 27, 32, 43 n. 53, 95, n. 175, 107, 112 nn. 205-206 (cf. *cassantes, nil dicis, interemptio actus*); read by John of Holland 23 n. 12, 66 n. 104.
- Thomas Chirmister, *Quaestiones in opus Prisciani* 19.
- Thomas Manlevelt 29, 30, 120.
- Thomson, S. H. 97 nn. 178-179.
- Thorndike, L. 19 n. 5, 20 n. 6, 28 n. 24, 29 n. 26, 67 n. 111.
- Time of disputation 119.
- Tiraboschi, G. 80 n. 144.
- Tokens of same type need not have same truth-value 43, 49, 57, 61, 85, 96, 114.
- Transcasus* 112.
- Truhlář, J. 38 n. 42, 67 n. 109, 70 n. 119, 77 n. 133.
- True: after causation 75; in one (or every) sense 19; *secundum quid* 44, 46, 66, 86, 93; *simpliciter* 46, 65, 66, 86, 93. (Cf. proposition.)

- Truth: five kinds of 39, 70 n. 120; measured by first, which is God 75; three kinds of 70 & n. 120, 75-76.
- Truth-&-falsehood conditions 29, 33, 50-51, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 84. (Cf. false, modal, true.)
- Type, cf. tokens.
- Understandings, three of insolubles 61-62.
- University: Bologna 49 n. 60; Erfurt 19 n. 5, 20, 28 n. 24, 29 n. 26, 67; Oxford 23 n. 12, 66 n. 104, Balliol College 70 n. 119, University College 56 n. 82; Padua 49 n. 60, 82 n. 148; Prague 23 n. 12, 66 n. 104; Vienna 24 n. 14, 67.
- Ut nunc: significat sive denotat* 108; *sequitur* 108.
- Variatio extremonrum* 115.
- Venator, Joannes, cf. John Hunter.
- Verb pertaining to motion 112. (Cf. present.)
- Verify itself 63, 104.
- Virtus sermonis* 63.
- Vocis*, cf. *actus, proprietas*.
- Walter 29, 30.
- Walter Burley 41 n. 47, 77, 111; on *obligationes* 111 n. 204; questions on *De interpretatione* 37; read by John of Holland 23 n. 12, 66 n. 104; rules for hypotheticals containing insoluble 32 n. 27, 118.
- Walter Sexgrave 83, 111.
- Weisheipl, J. A. 22 n. 11, 34 n. 31, 35 & nn. 32-35, 63 nn. 91-92 & n. 95, 68 n. 116, 69 nn. 117-118, 92 n. 167, 102 nn. 188-190, 105 & nn. 192-194, 106 & n. 195, 111 nn. 203-204, 116 nn. 216-217.
- Whole: integral 27 (cf. part); predicate 31; universal 26, 66, 112. (Cf. part stand for whole.)
- William Heytesbury 24, 29, 35 n. 36, 36, 41 n. 47, 49, 51, 52, 61, 64, 68 n. 114, 69, 75, 80-81, 82, 83, 86, 88, 89, 90, 95 n. 176, 96; definitions: of soluble *casus* 35, 62, 67, 81, 88, 117; of insoluble proposition 29, 31, 36, 62, 67, 81, 88, 110, 118; previous opinions: 37, 46, 54, 62, 82, 88, 93, 104 n. 191, 117, 118; first 37, 54, 104 n. 191, 116, ascribed to Roger Swyneshed 37, 54, 116 n. 218; second 37, 54, 62, 82, 88, 117, ascribed to Dumbleton 54, 117 n. 219, unasccribed 37, 82, 88; third 37, 54, 82, 88, 93, 117, ascribed to Kilmington 54, 93, 117 n. 220, unasccribed 37, 82, 88; rules: five 36, 37, 51, 54, 88, 118; first 2 in reverse order 37 & n. 38, 51 & n. 64; first three 36, 67 n. 112, 81, 118; 3rd & refusal to certify additional signification of insolubles 24, 29, 36, 37, 89-90 & n. 162, 110, 118; 4th & 4th 69, 118; studied by John of Holland 23 n. 12, 66 n. 104.
- William of Ockham 22 & n. 10, 33, 41 n. 47, 113 n. 211, 119; on *obligationes* 22, 119.
- William of Sherwood 26, 115 n. 215.
- Wilson, C. 49 nn. 62-63 & n. 62, 92 n. 168 & n. 170.
- Wolter, A. 44 n. 54, 65 & n. 101.
- Written: proposition 26, 29, 29, 34, 58, 84-85, 104; terms 34, 73.