

UNIVERSALS IN SECOND SCHOLASTICISM

BOCHUMER STUDIEN ZUR PHILOSOPHIE

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DANIEL HEIDER

Universals in Second Scholasticism

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Universals in Second Scholasticism

A comparative study with focus on the theories of
Francisco Suárez S.J. (1548–1617),
João Poinset O.P. (1589–1644) and
Bartolomeo Mastri da Meldola O.F.M. Conv. (1602–1673)/
Bonaventura Belluto O.F.M. Conv. (1600–1676)

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To Tereza, Vojtěch, Magdaléna and Tadeáš

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Introduction

1.1 The issue of universals in Scholasticism

Aristotle's inconsistency and its disambiguation

The problematic of universals, in its ontological core, is concerned with the question of the extramental foundation of our common concepts (terms) or, viewed more from the logico-semantic point of view, with the problem of the reference or meaning of common terms such as “man”, “cow”, etc. The issue is not difficult to motivate. How can one entity be common to more individuals? How can we explain the phenomenon that things agree in one attribute? What is the ontological basis for the predication of a common property of a multitude of things? All those questions, no matter how *a priori* and *perennial* they may sound, are deeply rooted in the history of philosophy and their origin can be traced to Plato and Aristotle, or, more specifically, to Aristotle's critique of Plato. Speaking of the issue of universals in Second Scholasticism at the end of the 16th century and the first half of the 17th century with special focus on the stream called moderate realism, the proper theme of this book, one can get an adequate understanding of this subject matter only when it is considered in continuity with the previous tradition, i.e., with the tradition of medieval scholasticism ramified into the various schools and “-isms”. Although the long and admirable scholastic tradition starting from the 11th century up to the beginning of the 18th century¹ underwent several more or less significant “paradigmatic” changes – let us mention the advent of the *via moderna* with its 13th century or the genre transfer from commentaries on Aristotle *per modum quaestionis* via *disputationes* to the elaboration of the all-comprising systematic manuals or *cursus* in the 17th century –, it still provides the historian of scholastic philosophy with a unified systematic body, in which (in particular in the context of the issue of universals) recurrent references to the same textual *loci*, links to identical *auctoritates* and to similar arguments employed in the substantiation of analogous conclusions of the very same doctrines may be observed. It is common knowledge that the medieval discussion of universals, just as its postmedieval counterpart, is fundamentally determined by Aristotle's critique of Plato's theory of general ideas separated from sensible singulars. Although Aristotle's critique based on the premise of the existence of essence in the things themselves is regarded as the point of

1. In the texts of Second Scholasticism 12th century authors are much less represented.

departure by the majority of medieval scholastics, the Stagirite's own solution to the ontological issue of the extramental foundation of common concepts and terms, as the *Corpus Aristotelicum* makes entirely clear, is full of Platonic relics rendering Aristotle's teaching scarcely consistent.² Apart from this procreative tension inherent in the ontological core of the topic, the Stagirite's statements on universals are also important because they consider the various definitions of the fully-fledged or the logical universal viewed by Aristotelians as the final point in the formation of the universal. Despite the problem-driven character of philosophical analysis in Second Scholasticism, not dissimilar to that of contemporary analytical philosophy, these Aristotle's formulations became an important referential frame for post-medieval scholastic discussions as they had been for medieval authors. Apart from this ambivalent legacy of Aristotle's teaching, mediated to medieval scholasticism chiefly by Porphyry's *Isagoge*³ and Boethius's two editions of *In Isagogen Porphyrii commentorum*,⁴ the *status quaestionis* in postmedieval scholasticism was also determined by Avicenna's doctrine of the indifference of essence,⁵ conceived by the Arabian philosopher as being independent of universality. This doctrine, again in virtue of its (fertile) ambiguity, incited various interpretations of the common nature and essence starting from the 13th century up to the early modern authors of the 18th century. It may be summed up that the ontological issue of universals in Second Scholasticism cannot be fully appreciated without taking into account Aristotle's formulations indicating the doctrinal tension in his ontologico-logical doctrine and without a brief characterization of Avicenna's doctrine of the nature, which from the 13th century on can be considered as the "place" crystallizing minds and schools.

2. On this thesis see for instance De Libera 1996, especially the sub-chapter "L'incohérence de l'aristotélisme ou d'une ambiguïté destinale", 29–34.

3. One, of course, has in mind Porphyry's unanswered questions whether genera and species are real or situated in bare thoughts alone, whether as real they are bodies or incorporeals and whether they are separated or immanent to sensibles and have their reality in connection with them, which largely determined the medieval and also postmedieval scholastic debates. See Porphyrius, *Commentaria in Aristotelem graeca. Pars prima: Porphyrii Isagoge et in Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium*, Chapter 1, 1a9–14 (Berlin 1887). On the systematic Platonic background in Aristotle's conception see De Libera 1996, 34–41.

4. It is especially Boethius's conception of abstraction, according to which the mind is capable of considering things in a manner different from that in which they exist. By abstraction the intellect is able to form universality, even though formal universality does not exist in the thing. See Boethius, *In Isagogen Porphyrii commenta*, § 11 (Vienna/Leipzig 1906, 164–167).

5. Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina V–X, Tractatus quintus: Capitulum de rebus communibus et quomodo est esse earum* (Louvain/Leiden 1980, 227–245).

One of the most quoted texts regarding the definition of *universale* can be found in Aristotle's logical treatise *On interpretation*, where he says: "Of things there are some universal and some individual or singular, I mean, as their nature is such that they can or they cannot be predicates of numerous subjects, as 'man', for example, and 'Callias'."⁶ Assuredly, Aristotle's reference to "things" (*hekaston*) is not evidence, to use a paradoxical expression, of Aristotle's Aristotelianism. If universals were things, how could they be predicated? This thing-like interpretation of universals is confirmed in the classical text of *Categories*, where Aristotle speaks about species and genera as about secondary substances: "But we *do* speak of secondary substances – those within which, being species, the primary or first are included, and those within which, being genera, the species themselves are contained."⁷ However, a couple of lines before that formulation in his exposition of the so-called ontological square Aristotle states as follows: "... you can predicate some of a subject, but they never are present in one. You can predicate 'man', for example, of this or that man as the subject, but man is not found in a subject."⁸ If "man" does not inhere in a subject and – contrary to primary substances, which do not inhere and are not predicated of subjects – it is predicable of this or that man, it is difficult to see in which sense the species "man" can be a thing. It is well-known that Aristotle's formulations are not entirely compatible with his statements from *Metaphysics*. In the 13th chapter of *Metaphysics Z* the Stagirite says as follows: "For it seems impossible that any universal term can be substance. First, the substance of an individual is the substance which is peculiar to it and belongs to nothing else; whereas the universal is common; for by universal we mean that which by nature appertains to several things."⁹ In *On the Soul* he is quite explicit in his claim about the non-extramental character of universals: "This is because actual sensation is of particulars, whereas knowledge is of universals; these in a sense exist in the soul itself."¹⁰ Similar tension can be observed even within one formulation from *Posterior Analytics*: "And experience, that is the universal when established as a whole in the soul – the One that corresponds to the Many, the unity that is identically present in them all – provides the starting-point of art and science ..."¹¹ From this quotation one can learn, on the one hand, that the

6. Aristoteles, *On Interpretation*, 17a39–b2 (Cambridge, Massachusetts/London 1938, 125).

7. Aristoteles, *Categories*, 2a13–15 (Cambridge, Massachusetts/London 1938, 19).

8. Ibidem, 1a20–23 (Cambridge, Massachusetts/London 1938, 15).

9. Aristoteles, *Metaphysics*, 1038b9–12 (Cambridge, Massachusetts/London 1933, 377).

10. Aristoteles, *On the Soul*, 417b22–24 (Cambridge, Massachusetts/London 1936, 99–101).

11. Aristoteles, *Posterior Analytics*, 100a7–10 (Cambridge, Massachusetts/London 1960, 259).

universal is in the soul, on the other, however, that it exists extramentally as being identical in the many. Moreover, this formulation is also at odds with the definition of *universale* from *De interpretatione*. The essence of the universal is defined by two aspects – “being in” (*esse in*) and “being said of” (*dici de*). However, as Aristotle’s two formulations from the *Organon* make clear, the Stagirite was far from clear about their exact distribution. While in *On Interpretation* we learn that the definition of *universale* consists in “being said of” (*dici de*) or, more precisely, in the potential (aptitudinal) “being said”, in *Posterior Analytics* the emphasis is laid on the “being in”, i.e., on the actual presence of the one in the many. Thus it may be concluded that Aristotle’s legacy, as received by medieval scholasticism, is not free of ambiguities both *in puncto* of the ontology of universals and the definition of the fully-fledged universal.

Important historical disambiguation of the notion of *universale* comes from two well-known sources. The first is the distinction, formulated probably by the Neoplatonist Ammonios Hermeiou (about 440–517), between universal *ante rem*, universal *in re* and universal *post rem*.¹² Roughly speaking, it may be said that this distinction accommodated both Plato’s (universal *ante rem*) and Aristotle’s (universal *in re* or universal *post rem*) teaching. The second is connected with the above-mentioned distinction between universality and essence, originally introduced by Alexander of Aphrodisias (2nd–3rd c. BC),¹³ and later developed by Avicenna. In order to make sense of Aristotle’s assertions, we have to conceive universality only as an accidental modification of the nature as such. Nature or essence in itself thus can be constituted only by essential (quidditative) predicates. The properties universality/singularity and unity/plurality can accede to it only from outside as its “accidents”.¹⁴ The procreative ambivalence in Avicenna’s statement was caused mainly by the claim that although this essence, the immediate referent of our common concepts (terms), does not have any unity, it possesses its proper being (*esse proprium*), which is ontologically prior to singulars.¹⁵ This asymmetry between being and unity, implausible for authors of the Latin medieval tradition, became important for 13th century authors who *either* started to ascribe some unity to the essence, *or* inclined to deny it had any being, which

12. See Wöhler 1992, “Nachwort. Zur Geschichte des Universalienstreites”, 320–321.

13. See above all Tweedale 1984.

14. Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina* V–X, 228: “Equinitas etenim habet definitionem quae non eget universalitate, sed est cui accidit universalitas. Unde ipsa equinitas non est aliquid nisi equinitas tantum; ipsa enim in se nec est multa nec unum, nec est existens in his sensibilibus nec in anima ...”

15. Ibidem, 233–234.

consequently led *either* to the ontological, *or* the epistemological interpretation of Avicenna's dictum.¹⁶

The web of sub-issues

Medieval and postmedieval scholasticism share not only the ontological nucleus of the issue of universals but also an array of sub-issues revolving around this ontological core.¹⁷ Because of the enormous complexity of the question of universals, which, as Alain de Libera notes, makes this problem a problem full of problems (*un problème saturé*),¹⁸ the related topics present problems and sub-problems pertaining to many philosophical and theological disciplines. Apart from ontology and logic (semantics and semiotics), it is also epistemology (or cognitive psychology), natural philosophy and theology, both natural theology in case of divine cognition and revealed theology of the Trinitarian doctrine in case of the commonality of divine essence to the three Divine Persons. The valuable contribution of the second scholastics is that they picked out all those issues, treated by medieval scholastics often dispersedly and fragmentarily in largely theological contexts, and put them in systematic order framed by the tight textual interrelatedness within the all-comprising *Cursus philosophici*.

Not surprisingly, the crucial bunch of problems complementary to the ontological issue of universals is connected with the notions of *individuality* and *individuation*. *Universale* as what can be communicated, shared, multiplied, exemplified or instantiated can be defined only in opposition to the non-communicable, non-sharable, non-exemplifiable singulars. Accordingly, in medieval scholasticism the issue of universals was often treated together with or within the immediate context of enquiry into the principle of individuation. The doctrine of universals constituted either the starting point for the ensuing ontological treatment of individuation (in Duns Scotus's elaboration¹⁹), or a short (more or less useless) appendix to a treatise on universals (as in the texts of nominalists who considered the issue to be a pseudoproblem). Not differently from the ontological or physical treatment of individuation (in fact, if substantial matter or quantity is designated as the principle of individuation, then the issue of the principle of individuation is a question pertaining rather to natural philosophy than to metaphysics), the

16. On these two different interpretations see Owens 1971. See also Honnefelder 1984, 495. Regarding the medieval context of Avicenna's philosophical "discovery" see Klima 2003. Concerning the ontological and epistemological interpretation of Avicenna see Pini 2004.

17. As regards this metaphor see Galluzzo 2008.

18. De Libera 1996, 11–65.

19. See Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* II, dist. 3, p. 1, q. 1 (ed. Vat. VII, 391–516).

epistemological issue – both on the level of intellectual and sensory cognition of material singulars and universals – also epitomizes the related bundle of sub-issues closely affiliated to the central ontological problem. The complexity of the epistemological question of the formation of universality fundamentally based on the notion of abstraction and cognition of material singulars becomes even greater if one takes into account the fact that the questions of *cognitio singularis* and *cognitio universalis* were in scholasticism often addressed in connection with the problem of the *primum cognitum*, i.e., whether the knowledge of singulars is prior to the apprehension of universals or vice versa.²⁰

Apart from the broad complex of issues related to the aspects of individuality and individuation, another important query concerns the question of *definition* and its *parts*. It is well-known that a definition spells out the content of the *universale*, in case of the specific definition dividing it into its parts, i.e., genus and specific difference. One important assumption inherent in the peripatetic traditions and “domesticated” chiefly in Thomism, is the premise that the categorial concepts (the so-called predicables) have a foundation in the thing, in the hylemorphic principles. In what sense can then those predicables be said to be taken from those principles? What is meant when it is said that genus is taken from the matter of a material substance and the specific difference from its form? At first glance, it is clear that those statements cannot be meant literally. Genus and difference must be considered as a whole because they are actually predicated of their subject. They cannot be thought of as parts because parts are never predicated of the whole. But matter and form *are* two physical principles composing a material substance. Consequently, not speaking of immaterial substances such as angels, it seems clear that the predicables cannot literally be taken from the individual physical parts but must be related to them only analogically.²¹ Even though some, especially the Scotists, replace this hylemorphic foundation in the thing with the metaphysical composition “common nature/haecceity” being distinct by formal distinction,²² the Thomists retain this hylemorphic foundation as the key extramental foundation for our concept-formation.

Besides the sub-issues classifiable under the notion of cognitive psychology analyzing the mechanism of a cognitive act with its principles and terms, an important part of the second scholastic debates follows the bulk of problems

20. Concerning the replies and solutions to the above-mentioned questions and problems in medieval scholasticism and partly in the postmedieval one as well see especially Bérubé 1964.

21. See also Galluzzo 2008.

22. As it shall be made clear, the general theory of distinctions constitutes one of the most important backdrops of the ontology of universals as well.

concerning the question of *intentionality* or, more precisely, of the fact how and why our concepts can be *about* extramental things. In this context, where the subject matter is the so-called *universale in repraesentando*, the notions of formal concept (*conceptus formalis*), which is the cognitive act by which things are apprehended, and objective concept (*conceptus objectivus*), the thing *qua* apprehended, are of the utmost importance, taken as both first and second intentions. While first intentions signify objects in their own right, i.e., independently of human thought, second intentions are based on previous notions and signify them only insofar as they are cognized. The thematic bunch connected with intentionality is important also for ontological reasons. Are first intentions beings of reasons (*entia rationis*), or real beings (*entia realia*)? How are we to ontologically evaluate second intentions with universality at the cutting edge? Do they have only intentional being in the mind, or can they be also somehow regarded as existing independently of the intellect's negotiation?²³

Apart from inquiries into intentionality or the ontology of intentions, another important part of the problems related to the issue of universals is linked also to *theological* considerations of the *universale ante rem*. When essence as such has its proper being (as Avicenna says) prior to the being of the singular, what is its relation to the divine idea, which is the *exemplar* of divine production? Can it be said that the assumption of the *universale ante rem* eliminates the need for the *universale in re*? If so, how can the human intellect reach its cognition? What is the ontological status of the *universale ante rem*? What is its relation to possible being and to essential being (*esse essentiae*)? How can one establish the very possibility of those essences?²⁴ Moreover, the problematic of universals in theology is not limited only to the matter of essential beings and exemplary causality but pops up also in the context of the Trinitarian dogma. The Trinitarian tenet stating that the numerically one divine essence is instantiated by three divine persons (supposits) strongly evokes comparison with the instantiation of human nature in Peter, Paul, etc. Can ontological treatment of the community of created human nature be somehow inspired by the Trinitarian model? Or is this type of community entirely irrelevant to metaphysical exploration of common natures *in creatis*?²⁵

23. On the different models of intentionality in medieval scholasticism see Perler 2002.

24. For a quick overview of representative medieval conceptions of divine ideas see Renemann 2010b, 17–58.

25. As regards the non-applicability of the Trinitarian model to the issue of universals in Aquinas see Borgo 2007. As regards the application of the model of the divine essence to the ambit of created substances in patristic authors see Cross 2002. For a historical and systematic introduction to the issue of universals see also Heider 2012c.

1.2 Historical context: Thomism, Nominalism, Jesuit philosophy and Scotism

Postmedieval scholasticism (academic philosophy) or Second Scholasticism²⁶ is dated by historians approximately from 1500 till the first half of the 18th century when the Thomistic bastion at the Benedictine university in Salzburg still manifested apparent signs of intellectual activity.²⁷ Even though its beginnings are commonly associated with the Hispanic Thomism of the School of Salamanca, namely with authors such as Francisco de Vitoria (1486–1546) and Domingo de Soto (1495–1560), its ideological roots can be traced back to the non-Hispanic Renaissance Thomism of Italian provenance represented by the works of Dominicans such as Tommaso de Vio, known as Cajetan (1468–1534), or Chrisostomus Javellus (1470–1538). Both are known not only as authors of commentaries on Aquinas's *Summa Theologiae* but also because of their shorter systematical treatises such as *De nominum analogia* (Cajetan) and *De transcendentalibus* (Javellus),²⁸ which in their all-embracing form were to become the typical genre of philosophical and theological production in the first decades of the 17th century. An important factor of the constitution of postmedieval scholasticism, nevertheless, is not only Renaissance Thomism, which took its profile predominantly vis-à-vis the doctrinal

26. I prefer to use these two labels with the variation of the word scholastic/academic philosophy because both are sufficiently extensive to cover the whole period from 1500 up to the first half of the 18th century. In case I want to specify this period, I will use a temporal determination such as “the first half of the 17th century”. When employing the designation “Second scholasticism” I do not have in mind the ideologically-laden meaning introduced by Carlo Giacon. For Giacon the expression “first scholasticism” basically signified the 13th century – the Golden Age of scholasticism – reaching its climax with Aquinas, which in the 14th century was followed by the unwelcome Scotistic decline. Analogously, Second scholasticism, then, was to mean above all the 16th century Thomism represented by the School of Salamanca culminating in Suárez, who was regarded as one of the (though obviously unorthodox) Thomists. For this exposition see Giacon 1946. I shall not use the labels “Renaissance scholasticism”, “Baroque scholasticism”, “Early modern scholasticism”, “Late medieval philosophy”, either, partly because they are temporally too restrictive, partly because they are straightly misleading. For an interesting discussion of the labels of the period see Novotný 2009, 212–218 and Forlivesi 2006a, 106–110.

27. For a detailed exposition of the philosophy (especially metaphysics) of the *Salzburgenses* see Bauer 1996.

28. Cajetan's Commentary to Aquinas's *Summa Theologiae* (being a part of the Leonina edition) was published in 1508 (I), 1511 (I–II), 1517 (II–II) and 1522 (III) in Venice. The systematical treatise *De nominum analogia* came out in Pavia in 1498. Javellus, a less known Thomist, drew up only a commentary to the *Prima pars* of the *Summa* published in Venice in 1588. His systematical treatise on the transcendental properties *De transcendentalibus* was published in 1555. For an analysis of this important treatise in its relation to Suárez's doctrine of transcendentals see Heider 2012b.

challenge represented by the Scotism of authors such Antonio Trombetta (1436–1517) and jointly with reaction to secular Aristotelianism inspired by the strong Averroist current.²⁹ It is also the nominalizing eclecticism exemplified by the figure of John Major (1467/9–1550) and his colleagues/students at the famous Collège of Montaigu in Paris in the lead with Thomists such as Peter Crockaert (ca. 1465–1514) and Juan de Celaya (1490–1558), who was later to become the teacher of Francisco de Vitoria. It is not historically inappropriate to say that the conciliatory attitude to nominalism, no doubt the result of humanist critique of scholasticism in general, which was apparent in the works of the early second scholastics such as Domingo de Soto,³⁰ is historically conditioned by the performance of Major and his school.³¹

Except for Pedro Fonseca (1528–1599) – the author of the monumental four-volume work *Commentariorum in libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae*,³² which, according to Fonseca's intention, was to serve as the first part of the *Curso Conimbricense* (commentaries to the complete *Corpus Aristotelicum*),³³ who was significantly influenced by Scotism and strong realism more than any other of the early Jesuits,³⁴ this conciliatory attitude to nominalism can be observed also

29. In this context I have in mind especially Pietro Pomponazzi (1462–1525) and his interpretation of Aristotle's *De anima*, in which the author endorses the thesis of the non-demonstrability of the immortality of the human soul (being the issue of Renaissance philosophy) by natural reason. For an edition of this text see Pietro Pomponazzi, *Tractatus de immortalitate animae: Abhandlung über die Unsterblichkeit der Seele* (Hamburg 1990). It is well-known that at the end of his career Cajetan also rejected such demonstrability by comparing the issue of the immortality of the human soul to the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation. See Fraile 1978, 399–400. For Suárez's critical reaction to Pomponazzi see South 2012 and Heider 2011c.

30. Domingo Soto, *In Porphyrii Isagogen, Aristotelis Categorias, librosque de Demonstratione commentaria* (Venice 1587; reprint: Frankfurt 1967, 28): "Quo circa qui inter Nominales nati sumus, interque Reales nutriti ..."

31. Concerning this claim see also Caruso 1979, 19–24. As regards Major and his followers see Broadie 1985.

32. *Commentaria in libros metaphysicorum Aristotelis* (vol. I–II, Rome 1577; vol. III, Cologne 1604; vol. IV, Lyon 1612).

33. The series of the *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis e Societate Iesu*, realized by Manuel de Góis (1543–1597), Baltasar Álvares (1561–1630), Cosmas de Magalhães (1551–1624) and Sebastião do Couto (1567–1639), comprises the following commentaries: *In octos libros Physicorum* (1591), *Parva Naturalia* (1592), *De Caelo* (1592), *Meteororum* (1592), *De generatione et corruptione* (1597), *De anima* (1598), *Tractatus de anima separata* (1598), *Tractatio aliquot problematum ad quinque sensus spectantium*, *In universam dialecticam Aristotelis* (1606). On the genesis of those texts, initiated by Jerónimo Nadal (1507–1580), the Vicar General of the Jesuit Order, see Martins 2006.

34. Concerning the strong realism of Fonseca see Menn 1997.

among the first members of the Society of Jesus, who actually can be regarded as the key inaugurators of Second Scholasticism. Even though Second Scholasticism was “officially” initiated by the Thomists of the School of Salamanca, who (with the important exception of Soto) were engaged predominantly in drawing up commentaries on the *practical* and *theological* parts of Aquinas’s *Summa Theologiae*, largely stimulated by the challenges of the discovery of the New World (the problem of the natural rights of Native Americans and the issue of international law became the “hot issues” of the period) and by the protestant *sola fides, sola Scriptura*,³⁵ the real breakthrough in theoretical philosophy (not speaking of the enormous Jesuit contribution concerning the theological issue of *De auxiliis* attempting to harmonize free human will with divine foreknowledge), influenced by the nominalizing eclecticism of Major’s school, came with members of the Society of Jesus such as Cardinal Francisco de Toledo (1534–1596).³⁶ This tendency, which had impact on Suárez’s metaphysics and epistemology, grew stronger in the post-Suarezian Jesuit generation represented by authors such as Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza (1578–1641), Rodrigo de Arriaga (1592–1667) and Francisco de Oviedo (1602–1651), who – unlike authors of the 16th century still drawing up commentaries on Aristotle’s writings or on Porphyry’s *Isagogé* – set out to present their philosophy in systematic manuals comprising all the theoretical philosophical disciplines (i.e., with the exception of ethics usually elaborated in a different work) called *Cursus philosophici*. Despite their veneration of Suárez – as Arriaga says: “Inter quos, ut et in ceteris materiis, longe altius extulit caput huius saeculi in Scholasticis Gigas Franciscus Suarez aureis illis duobus in metaphysicam tomis, quam alii postea gloriose imitati sunt”³⁷ – all those Jesuits not only substantially shifted Suarezianism in the direction of nominalism or, precisely speaking, of conceptualism, historically speaking, they were also one of the causes of the doctrinal fission within the Society of Jesus itself. Even though the Jesuits’ *Ratio studiorum* published in 1599 – the well-known statutes of education at Jesuit colleges and universities³⁸ – explicitly prescribe

35. See the systematic treatise on theological sources *De locis theologicis* (important for the reformation of the theological curriculum at universities) written by Melchior Cano (1509–1560), an advisor of the Council of Trent. About this text see Heider 2009, 22–23.

36. Franciscus Toletus, *Opera omnia philosophica* I–III: *Introductio in universam Aristotelis logicam* (Cologne 1615; reprint: Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 1985, 29): “Possunt autem omnes opiniones [those of nominalists, moderate realists and Platonists; D.H.] ex parte quadam conciliari ...”

37. Rodrigo de Arriaga, *Cursus philosophicus, Praefatio ad lectorem* (Paris 1639).

38. For a general overview of the Jesuit’s *Ratio studiorum* see Koláček 2006 and Heider 2009, 32–35.

Aristotle and Aquinas as the two key authorities in philosophy and theology,³⁹ the creeping influence of nominalism constituted an invariable of Jesuit philosophizing. It is not surprising that this doctrinal and methodological constellation led, *inter alia*, to the strongly conceptualizing interpretations of Aquinas's philosophy in Hurtado de Mendoza's exposition.⁴⁰ No wonder that in the first half of the 17th century the doctrinal division of Jesuits into Thomists represented by Thomas Compton Carleton (1591–1666) and the above-mentioned nominalizing Jesuits, critical of all sorts of moderate realism, became a historical fact.⁴¹

It was not only nominalism originally imported from Major's school to Second Scholasticism but also Scotism that must be regarded as an important doctrinal factor in the constitution of the philosophical orientation of Jesuit philosophy in the 16th and 17th century. The significance of Scotus's philosophy, largely due to the coexistence of chairs dedicated to a specific speculative orientation at the faculties of theology, most frequently *in via Thomae* and *in via Scoti*, is evident also in Suárez's metaphysics and epistemology. With a slight exaggeration it can be said that Scotism in the second half of the 16th century is represented, apart from Fonseca, mainly by Suárez's philosophy. Nevertheless, if the second half of the 16th century is not the strongest period in the history of Scotism, the situation in the 17th century is quite the reverse. The Jesuit school with its nominalizing orientation, the progressive line of the Jesuits, who were up to the scientific standards in natural sciences and widely open to modern philosophy and science in general,⁴² and the Thomism endorsed by Dominicans (headed by Francisco de Araújo (1580–1664), professor at the *Cathedra de prima* in Salamanca in 1621–1648, and Ioannes a Sancto Thoma, by civilian name João Poinset, Benedictines (besides the *Salzburgenses* especially José Sáenz de Aguirre /1630–1699/) and Discalced Carmelites (the most well-known are the so-called *Complutenses* from the College

39. Claude Pavur, *The Ratio Studiorum. The Official Plan for Jesuit Education* (Saint Louis 2005, 99): "In rebus alicuius momenti ab Aristotele non recedat, nisi quid incidat a doctrina, quam academiae ubique probant alienum; multo magis, si orthodoxae fidei repugnet"; *ibidem*, 100–101: "Contra vero de Sancto Thoma nunquam non loquatur honorifice, libentibus illum animis, quoties oportet, sequendo; aut reverter et gravate, si quando minus placeat, deserendo". See also Ariew 1992, 63–69.

40. Concerning the nominalization or conceptualization of Aquinas by Hurtado see Heider 2010b.

41. Caruso 1979, 81–99.

42. For the development of various streams (conservative, semi-conservative and progressive) within the Society of Jesus in the 17th century see Jansen 2004.

of St. Cyril in Alcalá de Henares, the *Complutum*⁴³) all no doubt constituted important scholastic force in the intellectual life of the 17th century. However, speculative superiority, detail of analysis, strength of argument, overall number of protagonists,⁴⁴ and – last but not least – manifest (though largely mediated) influence on the canonical early modern philosophy, represented by authors such as René Descartes,⁴⁵ were on the side of the Scotists.

Even though signs of Scotistic revival are noticeable already at the beginning of the 17th century,⁴⁶ the extraordinary blossoming of Scotism was mainly caused by two decisive factors in the first decades of the 17th century. The first was the defamation of Duns Scotus published by the Polish Dominican Abraham Bzovius (1567–1637), the author of nine volumes devoted to church history called *Annales ecclesiastici*. Advancing the work on the *Annales* after Cardinal Cesare Baronius (1538–1607), Bzovius presented the worst legends about Scotus's life and character, that he was buried alive, was of quarrelsome character, was a sophist, etc. Predictably, this denigration provoked apologetic reactions from aggrieved Franciscans. Among the most famous apologies belongs *Apologia pro Joanne Duns Scoto vindicando ab injuriis allatis per Abrahamum Bzovium* composed by the well-known Irish Franciscan Hugh Cavellus or McCaghwell (15171–1626). The second impulse was the popularity of the theological tenet of the Immaculate

43. The so-called *Complutenses* are authors of commentaries on Aristotle's *Logica* (Alcalá 1624), *Physica* (Alcalá 1625), *De generatione et corruptione* (Madrid 1627) and *De anima* (Madrid 1628). The author of *Logica* is Michael a SS. Trinitate (1588–1661), the other three were written by Antonius a Matre Dei (1583–1637). A couple of years later *Metaphysica*, composed in 1640 by Blasius a Conceptione (1603–1694), was added to the series. This series can also be well understood as a Thomistic counterpart to the Jesuit series of the *Collegium Conimbricense*. Concerning this Carmelite series see Risse, "Vorwort", in: *Complutenses Discalceati, Disputationes in Aristotelis dialecticam*, Lyons 1668 (reprint: Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 1977, v–vii).

44. Concerning this statement of Juan Caramuel y Lobkowitz (1606–1682) see Bak 1956.

45. On Scotistic influence on Descartes, among others, see Ariew 1999. For many Scotistic antecedents of the Cartesian notion *realitas objectiva* see especially Marrone 2008. Worth seeing is old but still valid Dalbiez 1929.

46. The following significant events can be mentioned: in 1586 the Franciscan Juan de Rada (ca. 1545–1608) released his influential *Controversiae theologicae inter S. Thomam et Scotum* in Salamanca; in 1587 the Pope Sixtus V. (1585–1590) founded the College of St. Bonaventure famous as *Collegio Sistino*; in 1602 the Conventual Filippo Fabri (1564–1630) set out his systematic *Philosophia naturalis I. Duns Scoti ex quatuor libris sententiarum et quodlibetis collecta* (published together with *Tractatus in formalitatibus emendatus et ampliatus*), which in the following 20 years was to live through five editions. For bio-bibliographical information on Fabri, an important Scotist of the turn of the 16th and 17th century, see Scapin 1976, 510; Jansen 1936, 150–152; Schmitt 1979 and Montanari 1883, 68–72.

Conception, of which Scotus was a resolute advocate.⁴⁷ One of the leading figures in this apologetic movement was the Irishman Luke Wadding (1588–1657), who studied in Coimbra and became rector of the Irish College in Salamanca in 1617. Studies of Scotus's theology and philosophy were especially stimulated by two Wadding's exploits. In 1618 Wadding founded the College of St. Isidore in Rome, where he assembled quite a large number of industrious collaborators recruited mainly from Ireland.⁴⁸ Apart from the well-known John Punch (1599 or 1603–1661), by the Latin name Poncius, it was mainly Anthony Hickey (1586–1641) and Francis Relly (d. 1651). However, by far the most important achievement was Wadding's publication of the first complete edition of *Opera omnia* of Duns Scotus in 12 volumes in Lyon in 1639, which made massive expansion of Scotus's philosophy and theology all over Europe and Latin America possible.⁴⁹

The overview of conservative scholastic intellectual currents at the end of the 16th and in the 17th century is not exhausted by the classification into Thomism, Scotism and Jesuit philosophy, comprising the influence of both schools and as well as elements of nominalism.⁵⁰ Nevertheless, compared to the above-mentioned three schools, the other speculative lines of thought appear like secondary stream-lets, which observed from afar are hardly noticeable. If we are to draw a representative picture of the scholastic discussion of the issue of universals at the end of the

47. On these two factors see Rivera de Ventosa, "§ 8. Der Scotismus", in: Schobinger 1998, 377–378. A detailed exposition of those two factors can be also found in Grajewski 1946, 58–61.

48. On the significance of Irish Scotism in the Scotist revival of the 17th century see Stone 2009. On Irish Scotists at St. Isidore's College see Millett 1968.

49. Concerning Wadding's greatest achievement see Mooney 1958, 231–232. Jacob Schmutz remarks that his edition was one of the first attempts at a critical edition. See Schmutz 2002, 59. One of the greatest names of Latin-American colonial scholasticism is the Scotist Alfonso Briceño (1587–1668), born in Santiago de Chile, who spent most of his life in Peru. On Briceño see Pich 2012.

50. One cannot leave out the teaching of St. Bonaventure often introduced especially among the Capuchins in the lead with the Bohemian Valerian Magni (1586–1661) and his famous *De luce mentium et eius imagine ad contemplandam lucem increatam*. Regarding Magni's philosophy see Sousedik 2009, 114–139 and Sousedik 1983. The most renowned member of the order of Servites Angelus Ventura (d. 1738) in his *Magistri Fr. Henrici Gandavensis Philosophica Tripartitio doctrinarum et rationum* (1701) follows the philosophy of Henry of Ghent. Others look for inspiration in the streams of medieval philosophy claiming allegiance to Raymondus Lullus (ca. 1232–1315). Especially the Jesuit Athanasius Kircher (1602–1680) with his *Polygraphia nova et universalis ex combinatoria arte detecta* (Rome 1663) became famous for this orientation. Many of these authors were engaged with writing courses *Ad mentem S. P. Augustini* or *Ad mentem B. Aegidii Romani*. For a list of those authors and the titles of their works see Fraile 1978, 429–432 (Augustinianism), 438–439 (Bonaventurianism), 470–473 (Lullism).

16th and at the beginning of the 17th century, the selected representatives must not be taken from those lateral “tributaries” but from the three main streams. No doubt the most representative authors of those schools, as a wide range of secondary literature confirms,⁵¹ are the *Doctor Eximius*, the Jesuit *Francisco Suárez*, the Dominican and Thomist *Ioannes a S. Thoma* (further in the main text only *Poinsot*) and the *Princeps Scotistarum*, the Italian Conventual *Bartolomeo Mastri da Meldola* and his Sicilian collaborator *Bonaventura Belluto*.⁵²

1.3 Goal and methodology

The goal of this work is to *present*, *interpret* and *compare* the highly complex and systematic doctrines of universals of the above-mentioned representatives of the three central orientations in Second Scholasticism, presented not in the pure form of commentaries on Aristotle’s *Organon* or Porphyry’s *Isagogé* but in systematically elaborated texts dealing with ontological and epistemological (sub)issues of the *universalia*. Apart from metaphysical treatises the issue is often presented in the logical questions called *De universale in communi*. In the context of the ontological issue of universals, the main criterion of comparison will be the aspect of the *degree* and *character* of the extramental foundation of universal concepts. At the epistemological level, complementing the metaphysical plane, the enquiry is guided, above all, by the dichotomy *cognitio singularis/cognitio universalis*. It is concerned not only with *how* this or that cognition is realized, but also with the issue of the “chronology” of this or that type of cognition. In the logico-ontological context of the issues of the ontology of first and second intentions, the defining criterion is the doctrinal polarity “*rationalist* conceptualism/*realist* conceptualism”, supplemented by the psychologism peculiar to Hurtado de Mendoza’s doctrine. The investigation is regulated by the question of the ontological status of first and second intentions, i.e., whether they are to be assessed as real beings, or rather as beings of reason and if so, in which sense.⁵³

51. This representative selection is confirmed by Jansen 1936, 48: “... was die Disputationes metaphysicae des Suarez für die Jesuiten, später die vielberühmte *Cursus philosophicus* des Johannes a S. Thoma für die Thomisten waren, das bedeutet diese Sammlung [*Philosophiae ad mentem Scoti cursus integer*, D.H.] für die Franziskaner”. It is not surprising that also Sven Knebel bases his exposition of the entry on “Universalien” in *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie* on the theories of Suárez, Poinsot and Mastri/Belluto (see Knebel 2001b).

52. Their brief bio-bibliographies are presented below in the Appendix.

53. This polarity is viewed as the main criterion of comparison also in Hickman 1980.

Accordingly, overall emphasis will be placed on the ontological and epistemological facets of the broad issue commonly associated with the three kinds of universals at the level of the *universale in re* and the *universale post rem*, i.e., with the *universale in essendo*, the *universale in repraesentando* and the *universale in praedicando*.⁵⁴ As far as possible, I leave aside systematic enquiry into the *universale ante rem* usually connected, apart from divine ideas with their exemplary causality, with the *universale in causando* equivalent to a singular being(s) (God, heavenly bodies) having a plurality of heterogeneous effects. Because of the disproportionate distribution of logical texts in the philosophical production of the selected authors – due especially to the absence of logical texts or commentaries on Aristotle's *Organon* in Suárez⁵⁵ – the *universale in significando* and the different kinds of supposition, the treatment of which belonged in Second Scholasticism especially to the so-called *Summulae* called also *Logica minor* or *Dialectica* (corresponding to what we call today formal logic⁵⁶), is dealt with only peripherally.

54. The inclusion of *universale in praedicando* does not imply that apart from the first mental operation, i.e., the simple apprehension (*simplex apprehensio*), I shall equally delve into issues related to the second mental operation (*judicium*). Even though the conception of predication, no doubt, guides the overall character of the logical universal, predicability, let alone actual predication, is not usually considered to be the essence of the logical universal but only its property (*passio*). The dominant part of epistemological and logical analyses thus shall be enacted on the level of *simplex apprehensio*.

55. Concerning the destiny of Suárez's logical treatises, most likely written during his stay in Segovia in the first half of 1570s, see De Scorraile 1911, 1: 416. Suárez himself informs of his intention to draw up a logical treatise on predicables in *Disputationes metaphysicae*, disputation VI, section 8, n. 5 (Paris 1861, 233). Further I shall quote from this Paris's edition set out by L. Vivès in the following way: *DM* VI, s. 8, n. 5 /Vivès, vol. 25: 233/. This textual disproportion is also the reason why I leave aside specific questions dealing with the individual predicables such as genus, species and difference, such as the question of the predicable and subjectable (*subicibilis*) logical species of angelic natures, i.e., the issue whether there can be more numerical instances of the same angelic species and specifically different angels of the same genus. Regrettably, similar textual disparity afflicts also Poinso's textual *corpus*. It is well-known that his *Cursus philosophicus Thomisticus* does not contain a part on metaphysics. It may be argued that with respect to the goal of this book this disproportion is nothing else but fatal. Fortunately, that is not the case. Admittedly, as far as the ontology of universals is concerned, comparatively to Mastri/Belluto and Suárez, Poinso's *Logica major* is a fairly modest piece of work but it still includes the significant part *De universale in communi* devoted to the same ontological subissues as those treated in the metaphysical texts of Suárez and Mastri/Belluto.

56. For the tradition of logical treatises of postmedieval scholasticism were of significance mainly *Summulae* written by Domingo de Soto (came out first in 1529; the second edition was published in 1547). Compared to their medieval model – the *Summulae* of Peter of Spain – they are (especially in the author's second edition) substantially modified, systematized and shortened. For an exposition of this see Risse 1964, 329–332.

Salient attention is paid to detailed textual analysis of the ontological foundation of *categorial* predicates.⁵⁷ By focusing on categorial universals I intend to lay aside the issue of the disposition of transcendental predicates going beyond the highest *genera*. The solution to this issue is mentioned only for the sake of illustration of the general theory of distinctions and for doctrinal contrast with the categorial universals. Of the bundle of categorial universals I deal primarily with *substantial monadic* predicates constituting the essence or quiddity of a *material* substance. The focus on mundane material universals, again, does not mean that I ignore analysis of the issue in the application to immaterial substances such as angels or God. Equally, the treatise on *monadic* substantial predicates does not entirely exclude the relative predicates from our field of vision. Not only is the relation of similarity, as it were, the ontological milieu in which the ontology of universals is firmly rooted, the notion of the fully-fledged universal itself is actually essentially relational. That makes clear that the issue of relation constitutes an important element in the complex issue of universals.

The upshot of the comparative study should be a *differentiated* picture of the various kinds of theories of the issue of universals within the doctrinal frame of moderate realism, which can be preliminary defined by the assumption of the so-called objective precision (*praecisio objectiva*).⁵⁸ It is beyond all question that this task can best be realized in the context of the second scholastic discussions standing at the peak of the long scholastic tradition, for which doing philosophy was basically of systematic character. The promising nature of this enterprise is underlined by the fact that there was both obvious continuation and progressive critical reactions to the above-mentioned three (four) authors. Not only are they the typical and key representatives of their schools, the historical sequence Suárez–Poinsoot–Mastri/Belluto, in which they are presented, makes clear that while Poinsoot, deeply influenced by Suárez, critically reacts to Suárez,⁵⁹ Mastri/

57. Categorial predicates were also the original context of the treatment of universals. Porphyry's *Isagoge* is an introduction to Aristotle's *Categories*, not to *Metaphysics*.

58. By the objective precision I mean the intellectual separation of two predicates in the way that one predicate (*rational*), or rather its counterpart *in re* can be cognized *without* the formal and immediate cognition of the other (*animal*). Especially in 2.6 I develop this definition when comparing the theories of Suárez and Hurtado de Mendoza.

59. As for Poinsoot's excellent knowledge of Suárez, cf. Beatus Reiser, "Editoris Praefatio", in: Ioannes a S. Thoma, *Cursus philosophicus Thomisticus* (further *CPT*), vol. 1 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, xi). Poinsoot's extraordinary knowledge of Suárez's philosophy is also confirmed by the no less excellent knowledge of Joseph Gredt (1863–1940). Gredt's familiarity is not incidental if one takes into account that his *Elementa Philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomisticae* are (apart from the work of Cajetan, the *Complutenses* and the *Salzburgenses*) largely based on Poinsoot's

Belluto critically respond both to Poinsoť and in depth and almost congenially to Suárez, by whom they were also strongly influenced.⁶⁰ This continuity, showing that the history of philosophy is not only a collection of disparate opinions craving for originality, also manifests that Suárez is not conceived in this work (as it is often the case) as “the last” or “a very late scholastic” but rather as “the first scholastic” of a venerable scholastic tradition in the 17th century. Accordingly, the method used in the book can be pointedly called “the accumulative method”. I proceed cumulatively so that my comparison will become more complex every time I pick up a new author and a new doctrine on the way to the final comparison and evaluation.

Although the comparative task will be of primary significance, the historical dimension cannot and will not be neglected. While the *objectum formale* of the enquiry in the theories of Poinsoť and Mastri/Belluto will be determined by the “projection screen” of Suárez’s (and Poinsoť’ŝ) standpoint – particularly in the interpretation of Mastri’s/Belluto’s theory that viewpoint will give us an important methodological guideline necessary for sailing the ocean of the doctrines, opinions and arguments found in their enormously detailed exposition –, the Jesuit’s theory will be exposed, at least basically, in the context of the classical medieval and renaissance scholastic *auctoritates* such as Aquinas, Scotus, Cajetan and Fonseca. Apart from this historical context, in order to distinguish Suárez’s theory from what can be called pure conceptualism of the post-Suarezian Jesuit philosophy of the first half of the 17th century, I *ex professo* also introduce the metaphysical conception of universals of the post-Suarezian Jesuit Hurtado de Mendoza (2.6). The doctrine of this “Father of modern scholastic conceptualism” will serve as the negative complement showing the borders of moderate realism as such.

Each chapter is structured by a “from bottom to top” grid. This procedure copies another commonly shared division into the threefold universal corresponding to the individual phases of the “actualization” of the universal nature, which begins with the ontological foundation determined by the particularized natures or the potential universal (*universale in potentia*) via the abstracted (absolute) nature to the logical (relational) universal usually designated as *universale in actu*. This division intersects with two other above-mentioned divisions into *universale in re/universale post rem* and *universale in essendo/universale in repraesentando/universale*

Cursus. It is also not incidental that Beatus Reiser, the editor of Poinsoť’ŝ *Cursus*, was Gredt’s student. Cf. Martin Walter, “Einleitende Bemerkungen”, *CPT*, vol. 1, xviii. Concerning Suárez’s influence on Poinsoť see also Pereira 2007, 156–171.

60. This also points to the non-individualistic and non-self-referential way of doing philosophy among the scholastics of the era, which was produced with regard to teaching in large communities and institutions. For this aspect of Second scholasticism see Blum 1998, 253–262 and Novotný 2009, 225–226.

in praedicando, with which it is almost identical. This phasing will enable us to pick out and gradually analyze in a well-ordered manner all the important aspects of the complex issue of universals cohering with other aspects of the philosophical systems (including the broad context of cognitive psychology) of the authors compared, leading from the ontology of universals based on the enquiry into the *in re* foundation, *via* the psychology and epistemology of the absolute universal acquired by the abstractive act of the intellect, *up to* the respective character of the logical universal characterized by predicability.

1.4 State of research

Despite the long and extensive research on the issue of universals in medieval scholasticism spearheaded by De Libera's comprehensive *La querelle des universaux* and the booming scholarship in the field, the literature on the issue of universals is meager. Above all, there is *no* monograph inquiring into the *comparative* analysis of the *complex* issue of universals in Second Scholasticism. Admittedly, there is a fine publication by Ester Caruso called *Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza e la rinascita del nominalismo nella Scolastica del Seicento* dealing with the issue of universals in the scholasticism of the 16th and 17th century. For all its merits, it treats the issue neither in its complexity nor comparatively, i.e., with the same attention devoted to all the authors compared. As the title suggests, Caruso's book presents the conceptualist theory of universals of Hurtado de Mendoza in the scholastic context of not only medieval nominalists such as William Ockham (ca. 1287–1347), Gregory of Rimini (ca. 1300–1358), Gabriel Biel (ca. 1425–1495) and of the pseudo-Aquinas's treatises *De universalibus*, but also of later authors and schools such as Cajetan, the Collège de Montaigu (with John Major and his followers), Domingo de Soto and the Jesuits including Francisco Toledo, Pedro Fonseca, Antonio Rubio (1548–1615), the *Conimbricenses* and Suárez. The significance of Hurtado's theory is shown both in his immediate positive influence on the Jesuits such as Arriaga,⁶¹ Oviedo and Antonio Bernardo de Quirós (1613–1668) and less on Sebastián Izquierdo (1601–1681),⁶² the Cistercian Juan Caramuel y Lobkowitz (1606–1682) and also in the critical reactions (Thomas Compton Carleton) it provoked. The overall emphasis on the nominalist tradition that at the end of the 17th century proved to be largely the winning force especially in

61. Arriaga's theory of universals, interpreted as a radicalization of Hurtado's theory toward sensualism, is presented in Sousedík 1998 and 2009, 88–96.

62. Concerning Izquierdo's theory see Di Vona 1994, 253–266 and Novotný 2012.

extra-scholastic philosophy,⁶³ however, entails some lacks in Caruso's publication as well. While Punch's theory (partly influenced by nominalism) is evaluated positively, the theory of Mastri/Belluto (called falsely Antonio⁶⁴), seen as of "un piú rigido atteggiamento",⁶⁵ gets a raw deal on mere two pages. The same holds also for Poinso's theory, which is seen as unoriginal and dealing only with fundamental elements suitable at most for undergraduate students.⁶⁶ Caruso's book cannot be called "a comparative study" since not only the doctrine of the two Scotists but also Suárez's doctrine and the theories of other authors (except that of Hurtado) are introduced briefly and unsystematically.

A relevant contribution to the issue constitutes the chapter *Universalien- und Distinktionlehre* in Emmanuel J. Bauer's book (having almost 900 pages) *Thomistische Metaphysik an der alten Benediktineruniversität Salzburg*, focusing on detailed exposition of the philosophical (especially metaphysical) production of the professors teaching at the Benedictine university in Salzburg in 1617–1742.⁶⁷ The book is important for our research especially because of doctrinal parallelism with Poinso's theory. The theories of orthodox Thomists, of which Ludwig Babenstuber (1660–1726) stands out, are in fact much like that of Poinso. Babenstuber's and other Thomists' teaching on universals are presented (apart from being directed against Platonism) as being of principally anti-Scotistic (often including also Fonseca), anti-Jesuit and anti-nominalist (often crossed with anti-Jesuit) orientation. Scotism is rejected by the deep-rooted dismissal of *distinctio formalis* considered either useless or even a contradictory item. Jesuit philosophy is found implausible because of its overall subjective rationalism or *Ich-philosophie* leading to undesirable modern philosophy fundamentally incompatible with Thomistic *Seinsphilosophie*. Bauer's explication of the doctrines of the *Salzburgenses* also casts important light on Suárez's doctrine, especially on his advocacy of the so-called *praecisio objectiva*,⁶⁸ which can be viewed as an important litmus paper of the doctrinal difference between moderate realism and nominalism (conceptualism). Although Bauer's exposé is focused on moderate realism and takes into account

63. Ignacio Angelelli quotes the opinion of Antoine Arnauld (1612–1694) and Pierre Nicole (1625–1695), representatives of the Port-Royal school, about the obsolescence of the *universale in essendo*. See Angelelli 1998, 296 and also Bolton 1998, 186.

64. Caruso 1979, 104.

65. Ibidem, 106.

66. Ibidem, 92–93.

67. See Bauer 1996, 116–193.

68. See also his conclusion "Der Salzburger Thomismus als philosophie-geschichtliches Phänomen", 735.

also other scholastic streams and authors, it cannot be called properly “a comparative study” either. In the centre of its attention stands Salzburg Thomism in its intrinsic continuity and dynamics of the 125-year long tradition supplemented by *Fragestellung* concerning the relation of the *Salzburgenses* to the genuine Aquinas (*Thomanische philosophie*).⁶⁹

Leaving aside a large number of titles (both books and articles) treating various aspects more or less connected with the complex issue of universals, which will be quoted *passim*, it may be said that the article production (again not large) dealing explicitly with the issue of universals in Second Scholasticism in the second half of the 16th and the first half of the 17th century can be roughly divided into two main categories. The first consists of articles on the theory of universals of Suárez. The majority are written from a Thomistic perspective viewing Suárez critically as a “shy” nominalist.⁷⁰ According to such interpretation, Suárez’s rejection of the universalizing abstraction of the agent intellect connected with the *primum cognitum* of a material singular grounded in the rejection of the material principle of individuation can lead to nothing else than to nominalism. Albeit quantitatively this kind of interpretation can be called majoritarian, it was also accompanied by a different viewpoint seeing Suárez less ideologically as “a renegade Thomist” and considering him more from the Augustinian perspective⁷¹ or on the basis of careful historical textual analysis compared with Aquinas⁷² or Ockham.⁷³ This last approach is of the significant help for getting a more differentiated picture of Suárez currently leading to a different evaluation of his teaching.

The second bunch of papers treats other second scholastics’ theories of universals. Significant research has been done on the “exotic” tenet of universals of Pedro Fonseca whose theory of unity of precision was sharply rejected not only by Suárez but as early as by his immediate colleagues and followers at the university in Coimbra. In the paper “The Coimbra Jesuits’ Doctrine on Universals (1577–1606)” Mário de Carvalho suggests that Fonseca’s philosophical divergences had been

69. Bauer 1996, 37. The same traits can be observed also in Ulrich Leinsle’s exposition of the *Disputationes* at the Swabian Jesuit University in Dillingen. See Leinsle 2006, 111–119. Contrary to the *Salzburgenses*, the theories of the *Dillinganes*, predictably, bear witness of the great doctrinal plurality within the Jesuit order.

70. See Mahieu 1921, 523; Manser 1934; Giacón 1941, 679–689; Peccorini 1972 and 1974. For a critique of Peccorini’s interpretation see Heider 2011d, 400–415. The nominalizing interpretation of Suárez’s teaching can be also found in Freddoso 1984; Mertz 2004, 130; Ross 1962; of recent ones see also Åkerlund 2009.

71. See Hoeres 1961; De Vries 1949; Roig 1961; Teixidor 1912.

72. See South 2002. The breakthrough work is the old but still valid Alejandro 1948.

73. Cf. Noreña 1981.

one of the reasons why by 1591 the “Portuguese Aristotle” was not involved any more in the long-term project of the Jesuits’ Coimbra *Course*, which he himself initiated and catalyzed by his *Metaphysics*. Sebastião do Couto, the author of the Course’s part *In Aristotelis Logicam* (1606), is shown as one of many authors who dismissed the conception of the *unitas praecisionis* as the kind of extramental unity.⁷⁴ Apart from the fine paper “Domingo de Soto on Universals and the Ontology of Intentions” written by Ria van der Lecq, discussing Soto’s synthesis of nominalism and realism,⁷⁵ there are some publications viewing Poinso’s theory of universals within the frame of his intensively researched semiotics. Poinso’s moderate realism is exposed as a realistic complement to his theory of signs largely elaborated in the *Tractatus de Signis* of his *CPT*.⁷⁶ Despite a number of publications on Mastri/Belluto’s philosophy (to mention, at least, the recent volume *Rem in seipsa cernere. Saggi sul pensiero di Bartolomeo Mastri* edited by Marco Forlivesi⁷⁷), interpretation of the Scotists’ extensive theory of universals is as yet undeveloped.⁷⁸ A brief but useful overview of Mastri’s/Belluto’s theory of universals is offered by the encyclopedic entry “Universalien” drawn up by Sven K. Knebel in the *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie* (Bd. 11: U–V).⁷⁹ Occasional references, especially to the Baroque Scotistic plurality in the issue of the community of common nature can be found in the oldish book *Die Lehre des Johannes Duns Scotus O.F.M. von der Natura communis* written by Johannes Kraus.⁸⁰

74. De Carvalho 2007, 538–539. Regarding Fonseca’s theory of universals see the old Uedelhofen 1916, 24–35; Menn 1997. See also the dissertation of Madeira 2006, 51–105. There are also many papers in Portuguese. See especially Abranches 1956.

75. Van der Lecq 2000; for Soto’s conception of universals see also Di Liso 2000, 269–278 and Svoboda 2012b.

76. See Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, vol. 1, *Artis Logicae Secunda Pars: Tractatus de Signis*, qq. 21–23 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 646–749). Apart from John Deely’s translation and detailed commentary on the treatise and his numerous other works (e.g. Deely 2008, 29–46), see also Rasmussen 1994 and Furton 1997. Cf. also the comprehensive and clear exposition in Meier-Oeser 1997, 213–235. There are also some, purely expository, papers such as Beuchot 1989 and Heider 2010a. For an exposé of Poinso’s doctrine of universals in the context of his theory of predication see Bondi 1966.

77. Of the papers included in the volume, sc. Renemann 2006, is of special relevance to the issue of universals.

78. One of a few exceptions is Heider 2010c, 2011e and Novák 2012.

79. Knebel 2001b.

80. Kraus 1927. Concerning the issue of the plurality of opinions in the school of Scotus in the Baroque Bohemia see also Sousedík 2005, 155–156.

Francisco Suárez (1548–1617) on universals

2.1 Universals in *Disputationes Metaphysicae* and *De Anima*

Francisco Suárez elaborates his theory of universals in the 6th disputation *De unitate formali et universali* of his two-volume *Metaphysical disputations*.⁸¹ The *DM VI* constitutes, in order, the second disputation in which the Jesuit takes up the issue of kinds of transcendental unity. The first one, i.e., *DM V* entitled *De unitate individuali et eiusque principio*,⁸² is concerned with the question of individual unity that – as compared to the other two kinds of unity – is regarded as ontologically privileged. Although it mainly focuses on the metaphysical aspect of the problematic, the epistemological (psychological) and logical topics regarding the ontology of logical intentions are taken into account as well. The issues of psychogenesis of universals and evaluation of various kinds of intentions are explicitly discussed also in *De anima* (further only *DA*) in the second part of the 3rd question *Utrum in rebus materialibus cognoscat intellectus noster singularia* of the 9th disputation.⁸³ Contrary to Scotus, whose treatment methodologically (even though not doctrinally) determines Suárez's procedure in *DM VI*, the Jesuit approaches the theme of universals only after having treated the convoluted issue of individual unity.⁸⁴ The methodological inversion of Scotus's key text concerning universals (*Ordinatio* 2.3.1),⁸⁵ having the existence of the common nature as its point of departure, clearly foreshadows the opposite setting and “tuning” of Suárez's theory.

Given the thematic orientation of Suárez's *DM VI*, I focus on the metaphysico-epistemological core of the query supplemented by an outline of the author's ontology of logical intentions. This thematic kernel can be found especially in the first

81. Francisco Suárez, *DM VI* (Vivès, vol. 25: 201–250).

82. *DM V* (Vivès, vol. 25: 145–201).

83. It is especially the block of paragraphs 12–30. I shall quote *De anima* from the following Salvador Castellote's critical edition: Francisco Suárez, *Commentaria una cum quaestionibus in libros Aristotelis “De anima”* available at URL: <http://www.salvadorcastellote.com/investigacion.htm>.

84. The above-mentioned complementarity of the issues of universality and individuality is also the reason why *DM V* will need to be considered as well.

85. Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* II, dist. 3, p. 1, q. 1 (ed. Vat. VII, 391–516).

six sections and partially also in the 7th and 8th section of the *DM VI*. Nevertheless, the issue of the so-called metaphysical parts (grades), i.e., the extramental counterparts of the predicates represented in the Tree of Porphyry, and their distinction elaborated in the 9th and partially also 10th section of *DM VI*, must be taken into account as well.⁸⁶ I present the upshot of the 11th section devoted to the topic of the physical principles (matter/form) of formal and universal unity only in passing in the context of other questions.⁸⁷

In this chapter I proceed in the following steps. In 2.2, on the background of Suárez's "settling accounts" with Scotus, I bring forward the Jesuit's definitions of two kinds of transcendental unity immediately relevant for the metaphysics of universals, sc. that of individual and formal unity (*unitas individualis et formalis*). In 2.3 formal unity is distinguished from universal unity (*unitas universalis*). In 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 I present the theory of universal unity and the aptitude to being in the many of Pedro Fonseca, which constitutes an important antipode to Suárez's thought. In the following 2.3.3 and 2.3.4 I bring in Suárez's critique of Fonseca's doctrine. In 2.4 I expound Suárez's theory of the nature of the distinction among the metaphysical grades. In 2.5 I come to the issue of Suárez's epistemology of universals. Prior to the exposition of the issue of the essence and genesis of *universale logicum* analyzed in 2.5.3 and 2.5.4, I introduce those Suárez's epistemological views that are relevant for the psychogenesis of universality (2.5.1) with special focus on intellectual cognition of material (sensible) singulars (2.5.2). In the penultimate Section 2.6 I compare Suárez's theory with the doctrine of universals of Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza with the intention of providing the reader with a doctrinal contrast to Suárez's theory.⁸⁸ In 2.7 I summarize the main features of Suárez's doctrine that constitute the *comparanda* with the theories of Poinset and Matri/Belluto.

2.2 The metaphysics of universals: Formal and individual unity

Suárez's terminology is traditional. Individual unity, the property of a singular entity, is defined by means of the incommunicability or indivisibility of many instances, which are of the same kind as the original (divided) entity. Universal unity,

86. *DM VI*, s. 9 (Vivès, vol. 25: 236–244); *DM VI*, s. 10 (Vivès, vol. 25: 244–247)

87. *DM VI*, s. 10 (Vivès, vol. 25: 247–250).

88. One of the main reasons for the "insertion" of the section on Hurtado de Mendoza's theory of universals is also to show how unfounded or one-sided are the interpretations of Suárez's theory that make him a supporter of (Hurtadian) conceptualism.

by contrast, is characterized by communicability and divisibility to many entities of the same kind as a divided whole.⁸⁹ Following Boethius, throughout the text of *DM VI* Suárez accepts the conception that universals are not communicable in part, in analogy to bread which is piecewise shared by the members of a family; nor are they shared successively, as a horse can be shared successively by all its temporary owners; and that they have to be an intrinsic part of the metaphysical make-up of the things to which they are common, not common in the way a performance is common to all the spectators. Briefly speaking, a universal is communicable as a whole in all its parts (singulars) at one time and constitutes the substance or intrinsic part of those things to which it is common.⁹⁰ By using the term *communicabilitas* Suárez, in its basic formulation, endorses Aristotle's definition of universal as that which is capable of being in the many (*esse in multis*) and predicable of the many (*dici de multis*).⁹¹ Suárez espouses the division of *universale* into the universal in causation (*universale in causando*), in signification or representation (*in significando* or *repraesentando*), in being (*in essendo*) and in predication (*in praedicando*) as a commonplace. In the regressive delineation of the subject matter of *DM VI* in *DM VI*, 8 Suárez remarks that the first two kinds of universals are not universals at all and are not the object of the present enquiry. The universal cause (God), being eminently singular, is universal only with respect to its (heterogeneous) effects. The same also holds for the universal in signification and in representation (at least if one conceives it as the cognitive act of the mind). As common terms (written or spoken), or as formal concepts (mental acts are nothing else than individual accidents inhering in the intellect) they are thoroughly singular. They can be taken as universal only if conceived as signs representing or signifying extramental reality. Suárez concludes that it is above all the third and fourth type (sc. *in essendo* and *in praedicando*) of universal that are relevant for the metaphysical elaboration of universals in *DM VI*.⁹²

89. *DM V*, s. 1, n. 2 (Vivès, vol. 25:146): "Commune enim seu universale dicitur, quod secundum unam aliquam rationem multis communicatur, seu in multis reperitur; unum autem numero seu singulare ac individuum dicitur, quod ita est unum ens, ut secundum eam entis rationem, qua unum dicitur, non sit communicabile multis, ut inferioribus et sibi subjectis, aut quae in illa ratione multa sint"; see also *DM VI*, Prologue (Vivès, vol. 25:201).

90. See Boethius, *In Isagogen Porphyrii commenta* (Vienna/Leipzig 1906, 162–163). See also Boethius, "From His Second Commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge*", in: Spade 1994, 22.

91. Aristoteles, *On Interpretation*, 17a39–b1 (Cambridge, Massachusetts/London 1938, 125). *DM VI*, s. 7, n. 3 (Vivès, vol. 25:229): "Multiplex enim relatio fingi seu excogitari potest in natura universali: una in ordine ad actum essendi; altera in ordine ad actum praedicandi." See also *DM VI*, s. 2, n. 9 (Vivès, vol. 25:209).

92. See *DM VI*, s. 8, n. 2 (Vivès, vol. 25:232). See also *DM VI*, s. 1, n. 1 (Vivès, vol. 25:201).

2.2.1 Nomenclature and historical point of departure

The emphasis on the above-mentioned ontological priority of individuality, supported by Suárez's statement, worked out at length in *DM V*, that the principle of individuation is the whole entity (*entitas tota*),⁹³ finds its loud echo at the very beginning of *DM VI*. Shall we say that individual unity is the only kind of transcendental unity being not only extensionally but also intensionally (by definition) equivalent to transcendental unity? Although at the beginning of the *DM V* Suárez claims that the extension of individual unity is all-embracing because all beings, whether actual or possible,⁹⁴ are singular, the Jesuit adds the important qualification "*immediately singular*".⁹⁵ It might be said that by means of individuals extramental natures are real beings (*entia realia*) as well. Moreover, the tenor of *DM IV*, 9 (immediately preceding *DM V*) suggests that nature meets the definition of the kind of (transcendental) unity, defined by Suárez by means of privation of division in its entity, as well. This transcendental unity is determined to formal unity characterized by the negation of division in formal or essential predicates. Man *ex definitione* cannot be formally divided into the predicates "man" and "non-man". Mutatis mutandis, the same can be said of generic and higher predicates.⁹⁶

In order to understand Suárez's theory of formal unity better, the two main medieval (and post-medieval) conceptions of the formal unity of an extramental nature must be introduced – the Scotistic one and the Thomistic one. According to Suárez, they differ in their explication of formal unity in two basic features. The first trait concerns the issue of the distinction between the common nature and the individual difference, which within the Tree of Porphyry is considered to be the ultimate difference determining specific nature to, e.g., Peter or Paul. The first theory,

93. See *DM V*, s. 6 (Vivès, vol. 25:180–188). The facit of Suárez's reasoning in *DM V* is as follows. On the physical plain the principle of individuation of a material substance is its whole entity, i.e., the prime matter, substantial form and substantial mode unifying both substantial principles, which Suárez actually considers to be incomplete beings (substances). On the issue of the so-called reification of hylemorphic principles, divergent from Thomism, see Heider 2008, 423–438. Cf. also Heider 2011d, 296–311.

94. Both are real beings (*entia realia*). That means that they meet the minimal condition of real being, i.e., being apt to actual existence. I am nevertheless convinced that the position of possible beings in Suárez's overall metaphysical system is not equal to that of actual ones. The main focus is on actual beings. For more on the issue see Heider 2011d, 112–114.

95. *DM V*, s. 1, n. 4 (Vivès, vol. 25:147): "... res omnes, quae sunt actualia entia, seu quae existunt, vel existere possunt immediate, esse singulares ac individuas. Dico *immediate*, ut excludam communes rationes entium ..."

96. *DM IV*, s. 9, nn. 13–14 (Vivès, vol. 25:144–145).

established by Scotus and Scotists, affirms that the extramental nature differs from the individual difference by means of formal distinction (*distinctio formalis*), which the followers of the Subtle Doctor consider to be an *actual* and less than numerical distinction in the thing itself (*ex natura rei*). According to the second approach, initiated by Aquinas and developed by his followers, there is only the so-called virtual distinction (*distinctio virtualis*) – one must keep in mind, however, that it is not a notion used by Aquinas (sic!) – between the common (specific) nature and the individual difference. They differ not actually *a parte rei* but only possibly as grades that *can* be discriminated by the intellect. They are actually distinct only in the intellect. Not being an actual and real distinction, the virtual distinction is often explained by analogy with the powers of things generating various activities. The specific nature and the individual difference are distinguished virtually in the same way as the different “powers” to warm, dry and illuminate differ in their common cause, e.g., in the Sun or fire. All the powers are really one and the same thing that, nevertheless, is capable of producing three *actually* different effects by means of the *virtually* distinct perfections. Likewise, two discriminable grades, such as the rationality and the animality of a man, are capable of occasioning two actually different concepts in the human intellect.⁹⁷

The second distinguishing mark is related to the issue of multiplicability/non-multiplicability of an extramental nature. While according to Thomists formal (specific) unity is not so much a unity, but rather the essential resemblance or convenience of individuals of the same species and thus multipliable in its numerical instances, for Scotists the presupposition of formal distinction, according to Suárez, leads to the state of affairs in which formal unity occurs as *literally* one and the same in numerically different things of the same species.⁹⁸ Although Suárez’s

97. More on the issue of the so-called metaphysical grades, of which specific nature and individual difference are two examples see 2.4.

98. *DM VI*, s. 1, n. 2 (Vivès, vol. 25: 201): “In hac re Thomistae et Scotistae conveniunt, docentes dari in rebus formalem unitatem aliquo modo distinctam a numerali ... Sed in modo explicandi hanc unitatem formalem dissentiunt praedicti auctores; videtur autem differentia in duobus potissimum consistere. Primum, in hoc quod Scotus hanc unitatem formalem, seu naturam ipsam, ut formaliter unam, censet esse formaliter et ex natura rei distinctam ab unitate seu differentia individuali. Alii vero existimant solum distingui ratione ... Secundo, differunt in hoc quod Scotus non censet unitatem hanc formalem seu naturam prout habentem hanc unitatem formalem, multiplicari numero in ipsis individuis, sed omnia individua eiusdem naturae habere unam et eandem formalem unitatem, unam (inquam) non tantum ratione, sed re ipsa, seu naturam, prout in re ipsa existit in multis individuis, habere unicam formalem unitatem. Alii vero existimant ... vero multiplicari in individuis cum unitatibus individualibus, et consequenter non esse unitatem aliquam, quae secundum veram unitatem realem eadem sit in multis individuis, sed solum secundum quamdam convenientiam vel similitudinem.”

formulations, at first sight, seem not to deny the *physical* multiplication of formal unity, his own metaphysical system (as it will be more obvious in the following) does not allow him to think of any other kind of *ex natura rei* distinction than the real distinction between two *res* or the modal distinction between *res* and separable mode.⁹⁹ Accordingly, the formal distinction of Scotus is reduced in Suárez to real physical distinction and formal unity to real (physical) unity *sensu stricto*.¹⁰⁰

2.2.2 Scotus on the common nature according to Suárez's

Disputationes Metaphysicae VI, s. 1

Although it is correct to regard Suárez's philosophical methodology as that of "the Problematicist" who is primarily after searching out solutions to philosophical problems, the historical, above all the scholastic, context of his exposition cannot be ignored.¹⁰¹ It has already been suggested that the main point of departure for Suárez is epitomized by Scotus's theory of the less than numerical unity of the extramental nature. This starting point is not incidental especially when one takes into account the fact that in *DM* VI, 1 Suárez lays the decisive emphasis on the nature *in re*, i.e., in an individual.¹⁰² What arguments are commonly introduced on behalf of the statement claiming that the extramental nature is endowed with formal unity, which according to Suárez is in Scotus conceived as *literally* common to many individuals? Suárez actually adduces four. However, I mention only the first three since the last reason can be taken as an extended version of the third

99. The extrinsic modal distinction is a type of real distinction, the extremes of which are separable only asymmetrically. Whereas sitting (*sessio*) is separable from Peter (who is sitting), Peter is not separable from his sitting. See *DM* VII, s. 1, nn. 16–26 (Vivès, vol. 25: 255–260). For a detailed exposition of Suárez's doctrine of modes see Alcorta 1949.

100. For Suárez's interpretation of Scotus's theory of formal distinction see *DM* VII, s. 1, nn. 13–15 (Vivès, vol. 25: 254–255). As far as Scotus himself is concerned, Suárez admits the basic ambiguity in his concept of *distinctio formalis*, but for the most part and in the crucial contexts he reduces it to the fully-fledged real distinction. This *reductio* can be seen as the root of Suárez's frequent historical misinterpretations of Scotus. See, e.g., Honnefelder 1990, 229–234. On Suárez's other false interpretation of Scotus, regarding this time the modal distinction in the theory of the distinction between existence and essence, see Wells 1962: "Thus, as an historian of men and texts on the problem of the modal distinction between essential being and existential being, Suarez comes off rather badly.", 443.

101. For the label "The Problematicist" related to Suárez's way of doing philosophy see Gracia 1992, 268–273.

102. *DM* VI, 1 is called *Utrum sit in rebus aliqua unitas formalis distincta a numerali et minor illa* [highlighting; D.H.].

one.¹⁰³ First, relying on the authority of Aristotle, Suárez claims that Scotus says that the modes of unity including both the unity of species and genus must be considered not as conceptual but as real properties (*passiones*) of being. Suárez makes reference to the 5th book of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, Chapter 15, explicitly employed by Scotus himself in his *Ordinatio* 2, 3, 1, 1.¹⁰⁴ There Aristotle confirms the real status of the unity of species and genus by linking it to the real relation of similarity that cannot be dissociated from the notion of unity. If a real relation is to be *real*, it must have a real foundation that must be considered as a partially and formally identical aspect in both relatives.¹⁰⁵ Second, an object insofar as it is an object naturally precedes a cognitive act.¹⁰⁶ An object is also an extramental nature, which is the object of a real definition. The nature cannot have definability through the intellect's efficiency. If it did, the intellect would provide a thing with its definability. Definitions would then have to be located in the intellect and not in reality. Consequently, the human intellect would turn into a force conferring the requisite unity upon an extramental thing, which would have destructive implications for the real character of the essential definition and for scientific enquiry into the universal and necessary in general. The statement that Peter and Paul are defined by one and the same (real) definition necessarily assumes a real unity common to both of them.¹⁰⁷ Third, formal unity of an extramental nature must be seen as a full-blown positive type of unity as each privation of division implies the

103. The fourth proceeds from the assumption that human nature of itself is positively a real being, and thus as such it must have a unity which is not material but formal. The connection between being and unity is, however, present in the third argument too. For the fourth argument cf. *DM* VI, s. 1, n. 6 (Vivès, vol. 25: 203).

104. Aristoteles, *Metaphysics*, 1016b31–1017a4 (Cambridge, Massachusetts/London 1938, 235).

105. *DM* VI, s. 1, n. 3 (Vivès, vol. 25: 202). Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* II, dist. 3, p. 1, q. 1 (ed. Vat. VII, 398): "Secundum Philosophum V Metaphysicae, cap. De 'Ad aliquid', idem, simile et aequale fundatur super 'unum', ita quod licet similitudo habeat pro fundamento rem de genere qualitatis talis, tamen relatio non est realis nisi habeat fundamentum reale et rationem proximam fundandi realem; igitur unitas quae requiritur in fundamento relationis similitudinis, est realis; non est autem numeralis, quia nihil unum est idem et simile vel aequale sibi ipsi."

106. Ibidem, 394: "Obiectum in quantum est obiectum, est prius naturaliter ipso actu ..." See also Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis*, lib. VII, q. 18 (St. Bonaventure N.Y. 1997, 345).

107. Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* II, dist. 3, p. 1, q. 1 (ed. Vat. VII, 403): "Licet enim nunquam sit realiter sine aliquo [singularity; D.H.], de se tamen non est aliquod istorum, sed est prius naturaliter omnibus istis, – et secundum prioritatem naturalem est 'quod quid est' per se obiectum intellectus, et per se, ut sic, consideratur a metaphysico et exprimitur per definitionem." For Suárez's explanation see *DM* VI, s. 1, n. 4 (Vivès, vol. 25: 202).

corresponding unity and entity. Nevertheless, distinctively enough, in the context of this argument Suárez introduces the Thomistic claim that the nature of itself is one only *negatively* (*ex se negative esse unam*). What is meant by negative unity?

A brief digression into the theories of Aquinas and Cajetan, which exercised significant influence on Suárez, is in order. According to Aquinas's *De ente et essentia*, the main textual pillar of Cajetan's theory of universals, and in direct link to Avicenna, nature absolutely considered (*natura absolute considerata*), i.e., taken neither abstractly in the intellect nor in the thing, is neither one nor many, neither singular nor universal. As such the nature has only quidditative predicates. If it were intrinsically one, it could not be particularized; if it were many, it could not be unified by the abstractive act. One may say that by this claim Aquinas *ipso facto* denies that nature as such has *any* being and *any* unity.¹⁰⁸ In the *Commentary* on *De ente* Cajetan interprets Aquinas's denial of the unity of the nature as a denial of numerical unity only.¹⁰⁹ Under the influence of the Patavian Scotists, headed by Antonio Trombetta, Cajetan (not the first Thomist endorsing this type of unity)¹¹⁰ attributes this special type of unity, i.e., formal unity, to the nature as such. Yet, being resistant to many doctrinal points of Scotism, Cajetan claims that formal unity is one only *negatively*. Formal unity is only negative unity since it is not such that it cannot be further divided. Contrary to the numerical unity of, say, Peter,

108. Thomas de Aquino, *De ente et essentia*, cap. 2: "Unde si quaeratur utrum ista natura sic considerata [absolute; D.H.] possit dici una vel plures, neutrum concedendum est: quia utrumque est extra intellectum humanitatis et utrumque potest sibi accidere ... Haec autem natura habet duplex esse, unum in singularibus et aliud in anima, et secundum utrumque consequuntur dictam naturam accidentia. Et in singularibus etiam habet multiplex esse secundum singularium diversitatem et tamen ipsi naturae secundum suam primam considerationem, scilicet absolutam, nullum istorum esse debetur." In the following I shall quote exclusively from *Opera omnia* S. Thomae made available at the *Corpus Thomisticum* (URL: <http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/oee.html>). As the *Brevis introductio* of this project makes clear, this website provides scholars with "A full edition of the complete works of St. Thomas according, where possible, to the best critical texts." (URL: <http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/wintroen.html>). For the best critical edition of the opusculum *De ente et essentia* see Thomas de Aquino, *Opera omnia*, t. 43: *De ente et essentia* (ed. Leon., Rome 1976, 315–381).

109. Thomas de Vio Caietanus, *Opuscula omnia, Super librum de ente et essentia Sancti Thomae Aquinatis* (further only *De ente et essentia*), cap. 4, q. 6 (Lyons 1587; reprint: Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 1995, 244).

110. Already Thomas de Sutton in the treatise *De natura generis* (falsely attributed to Aquinas) ascribes a similar sort of unity to the nature as such in the fourth chapter: "[L]icet in natura animalis non sit unitas vel pluralitas secundum quod est nata recipi in pluribus inferioribus, cum possit in uno recipi et in pluribus, est tamen in ipsa natura, absolute accepta et secundum quod non est in inferioribus considerata, quaedam unitas, cum definitio eius sit una, et nomen unum, ut patet", URL: <http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/xpg.html>. On the non-authenticity of this *opusculum* see Emery 1993, 524–525.

which is positively one and is indivisible to other spatially separated objects, the formal unity of *man* can be further divided by the individual differences of Peter, Paul, etc. A nature has positive unity only as being particularized in concrete things or abstracted in the intellect. Two reasons are introduced by Cajetan for this negative concept of formal unity, both connected with his critique of Scotism. First, the Scotists lapse into an ambiguity of the term “in itself” (*ex se* or *de se*) when claiming that the common nature is of itself nonsingular. Two senses of “of itself” must be strictly distinguished, though. One is positive expressing a causally efficient agent. The other, negative, articulates the status of *solitude* or “not-being-with-another”. The error of the Scotists consists in the fact that they understand the phrase *ex se* in the first sense while they in fact ought to conceive it according to the second meaning. “Of itself” does not express any kind of causality, proper only to actual beings, but only negation of union with another or negation of being proper to this or that individual. Second, the Scotists are wrong in the logical inference of a reduplicated affirmative proposition with a finite predicate from a reduplicated negative proposition with an infinite predicate. While from an affirmative proposition with an infinite predicate there follows a negative proposition concerning a finite predicate, the opposite does not hold. Let us take the example! From the proposition “Surface *qua* surface is not white” does not follow “Surface *qua* surface is non-white”. Surface cannot be *ex se* non-white, otherwise it could never become white. It holds that whatever belongs to something insofar as it is that thing is always and necessarily part of it. Applied to the issue of the nature as such, it may be said that from its not-belonging to Peter it does not follow that it is positively nonsingular (common) or positively not-belonging to Peter. What at most can be affirmed (according to Cajetan) is its negative oneness and negative commonality, i.e., a unity proper only to the nature as such isolated from being in singulars.¹¹¹ Wherever that solitude gets lost, negative community and oneness seems to vanish as well.¹¹²

111. Thomas de Vio Caietanus, *De ente et essentia*, cap. 4, q. 6 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 1995, 245): “Potest enim utrumque eorum [the terms *ex se* and *de se*; D.H.] accipi dupliciter. Uno modo positive: & sic dicit aliquam habitudinem causae. Alio modo negative, & sic dicit solitudinem, id est non cum alio ... cum tamen debuisset intelligere secundo modo ... est distantia inter propositionem negativam & affirmativam de praedicato infinito, reduplicatione addita. Licet enim ex affirmativa de praedicato infinito sequatur negativa, & e converso ... quando non sunt replicativae, cum reduplicatione: tamen licet ex affirmativa de praedicato infinito, sequatur negativa de praedicato finito: non tamen e contra. Hanc enim, Homo in eo quod homo non est albus, non sequitur ista, Homo in eo, quod homo, est non albus. Si enim homo in eo quod homo esset non albus, nunquam homini conjungi posset albedo: quia quod convenit alicui secundum quod ipsum, convenit ei semper necessario & per se.”

112. Thomas de Vio Caietanus, *De ente et essentia*, cap. 4, q. 6 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 1995, 244): “... cum dico natura secundum se, seu natura absolute, dico duo, scilicet naturam

Let us finally come back to Suárez's exposition of Scotistic arguments in favor of the less than numerical unity of the common nature! Suárez notes that the Cajetan theory (actually speaking of the theory of Thomists in general) is dismissed by the Scotists. If the nature as such is not formally divided and *ex se* it has a negation of division with repugnancy to being formally divided, then *as existing in the things themselves* it must be regarded as formally (literally) one and common. It is not the isolation or "not-being-with-another" of nature as such what makes it common and what gets lost in singulars, but it is the quiddity itself with the concomitant formal (positive) unity as the necessary *passio* which makes it existent *in re* as well. Formal unity conceived as a fully-fledged unity *ex natura rei* distinct from the individual difference cannot be lost in singulars.¹¹³

2.2.3 Suárez's "nominalization" of Scotus

Suárez's theory, inspired by Cajetan and taking the shape on the background of Scotus's theory, is presented in four succinct conclusions. With the important exception of the first statement all are based on the Jesuit's rejection of Scotus. First, there is formal unity *per se* and extramentally belonging to the nature or essence *qua* contracted in individuals. It is a real unity because, as the arguments for the Scotistic theory make clear, the negation of essential division is real.¹¹⁴ Second, in accordance with *DM* V, 2, where the doctrine of the ontological status of the individual difference is introduced as that what is only conceptually added to the

& solitudinem, & ejus conditionem ... Unde aliquid convenit sive repugnat naturae absolutae ratione naturae, & aliquid ratione solitudinis ... Cum igitur communitas negativae, quae est praedicatum in praepositione nostra, non conveniat naturae absolutae ratione sui, scilicet naturae, quia non est ejus praedicatum quiditativum, sed conveniat ei ratione explicite conditionis per ly secundum se, seu ly absolute, quae est solitudo (ex hoc enim natura est communis negative, quia solitarie accipitur absque determinatione ad hoc, vel illud) ... Statim enim, ut natura perdit solitudine, communitatem quoque perdere cogitur."

113. Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* II, dist. 3, p. 1, q. 1 (ed. Vat. VII, 404): "... ita etiam in re extra, ubi natura est cum singularitate, non est illa natura de se determinata ad singularitatem, sed est prior naturaliter ipsa ratione contrahente ipsam ad singularitatem illa ... ita etiam in re natura secundum illam entitatem habet verum esse reale extra animam, – et secundum illam entitatem habet unitatem sibi proportionale, quae indifferens est ad singularitatem ... illa unitas est propria passio naturae secundum entitatem suam primam ..." For Suárez see *DM* VI, s. 1, nn. 5 and 7 (Vivès, vol. 25: 202).

114. *DM* VI, s. 1, n. 8 (Vivès, vol. 25: 203): "[D]icendum est primo, dari in rebus unitatem formalem per se convenientem unicuique essentiae seu naturae ... quodlibet individuum, verbi gratia, Petrus, non solum est unus numero, sed etiam est unus essentialiter."

objective concept of the common nature,¹¹⁵ Suárez affirms that formal unity is only conceptually distinct (with a foundation in the thing) from individual unity. He affirms that only that kind of distinction is what is actually proved by the above-mentioned Scotistic arguments. What the arguments to the benefit of the formally distinct haecceity prove is actually nothing more than Suárez's own opinion claiming that the individual difference is only virtually distinct from a specific nature. If the individual difference differs from the specific nature only virtually (or as Suárez rather speaks about the rational distinction, namely the actualization of the virtual distinction in the intellect), nothing more can be expected in case of the distinction between individual and formal unity as well.¹¹⁶ The third conclusion can be taken as a confirmation of Suárez's anti-Scotistic stance. Formal unity cannot be considered as *ex natura rei* distinct from individual unity.¹¹⁷ Even though individual unity can be prescindend from the common nature and considered *in ratione* and by means of formal concepts (cognitive acts) as actually different, the specific nature is a truly real being only when it exists in individuals. In itself it does not exhibit a sufficient entitative robustness making it an extramentally distinct extreme. No being other than an individual (whether *in actu* or *in potentia*) can be a real being (*ens reale*), sc. a being having an aptitude for actual existence.¹¹⁸ Fourthly – a corollary of the statement about the co-existence of individual and formal unity – formal unity insofar as it exists in things themselves cannot be exposed as literally *common* to the many because it is entitatively multiplied, which for Suárez means in

115. At first sight *DM* V, 2 seems to indicate that the only intelligibile way of *additio* of an individual thing to the common nature is when the common nature is an extramental *thing*, independently existent of singulars, to which some other *thing* is added. However, that would be a misleading way of thinking since Suárez, of course, denies that prior “existence”. The only way to understand the question of “addition” is to claim that the individual difference is added to the specific nature understood on the level of the objective concept, which, as Suárez makes repeatedly obvious, is an extramental thing inasmuch as it is cognized (regarding the notion of *conceptus obiectivus* see more in 2.4). Accordingly, Suárez distinguishes two kinds of addition of “res individua” to specific nature. The first one concerns an added object (*quoad rem additam*). In this case Suárez contends that this object must be conceived as real. The other one concerns the way of addition (*quoad modum additionis*). This addition, on the contrary, must be regarded as proceeding only *per rationem*. See *DM* V, s. 2, n. 16 (Vivès, vol. 25: 153).

116. *DM* VI, s. 1, n. 9 (Vivès, vol. 25: 203): “Secundo dicendum est hanc unitatem formalem ratione saltem distingui ab unitate individuali.”

117. *DM* VI, s. 1, n. 10 (Vivès, vol. 25: 203): “Unde dico tertio: hae unitates non distinguuntur a parte rei, seu ex natura rei.”

118. As regards the definition of *ens reale* or *essentia realis* see *DM* II, s. 4 (Vivès, vol. 25: 87–92). See also *DM* VI, s. 1, n. 10 (Vivès, vol. 25: 203–204).

all possible extramental aspects, as many times as there are individuals.¹¹⁹ In the Jesuit's elimination of the metaphysical (Scotistic) formalities (realities) by means of the physical (entitative) reduction, no other conclusion can be expected. If the only full-blown extramental unity is individual unity, the specific natures must get (physically) multiplied in the things themselves too. No extramental thing can actually be called physically or metaphysically (in the *sui generis* dimension of Scotistic formalities) common. Accordingly, formal unity of an extramental nature and its community must be considered as two different things.¹²⁰

I have already said that Suárez believes that Scotus's arguments actually prove his own conclusion. He is no less sure that they are at most evidence that the unity and commonality of the specific nature is *fundamental* in his sense. The fundamental commonality is not literal community but a qualified resemblance of individuals of the same kind exhibited by their multiplied formal unities defined by means of the same formal indivision. Independently of the operation of the human intellect, individuals of the same kind are not one thing with a true unity. Formal unity is fully consistent with numerical (entitative) multiplication and essential similarity of a plurality of singulars. As such, formal unity is incompatible only with essential *dissimilarity*.¹²¹ The formal unity of things can be denied of them only if the individuals are dissimilar to the degree that they cannot be conceived or represented by a common formal concept.¹²² Although Suárez subscribes to Scotus's statement that a nature does not have definability through the agency of the intellect, he is quick to remark that it holds only fundamentally and remotely. Real definitions are properly not in the things but in the intellect. For Suárez, contrary to Scotus, the condition laid on real definitions is far from being connected with a commitment to the existence of the common nature *ex natura rei* different from the individual

119. DM VI, s. 1, n. 11 (Vivès, vol. 25:204): "Ex his concluditur quarto hanc unitatem formalem, prout existit in rebus ante omnem operationem intellectus, non esse communem multis individuís, sed tot multiplicari unitates formales, quot sunt individua."

120. DM VI, s. 1, n. 12 (Vivès, vol. 25:204): "[C]ommunitas autem proprie et in rigore non est in rebus, quia nulla unitas, quae in re existit, communis est, ut ostendimus; sed est in rebus singularibus quaedam similitudo in suis unitatibus formalibus ... quae similitudo non est proprie unitas, quia non dicit indivisionem entitatum in quibus fundatur, sed solum convenientiam, seu relationem, aut coexistentiam utriusque."

121. DM VI, s. 1, n. 14 (Vivès, vol. 25:205).

122. For a heuristic accent on this aspect of Suárez's fundamental sameness or resemblance see Ross 1962, 745. The disadvantage of Ross's interpretation (as stated in 1.4) consists in an overly conceptualist conception of Suárez's theory.

differences.¹²³ Accepting Ockham's Razor, Suárez is convinced that weaker ontological commitment is entirely sufficient.

2.3 Formal and universal unity

After the comparative evaluation of formal unity vis-à-vis the requirements connected with individual unity against the backdrop of coping with the Scotist solution in *DM VI*, s. 1, Suárez approaches the exposition and ontological evaluation of formal unity, now in juxtaposition with universal unity. It has been suggested that for Suárez formal unity is a real unity but comparatively to Scotism a deficient one. Rather than being a true and positive unity, Suárez says it is a multitude of individuals related by an essential affinity rooted in the formal unities of each singular's essence. In connection with Aristotle's definition of universality it has been also indicated that the notion of *unitas universalis* includes two essential aspects – unity and communicability. Without being one, the universal nature cannot be regarded as one universal but at most as an aggregate of various essences or things, i.e., as *ens per accidens*. Free of communicability, universal unity would turn into individual unity.¹²⁴

2.3.1 Suárez on the distinction between formal and universal unity

It may be said that by claiming that formal unity is *de facto* a plurality of essentially resembling individuals Suárez, so to say *a priori*, rules out any possible identification of formal unity and universal unity. Formal unity alone is not sufficient for the unity of a universal nature (the first conclusion).¹²⁵ (1) The unity of the universal nature inasmuch as it is universal must be a unity that is *peculiar* to it. It must therefore be a sort of unity that cannot pertain to a singular insofar as it is a singular. However, that is exactly what happens to formal unity. Although it does not intrinsically require material division (it is related to it indifferently), it does not call for being conceived as universal either. As indifferent to both “conditions”, it can exist under both determinations, i.e., it can occur both in the state of being particularized and

123. *DM VI*, s. 1, n. 13 (Vivès, vol. 25: 204–205).

124. *DM VI*, s. 2, n. 9 (Vivès, vol. 25: 209).

125. *DM VI*, s. 2, n. 10 (Vivès, vol. 25: 209): “Dico primo: unitas formalis per se sola non sufficit ad unitatem, quam requirit natura universalis, ut universalis est, ac denominatur, sed requiritur major aliqua unitas.”

universalized. (2) Universal unity *qua* universal cannot be numerically multiplied. If it were, specific unity would be numerically divided as well. As a result, one would get the same number of kinds as is the number of individuals. The universal *man* would thus be multiplied into the kinds of Peter, Paul, etc. Peter and Paul would thus become the exclusive representatives of their species. Suárez points out that universal unity is not what is divided but rather what is participated in by its inferior natures (instances) and what makes the participating particulars belong to the same kind or the same genus.¹²⁶ (3) Universal unity means the undividedness of several things in that thing which is denominated as universally one, so that none of those inferiors contained under it, taken by itself, possesses that whole universal unity.¹²⁷ Accordingly, universal unity is to be taken as a potential whole, of which – contrary to formal unity – it cannot be said that it is wholly had by some of its inferiors but only that all things are one under it. Universal unity is not an actual whole characterized by multipliable formal indivision, i.e., the quidditative features proper to the nature, but a potential whole by means of which all the things of a kind are one and which consequently virtually contains all the inferiors.¹²⁸ All those arguments show that for Suárez universal unity constitutes a *distinct* kind of unity different from both individual and formal unity. Although it includes formal indivision, it differs from it as well. As an additional item it requires undividedness and (proximate) disposition to being in the many.¹²⁹

126. That is what is explicitly said by Porphyry in his *Isagogé*: “The many men are one by participation in the species ...”, Porphyry, *Isagogé*, in: Spade 1994, 6.

127. It is necessary to distinguish “undividedness” and “indivision”. Whereas (formal) indivision does not rule out numerical (material) division, the undividedness pertaining to universal unity does. For this terminology see Ross, 1964, 45.

128. *DM VI*, s. 2, n. 10 (Vivès, vol. 25: 209): “Probatur primo, quia unitas rei universalis ut universalis est, talis esse debet ut sit illi propria, et rei singulari, ut singularis est, convenire non possit; sed unitas formalis non est hujusmodi; ergo illa ut sic non sufficit ad unitatem naturae universalis ut sic ... Secundo probatur, quia unitas formalis multiplicatur in individuis cum ipsa natura; sed unitas, quae est propria naturae universalis ut universalis est, non potest multiplicari ... ergo alium modum unitatis habet natura universalis ut sic, praeter unitatem formalem ... Unde agumentor tertio, quia unitas formalis solum dicit formalem seu essentialem indivisionem illius rei, quae sic una denominatur: unde ad hanc unitatem impertinens est, quod illa res sit singularis vel communis; at vero unitas universalis dicit intrinsece indivisionem plurium in ea re, vel ratione, quae una universaliter denominatur, ita ut nullum eorum inferiorum, quae sub tali ratione continentur, per se sumptum habeat totam illam universalem unitatem, sed omnia sub illa ratione unum sint; quomodo omnes species animalis sunt unum in ratione animalis; nulla autem species per se sumpta habet in se universalem unitatem animalis, quae est quasi potentialis, licet in se habeat formalem unitatem ejus.”

129. *DM VI*, s. 2, n. 11 (Vivès: vol. 25: 209–210).

As regards the second conclusion, Suárez makes a fairly predictable statement. The unity of universal nature *qua* universal is not real and is not in things insofar as they exist in reality independently of the operation of the intellect.¹³⁰ By this claim, leaving aside formal unity, Suárez seems to rule out *tout court* the opinion according to which universal unity as such can be somehow thought as being in extramental things.¹³¹ Only individual and formal unities are unqualifiedly real, with the only specification that formal unity *sensu stricto* is not a unity but rather a relation of essential similarity.¹³² When specifying the idiosyncratic character of universal unity Suárez also asserts that the relation of essential resemblance is not only insufficient but also unnecessary for something to be a universal nature.¹³³ For something to be formally *ratio universalis* it is not necessary that it be *actually* instantiated or exemplified by a plurality of essentially similar instances. What suffices is the existence of a *possible* entity of the same kind. The nature of heaven can be a universal without existing in an actual multitude of instances. If there were entities like the Platonic ideas separated from things, they would, no doubt, be universal even if they were entirely without instances (individuals). Suárez thus concludes that what is indispensable for universal unity is only its dispositional (aptitudinal) communicability.¹³⁴

2.3.2 Fonseca on universal unity and the aptitude to being in the many

The main challenge to Suárez's doctrine of the unity of the universal nature is not represented by Scotus, whose "nominalized version" the Jesuit actually finds plausible, but by his fellow from the Society of Jesus Pedro Fonseca. Without exaggeration it may be said that it is above all Fonseca's metaphysical theory of universals

130. DM VI, s. 2, n. 13 (Vivès: vol. 25: 209–210): "Ex his dico secundo, unitas naturae universalis ut universalis est, non est realis, neque est in rebus prout in re ipsa existunt anteceduntque omnem operationem intellectus."

131. This conclusion will be specified in 2.5. One thing, however, can be stated beforehand. Should universal unity be *entirely* a unity of reason, it would be difficult to fully justify its presence in Suárez's *metaphysical* project devoted to kinds of transcendental unity, which are obviously considered by him to be kinds of *real* unity.

132. Although this statement, no doubt, sounds as taken over from the arsenal of a conceptualist, immediately below it is shown that resemblance and plurality of essentially similar individuals is not a necessary condition for the genesis of universal unity.

133. DM VI, s. 2, n. 14 (Vivès, vol. 25: 210): "Haec autem similitudo neque necessaria simpliciter ad rationem universalis, neque sufficiens."

134. DM VI, s. 2, n. 14 (Vivès, vol. 25: 210–211).

what helps Suárez spell out his own theory. First, I briefly present Fonseca's theory of universal unity and the aptitude to being in the many. In the following subsection I come to Suárez's critique of Fonseca's doctrine.

In his *Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics* (Book 5, Chapter 28, question 3) Fonseca advances four conclusions, the third and fourth of which were later to become a target of Suárez's animadversion.¹³⁵ In fact, Suárez subscribes to the first two conclusions. (1) Universal unity is not numerical unity proper to singular things and (2) the unity of universal things cannot be identified with formal unity since formal unity gets numerically multiplied whereas universal does not. (3) After the first part of the third thesis Fonseca says that universal unity must be peculiar to universal things. So far there is agreement with Suárez. However, Fonseca comes with an important addition. He says that universal unity can pertain to universal things only insofar as they precede contraction by (in) particulars. He makes clear that as particularized they necessarily lose *any* aptitude (capability) to being in the many. Thus, e.g., the nature of man as such can neither *per se* (as an essential predicate) nor as a necessary accidental predicate (a well-known example is risibility) require universal unity called by Fonseca unity of precision (*unitas praecisionis*). If it did, it would have it also in the state of its particularization. Fonseca affirms that it can have this unity only by means of an absolute state of solitude. Nevertheless, he understands this state in a rather idiosyncratic way as a condition that naturally precedes the contraction by (in) singulars and thus is also independent of the intellect's negotiation. Only by having this unity of precision can the universal nature also possess the aptitude to being in the many, which is its necessary property. (4) The unity of precision, being a distinct type of unity, must be conceived as a sort (*quodammodo*) of mixture of formal and numerical unity. It has something of numerical unity since we do not count natures differently from counting individual things. We say that the human nature and the equine nature are two natures, similarly as Peter and Paul are two men. Nevertheless, formal unity, as being multiplied, cannot justify the ascription of a number to the nature. The human nature in Peter and Paul are, in fact, two natures. The "numerical unity" (*unitas numeralis*) thus, Fonseca makes clear, must be conceived as basically twofold. Apart from the unity proper to singulars, one must take into account also the other unity concerning universal natures with the unity of precision.¹³⁶ Obviously, by virtue of belonging

135. For the exposition of Fonseca's theory of unity of precision see Svoboda 2012a, 116–125.

136. Fonseca, *Commentaria in libros metaphysicorum Aristotelis*, t. 2, lib. V. Met., c. 28, q. 3, sect. 2, (Cologne 1615, 960–961): "Sit igitur hac in re primum pronunciatum. Unitatem rerum universalium propriam non esse numeralem simpliciter, sive qua numerantur res omnino singulares, ut homines singuli, & ut equi ... Alterum pronunciatum sit. Unitatem rerum universalium propriam non esse ex genere formalium ... unitas formalis multiplicatur in inferioribus

to the natures and not to singulars, it cannot be purely numerical either. It must have something of formal unity as well.

Besides, the occurrence of the nature absolutely considered with the unity of precision is further confirmed by the presence of many predicates belonging exclusively to it. They neither belong intrinsically to it as quidditative predicates, nor are they part of it due to the state of being particularized, but only on the basis of its absolute status, which is *prior* to contraction by particulars. Fonseca mentions the predicates “not to be generated”, “not to be corrupted”, “not to exist really”, “not to walk” as predicates attributed to a nature in that way.¹³⁷

How does Fonseca conceive the second feature of universal unity, the aptitude of universal things to be in the many? In coherence with the doctrine of the unity of precision he says that the common nature cannot have the aptitude to being in the many. Contrary to Scotus,¹³⁸ Fonseca comes with the assertion that no nature in singulars has the so-called remote aptitude to being in the many. Fonseca presents three arguments, of which it suffices to mention only one, the most concise, based on the particularization of the nature in Peter. A theory employing the notion of (remote) potency, based on the formal unity of the extramental nature, cannot be correct since it holds that whatever is in Peter is singular. Obviously, a singular nature cannot be in the many. It is not enough to say that the human nature in Peter has the aptitude to being in the many as it is not *per se* singular but only *per accidens* and thus of itself (*ex se*) is nonsingular. Fonseca makes clear that even though human nature is made individual in Peter only accidentally, it still is singular and in no way can be multiplied even by the intellect. To get a sufficient foundation

cum natura, cuius est unitas ... unitas quae propria est rerum universalium, ut universales sunt, multiplicari nequeat in inferioribus rei universalis ... Tertium pronunciatum esto. Eam unitatem, quam quaerimus esse ex genere earum, quae sunt quidem peculiares rerum communium non proprie tamen illis per se conveniunt, nisi quatenus naturae ordine praecedunt contractionem sui ad particularia ... Quartum pronunciatum sit. Unitatem de qua est controversia, (quam nos aliquando, ut a formali distingueremus, praecisionis appellavimus) si ad generalem divisionem unitatis in numeralem & formalem revocanda est, etsi quodammodo mista ex formali & numerali dici potest: tamen numeralem potius appellanda esse ... Erit igitur duplex unitas numeralis, altera rerum per se singularium, altera rerum universalium, sive naturarum communium.”

137. Fonseca, *ibidem*, lib. V. Met., c. 28, q. 3, sect. 4 (Cologne 1615, 967): “Multa n. praedicata negativa conveniunt hominis prius natura, quam contrahatur per differentias individuantes, quae praedicata illi non conveniunt per se: ut non existere realiter, non generari, non corrumpi, non ambulare, & alia infinita ut est luce clarius.”

138. Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis*, lib. VII, q. 18 (St. Bonaventure N.Y. 1997, 347–348).

for the intellectual precision, and not to lose advisable realism from sight, one is obliged to assume that nature absolutely considered has unity of precision.¹³⁹

The disposition to being in the many, though formulated negatively as non-repugnant to being in the many, must be something positive, which is for Fonseca nothing but a potential or aptitudinal mode which the nature has *antecedently* to its contraction by (in) singulars. Fonseca compares this mode to the mode which an effect has while it is in its cause(s). The potential mode, in virtue of which the nature has the ability to being in the many, is considered as a separable (extrinsic) mode, which does not belong to the nature intrinsically. It pertains to it only when the nature displays the above-mentioned state of potentiality being prior to the state of actuality occasioned by the determination by (in) particulars. When the nature gets reduced from potentiality to actuality, the unity of precision, jointly with its potential mode, is necessarily lost.¹⁴⁰

139. Fonseca, *ibidem*, lib. V. Met., c. 28, q. 4, sect. 5 (Cologne 1615, 980): “Si natura humana haberet in Socrate aptitudinem essendi in Platone, aut aliquo alio: cum, quidquid est in Socrate, singulare sit, aliqua singularis natura posset esse in pluribus, id est, per modum identitatis multiplicata, quod nec fieri, nec intelligi potest ... Dicent fortasse, non esse incommodum, naturam humanam habere in Socrate aptitudinem essendi in Platone: quia non est per se singularis, ut ipse Socrates, sed per accidens adiectione videlicet differentiae constitutivae Socratis. Nam, etsi illa, ut est in Socrate, non potest esse in Platone: tamen ex se ipsa potest esse in quolibet singulari homine: quia ex se ipsa non est singularis ... Facile tamen responsio refutatur: quia natura singularis, sive per se sit singularis, ut natura Socratis, qua Socrates est: sive per accidens, ut natura humana facta haec in Socrate per differentiam individuam Socratis modo tamen singularis fit, nulla omnino potentia, aut etiam intellectu multiplicari potest ... Oportet igitur illam sumere ante adventum (ut sic dicam) differentiae contrahentis ... ut apta sit in pluribus eiusdem rationis esse ...”

140. Fonseca, *ibidem*, lib. V. Met., c. 28, q. 4, sect. 2 (Cologne 1615, 974–975): “[A]liquid latere sub huiusmodi negatione repugnantiae, quod positivum sit, & in quo potius aptitudo essendi in pluribus constituenda videatur. Dicere enim possumus, hanc aptitudinem esse modum essendi intrinsecum rebus quae denominantur universales, hoc est, non per aliam entitatem eis convenientem: non tamen esse modum essendi actualem, ut est ipse actus essendi in pluribus, multoque minus eam quam vocamus actualem existentiam, sive in rerum natura, sive in intellectu, sed esse modum essendi potentialem, ut etiam est modus essendi cuiusque effectus in sua causa: ac denique non esse modum essendi omnino inseparabilem, ut sunt necessarium esse & contingens, finitum & infinitum; sed modo aliquo separabilem, ut est modus essendi rerum in suis causis ... Ut enim dicimus, creaturas, antequam existant, habere quendam modum essendi potentialem in suis causis, quem amittunt, cum primum existunt, & extra illas esse dicuntur: ita dicere oportet, eas habere quendam alium essendi modum potentialem ex se ipsis, qui esse desinit, cum ei succedit ipsa illarum actualis existentia.”

2.3.3 Suárez's dismissal of Fonseca's unity of precision

In analogy to Fonseca, Suárez also distinguishes between predicates belonging to a nature *per se* and belonging to it because of its state of solitude. The term *per se* (*secundum se*)¹⁴¹ can designate predicates necessarily connected with a subject (*animal* and *rational* in the case of *man*), or those predicates resulting from it (*esse risibile*). If the term *per se* is understood in this quidditative or proprial sense, Suárez agrees with Fonseca that universal unity does not belong *per se* to the nature. Surely, the unity of precision is not necessarily connected with its subject. The phrase *per se* can nevertheless be considered as referring to that which is signified absolutely or solitarily without an adjacent determination, which in case of the nature means without individual differences.¹⁴² After the exposition of the different meanings of the term “*per se*” or “*secundum se*” Suárez affirms, in agreement with Fonseca, that the unity of precision or universal unity does not belong to it necessarily, i.e., in the first sense of the word “*per se*”. He agrees that it pertains to it only in virtue of a certain condition. However, while for Fonseca the nature's solitude is a state belonging to the nature *prior* to its particularization, i.e., in potential being, Suárez rejects this claim as fully inconceivable. It does not make any sense to claim that there is a unity belonging to the nature prior to the activity of the intellect and never found in its inferiors.¹⁴³ Suárez denies that there are special predicates necessitating the consideration of the nature according to this potential state. All of the above-mentioned predicates introduced by Fonseca, which seemingly reinforce this introduction of the nature absolutely considered with the unity of precision independently of the human intellect, can be well conceived as belonging to the nature only *a posteriori*, i.e., either as being an intrinsic part of

141. Unlike Fonseca, who distinguishes between the terms “*per se*” (both in the sense of essential predicates and the necessary accidental predicates) and “*secundum se*” (Fonseca, *ibidem*, lib. 5 Met., c. 28, q. 3, sect. 4, 967: “... hoc mihi videtur non leviter peccari, quod particula, secundum se, sumitur in probatione pro, id est, per se, in primo aut secundo modo dicendi per se: cum accipi debeat pro, absolute, ut accipitur in ipso Avicennae pronunciato. Nihil enim aliud significat in illo Avicenna, nisi quod equinitas secundum se, id est absolute considerata, seu non spectata, ut est in suis particularibus contracta, aut ab eis per intellectum quasi avulsa, nec sit una numero, nec plures numero.”), Suárez in *DM VI*, s. 3, n. 2 (Vivès, vol. 25: 212) takes them as synonymous: “... dupliciter sumi posse illud *per se*, seu *secundum se* ...”

142. *DM VI*, s. 3, n. 2 (Vivès, vol. 25: 212).

143. *DM VI*, s. 3, n. 3 (Vivès, vol. 25: 212). “... non satis intelligendo, qualis possit esse unitas quae conveniat naturae ante intellectum, et tamen nunquam possit illi convenire in inferioribus, seu in singularibus existenti.”

a singular or as belonging to the nature abstracted by the intellect. In this sense, however, the unity of precision can be considered only as an *a posteriori* unity.¹⁴⁴

Every being and unity, if real (whether actual or potential), according to Suárez, must be singular or must exist in particulars. The claim that the extramental unity of precision gets lost when contracted by particulars obviously offends this premise. Yet it can be objected that the extramental unity of precision belongs to the nature according to its essential being (*esse essentiae*) and not according to its existential being (*esse existentiae*). One may say that though the nature can exist in existential being as particularized or intentionally as abstracted, it is no less true that according to essential being it can (additionally) exist “absolutely”. Suárez’s rejects this caveat by referring to his conception of real being, which he understands as a real essence (*essentia realis*) of which the aptitude to (actually) be is a necessary feature. If that is missing, a real being turns out to be nothing more than a being of reason (*ens rationis*). If the unity of precision cannot belong to the nature in existent singulars, then it cannot pertain to the nature having the aptitude to actual being either. The unity of precision cannot belong to the nature taken potentially since it cannot belong to it as being *in actu*. We may conclude that the parallelism of universality/individuality with regard to actual/potential being prevents Suárez from embracing the above-mentioned ontological asymmetry advocated by Fonseca.¹⁴⁵

How about the negative predicates allegedly said of the nature having the potential unity of precision? The aforesaid predications employing these predicates are considered by Suárez as nothing more than a sophistic equivocation (*sophistica aequivocatio*). The predicate in the propositions such as “Nature as such is not generated” is actually said not of the nature with an antemental unity of precision,¹⁴⁶ but only of the nature existing in the individuals or the intellect. Fonseca’s reference to the potential unity of precision can be avoided by the following simple analysis. First, Suárez makes clear that the above-mentioned proposition can be understood

144. *DM VI*, s. 3, n. 4 (Vivès, vol. 25: 213): “Nulla ergo praedicata contingentia, etiam negativa, conveniunt communibus naturis, nisi vel ratione individuorum, vel in ipsis individuis, vel ratione status quem in intellectu habent.” See also *DM VI*, s. 3, n. 6 (Vivès, vol. 25: 213–214).

145. For this parallelism see also *DM V*, s. 5, n. 3 (Vivès, vol. 25: 178): “... Petrus et Paulus, ut abstrahunt ab actuali existentia, seu ut possibiles, intrinsece includunt suas rationes individuas, quibus distinguuntur.” The same distinction, i.e., the virtual one, between the common nature and the individual difference in the actually existent Peter must be considered also within the possible Peter. See *DM VI*, s. 3, n. 3 (Vivès, vol. 25: 212–213).

146. I am using here the neologism “antemental” to distinguish it from “extramental” usually signifying the extramental status of an *actual* being.

as being valid only of a nature with the unity of precision produced by the intellect. By contraction in particulars the nature becomes generable and corruptible; by being abstracted it becomes resistant to becoming (*feri*). If interpreted in this way, the negative proposition can be considered to be true because the prescinded nature abstracts from *hic et nunc* and thus from corruptibility. By receiving the rational unity of precision it becomes, at least negatively, ubiquitous and eternal.¹⁴⁷ Second, the given sentences can be explained unqualifiedly, sc. in the manner that the natures as such are in no way generated and corrupted. If read in that manner, the propositions are not true. It holds that at least by their existence in individuals they are subjected to *feri*. Therefore, at least secondarily, they are generable and corruptible. Thirdly, those propositions can be expounded as follows: “Nature as such is not generated (corrupted) essentially in the first mode (*per se primo modo*) but only by individuals in which it exists”. If interpreted in that manner, they can be considered true. However, then they do not concern the natures having the extramental unity of precision but only as existent in individuals. Suárez concludes his *reductio* of Fonseca’s antemental unity of precision by claiming that the above-mentioned predicates, in fact, do not require and do not belong to possible natures having this kind of unity but only to natures occurring in individuals or conceived by the intellect.¹⁴⁸

2.3.4 Suárez on the aptitude to being in the many

Despite no explicit reference to Fonseca in *DM VI*, s. 4 (unlike *DM VI*, s. 3), the whole *Dico secundo* can be considered as Suárez’s ongoing critique of Fonseca’s doctrine. The aptitude to being in the many cannot be understood as a property belonging to the common nature in itself (*secundum se*) prior to the operation

147. By using the term “negatively eternal” Suárez refers to Aquinas’s understanding in his *STh.* 1, q. 16, a. 7, ad 2: “[A]liquid esse semper et ubique, potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo, quia habet in se unde se extendat ad omne tempus et ad omnem locum, sicut Deo competit esse ubique et semper. Alio modo, quia non habet in se quo determinetur ad aliquem locum vel tempus, sicut materia prima dicitur esse una, non quia habet unam formam, sicut homo est unus ab unitate unius formae, sed per remotionem omnium formarum distinguendum. Et per hunc modum, quodlibet universale dicitur esse ubique et semper, inquantum universalia abstrahunt ab hic et nunc. Sed ex hoc non sequitur ea esse aeterna, nisi in intellectu, si quis sit aeternus” [<http://www.corpusthomicum.org/sth1015.html>]. For the critical edition see Thomas de Aquino, *Opera omnia*, t. 4–5: *Pars prima Summae theologiae* (ed. Leon., Rome 1888–1889). See also *DM VI*, s. 7, n. 7 (Vivès, vol. 25: 231).

148. *DM VI*, s. 3, n. 4 (Vivès, vol. 25: 213).

of the intellect.¹⁴⁹ First, if the nature can be considered as prescinded only intellectually, then the disposition to being in the many can belong to the nature only when abstracted by the intellect. Second, this disposition can belong to the nature considered either as (actually) existent, or as non-existent. It cannot pertain to it as existent since it does not exist unless it is made individual through identity. It cannot be said that it belongs to it as non-existent because, as stated, the same principle governs individuality and universality both in the order of actual and possible being. The aptitude in question thus cannot be explained as a property belonging to the nature independently of the intellect. Third, the aptitudinal mode of being in the many (as conceived by Fonseca) is not an item contained in Suárez's metaphysical system. The extrinsic mode can actually be considered only as a real being (parasitical to its *res*), which, however, is not incapable of existing *in actu*. By being called *real* and *positive*, the mode *ipso facto* must be included in the extension of real being. However, if *ex definitione* it cannot exist outside its causes, it makes no sense to say that it is real and independent of the intellect.¹⁵⁰

In addition to the first *Dico*, Suárez introduces two more conclusions. In the second (negative) statement (in his numbering the first one), this time focused against the ultrarealist interpretation of Duns Scotus, Suárez declares that the disposition of the common nature to being in many things is not something belonging to the nature itself as it exists on the part of the thing.¹⁵¹ The critique is underlined by an analogy with the hylemorphic principle of prime matter and substantial form. According to the advocates of this opinion the common nature of Peter retains its remote disposition to being in Paul in the same way as prime matter informed by the substantial form *X* keeps a remote ability to being informed by the substantial form *Y*. Even though it does not have the proximate potentiality to be under *Y* because it is impeded by the substantial form *X*, it can stand under *Y* provided that the substantial form *X* gets replaced by the substantial form *Y*. The same holds also for the aptitude to being in Paul of the nature standing under the individual difference of Peter. Suárez dismisses this analogy by alerting to the crucial distinction between those two types of composition. The hylemorphic composite, in where there is distinction between two incomplete beings or substances, is a

149. *DM VI*, s. 4, n. 6 (Vivès, vol. 25:216): "Dico secundo: aptitudo ad existendum in multis non est aliqua proprietas realis conveniens naturae communi secundum se ante operationem intellectus."

150. *DM VI*, s. 4, nn. 6–7 (Vivès, vol. 25:219–220).

151. *DM VI*, s. 4, n. 2 (Vivès, vol. 25:216): "Dico ergo primo: aptitudo naturae communis, ut sit in multis non est aliquid conveniens ipsi naturae, prout a parte rei existit." On the ultrarealist interpretation of Scotus, claiming that common nature exists in the singulars *per inexistentiam*, see the chapter on Matri's/Belluto's conception.

type of a real composition;¹⁵² the compound of the common nature and individual difference is only conceptual, though having a foundation in the thing. Hence, the common nature existing in Peter cannot lose the individual difference of Peter and acquire the different individual difference of Paul as it happens when successive exchange of substantial forms occurs in the numerically same prime matter.¹⁵³

Having eliminated two rival theories Suárez presents his own opinion that is divided into two parts. First, the disposition of the nature to being in the many is only the so-called indifference or non-repugnance having foundation in the nature in itself (*secundum se*). Second, *in actu* this indifference belongs to the nature inasmuch the nature undergoes abstraction by the intellect. By this dual conclusion, Suárez, as he himself acknowledges, endorses the position of Cajetan and other Thomists.¹⁵⁴ How does Suárez explicate the first part of this conclusion? He admits that the non-repugnance to being in the many, which is founded in the nature itself, admits of two different interpretations. First, it can be said that the non-repugnance to being in the many of itself and positively belongs to the nature by virtue of its formal unity. Predictably, Suárez finds this interpretation implausible. If it were so, the indifference in question would have to be inseparable from the nature and thus it would have to accompany it everywhere, i.e., also in extramental reality. Second, this claim can mean that the non-repugnance to being in the many is not something positive by virtue of formal unity, but only something negative by virtue of its formal unity taken precisely and absolutely (*ex vi unitatis suae formalis*

152. The contrast between the two types of composite is even more palpable if one takes into account Suárez's reification of prime matter. By virtue of this reification, prime matter having the entitative act (*actus entitativus*) can exist by divine intervention without any substantial form. See *DM* 15, s. 9 (Vivès, vol. 25: 532–536).

153. *DM* VI, s. 4, n. 2 (Vivès, vol. 25: 216–217). On the differences between physical and metaphysical composition see also *DM* XV, s. 9 (Vivès, vol. 25: 557–566). On Suárez's emphasis on the persistence of the numerically same prime matter in substantial change see *DM* XIII, s. 3, n. 13 (Vivès, vol. 25: 413). See also *DM* V, s. 6, n. 2 (Vivès, vol. 25: 413).

154. Thomas de Vio Caietanus, *De ente et essentia*, cap. 4, q. 6 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 1995, 244): "... aliud est dicere: natura humana existens extra animam secundum se est communis pluribus negative, seu indifferens negative. Et aliud est dicere, natura humana existens extra animam est communis pluribus seu indifferens negative, prima enim est vera, secunda vero est falsa." On my tentative interpretation, Cajetan's position, in contrast to Suárez, is open to two basically different interpretations. Though Cajetan seems to be inclined to admit the exposition espoused by Suárez that the feature "to be common negatively" pertains to nature existent in extramental singular things (*in re existens*), his accent on the aspect of the solitude of the nature can be exposed no less as evidence that he has in mind the nature absolutely considered, which is in a way close to Fonseca's exposition of the unity of precision. Concerning Suárez's difference from Cajetan in this issue see also Caruso 1979, 42.

precise sumptae). Suárez makes clear that only on this second interpretation can the first part of the conclusion be regarded as true. I have said that formal unity is of itself indifferent to individual unity. The repugnancy of the nature to being in the many thus comes to it not from formal unity but from individual unity and its principle of individuation. What is of supreme importance is that for Suárez the basis of the non-repugnancy to being in the many is not something that would exist exclusively as abstracted by the intellect in its isolation but as something *existing in the thing itself (in re existens)*.¹⁵⁵ This statement makes clear that Suárez, not differently from Scotus and Scotists, recognizes the nature's *remote* potency to being in the many. Nevertheless, in his turn to the entitative dimension, by which all the formalities are reduced to physical entities generating efficient causality, Suárez thinks of this remote potency not as of a metaphysical potency overlaid by the *ex natura rei* distinct metaphysical act, i.e., the haecceity, as the Scotists do, but only as of a natural condition peculiar to any finite nature. Due to that finitude, it is not repugnant for a created nature to be numerically multiplied within the same species.¹⁵⁶

The second part of Suárez's *Dico* results from the aforesaid reasoning. For the nature's actual non-repugnance to being in the many it is not enough not to be determined from itself provided that it has determination from elsewhere, that is,

155. *DM VI*, s. 4, n. 10 (Vivès, vol. 25:220): "Dico tertio: aptitudo naturae communis ut sit in multis solum est indifferentia quaedam seu non repugnantia, quae fundamentum habet in ipsa natura secundum se, actu vero non convenit illi nisi prout subest abstractioni intellectus. Haec assertio communis est; in eaque videntur convenire auctores citati, maxime Caietanus et alii Thomistae ... Duobus enim modis intelligi potest hanc indifferentiam convenire naturae secundum se. Primo, quod ipsa non repugnantia per se convenit naturae ex vi suae unitatis formalis. Et hic sensus est falsus; alias non repugnantia seu indifferentia (quod idem est) esset inseparabilis a natura, et consequenter natura, ut in re existens, haberet illam non repugnantiam, quod est aperte falsum; nam ut est in re, est ita intrinsece et per identitatem individua effecta ut illi repugnet esse in multis. Alio modo potest intelligi mere negative, scilicet, quod natura ex vi unitatis suae formalis praecise sumptae non habet repugnantiam ut sit in multis. Et hic sensus est verus. Ex quo facile patet conclusio, quoad utramque partem: nam imprimis fundatur talis non repugnantia sic explicata in ipsamet unitate formali quae ex se individua non est, et hoc modo dici potest natura, etiam in re existens, habere hanc non repugnantiam, quia etiam in re ipsa non est incommunicabilis ex vi unitatis formalis suae sed ex vi unitatis individualis; quamquam enim tota natura et unitas formalis quae est in individuo incommunicabilis sit eique repugnet esse in multis, nihilominus id non habet ex vi unitatis formalis naturae, sed ex individuatione."

156. *DM VI*, s. 4, n. 12 (Vivès, vol. 25:220–221): "... fundamentum remotum huius aptitudinis voco naturalem conditionem seu proprietatem talis naturae, ratione cuius non repugnat illi multiplicatio individuorum intra eandem speciem; haec autem proprietas non est aliqua aptitudo naturae communis ut sic, quae intelligatur quasi potentia quaedam actuabilis per plures differentias, sed solum est talis perfectio et limitatio huiusmodi naturae."

from an individual difference. In order to be actually non-repugnant it must be absolutely and entirely (*simpliciter*) indifferent. However, this kind of indifference can be attributed to the nature neither in the state of antemental existence prior to determination by individuals, nor in the condition of extramental existence in the things themselves, but only as existing objectively in the intellect.¹⁵⁷ Led by a conciliatory ethos, Suárez declares that this statement is commonplace and it can be attributed not only to Aristotle, Averroes, Albert the Great, Aquinas, Durandus, Giles of Rome and all the Thomists but even to Scotus, even though “verba ejus valde sint aequivoca.”¹⁵⁸

2.4 The metaphysical grades and their distinction

I have pointed out that individual unity differs from the unity of species in the same thing of the same species not by a distinction *ex natura rei* but only by a conceptual distinction with a foundation in the thing. Analogously to the discussion in *DM V*, s. 2¹⁵⁹ and *DM VI*, s. 1, in *DM VI*, s. 9¹⁶⁰ Suárez also proceeds from a Scotistic point of departure. In the preliminary clarification of the *status quaestionis* of the distinction between *gradus metaphysici*, Suárez indicates that he is going to research the character of the distinction between metaphysical grades in the same thing of the same species.¹⁶¹ By that he sets aside three other alternatives. The first concerns the juxtaposition of the grades inasmuch as they exist in different things whether of the same or different species. The distinction between the genus *animal* in Peter and *animal* in Bucephalus is an irrelevant way of confrontation since it apparently entails a real distinction.¹⁶² The second is related to the comparison of metaphysical grades as abstracted both from existence in the things and the intellect in the way in which Fonseca ascribes the unity of precision to universal things as being

157. *DM VI*, s. 4, n. 11 (Vivès, vol. 25:220).

158. *DM VI*, s. 5, n. 1 (Vivès, vol. 25:222).

159. This section contains a valuable critique of the Scotistic conception of the *ex natura rei* composition of common nature and individual difference. See *DM V*, s. 2, nn. 9–20 (Vivès, vol. 25:150–155).

160. This section is called *Quomodo in re distinguantur unitas generis et differentiae tam inter se, quam ab specifica unitate*.

161. *DM VI*, s. 9, n. 12 (Vivès, vol. 25:239): “Quarto itaque modo possunt haec comparari prout in re existunt in una et eadem specie et in uno et eodem individuo talis speciei, et hoc sensu revera intenditur haec comparatio in praesenti quaestione.”

162. *DM VI*, s. 9, n. 9 (Vivès, vol. 25:238–239).

prior to the intellect. The upshot of the preceding section devoted to the critique of Suárez's forerunner gives evidence that this state is of no relevance for the "Doctor Eximius".¹⁶³ Third, at least preliminarily for the sake of refutation of the Scotistic position, Suárez also puts aside the confrontation of genus and difference insofar as they are abstracted in the intellect.¹⁶⁴ The assumption of intentional existence would entail a shift in the current issue devoted to the ontological question concerning the nature of the distinction between the individual metaphysical grades in the thing itself independently of mental operation.

2.4.1 Scotistic arguments for the distinction *ex natura rei*

Before looking at the Scotist arguments presented by Suárez, a closer description of what *gradus metaphysici* actually is in place.¹⁶⁵ It is a part of common experience that things are given to us not wholly, so to say at one shot, but only partially and aspectually. We can know only a part of Peter, either his face, back, or profile. Peter is not present to us as he is to the Divine Eye. Human aspectual cognition has two sides, though. One results from our "situational" cognitive imperfection. Contrary to divine cognition, humans always take a certain point of view, from which only things can be approached. The other is connected with the things themselves which seem to have different aspects or "parts" by which they are disclosed to us. We may say that, on the psychologico-logical level, different predications such as "Peter is man", "Peter is animal", "Peter is sentient", "Peter is substance", "Peter is being" express different ways of Peter's "exposure" to us. If one presumes that the identity theory of predication, commonly accepted by all the moderate realists introduced in this book, is valid, then all those predicates have to be *in re* identical with Peter – they cannot be separated from him as the Platonic ideas are¹⁶⁶ –, which also means that the extramental counterparts of our predicates can be neither integral parts, such as a hand or a leg, nor real (physical) parts, such as

163. *DM* VI, s. 9, n. 10 (Vivès, vol. 25: 239): "Ostendimus enim nullum esse statum, in quo natura communis, quaecunque illa sit, habere possit aliquam unitatem praecisionis secluso intellectu, si ut in rebus ipsis existens illam habere non potest."

164. *DM* VI, s. 9, n. 11 (Vivès, vol. 25: 239): "[E]x hoc quod aliqua, ut objecta menti, ratione distinguantur, non potest aliqua distinctio in re inter ea colligi."

165. This description will also serve to set the general frame for the comparison with the conceptualist doctrine of Hurtado de Mendoza and for the theories of Poinset and Matri/Belluto.

166. For Suárez's rejection of the Platonic conception of separated universals see *DM* VI, s. 2, n. 2 (Vivès, vol. 25: 239).

body and soul. These physical essential parts cannot be predicated of a physical essential whole since no part as being really distinct from a whole is predicable of this whole. Hence, the predicated parts in question have to be of a different kind. In the scholastic tradition those parts are called “metaphysical grades”. They are called “metaphysical” because they transcend the physical realm. As such they can be found, for instance, in angelic substances as well; they are called “grades” because they stand in correspondence to the higher or determined (superior) and lower or determinative (inferior) predicates expressed in the Tree of Porphyry. Considering individual substances, the main focus of Suárez’s *DM VI*, s. 9, one may say that every individual thing is structured not only according to its physical parts but also according to its metaphysical parts. The title question of this section, then, is what sort of distinction is to be assumed between the metaphysical parts on the side of a thing of one and the same species in order to make propositions such as “Peter is rational” and “Peter is an animal” true.¹⁶⁷

From what has been stated above it can be deduced that Suárez (and the Scotists as well) dismiss the extreme position advocated by some Averroists such as John of Jandun (ca. 1286–1328) who accepted the theory of a plurality of forms, according to which metaphysical grades are distinguished within a thing as really distinct (physical) forms. According to this opinion, the generic and specific grades are taken from really distinct forms, *animality* from the sensitive and *rationality* from the rational soul. On this view, a definition is immediately connected not so much with metaphysics but rather with natural philosophy (physics). Suárez quickly denies this assumption. It is neither necessary nor correct. It is false because angels and accidents retain the genus/difference composition even though entitatively they are entirely simple. Moreover, if the unity of genus and species were derived from different forms, there would have to be one form “accountable” for the grade of *substance*, the next corresponding to the rational soul and a third one which would match the metaphysical part of *Petreity*.¹⁶⁸

Not only in *DM VI*, s. 9 but also in *DM VI*, s. 11 Suárez explicitly rejects the statement binding formal (whether generic or specific) unity directly with matter/form. The principle of formal unity of genus and species is always the whole essence and the nature of the thing, however, each time differently. The principle of generic unity is the whole essence with regard to its perfectibility and determinability; the principle of the unity of the specific difference or species is the nature with respect to its ultimate perfection. On all accounts, matter and form are for Suárez

167. For a systematic exposition of the issue of metaphysical grades see Sousedík 2006, 110–112.

168. *DM VI*, s. 9, n. 5 (Vivès, vol. 25:238).

the principles of formal and mediately also universal unity at most with regard to a certain *proportion* and *analogy*.¹⁶⁹

Although both Suárez and the Scotists deny that physical forms are direct counterparts of predicates,¹⁷⁰ the Scotists do not abandon the idea of the ontological foundation by means of the *ex natura rei* distinct metaphysical formalities. Suárez presents four arguments supporting the opinion that the generic and differential grades are *in re* distinguished by formal distinction.

1. The genus/difference composition is a true metaphysical composition that cannot be fabricated by the intellect. The genus/difference or species/individual composition must be a real and actual composition independently of the intellect, since this composition constitutes an important metaphysical indicator of the finiteness of all created beings.¹⁷¹ Contrary to the utmost simplicity and undefinability of the divine essence, finite essences are to be taken as definable and metaphysically composed. The virtual distinction, which does not allow for a plurality of formalities in the things themselves, is not a sufficient kind of compositionality since it does not constitute a true actual composition independently of the human intellect.¹⁷²
2. Things having essences which are in some way diverse are somehow distinct in reality.¹⁷³ But genus and difference are related in that way. Hence, genus and difference must be distinct in reality. The minor premise is proved from the features attributed to genus and difference by Aristotle. In the 7th book of his *Metaphysics* Aristotle says: “[T]he genus is not considered to partake of its differentiae, for then the same thing would be partaking simultaneously of contraries, since the differentiae by which the genus is distinguished are contrary”.¹⁷⁴ Difference stands beyond the notion of genus and genus as a metaphysical part of the metaphysical

169. *DM* VI, s. 11, n. 4 (Vivès, vol. 25: 248): “... materiam et formam, non secundum proprietatem physicam, sed secundum quamdam proportionem et analogiam esse principia a quibus genus et differentia sumuntur.” On the difference between physical/metaphysical wholes and physical/metaphysical forms and matter see also *DM* XV, s. 11, nn. 3–18 (Vivès, vol. 25: 558–563).

170. I leave aside the issue of the form of corporeity (*forma corporeitatis*) epitomizing the Scotistic exception. As a really distinct form, it is the physical principle of the predicate “corporeal”.

171. Contrary to Thomism, which adopts real distinction between essence and existence as the key “litmus paper” distinguishing created and uncreated beings, Scotus seems to take the composition/non-composition of specific nature/individual difference as the crucial discriminating feature.

172. *DM* VI, s. 9, n. 1 (Vivès, vol. 25: 237).

173. This argument will be of importance for Mastri/Belluto, who label it “ex via contradictionis”. For more on that see 4.3.2.

174. Aristoteles, *Metaphysics*, 1037b18–20 (Cambridge, Massachusetts/London 1938, 373).

whole of species does not actually include its differences. If genus partook of its difference, it would be partaking of contraries, which would make it a contradictory item. The differences *rationalis* and *irrationalis* dividing the genus *animal* are contraries and thus cannot be of the essence of *animal*. If *rationalis* partook of the essence of *animal*, then *animal* could never be “formed” by the difference *irrationalis* since opposites exclude each other in the same thing. On the other hand, if the differences included genus, then the genus would be a transcendental notion, which is intrinsically included in all its inferiors. That would, however, destroy the basic difference between transcendental and categorial concepts.¹⁷⁵

3. There is no greater sign of a distinction *ex natura rei* between two grades than their separability. Things which are separated in reality must be somehow distinct in reality as well. But the metaphysical grade *animal* can exist not only in Peter but also in Bucephalus, where it exists without the differential grade *rationalis*. Besides, there must be an *ex natura rei* distinction since *animal* is the *ratio conveniendi* between Peter and Bucephalus, whereas the difference *rationalis* is the *ratio disconveniendi*. One and the same formality cannot ground real similarity and dissimilarity. Agreement and disagreement must be founded on the diverse *rationes* in reality. Moreover, the difference determines (contracts) the genus. It means that they are related as the determining and determinable elements, the nexus of which corresponds to the extramental order of things.

4. Propositions employing abstract terms such as “Animality is rationality” are false. This falsity is a result of the existence of formal distinction obtaining between the metaphysical grades of animality and rationality. If they were in reality entirely the same, the affirmation would be true. But it holds that the terms signify abstractly and precisely, i.e., with the exclusion of the lower grades. Therefore *animalitas* and *rationalitas* must be distinct in the same thing *ex natura rei*.¹⁷⁶

The same conclusion holds also for genus and difference taken one by one in respect to species (admittedly, all considered as first intentions or *metaphysical parts*). Though species as a metaphysical whole is not distinct from genus and difference insofar as they are taken at once (a whole is composed of its parts), it is distinct from them *ex natura rei* as the including from the included.¹⁷⁷ If *man*

175. DM VI, s. 9, n. 2 (Vivès, vol. 25: 237).

176. DM VI, s. 9, n. 3 (Vivès, vol. 25: 237).

177. As specified, I do not speak here about the potential universal whole (a generic or specific concept, of which “subjective” parts are the inferiors) or the logical essential whole but about the metaphysical essential *actual* whole composed of the metaphysical essential parts, which are related as the determined (animality) and determining part (rationality).

and *animal* were not distinct in the thing, then *horse* and *animal* would not be either. However, then it would not be possible to distinguish *horse* and *man* since it commonly holds that whenever two things are the same as a third thing, they are the same among themselves. But if *man* and *animal* are the same in reality, whatever is of the essence of *man* and of *horse* will be of the essence of *animal* as well. Moreover, if *animal* were in reality the same as *man* and *horse*, the term *animal* would thus cease to be applied univocally. The tenor of the Scotistic argument is that by setting aside the *ex natura rei* distinction one would lose the possibility to distinguish between univocal and analogical (equivocal) terms.¹⁷⁸

2.4.2 Suárez on the distinction between the metaphysical grades

Much like in the case of formal unity, Suárez dismisses the above-mentioned arguments for *distinctio formalis* between the metaphysical grades. Leaving aside the opinion claiming that the metaphysical grades differ neither in reality nor in the mind but only verbally, labeled by him as “vix autem credible,”¹⁷⁹ Suárez introduces three convoluted arguments for the conclusion that metaphysical parts are distinguished only conceptually with a foundation in the thing.

1. *From the single and simple individual difference.* Suárez affirms that there cannot be any other actual distinction between the *gradus metaphysici* than a conceptual distinction with a foundation in the thing because the individual difference, being only conceptually different from the specific nature (as stated in *DM* V, 2), is the only and most simple difference in the whole substance. Provided there is no multitude of individual differences in a substance, one of which could be taken as individuating the specific grade, another the generic one, etc., one loses any reason to consider any *ex natura rei* distinction between them. According to Suárez, as we know, the *ex natura rei* distinction can enter *only* between individual (complete) things or incomplete substances (the real fully-fledged distinction between two *res*) or between a thing and a mode (the modal distinction between *res* and mode).¹⁸⁰ However, if there is only one individual difference in a substance, the other (higher) grades can be distinct only by a distinction obtaining between the individual difference and the (proximate) specific grade, since the generic grades

178. *DM* VI, s. 9, n. 4 (Vivès, vol. 25:237–238).

179. *DM* VI, s. 9, n. 7 (Vivès, vol. 25:238).

180. This ontological assumption is of course related to the above-mentioned uncharitable reduction of the Scotistic formal distinction to the fully-fledged real distinction.

are individuated only through the mediation of the individuated species. *Animal* in Peter is contracted not directly and immediately by the individual difference except through the mediating specific difference *man*. The metaphysical grade of *body* (*corpus*) is not determined by the difference of *animal* except through the medium of the difference “living” (*vivens*), etc. Therefore, there is only one indivisible individual difference contracting both *man* to *this man* and *animal* to *this animal*. And thus there can be no stronger distinction between *animal* and *rational* than occurs between *man* and *Petreity*. However, that distinction is a conceptual distinction with a foundation in the thing.¹⁸¹

2. *From a single and simple physical principle (the soul)*. The second argument (targeted also against the opinion endorsing the plurality of forms) is based on the premise that all the metaphysical grades are rooted in a unique common soul. The rational soul is a simple form, which does not contain *ex natura rei* distinct formalities.¹⁸² The rational soul is the root of the manifold human operations, i.e., the vegetative, sensitive and rational (discursive) ones, without containing any actual distinction between different formalities connected with the vegetative, sensitive and rational soul.¹⁸³ The rational soul is an eminent whole, the universal and radical principle of *all* its operations. Whereas in the effects the acts are distinct and plural, in the cause they actually are one and the same.¹⁸⁴

181. *DM* VI, s. 9, n. 15 (Vivès, vol. 25: 240): “Potest igitur probari primo ex individuatione, quia in uno individuo una omnino et eadem est ac simplicissima individualis differentia contrahens proxime et immediate ultimam speciem, et cum illa ac per illam consequenter determinans omnes superiores gradus; ergo non possunt illi gradus inter se magis distinguui, quam unusquisque a sua differentia individuali distinguatur; sed nullus eorum distinguitur ex natura rei a sua differentia individuali, ut probatum est; ergo nec inter se distinguuntur ex natura rei in eodem individuo.”

182. It must be noted that just this argument will be employed by Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza a couple of years after Suárez’s *DM*. For more on that see 2.6.

183. Suárez, *Commentaria una cum quaestionibus in libros Aristotelis “De anima”*, disp. 2, q. 5, n. 4 (further I quote in the abbreviated form: *DA* 2, 5, 4).

184. *DM* VI, s. 9, n. 17 (Vivès, vol. 25: 241): “Secundo, probatur assertio posita, in uno individuo, verbi gratia, Petro, esse hoc animal, et esse hunc hominem, ab eodem physico principio proveniunt, scilicet, ab hanc anima ... sed in hac anima, verbi gratia, Petri, esse rationalem, sensitivam et vegetativam (sive formaliter, sive eminenter), non sunt gradus distincti ex natura rei; ergo nec gradus hominis et animalis distinguuntur ullo modo in Petro ... Igitur anima rationalis per suam entitatem in re omnino eandem et simplicem, est principium radicale omnium humanarum operationum absque ulla distinctione actuali, quae in ipsa sit, ut habet rationem talis principii, quamvis per conceptus inadaequatos possit a nobis multipliciter concipi, atque ita ratione distinguui in ordine ad varias operationes.”

3. *From the ontological “economy” of Suárez’s project.* The abstraction of genera and species has a sufficient basis in the intellect and in the things without the assumption of an actual distinction independent of the intellect. The similarity of things together with their dissimilarity is sufficient ground for the intellectual isolation of the *ratio conveniendi*. No actual distinction between the common and proper levels in things is necessary. The “discovery” of the actual items and the less than numerical distinction is nothing but the result of the projection of entities that originate in our manner of speaking and conceiving into extramental reality. The similarity of things is not to be explained by extramental partial identity since the very same thing can be both the principle of agreement and the principle of disagreement with other things. By way of analogy with the transcendental grades, which brings Suárez’s conception of the distinction between categorial grades close to that of the distinction between transcendental grades,¹⁸⁵ the Jesuit states that God and creatures agree under the aspect of a “real being” and differ in the notion of “such a being” without there being an *ex natura rei* distinction between the common and proper notion both on the part of God and creatures.¹⁸⁶

Suárez’s replies to the four Scotistic arguments manifest the Jesuit’s extensive employment of the distinction between two kinds of composition – real composition and conceptual composition with a foundation in the thing.¹⁸⁷ They also show how much Suárez withdraws from Scotistic premises.

In his reply to the first argument Suárez states that the metaphysical genus/difference composition contradicts God not only because of His metaphysical simplicity but chiefly because of His infinity. Because of His infinity the genus/difference composition cannot be ascribed to God. Such composition assumes a distinction between potential (perfectible) and actual (perfecting) *rationes* in the thing. However, as stated in 2.3.4, such perfectibility cannot be found in the divine infinity and illimitability. Because of this infinity one cannot abstract a *ratio* which would be strictly univocal with creatures.¹⁸⁸

185. Nevertheless, categorial and transcendental concepts cannot be considered as standing exactly on the same logical and ontological level. Concerning the distinction between categorial and transcendental notions see *DM VI*, s. 8, n. 12 (Vivès, vol. 25: 242). See also 2.6 of this work.

186. *DM VI*, s. 9, n. 19 (Vivès, vol. 25: 242).

187. For a detailed comparison of these two kinds of compositionality see esp. *DM XV*, s. 11 (Vivès, vol. 25: 557–566). For an exegesis of this passage see Åkerlund 2009, 159–182 and Hattab 2009, 53–64.

188. *DM VI*, s. 9, n. 21 (Vivès, vol. 25: 243).

If the second Scotistic argument claims that genus and difference have different essences, this statement holds only if they are considered with regard to reason.¹⁸⁹ Only when standing under abstract (formal) concepts it may be said that one grade is not included formally in the other. The fact that difference remains outside the *ratio* of genus means nothing but that it is not included in the *objective concept* of genus and not that it stands beyond it in the thing independently of intellectual operation.¹⁹⁰ This non-inclusion in the objective concept is enough to compare them by the way of potency/act or, as Suárez says in *DM XV*, s. 11, in the manner of metaphysical matter/metaphysical form, which is matter and form according to reason.¹⁹¹ These “hylemorphic (metaphysical) principles” thus compose a unity *per se* since in reality (*secundum re*) they are one and the same thing. In reality they constitute an even tighter unity than the one proper to the substantial unity of physical matter and form. Whereas real (physical) composition requires the substantial mode of unification, by which the matter and the form are connected, rational composition (with a foundation in the thing) does without that mode.¹⁹²

In his response to the third argument Suárez avers that there is no identical *animal* in reality existing both in *man* and *horse*. *Animal* insofar as it is a *parte rei* in *man* conjoined with the difference *rational* is not separable from this difference. From the viewpoint of things, *animal* in *man* and *horse* is not one and the same entity. In reality, the genus insofar it exists in different species includes the opposite differences. The genus *animal* in respect to the different species (*man* and *horse*) is identical only according to reason. Only when genus and difference are conceived as standing under different formal concepts can it be said that the difference is not of the essence of the genus and the genus is not of the essence of the differences.¹⁹³

In compliance with his rejection of the pro-Scotistic arguments on behalf of the formal distinction in the metaphysical make-up of things, Suárez asserts that an ontological commitment to formal distinction entailed by the semantics of propositions such as “Animality is rationality” is far from being necessary. Referring to Aquinas’s *De ente et essentia* and Cajetan’s Commentary on the same treatise he

189. See *DM VI*, s. 9, n. 24 (Vivès, vol. 25:244).

190. *DM VI*, s. 9, n. 23 (Vivès, vol. 25:243–244). The objective concept in this context must be, as the following section makes clear, primarily taken as an intelligible aspect of a thing focused by the attentive act of the mind (formal concept). Only if taken in this sense can Suárez’s theory still be seen as an answer to the question of comparing metaphysical grades in so far as they exist in one and the same individual of the same species.

191. *DM XV*, s. 11, n. 12 (Vivès, vol. 25:561).

192. *DM XV*, s. 11, n. 14 (Vivès, vol. 25:561–562).

193. *DM VI*, s. 9, n. 25 (Vivès, vol. 25:244).

says that the proposition is false not because of the occurrent distinction *ex natura rei* but only on the grounds of the specific mode of signification (*ob modum significandi*) of the abstract terms.¹⁹⁴ By reference to the special mode of signification *in abstracto* Suárez makes use of the special type of abstraction called formal abstraction (*abstractio formalis*). By this abstraction, as Suárez notes in *De anima*, one does not properly form the universal but grasps only the proper *ratio* excluding everything not contained in the constitutive essence of the thing.¹⁹⁵ The metaphysical part of *rationality* acquired by this abstraction comes to signify the rational nature only in a part-like manner. However, as already stated, the nature signified by an abstract term as a part of a subject can neither be predicated of another part nor of the whole of which it is a part.¹⁹⁶

194. An abstract term, unlike a concrete term, signifies only a form without an adjacent subject. In Second scholasticism two types of abstract terms were commonly distinguished. One were metaphysical abstracts (*abstracta metaphysica*), the other physical abstracts (*abstracta physica*). While the first, for instance animality or rationality, are abstracted by ultimate abstraction, the other ones, such as whiteness (*albedo*), are not, since they abstract only from the concrescence with an adjacent subject (as grown together with the subject they are signified by the concrete term *album*) and not from individual whiteness. Abstraction from individual whiteness is brought about by a further abstraction entailing the abstract term *albedineitas*, whiteness as such. See *DM VI*, s. 10, nn. 1 and 3 (Vivès, vol. 25: 245).

195. *DA* 9, 3, 18: "Formalis est illa qua uniuscuiusque rei propria ratio concipitur, praescindendo illam ab omnibus adiunctis, quomodo in scientiis abstrahimus essentiam a proprietatibus, genus a differentia, etc, ut uniuscuiusque rei essentiam consideremus, et haec formalis abstractio distinctionem aliquam supponit inter rem abstractam et illam a qua abstrahitur; unde non proprie causat illam, sed concipit. Abstractio vero universalis est propria abstractio superioris ut sic ab inferioribus. Dico 'ut sic', nam superius potest abstrahi praecise, considerando illud secundum ea tantum quae ex propriis actualiter habet, excludendo omnino inferiora. Et haec etiam est abstractio formalis, quia per illam non consideratur res ut universalis est, sed praecise secundum propriam formalitatem. Alio tamen modo abstrahitur superius, ita ut in potentia et in confuso claudat inferiora. Et haec proprie dici solet abstractio confusa et universalis, quia in illa concipitur res ut universalis et communis."

196. See *DM VI*, s. 10, n. 2 (Vivès, vol. 25: 245). The 10th section *Utrum abstracta metaphysica generum et specierum, et differentiarum vere possint inter se praedicari* of *DM VI*, however, contains not only a reply to the Scotistic argument for formal distinction between *gradus metaphysici*, but also Suárez's ontologico-semantic theory of the verification of predications with abstract terms. Distinguishing between propositions employing predicates *in quale* (rationality) and *in quid* (animality, humanity), Suárez says that propositions such as "Humanity is rationality", "Animality is rationality" are to be regarded as false. Nevertheless, in the exposition of the proposition such as "Humanity is animality" Suárez actually admits both the falsity and the truth of the proposition. Although the interpretation of the proposition "Humanity is animality" cannot be taken as true, the term animality, as we know, excludes inferior grades such as humanity and thus signifies in a part-like manner, Suárez asserts that the metaphysical abstract term

Having gone through the Jesuit's opinion, arguments and replies to the Scotistic theory, one important thing must be said by way of conclusion. Contrary to the Thomists (including Poinset), Suárez's theory, at least in one aspect, appears confusing. Though he introduces the whole issue as one concerning the distinction between metaphysical grades *in the thing* of the same species, Suárez seems to end with an answer to the query about the *logical* structure of the common nature.¹⁹⁷ Suárez's claims about the conceptual distinction, though with a foundation in the thing, seem to suggest that what he has in mind is the logical structure of the common nature or the essential logical parts inasmuch as they are *in* the intellect. Does Suárez stealthily shift the discussion from metaphysics to logic? I do not think so. As the following section shows, the conceptual distinction with a foundation in the thing and the objective concept, its important correlate, as such do not entail the production of a being of reason. Even though Suárez himself in *DM* XI, s. 11 employs *promiscue* the terms metaphysical/logical composition and metaphysical/logical form/matter (difference/genus), he still remains on the level of reflections on the metaphysical universal acquired by a direct (non-reflexive) abstractive act of the intellect, which (as shown below) is equivalent to an extrinsic denomination of the intellect.¹⁹⁸ The proper elucidation

humanity can also denote the form of the whole (*forma totius*) including not only the grades of rationality but also animality. *Humanity* thus can signify the whole nature composed of matter/form, containing thus all its metaphysical grades including *animality*. Moreover, Suárez makes obvious that from natures conceived abstractly by means of formal abstraction separating them from their supposit one can, in the next step, abstract the generic concept *animality* common to all of those abstract specific terms such as *humanity* and *equinity*. This concept can well be predicated of those inferiors because all are confusedly and potentially included in it. In sum, even though the metaphysical abstracts signify only a part which is not predicable of a whole, if related to the total form of a thing the given abstract term includes confusedly all its (inferior) determinations. In the same manner, one can also predicate the specific metaphysical abstracts of the individual metaphysical abstracts such as *humanity* of Peter's *humanity* or of that of Jesus Christ. See *DM* VI, s. 10, nn. 4–7 (Vivès, vol. 25: 245–247). For a similar “double teaching” in Poinset distinguishing the specificative (conceding true predication) and reduplicative signification (excluding it) see Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 5, art. 4 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 367–369). Concerning Poinset see also Peroutka 2012, 202.

197. For a clear differentiation of these two kinds of whole and parts in Aquinas see Svoboda 2012c, 143–152.

198. On the other hand, I do not deny that Suárez's emphasis on the conceptual distinction at the cost of much less frequent employment of the notion of its foundation, i.e., the virtual distinction, cannot be seen as a tendency to abandon the view of potential discriminability of the metaphysical grades and thus leading into the conceptualism of Hurtado de Mendoza. Despite this tendency I nevertheless prefer to interpret Suárez as not deserting the realm of moderate realism. A substantiation of this preference will be given especially in 2.6.

tion of the nature of this (and other) cognitive operations essential for the kind of moderate realism advocated by Suárez, however, requires an exposition of the basic features of the Jesuit's cognitive theory.

2.5 The epistemology of universals

Apart from the metaphysical and semantic facets of the issue of universals, which make up the most extensive part of *DM VI*, the whole 6th section *Per quam operationem intellectus fiant res universales* is devoted to the subject matter of the psychogenesis of universals. Segments of *DM VI*, ss. 7–8 also treat the problem of the ontology and epistemology of the logical intentions (concepts). The ontological status of the logical intentions cannot be synoptically expounded without an introduction of the relevant doctrinal points of Suárez's cognitive psychology. A sketch of the theory of intellectual knowledge, the only kind capable of the formation of universality, is immediately defining for the topic of intellectual cognition of material (sensible) singulars, which, as some scholars contend, is to be regarded as the point of departure or the axis of Suárez's whole epistemological system.¹⁹⁹ An analysis of the theory of *cognitio singularis*, the starting point of Suárez's *cognitio universalis*, however, cannot be elucidated without presenting some features of his cognitive psychology connected with the principles, powers and terms of intellectual knowledge.

In this section I first lay out three bundles of aspects of cognitive psychology constituting the systematic background of Suárez's theory of the intellection of material singulars (2.5.1). In 2.5.2 I present Suárez's arguments for his theory of the direct intellection of material singulars by means of the proper (singular) species. Third, I describe the two kinds of intellectual operation accountable for the psychogenesis of universality. Lastly, I provide ontological assessment of Suárez's theory of intentions supplemented by his theory of the "essence" of the logical universal (2.5.4).

2.5.1 Features of Suárez's cognitive psychology: Intellectual knowledge

In his analysis of human cognition Suárez applies the same set of the conceptual tools as the majority of other mainstream scholastics – the cognitive powers, habitus, cognitive act (*intellectio*), impressed intelligible species (*species impressa*), expressed intelligible species (*species expressa*) and cognized thing (*res cognita*).

199. Alejandro 1948, 358: "El singular directamente conocido, es el eje de la gnoseología suareciana ...".

Contrary to divine supreme simplicity, the cognitive powers of finite beings are really (*realiter*) different both from the soul and among themselves.²⁰⁰ The intentional species is conceived as an intermediary between the intellect and the *res cognita* represented by the species.²⁰¹ The intellection or cognitive act is considered to be a categorial quality *realiter* distinct from the cognitive powers. The agent intellect is neither God (Alexander of Aphrodisias), nor a separate substance (Avicenna), nor a human power common to the whole of mankind (Averroes), but an intellectual faculty of a human individual.²⁰² Intellective cognition originates in sensory perception and is properly realized not by (and in) the agent intellect but by (and in) the potential intellect.²⁰³

The systematic context of *cognitio singularis* requires an exposition of the following three topics: (1) definition of cognition and characterization of its principles; (2) exposition of the abstractive and cognitive functions of the agent/potential intellect; (3) explication of the character of the expressed species or the formal concept (*conceptus formalis*) and its relation to intellection.

1. In keeping with the basic assumption of scholastic cognitive realism, which is broadly shared by all the authors treated in this book, Suárez conceives cognition as an assimilative process of a cognitive power with an extramental object. Contrary to the opinion of authors who dismissed the mediating role of the impressed species – Henry of Ghent (ca. 1217–1293), Godfrey of Fontaines (before 1250–ca. 1306), Ockham –, according to Suárez assimilation can proceed only by means of the impressed species, which is a formal likeness (*similitudo*) of the thing.²⁰⁴ From the ontological point of view, the impressed species (both the sensible and the intelligibile one) is equivalent to an entity of the category of quality, a kind of disposition. As such it disposes a cognitive power to a cognitive act, which in case of rational knowledge is the elicitation of intellection.²⁰⁵ The

200. DA 3, 1, 7.

201. DA 5, 1, 3.

202. DA 2, 4.

203. DA 9, 8, 15.

204. DA 5, 1, 3: “Sit tamen prima conclusio: Unio obiecti cognoscibilis cum potentia est necessaria in omni cognitione. Haec est communis fere omnium philosophorum et theologorum qui in potentiis cognoscitivis ponunt similitudines quasdam obiectorum, ut per illas obiecta uniantur potentiis; et eas vocant species intentionales.”

205. DA 5, 2, 3: “Prima conclusio: Omnes istae species sunt accidentia quaedam.”; DA 5, 2, 23: “Item, nam haec res, quae est species, essentialiter est qualitas; ergo debet esse in aliqua specie qualitatis, et maxime in specie dispositionis, nam disponit ad operari.”

entitative identification of the intentional species with a categorial quality by no means denies its crucial, i.e., representative function.²⁰⁶ However, rather symptomatically, by this identification Suárez comes to reject the theory of two really distinct aspects within the species, i.e., that of entity and that of representation.²⁰⁷ As opposed to Cajetan (one of the key opponents in Suárez's treatment of intellectual cognition), Suárez does not understand the unity between the cognitive act and the conceived thing as a kind of unity which is greater or more intimate than the substantial unity of prime matter and substantial form in a material composite.²⁰⁸ The cognitive assimilation results in nothing more than an accidental union (*unio accidentalis*).²⁰⁹ Cajetan's theory that cognitive assimilation ultimately leads to a unification tighter than the substantial union of prime matter and substantial form – the soul of the cognizant is immaterially becoming the cognized object – can be regarded at most as a mere metaphorical expression.²¹⁰ The determination of the cognitive power can proceed only by a real action and real modification. That is also why the impressed species – likened to semen – as

206. DA 5, 2, 21: "Quarta conclusio: Ista species intentionales sunt similitudines formales obiectorum."

207. DA 5, 2, 24: "... divisio illa communis, qua species intentionalis distingui solet in esse qualitatis, et in esse repraesentativo, non est propria ..."

208. Thomas de Vio Caietanus, *Summa totius theologiae S. Thomae de Aquino cum commentariis*, p. 1, q. 14, a. 1 (Venice 1588; reprint: Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2000, 57): "Quod cognoscens est ipsum cognitum actu, vel potentia. Materia autem nunquam est ipsa forma. Ex hac differentia quoad esse, sequitur differentia quoad unitatem: quod scilicet: cognoscens, & cognitum sunt magis unum, quam materia, & formam ... quia ex intellectu, & intellecto, non fit tertium sicut ex materia, & forma: assignando enim pro ratione maiori unitatis exclusionem tertii, aperte docuit unitatem consistere in hoc, quia unum est aliud. Unde Arist. in 3. de anim. hoc idem predocuit dicens: quod anima est omnia sensibilia & intelligibilia ... Cognoscens autem recipiens cognitum non recipit ipsum propter operationem alicuius compositi, resultantis ex eis: neque propter operationem ipsi cogniti: sed propter specificationem proprie operationis ipsius cognoscentis. Visus enim recipit visibile, propter species visionis: quam constat esse visus propriam operationem. Nec obstat, quod visibile ut receptum in visu sit accidens, & visus sit subiectum: quoniam hoc est per accidens, i. e. ex necessitate materiae: & non est per se primo intentum: forma enim, intentio seu species visibilis, non inquantum accidens, sed inquantum visibile, transiens in visum specificat." Hereafter I quote only in the following form: Thomas de Vio Caietanus, *STh.* 1, q. 14, a. 1 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2000, 57).

209. DA 5, 2, 4: "... unio inter potentiam et speciem intentionalem est accidentalis, qualis esse solet inter accidens et subiectum ..."

210. DA 5, 2, 4: "... quomodo intelligi potest quod intellectus fit ipsa essentia? Nullo modo, nisi forte metaphorice nimium."

the functional principle in the specification of mental acts does not contribute to the production of cognitive acts formally but effectively.²¹¹

Apart from cognitive powers and intentional species, which are material and divisible in the case of sensible species and immaterial in the case of the intelligible,²¹² another cognitive factor is the cognitive act. The cognitive act is considered by Suárez to be a quality distinct from the cognitive power inasmuch as it is informed by the intentional species.²¹³ The cognitive act cannot be understood, as it seems to be in Aquinas, as being triggered only by the impressed species.²¹⁴ That would make cognition a purely passive operation proceeding in a “behaviorist” manner. The cognitive act is above all a vital immanent act which is not a passive response to external stimuli. Cognition is not *pati* but the supreme manifestation of life. If the species were the only cause of the elicitation of the cognitive act, then cognition would have to follow immediately after the reception of the intentional species. That does not accord with our experience, though. Without conscious attention, the intentional species received by sight does not lead to a visual act (*visio*). What is needed is the attention of the soul.²¹⁵

Much in line with Scotus, Suárez affirms that the integral principle of the cognitive act is the cognitive potency informed by a species. The two are seen as necessary co-principles.²¹⁶ The cognitive power is conceived as the superior one, the species as the subordinate one. But although Suárez follows the theory of Scotus, considered as adopting a middle position between the “passivist” theories

211. *DA* 5, 2, 6: “... species concurrat effective ad actum; ergo non est causa formalis ...” See also Spruit 1995, 297–300.

212. *DA* 5, 2, 17.

213. *DA* 5, 3, 2: “Actus cognoscendi est specialis qualitas realiter distincta a potentia, ut specie informata.”

214. Thomas de Aquino, *STh.* 1, q. 79, a. 2, *corpus*: “Sic igitur patet quod intelligere nostrum est quoddam pati ...” See also Thomas de Vio Caietanus, *STh.* 1, q. 79, a. 2 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2000, 259–260).

215. *DA* 5, 4, 5: “... si sola species esset tota ratio agendi, ageret ut naturale agens, et posita specie in potentia, statim naturaliter sequeretur actio. Consequens est contra experientiam, quia licet recipiam species in oculo non video, si non attendo.” *DA* 5, 4, 10: “Potentia cognoscitiva habet propriam et immediatam activitatem circa actum suum.” This omnipresent emphasis on the aspect of attention and the cognitive activism makes Suárez (at least in cognitive psychology) a true Renaissance philosopher. On the dynamism of the sensory powers among Renaissance authors (Nicholas of Cusa, Marsilio Ficino, Bernardino Telesio) see Spruit 2008.

216. *DA* 5, 4, 15: “Principium integrum productivum cognitionis est potentia informata specie ... Et haec est intentio Scoti ...”

typical of Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy and the “activist” theories appropriated by Augustinians one-sidedly accentuating the activity of the soul,²¹⁷ the doctrinal agreement, on my reading, is not unconditional. On an imaginary scale of cognitive theories ranked by the degree of cognitive activity and passivity, Suárez places the opinion of Henry of Ghent entirely in the “activist” field. For Henry the species cannot be even an instrumental principle since the cognitive act, being a vital act, is more perfect than the “dead” intentional species.²¹⁸ It holds that a less perfect thing cannot cause a more perfect one.²¹⁹ Suárez seems to have a liking for his theory. Henry also views the act of cognition as the supreme expression of life. Nevertheless, Suárez comes with a distinction of two implicit meanings in Henry’s statement. (i) A less perfect entity cannot co-produce a more perfect entity as the total immediate principle (whether principal or instrumental) of the cognitive act; and (ii) a less perfect entity cannot co-produce a more perfect entity as partially completing the immediate instrument of the cognitive act. When taken in the first meaning Suárez agrees with Henry. Indeed, in this case the species cannot concur with the cognitive power in the production of the cognitive act. But when considered according to the second meaning Suárez does not hesitate to reject his view. The cognitive power informed by the species constitutes the integral instrument by means of which *the soul* operates and elicits the cognitive acts.²²⁰

2. Suárez’s emphasis on cognitive activity is observable also in his doctrine of the agent/potential intellect. He declines the theory of a real distinction between the two intellects advocated by the Thomists.²²¹ He considers the opinion of Agostino

217. For this dichotomy see also Chabada 2005, 113–126 and 2007, 56–60.

218. DA 5, 4, 8: “Nihilominus est alia sententia, quae asserit speciem nullo modo concurrere active, sed solam potentiam habere totam activitatem respectu actionis. Tenet Henricus, Quodl. 4, q 7.”

219. DA 5, 4, 8: “... actus cognoscendi est perfectior qualitas quam ipsa species; non ergo potest species effective concurrere ad productionem illius ...”

220. DA 5, 4, 16: “Ideo respondetur, quod res imperfectior non potest attingere productionem perfectioris tamquam totale principium immediatum neque principale neque instrumentale, naturaliter loquendo, tamen potest attingere ut partialiter complens immediatum instrumentum ... Potentia cognoscitiva specie informata est unum integrum instrumentum per quod anima operatur; species autem non est instrumentum potentiae, ita ut ipsa potentia utatur specie, et sola ipsa species attingit immediate productionem actus cognoscendi.” On the importance of the issue of the spontaneity and receptivity of cognition in Second scholasticism see also Leinsle 2006, 431.

221. Thomas de Vio Caietanus, *De ente et essentia*, cap. 4, q. 7 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 1995, 249): “... necessarium enim est ut dicatur 3. de Anima, tex. Com. 17 in anima nostra esse

Nifo (ca. 1473–1545?) that there is a conceptual distinction to be probable.²²² At least three reasons for the conclusion can be found in Suárez's reasoning.

- A. *Nivelization of differences between the two intellects.* There cannot be a real distinction between the agent and the potential intellect since the potential intellect is not entirely passive and the agent intellect is not only active.²²³ Aristotle's analogy of the potential intellect with prime matter must be taken only in a narrow sense, i.e., in the sense of the intellect's original privation of the intelligible species. The intellect cannot be considered as a projective screen, which only receives the intelligible species. Above all, it is an active source from which the intelligible species emanate.²²⁴
- B. *Inefficiency of the agent intellect in afterlife.* The agent intellect, considered to be really distinct from the potential intellect, would be essentially vacuous when part of the intellect of a separated soul. In that disembodied state this intellect would be useless because there would be no need to convert sensibles into intelligibles.²²⁵
- C. *Rejection of the non-reified act-potency scheme.* What is considered by the Thomists to be a crucial philosophical principle, i.e., the act-potency scheme grounded in the assumption of a real distinction between them, is in Suárez, euphemistically speaking, modified. Being influenced by Scotus, Suárez disrupts the universal validity of the axiom that the mover and the movable have

duos intellectus, scilicet agentem & possibilem: qui non possunt esse eadem potentia cum potentia activa & potentia passiva non sint eadem apud Arist.

222. *DA* 9, 8, 18: "[E]adem potentia potest esse activa specierum, et ut sic dicitur intellectus agens, et operativa per illas, et sic dicitur intellectus possibilis." *DA* 9, 10, 8: "Ex quibus omnibus constat potentiam intellectivam esse unicam significatam diversis nominibus, iuxta diversos conceptus inadaequatos intellectus nostri." See also South 2001, 150.

223. Concerning this observation see also Fuetscher 1933, 271.

224. *DA* 9, 8, 18: "Intellectus autem noster et ex natura sua speciebus caret, in quo et a perfectione angeli declinat, habet tamen convenientiam aliquam cum illo, scilicet quod statim ac anima nostra cognoscit per phantasiam rem aliquam, dimanat ab ipso intellectu species representans rem illam. Unde haec efficientia potius est per modum cuiusdam emanationis speciei ab intellectu ..." As regards the Cartesian connotation of this claim evoking innatism see Abercrombie 1938, 86 and Heider 2011b, 884–886.

225. *DA* 9, 8, 18: "Et confirmatur haec opinio, nam intellectus agens post hanc vitam manebit vacuus et sine actione, quod est magnum inconveniens, si est potentia realiter distincta; erit ergo virtus eiusdem potentiae."

to be two really distinct principles.²²⁶ Taking the real distinction to be a distinction between two *res* (*quod*) and not between two principles (*quo*), Suárez eliminates a whole range of “real distinctions”, which can be regarded as pillars of Thomism, not only in metaphysics but also in epistemology. One of them is the real distinction between the two intellects. Provided that a real distinction is only the distinction of two, at least supernaturally, separable extremes, one may ask what functions remain to be attributed to the (hypothetically) separated potential and the separated agent intellect.²²⁷

What are the functions of the agent and the potential intellect? How does Suárez conceive the causal concurrence of the immaterial and material powers in the co-production of the intelligible species that is supposed to emanate from the intellect? Suárez’s theory of abstraction, no doubt crucial for the issue of the epistemology of universals, is essentially specified by what James B. South calls “cognitive processual dualism” between the operations of the material and immaterial power.²²⁸ This dualism, supplemented by the theory of really distinct soul’s faculties not interacting directly with each other,²²⁹ can also be viewed as an anthropological warrant of the Jesuit’s refusal to accept all explanations considering the images of the interior senses (phantasms) to be a partial *causal* explanans of the origin of the intelligible species. Suárez has especially two of them in mind. (1) *Species intelligibiles*, as Cajetan says, are produced by the so-called objective illumination by the agent intellect in the potential intellect. The illumination of the agent intellect cannot proceed by means of the so-called formal illumination – equivalent to the illumination of air by sunlight – since the intellect as an immaterial power cannot inhere in a material subject, i.e., in phantasms, whereas sunlight, on the contrary, can inhere in air. The only illumination that can be allowed for is the objective one. Prior to the very production of the intelligible species, the intelligible kernel is extrinsically illuminated by the agent intellect already in the phantasms. However, the light of the agent intellect does not inhere in them. The agent intellect only lets the quiddity appear by setting aside the individuating principle much like the colour of objects is made visible by the extrinsic assistance of sunlight. The intelligible

226. DM XXIX, s. 1, n. 7 (Vivès, vol. 26: 23): “... principium illud ... *Omne quod movetur ab alio movetur*, adhuc non esse satis demonstratum in omni genere motus vel actionis.”

227. For the application of this criterion of real distinction to metaphysical issues such as that of the nature of the distinction between essential and existential being see DM XXXI *De essentia entis finiti ut tale est, et de illius esse, eorumque distinctione* (Vivès, vol. 26: 224–312).

228. See South 2002, 796 and Heider 2011b, 868–871. This cognitive processual dualism is far from being restricted only to the material internal senses and the immaterial intellect. It regards all the really distinct powers.

229. As regards the issue of plurality and unity of Suárez’s doctrine of soul see Rozemond 2012.

species, later produced and received in the potential intellect, thus can represent only universally, abstracting from *hic et nunc*.²³⁰ (2) The intelligible species originates by means of the effective causal concurrence of the principal cause (the agent intellect) and the instrumental cause (phantasms). The agent intellect is unified with the phantasms by the so-called virtual contact. By this contact the agent intellect elevates the phantasms much like an artist uses and elevates a paintbrush when painting a picture. Just by this contact and through the subsequent elevation the phantasms take on the ability (*virtus*) to produce the intelligible species later received in the potential intellect.²³¹

Both opinions, espoused by Thomists, are strictly rejected by Suárez with reference to the impossibility of a real agency of the agent intellect in (on) phantasms. If the operation of the agent intellect is to be a real operation, it must result in a real modification of the phantasms. But how can the spiritual modify the material?²³² What does the second above-mentioned theory mean by virtual contact? What is added to phantasms by that contact?²³³ Suárez no less emphatically dismisses the opinion that the phantasms concur in the production of the

230. Thomas de Vio Caietanus, *STh.* 1, q. 79, a. 3 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2000, 261): “Singularis autem dicendi modus occurrit mihi non despicendus. Et consistit in hoc quod lumen intellectus agentis facit intelligibile in actu in phantasmate per modum abstractionis, prius natura quam fiat species intelligibilis in intellectu. Ad cuius evidentem perceptionem, ab effectu luminis & abstractionis procedendum est. Effectus luminis duplex est, scilicet formalis & obiectivus: Formalis quidem est, esse illuminativum, ut patet in diaphano. Obiectivus vero est, apparere, ut patet in colore, color non apparet nisi illustratus. Abstractio autem in qua non est mendacium, cum consistat in acceptione unius & non alterius sibi coniuncti, eius proprius quasi effectus est, apparere unum, non apparendo aliud, ut de se patet. Unde in proposito imaginor, quod cum in phantasmate sit natura haec adveniente lumine intellectus agentis, phantasma illustratur non formaliter, ut diaphanum, sed obiective, ut color, quia illustratione splendet atque relucet in phantasmate non totum quod est in eo: sed quidditas seu natura tantum & non singularitas illius et coniuncta, ita quod ista illuminatio est abstractiva, quia facit apparere unum, scilicet quod quid est, non apparendo aliud, scilicet principium individuans: ac per hoc splendet in phantasmate intelligibile in actu, natura, scilicet abstrahens ab hic & nunc, & tale intelligibile in actu movet intellectum possibilem ...” See also *DA* 9, 2, 5.

231. *DA* 9, 2, 7. For more on this conception see the following chapter on Poinset, esp. 3.4.1.

232. *DA* 5, 2, 6: “Peto, an per illam actionem sit aliquid impressum phantasmati, et an sit ipsum phantasma realiter mutatum. Neutrum enim dici potest, nam tota actio intellectus agentis est spiritualis; ergo nihil potest imprimere phantasmati materiali; ergo non immutat illud realiter; ergo nullo modo illuminat.”

233. *DA* 9, 2, 8: “... instrumentum inferioris ordinis non potest naturaliter concurrere ad producendum effectum superioris ordinis, maxime tam superioris quantum est res spiritualis supra materialem. Cruciantur enim theologi ut inveniant modum quo Deus de potentia absoluta possit, mediante re materiali, agere in spiritualem ... quando dicitur quod phantasma in virtute intellectus agentis, etc interrogo: Quid addatur phantasmati ex illa unione ad intellectum agentem?”

intelligible species materially in the sense that they are the subject “from which” (*ex quo*) the material quiddities are abstracted. He affirms that intelligible species can be educed only from a subject in which they are received. However, the intelligible species are not received in phantasms but only in the potential intellect.²³⁴

Having rejected the efficiently-causal and materially-causal *explanans* of the origin of the intelligible species, how does Suárez in fact spell out the determination of the intellect by phantasms? Given Suárez’s Aristotelianism, this determination is indispensable. The Jesuit is clear that phantasms provide the intellect only with what he calls a quasi-example or *materia circa quam*. The quasi-exemplary co-operation of phantasms is guaranteed by the fact that the intellect and the interior sense are rooted in the common (unique) soul.²³⁵ By virtue of the common rootage (*iradicatio*) the acts of the different powers are in mutual harmony and reciprocal interlacing (*colligentia*).²³⁶ What is cognized by the external senses is known *ipso facto* by the interior sense. What is recognized by the interior sense is *eo ipso* apprehended by the intellect as well. The metaphysical grounding of this doctrine is Suárez’s claim that each vital act is accompanied by a substantial influx of the soul.²³⁷ What is infused to every act by means of the powers is the aspect of attention.²³⁸ If it holds that the intellect apprehends the very same object as the senses do, then the function of the agent intellect is restricted to nothing more than the spiritualization of the sensible species. In the transition from the material to the immaterial level the conceptual content remains basically the same. What is changed is only the entity of the vehicle of this representation. At first the sensible species is material, then after

234. *DA* 5, 2, 10: “Quia forma non educitur nisi ex potentia subiecti in quo recipitur; species autem intelligibilis non recipitur in phantasmate, sed in intellectu possibili.”

235. This solution is applicable not only to the mediation between the interior senses and the intellect but also on the levels “exterior senses – interior sense” and “sensory cognition – sensory appetite”. On this parallelism see South 2001a, 224.

236. *DA* 5, 2, 12: “Haec determinatio non fit per efficientiam aliquam ipsius phantasmatis, sed per hoc solum quod materiam praebet et quasi exemplar intellectui agenti, idque propter unionem quam habet in eadem anima.” So far the best analysis of the issue of the harmony of powers in the context of the scholastic tradition up to Suárez is presented by Ludwig 1929.

237. *DM* XVIII, s. 5, n. 2 (Vivès, vol. 25: 628): “Ad vitales functiones non accidens solum, sed substantia etiam proxime influit.”

238. Concerning the intentional interpretation of this substantial influx of the rational soul see Hoeres 1961.

the agency of the agent intellect, the function of which is not cognitive but only preparatory, it becomes immaterial.²³⁹

3. The vital and “productive” character of cognition in Suárez’s cognitive psychology is mirrored in his theory of the expressed species or mental word or formal concept (all are synonyms). There are only few more controversial issues in the era of Second Scholasticism than the question of the nature of the expressed species. Its significance is especially due to direct connection with the dilemma between direct realism and representationalism.²⁴⁰

In the 5th question *Utrum per actum potentiae cognoscitivae aliquis terminus producat, et de verbo mentis* of the 5th disputation in *DA* Suárez gives four conclusions articulating his position. (1) The mental word is produced in *all* cognitive acts including even the acts of the exterior senses and the *visio beatifica* of the blessed.²⁴¹ Whether considering intuitive or abstractive acts – intuitive acts terminate in the objects *hic et nunc*, the second do not²⁴² –, the productive force of the cognitive act is not the result of the insufficiency (*indigentia*) of the cognized object, which is due to its absence or materiality,²⁴³ but the expression of the fundamentally active and

239. *DA* 9, 8, 15: “Respondetur quod possibilis simpliciter est perfectior ... eius actus est nobilissimus, qui est intelligere; et est potentia cognoscitiva, qualis non est intellectus agens.” *DA* 9, 2, 17: “... intellectus agens virtute sua efficit quamdam speciem spirituales repraesentantem eandem naturam quam phantasma repraesentat, non tamen materialiter, sicut phantasma representat, sed quoddam spirituali modo ...”, *DA* 9, 2, 17.

240. *DA* 5, 5, 17: “... res valde controversa apud Theologos.” On the topicality of the issue in the 17th century see Schmutz 2007. The good exposition of Suárez’s theory of mental word can be found in Müller 1968, 141–160. Cf. also Forlivesi 2008. By representationalism, roughly speaking, I understand such a cognitive theory that nothing we immediately cognize by a given cognitive power can exist apart from the act by which it is cognized. Direct realism, on the contrary, claims that at least some of what we immediately cognize by a given power exists independently of the mind.

241. *DA* 5, 5, 4: “Per omnem actionem cognoscitivam producitur aliquis terminus illi intrinsicus.” *DA* 5, 5, 17: “Quod in omni intelligente creatura eo ipso quod intelligit, formatur verbum, sive in absentia, sive in praesentia obiecti.”

242. *DA* 5, 5, 2: “Quid sit notitia intuitiva, et quid abstractiva. Et ad intelligendam diversitatem opinionum est breviter supponenda distinctio cognitionis: abstractiva et intuitiva. Intuitiva habet obiectum suum se sibi realiter praesens, ut visio Petri; abstractiva fit per species rei absentis in potentia relictas.”

243. *DA* 5, 5, 4: “Dicunt ergo quidam ex Thomistis quod per cognitionem, quae fit in absentia obiecti, producitur aliquid terminans cognitionem; per cognitionem vero intuitivam nihil producitur. Ratio huius est, quoniam ex vi actionis cognoscitivae ut sic nihil necessario producitur, sed si aliquando producitur est, ut actio habeat obiectum praesens, sine quo esse non potest;

productive nature of human cognition resulting in its formal term. In all cognitive acts, conceived of course as immanent acts, two aspects must be distinguished – the act-like *ratio productionis* and the quality-like *ratio qualitatis productae*.²⁴⁴ (2) The produced term differs from the cognitive act (*intelligere*) not really but only formally. Although it is not entirely clear what Suárez means by formal distinction in *De anima*, it is important that he outright denies the alternative real distinction. There is no real distinction between *qualitas in facto esse* and *qualitas in fieri*.²⁴⁵ (3) Nothing else than this formally distinct term is produced by the cognitive act. By this claim Suárez bolsters the rebuttal of the claim that the term of an act must be a really (*realiter*) distinct object functioning as an intramental substitute for an extramental thing.²⁴⁶ (4) The mental word produced by each cognitive act is both formally and really identical with the cognitive act *qua* quality (*ratio qualitatis productae*); it differs modally from the cognitive act inasmuch as it is a production (*ratio productionis*).²⁴⁷ By the first part of the conclusion Suárez underscores the specific feature of his doctrine of the expressed species, which is the real identification of the cognitive act (the formal concept) with the mental word. By the second part Suárez seems to contend that the very same cognitive act taken as a quality, as it were, virtually contains the aspect which is productive of the cognitive act *qua* quality. An important corollary of this Suárez's theory of the mental word is that the formal concept is seen not as "that in which" (*id, in quo*), i.e., that in which as if in a mirror²⁴⁸ the extramental thing is contemplated, but rather as "that by which"

quando ergo actio habet obiectum realiter praesens, ut est in cognitione intuitiva, non est cur aliquid producat. Quando vero obiectum non est praesens realiter, ut in cognitione abstractiva, necessaria est productio alicuius rei repraesentantis obiectum, et suplentis vicem illius."

244. Ibidem: "... in actionibus immanentibus esse distinguendam rationem productionis a ratione qualitatis productae; quae qualitas est terminus illius actionis, ut productio est."

245. DA 5, 5, 5: "Secunda conclusio: Talis terminus formaliter tantum distinguitur ab actione cognoscendi ... qualitas in facto esse et fieri qualitatis formaliter distinguitur, non realiter."

246. DA 5, 5, 6: "Tertia conclusio: Praeter terminum hunc non producitur aliquid per actum cognoscendi, neque formaliter, neque realiter ab illo distinctum."

247. DA 5, 5, 9: "Quarta conclusio: Per omnem actionem cognoscendi producitur verbum, vel aliquid illi proportionale, quod realiter et formaliter non est aliud quam ipse actus cognoscendi, ut est qualitas, tamen distinguitur modaliter ab illo, ut est productio." DA 5, 5, 17: "Quod huiusmodi verbum producitur per actionem intelligendi, ut productio est. Unde haec tria: 'dicere mentale', 'producere verbum' et 'efficere actum intelligendi' idem sunt, maxime in creaturis."

248. Miguel Cruz Hernández pointedly says that Suárez and Thomists understand the metaphor of mirror differently. While for Suárez what one apprehends in a mirror is a three-dimensional thing, Thomists tend to claim that what we come to know at first is the two-dimensional image

(*id quo*) one comes to grasp the things themselves. Suárez makes clear that only the latter conception can substantiate the direct cognitive realism so dear to him.²⁴⁹

Suárez's stance makes important suggestions about his approach to intentionality relevant for the (later) ontological evaluation of logical intentions. He introduces three (Thomistic²⁵⁰) caveats to the theory identifying the cognitive act with the mental word. First, how can the mental word, being a cognitive act or a formal concept, become the proper *term* of intellection? The mental word cannot be identified with the cognitive act but it must have the character of an *object*. If it did not have, one would be left without any explanation of the termination of the act. *Verbum mentis* must “complete” the cognitive act in the same way as a line is completed by a point. The mental word thus must be the medium *in which* (*id, in quo*) an extramental object is known and contemplated and not that by which (*id quo*) it is known. Second, as having the nature of a contemplated object the mental term must be also *realiter* different from the cognitive act conceived as a quality. Third, the mental word *is* the formal likeness of a thing. It is an even more perfect likeness than the impressed species since it is the likeness in the second (expressed) act. If the mental word happened to be the mental act itself, than the act itself would have to be the likeness of a thing, which is inconceivable.²⁵¹

In the replies to objections Suárez denies that intentionality is to be conceived materially, i.e., in the manner of the termination of a line by a point. Intentionality is, above all, a spiritual activity.²⁵² The ability to be related by thoughts and concepts to extramental objects is a primitive state of affairs that can be realized without the assumption of intramental substitutes really distinct from the cognitive acts. Suárez notes:

of a thing (Hernández 1949, 330–333). See also *DA* 5, 2, 15: “... falsum est quod visio terminetur ad imaginem in speculo ... per visionem non videtur res in speculo, sed immediate ipsa res”.

249. *DA* 5, 5, 17: “... quod non est id in quo fit cognitio, neque supplet vicem obiecti, sed est id quo ipsum obiectum cognoscitur, tamquam conceptu formali rei cognitae, nam ut res possit intelligi necesse est, ut in [intellectu; D.H.] vitaliter formetur, et illa formatio est verbum ... Unde verbum non est conceptus obiectivus mentis, sed formalis; obiectivus vero est res cognita.” Indeed, the word “intellectu”, as I have checked with Prof. Salvador Castellote, the editor of *De anima*, is absent in the critical edition of the work.

250. In fact he adduces a number of explicit quotations from Aquinas testifying the authenticity of the Thomistic objections.

251. *DA* 5, 5, 18–19; 21.

252. *DA* 5, 5, 23: “Terminatio cognitionis ad obiectum non est materialiter intelligenda eo modo quo intelligitur terminatio lineae ad punctum, sed est sumenda intentionali seu spirituali modo”, *DA* 5, 5, 23.

Hence, for cognition to find its term in a thing is to cognize a thing and that can happen even though a thing is absent. It is not necessary for it to be objectively represented in an image. Much like love terminates in a beloved thing, in so far as it can be in itself, in spite that it actually does not exist. The knowledge of a rose finds its term objectively in a rose itself, though a rose itself does not exist ... The cognitive act, produced by the intellect with the species, leads to the cognition of a thing. And that means to find a term in it and in nothing else.²⁵³

It is far from necessary to assume the mental word as (physically) terminating the cognitive act in order to secure the intentional relatedness of our cognition to an extramental thing. The only termination, next to the formal termination by the formal concepts (mental word), is objective. This conclusion is confirmed by Suárez's affirmation that the cognitive act *in facto esse* can well be the vehicle of mental representation without the assumption of a really distinct mental word.²⁵⁴

Allowing for Suárez's view of the formal concept, we may conclude that this conception in itself does not suggest that the Jesuit's conception employs a cognitive intermediary entity in the form of pictorial mental word really distinct from the cognitive act. Suárez's cognitive intentions, first of all, admit objective or intentional termination or termination by means of objective concepts, which are conceived by him as things known (*res cognitae*).²⁵⁵ It must also be said that Suárez's doctrine of the formal concept (comparatively to Aquinas) is much less susceptible to an interpretation making the formal concept a sort of objective concept conceived as a substitute of an extramental thing. Simultaneously, from this point of view it seems to be, on the level of the intellectual cognition, also less prone to representationalism than a theory employing really distinct terms. We may also say that Suárez's theory of intentionality is, viewed against the background of Thomism, based on attentive directedness *outwards* to (if they exist) the extramental things themselves.²⁵⁶

253. DA 5, 5, 23: "Unde cognitionem terminari ad rem non est, nisi rem illam cognosci, quod potest fieri etiam si sit absens. Neque est necesse quod in imagine obiective repraesentetur, sicut etiam amor terminatur ad rem amatam, prout in se esse potest, quamvis actu non existat. Scientia etiam rosae ad ipsam rosam terminari dicitur obiective, quamvis ipsa rosa non existat ... Actus igitur cognitionis ab intellectu cum specie productus est quod ducit illum in notitiam rei. Et hoc est terminari ad illam, et non aliud."

254. DA 5, 5, 27: "... si sumatur intellectio pro actu cognitionis in facto esse, per quem potentia formaliter cognoscit, sic verius videtur quod ille actus sit similitudo formaliter."

255. In case of the cognition of actually existent extramental things they are also actual existents.

256. On this opposite pointing of intentionality in Suárez and Thomists see also Aho 2007, 203.

2.5.2 Intellectual cognition of material singulars

It has been suggested that it is the doctrine of the rootedness of the powers in the same soul what accounts for the direct knowledge of material singulars in Suárez's epistemology. At the time when the exterior senses (and then the interior sense, sc. phantasy²⁵⁷) perceive Peter, the intellect *ipso facto* apprehends Peter as well because all the faculties are rooted in the same soul. While the anthropological underpinning of this "transfer" is the theory of the harmony (sympathy) of the powers, the ontological grounding is the principle of individuation by means of the whole entity (*entitas tota*).

Suárez presents three conclusions manifesting a close link between the determination of the potency in the first act (impressed species) and the (more perfect) second act (expressed species).

1. The intellect comes to know a material singular by forming a proper and distinct concept (*conceptus proprius et distinctus*). He affirms that *proper* knowledge moves necessarily along through the proper likeness of an object and not through an analogy or negation as in the case of prime matter or immaterial entities (angels). Since we cannot see prime matter, substantial form or angels, we come to know them only by analogy or by negation. Prime matter is known by analogy with the matter of artifacts, spiritual entities by the negation of materiality.²⁵⁸ As regards *distinct* knowledge and concept, Suárez does not give us an explicit definition but he seems to oppose it primarily to confusive knowledge in the sense understood by Cajetan (see below).

The first conclusion is justified by three arguments. First, the formation of propositions assumes the simple apprehension of both terms. The predicate "man" cannot be said of Peter if Peter is not clearly and distinctly apprehended by *the very same cognitive power* as the predicate. It does not make any sense to say that those extremes are cognized by different cognitive powers, e.g., the predicate by the intellect and the subject by an interior sense such as *vis cogitativa*.²⁵⁹ Second,

257. As regards Suárez's reduction of Aquinas's four internal senses to the only one, namely to phantasy, see South 2011b.

258. *DA* 9, 4, 3.

259. *DA* 9, 3, 3: "Intellectus cognoscit singulare formando proprium conceptum et distinctum illius. Nam intellectus format propositionem ex singulari et universali termino; ergo concipit utrumque extremum. Quod vero quidam aiunt quod in hac propositione: 'Petrus est homo', subiectum est in cogitativa et praedicatum in intellectu, omnino est alienum a ratione, nam ubi erit copula? Quomodo una potentia potest comparare praedicatum subiecto, nisi utrumque cognoscat?" On the significance of *vis cogitativa* in the cognition of singulars in Aquinas see Bérubé 1964, 60–63.

the intellect, being a higher faculty, must come to know what the lower potencies (senses) can do. It would be fairly inadequate if a higher potency could not apprehend what can be grasped by a lower faculty. Third, practical reason is concerned with singulars. In this or that situation the virtue of prudence tells us “Do this!” or “Do that!”. As an intellectual habit prudence thus must apprehend singulars.²⁶⁰

Suárez’s first conclusion, as in many other cases, is targeted against Cajetan’s doctrine.²⁶¹ Cajetan assumes that the intellect forms only the so-called confusive concept of a material individual. After the abstraction of the material quiddity the intellect inferentially (*arguitive*) comes to the recognition that the quiddity cannot subsist as abstracted but needs *some* subject to exist. Rather predictably, for Suárez this way of cognition is far from sufficient vis-à-vis the above-mentioned requirements posited by the formation of singular predication.²⁶²

2. The human intellect cognizes material singulars by means of the proper singular intelligible species.²⁶³ The expressed species (concept) requires an adequate foundational counterpart in the form of the impressed species abstracted by the agent intellect. The main argument for this thesis, employed by Suárez, can be

260. *DA* 9, 3, 3: “Item, prudentia versatur circa singularia, scilicet ‘fac hoc’, etc; sed prudentia est intellectualis virtus ... Est enim superior potentia, potens omnia, quae inferiores sensus possunt, immo corrigens et dirigens illos.”

261. Rinaldi 1998, 207: “É importante sottolineare la posizione del Gaetano, perché a Suárez la tesi tomista sulla conoscenza del ‘singolare’ da parte dell’intelletto viene filtrata attraverso i *Commenti* del Gaetano.”

262. *DA* 9, 3, 4: “... ait intellectum non formare proprium conceptum rei singularis, sed tantum illum concipere confuse isto modo quod intellectus prius concipit hominem, v. g. videns tamen postea illum non posse abstracte subsistere, arguit illum esse contractum in aliquo singulari; et ita concipit in communi esse aliquod singulare humanae naturae, nec distincte singularia concipit. Sed Caietanus in hac opinione singularis est, neque rationem adducit apparentem, neque solvere potest supra factam, nam vere ad tam evidentes discursus, quales sunt illi, quos circa singularia habemus, non sufficit illa confusa et arguitiva cognitio.” In his *Commentary to Summa Theologiae* Cajetan says: “Sed bene experimur quod ponimus differentiam inter Sortem & quod quid erat esse hominis, inter hoc & universale. Et ideo oportet quod utrumque cognoscatur: sed ad hoc sufficit cognitio arguitiva concipientes in nobis hominem & singularitatem: & quod homo non subsistit per se, & c. arguitur & concluditur ab intellectu in rerum naturas quoddam singularis & c. differens ab universali sibi oblato per differentiam sibi incognoscibilem quidditative, scilicet Sortitatem ... Concipitur ergo singulare ab intellectu nostro, non proprio, sed alieno conceptu, qui tamen est aliquo modo, scilicet confuso & arguitive eius ...”, Thomas de Vio Caietanus, *STh.* 1, q. 86, a. 1 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2000, 290). As regards Cajetan’s theory of *cognitio singularis* based on the exposition of *STh.* 1, q. 86, a. 1 see also Bérubé 1964, 230–232.

263. *DA* 9, 3, 5: “Intellectus noster cognoscit singulare materiale per propriam speciem illius.”

called “from the non-repugnancy of the singular species”. Using angels as example, Suárez claims that if angels come to know singulars by the proper likeness, then the formation of singular species is not alien to the intellect whether it is angelic or human. Inspired by angelic psychology Suárez declares that the human intellect is on the same level of intellectual powers as the angelic mind. Accordingly, if the formation of singular species is not repugnant to angelic cognition, it cannot be to the human intellect either.²⁶⁴

3. On the third thesis, the human intellect gets to know material singulars directly and non-reflexively.²⁶⁵ Reflective cognition (endorsed by Thomists) caused by the intellect’s conversion to phantasms cannot be correct. As a matter of fact, how can a material singular be cognized by this reflection? It cannot be said that the material singular is somehow detected in the material phantasms. If it were the case, one would first have to recognize the medium in which the singular is cognized, which for Suárez is an implausible procedure bordering on representationalism. Introducing an argument *ad hominem* Suárez adds that phantasms themselves are material and singular. If the intellect apprehended the material singular in the phantasms, then it could get to know the material singular directly as well.²⁶⁶

In doctrinal confrontation with Thomism Suárez presents three more reasons for the denial of reflexive cognition of material singulars. (A) A common man (*rusticus*) immediately apprehends Peter without knowing whether the abstracted universal exists in itself or in some subject and whether it occurs in phantasm or not. Before doing philosophy we are very well aware that we directly cognize extramental material singulars. (B) If there were only the universal intelligible species in the intellect, then one would be able to get distinct cognition only of the man who is first cognized. By further knowledge of other people the intellect

264. *DA* 9, 3, 5: “... intellectus humanus et angelicus sunt in eodem gradu potentiarum ...”, *DA* 9, 1, 7: “... in angelis dantur species spirituales repraesentantes propria singularia materialia ut sic; ergo non repugnat singulare materiale repraesentari per propriam speciem.” On the angelic soul and its powers being an important model for Suárez’s psychology see Lalla 2010.

265. *DA* 9, 3, 7: “Tertia conclusio: Intellectus noster cognoscit directe singularia materialia absque reflexione ulla.”

266. *DA* 9, 3, 7: “[A]it [Aquinas; D.H.] singulare cognosci ex eo quod intellectus, postquam cognovit naturam in universali, reflectit ad phantasma ipsum a quo res universalis abstracta fuit, et per illud cognoscitur res singularis ... Nam vel cognoscitur per phantasma, ut per obiectum cognitum, aut per speciem. Primum est impossibile, alias prius diceretur cognosci ab intellectu phantasma ipsum quam singulare repraesentatum per illud, quod est contra experientiam ... phantasma ipsum est quid materiale et singulare; ergo si ipsum cognoscitur, et in illo singulare repraesentatum; iam ergo aliquod singulare materiale directe cognoscitur.”

would not obtain any other universal species being the necessary basis for further reflection upon the phantasms (and other singulars), from which this universal species has been abstracted. Other humans would thus remain unknown to us. (C) There is no compelling reason for the denial of direct intellectual cognition of singulars. It can be neither a perfection nor an imperfection of the cognitive faculty. It cannot be a perfection because angels also cognize singulars directly. It cannot be an imperfection because the sensory powers come to know them as well.²⁶⁷ Concluding, for Suárez Aristotle's famous dictum "actual sensation is of particulars, whereas knowledge is of universals"²⁶⁸ must be read in the following modified way: "The senses cognize only singulars, the intellect also universals, singulars not excepting."²⁶⁹

It is tempting to consider a material singular apprehended directly by means of the proper species and the proper and distinct concept as a material *substance*. After all, Suárez is speaking about Peter as an example of a material singular.²⁷⁰ However, the doctrine of the continuity of powers based on their "sympathy" leads to a different conclusion. What is represented by the sensible species is not the material substance of Peter but Peter *qua* "dressed" with accidents.²⁷¹ The question, then, is how the intellect comes to apprehend the underlying substance. The answer to the question requires a brief classification of the possible objects of the exterior senses, which will also be of further use in the exposition of the same problematic in Poinset and Mastri/Belluto.²⁷²

267. *DA* 9, 3, 9: "... rusticus cognoscit Petrum et res individuas, et circa illas ratiocinatur, et prorsus ignorat an natura universalis possit esse per se subsistens, neque an sit phantasma, sed immediate singularia cognoscit ... species hominis tantum semel abstraheretur medio phantasmate cuiusdam hominis primo cogniti; ergo visis aliis hominibus, intellectus nullam speciem acquireret; ergo non posset illos distincte cognoscere ... nulla est ratio neque experientia ad denegandam directam intellectus cognitionem singularium, nam vel negatur propter perfectionem vel propter imperfectionem."

268. Aristoteles, *On the Soul*, 417b22–24 (Cambridge, Massachusetts/London 1936, 99).

269. *DA* 9, 3, 10: "[S]ensus cognoscit tantum singularia, intellectus non tantum, sed etiam universalia cognoscit, singularia non omittens."

270. *DA* 9, 3, 13: "... nam supposito phantasmate Petri, v.g., intellectus agens facit speciem Petri ut sic in intellectu possibili."

271. *DA* 9, 1, 5: "Quarta conclusio: Obiectum proportionatum intellectui humano secundum statum naturalem suum est res sensibilis seu materialis."

272. This point also shows that the theory of intellectual cognition cannot be dealt with as entirely disassociated from the theory of sensory cognition, which has been so far set aside.

In a link to Aristotle,²⁷³ Suárez distinguishes between two basic types of sensible objects – the sensible *per se* (the directly and properly perceived object) and the sensible *per accidens* (the indirectly perceived object). The sensible *per se* can be the proper object of only one particular exterior sense. Colour is the proper object *per se* of sight, sound the *per se* object of hearing, etc. They are first and in themselves cognized by the proper power. They imprint the proper species in the corresponding sensory powers. It is a part of the “essence” of a particular sensory power to be bound with its proper (formal) object. The incidental sensibles or the sensibles *per accidens*, however, do not afflict the cognitive power by their own species. They touch it only by means of the different objects with which they are, so to say, grown together. As the classical example Suárez mentions substance which in contrast to the sweetness of milk – which, though being an incidental object for sight, can be the proper object *per se* for taste²⁷⁴ – can never become the sensible proper object for an exterior sense. The material substance does not imprint its own species in any sensory faculty. As such it is cognized only through the cognition of its accidents (*per accidens*).²⁷⁵

If the material substance is only an incidental object of the senses, can we speak of intellectual cognition of the material substance at all? If so, how? Suárez answers this question in three conclusions. (1) Objects that are not the sensibles *per se* are not primarily cognized by means of the proper likeness (*similitudo*).²⁷⁶ The intellect apprehends only what is represented by the interior sense. However, that is not the “naked” substance but “this white thing”.²⁷⁷ We do not have extra-sensory intuition of the substance, which circumvents sensory perception and attains immediately the material substance. (2) The human intellect is not capable

273. Aristoteles, *On the Soul*, 418a7–26 (Cambridge, Massachusetts/London 1936, 101–103)

274. See *DA* 6, 1, 3.

275. Between them there are also the so-called common accidents (*accidentia communia*), i.e., movement, rest, number, shape and size, which are not proper to any sense. As such they modify the proper sensibles and thus they are also known by a given sense *per se*. While sight is primarily affected and forms the proper sensible species of the colour of an apple, this species is also modified by its figure and magnitude. For more on these *accidentia communia* see *DA* 6, 1, 4. On this traditional division in connection with Suárez see Lechner 1911, 21–23. On this division and interpretation of Suárez’s exposition of the intellectual cognition of substance see also Rinaldi 1998, 153–161.

276. *DA* 9, 4, 2: “Haec [*per accidens* sensibles; D.H.] non cognoscuntur primo ab intellectu per proprias species.”

277. Aristotle uses a similar example when saying: “I call an object indirectly perceived if, for instance, the white thing seen is the son of Diates”, *On the Soul*, 418a20–22 (Cambridge, Massachusetts/London 1936, 103).

of immediate formation of the proper and distinct concept of the sensibles *per accidens*. A material substance thus cannot be conceived by the proper and distinct concept since it does not imprint its proper likeness in the intellect. A substance is always cognized with respect to its accidents; its principles (matter and form) are cognized only by analogy (matter) and from operations (rational soul).²⁷⁸ The substantial form (soul) can be cognized only by means of its effects; the substantial matter, then, by analogy with the matter of artifacts.²⁷⁹

Suárez's denial of primary and *per se* cognition of the material substance does not entail an absolute negation of the apprehension, though. First, Suárez admits confused knowledge of the substance because of its "concrecence" with accidents. The apprehension of Peter's white colour of his skin is not cognition of the pure form of whiteness but of the whiteness inhering in the substance of Peter. Second, the intellect as an immaterial power can divide what in reality is simple and penetrate into "the bowels of being" (*intus-legere*).²⁸⁰ Third, the intellect is ultimately capable of producing a species representing somehow (*aliquo modo*) a material substance.²⁸¹ By gradual cognition of the variable accidents, the intellect comes to detect the "invariant" which is their individual subject.²⁸² The result of this discursive knowledge is the formation of the proper species of the substance, which facilitates the intellect's further operations.²⁸³

278. *DA* 9, 4, 3: "Intellectus noster non format proprium et distinctum conceptum rerum non sensibilibus per se ... dicitur conceptus proprius quando res concipitur prout in se conceptibilis est per propriam sui similitudinem et non per analogiam vel per negationem; res ergo quae sub sensu cadunt per se concipiuntur a nobis propriis conceptibus isto secundo modo, ut experientia constat; res autem quae sub sensu non cadunt, etiam si materiales sint, non possunt isto modo a nobis concipi pro isto statu."

279. *DM* XIII, s. 6, n. 3 (Vivès, vol. 25: 421): "... materiam cognosci a nobis per proportionem seu analogiam ad materiam rerum artificialium ..." *DA* 9, 5, 4: "... anima non cognoscit se ipsam per se, sed in cognitionem sui devenit per effectus suos."

280. *DA* 9, 4, 1: "Est differentia magna inter sensum et intellectum quod sensus in externorum accidentium sensibilibus cognitione sistit, intellectus vero non sic, sed ex accidentium cognitione ad contemplanda ea quae sub accidentibus latent ingreditur, et ideo intellectus dictus est quasi 'intus legens.'"

281. *DA* 9, 4, 7: "Ex his dico, 3^o: Intellectus, quando per discursum pervenit in cognitionem substantiae, elicit speciem repraesentantem aliquo modo substantiam ipsam." In 4.4.4 we shall see that just this claim is rejected by Mastroi/Belluto.

282. *DA* 9, 4, 6: "... videns intellectus accidentia, et praecipue cognoscens transmutationem eorum, quae fit circa idem subiectum, discursu colligit aliquid substat illis."

283. *DA* 9, 4, 7: "Item, quia postea intellectus facilius concipit rem; ergo manet aliqua species propria, nam per alienam non posset tam facile id efficere."

2.5.3 Direct and comparative acts of the intellect

By accepting the primordial direct intellectual cognition of a material singular by the proper and distinct notion Suárez *eo ipso* rejects the Thomistic doctrine claiming that universals are formed (at least in the phase of representation) by the agent intellect abstracting the quiddities of material substances from the individuating signated matter.²⁸⁴ Accordingly, Suárez makes allowance for two other options considered by him to be complementary.²⁸⁵ First, universals are formed either by an absolute abstractive (precise) act of the potential intellect, by which the nature is grasped and separated from its individuality according to its essence (nature) and thus according to its precise formal *ratio*, or they are produced by a comparative or so to say “vertical” act of the potential intellect, by which the nature, which is directly prescinded from the particulars, is related to the things in which it extramentally exists and from which it has been abstracted.²⁸⁶ Characteristically, the second operation is also seen by Suárez as a reflexive act. By means of this act the intellect turns back on its prior knowledge or its object according to the conditions which the object receives due to its being cognized.²⁸⁷ The two different ways of psychogenesis are evidence of two basic possible conceptions of universality. Either the “essence” of universality is determined by the absolute character – thus the *universale* will be of absolute character in the same way as the “essences” of Platonic ideas are absolute – or, more in the spirit of the Aristotelian notion of universality, it will be of relational character stressing the relatedness of the absolute universal to its inferiors. As other scholastics, Suárez takes both conceptions to be complementary and understands the absolute universal as the foundation of the relational universal.

According to the first conception it holds that after the formation of the proper and distinct concept of Peter “cloaked” by the *per se* sensible accidents the potential intellect isolates or prescinds his (common) nature (essence). Suárez is explicit that this abstraction does not necessarily require a plurality of singulars. He affirms that it can well be carried out on Peter alone, whose intelligible species, as well as concept, potentially includes all the superior predicates. The notion of “this man”,

284. For Suárez’s critique of the principle of individuation *materia signata* see *DM V*, s. 3 (Vivès, vol. 25:161–175). See also Heider 2011d, 269–283.

285. *DM VI*, s. 6, n. 10 (Vivès, vol. 25:228).

286. *DM VI*, s. 6, n. 1 (Vivès, vol. 25:223). See also *DA 9*, 3, 16. Obviously, the consideration of the two options makes clear that Suárez denies that sensory powers are formative of universality.

287. *DM VI*, s. 6, n. 4 (Vivès, vol. 25:225): “... hanc notitiam reflexivam, seu (quod idem est) comparativam ...”. See also *DA 9*, 3, 21 and 26.

Peter, includes the notion of “man”, the concept of “man”, then, comprises the notion of “animal”, etc.²⁸⁸ In *DM VI*, 6 Suárez adds that this precision precedes the “horizontal” comparison of Peter and Paul and as such it grounds this horizontal comparison.²⁸⁹ This precise abstraction, however, does not lead primarily to the formation of a universal in the proper sense, since as formal abstraction it is related to the inferiors in the way that it excludes them and thus considers only what belongs to the essence and nothing more. The formation of the proper universal requires universal or total abstraction, which – especially according to Suárez’s formulations in *De anima* – seems to amount, after all, more to the process of (horizontal) comparison of Peter, Paul, etc. Above all, this kind of abstraction can result in the *potential* containment of the inferiors in the abstracted superior predicate and thus create the foundation for the *universale in praedicando*. What must be highlighted is that those superior natures are, at first, cognized *within* the singular species of Peter. Only afterwards, and for the sake of the memory (not differently from the production of the species of an individual material substance by the potential intellect) does the potential intellect form the universal species underpinning the universal concept.²⁹⁰

288. James B. South calls this principle “The Containment Principle”. All the genera are contained in the singular species. See South 2002, 812. See also Alejandro 1948, 347–350. For Suárez cf. *DA* 9, 3, 13. For the opposite theory denying that singular cognition can convey apprehension of universality, see Guillelmus de Ockham, *Opera Philosophica et Theologica, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum Ordinatio* II–III, lib. 1, d. 2, q. 7 (St. Bonaventure, N.Y. 1970, 244): “... res de se singularis nullo modo nec sub aliquo conceptu est universalis”. For this characteristic claim of the “Prince of Nominalists” see also Saxlová 1997, 188.

289. *DM VI*, s. 6, n. 8 (Vivès, vol. 25: 228): “Secundo abstrahi potest natura communis per comparationem singularium seu inferiorum inter se, ut quando conferendo Petrum cum Paulo, cognosco eos esse inter se similes in natura humana. Quae comparatio supponit priorem praecisionem, nam supponit de utroque singulari cognosci esse talis naturae.” In *DA* 9, 3, 13, however, Suárez seems to lay emphasis on the priority of the comparison of singulars: “Modus autem cognoscendi universalis hic esse videtur: Quia intellectus, cognoscens singulare per propriam speciem, diversa singularia, etiam eiusdem speciei, per diversas species intelligit, nam fuerunt abstractae a diversis phantasmatibus; istae autem species diversorum singularium partim in repraesentatione conveniunt, dum eadem praedicata communia repraesentent; partim differunt, quia repraesentant illa diversimode contracta; intellectus ergo habet virtutem ad consideranda individua ipsa, ut talia sunt, et ad considerandum etiam id quod videtur illis individuis esse commune; et hoc est considerare universale.”

290. *DA* 9, 3, 14: “... ad primam conceptionem rei universalis non est necessaria species repraesentans universaliter et abstracte ... ex alia autem parte, potest assignari utilitas et necessitas, nempe ut intellectus possit facile et prompte, absque dependentia a re singulari, propriam eius quidditatem, genus et differentiam concipere.”

Leaving aside the universal formed by the direct precise act whether that of the formal or total (horizontal) abstraction, Suárez conceives the fully-blown (logical) universal as a relational entity. The fact that the universal *qua* universal is of relational character is confirmed by a whole range of Aristotle's statements viewing the *universale* formally as "one in many" and "one (said) of many". Much like the formal universal, the predicables (and not only those of the first mental operation, such as "genus", "species", "difference", but also those of the second and third operations) are characterized relatively as well.²⁹¹ As stated, the relational universal arises through the "vertical" comparison or collation of the abstracted nature with its inferior natures conceived by Suárez (as his formulation suggests) as existing *in re*,²⁹² which comes only after the comparison of a *plurality* of singulars of the same kind or species of the same genus. Contrary to other authors (Mastri/Belluto²⁹³), Suárez explicitly states that the production of the relational *universale* requires a multitude of singulars.²⁹⁴ Only by means of "vertical" comparative knowledge of the nature with its inferiors does the notion of the relational universal come to be formed. Suárez affirms that the universal abstracted by the precise act constitutes the proximate foundation for the relational universal. The direct universal – the output of the abstractive precise act – cannot be a relational universal because it is an absolute entity, likened by Suárez to a Platonic idea existing only intellectually, i.e., not subsisting in itself. Even though the direct universal is usually conceived relationally – we say that this universal or the universal unity exhibits the aptitude or the (proximate) non-repugnance to being in the many – Suárez denies that its relation to the inferiors is that of being of reason. In *De anima* the Jesuit explicitly affirms that after abstraction the nature refers to its inferior(s) *realiter*.²⁹⁵

291. The very etymology of the term *universale* suggests the relational aspect of one above the many or one against the many or one in many. For Suárez's emphasis on the relational character of the universal *qua* universal see *DM* VI, s. 6, n. 5 (Vivès, vol. 25: 225): "... universale ut universale, relativum est, ut patet, tum ex ejus definitione, scilicet: Est unum in multis, et de multis; tum ex suis speciebus ut sunt genus, species, differentia, etc."

292. Concerning Suárez's swing to this conception (as we shall see below, not shared by the Scotists Mastri/Belluto) see *DA* 9, 3, 28. There Suárez approvingly quotes the passage from Aquinas's *Commentary on De interpretatione* (liber 1, lectio 10): "... intellectus format intentiones, attribuens eas rei intellectae, secundum quod comparat eam ad res quae sunt extra animam."

293. For more on that see 4.5.3.

294. *DM* VI, s. 6, n. 12 (Vivès, vol. 25: 228).

295. *DA* 9, 3, 30: "Nam si facta abstractione, statim natura abstracta refertur ad inferiora, certe refertur realiter." See also *DM* VI, s. 6, n. 8 (Vivès, vol. 25: 227).

2.5.4 The first/second intentions and the “quiddity” of the logical universal

Contrary to late Ockham’s psychological theory of intentions which considers concepts to be natural signs identified with mental acts, i.e., with acts inhering subjectively in the mind, Suárez’s register is broader.²⁹⁶ To formulate a correct theory of predication one cannot make use only of subjective or formal concepts which belong rigidly to the category of quality. What is conceived when one apprehends the nature of Peter does not fall under the category of quality but under the category of substance. Moreover, a singular entity, which a formal concept always is, cannot be predicated of another singular entity. The mental sign of man as a real accident of the mind cannot be predicated of the mental sign of Peter. Even though, as I have said, we do not have Suárez’s treatise on logic at disposal, we may well assume that those are the reasons why the Jesuit, apart from formal concepts or intentions, endorses also objective concepts or intentions, the ontological status of which varies according to the conceptual content of this or that notion.²⁹⁷

I have said that Suárez calls the nature denominated as universal (in accordance with usage common in Second Scholasticism) the physical (material) universal (*universale physicum, universale materialiter sumptum*). This kind of universal exists *a parte rei*. It is designated “physical” since it is determined by singularity, through which it is subjected to sensible accidents and physical (natural) changes including generation and corruption. All those indications fall into the

296. On Ockham’s doctrine of intentions and its influence on early modern scholasticism see Hickman 1980, 38–42 (first intentions in Ockham), 73–84 (second intentions in Ockham). Suárez’s theory of first and second intentions is one of the many tokens that Ockham’s influence on Suárez’s theory of universals should not be overestimated. Hickman’s book gives us good evidence that discussion of the ontological status of the intentions was vigorous not only in the 14th century (as documented in the cases of Hervaeus Natalis, Peter Aureol and others) but also in the Second scholasticism of the 16th and 17th century. As regards the note about the vitality of the discussions of second intentions in post-medieval scholasticism see also Pinborg 1974. The same assertion can be found also in Pini 2002, 49. Concerning the substantial differences between Suárez and Ockham on the level of the ontological status of universal concepts see also Noreña 1981.

297. For Suárez’s definition of the formal and objective concept see the “locus classicus” from *DM II*, s. 1, n. 1 (Vivès, vol. 25: 64–65): “Unde colligitur differentia inter conceptum formalem et obiectivum, quod formalis semper est vera ac positiva res et in creaturis qualitas menti inhaerens, obiectivus vero non semper est vera res positiva; concipimus enim interdum privationes et alia, quae vocantur entia rationis, quia solum habent esse obiective in intellectu. Item conceptus formalis semper est res singularis et individua, quia est res producta per intellectum, eique inhaerens; conceptus autem obiectivus interdum quidem esse potest res singularis et individua, quatenus menti obiecti potest, et per actum formalem concipi, saepe vero est res universalis vel confusa et communis, ut est homo, substantia, et similia.”

factual domain of natural philosophy. At the same time the physical universal is not entirely extrinsic to the metaphysical and logical investigation. As stated above, it exhibits formal unity essentially pertaining to the metaphysical investigation dealing with kinds of transcendental unity. Moreover, formal unity can be found not only in material substances but also in immaterial substances such as angels. That makes it all the more the object of metaphysics. At least indirectly, the physical *universale* belongs to the logical investigation as well, since it constitutes the remote foundation (the foundation *in re*) of the second intention of universality.²⁹⁸

As extrinsically denominated by the potential intellect through the direct abstractive (precise) act, the physical nature “puts on” the so-called objective being. Thus it becomes the objective concept. Beside the formal concept (*prima intentio seu conceptus formalis*), identified, as we know, with the cognitive act, Suárez also accepts the first objective intention (*prima intentio objectiva*). Admittedly, the ontological evaluation of the first objective intention is one of the trickiest issues in Suárez’s philosophy in general and the subject matter of this work does not allow me to examine all the details and ramifications of this discussion here.²⁹⁹ Nevertheless, one gets sufficient textual evidence from *DM VI* that, as compared with the Scotists and the Thomists,³⁰⁰ Suárez’s theory of the objective intention,

298. *DM VI*, s. 8, n. 3 (Vivès, vol. 25: 232). See also *DA* 9, 3, 22.

299. As a sample of certain ambiguity in Suárez’s doctrine on the objective concept, see the illustrative discussion between Jorge J. E. Gracia (a defender of the realist reading) and Norman J. Wells (an advocate of the mentalist interpretation). See Gracia 1991, Wells 1993b, Gracia 1993. As for the claim about the outright incoherence of Suárez’s doctrine, see Forlivesi 2002, 14–15. For my “realist” exposition of the notion of the objective concept see Heider 2011a. One of the recent attempts at such realist reading of Suárez’s *conceptus objectivus*, realized in the analysis of the issue of exemplar cause, has been made by Renemann 2010a and 2010b.

300. Hickman shows, leaving aside the psychologism of Ockham’s followers, that there are two different conceptions of the first objective concepts (both called by him “objectivistic conceptualism”) in the scholastic *Neuzeit*. He calls the first “Conceptualism Two” (C2) and specifies it as “Rationalistic Conceptualism”, the second, “Conceptualism Three” (C3) is designated by him as “Realistic Conceptualism”. Whereas for the representatives of C2 (Hickman presents especially the theory of the less known Scotist Constantine Sarnanus, d. 1595) the objective concepts of first intentions are *entia rationis*, for the adherents of C3 (Suárez, Soto and Poinot) they are real entities. See Hickman 1980, 44–51. Although Hickman classifies Suárez as an advocate of C3 together with Poinot, I maintain that a certain difference, at least in accent, can be observed between them in the issue of the ontological import of extrinsic denomination. A being of reason is not conceived as late as through reflexive cognition (Suárez). For Poinot, as we shall show in the following chapter, a being of reason (at least fundamentally) is already produced by the direct act of extrinsic denomination. This difference, on my tentative hypothesis, is partly explicable by the above-mentioned differences in the issue of the nature of the mental word and its relation to the cognitive act.

after all, is willing to admit both evaluations as implying both real being and being of reason. The first objective intention, Suárez claims, is the abstracted nature (*natura abstracta*) which exists only intellectually. However, two aspects must be distinguished in the genesis of the first objective intention. In the first phase, the intention is neither something existing in the extramental nature since as such it does not exist as abstracted, nor is it a kind of being of reason that originates only when it is thought of in the manner of something real.³⁰¹ Just that reflection “as if” or “in the manner of” which constitutes a being of reason in general has not taken place yet. So what is the ontological status of the first objective intentions? Should it be said that the first objective intention exhibits a diminished being (*ens diminutum, esse debilius*) or an objective being *sui generis* standing as the *tertium quid* somehow between real being and being of reason as it seems to be endorsed by some Scotists?³⁰²

To cut through the paradox, two basic principles (devices) employed by Suárez must be taken into account. First, it is the above-mentioned distinction between the essence and its condition “being abstracted”; second, it is Suárez’s interpretation of the notion of *denominatio extrinseca* as the device by which the first objective intention comes into being.³⁰³ What does Suárez mean by extrinsic

301. DM VI, s. 7, n. 2 (Vivès, vol. 25: 229): “Dupliciter enim diximus naturam posse denominari universalem; primo, denominatione absoluta ac si universaliter subsisteret; secundo, denominatione respectiva. Priori modo non est universalitas ens rationis, tamquam aliquid proprie confictum a ratione, sed solum tamquam denominatio extrinseca proveniens ab actu rationis, sicut esse abstractum, cognitum, et alia huiusmodi, quae non dicunt aliquid existens realiter in natura denominata nec proprie dicunt aliquod ens rationis fabricatum ab intellectu, tamquam aliquid obiective confictum ab ipso quia talia entia non finguntur nisi dum cogitantur; tunc autem intellectus nihil tale cogitat vel cognoscit. Est ergo denominatio extrinseca a conceptu intellectus; nam, quia per conceptum abstracte et universe repraesentatur, ideo denominatur universalis praedicto modo.”

302. I think of James of Ascoli O.F.M. (14th c.) for whom “to be represented of an object”, at least on Dominik Perler, implies a third and special status of existence next to real being and being of reason. No doubt, this interpretation of Scotus’s theory of objective being (in itself not entirely clear) is not free of difficulty. I do not mean only the ontological problem regarding the introduction of a new type of being apart from real and rational being, but also the epistemological inconvenience related to the skeptical issue concerning the relationship of those objects with the special intentional being to the material objects *a parte rei*. For an exposition of the theory of James of Ascoli see Perler 2002, 230–239.

303. On Suárez’s (ambiguous) theory of extrinsic denomination see Doyle 1984. On the general importance of *denominatio extrinseca* against the backdrop of its “rollback” in early modern (extra-scholastic) philosophy see Knebel 1998.

denomination? James F. Ross, employing the analogy of attribution to explain the concept, says that in the context of universal (extrinsic) denomination of the intellect the extrinsic denomination is “a kind of secondary reference where the same term is used to refer to both the thing which has the property primarily signified by that term and to things related in various ways to something’s having the property signified by that term”.³⁰⁴ The universality originating from the extrinsic denomination of the intellect is primarily had by the intellective act or the formal concept itself, which is conceived as a real denominating form (*ratio denominans*). This denominating form conceived, so to say, as the primary analogate of the analogical notion of “universality” exhibits a transcendental relation to the denominated thing understood as the secondary analogate. This denominated thing is in the first step conceived precisely without reflection on its condition of “being abstracted” or “being cognized by a universal denomination”. As such this denominating form is a real being (*ens reale*). The formal concept, as stated, is a singular accident, a quality. No different ontological status is possessed by the particularized extramental nature or the *universale physicum* either, which makes it obviously an *ens reale*.³⁰⁵ The same also holds for the relation of the intellect to an object. It is real as well. It may be noted that actually all the factors inherent in the intellective act of the extrinsic universal denomination including the relation itself are real. Therefore, if one considers precisely the extrinsic denomination as such, i.e., as an act resulting from a real form directed to a real thing, no being of reason has been made up yet.³⁰⁶

Crucially, the condition of universality comes on the tapis only by means of a new act of the intellect, by reflecting on the condition which is “added” to the nature by the previous precise act of *denominatio extrinseca*. Only after reflecting upon the condition of “being abstracted” and of “being indifferent to the many”, or in the case of sensory perception of “being seen”, e.g., in the case of a wall, does the mind come to an awareness of the fact, as if the abstracted nature had the “form” of “being denuded from the individual difference”. By this reflection, the intellect “quasi-effectuates” (strictly speaking, it cannot be a real or a physical cause since the physical entity of a formal concept can be productive only of another physical entity, which is not the case of the objective intention) the next intellective operation, sc. the (vertical) comparative act, by which the abstracted nature is cognitively

304. Ross 1964, 10.

305. *DM* VI, s. 2, n. 1 (Vivès, vol. 25:206): “Principio statuendum est naturas illas, quas non universales et communes denominamus, reales esse, et in rebus ipsis vere existere.”

306. *DM* LIV, s. 2, n. 14 (Vivès, vol. 26:1021–1022).

related to its inferiors.³⁰⁷ By this comparison a relation of reason and thus the second intention of universality is established. While the remote foundation of this fully-fledged universality are the extramental natures, the proximate foundation comes to be formed by reflection on the quasi-property “to be abstract” or “to be prescinded from individual difference” acquired by the nature by the direct precise act of the potential intellect. This property thought of “as if it were” or “in the manner of” a real property thus constitutes the proximate foundation of the relation of reason.³⁰⁸ Obviously, as compared to a real relation, this second intention of universality is ontologically deficient. Contrary to a real relation, its foundation is not real but only of reason.³⁰⁹ Coming back to the issue of the ontological status of the first objective intention it may be concluded that Suárez’s *prima facie* striking evaluation seems now to be more intelligible. Before the intellect relates the abstracted nature to its inferiors, the abstracted nature, i.e., the first objective intention, is not to be considered as a being of reason but as something that is included within the scope of real being (*sub latitudine entis realis*).³¹⁰

The act of comparison is conceived as the second formal intention (*secunda intentio formalis*).³¹¹ The second formal intention is considered to be a comparative act or an accident of the mind which actively “builds” upon the previous objective knowledge of the first objective intention reflexively apprehended. It is this reflexively apprehended first objective intention, not the directly denominated nature, which is identified by Suárez with the metaphysical universal (*universale metaphysicum*). In analogy to the first formal intention, the second formal intention

307. It must be admitted that in his phrasing Suárez is not entirely clear. It seems as if the reflexive act actually creating the aggregate of *res cognita* and the first (abstract) intention (the so-called intention *in concreto*) leads *eo ipso* to the formation of the relational universal by means of comparative cognition. However, if that were the case, then the comparative act producing the second intention of universality would become redundant. On the other hand, Suárez states that the rational relation or second intention is not based on the real nature *a parte rei* but on the nature possessing the rational foundation of being abstracted. Just this second claim makes Suárez a follower of the moderate realism declining the view that the second intentions are based directly on the natures independently of the human intellect.

308. *DM* VI, s. 6, nn. 4; 8–9 (Vivès, vol. 25: 225; 227–228). See also *DM* LIV, s. 2, nn. 15–16 (Vivès, vol. 26: 1022–1023).

309. *DM* LIV, s. 6, nn. 1–8 (Vivès, vol. 26: 1039–1041).

310. *DMLIV*, s. 2, n. 14 (Vivès, vol. 25: 1012): “... si praecise sistamus in denominatione extrinseca proveniente a forma reali, et ab aliqua eius habitudine non ficta sed vera, et in re ipsa existente, non existimo pertinere ad ens rationis, sed comprehendi sub latitudine entis realis.” See also *DA* 9, 3, 27 and *DM* VI, s. 7, n. 2 (Vivès, vol. 25: 229).

311. *DA* 9, 3, 21.

(*notitia comparativa*) can also be ontologically qualified only as a real singular being belonging to the category of quality. Not differently from the first formal intentions it is treated especially in *De anima*. The case with the second objective intention (*secunda intentio objectiva*) is different, though. As an apprehended nature *qua* apprehended and as rationally related to its inferiors, it can only be a relation of reason. This rational relation or relational denomination of universality, under which the nature stands as a subject and thus meets the condition for becoming the *universale in praedicando*, is what Suárez calls the logical universal (*universale logicum*). Its administration, connected above all with its property of predicability, however, falls primarily into the competency of the logician and not of the metaphysician.³¹²

Having identified the logical universal with the nature standing under the second intention of universality, one may ask what sort of relation Suárez has in mind when speaking about the relational character of the fully-fledged universal. In other terms, how does the Jesuit interpret the order between the two Aristotelian types of relation connected with universality, *esse in* and *dici de*? It is not surprising to find Suárez answering this question in the *metaphysical* context of his *Disputationes metaphysicae* rather briefly. Actually, no more than two paragraphs in the whole of *DM VI* attends to the issue of the “essence” of the logical universal, which as a borderline case between metaphysics and logic has its proper place rather in the logical treatise.³¹³

In agreement with the scholastic tradition Suárez distinguishes four possible relations which can be viewed as the essential constituents of the universal nature. First, one can think of the relation of inherence and relation of predicating. Both relations, further, can be considered either actually, or aptitudinally. By combining them one obtains four possibilities constituting different answers to the question about the “quiddity” of the *universale logicum*. (a) The essence can be conceived as defined by its aptitudinal being in the many or (b) as consisting in actual existence

312. *DM VI*, s. 8, n. 4 (Vivès, vol. 25: 232–233). Despite some indications that the second intentions are grounded directly in the extramental natures themselves, Suárez’s key statements make clear that the Jesuit does not accept the opinion that the second intentions are immediately based on the real properties of the things or natures themselves. By that he implicitly rejects the statement of some *modistae* of the late 13th century considering the second intentions to be grounded in the real properties of extramental things. Suárez’s doctrine is much closer to the doctrines of Scotus and Aquinas (as the following comparisons will confirm) who ground the logical intentions in the *rational* properties of the thing known *qua* known. On the doctrinal contrast between the theories of Aquinas and Scotus and that of the *modistae* such as Simon of Faversham (ca. 1260–1306) and Radulphus Brito (d. 1320) see Pini 2002, 45–137.

313. *DM VI*, s. 7, nn. 3–4 (Vivès, vol. 25: 229–230).

in the many. The relation of predication can, analogically, be understood either as (c) being apt to be predicated of the many or (d) being actually predicated of its inferiors.³¹⁴ Suárez asserts that it is general doctrine that the relation of “being in” is prior to the relation of “being predicated of”. Further, predicability, not actual predication, is rated by him only as a property (*passio*) of the universal. “Being predicable” follows the *status quo* of “being in”. Only if the extremes of predication are identical or one extreme inheres in the other can one item be affirmatively and truly predicated of the other.³¹⁵

Having ruled out that the notion of the relation of predicability is the “quiddity” of the logical universal, since it is only its property, the question remains whether Suárez regards “being in” as part of its essence in the actual or the aptitudinal sense. Although the Jesuit agrees that the universal *in actu* is defined in both ways, he nevertheless inclines to the opinion that aptitudinal being in the many is not only the necessary but also a sufficient condition of logical universality. The fact that it actually exists in the “many” is only a contingent state of affairs. And a contingent factor cannot be that by which the universal is essentially distinguished from the singular. They can be distinguished only by a necessary feature, which is the dispositional or aptitudinal “being in the many”. In sum, for the universal nature to be universal, it is both necessary and sufficient that it *can* be in the many.³¹⁶

314. *DM VI*, s. 7, n. 3 (Vivès, vol. 25: 229): “Multiplex enim relatio fingi seu excogitari potest in natura universalis: una in ordine ad actum essendi; altera in ordine ad actum praedicandi; utraque autem potest, aut secundum aptitudinem, aut secundum actum apprehendi.” *DM VI*, s. 7, n. 4 (Vivès, vol. 25: 230): “Similiter in ordine ad actum praedicandi potest natura concipi, vel ut apta praedicari de multis, vel ut actu praedicata de multis; prior vero consideratio proprie denominat naturam praedicabilem.”

315. *DM VI*, s. 8, n. 2 (Vivès, vol. 25: 232): “Unde dici solet a dialecticis, esse praedicabile, esse quasi passionem seu proprietatem universalis.” See also *DM VI*, s. 8, n. 4 (Vivès, vol. 25: 232–233).

316. *DM VI*, s. 7, n. 3 (Vivès, vol. 25: 229–230): “[C]oncipitur enim natura communis ut apta ad existendum in multis et ut sic concipi potest ut habens relationem aptitudinis ad communicandum illis suum esse; potest item concipi ut actu existens in illis et ut sic habens relationem actualem seu rei actu se communicantis multis. Sicut enim in accidente intelligimus relationem aptitudinalis, vel actualis inhaesionis, ita eam possumus fingere vel excogitare in natura universalis ut communicabili vel ut communicata multis. Et utroque modo solet universale definiri; sufficit tamen aptitudinalis relatio ut natura complete censeatur universalis. Nam, quod actu sit in multis quae existant, contingens est, et non mutat naturam rei; aptitudo vero est simpliciter necessaria, nam in ea distinguitur universale a singulari.” See also *DM VI*, s. 2, n. 14 (Vivès, vol. 25: 210–211) and *DM V*, s. 1, n. 2 (Vivès, vol. 25: 146).

2.6 Hurtado's "confundism" and Suárez's moderate realism

In the preceding section I have shown that Suárez's apparent shift from the level of metaphysical composition to the logical plain of the objective concept, described in 2.4, does not amount to abandoning the enquiry into the metaphysical structure of the common nature. In this section I would like to argue for what can be called the presence of the so-called *objective precision* (*praecisio obiectiva*) in Suárez's thought³¹⁷ by means of comparison with the theory of Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza,³¹⁸ considered to be the first thinker of Second Scholasticism explicitly denying this kind of intellectual precision. I am convinced that this comparison with Hurtado, who otherwise follows Suárez,³¹⁹ can shed light on Suárez's (not always entirely clear) theory of the character of the intellectual precision. Before proceeding to the comparison I first present the common definitions of *praecisio obiectiva* and its negative counterpart, formal or subjective precision (*praecisio formalis et subjectiva*).

In a link to the established tradition of the 17th century beginning with Hurtado de Mendoza, this kind of precision is said to be the intellectual separation of one of two predicates, or rather metaphysical grades (both entirely identical in

317. As far as I know, one does not find this expression in Suárez. It was to become a widespread notion only in the post-Suarezian generation, which had to face the challenge of the growing conceptualism in Jesuit philosophy.

318. Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza, called "the Valmesadenian", was born in northern Spain in a village called Valmaseda near Bilbao in 1578. There he stayed till 1595 when he joined the Society of Jesus in Salamanca, where he was ordained a priest in 1607. In Salamanca Hurtado also finished his educational and spiritual formation. In 1608–11 "the Valmesadenian" taught philosophy in Pamplona. In 1611 he moved to Salamanca to become a professor of theology. There he stayed for thirty years till the end of his life (1641). In 1615 he published his famous *Philosophical Course* called *Disputationes a summulis ad metaphysicam*. In 1617 the second edition called *Disputationes de universa philosophia* comprising more than 1350 pages was published in Lyons. The third edition entitled *Commentarios in universam philosophiam* was released in 1621. Finally, the last edition, which can be considered to be Hurtado's "last word" in philosophy, called *Universa philosophia in unum corpus redacta*, was published in 1624 (Petro Hurtado de Mendoza, *Universa philosophia in unum corpus redacta*, Lyons 1624). In my exposition of Hurtado's theory I use the last edition. For Hurtado's biography and bibliography see Schmutz, *Petrus Hurtado de Mendoza*, S.J., URL: [319. Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza, *Universa philosophia*, disputatio 5 "De unitate universali", sectio 5, § 42 \(Lyons 1624, 763\): "... quod late confirmat magnus Suarez." Further I quote only in the form: Hurtado, *Metaphysica*, d. v, s. x /subsection w, if applicable/, § y \(Lyons 1624, page z\).](http://www.scholasticon.fr; Forlivesi 2000, 253–254; Caruso 1979, 44–46; Nicolaus Antonius Hispalensis, Bibliotheca Hispana nova sive Hispanorum scriptorum qui ab anno MD. ad MDCLXXXIV floruerunt notitia, vol. 2 (Madrid 1788, 202); Petrus Ribadeneira, <i>Bibliotheca Scriptorum Societatis Iesu</i>, ed. by P. Alegambe and N. Sotvell (Rome 1676, 676–677).</p>
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reality), *without* the formal and immediate cognition of the other. It is called *objective* because it has to do with the “bowels” of the things themselves and not only with the acts, by which one comes to grasp those things. This kind of precision is contrasted with the so-called *formal* or *subjective precision* advocated by Jesuit authors such as Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza, Rodrigo de Arriaga and Francisco de Oviedo. To prescind something by means of formal precision means to attain immediately both predicates (metaphysical parts) confusedly (i.e., without attaining separately or formally one without the other), since according to this precision (of a more general predicate) one conceives them only with respect to the common operations or “connotations”.³²⁰ Apparently, this kind of precision does not concern the things themselves, but only the acts (formal concepts) by which we apprehend things.

The interpretation of Suárez’s position on which type of precision he is actually employing came to be a significant *punctus controversiae* among the scholastics of the 17th century.³²¹ This discussion constituted one of the key issues in the problematic of universals in the 17th century in general and became a moot point after the publication of the *Cursus* of Jesuit conceptualists led by Hurtado de Mendoza.³²² The recurring charges that Suárez was a nominalist were not made only by the neo-Thomists of the 20th century but already by authors belonging to the first post-Suarezian Jesuit generation. I believe that the best historical “litmus paper” serving for the evaluation of whether a conception is to be labeled as an instance of conceptualism or rather of moderate realism in Second scholasticism of the 17th century is to be searched for not in the reply to the (too coarse) question of whether there extramentally exist abstract entities or not, as it is the case in contemporary analytical metaphysics, but rather in the answer to the issue of the character of intellectual precision. Briefly said, the question whether metaphysical

320. As regards this definition see Tirso González de Santalla (1624–1705), *De anima, Disputatio: Utrum intellectus noster possit obiective praescindere inter praedicata identificata*, in: Knebel 2011, 313. See also Knebel 2001a, 1015.

321. See Knebel 2011, 333–334.

322. For instance the English Jesuit Thomas Compton Carleton says: “Nulla celebrior hodie, quam de Praecisionibus, in scholis quaestio; nulla, maiore vel argumentorum, vel animorum contentione disputata, quasi ut ille *nodus*, Phrygiae, ita hic Philosophiae fatum foret.” Thomas Compton Carleton, *Philosophia universa*, disputatio XXIV: *Dentur necne Praecisiones Obiectivae* (Antwerp 1649, 97). Despite its novelty due to the entrance of the notion of *praecisio formalis* into the context of the issue of intellectual cognition, the issue of formal precision as such has a long tradition in the context of sensory cognition. Sight perceiving an object from afar can sense that this object is colourful (it can sense, so to say, its generic character) without knowing what kind of colour it is (its specific character). More on that see Sousedík 1998, 48–49.

parts including individual differences are prescinded by objective precision or by formal (subjective) precision is of utmost significance for the issue of universals in the scholasticism of the 17th century.

Although Hurtado shares an array of opinions with his famous Jesuit predecessor concerning the critique of rival theories such as the Scotistic³²³ and Fonseca's theory³²⁴ and thus one is not wrong to assume a significant impact of Suárez's philosophy on the Valmesadenian, his conclusion is at odds with the following three characteristics inherent in Suárez's theory which, on my reading, make his theory an instance of moderate realism. They are (1) the universal denomination of the intellect attaining the real natures of things; (2) formal unity as the ontological (remote) ground of the nature's non-repugnancy to being in the many; (3) the conception of universality embedded in the context of the theory of triple universal. All these features are substantially modified by Hurtado. Most importantly, the same applies also to objective precision, which Hurtado replaces with formal precision.

In his ramified conclusion Hurtado states that universal cognition terminates immediately not in the nature or in the universal materially taken but in singulars insofar as they are similar. By virtue of this similarity, viewed by Hurtado (as can be expected) as the primitive state of affairs, they are cognized confusedly and not collectively or distinctly. *A parte rei* there is no such thing as an objective formality which is made conceptually distinct from singulars in the intellect. Suárez, Ockham, Gabriel Biel, Aquinas and Gregory of Rimini are mentioned as proponents of this complex thesis.³²⁵ The reasoning for this claim comprises three convoluted arguments, which all point to Hurtado's reductionist interpretation of Suárez.

First, the universal act is an act by which a nature, e.g., man, is constituted as in itself undivided, or it is an act by which an object is cognized universally and indistinctly. However, the intellective act by which the nature "man" is constituted as being in itself undivided and represented universally attains immediately Peter and Paul. Thus the universal act terminates immediately in Peter and Paul.³²⁶ While the *ratio formalis* of the universal is a confusive act, the physical universal

323. Hurtado, *Metaphysica*, d. 5, ss. 2–3, §§ 6–37 (Lyons 1624, 761–763).

324. Hurtado, *Metaphysica*, d. 5, s. 6, §§ 54–64 (Lyons 1624, 765–767).

325. Hurtado, *Metaphysica*, d. 5, s. 10, subsectio 3, § 143 (Lyons 1624, 778): "Dico igitur, cognitionem universalem immediate terminari ad omnia singularia contenta intra speciem, vel genus; ut sunt similia in aliqua ratione; ratione cuius similitudinis per illum actum omnia confuse, & non collective noscuntur, nullum tamen in particulari: neque ex parte obiecti respondere formalitatem aliquam obiectivam distinctam ratione a singularibus, ut similibus. Primam partem conclusionis docent aperte S. Tho. Gregor Arimiensis, Okamus, Gabriel, & P. Suar. adducti subsectione praecedenti. Secunda pars est eorundem autorum ..."

326. Hurtado, *Metaphysica*, d. 5, s. 10, subsectio 4, § 144 (Lyons 1624, 778).

is for Hurtado nothing else than a set of singulars. The argument is proved by an analogy with mechanical composition and division of the physical whole or union of physical parts. The indivision or unity of physical parts is immediately related to those parts constituting the whole. The division of the whole then results in its individual physical parts. As in the context of the physical whole, also in the case of the potential whole corresponding to the universal as such, division and indivision involve the same entity. In the case of “man” the division is applied to Peter, Paul, etc. Should the divisible whole be “animal”, the division would reach “man”, “lion”, etc.³²⁷ While the partition of “man” into Peter and Paul takes its course through clear and distinct cognition, the opposite (unifying, confounding and universalizing) denomination proceed by a confusive (obscuring) act. Whereas clear cognition apprehends the distinctive features of objects, and thus by means of a distinct concept we are able to distinguish Peter from Paul, the confusive act allows a plurality of objects to merge into one undivided object.³²⁸ The upshot of this analogy with physical objects is telling. The parts clouded by the confusive act in the universal (potestative) whole are not contained in the whole potentially but *actually*. Consequently, the universal concept of man is prescinded from Peter by a confusive act not objectively but only subjectively, i.e., solely by a cognizing subject. Peter remains an actual part of the concept of “man” and the notions of man and lion are actual parts of the concept “animal”.³²⁹ This statement is in patent contradiction with Suárez’s statement in *DM* VI, s. 2, n. 12 where he characterizes the potential whole proper to universal unity as a whole abstracted by the so-called total abstraction, which includes its inferiors only *potentially*.³³⁰ It also directly collides with the statement in *DM* VI, s. 6, n. 3 where Suárez says that the potential intellect cognizes the formal “ratio” and essence *without* knowing anything of the inferiors or individuals.³³¹

327. Hurtado, *Metaphysica*, d. 5, s. 10, subsectio 4, § 148 (Lyons, 1624 779).

328. Hurtado, *Metaphysica*, d. 5, s. 10, subsectio 4, § 150 (Lyons 1624, 779).

329. Hurtado, *Metaphysica*, d. 5, s. 10, subsectio 4, § 152 (Lyons, 1624 779): “... Petrus dum per actum confusum est in homine, est actu pars illius per confusam cognitionem.” The transformation of univocal concepts into analogical concepts thus seems to be definitively sealed. As regards this “transformation” see also Novák, Dvořák 2007, 88–89.

330. *DM* I, s. 2, n. 12 (Vivès, vol. 25:16): “Solum est animadvertendum, quod dialectici dicunt, genus considerari posse, vel ut totum actuale, vel ut potentiale, seu (quod idem est) considerari posse ut abstractum abstractione praecisiva, id est, secundum id tantum quod in sua ratione formali actu includit in suo conceptu obiectivo sic praeciso, vel abstractione totali, ut abstrahitur tamquam totum potentiale includens inferiora in potentia.”

331. *DM* VI, s. 6, n. 3 (Vivès, vol. 25:224): “... universale non fieri ab intellectu agente, sed a possibili per operationem directam, qua cognoscit naturam communem secundum suam praecisam

The second argument is based on Hurtado's extensional interpretation of predication. The immediate object of the universal act is said of Peter and Paul. However, there can be *in re* nothing true of Peter but Peter and nothing of Paul but Paul. One is not allowed to predicate the whole object of the universal act of Peter because then we would necessarily say Paul of Peter, etc.³³² What is really identical with Paul can never become identical with Peter. Consequently, the immediate object of the universal act must be only Peter, Paul, etc. One may object that not only Peter but the whole immediate object of the universal act must actually be predicated of Peter. Not mentioning the tautological character of the predications, the object of the universal act extends to all individuals of the kind. In the reply Hurtado employs the distinction between two aspects of predication. One is a real aspect; the other is a way (*modus*) of predication. The tautological predication "Peter is Peter" expresses an identification not only *in re* but also according to the mode of predication. Peter in the position of both predicate and subject is cognized clearly and distinctly. On the other hand, the predication "Peter is man" assumes agreement only *in re*. As far as the mode of predication is concerned, Peter is also vaguely and disjunctively predicated of Paul. Thus, we may say that what is predicated of Peter is not "man" as such but rather "a man" or "this or that man". Whereas the truth of the propositions "Peter is a man" or "Peter is this or that man" is taken determinatively in the individual, there is nothing determinate in the mode in which the predicate is conceived.³³³ Regarding the mode of predication, the predicate "man", so to say, roams (*vagor*) the individuals of a given kind and thus it takes on confusive supposition. It does not signify Peter more than Paul. Clearly, Hurtado views predication primarily not as the application or contraction of the universal to the singular, as it is the case in moderate realism, but rather as the identification of one and the same singular conceived once confusedly, another

rationem formalem et essentiam, nihil de inferioribus rationibus, vel de individuis considerando, neque etiam formaliter et quasi in actu signato considerando communitatem ipsius naturae, sed solum essentiam, quae communis est." As regards the further Suárez's formulations implying his employment of *praecisio obiectiva* see the following quotation: "Sic igitur abstrahit et praescindit intellectus aliquid ab aliquo tamquam commune a particulari, non ob distinctionem vel praecisionem quae in re antecedit, sed ob imperfectum, confusum seu inadaequatum modum concipiendi suum; *ratione cuius in obiecto quod considerat non comprehendit totum quod est in illo, prout a parte rei existit*, sed solum secundum aliquam convenientiam vel similitudinem quam plures res inter se habent, quae per modum unius sub ea ratione considerantur [italics; D.H.]" *DM* II, s. 2, n. 12 (Vivès, vol. 25:75).

332. Hurtado, *Metaphysica*, d. 5, s. 10, subsectio 5, § 153 (Lyons 1624, 780).

333. Hurtado, *Metaphysica*, d. 5, s. 10, subsectio 5, § 157 (Lyons 1624, 780). See also Hurtado, *Universa philosophia, Logica*, d. 5: "De specie, & individuo", s. 8, § 74 (Lyons 1624, 96).

time distinctly. The universal thus is rather a vague individual (*individuum vagum*) than a real and univocal *universale* contractible by its inferiors.³³⁴

It is not difficult to see that this statement does not have a counterpart in Suárez. Contrary to Hurtado, Suárez endorses a theory of predication applying universal to singulars.³³⁵ The reformulation of the proposition “Peter is man” in the way “Peter is a man” employing the notion of *individuum vagum* cannot be authorized by Suárez’s text. For him the vague individual *cannot* be ranked among the universals. In fact, it equals to transcendental unity that is a property of being, which is an analogical concept.³³⁶

The third argument is based on the elimination of the possible candidates of the term of universal cognition. *Universale* comprising two factors, i.e., an object and universal (confusive) cognition, must find its terminus in the plurality of individuals as mutually similar. The term of the universal cognition in the things can be neither a singular inasmuch as it is a singular nor the plurality of singulars *qua* dissimilar. However, what about the nature equipped with formal unity which is neither universal nor individual unity? Can this *sui generis* unity be rated as a suitable candidate for a *res denominata*? The answer to this question is fundamental with regard to Hurtado’s evaluation of Suárez’s position.

Hurtado’s reply to this question, presented in the context of the interpretation of Avicenna’s theory of the indifference of the essence, makes clear that the indifference must be interpreted purely *epistemologically*, i.e., only as indifferent to the clear and the confusive concept. Referring to Avicenna’s dictum “Horseness is only

334. Hurtado, *Logica*, d. 5, s. 8, § 73 (Lyons 1624, 96): “Vagum autem est singularis res, incerta tamen, & quae nomine proprio, aut termino demonstrativo significari non potest, sed termino confuso, & sine distinctione, ut *aliquis homo, quoddam animal, Petrus vel Paulus, hic, aut ille puer*.” Hurtado, *Logica*, d. 5, s. 9, §§ 101–102 (Lyons 1624, 97–98): “... *Petrus est aliquis homo ... esse praedicationem specie de individuo ... Petrus est homo*, non differt nisi verbo ab hac *Petrus est aliquis homo ...*”

335. *DM VI*, s. 4, n. 4 (Vivès, vol. 25: 235–236).

336. *DM VI*, s. 8, n. 14 (Vivès, vol. 25: 236): “Dicendum ergo videtur individuum ut sic [vague individual; D.H.] respectu plurium individuorum non constituere novum universale, quia de formali nihil aliud dicit quam unitatem transcendentalem uniuscuiusque entitatis prout in re existentis; et ita excluditur, sicut alia praedicata transcendentia. Praesertim quia, si sumatur secundum id positivum quod dicit, nihil addit supra ens; si vero sumatur secundum id quod formaliter addit, illud solum est negatio quaedam.” *DM VI*, s. 8, n. 12 (Vivès, vol. 25: 235): “Sed responderi potest huiusmodi transcendentia non esse proprie et simpliciter universalialia, quamvis interdum late et secundum quid ita appellantur, ea ratione qua omne id quod aliquo modo unum est, et commune multis, potest universale vocari. Tamen, quoniam haec analogia sunt, vel non habent unitatem simpliciter, vel non aequae plura respiciunt, ideo ex hac parte excluduntur a propria ratione et divisione universalis, quod in ea partitione dividi intelligendum est.”

horseness” Hurtado says that it is not of the equine essence to be apprehended distinctly or confusedly. Even though it must always be conceived in one of those “modes”, it is not necessarily determined to “stand” under this or that conception. That, however, also means that no third unity besides singular and universal (confused) unity, whether called formal or absolutely considered, can be thought of at all.³³⁷ The nature abstracted from one individual turns to be immediately formally universal.³³⁸ For Hurtado there is no precise act of the intellect isolating the nature according to its formal “ratio” that would consequently constitute (as reflexively cognized) the foundation for a later comparative act and by which the relation of being (a fully-fledged universal) would be produced. This complex picture is abandoned in Hurtado’s exposition. In his presentation he lays emphasis on the statement that the nature abstracted from one individual is *ipso facto* abstracted from all similar individuals of the same species and thus immediately rendered predicable of them.³³⁹

It may be observed that the complex ontologico-epistemological picture comprised by the items of formal unity, formal and universal abstraction, the *notitia comparativa* producing the logical (relational) universal gets lost in Hurtado. Even though, as stated above, there is a tendency in Suárez to minimize what the Thomists call the intrinsic virtual distinction, i.e., the intrinsic conceptual eminence of the discriminable grades really identified in a thing,³⁴⁰ the Jesuit repeatedly speaks of not exhausting the whole quiddity and objective *ratio* of a thing and of wholes *in re* which are utterly simple and contain eminently the power to produce actually different effects, such as the soul, the Sun or

337. Hurtado, *Metaphysica*, d. 5, s. 9, § 113 (Lyons 1624, 773): “Voluit Avicena equinitatem esse indifferentem ad conceptum clarum, vel confusum, & in utroque concipi conceptum essentialem equi ... nec vero est de essentia equi concipi ut universale, alioquin non posset esse singularis: nec eius essentia est concipi ut singulare, alioquin ei repugnaret universalitas: sed est indifferens ad utramque cognitionem ... at sicut necessario concipitur, vel confuse, vel clare; ita necessario est, vel universale, vel singulare: neutrum tamen necessario ... Pat. Suarez hominem ut sic retinere conceptum primum hominis: dari autem unitatem mediam inter singularem, & universalem, nec P. Suarez vult, nec probat.”

338. Hurtado, *Metaphysica*, d. 5, s. 9, § 114 (Lyons 1624, 773).

339. Hurtado, *Metaphysica*, d. 5, s. 9, § 116 (Lyons 1624, 773). A certain radicalization of Hurtado’s teaching can be found in Arriaga’s theory. For Arriaga a universal concept is predicable only of those individuals that are contained in the concept, i.e., only of those from which it has been abstracted. See Sousedik 1998, 46–47.

340. See especially his inclination to confuse metaphysical and logical wholes/parts shown in 2.4. The same tendency can be observed also in *DM* VI, s. 9, nn. 17–18 (Vivès, vol. 25: 235–236) and in particular in *DM* VII, s. 1, nn. 5–7 (Vivès, vol. 25: 251–252).

God.³⁴¹ Hurtado, on the contrary, makes explicit use only of what can be called the *extrinsic* virtual distinction defined as the manifold cognoscibility of a thing based on a different comparability with other things or different extrinsic connotations or operations. Even though Suárez recognizes the significance of this cognoscibility and agrees that the conceptual distinction is often formed with the assistance of the relation to diverse things, which he also considers to be the foundation in the thing, he does not accept those extrinsic factors as the direct significates of the abstracted concepts. Hurtado, however, makes entirely clear that if one conceives Peter *qua* animal, it is not the case that some Peter's objective formality "animal" is grasped and another (rationality) is left aside. What is apprehended is the whole of Peter with reference to the sensitive operations. If Peter is conceived as "rational", then what is known is an intellectually indivisible whole, i.e., Peter, with reference to his operations (connotations) of discursive reasoning.³⁴² Distinctively, these operations are relevant not only in the context of the generation of universal cognition, where they serve as the extramental occasion for and assistance to the formation of the conceptual distinction, but, more importantly, also in Hurtado's semantic theory based on the distinction between direct and indirect signification. The term "animal" does not signify only *in recto* (directly), but also *in obliquo* (indirectly). Much like the relational term "father" signifies primarily not only all fathers but connotatively also their children, so the term "animal" signifies directly Peter and indirectly his sensitive operations, and "rational" signifies *in recto* (again) Peter and *in obliquo* the operations of discursive reasoning.³⁴³

341. DM VII, s. 1, n. 5 (Vivès, vol. 25: 251): "At vero posterior distinctio rationis [with a foundation in the thing or the distinction of reasoned reason; D.H.] fit per conceptus inadaequatos ejusdem rei; nam, licet per utrumque eadem res concipiatur, per neutrum tamen exacte concipitur totum id, quod est in re, neque exhauritur tota quidditas, et ratio objectiva ejus ..." DM VI, s. 9, n. 17 (Vivès, vol. 25: 251–252): "... anima rationalis ... in re una simplex forma est; quae si consideretur ut principium efficiens operationum omnium, quae in homine sunt, intelligitur esse unum eminens, et quasi universale principium earum ..."

342. Hurtado, *Metaphysica*, d. 5, s. 10, subsectio 1, § 124 (Lyons 1624, 775): "... docent Nominales, intellectum non posse partiri obiectum in duas formalitates: sed idem indivisibiliter obiectum cognosci per diversos actus, per illos referendo ad diversos effectus: in ordine ad quos diversas sumit denominationem. Quod adfirmat Pat. Suarez disput. 7 Metaphysicae sect. 1. num. 5 ..." Suárez, however, speaks of objective "portioning": "Sicut enim, quia non potest unico conceptu distincte cognoscere totam perfectionem unius rei simplicis, eam [the thing itself, D.H.] partitur diversis conceptibus, et sic format distinctionem rationis ...", DM LIV, s. 1, n. 8 (Vivès, vol. 26: 1017).

343. Hurtado, *Metaphysica*, d. 5, s. 10, § 127 (Lyons 1624, 775): "In his modis concipiendi non respondet ex parte obiecti aliud, & aliud obiectum; sed illud omnino, quod denominatur animal, denominatur rationale, homo, & Petrus, per diversos actus in ordine ad diversos effectus ..."

2.7 Summary

Suárez's metaphysical doctrine of universals is motivated by the objective to justify the process of scientific enquiry based on the Aristotelian assumption of universal and necessary knowledge. Suárez is convinced that the justification cannot be ontologically supported by the theories of Platonism, ultrarealism and ultranationalism. In relation to this *desideratum* those theories are useless or conspicuously insufficient.

Besides the overall unintelligibility of "the monsters of ideas" subsisting independently of any mind,³⁴⁴ the separated ideas are entirely functionless. They cannot be cognized by the human intellect since the only way how to establish universal cognition is by means of abstraction originating in sensory perception. As separated they cannot be predicated of their inferiors. Platonic ideas are thus relevant only in the context of the universal in causation, which is far from the present issue of the universal in being and in predicating.³⁴⁵

The position of ultrarealism, which may also be labeled as immanent Platonism, represented in late medieval philosophy by authors such as Walter Burley (ca. 1275–1344) and John Wycliff (ca. 1320–1384), not mentioned by Suárez in *DM* VI at all,³⁴⁶ which assumes the immanent existence of the *universale in actu* in extramental things is dismissed as early as in *DM* V, s. 1. The inexistence of the actual universal in things leads to a contradictory state of affairs, in which the same universal *man* existing in Peter and Paul comes to be simultaneously the same and distinct from itself.³⁴⁷ The denial of strict parallelism between *lex mentis* and *lex entis* is what ranks Suárez among outright opponents of all forms of excessive realism including the Scotistic conception, especially in its uncharitable interpretation. Suárez just as decisively rejects the theory, according to which universality is solely a matter of linguistic (conventional) terms (*voces*) and nominal (verbal) distinctions. This

Ibidem, § 128 (Lyons 1624, 775): "... dicitur illud repraesentare inadaequate, id est, inadaequate ex parte modi, non tamen ex parte obiecti significati in recto." For an evaluation of Suárez similar to mine see also Bauer 1996, 152.

344. As really different from singulars they can be only singular, never universal. See *DM* V, s. 1, n. 4 (Vivès, vol. 25:147).

345. *DM* VI, s. 2, n. 3 (Vivès, vol. 25:207). On the issue of the universal in causation in Suárez see especially *DM* XXV (Vivès, vol. 25:899–916).

346. That, however, does not mean that the ultrarealist position does not get its representation in Suárez's analysis. His uncharitable reading of Scotus or the Scotists, reducing the formal distinction to a fully-fledged real distinction, is *de facto* a critique of the ultrarealist position.

347. *DM* V, s. 1, nn. 4–5 (Vivès, vol. 25:146–147).

extreme nominalism is by Suárez reprehended as “hardly believable” (*vix autem credibile*).³⁴⁸

A negative counterpart of Suárez’s doctrine is the metaphysical theory of the unity of precision posited prior to mental operation and the determination by particulars attributed to Fonseca. In contrast to Fonseca, Suárez claims that universal unity is nothing more than a unity of reason with a foundation in the thing. Consequently, Suárez’s theory is fundamentally shaped by the moderate realism of doctrines such as those of John Duns Scotus and Thomas Aquinas, without being fully identical with them. On the issue of the *fundamentum* of universal unity Suárez draws inspiration both from Scotus (in the line of his conciliatory reading) and Aquinas (with his disciples, especially Cajetan). We may say that Suárez comes to structural agreement with Scotus and the Scotists in the doctrinal emphasis on the actual presence of formal unity in extramental things and on its rudimental non-repugnancy to being in the many. It is well-known that no explicit mention of the very term *unitas formalis*, let alone its existence in extramental things, can be found in Aquinas’s *De ente et essentia*, the canonical text on the issue of universals in Second scholasticism especially for the Thomists. On the other hand, when considering the uncharitable exposition of Scotus, Suárez is much closer to the Thomists with their denial of the *ex natura rei* distinction. That is also why he does not affirm that the extramental nature has the literal (formal) community *sui generis* and by the same token defends the theory of the essential resemblance of things of the same species, which seems to lead many expounders of Suárez’s conception (including Hurtado) to a purely conceptualist or semi-nominalist reading of his doctrine. The doctrinal proximity to the Thomistic stance is far from implying doctrinal identity. The Thomistic explicit endorsement of the virtual distinction *in re*, though no doubt present in Suárez, tends to be here and there “covered” by the distinctive role of cognitive activism penetrating intentionally to the essences of things.

Whilst the metaphysics of universals, after all, brings him closer to Aquinas and the Thomists than to Scotus and Scotists, the issue of the psychogenesis of universals is evidence of Suárez’s poignant divergence from Thomism, especially in its Cajetan version. The primary intellective cognition of singulars apprehended by the singular intentional species, of which universals are acquired within the same singular species by the potential intellect, the theory of the real identity of the agent and potential intellect, the denial of the causal relationship between the interior senses and the agent intellect and the doctrine of the mental word identical with the cognitive act are anything but theories discoverable in Aquinas

348. DM VI, s. 9, n. 7 (Vivès, vol. 25: 238).

and in Thomistic texts. The ontological evaluation of the various intentions, despite resemblance to Scotus and Aquinas, which assesses the logical or second intentions as relations of reason, cannot be unqualifiedly labeled as “Scotistic” or “Thomistic” either. The unequivocal statement that the first objective intentions fall under real being – a statement based on a specific understanding of *denominatio extrinseca* – moves Suárez and his “realist conceptualism” away from both Scotism and Thomism, as I attempt to show in the following chapters.

Despite Suárez’s conciliatory attitude to conceptualism declared to be different only *in modo loquendi* from his own theory,³⁴⁹ the Jesuit’s doctrine of formal unity is the main doctrinal element why his theory of universals is to be evaluated rather as a sort of moderate realism. *Expressis verbis* Suárez denies the claim endorsed later by Hurtado that what is immediately signified by universal concepts is a class of singulars. If the extensionalist redefinition of universals were correct, science (as Suárez repeatedly says) could not be about objective concepts or things (or aspects of things) standing under formal concepts, which on the pre-reflexive level are the same, but only about words or – as Hurtado claims – about formal concepts. By that metaphysics would turn either into logic or into psychology. Suárez leaves no doubt that without the ontological assumption of universally denominated natures prescinded objectively from individual differences the intellect would grasp nothing more than accidental similarities of singulars including *in actu* their individual differences. That would lead to nothing less than to the adoption of what is usually called abstraction *per confusionem* or, in other terms, the subjective or formal precision. Needless to say, this operation, unjustly ascribed to Suárez by a number of neo-Thomists in the 20th century, is far from capable of generating univocal logical concepts which are epistemologically founded in objective precision.

349. DM VI, s. 2, n. 1 (Vivès, vol. 25: 206); see also DM VI, s. 5, n. 3 (Vivès, vol. 25: 223).

João Poinset (1589–1644) on universals

3.1 Universals in *Cursus philosophicus Thomisticus*

Contrary to the metaphysical context of Suárez's *DM*, Poinset lays out his metaphysical doctrine of universals in the second part of his *Ars logica* in the first volume of *Cursus philosophicus Thomisticus* (*CPT*). But metaphysical issues are not entirely set aside in logical context. It is the 2nd part of the *Logical Art* (preceded by the *Summulae*), subtitled *De instrumentis logicalibus ex parte materiae*, dealing with the so-called *Material Logic* or *Logica major*, focused not on the formal correctness and consistency of our reasoning but above all on the truth in knowing,³⁵⁰ which is the crucial source of information on Poinset's metaphysics as well. Without an enquiry into reality and the way it is apprehended, the logical terms and their properties cannot be properly explained.³⁵¹ The core of the questions discussing the metaphysical aspects of universals can be found in the 3rd question *De universali secundum se* in the 2nd part of the *Logical Art*. It comes after two questions, which are also important for the complex issue of universals – *De Logica, qualis sit et ad quae se extendat* and *De ente rationis logico, quod est secunda intentio*. Especially the 2nd question on being of reason is significant for Poinset's theory of universals. The 3rd question *De universali secundum se* is concerned not only with what was classified as the physical or, as Poinset says, the material universal, but also the metaphysical and logical universal.

Cognitive psychology and the issue of the principle of individuation, the two “pillars” constituting the systematical “ambient” of Poinset's theory of universals,

350. Apart from a treatise on the logical instruments *ex parte materiae* and a commentary on Porphyry's *Isagogé* thoroughly analyzing predicables, the majority of the second part of the *Logical Art*, as a kind of explication of Aristotle's *Categories*, is devoted to the analysis of the individual categories (474–641). The last two parts then deal with Poinset's semiotics (within the framework of a commentary on Aristotle's *On Interpretation*), in recent secondary literature often considered to be the key to Poinset's philosophy in general, and his theory of demonstration (*The Posterior Analytics*). See Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, vol. 1: *Ars logica seu de forma et materia ratiocinandi*, “Tabula synoptica totius logicae” (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, xxvii).

351. Yves R. M. Simon says that “... the situation of the material logician is much the same as that of the metaphysician.” Yves Simon, “Foreword”, in: Simon, Glanville, Hollenhorst 1955, xv. Ibidem, xvii: “... the Logical Art of John of St. Thomas contains much philosophy of nature and much metaphysics.”

are treated in the two remaining volumes of *CPT*. It is chiefly *Tractatus de anima intellectiva*, an explication of the third book of Aristotle's *De anima*, and also the last part of the whole quadripartite *Naturalis philosophiae* of *CPT*, with the important 10th question *De intellectu agente et possibili* and 11th question *De intellectione et conceptu*, a valuable source of information on Poinso's theory of concept-formation and simple apprehension. Apart from the 4th part *De ente mobile animato*, the question of the principle of individuation is also expounded in the 9th question *De subiecto accidentium et principio individuationis* of the third part of the natural philosophy (explicating the first book of Aristotle's *De generatione et corruptione*). Moreover, I shall also consider some passages from *Cursus theologicus* (*CT*) which complement Poinso's exposition of *universale materialiter sumptum*.

After an introductory section on the definition and relevant categorization of the *universale* in 3.2 I focus on the theory of the nature being the extramental subject of the universal denomination of the intellect, explicitly designated by Poinso as *universale materialiter sumptum*. This theory of the universally denominated nature constitutes Poinso's opening demarcation against nominalism and Platonism, which the Dominican takes both at one blow (3.3.1). In 3.3.2 I address Poinso's theory of the formal unity of the nature. The subsection 3.3.3 deals with Poinso's theory of the aptitude to being in the many in the nature existing independently of the intellect. 3.3.4 presents Poinso's doctrine of the *distinctio virtualis intrinseca* and its application to the issue of metaphysical parts. The last subsection 3.3.5, devoted to *universale materiale*, explores the possibility of a synthesis of two seemingly conflicting statements in Poinso's *Logic* and in the Dominican's *Philosophia Naturalis* and *CT*. In the next Section 3.4 dealing with the *universale metaphysicum*, an intermediate type of universal, I start with an outline of the features of Poinso's epistemology pertinent to the issue of the epistemology of the universal (3.4.1). In 3.4.2 I introduce Poinso's critique of Suárez's theory of the direct apprehension of a material singular by the proper and distinct singular species formed by the agent intellect. The subsection 3.4.3 expounds Poinso's theory of the formation of the metaphysical universal. The ensuing 3.4.4 supplements this discussion with the introduction of the issue of the ontological import of extrinsic denomination considered as a significant indicator of the ontological status of the first objective intention. The fifth section considers two queries concerning the *universale logicum* – its "quiddity" and its formation (3.5.2). The conclusion (3.6) summarizes the basic features of Poinso's theory from the viewpoint of comparison with Suárez's theory.³⁵²

352. As the subtitle of this work suggests, Suárez's point of view is, so to say, the "formal object *quo*" by which I shall approach Poinso's doctrine.

3.2 Different meanings of *universale*

Omitting the universal from the vantage point of signification (*universale in significando*) and causation (*universale in causando*), Poinso asserts that it is the universal from the standpoint of being (*universale in essendo*) and predication (*universale in praedicando*) that primarily constitutes the object of Aristotle's definition of universality as "one in many and one of many". The universal in being and predication thus is "one" related to several things, in which it exists and of which it is (or can be) predicated.³⁵³ Briefly speaking, "one in many and of many" comprises all the necessary "parts" constituting formal or fully-fledged universality which essentially displays a *relational* character. Accordingly, the respective universal includes (i) subject, (ii) foundation, (iii) relation to terminus, and (iv) the property (*passio*) of universality. The subject and foundation are explicated by the term "one" in the description. *Universale* is *one* thing (*res*) which is apt to be in the many. As such it is a thing that is separated from the multitude of instances, to which it is communicable. The unity and disposition to being in the many constitute the very foundation of the relation of universality. The phrase "in the many" refers to relation which is the "quiddity" of universality. Universality is formally conceivable only as related to the term(s) which are its inferior natures (in case of specific universal unity they are individuals, in case of generic universal unity these immediate inferiors are specific universal natures). The universal is said to be in the many identically (*per identitatem*). After its contraction by a singular it is made one and the same with its inferiors. Only when it is one and the same with its inferiors is it predicable of them. Thus, as 3.5.1 expands, predicability constitutes the property of universality.³⁵⁴

The above-mentioned phasing of the relational universal is evidence of another division. There is the nature (the material universal) and its condition of "being abstracted", which explicates primarily the foundation of universality. Poinso calls the subject abstracted from the many "the metaphysical universal". Apart from the metaphysical universal there is also the logical universal, which is the form or intention by which something is denominated from the intellect as universal. As such this form of universality is usually called the second intention. It is *second* since it is founded on the first intention and designates the second status or the second condition of an object. Whereas the first intention designates the object as it has being in its own right, whether with regard to existence or with regard to quiddity,

353. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 3, art. 1 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 313–314). A more detailed exposition of what exactly this *universale in praedicando* means is presented in 3.5.1.

354. Ibidem, 314.

the second intention comes to it insofar as it is apprehended. Poinso's division of labor is of much the same character as we have seen in Suárez. While the first intentions and natures are treated especially by the metaphysician, the objects of study of the logician are the (second) intentions of universality and predicability.³⁵⁵

3.3 *Universale materialiter sumptum*

3.3.1 Rejection of Platonism, Ultrarealism and Nominalism

In the second article *Utrum universale materialiter sumptum et pro subiecto inveniatur a parte rei* Poinso introduces two conclusions targeted against Platonism and nominalism, shared also by Suárez. (1) To the universal words and concepts expressive of universals as object there corresponds, truly and in an absolute sense, some entity or nature denominated as universal. This nature does not exist in the real in the state of universality and with abstraction but as a result of the abstraction performed by the intellect. It is so related to the nature existing in the object as not to include singularity, or as to include the superior predicates without including the inferior ones.³⁵⁶ (2) The universal understood as the substratum or as the material universal can be something real. In other words, it can be a nature admitting of existence in the real. But the state of universality does not allow for real existence. Accordingly, the universal understood as the formal universal, i.e., as universality and abstraction, is found only in cognition.³⁵⁷

The conjunction of the theses *ipso facto* entails the rejection of the doctrines of Platonism and nominalism. Let us look first at Platonism. Platonism assumes strict parallelism between the order of being (*lex entis*) and the order of cognition (*lex mentis*). Universals and mathematical entities must truly exist independently of the intellect and have to stand in direct correspondence to our concepts and formulae as their actual correlates. The so-called eternal truths (*veritates aeternae*) expressed

355. Ibidem, 314–315.

356. Ioannes a St. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 3, art. 2 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 316): “Vocibus et conceptibus universalium vere et simpliciter correspondet pro obiecto aliqua entitas et natura, quae universalis denominatur; non quidem quae existat a parte rei sub illo statu universalitatis et abstractionis, sed quae per ipsam abstractionem intellectus ita attingat in obiecto naturam, ut non attingat singularitatem, vel ita attingat superiora praedicata, quod non inferiora.”

357. Ibidem, 318: “Universale pro substrato seu materiali potest esse aliquid reale, id est natura a parte rei dabilis, licet non cum illo statu universalitatis, unde pro formali, id est pro universalitate et abstractione non nisi in cognitione invenitur.”

in essential and necessary propositions such as “Man is animal” constitute the proper object of scientific enquiry and must be rooted in actual extramental existence independently of singulars. If they did not enjoy this separate existence, they would be corruptible and generable just as contingent particulars are.³⁵⁸

Despite the apparent doctrinal distance from Platonism, nominalism can be seen as an offspring of Platonism. The impossibility of existence of actual universals independently of the intellect, taken by many to be an evident fact, jointly with the assumption that if there are universals independently of the human intellect, then they must be only of the Platonic (actual) kind, leads nominalists to the immediate (in a way, comprehensible) denial of any universal nature in the thing including the *universale* as the extramental substrate of the universal extrinsic denomination. Accordingly, the universal concept signifying *man* can denote only the aggregate of all men, never the nature or the universal *materialiter sumptum*. The proposition “Man is animal” can be translated only extensionally as “All men are animal” or “Every thing, which is man, is animal”.³⁵⁹ Speaking of universal objective concepts, they actually admit two possibilities. The objective concept of man is either something one, or many. As one it cannot be something real, but only mental. No oneness exists independently of the human intellect. The nominalists only accept plurality. The universal concept is a collective concept designating primarily a set of similar singulars.³⁶⁰

In his reply Poinset stresses that both attitudes omit the key role of abstraction that can be found in rudimentary form already in sensory cognition. Sight attains the colour of an apple without attaining its taste or smell, much like the intellect attains man in Peter without capturing his singularity. When the visual faculty apprehends an apple only according to a single aspect and leaves aside other aspect(s) proper to the other external senses, this apprehension does not entail falsity. Sight attaining an apple according to its colour and not according to its smell or taste is not false because as such it is not an act of *judgment* affirming that an apple *is* in reality without its sweet taste or savoury smell. By analogy, the intellect as the faculty simply apprehensive of Peter’s nature does not *affirm* that the nature of man exists in reality in Peter as formally universal. The formation of the concept of colour or man is not the formation of a false notion but only of a notion which, when related to the whole thing, is not fully adequate. The accent on this aspectual cognition is in full harmony with the famous dictum “Abstrahentium non est mendacium” based on the distinction between the mode of being (*modus*

358. Ibidem, 319.

359. Ibidem, 317–318.

360. Ibidem, 317 and 319.

essendi) and mode of knowing (*modus cognoscendi*), which Poinsoot regards as the main argumentative tool against Platonism and nominalism.³⁶¹

As for the Platonist reasoning based on the assumption of eternal truths, it can be invalidated by saying that the objects of eternal truths are eternal not because of some subjective actual being they enjoy outside the singulars but by reason of existing objectively in the divine mind and thus they are not dependent on temporal existence.³⁶² The nominalist extensionalist translation of the proposition “Peter is man” to the form “Peter is every thing which is man” or “Peter is all men” is manifestly false. The same also holds in case of the proposition “Man runs”. The conversion of this sentence to “Everything that is man runs” also clashes with our intuitions. If those translations were valid, all indefinite propositions would be false.³⁶³ The ontological commitments accepted by nominalists as allegedly necessary assumptions of *any* realist doctrine are certainly redundantly strong. Poinsoot makes clear that a universal objective concept need not be and is not one as a real unity but only as a conceptual unity or a unity of precision. Yet, when taken materially as the *subject* of that unity (not formally for the relation of universality or for its foundation), it is a real being capable of actual existence even though not in every status.³⁶⁴

3.3.2 Formal unity and negative community

Whereas the upshot of the 2nd article of the 3rd question can be regarded as common to all sorts of moderate realism, the 3rd article *Utrum unitas formalis ut distincta a singulari conveniat naturae ante operationem intellectus* embarks on a more controversial claim. As stated above in the chapter on Suárez, the issue of the character of formal unity crystallizes minds, especially those following the teaching of Scotus and Aquinas. We have seen that since Suárez refuses to entertain *distinctio formalis*, he sides more with the Thomists than with Scotus and his followers. In this subsection, vis-à-vis Poinsoot’s theory, I would like to specify (partly also rectify) this statement. I advance in three steps. (1) I introduce Poinsoot’s definition

361. Ibidem, 317: “... reiciendam esse sententiam Platonis et Nominalium, quia non distinxerunt inter modum essendi et modum cognoscendi ... stat bene, quod correspondeat aliquid ex parte obiecti conceptui inadaequato et praeciso, licet in re praecisum non sit, sed simul cum alio existat.”

362. Ibidem, 319.

363. Ibidem, 318.

364. Ibidem, 320.

of formal unity, and (2) his interpretation of Scotus's position. (3) I comment on three Poinso's conclusions focused against Scotus and Scotism. Apart from this confrontation with Scotus I also point out the doctrinal difference between Suárez's and Poinso's theory.

1. Two aspects can be distinguished in the signification of the notion *unum* or *unitas*. Formally, unity, no matter of what kind, implies a lack of division (*carentiam divisionis*). Materially speaking, this notion articulates something positive on the part of the entity (*ex parte entitatis*). The whole *significatum* of the term "unity" applies not only to the *additum*, i.e., to what is conceptually added to the subject which is the formal significate of the term (basically it is this or that type of indivision), but also to the foundation which is the (material) entity to which the formal element is applied. The whole referent, then, has to comprise both parts, i.e., the indivision and the entity. If one is to get the diversity of units and not only the diversity of the modes of unity, determined by the diverse ways of negation of division articulating thus only the negative aspect of unity, one must take into account not only the diversity in the (formal) modes of unity but also the diversity of the undivided *entities*. So, when one distinguishes between formal and individual unity in one and the same thing, e.g., in Peter – both conceptually different from transcendental unity which accompanies being as such and is defined as the negation of division in an entity³⁶⁵ – we do not distinguish between various unities absolutely as if they constituted a multitude of units. What they constitute are not two absolute unities but only two modes of negation within one and the same individual. Formal unity thus is nothing but the negation of division by the formal or essential (quidditative) principles. This indivision in formal principles, whether generic or specific (it is formal since it comes from substantial forms), coexists in material substances with the indivision in material principles proper to individuation.³⁶⁶

2. Poinso is well aware of the long-lasting controversy on the issue of the formal unity of the nature between the Thomists and the Scotists. Prior to the formulation of his opinion he deems worthwhile to deliver his own (correct) interpretation

365. For Poinso's theory of transcendental unity and its conceptual distinction from formal and individual unity see Ioannes a S. Thoma, *Cursus theologicus in Summam theologicam d. Thomae*, t. 2, q. 11, disp. 11, art. 2, n. 12 (Paris 1883, 147–148). As regards Poinso's *Cursus theologicus* I shall quote below in the shortened form: *CT*, t. 2, q. 11, disp. 11, art. 2, n. 12 (Paris 1883, 147–148).

366. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 3, art. 3 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 321–322). It is also called material unity or indivision in material principles because it is related to formal unity materially in the manner of subject. See also Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CT*, t. 2, q. 11, disp. 11, art. 2, n. 1 (Paris 1883, 141).

of Scotus's theory. He is clear that Scotus is not an advocate of ultrarealism. The common nature is not a universal nature existing *in actu* as positively common to individuals. The genuine interpretation of his opinion must be conducted along the following two lines. First, there is a real (*a parte rei*), true and proper unity accompanying the nature as such (*secundum se*). It is neither a universal unity nor a numerical one, but a less than numerical unity. Since it belongs to the nature as such, it is found in the nature in every state. In the state of abstraction it is connected with universal unity, in the state of singularity it is bound up with numerical unity. Second, formal unity belonging to the nature considered in itself can be regarded as negatively universal, which means nonsingular, because as such it is neither singular nor positively universal but only "common", which is to be regarded as a middle status between singularity and universality. It is negatively common not only as such in isolation from being in singulars but also and above all *in singulars*. In the thing itself it possesses not only quidditative predicates but also properties such as the less than numerical or formal unity and negative community.³⁶⁷

3. The anti-Scotistic thorn of Poinot's thinking is apparent already in his first conclusion. No positive and absolute unity, though described as a less than numerical unity, belongs to the nature considered in itself. The nature considered in itself cannot be said to be bound up with numerical unity in reality. As such it possesses only negative formal unity, i.e., the negation of division by formal principles.³⁶⁸ Formal unity cannot be viewed as a unity in a positive and absolute sense (*simpliciter*) because of what I call "the ontological absorption" of formal unity by individual unity. At most it can be called negative unity and unity in a certain respect (*secundum quid*). In coherence with the above-mentioned definition of *unitas*, for a unity to be a unity in an unqualified (absolute) sense it does not suffice to consider only the pertinent negation of division by formal predicates. Absolute unity must yield the entity undivided in *all* remaining respects, that is, it cannot leave it undivided only in a certain respect, according to the formal principles. Obviously, formal unity does not satisfy this condition. The nature absolutely considered as such does not exclude the other division since in singulars it is divided by the material (individuating) principles. True, contrary to generic unity the specific unity of the lowest atomic species rules out any other

367. Ibidem, 322.

368. Ibidem, 322: "Nihilominus pro resolutione dico primo: Naturae secundum se non convenit aliqua unitas, quae positive et absolute unitas sit minor numerali, et quae a parte rei inveniatur coniuncta cum unitate numerica, sed solum convenit unitas formalis negativa, id est negatio divisionis per principia formalia."

formal division. Nevertheless, it still is further divisible by means of material division amounting to numerical multiplication.³⁶⁹

The negation of formal division peculiar to the nature absolutely considered does not result in an absolute and positive unity, i.e., in a unity that would be absolutely indivisible. The absence of formal division and the aspect of the supplementing material division making the nature as such to be existing in singulars in the utter particularized state is thus compatible with nothing more than with the nature's essential similarity and convenience that clearly is not a true unity but (in line of Suárez's reasoning) the essential agreement or convenience of the plurality of singulars of the same kind. Consequently, the negation of formal division in Peter's nature is numerically different from the essential indivision of Paul's nature. These two instances of formal indivision are numerically distinct. The multiplied negations of formal division of Peter's and Paul's natures are not enough to turn formal unity into a unity in an unqualified sense. The character of formal unity defined by the mere negation of division in essential predicates is not enough for the unity to be considered as a fully-fledged positive unity accompanying the nature in itself, as Scotus says, in *all* its (existential) conditions. As such it can be regarded only as the so-called fundamental unity which is nothing but the unity of essential resemblance.³⁷⁰

The ontological absorption of formal unity by numerical unity becomes obvious in Poinset's second conclusion. Though it holds that the nature considered in itself is negatively common because of the indivision by formal principles, this unity, whether positively or *negatively* common, can *never* be found absolutely and factually in reality and outside the intellect.³⁷¹ By the utter multiplication of the negation of formal division in Peter and Paul one *ipso facto* loses any possibility to make sense not only of its positive community but also of the negative one. The state of being in singulars is incompatible not only with positive community but, importantly, also with negative community. The nature in such state does not

369. Ibidem, 323: "Quia unitas positiva tunc absolute et simpliciter est unitas, quando non solum negat divisionem ex una parte, sed relinquit subiectum seu entitatem ex omni parte indivisam et determinate reductam ad unitatem. Si enim ex aliqua parte relinquit locum divisioni vel pluralitati, solum secundum quid erit unum, et non simpliciter ... Sed natura considerata secundum se non habet ex omni parte sublatam divisionem nec removet omnia principia pluralitatis. Ergo non habet unitatem formalem positive et simpliciter."

370. Ibidem, 326.

371. Ibidem, 324: "Licet natura secundum se sit negative communis, et negatio divisionis formalis, quae illi convenit, sit etiam negative communis, id est non singularis, tamen in re et extra intellectum absolute et de facto numquam reperitur ista unitas neque positive neque negative communis."

remain negatively common much like air when illuminated ceases to be negatively dark. Sunlight expels not only positive darkness but also negative darkness. The negative community proper to the nature considered in itself thus vanishes as soon as it is placed in reality and outside the intellect.

Without explicitly mentioning Suárez, Poinot introduces the following objection which has its direct counterpart in *DM VI*, s. 4. Even if we understand the individual nature outside the intellect, it still holds that it does not have the multiplication from itself (*ex se*) but rather from the singularity attached to it. So, the nature considered as such remains negatively common and formal (negatively common) unity belongs to it insofar as its own constitution is concerned regardless of its multiplication and particularization.³⁷² In *DM VI*, s. 4, n. 10 Suárez affirms that the nature taken in isolation (in itself) does not have repugnance to being in the many by virtue of its formal unity. This non-repugnance based on formal unity, which of itself is nonsingular, is concomitant to it, as Suárez explicitly states, *even as existing in things themselves*. Even in a thing itself the nature is not incommunicable by virtue of its formal unity but by its individual unity.³⁷³

Even though Poinot partly concedes this objection by affirming that it is true that singularity found in reality does not result from the essential constitutives of the nature but from the adventitious singularity, he makes clear that, absolutely speaking, the nature is not negatively common in the thing. Again, the parallel with air and light is employed. It is not on account of the quiddity of air that air is clear. Yet, when air is illuminated by sunlight, the fact that it is not illuminated by virtue of its intrinsic principles is not a reason for saying that it is not such, i.e., not illuminated absolutely. Analogically, for a nature to be described as negatively common in reality, it is not enough to say that singularity does not proceed from its intrinsic principles since the phrase “from its intrinsic principles” actually does not refer to the way of being but to the way of *non-being*.³⁷⁴

One may claim that the difference between Poinot and Suárez is only verbal, due only to different descriptions of the same state of affairs. Whereas Suárez talks explicitly of the ontological role of the nature as such in extramental things, Poinot is silent but does not exclude that talk. I think that a stronger interpretation

372. Ibidem, 324: “Natura illa singularis et extra intellectum adhuc non habet illam multiplicationem ex se, sed ex statu singularitatis adiuncto; ergo secundum se semper manet illa natura communis negative, et convenit illi unitas formalis communis negative, quantum est ex se, non obstante multiplicatione.”

373. See 2.3.4 of this work.

374. Ibidem, 324: “Ut autem denominetur communis negative in re, non sufficit quod ex se non sit singularis, ubi ly ‘ex se’ pertinet ad modum *non essendi*, sed quod careat ipsa singularitate” [italics; D.H.].

accentuating the doctrinal differences is possible as well. Poinso's statement about the non-being of the intrinsic principles betrays his different conception of the metaphysics of essence and existence. I am certain that Suárez would not subscribe to Poinso's affirmation that the nature in itself is non-being. The statement about the non-being of the essence *a parte rei* seems to assume the real distinction between essence and existence in created things advocated not only by Poinso but by all Thomists in general. But for Suárez existence is not the principle, the last act, approaching the whole (essential) composite. Already the physical principles (parts) of form and matter are conceived by him as partial and incomplete substances. That also implies that the Jesuit conceives subsistence as divisible, which for Poinso is a hardly plausible position.³⁷⁵

Admittedly, Suárez says that formal unity is rather a unity of resemblance than a proper unity. On the other hand, however, he is not hesitant to explicitly (and in line with Scotism) declare that formal unity is a sort of transcendental property of the nature in itself.³⁷⁶ This statement is in complete agreement with his endorsement of the Scotistic claim of the occurrence of positive formal unity supplemented by negative community in every state of the nature.

On the third thesis this "non-existent" character of formal unity is made positive and determinate in the following two ways: by a precision of the intellect through which the negative character of formal unity is rendered common, or by contraction by (in) individuals by which it becomes one according to numerical unity. Formal unity is never found absolutely and positively unless it is an aspect of the unity of universality or of numerical unity.³⁷⁷ The mediating role of the formal unity (eliminated by Hurtado) of the nature as such between *ordo mentis* and *ordo entis* is confirmed by this conclusion. Formal unity can be conceived as capable of receiving either the singular or the universal determination without having in itself either of them. While as contracted by (in) singulars it is rendered positively individual, by the intellectual precision it is made a positively universal unity. Positive universal oneness is thus attributed only to the cognized nature (*ipsi*

375. As regards universals in the context of issues such as the hylemorphic principles, existence and subsistence see 3.3.5.

376. *DM* VI, s. 1, n. 11 (Vivès, vol. 25: 204): "[E]rgo idem est dicendum de unitate formali, quae est veluti intrinseca et transcendentalis proprietas talis naturae."

377. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 3, art. 3 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 325): "Facta praecisione a singularibus per intellectum, natura et eius unitas formalis habet rationem unitatis determinatae et positivae, in quantum redditur unitas communis ad multa, quae est unitas praecisionis, et similiter contracta ad singularia redditur una unitate numerica. Quare numquam unitas formalis invenitur simpliciter et positive, nisi sit unitas universalitatis vel singularitatis."

naturae cognitae) which is immediately representative not of the individuals of the given species but of the uniform intelligibile aspect (*ratio convenientiae*) in which the individuals of the given kind agree.³⁷⁸

3.3.3 Formal unity and the aptitude to being in the many

The consequence of Poinso's denial of the negative community of the nature existent *in re* is the complementary theory of the nature's aptitude to being in the many. The main controversy of the 4th article *Utrum aptitudo et indifferentia ad multa conveniat rebus extra operationem intellectus* deals with the distinction between proximate and remote aptitude.³⁷⁹ We have seen that both Scotus and Suárez (in a weaker form) maintain this distinction. Admittedly, Scotus denies that the nature as such in the thing, non-repugnant to being in the many there, enjoys universality *in actu*, but he admits that it involves a certain (remote) indifference and aptitude to being in the many. Accordingly, the common nature does not have the aptitude to being in the many only when abstracted from the contracting (individual) differences but already when existing in singulars. When abstracted from individual differences it acquires the proximate indifference (*aptitudo proxima*). While impeded by the individual difference (haecceity) it retains the remote aptitude (*aptitudo remota*).

As stated above, Poinso does not accept the "reified" exegesis of Scotus's view of the common nature identifying it with the indifference of the prime matter determined by the substantial form which, despite being under one substantial form, retains the aptitude to other forms. Even though it is informed by the current form, the aptitude is not destroyed. It is only impeded or blocked. While the analogy with prime matter/substantial form and common nature/individual difference with regard to the issue of the aptitude of being in the many constitutes the common agenda for those arguing for the remote indifference to being in the many,³⁸⁰ Poinso seems to distinguish it from the genuine opinion

378. Ibidem, 325–326.

379. As regards the significance of the controversy between Scotists and Thomists in the issue of the remote foundation of the universal aptitude see Collegium Conimbricense, *Commentaria in universam dialecticam Aristotelis Stagiritae*, q. 3, art. 3 (Coimbra 1606, 86–88).

380. For Poinso's general rejection of this analogy see Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 3, art. 4 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York, 331–332): "... esse disparem rationem inter aptitudinem materiae et aptitudinem universalitatis, quia materia ex sua propria natura habet capacitatem ad plures formas, et eius aptitudo et potentia ad illa est eius entitas. Unde ubicumque salvatur entitas illius, salvatur et ista aptitudo, quia convenit illi secundum se. At vero aptitudo ad essendum et praedicandum de multis consequitur naturam ratione status unitatis abstractae."

of Scotus when he says that *alii* (not Scotus) who endorse just that interpretation *peius dixerunt*.³⁸¹

What does Poinso exactly mean by the aptitude to being in the many? In order to assess Poinso's relationship to Suárez properly one needs to answer the question whether Poinso allows only for the proximate aptitude, or also for the remote aptitude connected with the nature in itself. In his definition of the aptitude to being in the many, Poinso at first makes obvious that the aptitude can be conceived neither as a positive ability to act proper to some active potency nor as a receptive potency in the manner of prime matter. He is convinced that the only way how to think the aptitude to being in the many proper to the *universale* is negatively, i.e., by way of the logical non-repugnance to being in the many or to being contracted by them.³⁸²

Poinso adds another important distinction. He distinguishes the aptitude taken *formaliter* and *positive* and the disposition considered *fundamentaliter*. What does he mean by those two kinds of *aptitudo*? Does this distinction, after all, mean that he recognizes the distinction between remote and proximate potency as Scotus and Suárez do? The above-mentioned aptitude described by the non-repugnancy to being in the many, he says, is the fundamental aptitude. Just this kind of indifference and aptitude is at stake in the 4th article. Nonetheless, in the further specification Poinso notes that this aptitude is what grounds the respect (*respectus*) equivalent to the formal intention or universality *in actu*.³⁸³ This last claim reveals that what Poinso is actually after in this article is the non-repugnancy to being in the many called by Scotus (and Suárez) not the remote but the *proximate* foundation.

In the unique *conclusio* Poinso asserts that this (proximate) aptitude or non-repugnance to being in the many in no way belongs to the nature considered in itself or the nature as contracted in individuals, but only to the nature as abstracted and prescinded by the intellect. The non-repugnance to being in the

381. Ibidem, 328–329. The last rival theory rejected by Poinso is the above-mentioned theory of Pedro Fonseca that the universal aptitude is a separable mode that the nature has only in the antemental state. On Fonseca's theory see 2.3.3 and 2.3.4 of this work.

382. Ibidem, 329. On the issue of what it means for a nature to be in the many see Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 5, art. 1 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York, 354–357). I return to it when analyzing the question of the *universale in praedicando* in 3.5.1.

383. Ibidem, 329: "Et quidem haec aptitudo potest considerari formaliter et positive, in quantum respicit inferiora, vel fundamentaliter, pro ipsa capacitate seu non repugnantia ad respiciendum inferiora et descendendum ad illa. In hac enim non repugnantia fundatur ille respectus, et quando sumitur positive seu per modum respectus, est ipsa formalis intentio seu universalitas in actu."

many thus follows upon the nature by reason of its *status* and not by reason of its quiddity.³⁸⁴ The aptitude to being in the many thus cannot belong to the nature as being determined in individuals simply because as being contracted to them it is particularized and thus it is repugnant for it to be in the many. If the nature as contracted in Peter had the aptitude to being in Paul, one would have to infer that for Peter himself it is not repugnant to be in Paul. But Poinsoy says more. Not only a particularized nature but *also* the nature considered solely according to the quidditative predicates cannot have this indifference to being in the many. The predicate “to be non-repugnant to being in the many” does not and cannot pertain to the *quidditative* constitution of the nature. If it did, one would have to admit that the nature as determined by individuals possesses this aptitude as well, because whatever belongs to the nature as such belongs to it necessarily and in every state.³⁸⁵

Just as in the preceding article Poinsoy also here introduces (without an explicit reference) an argument which has an apparent Suarezian “flavour”. The nature does not have repugnancy to being in the many from its formal unity. Its indifference is based on formal unity, which in itself is not individual *even in an existing thing*. The incommunicability of the nature is not due to its formal unity but only to individual unity.³⁸⁶ The reply to the objection can be taken as evidence that Poinsoy has, in fact, nothing to say about that remote aptitude. In his reply to the objection, the Dominican immediately recurs to the proximate aptitude and predictably states that this unity having the proximate fundament of universality cannot be found in the thing at all.³⁸⁷ The Scotistic *aptitudo remota* leaving its marks in Suárez is

384. Ibidem, 329: “Ista aptitudo seu non repugnantia, quae est fundamentum proximum universalitatis, nullo modo invenitur in natura secundum se, neque ut contracta in individuis, sed in natura abstracta et praecisa per intellectum. Itaque illa non repugnantia ad essendum in multis sequitur naturam ratione status, non ratione quidditatis.”

385. Ibidem, 330.

386. *DM IV*, s. 4, n. 10 (Vivès, vol. 25: 220).

387. Ibidem 330: “Nec sufficit dicere, quod est incapax a parte rei absolute loquendo, sed non est incapax ex vi principiorum essentialium. Hoc, inquam, non sufficit, quia licet natura secundum se non est incapax neque ad existendum in multis neque ad singularitatem in uno, tamen non potest dici, quod ibi habet capacitatem unitatis ad multa, qualis requiritur ad fundandum universalitatem, quae est capacitas absolute, et non solum quod ex aliqua parte non sit incapax ... Et confirmatur, quia natura secundum se et in singularibus non est capax intentionis et respectus positivi ad multa, ergo neque fundamenti proximi istius relationis, qualis est aptitudo unitatis ad multa. Ergo non datur talis aptitudo in natura secundum se neque in individuis. Sed omnino dicendum est, quod ista aptitudo necessario supponit unitatem capacem multiplicationis in multis. Unde quamdiu in natura non invenitur talis unitas, neque aptitudo reperitur. Ista autem unitas solum est unitas abstracta et non realis, vel naturae secundum se.”

thus for Poinso not worth considering. In the overall context of the third question *De universale secundum se* his silence regarding this issue must be interpreted as its denial.³⁸⁸

3.3.4 *Distinctio virtualis intrinseca* and the metaphysical grades

Poinso's solution to the issue of the distinction between *gradus metaphysici* (in the CPT, Log. p. 2, q. 3 following the previous questions) substantially hinges on his theory of the distinction of reasoned reason (*distinctio rationis cum fundamento in re*) which is resolved already in the 3rd article *Quid sit distinctio et unitas rationis ratiocinatae et ratiocinantis* of the 2nd question of the *Ars Logica*.³⁸⁹ Not surprisingly, in Poinso's moderate realism the most important distinction is the distinction of reasoned reason (*distinctio rationis ratiocinatae*) which has the *distinctio virtualis intrinseca* as its *fundamentum*. This distinction is conceived by him as the virtual multiplicity of the different *rationes* in the thing. Precisely, the distinction of reasoned reason then designates the mental "reduction" of the *virtual* multiplicity to the form of the *actual* multiplicity of *rationes* in the intellect. Leaving aside *distinctio formalis* of Scotism, Poinso analyzes the distinction of reasoned reason in comparison with two other kinds of distinction of reason – the distinction of reasoning reason and the above-mentioned Hurtadian *distinctio virtualis extrinseca*.³⁹⁰ In general, Poinso's critique aims not only at Scotus but more or less explicitly also at the Jesuits who in the formation of the conceptual distinction overvalue the role of formal concepts to the detriment of objective ones.³⁹¹

388. *Conimbricenses* defend the same conclusion as Poinso: "Opposita sententia, quae negat in natura contracta reperiri aptitudinem remotam essendi in multis, communis est, & a nobis defendenda". They attribute this opinion to Thomists in general: "Traditur a Caietano opuscul. De ente, & essentia cap. 4. quaest. 6, Soncin. 7. Metaphy. quaest. 40. & communiter a Thomistis, caeterisque Recentioribus." Collegium Conimbricense, *Commentaria in universam dialecticam Aristotelis Stagiritae*, q. 3, art. 3 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 87).

389. The issue of metaphysical grades is introduced in the 6th article *Utrum gradus metaphysici in qualibet re distinguantur sola distinctione rationis, an ex natura rei* (337–342) of the 3rd question *De universale secundum se*.

390. The fact remains that Hurtado de Mendoza (with the only exception of *Philosophia naturalis*) is not quoted by Poinso at all. This points to Poinso's certain closeness not only to the modern world but also to the broad spectrum of scholastic thought in early modern academic philosophy. For the same observation see Rivera de Ventosa 1982.

391. This criticism of the overrating of formal concepts in the constitution of rationally different ratios is connected, above all, with Poinso's conception of the object of logic which is the second objective intention. The authors, mainly Jesuits, who lay emphasis on formal concepts,

There are two genera of distinction, the real distinction and the rational distinction, because there are only two kinds of being, real being and being of reason. Apart from the fully-fledged real distinction between two *res* and two different principles,³⁹² contrary to some other Thomists, Poinsoot also acknowledges the modal distinction between thing and mode as a kind of real distinction.³⁹³

When considering the distinction of reason Poinsoot observes that the commonplace distinction between the distinction of reasoned reason (having a foundation in reality) and the distinction of reasoning reason (lacking this foundation) is not generally accepted. Some Jesuits reject the distinction of reasoning reason as a type of distinction concerning *res ipsa* and affirm that this distinction does not reside in the objective concepts and that, strictly speaking, it is not a distinction. They believe that this “distinction” is nothing more than the mere repetition of the same formal concept which does not lead to the formation of a distinction in the objective concept. Thus the distinction of Peter from himself in the tautological proposition “Peter is Peter” is not enacted from the side of the objective concepts, it is only a material repetition of the same (formal) concept.³⁹⁴

incline to conceive logic as the art of the administration of intellectual operations. Poinsoot sees this tendency as a spurious psychologization of logic, which ultimately results in the lost of the objective content of our concepts. On Poinsoot's position in the battle against psychologism in logic enriched by a comparison with Edmund Husserl see Winance 1985.

392. Contrary to Suárez, for Poinsoot the criterion of separability is not the universal mark of a real distinction. A cognitive act and the mental word are really distinct without being separable even by divine interference. See Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT, Naturalis Philosophiae* (further “Nat. Phil.”) p. 4, q. 11, art. 1 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 345–346). For the same denial of separability as the universal mark of a real distinction see the opinion of *Salzburgenses* in Bauer 1996, 136–137.

393. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT, Log.* p. 2, q. 2, art. 3 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 294). On mode and the modal distinction see also the following subsection where Poinsoot's conception of subsistence as the substantial mode is briefly presented. Contrary to Poinsoot, for example, Ludwig Babenstuber is (in his *Physics*) opposed to the concept of *distinctio modalis* (see Bauer 1996, 137–138).

394. Ibidem, 294–295. The Jesuit Gabriel Vázquez (1549–1604) says: “... praedicta distinctio Petri a se ipso non sit de re ex parte conceptus obiectivi, sed de nomine: non quia sit diversum nomen ex parte praedicati & subiecti, sed quia idem bis reperitur ... Distinctio autem illa eiusdem a se ipso non est distinctio de re ipsa, ut supra dixi, sed est nominis quaedam, aut etiam eiusdem conceptus repetitio: aliud autem est repetitio conceptus, aliud autem distinctio.” Gabriel Vázquez, *Commentaria ac disputationes in primam partem S. Thomae*, t. 2, disp. 117, cap. 3 (Ingolstadt 1609, 60–61). Suárez says: “... de distinctione rationis ratiocinantis ... neque etiam in ipsis conceptibus obiectivis habeat formalem diversitatem, sed solum quasi materialem per repetitionem, vel comparisonem ejusdem conceptus ...” *DM VII*, s. 2, n. 28 (Vivès, vol. 25: 271). See also *DM VII*, s. 1, n. 5 (Vivès, vol. 25: 251). Poinsoot rejects this explication. Mere repetition is not enough for

The controversy related to the issue of universals is connected with the question of the character of a *fundamentum in re* of the distinction of reasoned reason.³⁹⁵ I have said that the Jesuits of post-Suarezian generations headed by Hurtado de Mendoza reduced this foundation or the intrinsic virtual distinction to its extrinsic mutation. By that they accentuated the role of formal (confusive) concepts at the expense of objective ones. The Thomism of the 17th century in general can be seen, among others, as a revolt against this form of psychologism which (they think) has fatal consequences for logic and science in general. Referring to Vázquez, Poinso explicitly mentions the opinion which replaces this virtual distinction that has an intrinsic foundation in the virtual multiplicity of the essential *rationes* in the thing with its extrinsic version. This distinction occurs due to the imperfection of human cognition and to the fact that a thing is knowable after the pattern (*ad instar*) of really distinct objects. *Alii*, according to Poinso, however, deny this “externalization” and insist on the necessity of intrinsic foundation. For them the reference to the really distinct things can be, as a matter of fact, maintained also in the distinction of reasoning reason and thus the replacement of the virtual intrinsic distinction by the extrinsic version amounts to nothing less than an (unfortunate) reduction of the distinction of reasoned reason to the distinction of reasoning reason.³⁹⁶

Just this autonomy of the two main distinctions of reason is articulated in the first two of Poinso’s four conclusions. According to the first one, the distinction of reasoning reason does not preclude any kind of identity (whether understood materially or formally) between distinguished extremes. As such it does not assume the virtual distinction but is entirely concerned with the way of signifying and conceiving. The distinction of reasoned reason, on the contrary, is a type of distinction which admits of material identity on the part of the object but not of formal or virtual identity.³⁹⁷ Obviously, the distinction of reasoned reason is stronger than the distinction of reasoning reason because the latter excludes virtual multiplicity as

the constitution of this distinction. If it were, even sight could be said to create this distinction when seeing Peter twice. What is necessary is apprehension of the intellectual collation by which the intellect apprehends a thing as if it were two objects, even though the distinction does not result intrinsically from the object but only extrinsically from its comparison. See Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 2, art. 3 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 297–298).

395. On Poinso’s theory of virtual distinction see also Heider 2010b, 117–120.

396. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 2, art. 3 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 295).

397. Ibidem, 295–296: “Distinctio rationis ratiocinantis est illa, quae inter extrema, quae distinguunt, nullam identitatem tollit ex parte obiecti, neque materialiter seu entitative neque formaliter, atque adeo distinctionem virtualem non supponit, sed tota distinctio est in ipso modo significandi et concipiendi. – Distinctio vero rationis ratiocinatae est, quae relinquit ex parte obiecti identitatem materialem, sed non formalem seu virtualem.”

well. Contrary to the real distinction, however, the distinction of reasoned reason does not rule out material identity or an identity in entity. Contrary to the distinction of reasoning reason, it excludes formal identity which is actually a distinction in definition or in the proper *ratio* which is primarily signified by a common term. As such this distinction is not formed solely by the conceiving intellect as the distinction of reasoning reason is.

The second conclusion is aimed at those who “externalize” the foundation of the distinction of reasoned reason in line with Hurtado’s conception. Poinsoot stresses that the distinction of reasoned reason requires a foundation in the object itself; distinction after the pattern of really distinct things is far from being enough because it becomes equivalent to the distinction of reasoning reason. When one distinguishes Peter from Peter when forming tautological propositions by way of the distinction of reasoning reason, one conceives this distinction only after the manner of two really distinct things such as Peter and Paul. This “extrinsic” pattern cannot be the only reason for the production of the conceptual distinction with a foundation in the thing.³⁹⁸

The crucial role of the distinction of reasoned reason and its extramental virtual “correlate” can be jeopardized also from the side of the formal distinction. In the third conclusion Poinsoot defines his own position against the Scotistic challenge. The distinction of reasoned reason does not presuppose any actual distinction on the part of the object; in fact, there is no such distinction. When the distinction of reasoned reason is activated by the intellect, the diverse objective concepts are brought about. They do not pertain to real existence but to the way which is proper to the objects represented.³⁹⁹ What the distinction of reasoned reason actually assumes – runs Poinsoot’s fourth thesis – is the virtual distinction or the eminency (loftiness) of a thing which in its unity contains a plurality of intelligible features and perfections, while at the same time on the part of our intellect it assumes imperfection and inability of the intellect to conceive simultaneously and adequately all the intelligible features of an object.⁴⁰⁰

398. Ibidem, 296: “Ad fundamentum distinctionis ratiocinatae non sufficit distinctio earum rerum, ad quarum instar fit distinctio, sed in ipso obiecto requiritur fundamentum distinctionis.”

399. Ibidem, 296: “Distinctio rationis ratiocinatae non supponit distinctionem aliquam ex natura rei actualem ex parte obiecti, nec illa datur. Quando vero actualiter fit ab intellectu ista distinctio, ex conceptibus intellectus resultant diversi conceptus obiectivi, non in esse rei, sed in esse obiecti et repraesentati.”

400. Ibidem, 298: “Fundamentum distinctionis rationis ratiocinatae ex parte obiecti est virtualis aliqua distinctio seu eminentia rei, quae unica existens plures rationes seu perfectiones continet in aliquo esse; ex parte autem nostri intellectus est imperfectio ipsius non adaequate concipientis omnes illas rationes obiecti, sed diversis conceptibus ea attingens seu comparans.” Both theses

The last two conclusions are evidence of Poinso's anti-Scotistic stance. In the single conclusion of the 6th article in the third question of his *Ars Logica*, in direct link to the article on the character of conceptual distinction, Poinso proceeds to the rejection of the existence of a formal distinction in the metaphysical make-up of things and endorses the virtual distinction which he also calls the fundamental distinction.⁴⁰¹ His ontological parsimony fully accords with the theory of the negative character of the formal unity of the nature as such. As we shall see below, the *raison d'être* of the Scotists for the introduction of the formal distinction is the fact of the formal or essential non-identity of concepts and the very possibility of scientific knowledge. Poinso is convinced that this non-identity is certainly not the reason for the introduction of a formal distinction *ex natura rei*. The formal non-identity of two extramental counterparts (*rationes*) of two essential predicates is nothing but the negation of their intrinsic and essential relation. In analogy to the negative character of formal unity which is only a unity *secundum quid*, the virtual distinction is not an unqualified distinction of two actually different formalities contained unitively in the thing but only a distinction in a qualified sense or, as some say, only a distinction *per equivalentiam*.⁴⁰² Indeed, this virtual or potential distinction epitomizes the genuine *distinctio media* of Thomism which assumes the place of the Scotistic formal distinction.

One of the most frequent arguments for the existence of the formal distinction is based on the logical principle of non-contradiction. Prior to the operation of the intellect there must formally (actually) be distinct realities or formalities. As suggested in 2.4.1, *rational* is not included in the concept of *animal* because prior to any activity of the intellect both predicates receive contradictory attributes. While it pertains to *animal* to be the *gradus* common to *man* and *horse*, that

are set against the conceptualist position of those eliminating the role of the objective concept: "... ista distinctio conceptuum non ponit aliquam distinctionem in obiecto in esse rei, sed in esse obiecti manifestabilis, in quantum inadaequate obiectum ipsum attingitur et manifestatur quantum ad unum et non quantum ad aliud. Et hoc non est sola extrinseca denominatio, qua res dicatur cognita, sed qua dicatur diverso modo manifestata. Ex quo resultat distinctio rationis, non quidem in ipsis conceptibus formalibus, qui realiter distinguuntur, sed in ipso obiecto ut in esse obiecti manifestato." Ibidem, 300.

401. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 3, art. 6 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 338): "Nulla datur distinctio ex natura rei formalis actu extra intellectum inter gradus istos metaphysicos, sed solum datur distinctio virtualis et fundamentalis, quae actualis redditur per intellectum."

402. For this label of the virtual distinction see Bauer 1996, 148. The meaning of this label is that a simple thing because of its conceptual loftiness is sort of equivalent to more realities, which provide the intellect with the occasion to form a plurality of inadaequate concepts. However, as said above, one must be careful not to interpret this *per equivalentiam* in the way that the distinction of reasoned reason would come to be merely the distinction of reasoning reason.

property does not belong to the differential *gradus* or formality *rational*. *Animal* and *rationality* thus receive contradictory attributes, “to be that, by which a man is similar to a horse”, and “to be that, by which a man is different from a horse”. However, these contradictory attributions cannot be verified about an identical subject in the thing. In order to accommodate them in reality, one needs to assume an actual distinction from the nature of the things (*ex parte rei*).⁴⁰³ Poinsoot is not cornered by this argument. He flatly denies that opposite attributions prior to the operation of the intellect call for the assumption of an actual distinction *a parte rei*. The contradictory attributions can well be accommodated by means of the virtual distinction. The virtual distinction deprives *animal* and *rationality* of adequate identity in every respect. Due to it, absolutely speaking, they remain one, but not in every respect. This distinction “not-in-every-way” is enough to ensure that the contradiction of those predicates is related to the same being but not under the same intelligible aspect (*non sub eadem ratione*). When we say that *animal* is that which is common to man and horse and *rational* is that by which they differ, we cannot entirely dissociate those predicates from their conceptual determination because (as affirmed) the conceptual apprehension is what makes them actually distinct.⁴⁰⁴

Poinsoot’s affinity to Suárez’s anti-Scotistic approach is underlined by his employment of an argument cited by the Jesuit himself.⁴⁰⁵ Poinsoot states that all the substantial predicates down to the individual grade of a thing have common root in the common substantial form.⁴⁰⁶ Even though no difficulty is connected with this claim in the case of separated substances irreceptible in matter, the issue of material substances is much more controversial. It is well-known that for Thomists, not excepting Poinsoot, the individual (metaphysical) grade comes from the signation of matter by quantity (*materia signata quantitate*) as from its physical root. The individual grade thus does not seem to proceed from the substantial form but from the signated matter or individual matter, which in the case of Peter is Peter’s flesh

403. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 3, art. 6 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 340). Mutatis mutandis, the same also holds for the Trinitarian application in case of the divine essence, which is communicable, and the three persons, who are not.

404. Ibidem, 341: “... non dicimus verificari contradictoria a parte rei, sed negamus requirere distinctionem actualem a parte rei, sed sufficere virtualem, ratione cuius aliqua non sunt idem omnino et adaequate; et ita fit contradictio circa idem non sub eadem ratione nec sub eodem modo.”

405. See 2.4.2 of this work.

406. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 3, art. 6 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 339): “Secundum principium ad non distinguendos istos gradus ex natura rei ... quia proveniunt ab eadem simplici forma ...”

and Peter's bones. So, taking into account this premise, how can Poinot claim that all the metaphysical grades including the individual grade come from the common substantial form? How can he consequently justify the conclusion that there is only a virtual distinction between the metaphysical grades and not a real one?

Before I expound Poinot's replies, let me first present two distinctions employed in the Dominican's solution. First, for Poinot there are two kinds of subjects of accidents including quantity. (1) There can be the subject of inhesion or the subject *quod*. The subject of inhesion has sufficient ontological robustness to bear accidents and as such it is primarily related to accidents. (2) The other type is the subject *quo*, i.e., that through which accidents are received. Obviously, only a supposit (substance) can be the subject of the first sort; the second kind of subjecthood belongs to prime matter. Prime matter cannot be the subject *quod* since it does not meet the conditions necessary for being the subject *quod*, i.e., it lacks sufficient actuality to be capable of bearing and standing under accidents. As such it is not primarily related to accidents but to the substantial form. So it can be only a medium or the root by which accidents are received, not an independent subject.⁴⁰⁷ Second, in his discussion of the issue of previous dispositions (*dispositiones praeviae*) in substantial generation Poinot makes use of the distinction between the orders of material and formal causality. Although it holds that in the order of material causality the dispositions (quantity) "portioning" matter to receive different substantial forms naturally (*prioritate naturae*) precede the form, in the order of formal causality they are posterior and follow the substantial form since *in re* they can exist only in the matter/form composite.⁴⁰⁸

In the clarification of the statement that even the individual difference finds its root in the substantial form Poinot makes substantial use of the notions of subject *quod* and formal causality. Only with them in mind can Poinot view the form as the principle of *gradus individualis*. Even though the individual grade in case of material substances is taken from signated matter as from the principle *quo*, when speaking of the subject *quod* the substantial form cannot be set aside. Prime matter cannot be signed by quantity without already being informed by the substantial form and without constituting a material composite, of which matter is a part. A determinate quantity and, in fact, all material accidents can be received in the matter only according to the exigency of the form concurring with the matter in the constitution of the material composite or the subject *quod*. Whether quantity

407. See Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Phil. Nat. p. 3, q. 9, art. 1 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 755–760).

408. Ibidem, 764–765. For a detailed exposition of the disposition in substantial generation see also Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Phil. Nat. p. 3, q. 1, art. 7 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 588–599).

is formed in this or that way, i.e., whether the quantity is the quantity of a horse or of a man, depends on this or that substantial form. Since matter in Thomism is pure potency, it cannot become the subject of inhesion or cannot become the subject *quod* for material accidents. It needs to be “supplemented” by the substantial form rendering it ultimately capable of receiving accidents. It neither has sufficient ontological robustness to become the bearer of accidents nor is it primarily directed to accidental forms.⁴⁰⁹ Even though conceived as the subject “by which” (*quo*) accidents are received, it must be supplemented by a second constituent, the form, in order to be receptive of accidents as the subject *quod*. Therefore, while in the order of material causality quantity and other dispositions naturally (*prioritate naturae*) precede the substantial form, in the order of formal causality the opposite is the case.⁴¹⁰

3.3.5 Individuation, subsistence, existence and universals

In addition to the issue of the indifference of the nature as such and its existential (actual) realizations treated in the *Ars Logica*, Poinso's articulation of the problematic of the *universale materialiter sumptum* involves another level of analysis.⁴¹¹ At first sight this level seems to be in conflict with the above-presented analysis of the essence within the context of its threefold status. This second analysis is largely determined by the issue of the *physical* root (*radix*) of the numerical unity. There is not only a consideration of the individual grade contracting the specific nature of a thing but also, and for Poinso in a way more fundamentally, an enquiry into the physical principle of what makes an individual incommunicable or indivisible to other individuals and divided from others, which gives him occasion to formulate anew his position, this time, however, with a rather strong realist flavour. Poinso pays much attention to the issue of the relation of the extramental nature and the hylemorphic principles, whereas in Suárez and the Scotists the issue is significantly marginalized, largely due to the denial of the principle of individuation by means of the *materia signata*.

409. According to Suárez “reifying” prime matter, on the contrary, it can well be their subject *quod*: “Ex his ergo satis demonstratum esse videtur ex parte materiae non esse repugnantiam neque improportionem ullam, quin possit esse sufficiens causa materialis quantitati.” *DM* XIV, s. 3, n. 15 (Vivès, vol. 25: 476).

410. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 3, art. 6 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 339–340).

411. The abbreviated version of this subsection can be found also in Heider 2012a, 53–61.

The hylemorphic principles are already physically reified and both have their own common nature and haecceity accountable for individuation. We have seen that for Suárez the physical root of the individual difference is the whole entity (*entitas tota*), i.e., in case of a material substance the matter, the form and the substantial mode of unification. On this physical plane Suárez actually does not differentiate between the individuating and the individuated elements in a substance. No single physical part, whether essential or accidental, is or can be accountable for the individuation of some other part since each part of a whole entity, i.e., of a material substance, is in itself physically entirely individual.⁴¹² The position of John Poinot is markedly different. The doctrinal difference from Suárez is not limited only to the issue of the principle of individuation but it extends also to the question of the character and distinction of the nature and *suppositum*, which explains Poinot's specific elaboration of the particularity/commonality of the extramental nature on the matter/form level.

In this subsection I proceed in four parts. After describing Poinot's conception of subsistence and existence (1) I present Poinot's doctrine of the physical root of individuation of material substances (2). Part 3 introduces Poinot's thesis according to which subsistence in fact *can* be conceived as including also the principle of individuation. This claim, I surmise, opens up considerable new space in the field of the investigation of the essence in Poinot's Thomism. Nevertheless, from a certain point of view this statement becomes the apple of discord for my interpretation encompassing Poinot's *Ars Logica*. In part 4 I submit my solution based on the distinction between two levels operative in Poinot's analysis of the essence or the *universale materialiter sumptum*.

1. Poinot regards the search for the principle of individuation as the quest for the root of the numerical multiplication within a given species. He thinks that subsistence is the *term* of the principle of individuation of material substances, which is of crucial importance for the connection between the issue of the relation of essence/principle of individuation and essence/supposit.⁴¹³

412. See also Heider 2011d, 304–305.

413. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Phil. Nat. p. 3, q. 9, art. 3 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 770): “Terminus individuationis est subsistentia seu suppositualitas, quae per se solum invenitur in individuis substantialibus, quae per se terminantur et per se sistunt in esse.” On the question of individuality, individuation and subsistence see also Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 9, art. 1 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 424–428). On Poinot's theory of being and subsistence see also Tyn 1988. Regrettably, this paper is a pure digest of passages from the 4th disputation *De simplicitate Dei, et compositione creaturae* from the first volume of Poinot's *CT*.

What does Poinsoot mean by subsistence? Subsistence or supposit or person⁴¹⁴ is an essential feature of the primary substance. A supposit, a being *per se*, is to be primarily considered not as opposed to the universal (this opposition belongs to singularity)⁴¹⁵ but to the being of accidents inhering in the subject.⁴¹⁶ Substance is not that what inheres, but that in which other beings, accidents, inhere. It stands under (*substans*) accidents as their ontological bearer. Its opposition is not exhausted by the mode of being *in alio*, though. It extends also to entities which exist as parts of a whole such as the substantial principles, which do not subsist although they are not accidents. A hylemorphic principle as a substantial part of the substantial whole is communicable both to its other co-principle and to the whole it composes. Moreover, even humanity composed of matter and form (body and soul) cannot be regarded as a supposit because as such it is not incommunicable.⁴¹⁷ Its further communicability is proved and made evident especially (but not exclusively⁴¹⁸) by the theological *factum* of the Incarnation. The divine Word in the hypostatic union with the human nature of Jesus Christ comprises not two different persons but two natures. In order for the human nature and not the human person to be assumed by the divine Word, the human (individual) nature must be really different from the personality of the divine Word. Therefore personality cannot be an intrinsic part of the human nature and cannot modify

414. "Persona", however, differs from "supposit" and "hypostasis" since it is related only to an intellectual nature. See Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 15, art. 1 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 525).

415. Suárez holds the same: "... quod autem haec humanitas sit communicabilis Verbo divino, verbi gratia, aut etiam pluribus suppositis, non est contra singularem et individuum unitatem ejus, quia non communicatur illis, ut superior inferioribus, sed ut forma supposito, vel suppositis ..." *DM V*, s. 1, n. 2 (Vivès, vol. 25: 146).

416. One may say that the term "supposit" signifies a singular or individual in the category of substance, the terms "a singular" or "an individual" stand for an individual in *any* category.

417. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 15, art. 1 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 524): "Ly 'per se' potest opponi enti per accidens, enti in alio inhaerenti, quod est accidens, enti in alio existenti ut pars in toto, enti in alio existenti non incommunicabiliter nec cum ultima terminatione, sicut humanitas integra est in supposito."

418. Poinsoot is convinced that the distinction between nature and subsistence can be proved also by natural reason. Created substances are capable of receiving real accidents without at the same time being mixed with their natures and without being modified by them quidditatively. Accidents inhere in the substances *inconfuse* and *impermixte* with their natures. As such they do not modify the nature essentially or quidditatively. So the nature cannot be their immediate subject. This subject can be only a supposit. See Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Phil. Nat. p. 1, q. 7, art. 1 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 119).

the human nature essentially. If it were its intrinsic part, the divine Word could not have assumed the human nature but only the human personality and thus there would be two persons in the hypostatic union, which is a conclusion contradicting the Christian faith.⁴¹⁹

Arguing against Scotus, Poinot makes clear that subsistence, as an item really different from nature, cannot be something negative but only positive *quid*. The attribution of negative character to subsistence, which is as such the highest perfection, would make subsistence a rather ignoble constituent.⁴²⁰ Its most fitting ontological articulation, in which Poinot agrees with Suárez,⁴²¹ is that it is a substantial mode (*modus substantialis*). As a point can be regarded to be the ultimate term of a line, so subsistence terminates and ultimately completes the nature as a whole. A tenuous entity such as a mode cannot exist on its own but only “parasitically” on its subject. On the contrary, the subject or nature, even though it cannot exist without a mode in reality, is capable of existing, as the case of the hypostatic union testifies, without a particular mode. Only because of this modal distinction between nature and subsistence can the human nature of Christ exist without the human subsistence. Only in virtue of this distinction could it take on the divine personality.⁴²²

An important aspect of the theory of subsistence relevant for the issue of essences and universals *a parte rei* is linked to its relation to *esse*. Poinot is clear that subsistence cannot be identified with *esse*. Contrary to some other Thomists such as Capreolus,⁴²³ Poinot contends that subsistence belongs to the nature *prior* to the act of being.⁴²⁴ Comparatively to *esse*, subsistence is more intimately bound to

419. Ibidem, 118.

420. Ibidem, 120–122.

421. Suárez, *DM XXXIV*, s. 4, n. 32 (Vivès, vol. 26:377): “... id, quod suppositum creatum addit supra naturam, distinguitur quidem in re ab ipsa natura, non tamen omnino realiter, tanquam res a re, sed modaliter, ut modus rei a re.”

422. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Phil. Nat. p. 1, q. 7, art. 1 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 120–123).

423. Ioannes Capreolus, *Defensiones theologiae divi Thomae Aquinatis*, tom. 5, lib. III. Sent., dist. 3, q. 3 (Tours 1904, 109b–110a): “... personalitas ... dicit aliquid positivum, scilicet esse, et aliquid negativum, scilicet non in alio.”

424. In that Poinot differs from Suárez who says: “Substantia non supponitur in natura ante existentiam.” *DM XXXIV*, s. 4, n. 20 (Vivès, vol. 26:373). This divergence is mainly due to Suárez’s critique of the real distinction between essence and existence (*DM XXXI*), which has far-reaching consequences for his metaphysical system as a whole. One of them is the reification of the hylemorphic principles of the material composite. If existence ceases to be the ultimate act

the nature because it is grounded in the individuating principle of the substance. Existence as an entirely contingent item coming from an extrinsic (efficient) agent cannot be based in the nature. If it were, it would be necessary for the thing, which contradicts the contingent character of created beings. The subject *quod* of the reception of *esse* thus cannot be the essence but the whole individual supposit. Although existence is said to be received in the essence, it is received in it only as in the subject *quo*,⁴²⁵ which specifies the existence, i.e., it determines whether the existence will be human or equine. The immediate subject *quod* of this reception can only be a supposit.⁴²⁶

Consistently with the scholastic tradition, Poinsoot conceives existence as that which places something outside its causes and outside mere possibility. He affronts the doctrine that existence exhibits only a relational character or as in Suárez⁴²⁷ that it equals to mere dependence on an efficient (creative) agent. For Poinsoot existence is more than that. It is an absolute item which is an intrinsic metaphysical component of the thing itself. As such it is more “distant” to the essence than to the subsistence. If subsistence, as Poinsoot says, is modally distinct from essence, then existence must be distinct from essence by means of a stronger type of distinction than the modal one. It must be distinguished by a fully-fledged real distinction. Accordingly, essence and existence must be taken as two distinct realities, which nevertheless cannot be taken, strictly speaking, as two *res* but as two distinct metaphysical *principles* (as two *quo*). It would be highly ill-founded to identify existence,

really distinct from essence, the essential principles *eo ipso* turn into incomplete beings generating almost efficient causality. That consequently leads to the theory of partial subsistence of prime matter and substantial forms, a claim that Poinsoot rejects by saying that subsistence as the ultimate term of the nature must concern only the *whole* composite. See Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CT*, t. 1, q. 3, disp. 4, art. 2 (Paris 1883, 570–575). Suárez, on the contrary, advocates the so-called partial subsistence: “... in homine integra subsistentia totius humanitatis constat ex partialibus subsistentiis animae et corporis, ita ut, horum dissoluta unione, maneat in utraque parte compositi pars subsistentiae, atque ita fit ut subsistentia integra hominis sit divisibilis quasi essentialiter sicut et natura.” The same divisibility holds also for *esse*: see Suárez, *DM* XXXIV, s. 5, n. 27 (Vivès, vol. 26: 387). On the indivisibility of existence in Poinsoot see Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CT*, t. 1, q. 3, disp. 4, art. 4, section: “Existencia est indivisibilis” (Paris 1883, 594–599). Suárez claims that “... existentiam, generaliter loquendo, non esse actum solius essentiae completae; sed, sicut distinguitur essentia in totalem et partialem, seu completam et incompletam, ita etiam distinguendam esse existentiam intra illum ordinem. Existencia ergo partialis immediate convenit parti essentiae ...” *DM* XXXI, s. 11, n. 8 (Vivès, vol. 26: 274).

425. See the distinction of two kinds of subject in the previous subsection.

426. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CT*, t. 1, q. 3, disp. 4, art. 2 (Paris 1883, 566–570).

427. See especially *DM* XXXI, s. 6 (Vivès, vol. 26: 251–260).

which is the ultimate and supreme actuality of a thing, with such a tenuous and imperfect entity as a mode.⁴²⁸

This distinction of two realities has nothing in common with the distinction between possible and actual existence endorsed by Suárez.⁴²⁹ Poinot agrees with Suárez that the distinction between those two extremes can hardly be designated as a distinction between two things. One could, at most, speak of a negative real distinction between nothing and something, i.e., between being *in potentia*, which is *nihil* before creation, and being *in actu*. The real distinction, defended by Poinot, refers to the essence in the state of actuality and existence *within* an actual thing. The essence in this status can be nothing but a *receptive potency* receiving the act of being. Poinot sharply rejects any theory tainting the purely potential character of the essence with an element of actuality. When Poinot speaks of the “contamination” of the pure potentiality and actuality of the metaphysical principles, he also has in mind Suárez’s assumption that the notion of receptive potency as such requires a residual entitative act (*actus entitativus*) in mind. Poinot’s argument against this relativization of the metaphysical principles is guided by the basic axiom that nothing receives in virtue of its own act but always due to its (pure) potency. The essence thus must be, first of all, conceived as something existing by means of reception and participating in the act of being. Accordingly, one has to avoid the reification of the extremes inherent in Suárez’s exposé considering essence and existence as two *res*.⁴³⁰ What is necessary for the subjective reception of *esse* is not autonomous existence of the essence but only the so-called concomitant existence. Just like matter has existence only *within* a composite and thus it always requires a concomitant form giving being to the matter, so essence always exists within the whole with its existence.⁴³¹

428. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CT*, t. 1, q. 3, disp. 4, art. 3, section: “Existentia non est modus, sed realitas” (Paris 1883, 584–587). See also Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Phil. Nat. p. 1, q. 7, art. 3 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 131–141).

429. Suárez, *DM XXXI*, ss. 2–3 (Vivès, vol. 26: 229–235). As regards Suárez’s restatement of the issue of the distinction between *esse essentialiae* and *esse existentiae* and the extensive critique of the Jesuit’s position from the viewpoint of Thomism see Owens 1957.

430. The conception according to which the real distinction between essence and existence must be considered only as the distinction of two *res* is derived from the general definition of the real distinction as such. See Suárez, *DM VII*, s. 1, n. 1 (Vivès, vol. 25: 250).

431. As for the detailed reply to the all aspects of Suarezian critique see mainly Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CT*, t. 1, q. 3, disp. 4, art. 3 (Paris 1883, 587–594). See also Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Phil. Nat. p. 1, q. 7, art. 4 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 131–141). Poinot’s employment of the matter/form as the analogue to the potency of essence and act of being makes intelligible his refusal of the possibility of the existence of the prime matter independently of the substantial

2. Having defined the different elements in the overall metaphysical constellation I may now proceed to Poinso's theory of individuation. Led by the doctrine of the difference between the individuating and the individuated elements on the level of the physical whole, Poinso endorses the typically Thomistic tenet that the principle of individuation of Peter is the *materia signata quantitate* or the individual matter, Peter's flesh and bones. By this signation Poinso does not mean the actual inherence of quantity in matter. Well aware of Suárez's objections, Poinso states that the inclusion of accidents in the individuality of material substances would violate the substantial character of individuation. The signation thus equals only to an intrinsic *ordo* to the dividing non-terminated quantity (*quantitas interminata*), which is quantity abstracted from changeable sizes and forms (*figurae*). The role of quantity is restricted to being a condition or connotation of matter, which remains the radical principle.⁴³² Nevertheless, the function of quantity is irreplaceable since substantial matter, precisely taken, is common matter (*materia in communi, materia non signata*) and therefore it is not the principle of individuation but the principle of genus. It is included in the so-called form of the whole (*forma totius*) which is different from the substantial form conceived as the *forma partis*.⁴³³ Since definitions of material things are different from definitions of immaterial entities such as mathematical objects, common matter must be the physical principle of genus. On the physical level, genus is taken from the matter, or more

form: "In sententia D. Thomae implicat materiam existere denudatam ab omni forma, atque ita essentialis ordo inter receptionem formae et existentiae." Ioannes a S. Thoma, CPT, Phil. Nat. p. 1, q. 3, art. 3 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 68). As is well known, Suárez does not find any metaphysical impossibility in that state of affairs: "Sed haec veluti ad hominem ex alienis principiis procedunt; ex propriis autem ratio a priori huius sententiae est quia materia, sicut habet suam partialem entitatem essentiae, ita et existentiae; existentia enim substantiae ita composita est sicut essentia substantiae, et ideo sine ulla implicatione vel repugnantia potest Deus sicut formam sine materia, ita et materiam sine forma conservare." DM XV, s. 9, n. 5 (Vivès, vol. 25: 533).

432. Ioannes a S. Thoma, CPT, Phil. Nat. p. 3, q. 9, art. 4 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 782): "Signatio materiae non fit formaliter per ipsam quantitatem tamquam per formam inhaerentem materiae et afficientem ipsam, sed fit per intrinsecum ordinem materiae ad quantitatem ut ad formam dividendam et separantem, et ita quantitas potius est terminus signationis materiae, ad quam dicit ordinem, quam forma intrinsece signans, et hoc modo dicitur se habere ut conditio et connotatio individuationis. Et in isto genere, scilicet ut conditio, quantitas est primum, licet materia sit primum et radicale individuandi principium." For a Thomistic criticism of Poinso's theory of individuation see Degl'Innocenti 1969.

433. As regards the concept of the *forma totius* see Thomas de Aquino, *De ente et essentia*, cap. 1: "... humanitas significatur ut forma quaedam, et dicitur quod est forma totius ... est forma quae est totum, scilicet formam complectens et materiam, tamen cum praecisione eorum, per quae nata est materia designari." URL: <http://www.corpusthomicum.org/oe.html>.

precisely, from what is “material”, perfectible or potential in a thing. The signation of the matter by an extrinsic principle, i.e., by the dividing accident of quantity, is inevitable if the notion of individual matter (*materia individualis*) is to be formed at all. Poinso’s central claim is that individual matter must stand *outside* the *entity* or the quiddity of the *specific nature*.⁴³⁴ The principle of individuation cannot pertain to the intrinsic entity of an essence, let us say *man*, because its effects, i.e., the individual unity and individual multiplication, belong to the nature neither as essential predicates nor as its properties (the so-called predicates *per se secundo modo* such as risibility) but only in the third mode of perseity, which is not a way of predication but of *per se* existence.⁴³⁵

Poinso’s conclusion is confirmed by the rejection of the following three *fundamenta* Suárez, the first of which, however, is not altogether just to Suárez since it reduces the three different kinds of unity treated by Suárez in *DM* V–VI to only one kind, i.e., to numerical unity. (1) Unity is a property of being. Real unity follows a real entity, which is necessarily singular because there is no other unity in a thing than singular unity. Therefore, real unity must be identified exclusively with numerical unity. One cannot say that there is some physical entity distinct from its individuator “waiting” to be individuated. (2) All the metaphysical grades, as stated in 2.4.2, down to the individual grade come from the same entity or in the case of Peter from Peter’s form (soul).⁴³⁶ So, on the physical level the grades cannot be viewed as really distinct. Individuation thus does not require a partial physical entity added to the entity of form. A material substance will be individual by its own whole entity, i.e., by the matter, the form and the substantial mode of unification. (3) The principle of individuation of substances cannot be made dependent on accidents because, on the diachronic level, it holds that while a material substance remains the same, its accidents vary. Moreover, the principle of

434. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Phil. Nat. p. 3, q. 9, art. 3 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 772): “Non potest natura specifica ex sola entitate sua, quae praecise includit praedicata quidditativa, esse principium adaequatum individuationis. Itaque sola entitas et essentia rei seipsa et sine alio ordine vel extrinseco super addito non est principium individuationis.”

435. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Phil. Nat. p. 3, q. 9, art. 3 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 773): “... individuum esse quid intrinsecum per modum terminantis et modificantis seu per modum subiecti potius quam praedicatis, siquidem est id, quod omnibus praedicatis superioribus subicitur; unde pertinet ad rem per modum constitutis subiectum, non naturam, et per modum modificantis quidditatem ... pertinet ad statum rei magis quam ad intrinsecam entitatem et constitutionem.” As regards Poinso’s division of actually four modes of perseity see Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 24, art. 4 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 769–770).

436. The similarity of this statement to the above-mentioned argument in favour of the merely virtual distinction between the metaphysical grades is clear. The difference between those two analyses will become manifest at the end of this subsection.

individuation cannot be matter because it is rather a principle of potentiality and determinability than of determinacy. The substantial form is much more likely to be the principle of individuation since form is what distinguishes.⁴³⁷

The replies to the arguments reveal Poinso's implicit theory of non-particular forms.⁴³⁸ Individual unity is not the only kind of real unity.⁴³⁹ A different understanding of unity implies a different understanding of being. The entity has formal unity from the form and singular unity from the matter, which is the principle of incommunicability and of the numerical multiplication within a given species.⁴⁴⁰ Regarding the second and third objection, Poinso agrees that the metaphysical grades are taken from the same entity as the other grades, i.e., from form, only in the case of the individual grade the connotation of some accident, quantity, must be added. True, Poinso's claim that matter is the *radical* principle of individuation implies that the principle of individuation is not taken purely from some principle lying outside the essence, as according to him Scotus claims. Nevertheless, standing between Suárez and Scotus, Poinso stresses that in order for common matter to become individual matter, it has to be supplemented by a relation to the extrinsic principle, which is the "portioning" non-terminated quantity.⁴⁴¹

437. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Phil. Nat. p. 3, q. 9, art. 3 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 775).

438. The issue of the universality or particularity of form independently of its union with matter is a point of controversy in the contemporary exegetical debate on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* Z 13. For a synoptic overview of the different ways of explication see Galluzzo 2003, 162.

439. This claim, as stated in the preceding chapter, is advocated by Suárez as well.

440. Accordingly singular unity is called material and sortal unity formal. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Phil. Nat. p. 3, q. 9, art. 3 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 775): "... ut est unitas formalis et specifica sequitur ad entitatem ex parte formae et actualitatis ... unitas ut individua sequitur ad unitatem ratione materiae, ut est principium incommunicabilitatis"; "... forma ut forma est principium speciei, ergo est principium alicuius communicabilis in plures seu communis ad multa ... Forma autem ut forma non est principium incommunicabilitatis nec unitatis ut individuae, sed ut formalis et specifica et ut communis multis." Ibidem, 779; "... quia forma est principium differentiae et distinctionis formalis, distinctio autem individuorum est materialis, ergo magis habet pro fundamento materiam, quam formam." Ibidem, 780. Suárez recurrently points out that the individual difference ought not to be confused with the material difference. The individual difference and numerical multiplication within a given species are not limited to material composites. They concern also immaterial substances like angels: "Distinctio ergo individualis latius patet quam materialis differentia dicto modo sumpta; differre enim numero solum est distinguere in propriis entitatibus cum convenientia et similitudine in integra ratione essentiali; quod commune esse potest tam rebus spiritualibus quam corporalibus". *DM* V, s. 2, n. 28 (Vivès, vol. 25: 157).

441. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Phil. Nat. p. 3, q. 9, art. 3 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 776–777).

Concerning the ontological character of extramental natures one can conclude that if the principle of individuation or individual matter is something external to the essences of sensible substances conceived as *forma totius* or *forma totalis*, the same must *a fortiori* be said about the form of material substance (*forma partis*), which is in fact more “distant” from individual matter than the essence, which includes both the substantial form and common matter. The substantial form is not individual by itself and independently of matter but only by virtue of the individual matter. Poinot thus views individual matter as the necessary and sufficient condition of individuality and of the numerical multiplication of material substances of the same kind. From the ontological point of view, it implies that Poinot understands the substantial form *in itself* as common.

3. Apart from considerations of the ontological status of form, one may detect another indication referring, this time, to the common character of Poinot’s extramental *essence*. As I have already suggested, this finding seems to be in conflict with his above-mentioned statement of the merely virtual distinction between the metaphysical grades. This indication concerns the metaphysical composition of the part-like form (nature) signified by the abstract term *humanitas* and the whole represented by a supposit (Peter). Even though Poinot insists on the fact that subsistence is added to an already individual nature (a conclusion supported also by the Incarnation in which Christ’s *individual* human nature is assumed by the divine Word),⁴⁴² a certain tension in Aquinas’s not entirely clear formulations leads Poinot (closely following Aquinas) to the conclusion, in which the Portuguese Dominican distinguishes between two notions of *subsistere* (*suppositum*).

In his *Cursus theologicus* Poinot comments extensively on the *Respondeo dicendum* of the 3rd article *Utrum sit idem Deus quod sua essentia vel natura* of the 3rd question *De Dei simplicitate* of his *Summa Theologiae*, one of the most quoted texts on Thomas’s theory of the nature/supposit relationship. There Aquinas on the one hand states that contrary to material substances, in which essence and supposit are distinguished, there is no such a distinction in angels. Aquinas says that essence or nature comprises only the quidditative (specific) notes contained in the definition of a thing. By those notes a thing is a thing of this or that sort. By humanity a man, say Peter, is a man, by equinity Bucephalus is a horse, etc. However, Peter’s individual matter, his flesh and bones, is not part of his quidditative definition. Peter includes more than what is “covered” by his essence. Essence is only the

442. By the following interpretation I do not wish to deny that Poinot admits individual essences. Quite the opposite is true. For his acknowledgment of singular abstract terms such as “this humanity” see Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 5, art. 4 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 364–369). However, one *can* also submit an interpretation of Poinot’s claims in *CPT* and *CT* pointing to the common character of extramental essences.

formal part of Peter.⁴⁴³ On the other hand, angels are not individuated by means of matter and accidents. As separated forms they cannot be received in matter and individuated by some extrinsic principle. So subsistence is not something distinct from them. Consequently, as separated forms they are self-subsistent.⁴⁴⁴

The exegetical difficulty Poinset faces is due to Aquinas's opposite claim appearing in the 1st article of the 4th question in the third part of the *Summa Theologiae*. There, in clash with *STh.* 1, q. 3, a. 3, Aquinas explicitly admits that the divine Word could have assumed not only a human nature but also an angelic one.⁴⁴⁵ When saying that, Aquinas must have assumed a real distinction not only

443. No doubt this talk of having this or that essence is an indication of the implicit relation of participation, in which that which is had, which is the act, is reduced by the potency. The multiplication of the species *man* is ensured just by the really distinct potency, which materially and numerically limits the specifically infinite species of *man*.

444. Thomas de Aquino, *STh.* 1, q. 3, a. 3, *corpus*: "... in rebus compositis ex materia et forma, necesse est quod differant natura vel essentia et suppositum. Quia essentia vel natura comprehendit in se illa tantum quae cadunt in definitione speciei, sicut humanitas comprehendit in se ea quae cadunt in definitione hominis, his enim homo est homo, et hoc significat humanitas, hoc scilicet quo homo est homo. Sed materia individualis, cum accidentibus omnibus individuantes ipsam, non cadit in definitione speciei, non enim cadunt in definitione hominis haec carnes et haec ossa, aut albedo vel nigredo, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Unde haec carnes et haec ossa, et accidentia designantia hanc materiam, non concluduntur in humanitate. Et tamen in eo quod est homo, includuntur, unde id quod est homo, habet in se aliquid quod non habet humanitas. Et propter hoc non est totaliter idem homo et humanitas, sed humanitas significatur ut pars formalis hominis; quia principia definientia habent se formaliter, respectu materiae individuantis. In his igitur quae non sunt composita ex materia et forma, in quibus individuatio non est per materiam individualement, idest per hanc materiam, sed ipsae formae per se individuantes, oportet quod ipsae formae sint supposita subsistentia. Unde in eis non differt suppositum et natura." URL: <http://www.corpusthomicum.org/sth1003.html>. See also Thomas de Aquino, *Quaestiones disputatae de potentia*, q. 7, a. 4, *corpus*: "In Angelis enim quodlibet suppositum est sua natura." URL: <http://www.corpusthomicum.org/qdp7.html>. For the best edition of *Quaestiones disputatae de potentia* see Thomas de Aquino, *Quaestiones disputatae*, t. 2: *Quaestiones disputatae de potentia*, ed. by P.M. Pession (Turin/Rome 1965, 1–276). Thomas de Aquino, *Summa contra Gentiles*, l. 4, c. 55, n. 6: "Convenientius igitur assumpta est hominis natura quam angelica: quia in homine aliud est natura et persona, cum sit ex materia et forma compositus; non autem in Angelo, qui immaterialis est." URL: <http://www.corpusthomicum.org/scg4027.html>. For the best edition of the fourth book of *Summa contra Gentiles* see Thomas de Aquino, *Liber de veritate catholicae fidei contra errores infidelium seu Summa contra Gentiles*, t. 2–3, ed. by P. Marc, C. Pera, P. Caramello (Turin/Rome 1961). Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CT*, t. 1, q. 3, disp. 4, art. 1, n. 31 (Paris 1883, 563): "Ex quibus verbis aperte sequitur Angelos cum non sint compositi ex materia, et forma consequenter non differre in eis naturam, et suppositum ..."

445. Thomas de Aquino, *STh.* 3, q. 4, a. 1, ad 3: "Ad tertium dicendum quod quidam dicunt Angelum non esse assumptibilem, quia a principio suae creationis est in sua personalitate perfectus, cum non subiaceat generationi et corruptioni. Unde non potuisset in unitatem divinae

between a human nature and its supposit, but also between an angelic nature and its supposit. Without this assumption he could hardly have made any sense of the statement about the hypothetical assumption of an angelic nature by the divine Word. The concession to this possibility, nevertheless, is at odds with the above-quoted passage from the first part of the *Summa Theologiae* and many other places of Aquinas's *corpus*.

Confronting this interpretative difficulty, Poinso proposes to take two different meanings of *subsistentia* into consideration. He is confident that Aquinas actually employs both in his writings. In the second passage from the first article of the 4th question of the 3rd part of the *Summa Theologiae* Aquinas takes subsistence formally (*formaliter*). By taking subsistence formally Poinso indicates that Aquinas had nothing more than the term or substantial mode completing a singular nature in mind. On this reading, subsistence is considered *without* individuation. Consequently, according to this interpretation it already presupposes individuality and gives the individual essence only the ultimate (suppositional) incommunicability. This kind of subsistence does not individuate an essence. On the other hand, in the first above-mentioned passage, Poinso (and also Aquinas) conceives subsistence radically or according to its origin (*radicaliter seu originative*). According to this interpretation, it signifies not only the completing mode adjoining to the singular nature but this mode *together* with the principle of individuation. The content of this term is therefore semantically richer than in the first case.⁴⁴⁶ While

personae assumi nisi eius personalitas destrueretur, quod neque convenit incorruptibilitati naturae eius; neque bonitati assumentis, ad quam non pertinet quod aliquid perfectionis in creatura assumpta corrumpat. Sed hoc non videtur totaliter excludere congruitatem assumptionis angelicae naturae.” URL: <http://www.corpusthomicum.org/sth4002.html>. For the critical edition see Thomas de Aquino, *Opera omnia iussu impensaue Leonis XIII P.M. edita*, t. 11–12: *Tertia pars Summae theologiae* (Rome 1903–1906). See also Thomas de Aquino, *Quodlibet* 2, q. 2, a. 2, ad 1: “... non solum in compositis ex materia et forma invenitur aliquod accidens praeter essentiam ipsius speciei, sed etiam in substantiis spiritualibus quae non componuntur ex materia et forma; et ideo in utrisque suppositum non est omnino idem quod ipsa natura.” URL: <http://www.corpusthomicum.org/q02.html>. For the critical edition see Thomas de Aquino, *Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P.M. edita*, t. 25/1: *Quaestiones de quolibet*, Préface, *Quodlibet* VII, VIII, IX, X, XI; t. 25/2: *Quaestiones de quolibet*, *Quodlibet* I, II, III, VI, IV, V, XII (Rome/Paris 1996).

446. Thomas de Aquino, *STh.* 1, q. 29, a. 2, ad 3: “Et ideo hypostasis et persona addunt supra rationem essentiae principia individualia; neque sunt idem cum essentia in compositis ex materia et forma ...” Not incidentally, it is also Mastri/Belluto who note this aspect of individuation in subsistence in Aquinas (*STh.* 1, q. 3, a. 3). See Mastri/Belluto, *Cursus philosophiae ad mentem Scoti*, *Metaphysica*, t. 5, disp. 11, q. 3, art. 1, § 40 (Venice 1727, 197). Even though it was only Mastri who composed *Metaphysics* from his *Philosophiae ad mentem Scoti cursus integer*, due to its narrow interconnections with *Logic* and *On the Soul* even when quoting from *Metaphysics* I cite Belluto as well.

approaching subsistence in the formal sense Aquinas always assumes a real distinction between the nature and the supposit in all beings except God whose being is His essence.⁴⁴⁷ If understood in this manner, there is good sense in conceiving an extramental distinction between nature and supposit in angels as well and thus to claim that an angelic nature could also have been assumed by the divine Word, even though (as Aquinas notes) a human nature was more suitable for that purpose. If on the other hand subsistence is considered in its “radical” meaning, i.e., as including the principle of individuation, then Aquinas restricts the extramental distinction between nature and subsistence to material substances.⁴⁴⁸

This distinction of two meanings of subsistence gives us sufficient evidence that, at least in one of the possible interpretations, Poinsoot admits the interpretation of subsistence, according to which one may speak of it as comprising the principle of individuation as well. That is of great information value for the present enquiry. Following Poinsoot, one may say that even though physically nature is always singular, metaphysically it can be thought of as common.⁴⁴⁹ The above-mentioned quotation from the third question of the first part of the *Summa Theologiae* shows that Aquinas and Poinsoot consider the *extramental* nature to be the formal part of the whole (a supposit). Humanity is thus the formal part of a man, it is that by which a man is man, or what is possessed by a man, say Peter. Taking into

447. In *Quodlibet* 2, q. 2, a. 2, an often-quoted passage evidencing the extramental distinction nature/supposit also in angels, Aquinas in reply to the first objection says that a supposit differs from an angelic nature because *esse* is added to its essence. This passage is one of the main supports for the interpretation that the formal feature of subsistence consists in *esse*. See the exposition of Aquinas’s theory of a supposit in Wippel 2000, 243–244.

448. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CT*, t. 1, q. 3, d. 4, art. 1, n. 34 (Paris 1883, 564–565): “Quare Div. Thomas aliquando sumit suppositum, seu subsistentiam tantum formaliter pro ipso termino complente naturam, aliquando etiam pro principiis individuantibus, ex quibus originatur iste terminus subsistentiae. Et quando loquitur primo modo docet distingui subsistentiam a natura etiam in rebus immaterialibus. Quando vero sumit subsistentiam simul cum principiis individuantibus docet non differe naturam, et suppositum in rebus immaterialibus, bene tamen in rebus materialibus, in eo quod in illis principia individuationis non differunt ab ipsa forma, quae per se redditur incommunicabilis.”

449. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 15, art. 1 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 526): “Nam humanitas etiam metaphysice considerata significatur per modum formae et non per modum totius; significat enim abstractum huius hominis ‘homo’ et id tantum, quo homo est homo. Ergo ita praescindit a differentiis individuantibus, quod non est praedicabilis de individuis. Hoc autem non aliunde provenit, nisi quia significatur ut pars, ergo respectu alicuius totius. Sed totum est suppositum; ergo humanitas etiam metaphysice accepta, significatur ut spoliata supposito et subsistentia, licet verum sit, quod physice considerata accipitur ut singularis, eo modo, quo illam assumpsit Verbum Divinum. Metaphysice autem potest considerari in communi.”

account Poinso's theory of real distinction (in the broad sense including also modal distinction), whether between the principle of individuation and essence or individual essence and supposit, the individuating subsistence of Peter is extramentally distinct from humanity, by which he is assigned as a member of the class of human beings. However, if humanity is to be considered as really distinct from the individuating subsistence of Peter, it must be considered as *extramentally common* humanity. Different human supposits of the same kind thus share the extramentally common nature. This extramental extrinsic character of individuation guarantees the numerical plurification of individuals within the same species, which does not obtain at the level of immaterial substances. We may presume that the main reason why Poinso posits such common principle is that without just that extramental common nature it would be difficult to distinguish between material and immaterial substances, in which numerical multiplication of individuals within the same species is ontologically impossible.

4. If one admits the "part-whole" model as a feasible ontological model governing the nature/supposit relationship, one is confronted with considerable tension in Poinso's overall treatment of the *universale materialiter sumptum*. In the above subsections focusing on the analysis of Poinso's position in the *Ars Logica* we have observed that negative community and the aptitude to being in the many *do not* pertain to the nature *in re*. We have seen that negative community belongs only to the nature absolutely (solitarily) considered and the aptitude to being in the many pertains only to the nature as abstracted by the intellect. I have accentuated that for Poinso the nature with its formal unity exists in individuals as *utterly* particularized and "absorbed" by the individual unity. Formal unity was said to be nothing but a unity of convenience and a plurality of essentially similar individuals of the same species. On the top of that, in the passage on the virtual distinction and the metaphysical grades Poinso held that all the metaphysical grades down to the individual grade differ not by a real distinction but only by an intrinsic virtual distinction.

Now the situation seems to be substantially different. Seen from the viewpoint of the interpretation considering subsistence as including the principle of individuation, Poinso's doctrine appears much more realistic than it seemed in the context of his *Ars Logica*. According to the above-described model, the nature is said to be the formal part of a supposit conceived as really or, more precisely, as modally distinct from the individuating supposit. Thus, if I have said that on an imaginary scale of the different kinds of (moderate) realism, and especially comparatively to Suárez, Poinso's theory is ontologically "deficient", the situation now appears to be quite the reverse. Can those two contradicting statements about the *universale materialiter sumptum* in Poinso's theory of universals be reconciled at all? If so, how?

Poinsot himself gives us a clue that those two analyses are not in tension, let alone in fatal conflict. They are compatible if one allows for two distinct levels of analysis.⁴⁵⁰ In his *Material Logic* Poinsot lays decisive emphasis on the *actual* existence of the essence. The main reason for the introduction of the nature absolutely considered was to explain the fact how nature can actually exist both on the extramental level as particular and on the intramental level as universal. Only when Poinsot came to the privation of the nature as such of all its extra-quidditative features,⁴⁵¹ he was able to ascribe to it the opposite characteristics according to the different ontological conditions. This viewpoint, however, is considerably different from the one employed by Poinsot in the context of the principle of individuation and his “approximation” of individuation to subsistence. This context concerns not the level of actual existence but the level of *pre-existential* or *essential* level of the (remote) *principles* of individual substances. This priority of the principles is fully justified by Poinsot’s claims about the *priority* of nature and supposit to the ultimate act of being. Just this contention fundamentally distinguishes Poinsot’s point of view from the one of Suárez.⁴⁵² This theory opens up for Poinsot the broad pre-existential and principle-like realm, which can be thought of as not-existent but real.⁴⁵³

One more piece of justification for this interpretation can be submitted. One may say that the nature and the supposit always and necessarily coexist. For Poinsot, as stated above in 3.3.1, the Platonic alternative of the extramental subsistence of the essence is an impossible state of affairs. Nonetheless, there is nothing repugnant in its separate intramental existence; on the contrary, it is a quite ordinary fact. Despite the extramentally necessary coexistence with individuation, the essence in rational being has properties such as “being prescinded by formal abstraction” or “being separated from the individual matter”,⁴⁵⁴ which it cannot have when it

450. I have found inspiration for this compatibilist reading in Galluzzo 2004 and 2011.

451. Jorge Gracia assesses the elimination of all extra-quidditative features from the nature absolutely considered as the main breakthrough of Aquinas’s metaphysical doctrine in medieval scholasticism. Gracia laments that a couple of decades after Aquinas’s death this element got completely lost in Scotus’s metaphysical analysis. See Gracia 1994.

452. Contrary to Poinsot, Suárez does not admit individuation of the nature abstractly taken by subsistence *in any sense*. See *DM* V, s. 5, n. 7 (Vivès, vol. 25:179).

453. See Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 3, art. 3 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 321–322). By saying “real” I do not mean that essential and pre-existential principles enjoy some special kind of being peculiar to some third realm of being, which is neither actual nor rational being. What I want to say is that one can consider them to be prior to being connected with an act of being even though they exist only with it.

454. For Poinsot definitions of formal and total abstraction see Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 5, art. 2 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 358).

is part of a supposit *in re*. This logical non-repugnancy is proved by the fact of the “intellectual subsistence” of the nature in the intellect. The potential universality of the essence becomes an actual one when it becomes an intentional correlate of the human intellect. In the intellect thus *man* can be thought of as being identical with his essence. The intellect as an exceptional immaterial power is capable of abstracting the nature from its individual matter and supposit. As a rational correlate of the intellective acts the human nature can intellectually exist as one and common to all individual human supposits. This ability of the intellect thus, as if retrospectively, reveals what is “covered” by the extramental existence by stripping the essence from its individual properties and subsistence. This transfer of the real principles to the level of rational or objective being of the human mind thus can be taken as a specific feature of Poinso’s moderate realism.⁴⁵⁵ This shift betrays that no matter how Poinso rejects strict isomorphism between language and the world,⁴⁵⁶ the *modi significandi* can in a way be taken as ultimately reflecting the participated status of created beings.⁴⁵⁷

3.4 *Universale metaphysicum*

In 3.2 I have affirmed that the foundation of relational universality plays an important part in the gradual construction of fully-fledged universality in moderate realism. After the exposition of the key features of Poinso’s theory of the *universale materialiter sumptum* culminating in the analysis of the remote principles of the universal nature, reflection must be devoted to the metaphysical universal conceived by Poinso as the proximate and immediate foundation of the relational universal known as the logical universal. As such it is the product of the abstractive operation of the intellect transferring intelligible content from the order of reality to the order of objective being. In order to understand Poinso’s theory of

455. Alexander Rozwadowski is convinced that the real distinction between the essence and the individual matter is absolutely crucial for the ultimate extramental foundation of the perfect virtual distinction between the metaphysical grades. Without that distinction it would be entirely impossible to defend the traditional doctrine of moderate realism with intrinsic virtual distinction. See Rozwadowski 1937. I do not want to explicitly discuss this claim that the only kind of moderate realism is the Thomistic one. I can only say that my typological analysis and its upshot can be taken as evidence that there are more “kinds” of moderate realism than only that of Thomism.

456. See 3.3.1 in this work.

457. For a similar interpretation of the relation of the *modi significandi* and the *modi essendi* see also Buersmeyer 1987.

abstraction better it is necessary to devote attention to some relevant aspects of his cognitive theory. The following pages observe the same procedure as the exposition of Suárez's theory of intellectual knowledge and deal with the very same issues in Poinot.

3.4.1 Some features of Poinot's cognitive psychology

The basic fabric of Poinot's cognitive psychology is identical with that of Suárez: cognitive powers, the impressed intentional species as an intermediary between things and cognition, the cognitive act elicited by the power after the reception of a species (form) and the expressed species (the mental word or the formal concept) which is the inward terminus of the act of intellectual apprehension. Especially in Thomism one should not omit the important metaphysical medium, which is the spiritual light of the agent intellect transferring the nature from the physical order into the objective order of the intellect.⁴⁵⁸

1. *The nature of the impressed species and its union with the cognitive power*

A typical feature of Poinot's epistemology, different from that of Suárez, is the emphasis on the distinction between the entitative being and the intentional being of a species or likeness (*similitudo*).⁴⁵⁹ In entitative being the species belongs to the category of quality and informs and inheres in the cognitive power and in the cognizant as an accident. As such the species together with the cognitive power forms a *tertium quid*, which is an elementary aggregate of subject and accident. On the other hand, and more importantly, the species also has a representational function corresponding to its intentional being. This being is not limited only to one category, i.e., to the category of quality, but as such it can stand for a plethora of entities falling under various categories. The cognitive power thus is not perfected and actualized only by the categorial feature of the species with which it constitutes an ontological aggregate or a being *per accidens*, but also by its intentional and representational feature. Contrary to the material union of the cognitive powers with the entitative character of the species, the intentional being of the species is assimilated immaterially. By passive reception of the intentional species the cognitive

458. On these common features in Poinot and in the scholastic mainstream in general see also Darós 1980, 383–384.

459. Even though Poinot, as far as I know, *expressis verbis* does not say that the entitative and intentional aspects are distinct by a real distinction, his definition of cognition (presented in the following) assumes this distinction.

power or, more precisely, the cognitive act becomes immaterially or intentionally one and the same with the *res cognita*.⁴⁶⁰

In this Poinset's conception differs substantially from that of Suárez who minimizes this distinction. Poinset's objection to Suárez is based on the assumption of the distinction between the entitative and the intentional character of the *species intelligibilis*. Suárez's "materialization" or "reification" of the species (by far not restricted to the intentional species) prevents him from seeing the genuine character of cognition as such. If the species is taken above all according to the categorial line, that is, as a quality, its function is limited to directing the power to the extramental things (*intentio per modum tendentiae ad obiectum*). Cognition thus ceases to be drawing things inwards into the intellect. Intentionality becomes directed outwards to the extramental things themselves, not differently from transitive operations, which for Poinset is implausible. If the species is considered only with respect to the virtual representation (a claim confirmed by the Jesuit's biological metaphors of the semen), which for Poinset is connected with manifest overvaluation of the efficient causality of the object on the cognitive power to the detriment of formal causality, then one can at most speak of an accidental union (*unio accidentalis*) between the cognitive power and the species, and not of a union which is greater than the substantial union of form and matter. From the point of view of Poinset's theory this Suarezian opinion misses the essential twofold character of the species and, in consequence, the idiosyncratic character of cognition based on the twofold nature and twofold reception of the cognitive power. If no distinction between the

460. "Dico ergo primo: Obiectum coniungi debet potentiae cognoscitivae et concurrere cum illa in ordine ad eliciendam suam operationem et actum secundum." Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Phil. Nat. p. 4, q. 4, art. 1 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 102). Ibidem, 102–103: "Dico secundo: Potentia sensitiva passive se habet respectu specierum, quibus vice obiectorum actuatur tam in esse entitativo quam in esse intentionali, sed per se et principaliter in esse intentionali. Non omnes conveniunt in hac conclusione ... Alii, quod concurrat obiectum ad cognitionem ex aequo cum potentia et quasi illi assistens, non per se illa informans, nisi quatenus species accidentia sunt, quae entitative inhaerere debent sicut reliqua accidentia. Quae est sententia Scoti in 1. dist. 3. q. 9. art. 2. Et sequitur P. Suarez ... imo distinctionem illam de species in esse intentionali et in esse entitativo reicit in libro 3. de Anima cap. 2 n. 26 ..." Ibidem, 103: "At vero D. Thomas profundius scrutatus naturam cognoscitivam, distinguit duplicem rationem passivae receptionis. Est enim passiva immaterialis et passiva materialis. Materialis est ad recipiendum aliquid constituendo esse cum illo, et sic recipitur aliquid tamquam pertinens ad se et communicans in esse cum ipso recipiente, non autem recipitur aliquid tamquam pertinens ad alterum extra se ... Et sic recipere formas est commune cognoscenti et non cognoscenti. Passiva immaterialis est, quae non solum recipit formas proprias et ad se pertinentes, sed etiam potest recipere formam alterius seu fieri alia a se." This strict immaterial identification is motivated by the exigencies of epistemological realism, in which the forms of objects themselves are cognized.

entitative (existential) aspect and the (essential) intentional aspect in the species is considered – even though, as I have said, in Suárez the formal representative aspect is still preserved as being really identical with its entity – one loses the essential feature of cognition, which is the immaterial identification of the cognitive act with the cognized extramental object.⁴⁶¹ Poinso's emphasis on the distinction between the two aspects inherent in the intentional species also has to do with a different doctrine of the agent/potential intellect, to which I turn now.

2. *The real distinction between the agent and the potential intellect*

The real distinction between the agent and the potential intellect constitutes another important background characteristic of Poinso's theory of the psychogenesis of the metaphysical universal. As in Suárez, the function of the agent intellect is seen as being not primarily cognitive but only preparatory. Its function is restricted to the production of the intelligible impressed species, which is later received by (in) the (cognitive) potential intellect. Without the illuminating operation of the agent intellect the species could not be impressed in the potential intellect. Thus the sensible species must be "spiritualized" and properly prepared for the reception. There is conformity between Poinso and Suárez also in the issue of the ontological status of the agent intellect. The agent intellect is not a separate substance or some higher intelligence pouring the species into the human soul, but a rational power of the human soul which is the form of the body.⁴⁶²

However, the similarities are eclipsed by an important dissimilarity. The main difference is in Poinso's reply to the question whether the potential intellect is a power really distinct from the agent intellect. Suárez's statement professing the identity of both intellects is radically dismissed. The potential intellect as the power assimilating into intelligible reality (*omnia fiat*) and the agent intellect rendering everything actually intelligible (*omnia agat*) can in no way be really one and the same power, much like prime matter, deprived of every form and of every activity,

461. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Phil. Nat. p. 4, q. 6, art. 3 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 185): "Et licet P. Suarez loco cit. n. 26 solum admittat similitudinem analogam inter speciem et obiectum, imo solum intentionem per modum tendentiae ad illud et per modum instrumenti ... tamen hoc totum est considerare speciem in esse accidentis et entitative ... Ergo si ab entitate speciei non specificatur, bene tamen ab obiecto repraesentato, alia unio seu actio aut determinatio debet intercedere obiectum repraesentatum et potentiam, et haec dicitur unio intelligibilis seu intentionalis, inter entitatem vero speciei et potentiam est unio accidentalis, id est inhaerentiae." On the importance of this distinction in Thomistic cognitive doctrines (especially in Poinso) see Maritain 1937, 134–143.

462. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Phil. Nat. p. 4, q. 10, art. 1 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 295–298). Nevertheless, as already stated, it may be said that Suárez's view of the relationship of the soul and the body is, after all, more "dualistic".

must be really distinct from the substantial form.⁴⁶³ The cognition of the potential intellect is elicited only after the production and reception of the intelligibile species processed by the agent intellect. While the operation of the agent intellect is vital and transitive (*transeuns*) and thus (causally) moving, the act of the potential intellect is moved.⁴⁶⁴ If both intellects were really one and the same cognitive power, as Suárez thinks, then one and the same power would reduce itself to act, which would obviously offend the “golden rule” of Thomism *Quidquid movetur ab alio movetur*. The doctrine of act/potency would thus inevitably lose its privileged position based on the principle of contradiction that the same thing cannot be at once in act and in potency with respect to the same thing.⁴⁶⁵

Poinot rejects the arguments stated *in favorem sententiae Suarez*, which, as emphasized, are largely inspired by the cognitive case of spiritual beings. Suárez’s frequent reference to angels, palpable in his argument for the non-repugnancy of the singular intelligible species, is not shared by Poinot. The thesis that the principle of activity and passivity in the case of spiritual creatures can well be accommodated by really one and the same power is rejected by Poinot, who says that act and potency constitute the very first universal principle of distinction in being. No less emphatically, Poinot attacks the argument from the otiosity of the agent intellect in the after-life of the separated soul.⁴⁶⁶ According to Suárez the agent intellect as really distinct from the potential intellect would become utterly superfluous and inactive in a state without a supply of phantasms. Poinot accepts this inactivity with respect to the illustration of phantasms, but offers two other alternative functions. The agent intellect can illuminate the species already abstracted with respect to their actual usage or, if it did not have any act to realize, it would function as an ornament and virtue of the soul, which will be renewed after the soul’s reunion with the body.⁴⁶⁷

463. See also Spruit 1995, 332.

464. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Phil. Nat. p. 4, q. 10, art. 1 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 303): “... actionem intellectus agentis esse transeuntem et vitalem ... Et cum dicitur, quod non potest movere seipsum, quia non habet partem moventem et partem motam, respondetur intellectum agentem non movere seipsum, sed intellectum possibilem, et sic distinguitur movens et motum.”

465. Ibidem, 299: “Ratio autem faciendi species sine cognitione et ratio eliciendi cognitionem per species non conveniunt in aliqua ratione communi constituyente unam potentiam, sed sunt rationes ita distantes, quod ex se sufficiunt fundare distinctas potentias ... Ad haec accumulatur aliqua inconventia: Primum, quia eadem potentia seipsam movere et reduceret de potentia ad actum ...”

466. See 2.5.1 of this work.

467. Ibidem, 302–303: “Tertio arguitur in favorem sententiae Suarez ad probandum non distinguere intellectum agentem a possibili, quia non repugnat eandem potentiam habere vim producendi species et recipiendi illas ad cognoscendum. In spiritualibus enim idem potest esse

3. *The concurrence of phantasms and the agent intellect in the production of the intelligible species in the potential intellect*

Suárez's reduction of the range of "real distinctions of Thomism" can be observed also in the analysis of the number of the interior senses. Instead of four really distinct powers (common sense, phantasy or imagination, memory and *vis cogitativa*), defended by Aquinas and Poinso, ⁴⁶⁸ Suárez states that *realiter* there is only one active power exercising all the operations commonly connected with those four – phantasy. ⁴⁶⁹ One of Suárez's main arguments, relevant for the theory of concurrence of phantasms in the co-production of the intelligible species, is based on the denial of the criterion of the absence/presence of an object. It is not correct to distinguish between particular interior senses on this basis because phantasy as

principium agendi et recipiendi, licet non in sensibus ... quia alias in anima separata remaneret illa potentia penitus otiosa, cum ibi non sint phantasmata, a quibus extrahantur species; ergo si non habet alium actum, vacabit ibi ... Respondetur etiam in spiritualibus diversa principia esse activum et passivum, quando circa idem versantur, cum fundentur in illo, quod est primum distinctivum in genere entis, scilicet in actu et potentia. Et praesertim hoc currit in intellectu nostro, quia est pura potentia in genere intellectivo respectu specierum, ergo non solum debet carere illis, sed etiam activitate faciendi eas, sicut materia non solum caret formis naturalibus, sed etiam virtute faciendi illas, quia est pura potentia. Et deinde, quia intellectus possibilis cum essentialiter sit potentia cognoscitiva, non potest alium actum habere, qui non sit cognitio. Actio autem intellectus agentis non est cognitio, quia facit species ad primam cognitionem requisitas ... intellectus agens in anima separata poterit ... habere alium actum, nempe illuminare species iam abstractas in ordine ad actualem usum illarum ... Vel etiam si nullum actum habeat pro illo statu, debet tamen manere in anima tamquam ornamentum quoddam illius et virtus, quia potest anima reuniri corpori, in quo suam operationem exercebit, sicut in corporibus beatis ..."

^{468.} Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Phil. Nat. p. 4, q. 8, art. 1 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 244): "Nihilominus sententia D. Thomae defendenda est, scilicet dari quatuor sensus interiores realiter distinctos."

^{469.} Ibidem, 243: "... unicum potentiam, quae omnia ista munera exerceat sensataque et insensata obiecta apprehendat, retineat et componat. Ita P. Suarez ..." The rationale for the number of the interior senses comes from the distinction of formal objects and the distinction of bodily organs. While the common sense (*sensus communis*) cognizes the objects of the particular exterior senses only when they are present, phantasy gets to know them independently of their being *hic et nunc*. Whereas *vis cogitativa*, or *vis aestimativa* in the case of brutes apprehends the *intentiones insensatae* – by the perception of the grey colour of the figure of a wolf, the sheep *ipso facto* grasps the non-sensed intention of the imminent danger –, memory retains the species apprehended in the past. The different formal objects of the interior senses are evidence that one has to allow for really diverse kinds of abstraction and immateriality even among the particular interior senses themselves. As for the distinction of bodily organs, one of the main criteria is their make-up according to the humidity/dryness of the pertinent organs. While the humid organs are fit for apprehension, the dry parts of the organs are better for the conservation of the species. See Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Phil. Nat. p. 4, q. 8, art. 1–2 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 241–260).

the power capable of apprehending objects *in absentia* can, and in fact does, grasp them before *in praesentia*. It is part of our experience that when sight comes to know Peter, phantasy is *ipso facto* modified by the sensible species of Peter as well. Suárez further extends this transfer from the realm of the exterior to the interior senses to the ambit of the intellect, since all are rooted in the unique soul.⁴⁷⁰

Suárez's overall suppression of the role of the interior senses, recorded also in the secondary literature,⁴⁷¹ manifests itself not only in the reduction of the number of the interior senses, but also in the elimination of the causal efficiency of phantasy with respect to the co-production of the intelligible species. As stated above, for Suárez the concurrence with the agent intellect with regard to the production of the intelligible species is restricted to a sort of non-causal explanation, in which phantasms function as quasi-exemplars for the agent intellect's "depiction" of what has been seen by the exterior senses. The Jesuit's cognitive processual dualism of the material and the immaterial powers and the non-interacting of faculties in general do not allow him to think of strict causal concurrence.

Even though, to a certain degree, Poinset shares Suárez's misgivings about the possibility of the influence of the immaterial agent intellect on material phantasms, the Dominican unequivocally rejects the Jesuit's quasi-solution, according to which the object in the phantasm is related to the agent intellect in the fashion (*ad instar*) of a quasi-exemplar or of *materia circa quam*. The metaphorical expression *ad instar*, employed by Suárez, cannot be regarded as a plausible solution to the problem of the *causal* concurrence in the co-production of the *species intelligibilis*. Suárez's justification of this claim by means of the coexistence of phantasy and the intellect and their *iradicatio* in the common soul can hardly be considered as an acceptable *explanans*. If it were, there would be no reason why the agent intellect could not be excited by the object of the exterior senses without any mediation of the interior senses at all. If that were the case, not only phantasy but also the agent intellect would be made entirely superfluous with respect to the abstractive process. Nothing would thus prevent the extramental objects themselves from being directly and immediately determinative for the potential intellect.⁴⁷²

470. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Phil. Nat. p. 4, q. 8, art. 3 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 261): "... ex P. Suarez libro 3. de Anima cap. 30. n. 13. Nam potentia, quae cognoscit abstractive et in absentia obiecti, potest etiam cognoscere in praesentia". As regards Suárez see *DA* 8, 1, 17: "Prima conclusio. His suppositis, probabilius videtur sensum communem et phantasiam non esse potentias realiter distinctas. Et idem est de aestimativa et memoria, et in universum de potentia intuitive et abstractive cognoscente."

471. See South 2001b.

472. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Phil. Nat. p. 4, q. 10, art. 2 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 306–308).

Poinsot insists that the agent intellect *really* modifies the phantasms. He therefore rejects Cajetan's theory of objective illumination as well. On this theory, as stated in 2.5.1, the agent intellect does not bring about any intrinsic change in the phantasms since its operation is limited to extrinsic assistance in making the intelligible object in the phantasm apparent.⁴⁷³ The only plausible solution is the causal coordination of phantasms generating instrumental causality with the agent intellect being productive of the principle (efficient) causality. The phantasms are used as instruments moved and elevated by the spiritual power (*virtus spiritualis*) of the agent intellect, which capacitates them (*habilis*) to concur efficiently in the production of the intelligible species in the potential intellect, basically not differently from the instrumental and principal causes in the common examples from fine art. A paintbrush in the hand of an artist is capacitated to produce an effect exceeding the power proper to it. As such it cannot draw. However, the artist's causal efficiency cannot do without the paintbrush and its inherent qualities. If the paintbrush is old and frayed, the quality of the picture will be markedly different than if the picture is painted with a new one. Applying that to the current issue, one can say that without the physical premotion⁴⁷⁴ of the agent intellect, by which phantasms receive the power to have spiritual effect, there would be no concurrence between the spiritual principal cause (the agent intellect) and the material instrumental cause (phantasms). Without the previous concurrence of the agent intellect leaving some impression in the phantasms, the potential intelligibility of the phantasms would not be reduced to actual intelligibility.⁴⁷⁵

473. For a complete list of possible solutions (both approved and rejected by Poinsot) see Spruit 1995, 333.

474. Poinsot employs the notion *praemotio physica* or the previous concurrence of the principal cause with the instrumental cause in the context of his metaphysico-theological treatise on the subordination of the second (created) cause to the uncreated cause in the 25th question *De subordinationatione causae secundae ad primam* in the first part of his *Philosophia Naturalis*. See Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Phil. Nat. p. 1, q. 25, art. 2–3 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 493–509). For the reference to Suárez and his rejection of this previous concurrence of the first cause with the second cause see *ibidem*, 494. For an application of physical premotion in psychological theory see also Gredt 1961, vol. I, nn. 497–503 and 576–579. On the probable influence of Domingo Báñez (1528–1604) on Poinsot's exposition of the efficient concurrence of the phantasms and the intellect see Peroutka 2010, 113.

475. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Phil. Nat. p. 4, q. 10, art. 2 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 304): "... obiectum non redditur intelligibile in actu, nisi primo in ipsis speciebus formatis ab intellectu agente, non in ipsis obiectis sensibilibus ad extra, neque in ipsis speciebus aut cognitionibus sensuum, neque in ipsis phantasmatis." *Ibidem*, 306: "Phantasma necessario debere concurrere ad producendam determinatam speciem intelligibilem in intellectu possibili; neque istum concursum posse salvari alia meliori via quam ponendo, quod phantasma concurrat ut

By way of conclusion we may say that for Poinso phantasms play irreplaceable roles in the process of the abstraction of the intelligible species. They are evidence that the abstractive transfer from sensibility to intelligibility is not an abrupt but a continuous and gradual process. The human spirit is naturally directed towards a body and the body is naturally subordinated to the spirit. While Suárez tends to “dichotomize” the cognitive powers, for Poinso the natural bond with the body, due to the anthropological status of the soul as the form of the body, is not an obstacle for the spirit or a “tax” for the original sin (as Scotus thinks⁴⁷⁶), but the natural *status quo* in which one level perfects the other, the higher perfects the lower.⁴⁷⁷

4. *The expressed species and its relation to intellection*

The actual intelligibility of the intentional species derived from the potential intelligibility of the natures indwelling in the sensible material individuals, then received in the potential intellect, is followed by the elicitation of the intellectual act (intellection). So far I have analyzed the doctrinal differences between Poinso and Suárez in the field of the *principles* of intellection. Important dissimilarities can, nevertheless, be also detected in Poinso’s analysis of the *terminus* of intellection and its relation to intellection itself. Cognition exhibits not only an assimilative but also an expressive or productive character, manifest in the formation of the mental word (on the sensory level of *idolum*).

Both Suárez and Poinso agree that, ontologically speaking, intellection belongs not to the category of action (*actio*) but to the category of quality. Intellection cannot be action because it is above all an immanent operation and not the *way* to a produced thing. The elicitation of intellection, triggered by the immaterial

instrumentum intellectus agentis ad talem productionem.” Ibidem, 308–309: “Intellectum agentem non reddere obiectum intelligibile aut apparens in ipso phantasmate, sed uti phantasmate tamquam instrumento a se moto et elevato ad producendam speciem spiritualem et intelligibilem, in qua primo repraesentatur obiectum modo intelligibili et immateriali ... ita phantasmata ex virtute intellectus agentis redduntur habilia, ut ab eis intentiones intelligibiles abstrahantur ... habilitas ... non potest esse aliud quam motio seu impressio aliqua, qua phantasma movetur et subordinatur intellectui agentis et sic tamquam instrumentum habilitatur ad species producendas ...” For the parallels with artistic instruments and the *premotio* of phantasms by the agent intellect see also ibidem, 309 and 313.

476. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Phil. Nat. p. 4, q. 10, art. 4 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 333): “Quod vero reducitur haec dependentia a phantasmatis ad poenam peccati, ut facit Scotus ... optime refutatur a Caietano ...”

477. For Poinso’s numerous references to the spiritual power received in phantasms, their pre-motion by the agent intellect and the natural subordination of the body to the spirit see Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Phil. Nat. p. 4, q. 10, art. 2 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 308–309 and 312–313). See also Spruit 1995, 333–334.

reception of the intelligible species in the potential intellect, is the ultimate act perfecting a cognizant, not subservient to any other purpose. The cognitive act is not essentially related to its *passio* in the way that by leaving its effect in that object, the mental word, it is completed and made further redundant. As a matter of fact, even after the production intellection does not cease to be active and it further contemplates the object cognized in the mental word.⁴⁷⁸ Both also admit the expressive act producing the mental word (*dictio*) defined by Poinot as the production of the mental word expressing and making apparent a cognized thing. Both also agree that *dicere* is not an activity really distinct from the “non-productive” *intelligere*, as the Scotists claim,⁴⁷⁹ but one and the same action. The cognitive intellectual act as a quality is virtually and eminently productive of the mental word since we cannot understand without simultaneously expressing the conception.⁴⁸⁰

The doctrinal divergence, however, is striking in the fact that for Poinot *dicere* is dispensable in relation to *intelligere*. The expressive act of *dicere* is related to *intelligere* only as a mode to a thing. The asymmetrical separability of a mode from a thing leaves no doubt that for Poinot *intelligere* as *res* can exist without *dicere* and without the expressed species.⁴⁸¹ *Dicere* takes place *ex parte ipsius obiecti*.⁴⁸² Only

478. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Phil. Nat. p. 4, q. 11, art. 1 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 346): “Intellectio etiam distinguitur a conceptu producto, non est actio de praedicamento actionis, sed de genere qualitatis. Itaque est actio metaphysica, cuius munus est per modum actus ultimi et secundi actuare ipsum operantem et sic manere in illo, non autem se habet praecise ut via et motus ad rem productam; sicque actio metaphysica de se et formaliter solum respicit pro termino obiectum, non productum, licet secundario non repugnet producere.”

479. For this Scotistic doctrine see 4.4.2 below.

480. Ibidem, 348: “Expressio productiva verbi seu dictio non est actio distincta ab ipso actu immanente intellectionis, sed ipsa intellectio est virtualiter actio productiva verbi; nec indiget intellectio alia actione, per quam producat, quia procedit per emanationem, neque alia, qua producat, quia ipsa virtualiter est productio.” Ibidem, 349: “Unde constat, quod ipsamet intellectio, licet sit qualitas, tamen quia habet rationem actus secundi et ita eminenter est actio productiva, de se habet procedere a suo principio eo modo, quo procedit actio, scilicet per modum emanationis, non per actionem mediam superadditam.”

481. Ibidem, 349–350: “Intelligere et dicere differunt ut res et modus ... dictio ponit aliquam habitudinem in intelligere praeter ipsam substantiam intellectionis, quia intellectio de se non dicit habitudinem productivi nec respicit terminum ut productum, sed ut cognitum, dicere autem respicit terminum ut dictum seu ut productum; iste autem respectus seu habitudo aliquis modus est. Potest etiam separari ab intellectione, licet non e contra, ut in visione beata secundum sententiam probabilem non generatur verbum ...”

482. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Phil. Nat. p. 4, q. 11, art. 2 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 356): “... apud D. Thomam et eius scholam verbum requiritur in intellectu, non ex parte potentiae aut operationis eius ut productivae, sed ex parte ipsius obiecti.”

if the object is absent – in the case of acts of phantasy – or if the object is rendered immaterial as the intrinsic terminus of intellection, a mental word or an *idolum* are brought about by the intellect or the phantasy as their representatives. The positing of the mental word is not derived from the essentially productive character of the intellect or *de facto* of all the cognitive faculties, as it is in Suárez, but from the insufficiency of the objects requiring the formation of substitutes within the cognitive power. If the object is present and attained in itself, as it happens in the exterior sensation or in the *visio beatifica*, the mental word is dispensable since the sensory perception or the perceptive beatific vision are terminated directly and *experimentaliter* in the objects themselves.⁴⁸³ As indicated in 2.5.1, this claim is alien to Suárez for whom the mental word is produced in *all* types of cognition due to the very nature of cognition.⁴⁸⁴

There is another important doctrinal divergence concerning the substitutive character of the mental word. Contrary to Suárez who is convinced that the mental word is really identical with the cognitive (intellective) act understood as a produced quality, Poinot emphasizes that they actually differ as *res a re*.⁴⁸⁵ Poinot denies the criterion of separability as the sole sign of real distinction and therefore the expressed species and intellection are mutually non-separable. Nevertheless, they must be understood as really distinct.⁴⁸⁶ Laying emphasis on the distinction between the non-pictorial cognitive act and the pictorial expressed species, Poinot claims that the mental word cannot be *realiter* identified with the cognitive act. Moreover, it holds that the expressed species is a more perfect representation of a thing than the impressed species. While the intelligible impressed species represents its object only virtually, the expressed species stands for an object *in actu*. Yet, as we know, the impressed species is a quality or a virtual (not expressed) image, which is really distinct from the cognitive act. Seen from the viewpoint of comparison with Suárez, this statement leads to three important doctrinal differences. First, for Poinot the intellect, rather than tending to things outwards, primarily drags things inwards.⁴⁸⁷ Second, while Suárez conceives the mental word as *id*

483. Ibidem, 357–358.

484. For the explicit dismissal of Suárez see ibidem, 361–362.

485. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Phil. Nat. p. 4, q. 11, art. 1 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 349): “... intelligere autem et verbum differunt sicut res a re.”

486. Ibidem, 346: “Verbum autem distinguitur ab intelligere, non quia verbum ipsum possit separari ab intelligere actuali, sed quia verbum est aliquid procedens per intelligere tamquam imago expressa ...”

487. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Phil. Nat. p. 4, q. 11, art. 2 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 357): “... intellectus est potentia perfecte trahens res ad se et uniens illas sibi ...”

quo, Poinot conceives it as *id in quo*.⁴⁸⁸ A concept cannot be identified with the intellectual act since the act as a non-pictorial item cannot become the semantic vehicle of the intentional similarity with an object known. Third, comparatively to Suárez's conception of the formal concept, Poinot's theory of the mental word displays more of the character proper to the *tertium quid* between the cognitive acts and extramental things than Suárez's doctrine.⁴⁸⁹

3.4.2 Knowledge of material singulars

There is a crucial doctrinal difference between Suárez and Poinot immediately relevant for the issue of the psychogenesis of universality in how they deal with the issue of the intellectual cognition of material singulars. Although, as Camille Bérubé remarks,⁴⁹⁰ in the context of the history of Thomism Poinot's theory of the intellectual cognition of material singulars is original and more open to the *factum* of the intellectual cognition of singularity because it adopts the proper and distinct concept of a sensible singular, his epistemological point of departure is far from identical with that of Suárez. In order to exemplify this contrast I proceed in the following way. (1) As a preliminary note I introduce three kinds of distinction relevant for Poinot's theory of the intellectual cognition of material singulars. (2) Further, I expound Poinot's teaching on the priority of *quidditative* cognition. (3) I outline the cognitive "mechanism" of Poinot's theory of cognition of singulars by conversion to singulars represented in phantasms. (4) Finally, I briefly set Poinot's doctrine in the broader context of his anthropology and psychology.

1. The first important distinction in the issue of *cognitio singularis* already introduced in the immediate context of presenting Suárez's theory is the one between the impressed and the expressed species. For Poinot the issue of the concept of

488. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 22, art. 2 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 705): "... tamquam id, in quo continetur res cognita intra intellectum ... Et quia [conceptus; D.H.] est id, in quo res seu objectum redditur proportionatum et immaterializatum per modum termini ..."

489. See Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Phil. Nat. p. 4, q. 11, art. 2 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 357–358). Nevertheless, I do not want to say that Poinot openly endorses representationalism. In the second article *Utrum conceptus sit signum formale* of the 22nd question of the second part in his *Logic*, Poinot affirms that the concept or the expressed species is not an instrumental sign (*signum instrumentale*) firstly cognized before the cognition of the *significatum*, but a formal sign by which cognition is immediately carried to extramental objects. See Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 22, art. 2 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 704).

490. Bérubé 1964, 236.

a material singular formed by the potential intellect after the reception of the impressed species is not as disputable as the question concerning the *species impressa*. He agrees that we ultimately have the proper and distinct concepts of material singulars employed in singular predication at our disposal. Of much more controversial character is the issue whether the impressed species abstracted by the agent intellect from phantasms directly represents a material singular or rather material quiddity (the metaphysical universal). The second distinction concerns two ways of cognition of singulars. A sensible singular may be apprehended either *in actu exercito*, i.e., as realized *in concreto* in a subject as it is attained by the senses, or *in actu signato*, i.e., *in abstracto* and quidditatively, more precisely, according to the sum of descriptive properties disconnected from the subject. The third distinction is related to the difference between proper/distinct knowledge (*cognoscere proprie et distincte*) and direct cognition (*directe cognoscere*). Poinot stresses that the proper and distinct knowledge of singulars cannot be made dependent on direct cognition. Proper and distinct knowledge is opposed not to indirect but to confusive and common knowledge.⁴⁹¹ Accordingly, direct knowledge must be contraposed to reflexive cognition characterized by turning back either on the principles eliciting this cognition (cognitive power, habit, species, soul) or on those assisting the intellect in intellection (sensory powers).⁴⁹²

2. In the first *Dico* Poinot states that (a) the intelligibile impressed species abstracted from phantasms cannot represent material singulars directly and *in actu exercito*, i.e., as actually modified by singularity; but (b) it can attain them abstractly and quidditatively (*in actu signato*).⁴⁹³ (a) The formal object of the human intellect is not a concrete accident (*accidens in concreto*) or a form existing in matter but only the quiddity of a material singular (the so-called material quiddity).⁴⁹⁴ The intellect as the power capable of penetrating into the “bowels” of things (*intus-legere*)

491. Just this *cognoscere proprie*, as shown in 2.5.2, is denied by Cajetan.

492. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Phil. Nat. p. 4, q. 10, art. 4 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 323–324).

493. Ibidem, 324: “Species impressa intelligibilis, quae pro hoc statu abstrahitur a sensibus, non potest repraesentare singulare directe sub exercitio et modificatione singularitatis, bene tamen ipsam singularitatem potest attingere per modum quidditatis.”

494. More precisely, Poinot says that the first *ratio cognoscibilis* is the material quiddity considered in light of the most confuse predicate, i.e., being. The first quidditative knowledge is rather imperfect because our intellect proceeds from potency to act and from the imperfect to the perfect. So the material quiddity is attained not under some generic or specific grade but under the most common predicate of being. See Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Phil. Nat. p. 1, q. 1, art. 3 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 24–25).

cannot be distinguished from the sensory powers only by means of the distinction in the entity of its principle. It would be highly insufficient for the intellect to be distinguished from the senses only through the distinction in the entity of the intentional species in the way that the sensible species is a material entity and the intelligible species is an immaterial entity. Contrary to Suárez, Poinsoot claims that the distinction in representation cannot be ignored.⁴⁹⁵ While the sensible species of the sensory powers can stand only for the exterior aspects of objects, i.e., their materiality and singularity, the intellect gains insight into the interior of sensible things, i.e., to their quiddity. It cannot be affirmed that the intellect as the power dependent upon the input of sensory data is first moved by the singulars. It is false to say that the intellect firstly cognizes the sensible singulars since the senses as the “gateway” of any cognition are originally and most strongly affected by them. Admittedly, the intellect is “hit” by singulars but only *through* the medium of the “light” of the agent intellect, the proper function of which is to abstract the species from materiality and singularity. If the intellect *per impossibile* attained singulars as modified by materiality and thus singularity, it would go well beyond its natural *modus operandi*.⁴⁹⁶

The analogy with the angelic cognition of singulars employed by Suárez is misleading. One cannot say that in view of the non-repugnancy of the species representing singulars we humans have them at our disposal as well. Poinsoot does not share Suárez’s “angelization” of the human intellect. He makes clear that the angelic species are of entirely different origin than the human ones. They are not abstracted from phantasms but are infused into angels directly by God. Just this divine infusion of ideas is the reason why the angels have species representing singulars (being exemplary causes, the divine ideas are not only the causes of the specific natures but also of the individuality of created beings). True, no contradiction can be found in the notion of a singular intelligible species, but that, according to Poinsoot, is far from being a valid premise for the conclusion that such species is formed also by humans.⁴⁹⁷

(b) Although the intelligible species cannot represent singularity directly *in actu exercito* – that is reserved for the sensible species –, it can attain it abstractly *per modum quidditatis*. What does Poinsoot actually mean by this quidditative

495. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Phil. Nat. p. 4, q. 10, art. 4 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 326).

496. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Phil. Nat. p. 4, q. 10, art. 5 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 338–339).

497. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Phil. Nat. p. 4, q. 10, art. 4 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 327).

apprehension? *Prima facie* one could be inclined to affirm that what Poinso has in mind is that the intellect apprehends singularity somehow in depth, i.e., in its principle, as the Scotists would say “in its haecceity”. However, that is not Poinso’s intention. His brevity concerning the explanation of what he actually means by the cognition of singularity *per modum quidditatis* can be compensated by the text he refers to, Aquinas’s 20th article *Utrum anima separata singularia cognoscat* of the *Quaestio disputata de anima*. In the long body of the article Aquinas mentions authors who think that God, angels and separate substances cognize singulars only by means of cognition of the universal causes of all things. The Angelic Doctor says that they resemble those who claim to be able to envisage all the particular details of future eclipses, including their number, position and time, on the basis of universal knowledge of the position and movement of the stars and celestial bodies. Aquinas rejects this opinion as insufficient in relation to the demands of the proper and distinct knowledge of singulars. The prediction of an eclipse on the basis of the knowledge of universal causes does not imply definite knowledge of particular effect(s). This prediction can in fact pertain to more than one eclipse. Likewise, universal knowledge of Peter by means of a bundle of properties such as being white, being curly, being well-educated, etc., does not lead to definite cognition of Peter. A list of those qualitative predicates, no matter how extensive it would be, could still be applied to Peter’s twin Paul.⁴⁹⁸ The cognition of singulars *per modum quidditatis*, Poinso concludes, does not entail the constitution of the proper and distinct concept of the material singular.⁴⁹⁹

498. Thomas de Aquino, *Quaestio disputata de anima ab articulo XIV ad articulum XXI*, art. 20, *corpus*: “Et ideo alii dixerunt Deum quidem et Angelos, necnon et animas separatas, singularia cognoscere per cognitionem universalium causarum totius ordinis universali. Nihil enim est in rebus singularibus quod ex illis universalibus causis non derivetur. Et ponunt exemplum: sicut si aliquis cognosceret totum ordinem caeli et stellarum, et mensuram et motus eorum, sciret per intellectum omnes futuras eclipses, et quantae, et quibus in locis, et quibus temporibus futurae essent. Sed hoc non sufficit ad veram singularium cognitionem. Manifestum est enim quod quantumcumque adunentur aliqua universalia, nunquam ex eis perficitur singulare. Sicut si dicam hominem album, musicum et quaecumque huiusmodi addidero, nunquam erit singulare. Possibile est enim omnia haec adunata pluribus convenire. Unde qui cognoscit omnes causas in universali, nunquam propter hoc proprie cognoscet aliquem singularem effectum. Nec ille qui cognoscit totum ordinem caeli, cognoscit hanc eclipsim ut est hic. Etsi enim cognoscat eclipsim futuram esse in tali situ solis et lunae, et in tali hora, et quaecumque huiusmodi in eclipsibus observantur; tamen talem eclipsim possibile est pluries evenire.” URL: <http://www.corpusthomicum.org/iopera.html>. For the critical edition see Thomas de Aquino, *Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P. M. edita*, t. 24/1: *Quaestiones disputatae de anima* (Rome/Paris 1996). See also Bérubé 1964, 46–48.

499. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Phil. Nat. p. 4, q. 10, art. 4 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 326–327).

3. If quidditative cognition cannot give us the proper and distinctive notion, how does the intellect attain its formation? Poinsoot states that the proper and distinct concept of a material singular attainable by the human intellect originates only from *indirect* and *reflexive* cognition turning back on phantasms, more precisely, on singulars represented in phantasms.⁵⁰⁰ The concept representing a material singular we have *in statu isto* cannot be derived from direct cognition but only from reflexive intellection turning back on phantasms as the terms from which (*a quo*) that quidditative notion has been acquired. This conversion does not proceed by means of reflection from the impressed species but from the concept. By means of the concept of *universale* the intellect turns back on the phantasms to capture a singular material object in them. In that turn the phantasms and material objects become not the object *a quo* but the object *ad quem*. In an implicit reply to Suárez's accusation that he falls into undesirable Thomistic representationalism, raised by the question of *what* that turn is exactly like (If a singular is first apprehend in a phantasm, then the phantasm must be known before the extramental singular. Is it cognized by a new species? If so, does this species represent singularly or universally?), Poinsoot states that the intellect does not need any new species to cognize an object in phantasy.⁵⁰¹ The intellect commences its way from the notion of the material quiddity back to its epistemological source by virtue of a stimulus inherent to the intellect. This incitement is due to the concept's *connotations* of singulars in phantasms.⁵⁰² Even though the universal concept *in recto* signifies the material quiddity, *in obliquo* it signifies singulars in phantasms as well. This connotation intrinsic to the universal concept makes the intellectual *reditus* to material phantasms an entirely continuous process. Just this process should be regarded as evidence of the natural *continuity* between the intellectual and the sensory powers already apparent in Poinsoot's theory of the concurrence of phantasms and the agent intellect in the co-production of the intelligible species.⁵⁰³

500. Ibidem, 327: "Dico secundo: Conceptus formati ab intellectu de re singulari sub illa reflexione et connotatione ad phantasmata, ad quae fit conversio, non repraesentant directe singulare, licet possint esse proprii et distincti conceptus rei singularis."

501. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 23, art. 3 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 743): "Quodsi petas, quaenam species impressa deserviat ad cognitionem reflexam conceptus, respondetur ... quod ea, quae cognoscuntur per cognitionem reflexam, non cognoscuntur per suam essentiam nec per speciem propriam ..."

502. On this Poinsoot's central (as Bérubé also says quite simple) thought see Bérubé 1964, 236.

503. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Phil. Nat. p. 4, q. 10, art. 4 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 331). Surely, this kind of reflexive cognition of singulars in phantasms would be dismissed by Suárez as unworthy of the higher cognitive power: "... contra rationem intellectus est quod in re materiali et inferioris ordinis cognoscat tamquam in obiecto. Haec enim imperfectio magna est,

Unlike Cajetan advocating only confusive concepts of material singulars⁵⁰⁴ and for a different reason also contrary to Suárez,⁵⁰⁵ Poinso sees no incompatibility between the indirect and reflexive intellection of material singulars and the premise of the proper and distinct concept thereof. Although the intellect does not primarily form a species representing a singular but representing quidditatively, it can still obtain the proper and distinct concept of the material singulars from the species. In agreement with Suárez, Poinso claims that confusive cognition is not enough in view of the epistemological presumptions connected with the formation of predications such as “Peter is man” and “Peter is not Paul”. The determinative grasp of the truth of such propositions requires the intellectual apprehension of singulars by means of the proper and distinct concept.⁵⁰⁶

Moreover, this proper and distinct concept of Peter can later become the basis for the formation of the *species* of the very same individual, which remains in the memory of the separated soul in the afterlife. Yet, even though this species can represent Peter properly and distinctly, it does not represent him adequately and directly in the way the universal species represents the material quiddity of Peter.⁵⁰⁷ Since its basis (concept) represents Peter only inadequately and reflexively by means of turning back on phantasms, the species itself, processed by the potential intellect and formed from the concept, can represent no more than inadequately and indirectly. As representative of the termination of the intellectual turning back

et nulla est ratio cogens ad id asserendum, et in omnibus aliis potentiis cognoscitivis numquam visum.” *DA* 9, 3, 7.

504. Franz Sladeczek distinguishes between three kinds of Thomistic exegesis of Aquinas’s doctrine of the intellectual knowledge of sensible singulars. Apart from the above-mentioned doctrines endorsing confusive and inferential knowledge advocated by Cajetan and the opinion endorsing reflexive apprehension based either on conversion to phantasms (Poinso, Bañez) or to the abstractive act (Capreolus), Sladeczek mentions and defends the exposition supported by the Dominican Cardinal Tommaso Maria Zigliara (1833–1893) who seems to have been significantly influenced by the Scotistic interpretation and probably also by Suárez. For Zigliara the universal is cognized in and with a material singular. The essence (the nature considered absolutely) constitutes the formal object, a singular is the material object of the first intellectual cognitive act. For this conception see Sladeczek 1926, 184–185 and 212.

505. *DA* 9, 3, 6.

506. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Phil. Nat. p. 4, q. 10, art. 4 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 328–329).

507. Ibidem, 330: “Species impressae, quae formantur in intellectu nostro ex praeconceptis speciebus seu conceptibus rerum singularium etiam non repraesentant illas adaequate et directe, sed sicut ipsi conceptus, a quibus formantur, licet possint repraesentare proprie et distincte singularia.”

on the phantasms in which Peter is cognized, the species must directly and adequately represent the universal nature. That, however, does not alter the fact that the (second-order) species representing Peter retains not only the quiddity but also the particular reflexion of the phantasm by which Peter is known.⁵⁰⁸

4. Poincot's *conversio* of the intellect to the material singulars contained in phantasms is not an additional and incidental feature of his philosophy. It gives clear evidence of the close interconnection and continuity between the intellectual and the sensory powers so dear to Thomism. Apart from the psychological (*a posteriori*) arguments for this interrelation accepted by Suárez, i.e., that intellection is facilitated by the pre-formation of suitable phantasms and that without reference to corporeal images our thinking quickly becomes fallacious,⁵⁰⁹ Poincot gives also an *a priori* reason not shared by the Jesuit.⁵¹⁰ This reason can be reformulated in the following way. For Poincot the proper object of the human intellect is the quiddity of a material thing conceived under the most general predicate (being). Since the quiddity cannot exist unless it exists in an individual, it must have *esse* only in singulars. If it is to be fully known, the intellect cannot entirely abstract from this *esse*, i.e., from the singulars in which it exists. Only in them, in their *esse* or *non-esse*, is the intellect capable of asserting the propositional truth/falsity. Our concepts are directed to truth and thus inevitably directed to being. Since they have being only in the singulars, the universal (quidditative) concepts must be traceable back to the phantasms. Consequently, it is impossible for the human intellect to abstract completely from those (individual) connotations because in this form of connotations the abstracted natures retain their similitude to things, in which they *a parte rei* exist.⁵¹¹

508. Ibidem, 330–331.

509. DA 9, 7, 6: "... quando aliquid perfecte volumus intelligere, semper aliquam imaginationem sensibilem intra nos formare conamur; et si volumus docere aliquid, sensibilia exempla quaerimus, quasi materiam dantes phantasiae a qua intellectus pendet. Et istae experientiae faciunt quidem conclusionem [Anima dum est in corpore habet intrinsecam dependentiam a phantasia, id est, non potest per intellectum operari nisi simul actu operetur per phantasma; D.H.] certam a posteriori."

510. DA 9, 7, 6–7: "Tamen ratio a priori difficile redditur. D Thoma, supra, rationem reddit, quia obiectum intellectus nostri est quidditas rei materialis; haec autem non potest ab intellectu nostro cognosci secundum modum quem in singularibus habet, nisi per iuvamen sensus; et ideo ad perfectam rei cognitionem necessaria est concomitantia operationis sensitivae. Quae ratio multis impugnatur ab Scoto, supra; et in 1, d 3, q 3. Et mihi etiam displicet."

511. Ioannes a S. Thoma, CPT, Phil. Nat. p. 4, q. 10, art. 4 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 332).

Poinot confirms that the typical character of the indirect intellection of sensible singulars has to do with turning back on the phantasms by claiming that this reflection of the intellect is nothing but a manifestation of the essential necessity of such conversion. This conversion is necessary not only in the phase of the reception of the species but also in the course of the cognitive process itself. The identification of the intellectual reflection on sensible objects with this fundamental conversion of the intellect to phantasms is underpinned by Poinot's doctrine of the substantial and operative unity of a human being, grounded in Poinot's hylemorphism.⁵¹² Hylemorphism is thus defining not only for the anthropological dimension determined by the relationship of matter/form, but accounts also for the relationship and natural continuity between the sensory and the intellectual powers and between *cognitio singularis* and *cognitio universalis*. It is not surprising that for Poinot the *reditus* of the intellect to the interior senses, facilitated by this natural connection between the intellectual and the sensory powers, is a clear token of the *natural* unity of the body and the soul, which (as stated) is neither a result of original sin nor a manifestation of the imperfect state (Suárez⁵¹³) in which the human intellect is temporarily made dependent on the senses.⁵¹⁴

3.4.3 The metaphysical universal: Representational and cognitional aspect

The essentially relational character of the universality proper to the logical universal requires an appropriate (rational) foundation. While the *universale in essendo* or the *universale materialiter sumptum* is equal to the extramental subject, the proximate foundation matches the metaphysical universal ultimately identifiable with the *repraesentatum* of the *universale in repraesentando*, which is the formal concept.⁵¹⁵ As for Suárez, for Poinot the *universale metaphysicum* is not the end

512. Bérubé points out that the issue of the intellectual knowledge of singulars, even in the times of Aquinas, was often dealt with together with the question of the substantial unity of man. See Bérubé 1964, 64.

513. *DA* 9, 7, 8: "Quocirca nihilominus nulla concurrir commodior et evidentior ratio, nisi quod haec dependentia provenit ex imperfectione status, nam intellectus nunc non recipit species, nisi dum actu operatur phantasia ..."

514. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Phil. Nat. p. 4, q. 10, art. 4 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 333).

515. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 4, art. 1 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 345): "Unde consulto non proposuimus in titulo quaestionis, an *sit* ibi universale metaphysicum, sed an *repraesentetur*. Agimus enim hic non tam de universali in essendo quam in repraesentando."

of the story in the psychogenesis of universality. Even though the term *universale* is indifferent to the foundation of universality as well as to the relational form,⁵¹⁶ Poinsoot considers the relational form of universality to be universality in the proper sense.⁵¹⁷

In this subsection I deal with the two basic questions concerning the so-called fundamental (metaphysical) universal corresponding to the two stages of concept-formation mentioned above. First, I develop Poinsoot's doctrine of the representational nature of the intelligible species acquired by the agent intellect. Second, aiming at the level of actual cognition I explicate Poinsoot's assertion that the metaphysical universal arises by an absolute and direct act of the intellect.

1. According to Poinsoot the *primum cognitum* formed by the embodied human intellect is not the concept of a material singular but that of the material quiddity.⁵¹⁸ What does Poinsoot exactly mean by "material quiddity"? And what is the abstractive process like? Poinsoot believes that the *concept* of material quiddity is preceded by the formation of the universal *species* or the species, which represents universally. One does not come to the cognition of the universal nature by means of the intellectual precision of the nature from its individuating factors *within* the particular species, as Suárez asserts. The actual cognition of the universal nature proceeds only by means of its own universal species formed by the agent intellect. Further, this universal species does not represent the nature in the state of being isolated from other (existential) determinations as if it were abstracted by double abstraction, i.e., not only from individuation but also from the universal being in the intellect. Poinsoot underlines that what this species immediately signifies is the nature having the unity of precision (*unitas praecisionis*), which for him is a conceptual unity and not an antemental unity in the sense professed by Fonseca. Due to this unity, the species or form represents the nature as *one* nature. This unity, however, can be attributed neither to the nature absolutely considered, nor

516. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 4, art. 2 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 352): "... hoc nomen 'universalis' indifferens est ad fundamentum universalitatis et ad ipsam formam relativam ..."

517. See Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 3, art. 5 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 334). On Poinsoot's affinity to Suárez's theory of the metaphysical and the logical universal see also Guil 1956, 227–228.

518. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Phil. Nat. p. 1, q. 1, art. 3 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 22): "Impossibile est, quod primum cognitum nostri intellectus in hac vita sit aliquod singulare per modum singularis." Ibidem, 24: "Prima ratio cognoscibilis a nostro intellectu ... est quidditas materialis sub aliquo praedicato maxime confuso, quod praedicatum est ens ..."

to the extramental nature, but only to the metaphysical universal.⁵¹⁹ It is not inappropriate to say that the main reason for this view of the immediate production of the (metaphysically) universal nature is the axiom that the (agent) intellect's dematerialization amounts to universalization.

By this intellectual precision, which can be carried out even on the basis of a single instance,⁵²⁰ the nature becomes not only one but, as we already know, also non-repugnant to being in the many. As stressed, this non-repugnancy is neither part of the particularized nature in the thing nor a property of the nature absolutely considered. Poinso makes clear that this property pertains only to the abstracted nature in the intellect. Regarding the "relation" of this non-repugnant nature to the many, Poinso notes that it is not a relation as to the term(s) *ad quem*. Actually, if it were the case, the metaphysical universal would be replaced by the logical universal and the mere foundation of a relation of reason would formally become the actual or relational universal. The metaphysical universal is related to them by a relation as to the term(s) *a quo*, i.e., as to the terms from which the species representative of the *universale metaphysicum* has been abstracted. The connection to them as to the terms *ad quem* requires a substantially different operation, a comparative act, the act by which the logical universal is formed.⁵²¹

2. Poinso's theory of the cognition of the metaphysical universal by the potential intellect and its role in the formation of the fully-fledged (logical) universal is not different from that of Suárez. Analogously to Suárez, Poinso distinguishes between two basic intellectual operations. One is absolute, the other is comparative. Both can be further divided into direct and reflexive. While the absolute act cognizes a thing in itself (*secundum se*), the comparative operation comes to apprehend the thing as basically directed *ad aliud*.⁵²² The comparative act produces the logical

519. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 4, art. 1 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 344): "In sententia D. Thomae, quod species producta ab intellectu agente repraesentat naturam sine singularitate, dicendum est repraesentari universale fundamentaliter, quod est universale metaphysicum, ita quod illa species non solum respicit naturam secundum se et in statu solitudinis, sed sub unitate praecisionis." Poinso even thinks that it is outright impossible to conceive the nature as such, which would *ex modo intelligendi* have neither unity nor plurality. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, p. 2, q. 4, art. 2 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 354): "Et fortasse non est possibile concipere naturam, ita quod ex modo intelligendi nec unitatem habeat nec pluralitatem, licet secundum se ex parte rei cognitae nec una sit nec plures, quantum est ex vi essentialium praedicatorum."

520. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 4, art. 1 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 346).

521. Ibidem, 345. On the new comparative act producing the logical universal see 3.5.2.

522. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 4, art. 2 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 347).

universal, the absolute operation forms the metaphysical universal. Both types and their corresponding universals are made compatible (as in Suárez) by the assertion that the metaphysical universal constitutes the foundation for the logical (relational) universality. Both seem to assume that it does not really matter whether the absolute act is negative or positive abstraction. Both negative abstraction apprehending the nature while omitting the individuating principle and positive abstraction grasping the individuating element as what is separated in the abstraction can be regarded as a kind of operation producing the metaphysical universal.⁵²³ Both employ the same comparison of the *universale metaphysicum* to the Platonic ideas subsisting intellectually. If *per impossibile* the metaphysical universals existed independently of the human intellect, they would be identified with the Platonic ideas with their absolute unity. If they subsisted *a parte rei*, they would ground the categorial relations to the existent inferiors or the relations according to being said (*secundum dici*) if those *inferiora* did not exist.⁵²⁴

The theory of the triple universal endorsed by the majority of authors espousing moderate realism with the metaphysical universal as the middle “foundational” element can be contested by the following argument. The new comparative act productive of the logical universal is not necessary and thus the “middle” metaphysical universal is redundant since by the very positing of the *foundation* of the relation of reason the logical universal and the relation of reason *ipso facto* emerges. Accordingly, no other act than this absolute act is necessary. The rational relation proper to the *universale logicum* thus originates naturally by emergence (*per resultantiam*).⁵²⁵ Poinsoot dismisses this opinion. The direct and absolute act can never result in the production of the logical universal but, at most, in the

523. Ibidem, 348: “Universale metaphysicum fit per actum absolutum abstrahentem naturam ab inferioribus tam abstractione negativa quam positiva. Itaque utraque abstractio est actus absolutus et non deservit ad universale logicum formaliter constituendum, quod in relatione consistit.”

524. Ibidem, 352: “Unde si daretur a parte rei universale eo modo, quo posuit Plato, esset universale metaphysicum, quod in unitate praecisa consisteret; fundaret tamen relationem ad ipsa inferiora, praedicamentalem quidem, si inferior existerent, vel secundum dici, si non existerent.” For the same opinion in Suárez see *DM* VI, s. 6, n. 10 (Vivès, vol. 25: 227). Contrary to the ontological relation (*relatio secundum esse*), the whole character of which is to be related (so to say carried away) to its term, the relation according to being said (*relatio secundum dici*) is something absolute, from which relation only follows. The relation according to being said is related to its term rather in the way of being its foundation than by means of a pure relation to its term *qua* term. See Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 17, art. 2 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 578). For translation of the *relatio secundum esse* as “the ontological relation” see Deely 1985, 463–465.

525. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 4, art. 2 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 351). In Second Scholasticism this opinion seems to have been defended by Jean Lalemandet (1591–1647),

generation of the metaphysical universal. Just as Suárez, Poinso contends that the rational relation does not and cannot originate by natural emergence, i.e., in the way real relations come to be,⁵²⁶ but only by cognition (*per cognitionem*). But this cognition is not absolute cognition but *notitia comparativa*, by which the metaphysical universal is cognized as related to its inferiors apprehended as the term(s) *ad quem*.⁵²⁷

3.4.4 The extrinsic denomination and the first objective intention

The metaphysical universal, the objective correlate of the direct cognitive act, is to be identified with the first objective intention (*intentio obiectiva prima*).⁵²⁸ The absolute cognitive act of the potential intellect or the first formal intention accords with the extrinsic denomination of the intellect. The intellect's *denominatio extrinseca* is what makes the *universal materialiter sumptum* into the metaphysical universal or the first objective intention. If this identification is valid, appropriate attention must be paid to the issue of the *ontological import* of the extrinsic denomination in Poinso's logical texts, as it was in the chapter on Suárez. This issue, as I have highlighted, is closely connected with the question of the ontological status of objective being (*esse obiective*).⁵²⁹

a member of the Order of Friars Minor, who in his late years lived and died in Prague. See Sousedík 2004, 542–543.

526. The actual being of relations of reason does not spring from the mere positing of the foundation and the term but from being cognized by the intellect. Actually, in the case of rational relations much can be said about the subjects without saying anything about the resulting relations. A nature can be denominated as universal while “denuded” from individuation before the actual comparative knowledge relating the nature to its term(s). The situation is different with real relations. If accepted in ontology, they result immediately from the positing of a foundation and a term. The cause that brings about the existence of the foundation of the subject of a relation at the same time gives rise to the relation itself. The cause, let us say sunlight bringing about the fact that an apple *A* turns red, is also the cause of *A*'s relation of similarity (in colour) to the apple *B* which is red as well. As a consequence, in case of real relations nothing can be predicated of a subject in itself without the mediation of the relation. See Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 2, art. 4 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 303–304).

527. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 4, art. 2 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 352).

528. In the exposition of Suárez's theory of the objective concept and universals Theo Kobusch says the following: “... erste objective Intention oder objektiver Begriff heist. Das ist das universale metaphysicum.” Kobusch 1987, 209.

529. This question has been treated by extensive contemporary research, in particular in the context of Descartes's notion of *realitas obiectiva*. See especially Wells 1993 and Cronin 1966.

In 2.5.4 we have seen that for Suárez the direct, non-reflexive act does *not* immediately produce beings of reason. Suárez endorsed a theory of the real character of the *denominatio extrinseca* due to the real “components” inherent in its ontological make-up, at least in the first (non-reflexive) stage. It is only the reflexive act brought back on an already cognized thing, or more precisely, on its property “being known” or “being abstracted”, what generates beings of reason. In this subsection I propound Poinso’s theory which may be viewed as a certain revision of Suárez’s model. I would like to show that this revision can be, from a specific point of view, considered as displaying features of representationalism to a greater degree than the theory of Suárez.⁵³⁰

As indicated in the previous subsection, the issue of the *universale metaphysicum* is in a way the borderline case between real and rational being. In the following I do not present Poinso’s theory of being of reason in all its aspects.⁵³¹ I render Poinso’s doctrine of beings of reason from the point of view of the ontological import of the intellectual act called the *denominatio extrinseca*. This is done in two main contexts. The first one is concerned with the “formality” and the division of beings of reason;⁵³² the second one deals with the formation of beings of reason.⁵³³ Before coming to them I first sketch Poinso’s classification of the logical intentions, which in its basic form is not different from that of Suárez.

1. Leaving aside the term *intentio* in the volitional sense, Poinso distinguishes between two kinds of intentions (concepts) of the intellect. In agreement with the scholastic tradition he calls concepts also intentions, because they *tend* to objects. The first kind of intention is the formal concept; the second kind of intention is the objective concept. The formal intention is that, by which or, more precisely in accord with the above-mentioned exposition, that, in which (*id in quo*) one conceives, e.g., *man*. As such the formal intention (analyzed chiefly in the psychological parts of the *Cursus philosophicus*) is (active) cognition or the cognitive act terminated by the mental word (expressed species). The objective concept is the known thing (*res cognita*). The typical feature in Poinso’s classification is that the objective concept is a relation of reason attributed to the known thing. If *animal* is

530. By saying that, as already stated, I do not wish to attribute representationalism to Poinso. There are many indications in Poinso’s philosophy defying such absolute evaluation.

531. For a more complex study of Poinso’s theory see Doyle 1994. In addition, in the *Material Logic* (especially when compared to the long treatise elaborated by Mastri/Belluto) Poinso does not give an exhaustive exposition of the issue of beings of reason, either. Due to the logical context, he rather focuses on the problem of the logical intentions.

532. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 2, art. 1 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 284–290).

533. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 2, art. 4 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 301–306).

conceived by the formal concept as superior to an inferior concept, the universality affecting animal is the objective or so-called passive intention.⁵³⁴

A further distinction has to do with the first (*intentio prima*) and the second intention (*intentio secunda*). The first intentions are indicated as first since they are connected with an object according to the being it has in its own right, whether with regard to existence or with regard to quiddity. The second intentions are called second because they are connected not with the first extramental state, but with the second condition of the object, i.e., with the state of being in cognition, which Poinso considers to be secondary and following upon the being of the thing in its own right. Being known comes after cognoscibility, which in turn follows upon entity or the being that objects have extramentally. While the concepts of the first intention are treated in metaphysics and other (real) sciences dealing with real beings, the second intentions, e.g., genus, species and universality when speaking about the second intentions adherent to the first mental operation called *simplex apprehensio*, are the formal and adequate object of logic. Basically, Poinso works with four combinations corresponding to this classification. There are the first formal/objective intentions and the second formal/objective intentions. While the first formal intention is the direct intellectual act grasping the essence or form of a cognized thing, being an object *qua* known, the second formal intention is the comparative act (*notitia*) by which the cognized thing is rationally related to its term(s), which are its inferior natures. The objective counterparts are “passive” objects, in case of the first intention real ones, in the instance of the second intention rational ones.⁵³⁵

2. It seems that if Poinso classifies the first objective intentions as connected with the affections or conditions proper to the extramental things themselves, then the ontological assessment of the notion of *universale metaphysicum* can only be “non-mentalistic”. However, the contrast with Suárez’s conception is instructive. We have seen that Poinso’s conception of the *universale materialiter sumptum*

534. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 2, art. 2 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 290–291): “Obiectiva [intentio; D.H.] dicitur ipsa relatio rationis, quae attribuitur rei cognitae, formalis vero ipse conceptus, per quem formatur. Sicut quando concipimus animal tamquam superius ad sua inferiora, ipsa universalitas ex parte animalis se tenens dicitur intentio obiectiva seu passiva, ipse vero conceptus, quo sic concipitur animal, dicitur intentio formalis.” Likewise, Constantine Sarnanus, a Scotistic contemporary of Suárez, calls the formal intention the active act and the objective intention, in a rather oxymoronic way, the passive act of the intellect. See Hickman 1980, 104–107.

535. Ibidem, 291. For definitions of the first and the second intentions see also Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 1, *Textus Summularum*, liber 1, cap. 4 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 12–13).

seems to be, on the level of actual existence, of a more tenuous character than the extramental reality of the nature in Suárez. For Poinot the nature in singulars is neither positively nor negatively common and the aptitude to being in the many can be ascribed neither to the nature found in singulars nor to the nature considered absolutely. However, comparatively to Suárez, this ontological insufficiency on the level of the actually existent nature (though compensated on the level of the non-actual hylemorphic principles) can be taken as being in agreement with Poinot's conceptualist approach to the issue of the ontological assessment of the first objective intention.⁵³⁶ The ontological import of the extrinsic denomination as analyzed by Poinot is evidence thereof.

The Dominican situates his theory of the extrinsic denomination between two extreme positions. On the one hand, there is Gabriel Vázquez and Durandus of Saint-Pourçain (about ca. 1270–1334) who unqualifiedly claim that the extrinsic denomination (for Durandus, at least, in the case of the intellect's denomination) equals to a being of reason (*aliquid rationis*). On the other hand, there is Suárez for whom the extrinsic denomination, as we have seen, is something real (*aliquid reale*). For him the *denominatio extrinseca* as such is capable of bringing about its effect *without* the immediate production of a being of reason. Although Poinot agrees (against Durandus) that the extrinsic denomination cannot be the form constitutive of a being of reason since it can pertain to real beings as well,⁵³⁷ he adds another important aspect necessarily “concurrent” in the constitution of the ontological import of the *denominatio extrinseca*. It is not only the form, i.e., the formal concept called *ratio denominans*, what constitutes the “essence” of the extrinsic denomination, but integrally also the *application* of that form to the denominated thing. Admittedly, the vision of a wall is nothing but a real form (accident) in the eye. However, when conjoined with this application, by which the form is brought into contact with the denominated subject (*res denominata*), i.e., with the wall seen, it ceases to be a real entity. “To be seen” does not produce anything in the wall; it is not an intrinsic denomination but *only* an extrinsic denomination. Accordingly, the extrinsic denomination must be considered as being productive of beings of reason insofar as it is considered with reference to something caused by it “in” the denominated thing. Apart from those two factors constituting the act of extrinsic

536. As regards this comparison of Poinot and Suárez see also Heider 2013.

537. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 2, art. 1 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 285–286): “Deinde falsum est universaliter loquendo ens rationis ut sic consistere in sola denominatione cogniti. Nam ista denominatio vel est forma constituens ens rationis, vel est id, quod suscipit formationem entis rationis. Primum esse non potest, cum denominatio ista etiam cadere possit super entia realia, quae denominantur cognita, nec tamen hac denominatione formantur in entia rationis, quia ficta non redduntur.”

denomination, i.e., the mental act and the thing denominated, one has to allow also for the aspect of the *union* between the denominating form and the denominated thing. This interpretation of the extrinsic denomination construed fundamentally in the manner of the inhesion or inherence of a form in a subject (whiteness inhering in a wall) seems to be the decisive reason why Poinso evaluates the extrinsic denomination as a being of reason. Since the property “to be seen” (or any other denomination such as “to be known” or “to be willed”) does not inhere in a wall in the way whiteness inheres in it, the *denominatio extrinseca* must be *ipso facto* considered as being *immediately* productive of beings of reason.⁵³⁸

Having endorsed the view that the extrinsic denomination immediately entails the production of beings of reason, Poinso is now confronted with the difficulty of categorizing it. Contrary to Suárez who acknowledges three kinds of beings of reason – negations, privations and rational relations, Poinso acknowledges only two kinds – negations and relations of reason. Beings of reason as the opposite of real beings capable of actual existence can be either positive or negative. While positive beings of reason can only be relations of reason, negations can also be privations removing a form naturally apt to be in a subject from that subject.⁵³⁹ Where does he locate the *denominationes extrinsecae*? In accord with the above-mentioned definition of the *conceptus objectivus* Poinso notes that the extrinsic denomination as such “categorially” belongs to relations of reason. The extrinsic denomination makes the denominated subject dependent on the denominating form. The denominated subject, such as an extramental nature, is made dependent on the denominating form, which is the abstracting act of the intellect, and thus rationally related to it.⁵⁴⁰

A similar difficulty is connected with the classification of the unity of reason or the conceptual unity of precision pertaining, as we know, to the *universale*

538. Ibidem, 289: “... in denominatione ista concurrunt duo, scilicet ipsa forma ut ratio denominans, et adiacentia seu applicatio eius ad denominatum ut conditio. Et quantum ad ipsam formam, manifestum est esse aliquid reale, sicut visio, qua paries denominatur visus, realis forma est in oculo; applicatio tamen eius, ut tangit subiectum denominatum, non est aliquid reale, quia nihil in ipso pariete ponit.” The objection, not answered by Poinso, is why the above-mentioned model of inherence is to be thought of as the only possible and determinative one in the evaluation of the ontological import of an extrinsic denomination. Why not take into account the model of *adhesion* which apparently does not entail the immediate formation of a being of reason? For this critique (close to that of Suárez) see 4.4.1.

539. Ibidem, 287–288.

540. Ibidem, 289: “Et si inquiras, ad quod membrum huius divisionis pertineat denominatio extrinseca, quando concipitur ut ens rationis, *respondetur* pertinere ad relationem, quia non concipitur ut efficiens negando et tollendo formam, sed ordinando et dependendo ab eo, unde sumitur denominatio ...”

metaphysicum. It seems that it can be neither a negation nor a relation of reason. It may be argued that it is not a relation since it is something absolute. It cannot be a negation, either, since unity, as Aquinas says,⁵⁴¹ designates something positive.⁵⁴² Poinsoot replies that *ex parte obiecti pro formali* this unity of precision pertains to a negation or privation because it is nothing but the intellectual segregation of what is common to many instances of the same species from what is individual. As such it is a being of reason, especially if this separation is conceived in the manner of being (*per modum entis*). When Aquinas says that a unity is only something positive, two aspects (introduced already above in 3.3.2) must be distinguished – the material aspect and the formal aspect. While materially it is of positive character, formally it equals to a negation of division. Poinsoot thus concludes that *aliquid rationis* is already found in the metaphysical universal that is one and non-repugnant to being in the many. Nevertheless, this *universale* is not called the logical universal since it is not a second intention yet.⁵⁴³

3. One may insist that Poinsoot, not differently from Suárez, still makes substantial use of the distinction between the two elements inherent in the make-up of the extrinsic denomination – the denominating form and the denominated subject on the one hand, and the application of the *ratio denominans* to the *subjectum denominatum* on the other. Therefore, one may object that the doctrinal difference between Suárez and Poinsoot I am introducing is not a genuine one. I do not want to deny that Poinsoot knows this distinction. Such denial would clearly lead to the denial of the conception that beings of reason have a foundation in the thing, proper to all moderately realistic conceptions including that of Poinsoot. However, what I want to say is that the overall tenor of Poinsoot's epistemology and metaphysics

541. In this context Poinsoot mentions the *locus communis* from Aquinas, *STh.* 1, q. 11, a. 1, *corpus*. Surely, Poinsoot has the following passage in mind: “Et inde est, quod unumquodque, sicut custodit suum esse, ita custodit suam unitatem.” URL: <http://www.corpusthomicum.org/sth1003.html>. It would not make much sense to say that every being protects something negative. On transcendental unity as a real positive property of being as such in Aquinas see Svoboda 2012d.

542. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 2, art. 1 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 289).

543. Ibidem, 289–290: “... unitas rationis ex parte obiecti pro formali pertinet ad negationem seu privationem, quia nihil aliud est quam segregatio eius, in quo est convenientia a pluribus facientibus differentiam ... in universali metaphysico, quod solum dicit naturam abstractam et per modum unius conceptam, ut seq. quaest. dicemus, iam invenitur aliquid rationis, scilicet id, quod ex vi abstractionis convenit naturae repraesentatae seu cognitae, id est unitas sive aptitudo ut non repugnantia ad essendum in pluribus. Ista enim negationes aliquid rationis sunt, sed non sunt formaliter secundae intentiones, quae in relatione consistunt fundata in naturis sic abstractis. Dicitur autem universale sic abstractum metaphysicum, non logicum, quia non omne ens rationis formaliter et directe pertinet ad Logicam, sed secunda intentio ...”

of universals makes this distinction less operative than it is in Suárez. The operative marginalization of this distinction is confirmed by Poinso's teaching on the formation of beings of reason as well.

Reserving the constitution of beings of reason to the intellectual power,⁵⁴⁴ Poinso at first, contrary to Suárez, affirms that the cognition forming a being of reason is not the reflexive knowledge considering the being of reason as a thing (*quod*) known, but already the *direct* cognition denominating *in actu exercito* a non-being or what is not a real relation in the manner of a real being or a real relation or as if it (*per modum*) were a real relation. The reflexive knowledge denominating a being of reason as *quod* thus is not what *primarily* and *formally* constitutes the being of reason. It assumes an already formed being of reason. The reflexive cognition is thus related to those previously formed beings of reason only speculatively and extrinsically.⁵⁴⁵ It only mirrors what is already formally there. Poinso corroborates this statement by the illustrative example of God's cognition of Peter's knowledge of second intentions. When God knows Peter's syllogisms, He does not thereby generate beings of reasons belonging to the third mental operation. God does not produce them since He only cognizes that the being of reason has already been formed by Peter. He only acknowledges that they have objective being as *quod* in Peter's syllogising mind. The divine knowledge of Peter's logical intentions is related to them only denominatively or extrinsically. Mutatis mutandis, the same can be said about Peter's own reflexive cognition of his syllogisms.⁵⁴⁶

It is also important to note that Poinso explicitly distinguishes between *ens rationis formaliter* and *ens rationis fundamentaliter*.⁵⁴⁷ While the fundamental being

544. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 2, art. 4 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 301–302).

545. Ibidem, 304: "Cognitio formans ens rationis non est reflexa respiciens ipsum tamquam rem cognitam ut quod, sed illa cognitio directa, quae ipsum non ens reale vel quod realiter relativum non est, denominat cognitum ad instar entis vel relationis realis, dicitur formare vel ex illa resultare ens rationis. Ratio est manifesta, quia talis cognitio, qua ipsum ens rationis denominatur cognitum reflexe et tamquam *quod*, supponit ens rationis formatum, siquidem super ipsum fertur tamquam super terminum cognitum. Ergo talis cognitio reflexa non primo format ipsum, sed supponit formatum et quasi speculator ipsum ens rationis."

546. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 2, art. 5 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 307): "Ex eo, quod Deus intelligit entia rationis ut formata a nostro intellectu, non dicitur ea formare, neque ex vi illius cognitionis talia entia rationis formaliter et per se dicuntur esse ... Deus autem quando cognoscit entia rationis formata a me, supponit illa existere per talem formationem et cognoscit illa ut obiectum iam formatum et praesuppositum ut quod."

547. Ibidem, 311: "Esse autem cognitum, quod ex tali cognitione resultat, est denominatio extrinseca, quae non est ens rationis formaliter, sed fundamentaliter ..." On the different evaluation of objective being in Suárez and Poinso see also Kobusch 1987, 210–214. Kobusch explains Poinso's revision of Suárez's theory of being of reason and objective being by reference to the

of reason coming into existence by the direct abstractive act separating the universal nature from individuation can be identified with the *universale metaphysicum*, the formal being of reason arising by the collation of the abstracted nature to its terms (inferiors) is justifiably recognizable as the logical universal.

It is not inappropriate to assume that the above-mentioned distinction between direct and reflexive cognition, applied by Poinsoot in the case of God's knowledge of Peter's syllogisms to formal beings of reason such as second intentions,⁵⁴⁸ can also be applied to the fundamental beings of reason. Direct and reflexive acts can be distinguished on this level as well.⁵⁴⁹ Analogically to the formation of beings of reason in the formal sense conceived directly *in actu exercito*, the fundamental beings of reason, such as the metaphysical universals, are also formed immediately by direct cognitive (abstractive) acts. One may say that, contrary to Suárez for whom the abstractive act seems to be, after all, more rooted in the extramental things (ontologically underpinned by his "nominalizing" Scotism), Poinsoot's abstraction carried out by the agent intellect transfers the materially quiddity promptly into the domain of (though only fundamental) intentional being.

Despite this difference, the divergence in the issue of the ontological status of the metaphysical universal is not fundamental. Rather than an essential difference it is a difference *in accent*. As a matter of fact, both authors retain the crucial assumption typical of moderate realism that it is the quiddity as being universally denominated what is *retained* in the intentional transfer from the state of particularization to the state of universality. Both agree that formally the universality of the nature is not part of the extramental world. The difference consists only in the fact – leaving aside the primordial intellectual cognition of material singulars – that the Suarezian potential intellect first attains the real natures in the extramental things themselves (if they exist) by means of formal abstraction. That is the case largely due to not only his direct epistemological realism but also to his ontology of universals. The nature in itself, even *in re*, has its own formal unity with the remote non-repugnancy to being in the many. The realistic aspect of Suárez's conception of the *denominatio extrinseca*, in remarkable coherence with his ontology,

Thomist's critique of the nominalist aspects in the Jesuit's doctrine ("... Johannes das nominalistische Moment in der Lehre des Suarez kritisch im Auge hat ...", *ibidem*, 211). This rationale, nevertheless, can be misleading. Two meanings of this claim should be distinguished. If what Kobusch means by "the nominalist moment" is epistemological nominalism eliminating intermediary entities between the subjective cognitive acts and the extramental objects, I agree. However, if he has the ontological dimension in mind, I do not.

548. For this application see 3.5.2.

549. This conclusion is also consistent with Dalbiez's general appraisal of *esse obiectivum* in Thomism: "pour les thomistes, l'esse obiectivum n'est qu'un être de raison." Dalbiez 1929, 465.

seems to be inhibited in Poinso. For him the intellect, rather than apprehending the quidditative content realized directly in the extramental thing, conceives this nature *immediately* with its metaphysical or absolute universality.⁵⁵⁰ Again, this conclusion seems to be in agreement with Poinso's ontological assumption denying that the particularized natures in extramental (actual) things have community and non-repugnance to being in the many.

3.5 *Universale logicum*

The essence of universality consists in relation. It is not a real relation because as the second objective intention it is not founded in real features of extramental things but in the things insofar as they are cognized, i.e., in their objective being. The form or *ratio* of universality cannot be a real form. If it were, one would be obliged to consider the relation of the superior nature to its inferiors already in the extramental things themselves. That would lead to the affirmation of the extramental existence of formal universality. However, this ultrarealist tenet is decisively rejected both by Suárez and Poinso.⁵⁵¹ Genus or species as examples of second intentions are not concepts signifying immediately an extramental reality but relations of reason dealt with by logic.⁵⁵² Even though remotely they are grounded in the natures of things and thus constitute beings of reason with a foundation in the thing, their proximate foundation is only the thing *qua* known.⁵⁵³

The objective second intentions cannot be extrinsic denominations, either. (I leave aside the formal second intentions which are second acts of the intellect considering the cognized and abstracted nature.) We have observed that the extrinsic denomination and its "product", i.e., the first objective intention contemplated in the formal concept or in the mental word, are presupposed as the necessary

550. This claim is, no doubt, in accord with the above-mentioned concurrency of the aspect of the *ratio denominans* and the aspect of its application to the *res denominata*.

551. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 2, art. 2 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 292).

552. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 4, art. 2 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 349).

553. The proximate foundation of the second intentions or the logical relations, which is the nature in objective being, must be distinguished from relations of reason which are not proximately grounded in the second state of things, i.e., in their being known. The relation of "being Creator" does not denominate God absolutely as being known. It denominates Him in the state of existence independently of cognition. The same holds for the denominations "to be judge" or "to be doctor". Admittedly, these denominations require cognition which causes them, but this cognition does not constitute the subject in cognitive being, which is the only state in which they can take these denominations on. See Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 2, art. 2 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 291).

foundation for the logical rational relations. Even though according to Poinsoť extrinsic denominations are said to be beings of reason, relatively to second intentions they are nevertheless designated as *fundamental* beings of reason. The difference is also confirmed by Poinsoť' s claim that the relation of the first intentions to the inferior natures, being a relation to them as to the term(s) *a quo*, is different from that of the logical universal related to them as to the term(s) *ad quem*.⁵⁵⁴

In the following subsections I examine two common issues regarding the logical universal. First, I expound Poinsoť' s view of the ordering of the two essential features of universality, "being in" (*esse in*) and "being said of" (*dici de*), introduced by Aristotle in his definition of *universale*.⁵⁵⁵ Second, I lay out Poinsoť' s theory of the comparative act accountable for the production of the logical universal.

3.5.1 The "quiddity" of the logical universal: *Esse in* or *dici de*?

Considering the candidates for the "essence" of the logical universal, Poinsoť (much like Suárez) allows for a quartet of possibilities determined by the two features of universality, i.e., by "being in" and "being said of". Apart from the distinction between "being in the many" and "being said of the many", he takes into account their actual and aptitudinal (dispositional) dimension. Accordingly, one obtains the following two pairs of distinctions: "aptitudinal being in the many"/"actual being in the many" and "aptitudinal being said of the many"/"actual being said of the many".

Poinsoť makes clear that the essence of the logical universal, which is a kind of second intention, does not consist in actual predication or in the composition and division of comparative attribution, i.e., in the second mental operation, but in the simple relation proper to the first mental operation without the actual inclusion of the nature in its inferiors. The logical universal thus equals to the aptitude to being predicated of the many. This aptitude is not one pertaining to the metaphysical universal, characterized by the non-repugnancy to being in the many, but it is a positive relation to them.⁵⁵⁶

554. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 4, art. 2 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 352).

555. As stated in Chapter 1, Aristotle's formulations concerning the definition of universal are not without ambiguities. While in *On Interpretation* 7 the Stagirite says that the nature of universals is being apt to be predicated (17a38–b2), in *Posterior Analytics* I. 4 he says that "By a 'universal' attribute I mean one which belongs as 'predicated of all' to its subject ..." (73b26–27); finally in *Metaphysics* Z, 13 he claims that universal is that, which by nature *actually* appertains to several things (1038b12–13).

556. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 3, art. 5 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 335): "Universale logicum sive pro secunda intentione non consistit in comparatione attributionis

This conclusion explicitly rejects two options listed above. It is the “actual being in” considered in the way of the inclusion of the nature in its inferiors,⁵⁵⁷ and the “actual being said of” corresponding to actual predication. In his justification of the second elimination Poinso asserts that every act is preceded by potentiality. However, if an act is preceded by potency, so actual predication must be preceded by predicability. Potential predication thus is to be conceived as prior to actual one. In order to distinguish this aptitudinal predication from the metaphysical universal Poinso also claims that the mere non-repugnancy to being in the many (proper to the *universale metaphysicum*) is not immediately predicable of its inferiors, because this predicability requires more and this “more” is the positive relation to its inferiors as to the terms *ad quem*.⁵⁵⁸

For the same reason Poinso also rejects the opinion which defines the *universale logicum* by means of the actual inclusion of the superior nature in its inferiors. Poinso affirms that prior to the actual identification and the actual being in the many, the formal universal must be *apt* to be in the many. Obviously, the aptitude of the *universale* does not concern only the aptitude to being said of the many but also the aptitude to be in the many. There must be the aptitudinal identification with the many, which must be taken into account in the *definiens* of the logical universal. Moreover, the actual inclusion of the *universale* cannot be thought of without the contraction to the *inferiora*. However, this determination, actually the reverse process to abstraction, dissolves the aptitude to being in the many since it necessarily resolves abstraction. As a result, as stated in 3.3.2 and 3.3.3, by the process of contraction the nature’s indifference to being in the many gets lost. The positive relation to being in the many, which is the essential feature of the formal universal, can be retained only with abstraction and with the positive relation to them. When the universal is contracted, this relation is lost as well.⁵⁵⁹

sive praedicationis, sed simplicis relationis seu ordinis sine inclusione actuali in inferioribus. Itaque ipsa aptitudo ad praedicandum de multis ut positive respiciens inferiora universale logicum est.”

557. The relevance of this rejection becomes apparent in the next chapter when the conception of Mastri/Belluto is presented. See especially 4.5.2 and 4.5.3.

558. Ibidem, 336.

559. Ibidem, 336: “... inclusio actualis in multis non potest intelligi sine contractione actuali in illis; siquidem non includitur actu in singularibus nisi eo modo, quo est in illis ut contractum et determinatum in quolibet singulari, cum quo identificetur, non autem est ut indifferens ad plura in quolibet singulari, ergo identificatur et includitur in illis mediante contractione. Sed prius universale est contrahibile in multis quam contractum actu, ergo prius quam inclusum actu.” See also Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 4, art. 2 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 351) and Log. p. 2, q. 5, art. 1 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 356).

To the objection that the character of the inferior natures themselves is constituted only in virtue of the actual inclusion of the superiors in them – without the actual inclusion one cannot talk about the superior nature's being related to the inferiors – Poinsoot replies that the actual inclusion is entirely inappropriate for the distinction between the superior and the inferior nature. *In re* the inferior natures cannot be said to actually include the superiors because of their utter identification with them. By this identification the inferiors are related to the superior nature identically and not formally insofar as they are inferiors.⁵⁶⁰ The *facit* of this reply is clear. Poinsoot's emphasis on the particularization of the natures in the thing leads to the conclusion that only the "aptitudinal being in the many", and not "actual being in the many", can be regarded as the essential feature of the *universale logicum*.

While the aptitudinal being in the many constitutes the essence of the logical universal, the aptitudinal being said of the many, or predicability, is only a quasi-property of universality (*quasi passio universalitatis*). The root of predicability is the *real* identity of the extremes. There cannot be true predication employing concepts which extramentally are not one and the same thing. Therefore, predicability must have its root in the *intentional* aptitude to being in the many. Predicability thus "emanates" from the aptitude to being in the many, which is the essence of the logical universal.⁵⁶¹

3.5.2 Formation of the logical universal

The issue of the psychogenesis of the logical universal can be regarded as an instructive corollary to the issues of both the essence of the *universale logicum* and the formation of the metaphysical universal.⁵⁶² I have said that while the metaphysical universal is formed by an absolute act of the intellect, the logical universal is established by a comparative or collative act of the potential intellect.

From what has been said so far it is clear that the comparative act constitutive of the logical universal cannot be identical with actual predication. As such it is formed only by the collative act belonging to the first mental operation. Since the actual "being in" is preceded by the aptitudinal identification of the superior nature

560. See Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 3, art. 5 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 336).

561. Ibidem, 336: "Praedicabilitas seu relatio ad plura in ratione praedicandi est quasi passio universalitatis, quae est relatio ad essendum in pluribus."

562. The issue of the formation of the logical universal is treated in the second article of the fourth question of *De causa universalis* called *Utrum universale metaphysicum in actu cognitum fiat per actum absolutum intellectus, et universale logicum per comparativum*.

with its inferiors, the act formative of the logical universal cannot be a comparative inclusion either. Poinso declines the opinion, advocated by his less known companion from the university in Alcalá, Ioannes González Martínez (d. 1656),⁵⁶³ for whom the metaphysical universal originates by negative abstraction (abstraction omitting that from which it abstracts) and the logical universal by positive abstraction (abstraction recognizing not only what is separated but also that from which it is abstracted). For Martínez the act of positive abstraction apprehends the specific nature as *being included in the inferiors* and at the same time as being conceptually distinct from the individual differences. Even though this kind of abstraction prescind from those differences, it does not abstract the superior from the inferiors themselves because it is included in them.⁵⁶⁴

In consistence with his definition of the *universale logicum* Poinso rejects Martínez's opinion. Positive abstraction does not give rise to the logical universal but only to the metaphysical universal.⁵⁶⁵ In abstraction the term, from which one abstracts, is apprehended not as the term *ad quem* but only as the term *a quo*, i.e., as what is left by the abstractive act. Positive abstraction consists in the mere stripping of the nature from the inferiors and as such is treated by metaphysics, not by logic. The logician captures the natures always with the supervening intentions of universality directed at their inferiors.⁵⁶⁶

The positive part of Poinso's opinion on the psychogenesis of the *universale logicum* is thus established. The logical universal comes to existence by an act of simple apprehension, by means of which the nature is cognized with respect to its inferiors.⁵⁶⁷ The aptitude to being in the many constituted by the absolute act

563. For brief information on Martínez (d. 1656), professor of theology at the University in Alcalá in 1632–1641 and a strong adversary of Thomists, see Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, vol. 3, *Index Personarum* (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 486).

564. As regards Poinso's report on Martínez's conception see Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT Log.* p. 2, q. 4, art. 2 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 348). See also Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT, Log.* p. 2, q. 3, art. 5 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 334): "[U]niversale logicum qua universale est unum, qua logicum in multis, non vero solum sine multis. Hoc autem esse in multis respectus est ad illa multa. Sed iste respectus non potest esse, nisi in illis includatur natura, siquidem non potest intelligi, quod respiciat alterum, nisi ipsum alterum cogitetur ... sine inclusione superioris non cogitantur; igitur respectus ad inferiora inclusionem petit in illis."

565. *Ibidem*, 348.

566. *Ibidem*, 350: "Universale logicum seu relativum et secunda eius intentio fit per actum comparativum, non per modum compositionis vel iudicii nec per modum inclusionis in inferioribus ..." See also *ibidem*, 348–349.

567. *Ibidem*, 350: "Universale logicum ... fit ... per modum simplicis apprehensionis, qua cognoscitur natura cum ordine et respectu ad inferiora."

cannot be identified with the aptitude proper to the relational logical universal. As every relation, a rational relation is not something absolute. The essence of relation as such consists neither in the relation according to being said (*relatio secundum dici*) nor in transcendental relation. The essence of relation is to be identified with the ontological relation (*relatio secundum esse*). Its essence consists in being *ad aliud*. Relation, which in Poinso's semiotics is predicated *univocally* of real and rational relations⁵⁶⁸ and therefore is a key ontological category in his system, requires a comparative act.⁵⁶⁹

568. On the basics of Poinso's ontology of signs, based on the assumption of the univocity of real and rational relations, see Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 21, art. 1 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 646–655). Contrary to Poinso, Suárez denies the univocal character of relation for real and rational relations. For him, as in the case of real and rational beings in general, there is only an improper analogy of proportionality between them. See Suárez *DM XLVII*, s. 3, n. 3 (Vivès, vol. 26: 794). For John Deely, an assiduous apologist of Poinso, it is "... precisely the essential univocity of relation in the two orders that creates, first, the very possibility of a mind-dependent order of being, and, consequently, the ground of semiosis among the higher animals, this view of Suarez as it applies to the particular case of relations removes entirely the possibility of working out a doctrine of signs." Deely 1985, 44, note 2. For partial agreement with this evaluation from an expert on Suárez see Doyle 1987, 132–133.

569. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 4, art. 2 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 350 and 353–354). The essentially relational character of the logical universal and its significance for cognitive realism is pointed out also in Rasmussen 1994, 420–423. Even though Suárez shares Poinso's distinction between the absolute and the comparative acts of the intellect, it seems (as already stated in 2.5.4) that the Jesuit's exposition, after all, blurs this distinction. Some of Suárez's formulations indicate that reflexive knowledge of the abstracted nature leads *eo ipso* to the constitution of the formal universal, which is far from Poinso's opinion. See *DA* 9, 3, 21: "Cum ergo in natura abstracte cognita duo sint, scilicet natura et abstractio naturae, intellectus directa operatione cognoscit naturam ipsam, tamen quia virtutem habet reflectendi, non sistit in cognitione naturae, sed ulterius transit et considerat modum quem illa natura habet, et ab ipso intellectu est cognita, et invenit illam denudatam ab omni contractione, et illam denudationem quasi formam quamdam in illa natura considerat, ratione cuius respicit illa natura plura inferiora a quibus est abstracta. Et haec vocatur notitia comparativa, seu secunda intentio formalis; natura vero, ut sic cognita, vocatur secunda intentio obiectiva." [italics; D.H.]. Poinso's emphasis on the form of relation or the (second) intention itself is observable also in his exposition of the definition of the predicable of genus. The *definiens* of genus is neither the aggregate of the subject (nature) and the intention of genus, nor the nature itself being the subject of the intention, but it is primarily the second intention of genus connotating the subject. See Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 7, art. 2 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 393–394). It seems to me that Suárez's nebulous formulations about the formation of the metaphysical and the logical universal are also the reason, why Mastri/Belluto think that the Jesuit claims the absolute universal to be the formal universal. On this issue see 4.5.2 and 4.5.3. I am no less certain that Poinso's emphasis on the relational character of the logical universal and its specific weakening in Suárez is ultimately determined by their different ontology of relations. While for Suárez there is only a

In consistence with his doctrine of the act by which beings of reason in general are formed, also in the context of the specification of the cause of the *universale logicum*, Poinso distinguishes the twofold cognition of the nature as compared to its inferiors. The relation of the cognized nature to its terms can be known either reflexively (*in actu signato*) or concomitantly (*in actu exercito*).⁵⁷⁰ Defining this reflexive cognition Poinso says that it is characterized by the attribution of the rational relation to the cognized nature as to the subject denominated by that attribution. In conclusion Poinso declares that this reflexive act is not the comparative act he is looking for. It is not the act by which the logical universal actually comes to be. This attribution is not the formal consideration toward a term (*esse ad*) because that attribution is primarily related not to its terms but to the *subject* in which the relation inheres. The attribution of the relation to the cognized nature in the reflexive act is thus the consideration of the relation in the second and less important aspect, which is its “being in” (*esse in*). It is less important since the aspect of inherence of accidents in a subject is not what the essence of the logical universal consists in. In fact, it is the aspect *common* to all the accidents. By this aspect “being in a subject” (*esse in alio*) accidents are distinguished only from the substance existing *per se*, not among one another. Accordingly, Poinso concludes that this reflexive act positing relation in the subject presupposes the rational relation of the logical universal constituted already by the comparative act *in actu exercito*.⁵⁷¹

3.6 Summary

Poinso’s theory of universals and Suárez’s doctrine share the features of moderate realism. There are natures in things denominated by acts of the intellect, the conceptual content of which is maintained and transferred from the extramental plane to the intramental level of our concepts. The natures are neither reducible to sets of individuals nor can they exist as properly universal separately from the singulars or as actually universal in them. Just as Suárez, Poinso accepts the basic

conceptual distinction between the foundation of the relation and the form of the relation itself and the relation as such is conceived basically as the connotation of a term, for Poinso there is a real (namely, modal) distinction between the foundation (*res*) and the relation itself (*modus*), and no matter how minimal reality (*esse minimum et debilissimum*) it displays, it possesses its own reality. For Suárez’s theory see esp. *DM* XLVII, s. 2, n. 22 (Vivès, vol. 26: 792). For Poinso’s doctrine see Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 17, art. 4 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 510–515).

570. See Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 4, art. 1 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 347).

571. *Ibidem*, 351.

framework of the theory of the triple universal. The three kinds of universal are different states of the same nature, the first two of which, i.e., the material and the metaphysical universal, ground the fully-fledged universality of the logical or relational universal. Poinso's construal of the logical universal founded in intelligibile reality exhibits several nontrivial agreements with Suárez.

Starting with the metaphysical foundation on the level of the singular and of extramental reality, Suárez and Poinso (1) decisively reject the Scotistic formal distinction in order to adopt the virtual distinction in its intrinsic "vestment". Just this type of distinction enters the metaphysical make-up of a thing structured by the *gradus metaphysici* corresponding to the predicates of the Tree of Porphyry. (2) In consequence of that, both take an anti-Scotistic stance while rejecting the extramental nature's formal unity *common* to the many. Rather than the unity, they opt for vocabulary of essential similarity of things of the same species. (3) Apart from their defense of the *praecisio objectiva* of the intellect, they also agree that the metaphysical and the logical universal are formed only by the intellect and never by the sensory powers. (4) Both of them distinguish between the absolute and the comparative act of the intellect. While the former is accountable for the formation of the metaphysical universal, the latter constitutes the logical universal. (5) Both agree as far as the synthesis of both kinds of *universale* is concerned. One of them, the metaphysical universal, is the foundation of the other, the logical universal. (6) They accept the fourfold division of the intellectual intentions and identify the logical universal with the second objective intention. They also both reject the elimination of the objective concepts in favour of the operations of the intellect advocated by Hurtado. (7) Within the discussion on the *universale logicum* they both posit its "essence" in the feature of *esse in*, more precisely, in its aptitudinal semblance, making predicability, i.e., the aptitudinal *dici de*, to be its property.

At first sight, the long list of the doctrinal agreements seems to suggest that their ontologico-logical theories of universals are identical. However, such conclusion would be a hasty one. One of the main motives for the analysis was to introduce an interpretation pointing to differences between the particular versions of moderate realism. A closer look at both theories reveals differences which are due to deep divergence in metaphysical assumptions. In particular, they concern the metaphysical options connected with issues such as the essence/existence of created beings, the relationship of *esse* to subsistence, the question of hylemorphism and, last but not least, the problem of individuation. Tersely speaking, although Suárez rejects the formal distinction just as Poinso does, he retains many features of Scotistic metaphysics.⁵⁷²

572. This conclusion is fully substantiated at the end of the next chapter focusing on Mastri's/Belluto's doctrine.

The analysis has shown that two doctrinal differences are of utmost importance. (1) Comparatively to Suárez, Poinot's teaching on the *universale materialiter sumptum* (especially if one takes into account only what is said in his *Logic*) – and, due to say, contrary to the dominant interpretation – has been evaluated as ontologically “deficient”. Contrary to Suárez, Poinot deprives the extramental nature not only of the negative community but also of the aptitude to being in the many. He reserves the former for the nature absolutely (solitarily) considered. By this Poinot appears to work with the remote foundation of the extramental nature significantly less than Suárez who explicitly takes into account the remote aptitude to being in the many of formal unity *in re*. Poinot expressly places the nature as such in the realm of the actual non-being of the nevertheless real principles (existent only within actual wholes). This is what makes his statements about the unity and the disposition to being in the many of the extramental nature fully intelligible. (2) The ontological “deficiency” is compensated by Poinot's views introduced in the texts discussing the issues of individuation, hylemorphism, subsistence and existence, found chiefly in the *CPTs* volume on natural philosophy and in the first volume of the *CT*. There the entity of the nature is not analyzed in relation to its *actual* existence in the things or in the mind but as it were “pre-existentially”, i.e., in the form of (in themselves) purely “non-existent” principles. Apart from the non-particular character of the substantial form, Poinot can also be construed as admitting a *real* or, more precisely, a modal distinction between the nature and its individuating supposit. This conception is supplemented by the assumptions of individuation by the *materia signata quantitate* and of a real distinction between the essence and *esse*, including marked involvement of subsistence in the individuation of the essences of material substances. All these assumptions, as I have shown, are unambiguously rejected by Suárez.

Dissension with Suárez's standpoint is observable in Poinot's epistemology and cognitive psychology as well. Even though both employ the same conceptual tools, the particular elements of their build-up take on different meanings in a reinterpretation according to the diverse doctrinal assumptions. Poinot does not share Suárez's methodology of eliminating real distinctions wherever possible. Quite on the contrary, the Dominican retains the real distinction in many cases, however, interpreted not as two *res* but as two distinct principles (*quo*). First of all, the differences concern two aspects of the intentional species, both enabling Poinot to conceive the union of the apprehensive power with the intentional species considered in the representative aspect as a kind of cognitive union more intimate than the one between matter and form. The real distinction between the agent and the potential intellect and between the intellectual act and the mental word leading to the statement that concepts are “that, in which” (*id in quo*) also suggest Poinot's divergence from Suárez. Nevertheless, even though Suárez eliminates many of

the Thomistic real distinctions, there is an anthropological tenet in which Suárez seems to be less “Ockhamian” than Poinot. It is the question of the relationship of the soul and the body. Poinot does not share the implicit “angelization” of the human intellect found in Suárez. On the contrary, he emphasizes the continuity and subordination between the sensory and the intellectual powers by stressing the role of the interior senses. This emphasis on the substantial unity of body and soul also facilitates the causal concurrence of phantasms and the agent intellect in the production of the intelligible species.

Two differences based on this cognitive background are immediately relevant for the issue of universals. (1) In direct connection with the theory of the principle of individuation, Poinot rejects Suárez’s claim that the embodied intellect cognizes a material singular prior to the material quiddity. The material singular can only be traced after the apprehension of the material quiddity by means of reflexive cognition. The different epistemological point of departure has to do with different conceptions and functions of the agent intellect. Simply speaking, for Poinot the agent intellect is more important than for Suárez. Its role cannot be restricted to the mere spiritualization of the sensible species (as it is in Suárez), but it must be basically open to universalization as well. In order to distinguish the intellect from the sensory powers, one has to take into consideration their different ways of representation. Contrary to Suárez, Poinot states that the universal cannot be cognized by the potential intellect without the previous abstraction of the intelligible universal species produced by the agent intellect. (2) Laying the emphasis on the intramental *esse objectivum* in human cognition, Poinot arrives at a different evaluation of the ontological import of the *denominatio extrinseca*. Beings of reason – both fundamental and formal ones – are brought about not only when the reflexive act of the intellect conceives something as *quod*, that is not a real being as if it were a real being, but already prior to that reflexive operation. Seen from the viewpoint of the immediate production of *esse rationis* by the extrinsic denomination, Poinot lays greater emphasis on the aspect of being of reason in the issue of the metaphysical universal than Suárez. Poinot’s doctrine of the *universale metaphysicum* thus can be designated as, in a way, more conceptualist than that of Suárez or, in other terms, as an instance of what Larry Hickman calls “rationalist conceptualism” as compared to the Jesuit’s “realist conceptualism”.⁵⁷³

With a few exceptions I have completely left aside the broad and already well-explored issue of Poinot’s semiotics, which no doubt complements his theory of

573. This conclusion is not entirely shared by Hickman, who in the issue of the ontology of first intentions puts Suárez and Poinot in the same group of the so-called “realist conceptualist”. See Hickman 1980, 47. In this regard Hickman’s classification is in need of correction.

cognition. Due to the unavailability of Suárez's logical texts,⁵⁷⁴ this book focuses on the *universale in essendo*, *universale in repraesentando* and (to a certain degree) also on the *universale in praedicando* and not primarily on the *universale in significando*. However, one comment regarding Poinot's semiotics should be made here. Poinot's semiotics, including his theory of concepts as formal signs,⁵⁷⁵ is based on the concept of relation according to being. By this relation a concept is wholly carried to the extramental signified thing. The essentially relational character of signs is in general ontologically underpinned by Poinot's claim of the univocal character of real and rational relations. This claim is not shared by Suárez, among others, because of his reductionist account of relation. If I may offer a historiographical hypothesis, it seems to me that this trait of Poinot's thought was largely formed under the influence of Suárez. Suárez appears to be the author accountable for Poinot's extensive elaboration of the theory of signs. I believe that Poinot's detailed elaboration of semiotics serves to compensate for those features of his epistemology which from Suárez's viewpoint can be seen as unwelcome traces of representationalism and mentalism. Poinot's theory of signs gives us clear evidence of the priority of the extramental object over possible intramental intermediaries, whether ideas or images. What is directly apprehended are not intramental intermediaries but the extramental objects, because concepts *qua* formal signs carry us immediately to the things themselves.

574. That does not mean that in his voluminous *Opera omnia* Suárez has left no thoughts on the theory of signs. Especially in the introduction to sacramental theology in his *Commentaria ac disputationes in tertiam partem Divi Thomae*, in: *Opera omnia*, vol. 20, q. 60, disp. 1–3 (Paris 1860, 1–64) one can find a significant portion of his semiotics. On Suárez's semiotics in the context of interpreting law see Doyle 2010.

575. On the question whether a concept is a formal sign see Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 22, art. 2 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 707–712).

Bartolomeo Mastri da Meldola (1602–1673)/ Bonaventura Belluto (1600–1676) on universals

4.1 Universals in *Cursus ad mentem Scoti*

The most detailed elaboration of the issue of universals in Mastri's/Belluto's *corpus* is contained in the 9th disputation *De natura communi, seu universali* in the second part of the *Metaphysics*, the fifth volume of the *Philosophiae ad mentem Scoti cursus integer*.⁵⁷⁶ As part of the second volume devoted to *Metaphysics*, this exposition is anticipated by the earlier and much more concise treatment in the 4th disputation *De universalibus in communi* in the *Logic*, the first volume of the Course.⁵⁷⁷ The important segment frequently quoted in the discussion of the 9th metaphysical disputation is found also in the preceding 8th metaphysical disputation *De entis finiti essentia, & existentia*, especially in the 6th question *Qualis, & quanta distinctio versetur inter gradus metaphysicos*.⁵⁷⁸ The solution to this issue is systematically and “chronologically” posterior to what the Scotists say in the first volume of their *Metaphysics*, especially in the long 6th disputation *De passionibus simplicibus entis complexis, actu, & potentia; necessario, & contingenti; eodem & diverso*. Of essential significance for the forthcoming analysis is the 11th question *De natura identitatis, & distinctionis formalis, ejusque utilitate*.⁵⁷⁹ In analogy to the treatment of the common nature, the long metaphysical discussion on the question of distinctions has a much more “reader-friendly” counterpart in the *Logic*, in the 2nd article *Quid, & quotuplex sit distinctio* of the 1st disputation *De modi, seu instrumentis sciendi*. Another important correlate to the issue of distinctions is the 16th question *Num praeter precisiones formales etiam objectivae sint admittendae* which testifies how up-to-date the question of *praecisio objectiva/praecisio formalis* was in the first half of the 17th century.⁵⁸⁰

576. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, t. 5 (Venice 1727, 77–137).

577. Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, t. 1 (Venice 1727, 140–159).

578. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, t. 5 (Venice 1727, 58–70).

579. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, t. 4 (Venice 1727, 292–305).

580. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, t. 4 (Venice 1727, 327–336).

Apart from the 9th metaphysical disputation and the 4th logical disputation, the main body of Mastri's/Belluto's doctrine of the psychogenesis of (metaphysical) universality is found in the 7th question *De cognitione universalis, et singularis* and the 8th question *An primo cognoscatur singulare, vel universale, & inter universalia an magis, vel minus universale* of the 6th disputation *De potentiis animae rationalis, & primo de intellectu, ac ejus actibus* in the *Libros de Anima* of the 3rd volume of the *Cursus*.⁵⁸¹ The whole 6th disputation provides the framework for our exposition of the features of Mastri's/Belluto's cognitive theory relevant to the issues of *cognitio singularis* and *cognitio universalis*.

The issue of the *universale logicum*, both its essence and formation, is to be found in the 4th logical disputation. A relatively detailed treatment is provided also by the 9th question *Quid sit unitas universalis, & in quo statu naturae conveniat* of the 9th metaphysical disputation. As part of the enquiry into the logical universal I also *ex professo* consider the 8th question *De praecipua species entis rationis, quae dicitur secunda intentio* of the 3rd logical disputation *De ente rationis, & secundis intentionibus* dealing with the issue of the second intentions as kinds of being of reason.⁵⁸²

As in the previous two chapters I proceed in three main sections corresponding to the gradual constitution of the actual universal (*universale in actu*). In keeping with Suárez and Poinset, Mastri/Belluto conceive the fully-fledged universal as being identical with the logical universal, which is equivalent to a rational relation. Before advancing to the bundle of issues connected with the extramental common nature I present Mastri's/Belluto's classification of the different types of *universale* (4.2). In Section 4.3 devoted to the *universale metaphysicum remotum* or, as they say in the *Metaphysics*, to the *universale physicum* I go through the following issues. The subsection 4.3.1 presents Mastri's/Belluto's rejection of nominalism and Platonism. Then I expound the Scotists' views regarding the issues of the intellectual precision, *distinctio formalis* and the derived question of the nature of the distinction between the metaphysical grades (4.3.2). In 4.3.3 I lay out their seminal concept of the community of the extramental common nature. In the following 4.3.4 I consider the intra-Scotistic dispute over the character of this community. In the last subsection 4.3.5 I approach the issue of the disposition of formal unity in its essential and existential state.

The first subsection of the fourth section called *Universale metaphysicum proximum* examines the question of the character and ontological status of the so-called unity of precision (*unitas praecisionis*). The transition to the issue of the psychogenesis of universal unity is followed by a general outline of the relevant features

581. Mastri/Belluto, *De anima*, t. 3 (Venice 1727, 175–189).

582. Mastri/Belluto, *Logica* (Venice 1727, 135–139).

of Mastri's/Belluto's theory of intellectual (and partly also sensory) knowledge (4.4.2). In 4.4.3 and 4.4.4 I set out Mastri's/Belluto's theories of particular and universal knowledge.

The first subsection of the last section entitled *Universale logicum* presents Mastri's/Belluto's identification of the logical universal with the *universale in actu*. In 4.5.2 I expound Mastri's/Belluto's theory of the unity and community of universal unity. I also take up the issue of the essence of the *universale logicum*. The last subsection 4.5.3 deals with the formation of the *universale logicum*. In the vein of "the *objectum formale quo*" of this book, all expositions are motivated by comparison with the theories of Suárez and Poinset.

4.2 Division of *universale*

In accordance with common usage, the Scotists distinguish between the universal in causation, universal in signification, universal in representation, universal in being and universal in predication.⁵⁸³ Just as Suárez and Poinset, they distinguish between three basic kinds of *universale* or, according to their procedure in the *Metaphysics*, three stages of one and the same universal, cognate with the *universale in essendo*, *universale in repraesentando* and *universale in praedicando*. They are the *universale physicum*, akin to the universal in being, the metaphysical universal being *representatum* of the universal in representation, and the logical universal identifiable with the universal in predication. In the *Metaphysics* they describe the first kind as designating the nature with its formal unity occurrent in singulars; the second as referring to the nature prescinded from its individual differences by the intellect; by the last type they indicate the nature affected by the second intention of universality, by which it refers to its *inferiora* as the superior and predicable nature.⁵⁸⁴

The clear assignment of these definitions to the particular phase-universals gets slightly complicated in the *Logic*. What in the *Metaphysics* Mastri/Belluto understand as the metaphysical universal, in some of their formulations in the *Logic* they at first seem to call the logical universal. They say that the unity of

583. Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 4, Prologue, 140.

584. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 9, § 201 (Venice 1727, 130): "Praeterea distingui solet apud omnes universale in physicum, metaphysicum, & logicum, per universale physicum intelligunt naturam in singularibus existentem cum sua unitate formali, quae est minor numerali, per metaphysicum intelligunt naturam, cum per opus intellectus abstrahitur, & exiit differentis, & induitur unitate praecisionis; denique per universale logicum intelligunt eandem naturam affectam secunda intentione universalitatis, per quam ad inferiora refertur in ratione superioris, & praedicabilis."

precision proper to the metaphysical universal acquired by abstraction from the individual difference is immediately and proximately predicable of its supposit by the predication *hoc est hoc* (such predicability is a property of the *universale in actu*).⁵⁸⁵ However, if that were so, then the logical universal, as affected by the second intention of universality, would be made superfluous, a view not endorsed by Mastri/Belluto. At the end of the 2nd article *Resolutio quaesiti de universali in praedicando* of the first question *An detur universale a parte rei* of the 4th logical disputation *De universalibus in communi* they duly rectify this statement by distinguishing between the universal in predication (the actual universal) and the metaphysical universal. They reject the opinion ascribed to the Theatine Zaccaria Pasqualigo (d. 1664) claiming that there are only two kinds of *universale*, the physical universal (connected *in re* with an individual difference) and the metaphysical universal (obtained by the objective precision). Mastri/Belluto assert that the metaphysical universal cannot be the actual universal (*universale in actu*) but at most the fundamental or potential universal. This universal is not related to its term(s) as a superior nature to its inferiors but rather as a metaphysical part contractible by determining elements (individual differences). However, the universal in predication must be related to its term(s) only as a superior nature to its inferiors and not as a subjectable part (*pars subicibilis*) contractible by differences. The nature can be predicated only when it is affected by the rational form of universality.⁵⁸⁶

Even though they are not always clear in the description of the logical universal – once they seem to think of it as of the rational form of universality itself (the second intention *in abstracto*), another time as of the aggregate of the accidental form of universality and its subject (the second intention *in concreto*) – they always make obvious that what is predicated by exercised predication (*praedicatio exercita*),⁵⁸⁷ the type of predication relevant to our enquiry, is neither the mere form

585. Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 4, q. 1, art. 2, § 19 (Venice 1727, 143): “... universale in actu illud est, quod habet unitatem indifferentem, secundum quam ipsum idem est in potentia proxima, ut dicatur de quolibet supposito praedicatione dicente, hoc est hoc, quia universale I Post. 25 est, quod est unum in multis, & de multis, sed nihil secundum quamlibet unitatem in re est tale, quod secundum ipsam unitatem praecisam sit in potentia proxima ad talem praedicationem ...”

586. Ibidem, 144. This first insight into the issue of the difference between the *universale metaphysicum* and the *universale logicum* is of course further elucidated and developed below, especially in the fifth section of this chapter.

587. While exercised predication (*praedicatio exercita*) pertains to the first intentions, signated predication (*praedicatio signata*) belongs to the second intentions. When we say “Man is rational”, we predicate “rational” of “man” *in actu exercito* because rationality really exists in man. However, when something belongs to something else *signate*, it belongs to it only as to a sign. If we say of a painted horse that is wild, we do not want to say that this property belongs to this painted horse *exercite* but only *signate*, inasmuch as the picture gives us knowledge of the character of

of universality nor the accidental whole, i.e., the second intention of universality applied to the nature, but only the nature *standing under* the second intention of universality conceived as the *condition* of predication.⁵⁸⁸

Within the clear description of the above-mentioned three types of *universale* in *Metaphysics* Mastri/Belluto note another possible terminological ambiguity. They agree with the replacement of the term *universale physicum* (used by Suárez⁵⁸⁹) by *universale metaphysicum remotum*. It not only corresponds better to the metaphysical character of the extramental nature, the latter term (unlike the former) does not make use of an expression already reserved for the signification of prime matter.⁵⁹⁰

In a direct link to Scotus they also distinguish between two kinds of the metaphysical universal, both of them as the foundational universal, but each time differently. One of them is the remote metaphysical universal, the other the proximate metaphysical universal. While the former designates the extramental nature in its contraction by an individual difference, the latter indicates the same nature as liberated from that condition by the objective precision. The latter universal constitutes the immediate and proximate foundation for the logical universal.⁵⁹¹

The nomenclature in the *Metaphysics* suggests that Mastri/Belluto operate with a threefold universal ordered in the following metaphysico-epistemologico-logical sequence: the remote metaphysical universal (designated also as the material or physical universal or universal in being) – the proximate metaphysical universal (constituting the proximate foundation of the rational relation of universality proper to the logical universal) – the logical universal (the universal in predication).

a real (particular) horse. Analogically, when we say “Individuum est species” we predicate the second intention of species of the second intention of individual only *signate*, because *species* cannot be predicated *exercite* of *individuum* since both are different second intentions. We only predicate it *signate* because we predicate what is signified by the concept of *species* (man) of what is signified by the second intention of *individuum* (Peter). Contrary to exercised predication, in signated predication we do not predicate only the natures under the condition of universality, but the universality taken *in concreto*, i.e., as applied to the nature. See Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 5, q. 1, art. 1, § 8 (Venice 1727, 161) and Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 9, art. 1, § 206 (Venice 1727, 131–132).

588. On this issue see more in 4.5.1.

589. I believe that the different nomenclature in Suárez and in Mastri/Belluto is not entirely incidental. It points to the important difference caused by Suárez’s nominalization or “physicalization” of the Scotistic genuine metaphysical dimension of formalities.

590. See also Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 9, art. 1, § 201 (Venice 1727, 130) and *Logica*, disp. 4, q. 1, art. 2, § 27 (Venice 1727, 145).

591. Ibidem.

The last possible ambiguity partially disrupting that above-mentioned sequence concerns Mastri's/Belluto's employment of the notion of the *universale metaphysicum* in the *Logic* where it seems to signify the Avicennian nature absolutely considered deprived of *all* its properties and present in every state, in which it happens to be.⁵⁹² While the overall purport of the reasoning in the *Metaphysics* leaves no doubt that the metaphysical universal or the proximate metaphysical universal is to be identified with the common nature having *objective being* in the intellect, in the *Logic* there are *loci* where the Scotists make use of the Avicennian nature absolutely considered (*natura secundum se*) as well. While in the *Metaphysics* they speak of the metaphysical universal having the unity of precision, what they call the *universale metaphysicum* in the *Logic* seems to be reserved for the nature abstracted both from real being and from objective being in the mind. This nature absolutely considered is not acquired by the same kind of abstraction as the metaphysical universal with its unity of precision treated in the *Metaphysics*, because it involves double abstraction, i.e., not only from real being but also from objective being.⁵⁹³ I do not take this consideration as entailing a fatal inconsistency with the nomenclature in the *Metaphysics*. As a matter of fact, even in the *Logic* Mastri/Belluto make clear that they do not see any fundamental incompatibility of the nature as such with its being in singulars. Even though the *natura secundum se* abstracts from both singularity and universality, they still consider it as being somehow in the thing. If it were not in a thing, it could hardly be called the *universale in essendo*. Besides, as I show below in 4.5.3, when revising the steps which lead from the primordial cognition of singulars to the act of predication Mastri/Belluto declare that before the abstraction of the *universale metaphysicum* corresponding to the *rational* attribute by which the nature is related conjunctively to all the inferiors (the universal having the conceptual unity of precision),⁵⁹⁴ the prescinded nature is first compared to the

592. For this remark I am grateful to Dr. Lukáš Novák. See also Novák 2012, 240–242.

593. Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 4, q. 1, art. 2, § 26 (Venice 1727, 144): “Neque Scotus 2. d. 3. q. 1. ... quando dixit naturam de se nec universalem esse actu, nec particularem, et licet realiter nunquam sit sine aliquo istorum, non tamen est de se aliquod istorum, sed est prius naturaliter omnibus istis, & secundum istam prioritatem naturalem est quod quid est, & per se obiectum intellectus, & per se ut sic consideratur a Metaphysico; ita Doctor; quibus verbis aperte significat universale metaphysicum esse naturam secundum se consideratam, ut praescindit a singularitate et universalitate actuali: non ergo secundum Doctorem universale metaphysicum est universale in actu, sed tantum in potentia.”

594. The notion of “conjunctive” (and the opposite “disjunctive”) indeterminations is elucidated below in 4.3.4.

individuals with respect to a *real* attribute. This claim reveals that they admit that the nature as such is compatible with existence in things.⁵⁹⁵ This compatibility is fully developed in the *Metaphysics*.⁵⁹⁶

4.3 *Universale metaphysicum remotum*

4.3.1 Anti-Nominalism and Anti-Platonism of Mastri's/Belluto's Doctrine

Not distinguishing between nominalism and conceptualism (semi-nominalism) Mastri/Belluto take, generically speaking, nominalism as the position denying the universal in being and admitting only the universal in signification. Universal concepts are not *in re* since they are only the *signs* of individual things. There is no community or unity in the thing grounding the formation of universal concepts. Extramentally there is only the multitude of similar things conceived by the confusive act.⁵⁹⁷

Contrary to Suárez's conciliatory attitude towards the *Nominales*, Mastri's/Belluto's approach is radically critical.⁵⁹⁸ If I may use a metaphor, there is not a distinction in *modo loquendi* between nominalism and moderate realism but a distinction *ex natura rei* for them. The doctrinal contrast between realism and nominalism is observable also in Mastri's/Belluto's dismissal of Punch's opinion claiming that there is no substantial disagreement between moderate realism and nominalism, since when criticizing the universal in being the nominalists always have in mind the fairly robust (positive) unity of the nature physically existing as non-multiplied in individuals. However, clearly, such unity is rejected not only by the *Nominales* but also by moderate realists. The Scotists note that this interpretation is too coarse and mistaken, since it ignores the foundational unity, which – as developed below – is neither endorsed by nominalists nor is the complete actual universal.⁵⁹⁹

595. See Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 4, q. 3, § 73 (Venice 1727, 152).

596. See Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 7 (Venice 1727, 119–126).

597. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 1, §§ 2–3 (Venice 1727, 77); see also Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 4, q. 1, § 2 (Venice 1727, 140). Apparently, the Scotists entirely leave aside the view granting universality only to (conventional) linguistic signs. This opinion is for them no doubt unworthy of any critique.

598. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 4, q. 1, § 4 (Venice 1727, 77): “Falsum vero mihi videtur, quod hic ajunt quamplures ut Suarez disp. 6. Met. sect. 2 ... Poncius disp. 3. log. qu. 5 ... Nominales in hac materia verbis solum, & in modo loquendi a sententia Realium dissidere ...”

599. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 1, § 4 (Venice 1727, 77–78).

Leaving the precise character of the universal in being for further *quaestiones*, in the first section *An ultra singularia a parte rei dentur naturae communes, seu universales* of the 9th disputation the goal is to defend the fundamental claim that there is the universal in being, or as the Scotists prefer to say, common nature (*natura communis*) in the things vis-à-vis the challenge presented by the Jesuit nominalism.⁶⁰⁰ In their defense they share the position of Suárez and Poinset.⁶⁰¹

Apart from the well-known arguments emphasizing the *real* character of definitions of common things and the *real* character of science postulating necessary and universal objects *a parte rei*,⁶⁰² Mastri/Belluto introduce in both their *Logic* and *Metaphysics* two main arguments against those denying the existence of common natures in things. As typical of Mastri/Belluto, both reasons are developed by replies to a number of objections giving us evidence of the Scotists' excellent knowledge of conceptualism represented by the trio Hurtado-Arriaga-Oviedo.⁶⁰³ The first argument can be called confutation "from the denotation of terms" (*ex significatione vocum*), the second "from the truth of predication" (*ex veritate praedicationis*). They affirm that one cannot say that the term *man* primarily and immediately signifies Peter, Paul, etc. What it signifies is the common nature independently of the intellect. Universal cognition does not find its *terminus* in Peter, Paul, etc. contained under confusive cognition, but in the one nature common to them. If the nominalists argue that the *significatum* of a common term are individuals signified *in confuso* by the universalizing (formal) concept, the question is in what aspect they actually merge. The answer that they get confused in the unity of resemblance and that consequently the immediate object of our conception is not the one common nature but a plurality of objects inasmuch as they are similar is not satisfactory. In fact, similarity must be reduced to unity. By universal cognition one does not articulate the individual differences of things. Even if Peter, Paul,

600. The reason for this terminological preference is clear. On their view, there is no universality formally *in re*. See Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 1, § 2 (Venice 1727, 77).

601. Admittedly, Mastri's/Belluto's emphasis on the commonality of the nature can be taken as sufficient evidence of their doctrinal difference from Suárez and Poinset. Nevertheless, in this subsection I leave these differences aside.

602. Aristoteles, *Posterior Analytics*, 77a7–8 (Cambridge, Massachusetts/London 1960, 75): "... if there is no universal there will be no middle term, and hence no demonstration." See Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 1, art. 1, § 11 (Venice 1727, 80) and *Logica*, disp. 4, q. 1, art. 1, § 3 (Venice 1727, 140).

603. In view of the fact that the doctrinal confrontation of early modern Scotism with nominalism is not the primary goal of this publication, in the following I present only the core of their arguments. No doubt, Mastri's/Belluto's critique of the nominalists would be worth special analysis.

etc., were signified by the common term *man* implicitly, the signification would still require an explicit *significatum*. This denotate can be nothing but the extramental unity of the common nature, which grounds the extramental relation of similarity. The explicit and immediate significate of the term *man* is what only enables the implicit and mediated signification of Peter, Paul, etc.⁶⁰⁴

According to the second reason, predication correctly understood means nothing else than that a common nature is said of an individual or a superior nature of an inferior one, as it is expressed in the proposition “Peter is man”. The nominalist redefinition cannot comply with the intuitive assumption we have about the “truth of predication”. Leaving aside the obvious implausibility of a doctrine according to which one predicates *voces* or formal concepts of Peter,⁶⁰⁵ one must be equally dismissive of the claim that a whole set of individuals of the same species is predicated. A whole sum of individuals cannot be said of Peter because the aggregate of human individuals is expressed only by the complex term “every man”. Clearly, we do not say “Peter is every man” because Peter is not Paul. As we already know, this is just the reason why Hurtado claims that the only thing that can be predicated *in recto* of Peter is Peter himself and the only thing that can be predicated of Paul it is Paul himself. There is no other item really identical with Peter than Peter himself. In order to preclude the obvious objection from tautological predication, as we know, Hurtado recurs to the way of predication whereby we actually predicate of Peter disjunctively and vaguely also Paul, Anthony, etc. Accordingly, the proposition “Peter is man” is – at least as far the mode of predicating is concerned – equivalent to the propositions “Peter is a man” or “Peter is this man, or that man, etc”. Mastri/Belluto are quite unimpressed by this additional Hurtadian remark. For them this explication is equivalent not to the predication of a universal of Peter but only to the enunciation of a vague individual of Peter. However, that predication does not concern the predication of the superior nature of the inferior one constituting the “essence” of predication. Last but not least, Hurtado et al. are wrong to think that *in re* there can be only the tautological predication “Peter is Peter” (*nugatoria praedicatio*) since even *in re*, as Mastri/Belluto claim, human nature retains (as shown below) its negative indifference or the non-repugnance to being in the many by means of which universality can be taken as grounded. Due to this indifference it holds that even though the predicate *man* is really identified with Peter, its extension is nevertheless broader and it does not lose its universality or commonality applicable to all the individuals of the same species. If it lost it,

604. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 1, art. 1, § 6 (Venice 1727, 78) and *Logica*, disp. 4, q. 1, art. 1, § 3 (Venice 1727, 140).

605. Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 4, q. 1, art. 1, § 4 (Venice 1727, 140).

the common concept *man* signifying the item common to Peter, Paul, etc., would be transformed into a singular term.⁶⁰⁶

The upshot of this reasoning against the *Nominales* leads to the affirmation of the real existence of the common nature which cannot exist as separated from individuals but only as immersed in them and as really identified with them.⁶⁰⁷ In agreement with Suárez and Poinset, Mastri/Belluto affirm that to posit the separate existence of the common nature, which medieval and post-medieval scholasticism labeled as the Platonic position, is to assert a contradictory state of affairs which even the divine power cannot produce. The particular essence of a thing, of which the common nature is part, is the most intrinsic and intimate principle of the thing itself.⁶⁰⁸ Importantly, if separated, they could not be predicated of the things from which they have been detached. The identity theory of predication, the common heritage of all streams of moderate realism, would then be replaced by the predication of an exemplar of what exemplifies it (*exemplatum*). The predication of the predicate “man” of Peter would be replaced by the predication of the exemplar of all humans or of what eminently represents all individual human beings.⁶⁰⁹

In addition to this contradictory character of the separated natures, positing them is entirely useless. To introduce them in order to have the universal, necessary and eternal truth-maker of scientific propositions is redundant. The maintenance of the eternal truths (*veritates aeternae*) which are the proper objects of science

606. Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 4, q. 1, art. 1, § 5 (Venice 1727, 140–141). See also Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 1, art. 1, § 7 (Venice 1727, 79) and q. 1, art. 2, § 22 (Venice 1727, 83). For definitions of common and singular terms see Mastri/Belluto, *Disputationes in Organum Aristotelis, dialecticarum institutionum*, pars prior, caput IV, § 11 (Venice 1727, 5). In the *Metaphysics* Mastri/Belluto criticize not only the “intellectio-theory” (originally appropriated by the late Ockham), close to Hurtado and other Jesuits, but also the “fictum-theory” (advocated by the early Ockham) postulating an image (*simulacrum*, *idolum*) formed by the intellect as the universal representative of individual objects. In analogy to Hurtado’s refusal of this version of nominalism, Mastri/Belluto say that the *fictum*-theory is false since science is not about beings of reason but about real beings. See Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 1, art. 1, §§ 12–13 (Venice 1727, 80).

607. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 2, § 24 (Venice 1727, 84): “Alii vero communiter in schola Peripat. docent nec dari a parte rei imo nec posse dari per divinam potentiam naturam universalem ab individuis separatam, sed semper, ac indispensabiliter immersam esse singularibus, ac in eis essentialiter inclusam.” See also Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 4, q. 1, art. 1, § 8 (Venice 1727, 141).

608. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 2, § 25 (Venice 1727, 84): “... nil rei magis intrinsecum datur, quam propria essentia, sed natura communis, seu universalis in essendo sunt de essentia singularium ...”

609. See Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 2, § 26 (Venice 1727, 84) and *Logica*, disp. 4, q. 1, art. 1, § 8 (Venice 1727, 141).

does not entail the existence of immutable, necessary and universal objects. What it implies is only the necessary connection of the predicate with a subject, which does not concern the non-complex necessity of terms but the necessity of complex items such as propositions and syllogisms. This necessity of the connection of these extremes, however, need not be searched for in a separated *universale in essendo*. It can well be founded in the objective being of the divine intellect.⁶¹⁰ Accordingly, the only sense Mastri/Belluto can make of the Platonic concept of ideas separated from things is that one provided by St. Augustine and the Church Fathers. The ideas separated from things are not universal objects existing independently of any mind, but thoughts occurring in the divine mind. Therefore their universality cannot be understood as universality in being but rather as universality in representation.⁶¹¹

4.3.2 Objective precision, formal distinction and the metaphysical grades

The bundle of issues comprising the topics of intellectual precision, the distinctions and the metaphysical grades is of fundamental significance for Mastri's/Belluto's doctrine of the common nature. Due to the large and ramified extent of these topics, powered by Mastri/Belluto in-depth and lengthy treatment of all philosophical issues, I proceed in four parts, following to a large degree the way in which the Scotists cope with Suárez and Poinset. Nonetheless, in view of the fact that their solutions are defined also against the background of their settlement with the Jesuit nominalism, their critique of the *praecisio formalis* needs to be mentioned as well.

First, I present Mastri's/Belluto's division of three kinds of *praecisio intellectualiva*. Second, I introduce the basic contours of the general theory of distinction with focus on the *distinctio formalis*. Third, I develop Mastri's/Belluto's crucial

610. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 2, § 28 (Venice 1727, 85): "... scientia sit de objecto immutabili, incorruptibili, & aeterno, quia non est de ratione obiecti scientiae necessitas, & immutabilitas quoad existentiam, sed tantum quoad connexionem praedicati cum subjecto ...". Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 4, q. 1, art. 1, § 17 (Venice 1727, 143): "... ad veritatem propositionum necessarium non requiritur, quod extrema supponant pro aliquo existente, sed sufficit, quod supponant pro aliquo in esse cognito, & quod jungatur adinvicem, quandocumque enim extrema talium suppositionum componuntur adinvicem, propositiones constitutae ex ipsis sunt semper verae, quia semper tunc est conformitas actus intelligendi, seu propositionis mentalis ad rem cognitam ...". See also Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 4, q. 1, art. 1, § 8 (Venice 1727, 141).

611. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 2, § 26 (Venice 1727, 84): "Haec opinionis Platonis expositio ex parte coincidit cum explicatione relata D. Augustinus nam talis Idea praecise considerata erit, quid singulare in seipsa quoad esse, & solum potest esse universalis in repraesentando, non erit autem universale in essendo, & a singularibus separatum, in quo sensu tantum hic impugnatur." See also Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 4, q. 1, art. 1, § 8 (Venice 1727, 141).

argument for the necessity of the introduction of this distinction. Finally, as a corollary, I bring forth Mastri's/Belluto's reasoning on behalf of the existence of the formal distinction between the *gradus metaphysici*.

1. *Kinds of intellectual precision*

Mastri/Belluto distinguish between two main *genera* of the intellectual precision of the formal *rationes* of a thing. The first runs solely on the side of the act (*ex parte actus*). On this precision the segregation of the formalities of one and the same thing is occasioned not by any intrinsic plurality in the thing but only by the precise act called the confusive act.⁶¹² This formal/subjective precision attains the object as a whole. The confusive act is productive of the specific (generic) concepts by means of not distinguishing (merging) the individualizing (specific) features of things, never by touching and detecting some intrinsic (whether formal or virtual) plurality in the thing. The only possible foundation(s) of this *praecisio* are the extrinsic operations or effects called the connotations of things.

The second genus is represented by the objective precision. By this kind of precision the intellect does not attain the object as a monolithic whole but much more differentially, according to the various *rationes* which exist as really united in one and the same thing. One intellective act finds its terminus in a *ratio*, in which another does not. Admittedly, the objective precision coincides with formal precision in that it does not cognize the object perfectly and comprehensively as a whole essence (the type of cognition proper to God). It discerns only a partial aspect since the object is not given to us as a whole. However, the two kinds of *praecisio* differ in that the objective precision intelligibly separates or intentionally "carves" the object itself.

The contribution of the object can be basically of two kinds. Either the formalities occur in the thing according to the formal characters (*rationes*), or (more weakly) only by virtual or eminent being in the way the operations of heating, illuminating and drying are said to be contained in their common cause, i.e., in sunlight. If by the different acts the intellect attains the *rationes* or formalities which are actually distinct in the thing according to the formal characters so that one actually negates the other, then the precision is called the *extramental* objective precision and as such it pertains to the thing *prior to* being conceived by the intellect. On this kind of precision, the intellect by a single act apprehends one formality without the other since already in the thing they are formally, i.e., *in actu* distinct or prescinded.⁶¹³ Even though the single acts do not grasp the essence as a whole and thus in respect to the whole essence they are inadequate, they must be regarded as adequate in their own orders since there is always the formality, actually different

612. See also 2.6 of this work.

613. In this case the notions of distinction and (extramental) precision can be taken as synonymous.

from another, which terminates the intellectual precise act. This isomorphism between the mind and reality is not fully maintained in the second kind of objective precision, though. If by the different acts the intellect attains formalities which are distinct in one and the same thing only virtually and are contained in the thing only eminently, then the precision is not entirely in the thing (*a parte rei*) since it is the *intellect* that makes this distinction actual. The various concepts produced by this kind of objective precision are inadequate not only because they do not grasp comprehensively the whole essence but also because they do not match them in their own orders. As such those extramental counterparts are not actually distinct formalities. Mastri/Belluto note that while the first kind of objective precision is endorsed by the Scotists, the second kind is advocated by the Thomists.⁶¹⁴

2. General theory of distinctions

In order to grasp the doctrinal divergences between Mastri/Belluto and Suárez/Poinsot in the issue of the metaphysical grades it is necessary to present the Scotists' theory of formal distinction. This task cannot be accomplished without a brief exposition of the general theory of distinction.⁶¹⁵ More specifically, understanding of the role of the *distinctio formalis* in Mastri's/Belluto's system cannot be attained without the pertinent expositions of *distinctio ex natura rei* and *distinctio rationis* and its extramental counterpart *distinctio virtualis*.

Mastri/Belluto do not look for the real definition of distinction as such but state that the concept of distinction as such is nominally defined (*quid nominis*), as all agree, by the negation of identity and the concept of identity as the negation of distinction.⁶¹⁶ Since identity and distinction as disjunctive properties of being (the so-called disjunctive transcendentals⁶¹⁷) follow the concept of being, basically

614. See Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 6, q. 16, § 292 (Venice 1727, 327). On Mastri's/Belluto's doctrine of the objective precision in comparison with the nominalist *praecisio* see also Renemann 2006.

615. For a detailed elaboration of Mastri's/Belluto's theory of distinction in the *Metaphysics* and its relation to the so-called *Formalistae* in Padua in the 17th century see Poppi 1966, 723–774.

616. Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 1, q. 5, art. 2, § 59 (Venice 1727, 86): “Sed cum hic sermo sit de distinctione & identitate in tota sua amplitudine, ut nimirum sub se comprehendit tam realem, quam rationis, tam positivam, quam negativam, vanum est laborare, ut inquiramus aliquam rationem communem univocam distinctionis ... quare cum distinctio, & identitas in tanta communitate sit aliquid aequivocum, sufficet assignare quid nominis explicando formalitatem distinctionis per negationem, aut carentiam identitatis, e contra identitatem per negationem distinctionis, seu alietatis.”

617. By this theory of disjunctive transcendentals Mastri/Belluto differ not only from Poinsot but also from Suárez. On Suárez's rejection of the Scotistic theory of *passiones disjunctivae* see Heider 2011d, 180–181.

divided into real and rational being, Mastri/Belluto are convinced that the first and immediate division of distinction must be that into real distinction broadly conceived (*distinctio ex natura rei*) and (no less broadly conceived) distinction of reason (*distinctio rationis*).⁶¹⁸ The distinction from the nature of the thing further bifurcates into the real distinction (*distinctio realis*) and the formal distinction (*distinctio formalis*). Because distinction as such is based on plurality, there are accordingly two kinds of plurality. One is the unqualified multitude (*pluralitas simpliciter*), the other is plurality in a certain respect (*pluralitas secundum quid*). The unqualified multitude concerns the plurality of things (*res*). By *res* Mastri/Belluto mean that which is capable of receiving existence by physical (entitative) causality, whether it can exist separately or not.⁶¹⁹ *Res* are not only complete substances but also incomplete substances (matter/form) as well as some accidents. The qualified plurality, contrarily, is the plurality of the formalities or realities. These realities are called by that diminutive of *res* or *forma* since as such they do not have their own essence.⁶²⁰ They are not essences but only *of* essences (*aliquitates*). They are the objective *rationes* conceivable by perfect and adequate concepts. Accordingly, they are immersed into the real identity of a thing. They are unitively contained in the thing. Consequently, a formality cannot be the item immediately terminating the physical causality of an efficient cause. Physical causality cannot be concerned with the realities because it is related only to items possessing a *complete* essence. Only an item with such complete essence can actually exist. The realities thus exist only by the existence of the whole in which they are unitively contained. Their origin is not physical because they are not caused by a physical cause, but rather by a metaphysical cause. Mastri/Belluto say that they sprout (*pullulare*) from the physical entity by means of metaphysical emanation from the physical entities in the same way as the property of risibility sprouts from its subject, i.e., from the essence of man, or the cognitive powers sprout from the rational soul.⁶²¹

618. Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, ibidem, § 62 (Venice 1727, 87).

619. Mastri/Belluto admit that separability, whether the symmetrical separability of two *res* or the asymmetrical separability of a thing and its extrinsic mode (e.g., Peter and his sitting), is the sufficient condition of real distinction. See Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 1, q. 5, art. 2, §§ 64–71 (Venice 1727, 87–88).

620. I return to the issue of the essence and existence of the formalities in 4.4.4.

621. Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 1, q. 5, art. 1, § 63 (Venice 1727, 87). Beside the distinction between two formalities of the same thing Mastri/Belluto acknowledge also the so-called formal distinction *minor* obtaining between the essence and its intrinsic mode. An example is the distinction between essence and existence. See Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 8, q. 2, art. 4 (Venice 1727, 53–56).

The distinction of reason is divided into two familiar kinds. One is the distinction of reasoning reason (*distinctio ratio rationis ratiocinantis*), the other is the distinction of reasoned reason.⁶²² Although Cajetan designates the virtual distinction as the formal distinction, constituting (as stated) the extramental foundation of the distinction of reasoned reason, Mastri/Belluto do not hesitate to subsume this distinction under the heading of *conceptual* distinction. The above-mentioned two kinds of *praecisio objectiva* are distinguished by the criterion of the presence/absence of the actual precision in the thing itself. Whereas the Scotistic objective precision discovers a division in the thing itself, the Thomistic *praecisio objectiva* admits actual distinction only in the mind. So it cannot be evaluated *tout court* as a distinction *ex natura rei* because in order to be actual it needs to be actualized or activated by the mind. It can be regarded as an actual distinction only when transferred from the state of being fundamentally or virtually distinct in the thing to the mental state with its objective being.⁶²³

For Mastri/Belluto the distinction of reasoning reason and the distinction of reasoned reason are two independent types of distinction. The crucial difference between them is the measure of the foundation in the thing, which means either the assumption or the denial of the intrinsic virtual distinction. I have said that the powers of heating, illuminating and drying are virtually contained in solar light. Even though Mastri/Belluto acknowledge that one often comes to detect the different powers *a posteriori*, i.e., by the observation of the different operations or by means of concept formation in the manner of comparison with really distinct things, the foundation of the distinction of reasoned reason (contra Hurtado)

622. Contrary to the (conservative) Scotists such as Bernhard Sanning (1637–1704), Mastri/Belluto affirm that Scotus did not reject the virtual distinction on the grounds that its concept was confusing or useless. See Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 1, q. 5, art. 2, § 87 (Venice 1727, 91–92). See also Grajewski 1944, 52–55.

623. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 6, q. 8, § 164 (Venice 1727, 277): “Distinctio itaque formalis actualis et, quae versatur inter plures formalitates in eadem re Physica actu, & non virtute tantum contentas, quae proinde a parte rei citra quodcumque opus intellectus diversas habent rationes conceptibiles ... Distinctio autem virtualis est, quae versatur inter plures ejusdem rei formalitates, non actu, sed virtute tantum in ea contentas, quod praesertim contingit, cum eadem res simplicissima plures perfectiones continet, non formaliter, & actualiter, sed eminenter tantum, & virtualiter, quae virtualis continentia fundamentum praebet intellectui nostro res imperfecte concipienti, formandi de illa eadem re plures conceptus inadaequatos singulis illis perfectionibus in ea re virtualiter contentis correspondente ...” By this contradistinction between the formal and the virtual distinction Mastri/Belluto distance himself from the Scotist “apostate” Francisco Herrera (1551–1609) who claimed that the two distinctions are in fact identical. See Grajewski 1944, 5–6. In the chapter on Suárez we have seen that in his charitable explication of Scotus the *Doctor Eximius* defended just that identification.

cannot be reduced to a mere extrinsic or connotative foundation.⁶²⁴ The connotations of Peter's sensitive and discursive acts cannot be considered as the only foundation, attained indirectly (*in obliquo*) by the precise intellect. As in the critique of the formal precision, based on the premise that the extrinsic connotations assume the intrinsic "denotations",⁶²⁵ Mastri/Belluto reject this externalization of the virtual distinction proposed by Hurtado and other *Nominales*.⁶²⁶

3. *Argument for the introduction of the formal distinction*

Contrary to Suárez and Poinsoy who *en bloc* reject the formal distinction as a non-intelligible and unnecessary sort of distinction, Mastri/Belluto make substantial use of it in many solutions to philosophical and theological problems. Although they admit the virtual distinction as the foundation of the distinction of reasoned reason – they see its utility especially in the application to the issue of transcendental grades such as the notion of being related to its immediate inferiors God and creatures⁶²⁷ –, their main instrument of philosophical analysis is the formal distinction.

In the *Metaphysics* Mastri/Belluto offer several arguments for its necessity, not all of which they accept without reservations, though. Leaving aside the arguments based on the texts of *auctoritates* such as Scotus and Aristotle, the most important argument *ex ratione* seems to be the reasoning *ex via contradictionis*. The argument occurs in many places, not only in Mastri's/Belluto's treatises on

624. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 6, q. 15, art. 2, § 283 (Venice 1727, 323): "... pro fundamento distinctionis ratiocinatae necessariam quidem esse ex parte obiecti virtutalem aliquam distinctionem, seu eminentiam rei, non tamen omnino spernendam esse diversitatem extrinsecam connotatorum, quia ut diximus, talis extrinseca diversitas saltem valde conducit a posteriori ad dignoscendam rei eminentiam, & virtutalem distinctionem in ea latentem ..."

625. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 6, q. 16, art. 1, § 294 (Venice 1727, 328): "... distinctio per connotata est extrinseca, & regulariter loquendo supponit aliquam priorem intrinsecam in connotante ... unum illorum in sensu formali negatur de altero, ita ut negatio cadat, nedum supra connotata in obliquo, sed etiam supra ipsas formalitates in recto, non solum enim dicimus sessiones non sunt discursus, sed dicitur etiam quod animalitas non est rationalitas."

626. Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 1, q. 5, art. 2, § 88 (Venice 1727, 92): "Verum magis placet prior dicendi modus, quod sola extrinseca connotata non sufficiant absque fundamento intrinseco distinctionis in objecto ad constituendam distinctionem rationis ratiocinatae, sed solum constituent distinctionem rationis ratiocinantis, & ita videtur sensisse Scotus loc. cit. dum docuit, concretum, & abstractum non differre, nisi ratione ratiocinante, nimirum penes diversum modum concipiendi idem formale objectum, certum autem est concretum, & abstractum non differre, nisi per connotatam extrinsecum, nimirum subjectum, quod connotatur a forma in concreto sumpta, non in abstracto." See also Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 6, q. 12, § 248 (Venice 1727, 308–309).

627. See Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 2, q. 4, art. 1 (Venice 1727, 44–48).

distinctions in the *Metaphysica* and the *Logica* but also in the treatise on the nature of the distinction between the metaphysical grades. On this argument there are *rationes* in things which are *realiter* identical, about which contradictory predicates are actually verified. In order to make those predicates or propositions involving them true, one has to assume an actual distinction in the thing.⁶²⁸ However, this distinction cannot be the real distinction of two *res* but only the distinction of two *formalitates*. Let us take an example! Due to animality Peter actually resembles or is in agreement with a horse before the intellect's operation. In virtue of his rationality, again prior to the interference of the intellect, Peter is distinct from a horse. The sentences "to be in agreement with X" and "not to be in agreement with X", as related to the same term, entail the contradiction. In order to accommodate them one must insert and assume a pertinent distinction *ex natura rei*. As the history of the formal distinction testifies, the same holds not only *in creatis* but also *in divinis*, which – as medieval scholarship shows⁶²⁹ – is the original milieu of the application of the formal distinction. While the divine essence has the property of being communicable to its supposits, i.e., to the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, its supposits have the attribute "not to be communicable". The Father is communicated neither to the Son nor to the Holy Spirit. It holds that antecedently to the operation of intellect the divine essence is really identified with the three divine persons. No less it is true that independently of the intellect the divine essence has a property (i.e., communicability) which the supposits do not. Mastri/Belluto are convinced that it is not sufficient to say that this contradiction can be dealt with by means of the distinction of reasoned reason and its foundation, the virtual distinction. The virtual distinction as a kind of *non-actual* distinction in the thing containing only a virtual plurality of *rationes* cannot actually verify two contradictory propositions holding about a thing *a parte rei*.⁶³⁰ So it cannot be correct, as Suárez claims, that there is no available sign of the formal distinction because mutual separability is a sign of real distinction, asymmetrical separability is a sign of modal distinction, and inseparability is a sign of conceptual distinction(s). The reification of

628. Of course, not all contradictory propositions require the ontological assumption of this distinction. Those based on the predicates "to be" and "not to be" or "to be produced" and "not to be produced" imply the fully-fledged *real* distinction. Saying that "Peter exists at *t*" and "Paul does not exist at *t*", one gets the real distinction between them. Clearly, when Peter is in the position of both the subject and the predicate, on the contrary, one gets only the distinction of reasoning reason.

629. See e.g. Kraml 1995.

630. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 6, q. 11, art. 1, §§ 215–217 (Venice 1727, 296–297) and *Logica*, disp. 1, q. 5, art. 2, § 75 (Venice 1727, 89). See also Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 8, q. 6, art. 2, §§ 190–191 (Venice 1727, 62) and *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 3, §§ 44–49 (Venice 1727, 88–90).

the formal distinction, a constant feature of Suárez's procedure, equals to a crude misunderstanding of what the formal distinction actually involves.⁶³¹ This interpretation loses sight of the peculiar metaphysical character of the *formalitates* which fall within the notion of being as well *res* do, though indirectly (*in obliquo*) by means of their identity with *res*.⁶³² For the Scotists Suárez's reduction of the formal dimension or metaphysical formal causality *sui generis* either to physical causality or to the *distinctio virtualis* is an inadmissible fallback from realism.

Poinsot's arguments against the formal distinction are not better off, either. I have stated that for Poinsot the formal distinction is not a positive and actual distinction in the thing but rather a negative and virtual one. First, its extremes are not distinct in the way that they can ground a true relation of distinction. There is no real relation in Peter *qua* man to Peter *qua* animal. If so, the formal distinction cannot be an *ex natura rei* distinction but only the negation of a formal connection between the formal *rationes* of *man* and *animal*. But such negation can easily be accommodated by the assumption of the virtual distinction. Second, I have shown that for Poinsot the only function of the formal distinction was to prevent the identification of concepts saying that one is not formally the other, e.g., that *rationality* is not formally *animality*. However, in order to obtain such impediment one is not obliged to assume the formal distinction in the thing, because the virtual distinction can do the job just as well.⁶³³

As in their response to Suárez, in the reply to Poinsot Mastri/Belluto detect the creeping reification of the formal distinction. By that its extremes are made into two *res*, which is not difficult to discredit. The Scotists disclaim Poinsot's argument that the formal distinction requires a positive and actual relation in the formal sense. This relation actually can occur only between two really distinct extremes. To the second argument they reply that there are definitions which are handed down by perfect objective concepts. However, these perfect and adequate objective concepts expressing the formal being of a thing require the formal distinction *ex natura rei*. If Poinsot concedes the claim that one formality is not another one, though identically the same, he *ipso facto* assumes the formal distinction *ex*

631. On this historical interpretative tendency, of which Suárez is an integral part, to reduce the formal distinction to the fully-fledged real distinction see also Grajewski 1944, 11–22.

632. Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 1, q. 5, art. 2, § 84 (Venice 1727, 91): "... aliquid esse potest a parte rei, & extra nihil dupliciter, vel ratione sui, & recto, vel in obliquo, & ratione alterius, cujus est aliquid per identitatem, primo modo sunt extra nihil res physicae, secundo modo formalitates metaphysicae."

633. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 2, art. 3 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 296–297). See also 3.3.4. For Mastri's/Belluto's presentation of Poinsot's arguments see Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 1, q. 5, art. 2, § 81 (Venice 1727, 90).

natura rei between them.⁶³⁴ All in all, the Scotists' arguments give evidence that the central principle of the introduction of the formal distinction to philosophical analysis is the assumption of isomorphism between thought and reality. Truth and falsity do not concern a thing inasmuch as it exists in the mind but as it has actual being in reality.

4. Formal distinction and the metaphysical grades

Mastri's/Belluto's negative attitude to the doctrine endorsed by the Thomists and Suárez, who say that there is only a virtual distinction and a conceptual distinction between the metaphysical grades, is already noticeable in the introductory classification in the *quaestio* in the *Metaphysics* devoted *ex professo* to the issue of the *gradus metaphysici*. The position claiming there is the distinction of reasoned reason between the metaphysical grades is, together with the nominalists espousing only the formal precision, classified as *opinio extrema*. The antipode of this position is the teaching assuming there is a real distinction between the grades *in re*, so that the multiplication of the essential grades of a substance is accompanied by the plurification of substantial forms. The only true *sententia media*, according to Mastri/Belluto, is the one admitting the formal distinction between the grades.⁶³⁵

The multiplication of the metaphysical grades does not entail the multiplication of physical forms since substances, as the example of the essences of simple substances testifies, are structured according to the hierarchy of the metaphysical grades without being composed of a plurality of forms. There is no form, by which the archangel Michael is a substance, by which it is a spirit, and due to which it is Michael. Yet the archangel Michael belongs to the category of substance and thus the different essential grades are to be distinguished in him. The same holds also about accidental forms. In the accident of whiteness there is no physical form accountable for the metaphysical generic grade of colour, another securing the metaphysical grade of whiteness as such and a further one guaranteeing this particular whiteness.⁶³⁶

Just as Suárez, Mastri/Belluto also loosen the relationship between the metaphysical grades of genus and specific difference (to say nothing of haecceity), on the one hand, and the hylemorphic principles, on the other. Despite Poinset's claims that genus is proximately taken not from matter but only from what is material and

634. Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 1, q. 5, art. 2, § 82 (Venice 1727, 90–91).

635. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 8, q. 6, art. 1, § 187 (Venice 1727, 58).

636. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 8, q. 6, art. 1, §§ 178–179 (Venice 1727, 59). The only well-known exception in Scotism is the metaphysical grade of "body" (*corpus*). In a link to Scotus, Mastri/Belluto admit the form of corporeity (*forma corporeitatis*) as a really distinct physical form. See Mastri/Belluto, *Physica*, t. 2, disp. 2, q. 2, art. 2 (Venice 1727, 55–59).

potential in a thing and difference not from form but only from what is formal and perfect,⁶³⁷ the interconnections are relatively strongly maintained in his account. The notions of the common and the individual matter as the physical roots of the metaphysical grades of genus and individual difference are abandoned in Mastri's/Belluto's account. Similarly to Suárez, Mastri/Belluto claim that the Aristotelian axiom *genus a materia & differentia a forma* is to be interpreted only analogically. Accordingly, the essential definition by means of genus and specific difference does not have its origin in the diverse physical parts of the material composite. The physical and the metaphysical definition are two different kinds of definition. True, man as physically composed of the rational soul and the form of corporeity can be defined physically as a compound of the soul and the body. Metaphysically, however, man is defined by means of the genus/difference composition, which has its root not in the *realiter* different principles but in the *ex natura rei* different metaphysical formalities.⁶³⁸

One of the main arguments for the *sententia media* apart from the above-mentioned argument *ex via contradictionis* is based on the supposition of the metaphysical composition as a kind of *ex natura rei* composition not occurring in the divine essence. The metaphysical composition of genus/difference and species/individual difference, which is for the Scotists a mind-independent composition, is a distinctive feature of all created beings. It is what actually distinguishes the created from the uncreated. While in Thomism this distinctive function is, as is well-known, ensured by the real distinction between being and essence, in Scotism this role seems to be largely taken over by the formal distinction between the specific nature and the individual difference. Distinctively, for Suárez this genus/difference or species/individual composition cannot be attributed to God not because it is real and entirely mind-independent and thus repugnant to the divine metaphysical simplicity but above all by virtue of His entitative infinity. As we have seen, Suárez considers the genus/specific difference and species/haecceity distinctions found in the metaphysical whole to be the actually distinct metaphysical grades only due to the fundamental involvement of the intellect.⁶³⁹ This Suarezian composition enacted on the level of objective concepts or under the supervision or focus of (attentive) formal concepts is repugnant to God primarily not due to His extramental simplicity but because of the infinity of His perfection. The infinity of the divine

637. See Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 7, art. 3 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 402).

638. Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 5, q. 3, art. 2, § 136 (Venice 1727, 184): "... genus sumi a materia, differentia a forma, non quidem proprie, sed per quamdam proportionem ad partes compositi physici." See also Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 8, q. 6, art. 1, § 184 (Venice 1727, 60).

639. See *DM* XV, s. 11 (Vivès, vol. 25:557–566).

perfection is the only reason why there can be no specific or numerical multiplication of the divine essence.⁶⁴⁰ Mastri/Belluto disagree with this relativization of the fundamental significance of the mind-independent character of the genus/specific difference and species/haecceity metaphysical composition. They are not hesitant to say that also God can be actually analyzed by the common concept of being and peculiar determination (mode) of infinity, which *in re* are virtually distinct. Thus also God in fact can be considered by means of the same composition on the level of objective concepts assuming the pertinent extramental foundation in Him. But if no more than this composition were detected in *creatis*, then, leaving aside any other possible kinds of compositionality, any created being would turn to be *ex natura rei* simple no less than the Divine essence. That would level out the crucial metaphysical difference between God and creatures, though. The Scotists believe that the genus/specific difference and species/haecceity metaphysical compositions are contradictory to the divine essence primarily in virtue of their *ex natura rei* and mind-independent character. The fact of the extramental metaphysical composition of created beings and the non-compositionality of uncreated being is for them the essential metaphysical *differentia*. It holds that the character of agreement between Peter and Paul in the common predicate of *man* is considerably different from the character of agreement between God and creatures in the notion of being. Whereas the first one is actual and positive, the other is only fundamental and virtual.⁶⁴¹ It cannot be said that the notion of being is *ex natura rei* or formally distinct from the difference of *infinitas* in God since that would imperviously insert extramental composition in the divine essence.⁶⁴² Jointly with Suárez, Mastri/Belluto admit that divine infinity impedes the above-mentioned multiplications, but unlike him they add that it does so only remotely and radically (*remote & radicaliter*). Proximately and metaphysically considered, this non-multiplication is caused by His *ex natura rei* identity of haecceity and the divine essence.⁶⁴³

In a link to the distinction between the remote and the proximate foundation in God and the distinction between the efficient and the formal principle, Mastri/

640. DM VI, s. 9, n. 21 (Vivès, vol. 25: 243).

641. For a critique of Mastri's/Belluto's different foundation in reality in the case of categorial and of transcendental grades see Novák 2006. For a defense of this Mastri's/Belluto's "double talk" see Forlivesi 2006b.

642. Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 5, q. 3, art. 2, § 127 (Venice 1727, 182): "Compositio metaphysica ex gradu generico, & differentialis talis est, quod Deo repugnat, & ejus summae simplicitati, ut passim fatetur omnes, ergo est aliquo modo realis, & non rationis tantum, quia haec non tollit simplicitatem a parte rei." See also Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 8, q. 6, art. 2, § 187 (Venice 1727, 61).

643. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 3, art. 1, § 52 (Venice 1727, 91).

Belluto come also to the rebuttal of Suárez's and Poinso's argument for the distinction of reasoned reason between the essential grades of man based on the fact of the common and unique physical root, i.e., the rational soul. According to their argument there are no *ex natura rei* distinct vegetative, sensitive and rational grades in the human soul because the human soul is an entirely *simple* entity. One does not have to posit various modes of entity by which the remote and main principle, i.e., the soul, is operative. Striving for ontological simplicity Suárez argues that there is no need to introduce different modes of entity here since the same would have to be done also, e.g., in solar light in respect to its different operations.⁶⁴⁴ Predictably, Mastri/Belluto attack this reasoning. In principle they do not agree with the equalization of formal and efficient causality in Suárez.⁶⁴⁵ The physical simplicity of the soul is not incompatible with the formal multiplicity of grades and powers. The Scotists are convinced that the rational soul does not exercise its vegetative, sensitive and intellectual operations only in the order of efficient causality but also in the order of *formal* causality. Even though the rational soul is the principal and radical cause of all the particular powers efficiently coming from it, the same cannot be said about its grades and powers. They must be formally distinct because by means of them the soul exercises the specifically different effects not only in the order of efficient causality but also in the order of formal causality. Accordingly, what Suárez says, i.e., that what holds of one cause holds also of the other, cannot be true.⁶⁴⁶

4.3.3 The extramental character of the community of the common nature

Compared to Suárez, Mastri's/Belluto's exposition of the issue of the community of the *natura communis* in the *Metaphysics* is reversed in a twofold regard. First, the enquiry into the common nature in the 9th disputation – following Scotus's progression in *Ordinatio* 2, 3, 1 – precedes the treatise on the issue of the individual difference (haecceity) delivered in the 10th disputation. The metaphysical question of the principle of individuation can arise only if a (created) substance is not *de se* singular in the thing itself. If the nature were *a parte rei* singular, the question of the principle of individuation, by virtue of which a singular thing is indivisible into things of the same kind as a divided whole, would turn out to be a

644. DM VI, s. 9, nn. 17–18 (Vivès, vol. 25: 241–242). See also Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 8, q. 6, art. 3, § 200 (Venice 1727, 65).

645. On the approximation of these two causes in Suárez see also Hattab 2009, 64.

646. "... falsum est, quod dicebat Suarez eandem esse rationem de uno, ac de alio genere causae ..." Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 8, q. 6, art. 3, § 202 (Venice 1727, 66).

pseudoproblem.⁶⁴⁷ Second, differently from Suárez and Poinset, in the investigation of the common nature they start with the issue of *community* and the *aptitude* to being in the many and only then they come to the query of the formal *unity* of the common nature.⁶⁴⁸

The exposition of Mastri's/Belluto's crucial doctrine of the real character of the indifference of the common nature requires an elucidation of what is meant by the term *indifference* or *community* of the extramental nature. Hence, before the presentation of the Scotists' arguments for the extramental community of the common nature, two kinds of indifference and aptitude to being in the many (already mentioned in 4.2) must be distinguished. Finally, I present the Scotists' rejection of Suárez's argument for the rational character of the community of the extramental nature complemented by exegetical reference to the Jesuit's certain doctrinal ambivalence.

1. At the beginning of the 4th question of the 9th metaphysical disputation, in a link to Scotus,⁶⁴⁹ Mastri/Belluto distinguish between two kinds of indifference. The first belongs to the proximate metaphysical universal and is called the *conjunctive* indifference. The nature in this state acquired by the abstractive act is related to all the inferiors as one undivided numerical thing (sic!) positively in the way that it can simultaneously (conjunctively) be in *all* of them. In this state it is also characterized as having the so-called *contrary* indeterminacy since as abstracted it stands in contrary opposition to actual determination by an individual difference.⁶⁵⁰ By acquiring this kind of determination through an individual difference it ceases to be one by the unity of precision (*unitas praecisionis*), which contrary to Fonseca and as in Suárez/Poinset is of conceptual character, and loses the status of being conjunctively related to all its *inferiora*. So the positive indeterminacy conceived as universality *in actu* (but still not the complete one⁶⁵¹) is lost. In this state the nature is only negatively common, which is a markedly weaker sort of indifference than the one possessed by the nature in the first state of being abstracted.

647. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 10, q. 1, § 6 (Venice 1727, 139): "Dicendum est, quod licet omnis res creata existens sit singularis, ut dictum est, nulla tamen natura creata est ex se individua, & singularis, idest ex principiis sibi intrinsicis, & ideo merito quaeritur quodnam sit principium individuationis ejus."

648. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 4, § 71 (Venice 1727, 96).

649. Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis*, lib. VII, q. 18 (St. Bonaventure N.Y. 1997, 347).

650. For Mastri's/Belluto's *ex professo* treatment of the conjunctive indifference of the abstracted nature see *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 8, § 184 (Venice 1727, 126–127).

651. See especially 4.5 of this work.

By this determination the indifference of the common nature comes to be only *disjunctively* indifferent and common to the instances of the given kind. The term “disjunctive”, a crucial term in the Scotists’ ontological doctrine, is by Mastri/Belluto construed *modally*. The human nature constituting Peter at the very logical moment in which it came to be contracted by *Petreity* could have (synchronically) constituted also Paul, or Anthony. Nevertheless, when constitutive of Peter it cannot be “replanted” to Paul any more, since as such it is not really (and thus separably) but only formally distinct from *Petreity*. As conjoined to *Petreity*, as the employment of the modal operator in the composite sense (*sensus compositus*) shows, it can no more constitute Paul. However, in the divided sense (*in sensu diviso*), expressive of its disjunctive indifference, the common nature of *man* could have *ex se* constituted also Paul, or Anthony, etc. In itself it is indifferent to being in them. Even though from eternity God by His decree determined that the effect in terms of the haecceity be this or that, i.e., particularized by *Petreity*, or *Pauleity*, the nature communicated to this or that individual or contracted by this or that haecceity still could *ex se* have been communicated to a different individual or contracted by a different haecceity.⁶⁵² The compatibility of the determination with an individual and the indifference of the common nature is confirmed also by the analogy with the well-known theological issue of *futura contingentia*. Just as *extrinsic* determination by the divine will to one of the alternatives in Peter’s volition is compatible with the *intrinsic* indifference of his (free) will, so the common nature “connected” by divine decree with *Petreity* intrinsically retains its indifference and thus as such is capable of being determined by *Pauleity* as well.⁶⁵³

In the further specification of the notion of the disjunctive *communitas* Mastri/Belluto reject two false explications. While one “reifies” the notion of the indifferent common nature, the other weakens it by means of a purely negative consideration. Although one can well present the obvious analogy between the indifference of the common nature and that of prime matter – while under a substantial form prime matter in itself retains the capability of receiving another substantial form just as the common nature under the difference of *Petreity* retains its indifference to the difference of *Pauleity* – the Scotists sharply reject such physical explication of

652. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 4, art. 1, §§ 73–74 (Venice 1727, 96–97).

653. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 4, art. 2, § 103 (Venice 1727, 104). This modal employment connected with the conception of synchronic possibility is in the context of the analysis of Scotus’s theory mentioned also by Peter King. According to King, Scotus introduces the “non-evident power for opposites” into the analysis of potency and act. The potency, construed as being “not used up”, is what guarantees that the things “could have been otherwise”. I am sure that this hypothesis is confirmed also in Mastri’s/Belluto’s reasoning about the disjunctive indifference of the extramental common nature. See King 1992, 67.

the indifference of the common nature. Its community is not physical but strictly metaphysical. Yet this does not mean that it is not in the thing but only in objective concepts or standing under the focus of formal concepts. Mastri/Belluto also rebut the claim (attributed to Cajetan) that the indifference of the common nature is to be understood exclusively as the negation of repugnance to being in the many. They assert that the aptitude and communicability of the common nature as a property of the nature stemming from its intrinsic principles must be conceived as something positive. The fact that it is articulated in negative terms cannot prevent us from understanding it positively. Actually, it is often the case that by negation one expresses a positive characteristic, as in the case of the difference “irrational” one indicates the positive differential grade of brutes.⁶⁵⁴

2. As all the Scotists with the only exception of Punch and contrary to Thomists and Suárez, Mastri/Belluto declare that community and the aptitude to being in the many belong to the nature *a parte rei*.⁶⁵⁵ Having defined the disjunctive and the conjunctive kind of indifference, they specify this extramental community by saying that it is disjunctive. It belongs to the nature not *reduplicative*, i.e., insofar as it is conceived *qua* existent in a singular, but *specificative* (*qua* the common

654. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 4, art. 1, § 76 (Venice 1727, 97): “... hanc non repugnantiam, vel aptitudinem naturae, ut sit in multis, non esse cogitandam in natura per modum potentiae, quae conveniat naturae, sicut convenit potentia materiae ad recipiendas formas ... Sed neque ex alia parte ponenda est mera negatio repugnantiae, ut voluit Cajetan ... cum enim haec aptitudo, & communicabilitas ponatur passio naturae, & fluens a principii ejus, ut a singularitate distinguitur, melius in positivo statuitur, quam in negativo ... Nec etiam obstat, quod talis aptitudo explicetur per negationem repugnantiae, frequenter enim per negationem rationem positivam indicare solemus, ut quando per negationem rationalis, exprimitur differentia positiva brutalis.”

655. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 4, § 71 (Venice 1727, 96): “Difficultas ergo est in praesenti quid sit, & in quo consistat naturae communitas, & aptitudo ad essendum in multis, & in quo statu naturae conveniat, an scilicet prout existit a parte rei in individuus; vel tantum per opus rationis; communitatem non convenire naturae a parte rei, sed tantum per opus intellectus fert communis Thomistarum sententia ... Suar. disp. 6. Metaph. sect. 4 ... Jo. de S. Thom. p. 2. log. q. 3 art. 4 ... Oppositum tenet Scotus 1. d. 3. q. 1 & 7. Met. qu. 18 quem omnes ejus sequuntur discipuli citati ab initio qu. praec. uno excepto Poncio, quia in hac materia de natura communi Praeceptorem suum Scotum dereliquit, & Thomistas adhaesit disp. 3. log. & ideo sicut ibi q. 2. concl. 4. nullam veram unitatem ponit in natura communi, sed solam agnoscit unitatem similitudinis unius individui cum alio sub eadem specie, ita consequenter loquens q. 3 cum Thomistis, & Suar. disp. 6. Met. sect. 4 ...” For a comparison of Mastri/Belluto and Punch in the issue of the unity and the community of the common nature see Heider 2010c. See also 4.5 of this work.

nature).⁶⁵⁶ All three arguments for this *Dico* revolve around the issue of how exactly to understand the particle *de se* in the claim that the created nature as such is *de se* nonsingular.⁶⁵⁷ All can be taken as evidence of Mastri's/Belluto's explication which is different from those of Suárez and Poinset.

- i. The finite common natures must be common and non-repugnant to being in the many because if they were not one would conceive them in a way repugnant to them.⁶⁵⁸ Mastri/Belluto agree that this community cannot be conjunctive but only disjunctive. The ontological commitment to this indifference cannot be eliminated by saying that it is secured by the entitative limitation and finitude of the created natures. According to this claim made by Suárez,⁶⁵⁹ it is the finitude of created substances what ontologically guarantees that the "products" of abstractive acts are not lies (*mendacium*). It is just this limitation that concedes the plurality of created instances of the same kind, which is not conceded in the case of the divine essence. Mastri/Belluto

656. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 4, art. 1, § 77 (Venice 1727, 97): "His praeceptis dico hanc aptitudinem remotam, ac indifferentiam negativam convenire naturae etiam in statu existentiae realis, non quidem reduplicative, sed specificative, nam natura existens habet duo scilicet sua essentialia, & singularitatem cum existentia, unde licet ratione singularitatis, & existentiae sit ad unum determinata, atque adeo ut sic nequeat esse in pluribus, tamen secundum sua essentialia non habet determinationem ..." See also Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 4, q. 1, art. 1, § 11 (Venice 1727, 142).

657. On the crucial significance of the interpretation of this term *de se* or *ex se* see also Kraus 1927, 43–54. Kraus's interpretation is misleading, at least, in one regard. His argument is based on the assumption that Scotus must be interpreted as conceiving the community of the extramental nature *physically*. The *metaphysical* consideration means for him nothing more than the composition on the plane of the objective concepts endorsed by the Thomists, Suárez and the like. He finds this metaphysical explication of Scotus's theory in the interpretation of Parthenius Mingos who brings Scotus too close to the theory of Aquinas. One of the upshots of my analysis is that Mastri's/Belluto's theory of the community of the *natura communis*, though critical of the Thomistic position, is to be seen as endorsing not the physical but the *metaphysical* community. For Mingos's interpretation see Mingos 1930, 67–106.

658. See also Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* II, dist. 3, p. 1, q. 1 (ed. Vat. VII, 394) and *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis*, lib. VII, q. 13 (St. Bonaventure N.Y. 1997, 215).

659. *DM* VI, s. 4, n. 12 (Vivès, vol. 25:221): "Sed fundamentum remotum hujus aptitudinis voco naturalem conditionem seu proprietatem talis naturae, ratione cujus non repugnat illi multiplicatio individuorum intra eandem speciem; haec autem proprietas non est aliqua aptitudo naturae communis ut sic, quae intelligatur quasi potentia quaedam actuabilis per plures differentias, sed est solum talis perfectio et limitatio hujusmodi naturae ... in specie humana unumquodque individuum talis conditionis est, ut illi non repugnet habere aliud simile in specie ..." See also 2.3.4 of this work.

decline Suárez's view by stressing the need to search for the metaphysical (mind-independent) root of this aptitude. It is not enough to explicate this aptitude to being in the many by the (physical) assumption of the existence of the plurality of similar natures, because there still remains the question of what the foundation of that possibility actually consists in. The correct answer must recur to two formally distinct elements in the created natures, one of which is *de se* nonsingular.⁶⁶⁰

- ii. With the exception of the nominalists, all agree that the nature in the thing (*a parte rei*) is not incommunicable and singular *ex se* but receives singularity from an extrinsic principle, the individual difference. Thus at least negatively it is *ex se* indifferent and communicable, i.e., as such it is not singular.⁶⁶¹ We have seen above that Cajetan and Poinsoot do not accept this conclusion on the score of a different interpretation of this term *ex se*. Communicability cannot pertain to the nature in the thing since the expression *ex se* is to be understood not positively as signifying the relation of causality but only negatively as “not-being-with-another”. Accordingly, the term *ex se* spells out the nature considered *solitarily*, i.e., in isolation from its being *in re*. As being *a parte rei*, it cannot be called negatively indeterminate because of its conjunction with the individual difference.⁶⁶² Mastri/Belluto deny that such communicability belongs to the nature only on the basis of the extrinsic condition, i.e., the

660. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 4, art. 1, § 78 (Venice 1727, 98): “... natura quae a parte rei in aliquo individuo reperitur, quantum est ex se, & ab intrinseco vel est communicabilis alteri ab illo, in quo est, vel non, vel est apta alteri inesse per identitatem, vel non; si primum, habetur intentum; si secundum, ergo quando concipitur sub ratione communicabilis, quod toties fit, quoties concipitur sub ratione universalis, concipitur sub modo suae essentiae repugnanti, quia de se non est communicabilis ... quod natura divina non possit concipi sub non repugnantia tali, fundatur in hoc, quia est de se essentialiter haec ... Respondent id [the non-repugnance to being in the many; D.H.] oriri ex limitatione, & finita perfectione naturae creatae, ratione cujus non repugnat, ut sint plura individua talis naturae, & plures consimiles naturae coexistent, sed talis non repugnantia non est aliqua naturae communicabilitas intellectum praecedens ... impossibile est intelligere consimilem naturam posse esse in alio individuo, nisi natura ex se intrinsece habeat, ut ad nullum sit intrinsece determinata, sed cuilibet de se compossibilis saltem disjunctim ...”

661. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 4, art. 1, § 82 (Venice 1727, 99): “... natura a parte rei existens ex se, sive ex essentia sua non est incommunicabilis, & singularis, sed illud habet a differentia individuali, quae est essentiae extrinseca; ergo ex se erit indifferens, & communicabilis saltem negative, idest non de se, nec ex se singularis.”

662. For a reference to Cajetan see Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 4, art. 1, § 84 (Venice 1727, 99). See also Thomas de Vio Caietanus, *De ente et essentia*, cap. 4, q. 6 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 1995, 245). For Poinsoot see Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 3, art. 4 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 328–332).

solitude which may be obtained by two kinds of mental abstraction, the one entailing the nature in its objective being and the one entailing the nature absolutely considered conceived by the “double abstraction”. The communicability must pertain to it already in the thing itself, because the extramental nature intrinsically possesses not only the quidditative predicates but also the predicates of the second mode *per se*, including the properties of community and unity. Accordingly, it is not correct to assume that the common nature exists *in re* only according to its essential predicates or its sheer conceptual content. Cajetan and Poinsoot are mistaken in the critique of Scotism because they seem to conceive this indifference attributed by the Scotists to the nature *in re* as indifference in the composed sense (*in sensu composito*), i.e., as taken together with the individual difference and thus considered reduplicatively with its existence in a singular. That, however, cannot be right. Its indifference is to be taken only in the divided sense (*in sensu diviso*). When it is said to be *ex se* not incommunicable, it is to be understood not in the sense reduplicating existence, as if the nature as existing *with* the individual difference were not incommunicable, but only *specificative*, insofar as it is still *in re* conceived as such.⁶⁶³

- iii. The last argument is based on the inference of the community from the non-singular character of the common nature. This inference is based on the logical rule that a negative proposition about a definite predicate entails an affirmative proposition about an indefinite predicate. If prime matter in itself is not determined by a particular substantial form, then in itself it is indeterminate by any substantial form. By analogy, if the common nature of *man* is not determined by Peter, then in itself it will be indeterminate by *Pauleity* and *any* other haecceity. Neither Cajetan nor Poinsoot⁶⁶⁴, as we have seen, find this argument cogent. They say that the rule is not applicable if propositions include reduplication. For it does not hold that if man *qua* man is not white, then man *qua* man is non-white. If that inference were valid, then the negation of the conjunction with whiteness would have to be part of the essence of man, which is false. Man *qua* man thus could not be connected with whiteness at all. Indeed, say the Thomists, the same conclusion is made by Scotus (and in fact later by Mastri/Belluto) when saying that if the nature as such is not *haec*, then

663. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 4, art. 1, § 85 (Venice 1727, 99): “... falsum enim est hanc communitatem negativam non convenire naturae ratione suae essentiae, sed precise ratione solitudinis, quam non habet, nisi per intellectum ...”

664. See Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 3, art. 3 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 328) and q. 4, art. 4 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 331).

in itself it must be common or nonsingular.⁶⁶⁵ Although Mastri/Belluto agree with Cajetan that the aforesaid rule does not apply to the reduplications in case of accidental predications (as Cajetan's example testifies), the Scotists reject it in the case of essential predications both in the first and the second mode. If God insofar as He is God is not finite, then God insofar as He is God is infinite; if matter *qua* matter is not determined by a form, in itself it is indeterminate. As long as the predicate "common" pertains to the nature in the second mode of predicating *per se* as its property – contrary to universality and singularity which are its accidents –, the inference is valid. Strictly speaking, the terms *inquantum* or *qua* are not applied in accidental predications *reduplicative*. As a matter of fact, reduplication implies that what follows the reduplicative term is the formal cause of the inherence (or the division) of a predicate in (from) the subject (either in the first or in the second mode of essential predication). If Cajetan says that man insofar as he is a man is not white, of course it does not mean that man insofar as he is a man is the formal cause of why man is not white. If it were the case, than man *qua* man could never become white. Mastri/Belluto thus conclude that reduplication makes sense only in *essential* propositions, as in the sentence "Man *qua* man is not capable of braying".⁶⁶⁶

3. The Scotists' conclusions about community and the aptitude to being in the many are confirmed by the reply to both Suárez's (especially *DM* VI, s. 4) and Cajetan's objections, which they find identical. For both community cannot belong to the nature in the existential state since by the contraction nature comes to be "this" in such a way that it is contradictory for it to be at the same time contracted by another "this", whether conjunctively or disjunctively. Moreover, it is impossible

665. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 4, art. 1, § 85 (Venice 1727, 99–100): "... natura secundum se non est propria alicujus, ergo ex se est communis, & indifferens negative ... a negativa de praedicato finito consequentia tenet ad affirmativam de praedicato infinito virtute illius primi principii, a quo removetur unum contradictorium, de eodem dicitur & reliquum; sicut ergo valet inferre virtute hujus regulae materia secundum se non est determinata, & de se haec, ergo de se est indeterminata ad quamcumque singularitatem. Resp. Cajetan, non valere processum a propositione negativa ad affirmativam de praedicato infinito cum reduplicatione ..."

666. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 4, art. 1, § 87 (Venice 1727, 100): "... non bene solvitur a Cajet. quamvis enim concederetur, regulam illam non valere cum reduplicatione in praedicatis accidentalibus ... universaliter tamen valere videtur in praedicatis essentialibus primi, & secundi modi ... proprie loquendo in praedicatis accidentalibus ly *inquantum* non tenetur reduplicative, reduplicatio ... denotat id, quod immediate sequitur, esse causam praecisam, & formalem inherentiae praedicati ad subjectum in primo, vel secundo modo, aut divisionis ab eo; cum autem dicimus, homo inquantum homo non est albus, non est sensus, quod humanitas sit causa formalis, & praecisa, cur homo non sit albus, quia tunc homo numquam esse posset albus, bene tamen cum dicimus, quod, homo quatenus homo, non est rudibilis."

for the contracted nature to lose its individuation and then go over to another one because the contraction occurs by real identification of the individuation with the nature. Finally, it is contradictory to predicate the properties “to be determined to *this*” and “to be indeterminate to the many” of the extramental nature. The nature in the thing is determined to “this”. Therefore as extramental it is fully particularized.⁶⁶⁷

Leaving aside the obvious “reification” of the formal distinction due to Suarez’s requirement of the separability of the current haecceity and reception of another one, all the arguments are based on the axiom of the incompatibility of the extramental particularization of the nature and its lasting community. For the Scotists this Cajetanico-Suarezian assumption ignores a crucial distinction, according to which “to be particular” and “to be common” are to be taken in two different ways. The nature can be *intrinsically* common and *extrinsically* or *denominatively* individual at the same time. The repugnancy arises only if the contradictory opposites are taken according to the same thing and according to the very same respect (*respectu ejusdem et eodem modo*). However, that is not the case with the *intrinsic* community and *extrinsic* individuality of the nature.

Nevertheless, it can still be objected that if one of the contradictory opposites pertains essentially to a subject, the opposite cannot be attributed to it even extrinsically and accidentally. If *man* is rational and capable of laughter, he can neither essentially nor accidentally be irrational and incapable of laughter. Equally, if the nature is essentially common, it can never be even accidentally and extrinsically singular. Mastri/Belluto are sure that this mutual exclusion of opposites holds only in the case of true and absolute opposites. As example of such absolute opposites they mention the propositions “the man is unqualifiedly black as a whole” and “the man is unqualifiedly white as a whole”. However, the contradiction does not hold when those opposites concern oppositions only in a certain respect (*secundum quid*), i.e., if the second member of the opposition is “the man is white according to her/his teeth”. The Scotists make clear that this second proposition is fully compatible with “the man is unqualifiedly black as a whole” since “to be white” can belong *per accidens* to a black man. Similarly, it can be said that intrinsic community *per se* is opposed to singularity *per se* but not to extrinsic and accidental singularity. Singularity cannot be in opposition to indetermination by the formal principles because if it were, the same would have to be espoused in the issue of the *futura contingencia*.⁶⁶⁸ Provided that there is such a repugnancy, one would

667. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 4, art. 2, § 102 (Venice 1727, 104).

668. Theological theories such as the issues of the *futura contingencia* and the Trinitarian dogma (see especially the fifth section of this chapter) show that Mastri’s/Belluto’s philosophy is deeply inspired by theology.

analogically be obliged to say that when Peter's human will in his decision-making is determined by the divine will to one of the possible options, it necessarily loses its intrinsic indifference to both alternatives and thus ceases to be free. If that were the case, the *futura* would not be *contingentia*, a conclusion denied by all theologians of all schools.⁶⁶⁹

Strikingly enough, in spite of all the extensive critique of the community of the extramental nature in *DM VI*, 4, Mastri/Belluto detect a doctrinal undercurrent in Suárez which throws the Jesuit in the Scotistic arms.⁶⁷⁰ As stressed in 2.3.4, when explicitly stating his *Dico* Suárez in fact concedes the item of the negative indifference of the extramental nature by affirming that the nature by virtue of its formal unity precisely taken does not have repugnancy to being in the many since this (remote) repugnancy pertains to it only by virtue of its individuation. Importantly, this holds not for the state after the intellectual precision of the individual difference from the nature (that would make it nature in proximate potency) but directly in the thing itself (*in re ipsa*).⁶⁷¹ For Mastri/Belluto this Suárez's formulation is evidence that the Doctor Eximius "*volens nolens se subscribit Scoticae sententiae de indifferentia naturae*".⁶⁷²

669. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 4, art. 2, §103 (Venice 1727, 104): "... naturam in statu existentiae fieri individuum solum extrinsece, & per accidens ex adventu differentiae, quam non includit in sua ratione formali, & ideo adhuc intrinsece remanere aliis communicabilem ... cum singularitas non opponitur indeterminationi per principia essentialia, ut aiebam, non eam aufert, & ideo natura talem indeterminationem adhuc retinet cum determinatione ad singularitatem; alioquin pariter dicendum esset idem de futuro contingenti, quod cum determinatum est a divina voluntate ad alteram partem, non amplius retineat suam intrinsecam indifferentiam ad utrumlibet ... tunc futura veram non haberet contingentiam, quae proprie consistit in illa indifferentia ad utrumlibet ..."

670. At the same time it also confirms my interpretation introduced above in the chapter on Suárez.

671. *DM VI*, s. 4, n. 10 (Vivès, vol. 25: 220).

672. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 4, art. 2, §103 (Venice 1727, 104). By this comment regarding Mastri's/Belluto's detection of the Scotistic (though nominalized) undercurrent in Suárez's reasoning I do not intend to say that Mastri's/Belluto's theory presents "the final and the true word" to the problem. Their theory is committed to fairly strong ontological assumptions, such as not everyone is willing to accept. What I want to show is that it is not only their chronological posteriority as compared to the works of Poinsett and Suárez but above all their detailed and in way congenial encyclopedic knowledge of the philosophical systems of other thinkers (including the philosophies of Poinsett and Suárez) together with their subtle Scotistic conceptual "armamentarium" what often bring them to discover the doctrinal lacunae, systematic tensions and latent Scotistic features within the concepts of other authors. Just that happens here in their exposition of Suárez's "Scotism" manifested by the Jesuit's espousal of the extramental remote potency of the common nature to being in the many.

4.3.4 Community *per indifferentiam*, or *per inexistentiam*?

After restating the extramental community of the *universale metaphysicum remotum* Mastri/Belluto approach, once again, the enquiry into the precise character of its indifference. Although in the 4th question of the 9th metaphysical disputation they have more than replied to the issue “whether” (*an sit*) there is extramental community belonging to the nature in the thing (by accepting the disjunctive indifference of the extramental nature they substantially answered the query *quid est* as well), the challenge they (and in fact all Scotists in general) have to face now is epitomized by the alternative exposition of this indifference. This explanation of the indetermination of the *natura communis* is based on the notion of the so-called community by inexistence (*per inexistentiam*). This challenge makes them take up *ex professo* the issue of “what sort of community” in a special question.⁶⁷³ Before coming to the arguments for the doctrine of community *per indifferentiam* I specify the above-mentioned kinds of community by introducing the distinction between the metaphysical and the physical order, which directs Mastri’s/Belluto’s answering to the question. No matter how intra-Scotistic this decision-making seems to be,⁶⁷⁴ I surmise that the theory of community *per indifferentiam*, as considerably different from the ultrarealist exposition *per inexistentiam*, avoids the majority of objections to the Scotistic opinion laid down by a whole range of scholastics starting with Peter Aureol (ca. 1280–1322) and ending with Suárez.

1. By the notion of community *per inexistentiam* Mastri/Belluto understand the community of the nature, say human nature, which as one and the same simultaneously occurs or can occur *across* all individual humans. Importantly, this state of affairs implies that the humanity of Peter in itself is not really distinct from the humanity of Paul. Both are distinguished purely extrinsically by the added individual differences of *Petreity* and *Pauleity*. Nevertheless, in order to distinguish the common nature indwelling in a plurality of supposits from the existence of the divine nature, which as *numerically* one and the same exists in three divine persons, the adherents of this interpretation come with the important addition that the unity of the common nature is not numerical but only less than numerical (formal)

673. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 5: *An natura sit communis a parte rei per inexistentiam, num potius per solam indifferentiam* (Venice 1727, 105–111).

674. On the importance of this question for Scotists in the 17th century see Sousedik 2005, 155–156. Among the followers of the doctrine *per inexistentiam* Mastri/Belluto include the Scotists Nicholas Bonetus (ca. 1280–ca. 1343), Martin Meurisse (1584–1644), Filippo Fabri (1564–1630) and the Theatine Zaccharia Pasqualigo. The *status quaestionis* and the argumentation for the community *per indifferentiam* are presented also in Kraus 1927, 65–76. As for Fabri’s doctrine see Heider 2012e.

characterized by the indivision in essential principles.⁶⁷⁵ In the presentation of this position the Scotists lay emphasis on the fact that the unity stretches *physically* across all its inferiors as one and the same humanity. Their *entitative* interpretation of this kind of community becomes even clearer in the definition of the opposite indetermination, the community *per indifferentiam*. As stated, the common created nature is for them *in re* only disjunctively common because as such it could have been part of a different individual than the one it actually constitutes. Its indifference is not based on the capability to be simultaneously part of more than one individual. The common nature of Peter could have been a metaphysical part of Paul. Yet, as conjoined with *Petreity* in the thing it is multiplied not only extrinsically by the individual difference but even in such a way that it can be said that the humanity in Peter as *not taken with Petreity* is different from the humanity in Paul *not taken with Pauleity*. Although Mastri/Belluto deny that the distinction between the humanity in Peter taken without *Petreity* and the humanity in Paul taken without *Pauleity* is a real distinction between two things – there cannot be any real distinction *sensu stricto* since this distinction can be applied only to things including haecceities as well⁶⁷⁶ –, they say that both are entitatively non-identical and physically multiplied.⁶⁷⁷

675. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 5, § 107 (Venice 1727, 105): "... naturas creatas esse communes individuīs per inexistētiām, ita quod una, & eadem humanitas v. gr. reperiatur in omnibus, & singulis hominibus simul, & semel, nec humanitas unius differat ab humanitate alterius, nisi extrinsece, & ratione differentiarum adjunctarum. Ne autem per hunc dicendi modum videatur concedere in naturalibus id, quod tantum evenit in mysterio ineffabili Trinitatis, ubi una & eadem numero natura reperitur in tribus, addunt, quod cum ajunt unam communem esse naturam in singularibus, id plane intelligendum non esse de unitate numerica, quasi, & eadem numero natura sit in omnibus, & singulis, quia hoc est proprium dumtaxat mysterii Trinitatis, sed debet intelligi de unitate illa propria naturarum, quae importat indivisionem per principia essentialia, unde & dici solet unitas formalis, & essentialis, qua ratione dicitur etiam unitas minor numerali."

676. As we have seen in 4.3.2, the extremes of the real distinction are not formalities but entities with the aptitude to actually be. Real distinction belongs to the common nature only if supplemented by its singularity. However, Mastri/Belluto make clear that even though every distinction is non-identity, the opposite does not hold. There are non-identities which, strictly speaking, are not distinctions. One of the examples is the humanity in Peter conceived in precision from *Petreity* and the humanity in Paul considered in separation from *Pauleity*. Although strictly speaking they are not really different, they are not really identical either. See Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 3, art. 2, § 60 (Venice 1727, 93). On the difference between the notions of difference and non-identity see also Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 6, q. 7, art. 1, § 146 (Venice 1727, 270–271). See also Grajewski 1944, 91.

677. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 5, § 108 (Venice 1727, 105). See also Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 4, q. 1, art. 1, § 10 (Venice 1727, 141–142).

2. Mastri/Belluto leave no doubt that it is the second type of indifference that accompanies the common nature in the thing.⁶⁷⁸ Despite persisting doctrinal differences, this kind of community is much closer to the teaching of Suárez and Poinset who both stress the entitative (physical) particularization and multiplication of the nature in the thing. On the other hand, it is also apparent that Mastri's/Belluto's theory is more in need of doctrinal differentiation from ultrarealism assuming a *parte rei* community *per inexistentialiam* equivalent to the *universale in actu* than the theories of Suárez and Poinset.

Mastri/Belluto believe that their preference for the weaker community *per indifferentiam* can be confirmed also by the formulations of Scotus himself. In *Ordinatio* 2, 3, 6 Scotus asserts that the common nature is of such entity that it exists only in one and not in two individuals.⁶⁷⁹ The formal unity of Jesus's humanity is different from Mary's humanity.⁶⁸⁰ In *Ordinatio* 2, 3, 1 Scotus points out that the formal unity of created natures is not common in the way that it would be proximately or immediately predicable of many but only in the manner that it is not repugnant for it to be in some other singular than in the one, in which it actually is. It is not only the numerical unity, indivision and indivisibility of the divine essence extramentally common to the three persons what distinguishes the divine nature from the formal unity of finite common natures. It is also its proximate predicability by saying "Hoc est hoc" – the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God – which does not hold of the common nature *in creatis* and is reserved for thought-objects having objective or intentional being in the mind.⁶⁸¹

678. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, ibidem, 105: "Dicendum est, naturam creatam, & praedicamentalem (de his namque est sermo in praesenti disp.) esse communem pluribus per indifferentiam, non autem per inexistentialiam." See also Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, ibidem, 142.

679. Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* II, dist. 3, p. 1, q. 6 (ed. Vat. VII, 476): "In eodem igitur quod est unum numero, est aliqua entitas, quam consequitur minor unitas quam sit unitas numeralis, et est realis; et illud cuius est talis unitas, formaliter est 'de se unum' unitate numerali. Concedo igitur quod unitas realis non est alicuius existentis in duobus individuis, sed in uno." See Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 5, art. 1, § 109 (Venice 1727, 105–106) and *Logica*, disp. 4, q. 1, art. 1, § 13 (Venice 1727, 142).

680. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, ibidem, 106.

681. Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* II, dist. 3, p. 1, q. 1 (ed. Vat. VII, 408): "... eo modo quo in divinis 'commune' est unum realiter, eo modo commune in creaturis non est unum realiter. Ibi enim 'commune' est singulare et individuum, quia ipsa natura divina de se est haec, et eo modo manifestum est quod nullum universale in creaturis est realiter unum ... In creaturis tamen est aliquod commune unum unitate reali, minore unitate numerali, – et istud quidem 'commune' non est ita commune quod sit praedicabile de multis, licet sit ita commune quod non repugnet sibi esse in alio quam in eo in quo est." Obviously, the Scotists' employment of the Trinitarian dogma in the realm of created common natures is much more extensive than in Suárez and

Although an extramental common nature is not of itself *haec*, it is not immediately predicable of its inferiors. In order to become proximately predicable, it must be, first of all, related conjunctively to its inferiors. However, this state of affairs can obtain only at the level of objective being where the nature is abstracted from the individual differences.⁶⁸²

Despite the running quotations from Scotus, emphasis is laid on systematic elaboration of the issue in the form of what I would label the “contrastive function” of the Trinitarian dogma in Mastri’s/Belluto’s explication of the community of the common nature.⁶⁸³ Their main argument goes as follows. If one admitted the community *per inexistentialitatem* as the sort of community proper to created natures, the Trinitarian mystery would be introduced *in creatis* as well. This introduction would, however, mean that our, as Richard Cross says, “polyanthropic talk”, i.e., our common *modus loquendi* saying that Peter and Paul are *two men*, would turn out to be a rather improper and misleading way of speaking.⁶⁸⁴ Peter and Paul would come to be not two human beings but only one man who is differentiated only personally by means of the different suppositis, in the same way as the Father and the Son are not two gods but only one God differentiated *suppositionaliter*. Mastri/Belluto find the assertion that the unity common to the numerically different individuals is not numerical but only formal to be a feeble evasion. If my reading of Mastri/Belluto is correct, the formal unity of created natures possessing (as the opponents say) the community *per inexistentialitatem* is a directly singular unity (making their theory an instance of ultrarealism) in virtue of the fundamental parity of both instances *in creatis* and *in divinis*.⁶⁸⁵ One cannot say that created natures are numerically divided in the singulars since the individual differences are really identified with them. Indeed,

Poinsot. The reason is that for them not only the dichotomy “universal/individual” but also the pair “common/individual” is of relevance. Mastri’s/Belluto’s conception of the *universale logicum* also employs the Trinitarian doctrine as an important device illustrating the Scotists’ theory of universals. On the contrary, in Aquinas’s theory of created natures the model “common/individual” is not applicable (Borgo 2007). For more on the illustrative function of the Trinitarian tenet see 4.5.

682. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 5, art. 1, § 109 (Venice 1727, 105).

683. On this designation see Heider 2011 and Kraus 1927, 124–127.

684. Richard Cross affirms that exactly this happens in the conception of Gregory of Nyssa (ca. 335–ca. 395) who extrapolates the Trinitarian conditions to those of created natures. See Cross 2002, 408.

685. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 5, art. 1, § 112 (Venice 1727, 106): “Ex praefatis ergo capitibus nulla potest colligi ratio, cur natura in divinis non dicatur dividi, & multiplicari per multiplicationem personalitatum in ipsa, sed bene natura creata per plurificationem haecceitatum, semper enim ex ipsis eadem currit paritas utrobique.”

even *in divinis* the personalities are plurified in the three suppositis and identified with the divine nature, and yet we do not say that the divine persons are a plurality of gods. Nor can it be said that a created nature is contracted by haecceities and the divine essence is not determined in that way because in itself it is ultimate actuality. As a matter of fact, the advocates of the rival theory of the community *per inexistentiam* hold that it is impossible to assume that the nature in itself is multiplied by an added extrinsic element. They are convinced that the created nature remains formally one and the same as it was before the contraction by this or that haecceity, much like the divine nature continues to be the numerically one and the same after being completed by this or that divine personality. The tentative account that by the advent of haecceity the created nature becomes incommunicable is rejected by the opinion of the *adversarii* who advocate the community *per inexistentiam* by an appeal to the merely extrinsic character of the individuality. In fact, this incommunicability concerns not the nature in itself but the nature *plus* its individuation. The divine nature *plus* the paternity or filiation is also incommunicable.⁶⁸⁶

The only way how to avoid the undesirable implementation of the Trinitarian conditions in the realm of created essences is to insist that created natures are identified with haecceities in such a way that they are multiplied also according to the real being of the natures themselves.⁶⁸⁷ Although not multiplied according to

686. Ibidem, § 111, 106: "... juxta hanc sententiam admittitur in creatis mysterium Trinitatis, nam eadem omnino natura est idem realiter cum pluribus singularitatibus, quin singularitates sint idem realiter inter se, sicut eadem natura divina cum tribus personis, quin ipsae personae sint idem inter se realiter. Caeterum, nihil aliud addatur, facile evadunt Auctores primae opinionis haec, & similia argumenta dicendo, quod procedunt ex hypothesi, quod haec unitas naturae in pluribus sit numeralis, quod quidem ipsi non afferent, nam haec est unitas formalis, quae est propria naturae ... Ad evertendam funditus hanc solutionem, quae magis prompte datum, quam refelli potest, inquirenda est ratio, cur divina natura in tribus divinis suppositis non dicatur dividi, nec numero multiplicari, quantumvis divinis personalitatibus terminetur, bene tamen natura humana in Petro, & Paulo eo ipso, quod ab eorum individualibus differentiis contracta intelligitur, adeo quod cum veritate dici possint duo homines, non sic Pater, & Filius duo Dii, vel enim id est, quia multiplicantur differentiae individuales in natura creata, & cum ipsa identificantur realiter, & ob hanc identitatem natura quoque in seipsa suscipit divisionem, & hoc esse non potest, quia etiam in divinis plurificantur personalitates in natura, & cum ipsa summe identificatur, & et non ob id plurificatur natura, adeo quod dici possint divinae personae plures Dii. Vel id est, quia natura in creatis contrahitur, & actuatur per haecceitates, non sic divina per personalitates, cum sit in ultima actualitate; neque hoc dici potest, quia intelligi nequit aliquid dividi, & multiplicari per adventum alterius ... sed natura humana secundum Adversarios ita in se manet una formaliter, & positive post adventum singularitatum, sicut antea ... natura simul cum singularitate nequeat communicari ... sic etiam pariter dici posset de natura divina, quod sumpta cum paternitate, vel filiatione sit incommunicabilis."

687. Ibidem, § 112, 106.

essential being abstracting from existence,⁶⁸⁸ they are plurified according to real *physical* being.⁶⁸⁹ Even if it were conceded that the unity *in rebus* as one and the same is not numerical unity but only a less than numerical unity, one would still get a mystery not dissimilar to that of the Trinity. The adoption of this doctrine proper to the *divinis* would amount to the violation of the principle “Things which are equal to the same thing are equal to each other”. The assumption of two really different haecceities of Petreity and Pauleity both being really identified with the third entity of humanity contradicts this principle, which only the divine essence (because of its infinity) is dispensed from.⁶⁹⁰ The doctrine of the community *per inexistentialiam* is also at odds with the principle “In things which are equal one cannot be without the other”.⁶⁹¹ If one assumes the real identification of Peter and Paul in a third entity, i.e., in humanity, one will have to deny the possibility of their

688. Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 4, q. 4, art. 2, § 25 (Venice 1727, 144): “... ens dupliciter accipi, primo formaliter, seu nominaliter, & significat essentiam; secundo materialiter, seu participialiter, & significat existentiam, & quidem primo modo abstrahit secundum se ab omnibus conditionibus individuandis, alio modo concernit omnes.” For this division see also Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 2, Prologue, 25 (Venice 1727, 25) and *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 5, art. 2, § 122 (Venice 1727, 109).

689. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 5, art. 1, § 113 (Venice 1727, 106): “... humanitas in suis individujs, sicut, & quaelibet alia natura creata in suis multiplicetur aliquo pacto etiam secundum esse reale naturae suadetur evidenti ratione, ita enim in individujs multiplicatur, ut quamvis multiplicatio non fit secundum esse essentiale naturae, fit tamen secundum esse reale physicum, quod a parte rei accipit, & hujusmodi multiplicatio est intrinseca naturae quia est secundum esse intrinsecum ejusdem naturae, hoc, inquam, probatur, quia si natura creata non ita plurificatur in suis individujs, jam illi communicabitur, sicut natura divina tribus personis, & sic Petrus, & Paulus bene dici poterunt duae personae humanae, non tamen duo homines.”

690. Ibidem, § 114, 107: “... etiam concessio hinc non sequi eandem naturam numero in creatis pluribus communicari, sed unam, & eandem unitate minori, quae dicitur unitas formalis adhuc miraculum habebimus in creatis simillimum mysterio Trinitatis praesertim in hoc consistit quod plures personalitates inter se realiter distinctae realiter identificantur cum tertio, scilicet cum divina essentia, nec tamen identificentur inter se, id enim directe repugnat illi naturali principio, quae sunt eadem uni tertio, sunt eadem inter se, & hoc in divinis privilegium ajunt oriri ex infinitate divinae naturae. Sed ex opposita sententia totum hoc contingeret in creatis, nam haecceitates inter se realiter distinctae identificarentur realiter in tertio absque quod inter se identificari dicantur; & parum refert, quod in creatis hoc tertium, in quo realiter distincta identificantur, sit aliquod commune, & non particulare, sicut est in divinis. Quia etiamsi divina natura sit singularis, adhuc tamen etiam est communis tribus, quia ibi nec singularitas communitatem excludit, nec e contra, ut in creatis contingit.”

691. Ibidem, § 118, 108: “Nam Adversarii, ut hanc suam tueantur sententiam de communitate naturae per inexistentialiam, duo negant prima principia, nam primo negant illud, quae sunt idem uni tertio, sunt idem inter se ... deinde negant aliud, quae sunt realiter identificata, unum esse nequit sine alio ...”

separation as well. Peter and Paul would thus be strictly coexistent in the way that Peter would come to exist necessarily with Paul and would necessarily cease to exist when Paul did. However, under the influence of commonsense experience,⁶⁹² the *adversarii* deny that. They say that it is because of its scope (*latitudo*) and inadequate identification with Peter and Paul that humanity can exist as really identified with Peter without being in Paul.⁶⁹³ So they come to two incompatible claims – of one common humanity in Peter and in Paul and of their mutual separation. As Peter Aureol had already argued,⁶⁹⁴ if annihilation and creation amounts to ceasing to be and coming to be of the *whole* entity, and provided that one professes the *per inexistential* theory, it would be impossible for God to create and annihilate Peter without the simultaneous creation and annihilation of Paul, which would among others equal to unjustified restriction of the divine power.⁶⁹⁵

The adoption of the entitative identification of the humanity in Peter with the humanity in Paul must be rejected also for another obvious reason. This admission establishes nothing less than an extramental *universale in actu*, rejected by all Aristotelians as a *monstrum*. If the nature *a parte rei* were formally positively one in all its suppositis by means of the community *per inexistential*, it would be

692. Ibidem, § 117, 107: “... ad sensum videmus incipere naturam secundum suum esse formale, ac entitativum in Petro, vel desinere, non autem in Paulo, ergo non est una, & eadem natura positive in Petro, & Paulo per inexistential ...”

693. In this context Mastri/Belluto mention Pasqualigo, the theoretician of the *per inexistential* community. In the the third section *Solvuntur nonnulla difficultates* of the 15th disputation *Quam unitatem habeat natura secundum statum realis existentiae* of the bloc called *De unitate essentiali* of his *Metaphysical disputations* Pasqualigo says: “... natura de se ex vi sui esse non est limitata, ut sit in uno tantum individuo, sed respicit plura individua, ita ut habeat ex se, quod ad plura possit extendi, ex quo fit, quod, quando ponitur in uno individuo, non habeat totam suam latitudinem, sed adhuc possit esse in aliis, neque enim in uno habet suum actum adaequatum; ex hac autem latitudine, quam habet fit, quod possit identificari cum pluribus unitatibus individualibus absque eo, quod in se ipsa dividatur, quia cum nulla adaequate identificatur ...”, Zaccaria Pasqualigo, *Disputationes metaphysicae*, pars secunda (Rome 1636, 133).

694. See Petrus Aureoli, *Commentariorum in secundum, tertium, quartum libros Sententiarum*, t. 2, lib. 2, d. 9, q. 2, art. 1 (Rome 1605, 103–104).

695. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 4, art. 2, § 89 (Venice 1727, 100): “Aureolus 2. d. 9. qu. 2 art. 1. putans opinionem Scoti de communitate naturae coincidere cum opinione Platonis sic eam impugnat, nam data tali unitate naturae communis in individuis non posset Deus sub una specie unum creare, vel annihilare individuum, quin omnia crearet, vel destrueret; consequentia probatur, quia si annihilaret totum individuum, aut tollit totam suam realem, & tunc cum realitas illa specifica sit in aliis individuis, quibus est communis, oportet eam in aliis annihilari, quod si non, ergo tota entitas individui non est annihilata, & sic proportione servata idem probatur de creatione.” See also Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 5, art. 1, § 115 (Venice 1727, 107) and *Logica*, disp. 4, q. 1, art. 1, § 12 (Venice 1727, 142).

related to them conjunctively, i.e., in a way liberated from the impediments of the individual differences. It would thus be proximately predicable of them by the predication “This is this”, for the Peripatetics an implausible consequence. It would not be far-fetched to designate such an extramental universal as the *universale Platonium* or due to its constant conjunction with *some* haecceity as the *universale quasi-Platonium*. Although connected with an individual difference, it would be ontologically independent of any determinate haecceity, which would make it a really distinct item in the ontological make-up of a substance, not dissimilar to matter and form.⁶⁹⁶

I believe that Mastri’s/Belluto’s rejection of the community *per inexistentialiam* gives us important clue that their conception ought not to be evaluated as a case of ultrarealism and that many popular objections to Scotism coming chiefly from nominalists aim at *this* ultrarealist version espousing the extramental inexistential community.⁶⁹⁷ Even though they concede that one can speak of ultrarealism in case of the divine nature and its indivisible exemplifications, and as we shall see below in 4.5 also on the intentional plane of the *universale logicum*, the community proper to the *universale metaphysicum remotum* is not physical but only metaphysical. That also means that as such it is to be conceived as physically multiplied in all its instances.

4.3.5 Formal unity of the common nature: Essential and existential order

The treatise on the community of the common nature and its aptitude to being in the many is followed by Mastri’s/Belluto’s treatise on formal unity. The issue of formal unity is analyzed in two questions; one deals with the unity in the state

696. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 5, art. 1, § 119 (Venice 1727, 108).

697. In the chapter on Suárez we have seen that the Jesuit’s approach to Scotus is *de facto* twofold. On the more charitable reading, Suárez claims that Scotus’s doctrine of the formal distinction and of formal unity is basically his own. On the uncharitable reading, he interprets the formal distinction as a real distinction. Not surprisingly, this reading leads to the assumption of actual universality in the thing. That can be observed, among others, in Suárez’s reasoning in *DM* V, 2, 10, where he argues against the implementation of the formal distinction between the specific nature and the individual difference in the following way: “... licet in tali natura haec unitas formalis possit ratione distingui ab unitate individuali, tamen concipi non potest quod a parte rei sit secundum entitatem suam praecisa et ex natura rei distincta ab unitate individuali et quod ut sic etiam careat unitate universali. Probatur, quia vel illa ut sic est communis vel incommunicabilis; haec enim duo immediate opponuntur; si incommunicabilis, est individua; si communis, est universalis.” [italics; D.H.] *DM* V, s. 2, n. 10 (Vivès, vol. 25: 151). One could also say that Suárez’s critique of Scotus and Scotism aims, above all, at the *per inexistentialiam* interpretation of the community of the extramental nature.

of essence,⁶⁹⁸ the other is concerned with the unity in the state of real existence in singulars.⁶⁹⁹ Before coming to the issue of the formal unity of nature in the essential state I first present four solutions to the issue of formal unity in general constituting the doctrinal frame of the Scotists' *status quaestionis*.⁷⁰⁰ Second, I introduce Mastri's/Belluto's four conclusions regarding the issue of the character of the nature in the essential state. Third, in the context of the problem of the existence/non-existence of formal unity *in re*, I present four statements, which (as the first quaternion) provides evidence of the Scotists' critical attitude to Suárez and Poinset.

1. Four opinions are identified by Mastri/Belluto as the typical answers to the issue. (A) Formal unity, whether in the essential or the existential state, does not pertain to the nature independently of the human intellect. The only unity *a parte rei* is numerical unity which by the intellect is appended by universal unity. There is no third unity as the formal unity mediating between the numerical and the universal unity.⁷⁰¹ (B) The nature in the essential state possesses a unity mixed of formal and numerical unity. This quasi-numerical unity does not descend to singulars since it is not multipliable. It differs from the multipliable formal unity by being countable. Despite its distinction from the numerical unity proper to singulars, it *qua* countable – the human and equine natures are two natures – has something of numerical unity as well. So it cannot be designated as purely formal or purely numerical. As such it must be conceived as including both formal and numerical unity without being identical with either of them.⁷⁰² (C) The nature as such does not have a *positive* unity, whether formal, numerical or mixed. In a direct link to Avicenna's dictum *equinitas est tantum equinitas*, the nature absolutely considered cannot have any of those. The only unity belonging to the nature in the essential state can be *negative* formal unity equivalent to mere formal indivision.⁷⁰³ (D) The nature in the essential state exhibits a unity which must be regarded formally as

698. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 6: *An natura in statu essentiae habeat quandam unitatem minorem unitate singulari, qua dicitur formalis* (Venice 1727, 111–119).

699. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 7: *An unitas formalis conveniat naturae etiam in statu existentiae, & et quodammodo* (Venice 1727, 119–126).

700. All the solutions can, among others, be taken as evidence that the selection of authors treated in this book is representative.

701. This doctrine is advocated by *Nominales* such as Ockham and Hurtado. On Hurtado's elimination of formal unity as a unity *sui generis* see 2.6.

702. On this (Fonseca's) doctrine see 2.3.2.

703. Mastri/Belluto attribute this opinion, among others, to Poinset.

a fully-fledged *positive* unity. This unity can be neither numerical nor mixed of formal and numerical unity, but only a less than numerical unity.⁷⁰⁴

2. Mastri/Belluto defend the last opinion. The nature absolutely considered or nature in the essential state has a proper positive unity, which is its property (*passio*).⁷⁰⁵ With reference to Scotus they say that Avicenna's statement on the neutrality of the essence toward singularity and universality does not imply that the nature has no unity at all. It only says that it has neither universal nor singular unity.⁷⁰⁶ The nature as such is "not this" because it includes the "modal element", according to which it can be disjunctively contracted by different haecceity.

In the argument⁷⁰⁷ the Scotists show that the nature in itself must have a perfect unity, since every being at every level has its proper unity.⁷⁰⁸ The nature as such has its own essence formally distinct from singularity. Considering *ens* essentially, the nature has its own "entity" followed by its adequate properties. According to Scotistic *scientia transcendens* these properties must be of a real and positive character.⁷⁰⁹ Formal unity is commonly characterized by the negation of division in formal principles. This negation and the corresponding "entity" of nature is basically all that is required for a fully-fledged and perfect unity. The negation of division in essential predicates implies a perfect and positive unity.⁷¹⁰

704. This opinion, as the Scotists note, is advocated also by Suárez (*nota bene* their different evaluation of Poinset and Suárez!). See Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 6, § 132 (Venice 1727, 112). This "allocation" of Suárez and "non-allocation" of Poinset in the camp of Scotists can again be taken as a corroboration of my interpretation pointing to the Jesuit's stronger ontological realism as compared to Poinset.

705. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 6, art. 1, § 133 (Venice 1727, 112): "Dico primo, naturam absolute acceptam, seu in statu essentiae habere propriam unitatem positivam, quae ipsam consequitur, veluti propria passio."

706. They refer to Scotus's classical *passus* on universals in *Ordinatio* II, dist. 3, p. 1, q. 1 (ed. Vat. VII, 402–405).

707. Though the Scotists present four arguments against the merely negative character of the nature absolutely considered, I present only those two of them, which are directly relevant to their coping with Poinset.

708. On the transcendental character of the unity of the common nature in Scotus see Wolter 1946, 107.

709. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 4, q. 1, § 3 (Venice 1727, 112): "Pro resolutione quaesiti dicendum est, ut ens, habere suas proprias affectiones, seu passiones reales, & positivas, ac certe plusquam ratione ab ipso ente distinctas ..."

710. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 6, art. 1, § 133 (Venice 1727, 112): "... sed in natura secundum se, ut ab individuatione distincta, invenitur entitas positiva, & invenitur negatio

Mastri/Belluto disagree with Poinso's description of formal unity. As we have seen, for Poinso formal unity is not a perfect and fully-fledged unity because the negation of essential division in the nature is not the type of indivision leaving the nature undivided *absolutely* and in *all* respects (*absolute et ex omni parte*). Formal unity actually admits of further division by the material principles entailing numerical division. Therefore it can be conceived as formally undivided only when it is taken with a reduplication (*sub reduplicacione*), insofar as the nature is taken according to its formal principles.⁷¹¹ The Scotists make clear that this argument in fact shows only that the nature is not numerically one. It does not demonstrate that it is not positively one in its own order, i.e., by means of formal unity. There is no doubt that Mastri's/Belluto's evaluation of formal unity as of a positive unity *sui generis* reflects their essentialism. If a being is regarded as a real essence and not as an actual being, then it also holds that indivision in a certain respect (*unitas secundum quid*) is not a decisive reason for the absorption of this unity by numerical unity, seen as the only kind of absolute and perfect unity (*unitas simpliciter*).⁷¹² On the supposition of such essentialism, it is not that surprising to see Mastri/Belluto say, so their second argument, that formal indivision is all that is in fact needed for a formal *positive* unity. Formal unity cannot be destroyed or diminished by numerical multiplication, only by formal division.⁷¹³

According to the second conclusion, shared both by Suárez and Poinso, the nature in the essential state cannot have the Fonsecan unity mixed of formal and numerical unity. A unity conflated of numerical and formal unity is a contradictory item. Merging of (categorical) numerical and formal unity is impossible since it holds that formal unity is communicable and numerical unity is not. Numerical unity is commonly attributed to singulars and not to multipliable natures.⁷¹⁴ Moreover, Fonseca's affirmation that the quasi-numerical unity is lost in singulars by being multiplied in them does not make much sense, either. Whatever pertains to the essence as such or in its essential state belongs to it everywhere, i.e., under all possible conditions including being in the thing as

divisionis quoad principia formalia; ergo invenitur plena, & perfecta unitas ... consequenter erit una positive ..."

711. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 3, art. 3 (Hildesheim/Zürich, New York 2008, 321–322). See also 3.3.2 of this work.

712. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 6, art. 1, § 134 (Venice 1727, 112).

713. Ibidem, § 137, 113.

714. However, the numerical unity (but not categorical) belongs also to the *universale metaphysicum proximum* having the unity of precision.

well. One cannot say that the unity proper to the essence exists only prior to its *descensus* to singulars.⁷¹⁵

The third *Dico* propounds the opinion that formal unity is a real unity which is less than numerical unity.⁷¹⁶ Typically of Scotism they claim that the reasoning for this conclusion cannot be disassociated from the solution to the issue of the nature of the distinction between formal and numerical unity presented in the fourth conclusion. There they say that in analogy to the formal distinction between the common nature and the individual difference, there is an *ex natura rei* distinction between formal and numerical unity as well.⁷¹⁷ In the comment to this conclusion they say that if the Thomists (and it must be added Suárez as well) concede that there is a less than numerical unity of the nature independently of the human intellect (which some do), and if they want to be consistent, they have to say (which they do not) that this formal unity is also *ex natura rei* distinct from numerical unity. Not considering formal unity as being *ex natura rei* distinct from numerical unity amounts for them to nothing but not conceiving this unity of the nature in itself as a less than numerical unity. If they deny the *ex natura rei* distinction between formal and numerical unity, Mastri/Belluto are sure, they cannot consider the nature as being *ex se* not “this”.⁷¹⁸

Apart from this nexus between the issues of the character of formal unity of the nature in itself and its distinction from numerical unity, the arguments for the third conclusion – based largely on Scotus’s well-known seven arguments from *Ordinatio* 2, 3, 1⁷¹⁹ – points to the close link (hinted at above in 4.2) between the

715. Ibidem, § 138, 113.

716. Ibidem, § 139, 113: “Dico tertio, unitas formalis naturae est unitas realis, seu a parte rei conveniens naturae, & minor unitate numerali. Haec conclusio est Doctoris loc. cit. quam etiam tenet praecipua Thomistarum pars cum Cajet. de ente, & essentia c. 4. qu. 6. ubi asserit hanc. concl. esse adeo manifestam, ut nemo sane mentis eam negare possit ... Suar. disp. 6. Metaph. sect. 1 ...”

717. Ibidem, § 149, 116: “Dico tandem formalem naturae unitatem non tantum ratione, sed ex natura rei formaliter actualiter distinguui ab unitate numerali.”

718. Ibidem: “Imo hoc ipso, quod fatentur Thomistae unitatem naturae esse realem, esseque minorem unitate numerali, fateri quoque debent esse ex natura rei formaliter actualiter ab ea distinctam; nam si ex natura rei, & a parte rei non est a numerali formaliter distincta, ergo in sua formalitate non est a parte rei minor ipsa, cum enim a parte rei ponatur prorsus eadem cum ipsa ...”

719. The analysis of these arguments in the secondary literature is abundant. *Ex professo* those arguments are commented, among others, by Tweedale 1999a, Cresswell 1965 and Kraus 1927, 76–86. Employing the terminology of Peter Frederick Strawson (1919–2006), Giorgio Pini calls these Scotus’s arguments “an exercise in descriptive metaphysics”. The less than numerical unity must be posited if one is to make sense of phenomena such as similarity, etc. See Pini 2007, 402–403.

analysis of formal unity in the first (essential) state and in the second (existential) state. That is fully testified especially by the argument “from the foundation of the relations of identity, similarity and equality”.⁷²⁰ Mastri/Belluto elaborate this argument in great detail.⁷²¹

The formal unity of the common nature must be real since if real relations, such as the relation of similarity, are to be real, they must be grounded in a *real, actual* and *positive* unity that cannot be numerical unity. A relation can only be real when its foundation is real. If this condition is not met, the result can only be a relation of reason. The unity of the foundation cannot be numerical unity because numerical unity is not the *ratio* of similarity but the *ratio* of dissimilarity. The distinction by the whole entity is the utmost diversity. As we have seen, Suárez and Poinso do not favour such reduction of similarity to unity. For both the similarity-talk seems to be ontologically irreducible to the unity-talk since the notion of *similarity* signifies primarily the plurality and distinction of things. One is not obliged to search for a unity founding the relation of similarity due to the requirements of ontological parsimony.⁷²² What is actually needed, and not only in the transcendental realm, is not a strong ontological commitment to the real less than numerical actual unity of natures, but only the so-called unity of similarity (*unitas similitudinis et conformitatis*) based on the similarity of the multiplied formal natures of things of the same species.⁷²³ If it cannot be ontologically analyzed by means of the notion of unity, the only way to explain it is to make use of the epistemological *explanans* of the

720. This argument, in Mastri's/Belluto's numbering the first one, corresponds to Scotus's second (from the comparison of the specifically same entities), third (based on the assumption of the foundation of real relations) and also sixth argument (grounded in the fact of the sameness of numerical diversity). A typologically different argument based on the notion of the adequate object of visual perception (in Scotus's *Ordinatio* labeled as argument five) claiming that the common nature is what “moves” human sensory cognition is analyzed in the following section. For Scotus's arguments see Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* II, dist. 3, p. 1, q. 1 (ed. Vat. VII, 396–402). For their concise presentation see also Suárez's explication of Scotus's arguments in 2.2.2 of this work.

721. The rudimentary version of this argument has already been presented in 4.3.2, in the context of Mastri's/Belluto's defense of the *distinctio formalis*. Nevertheless, in the context of advocating the formal unity of the nature in the essential and the existential state, this argument is given in a more developed form.

722. Even Mastri/Belluto are not entirely deaf to this requirement. They maintain ontological economy on the level of transcendental analysis. God coincides with creatures in the feature of *real being* (equivalent to being *extra nihil*), two haecceities agree in the common notion of *individual difference* as such, the three divine persons accord in the concept of *person*, and yet they all do not agree in some real positive unity, which would be *ex natura rei* distinct from their contradictory determinations. See Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 6, art. 1, § 140 (Venice 1727, 114).

723. Ibidem, § 141, 114.

notion of representability through a formal concept. As Suárez explicitly claims, the natures of Peter and Paul are similar to the extent that they can be conceived by the very same formal concept. What is not conceivable in this manner does not have the unity of similarity and thus it does not have formal indivision. For Suárez and Poinsett the unity of conformity conceived as a fundamental unity taken as the unity of essential resemblance is the fully sufficient condition of concept formation.⁷²⁴

Mastri/Belluto view the theory espousing similarity as a primitive state of affairs as blatantly insufficient. An object cannot receive unity from a concept because it is the object what specifies the faculties. On the contrary, the concept acquires its unity from the object which in itself must be one. It cannot be numerically one but only formally one. Each comparison actually requires the *tertium comparationis*, the aspect according to which it can be realized. If someone says that *A* is whiter than *B*, then both *A* and *B* must participate in the same formality of whiteness which exists in both of them as one and common *per indifferentiam*. It cannot be a singular whiteness since then *A* and *B* would participate in numerically the same whiteness. They must share in real whiteness which is disjunctively common and indifferent to both of them.⁷²⁵ When real and positive formal unity is dropped, one fails to give a non-circular answer to the question why Peter is more similar to Paul than to Bucephalus or why Peter is more similar to Bucephalus than to this stone. A theory not employing the ontological assumption of real and positive formal unity ultimately comes to the equalization of all the different grades of formal unity.⁷²⁶

The statement that the formal unity or the unity of similarity of Peter and Paul can be accounted for by the antecedent notion of representability by the same formal concept just trespasses against this non-circular explanation. Why can Peter and Paul be represented by the same formal concept? The advocates of the unity of similarity cannot say that it is because the nature has formal positive unity. They can only say that it is in virtue of having similar natures. Doing so, they in the very explanation of representability by the same formal concept make use of reference to similarity, which they before took as the original *explanandum*.⁷²⁷

724. For Mastri's/Belluto's reference to this opinion see their *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 7, art. 1, §172 (Venice 1727, 122): "... si requiritur aliqua unitas antecedens similitudinem inter naturam Petri, & Pauli, illam non esse aliam, quam repraesentabilitatem per eandem speciem, aut conceptum formalem, ita scilicet, ut quaecunque duo sunt repraesentabilia per eandem speciem, aut conceptum formalem, seu cognitionem, illa debent dici una, & consequenter similia, & hanc unitatem ait optime vocari posse unitatem formalem, & essentialem ..."

725. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 6, art. 1, §142 (Venice 1727, 114).

726. Ibidem, §143, 114–115.

727. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 7, art. 1, §172 (Venice 1727, 123).

The counterexamples taken from the domain of transcendental analysis are of no use here either. The Scotists rebut them by reference to the radical disparity between the categorial and the transcendental order. Contrary to the God/creatures relation, the categorial similarity of Peter and Paul is a real, positive and actual relation. As such it requires not only real formal unity but also *positive* formal unity. The foundation cannot be negative unity since the relation is not a negative but a positive entity. What is grounded cannot be greater than the grounding principle.⁷²⁸ It is not possible to say that a relation is positive and its foundation negative or privative in the way of being deprived of its original positive unity possessed in the essential state. The same can also be said about its *actual* character. It is not sufficient to take the foundation of a predicamental relation as a virtual one. If the relation of similarity is an actual relation, its foundation must be actual as well. However, all those requirements are not met by transcendental instances. The similarity between God and creatures is not of the same character as the categorial similarity between Peter and Paul. Since they are primarily diverse (*primo diversa*) their resemblance cannot be the same as in the latter case but it can be at most virtual. The primary and immediate diversity is due to the fact that one of the extremes, God, is simple, not composed by (actual) metaphysical composition of haecceity and common nature. Although by virtue of the foundational and virtual similarity one can abstract from them an inadequate concept of being,⁷²⁹ what is represented by that concept is not an actual and positive unity common to God and creatures but only the negation of their dissimilarity. The same holds also for the abstraction of the common concept of haecceity from single haecceities and in the case of the notion of personality as such within the three persons of the Trinity.⁷³⁰

3. The argument “from the foundation of similarity” verifies the systematic interlock between the metaphysical decisions concerning the first and the second state of the nature and consequently articulates the specific feature of Mastri’s/Belluto’s theory. The argument confirms that in the existential state the nature retains the

728. This argument is urgent especially for Poinset who, contrary to Suárez, does not reduce relations to the mere connotations of terms.

729. It may well be said that for Mastri/Belluto the abstraction of the inadequate transcendental concept is equivalent to the abstraction of categorial concepts endorsed by the Thomists and Suárez.

730. See Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 6, art. 1, § 144 (Venice 1727, 115). On the inadequate concept of being in relation to God and creatures see Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 2, q. 4, art. 1 (Venice 1727, 44–51). Regarding the notion of haecceity as such see Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 10, q. 10 (Venice 1727, 177–181).

formal unity, which it had in the essential state (the first conclusion).⁷³¹ In the existential state and when contracted to individuals it retains the formal unity in the same shape, i.e., not deprived of its positive character (the second conclusion).⁷³²

Concerning the question whether formal unity is conserved also at the existential level Mastri/Belluto distinguish two main opinions. One of them denies that the nature *in re* retains the formal unity, whether positive or negative, which it had in the essential state. The adherents of this thesis are not only the authors who refuse formal unity in the essential state (Hurtado de Mendoza), but also those who are willing to ascribe to the nature in essential being some kind of formal unity. Typically, Poinsoot is mentioned as one of them. If Poinsoot denies negative community of the natures in things (which he does *expressis verbis*⁷³³), there is no way he could maintain even a negative formal unity *in re*. The only way to conceive formal unity in the existential state is to take it as the unity of similarity and conformity, a theory already rejected by Mastri/Belluto.⁷³⁴

The authors defending the opposite view believe that the nature in the existential state fully retains the formal unity it had before in the essential state. This opinion can be construed in two ways. This twofold explication shows how methodologically important the distinction between the community (unity) *per inexistenciam* and *per indifferentiam* is for the Scotists. Some think that the formal unity of the nature is not multiplied in its inferiors. They call this unity formal because, unlike numerical unity, it exists or can exist in more than one individual. By asserting this non-multiplication, as we know, they *ipso facto* endorse the community *per inexistenciam*. On the other hand, some (including Mastri/Belluto) do not share this ultrarealist teaching and accentuate the multiplication of the nature

731. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 7, art. 1, § 163 (Venice 1727, 120): “Dico primo naturam etiam in statu existentiae, seu ad individua contractam adhuc suam retinere unitatem formalem, quam habebat in statu essentiae. Conclusio est Scoti, & Scotistarum ...”

732. Ibidem, § 167, 121: “Dico secundo formalis naturae unitas non est privativa in statu contractionis, & existentiae, sed positiva.”

733. See 3.3.2.

734. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 7, § 159 (Venice 1727, 119): “Prima sententia est negativa, quam tenent nedum Auctores, qui in praeced. quaest. negabant unitatem naturae in statu essentiae, sed etiam quamplures ex iis, qui aliquam unitatem concedebant naturae in eo statu; quia enim existere nequit, nisi individuata, nec in pluribus individuis potest existere, nisi dividatur per haecceitates, ideo in tali statu dicunt unitatem formalem amittere, qua in priori gaudebat ... Jo. de S. Thom. 2. par. Log. q. 3. art. 3 ...” Even though they mention Suárez as a supporter of the second opinion endorsing that the nature actually retains its formal unity in the existential state, they say that Suárez’s theory “non multum distat” from Poinsoot’s theory (ibidem). No doubt that is the consequence of his denial of the formal distinction.

and the formal unity in the things. They say that this multiplication is compatible only with the community *per indifferentiam*. Detecting the doctrinal difference between Poinset and Suárez, they classify Suárez⁷³⁵ as an advocate of the second opinion.⁷³⁶

The crucial exegetical problem regarding Mastri's/Belluto's text is how to reconcile their two apparently irreconcilable statements. On the one hand, in the first two conclusions they state that formal unity as contracted in the thing is compossible with numerical unity without losing any of its properties (especially its positive character).⁷³⁷ On the other hand, in the third conclusion they say that the natures and the unities are multiplied and particularized in singulars.⁷³⁸ One may say that while in the thesis about the non-compromising compatibility they seem to be disassociated from both Suárez and Poinset who do not concede the Scotists' claim that Peter is formally one with Paul and replace it with the claim of being formally one in himself,⁷³⁹ the statement about the multiplication,

735. It is not surprising that Mastri/Belluto rebuke Suárez for including Scotus in the first exposition: "... etiam merito [Meurisse; D.H.] Suarez reprehendit, cum dicit in hoc differre Scotum a Thomistis, quod Scotus non censeat unitatem hanc multiplicari ..." Ibidem, § 162, 120.

736. Ibidem, § 161, 119–120: "Opposita sententia affirmat naturam in statu existentiae eandem unitatem formalem retinere, adhuc in individuis, quam habebat in statu essentiae ... Verum duplex est modus explicandi hanc sententiam, primus asserit, quod haec unitas minor unitate numerali est una, & eadem positive in omnibus individuis, quia non est inconueniens, quod haec unitas stet cum plurificatione individuali, cum haec plurificatio tali unitati non opponatur; unde juxta hunc dicendi modum unitas formalis naturae non multiplicatur in inferioribus, sed est eadem in omnibus, & ex hoc capite dicitur minor numerali ... Alter dicendi modus negat, esse eandem simplicem unitatem communem omnibus individuis ... sed in quolibet singulari docet esse suam unitatem formalem ratione propriae suae naturae distinctam ab unitate numerali ejusdem individui, atque a simili unitate formali alterius individui; & hic refertur velut communis modus dicendi Thomistarum, quem proinde docent Cajetan ... Suarez ipse profitetur loc. cit. cum ceteris Recentiorib. ex quo fit quodlibet individuum duplicem unitatem habere, alteram formalem, & alteram individualementalem, formalis sequitur naturam; individualis vero esse individuale. Cajetan tamen ait unitatem formalem non importare quid positivum; sed solam negationem divisionis per principia essentialia ..."

737. For the argument from the compossibility of both unities (already mentioned above) see also ibidem §§ 163–165, 120–121.

738. Ibidem, § 168, 121: "Dico tertio unitas formalis, dum multiplicatur natura in individuis, non manet una indivisa in omnibus, sed ipsa etiam cum natura multiplicatur."

739. Ibidem, § 166, 121: "Respondet Suarez dari quidem in singulis individuis unitatem formalem naturae aliquo modo ab unitate numerali distinctam, sed ejus virtute non posse dici, Petrum v. gr. esse unum formaliter cum Paulo, sed tantum esse unum formaliter, & indivisum in seipso, quatenus in se a parte rei caret nedum divisione numerali, sed etiam divisione essentiali. Contra, haec etiam solutio rejicitur ex proxime dictis, tum quia eadem ratione, qua inquit Suarez Petrum

contrariwise, seems to bring Mastri/Belluto close to the position of Suárez and Poinset.

It is not the conclusion itself but rather the arguments for it that attest to the differences between Mastri/Belluto and Suárez/Poinset.⁷⁴⁰ Suárez's/Poinset's arguments are based on two premises which the Scotists find implausible. First, formal unity is not *ex natura rei* distinct from numerical unity. Second, the nature does not have community in the thing. If formal unity is not distinct *a parte rei* from numerical unity, then formal unity must be logically multiplied according to the singularities. If the nature is not common in the thing, then it must be multiplied according to the number of individuals.⁷⁴¹

One may ask what Suárez actually means by the community he rejects. If it was the community *per inexistentialiam*, Mastri/Belluto would definitely agree. However, if it was the community *per indifferentiam*, they would not.⁷⁴² Indeed, if one takes into account the uncharitable line of Suárez's interpretation of Scotus guided by the assumption of the reified formal distinction, one may conjecture that the Jesuit had the community *per inexistentialiam* in mind. But using the contrafactual state of affairs, what would Suárez have said about the community *per indifferentiam* if he had known it in the form advocated by Mastri/Belluto? Would he have found it plausible? Should he in the end be classified, as even the Scotists suggest, as strictly speaking "the latent Scotist"? I seriously doubt that such evaluation would be true to Suárez's metaphysical setting. The general framework of Suárez's metaphysics, no matter how strongly inspired by Scotism, inhibits the *sui generis* metaphysical domain of the Scotistic *formalitates* and formal causes for the benefit of physical entities and efficient causes. This suppression, I think, would have made this adoption difficult.

Saying so, the different ontological assumptions may be perceived also in the Scotists' justification of the multiplication of formal unity. The only possible account must be based on the distinction between the community *per indifferentiam*/ *per inexistentialiam*. The option-formation in the case of formal unity is conditioned by the decision-making in the issue of the character of the nature's community, which brings the Scotists to the conclusion that it is the nature's community what

dici in se formaliter unum, quia nimirum est in se indivisus per principia essentialia, poterit etiam dici formaliter unus cum Paulo, quatenus non est ab eo divisus, & distinctus per principia essentialia, sed tantum individualia."

740. Ibidem, § 171, 122: "... teneatur ergo conclusio cum Thomistis de multiplicatione unitatis formalis, sed eorum rationes dimittantur."

741. Ibidem, § 168, 121–122.

742. Ibidem, § 169, 122.

determines the character of unity.⁷⁴³ If the nature is not common *per inexistential* but only *per indifferentiam*, it must be multiplied in such a way that Peter's nature is *physically* and *entitatively* different from Paul's nature. Nevertheless, this physical multiplication does not prevent the metaphysician from considering Peter's nature as not different from Paul's nature, since the natures are of the same *ratio*. Metaphysically speaking, the natures are individual only accidentally (extrinsically) or denominatively. The metaphysician can distinguish the *ex natura rei* distinct nature from its individual difference because she/he considers the essence as prescinded from actual existence. While it is impossible for it to exist as common and one *per inexistential*, community and formal unity *per indifferentiam* are not incompatible with physical and numerical indivision.⁷⁴⁴

Yet is not just this claim about the precision from actual existence at odds with Mastri's/Belluto's present thesis of the (actual) existence of formal unity *in the thing*? Do not the Scotists lapse into the opinion of Poinset and other Thomists laying emphasis on the existential particularization of essences?⁷⁴⁵ I believe that affirmative answer to the questions would entail nothing less than the destruction of Mastri's/Belluto's teaching as such. The precision of existence from essence is not to be understood in the sense of a precision excluding actual existence. The intellectual precision need not result in the "production" of the essence in the state of potentiality (in the *universal ante rem*) or in the state of objective being in the intellect. It can also lead to the existence of the essence in the existential state in the things themselves. In my opinion it is the modal distinction between the essence and the intrinsic mode of existence what enables the Scotists to elaborate the issue of the formal unity of the essence in this twofold structuring, first at the level of the essential state, then at the level of the existential state.⁷⁴⁶ On the contrary, just the denial of this modal distinction is one

743. Ibidem, § 170, 122: "Recta igitur, ac fundamentalis probatio hujus conclusionis peti debet ex dictis quaest. 5 de communitate naturae, qualis enim erit naturae communitas, talis erit communitas unitatis ejus."

744. Ibidem.

745. Ibidem, § 170, 122. Raffaele Aversa (1589–1657) – an Italian Minorite – argues clearly as follows: "Dices, si [formal unity; D.H.] spectat ad essentiam, ut ab existentia praescindit, ergo non est divisio, vel unitas conveniens naturae a parte rei, seu existenti, in quo sensu hic agitur quaestio de unitate naturae." Ibidem, § 174, 123.

746. On this kind of modal distinction as the minimal form of *ex natura rei* distinction as applicable to the relation of *esse/essentia* see Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 8, q. 2, art. 4 (Venice 1727, 46–48). As for the difference of this formal-modal distinction from the formal distinction of two formalities see ibidem, § 131, 47. For the same interpretation of *esse* as an intrinsic mode of the essence in Scotus see O'Brien 1964.

of the reasons for the absence of this twofold structuring in Suárez's exposition of *unitas formalis*, whose explication in *DM VI* starts *immediately* with the issue of the existence of the formal unity *in rebus*.⁷⁴⁷ For Mastri/Belluto the precision does not eliminate actual existence but it is indifferent to actual existence/non-existence in the way, in which Aristotelian science abstracts from actual existence. Accordingly, this formal unity based on the essential indivision is real and belongs not only to the nature in the essential state but *specificative* also to the nature in the thing as *involuta cum existentia*.⁷⁴⁸

4.4 *Universale metaphysicum proximum*

Regardless of the terminological differences in the designation of the kinds of "phasic" universals, Mastri/Belluto distinguish between the metaphysical universal and logical universal just as Suárez and Poinset do. The *universale metaphysicum proximum* exhibits the so-called unity of precision (*unitas praecisionis*), which contrary to the *universale metaphysicum remotum* is defined as being positively or conjunctively indeterminate and thus disengaged from contracting individual differences.

In this section I follow two main goals. Differently from the exposition in the chapters on Suárez and Poinset, I firstly expound Mastri's/Belluto's view of the ontological status of the *universale metaphysicum proximum*. Only then I focus

747. The first section of the *DM VI* is called *Utrum sit in rebus aliqua unitas formalis distincta a numerali, et minor illa* [highlighting; D.H.].

748. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 7, art. 2, § 174 (Venice 1727, 123): "Resp. per essentiam ab existentia praescindentem non solum intelligi debere essentiam naturae in statu potentialitatis, antequam producat, aut in esse objectivo apud intellectum abstrahentem, sed etiam in statu actualitatis, quatenus sub existentia manens adhuc ex natura rei formaliter, vel saltem modaliter ab ea secernitur, quo pacto appellatur nomine essentiae, nam sub nomine entitatis significatur, veluti involuta cum existentia, in hoc itaque sensu indivisio essentialis individuorum dicitur spectare ad essentiam, ut ab existentia praescindit, quatenus, scilicet convenit essentiae, sive existat, sive non; quo etiam sensu scientia dicitur abstrahere ab existentia, non quia de rebus existentibus haberi nequeat, sed quia indifferenter habetur, sive existant, sive non; sic igitur in proposito talis unitas, & indivisio adhuc dici potest realis, & realiter naturae convenire etiam existenti, non quidem reduplicative, ut tali, sed specificative ..." I do not want to say that Suárez does not know this kind of non-eliminating abstraction from existence. As his notion of *ens reale sive essentia realis* shows, just the opposite is true. What I want to say is that Suárez's denial of any *ex natura rei* distinction between *esse essentiae* and *esse existentiae* of the created being makes it much more difficult for him than for Mastri/Belluto to distinguish between those two levels of analysis connected with the essential and existential state in the thing itself. On this abstraction in Suárez in case of *ens reale* see Heider 2011d, 112–114.

on the question of its formation. As in the two previous chapters the issue is presented within the broader epistemological and psychological context of Mastri's/Belluto's cognitive theory. As above, the main emphasis is laid on the issue of *cognitio singularis*, which is decisive for the understanding of the authors' doctrine of *cognitio universalis*.

4.4.1 The unity of precision and the extrinsic denomination

Mastri/Belluto take into account two opinions on the issue of the ontological status of the nature with the unity of precision. According to the first one the unity of precision is to be considered as a real unity. This claim can be understood in two ways. First, in the sense advocated by Fonseca, this unity belongs to the nature only in the state of *esse essentiae* considered as *ens possibile*; second, in the state of *esse existentiae* constituted by the *ex natura rei* distinction between the metaphysical grades. When one admits such extramental distinction, there seems to be no reason not to assume that this unity of precision is in fact an instance of real unity.⁷⁴⁹ According to the second opinion, the unity of precision pertains to the things neither in the essential nor in the existential being. It comes to existence only by the objective precision of the intellect which separates it from the individual differences.⁷⁵⁰

As in the question on the (physical) multiplication of formal unity, so in the context of the reasoning for the rational character of the unity of precision, Mastri/Belluto endorse the same conclusion as the Thomists and Suárez, although they reject their arguments for the conclusion. First, they dismiss the account based on the claim of the overall *ex natura rei* identity of the common nature and the individual difference. According to this reasoning it holds that the unity of precision necessarily postulates an *ex natura rei* distinction. But if one assumes that there is only a virtual distinction between the metaphysical grades, there is no way how to conceive this unity of precision as a kind of real unity. They dismiss Suárez's arguments based on the same assumption as well. If there is no distinction or precision *in re*, the only precision is that brought about by the intellect.⁷⁵¹ Nevertheless, they agree with Suárez's argument against Fonseca's opinion based

749. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 8, § 184 (Venice 1727, 126–127).

750. Ibidem, § 186, 127.

751. Ibidem, § 187, 127: "Secundo probat Suarez disp. 6. Metaph. sect. 3. num. 5. ex nomine, & ratione istius unitatis, quam dicunt praecisionis; si ergo praecisio non est in re, neque convenit naturae secundum se, sed per intellectum tantum neque etiam unitas convenire potest naturae secundum se, secludendo intellectum."

on the above-mentioned ontological parallelism between essential and existential being. If the unity of precision cannot belong to the nature existent in existential being, it cannot be its property in essential being, either. The essential being proper to possible beings is defined by the non-repugnancy to actual existence. However, if the unity of precision cannot pertain to the nature in existential being, then it cannot belong to it in the essential state, either. Since it exists only as individual, it is also apt to exist only as individual.⁷⁵² In the evaluation of these arguments the Scotists make clear that Suárez's argument for the conceptual character of the unity of precision makes the implausible assumption of the non-existence of the *ex natura rei* distinction.

Admittedly, Mastri/Belluto conceive the unity of precision as a universal unity (though not as the one belonging to the logical universal⁷⁵³), the cause of which must be searched for. This seeking does not take place in the instance of the community of an extramental common nature. Its community, not its universality, is regarded by them as the systematic point of departure. Even though there is the extramental precision in the things based on the formal distinction between the metaphysical grades necessarily complementing the community of the extramental nature, the unity of precision cannot be an extramental unity since as such it negates not only formal but also *real* unity. We have seen that formal distinction is compatible with the unitive (real) containment in an individual. This compatibility does not hold for the unity of precision. This unity includes not only features connected with the perseity of the first and the second mode (quidditative marks and properties) but also with the perseity of the third mode (the state of isolation from differences). This state yields not only the negation of formal unity but also the negation of real unity. This negation requires not only the exclusion of the intrinsic or essential individuality of the common nature but also the exclusion of its extrinsic particularization. However, that does not obtain in the case of the formal unity of the common nature. Despite its intrinsic nonsingularity, it *is* extrinsically singular. Mastri/Belluto state that just this extrinsic singularity must be denied of the nature having the unity of

752. Ibidem, §188, 127: "Tertio probat idem Suarez cit. num. 3. quia si dicatur hanc unitatem convenire naturae, non quidem in statu existentiae, sed essentiae possibilis (nam status essentiae solet interdum sumi pro statu possibilitatis, ut constat ex dictis disp. 8) hoc non videtur intelligibile, quia esse essentiae non potest concipi, ut reale, nisi saltem aptitudine per ordinem ad existentiam; ergo si haec unitas non potest convenire essentiae, ut existenti, neque convenit illi, ut aptae ad existendum, quia sicut non existit, ut individua, ita neque est apta ad existendum, nisi ut individua; ergo nullo modo illi realiter convenit."

753. On the distinction between the metaphysical proximate universal and the logical universal see 4.5.1.

precision.⁷⁵⁴ The unity of precision therefore belongs to the nature neither in the state of actuality nor in the state of possibility but only in the state of objective being, which it receives from the abstractive operation of the intellect.⁷⁵⁵

How do they specify this objective being? How does the nature obtain the unity of precision? As elsewhere in the *Metaphysics* and the *Logic* they say that the common nature in objective being gains this being by virtue of the *extrinsic denomination* of the intellect. As such this being is not truly real being but only being in a certain respect (*secundum quid*) or the so-called diminished being (*ens diminutum*) or being known (*esse cognitum*), all of which they characterize unequivocally as *esse rationis*. Though they accept that the nature abstracted from singulars as *res denominata* naturally precedes the act of the intellect, they deny that the nature *qua* abstracted and *qua* represented in this state retains real being.⁷⁵⁶

754. Ibidem, §188, 128: “[E]rgo a parte rei nequit obtinere natura unitatem praecisionis ab haecceitate etiam admissa formali distinctione inter ipsas, probatur consequentia, quia identitas realis adhuc sufficiens est ad impediendam hanc praecisionem, cum enim praecisio sit negatio quaedam, & haec sit malignantis naturae, debet distributive negare quamcumque conjunctionem naturae cum differentia, nedum per identitatem formalem, sed etiam per realem ... unitas praecisionis in hoc differt a unitate formali, quod haec utique competit naturae secundum se consideratae, ut ly *secundum se*, dicit perseitatem primi, & secundi modi ... verum unitas praecisionis convenit illi *secundum se*, ut dicit perseitatem tertii modi, & statum solitudinis ... status solitudinis dicit denudationem naturae ab omni prorsus differentia ...” See also ibidem, §190, 128.

755. Ibidem, §190, 128: “... hanc unitatem praecisionis non posse esse realem in natura, quia nec in statu actualitatis, nec in statu possibilitatis bene illi accommodatur, sed tantum in statu existentiae objectivae.”

756. Ibidem, §191, 129: “... natura communis, ut sic, aut representata universaliter, aut expressa universaliter nullum habet esse reale realis existentiae, aut essentiae, sed solum esse extrinsecae denominationis, quod est esse secundum quid, & rationis ... ergo unitas praecisionis, quae competit naturae, ut sic, non potest esse unitas realis, & competens naturae habenti esse extra animam ... natura, quatenus abstracta, nullum esse habet extra animam, quia extra non est abstracta; igitur unitas ista praecisionis, quae illi convenit, ut abstracta est, nequit sibi accommodari extra animam.” In the 2nd article of the 1st question of 8th metaphysical disputation *De entis finiti essentia, ac existentia*, where the issue of the *esse diminutum* enjoyed by the creatures from eternity in the divine mind is discussed, they take a critical stance against those Thomists who take the Scotistic diminished being of creatures to be either as some kind of real being or some middle (ghostly) being independent of the real being of God and His intellection. They affirm that “... illud esse cognitum prius quod in creaturas possibles derivatur ex terminatione divinae cognitionis non est aliquod esse reale, vel medium inter esse reale, & rationis, ut Thomistae Scot. idioma non intelligentes comminiscuntur, sed est *purum esse rationis*, qualis est esse visum in pariete, & esse intellectum in objecto intellectui repraesentato ...” [italics; D.H.], Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 8, q. 1, art. 2, §17 (Venice 1727, 22–23).

This *prima facie* clear evaluation of the ontological import of the extrinsic denomination delivered by Mastri/Belluto, nevertheless, stands in contrast with the statement about the “reality” of the extrinsic denomination in the 3rd logical disputation *De ente rationis, & secundis intentionibus*. In the 2nd article of this disputation devoted to the “formality” of being of reason Mastri/Belluto – in agreement with Suárez – conclude that being of reason consists formally neither in an extrinsic denomination nor in a relation of reason resulting immediately from an extrinsic denomination.⁷⁵⁷ In a fairly Suarezian manner they distinguish between two kinds of union between a denominating form (*forma denominans*) and a denominated thing (*res denominata*). While the first is a union in the manner of inhesion (*per modum inhaesionis*), the second is a union *per modum adhaesionis*. The assimilation of vital potencies with objects known cannot be primarily considered, as in Poinsett, in the fashion of inhesion but rather *per modum adhaesionis*. Contrary to the first model, the second model unifies the extrinsic denomination with its object not inherently but only adhesively and thus is related to the object as to (*esse ad*) its term.⁷⁵⁸ Accordingly, *esse cognitum* or *esse objective* formally and primarily cannot be considered as intramental being objectively in the intellect but rather as a formal concept existing subjectively in the intellect, which tends to the extramental *res cognita*. In compliance with Suárez, the Scotists state that the extrinsic denomination is not objectively in the intellect on the basis of direct cognition, but only in virtue of a subsequent *reflexive* act. By this reflexive act the extrinsic denomination is conceived as if it were something intrinsic to the denominated thing.⁷⁵⁹

757. Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 3, q. 2, art. 1, § 15 (Venice 1727, 118): “Dicendum est primo ens rationis formaliter non consistere in extrinseca denominatione proveniente ab aliqua forma reali, neque ab actu rationis, sive hic exprimat rem, sicut est, sive aliter.” Ibidem, § 21, 119: “Dicendum 2. ens rationis formaliter neque consistere in aliqua relatione, quae in rebus resultet ex ipsa denominatione extrinseca, seu ex formis res extrinsece dominantibus, sive per has formas intelligantur solum actus intellectuales, seu quaecumque aliae formae res extrinsece denominare valentes.”

758. Ibidem, § 16, 118: “... denominationem extrinsecam non esse realem, quia ad realitatem denominationis praeter formam dominantem, & rem denominatam, requiritur vera unio formae dominantis cum re denominata, & ideo cum forma extrinsece dominans non habet veram unionem cum subjecto denominato, denominatio extrinseca non est realis, sed solum ens rationis consistens in concomitantia plurium entium intrinsecarum terminantis, & terminati se habentium, idem habet Jo. de S. Th. p. 2. Log. q. 2 art. 1, ait enim, quod licet ratione formae dominantis possit extrinseca denominatio dici realis, ratione tamen unionis, & applicationis ad rem denominatam est rationis, quia nihil reale in ea ponit.”

759. Ibidem, § 19, 119: “... objectum reale non suscipit esse rationis formaliter, cum primo consideratur, cum tamen tunc suscipiat denominationem extrinsecam cogniti, sed suscipit illud quando secundo consideratur quasi per actum reflexum apprehendendo illud esse cognitum, velut quid intrinsecum objecto.”

Supposing that the act abstracting the common nature from its individual differences is the direct abstractive act, one is confronted with a tension in Mastri's/Belluto's theory concerning the ontological import of *denominatio extrinseca*. The way out of this *impasse* is not difficult to find, though. In the very article on the extrinsic denomination and its relation to the formality of being of reason in the *Logic* the Scotists assert that every philosopher in the school of the Subtle Doctor must distinguish between two kinds of being of reason, i.e., between being of reason considered *formally* or *actually* and being of reason taken *materially* or *potentially*.⁷⁶⁰ While a being of reason in the formal and actual sense requires actual fiction (*exigentiam fictam*), a being of reason in the potential sense is that to which actual fiction is non-repugnant. A potential being of reason can therefore be defined analogically to a real being, which is defined as that to which actual being is not repugnant. An extrinsic denomination in itself thus is a potential or material being of reason insofar as it *can* be conceived as an intrinsic form in an object, which actually is the only way how to form a being of reason in the fictitious, i.e., the formal and actual sense. Even though formally a being of reason comes to existence only by a reflexive act of the intellect, an extrinsic denomination such as "being known" on the non-reflexive level can still be ranked among beings of reason since it constitutes a potential being of reason. In this sense Mastri/Belluto note that the extrinsic denomination leaves something in the denominated thing, which is further elaborated in a way different from the *status quo* in extramental being.⁷⁶¹

By this distinction, as far as I know not explicitly advocated by Suárez, Mastri/Belluto come close to Poinset's "mentalist" standpoint after all. One might object that the difference between the Scotists' conception and that of Suárez, which I have sketched, is only verbal. Just as Mastri/Belluto, Suárez is of the opinion that what is called the metaphysical universal is the foundation of logical universality and a being of reason in the proper sense called the formal and actual one arises only by means of reflexive knowledge. Mastri's/Belluto's distinction between an actual and a potential being of reason thus can be seen as a logical development of Suárez's own theory. Nevertheless, no matter how subtle the difference is, it seems to me that Mastri's/Belluto's distinction between a formal and a potential (virtual) being of reason points to the deeper doctrinal difference in the issue of beings of reason. This difference comes to the fore especially in the definition of being of reason. Contrary to Suárez who admits as beings of reason only those "shadows of a being" that are *actually* thought in the manner of real beings,

760. On the importance of this distinction see Wells 2007, 333–335 and Kobusch 1987, 244–250.

761. Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 3, q. 2, art. 1, § 20 (Venice 1727, 119).

Mastri/Belluto explicitly assert that a being of reason is that which is or *can be* object of the intellect as if it existed in reality, when in fact it does not exist and cannot exist.⁷⁶² Why do the Scotists come with this modalization of the formality of being of reason? As Theo Kobusch rightly remarks, the reason is to answer Punch's objection to Mastri's/Belluto's (putative) inconsistency in the notion of the formality of being of reason.⁷⁶³ This incoherence consists in the denial of the commonly accepted axiom of the priority of intelligibility to actual cognition, according to which whenever something is known, it must have been knowable before. Nothing can be known without being previously intelligibile. However, if the essence of being of reason is equivalent to actually being known, it cannot be thought as potentially intelligibile. If it were, its essence would be denied.⁷⁶⁴ This caveat brings Mastri/Belluto to the application of the above-mentioned distinction. Though denying that the intelligibility of a being of reason is due to some formal and actual being in its own right, and despite the statement that the formality of beings of reason equals only to the actually being known, they concede that one can still speak of the cognoscibility of beings of reason contained virtually in the causes. Significantly, by those causes the Scotists mean nothing but the extrinsic denomination coming from the intellect, which in the subsequent reflexive act can be conceived in the manner of a real being while it actually does not and cannot exist.⁷⁶⁵

762. Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 3, q. 2, art. 2, § 30 (Venice 1727, 121): "... ens rationis esse illud, quod obiicitur, vel *potest obiici* intellectui, ac si esset, cum tamen nec existat in rerum natura, nec existere possit." [italics; D.H.]. For Suárez: "Et ideo recte definiri solet ens rationis esse illud, *quod habet esse obiective tantum in intellectu, seu esse id, quod a ratione cogitatur ut ens, cum tamen in se entitatem non habeat.*" DM LIV, s. 1, n. 6 (Vivès, vol. 26:1019).

763. Kobusch 1987, 246–247. It is not only in the *Logic* but especially in the *Metaphysics* where Mastri/Belluto reply to Punch's critique. See Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 8, q. 1, art. 2 (Venice 1727, 21–25). See also Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 2, q. 9, art. 1 (Venice 1727, 87–92).

764. This objection is formulated by Mastri/Belluto in *Logica*, disp. 3, q. 1, § 7 (Venice 1727, 116). For Punch's criticism see Ioannes Poncius, *Integer philosophiae cursus ad mentem Scoti*, prima pars complectens Logicam, disp. 1, q. 2, § 11 (Rome 1642, 73–74). On the challenge of the so-called "potentialism" to Mastri's/Belluto's doctrine and their reply (but without mentioning the theory of Punch) see Novotný 2008, 490–491.

765. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 2, q. 9, art. 1, § 236 (Venice 1727, 88): "Immerito etiam me arguit contradictionis, hic Auctor [Poncius; D.H.], quasi absque ulla prorsus limitatione, vel declaratione dixerim in ea ipsa solutione ens rationis non prius habere esse intelligibile, quam intellectum; & esse cognoscibile, antequam cognoscatur, quae est manifesta contradictio ... sed dico, quod licet ens rationis formaliter, & actualiter consideratum secundum suum esse proprium, non prius habeat esse intelligibile, quam intellectum; tamen adhuc absolute loquendo, potest in aliquo sensu dici cognoscibile antequam cognoscatur, quia scilicet in suis causis, &

We may conclude that although Mastri's/Belluto's evaluation of the unity of precision – pertaining to the nature in virtue of the abstractive transfer from the order of extramental being to the objective (intentional) order – is ultimately identical with that of Suárez and Poinset (for all of them the unity of precision on the reflexive level constitutes basically the rational foundation for the later relations of reason, i.e., second intentions), it still exhibits features ranking it under the header of “mentalism” rather than “realist conceptualism” as it is the case in the theory of Suárez.⁷⁶⁶ The immediate mental character of the objective being can be seen not only in the above-mentioned extended definition of the formality of being of reason but also in some additional indications. For Mastri/Belluto, beings of reason have not only an efficient cause (as Suárez thinks) but actually all four types of causes as real beings do.⁷⁶⁷ They also exhibit quasi-transcendental properties. The Scotists devote a special question to the issue of the attributes of being of reason.⁷⁶⁸ They regard the division of beings of reason into negation, privation and relation of reason endorsed by Suárez as insufficient and as standing in need of replacement by a more comprehensive division into ten categories mirroring the division of real being.⁷⁶⁹ The Scotists' conception of the unity of precision and the first intentions based on the abstractive operation of the *denominatio extrinseca* show that they stand closer to “the ways of ideas” of early modern classical (extra-scholastic) philosophy than Suárez, often considered to be its herald.⁷⁷⁰

fundamentaliter consideratum potest dici prius intelligibile, quam intellectum; immo etiam, & aliquo sensu formaliter juxta sensum duplicis allatae cognitionis directae, & reflexae ... ideo esse intelligibile in entibus rationis, antequam intelligantur, non esse aliquod intrinsecum, ut in entibus realibus, sed puram denominationem extrinsecam desumptam a potentia entis rationis fabricativa.” See also Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 3, q. 1, § 9 (Venice 1727, 117).

766. This conclusion is indirectly confirmed by Mastri's/Belluto's historical reference. When specifying their conception of first intentions they refer to Constantine Sarnanus – see Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 3, q. 8, art. 1, § 121 (Venice 1727, 137) –, whom (as stated) Larry Hickman regards as the key representative of the so-called “rationalist conceptualism”. On this sort of conceptualism, the first objective intentions are to be conceived as beings of reason. Suárez, on the other hand, is ranked by Hickman among “realist conceptualists”, for whom they are primarily real beings. For this evaluation of Sarnanus see Hickman 1980, 44–47; for Suárez see 47–51.

767. Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 3, q. 3 (Venice 1727, 123–124).

768. Ibidem, q. 6, 131–133.

769. Ibidem, q. 7, 133–135.

770. The same conclusion is formulated also in Novotný 2008, 497.

4.4.2 Intuitive and abstractive cognition: Principles and terminative objects

Having characterized the unity of precision as a unity of reason I have not so far said anything about the order and mechanism of its production. Just as in Suárez, an adequate presentation of Mastri's/Belluto's theory of abstraction calls for an exposition of the theory of *cognitio singularis*. Since they formulate their theories of singular and universal cognition within the two main contexts determined by the distinction between abstractive and intuitive cognition (*cognitio abstractiva et intuitiva*), one cannot expound the theories without an antecedent description of the basic *differentiae* between these kinds of intellectual cognition. This characterization is followed by a survey of the doctrinal items of Mastri's/Belluto's cognitive theory germane to the theories of singular and universal cognition. Analogously to the exposition of Suárez's and Poinso's theory, I go through the issues of the necessity of the intelligible species in abstractive cognition, the causes concurring in the production of the *species intelligibilis*, the distinction of the agent and potential intellect and intellection and the mental word (*verbum mentis*).

1. *The differentiae between intuitive and abstractive cognition*

In line with Scotus's and, in general, Franciscan "discovery" of the intellectual intuitive cognition in the 13th and 14th century,⁷⁷¹ Mastri/Belluto believe that there is an *essential* difference between intuitive and abstractive cognition.⁷⁷² By that they diverge from both Suárez and Poinso who regard this distinction as either accidental (Poinso) or of no relevance (Suárez).⁷⁷³ Their arguments for this distinction are of both theological and epistemological vein. Abstractive cognition differs from intuitive cognition because abstractive knowledge of God differs from the intuition of God just as human beatitude and fruition *in patria* based on face-to-face (intuitive) cognition of God differs from the beatitude we have *in statu isto* on the grounds of abstractive cognition brought about, e.g., by means of insight into metaphysical arguments for divine existence.⁷⁷⁴ Besides, it would be highly

771. On Scotus and Ockham on intuitive cognition (both considered to be landmarks in the issue) see Boler 1982.

772. Mastri/Belluto, *De anima*, disp. 6, q. 11, § 335 (Venice 1727, 200).

773. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 23, art. 1 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 724): "Formalis et propria ratio intuitivi et abstractivi non sunt rationes essentialiter et intrinsece variantes cognitionem, sed accidentaliter ..." Alejandro, 1948, 252: "Suárez no da mayor importancia al concepto de *intuición*, que tanta y exagerada la ha tenido modernamente." In 4.4.4 I also show that for Suárez intuitive cognition seems to be equivalent, above all, to the so-called *comprehensive* cognition exhaustively cognizing all the formalities of a thing.

774. On the theological motivation for the distinction between those kinds of cognitive acts in Scotus see Bérubé 1964, 183.

disproportionate if intellectual ability could not find its terminus in an object *hic et nunc*. Both sorts of cognition must be seen as essentially different on account of the distinction in their principles. The principle of abstractive cognition is an *impressed species* abstracted from sensible objects through phantasm. In the case of intuitive cognition this principle is the *object itself* in the immediate (experiential) existence or, in the case of the exterior senses, the object represented by a sensible species. One may argue that just this second statement about the presence of sensible species in intuitive cognition in fact relativizes the difference between cognition proceeding by means of species and without species. Mastri/Belluto do not share this concern. A sensible species proper to the exterior senses is of a significantly different character than an intelligible species. Both differ not only in entity, i.e., one is material, the other spiritual, they also differ in becoming (*fieri*) and conservation (*conservari*). The “becoming” of a sensible species, contrary to an intelligible species, depends on the presence of a sensible object. Without its presence a sensible species could not be conserved and could not elicit an adequate perceptive act. On the contrary, an intelligible species as mediated through phantasms can be preserved in the intellect even though the originally sensed object has long been absent.⁷⁷⁵

They differ no less substantially in their view of the terms of cognition. The Scotists even think that the aspect of the terms should be regarded as the main differential mark. While an intuitive act terminates directly in an actually existent and present object, that is not the case with abstractive cognition. The latter finds its terminus not in an extramental object but in an object “shining out” (*relucens*) objectively in the intelligible species *whether that object actually exists or not*. The last part of the description of *cognitio abstractiva* is important. What Mastri/Belluto are after is that the abstractive act is related to the existence of objects not as a kind of so-called eliminating (excluding) abstraction but as a kind of non-eliminating one. Abstractive cognition does not lay aside the actual existence of objects. However, stating that actual existence is apprehensible abstractively does not entail that actual existence *constitutes* the proper motive and terminative *ratio* of abstractive cognition.⁷⁷⁶

775. Mastri/Belluto, *De anima*, disp. 6, q. 11, § 332 (Venice 1727, 200).

776. Ibidem, § 334, 200: “Itaque concludimus, notitias istas distingui debere tam ex parte principii, quam ex parte termini ... principium abstractivae est species impressa objecti, intuitiva vero causari postulat ab objecto in propria existentia immediate, vel saltem mediate, quod addimus ob sensationes externas ... ex parte termini, quia intuitiva terminatur immediate ad rem in propria natura existentem, & praesentem, non in specie, abstractiva e contra terminatur ad objectum in specie relucens, sive a parte rei existat, sive non ...” Poinset, contrarily, says: “... intuitivum et abstractivum non important diversitatem in ipso formali principio cognoscibilitatis, quia

One may object that the existence of an object is only an accidental feature and not a trait differentiating essentially both kinds of cognition.⁷⁷⁷ Existence/non-existence seem to be only accidental “modifiers” of one and the same cognition, just as the common sensibles (size, shape, number, rest and movement) only accidentally modify the object *per se* of visual cognition, which is colour. The existence/non-existence of objects thus does not essentially change the character of cognition, just as the variability of the common sensibles does not change the character of the cognitive act of sight primarily focused on the cognition of its formal object, which is a colour.⁷⁷⁸ Mastri/Belluto reject this reasoning by pointing out that though both kinds of cognition can be constituted according to the very same object (the object *quod*), they nevertheless differ by virtue of the different *ratio sub qua*, i.e., by the viewpoint under which both kinds of cognition tend to an object. While abstractive cognition terminates in an object *regardless* of its existence/non-existence, intuitive cognition tends to the object *qua* existent object.⁷⁷⁹

2. Necessity of the intelligible species in abstractive cognition

We have seen that *ex parte principii* abstractive/intuitive knowledge differ in the aspect of the presence/absence of an intelligible species. While in the co-production of the abstractive act the intelligible species is conceived as a partial instrumental principle causally concurrent with the intellect taken as the principal cause, in the case of intuitive cognition this partial instrumental cause is the extramental thing

intuitivum et abstractivum in notiis non oriuntur ex ipsis mediis seu motivis aut principiiis specificantibus, neque ex diversa immaterialitate, quae est radix cognitionis, neque ex diversa ratione formali repraesentandi *quae* nec *sub qua*.” Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 23, art. 1 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 724).

777. Also Mastri/Belluto are sure that both types of cognition can and do aim at the same objects. They agree that it is false to assume that abstractive cognition concerns only quiddities and the intuitive cognition only singulars. In the following two subsections I show that by abstractive cognition the intellect grasps not only quiddities but also singulars and intuitive cognition *can* according to Mastri/Belluto take hold not only of singulars but even of common natures.

778. See Mastri/Belluto, *ibidem*, § 342, 202. Poinsoy says: “Ergo per se [the presence of an object; D.H.] non est differentia essentialis, quia non ex parte principii specificantis se tenet, quod est obiectum seu ratio repraesentabilis, ut ratio quae vel sub qua ... Modificat enim terminationem ipsius, non rationem motivam constituit, quatenus illi coexistit terminative seu ex parte termini, quod totum accidentaliter variat cognitionem, sicut in visione modificatio sensibilis communis ad sensibile proprium, ut quod album videatur cum motu vel sine motu, in tali vel tali situ, non variat essentialiter visionem ...” Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 23, art. 1 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 725).

779. Mastri/Belluto, *ibidem*, § 342, 202: “... praesentia objecti in seipso ad cognitionem intuitivam ... intervenit ... ut ratio *sub qua*, seu ut ratio cognoscendi, & terminandi talem notitiam ...”

itself.⁷⁸⁰ Mastri/Belluto understand the intelligible species as a spiritual quality, which as a seed of the object (it is only a virtual image of the thing) fertilizes the intellect with respect to cognition.⁷⁸¹ The existence of an intelligible species is much more disputable than that of its sensible counterpart. Since it is non-evident experientially, its existence stands in need of rational demonstration.

The first proof considered by the authors conversant with the Aristotelian tradition is one stating that the intelligible species is necessary since the intellect simply is an indeterminate cognitive potency requiring appropriate determination. Its indifference cannot be revoked extrinsically by the presence of an extramental object, but only intrinsically by means of a substitute in the form of an intelligible species.⁷⁸² The Scotists reject this argument by claiming that it entails an outright *petitio principii*, since from the very beginning it assumes the impossibility of direct causal concurrence of the *object itself* with the cognitive power. Even though they deny that the human intellect *in statu isto* is capable of intuitive cognition,⁷⁸³ by which they come close to the stance of Poinset and Suárez, they retain this cognition as a *real* alternative for the world to come and for the cognitive world of disembodied souls. They base their claim that the immediate concurrence of the extramental object in the production of the intellectual intuitive act is not only a possible state of affairs but a reality to come on the theological promise of *visio beatifica*.

780. On the causes of intellection in general and their division into the principal and instrumental cause see Mastri/ Belluto, *De anima*, disp. 6, q. 2 (Venice 1727, 139–142).

781. Mastri/Belluto, *De anima*, q. 4, § 71 (Venice 1727, 151).

782. For this Suárez's and Poinset's opinion see *DA* 5, 1, 3 and *CPT*, Phil. Nat. p. 4, q. 4, art. 1, 102; Phil. Nat. p. 4, q. 6, art. 2, 180.

783. Mastri/Belluto, *De anima*, q. 4, art. 2, § 109 (Venice 1727, 157–158): “Deinde falso quoque tribuitur notitia intuitiva pro statu isto intellectui nostro, probabilius enim est ... omnem nostram notitiam intellectualem, quam habemus naturaliter, ac de lege communi esse abstractivam, & nullam intuitivam, & ratio est, quia nunquam intellectus noster pro statu isto fertur in rem extra, & in propria existentia, sed ut apparet in aliquo repraesentativo v. g. phantasmate, aut specie intelligibili ...” *De anima*, disp. 6, q. 11, § 342 (Venice 1727, 202): “... pro statu isto cognitionem proprie intuitivam negavimus intellectui hac ratione, ac etiam sensibus internis.” Mastri/Belluto admit only what Bérubé calls the psychological intuition (see Bérubé 1964, 188), which is the intellectual intuition of the soul and our cognitive or volitional acts: “... satis probabile est intellectum nostrum saltem actus suos intuitive cognoscere ...” Mastri/Belluto, *De anima*, disp. 6, q. 7, art. 1, § 203 (Venice 1727, 175). The question of the factuality of the intellectual intuition in the present state of the connection with body is the highly controversial issue in the research on Scotus's philosophy, to which I cannot delve into here. See Bérubé 1964, 202–209 and Chabada 2005, 97–100.

Following Scotus's treatise *De anima*⁷⁸⁴ Mastri/Belluto dismiss the account based on an often accepted interpretation of Scotus's *Ordinatio*.⁷⁸⁵ On this view, it is necessary to assume the intelligible species because the intellect by its abstractive act primarily apprehends universal natures. The universal nature cannot "shine out" in the *species phantastica*, which is material and represents only singulars, it can stand out only in the intelligible species acquired by an abstractive act of the agent intellect denuding it both of materiality and *singularity*.⁷⁸⁶ Mastri/Belluto do not accept this justification. In a marked swing to Scotus's *De anima* they disclaim the premise of the above-mentioned argument, that to be material and singular collides with the indifference of the common nature.⁷⁸⁷ If that were the case, the claim of the merely denominative character of individuality of the common nature *in re*, including the compatibility of singularity and indifference of the common nature, could not be justified. The Scotists believe that just as there is *Petreity* and the common nature in the real Peter, there is also *Petreity* and the common nature in the external senses and in the phantasm of Peter as well. Though the visual power is moved by a singular object as by its object *quod*, this object *quod* is not the formal *ratio* or the principle *quo* by which the faculty is moved. The formal principle of this production of the sensible species is not the haecceity of the singular object but its *natura communis*. If it were the haecceity, one would have to be able to distinguish between two qualitatively identical singular objects in their singularity, which is impossible *in statu isto*.⁷⁸⁸ The same holds for the intelligible species,⁷⁸⁹ which also includes both representative characters, i.e., that of the *ratio singularis*, in which the *ratio universalis* is included.

784. For Bérubé (1964, 136) who considered *De anima* to be an inauthentic text, Mastri's/Belluto's reliance on the treatise *De anima* makes Scotus fundamentally inconsistent, especially when one takes into account the provably authentic texts such as *Ordinatio* and *Quaestiones subtilissimae in metaphysicam Aristotelis*. For a critique of Bérubé's opinion see Bazán et al. 2006, in: Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super secundum et tertium De anima* (St. Bonaventure N.Y. 2006, 121–135).

785. This account can be found, among others, in Chabada 2005, 106–108. This argument refers especially to Scotus's *Ordinatio* I, dist. 3, p. 3, q. 1 (ed. Vat. III, 201–244).

786. Mastri/Belluto, *De anima*, disp. 6, q. 4, art. 1, §76 (Venice 1727, 152).

787. Ibidem, §77, 152: "... esse extensum, & materiale, item esse singularizatum, & individuale non tollit intrinsecam naturae communitatem, ac indifferentiam ... per speciem minus, atque magis universale repraesentari posse ..."

788. Mastri/Belluto, *De anima*, disp. 4, q. 3, §28 (Venice 1727, 68).

789. For more on that see 4.4.3.

By this inclusion of the universal *rationes* in the singular species Mastri/Belluto *de facto* endorse Suárez's own opinion⁷⁹⁰ which is, as we know, markedly different from that of Poinset. That is also confirmed by the claim that the intelligible species differs from the sensible species not in representation but only in entity. For Mastri/Belluto and Suárez both represent singulars and the only distinction between them is the distinction in entity.⁷⁹¹

Having rejected the argument employing the universalizing function of the agent intellect, Mastri/Belluto take into account two more justifications. According to the first one, sensible objects are not intelligible *in actu* in relation to the human intellect but only *in potentia*. In order to be actually intelligible they must be stripped of materiality and elevated to the spiritual level. The purification from the material conditions is equivalent to the abstraction of the intelligible species from phantasms. On the doctrinal background of the distinction between the different cognitive statuses of the human intellect in the state of embodiment/disembodiment they conclude that this argument holds only for the *embodied* human intellect. Only *in statu isto*, in which we are significantly afflicted by original sin, is the intellect dependent on phantasms not only for the acquisition of the species but also for operation.⁷⁹² But an intellect capable of bypassing the senses, i.e., the intellect of separated souls, can and does have extra-sensory access to material beings.⁷⁹³

Since this (otherwise valid) argument from the potential intelligibility of sensible objects is limited, Mastri/Belluto present also a reason based on the assumption of intellectual memory. They take just this argument to be the best and universal proof of the existence of the intelligible species. Without the assumption of the intelligible species one cannot make good sense of the (theological) fact of the

790. On the influence of Suárez on Mastri's/Belluto's epistemology as well as influence of Scotism on Suárez see Tropia 2010.

791. Mastri/Belluto, *De anima*, disp. 6, q. 4, art. 1, § 77 (Venice 1727, 152): "... juxta hunc dicendi modum species intelligibilis, & phantasma non distinguuntur ex objecto representato, sed ex propria entitate, quod phantasma sit ens corporale, & species intelligibilis spirituale ..."

792. Mastri/Belluto, *De anima*, disp. 6, q. 1, § 6 (Venice 1727, 138): "Dicendum est de lege ordinaria pro hoc statu necessariam esse conversionem ad phantasmata in omni intellectione." Ibidem, § 12, 139: "... hanc dependentiam non oriri ex natura intellectus, ut sic, quia tunc anima separata necessario sic intelligeret ... Assignat Doctor duplicem causam, unam pro Theologis, alteram pro Philosophis: prima est originalis culpa ... causa pro Philosophis est naturalis ordo istarum potentiarum, adeo enim connexae sunt intellectus, & phantasmata pro statu isto in suis operationibus, ut superior operari nequeat absque famulatu inferiori."

793. Mastri/Belluto, *De anima*, disp. 6, art. 4, art. 1, § 75 (Venice 1727, 152).

memory of separated souls substantiated by biblical evidence.⁷⁹⁴ Sensory memory is far from sufficient for this kind of recording. As such it does not extend to the afterlife. Recurrence to divine infusion of those species to spiritual beings inadmissibly suppresses the natural abilities of the separated soul.⁷⁹⁵

3. *Concurrence of the agent intellect and phantasms in the production of the intelligible species*

Contrary to intuitive knowledge,⁷⁹⁶ abstractive cognition makes substantial use of intelligible species. In consonance with Suárez and Poinset, Mastri/Belluto assert that it is the agent intellect, what transfers objects from the order of materiality and potential intelligibility to the order of spirituality and actual intelligibility. The agent intellect makes the objects proportionate to intellectual cognition. Although sensible objects are fully intelligible, they are not such immediately for the embodied intellect. The input of sensory cognition or the “gateway” for intellectual cognition cannot *in statu isto* be bypassed by the intellect. The only way for sensible objects to become actually intelligible is to be elevated by the agent intellect.

The claim that the agent intellect causes the intelligible species does not mean that it is its total cause.⁷⁹⁷ It is accountable for its entitative (spiritual) aspect, but the entitative aspect is not the only facet of the intelligible species. It also includes representation, which it has in virtue of the represented object virtually contained in the phantasms, which are necessary for the production of the intelligible species. How do phantasms, the vehicles of abstractive cognition independent of the existence/non-existence of objects, concur in this co-production? Mastri/Belluto hold that they are not its material cause. An intelligible species is not received in phantasms but only in the potential intellect. As not received in phantasms it cannot be the subject from which (*ex quo*), either. The subject “in which” (*in quo*) must be identical with that “from which”. They also reject the solution endorsed by Suárez that phantasms generate quasi-exemplar causality as the *materia circa*

794. Luke 16, 23–26: “The poor man died and was carried away by the angels to be with Abraham. The rich man also died and was buried. In Hades, where he was being tormented, he looked up and saw Abraham far away with Lazarus by his side. He called out, ‘Father Abraham, have mercy on me, and send Lazarus to dip the tip of his finger in water and cool my tongue; for I am in agony in these flames.’ But Abraham said, ‘Child, remember that during your lifetime you received your good things, and Lazarus in like manner evil things; but now he is comforted here, and you are in agony.’”

795. Mastri/Belluto, *De anima*, disp. 6, q. 4, art. 1, § 78 (Venice 1727, 152–153). On the necessity of the intelligible species in Mastri/Belluto see also Spruit 1995, 345–346.

796. See Mastri/Belluto, *De anima*, disp. 6, q. 4, art. 2 (Venice 1727, 157–159).

797. Mastri/Belluto, *De anima*, disp. 6, q. 5, art. 1, § 117 (Venice 1727, 159).

quam. They do not hesitate to say that phantasms generate *efficient* causality, though partial and instrumental one. As in the production of intellection, where the total cause comprises two partial causes, the partial principal cause and the partial instrumental cause, they take phantasms to be the instrumental cause concurrent with the agent intellect. Phantasms are not only quasi-exemplar causes, in virtue of which the agent intellect actively depicts the intelligible species, but the real efficient cause.⁷⁹⁸

Although they note that Scotus himself considered the solution adopted by Suárez as “very probable”,⁷⁹⁹ they insist that phantasms generate efficient causality. Employing the theory of the total/partial causes they deny the claim that something corporeal (less perfect) cannot concur in the production of more perfect spiritual entities such as intelligible species or intellection. Although it is false to affirm that phantasms can be co-productive of intelligible species as the total cause or the partial principal cause, it is not incorrect to maintain that they are active in the order of the partial instrumental cause. This spiritual elevation should not be explicated as the reception of some intrinsic impression in the phantasms from the agent intellect à la Poinset’s *praemotio physica*, by which phantasms would be capacitated to the co-production of the intelligible species. What they stress is that this elevation is only extrinsic by way of mere assistance. They exemplify this causal concurrence on the example of a boy having the strength for two (normal) boys who is pulling a boat. A boat which can usually be hauled by five (normal) boys can be pulled also by four if one of them is just the boy having the strength of two. Although under normal circumstances the boat could not be hauled by four boys, it can be pulled by them provided that one of them is just the “strong boy”. Obviously, by the presence of the “strong boy” the original power or the strength of the given number of boys is elevated so that even four extrinsically assisted by the one having the strength of two can manage this task. Analogously, phantasms are extrinsically elevated and illustrated by the illuminative operation of the agent intellect so that they can be concurrent in the production of the intelligible species.⁸⁰⁰

798. Ibidem, § 121, 160.

799. Ibidem, § 116, 159: “... multi dicentes phantasma solum materialiter, & exemplariter concurrere ad productionem speciei intelligibilis, quatenus praebet materiam intellectui agentis, quodammodo exemplar quoddam, ad cuius similitudinem intellectus agens producat species, ita Suarez lib. 4 de Anim. cap. 2. num. 32 ... quem dicendi modum ut valde probabilem defendi Scotus quaest. 17 de Anim. ...”

800. Ibidem, § 125, 161.

Mastri/Belluto also deny the theories of objective, formal and radical illumination.⁸⁰¹ According to the theory of objective illumination the intellect only makes apparent quiddity and not individuation, just as sunlight makes apparent for sight only the colour of an apple and not its taste or smell. This explanation cannot be true since without the real agency and efficiency of the agent intellect in phantasms they cannot represent something actually intelligible.⁸⁰² Formal illumination based on the actual inhesion of the light of the agent intellect in phantasms is not a good candidate either. What is actually this light of the agent intellect? It can be either something corporeal, or something spiritual. It cannot be spiritual since a spiritual quality cannot be received in a corporeal subject. It cannot be a corporeal quality because then the object could not be transferred from the conditions of corporeality to spirituality. The theory of radical illumination, based on the doctrine of the irradiation of the powers in the common soul, cannot be regarded as the correct explanation, either.⁸⁰³

The agent intellect's illustration of phantasms is to be thought of as an instance of efficient causality. The intelligible object can exist only in the intelligible species. Employing the light metaphor they say that the agent intellect is related to phantasms in the same way as sunlight is related to the colours of sensible things. In the dark the colours are only potentially sensible. They are made actually sensible by sunlight. It is sunlight mediating the transmission of the sensible species to the sensory powers what appropriately modifies the sensory powers. The sensible objects can be active only when the other cause is co-active as well. The same can be said about phantasms and their "emission" of the species to the potential intellect. The illustrative activity of the agent intellect creates a luminous "medium", in which phantasms or objects represented in them, as purified from materiality, can give rise to the intelligible species received in the potential intellect.⁸⁰⁴ This denudation, importantly, *is not* the de-individualization of a species but only its "spiritualization".

801. Mastri/Belluto, *De anima*, disp. 6, q. 5, art. 3, § 148 (Venice 1727, 166): "Dicendum tamen, illustrationem phantasmatum ab intellectu agente nec fieri objective, neque formaliter, neque radicaliter ... sed effective, quatenus intellectus agens per suam actionem abstractivam illa elevat ad secum comproducendum speciem intelligibilem, in qua solum redditur objectum actu intelligibile, quod antea in phantasmatis erat solum potentia intelligibile."

802. Ibidem.

803. Ibidem, § 149, 166.

804. Ibidem, § 150, 166: "... intellectum agentem ad phantasma se habere sicut lumen ad colores, at lumen ad colores ita se habet, quod ubi in tenebris delitescunt species visibiles transmittere nequeunt ad oculum, postea commode cum lumine transmittunt, & visum immutant ... quando ... una earum non est in potentia propinqua ad agendum, nisi alia concurrens ad agendum, scilicet lumen, ergo pari modo phantasma gignere nequit speciem intelligibilem, nisi concurrente actione intellectus agens ... in hoc sensu tenet comparatio facta ab Arist. intellectus agentis ad lumen, & phantasmatum ad colores."

4. *The agent and the potential intellect and their distinction*

On the ontological character of the agent intellect Suárez, Poinsoot and Mastri/Belluto are in agreement. It is not an extrinsic, separated principle, God or a separate intelligence, but an intrinsic part of the human soul. As a principle of operations it cannot be extrinsic to the human soul.⁸⁰⁵ It is a faculty of the rational soul. However, Mastri/Belluto differ from Suárez and Poinsoot by introducing a formal distinction between the soul and its powers, and between the powers themselves.⁸⁰⁶

In contrast to Thomism, Mastri/Belluto do not accept a close analogy between the potential intellect and prime matter. This analogy seems to fallaciously suggest that the potential intellect lacks an entitative act much like prime matter is pure potency without any form. Just as Suárez they attribute an entitative act not only to prime matter but also to the potential intellect. The potential intellect must have its entitative act because the intelligible species and intellection received in it are accidental forms, qualities. As such they cannot inhere in a subject that is entitatively purely potential. The only sense that can be made of the analogy with prime matter is that the intellect is potential only with respect to the intelligible species. The potential intellect in itself lacks any intelligible actuality even in relation to itself. In order to enable self-cognition the intellect must first cognize other objects abstracted from the phantasy.⁸⁰⁷

The rejection of the analogy between the potential intellect and prime matter leads to the conclusion denying the real distinction between the agent and the potential intellect. Following the doctrine of the formal distinction between the powers, they “insert” the formal distinction also between the agent and the potential intellect. They even come close to Suárez’s own opinion. In order to satisfy the principle of the non-multiplicability of entities they say that the two intellects differ in a weaker way than the intellect and the will, which differ formally. They regard the theory of the conceptual distinction as *valde probabilis*. This conceptual distinction is in itself capable of securing all the functions commonly associated with the agent and the potential intellect.⁸⁰⁸

805. Mastri/Belluto, *De anima*, disp. 6, q. 5, art. 2, § 130 (Venice 1727, 162).

806. Ibidem, § 134, 163. Concerning the formal distinction between the powers and the soul and the distinction among the powers themselves see also Mastri/Belluto, *De anima*, disp. 2, q. 1, art. 2 (Venice 1727, 44–46). Concerning Suárez’s and Poinsoot’s assumption of the *real* distinction see Suárez, *DA* 3, 1, 7 and Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Phil. Nat. p. 4, q. 1, art. 2 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 61).

807. Mastri/Belluto, *De anima*, disp. 6, q. 5, art. 2, § 135 (Venice 1727, 163).

808. Ibidem, § 140, 164.

By the denial of the real distinction between the agent and the potential intellect they also reject two basic (Thomistic) axioms advocated by Poinset. One concerns the crucial role of the notions of act/potency in the diversification of the powers, which is closely connected with the axiom that one and the same power cannot be the proximate principle of both action and passivity. The agent intellect cannot really be one and the same power as the potential intellect since the agent intellect is characterized by pure activity making all objects *in actu* intelligible, while the potential intellect immaterially becomes all objects by means of spiritual or immaterial reception of the forms of sensible objects. According to the second axiom, both intellects must be really distinct since one and the same power cannot reduce itself to act just as prime matter cannot receive those forms without the operation of some extrinsic agent already *in actu*. As regards the first axiom, the Scotists reply that in fact the very same vital power both receives and triggers the act. Activity and passivity do not always diversify the powers absolutely. If they did, one would have to admit that *any* vital power actually is two really distinct powers, since with respect to its elicited act each power is both active and passive (receptive). However, for the reason of ontological economy (sic!) it must rather be said that one and the same intellect both receives the species and (with phantasms) produces them, just as the really very same intellect (with a species) both produces and receives a cognitive act. On the side of the intellect it suffices to assume only two distinct formalities corresponding to the two distinct *rationes agendi* and *patiendi*. Concerning the second axiom they say that what makes the powers vital is precisely the fact that they are capable of reducing themselves to act if an object is available. They dismiss the analogy of the intellect with the pure potency of prime matter. If this analogy were strictly endorsed, one would have to say not only that the agent intellect is really distinct from the potential intellect, but also that it is extrinsic and separate since only such extrinsic agent can reduce matter to act.⁸⁰⁹

5. *Intellection and the mental word (verbum mentis)*

Regarding intellection Mastri/Belluto give four opinions widespread in Second Scholasticism. First, it is the famous (*famosa*) Thomistic thesis that intellection (if not formally then at least virtually) is an *action* producing a really distinct item called the mental word or the expressed species. On the contrary, for Peripatetics following strictly Aristotle's assertion that *intelligere est quoddam pati*,⁸¹⁰ it does not consist in action but rather in passivity and the reception of the intelligible

809. Ibidem, § 143, 165.

810. Aristoteles, *On the Soul*, 429b25–26 (Cambridge, Massachusetts/London 1936, 169).

species.⁸¹¹ The majority of authors including Suárez, however, state that intellection belongs chiefly to the category of *quality*, it is produced by the intellect and the quality in itself *is* the mental word. For them it is equivalent neither to the production of intellection nor to reception, but to a vital operation with a fundamental tending towards the cognized object, which in the case of abstractive knowledge is an object in objective or cognized being, in the case of intuitive knowledge it is an extramental object. As the last view (*ut omnibus det manus*) Mastri/Belluto mention the syncretic tenet, according to which intellection includes all the above-mentioned elements, i.e., the productive activity, the produced quality and the reception of that quality.⁸¹²

In the first conclusion the Scotists show that they do not share the Thomistic view. Following a whole range of places from Scotus's *corpus*⁸¹³ they state that intellection is not a activity producing a distinct term called the mental word, but an *immanent* action. It is an action only grammatically or in analogy to a true, i.e., transitive action. *Intelligere* does not aim at the physical production of a distinct term with a new real being. It only tends towards an object which has being in a certain respect (*secundum quid*), i.e., the diminished or objective being. It is not a transitive action since it is an ultimate perfection of the cognizant and thus it does not serve any other purpose.⁸¹⁴

811. Mastri/Belluto, *De anima*, disp. 6, q. 3, § 27 (Venice 1727, 142): "Satis vulgaris, & famosa est in hac materia Thomistarum sententia affirmativam intellectionem esse formaliter actionem productivam cujusdam termini distincti, quem vocant verbum mentis, ac etiam imaginem, similitudinem, ac speciem expressam obiecti, quo nomine distinguitur a specie intelligibili, quae dicitur species impressa ... alii recentiores Thomistae, qui solum addunt intellectionem esse actionem virtualiter productivam termini, non formaliter, ita ... Jo. de S. Thom. quaest. 21. art. 1 ... Altera ... intellectionem potius esse passionem, ac receptionem, aut species intelligibilis, & impressae ... aut verbi ... intelligere est quoddam pati ..."

812. Ibidem, § 28, 142: "Tertia ... intellectionem esse potius qualitatem quandam, quae ab intellectu producitur, & hanc ipsam esse imaginem, ac speciem expressa obiecti ac ipsum verbum mentis ... intelligere nec esse formaliter producere intellectionem, nec eam recipere, sed per eam vitaliter operari tendendo in objectum ... Suarez disp. 48. Met. sec. 2. lib. 3. de An. cap. 5 ... Quarta ... haec omnia complectitur, constituitque intellectionem ..."

813. See, e.g., Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, dist. 27, q. 1 (ed. Vat. VI, 64): "Contra: Ibidem vocat Augustinus verbum notitiam: Notitia ejus, quod est proles ejus; et XV Trinitatis cap. 12 a, et 21: 'Est visio de visione et notitia de notitia.'"

814. Mastri/Belluto, *De anima*, disp. 6, q. 3, art. 1, § 29 (Venice 1727, 143): "Dicimus primo nec intellectionem esse actionem termini productivam qui dicatur verbum, aut species expressa obiecti, neque intelligere formaliter esse verbum mentis producere ... intellectio non est actio vera, & physica alicujus termini productiva, sed tantum mere grammaticaliter sic appellata ... dicitur actio immanens, quia praeter ea non est aliud opus, & per hoc ibidem distinguitur ab

The teaching of Poinsoot and *recentiores Thomistae*, influenced by Scotus as Mastri/Belluto note, who claim that although intellection belongs to the category of quality it nevertheless retains the character of a proper action, can in no way be considered correct. For Poinsoot, and also for Suárez,⁸¹⁵ intellection, owing to its eminence and perfection – the Scotists seem to view this reference to eminence as a Thomistic *deus ex machina*⁸¹⁶ –, retains the character of a true action. It includes both the *ratio fieri* and the *ratio termini producti*. However, comparatively to Suárez, Poinsoot's theory is less probable since it admits that in some cases the term of *intelligere* is *not* produced. While it *is* produced in intellection and in the cognitive acts of the interior senses, it is not in the perceptive acts of the exterior senses and in the beatific vision. For the Scotists, that contradicts the above-mentioned claim of the inherent virtual act-like character of intellection. If it sometimes lacks this term, it cannot as such be virtually productive of the expressed species.⁸¹⁷

If intellection is not properly an action, it is entirely superfluous to consider any distinct term produced by it. Though it is directed to a new object, this object does not have real being. This object is a *res cognita* having the diminished and cognized being. Moreover, the production of a distinct mental word justified by the necessity to have a similitude or expressed image of the object is entirely superfluous as well. In compliance with Suárez, Mastri/Belluto affirm that intellection itself can be a sufficient similitude and representation of an object without further attachment of any image. There is no need for a new item functioning as a representative of the object. There is no need for this item to have a cognized object intentionally present, either. That is sufficiently secured by other cognitive elements. Whereas the habitual presence of an object is sufficiently safeguarded by the impressed species, the actual presence is guaranteed by the intellection itself. As Suárez, Mastri/Belluto reject the claim that objects are known in the mental word as if in a mirror. This opinion corresponding to understanding the mental word or the formal concept as that in which (*id in quo*) an extramental thing is known is affected by an undesirable trace of representationalism being in repugnance with our experience. When one cognizes whiteness, one does not apprehend an image in the mind by means of which that whiteness is known. What one immediately perceives is the whiteness itself. The same holds also for *intelligere*. When one thinks of an object one does not think

actione transeunte, quae habet aliquod operatum per ipsam tanquam terminum ... operationes vitales ... dicuntur actus ultimi, & ultima perfectio operantis.”

815. On Suárez see 2.5.1, on Poinsoot see 3.4.1.

816. Ibidem, § 31, 143: “Pluries experti sumus Thomistas, cum rerum formalitates explicare nesciunt, ad eminentias, & virtualitates rerum properare ...”

817. Ibidem.

of any image of that object but of the object itself. The impressed and the expressed species are only images of objects *in repraesentando*, not *in essendo*. If they were, we would cognize them before cognizing the *res cognita*.⁸¹⁸

Since Matri/Belluto admit elements of “cognitive activism”, they cannot accept a purely “passivist” understanding of intellection, either. In the second conclusion they point out that intellection does not consist in the reception of the impressed or the expressed species. By reception intellection is related not to the object but rather to the cognizing subject. Just as for Suárez, intentionality is not primarily directed inwards, into the cognizant, but *outwards* to the object. Although reception is assumed as one of the conditions of intellection, *intelligere* is not equivalent to reception. Its essence consists in the expression of an object by means of tendency to it. This tendency is nothing but attentive focus on the object. Without the aspect of attention, accentuated by Suárez as well, no intellection or sensation can be elicited at all. If distracted and restless, it is difficult for the soul to elicit intellection.⁸¹⁹

Even though there occurs successive alternation of the reception/action phases in the production of intellection, *intellectio* is formally an operating vital quality which is being intentionally assimilated to an object.⁸²⁰ It is this aspect of tendency⁸²¹ what constitutes the quality of intellection in its vital being. Importantly, this vitality of *intelligere* is not primarily a physical vitality. That actually belongs to an act really different from intellection, to *dicere*. The life lived by the vital power of understanding is not physical life but *intentional* life.⁸²²

818. Ibidem, § 32, 143: “... at operatio vitalis transit in objectum, non simpliciter accipiens esse, cum secundum hoc esse naturaliter praeexigatur, sed secundum esse quoddam diminutum, cognitum ... nam ipsamet intellectio est sufficiens similitudo, & actualis repraesentatio objecti ... Et prorsus vanum est, quod quidam Thomistae comminiscuntur cum Cajet. cit. cognoscentem intueri in verbo objectum velut in ejus imagine, & quasi speculo, quia dum quis cognoscit albedinem v.g. non cognoscit aliquam imaginem existentem in mente, & media illa albedinem, sed immediate percipit albedinem ... tam species impressa, quam expressa sunt imagines tantum in repraesentando suorum objectorum, non autem in essendo ...”

819. Ibidem, § 34, 144.

820. Ibidem, § 35, 144: “Dicimus 3. quod esto in nostra intellectione tria illa concurrant actio, passio, & vitalis qualitas, non tamen intrinsece, & formaliter illa tria includit, sed tantum qualitatem illam vitalem, qua intentionaliter assimilatur intellectus objecto, eique vitaliter conjungitur.”

821. This aspect is, in my opinion, what also enables Matri/Belluto to distinguish between the adhesion and inhesion of the extrinsic denomination in the *res denominata*. See the previous subsection.

822. Ibidem, § 37, 144: “Et verum est, potentiam vitalem tum producendo, tum operando exercere vitaliter, sed diversimode, nam producendo actum vitalem exercetur vita physica, & per illum operando, ac tendendo in objectum, exercetur vita intentionalis.” On the emphasis on the intentional life in Scotus see Pasnau 2003, 287–290 and Cross 2010.

In the following article⁸²³ Mastri/Belluto, quite symptomatically in keeping with Suárez and against Poinset, formulate the first conclusion stating that the mental word is nothing but the intellection itself and not any other distinct produced term. The Scotists prove the conclusion by eliminating rival positions. Leaving aside the Thomistic solution dismissed in the previous article, they reject four other alternatives. (1) The mental word cannot be an intelligible species, since the mental word is not the cause or principle but the effect of the species. (2) The mental word cannot be a habitus, because a habitus is the effect of the repeated production of a mental word. (3) It cannot be an object in its real and extramental being, since it is produced by the intellect and “resides” in the intellect. (4) Likewise, the expressed species is not the object according to the being known, which it has in the intellect. This object, as stated, has the cognized or diminished being expressed by the mental word and thus is not identical with it. By means of this elimination, Mastri/Belluto arrive at the “Suarezian” doctrine that the mental word cannot be anything but intellection itself.⁸²⁴

In the second and third conclusion the Scotists formulate the corollaries, shared neither by Poinset nor by Suárez. As we have seen, Mastri/Belluto reject the virtually act-like character of *intelligere*. In the second conclusion they state that the mental word is constituted by the memory fecundated either by the object itself or by its species. The operation of the fecundated memory is necessary to secure the different character of the productive act of the mental word from intellection.⁸²⁵ In the third *Dico* they confirm this conclusion by claiming that the mental word is produced not by an act of intellection (*actus intelligendi*) but by an act of saying (*actus dicendi*).⁸²⁶

We may conclude that even though there are substantial affinities between Mastri/Belluto and Suárez, the last stated conclusion of the real distinction between

823. This article, actually the second article of the third question *De intellectione, ac verbo mentis* of the sixth disputation of *De anima*, is called *Declaratur natura verbi mentalis, ejusque productio*.

824. Mastri/Belluto, *De anima*, disp. 6, q. 3, art. 2, § 47 (Venice 1727, 146): “Dicendum primo, quod verbum mentale est ipsa actualis intellectio, non quid ab ea distinctum.” For Hermann Müller this thesis of the real identity of the cognitive act and the mental word, together with the statement on the intentional direction to a cognized object, constitute the typical features of Augustinianism in the theory of the mental word in Spanish Scholasticism of the 16th century. This doctrine passing to Second Scholasticism *via* Scotus substantially influenced Suárez as well. See Müller 1968, 169–176. On the importance of the authority of Scotus for Suárez in the teaching on the mental word see also Rinaldi 1998, 104–106.

825. Mastri/Belluto, *De anima*, disp. 6, q. 3, art. 2, § 51 (Venice 1727, 147): “Dicimus 2. verbum mentale, & proprie produci a memoria fecunda per actionem a seipso distinctam.”

826. Ibidem, § 53, 147: “Dicimus tertio, verbum mentale produci per actum dicendi, non autem intelligendi.”

intelligere and *dicere* is explicitly rejected by the Jesuit.⁸²⁷ Even though Suárez agrees with Scotus that *dicere* is prior to *intelligere*, he believes that considering those acts as two really distinct acts is misleading. This identification of *intelligere* and *dicere* makes Suárez's doctrine, at least in one aspect, similar to Poinso's doctrine.⁸²⁸ Suárez's identification of both acts is also the reason why the Jesuit is much less explicit and, due to say, also less clear than Mastri/Belluto in distinguishing between physical and intentional being. Even though Suárez speaks about the spiritual character of intentionality (2.5.1), intentional being seems not to be as clearly distinguished from physical (entitative) being as it is in Mastri/Belluto. In Suárez it appears to be, after all, rather tied to the entitative being of cognitive acts, which makes his conception (as suggested elsewhere) tend to the Jesuit conceptualism of the first half of the 17th century. This conclusion, so my opinion, is also another "by-product" of Suárez's tendency to gradual reduction of formal causality to the efficient one.

On the other hand, the overall facit of this comparison is unequivocal. The Scotists' theories concerning not only the issue of the agent/potential intellect, the representation of the intelligible species, but also of the mental word and intellection stand much closer to Suárez than Poinso. The different kind of intentionality based on the model of intentional objects (rejecting the model of formal identity),⁸²⁹ the decisive rebuttal of cognitive passivism in the construal of intellection, the *verbum mentis* as not a really distinct term but identical with intellection itself, the formal concept as that by which (*id quo*) things are known are features advocated by Suárez, not by Poinso.

4.4.3 *Cognitio singularis*

The above exposition of the theory of intellectual cognition has provided us with a useful background for an outline of Mastri's/Belluto's theory of the intellection of material singulars (*singulare materiale*). Nonetheless, the setting has been outlined only partially. An exposition of Mastri's/Belluto's conclusions on the issue of

827. Suárez, *DA* 9, 5, 26: "Erravit tamen Scotus in 1, d 2, q ultima, et d 27, q 1, ubi videtur asserere 'dicere' et 'intelligere' esse duos actus realiter distinctos. Non sunt enim, nisi unus, qui se habet ut productio et terminus. Ut in visu non est nisi producere visionem et videre, ita in intellectu est 'dicere', id est, producere intellectionem et 'intelligere'."

828. Again, it is also evidence that Suárez's philosophy can be reduced neither to Thomism nor to Scotism.

829. On these two models, one appropriated by Aquinas, the other by Scotus, see Perler 2002, 31–105 (Aquinas) and 185–251 (Scotus and Scotists).

cognitio singularis must be preceded by remarks regarding the basic distinctions (1)⁸³⁰ employed in the solutions to the issue. Only then can the topic of the *way* (2) of cognition of *singulare materiale* and the *order* (3) of the primacy of singular and universal cognition be intelligibly presented.

1. The first distinction is between absolute (by nature) intelligibility and intelligibility relatively to us (*prout nobis*). The cognitive condition *prout nobis* can be basically of two kinds. One concerns the cognition of the intellect in the present state (*pro statu isto*) in which the intellect affected by original sin is connected with the body in a way that makes it substantially dependent on the senses. The other occurs in the state of separation from the body which makes the intellect more predisposed to intellectual intuition. Dependence on sensory cognition precludes intellectual intuition of material and sensible singulars in the “embodied” state.

Another relevant distinction involves confusive and distinct cognition (*cognitio confusa et distincta*). In the text of *Physics* 1, 1, the *locus classicus* of this distinction, Aristotle affirms that confusive knowledge is imperfect knowledge.⁸³¹ As a kind of knowledge “located” between total ignorance and perfect cognition,⁸³² confusive cognition precedes distinct cognition based on the analysis of the parts of a confused actual whole. Even though both kinds of cognition have to do with wholes, the ways of knowing differ. While confusive knowledge is related to the whole without the previous cognition of its parts (principles), distinct knowledge grasps the whole by means of knowing its parts. Whereas the former proceeds by means of one act, the latter requires a multitude of acts by which the parts or principles are analyzed and the whole is “dissolved” into its parts. The Scotists therefore understand distinct cognition as cognition *per definitionem*, i.e., as assuming the identification of the order of the parts in the *definiens*. As such this kind of cognition is grounded in the well-known Scotistic conceptual resolution of a confusive concept into distinct concepts by means of ordering the (lower) determining concepts to the (higher) determinable concepts, of which the notion of being is the last and entirely simple (*simpliciter simplex*).⁸³³

830. The listing of these distinctions can be found also in Goris 2009.

831. Aristoteles, *The Complete Works of Aristotle, Physics* 1, 1, 184a 22–184b1 (Princeton 1995, 315): “Now what is to us plain and clear at first is rather confused masses, the elements and principles of which become known to us later by analysis. Thus we must advance from generalities to particulars; for it is a whole that is best known to sense-perception, and a generality is a kind of whole, comprehending many things within it, like parts.”

832. Mastri/Belluto, *De anima*, disp. 6, q. 8, § 250 (Venice 1727, 185).

833. For the definition of confusive and distinct cognition see Mastri/Belluto, *De anima*, disp. 6, q. 8, § 236 (Venice 1727, 183). See also *ibidem*, § 250, 185 and §§ 258–259, 187.

Within the scholastic tradition the issue of *cognitio singularis* was often associated with the question of the *primum cognitum* of the human intellect. This familiar issue is commonly specified by the following five conditions. (1) The question of the *primum cognitum* is related to *actual* cognition and not to habitual knowledge based on previous acquisition. (2) It regards knowledge of what is *actually* known and not of what is only knowable (*intelligibile*). (3) It is applied to simple apprehension (*simplex apprehensio*) and not to the complex cognition of, e.g., axioms. (4) It bears on confusive knowledge which as the less perfect one precedes the more perfect distinct knowledge. (5) The question of the *primum cognitum* is the question of the primacy of origin (*primitas originis*) and not an enquiry into the first object in the order of perfection or adequacy (*primitas perfectionis vel adaequationis*).⁸³⁴

2. Assuming the distinction between intuitive/abstractive knowledge Mastri/Belluto articulate two conclusions concerning the intellectual cognition of singulars. One is applied to intuitive cognition, the other to the abstractive one. As regards intellectual intuition, they adopt what Camille Bérubé characterizes as the middle position between two extremes.⁸³⁵ According to one of them no created intellect, whether angelic or human, in any state can actually intuit material singulars. The other opinion affirms that not only an angelic intellect or a separated human intellect but even an embodied human intellect *in statu isto* intuitively cognizes material singulars.⁸³⁶ Applying the above-mentioned distinction between absolute and relative cognoscibility they come to the thesis that a sensible singular is *not* attained intuitively by the intellect *in statu isto* (the 1st part of the conclusion), though it can well be known absolutely, and even more, it *de facto* is attained by an angelic intellect and a human disembodied intellect (the 2nd part).⁸³⁷

The absolute intelligibility of material singulars follows from the general assumption of the actual intelligibility of sensible beings. Sensible beings are actual beings and as such they must be actually intelligible, since what is actual, must also be intelligible. In an appropriate cognitive potency, i.e., in the power capable of extrasensory cognition, those sensible objects can (as partial causes in the

834. Ibidem, § 236, 183. The issue of the adaequate object of the human intellect as such and *in statu isto* is treated by Mastri/Belluto in *De anima*, disp. 6, q. 6, art. 1, §§ 160–177 (Venice 1727, 168–171).

835. Bérubé 1964, 206.

836. Mastri/Belluto, *De anima*, disp. 6, q. 7, § 202 (Venice 1727, 175).

837. Ibidem, § 203, 175: “Quoad cognitionem intuitivam dicendum est, quod licet singulare materiale, & sensibile, quod nimirum subest accidentibus hic, & nunc quantitati, qualitati, & c. hoc genere cognitionis non attingatur ab intellectu nostro pro statu isto, absolute tamen attingi potest, imo de facto attingatur ab intellectu angelico, ac humano soluto.”

above-mentioned sense) be generative of intellectual intuition.⁸³⁸ Materiality and sensibility is no obstacle and it does not remove those objects from the cognitive radius of the intellectual power. If it did, not even God and the angels could directly know material sensible objects. Consequently, theologically speaking, one could not make much sense of the claim that guardian angels take care of people if one did not assume that they can intuitively cognize sensible contingent states of affairs such as Peter's being in danger.⁸³⁹

If the second part of the first conclusion has left the Scotists far from Suárez and Poinset, the first part draws them close together. The very definition of intuitive cognition and the assertion of the inability of the embodied intellect to bypass sensory cognition make them decisively deny the possibility of intellectual intuition of material individuals *in statu isto*. Even though they retain the psychological intuition of cognitive or volitional acts concomitant to sensory acts *in statu isto*,⁸⁴⁰ they reject the "philosophical" intuition concerning the knowledge of material and sensible singulars.⁸⁴¹ They are explicit that we do not experience

838. Ibidem, § 206, 176.

839. Ibidem, § 205 and § 207, 176.

840. Mastri/Belluto, *De anima*, disp. 6, q. 6, art. 2, § 198 (Venice 1727, 174).

841. This Mastri's/Belluto's claim is sharply criticized by Bérubé in his detailed exposition of Scotus's theory of *cognitio singularis*: "Que deviennent, en cette opinion, les affirmations de Scot sur l'intuition concomitante à la sensation et portant sur le même objet? Mastrius n'est pas embarrassé pour si peu!" Bérubé, 1964, 207. Bérubé (196–199) believes that the concomitant intuitive cognition of my sensory acts (affirmed by Scotus in his *Ordinatio* IV, dist. 45, q. 3: "Breviter ergo omnium eorum, quorum recordatur conjuncta, potest recordari separata, quia quorumcumque fuit memoria sensitiva, eorum fuit intellectiva, propter cognitionem intuitivam concomitantem omnem sensitivam perfectam." See Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones in Quartum Librum Sententiarum* (dist. 43–48), vol. 20 (Paris 1894, 365–366)), e. g., the vision of a white colour, later recorded by us in the (intellectual) memory, is evidence that *in statu isto* we have intuitive (though imperfect, i.e., not in the thing's haecceity) intellection of singulars apprehended by the senses. Mastri/Belluto themselves in *Satisfit objectionibus* actually point out this passage and, quoting the Scotist Filippo Fabri as the defender of this interpretation in § 216 they bring forward other arguments on behalf of the intellectual intuition of material singulars *in statu isto*. These are as follows. (1) The superior power in a supposit cognizes in a more noble way what is cognized by the inferior power. The sensory power perceives the sensible singular intuitively, thus the intellect does as well. (2) The intellect cognizes contingent propositions, but contingent propositions such as "Peter is (now) sitting" are composed of singulars, "Peter" and "is sitting". The conjunction of these terms can be cognized only through intellectual intuition and not by the "abstractive" species. (3) The intellect remembers singulars with their accidents. Mastri/Belluto agree neither with the above-mentioned exegesis of the passage from Scotus, nor with any of those Fabri's arguments. They are convinced that the above-mentioned passage from Scotus mentioning the later recorded concomitant intuitive knowledge of sensory acts speaks

such cognition in the present state.⁸⁴² *In statu isto* an object is present to the intellect only in an intentional species because the intellect attains objects only through phantasms.⁸⁴³

If the issue of the intuitive cognition of material singulars means more or less taking a stand in the intra-Scotistic debate, the conclusion concerning the abstract knowledge of sensible singulars aims at a controversial issue transcending the narrow circles of the Scotistic polemic. Leaving aside the issue of the absolute intelligibility of material singulars, this dispute comprises two main sets of questions. Provided that the intellect can come to know material singulars – an assumption accepted by all the major authors analyzed in this book –, the first question is *how* and *under which aspect* it is known by the intellect in the present state; the second is *in what order of origin* – both on the axis “singular/universal” and “the less universal/the more universal” – they come to be cognized. Within the question *how* Mastri/Belluto consider the following sub-questions. Are singulars known directly, or reflexively? By what kind of concept are material singulars known? Are they conceived by a proper and *distinct* concept, or only by a proper (and thus less perfect) concept? Are they known by means of their own species, or only through an extrinsic (universal) species? May it be said that those concepts signifying singulars are perfect in the sense that they match the singular in its haecceity?

Mastri/Belluto answer all these queries in a single ramified conclusion. A material singular is intelligible (i) not only absolutely (*per se*) but (ii) also to us in the present state by means of a *proper* (to be distinguished from common) and

in fact only about the intellect of separated souls. The cognition of contingent states of affairs can well be accommodated without intellectual intuition. Actually, they distinguish between two kinds of abstractive cognition. One is purely abstractive and concerns an object absent for both the intellect and the senses. The other concerns an object present to the exterior senses when actually perceived. This kind of abstract cognition is called concomitantly intuitive since it is accompanied by actual sensory intuition. Such concomitant cognition is sufficient for the apprehension of contingent states of affairs, such as that Peter is sitting. The argument from the dignity of the intellect proves only that the intellect of its own power, i.e., absolutely, and not *in statu isto* is capable of the intellectual intuition of material singulars. They answer the argument from the intellectual memory in a similar fashion. *Notitia memorativa* belongs to the genus of abstractive cognition, not to intuitive cognition. For those Mastri's/Belluto's replies see Mastri/Belluto, *De anima*, disp. 6, q. 7, art. 1, § 217 (Venice 1727, 178). For Bérubé's critique of Mastri's/Belluto's interpretation (similar to that of Étienne Gilson) of Scotus see Bérubé 1964, 214. On this discussion between Bérubé and Gilson concerning the issue of the necessity of the intelligible species *in statu isto* in case of intellectual intuition see Chabada 2005, 97–100. For Gilson's interpretation see also Gilson 1959, 573 (note 1).

842. Mastri/Belluto, *De anima*, disp. 6, q. 7, art. 1, § 203 (Venice 1727, 175–176).

843. Ibidem, § 204, 176.

(iii) *direct* (a material singular is not cognized reflexively) concept (iv) through the proper and not extrinsic intelligible species but (v) not in its haecceity.⁸⁴⁴

The justification of (i) has already been given above. If a material singular is a being in a way more perfect than a common nature to which it adds an individual difference, then it must also be intelligible since intelligibility follows entity.⁸⁴⁵ The arguments for (ii), defended by both Suárez and Poinso, are almost literally taken over from the Jesuit. It must be one and the same cognitive power, the intellect and not, e.g., *vis cogitativa*, what comes to know both the subject and the predicate of a proposition and what consequently detects the difference between the singular and the universal. The intellect must have the proper concept of a material singular because what is not known cannot be loved and willed. We love singulars, therefore they must be intellectually known by us. The virtue of prudence, an intellectual virtue, is concerned with singulars. So they must be known by the intellect. The process of induction requires prior knowledge of singulars. The higher power (intellect) must grasp the objects apprehended by the lower power (senses).⁸⁴⁶

Just as the arguments for (ii), the arguments for (iii) also bear the seal of Suárez's reasoning. Contrary to Poinso who, despite his defense of reflexive cognition of singulars, endorsed the theory of the proper concept of a material singular, Mastri/Belluto assert that singulars are apprehended directly. *In statu isto* the production of an intelligible species is dependent upon the senses and the agent intellect. As stated in the previous subsection, the agent intellect does not intervene in the production of the intelligible species as a universalizing power but only as an elevating and spiritualizing factor. The intellect therefore comes to know what is known by the senses, i.e., the material individual "dressed" in the accidents of quantity, quality, etc. Therefore, it is not the agent intellect but the potential one what is liable for the universal precision. Importantly, the universalizing abstraction cannot be executed without the prior knowledge of a material singular. The direct cognition of a *singulare* is an evident fact. We ourselves experience the cognition of singulars as the kind of apprehension preceding any formation of universality. Leaving aside the difficulty regarding the determination of an indifferent universal species by a

844. Ibidem, § 208, 176: "Quo autem ad cognitionem abstractivam dicendum est, singulare materiale, & sensibile non solum absolute loquendo esse per se, & directe intelligibile, sed etiam a nobis pro statu isto proprio, ac directo conceptu attingi, ac proinde per propriam speciem, licet non [the word "non" is supplied by me; even though the original text omits the word "non", the following context of this conclusion makes entirely clear that the Scotists deny this cognition of material singulars to the human intellect in the terrestrial life; D.H.] ita propriam, ut illud repraesentet sub propria ratione singularitatis."

845. Ibidem.

846. Ibidem, §§ 209–210, 176–177.

singular inherent in phantasms which affects the Thomistic endorsement of the *conversio* of the intellect to phantasms,⁸⁴⁷ no convincing reason for abandoning the thesis of the direct knowledge of material singulars can be produced. One cannot say that it is an imperfection of the human intellect, because the senses have access to this kind of cognition as well. By the same token one cannot say that the reason is the perfection of intellectual power. If it were the case, one could attribute this cognition neither to God nor to the angels.⁸⁴⁸

The direct cognition of material singulars must proceed by means of the proper singular species (iv). The sensible and the intelligible species differ not in the object of representation but only in entity. While the sensible species is material, the intelligible species is not.⁸⁴⁹ The fact of intellectual memory concerned especially with singulars is evidence that there are singular species in the intellect conserved and remembered by the separated intellect. The recourse to the divine infusion of those species, employed by the Thomists,⁸⁵⁰ is useless as it is not possible to explain why in a certain case a certain species has been infused by God.⁸⁵¹

Even though the Scotists espouse the view that the material singular is known by the proper and direct concept, they do not claim that this concept spells out its haecceity (v). Their claim that the intellect knows what is known before by sense perception is not to be understood so that the senses attain the material singular under the character of its singularity. As we have seen in the preceding subsection,

847. Ibidem, § 212, 177: "Nec dicas, naturam communem saltem potentialiter differentias individuales continere, quia talis continentia est tantum passiva per indifferentiam materialem, quam habet, ut per eas contrahatur, & ideo. Nec minus dicas, speciem universalis determinare ad repraesentandum hoc, vel illud singulare ex occursu determinati phantasmatis, sicut ex ejusdem occursu dici solet intellectus agens determinare ad hanc potius quam illam species intelligibilem producendum ... operatio phantasiae ad hoc est prorsus insufficiens ..."

848. Ibidem, § 211, 177.

849. As Suárez, Mastri/Belluto consider the assertion of an inferential link between entitative immateriality and intentional immateriality (entitative immateriality implies universal cognition) to be a kind of content fallacy. They see no reason why an immaterial power could not cognize material things. On this fallacy between the entitative and the intentional level in Aquinas see Pasnau 1998.

850. Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Phil. Nat. p. 4, q. 10, art. 4 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 327): "... angelus intelligit quidditates multo intimius quam nos, non abstrahendi a singularibus et discurrendo, sed comprehendendo et secundum influxum a superiori causa, a qua emanant, scilicet a Deo." On the other hand, Poinset, as we know, also admits the *ex post* formation of singular species from prior singular concepts. See Ioannes a S. Thoma, ibidem, 329–330 and 3.4.2 of this work.

851. Mastri/Belluto, *De anima*, disp. 6, q. 7, art. 1, § 213 (Venice 1727, 177–178).

what formally motivates the senses (*ratio formalis movendi*) is not the haecceity of the object but its common nature. Although the object *quod* or that which is known is an individual metaphysically composed of a common nature and a haecceity, it is the common nature and not the haecceity what as the formal *ratio* moves the sensory power. The sense cannot distinguish between two qualitatively identical objects, such as two sunbeams or billiard balls, only on the basis of their haecceities. This claim is what separates Mastri/Belluto both from Suárez and Poinset. Just this statement is implied by the Scotists' ontological assumption of the formal distinction between the common nature and the individual difference. It is just this premise what leads to a manifest relativization or modification of Aristotle's thesis "the senses are about singulars, the intellect about universals", this time from the point of view of sensory cognition.⁸⁵²

The aspect under which an individual is cognized by the senses is not its singularity but the common nature. Subsequently the intellect comes to apprehend the singular only under the aspect of the common nature. An individual difference is thus cognized only indistinctly and confusedly. The intellect grasps this individual difference only as contained within the whole individual composed of the common nature and the individual difference and not separately from it. In other terms, the common nature is known by the senses as existent in a subject. The singular species generated by the agent intellect and the phantasm comprises both the formal *ratio movendi* of the sensible object, i.e., the common nature, and the condition *sine qua non* of this efficacy, i.e., the individual supposit.⁸⁵³ The result of this conception is

852. Mastri/Belluto, *De anima*, disp. 4, q. 3, § 28 (Venice 1727, 68): "... quia in cognitione singularis tria interveniunt, scilicet natura specifica, & communis, singularitas, seu haecceitas, & tandem ipsum singulare constitutum, certum est, quod ipsum singulare est id, quod percipitur, & se habet ut principium *quod* movendi sensum, controvertitur tamen de principio *quo*, & ratione formali movendi sensum, an scilicet sit natura communis singularis, an vero singularitas ipsa. Qui negant naturas communes a parte rei actu distinctas differentiis individualibus, negant quoque naturam esse rationem movendi, sed ajunt ipsum singulare sub ratione singularitatis movere sensum; Scotus ... sustinet rationem formalem movendi esse ipsam naturam, singularitatem tamen esse conditionem sine qua non ... secundum illud potentia moveatur ab objecto, secundum quod apprehendit illud, sed potentia sensitiva apprehendit secundum naturam communem ... sed nequit sensus ponere differentiam inter duo singularia praecisis omnibus extrinsecas accidentibus ... non posset unum ab altero discernere, ut sunt duo radii Solis ..." See also Mastri/Belluto, *De anima*, disp. 6, q. 7, art. 1, § 214 (Venice 1727, 178).

853. Ibidem, § 215, 178: "... aliud est singulare intelligi sub ratione singularitatis, sic quod singularitas sit ratio intelligendi, aliud est, quod singularitas esse objectum intellectum, aut pars objecti intellecti, primo modo singularitas non concipitur a nobis, quia sic concipere singularitatem est concipere ipsum distincte, & seorsum ab alia singularitate, & a sua natura, seu quidditate: secundo modo singularitas bene concipitur, & intelligitur a nobis ..."

as follows. The concept of a material singular acquired by this kind of cognition is not a *distinct* concept, but only the proper concept substantiated by the species representing the so-called vague individual (*individuum vagum*).⁸⁵⁴ By this notion Mastri/Belluto do not mean a common concept abstracted from the concept of this or that individual. They have in mind a particular which is neither common nor determinate. This concept does not signify anything common to more things. It disjunctively and immediately denotes particulars so that it can stand for this, or that man.⁸⁵⁵

The formation of the proper concept of a vague individual does not leave us only with this rather “weak” notion of the individual. If it did, then not only Suárez but also Poinset would seem to be laying greater emphasis on the aspect of individuality in the overall context of the issue. Though the Scotists are sure that we do not form a distinct concept matching an individual in its haecceity *in statu isto* (neither the exterior nor the interior senses cognize haecceities), we can arrive at distinct concepts of individuals by means of indirect and universal knowledge. In the outline of the “chronology” of cognition⁸⁵⁶ they state that the cognition of a vague individual is followed by the precision of the common nature. Of course, this precision is not exercised only in the case of substantial common natures, but in the case of accidents as well. After this precision, the character of which is analyzed in the next subsection, the intellect proceeds to the formation of a *complex* or *aggregate* concept of the material singular. Using this technique of composed concept formation, employed not only in the cognition of substances but, *inter alia*, also in philosophical cognition of God,⁸⁵⁷ they claim that the intellect abstracts the (sortal) concepts of accidents, which jointly represent the material singular more distinctly than in the previous cognitive stage when they were represented by the notion of a vague individual. The intellect thus comes to apprehend the material singular in a more (signated) determined and distinct manner by accumulating the identifying circumstances and accidents, which – at

854. Ibidem, § 224, 180: “... species primo impressa intellectui possibili, & abstracta a phantasmate primo repraesentat singulare vagum ...”

855. For this definition of *individuum vagum* see Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 4, q. 5, § 99 (Venice 1727, 157).

856. On this genealogy see Mastri/Belluto, *De anima*, disp. 6, q. 8, § 244 (Venice 1727, 184).

857. On the importance of this technique of composed concept or concept *per accidens* closely connected with the procedure of the resolution from confusive concept to distinct concept in Scotus see Bérubé 1964, 156–175.

least non-modally in this actual world⁸⁵⁸ – suffices for (re)identification. It thus generates an aggregate concept or a concept *per accidens* which, at least for the sake of determining individuals in this actual world, is sufficiently distinct.⁸⁵⁹

3. What Mastri/Belluto propose about the intellectual cognition of *individuum vagum* in the 1st article of the 7th question of the 6th disputation of *De anima* leads to the conclusion of the primacy of the cognition of singulars in the 2nd article *An primo cognoscatur singulare, vel universale, & inter universalia, an magis, vel minus universale*. In the order of the origin of intellectual cognition, the absolutely first *in statu isto* is a material singular of the lowest (atomic) species (*singulare materiale sensibile speciei specialissime*).⁸⁶⁰ The *primum cognitum* as far as *the aspect under which (sub quo)* is concerned is neither the most universal predicate, i.e., being, as Poinset claims, nor a sensible accidental singular, as the nominalists say.⁸⁶¹ If the first species impressed upon the intellect is the species of a singular thing and only afterwards the potential intellect separates the common nature from the individual difference, then the material singular is known before the universal nature. If there is no obstacle for a successful perceptive act, the object is close enough to the cognitive power, the cognitive medium is diaphanous and the cognitive power properly disposed, then what is more proximate to the senses is also closer and firstly known by the intellect.⁸⁶²

The Scotists apply the arguments they employed in their reasoning for the primacy of the singular also to the comparison of the less and more universal.

858. Although the proper and distinct notion of the material singular of Peter that we have *in statu isto* sufficiently guarantees that we can discern him from any other individual in the actual world (there is usually no other individual having exactly the same accidents as those possessed by Peter), the nature of this concept of Peter is not such that it would be contradictory for it to denote some other individual, say Paul. God can annihilate Peter and in the very same place create Paul who has exactly the same qualities and accidents. Nonetheless, even if the two were qualitatively identical, their haecceities would be different. See Mastri/Belluto, *De anima*, disp. 6, q. 7, art. 1, § 225 (Venice 1727, 181).

859. Ibidem, § 225, 181–182.

860. Mastri/Belluto, *De anima*, disp. 6, q. 8, § 239 (Venice 1727, 183): “Dicimus primo, simpliciter, & absolute loquendo primum cognitum a nobis primitate originis esse singulare materiale sensibile speciei specialissime.”

861. Ibidem, § 238, 183: “Opposita sententia docet primum simpliciter, & absolute cognitum esse singulare sensibilis accidentis ...”

862. Ibidem, § 240, 183: “... illa esse notiora nobis, quae sunt sensui proximiora ...” Suárez shares this “non-Thomistic” axiom. See *DA* 9, 3, 15: “... nam cognitio nostra a sensu incipit; ergo quod facile sensu percipitur, facilius etiam concipitur intellectu ...”

In accord with the axiom of the proximity to the senses the Scotists say that provided powers and objects are properly disposed, cognition of the less universal precedes cognition of the more universal.⁸⁶³ On the axis less/more universal, the first cognized object cannot be the most general predicate of being but only the lowest species, because the partial causes of cognition, if unimpeded, generate the most perfect effect they can. This most perfect effect is not an effect in the absolute sense, i.e., not in the order of distinct knowledge but in the order of confusive knowledge.⁸⁶⁴

Regardless of some differences from Suárez, due to the statement that the common nature is the *ratio movendi*,⁸⁶⁵ we may conclude that Mastri's/Belluto's theory of the intellectual cognition of material singulars is more similar to the Jesuit's conception than to that of Poinset. Sharing with both of them the rejection of the intellectual intuition of material singulars *in statu isto* the Scotists lay emphasis on the *direct* cognition of a material singular. Even though in the first (chronological) stage they do not employ the distinct concept of a material and sensible object, this object, already in this phase, impresses upon the potential intellect its own *singular species*. This claim of the temporal primacy of the cognition of singulars to the *cognitio universalis* is in full agreement with Suárez's theory.

863. Mastri/Belluto, *De anima*, disp. 6, q. 8, § 247 (Venice 1727, 185): "Dicimus 2. facta comparatione inter ipsa universalia, minus universalia esse nobis prius nota primitate originis, quam magis universalia, adeout in objecto debite sensibus applicato prius concipiat intellectus gradum speciei specialissimae, & sic deinceps ascendat usque ad ens."

864. Ibidem, § 248, 185. Apart from the argument "from proximity to the senses", the Scotists present an argument that can be labeled as complementary reasoning "from the difficulty of the more universal cognition". What is more distant from the senses is more difficult to attain than what is proximate to them. Therefore, metaphysics dealing with the most universal principles is to be ranked (and also taught) in this sense as the ultimate science.

865. I have in mind especially Suárez's (*prima facie* nominalizing) emphasis on the proper and *distinct* concept of the material singular produced in the very first stage of human intellection or concept-formation. While for the Scotists the concept becomes distinct only after the isolation of the quiddities of accidents and by means of the constitution of complex individual concepts, Suárez – though obviously not excluding the later specification (he considers quantity and other accidents to be the *epistemological* principle of individuation or the principle of discernibility) – seems after all to assume at the beginning a more perfect concept of material singular than the Scotists do. On the principle of discernibility of material singulars in Suárez see *DM* V, s. 3, n. 33 (Vivès, vol. 25: 174). For the Scotists' critique of Suárez see Mastri/Belluto *De anima*, disp. 6, q. 7, art. 1, § 215 (Venice 1727, 178).

4.4.4 *Cognitio universalis*

The abstractive cognition of a vague individual by means of the proper concept *in statu isto* is followed by the precision of the common nature and the formation of the distinct concept of Peter identifying his properties such as “to be white”, “to be curly-haired”, “to be well-educated”, etc. The question is how Mastri/Belluto understand this universal precision. In a preliminary note the Scotists aver that this precision concerns not the formation of the *universale logicum* defined as a rational relation but only the formation of the metaphysical universal. However, the key exegetical issue in the 2nd article *Resolutio quaesiti quoad cognitionem universalis* of the 7th question of the 6th disputation of *De anima* is whether this universal designated by the Scotists as the metaphysical universal is the universal which is separated from its haecceities and thus constitutes the *universale metaphysicum proximum* (as stated in 4.4.1), or whether it can be somehow viewed also as conjoined with them *in re* as thus equivalent to the *universale metaphysicum remotum*.⁸⁶⁶

Copying the Scotists’ procedure in the subsection on *cognitio singularis*, I first present their theory of the precise *intuitive* cognition. Only then I approach the issue of the *abstractive* universal cognition. Although it is commonly accepted that only the abstractive operation is the act prescinding the common nature from individuation, the case of the precise intuitive cognition, at least among the Scotists, must be taken into account as well. Regarding the context of the issue of abstractive cognition, I focus on the question whether the metaphysical universal is formed only by means of an alien species representing a vague individual, i.e., without the antecedent formation of a universal species, or only with it.

1. Following Scotus,⁸⁶⁷ Mastri/Belluto assert that the universal precision is the result of not only abstractive cognition but also of the intuitive one. A common nature *qua* isolated from the individuating principles can be the object of not only

866. The reply to this disjunctive question is not at first sight clear. One has to take into account that the question is related to the text of *De anima* (published first in 1643) and not the *Metaphysica* (the second part with the issue of universals appeared in 1647). Compared to the *Metaphysica*, the publication of *De anima* stands temporally closer to Mastri’s/Belluto’s *Organon* (1639), where (as we have seen in 4.2) it is not exegetically entirely clear what *universale metaphysicum* actually means. For the years of publication of the first editions of all the parts of the *Cursus* see below “Appendix: Bio-bibliographies”.

867. They refer to *Ordinatio* IV, d. 14, q. 3, § *ad quaestionem* and *Ordinatio* IV, d. 45, q. 4, ad 2. See also Bérubé 1964, 188–202.

abstractive cognition but also of intuitive cognition.⁸⁶⁸ Obviously speaking about the common nature *in re* – clearly, one of the “formalities” of intuitive cognition is the termination in the thing *hic et nunc* –, importantly, the Scotists outline their plan as far as the later *Metaphysica* is concerned. They promise to prove that a common nature has not only its own essence but also its existence (or its *esse existentiae*) and, accordingly, that it can be cognized intuitively as well. Contrary to what has been said above in 4.3.2, i.e., that existence accedes only to *res* and not to their formalities, they vow to show that on the basis of the proper actual existence a common nature can be attained by intellectual intuition as well.⁸⁶⁹

It must be confessed that the information value of the 2nd article of the 7th question of the 6th disputation of *De anima* on the current issue is low. When approaching this text two interpretative difficulties must be tackled. First, what do the Scotists exactly mean by intuitive cognition? Or more precisely, “whose” intuitive cognition or of what intellect are they speaking about? Is it the embodied or the disembodied intellect? Second, can their claim of the existence of formalities be justified vis-à-vis the upshot presented above in the context of the general treatise on distinctions (4.3.2)? The answers require the introduction of several other passages from Mastri’s/Belluto’s *corpus* apart from those in *De anima*.

Unfortunately, the Scotists’ promise to confirm the proper existence of formalities comes to nothing in the 8th metaphysical disputation analyzing the essence and existence of finite beings.⁸⁷⁰ Although Mastri/Belluto evaluate the thesis of the proper existence of the common nature as probable, they nevertheless explicitly state that existence regards not *formalitates* but only *res*, which can become the terms of the proper physical causality. In an explicit allusion to Suárez they state

868. Mastri/Belluto, *De anima*, disp. 6, q. 7, art. 2, § 226 (Venice 1727, 181): “... dicendum tamen est ipsam quoque naturam ut sic, a singularitate praecisam esse posse objectum cognitionis intuitivae ...”

869. Ibidem: “... ut dicemus in Met. natura, seu quidditas, sicut ex natura rei formaliter est distincta a differentia individuali, & natura singulari per differentiam individualement constituta, sic etiam habet suam propriam existentiam [the text incorrectly states “existentem”, the context makes clear that the noun “existentiam” is meant; D.H.] ex natura rei formaliter distinctam ab existentia differentiae individualis, & naturae singularis, unde secundum hanc existentiam potest intuitive cognosci ...”

870. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 8, q. 4, § 163 (Venice 1727, 55): “... sed gravior adhuc remanet difficultas de naturis communibus ... et aliis rerum formalitatibus in eadem re ex natura rei repertis ... quia haec omnia propriam habent essentiam, quae, & per distinctam definitionem exprimitur; ergo si verum est principium supra positum, quod cuicumque essentiae propria debet in suo genere existentia correspondere, singulae formalitates propriam habebant existentiam ...”

that the common nature cannot be said to exist unless it exists in singulars having their own essence.⁸⁷¹

One of the passages relevant for the solution of the present issue occurs in the reply to the objection against the theory of formal distinction between the common nature and the individual difference presented in the 2nd article of the 6th question of the 9th metaphysical disputation. According to the objection the common nature cannot be formally distinct from the haecceity because if it were, one could intuit the common nature without the haecceity. However, the possibility of such intuition would entail that what is intuited is in fact only a singular, since intuitive cognition can only attain a singular. Accordingly, the intuitive vision of the humanity of Peter and of Paul would be the vision of two numerically distinct singulars. Mastri/Belluto do not find this conclusion plausible.⁸⁷² The whole question depends on whether one is justified in attributing existence also to the formality of the common nature. In the context of the 9th metaphysical disputation they explicitly acknowledge that they have spoken differently about this issue throughout their *Cursus*. They say that if one accepts the affirmative reply, one will have to endorse Scotus's opinion presented in the above-mentioned passages, as they actually did in *De anima*. However, if the negative opinion is accepted (considered to be more probable in the *Metaphysica*, disp. 8), then one should accept the opinion *ex professo* presented in the 17th question *An per actus intuitivus fieri possit praecisio, seu distinctio rationis* of the 6th disputation of the *Metaphysica*.⁸⁷³

871. Ibidem, § 164, 55: "... non singulis gradibus rerum, ac earum formalitatibus, quas in eadem re multiplicatas concedimus, ac ex natura rei formaliter distinctas proprias correspondere existentias, sed omnes adequate existere per eandem existentiam illius rei, cui identificatur, & ad cujus integritatem spectant ... formalitates non sunt effectus accipientes esse per aliquam physicam causalitatem, sed per simplicem metaphysicam dimanationem ..." Ibidem, § 166, 55: "Et hac eadem ratione negandum est naturis communibus, ut a singularibus praecisio, propriam correspondere existentiam, quia in tali statu natura, ut bene Suarez adnovit d. 31. cit. sec. 11. n. 2. non est existentiae capax, nec potest esse immediatus terminus productionis, & physicae causalitatis, cum ergo non sit capax existentiae, nisi ut est sub singularitate ..." Mastri/Belluto describe the revision of the opinion as follows: "... oppositam quoque sententiam esse valde probabilem, & saepe Scotum in eam inclinare, quam proinde, ut communiorem in schola nostra sum amplexus disp. 6. de anima. quaest. 7. art. 2. ... immo & eandem in Met. tradere sum pollicitus; at re maturius considerata promissis omnino stare non potui." (ibidem, § 166, 56)

872. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 6, art. 2, § 157 (Venice 1727, 119).

873. Ibidem, § 158, 119: "... num naturae, ut distinguitur ab individuatione, propria competat existentia formaliter distincta ab existentia ipsius singularis, vel singularitatis, varie enim loquitur de hac re, ut dictum est supra disp. 8. q. 4. a nu. 173 [there should be the number 163; D.H.]. Si pars affirmativa teneatur, tunc ad argumentum adhibenda est solutio Doctoris jam allata, quam etiam juxta hac viam ad idem dubium jam ego dedi, & amplius declaravi disp. 6 de Anim. q. 7.

In this question (as in *De anima*) Mastri/Belluto note that while there is actually no doubt about the precise character of abstractive cognition, intuitive cognition is of controversial vein. Evidently, abstractive cognition is a most suitable type of cognition for producing the distinction of reason. Abstractive cognition conceives natures differently from the way they are *in re*. In the things they are impeded by the individual differences and thus have only the disjunctive community *per indifferentiam*, in the mind they are “liberated” from the haecceities and take on conjunctive community. The crucial question is as follows. Can intuitive cognition represent an object *per partes* as abstractive knowledge can?⁸⁷⁴

Mastri/Belluto present two conclusions concerning the two types of distinction relevant for the issue, i.e., the conceptual distinction and the formal distinction. As regards the conceptual distinction, they reject the possibility that the distinction may emerge by means of intuitive precision. Intuitive cognition can only attain objects existing as actually distinct *a parte rei*, which is not the case of the conceptual distinction in the intellect. They cannot terminate intuitive knowledge since intuitive knowledge concerns only objects existent extramentally *hic et nunc*. Therefore no conceptual distinction of any kind can be formed by intuitive cognition. It can only be generated by abstractive cognition.⁸⁷⁵

Not accepting the possibility of the emergence of a conceptual distinction by means of intuitive knowledge, however, does not entail that the same holds also for the intuitibility of the formal distinction. In explicit contrast to Suárez, who – as Mastri/Belluto *expressis verbis* note – conceives intuitive knowledge only in the sense of the *comprehensive* knowledge (*notitia comprehensiva*) including all the “formalities” of a real thing,⁸⁷⁶ Mastri/Belluto maintain the thesis of

art. 2. n. 215. Si vero teneatur pars negativa, quam dedi ad eandem fere difficultatem de notitia intuitiva supra d. 6. Met. q. 17. n. 324. ubi ex professo de hac re disputatur.”

874. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 6, q. 17, § 315 (Venice 1727, 336).

875. Ibidem, § 316, 336: “... per actus intuitivus distinctionem rationis fieri non posse, qualiscunque illa fuerit sive rationis ratiocinantis, sive ratiocinatae ... intellectus intuitivus nullam habet distinctionem in objecto, nisi secundum quod existens est.”

876. Ibidem, § 317, 337: “... Vasquez, & Suarez ex eo capite cognitionem intuitivam ab abstractiva discernant, quod intuitiva necessario repraesentat formalitates omnes in objecto repertas, & realiter cum eo identificatas, non sic abstractiva.” Not quoting any passage from Suárez, Mastri/Belluto seem to have in the mind the following *passus* from the 18th question *An visio dei sit cognitio quidditativa et intuitiva dei, habeatque omnes conditiones perfectae scientiae* of the second book *De attributis dei negativis* of the first treatise *De divina substantia ejusque attributis* of the Jesuit’s *De deo trino, et uno*: “Dico secundo visionem illam esse quidditativam et intuitivam cognitionem DEI ... addo contra Scotum ... non posse esse quidditativam cognitionem [cognitio per quam de illa re cognoscuntur omnes proprietates essentiales ejus; D.H.] Dei, quin simul etiam sit intuitiva ... cognitio autem intuitiva dicitur, qua videtur res ut existens et sub

the fundamental compossibility of intuitive knowledge of formally distinct extremes.⁸⁷⁷ In the intuitive vision of one formality as different from the other, for instance the formality of animality as not being the formality of rationality or the formality of the divine essence as not being that of the divine relations, no “fiction” and negotiation of the intellect, similar to that in abstractive knowledge, takes place. As in the other texts, also in the 17th question of the 6th metaphysical disputation, Mastri/Belluto introduce a caveat based on the statement that existence does not belong properly to the formalities. On this objection it holds that intuitive cognition concerns only things *qua* existing. However, existence formally and immediately belongs only to things (*res*) and not to realities (*realitates*) existing only by the unique existence proper to a thing. Accordingly, intuitive cognition cannot attain one formality without another, with which it exists *per identitatem realem*.⁸⁷⁸ In the reply Mastri/Belluto concede that existence formally and immediately belongs only to things. But they obviously extend the understanding of a “thing”. Indeed, intuitive cognition concerns only things inasmuch as they exist. Nevertheless, an existent thing *qua* existent is not only an entity that exists immediately and formally, but also the realities which are mediately present in it. No obstacle can be found in the state of affairs assuming the intuitive attainment of one of those realities without another. Even though existence does not belong to the formalities formally and immediately, it belongs to them concomitantly and *per identitatem* with a thing.⁸⁷⁹

Having acknowledged the essential possibility of the intuitive intellectual cognition of a common nature, the question is what intellect that knowledge pertains to. Regrettably, Mastri’s/Belluto’s answer to the question is far from being unequivocal. Is the intuitive cognition of a common nature available only to a disembodied intellect, or can it be also regarded as a common fact of our everyday cognition *in statu isto*?⁸⁸⁰ When tracking Mastri’s/ Belluto’s answer it must at first be said that

omnibus conditionibus existentiae.” Franciscus Suárez, *Pars prima Summae theologiae de Deo uno et trino* (Paris 1856, 114).

877. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 6, q. 17, § 319 (Venice 1727, 337): “Altera conclusio est cognitionem intuitivam cum nostra formali distinctione bene consistere, eamque attingere ... distinctionem in objecto perceptam ab intellectu intuitivo esse debere ex natura rei realem, vel saltem formalem, quia intellectus intuitivus nihil omnino fingit in objecto, aut aliter concipit, quam sit a parte rei ...”

878. Ibidem, § 323, 339.

879. Ibidem, § 324, 340.

880. Bérubé 1964 (220) says: “Dans une intuition intellectuelle concomitante à la sensation, l’intellect connaît l’objet comme le sens lui-même le connaît, que ce soit ce papier blanc sur lequel j’écris, le clapotis de mon dactylographe, la résistance des clefs, etc. Voilà des intuitions

this intuition cannot be sensory intuition. Even though the formal motive (*ratio agendi*) of sensory cognition is a common nature, singularity is seen as the necessary object *quod* (*ratio agentis*) of every sensory intuition. So it cannot perform the required precision. If singularity is the *sine qua non* condition of sensory intuition, then sensory intuition cannot attain the common nature as prescinded from its singularity. That can be done only by means of intellectual intuition.

What intellect does this intuition pertain to, then? Do Mastri/Belluto allow for the possibility of the intuitive precision also for the intellect *in statu isto*? A clue can be found in Mastri's/Belluto's reply to the objection from the impossibility of the intuitibility of the formal distinction. According to this objection intuitive cognition applies only to existent things *qua* existent, i.e., it can attain only individuals. However, existence is the existence of singulars or primary substances, never of universals. Consequently, the humanity in Peter cannot be intuitively cognized without *Petreity*.⁸⁸¹ In the reply Mastri/Belluto admit the antecedent of the argument only partially, in relation to the intuitive cognition of the senses but not with respect to intellectual intuition.⁸⁸² Concerning intellectual intuition they say that the common natures can become sufficient object of intuitive cognition *saltem respectu intellectus separati*.⁸⁸³ Although this *saltem* in itself of course does not rule out *respectu intellectus in statu isto*, I think that the overall context of the 17th question of the 6th metaphysical disputation, given especially by Mastri's/Belluto's examples of intuitive cognition from theology (the intuition of the divine essence without the divine relations, the intuitive knowledge of individual divine attributes), contrary to *De anima* and *Logica* (!),⁸⁸⁴ suggests that in the *Metaphysica* Mastri/Belluto limit the precise cognition of the intellect *in statu isto* to abstractive cognition.

2. The pivotal question in the 2nd article of the 7th question *De anima* on abstractive cognition is whether the abstractive cognition of a common nature proceeds by means of the proper species (Poincot) or through a singular species (Suárez). Mastri/Belluto assume that the universal abstraction forming the metaphysical

sensibles doublées d'intuitions intellectuelles. Ces natures existentes, ce sont des couleurs, des sons, des résistances mécaniques."

881. Ibidem, § 323, 340.

882. Ibidem, § 325, 340 : "... assumptum [quod terminetur ad aliquid individuum, D.H.] de cognitione intuitiva sensus concedi queat, quia sensus est singularium, negatur tamen de cognitione intellectuali ..."

883. Ibidem.

884. For more on this see 4.5.3.

universal with the unity of precision (*unitas praecisionis*) can only be carried out by the intellect and never by the senses. Provided that the cognition of a singular precedes the precision of the universal, the question is whether apart from the singular species one must also take into account the universal species as a necessary item in universal cognition. I have highlighted that, contrary to Poinsett, for Suárez – at least in the very first conception – the abstraction of the universal species is not necessary. The Jesuit regarded the doctrine that the intellect cognizes the universal by means of a singular species to be more likely. We have seen that Suárez rejects the claim of the incompatibility of the double representation of the singular and universal thing by means of one species and concept, i.e., the claim ruling out the virtual inclusion and containment of the universal in the singular. For him, the singular species representing the singular *in esse* virtually contained also the higher grades including the transcendental ones. “This man” includes “man”, “man” includes “animal”, and so forth. Further, it was also the role of the potential intellect in this precision of the common nature pointed out by Suárez. Not the agent intellect, the function of which is to dematerialize and not to de-individualize the sensible species in the *species phantastica*, but the potential intellect is accountable for the universal abstraction. Last but not least, in *De anima* at least (contrary, e.g., to *DM* 6, 6, 11⁸⁸⁵) Suárez underlines the aspect of the (horizontal) comparison of the plurality of singulars represented by the singular species as necessary for the generation of the *universale metaphysicum* on the basis of the detection of the partial agreement of the singulars. *Considerare universale* thus was for him the intellectual disclosure of the partial specific agreement of things of the same species or the partial generic agreement of different things of the same genus.

It is not an overstatement to say that all those Suarezian features are retained in Mastri/Belluto as well. Although the Scotists, under the influence of Scotus, consider the opinion that the agent intellect abstracts the universal species probable, they hold the view that the universal is known by means of a singular species to be more likely. The main argument for this statement (as in Suárez) is based on the principle of the virtual containment of the higher grades in the inferior grades. In analogy to the containment of the higher grades in the inferiors *in essendo*, one should consider similar inclusion of the higher predicates in the singulars *in repraesentando*. Moreover, arguing against the view rejecting cognition through

885. Suárez, *DM* VI, s. 6, n. 11 (Vivès, vol. 25: 228): “Primo enim abstrahi potest natura communis per puram praecisionem naturae ab uno inferiori absque ulla comparatione vel superioris conceptus ad aliquem inferiorem vel ipsorum inferiorum inter se, ut quando a solo Petro simpliciter praescindo individuantes proprietates et sisto in humanae naturae consideratione.” For the formulation in *De anima* see *DA* 9, 3, 13.

singular species, they say that if universals were cognized by means of their own proper species, the same would have to be said about the higher *genera* including the transcendental *rationes*. However, the latter – as Mastri/Belluto admit – do not have their proper species.⁸⁸⁶

They also reject the objection claiming that no species can represent an object under the opposite respects (*rationes*), such as universality and singularity.⁸⁸⁷ Though they assent to the thesis that the same species cannot formally represent under both *rationes* equally, they distinguish between two ways of representation. One is immediate representation, the other is secondary representation. While a singular species immediately represents a (vague) singular, secondarily and virtually it stands for the universal.⁸⁸⁸ In the 11th question of the 6th disputation of *De anima* Mastri/Belluto confirm this statement of the compatibility of both representations at the level of cognitive acts. One and the same cognitive act can attain several objects provided that those objects are subordinated to one another. This is the case when the cognitive act attains the universal by means of the singular species.⁸⁸⁹

Apart from formal and universal abstraction the Scotists distinguish two further kinds of abstraction. One comes from the agent intellect; the other is accomplished by the potential intellect. The only function of the agent intellect is to produce the intelligible species. Even though Mastri/Belluto admit that this species can be universal, they consider the view is that it is singular to be more probable. Only in the second phase and only through the potential intellect is the

886. Mastri/Belluto, *De anima*, disp. 6, q. 7, art. 2, § 228 (Venice 1727, 181): “Dicendum est utrumque defendi posse, probabilius tamen esse, quod universale cognoscatur per speciem ipsam singularis, quod ostenditur hac evidenti ratione, sicut se habet singulare ad universale in essendo, ita repraesentativa ipsorum, quae sunt species illa objecta repraesentantes, se habent in repraesentando, sed singulare continet universale essentialiter, & inferius omnes gradus superiores, ergo repraesentativum singularis formaliter erit quoque virtualiter repraesentativum universalis ... si universale cognoscitur per propriam speciem, idem erit de omnibus gradibus superioribus usque ad transcendentis ... quae nullo pacto proprias habent species.”

887. Ibidem, § 232, 182 : “... nulla eadem species est per se repraesentativa objecti sub oppositis rationibus, ratio singularis, & universalis sunt oppositae rationes, ergo.”

888. Ibidem, § 233, 182.

889. Mastri/Belluto, *De anima*, disp. 6, q. 9, § 278 (Venice 1727, 190): “... si objecta sint subordinata in ratione superioris, & inferioris, possent uno, & eodem actu attingi ... magis, & minus universale posse per eandem speciem cognosci, sicut ergo haec objecta possunt per eandem speciem impressam repraesentari, quia sunt subordinata, & superius in inferiori essentialiter continetur, ut qu. 7. diximus art. 2. sic quoque videntur per eandem speciem expressam posse cognosci, nam sicut se habet species impressa ad repraesentationem virtuales, & habituales, ita se habet expressa ad formalem, & actualem ...”

universal produced. On the basis of the horizontal comparison of the multitude of the singulars represented in the singular species,⁸⁹⁰ a new intellectual consideration is thus connected with the detection of the partial agreement of those singulars. Just by this consideration and without the production of a new (universal) species the potential intellect attains the nature as prescinded from singularity. Precise abstraction therefore pertains only to the potential intellect.⁸⁹¹

Yet the doctrinal conformity with Suárez is not absolute. When dealing with the issue of the potential intellect's capacity to produce a new species (the universal species) from prior cognition, Suárez sides not with the opinion of Mastri/Belluto but with that of Poincot. Poincot (as we have seen in 3.4.2) counts with the general possibility of the production of an intelligible species representing (though indirectly, inadequately and *in obliquo*) a material singular even in the world to come. Although not formed by the agent intellect (the agent intellect only produces universal species), it is actually formed by the potential intellect on the basis of the universal concept and its connotations to material singulars in phantasms. The same *ex post* formation of intelligible species, this time of universal species, is advocated also by Suárez.⁸⁹² Though allowing for the opposite opinion that a singular species virtually including the universal is sufficient for the later elicitation of universal knowledge, Suárez views the solution that after the precision of the common nature within a singular species the potential intellect produces a universally representing species to be more probable.⁸⁹³ The analogy with the production of the species representing material *substance* suggests itself. Suárez (as stated)

890. The necessity/non-necessity of the plurality of singulars for the precision of the metaphysical universal becomes the focus of Mastri's/Belluto's exploration at the end of the 8th question of the 9th metaphysical disputation. There they approvingly quote Pasqualigo's critique of Suárez's opinion from *DM* V, s. 6, n. 11 concerning the sufficiency of a single exemplar. See Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 8, § 199 (Venice 1727, 130). Admittedly, they agree that the nature abstracted from Peter is, in a way, *ipso facto* abstracted from all the individuals of the same species, since it abstracts from Peter a formal (quidditative) whole applicable to all the individuals of the same species. In fact, this actual formal whole and nothing more is gained by that kind of abstraction (*ibidem*, § 196, 129–130). Nevertheless, at least *in statu isto* the human intellect is not capable of prescinding the nature from its individuation without comparing individuals and detecting their partial agreement (*ibidem*, § 198, 130).

891. Mastri/Belluto, *De anima*, disp. 6, q. 7, art. 2, § 229 (Venice 1727, 181).

892. See 2.5.3 of this publication.

893. Not quoting Suárez, Mastri/Belluto, nevertheless, cite the crucial passage from *STh* 1, q. 12, a. 9, ad 2 of Aquinas's *Summa Theologiae* (mentioned also by Poincot) documenting the capacity of the potential intellect to form *ex post* intelligible species: "... aliquae potentiae cognoscitivae sunt, quae ex speciebus primo conceptis alias formare possunt. Sicut imaginatio ex praeconceptis speciebus montis et auri, format speciem montis aurei, et intellectus ex praeconceptis speciebus generis et

accepts the formation of the species of substance (for later prompt employment) on the basis of previous discursive reasoning. No matter how complex and indirect this inferential cognition of substance is, this knowledge ultimately leads to the elicitation of the species proportionate to this cognition representing the material substance as such.⁸⁹⁴ Just this claim is rejected by Mastri/Belluto. For them the formation of that species would imply nothing less than the endorsement of a too perfect knowledge of the substance, which *in statu isto* we simply do not have.⁸⁹⁵ Mutatis mutandis, Mastri/Belluto claim the same in the context of the production of the universal species. Not only that those species are useless for future application (the singular species virtually containing them can do the job as well), the intelligible species can be formed *only* by the agent intellect.⁸⁹⁶

4.5 *Universale logicum*

The formal universal is the universal in predication (*universale in praedicando*).⁸⁹⁷ The act of predicating is what basically determines the formation of the fully-fledged universal. The guideline and objective given by the act of predication is one of the main reasons why in the analysis of the *universale in actu* Mastri/Belluto

differentiae, format rationem speciei. Et similiter ex similitudine imaginis formare possumus in nobis similitudinem eius cuius est imago." URL: <http://www.corpusthomicum.org/sth1003.html>.

894. Concerning this statement see also 2.5.2 of this work.

895. Mastri/Belluto, *De anima*, disp. 6, q., 4, art. 2, § 184 (Venice 1727, 172): "Sed nec etiam potest haberi propria substantiae species pro statu isto, modo quo dicebat Suarez, quod nimirum utique ab initio cognoscatur substantia confuse, per species accidentium per conceptum proprium ex communibus, sed ex hac postea ipsa cognitione relinqui in intellectu propriam substantiae speciem, & per hanc deinceps elici conceptum proprium ex propriis de substantia. Hoc itaque non satis rationabiliter assertitur, quia non experimur alium conceptum non habere de substantia, quam proprium ex communibus pro statu isto ... ergo pro statu isto nullam habemus speciem propriam de substantia ..."

896. Mastri/Belluto, *De anima*, disp. 6, q. 7, art. 2, § 230 (Venice 1727, 181): "Verum huiusmodi species formatas ab intellectu possibili ex aliis praeconceptis speciebus jam refutavimus quaest. praeced. artic. 2. dub. 3. ut omnino superfluas, si non impossibiles ... munus formandi species soli intellectui agenti competit, non possibili ... ut enim naturarum universalium memoriam retineamus opus non est, ut intellectus possibles species earum proprias efformet ex speciebus singularium, easque conservent, sed sufficit, ut in ipso asservantur species ipsae singularium, quae virtute continent cognitionem universalium ..."

897. Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 4, q. 1, art. 2, § 18 (Venice 1727, 143); see also Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 9, § 200 (Venice 1727, 130), and § 203 (Venice 1727, 131).

make use not only of the formal but also of the objective intentions. While the character and ontological status of first and second formal intentions is clear and does not present any difficulty, the question of the ontological status of the first and the second objective intentions is more controversial.⁸⁹⁸

In the following I propound Mastri's/Belluto's arguments for the thesis identifying the logical universal with the *universale completum* (4.5.1). Second, in analogy to the twofold analysis of the community/unity of the extramental common nature I introduce the Scotists' theory of the community/unity of the formal universal (4.5.2). In this context I focus on their teaching of the universal nature's *actual* inclusion in many inferiors which constitutes the most significant doctrinal divergence from Suárez and Poinset. Third, I complete the analysis of the essence of the *universale completum* by Mastri's/Belluto's theory of the formation of the logical universal and their summary of all the cognitive steps in the construction of that universal (4.5.3).

4.5.1 The logical universal as the complete universal

The notion of *universale* is basically viewed as an analogical concept having its principal (major) and less than principal (minor) analogate.⁸⁹⁹ The search for the *universale in actu* is the search for the principal (major) analogate. Mastri's/Belluto's procedure is basically guided by Scotus's definition of the formal universal presented in *Ordinatio* 2, 3, 1, 1. There Scotus says: "... the universal in act is what has some indifferent unity according to which it itself, the very same, is in proximate potency to being said of each suppositum ... by a predication that says 'This is this'".⁹⁰⁰ Two elements of this definition are relevant for the purpose of the following analysis. First, the actual universal exhibits a kind of indifference making the nature the *proximate* and not only the remote foundation of predicability. Second,

898. For the (common) classification of intentions see Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 3, q. 8, § 111 (Venice 1727, 135).

899. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 9, art. 1, § 203 (Venice 1727, 131): "... apud Philosophos analogum, quale est universale, ut sic ..."

900. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 9, art. 1, § 200 (Venice 1727, 130). See Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* II, dist. 3, p. 1, q. 1 (ed. Vat. VII, 406–407): "[U]niversale in actu est illud quod habet aliquam unitatem indifferentiam, secundum quam ipsum idem est in potentia proxima ut dicatur de quolibet supposito ... praedicatione dicente 'hoc est hoc'." The translation is taken over from Spade 1994, 65.

the essence of the actual universal amounts not to actual essential predication but is somehow connected with the (proximate) aptitude to predication.⁹⁰¹

The description of the formal *universale* shows that the essence of the actual universal should not be searched for in the remote foundation which is the common nature formally distinct from the individual difference. However, this characterization leaves open whether the formal universal is, after all, to be identified with the above-mentioned *universale metaphysicum* exhibiting the unity of precision or with some other kind of *universale* bringing a new “element” to the metaphysical universal and thus making it a sort of logical or intentional “matter-form” compound. Even though all Scotists and Thomists agree that in order to get the really complete *universale* an additional item must be added to the absolute universal, some Scotists – Mastri/Belluto name the French Observant Martin Meurisse (1584–1644)⁹⁰² – are in defining the complete universal actually not willing to leave the ambit of the metaphysical universal. In Mastri’s/Belluto’s reference to Meurisse the formal universal is a *mixture* of two equal items – the metaphysical universal and the added intention of universality. Employing a neologism, Meurisse calls this mixture the *universale metaphysilogicum*.⁹⁰³ His motivation for this aggregative conception of the formal universal is not difficult to find. It is well-known that in the broad stream of moderate realism the logical universal is commonly understood as a relational form, by which the superior nature is rationally related to the inferiors. But this relational form as such obviously cannot be predicated of Peter and Paul in the form *hoc est hoc*. One does not say “Peter is species” or “Peter is genus” but only “Peter is man” or “Peter is animal”. So, Meurisse argues, one is not allowed to withdraw from the ambit of the metaphysical universal and consequently in the definition of the actual universal the metaphysical universal must be retained as well.⁹⁰⁴

In the main *Dico* of the article on the issue of the unity of precision (*Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 8), the Scotists reject both alternatives affecting the peculiar and autonomous character of the logical universal, the concept of the *universale metaphysilogicum* as well as the *universale metaphysicum* as identical with the complete *universale in actu*. Embracing the teaching about the clear difference between the

901. Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 4, q. 2, art. 3, § 50 (Venice 1727, 149): “... dici de multis sit passio universalis, tantum ut dicit aptitudinem, non actum ...”

902. As regards the brief bio-bibliography of Meurisse in the context of French Scotism at the *Grand Couvent* in Paris of the 17th century see Schmutz 2008, 469 and *passim*.

903. For this conception see Martin Meurisse, *Rerum metaphysicarum libri tres* (Paris 1628). Unfortunately the text was not at my disposal.

904. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 9, art. 1, § 202 (Venice 1727, 130–131).

metaphysical universal and the formal (actual) universal they state that the universal in the proper sense can only be the logical universal.⁹⁰⁵ The metaphysical universal cannot be the complete universal since it is not the *universale in praedicando* but only what it is signified by the *universale in repraesentando*. As such the metaphysical universal, acquired by formal abstraction, is not proximately predicable of its inferiors since it is not related to them as that which is predicable of them, i.e., as a potential whole, but rather as a contractible part. In order to obtain the logical universal the supervening logical intention must be added to the absolute metaphysical universal. Only by this intention of universality equivalent to the second formal intention is the nature positively related to its inferiors and thus completed.⁹⁰⁶ Indeed, the metaphysical universal having the positive and contrary indifference to being in the many is “situated” in the proximate potency to receive the relation of formal and actual universality. But this statement regarding the proximate potency to receive the intention of universality is different from the thesis that the nature in the status of objective precision is in the proximate potency to *be predicated* of many instances by the predication *hoc est hoc*. Mastri/Belluto are at pains to say that the receptive potency of the metaphysical universal toward the intention of universality *is not* the logical universal capable of being said of its inferiors. As such this receptive potency of the *universale metaphysicum* is not identical with the logical universal because it *precedes* the latter (formal) universality. In order to become the logical universal it is not sufficient for it to be proximately receptive of the intention of formal universality but to be proximately predicable of its suppositis in the form *hoc est hoc*.⁹⁰⁷

Mastri/Belluto no less vehemently dismiss the need to invent the new type of *universale metaphysilogicum*.⁹⁰⁸ They render this new type of *universale* redundant

905. Ibidem, § 203, 131: “Dicendum tamen est, solum universale logicum esse universale vere, & proprie dictum, eique praefatam definitionem convenire non metaphysico ...”

906. Ibidem, § 204, 131: “... universale metaphysicum etiam consideretur sub unitate praecisionis ... non adhuc habet rationem universalis in actu, seu proxime praedicabilis de inferioribus, quia vel in eo statu concipitur solum per modum partis potentialis, & contrahibilis, & sic non habet rationem universalis, quia non respicit differentiam, ut inferius de quo praedicari possit, sed ut aliam compartem, a qua possit determinari; vel in eo statu concipitur ut totum quoddam, plane non concipitur ut totum potestativum divisibile in plures partes subjectivas, de quibus est praedicabile, sed potius ut totum quoddam actuale, idest in ordine tantum ad ea attributa, quae actu continet, & quoad sua praedicata essentialia, & sic potius concipitur, ut natura subicibilis, quam ut praedicabilis.”

907. Ibidem, § 205, 131. See also Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 4, q. 1, art. 2, § 26 (Venice 1727, 144).

908. After Martin Meurisse it was also another French Scotist Claude Frassen (1620–1711) who endorsed the *universale metaphysilogicum* as a kind of complete universal: “*Universale trifarium*

by understanding the *universale logicum* as the logical universal *per se* and not *per accidens*. However, how can the logical universal be thought as a being *per se* if *ex definitione* it is conceived as a being composed of a nature and the second intention of universality affecting this abstracted nature? Does not the rational relation applied to the nature in fact make the logical universal into an accidental being (*ens per accidens*) rather than a being *per se*?

The answer to the questions cannot be given without the pertinent elucidation of two types of distinctions operative in the Scotists' analysis. One concerns the distinction between the predicated item and the condition under which an item is predicated.⁹⁰⁹ The other applies to the distinction between the two types of predication mentioned in note 587, exercised predication (*praedicatio exercita*) and signated predication (*praedicatio signata*).⁹¹⁰ As stated, the former type of predication concerns first intentions; the latter has to do with second intentions. Exercised predication is predication in which an attribute is ascribed to a subject as it is found in the thing itself (*a parte rei*). On this predication *man* is said to be *rational* or *animal* is predicated of Peter. By signated predication something is said to belong to something *signate* when it pertains to it *qua* sign, by means of which it signifies that a given attribute *exercite* belongs to the thing of which it is a sign. When it is said of a painted horse "This horse is wild", one does not want to say that the wildness belongs to the painted horse *exercite* (as such this horse is only a patch on paper) but only insofar as it signifies a real horse, which possesses this property *exercite*. Predicating "being wild" of a painted horse is not exercised predication in the sense that wildness belongs *exercite* to the painted horse but only *signate*. Equally, the predication "Individual is species" does not mean that species pertains to this individual in an exercised way but only according to signated predication, i.e., insofar as both species and individuals are considered to be signs of some extramental *significata*, such as *man* and Peter.⁹¹¹

usurpari. 1. Quidem pro natura multis communi, quae juxta Avicennam ... ex se, nec universalis est formaliter, nec singularis: sed tantum indifferens ut huic aut illi singulari inexistat; & solito dicitur universale *Metaphysicum, Fundamentale, primo intentionale* ... 2. Pro illa forma accidentali fictitia vel *Generis* vel, *Speciei* ... quam intellectus tribuit naturae, postquam eam a suis inferioribus abstraxit, & ad inferiora comparavit; & dicitur universale *Logicum, formale, secundo intentionale*. 3. Pro concreto & adunato ex utroque & dicitur universale *completum, Metaphysilogicum*, id est ex Logico, & Metaphysico coalescens." Claude Frassen, *Philosophia academica*, t. 1, *Logica*, disp. 2, q. 2 (Venice 1767, 85b). As regards Frassen see Schmutz 2008, 464–465 and *passim*.

909. See Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 4, q. 2, art. 1, § 35 (Venice 1727, 146).

910. As regards this twofold predication in Scotus see Pini 2002, 137.

911. For this definition of two types of predication see Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 5, q. 1, art. 1, § 8 (Venice 1727, 161).

Equipped with these conceptual tools the Scotists reach the following conclusion. As far as exercised predication is concerned, one is to reject the claim of the accidental compositionality of the logical universal. One is obliged to dismiss the claim that the natures are only the logical universal *per accidens* because in the constitution of the *universale in actu* both elements actually do not concur equally. The predicated item here is the nature itself. The universality constitutes only the *condition* of predication. Just this condition makes the nature proximately predicable. Accordingly, universality considered as the condition in *praedicatio exercita* does not compromise the essential character of the *universale logicum*. This condition does not preclude the common nature from being called “the logical universal *per se*”. In signated predication, on the contrary, one may say that what is predicated is the universality considered *in concreto*, i.e., the second intention of universality as applied to or grown together with the nature, which is a first intention. Consequently, it may be granted that the common nature can be called the logical universal *per accidens* only in the context of signated and not exercised predication.⁹¹²

4.5.2 The logical universal: Its community and unity

Having identified the universal *in actu* with the logical universal, Mastri/Belluto approach the issue of the community/unity spelled out in Aristotle’s description of *universale* “one in many and one of many”. Their method in the context of the *universale in actu* is the same as in their exposition of the common nature in the thing. They first analyze the issue of the community of the *universale logicum*, afterwards they deal with its unity.

1. The Scotists assert that the community of the logical universal is not one existing outside its inferiors, as is the case with the metaphysical universal, but only as

912. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 9, art. 1, § 206 (Venice 1727, 131–132): “... natura sub ratione relationis ad inferiora per se praedicatur de illis, non quidem quatenus est ens per accidens ex natura, & relatione constitutum, sed tantum per rationem naturae, quae est unum per se, quae tamen praedicari non potest, nisi actu sit sub tali relatione rationis; adeo ut natura ipsa praedicatur, ut substat intentioni, non quidem tanquam rationi formali praedicandi, sed veluti conditioni eam ponenti in statu universalitatis ... distinguendo de duplici praedicatione exercita, & signata, quamvis enim in praedicatione signata non sit proprie natura, quae praedicatur, sed universalitas ipsa in concreto sumpta, idest ut applicata naturae predicanti de pluribus, quia praedicatio huiusmodi fit per terminos secundae intentionis, ut applicantur primis; tamen loquendo de praedicatione exercita, quae fit per terminos primae intentionis, natura est, quae proprie praedicatur non intentio ... universalitas erit tantum conditio, quae facit naturam in potentia proxima de illis praedicabilem ... quamvis dici possit universale logicum per accidens, quoad praedicari signate ... tamen quoad praedicari exercite est universale logicum per se ...”

included in them in the manner of the intentional community *per inexistentialiam*.⁹¹³ What do they mean by this “intentional in-existentia community”? In the first negative approximation we may say that the community of the logical universal or more precisely the intentional community *per inexistentialiam* is a kind of community *sui generis*, different from the community proper to the extramental indetermination of the common nature found in the thing independently of the mind. Comparatively to this extramental indifference, this in-existentia community is stronger in the way that it is conceived as *one* and *undivided* in and across all its inferiors. As such it is framed by separation from individual differences. Mastri/Belluto point out that this abstractive release of the natures from their haecceities and their subsequent intentional inclusion in the inferiors is structurally analogical to the above-mentioned ultrarealist tenet of the extramental community *per inexistentialiam* of the common nature in all its inferiors.⁹¹⁴ The “only” difference lies in the fact that for them this community is not a unity existent independently of the human intellect but only within the realm of the intentional (objective) existence generated by the abstractive process of the intellect.⁹¹⁵

This assertion of the in-existentia community of the *universale in actu* constitutes the main doctrinal *differentia* from Poinso’s and Suárez’s doctrine of the “quiddity” of the logical universal. This crucial statement can be taken as the articulation of Matri’s/Belluto’s fundamental ontological and methodological options on the level of the *universale logicum*. Considering the differences in these options it is not surprising that the Scotists diverge from Poinso and Suárez also in the issue of the actual universal. What are these options? First, it is the theory of the unity of the common nature *ex natura rei* distinct from “thisness” having the unity and community *per indifferentiam* in the above-defined sense. Second, it is the methodology characterized by their substantial employment of the Franciscan (if I may use the paraphrase) “Behold! Everywhere there are traces of the Trinity!”⁹¹⁶ Before analysing this in-existentia unity proper to the *universale logicum* I have

913. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 9, art. 2, § 210 (Venice 1727, 133): “... ut quando concipitur natura universalis actu in suis inferioribus, concipiatur in eis una per inexistentialiam, quamvis enim talis repugnat, ut existit a parte rei in singularibus, non tamen ei repugnat, ut concipitur in eis per intellectum per modum universalis.”

914. See also 4.3.4 of this work.

915. For the description of the community and universal unity proper to the logical universal see especially Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 9, art. 3, § 221 (Venice 1727, 136).

916. On the twofold employment of the Trinitarian doctrine in the context of Mastri’s/Belluto’s theory of universals see Heider 2011e. Regarding the analogies and differences between the *universale in actu* and the divine essence instantiated (not divided) by the three divine persons in Scotus see also Cross 2003a and 2003b.

to outline the Scotists' conception of the ontological status of the community of the logical universal.⁹¹⁷

The rejection of the extramental community *per inexistential* related to the denial of the ultrarealist tenet of the extramental existence of the actual universal *in re* shows that the community proper to the logical universal cannot be real but only *rational*. As stated, the logical universal is characterized not by the remote but by the proximate aptitude to being predicated of its inferiors. This proximate aptitude is based not on the extramental natures *qua* existent but *qua* apprehended.⁹¹⁸ The common nature of humanity in Peter possessing the remote aptitude to being said of Paul cannot be proximately predicated of Paul because *in re* it is identified with Peter and not with Paul. In order to be proximately predicable, it must be "transferred" from the order of the remote aptitude to proximate aptitude, in which it is not impeded by the individual differences and thus can be *at the same time* in all its inferiors. Contrary to the indifference of the human nature in the thing which is indifferent so that in itself it can be (disjunctively) either in Peter or in Paul, the indetermination of the human nature in the proximate potency is such that it can be (conjunctively) simultaneously in Peter, Paul, etc. The nature can have this "conjunctive" indifference only in the state of objective being.⁹¹⁹

917. As they note, this question is of less controversial character than the issue of the universal unity of the logical universal.

918. This emphasis makes Scotus's doctrine similar to that of Aquinas. Currently it makes it also distinct from the *modistae* of the 13th century such as Radulphus Brito, who defended the extramental character of the second logical intentions. On Brito see Pini 2002, 83–98.

919. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 9, art. 2, § 208 (Venice 1727, 132): "... unanimiter tam Scotistae quam Thomistae fatentur communitatem constitutivam universalis in actu non esse realem, sed rationis ... in natura desideratur, ut dicatur universalis, in actu, & complete, talis esse debet, ut sit in potentia proxima quod secundum ipsam de quolibet supposito praedicetur praedicatione dicente, hoc est hoc, sed nihil datur sic commune pluribus a parte rei, quia licet alicui existenti in re non repugnet esse in alia singularitate ab ea, in qua est, non tamen illud vere dici potest ... at humanitas Petri v. gr. a parte rei identificatur tantum cum Petro, non vero cum Paulo, & Joanne, ergo nequit de omnibus, & singulis praedicari natura a parte rei praedicatione dicente hoc est hoc." Even though this statement is endorsed almost by all Scotists and Thomists (being a mark of moderate realism in general), there is a Scotist, John Punch, who finds it implausible. For him the nature cannot receive any kind of universal unity. If it did, it would have to be either fictional, real, or it would have to be an extrinsic denomination. None of those possibilities are conceivable. It cannot be a fictitious unity since then it could not be truly predicated of Peter and Paul. It cannot be any kind of real unity either. The intellect with its immanent operation cannot cause any real modification in the cognized object. Nor is the extrinsic denomination of conceiving Peter and Paul by one concept sufficient for saying that Peter and Paul are truly one. The extrinsic denomination cannot make them really one. Consequently, the

2. Two main rival theories are attacked by Mastri/Belluto in the article on universal *unity*. The first claims that universal unity is a rational unity, not a new specific kind of unity but the unity of precision. Even some of those advocating that the unity of precision is complemented by the second intention of universality related to the inferiors think that this completion is accountable only for the community of the logical universal. By that they mean that the unity proper to the logical universal equals to the unity of precision acquired by the abstractive act. The completion by the comparative act, which leaves the second intention of universality in the abstracted nature, adds only the aspect of community to the logical universal.⁹²⁰ As in the context of the community of the nature *in re*⁹²¹ they also introduce Punch's statement that universal unity is nothing but the real unity of resemblance.⁹²²

The first conclusion is targeted against this opinion. The universal unity *in actu* is not a real unity but a *rational unity* formed by the intellect on the basis of the foundation *in re*. As in the case of community they say that this claim is common to all schools. In the same way as Poincet and Suárez the Scotists also affirm that the universal unity of the *universale logicum* can be neither a formal unity nor a numerical unity (in the sense of an extramental unity) because both are real. Contrary to formal unity, universal unity must be numerically (objectively) one, i.e., it must be countable. Compared to numerical unity, it must be actually communicated to the many instances of the same kind. Without this communicability it would be singular. Both conditions can be met only by the nature having objective existence in the mind. Only in the intellect can it become one of the countable intelligibiles.⁹²³

extramental unity must *already* be actually universal independently of the intellect. For more on this interesting comparison with Punch see Heider 2010c. For a rejection of this theory see Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 9, art. 2, § 209 (Venice 1727, 133).

920. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 9, art. 3, § 213 (Venice 1727, 133). Just this is the conception of the *universale metaphysilogicum* advocated by Meurisse.

921. See also 4.3.3 of this work.

922. Ibidem: "Poncius ... naturam Pauli non habere aliam unitatem a parte rei cum natura, quae est in Petro quam unitatem similitudinis & conformitatis, & addit aliam unitatem non requiri ad hoc, ut sit formaliter universalis." Concerning this Punch's statement see Heider 2010c, 150.

923. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 9, art. 3, § 214 (Venice 1727, 134): "Dico primo. Unitatem universalem in actu non esse unitatem realem, sed rationis, & per operationem intellectus cum fundamento in re ... est communis fere in omni Schola ... unitas ad universalitatem naturae requisita, debet ei in aliquo statu convenire, nempe in eo statu, in quo ipsa natura est universalis ... competet ei tantum in statu existentiae obiectivae ... quandam videatur tribuere numeralem unitatem, certum tamen est ibi non loqui [Scotus; D.H.] de unitate numerali reali,

Even though Suárez endorses the same conclusion, the Scotists again replace his arguments presented in *DM VI*, 2, 10 with their own. The ontological “common denominator” of Suárez’s arguments⁹²⁴ was the claim concerning the strong particularization of the nature’s formal unity in singulars, which obviously is far from being compatible with universal unity. The Scotists’ *via* to the same conclusion distinguishing between formal/universal unity is different. They make use of a genuine Scotistic principle. They utilize the basic distinction between the above-defined indifference of the extramental common nature and that possessed by the nature in objective being. Instead of speaking about the radical particularization of formal unity they say that universal unity of the nature cannot be identified with formal unity, since the former is not characterized by the relatively weak disjunctive indifference. As such it is defined by a kind of stronger unity which is not related to singulars by means of negative or privative opposition but by contrary opposition.⁹²⁵

Even though Punch, isolated in his espousal of the real community and real unity of the universale *in actu*, is often treated as a “Suarezian” by Mastri/Belluto,⁹²⁶ which makes one expect him to be consistent with the Jesuit’s teaching, the doctrine of the *enfant terrible* of the Scotist school on the unity of the essential resemblance as being proper to the universal unity *in actu* is anything but that of Suárez. In *DM VI*, 2, 14 Suárez explicitly says that real similarity is not *sufficient* for the notion of the actual universal or the *ratio universalis*.⁹²⁷ Since the formal universal *qua* the plurality of similar items does not constitute one unit, the essential similarity is not a sufficient condition of formal universality. The universal *in actu* must be taken both as an undivided whole and as a whole divisible by instances or subjective parts of the same kind as the whole itself. Thus, assuming that Suárez is

sed objectiva, seu in ratione objecti intellecti ...” Suárez also speaks of the *unitas numeralis objectiva* of the abstracted nature. See *DM VI*, s. 2, 12 (Vivès, vol. 25: 210).

924. See 2.3.1 of this work.

925. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 9, art. 3, § 215 (Venice 1727, 134): “Quod vero unitas universalis non sit ipsa unitas formalis naturae minor unitate numerali ... probat hoc Suarez disp. 6. cit. sect. 2. n. 10. tribus rationibus ... Potest itaque melius ex nostris principiis Scoticis, quae jecimus in superioribus; natura, ut sit universalis in actu, non sufficit quod sit indeterminata negative, sed etiam positive, & contrarie, quia universale opponitur singulari non negative tantum, vel privative, sed contrarie ...”

926. Even though Mastri/Belluto in general hold the *Doctor Eximius* in high regard, the “label” in this context is to be taken pejoratively.

927. *DM VI*, s. 2, n. 14 (Vivès, vol. 25: 210): “Haec autem similitudo ... rationem universalis, neque sufficiens.”

the authority for Punch,⁹²⁸ the Scotists conclude that the Irish Observant's theory cannot be correct since the Jesuit does not endorse universal unity as the unity of essential resemblance.⁹²⁹

Significantly, Punch's thesis of the real character of the universal unity destroys the essential feature of moderate realism as such, which is the assertion of the ability of the intellect to generalize on the occasion of a foundation *in re*.⁹³⁰ This claim is what makes Mastri/Belluto, Poinsoot and Suárez, contrary to Punch (and Hurtado de Mendoza), advocates of moderate realism. Yet, of course, the foundation considered by Suárez and Poinsoot is not *the* foundation espoused by Mastri/Belluto.⁹³¹ Neither a bare negation of the formal division of the multitude of the individuals of the same species (Poinsoot), nor formal unity entirely particularized in singulars (Suárez) are *the* foundation accepted by Mastri/Belluto. *The* extramental foundation of universal unity corresponding to the teaching of the Scotists is an idiosyncratic and metaphysically-laden formal unity which is common *per indifferentiam* to the individuals of the same kind formally distinct from the haecceity.⁹³²

While the first conclusion endorsing the necessity of the notion of a rational being with a foundation in the thing is understandable in the context of Mastri's/Belluto's "settling accounts" with Punch's theory, the second conclusion is *ex professo* a critique of the opinion identifying universal unity with the unity of precision or with the unity of precision completed "accidentally" by the second intention of universality leaving the unity basically unaltered.⁹³³ Their settlement with the view

928. This assumption is not entirely justified, though. Punch is not an author who worries much about *auctoritates*. See Forlivesi 2002b, 214.

929. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 9, art. 3, § 217 (Venice 1727, 134): "[E]rgo ex concessione ipsius Auctoris, quem Poncius sequitur, unitas similitudinis non sufficit pro essentiali constitutione universalis." Punch's theory must be rejected also for another reason. He shows that literal inclusion in the many is not necessary for the nature to be predicable. What suffices is that it is in the many by similarity. From the point of view of Mastri/Belluto, however, that means the abandoning the essential feature of the *identity* theory of predication. The predications "Peter is man" and "Paul is man" are essential predications claiming identity between what is signified by the predicate and subject terms. But the proposition "Peter is similar to Paul" is neither essential nor identical predication. Though Peter and Paul are similar essentially, they resemble each other in the nature, still this similarity is only an accident, a relation. As a consequence, Punch's concept is not compatible with the identity theory of predication and replaces the definition of *universale* as "*one* in many and *one* of many" by "*one similar* to many" (ibidem).

930. Ibidem, § 222, 136–137. Punch's theory coheres with his conception of logic, according to which its object is not being of reason but real being. See Risse 1964, 432–433.

931. See 4.3.2 and 4.3.3.

932. Ibidem, § 218, 135.

933. Basically, that is the doctrine of the *universale metaphysilogicum* advocated by Meurisse.

relativizing the idiosyncratic aspect of universal unity is significant for the present study. By emphasising the “essential” difference between the unity of precision and the universal unity of the *universale logicum*, Mastri/Belluto *eo ipso* claim that the feature “actual being in the many” belongs to the *essence* of the logical universal. By this claim they endorse a position different from that of Poinset and especially (as they explicitly confirm) that of Suárez.

In the second conclusion they affirm that even though the unity of precision posits being of reason (*esse rationis*), it is not universal unity.⁹³⁴ The conclusion is justified by three reasons which can be called (1) “from Scotus’s authority”, (2) “from the etymology of the term *universale*” and (3) “from the fact of the proximate potency of predication”.

1. In an argument supported by the well-known text of Scotus’s question *Utrum universale sit aliquid in rebus* of the 7th book of the *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis* Mastri/Belluto cite the passage, in which the Subtle Doctor distinguishes between three types of *universale*. (A) The second intention, which is the rational relation of predicability to the inferiors of which it is sayable. This relation is signified by both the concrete term *universale* and the abstract term *universalitas*. Apart from this second intention Scotus also speaks about the subject of the denomination of the intellect, which is the first intention. This subject can be twofold. Either (B) it is the remote subject of this intention, i.e., the nature absolutely considered, which of itself is not “this” and thus *ex se* non-repugnant to being said of the many, or (C) it is the proximate subject or the universal nature having the contrary indetermination, which is numerically one, intelligible, sayable of every supposit in the form *hoc est hoc*. Mastri/Belluto point out that even though Scotus qualifies this proximate subject as the complete universal (*universale completum*), a couple of lines below he adds that (C) is not the entirely complete universal since it precedes the second logical intention, which only can be regarded as the true complete and logical universal.⁹³⁵ In their exegesis of the passage

934. Ibidem, § 219, 135: “Dico 2. unitatem universalem non esse ipsam unitatem praecisionis, etiamsi haec ponatur esse rationis.”

935. Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis*, lib. VII, q. 18 (St. Bonaventure, N.Y. 1997, 347–348): “Sumitur enim vel sumi potest tripliciter: Quandoque pro intentione secunda, quae scilicet est quaedam relatio rationis in praedicabili ad illud de quo est praedicabile, et hunc respectum significat hoc nomen ‘universale’ in concreto, sicut et ‘universalitas’ in abstracto. Alio modo accipitur universale pro illo quod denominatur ab ista intentione, quod est aliqua res primae intentionis, nam secundae intentiones applicantur primis. Et sic accipi potest dupliciter: uno modo pro illo quod quasi subiectum remotum denominatur ab ista intentione; alio modo pro subiecto propinquo. Primo modo dicitur natura absolute sumpta universale, quia non est ex se haec, et ita non repugnat sibi ex se dici de multis. Secundo modo non est universale nisi sit actu indeterminatum, ita quod unum intelligibile numero sit dicibile

the Scotists conclude that Scotus's contention about the priority of the proximate foundation of logical universality is evidence that the unity of precision is *not* the logical and formal universal but only its proximate foundation.⁹³⁶

2. The second argument is based on an interpretation of the etymology of the term *universale* analyzed as *unum-versus-alia*. The relational aspect of *universale* contained in this etymology is not allowed for in the metaphysical universal having the unity of precision. The Scotists make clear that the description "one-against-many" is to be interpreted as "one-*in*-many" and not "one-*outside*-many". Likewise they reject the view that the unity of the logical universal is of the same character as the unity of the metaphysical universal except for its relatedness to the inferiors. The universal nature is not partly absolute and partly relational. Mastri/Belluto are explicit that universal unity differs from the unity of precision in the very *ratio* of the unity. The unity of precision is essentially absolute; universal unity is essentially relative.⁹³⁷

3. The last argument is important since it presents an explicit critique of Suárez's theory. As stated, the unity of precision places the nature in the state of isolation from its inferiors making it incompatible with contracting differences. Universal unity, by contrast, makes the nature be in the many not only *aptitudine* but also *actu*. Thus, universal unity actually *destroys* the unity of precision. Yet it remains universally one. Therefore genuine universal unity cannot be the unity of precision.⁹³⁸ The key premise in the argument is the allusion to the *actual* being of the universal nature in the many. Not only the "aptitudinal *esse-in*" but especially the

de omni supposito, et illud est complete universale ... indeterminatio quasi contraria, qua 'homo' est sic indeterminatum, ut unica intellectione conceptum quidditative insit omni, praecedit naturaliter illam intentionem secundam quae est universalitas logica sive habitudo de multis."

936. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 9, art. 3, § 219 (Venice 1727, 135): "... ex quo primo sic argumentor, unitas praecisionis habetur ante illam relationem naturae, ut praedicabilis ad inferiora, primo enim consideratur ut abstrahibilis, vel abstracta a singularibus, & postmodum ut praedicabilis de illis, in quo praecise statu ait Doctor esse universale completum, & in actu; ergo unitas praecisionis non est ipsa unitas universalis, sed potius proximum ejus fundamentum."

937. Ibidem, § 219, 135–136: "... unitas constitutiva universalis in actu non est illa, qua natura est in se una, sed ... per quam est una in multis, ut constat ex definitione ipsius universalis ... unitatem praecisionis, & unitatem universalem non solum inter se differre ratione universalitatis additae, vel non, sed etiam ratione ipsarum unitatem, quae in se sunt alterius rationis, nam unitas praecisionis est unitas absoluta, qua natura dicitur una in seipsa, sed unitas universalis est essentialiter unitas relativa ..."

938. Ibidem, § 220, 136: "Tertio unitas praecisionis ponit repugnantiam in natura, ut sit in multis, quia ponit eam in statu solitudinis, cui repugnat consortium differentiarum contrahentium; sed unitas universalis e contra ponit naturam in multis actu, vel saltem aptitudine, & tollit statum

“actual *esse-in*” is to be regarded as the constitutive feature of the universal unity of the *universale logicum*.⁹³⁹ As Mastri/Belluto agree, this contention about the actual in-being regarded as the essence of the *universale logicum* is much more controversial than the statement about the aptitudinal *esse-in*.⁹⁴⁰ This is also confirmed by the fact that Poinset and Suárez take the formal universal as having only the aptitude to being in the many without being included in the inferiors.⁹⁴¹

In the 1st article of the 2nd question of the 4th logical disputation Mastri/Belluto directly attack Suárez’s opinion. They reproduce the Jesuit’s opinion in the following way.⁹⁴² The unity of the logical universal consists in two features: the indivision of the nature in the many instances of the same species and the aptitude to be divided by them. Neither of those features belongs to the nature in the state of real existence but only in the state of objective precision. Only by virtue of the objective precision can human beings be called one species because they are not divided and considered as one species but in the concept. So far Mastri/Belluto agree. Nevertheless, when contracted and even within this “intellectual contraction” (sic!) the unity of precision is revoked. As divisible, the nature is divided into the many instances of the same name and concept. Suárez’s doctrine of universal unity which lays marked emphasis on the absolute character of *universale*⁹⁴³ is not

solitudinis, ergo unitas praecisionis non est formaliter unitas universalis, nec ad universalitatem sufficit.”

939. Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 4, q. 2, art. 1, § 32 (Venice 1727, 145): “... unitatem universalis etiam consistere cum actu essendi in multis ...”

940. Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 4, q. 2, art. 3, § 47 (Venice 1727, 148): “... hoc assertum [the universality is consistent with the actual communication of the universal; D.H.] sit contra communem, quae reponit totam rationem universalis in actu in sola aptitudine ad essendum in multis ...”

941. On Suárez see 2.5.4; on Poinset see 3.5.1.

942. Not quoting any passage from *DM*, they seem to have the following formulation of Suárez in mind: “Dicitur enim haec unitas universalis, eiusque ratio consistit in indivisione alicuius naturae in plures naturas similes sub eodem nomine et ratione cum aptitudine ut in eas dividitur.” *DM* VI, s. 2, n. 11 (Vivès, vol. 25:209) Cf. also *DM* VI, s. 2, n. 15 (Vivès, vol. 25:211). See Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 4, q. 3, art. 1, § 31 (Venice 1727, 145) and *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 9, art. 3, § 225 (Venice 1727, 137).

943. This critique is not entirely justified. As stated in 2.5.3, Suárez asserts that the absolute metaphysical universal calls for completion by the comparative act, by which only the rational relation of universality is produced. However, from the viewpoint of Suárez’s *Wirkungsgeschichte* the fact remains that the Jesuits in general were often taken not only by Scotists but also by Thomists as advocates of this opinion considering the absolute (metaphysical) universal to be the formal universal. This is confirmed also by Suárez’s claim (not entirely compossible with his other statements) about the immediate formation of the logical universal by means of the

compatible with the actual being in the many but only with the aptitudinal being in the many. Therefore only the aptitudinal being in the many constitutes the “quiddity” of the logical universal.⁹⁴⁴

Mastri/Belluto decisively reject Suárez’s opinion.⁹⁴⁵ The Jesuit’s (and also Poinso’t’s) theory has objectionable consequences for universal predication as such. Whenever *universale* is predicated of its inferiors, intellectual contraction to its inferiors is involved. The actual universal must be in proximate potency to predication. However, for the superior there is no greater proximate potency of being predicated of the inferiors in the form of *hoc est hoc* than when it exists *in actu* in the many. Accordingly, actual predication cannot occur unless the nature is conceived as intentionally existent in the many *in actu*.⁹⁴⁶ The universal unity proper to the logical universal cannot be destroyed by the act of predication since act does not destroy potency. Just as actual laughter does not destroy the ability to laugh but places it in the second act, so actual predication places the *universale logicum* in the second act without revoking it. Without the assumption of the actual being of the *universale* in the many the term *homo* in the predication *Petrus est homo* would stand for (*supponit*) not commonly but only singularly. However, if it signified singularly, one would obtain just the predication *Petrus est hic homo*, which would invalidate the essential character of universal predication. Universal predication must be conditioned by the actual in-existence of the formally one

reflexive act, which *seems not* to require a (new) comparative act relating the abstracted nature to its *inferiora*. On this interpretation found in the Salzburg Thomists in the 17th and in the beginning of the 18th century see also Bauer, 1996, 178.

944. Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 4, q. 2, art. 1, § 31 (Venice 1727, 145): “Hinc fallitur Suarez cit. dum ait unitatem universalis logici consistere in indivisione [the text incorrectly states “in divisione”; D.H.] alicujus naturae in plures naturas similes sub eodem nomine, & ratione cum aptitudine, ut in eas dividatur, & hac de causa, inquit, non esse unitatem realem, sed rationis, quia talis indivisio non competit naturae in statu realis existentiae ... sed solum in statu praecisionis objectivae, & ut substat conceptibus mentis, hoc enim modo omnes homines in ratione speciei dicuntur unus homo, quia in conceptu hominis, ut sic, non dividuntur; facta vero divisione, seu contractione universalis etiam per intellectum, statim ejus unitas corrui’t, quia jam dividitur in plura ejusdem nominis, & rationis, unde vult unitatem universalis esse solum compossibilem cum aptitudine essendi in multis, non tamen cum actu.”

945. It is not unwarranted to deduce that they hold the same opinion about Poinso’t’s view. As shown in 3.5.1, Poinso’t explicitly rejects the actual inclusion of the nature in the inferiors as well.

946. Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 4, q. 2, art. 3, § 47 (Venice 1727, 148): “... universale in actu dici, dum est in potentia proxima, ut praedicetur de multis simul, sed numquam est in potentia magis propinqua ad sic praedicandum, nisi quando actu concipitur unum in multis, tunc enim immediate potest sequi talis praedicatio, nec unquam fieri potest talis praedicatio, nisi prius natura concipiatur, nedum apta, sed etiam actu existens in pluribus ...”

and the same *universale* in the inferiors. This in-existence, as stated, is not real in-being⁹⁴⁷ since that state is repugnant to all finite natures. This contraction of the universal nature to (by) individuals, which does not invalidate the numerical and objective oneness of the universal nature, can only be intentional. Against Suárez they conclude that predication must be preceded by the intentional contraction of *universale* in its inferiors, where it has the positive and conjunctive indifference to being in the many.⁹⁴⁸

The following objection suggests itself. We have seen that the actual universal is acquired only by total abstraction, by which the intellect comes to conceive the *potential* whole including its *inferiora* only virtually. It is this virtual inclusion of the inferiors in the abstracted nature what makes the actual universal predicable of its subjective parts. Excluding them, which is the case in formal abstraction conceiving the nature as a part (in fact a *pars subicibilis*), is what basically precludes the possibility of predication. However, as all agree, this potential whole is lost when divided. Therefore, the essence of the logical universal, based on the aspect of communicability and divisibility, cannot consist in the actual but only in the aptitudinal *esse-in*.⁹⁴⁹

In their reply to this objection the Scotists agree that the potential whole vanishes when divided into its subjective parts.⁹⁵⁰ However, in accord with the overall Scotistic emphasis on the role of the actual whole, they affirm that one should allow, above all, for actual totality which is not lost when divided by the inferiors. The actual whole of *animal* does not disappear when divided by the various species such as *man*, *horse*, etc. All the species, in fact, include the actual whole defining

947. See 4.3.4 of this book.

948. Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 4, q. 2, art. 1, § 32 (Venice 1727, 145–146): “... dum enim universale praedicatur de inferioribus, vel supponitur per intellectum prius contractum ad illa, ut de illis praedicetur vel saltem sic contrahitur in ipsa actuali praedicatione, ergo nisi exterminare velimus omnes hujusmodi praedicationes, fateri debemus unitatem, & aptitudinem universalis manere cum ipso actu essendi in multis, & praedicandi de multis.” See also Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 4, q. 2, art. 3, § 47 (Venice 1727, 148) and *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 9, art. 3, § 220 (Venice 1727, 136); § 225 (Venice 1727, 137).

949. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 9, art. 3, § 225 (Venice 1727, 137): “... arguunt Suar. ... contra 2. conclusionem probantes unitatem universalem esse ipsam unitatem praecisionis, nam unitas propria universalis est negatio divisionis in plura ejusdem nominis, & rationis conjuncta cum aptitudine ad talem divisionem ...”

950. Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 4, q. 3, art. 1, § 32 (Venice 1727, 146): “[S]ane, quando universale v.g. animal dividitur in sua inferiora, ut hominem, & equum, destruitur totalitas potentialis, & per consequens ejus unitas, quae in illa indivisione consistebat.” See also Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 4, q. 3, art. 3, § 49 (Venice 1727, 149).

animality. Though, contrary to the Trinitarian case where the divine nature occurs as numerically one and the same in its supposits, the actual whole of *animal* is materially or numerically multiplied in the instances, by this multiplication the unity and community of the universal does not become the unity and community *per indifferentiam* proper to the extramental common nature. Laying emphasis on the intellectual contraction (*contractio intentionalis*), Mastri/Belluto assert that by this determination the logical universal *animal* in the state of objective being is divided by the specific differences only extrinsically. As intellectually contracted it retains not the community and unity *per indifferentiam*, but the stronger unity and community *per inexistentialiam*.⁹⁵¹

Yet someone can insist that what actually makes the universal unity formally universal is not the actual logical whole actually comprising its logical essential parts, but the potential or universal whole which contains its subjective parts only virtually. Mastri/Belluto reply that *in rigore logico* the universal as such is equivalent to the potential whole. However, metaphysically speaking they lay emphasis on the aspect of the actual whole. Once again they recur to the above-mentioned distinction between *praedicatio exercita* and *praedicatio signata*. While in signated predication the universal is predicated *sub ratione totius potestativi*, in exercised predication it is said *per modum totius essentialis et actualis*. The universal of first intentions is predicated of its inferiors through the predication *hoc est hoc* is above all the predication of the second mode. Universal unity is better articulated in respect to exercised predication than to signated predication. Consequently, the universal unity of the logical universal is better spelled out by means of the unity of inexistence and by indivision in the essential predicates than through essential indivision *and* divisibility into subjective parts.⁹⁵²

951. For the emphasis on the actual whole (*totum actuale*) see Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 9, art. 3, § 226 (Venice 1727, 137). See also Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 4, q. 2, art. 1, § 32 (Venice 1727, 145–146) and *Logica*, disp. 4, q. 2, art. 3, § 49 (Venice 1727, 149): “... sed loquitur de unitate formali, quae sequitur naturam, ut est totum quoddam actuale, & essenziale ... etiam post divisionem perseverat unitas, quae ipsum sequebatur in ratione totius essentialis.”

952. Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 9, art. 3, § 226 (Venice 1727, 137): “Fateor hanc esse bonam instantiam, & qui vellet in rigore logico loqui, utique argumento cedere deberet, quia universalitas in ratione totius potestativi re vera consistit in indivisione ejus in partes subjectivas cum aptitudine ad sic dividi; verum notandum est universali duplicem habere praedicationem de suis inferioribus; unam signatam, aliam exercitam, cum hac differentia, quod in praedicatione signata praedicatur sub ratione totius potestativi, ut v.g. genus de pluribus speciebus ... in exercita vero per modum totius essentialis, & actualis, ut v.g. homo est animal ... non enim ex hoc quod aliquid commune concipitur per modum totius potentialis, amittit rationem totius actualis ... quia universale in actu a metaphysico praesertim definitur, & consideratur, ut praedicabile de inferioribus praedicatione exercita ... ejus unitatem melius explicari per unitatem inexistentialiae,

We may conclude that in Mastri's/Belluto's elaboration of the theory of the universal unity of the *universale logicum* the *distinctio formalis* and the Trinitarian "model" as the regulative idea are substantially operative. In compliance with the notion of rational beings with a foundation in the thing, it is above all the extramental formal unity of the common nature on which and by means of which the intellect conceives and "moulds" the logical universal. It is not incidental that the Scotists in fact understand the universal unity of the logical universal as an intentional formal unity. The "only" difference from the formal unity proper to the extramental common natures thus is that this formal unity is common *per indifferentiam* to the many, while the logical universal is common in a stronger sense *per inexistentialiam*. However, the Scotists' theory of the logical universal is not guided only by the imitation of the extramental formal unity but also by the pattern of commonality inherent in the divine essence related to the three suppositis. Not differently from the logical universal, the divine essence is predicated (proximately) of the suppositis by the predication *hoc est hoc* so that "The Father is God", "The Son is God", "The Holy Spirit is God". Nevertheless, the specific character of universal unity is due to the fact that, contrary to the divine essence which is numerically one and the same in all its suppositis, universal unity (though formally one and undivided) is numerically (though extrinsically) *divided* and *multiplied* in the inferiors. If *per impossibile* the divine essence were divided in its suppositis, nothing would prevent one from calling it the fully-fledged or complete universal.⁹⁵³

4.5.3 Formation of the *universale in actu*

We have seen that the essence of the logical universal consists in the intentional community and intentional unity *per inexistentialiam*. In the 3rd question *Per quam operationem intellectus fiat universalis in actu* of the 4th logical disputation the Scotists confirm the conclusion with an additional specification. The state of the nature's proximate predicability is equivalent to the formal universal in the second act (*universale formale in actu secundo*). This universal is preceded by the formal universal in the first act (*in actu primo*), which comes to existence with the act by

& indivisionem praedicatorum essentialium, quam per indivisionem in partes subjectivas ...". Admittedly, Suárez and Poinset also acknowledge that this actual totality is transferable from the metaphysical universal to its inferiors. However, contrary to the Scotists, they lay emphasis on the aspect of the potential whole.

953. For Mastri's/Belluto's "placement" of universal unity between the extramental formal unity and the numerical unity of the divine essence see Mastri/Belluto, *Metaphysica*, disp. 9, q. 9, art. 3, § 221 (Venice 1727, 136).

which the abstracted nature is compared to the inferiors as the item conjunctively communicable to all of them. Before approaching the issue of the genesis of the formal universal I outline Mastri's/Belluto's general classification of intellectual acts.

Setting aside the psychological issue of the nature of the agent and the potential intellect, the issue of the intelligible species and that of intellection (examined in 4.4.2), Mastri/Belluto distinguish between two categories of intellectual operations. The first is the absolute act (*actus absolutus*). By this act the intellect is "carried away" to the thing directly without respect to anything else. It is often equalled to abstractive operation. This act is further divided into direct act (*actus rectus*) and reflexive act (*actus reflexus*). While the former reaches the thing immediately, the reflexive act requires a prior direct act which (or the "objective result" of which) it turns back on. The second category of intellectual acts comprises comparative acts. By these the intellect considers a thing (concept) not in itself and absolutely but in relation to some other thing (concept). This act can be considered either *in actu exercito* (while exercised) or *in actu signato* (reflexively). Apart from this distinction they introduce two further conceptual pairs. One concerns the criterion or the *tertium comparationis*. The *tertium comparationis* between the compared things (concepts) can either be a *real* attribute, i.e., an attribute belonging to the compared things *ex natura rei*, or a *rational* attribute. Last but not least, one has to distinguish between two levels of mental operation. Both collative acts can be further divided into the *simple* comparative act and the *composite* comparative act. The comparison can be either that of the first mental operation, i.e., simple apprehension, or that of the second mental operation, i.e., judgment affirming or denying a predicate of a subject.⁹⁵⁴

The Scotists' conclusion consists of four parts. The universal *in actu* is formed (1) not by the agent but by the potential intellect; (2) not by an absolute but by a collative act; (3) not by a composite but by a simple comparative act; and (4) not by means of a collative act comparing things in a real attribute but in a rational attribute.⁹⁵⁵

1. The first part of the conclusion is evident from what has been said in 4.4.4. The agent intellect cannot be the intellect forming the universal *in actu* since its function is strictly speaking not cognitive. Its operation is limited to abstraction,

954. Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 4, q. 3, § 60 (Venice 1727, 150); see also *Logica*, disp. 3, q. 4, art. 2, §§ 60–61 (Venice 1727, 127).

955. Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 4, q. 3, § 64 (Venice 1727, 151): "Dicendum est universale in actu non fieri per actum intellectus agentis, sed possibilis, non quidem absolutum, sed collativum, non compositum, sed simplicem; & hunc non primi, sed secundi generis."

equivalent to the production of the intelligible species representing the very same object as the one cognized by the exterior senses, i.e., a vague or not yet fully determinate individual. The agent intellect cannot generate the actual universal since its dematerialization does not imply universalization. Its only operation is the spiritualization of the sensible species. It only “transfers” the intentional species from the material order to the order of actual intelligibility without any change in representation. Even if the agent intellect stripped the essence of the individuating principles, still that *universale* could be, at most, the *representatum* of the *universale in repraesentando*. This universal species and the object shining out in that species would be only an intermediary “phase” in the formation of the actual universal, which proceeds by the act of the potential intellect.⁹⁵⁶

2. The second part of the conclusion has already been indicated in the preceding subsections 4.5.1 and 4.5.2. The complete *universale in actu* cannot be acquired by an absolute act. An absolute act produces only the metaphysical universal, which is not proximately predicable. The proximately predicable *universale* cannot be “situated” outside the many but *in* the many. However, this “location” cannot be realized by means of the absolute abstractive act focusing on the nature getting intentionally “isolated” from its inferiors. Only the comparative consideration of the other items, its inferiors, can place the nature in the many or (at least) in relation to them (the formal universal in the first act). This relation of reason cannot come to existence by an absolute act and the following emergence (*per resultantiam*). It would be a categorial mistake to say that the logical universal, being one of the second intentions, arises in the same way as the real relation of similarity in colour of, let us say, two red apples. The relation of reason intrinsic to the second intention differs from real relations. Contrary to real relations, the second intention as a being of reason arises not by the mere positing of the extremes but by means of active comparison and cognition (*per cognitionem*). Only by cognition conceiving that, which is not a real relation, *as if* it were a real relation can a rational relation come to be.⁹⁵⁷

956. See *ibidem*.

957. *Ibidem*, § 65, 151. For the rejection of the establishment of rational relations by mere emergence (*per resultantiam*) from *denominatio extrinseca* see Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 3, q. 2, art. 1, § 21 (Venice 1727, 119). For the addition of the fictive aspect “as if” in the formation of beings of reason see Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 3, q. 2, art. 2, § 30 (Venice 1727, 121). See also the statement about the act producing beings of reason in *Logica*, disp. 3, q. 4, art. 2, § 60 (Venice 1727, 127).

3. The comparative act constituting the logical universal is not a composite comparative act but an act belonging to the first mental operation. The composing and dividing act cannot be the act forming the logical universal since the relation of predication is not the essence of the logical universal but only the (accidental) realization of its *property* (*passio*).⁹⁵⁸ *Esse-in* must be conceived as prior to *dici de* because the former is the cause of the latter. *Esse-in* must be prior because it is the cause of the truth or falsity of the proposition. Only if the universal is in the many can one truly attribute the predicate to the subject.⁹⁵⁹ By saying “one in many” one has to consider the *rational* “in-being”, not the real “in-being”. The immediately preceding *esse-in* must be the rational or objective *esse-in* specified above by the aspect of intentional contraction. It cannot be the real *esse in* since the majority of philosophers agree that the *universale in actu* cannot be defined by means of the real “in-being”.⁹⁶⁰

Accepting *dici de* as a property of the actual universal, one must be cautious not to accept it in the sense of *actual* predication. Only aptitudinal predication is a property of the *universale in actu*. Whereas actual predication is related to the logical universal only as an accident, predicability is connected with this *universale* as a property (*passio*). Similarly, Peter’s actual laughter, contrary to his *risibilitas*, is only an accident of Peter. Contrary to the actual *esse-in* considered as the essence of the logical universal, *dici de* is the property taken only aptitudinally (*aptitudine*). Although *man* actually predicated of Peter is predicated *qua* universal, i.e., the supposition of the term “man” in the predication is the *common* supposition, this supposition is not the “effect” of the actual predication. Rather, in actual predication *man* is restricted to an individual. The common supposition results from aptitudinal predication, by which the nature of *man* is extended to a plurality of individuals.⁹⁶¹

958. Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 4, q. 2, art. 2, § 36 (Venice 1727, 146): “... palam esse ... universale constituitur per *esse in* & *dici de* est passio.” For the same opinion in Suárez see *DM* VI, s. 8, n. 2 (Vivès, vol. 25: 232). For Poinset see Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, Log. p. 2, q. 3, art. 5 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 336).

959. Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 4, q. 2, art. 2, § 37 (Venice 1727, 146–147): “... *esse in*, est causa *dici de*, sicut enim quia hoc est in illo realiter, ideo enunciamus hoc de illo realiter, sic quia hoc est in illo per rationem, ideo enunciamus hoc de illo per intellectum.”

960. Ibidem, § 38, 147: “... loquitur de universali logici, ac proinde de *esse in* rationis ... apud omnes est in concessio universale logicum per *esse in* reale non constitui.”

961. Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 4, q. 2, art. 3, § 50 (Venice 1727, 149): “... *dici de* multis sit passio universalis, tantum ut dicit aptitudinem, non actum ... actum ipsum praedicandi accidere universali, quod etiam manifesta ratione convincitur, quando homo v.g. de uno solo praedicatur dicendo *Petrus est homo*, sane praedicatur adhuc ut universale, quia non supponit suppositione

4. The universale *in actu* is constituted by a collative act based on a comparison according to a rational attribute. This comparison substantially differs from the one made according to a real attribute. *Prima facie* it seems that Suárez and Poinset share this part of the conclusion. For them as well the abstracted nature actively referred to the inferiors is not one existing extramentally in singulars but the nature already “liberated” from the individual differences, whereby it receives the new properties of “being objectively one” or “being proximately non-repugnant to being in the many”. In this case first sight is partly misleading, though. The Scotists’ doctrine of the formation of the logical universal, in comparison with Suárez/Poinset, exhibits after all more signs of “internalism” or “mentalism”. In order to warrant this conclusion I have to now address the issue of Mastri’s/Belluto’s theory concerning the nature and formation of the second intention.⁹⁶²

Without delving into the progressive elimination of all rival opinions (starting with the least probable⁹⁶³), I outline the Scotists’ teaching in the backdrop of their settlement with Suárez’s and Poinset’s theory, which they seem to find basically identical. Actually, all the authors agree that second intentions are *second* because they are formed by a simple comparative act grounded in previous cognition or in the first intention. All agree that not all rational relations are actually second intentions. The extension of the notion of *relatio rationis* is broader than that of that

singulari, sed communi, ut supra dicebamus, id autem non habet ex vi actualis istius praedicationis ... sed praecise id habet ex vi praedicationis aptitudinalis, nam esto ex vi actualis ad unum tantum singulare maneat coarctatum, tamen ex vi aptitudinalis manet adhuc illimitatum ad plura, ergo *dici de* est passio universalis, ut dicit aptitudinem non actum ... ex vi aptitudinalis necessario extenditur ad plura.”

962. This doctrine is elaborated in the 1st article *Quid sit secunda intentio, quomodo fiat, & a prima differat* of the 8th question *De praecipua specie entis rationis, quae dicitur secunda intentio* of the 3rd logical disputation *De ente rationis, & secundis intentionibus*. For the classification of first and second (both formal and objective) intentions and analysis of the term “intentio” or “attentio” see Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 3, q. 8, § 111 (Venice 1727, 135).

963. They consider the opinion of the Franciscan confrere Francisco Mayronnis (ca. 1280–1328) to be the least acceptable solution to the issue of the nature of *intentiones secundae*. For Mayronnis, regarded by the Scotists as a representative of extreme realism, second intentions are *aptitudines* to communicability to the many belonging to the quiddities of the extramental things independently of the human intellect. A species is nothing but the aptitude of the *extra-mental* nature to be communicated to a plurality of individuals of the same species. Mastri/Belluto decline this opinion as confusing the foundations of second intentions with the second intentions themselves and consequently the distinction between the first and the second intentions. See Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 3, q. 8, art. 1, § 112 (Venice 1727, 135). As the second least probable they reject the nominalist teaching (ascribed to Jacob Zabarella /1533–1589/) identifying first and second intentions with the *terms* of first and second intentions. See *ibidem*, § 113, 135.

of *intentio secunda*. Actually there are rational relations resulting from cognition that do not supervene upon the “being known” conceived as their *ratio fundandi*. The relation of being on the left from column or the relation of the Creator God to creatures can be taken as examples. Although the relation to creation in God is a rational relation because as such it arises *per cognitionem*, it is not grounded in God *qua* known but in the *real* omnipotence of the *real* God independently of the human intellect.⁹⁶⁴

When coming to the opinion of Poinsoot and Suárez, the Scotists start with a positive appraisal of their theory saying that it “multum habeat probabilitatis, & propius aliis accedat ad veritatem.”⁹⁶⁵ How do they expose their doctrine? They say that the second intentions are based on previous cognition or on the object *qua* understood. However, not only “being predicate” or “being subject” but also “being thought” of a thing can become the object of the second formal intentions and thus produce the second objective intentions. By this second intention this property “being thought” is cognized reflexively. By this reflexive act, equivalent to a comparative act, the rational relations proper to the second intentions are produced.⁹⁶⁶ So much is their brief exposition.

No matter how probable their view is, Mastri/Belluto say, it does not exactly “pick out” the formality of the second intention. As stated above, a second intention must express and compare things in terms of their *rational* attribute. However, the solution of Suárez and Poinsoot comes to articulate only the things *ex natura rei* and in their own order (*in suo ordine*). It does *not* express and does *not* compare things in terms of their rational attributes. For the Scotists it remains in the ambit of first intentions which as actually cognized objects originate by an absolute act or even a comparative act based on a real attribute.⁹⁶⁷ The relation of being cognized to the

964. Ibidem, § 115, 136. On Suárez see 2.5.4; on Poinsoot see 3.5.

965. Ibidem, § 118, 136.

966. Ibidem, § 117, 136: “... secundam intentionem esse utique relationem rationis, non tamen omnem, sed illa solum, quae supponit aliquam priorem cognitionem, & intentionem, in qua fundetur, quae proinde non solum in fieri ab intellectu dependet, ut est relatio rationis in Deo, sed etiam in fundari, fundatur enim specialiter in priori cognitione, vel in objecto, prout denominato a priori cognitione atque ita cum concipitur esse cognitum, esse praedicatum, esse subjectum per modum relationis fundatae in objecto prius cognito, dicunt fieri secundas intentiones; ita Suárez ... Jo. de S. Thom. ... sed non solum esse praedicatum, esse subjectum, & c. sed etiam esse cognitum, esse apprehensum, cum reflexe concipiuntur per modum relationis, obiciuntur secundae notioni formali intellectus, ergo proprie erunt secundae intentiones ...”

967. Ibidem, § 121, 137: “... prima intentio est objectum actu cognitum, vel absolute per actum rectum, aut reflexum, vel in ordine ad aliud per actum collativum secundum aliquod attributum conveniens illi ex natura rei ante intellectus negotiationem.” If man and animal are cognized by

cognizing power cannot release it from the ambit of first intentions in the same way as the rational relation to creation in God is not extricated from it. In both one actually articulates what is *a parte rei*, i.e., the real relation of creatures to God and the real relation of the cognitive act to an object.⁹⁶⁸ Mastri/Belluto make clear that the second intention must meet two conditions. First, it must occur not between the cognized object and cognizing intellect but between the abstracted nature and its *inferiora*. Second, its relation cannot be a non-mutual rational relation but only a mutual one.⁹⁶⁹ The secondary notion of universality must be obtained only from the relation of the abstracted nature to Peter and Paul, not from the relation to the knowing intellect. There is a fundamental distinction between the (formal) concept, through which it is conceived that a man is cognized or related to the

an absolute direct act, they are conceived in the way they exist *a parte rei*. Even a collative act, which knows the nature of man as essentially participating in the nature of animal, does not conceive anything that does not belong to them *in suo ordine*.

968. Ibidem, § 118, 136: "... de ratione secundae intentionis est, ut per eam exprimatur res extra suum ordinem, idest quoad attributa rationis, quae ei competunt in secundo statu, in quo non ponitur, nisi ab intellectu negotiante; sed per relationes rationis etiam fundatas in priori cognitione, seu in objecto, quatenus prius cognito saepe exprimuntur res in suo ordine, & secundum quod sunt a parte rei, ergo non omnes huiusmodi relationes sunt secundae intentiones ... quia sicut per relationem creationis in Deo exprimimus, quod est a parte rei, licet sit relatio rationis, nam exprimimus habitudinem realem creaturae ad ipsum, ita per relationem cogniti in objecto ad potentiam cognoscentem exprimimus id, quod est a parte rei, scilicet habitudinem cognitionis ad objectum ... omnes istae notiones non egrediuntur limites conceptus primarii rei, cum explicant rem in suo ordine."

969. Ibidem: "Rursus ideo relationem creationis in Deo diximus non esse secundam intentionem, quia non est rationis in utroque extremo, cum in creatura sit realis; secunda vero intentio est relatio rationis mutua in utroque extremo ... relatio rationis pertinens ad extrema ... resultat in extremis per mutuam comparationem in attributo rationis ..." The Scotists's statement about the non-relatedness of the prescinded nature to the *inferiora* in Suárez and Poinset does not seem to me to be entirely justified. Though some of Suárez's formulations seem to indicate that the reflexive act and relation to the knower are the crucial factors determining the production of the logical universal, Suárez (and Poinset as well) points out that the prescinded nature (having the unity of precision) actually must be compared with its *inferiora* (see 2.5.3). A different question, however, is whether those inferiors are conceived by Suárez as thought-objects, or as extramental things. In 2.5.3 and 3.5.2 I quoted the passage from Aquinas, to which both Suárez and Poinset refer, where, within the context of the constitution of the second intention of universality, the Angelic Doctor speaks explicitly about *extramental* inferiors. Just this point seems to be rejected by Mastri/Belluto. On this aspect as a doctrinal *differentia* between Aquinas and Scotus see also Pini 2002, 113.

cognizing intellect, and the concept, by which the nature of man compared to Peter and Paul displays predicability.⁹⁷⁰

Having rectified the opinion of Suárez and Poinso, the Scotists present their own conclusion. The rational relation proper to the second objective intention comes to its own rational existence only by means of the so-called passive comparison, which is materially left (*derelicta*) in the objects compared with respect to a rational attribute.⁹⁷¹ By the term “passive comparison” they want to set the objective intention apart from the formal intention, which is “active comparison”. The term “left” (*derelictus*) is employed as a more suitable term than “caused”.⁹⁷² Strictly speaking, a second objective intention cannot be caused by a formal second intention because the formal intention is a singular real being and the objective intention in itself is not part of any single category. It holds that a singular real being can cause only another singular real being. Therefore a formal intention can only quasi-effectuate or leave an objective being (intention) in a cognized object. However, this being left by the second formal intention in the compared objects is not a second intention in the formal and fabricated sense (*esse rationis fabricatum & formale*) but a being of reason only in the material and foundational sense (*esse rationis materiale & fundamentale*).⁹⁷³ A fully-fledged objective second intention thus can be constituted only by a reflexive act, by which passive comparison is conceived in both objects in the manner of a true mutual relation.⁹⁷⁴

970. Ibidem, § 120, 137: “... magnum discrimen est inter conceptum, quo concipitur homo, v.g. habere esse cognitum, vel comparatum in ordine ad intellectum concipientem, & comparantem, & alium conceptum, quo comparatus cum Petro & Paulo intelligere habere rationem praedicabilis, quia hic ultimus, ex quo nec rem, nec habitudinem realem eius ad aliud exprimit, aut alterius ad ipsam, est conceptus omnino secundarius exprimens hominem, & Petrum, non sicut sunt in suo ordine, sed secundum illud additum ab intellectu ea comparante in attributo rationis.”

971. Ibidem: “... comparatio passiva duorum objectorum in aliquo attributo rationis concepta ab intellectu inter illa ad instar respectu inter illa duo versantis sit secunda intentio...”

972. On the term “passive act” in the meaning of “objective intention” see also the exposition of Constantine Sarnanus’s theory in Hickman 1980, 105–107. The similarity of Mastri’s/Belluto’s conception with that of Sarnanus is striking. It would definitely be worth further research. See ibidem, § 121, 137.

973. For the distinction between material and formal being of reason see Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 3, q. 2, art. 1, § 20 (Venice 1727, 119). See also 4.4.1 of this work.

974. Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 4, q. 3, § 66 (Venice 1727, 151): “... cum dicimus universale accipere esse per actum collativum, id est intelligendum de esse materiali, ac derelicto rationis, quia esse formale non habet, nisi cum intellectus reflectens se supra naturam comparatam in attributo rationis ad inferiora, concipit talem comparisonem in natura ad modum cuiusdam vero relationis ad inferiora terminatam.” See also Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 3, q. 8, art. 1, § 122 (Venice 1727, 137).

Summary of cognitive steps

At the end of the 3rd question of the 4th logical disputation Mastri/Belluto provide the reader with a concise summary of all the cognitive steps on the way to the formal universal. This presentation can be taken as a useful summary of the Scotists' epistemology of the *universale*. They distinguish no less than six phases. (1) The intellect apprehends (vague) individuals and the real agreement or similarity between them. (2) Then the intellect abstracts the nature, which is the *ratio convenientiae* of the individuals. Although this abstraction can proceed on the basis of a unique instance, *in statu isto* it ordinarily happens with the "assistance" of a plurality of individuals. (3) This abstracted nature is then compared to the individuals, from which it has been abstracted, with respect to a *real* attribute. As such it is compared to them as being participated by them in the disjunctive way. What does this and the previous claim mean? The separated human nature is participated by Peter in such a way that in the divided sense (*in sensu diviso*) it could also have been participated by Paul. In itself it is not-repugnant to being instantiated in (by) Paul as well. As we know, in the composite sense (*in sensu composito*), after and with the addition of Petreity, it is contradictory for it to be participated by Paul. From the conjunction of claims (2) and (3) there follow, at least, two important things. First, it shows that Mastri/Belluto in the *Logic* (and probably also in *De anima*, contrary to the *Metaphysics*) make use of the notion of the nature *secundum se*, which is not the proximate metaphysical universal with the unity of precision and conjunctive aptitude to being in the many. If it were the *universale metaphysicum proximum*, then the specific nature could not be compared with the inferiors (individuals) with respect to a real attribute.⁹⁷⁵ Second, though in (2) they use the notion of *abstractio*, I think one ought to consider it rather in the sense of intellectual intuition of the extramental common nature, which is only formally (not really as the metaphysical universal with its unity of precision) distinct from

975. As stated in 4.4.2, the ambivalent usage of the term metaphysical universal makes Mastri's/Belluto's texts in the *Logic* difficult to understand. Once they use the term in the sense of the proximate metaphysical universal as implying a rational attribute (the sense accepted in the *Metaphysics*), i.e., as having the unity of precision and being conjunctively related to the inferiors. At other times they seem to mean the nature as such, which (as the 3rd cognitive step testifies) is *compatible* with the disjunctive indifference. Thus, in order to interpret what they say in this summary, one has to assume that they think of the metaphysical universal in a sense abstracting also from the intentional being in the mind and thus from its unity of precision as well. Accordingly, it may (or must) be also understood as being existent in the things themselves as denoting the real *ratio fundandi* of the real relation of similarity. If one employed the meaning of the *universale metaphysicum* from the *Metaphysics* here, the summary of cognitive steps would become unintelligible. I am grateful to Dr. Lukáš Novák for pointing out the ambivalent usage of term *universale metaphysicum* in the *Metaphysics* and the *Logic* to me.

the individual difference. On my tentative interpretation, this claim about the precision of the common nature viewed as the real *tertium comparationis* of similar things can be regarded as supportive evidence that in the *Logic*, contrary to the *Metaphysics*, Mastri/Belluto employ the notion of (intellectual) intuitive *cognitio universalis*.⁹⁷⁶ (4) Further, after having objectively prescinded the nature from individuation, which results in the production of the metaphysical universal with the unity of precision, the intellect compares the nature to the individuals in such a way that it becomes conjunctively communicable to them. The *tertium comparationis* of this collation now is a rational attribute. By this collation the formal universal in the first act is produced. (5) This formal universal in first act is then reduced to the second act. By simple, non-judgmental comparison, different from composite comparison, it relates the nature to the individuals in such a way that they include it. By that the nature as formally one and the same and also numerically divided (by which it differs from the inexistence of the divine nature in the three persons) is conceived *in* all the inferiors in the way of being *per inexistential*. Obviously, this way of being *per inexistential* is nothing *a parte rei* occurring independently of the human intellect. The in-existential community and unity *in creatis* can be thought only as intentional and objective in-existence. (6) In this state of in-existential community and unity the nature acquires universality, which makes it proximately predicable of the many. Only in that mode of being it can (accidentally) exercise its own property of predicability by saying *hoc est hoc*.⁹⁷⁷

4.6 Summary

Starting with the remote metaphysical universal Mastri's/Belluto's exposition of the issue of the common nature may in general be regarded as a *stronger* kind of moderate realism than we have seen in Suárez and Poinset. A more robust foundation of common concepts is above all due to the acceptance of actual less than numerical distinction between the common nature and the individual difference. The non-actual virtual distinction advocated by Suárez/Poinset is insufficient for granting the necessary foundation for univocal categorial universal concepts. Without the precision *ex natura rei* one is not in the position to explain the fundamental phenomena such as the real relation of essential similarity. The Scotists' different ontological commitments are apparent also in their co-classification of Suárez and Poinset with the *Nominales*. These stringent

976. This conclusion is in full accord with what has been said in 4.4.4.

977. Mastri/Belluto, *Logica*, disp. 4, q. 3, § 73 (Venice 1727, 152).

demands cohere with their refined sense for pointed doctrinal differentiation between conceptualism and the true (Scotistic) moderate realism. Especially contrary to Suárez and his verbal declaration that there is only nominal distinction between nominalism and moderate realism the Scotists are much stouter in their attitude to conceptualism.

The espousal of the formal distinction between the metaphysical grades is also the reason why they lay strong emphasis on the *common* character of the extramental nature, not present in Suárez/Poinsot. The community of the nature, different from universality, is not reducible to the primitive resemblance of the numerically different formal unities. The nature has formal unity, a *true* and *positive* property, which grounds the real relations of essential similarity. While for Poinsot the nature displays only quidditative marks and in Suárez formal unity is only conceptually distinct from the individual difference, according to Mastri/Belluto it possesses also predicates *per se secundo modo* such as the unity and community accompanied by the formal distinction between the common nature and the individual difference.

In fact, the Scotists' statement that the formal unity of the common nature is formally distinct from the haecceity can – on an uncharitable interpretation – be jeopardized by coming too close to ultrarealism endorsing actual universality of the common nature in the thing. This doctrinal approximation is also one of the reasons why the Scotists devote a whole *quaestio* in the metaphysical disputation on the common nature to the distinction between two kinds of community of the extramental nature, the community *per indifferentiam* and the community *per inexistentialiam*. The former is most aptly labeled by them as the “disjunctive” community. By that the Scotists want to say that at the very logical moment when the human nature is contracted by Petreity or to Peter, it from itself could also have been determined by *Pauleity*. From itself it could also have been a metaphysical part of Paul, even though it was (by divine decree) contracted by Petreity or to Peter. However, when contracted by Petreity, i.e., taken *qua* existent in Peter in the composite sense, it can no more be a part of Paul. Importantly, Mastri/Belluto indicate that this disjunctive formal unity and community of the human nature is an ontological theory conceding the physical multiplication of the human nature in Paul and Peter. By contrast, the community *per inexistentialiam* is often designated as the “conjunctive” or “contrary” community. Due to this community “liberated” from the individual difference the nature can simultaneously exist as formally one and the same both in Peter and Paul. The denial of physical multiplication, as Mastri/Belluto claim, would mean nothing less than the introduction of the mystery which occurs in the case of the inexistence of the numerically one and the same divine essence in the three persons into the conditions of created natures. By this contrast of two kinds of community/unity the Scotists also show how important the

contrastive function of the Trinitarian dogma in the issue of mundane universals is for them. By rejecting the interpretation of the commonality of the extramental common nature by means of the community *per inexistential* they also show how implausible the ultrarealist conception admitting quasi-Platonic entities or actual universals in the thing is.

Apart from the remote metaphysical universal the Scotists also detect the proximate metaphysical universal acquired by the precise act of the potential intellect. Not differently from Suárez and Poinset, this kind of *universale* constitutes the proximate foundation of the logical universal conceived as the formal and complete universal. “Chronologically” this objective precision of the universal nature is not the first cognitive act elicited by the intellect. The objective precise operation comes only after the singular cognition of a vague individual of the lowest kind. In a doctrinal swing to Suárez, Mastri/Belluto explicitly affirm that the universalizing act of the potential intellect comes only after singular cognition. In accord with Suárez and contrary to Poinset, they say that universal cognition does not require a prior universal species abstracted by the agent intellect since it can well be attained by means of the proper singular species of a vague individual. Despite the striking similarity with Suárez they seem, however, to be less optimistic about the character of this primordial singular cognition. It is not the haecceity of the material singular what is touched by the sensory power and by the intellect. The motivating *ratio* by which the material singular is known is only the common nature. Singularity is conceived not as that, by which (*quo*) the senses perceive and the intellect apprehends, but only as the necessary condition.

Contrary to Suárez and Poinset, they also make explicit use of the other type of intellectual cognition – intellectual intuition. As a distinctive kind of cognition it has a significant role in their presentation of singular and universal knowledge. Even though they are quite skeptical about the occurrence of intuitive knowledge in the human cognition *in statu isto*, they take the very possibility of the precision of the common nature by means of intellectual intuition seriously. Even in *De anima* and in the earlier *Logica* they employ this kind of cognition when speaking about the cognition of a common nature *qua* a real attribute grounding the real essential similarity of individuals. It is not inappropriate to say that this theory of the intellectual intuition of the extramental common nature or the nature *secundum se* found *in re* is in fact endorsed also by Suárez in his exposition of the intellectual *praecisio* of the nature, which later grounds the comparison of Peter and Paul with respect to the real attribute of “being human”.

Although all the authors affirm that the proximate metaphysical universal with universal unity or the unity of precision is a being of reason, whereby they all reject Fonseca’s theory of the real potential unity posited prior to the descent to singulars, this evaluation conceals doctrinal discrepancies due to the different ontological

import of the extrinsic denomination of the universalizing abstractive act. On the one hand, by virtue of the emphasis on the realistic components inherent in the extrinsic denomination supplemented by the vital “adhesive” character of the cognitive act Mastri/Belluto incline to the “realist” interpretation of *denominatio extrinseca*, which in Suárez leads even to the conclusion that from a certain point of view universal unity can be regarded as a kind of real unity. On the other hand, however, the Scotists’ stringent distinction between objective and physical (formal) being (underpinned by Mastri’s/Belluto’s theory of the mental word and intellection) shows that the objective precision immediately transfers a real object to the state of intentional and known being, which are part of the intentional life lived by the intellect. In analogy to Poinset who makes extensive use of this notion of objective or intentional being especially in his critique of the Jesuit’s psychologism, the Scotists conceive this objective being, in line with their definition of being of reason, as the fundamental or potential being of reason.

In compliance with Suárez/Poinset the Scotists conceive the proximate metaphysical universal as the immediate foundation of the formal logical universal. Comparatively to this *fundamentum*, the logical universal adds the relatedness to the *inferiora*, which is (differently from the theories of Poinset and Suárez) supplemented by the intentional *inherence* of the universal nature in them. Contrary to Suárez’s oscillation in the issue of the proper nature of the *universale logicum*, due especially to his ambivalence in the question of the reflexive and comparative acts, Mastri/Belluto deny that the metaphysical universal with its unity of precision is somehow equivalent to the ultimate universal proximately predicable of its inferiors. The metaphysical universal cannot be taken as the formal universal since it is not proximately predicable. It is related to them only as a contractible and subjectable part and not as a predicable whole. The idiosyncratic unity of the logical universal cannot be approximated to the metaphysical universal by claiming that the formal universal is half the metaphysical and half the logical universal. As such it constitutes a type of (rational) unity *sui generis* different from both the formal unity of a common nature and the unity of precision of the metaphysical universal.

As indicated, the essence of the logical universal does not consist, as Suárez/Poinset think, in aptitudinal being in its inferiors but in actual “being in”. Only the intentional inherence of the universal nature in the inferiors conceived as thought-objects is what makes the “quiddity” of the logical universal. Only as intentionally inherent in inferiors can it be predicated (the property of the *universale logicum*) in the manner of “this is this”. In this aspect the logical universal is similar to the unity and community *per inexistentialiam*, assigned by ultrarealist Scotists to the common natures *in re*. The “only” difference is that this community cannot be real but intentional. In the replies to Suárez’s objections claiming that universal unity should primarily be due to the potential whole they accentuate the aspect

of the actual logical whole containing the (actual) quidditative marks. As when analysing extramental community, so in delimiting the character of the *universale logicum* they often recur to the topos of the Trinity. In this context the conditions concerning the relation of the divine essence and its instantiation in the three supposits are not used in a “contrastive” function in the sense that the community of the extramental nature is different from that of the divine essence, but in an “illustrative” role. The intentional community *per inexistentialiam* of the nature is in some nontrivial aspects similar to that of the divine essence.

Just as Suárez and Poincot, Mastri/Belluto endorse the comparative act as the act by which the logical universal is conceived. They also agree that it is an operation belonging not to the second mental operation but to the first mental operation. Despite the similarities, though, Mastri/Belluto advocate a different conception of second intentions, of which the intention of universality is an instance. They observe that the second intention of universality cannot be conceived as a non-mutual relation in the sense that the abstracted nature would be related only to the conceiving intellect and, if to the inferiors, only to the *extramental* individuals. It must be viewed as a mutual rational relation, in which the *inferiora* are conceived as thought-objects, a conclusion not proposed by Suárez/Poincot.

Concluding comparison and evaluation

It is often claimed that by mid 17th century the traditional medieval issue of universals had entirely vanished from philosophical discourse. By this time the classical problematic had begun to be co-treated marginally within expositions devoted to other issues such as the theory of knowledge, creation, necessity/possibility, etc. This shift is said to be connected with the definitive collapse of moderate realism as such. Moderate realism, a product of ancient and medieval interpretation of Aristotle, could not and did not survive the radical change in the philosophical paradigm once the theories of hylemorphism and intentional species were rejected as obsolete philosophical achievements and replaced by mechanicism and mechanical explanation of cognition. The anti-Aristotelian climate, widespread in early modern philosophy, makes once for all impossible all “extractionist” theories of universals, i.e., doctrines based on the abstraction of universals from the extramental particulars. The elimination of substantial forms, the crucial extramental vehicles of commonality, left no other alternative how to think a foundation of universality in the thing as such not yet particular, which could aspire to become the potential universal in the thing. The thoroughly singular extramental things⁹⁷⁸ did not allow any consideration of foundational universality typical of moderate realism. Particularity and universality (commonality) started to be thought of as two incompatible items, which could not co-exist in a thing. The theory of the *universale in essendo* inchoatively inherent in the things became an outdated piece of knowledge, to be superseded by more viable alternatives such as conceptualism (or even ultranominalism employing arbitrary linguistic signs⁹⁷⁹) and Platonism popular in early modern rationalism.⁹⁸⁰

One of the main goals of this book was to show that, as far as the first half of the 17th century is concerned, this picture is one-sided. Suárez is not, as it is often asserted, one of the last scholastics and the end of the 16th century is not the “swan song” of Second Scholasticism followed by the advent of the “non-dogmatic” philosophers such as Descartes, Locke, Malebranche, Berkeley and others. Quite

978. This common ontological point of departure is often (and partly misleadingly) justified by Suárez’s theory of individuation by means of the whole entity (*entitas tota*).

979. Cf., e.g. Thomas Hobbes’s theory of universals. Concerning his theory see Hull 2006.

980. For this opinion see Bolton 1998.

the reverse is true. Suárez can be rightfully regarded as one of the first scholastics of the enormously influential Second Scholastic movement inaugurating an admirable flourishing of developed versions of scholasticism in the 17th century. Suárez's impact, whether negative or positive, was extensively documented by the plethora of the doctrinal aspects of universals found in the doctrines of Poinsoot and Mastri/Belluto. The above realized analyses enabled us to see that collaterally to the tradition of expanding nominalism and Platonism of the early modern canonical philosophy there still existed the scholastic mainstream of moderate realism, which proved to be a real alternative to the blossoming early modern philosophy. In this "parallel world", in which nevertheless especially Suárez and Mastri/Belluto were in principle open to the challenge presented by the scholastic and humanist nominalism (affecting the early modern classical nominalism),⁹⁸¹ the highly systematic and detailed treatment of the complex issue of universals arrived at a level of conceptual and argumentative precision that had absolutely no analogue in the history of philosophy, including the scholasticism of the 14th century which stands close to the scholastic discussion of the 17th century. The detailed and painstakingly extensive elaboration of the issue (assuredly discouraging for modern philosophers in general, perhaps with the exception of Leibniz), was not an end in itself. The scholastic expositions not only throw valuable light on the often ambiguous teachings of medieval *auctoritates* and give us the key to the elaboration of the doctrinal typology of the various kinds of moderate realism; the scholastics professing moderate realism also provide us with important indications regarding the "generic" delimitation vis-à-vis "non-moderately realistic" theories.

The generic unity of the kinds of moderate realism represented in this book by the theories of Suárez, Poinsoot and Mastri/Belluto was based on the fundamental axiom of the compatibility of universality and singularity, or primary and secondary substance, tension between which was apparent already within Aristotle's *corpus*. All of them, with different accents, espouse the traditional premise making this compatibility possible, i.e., the Aristotelian teaching of the *universale in essendo* conceived as the *universale in re*. This doctrine reached the postmedieval scholastics in the form to which it had developed especially in the medieval scholasticism of the 13th century. In the High Middle Ages its shape had been substantially

981. See Tweedale 1999b. By that I do not want to rule out that one may interpret some of early modern classics, for instance, Descartes, in accordance with Aristotelian-scholastic realism. For instance, in Pessin 2008 we may read: "What he [Descartes; D.H.] does allow is a real distinction between the objective object and the formal object, but in the former we have an essence realized in mind, and in the latter, an essence realized in matter, which is the position that merits the label 'realism' – perhaps 'Aristotelian-scholastic realism' ..." URL: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartes-ideas/> (Chapter 4: "Cartesian Ontology, and Ideas").

influenced by Avicenna's theory of the indifference of the essence in itself distinct from both universality and singularity and by Boethius's doctrine of abstraction productive of the universal cognition of a thing which as such formally is not universal in itself. By the crucial distinction between the nature and the "mode" of the nature (its universality) all the authors came to reject both the Platonic theory of universals separated from the sensible things and the ultrarealist tenet considering actual universality as occurring in the singulars themselves.

The doctrinal agreement of the examined authors was far from exhausted by the common critique of both versions of extreme realism operating with ready-made universals *extra* the human intellect. The advocacy of the Aristotelian concept of science based on the notions of essence and its necessary properties prevents the authors also from embracing theories seeing the entire universality only in conventional and arbitrary signs. True to Aristotelian semiotics based on the fundamental triad "thing-concept-word",⁹⁸² they make substantial use of concepts conceived as natural, non-arbitrary signs (caused by the things themselves) *common* to people of different linguistic communities. For all of them concepts are basically of two kinds: formal concepts, which are cognitive acts placed in the category of quality; and objective concepts, which are the things known differing in ontological status according to the character of the conceived thing. By this distinction, originally developed in the 14th century, together with the division into first and second intentions, they parted company not only with the terminism of those emphasising grammar and arbitrary signs (words) in their "ontology" of universals, but also with the psychologism of those (headed by Hurtado de Mendoza) who employ only formal concepts and non-reducible similar singulars in their ontology and logic.

The doctrinal differentiation of the representatives of moderate realism from the "psychologists" admitting only formal concepts taken as confusive acts conceived by them as constituting the adequate object of logic, was one of the partial aims of the present study as well. It was fulfilled above all by the comparison of the theories of Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza and Suárez. Even though there are some features in Suárez's doctrine which make it a precursor of Hurtado's concept, I set his theory – presented only succinctly in its "ontological core" – against the doctrine of the *Doctor Eximius*. One of the main motives for this confrontation was to show that Suárez's doctrine of universals is to be regarded first of all as a kind of moderate realism and not as part of the tradition of Jesuit nominalism developed in the first decades of the 17th century. Suárez not only acknowledges the *praecisio objectiva*, considered to be the "litmus paper" distinguishing moderate

982. Aristoteles, *On Interpretation*, 16a4–9 (Cambridge, Massachusetts/London 1938, 115).

realism from conceptualism,⁹⁸³ the *distinctio virtualis intrinseca*, the extramental existence of the nature denominated as universal and objective concepts viewed as the thing known (and not as *esse fictum*), the Jesuit also advocates the theory of the triple universal, i.e., the *universale physicum*, the *universale metaphysicum* and the *universale logicum* which has become the methodological axis of the comparative disquisition in this book.

All the exponents of moderate realism were shown to be unanimous in their rejection of the extensionalist reinterpretation of the signification of universal terms and the extensionalist redefinition of predication. Common terms do not primarily signify a set of similar individuals but their (common) nature. The nature is the immediate *significatum* of common terms such as *man* or *animal*. As a matter of fact, all the individuals of the same species can be signified by the terms only in virtue of this immediate significate. Predication does not equal to saying individual(s) of an individual. Neither a set of individuals nor an individual can actually be predicated as the superior (predicate) notion of an inferior (subject) one. What is predicated is the *nature* of the thing having a kind of indifference accompanied by the intention of universality produced by the comparative act of the intellect and taken as the condition *sine qua non* of each predicative act.

Irrespective of the common demarcation against theories not subsumable under the header “moderate realism”, by far the largest portion of the analyses was dedicated to the mutual and crossing confrontation of the doctrines pertaining to moderate realism espoused by the key representatives of Jesuit philosophy, Thomism and Scotism of the end of the 16th and the first half of the 17th century. The doctrinal (dis)similarities proved to be so complex that no two (or three, if one takes into account the author couple Matri/Belluto) of the selected authors could be classified as a representative of an identical scholastic “-ism”. Despite similarities in certain issues, if one takes the problematic of universals in its complexity one is justified to say that the three doctrines represent three typologically different versions of moderate realism.

More precisely, leaving aside the familiar divergence between Thomism and Scotism certified by the host of literature devoted to the comparison of Scotus and Aquinas, one cannot say that Suárez’s theory of universals, as it is often maintained, is a historical moment in the development of Thomism or Scotism.⁹⁸⁴ In order to obtain more detailed knowledge of “Suárez’s Thomism” and “Suárez’s Scotism”

983. It would be historically inadequate to define nominalism simply as a theory rejecting the existence of abstract entities or as a doctrine asserting that what exists is thoroughly individual. For such too coarse (and unhelpful) definition of nominalism in connection with Suárez’s nominalism see Secada 2012, 66, note 24.

984. All the more if one takes into account the doctrinal plurality within the schools themselves.

one needs differentiated and detailed comparisons, based on close textual analysis, with the theories of representatives of the two schools who are well-versed in the Jesuit's teaching and tend to be true to the philosophy of the "founding Fathers", in other terms, who aim to practice philosophy *ad mentem Divi Thomae* and *ad mentem Scoti*. Both conditions were in principle met by the theories of Poinsoot and Mastri/Belluto.

1. *Universale physicum*

The presence of both Scotistic and Thomistic features in Suárez's ontology of universals was already apparent in his introductory statements in *DM VI*, in his declaration that formal unity is a *true* unity belonging to the essence or nature of the thing itself and is not *ex natura rei* distinct from individual unity. The second claim results in the conclusion that formal unity and its community are two different things. These two assertions make entirely clear that, on the one hand, Suárez is guided by Scotistic resources, i.e., by the theory that formal unity is to be regarded as a kind of transcendental unity and, accordingly, dealt with in the block of three disputations (*DM V–VII*) devoted to kinds of transcendental unity, treated by the Jesuit *ex professo* in *DM IV*. On the other hand, the second contention shows that Suárez is not willing to accept all the concomitant paraphernalia of the Scotistic *scientia transcendens*.⁹⁸⁵

Even though in virtue of his denial of the formal distinction and the "physicalization" of all the Scotistic formalities Suárez rejected community as a necessary property of the extramental nature, he still makes obvious that formal unity as a *true* unity pertains to the nature not as isolated from being in singulars but right in them. On the other hand, by virtue of the dismissal of the nature's community the Jesuit is more inclined to circumscribe the nature present in the thing solely by means of the quidditative or essential predicates *per se primo modo* concerning the pure conceptual content. This step throws him back into the arms of Thomists. In Suárez's uncharitable reduction of the formal distinction to the fully-fledged real distinction of two *res* or *res* and *modus* there crops up not only a certain proximity to the school of the Angelic Doctor but mainly the influence of nominalism. Not surprisingly, such construal led him to interpret the community of the common nature as a kind of literal or physical community. Just this "reifying" exegesis of the formal distinction and the community of the *natura communis*, as the history of the rejection of the formal distinction confirms, is not difficult to reject. One may surmise that Suárez's *en bloc* denial of the formal distinction prevented him from considering what can be regarded as a more sophisticated (modal) alternative of the commonality of the extramental nature delivered by Mastri/Belluto, i.e.,

985. Concerning this conclusion in the context of his transcendental theory see Heider 2011d, 73–86 and 167–178. Cf. also Darge 2004.

the community *per indifferentiam*. Translated to the Scotists' "vocabulary", Suárez recognized either the community *per inexistentialiam* construed as a physical or literal community across singulars (in Mastri/Belluto worth nothing but a quick rejection) or the essential resemblance of the multiple formal unities.

Even though Suárez's adoption of the second option drew him back to the realm of Poinso's theory, the Scotistic undercurrent of his teaching manifests itself in his conclusion regarding the distribution of the property of the aptitude to being in the many. Denying the reified understanding of this property seen in analogy with the indifference of prime matter to substantial form different from the one currently informing it, Suárez (in contrast to Poinso) retained the *remote* foundation of the aptitude in the thing itself. This assertion, accentuated also by Mastri/Belluto, shows that Suárez's Scotistic point of departure, manifest in his assumption of a true formal unity in the thing, was far from silenced once for all by the Jesuit's rejection of the formal distinction. The Scotistic undercurrent is also evidence that Suárez's doctrine of universals, setting aside Poinso's hylemorphic foundation, can be assessed at the first glance as a kind of moderate realism evidently different from that of the Dominican denying both negative community and the aptitude to being in the many as properties belonging to the nature in the thing itself. Historiographically speaking, the fact that Mastri/Belluto explicitly note this Scotistic remote foundation *in re* in Suárez's exposition can be rated as a sign of their detailed and congenial knowledge of the Jesuit's philosophical system.

The anti-Thomistic thorn of Suárez's explication was equally underlined by his rebuttal of the extramental foundation at the level of the hylemorphic principles cohering with the issue of the relationship between subsistence and nature. Physically speaking, the hylemorphic principles, conceived by Suárez and Mastri/Belluto as incomplete substances or beings, are already thoroughly singular. They cannot be (physically) individuated by a really different principle. There can be no not-yet-particular principle or entity "waiting" to be individuated. Suárez (as well as the Scotists) conceived the substantial form not as the vehicle of universality but above all as an individual partial essence and being. *A fortiori* the same holds for the whole singular essence composed of matter and substantial form. Contrary to Poinso, on the physical level Suárez and Mastri/Belluto endorsed theories of singular essences.⁹⁸⁶ Though Suárez, not differently from Poinso, took subsistence as a substantial mode of the nature, this mode *follows* existence. This metaphysical priority blocked the possibility to conceive the hylemorphic constituents as principles basically different from the actual being. Seen from the viewpoint of hylemorphism, although Suárez and Mastri/Belluto inhibited the (remote) foundational

986. On Scotus's identification of individuals and singular essences see also King 2005, 118.

role of the hylemorphic principles in the formation of common concepts,⁹⁸⁷ they still (differently) retained the assumption of the potential *universale* in the thing. This different foundation, making evident the different character of their moderate realism, is the reason why Poinso's version of moderate realism may be called "hylemorphic moderate realism" and Suárez's and Mastri's/Belluto's version "non-hylemorphic moderate realism". This doctrinal complexity is also the reason why moderate realism as such cannot be rejected, as Martha Bolton seems wrongly to suggest,⁹⁸⁸ only because one rejects the (common) substantial forms.

2. *Universale metaphysicum*

In spite of the fact that the agreement between Suárez's ontology of universals and that of Mastri/Belluto was overlaid by the replacement of the formal distinction by the virtual distinction connected with an emphasis on the active role of the intellect implying for the Jesuit also the doctrinal unavailability of the theory of the community *per indifferentiam*, the broad problematic of cognitive psychology revolving around the issues of singular and universal cognition betrays a major doctrinal coincidence of the Jesuit's theory with that of the Scotists, rather than with Poinso. If the principle of individuation is not matter signated by quantity and if the hylemorphic (remote) foundation is replaced by the metaphysical foundation, which is the (common) nature formally (Mastri/Belluto) or conceptually (Suárez) distinct from the individual difference, the dematerialization of the agent intellect could not result in its desingularization. Considering the theory of abstraction, however, it was not Suárez who was primarily influenced by Scotism. On the contrary, Mastri/Belluto were inspired by the Jesuit. Scotus himself, as contemporary research has shown, does not reject the universalizing function of the agent intellect. However, for both Baroque Scotists, following especially Scotus's *De anima*, the function of the agent intellect was restricted to the spiritualization of the sensible species. The transfer from real existence to the level of intentional existence was not accompanied by a modification in representation but only in entity. The abstracted intelligible species was not a universal species representing a universal nature but a singular species standing for a material singular justifying thus the primordial formation of the *proper* concept of a singular. Though the Scotists repeat that a material singular is cognized by the common nature (which is the *ratio agendi* by which the cognitive power attains it), the first known is a *material singular* (the *ratio agentis*) of the lowest species. This doctrine, with a difference in detail, is shared by Suárez. For Suárez and Mastri/Belluto universal representation and cognition are realized only by the potential intellect, which is within the

987. Admittedly, in the above-mentioned sense they can be regarded as "moderns".

988. Bolton 1998, 182.

very same singular species capable of separating that by which the singulars of the same species agree from the aspect(s) in which they differ.

The important agreement reigning between Suárez and the Scotists, predictably at the expense of a divergence from Poinset, is also due to the Jesuit's different interpretation of the intentionality of cognitive acts and concepts. The intentionality of concepts and cognitive acts (a broad issue which I have touched only from the viewpoint of intellectual cognition), i.e., their ability to be *about* extramental things, is not explained by formal identity, i.e., by the identity of a form indwelling in the things and then immaterially received in the intellect in the manner of an intentional species, as it is in Poinset. The cognitive union of an intelligible species and the intellect does not result in a unity tighter than the substantial unity of matter and substantial form. It is only constitutive of what Suárez calls the accidental union of the intellect and quality-like species. In Suárez and Mastri/Belluto cognition in general is seen not as a purely receptive operation by which a cognitive act is immaterially assimilated with the form of the known object. Intentionality is not reducible to formal identity and to the extramental forms becoming immaterial. It is seen primarily as a primitive fact by which the extramental things turn into intentional objects in cognitive potency.

If one of the most typical "regulative ideas" of Suárez's procedure in the context of the physical universal is the reduction of the *distinctio formalis* to its virtual "edition", in questions related to the epistemology of universals one can observe how the Jesuit repeatedly eliminates Poinset's "real distinctions". Suárez not only rejects the real distinction between the cognitive act and the mental word, the real distinction between the entitative and the representational aspect of an intentional species, but he also denies the real distinction between the agent/potential intellects. In *Disputationes metaphysicae* Suárez denies the Scotistic formal distinction by means of prior reification of the extremes. In *De anima* he employs similar methodology in order to discredit the opinions of his Thomistic opponents (especially of Cajetan). The elimination of real distinctions is made possible by the reification of their extremes. The extremes, in consistence with Suárez's reification of the hylemorphic principles, cease to be *principles* and become (incomplete) *beings*.

Although Suárez and Mastri/Belluto do not share a theory of intellectual intuition, I believe that the Scotists' theory comprises an important aspect utilized by Suárez. I have claimed that, comparatively to Poinset and Mastri/Belluto, Suárez accentuates the "realistic" components in the cognitive device called the extrinsic denomination. We have seen that the theory of the ontological import of the *denominatio extrinseca* is significant for his evaluation of the first objective intention. The Jesuit leaves no doubt that that on the non-reflexive level the direct precise act results immediately neither in the production of a being of reason, nor in the formation of an object in the specific intentional, diminished or *secundum quid*

being (by the way, Suárez does not normally make much use of these terms). What is prescinded is the extramental nature, which is a *real* (actual) attribute of the essentially similar things. Only reflexively can one obtain the compound of the nature and universality or the nature's unity of precision of the *universale metaphysicum* existing only "intellectually". Tentatively speaking, this separation of the really existent nature, a result of *abstractive* precision in Suárez (sic!), is remarkably similar to the intellectual *intuition* of the extramental nature described in Mastri's/Belluto's *Logica*, which detects a real attribute according to which the singulars are in agreement. Evidently, from the doctrinal perspective of Mastri/Belluto the employment of such abstraction would be impossible since for Suárez the common nature is not common *ex natura rei* but only conceptually. For them merely conceptually distinct extremes cannot be cognized intuitively. In order to be known in that way they have to be *ex natura rei* distinct.

On my reading, this Suárez's quasi-intuitive cognition of the extramental nature can be taken as an important compensatory tool in his theory of universals. The "realist" conception of the *denominatio extrinseca* leads him to a "non-mentalist" interpretation of the objective concept. The direct attainment of the different aspects of the extramental thing itself (if existent) without the immediate and necessary constitution of the specific ("middle") diminished being proper to cognized things can be regarded as a systemic compensation for the – comparatively to Scotism – relatively insufficient ontological foundation of actual universality. The direct focus on the different aspects of a thing then seems to atone for or supplement Suárez's general theory of conceptual distinction, which vis-à-vis the assumptions of Scotism seems unsatisfactory. This compensation leads me to the following evaluation of Suárez's doctrine of universals: It is not sufficient to label Suárez's conception of universals as an instance of "non-hylemorphic moderate realism". In order to differentiate it from Mastri's/Belluto's variety the term "epistemologically-driven" needs to be added. Suárez's theory thus can be designated as "non-hylemorphic, epistemologically-driven moderate realism" typologically different from Mastri's/Belluto's "non-hylemorphic ontologically-driven moderate realism".

The agreement between Suárez and Mastri/Belluto is not absolute, though. Indeed, there are many subissues in which Suárez sides with Poinso's Thomism rather than with Mastri's/Belluto's Scotism. Contrary to the Scotists, Suárez and Poinso both admit the *ex post* formation of the intelligible species by the potential intellect. The Scotists, on the other hand, say that the intelligible species can be formed only by the agent intellect. They do not think that this *ex post* formation of the universal species is necessary for the later recollection of universals. Next, even though Suárez and Mastri/Belluto espouse the primacy of singular cognition, they differ in their assessment of the *quality* of the proper concept of a material singular. While for Suárez the first conceived concept is not only the proper but also a *distinct*

notion, the Scotists seem to be more skeptical. They admit that the first knowledge *in statu isto* is abstractive knowledge of a material individual, nevertheless seen through the prism of a common nature. They rule out that the intellect *in statu isto* can come to know singulars in their haecceities. On the contrary, Suárez's merely conceptual distinction between the common nature and the individual difference gives the impression that the viewpoint, under which a material singular is known, is not the common nature but rather individuality. That is also why Suárez qualifies the primordial concept of a material singular as a *distinct* concept.

The ontological parsimony reveals itself also in the difference concerning the issue of the relation of the act productive of the mental word (*dicere*) and intellection (*intelligere*). While for Suárez (and for Poinset as well) they are one and the same quality in which two aspects can be distinguished, namely the act-like *ratio productionis* and the quality-like *ratio qualitatis productae*, Mastri/Belluto emphasize the real distinction between *dicere* and *intelligere*. While intellection is only an absolute quality not formative of any other physical entity and only intentionally tends to the known object, diction is an act by which the mental word, i.e., the cognitive act, is produced. Even though Suárez and Mastri/Belluto, contrary to Poinset, agree that the mental word amounts to the cognitive act, they differ in how they explain its origin. I am certain that this distinction is also one of the reasons why there is more clear-cut contrast between the physical (entitative) and the intentional realm connected with objective being in Mastri/Belluto than can be observed in Suárez. On my hypothesis, the permeation of those two levels, coupled with the above-mentioned compensation of the virtual distinction, is also the reason why Suárez accentuates the realist elements in the first objective intentions.

3. *Universale logicum*

All the authors agree that the logical universal as the second intention of universality is a rational relation established on the rational foundation of the (proximate) metaphysical universal. All employ four kinds of intentions – the formal and the objective ones with their first and second variants. The formal intentions as cognitive acts are always real accidents, the first objective intentions always signify an extramental aspect of a thing (nature), the second objective intentions are understood by all of them as relations of reason. Though Suárez is sometimes ambiguous in the issue of the reflexive and the comparative act, he repeatedly makes clear that it is the comparative act of the potential intellect, different from the direct and precise act, what generates the logical universal. This collative knowledge is not enacted on the level of the second mental operation (judgment) but already on the level of the first mental operation (simple apprehension). The agreement further extends to identical assessment of predicability. Predicability does not constitute the “essence” but rather a property (*passio*) of the *universale logicum*.

While all the authors admit the features “being in” and “being said of” in both the actual and the aptitudinal profile, Suárez (jointly with Poinsoot) parts company with Mastri/Belluto in the issue of the “essence” of the *universale logicum*. He does not accept the Scotists’ conclusion that the essence of the logical universal consists in the *actual* inherence of the superior item in the inferior one. For him the logical universal is defined by means of the potential whole, which as undivided is divisible to the (subjective) parts of the same species. Moreover, this divisible whole exhibiting universal unity is related to the extramentally existent individuals and not, as Mastri/Belluto claim, to the *inferiora* conceived as thought-objects. The Scotists’ insistence on the actual “being in” as the essential feature of the logical universal is supplemented by the employment of a simile occurring neither in Suárez nor in Poinsoot. Mastri’s/Belluto’s theory of the unity of the logical universal is motivated by the theological model of the Trinity. This dogma is fundamental not only in its “contrastive” function as a kind of the extramental unity *per inexistentialiam*, but also in the “illustrative” function as inspiring the Scotists’ theory of the intentional unity *per inexistentialiam* of the logical universal. Contrary to Suárez/Poinsoot, the Scotists’ application of the Trinitarian mystery of the numerically one divine essence in three suppositis in the discussion of the logical universal points to the fact that for them not only is philosophy (especially metaphysics) important for revealed theology, but revealed theology can be also employed in the solutions to philosophical issues.

While by virtue of their refusal to accept the actual “being in” as the essential feature of the logical universal Suárez and Poinsoot are to be regarded as defending a theory opposed to Mastri/Belluto, their theories cannot be viewed as identical, either. In Poinsoot I do not observe the ambiguity I find in Suárez. Poinsoot’s theory seems to me to be clearer than that of the Jesuit. For Poinsoot the new comparative act is absolutely necessary since the logical universal is, above all, a rational relation, which in its concept of “esse ad” is univocal with real relations. Poinsoot’s non-reductive conception of the category of relation requires a new comparative act added to the absolute metaphysical universal. The abstracted nature can be designated as the *universale logicum* only as being positively related to the *inferiora*. The situation in Suárez is different. His concept of relation, based on the conceptual distinction between the foundation and the relation itself, leads to a reductionist theory of real relations viewed fundamentally as the connotation of terms. If one, in addition, takes into account that Suárez denies that relation is univocally predicated of real and rational relations, one gets the impression that the new comparative act forming the logical universal is *de facto* not as necessary as it is in Poinsoot. I believe that just this reasoning stands behind Mastri’s/Belluto’s acute evaluation and critique of Suárez’s theory of the essence of the logical universal. For

them Suárez's theory of the formal and complete universal is a theory advocating the absolute character of the logical universal having the unity of precision. When conceived in this way, its essence cannot consist in the actual "being in" but only in the aptitudinal "being in".

It may finally be said that the ontological theories of Mastri/Belluto and Poinso, the main representatives of Scotism and Thomism in the era known as Second Scholasticism, confirm the deep-seated doctrinal difference between Scotistic and Thomistic metaphysics in general. Both have their own ontological commitments (formal distinction on one side, the doctrine of common forms underpinned by the material principle of individuation on the other), which not everyone would be willing to accept. The difference can be observed also in the epistemologico-logical questions, even deepened by the Scotists' inspiration by Suárez's epistemology. Roughly taken, Suárez's position, which – comparatively to Poinso's and Mastri's/Belluto's theories – displays weaker ontological commitments, given by his refusal of *distinctio formalis*, ultimately compensated by an "activist" epistemology (both features characterizing the *Zeitgeist* of early modern philosophy in general), can be seen as standing "in between". It is neither reducible to the Scotism of Mastri/Belluto nor identical with Poinso's Thomism. Nevertheless, if I were asked which scholastic stream it is closer to I would opt for the Scotism of Mastri/Belluto.

Bio-bibliographies

Francisco Suárez

Francisco Suárez was born in Granada on 5th January 1548.⁹⁸⁹ After an unsuccessful attempt to join the Society of Jesus, partly due to his physical fragility, and partly, ironically, to his intellectual retardation, he was admitted in the order on 16th June 1564. After a sudden change in his intellectual disposition in 1566 he began studying theology and philosophy at the University of Salamanca. In 1570 he finished his studies with the honour of defending his theological thesis in front of the academic and clerical public. One year later he took the religious vows and in 1572 Suárez was ordained a priest in Segovia. There he obtained the first appointment to teach philosophy as a regular professor at the Jesuit College in 1573. Within the next two years he moved to Ávila, back to Segovia, and then in 1576 to Valladolid where he became a theology teacher. In 1580 Suárez was sent by the General Superior of the Jesuits Everard Mercurian (1514–1580) to the *Collegium Romanum* in Rome (today known as the Pontifical Gregorian University). In Rome, with the appointment of a new General Superior Claudius Acquaviva (1543–1615), along with other Jesuit theologians such as Pedro Fonseca and the Cardinal Roberto Bellarmine (1542–1621), Suárez began drafting the *Ratio Studiorum Societatis Jesu*. In 1585 he left for Alcalá where he met his *alter ego* Gabriel Vázquez in 1591. Because of the unfavorable climate due largely to the rivalry between them, Suárez left Alcalá for his *alma mater* in 1593. However, he came to Salamanca not to teach but to write. The sabbatical terms soon brought fruit. In 1597 he published his *Disputationes metaphysicae*. Unfortunately, the favourable conditions for research and writing were interrupted by the intervention of Philip II of Spain (1597) calling Suárez to Coimbra to enhance the level of university education in Portugal. With several intermissions the Jesuit stayed there till 1615. In 1615, at the age of 67, he left university premises for good. In May 1617 he moved to Lisbon, where he died on 25th September of the same year.

⁹⁸⁹. On Suárez's life and work see mainly De Scorraile 1911. For a biography in English see Fichter 1940.

Suárez's production, amounting to 28 volumes in the Vivès edition (1856–1861), comprises chiefly theological writings.⁹⁹⁰ The majority are commentaries on Aquinas's *Summa Theologiae*. Of great philosophical importance is especially the two-volume *De legibus ac Deo legislatore* published in Coimbra (1612). This publication of almost 1200 pages can be regarded as an all-encompassing encyclopedia of Suárez's political and legal philosophy. Outside the commentaries on the *Summa* there stand in the lead *Defensio fidei catholicae adversus anglicanae sectae* published in Coimbra (1613). Two publications are essential for the author's theoretical philosophy. One is the two-volume *Metaphysical disputationes*, rightly regarded as the first systematic and complex elaboration of metaphysics in the history of philosophy in general. From 1597 to 1636 there appeared no less than seventeen editions of the work not only in Catholic lands but also in the Calvinist Geneva. In order to maintain a formal link to Aristotle's *Metaphysics* Suárez attached the part *Index locupletissimus in metaphysicam Aristotelis*. Even though the second most significant work of Suárez's theoretical philosophy *De anima* is presented in the third volume of the Vivès edition in the context of his commentaries on the *Summa*, the treatise is a (liberal) commentary on Aristotle's *De anima*. Albeit Suárez started working on the text already in 1570s in Segovia, the urgency of theological and polemical issues along with teaching duties forced him to defer this work until the last months of his life. Its edition was interrupted by Suárez's death. In 1621 the volume was published by the Portuguese Jesuit Baltasar Álvarez (1561–1630) in Lyons.

João Poinso (Ioannes a S. Thoma)

John Poinso was born on 9th July 1589 in Lisbon of Maria and Peter Poinso.⁹⁹¹ His father came from a noble family with roots in Burgundy (he himself was born in Vienna), his mother Maria Garcêz came from a wealthy Portuguese family and was born in Lisbon. Around 1604 Poinso studied humanities and philosophy at the university in Coimbra. On 11th March 1605 he receives the Bachelor of Arts degree there. Although in the spring of 1606 he was still attending the first-year theological lectures at Coimbra University, in June he had already gone to Belgium (the then "Spanish" Netherlands) to pursue his studies of theology

⁹⁹⁰. For a complete list of the Vivès edition with characteristics of the individual volumes, see Heider 2009, 105–112.

⁹⁹¹. For a detailed presentation of the life and work of Poinso see Deely 1985, 396–397, 421–444. See also Beatus Reiser, "Editoris Praefatio", in: *Cursus philosophicus Thomisticus* (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, vii–xviii). For an analysis of the editions of *Cursus theologicus* see Forlivesi 1994.

at the University of Leuven. In Leuven he attended the theological courses of Tomás de Torres, a Dominican friar from the convent *Nuestra Señora de Atocha* in Madrid. On 12th February 1608 he received the degree “baccalaureus biblicus” there and resolved to become a Dominican friar. Coming from Leuven back to Madrid in 1609 he joined a house of the Order in the Convent of Our Lady of Atocha and found time to consider the implications of his decision. On 17th July 1610 Poinsoot professed the eternal vows and chose the religious name “Ioannes a Sancto Thoma”. Regardless of his studies in Coimbra and Leuven, he was still required to undergo almost the entire curriculum of studies for students in the Order comprising three years of philosophy and four years of theology. After completing the studies in 1617 he was appointed to be the “lector artium” and “studentium magister”. In 1620 he was sent to Plasencia (a town in southwestern Spain), where he taught theology at the Dominican priory. In 1625 Poinsoot went to the University of Alcalá, a center of learning in the Iberian Peninsula equal to Salamanca and Coimbra, where he became the Regent of the College of St. Thomas. Poinsoot’s reputation grew rapidly. In 1627 he became a Qualificator both for the Supreme Council of the Spanish Inquisition and the Inquisition in Coimbra. In 1630 he was appointed to hold the Evening chair (*cathedra vespertina*). In 1633 he received the degree “Doctor of Theology”, the highest academic title in Spain. In 1641 he was promoted to the Morning chair (*cathedra matutina*). In 1643 he left Alcalá for Madrid to become the royal confessor of the king Philip IV of Spain. Poinsoot died at Fraga in Spain on 17th June 1644.

Setting aside Poinsoot’s treatises on the issues of spirituality and confessional practice, the Dominican’s output includes two major titles. One is the *Cursus theologicus*, a commentary on the *Summa Theologiae* of Aquinas. The archetypal edition comprises eight volumes (published in Alcalá, Madrid, Lyon /1637–1664/, the last then in Paris /1667/), of which he, however, finished only the first four and half of the fifth (the rest was accomplished by Didacus Ramirez). The last complete edition having no less than ten volumes appears in the Paris (Vivès) series coming out in 1883–86. Though complete, it is regarded as a hasty work based on the flawed Lyon (the second) edition. Therefore in 1931 the French Benedictines (*The Solesmes Congregation*) resolved to start working on a critical edition. Unfortunately, this work remains incomplete, leaving only five volumes, the last of which was published in 1964. The other major work is his *Cursus philosophicus Thomisticus* comprising volumes on logic and natural philosophy. Before its first (5-volume) general edition in 1637–38 in Rome (the second followed one year later in Cologne), the individual volumes were published separately in 1631–35. The best modern and used edition (1930–37) is the Turin edition procured by Beatus Reiser. At present the academic community has a fine reprint made by Georg Olms Verlag at its disposal.

Bartolomeo Mastri da Meldola

Bartolomeo Mastri (“Prince of Scotists”) was born in Meldola (not far from Ravenna) on 17th/18th December 1602.⁹⁹² At the age of fifteen, on 26th November 1617, he was invested in the Franciscan habit and began his year of novitiate with the Friars Minor Conventual at Cesena. After the profession in the Order in 1619 he commenced his studies of philosophy and theology at the University of Bologna. On 28th September 1621 he was awarded the bachelor’s degree there. He then went to Naples to study theology under the renowned professor Giuseppe Napoli. After the first teaching practice in Parma and Bologna (1623–25) he went on to study at the famous College of St. Bonaventure in Rome where he met Bonaventura Belluto, his longtime friend and work fellow.⁹⁹³ In Rome, where Mastri was granted the doctoral laureate and promoted to priesthood in 1628, they determined to elaborate an all-embracing *Cursus ad mentem Scoti*. After teaching in Cesena in 1628–31 they were appointed Regents of Studies in Perugia (1631–38) and Padua (1638–41). In 1641 they went separate ways. While Belluto was called back to Catania (Sicily), Mastri went to Ravenna (1641), where he was obliged to stand as a theologian in the service of the Cardinal Luigi Capone. In Ravenna Mastri completed the philosophy course by writing the last part, the metaphysics. At the same time he entered a polemic with his two principal opponents, Matthaeus Ferchius (1583–1669), a Conventual of Croatian origin, and John Punch (Poncius), an Irish fellow of Luke Wadding. In 1647–50 Mastri was appointed the Minister Provincial of the province of Bologna. With several breaks – one of them was a stay with the Minister General Giacomo Fabretti in Rome, where he met the pope Alexander VII – Mastri spent the rest of his life in his native Meldola where he died in January 1673.

Mastri’s writings can be divided into three categories – philosophical works, theological works and poetry. The philosophical production comprises the crucial *Cursus integer philosophiae ad mentem Scoti* published as a whole posthumously in 1678. The individual *disputationes*, however, were published during Mastri’s life. The first was *Logica parva* (known as *Summulae*) published in 1630, the second *Disputationes in Aristotelis libros physicorum* (Venice 1637), the third *Commentarii in Logicam* (preceded by the *Summulae*, Venice 1639). Then there followed *In De coelo et De metheoris* and *In De generatione et corruptione* (Venice 1640) and *In libros de anima* (Venice 1643) which in fact is the last volume published by both Mastri/Belluto. By himself Mastri (again in Venice) published *Disputationes in XII*

⁹⁹². For by far the most detailed bio-bibliography see Forlivesi 2002b. See also the shorter Crowley 1948.

⁹⁹³. On Belluto’s life and work see below.

Arist. Stag. libros metaphysicorum (first volume in 1646, second in 1647). Alone he wrote polemical treatises against Punch (published first as the appendix to *Disputationes de generatione et corruptione* in the second edition from 1652) and against Ferchius, titled *Scotus, & Scotistae Bellutus, & Mastrius expurgati a querelis Ferchianis*, published in Ferrara in 1650. His theological works were also first published separately and only then republished as a whole under the title *Disputationes theologiae in libros Sententiarum* (Venice 1675). The individual volumes were published in this sequence: *In primum librum Sententiarum* (1655), *In secundum* (1659), *In tertium* (1661) and *In quartum* (1664). The author's last work was his *Theologia Moralis ad mentem DD. Seraphici et Subtilis* published in 1671 in Venice.

Bonaventura Belluto

Bonaventura (by civilian name Jerome) Belluto was born in Catania (Sicily) at the beginning of October 1603.⁹⁹⁴ After studying the humanities he took courses at the Faculty of Law of the local University of Catania. Called to religious life he entered the Order of Friars Minor Conventual at the Convent in Catania. In 1621 he began his novitiate there, accepted the religious name Bonaventura and professed the religious vows a year later. In the first half of 1620s he became the “magister studentium” in Messina. In 1625 he met Mastri at the College of St. Bonaventure. Meeting Mastri, the key event in his professional life, launched the sixteen years of prolific collaboration not only in Rome but also in Cesena, Perugia and Padua where they both taught. With the exception of the two-volume *Metaphysics*, Belluto is the co-author of all the *disputationes* of the famous *Cursus philosophicus ad mentem Scoti*. After coming back to Catania in 1641 (after he did not return to northern Italy any more) Belluto started writing his key theological work called *De incarnatione dominica ad mentem Doctoris subtilis*. This work dealing with Christology and Mariology was published in 1645. In the same year Belluto was appointed to the office of the Minister Provincial of the provinces of Sicily and Malta in Agrigento. Afterwards the Scotist stayed at his home Convent of St. Francis. Absorbed by a number of practical matters he did not have much time to write and edit his other works. Posthumously only one volume *Opuscula et resolutiones morales* (1679) was published. Belluto died on 18th May 1676 in Catania, where he is buried in the church of San Francesco.

⁹⁹⁴ For the most elaborate biography of Belluto see Costa 1976. For a short profile see Costa 2006, 169–171.

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